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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

AN ATTITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE AND PERFORMANCE OF FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

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BY

WAYNE J. DONICA

Norman, Oklahoma

1974

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APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF CHARTS	xiv
PREFACE	xv
Chapter	
I. WHY THE NEED FOR FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS	1
A Brief Historical Resume of Federal Grants-in-Aid	1
The Establishment of Federal Regional Councils	25
II. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS	59
Attitudes of City Officials Toward the Performance of Federal Regional Councils	59
Attitudes of Federal Regional Council Members	62
Hypotheses	62
Setting	64
Explanation of Dependent Variables	75
Quantitative Analysis	86
III. ATTITUDES OF SELECTED CITY OFFICIALS TOWARD THEIR RESPECTIVE FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS	88
City Officials' Acquaintance with Councils	88
Frequency of Contact with Federal Regional Councils	93
Frequency of Contact with Grant Access Sources Other Than the Federal Regional Councils	99
Effectiveness Ratings of Selected Grant Access Sources	106
An Analysis of Positive Attitudes Held by City Officials Toward Federal Regional Councils	119

Chapter Page

IV. ATTITUDES OF FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS 131

Council Service to Cities 131
The Lack of Decentralization of Member Agencies 141
Council Coordination and Authority 147

V. CONCLUSION 161

SOURCES CONSULTED 177

APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE TO CITIES 185

QUESTIONNAIRE TO FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS . . . 191

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
2A.	Ranking in Terms of Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact	86
3A.	Local Official Respondents' Personal Contact with Federal Regional Council Members	89
3B.	Local Official Respondents' Attendance at Meetings Sponsored by Federal Regional Councils	89
3C.	Local Official Respondents' Familiarity with the Functions and Activities of Federal Regional Councils	90
3D.	Acquaintance of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Presence of a Grant Liaison Officer	90
3E.	Acquaintance of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Councils by Independent Variables	92
3F.	Frequency of Contact with a Federal Regional Council	94
3G.	Frequency of Contact of Local Officials with Federal Regional Councils	94
3H.	Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Partisan/Nonpartisan Government	95
3I.	Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Median Education Level	96
3J.	Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Councils by Family Poverty Level (Family Yearly Income less than $3,000)	97

Table		Page
3K.	Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Councils by Median Income ($10,000 or Less)	97
3L.	Frequency of Contact by Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Independent Variables	98
3M.	Frequency of Contact Direct to Washington, D.C.	99
3N.	Frequency of Contact with Congressmen or Senators in Seeking Information about or Assistance with Federal Grants	100
3-O.	Frequency of Contact to a Council of Government in Seeking Information about or Assistance with Grants	101
3P.	Frequency of Contact to a District Federal Office	101
3Q.	Local Official Respondents' Frequency of Contact with District-Subdistrict Office . .	102
3R.	Local Official Respondents' Frequency of Contact with Washington Federal Department/ Agency	102
3S.	Local Official Respondents' Frequency of Contact with U.S. Congress	103
3T.	Local Official Respondents' Frequency of Contact with Council of Government (C.O.G.) .	103
3U.	Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondent to Other Sources by Population .	104
3V.	Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents to Other Sources by Mayor Selection	104
3W.	Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents to Other Sources by Poverty Level of Families	105
3X.	Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents to Other Sources by Independent Variables	107

Table		Page
3Y.	Frequency of Contact: Seeking General Information	108
3Z.	Frequency of Contact: Seeking Assistance with a Grant Problem	108
3AA.	Effectiveness of Contact: Gaining General Information about Available Grants	109
3BB.	Effectiveness of Contact: Solving a Problem.	110
3CC.	Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Selection Method of City Council Members	111
3DD.	Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Independent Variables	112
3EE.	Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with U.S. Congress by Independent Variables	113
3FF.	Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Washington Federal Offices by Grant Liaison Officer	114
3GG.	Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Washington Federal Office by Population	115
3HH.	Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Washington Federal Department/Agency by Independent Variables	116
3II.	Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Council of Governments by Partisan-Nonpartisan Government	117
3JJ.	Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Council of Governments by Method of Selection of City Council Members	117

Table		Page
3KK.	Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Council of Governments by Reform Score . . .	118
3LL.	Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Council of Governments by Population	119
3MM.	Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Council of Governments by Independent Variables	120
3NN.	Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with District/Subdistrict Federal Office by Independent Variables	121
3-OO.	Federal Regional Councils Have Expedited the Grant Process for This City	122
3PP.	The Council Keeps This City Informed about Its Activities and Programs That Relate to Urban Needs	122
3QQ.	Councils Have Reduced the Number of Steps Necessary in Obtaining a Grant	123
3RR.	Council Members Are More Likely to Respond with Action to Local Needs and Problems Than Are Bureaucrats in Washington	123
3SS.	Council Members Have a Greater Sensitivity and Awareness to the Needs of Local Governments Than Do Washington Bureaucrats	123
3TT.	Council Members Have Coordinated Federal Grant Information for My City When Asked . .	124
3UU.	Members of the Council Have Coordinated the Resources of Their Respective Agencies in Solving the City's Grant Problem	125
3VV.	Councils Have Reduced the Number of Contacts This City Makes with Other Grant Sources	125
3WW.	Members of the Council Lack Sufficient Authority To Make Decisions and Must Clear Problems with Washington	125

Table		Page
3XX.	Contacts with the Federal Regional Council Have Been Beneficial to My City	126
3YY.	Best Description of Federal Regional Councils: Merely Another Bureaucratic Obstacle in the Process of Obtaining a Federal Grant .	126
3ZZ.	I Believe Councils Should Continue as a Permanent Part of the Federal Structure . . .	127
3AAA.	Positive Attitudes of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Independent Variables	128
3BBB.	Summary of Relationships Between Dependent and Independent Variables: Government Structure Variables (Chi-squares and Significance Levels)	129
3CCC.	Summary of Relationships Between Dependent and Independent Variables: Socioeconomic Variables (Chi-squares and Significance Levels)	130
4A.	Most City Managers Have Working Contacts with the Council	132
4B.	The Council Makes an Effort To Keep City Managers Familiar with Council Programs . . .	132
4C.	The Council Makes an Effort To Keep City Managers Familiar with Council Programs: Level of Statistical Significance	132
4D.	The Council Has Sponsored Meetings for City Officials within This Region	133
4E.	The Council System Allows Federal Officials a Closer Working Arrangement with City Officials Than Existed Previously	134
4F.	The Council System Allows Federal Officials a Closer Working Arrangement with City Officials Than Existed Previously: Level of Statistical Significance	134
4G.	Council Members Have a Greater Sensitivity to the Needs of Local Governments Than Do Washington Bureaucrats	134

Table		Page
4H.	Council Members Have a Greater Sensitivity to the Needs of Local Governments Than Do Washington Bureaucrats: Level of Statistical Significance	135
4I.	The Council Is Becoming Accepted by Local Officials as the Place Where Substantive Decisions Are Made	135
4J.	Councils Are Helpful to Cities Only When a Grant in Question Relates to Several Agencies	136
4K.	When a City Official Has a Question Concerning a Grant Handled by a Specific Agency, He Is Better Served by the District Federal Office Rather Than the Council	136
4L.	When a City Official Has a Question Concerning a Grant Handled by a Specific Agency, He Is Better Served by the District Federal Office Rather Than the Council: Level of Statistical Significance	136
4M.	Councils Expedite the Grant Process When the Grant Relates to Several Agencies on the Council	137
4N.	Councils Expedite the Grant Process When the Grant Relates to Several Agencies on the Council: Level of Statistical Significance	137
4-O.	The Councils Have Been Very Successful in Achieving Program Coordination	138
4P.	Perception Concerning Contact: The Council Is Consulted on a Regular Basis by City Officials Seeking General Information about Federal Grants	138
4Q.	Perception Concerning Contact: The Council Is Consulted Frequently by City Officials Seeking Specialized Assistance with Grant Problems	139
4R.	Council Members' Attitudes toward Council Service to Cities: Levels of Statistical Significance	140

Table		Page
4S.	Perception of the Problem of Decentralization of Member Departments and Agencies: Is the Lack of Decentralization a Principal Problem?	142
4T.	Perception of the Problem of Decentralization of Member Departments and Agencies: Is the Lack of Decentralization a Principal Problem: Level of Statistical Significance	142
4U.	If Equal Line Authority Were Granted to Each Member, the Council Would Benefit	143
4V.	If Equal Line Authority Were Granted to Each Member, the Council Would Benefit: Level of Statistical Significance	143
4W.	Members Who Have More Line Authority Play a More Effective Role on the Council	144
4X.	Members Who Have More Line Authority Play a More Effective Role on the Council: Level of Statistical Significance	144
4Y.	Council Members Must Frequently Pass Problems to Washington for Solving	145
4Z.	Council Members' Attitudes Toward Problem of Decentralization: Levels of Statistical Significance	147
4AA.	The Council Has Experienced Some Disagreement Because of Agency Pressures To Avoid Compromise	148
4BB.	Issues with High Potential for Controversy Are Avoided by the Council	148
4CC.	The Operation by Consensus Prevents the Council from Taking Action on Controversial Issues	149
4DD.	A Stronger Coordinating Mechanism Is Needed Within the Council	149
4EE.	A Stronger Coordinating Mechanism Is Needed Within the Council: Level of Statistical Significance	150

Table		Page
4FF.	The O.M.B.'s Role Should Be Increased So It Can Have Power of Enforcement	150
4GG.	The O.M.B.'s Role Should Be Increased So It Can Have Power of Enforcement: Level of Statistical Significance	151
4HH.	The Council Would Operate More Effectively if O.M.B. Would Assign a Full Time Permanent Representative Here	151
4II.	The Council Chairman Should Be Given Line Authority over the Other Council Members . .	152
4JJ.	The Council Chairman Should Be Given Line Authority over the Other Council Members: Level of Statistical Significance	152
4KK.	The Chairman Should Not Have To Serve a Dual Assignment as Agency Head as This Curtails His Effectiveness on the Council . . .	152
4LL.	The Under Secretaries Group Can Be Characterized by Permissive Management	153
4MM.	The Council Operates Best When the Under Secretaries Group Provides Clear Management Direction and Assistance	153
4NN.	Absence of Formalized Standards for Planning Work and Reporting Curtails Effectiveness of the Council	154
4-OO.	Council Members Have Experienced Conflict as a Result of Functional Expectations of One's Agency Contradicting the Area Coordination Expectations of the Council	154
4PP.	When a Council Member Is Torn Between Expectations of His Agency and the Council, He Decides in Favor of the Agency	155
4QQ.	When a Council Member Is Torn Between Expectations of His Agency and the Council, He Decides in Favor of the Agency: Level of Statistical Significance	155

LIST OF CHARTS

Figure		Page
1A.	Standard Federal Regions	33
1B.	An Organizational Chart of the Federal Regional Council System	36
2A.	Acquaintance Continuum (Scale I)	77
2B.	Acquaintance Scale: Dichotomized by Mean Score	77
2C.	Frequency of Contact with Federal Regional Council Continuum (Scale II)	78
2D.	Frequency of Contact Scale: Dichotomized by Mean Score	79
2E.	Frequency of Contact Continuum for Non-Federal Regional Council Sources (Scale III)	80
2F.	Frequency of Contact Scale for Non-Federal Regional Council Sources: Dichotomized by Mean Score	81
2G.	Positive Attitude Toward Federal Regional Council Continuum (Scale IV)	83
2H.	Positive Attitude Toward Federal Regional Council Scale Dichotomized by Mean Score .	84

PREFACE

The Federal grant-in-aid device is historically one of the principal mechanisms the nation has utilized in accomplishing its goals and objectives. Since the Eisenhower administration, in particular, there has been an acute awareness of the chaotic nature of the administration of the country's grant-in-aid system. Many theoreticians and practitioners recognized that if the nation's goals, both social and material, were to be met, extensive modification of the present Federal grant-in-aid picture seemed essential.

Because ours is an urban society, the public officials responsible for urban areas must be in the forefront of the formulation and implementation of public policy. Consequently, city officials must be made aware of, and actively assisted with, Federal grants and programs that have a direct influence on their given municipalities.

The Federal Regional Council system is one attempt to come to grips with the unwieldy nature of Federal grant administration as it relates to the nation's urban areas. In order to simplify the administration of

Federal grants and speed the delivery of Federal services, President Nixon directed, through an executive order in 1972, that Federal agencies be decentralized to the regional level. Ten Councils were established in each of the ten Federal regions to assist all general purpose governments within their respective regions. The Federal Regional Councils are designed, in the main, to coordinate different Federal grant making "human resources agencies" at the regional level in order to aid local and state public officials when they are seeking information about or assistance with Federal programs or grants. It was also hoped that the establishment of the Councils would aid various Federal departments and agencies in coordinating their programs with other agencies, as well as aiding Federal departments decentralize their programs to the regional level. One of the principal theories behind the Federal Regional Council concept is that Council members, due to their proximity, can develop and maintain a greater sensitivity to the needs of state and local governments within their region than can Washington bureaucrats.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact that three selected Federal Regional Councils have had on Federal grant assistance to local government officials in these respective Federal regions. The study describes and analyzes the attitudes of city officials

and Council members toward the Council performance in their respective region.

Since the principal method of the investigation is by survey, it was necessary that a time demarcation point of July, 1974, be set for this research. Legislation enacted, or programs implemented after this date are not described by the author because the attitudinal survey was conducted prior to this date. If we continue to move toward Federal bloc grants and revenue sharing a substantial modification in the present grant administration arrangement will inevitably occur. This study, however, focuses on the original purpose of the Council system, i.e., to rationalize the categorical grant arrangement.

There are, quite obviously, a number of approaches one could utilize in researching the Federal Regional Council system. One could employ a decisional approach, i.e., what Council agencies, groups, and individuals were active in meeting certain municipal needs when they were presented; or, one could utilize a descriptive historical approach to the formulation of the Council system. After extensive deliberation the author concluded, however, that the most feasible approach to understanding the relationships and interactions that exist between the Council and their recipient cities was by surveying a sample of Council members as well as city officials within their

Federal region. Consequently this study emphasizes the performance aspect of Federal Regional Councils, i.e., are Councils playing the role they were intended to play when they were established?

One official has stated that the Federal Regional Councils did not emerge full grown like Athena from the brain of Zeus. It is because of the great truth of this remark that the author introduces the study with a brief historical resumé of Federal grant administration.

CHAPTER I

WHY THE NEED FOR FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS

Part I. A Brief Historical Resumé of Federal Grants in Aid

Before going into the specifics of the Federal Regional Council arrangement, a brief resumé of Federal grants-in-aid is covered in order to provide a more comprehensive perspective of the role and intent of the Federal Regional Council system within the American Federal system.

Federal grant programs have provided a cooperative method for achieving national goals that the nation would have found difficult, if not impossible, to attain otherwise. The accessibility of the grant-in-aid mechanism has given public legislators at various levels of the Federal system a proven format for policy formulation and implementation. It has provided for the allocation of responsibilities between the different levels of government according to prescribed criteria of administrative and fiscal efficiency.[1]

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[1] Daniel J. Grodzins, The American System: A New View of Government in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 62.

> These criteria can be simply stated: the national government assumed partial responsibility for supplying funds and primary responsibility for establishing minimum standards of service, because the national government possessed superior fiscal resources and was concerned with the general welfare of the residents of all states. The states (and their political subdivisions) assumed primary responsibility for administration because they were in the better position to interpret and meet local needs.[2]

The interaction between the national government and the states, in addition to the device of matching funds, has prevented any absolute demarcation between grant financing and the establishing of standards on the one hand and program administration on the other hand. Instead the entire grant process of policy determination, financing, and administration can be characterized as a circular, cooperative process.[3]

Grants-in-aid, which have been utilized by the Federal government in some form from its origin are essentially a mechanism by which a larger governmental unit gives financial aid to a smaller governmental entity and assures that certain functions will be performed and certain minimum standards maintained throughout the granting jurisdiction.[4] "True grants-in-aid are

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[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] W. Brooke Graves, American Intergovernmental Relations: Their Origins, Historical Development and Current Status (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 508.

intergovernmental from one public treasury to another, and usually from the treasury of a higher level, more central government, into the treasuries of the local governments included within the central government's area."[5] Although the present system of Federal grants-in-aid is largely a twentieth century phenomenon, precedents for the grant mechanism extend back to the founding of the American Republic.[6]

> It has been said that one of the basic principles of federalism is that the superior resources of the central government shall be used to initiate and support national programs, largely administered by the political subdivisions. If this is true, it is clear that American federalism early passed the test. Even before the present government was established, land grants had been made for many worthy purposes.[7]

The principle of providing assistance to smaller government entities by the federal government was established early in American history. The early grants were, in the main, land grants. Land grants for education date back to the eighteenth century, and quite extensive land grants for internal improvements, education, and agriculture were given during the nineteenth century. In

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[5]William Anderson, The Nation and the States, Rivals or Partners? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), p. 176.

[6]Graves, op. cit.

[7]Ibid., 481.

the twentieth century, grants have been administered principally for highways, health, welfare, and education.[8]

> Thus the grant-in-aid system has evolved from land grants to cash grants and from "single shot" to annual payments. Federal control has increased, and financial participation by the states and municipalities has been encouraged through the development of matching formulae.[9]

Some of the salient distinguishing characteristics of the contemporary federal categorical grant-in-aid system can be traced back to 1862 when Congress enacted the Morrill Act, which assisted states in maintaining land-grant colleges. The Morrill Act lucidly specified the objectives of the grant, placed limiting conditions on the utilization of revenue derived from the granted lands, and required annual reports.[10] "The pattern of categorical grants was thereby established: needed resources were provided in exchange for the acceptance of certain minimum standards for a specific purpose."[11]

During the latter part of the nineteenth century, Federal aid in the form of annual money grants was

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[8] Ibid., 478.

[9] Ibid.

[10] U.S. Congress, A Commission Report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 138.

[11] Ibid.

extended in three program areas. The first of these were agricultural experiment stations in 1887, followed by aid to veterans homes in 1888 and Land Grant Colleges in 1890.[12]

The Woodrow Wilson Administration had a profound influence on intergovernmental relations and the nation's grant-in-aid system. The Wilson administration marked both the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment as well as the first use of the grant-in-aid mechanism in which the national government proposed a comprehensive program and offered large grants to states willing to participate.[13] Federal grants-in-aid were given a substantial impetus with the passing of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. The subsequent inevitable financial disparity between the federal and lesser governmental entities was somewhat alleviated by grants-in-aid awarded by the federal level to the lesser levels in the federal system.

> The income tax soon proved to be a readily expandable source of revenue which, as World War I demonstrated, could funnel billions into the national treasury. The war's end brought a reduction in national expenditures, although not to the 1913 level. The Congress and the executive were thus in possession of a financial tool of the first magnitude.[14]

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[12] Ibid., 139.

[13] Richard H. Leach, American Federalism (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1970), p. 196.

[14] Grodzins, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

The Smith-Lever Act of 1914, which established the cooperative agriculture extension program, is reputed to be the administrative prototype for most subsequent federal grant-in-aid programs. The Smith-Lever Act is characterized by three principal features which have become virtually standard requirements in federal grant-in-aid programs: (1) an apportionment formula for fund distribution among the states,[15] (2) 50-50 state matching requirements,[16] and (3) advance federal approval of state plans.[17]

By 1916, the federal program of cooperative agriculture extension work was utilizing $1.1 million of Smith-Lever money matched by an additional $597,924 from the states.[18] Added to these funds was $1.1 million from the Department of Agriculture, $873,000 from state and college funds, $973,000 from county funds, and $277,000 from philanthropic and other funds.[19]

> These large expenditures, the importance of the program, and the many groups involved in it focused

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[15] Deil S. Wright, Federal Grants-in-Aid: Perspectives and Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1968), p. 5.

[16] U.S. Congress, Senate, Impact of Federal Urban Development Programs on Local Government and Planning (Committee Print), 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1964, p. 3.

[17] Wright, op. cit.

[18] Grodzins, op. cit., p. 43.

[19] Ibid.

> national attention on the system of conditional grants. Once accepted as a useful combination of national money with local needs, in a program of national, social, and economic interest, the grant device was now ready for further evolution. Public opinion and official thinking seized upon it as a basis for new social and economic programs. Consequently, in the years immediately following the Smith-Lever Act, a number of influential programs developed, including the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916, the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, the Chamberlain-Kahn Act of 1918, and the Sheppard-Tower Act of 1921.[20]

Economic and social changes in the earlier part of the twentieth century had a profound impact on intergovernmental relations and in particular the role of grants-in-aid. After 1929 the number of individuals who depended on day-to-day earnings for a livelihood and who lost this means of support in the nation's economic collapse, reached proportions too staggering for the state and local governments to handle.[21] The federal government deemed it essential to massively subsidize state and local governments in order for them to remain viable institutions during this era. One student of federal grants-in-aid has observed that the narrow and crooked paths of federal-city relationships of past years evolved in the 1930's to express ways connecting the city halls and the national Capitol.[22]

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[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Wright, op. cit., p. 111.

> Direct relations between Washington and the cities, long existent but as long submerged, were brought to the surface and recognized openly for what they were. The chief instrument by which this transformation was effected was the grant-in-aid.[23]

Considering the complete expenditures of state and local governments federal grants had little significance until the depression years of 1934-1939. During this brief period grants for WPA, PWA, FERA and other programs significantly increased the totals to an average of over $2,000 million a year and supplied funds for over 25 per cent of state and local expenditures.[24] In the 1930's, of course, the Federal Government launched a plethora of new welfare and economic security programs. These programs were designed to assist not only individuals but also to alleviate the pressures on depleted state and local resources. Measures were inaugurated, for example, to provide low-rent public housing and improve health service.[25]

> Many of these grants, especially those authorized by the Social Security Act of 1935, provided for

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[23] Ibid.

[24] William Anderson, Intergovernmental Relations in the United States as Observed in the State of Minnesota: Intergovernmental Relations in Review (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1960), p. 45.

[25] U.S. Congress, Senate, Impact of Federal Urban Development Programs on Local Government and Planning, op. cit., p. 139.

> extensive administrative supervision by the National Government, including the requirement, added in 1939, that State and local personnel participating in Federally aided programs in health, welfare and employment security be selected and administered under a merit system of personnel administration.[26]

A retrenchment in federal grants started in 1939. Many of the federal programs operative during the depression were dropped starting in that year. During the American involvement in World War II, moreover, all federal grants were curtailed. By 1946 state and local funds obtained from federal sources were drastically reduced.[27]

> Then began another spectacular rise in federal aids, due partly to the enactment of some important new regular aid programs, so that by 1952, . . . the total of regular grants came to $2,393 million, which accounted for over 10 per cent of all state and local expenditures.[28]

The extensions of federal responsibility during the twentieth century were, in the main, sponsored by the Democratic party, and were fought, at times quite bitterly, by the Republican party.[29]

> The Republican party and its leadership attacked the expansion of federal power, and much of the

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Anderson, Intergovernmental Relations in the United States as Observed in the State of Minnesota: Intergovernmental Relations in Review, op. cit., p. 45.

[28] Ibid.

[29] James L. Sundquist and David W. Davis, Making Federalism Work (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 7.

> political debate from Woodrow Wilson to Lyndon Johnson centered on that issue. In Republic rhetoric, the aggrandizement of the federal government was part of the Democrats' effort 'to achieve their goal of national-socialism'--in the words of the 1952 Republican platform--and its result, in the mixed metaphor of that same document was 'weakened local self-government which is the cornerstone of the freedom of men.'[30]

President Eisenhower ran for election on that platform, of course, and entered the office of the presidency with a genuine commitment to halt the extension of federal programs and reverse the trend toward centralization. In a speech at a Governors Conference in Seattle, Washington, on August 4, 1953, President Eisenhower stated that: ". . . I am here for a very simple purpose, because of my indestructible conviction that unless we preserve, in this country, the place of the State government, its traditional place--with the power, the authority, the responsibility, then we are not going to have an America as we have known it; we will have some other form of government."[31] President Eisenhower's mechanism for ceasing the expansion of federal programs and consequently increased federal authority was his Commission on Intergovernmental

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[30] Ibid.

