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THE REPUDIATION OF THE TWENTY-EIGHT-YEAR TRUCE: A STUDY OF ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1399-1404

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THE REPUDIATION OF THE TWENTY-EIGHT-YEAR TRUCE:

A STUDY OF ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

1399-1404

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THE REPUDIATION OF THE TWENTY-EIGHT-YEAR TRUCE: A STUDY OF ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1399-1404

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One view of European history, expressed recently, describes the period from 1300 to approximately 1450 as "the first decisive stage from medieval to modern forms."[1] Rulers of territorial or national states gradually deprived feudal lords, church officials and urban communes of their independent jurisdiction. In France, the most thoroughly feudalized country of Europe, a weak feudal monarchy began to centralize power and authority in the king's person so that by the end of the period it had laid the foundations for absolute rule. In 1450, the French ruler possessed a standing army in place of the old feudal levy, the power to impose a direct tax on persons without any further authorization from the nation, control over the Catholic Church within his realm, and patriotic subjects aware of their national identity. What made such gains possible for the

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[1]Wallace K. Ferguson, Europe in Transition 1300-1520 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), p. 145.

monarchy in France was the long disastrous struggle with England known as the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453). Concessions were obtained for the crown because of the crisis which confronted the kingdom.

The vested interest most threatened by the growth of royal power was the high nobility. Members of this class had been immeasurably strengthened by the crown's practice of bestowing large portions of the royal domain on younger sons. A group of practically autonomous territories within the realm emerged, some of which were headed by rich and powerful magnates of the royal blood, who naturally opposed monarchial centralization. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, France experienced an age of principalities, a development similar to what happened in Italy where a system of territorial states emerged without the rise of national monarchy.[2] If the Hundred Years' War had never been fought or, if it had been shortened considerably, France may very well have disintegrated into a series of autonomous principalities independent in their relations with the king, each other, and foreign powers. French monarchs would not have been able to use the war emergency in bringing to life national sentiment, in establishing their right to levy taxes on their own

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[2]B.A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, Les papes et les ducs de Bretagne, essai sur les rapports du Saint-Siège avec un état (2 vols., Paris: E. de Boccard, 1928), I, pp. xi-xiii and Ibid., "Deux féodaux: Bourgogne et Bretagne (1363-1491), i," Revue bimensuelle des cours et conferences, XXXV (1934), 481-493. See also E. Perroy, "Feudalism or Principalities in Fifteenth-Century France," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XX (1945), 181-185.

authority or in creating an effective royal army which ultimately robbed the feudal nobility of their raison d'être, namely their task of solely supplying the nation's military forces.

How different the history of France would have been in the Later Middle ages had the conflict with England been terminated at an early date! Besides the probable evolution of a system of territorial states within the kingdom, which would have denied any real progress towards royal centralization, France would have been spared the devastation and depopulation of the country at the hands of a ravenous soldiery indifferent to the troubles of either friend or foe. Both French and English armies and the bands of mercenary troops, which roamed the land, brought with them death, disease, famine, and destruction. Edouard Perroy, the leading authority on the protracted Anglo-French struggle, describes the results of their plundering in this way: "some districts were practically deserted; their inhabitants were either dead or had fled...villages once prosperous now counted only a few families. Farming was so diminished that it threatened to be insufficient for feeding the towns. . . ."[3] The ravages of the soldiers everywhere contributed substantially to the serious economic decline which gripped France during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Only a conclusion of hostilities could have lessened the desolation of so many regions in the kingdom.

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[3]E. Perroy, The Hundred Years War, trans. W.B. Wells (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 324.

On various occasions, both sides tried to end the Hundred Years' War through the use of either military force or diplomatic persuasion. Such attempts take on special significance when viewed against the background of the effects the war had on the people, the economy, and the political institutions of France. The two most spectacular efforts to bring the fighting to a close--the treaty of Brétigny-Calais in 1360 and the English invasion of France in 1415--failed because they demanded more concessions from the French than they were willing to accept, once their defeats were forgotten. One of the most statesmenlike bids for a permanent reconciliation between the two kingdoms, on the other hand, came at the end of the fourteenth century from the English king, Richard II, who has been accused of planning the establishment of royal absolutism with the aid of French arms.[4] In 1396, he concluded a truce of record length with France, which should last twenty eight years, and sealed the agreement by marrying Isabelle, the seven-year-old daughter of the French king. The marriage alliance and the long-term truce created a friendly atmosphere in which discussions of the outstanding problems plaguing the two realms could take place without the threat of an immediate revival of hostilities. Before any real progress had been made, however, Richard lost his throne.

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[4]Thomas Frederick Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England; the Wardrobe, the Chamber and the Small Seals (6 vols., Manchester: The University Press, 1920-1935), IV, pp. 1-5. Cf. A.B. Steel, Richard II (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1941), pp. 212-214.

The accession of his cousin, the duke of Lancaster, as Henry IV, in 1399 raised the question of just how long the Anglo-French rapprochment of 1396 would endure.

Surprisingly enough, neither side abjured the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce until 1404. The present work will examine relations between England and France from the deposition of Richard II in 1399 to the repudiation of the truce, determining, on the one hand, why it lasted so long after the Lancastrian revolution and on the other, the major causes which resulted in the final breach between the two countries. No historian yet has analyzed the problem just posed. Because of the absence of any systematic and scholarly study of it, Edouard Perroy, for example, devotes little space to the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce and how it governed relations between England and France during the first years of Henry IV's reign, although he recognizes the importance of the agreement.[5] Indeed, only two scholars have been deeply interested in Anglo-French diplomatic history at the beginning of the fifteenth century. They have been intrigued particularly by the Anglo-French royal marriage of 1396 and the fate of Isabelle after the English revolution.[6] Both studies have

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[5]Perroy, The Hundred Years War, pp. 217-218.

[6]Leon Mirot, "Isabelle de France, reine d'Angleterre, comtesse d'Angoulême, duchesse d'Orléans 1389-1409: épisode des relations entre la France et l'Angleterre pendant la guerre de cent ans," Revue d'histoire diplomatique, XIX (1905), 481-508; Agnes Strickland, Lives of the Queens of England from the Norman Conquest (15 vols., Philadelphia: George Barrie & Sons, 1902-1903) III, 1-42.

been dismissed by leading authorities of the period as incomplete, confusing, and misleading.[7] A reading of these works confirms their opinion, for one is nothing less than a romantic account based almost solely on contemporary chronicles[8] while the other, though relying more on public documents, is an unsystematic treatment containing numerous errors.[9] Since no methodical and learned monograph exists on either the Anglo-French negotiations dealing with Isabelle or the preservation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce after the deposition of Richard II, this study has been undertaken. Its aim is to fill the gap in our knowledge of the diplomatic history of England and France at the outset of the fifteenth century.

Anglo-French relations, at that time, were troubled by the same issues as were at stake when the prolonged conflict between the two countries began. The two most important problems were English possession of the duchy of Aquitaine, the rich wine-producing region of southwestern France, and the English king's claim to the crown of France. From the middle of the thirteenth century, English kings had acknowledged formally that they held Aquitaine as a fief

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[7]E. Perroy, "Franco-English Relations, 1350-1400," History, XXI (1936), 153-154; Richard Vaughan, Philip the Bold: the Formation of the Burgundian State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 183.

[8]Strickland, Lives of the Queens of England, III, 1-42.

[9]Mirot, Revue d'histoire diplomatique, XIX (1905), 481-508.

from the rulers of France. Friction between vassal and overlord, however, had increased significantly by the fourteenth century. French monarchs resented the existence of a vassal who was also a king in his own right. English kings, on the other hand, disliked rendering homage for their duchy because this ceremony was galling to their pride. When the king of France, Philippe VI, tried to bring Aquitaine more directly under royal control through the exercise of his feudal rights, his vassal--Edward III of England--resisted. He objected to monarchial encroachment whereby Philippe declared his French lands confiscate in 1337. Edward replied by laying claim to the French throne, the succession to which he had disputed with Philippe ever since the last member of the Capetian dynasty had died nine years earlier. As the nearest male heir of that ruler, Edward believed that he had been unjustly rejected by the great peers of France as their rightful lord. Thus the Hundred Years' War began as one of the great wars of succession which were to beset Europe for another five centuries.[10]

Although fighting continued intermittently throughout the fourteenth century, neither of the two basic problems confronting England and France was solved. Richard II, who

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[10]For the origins of the Hundred Years' War, see Eugène Déprez, Les préliminaires de la guerre de cent ans: la papauté, la France et l'Angleterre (1328-1342) (Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1902), passim; A. Colville, Les premiers Valois et la guerre de cent ans, 1328-1422, Vol. IV pt. 1 of Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'à la révolution (9 vols., Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1900-1911), pp. 34-47, 54-69.

inherited the English crown from his grandfather, Edward III, in 1377, still entitled himself king of England and France. He still kept the duchy of Aquitaine firmly under English control, refusing to accept French sovereignty over the fief. Yet, as the years passed, Richard's enthusiasm for peace grew. He began to regard the Anglo-French wars as intolerable.[11] Because of his desire for improved relations with France, hope for a permanent reconciliation seemed near in 1393 when a provisional treaty was drawn up. It provided for the separation from the English crown of Aquitaine as an independent duchy forever under the rule of Richard's uncle, the duke of Lancaster and his heirs, who would hold their lordship directly from the king of France. Only violent opposition on the part of the subjects of Aquitaine, who resisted the prospect of an effective ruler living in Bordeaux and alienation from the English crown, prevented the implementation of the proposed agreement in 1394.[12]

When Anglo-French negotiations for peace resumed a year later, the fundamental basis of settlement had shifted from the creation of an independent ducal house in Aquitaine

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[11]May McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399, Vol. V of The Oxford History of England, ed. Sir George Clark (14 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 475.

[12]J.J.N. Palmer, "The Anglo-French Peace Negotiations, 1390-1396," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, XVI (1966), 81-94 and Ibid., "Articles for a Final Peace between England and France, 16 June 1393," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XXXIX (1966), 180-185; Richard H. Jones, The Royal Policy of Richard II: Absolutism in the Later Middle Ages (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968), p. 87.

to a marriage alliance and a long truce. Richard II in July of 1395 dispatched a large diplomatic mission to Paris, instructing the members of it to treat for a marriage between himself and Isabelle, the six-year-old daughter of Charles VI, king of France. In order to encourage progress in the discussions, the ambassadors were given permission to reduce the preposterous money demands which the English had been making since the capture of Jean II, king of France, at the battle of Poitiers in 1356. He had promised to pay a ransom of three million gold crowns, but only a million was ever paid. Instead of demanding the full balance of the ransom, Richard authorized his representatives to settle for half of it in payment of the debt.[13] Still they achieved little. Negotiations at Paris dragged on for several months while ambassadors discussed numerous proposals and counter-proposals. Ultimately on 1 January 1396, the English king issued his representatives new instructions which did not mention the unpaid balance of Jean II's ransom, but rather stressed his request for a truce

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[13]Thomas Rymer, Foedera, conventiones, literae et cujuscunque generis acta publica, inter reges Angliae et alios quosvis imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes, vel communitates..., (3d. ed., 10 vols., the Hague: Joannem Neaulme, 1739-1745), III, pt. IV, p. 108-109. Instructions for the English ambassadors, 8 July 1395. Cited hereafter as Rymer, Foedera. The gold crown was worth twenty-two sous six deniers tournois at the end of the fourteenth century. The money of account in both England and France consisted of pounds (livres), each composed of twenty shillings (sous), which in turn were made up of twelve pennies (deniers). The livre tournois was the most common in France, the livre sterling in England. The exchange rate between the two currencies was six livres tournois to one pound during the fourteenth century.

lasting twenty eight years which would be concluded along with the marriage alliance.[14]

Two months later, difficulties impeding the Anglo-French talks at Paris were removed. The ambassadors of both sides signed on 9 March a marriage contract in which the betrothal of Richard II to Isabelle, daughter of the French king, was proclaimed.[15] Charles VI gave his daughter a dowry of eight-hundred-thousand francs of which three-hundred-thousand must be paid at the wedding, the remainder in annual installments of one-hundred-thousand each. The franc, first issued by Jean II was worth twenty sous tournois and contained 3.88 grammes of gold. The dowry was to take the place of the rights which Isabelle and her heirs would have to the French throne and its possessions. It was agreed that upon reaching her majority (twelve years of age), she would renounce all claims on the French crown. The existing rights of her prospective husband, Richard II and his heirs, however, were reserved. The English king still was not prepared to give up his grandfather's claim to the French royal title so that one of the basic differences dividing the two countries required further negotiation. Other provisions of the

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[14] Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, pp. 111-112. Instructions for the English ambassadors, 1 January 1396. See too, The Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II, ed. E. Perroy, Vol. XLVIII of Publications of the Camden Society, Third Series (London: Royal Historical Society, 1933), p. 252 (notes).

[15] Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV. pp. 113-114. Marriage contract between Richard II and Isabelle, 9 March 1396.

marriage agreement dealt with the contingency of a premature death of either Richard II or Isabelle. If the king of England died before the consummation of the marriage, the little queen would be allowed to return home to her father at Paris, set free of any bond and with her personal belongings.[16] If her husband died after the wedding without leaving any children, Isabelle would be given back her dowry less the initial payment of the three-hundred-thousand francs. In case she died first under the same conditions, Richard was obligated to return only half of the dowry to Charles VI. After determing what would happen if the royal couple had children and either of them died, the treaty was sealed and three days later on 12 March a marriage by proxy took place at Paris.[17]

Along with the marriage alliance, Richard II and Charles VI, through their deputies, agreed upon a long truce in place of a permanent peace treaty. It was to last for twenty-eight years beginning on 29 September 1398, the terminal date of a previous truce concluded in 1394. As in other medieval truces, the Anglo-French agreement of 1396

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[16]Richard II and his kinsmen had to promise by letters patent that this article of the marriage treaty would be fullfilled. See The Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard II, pp. 168-169. Letter from Richard II to Charles VI, king of France, 14 May 1396.

[17]Joseph Calmette and Eugène Déprez, La France et l'Angleterre en conflit, Vol. VII, pt. 1 of Histoire du moyen âge, ed. Gustave Glotz (Paris: Les presses universitaires de France, 1937), p. 261.

secured both the kingdoms of England and France against war and absolutely suspended hostilities between them. Richard and Charles promised to preserve the status quo of 9 March 1396. During the truce, neither side was permitted to build new forts or even to repair old ones within seven leagues of an enemy stronghold. Neither side was allowed to acquire a castle, a town, or a fortress of its opponent through force of arms or any other method. Both monarchs prohibited their subjects from taking prisoners, seizing spoils or generally engaging in acts of war in the lands where the truce operated In order to repair breaches of their agreement which they knew would occur despite their injunctions, Richard and Charles appointed conservators of the truce for various regions in France where friction between the adversaries most likely would cause violations and for the high seas and territorial waters of the two kingdoms where acts of piracy were prevalent. The conservators were empowered to judge individual cases involving infringements of the truce, to punish the violators, and to award damages to the injured parties. These included, among others, English and French merchants, who particularly were given permission to trade in all the lands, countries, and lordships of either realm as long as they carried only personal weapons, notified the captains of strong towns of their arrival, and dealt in goods other than war material.[18]

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[18]E. Cosneau, Les grands traités de la guerre de cent ans (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1889), pp. 69-99. The Twenty-

The Twenty-Eight-Year Truce, in other words, pledged unrestricted commercial intercourse between the subjects of Richard II and Charles VI. The fief in France which most welcomed such a guarantee was the county of Flanders a wealthy manufacturing region in the extreme northern part of the kingdom. The prosperity of its textile industry depended upon an uninterrupted supply of English wool, which the Flemings purchased from Calais, a port in northeastern France conquered by Edward III in 1347. The town served as a compulsory staple or market, through which most wool destined for the continent passed. From there, wool cargoes were shipped directly to Bruges, which was connected to the North Sea in the Later Middle Ages by an estuary called the Zwin. The English wool was distributed, in turn, throughout Flanders, especially to the cloth-manufacturing towns of Ghent at the confluence of the Scheldt and Lys rivers and of Ypres located on the Yperlee, some thirty-five miles southwest of Bruges. Keeping the trade route from Calais to Bruges open for the free movement of English wool to the principal centers of the cloth industry in Flanders, therefore, was the major objective of Flemish foreign policy.[19]

Eight-Year Truce, 9 March 1396. On the general nature of medieval truces see, M.H. Keen, Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1965), pp. 206-217.

[19]For Anglo-Flemish economic relations during the fourteenth century, see M.A. Lefevre, "Conditions de l'évolution de la Flandre, région géographico-historique," Bulletin de la société belge d'études géographiques, XXXVI

The Flemings voiced their demands for friendly relations with England, which would assure the safe delivery of wool to their textile-producing towns, in representative assemblies. During the fourteenth century, deputies from Bruges, Ghent, and Ypres designating themselves as leden or members met together to give consent to taxes and to the raising of non-feudal troops. After 1385, delegates from the Brugse Vrije (Franc of Bruges), the rural territory surrounding that great port from Dixmude to Eekloo and Biervliet, attended the meetings of the three towns, thereby creating the vier leden or four members. The vier leden actively participated in the governing of Flanders with their count, who was none other than Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, an uncle of the king of France. Although he disputed many internal matters with the vier leden, Philippe le Hardi agreed with them on foreign policy towards England. Both wanted the conclusion of a separate commercial treaty with that kingdom.[20] Anglo-Flemish negotiations between 1387 and 1390, however, proved futile so that Philippe

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(1967), 23-36; J. Le Patourel, "L'occupation anglaise de Calais au XIVe siècle," Revue du nord, XXXII (1951), 228-241; Henri Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique, Vol. II: Du commencement du XIVe siècle à la mort de Charles le Téméraire (Bruxelles: H. Lamertin, 1908), pp. 100-133, 184-191, 203-215; For the most detailed map of the Zwin in the Later Middle Ages, see A.E. Verhulst, "Middeleeuwse inpolderingen en bedijkingen van het Zwin," Bulletin de la société belge d'études géographiques, XXVIII (1959), 55.

[20]Walter Prevenier, De leden en de staten van Vlaanderen, 1384-1405 (Brussel: Paleis der Academien, 1961), pp. 107, 109, 120, 145-146, 228, 289-296.

le Hardi and the vier leden had to be satisfied with the inclusion of Flanders in the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce as a fief of France.[21]

Another region with close ties to the French crown included in the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce was the kingdom of Scotland.[22] Its firm alliance with France, an established tradition in Western diplomacy, reached back into the thirteenth century. During the Hundred Years' War even closer links had been forged between the two kingdoms.[23] While Edward III sought to draw Flanders into a coalition of the Low Countries against the king of France, Philippe VI supported the Scots in their resistance to English domination. He gave the nine-year-old heir to the Scottish throne asylum in France when Edward displaced him with his own candidate.

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[21]Five Anglo-Flemish conferences took place at Calais during these years, see O. Cartellieri, Geschichte der herzöge von Burgund, 1363-1477, Vol. I: Philipp der Kühne (Leipzig: C. Winter, 1910), pp. 123-124; Handelingen van de leden en van de staten van Vlaanderen, 1384-1405: excerpten uit de rekeningen der steden, kasselrijen en vorstelijke ambtenaren, ed. Walter Prevenier (Brussel: Paleis der Academien, 1959), pp. 23-39, nos. 56, 74, 81, 87, 98, 100--cited hereafter as Handelingen; Archives départementales du nord, B519, no. 11895, a memorandum of the Anglo-Flemish conference beginning on 1 April 1389--cited hereafter as A.D.N.; Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of the Close Rolls, Richard II, Vol. IV (1385-1389): 5 May 1389, safe-conduct for Flemish merchants, p. 673--cited hereafter as C.C.R.

[22]Cosneau, Les grands traités de la guerre de cent ans, p. 79. The Twenty-Eight-Year Truce, 9 March 1396.

[23]James Campbell, "England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War in the Fourteenth Century," Europe in the Late Middle Ages, ed. J.R. Hale, J.R.L. Highfield, B. Smalley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), pp. 184-216.

He insisted upon the Scots' inclusion in any general settlement with England. He sent them food, weapons, and other provisions. Although it was feared that Philippe might go beyond the role of supplier by sending an army to Scotland, French intervention there did not threaten England seriously until the reign of Richard II. In 1385, a major French army landed in Scotland, where it joined with Scottish forces in an invasion of northeastern England which ended with Franco-Scottish troops in full retreat before Richard's advancing army. The failure of French expeditionary forces to achieve any positive results in Scotland and of a French armada to sail against England[24] in the following year discouraged Charles VI from pursuing the war. Instead he consented in 1389 to a three-year truce with England, making sure that his allies, the Scots, were included in it. They observed the truce and successive extensions of it, the last one (in 1394) enduring until 29 September 1398.[25] Consequently when English and French diplomats concluded the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce at Paris, the Scots were comprehended in the agreement as allies of the king of France.

With the signing of the long-term truce and the

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[24]Leon Mirot, "Une tentative d'invasion en Angleterre pendant la guerre de cent ans (1385-1386)" Revue des études historiques, LXXXI (1915), 249-287, 417-466.

[25]An Anglo-French truce for three years was concluded on 18 June 1389. It was renewed on 5 May 1392, 28 April 1393, and 27 May 1394. See Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, pp. 39-42, 74-75, 87, 95-98.

marriage alliance, improved relations between England and France gave Charles VI and Richard II the opportunity to solve the basic differences dividing the two countries. They met near Calais in October 1396. Although no progress was made in negotiations for a permanent reconciliation, Charles handed his daughter Isabelle over to Richard, who married her in a magnificent ceremony at Calais on 4 November, thereby ushering in a new era of peace between England and France.[26] Certain problems, however, still plagued the two realms. Richard had not relinquished his grandfather's claim to the French throne nor had he recognized French sovereignty over the duchy of Aquitaine. He faced the additional issue of the English occupation of Calais, which the French wanted dismantled as a fortified town and returned to them. If he became a vassal of the French crown for his fief in southwestern France and recognized Charles as the rightful ruler of the kingdom, Charles had to determine the extent of territory, which would be given up to the English for these concessions. Before these questions were resolved, however, Richard was deposed. The accession of his rival, Henry IV, presaged a revival of hostilities between the two kingdoms. The French now would be satisfied with nothing less than the

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[26]Calmette and Déprez, La France et l'Angleterre en conflit, pp. 260-266 and Paul Meyer, "L'entrevue d'Ardres 1396", Annuaire-bulletin de la société de l'histoire de France, XVIII (1881), 209-224 provide detailed narratives of these events.

complete evacuation of all English possessions in their country.

CHAPTER II

THE CONFIRMATION OF THE TWENTY-EIGHT-YEAR TRUCE

The Twenty-Eight-Year Truce and the Anglo-French royal marriage concluded in 1396 ushered in a new era of friendly relations between England and France. Expectations for a long, peaceful future, however, were shortlived. Richard II embarked upon a policy at home of arbitrary government which culminated in his deposition by Henry, duke of Lancaster, in the autumn of 1399. The accession of the duke of Lancaster as Henry IV soon created renewed French hostility. "Cognut-on bien que toutes alliances et trefves estoient rompuës," maintained one French chronicler, "et qu'on estoit revenu à la guerre."[1] Charles VI, king of France, attempted to detach the subjects of Aquitaine from their allegiance to the new Lancastrian regime, prepared a fleet for the invasion of England and demanded the return of his daughter Isabelle to France. Henry IV, on his side, desired to improve relations with France because of his own tenuous hold on the English throne. After Richard II died in captivity early in 1400,

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[1]Jean Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI. roy de France, et des choses memorables advenuës durant 42. années de son regne, depuis 1380. jusques à 1422, ed. Denys Godefroy (2d ed., Paris: de l'imprimerie royale, 1653), p. 142. Cited hereafter as Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI.

Charles VI abruptly changed his policy towards England. He announced his intention to observe the terms set forth in the Anglo-French truce of 1396. Later in May, Henry IV similarly confirmed the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce, thereby averting an open clash with France.

The Deposition of Richard II

Beginning in 1397, events in England threatened to nullify the diplomatic breakthrough of the previous year. Richard II determined to make one last bid for absolute power, a policy which eventually alienated all but a comparatively small loyal clique. He packed the parliament with his own supporters who, in turn, condemned to death the king's old enemies--Thomas of Woodstock, duke of Gloucester, youngest son of Edward III, Richard III Fitzalan, earl of Arundel, and Thomas de Beauchamp, earl of Warwick. As the three leading Lords Appellant in 1388, they had dominated the Merciless Parliament which convicted the king's principal councillors of treason and had some of them executed. By destroying Richard's court circle, they had left him no choice but to accept a baronially imposed governing council. Although Richard declared himself of age in the following year and ruled in cooperation with barons and parliaments during the next eight years, he never forgave the Lords Appellant. The duke of Gloucester after a forced confession was murdered, Arundel was executed and Warwick banished. Richard exiled the two remaining Lords

Appellant in the fall of 1398.[2]

One of them was Henry of Bolingbroke,[3] eldest son of the aged duke of Lancaster, John of Gaunt. Before leaving England on 13 October,[4] he sent a herald to Charles VI to ask permission to reside at Paris with a few faithful followers. The king of France readily complied with his request. He ordered all of the towns on the route from Calais to the royal capital to open their gates to Bolingbroke and his party as they traveled to Paris. The French royal family welcomed him in the style befitting one of the leading

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[2]Sidney Armitage-Smith, John of Gaunt (reprint; New York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 1964), pp. 390-419; M.V. Clark, "Forfeitures and Treason in 1388," Fourteenth Century Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), 115-145; McKisack, The Fourteenth Century 1307-1399, pp. 454-489; T.F.T. Plucknett, "State Trials under Richard II," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, II (1952), 159-171 and "Impeachment and Attainder," Ibid., Fifth Series, III (1953), 145-158; Steel, Richard II, pp. 141-260; H. Wallon, Richard II: épisode de la rivalité de France et de l'Angleterre (2 vols.; Paris: Librairies de L. Hachette et C^ie, 1864), II, pp. 133-239--cited hereafter as Wallon, Richard II.

[3]Born at Bolingbroke castle, Lincolnshire in 1366, Henry was the eldest surviving son of John of Gaunt, fourth son of Edward III and Blanche, daughter of Henry, first duke of Lancaster. Richard II created him earl of Derby in 1377 and twenty years later, duke of Hereford.

[4]On 3 October, Richard II ordered the captain of Sangatte, a small port immediately west of Calais, to permit Henry to pass through the town when he arrived in France. He further authorized Henry to stay at Sangatte for six weeks and then, one month at Calais. Sire Jean Froissart, Oeuvres de Froissart publiées avec les variantes des divers manuscrits, Vol. XVI: Depuis l'arrestation du duc de Glocester jusqu'à la mort de Richard II, 1397-1400, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Bruxelles: Victor Devaux et C^ie, 1872), p. 309. Cited hereafter as Oeuvres de Froissart.

noblemen of England.[5] Louis, duc d'Orléans, the brother of the king, especially became good friends with the exiled Englishman. He introduced Henry to the important members of the French court and later, on 1 December, gave a great banquet in his honor.[6] Richard II, learning of the very friendly greeting Henry received at Paris, wrote Charles VI an angry letter. He requested the king of France to stop giving such hospitality to English traitors and in the future, to grant them no special favors.[7] Richard's demands fell on deaf ears because the French royal family disapproved of the banishment of Henry.[8]

Indeed, he continued to receive cordial treatment at

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[5]Ibid., pp. 113-114. Froissart relates the greeting Henry received from the French royal family: "Quant les nouvelles vindrent au roy, au duc d'Orléans son frère et à leur oncles, que le conte d'Erby venoit à Paris, si s' efforchèrent tous les seigneurs et firent efforchier leurs gens de euls ordonner et mettre en bon estat et arroy, pour aler et yssir hors de Paris à l'encontre du dit conte. Et furent les chambres de l'ostel de Saint-Pol très-richement parées, et widèrent hors de Paris tous les Seigneurs qui adont y estoient . . . et tout devant estoient le duc de Berry et le duc d'Orléans qui eurent le premier encontre; et puis le duc de Bourgoingne et le duc de Bourbon et messire Charles de Labreth, et, après, tant de nobles prélats, barons et chevalliers que tous les chemins en estoient couvers."

[6]E. Jarry, La vie politique de Louis de France, duc d'Orléans 1371-1407, (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1889), pp. 226-227.

[7]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI, de 1380 à 1422, ed. and trans. M.L. Bellaguet (6 vols.; Paris: l'imprimerie de Crapelet, 1839-1852), II, p. 674. Cited hereafter as Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys.

[8]Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 112.

Paris. Louis, duc d'Orléans, even tried to arrange a marriage between him and Marie, daughter of his uncle Jean, duc de Berri, early in 1399.[9] Henry had been a widower since 1394 when his wife Mary, daughter of Humphrey de Bohun, duke of Hereford and constable of England, died leaving him four sons and two daughters.[10] The French royal family, realizing that he was heir to great estates in England, considered Henry of Bolingbroke to be a good matrimonial prospect. They reasoned that once Henry's sentence of banishment[11] was over, Marie de Berri would make an excellent companion in England for Isabelle, Richard II's young queen. The marriage, too, would draw the two countries closer together in peace and friendship. As soon as reports of the negotiations for a marriage between Henry and Marie de Berri reached Richard II, he commissioned John de Montacute, earl of Salisbury, to inform Charles VI of his opposition to the forthcoming wedding. Richard warned his father-in-law against forming any alliance or marriage with such a traitor as Henry of Bolingbroke and directed the earl of Salisbury to make known his displeasure

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[9]Jarry, La vie politique de Louis de France, duc d'Orléans 1372-1407, pp. 227-228.

[10]They were later the renowned Henry V, king of England, Thomas, duke of Clarence, John, duke of Bedford, regent of France, Humphrey, duke of Goucester, protector of England, Blanche, wife of the count Palatine, and Philippa, wife of Eric, king of Denmark.

[11]At first Henry's banishment was for ten years, but on 18 March 1399, when Richard II confiscated his estates, it was extended for life. McKisack, The Fourteenth Century 1307-1399, pp. 487-490.

over the marriage project especially to Jean, duc de Berri. Later, when Henry attempted to conclude arrangements for the wedding, Charles VI informed him that the marriage must be postponed until he improved relations with his king, Richard II.[12]

Despite Charles VI's refusal to allow his marriage to Marie de Berri, Henry remained close personal friends with both her father and Louis, duc d'Orléans. When Henry became enraged at Richard II for confiscating the vast Lancastrian estates in England[13] after the death of his father, John of Gaunt, early in February of 1399, it was Jean, duc de Berri, who unsuccessfully tried to console him. Each time Henry showed him letters from his partisans in England who begged him to return home, the duc de Berri advised him against any rash action which would dishonor his reputation as a great prince.[14] Jean de Berri's friendship for Henry was more than matched by that of Louis, duc d'Orleans, who concluded a personal alliance with him for mutual assistance against all their enemies on 17 June.[15] Henry, surprisingly, excluded from this

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[12]Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, pp. 141-151.

[13]The Lancastrian lands were confiscated on 18 March 1399. See note 11.

[14]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, II, pp. 676.

[15]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, publiées pour la société de l'histoire de France, ed. L. Douët-d'Arcq (2 vols.; Paris: Jules Renouard, 1863-1864), I, pp. 157-160. Letter of alliance

agreement, among others, the king of England who had revealed his enmity towards him on more than one occasion since his arrival in France. Louis' part in the alliance created the suspicion that he harbored animosity towards England in spite of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. He did not omit Richard II specifically from the agreement as Henry had done. He excepted him only in a general manner as an ally of the king of France. Both did agree, however, that the personal alliance would be valid as along as peace existed between their two countries.

The possibility of anything disturbing the friendly relations between England and France seemed remote in June 1399 but Henry of Bolingbroke soon changed that happy state of affairs. He informed Charles VI of his wish to visit Jean IV, duc de Bretagne, who, several years earlier, had married his father's sister, Mary, a daughter of Edward III. The French king, unaware of Henry's real plans to return home, agreed to the trip. On the journey to Brittany, Henry stopped at Blois, from which he sent a messenger to

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between Henry, duke of Lancaster, and Louis, duc d'Orléans, 17 June 1399. See also Enguerran de Monstrelet, La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet en deux livres avec pièces justificatives 1400-1444, publiée pour la société de l'histoires de France, ed. L. Douët-d'Arcq (2 vols., Paris: Jules Renouard, 1857), I, pp. 49-52--cited hereafter as La chronique d' Enguerran de Monstrelet; Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, II, pp. 700, 702; France, Archives Nationales, Inventaires et documents publiés par ordre de l'empereur: Monuments historiques, ed. Jules Tardif (Paris: J. Claye, Imprimeur-Éditeur, 1866), no. 1772, p. 425. Cited hereafter as Monuments historiques.

the Breton court at Nantes in order to determine if the duke would receive him. Jean IV assured the envoy that Henry would be greeted with a hearty welcome. After his arrival at Nantes, Henry told his host of plans to cross the Channel and take possession of those estates which Richard II had seized illegally from him. Jean IV not only approved the venture, but offered to help him with ships, men-at-arms, and archers, a proposal Henry eagerly accepted.[16] Ironically, the duke paid a high price for assisting Henry of Bolingbroke. He lost possession of the earldom of Richmond, an English fief belonging to the dukes of Brittany since the twelfth century. Once Henry became King of England, he granted the castle and honor of Richmond to a powerful supporter, Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland,[17] despite pleas from Jean IV, who begged to have his former earldom restored to him.[18]

Why Henry was so ungrateful to Jean IV is difficult

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[16]Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, pp. 167-171.

[17]Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1401): 20 October 1399, Grant to Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland, p. 24. Cited hereafter as C.P.R.

[18]Great Britain, Parliament, Rotuli Parliamentorum; ut et petitiones et placita in Parliamento tempore Edwardi R.I. (Edwardi II., Edwardi III., Ricardi II., Henrici IV., V., VI., Edwardi IV., Ricardi III., Henrici VI., 1278-1503), ed. J. Strachey (6 vols., London, 1767-1777) III, p. 427. Cited hereafter as Rotuli Parliamentorum. The duc de Bretagne requested of Parliament that "nulles lettres patentes, n'autre grante, serroit fait a nully del Contee de Richemond, quel est l'eritage du dit Duc." Since "certeinex lettres patentes feurent faitz au Cont de Westmerland du dite Contee de Richmond," he beseeched the king that "si ascunes tieles lettres patentes feurent grantez ou issez, q'ils ferroient repellez."

to understand. The assistance which he rendered Henry proved vitally important for the success of his enterprise. Henry successfully crossed the Channel because of the three war ships with which Jean provided him. He safely reached his supporters in London because of Jean IV's men-at-arms and archers who escorted him.[19] Yet, it was the general dissatisfaction among the English nobility with the rule of of Richard II which ultimately caused the latter's downfall. The seizure of the vast Lancastrian lands turned the greatest magnate of the kingdom, Henry of Bolingbroke--known as the duke of Lancaster after his father's death--into a bitter foe and demonstrated to the rest of the aristocracy that the precious right of inheritance was no longer safe. Richard II, however, was completely oblivious to the growing resentment of the nobility. Late in May, he led an expedition to Ireland to deal with rebellious Irishmen, who had murdered his deputy. During his absence, the duke of Lancaster landed at Ravenspur on the Humber in Yorkshire at the end of June, ostensibly for the purpose of recovering his estates. As he moved south, one great magnate after another flocked to his banners. By the time Richard returned to England in August, the rebels not only demanded the Lancastrian estates but the English crown for Henry. Ultimately, on 19 August, Richard surrendered to Henry at Flint in Wales, promising to abdicate if his life were spared.

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[19] Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, pp. 171-175.

Parliament received his abdication on 30 September 1399, declared him deposed, and recognized the duke of Lancaster as Henry IV, king of England.[20] A month later, the unfortunate Richard was imprisoned at Pontefract castle where he died mysteriously during January of 1400.[21]

French Reaction to the English Revolution

Reports of the English revolution slowly reached France. Brugeois merchants who arrived from England gave confusing accounts of the crisis. More accurate knowledge of the uprising against Richard II came in September when an important member of young queen Isabelle's entourage returned to France. Henry's supporters, after confining Richard II to the Tower of London at the end of August,

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[20]M.V. Clark and V.H. Galbraith, "The Deposition of Richard II," Fourteenth Century Studies, 53-89; E.F. Jacob, The Fifteenth Century 1399-1485, Vol. VI of The Oxford History of England, ed. Sir George Clark (14 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 1-27--cited hereafter as Jacob, The Fifteenth Century 1399-1485; Mc Kisack, The Fourteenth Century 1307-1399, pp. 489-498; Steel, Richard II, pp. 260-300; Wallon, Richard II, II, pp. 239-388; B. Wilkinson, "The Deposition of Richard II and the Accession of Henry IV," English Historical Review, LIV (April, 1939), 215-239; H.G. Wright "Protestation of Richard II in the Tower of September, 1399," Bulletin of John Rylands Library, XXIII (April, 1939), 151-165.

[21]James Hamilton Wylie, History of England under Henry the Fourth (2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green and Co., (1884), I, p. 114, summing up the existing evidence concerning Richard II's death, concludes that "the few known facts of undoubted authenticity all go to prove that Richard really died at Pontefract about the middle of January, 1400; and the fact that he died just at this time seems to point to a death by violence, less attributable to accident than design."

compelled Françoise Paynel,[22] the governess of Isabelle, to leave the queen's household and depart for home. After landing at Boulogne, she traveled directly to Paris, where her description of the tragic events taking place in England so shocked Charles VI that he suffered a severe and violent attack of madness.[23] Since 1392, Charles had experienced recurring bouts of insanity which forced his uncles--Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, Jean, duc de Berri, and Jean, duc de Bourbon--and his brother, Louis, duc d'Orléans, to exercise royal authority in his name.[24] Early in October, Louis, duc d'Orleans, accompanied Charles VI on a journey from Paris to Rouen in order for the royal family to be

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[22]Françoise Paynel was the wife of Guillaume de Courcy, a knight attached to the court of Charles VI. Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 347.

[23]Ibid., pp. 189-190, 211-212; Isabelle also wrote to her father during the revolution, but he was not given her letters because of his mental condition: "Regina tamen venerabilis, faciens quod tenebatur, litteras ad dilectissimum patrem regem Francie destinavit; quas tamen non recepit, quia tunc graviter infirmabatur. Sed et ne dolor amplius ingravesceret, quociens de statu regis Anglie inquirebat, perpetratam prodicionem celabant, et quantum familiares sui poterant, memoriam ipsius ab hoc proposito avertebant." Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, II, pp. 720, 722.

[24]For a thorough examination of Charles VI's madness, see Gaston Jacques Dodu, Les Valois: histoire d'une maison royale, 1328-1589 (Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1934), pp. 74-103, a study dealing with the personalities of French kings rather than a history of their reigns. Charles VI succeeded to the French throne on his father's death in 1380. His uncles ruled until 1388 when Charles announced that he would conduct the affairs of the kingdom himself, a policy which he maintained to 1392.

informed more rapidly of the fate of Isabelle and her husband.[25] The presence at Rouen of the three uncles of Charles VI and his brother revealed the gravity of the crisis. On 22 October, they ordered captains of fortresses near English possessions in France not to leave their posts, and required them to compel inhabitants of their districts to maintain a constant vigil against the enemy as they had done before the conclusion of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. The royal dukes intended the mandate to be enforced in all the French territory south of the Loire, the coastal regions of Normandy and Picardy, in the marches of the Empire and all towns of the kingdom which were located at river crossings.[26]

After taking these defensive measures to safeguard the realm against possible English incursions, the French royal family faced another major crisis. Jean IV, duc de

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[25]Charles VI arrived at Rouen on the same day (10 October 1399) as Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne. That town remained the temporary headquarters of the French government until December. See E. Petit, Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi et Jean sans Peur, ducs de Bourgogne (1363-1416), d'après les comptes de dépenses de leur hôtel (Paris: de l'imprimerie de Crapelet, 1888), p. 291--cited hereafter as Petit, Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi; Jarry, La vie politique de Louis de France, duc d'Orléans 1371-1407, p. 232; Marcel Thibault, Isabeau de Bavière reine de France: La jeunesse, 1370-1405 (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1903), pp. 333-334.

[26]France, Ordinances, Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race, recueillies par ordre chronologique, Vol. VIII: Les ordonnances de Charles VI, données depuis le commencement de l'année 1395 jusqu'à la fin de l'année 1403, ed. M.r Secousse (Paris: de l'imprimerie royal, 1750), pp. 356-357. Instructions of Charles VI "à la relacion du Grant Conseil....", 22 October 1399. Cited hereafter as Ordonnances des rois de France.

Bretagne, died at Nantes on 1 November, leaving the duchy to Jean V, a twelve-year-old boy.[27] The French council, believing the young heir might be susceptible to English overtures, directed the duc d'Orléans to confer at the border of Brittany with the barons and magistrates of the principal towns of the duchy on the problem of Jean V's minority. He should determine "comment ils se vouldroient maintenir de leur hoir, et leur requerroit que on luy délivrast, si le amenroit en l'ostel de France."[28] When Louis delivered this demand to the estates of Brittany deliberating at Pontorson, they rejected it. Rather than turn Jean V over to Louis, duc d'Orléans, to be raised at the French court, the nobles, clergy, and burgesses of Brittany preferred to educate him in their own country until he reached his majority, when they promised to bring him before the king to swear an oath of homage for the duchy. To make sure that they kept their word, Louis required the most important members of the Breton nobility to pledge their lands as a guarantee that, once Jean V came of age, he would become a loyal vassal of Charles VI.

