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LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION: WHAT FACTORS DRIVE WHERE U.S.-BASED NGOS GO?

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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For JTD, who followed me across oceans and the plains. Here's to new adventures.

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Abstract

This dissertation advances our understanding of how U.S.-based transnational nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs) with international scopes of work navigate decision-making related to country-level location choices. It accomplishes this by conducting a comparative cross-sector and multinational examination of 554 organizations across 194 countries between 2008 and 2012. It proposes that location selection is a more complex process than existing theories allow and hypothesizes that organizations are influenced by both internal and external factors beyond resources. By examining the political, economic, and organizational factors that influence location decisions, it systematically tests existing theoretical explanations for nonprofit location while also expanding the scope cases in public administration and nonprofit studies. It finds evidence that 1) country characteristics make a location more or less attractive, particularly the political and operating environments; 2) U.S. government attention to a country differentially impacts the presence of U.S. based TNGOs in that country if they already receive government support; 3) the type of work in which an TNGO engages influences how it sets and communicates location priorities.

Chapter 1 : Introduction

1.1: Research Problem

This dissertation examines the impact of political, economic, and organizational factors on the location of U.S.-based international nonprofits, or transnational nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs), from 2008 to 2012. Over the past three decades, the nonprofit sector has proliferated both in the number of organizations and the number of dollars flowing into it. From 2002 to 2012, the number of nonprofits in the U.S. grew from 1.32 million to 1.44 million, a growth rate of 8.6 percent that accounted for 5.6 percent of the U.S. economy in 2014 (McKeever and Pettijohn 2014). Explanations for such rapid growth of the nonprofit sector has centered on the hollow state and the subsequent devolution of authority (Salamon 1994; Milward and Provan 2000; Moulton and Eckerd 2012). Such a downward movement of authority in some instances is motivated by a greater desire for efficiency or expertise in the provision of public benefit services, resulting in increased opportunities for nonprofits in the form of grants and contracts. In other instances, opportunities for the sector have stemmed from budget cuts or shortfalls as elected officials still seek to fulfill the wants of the majority. At the same time, nonprofit growth is also driven by the needs of minority populations excluded from the mainstream by the majority in democracy, for which nonprofits may receive private or government support. Lastly, economic booms not only create higher levels of private revenue available to nonprofit organizations as grants, but also drive greater activity among individual philanthropists through their own 501(c)(3) foundations.

This upward trend has been consistent over the past three decades and is not confined to only those organizations conducting work domestically. International nonprofits have undergone the same phenomenon. For those operating transnationally, the causes of growth are attributed to weak states, shifts in political and donor agendas, and an atmosphere that favors non-state providers for reasons of credibility and accountability over aid delivered directly through government (Edwards and Hulme 1996a; Fisher 1998; Lindenberg and Dobel 1999). These explanations may be applied to the domestic and international spheres with certain caveats, yet the logistical, operational, and political environments that international nonprofits face make them worthy of study in their own right. Still, the literature on nonprofits channels much of its energy toward domestic case studies while the literature on TNGOs lacks attention to organizational dynamics and operations. This is a missed opportunity on two levels. First, the lack of international cases limits the generalizability of existing research in the field of nonprofit studies. Second, the internal dynamics of an organization should also be considered in examinations of the roles of TNGOs and the environments in which they operate.

In both categories of organization, nonprofits are widely viewed as more efficient, more accountable, and more adaptable and effective than government. Consequently, a great deal of attention has been paid to the scope of their work, what they do, rather than where they do it. This is a second missed opportunity in the study of nonprofits, and in this case international nonprofits specifically. As the number of international nonprofits continues to rise, what explains where they target their efforts geographically? Why and how do they make these decisions? Where nonprofits work is

as important if not as controversial as what they do. This dissertation answers the question of location, investigating how conditions in the U.S. and host countries impact decision-making and location patterns among U.S.-based TNGOs. By doing so, it addresses the theoretical debate about the publicness of TNGOs and the demands placed on them, and practitioner oriented discussions about upholding both financial and mission-related obligations, networks, and competition versus collaboration. Finally, this dissertation contributes to the field of public administration and nonprofit studies by systematically testing existing explanations of location, including need, convenience, and resources.

Understanding TNGO location is important for a number of reasons. Knowing where TNGOs go helps policymakers and donors comprehend the goals and operations of TNGOs, who they target, and what they prioritize. It may also help scholars to account for the competing forces that influence the geographic distribution of such organizations beyond the most common donor-centered explanations. Despite this, the existing literature leaves location largely unexplored and that which does focus on it does so by examining single large organizations or sectors as case studies[1], ultimately endangering generalizability. Few have approached TNGOs from a comparative perspective, which is a missed opportunity because it frames location through a cross-sector multi-country lens. Another missed opportunity is the lack of attention to TNGOs

[1] See Fruterro and Garui (2005), Haque (2002) and Kamruzzaman (2013) on NGO placement in Bangladesh; Raberg and Rudel (2007) on sustainable development entities in Ecuador; and Rogers (2011) on the Nature Conservancy.

in the field of Public Administration and nonprofit studies more broadly, both of which are dominated by domestic cases.

In order to address these gaps in the literature, this dissertation aims to synthesize TNGO scholarship from other fields and to undertake a cross-sector multi-country study of U.S.-based TNGOs that maintain a presence abroad through staff or infrastructure. TNGOs are understood using the legal definition of 501(c)(3) status and identified through the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). Such organizations are an ideal opportunity to investigate location because of the size, impact, and significance of U.S.-based entities in the international sector (Mitchell 2012b), the diversity of activity, and of course the level of documentation available for analysis. In a broad sense, this dissertation attempts to explain why TNGOs make the decisions they do when confronted by need, operational barriers, or instability. Why do some TNGOs choose to implement nutrition programs in South Sudan over Yemen, Myanmar, Guatemala, or another part of the world?[2] In times of crisis, how much uncertainty is too much? How much do politics matter to mission-driven organizations?

[2] Food insecurity in the period from January to March 2015 was rated as "crisis" among poor households in the near term, and as "emergency" in portions of South Sudan in the medium term by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS) (http://www.fews.net/). Established by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), FEWS provides analyzes data across five U.S. federal agencies and 22 field offices to assist government and NGOs respond to humanitarian crises.

1.2: Previous Research

Scholars in a number of fields address nonprofits, TNGOs, and issues related to decision-making. Related scholarship includes public administration debates about publicness and public management, sociological studies of social movements and civil society, business management and organizational structure, international relations' queries about delegated authority and international institutions, economics and law, and the field of nonprofit studies within public administration. While each of these themes investigates elements of TNGO roles, they do so in isolation. This places constraints on the accumulation of knowledge concerning TNGOs. An examination of previous research addressing TNGOs and questions related to decision-making may be organized thematically into broad categories: institutions and the state, development, globalization and transnational TNGOs, and decision-making. Each of themes addressed cuts a broad swath across disciplines, synthesizing scholarship on TNGO decision-making and location.

TNGOs, Institutions, and the State

In a domestic institutional context, nonprofit organizations have been approached as extensions of the state as governments rely on them more than ever to deliver services (Gronbjerg 2003). The field of public administration is replete with case studies examining various sectors and elements of nonprofit-government collaboration in service provision, ranging from health to education (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Van Slyke 2006; Garrow 2010). Scholarship is not restricted to only service provision, however, and also addresses the impact such collaboration can have on a

nonprofit. Guo (2007) questions how funding dynamics can change the representativeness of a nonprofits Board of Directors if government resources are involved, arguing that in such cases resource dependency not only influences *what* projects a nonprofit takes on, but also changes the links an organization has with the community it serves. Embedded within the hollow state's emphasis on maximizing efficiency and capacity is nonprofit knowledge of the cultural landscape of communities served. This expertise makes them particularly advantageous extensions of government because they know the community needs better, having gained entrée into the community, already hold the trust of its citizens, and possess specialized knowledge in their field that may be difficult to build and maintain within a large bureaucracy. In the international context, TNGOs are advantageous to governments as vehicles of aid in situations where direct government-to-government aid is not possible or mired in politics and red tape.

TNGOs, Government Support, and Implementation

A second example raises the question of government influence on the advocacy activities of human services focused nonprofits, specifically the homeless, finding that where government resources are concerned nonprofits focus advocacy efforts to solidify funding relationships rather than on substantive policy change (Mosley 2012). Public management scholars pick up this issue of substantive policy, but focus attention on the gap between the fields of public policy and public administration (Hicklin and Godwin 2009; Heinrich, Lynn, and Milward 2010; Lynn, Heinrich and Hill 2001). Drawing attention to street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) as implementers of purposefully

vague policies constructed by policy actors, these texts highlight government-nonprofit relationships indirectly and the pitfalls faced by nonprofits as implementers when policy actors are decoupled from outcomes.

Consequently, Boards of Directors cease being representatives of their communities as government funding of a nonprofit increases. Government funding changes the activities a nonprofit conducts on behalf of its beneficiaries. This outcome quickly becomes problematic for nonprofit decision-making. This highlights another thread in the literature on domestic nonprofits, especially where revenue diversification is minimal, but the concept is also present in broader political science, economics, and elsewhere. The principal-agent relationship (or problem) is one that is characterized by information asymmetry, uncertainty, and risk in which the agent or implementer engaged by the principal to perform a task holds more information about how that task is performed, its cost, and its outcomes while the principal holds contractual power over the agent. In such an arrangement, the agent is expected to select actions that will produce the principal's desired outcomes (Moe 1984). In the cases described earlier, emphasis is placed on ways in which external actors can shape the behavior of an organization. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) outline how dependence asymmetries shift power dynamics between organizations based access, ownership, use, and possession of a resource. Where organizations are overly reliant on one or a few sources of revenue, donors or government may exercise undue influence over the decision-making of that organization. This dynamic is also represented in TNGO research focused on accountability mechanisms produced by donors and government (Ebrahim 2002; Gibelman and Gelman 2004).

However, there is little guarantee that agents will in fact pursue the interests of principals (Bryce 2005). As a result, more monitoring and other accountability measures are put in place by government or other principals. Elements of a relationship (trust, reputation, accountability) contextualize this dynamic by evolving the relationship from principal-agent to principal-steward Van Slyke (2006). The implication of this is that neither the agency theory on which principal-agent relationships rest nor stewardship theory are entirely correct. The length of the relationship between two parties, the reputation of a nonprofit, and urgency of an issue can shape the constraints placed on the agent/steward. At the same time, stewards are still subject to principal influence. What the steward model fails to take into consideration is the agency present on the part of the TNGO in influencing the relationship dynamic, program decisions, donor perceptions and path, and location.

In an international context, a similar pattern is evident during the post-Cold War period in the literature on delegated authority and the increased attention to TNGOs in international relations. Like the hollow state scholarship, the state's attention was drawn to TNGOs because of greater flexibility, credibility, and efficiency (Hertzke 2004). Scholars describe the shift toward TNGOs as delivery mechanisms as soft power (Rogers 2011; Clark 1995), or "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment" (Nye 2008, 94). Through culture, policy, and values, states are able to co-opt rather than coerce people; examples of this strategy include the Bush administration's HIV/AIDS initiatives and relief efforts following the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia. Both achieved the goal of public diplomacy, shifting opinions of the United States, while also achieving the nonprofit

goal of assisting those in need. Nye notes the ways in which countries differ in public diplomacy, which is also evident in studies of aid delivery and effectiveness. For example, one study of Switzerland focuses on how aid effectiveness differs among state, private, and nonprofit institutions (Nunnenkamp, Weingarth, and Weisser 2009) while others question the capacity of TNGOs to deliver on the lofty goals of public diplomacy (Marcussen 1996). Movement toward TNGOs as vehicles of implementation is evident among international institutions as well, most notably by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as they pursued structural adjustment policies. During this period, the credibility of TNGOs combined with the lack of credibility of government in developing countries resulted in aid channeled through TNGOs rather than state institutions (Herbst 2000; Roberts 2000; Riddell 1992). Transfers of authority from states to TNGOs illustrates the challenges of control in principal-agent relationships, yet the tradeoff continues to be worthwhile and as a result, the state has fueled the growth of the nonprofit sector both domestically and internationally.

What is missing from discussions of TNGOs as tools of public diplomacy, delegated authority, and aid more generally is the influence of the operating and political environment in the host country. TNGOs have reputations for working in the most desperate locations and for the direst causes. Furthermore, TNGOs serve as aid vehicles to deliver assistance on behalf of governments and donors. This enables TNGOs to influence problems and solutions with some freedom. It also permits governments and donors to engage with problems, host governments, and solutions with fewer constraints; hence the term delegated authority. However, certain elements must be in place for them to succeed. The political environment must be open and stable

enough to allow them to register in the first place, move about the country, and conduct their work with a degree of safety. The operating environment must allow them to receive funds to conduct their work and infrastructure to conduct work must also be present. Bratton (1989a; 1990) touches on government-TNGO relations when he links the worlds of public policy and comparative politics in his examination of TNGOs as policy entrepreneurs, but otherwise TNGOs are approached without concern about what influences their decisions or motivates them. Instead, they are viewed simply as agents of the state and international institutions operating in a void. Obviously, nothing could be further from the truth. The domestic environments in which TNGOs operate are as important as the domestic environments in which they were formed, find funding, and are regulated. That is, nonprofits with an international scope are subject to multiple principals. This means that the environment inhabited by organizations working internationally moves beyond the government-TNGO and donor-TNGO relationship. Rather, decision-making is also constrained by host governments, other international TNGOs, and local TNGOs join the field as agents or principals themselves. This creates a nested rather than hierarchical set of relationships. This dynamic changes the way in which TNGOs are perceived by beneficiaries, governments, partners, and donors.

Influences on Location: Operating and Political Environments

Within this framework, the operating and political environments are significant factors shaping TNGO decision-making. Referring to their framework concerning location in OECD countries, Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire (2014) observe that TNGOs carefully consider the countries in which they operate in order to avoid Keck

and Sikkink (1998) boomerang effect. The boomerang effect is a phenomenon in transnational advocacy networks. In it, citizens of a country lacking open channels of political communication and civil society petition assistance from citizens of another country. Those citizens in turn pressure their own government to influence the government of the first country. Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire (2014) posit that decisions of TNGOs, specifically the countries they enter, are predictable based on the political landscape. They believe it is possible to predict whether advocacy organizations are more or less likely to locate in corporatist or pluralist regimes based on openness and the manner in which the regime maintains stability.

The regulations TNGOs face in their quotidian activities may capture openness. This is because institutions and the regulations they impose permit, prohibit, or prescribe behaviors (Ostrom 1990). Therefore, governments may block or facilitate behavior through regulations that influence the registration of TNGOs, the structure of Boards of Directors, their finances, meetings, and even the activities in which they may engage (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The ability to encourage or discourage behavior through the operating environment is, of course, not restricted to governments in countries of implementation. Requirements such as the non-distribution constraint and the registration process for tax-exempt status in the United States illustrate the ways in which governments shape the nonprofit environment. The contexts in which they do so, however, are distinct. Evidence of this can be found in the news as well as in scholarship.

In 2009, Ethiopia adopted restrictive TNGO legislation focused on foreign sources of funding and violating international protocols for freedom of association (ICNL

2015). Dupuy et al. (2015) ask how public regulations shape the behavior of TNGOs and the composition of the sector as a whole. Similarly restrictive measures have also been introduced in Russia, Azerbaijan, Mexico, and Uganda among others. Dupuy et al. note that because many international TNGOs are advocacy organizations, working on issues such as human rights or gender, they upset the political status quo and governments use regulations to gain greater control over them. The assertion by Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire (2014) that advocacy organizations are more likely to be active in pluralist regimes because of channels open to them may be extended beyond the OECD countries upon which they focus. However, the authors assume that varieties of regimes share affinities for certain types of regulations and that these are already in place, beginning at the point of entry for a TNGO.

The Ethiopia case illustrates the significance of the political and operating environments in TNGO decision-making concerning location. Regulatory environments are influential not only at the point of entry. They are also game changing later in the organization's lifecycle, for example, leading to the exit of TNGOs in the Ethiopian case. Host countries introduce regulations that adversely affect U.S.-based and other international TNGOs for political, economic, and other reasons. Development scholars refer to shell organizations set up to benefit from funds delivered through TNGOs, but who do not contribute to development goals, as briefcase TNGOs. Recent regulatory restrictions may be in response to "briefcase NGOs" (Hearn 2007) as well as advocacy organizations promoting the rights or issues that threaten the power of the status quo. In the former, governments with weak institutions may use the operating environment to ensure accountability and minimize duplication, thereby improving outcomes. Such

explanations are to be taken at face value. In Ethiopia, most local human rights organizations disappeared following legislation enactment and the number of TNGOs decreased across sectors (Dupuy et al. 2015). Azerbaijan, Mexico, Israel, Russia, and more recently Uganda are among those who introduced legislation influencing the operating environment of TNGOs. Although foreign funding is often the target of restrictive legislation, it has been shown to increase accountability among TNGOs as well as local civil society. Consequently, recipients of foreign funding are well-regarded in their communities. Such funding conveys a degree of prestige and recipients are also more likely to receive funding in the future, improving their sustainability and ultimate impact (Chahim and Prakash 2014). Although there are many examples of laws pertaining to TNGOs and domestic nonprofits, such as 501(c) registration in the United States, laws such as these represent particularly challenging conditions that change the civil society landscape. For example, in Uganda, several U.S.-based TNGOs interviewed in Chapter 4 directly stated that they would exit if the proposed legislation is enacted in 2016.

Restrictive legislation is a means for semi-democracies to control or eliminate challengers in order to maintain power as civil society is often seen as a source of public opposition (Carothers 2002). 44 percent of states have passed more restrictive TNGO legislation since 1955, 69 of them since the Cold War's end (Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2015). Thus, the impact of phenomenon is evident and generalizable beyond the Ethiopian case. With the exception of a few authors (Bratton 1989b; Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2014; Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2015), little research has been conducted on the legal environment and how it influences TNGOs. Even less research is

focused on NGOs outside of advanced industrialized countries, making this a fruitful area for research. Of course, factors beyond legal regulations and the operating environment also shape TNGO location and decision-making. As mentioned, donor attention cycles, principal demands, capacity, the political, operating, and economic environments, mission, and beyond all fit within the decision-making framework when considering where to go and what to do there. It is the way in which these factors influence the TNGO lifecycle that is the contribution of this dissertation, distinguishing it from time-bounded types of decision-making research (Berlan and Bruno-van Vijfeijken 2013).

The Role of TNGOs in Development and Civil Society

While political science took a largely positive view on the expansion of TNGOs through the 1980s and 1990s (Fisher 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2015), a more skeptical literature emerged in the late 1990s. The concept of development refers to a project of intervention in the developing world (Mitlin, Hickey, and Bebbington 2007, p. 1701). Motives for these interventions are complex, with some claiming altruism and need as drivers and others fueled by historical, religious, or political motives. The emerging skepticism in the interdisciplinary field of development signaled a branch in the study of aid, NGOs, and development more broadly as both scholars and practitioners raised alarms about the effectiveness of aid accountability (Edwards and Hulme 1996a; Marcussen 1996; Smillie 1995; Leonard and Straus 2003; Moyo 2009; Easterly, William 2009; Ebrahim 2002).

The development can be divided into two sub-sections. The first is concerned with development in an institutional context. That is, TNGOs supplementing weak state institutions with low capacity in less developed countries (Bratton 1989a; Hearn 2007; Herbst 2000; Carothers, Thomas 2002) or explanations for economic development or lack thereof (North 1990; Przeworski 2000; Przeworski and Limongi 1993; Boix and Stokes 2003; Englebert 2000).

The first grouping of literature is linked to the field of public administration in its emphasis on implementation and service provision. The hollow state addresses the devolution of authority, a role similar to that of TNGOs in the development literature. Debates about development, civil society, and effectiveness are centered on the question of whether TNGOs are institutions that supplant or supplement the state. Some feel that such organizations are simply extensions of the state. Brass (2012a), for example, reports that citizens in remote areas of Kenya make little differentiation between the Kenyan government and TNGOs. Because many TNGOs work in the area of service provision in many development contexts, welfare frameworks emphasizing advanced industrialized states (Esping-Andersen 1990) become distorted. His thesis that development serves as the causal mechanism for higher levels of welfare provision assumes advanced industrialized status and lacks a threshold for welfare provision. Thus, a lower level of development, combined with TNGOs as service providers, complicates the landscape. Wood and Gough (2006) propose an alternative comparative conceptual framework in which informal relationships are integral parts of well-being and state institutions perpetuate insecurity. Others argue that the presence of TNGOs keeps state institutions weak, thereby supplanting them and doing little to build capacity

(Fisher 1998; Smillie 1995). In addition to the international development literature and the role of TNGOs as service providers, a significant proportion of scholarship in the domestic nonprofit sphere has also been focused on service provision (Mosley 2012; Gazley 2008; Garrow 2010; Van Slyke 2006). Various models of development curry favor or fall out of fashion as donor and geopolitical priorities shift (Igoe and Kelsall 2005). Lieberman's (2009) work on HIV/AIDs responses in four countries illustrates how state capacity and attitudes toward TNGOS, the socio-cultural landscape, and need are capable of shaping different responses and outcomes depending on the environment. The implication is that resources, politics, and the level of need all interact to influence TNGO location and decision-making.

Within the realm of development, much attention is also dedicated to the subject of civil society, which is viewed as the foundation for political and economic development (Putnam 1993). Consequently, the state and civil society may be viewed as mutually dependent beings formed in a fashion similar to the process of development, both evolving together as needs and values change. TNGOs are a more recent addition to civil society, but their place is twofold: TNGOs are a part of civil society and they strengthen (local) civil society organizations through their activities (Mercer 2002). Consequently, TNGOs are both endogenous and exogenous to development (Mitlin, Hickey, and Bebbington 2007). At the same time they are implementers contributing to development processes they must also be understood in terms of their relationship to the state and market, as well as to other TNGOs.