[31] U.S. President, Public Papers of the President of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1953-), Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, p. 536.

Relations, which later became known as the Kestnbaum Commission.[32] In a speech at the White House Conference of Governors on May 5, 1953 he outlined the purpose of the Kestnbaum Commission. "We are deadly serious about this business of trying to find a logical division between the proper functions and responsibilities of the State and Federal government."[33]

In a speech on March 30, 1953, in which President Eisenhower recommended the establishment of the Kestnbaum Commission, he emphasized the theme of decentralizing authority from the federal level by attacking the federal grants-in-aid system directly.

> . . . there is a need to review and assess, with prudence and foresight, the proper roles of the Federal, state and local governments. In many cases, especially within the past twenty years, the Federal Government has entered fields which, under our constitution, are the primary responsibilities of state and local governments. This has tended to blur the responsibilities of local government. It has led to duplication and waste. . . .[34]

President Eisenhower emphasized in this speech that, "A major mark of this development has been the multiplication

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[32] Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 8.

[33] U.S. President, Public Papers of the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, op. cit., p. 260.

[34] Ibid., p. 39.

of the Federal grants-in-aid for specific types of activities."[35]

The Kestnbaum Commission forthwith rejected the concept of federal encroachment at the state level and upheld the cooperative view of federalism by maintaining that the state and federal levels should not be viewed as competitors but should be viewed as cooperating with and complementing each other in an era of increased demands on both governmental levels. No plan was offered by the Commission to the point of dividing federal and state governmental functions and responsibilities.[36]

President Eisenhower, however, was not to be deterred by the lack of responsiveness by the Kestnbaum Commission for his dual federalism concept. At a governors' conference at Williamsburg, Virginia, on June 24, 1957, he stated:

> I have not the slightest doubt that, by mobilizing our collective leadership, we can revitalize the principle of sharing of responsibility, of separation of authority, of diffusion of power, in our free government. . . . I have a competent man and his assistants trying to identify those things we believe the Federal government has improperly invaded the rights and responsibilities of States. . . .[37]

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[35] Ibid.

[36] Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 8.

[37] U.S. President, Public Papers of the President of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1953-), Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp. 494-496.

President Eisenhower then created a federal-state committee for the purpose of sorting out governmental functions. The committee, however, did not present suggestions that could be considered meaningful revitalizing principles for the federal system. ". . . It proposed that the federal government eliminate grants-in-aid for vocational education and for sewage treatment plants, and that a portion of the tax on local telephone service be made available to those states."[38] Even these quite modest proposals were quickly disposed of by powerful interest groups which would have been directly involved by the implementation of such changes.

President Kennedy, in contrast with President Eisenhower, was more concerned about the nation's needed functions being performed than in what level of government performed them. President Kennedy's approach to the federal grants-in-aid mechanism was in stark contrast to President Eisenhower's perspective. In proposing the creation of a Department of Urban Affairs and Housing in a message to Congress January 30, 1962, he stated:

> I propose to act now to strengthen and improve the machinery through which, in large part, the Federal Government must act to carry out its proper role of encouragement and assistance to States and local

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[38] Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 9.

> governments . . . we will neglect our cities at our peril, for in neglecting them we neglect the Nation.[39]

Before the 1960's the typical federal assistance program did not involve an explicitly stated national purpose. Federal grants were, in the main, a method of merely aiding state and local governments to accomplish their modest objectives. Policy making rested with the state and local governments. The limited federal review that existed extended primarily to the "caretaker" areas of economy and efficiency, and did not touch on substantive aspects of policy making.[40]

> The federal agencies saw their role as one of technical assistance rather than control. They would offer advice, and work with the states to improve their programs, but they would not substitute their policy judgment for that of the recipient agencies.[41]

The 1960's, however, marked a significant new phase of American federalism. Congress, through significant enactments, asserted for the first time national interests and authority in a myriad of governmental functions that previously had been the exclusive domain of state and local governments. In the 1960's model

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[39] U.S. President, Public Papers of the President of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1961-), John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 77-78.

[40] Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 3.

[41] Ibid.

the grant was viewed as a method of enabling the federal government to accomplish its objectives rather than a means whereby the local governments accomplish their goal. ". . . The motive force is federal, with the states and communities assisting--rather than the other way around."[42] Manifesting the transformation of the federal process in the 1960's was the substantial increase in the number of grant-in-aid programs available to communities. Most of the increase in grant programs and authorizations between the years of 1964-1968 took place in the Department of Health Education and Welfare. However other federal departments expanded their bureaucracies also in order to increase their grant-in-aid services to state and local governments. The administration of federal grants-in-aid became a vast operation, spanning approximately twenty-five departments and agencies and over 135 bureaus.[43] Two of the principal consequences of increased grants-in-aid, and especially of the shift toward specific project grants, were increased problems of coordination and greater discretion in the hands of federal administrative officials.[44]

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[42] Ibid., p. 4.

[43] Wright, op. cit., p. 8.

[44] Ibid.

By the mid 1960's the problems of federal grant proliferation and lack of coordination among administering agencies had indeed reached a crisis point.[45] Increased criticisms of the grant-in-aid situation was concomitant with the peak years of grant-in-aid authorizations associated with President Johnson's vigorous War on Poverty programs.

> From the point of view of the grant recipients--State and local governments--the sheer number, variety, and complexity of grants make it all but impossible for eligible recipients to be fully aware of what aids are available, which Federal agencies administer them and how they suit particular needs. A major complaint of State and local governments concerns this information gap.[46]

The complexity of the grant-in-aid system bewildered state and local officials. Many localities were forced to add a grant officer to their staff to interpret the maze of grants.[47]

> Each statute had its own administrative strategy. Some programs followed the older model of federalism; most were patterned on the new. Formula grants coexisted with project grants. Established agencies vied with new ones as the recipients of federal funds in a welter of relationships and patterns that varied from agency to agency and from program to program.[48]

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[45] Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 13.

[46] U.S. Congress, A Commission Report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System, op. cit., p. 151.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 13.

Over 1,000 categorical grant programs are listed in the current Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance. As each of these categorical programs came into being, it was accompanied by its own individual set of esoteric federal guidelines, administrative requirements, and unique practices. "The leadership of elected state and local public officials frequently was undercut, and it is clear that the funding uncertainties and red tape burdens have weakened state and local capacity to govern, blunted the effectiveness of programs, and greatly increased the cost and time of response to public needs."[49]

As the complexities of the grants-in-aid situation increased, pressure in Washington to alleviate the burdened grant recipients grew. Congressman Richard D. McCarthy of New York remarked in the House of Representatives:

> Today we must cope with eighty-six new programs for local assistance--all passed by the 89th Congress, and eighty-four previous programs. These 170 Federal-aid programs are currently financed by more than 400 separate appropriations and are administered by twenty-one Federal departments and agencies assisted by 150 Washington bureaucracies and more than 400 regional offices--all of which can gather applications and dispense Federal funds. . . . Subsequently, many of these programs move slowly if at all, and prompt inefficiency at all levels of government. Towns, cities, and smaller villages--who often come to consider the Federal Government a

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[49]Dwight A. Ink, "Federal Assistance Review (F.A.R.) Program," Public Management, LIV (November, 1972), 19.

> great ogre with interest only in large urban areas--have no real clearing place where they can know immediately what aid is there for them, how they can become eligible for the aid, and how they may apply for it.[50]

As criticism of the maze of federal programs intensified in the mid-1960's, the government responded by creating an elaborate structure of coordination in Washington as well as the community level. At the Washington level the government designated several coordinating mechanisms with responsibility in a particular field, but completely powerless to enforce coordination on an interagency basis. For example, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development was made responsible for coordinating urban development programs while the Secretary of Agriculture was given the responsibility for coordinating rural programs.[51] By 1965 federal agency coordination mechanisms were being designated with such frequency that one of the coordination officials referred to the situation as the "coordinator of the month club."[52] Problems with this multiplicity of coordinators, of course, arose immediately. One of

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[50]U.S., Congress, House, Representative McCarthy speaking for aid to Cities and States. 90th Cong., 1st sess., February 8, 1967, Congressional Record, 3129 /A reference to the bound volume, which is differently paged from the Daily Digest/.

[51]Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 20.

[52]Ibid., p. 26.

the principal problems was the overlapping of authority, that is, a particular problem would, by its very nature, overlap several designated coordinators. The problems that arose from these modest coordinating bodies were so overwhelming that "by 1967 the cry for coordination that was rising from governors, mayors, and other participants in the federal system at all levels was directed less toward the need for coordinated federal programs as such than to the need for bringing order to the maze of coordinating structures that federal agencies were independently propagating."[53]

Two of the more publicized coordination mechanisms that the Johnson Administration employed in order to reorganize the delivery system of federal programs were the Community Action Agency and the Model Cities Program. The Community Action Agency under the Office of Economic Opportunity was implemented in 1964 for the purpose of coordinating the War on Poverty Programs.[54]

In January of 1964 President Johnson stated clearly the explicit role that the Community Action Agency was to play in the federal system.

> Poverty stems from no one source, but reflects a multitude of causes. Correspondingly, a number of individual programs have been developed over the years to attack these individual problems of job opportunities, education, and training. Other specific programs deal with . . . health, housing,

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[53] Ibid.

[54] David M. Austin, "Resident Participation: Political Mobilization or Organizational Co-optation?" Public Administration Review, XXXII (September, 1972), p. 410.

> welfare, and agricultural services. I propose to establish a means of bringing together these separate programs--Federal, State, and local--in an effort to achieve a unified and intensified approach to this complex problem, in which each separate element reinforces the others.
>
> Under this proposal, locally initiated, comprehensive community action programs would be developed, to focus the various available resources on the roots of poverty in urban and rural areas. I shall shortly transmit to the Congress legislation initiating this attack. . . .[55]

The Community Action concept was frequently characterized as a mechanism that would draw federal, state, and local programs together and meld them into a coordinated attack on the problems of poverty. However, as soon as the first agencies were formed under the auspices of the Office of Economic Opportunity, they began to evolve in directions not anticipated by those who designed the concept.[56] From a coordinating perspective the Community Action Agency concept was a rather dismal failure. Their lack of effectiveness is usually attributed to the following reasons: the heated controversy over participation of the poor in the agencies; the deemphasis on planning as a prerequisite for assistance; the lack of government support for aid to the poor; and, the controversy resulting when the agency demanded limitation of community assistance to "high priority" projects. As a

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[55] U.S. President, Public Papers of the President of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1963-), Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, p. 132.

[56] Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 32.

result of these phenomena the power structure of local communities eschewed the Community Action Agencies, and as outcasts they were rendered powerless to perform as an efficacious coordinating mechanism.[57]

The Model Cities Program soon replaced the ineffectual Community Action Agency as the principal coordinating vehicle of the War on Poverty. Model Cities, in some respects, used different terminology to describe many of the same functions and activities previously undertaken by the Community Action Agencies.[58] The cardinal point behind the Model Cities Program originated in a task force appointed by President Johnson in 1965. One of the primary concerns of this task force was the rising criticisms against the problems associated with urban renewal programs. The central focus of the task force was to reconcile the physical rebuilding of the cities with bettering the social milieu of the citizens as well.

> While urban renewal might remake the physical structure of a city slum, the critics observed, it did little to improve the lives of the slum's inhabitants. Indeed it worked the other way--it added to the problems of the poor by forcing them out of their neighborhoods into other slums to make way for the 'federal bulldozer.' Residents of black

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[57] Ibid.

[58] Howard W. Hallman, "Federally Financed Citizen Participation," Public Administration Review, XXXII (September, 1972), p. 423.

> ghettos commonly referred to urban renewal as 'Negro removal.'[59]

The task force emphasized "the concentration of resources from all quarters on problems of urban blight and decay, the coordination of governmental and private assistance in deploying those resources, and the mobilization of local leadership and initiative to assure that the citizens affected by the action planned to take part in the decisions leading up to it."[60] The basic relationship inherent in the Model Cities Program involves the Department of Housing and Urban Development and city demonstration agencies.

> To be effective, concerted attacks on city problems must be planned by the cities themselves. The new Model Cities Program is now the primary incentive provided by the Federal Government to accomplish this objective. Special grants will be made to help transform entire blighted areas into attractive and useful neighborhoods. To receive these grants, cities must: Develop imaginative and comprehensive plans of action; and enlist Federal, State, local and private resources in a concerted effort to bring their plans to fruition.[61]

Localities participating in the Model Cities Program were expected to develop comprehensive city demonstration programs which would be implemented through

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[59] Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 80.

[60] Leach, op. cit., p. 234.

[61] U.S. President, Public Papers of the President of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1964-), Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, p. 53.

the concentrated and coordinated utilization of Federal, state, local public as well as private funds. Federal funds for Model Cities were of two types: categorical funds and special Model Cities supplemental funds, that is, funds that could be used flexibly for a comprehensive range of uses.[62] The primary emphasis of Model Cities was that cities must plan the attack on their own unique problems. Special grants would be available to assist the transformation of entire blighted urban areas into inhabitable neighborhoods. In order to receive federal grants to assist cities in their programs, city officials were required both to submit a comprehensive plan and to work with all levels of the federal system to implement their plan.[63] One of the principal differences in Model Cities and Community Action Agencies was that the administrative mechanism was to be an accepted public agency in the case of the former agency, and, of course, it was hoped that Model Cities would operate as a communitywide

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[62]U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, The Federal Grant Process: An Analysis of the Use of Supplemental and Categorical Funds in the Model Cities Program, Community Development Evaluation Series Pubn. No. 10 (1972), p. 4.

[63]U.S., Bureau of the Budget, The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 25-26.

planning and coordination mechanism vis-a-vis an agency of advocacy and confrontation. The Model City's Community Demonstration Agency, due to its bicameral organization of community representation and official public representation was infinitely more effective as a coordination mechanism than was the Community Action Agency.[64] The Community Demonstration Agency director was, in many cases, at the epicenter of intergovernmental activity that related to both the physical and social aspects of the municipality. One of the weaknesses of the Model Cities Program, however, was that it left out the state governmental level. Applications flowed directly from the federal departments to the cities.[65] In the final weeks of 1968 President Johnson's Administration a substantial amount of federal funds were provided to this program in the hope that it could be propelled past possible budget cuts of the Nixon presidency.[66]

In the early stages of the Nixon Administration, a number of alterations were made in the Model Cities Program. Local governments were asked to establish

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[64] Sundquist and Davis, op. cit., p. 99.

[65] Ibid., p. 14.

[66] Joseph L. Zentner, "Presidential Transitions and the Perpetration of Programs: The Johnson Experience," Western Political Quarterly, XXV (March, 1972), p. 7.

lucid priorities among alternative proposals for action in an effort to determine the more urgent problems, rather than dissipating resources in attempting to attack all problems simultaneously. More extensive efforts were made to involve state government officials in the Model Cities Program and the regional offices for Model Cities were shifted to the same cities as the offices for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The Nixon Administration pledged continued support of Model Cities but at a reduced level of financial assistance.[67]

Part II. The Establishment of Federal Regional Councils

Because of local government officials' bewilderment with the mass of federal programs operating in their jurisdiction, in September, 1968, the then Bureau of the Budget launched an experiment to aid state and local government officials by having Federal agencies attack problems increasingly in the field. Regional officers from Housing and Urban Development, Department of Labor, Office of Economic Opportunity, and Health, Education and Welfare in four regional cities were asked to meet regularly and to familiarize themselves with

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[67] Leach, op. cit., p. 234.

each other's programs and problems. It was hoped this effort would achieve more coordination in the implementation of the programs of these departments. These informal meetings were, in effect, the first experimental Federal Regional Councils.[68]

Although the regional council concept was initially tested in the waning days of President Johnson's Administration, it received major attention in the Nixon Administration because of its potential of bringing order and efficiency to the delivery of federal resources and because of its compatibility with his New Federalism program's emphasis on bringing governmental decision making closer to the people.[69]

The Nixon Administration was convinced that President Johnson's approach to the coordination of grants-in-aid was inadequate. A far more comprehensive revamping of federal grant administration would be required than such stop-gap programs as Community Action Programs and Model Cities. In fiscal year 1973, $43,000,000,000

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[68]Frederick V. Malek, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Speech before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the House Committee on Government Operations on Federal Regional Councils and Other New Federalism Initiatives," Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Press Release, January 29, 1974, p. 4.

[69]Melvin B. Mogulof, "Federal Interagency Action and Inaction: The Federal Regional Council Experience," Public Administration Review, XXXII (May, June, 1972), 232.

flowed to state and local governments through 1,200 separate federal programs. There are sixty-one federal departments, commissions, independent agencies, and councils engaged in grant administration. Approximately 550 of the 1,200 separate programs are main-line grants-in-aid. The red tape generated by the current organization is indeed unwieldy for local officials. Each of the 550 programs is operated by specialists. Responsibility for their administration has run from the top specialists in Washington right down to the specialists at the local or state level. Each group of functional specialists has its unique esoteric procedures and its own methods of communication. The primary disadvantage of this situation is that one will find few specialists who have an interest in other than their own narrow programs.[70]

> They are concerned first and foremost with their immediate program responsibilities, and secondly with some coordination of related programs within an agency. Outside of the agencies responsibilities there is little or no interest in coordination.[71]

The primary problem with this specialist-oriented arrangement is that it has completely bypassed general purpose officials at the state and local government

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[70] William H. Kolberg, "The New Federalism: Regional Councils and Program Coordination Efforts," Public Administration Review, XXXIII (September, 1973), p. 51.

[71] Ibid.

levels.[72] Chief elected officials had not been effectively brought into significant aspects of planning and decisionmaking in the categorical grant system.[73] These officials are under two handicaps in a system dominated by functional specialists: "They are responsible to the citizens for the results of the grant-in-aid programs and must stand for election on the basis of these results;" and "When you bypass the general purpose local governments, or the generalists, you do not develop the kind of coordinative relationship required to make the system a realistic whole."[74]

A strong leadership position filled by state and local officials has been a primary theoretical tenet of American democracy. In practice, however, too frequently the politician has been viewed with suspicion and consequently has been circumvented whenever possible. Local school districts, special districts, and Community Action Projects are only a few examples of devices that have been utilized to restrain the jurisdiction of general-purpose officials. The sponsors of New Federalism realized that the general executive must be brought back into the federalism process since general purpose executives are

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[72] Ibid.

[73] Malek, op. cit., p. 3.

[74] Kolberg, op. cit., p. 51.

the only ones in the political system to be directly accountable to the electorate and, in addition, they have the abilities to coordinate resources in order that the general good may be served.[75]

Because of these foregoing phenomena the Federal Regional Council arrangement was established. "Somehow within this multitude of categorical programs, each with its own worthy end, the federal government must coordinate better and relate the objectives of these programs to the general ends of governors, mayors, and executives of the other units of general purpose local government."[76] This emphasis on aiding state and local officials in federal program coordination is, of course, compatible with the New Federalism Program which was identified closely with the Nixon Administration. The New Federalism concept calls for Federal support in meeting national problems, and holds that State and local authorities are best able to make decisions on local and state needs in accordance with the unique local environment and aspirations.[77]

President Nixon formally manifested his interest in the regional council concept in an executive order of March 27, 1969. This executive order established

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[75] Ibid., p. 52.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Malek, op. cit., p. 4.

uniform regional boundaries for four of the Federal agencies most concerned with the development of human resources (Department of Health, Education and Welfare; the Department of Labor; the Department of Housing and Urban Development; and the Office of Economic Opportunity) and in addition ordered the creation of regional councils in ten designated federal regional headquarter locations.[78] The four human resource agencies were joined by the Department of Transportation in being designated as the core membership of the Regional Council.[79] In the executive order of March 27, 1969, President Nixon asked the Director of the then Bureau of the Budget to join with the heads of nine departments and agencies in a review of existing relationships between centralized authority and their field operations. This review was designed to produce recommendations as to how each participant agency could eliminate unnecessary steps in the decentralizing process, could develop organizational forms and administrative practices which would mesh more closely with those of all other departments, and could give more day-to-day authority to those who are at lower

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[78]U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, (1969-), Richard M. Nixon, 1969, pp. 255-257.

[79]Mogulof, op. cit.

levels in the administrative hierarchy. The Bureau of the Budget then launched the three year Federal Assistance Review effort (FAR) to bring some order to the categorical grant system, to push decentralization and to implement the decision to establish ten Federal Regional Councils.[80]

On February 11, 1972, the Federal Regional Councils were formalized by executive order. This executive order included the decentralization of two additional agencies: the Law Enforcement Agency and Environmental Protection Agency. This made a total of seven agencies that were to operate in councils established in each of the Standard Federal Regions. The headquarters and their respective federal regions are: Boston, Region I; New York City, Region II; Philadelphia, Region III; Atlanta, Region IV; Chicago, Region V; Kansas City, Region VI; Dallas, Region VII; Denver, Region VIII; San Francisco, Region IX; and Seattle, Region X.[81]

Regions IX, VI, and II, of which this research concerns, are delineated as follows: Region IX consists of California, Nevada, Arizona, Hawaii and the Trust Territories; Region VI is composed of New Mexico,

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[80] Ibid.

[81] U.S. President, Executive Order 11647, "Federal Regional Councils," Federal Register, XXXVII, No. 30, Feb. 12, 1972, 3167-3169.

Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas; Region II embraces New York and New Jersey. See Figure 1-A.

The executive order of February 11, 1972, stated that "The proper functioning of Government requires the development of closer working relationships between major Federal grantmaking agencies and State and local government and improved coordination of the categorical grant system." The Domestic Council was directed to:

> (1) receive and develop information necessary for assessing national domestic needs and defining national domestic goals, and to develop for the President alternative proposals for reaching those goals;
>
> (2) collaborate with the Office of Management and Budget and others in the determination of national domestic priorities for the allocation of available resources;
>
> (3) collaborate with the Office of Management and Budget and others to assure a continuing review of ongoing programs from the standpoint of their relative contributions to national goals as compared with their use of available resources; and
>
> (4) provide policy advice to the President on domestic issues.[82]

In this executive order the Office of Management and Budget was assigned the responsibility for assisting the President in developing efficient coordinating mechanisms to implement Government activities and to expand interagency cooperation.

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[82] Ibid.

STANDARD FEDERAL REGIONS



The functions of the Federal Regional Council were designated as follows:

> (1) the development of short-term regional interagency strategies and mechanisms for program delivery;
>
> (2) the development of integrated program and funding plans with Governors and local chief executives;
>
> (3) the encouragement of joint and complementary grant applications for related programs;
>
> (4) the expeditious resolution of interagency conflicts and coordination problems;
>
> (5) the evaluation of programs in which two or more member agencies participate;
>
> (6) the development of long-term regional interagency and intergovernmental strategies for resource allocations to better respond to the needs of States and local communities;
>
> (7) the supervision of regional interagency program coordination mechanisms; and
>
> (8) the development of administrative procedures to facilitate day-to-day interagency and intergovernmental cooperation.[83]

In this executive order an Under Secretaries Group for Regional Operations was created. The Under Secretaries Group is composed of the Under Secretaries of all member departments and agencies on the Council.