While Louis undertook the task of assuring Breton loyalty to France, his uncles in the king's name dispatched an embassy to England. They commissioned Pierre Fresnel,

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[27]Arthur le Moyne de la Borderie and Barthélemy Pocquet, Histoire de Bretagne (6 vols.; Rennes: J. Plihon et L. Hommay, 1906), IV, p. 139.

[28]Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 230.

bishop of Meaux, Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, and several other eminent persons to find out what had happened to Isabelle during the revolution and "quid tot emergentibus novitatibus Anglici facere intendebant."[29] The royal dukes obviously planned to send an impressive delegation to England because on 31 October Henry IV granted the French ambassadors a safe-conduct for "jusques au noumbre de cent parsonnes...."[30] When they arrived in England, several lords of the English court escorted them as far as London and expressed to them their gratitude for the kind treatment which Henry IV had received during his exile in France. Henry himself was no less gracious. The French emissaries dined at sumptuous banquets for four successive days, saw the king's private chambers, and viewed his most precious treasures. Yet, they accomplished very little as far as their mission was concerned.

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[29]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, II, p. 730. Pierre Fresnel was an experienced diplomat. Before becoming bishop of Meaux in 1390, he had traveled to both England and Scotland in 1388 as an ambassador for the king of France. In that year he also represented Charles VI in discussions with deputies of the king of Aragon. Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, on the other hand, had acted as captain of Crotoy from 1386 for Charles VI. His career as an ambassador for the king of France began with this mission. See P. Anselme, Histoire genealogique et chronologique de la maison royale de France, des pairs; grands officiers de la couronne et de la maison du roy, et des anciens barons du royaume; avec les qualitez, l'origine, le progres et les armes de leur familles: ensemble les statuts et le catalogue des chevaliers, commandeurs, et officiers de l'ordre du S. Esprit (3d. ed., 9 vols., Paris: par la compagnie des libraires associez., 1733), II, p. 415; VIII, p. 63. Cited hereafter as Anselme Histoire genealogique.

[30]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 166. Safe-conduct for the French ambassadors, 31 October 1399.

Henry merely promised that his own representatives soon would be traveling to France in order to thrash out differences between himself and Charles VI.[31]

Several major problems which had prevented a complete understanding between Charles VI and Richard II still remained to plague Anglo-French relations. After his coronation, Henry IV perpetuated the most obvious issue between the two kingdoms by refusing to withdraw Edward III's claim to the French throne. He entitled himself king of England and France[32] and referred to Charles VI as "nostre treschier Cousin de France."[33] That Henry IV aimed at pursuing the policies of his predecessors towards France became even clearer in how he dealt with Calais and the duchy of Aquitaine. Permanent reconciliation between the two realms could only be achieved if the English gave up their French possessions. Henry intended no such drastic departure from previous English policy. As early as August of 1399, he installed his own officials at Calais. Peter Courtenay was named captain of Calais while two other English knights, Nicholas Usk and William Caston were appointed respectively treasurer and controller of finances. Henry confirmed these

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[31]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, II, pp. 730, 732 claims that French ambassadors were in England on 1 November.

[32]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, 167. Letter of Henry IV to the king of Portugal, 8 November 1399.

[33]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 166. Safe-conduct for the French Ambassadors, 31 October 1399.

nominations after his accession to the throne and made others for the less important posts of Calais.[34] He revealed the same desire to retain English possessions in France in considering the status of Aquitaine in relation to the English crown. On 23 October his eldest son, the future Henry V, was made duke of Aquitaine,[35] an honor declared to be the special privilege of the duke of Lancaster and independent of the kingship of England.[36]

Impact of the English Revolution in Aquitaine

How the subjects of Aquitaine or Gascony as it was also known in the fifteenth century reacted to their new ruler created an unexpected crisis. When the Gascons learned of the imprisonment of their lord, Richard II, and the coronation of Henry, duke of Lancaster, as king of England (October 13), they seriously considered transferring their allegiance to Charles VI. The burgesses of Bordeaux, Dax, and Bayonne closed the gates of their towns and refused to allow anyone,

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[34]J.L. Kirby, "Calais sous les Anglais, 1399-1413," Revue du Nord, XXXVII (1955), 19-20.

[35]Rotuli Parliamentorum, III, p. 427. The question was raised in Parliament "si Henry l'eisne fitz du roy, Prince de Gales, Duc de Cornewaill, et Cont de Cestre, serroit nomez Duc d'Aquitaigne...a quel demande toutz les ditz seignrs espirituel et temporelx feurent assentuz; et le roy mesmes s'agrea ̄n, et voet l'assent...." See also Great Britain, Public Record Office, Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendix A, ed. Charles Purton Cooper (London, 1869), pp. 65-66 for letters of Henry IV proclaiming the creation of his eldest son as Prince of Wales (15 October 1399).

[36]Wylie, History of England under Henry IV, p. 66.

including knights and squires, from entering or leaving the premises. The inhabitants of Bordeaux particularly lamented the plight of Richard II because he had been born in that town and always treated its representatives with special favor when they presented petitions to him in England. Froissart expressed their sorrow over Richard II's misfortune by attributing the following speech to them:

> Ha! a! Richart, très-gentil roy, par Dieu, vous estes le plus preud'homme de tout vostre roiaulme. Ce dommage et encombrier vous ont brassé les Londriens, ne oncques ne vous porrent amer, et encoires mains depuis que vous vous aliastes par mariage au roy de France que en devant. Ce meschief est si grant que nous ne le povons, ne devons souffrir. Ha! a! Richart, ils vous ont tenu pour roy vinght-et-deux ans, et puis vous ont dégradé et condempné à mort; car, puisque vous estes en prison et que ils ont couronné Henry de Lancastre, ils vous traitteront à mort.[37]

Their grief soon turned to disaffection. The senechal of Bordeaux, an English knight, believed that the burgesses in his town along with those of Bayonne and Dax were on the verge of requesting the French to intervene on their behalf in Gascony. He decided to inform Henry IV of the dangerous

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[37]Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 214. Works dealing with the English domination of the duchy of Aquitaine say little about the early years of the reign of Henry IV (1399-1403). See Robert Boutruche, La crise d'une société: seigneurs et paysans du Bordelais pendant la Guerre de Cent ans (Publications de la faculté des lettres de l'université de Strasbourg, fasicule 110; Paris: Société d' édition, les belles lettres, 1947), p. 219--cited hereafter as Boutruche, La crise d'une société; Eleanor C. Lodge, Gascony under English Rule (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1926), p. 111; Yves Renouard Bordeaux sous les rois d'Angleterre, Vol. III of Histoire de Bordeaux, ed. Ch. Higounet (8 vols.; Bordeaux: la Fédération historique du sud-ouest, 1965), p. 413.

unrest in the duchy and sent to England a messenger who arrived at London before 19 November[38] while Parliament was still in session. The king consulted with members of Parliament on the alarming reports from Bordeaux. They insisted that the burgesses would never renounce their allegiance to Henry IV because, if Charles VI governed them, they would suffer from excessive taxation and because the great lords such as Gaillard de Durefort, sire de Duras, and others whose lands surrounded these three towns would wage war immediately against them if they swore an oath of loyalty to the French king. Although the members of Parliament considered the possibility of revolt in Gascony remote, they nevertheless recommended that the king reinforce the English garrison at Bordeaux.

Henry IV followed their advice in December and took other measures to bring Gascony safely under his control. He directed a relief force prepared in Cornwall to sail as soon as possible for Bordeaux. It numbered two hundred men-at-arms and four hundred archers, but could not embark for Gascony at Christmas because of high winds and a rough sea.[39]

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[38]When the envoy arrived in London, "y estoit le roy Henry, et avoit parlement aux Londriens...." Since Henry's first Parliament adjourned on 19 November, the messenger from Bordeaux came to London before that date. Ibid., XVI, p. 214.

[39]For the preceding paragraph and these sentences, Ibid., XVI, pp. 214-216. Froissart believed that Thomas Percy, earl of Worcester, had been place in charge of the forces going to Bordeaux. Percy, however, was sent to France on a diplomatic mission on 29 November. Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 170.

At the same time, Henry filled the most important post of the duchy. He chose on 23 December 1399 Gaillard de Durefort, sire de Duras, to be senechal,[40] the official who exercised the political, judicial and military powers of the crown in Aquitaine except when the king authorized a special lieutenant from England to supercede him. The senechal played no part in the administration of finance, which the constable of Bordeaux supervised.[41] For this important position, the king appointed Henry Bowet, who had acted as his attorney in England while he lived in exile at Paris.[42] Bowet was also nominated as one of the judges of the high court of Aquitaine alongside the senechal and ten other members.[43]

The appointment of Gaillard de Durefort, sire de Duras, in particular was a direct reaction to French attempts to foment rebellion against Henry IV in Gascony. Until the nomination of the sire de Duras late in December, the English government acknowledged Archambaud de Grailly, captal[44] de

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[40]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 174. Appointment of the sire de Duras as senechal of Aquitaine, 23 December 1399.

[41]Boutruche, La crise d'une société, pp. 129-133, 174-175, 219-221.

[42]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 173. Appointment of Henry Bowet as constable of Bordeaux, 17 December 1399.

[43]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 174. Appointment of the senechal of Aquitaine, the constable of Bordeaux, and ten other persons to act as judges of the high court, 24 December 1399.

[44]Captal was the Gascon title roughly equivalent to count.

Buch, as the senechal of Aquitaine.[45] His secret discussions with a deputy of Charles VI on the possibility of changing his allegiance to the French king, however, became known to the Lancastrian administration, which replaced him by the sire de Duras. Reports had reached the French court after the coronation of Henry IV that several Gascon lords refused to accept the deposition of Richard II. They did not intend to recognize Henry as their liege lord, and instead hoped "avoir recours au Roy /Charles VI/ comme à leur souverain seigneur, et se mettre en sa garde et protection."[46] To encourage the rumored disaffection among the great magnates of Aquitaine, Charles in a lucid moment[47] decided to send an envoy to them secretly. He chose for this delicate mission

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[45]Leon Flourac Jean Ier comte de Foix, vicomte souverain de Béarn, lieutenant du roi en Languedoc: étude historique sur le sud-ouest de la France pendant le premier tiers du XVe siècle (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1884), p. 9. Cited hereafter as Flourac, Jean Ier comte de Foix.

[46]J. de la Martiniere, "Instructions secrètes données par Charles VI au sire d'Albret pour soulever la Guyenne contre Henri IV (fin d'octobre 1399-janvier 1400), Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes, XXIV (1913), 338.

[47]Charles VI appears to have recovered from his mental illness at least long enough to be responsible for these instructions to Charles d'Albret. They were written by the king's secretary Jean de Sains and Charles personally signed the document. Ibid., 330. According to the Chronique de religieux de Saint-Denys, II, pp. 744, 746, Jean, duc de Berri, Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, and Louis, duc d'Orléans, governed France until near the end of the year (1400 began on 18 April--old style) when Charles VI regained his sanity. It is clear, however, from official French records that Charles VI had come to his senses by 29 January. See Leon Mirot "Isabelle de France, reine d'Angleterre (1389-1409)," Revue d'histoire diplomatique XIX (1905), 487.

his nephew Charles d'Albret, whose father Arnaud-Amanieu had married Marguerite de Bourbon, daughter of Charles V, in 1368. Since he possessed great influence with his many relatives in Gascony who still remained loyal to the English, Charles d'Albret seemed well-suited for the task.[48]

Charles VI issued him detailed instructions for the embassy to Aquitaine during the autumn of 1399.[49] He ordered his nephew to assure those Gascon nobles who wanted to renounce their allegiance to the English crown that their requests to become vassals of the king of France would be favorably received at Paris. If they appealed to the king in person for his protection, Charles would confirm them in all of their titles, honors, and privileges. With respect to the other magnates of Aquitaine who remained uncommitted the king set forth the arguments which Charles d'Albret should use to persuade them to the French side. Richard II had governed England for twenty-two years "en bonne justice et transquilité"[50] until Henry, duke of Lancaster, compelled

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[48]Boutruche, La crise d'une société, pp. 377-395. Charles d'Albret was named constable of France on 6 February 1403.

[49]J. de la Martiniere, Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes, XXIV (1913), 332 claims the document must have been written between November and January 1400. The latter date is placed too late. The replacement of Archambaud de Grailly by Gaillard de Durefort proves that the English government was aware of secret negotiations taking place between the captal de Buch and the French crown. Consequently, the instructions to Charles d'Albret should be dated between November 1399 and 23 December 1399.

[50]Ibid., 339.

him to abdicate "pour paour de mort et par force."[51] Henry therefore dishonorably broke the feudal relationship with Richard II, his liege lord, an act which must offend all noble men of the chivalric order. "ledit duc, non content de ce...," Charles VI charged, "a usurpé de fait pour soy ledit royaume d'Engleterre, et se est fait couronner Roy."[52] Many of Richard II's subjects in England and his loyal vassals in Gascony would never have allowed their lord to be treated in such a detestable manner if they had not been caught unprepared by the duke of Lancaster's devious plot. Consequently Charles VI believed that the lords of Gascony would seize the opportunity to demonstrate their devotion to Richard II.

Among them was Archambaud de Grailly, captal de Buch, whom the king especially hoped to detach from the Lancastrian obedience. The defection of the captal de Buch, senechal of Aquitaine, from the English, would induce other magnates to follow his lead. Charles VI expected to accomplish his objective through Guy VIII, sire de la Rochefoucauld, whose mother was a sister of Archambaud de Grailly.[53] The king sent with his nephew, Charles d'Albret, instructions on how

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[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Calmette and Deprez, La France et l'Angleterre en conflit, p. 274.

Guy VIII should approach his uncle. If the captal de Buch revealed "par effect avoir desplesir en ce que ainsi a esté fait contre ledit Roy d'Angleterre, et non obéir ne donner aide ne faveur audit duc de Lencastre,"[54] Charles VI would grant him anything he wished. Such an offer was tantamount to acceding to the one request which would persuade Archambaud de Grailly to transfer his allegiance to the French king. Since 5 August 1398 when Mathieu de Castelbon, comte de Foix, died without leaving any legitimate heirs, the captal de Buch laid claim to the county of Foix, a small principality on the northern side of Pyrenees, as the husband of Isabelle, sister of the deceased count.[55] Late in 1398, Archambaud de Grailly tried to take possession of the county by force of arms, but Charles VI opposed him. He sent Louis de Sancerre, the constable of France, to Foix with a large army which eventually forced the captal to seek a peaceful arrangement with France. On 10 May 1399 both sides signed an accord which prohibited military operations against each other. Two days later, the captal de Buch turned over his two sons, Jean and Gaston, to Louis de Sancerre as hostages

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[54]J. de la Martiniere, Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes, XXIV (1913), 340. Charles VI also instructed his nephew to inform two loyal French vassals, Bernard VII d'Armagnac and Renaud VI de Pons whose lands bordered on the duchy of Aquitaine that they should use their influence to convert the Gascon lords to the Valois obedience.

[55]Dom Cl. Devic and Dom J. Vaissete, Histoire générale de Languedoc avec notes et les pièces justificatives (15 vols., Toulouse: Edward Privat, 1872-1892), IX, pp. 976-979.

until a decision could be reached on the disposition of the county of Foix. Archambaud de Grailly and his wife Isabelle promised to appear personally before the king in order to do him homage for the county. If Charles VI refused to receive them, the captal agreed in advance to submit his dispute with the French king to the Parlement de Paris and accept its decision. As a guarantee for his observance of these conditions, Louis de Sancerre took the captal's two sons to Paris with him in the middle of August.[56] In November 1399, Archambaud beseeched the king to be allowed to do homage for the county of Foix, but Charles VI rejected his request.[57] With such a valuable bargaining counter as the county of Foix, Charles had every reason to believe that now the captal de Buch would renounce his allegiance to the English.

Although the captal did not formally abandon the English side during the fall of 1399, grave doubts about his loyalty compelled Henry IV to replace him as senechal of Aquitaine on 23 December by the sire de Duras. What prevented the captal from officially changing his allegiance to Charles VI at that time is revealed by the monk of St. Denis, a French chronicler. He suspected that the volte-face of Archambaud de Grailly resulted more from his desire to

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[56]Ibid., X, preuves de l'histoire de Languedoc, no. 769, cols. 1888-1892. Agreement between Louis de Sancerre and Archambaud de Grailly, 10 May 1399. See also Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, II, pp. 650, 652. The monk of St. Denys incorrectly places these events in 1398.

[57]Flourac, Jean Ier comte de Foix, p. 25.

possess the county of Foix and his reaction against the usurpation of Henry IV than any real devotion for the Valois king. He claimed that

> hic, grandevus existens atque famosus, hucusque regem Anglie coluerat, ad quem forsitan deserendum et ambicio comitatus [Fuxi] et excecrabilis intronizacio ejus commoverat. Sed de fidelitate successorum plurimum dubitabatur.[58]

Charles VI must have had similar doubts about Archambaud de Grailly after commissioning his nephew to negotiate with the Gascon lords because he did not permit the captal to perform an act of liege homage for the county of Foix until 10 March 1401 at which time additional precautions were taken by the king. He required Archambaud de Grailly to swear a special oath of loyalty to him. The captal promised to be a good, true, and faithful subject of his liege lord, the king of France.[59]

The success which Charles VI achieved in the case of Archambaud de Grailly did not attend other French efforts to convert the subjects of Gascony to the Valois obedience. When, before the coronation of Henry IV the French first received reports of the imprisonment of Richard II, Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, suggested that the council appoint ambassadors to negotiate with the burgesses of Bordeaux, Dax,

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[58]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, II, p. 778.

[59]Flourac, Jean Ier comte de Foix, pièces justificatives no. VI, pp. 215-218. At the same time, Charles VI pardoned Archambaud de Grailly for his relations with the English. La Gascogne dans les registres du trésor des chartes, ed. Charles Samaron (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1966), p. 212.

and Bayonne.[60] Its members sent Jean, duc de Bourbon, south to the borders of Aquitaine, where he openly tried to encourage the Bordelais to reject English rule, a contrast to the secret character of Charles d'Albret's mission to the Gascon barons. Apparently the councillors considered open discussion with the townsmen to be perfectly respectable whereas attempting to persuade vassals of the English crown to violate their feudal oath tended to damage the prestige of the French king. Whatever their reasons may have been for following such a policy, they empowered the duc de Bourbon to remain at Agen, from which he could send envoys to the major towns in Gascony. His skill at negotiation proved successful, for deputations of burgesses from Bordeaux, Dax, and Bayonne came there to talk with him.[61]

For the moment, it seemed as if the three most important towns in Aquitaine were on the verge of submitting to Charles VI. Jean de Bourbon promised the Gascon deputies that

> se ils vouloient tourner Francois et venir en l'obéissance du roy de France, le roy leur accorderoit tout ce que demander vouldroient et leur séelleroit à tenir à perpétuité, et quant ils venroient en France ou à Paris, de toutes leur requestes tantost expédiés seroient en moult de choses leur promist à tenir, jurer et séeller...[62]

The ambassadors from the towns agreed to return home and

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[60] Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, pp. 212-213.

[61] Ibid., XVI, p. 216.

[62] Ibid.

place the duke's proposals before their fellow citizens for consideration. The burgesses of Bordeaux and Dax ultimately decided to remain loyal to Henry IV because they valued exemption from oppressive French taxes and realized the important role English trade played in keeping their economy prosperous.[63] At Bayonne, however, a revolution occurred. The burgesses renounced their allegiance to the English king, elected prominent citizens to fill the offices of municipal government, and imprisoned those persons holding letters patent from Henry IV. The rebels then seized the citadel, but later, dissension broke out among them. The English quelled the rebellion in the autumn of 1400 and subsequently pardoned most of the insurgents.[64]

Along with the economic reasons which prevented similar revolts in other towns, the Gascons remained loyal to the Lancastrian regime because of new measures Henry IV took to secure the duchy in the spring of 1400. The relief force which he had prepared in December finally landed at

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[63]Indeed, Bordeaux throve on close commercial relations with England. Gascony supplied much of the wine consumed in England and most of it passed through Bordeaux and Bayonne on the way to its destination. In return, Gascons imported such products as cloth, hides, grains and fish from England. See E.M. Carus-Wilson, "The overseas Trade of Bristol in the Fifteenth Century," Medieval Merchant Ventures (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1954), 28-49 and Margery K. James "The Fluctuations of the Anglo-Gascon Wine Trade during the Fourteenth Century," Economic History Review, Second Series IV (1951), 170-196.

[64]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 199. Pardon to those rebelling against the king at Bayonne, 14 March 1401.

Bordeaux in the middle of March with two hundred men-at-arms and four hundred archers. The Bordelais greeted its leaders with mixed emotions. Some rejoiced while those of the French party expressed great disappointment. Under these circumstances, the English knights set up temporary headquarters at the abbey of Saint-Andrew and waited for what they thought to be the proper time to enter into discussions with the burgesses of the town on "l'estat d'Angleterre."[65] After hearing their persuasive arguments, discontent among them disappeared. To augment the meager forces sent to Bordeaux, in March the council meeting in England ordered Henry IV's cousin, the earl of Rutland, son of the duke of York, to embark with an army of several hundred archers and one thousand men-at-arms for Aquitaine, where he would act as the king's lieutenant.[66] While Rutland remained in England performing other services for the crown during May,[67] Henry

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[65]Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 217. Froissart, again, claims that Thomas Percy, earl of Worcester, arrived at Bordeaux in the middle of March, commanding the relief force. English records, however, reveal that his commission to treat with the French in November was renewed on 19 February. Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 178. The monk at St. Denis also relates how the earl of Worcester negotiated with the French ambassadors during March. Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, II, pp. 744, 746.

[66]Great Britain, Privy Council, Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England, ed. Sir Harris Nicolas (7 vols.; London: G. Eyres and A. Spottiswoode, 1834-1837), I, p. 118. Cited hereafter as Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council.

[67]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 183. Order to the earl of Rutland, 10 May 1400. Rutland held at this time a command in the Channel Islands.

IV appointed a special commission--Henry Bowet, the constable of Bordeaux, Hugh le Despenser, an English knight, cardinal Francesco Uguccione, the archbishop of Bordeaux, and John Trailly, mayor of Bordeaux--to govern the duchy until the earl arrived.[68]

The Revolt of the Earls and the Threat of Foreign Invasion

That Henry IV delayed the pacification of Gascony for so long is quite understandable when his domestic problems are considered. Henry could not combat French overtures to Aquitaine with any practical display of force before the spring of 1400 because he faced a serious rebellion at home known as the Revolt of the Earls. Four former councillors of Richard II, who especially hated the new king despite his leniency towards them, plotted to overthrow the Lancastrian regime on 17 December 1399. The included Edward Langley, earl of Rutland, Thomas Holland, earl of Kent, and John Holland, earl of Huntingdon, who had been degraded from the rank of dukes to their present position by Henry IV and John de Montacute, earl of Salisbury, a personal enemy of the king.[69] Huntingdon, Kent, and Salisbury along with

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[68]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 183. Appointment of the commission to govern Aquitaine, 14 May 1400. Henry IV also confirmed the privileges of the merchants of Aquitaine on 8 May. Wallon, Richard II, II, p. 509.

[69]Henry IV considered the earl of Salisbury a personal enemy because of the embassy he accepted from Richard II in 1399 to prevent the marriage between himself and Marie de Berri.

their supporters attempted to seize Henry IV and his sons on 4 January 1400 and restore Richard II to the English throne. Henry, who had been informed of the plot by Rutland, whose role in the whole affair is somewhat obscure, left Windsor less than twelve hours before the traitorous earls arrived. He fled to London, recruiting an army of about twenty thousand men to resist the rebels. Salisbury and Kent retreated west with their dwindling troops to Cirencester, where the townsmen captured and executed them on 7 January. Huntingdon met with a similar fate eight days later at Pleshey Castle, home of Henry IV's mother-in-law.[70]

The Revolt of the Earls, in Henry's opinion, increased the possibility of foreign invasion. On the day following his flight from Windsor, he ordered port officials at London and elsewhere to prevent anyone from leaving England without his express permission.[71] Nine days later when the principal instigators of the revolt had been captured, he modified this mandate to mean that no person of the obedience of France was to leave the country.[72] If reports of the

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[70]For the Revolt of the Earls see Alan Rogers, "Henry IV and the Revolt of the Earls, 1400," History Today, XVIII (April, 1968), 277-283; Wylie, History of England under Henry the Fourth, I, pp. 91-111; Gervase Mathew, The Court of Richard II (London: John Murray, 1968), pp. 167-172; Jacob, The Fifteenth Century 1399-1485, pp. 24-26.

[71]C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 5 January 1400, Order to authorities at several ports, p. 37.

[72]Lettres de rois, reines et autres personnages des cours de France et d'Angleterre depuis Louis VII jusqu'à Henri IV tirées des archives de Londres par Bréquigny, ed.

English rebellion reached the continent, they could precipitate a foreign invasion. Henry feared a French attack with good reason. He was aware of the threatening measures being undertaken by the French King. Charles VI reinforced the fortresses on the frontier of Picardy, closed the river Somme at Abbeville to prevent products such as wheat and oats from being exported to England and forbade all commercial intercourse between English and French merchants. His most menacing act, however, was the preparation of an invasion fleet at Harfleur under the command of Charles d'Albret and Waleran de Luxembourg, comte de St. Pol and Ligny, one of the most powerful vassals of Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne.[73] They intended to sail to the coast of South Wales in order to seize the castles of Pembroke and Tenby, which Richard II had given to his wife Isabelle as

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M. Champollion-Figeac (2 vols., Paris: imprimerie royale, 1839-1847), II, p. 307. Order to port officials at London, 14 January 1400; C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 14 January 1400, Order to authorities at several ports, p. 38.

[73]"Il fut sceu en Angleterre que au commandement du roy de France et de son conseil," Froissart maintains, "les François se pourvéoient moult fort et garnissoient cités, villes et chasteaulx sus les frontières de Picardie et avoient clos la rivière de Somme par telle manière que nulles merchandises, bleds, avoines, ne autre choses qui appartenissent à aler en Angleterre, ne passoient à Abbeville; ne les marchans qui souloient aler en France, ne se osoient veoir en France, ne les marchans françois en Angleterre." Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, pp. 231-232. The monk of St. Denis also notes that "circa finem hujus anni domini duces Biturie, Burgundie, regis Francie patrui, et dux Aurelianis ejus frater, qui una cum consiliariis palatinis regni ardua disponebant, statuerunt fieri ad honorem et utilitatem regni que secuntur." Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, II, p. 744.

stipulated in the terms of the marriage contract of 1396.[74]

Henry IV took several steps to thwart Charles VI's plans. He stationed men at Guernsey and the Channel Islands to report French naval movements[75] and ordered Peter Courtenay, captain of Calais, to keep him informed of French activities on the continent.[76] In order to help Courtenay withstand a possible French siege, Henry commanded officials at London and five other ports on 23 January to load all vessels in their harbors with supplies and send them immediately to Calais.[77] Twenty-two ships, two barges, and two balingers detained at Great Yarmouth because of Henry IV's earlier order which prevented anyone from leaving England were released also to bring provisions to Calais.[78] At the same time, Henry informed Peter Courtenay of the departure of these vessels for Calais, and instructed him to send their

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[74]Chronicque de la traison et mort de Richart deux roy d'Engleterre /1397-1400/, ed. Benjamin Williams (London: English Historical Society, 1846), p. 168--hereafter cited as Chronicque de la traison et mort de Richart and Wylie, History of England under Henry the Fourth, p. 121.

[75]Chronicque de la traison et mort de Richart, p. LXI.

[76]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 175. Writ to Peter Courtenay, captain of Calais, 6 January 1400.

[77]C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 23 January 1400, Order to various port officials, p. 39.

[78]Ibid., 20 January 1400, Order to port officials at Great Yarmouth, p. 27. Unfortunately, sixteen of these ships and one barge were forced to put in to Sandwich because of a severe storm. Port officials then arrested them. Ibid., 29 January 1400, Order to release sixteen ships and one barge arrested at Sandwich, pp. 43-44. The balinger has been described as a small seagoing vessel of the fifteenth century, apparently a sloop.

masters and any others in port as quickly as possible to London or Sandwich, where they would be required to serve in the king's navy.[79]

In case the navy could not repel the anticipated French onslaught, the English government organized its troops at home. It commissioned certain lords in each county of the realm to hold all men liable for military service in constant readiness to engage the enemy if an invasion took place. To face the common danger with the lay barons, Henry IV directed the abbots, bishops and other ecclesiastical lords on 27 January to arm the clergy and prepare them to meet the French, who had gathered a mighty armada to attack the coastal towns of the kingdom.[80] He believed the most likely targets for an attempted landing were the port of Southampton and the town of Pembroke in South Wales. The mayor and the bailiffs of Southampton were ordered to maintain a twenty-four-hour watch against the enemy, to fortify the town as best they could on such short notice, and to compel the burgesses to contribute a

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[79]Ibid., 23 January 1400, Order to the captain and treasurer of Calais, p. 40.

[80]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 176. Order to the archbishops of Canterbury and York and all bishops throughout England, 27 January 1400. Henry IV understood that the French "cum magna classe navium, cum maxima multitudine armatorum et bellatorum supra mare congregati, diversas villas super costeris regni nostri Angliae invadere, ac nos, et regnum nostrum praedictum, necnon populum nostrum per terram et per mare destruere, et ecclesiam Anglicanam subvertere, cum omnibus viribus intendunt et proponunt."

fair share in defending their community.[81] Early in February the king's council made certain the castle of Pembroke along with other castles on the coast in its immediate vicinity were protected from the threatened French invasion.[82]

According to one chronicler, however, Henry IV feared neither the French, the Scots, the Irish, nor the English who had armed against him, but only the Flemings. They would be the first of his enemies to invade England once they learned of the Revolt of the Earls. Consequently, he closed the ports against the introduction of troops from Flanders.[83] Just how much of this report can be accepted is difficult to determine. Contemporary sources do not substantiate it. What little they say about Anglo-Flemish relations during the first year of Henry IV's reign indicates that the real threat from Flanders emanated not from the Flemings, themselves, but from their count, Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne. When he heard of the revolution against Richard II, Philippe claimed that Henry might very well be compelled to renew the war against France. He reasoned that

> Puisque ils /Londoners/ ont prins leur roy et mis en prison, ils le feront morir, car oncques ne l'amèrent. Et pour tant que il ne vouloit

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[81] C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 27 January 1400, Order to mayor and bailiffs of Southampton, p. 58.

[82] Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, p. 108. (Between 2 February and 8 February).

[83] Chronicque de la traison et mort de Richart, p. 83.

> point de guerre, mais toute paix, si couronneront à roy Henry duc de Lancastre, qui se aloyera et très-grandement obligera à eulx, et fera, vueille ou non, ce qu'ils vouldront[84]

Accordingly, he urged that the French send ambassadors south to Aquitaine to persuade the Gascons to become subjects of Charles VI.

There is also evidence to suggest that Philippe le Hardi issued orders forbidding trade between England and Flanders. Violations of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce between 1396 and the accession of Henry IV were not serious enough to disrupt Anglo-Flemish commerce. Brugeois records note in 1396 the "areeste ghedaen bi den Inghelschen te Brest up de coopliede van Vlaendre,"[85] and the "scaden ghedaen de cooplieden van Vlaendre ter zee bi den Inghelschen."[86] Negotiations[87] concerning these breaches of the truce apparently ended in a solution acceptable to the Flemings because Philippe le Hardi, their count, granted special privileges of free ingress and egress and of free commerce to merchants trading in Flanders from Newcastle-on-Tyne in 1397[88] and from Berwick-on-Tweed in 1398.[89] Only the

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[84]Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 212.

[85]Handelingen, no. 341b (18 April 1396), p. 123.

[86]Ibid., no. 351b (5 June 1396), p. 127.

[87]Ibid., nos. 351b, 357b, 358b, 362b, 362d, 363d, 365d, 366b, 370b, 371b (5 June 1396-22 February 1397), pp. 127-135.

[88]Louis Gilliodts van Severen, Cartulaire de l'ancienne estaple de Bruges: Recueil de documents concernant le

deposition of Richard II compelled him to alter his policy. On 23 February 1400, the Brugse Vrije sent two representatives to Ghent to deliberate with other deputies of the vier leden on replies of the duc de Bourgogne to letters which the Flemings had received from authorities at Calais. The English had asked for permission to trade in Flanders, and had requested that Flemish merchants be allowed to travel to Calais as "zij hadden ghedaen en tiden verleden."[90] In other words, the English wanted to resume commercial relations with Flanders as they had done before the accession of Henry IV.

The French Volte-Face: Charles VI Confirms the Truce

Although Philippe's response to this inquiry is not known, it is clear that a dramatic change occurred at about this time in French policy towards England which directly affected Anglo-Flemish commercial relations. On 29 January

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commerce intérieur et maritime, les relations internationales et l'histoire économique de cette ville (4 vols., Bruges: L. de Plancke, 1904-1906), I, pp. 400-401.

[89] Ibid., I, pp. 404-406.

[90] Handelingen, no. 475d (23 February 1400), p. 185. CF. Précis analytique des documents que renferme le dépôt des archives de la Flandre-Occidentale à Bruges, Second Series, Vol. I: Comptes du Franc, ed. Octave Delepierre (Bruges: Vandecasteele-Werbrouck, 1845), p. 46. Delepierre claims that the English asked "que les marchands d'Angleterre puissent venir commercer en Flandre, et les Flamands en Angleterre...." The original document states that officials at Calais requested "dat de coopman van Inghelant in Vlaendre ende de coopman van Vlaendre in Calays zouden verkeren...."

1400, Charles VI officially confirmed the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce,[91] a measure particularly surprising in view of how he had treated Henry IV's initial peace overtures. Henry, in response to recent discussions with Pierre Fresnel, bishop of Meaux, and Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, in London, attempted to reconcile differences with France on 29 November 1399 by sending Walter Skirlaw, bishop of Durham, and Thomas Percy, earl of Worcester, to Charles VI. He commissioned them to offer marriage "inter Henricum primogenitum filium nostrum, principem Walliae, et fratres et sorores suos, et liberos ipsius consanguinei nostri Franciae aut patruorum et avunculorum suorum praedictorum."[92] More important for Anglo-Flemish trade was the added directive to negotiate a confirmation and ratification of the truce of 1396 or better still, to conclude a new pact between England and France.[93]

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[91]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 176. Confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce by Charles VI, 29 January 1400.

[92]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 170. Commission to the English ambassadors, 29 November 1399. Both Thomas Percy, earl of Worcester, and Walter Skirlaw, bishop of Durham, served Richard II on many diplomatic missions during his reign. During the early 1390's they took part in negotiations for peace with France. Worcester especially acted as the chief plenipotentiary of England in the Anglo-French talks taking place in February of 1392. Consequently Henry IV chose two capable diplomats to improve relations with Charles VI in November of 1399. See The Dictionary of National Biography, ed. Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee (Reprint, 22 vols., London: Humphrey Milford, 1921-1922), XV, pp. 874-878, XVIII, pp. 357-358.

[93]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, pp. 170-171. See also, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Thomae Walsingham,

Charles VI responded to Henry IV's friendly gesture by refusing the bishop of Durham and the earl of Worcester an audience and by imprisoning the herald charged with requesting a safe-conduct for them.[94] He denied the English ambassadors an interview "afin que aucun ne peust ymaginer que il approuvast taisiblement ou appertement le title du dit duc /Henry, duke of Lancaster/ que se appelle roy, et de la seignourie qu'il a ainsi usurpée,"[95] a position already expressed in his secret instructions to Charles d'Albret. Charles especially did not wish to accept the English ambassadors' letters because they referred to the

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quondam monachi S. Albani, historia anglicana, No. XXVIII, pt. I of Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi scriptores; or Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages (Rolls Series), ed. Henry Thomas Riley (2 vols., London: Longmans, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1863), II, p. 242--cited hereafter as Walsingham, Historia anglicanna and Great Britain, Public Record Office, Johannis de Trokelowe, et Henrici de Blaneforde, monachorum S. Albani, necnon quorundam anonymorum, Chronica et annales, regnantibus Henrico tertio, Edwardo primo, Edwardo secundo, Ricardo Secundo, et Henrico quarto, No. XXVIII, pt. III of the Rolls Series, ed. Henry Thomas Riley (London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Ryder, 1866), p. 320--cited hereafter as Annales Ricardi II et Henrici IV (1392-1406)

[94]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 177. Memorandum of the king's council, 9 February 1400. See also Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England, I, pp. 102-106. The arrest of the English herald was a serious offense, because as a member of the international order of heralds, he enjoyed immunity from war and needed no safe-conduct to travel to the French court. See, Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages, pp. 194-196.

[95]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, p. 188. Instructions to the French ambassadors being sent to Scotland, 6 September 1400.

duke of Lancaster as Henry IV, king of England. The French king considered Henry to be a usurper and would not recognize him as king even in the confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce early in 1400.

Why did Charles VI intend to abide by the conditions set forth in the agreement of 1396, if he considered Henry IV a mere pretender to the throne of England? The confirmation of the truce, itself, partly reveals his motives. In this document, the French king and his council refer to Richard II as being dead.[96] With Isabelle now a widow, Charles could legally request her return to France, so that he wished friendly relations between England and France maintained until his daughter was safely back at Paris. The same day as he confirmed the truce, Charles VI issued instructions to his ambassadors Jean de Montaigu, bishop of Chartres, Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, Pierre Blanchet, maître de requêtes of the royal household, and Gontier Col, his secretary, to renew diplomatic relations with England which had been severed since the previous November. They were to inform the English ambassadors that "le roy a entendu que le roy Richart d'Engleterre est alé de Vie à trespassement."[97] The death of Richard II,

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[96]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 176. Charles VI referred to Richard II as "roy d'Angleterre que Dieux absoille."

[97]Oeuvres de Froissart, Vol. XVIII: Pièces justificatives, 1319-1399, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Bruxelles: Mathieu Closson et Cie, 1874) pp. 587. Instructions to the

according to Charles VI, compelled the English government to send Isabelle home without delay. Since the marital contract agreed upon in 1396 stipulated that "se le dit roy d'Engleterre trespassoit avant la consommation dudit mariage, Ysabel...seroit, ensemble tous ses joyaux, meubles et biens, rendue et restituée au roy son Pere."[98] Charles directed his representatives to demand that Henry, "duc de Lencastre," carry out these terms of the matrimonial agreement between Richard II and Isabelle because he had personally sworn an oath to uphold them in 1396.

Before the French commissioners arrived in Picardy to discuss the return of Isabelle with their English counterparts, a great council met at Westminster to consider, among other matters, instructions for the king's representatives currently at Calais. The ambassadors--Walter Skirlaw, bishop of Durham, Thomas Percy, earl of

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French Ambassadors, 29 January 1400. Jean de Montaigu, a member of the Parlement de Paris became bishop of Chartres in 1390. He replaced Arnaud de Corbie as chancellor of France in 1405 and died at the battle of Agincourt in 1415. Pierre Blanchet had served Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, as secretary, but in 1400 was maître des requêtes for the royal household. Gontier Col had been a secretary of Jean, duc de Berri, and after 1388, served Charles VI in the same capacity. Among these ambassadors, he alone appears to have been employed on diplomatic missions during the 1390's. See Anselme, Histoire genealogique, VI, pp. 377, 382; Dictionnaire de biographie Française, Vol. IX: Clesinger-Dalliere, ed. Roman d'Amat (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1961), cols. 170-171; Oeuvres de Froissart, Vol. XXII: Table analytique des noms historiques J-Q (Bruxelles: Mathieu Closson et Cie, 1875), p. 217.

[98]Oeuvres de Froissart, XVIII, p. 588. Instructions to the French ambassadors, 29 January 1400.

Worcester, and William Heron, Lord of Say--sent Henry IV a copy of a letter which they had received from the French king. The councillors concluded from reading the message that Charles VI "estoit vraisemblance d'avoir esperance plus de guerre, que le pees, ou de trieves ou affermance des trieves, prises en temps de Richard n'adgairs Roi par entre le roialmes principaux."[99] The observation clearly reveals that news of Charles VI's confirmation of the truce as yet had not reached England. They could judge the motives of the French king only by his past behavior. He refused the English ambassadors at Calais an audience, arrested their herald charged with obtaining a safe-conduct for them, and aided the Scots who raided the northern border of England. Since war against France and Scotland seemed imminent, the lords present at the council agreed for the nobility to supply the king with ships, men and money during the following three months. In lieu of personal service, clergymen were required as landowners to contribute one tenth of their possessions to the war effort.

Such preparations, however, soon proved to be unnecessary. Charles VI's representatives, who had traveled

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[99]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 177. Memorandum of the Great Council, 9 February 1400. The Great Council differed from the ordinary King's Council in that it was much like Parliament, meeting either in the presence of the king or near him. It was usually an enlarged council perhaps averaging thirty to fifty members, but sometimes as large as the commons of Parliament. See J.L. Kirby, "Councils and Councillors of Henry IV," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series XIV (1964), 35.

to Boulogne granted the English ambassadors a safe-conduct on 14 February.[100] Two days later, the plenipotentiaries of England and France met at Leulinghen, a small town on the Anglo-French frontier between Calais and Boulogne, where Walter Skirlaw, bishop of Durham, and his fellow envoys received notice of Charles VI's confirmation of the Anglo-French truce of 1396. Little was accomplished at the conference except that Henry IV's deputies agreed to hold another meeting with their French counterparts on 26 February.[101] Difficulties undoubtedly arose over Charles VI's instructions to his ambassadors. He specifically ordered them not to recognize Henry, duke of Lancaster, as king of England, but to refer to him as "le seigneur qui vous a envoyez ou vostre seigneur."[102] Before new Anglo-French discussions took place, Henry IV on 19 February renewed the commission of Walter Skirlaw, bishop

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[100]Great Britain, Public Record Office, Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, ed. Charles Purton Cooper (London, 1869), p. 67. Safe-conduct for English ambassadors, 14 February 1400.