Several scholars have noted TNGO efforts to secure official revenue streams, which sometimes includes of partnerships with larger organizations (Green 2012; Okuku

2002). Both come in response to state weakness. Green refers to transnational policy regimes, such as the World Bank, as drivers of TNGO expansion, location, and development strategies (Green 2012). Development failures are attributed to the wholesale import of such strategies without adaptation to local landscapes, as well as foreign organizations with limited commitment beyond their contract or buy-in from the community (Moyo 2009; Forje 2008). Some claim that the concept of civil society holds little use outside of Western contexts and explains the lack of organization in some societies (Bayart 1986; Khilnani 2001; Obadare 2011; Hann 1996) while others argue that there are a diversity of ways to define civil society, broadening its conceptual applicability (Lewis 2002). In either case, governments and transnational policy regimes reflexively shifted toward TNGOs as vehicles of development following the failure of top-down development approaches in the 1960s and 1970s (Kamruzzaman 2013; Marcussen 1996; Salamon 1994), which ultimately led to the growth of the nonprofit and TNGO sectors. Partnerships, particularly local-TNGO collaborations, are also the product of changing development models. These often come at the behest of donors seeking to build the capacity of local civil society and long-term sustainability, creating a nested principal-agent relationship in which TNGOs are faced with uncertain information from implementing partners and uncertain funding from donors (Watkins, Swidler, and Hannan 2012). Collaboration, and the location of other TNGOs, has been shown to influence location decisions specifically (Brass 2012b; Mitchell 2013; Fruttero and Gauri 2005). Critiques of a TNGO-centric development strategy raise concerns about effectiveness, more specifically accountability to the wants of donors over beneficiaries due to resource dependency (Edwards and Hulme 1996a; AbouAssi 2012).

The rise of transnational regimes since the Cold War also reflects to the geopolitical changes afoot and TNGOs as part of a broader development system while the variation in civil society across states is testimony to the influence the political and legal environments have on TNGO operations.

Historical Contexts for TNGOs: Colonial Legacies

The second grouping examines colonial systems of governance and the influence these have on regimes and state institutions today (Boone 2003; Carbonnier 2013; Bates 1981; Herbst 1990). In addition to the impact of the institutions themselves, scholars are also interested in the outcomes produced by the institutions. Van de Walle (2001) builds on previous institutionalist work noting that many states have experienced an institutional regression. Consequently, he says, this means that in the African case states possessed more capacity at independence than they do today. Moving forward, Olzak (2011) examines the more contemporary phenomenon of globalization. While Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2014 and Dupuy et al. 2015 see globalization as a positive force that pressures regimes to create space for TNGOs (albeit, not always through liberalization), she argues that globalization affects ethnic conflicts differently than other types of armed conflicts. In many post-colonial states, ethnicity becomes an extremely salient political issue due to colonial borders and privileges granted to certain ethnic groups over others by the colonial administration. Many have noted divergent democratic and economic paths between former French and former British colonies (Boone 2003; Hyden 2000; Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001), but ethnicity emerges as a common theme, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Olzak (2007) finds that cultural and

economic globalization increases the number of fatalities in ethnic conflicts, thereby exacerbating ethnic competition. More diverse societies, however, experience fewer fatalities. This is contrary to much of the research on ethnic fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Fearon and Laitin 2003), but may support the work of Varshney (2001). Varshney, also interested in fractionalization, uses civil society in India to examine ethnic conflict. Among his findings, the types of interactions between citizens and especially civil society play a role in conflict. Instances where interethnic networks are characterized by interaction through civic associations fare better in terms of levels of democracy and conflict than those in which interactions are limited to routine interactions such as shopping (Varshney 2001; Lussier and Fish 2012). Like Olzak, others also note the influence globalization has on ethnic identities. In Ethnicity Inc. Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) observe that globalization can create stronger ethnic identities.

In Olzak's description, this may produce more intense ethnic conflict while in Comaroff and Comaroff's it may produce the commodification of a culture, but also inequalities within a population. The ethnic competition that follows is not purely the product of globalization, but part of a path dependency that begins with colonial institutions. Ethnic identities in a development context is illustrated by Habyarimana et al. (2007), who presents an experiment conducted in Uganda in which co-ethnics engage in a greater number of altruistic actions and cooperation with group members than with non-group members, even when at their own expense. History matters, and institutions are shaped by historical trajectories (Putnam 1993). Putnam's case is modern Italy, but the observation that governments receive inputs from society and

institutions produce outputs accordingly is well applied to colonial institutions and the ethnic competition that resulted.

Weak post-colonial institutions combined with ethnic competition for public goods and power produced an opening for TNGOs in less developed countries. Although these authors may not consider their work to be directly applicable to TNGOs, they set the stage for political and economic development follows.

Globalization and TNGOs: Structure and Management

If colonial empires can be thought of as transnational networks, this thread is also present in the third theme or literature on TNGOs, location, and decision-making. Transnational presence during the colonial period was about exporting of values, extraction of resources, and the projection of power and empire. Today, transnational presence is also about values and power, but with drastically different goals.

Scholarship on transnational advocacy networks emerged in the late 1990s to early 2000s, perhaps the most notable contribution coming from Keck and Sikkink (1998) on international activism and human rights. While there is some overlap with literature on development and the institutions, transnational advocacy networks are distinct because they serve as mechanisms for communication and values across TNGOs. Rather than channeling state aid or values, they transform individual, group, or state values (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Transnational advocacy networks encompass a diversity of organizations, including religious lobbies (Hertzke 2004), which coalesce around particular issues and shared values. Although many are focused on human rights

issues, Mitchell (2013) work on collaborative propensities shows that they are engaged in many different sectors.

In terms of decision-making, the most interesting area of research on transnational NGO networks is related to organizational structure and management. Stroup (2012) posits that organizational structures and strategies are deeply embedded in national environments. For example, OXFAM as a British organization resembles British organizations more than other humanitarian groups from around the world while Médicins Sans Frontières[3] more closely resembles other French TNGOs. Strop argues that, as a result, durable transnational campaigns are unlikely due to differences in management, fundraising, government relations, and issue selection among others. Despite this, many TNGOs are increasingly active in the international sphere as "going global" becomes easier with changes in technology.

The way in which these elements shape organizational structure and culture are important to TNGO location selection and the decision-making process. Cultural and historical connections are correlated with location choices; for example, French TNGOs are more likely to be present in former French colonies while attributes such as language, heritage, and religion are also associated with location (Stroup 2012).

While Stroup takes an international relations approach, her observation is not remiss. Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) also note global, cultural, and national in their study of public administration and governance structures. They observe that "Any

[3] Médicins Sans Fontières (MSF) is a French TNGO better known as Doctors Without Borders in the U.S.

governance regime, from the local to the international, is embedded in a wider social, fiscal, political, and cultural context" (p. 17), suggesting that context shapes the structures, practices, and outcomes of regimes and their policies. Such networks are most likely to emerge around issues where domestic channels of communication between citizens and government are minimal; activists believe networks will further their missions; and where international contact via conferences and other mediums strengthens networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998). While TNGOs represent some of the largest and strongest TNGOs in the world (Mitchell 2013), networks may be made up of transnational and national NGOs, local social movements, media, religious organizations, and intergovernmental organizations (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p.9).

Globalization and TNGOs: Advocacy and Framing

Frames serve as an important mechanism for action among nonprofits and TNGOs, but particularly where transnational networks are concerned. Through shared definitions and understandings of issues, TNGOs are able to form connections with each other and to urge individuals and institutions to action. In the fields of policy and public administration, the deeply held beliefs that serve as the foundations are akin to core beliefs, which serve as the causal driver for behavior, while transnational networks are similar to advocacy coalition networks that coalesce around beliefs (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993). Within advocacy coalition networks, conviction toward sets of beliefs varies on three levels, ranging from strongly stable to middling, to those that may change over space and time. While Jenkins-Smith's and Sabatier's work is presented in a domestic context, its policy actors are inclusive of TNGOs. It neatly

lends itself to questions of TNGOs, commitment to mission or other goals, and collaborative propensities. TNGOs may be willing to acquiesce certain points in order to further a goal central to their mission and frames may serve as a heuristic for assessing organizations, issues, and causes (Busby 2007).[4]

In his assessment humanitarian issues, Heinze (2007) finds that the framing of Rwanda was more successful than that of Darfur in terms of government intervention and aid. While outcome of both reflects the path dependency of events in Somalia, it provides a comparative analysis of Busby's (2007) conditions for successful framing: a permissive international environment, focusing events, credible information, low cost, cultural matching, and supportive policy gatekeepers. Both Busby and Heinze work within the international relations tradition, but it is easy to see how their findings apply to TNGOs. The policy environment and framing can both impact the decision-making of NGOs as well as their advocacy efforts. In either scenario a TNGO's decision-making may be influenced because of the resources available, safety, or perceptions about how much need is in an area or how impactful the work is. This suggests that government or public attention may create a domino effect that influences decisions. At the same time, TNGOs are also able to shape ideas, institutions, and practices on a global level (DeMars 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998). For TNGOs themselves, the goals of networks are encapsulated by a global moral compass, allowing them to use frames to make blanket claims about human needs or rights (DeMars 2005).

[4] Also see the policy literature on core and secondary belief systems, especially Hank Jenkins-Smith, for further discussion on which beliefs are more negotiable than others.

The moral compass of TNGOs raises a second issue through the question of relationships between Northern TNGOs and counterparts in the Global South, as well as the broader North-South relationship. Although North-South relations are a theme present in the development literature, it is raised here because of the focus of the dissertation. Rather than being a question of aid effectiveness (Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Edwards and Hulme 1996a) or one of capacity building of local civil society, the question concerns professionalization, collaboration, and what makes a location more or less attractive to a U.S.-based TNGO. Local NGOs operate differently from TNGOs. While U.S.-based TNGOs emphasize evaluation, receipted accounts, and budgeting, many local organizations lack such professionalization (Elliott 1987). Today, community based projects have experienced success after following the participatory policy-making model and incorporating the views and concerns of local people (Brooks, Waylen, and Mulder 2013). However, what Elliott writes remains true about local NGOs nearly 30 years later.

National and Transnational Collaboration

A push for international-local partnerships from donors, particularly on the part of government agencies such as USAID[5], occurred over the last decade. Collaboration

[5] United States Agency for International Development (USAID), created in 1961 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, drew together several development organizations into a single agency. This formative moment shaped U.S. foreign assistance for more than half a century. USAID is charged with administering aid to foreign countries with

with local entities is meant to strengthen local civil society indirectly and ultimately to create sustainable projects which local organizations can oversee and secure funds for independently. However, during field interviews in summer 2015 many U.S.-based TNGOs indicated that they do not partner with local organizations, citing corruption and professionalization as the primary reasons. TNGOs that do partner with local groups utilize an intensive vetting process. In addition, the TNGO community maintains a shared list of groups with whom they have successfully partnered in the past. Nonetheless, during interviews conducted in Uganda for this dissertation in summer 2015, multiple TNGOs indicated that they receive government support for their work, with or without local partners.

Roberts, Jones, and Frohling (2005) and Smillie (1995) take a more optimistic view of North-South relations among local organizations and TNGOs. Typically, local organizations are perceived as the beneficiaries, absorbing USAID best practices via U.S.-based TNGOs for example. TNGOs are also beneficiaries though because local organizations increase their spatial impact (Roberts, Jones, and Frohling 2005, p. 1846). Coupled with the growth of the sector overall, this suggests growth in the local sector. Smillie supports claims of local sector growth in tandem with TNGOs, but notes that the patterns subject to different influences. Although local NGOs may be small or amateurish by comparison to Northern counterparts, they have been present for far longer. However, the introduction of the state and the market both exert strong

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the objective of advancing social and economic development (www.usaid.gov/who-we-are).

influences on their presence, as has the entry of Northern TNGOs (Smillie 1995). More specifically, the managerialism adopted by the nonprofit sector in the 1990s, including strategic planning and double-entry bookkeeping, is transferred through the networks formed by TNGOs and local NGO (Roberts, Jones, and Frohling 2005). If the majority of funding for local NGOs flows through TNGOs (James 1989; Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2015), collaboration with TNGOs becomes an integral piece of their growth, livelihoods, and professionalization of local NGOs.

If collaboration makes a location more attractive to U.S.-based TNGOs, the local landscape may also be an influential factor on decision-making. Mitchell (2013) and (Brass 2012b) both find that networks and collaboration are significant and positive factors in their research. At the same time, dependency on the North is a primary concern in the North-South relations literature and one that agencies such as USAID aim to minimize through collaboration. To be successful, power asymmetry must be carefully managed. Collaborations must be meaningful, and Northern partners must not be perceived as patrons.

Meaningful collaborations are not limited only to North-South partnerships. Brass (2012b) notes that networks may influence where TNGOs go in the Kenyan case, identifying staff as a primary factor. The ability to obtain and retain knowledgeable and experience staff is important to the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S.-based TNGOs. She refers to international staff, however, national staff is as important. The movement of talented national staff from the public sector to the third sector is one of the contributing factors to weak state institutional capacity discussed earlier. National staff provide useful connections as well as knowledge about the political and cultural

landscape that can help U.S.-based TNGOs navigate a country and achieve its goals. In a few cases encountered during field interviews in Uganda, U.S.-based TNGOs preferred to place North Americans in positions related to accountability, such as a Country Director or Financial Controller. Because of work regulations, this is most often attributed to skills and education rather than corruption. More often, U.S.-based TNGOs employed staff who were entirely Ugandan nationals.[6] The interaction between headquarters and a country office made up entirely of national staff or between expatriates and national staff within a country office raises another issue for globalization and TNGOs: cross cultural management.

Cross-cultural management is an obviously important, yet under addressed, area of research for TNGOs operating in the international context. Cross-cultural management is at the heart of program effectiveness, but cultural sensitivity within an TNGO as well as the cultural appropriateness of the programming are also important (Jackson 2009). Of course, this overlaps with Lewis's (2001) managerialism and the wholesale export of practices and solutions from the West. To both meet the demands of donors for accountability and to meet the needs of the organization and its beneficiaries, a cross-cultural convergence approach is recommended. Such an approach should hybridize a TNGO by retaining managerialist elements, but also incorporating local humanistic values focused on staff as individuals (Jackson and Haines 2007; Jackson 2009). Jackson and Haines (2007) offer the cross-cultural approach as an inter-ethnic one, a reminder of Varshney's (2001) findings on inter-ethnic harmony and meaningful interaction. Both perspectives highlight the significance

[6] Field interviews, Kampala, Uganda, Summer 2015

of upward and downward accountability is especially significant for TNGOs due to the competition between organizations for resources and the management of those resources (Schmitz, Raggo, and Bruno-van Vijfeijken 2012), but also the value of individuals to the success of a TNGO's mission. Accordingly, internal as well as external factors may influence location.

Decision-making

Essential to the location choices of TNGOs is the decision-making process. Central to studies of decision-making is Taylor's (1912) rationalist scientific management scholarship. The study of decision-making is a key area in the field of public administration. Simon (1946) maintains a distinction between public and private organizations and challenges those who view decision-makers as rational beings. When decision makers are rational, there are more similarities than differences between public and private organizations (Rainey, Ronquillo, and Avellaneda 2010). Simon's bounded rationality is juxtaposed with Lindblom's "muddling through", or incremental decision-making (Lindblom 1959). This approach to decision-making proposes that bureaucrats make successive and limited comparisons. In this manner, Lindblom's approach is similar to that of Simon, but the actors are able to curtail mistakes by making decisions incrementally.

Alternate approaches to decision-making include participatory, contingent, and garbage can (Child 1975; Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). These are shaped in part by preferences for different methodological approaches. Interpretivists rely on tools such as case studies and content analysis to examine decision-making in legal, judicial, and

bureaucratic dimensions. Rationalists address many of the same bodies, yet take a markedly different perspective using logic and mathematics to examine the decision-making process.

Scholarship within public administration, and more specifically public management, has grown as the public-private distinction persists. Nutt (2005) takes a comparative approach, examining the claim that decision-making approaches should be context-specific and dependent on the demands placed on the institution. The divergent demands lead to different decision-making processes. While the private sector is more likely utilizes analytical or subjective interpretations, the private sector is more inclined to employ user-based assessments and judgment tactics. Still, the nonprofit sector preferred to solicit views of professionals and possessed the greatest latitude in terms of decision-making tactics. This underlines the question of publicness and the grey area that the nonprofit sector occupies. Such flexibility highlights the grey space between public and private occupied by nonprofits. In this space, nonprofits uphold the concept of publicness and public value, both of which underpin the growth of nonprofits. Nonprofit organizations are viewed as more efficient, subject to less red tape, yet still subject to political authority (Bozeman, Reed, and Scott 1992; Bozeman and Bretschneider 1994).

Other approaches focus on how organizational characteristics influence the participation by specialists in the decision process. The subject at hand may also influence participation. Bozeman and Pandey (2004) find that content influences the decision process, including the information quality, the length of time, the red tape involved, and the flow and criteria for making the decision. Their focus is on internal

decision-making, but decisions sometimes involve externalities. Content also matters for the process in these cases. Communication and stakeholder involvement remain key, however. Such content frameworks overlook the variability of professionalization among nonprofits though, which may impact the structure centralization of decision-making as well as the process. As a result, content as well as organization scholars' emphasis on more measurable factors (organization size, budget, personnel) should be combined in analyses of decision-making processes, more specifically operational decision-making and location.

Decision-making is never a simple process. As situations become more complex and dynamic the information available may overwhelm ordered analysis of alternative choices. Bounded rationality and incremental decision-making may emerge where limited changes are made (Rainey, Ronquillo, and Avellaneda 2010), for example a TNGO expanding existing programming within a country versus a new country, or perhaps expansion to a country with similar cultural traits. Decisions may also be based on identified characteristics or goals, including the level of need or project feasibility (resources, staffing, infrastructure, etc.). Markham et al. (1999) find evidence to support this in their case study on women's organizations, the majority of which allocate the bulk of their resources to programs with a high degree of goal congruence and mission compatibility. Mission, consequently, serves as a guide through a nonprofits entire planning process and represents the role of identity in decision-making. In addition, organizations also consider community needs and networks. These elements are equally important to domestic and international organizations. In the case of TNGOs, the level of need and networks are both important aspects of location decisions. A greater

exchange of information between a country office or chapter and headquarters may translate to more support for programming in that country, echoing previous findings (Bozeman and Pandey 2004; Brass 2012b),

Leadership style is also critical to the decision-making process. Decisions cascade throughout the organization (James 2008; Hailey and James 2004), changing the overarching goals and structure of an organization. Decisions related to revenue are more likely to be anticipatory, incorporating budgeting and strategic planning tools. Reactive decision-making takes up the remaining space, influenced by both time and content (Bozeman and Pandey 2004). TNGOs face a distinct set of spatial challenges that highlight the importance of internal communication and communication with donors, host governments, and beneficiaries (Roberts 2000).

Leadership decision-makers include the chief executive, the Board of Directors, and others. Although they are not involved in implementation or day-to-day decision-making, they are important actors in strategic decision-making. Boards make strategic decisions about where to invest resources, ensure that the organization's mission is being upheld, and may be involved in location choices in nonprofits where countries are identified as target goals in strategic plans. Whether programs fit within an organization's purview is subject to interpretations and the knowledge board members possess about an organizations substantive work or cost is variable. However, organizations utilizing mission in management decision-making appear to have increased performance outcomes (Kirk and Nolan 2010) while performance measures also assist in strategic decision-making (LeRoux and Wright 2010).

Decision-making is central to studies of organizational performance. While the structure of an organization shapes the decision-making processes, the scope of work in which an organization is engaged is also influential. The scope of work and organizational structure may be subject to isomorphism, a phenomenon in which similar organizations resemble each other. This may further define the menu of choices available to any single organization. External forces also influence location and decisions. Donor preferences may create windfalls for some sectors, but not for others. They may also unduly influence what an organization does and where it does it via resource dependency. Lastly, the political and operating environments are also integral to location choices, shaping program feasibility and need.

1.3: Perspectives on TNGOs and Soft Spots

One stream of research on TNGOs focuses on the internal and administrative aspects of organizations and the element of public service. This approach relies on domestic case studies and examines questions ranging from accountability to human resources to collaborative propensity and efficiency. The approach emphasizes the interaction between organizations, government, and international institutions. The scholarship related to this dissertation is presented along four themes to represent an interdisciplinary review of the literature: institutions and the state; development; globalization and TNGOs; and finally, decision-making.

There is little research on TNGO or nonprofit location, and even less conducted in a comparative context. Instead, much of the scholarship focuses on the size of a single sector or one large organization (Corbin 1999; James 1989; Rogers 2011). Where

location is addressed, it is done so indirectly. This introduction highlights the perspectives on location, its significance or lack thereof, and its place within the decision-making framework; for example, the role of regulatory environments in deterring TNGOs and the presence of other TNGOs in attracting other TNGOs. It is worth noting, however, several influential pieces that directly address location and that were influential in shaping this research question.

Brass (2012b) provides a framework that helped to shape this project. Her research focuses on three explanations for district-level TNGO location in Kenya, using variables including the level of need, population density, urbanization, and political patronage. In her work, Brass finds support for the level of need and convenience (population density and urbanization), but not for political patronage. This finding is especially interesting for research on location in sub-Saharan Africa given the persistence of client-patron systems in the post-colonial period there. Brass adds a caveat to the convenience finding, noting that while the number of TNGOs in urban areas is higher, the density or number of TNGOs per capita is greater in rural areas (Brass 2012b).

Equally thought-provoking is her observation that beneficiaries in rural areas make no differentiation between TNGO service providers and the Kenyan government (Brass 2012a). This in turn may provide a necessary but not sufficient condition for the convenience argument and also provide further support for the need argument. Galway, Corbett, and Zeng (2012) examine location from a public health perspective, yet also pinpoint the level of need as a driving factor of location in Bolivia while Appe (2013)

uses the case of Ecuador and location to examine interpretations of civil society and the scholarly discourse surrounding definitions of and what constitutes civil society.

Mitchell (2013) does not examine location per se, yet his analysis of collaborative propensities among TNGOs provides further evidence for the convenience argument. While Brass (2012b) conceptualizes convenience in terms of amenities to assist in personnel retention as well as the possibility of gaining good personnel from other TNGOs in the area, Mitchell's research question centers on collaboration. He finds that human rights and faith-based organizations are less likely to work with others while development and humanitarian organizations are more likely to collaborate. Notably, organizations that collaborate are likely to see certain benefits including increased government funding, greater efficiency, and improved recognition and access (Mitchell 2013). Should these findings hold true, it adds more complexity to the convenience argument presented by Brass if TNGOs make location decisions based on collaborative partnerships. At the same time, other research shows that TNGOs are duplicative in location, seeking to cover as much territory as possible despite replicating the work of others (Fruttero and Gauri 2005). Therefore, collaboration and location may possess further qualifications than those already identified by Mitchell.