> The Under Secretaries Group for Regional Operations shall, consistent with the objectives and priorities established by the President and the Domestic Council, establish policy with respect to Federal Regional Council matters, provide guidance to the Councils, respond to their initiatives, and seek to resolve policy issues referred to it by the Councils. The Under Secretaries Group, under the Chairmanship of the Associate Director of the Office of Management

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[83] Ibid.

and Budget, shall be responsible for the proper functioning of the system established by this Order.[84]

On March 10, 1972, a month after Executive Order 11647 was issued, the Under Secretaries Group for Field Operations issued guidelines for the Councils which detailed the responsibilities of Council chairmen, procedures for the conduct of Council affairs, the means to be used in the resolution of conflicts, the instructions for the development of work plans, and the responsibilities of member agencies for providing staff to the Councils. The combined effect of the Executive Order 11647 and the guidelines was to accord Councils a more formal and recognized position in the administrative apparatus of the Federal Government and to enlarge the opportunities for Council to come to grips with problems of field coordination in the administration of grant-in-aid programs.[85] For an analysis of the organizational structure of the Council and its relationship to other federal mechanisms, see Figure 1-B.

A further executive order relating to Federal Regional Councils was issued July 25, 1974, which modified

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[84] Ibid.

[85] Alan L. Dean, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, "Coordinating Regional Operations: The Emerging Federal Regional Councils," Speech before the Highway Research Board 50th Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1974.

Table 1B. An Organizational Chart of the Federal Regional Council System

STRUCTURE	DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
DOMESTIC COUNCIL **Chairman** President of the United States Vice President of the United States Attorney General Secretaries of the Departments of: Agriculture Commerce Health, Education, and Welfare Housing and Urban Development Interior Labor Transportation Treasury Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors Director and Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget Counsellors (2)	Receive and develop information necessary to assess national domestic needs and define goals and to develop alternative proposals to reach those goals
UNDER SECRETARIES GROUP FOR REGIONAL OPERATIONS **Chairman** Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget Under Secretaries of the Departments of: Labor Health, Education, and Welfare Housing and Urban Development Transportation Administrator, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Deputy Director, Office of Economic Opportunity Deputy Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency	Generally responsible for the Federal Regional Council System including establishing policy on Council matters, providing guidance to Councils, responding to their initiatives, and resolving policy issues referred by Councils.
UNDER SECRETARIES WORKING GROUP **Chairman** Representative of the Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget Representative from each of the member agencies of the Under Secretaries group having access to policymaking levels of his agency.	Provide staff support to the Under Secretaries group including serving as a focal point for the group in their respective agencies, monitoring and evaluating Federal Regional Councils' activities, and providing liaison and guidance to Councils to help in solving issues.
FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS **Chairmen** Designated from among the Regional Heads of member agencies Regional heads of the departments of: Labor Health, Education, and Welfare Housing and Urban Development Transportation Agriculture Interior Regional heads of the: Office of Economic Opportunity Environmental Protection Agency Law Enforcement Assistance Administration	Develop closer working relationships between major federal grant-making agencies and state and local governments and to better coordinate their categorical grant services to state and local governments.

Executive Order 11647. The Departments of Agriculture and Interior were added to the Council system bringing the total to nine member departments and agencies. Council functions were maintained with one addition. Responsibility was extended to general program coordination imparting on State and local government, in addition to the previous responsibility for coordinating grant-making.[86] In effect Federal Regional Councils were now expected to be in the forefront of developing and maintaining a working partnership with State and local governments covering a comprehensive range of Federal grants and other forms of assistance.[87]

The activities of Federal Regional Councils have been delineated by one writer into three primary general areas: interagency coordination, intergovernmental relations, and crisis management. In attempting to facilitate increased interagency coordination four principal programs deserve mentioning: Integrated Grant Administration (IGA); Regional Management Information System (RMIS); compliance with standard federal requirements; and coordinating program delivery.[88]

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[86]U.S. President, Executive Order 11731, "Amending Executive Order No. 11647 Relating to Federal Regional Councils," Federal Register, XXXVIII, No. 142, July 25, 1973, 19903-19904.

[87]Malek, op. cit., p. 9.

[88]Ibid., p. 10.

Federal Regional Councils have administered twenty-six Integrated Grant Administration Projects which allow applicants for multiple, yet related, grants to submit a single application for Federal assistance. "Review by the agencies is synchronized, with a single set of requirements for financial control, record-keeping, and auditing."[89]

Councils are involved in the development of information systems to strengthen overall Federal, State and local planning, problem analysis, and program evaluation activities. Regional Management Information System, though only in its developmental phase, has enabled the Councils "to provide more comprehensive budgetary information to all States on selected grant programs, assure that state and local officials are afforded an opportunity to review project applications through more systematic monitoring of grant applications, and utilize a wider range of data from various Federal sources for Federal, State and local planning and evaluation of multi-agency projects."[90]

Councils encourage compliance with standard federal requirements in such areas as grant administration, relocation assistance payments, audit standards,

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[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid., p. 11.

grant review and coordination procedures. This effort responds to past criticisms from State and local officials that Federal administrative policies have not been consistent and are not always implemented uniformly in the field.[91]

The Councils are involved in several instances of coordinating Federal program response relating to specific State and local problems, for example, the Federal Regional Council in Kansas City has been coordinating a riverfront development project which involves two states, six counties, numerous municipalities and six federal agencies. "The Council and local representatives identified and assisted in mobilizing Federal funds for planning and a key Federal grant around which local governmental and private investment is coalescing."[92]

Encouraging intergovernmental coordination is another area in which the Council has devoted their efforts. Some of the activities that comprise the intergovernmental coordination phase of the Council's operations are: the Annual Arrangements Program; the Planned Variations Program; encouraging working relationships with state and local governments; encouraging working relationships with Indian tribal governments; sponsoring

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[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid.

regional budget briefings; regional energy briefings; and intergovernmental conferences.[93] Of this list of activities the only programs that perhaps would need some explanation are the Annual Arrangements Program and the efforts toward encouraging relationships with State and local governments.

Annual Arrangements is an innovative mechanism for delivering Federal funds to units of general purpose local government in a way that emphasizes comprehensive planning and program coordination under the direction of the local chief executive.[94] The principal objectives of the Annual Arrangements process are to enable city officials to improve the coordination of federally-funded and local programs, to increase their ability to set local priorities, and to improve the management capacities of the local chief executives and local general purpose government.[95]

Another experiment to achieve flexibility and coordination at the community level is the Planned Variations Program which is administered under Housing and Urban Development guidance in twenty participating cities.

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[93] Ibid., p. 13.

[94] U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Annual Arrangements: Improving Coordination of Community Development Programs, Community Development Evaluation Series Pubn. No. 14 (May, 1973), p. v.

[95] Ibid., p. vii.

Local chief executives have the opportunity to review requests for Federal assistance from the Housing and Urban Development Program prior to finding decisions. Planned Variations has provided financial assistance for the review and comment process, and eliminated as much unnecessary paperwork as the law permits.[96]

Federal Regional Councils have established a variety of methods to establish effective working relationships with State and local governments. Some of these methods include "agency representatives working as staff liaison to governors' and mayors' offices; individual regional directors working with States where they are particularly effective; forming State and local advisor groups; meeting regularly with State-employed Federal-State coordinators; and having representatives of governors, municipal-county associations, and Indian tribes attend Council meetings and work directly with Federal Regional Council task forces."[97]

When the need arises Federal Regional Councils have been involved with crisis management. A few examples of past involvement in this area are: energy program assistance; base closings; Rapid City, South Dakota, flood rehabilitation; and assistance after Hurricane Agnes flooding. Recently Federal Regional Councils mobilized

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[96]U.S., Office of Management and Budget, Responsive Federalism Report to the President on the Federal Assistance Review (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973). p. 11.

[97]Malek, op. cit.

temporary personnel and technical assistance for the ten regional headquarters of the Federal Energy Office as well as the sixteen State-Federal Allocation Officers. In other examples of crisis management the Federal Regional Councils attempt to coordinate the resources and programs of Federal, State and local governments in responding to a crisis.[98]

The three federal regional councils that this paper covers are involved in diverse activities and functions that are tailored to meet the needs of their respective regions. The following is a list in some detail of the recent goals or accomplishments of the New York City, Dallas and San Francisco Federal Regional Councils.

The New York City Council, Region II, has categorized its past accomplishments into five principal phases: increased program impact through joint action; developed local government management capacity; improved intergovernmental relations; developed crises response; and reduced administrative complications.[99]

I. Increased Program Impact Through Joint Action

A. Special effort was made to fund applications from the Spanish speaking community. A total of $2,300,000 in Department of Labor, Environmental

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[98] Ibid.

[99] U.S. Office of the President, Federal Regional Council, Region II: New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 8.

Protection Agency, Health, Education Welfare, Housing Urban Development, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and Office of Economic Opportunity funds were committed.

B. Housing and day care services have been provided by Housing Urban Development and Health Education Welfare in the Town of Brookhaven to assist Brookhaven Internal Revenue Service Center employees.

C. Under the Integrated Grant Administration pilot effort, Housing Urban Development and Environmental Protection Agency funded the Genesee Finger Lakes Regional Planning Board's proposal for a total of $260,800. Health Education Welfare and Housing Urban Development funded three elements of the New York City office of Neighborhood Government's application for an integrated services delivery system totaling $365,538. The Syracuse Integrated Grants Administration was withdrawn.

D. The Appalachian Regional Commission, Housing Urban Development, and Economic Development Administration jointly funded the New York State Disaster Recovery Planning effort.

E. Health Education Welfare and Department of Labor signed an agreement on the Migrant Work Group proposal to fund the New Jersey Migrant and Seasonal Workers Information Center.

F. Housing Urban Development, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Transportation and Health Education Welfare conducted a joint Equal Employment Opportunity compliance review in Westchester County.

G. The Federal Regional Council reorganized the Model Cities interagency function adding Environmental Protection Agency, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and Department of Transportation as ad hoc members.

H. Department of Transportation funded $333,000 to the Syracuse Aging Model as a result of efforts of the Committee on Aging.

I. Employment of Spanish speaking staff in the seven agencies was increased by fifty.

II. Developed Local Government Management Capability

A. Procedures for Chief Executive Review and Comment under the Planned Variations experiment were adopted and implemented by each agency.

B. Regional Interagency Management Information System Committee has provided State and local governments with information on the Boston/Dallas pilot efforts.

C. Formula grant budget information based on the proposed Federal Year 1974 budget was provided to each of the Governors to assist them in their own budget planning process.

D. The Committee on Youth worked with several localities to develop integrated youth services delivery systems. Results were limited.

III. Improved Intergovernmental Relations

A. The Federal Regional Council held briefings on the President's Budget for Federal Year 1974 for State and local government chief executives in five locations throughout the Region. Over 400 individuals attended.

B. Planned Variations conferences were scheduled in Newark, Paterson and Rochester. The Federal Regional Council met with the Mayors, City, County, State and local organization officials to explain the Planned Variations concept.

IV. Crises Response Was Developed

A. The White House assigned to the Federal Regional Council responsibility for coordinating the Federal participation in the long-term reconstruction effort in areas affected by Tropical Storm Agnes. For this purpose the Council was expanded to include the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Corps of Engineers, Small Business Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the Appalachian Regional Commission and the Economic Development Administration. The Council worked closely with the New York State Office of Planning Services to coordinate disaster recovery plans through the Southern Tier Central Regional Planning and Development Board.

The Federal Regional Council designated a coordinator to provide technical assistance to local officials in the area.

B. New York State, the Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Geological Survey and Housing Urban Development reached an agreement on flood plain mapping.

C. Federal Regional Council/Office of Economic Opportunity memorandum of agreement signed for future Phase III reconstruction operations.

D. Housing Urban Development, Department of Transportation and Small Business Administration reached an agreement to coordinate programs impacting on Phase III disaster operations.

E. The Federal Regional Council is monitoring the Great Lakes flood potential to determine whether any preventative actions can be taken by the Federal Regional Council.

F. The Community Relations Service and the Federal Regional Council have agreed to a mutual alert system with regard to civil disturbances.

V. Reduced Administrative Complications

A. Interagency agreements were reached on the four jointly funded projects which were part of the Spanish action plan transferring administrative and audit responsibility to one lead agency.

B. The Governor of New Jersey issued an executive order designating sub-state districts as a result of Federal Regional Council concern.

C. The Federal Regional Council agreed to waive Federal requirements in Newark and accept the City's Travel Regulations as the applicable regulation for all federal grant-in-aid programs funded to the City.

D. Office of Economic Opportunity Transition Task Force established. Department of Labor, Office of Economic Opportunity and Health Education Welfare auditors have agreed to seek to conduct joint audits.[100]

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[100] *Ibid.*

The Southwest Federal Regional Council, Region VI, has developed a group of priority projects. Here are a few of them:

Chief Executive Review and Comment--The top elected official such as the Governor of a State or the Mayor of a City is given the opportunity to review and comment on applications for Federal assistance within his area of jurisdiction. The Council hopes to have the program operative in one city in each State in the region, in the State of Arkansas, and in the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area this year.

Delegation of Authorities--Administration of Federal programs has tended to focus at the Federal level activities which could more effectively be handled by State or local government. The target for this year is to identify and delegate a minimum of six such functions to State or local government.

Annual Arrangement--City officials can better manage and coordinate programs with an advance knowledge of the Federal resources which will be allocated to their city in the future. An annual arrangement is an agreement between the Mayor and the Federal agencies linking local plans and priorities with Federal program funds. Completion of such an arrangement with the City of Tulsa and use of the project to identify and resolve interagency differences is planned this year.

Integrated Grant Administration--Federal grant procedures in the past have been complex. Integrated grants aim at development of a means by which several Federal agencies can work together to meet local needs by synchronizing their resources in developing single application, funding, monitoring and auditing procedures. Four integrated grants with planning agencies and one with the Pueblo of Zuni are sheduled this year.

Selected Project Evaluation--Some earlier Council programs have progressed to the point where their effectiveness can be evaluated. Evaluation of three such projects is planned this year.

Crime and Delinquency Reduction--Coordination of the multiplicity of Federal criminal justice and law

enforcement activities through intergovernmental and interagency agreements will eliminate confusion and costly overlap and duplication of services. Agreements with the State of Louisiana and with the city of Dallas, Texas, are planned this year.

Regional Profile--To meet its objective of improving delivery of Federal services to State and local governments, the Council requires information about regional needs. A profile will be developed to provide much of this information.[101]

The Region IX Federal Regional Council, San Francisco, has set seven objectives for its Council to attain. These objectives are:

1. The development of a problem statement and analysis of Regional concerns, drawing upon quarterly meetings in State capitols and assessments provided by Council agencies and governmental officials, in order to provide a more rational basis for Fiscal Year 1975 Council work planning.

2. To strengthen Tribal government planning and management capacity and coordinated delivery of Federal resources to reservation Indians through Council review and response to Tribally-developed comprehensive plans with at least three of the following five Indian communities--Papago, Fort McDowell, Tule River, Pyramid Lake, and Fort Apache.

3. The design, joint negotiations, and initial implementation of an interagency annual arrangement with one of the following--the City and County of San Francisco, the Navajo Reservation, and the City of San Jose/County of Santa Clara.

4. To improve intergovernmental planning by developing a workable, coordinated Council agency strategy for assisting State and local agencies in implementing a transportation control plan for the South Coast Air Basin.

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[101]U.S. Office of the President, Southwest Federal Regional Council: Leadership for Better Government (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973).

5. Drawing upon a pilot study in the City of Compton and other related Council activies and begin implementing in a pilot jurisdiction an interagency strategy to reduce the incidence of crime and delinquency and to alleviate their adverse social effects.

6. To complete the development of a Council strategy for implementing the Rural Development Act of 1972.

7. To promote general purpose government planning and management capabilities and improve intergovernmental exchange of ideas and experiences through implementation during Fiscal Year 1974 of an inter-local technical assistance program, derived from innovative Federal Regional Council and agency capacity-building projects.[102]

The Federal Regional Council system has generated substantial discussion. Some observers believe that there is a need to clarify the role which Federal Regional Councils play within the American federal system. Initially the Federal Regional Councils concentrated primarily on the improvement of administration of grant-in-aid programs and all Council members were quite involved in assistance to state and local governments. It has been suggested that there has been a drift away from the coherence which characterized the early activities of the Council and to involve them in matters that could be handled equally as effectively by other mechanisms, such as Federal Executive Boards.[103]

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[102]Beau Carter, Staff Director for Region IX Federal Regional Council, private interview held at the Federal Regional Council Offices in San Francisco, Calif., January, 1974. (This material was taken from an unpublished document given to the author at this meeting.)

[103]Dean, op. cit., p. 9.

> The more diffuse the activities of the Councils become, the less commonality of interest exists among the members. The result could be the evolution of the Councils into something like Regional Federal Executive Boards, useful as forums for discussion and exchanging information but ineffective as devices for program coordination.[104]

It has been suggested that there is a need to strengthen the participation of certain of the member agencies now included in the membership of the Councils. If the Federal Regional Council is to be an effective coordinating body the respective representatives of the departments and agencies seated at the Council table must be able to commit their organizations to specific courses of action or, at least, must be able to secure a commitment from the agency without undue delay. However, such has not been the case. Some of the agencies have not placed field officials on the Council with the sophistication and authority to make an effective contribution to the affairs of the Council. The Departments of Agriculture, Interior and Transportation have all been criticized for being represented on the Council by ineffective Regional Directors, or in the case of the Department of Transportation, an ineffective Secretarial Representative.[105]

Another criticism of Federal Regional Councils is the lack of member agency decentralization, which is of

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[104] Ibid.

[105] Ibid., p. 10.

course, related to the previously mentioned criticism of participation. Where there is a lack of decentralization on the part of a member agency, the agency field staff find it quite difficult to contribute effectively on the Council. Frequently the agencies, which they represent, have retained necessary program authority in their Washington headquarters and have refused to place with regional field officials the delegations needed for cooperative action with the regional representatives of other agencies. Although decentralization has theoretically been stressed as a crucial reform objective from the beginning of the Federal Assistance Review Program, much remains to be achieved in several of the Council agencies.[106]

The stages of decentralization of agencies making up the Federal Regional Councils are quite varied. Some agencies have granted substantial autonomy to their regional offices, while other agencies have decentralized very little. As yet, one observer points out, the Office of Management and Budgeting has not "cracked the whip" to force a faster pace of decentralization. It has been suggested that one of the reasons that more effectiveness has not been demonstrated by the Federal

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[106] Ibid., p. 11.

Regional Councils is that uneven degrees of member agency decentralization have allowed the regional council members to act in harmony in only few and isolated minor instances.[107]

The most decentralized of the departments and agencies is the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Office of Economic Opportunity. "Each of their regional directors have independent sign-off authority and they are given a great deal of discretion in determining how programs are run." These three agencies are effectively decentralized to the extent that their regional directors can commit their agencies to whatever course of action the Council decides to take.[108]

Another type of decentralization is found in the Department of Labor and the Department of Transportation. Although the regional director of the Department of Labor has no line authority over grants, "there is enough implicit authority in the position that he can adequately perform his responsibilities with the Council."[109] The Department of Transportation's representative, like the Department

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[107] Timothy B. Clark, "New Federalism Report: Nixon Seeks to Decentralize Management of Domestic Programs," National Journal, V (March, April, 1973), p. 580.

[108] Kolberg, op. cit., p. 53.

[109] Ibid.

of Labor, has no authority over the agency's operating programs, however, he "can make things happen."[110]

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration representative on the Council directs a bloc grant system. This power over some important planning grants allows him to play a relatively significant role on the Council. Health Education and Welfare is the most centralized of all the agencies. Its attempts to decentralize have been minimal in relation to its capacity to decentralize. Since Health Education and Welfare is the largest spending agency in the federal government, it is obviously quite important that Health Education and Welfare does decentralize in order for the Federal Regional Council arrangement to be effective.[111]

Another problem of the Council system is staffing. There has been excessive turnover in staff directors who generally are brought in by the current chairman. Since the chairman usually serves approximately a year the Councils have suffered greatly from staff leadership discontinuity. Some of the professional staff supplied by member agencies have at times lacked competence, leadership and dedication to the purpose of the Council.[112] Some writers think that one of the primary problems that

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[110] Ibid., p. 54.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Dean, op. cit., p. 11.

Federal Regional Councils face is a lack of adequate supergrade personnel supplied by member agencies and departments on the Councils.[113] Without adequate supergrade personnel the Council staff in the field tend to be viewed by Washington bureaucrats as minor officials. This view weakens the role the Councils can play in coordinating grants-in-aid.

A frequent criticism of the Council organization is that the personality of the chairman is crucial to the Council's effectiveness. To date there has been substantial variation in the performance of Chairman, and consequently the Council waxes or wanes according to the personality of who happens to be chairman at the time.[114] Since July, 1973, the Under Secretaries Group has been experimenting in two Federal regions (Chicago and Denver) with a full time Chairman concept. The intent is to determine if more time devoted by the Chairman can facilitate the Federal Regional Councils' performance in interagency and intergovernmental affairs and upgrade management of the Council process.

Some writers question if the Councils can be effective as they are now organized. The feasibility of making coordinated behavior dependent upon the

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[113] Ink, op. cit.

[114] Dean, op. cit., p. 12.

consensual agreement of the parties to be coordinated is seriously questioned. The Council is barred from taking a position which it can seek to enforce with its individual members.[115]

> The Council is enjoined by the Bureau of the Budget memorandum of January 14, 1970, from injecting new operating and decision-making points into the system, nor to assume authority or responsibility now lodged in the individual agencies or existing coordinating mechanisms.[116]

The net result of this situation is that the Council establishes an interagency arena in which member agencies can identify conflicting policies and practices which should be coordinated. However, the Council is not authorized to go further.

The literature of coordination suggests that in a situation where there is no collective authority or authority supra to the Council agencies, a natural bargaining situation will be established. "In effect, Agency 'A' will accommodate its behavior to Agency 'B' if Agency 'A' receives something in return from Agency 'B' or one of the other agencies on the Council."[117]

It has been maintained that the current state-of-the-art of Council coordination is perceived as functional

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[115] Malek, op. cit., p. 20.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Ibid.

by those who control departmental decision making in Washington, and that a weak council is conducive to chaos which supports pluralism. In effect, the construction of a weak council is no accident. The current structure has powerful allies, both bureaucratic and ideological, and these allies may continue to block the construction of a stronger council.[118]

It has been pointed out that those pleased with the current Council system will point out many minor useful activities of the Council, for example, joint technical assistance to communities and joint use of audits; however, these activities do not test the weakness in the authority structure of the Council. Although in a few instances council members may counter their agency loyalties and go along with a Council decision on a minor issue, one should not make too much of this development. There are two cases when the influence of the Council as a small culture valuing cooperation breaks down.[119]

> One occurs when Council members come to feel that they are being asked to engage in behavior which compromises their agency's interests, and therefore refuse to commit themselves to the contemplated action. The other arises when the Council member tentatively commits himself to the collective action,

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[118] Ibid., p. 237.

[119] Ibid.

> and then back in his own agency, surrounded by the expectations of another 'culture' finds it necessary to retrench on his prior commitment to common action.[120]

These two instances of breakdown manifest the primary flaws in the authority structure of the Council. Under the present arrangement there is an unfortunate likelihood that Councils will refrain from developing agenda items on which consensus cannot be expected. Some authors advocate aggressive Washington action in helping to determine Council agenda items where local Councils habitually avoid dealing with interagency conflict. Under the present system of uneven departmental decentralization, it is suggested a continued crucial role be played by the Office of Management and Budget. The Office of Management and Budget representative is especially functional in interpreting to Washington agency headquarters the meaning and wisdom of Regional Council decisions.[121]

In response to increasing public and congressional concern with the Federal Regional Councils' role in administering Federal Programs the General Accounting Office reviewed the activities of the Councils to determine what they had accomplished. The General Accounting

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[120] Ibid.

[121] Ibid., p. 238.

Office concentrated its work to the Atlanta, Boston, Chicago and Seattle federal regions.