[101]Recueil des roys de France, leurs couronne et maison, ensemble, le rang des grands de France, plus une chronique abbregee contenant tout ce qui est advenu, tant en fait de guerre, qu'autrement, entre les rois et princes, republiques et potentats estrangers, Pt. III: Recueil de traictez d'entre les roys de France et d'Angleterre, ed. Sire Jean du Tillet (Paris: Pierre Mettayer, Imprimeur et Libraire ordinaire du roy, 1618), pp. 334-335--cited hereafter as Recueil de traictez d'entre les roys de France et d'Angleterre.

[102]Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, p. 67. Instructions for French ambassadors, 29 January 1400.

of Durham, and Thomas Percy, earl of Worcester, to treat for marriages between the royal families of England and France. He also appointed William Heron, Lord of Say, and Richard Holm, canon of the cathedral of St. Peter in York, commonly known as York Minster, to the diplomatic mission at Calais and directed all of his representatives to conclude a confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce or a new agreement of friendship with the emissaries of Charles VI. Yet, in these instructions to his deputies at Calais, Henry IV revealed a certain animosity towards Charles VI, which was not present the previous fall when he sent the bishop of Durham and the earl of Worcester to France. Instead of referring to Charles as "carissimo consanguineo nostro Franciae"[103] as he had done in the November commission to the English ambassadors, he now addressed him as "adversario nostro Franciae".[104]

English enmity towards France, as revealed by the manner in which they referred to Charles VI, did not impede further progress towards friendly Anglo-French relations.

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[103]Rymer, Foedera, vol.III, pt. IV, p. 170. Commission to the English ambassadors, 29 November 1399.

[104]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 178. Commission to the English ambassadors, 19 February 1400. William Heron was a knight of the shire for Northumberland in 1382 and 1385. He was a member of Richard II's expedition to Ireland in 1394. A year earlier, Heron married Elizabeth, widow of John Lord Say, whose lands he held until his death in 1404. See The Complete Peerage or a History of Lords and all its Members from the earliest Times, Vol. VI: Gordon to Hurstpierpoint (London: The St. Catherine Press, 1926), pp. 492-493.

The English and French ambassadors held a conference at Leulinghen on 26 February as resolved upon earlier in the month, but adjourned the meeting until 19 March[105] when they agreed to a limited truce effective to the feast of Pentecost, 13 June.[106] Such an agreement was necessary since the truce of 1396 remained inoperative as long as the present English government did not approve it. Henry IV, however, declared himself ready to accept the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce on 10 March[107] and instructed his deputies at Calais to receive the oath of the king of France to the confirmation of that pact.[108] He also rescinded later in the month his earlier command which prevented all persons of the obedience of France from leaving England without his express permission.[109] Such a mandate openly violated the truce once Charles VI's confirmation was accepted. By directing officials at various ports to release all ships and vessels arrested as a result of his previous order, Henry seemed ready to announce his own confirmation of the

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[105]Recueil de traictez d'entre les roys de France et d'Angleterre, p. 335.

[106]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, II, p. 746, and Jean Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, p. 142.

[107]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 180. Commission to the English ambassadors to explain ambiguities in the truce, 10 March 1400.

[108]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 179. Commission to English ambassadors, 10 March 1400.

[109]C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 28 March 1400, Order to the authorities at several ports, p. 76.

Twenty-Eight-Year Truce, but he still refused to give it in March of 1400.

Despite the delay in confirming the truce of 1396 on the English side, the king's councillors at Paris decided on the nomination of another diplomatic mission to visit Henry IV in England. They agreed that "ils envoieroient en Angleterre de par le roy aucun seigneur notable et prudent pour savoir et veoir l'estat de la royne /Isabelle/...."[110] Charged with this important mission were Charles d'Albret, the king's nephew, who had served his lord earlier by negotiating with the Gascon lords and another knight, Charles de Hangiers. They remained at Boulogne while their herald proceeded to the English court where he requested a safe-conduct for the French emissaries so they might sail immediately to England. Henry IV told the herald that "c'estoit bien la plaisance et voulenté du roy et de son conseil, que messire Charles de Labreth et sa campaignie venissent en Angleterre, et tout droit le chemin devers le roy sans traire ailleurs, fors par congié."[111] Upon receiving this favorable reply the

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[110] Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, pp. 217-218. The French embassy to England occurred in the year of 1399 which means it could have taken place at anytime up to 17 April 1400, the end of the year. According to Froissart, Isabelle resided at Havering-atte-Bower when the French ambassadors came to England. Yet Isabelle was moved to that town only at the end of January after the Revolt of the Earls. Wallon, Richard II, II, p. 494. Froissart also describes the king's council meeting at Eltham. Between the end of January and 17 April, it met at Eltham only in March. Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, p. 117. Consequently, the French mission to England should be dated March 1400.

[111] Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 218.

French ambassadors embarked for England where they landed at Dover and were met by one of the king's knights, whom they knew because he had shared his lord's exile at Paris. The English knight escorted Charles d'Albret and his companion to Henry IV and his Council meeting at Eltham, the royal residence in Kent.

Charles d'Albret explained his commission to the king who directed him to wait in London while he and his Council deliberated upon the matter. The central purpose of the French embassy was to obtain an audience with Isabelle so Charles VI would know how his daughter had been treated since the revolution against Richard II. After conferring with his Council, Henry IV allowed Charles d'Albret and Charles de Hangiers to see Isabelle but stipulated that

> vous nous jurerés souffissamment que de chose nulle qui advenue soit en Angleterre, ne de Richart de Bourdeaulx, ne d'autre chose, vous ne parlerés, ne ferés parler homme des vostres. Et, se vous faisiés, ne alies au contraire, il est ainsi déterminé, vous courroucheriés grandement le pays et vous mettriés en péril de vos vies.[112]

They agreed to the terms set forth by Henry IV who sent Henry Percy, earl of Northumberland, with them to visit Isabelle at Havering-atte-Bower, a small town some ten miles east northeast of London in Essex where she had resided since the Revolt of the Earls. The French envoys kept their promise by never mentioning Richard II to her and after a short

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[112] Ibid., XVI, pp. 219-220.

interview returned to London. Before they left for France, Henry assured them that no harm would ever come to Isabelle and that she should live always in a style becoming her birth and rank, enjoying all the privileges due a dowager queen of England.

Henry IV's parting words to the French diplomats indicated that he intended to keep Isabelle in England. His Council, however, advised him against such a measure in May. Its members agreed that Isabelle must be sent home with her jewels and possessions since neither Charles VI nor the king had repudiated the marriage contract made between her and Richard II in 1396. Henry should act upon their recommendation only if Charles properly requested the return of his daughter. That is, he must recognize Henry as king of England in future negotiations concerning Isabelle. The councillors further stipulated that the amount of Isabelle's dowry already paid to the English government by Charles VI should be remitted to him, except for the first three-hundred-thousand francs, which according to the marriage contract of 1396, could not be reclaimed.[113] With the position of the English government on the restoration of Isabelle to her father clearly set down in the minutes of the king's council, Henry IV took the required step to reach a reconciliation with France. On 18 May, he officially confirmed the truce

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[113] Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, pp. 118-119. Wylie, History of England under Henry IV, p. 130 dates these minutes of the council as May 1400.

of 1396.[114]

The acceptance on both sides of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce by May of 1400 ended a period in which England and France had been on the verge of open war. It did not guarantee the immediate return of Isabelle to her father, but at least, discussions concerning her future could proceed in a friendlier atmosphere. Serious problems, however, prevented Henry IV and Charles VI from reaching an amicable understanding. The French king refused to acknowledge Henry IV as king of England and only negotiated with his representatives because Isabelle remained in English hands. Henry, for his part, wanted improved relations with France, but continued to keep Isabelle in England, hoping for further concessions from her father. Other difficulties arose in subsequent negotiations. Yet the immediate threat of a French invasion of England diminished and Henry IV, for the moment, established a tenuous Anglo-French peace.

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[114]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 183. Confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce by Henry IV, 18 May 1400. Henry IV issued orders as early as 23 April 1400 to prevent his subjects from attacking the French at sea. C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1400): 23 April 1400, Commission to William Prince, p. 271

CHAPTER III

THE RETURN OF ISABELLE TO FRANCE

Henry IV's confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce in May of 1400 reduced the danger of an open conflict with France, thereby permitting at Leulinghen new Anglo-French conferences which considered the plight of Isabelle. The English king, however, embarked upon an invasion of Scotland which threatened to disrupt the delicate negotiations between France and England because the truce of 1396 named the Scots as allies of Charles VI. Henry wanted the Scots to observe the terms of that accord and to recognize him as their overlord. Although failing in his avowed purpose, he achieved improved commercial relations with the county of Flanders, another region closely tied to the Valois crown, and entered into a series of lengthy discussions with the French for Isabelle's release from English custody. The French even sent two ambassadors to England with demands for the immediate restitution of the young queen, but Henry proved obdurate, setting forth certain conditions which must be met before he granted permission for her departure from his kingdom. Under these circumstances, negotiations remained in a deadlock until the spring of 1401 when English

and French diplomats ultimately reached a reasonable settlement which called for the return of Charles VI's daughter to France and a conference dealing with the many violations on both sides of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce.

Henry IV and the Scots

That Henry IV sincerely wished to maintain the truce of 1396 made with the French cannot be doubted in spite of a serious infraction of that agreement which he committed late in the summer of 1400. Henry especially revealed his desire to pursue an amicable policy towards Charles VI by empowering the bishop of Durham, Thomas Percy, William Heron, and Richard Holm on 18 May 1400 to open new negotiations "cum carissimo consanguineo nostro Franciae."[1] He directed his representatives to discuss all questions concerning the return of Isabelle and her property to France, to interpret obscure passages of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce or to add new clauses to it, and to enter into any new alliance which the French ambassadors might be prepared to contract. Besides these friendly overtures expressed in the instructions to his deputies, Henry appointed two admirals as conservators of the truce in the Channel[2] and ordered his subjects in various ports neither to send out

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[1]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, pp. 167-171. Instructions for the ambassadors of England, 18 May 1400.

[2]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 187. Henry IV's instructions to the English council, 19 July 1400.

armed vessels against the French nor to seize their ships, merchandise or goods at sea.[3] Allies of the French king were included in this mandate with the exception of the Scots, who had raided the northern border of England on many occasions both in Richard II's reign and now during the rule of Henry IV. In order to prevent such violations of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce, which designated Robert III, king of Scotland,[4] as an ally of Charles VI, Henry led an expedition across the Scottish border in August of 1400.

Why did Henry IV risk a new war with Charles VI by attacking one of his most important allies? An examination of Anglo-Scottish relations from the deposition of Richard II explains his invasion of Scotland. Before Henry's accession to the throne, English and Scottish commissioners arranged a short truce to last for a year and expire on 29 September 1400. Henry requested that Robert III send representatives from his council to confirm the new agreement publically at Westminster. Robert, however, decided on delaying tactics. He informed Henry on 6 October that

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[3]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 185. Order to several port officials, 18 June 1400.

[4]Robert III ruled Scotland from 1390 to 1406 with the assistance of his eldest son, the duke of Rothsay, who acted as Guardian of the Realm, his brother, the duke of Albany, who held the office of Chamberlain of Scotland and a council of eighteen. See P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland (3 vols.; Cambridge: at the University Press, 1929), I, pp. 195-210; J.D. Mackie, A History of Scotland (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 94-117; Wylie, History of England under Henry the Fourth, I, p. 80. Jacob, The Fifteenth Century 1399-1485, pp. 34-36.

his proposal could not be acted upon immediately because the Scottish council was not then in session.[5] A month later, Robert wrote another letter to the English king. He agreed to appoint deputies who would meet with their English counterparts at Hadden Rig, some fifteen miles southwest of Berwick on the Anglo-Scottish Border, to negotiate a truce or even a formal treaty of friendship. Robert spoke as if no truce had been arranged between him and Henry IV.[6] He simply delayed discussions with the English while his own subjects ravaged the northern counties of England. The Scots, for example, captured and destroyed the Castle of Wark on the south bank of the Tweed between Berwick and Roxburgh. They kidnapped the children of Sir Thomas Gray, the captain of Wark Castle, and stole property valued at a thousand pounds.[7]

Such an unprovoked attack infuriated Henry IV. He announced in Parliament on 10 November his plan to lead an

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[5]Great Britain, Public Record Office, Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry The Fourth, King of England and France, and Lord of Ireland, Vol. I: A.D. 1399-1404, No. XVIII of the Rolls Series, ed. Rev. F.C. Hingeston (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1860), pp. 4-6--cited hereafter as Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV. Letter from Robert III, king of Scotland, to Henry IV, 6 October 1399.

[6]Ibid., pp. 8-11. Letter from Robert III, king of Scotland, to Henry IV, 2 November 1399.

[7]C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1401): 24 May 1400, Pardon to Sir Thomas Gray, p. 287. The Scots demanded one thousand pounds for the return of his children and servants. Henry IV complains in a letter written to Robert III during November 1399, of the devastating raids committed by the Scots against the counties of northern England. See Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 13.

expedition personally against the Scots. Although the northern earls traditionally in command of the Marches claimed that they had not advised the king to invade Scotland, the Lords favored the project "considerant la grant malice et rebellion de les Escotes, sanz decerte de sa partie ou offense."[8] The Commons, on the other hand, urged the king to place a trustworthy lieutenant in charge of the expedition to Scotland and remain in England since his own position at home was still precarious.[9] Whether it was the advice of Commons or another more compelling reason, Henry temporarily abandoned the invasion of Scotland in favor of further negotiations with Robert III. He authorized Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland, to negotiate with the Scots for the preservation of the towns of Penrith in England and Dumfries in Scotland[10] and offered to send representatives to Kelso at the confluence of the Tweed and Teviot Rivers on 5 January 1400, where they would meet with deputies of Robert III in order to choose a place on the border where discussions concerning the truce could be held.[11]

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[8]Rotuli Parliamentorum, III, p. 428. Henry Percy, earl of Northumberland, and Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland, objected to the proposed invasion of Scotland.

[9]Ibid., III, p. 434. The commons also warned the king of the "graunde pestilence" then prevalent in the north, reminding him that he had suffered an illness recently.

[10]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 170. License to the earl of Westmorland, 26 November 1399.

[11]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of

Despite Henry IV's willingness to treat with Robert III during the autumn of 1399, relations between England and Scotland continued to deteriorate. Serious differences divided the two rulers. Throughout his correspondence with Henry, Robert III refused to recognize him as king of England, following the policy laid down by Charles VI, king of France.[12] Henry IV noted in one of his replies to the Scottish king that he had received "voz lettres a nous come Duc de Lancastre, Comte de Derby et Senechal d'Engleterre darreiniment envoiees."[13] Robert III's refusal to acknowledge him as king of England coupled with the devastating Scottish raids into the northern counties of his kingdom caused Henry to be much more suspicious of the intentions of the Scots than of those of the French. On 29 November, Henry addressed Charles VI as "carissimo consanguineo nostro Franciae"[14] whereas less than two weeks later, he empowered

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Henry IV, pp. 11-14. Letter from Henry IV to Robert III, king of Scotland, November 1399.

[12]Robert III's salutation to Henry IV: "Robert, par la grace de Dieu Roy d'Escoce, a nostre treschier et tresame cousin le Duc de Lencastre, Count de Derby, et Seneschale d'Engleter, salus et dilection." remained the same throughout the correspondence between the two monarchs until 14 March 1400 when Robert simply addressed Henry as "chier cousin d'Engleterre," dropping the enumeration of his other titles which only annoyed the king of England. See Ibid., pp. 4, 8, 25.

[13]Ibid., p. 11. Henry IV to Robert III, king of Scotland, November, 1399.

[14]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 170. Commission to the English ambassadors, 29 November 1399.

three special commissioners to negotiate "cum Roberto adversario nostro Scotiae."[15] His doubts about the Scots proved well-founded. The king's councillors meeting at Westminster on 9 February 1400 heard reports that the Scots still were raiding and pillaging on the border and preparing to invade northern England with the help of Charles VI.[16] Robert III's dilatory manner in handling diplomatic affairs with England tended to confirm the view that the Scots wanted to renew the war. The Scottish king put off answering Henry's proposal for a meeting at Kelso on 5 January until 14 March when he suggested that discussions between England and Scotland should be resumed.[17]

Robert III's offer, however, arrived too late. The Great Council held on 9 February at Westminster discussed the invasion of Scotland and arranged for the necessary financing to carry out the expedition.[18] The English were encouraged further in their plans a few days later when a

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[15]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 172. Power for Sir Thomas Gray and two other ambassadors to treat with the Scots for redress of injuries, 10 December 1399.

[16]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 177. Memorandum of the king's council, 9 February 1400.

[17]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 25-27. Letter from Robert III, king of Scotland to Henry IV, 14 March 1400. Although Robert could not justify postponing a reply to the English king until March, it was impossible for him to send representatives to Kelso on 5 January since he only received Henry IV's letter the day before the proposed meeting.

[18]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 177. Memorandum of the king's council, 9 February 1400.

leading Scottish nobleman announced his desire to transfer his allegiance to Henry IV. George Dunbar, earl of the Scottish March, whose daughter Elizabeth had been formally betrothed to the heir of the Scottish throne, the duke of Rothsay, harbored a deep personal hatred for Robert III, whose son had broken off the engagement to Elizabeth, marrying instead Margaret, the daughter of Archibald the Grim, earl of Douglas. Accordingly on 18 February Dunbar asked Henry IV for a safe-conduct to the border, where he would discuss the terms of his defection to the English with either the earl of Westmorland or his brother, Lord Neville of Furnival.[19] Henry granted the safe-conduct on 8 March[20] and commissioned the earl of Westmorland to conduct the negotiations with George Dunbar.[21] If he agreed to give up his two oldest sons and one of his daughters as proof of his good faith, to place one of his castles at

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[19]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 23-25. Letter from George Dunbar, earl of the Scottish March to Henry IV, 18 February 1400. See also Sir Herbert Maxwell, A History of the House of Douglas from the earliest Times down to the legislative Union of England and Scotland (2 vols., London: Freemantle & Co., 1902), I, pp. 135-136.

[20]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 179. Safe-conduct for George Dunbar, earl of the Scottish March, 8 March 1400. Dunbar received another safe-conduct which remained valid until 29 September 1400. Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 186. Safe-conduct for the earl of the Scottish March, 21 June 1400.

[21]Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, pp. 114-115. Instructions for Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland, 13 March 1400.

the disposal of the English, and to make no further commitments to Robert III, Henry offered to pay him one thousand pounds per annum for the next six years. Discussions with the earl of the Scottish March ended on 25 July, when he formally renounced his oath of loyalty to "Robert that Pretendes Hymself King of Scotland..."[22] and became a loyal vassal of Henry IV.

While negotiating the defection of George Dunbar to the English side, Henry IV prepared for the invasion of Scotland. The Anglo-French truce of 1396 named Robert III as an ally of the French king and consequently bound him to maintain the peace with England. Once the English confirmed the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce on 18 May,[23] they expected Robert to comply with the terms of that agreement. Six days later, Henry demanded that the Scottish king require all his lords, officials and subjects to swear an oath to observe the Anglo-French pact of 1396 and that he pay compensation for all violations of it. If Robert failed to agree to these conditions, the Scots would be excluded from all benefits of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce.[24] Henry

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[22]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, pp. 187-188. Indenture between Henry IV and George Dunbar, earl of the Scottish March, 25 July 1400. Dunbar promised the actual performance of liege homage to Henry IV by 15 August in return for which the earl received the castle and lordship of Somerton and the manor of Clipstone.

[23]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 183. Henry IV's confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce with France, 18 May 1400.

[24]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 184. Commission to

gave the king of Scotland very little time to reply, for on 9 June he ordered all men, who owed military service to the crown, to meet him at York by 24 June.[25] The king of England, himself arrived there two days before the deadline which he had set.[26]

Still it was several weeks before the English army could advance towards Scotland. Provisions for the expedition proved inadequate. Henry IV urgently instructed his council at Westminster on 4 July to order the mayors of London and other ports on the east coast to buy wine, flour, wheat, oats, and other products on the security of the customs of those ports and then ship the supplies north immediately to the mouth of the Tyne.[27] Later in the month, he directed authorities at the Cinque Ports to send him twenty ships, each armed with forty men, to arrive at Newcastle-on-Tyne no later than 4 August.[28] With preparations finally

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the English ambassadors to notify Robert III, king of Scotland, of Henry IV's confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce, 24 May 1400.

[25]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 185. Order to the sheriffs of the counties, 9 June 1400.

[26]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 186. Safe-conduct for the Scottish ambassadors, 22 July 1400. On 21 June Henry was at Pontefract where he signed a safe-conduct for George Dunbar, earl of the Scottish March. Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 186.

[27]Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, pp. 122-123. Letter from Henry IV to the English council, 4 July 1400.

[28]C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 24 July 1400, Orders to authorities at the Cinque Ports, pp. 170-171.

completed, Henry led his troops to Newcastle-on-Tyne, where on 6 August he issued a proclamation to Robert III, asking him to do homage for his kingdom of Scotland at Edinburgh on 23 August.[29] The English army crossed the border on 17 August and met little resistance on the march through Haddington to Leith, where Henry again summoned Robert to perform an act of homage for his kingdom, but received no reply.[30] A shortage of provisions[31] and heavy casualties suffered by the army from the savage guerilla fighting of the Scots[32] compelled Henry to accept much less from Robert

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[29]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 188. Proclamation in which Henry IV summons Robert III to do homage to him for the kingdom of Scotland, 6 August 1400. On the following day, Henry IV issued another declaration to all the nobles of Scotland, asking them to compel their king to do homage at Edinburgh on 23 August or failing that, to perform it themselves. Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 189.

[30]Ibid., vol. III, pt. IV, p. 189. Henry IV's command for Robert III to do homage for his kingdom of Scotland, 21 August 1400; Adam of Usk, Chronicon Adae de Usk A.D. 1377-1421, ed. and trans. Sir Edward Maunde Thompson (2d ed. London: Henry Frowde, 1904), p. 208; Wylie, History of England under Henry the Fourth, p. 138.

[31]Great Britain, Public Record Office, Eulogium (Historiarum sive Temporis): Chronicon ab orbe condito usque ad annum Domini M. CCC. LXVI., a monacho quodam Malemesburiensi Exaratum, accedunt continuationes duae, quarum una ad annum M. CCCC. XIII. altera ad annum M. XXXX. XC perducta est, No. IX of the Rolls Series, ed. Frank Scott Haydon (3 vols., London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1858-1863), III, p. 387. Cited hereafter as Eulogium Historiarum.

[32]Chronicon Adae de Usk, p. 47. Adam of Usk relates how the Scots fought against the English and the heavy toll inflicted on Henry IV's troops: "Eodem anno, rex cum magno et glorioso exercitu transiit in Scociam ad Scotorum ferocitatem domandam. Ipsi tamen propria rura, domos, et predia, ne regi nostro aliquid cederet, in refugium

than he originally wanted. Instead of punishing the Scots for their raids into English territory or forcing Robert to swear an oath of homage to him, Henry received only a vague promise from a representative of the Scottish court that full consideration would be given to the claim of overlordship.[33] He recrossed the border on 29 August[34] without having compelled Robert III and his subjects to observe the terms of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce.

Henry IV and the Flemings

Although the Scottish expedition ended in failure, relations with another region closely allied with Charles VI--the county of Flanders--had improved by the autumn of 1400. A measure which Henry IV took in conjunction with

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preveniendo, devastarunt et denudarunt; ac, se delitentes ad frutices ac deviarum cavernarum et nemorum abdita, a facie regis se subtraxerunt. Tamen, ex hujusmodi absconditis sepius exeuntes, in desertis deviis ac diversoriis nostratum quam plures interfecerunt et captivarunt, plus nobis quam nos eis dampni inferendo." Henry needed reinforcements desparately for on 22 August he commanded port officials of several towns on the west and southern coasts to send ships, armed men, and archers immediately "by the Irish sea" to Scotland. C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): Order to several port officials in various towns along the west and southern coasts, pp. 168-169.

[33]Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, p. 169. Instructions for the English ambassador for treating with the Scots, 1 September 1401. See also Rotuli Parliamentorum, III, p. 487 where Henry IV on 22 October 1402 discussed how the Scottish ambassador "par pleuseurs blanches paroles et bealx promesses fist mesme ñre Sr̃ le Roi voider la dite terre d'Escoce."

[34]Chronicon Adae de Usk, p. 47.

the invasion of Scotland particularly affected the Flemings. On 16 August Henry commanded officials at several ports to prevent any foreigner from leaving the country or traveling to any other part of the kingdom,[35] a mandate similar to the one issued after his flight from Windsor early in January. He barred aliens from embarking from English ports because they might bring supplies to Scotland. Among those detained by Henry's order were the Flemings. Several of their ships were allowed to sail from Scarborough, Great Yarmouth and Winchelsea early in September provided that they did not carry provisions to Scotland.[36] The significance of Flemish ships being arrested in English ports at this time must be emphasized. The vier leden discussed the possibility of resuming normal commercial intercourse with the English on 23 February 1400,[37] but the first recorded evidence definitely proving that English and Flemish merchants were

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[35]C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 16 August 1400, Order to authorities at several ports, pp. 177-178. See too, Ibid., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 5 September 1400, Order to Peter Courtenay, captain of Calais, p. 167. Henry IV commanded that no foreigner of noble birth might enter Calais for any reason and that if alien merchants or envoys came to the town, they must be arrested until cleared by the king and his council.

[36]Ibid., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 8 September 1400, Order to the mayor and bailiffs of Winchelsea, p. 85; C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1401): 11 September 1400, Mandate to the bailiffs of Scarborough and Great Yarmouth, p. 358; Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den handel met Engeland, Schotland en Ierland, 1150-1485, ed. H.J. Smit, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien No. 65 (2 vols.; 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1928), I, p. 483.

[37]Handelingen, no. 475d (23 February 1400), p. 185.

trading again with each other is the release of Flemish ships from the three English ports mentioned above.

Yet the confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce by Charles VI at the end of January should have re-established friendly commercial exchange between England and Flanders long before August of 1400. Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne and comte de Flandre, signed the confirmation as a guarantor of the truce,[38] but deliberately impeded its implementation despite formal offers of friendship from Calais. During March, deputies of the vier leden still deliberated on the "brieven van minen gheducten here die hi ghescreven hadde in manieren van andworden up de vrede die de cooplieden van Calais beghert hadden ant lant van Vlaendre."[39] Philippe le Hardi seemed more bent on making preparations for new hostilities with the English than restoring peaceful trading relations with them for the benefit of his Flemish subjects. He demanded that the vier leden supply him with "M serjanten...omme de verwaernesse van de sloten int West Vlaendre jeghen dInghelsche up dat dorloghe tusschen den II coninghen voort gheghaen hadden...."[40] What decision the Flemings reached concerning his request is not known. They did inform, however,

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[38]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 176. Confirmation by Charles VI of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce, 29 January 1400.

[39]Handelingen, no. 476d (16 March 1400), p. 186.

[40]Ibid., no. 477 (1 April 1400), p. 186. M meant mille or one thousand.

the ducal councillors at Lille of their desire to remain neutral in the conflict between England and France on 15 May.[41] Three days later, Henry IV confirmed the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce and in a letter to the vier leden on 21 July recognized them as a party to that agreement.[42] He further authorized certain merchants of Newcastle-on-Tyne in August to ship two thousand sacks of wool directly to "Flanders or other foreign parts of the king's friendship" as long as they paid appropriate duties due normally in England and at Calais.[43] Consequently expressions of good will on both sides brought about a resumption of Anglo-Flemish commercial relations.

Anglo-French Negotiations and the Fate of Isabelle

Henry IV achieved a similar success in reconciling differences with France.[44] At the end of May, Charles VI

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[41] Ibid., no. 481 (15 May 1400), p. 188. See also Ibid., no. 482 (22 May 1400), p. 188. The vier leden deliberated "upt fait van dat tlant neutrael soude mueghen staen up dat dorloghe tusschen den II coninghen upghinghe."

[42] A.D.N., B 523, N° 14900bis. Letter from Henry IV, king of England to the vier leden, 21 July 1400.

[43] C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1401): 8 August 1400, License to merchants of Newcastle-on-Tyne, p. 358. Perhaps to encourage direct shipments of wool from England to Flanders, Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, granted merchants of Norwich, a year later (3 August 1401), the same commercial privileges which he had given to both the merchants of Berwick-on-Tweed and Newcastle-on-Tyne late in Richard II's reign. See Cartulaire de l'ancienne estaple de Bruges, I, p. 415.

[44] Besides official negotiations between the two countries a French nobleman named Charles de Savoisy

authorized his ambassadors--Jean de Hangest, Jean de Montaigu, Pierre Blanchet, and Gontier Col to open new discussions with the English ambassadors for the restoration of Isabelle to her parents.[45] Preliminary talks at Leulinghen during July convinced the English representatives--the bishop of Durham, Thomas Percy, William Heron and Richard Holm--that "il ... semble, pour le mieux que la susdicte nostre cousine le Roigne sera restitue a son pere de France." Henry, accordingly, empowered them on 19 July to proceed with the negotiations for her return.[47] Three days later, Jean de Hangest presented the French council with a copy of the

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brought a party of knights and squires to England in July, 1400 in order to engage in a tournament of arms with English knights led by Sir John Cornewaill at York in the presence of Henry IV. See C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1401): 16 July 1400, Commission to Richard Lancastre, king of arms, and John Orewell, sergeant-at-arms, p. 352; Ibid., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1401): 17 July 1400, Mandate to port officials at Dover and Sandwich, p. 356; Issues of the Exchequer; being a Collection of Payments made out of His Majesty's Revenue, from King Henry III to King Henry VI inclusive, ed. and trans. Frederick Devon (London: John Murray, 1837), p. 278. Payment to John Orewell, sergeant-at-arms, 6 July 1400. Cited hereafter as Issues of the Exchequer. A safe-conduct was also granted to a French squire, Ector de Pontbreant and a party of fifteen persons on 1 August 1400. C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1401): 1 August 1400, p. 353.

[45]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, pp. 171-173. Charles VI's commission to the French ambassadors, the latter part of May, 1400. In these instructions, Charles does not mention Henry IV, but merely empowers his representatives to negotiate with "les messages du royaume et pais d'Engleterre."

[46]Rymer, Foedera, Vol. III, pt. IV, p. 187. Henry IV's instructions to the English councillors, 19 July 1400.

[47]Ibid.

terms which the English diplomats offered for the restitution of Isabelle. They proposed to send her home to Charles VI on 2 February 1401, "franche et desliée de tous liens de mariage et autre obligations, selon la fourme du traictié et conveniences sur ce Faictes."[48] The marriage contract, according to Charles VI's councillors, not only obligated Henry to deliver Isabelle to her father released from all bonds of matrimony, but also to remit her jewels and other possessions at the same time. Yet their chief objection to the English plan was the lengthy delay before Isabelle could be reunited with her family. They instructed Jean de Hangest and his colleagues at Leulinghen to demand that her return to France take place during September, or by 1 November at the latest if the English representatives rejected the first date.[49]

Other problems further complicated the negotiations concerning Isabelle in July. The French king had paid to Richard II in 1396 three-hundred-thousand francs without any conditions attached to them as a dowry for his daughter and had promised five more annual installments totaling five-hundred-thousand francs which would be returned with Isabelle, if Richard died before her, leaving no heirs. Of the latter sum, Richard received two-hundred-thousand francs

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[48]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, pp. 182-183. Response of the French council to the proposal made for Isabelle's release by the English ambassadors, 22 July 1400.

[49]Ibid., pp. 182-184.

before his deposition in 1399. The English council agreed in May of 1400 to repay that amount to Charles VI,[50] but Henry IV, in the instructions to his ambassadors during the same month, did not authorize them to discuss the subject.[51] That Henry really intended to reimburse Charles VI for the two-hundred-thousand francs of Isabelle's dowry is doubtful because he directed his deputies to put forward a claim for the outstanding ransom for Jean II, king of France, who had been captured by the English at the battle of Poitiers in 1356.[52] Undoubtedly, Henry raised the question of this old debt so the amount of Isabelle's dowry due for remittance could be set off against it. The French council, however, saw through the scheme. Its members ordered Charles VI's ambassadors to demand "la somme de deux cens mille francs, qui clèremont doit estre restituée par ledit traictié,"[53] and to avoid discussing the unpaid balance of Jean II's ransom.

The English ambassadors heard the various objections to their plan of sending Isabelle home to France at Leulinghen, promised to relate them to Henry IV, and then

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[50]Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, p. 118.

[51]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, pp. 167-171. Instructions for the ambassadors of England, 18 May 1400.

[52]Ibid., p. 170.

[53]Ibid., p. 183.

terminated discussions with their French counterparts.[54] Instead of waiting for Henry to initiate further negotiations, Charles VI in August decided on sending Pierre Blanchet and Jean de Hangest directly to England.[55] Because the English plenipotentiaries left the impression that their lord might allow Isabelle to leave England sooner than the original date stipulated by them,[56] Charles instructed his representatives to press the English king for the return of his daughter no later than 1 November. He realized that some form of recognition must be given Henry in order to induce him to receive his ambassadors and their request in a favorable manner. Blanchet and Hangest, therefore, carried instructions in which Henry was referred to as "nostre cousin

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[54]Ibid., p. 185. Charles VI's instructions to the French ambassadors nominated for the English embassy, August 1400. In these orders, the king relates the demands put forward by the French envoys and the English reaction: "Aux quèles requestes ait esté respondu par les diz messages d'Engleterre que ilz raporteroient à nostre dit cousin ce que noz diz messages leur avoient dit." See also Wylie, History of England under Henry the Fourth, p. 131 who, citing Foreign Roll 1 H.IV, notes the ambassadors were absent from England 28 May - 6 August.

[55]For the complete instructions for the French ambassadors, see, Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, pp. 185-187.

[56]Ibid., p. 190. Charles VI's instructions for the French ambassadors nominated for the Scottish embassy, 6 September 1400. The Anglo-French conferences in July left the king with the impression that for the restitution of Isabelle "il y a espérance que au plaisir de Dieu se fera briefment, et comme l'en espère au terme de la feste de Tous Sains prochainement /1 November 1400/ venant, ou plus tost se faire se peut."

d'Engleterre."[57] Other than this grudging acknowledgement, no new concessions were made. Charles based his claim on the marriage contract of 1396 in which Henry personally bound himself, along with other great magnates of England to hand Isabelle over to the French royal family with all her jewels and possessions if Richard died before consummating the marriage. In other words, he hoped that Henry would be concerned enough about his honor as a Christian knight to keep his word when Blanchet and Hangest reminded him of his oath swearing to uphold the marriage contract between Richard II and Isabelle.

The appointment of two ambassadors charged with talking personally with the English king, on second thought, worried Charles VI. He wondered what effect such an embassy would have on his close ally, Robert III, king of Scotland, and decided upon an additional assignment for Blanchet and Hangest. He ordered on 6 September that after completing their business in England, they would meet with Robert III in Scotland.[58] Blanchet and Hangest must apologize for the king's lack of communication with the Scottish court during the preceding year caused primarily by Charles VI's preoccupation with events happening in England since the deposition of Richard II and by armed English vessels

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[57] Ibid., p. 185.

[58] Ibid., pp. 187-193. Charles VI's instructions for the French ambassadors nominated for the Scottish embassy, 6 September 1400.

patrolling the Channel, which prevented French envoys from sailing north into Scottish waters.[59] Since little information had reached Robert about Anglo-French relations in the year following the deposition of Richard II, Charles wanted him to know why the French government engaged in discussions with the usurper, Henry of Lancaster. When he first sent envoys with letters for the French king, Charles refused them an audience because he wished no one given the impression that recognition had been granted the duke of Lancaster as king of England. Later, the royal family and his own councillors insisted that negotiations with the English would be entirely proper if restricted to the subject of Isabelle's return to France.

At the conferences which took place at Leulinghen, however, the English ambassadors had been commissioned "sentir l'entencion du Roy se il vouldroit tenir les trèves prinses entre le Roy et le dit feu roy Richart...."[60] Blanchet and Hangest must make it perfectly clear to the Scottish king the Henry raised the issue of confirming the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. His arguments persuaded Charles to submit the question to his council for further consideration.

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[59]A Scottish envoy, trying to reach France, was captured during the autumn of 1400. See Annales Ricardi II et Henrici IV (1392-1406), pp. 332-333, Historia anglicana, II, p. 246 and Wylie, History of England under Henry the Fourth, I, p. 132.

[60]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, p. 189.

Its members believed the king should not break the truce of 1396 since it embraced not only him alone "mais ses alliez, leur royaumes, terres seignouries et subgiez."[61] Furthermore, the Anglo-French agreement expressly provided for the maintenance of the truce regardless of what occurred after its publication. That Robert III would accept these reasons for the confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce is doubtful. Any inclination which he may have had of resuming friendly relations with the Lancastrian government disappeared when the English invaded Scotland. Robert, too, would be suspicious of Charles' claim that Henry initiated discussions at Leulinghen on the confirmation of the truce. In the notice the English monarch sent Robert of his intention of complying with the conditions set forth in the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce on 24 May, he included a copy of Charles VI's confirmation dated 29 January, a mere four months after the deposition of Richard II.[62] Thus, Robert might be very dubious of Charles VI's version of why he opened discussions with their mutual enemy.

Further explanations given Robert III of French conduct toward England seemed more plausible. Charles VI maintained that he only negotiated with Henry, duke of

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[61] Ibid., p. 190.

[62] Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 184. Commission for English ambassadors to notify Robert III, king of Scotland of Henry IV's confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce, 24 May 1400.

Lancaster, because of "la grant affection qu'il a du dit retour de sa dicte fille...."[63] For this reason he sent Henry two ambassadors carrying instructions demanding Isabelle's release from English custody. Besides the advantage of gaining a personal interview with the duke of Lancaster, the diplomats could procure from him a safe-conduct, guaranteeing them unmolested passage to Scotland where French envoys had not been able to go before due to the English naval patrol in the Channel. Charles considered the safe arrival of his representatives in Scotland necessary for the maintenance of the Franco-Scottish alliance. He understood that Henry had been engaged in discussions with the Scots in which he attempted "rompre les ligues et amistiés qui ont esté de long temps et encores sont, tenues et gardées fermement entre les roys de France et d'Escoce."[64] Hangest and Blanchet must assure the king of Scotland of Charles' desire to preserve the Franco-Scottish alliance[65] and warn him against believing any reports which the English circulated about Anglo-French conferences. They dealt with the

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[63]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, p. 190.

[64]Ibid., pp. 190-191.

[65]Unconfirmed reports of the Anglo-Scottish war had reached the French court. Charles VI closed his instructions for the French ambassadors with this excuse to Robert III for not having sent him aid: "Le Roy n'a point sçeu de certain que le dit duc [of Lancaster] lui face querre, car d'Engleterre lui viennent peu de nouvelles, et du dit roy d'Escoce n'en a eu aucunes. Pour quoy il n'en a peu aucune chose sçavoir, et par ce le doit avoir de ce pour excusé." Ibid., p. 192.

return of Isabelle, which solely motivated French negotiations with Henry, duke of Lancaster.

Charles VI revealed his deep concern over the release of his daughter by taking extra precautions with the embassy designated for England. On the same day he issued orders for Blanchet and Hangest to visit Scotland, he broadened their original instructions drawn up in August.[66] Whey they arrived at the English court, Blanchet and Hangest, in addition to acknowledging Henry as "nostre cousin d'Engleterre," should recognize him as "cellui qui se dit roy d'Engleterre,"[67] and request an audience with Isabelle. She must be told of the rational mental condition of Charles who wished her to follow precisely the instructions of his ambassadors. If she personally had the opportunity of talking with Henry, Isabelle was to beseech him for permission to leave England under the conditions stipulated in the marriage contract of 1396, stressing her "très grant désir de veoir le Roy et la Royne, et de retourner devers eux."[68] Beyond this request, however, she could not go. No oral promises or written agreements must be entered into on her part for the marriage to anyone chosen by Henry for "elle ne puist et doie retourner devers eux, franche et

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[66]Ibid., pp. 193-197. Charles VI's further instructions for the French ambassadors nominated for the English embassy, 6 September 1400.

[67]Ibid., p. 193.

[68]Ibid., p. 194.

desliée de tous liens et obligacions de mariage et autre quelconques."[69] It was incumbent on the French ambassadors to discover if pressures had been brought to bear on Isabelle to marry again. If any matrimonial arrangements had been concluded between her and Henry, she would be compelled to remain in England.

After Blanchet and Hangest conferred with his daughter, Charles VI wanted discussions begun on her return to France. If Henry had authorized his council to negotiate this subject, the French envoys were bound to demand her release from English custody by 1 November and to proceed no further in obtaining an interview with the duke of Lancaster. On the other hand, if no such powers had been given the council, they must go wherever Henry resided at the time and personally meet with him, praying for the restitution of Isabelle to her father. Should he grant their request, Charles insisted that his deputies guard against making concessions on other problems existing between England and France. English and French ambassadors had agreed in July to hold a conference at Leulinghen on 15 October. The meeting would take place as scheduled, Charles stipulated, and deal with the many differences between the two realms, provided Isabelle first rejoined her family at Paris.[70]

Armed with these elaborate instructions from the king,

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[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid., pp. 195-197.