Collaboration is a discussion of resources and capacity, whether monetary, capital, services, or otherwise. Resources of course are an integral piece in TNGO decision-making. If there is no money to support a program, organizational capacity is absent no matter how great the need. Stater (2010) combines the question of resources with population heterogeneity. Contrary to Brass (2012b), Stater finds that a greater number of nonprofits operate in communities with a higher population density and more

diverse demands. Demographic characteristics influence both the number and type of nonprofits (Lecy and Van Slyke 2012; McDougle 2015). Thus, one can expect service providers in poorer areas and nonprofits more in line with Inglehart's (1997) leisure social values in as economies advance and become more affluent areas. Others take a more direct approach to resources and location. Disaster and government attention may create opportunities for TNGO response (Kerlin 2006, 2013) whereas in other cases location may serve a signal to donors that a TNGO is a good fit (Koch et al. 2009; Reinhardt 2009).

Finally, Acheson and Gardner (2005) explore the question of territoriality, through the frame of the regulatory environment. Agents face multiple principals in their study, as do TNGOs. However, instead of a domestic context, TNGO face host government legislation that shapes the operating environment into a more or less inviting one while also contending with U.S. regulations.

Although the nonprofit and TNGO literature provides insight into location in some ways, it does so most often in an indirect manner. I argue in this dissertation that existing scholarship oversimplifies how and why TNGOs go where they go. At present, explanations omit environmental and organizational factors that TNGOs consider in their calculations. Is it possible, for example, that some TNGOs are more risk averse than others and if so, is there a threshold for risk toleration that helps us understand who helps whom, when, and how we can better reach those in need?[7] Beyond donor

[7] Returning to food insecurity, the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa serves as a good example of issues created by fear and catastrophe that would have otherwise been

demands, what about the demands that host governments also make of organizations and the barriers that they throw up in their political maneuvering? Add these to the economic reality of the charitable sector and the story of why TNGOs go where they go begins to unfold with greater nuance and descriptive power.

1.4: Overview of the dissertation

This dissertation seeks to explain the country-level drivers that explain the presence of TNGOs in a country. To accomplish this, I analyze data for 554 U.S.-based TNGOs with in-country programming over a five year period between 2008 and 2012. Chapter 1 provides an overarching introduction to the dissertation and an introduction to related research on TNGOs. In Chapter 2, I draw on research from Brass (2012b; 2012a), Fruttero and Gauri (2005), Lecy and Van Slyke (2012), the TNGO project at Syracuse University, and Keck and Sikkink (1998) to underscore the progress of scholars in other disciplines and synthesize their findings with their domestic counterparts. Based on discussions surrounding the role of TNGOs in development and the more commonly studied area of service provision, I propose a more complete model of TNGO decision-making pertaining location through the incorporation of political-structural, economic, and operational dimensions that influence such choices. Chapter 3 is motivated by a follow-up question centered on resource dependency: does the U.S.

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addressed. Here, sickness compounded by drought resulted in untended crops and subsequently a food shortage. While attention and resources focused on the sick, the food crisis grew into a second humanitarian crisis.

government influence the location of U.S.-based TNGOs? Empirical observations show that U.S.-based TNGOs tend to be very active in areas of U.S. government strategic initiative. International relations literature notes the phenomenon of delegation of authority while scholarship on transnational networks observe how TNGOs engage in collaborative advocacy efforts to influence government (Stroup 2012; Keck and Sikkink 1998), leading to the question of whether U.S.-based TNGOs follow government or vice versa. Chapter 4 focuses on an important yet underexplored question in the literature on domestic and international cases: how do the internal dynamics of an organization, including its structure and the manner in which it communicates, influence resource allocation and program prioritization? Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation with a summary of my findings, a discussion about the theoretical and practical implications of this work, and directions for future research.

The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to improve the scholarly and practitioner communities understanding of "why NGOs go where they go" (Brass 2012b) and how such efforts are targeted. As an intermediate step, this research serves the purpose of cross-field pollination, drawing from a range of disciplines to build on existing knowledge about TNGOs as well as expand its scope and the way we think about such institutions. As mentioned, location is often overlooked in lieu of institutional relationships and networks, aid effectiveness, and the North-South dynamic. Nonetheless, this dissertation's approach is firmly rooted in the interdisciplinary field of public administration and policy, which aims to improve the public benefit of organizations working on such endeavors in complex environments.

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Chapter 2 : Country-level Characteristics and Operating Environment: What Attributes Attract Transnational TNGOs?

2.1: Introduction

Transnational nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs) represent one of the most dynamic and rapidly expanding nonprofit sectors. The United States is home to 13 percent of international TNGO headquarters (Mitchell 2012b), a sector that grew by 25 percent between 2002 and 2012 (McKeever and Pettijohn 2014). By some estimates, TNGOs make up as much as 9.2 percent of nonprofits in the United States. The sector is a force both in the number of organizations and in the number of dollars flowing to the sector, accruing $290 billion USD in private donations in the United States and an estimated $2.2 trillion USD globally (Salamon 2010). Due to the international nature of TNGO efforts, these figures can be multiplied as organizations transit political boundaries to implement, fundraise, and manage objectives. The same phenomenon also amplifies the significance of TNGOs, multiplying their impact as they engage in service provision, advocacy and policy-making, and technical support with beneficiaries, donors, and government.

Where TNGOs go is as important and as controversial as what they do. Understanding the internal and external drivers that shape TNGO decision-making concerning which countries they work in is important to scholars as well as practitioners. With this knowledge, policymakers and donors may better comprehend the priorities and operations of TNGOs. Doing so enables them to advance their own agendas by matching donor and TNGO expectations, understanding the challenges faced by TNGO programs and operations more broadly, and by better meeting

beneficiary needs. Studying location may also aid scholars seeking to explain TNGO behavior beyond donor-centered explanations. The geographic distribution of TNGOs has primarily been explored using large organizations or single country case studies (Fruttero and Gauri 2005; Rogers 2011; Brass 2012a; Galway, Corbett, and Zeng 2012). Few have approached TNGOs from a comparative perspective and the number of international cases within the public administration and nonprofit literatures is limited.

This is a missed opportunity on two counts. First, the comparative perspective frames location through a cross-sector multi-country lens that increases generalizability. Second, it expands the scope of nonprofit and public administration studies, which are dominated by domestic cases. While there are distinctions between the challenges and operations of domestic and international nonprofits[8], they share many of the same tenets and management challenges. Where overlap may seem less obvious, it may be possible for one to learn from the other. At the same time, organizations engaged in international scopes of work are important in their own right. They epitomize the nonprofit mission to help those in need and serve as a voice for the marginalized while also filling out state capacity in many cases. U.S.-based TNGOs are especially interesting as they

[8] The term TNGO is used in this dissertation; however, nonprofit and TNGO are treated as interchangeable. TNGO refers to organizations with domestic and international scopes of work outside the U.S. while the term nonprofit is typically used to distinguish between domestic and international organizations in the U.S. Otherwise, both are subject to the non-distribution constraint as well as the same requirements to achieve nonprofit legal status.

represent a diversity of organizations and locations, models, and partnerships. It is because of this depth and breadth, as well as the rich data available, that they are ideal to study.

This chapter addresses these gaps by synthesizing nonprofit and TNGO literatures and undertakes a cross-sector multinational investigation of U.S.-based TNGOs that maintain a presence abroad through staff or infrastructure (roads, internet, phones, water, and so on). Presence abroad is categorized at the country level and defined as staff or infrastructure in that country. By examining the country-level factors that influence TNGO location, this paper serves as the foundation to merge organizational attributes with country characteristics to see how and if these factors shape TNGO decision-making about whether or not to operate in a country. Put another way, what attributes attract U.S.-based TNGOs to certain countries? U.S.-based TNGOs provide an ideal opportunity to examine the factors that predict country-level location because of their diversity and impact (Schmitz, Raggo, and Bruno-van Vijfeijken 2012; Mitchell 2012a), and the availability of data on financial and organizational features.

Few have examined why TNGOs go where they go. If location is included, it is discussed in an indirect manner. However, the location of a TNGO is enlightening to scholars, donors, and practitioners. Contrary to the picture of TNGOs as resource-hungry and dependent entities, mission also guides their work. Grant-seeking entities are aware that the goals of donors are also shaped by mission and that to be successful it necessary to fit within that scope. Among TNGOs, country level location tells about how TNGOs reconcile demands and prioritize programs. Examining both internal and external factors that influence the decision-making process allows us to test competing

explanations of TNGO behavior and better understand when and where they go, as well as variation across sectors. Finally, approaching location from a decision-making perspective places location centrally within public management, thereby improving the decision-making and assessment processes around when to exit, enter, or withdrawal from a country.

2.2: TNGOs and Location: Perspectives in the Academic Literature

Previous research proposes that the level of need and limitations on an organization's financial capacity influence location selection among TNGOs (Froelich 1999; Koch et al. 2009; Milward 1994; Lecy and Van Slyke 2012). Proponents of resource dependence arguments claim that financial resources are a motivating factor for certain behaviors and a mechanism of control used by donors to influence not only the type of programming in which a TNGO is engaged, but also how it does it and where it does it (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). More recent findings support location choices at the country and sub-country levels based on collaborative opportunities, amenities, and strategic interests as determining factors of location (Brass 2012b; Stater 2010; Mitchell 2013). Political and demographic characteristics also play a role in some cases (Raschky and Schwindt 2012; Galway, Corbett, and Zeng 2012). Based on the support in the existing literature, this chapter focuses on need, economic, demographic, and political themes.

Of these themes, perhaps the most consistent predictor of location in the domestic and international contexts is the level of need in a community. Koch et al. (2009) show that TNGOs are active in the neediest countries in their analysis of 61

large organizations, a finding that is reinforced by within country cases utilizing institutional coverage and development measures as indicators of need in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (Brass 2012b; Galway, Corbett, and Zeng 2012).[9] On the domestic side, studies of domestic nonprofits often focus on service provision à la the hollow state as well as community need, arriving at similar conclusions. Lecy and Van Slyke (2012) show that the source of funding matters as well as the level of need for nonprofit density while hollow state arguments are centered outsourcing responsibilities to maximize efficiency and effectiveness (Milward and Provan 2000). The hollow state is one explanation for nonprofit growth in the North where the origins of the expanding sector are often described in terms of democracy, government or market failure, or philanthropic culture (Milward 1994; Moulton and Eckerd 2012). By comparison, the presence and growth of TNGOs in the Global South is attributed to an influx of funds from government and private sources. These resources are the product of ramifications of the colonial period impacting contemporary bureaucracies, resulting in weak state institutions that are either unable or unwilling to provide services to citizens in their respective countries (Smillie 1995; Anheier et al. 1999). This also carries connotations of government or market failure, but of a different strain than in the North. In both instances, it is the expertise and flexibility of domestic and international nonprofits that helps to explain sector growth across both sets of organizations.

[9] Fruterro and Gauri (2005) challenge the need argument, providing evidence that TNGOs do not select the neediest communities and instead seek to maximize their coverage area despite service duplication.

In the past, the role of TNGOs in relationship to government included the delivery of services such as education and social services to target populations. Importantly, they also served as instruments of colonial control and a vehicle for the promulgation of colonial values. Some argue that TNGOs continue to face similar trade-offs through government donors and issues of delegated authority today, while others counter that the allocation of resources between government and self-financed TNGOs is not so different (Smith 1989; Nunnenkamp, Weingarth, and Weisser 2009). Instead, TNGOs form transnational networks that work to transform values at the state, individual, and group levels, thereby exercising their own brand of influence (Keck and Sikkink 1998). If TNGOs and states do make similar choices about resource allocation or physical location and this finding is generalizable, it may indicate that each makes similar evaluations of where and to whom to allocate resources. However, location decisions reach dollars and donors. Koch et al. (2009) note that common history or characteristics influence the location choices of TNGOs, finding that TNGOs are more likely to locate in countries with shared colonial history or language, religion, or other characteristics.

A second stream of research addresses networks or collaboration among TNGOs, described as the "convenience" explanation for TNGO location. Here, location at the macro and micro levels is driven by rational choice. Access to a region either through infrastructure or lack of access due to conflict is key to operations and the mission of an organization. Tolerance for degrees of access and instability vary by sector, yet it serves as a basic guideline for when to enter and exit in the decision-making process across TNGOs. Competent individuals in technical and administrative

capacities must also staff programs. At the same time, that staff must be able to communicate with headquarters, other offices, and procure necessary supplies making infrastructure such as roads and cell networks necessary. TNGOs may also select sites based on professional or personal networks (Brass 2012b), although some sectors are more likely to collaborate than others (Mitchell 2013). A country's demographic make-up may be a challenge in the delivery of services and act as a disincentive for TNGO location (Juma and Clark 1995; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Lieberman 2009). While Brass discusses location at the sub-national level, her observations about convenience are extendable to the national level, particularly among TNGOs working in less developed countries. Location based on convenience leads to the expectation that politicians engaged in patron-client systems will be able to channel TNGOs to specific locations (Bratton 1989b; Ekeh, Peter P. 1975), yet others find evidence refuting this (Kasara 2007; Brass 2012b). Donor pressure may explain clustering through monetary and accountability channels as well as the clustering of organizations geographically and concentrations by sector (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Alnoor Ebrahim 2003; Edwards and Hulme 1996c; Hearn 2007; Green 2012). Clustering programmatically and geographically is related to the survivability of an organization as it seeks to achieve as much coverage as possible. For example, Fruterro and Gauri (2005) present evidence that TNGOs show little consideration for the duplication of services in the case of Bangladesh. Responses to these types of donor pressure must be carefully considered on the part of TNGOs and choices are limited (AbouAssi 2012; Froelich 1999).

2.3: Country Characteristics and TNGO Decision-making

Based on the literature, this chapter concentrates on two areas that may influence the attractiveness of a country to TNGOs: the operating and political environments. As controls, it introduces demographic and economic characteristics for each case. These groupings represent supported explanations for nonprofit and TNGO location in the existing literature. For example, the level of need and resource dependency arguments each present perspectives on why nonprofits go where they go as well as reasoning for the varieties of programming in which they engage. On one hand, the emphasis is placed on inequality, service voids, and marginalized populations. Where there is need, one can expect nonprofits to step in on the domestic and international stages. On the other hand, such organizations are rational decision-makers that must allocate human and financial resources, prioritizing one program or location over another. When speaking of country-level location and priorities convenience must also be taken into consideration, meaning that if a location is unreachable due to infrastructure, conflict, or other barriers it never has the opportunity to move from problem to objective. Convenience points to capacity rather than ease; more specifically, can the organization in question reach the target population, secure supplies, and so on necessary to achieve its objectives. Networks might facilitate such goals through collaborative efforts; however, some organizations shun duplication of services and are as likely to avoid over saturated areas. There is some overlap between the operational, political, demographic, and economic/development categories with one variable easily placed in another category. For analytical purposes the categories have been selected along the lines of supported explanations and literature. However,

theoretical boxes are rarely so neatly defined in reality. Consequently, these blurred lines underline the difficulty of TNGO decision and its interdisciplinary character.




Figure 1.1: Map of Country Characteristics

Operating Environment and Country Attractiveness

First, operating environments refer to factors that may influence the day-to-day operations of a TNGO. These may be administrative or programmatic. For example, the level of infrastructure in a country may influence the operating environment. Infrastructure may include roads, access to water, and phone or internet service. More developed infrastructure facilitates the transport of human and material resources to implementation sites, as well as communication between country staff and with the international headquarters of the TNGO. The work of TNGOs is also influenced by

constraints on activities, including the movement of national or expatriate staff within a country or the freedom of speech, which may strongly impact advocacy organizations. Physical features of a country also shape the operating environment. A country's geographic profile, including the number of borders it shares, may be beneficial to the operations of TNGOs in terms of supplies, support, and exit plans in extreme situations. Operating environments can influence the decision of a TNGO to enter, temporarily or permanently withdrawal from a country, or to expand to a new location. The operating context is assessed using a combination of civil rights, including *freedom of movement* (domestic and foreign) from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset. The CIRI dataset incorporates Department of State and Amnesty International reports into its measures, creating a useful tool for analyzing a broad set of countries from year to year. *Freedom of domestic movement* refers to freedom of movement within a country while *freedom of foreign movement* refers to the freedom of citizens or certain groups to leave and return to a country. *Freedom of speech*, also drawn from CIRI, measures government censorship of the press and includes government ownership of media outlets. These are coded on a scale of 0 (severely restricted) to 2 (no restrictions) and together they represent the associational, operational, and logistical barriers TNGOs face in operating in a particular location. In addition, the convenience of a location is also considered using the *number of shared borders* variable captured by the *Major Episodes of Political Violence Dataset* (Jaggers, Marshall, and Gurr 2013). A greater number of borders may make it easier for a TNGO to reach other programs or resources. The operating environment may also be affected by directed toward TNGO workers or in a country more generally. Therefore, the *magnitude of conflict* in a country (Sarkees and

Wayman 2010) as well as the *number of attacks* against aid workers (Humanitarian Outcomes 2015) are also incorporated into the operating model. The *magnitude of conflict* includes intrastate and societal conflicts and is captured on a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high) by summing these two variables. *Number of aid attacks* is coded using the number of reported attacks directed at humanitarian aid workers. Finally, the *cell phone users* (United Nations Statistics Division 2015) is used as a proxy measure for infrastructure. The *cell* variable is calculated using the number of subscriptions per 100 people.

Hypothesis 1: Favorable operating environments, including fewer conflicts and higher civil liberties, will result in a higher number of TNGOs.

The Political Environment and Country Attractiveness

The second frame, political environment, outlines the conditions placed on a society by political actors. Such conditions influence individuals and organizations. The stability of a country, measured using Polity IV, sets expectations about the overarching predictability or type of action one can expect from government. In addition, it may also indicate the durability of that government and political environment. The actions of political actors holds implications for TNGOs, even if these actions occur outside of the nonprofit sector. Efforts to solidify control, for example, may lead those in power to curtail freedom of speech or engage in tactics outside of the normal institutional channels. Directed at citizens, the political environment impacts national staff and beneficiaries. In some cases, such action more be targeted at or influence the behavior

of international staff too. More broadly, the political environment possesses the ability to ease entry for TNGOs through regulations and legislation. For example, political attention in several countries has turned toward TNGOs, making it more difficult to enter and to stay in those countries. In other countries, organizations that disagree with official government positions are shut down. Therefore, the political environment may attract or detract from a country's profile on the beneficiary and the TNGO sides through degree of independence of the independent sector, political control, funding, and so on.

The political context in a country may also influence the decision of a TNGO about where to go. *Polity IV* is a measure of regime type used to indicate openness and the degree of consolidation that TNGOs may encounter, rated on a scale of -10 (hereditary monarchy) to 10 (consolidated democracy) (Jaggers, Marshall, and Gurr 2013). Physical integrity is examined using measures of the frequency of *disappeared, extrajudicial killings, political prisoners,* and *torture,* are drawn from CIRI and are incorporated to further contextualize how the political environment influences location decisions (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). Like *freedom of movement*, each variable is scored on a scale of 0 (frequent, or more than 50 incidents) to 2 (never, 0 incidents or unreported). *Disappeared* describes disappearances where the agents of the state are likely responsible and the whereabouts of the disappeared is not public knowledge. *Political prisoners* refers to individuals who are incarcerated for their beliefs or membership in a group, including ethnic or racial groups as well as political opposition. It is measured using the number of political prisoners held, not taken, in a year. *Torture* describes the intentional use of mental or physical pain against private

individuals by government. Where data on human rights is not available, the coding scheme uses discourse analysis to assign values (systemic, widespread, many, multiple, etc.). The variable *extrajudicial killings* describes killings by government officials without due process, including political and non-political killings and fatalities resulting from military hazing.

Hypothesis 2: Favorable political environments will correlate with a higher number of TNGOs.

Controls

The demographic composition of a country is used as a control. It refers to country-level characteristics that may attract or discourage TNGO activity based on opportunity. The demographic dimension is primarily focused on the level of need explanations for why TNGOs are drawn to some locations over others. Typically employed at a sub-national level, here the comparative method is used to analyze such characteristics at a macro-level. Need is an explanation documented in both the domestic and international literatures (Brass 2012b; Gerdin et al. 2014; Van Slyke 2006; Schneider 2012). Demographic characteristics that may influence attractiveness include the size of the population, adult literacy, and inequality. TNGOs must weigh the benefits and costs of location. Although they are committed to a cause or specific group, the number of beneficiaries they are able to reach influences the degree of impact TNGOs are able to produce. The effectiveness and efficiency of programs is a significant factor, as is the need for such programming. The appeal of a cause or

location may also make a country more or less attractive to TNGOs. As a result, demographics have an important place in the analysis of country characteristics.

The literature also supports the importance of demographic factors for location. TNGOs seeking to maximize impact for the best outcomes and in terms of group identity. Nonprofit organizations are viewed as experts in their programmatic area and in the cultural landscape, better able to adapt and more in-tune with the communities in which they work than bureaucracies (Guo 2007; Gronbjerg 2003b). Explanations centered on the level of need argue that TNGOs concentrate in countries with higher levels of need, measured using *total population* and the *poverty ratio*. The *total population* is estimated in millions using official sources and World Bank estimates. The *poverty ratio* is a headcount of those living at $1.25 or less a day divided across the population. Alternatively, the level of inequality in a country might garner more attention than poverty; to test this, the World Bank's *GINI* coefficient is also included. Need might also be interpreted using discrete measures of well-being, such as *life expectancy* (number of years) or *adult literacy* (percentage) (The World Bank 2013). The existing literature also states that TNGOs locate in countries with which they share traits (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). This may be particularly important in future research on TNGOs based in countries other than the United States which have stronger cultural and historical ties to certain regions, as well as for organizational research that examines characteristics including faith-based orientation.

In addition to demographic characteristics, controls for the level economic/development in a country are also introduced as a control. The economic/development characteristics of a country also underpin multiple explanations

of location, including need and resource dependency. In terms of decision-making, the economic/development characteristics of a country as a whole are often the first knowledge a TNGO has of a country. Furthermore, economic and development factors serve as a useful tool for comparison of countries, assessment of government capacity, and as a heuristic for decision-making regarding location. These decisions may be influenced by a country's GDP, level of existing aid, and degree of investment from the private sector among others. Furthermore, many TNGOs fall under the broad heading of "international development", making analysis of these markers especially pertinent for the targeting and effectiveness of development assistance delivered via TNGOs.
A country's *GDP, growth* as a percentage of GDP by year and *unemployment* as a percentage of the total population are used to measure the influence of country-level economic/development context on the location of U.S.-based TNGOs (The World Bank 2013). To determine the impact of development aid and whether this draws organizations to particular countries, foreign assistance administered by the U.S. as overseas *economic aid* or *military aid* (billions of USD) in the form of loans and grants is also analyzed (USAID 2015). All financial measures are in millions of current USD unless otherwise noted.