The following is a list of some of the major findings and conclusions of the General Accounting Office study. Most officials of States and larger local units of government knew about the Councils and their purposes; however, the extent of their knowledge and experience with the Councils varied widely. Representatives of smaller units of local government generally were unfamiliar with the Councils. State and local governments need additional information on Federal grant-in-aid programs and on the opportunities for securing assistance from the Councils. The limited staff resources available to Councils as well as the Councils brief experience in operating intergovernmental programs contribute to State and local government lack of knowledge of Federal grant-in-aid programs. Programs such as Integrated Grant Administration, as implemented by the Councils, helped State and local governments to coordinate the administration of some Federal grant-in-aid programs. These programs, however, were experimental in nature and reached only a very small percentage of potential recipients.[122]

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[122]U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress: Assessment of Federal Regional Councils (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 1.

The General Accounting Office study considered that the Councils were impeded from being more effective because of the following reasons: member agencies' lack of, or variation in, decentralized decision-making authority; limit on the authority of the chairmen; division of time and effort by Council members, staffs, and task force members between Council and agency affairs; insufficient participation by nonmember Federal agencies in Councils' activities; and absence of formalized standards for planning work and reporting progress.[123]

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[123] Ibid., p. 2.

CHAPTER II

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Part I: Attitudes of City Officials toward the Performance of Federal Regional Councils

The research framework utilized for Chapter III of this study is taken from the policy analysis literature.[124] Various independent variables are cross tabulated against dependent variables to determine the

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[124] See Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Richard I. Hofferbert, "Elite Influence in Policy Formation: A Model for Comparative Inquiry" (Paper delivered at the 1968 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.); Robert Lineberry, "Community Structure and Planning Commitment: A Note on the Correlates of Agency Expenditures," Social Science Quarterly, L (December, 1969), 723-30; Louis A. Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," Journal of Politics, XXIX (February, 1967), 94-108; Robert C. Wood, 1400 Governments (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1961); Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), 124-43; Brett W. Hawkins and Thomas R. Dye, "Metropolitan Fragmentation: A Research Note," Midwest Review of Public Administration, XIV (February, 1970), 17-24; Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks, Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems (New York: Free Press, 1957); Thomas R. Dye, "City-Suburban Social Distance and Public Policy," Social Forces, XLIV (September, 1965), 100-06; Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau, "City Councils and Policy Outcomes: Developmental Profiles," in City Politics and Public Policy, ed. James Q. Wilson (New York: Wiley, 1968).

impact, if any, selected socioeconomic and governmental structure variables have on the attitudes of city officials concerning the performance of Federal Regional Councils.

Explanation of Independent Variables

The governmental structure variables utilized for purposes of this research are: percent of city employees on a merit system; city manager or mayoral form of government; partisan or nonpartisan form of government; at-large or ward selection of council members; method utilized in mayoral selection; total city reform score, and access to a grant officer. These government structure variables are quite obviously taken from the literature on reformism[125]

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[125]See Brett W. Hawkins, Politics and Urban Policies (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971); John H. Kessel, "Government Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about American Cities," American Political Science Review, LVI (September, 1962), 615-20; Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966), 306-26; Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Political and Socioeconomic Characteristics of American Cities," in Municipal Yearbook (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1965), 82-97; Daniel N. Gordon, "Immigrants and Urban Governmental Form in American Cities, 1933-1960," American Journal of Sociology, LXX (September, 1968), 158-71; Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), 701-16; Phillips Cutright, "Nonpartisan Electorial Systems in American Cities," Comparative Studies in Society and History, L (January, 1963), 212-26; and Brett W. Hawkins, "A Note on Urban Political Structure, Environment, and Political Integration," Polity, II (Fall, 1969), 32-48.

as it relates to municipal governmental institutions, or "culture studies," a rubric under which such studies are frequently classified.

The socioeconomic variables utilized in analyzing cities surveyed for purposes of this study are: population of city; per capita income; median income; median educational level; number of families making less than $3,000 yearly; extent of unemployment; and the federal region in which the responding city is located.

Explanation of Dependent Variables

The dependent variables utilized in this study are: the extent of acquaintance city officials have with the Federal Regional Council System; the frequency of contact city officials have with Councils vis-à-vis other sources of grant information and/or assistance; the extent of positive attitudes held by city officials toward Federal Regional Council performance; and an evaluation of Council performance by city officials concerning effectiveness of contact relating to gaining general information and problem solving vis-à-vis other sources of grant information and/or assistance. The "other sources" employed by this research are: congressmen and senators, direct communication to Washington, Council of Government, and the district federal office.

Part II: Attitudes of Federal Regional Council Members

The research design utilized for Chapter IV is an analytical framework concerning Council members' attitudes toward selected phases of Council performance. Four principal aspects are explored for the purpose of this study: members' attitudes toward Council service to cities; attitudes relating to the frequency with which cities consult Federal Regional Councils for grant information and/or assistance; attitudes concerning decentralization of Council member agencies and departments; and attitudes concerning problems relating to authority and coordination.

Part III: Hypotheses

Since the Federal Regional Council system has been implemented quite recently little survey research has been done in this area. Most of the research on Councils has been in the nature of theoretical analyses of the Councils' intent, role and organization. Little work, aside from the General Services Administration study, has been done in either surveying the recipients of Council services or the members of the Councils. This study makes a contribution in this area.

The research hypotheses are tested in order to seek answers to these principal research questions: Do city officials believe that Federal Regional Councils have assisted them with federal grants? Are city socioeconomic

and/or government structure variables related to the attitudes that respective city officials hold toward Federal Regional Councils? Do Federal Regional Council members believe the Council is adequately assisting cities with grants? What do the Council members think are major problems of the Council which inhibit its effectiveness? The hypotheses that follow have been formulated to examine the attitudes of city officials toward Federal Regional Council performance, and to determine the nature of attitudes of Council members concerning the performance of the organization.

Hypotheses Relating to City Officials' Attitudes Toward the Performance of the Federal Regional Council in Their Region

1. Urban reform institutions are positively associated with the extent of acquaintance city officials have with Federal Regional Councils.

2. Urban reform institutions are positively associated with frequency of contact made by city officials with Federal Regional Councils vis-à-vis other sources of grant information or assistance.

3. Urban reform institutions are positively associated with effectiveness ratings of Federal Regional Councils vis-à-vis other grant sources concerning effectiveness and frequency of contact.

4. Urban reform institutions are positively associated with the extent city officials hold positive attitudes toward Federal Regional Councils.

5. Magnitude of population is the primary socioeconomic variable positively associated with the level of acquaintance cities have with Federal Regional Councils.

6. Magnitude of population is the primary socio-economic variable positively associated with the frequency of contact city officials have with Councils.

7. Magnitude of population is the primary socio-economic variable positively associated with effectiveness and frequency ratings of Councils vis-à-vis other sources concerning solving a grant problem.

8. Magnitude of population is the primary socio-economic variable positively associated with positive attitudes city officials hold toward Federal Regional Councils.

Hypotheses Relating to Council Members' Attitudes Toward the Performance of Federal Regional Councils

1. Members believe the Federal Regional Council members have a greater sensitivity to the needs of local officials than do Washington bureaucrats.

2. Members believe the Federal Regional Council is contacted on a regular basis by city officials seeking information and/or assistance with grants.

3. Council members perceive that one of the organization's primary problems is a lack of sufficient decentralization of member departments and agencies.

4. Council members think a stronger coordination mechanism would facilitate the Council's effectiveness.

Part IV. Setting

This study analyzes three Federal Regional Councils and a sample of their respective service recipients. These Councils are located in San Francisco, Federal Region IX; Dallas, Federal Region VI; and New York City, Federal Region II. The foregoing Federal regions were selected for purposes of this study because they represented Councils serving urban regions on the East and

West coasts, and in South-Central United States. It is assumed that the selection of these three areas for survey purposes provides an element of geographical and cultural balance to the study. Research is conducted to ascertain the nature of attitudes held by recipient city officials and Council members concerning Council performance. The research is divided into three phases.

The first phase of research involves a questionnaire survey of city officials within the three selected Federal regions. The questionanires (see appendix) were designed to elicit attitudes of these officials concerning Federal Regional Councils as effective instruments of grant administration. All cities in Standard Federal Regions IX, VI, and II with a population of 50,000[126] and above were sent questionnaires. A questionnaire was sent to the mayor of mayor-form cities and conversely to the city manager of manager form cities.[127] In the analysis of questionnaire data obtained from city officials, environmental and institutional variables are cross tabulated against these officials' attitudes to determine what impact, if any, selected socioeconomic and governmental

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[126]The categorization of Municipal Yearbook was utilized for purposes of determining the magnitude of population and delineating type of urban institutions. See International City Management Association, The Municipal Year Book, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: ICMA, 1974).

[127]Ibid.

structure variables have on the attitudes of city officials toward the Federal Regional Council in their region. The second phase of research consists of a questionnaire (see appendix) which was sent to each of the nine members of the three selected Federal Regional Councils to determine their attitudes toward Council performance. The third phase of research consists of interviews of the members and certain personnel of two of the three selected Councils.

Questionnaires Sent to the Cities

The population magnitude of 50,000 was used as a demarcation point for this research because of an obvious necessity to limit the scope of the study. The Bureau of the Census' definition of "Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area"[128] was utilized as the demarcation point for purposes of this study.

The distribution of questionnaires sent to city officials is as follows: Sixty-two questionnaires were sent to Region IX; thirty-five to Region VI; and seventeen to Region II. One hundred and fourteen questionnaires were sent to city officials in all. Of this total number sent, thirty-six were received from Region IX,

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[128]John C. Ballens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 2.

twenty-five were received from Region VI, and seven were received from Region II. Of the total sample, Region IX cities comprise 52.9 percent of the sample, Region VI cities comprise 36.8 percent, and Region II cities comprise 10.3 percent. For purposes of cross tabulation it was necessary that Regions IX and II be consolidated to give a combined total of forty-three respondents. This combination reflects the attitudes of city officials on the East and West coasts vis-à-vis the attitudes of city officials in the South Central United States.

Further explanations of demarcations made for cross tabulation purposes are as follows: The "percent of city employees on a merit system" variable was broken down into two parts: (1) 0-95 percent of city employees on a merit system, (2) 96 percent or more on a merit system. Twenty-five of the responding cities had 0-95 percent of city employees on a merit system. Thirty-seven had 96 percent or more. Six could not be ascertained.

The "city manager, mayor or commission form of government" variable obtained these different responses. Fifty-four responding cities were city manager. Twelve were mayoral. Two were commission cities.

Concerning the "grant liaison officer" variable, the responses received were as follows. Thirty-six cities had access to a grant liaison officer. Thirty-one did not. One did not answer the question.

The "partisan/nonpartisan" variable responses broke down as follows. Fifty-seven cities possessed a partisan system. Eleven did not.

The "at-large or ward selection of city council members" variable obtained these responses. Fifty-one respondents had an at-large selection system. Seventeen utilized a ward selection method.

Concerning the "method utilized for the selection of the mayor" variable the responses were as follows: nineteen cities' mayoral selection process was by the city council; forty-eight were selected by the electorate. One city did not respond.

A "reform score" was obtained by combining five reform institution variables. These variables are: (1) What percentage of city employees are on a merit system? (2) Is the city nonpartisan? (3) Does the city possess a city manager form of government? (4) Are the city council members selected by an at-large method? (5) Is the mayor selected by the city council?

Aside from the merit system score, one hundred points were given to each positive response. The merit system score was recorded as it was listed on the questionnaire, that is, a city having 70 percent of its employees on a merit system was given a score of "70." If hypothetically that city possessed three other reform institutions, the city would score "370" on the reform

score. A city could theoretically have a total score of 500 if it possessed all of the previously mentioned reform institutions and had one hundred percent of its employees on a merit system; or, conversely, a city could have a total of "0" if it did not possess any of these reform institutions. For purposes of cross tabulation three points of demarcation were made in relation to the reform score. (1) 0-299, (2) 300-399, (3) 400-500. The responses broke down as follows. Eighteen cities had a reform score in the 0 to 299 range. Twenty-two cities had a reform score in the 300-399 range. Twenty-four cities had a total reform score in the 400-500 range. Four cities did not respond.

The "magnitude of population" variable is broken down into two categories: (1) 50,000 to 250,000 in population, and (2) 250,000 or more in population. Fifty-two cities were in the 50,000 to 250,000 range. Sixteen cities were in the 250,000 or more range.

"Per capita income" of the city is designated as follows: (1) $3,500 or less; and (2) more than $3,500. Forty-two cities fell in the $3,500 or less range. Twenty-three fell in the more than $3,500 range. Three cities have no response.

The "median income" of the city variable is categorized as follows: (1) 10,000 or less; and (2) more than 10,000. Thirty-two cities were in the 10,000 or

less range. Thirty-three were in the more than 10,000 range. Three cities have no response.

The "rate of unemployment" variable is designated as follows: (1) 4.9 percent or less; and (2) 5.0 percent or more. Thirty-four cities were in the 4.9 percent or less range. Thirty-one cities were in the 5.0 percent or more range. Three cities have no response.

The "families making less than $3,000 yearly" variable is broken down as follows: (1) 8.9 percent or less; and (2) 9.0 percent or more. Thirty-six cities responded in the 8.9 percent or less range. Twenty-nine cities responded in the 9.0 percent or more range. Three cities have no response.

Questionnaires Sent to Federal Regional Councils

Each Regional Director or departmental representative of the national agency or department on the Council in the three selected Federal regions were sent questionnaires to determine their attitudes concerning Council performance (see appendix). Consequently nine questionnaires were sent to each of the three Councils. Of this number one was received from Federal Region IX, seven were received from Region VI, and three were received from Region II. Of the twenty-seven questionnaires sent to the three Councils, thirteen were completed and returned. Three questionnaires were received without regional designation.

Frequencies are listed in Chapter IV which designate the extent of agreement or disagreement Federal Regional Council members have concerning the performance of their respective Councils. These responses are divided into three areas of comparison: attitudes toward Council service to cities; attitudes concerning decentralization of Council member agencies and departments; and attitudes concerning problems relating to Council coordination and authority.

It was hypothesized that if there were no important differences in Council members' attitudes the responses would be relatively evenly distributed between agree and disagree responses. Thus, hypothetically, if ten Council members responded to a particular question, and there was no significant difference in their attitudes, one would anticipate five responses with agree designation and conversely five responses with disagree designation. On the other hand, if Council members responded overwhelmingly for either the agree or disagree response one would assume that such overall agreement is meaningful. A Chi-square statistical test was run on the basis on the foregoing hypothesis to determine if there was a significant difference in the opinions of Council members in relation to the selected research items.

The following questionnaire items are listed according to the area in which they are utilized for purposes of explanation.

I. Council Members' Attitudes Concerning Council Service to Cities

1. Most city managers of cities over 50,000 population within your region have working contacts with the Federal Regional Council.

2. This Federal Regional Council makes an effort to keep city managers within the region familiar with Council programs that relate to urban needs.

3. This Federal Regional Council has sponsored meetings for city officials in the region.

4. The Federal Regional Council allows federal officials in the region a closer working arrangement with city officials than these local officials had with Washington bureaucrats prior to formulation of the Council arrangement.

5. Federal Regional Council members have a greater sensitivity to the needs of local governments in their region than do Washington bureaucrats.

6. The Federal Regional Council is becoming more institutionalized and accepted by local officials as the place where the decisions on program approval and implementation are made.

7. On the average Federal Regional Councils are of little assistance to cities in the grant process except when a grant in question relates to several different agencies on the Council.

8. If a city official has a question concerning a grant that is handled by a specific federal agency he is usually better served by contacting the related district federal office rather than the Federal Regional Council.

9. Federal Regional Councils expedite the grant process when the grant relates to several different agencies on the Council.

10. The Federal Regional Council has been very successful in achieving its stated purpose of program coordination.

11. This Federal Regional Council is consulted on a regular basis by city officials seeking general information about federal grants.

12. This Federal Regional Council is consulted frequently by city officials seeking specialized assistance with grant-in-aid problems.

II. Council Members' Attitudes Concerning Decentralization of Council Member Agencies and Departments

1. One of the principal problems of the Federal Regional Council is lack of sufficient decentralization of member departments and agencies.

2. If the same amount of line authority were granted to each of the Federal Regional Council members within their respective agencies, the Council would be able to perform its functions more effectively than at the present.

3. Those Federal Regional Council members who have more line authority usually play a more effective role on the Council than those members who have less line authority.

4. Individual members of the Federal Regional Council find it necessary to frequently clear up problems by passing them to the Washington level.

III. Council Members' Attitudes Concerning Problems Relating to Authority and Coordination

1. The Federal Regional Council experienced some disagreement among its members because of functional agency pressures to avoid compromising agency interest.

2. Issues that have a high potential for controversy are at times avoided by the Federal Regional Council.

3. Since the Federal Regional Council arrangement operates by consensus this usually prevents Council members from taking effective action--as

an organization--on issues in which there is considerable conflict among the Council members.

4. In order for Federal Regional Councils to perform adequately there must be a stronger coordination mechanism within the Council than now exists.

5. The Office of Management and Budget's role within the Council should be increased so that this agency can act as a coordinating influence with power of enforcement.

6. The Council Chairman should be given line authority over other Council members.

7. A Council Chairman should not have to also serve as his agency's regional head because this divides his time too much between agency and Council duties.

8. The Under Secretaries Group can be characterized by permissive management.

9. This Council operates best when the Under Secretaries Group provides clear management direction and assistance.

10. This Council would operate more effectively if O.M.B. would assign a full time permanent representative here.

11. The absence of formalized standards for planning work and reporting progress curtail the effectiveness of this Council.

12. I have observed Council members experiencing conflict as a result of functional expectations of one's agency contradicting the area coordination expectations of the Council.

13. In a situation where a Council member is torn between the expectations of his agency and the expectations of the Council he usually decides in favor of his agency.

Interviews Held with Federal Regional Council Representatives and Staff

The author interviewed various Council members and staff in two of the three selected Councils. Interviews were held in the San Francisco and Dallas Councils. These interviews concentrated on the performance of the respective Council. Six staff members were interviewed in the San Francisco Council, and two directors and three staff members were interviewed in the Dallas Council.

Part V. Explanation of Dependent Variables

In order to make the most effective use of the data collected, that is, in order to secure the maximum information from the data that is possible, the following scaling procedure for the dependent variables was devised. Four scales have been developed for explanation purposes.

Scale I

Extent of Acquaintance City Officials Have with the Federal Regional Council Systems

Three questionnaire items that relate to the acquaintance that city officials have with Federal Regional Councils are consolidated into an acquaintance scale in order to give one an overall perspective of the extent city officials are familiar with the Federal Regional Council in their area. The items employed in the construction of the acquaintance scale were:

1. I have personally met with some of the Federal Regional Council members.
2. I have attended meetings sponsored by a Federal Regional Council.
3. I am familiar with the functions and activities of the Federal Regional Council.

In the scoring procedure utilized for obtaining an acquaintance score "no" responses are scored "0." "Yes" responses are scored "1." Thus for the three total items that encompass the "extent of acquaintance" scale the maximum score that can be obtained from a given respondent is "3," and the minimum score that can be obtained from a given respondent is "0." It is obvious from the foregoing explanation that the higher the total number obtained from a given respondent on the acquaintance scale signifies the more familiar that respondent is with the operations of the Federal Regional Council in his federal region. Conversely the lower the total number obtained from a respondent on this score signifies the less familiar a respondent is with the Federal Regional Council in his region. An analysis of how the respondents scored on the acquaintance continuum is covered in Figure 2A.

For purposes of cross tabulation the cases, that is, cities responses, were divided into two separate categories in order to facilitate statistical analysis. Accordingly cases were dichotomized in the following



Figure 2A. Acquaintance Continuum (Scale I)

manner: the mean score was computed, and the mean obtained from the total cases was utilized as the demarcation point for the data. For example, all cases for Scale I had a mean of 2.13. Consequently, each individual case which had a Scale I score of less than 2.13 was placed in the first category and conversely, all cases which had Scale I scores of 2.13 or more were assigned to the second category. Figure 2B gives an analysis of Scale I dichotomized by mean score.



Figure 2B. Acquaintance Scale: Dichotomized by Mean Score

Scale II

Frequency of Contact with Federal Regional Councils

Scale number II consists of one questionnaire item:

> On the average what is your frequency of contact (via telephone, letter, personal communication, etc.) with Federal Regional Council Officials?
> 0. Never
> 1. Once a year or less often
> 2. Two to three times a year
> 3. Four to twelve times a year
> 4. More often than once a month

Responses are scored on a continuum from "0" to "4." The "0" responses are those officials who have "never" contacted a Federal Regional Council, and conversely, "4" responses denote city officials who have contacted a Federal Regional Council "more than once a month." An analysis of officials' frequency of contact with Councils is found in Figure 2C.



Figure 2C. Frequency of Contact with Federal Regional Council Continuum (Scale II)

For purposes of cross tabulation the responses were divided into two categories of scale scores. Cases were dichotomized on the basis of the Scale II mean, which

was 2.04. Each case which had a scale II mean score of less than 2.04 was placed in the first category. All cases which had a mean score of 2.04 or above were assigned to the second category. Figure 2D gives an analysis of Scale II dichotomized by mean score.



Figure 2D. Frequency of Contact Scale: Dichotomized by Mean Score

Scale III

Frequency of Contact to Other Sources for Grant Information and/or Assistance

Scale number III consists of four questionnaire items. These items are:

1. On the average what is the frequency of contact made directly to a Washington federal department or agency?

2. On the average what is the frequency of contact made with your congressmen or senators in seeking information about or assistance with federal grants?

3. On the average what is the frequency of contact made to a Council of Government (C.O.G.) in seeking information about or assistance with Federal grants?

4. On the average what is the frequency of contact made to your district Federal offices or other Federal sub-regional offices (if they exist for specific functional areas)?

Responses to each of the preceding questions were limited to the following choices:

0. Never
1. Once a year or less often
2. Two or three times a year
3. Four to twelve times a year
4. More often than once a month

The response on each non-Council agency was summed to create a total contact score, that is, the more frequent the contact with the various agencies the higher the score. Figure 2E illustrates the frequency of contact continuum for these scores.



Figure 2E. Frequency of Contact Continuum for Non-Federal Regional Council Sources (Scale III)

These four responses are consolidated for purposes of cross tabulation into a low-high response. The mean score for these four items is 11.20. All responses below 11.20 were assigned the first category. All items 11.20 or above were assigned the second category. The cities' response concerning frequency of contact to "other sources" of grant information and/or assistance is contrasted with the frequency of contact cities have with Federal Regional

Councils. Figure 2F provides an analysis of Scale III responses dichotomized by mean score.



Figure 2F. Frequency of Contact Scale for Non-Federal Regional Council Sources: Dichotomized by Mean Score

Scale IV

The Extent City Officials Possess Positive Attitudes Toward Federal Regional Councils

Twelve items on the questionnaire sent to city officials related to the extent city officials hold positive attitudes toward the Federal Regional Council in their area. These twelve items are consolidated into a "Positive Attitude Scale." The questions employed in the construction of this scale are:

1. Federal Regional Councils have expedited the grant process for this city.
2. The Federal Regional Council in this region attempts to keep this city informed about the Council's activities and programs that have a bearing on urban needs.
3. Federal Regional Councils have reduced the number of steps necessary in obtaining a grant.

4. Federal Regional Council members are more likely to respond with action to local needs and problems than are bureaucrats in Washington.

5. Federal Regional Council members have a greater sensitivity and awareness of the needs of local governments than do Washington bureaucrats.

6. The Federal Regional Council members have coordinated information from their respective agencies concerning federal grants for this city when this city has made an inquiry for such information.

7. The members of the Federal Regional Council have coordinated the resources of their respective agencies in relation to solving grant problems for this city.

8. Federal Regional Councils have reduced the number of contacts your city makes with other sources, e.g., Congressmen and senators, direct to Washington, C.O.G.s, and district federal offices.

9. Agency members of the Federal Regional Council lack sufficient authority to make decisions and consequently must frequently clear problems encountered on the Council with their department chiefs in Washington.