Pierre Blanchet and Jean de Hangest left Paris on 1 October.[71] Bad weather in the Channel delayed them for several days at Boulogne, but then on 12 October, they embarked for England, landing at Sandwich and from there, traveling on the following day to Canterbury where Walter Skirlaw, bishop of Durham, and William Heron, lord of Say, met them. The two English ambassadors were setting out for Leulinghen in order to be on time for the Anglo-French conference arranged for 15 October. The bishop of Durham delayed his departure, dining with Blanchet and Hangest at his lodging in Canterbury and conferring with them about their mission. He informed the French envoys that Isabelle was expected at Canterbury on 30 October, but that his lord, Henry IV had led forces into Wales in order to quell an uprising there. When they asked him "se il avoit povoir et puissance de nous rendre et restituer la royne d'Angleterre selon le contenu des lettres dudit marriage,"[72] he told them that no authorization had been given for her release by Henry, who would never consent to Isabelle's departure from England before talking with her.

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[71]For the French Embassy to England, see Jean de Hangest's own account, Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, pp. 366-377 and Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, II, pp. 753-754; Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, pp. 143-144; MS. Lebaud printed in Chronicque de la traison et mort de Richart, p. 105. The monk of St. Denis provided the least reliable account, placing the events in the wrong year and claiming that "De Hangest et de Hugavilla domini cum magistro Petro Blancheti, regis secretario, propter hoc transfretaverunt." The Chronicler of MS. Lebaud, too, asserts that Charles VI sent his ambassadors "pluseur fois" to England.

[72]Jean de Hangest, Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 367.

Since the bishop of Durham possessed no power to proceed in the negotiations, the French diplomats asked him to escort them to his lord, stressing that more could be accomplished working together than if he journeyed to Leulinghen for the Anglo-French conference, which they, at any rate, were unable to guarantee would take place as arranged in July. The bishop,[73] disregarding their arguments, advised them to meet with Thomas Percy, earl of Worcester, who, although a member of the English embassy destined for France, had remained in London with the king's council. Consequently, they departed from Canterbury, having achieved little in the way of securing Isabelle's freedom.

Hangest and Blanchet arrived at London on 16 October. The same evening, they received a visit from the earl of Worcester who, much to their dismay, possessed no authority to grant Isabelle's release from English custody. He did promise, however, to assemble the king's councillors[74] on the following day so the French ambassadors could discuss their mission with them. At that meeting, "exposa ledit maistre Pierre Blanchet audis conselliers comment le roy,

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[73]The king's council recalled the bishop of Durham from his mission to France on 22 October 1400. The Anglo-French conference planned for 15 October never took place. Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, II, p. 82.

[74]Henry IV's advisers apparently believed that the king was prepared to release Isabelle very soon, for they commissioned two persons to provide horses for Isabelle's departure from England. Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 191. Orders for horses for Isabelle's journey to France, 14 October 1400.

nostre seigneur, nous envoioit par delà par devers la royne, sa fille, à lequelle il envoioit lettres...."[75] He requested permission for himself and Hangest to deliver the letters personally in order to have an audience with Isabelle. Henry's advisers agreed to allow them an interview with the young queen and inquired if they wished to lay any other business before the council. Blanchet responded that all further discussions must be held with their lord, according to his instructions from Charles VI. He asked the English councillors to select certain persons to guide him and his colleague to wherever Henry might be in Wales. They decided to put off giving a reply until after the French envoys concluded their conference with Isabelle.

Jean de Hangest met with Isabelle at Havering-atte-Bower on 18 October. Blanchet did not accompany him because during the preceding night he fell seriously ill. The young widow received the letters[76] from her father, but the earl of Worcester opened and read them to her. He remained present while Hangest told Isabelle of how Charles VI had sent him to find out "son estat et santé,"[77] and to bring

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[75]Jean de Hangest, Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 368.

[76]One of the letters is printed in Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, p. 187. Letter from Charles VI to his daughter, August 1400. It contains little of interest because the king anticipated the English would read the letter before allowing Isabelle to see it.

[77]Jean de Hangest, Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 369.

her news of the French royal family. The earl's presence prevented him from saying more. Worcester, an experienced diplomat himself, knew the French ambassador possessed secret instructions and inquired if Hangest had private messages intended only for the young queen. Such a direct question in medieval diplomatic talks might have upset a less-experienced negotiator than Hangest, who rose to the occasion by concocting an acceptable story on the spot. "Ma très-redoubtée dame la royne," he maintained, "m'avoit bien chargié et commandé aucunes choses à dire à la royne d' Angleterre, sa fille, lesquelles je lui diroie à part...."[78] The earl apparently believed Hangest for he permitted him to continue speaking with Isabelle alone in her private chambers. Hangest informed the young girl that Charles VI absolutely prohibited her from marrying again while she resided in England. Isabelle promised to obey her father's command even if doing so incurred the wrath of the English who had tried to persuade her to enter into new matrimonial arrangements on several occasions.[79] When she began weeping from thoughts

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[78]Ibid., p. 370. Marcel Thibault, Isabeau de Bavière, pp. 336-337 maintains that Charles VI's wife always opposed any English marriage for Isabelle because she hoped to marry her daughter into a prominent German family. Beyond this comment, Thibault attributes no special messages on her part to Isabelle.

[79]Jean de Hangest, Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 370. Isabelle informed the French ambassador that on the subject of marriage "il estoit vray que on lui en avoit parlé plusieurs fois d'aucuns et d' aucunes qui estoient à l'ostel, mais ne se doubtast son seigneur et père qu' elle n' avoit oncques pensée, ne vouloir de désobéir à son commandement, et que pour doubte de mort ne le feroit."

about home, Hangest ended the conversation.

When Hangest arrived at London, he found Pierre Blanchet very ill. The next day, at noon, Blanchet died.[80] The king's councillors, the mayor of London, and other dignitaries of the realm attended the funeral services for Blanchet, which took place on 21 October. Although deeply saddened by the death of his colleague, Hangest wasted no time in resuming discussions with the English.[81] He requested a safe-conduct from Thomas Percy, the earl of Worcester, for the purpose of traveling across England into Wales where he could confer with Henry on his mission. Worcester advised him to wait in London until Saturday, the twenty-third of October at which time he expected news of his lord. On 23 October, a messenger from Worcester informed Hangest that the earl had left London to meet Henry, who would be returning soon from Wales. When Henry reached Windsor three days later, he immediately sent for the French ambassador in order to speak

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[80]Blanchet died on 19 October. The King's Council sent Sir John Cheyne of Beckford, one of its members, to ask Jean de Hangest to delay the funeral services for Blanchet until 21 October so the mayor of London and other dignitaries of the realm could attend them. Ibid., XVI, p. 371. See also J.S. Roskell, "Sir John Cheyne of Beckford," Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaelogical Society, LXXV (1956), 60 who mentions the episode, but places it in the wrong year (1399).

[81]Hangest discussed his mission with both the earl of Worcester and the chancellor, John Scarle, clerk, who held the chancellorship from 11 November 1399 to 8 March 1401. Jean de Hangest, Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 371. For Scarle, see Kirby, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series XIV (1964), 42-43, 61.

with him.[82]

The audience began poorly for Hangest. His instructions prevented him from addressing Henry as king of England. He escaped an embarrassing moment by greeting him as the sovereign of England, emphasizing that the salutation came from Jean de Hangest, not the king of France. Another more serious problem he could not surmount. Henry demanded his credentials in order to ascertain if Hangest represented "son cousin de France."[83] The French ambassador replied that no such papers had been given him, but that he would relate the messages from Charles VI at the king's convenience. Upon hearing Hangest's response, Henry dismissed him and summoned his councillors. After deliberating with them, he recalled Hangest asking why Charles VI wrote Isabelle letters, but sent none for him. European rulers ordinarily expected foreign diplomats to present them with letters from their lords. Charles' only excuse for not following diplomatic protocol would have been his mental condition[84] but now he

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[82]**At Windsor,** Hangest relates, "vint ledit conte /Worcester/ auquel je demanday quant il plairoit à son seigneur que je parlasse à lui et que il me le feist savoir, et il me respondi que si feroit-il, et tost comme je eus disné, me manda ledit conte que je alasse devers son seigneur quant il me plairoit, et lors je y alay." Jean de Hangest, Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, pp. 371-372.

[83]Ibid., XVI, p. 372.

[84]Henry IV, having been at Paris in 1399, not only knew of Charles VI's insanity but sent him letters during the summer and early autumn of 1400 inquiring about his state of mind: "Henri...à nostre tres cher et tres amé

obviously was well enough to be able to write Isabelle. Henry added that, if Hangest possessed letters patent, which duly accredited him as Charles VI's envoy, permission would be granted for him to discuss his mission with the king's councillors. Hangest retorted that his orders called for no further meetings with them.

Although he became angry at the French plenipotentiary, Henry did not terminate the interview. He offered to hear the French envoy as Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, rather than as an official representative of Charles VI.[85] Hangest, however, obstinately refused the proposition. As a private party, he would say nothing. If Henry refused him recognition as the ambassador from the French king, he was determined to leave England. With the discussions stalemated again, Henry consulted his Council[86] for the second time.

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cousin de France par mesme la grace salut et dileccion. Pur ce que nous desirons bien assavoir sovent certenes novelles de vostre bon estat et parfaite santé, prions à Messire tendrement de cuer qu'il vous vuille toudiz ottroyer...." See Wallon, Richard II, pp. 533-534. Letter from Henry IV to Charles VI, king of France, 24 June 1400. Wallon cites two other letters from Henry IV to Charles VI dated 22 August 1400 and 30 September on the same subject.

[85]Henry IV told the French ambassador that "comme message de son cousin de France ne m'oïroit-il point, mais s' aucune chose comme seigneur de Hengneville je lui vouloie dire, que il me oïroit volentiers." Jean de Hangest, Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 372.

[86]The king's councillors played such a vital role in these discussions that those present either at London or Windsor during Jean de Hangest's mission warrant recognition. They included according to the French ambassador's own account: Richard Clifford, clerk, keeper of the privy seal, John Scarle, clerk, chancellor, Thomas Percy, earl of

He instructed the earl of Worcester and the bishop of Durham to ask Hangest for the powers which Charles had given him. The French deputy decided against revealing them. Henry's arrogant behavior irritated him, but more important was his fear that, if the English king read the powers, he would end the audience because they failed to acknowledge him properly as the ruler of England. Consequently, Hangest refused to disclose his powers until after he delivered the messages from Charles VI. Henry expressed great astonishment at "la forme et manière"[87] in which Charles had sent an ambassador without credentials to the English court. Nevertheless, he consented to listen to whatever Hangest wished to say.

The French diplomat, accordingly, revealed his mission. He demanded the release of Isabelle from English custody, which must be granted according to the marriage contract concluded in 1396. It guaranteed the return of Isabelle to France free from all bonds of matrimony and other obligations, if Richard II died, leaving no heirs. Henry had signed the agreement in 1396, swearing to observe its conditions. Hangest now expected that Henry execute his oath and send Isabelle home by 1 November. Henry, on his side,

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Worcester, Walter Skirlaw, bishop of Durham, and Sir John Cheyne of Beckford. Ibid., XVI, pp. 368, 371, 373. During the Chancellorship of John Scarle, 11 November 1399 - 8 March 1401, these men were among those who most frequently attended the king's council. See Kirby, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series XIV (1964), p. 61

[87]Jean de Hangest, Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 373.

postponed giving the French ambassador an answer for two days while he deliberated with his council. On 28 October, he announced his decision. Isabelle would be permitted to leave England with all of her property except for the two-hundred-thousand francs of her dowry. One month after Charles VI officially released him from the obligation of repaying them, Henry agreed to deliver Isabelle into French hands at Leulinghen. The English councillors recognized that Henry owed the two-hundred-thousand francs, but claimed the sum could be deducted from the unpaid balance of Jean II's ransom. Hangest protested against their arguments, but finally concurred with the English on reserving the question of Isabelle's dowry for later Anglo-French conferences. Still Henry's basic offer did not change. He promised "par la foy, serement et loyauté de son corps, comme chevalier et roy, que sans fraude, sans mal engin, ne déception aucune..."[88] to send Isabelle home one month after her father discharged him from the debt of two-hundred-thousand francs. Unable to obtain any further concessions from Henry, Hangest held another brief interview with Isabelle and then embarked for France.

The Question of Isabelle's Dowry

The French diplomat's remarks at the English court caused Henry to consider further his policy concerning

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[88] Ibid., XVI, p. 375.

Isabelle's release.[89] On 12 November, he asked the faculty at the University of Oxford to give him advice on "certeines questiones et doubts, touchantes restitution de la roigne et de ses biens et joialx et certeine compensation de certeines sommes de monoie...."[90] These questions, drawn up by the king's council in September, had been submitted to the leading lawyers of the realm for their legal opinions. Henry now desired additional comment on them. His councillors had set forth carefully the conditions agreed upon in the marriage contract of 1396:

> Item, concordatum erat quod, si post solemnizacionem dicti matrimonii rex Anglie discesserit sine liberis de dicto matrimonio procreatis, et quod dicta regina ipsum regem supervixerit, ipsa existente infra etatem vel etate XII annorum plenarie non completorum, summa quingentorum mille francorum, aut illud quod fuerit solutum de dicta majori summa ultra summam trecentorum mille francorum, deberet restitui prefate regine: ad quod dictus rex Anglie obligavit se et heredes et successores suos et habentes causam ac omnia bona sua mobilia et immobilia, tunc

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[89]Besides considering the legal problems involved in releasing Isabelle, Henry IV sent a spy, John Brampton "to France, to watch for and obtain news in those parts concerning the estate and condition of the King's enemies there." Issues of the Exchequer, p. 280. Payment for John Brampton's wages and expenses while in France, 11 December 1400. For other espionage activities of Brampton, see C.P.R. Henry IV, vol. I (1399-1401): 6 September 1400, Mandate to all sheriffs, p. 349; Ibid.,: 6 February 1401, Appointment for John Brampton, p. 422.

[90]Rymer, Foedera, Vol. III, pt. IV, p. 191. Questions concerning the restitution of Isabelle submitted to the faculty of the University of Oxford, 12 November 1400.

> presencia et futura, consensu tamen parliamenti ad hoc non interveniente.[91]

They wanted to know if Henry was obligated to carry out all of the provisions of the marriage contract since Richard II concluded the agreement in 1396 without consulting Parliament. Could Henry refuse to pay back the two-hundred-thousand francs of Isabelle's dowry on the grounds that Parliament never consented to the matrimonial arrangements.

If not, the king's councillors inquired into the degree of liability which Henry might be compelled to assume. They noted that

> vigore tractatus, dominus noster rex modernus, tempore quo fuerat comes Derbeie, et alii domini proximiores de regali sanguine omnes simul et singuli, pro se et particulariter propriis heredibus et successoribus et habentibus causam, per suas litteras promiserunt, ex certa sua sciencia et plenaria voluntate, quod, si dictus rex Ricardus decederet ante consummacionem dicti maritagii, dicta regina...deberet plene restitui, cum omnibus jocalibus et bonis suis, regi Francie, patri suo, heredi et successori suo...."[92]

That is, Henry, along with other great magnates of the realm, bound himself personally in 1396 to send Isabelle home with her jewels and possessions if Richard II died before consummating the marriage. How to interpret the phrase "cum omnibus jocalibus et bonis suis" troubled Henry's advisers. Did it refer to the property and jewels which Isabelle

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[91] Chronicon Adae de Usk, p. 49. The questions drawn up by the King's Council dealing with Anglo-French differences on the release of Isabelle are written down in full by Adam of Usk. See Ibid., pp. 48-54.

[92] Ibid., p. 50.

brought with her from France or to the possessions acquired since her arrival in England? Did it include the two-hundred-thousand francs of her dowry?

In case Henry must repay them, his councillors asked if the amount could be subtracted from the outstanding balance of Jean II's ransom. Before 22 July 1400, Arnaud de Corbie, the chancellor of France, informed the bishop of Durham of French objections against honoring the debt owed for Jean's release from imprisonment in England.[93] Although no records of these proceedings survive, an account of French arguments opposing the settlement of the obligation can be reconstructed from the questions drawn up by the king's councillors.[94] Henry could not claim the unpaid balance of Jean's ransom for several reasons. The treaty of Brétigny (24 October 1360) stipulated that Jean II must pay three million crowns to Edward III, but it did not explain why the French king incurred such a huge debt. In other words, the English neglected to designate the three million crowns as ransom money. This omission disturbed the French, but the conditions under which Jean signed the agreement gave them more concern. As a prisoner of the English at Calais in 1360, they urged,

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[93]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, p. 184. Response of the French council to the proposals of the English ambassadors, 22 July 1400. The meeting between the chancellor and the bishop of Durham must have occurred between 18 May 1400 when Henry IV first commissioned his representatives to demand the outstanding balance of Jean II's ransom and 22 July 1400.

[94]Chronicon Adae de Usk, pp. 51-52.

Jean concluded the treaty of Brétigny because he feared his captors. Such coercion coupled with the numerous violations of the treaty committed later by Edward III automatically nullified any of the provisions set forth in it. The English denied the charge of coercion, maintaining that Jean II, after gaining his freedom, sent Edward III letters in which he again bound himself and his heirs to pay the remainder of the ransom. Henry's advisers now wanted the leading lawyers of the kingdom and the faculty at Oxford to supply additional answers refuting French interpretations of the treaty of Brétigny and Edward III's infractions of it.

Besides requesting advice on the validity of the English demand for the outstanding balance of Jean II's ransom, the king's councillors posed other questions dealing with the two-hundred-thousand francs of Isabelle's dowry.[95] A difficulty arose in deducting them from the money still owed for Jean's release from English captivity. According to the marriage contract of 1396, they belonged to Isabelle, not her father. She was not obligated in any way to discharge the debt incurred by Jean, whose rightful heir, Charles VI must assume that responsibility. Since he no longer legally possessed any claim to the two-hundred-thousand francs, they could not be set off against the unpaid amount of Jean's ransom. Henry's advisers, however, thought differently. They sought a solution to the dilemma. If it

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[95] Ibid., pp. 53-54.

was surmounted and the king proceeded with the plan of subtracting the two-hundred-thousand francs from the remainder of Jean's ransom, his councillors believed the Anglo-French negotiations concerning Isabelle's return to France might be adversely affected. Again, the English ambassadors had promised in an agreement concluded with the representatives of Charles VI in July at Leulinghen to send Isabelle home with her property before 2 February 1401. Should Charles, upon hearing of Henry's scheme, refuse to give a quittance discharging him of all obligations to Isabelle, the English councillors desired an opinion on a possible response which they planned. Could Henry's emissaries withdraw their previous committment of turning Isabelle over to the French until Charles officially declared the English king free of all liability concerning her?

This question struck at the heart of the differences between the two kings. Henry wanted a quittance from the king of France which especially discharged him from paying back the two-hundred-thousand francs before he granted permission for Isabelle's departure from England. Jean de Hangest reported the offer to Charles VI, but Henry received no reply. Jean Juvenal des Ursins, bishop of Beauvais, probably best summed up French reaction to Henry's proposal. The king's ambassadors "furent bien long-temps en Angleterre, sans ce qu'ils y eussent rien fait."[96] That the Hangest-

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[96]Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, p. 144.

Blanchet embassy accomplished little cannot be debated. That it created new feelings of animosity in France must be noted. Rumors circulated about the mission to England, but differed substantially from the official account written by Jean de Hangest. In popular versions of the embassy's negotiations in England, Blanchet argued so strongly for Isabelle's release that "les Anglois conceurent grand haine contre luy et aussi contre son compagnon."[97] They vented their anger by poisoning both French envoys who became violently ill.

The Delay in Isabelle's Release: the Hostile French Reaction

Such a story, undoubtedly inflamed the average Frenchman, while Charles VI, better informed, boiled with indignation for other reasons. His resentment, however, did not reveal itself until the beginning of the new year. On 14 January 1401, he granted the duchy of Aquitaine with its revenues to his eldest son Louis, who was only five years old. Upon his accession to the French throne, Charles had ordered the duchy seized and automatically reunited with the royal domain.[98] For the present, he claimed the allegiance of the nobles of Aquitaine and prepared to receive an oath of homage from one of the most powerful vassals of Henry IV in southwestern France. Early in March, Archambaud de Grailly, captal de Buch, and former senechal of Aquitaine for the English, publically

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[97] Ibid., p. 143.

[98] Ordonnances des rois de France, VIII, pp. 418-420.

renounced his loyalty to Henry IV at Paris.[99] Charles granted him on 10 March letters of remission in which he pardoned the captal for having served the English in Gascony and bestowed on him and his two sons the county of Foix.[100] As proof of his deep devotion for Charles VI, the new comte de Foix handed over to the French royal government five towns and castles which he had captured on the frontier of the duchy of Aquitaine.[101] He further strengthened the bonds between himself and the French royal family in April. Archambaud de Grailly and his two sons, the future Jean I de Foix and Gaston, captal de Buch, entered into a contract with Louis, duc d'Orléans, whereby they agreed to become his servants.[102]

That Henry IV at least knew something of the hostile policies being pursued by Charles VI in connection with Aquitaine was revealed on 21 January 1401 in the opening

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[99] Flourac, Jean Ier comte de Foix, pièces justificatives no. VI, pp. 215-218. Oath of Archambaud de Grailly, 10 March 1401.

[100] La Gascogne dans les registres du trésor des chartes, p. 212. Letters of remission for Archambaud de Grailly, 10 March 1401. On the same day Charles VI commanded Louis de Sancerre, constable of France, to evacuate all the places occupied by the royal forces in the county of Foix during the invasion of that land in 1399. Flourac, Jean Ier comte de Foix, pièces justificatives no. V, pp. 212-215.

[101] Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. IV, p. 14. Commission to English representatives treating with the French in Aquitaine, 18 September 1401.

[102] Monuments historiques, no. 1784, p. 426. Letters of Archambaud de Grailly, comte de Foix, to Louis, duc d'Orléans, 4 April 1401. See also P.S. Lewis, "Decayed and non-decayed Feudalism in later medieval France," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XXXVII (November, 1964), p. 161

address to his second Parliament delivered by William Thirnyng, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. He declared that Charles VI seemed more bent on war than peace.[103] The Commons agreed with his estimate of French intentions. They advised the king "considerer, comment il est pluis semblable q̃ les Franceys se purposent d'avoir les Guerres q̃ la Paix."[104] The French had recently challenged certain lords and other notable persons of the realm to meet them in the lists. The Commons believed that the challenges were issued by the French as a means of satisfying their warlike designs. They pleaded with Henry to prohibit the encounters because of the "graundes Costages des ditz Chalengez si cel purpose se preigne, et auxi la grand aventure de leur [the English knights'] corps diversement."[105] The anti-French sentiments of the Commons also resulted from other remarks of Thirnyng in his opening speech before Parliament. He announced ominous news from France: the duchy of Aquitaine "q'est annexe a la Corone d'Engleterre...est au present en grand peril, pur ceo q̃ le Roy Franceis ad fait son eisne fitz Duc de Guyen...."[106] In making his eldest son, Louis, the duke of Aquitaine, Charles performed an act which seriously threatened the peace, but Henry, on his side, still planned

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[103] Rotuli Parliamentorum, III, p. 454.

[104] Ibid., p. 456.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid., p. 454.

to "restorer Madame la Roingne, ove toutes ses joialx, et autre sommes...."[107] Through his spokesman, Chief Justice Thirnyng, he justified to Parliament his request for funds partly because of the great expense involved in sending Isabelle home.

Although Henry expressed his intention of handing Isabelle over to her family in Thirnyng's address before Parliament late in January, she remained in England beyond 2 February 1401, the date by which the English ambassadors had promised her release. Charles VI refused the quittance which Henry IV demanded so that further negotiations proved necessary. On 1 April the English king authorized his experienced diplomatic team of the bishop of Durham, the earl of Worcester, the lord of Say and Richard Holm, canon of St. Peter's minster in York, to meet with the representatives of Charles VI at Leulinghen on 23 May.[108] He directed them to put forward demands for the unpaid balance of Jean II's ransom and for redress for infringements of Henry's rights in the duchy of Aquitaine. In a more conciliatory vein, they were ordered to treat for the restoration of Isabelle, a new confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce

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[107] Ibid.

[108] Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 200. Commission for the English ambassadors to treat with the French, 1 April 1400. Henry IV also granted William Heron, lord of Say, permission to proceed to Paris if it became necessary for a conference with Charles VI or his uncles. Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, pp. 129-130. Letter from Henry IV to his council, 20 May 1401.

and any other leagues or alliances which the French emissaries might be prepared to conclude. They,[109] in turn, voiced a reluctance to join the English deputies at Leulinghen until Henry issued them a safe-conduct. On the same day that the bishop of Durham and his colleagues received their instructions for the projected Anglo-French conference, he empowered them to grant the French diplomats the safe-conduct which they requested.[110]

Isabelle Returns Home

With differences between them ironed out, the English and French plenipotentiaries assembled at Leulinghen during the last week in May. They soon reached a satisfactory settlement.[111] The English promised to bring Isabelle by 1 July to either Canterbury or Dover, where she would embark, good weather in the Channel permitting, for Calais. While she remained there, both sides agreed on a further meeting at Leulinghen for the purpose of hearing Charles VI's letter of quittance. If the bishop of Durham and his colleagues accepted the conditions set forth in the document, French

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[109]The French ambassadors during these final negotiations for Isabelle's release included Jean de Montaigu, bishop of Chartres, Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, Gontier Col, the king's secretary, and Jean de Poupaincourt, the First President of the Parlement de Paris.

[110]Ibid., vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 1. Power for the English ambassadors to grant a safe-conduct to the French envoys, 1 April 1401.

[111]Ibid., vol. IV, pt. 1, pp. 3-4. Agreement for the return of Isabelle to France, 27 May 1401.

envoys at Calais would check the jewels and property which Isabelle brought with her from England against an inventory[112] of them drawn up in 1396 and make final arrangements for her release. The French, then, consented to deliver Charles VI's letter of quittance to Henry IV's representatives at the same time as they received Isabelle from the English at Leulinghen. On the day after her release, she was required to sign a bond pledging to abstain in the future from all opposition, intrigue or evil designs against England. When transactions concerning Isabelle were completed, the English and French ambassadors recognized the need for another meeting between themselves. They stipulated that four days after the formal restoration of Charles VI's daughter a conference would take place, "pour remedier et reparer les attemptatz et excez fais, d'une partie et d'autre, contre la teneur des trieves."[113] The English especially wanted redress for infringement of Henry's rights in Aquitaine or more specifically for the creation of a new duke for the duchy by Charles VI, the attempts of Charles d'Albret to persuade Gascon nobles from their English allegiance, and the successful conversion to the French side of one of the most powerful vassals of Henry IV, Archambaud de Grailly,

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[112]For the inventory of Isabelle's jewelry, see Chronicque de la traison et mort de Richart, pp. 108-113.

[113]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 4. The English complained "en especial de ce, que ceulx de France ont fait et cree un duc en Guienne, et du fait du Conte de Fouz, et des fais du Seigneur de Lebret...."

comte de Foix.

While the bishop of Durham and his associates pressed for compensation for infractions of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce in Aquitaine, they concurred with their French counterparts in reserving the two most vital issues which divided them for later discussion. Neither party mentioned in the agreement the outstanding balance of John II's ransom or the two-hundred-thousand francs of Isabelle's dowry. Yet these very omissions must be considered a serious diplomatic defeat for the English ambassadors, who, with Isabelle in their possession, could have compelled Charles VI to grant them almost any concession they wished. To give up Isabelle for the promise of one Anglo-French conference revealed just how far the English were willing to go in the hope of achieving a lasting peace with France. It is clear, too, that they arrived at a private understanding with the French deputies concerning the terms of Charles VI's letter of quittance because on 3 June he published it in a form contrary to Henry's original demands.[114] He declared the king of England discharged from all obligations towards his daughter, except for the two-hundred-thousand francs. His uncles--Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, Jean, duc de Berri, and Louis, duc de Bourbon--who were parties to the marriage contract of 1396 confirmed the quittance six days later.[115] Charles

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[114] Ibid., vol. IV, pt. 1, pp. 4-5. Quittance granted by Charles VI, 3 June 1401.

[115] Ibid., vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 5, Confirmations of

even authorized Isabelle to renounce all claims on Henry IV once she gained her freedom at Boulogne and promised a further declaration from her on this subject when she attained her majority.[116] Such elaborate preparation for Isabelle's release would not have been made by the French unless they had been assured in advance of English agreement on the conditions set forth in Charles VI's letter of quittance. The bishop of Durham and his colleagues by no means relinquished demands for the outstanding balance of Jean II's ransom or Henry's right to deduct the two-hundred-thousand francs of Isabelle's dowry from it. They merely tabled these difficulties until after Charles VI's daughter returned to France.

The proposed departure of Isabelle from England on 1 July required extensive arrangements.[117] On 21 June, Henry IV issued a safe-conduct for as many as five hundred persons to accompany the young queen on her journey back

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Charles VI's quittance by Jean, duc de Berri, Philippe, duc de Bourgogne, and Louis, duc de Bourbon, 9 June 1401. The duc de Berri's confirmation is copied incorrectly as 9 July. See Great Britain, Public Record Office, List of Diplomatic Documents, Scottish Documents and Papal Bulls, No. XLIX of Lists and Indexes (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923), p. 35.

[116] Ibid., vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 5. Charles VI's authorization for Isabelle to give a quittance to Henry IV, 3 June 1401.

[117] Even before the agreement concluded at Leulinghen on 27 May 1401, arrangements for Isabelle's departure had been made. On 15 April, Henry IV paid certain men of Dover nearly one hundred pounds to provide passage for Isabelle and her party to France. Issues of the Exchequer, pp. 282-283. On 14 May the council ordered horses requisitioned for Isabelle's journey to France. Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 3.

to France.[118] Her personal retinue included from England a royal duchess and Henry IV's own mother-in-law, two earls, two bishops, four bannerets, six knights, four ladies-in-waiting and seven maids of honor along with over two hundred servants.[119] The estimated cost of their wages, gold and silver vessels, carpets, tents, and other accoutrements needed at Calais, the maintenance of French lords who planned on meeting Isabelle at Dover, and the complete entourage's transportation across the Channel from there exceeded eight thousand pounds.[120] Henry, nevertheless, continued making preparations for the return of Isabelle to France. He placed the earl of Worcester, the bishop of Durham, the lord of Say, and Richard Holm in charge of the formal ceremony of handing Isabelle over to the French with her jewels and other possessions at Leulinghen,[121] granted Jean de Hangest and his party of fifty persons, who were coming to England, for the purpose of accompanying Isabelle back to France, a safe-conduct[122] and ordered three ships and two men-of-war equipped

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[118] Ibid., vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 4. Safe-conduct for five hundred persons to accompany Isabelle to France, 21 June 1401.

[119] Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, pp. 136-142.

[120] Ibid., pp. 130-133, 136-142, 154.

[121] Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 7. Commission for the English ambassadors to restore Isabelle, 21 June 1401.

[122] Lettres des rois, reines et autres personages des cours de France et d'Angleterre, II, pp. 308-309. Safe-conduct for Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, 23 June 1401.

and rigged at Dover by 1 July for the transporting of Isabelle's vast escort to France.[123]

In order to arrive at Dover promptly for the voyage across the Channel, Isabelle left Havering-atte-Bower on 27 June accompanied by two ladies of the royal family--the duchess of Ireland and the duchess of Hereford--to whom the custody of the young queen had been entrusted. The earl of Worcester met them at Tottenham and from there, led Isabelle's cortège towards London. The mayor, aldermen and sheriffs of that town joined the procession at Stamford Hill as it moved on slowly to Hackney, where Thomas, the king's second eldest son, with the earls of Northumberland and Westmorland greeted Isabelle and her party. They escorted the entourage the rest of the way to the royal residence at Westminster.[124] Charles VI's daughter expressed, however, little enthusiasm over the friendly reception, setting out for Dover the next day in a sullen and morose mood further emphasized to those who watched her leave by the black mourning clothes she wore. Some English officials, witnessing her departure, cursed the day she came to England, blaming the young queen for all of the country's ills, while others believed her return home created the threat of still greater troubles for the land,

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[123]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 7. Order to the constable of Dover Castle, 22 June 1401.

[124]Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, p. 145; Wylie, History of England under Henry the Fourth, p. 208.

since the widow of Richard II certainly would wreak her vengeance upon them for the death of her husband.[125] Notwithstanding the doubts which some of Henry's subordinates raised about the wisdom of releasing Isabelle, she proceeded, as agreed in the Anglo-French accord concluded during the last week in May, to Dover. She remained there nearly the whole month of July.[126] What prevented her from leaving England as arranged in May is not known. Yet Henry provided a possible explanation for the delay in a letter which he wrote his councillors early in June. The king informed his advisers that Isabelle's jewelry was now in the possession of his six children but that he had issued orders commanding them to give up her property immediately.[127] Isabelle's return home, therefore, may have been put off until her jewels, which the English must relinquish according to the marriage contract of 1396, could be collected from Henry's sons and daughters.

Whatever the reason for postponing the young queen's departure may have been, Isabelle ultimately embarked for France on 28 July,[128] landing at Calais, where she stayed

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[125] Chronicon Adae de Usk, p. 63.

[126] MS. Lebaud, Chronicque de la traison et mort de Richart, p. 107.

[127] Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, pp. 133-135. Letter from Henry IV to his council, 8 June 1401.

[128] Chronicon Adae de Usk, p. 69. For the official return of Isabelle to the French ambassadors at Leulinghen, see in the order of their importance, Jean Creton, "Histoire

for three days. On 31 July, the earl of Worcester escorted her along with the huge throng of English ladies and lords to Leulinghen.[129] They found there near the chapel, where Richard II had received his infant bride in 1396, a large and magnificent pavilion erected and amply provisioned for Isabelle's comfort by Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, who had arrived a few days earlier at Boulogne. He camped on a neighboring hill about a mile and a half from the enormous tent with five hundred knights and esquires fully

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du Roy d'Angleterre Richard, traictant particulierement la rebellion de ses subiectz et prinse de sa personne. Composee par un gentilhome francois de marque, qui fut a la suite dudict Roy, avecq permission du Roy de France," ed. and trans. J. Webb, Archaeologia: or Miscellaneous Tracts relating to Antiquity, XX (1824), 416-423; MS. Lebaud, Chronique de la traison et mort de Richart, p. 107; Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 4; Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, pp. 145-146; La chronique d' Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, pp. 33-34. English chroniclers, too, mention Isabelle's release but provide much less detail. See Annales Ricardi II et Henrici IV (1392-1406), pp. 331-332; Eulogium Historiarum, III, p. 387; Historia anglicana, II, p. 248; An English Chronicle of the Reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, Henry V, and Henry VI, ed. J.S. Davies (London: Camden Society, 1856), p. 22; Great Britain, Public Record Office, John Capgrave, The Chronicle of England, No. I of the Rolls Series, ed. Rev. Francis Charles Hingeston (London: Longmans, Brown, Green, Longmans and Roberts, 1858), p. 278; Great Britain, Public Record Office, Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden Monachi Cestrensis, No. XXXXI of the Rolls Series, ed. Rev. Joseph Rawson Lumby (9 vols., London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1865-1886), VIII, p. 515; The Brut or the Chronicles of England, No. 136 of the Early English Text Society, ed. Friedrich W.D. Brie (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1908), p. 362; The Great Chronicle of London, ed. A.H. Thomas and E.D. Thornely (London: George W. Jones, 1938), p. 84.

[129]Eulogium Historiarum, III, p. LXIII quotes foreign accounts 1-6 Hen. IV for the date of 31 July 1401 for Isabelle's release at Leulinghen.

armed. If any belated problems arose preventing Isabelle's release, Philippe le Hardi aimed at solving them by the use of force. Such difficulties, however, did not plague the proceedings. The duc de Bourgogne sent his vassal, Waleran de Luxembourg, comte de St. Pol and Ligny, to receive formally the daughter of Charles VI from the English, who had nominated Thomas Percy, earl of Worcester, to hand her over to the French representative. The official ceremony took place in the chapel. Worcester declared upon meeting the comte de St. Pol that Isabelle returned home just as she had been received and if any Frenchman, whatever his rank, asserted the contrary, an Englishman of equal station would meet him in the lists. Since no one challenged the earl on this point, Isabelle joined the comte de St. Pol, who presented the English ambassador with a letter of quittance from Charles VI, releasing Henry from all obligations, except the two-hundred-thousand francs of the young queen's dowry.

When the ceremony ended, Isabelle enjoyed refreshments with the ladies of her retinue from England at the French pavilion, gave them presents according to their rank, and bade them farewell as she went to meet the duc de Bourgogne and Louis, duc de Bourbon, waiting for her on a nearby hill. The royal dukes took her to Boulogne where on the following day, as previously arranged between the English and French ambassadors, Charles VI's daughter signed a quittance discharging Henry of all liability for her property and jewels

with the exception of the two-hundred-thousand francs dower[130] and personally swore an oath never to make any claims against him or his successors.[131] From Boulogne,[132] Isabelle on her way home passed through Abbeville, where Philippe le Hardi turned her over to Louis, duc de Bourbon,[133] who escorted the young queen as far as the abbey of St. Denis which they arrived at on 10 August. In every place through which she traveled, enthusiastic demonstrations of affection greeted her. On approaching Paris, Isabelle was met by Louis, duc d'Orléans, and his uncle, Jean duc de Berri, who conducted her through the capital in the midst of much rejoicing and feasting "car le peuple avoit grant désir de la veoir."[134] Charles VI and his wife received their daughter with equal happiness and delight.

The reunion of Isabelle with her parents at Paris in August of 1401 was the final result of eighteen months of Anglo-French negotiations. Why did Henry IV delay so long

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[130]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 12. Isabelle's quittance from Henry IV and promise of another when she reached her majority, 1 August 1401.

[131]Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, pp. 12-13. Oath of Isabelle, 1 August 1401.

[132]For Isabelle's journey through France and reception at Paris, see MS. Lebaud, Chronique de la traison et mort de Richart, p. 107; Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 4, 6; Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, p. 146; La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, pp. 34-35.

[133]Petit, Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi, p. 316.

[134]MS. Lebaud, Chronique de la traison et mort de Richart, p. 107.

the release of Charles VI's daughter from English custody? He certainly opposed her departure from England in order to force Charles VI to discharge him from repaying the two-hundred-thousand francs dower. Three French chroniclers, however, suggest another more compelling reason. They insist that Henry refused Isabelle permission to return home in the hope of creating a strong alliance with the Valois through the marriage of the young queen to the Prince of Wales.[135] As early as the autumn of 1399, one of the chroniclers asserts, the English king ordered his ambassadors to negotiate a marriage between Isabelle and the future Henry V.[136] Official English records do not support his contention. They reveal that on 29 November 1399 Henry IV directed the bishop of Durham and the earl of Worcester to treat for marriages between the royal families of England and France.[137] Although the Prince of Wales was mentioned specifically in the instructions, Isabelle was not included in them because she remained the wife of Richard II who still was living.

After his death, Henry IV on 19 February 1400 renewed the commission of the English emissaries. He directed them to offer marriage "inter Henricum primogenitum filium nostrum,

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[135]Jean Creton, "Histoire du Roy d'Angleterre Richard," Archaeologia, XX (1824), 413; MS. Lebaud, Chronique de la traison et mort de Richart, p. 106; Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 237.

[136]Jean Creton, Archaelogia, XX (1824), 413.

[137]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 170. Commission to the English ambassadors, 29 November 1399.

principem Walliae, et fratres et sorores suos, et liberos ipsius adversarii nostri aut patruorum et avunculorum suorum praedictorum."[138] How did Henry wish his representatives to interpret their orders? Were they expected to consider Isabelle eligible for marriage to one of Henry IV's sons now that Richard II was dead? It is difficult to answer these questions since no record of the Anglo-French conferences during February and March of 1400 have survived. A tentative conclusion concerning these negotiations can be reached from instructions which Charles VI issued his ambassadors in the following May. He forbade them from discussing "aucun traictié de son /Isabelle's/ mariage" until "elle sera restituée en la puissance du Roy...."[139] The bishop of Durham and the earl of Worcester apparently sought a second English marriage for Isabelle so that Charles prepared the French plenipotentiaries with his reply. If this assumption is correct, the English diplomats at Leulinghen could have offered any one of Henry IV's sons as a prospective husband for Isabelle according to the royal instructions of 19 February. Therefore the French chroniclers' claim that Henry IV wished the Prince of Wales as Isabelle's new spouse can be neither confirmed nor denied from official English records. What can be maintained unequivocally is

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[138] Ibid., vol. III, p. IV, p. 178. Commission to the English ambassadors, 19 February 1400.

[139] Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, p. 67. Instructions for the French ambassadors, May 1400.

that, by the testimony of Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, the English king on several occasions while she was still in England tried to persuade the young queen to wed again.[140]

The Scots Repudiate the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce

When these efforts failed, Henry IV sent Isabelle home, leaving Charles VI free to pursue whatever policy he wished towards England. A real danger existed that the French king, no longer restrained by his daughter's captivity in England, would decide against complying with the terms of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. His chief ally, Robert III, king of Scotland, already refused to observe it. Even an English invasion of his realm did not change Robert's mind. The only concession which he made towards peace with Henry IV was a brief six-week truce beginning on 9 November 1400.[141] During the following year while both countries refrained from new attacks against each other, two important Anglo-Scottish conferences took place, but neither produced significant results.[142] At the second meeting which occurred on 17

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[140]Jean de Hangest, Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 370. See also Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, p. 180. Henry IV's councillors in May of 1400 suggested that Isabelle might be married again while she remained in England.