The operating and political characteristics of a country are proposed as driving factors that increase or decrease the attractiveness of a country to U.S.-based TNGOs. As a test of existing theories of TNGO location, these categories touch on resource dependency, the level of need, networks, and convenience. Existing scholarship has argued for one explanation over others, however, it is more likely that the decision-

making process is influenced by a complex array of factors that rise and fall in salience depending on context.

2.4: Data and Method

This dataset includes original data collected from documentary government and TNGO sources on organizational and financial features. In addition, it also incorporates measures from existing quantitative datasets on demographic, economic, and political measures. A mixed-methods approach was used to explore the research question, what factors make a country more attractive to U.S.-based TNGOs, to allow triangulation using primary and secondary sources. Triangulation serves as a verification tool for self-reported data drawn from 990 forms, annual reports, and organization websites. A diverse group of 554 organizations is included in the dataset, representing U.S.-based TNGOs with operations in 194 countries and across programmatic areas between 2008 and 2012.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the total number of U.S.-based TNGOs in a country between 2008 and 2012. TNGOs are defined as organizations registered with the IRS as 501(c)(3) tax-exempt public charities, excluding private foundations, and were identified using the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) database (*Guidestar-NCCS National Nonprofit Research Database* 2015). Gronbjerg, Liu, and Pollak (2010) show discrepancies between federal and state registries. Federal status is

used here because many TNGOs pursue federal grants or contracts. Tax-exempt credentials are often a requirement to register and proceed with in-country operations. It is not always necessary for TNGOs to register as local TNGOs, although it may confer some benefit in certain cases, tax-exempt credentials from the country of origin lend credibility and legitimacy, facilitate access, and assist the permission-seeking process surrounding operations and implementation.

The 2008 and 2012 period was selected due to changes in the form 990, one source of location data and organizational characteristics. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has introduced several updates to the form, most recently in 2007. In 2016, the IRS plans to the forms available in an electronic format following a court mandate. This is a welcome addition to the IRS Core Master Files and the scanned hardcopy form 990s housed at the Urban Institute, Guidestar, Charity Navigator, and similar institutions. The various iterations of the form 990 present several sets of questions, sequences, and layouts. This presents a challenge to the standardization of data across years. Certain questions are included in one year, but not the next or a question may be worded differently. In the latter instance disparate interpretations of the question from year to year may lead to inconsistent responses in self-reported data, although the intent of the question may be the same.

Searches for organizations were first conducted using the National Tax-Exempt Entities Taxonomy (NTEE) codes to locate TNGOs whose mission was international in its scope. The NCCS estimates that there are 1.6 million 501(c)(3) public charities

operating in the United (National Center for Charitable Statistics 2015)[10]. Because not all TNGOs engaged in international activities are coded using the NTEE international (Q) code, a secondary search was conducted using the keyword "international" in the NCCS database and cross-referenced with the Guidestar database. This yielded several thousand results, including some defunct organizations and others reporting zero revenue. To narrow the population, two decision rules were implemented. These rules are designed to eliminate nonprofits that are no longer operating and those that are unlikely to have a significant international presence.

First, organizations must meet or exceed a $1 million USD revenue threshold under the NCCS parameters, which is calculated using the most recently filed form 990 and located in the organization profile summary. Other scholars have implemented similar decision rules, using revenue thresholds as a mechanism to identify the population of interest.[11] The NCCS database is searchable using several search

[10] The NCCS conducted estimates in 1999 and 2009; this figure reflects the 2009 estimate. The Urban Institute estimates that the nonprofit sector grew at a rate of 8.6 between 2002 and 2012. Public charities make the largest and fastest category (29.6 percent) category of nonprofit, accounting for two-thirds of the sector and three-quarters of sector revenue ($1.65 trillion USD) (McKeever and Pettijohn 2014)

[11] Other studies also employ revenue as a decision rule; some use a moving average over several years. Revenue from year to year between 2008 and 2012 shows only a handful of extreme fluctuations. This may be the result of the $1 million threshold used to select organizations or a reflection of the time period. As a result, a moving average

parameters. Revenue is coded at several levels using data from the form 990. Although it is not possible to select multiple criteria, the categorization of revenue data prevents duplicates across searches. Capturing TNGOs with $1 million USD or more excludes organizations that are not required to register for 501(c)(3) status because they are too small, such as churches, while preserving the diversity of organizations in terms of size. The revenue decision rule acts as a heuristic for selecting organizations that are active, international in scope, and captures a range of capacities.

The second decision rule used to identify TNGOs in the data is the physical presence in a country. In-country programming is defined as staff, volunteers, or other infrastructure in the country of operations a given year between 2008 and 2012. In this dissertation, location is understood at the country level. Any U.S.-based organization meeting the first rule and which also has staff or infrastructure present in a country is included in the data. Annual reports, 990 forms, and program descriptions were used to determine a TNGO's in-country status. TNGOs not meeting this qualification, but whose scope of work is international were excluded because of this dissertation's focus on location.[12] Organizations such as think tanks or those providing non-monetary

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is not used in this chapter. For more on revenue thresholds see Transnational TNGO Initiative (2010), Kerlin (2013), and Koch et al. (2009).

[12] The following subcategories were excluded based on the in-country decision rule: international understanding; professional societies, associations; research institutes and/or public policy analysis; nonmonetary support N.E.C.; promotion of international understanding; international cultural exchange; international student exchange and aid;

support do not face the same levels of logistical or programmatic commitment as that required of in-country TNGOs. This approach produced a dataset containing data on 553 U.S.-based TNGOs across 194 countries between 2008 and 2012.

In addition to the form 990, the presence or absence of a TNGO during a specific year was documented using the website and the annual report of the TNGO. Reports were curated from several sources, including the organization websites, Guidestar, and through electronic and correspondence and telephone inquiries with TNGO representatives. The majority of organizations maintain libraries of annual reports for three to five years. Larger organizations possessing a higher degree of professionalization may offer five to ten years of annual reports on their websites, though this is not consistent across organizations. Beyond the three to five year marks, annual reports are either destroyed or archived off site. Due to the size of the population from which the sample is drawn, the most recent version of the form was chosen for data availability and consistency.

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international exchanges; arms control and peace organizations; United Nations association; and domestic national security were excluded. An assessment of these sub-categories showed that many organizations possessed multiple Q codes and that these were most likely not to meet the in-country programming decision rule.

Methods

The hypotheses are tested using a negative binomial count regression on the number of TNGOs in a country by year between 2008 and 2012 because ordinary least squares (OLS) regression could result in biased coefficients with count data. Similar to many count variables, the dependent variable (*total_TNGO*) includes a high number of low- and non-occurrences per country with a Poisson-like distribution. The mean level of TNGOs per country is 25.47 with a standard deviation of .83. The dispersion in the data is greater than expected in a traditional Poisson distribution. As a result, the models are estimated using the negative binomial estimation technique. In addition, robust standard errors are estimated. These corrections eliminate heteroskedasticity effects on standard errors. Such corrections also build confidence in the validity of the results, as significant coefficients are more difficult to obtain. Results are presented in Table 1.

2.5: Results

Analysis of country characteristics and TNGO location forms the foundation of the larger research question: what factors drive TNGO decisions concerning location? Using negative binomial regression with robust standard errors, this chapter presents the country characteristics as four categories: operational, political, demographic, and economic/development. It then attempts to answer what country characteristics make a location more or less attractive to U.S.-based TNGOs. Importantly, while the results illustrate a relationship between variables, they are unable to demonstrate causality.

Table 2.1 clearly illustrates that some categories are more influential than others on the number of TNGOs in a country, and that only certain elements of these

groupings matter. Both the operating environment and political environment are influential in their individual models, as well as in the larger model. This shows the importance of the political and operating environments on decision-making among TNGOs related to their location and implementation choices. Where these environments are more favorable, it is easier to enter and conduct work. Therefore, there are a higher number of U.S.-based TNGOs in countries with favorable political and operating environments, with certain caveats. These appear to outweigh the level of need in a country, as measured by demographic characteristics.

Hypothesis 1: Favorable operating environments, including fewer conflicts and higher civil liberties, will result in a higher number of TNGOs.

In summary, the operating environment consists of six variables to measure the ease or the difficulty affecting day-to-day operations of a TNGO. Of the six variables included in the operating model, all are statistically significance. Holding all else constant, we can expect 3.5 more U.S.-based TNGOs for each unit of increase on the freedom of domestic movement measure. For each one point *freedom of speech* scale, we can expect an additional four U.S.-based TNGOs in that country; therefore, countries with a higher degree of freedom of movement internally and free speech attract more TNGOs.

VARIABLES	(1) Operating total_TNGO	(2) Political total_TNGO	(3) Demographic total_TNGO	(4) Economic total_TNGO	(5) Combined total_TNGO
Frdm. of Domestic Mvmnt.	0.124*				0.191***
	(0.054)				(0.056)
Frdm. of Speech	0.146*				0.176***
	(0.066)				(0.056)
Conflict Magnitude	0.209***				-0.067**
	(0.019)				(0.024)
# Shared Borders	0.072***				0.035**
	(0.012)				(0.129)
Cell Phones ppc	-0.009***				-0.006***
	(0.001)				(0.001)
Polity IV		0.030***			0.021**
		(0.007)			(0.007)
Disappeared		0.096			0.065
		(0.064)			(0.067)
Extrajudicial Kill.		-0.598***			-0.453***
		(0.063)			(0.050)
Pol. Prisoners		-0.146**			-0.106*
		(0.056)			(0.049)
Torture		-0.570***			-0.575***
		(0.062)			(0.052)
Population			0.003*		0.954***
			(0.001)		(0.156)
Poverty Ratio			0.023***		
			(0.003)		
Life Expect.			-0.004		
			(0.008)		
GDP				-0.002	-0.149***
				(0.034)	(0.032)
Unemployment %				-0.028***	-0.022***
				(0.005)	(0.004)
U.S. Economic Aid				1.967***	1.515***
				(0.327)	(0.274)
U.S. Military Aid				-0.327**	-0.010
				(0.113)	(0.065)
Constant	3.314***	4.057***	-3.002***	3.304***	3.885
	(0.121)	(0.088)	(0.638)	(0.498)	(0.150)
Lnalpha Constant	-0.349***	-0.653***	-0.830***	-0.310***	-1.074
	(0.052)	(0.030)	(0.073)	(0.050)	(0.072)
Alpha	0.705	0.0535	0.044	0.734	0.342
	(0.0347	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.0366)	(0.025)
Observations	648	642	265	789	613

Table 1.1: Regression Analysis of Country Characteristics, Robustness Check, 2008—2012

The variable measuring the magnitude of civil and ethnic violence in a country is also positive and significant, for every one-point increase in this measurement an additional six TNGOs are present in that country. The magnitude of conflict in a

country may provide additional support need-based arguments. If conflict zones harbor a higher proportion of individuals in need, for example in a complex human emergency, one might expect an increase in the number of TNGOs in that country. While number of shared borders appears to be important, it is possible that conflicts in neighboring countries might also influence the number of TNGOs in neighboring countries. The number of *shared borders* is also positive and significant. On its own, this finding might be taken as evidence of the convenience argument. However, if it is considered along with the magnitude of conflict, it also encompasses the level of need and perhaps the opportunity to collaborate across borders.

The variable *cell users* is negative and significant, meaning that for each decrease on the scale there is a decrease in the total number of U.S.-based TNGO in a country. One explanation for this is that many TNGOs operate in countries where infrastructure is less developed. However, even in less developed countries cell phone technology has markedly increased and become an integral piece of communication and business. TNGOs may rely on other mechanisms of communication to bridge gaps in technology. Instead of convenience and infrastructure, this result may point toward a need-based argument. Furthermore, the relationship between TNGO decisions regarding location and infrastructure may be the inverse. More specifically, TNGOs go and infrastructure follows as a consequence of their presence rather than TNGOs being attracted to a country because of its convenience.

Hypothesis 2: Favorable political environments will correlate with a higher number of TNGOs.

In the political environment model, four of the five variables are significant, with three reporting a negative direction. Specifically, all else held constant, *Polity IV* is positive and significant. As countries move up the Polity scale, becoming more open, we can expect to see one additional U.S.-based TNGO per unit increase. This result is interesting and suggests that political stability, while important, holds less influence over the decision-making process than anticipated. Measures of *extrajudicial killings, political prisoners*, and *torture* are negative and significant; however, *disappeared,* another measure of physical integrity, is neither negative nor significant. The marginal effects for the frequency of extrajudicial killings and the use of torture are especially impactful; for each one-unit change, we can expect to see sixteen to seventeen fewer TNGOs in a country. The use of political prisoners also has a negative effect, with four fewer TNGOs per one-unit change. The results for *Polity IV* support the findings from the previous model for freedom of movement and speech, suggesting that governments that are more open are also more attractive to U.S.-based TNGOs. This may be a reflection of the barriers to entry to start, in which TNGOs face greater difficulty securing permission to enter let alone conducting operations on a day-to-day basis. Interestingly, the other significant variables in the political model have the opposite relationship, seeming to refute findings related to *Polity IV*. When all else is held constant, as the frequency of extrajudicial killings, political prisoners, or torture as a political tactic increases, an increase in the number of U.S.-based TNGOs is also expected. Human rights organizations make up a significant proportion of the U.S. international nonprofit sector. Such conditions may signal a need for them. It is unlikely that this is evidence of alternative explanations, specifically resource dependency,

because of the value placed on neutrality by TNGOs working in the human rights sector. Consequently, such organizations place distance between themselves and government in an effort to maintain credibility and neutrality (Mitchell 2013), making a relationship between location and at least government resources unlikely in this case. There may be another driving factor such as foreign policy or media attention that should also be taken into consideration.

Combined Models

The individually specified models were combined into a single negative binomial regression with robust standard errors to further verify the results. The variables *poverty ratio* and *military aid* were excluded to preserve the sample size. The directions of the relationships of significant variables reported in the individual models were preserved with one exception. The *conflict* variable changed from positive to negative, but maintained the same level of significance. This suggests that on its own, the level of conflict is a factor that makes countries more attractive to U.S.-based TNGOs, but when taken in sum with other factors it becomes a detractor. In addition, *freedom of domestic movement* gained, but the direction changed from positive to negative. Levels of significance increased or decreased in several variables, but all reported a significance of .05 or better.

Each of the models were also calculated using a one-year and two-year lag on the independent variables in order to assess the influence the characteristics in the preceding year had on the total number of TNGOs in a country. The levels of

significance and relationship directions remained consistent in each of the models, with the exception of *freedom of domestic movement*, which shifts from positive and significant to negative and significant with a two-year lag. Such a change may be a reflection of more restrictive TNGO regulations introduced in multiple countries. At the macro-level, the stability of the model with the one and two-year lagged variables suggests that attractiveness on a macro-level is not influenced by characteristics in the near-term for the most part.

Across the individual and combined models, *freedom of speech, conflict, cell phone users, Polity IV, extrajudicial killings, torture, population size, unemployment ratio,* and *U.S. economic aid* were significant. Only *GDP* lost its significance. The marginal effect of freedom of speech decreased slightly to six additional TNGOs per one-unit increase on the scale. The magnitude of conflict resulted in two fewer TNGOs while increases in *Polity IV* lead to one additional TNGO. The frequency of extrajudicial killings, and torture produces twelve and eleven fewer TNGOs respectively. The marginal effects for unemployment remain static, with one less TNGO for each one-unit increase in the ratio, and the magnitude of economic aid weakens further. These environments do not exist in a void. Earlier, it was acknowledged that the categorization of variables was for the benefit of scholarship and that there might be several ways to organize the variables. By comparing the combined and individual models, the complexity of the world inhabited by TNGOs and the way in which each environment relates to the other. This is further evidence that TNGOs are attracted or discouraged from working in a country for a number of reasons. It is also evidence that the explanations for TNGO location cannot be treated discretely. Instead,

a synthesized theory acknowledging the layered and contextual nature of such choices is a stronger narrative.

Controls

Among the demographic controls, two variables are both positive and significant. As a country's population increases, the number of U.S.-based TNGOs is also expected to increase. However, the marginal effect is weak at .11. The marginal effect for the *poverty ratio* is stronger, with every one-unit increase on the poverty scale resulting in one additional TNGO in a country. While the direction of the relationship may not be surprising, the magnitude does bring into question the strength of explanations centered on the level of need. The association is perhaps one of "more bang for your buck" in which the ability of TNGOs to make a greater impact at the individual level, maximizing financial and human resources, makes a country a more attractive choice.

Alternatively, the inability of weak state institutions to provide services to citizens increases exponentially with the population. The result is an amplified level of need in a country. Countries with a greater proportion of poor also have a higher number of U.S.-based TNGOs, providing further support for need-based explanations. The origins of the nonprofit sector and the concentration of TNGOs in development, humanitarian, and relief work illustrate the demographic drivers of country attractiveness in further detail. At the same time, TNGOs do not exist in a void. An organization may be strongly committed to a community with a high level of need

regardless of its size, yet implementation becomes impossible where there is little interest or need. Thus, the level of need and resource dependency becomes interrelated, highlighting the overlapping reality of location-centered explanations. Although demographics might be useful heuristic to both TNGOs and donors seeking to maximize efficiency, the results suggest that more influential factors exist in how attractive a country is to U.S.-based TNGOs.

Among the economic/development variables included as controls, all are significant. Two of the four report the same direction. *GDP* is positive and significant, however, when the model is run using GDP growth as an annual percentage of GDP instead of *GDP* the measure loses significance. Higher rates of *unemployment* are also associated with fewer TNGOs by year in total; each one-unit increase in the unemployment scale leads to one less TNGO. *Economic aid* is positive and significant, but the marginal effect is weak. This raises questions about resource dependency if TNGOs are assumed to be heavily reliant on government resources for international projects. However, the relationship between the total number of TNGOs and economic aid suggests that government and TNGOs may undertake similar evaluations in the targeting of resources. Alternatively, U.S. government agencies may use TNGOs as mechanisms by which they are enabled to identify priority countries and regions. Interestingly, previous research using this dataset also shows a relationship between TNGO location and government initiatives. It is unclear, however, whether TNGOs follow government cues, if government looks to TNGOs as experts, or as already stated, they simply possess similar interests and employ similar evaluation strategies. In

contrast, military aid from the U.S. is negative and significant, suggesting that although there may be overlap in strategy certain areas, interests diverge in others.

2.6: Discussion

The investigation of country-level characteristics presented here seeks to explain what factors draw U.S.-based TNGOs to certain locations. Existing literature discusses location (Brass 2012b; Fruttero and Gauri 2005; Koch et al. 2009) in an international context, but lacks multinational focus and grounding in the nonprofit literature. At the same time, the nonprofit literature emphasizes domestic cases, but focuses on external drivers such as donors rather than organization decision-making (Froelich 1999; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). This chapter contributes to the literature by building on existing scholarship and testing the factors that attract TNGOs to a country. In the future, it will also incorporate organizational characteristics. Political, operating, economic, and demographic contexts may help to explain when and why TNGOs choose certain locations. For now, it seems that some contexts matter more than others.

The results for the dependent variable, total number of U.S.-based TNGOs in a country by year, show that TNGO location is influenced by a number of factors. The operating context and the political context appear to matter most, but certain elements of the demographic and operational contexts also matter. The findings provide some support for the level of need explanation that argue that TNGOs locate in the neediest communities, for example where the level of poverty is the highest or where people most need the services provided. However, the magnitude of need on the attractiveness of a country is low in comparison to other factors. Instead, the operational and political

dimensions, especially freedom of movement and physical integrity measures (political prisoners, the use of torture, and the use of extrajudicial killings) appear to have significant yet opposite effects on the attractiveness of a country to U.S.-based TNGOs. This carries the implication that first and foremost, an organization must be able to carry out its work with reasonable expectations for safety of staff and beneficiaries before it considers entering or remaining in a country.

Contrary to expectations, insecurity stemming from conflict appears to attract TNGOs to a country rather than deter them by disrupting the operating environment. Measures of physical integrity also appear to be important, but the message is unclear. While the findings for *Polity IV* and *freedom of movement* and *speech* suggest more open regime types correspond a higher total number of TNGOs, results for *extrajudicial killings, political prisoners,* and *torture* run contrary. That the number of disappeared was not also significant is puzzling, but perhaps it is more difficult for TNGOs to respond at the time because the definition and number of disappeared is murky.

Finally, official government economic aid increases, so too does the number of TNGOs but when military aid is considered, the number decreases. The magnitude of this result is small, however. Therefore, this finding requires more research. Combined with the evidence for level of need, this chapter creates a more complex explanation of TNGO location.

This dissertation is not without limitations. First, it only includes U.S.-based TNGOs. As a result, it is unable to address variation between different nationalities of TNGOs or the distinction between indigenous and international TNGOs in less

developed countries. However, organizations registered in the U.S. to solicit funds or conduct other business may have roots elsewhere. Stroup (2012) argues that organizations such as Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam resemble organizations from their home countries more than humanitarian organizations elsewhere, elevating collaborative issues related to professionalization and management. In these cases, the characteristics that make some countries more attractive than others should translate across institutional boundaries. Second, proponents of networks and collaboration who may ask whether the total number of TNGOs is better than a measure of consolidation or impact may critique the dependent variable. However, data on local TNGOs is difficult to obtain or simply unavailable. Where it is available, it may be inaccurate or incomplete due to poor record keeping. Given that the focus of this dissertation is on U.S.-based TNGOs, indigenous groups and networks may be an area for future exploration. Finally, flawed data is not a challenge restricted to research on indigenous NGOs. Missing annual reports, foggy memories, and incomplete data on form 990s or other documents mean that data on U.S.-based TNGOs is not perfect either.

In addition, there are several notable instances where the total rises sharply whereas in the majority of cases the total is relatively stable from year to year. In at least three of these cases the most obvious explanation are natural disasters, including earthquakes or tsunamis in Samoa in 2009, Haiti in 2010, the Japan in 2011, and the Philippines in 2012. On average, these four cases experienced a 78.5 percent increase in the total number of TNGOs compared to the previous year.

In other instances, catalysts for spikes in the total number of U.S.-based TNGOs in a country are more difficult to pinpoint. Countries in East Africa and Central America were also notable for their increases, although these increases occurred over a longer period of time than those associated with natural disaster. Between 2008 and 2012, Guatemala and Honduras added an average of 18 U.S.-based TNGOs to their registers while Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya added an average of 28 organizations during the same period. This may support the claim that TNGOs locate in countries with shared histories or characteristics made by Koch et al. (2009) if British colonial rule is considered in the cases of Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya, but the argument is less compelling when Guatemala, Honduras, and many other countries where U.S.-based TNGOs work are taken into account. This suggests that there is more to location decision-making at play.