10. Contacts with the Federal Regional Council have been beneficial to my city.

11. The best way to characterize Federal Regional Councils is that they are merely another bureaucratic obstacle one faces when he seeks to obtain a federal grant.

12. I believe that Federal Regional Councils should continue as a permanent part of the federal structure.

The respondent is scored on a "one" to "five" basis for each question on this scale depending on how he responded. The respondent was presented the following choices:

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

Those respondents who indicated "1" were recorded one score; those who indicated "2" were recorded two, etc. Consequently the maximum score that can be obtained in this scale is "60." The minimum score that can be obtained is "12." It is obvious that those officials scoring "60" have negative attitudes toward the Federal Regional Council in their area, and conversely those scoring "12" would have the highest positive attitudes toward the Federal Regional Council system. For purposes of scoring, questionnaire items "9" and "11" were reversed because they were obviously originally formulated to elicit city officials' attitudes relating to negative vis-à-vis positive Council performance. An analysis of the positive attitude continuum appears in Figure 2G.



Figure 2G. Positive Attitude Toward Federal Regional Council Continuum (Scale IV)

For purpose of cross tabulation the responses were divided into two categories of scale scores. The cases were dichotomized by the computed mean obtained from all the cases. All cases for scale IV had a mean of 38.91. Consequently each case which had a scale IV score of less than 38.91 were placed in the first category and conversely, all cases which had scores of 38.91 or more were assigned the second category. Figure 2H illustrates scale IV dichotomized by the mean score.



Figure 2H. Positive Attitude Toward Federal Regional Council Scale: Dichotomized by Mean Score

The Ranking of Councils vis-à-vis Other Sources on Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact

Four questionnaire items comprise the ranking of agencies. These items are:

1. In relation to effectiveness of contact how would you rank the following access routes for gaining general information about available grants on a one (1) to five (5) ranking? ((1) being the most effective)

2. In relation to effectiveness of contact how would you rank the following access routes for solving a problem during a grant negotiation on a one (1) to five (5) ranking? ((1) being the most effective)

3. Rank each of the following access routes on a one (1) to five (5) ranking to correspond with frequency of contact you make in relation to seeking general information about available grants. ((1) being the most effective)

4. Rank each of the following access routes on a one (1) to five (5) ranking to correspond with frequency of contact you make in relation to seeking assistance with a grant problem. ((1) being the most effective)

The agencies listed under each of these items are:

Congressmen and senators
Direct contact to Washington
Federal Regional Council
Council of Government (C.O.G.)
District federal offices or other federal sub-regional offices

Respondents ranked the five agencies on the previously mentioned four characteristics. Each agency's overall rank was averaged, i.e., a mean agency rank for the combined four characteristics was obtained. Then, city officials were separated into two groups according to whether their average rank for each agency was lower or higher than the given agency mean.

The overall mean rankings for the five agencies are as follows: direct to Washington 2.6; Federal Regional Councils 3.9; Congressmen and Senators 2.8; Council of Government 3.8; and district federal office 2.0. In terms of effectiveness of contact the highest average rating went to the district federal office, then direct communication to Washington, Congressmen and Senators, Council of Government, then Federal Regional Councils.

Table 2A. Ranking in Terms of Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact

Agency	Mean Ranking
1. District federal office	2.0
2. Direct communication to Washington	2.6
3. Congressmen and Senators	2.8
4. Council of Government	3.8
5. Federal Regional Council	3.9

Part VI. Quantitative Analysis

Quantitative analyses for Chapter III were made by computer, through the use of the University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research's OSIRIS III statistical package. This statistical package is "on-line" at the University of Oklahoma and was obtained by the Department of Political Science as a member of the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research.

The computer file was created with the OSIRIS III file build program. Data transformations and scales were created with the Index Construction (ICON) program. Univariate frequencies, bivariate cross-tabulations, and assorted descriptive statistics were obtained with the TABLES program.[129]

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[129]For a detailed explanation of the OSIRIS III package and of the programs used to complete this research see Institute for Social Research, Osiris III Volume 1: System and Program Description (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1973).

All cross tabulation results for this research utilized the Chi-square statistical test. The Chi-square, for Chapter III, was computed by the Osiris III statistical package TABLES program which automatically utilizes the Yates correction factor when such a correction is appropriate. The .05 level of significance was utilized as the demarcation point for all statistical tests.

CHAPTER III

ATTITUDES OF SELECTED CITY OFFICIALS TOWARD THEIR RESPECTIVE FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS

This chapter is divided into five parts. It covers the extent of acquaintance city officials have with the Federal Regional Council in their respective region, the frequency of contact city officials have with Councils, as well as the effectiveness ratings of selected grant access sources, and finally, analyzes the positive attitudes held by city officials toward Federal Regional Councils.

Part I: City Officials' Acquaintance with Councils

This section analyzes the extent of acquaintance city officials have with the Federal Regional Council in their Federal region.

Local officials that were surveyed reported a quite high degree of acquaintance with the Federal Regional Council in their respective Federal areas. Forty-five, or nearly 62 percent of the local officials had personally met with Federal Regional Council members, while twenty-one, or about 31 percent, had not as is indicated in Table 3A.

Table 3A. Local Official Respondents' Personal Contact with Federal Regional Council Members

Personal Contact	Number	Percent
Contact	45	69.1
No Contact	21	30.9
Total	N=66	100.0

In addition, forty-two, or approximately 62 percent, of the responding local government officials had attended meetings sponsored by the Federal Regional Council in their area. Table 3B covers the Council attendance record of these officials.

Table 3B. Local Official Respondents' Attendance at Meetings Sponsored by Federal Regional Councils

Attendance	Number	Percent
Attendance	42	61.8
Non-Attendance	26	38.2
Total	N=68	100.0

The highest response obtained by the local public officials relating to their extent of acquaintance with Councils was their alleged familiarity with the functions and activities of the Councils. Table 3C indicates that over 82 percent of the local officials had some familiarity with the operations of their Regional Council, while twelve,

or 17.5 percent, of the respondents did not.

Table 3C. Local Official Respondents' Familiarity with the Functions and Activities of Federal Regional Councils

Familiarity	Number	Percent
Familiarity	56	82.4
Non-Familiarity	12	17.6
Total	N=68	100.0

One independent variable that was found to be of significance at the .05 level or below was the governmental structure reform variable, the possession of a city grant liaison officer, which is analyzed in Table 3D.

Table 3D. Acquaintance of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Presence of a Grant Liaison Officer

Acquaintance	Grant Liaison Officer			
	Liaison		No Liaison	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Non-Acquaintance	11	30.5	19	61.3
Acquaintance	25	69.5	12	38.7
Total	N=36	100.0	N=31	100.0

Chi-square = 5.181 $P < .025$

Those cities that had access to a grant liaison officer either in Washington, D.C. or in their local government demonstrated a significantly high degree of acquaintance

with the Council system in their Federal region. A high significance level of .025 was ascertained for the grant liaison officer in correlation with the acquaintance scale. All other independent variables, analyzed in Table 3E, were found to be not significant at the standard level stated above for the Chi-square measure. One socioeconomic variable worthy of mention, that did not meet the .05 level but did exhibit a fairly high significance level was low city median income (significance level .06). Although the prediction that magnitude of population would be the primary socioeconomic variable associated with acquaintance was not confirmed, nevertheless, high population did post a significance level of .20. Other socioeconomic variables and their levels of significance under .20 were low per capita income, .10; low median educational level, .10; and median income, .06.

Governmental structural variables showed the least relationship with extent of acquaintance with Federal Regional Councils. Nonpartisan vis-à-vis partisan local government, and the percent of city employees in merit system achieved significance levels of .99 and .995 respectively.

In summary, the presence of a grant liaison officer proved to be of most significance to local officials' acquaintance with Federal Regional Councils. Other reform variables were not significant at the standard Chi-square significance level. No socioeconomic variables

Table 3E. Acquaintance of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Chi-square	Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables:		
Merit System	0.010	$P < .995$
Reform Score	2.592	$P < .30$
*Form of Government	1.712	$P < .50$
Grant Liaison Officer	5.181	$P < .025$
Partisan/Non-Partisan	0.055	$P < .99$
At Large-Ward Selection of City Council Members	0.318	$P < .90$
Method of Selection of Mayor	1.180	$P < .30$
Socio-Economic Variables:		
Population	2.171	$P < .20$
Per Capita Income	2.856	$P < .10$
Median Education	2.740	$P < .10$
Families with Income Below Poverty Level	1.498	$P < .25$
Region of Federal Regional Council	0.600	$P < .45$
Median Income	3.553	$P < .06$
Unemployment Level	0.112	$P < .80$

*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies for each cell were less than five.

The Yates' Correction Method was employed to compute the Chi-Square of the above correlations when applicable.

tested were of significance at the .05 level although low city median income posted a .06 significance level. Table 3E gives a complete listing of the Chi-square test results and the corresponding levels of significance for each of the independent variables to the acquaintance level of local officials with the Federal Regional Council.

Part II. Frequency of Contact with Federal Regional Councils

Another area of interest is the frequency of contact local officials have with their respective Federal Regional Council officials. This is then followed in Part III with an analysis of the frequency of contact that local officials have with other sources of grant information and/or assistance.

The frequency with which Federal Regional Councils are consulted by city officials is examined in detail in Table 3F. Table 3G then divides the detailed responses into high and low categories. The responses, more often than once a month, and four to twelve times a year are consolidated into a high category. Two to three times a year, once a year or less often, and never are consolidated into a low category. This procedure is followed for each of the five sources.

Table 3F clearly indicates that the frequency with which local officials consult with their Federal Regional Council is low for as many as 63 percent, who show three

Table 3F. Frequency of Contact with a Federal Regional Council

	Number	Percent
More Often than Once a Month	11	16.2
Four to Twelve Times a Year	14	20.6
Two to Three Times a Year	17	25.0
Once a Year or Less Often	19	27.9
Never	7	10.3

or less contacts in a year. The remainder, with four or more contacts a year, appear to have established more of a continuing working relationship.

Table 3G. The Frequency of Contact of Local Officials with Federal Regional Councils

Frequency of Contact	Number	Percent
Low Frequency	43	63.2
High Frequency	25	36.8

In correlating the local government structure variables to the city officials' frequency of contact with Federal Regional Councils, only one structural variable, partisan/nonpartisan government, as shown in Table 3H, proved to be significant at the .05 level or below. Those cities whose officials are elected on a nonpartisan basis report a high degree of relationship to the absence of contact with Federal Regional Councils. Conversely, those

cities whose elected officials are identified by a political party demonstrate a high correlation with frequency of contact to Federal Regional Councils.

Table 3H. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Partisan/Nonpartisan Government

	Partisan/Nonpartisan Government			
	Partisan		Nonpartisan	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Contact	3	27.3	40	70.2
High Contact	8	72.7	17	29.8
Total	N=11	100.0	N=57	100.0

Chi-square = 5.571 $P < .02$

Other government structural variables did not meet the standard level of statistical significance. It is interesting to note, however, that cities with a grant liaison officer demonstrate less frequency of contact with Federal Regional Councils than those cities who are without a liaison (.20 level of significance). Also, city manager cities report a correlation with less frequency of contact than mayoral cities (.10 level of significance).

Three socioeconomic variables proved to be of statistical significance in relationship to local officials frequency of contact with Federal Regional Councils. Interestingly the higher the median educational level of

the city the less contact local officials report with Federal Regional Councils. This is revealed in Table 3I.

Table 3I. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Median Education Level

	Median Education Level			
	Low Education 12.4 years or less		High Education 12.5 years or more	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Contact	27	56.2	15	88.2
High Contact	21	43.8	2	11.8
Total	N=48	100.0	N=17	100.0

Chi-square = 4.697 $P < .04$

Table 3J shows that those cities that have a low poverty level manifested a correlation to less frequent contact with Federal Regional Councils.

Another statistically significant variable at the .05 level or below is the city median income rank. A high relationship is shown in Table 3K between cities whose median income is more than $10,000 and a low frequency of contact to Federal Regional Councils.

The socioeconomic variable, high population magnitude, hypothesized to positively associate with the frequency of contact city officials have with Federal Regional Councils did not prove to be statistically significant at the required level, reporting a .14 level of

Table 3J. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Family Poverty Level (Family Yearly Income less than $3,000)

	Family Poverty Level			
	Low Poverty Level 8.9 percent or less families making $3,000 yearly		High Poverty Level 9.0 percent or more families making $3,000 yearly	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Contact	28	77.8	14	48.3
High Contact	8	22.2	15	51.7
Total	N=36	100.0	N=29	100.0

Chi-square = 4.892 $P < .04$

Table 3K. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Councils by Median Income ($10,000 or Less)

	Median Income			
	Low Income $10,000 or less		High Income More than $10,000	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Contact	16	50.0	26	78.8
High Contact	16	50.0	7	21.2
Total	N=32	100.0	N=33	100.0

Chi-square = 4.697 $P < .04$

significance. Table 3L gives information regarding the results of the Chi-square test and the corresponding levels of significance and each of the independent variables and

Table 3L. Frequency of Contact by Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Chi-square	Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables		
Merit System	0.432	P < .60
Reform Score	1.045	P < .70
*Form of Government	4.993	P < .10
Grant Liaison Officer	1.771	P < .20
Partisan/Non-Partisan	5.571	P < .02
At Large-Ward Selection of City Council Members	0.021	P < .90
Method of Selection of Mayor	0.545	P < .50
Socioeconomic Variables		
Population	2.409	P < .14
Per Capita Income	0.790	P < .40
Median Education	4.305	P < .04
Families with Income below Poverty Level	4.892	P < .04
Region of Federal Regional Council	1.450	P < .25
Median Income	4.697	P < .04
Unemployment Level	0.059	P < .90

*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies for each cell were less than five.

The Yates' Correction Method was employed to compute the Chi-Square of the above correlations when applicable.

frequency of contact by local officials with Federal Regional Council.

Part III. Frequency of Contact with Grant Access Sources Other than the Federal Regional Council

The frequency of contact local government officials have with other access sources to grant information and/or assistance is significant. The sources, other than the Federal Regional Council, that are included in this analysis are: communication to Washington, D.C., Congressmen and Senators, Council of Government (C.O.G.), and the official's district Federal office.

Table 3M makes apparent that over 75 percent of the city officials responding in this survey generally maintained rather frequent contact with Federal officials in Washington, D.C., while the remainder ranged from a couple to no contacts in a year's time.

Table 3M. Frequency of Contact Direct to Washington, D.C.

	Number	Percent
More Often than Once a Month	26	38.2
Four to Twelve Times a Year	24	35.3
Two to Three Times a Year	9	13.2
Once a Year or Less Often	8	11.8
Never	1	1.5

In respect to the frequency of contact made by city officials with congressional members, Table 3N shows that there is, overall, a slightly lower level of contact than in the case of Federal officials.

Table 3N. Frequency of Contact with Congressmen or Senators in Seeking Information about or Assistance with Federal Grants

	Number	Percent
More Often than Once a Month	17	25.0
Four to Twelve Times a Year	26	38.2
Two to Three Times a Year	16	23.5
Once a Year or Less Often	8	11.8
Never	1	1.5

The Council of Government does not fair as well with city officials for consultation on grant programs as do the Washington bureaucrats and politicians. Table 3-O shows that only 53 percent had contact with their Council of Government four or more times a year as compared to 73 and 63 percent, respectively, in the case of Washington officials and Congressional representatives.

The frequency of contact by city officials shows a marked increase in the case of Federal agencies' district offices. As indicated in Table 3P, nearly 53 percent made such contact more than once a month, and more than 76 percent are found in the range of four or more contacts in a year.

Table 3-O. Frequency of Contact to a Council of Government in Seeking Information about or Assistance with Grants

	Number	Percent
More Often than Once a Month	15	22.1
Four to Twelve Times a Year	21	30.9
Two to Three Times a Year	13	19.1
Once a Year or Less Often	10	14.7
Never	9	13.2

Table 3P. Frequency of Contact to a District Federal Office

	Number	Percent
More Often than Once a Month	36	52.9
Four to Twelve Times a Year	16	23.5
Two to Three Times a Year	9	13.2
Once a Year or Less Often	5	7.4
Never	2	2.9

An examination of the frequency with which other sources of grant information and/or assistance are consulted by local officials makes apparent that there is comparatively a low frequency of contact with Federal Regional Councils. In fact, it is the lowest maintained by local officials among all the contact agencies.

Tables 3Q through 3T present a general review of the frequency of contact by local officials with the

alternative agencies mentioned above. The highest percentage contact rate, at 76.5 percent, was with the Federal district office, while the next highest, at 73.3 percent, was with the Washington Federal agency. U.S. Senators and Representatives were third highest in the rate of frequency of contact by city officials, with 63.2 percent falling in the category of high frequency, while the Council of Government, at 53 percent high contact, stands as least significant to the respondents as a resource for assistance among the alternative agencies other than the Federal Regional Council.

Table 3Q. Local Official Respondents' Frequency of Contact with District/Subdistrict Office

Frequency of Contact	Number	Percent
Low Contact	16	23.5
High Contact	52	76.5
Total	N=68	100.0

Table 3R. Local Official Respondents' Frequency of Contact with Washington Federal Department/Agency

Frequency of Contact	Number	Percent
Low Contact	18	26.5
High Contact	50	73.5
Total	N=68	100.0

Table 3S. Local Official Respondents' Frequency of Contact with U.S. Congress

Frequency of Contact	Number	Percent
Low Contact	25	36.8
High Contact	43	63.2
Total	N=68	100.0

Table 3T. Local Official Respondents' Frequency of Contact with Council of Government (C.O.G.)

Frequency of Contact	Number	Percent
Low Contact	32	47.0
High Contact	36	53.0
Total	N=68	100.0

It was explained in Chapter II that these four "other sources" responses are consolidated for purposes of cross tabulation into an overall low-high other sources ranking. (See Table 2F.)

Magnitude of population, as hypothesized, did correlate strongly with frequency of contact by local officials with other sources of grant information and/or assistance at the .005 significance level. Cities with a population of 250,000 or more, covered in Table 3U, exhibited a high relationship to a greater frequency of contact with other sources by their local officials.

Table 3U. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents to Other Sources by Population

	Population			
	Low 50,000 to 250,000		High More than 250,000	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Contact	30	57.7	2	12.5
High Contact	22	42.3	14	87.5
Total	N=52	100.0	N=16	100.0

Chi-square = 8.298 P <.005

Another significant relationship is the high correlation of elected mayor to more frequency of contact by local officials to other sources of grant information and/or assistance. In Table 3V this correlation recorded at .02 level of significance.

Table 3V. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents to Other Sources by Mayor Selection

	Mayor Selection			
	Appointed		Elected	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Contact	14	73.7	18	37.5
High Contact	5	26.3	30	62.5

Chi-square = 5.766 P <.02

The remaining correlation that is significant at the .05 level or below is the poverty level of families in the

selected cities. Table 3W establishes that cities in which 9.0 percent or more of the families have a yearly income of less than $3,000 show a strong tendency for more frequency of contact by local officials with other sources of grant information and/or assistance.

Table 3W. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents to Other Sources by Poverty Level of Families

	Poverty Level of Families			
	Low Poverty Level 8.9 percent or less families making $3,000 yearly		High Poverty Level 9.0 percent or more families making $3,000 yearly	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Contact	21	58.3	8	27.6
High Contact	15	41.7	21	72.4
Total	N=36	100.0	N=29	100.0

Chi-square = 4.964 $P < .04$

Other independent variables reporting a .20 level of statistical significance or below are as follows: the possession of a city grant liaison office and high frequency of contact with other sources (.08); high reform score correlated with low frequency of contact with other sources (.20); region of Federal Regional Council, i.e., Federal Region VI correlated with high frequency of contacts with other sources (.10); and low median income level of a city associated with high frequency of contact to

other sources (.18). Table 3X shows a complete listing of independent variables listed with the Chi-square and corresponding level of statistical significance.

Part IV. Effectiveness Ratings of Selected Grant Access Sources

In order to complete a comprehensive look at the frequency of contact and rated effectiveness of Federal Regional Councils relative to their counterparts in the Federal system, each city official was requested to rate the foregoing sources relative to each other (Table 2-I). This research examines in detail the ratings by local officials of each of the selected agencies in relation to frequency of contact in seeking general information; frequency of contact in seeking assistance with a grant problem; the effectiveness rating of agencies in gaining general information about grants; and effectiveness of contact rating in solving a problem. The numbers utilized to differentiate effectiveness ratings indicate the mean ranking of each agency. The lower the mean ranking achieved by a given agency denotes its relative effectiveness vis-à-vis the other ranked agencies.

In Table 3Y direct contact to a Washington agency appears as the most frequently employed method for seeking general information about grants. The Federal Regional Councils is the fourth frequently consulted source, placing only above Congressmen and Senators.

Table 3X. Frequency of Contact of Local Official Respondents with Other Sources by Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Chi-square	Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables		
Merit System	1.550	$P < .25$
Reform Score	4.283	$P < .20$
*Form of Government	3.183	$P < .25$
Grant Liaison Officer	3.284	$P < .08$
Partisan/nonpartisan	0.199	$P < .70$
At Large-Ward Selection of City Council Members	0.079	$P < .80$
Method of Selection of Mayor	5.766	$P < .02$
Socioeconomic Variables		
Population	8.298	$P < .005$
Per Capita Income	0.418	$P < .60$
Median Education	0.270	$P < .70$
Families with Income below Poverty Level	4.964	$P < .04$
Region of Federal Regional Council	2.706	$P < .10$
Median Income	1.921	$P < .18$
Unemployment Level	0.695	$P < .45$

*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies for each cell were less than five.

The Yates' Correction Method was employed to compute the Chi-square test of all the above correlations when applicable.

Table 3Y. Frequency of Contact Rating: Seeking General Information

Direct to Washington	1.42
Federal District Office	1.49
Council of Government	1.62
Federal Regional Council	1.64
Congressmen or Senators	1.74

Some change occurs in the ratings, as is shown in Table 3Z, when local officials seek assistance with a grant problem. They most frequently turn to the Federal district office for such help, followed by direct contact to Washington. The Federal Regional Council again rates fourth, in this case above the Council of Government.

Table 3Z. Frequency of Contact Rating: Seeking Assistance with a Grant Problem

Federal District Office	1.46
Direct to Washington	1.46
Congressmen and Senators	1.58
Federal Regional Council	1.67
Council of Government	1.73

The ratings of agencies change again when tested for effectiveness of contact, covered in Table 3AA. Local officials think that direct communication to a Washington agency is the most effective means of gaining general

information about available grants. The Federal Regional Council was the last agency local officials would turn to for gaining information about available grants.

Table 3AA. Effectiveness of Contact Rating: Gaining General Information about Available Grants

Direct to Washington	1.48
Federal District Office	1.52
Council of Government	1.55
Congressmen and Senators	1.63
Federal Regional Council	1.68

When rating the agencies for effectiveness of contact in solving a problem, shown in Table 3BB, a close comparison occurs with the ratings in Table 3Z, showing frequency of contact in seeking assistance with a grant problem. One can hypothesize that the effectiveness at an agency level in solving a problem determines the frequency that local officials will make contact for such assistance. In this respect the Federal district office is considered by city officials as the most effective agency for solving a grant problem. Direct contact to Washington is rated second, and Congressmen and Senators third. The Federal Regional Councils do not fare so well with a low fourth in the ratings.

Table 3BB. Effectiveness of Contact Rating: Solving a Problem

Federal District Office	1.45
Direct to Washington	1.49
Congressmen and Senators	1.51
Federal Regional Council	1.68
Council of Government	1.76

Table 3CC reveals that the only meaningful correlation at the .05 level of significance or below is the relationship of the effectiveness of contact with Federal Regional Councils and the method of selection of city council members--at large or ward selection. The higher the rating of Federal Regional Councils by local officials may be related to at-large selection of city council members, or more importantly ward selection seems to elicit a low effectiveness rating of Federal Regional Councils.