[141]Rymer, Foedera, vol. III, pt. IV, p. 192. Henry IV's orders to the earl of Northumberland, 28 November 1400.

[142]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 52-56. Letter from the earl of Douglas to Henry IV, 1 February 1402. This letter is dated 1 February 1401 by the editor but internal evidence proves it should be dated a year later.

October at Yetolm in Roxburgh, the earl of Douglas, brother-in-law of the duke of Rothsay, headed the Scottish delegation while Henry Percy, earl of Northumberland, represented the English side as the chief negotiator. Henry IV instructed him and his colleagues to put forth the claim of overlordship in these terms: If Robert III agreed to perform an act of homage for his realm and to supply the English king with five-hundred fighting men on demand, Henry offered him either one-thousand marks or one-thousand pounds worth of land in England. Should these conditions be refused, Henry empowered his ambassadors to accept a year's truce beginning on 11 November.[143] None of these terms, however, proved acceptable to the earl of Douglas, who publically rejected the provisions set forth in the Anglo-French agreement of 1396. Shortly after the conclusion of the conference, he raided English territory, burning the town of Bamburgh and the surrounding countryside.[144]

A state of open war now existed between England and

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[143]Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of Documents relating to Scotland preserved in Her Majesty's Public Record Office, London, ed. Joseph Bain (4 vols., Edinburgh: H.M. General Register House, 1881-1888), IV, pp. 122-123; Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, pp. 168-173; Great Britain, Public Record Office, Rotuli Scotiae in turri londinensi et in domo capitulari westmonasteriensi asservati, Vol. II: Temporibus regum Angliae Ric. II. Hen. IV. V. VI. Ed. IV. Ric. III. Hen. VII. VIII. (1819), p. 159. Instructions for the English ambassadors, 1 September 1400.

[144]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 58-65. Letter from Henry IV to the earl of Douglas, 27 February 1402.

Scotland.[145] Robert III's representatives had repudiated the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. Only one question remained. Would Charles VI follow his ally's lead? The French royal family appeared split on the issue of reviving hostilities with the English. Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, favored peaceful relations with the Lancastrian regime while Charles VI's brother, Louis, wanted war for the purpose of reuniting the duchy of Aquitaine to the royal domain. During the autumn of 1401 Charles VI succumbed to a severe attack of mental illness. The fate of Anglo-French relations, consequently, depended on whether the duc de Bourgogne or the duc d'Orleans emerged victorious in the struggle for control of the French government.

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[145] Chronicon Adae de Usk, p. 68.

CHAPTER IV

THE QUESTION OF WAR OR PEACE WITH ENGLAND: PHILIPPE LE HARDI VERSUS LOUIS d'ORLÉANS

Neither the French nor the English officially broke the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce in the year following the departure of Isabelle from England. Certain French nobles advocated war, but a serious quarrel which developed between Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, and Louis, duc d'Orléans, prevented a renewal of hostilities with England. Because Charles VI suffered more serious and prolonged attacks of mental illness, Philippe and Louis contested for control of the government. Their dispute almost flared up into open civil war late in 1401. Although upon the insistence of other members of the royal family, they soon promised to stop military preparations, each prince still pursued his own policy towards England. Philippe, who emerged victorious in the struggle for power in France, desired peace with the new Lancastrian regime so that the prosperity of Flanders, which depended on free commercial intercourse across the Channel, would be maintained. Louis, on the other hand, favored a resumption of the war directed primarily at the conquest of the duchy of Aquitaine. In the autumn of 1402,

he challenged Henry IV to meet him in person in the lists on the borders of Aquitaine. Henry chose to disregard Louis' challenge and other French provocations occurring since the return of Isabelle to France. Unofficially, however, the English increased privateering activity in the Channel during the summer of 1402.

Anglo-French Negotiations (August - December, 1401)

Three days after the formal release of Isabelle, Walter Skirlaw, bishop of Durham, Thomas Percy, earl of Worcester, William Heron, lord of Say, and Richard Holm, canon of St. Peter's minster in York, assembled at Leulinghen with the French ambassadors--Jean de Montaigu, bishop of Chartres, Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, Jean de Poupaincourt, first president of the Parlement de Paris, and Gontier Col, the king's secretary--in the hope of hammering out an agreement which would solve outstanding differences between them. They did not reach, however, any settlement of such fundamental issues as Charles VI's claim for repayment of the two-hundred-thousand francs dower or Henry IV's demands for the outstanding balance of Jean II's ransom or for redress for infringement of his rights in the duchy of Aquitaine.[1] The negotiators even postponed consideration of compensation

[1]The English emissaries received instructions from Henry IV to put forward these demands on 21 June 1401 along with treating for Isabelle's release. Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 7. Commission for the bishop of Durham and his colleagues, 21 June 1401.

for those on each side injured by violations of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. They decided on the appointment of special arbitrators who would hold conferences in Aquitaine and in Picardy for the reparation of infractions of the Truce in each region.[2]

The procedure for arriving at the actual time and location of these meetings was somewhat circuitous. On 11 November, it was incumbent upon the French representatives to be at Saint-Jean d'Angély and their English counterparts at Bordeaux in Aquitaine. Then both sides would agree on a place and date for discussions dealing with the violations of the Anglo-French accord of 1396. These included especially Henry IV's demands for redress of the infringements of his rights in Aquitaine such as the creation of a new duke for the duchy by Charles VI, the attempts of Charles d'Albret to persuade Gascon nobles from their English allegiance, and the successful conversion to the French side of Archambaud de Grailly, comte de Foix. Two similar Anglo-French conferences were planned for northern France. One was to consider infractions of the Truce in Picardy and Normandy, the English plenipotentiaries at Calais and the French at Boulogne on 11 November to decide on the time and place for their talks. The other concerned violations of the Truce committed at sea which would be judged by two admirals, one

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[2]Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, p. 13. Indenture between the English and French ambassadors for redress of injuries and the preservation of the Truce, 3 August 1401.

English, the other French.[3]

Besides scheduling conferences for the autumn of 1401 in Picardy and Aquitaine, the English and French ambassadors in August resolved upon a reiteration of certain clauses of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. They announced, for example, that "aucuns chastell, ville ou forteresse ne poura estre prins, receu, subtrait, ou acquis, de l'un partie sur l'autre par force d'armes..."[4] or by any other means while the present accord remained in effect. Beyond attempting to prevent new acquisitions of territory by either party, the diplomats at Leulinghen aimed primarily at a restoration of Anglo-French commercial relations. Despite the confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce by Henry IV and Charles VI in 1400, they proclaimed that all English and French merchants could trade freely with each other without special safe-conducts and that merchandise pillaged by corsairs would be returned if the culprits were apprehended. Goods, too, seized as a result of letters of marque or reprisal were to be given back to the original owners. Indeed, both sides agreed on the revocation of all letters of marque and reprisal, stipulating that Charles VI and Henry IV would issue no new ones. To

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[3]Ibid. The clause pertaining to infractions of the Truce committed at sea stated that "les deux admiralx assembleront pour celle cause au dit jour de Saint Martin [11 November], c'estassavoir, cellui de France a Bouloigne, et cellui d'Angleterre a Calaiz, et semblablement feront savoir l'une a l'autre le lieu et jour aux quelz ils vouldront assembler pour la dite cause."

[4]Ibid.

these rulers must be submitted the decisions made between the English and French negotiators who, by 29 September, would inform each other of their lord's approval or disapproval of the various articles of the indenture.

Although the agreement of 3 August presaged friendly relations between England and France, other developments indicated that new Anglo-French fighting seemed imminent. During the summer of 1401, numerous clashes already had occurred at sea between English and French ships,[5] and Henry IV's advisers had considered formally the question of peace or war with France[6] at the same time as final arrangements were being made for Isabelle's return home. In case difficulties arose over her release at Leulinghen, the earl of Rutland, the king's cousin, had assembled at Southampton in July a fleet of fifty ships for the reinforcement of his position in Aquitaine, where he acted as the king's lieutenant.[7] Henry IV's precautionary measure proved justified when, less than two weeks after the English ambassadors turned Isabelle over to her family, relations between England and France deteriorated to the point that

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[5]Adam of Usk reported that "ista estate, classes Anglie et Francie se multum in mari mutuo infestabant." Chronicon Adae de Usk, p. 69.

[6]Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, pp. 143-144. Minutes of the council, end of June, 1401. The councillors decided against war because they desired the consent of Parliament before taking such a drastic step.

[7]C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1401): 14 July 1401, Commissions to John Coux and John Bythan, p. 551.

Henry summoned to Westminster a Great Council at which his advisers discussed the possibility of reopening the struggle with the French.[8] They, apparently, decided against any new bellicose steps because on 18 September Henry named twelve commissioners headed by the earl of Rutland to treat with a similar number from the French side in southern France for infractions of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce committed in Aquitaine.[9] A little more than a month later, the king's council issued a proclamation directing all Henry IV's subjects injured by the French in Picardy or Normandy, on land or sea, to be present at Calais about 11 November for reparation of the damages which they had incurred.[10]

To handle these grievances and to negotiate with Charles VI's representatives in northern France, Henry IV nominated nine distinguished Englishmen. Of the embassy previously empowered to negotiate Isabelle's release from English custody, only William Heron, lord of Say, still acted as the king's ambassador. One French chronicler

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[8]Chronicon Adae de Usk, p. 69. The Great Council was held on 16 August 1401.

[9]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, pp. 14-15. Two commissions for the earl of Rutland and his colleagues to demand redress for infractions of the truce in Aquitaine, 18 September. Henry IV's representatives included the earl of Rutland, the archbishop of Bordeaux, Gaillard de Durefort, sire de Duras, the sire de Lesparre, Mathieu de Gournai, senechal of Landes, the mayor of Bordeaux, William Faringdon, the constable of Bordeaux, the sire de Montferrand, the captain of Lourdes, the abbot of Saint-Sever, and two doctors of law, Pelerin de Fave and Bertrand de Ast.

[10]Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, p. 17. Order to the sheriffs of London, 27 October 1401.

assessed the character of the lord of Say as a man "who knew well how to behave himself...."[11] His three colleagues--Walter Skirlaw, bishop of Durham, Thomas Percy, earl of Worcester, and Richard Holm, canon of St. Peter's minster in York--remained in England. Skirlaw undertook no new assignments from Henry IV, but occupied himself with religious matters until his death in 1406.[12] The earl of Worcester, on the other hand, served the king in new ways. Early in 1402 he became lieutenant of South Wales, captain of Cardigan and Lampeter castles and tutor to the Prince of Wales.[13] While Percy gave up diplomatic duties, Richard Holm resumed his career as an ambassador of the realm in the summer of 1402.[14] In the place of these three experienced diplomats, Henry IV chose in the autumn of 1401 eight new commissioners, some of whom had either close personal or family connections with the king.[15] The chief secular plenipotentiary, for

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[11]Jean Creton, "Histoire du Roy d'Angleterre Richard," Archaelogia, XX (1824), 411.

[12]The Dictionary of National Biography, XVIII, p. 358.

[13]Ibid., XV, p. 877.

[14]L. Mirot and E. Déprez, "Les ambassades anglaises pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans (1327-1450)," Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes, LXI (1900), 23.

[15]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 17. Two commissions for the English ambassadors, 1 November 1401. The English envoys included John Bottlesham, bishop of Rochester, John Beaufort, earl of Somerset, John Norbury, captain of Guines Castle, Sir Thomas Rempston, admiral in the west, William Heron, lord of Say, Richard Grey, lord of Codnor, Sir John Doreward of Essex, Speaker of the Parliament of 1399, and two doctors of law, Ralph Selby and Simon Sydenham.

example, was John Beaufort, the king's half-brother and earl of Somerset, who had replaced Peter Courtenay as captain of Calais in April of 1401.[16] Little is known about the other leader of the English delegation--John Bottlesham, bishop of Rochester--and his relationship to Henry IV except that he had assumed his post on 4 July during the first year of that monarch's reign (1400).[17] Despite the great pains which Henry took to send an impressive diplomatic mission to France, Charles VI's emissaries postponed the conference scheduled about 11 November until the end of the month. Henry believed that "ycelle prorogacion pluistost procede de fraude et subtilitee de ceux de France, que de bone entencion."[18]

English suspicion of French motives was, in part, well-founded. A clever but illegal diplomatic manoeuver plotted by the bishop of Durham and his colleagues just before the release of Isabelle infuriated Charles VI. They had

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Those personally associated with the king were John Norbury and Sir Thomas Rempston, who had accompanied Henry on his expedition to the Baltic in 1390-91 and had shared their lord's exile in France. See Jacob, The Fifteenth Century 1399-1485, pp. 1, 18; J.S. Roskel, The Commons and their Speakers in English Parliaments (1376-1523) (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1965), pp. 137-139; The Dictionary of National Biography, VIII, pp. 642-643, XVI, p. 895.

[16]Ibid., XXII, pp. 158-159; Kirby, Revue du Nord, XXXVII (1955), 20.

[17]A.B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Cambridge to 1500 (Cambridge: University Press, 1963), p. 76.

[18]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 18. Instructions for the bishop of Rochester and his colleagues at Calais, 22 November 1401.

inserted the phrase "nostri mariti successor"[19] after Henry's name in the quittance which the young queen signed at Boulogne. The French ambassadors, in the excitement of the moment, did not preceive the significance of the phrase which recognized Henry as the legitimate successor of Richard II. No sooner had Isabelle joined her family at Paris than a document was published explaining how the mistake had occurred.[20] While she remained at Calais (28 July - 31 July), the English ambassadors had compelled her to sign the quittance in which she named Henry as her husband's successor. Although Charles had authorized his daughter to give a quittance,[21] discharging the English ruler from all obligations, except the two-hundred-thousand francs dower, he never gave her permission to acknowledge Henry as king of England. According to Isabelle, she had disobeyed her father at Calais "pour doubte de mort et pour eschever le péril de honte et villenie qui vraisemblablement pouvoient ensuir sur nous et nostre corps."[22] In other words, Isabelle denied granting the quittance at Boulogne, but claimed the English had threatened her with

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[19] Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, p. 12. Quittance given by Isabelle, 1 August 1401

[20] This protest against the English ambassadors is published in both Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, pp. 377-378 and Chronicque de la traison et mort de Richart, pp. 277-279.

[21] Rymer, Foedera, Vol. IV, pt. I, p. 5. Authorization for Isabelle to give Henry IV a quittance, 3 June 1401.

[22] Oeuvres de Froissart, XVI, p. 378.

physical violence at Calais where she really signed the debt release. Safely under the protection of her father at Paris, the young queen renounced her recognition of Henry IV as king of England and as legitimate successor of Richard II. If English treatment of Isabelle as revealed in her own account did not offend members of the royal family, the failure of Henry IV to repay the two-hundred-thousand francs of her dowry definitely angered several French princes, who pressed Charles VI to wage war against England.[23]

Cooler tempers, however, prevailed. The royal dukes--Jean, duc de Berri, Louis, duc de Bourbon, and Louis, duc d'Orleans--acting for Charles VI, who again became incapacitated by mental illness soon after Isabelle's return home, decided to continue Anglo-French negotions. On 29 November 1401 they set forth the French position in detailed instructions[24] to their ambassadors who were directed to inform the English plenipotentiaries that "il plest au Roy que les trèves prinses et accordées derrainement entre lui et le roy Richart d'Engleterre soient tenues...."[25] The French princes, nevertheless, protested English violations of the indenture

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[23]Because Henry refused Isabelle part of her dowry, "plusieurs princes de France ne furent pas bien contens dudit roy d'Angleterre, et désiroient moult que le Roy se disposast à leur faire querre." See La chronique de Monstrelet, I, p. 34.

[24]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, pp. 215-220. Instructions for the French ambassadors, 29 November 1401.

[25]Ibid., I, p. 217.

signed on 3 August, charging that "car de leur dicte partie ont esté prinses plusieurs nefs et barges et autre vaisseaux chargiez de gens, de denrées et marchandises; qui est contre la teneur des dictes trèves, et mesmement contre la forme du dit derrain appoinctment prins à Leulinghem."[26] In order to prevent further infractions, they demanded the publication of the last Anglo-French agreement in every port and town in England just as Charles VI already had done in France and orders from Henry IV to his subjects, directing them to refrain from further illegal acts against the French. The royal dukes, too, instructed their representatives to press for the repayment of the two-hundred-thousand francs of Isabelle's dowry and to refuse negotiations on either the unpaid remainder owed for Jean II's ransom or the infringements of Henry IV's rights in Aquitaine.

Despite these serious differences with the English, the French princes decided on the observance of the terms of the 3 August agreement. They sent commissioners south for the proposed conference with the English deputies on the borders of the duchy of Aquitaine,[27] but no records of the meeting have survived. One of the two conferences planned for Picardy, on the other hand, is known to have taken place.

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[26] Ibid., I, p. 216.

[27] Ibid., I, pp. 216-217. The royal dukes noted in their instructions to the French ambassadors that "envoie le Roy ses messages oudit pays de Guienne pour assembler avecques ceulx d'Engleterre...selon la forme dudit derrain appoinctement."

The French diplomats originally had postponed discussions with their English counterparts scheduled for about 11 November until the end of the month. Another delay followed. John Beaufort, earl of Somerset and captain of Calais, ultimately issued Charles VI's emissaries a safe-conduct on 6 December.[28] The French embassy remained substantially as it had been during the final negotiations for Isabelle's return home. The bishop of Chartres, Jean de Hangest, and Jean de Poupaincourt still acted as the king's ambassadors. Only Gontier Col was replaced by Jean de Sains, another royal secretary. Together, these envoys assembled with Henry IV's representatives at Leulinghen, where cases involving infractions of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce committed by both parties were judged. On 10 December the English and French plenipotentiaries agreed to hold on 3 April 1402 another conference at which they would make reparations to those injured persons of either side who had not presented their depositions to the commissioners during the late autumn of 1401.[29]

The Struggle for Supremacy in France

The willingness of the French royal princes to disregard their initial impulse of reviving hostilities with the English,

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[28] Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, p. 71. Safe-conduct for French ambassadors, 6 December 1401.

[29] Ibid., pp. 70-71. Indenture between French and English ambassadors, 10 December 1401. Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, pp. 179-180; Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 30. Proclamation of Henry IV, 21 June 1402.

as revealed by the successful negotiations at Leulinghen in December, resulted from the lack of effective leadership. A protracted seizure of insanity, beginning in August, rendered Charles VI helpless until the following January.[30] While he suffered from madness, Louis, duc d'Orléans, and Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, shared the task of ruling France.[31] From the beginning of August until December, Philippe visited Flanders, Brabant, and northern France, leaving Louis in control of the government.[32] the duc d'Orléans, a friend and ally of Henry IV in 1399, first revealed his hostility towards the Lancastrian king in April of 1401 when he allowed Archambaud de Grailly, comte de Foix, and his two sons--all three traitors to the English cause in Aquitaine--to become his vassals.[33] If Louis planned any further belligerent acts towards Henry IV in the autumn of 1401, he could not carry them out because of a serious struggle for power which developed between him and his uncle, Philippe le Hardi, duc

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[30]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 18.

[31]Ibid., III, p. 12. The monk of St. Denis noted that "nam duce Biturie ad tocius Guienne regimen specialiter deputato, ceteri regni arduis incumbebant, quociens morbus regius ad hoc ipsum regem reddebat inhabilem. Sed Aurelianis dux, consortis impaciens, ad hoc abiliorem se dicebat, tanquam propinquiorem corone."

[32]Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi, pp. 316-320.

[33]Monuments historiques, no. 1784, p. 426. Letters of Archambaud de Grailly, comte de Foix to Louis, duc d'Orléans, 4 April 1401. See also Louis, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XXXVII (November, 1964), 161.

de Bourgogne.[34]

Philippe converted the intense rivalry for control of the government between himself and Louis, duc d'Orléans, into a direct confrontation at Paris. Late in October, he wrote to the Parlement de Paris, complaining of the incompetent manner in which the kingdom was being governed: the king's lands "ne soient gouvernez ainsy que ilz sont de présent... c'est grant pitié et douleur de oyr ce que j'en ay oy dire, et ne cuidasse pas les choses estre en l'estat que on dit qu'elles sont."[35] Since Louis, duc d'Orléans, remained at the capital managing the administration of the realm, it is clear whom Philippe le Hardi blamed for the troubles besetting the kingdom. Final arrangements for the betrothal of his son Antoine to Jeanne de Luxembourg, daughter of the comte de St. Pol, prevented him from returning to Paris until 7 December, when he arrived there at the head of a large army of vassals,[36] intending to correct the mismanagement of the kingdom by force of arms. Louis, aware of his uncle's plans, mustered his own troops in the capital so that the two royal dukes faced each other in a hostile posture which threatened to embroil the whole of France in a civil war of great

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[34]Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI , p. 146 stresses that the principal issue between the two royal dukes "estoit pour avoir le gouvernement du royaume, et mesmement des finances."

[35]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI. I, p. 213. Letter from Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, to the Parlement de Paris, 29 October 1401.

[36]Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi, p. 320.

magnitude.[37]

Only the mediation of other members of the royal family prevented a violent clash between the two armies. The crisis became so grave that members of the Parlement declared that they would not consider any cases involving the four royal dukes without the advice of the king's court, itself.[38] For a month after Philippe's arrival at Paris, Isabeau de Bavière, queen of France, Jean, duc de Berri, and Louis, duc de Bourbon, tried to reconcile the protagonists. They invited Philippe and Louis to several gala banquets, but both always attended these affairs accompanied by armed retainers.[39] What ultimately convinced them to pursue a peaceful policy towards each other will never be known. Nevertheless, they agreed on 6 January 1402 that their quarrel should be submitted for judgment to the queen of France, Louis, duc de Bourbon, Jean, duc de Berri, and Louis II d'Anjou, king of Naples and first cousin of Charles VI,[40] who, eight days later, reached a decision which they announced at a great

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[37]For the confrontation between the duc de Bourgogne and the duc d'Orléans at Paris, see Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 14, 16; Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, p. 146; La chronique d'Euguerran de Monstrelet, I, p. 35-36.

[38]Journal de Nicholas de Baye, greffier du Parlement de Paris 1400-1417, ed Alexandre Tuetey (2 vols., Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1885-1888), I, p. 18. Cited hereafter as Journal de Nicholas de Baye.

[39]Chronique de religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 16.

[40]Thibault, Isabeau de Bavière, p. 301 and Jarry, La vie politique de Louis de France duc d'Orléans, p. 263.

council held at Paris. Philippe le Hardi and Louis d'Orléans were ordered "estre doresenavant bons, entiers, vrays et loyaulx amis ensemble,"[41] and to end military preparations against each other. If disputes arose again, they were instructed to refer them to the King's Council or the queen and the royal princes who stipulated that the party violating the agreement automatically incurred their wrath. As an act of their good intentions of maintaining peaceful relations with one another, Philippe and Louis dined together on 15 January with Jean, duc de Berri, and several other notable persons.[42]

The threat of civil war, momentarily averted, diminished even further upon the recovery of Charles VI, which occurred at the same time as his uncle and brother agreed on the suspension of hostilities between themselves.[43] Profiting from the temporary sanity of his brother the king, Louis attempted to improve his status in reference to the other royal princes. He persuaded Charles on 28 February 1402 to order an inquest into the inferiority of his appanage

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[41]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, p. 223. Treaty of Paris between Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, and Louis, duc d'Orléans, 14 January 1402. For the entire treaty, see Ibid., I, pp. 220-226.

[42]Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi, p. 321.

[43]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 18. The monk of St. Denis reports that "ducum sic discordia sedata, rex, qui fere per quinque menses solita infirmitate detentus fuerat, incolumitatem recepit, et ad ecclesiam beati Dyonisii die dedicacionis ejusdem accessit cum fratre et patruis, ut Deo regraciaretur de sanitate adepta."

of Orléans in relation to those of his uncles and to correct any inequity discovered by the investigation.[44] Philippe raised no objections against the inquiry, and a month later, departed for Arras, where he had arranged for the marriage of his son Antoine to Jeanne de Luxembourg on 25 April.[45] During his absence from Paris, Charles VI named Louis, duc d'Orléans, "souverain gouverneur de toutes les finances venans des aides ordonnées et à ordonner pour la fait de la guerre,"[46] for the whole of northern France. That is, he put the duc d'Orléans in charge of extraordinary taxes collected for the conduct of the war.

Aside from desiring the post as an obvious mark of prestige and power not possessed by Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, Louis planned on using his new office for the purpose of financing a renewal of the war against the English in Aquitaine. At the end of February, Charles VI, who had granted the duchy with its revenues to Louis, the dauphin, a year earlier, now decided his eldest son should do him homage for the fief, an act of extreme provocation to the king of

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[44] Ordonnances des rois de France, VIII, pp. 484-486.

[45] Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi, pp. 323-324.

[46] Ordonnances des rois de France, VIII, pp. 494-495. The actual title of the office granted to the duc d'Orléans is taken from vol. VIII, p. 498. Letters from Charles VI to Louis, duc d'Orléans, 27 April 1402. Charles granted Louis the post on 18 April 1402 and two days later, the royal letters of authorization were registered with the Parlement de Paris. See Journal de Nicholas de Bay, I, p. 33.

England.[47] The Anglo-French conference scheduled for 3 April also was canceled.[48] Although Charles did not attempt to occupy Henry IV's French possessions immediately, Louis, duc d'Orléans, took another very threatening step. As governor of the aides pour la guerre, he levied a tax on the people of northern France at the beginning of May to provide funds for war against the English in Aquitaine. Louis claimed that Henry IV had flagrantly violated the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce in the preceding summer of 1402 by sending men-at-arms and archers to the duchy under the leadership of the earl of Rutland.[49] Consequently, the proposed tax merely supplied the money necessary for defending France against the hostile intentions of the English. Technically, Louis correctly charged Henry IV with a serious infraction of the Truce, but the earl of Rutland had arrived with his forces in southern France during August of 1401.[50] If the French government

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[47]Recueil de traictez d'entre les roys de France et d'Angleterre, p. 336; Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, p. 71. Letters patent of Charles VI, 28 February 1402.

[48]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 30. Proclamation of Henry IV, 21 June 1402. The French were responsible for the cancellation of the 3 April 1402 conference. See Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, pp. 179-180.

[49]The official document levying the tax on the king's subjects of northern France has been lost. For references to the impost, see Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 26, 28; Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, pp. 147-148; Journal de Nicholas de Baye, I, p. 34; Jarry, La vie politique de Louis de France duc d'Orleans, p. 266.

[50]C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1401): 23 August 1401, Grant to Edward Langley, earl of Rutland, p. 531. See

seriously objected to reinforcements landing in Aquitaine, it would have formally protested the earl of Rutland's mission before May of 1402. It seems clear that the duc d'Orléans determined on using the violation of the truce as a pretext for inciting his brother's subjects against their enemy, the English.

Louis' plan of launching a new French offensive against Aquitaine, however, failed to materialize. He committed the serious blunder of including the clergy among those required to pay the impost. A storm of protest quickly developed.[51] Philippe le Hardi, seeing in the resistance an opportunity of reducing his nephew's influence with Charles VI, publically expressed his disapproval of the tax on 18 May and advised members of the Parlement de Paris to beseech the king to rescind it.[52] Louis, who realized that his uncle intended to convince Charles VI to revoke the levy as soon as he returned to Paris, abolished the tax himself in the hope of gaining public favor. The principal councillors of the king, nevertheless, objected to the authority conferred on the duc

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also Ibid., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1401): 31 July 1401, Commission to Robert Spellowe, p. 553 which reveals that in addition to the fifty ships that the earl of Rutland brought to Aquitaine, Mathieu de Gournai, senechal of the Landes commanded another twelve vessels, thirty-nine men-at-arms and sixty archers destined for southern France.

[51]See note 49.

[52]Journal de Nicholas de Baye, I, pp. 35-36. Letter from Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, to the Parlement de Paris, 18 May 1402.

d'Orléans because they considered him impetuous and easily excited, personality traits which caused him to act imprudently in the conduct of his office. Accordingly, on 24 June, Charles appointed Philippe le Hardi to share the supervision of extraordinary taxation for northern France with Louis, duc d'Orléans.[53] Failing to placate opposition against the duc d'Orléans with this measure, Charles summoned his council on 1 July in order to debate the relative merits of Phillipe and Louis as administrators of the aides pour la guerre. The discussion which ensued persuaded Charles that his brother lacked both the necessary prudence and skill to continue at his present post. He ordered Philippe le Hardi placed in sole charge of the office.[54]

The French Challenges

The preference which the council expressed for Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, left Louis, duc d'Orléans, with little influence in the royal government particularly after Charles VI suffered another attack of mental illness in the middle of July. Louis no longer could plan on waging war against the English in Aquitaine unless he found some way to do it as a private party. As early as May, 1402, the duc d'Orléans disclosed how he would proceed if the French government could not be persuaded to his view. Seven of his

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[53]Ordonnances des rois de France, VIII, pp. 518-519.

[54]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 34, 36. Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, p. 148.

vassals sent a herald to England with letters challenging a similar number of English nobles to a melée in which an English group of knights would fight a French group. Outwardly, they claimed that the outcome of the contest would determine which kingdom possessed the bravest warriors, but secretly, Louis' men wanted the battle for different reasons. They regarded the "assassination" of Richard II and the subsequent "banishment" of Isabelle from England as personal injuries which must be avenged without violating the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce by overt warfare.

Henry IV, unaware of the real motives inspiring the vassals of the duc d'Orléans, approved the contest. After being informed of Henry's response, Louis took the proper religious steps to ensure a French victory. He resolved to give generous alms to several holy places, and went personally to the abbey of St. Denis where he asked the monks to pray fervently for the success of his knights, whom Jean de Herpedenne, the senechal of Saintonge, was conducting to the site of the proposed melée, Montendre, some thirty miles north of Bordeaux. A party of seven English knights escorted by the earl of Rutland, king's lieutenant in the duchy of Aquitaine, arrived at Montendre to participate in the tournament, which took place on 19 May. The English nobles led by Robert Lord Scales planned on directing the brunt of their assault against Guillaume du Chastel, an important magnate from Brittany, whom they considered the most formidable of

their opponents. He successfully defended himself, however, against their attacks. As the battle raged, the French knights chided their adversaries for the ignominious death of Richard II, thereby revealing the true reason that they so eagerly desired combat. The death of an English knight ended the fighting. The defeated Englishmen recrossed the Channel for home deeply embittered by the French deceit while the victorious vassals of the duc d'Orléans returned to Paris, where members of the royal court lavished praise and gifts upon them for the honor they had gained for France.[55]

The glory of Montendre, however, did not satisfy Louis, duc d'Orléans, who still harbored a profound grudge against Henry IV for the degrading manner in which Isabelle was treated after the death of Richard II. Resorting to the same deception which his vassals used in May to provoke the English to take up arms, Louis challenged Henry IV on 7 August 1402 to meet him in the lists on the borders of Aquitaine in these very courteous, but deceptive terms:

> Très hault et puissant prince, Henry, roy d'Angleterre, je, Loys, par la grace de Dieu, filz et frère des roys de France, vous escrips et faiz savoir par moy, qu'à l'aide de Dieu, de la benoiste Trinité, pour le désir

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[55]For the tournament of Montendre (19 May 1402) and the events immediately preceding it, see Chronique de religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 30, 32, 34; Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, pp. 148-150; Leroux de Lincy, "Chants historiques français des XIII^{e}, XIV^{e}, XV^{e}, siecles," Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes, I (1839), 376-377. Juvenal des Ursins maintained that Robert, Lord Scales died on the battlefield, but the monk of St. Denis does not name the dead English knight.

> que j'ay de venir à honneur, l'emprinse que je pense que vous devez avoir pour venir à proesse en regardant l'oisiveté en quoy plusieurs seigneurs se sont perdus, extrais de royale lignée, quant en fais d'armes ne s'emploient, jeunesse qui mon cuer requiert d'emploier en aucuns fais pour acquérir honneur et bonne renommée, me fait penser à, de présent, commencer a faire le mestier d'arms. Plus honnorablement ne le pourroie acquérir, tout regardé, que d'estre en lieu, à ung jour advisé tant de vous comme de moy, et en une place comme nous feussions nous deux acompaignez de cent, tant chevaliers que escuiers de nom et d'armes sans aucun reprouche, tous gentilz hommes, et nous combatre jusques au rendre. Et, à qui Dieu donra la grace d'avoir la victoire, le jour, chascun chez soy comme son prisonnier pourra mener son compaignon pour en faire sa voulenté.[56]

As these words reveal, the duc d'Orléans proved equally adept at the art of subterfuge as his own vassals. He cleverly concealed his own animosity towards Henry IV while at the same time attributing his challenge to a desire of enhancing his reputation as a knight. Louis even went so far as to break with official French policy by addressing Henry as king of England. That he really considered Henry the legitimate successor of Richard II is difficult to believe in view of his later remarks. The duc d'Orléans, undoubtedly, recognized Henry IV as king of England as a stratagem to induce him to accept his proposal.

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[56]La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, pp. 43-45. Letter from Louis, duc d'Orléans, to Henry IV, king of England, 7 August 1402. English chroniclers fail to mention Louis' challenges to Henry IV except for Eulogium Historiarum, III, p. 395 and Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden Monachi Cestrensis, VIII, p. 542. Even Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, p. 151 says very little about the episode between Louis, duc d'Orléans, and Henry IV.

Under other circumstances, acknowledgment as the rightful king of England by the brother of Charles VI, king of France, would have pleased Henry IV. Quite naturally it brought forth just the opposite reaction from him when accompanied by Louis' request for combat. Henry listened angrily to the challenge delivered by the duc d'Orléans' heralds, whom he dismissed without giving gifts which customarily were expected on such occasions.[57] That Louis wished to meet him in the lists on the borders of Aquitaine greatly astonished Henry, considering both the Anglo-French truce of 1396 still in effect and the personal alliance made between himself and the duc d'Orléans in 1399. In a lengthy letter to Louis written on 5 December,[58] he declared their personal alliance null and void "car il nous semble que nul prince, seigneur, chevalier ne autre de quelque estat qu'il soit, ne doit demander ne faire armes soubz icelle aliance

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[57] Chronique de religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 56. Cf. Great Britain, Public Record Office, Jehan de Waurin, Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de al Grant Bretaigne, à present nommé Engleterre, No. XXXIX of the Rolls Series, ed. W. Hardy and E.L.C.P. Hardy (5 vols., London: Longmans, Green, Reade and Dyer, 1864-1891), II, p. 69. Waurin generally does not require notice for this period because he merely copied Froissart, the Chronicque de la traison et mort de Richart and Monstrelet, but in this particular case he related material not found in those sources. Henry IV cordially received the duc d'Orléans' herald, according to Waurin, gave him a letter from Louis and paid for all of his expenses along with giving him a present of forty nobles.

[58] La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, pp. 46-49. Letter from Henry IV to Louis, duc d'Orléans, 5 December 1402.

et amitié."[59] By thus terminating one of the two basic agreements which ensured peaceful Anglo-French relations, Henry IV moved one step closer to open hostilities with France, especially since he decided to answer Louis in a contemptuous manner.

The monk of St. Denis judged Henry IV's letter offensive to the honor of the duc d'Orléans and the king of France: "Quamvis regis responsio pungitiva honorisque ducis et regis diminutiva videreteur...."[60] He correctly interpreted it. Henry IV maintained in his reply, for example, that Louis' proposal did not require a response because it came from a person who was inferior to himself in rank.[61] Former kings of England never had been challenged by men lower in status than themselves, nor had they engaged in combat merely to seek vain glory or selfish advantage, goals which, Henry implied,[62] motivated the duc d'Orléans. Although Henry did not refuse to meet Louis in battle, he gave a very evasive answer intended to express further his

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[59] Ibid., I, p. 47.

[60] Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 58.

[61] Henry claimed that "consideré la dignité que Dieu nous a donnée et là où Dieu nous a mis de sa bonne grace, ne devrions respondre à nul tel fait si non de pareil estat et dignité que nous sommes...." La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, p. 47.

[62] Henry maintained that a royal prince should do only those things which contribute "à l'onneur de Dieu et commun prouffit de toute chrestienté ou de son royaume, et non pas pour vaine gloire, ne pour nulle convoitise temporelle." Ibid., I, p. 48.

scornful attitude towards the duc d'Orléans. Whenever it was convenient for him, he would visit his French possessions, where the joust between them would take place, if Louis still desired it. Until that time, Henry warned him to be carefül of what he said in letters, and in the promises which he made to others, an obvious reference to their personal alliance.

Louis received Henry IV's reply on 1 January 1403,[63] but did not respond to it until 26 March[64] when he abandoned the polite form of his first letter for vehement invective. He virtually accused Henry of being responsible for the murder of Richard II, "derrenierement trespassé, Dieu scet par qui,"[65] menacingly predicted that his reign would end in chaos, and gladly renounced their personal alliance. Technically, the imprisonment and deposition of Richard II, an ally of his brother, the king of France, automatically dissolved that agreement which he had made in 1399 without any knowledge of Henry's plans. "Au temps que je fis ladicte aliance," the duc d'Orléans insisted, "je n'eusse cuidié, ne pensé que vous eussiez fait contre vostre roy ce qui est

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[63]Henry IV's letter angered both Louis and his advisers who, nevertheless, treated the king of England's envoy in a generous fashion. They paid his expenses, gave him fifty crowns and told him to inform his master that in the future messengers from France should be more hospitably received. See Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 58 and Waurin, Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne, II, p. 72.

[64]La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, pp. 52-57. Letter from Louis, duc d'Orléans, to Henry IV, 26 March 1402.

[65]Ibid., I, p. 53.

congneu et que chascun scet que vous avez fait."[66] Louis' denial of any complicity in the dethronement of Richard II allowed him to pose as the defender and protector of Isabelle, queen of England, whom he believed Henry IV had mistreated severely. Because of "vostre rigueur et vostre cruaulté," the duc d'Orléans contended, she "est venu désolée en ce pays de son seigneur qu'elle a perdu, desnuée de son douaire que vous détenez, despoullez de son avoir qu'elle emporta pardelà et qu'elle avoit par son signeur...."[67] In other words, Louis essentially reiterated the official French position concerning Isabelle, except that he now personally intended to champion her cause.

When the envoys of the duc d'Orléans tried to deliver this message, officials at Calais detained them, a serious offense against the immunity of heralds. Henry IV finally granted the messengers an audience on 30 April. After hearing Louis' recriminating letter, he told them: "littere vestre, inquit, subjecticie et ignominiose mendaciorum plene sunt; et ideo regnum nostrum exeuntes. dicite domino vestro me in brevi alias sibi missurum veritatem continentes, et de quibus, si prudens est, poterit contentari."[68] Henry kept his promise. He wrote Louis[69] a passionate repudiation of

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[66]Ibid., I, pp. 54-55.

[67]Ibid., I, p. 56.

[68]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 58.

[69]La Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, pp. 57-67. Letter from Henry IV to Louis, duc d'Orléans, no date.

the charge that he ordered the death of Richard II and at the same time, implicated him in the events leading up to the deposition of the unfortunate monarch. Henry claimed that the duc d'Orléans knew his plans before he left France, approved them, and offered him aid against Richard II. Even after he became king of England, Henry revealed, Louis still desired his friendship. He sent one of his vassals to England in order to assure Henry that he wished to preserve their alliance as long as it was maintained in strict secrecy.

How much of Henry IV's assertions can be accepted is difficult to determine. Louis' deceitful behavior from May of 1402 proves him capable of secretly espousing friendship for Henry abroad while at home agreeing with most Frenchmen that a usurper sat on the throne of England. Only one source, however, tends to confirm the view that Louis actually wished to perserve the personal alliance of 1399 after the deposition of Richard II. It reports that vassals of the duc d'Orléans attended the coronation of Henry IV at Westminster, where they received special treatment and dined at the king's table while all other foreigners were excluded from the festivities.[70] If this account can be trusted, the question then arises as to why Louis pursued such a policy. Henry IV

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[70]Wallon, Richard II, II, pp. 346-347, 509 quoting from an anonymous chronicle MS. 3884 f° 150 relates that "commanda le roi qu'on leur fît très-bonne chère et qu'ils fussent servis après le roi et après ceux de Londres, et avant que les autres." Wallon has translated the quotation from the chronicle into modern French and fails to give an adequate citation for his source.

supplies a possible answer. "Une des principales causes de vostre aliance, qui se fist à vostre instance et request," he avowed, "estoit pour la malveillance que vous aviez à vostredit oncle de Bourgogne...."[71] That is, the duc d'Orléans had entered into the agreement of 1399 because he wanted to secure Henry's assistance in his struggle against Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, for control of the French government. It was for this reason too, Henry implied, that Louis did not dissolve their personal alliance when he became king of England. Since existing evidence neither supports nor denies Henry IV's allegations, the role which the duc d'Orléans played in Anglo-French relations before the spring of 1401 will never be known. Whatever Louis' conduct may have been towards Henry in the first year and a half of his reign, by March of 1403, he definitely desired war with England.

Another prominent French nobleman, who considered the duc d'Orléans' opposition to the English king justified, was Waleran de Luxembourg, comte de St. Pol and Ligny. He was the husband of Maude Courtenay, a half-sister of Richard II, and the revolution of 1399 prevented him from enjoying the possession of his wife's English lands. On 10 February 1403, he sent "Henry de Lenclastre" a personal declaration of war[72]

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[71] La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, p. 60. The monk of St. Denis summarizes the correspondence between Louis, duc d'Orléans, and Henry IV, See Chronique de religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 54, 56, 58, 60.