Implications for Practitioners

Patterns of location subject related to country characteristics may provide important evidence about the decision-making process of TNGOs, including perceptions about which countries are the most efficient and effective for meeting goals. Political stability on its own may be an easy assessment tool, but the identification of attractive venues is more complex than stability or convenience. In addition, the country characteristics lead to a higher number of U.S.-based TNGOs is useful information for policymakers, donors, and TNGOs themselves. Policymakers and donors will be interested in the priorities and strategies of TNGOs, particularly in more difficult operating environments. This knowledge better equips them for communicating with

TNGOs, reconciling objectives, and targeting resources. Policymakers may also be interested in the findings not only for the targeting of resources, but also for ways in which they can aid TNGOs overcome barriers to entry and operation through channels of soft power. For TNGOs, the overlap between the number of organizations in a country and resource dependency also assists with communication. The data offers both sides tools of translation and compromise, creating a collaborative partnership. Furthermore, better understanding how country profiles influence location helps TNGOs and donors more effectively reach beneficiaries, particularly those that fall outside the "most likely" categories.

2.7: Conclusion

This research assesses the influence of country characteristics on the total number of U.S.-based TNGOs in a country between 2008 and 2012. It asks what makes a country attractive to such organizations. It is often assumed that the location decisions of TNGOs are concentrated along single explanatory dimensions, such as the level of need or resource dependency. This chapter finds support for multiple explanations clustered around the operating environment, political environment, demographic context, and economic/development environment. It finds strongest support for the political and operating environments, followed by the economic/development environment. However, certain demographic elements are also found to be influential.

Countries characterized by greater civil liberties, including freedom of movement and speech, experience a higher number of U.S.-based TNGOs within their borders whereas countries with political environments in which government or its

representatives engage in oppressive tactics (extrajudicial killings, political prisoners, torture) have fewer U.S.-based TNGOs. The number of attacks on humanitarian aid workers further corroborates these findings. Attacks on humanitarian aid workers holds implications of their own. For donors and staff, it speaks to the way that risk is communicated and managed in the organization. It may also provide some indication of the brand or identity a TNGO seeks to build, as well as the type of work in which it is engaged. Consequently, the operating and political environments on the whole are both influential sets of characteristics on the total number of TNGOs in a country. Stability emerges as a theme, however, the magnitude of conflict attracts rather than deflects U.S.-based TNGOs. As already noted, this may be due to the nature of the work of TNGOs, Some may be more inclined to help victims of conflict as the neediest members of society. Theoretically, this finding also may also demonstrate support for resource dependence where donor attention is subject to focusing events.

Donors and resource dependency as an explanation arrive at the forefront again when the demographic context and the economic/development environment are examined in further detail. The size of a country's population is found to attract a greater number of TNGOs as its size increases. Increases in U.S. government economic aid to a country also indicate an increase in the number of U.S.-based TNGOs. In the former, the results might be interpreted as support for need-based arguments when the poverty ratio is also significant; in other contexts it might be interpreted as donor pressure for maximum efficiency and consequently the product of resource dependency. Resource dependency may also be a reflection economic aid, suggesting that more

funds are available for certain countries, issues, or regions that therefore attract a greater number of U.S.-based TNGOs.

Among the explanations for TNGO location and country characteristics, little support is found in this chapter for the convenience argument that TNGOs go where it is easiest to operate and where there are a greater number of amenities to attract and retain staff (Brass 2012). Measured using indicators of infrastructure, both cell and Internet users were negative. Only the measure *internet users* was found to be significant. This raises a question: is development and infrastructure the product of TNGO activity or do TNGOs simply not care about convenience as some have argued? Despite the lack of support for this explanation, it is evident that the array of characteristics available to U.S.-based TNGOs creates a complex decision-making environment. Rather than a one-dimensional structure, TNGOs are ultimately subject to the conditions of multiple explanations in location decision-making.

2.8: Future Research

The research on country characteristics outlined here will be expanded to include organizational characteristics, adding internal dynamics to the scholarly discussion surrounding TNGO decision-making and location. Further data collection on TNGOs and location should allow research on what drives TNGOs decision-making in addition to country characteristics, as well as more generalizable findings. Scholars may be interested in pursuing comparative studies of TNGOs. Expansion of the scope of this chapter would allow examination of how TNGOs based in different countries, particularly advanced industrialized ones, vary across country characteristics and

TNGO location. With some additional data, analysis of organizational culture from a comparative perspective might also be fruitful. Future research should not discount the relationship (or absence of a relationship) between local-international TNGOs. Such dynamics, as well as exploration of shared borders and causation may prove particularly interesting to donors, scholars, and practitioners.

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Chapter 3 : Government Attention and U.S.-based TNGO Location

3.1: Introduction

This chapter continues the examination of location of U.S.-based transnational nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs). It builds upon the previous chapter by focusing on the influence of the U.S. government on location choices by U.S.-based TNGOs through the frame of monetary support and foreign policy. More specifically, it asks whether TNGOs receiving monetary support from the U.S. government are more likely to locate in countries identified by the U.S. government as strategically significant. Government signals strategic interests in particular countries through statements, including the State of the Union (SOTU) given annual by the president, the National Security Strategy (NSS), and initiatives such as the Critical Language Scholarship (CLS).

Donor influence on nonprofit behavior is well documented (Verbruggen, Christiaens, and Milis 2011; Froelich 1999; Mosley 2012; Guo 2007). At the same time, these donors are also responsible for the growth of the nonprofit sector. Both national and international nonprofits have experienced notable growth, proliferating in the number of organizations and the amount of revenue flowing into the sector (Fisher 1998; DeMars 2005). The United States hosts an estimated 13 percent of TNGO headquarters in the world (Mitchell 2012a). Between 2002 and 2012, the TNGO sector in the United States grew by faster than any other sector at a rate of 25 percent (McKeever and Pettijohn 2014). Nearly 18 percent of U.S.-based TNGOs receive

support from the U.S. government in the form of grants or contracts, averaging $4.8 billion USD a year in the international sector alone.[13]

Such growth is due in part to the perceived efficiency of nonprofit organizations, but especially among TNGOs working in countries with weak institutions, low infrastructure, conflict, or high rates of corruption (Nunnenkamp, Weingarth, and Weisser 2009; Wood and Gough n.d.). In a domestic context, explanations for nonprofit growth include the hollow state in which government responsibilities are outsourced to nonprofit or private organizations that possess greater expertise and that can performs tasks at a reduced cost (Milward and Provan 2000; Milward 1994). The themes of efficiency and capacity are consistent in the international context, yet the motives they embody differ. Instead, TNGOs are active on two planes. For the governments of host countries faced with low state capacity, TNGOs provide an attractive mechanism to provide services to citizens where they themselves are unable to do so. Like the hollow state, services are contracted out to a third party for reasons of capacity and efficiency (but primarily for capacity). For the U.S. government, TNGOs serve as a vehicle of efficiency and capacity. They are carefully selected to deliver certain foreign policy goals. For example, the U.S. government sets strategic goals as part of its international policy agenda and operationalizes them in part through grants and contracts. These

[13] This figure is based on data collected from form 990s for U.S. registered 501(c)(3) nonprofits with more than $1 million USD reported in the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) search and an office, staff, or infrastructure abroad.

grants and contracts are awarded to carefully selected entities that will help advance progress toward those goals. As a result, TNGOs are a vehicle of delegated authority.

3.2: TNGOs and Foreign Policy

The ability of the U.S. government to influence the behavior of nonprofits, including TNGOs, occupies the resource dependency literature at the federal, state and local levels. Resource dependence stems from a lack of financial diversification. It occurs where a significant concentration of resources among one or few sources leads to gross influence on the behavior of a nonprofit; for example, where TNGOs implement programs. The TNGO-U.S. government relationship is important, particularly in international development contexts, due to the significant role TNGOs play in foreign policy agendas. In addition, the absence of local individual philanthropic giving, resulting from a lack of means and philanthropic culture, amplifies the need for official government funding channels. As a result, TNGOs are left open to greater influence (Ebrahim 2003; Brass 2012b; Watkins, Swidler, and Hannan 2012). Additional explanations for location include need and the networks available to affect such need, examined as within case comparisons (Fruttero and Gauri 2005; Brass 2012b). The impact of resource dependence may be amplified for large TNGOs which appear to be more effective at securing government funding, but who are consequently less diversified in their income in some cases. Further, the influence of strategic initiatives on location choices may be particularly important in the decision-making process.

Because the question of whether strategic initiatives influence the geography of TNGOs is essentially one of resources, resource dependence theory is used as the frame

for this sudy. Resource dependence theory states that resources are fundamental to organizational survival, making the assumption that a certain degree of dependence is present in the relationship between those who control the distribution of resources and those who are reliant on said resources for survivial. How dependent the seekers are on the distributors is determined by the concentration of resources (Froelich 1999; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Those deriving resources from few distributors become beholden to them, hence the push for resrouce diversification. These outcomes impact not only the policies and procedures of the organization, but also representativeness, legitimacy, and autonomy (Edwards and Hulme 1996c; Moulton and Eckerd 2012; Smillie 1995).

Organizations that receive government funds for international programs are therefore expected to be strongly influenced by U.S. government strategic initiatives and to acquiescence to donor demands. In one study of domestic nonprofits, nonprofit density is more sensitive to changes in government grants and program revenues than other types of funding (Lecy and Van Slyke 2012). While Lecy and Van Slyke's study is a comparison of government failure and interdependence theories, their observations about varieties of funding and the stability that domestic organizations draw from government support may be applicable to TNGOs as well. For TNGOs, uncertainty about funding and the operating environment shapes the work of the organization (Watkins, Swidler, and Hannan 2012).

However, stability is not without costs. As TNGOs seek to improve efficiency and build donor relationships, they may lose their effectiveness among target populations and thus use the least costly methods to make themselves appealing to donors (Reinhardt 2009, p. 284). Others find that TNGOs with government support are

more likely to comply with financial reporting requirements (Verbruggen, Christiaens, and Milis 2011) and that such support can change the dynamics of advocacy as well as representativeness (Guo 2007; Mosley 2012). Donor influence and the impact of compliance or non-compliance may be extended to increased activity in strategic initiative countries. It is plausible that location is a mechanism for TNGOs to respond to donors; greater agency on the part of TNGOs suggests that resource dependency may hold some value and that TNGOs are responsive to donor demands, but not without ceratin caveats like mission congruence.

Earlier findings on TNGO location at the regional level suggest that larger organizations are more likely to operate in one or more regions, but that multi-regional operations are not significant in relationship to government funding. Disaggregating regional location to country-level data provides greater insight into the geographic scope of TNGOs. Linking the behavior of TNGOs to funding streams adds to the scholarly discussion in two ways. First, it expands upon the set of domestic cases that are predominant in the nonprofit literature and synthesizes scholarship about TNGOs across disciplines. Second, it considers the influence of mission on location in relationship to resource dependence and shifts it from a dependent variable to an independent variable (Moulton and Eckerd 2012; Bozeman 1987).

The result is that TNGOs are granted greater agency in their pursuit of donors, a greater degree of entrepreneurship, and resource dependence is contextualized. Location may be a function of funding streams, but the public value innate in the charitable sector is also significant in decision-making. Kerlin (2006) argues that although TNGOs often agree with the basic goals of donors, their approach and the ideology that motivates that

work may occassionally be out of alignment with that of donors, particularly governmnet. Rather than pure resource dependence, nonprofits focus on mission and relationships are used to maximize substantive policy change. Previous scholarship highlights how power dynamics can shape agent behavior, particularly in cases where financial resources are at stake (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Mosley 2012), yet the public administration literature on implementation keenly points out that vague policies are advantageous in mitigating this dynamic. Rather than a top-down dynamic, such vagueness is employed to shape ideas and to implement programs in line with nonprofit vision and goals (Bryce 2005; Lipsky 1980; DeMars 2005), thereby making donors and TNGOs mutually dependent. This has spawned a separate but related literature on accountability, not only upwardly to donors, but also downwardly to beneficiaries (Alnoor Ebrahim 2003; Christensen and Ebrahim 2004; Benjamin 2010). As such, this research engages in a theory-building endeavor premised on resource dependency to explain how government-funding influences the decision of U.S.-based TNGOs as both seek to advance their agendas.

3.3: U.S. Government Attention and TNGO Location

The focus of this chapter is on U.S. government attention directed toward countries in the form of strategic initiatives via foreign policy initiatives. The emphasis on U.S. government attention is based on the existing literature on resource dependency and the significance of the U.S. government as a sponsor of U.S.-based TNGO activities. The previous chapter addressed what makes a country more or less attractive to U.S.-based TNGOs, finding that the political and operational environments are formative factors in location selection.

Here, location is explored through the lens of resources. Are U.S. government supported TNGOs more likely to operate in countries identified in strategic initiatives? Need-based and resource dependency arguments focus on the types of programs nonprofit organizations provide. Often service-oriented explanations indirectly touch upon location. For example, the outsourcing of some services for particular populations by government to nonprofits is attached to location. Where there is a prioritized need or population and it is more efficient for a third party to provide the service, one can expect grants and contracts to be organized. The decision-making process driving the prioritization of location by nonprofit organizations, why they go where they go, is less discussed. TNGOs possess finite financial and human resources and must prioritize objectives based on the mission of the organization and its capacity. Increased competition for these resources due to budget cuts, economic downturns, and a greater number of competitors suggests that donors may exercise influence over not only what TNGOs do, but also where they do it. While survival is certainly a priority for nonprofit organizations across the board, it is unlikely that decisions about which locations to pursue occurs in space devoid of mission, the bedrock of any nonprofit. Of course programs cannot run without funds, yet organizations exercise a degree of agency and selectivity in which locations and projects to pursue rather than obligingly following donor cues with little choice.

Organizational Characteristics

Organizational characteristics play a large role in how TNGOs respond to donor cues. The diversity of an organization's income portfolio, for example, shapes the

responses available to an organization. Those with greater diversification may be less susceptible to donor preferences whereas organizations with one or a few sources of income may have more limited latitude. Diversification is measured as a ratio of government income received in the form of government funds received over total income, excluding non-cash contributions. Total income includes monies raised through membership, federated campaigns, fundraising events, related organizations, and program revenue as reported in Part VIII of the form 990 (questions 1a through 1f). Government funding is defined as grants, payments, or other contributions from local, state, or federal government. Nearly 18 percent of TNGOs included in the dataset report receiving some form of government support between 2008 and 2012.

Financial support plays a significant role in the work of nonprofit organizations due to their nature and structure. As noted, other organizational characteristics also play an important role in shaping the actions of the organization. Perhaps one of the most important characteristics is the sector or area of specialization in which the TNGO operates. The sector of the organization is captured as *ntee* using the National Taxonomy for Exempt Entities (NTEE) housed at the Urban Institute. This dissertation is focused on TNGOs, therefore, the majority of the NTEE codes in the dataset correspond with the "international" (Q) category. Organizations are categorized using up to three codes, which may be derived from different categories depending on the nature of the TNGO's work. Codes are assigned based on the form 1023 when organizations apply for 501(c)(3) status with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This data was collected primarily from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) at the Urban Institute, but was also cross-referenced with Guidestar, a similar

independent database. If there is are duplicate Employer Identification Number (EIN) entries that have divergent primary NTEE codes between NCCS and Guidestar, the NCCS entry beginning with Q is used as the primary code and is followed by subsequent codes.

International philanthropic traditions can be traced to missionaries. Faith-based organizations continue to be major players in the international philanthropic sphere (Carbonnier 2013; McCleary and Barro 2008), conducting activities ranging from education to healthcare to emergency relief across the globe. The size, organizational structure, and the type and degree of religious affiliation vary by organization. For example, some organizations incorporate their faith into daily programs and activities. Others view faith as a guide that shapes the broadly shapes the mission of the organization, but whose activities do not include proselytizing. Faith also influences organizational structure. Decision-making in Catholic organizations tends to follow a top-down hierarchical structure whereas organizations affiliated with the Baptist tradition follow a decentralized decision-making model (Wittberg 2013).

In addition to diversity of decision-making structures, some scholars suggest that faith-based organizations are less susceptible to resource dependency and operate with a larger degree of independence and less collaboration than secular organizations (Mitchell 2013). Despite this, the U.S. government made several efforts to strengthen faith-based philanthropy under George W. Bush and Barak Obama through initiatives including the

White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships.[14] To test how U.S. government attention influences the location of faith-based TNGOs, faith is captured as a dichotomous variable (*faith*). Nonprofits are identified as faith-based in the dataset if they are cataloged under NTEE code X (religious) in the NCCS, if the organization explicitly affiliates with a religious tradition or states a broad faith-based affiliation in its mission statement, or if the organization cites a religious tradition in their title. Nonprofits that do not indicate a faith-based orientation or state directly that they are secular are coded as 0. This data is collected from the NCCS summaries, form 990s, and TNGO websites.

Finally, the age of a TNGO may shape its location through experience. More seasoned TNGOs may be more established, possess greater credibility, and operate with a larger degree of independence. The age of an organization is determined in the dataset using its 501(c)(3) ruling date, provided in the NCCS summary. In a few cases, a TNGO's founding year differed from its ruling date. Rules established by the IRS regarding 501(c)(3) status state that an organization may file for tax-exempt status at any point, but that this status is not retroactive (Internal Revenue Service 2015). Consequently, it is in a nonprofit's interest to file as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the ruling year is the most consistent data point and is available for all organizations regardless of rule changes or non-U.S. origins. Age is calculated as the year of observation (2008 to 2012) less the 501(c)(3) ruling year.

[14] Formerly the White House Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives, established under George W. Bush in 2001.

The following proposition is offered based on the literature and organizational characteristics outlined above:

Hypothesis 1: U.S.-based TNGOs with government funding are more likely to be present in countries identified in strategic initiatives.

Where strategic initiatives sway TNGO location selection, it also follows that certain locations may be of higher priority to the U.S. government. This may be indicated by the number of times each is mentioned in the documents described. The number of times a country is mentioned is an aggregated measure across the three documents by year. An additional test of the influence of U.S. attention to countries in strategic initiatives is offered in the following proposition:

Hypothesis 2: Countries with a higher number of mentions in strategic initiatives will have a greater number of U.S.-based TNGOs in them.

3.4: Data and Method

To explore the research question, a mixed-methods approach is used to examine a diverse set of U.S.-based TNGOs representing operations 554 organizations conducting a variety of activities in 194 countries. The data is collected from documentary government and TNGO sources on organizational and financial characteristics for organizations.

To be included in the dataset, TNGOs must be 501(c)(3) public charities, excluding private foundations. Legal status and the NTEE are employed as a tools to identify TNGOs using the NCCS database, a widely accepted source for data on the

nonprofit sector in the United States. To identify U.S.-based TNGOs, a search of the NCCS database using the NTEE's international (Q) code was conducted between the years 2008 to 2012. To narrow the population, a second decision rule requiring organizations to have reported at least $1 million USD in revenue in the most recent form 990 was added[15]. A critique of the legal status approach is that it excludes many entities from being identified. Organizations excluded may include those that fall below the threshold for filing the 990 form or certain classes of organization per the IRS typology. Furthermore, discrepancies may exist between the federal and state levels. Combined, an inaccurate picture of the sector may be given (Gronbjerg 2003a). Concerns about classes of organization are mitigated by the $1 million USD threshold; organizations that meet this decision rule must file 990 forms and will thus be identifiable through legal status. Gaps between registries are addressed through emphasis on the international rather than domestic sphere and the fact that more than half of the organizations in the dataset receive government funding. The nature of their

[15] The following subcategories did not meet the decision rule and were excluded: international understanding; professional societies, associations; research institutes and/or public policy analysis; nonmonetary support N.E.C.; promotion of international understanding; international cultural exchange; international student exchange and aid; international exchanges; arms control and peace organizations; United Nations association; and domestic national security were excluded. An assessment of these sub-categories showed that many organizations possessed multiple Q codes and that these were most likely not to meet the in-country programming decision rule.

work and the pursuit of government funds will also make them identifiable through legal status. The lack of data on smaller organizations makes them difficult to study; however, while smaller organizations may conduct international activities, they are more likely to do so through in-kind donations rather than in-country programs and would be excluded based on the decision rules anyhow.

Earlier analysis of location at the regional level that compared organizations above and below this revenue threshold showed similarities between the two groups, therefore the data is likely to be representative of both groups. Previous studies have also used thresholds as selection criterion, ranging from as low as $25,000 USD to as high as €10 million (Kerlin 2013; Transnational TNGO Initiative 2010; Koch et al. 2009). The TNGO Initiative at Syracuse University uses a threshold of $500,000 USD as one selection criterion, however, the increase to $1 million USD reflects the scale of operations and support that substantial in-country programs related to strategic initiatives require and that it raises the likelihood of stability for comparable data points over time. This is reinforced by the finding that among European TNGOs, 20 percent of organizations engaged in development work control 90 percent of the funds in the sector (Woods 2000 cited in Koch et al. 2009, p. 904). Finally, it represents a pre-determined category within the NCCS data.

Following the initial Q search of the NCCS database, a second search using the NCCS code "international" (INT) was conducted to identify additional organizations. These additional organizations possess an international dimension to their programs, but were not included in the Q code search because they are assigned to other NTEE categories. The majority of organizations identified in this search were health and

human services organizations (E, M, and P categories) and many operate domestic and international programs. The combined search results represent a variety of sectors and locations internationally and at the state-level.

A snapshot of the dataset is shown in Table 1. The table shows the top NTEE codes listed as primary sector of operation. It is quickly apparent that most of the TNGOs in the dataset are primarily focus on international development (q30) as it is broadly defined in the NTEE coding scheme.

NTEE Code	Q30: Int. Dev.	Q33: Int. Relief	Q30: Int. Econ. Dev.	Q70: Int. Human Rights	E70: Public Health	P30: Children & Youth	Q31: Int. Ag.	Q02: Int. Technical Asst.
%TNGOs	23.7%	23.1%	5.8%	3.4%	2.5%	2.5%	2.4%	1.5%

Table 3.1: TNGOs in Data by Primary Sector

Focusing on TNGOs with in-country programming, each record from the combined searches was reviewed manually. In-country programming is defined as the presence of staff, an office, or a collaborative effort in the country of implementation. In-country programming was determined using program descriptions from the 990 form, mission statements, and organization websites. This has proven to be challenging conceptually. It was sometimes difficult to determine what constitute a sub-contract versus a truly collaborative partnership and to make value judgments on degree of "in-country" of an organization. For example, the coordination, shipment, and delivery of medical supplies compared to volunteer vacations.