One observes in Table 3DD that two variables were essentially unrelated, significant only at the .95 level: form of government and the method of mayoral selection. This table also gives a complete listing of correlations between Federal Regional Council ratings and independent variables.

For correlations involving U.S. Congress and its effectiveness rating of independent variables there were no significant relationships at the .05 level. However

Table 3CC. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Selection Method of City Council Members

	Selection Method of City Council			
	At-Large		Ward	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Rating	19	48.7	14	100.0
High Rating	20	51.3	0	0
Total	N=39	100.0	N=14	100.0

Chi-square = 9.451 $P < .005$

there were three interesting correlations: mayoral form of government associates with a high U.S. Congress rating (.10); ward selection of city council members associates with a high rating (.05); and a low unemployment level associates with a high Congress rating (.18). Table 3EE gives a complete table on effectiveness and frequency of contact rating of Congress by independent variables.

As one might anticipate, due to the close proximity of a Washington based grant liaison officer, and the specialization of such an officer, there appears to be a high correlation (.02 level of significance) between the high effectiveness and frequency of contact rating of city officials with the Washington Federal office when the city in question has a grant liaison officer on its staff. Table 3FF indicates this relationship.

Table 3DD. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Chi-square	Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables		
Merit System	0.899	$P < .35$
Reform Score	1.416	$P < .50$
*Form of Government	3.819	$P < .20$
Grant Liaison Officer	0.013	$P < .95$
Partisan/Nonpartisan	1.564	$P < .25$
At Large-Ward Selection of City Council Members	9.451	$P < .005$
Method of Selection of Mayor	0.005	$P < .95$
Socioeconomic Variables		
Population	0.857	$P < .35$
Per Capita Income	0.362	$P < .60$
Median Education	0.189	$P < .70$
Families with Income below Poverty Level	1.013	$P < .35$
Region of Federal Regional Council	0.833	$P < .40$
Median Income	0.357	$P < .60$
Unemployment Level	0.166	$P < .70$

*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies for each cell were less than five.

The Yates' correction method was employed to compute the Chi-square test of all the above correlations when applicable.

Table 3EE. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with U.S. Congress by Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Chi-square	Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables		
Merit System	0.086	P < .80
Reform Score	0.818	P < .70
*Form of Government	5.005	P < .10
Grant Liaison Officer	0.405	P < .60
Partisan/Nonpartisan	0.733	P < .40
At Large-Ward Selection of City Council Members	3.752	P < .06
Method of Selection of Mayor	0.232	P < .70
Socioeconomic Variables		
Population	0.055	P < .90
Per Capita Income	0.012	P < .95
Median Education	0.018	P < .90
Families with Income Below Poverty Level	0.765	P < .40
Region of Federal Regional Council	0.052	P < .90
Median Income	0.721	P < .40
Unemployment Level	1.952	P < .18

*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies for each cell were less than five.

The Yates' correction method was employed to compute the Chi-square test of all the above correlations when applicable.

Table 3FF. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Washington Federal Office by Grant Liaison Officer

	Grant Liaison Officer			
	Liaison		No Liaison	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Rating	9	28.1	13	65.0
High Rating	23	71.9	7	35.0
Total	N=22	100.0%	N=20	100.0%

Chi-square = 5.429 $P < .02$

Population also correlates with the effectiveness and frequency of contact rating of a Washington Federal office as determined by local officials. The response appears to indicate that the higher the population of a city the greater the contact with a Federal agency in Washington. Table 3GG denotes that this correlation is significant at the .05 level.

No other correlations proved to be meaningful at the .05 level of significance or below; however, there were three independent variables that appeared to illustrate a low significance rating. Partisan/nonpartisan elections, families with income below poverty level and median income level of a city's population all correlated at the .95 level or higher with effectiveness and frequency of contact

Table 3GG. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Washington Federal Office by Population

	Population			
	Low Population 50,000 to 250,000		High Population More than 250,000	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Rating	21	52.5	2	15.4
High Rating	19	47.5	11	84.6
Total	N=30	100.0	N=13	100.0

Chi-square = 4.095 $P < .05$

rating of a Washington Federal office by local leaders. Table 3HH has a complete diagram of all Washington Federal departments correlations.

There were four significant correlations at the .05 level or below for the effectiveness and frequency of contact rating with Councils of Government (C.O.G.) and independent variables. It appears by the responses of local officials that a partisan elected government has a high relationship with a low effectiveness and frequency of contact rating for Councils of Government ($P < .05$), as is indicated by Table 3II.

Ward selection as a method of city council selection also appears to correlate significantly with the effectiveness rating given C.O.G.s by city officials ($P < .025$). Seemingly, ward selection of city council

Table 3HH. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Washington Federal Department/Agency by Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Chi-square	Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables		
Merit System	0.022	P < .90
Reform Score	1.045	P < .70
*Form of Government	2.985	P < .25
Grant Liaison Officer	5.429	P < .02
Partisan/Nonpartisan	0.013	P < .95
At Large-Ward Selection of City Council Members	2.621	P < .12
Method of Selection of Mayor	0.038	P < .90
Socioeconomic Variables		
Population	4.095	P < .05
Per Capita Income	0.562	P < .45
Median Education	0.044	P < .90
Families with Income Below Poverty Level	0.008	P < .95
Region of Federal Regional Council	0.048	P < .90
Median Income	0.000	P < 1.00
Unemployment Level	0.445	P < .60

*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies for each cell were less than five.

The Yates' correction method was employed to compute the Chi-square test of all the above correlations when applicable.

members parallels a low effectiveness rating for C.O.G.s, as is illustrated in Table 3JJ.

Table 3II. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Council of Governments by Partisan-Nonpartisan Government

	Partisan-Nonpartisan Government			
	Partisan		Nonpartisan	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Rating	9	90.0	21	48.8
High Rating	1	10.0	22	51.2
Total	N=10	100.0	N=43	100.0

Chi-square = 4.046 $P < .05$

Table 3JJ. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Council of Governments by Method of Selection of City Council Members

	Method of Council Selection			
	At-large		Ward	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Rating	18	46.2	12	85.7
High Rating	21	53.8	2	14.3
Total	N=39	100.0	N=14	100.0

Chi-square = 5.052 $P < .025$

Table 3KK indicates that the level of significance for the correlation of reform score and the effectiveness rating of Councils of Government is at the .05 level. The sample taken of local officials illustrates that

the higher the reform score the more likely a Council of Government will elicit a high effectiveness and frequency of contact rating.

Table 3KK. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Council of Governments by Reform Score

	Reform Score					
	Low		Medium		High	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Low Rating	12	80.0	10	55.6	6	35.3
High Rating	3	20.0	8	44.4	11	64.7
Total	N=15	100.0	N=18	100.0	N=17	100.0

Chi-square = 6.466 $P < .05$

As hypothesized the population variable shows a meaningful relationship ($P < .05$) with the effectiveness rating of Council of Governments by local leaders. Conversely to other correlations in this study by population, it appears that a low population correlates strongly with a low effectiveness rating of Council of Governments by city public officials, as is shown in Table 3LL.

Median income, median education and unemployment level of a city in this study demonstrate a low significance level of .95 or higher. Table 3MM lists all correlations by independent variables.

In correlating independent variables with the effectiveness rating of the district Federal office one

Table 3LL. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Council of Governments by Population

	Population			
	Low Population 50,000 to 250,000		High Population More than 250,000	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Low Rating	19	47.5	11	84.6
High Rating	21	52.5	2	15.4
Total	N=40	100.0	N=13	100.0

Chi-square = 4.095 $P < .05$

observes that there are no significant relationships at the .05 level. Three variables were clearly not significant: merit system; selection of council members; and median income, as is shown in Table 3NN.

Part V. An Analysis of the Positive Attitudes Held by City Officials Toward Federal Regional Councils

The following is an assessment of the extent that city officials view Federal Regional Councils favorably. Twelve items comprise this section of the study.

Table 3-00 indicates that city officials responded in a mixed manner to the statement that Councils have expedited the grant process, although interestingly the largest reaction to this statement is the disagree answer, thirty-one officials indicating this response.

Apparently city officials do not feel that the Council in their region has attempted to keep the city

Table 3MM. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with Council of Government (C.O.G.) by Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Chi-square	Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables		
Merit System	0.544	$P < .50$
Reform Score	6.466	$P < .05$
*Form of Government	3.922	$P < .20$
Grant Liaison Officer	0.901	$P < .35$
Partisan/Nonpartisan	4.046	$P < .05$
At Large-Ward Selection of City Council Members	5.052	$P < .025$
Method of Selection of Mayor	0.038	$P < .90$
Socioeconomic Variables		
Population	4.095	$P < .05$
Per Capita Income	0.007	$P < .95$
Median Education	0.071	$P < .80$
Families with Income Below Poverty Level	3.075	$P < .08$
Region of Federal Regional Council	0.048	$P < .90$
Median Income	0.000	$P < 1.00$
Unemployment Level	0.002	$P < 1.00$

*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies for each cell were less than five.

The Yates' correction method was employed to compute the Chi-square test of all the above correlations when applicable.

Table 3NN. Effectiveness and Frequency of Contact Rating of Local Official Respondents with District/ Subdistrict Federal Office by Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Chi-square	Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables		
Merit System	0.011	P < .95
Reform Score	2.912	P < .25
*Form of Government	0.981	P < .70
Grant Liaison Officer	0.341	P < .60
Partisan/Nonpartisan	0.048	P < .90
At Large-Ward Selection of City Council Members	0.000	P < 1.00
Method of Selection of Mayor	0.017	P < .90
Socioeconomic Variables		
Population	0.051	P < .90
Per Capita Income	0.039	P < .90
Median Education	0.026	P < .90
Families with Income Below Poverty Level	0.061	P < .90
Region of Federal Regional Council	0.020	P < .90
Median Income	0.000	P < 1.00
Unemployment Level	0.061	P < .90

*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies for each cell were less than five.

The Yates' correction method was employed to compute the Chi-square test of all the above correlations when applicable.

Table 3-00. Federal Regional Councils Have Expedited the Grant Process for This City

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
20.6%	45.6%	33.8%	100%
(14)	(31)	(23)	(68)

informed about Council activities and programs that have a bearing on urban needs. Table 3PP illustrates that only eighteen officials agree that they have been kept informed by their Council.

Table 3PP. The Council Keeps This City Informed about Its Activities and Programs Relating to Urban Needs

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
26.4%	54.5%	19.1%	100%
(18)	(37)	(13)	(68)

Apparently city officials do not feel that Councils have reduced the number of steps necessary in obtaining a grant. Table 3QQ denotes that only seven city officials agree that Councils have reduced the steps necessary in obtaining a grant.

A substantial number of city officials appear uncertain whether Council members are more likely to respond with action to local needs and problems than are Washington bureaucrats. Table 3RR shows that twenty-seven city

Table 3QQ. Councils Have Reduced the Number of Steps Necessary in Obtaining a Grant

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
10.3%	50.0%	39.7%	100%
(7)	(34)	(27)	(68)

officials do not know if Council members are more likely to respond with action. However, more officials agreed with this statement than disagreed.

Table 3RR. Council Members Are More Likely To Respond with Action to Local Needs and Problems than Are Bureaucrats in Washington

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
35.3%	25.0%	39.79%	100%
(24)	(17)	(27)	(68)

Table 3SS indicates that a substantial number of city officials agree that Council members have a greater sensitivity and awareness to the needs of local governments than do Washington bureaucrats, although the largest response to this statement is the "don't know" category.

Table 3SS. Council Members Have a Greater Sensitivity and Awareness to the Needs of Local Governments than Do Washington Bureaucrats

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
36.8%	25.0%	38.2%	100%
(25)	(17)	(26)	(68)

Table 3TT shows that almost half of the city officials specified the "don't know" response in relation to the statement that Council members have coordinated Federal grant information from their respective agencies for their particular city when such an inquiry was made. One could conjecture that the reason the "don't know" response is so frequent is that many officials have simply not made an information inquiry to their regional Council. More officials disagreed with this response than agreed.

Table 3TT. Council Members Have Coordinated Federal Grant Information for My City When Asked

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
23.5%	30.9%	45.6%	100%
(16)	(21)	(31)	(68)

Only sixteen officials agree that members of the Federal Regional Council have coordinated the resources of their respective agencies in relation to solving grant problems for their city, as is shown in Table 3UU.

Table 3UU. Members of the Council Have Coordinated the Resources of Their Respective Agencies in Solving the City's Grant Problems

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
23.5%	45.6%	30.9%	100%
(16)	(31)	(21)	(68)

City officials overwhelmingly disagree that Councils have reduced the number of contacts their city makes with other sources, i.e., Congressmen and Senators, direct to Washington, C.O.G.s, and district Federal offices. Table 3VV denotes that only five officials agreed with this statement.

Table 3VV. Councils Have Reduced the Number of Contacts Your City Makes with Other Grant Sources

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
7.4%	73.5%	19.1%	100%
(5)	(50)	(13)	(68)

Perhaps one of the reasons that city officials have manifested a hesitance to contact Councils is that they view Council members as lacking sufficient authority to make decisions and that these members must frequently clear problems encountered on the Council with their department chiefs in Washington. Table 3WW indicates that thirty-eight officials agree that Council members are lacking in sufficient authority.

Table 3WW. Members of the Council Lack Sufficient Authority To Make Decisions and Must Clear Problems with Washington

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
55.9%	8.9%	35.2%	100%
(38)	(6)	(24)	(68)

Table 3XX illustrates that there appears to be substantial disagreement concerning whether the Councils have been beneficial to one's city. Interestingly the largest response to this item is "disagree," indicated by twenty-five officials.

Table 3XX. Contacts with the Federal Regional Council Have Been Beneficial to My City

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
35.3%	36.8%	27.9%	100%
(24)	(25)	(19)	(68)

City officials obviously disagree that Councils are merely another bureaucratic obstacle one faces when he seeks to obtain a Federal grant. Table 3YY indicates that only sixteen officials agreed with this statement; however, a substantial number of officials designated "don't know."

Table 3YY. Best Description of Federal Regional Councils: Merely Another Bureaucratic Obstacle in the Process of Obtaining a Federal Grant

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
23.5%	41.2%	35.3%	100%
(16)	(28)	(24)	(68)

Table 3ZZ denotes that the jury appears still to be out concerning the question of the continuation of the

Councils as a permanent part of the Federal structure. A surprisingly high thirty-three city officials indicate they do not know. Of interest, certainly, is the quite low number of officials who indicate they disagree that the Council should continue.

Table 3ZZ. I believe Councils Should Continue as a Permanent Part of the Federal Structure

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
38.3%	13.2%	48.5%	100%
(26)	(9)	(33)	(68)

In correlating the independent variables to positive attitudes of local officials with Federal Regional Councils, no correlations were found to be significant at the .05 level or below. Moreover, many of the relationships appeared to illustrate an extreme lack of correlation, e.g. reform score ($P < .99$), at-large/ward selection of city council members ($P < 1.00$). For greater detail in regard to positive attitudes of Councils by local official respondents and correlation with independent variables, see Table 3AAA.

Table 3AAA. Positive Attitudes of Local Official Respondents with Federal Regional Council by Independent Variables

Independent Variable	Chi-square	Level of Significance
Government Structure Variables		
Merit System	0.041	$P < .90$
Reform Score	0.400	$P < .99$
*Form of Government	1.712	$P < .50$
Grant Liaison Officer	0.900	$P < .35$
Partisan/Nonpartisan	0.184	$P < .70$
At Large-Ward Selection of City Council Members	0.000	$P < 1.00$
Method of Selection of Mayor	0.023	$P < .90$
Socioeconomic Variables		
Population	0.689	$P < .45$
Per Capita Income	0.096	$P < .80$
Median Education		
Families with Income Below Poverty Level	0.258	$P < .70$
Region of Federal Regional Council	0.057	$P < .90$
Median Income	0.020	$P < .90$
Unemployment Level	0.330	$P < .60$

*Ten percent or more of the computed expected frequencies for each cell were less than five.

The Yates' Correction Method was employed to compute the Chi-square test of all the above correlations when applicable.

Table 3BBB. Summary of Relationships Between Dependent and Independent Variables--Government Structure Variables

(Chi-squares and significance levels)

	Partisan-nonpartisan government	Grant liaison officer	Percent of city employees on merit system	Mayor-city manager form of government	At-large or ward selection of city Council members	Method utilized in selection of mayor	Reform score
I. Acquaintance with Councils	0.055 P<.99	5.181 P<.025	0.010 P<.995	1.712 P<.50	0.318 P<.70	1.180 P<.30	2.592 P<.30
II. Frequency of contact with Councils vis-a-vis other sources							
A. Councils	5.571 P<.02	1.771 P<.20	0.432 P<.60	4.993 P<.10	0.021 P<.90	0.545 P<.50	1.045 P<.70
B. Other sources	0.199 P<.70	3.284 P<.08	1.550 P<.25	3.183 P<.25	0.079 P<.80	5.766 P<.02	4.283 P<.20
III. Rating of Councils vis-a-vis other sources on effectiveness and frequency of contact							
A. Federal Regional Councils	1.564 P<.25	0.013 P<.95	0.899 P<.35	3.619 P<.20	9.451 P<.005	0.005 P<.95	1.416 P<.50
B. Congressmen and Senators	0.733 P<.40	0.405 P<.60	0.086 P<.80	5.005 P<.10	3.752 P<.06	0.232 P<.70	0.818 P<.70
C. Direct to Washington	0.013 P<.95	5.429 P<.02	0.022 P<.90	2.985 P<.25	2.621 P<.12	0.038 P<.90	5.710 P<.10
D. Council of Government	4.046 P<.05	0.901 P<.35	0.544 P<.50	3.922 P<.20	5.052 P<.025	0.038 P<.90	6.466 P<.05
E. District Federal Office	0.048 P<.90	0.341 P<.60	0.011 P<.95	0.981 P<.70	0.000 P<1.00	0.017 P<.90	2.912 P<.25
IV. Positive attitudes toward Councils held by city officials	0.184 P<.70	0.900 P<.35	0.041 P<.90	3.102 P<.25	0.0 P<1.00	0.023 P<.90	0.400 P<.99

Table 3CCC. Summary of Relationships Between Dependent and Independent Variables--Socio-economic Variables (Chi-squares and significance levels)

	Population	Median income	Per capita income	Median education level	Families earning less than $3,000 yearly	Unemployment	Federal Region of Council
I. Acquaintance with Councils	2.171 P<.20	3.553 P<.06	2.856 P<.10	2.740 P<.10	1.498 P<.25	0.112 P<.75	0.600 P<.45
II. Frequency of contact with Councils vis-a-vis other sources							
A. Councils	2.409 P<.14	4.697 P<.04	0.790 P<.40	4.305 P<.04	4.892 P<.04	0.059 P<.90	1.450 P<.25
B. Other sources	8.298 P<.005	1.921 P<.18	0.418 P<.60	0.270 P<.70	4.964 P<.04	0.695 P<.45	2.706 P<.10
III. Rating of Councils vis-a-vis other sources on effectiveness and frequency of contact							
A. Federal Regional Councils	0.857 P<.35	0.357 P<.60	0.362 P<.60	0.189 P<.70	1.013 P<.35	0.166 P<.70	0.833 P<.40
B. Congressmen and Senators	0.055 P<.90	0.721 P<.40	0.012 P<.95	0.018 P<.90	0.765 P<.40	1.952 P<.18	0.052 P<.90
C. Direct to Washington	4.095 P<.05	0.0 P<1.00	0.562 P<.45	0.044 P<.90	0.008 P<.95	0.445 P<.60	0.048 P<.90
D. Council of Government	4.095 P<.05	0.0 P<1.00	0.007 P<.95	0.071 P<.80	3.075 P<.08	0.002 P<1.00	0.048 P<.90
E. District Federal Office	0.051 P<.90	0.0 P<1.00	0.039 P<.90	0.026 P<.90	0.061 P<.90	0.061 P<.90	0.020 P<.90
IV. Positive attitudes toward Councils held by city officials	0.689 P<.45	0.020 P<.90	0.096 P<.80	0.010 P<.95	0.258 P<.70	0.330 P<.60	0.057 P<.90

CHAPTER IV

ATTITUDES OF FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS

This chapter presents an analysis of the opinions of a sample of Council members in Federal regions IX, VI, and II. These opinions are divided into three principal areas: Council service to cities within their Federal region; lack of decentralization of member Council agencies to the regional level; and the question of the need for increased Council coordination and authority.

Part I. Council Service to Cities

Part I is an analysis of Council members' perception of the nature of service the Council provides to cities in their respective Federal Region.

Apparently most Council members do not perceive their organization as having working contacts with city managers within their Federal region. Table 4A illustrates that only three of the thirteen members participating in the study agree that the Council has working relations with city managers.

Table 4B indicates that even though members do not perceive the Council as having working contacts with city

Table 4A. Most City Managers Have Working Contacts with the Council

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
23.1%	46.2%	30.7%	100%
(3)	(6)	(4)	(13)

managers, the members are, nevertheless, of the opinion that the Council does make an effort to keep city managers within their region familiar with Council programs that relate to urban needs. Ten members agree that such an effort is made. The response to this item was found to be statistically significant at the .025 level (Table 4C).

Table 4B. The Council Makes an Effort To Keep City Managers Familiar with Council Programs

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
77.0%	15.4%	7.6%	100%
(10)	(2)	(1)	(13)

Table 4C. The Council Makes an Effort To Keep City Managers Familiar with Council Programs: Level of Statistical Significance

	Observed	Expected
Agree	10	6
Disagree	2	6
Total	12	12

Chi-square = 5.333 $P < .025$

Table 4D shows that there appears to be some disagreement concerning whether Councils have sponsored meetings for city officials. Eight members, of thirteen, stated that such meetings were held. This factual discrepancy could perhaps be explained in part by the fact that members from three different Councils participated in the study.

Table 4D. The Council Has Sponsored Meetings for City Officials within This Region

Agree	Disagree	Total
61.5%	38.5%	100%
(8)	(5)	(13)

There appears to be quite strong agreement that the Council system allows Federal officials in the region a closer working arrangement with city officials than these local officials had with Washington bureaucrats prior to the formulation of the Council. Table 4E points out that eight members agree that a closer working arrangement has been achieved by the Council system. The response to this item is significant at the .005 level (Table 4F).

Table 4G indicates that Council members overwhelmingly agree that they have a greater sensitivity to the needs of local governments in their region than do Washington bureaucrats. The response to this item is significant at the .005 level (Table 4H).

Table 4E. The Council System Allows Federal Officials a Closer Working Arrangement with City Officials than Existed Previously

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
61.6%	0	38.4%	100%
(8)	(0)	(5)	(13)

Table 4F. The Council System Allows Federal Officials a Closer Working Arrangement with City Officials than Existed Previously: Level of Statistical Significance

	Observed	Expected
Agree	8	4
Disagree	0	4
Total	8	8

Chi-square = 8.0 $P < .005$

Table 4G. Council Members Have a Greater Sensitivity to the Needs of Local Governments than Do Washington Bureaucrats

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
76.9%	0	23.1%	100%
(10)	(0)	(3)	(13)

Council members do not perceive the Council as becoming institutionalized and accepted by local officials as the place where decisions on program approval and implementation are made. Table 4I shows that only three

Table 4H. Council Members Have a Greater Sensitivity to the Needs of Local Governments than Do Washington Bureaucrats: Level of Statistical Significance

	Observed	Expected
Agree	10	5
Disagree	0	5
Total	10	10

Chi-square = 10.0 $P < .005$

members agree that Councils are becoming more accepted as such a mechanism.

Table 4I. The Council Is Becoming Accepted by Local Officials as the Place Where Substantive Decisions Are Made

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
23.1%	46.2%	30.7%	100%
(3)	(6)	(4)	(13)

Table 4J illustrates that a majority of Council members consider that Councils are of little assistance to cities in the grant process except when a grant in question relates to several different agencies on the Council.