[72] La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, pp. 67-68. Letter from Waleran de Luxembourg, comte de St. Pol, to Henry IV, 10 February 1403.

which, in his opinion, was not restricted in any way by the present truce between England and France. Waleran de Luxembourg threatened to avenge his half-brother-in-law's death which everyone attributed to Henry. "Tout dommages tant par moy comme par mes parens, mes hommes et mez subgetz," he swore, "je vous feray, soit en terre ou en mer, toutefois, hors du royaume de France...."[73] Upon learning of the comte de St. Pol's intention of waging war against him, Henry arrogantly disregarded the threat. He told the herald who delivered Waleran de Luxembourg's declaration of war that no written reply would be given the comte de St. Pol, who in the future would be unable to take up arms against England because he would be preoccupied completely with protecting himself, his subjects, and his lands from English attacks.

Henry IV's condescending answer infuriated Waleran de Luxembourg who immediately began preparations for open hostilities with the English. He devised an elaborate act of defiance which symbolized the beginning of his personal war with Henry. A figure, representing the earl of Rutland, the king's lieutenant in Aquitaine and now duke of York, was stuffed and dressed at his castle in Bouchain. The dummy, clothed in full armour, and a portable gibbet were taken secretly to one of St. Pol's fortresses near Boulogne. From there, a small band of his soldiers during the night carried the figure and the gibbet to the gates of Calais, where they

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[73] Ibid., I, p. 67.

hung the earl of Rutland in effigy by his heels. The English garrison cut the dummy down the next morning and brought it into the town. "Et depuis ce temps," Monstrelet, the Burgundian chronicler stressed, "/The English/ furent par longue espace plus enclins à faire dommage et desplaisir au conte Waleran et à ses pays et subgets, plus que paravant n'avoient esté."[74] In other words, the English finally realized the danger represented by Waleran de Luxembourg, who should have received more serious attention sooner for he was one of the most powerful vassals of the duc de Bourgogne. A very close relationship existed between them. Philippe's second son, Antoine, for example, had married Waleran's daughter, Jeanne on 25 April 1401. That the duc de Bourgogne did not prevent the comte de St. Pol's declaration of war early in 1403 against Henry IV casts doubt on Philippe's own policy towards England.

Philippe le Hardi and the Decision for Peace

At least one Frenchman--Jean Creton, a chamberlain in the king's household--thought Philippe le Hardi might be persuaded to take the field against the English. As a poet of some merit, Creton had composed a metrical history of the deposition of Richard II,[75] and in the closing months of 1402

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[74] Ibid., I, pp. 68-69.

[75] Jean Creton, "Histoire du Roy d'Angleterre Richard, traictant particulierement le rebellion des ses subiectz et prinse de sa personne. Composee par un gentelhome francois de marque, qui fut a la suite dudict Roy, avecz permission

wrote the duc de Bourgogne, whom he considered the virtual ruler of France, a learned appeal.[76] In the letter, he beseeched Philippe le Hardi to refuse Henry IV any further truces and to assemble his troops for an invasion of England. Because of the domestic problems which the English faced, Creton believed the most opportune moment for an attack had arrived. "Et pour ce sires s'il te plâit," he implored the duc de Bourgogne, "mectre tes voiles en mer...et tes enseignes au vent...tu verras la plus grand partie des nobles hommes mectre la main aux armes ententivement pour aler avecque toy desirant la vengeance du noble sang espandu en Albion."[77] The noble blood shed in Albion referred to the murder of Richard II in England. It was the plain duty of every Frenchmen to avenge his death. Creton maintained that, before his capture in Wales during August of 1399, Richard II had called upon the royal princes of France, especially

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du Roy de France," ed. and trans. J. Webb, Archaeologia: or Miscellaneous Tracts relating to Antiquity, XX (1824), 295-423. Early in the spring of 1399, Creton, in attendance upon a French knight, crossed the Channel in time to accompany Richard II on his expedition to Ireland. When Richard was imprisoned in the Tower of London at the end of August 1399, he obtained permission from Henry to return to France where he wrote his chronicle after Isabelle's release from English custody (1 August 1401).

[76]Letter from Jean Creton, squire, to Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, no date printed in P.W. Dillon, "Remarks on the Manner of the Death of King Richard the Second," Ibid., XXVIII (1840), 91-94. Dillon on the basis of internal evidence dates the letter after 19 October 1402.

[77]Ibid., 93-94.

Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, for aid in preventing the English traitors from seizing the throne.[78]

How the duc de Bourgogne reacted to Creton's supplication for an invasion of England does not stand recorded either in contemporary chronicles or official French records. Still the results of Anglo-French negotiations during the summer of 1402 while Philippe le Hardi governed the kingdom of France indicates that he wished to remain on friendly terms with the new Lancastrian regime. As has been pointed out above, the intense rivalry between him and Louis, duc d'Orléans, for control of the government ended the first day of July, 1402 when Philippe assumed sole charge of the aides pour la guerre, an appointment which confirmed his position as the most powerful figure in the realm next to the king.[79] On the same day, Charles VI, besides reducing the duc d'Orléans' power, rejected the hostile English policy of his brother. He issued instructions for his ambassadors--Jean de Montaigu, bishop of Chartes, Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, and Jean de Poupaincourt, first president of the Parlement de Paris--to hold a new conference with Henry IV's representatives on the repayment of the two-hundred-thousand

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[78]The anonymous chronicler of Chronicque de la traison et mort de Richart, p. 53 mentions similar appeals for assistance from the French princes by Richard II while he was imprisoned in Flint Castle (17 August 1399).

[79]See Note 54.

francs of Isabelle's dowry.[80] Since Charles had compelled the dauphin to do him homage for the duchy of Aquitaine and had allowed his brother Louis to levy a tax in northern France for the financing of a projected war against the English earlier in the year, his volte-face at the beginning of the summer can only be ascribed to Philippe le Hardi's increasing influence over him, which was reflected in the decisions of 1 July. In the middle of that month, Charles succumbed to another attack of mental illness, leaving the duc de Bourgogne to direct the affairs of the kingdom.[81]

The French ambassadors left Paris on 18 July for Leulinghen[82] where they met with Henry IV's representatives--John Bottlesham, bishop of Rochester, William Heron, lord of Say, Richard Holm, canon of St. Peter's minster in York, and John Urban, lieutenant of Sir Thomas Rempston, admiral in the west. They carried instructions demanding the unpaid balance of Jean II's ransom,[83] but that issue along with the French insistence for the repayment of the two-hundred-

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[80]Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, p. 72. Instructions for the French ambassadors, 1 July 1402.

[81]Chronicque du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 36.

[82]Journal de Nicholas de Baye, I, p. 38. Nicholas de Baye noted that "Ce jour /18 July/, s'en ala messire J. de Poupaincourt, premier president, et autres en Boulenoiz sur la mer pour traicter avez les Angloiz." The editor Tuetey wrongly attributes the instructions of 29 November 1401 for the French ambassadors as applicable to this mission. Ibid., note 2, pp. 38-39.

[83]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 31. Instructions for the English ambassadors, 1 July 1402.

thousand francs dower remained unsolved. The emissaries from both countries, nevertheless, judged cases involving infractions of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce,[84] awarded damages for the injured parties and promised to continue observing the Anglo-French agreement of 1396 until 1 May 1403 when reparation for any violations of it would be considered at Leulinghen. The numerous breaches of the Truce which had occurred during the previous year convinced the English and French diplomats of the wisdom of reiterating especially the guarantee of unrestricted commercial intercourse between England and France. It was stipulated that merchants of both countries could trade freely with each other without any special safe-conducts while other subjects regardless of rank or status similarly were allowed to travel safely between the two realms with no restrictions attached to their visits. All merchants, seafaring men, and fishermen of each kingdom currently imprisoned were to be released without paying any ransom and their possessions returned to them. The English and French plenipotentiaries further agreed to revoke all letters of marque and reprisal issued by their respective governments and to close the ports of England and France to all pirates of either country.[85]

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[84] Ibid., Vol. IV, pt. I, p. 30. Order for the publication of proclamations announcing that all persons injured by French violations of the Truce should be at Calais before 14 July, 21 June 1402.

[85] Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, pp. 34-35. Agreement between

With the signing of this accord on 14 August 1402, Philippe le Hardi's policy emerged as the official French position. Friendly relations with England seemed assured at least until the following May. Yet other developments threatened the delicate equilibrium established between the two countries. Louis, duc d'Orléans, a former friend and ally of Henry IV, emerged as the champion of those Frenchmen who regarded the usurpation of the throne of England by the duke of Lancaster and the treatment which Isabelle received from the English after the deposition of Richard II as personal injuries which they must revenge. Although unsuccessful in goading Henry into a fight, Louis did dissolve their personal alliance of 1399, one of the two basic agreements which assured the peace between England and France. Only Philippe le Hardi's dominant influence at the French court and the confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce in August of 1402 prevented an open rupture between the two kingdoms.

English and French commissioners, 14 August 1402.

CHAPTER V

ANGLO-FLEMISH RELATIONS (1402-1404)

During the summer of 1402, a Flemish ambassador attended the Anglo-French conferences at Leulinghen. He wanted the county of Flanders included in the agreement which the English and French plenipotentiaries concluded on 14 August. Although they complied with his request, Anglo-Flemish discussions[1] continued intermittently for more than a year. These

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[1]P. Bonenfant, "Actes concernant les rapports entre les Pays-Bas et la Grande Bretagne de 1293 à 1468 conservés au château de Mariemont," Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire, CIX (1944), 57 and Vaughan, Philip the Bold, p. 183 describe existing accounts of Anglo-Flemish relations as confusing, misleading, and incomplete. See Cartellieri, Philipp der Kühne, p. 106; F. de Coussemaker, "Thierry Gherbode, négociateur des trêves commerciales conclues avec l'Angleterre," Annales du comité flamand de France XXVI (1901-1902), 282-286; Hingeston, Royal and Historical letters during the Reign of Henry IV pp. Li-Liv; Adrien Huguet, Aspects de la Guerre de Cent ans en Picardie maritime, 1400-1450 (2 vols., Paris: A. Picard, 1941-1943), I, pp. 33-34; Kervyn de Lettenhove, Histoire de Flandre (6 vols., Bruges: Beyaert-Defoort, 1874), III, pp. 52-53; L.V.D. Owen, The Connection between England and Burgundy during the First Half of the Fifteenth Century (Oxford: B.H. Blackwell, 1909), pp. 15-18; Quicke, Geschiedenis van Vlaanderen, III, pp. 62-63; Walther Söchting, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Flandern und England am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts," Historische Vierteljahrsschrift XXIV (1927-1929), 182-183; Emile Varenbergh, Histoire des relations diplomatiques entre la comté de Flandre et l'Angleterre au moyen âge (Bruxelles: C. Muquardt, 1874), pp. 487-489; Wylie, History of England under Henry the Fourth, I, pp. 380-381, 391-392, IV, pp. 304-305. Note the critical comment concerning Varenbergh's work in Henri Pirenne, Bibliographie de histoire de Belgique (3d ed., Bruxelles: Maurice Lamertin, 1931), p. 93.

negotiations are especially important because they reveal how ernestly Henry IV labored to maintain the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce and why Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne and comte de Flandre, eventually changed his peaceful policy towards England. What angered him more than anything else was English privateering, which cost Flemish shipping heavy losses. When Henry failed in efforts to curb the piracy of his subjects, the duc de Bourgogne ordered English merchandise seized at Sluis, a port on the southern side of the mouth of the Zwin. By retaliating against Henry's subjects trading in Flanders, Philippe le Hardi prevented the conclusion between the county and England of a separate commercial truce which would hold good even in the event of a Franco-English war. Yet he did obtain permission from Charles VI to negotiate such a truce in the first place, indicating his desire for friendly relations with the Lancastrian government. The ultimate failure of Anglo-Flemish negotiations, therefore, must be attributed to the predatory attacks of English privateers on the maritime trade of Flanders.

Brugeois Complaints of English Privateering

The desire on the part of the Flemings to attend the Anglo-French negotiations occurring at Leulinghen in July of 1402 resulted from the damage which English pirates had been inflicting on their commerce. The most authoritative chronicler of the period--the monk of St. Denis--reported increased English privateering activity in the Channel and along the

French coast from September of that year,[2] but as early as June, an envoy from Bruges traveled to the court of Henry IV with letters complaining of the "scaden ghedaen ter zee den cooplieden van Vlaendre bi den Ingelschen."[3] The numerous losses suffered by Flemish merchants prompted Philippe le Hardi, comte de Flandre, to demand that the Flemings relaliate against the English by taking reprisals, which usually meant seizing the goods of merchants from the offending country at the ports or elsewhere in the land of the injured parties.[4] The vier leden met at Ypres on 5 July to consider the duc de Bourgogne's directive. They decided against retaliation and sent representatives to inform Philippe le Hardi at Paris and his Council at Lille of their resolution.[5]

Instead of seeking compensation for injuries through reprisals, two of the vier leden--Bruges and the Brugse Vrije--chose to negotiate directly with the English government. They sent ambassadors to Calais and to Leulinghen, where the Anglo-French conference was scheduled to begin in

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[2]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 53.

[3]Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B.I: Documents pour servir à l'histoire des relations entre l'Angleterre et la Flandre de 1341 à 1473, ed. L. Gilliodts van Severen (Bruxelles: Havez imprimerie, 1896), p. 59. Cited hereafter as Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B.I.

[4]Huguet, Aspects de la Guerre de Cent ans en Picardie maritime, 1400-1450, I, p. 11.

[5]Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B.I, annexes no. I, p. 466; Handelingen, no. 564d (5 July 1403), p. 235.

July. The loi or magistrature of Bruges nominated on 9 July its own registrar, Victoor van Leffinghe, to obtain reparation for Flemish losses resulting from English infractions of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce.[6] At Calais, he presented a list of grievances on behalf of both Bruges and the Brugse Vrije to John Bottlesham, bishop of Rochester, William Heron, lord of Say, Richard Holm, canon of St. Peter's Minster in York, and John Urban, lieutenant of Thomas Rempston, admiral in the west--members of the diplomatic embassy chosen by Henry IV to negotiate with the French. Van Leffinghe particularly complained about a violation of the Truce occurring in June of 1401 undoubtedly to protest the dilatory manner in which the Lancastrian government adjudicated damage suits of the Flemings. He accused John Hawley, a prosperous West-Country merchant who had been mayor of Dartmouth, of having captured at sea a ship under the command of Jean de la Chapelle of Abbeville. It carried a cargo of wheat, flour and cloth, part of which belonged to Frans Davennes and Wouter Foyti, merchants of Bruges. The bishop of Rochester forwarded this claim for compensation along with others to the king's council at Westminster recommending that restitution should be made to the injured parties.[7]

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[6]Ibid., no. 565b (9 July 1403), p. 236.

[7]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 111-113. Letter from the English ambassadors to the king's council, 18 July 1402. The same letter is published in Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, pp. 59-61.

Joris Guydouche, a representative of the Brugse Vrije, also met with the bishop of Rochester and his colleagues. The magistrates of the Brugse Vrije commissioned him to discuss one specific infraction of the truce which they apparently believed required special emphasis rather than appearing as one of many claims submitted to the English ambassadors by Van Leffinghe. Guydouche insisted on compensation for the injury and damage suffered by thirteen herring fishermen from Heist and their release from imprisonment in England. Henry IV's representatives promised to inform the king's councillors at Westminster of this demand, to advise them to reimburse the herring fishermen for any losses they might have incurred and to hold another meeting with Guydouche later in the month when a decision on the matter could be expected from England.[8]

When both Victoor van Leffinghe and Joris Guydouche returned together to Calais on 24 July,[9] each pursued the same negotiations which they had discussed with the bishop of Rochester and his associates earlier in the month. Joris Guydouche remained at Calais in order "gherestitueerd te hebbene tgrief ende scaden die dInghelsche ghedaen hadden den corvers[10] van Heys die in Ingheland ghevaen laghen, ende

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[8]Handelingen, no. 565d (14 July 1402), p. 236. Joris Guydouche is not identified in the accounts of the Brugse Vrije.

[9]Ibid., no. 566d (24 July 1402), p. 236.

[10]Corvers are defined as herring fishermen in J. Verdam,

omme die uter vanghenesse ghetelivereet te hebbene...."[11] Beyond observing that the "land van Vlaendren den coninc van Ingheland gheen viand en was,"[12] Guydouche dealt only with the plight of the imprisoned herring fishermen. The English diplomats presented two officers of an English barge who testified to the crimes committed by the fishermen from Heist. Despite their guilt, Henry IV's deputies promised to have them released and their possessions restored to them because, above all, they wished to preserve the friendship of Flanders. While Guydouche attempted to gain compensation for one specific violation of the truce, Van Leffinghe presented a general protest against English privateering on behalf of all Flanders. He went to the Anglo-French conference at Leulinghen "omme te achtervolghene de scaden die de Inghelsche ghedaen hadden ter zee den cooplieden ende scipliden van Vlaendre,"[13] and to inform the English ambassadors that the Flemings wanted to be included in the truce currently arranged between England and France.[14] When the English and French

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Middelnederlandsch Handwoordenboek ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nyhoff, 1964), p. 307.

[11] Handelingen, no. 566d (24 July 1402), pp. 236-237.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., no. 566b (23 July 1402), p. 236.

[14] C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 19 August 1402, Order to the mayor of Kingston-on-Hull, p. 547. The mandate reads "the king is aware that they of Flanders are of his friendship, and are desirous of enjoying the benefit of the last truce with France, as the king's ambassadors in Picardy upon the treaty for that truce by letters close did certify the king and council."

plenipotentiaries ultimately determined to continue observing the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce on 14 August 1402, they recognized the county of Flanders as a party to the agreement as it had been originally in 1396.[15]

After Victoor van Leffinghe returned to Bruges on 28 July,[16] the town magistrates considered further measures which would gain indemnification for the Brugeois from Henry IV for their losses caused by the piratical attacks of his subjects. Acting in concert with their counterparts from the Brugse Vrije, they wrote to the mayor and aldermen of London[17] and to Henry IV's emissaries at Leulinghen in the middle of August[18] charging that their previous complaints concerning English privateering had been ignored by the Lancastrian regime. The Brugeois magistrates set forth especially two incidents involving subjects of the Brugse Vrije. Johannes Wylles, a poor fisherman from Ostend, for example, had been captured and taken to Kingston-on-Hull, where he was detained with his vessel and tackle. Another case even more annoying since Van Leffinghe had discussed it[19] with the bishop of

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[15]C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. II (1401-1405): 17 February 1403, Order to several subjects of Kingston-on-Hull, p. 201.

[16]Handelingen, no. 566b (23 July 1402), p. 236.

[17]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 34. Letter from the magistrates of Bruges to the mayor, aldermen and councillors of London, 11 August 1402.

[18]Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, p. 35. Letter from the magistrates of Bruges to the English ambassadors, 15 August 1402.

[19]See Note 7.

Rochester and his colleagues at Calais early in July concerned Paulus Kangiarde, a merchant from Monikerede, who still remained in captivity at Portsmouth at the orders of the king's admiral.

That Henry IV's officials purposely delayed the adjudication of Flemish damage suits, as the Brugeois magistrates believed, can be refuted easily by a closer examination of the English infraction of the truce involving Paulus Kangiarde. Richard and John Spicer, well-known English privateers, had seized nine large casks of wine belonging to him at Portsmouth near the end of March in 1402. When Kangiarde brought suit against the Spicer brothers and won the litigation, they imprisoned him and his partner, Hendrik Claiszone of Damme, who brought letters to them from Henry IV ordering the return of the confiscated wine to the legitimate owners. Thomas Rempston, the king's admiral in the west, also wrote similar instructions to Richard and John Spicer, thereby proving that the Brugeois magistrates erroneously held the admiral responsible for Kangiarde's imprisonment at Portsmouth. The Spicer brothers simply refused to obey the royal directive so that Henry IV on 29 August commanded them to appear in person before the King's Council to explain their behavior.[20]

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[20]C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 19 August 1402, Order to Richard Spicer, pp. 546-547. Cf. Select Cases in

Two other notorious English privateers whom the king in August ordered to appear before the Council at Westminster were John Hawley of Dartmouth and Mark Mykstoke of Fowey. Van Leffinghe while negotiating with the English ambassadors at Calais early in July complained of the seizure of certain vessels carrying Flemish merchandise by pirates from Fowey.[21] English records reveal that Mark Mykstoke was responsible for two such violations of the truce. He attacked a ship, the Seint Cristofre, commanded by Johannes Leys of Sluis in May of 1402, forcibly escorted it to Fowey, and illegally confiscated its cargo of wine, jewels, and cloth along with the captain's personal fortune of gold and silver coins. During the same month Mykstoke stole from a Spanish barge several commodities--olive oil, wine, grease, and hides--belonging to Alexander le Vos, a Brugeois merchant. Le Vos suffered an additional loss later in July when John Hawley captured a ship from Sluis laded with merchandise owned by him and several other Flemish merchants. Henry IV commanded both Hawley and Mykstoke to account for their actions personally to him and the royal Council, explaining why the injured parties from Flanders should not be compensated for their losses.[22]

Chancery A.D. 1364 to 1471, Vol. X of the Selden Society, ed. William Paley Baildon (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1896), p. 55. The Spicer brothers may have imprisoned Kangiarde and Claiszone in reprisal for the arrest of a London merchant at Sluis.

[21]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 113; Le Cotton Manuscrit Galba B. I, p. 60.

[22]C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 16 August

The English king acted in an equally decisive manner towards his subjects of Kingston-on-Hull who had violated the truce with respect to Flanders. He sent Richard Kays, sergeant-at-arms, on 19 August to that port for the purpose of securing the release of Flemish fishermen being detained there. Among those held captive at Kingston-on-Hull was Johannes Wylles, whose grievance had been made known to the mayor and aldermen of London and Henry IV's representatives at Leulinghen by the magistrates of Bruges.[23] As the master of a ship named La Maudeleyn, he had sailed from Ostend to the coast of England near Scarborough to fish on 25 July when "certain of the king's lieges" from Kingston-on-Hull took him and his fifteen-man crew prisoner. A similar fate befell Johannes de Kynghelare and his seamen from Dunkirk a week earlier when they were fishing at the same location. Since the Flemings expressed at Leulinghen the desire of being included in the Anglo-French agreement just concluded, Henry IV not only commissioned Richard Kays to set free Wylles and Kynghelare[24] but also ordered the mayor of

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1402, Orders to John Hawley and Mark Mykstoke, p. 545.

[23]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, pp. 34-35. Letters from the magistrates of Bruges to the mayor, aldermen and councillors of London and to the English ambassadors, 11 August, 15 August 1402.

[24]C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. II (1401-1405): 19 August 1402, Commissions to Richard Kays, pp. 135-136. Wylles and his crew were captured later at sea and put to death. See Gaston Dept, "De oudste rekening van Oostende (1403-1404), Annales de la société d'émulation de Bruges, LXXV (1932), 189. The magistrates at Ostend sent deputies to Bruges on 3 April

Kingston-on-Hull and the bailiffs of Scarborough to do the same.[25]

The Flemish Diplomatic Mission at Westminster

While Henry IV attempted to settle Flemish claims such as those resulting from the imprisonment at Kingston-on-Hull of the fishermen from Ostend and Dunkirk, representatives of the vier leden deliberated at both Ghent and Bruges on the possibility of sending ambassadors directly to England. They conferred with each other at Ghent on 20 August, but could not arrive at any decision.[26] Five days later, disagreement arose between them at Bruges over whether "men zenden zouden an den coninc van Ingheland bi ghedeputeerden of bi brieven"[27] their demands for compensation of losses suffered at the hands of English privateers. After receiving letters from the king of England, the town of London and the mayor of Calais concerning "den prisen ghedaen bi den Inghelschen up de zee,"[28] the vier leden at the end of August agreed to write Henry IV rather than nominate an embassy to negotiate personally with him in England. This resolution did not

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1403 to discuss the case of "Jan Willis ende van sine veynoten die vermord up de zee van den Inghelschen."

[25]C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 19 August 1402, Orders to the mayor of Kingston-on-Hull and the bailiffs of Scarborough, p. 547.

[26]Handelingen, no. 567b,c,d (20 August 1402), p. 237.

[27]Ibid., no. 568d (25 August 1402), p. 238.

[28]Ibid., no. 569d (30 August 1402), pp. 238-239.

satisfy the magistrates of Bruges who met with Joris Guydouche and two other deputies from the Brugse Vrije early in September. They jointly decided to send two envoys to England, one from Bruges and the other from the Brugse Vrije.[29]

By treating directly with Henry IV in England, the officials of Bruges and the Brugse Vrije embarked upon a policy which the other two leden opposed.[30] They neither participated in nor authorized the Brugeois negotiations with the English ambassadors in July. No meeting of the vier leden took place during that month to consider sending an embassy to Calais and Leulinghen because they had commissioned deputies on 5 July to inform Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, of their resolution of refraining from taking reprisals against the English.[31] The representatives of the vier leden met with him at Paris on 27 July,[32] and returned to their respective communities early in August. The magistrates of Ghent and Ypres apparently refused to discuss Anglo-Flemish relations with the other two leden until

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[29]Ibid., no. 570d (4 September 1402), p. 239. Representatives from Bruges and the Brugse Vrije left for England on 9 September. See Inventaire des archives de la ville de Bruges, ed. L. Gilliodts van Severen (7 vols., Bruges: Edw. Gailliard et Cie, 1871-1878), III, p. 466.

[30]Deputies of the Brugse Vrije and of Bruges met on 4 September "omme raet ende avys te hebbene hoe men zenden zoude in Ingheland, al waest dat de steden van Ghend ende van Ypre daer niet zenden en wilden...." Handelingen, no. 570d (4 September 1402), p. 239.

[31]Ibid., no. 564a,b,c,d (5 July 1402), p. 235.

[32]Petit, Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi, p. 327.

Philippe le Hardi apprised them of his reaction to the position taken by the vier leden with regard to taking reprisals against the English. When delegates from Ghent and Ypres ultimately deliberated with their counterparts from Bruges and the Brugse Vrije in the latter part of August, they still resisted nominating an embassy for England. Consequently, deputies of the vier leden debated this issue at several meetings during September, October and November without reaching any agreement.[33]

These conferences in the autumn of 1402 produced only one positive result. The vier leden empowered the magistrates of Bruges to correspond again with Henry IV on behalf of all Flanders. They wrote to him on 11 November[34] complaining that in spite of special royal mandates on his part and the confirmation of the Anglo-French truce in August, English privateers still threatened Flemish commerce. One of them, William Prynce who conducted his raids from the Isle of Wight, especially menaced their shipping. He intercepted near that island on 3 November a crayer[35] of Sluis sailing from La

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[33]Handelingen, nos. 571-579 (27 September - 24 November 1402), pp. 239-244.

[34]Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, p. viii. The introduction of this work is an inventory of the accounts of the vier leden 1402-1405.

[35]Wylie, History of England under Henry the Fourth, IV, p. 341 defines a crayer simply as a cargo boat while G. Kuhnast, "La guerre de course en Flandres, Artois et Picardie maritime," (Unpublished thesis, University of Lille, 1956), p. 19 describes it as "un bateau de 40 à 50 tonneaux..." which "est exclusivement un bateau à voile. Il n'avais pas de rames."

Rochelle to Flanders. It carried a cargo of sixty-one casks of wine belonging to Nicolaas Kennes, a Brugeois merchant, and another five casks of wine owned by the master of the ship, Pieter Boumart and his crew. Prynce conveyed Bloumart's vessel to Portsmouth, where he put ashore most of the casks of wine. Because Prynce had openly violated the truce by capturing this ship and another crayer from Sluis about the same time, Henry IV commissioned Robert de Sapirton, sergeant-at-arms, on 25 November to arrest him and bring him before the King's Council by the following Friday. He further instructed de Sapirton to investigate the detention at the Isle of Wight of two ships loaded with one hundred thirty-six casks of wine belongings to merchants of Ypres and to take them into royal custody.[36]

One of the owners of the wine cargo seized at the Isle of Wight was Jan Paldinc, a member of the loi of Ypres. After the capture of his merchandise, the magistrates of Ypres abandoned their previous policy towards England. They now were willing to join with their counterparts at Bruges and the Brugse Vrije in sending representatives to Henry IV. On 28 November, delegates from Bruges, the Brugse Vrije and

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[36]C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. (1401-1405): 25 November 1402, Commission to Robert de Sapirton, pp. 198-199; Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den handel met Engeland, Schotland en Ierland, 1150-1485, I, p. 488; Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van de handel met Frankrijk 753-1585, ed. Z.W. Sneller and W.S. Unger, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien, no. 70 ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1930), p. 32.

Ypres resolved that "men scriven zoude an die van Ghent, weder zij mede scriven of zenden wilden in Ingland ende in Scotlant of neit."[37] Early in December, the magistrates of Ghent decided in favor of the expanded diplomatic mission which included visits to both England and Scotland, but the Brugse Vrije raised new objections. Its deputies at the meeting of the vier leden on 3 December rejected the plan of nominating ambassadors from Scotland because "de vrijlaten van den Ingheleschen bescadicht waeren ende niet van Scotten."[38] Despite the refusal of the Brugse Vrije to participate in an embassy for Scotland, the other three leden tentatively agreed that "Ghent ende Brucghe souden zenden in Ingheland ende Ypre ende t Vrije in Scotlant...."[39] and that the deputies of the Brugse Vrije were not bound by the decision. They, in turn, left the meeting for a conference with their magistrates, who consented to send an envoy to Scotland. Later in the month, the vier leden selected their plenipotentiaries for the Anglo-Scottish embassy. They appointed Simon van Formelis, pensioner of Ghent and councillor of the duc de Bourgogne, Niclais Scoorkinne, pensioner of Bruges and canon of Saint Donatian, Joris Guydouche of the Brugse Vrije and Jan Belle of Ypres.[40]

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[37]Handelingen, no. 580d (28 November 1402), p. 244.

[38]Ibid., no. 581d (3 December 1402), p. 245.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid., nos. 582-583 (19-22 December 1402), pp. 245-

The Flemish diplomats departed for England on 22 December. Henry IV received them cordially, granting the representatives from Ypres and the Brugse Vrije a safe-conduct for traveling through his kingdom to Scotland.[41] The king's councillors treated Niclais Scoorkinne and Simon van Formelis in an equally friendly manner. They accepted from them a paper roll of claims for damages inflicted on the Flemings by English corsairs[42] and on 11 January, ordered that the alleged offenders of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce appear before the Council on 3 February for the purpose of answering the charges brought against them by the Flemish ambassadors.[43] Among those accused of acts of piracy against the Flemings were Mark Mykstoke, John Hawley, William Prynce, Richard and John Spicer, and John

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248; Inventaire des archives de la ville de Bruges, III, p. 466; Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, annexes no. I, pp. 469-470. See too Biographie Nationale publiée par l'academie royal des sciences, des lettres et des beaux arts de Belgique, Vol. XXX, pt. 2: Hennebicq-Woutersz (Bruxelles: Émile Bruylant, 1959), cols. 761-763, for an article on Niclais Scoorkinne which describes him as "le délégué le plus réputé de la ville /Bruges/." A pensioner was one who was in receipt of a pension or stated allowance in consideration for present services to a town.

[41]Handelingen, no. 583d (22 December 1402), pp. 246-248. Guydouche and Belle were still in England on 5 March, but completed their mission to Scotland and returned to Flanders by 23 June 1403, when they reported to the vier leden. Ibid., nos. 587d, 610b (5 March, 9 June 1403), pp. 251, 267.

[42]List of Diplomatic Documents, Scottish Documents and Papal Bulls, p. 180.

[43]C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. II (1402-1405): 11 January 1403, Order to John Hawley and seventeen others, p. 27.

Kyghley.[44] Besides awarding the Flemings compensation for injuries incurred at the hands of these men, Henry IV's advisers intended to gain indemnification for English seafaring men who had suffered from the attacks of Flemish pirates. They issued a proclamation to all subjects with grievances against the Flemings, asking them to set forth their complaints at a meeting of the council on 3 February, when their suits would be settled in the presence of Niclais Scoorkinne and Simon van Formelis.[45]

The conference arranged for early in February, however, proved a dismal failure from the Flemish point of view. None of the English privateers guilty of violating the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce appeared before the king's council on the day agreed upon for the adjudication of Flemish claims.[46] Niclais Scoorkinne and Simon van Formelis wrote the vier leden, informing them of the difficulties which they experienced in negotiating with the English council. Representatives of the vier leden met at Bruges on 18 February in order to consider new instructions for their ambassadors in England. Those deputies of Ghent,

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[44]Why Henry IV commanded John Kyghley to appear at Westminster is difficult to understand, since he already was banished from the realm. See C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. II (1401-1405): 17 February 1403, Order to several subjects of Kingston-on-Hull, p. 201

[45]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 38. Proclamation of Henry IV, 11 January 1403.

[46]Ibid., vol IV, pt. I, p. 45. Order to John Hawley and seventeen others, 12 June 1403.

Ypres, and the Brugse Vrije asserted that the Flemish diplomats in a friendly manner should leave England and terminate discussions with Henry IV's council. The delegates from Bruges, on the other hand, wanted the talks in England continued until a definite settlement could be reached.[47]

The Brugeois opinion prevailed. Scoorkinne and Van Formelis remained in England, where on 7 March they arrived at a provisional agreement with the English council. It was decided to postpone the question of compensation for damages suffered by both sides until 1 July at Calais so that Henry IV's councillors might determine the truth of the charges against the English privateers and then, summon them to appear before the English and Flemish commissioners. In the meantime, the Flemings could trade freely in England even if they brought merchandise there in French ships. Similarly, English merchants were allowed to engage in commercial transactions in the county of Flanders with the assurance that their goods would be safe from reprisals. The accord, too, stipulated that Flemish merchants must not include French goods of any value in their claims for reparation of damages.[48]

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[47]Handelingen, no. 585d (19 February 1403), pp. 247-248.

[48]A.D.N., B 528, No. 14994bis published in Söchting, Historische Vierteljahrsschrift XXIV (1927-1929), 196-197. Provisional agreement between England and Flanders, 7 March 1403. Cf. Great Britain, Public Record Office, The Antient Kalendars and Inventories of the Treasury of His Majesty's Exchequer together with other Documents illustrating the History of that Repository, ed. Sir Francis Palgrave (3 vols., London, 1836), II, p. 68 and Proceedings and Ordinances

The Seizure of English Merchandise at Sluis

If Henry IV's advisers and the ambassadors from Ghent and Bruges seriously believed that this provisional agreement would insure peaceful Anglo-Flemish commercial relations until July 1403, they were sadly mistaken. On 9 April, deputies of the vier leden met at Ghent to consider a new wave of English raids upon their shipping.[49] In the month of March alone, seven English attacks against Flemish vessels stand recorded.[50] While the vier leden deliberated on what policy they should follow, their count, Philippe le Hardi acted decisively. He ordered his representative at Sluis, the maritime bailiff, to take reprisals against the English merchants despite the agreement recently signed at London. The maritime bailiff already had arrested eight Englishmen late in March in reaction to the increased English privateering.[51] He now confiscated on 13 April English merchandise at Sluis worth ten thousand pounds.[52] Among those

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of the Privy Council, I, p. 219 where the indenture signed between the Flemish ambassadors and the King's Council is dated 2 March 1403.

[49]Handelingen, no. 595b,d (9 April 1403), p. 256.

[50]Great Britain, Public Record Office, Exchequer 30/1281. Enrolment of injuries inflicted on Flemish shipping by the English between the years 1398 and 1403; C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. II (1401-1405): 10 July 1403, Commission to Simon Blakebourn, p. 281.

[51]Handelingen, no. 592d (25 March 1403), p. 254. The vier leden discussed the possibility of sending an embassy to Philippe le Hardi at Paris "omme met hem te sprekene van den VIII Inghelschen ghevaen ter Sluis bi den Bailliu van den watere."

[52]Letter from Henry IV to Jean, duc de Bourgogne, 29

affected by the bailiff's measure was Thomas Fauconer,[53] alderman and sheriff of London. The maritime bailiff seized his goods valued at over two hundred pounds from two Flemish ships anchored in the harbor at Sluis. Fauconer and other English merchants, whose property had been confiscated, petitioned the vier leden for assistance in obtaining the release of their merchandise.[54]

Representatives of the vier leden on 19 April discussed the request at Bruges. The English merchants wanted to know if "zij vrij commen mochten ter Brucghemaerct ende elre in Vlaendren ende of zij haer goed uutvoeren mochten zonder belet."[55] They more importantly lodged an official protest against the confiscation of their goods at Sluis. The reaction of the vier leden was conditioned partly by a large delegation of Flemish fishermen and merchants who "camen claghen voor de IIII Leden van groter scade die zij hadden up de zee van den Inghelschen."[56] Complaints against English privateering were so strong that the deputies of the

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June 1404 published in Ernest van Bruyssel, "Documents tirés des archives et des bibliothèques d'Angleterre," Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire, III (1861), 175-177.

[53]J.S. Roskell, The Commons in the Parliament of 1422: English Society and Parliamentary Representation under the Lancastrians (Manchester: The University Press, 1954), p. 179 gives a brief sketch of Fauconer's life.

[54]Handelingen, no. 596a, d (19 April 1403), pp.256-257.

[55]Ibid., no. 596d (19 April 1403), p. 257.

[56]Ibid., no. 596d (19 April 1403), pp. 256-257.

vier leden were afraid of what Flemings living in the ports along the northern coast might do by way of retaliation. They decided in favor of sending an official delegation to the various coastal towns located between Sluis and Gravelines, a port at the mouth of the Aa River, which marked the western boundary of Flanders. The envoys from the vier leden were instructed to persuade their fellow citizens to refrain from attacking English shipping in reprisal for acts of piracy committed by Henry IV's subjects. Instead injured Flemings should seek compensation for damages from the English ambassadors at Leulinghen on 1 July. Besides pacifying the ports along the northern coast of Flanders, the representatives of the vier leden were directed to meet with Jean Canard, chancellor of the duc de Bourgogne, at Lille on the seizure of English merchandise at Sluis.[57]

The Vier Leden and the Quest for Neutrality

Talks with the chancellor, however, achieved little. English goods remained impounded at Sluis. Consequently, deputies of the vier leden held another conference at Ghent on 6 May. They joined together in a bold decision which went beyond seeking the release of English property confiscated at Sluis. It was resolved that "men bi den coninc van Vrankerike trecken soude ende bi onzen gheducten here

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[57]Ibid., no. 597-598 (21 April - 23 April 1403), pp. 257-258.

om tstic van der neutraliteid."[58] That is, the representatives of the vier leden agreed to send an embassy to both the king of France and Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, beseeching them to allow the county of Flanders to remain neutral in any forthcoming Anglo-French struggle.[59] On 14 May, Niclais Scoorkinne, Simon van Formelis and other prominent Flemings departed for Paris in order to carry out the resolution of the vier leden. At the French capital, they learned of an astonishing development. Charles VI had promised their count, Philippe le Hardi, letters patent, guaranteeing the neutrality of Flanders in the event of open war between England and France and giving the duke permission to negotiate a separate trêve merchande or commercial truce for Flanders.[60]

Charles VI on 12 June issued the letters patent. They authorized Philippe le Hardi to treat for compensation of damages committed by English privateers who "plusieurs fois ont pris, robé, emmené et mis à mort plusieurs de noz subgez ensemble leur navire, merchandise et biens et par

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[58]Ibid., no. 599c (6 May 1403), p. 259.

[59]Ibid., no. 599a,b,d,e, (6 May 1403), pp. 258-260. The bailiff of Ghent, Philippe le Hardi's representative noted that "les Quatre Membres du pays de Flandres et les prelas avoient esté assamblés en la ville de Gand, et illec ordonnés certaine requeste et supplicacion pour supplier au roy et mon tres redoubté seigneur de Bourgongne et de Flandres, ou cas que guerres se meuissent entre les royaulmez de France et d'Engleterre, que le pays de Flandres en peust demorer neutre...."

[60]Ibid., no. 601b,d (14 May 1403), p. 261.

espécial des marchans et habitans de la comte et pais de Flandre."[61] In order to prevent such deplorable crimes in the future, the letters gave the duc de Bourgogne the necessary power for concluding a trêve marchande with the Lancastrian government on behalf of Flanders. In detailed instructions for Philippe le Hardi,[62] the French king spelled out exactly what type of agreement he expected his uncle to reach with the English. Normally the trêve marchande gave security only to merchants and their goods,[63] but Charles was willing to extend protection to Englishmen of whatever rank who wished to visit Flanders as long as they came there unarmed and in small numbers. He further expressed the sincere wish of avoiding any action such as demanding Flemish troops for war, which would involve the county of Flanders in any revival of the Anglo-French conflict.

Equally concerned about keeping the Flemings out of new hostilities which might arise between England and France was Henry IV. Powerful economic reasons motivated him. Piracy in the Channel already had affected the English wool

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[61]A.D.N., B 286, no. 15000. Letters from Charles VI granting Philippe le Hardi the authority to conclude a separate commercial truce, 12 June 1403.

[62]A.D.N., B 517, no. 11709 published in Cartellieri, Philipp der Kühne, pp. 154-157. Instructions for Philippe le Hardi, 12 June 1403.

[63]Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages, p. 210.

trade. Flemish merchants, during the previous year, had refused to purchase their wool at Calais "pur doubte des troubles et riotes de jour en autre ꝑ terre et ꝑ meer faitz et continuez,"[64] thereby causing a serious loss to the staple there. Wool exports from England, for example, dropped from about fifteen thousand sacks in 1401-1402 to approximately ten thousand in 1402-1403.[65] Consequently Henry IV wanted negotiations with the Flemings resumed at Calais in the summer of 1403 in order to improve commercial relations with them. His own efforts for peace since the provisional agreement of 7 March were many. He wrote the vier leden letters on three occasions, assuring them that English privateers would no longer attack Flemish shipping.[66] He tried to settle Flemish claims for damages personally instead of putting them off until the Anglo-Flemish conference in July.[67] Yet Flemish complaints were so numerous that most of them could only be adjudicated

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[64]Rotuli Parliamentorum, III, p. 529.