Private foundations, universities and colleges, and hospitals were excluded. In some instances, these types of organizations met the in-country decision rule, but the

lacked location choice based on their mission and association with a pre-existing institution. Many of the TNGOs excluded from the dataset were cross-coded as one of the removed Q subcategories, such as research institutes or international exchanges. Others were international in character, but emphasized international programs in the U.S. and lacked in-country programs; these included international visitors' bureaus and professional or student exchanges.

Data from form 990s, the websites of the TNGOs, annual reports, and NCCS summaries was hand-coded by a team of two non-specialists and the author. For purposes of inter-coder reliability the two non-specialists were chosen for their familiarity with social science, but neither are public administration nor political science majors. The NCCS presents several advantages over similar sources. First, the data undergoes periodic checks for accuracy by staff. Although not every record is reviewed, this procedure is a valuable tool for reliability. Second, several types of files are available in addition to the 990 form, including the IRS Core Files and Master File. This greatly expands the options for data collection and variety. Third, the NCCS attempts to fill missing data and verify the appropriate NTEE code.[16] Finally, the NCCS is housed

[16] NTEE codes represent broad categories and are assigned based on the organizations application for 501(c)(3) status. As an organization grows, the NTEE code may no longer accurately reflect the scope of its work. Categories and subcategories might be divided to create more descriptive categorizations; Kerlin (2013) re-coded organizations to better reflect their work in international relief. A similar process is being considered in the development of this project.

at the Urban Institute. In addition to the papers published by its team or researchers, the community that surrounds the center establishes a network of scholarship from which to build and through which to communicate.

The data collected from the form 990 is self-reported. Therefore, both the IRS and scholars rely on organizations to accurately and appropriately report data. This includes categorizing funding streams, succinctly reporting programming, and accurately describing other organizational and financial characteristics. In the case of funding streams, self-reported data may obscure some details if monies are derived from government grants awarded through third parties by sub-contract or a non-monetary collaborative arrangement. However, this is not expected to greatly influence the data as the emphasis of this study is location and the influence of strategic initiatives. Where TNGOs choose to partner with other organizations, the programmatic aspects and location of the partnership remains constant. Limitations do exist where such partnerships are unclear and locations are duplicitously reported or where organizations report location at a macro-level, identifying regions rather than countries. It is possible to overcome location reporting in part by triangulating data through organization literature and websites.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variable in the first model is an active presence in a strategic initiative country between 2008 and 2012, constructed as a binary variable. Each organization is coded as a "1" if it is present in at least one country designated as a strategic initiative country. This data is then cross-referenced with data collected from

three strategic documents identified in order to create the *strategic_country* variable in which TNGO presence in strategic countries is cataloged. The dependent variable in the second model, *total_TNGO*, represents an aggregated count of U.S.-based TNGOs present in a country in a year between 2008 and 2012. Data on TNGO location is collected from parts III and V of the form 990s and Schedule O: Supplemental Information to 990 and 990-EZ forms. The period of 2008 to 2012 was selected due to data availability and changes introduced to the form 990 in 2007.

Strategic initiative countries are identified using three documents: the National Security Strategy; the State of the Union; and the State Department's Critical Language Scholarship. The three documents were chosen for their relative accessibility to the public and their ability to signal the government's interest in particular countries. Together they represent several dimensions of strategic interests of the U.S. government. In addition, they also embody interests particular to a given year and administration. The number of times a country is mentioned in each document is aggregated into a single score to create a measure of the level of attention a country receives from the U.S. government in a particular period. The Critical Language Scholarship reflects areas of linguistic priority; to translate linguistic priorities into a country measure, each year a language is offered is coded as one mention for each country where that language is designated an official language. Data for each document

was collected from the responsible agency, with the exception of the State of the Union, which was collected from the National Archives.[17]

Methods

Analysis of the data uses a mixed-methods approach that includes content analysis, descriptive statistics, and logistic regression with one-way fixed effects. Content analysis allows for the examination of documentary evidence from TNGO and government sources, verifying existing or creating new taxonomies as needed and categories for statistical measuring (Charmaz 2006; Schreier 2012). In the first model, the proposition is tested using logistic regression. It is the most appropriate analytical tool because, as constructed, the dependent variable *strategic_country* is dichotomous and logit fits the model for a binary response by maximum likelihood. Results are presented in Table 3.3.

In the second model, the dependent variable *total_TNGO* changes from a dichotomous to a continuous variable, therefore a negative binomial count regression is used instead. This avoids the bias of ordinary least squares regression. The dispersion in the data is greater than would be expected in a traditional Poisson distribution, therefore the negative binomial estimation is a better fit. Robust standard errors are also estimated to increase confidence in the results. Results are presented in Table 3.4.

[17] Documents were collected from www.clscholarshiporg (CLS); www.whitehouse.gov (NSS); and the National Archives Center for Legislative Archives at www.archives.gov/legislative/features/sotu (SOTU).

3.5: Results

n = 533	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
% of TNGOs in at least one strategic initiative country	42.6%	38.1%	44.3%	43.3%	40.9%
% of TNGOs w/ government support	14.6%	14.1%	13.4%	15.4%	29.8%
% of TNGOs w/ operations in multiple strategic initiative countries	29.8%	30.0%	24.8%	28.6%	24.8%
% TNGOs w/ government support and in a strategic country	12.1%	6.3%	10.7%	12.3%	18.4%

Table 3.2: TNGO Location and Support 2008 – 2012

Table 3.2 shows the number of TNGOs operating in at least one strategic country. This number dips in 2009, but recovers to reach a peak of 44.3 percent in 2010 and is subsequently followed by a slight downward trend. The pattern for organizations operating in multiple strategic initiative countries shows a similar pattern. Across all years, 17.5 percent of the TNGOs contained in the dataset received government grants or contributions. The number of government funded organizations remains relatively static from 2008 to 2011, followed by a 14.4 percent increase in 2012. This may be in response to external events, including political stability or natural disasters, or an anomaly due to self-reported data. The pattern for TNGOs operating in strategic initiative countries and that also have government support diverges from overall government support in 2009, but the two move together in a steady upward trend.

Analysis of organizational characteristics and TNGO location in strategic initiative countries underpins the larger question of what drives TNGO country selection. Using logit with one-way fixed effects on the year, the first model narrates the relationship between U.S. government attention and TNGO presence in strategic initiative countries.

Hypothesis 1: U.S.-based TNGOs with government funding are more likely to be present in countries identified in strategic initiatives.

Table 3.3 clearly illustrates that some categories are more influential than others on the number of TNGOs in strategic initiative countries. The hypothesis is that recipients of government support are more likely to locate in countries identified in strategic initiatives, as indicated by mentions in the SOTU, NSS, and CLS. The results show that in the period between 2008 and 2012, the relationship between location in a strategic initiative country and government funding is positive and significant at a level of .001. This relationship remains significant at the same level when government funding is operationalized as a percentage of a TNGO's total income (*gov_percent*) and as a dummy variable (*gov_funded*). This suggests that TNGOs with government support are more likely to operate in strategic initiative countries than those without such funding. However, it takes time to apply for and to be awarded a grant, and to stand up operations in a country. When a one-year lag is introduced to the dependent variable, the direction of the relationship with *gov_percent* maintains direction, but loses significance. When the same lag is introduced to the *gov_funded* model, the direction and significance of the relationship remain the same. Consequently, receipt of government funds may matter more than the amount of support for TNGOs for location over time.

DV: Strategic Country Presence, Dichotomous	(1) Gov't %	(2) Gov't %, Lag	(3) Gov't Funded	(4) Gov't Funded, Lag
VARIABLES				
Government %	0.299***	-18.414		
	(0.060)	(19.897)		
TNGO Age	0.004***	-1.205**	0.003***	-0.246***
	(0.001)	(0.379)	(0.001)	(0.203)
Faith-based	-0.092*	5.914	-0.0987***	-10.639***
	(0.040)	(13.367)	(0.019)	(6.327)
Int'l Development	-0.009	-90.647***	-0.484*	-76.314*
	(0.041)	(13.739)	(0.022)	(7.265)
Int'l Agriculture	-0.066	-96.540***	-0.026	-54.206
	(0.063)	(21.060)	(0.047)	(15.505)
Int'l Economic Asst.	0.048	-0.695	0.052	-7.765
	(0.050)	(16.569)	(0.033)	(10.927)
Int'l Relief	-0.278*	-44.376**	-0.037	-42.127
	(0.045)	(14.965)	(0.024)	(7.734)
Int'l Migration	0.124	-39.898	-0.038	-21.502
	(0.110)	(36.622)	(0.082)	(15.198)
Government Funded			0.279***	-25.916***
			(0.026)	(8.604)
Observations	710	710	2650	2650
R-squared within	0.0658	0.1034	0.0879	0.0566

Table 3.3: Regression Analysis of Strategic Country Presence 2008—2012, Fixed Effects

Other organizational characteristics are also influential on location in strategic initiative countries. When all else is held constant, the age of an organization is significant at a level of .01 or better across all of the models; however, the direction of the relationship turns negative when a lag is introduced in both cases. This may indicate that while older organizations are more likely to operate in strategic initiative countries, they are less influenced by cues in some cases. For example, older organizations are likely to have more stable funding and may also possess more diversification. As a result, they exhibit less need to respond to government cues. Earlier findings using regional level data showed that older organizations were more likely to operate in multiple regions and that they were also more likely to secure government funding. Together, these may describe TNGOs with more experience and success in securing

funding regardless of source and therefore actively present in more countries due to their survivability.

Faith-based TNGOs are less likely to be present in strategic initiative countries, all else held constant. *Faith* is negative and significant in three of the four models, but changes direction when the one-year lag is introduced with *gov_percent.* In this last case, *faith* is not significant. This result supports previous research showing that faith-based organizations are less likely to collaborate and that certain sectors are also less likely to partner with government (Mitchell 2013). This finding is also supported by research that shows that faith-based groups are more likely to be supported by a donor base made up of individuals and less likely to accept funds from government.

Using international migration as the constant, international development and international agricultural development are both significant. International development (*int_dev*) was negative in all models and significant in three of four models when all else is held constant. When a one-year lag is introduced to the model calculating government support as a percentage, it reaches a significance level of .001; however, when *gov_percent* is introduced without a lag, international development is negative but not significant. International agriculture (*int_ag*) was also negative and significant, but only in the lagged model with government support as a percentage. International relief (*int_relief*) was also negative and significant in this same model.

International economic development and international migration are not significant, but the direction of the relationship may provide support for previous findings. For example, if migration is considered under the header of human rights, the direction of the relationship might be explained by the premium the sector places on

neutrality (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mitchell 2013). However, international human rights is shown here as a distinct NTEE category and does not exhibit a negative relationship (with the exception of the model using a lag and *gov_percent*). Although these sectors are not significant, the direction of the relationship may provide support for previous findings. For example, if migration is considered under the header of human rights, the direction of the relationship might be explained by the premium the sector places on neutrality (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mitchell 2013). However, international human rights is shown here as a distinct NTEE category and does not exhibit a negative relationship. Perhaps a more straightforward explanation is simply that it is easier to secure government funding for less politically charged scopes of work.

Of any sectors, one expects international relief to be most likely to be correlated with location in strategic initiative countries. On January 10, 2010, Haiti experienced a catastrophic 7.0 earthquake that led to a large-scale humanitarian response. On January 27, 2010, President Obama delivered his State of the Union Address in which only Afghanistan received as many mentions as Haiti. The following year, the count for Tunisia sharply increased on the heels of unrest in late 2010 and into 2011. There appears to be some overlap between countries of interest to the international relief community and countries that are of importance to the U.S. government, but each may be responding to external stimuli.

Although government support and operations in at least one strategic initiative country are correlated, it is difficult to discern whether TNGOs follow U.S. government cues or whether the U.S. government uses TNGOs as the proverbial canary in the

coalmine. To delve deeper into the directionality of this relationship, the second model approaches the same question from a different perspective. Rather than focusing on government support and location, it examines the total TNGO presence in a country and the number of times a country is mentioned in a strategic document

Hypothesis 2: Countries with a higher number of mentions in strategic initiatives will have a greater number of U.S.-based TNGOs in them.

Holding all else constant, strategic mentions (*strategic*) is negative and significant at a level of .05. The more often a country is mentioned in the SOTU, NSS, or CLS, the lower the total number of U.S.-based TNGOs located there. As noted in the previous chapter, certain country characteristics also attract a higher number of U.S.-based TNGOs. Freedom of domestic movement (*dommovfix*) and the measure of political stability (*polityfix*) is positive and significant whereas measures of low physical integrity are negative and significant (*killfix* and *tortfix*). This corresponds with earlier findings that the operating environment is important to the location choices of TNGOs, as is the political environment. Cell usage (*hcell_ppc*) is negative and significant, suggesting that there are fewer TNGOs where cell phones are more accessible, which may address wealth or infrastructure development.

DV: Total # TNGOs in a Country	(1) Strat. Mentions
VARIABLES	total_TNGO
Strategic Mentions	-0.094*
	(0.043)
Frdm. of Domestic Mvmnt.	0.022***
	(0.055)
Frdm. of Speech	0.088
	(0.060)
Conflict Magnitude	0.046*
	(0.022)
Cell Phones ppc	-0.008***
	(0.001)
Polity IV	0.016*
	(0.007)
Extrajudicial Kill.	-0.517***
	(0.054)
Torture	-0.670***
	(0.056
Population	0.001***
	(.0001)
Unemployment %	-0.018***
	(0.004)
Constant	4.262
	(0.148)
Lnalpha Constant	-.868
	(0.066)
Alpha	0.420
	(0.028)
Observations	626

Table 3.4: Regression Analysis of Strategic Mentions 2008--2012, Robustness Check

Conflict (*actotal*) and the size of the population (*mpop_total*) are positive and significant. Therefore, TNGOs are drawn to hardship areas as well as locations where impact among the population is maximized. Taken together, the negative finding for the relationship between strategic mentions and the total number of TNGOs and the previous models points to TNGOs as important advocates for certain causes and locations, regardless of funding. At the same time, donor cues are perhaps noteworthy to organizations that have an already established relationship with that donor.

3.6: Discussion

The investigation of U.S. government attention to particular countries via strategic initiatives seeks to explain when and how donors shape the decisions and behavior of U.S.-based TNGOs in terms of location selection. Existing scholarship discusses resource dependency and income diversification, but lacks an international focus. The nonprofit literature emphasizes resource dependency, but focuses on domestic cases and programmatic expertise. The TNGO and accountability literatures touch upon altruism from afar (Smillie 1995) and upward and downward accountability, yet location decision-making receives limited attention and space. This chapter contributes to the literature by building on existing scholarship and testing to what degree donors shape TNGO location. The type of income and how diversified it is, in addition to organizational characteristics, may help to explain when and why TNGOs decide to operate in certain countries. However, the directionality of the relationship remains muddied and requires further research.

The results for the dependent variable, presence in at least one strategic initiative country, in the first set of models shows that there is a correlation between government support received by U.S.-based TNGO and operations in one or more strategic initiative countries. The findings provide some evidence for the resource dependency argument as a result, for example recipients of government monies may be more inclined to follow government cues either through isomorphism or as a competitive strategy to secure funding. However, the question of whether TNGOs create government attention through advocacy, follow government cues, or both respond to external cues makes it difficult to identify directionality of the relationship. Nonetheless, certain organizational

characteristics beyond resources also influence the likelihood that an organization will operate in a strategic country.

As expected, there is a strong relationship between TNGO location in strategic countries and government funding. This result supports a finding presented in the previous chapter: the greater the amount of U.S. economic aid a country receives, the higher the number of U.S.-based TNGOs there. The magnitude of economic aid was small compared to other factors though, which may lend an additional clue to the directionality of the relationship between government cues, support, and TNGO location. Beyond funding types, other organizational characteristics also matter. The age of an organization is also correlated with an increased presence in strategic initiative countries. This may be an indication of the breadth of an organization developed over time or its government savvy. However, when a one-year lag is introduced, the direction of the relationship changes to negative. Perhaps older TNGOs possess more stable funding and are less susceptible to donor cues over time. This result is also indicate a break in the age category, and may be a reflection of the push for collaboration by donors. Consistent with the literature, faith-based TNGOs are less likely to be in strategic initiative countries. This result is significant in three of the four models, and negative in all models where it was significant. Despite domestic initiatives by the U.S. government to extend more support to faith-based community organizations, organizations abroad are less likely to partner with government. One explanation for this reluctance relates to the operating and political environments noted in the previous chapter, and the emphasis placed on neutrality noted by previous scholars (Mitchell 2013).

Contrary to expectations, the type of work a TNGO does is negative in each model where the sector in question is significant. International development, the broadest category, was negative and significant in three of the four models. While not significant in the model where government support was calculated as a percentage, the sign is still negative. The international agriculture and international relief sector results were also significant and negative. Both were significant in the model in which government support was calculated as a percentage and lagged, and international relief was also significant in the percent model without a lag. In each case, U.S.-based TNGOs claiming these sectors as their primary NTEE code are less likely to be in strategic initiative countries. International relief, like faith-based organizations, may value the neutrality and impartiality of the organization and therefore be less likely to partner with government. A second possible explanation rests with the interests of the U.S. government and the selection of sectors included in the model. Although some of the largest international sector categories, these may not capture the government interests as expressed in the strategic initiatives. For example, the most frequently mentioned countries include Afghanistan. Aid here includes relief and development, but also requires a foundation for delivery and may be best implemented by local organizations rather than U.S.-based TNGOs. TNGOs choose locations based on need, but they are also concerned with the safety embodied by the political and operating environments, a factor overlooked by the existing literature by discussed in-depth in this dissertation.

Approached a different way, the second section of this chapter weights TNGO location and the number of strategic mentions a country receives, whereas in the

previous models location was explored as a dichotomous variable. The number of strategic mentions is negative and significant when the total number of TNGOs present in a country is introduced as the dependent variable, meaning that TNGOs are less likely to be present in a country the more often it is mentioned in the SOTU, NSS, or CLS when other country characteristics are held constant. This lends some directionality to the relationships outlined in the previous model. There, a positive correlation between government funding and the location of TNGOs in strategic countries exists, but it is unclear which precedes the other. This suggests that TNGOs possess greater agency than resource dependency allows and re-emphasizes the importance of organizational characteristics. Cues appear to be more important to some types of TNGOs than others, namely those already in receipt of government funds. Further, TNGOs pay attention to the stability and security of their locations. In strategic initiatives, instability and catastrophe may overtake more mundane long-term development goals. With certain exceptions, such countries geographically or economically significant to the U.S., the relationship between the number of mentions and the total number of TNGOs would be expected to be negative.

Implications for Practitioners

Information about TNGO location and the decision-making surrounding such choices is useful to practitioners and scholars. For donors and TNGOs, it helps to build a more layered and nuanced explanation about not only why TNGOs do what they do, but where they do it. Furthermore, examining location through this lens helps policymakers and TNGOs to better understand and to navigate the priorities and

strategies of the other. This produces more clarity in communications, accountability, and agenda setting. Stronger partnerships mean greater capacity to reach goals and beneficiaries. Finally, this lens helps dispel the myth of singularly resource dependent organizations. While some evidence is provided to support resource dependency arguments, the results show that overall TNGOs possess greater agency as advocates and implementers. This ultimately helps practitioners improve decision-making by equipping them with the tools to rationalize decisions and to demonstrate independence to the Board of Directors, donors, and beneficiaries.

3.7: Conclusion

This chapter asks whether U.S. government attention to certain countries between 2008 and 2012 (measured using SOTU, NSS, and CLS) encourages TNGOs to locate in those countries. It finds a correlation between the presence of U.S. government attention to a country and the presence of U.S.-based TNGOs in that country, with certain caveats. For example, faith-based TNGOs are less likely to be present, which supports previous scholarship on U.S. government and faith-based TNGO collaboration (Mitchell 2012). Explanations for TNGO location are often singular, emphasizing one side of the decision-making process. For example, level of need proponents exclude security and resources while resource dependency overlooks elements included in counter-arguments. The findings in this chapter also corroborate findings presented earlier concerning country characteristics and the place of operating and political environments in the location decision-making process. This chapter finds evidence to support the resource dependency argument for location in the correlation between U.S.

government attention and the presence of certain types of U.S.-based TNGOs in countries of interest. However, it should be noted that there are important organizational characteristics that impact the generalizability of this finding to the TNGO sector as a whole. Far from a generalizable explanation, attention must be paid to an organization's scope of work, its mission, and its self-perception.

The receipt of government support as a dummy variable and a percentage of total income showed a positive and highly significant relationship with TNGO location in strategic initiative countries. This suggests that recipients of U.S. government support are more likely to locate in strategic initiative countries. Other organization characteristics were also important factors. More experienced organizations also show a positive and highly significant relationship with the dependent variable. International development, international agriculture, and international relief are significant and negative, which may reflect the priorities of government in different ways. In an effort to determine causality, a second model weighting the number of strategic initiative mentions per country and the total number of U.S.-based TNGOs in a country was investigated. This showed that the more frequently a country is mentioned in strategic documents, the lower the number of U.S.-based TNGOs in that country. As noted, political and operating environments figure into location decision-making by TNGOs. The negative relationship in this second model lends further support to this finding. It also demonstrates that strategic initiative cues are may be more influential for certain U.S.-based TNGOs than others depending on organizational characteristics such as faith-based orientation, previous U.S. government funding, and scope of work.

Location raises interesting questions about how TNGOs decide where to go and the nature of resource dependence. The resource dependency argument appears to hold some weight, but the sector and organizational characteristics show that there is more to consider, including whether the strategic interests and not just the country fit within the scope of mission of TNGOs. This research presents a more nuanced understanding of U.S.-based TNGO location choices. It shows that U.S. government interest in a country and how U.S.-based TNGOs respond to that interest is not purely based on resources. Instead, the influence U.S. government attention exercises over U.S.-based TNGO location varies. A more complex explanation is supported, which is important in foreign policy conversations where the U.S. government depends on TNGOs as delivery vehicles and soft power. Rather than TNGOs being influenced by strategic initiatives and subject to resource dependency, they themselves may be influencers with considerable agency.

3.8: Future Research

A better understanding of how and when donor cues, the U.S. government in particular, shape the behavior of U.S.-based TNGOs necessitates future research. Further data collection on TNGOs and prioritization of location may give a stronger indication of directionality: do TNGOs follow government cues, or is it government that is following TNGO cues? To do so, scholars may be interested in pursuing a multi-method approach that includes qualitative interviews with decision-makers in TNGOs. In addition, an analysis of the networks between TNGOs and between TNGOs and government would illustrate more clearly the levels of donor influence toward primary

awardees and sub-awardees. A survival analysis of TNGO location in relationship to government funding and strategic initiatives may also yield beneficial information to scholars exploring TNGO status, location, and influence.