There appears to be significant agreement on the point that a city official is better served by contacting the related district Federal office rather than the Council when he has a question concerning a grant that is handled by a specific Federal agency. Table 4K points out that

Table 4J. Councils Are Helpful to Cities Only When a Grant in Question Relates to Several Agencies

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
53.8%	23.1%	23.1%	100%
(7)	(3)	(3)	(13)

the district Federal office would be the best contact in such a case, none disagreed. Two did not know. This response is statistically significant at the .001 level (Table 4L).

Table 4K. When a City Official Has a Question Concerning a Grant Handled by a Specific Agency, He Is Better Served by the District Federal Office Rather Than the Council

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
84.6%	0	15.4%	100%
(11)	(0)	(2)	(13)

Table 4L. When a City Official Has a Question Concerning a Grant Handled by a Specific Agency, He Is Better Served by the District Federal Office Rather Than the Council: Level of Statistical Significance

	Observed	Expected
Agree	11	5.5
Disagree	0	5.5
Total	11	11

Chi-square = 11.0 $P < .001$

There appears to be an agreement by Council members that Councils do expedite the grant process when the grant in question relates to several different agencies on the Council. Table 4M indicates that nine members are of the opinion that Councils do expedite the grant process in such a case. A statistical significance level of .05 is recorded for this response (Table 4N).

Table 4M. Councils Expedite the Grant Process When the Grant Relates to Several Agencies on the Council

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
69.2%	15.4%	15.4%	100%
(9)	(2)	(2)	(13)

Table 4N. Councils Expedite the Grant Process When the Grant Relates to Several Agencies on the Council: Level of Statistical Significance

	Observed	Expected
Agree	9	5.5
Disagree	2	5.5
Total	11	11

Chi-square = 4.455 $P < .05$

Table 4-O appears to indicate that apparently there is significant disagreement and uncertainty on the point whether the Council system has been very successful in achieving its stated purpose of program coordination. Only

four members agree that the Council system has achieved coordination.

Table 4-O. The Council Has Been Very Successful in Achieving Program Coordination

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
30.8%	30.8%	38.4%	100%
(4)	(4)	(5)	(13)

There appears to be disagreement concerning whether the Council is consulted on a regular basis by city officials seeking general information about Federal grants. Table 4P points out that only seven officials agree with this observation.

Table 4P. Perception Concerning Contact: The Council Is Consulted on a Regular Basis by City Officials Seeking General Information about Federal Grants

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
53.9%	38.5%	7.6%	100%
(7)	(5)	(1)	(13)

Table 4Q indicates that there also appears to be substantial disagreement concerning whether the Council is contacted frequently by city officials seeking specialized assistance with grant problems.

In the Southwest Council there is an effort for the Council Secretariar to meet with local officials in a consistent manner. Currently meetings are held with local

Table 4Q. Perception Concerning Contact: The Council Is Consulted Frequently by City Officials Seeking Specialized Assistance with Grant Problems

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
56.2%	30.8%	23.0%	100%
(6)	(4)	(3)	(13)

officials on a quarterly basis. At these meetings an attempt is made to meet with state, county, and municipal officials in each of the Region VI states. At one time the Council decided for the Secretariat to meet regularly as a group in each of the region states in order to allow state and local officials in those states a working knowledge of the Council. However, only one such meeting was held. It was decided that the constraints of the energy crisis made such trips impractical.[130] Region IX sponsors quarterly meetings in the states. Special sessions are held with governors, state agency heads, city and county officials, public interest groups, etc.[131] In Region VI an Activity

[130]Harvey Bradshaw, Special Assistant to the Director of the Federal Regional Council, private interview held at the Federal Regional Council Office in Dallas, Texas, March, 1974.

[131]Gale Held, Special Assistant for the Director of Health, Education and Welfare, private interview held at the Federal Regional Council in San Francisco, Calif., January, 1974.

Table 4R. Council Members' Attitude Toward Council Service to Cities: Levels of Statistical Significance

Attitudes	Chi-square	Level of Significance
City Managers Have Working Contacts with the Council	1.0	$P < .50$
Council Makes Effort To Keep City Informed on Its Activities	5.333	$P < .025$
Council Has Sponsored Meetings	.692	$P < .50$
Council Allows Federal Officials a Closer Working Arrangement with City Officials	8.0	$P < .005$
Council Members Have Greater Sensitivity to Local Needs than Washington Officials	10.0	$P < .005$
Council Is Becoming Accepted as Decision Making Body	1.0	$P < .50$
Council Is Helpful to Cities Only When a Grant in Question Relates to Several Agencies	1.60	$P < .25$
When the City Official Has a Question Relating to a Specific Agency He Is Better Served by the District Federal Office	11.0	$P < .001$
Councils Expedite the Grant Process When the Grant Relates to Several Agencies on the Council	4.455	$P < .05$
Councils Are Helpful in Program Coordination	0.0	$P < .995$
Council Is Consulted Regularly by City Officials Seeking General Information about Grants	.333	$P < .70$
Council Is Consulted Regularly by City Officials Seeking Assistance with Grant Problems	.40	$P < .70$

Plan is sent yearly to state and local officials describing the objectives and activities of the Council.[132]

There is some controversy within the Councils concerning whether Councils should serve larger or smaller governments within their respective region. One member of the Region IX Secretariat reasoned that the larger cities already have access to expertise in grnatsmanship, that is, many have a grant liaison officer on their staff. On the other hand smaller governments need assistance quite badly. Realizing this, the Region IX Council actively attempts to assist Indian Tribes within its jurisdiction.[133]

Part II. The Lack of Decentralization of Member Agencies

This section concerns an analysis of Council members' attitudes toward the problem os decentralization of member agencies and departments on the Council. Several writers, for example Mogulof,[134] Kolberg,[135] Clark[136] and Malek,[137] state that the lack of decentralization of

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[132]Bradshaw, op. cit.

[133]Bill Stone, Staff Assistant to the Regional Representative of the Secretary of Transportation, private interview held at the Federal Regional Council in San Francisco, Calif., January, 1974.

[134]Mogulof, op. cit., p. 238.

[135]Kolberg, op. cit., p. 53.

[136]Clark, op. cit., p. 580.

[137]Malek, op. cit., p. 18.

of member agencies is one of the chief problems faced by the Council.

Table 4S points out that Council members are of the opinion that the lack of decentralization of member agencies and departments on the Council is indeed an inhibiting factor for the Federal Regional Councils. Ten members agree that the lack of decentralization is a significant problem on the Council. This response is statistically significant at the .01 level (Table 4T).

Table 4S. Perception of the Problem of Decentralization of Member Departments and Agencies: Is the Lack of Decentralization a Principal Problem?

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
77%	7.7%	15.3%	100%
(10)	(1)	(2)	(13)

Table 4T. Perception of the Problem of Decentralization of Member Departments and Agencies: Is the Lack of Decentralization a Principal Problem: Level of Statistical Significance

	Observed	Expected
Agree	10	5.5
Disagree	1	5.5
Total	11	11

Chi-square = 7.364 $P < .01$

Table 4U illustrates that the Council members agree almost unanimously that if the same amount of line authority were granted to each of the nine Federal Regional Council members within their respective agencies, the Council would be able to perform its functions more effectively than at present. Twelve members agree that such an arrangement would facilitate the Council's performance. A statistical significance level of .005 is recorded for this response (Table 4V).

Table 4U. If Equal Line Authority Were Granted to Each Member, the Council Would Benefit

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
92.3%	7.7%	0	100%
(12)	(1)	(0)	(13)

Table 4V. If Equal Line Authority Were Granted to Each Member, the Council Would Benefit: Level of Statistical Significance

	Observed	Expected
Agree	12	6.5
Disagree	1	6.5
Total	13	13

Chi-square = 9.307 P .005

Most Council members are of the opinion that those members who have more line authority over their agency

usually play a more effective role on the Council than those members who have less line authority, as is indicated in Table 4W. Nine members agree that members having more line authority play a more effective role in the Council than those members who have less line authority. This response is statistically significant at the .05 level (Table 4X).

Table 4W. Members Who Have More Line Authority Play a More Effective Role on the Council

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
69.2%	15.4%	15.4%	100%
(9)	(2)	(2)	(13)

Table 4X. Members Who Have More Line Authority Play a More Effective Role on the Council: Level of Statistical Significance

	Observed	Expected
Agree	9	5.5
Disagree	2	5.5
Total	11	11

Chi-square = 4.455 P .05

Table 4Y specifies that Council members appear to be in substantial disagreement concerning individual members of the Council finding it necessary to frequently clear up Council problems by passing them to their Washington

headquarters. Six members disagree that this is the case.

Table 4Y. Council Members Must Frequently Pass Problems to Washington for Solving

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
30.8%	46.2%	23.0%	100%
(4)	(6)	(3)	(13)

When the Council member lacks line authority over agencies or programs within his department, the member must "handle the agency diplomatically"[138] or attempt to "get things done through power plays."[139] Some Council members think this arrangement seriously curtails the effectiveness of the Council. One here is reminded of Mogulof's contention that with an absence of authority a natural bargaining situation will be established, i.e., Agency 'A' will accommodate its behavior to Agency 'B' if the former receives something from the latter.[140]

In some cases Council members find it frustrating attempting to coordinate subordinate departmental agencies

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[138] Bob Mace, Special Assistant to the Regional Forester, private interview held at the Federal Regional Council Office in San Francisco, Calif., January, 1974.

[139] Gale Held, Special Assistant for the Director of Health Education and Welfare, private interview held at the Federal Regional Council Office in San Francisco, Calif., January, 1974.

[140] Mogulof, op. cit., p. 236.

and programs when they have little, or no, interest in coordination or compromise. In one particular case a newly appointed Council member in Region IX thought he had, and acted as if he had, line authority over his agency when indeed he had virtually none. He ended up "offending a lot of people and consequently didn't last long on the Council."[141]

On the other hand there is a contention that the lack of line authority of Council members over their own departmental agencies does not hinder their effectiveness in the least but, conversely, enhances the member's position within his own agency.

> If they /Council members/ are effective people then the lack of line authority does not matter. In fact an increase in line authority can block communication, that is, there can't be a free interchange. The emphasis should be on personality not formal authority.[142]

One Council staff member stated that in order for the Council to serve its purpose a stronger organizational devision making system would be absolutely mandatory. She thought the answer to this problem essentially was to grant all Council administrators complete line authority over

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[141] Hardy Pierce, Staff Assistant for Environmental Review, private interview held at the Federal Regional Council Office in San Francisco, Calif., January, 1974.

[142] Arthur Busch, Regional Director of Environmental Protection Agency, Chairman of the Southwest Federal Revional Council; Private interview held at the Federal Regional Council Office in Dallas, Texas, March, 1974.

their own agencies. This "begging" to coordinate must be stopped.[143]

Table 4Z. Council Members' Attitudes Toward Problem of Decentralization: Levels of Statistical Significance

Attitudes	Chi-square	Level of Significance
Is Lack of Member Agencies' Decentralization a Principal Problem	7.364	$P < .01$
If Equal Line Authority Were Granted, the Council Would Benefit	9.307	$P < .005$
Members Who Have More Line Authority Play a More Effective Role	4.455	$P < .05$
Council Members Must Pass Problems to Washington	.4	$P < .70$

Part III. Council Coordination and Authority

This section concerns an analysis of the attitudes of the Council members and staff toward the need for increased coordination and authority within the Council mechanism. The following is a list of various items that elicited opinions from Council members on the subject of Council coordination and authority.

A preponderance of members express agreement that the Council has experienced some disagreement among its

[143] Held, op. cit.

members because of functional agency pressures to avoid compromising agency interests. Six members are in agreement as is specified in Table 4AA.

Table 4AA. The Council Has Experienced Some Disagreement Because of Agency Pressures To Avoid Compromise

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
46.2%	23.1%	30.7%	100%
(6)	(3)	(4)	(13)

Table 4BB denotes that a clear majority of the Council members disagree that issues which have a high potential for controversy are at times avoided by the Federal Regional Council. Seven members disagree that controversial issues are avoided by the Council.

Table 4BB. Issues with High Potential for Controversy Are Avoided by the Council

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
15.4%	53.9%	30.7%	100%
(2)	(7)	(4)	(13)

Table 4CC indicates that a preponderance of Council members are of the opinion that since the Council operates by consensus, this usually prevents Council members from taking effective action, as an organization, on issues which there is considerable conflict among the Council

members. Nine members agree that the operation by consensus inhibits Council action.

Table 4CC. The Operation by Consensus Prevents the Council from Taking Action on Controversial Issues

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
69.3%	30.7%	0	100%
(9)	(4)	(0)	(13)

There is apparently quite strong agreement that in order for the Federal Regional Councils to perform adequately there must be a stronger coordination mechanism within the Council than now exists as is designated in Table 4DD. Ten Council members agree that a stronger coordination mechanism is needed. A statistical significance level of .025 is recorded for this response (Table 4EE).

Table 4DD. A Stronger Coordination Mechanism Is Needed Within the Council

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
77.0%	15.4%	7.6%	100%
(10)	(2)	(1)	(13)

While it appears that Council members are of the opinion that there is a need for a stronger coordination mechanism within the Council, obviously most members do not feel that the Office of Management and Budget is the desirable agency to provide the needed coordination.

Table 4EE. A Stronger Coordination Mechanism Is Needed Within the Council: Level of Statistical Significance

	Observed	Expected
Agree	10	6
Disagree	2	6
Total	12	12

Chi-square = 5.333 $P < .025$

Table 4FF specifies that only two Council members agree that the Office of Management and Budget's role within the Council should be increased so that this agency can act as a coordinating influence with power of enforcement. A statistical significance level of .025 is recorded for this response (Table 4GG).

Table 4FF. The O.M.B.'s Role Should Be Increased So It Can Have Power of Enforcement

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
15.4%	76.9%	7.7%	100%
(2)	(10)	(1)	(13)

Council members express considerable disagreement concerning whether there is a need for a full time Office of Management and Budget representative on the Council. A substantial number, however, denote they do not believe a

Table 4GG. The O.M.B.'s Role Should Be Increased So It Can Have Power of Enforcement: Level of Statistical Significance

	Observed	Expected
Agree	2	6
Disagree	10	6
Total	12	12

Chi-square = 5.333 $P < .025$

full time Office of Management and Budget representative member should be assigned to the Council, as is specified in Table 4HH.

Table 4HH. The Council Would Operate More Effectively if O.M.B. Would Assign a Full Time Permanent Representative Here

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
23.1%	61.5%	15.4%	100%
(3)	(8)	(2)	(13)

Table 4II indicates that most members do not feel that the Council chairman should be given line authority over other Council members. Only two members agree that the chairman should be given line authority. This response is statistically significant at the .05 level (Table 4JJ).

It seems as if there is somewhat of a differing of opinion concerning whether or not a Council Chairman should

Table 4II. The Council Chairman Should Be Given Line Authority over the Other Council Members

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
15.4%	69.2%	15.4%	100%
(2)	(9)	(2)	(13)

Table 4JJ. The Council Chairman Should Be Given Line Authority over the Other Council Members: Level of Statistical Significance

	Observed	Expected
Agree	2	5.5
Disagree	9	5.5
Total	11	11

Chi-square = 4.455 $P < .05$

not have to also serve as his agency regional head because of this dual assignment dividing his time too much between agency and Council duties. Table 4KK indicates, however, that a majority of members disagree with this position.

Table 4KK. The Chairman Should Not Have To Serve a Dual Assignment as Agency Head as This Curtails His Effectiveness on the Council

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
30.8%	53.9%	15.3%	100%
(4)	(7)	(2)	(13)

The Office of Management and Budget's evaluation of the Councils contended that the Under Secretaries Group could be characterized by permissive management. There appears to be substantial disagreement and uncertainty concerning this evaluation, as is denoted in Table 4LL.

Table 4LL. The Under Secretaries Group Can Be Characterized by Permissive Management

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
38.5%	23.0%	38.9%	100%
(5)	(3)	(5)	(13)

The Office of Management and Budget's assessment of Council observed that Councils generally make a concerted effort on projects when the Under Secretaries Group provides management direction and guidance. A majority of the Council members agree with this assessment, as is designated in Table 4MM.

Table 4MM. The Council Operates Best When the Under Secretaries Group Provides Clear Management Direction and Assistance

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
53.8%	15.4%	30.8%	100%
(7)	(2)	(4)	(13)

The Office of Management and Budget's study of the Council system asserted that one impediment to effective Council operation was the lack of formalized standards for planning work and reporting progress. Apparently Council members don't agree with this assessment, although it does seem as if there is a significant amount of uncertainty about this matter, as is reflected in Table 4NN.

Table 4NN. Absence of Formalized Standards for Planning Work and Reporting Curtails Effectiveness of the Council

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
7.6%	46.2%	46.2%	100%
(1)	(6)	(6)	(13)

Table 4-00 indicates that there appears to be a significant differing of opinion concerning having observed fellow Council members experiencing conflict as a result of cross pressures from one's agency vis-à-vis the Council.

Table 4-00. Council Members Have Experienced Conflict as a Result of Functional Expectations of One's Agency Contradicting the Area Coordination Expectations of the Council

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
46.1%	53.9%	0	100%
(6)	(7)	(0)	(13)

A clear majority of the Council members appear to believe that when a member is torn between the expectations of his agency and the Council he decides in favor of the agency vis-à-vis the Federal Regional Council. Table 4PP specifies that eight members agree with this position. A significance level of .02 is recorded for this response (Table 4QQ).

Table 4PP. When a Council Member Is Torn Between Expectations of His Agency and the Council, He Decides in Favor of the Agency

Agree	Disagree	Don't Know	Total
61.6%	7.6%	30.8%	100%
(8)	(1)	(4)	(13)

Table 4QQ. When a Council Member Is Torn Between Expectations of His Agency and the Council, He Decides in Favor of the Agency: Level of Statistical Significance

	Observed	Expected
Agree	8	4.5
Disagree	1	4.5
Total	9	9

Chi-square = 5.444 $P < .02$

The Councils operate from a standpoint of consensus. As a general rule there is not a great deal of disagreement or conflict on the Council. In cases where

one agency has strong feelings about an issue before the Council, the other member agencies "tend to go along silently." There are obvious pay-offs; that is, it is understood when an agency makes a compromise the other agencies are expected to make similar compromises later on.[144]

At times there is a feeling that bitter inter-agency conflict is inevitable; however, it rarely turns out to be as heated as was expected. An example of this in region IX was the potential for conflict between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Transportation in setting standards for mass transit in the Los Angeles basin. The issue of a timetable for completion of a Department of Transportation program was a much debated issue but ultimately did not present an insurmountable problem for the members representing the respective related agencies on the Council.[145]

One staff member of region VI characterized the Council members as lacking candor in many instances, that is, the members don't "speak their minds" but "try to get along" or at least "give the impression of getting along." A concentrated effort is made to "not offend anyone." As

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[144] Stone, op. cit.

[145] Ibid.

a result of this phenomenon, Council members don't challenge each other's position for fear of conflict. On the other hand the Secretariat members are not this way but tend to "bite the bullet" and "tell it like it is." The Secretariat members do not fear conflict as do the members. They see conflict as inevitable if anything is to be accomplished by the Council.[146]

Dean[147] has maintained that the role of the chairman is crucial to the operation of the Council, and that perhaps some modification in the present situation of frequent turnover of the chairman should be made. A Secretariat member stated that by assuming dual roles as chairman as well as agency representative, the Council chairmanship is weakened. For example, if the Council chairman's home agency opposes a Council activity, then the chairman will oppose this activity forthwith and the Council's effort is consequently squelched.[148]

One Council member stated that the Council suffers because of the vicissitudes of the chairmanship. At times of a strong chairman, the Council gets a lot done. When this is not the case "the Council does not accomplish much." Under one past chairman some members stopped going

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[146] Bradshaw, op. cit.

[147] Dean, op. cit., p. 12.

[148] Ibid.

to Council meetings entirely because they knew nothing would be accomplished anyway.[149]

The issue concerning the need for a more meaningful coordination mechanism within the Council brings mixed responses from Council members and staff. A Council chairman stated that if the Chairman is given line authority over the other Council members, then one will have merely another layer of bureaucracy. This was, he stated, "not the intent of the Council arrangement."[150] One member expressed doubts that the Office of Management and Budget would be a feasible agency to provide coordination on the Council. The Office of Management and Budget, she stated, merely duplicated the work already effectively completed by other agencies.[151]

An interesting observation was made by the staff director of Region VI concerning the Councils. He stated that one must not anticipate unrealistic expeditious progress to be made by the Councils. He referred to the racial integration issue as being analogous to the Council situation in that the complexities involved

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[149]Richard Morgan, Regional Administrator, Department of Housing and Urban Development, private interview held at the Federal Regional Council Office in Dallas, Texas, March, 1974.

[150]Bush, op. cit.

[151]Held, op. cit.

in both situations demand that one be relatively patient and appreciate incremental progress when it is realized. This outlook prevents one from throwing up his hands in despair saying nothing is being accomplished, when in actuality some very meaningful changes are being made. "Concessions are being made that can lead to further progress." If one wanted to find the evidence he could contend that as of today Councils have accomplished virtually nothing of significance, and consequently serve no purpose in our Federal system. On the other hand, a structure has been implemented where representatives of different Federal agencies can sit down and talk with each other and begin to see each other's problems and for the first time really understand what the other agencies are all about. "So a stage has been set up for further intergovernmental cooperation, and viewed in this manner the Council arrangement does definitely represent progress in the intergovernmental area."[152]

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[152]Charles Woods, Staff Director for Region VI Federal Regional Council, private interview held at the Federal Regional Council Office in Dallas, Texas, March, 1974.

Table 4RR. Members' Attitudes Concerning Council Coordination and Authority: Levels of Statistical Significance

Attitudes	Chi-square	Level of Significance
Council Has Experienced Disagreement Because of Agency Pressures	1.0	$P < .50$
Controversial Issues Are Avoided	2.778	$P < .10$
Consensus Prevents Council Action on Controversial Issues	1.923	$P < .10$
A Stronger Council Coordination Mechanism Is Needed	5.333	$P < .025$
The O.M.B.'s Council Role Should Be Increased	5.333	$P < .025$
Council Chairman Should Be Given Line Authority	4.555	$P < .05$
Chairman Should Not Have Dual Roles	.818	$P < .50$
Under Secretaries Group Can Be Characterized by Permissive Management	.5	$P < .50$
Councils Operate Best When Under Secretaries Group Provides Clear Management	2.778	$P < .10$
If O.M.B. Would Assign a Full Time Representative Here, the Council Would Benefit	2.273	$P < .10$
Absence of Formalized Standards Curtails Council Effectiveness	3.571	$P < .10$
Members Have Experienced Conflict over Agency vis-a-vis Council Expectations	.077	$P < .98$
When a Member Is Torn Between His Agency and the Council, He Decides in Favor of the Agency	5.444	$P < .02$

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This research has examined various facets of city officials' attitudes toward Federal Regional Councils as well as Council members' attitudes toward Councils.

The research first emphasized city officials' attitudes on these general areas: officials' acquaintance with Councils, the frequency with which city officials contact Federal Regional Councils vis-à-vis other sources of grant information and/or assistance (the other sources selected for purposes of the research were: Congressmen and Senators, direct to Washington communication, C.O.G.s, and district Federal offices); officials' rating of Councils, and each of the other selected grant access sources, on the combined criteria of frequency of contact and effectiveness of contact; and, lastly, the extent city officials hold positive attitudes toward the Federal Regional Council arrangement.

Concerning the extent city officials are acquainted with their respective Federal Regional Councils, this study found substantive alleged acquaintance. A majority of city officials claimed to have had personal contact

with their Council, to have attended at least one meeting sponsored by the Council, and, overwhelmingly, professed to be familiar with the functions and activities of their Council.