[65]E.M. Carus-Wilson and Olive Coleman, England's Export Trade, 1275-1547 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), p. 55.

[66]Handelingen, nos. 592c, 595d, 599d (25 March, 9 April, 6 May 1403), pp. 254, 256, 258.

[67]C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. II (1402-1405): 14 April 1403, Orders to John Mulsho and the earl of Somerset, pp. 36-37; Ibid., Henry IV, Vol. II (1402-1405): 19 April 1403, Order to bailiffs of Pole, p. 59; C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. II (1401-1405): 9 May 1403, Commission to the earl of Somerset, p. 279.

by the special commission meeting at Calais.[68] Therefore on 14 June, Henry empowered Nicholas Rishton, doctor of laws, and John Urban to treat with the Flemish ambassadors for redress of injuries on both sides.[69]

When the Anglo-Flemish conference ultimately began on 5 July,[70] there was every possibility of a meaningful settlement being reached at Calais. Niclais Scoorkinne, Jan Paldinc, and Willem van Ravescoet, a magistrate from Ghent, headed up a ten-member delegation representing the vier leden. They were prepared to negotiate a separate trêve marchande with Rishton and Urban, since their count, Philippe le Hardi, now possessed the necessary authority from Charles VI, king of France.[71] A serious problem,

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[68]Great Britain, Public Record Office, Exchequer 30/1281 lists six English attacks on Flemish shipping in March, and eight more in April.

[69]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 49. Power for Nicholas Rishton and John Urban to meet the Flemish commissioners for redress of injuries at Calais on 1 July, 14 June 1403. Henry IV also on 12 June ordered John Hawley of Dartmouth and seventeen other English privateers to answer charges brought against them by the Flemish ambassadors at Calais. Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, p. 45. Rishton was just beginning a distinguished career as a diplomat for Henry IV while Urban later became lieutenant of the mayor of the staple of Calais. See A.B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500 (3 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), III, pp. 1619-1620; Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 248.

[70]Handelingen, no. 613d (5 July 1403), p. 272; Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, annexes no. I, p. 471

[71]Instructions for the representatives of the vier leden, 25 June 1403 published in Varenbergh, Histoire des relations diplomatiques, pp. 540-543.

however, arose. The English ambassadors refused to take part in any discussions before the "goed ontsleghen war dat ghearresterd es ter Sluus, toebehorende den voors. Inghelschen."[72] Faced with the obstinacy of Rishton and Urban, the Flemish envoys except for Niclais Scoorkinne returned on 22 July to Bruges where they informed the vier leden of the English demand.[73] Four days later, Flemish deputies meeting at Ghent ordered Willem van Ravescoet, Jan Paldinc, and two of their colleagues back to Calais with the message that the vier leden would convince their lord, Philippe le Hardi, of the wisdom of releasing English merchandise seized at Sluis.[74] Henry IV's representatives, nevertheless, decided against negotiating with the Flemish emissaries until Philippe le Hardi had made known his position on the confiscated goods at Sluis.[75] On 16 August he announced that they would not be given back to the English merchants.[76]

The Failure of Anglo-Flemish Negotiations

The duc de Bourgogne's decision prevented the conclusion of a trêve marchande at Calais. Instead, the English

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[72]Handelingen, no. 613d (5 July 1403), p. 272; Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, annexes no. I, p. 471.

[73]Handelingen, no. 617d (22 July 1403), pp. 275-276.

[74]Ibid., no. 620d (26 July 1403), p. 277.

[75]Ibid., no. 613d (5 July 1403), p. 273.

[76]Ibid., no. 625d (16 August 1403), pp. 279-280.

and Flemish plenipotentiaries merely prolonged the provisional agreement of 7 March 1403 until 10 November, primarily for the purpose of giving the Flemings additional time for persuading their count to change his mind. Meanwhile, Niclais Scoorkinne and his colleagues guaranteed that the goods attached at Sluis would be kept there in good condition and if any of them deteriorated in value, the Flemings would stand the loss.[77] In order to avoid further attacks on Flemish shipping which had caused the original appropriation of English merchandise on 13 April, both sides resolved on elaborate precautionary measures. Neither English nor Flemish subjects could equip their vessels with weapons unless they had received permission from their respective lords, stating the reasons for the arming and the destination of the cruiser. Since Flemings had suffered great losses from English piracy, all of their trading ships should have the arms of Flanders and of the town from which they came, painted distinctly on their prow and should carry a certificate with a schedule of their cargos signed by the governor of such town. If these provisions were carried out, "les nefz de Flandres passeront paisiblement par la mer sans arrest, mais que elles ne portent biens de ennemis et que les Flamens estans èsdictes nefz en facent aide aux nefz des Francois, Escoz

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[77]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 54. Indenture between England and Flanders, 29 August 1403.

ou autres ennemis d'Angleterre."[78]

That the English ambassadors referred to the French as enemies in this agreement and sought to prevent the Flemings from aiding them at sea reveals just how badly Anglo-French relations had deteriorated by the summer of 1403. On the French side, Philippe le Hardi took in conjunction with the county of Flanders certain steps which disclosed his increasingly hostile attitude towards England. As early as 11 July he asked the vier leden for two thousand soldiers for the defense of West Flanders against the English, but they refused him because of the deleterious effect such a decision might have on the Anglo-Flemish discussions at Calais.[79] At the same time as these negotiations ended on 29 August, the duc de Bourgogne made another threatening gesture towards England. He proclaimed that

> ou cas que mondit seigneur le Roy ou ses successeurs, pour l'utilité du royaume vouldroient ordonner et mectre aucune armées oudit pais de Flandres, en aucuns des pors d'icellui, pour faire passage à puissance de gens et de navire en Angleterre, en Escoce, ou en autre pais, mondit seigneur ou ses successeurs, ou leurs gens de par

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[78]A.D.N., B 528, no. 14994ter. This undated memoir entitled "extrait des poins prejudiciables contenus es endenteures et escriptures advisees par les messaigiers de Flandres et d'Angleterre, touchans la marchandise" summarizes the terms of the agreements of 7 March 1403 and 29 August 1403.

[79]Handelingen, no. 615d (11 July 1403), p. 274. "Onze voors. gheduchte heere," the accounts of the Brugse Vrije record, "begheerde te hebbene van den Ghemeenen Lande II[M] serjanten omme de Bewaernesse van den Westlande...."

> eulx, le pourroient faire licitement et raisonnablement....[80]

That is, in spite of the authority which Charles VI gave him for the conclusion of a separate commercial truce for Flanders and for the maintenance of the neutrality of the county, Philippe would allow his nephew the use of Flemish ports as bases from which a French Fleet could invade England.

Such a belligerent pronouncement on the part of the duc de Bourgogne presaged new troubles for Anglo-Flemish relations. The magistrature of Bruges, for example, learned in September that the maritime bailiff of Sluis was preparing to sell the English merchandise seized on 13 April in direct violation of the Anglo-Flemish agreement recently concluded.[81] Only a special appeal by the Brugeois magistrates to the ducal council at Lille prevented the sale which Jean Canard, the chancellor, had authorized.[82] The council simply passed on the request of the Brugeois

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[80]Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, I, p. 251. Proclamation of Philippe le Hardi, 29 August 1403.

[81]A.D.N., B 542, no. 19572. Letter from the magistrates of Bruges to the council of the duc de Bourgogne at Lille, 15 September 1403.

[82]The maritime bailiff claimed the chancellor ordered him to sell the English merchandise. See A.D.N., b 542, no. 19573. Letter from the maritime bailiff to the council of the duc de Bourgogne at Lille, 15 September 1403.

magistrates to the duke for his final judgment.[83] He postponed the sale of the English merchandise, but instructed the vier leden to treat with Henry IV's representatives at Leulinghen instead of Calais. Niclais Scoorkinne and his colleagues, therefore, departed for Calais on 2 November for the purpose of seeking a different place for the Anglo-Flemish talks rather than for any serious negotiations of the basic issues dividing England and Flanders.[84] When they arrived at St. Omer, a small town just across the border into France about twenty miles south of Gravelines, the Flemish diplomats were prevented from traveling further by Charles VI's officials. By his order, French troops had closed the roads leading from St. Omer, Gravelines and Boulogne to Calais and all intercourse or trade between the English and the subjects of the king of France were forbidden.[85]

Although the Flemish diplomats eventually visited Calais at the end of November through special permission received from Philippe le Hardi,[86] their conference with

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[83]A.D.N., B 542, no. 19575. Letter from the ducal council at Lille to Jean Canard, chancellor of the duc de Bourgogne, 17 September 1403.

[84]Handelingen, no. 635b,c,d (2-4 November 1403), pp.285-287; Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, annexes no. I, p. 472.

[85]Handelingen, no. 635d (4 November 1403), p. 287; Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 172. Letter from the English ambassadors to Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, 4 December 1403.

[86]Ibid., pp. 429-431 and Le Cotton manuscrit Galba

the bishop of Rochester and his associates was the last meeting between English and Flemish ambassadors for more than a year.[87] Before they assembled again in January of 1405, the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce which governed Anglo-Flemish relations had been broken by military operations. Thus no agreement existed between the two parties for the protection of their maritime trade. The provisional pact of 7 March 1403 had expired on 10 November. It was not renewed, marking the failure of Anglo-Flemish negotiations. Who was responsible? While the vier leden wanted peace with Henry IV in spite of English privateering, Philippe le Hardi became more bellicose because of it. His decision to take reprisals against English merchants and Henry's inability to check the piracy of his subjects, in the final analysis, prevented the settlement of outstanding problems between England and Flanders. Yet Philippe le Hardi had laid the foundation for a lasting understanding between the

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B. I, pp. 63-65. Letter from the English ambassadors to the keeper of the privy seal, 1 December 1403; Handelingen, no. 635d (4 November 1403), p. 287.

[87]This conclusion is drawn from Hand., nos. 636-728 (12 November 1403 - 13 January 1405), pp. 287-354. English and Flemish ambassadors met at Calais on 13 January 1405. English merchants trading in Flanders also were affected by the disruption of Anglo-Flemish discussions. They were prevented from entering the county early in 1404. See Inventaire des archives de la ville de Bruges, III, p. 467; Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den handel met Engeland, Schotland en Ierland, 1150-1485, p. 501; Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van Middelburg in den landsheerlijken tijd, ed. W.S. Unger, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatien, Nos. 54, 61, 75 (3 vols., 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1923-1931), III, p. 49.

two countries when he obtained leave from his nephew to conclude a separate commercial truce for Flanders. He had set the precedent which compelled Charles VI to grant the same permission to Jean Sans Peur, son of Philippe le Hardi, who made better use of it than his father by negotiating a separate trêve marchande with the English government on 10 January 1407.[88]

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[88]Bonenfant, Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire CIX (1944), 56-58; Cartulaire de l'ancienne estaple de Bruges, I, p. 447; De Coussemaker, Annales du comité flamand de France XXVI (1901-1902), 315-316; L.V.D. Owen, "England and the Low Countries, 1405-1413," English Historical Review XXVIII (1913), 21-22.

CHAPTER VI

THE FRENCH REPUDIATION OF THE TWENTY-EIGHT-YEAR TRUCE

The ultimate disruption of Anglo-Flemish negotiations sprang from a growing hostility between England and France. Despite the confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce late in June of 1403, outstanding problems still plagued the two realms. Henry IV demanded the unpaid balance of Jean II's ransom, while the French Council, acting on behalf of the mentally deranged Charles VI, set forth a counterclaim for the two-hundred-thousand francs of Isabelle's dowry and for her jewels. The duc d'Orléans and the comte de St. Pol and Ligny too, wrote to Henry again, threatening to wage war against him. Under these conditions, only Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, could preserve the peace. Instead, he secretly aided the Bretons, who ravaged the southern coast of England, allowed Waleran de Luxembourg the privilege of stationing at Gravelines in his county of Flanders armed vessels, which preyed on English merchant shipping and even conceived plans for besieging the stronghold of Calais. The death of Philippe le Hardi in the spring of 1404 did not improve deteriorating relations between England and France. Louis d'Orléans, who replaced him as the real ruler of the

kingdom, caused an irreparable breach with the Lancastrian government in July when he encouraged the conclusion of an offensive alliance between his brother Charles VI and Owen Glyn Dŵr, a Welsh prince, who had revolted against Henry IV.

The Last Confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce

The Anglo-French accord of 14 August 1402 in which each party promised to continue observing the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce until the following May was not implemented immediately. The agreement stipulated that the provisions decided upon must be submitted to Henry IV and Charles VI for final approval and that their representatives would assemble again on 29 September to settle any differences which might arise.[1] On 19 September, Charles authorized his deputies to give the English ambassadors a safe-conduct so that the meeting could take place as scheduled. He also issued new instructions for them.[2] Although no record of the Anglo-French conference survives, subsequent actions on the part of Henry IV prove that it was successful. In the middle of October, he ordered John Beaufort, earl of Somerset and captain of Calais, and Sir John Croft, captain of Marck

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[1]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, pp. 34-35. Agreement between English and French commissioners, 14 August 1402.

[2]Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, p. 72. Instructions for the French ambassadors and authority for them to grant a safe-conduct to the English plenipotentiaries, 19 September 1402. See too List of Diplomatic Documents, Scottish Documents and Papal Bulls, p. 180.

Castle, to issue a proclamation informing English subjects residing in the frontier borderlands of Picardy of the Anglo-French agreement just concluded.[3] A month later, Henry appointed the captains of Calais, Guines, and Hammes as conservators of the truce in Calais, Artois, Picardy, and Flanders.[4]

With the naming of the conservators of the truce for northern France and Flanders in November of 1402, Anglo-French relations remained friendly until the following May.[5] Only Louis, duc d'Orléans, and Waleran de Luxembourg, comte de St. Pol and Ligny, had disturbed the peace by virtually declaring a private war on the king of England. Yet their threats did not represent official French policy

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[3]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 36. Order for the captain of Calais and the captain of Marck Castle, 18 October 1402. Sir John Croft was from Dalton in the county of Lancaster. He served Henry IV in Picardy until 1405, when old age compelled him to give up his command. See C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. II (1401-1405): 7 February 1405, Grant to Sir John Arundell, p. 488; Ibid., Henry IV, Vol. III (1405-1408): 16 June 1408, Commission to several prominent subjects of Henry IV, p. 479.

[4]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 37. John Norbury had served Henry IV as captain of Guines but by 1402 had been elevated to the dignity of treasurer of England. See Madeleine Barber, "John Norbury (c. 1350-1414): an Esquire of Henry IV," English Historical Review, LXVIII (1953), 66-76. Sir Thomas Swinburn acted as captain of Hammes Castle, having been granted the post late in Richard II's reign. See C.P.R., Richard II, vol. V (1396-1399): 7 March 1397, Grant of lordship of Hammes for life, p. 85.

[5]The duc de Bourgogne even sent one of his councillors, Jean de Saulx to England on an amicable mission in the spring of 1403. See Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 44. Safe-conduct for Jean de Saulx, 24 April 1403.

so that Henry IV at the end of April in 1403 prepared for new discussions with the French. He chose Henry Bowet, bishop of Bath and Wells, John Beaufort, earl of Somerset, William Heron, lord of Say, Sir Thomas Rempston, admiral in the west, and Nicolas Rishton, doctor of laws, as his ambassadors.[6] Except for the bishop of Bath and Wells, each member of the diplomatic mission recently had negotiated with either French or Flemish plenipotentiaries. Henry Bowet, on the other hand, had been employed as the constable of Bordeaux early in Henry IV's reign and on 20 November 1401 became bishop of Bath and Wells. He, too, possessed experience as a diplomat, having served Richard II in this capacity.[7] Henry IV instructed the bishop of Bath and Wells and his colleagues to treat for the redress of injuries, an extension of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce beyond 1 May 1403, and the unpaid balance of the ransom of Jean II, king of France.[8]

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[6]Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, p. 44. Commission for the bishop of Bath and Wells, the earl of Somerset, lord of Say, Nicolas Rishton and Sir Thomas Rempston, 28 April 1403.

[7]The Register of Henry Bowet, Bishop of Bath and Wells, 1401-07, ed. T.S. Holmes, Somerset Record Society, Vol. XIII (1899), xxii-xxvi.

[8]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 44. Commission for the English ambassadors, 28 April 1403; Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, pp. 44-45. Another commission for the same deputies to demand the balance of Jean II's ransom, 28 April 1403. A copy of the second commission is printed in Lettres des rois, reines et autres personages des cours de France et d'Angleterre, II, p. 314. Henry IV appointed another embassy at the same time, led by the earl of Somerset,

Since the king of England issued these instructions on 28 April, it was impossible for an Anglo-French conference to take place by the beginning of the next month when the previous agreement would expire. Early in May, Henry IV announced that the meeting was scheduled for the twenty-second of the month at Leulinghen. English subjects, who expected reparation for damages suffered at the hands of Frenchmen, were required to submit their claims to the commissioners of both countries for settlement at that date.[9] On 5 May, Charles VI empowered his representatives--Jean de Montaigu, bishop of Chartres, Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, Ansel de Longviller, sire d'Angoudessent,[10] and Jean de Sains, the king's secretary--to discuss "et traiter diligenment et loialment ... sur les fais et materes, touchans le reparacones des attemptas et exces, fais de l'une partie et de l'autre, et par l'une contre l'autre, contre le teneur des treves...."[11] Beyond

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for the purpose of repairing breaches of the truce. See Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 44. Commission for the captain of Calais, Sir Hugh Luttrell, his lieutenant, John Urban, lieutenant of the admirals, and William de Pilton, canon of Bridgeworth, 27 April 1403.

[9]Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, p. 45. Order for the sheriffs throughout England, 5 May 1403.

[10]The fief of Angoudessent was located near Bologne. See Anselme, Histoire genealogique, Vi, p. 619.

[11]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 50. Notarial attestation of Anglo-French meeting (includes the instructions for the French ambassadors, 5 May 1403), 21 July 1403.

this specific injunction, the king of France gave his deputies great latitude by allowing them "de faire es dites choses et en tous leurs accoustances et dependances tout ce qui y fera necessaire et expedient, et que nous y purroions faire se nous y estions en nostre personne...."[12]

Such scope in the instructions of the French plenipotentiaries suggested the strong possibility of real progress in the forthcoming negotiations. The bishop of Bath and Wells and his associates, however, introduced a new issue at those proceedings. They officially protested against the two letters which Louis, duc d'Orléans, had sent their lord. The duc d'Orléans had challenged Henry IV to meet him in the lists on the borders of Aquitaine. The English ambassadors demanded to know if Charles VI approved of his brother's very serious violation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce.[13] That the bishop of Bath and Wells and his colleagues would complain of Louis' challenge at the Anglo-French conference when their instructions contained no reference to this subject is not surprising. Henry IV only received the duc d'Orléans'

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[12] Ibid., vol IV, pt. I, p. 51. Same document as above.

[13] Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, p. 75. Letters from the English ambassadors to their French counterparts, no date. That the bishop of Bath and Wells complained of Louis d'Orléans' challenge at an Anglo-French conference is clear from instructions for the French deputies dated 11 June 1403. Ibid., p. 73.

second letter on 30 April[14] after he had issued his representatives their orders. Louis, too, had abandoned the polite form of his first letter, virtually accusing Henry of being responsible for the murder of Richard II.[15]

When the French diplomats were confronted with the English protest of Louis' two letters, they postponed further discussion for over a month. In the meantime, the French council considered what had taken place at the conference. It decided to set forth at the next meeting a demand for the two-hundred-thousand francs of Isabelle's dowry and her jewels. On 27 May, Isabelle authorized the French deputies to make the claim in her name, a step clearly designed to off set the English demand for the payment of the balance of Jean II's ransom.[16] The French council, too, advised the royal ambassadors to inform Henry IV's representatives that no reply could be given to their inquiry concerning the duc d'Orléans' letters

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[14]La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, p. 57 gives the date when Henry received Louis' second letter. Letter from Henry IV to Louis, duc d'Orléans, no date.

[15]Ibid., I, pp. 52-57. Letter from Louis, duc d'Orléans to Henry IV, 26 March 1403.

[16]She empowered Jean de Hangest and his colleagues "de requérir pour nous et en nostre nom ... la somme de deux cens mille francs d'or nous estre restituée realement et de fait ... avec nos joiaux et autres biens meubles qui nous ont esté donnés depuis que mon dit seigneur le roy nous bailla à nostre dit seigneur et mari." Commission for the French ambassadors, 27 May 1403, quoted in Mirot, Revue d'histoire diplomatique XIX (1905), 514.

because Charles VI had suffered another attack of mental illness.[17]

Armed with these new instructions, Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, and the other French commissioners met with their English counterparts on 27 June.[18] Speaking for the English delegation, Henry Bowet, bishop of Bath and Wells, declared that he considered the letters of the duc d'Orléans and his other warlike acts a clear violation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. He demanded to know from the French plenipotentiaries if the duc d'Orléans had acted with the consent and advice of Charles VI or with the consent and advice of the great princes of the realm who formed the Council which governed France while the king was incapacitated by mental illness. The bishop repeated his question several times, but the French deputies failed to give a satisfactory explanation. Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, ultimately, answered him. The king and his Council had never broken the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce nor did they intend doing so in the future.[19] Bowet, rightfully believing the response obscure, asked if a more

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[17]Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, p. 73. Instructions for the French ambassadors, 11 June 1403.

[18]For this paragraph, see Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 48. Notarial recital of a debate between the English and French commissioners at Leulinghen, 27 June 1403.

[19]Jean de Hangest maintained that "dominus suus ligeus, saltem per concilium suum, et per certos duces regni Franciae praedicti, mandarunt sibi dicere ... quod treugas captas numquam infregerunt." Ibid.

complete reply could be made on 1 March of the following year or as soon as Charles VI recovered his health. To this question, Jean de Hangest retorted that his answer would be the same even if the king regained his sanity a thousand times.

Because the French ambassadors obstinately refused further discussion on the duc d'Orléans' letters, the bishop of Bath and Wells dropped the matter for the moment. Instead, he and his colleagues negotiated with Charles VI's deputies a settlement which preserved peaceful relations between England and France. The representatives of both kingdoms agreed to continue observing the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce until 1 March 1404.[20] Again, they emphasized the principal commercial clause of that agreement. Merchants and all other subjects of either country were allowed "ire et navigare libere, pacifice et secure, secundum formam dictarum treugarum, per ambo regna praedicta, per terram, et per mare, pro mercandisiis, seu mercimoniis, et quibuscunque aliis suis negotiis exercendis...."[21] It was considered important to reiterate the guarantee of unrestricted commercial intercourse between the two realms because of the numerous violations of the truce occurring

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[20]For the next two paragraphs, see Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, pp. 46-47. Indenture for the preservation of the truce between England and France, 27 June 1403.

[21]Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, p. 47.

in recent months. Many of these infractions involved imprisoning merchants, fishermen and other seafaring men of each country. The problem was so serious that the diplomats at Leulinghen made special provisions to secure their release. They announced that subjects of Charles VI who had been incarcerated in England would be sent to Calais by the first of September and released without having to pay ransom five days later at Leulinghen. The same procedure applied to Englishmen held captive in France. They would be brought to Boulogne and then freed.

Along with the articles concerning the liberation of prisoners, others attempted to reduce the dangerous friction which was increasing between England and France. All armed vessels of either side were ordered back to their own ports. Letters of marque and reprisal were revoked. The ports of England and France were closed to pirates or banished men of both kingdoms.[22] Obviously corsairs and persons exiled from their homelands were

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[22]This article of the agreement meant little. While Anglo-French negotiations took place during the summer of 1403, the sire de Hugueville encouraged Guillebert de Frethun, who had been banished from the kingdom of France, in his attacks on English shipping and in his raid on the Island of Alderney. Far from disavowing Frethun's piracy and plundering expedition, Jean de Hangest allowed him access to Le Crotoy at the mouth of the Somme where he unloaded and sold his cargoes of stolen merchandise. See Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 216-218. Richard Aston to Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, 18 March 1404; C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. II (1401-1405): 17 February 1403, Commission for John Holme and others, p. 201; Huguet, Aspects de la Guerre de Cent ans en Picardie maritime, 1400-1450, I, pp. 19-20.

excluded from the benefits of the truce. According to one English chronicler, the bishop of Bath and Wells and his colleagues also had the duc d'Orléans and the comte de St. Pol deprived of the advantages of the agreement concluded at Leulinghen. "Circa presens tempus," he maintained, "regressi sunt de Francia solemnes nuncii...hii reportaverunt belli vacationem usque ad mensis Martii diem primam. Exceptae sunt tamen de hiis induciis duae personae Franciae, Dux Aurelianorum et Comes Sancti Pauli...."[23] The exclusion of the duc d'Orléans and the comte de St. Pol and Ligny from the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce allowed the English to retaliate against these two French princes without being charged with disturbing the peace between England and France.

Once the problem of the duc d'Orléans' and the comte de St. Pol and Ligny's letters had been temporarily set aside, the French and English negotiators decided to meet in July to discuss other issues affecting relations between the two kingdoms which they represented. On 4 July, the English representatives granted Jean de Hangest and his associates a safe-conduct.[24] Thirteen days later, the diplomats assembled at Leulinghen, where they judged

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[23]Annales Ricardi II et Henrici IV (1392-1406), p. 372; See also Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 102, 104; Walsingham, Historia anglicana, II, p. 259.

[24]Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, p. 73. Safe-conduct for the French ambassadors, 4 July 1403.

cases involving subjects from both realms who claimed injuries resulting from infractions of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce.[25] Beyond settling damage suits, the ambassadors considered two outstanding questions which they had been instructed originally to set forth at the Anglo-French talks. Jean de Hangest, for example, demanded the repayment of the two-hundred-thousand francs of Isabelle's dowry and the return of her jewels. The bishop of Bath and Wells replied that neither he nor his colleagues had been empowered to discuss the question of Isabelle's dowry and her jewels. Yet, at the same time, the bishop presented a counterclaim for the payment of the outstanding balance of Jean II's ransom, which the present French king still owed. He further suggested that the two-hundred-thousand francs dower could be deducted from that amount. The French plenipotentiaries naturally denied that Charles VI was liable for the debt incurred by Jean II or that there existed any bond which acknowledged such a debt. Since negotiations became deadlocked on these subjects, they were postponed until March of the following year when the French and English representatives would meet again.[26]

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[25] Ibid., p. 241. List of several maritime infractions of the truce committed by the French, 17 July 1403; Ibid., p. 73. Instructions for the French ambassadors to treat for reparation of breaches of the truce, 10 July 1403.

[26] Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 50. Notarial recital of an Anglo-French debate on Isabelle's dowry and Jean II's ransom, 21 July 1403.

Out of the July conferences there really emerged only one new development. The French Council had directed the royal ambassadors to insist upon the inclusion of the Scots in the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce.[27] "Il est impossible," the Council maintained, "que elles [the truces] puissent estre seurement tenues, ne la mer estre seure, se les Escos ne y sont comprins."[28] Moreover, the Scots had been "alliez au roy et à ses predecesseurs de long temps, et y peuvent et doivent estre comprins, se il leur plest."[29] That is, the Scots should be included in the Truce if they wished. When the French diplomats requested the recognition of Robert III, king of Scotland, as a party to the Anglo-French agreement of 1396 under these conditions, the English plenipotentiaries agreed that both sides would observe the truce better if the intentions of each king's allies were ascertained.[30] Jean de Hangest and his colleagues revealed that they did not know "la volente du roy d'Escoce" in this matter, but that the French Council was prepared to send envoys "devers

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[27]Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, p. 73. Instructions for the French ambassadors, 10 July 1403.

[28]Instructions for the French ambassadors, 10 July 1403 as quoted in Francisque-Michel, Les Écossais en France, Les Français en Écosse (2 vols.; Londres: Trübner et Cie, 1862), I, p. 105.

[29]Ibid., I, pp. 105-106.

[30]For the quotes which follow and the subsequent safe-conduct, see Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 51 Safe-conduct for French ambassadors traveling to Scotland, 22 July 1403.

le dit roy d'Escoce, pour savoir sa volente sur le dit fait." Consequently, Henry IV's Council at Westminster issued a safe-conduct for several prominent Frenchmen so they might learn if Robert III wished to be comprehended in the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. Such a safe-conduct, however, proved unnecessary for the Scots already had formed an alliance with the Percies, northern English lords, who had revolted against the king of England. Henry IV met their combined forces on 21 July at Shrewsbury on the upper reaches of the Severn River near the modern Welsh border.[31] The defeat of the Scots left them still hostile to England and unwilling to re-establish friendly relations with Henry IV.[32]

Whether or not news of the battle of Shrewsbury reached the English and French deputies at Leulinghen before their last meeting on 27 July is not known. Still for some reason, they decided to draw up another convention on the release of prisoners as if some recent development endangered their previous indenture. Nothing new appeared in the agreement of 27 July. The ambassadors merely stressed that two

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[31]Brown, History of Scotland, I, pp. 201-202; Jacob, The Fifteenth Century, 1399-1485, pp. 51-53; Maxwell, A History of the House of Douglas, I, pp. 137-138.

[32]Only in 1406 did Henry IV neutralize the Scottish threat. The Scots were rendered powerless by the capture of their Crown Prince James off Flamborough Head on his way to France. Robert III died soon after, leaving James' uncle as regent. He dreaded the possibility of the Crown Prince's release. Henry IV kept the Scots quiet for the rest of his reign, therefore, by periodically threatening to set free their king.

or three prominent men from each kingdom would be at Leulinghen on 5 September with sufficient authority to set free the prisoners brought there from Calais and Boulogne.[33]

The Collapse of Anglo-French Negotiations

Both the English and French governments considered the negotiations for the release of prisoners less important than previous Anglo-French conferences. Although it had been agreed to choose two or three prominent men from each realm to conduct the discussions at Leulinghen, both sides sent much less distinguished delegations than those which had taken part in earlier meetings.[34] The bishop of Bath and Wells, the earl of Somerset, the lord of Say, and the admiral, Sir Thomas Rempston, no longer represented England. Only Nicolas Rishton, doctor of laws, remained of the original English mission. He was joined by Sir Hugh Luttrell,[35] lieutenant of the earl of Somerset, captain of

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[33]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, pp. 47-48. Conventions for the meeting of commissioners for the release of prisoners, 27 July 1403. These documents are placed chronologically as if they were dated 27 June. See also, Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, p. 241.

[34]The ambassadors of both sides are listed in Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 56. Agreement between the English and French ambassadors, 13 September 1403.

[35]Sir Hugh Luttrell was originally an esquire in the household of John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster. He was at Calais early in 1400, but the first mention of him as lieutenant of the captain of Calais is in official records dated 19 June 1402. See John of Gaunt's Register, 1379-1383, ed. Eleanor C. Lodge and Robert Sommerville, Camden Society,

Calais, and Sir Thomas Swinburn, captain of Hammes Castle.[36] The French Council similarly sent a less illustrious group of plenipotentiaries. Both Jean de Montaigu, bishop of Chartres, and Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, who had headed up for so long the French embassy at Boulogne, were replaced by less important dignitaries. Of the original commissioners negotiating during June and July, the French government returned only Ansel de Longviller, sire d' Angoudessent, who acted as a lieutenant of the comte de St. Pol and Ligny in his capacity as captain-general of Picardy for Charles VI.[37] The other French diplomats were Philippe d'Auxi, sire de Dompierre,[38] and Aller de Beucouvroy, lieutenant of the king's admiral at Boulogne.[39]

What prevented these lower-ranked ambassadors from

Third Series, Vol. LVI (1937), pt. I, p. 12; C.C.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1402): 19 June 1402, Order to release William Pikerell, p. 536; C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. I (1399-1401): 28 April 1400, Commission to the captain of Calais, p. 271.

[36]The commission of the English ambassadors, 26 August 1403, in Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 53 also names John Urban and William Harleston as assisting in the negotiations.

[37]Report on Rymer's Foedera: Appendices B, C, D, p. 74. The instructions for the French ambassadors, 3 September 1403, gives Ansel de Longviller's official position with the French administration.

[38]Philippe d'Auxi, sire de Dompierre, became chamberlain of the king in June of 1407. Later, he served Jean Sans Peur, duc de Bourgogne, see Anselme, Histoire genealogique, VIII, p. 106.

[39]Regnault de Trie was the king's admiral at Boulogne. See Monuments historiques, p. 425.

arriving at a settlement concerning the liberation of prisoners is set down clearly in an agreement which they drew up at Leulinghen on 13 September. Those officials and other persons, who had imprisoned merchants, fishermen and various subjects of both realms, simply failed to deliver their captives to Boulogne and Calais as they were required to do by the earlier indentures. The commissioners, therefore, ordered them to appear on 20 November at Leulinghen, where they should be prepared to release their prisoners. Since nothing further could be accomplished in the present negotiations, the plenipotentiaries solemnly scheduled the next Anglo-French conference for the date when the prisoners would be available for exchange.[40]

In the meantime, the English government tried to preserve friendly relations with the Valois kingdom. At the request of Ansel de Longviller, Henry IV, notwithstanding the existing Truce, gave French fishermen special permission to fish for herring and other fish from the mouth of the Seine River to Gravelines on the Aa and to enter English ports without fear of imprisonment or capture.[41]

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[40]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 56. Agreement between the English and French ambassadors, 13 September 1403. At least one effort by Henry IV to have a French prisoner turned over to his officials stands recorded. Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, p. 53. Order to John Newsom, 16 August 1403.

[41]Ibid., vol. IV, pt. I, p. 58. License for French fishermen, 26 October 1403. An extension of this permission which terminated on New Year's day was granted by Henry IV towards the end of the year. See Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 187, 189, 190. English

On 26 October, he also ordered those who had captured or detained French subjects to appear at Leulinghen with their prisoners as the English commissioners had promised earlier in September.[42] In compliance with that agreement, the English ambassadors[43] landed at Calais on 17 November. They notified their French counterparts at Boulogne on the following day of their arrival, sending them a copy of their commission from the king of England. Yet Nicolas Rishton and his colleagues received no reply from the French deputies.[44] The scheduled conference did not take place on 20 November because the roads leading to Calais had been closed by French troops and a proclamation had been issued forbidding intercourse or trade between the English and subjects of Charles VI.[45]

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ambassadors to Henry IV, 29 December 1403; Henry IV to his council, 29 December 1403.

[42]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 58. Order to Richard Kays, sergeant-at-arms, 26 October 1403.

[43]The English plenipotentiaries included Sir Hugh Luttrell, lieutenant of the captain of Calais, Sir John Croft, captain of Marck Castle, John Urban, lieutenant of the admiral, and Nicholas Rishton, doctor of laws.

[44]Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, p. 65. The English ambassadors to Thomas Langley, keeper of the Privy Seal, 1 December 1403.

[45]"Ac etiam in Francia proclamatum est publice, prout asseritur ex ipsorum suggestione, quod nullus Gallicus cum Anglicis in contínctibus seu mercimoniis debet communicare." Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 172. The English ambassadors to Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, 4 December 1403.

Under these critical conditions, the English plenipotentiaries bent every effort to find out how the French government intended to proceed. They sent the duc de Bourgogne and other members of the King's Council a letter, demanding an explanation for the failure of Charles VI's deputies to exchange prisoners at Leulinghen as planned, for the proclamation suspending intercourse between the subjects of England and France and for the private declarations of war which Louis, duc d'Orléans, and Waleran de Luxembourg, comte de St. Pol and Ligny, had made to Henry IV. If Philippe le Hardi and the French Council approved of these belligerent acts, the English ambassadors contended, negotiations between the two kingdoms should be broken off. On the other hand, if the duc de Bourgogne and the other French councillors preferred peace, they must inform Henry IV's representatives at Calais of their willingness to participate in the discussions set for 1 March, the date terminating official compliance on both sides of the terms of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce.[46]

The ultimate disposition of the Anglo-French agreement of 1396 was so important that the English negotiators remained at Calais throughout the winter of 1403-1404.[47] At

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[46]Ibid., pp. 170-174. Same letter as in the previous note.

[47]See the account of Nicholas Rishton, which records his mission at Calais as lasting from 14 November 1403 to 6 April 1404. Mirot and Déprez, Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes, LXI (1900), 23.

the end of December, they informed Henry IV that no answer had been received to their letter from either the duc de Bourgogne or the French Council.[48] In January, the English ambassadors sent their lord similar reports, apprising him of a meeting at Paris of the King's Council which had decided in favor of nominating an embassy for Scotland in order to form an alliance with that kingdom against Henry IV.[49] Such a resolution on the part of Charles VI's council persuaded the Lancastrian government that diplomatic measures beyond the ambassadorial level were required if it wished to preserve the peace. Consequently, on 14 February, a collective diplomatic letter, composed on behalf of the English nation then assembled in parliament, was addressed to the prelates and magnates, lords spiritual and temporal, and the whole community of the realm of France.[50] It served as a manifesto

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[48]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 187. The English ambassadors to Henry IV, 29 December 1403.

[49]Ibid., pp. 198-199 and Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, pp. 67-68. The English ambassadors to Henry IV, 4 January 1404. Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 205. The English ambassadors to Henry IV, 10 January 1404.

[50]H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, "Parliamentary Documents from the Formularies," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XI (1934), 161-162. Letter to the French nation, 14 February 1404. The English signatories represented every rank in Lancastrian society. They included Henry, prince of Wales, the archbishops of Canterbury and York, Henry Beaufort, the king's half-brother, and bishop of Lincoln, the royal duke Edward Langley of York, the earl of Northumberland, a baron William de Roos, the treasurer, the abbot of Westminster and Sir Arnold Savage, Speaker of the Commons.

in which the English people publically protested against the "libellos famosos et scripturas minus digestas"[51] of the duc d'Orléans and the comte de St. Pol and Ligny and against a threatened blockade of Bordeaux by the French fleet. Despite these bellicose acts, the most important dignitaries of the kingdom declared their intention of observing the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce unless forced into war by the French. Later in the month, Henry IV sent the king of France a letter which was almost identical with the manifesto issued by the English nation.[52]

Assurances from the king of England and the leading peers of the realm of their desire for peace, however, failed in convincing the duc de Bourgogne and the French Council to resume negotiations with England. The French ambassadors did not meet with Nicolas Rishton and his colleagues on 1 March as expected.[53] Instead, they sent the English plenipotentiaries a scathing dispatch, denouncing the numerous violations of the Truce committed by Henry IV's subjects in Picardy. Englishmen had "couru,

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[51] Ibid., 162.

[52] Along with Henry IV's missive to Charles VI on 25 February, the lords spiritual addressed a similar appeal to their counterparts in France while the lords temporal wrote their fellow nobles of the Valois kingdom. A notarial exemplification, dated Calais, 6 June 1404 of these three letters is printed in Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, pp. 62-64.

[53] Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, Jean de Montaigu, bishop of Chartres and Jean de Sains, the king's secretary, were at Boulogne in March of 1404.

pillears, et proie es parties de la conte de Boulloigne, et aillours en Picardie, et ovesque ce occis et prinse prisonners hommes, femmes, et enfans, et tous autres oevres faites accoustumez au fait de guerre."[54] That is, the English had committed all of the atrocities usually associated with the waging of war. Sir Richard Aston,[55] who recently had replaced Hugh Luttrell as lieutenant of the captain of Calais, wrote the duc de Bourgogne a spirited denial of the charges which the French diplomats had made.[56] He particularly insisted that Charles VI's subjects had committed many more grave infractions of the truce than had his fellow countrymen. Nevertheless, his lord, Henry IV wanted friendly relations preserved with France so he had appointed Sir John Cheyne of Beckford, a

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[54]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 215-216 and Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, pp. 75-76. Richard Aston, lieutenant of the captain of Calais, to Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, 18 March 1404. Cf. another copy of the letter from the departmental archives at Lille. A.D.N. B.18.823 published in Huguet, Aspects de la Guerre de Cent ans en Picardie maritime, II, pièces justificatives no. II, p. 383.

[55]Like Luttrell, Sir Richard Aston had been an esquire in the household of John of Gaunt. From 1402 to 1404, he served under the command of Prince Henry in Wales. Aston remained lieutenant of the captain of Calais from March of 1404 until 11 June 1408. See John of Gaunt's Register, 1379-1383, pt. I, p. 12; Kirby, Revue du Nord, XXXVII (1955), 24; Wylie, History of England under Henry IV, II, p. 92, IV, pp. 243, 254-255.

[56]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 214-225; Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, pp. 75-79; Huguet, Aspects de la Guerre de Cent ans en Picardie maritime, II, pièces justificatives no. II, pp. 382-389. Richard Aston to the duc de Bourgogne 18 March 1404.

member of the royal council,[57] to proceed to Paris for a personal conference with Charles VI and the duc de Bourgogne.

Little is known about Sir John Cheyne's mission except that he still remained at Calais with three colleagues as of 6 June 1404, being unable to cross the border into France.[58] Members of the French council obstinately refused any further negotiations with the Lancastrian regime, thereby giving the impression that they had abjured the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. Technically, the observance of that agreement by both sides ended on 1 March 1404 according to the Anglo-French indenture concluded during the previous summer. As M.H. Keen, a leading authority on the laws of war in the middle ages argues, no one ever completely observed a medieval truce. "The true guide to the effectiveness of truces," he contends, "is not, therefore, the success of the parties to them in keeping the peace but the efforts which

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[57]Kirby, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, XIV (1964), 61-63; Roskell, Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society, LXXV (1956), 63-64.