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Chapter 4 : Internal Dynamics of International Development TNGOs

4.1: Introduction

The internal dynamics of transnational nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs) plays an important role in organizational decision-making for both programs and location choices. Understanding the internal dynamics of decision-making is important because organizational structure dictates the way in which priorities are set and communicated and shapes the manner in which units compete for attention and resources. More specifically, it places information collected from the external environment within the context of a TNGO's mission and values. The previous two empirical chapters show that decision-making by TNGOs is more layered and complex than existing theoretical lenses allow. As open systems, TNGOs rely on external resources to pursue their objectives, yet decision-making involves more than only donor imperatives. As a result, a more detailed examination of the factors driving location decisions must include organizational structure and the internal dynamics of TNGOs.

This chapter is tasked with explaining who sets priorities and how those priorities are communicated within TNGOs. Studies find that transnational organizations, nongovernmental organizations and multinational corporations (MNCs) included, are more likely to resemble the structure and culture of entities in their home countries (Stroup 2012; Ghoshal and Nohria 1989). As an American TNGO, CARE will share more traits with the American Red Cross, Heifer International, and Landesa than with Oxfam or Médicins sans Frontières (MSF / Doctors Without Borders). Similar to a formative event in an individual's life, the home country environment is so

determinative that U.S.-based TNGOs are likely to resemble each other more than any other organization. Formative events are used by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) to explain shifts in values, and in particular, democratization. Part of a larger body of work, including the World Values Survey, they find that shifts in intergenerational values are limited. Importantly, however, shifts reflect first-hand experiences. Such formative experiences are the produce of the socioeconomic and political environments in which might experience war, hunger, or significant economic growth and security. Such experiences are broad and shared across generations, creating strong preferences for certain values, outcomes, and forms of expression. In the case of organizations, the socioeconomic and political environment also produces formative experiences that help to shape organizations. As with individuals, such experiences are broad and generational. For example, the overall growth of the nonprofit sector and the push toward social entrepreneurship by that is prevalent among Millennials. In an organizational context, governance and decision-making by consequence, are embedded in a broader social, fiscal, political, and cultural environment that thereby shapes practices and outcomes (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001, 17).

Still, little scholarship focuses on patterns of communication and organizational structure among TNGOs. Federated bodies have been examined in the domestic context (Provan 1983; Stone, Hager, and Griffin 2001) and the role of organization identity in the international context (Young 2001). However, there is little linkage between these two areas of study compared to the body of literature on organizational structure and the relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries in MNCs (Ghoshal and Nohria 1989; Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990; Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen, and Li 2004; Gupta

and Govindarajan 2000). In their discussion of MNCs as interorganizational networks, Ghoshal and Bartlett acknowledge the work of Dimaggio and Powell (1983) on institutional legitimacy and the competition for political power and Provan (1983) on federated structures. This highlights the potential for nonprofit studies to draw from MNC scholarship to understand factors that shape decision-making in addition to the external environment.

Focusing on the international development sector, this chapter presents three conceptual models of organization structure. The models were developed using interviews conducted with the country directors and deputy country directors of 23 U.S.-based TNGOs operating in Uganda. International development as a sector encompasses a range of organizations in size, age, and activity. Due to this diversity, the sector is well suited for a comparative examination of the internal dynamics of TNGOs while also offering a premise for comparability. Uganda was selected as the field site for the number of U.S.-based international development TNGOs and for its representativeness as a case. Although the number of organizations is higher than in other cases, TNGOs operating in Uganda are representative the broader population of international development TNGOs.

Finally, interviews with the country directors and deputies of U.S.-based TNGOs serves two purposes. First, it directly addresses the question of internal dynamics: who sets priorities in the organization internally and how are these communicated to the distinct units across the organization? This approach expands the domestic scope of the nonprofit and public administration literature, and emphasizing a dimension other than performance (Brown 2004; Brown 2005; Rojas 2000; Sowa 2009;

Herman and Renz 1999). It also adds a new perspective by focusing on field staff rather than elite interviews with Boards of Directors or executives (Daley and Angulo 1994; Bradshaw, Murray, and Wolpin 1992; O'Regan and Oster 2005). Second, interviews are a mechanism to verify earlier findings on the significance of external factors.

4.2: Previous Research

Organizational Structure in Transnational Organizations

Studies of organizational structure in transnational organizations are predominantly found in scholarship on for-profit entities (Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen, and Li 2004; Ghoshal and Nohria 1989). Attention to this issue in the nonprofit and TNGO spheres places a strong emphasis on federated bodies and associations (Young et al. 1999) or on comparative cases in developed countries (Zald and Garner 1987; Wilson 1973). In the development literature, attention to North-South relations and partnerships with local TNGOs are much studied (Suzuki 1988; Hudson and Bielefeld 1997). There are, however, special challenges in managing transnational nonprofits that distinguish TNGOs from domestic nonprofits. For example, decentralized organizations re found to be more effective in politically charged environments that require immediate adaptation (Zald and Garner 1987). Similarly, one organizational structure may be more suitable for some activities over others. This makes the study of internal dynamics and organizational structure worthwhile.

The literature examining the organizational structure, transfer of knowledge, and communication flows within MNCs can be extended to TNGOs. MNCs, like TNGOs, are geographically dispersed entities whose structures may be adapted to fit the local

political and operating environment and to reflect different scopes of work and resource contingencies. In the case of TNGOs, the country offices represent the subsidiary units in a MNC. Rather than a dyadic relationship solely between headquarters and the subsidiary, the complex nature of these bodies is better described as an interorganizational network in which goals may be disparate and structure is homogenous (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990).

The units of TNGOs engage in varying degrees of integration, including federative structures, coalitions, and corporate structures (Hudson and Bielefeld 1997, 34–37). Like for-profit counterparts, TNGOs may make adjustments to internal organization in response to market changes (Marwell 2005). Arguments concerning organizational structure are heavily reliant on resource dependency as an explanation, whether resources are centralized or locally available. The configuration and control of these resources dictates structural characteristics (Ghoshal and Nohria 1989). For example, where units control their own resources a decentralized structure or associational organizations are more likely. Where local resources are scarce, a centralized model is more likely. Units with control over resources possess greater power, and the ability to set the agenda and control the conversation about those priorities (Hudson and Bielefeld 1997).

Within the development and TNGO literatures, the focus is primarily outward and on relationships with government and donors (Bebbington and Riddell 1997; Nunnenkamp, Weingarth, and Weisser 2009; Temudo 2005). Within the nonprofit literature, federated decision-making among grant-making foundations has received particular attention. The concept of federated decision-making can be applied to

TNGOs given the geographically diffuse nature of TNGOs if the units are assumed to operate somewhat independently, yet pursue the same overarching goal. As an organizing structure, federations aggregate a diverse set of activities while linkages between units create a cohesive identity and organizational structure through which units communicate. These organizations function in a similar environment to the domestic federations Provan (1983) focuses upon. U.S.-based TNGOs are interdependent, although certain programs or country offices may be sacrificed for the greater good of the organization. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) refer to an "organized coordination of interdependence", which presumes federation members consent due to an assumed need for centralized coordination and management. Federations are most likely to form when a large number of units with interdependent interests exist. While the examples listed above refer to independent units with common interests at a national level, it is possible to apply the same conceptual framework to TNGOs. Similar to federations, TNGOs exist in a geographically diffuse space where communication, coordination, and interdependence play important roles in the management of the organization as a whole. Even where TNGOs do not elect a federated structure, they still face many of the same conditions and operate with the goal of reducing uncertainty

Federated structures follow three models: mandated, voluntary, and independent. In each, the degree of influence experienced by the individual units is mediated by the variety of organizational structure. Strategic decisions are most highly influenced by the hierarchy in mandatory federations whereas independent federations grants units far more independence while still benefitting from linkages (Provan 1983). Such linkages are underpinned by organizational identity. In the case of U.S.-based

TNGOs, this identity is key to the success of the organization regardless of its structure. This identity is key to organizational structure and decision-making. Young (2001) argues that although form may differ across organizations, identity guides and shapes the organization's actions. He notes that "All participants commonly understand that the organization is a bus going along a certain route, and this is what allows them to support it collectively" (Young 2001, 141). This suggests that a common mission, vision, and strategy is understood across units. At the same time, the metaphorical bus might also be a vehicle for units to get to different places as they compete with each other to advance their own priorities and ensure sustainability. In this sense, units commit to a common mission and vision, but might pursue different endeavors and strategies to reach those goals.

If the federated model described by others were efficient enough to meet the demands placed on it by multiple stakeholders, we would expect a uniform structure across TNGOs. However, there is diversity in form. This indicates forces beyond resource dependency at play, including mission as well as leadership changes. This not only governs overarching organization goals, but also the communication and knowledge flows within said organization:

> "Structure is the architecture through which parts of the organization interact with one another. Strategy is the set of policies and practices through which the organization addresses its purposes. An organization can frame its identity in structural or strategic terms... Identity, though, is a deeper idea from which implications for structure and strategy follow." (Young 2001, 143)

This raises two questions. Does the often-addressed federated model in the nonprofit literature represent TNGOs? And what can the MNC literature add to the discussion about the internal dynamics of TNGOs? This study adds to the field by

testing whether such characterizations hold true in a broader set of cases and examining the decision-making and communication process that shapes resource allocation and goal prioritization.

The outcome of internal dynamics produced by organizational structure, resource allocation, and communication is effectiveness and accountability. Accountability in the field of public management, and especially in the context of TNGOs and domestic nonprofits, has become a primary concern for both practitioners and scholars (Ebrahim 2003; Edwards and Hulme 1996b; Sloan 2009; Schmitz, Raggo, and Bruno-van Vijfeijken 2012). One of the pitfalls of civil society is its inability to demonstrate outcome accountability (Bruno-van Vijfeijken and Schmitz 2011). For domestic nonprofits, this led to the rise of charity watchdogs that serve as self-appointed oversight organizations for stakeholders, but especially for donors. Assessments by such organizations are critiqued as overly dependent upon financial measures and ratios that obscure the true impact of a nonprofit. Furthermore, this emphasis perpetuates the myth that overhead is bad, thereby stunting growth of infrastructure and future development in nonprofits. For organizations focused on international scopes of work, accountability is amplified by the geographical distance between donors, headquarters, and the programs themselves (Smillie 1995).

While upward accountability may be difficult to demonstrate, downward accountability proves even more challenging. In contrast to upward accountability when TNGOs are responsible to donors through charity watchdogs, financial reports, annual reports, and so on, downward accountability describes an organization's responsibility to beneficiaries (Ebrahim 2003). TNGOs are sometimes described as elitist due to their

inability to provide appropriate policy solutions. At the same time, they are the organizations that possess the knowledge, capacity, and expertise to implement policy solutions. The elitist critique is not without merit, cases in which programs were not appropriate for a political or operating environment, or culturally appropriate on a larger-scale, are well documented. Instead of inattention to context, this critique may be more strongly connected to the challenges of downward accountability (Bexell, Tallberg, and Uhlin 2010; Ebrahim 2003)whose mechanisms remain underdeveloped at the expense of functional short-term accountability over long-term strategic accountability (Ebrahim 2003).

Civil society, a broader category of voluntary and associational nongovernmental organizations that includes TNGOs, is driven by a number of external factors. These include weak state institutions that rely on the third sector to fill gaps in services, similar to the hollow state (Milward 1994; Milward and Provan 2000), but with different motives.

4.3: Conceptual Framework

Like MNCs, TNGOs are transnational bodies operating in heterogeneous environments. Scholars of MNCs use contingency theory to explain the variation in organizational structure and internal dynamics through the lens of operating environments at the national level. Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) advance the contingency framework to understand the conditions under certain forms of organization are more or less likely, building upon the earlier scholarship on contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Drazin and de Ven 1985). Contingency theory posits that organizational

effectiveness results from adjusting organizational characteristics, including structure, to contingencies that reflect the reality of the organization (Donaldson 2001). This may include the operating environment, resources, organization size, technology, or other factors (Child 1975; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Consequently, this framework provides an opportunity to understand the variation on organizational structure and the implications it has for location decision-making. This chapter explores this conceptual framework further to see if its proposals might be extended to TNGOs.

The proposed framework is premised on local resource levels as well as the relative environmental complexity, emphasizing organizational adaptation to fit these two contingencies. The relationship between the unit and headquarters is organized into three categories: 1) centralization in which the unit exercises little autonomy; 2) formalization, in which decision-making is subject to rules and procedures; 3) and normative integration, in which consensus is the basis for decision-making (Ghoshal and Nohria 1989). Adapted to TNGOs, the relationship under examination is that between headquarters and the country offices. The elements of autonomy, procedures for decision-making, and shared values across the organization may be used to describe the processes and structure within TNGOs. The case under consideration here is the international development sector in Uganda. Consequently, the environmental complexity is adapted to describe variation within the sector. For example, the political and operating environment faced by human rights organizations is likely more contentious than that of education or public health organizations. Figure 1 illustrates the conditions and organizational outcomes.




Table 4.1: Contingency Framework and Authority Levels

Although contingency theory is not without its challenges, it provides a useful starting point for developing propositions about TNGO decision-making and structure. Critics of the theory cite the assumption that there is no one best way to organize or that organizing is not equally effective in all contexts (Schoonhoven 1981). However, this perspective posits that organizational outcomes are adapted to the environment in question. Furthermore, it is an approach that achieves generalizability resulting from its fit to a range of subjects. Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) did exactly this, extending on the work of Lawrence and Dyer (1983) to MNCs. Furthermore, the application of the framework to TNGOs is an opportunity to adapt and refine it, drawing together fields including development, organization behavior, and nonprofits.

In the private sector, environmental complexity results in greater interdependency between headquarters and subsidiary units. Information asymmetry and changes in the operating environment lead to reciprocal communication, cooperation, and collaboration. In contrast, as resource levels at the national level

increase, units are able to exercise more autonomy in setting priorities and limit the exchange of information with other units. This decentralization may ultimately lead to tension between individual units in the organization if resources are unevenly distributed, especially where headquarters is concerned.

Environmental Complexity	Local Resources: (low)	Local Resources: (high)
(high)	**Clans** Moderate Centralization Low Formalization High Socialization	**Integrative / Hybrid** Low Centralization Moderate Formalization High Socialization
(low)	**Hierarchy / Centralized** High Centralization Low Formalization Low Socialization	**Federative / Decentralized** Low Centralization High Formalization Low Socialization

Table 4.2: Ghoshal and Nohria Predicted Organization Structure by Fit (1989, 328)

Fit conditions lead Ghoshal and Nohria to develop a four-category typology characterizing headquarter-subsidiary relations. In the first, both the complexity of the environment relative to other units and local resources are low, meaning that operations are straightforward and subsidiaries are dependent on headquarters for resources. In the second scenario, environmental complexity is low while resources available directly to the subsidiary at the local level are high. The third scenario describes high environmental complexity and low resource levels, while the fourth scenario describes high environmental complexity and high levels of local resources (Ghoshal and Nohria 1989). These conditions shape organizational structure and communication exchanges, as outlined in Figure 2.

Proposition 1a: Centralized TNGOs follow a top-down approach to decision-making and communication of priorities.

Consequently, country directors and field experts hold little sway in the process and act primarily as receivers of information and implementers, resembling a more traditional conception of TNGOs in the fields of public policy and development. Among MNCs, this suggests that as environmental complexity goes down and there are fewer local resources available, a centralized organizational structure is more likely. The same may be true for TNGOs. Where the need for cultural and political knowledge or a higher degree of dependence on centralized funds, priorities are more likely to be set and communicated in a top-down manner.

Proposition 1b: Federative TNGOs follow a bottom-up, yet autonomous, approach to priority setting, framing, and communication.

Country directors and field experts play an integral role in the identification of priorities, and implementation and termination. Units resemble each other in brand and mission, but operate as discrete units in decision-making. This structure is not present in the contingency framework targeted toward MNCs because a decentralized model is neither characteristic of the cohesive organization that an MNC represents nor the uniformity of its stakeholders. Still, it may be characterized using environmental complexity and the availability of local resources. In this case, environmental complexity is high thereby requiring field expertise and local resources are readily available. The contingency framework's formalization structure is also high in environmental complexity and local resource levels, yet they lead to interdependence.

Rather than interdependence, a decentralized federative model characterized by greater autonomy with high levels of complexity and resources is proposed.

Proposition 1c: Hybrid TNGOs follow an incremental approach to priority setting, framing, and communication.

Both the U.S. headquarters and country directors play a role in decision-making within the organization. Strategy is ultimately communicated from headquarters, but it is the product of information sharing in both directions. Like MNCs, there is a higher degree of communication and participatory decision-making in this model. This consensus building is dependent upon a shared set of values across the organization, creating a structure that is interdependent with larger flows of information from subsidiary to headquarters and vice versa. This is necessitated by the expertise possessed by the individual units in relationship to the goals of the organization and its resources.

4.3: Data and Methods

The origins of this research begin with a dataset that includes original data collected from documentary government and TNGO sources. It includes both organizational and financial characteristics for 554 U.S.-based TNGOs between 2008 and 2012. U.S.-based TNGOs represent some of the largest and most impactful nongovernmental organizations in the world (Mitchell 2013). In addition, focusing on U.S.-based TNGOs provides a wealth of data, made available through the form 990 filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) at least once every three years and

cataloged at the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) at the Urban Institute. For a TNGO to be included in the dataset, it is required to meet three conditions. First, it must be a 501(c)(3) public charity registered nonprofit organization with the IRS[18]. This establishes consistency in the type of TNGO and data availability. Second, organizations must report at least $1 million in revenue per the NCCS database. This threshold was selected based on a pre-determined search parameter in the NCCS database and to eliminate TNGOs that are not required to register with the IRS, are less likely to operate across borders, and to minimize missing data. However, it encompasses a diverse set of TNGOs from very small to very large, and a range of scopes of work. Finally, TNGOs must meet an "in-country" rule, meaning that the organizations included in the data maintain staff, infrastructure, or another presence in a location overseas. This condition was evaluated using program descriptions, maps, websites, and annual reports.

[18] This excludes 501(c)(3) private foundations, universities and colleges, and hospitals, which are also captured in the public charity category. Private foundations in particular are excluded because they do not engage in implementation. Although they may shape decision-making in some cases, as discussed in the previous chapter, they along with the other excluded public charities are not subject to the same operational and logistical commitments of other public charities. Furthermore, private foundations report financial and organizational information to the IRS using the form 990-PF. This form asks questions different from that of the form 990 filed by the TNGOs included in this dataset.

The form 990 provides a strong foundation, yet self-reported data provided in the form varies widely from organization to organization. This reflects the range of professionalization, expertise, and size of U.S.-based TNGOs. The level of professionalization in an organization and the expertise of the person responsible for completing the form 990 produce different levels of detail and accuracy in the reporting of information on the form 990. In terms of location specifically, some TNGOs may report location data at the micro-level while others report at the macro-level. Others may report only on the programs offered and omit location data altogether. To capture the location of TNGOs more accurately, the form 990 is supplemented with TNGO documents. Using content analysis, data points are collected using annual reports and a retrospective analysis of TNGO websites.

Data collected from the form 990s was hand coded by the author and a team of two non-specialists. The data collected from TNGO annual reports was coded by the author and non-specialists sourced using Mechanical Turk. An initial test was run using Mechanical Turk to identify a group of reliable coders whom the author corresponded with throughout the process to ensure accurate data collection. The work of Mechanical Turk coders was also checked as it was submitted.

Following the identification of the U.S.-based TNGO population, a preliminary analysis of sector using the National Taxonomy for Tax-Exempt Entities (NTEE) was conducted. The international development sector was selected due to its breadth and diversity. As a whole, it represents the largest sector of U.S.-based TNGOs in the dataset and includes both small and large organizations working in a number of locations with a variety of funding sources. The sector is also broad enough to capture

an array of activities from governance to health to small business development. U.S.-based TNGOs may be coded using up to three NTEE codes, which are assigned by the IRS when the organization applies for its tax-exempt status. Codes are designated by an expert and are based on the programs a TNGO offers and additional information provided in its application materials. Across all the data, TNGOs listing international development (Q30) as their primary activity comprise 23.7 percent of the total number of organizations.




Table 4.3: Map: of Uganda and Surrounding Countries (CIA 2005)

This chapter uses semi-structured interviews with U.S.-based TNGOs working in the field of international development. No organizational structure criteria were imposed in the selection of TNGOs for interviews. Instead, interviews were sought with a diverse range of U.S.-based TNGOs to understand the internal dynamics of decision-making. These organizations varied in age, size, shape, and orientation. Interviews were

conducted over an eight-week period in the summer of 2015 with country directors or deputy country directors at 23 organizations in Kampala, Uganda. Reliance on high-level interviews and written sources for analysis carries a risk of bias and missing data, but was necessary due to time and resource constraints. The country directors or deputies who agreed to interviews were fully cooperative and available for follow-up meetings and email correspondence to answer remaining questions, thereby mitigating incomplete information.

Uganda is representative as a case in many ways, but uncharacteristic in others. Compared to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, organizations working in the field of international development in Uganda are similar in age and program expenditures. Although they tend to be somewhat smaller in terms of the number of employees than organizations operating elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa in international development, the number of volunteers is similar across international development cases in Uganda and elsewhere in the region. Salaries, however, tend to be slightly higher in the Ugandan cases. Overall, the total number of international development U.S.-based TNGOs in Uganda is higher than in other countries. This makes the case unique, however, the density of international development TNGOs might be explained at a regional level. Uganda's neighbors, including Kenya, South Sudan, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo all experience refugee flows. In addition, Uganda is also in close proximity to other high activity areas such as Burundi, Ethiopia, and Sudan all experience refugee flows or conflict. Uganda is also advantageous for fieldwork due to accessibility of TNGOs. Neighboring Kenya also contains a high concentration of international development TNGOs and shares some of the same traits, however, the

amount of scholarship on Kenya makes access to TNGOs challenging.[19] Therefore, Uganda presented an opportunity to explore the research question at hand and to expand the breadth of cases in the literature.