In appraising the overall frequency of contact with which Federal Regional Councils are consulted vis-à-vis other sources of grant information and/or assistance, Councils placed last, behind all the four other alternative sources, listed in order of preference by city officials: district federal offices, direct communication with a Washington agency, U.S. Congressmen or Senators, C.O.G.s, and Councils.

In rating Councils vis-à-vis other sources concerning the frequency consulted for seeking information about grants, Councils placed fourth behind these sources (listed in order of preference): direct communication with Washington, Federal district offices, and C.O.G.s. Councils outranked only Congressmen and Senators in this category.

Concerning the frequency with which local officials seek assistance with a grant problem Councils again placed fourth behind these sources (ranked in order of preference): the district federal offices, direct communication to a Washington agency, and Congressmen and Senators. Councils placed above only C.O.G.s in this area.

The following responses were obtained in evaluating how Councils ranked vis-à-vis other sources concerning effectiveness of contact rating in gaining general information about available grants. Councils placed last behind these ranked agencies: direct communication with a Washington agency, Federal district office, C.O.G.s, and Congressmen and Senators.

In appraising how Councils rank as opposed to other sources concerning effectiveness of contact ratings relating to grant problem solving, Councils placed fourth, only above C.O.G.s, and behind (in order of preference) Federal district offices, direct communication to a Washington agency, and Congressmen and Senators.

From the foregoing analysis one sees that the least effective rating the Council received was in the area of officials gaining general information about available grants. In the other ratings the Councils were at least preferable to one of the four other agencies. Councils outranked C.O.G.s both in frequency of contact in seeking assistance with a grant problem and in effectiveness of contact rating in solving a problem, and of course, Councils outranked Congressmen and Senators in the frequency of contact made in seeking general information about grants.

In analyzing the extent city officials hold positive attitudes towards Federal Regional Councils, these

results were obtained: city officials do not believe Councils have expedited the grant process for their city, officials do not think their Council keeps them informed about its activities and programs, they do not believe their Council has reduced the number of steps necessary in obtaining a grant, they do not think their Council has reduced the number of contacts their city makes with other grant sources; city officials disagree that Council members have either coordinated grant information for their city, or coordinated the resources of the respective Council agencies in solving the city's grant problems.

However, city officials do perceive the Councils as more likely to respond with action to local needs and problems than are Washington bureaucrats, and that Council members have a greater sensitivity and awareness to the needs of local government than do Washington bureaucrats.

City officials express uncertainty and substantial disagreement with each other concerning whether Councils have been beneficial to their city. Officials disagree that Councils are merely another bureaucratic layer and, perhaps most importantly, agree that Councils should be maintained as a permanent part of the Federal structure.

This research operated on the basis of two principal sets of hypotheses: hypotheses relating to city officials' attitudes toward the performance of the Federal Regional Council in their respective region, and hypotheses relating

to Council members' attitudes toward the performance of Federal Regional Councils.

Each of the hypotheses making up these two sets listed in Chapter II are examined in order to ascertain if the hypothesis in question is confirmed, or conversely, if its null hypothesis is accepted.

The relationship between urban government reform institutions and the extent of acquaintance cities have with Federal Regional Councils was explored. The null hypothesis was accepted for the following reform institutions as they relate to extent of acquaintance with Federal Regional Councils: nonpartisan government; percent of city employees on a merit system; city manager form of government, at-large selection of Council members, method used in selection of mayor, and city reform score. The hypothesis was confirmed for the possession of a grant liaison officer and the extent of acquaintance with Councils.

The relationship between urban reform institutions and the overall frequency of contact local officials have with Federal Regional Councils was explored. The null hypotheses were accepted for all the reform variables associated with frequency of Council contact. Indeed, it is of interest to note that partisan vis-à-vis nonpartisan government correlated positively with frequency of Federal Regional Council contact by local officials.

The relationship between local government reform institutions and the frequency with which other selected sources of grant information and/or assistance are consulted by city officials was explored. The null hypothesis was accepted for each of the dependent variables. An elected mayor vis-à-vis a mayor appointed by the city council associated significantly with high frequency of contact with other sources.

The relationship between urban reform institutions and the combined effectiveness and frequency rating of Councils vis-à-vis other grant sources was analyzed. The hypothesis was confirmed for the relationship between at-large selection of the city council and high effectiveness rating of Councils. The null hypothesis was accepted for the following variables and their relationship to Council effectiveness ratings: nonpartisan government, grant liaison officer, percent of city employees on a merit system, city manager form of government, at-large selection of Council, method used in mayoral selection and reform score.

The null hypotheses were accepted for all local government reform variables as they relate to a combined frequency of contact and effectiveness of contact rating for Congressmen and Senators.

The relationship between local government reform variables and a combined frequency of contact and

effectiveness of contact rating for direct contact with a Washington agency was analyzed. The hypothesis was accepted for the possession of a grant liaison officer associated with this dependent variable. The null hypotheses were accepted for all other reform variables associated with this particular rating.

The relationship between local government reform variables and the combined effectiveness and frequency of contact rating of C.O.G.s was examined. These hypotheses were accepted: at-large selection of city council members and high C.O.G. rating; high city reform score and high C.O.G. rating; and, nonpartisanship local government and high C.O.G. ranking. Other hypothesized relationships concerning local government reform variables associated with the frequency and effectiveness rating for C.O.G.s were rejected.

The null hypotheses were accepted for all local government reform variables as they relate to a combined frequency and effectiveness rating for district federal offices.

The hypothesized relationship between reform institutions and the extent city officials perceive Councils positively was totally rejected for all reform institution variables. The null hypothesis was confirmed in all cases when reform variables were correlated with the extent of positive attitudes.

The association between magnitude of population and the level of acquaintance cities have with Federal Regional Councils was examined. The null hypothesis was accepted for this relationship. The null hypothesis was accepted for each of the other socioeconomic variables in association with level of Council acquaintance: median income, per capita income, median education level, families earning less than $3,000 yearly, unemployment and Federal region.

The association between magnitude of population and the overall frequency of contact city officials have with Councils was examined. The null hypothesis was confirmed in this relationship and the hypothesis rejected. The null hypothesis was accepted for the relationship between frequency of contact and the following city socioeconomic variables: per capita income, extent of unemployment, and Federal region. The hypothesis was confirmed in the relationship between frequency of Council contact and the following socioeconomic data: high median income and low Council contact, low poverty level and low contact, and high educational level and low contact.

The relationship between magnitude of population and the overall frequency of contact city officials have with other sources of grant information and/or assistance was examined. The hypothesis was accepted for this relationship, i.e., high population positively associates

positively with high frequency of contact with other sources of grant information and assistance. The hypothesis was also confirmed concerning high poverty and high frequency of contact with other grant sources. The null hypotheses were accepted for the other city socioeconomic variables as they correlate with this dependent variable.

The association between magnitude of population and the combined frequency and effectiveness rating of Federal Regional Councils was explored. The null hypothesis was accepted for this relationship. The null hypothesis was also accepted for all socioeconomic variables associated with this dependent variable.

The association between magnitude of population and the combined frequency and effectiveness rating of Congressmen and Senators was analyzed. The null hypothesis was accepted for this relationship. The null hypotheses were accepted for all socioeconomic variables as they associate with the rating of Congressmen and Senators.

The correlation between magnitude of population and the combined frequency and effectiveness rating of direct to Washington contact was examined. The hypothesis was accepted for this relationship, i.e., high city population positively associates with high direct to Washington contact. The null hypotheses were accepted for the other socioeconomic variables as they correlate with the frequency and effectiveness rating of Washington contact.

The relationship between magnitude of population and the combined frequency and effectiveness rating of C.O.G.s was explored. The null hypothesis was accepted for this relationship. In fact high population associates positively with a low C.O.G. rating. The null hypotheses were accepted also for the other socioeconomic variables as they associate with this dependent variable.

The association between magnitude of population and the combined frequency and effectiveness rating of district Federal offices was analyzed. The null hypothesis was accepted for this relationship. The null hypotheses were also accepted for all socioeconomic variables as they associate with the rating of district federal offices.

The relationship between magnitude of population and the extent of positive attitudes city officials hold toward Councils was examined. The null hypothesis was confirmed in this case and the hypothesis was rejected. The null hypothesis was accepted for each of the socio-economic variables in this relationship.

The hypothesis that Federal Regional Council members believe they have a greater sensitivity to the needs of local officials than do Washington bureaucrats was accepted. This response was found to be statistically significant.

The hypothesis concerning members of the Council are of the opinion that the Council is contacted on a

regular basis by city officials seeking information and/or assistance was rejected. The response was found to not be statistically significant.

The hypothesis that Council members perceived that one of the organization's primary problems is a lack of sufficient decentralization of Council departments and agencies was accepted. The response to this item was statistically significant.

The hypothesis that Council members think a stronger coordination mechanism would facilitate the Council's effectiveness was accepted. The response to this item was found to be statistically significant also.

Other responses which were found to be statistically significant were: The Council makes an effort to keep city managers familiar with Council programs; the Council system allows Federal officials a closer working arrangement with city officials than the previous arrangement; a city official is better served by contacting his district Federal office when his grant question concerns a specific agency; Councils expedite the grant process when a grant in question relates to several agencies on the Council; if equal line authority were granted to each Council member, the Council would benefit; members who have more line authority also play a more effective role on the Council; the Office of Management and Budget's role should not be increased so it has power of enforcement; the Council

Chairman should not be given line authority over other Council members; and, when a Council member is torn between the expectations of his agency and the Council, he decides in favor of the agency.

It appears that Council members agree strongly with such writers as Clark, Mogulof, and Kolberg, that the lack of decentralization of Council departments is an impediment to effective Council operation. There appears to be substantial agreement, both from the standpoint of Council members and staff, with the Mogulof assertion that the decision making system of Federal Regional Councils is limited to the extent that Council members are ineffective in the area of inducing coordination. Council members, however, disagree with the Mogulof contention that the Office of Management and Budget should play a more aggressive role on the Council.

Council members agreed with the Office of Management and Budget's assessment of Councils on the point that the Councils were being impeded from being effective because of member agencies' lack of, or variation in, decentralized decision making authority. They disagreed with the Office of Management and Budget recommendation concerning increasing the authority of the Council chairman.

Because of the nature of the research the implications that can readily be drawn from this study are, of

course, limited. This research found, as did the Office of Management and Budget study, that officials of larger units of local government generally knew about, or claimed they knew about, the Federal Regional Council system and its programs. This alleged familiarity with Councils, however, must be taken with some reservations, e.g., two city officials in Federal Region IX who contended they were familiar with the Council system stated that their Council was located in Los Angeles.

Certainly the Council system has not revolutionized Federal grant administration as it relates to urban areas. In terms of effectiveness and frequency of contact, traditional grant access sources continue to outrank Councils. In some cases, e.g., district Federal office contact and direct communication to Washington, these traditional sources by far outrank Councils. However, there is some tendency for city officials to turn to Councils when they are seeking information and/or assistance with grants. The fact that Councils placed above Congressmen and Senators concerning the frequency consulted for information about grants, and above Council of Governments concerning the frequency with which local officials seek assistance with a grant problem should not be taken lightly. This certainly signifies a modicum of acceptance of the Council's role as a grant administration device. One could surmise that as the Council system becomes more institutionalized in

the Federal structure that city officials will increasingly utilize the services provided by the Council.

The fact that city officials perceive the Councils as being more likely to respond with action to local needs than are Washington bureaucrats, and that Council members have more sensitivity to the needs of cities, is perhaps a portent that Councils are being accepted as a mechanism for providing a comprehensive range of Federal grant assistance. Emphasizing this vein of thought is the finding that city officials disagree with the conceptualization of Councils as being merely another bureaucratic layer, but agree, on the other hand, that Councils should indeed be maintained as a permanent part of the Federal structure.

In attempting to discern meaningful implications from the government structure and socioeconomic analysis of the attitudes of Council service recipients, the finding that the presence of a city grant liaison officer significantly increases the probability that a given city will be familiar with the Council system certainly comes as no great surprise. It is assumed that a professional grant liaison officer would be quite familiar with Federal innovations such as the Council system, and this officer would transmit such information to his peers within the city government.

The positive association between partisan city government and high frequency of contact to Councils can

perhaps be explained by observing that partisan city council members would probably have more of a tendency to see the political ramifications of Federal Regional Councils, e.g., Republican mayors or Republican council members may readily identify with the New Federalism goals and objectives of which Councils, of course, are an integral part. Consequently there may be a tendency for these partisan cities to more frequently utilize the services of the Council than nonpartisan cities.

The positive association between at-large selection of the city council and high effectiveness ratings of Councils can be interpreted by observing the propensity of the at-large institution to elect officials who are of the blue ribbon and Chamber of Commerce genre who would more favorably perceive the reform and innovative aspects of Councils than would elected city officials.

Of some surprise is the fact that magnitude of population did not have a significant impact on the extent of familiarity city officials have with Councils, or with the frequency city officials consult Councils. Of course the demarcation point of this study was a magnitude of population of 50,000; consequently, one is dealing only with larger units of government. High population magnitude does correlate with the overall frequency of contact city officials have with other sources of grant information and/or assistance, e.g., in the case of direct contact to

Washington. The finding that high population magnitude associates positively with a low Council of Government frequency of contact and effectiveness rating can be explained, in part, by the observation that smaller units of government usually support the Council of Government's efforts of area wide metropolitan planning more extensively than do the larger units, primarily because the larger unit perceives it has more to lose in compromises that are encouraged by the Council of Government Association.

The finding that high median income, low city poverty level, and high educational level all correlate positively with low Council contact can perhaps be explained in part by looking at the agencies which are on the Council. Since they are basically "human resource" agencies, it is assumed that cities with a lower socioeconomic index will best utilize the services of the Councils significantly more than cities with a higher socioeconomic index, i.e., cities with a low socioeconomic level will contact the Councils more frequently for information and/or assistance with grants that relate to social problems.

It is of interest that Council members' perception of themselves as being more sensitive to the needs of local officials than are Washington bureaucrats is a view shared by city officials. Another area in which Council members' self perception is compatible with city officials' attitudes is that Councils make an effort to keep city managers

familiar with Council programs. Some Council members do seem to have a somewhat exaggerated opinion of the frequency with which Councils are consulted by city officials. A small majority of Council members stated that Councils were consulted by city officials on a regular basis. To the contrary, contact with Councils by city officials on a regular basis appears to be the exception rather than the rule. Council members do not believe that Councils have been successful in achieving program coordination, a view that is apparently shared by the city officials.

In the final analysis one could observe that while Councils have obviously not revolutionized the Federal grant administration system to cities, they nevertheless have had some impact. It appears, however, that city officials need to be much better informed about Federal Regional Councils and what services they can provide them. City officials, it seems, must utilize the services of the Councils more frequently than the present or Councils may become another tea and crumpet organization, providing a forum for much inter-departmental discussion but accomplishing little else.

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QUESTIONNAIRE TO CITIES

1. What is the population of your city?_____

2. What is the percent of city employees under the merit system in this city?_____

3. The form of government of this city can be described as
   _____ 1. City manager
   2. Mayor
   3. Commission

4. What characteristics of the following best describe your city's form? (Check the appropriate spaces.)

   A. Nonpartisan election system_____ Partisan election system_____

   B. At large selection of council_____ Ward selection of council_____

   C. Mayoral selection by council_____ Mayoral selection by the electorate_____

5. Does your city presently have an office (either in the city or Washington) devoted to carrying on liaison activities with the federal government concerning federal grants? Yes___ No___

6. The Federal Regional Council that services this city is locate in _____.

Questions one through nine relate to the role and participatio of your city.

1. On the average what is your frequency of contact (via telephon letter, personal communication, etc.) with Federal Regional Council Officials?
   _____ 1. More often than once a month
   2. Four to twelve times a year
   3. Two or three times a year
   4. Once a year or less often
   5. Never

2. On the average what is the frequency of contact made directly a Washington federal department or agency?
   _____ 1. More often than once a month
   2. Four to twelve times a year
   3. Two or three times a year
   4. Once a year or less often
   5. Never

3. On the average what is the frequency of contact made with your Congressmen or Senators in seeking information about or assistance with federal grants?
   _____ 1. More often than once a month
   2. Four to twelve times a year
   3. Two or three times a year
   4. Once a year or less often
   5. Never

4. On the average what is the frequency of contact made to a Council of Government (C.O.G.) in seeking information about or assistance with federal grants?
   _____ 1. More often than once a month
   2. Four to twelve times a year
   3. Two or three times a year
   4. Once a year or less often
   5. Never

5. On the average what is the frequency of contact made to your district federal offices or other federal sub-regional offices /if they exist for specific functional areas/?
   _____ 1. More often than once a month
   2. Four to twelve times a year
   3. Two or three times a year
   4. Once a year or less often
   5. Never

6. In relation to effectiveness of contact how would you rank the following access routes for gaining general information about available grants on a one (1) to five (5) ranking? /(1) being the most effective/
   _____ Congressmen and Senators
   _____ Direct contact to Washington
   _____ Federal Regional Council
   _____ Council of Government (C.O.G.)
   _____ District federal offices or other federal sub-regional offices (if they exist for specific functional areas)

7. In relation to effectiveness of contact how would you rank the following access routes for solving a problem during a grant negotiation on a one (1) to five (5) ranking? /(1) being the most effective/
   _____ Congressmen and Senators
   _____ Direct contact to Washington
   _____ Federal Regional Council
   _____ Council of Government (C.O.G.)
   _____ District federal offices or other federal sub-regional offices (if they exist for specific functional areas)

8, Rank each of the following access routes on a one (1) to five (5) ranking to correspond with frequency of contact you make in relation to seeking general information about available grants. /(1) being the most effective/

_____ Congressmen and Senators
_____ Direct contact to Washington
_____ Federal Regional Council
_____ Council of Government (C.O.G.)
_____ District federal offices or other federal sub-regional offices (if they exist for specific functional areas)

9. Rank each of the following access routes on a one (1) to five (5) ranking to correspond with frequency of contact you make in relation to seeking assistance with a grant problem. /(1) being the most effective/

_____ Congressmen and Senators
_____ Direct contact to Washington
_____ Federal Regional Council
_____ Council of Government (C.O.G.)
_____ District federal offices or other federal sub-regional offices (if they exist for specific functional areas)

Questions one through three seek to gain information on your role as an official in city government.

1. I have personally met with some of the Federal Regional Council members.

_____ 1. Yes
2. No

2. I have attended meetings sponsored by a Federal Regional Counci

_____ 1. Yes
2. No

3. I am familiar with the functions and activities of the Federal Regional Council.

_____ 1. Yes
2. No

Questions one through fourteen seek to elicit your opinion or judgment on various items concerning the Federal Regional Cou that services your city.

1. Federal Regional Councils have expedited the grant process fo this city.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

2. Federal Regional Councils devote too much of their time and efforts to large cities (over 250,000 population) at the expense of smaller cities.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

3. Federal Regional Councils devote too much of their time and effort to smaller cities (under 250,000 population) at the expense of larger cities.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

4. Agency members of the Federal Regional Council lack sufficient authority to make decisions and consequently must frequently clear problems encountered on the Council with their department chiefs in Washington.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

5. The best way to characterize Federal Regional Councils is that they are merely another bureaucratic obstacle one faces when he seeks to obtain a federal grant.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

6. I believe that Federal Regional Councils should continue as a permanent part of the federal structure.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

7. The Federal Regional Council in this region attempts to keep this city informed about the Council's activities and programs that have a bearing on urban needs.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

8. Federal Regional Councils have reduced the number of steps necessary in obtaining a grant.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

9. Federal Regional Council members have a greater sensitivity and awareness of the needs of local governments than do Washington bureaucrats.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

10. Federal Regional Council members are more likely to respond with action to local needs and problems than are bureaucrats in Washington.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

11. The Federal Regional Council members have coordinated information from their respective agencies concerning federal grants for this city when this city has made an inquiry for such information.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

12. The members of the Federal Regional Council have coordinated the resources of their respective agencies in relation to solving grant problems for this city.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

13. Federal Regional Councils have reduced the number of contacts your city makes with other sources, e.g., Congressmen and senators, direct to Washington, C.O.G.s, and district federal offices.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

14. Contacts with the Federal Regional Council have been beneficial to my city.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

15. I am an official of the city of _____.

QUESTIONNAIRE TO FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS

1. One of the principal problems of the Federal Regional Council is lack of sufficient decentralization of member departments and agencies.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

2. If the same amount of line authority were granted to each of the Federal Regional Council members within their respective agencies, the Council would be able to perform its functions more effectively than at the present.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

3. Those Federal Regional Council members who have more line authority usually play a more effective role on the Council than those members who have less line authority.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

4. Since the Federal Regional Council arrangement operates by consensus this usually prevents Council members from taking effective action--as an organization--on issues in which there is considerable conflict among the Council members.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

5. The Federal Regional Council arrangement should continue as a permanent part of the federal structure.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

6. Issues that have a high potential for controversy are at times avoided by the Federal Regional Council.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

7. Most city managers of cities over 50,000 population within your region have working contacts with the Federal Regional Council.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

8. Federal Regional Councils are usually short on supergrade staff to provide continuing direction and administration in respect to Council decisions.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

9. This Federal Regional Council makes an effort to keep city managers within the region familiar with Council programs that relate to urban needs.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

10. This Federal Regional Council is consulted on a regular basis by city officials seeking general information about federal grants.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

11. This Federal Regional Council is consulted frequently by city officials seeking specialized assistance with grant-in-aid problems.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

12. The Federal Regional Council allows federal officials in the region a closer working arrangement with city officials than these local officials had with Washington bureaucrats prior to formulation of the Council arrangement.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

13. Federal Regional Councils expedite the grant process when the grant relates to several different agencies on the Council.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

14. Individual members of the Federal Regional Council find it necessary to frequently clear up problems by passing them to the Washington level.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

15. Federal Regional Council members have a greater sensitivity to the needs of local governments in their region than do Washington bureaucrats.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

16. The Federal Regional Council is becoming more institutionalized and accepted by local officials as the place where the decisions on program approval and implementation are made.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

17. The Federal Regional Council has been very successful in achieving its stated purpose of program coordination.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

18. The Federal Regional Council experienced some disagreement among its members because of functional agency pressures to avoid compromising agency interest.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

19. On the average Federal Regional Councils are of little assistance to cities in the grant process except when a grant in question relates to several different agencies on the Council.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

20. If a city official has a question concerning a grant that is handled by a specific federal agency he is usually better served by contacting the related district federal office rather than the Federal Regional Council.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

21. In order for Federal Regional Councils to perform adequately there must be a stronger coordination mechanism within the Council than now exists.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

22. The Office of Management and Budget's role within the Council should be increased so that this agency can act as a coordinating influence with power of enforcement.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

23. This Federal Regional Council has sponsored meetings for city officials in the region.
_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

24. The Council Chairman should be given line authority over other Council members.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

25. A Council Chairman should not have to also serve as his agency's regional head because this divides his time too much between agency and Council duties.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

26. The Undersecretaries Group can be characterized by permissive management.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

27. This Council operates best when the Undersecretaries Group provides clear management direction and assistance.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

28. This Council would operate more effectively if O.M.B. would assign a full time permanent representative here.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

29. The absence of formalized standards for planning work and reporting progress curtail the effectiveness of this Council.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

30. I have observed Council members experiencing conflict as a result of functional expectations of one's agency contradicting the area coordination expectations of the Council.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

31. In a situation where a Council member is torn between the expectations of his agency and the expectations of the Council he usually decides in favor of his agency.

_____ 1. Agree strongly
2. Agree, but not very strongly
3. Not sure, it depends
4. Disagree, but not very strongly
5. Disagree strongly

32. This Federal Regional Council is located in Federal Region

_____