[58]Sir John Cheyne was appointed for the Paris mission in March of 1404. He left for France on 29 April, just four days after receiving his instructions from the King's Council. At Calais, he made little headway in his projected embassy to Charles VI beyond some communication between him and the sire de Hugueville occurring between 6 June and 20 July. See Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, pp. 240-241. Instructions for Sir John Cheyne, 25 April 1404. Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 306-308. English ambassadors to the French council, September 1404. Wylie, History of England under Henry IV, p. 438.

they made to repair the breaches which were always committed."[59] Although Henry IV willingly authorized his representatives to compensate Frenchmen injured at the hands of his subjects during November of 1403 and again in the following March, the Valois government did not honor the commitments which its deputies had made. Therefore, by the spring of 1404, it seemed clear that the great princes of France had decided against any further attempts at repairing the breaches of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce.

Philippe le Hardi and the Undeclared War against England

No official repudiation of the Anglo-French agreement of 1396, however, came from Paris. Faced with the problem of guessing the true intentions of the Valois government, the English plenipotentiaries had appealed twice to Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, for a resumption of Anglo-French negotiations. They had recognized him as the real ruler of France while Charles VI remained incapacitated by mental illness. Consequently, in order to understand the aims and objectives of French policy, Philippe le Hardi's attitude towards England must be examined.

Was he, however, the real ruler of France? Certainly by July of 1402 the duc de Bourgogne had emerged from the struggle for control of the government with his nephew, Louis d'Orléans, as the first peer of the realm. Three months later,

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[59]Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages, pp. 214-215.

Philippe le Hardi increased his prestige by receiving the guardianship of the duchy of Brittany on behalf of the ten-year-old Jean V.[60] In 1403, he further reduced the authority of his rival, the duc d'Orléans. Louis had been designated in an ordinance of 1393 as regent of the kingdom if Charles VI died leaving a minor heir.[61] On 26 April 1403, Philippe le Hardi aided by the duc de Berri changed that decree. If the dauphin had not reached his majority at Charles VI's death, the realm would be governed in the name of the young king by the queen, the four royal dukes, and the council. Decisions would be made according to majority vote "sanz avoir regard à la grandeur, auctorité et etats de personnes...."[62] thereby effectively reducing Louis d'Orleans' share in the regency. Philippe le Hardi crowned his final victory over the duc d'Orléans in May by announcing plans for marrying four of his grandchildren into the royal family.[63]

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[60]B.A. Poquet du Haut Jussé, "Philippe le Hardi, régent de Bretagne," in Mémoires de l'académie des sciences, arts et belles lettres de Dijon (Dijon: Imprimerie Bernigaud et Privat, 1934), 189-191.

[61]Jarry, La vie politique de Louis de France duc d'Orléans 1372-1407, p. 280.

[62]Ordonnances des rois de France, VIII, p. 582. Letters of Charles VI for the regency, 26 April 1403.

[63]Marguerite de Nevers, daughter of Jean Sans Peur, was betrothed to the dauphin, Louis. The only legitimate son of Jean Sans Peur, who later became Philippe le Bon, duc de Bourgogne, was to Marry Michelle, daughter of Charles VI. The other two marriages involved an unnamed daughter of Jean Sans Peur and Jean, duc de Touraine, and

The most important of these projected marriages was between the dauphin, Louis, and one of the granddaughters of the duc de Bourgogne. It clearly revealed that Philippe le Hardi had reached the peak of his power in France. He was, therefore, primarily responsible for French policy towards England. An examination of Anglo-Flemish relations already has disclosed his growing dislike for the Lancastrian regime during the summer of 1403. Another indication of Philippe le Hardi's increasingly belligerent attitude can be seen in his role as regent of Brittany. He did not prevent the Bretons from launching attacks on the wine convoys coming from Bordeaux to the ports of Bristol, Dartmouth, Plymouth, and Southampton[64] or from conducting hostile raids on the English coast. The Bretons actually waged open war on England from the summer of 1403 as a protest against the marriage between their duke's mother, Jeanne de Navarre, and Henry IV.[65]

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another son of the king of France, Charles, with Jacqueline de Bavière born in 1401. See David, Philippe le Hardi, le train somptuaire d'un grand Valois, pp. 140, 188-189; Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, pp. 601-603 in which the editor Denys Godefroy prints two treaties of marriage for the dauphin and Michelle de France, 5 May 1403; Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 76, 78; Thibault, Isabeau de Bavière reine de France, pp. 379-381

[64]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 54. Commission for John Stevens, mayor of Bristol, 26 August 1403; C.P.R., Henry IV, Vol. II (1401-1405): 24 August 1403, Order to port officials at Bristol, Plymouth, Dartmouth, Lynn, Southamption, and Great Yarmouth, pp. 298-299.

[65]For a thorough examination of Anglo-Breton negotiations dealing with Henry IV's marriage to Jeanne de Navarre,

If Henry IV envisaged his marriage to Jeanne de Navarre on 3 April 1402 as resulting in a firm alliance between England and Brittany, he was sorely disappointed. Philippe le Hardi came to Nantes in October of that year, assumed the guardianship of the duchy for the young duke, and prevented Brittany from defecting from the French side.[66] Any chance of the Bretons forming close ties with England disappeared completely in July of 1403. They prepared for a resumption of hostilities with England[67] by assembling twelve hundred men-at-arms, a great many cross-bowmen and some light troops at Morlaix. The armed forces boarded thirty ships under the command of Jean de Penhouet, the admiral of Brittany, at Roscoff, a port on the northwestern coast of the duchy. Three days after putting to sea on 8 July,[68] a few vessels on reconnaisance from the fleet, located a host of English ships lying off the Cape of St. Matthieu near the harbor at Brest.

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see George Akenhead Knowlson, Jean V, duc de Bretagne, et l'Angleterre (1399-1442) (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1964), pp. 32-41

[66]Poquet du Haut Jussé, Mémoires de l'académie des sciences, arts et belles lettres de Dijon, 184-201

[67]Knowlson, Jean V, duc de Bretagne, et l'Angleterre 1399-1442, p. 42 says little about Anglo-Breton relations in 1403-1404.

[68]Of the accounts given by chroniclers only Chronique Normande de Pierre Cochon notaire apostolique à Rouen, ed. Charles de Robillard de Beaurepaire (Rouen: A. Le Brument, 1870), p. 209 gives the date of 8 July. The others furnish no chronology.

They attempted an escape under the cover of darkness, but the Breton fleet after dividing into two squadrons closed in on the enemy. A furious battle ensued lasting six hours until the English exhausted their supply of munitions. The Bretons emerged victorious, reportedly capturing forty large ships and either drowning or taking prisoner two thousand crew members.[69] As soon as the Bretons returned to their home base, the admiral sent news of the tremendous victory to Philippe le Hardi and the French court at Paris.[70]

Neither the duc de Bourgogne nor any other prince of the realm publically disavowed the attack on the English flotilla at the Cape of St. Matthieu as a serious violation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. Indeed, the Valois government sent Jacques, comte de la Marche, Louis, comte de Vendôme, and Jean, comte de Clermont, sons of the duc de Bourbon, to Brittany in order to take charge of further operations against the English. Sailing from Brest on the

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[69]For the Anglo-Breton naval encounter off the Cape of St. Matthieu, see Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 104, 106, 108, 110; Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, pp. 156-157; La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, pp. 71-72. The account for 1404 of Robert Sorin, receiver-general and treasurer of Brittany, mentions the preparations of Jean de Penhouet for the naval battle with the English. Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne, ed. Dom Hyacinthe Morice (4 vols.; Paris: Charles Osmont, 1742-1746), II, col. 746.

[70]Dom Gui Alexis Lobineau, Histoire de Bretagne composée sur les titres et les auteurs originaux (2 vols., Paris: Francois Muguet, 1707), I, p. 503 cites another account of the treasurer of Brittany, which, unfortunately, is not published in his second volume "contenant les preuves et pièces justicatives."

second of August, they led a large Breton fleet across the Channel, attacking seven English merchantmen, which tried to break away for Plymouth. Being unable to make port, the English captains and crews abandoned their crafts, escaping in open boats. The comte de la Marche and his brothers captured the vessels with their cargoes and then, decided on an assault against Plymouth. The Bretons under the command of the sons of the duc de Bourbon burst in upon the town at night on 10 August,[71] burning and plundering it until three o'clock the next afternoon. Many of the townsmen were killed, mutilated or taken captive. Not satisfied with the destruction which they caused at Plymouth, the Bretons sacked other towns along the southern coast of England[72] and after recrossing the Channel, landed looting parties on the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, who burnt houses, took numerous prisoners and exacted huge sums of ransom money from the inhabitants.[73] Upon arriving at

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[71]The chronology connected with the expedition launched against Plymouth is derived from Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden Monachi Cestrensis, VIII, p. 543 where the date (St. Lawrence Day, 10 Aug.) is given and from Chronique Normande de Pierre Cochon, p. 208 who estimates the Bretons were at sea for eight days.

[72]In a commission for John Stevens, mayor of Bristol, 26 August 1403, Henry IV noted that the Bretons had sacked several towns along the coast. Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 54 and Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne, II, cols. 731-732.

[73]Although chroniclers mention the Breton attacks on the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, the best account is in Sir Richard Aston's letter to the duc de Bourgogne, 18 March 1404. Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign

St. Malo, the comte de la Marche departed for Paris with reports of the successful attacks against England.[74]

Peace between England and France depended on how Henry IV interpreted these raids. In a letter written on 26 August to John Stevens, mayor of Bristol, the king maintained that, because of the confirmation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce recently concluded at Leulinghen (27 June), he believed the Bretons were "amicos nostros," but they had burned and pillaged several towns along the southern coast of the kingdom.[75] Obviously, Henry intended to consider the attacks as the work of the Bretons and not of the French with whom he still maintained friendly relations. He even went so far as to refer to the Bretons as allies of Charles VI when, in fact, they were his subjects. That Henry purposely created this fictitious status is clear from Richard Aston's letter to the duc de Bourgogne in March of the following year when the French plenipotentiaries had

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of Henry IV, p. 220; Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, pp. 77-78; Aspects de la Guerre de Cent ans en Picardie maritime, II, pièces justificatives no. II, p. 386.

[74]For the sack of Plymouth and the accompanying events, see Annales Ricardi II et Henrici IV (1392-1406), p. 375; Capgrave, The Chronicle of England, p. 284; Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 112; Historia anglicana, II, p. 259; Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, p. 157; La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, pp. 69-70.

[75]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 54 and Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne, II, cols. 731-732. Commission for John Stevens, mayor of Bristol, 26 August 1403.

failed to meet with their English counterparts at Leulinghen. Aston contended after complaining of Breton raids on Plymouth and the islands of Jersey and Guernsey that "les gens du pays du Bretaign...sont purs subges de la courone et de l'obeissance de l'Amiralle de France...."[76] That is, the Bretons were definitely Charles VI's subjects and under the obedience of the admiral of France.

Why Henry IV preferred treating the Bretons as the subjects of a principality separate from France during the late summer of 1403 already has been suggested. He wanted peace with the Valois kingdom. Accordingly, the king's councillors at London resolved on confining retaliatory assaults to the coast of Brittany. In October, two months after the sack of Plymouth, they fitted out the king's war sloop and a few other ships in the Thames under the command of Sir William Wilford, who sailed down the Channel to Dartmouth, where he encountered a western fleet outward bound for Bordeaux with orders to protect the merchant convoys bringing wine cargoes to England.[77] Wilford took charge of the armed vessels, setting sail across the Channel for Brest. Arriving there, he seized six ships in

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[76]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 220; Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, p. 77; Aspects de la Guerre de Cent ans en Picardie maritime, II, pièces justificatives no. II, p. 386. Sir Richard Aston to the duc de Bourgogne, 18 March 1404.

[77]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 167-170. Henry IV to his council, 25 October 1403.

full view of the fortress of Brest and the next day, his men took four freighters loaded with iron, oil, and tallow. Meeting with no resistance, the English fleet set out for Belle-Ile, where it captured thirty more merchantmen filled with one thousand casks of wine from La Rochelle. Acts of piracy like this, however, did not satisfy the English commander, who landed a large body of troops on the rocky promontory of Penmarch. They marched inland about eighteen miles, burning and plundering along the way. Returning to their ships, Wilford's men disembarked again at St. Matthieu, burning the town to ashes. The captain of Brest, the famous Guillaume du Châtel, sire de Châteauneuf,[78] who had participated in the tournament of Montendre, with a small force came upon the invaders unexpectedly. Because they did not possess sufficient strength for engaging the enemy in battle, the Bretons retreated, allowing the English an unmolested departure for home.[79]

As devastating as these raids were, they did not

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[78]The fief of Châteauneuf was located ten miles south of St. Malo. For biographical information on Guillaume de Châtel, see Dom P.-H. Morice, Histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne composée sur les auteurs et les titres original (20 vols.; Guingamp: Benjamin Jollivet, 1835-1837), VI, pp. 73-75.

[79]The accounts of Sir William Wilford's expedition against Brittany are from English chroniclers except for Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 112, 114, who dates Wilford's attack on Brittany early in November of 1403 and estimates his troops at six thousand combatants. See, too, Annales Ricardi II et Henrici IV (1392-1406), pp. 375-376; Capgrave, The Chronicle of England, p. 284; Historia anglicana, II, pp. 259-260.

prevent the Bretons from planning new reprisals against England. Early in 1404, they sent Guillaume du Châtel to Paris, instructing him to obtain leave from the royal dukes for an invasion of the Lancastrian kingdom.[80] The Bretons believed the mission necessary because the duc de Bourgogne had just relinquished the regency of the duchy on 7 January, when Jean V attained his majority.[81] Whereas the princes of the royal family secretly had assisted the Bretons in the sack of Plymouth by sending them the sons of the duc de Bourbon, they now openly approved attacks on the southern coast of England emanating from Brittany as justified because of the earlier assaults by Sir William Wilford. Guillaume du Châtel, upon arriving home, mustered some two thousand knights and squires along with a number of cross-bowmen, archers, and other light troops at St. Malo.[82] They embarked for the coasts of Devonshire on one-hundred-fifty war ships,[83] preparing for a descent upon Dartmouth, which would duplicate the triumph at Plymouth. Dissension, unfortunately, broke out between two leaders of the

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[80]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 170.

[81]Jean V, duc de Bretagne, performed an act of homage publically for the duchy on 7 January 1404. Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne, II, cols. 734-735.

[82]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 172 estimates French forces at two thousand combatants, but La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, p. 80 puts the number at twelve hundred.

[83]Chronique Normande de Pierre Cochon, p. 207.

expedition--the captain of Brest and the admiral of Brittany, who refused for six days to permit a landing. Ultimately on 15 April,[84] Guillaume du Châtel led the Breton army ashore at Blackpool,[85] a rocky inlet about two miles south of Dartmouth. They immediately encountered stiff resistance from the Devonshire men, who, after much bloodshed, defeated the enemy forces, killing their leader and capturing no less than twenty-three noblemen. No help came from the Breton admiral, who, after helplessly watching the slaughter of his countrymen, sailed for home.[86]

The attempted sack of Dartmouth brought the kingdoms of France and England to the verge of open warfare. As regent of Brittany, Philippe le Hardi had done nothing to prevent the unprovoked attack upon the English flotilla lying off the Cape of St. Matthieu. He secretly had encouraged

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[84]Annales Ricardi II et Henrici IV (1392-1406), p. 384.

[85]Blackpool is mentioned in Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden Monachi Cestrensis, VIII, p. 543 and confirmed as the landing point of the Bretons in Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 272. John Hawley of Dartmouth to Henry IV, 14 July 1404.

[86]Besides the accounts of the assault on Dartmouth already mentioned, see Capgrave, The Chronicle of England, p. 285; Historia anglicana, II, pp. 261-262. Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, p. 159. Cf. Waurin, Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne, II, pp. 88-89 whose narrative at this point differs with La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, pp. 80-81. Examine, too, Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 66 and Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne, II, col. 741 for Henry IV's order to the sheriff of Devon, dated 25 May 1404, which names some of the captured Breton nobles.

the Bretons in their sack of Plymouth, supplying them with the sons of the duc de Bourbon as leaders of the expedition. Although Henry IV in an effort to preserve the peace decided against treating the Bretons as an integral part of the French nation, the royal dukes still publically approved plans for a new assault on Dartmouth. The duc de Bourgogne disclosed a similar animosity towards England in allowing his vassal, Waleran de Luxembourg, comte de St. Pol and Ligny, to conduct a private war against Henry IV. He permitted the comte de St. Pol and Ligny, for example, to station in the county of Flanders at the port of Gravelines French war ships which preyed upon English commerce in the Channel. English merchants claimed losses amounting to twenty thousand pounds from Waleran de Luxembourg's privateering.[87] In September of 1403, he wrote Henry IV a second letter, threatening to carry his vendetta beyond mere acts of piracy by launching an invasion force for England.[88]

The comte de St. Pol and Ligny's menacing words were no idle boast. He assembled at Abbeville six hundred combatants, composed chiefly of members of the local nobility.

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[87] Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 221; Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, p. 78; Aspects de la Guerre de Cent ans en Picardie maritime, II, pièces justificatives no. II, p. 387. Sir Richard Aston to the duc de Bourgogne, 18 March 1404.

[88] Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 116, 118.

Every care was taken in the preparation of the expedition. Large supplies of salted meats, biscuits, wine, beer, butter, flour, and "autres choses necessaires à mectre en mer"[89] were brought together. The French troops left from Harfleur aboard twenty nine ships,[90] sailing directly for the Isle of Wight. After landing there on 6 December, Waleran de Luxembourg issued a proclamation, demanding the submission of the inhabitants under pain of total destruction if they refused[91] and announcing that he would celebrate Christmas on the Island.[92] His men took prisoner a few fishermen with their nets and tackle,[93] seized abandoned sheep and cattle as the population scattered and threatened to set on fire farm buildings and homes if their demands for money were not met.[94] A priest offered to collect the tribute

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[89]La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, p. 91

[90]Chronique Normande de Pierre Cochon, p. 206.

[91]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 60. Letters to the bishop of Winchester and several others, 9 December 1403. Henry IV informed them that "le conte de Seint Poul ...est arrivez sur les coustes de nostre Isle de Wyght et, par ses lettres, donnees desouz son seal le sisme jour de ce present moys de Decembre, a signifiez a noz foiaux subgiez de nostre roiaume, q'il y est arrivez pur lour faire et porter touz les mals et displaisirs q'il poet, s'ils ne viegnent par devers lui."

[92]Annales Ricardi II et Henrici IV (1392-1406), p. 375.

[93]Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 221; Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, p. 78; Aspects de la Guerre de Cent ans en Picardie maritime, II, pièces justificatives no. II, p. 387; Sir Richard Aston to the duc de Bourgogne 18 March 1404.

[94]Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, pp. 157-158.

from the islanders if their cottages, barns, and sheepfolds were spared. The comte de St. Pol and Ligny, delighted over his initial success, knighted some of his followers.[95] He expressed his joy too soon for English troops were approaching from Southampton. Instead of giving the enemy battle on the island, the French forces withdrew to their vessels, returning home with many disgruntled lords angry at their leader because the enterprise had failed.[96]

The Final Breach between Valois France and Lancastrian England

Waleran de Luxembourg's attack on the Isle of Wight may have been part of a plan formed late in the summer of 1403 for a large-scale revival of hostilities with England. While Charles VI remained incapacitated by mental illness, early in September,[97] the King's Council faced a serious

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[95]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 118; La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, p. 92.

[96]In addition to the chroniclers already cited for the comte de St. Pol and Ligny's landing at the Isle of Wight, see Capgrave, The Chronicle of England, p. 285; Historia anglicana, II, p. 260; Eulogium Historiarum, III, p. 398-399. The comte de St. Pol and Ligny could not have stayed on the Isle of Wight very long, for on 13 December Henry IV countermanded orders, which were issued four days earlier for the summoning of all knights to resist Waleran de Luxembourg, should he attempt an invasion of England. Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, pp. 60-61. Indeed, at the opening of the Parliament on 14 January 1404, the chancellor reported that "le dit count /de/ Seint Poule s'arriva ore tard ove grant poair en l'Isle de Wyght; mais...q'il n'osa illoeques attendre ne demurer." Rotuli Parliamentorum, III, p. 522.

[97]Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 122.

crisis. Philippe le Hardi and his nephew, Louis d'Orléans, were preparing for another struggle for power at Paris. In order to rid the capital of the arch-rivals, the Council decided upon launching simultaneous assaults against the English in the duchy of Aquitaine and in Picardy, especially their stronghold there of Calais, placing the two dukes in charge of the expeditions.[98] The duc de Bourgogne with a large body of troops, which included many Flemings along with contingents from Brabant and Holland, left Paris for the siege of Calais.[99] He closed the roads leading to the town from Boulogne, St. Omer, and Gravelines, prohibiting any further contact between the English and subjects of Charles VI.[100] The duc de Bourgogne even secretly negotiated with some traitors in the garrison, who agreed to open the

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[98]Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, p. 156 records: "Pource qu'on voyoit evidemment les envies qui estoient et regnoient entre les ducs d'Orleans et de Bourgogne, on advisa qu'il seroit expedient des les separer, et employer au faict de la guerre...et fut ordonné, que l'un iroit vers Calais faire guerre aux ennemies, et l'autre vers Bordeaux."

[99]Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 58. Writ of military summons from Henry IV, 25 October 1403. See, also, Christine de Pisan, Le livre de fais et bonnes meurs du sage roy Charles V, ed. S. Solente. (2 vols.; Paris: Honore Champion, 1936-1940), I, p. 150 who contended that "le bon duc [de Bourgogne] avoit ferme esperance et voulenté de... aler, l'annee de son trespassement, en propre personne, à grant host, et les communes de ses bonnes villes de Gant et d'autres de Flandres, assigier la forteresse de Calais...."

[100]Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I, p. 65. English ambassadors to Thomas Langley, keeper of the privy seal, 1 December 1403; Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 172. English ambassadors to the duc de Bourgogne, 4 December 1403.

gates for the enemy. The conspiracy, however, was discovered.[101] Because Philippe le Hardi did not possess the ships for a blockade of Calais, he never attempted a siege of the town.[102] His decision left him in the peculiar position of being the only prince of the royal family whom the English plenipotentiaries believed favorably inclined towards peace.

The same conclusion could not be drawn from the actions of Louis, duc d'Orléans. At the head of an impressive force of fifteen-hundred knights and squires,[103] he left Paris on 16 September for the invasion of the duchy of Aquitaine.[104] Accompanying him were many prominent nobles and officials of the kingdom including Jean, comte de Clermont, eldest son of the duc de Bourbon and Charles d'Albret, the constable of France. The expedition could in no way be considered a private undertaking of the duc d'Orléans.[105] It was officially sanctioned by the Valois

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[101] Annales Ricardi II et Henrici IV (1392-1406), p. 377. Disaffection amongst members of the garrison sprang from nonpayment of wages. See the subsequent statement of the captain of Calais in Rotuli Parliamentorum, III, pp. 534-535.

[102] Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 158.

[103] Gilles de Bouvier, Abrégé d'une histoire chronologique de 1400 à 1467, at the end of the edition of Juvenal des Ursins, by Denys Godefroy, p. 412.

[104] Rymer, Foedera, vol. IV, pt. I, p. 58. Writ of military summons from Henry IV, 25 October 1403.

[105] Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, p. 156.

regime. The army arrived at Orléans, where Louis again wrote Henry IV on 14 October, charging him with murder and treachery.[106] Five days later, the duke made out his will as if he were prepared to die in the forthcoming fighting with the English.[107] Louis' plans for war in Aquitaine, however, did not materialize until the following spring. What prevented his troops from moving south in October of 1403 is not known. The king, who recovered his health briefly, may have prevented the enterprise.[108] Philippe le Hardi's reluctance to storm Calais may have influenced the duc d'Orleans, especially when his uncle returned to Paris on 7 December.[109]

Whatever the reason for delaying the offensive in Gascony may have been, Louis d'Orléans ultimately opened hostilities with England late in April of 1404. Having recently been named captain-general for the duchy of Aquitaine, Louis ordered part of his army led by Jean,

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[106] Chronique de la traison et mort de Richart, p. lxvii quotes from the letter of Louis d'Orléans to Henry IV, 14 October 1403. It was entered into the register of the Parlement de Paris on 21 November at the request of the duc d'Orléans and received by Henry IV before Christmas. Journal de Nicholas de Baye, I, p. 75; Rotuli Parliamentorum, III, p. 525; France, Archives Nationales, Inventaire analytique des ordonnances enregistrées au Parlement de Paris jusqu' à la mort de Louis XII, ed. Henri Stein (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1908), no. 178, p. 13.

[107] A copy of the duc d'Orléans' will is printed at the end of Juvenal des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, pp. 631-639.

[108] Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, p. 122.

[109] Petit, Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi, p. 336.

comte de Clermont, and Archambaud de Grailly, comte de Foix, south into Saintonge against the English stronghold of Bouteville, some fifty miles southeast of La Rochelle on the Charente. It fell before the French onslaught in less than two weeks.[110] At the same time, the remainder of Louis' forces under the command of the constable of France besieged the strong fortress of Courbefy, located about one hundred miles northeast of Bordeaux near Chalus by one of the tributaries of the Isle River.[111] It was built on a hillside, surrounded by a high wall and guarded by many towers placed at regular intervals. The constable tested the castle's defenses with catapults, battering rams and other types of siege engines, but made no progress.[112] Thomas Harvey,[113] in charge of the English garrison, withstood the French assault for twelve weeks[114]

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[110] Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 441, 446. The archbishop of Bordeaux to Henry IV, 17 April 1404; John Morhay to Henry Bowet, bishop of Bath and Wells, 30 April 1404. See, also, La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, p. 94; Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, p. 242. Gilles de Bouvier, Abrégé d'une histoire chronologique de 1400 à 1467, pp. 402, 412.

[111] "Petite chronique de Guyenne jusqu'à l'an 1442," ed. Germain Lefevre-Pontalis, Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes, XLVII (1886), 64, 73; Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, pp. 456-457. John Morhay to the bishop of Bath and Wells, 30 April 1404.

[112] Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 202, 204.

[113] Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, I, p. 254.

[114] Both the Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys,

before capitulating. He surrendered the castle during the summer upon the understanding that the English soldiers could leave unmolested with their belongings. The fall of Courbefy signalled the beginning of a major French attempt at the conquest of Aquitaine.[115]

The siege of Courbefy at the end of April, strangely enough, brought forth no immediate declaration of war from Paris. It coincided, unfortunately, with the death of Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, which temporarily stunned the French government.[116] On the English side, Sir John Cheyne remained at Calais as late as 6 June, hoping for a resumption of diplomatic relations with France which would confirm the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. The final rupture between the Lancastrian and Valois kingdoms, however, was close at hand. The death of the duc de Bourgogne on 27 April left Louis d'Orléans in sole charge of the realm. With his influence now paramount at court, Louis caused an irreparable breach with England in July when he encouraged

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III, p. 204 and Juvenal des Ursin, Histoire de Charles VI, p. 163 estimate the siege as lasting twelve weeks, while La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, I, p. 94 notes only a six-week attack against Courbefy.

[115]Boutruche, La crise d'une société, pp. 219-220; Calmette and Déprez, La France et l'Angleterre en conflit, pp. 280-281; Renouard, Bordeaux sous les rois d'Angleterre, p. 414.

[116]Richard Vaughan, John the Fearless, the Growth of Burgundian Power (New York: Barnes & Noble Inc., 1966), pp. 1-2.

the conclusion of a formal alliance between France and Owen Glyn Dŵr, a Welsh prince, who had revolted against Henry IV.

Owen Glyn Dŵr, lord of Glyndfrdwy and Gynllaith, had rebelled in 1400 because of the injustice of one of Henry IV's councillors. He soon had nearly the whole of Wales on his side, having been proclaimed prince of that country. The battle of Shrewsbury in July of 1403 prevented the Scots and the Percies from joining their forces with those of Glyn Dŵr.[117] Nevertheless, in the following year, the Welsh prince forged a much more impressive league with the kingdom of France. John Hanmer, his brother-in-law and Gruffydd Young, his chancellor, arrived at the French court early in June with full powers to conclude a treaty of friendship with Charles VI.[118] They were received cordially at Paris by Jean, comte de la Marche, and Jean de Montaigu, bishop of Chartres, who were authorized formally to make an agreement with the two special envoys of Owen Glyn Dŵr.[119] At the house of the French chancellor, Arnaud de Corbie, the Welsh ambassadors held negotiations with the comte de la March. On 14 July 1404, the representatives of both sides

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[117] J.E. Lloyd, Owen Glendower (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), pp. 1-75.

[118] Welsh Records in Paris, ed. T. Matthews (Carmarthen: W. Spurrell and Son, 1910), pp. 23-24. Instructions for the Welsh ambassadors, 10 May 1404.

[119] Ibid., pp. 28-29. Instructions for Jean, comte de la Marche, and Jean de Montaigu, bishop of Chartres, 14 June 1404; Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 164, 166.

bound the king of France and the prince of Wales in an offensive alliance against Henry of Lancaster, their common foe and all his adherents. The key passage of the agreement stated that

> ipsi domino rex et princeps erunt amodo ad invicem conjuncti, confederati, uniti et ligati vinculo veri federis et vere amicicie certeque et bone unionis, potissime contra Henricum de Lencastria utriusque ipsorum adversarium et hostem suosque adherentes et fautores.[120]

The diplomats further promised that neither ruler would make a separate peace or truce with Henry.

This offensive combination formed against the king of England at Paris proclaimed an official resumption of the war. The Twenty-Eight-Year Truce, which had governed relations between England and France since 1396, had been repudiated. The comte de la Marche prepared an expedition for Wales, which included five hundred knights and two hundred cross-bowmen. It came to nothing.[121] In 1405, however, Jean de Hangest, sire de Hugueville, launched an invasion force of twenty-six hundred soldiers from Brest, which landed in Wales early in August. His campaign coincided with new French assaults upon England positions in Aquitaine and Picardy. Waleran de Luxembourg, who had become the vassal

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[120] Welsh Records in Paris, p. 25. Franco-Welsh alliance, 14 July 1404.

[121] Royal and Historical Letters during the Reign of Henry IV, p. 282. The bishop of Bangor to Henry IV, 2 August 1404; Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, III, pp. 222, 224; Chronique Normande de Pierre Cochon, pp. 209-210.

of the duc d'Orléans, laid siege to the outpost of Marck, near Calais, but failed in his objective. French fortunes fared better in the south where Louis' personal dreams of seizing the duchy of Aquitaine almost came to fruition. His forces captured many English fortresses in an attempt to encircle Gascony. Consequently, by 1405, fighting between the kingdoms of England and France had begun again on a grand scale.[122]

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[122]For the full-scale revival of Anglo-French hostilities in 1405, see note 115 and Le Moyne de la Borderie, Histoire de Bretagne, IV, p. 151; Charles de la Ronciére, La Guerre de Cent ans: Révolution maritime, Vol. II of Histoire de la marine française (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1900), pp. 182-185; Vaughn, John the Fearless, pp. 20-21.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Through the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce and his marriage to Isabelle, Richard II attempted to end the Hundred Years' War. A truce of record length and a judicious wedding, temporarily, created a congenial climate in which the monarchs of England and France could arrive at a final settlement of their differences. In 1396, three major problems confronted Charles VI and Richard II. The English king had neither recognized French sovereignty over the duchy of Aquitaine nor Charles as the rightful ruler of the kingdom of France. Richard still entitled himself king of England and France, thereby perpetuating Edward III's claim to the French throne. In order to lay the foundation for a lasting understanding with the Valois government, Richard knew that he must become Charles' vassal for the duchy of Aquitaine and acknowledge him as the legitimate ruler of France. In return for these concessions, Charles faced the difficult decision of determining the extent of the territory which would be given up to England. Before these questions were resolved, however, Richard was deposed. The accession of his rival, Henry IV, seriously jeopardized the

peace.

Indeed, it is amazing that the English revolution of 1399 did not bring about immediately the repudiation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce by the French. A major task of the present work has been to explain why Anglo-French relations were not disrupted completely by the dynastic change occurring in England. During the first few months after Richard II's deposition, a renewal of the war seemed imminent. The English revolution provided an obvious occasion for detaching the duchy of Aquitaine from England, an opportunity which Charles VI found very tempting. He ordered his nephew south in the hope of encouraging the great magnates of Gascony to renounce their allegiance to England in favor of becoming vassals of the French crown. The duc de Bourbon, too, was sent to Aquitaine with grand promises for the burgesses of Bordeaux, Dax, and Bayonne if they gave up their loyalty to the English government. Although both efforts proved unsuccessful in bringing about the submission of the duchy to Charles VI, they revealed that the French were no longer satisfied with gaining mere feudal sovereignty over Aquitaine, but now wanted it reunited to the royal domain under the direct control of the king.

Plans for a military conquest of Aquitaine, however, had to be set aside early in 1400. Isabelle, daughter of Charles VI, remained in English hands after the death of

her husband. Her return to France became the primary objective of French foreign policy and explains most clearly why a revival of hostilities between the Valois and Lancastrian kingdoms had not taken place after the deposition of Richard II. In order to secure the release of Isabelle from English custody, Charles confirmed the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce and authorized further negotiations with ambassadors from England, although he considered Henry IV nothing less than a usurper. Henry, on his side, also accepted the Anglo-French agreement of 1396. He wanted peace with France because his own position in England had been threatened by the Revolt of the Earls and because the Scots on his northern border refused to observe the provisions of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce, which named them as allies of the king of France. Even an English invasion of Scotland failed to convince the Scottish king of the wisdom of maintaining friendly relations with England. By 1401, a state of open war existed between the two realms.

Despite trouble with Scotland, delicate negotiations for Isabelle's return home took place at Leulinghen. As a result of these Anglo-French conferences, Henry IV eventually released her in the summer of 1401. This decision, undoubtedly, was the most serious blunder which Henry made in all of his dealings with the French. Any goodwill which he might have gained from setting the young queen free was nullified when he delayed her departure so long trying to

have her married again while she resided in England. By sending Isabelle home, too, Henry left Charles VI free to pursue whatever policy he wished towards England. The French monarch was no longer restrained from waging war by his daughter's captivity in England. Henry gave up a valuable bargaining counter in exchange for a vague promise of further discussions of the major issues dividing England and France. He gained nothing from the transaction. Charles still refused to recognize him as the legitimate successor of Richard II. Charles still raised the claim for the two-hundred-thousand francs of his daughter's dowry. Charles still rejected Henry's demands for redress for infringement of his rights in the duchy of Aquitaine. English complaints concerning the creation of a new duke for the duchy of Aquitaine, the attempts of Charles d'Albret to dissuade Gascon nobles from their allegiance to the Lancastrian kingdom, and the successful conversion of Archambaud de Grailly, comte de Foix, to the French side fell on deaf ears. Above all, many French princes harbored a profound grudge against the English king because of the ill treatment which they believed Isabelle had received while in England. For them only war could slake their thirst for revenge.

In view of such hostile feelings, why did the French royal family preserve the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce in the year following Isabelle's departure from England? The

answer can be found only in the worsening internal troubles which afflicted France. The Valois regime failed to mount a new offensive against the Lancastrian kingdom because it lacked effective leadership. Charles VI suffered from recurring bouts of madness, during which Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, and Louis, duc d'Orléans, contested for control of the government. Their dispute left France mired in domestic conflict, making any consistently belligerent policy towards England impossible. The duc d'Orléans, who was a former friend and ally of Henry IV, nevertheless, turned into a determined foe. He regarded the usurpation of the throne of England by the duke of Lancaster and the manner in which the English treated Isabelle after the deposition of Richard II as personal injuries for which satisfaction must be obtained. The duc d'Orléans challenged Henry to meet him in the lists, but when the English king disregarded him, he advocated a resumption of the war, directed primarily at the conquest of the duchy of Aquitaine. Fortunately for both kingdoms, Philippe le Hardi, who emerged victorious in the struggle for power in France, maintained the peace so that his subjects of Flanders could continue enjoying free commercial intercourse with English merchants across the Channel and at Calais.

The prosperity of Flemish maritime trade, consequently, deeply concerned the duc de Bourgogne. Why he eventually decided against following a friendly policy towards England

becomes clear only when Anglo-Flemish relations are examined. Besides explaining French reluctance to renew the war immediately after the English revolution, this work has also sought to determine the causes of the ultimate repudiation of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce by the Valois government. A significant reason was the increasing animosity towards England, which Philippe le Hardi disclosed in 1403. What angered him more than anything else was English privateering, which cost Flemish shipping heavy losses. While the vier leden favored peace despite the attacks of English corsairs, Philippe le Hardi became more bellicose because of them. When Henry IV failed to curb the piracy of his subjects, the duc de Bourgogne took reprisals against English merchants trading in Flanders, obstinately refused all pleas for the return of their goods, asked the vier leden for two thousand soldiers for the defense of West Flanders against the English, and to give his nephew, the king of France, permission to use Flemish ports as bases from which to launch an invasion force for England. Such belligerent decisions on the part of the duc de Bourgogne prevented the conclusion of a separate Anglo-Flemish commercial truce and presaged new troubles for England and France.

Although both sides confirmed the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce in June of 1403, outstanding problems still plagued the two realms. The French Council, acting on behalf of

Charles VI, incapacitated by a prolonged fit of madness, set forth the demand for the two-hundred-thousand francs of Isabelle's dowry, a step obviously designed to offset the English claim for the payment of the balance of Jean II's ransom. The duc d'Orléans and Waleran de Luxembourg, comte de St. Pol and Ligny, also wrote Henry IV letters, declaring that they would wage war against him notwithstanding the truce. English ambassadors at Leulinghen protested against the threats of Louis d'Orléans and Waleran de Luxembourg, but reiterated their lord's desire for peace. Indeed, Henry sought in every way to reduce the hostility expressed by the Valois government. He even issued a safe-conduct for several prominent French diplomats so that they might travel safely through his kingdom to Scotland, where Robert III could be asked if he wished to be included again in the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce. Henry's generosity, however, proved futile. The Scots, already at war with England, launched a new offensive only to be defeated at the battle of Shrewsbury along with their allies, the Percies.

The Scots rejected all peace offers from Henry IV even after their defeat in July of 1403, and the French war party gained increasing influence over the duc de Bourgogne at Paris. Although never officially renouncing the Truce, he did nothing to enforce its provisions. As regent of Brittany, he did not prevent the Bretons from

launching attacks on the wine convoys coming from Bordeaux to the ports at Bristol, Dartmouth, Plymouth, and Southampton or from conducting hostile raids on the English coast. In fact, he began participating actively in the hostile acts against Henry IV's kingdom. Philippe le Hardi secretly aided the Bretons, who continued ravaging the southern coast of England, allowed one of his most important vassals, Waleran de Luxembourg the privilege of stationing at Gravelines in his own county of Flanders armed vessels, which preyed on English merchant shipping and most significantly conceived plans for besieging the stronghold of Calais. When the duc de Bourgogne died in the spring of 1404, Anglo-French relations did not improve. He was replaced at the head of the Valois government by his arch-rival, Louis d'Orléans, who caused the final breach with England. In July, he encouraged the conclusion of an offensive alliance between his brother Charles VI and Owen Glyn Dŵr, a Welsh prince, who had revolted against Henry IV. The Twenty-Eight-Year Truce, which had governed relations between England and France since 1396, had been repudiated.

The full-scale revival of the war in 1405, featuring especially French attacks against Picardy and Aquitaine, gravely threatened English possessions in France. A year later, however, an intense revival of the conflict between the ducal houses of Orléans and Bourgogne stalled Valois

military efforts. The murder of Louis d'Orléans in November 1407 at the behest of the duc de Bourgogne ended French plans of conquest, eliminating the greatest foe of England and beginning nearly thirty years of civil strife, during which Henry V defeated French forces at Agincourt, occupied Normandy, and had himself recognized the legitimate heir of Charles VI. Such glittering triumphs were made possible with the help of the new duc de Bourgogne, who formed a firm alliance with the English king. When he abandoned the English at the great Congress of Arras in 1435 and made peace with his rightful king, Charles VII, on his own terms, the decline of the English position in France began. Charles VII pressed the war to a final conclusion. He recaptured Paris, Rouen, Cherbourg, and Bordeaux, so that by 1453 only Calais remained in English hands. The Hundred Years' War ultimately ceased without treaty or ceremony heralding its end.

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One of the major reasons for choosing the problem of the Twenty-Eight-Year Truce and Anglo-French diplomatic relations (1399-1404), beyond its significance for the history of the Hundred Years' War, was the accessibility of the primary sources. Most of them have been published. Manuscripts, which are preserved in the Public Record Office at London and bear directly upon the subject of this study, for example, have been either published in full in such collections as Rymer's Foedera or have been summarized in various calendars listed below in pages 250-252. Walter Prevenier in his Handelingen van de leden en van de staten van Vlaanderen and L. Gilliodts van Severen in his Le Cotton manuscrit Galba B. I have printed the most important accounts of the vier leden which deal with Anglo-Flemish relations. Documents from the Archives Nationales at Paris appear in many books such as Choix de pièces inédites relatives au règne de Charles VI, Cosneau, Les grands traités de la guerre de cent ans, and Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race. Even manuscripts from the Archives departementales du nord at Lille have been published in various works. See especially those in volume II of Huguet, Aspects de la guerre de cent ans en Picardie maritime, 1400-1450 and in volume XVI of Oeuvres de Froissart edited by Kervyn de Lettenhove. Consequently this dissertation relies most heavily on printed sources, a variety of lists, inventories and calendars, contemporary chronicles, and a comprehensive examination of the secondary works related to the diplomatic history of England and France at the beginning of the fifteenth century.

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APPENDIX I

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