Int'l Development TNGOs	Age	No. Employees	No. Volunteers	Salaries	Program Expenditures
In Uganda	20.20	56.12	3060.81	4406017	2.74e+07
Not in Uganda	28.05	183.07	10934.32	2.15e+07	8.88e+07
Total	21.85	86.53	4982.1	8887660	4.35e+07

Table 4.4: Representativeness of Ugandan Case Study

Methods

Using a case study in international development, this analysis tests the MNC contingency framework to determine if its propositions about organizational structure hold true for TNGOs. By comparatively examining how U.S.-based TNGOs set priorities and communicate these priorities internally, both practitioners and scholars can benefit from a better understanding of the internal and external drivers of decision-

[19] Kenya is perhaps the most often studied case in sub-Saharan Africa (see Berg-Schlosser, Dirk and Rainer Siegler 1990; Brass 2012; Hyden 1984; Okuku 2002; Rono 2002; Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). Kenya is also attractive to TNGOs for its geography and infrastructure. Its proximity to several "hot spots" in the region along with its roads, Internet, and telephone infrastructure make it an ideal operational and logistical environment for regional headquarters and implementation inside and outside of the country. In addition, the political stability of Kenya facilitates TNGO activities, despite some restrictive legislation concerning TNGOs.

making. This approach offers insight into the internal dynamics of TNGOs, the value placed on field expertise, and the assumptions made by decision-makers. Furthermore, it adds depth to the quantitative findings outlined in previous chapters. Case studies are a useful approach for understanding a phenomenon in greater detail. This chapter uses the representative case, or single case study, approach focusing the international development sector as a unit to learn more about its management and decision-making processes. It is an appropriate tool to learn more about how nonprofit managers address risk, cope with uncertainty, and communicate with one another internally.

The objective of this chapter is to determine how TNGOs communicate and set priorities internally. The international development sector was selected as the unit of study due to its size and diversity of organizations. In addition, it is comprised of the most geographically diverse organizations. In public administration, single case studies often provide a record of successes or failures (McNabb 2010, 68). In this research design, success and failures are documented both by interviews with country directors and deputy country directors, and by content analysis identifying the expansion and retrenching of TNGOs presented in earlier chapters. Content analysis of the form 990s, annual reports, and websites represents the first phase of the research design in which organizations, sector, and field site are identified. Semi-structured interviews represent the second phase of the research design. To build theory about communication and prioritization among TNGOs, data was organized into three conceptual categories using the contingency framework adapted by Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) to examine subsidiaries within MNCs. This approach allows for patterns of prioritization and

communication to emerge from the data while also taking external factors into consideration, and to ultimately build a theory of TNGO structure.

Interviews with the TNGOs were conducted in the capitol city of Uganda, Kampala. The initial research design included travel throughout the country by the author to the offices of TNGOs. However, this approach was adapted due to travel schedules of country directors and their deputies. In summer, many expatriate staff members schedule leave to their country of origin to correspond with the traditional western holiday season. In all but one case, organizations accepting interviews scheduled meetings in Kampala. However, many TNGOs maintain main offices in Kampala with smaller field offices located at program sites. This achieves two goals: first, country directors in closer proximity to policymakers and government offices enabling them to advocate for their organization, build relationships, and coordinate logistics; second, infrastructure and amenities in Kampala are significantly better than elsewhere in the country. As a result, directors are supported by more consistent electricity, water, and telephone services. Furthermore, housing and schools provide a more attractive package to directors and thereby better human resources opportunities for the organization.

Constant comparison and contrasting of empirical evidence occurred as interviews were conducted. As others have found in fieldwork, the best-laid plans are often ill fitted in reality and must be adapted. This was also the case with the interviews in this study. Initial efforts to secure contacts through U.S. TNGO headquarters were limited in their success. The strategy of securing contacts through U.S.-based TNGO headquarters was designed to snowball the sample, establishing relationships with

certain organizations and utilizing these relationships and built credibility to secure further interviews. In reality, requests to U.S. headquarters were met with silence in most cases. Consequently, it became necessary to adjust the snowball approach to being upon arrival in Kampala.

The principle of credibility and networks remained key to the interview process, and the process in Kampala produced a higher response rate than attempts to contact U.S. headquarter offices or country offices before arrival. This is the product of commitment, attention, and a local phone number. TNGOs receive requests from potential doors, policymakers, and researchers. Like bureaucrats, they are subject to bounded rationality in which they use heuristics to prioritize their agendas (Jones 2001). Contacting country directors after arrival in Kampala signaled a greater commitment to the study on the part of the researcher and a lower likelihood of failure and poorly invested time on the part of the director. Initial contact was made via e-mail, with the exception of two cases where the researcher's business cards were left at the offices because the name and e-mail of the contact were not located. The most frequent means to secure contact information was directly from country directors who shared the new contact's information with the researcher or who provided the researcher's information to the contact. The second most common means was referral by name in which the name of the country director was provided to the researcher at the conclusion of the interview and the researcher used TNGO documents and online databases to identify the correct person and his or her contact details. A local phone number facilitated contact and further demonstrated commitment and credibility. Due to the nature of snowball

interviews and scheduling, meetings with country directors and their deputies were conducted in alternating periods with other research on organizations and contacts.

Category	Question Prompts
General	Is the organization driven by a commitment to a specific country, region, or demographic, or is it issue-driven?
Location	I see from your organization's form 990 that it works in [# of countries], is this accurate? What brought you to these countries?
Location	Does the work of other organizations come into consideration in location decisions?
Location	In the news, several TNGOs decided to withdrawal international staff from areas affected by Ebola. How does risk figure into your organization's decisions to enter or exit?
Organizational	Are decisions about programming and location participatory or made at the executive level?
Organizational	What is the role of in-country staff in decision-making? Doe decision-makers value the views of staff?
Organizational	In some organizations, the Board of Directors plays a formative role in meeting the goals of the organization, providing contacts, special skills, and passion for the cause. What is the role of the Board of Directors in program development and strategic planning in your organization?
Resources	Do donors influence location choice? How do they do so?
Final	How can the decision-making process be improved?
Final	Are there any important factors I have overlooked that you feel are important in determining where your organization works?

Table 4.5: Sample Prompts for Country Director Interviews[20]

Interviews were conducted at TNGO offices or a location convenient to the interviewee. In two cases, interviews took place via Skype. One interview was conducted at a country director's home while the other interviews conducted outside TNGO offices were held in coffee houses. In most cases, interviews conducted outside the officer were for the convenience of the interviewee; however, this is also a reflection of the diversity of U.S.-based TNGOs in international development. Smaller TNGOs may not have the space to host a researcher, even for a short period of time. In some cases, small TNGOs did not have a formal office and instead operated from

[20] See Appendix A for complete list of interview prompts.

homes or coffee shops. Comparatively, other TNGOs possessed highly professionalized spaces and even entire buildings. Interviews ranged from 45 minutes to two and a half hours. The final response rate was 41.6 percent, with 23 interviews secured from sixty U.S.-based TNGOs in the international development sector in Uganda.

The following analysis is based on findings from semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews are advantageous because they allow the researcher to gently guide the discussion while permitting the interviewee to identify themes and issues that are important to him or her. Chapter 3 identified significant factors in the operating and political environment that influence decision-making. These factors, however, are overlooked in scholarship. Semi-structured interviews are an opportunity for practitioners to inform scholarship by building on existing themes and by identifying influential but overlooked areas of concern. The aim of this chapter is to capture the dynamics of internal decision-making, including the process, setting of priorities, and communications of such priorities. The goal is to provide a description of internal decision-making and to improve understanding of how internal factors shape location choices. This chapter lays out three models of internal decision-making among U.S.-based TNGOs in the international development sector and introduces factors and characteristics that help to explain how organizations decide locations, including expansion and withdrawal.

The previous chapters have employed statistical analyses to estimate the magnitude of effects of external forces on location decision-making. Such measures are useful for the examination of multiple factors and pursuing generalizable findings, but the causal pathways internal to an organization influence actors in the decision-making

process, the flow of information, and the ultimate prioritization of items on the agenda. Comparative analysis of decision-making process in U.S.-based international development TNGOs is a model-building analysis that seeks to explain differences in communication across organizations and the roles of country directors and field experts.

Using a cast study of international development, data from the semi-structured interviews is used to comparatively examine the internal dynamics and decision-making roles of each TNGO. The explanation outlined here presents three organizational structures of location decision-making: centralized, a top-down decision-making strategy in which the input of country directors and field staff play a limited role; decentralized, a highly autonomous decision-making structure in which country offices operate with little support from U.S. headquarters or from each other; and hybrid, a consensus oriented decision-making structure in which priorities are set by U.S. headquarters with input from country offices.

4.5: Setting and Communicating Priorities: Models of Organizational Structure

The following analysis focuses on findings concerning the internal dynamics of decision-making. More specifically, it explains who sets location priorities within U.S.-based TNGOs in the field of international development and how these priorities are communicated. This explanation is composed of three elements: a top-down relationship between the U.S. headquarters and the country offices; a bottom-up approach in which the country offices operate autonomously; and finally, a consensus approach that operates on an incremental flow of information in both directions. The

role of country directors and field experts can be altered by the organizational structure of the TNGO, even where implementation is heavily reliant on such expertise.

Characteristics	Centralized	Federative	Hybrid
Participation of country offices	Low	High	High
Primary source of power	Centralized	Decentralized	Federative
Primary resource management	Centralized	Decentralized	Decentralized
Network Structure	Hierarchy	Decentralized	Integrated
Communication	Top-down	Bottom-up	Two-way

Table 4.6: Organization Linkage Characteristics

Centralized

Proposition 1a: Centralized TNGOs follow a top-down approach to decision-making and communication of priorities.

The centralized model describes TNGOs that are hierarchical in setting priorities and communication. This was the smallest category of TNGOs interviewed. This may be the result of donor pressure to increase partnership with local TNGOs to create sustainable solutions. It may also indicate bias in the international development sector toward other organizational structures due to environmental complexity.

Of the TNGOs interviewed, only 3 can be characterized as centralized. This accounts for 14 percent of the organizations interviewed. These TNGOs represented a range of sectors, implementing programs in health, agriculture, education, and infrastructure development. In two of the cases, the centralized structure was linked to recent leadership changes.




Figure 4.1: Centralized Priority and Communication Flows

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Decision-making in centralized organizational structures is restricted to U.S. headquarters. Typically the Board of Directors makes strategic country choices, and decisions are subsequently communicated downward to country units. One country director directly related a transition at the CEO level with less autonomy at the country level, noting the introduction of stricter financial and program-related policies requiring

approval from headquarters for spending and other decision-making. Although this TNGO identifies itself primarily as an international TNGO, its program portfolio includes a large domestic program. While this program's beneficiaries are immigrants and refugees, the hierarchical priority setting and communication creates tension with the country units. This is amplified by the perception that U.S.-based staff allocate the majority of their time to this domestic project, despite being designated as international staff, amplifying tension between the units.

This conflicts with Young's (2001) emphasis on nonprofit identity and provides support for resource dependency. On the one hand, the organization presents itself as an international entity, yet the perception of field staff is that it is a primarily domestic organization to the detriment of international programs. At the same time, the organization views its domestic beneficiaries as international, fitting with its public profile. At the same time, the "bread and butter" of the organization is with the domestic program, obliging the organization to acknowledge and structure itself in response to the reality. In this case, the environment is complex not in the field, but in its resources.

Despite the centralized structure that governs policies and goals, fundraising in centralized cases remains the responsibility of the country office. Ghoshal and Nohria's contingency framework highlights the importance of local resources in organizational structure. Where units are dependent on headquarters for funds, a centralized structure is more likely. In addition, low formalization in routinization and allocation is also characteristic of a centralized structure. However, the relinquished control over resources and the autonomy units exercise in what, when, and how much revenue to

pursue poses several challenges for the contingency framework. More specifically, this empirical observation does not correspond with descriptions of centralized MNCs. Instead, it describes high local resources leading to higher degrees of autonomy characteristic of the federative or hybrid models. This may be a reflection of one of the largest challenges for TNGOs, sustainable and sufficient resources and the environmental complexity requiring field staff expertise. It may also reflect the nature of human resources in some TNGOs, where resources are channeled toward programs rather than the maintenance of a Business Development unit or other overhead that is common in the for-profit sector.

Each of the centralized TNGOs stated that its staff was mostly Ugandan nationals. However, in all cases expatriate staff from Western countries occupied executive level positions. In one case, the entirety of the organization was expatriate staff. This supports the contingency framework, which describes a lack of trust at the local level. In the Ugandan case, interviewees indicated that this outcome is the product of education and training. More simply, the Ugandan education does not produce enough graduates with the knowledge to effectively and efficiently operate a TNGO at the level of accountability required by donors. Ethnic competition and patron-client systems prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa (Bates; Bevan 2004; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010) are perhaps the most tangible example of this. Family ties place a significant amount of pressure on nationals to hire kinsmen or to otherwise direct benefits to them. For this reason, many TNGOs place Western staff in decision-making positions or make efforts to place national staff outside of their home region. In the latter case, pressure may transfer from kinship to a broader Ugandan identity. In

organizations with Ugandan staff, country directors expressed the hope that the education system would eventually supply enough qualified individuals that the work became self-sustainable and Western staff would no longer be necessary.

Centralized organizational structures exhibit low socialization. Although there may be opportunity for national staff to move within country or region, opportunities for them to advance through the organization are absent. In addition, the top-down nature of communication and priority setting does not emphasize socialization between organization units. Furthermore, competition between units, especially in the same region, for the same funds may further provides a disincentive for knowledge sharing and socialization.

Proposition 1a states that centralized TNGOs follow a top-down approach to decision-making and communication of priorities. This proposition holds true along two of the three dimensions, high centralization and low socialization, but requires some adjustment to transfer from MNCs to TNGOs. The contingency framework's propositions about centralized organizational structures among MNCs holds true for TNGOs along several dimensions, however, it is evident that TNGOs are unique in several ways. First, the nature of fundraising and revenue diversification requires some adjustments to the framework. Along this dimension, there may be more similarities across TNGOs than present across MNCs. Second, although the framework's description of human resources at the local level is appropriate in terms of thresholds, the underlying factors must be reexamined. Finally, the consistency of environmental complexity given the single country case of Uganda should also be reexamined to

incorporate mission and subsector to address structural variation across TNGOs working in the same sector and field.

Federative

Proposition 1b: Federative TNGOs follow a bottom-up, yet autonomous, approach to priority setting, framing, and communication.

The federative model represents TNGOs that operate on a largely autonomous basis. The parent entity, U.S. headquarters, provides guidance but serves a mostly symbolic purpose. It may also function as an advocacy arm to represent interests of the organization and as a coordinating body for the sub-units that fall under its umbrella. Individual organizational units receive support through branding. This means that federative organizations have a cohesive identity, mission, and message that may include words and images. Consequently, the brand of the organization is easily recognizable regardless of location. Despite this, each unit is responsible for its strategic planning, fundraising, collaborative decision-making, programmatic choices, and location selection.




Figure 4.2: Federative Priority and Communication Flows

Federative TNGOs comprise 29 percent of organizations interviewed. They represent a range of subsectors, but predominantly specialize in politically sensitive issues or in geographically remote areas that exhibit a high level of need. Although these locations are isolated, field staff knowledgeable about existing need and politics strategically selects them. Without such expertise, it would be challenging to carry out the sensitive programs and services provided by such organizations, underlining how high environmental complexity can promote a federative structure. This type of decentralized structure allows for an overarching mission while also permitting flexibility at the country level. Such flexibility may also be useful in quickly adapting to situations and pivoting in sensitive political landscapes.

Federative organizations share values, broad objectives, and their mission. Beyond these three elements, the individual country units have a large degree of independence from headquarters to make decisions at the local level financially and programmatically. As a result, country offices operate like discrete entities with some support from the umbrella organization. For example, a refugee TNGO in Uganda shares its values and mission with sister organizations operating in other parts of the world, but it is responsible for its own fundraising, lobbying, and implementation decision-making.

Location decisions must coincide with the organization's mission and an interest from donors. The identity of these types of TNGOs also figures into the decision-making process as the often work with at-risk populations or in conflict sensitive areas. In a second example, the country headquarters was unusually located outside of Kampala. While many TNGOs choose to base themselves in Kampala for convenience,

it also provides access to policymakers. In this case, the location selected served two conflict-prone areas in neighboring countries. In another case, the TNGO maintained a country headquarters in Kampala, but operated semi-permanent field offices based on existing programs. Within countries, there is a high degree of socialization within units due to the fluid nature of location and need. Notably, the umbrella organization and not the country unit make decisions to withdrawal from a location due to conflict or otherwise.

Socialization within the broader organization, however, is low. Federative organizations are also less likely to collaborate with other TNGOs. Collaboration between country units is uncommon due to the organizational structure and culture. Collaboration with other TNGOs is also infrequent, although several interviewees noted that knowledge sharing across organizations does occur in the Ugandan case through monthly meetings of country directors. These meetings act as a vetting mechanism and knowledge sharing platform for U.S.-based TNGOs and others based in Western countries. Meetings are exclusive and by invitation only.

The contingency framework characterizes federative structures as highly formalized. Formalization includes policies and procedures that are standardized across the organization, which helps in the administration of the TNGO. By standardizing operating procedures, financial management, and other policies, the umbrella organization ensures that the autonomy of the country units is protected while guaranteeing accountability and maximized efficiency. This safeguards the brand of the TNGO as a whole and makes interactions between headquarters and the units more predictable.

Decision-making and administrative procedures are primarily funding driven. For example, one multinational TNGO ceased operations elsewhere due to a lack of donor interest and funding. At the same time, a new operation that was not on the agenda for the organization opened solely due to interest by and a generous donation from one family. This also fits the contingency framework's description of federative organizational structure, with the caveat that high local resources may be more volatile and quickly turn into little to no resources. Another organization commented that although it was primarily donor driven in the past, it moved away from this model due to volatility. In addition, it had reached is operating capacity with its current staff and resources and matured into an established reputation, possibly making the decision to pause easier.

In terms of staff, federative TNGOs interviewed similar challenges as those faced by centralized TNGOs. One country director noted that:

> "We don't do bribes, but public service problems manifest in other ways. For example, 88 percent of public hospital staff are not at their stations because they get two salaries by working in the private sector." (Organization C 2016)

This underlines both the supply of trained staff and state capacity in less developed countries. Bureaucrats and other government-paid staff often make far less than they would in the private or TNGO sectors. In addition, payroll may be infrequent due to monetary and administrative capacity challenges. Consequently, qualified individuals seek out additional opportunities to diversify their income in order to support themselves and their families. To mitigate abuse, some TNGOs introduce human resources policy that place restrictions on dual employment. For example, one may hold a government position, but only work in the TNGO sector part-time. Trained professionals often choose

the TNGO sector because of its resources and support, which raises concerns about the poaching of qualified staff from a system that sorely needs them.

As in centralized structures, implementation staffs are overwhelmingly Ugandan nationals whereas expatriate staff fills executive level positions. Unlike centralized TNGOs, a mix of expatriates fills executive positions. These individuals come from Western and other countries. In several cases, Ugandan nationals served as deputy country directors while Western expatriates always filled key financial positions. In federative organizational structures, there is an emphasis on developing Ugandan staff. In one example, TNGOs pays for tertiary education, including medical degrees and nationals apprentice with Western experts for up to ten years preparing them for director positions. For expatriate staff, there is opportunity to move to other country offices or to U.S. headquarters. This is a parallel to centralized organizations, with one exception. Country directors in federative organizations were American, Ethiopian, Italian, and Kenyan. This is a distinguishing characteristic of federative bodies and illustrates its bottom-up communication flow compared to a centralized organizational structure in which similar positions are occupied by Western expatriates.

Proposition 1b states that federative TNGOs follow a bottom-up, yet autonomous approach in decision-making and communication. The contingency framework posits that federative MNCs are characterized by low centralization, high formalization, and low socialization. Furthermore, this best fit for this structure is an environment in which there are low local resources and low environmental complexity. Although the characteristics outlined by the framework fit the TNGO federative structure, the conditions do not fit. Instead, U.S.-based international development TNGOs are located in environments with

high complexity and high local resources, although resources vary and the majority of organizations readily identify as donor driven.

Integrative / Hybrid

Proposition 1c: Hybrid TNGOs follow an incremental approach to priority setting and communication is both upward and downward.

Finally, the hybrid organizational model represents an agenda-setting strategy and communication style that combines the top-down and bottom-up approaches described in the centralized and federative models into a structure that emphasizes the flow of information, policy, and human resources in both directions. More specifically, hybrid organizations operate on the assumption of the equality of information in which input from sub-units are considered and incorporated into the decision-making a higher organizational levels, which then flow down through the organization. Hybrid organizational structures represent 48 percent of interviewed TNGOs, making it the most common model.




Figure 4.3: Hybrid Priority and Communication Flows

The contingency framework frames hybrid organizations as integrated networks that are situated on a continuum between centralized and federative organizational structures. Hybrid TNGOs are not unique to one sector. Instead, they implement

programs ranging from agriculture to health. This theme is also present among centralized and federative entities. Among the hybrid TNGOs interviewed, the majority self-identified as faith-based organizations.

Two-way communication is central tenet of hybrid organizational structures. Decisions are made at every level, with input from various stakeholders in the organization. Decision-making concerning implementation and location is incremental. Knowledge sharing shapes decision-making at each level and the accumulation of this knowledge creates a feedback loop that informs future decisions. Country directors have autonomy within the organization, for example solicitation of funds or collaborative decisions, but their strategic planning and choices are shaped by the organization's overarching strategic plan. The relationship between country offices and U.S. headquarters is direct, with frequent knowledge transfers from headquarters to country offices. One interviewee noted that transfers in the opposite direction are less common, but that regional sharing did occur often. Others overtly stated that they are in frequent communication with headquarters. Donors and feasibility also play a role in decision-making. Empirically, this fits with the integrative model in the contingency framework.

Formalization in hybrid models varies. One example of this variation is security. In a few larger organizations, a security team at headquarters collaborates with country offices to make decisions about risk. In many more organizations, decisions are made based on advisories issued by the United Nations. Other examples of formalization include the communication protocol described above; weekly or bi-weekly reports are integral in this process. Human resources are also an example of formalization. Another aspect of hybrid organizations that makes them unique is the upward and downward

movement of staff. Hybrid organizations present more opportunity for the development of national staff. In the Ugandan case, programmatic staff is Ugandan nationals while program managers and those above them are expatriates. However, nationals have the opportunity to move laterally to other countries as well as spend time at headquarters. This is especially pertinent given the donor push for collaboration with local organizations to increase sustainability and for the development of local staff to also increase sustainability. Importantly, hybrid organizations face the same challenges in international development that centralized and federative structures face. Consequently, promotions of nationals are often strategically placed to maximize impartiality and to avoid corruption.

Due to the upward and downward accountability that is prevalent in hybrid organizations, the need for communication, staff exchanges, and so on requires a high degree of socialization. This occurs through the values and culture that permeates the organization. The high level of communication and interaction are also mechanisms of high socialization. High levels of socialization also occur between TNGOs. For example, if a TNGO is working in a community with youth and a second TNGO enters, the hybrid entity will communicate with the second TNGO to ensure that services are not duplicated. This is particularly important for transparency efforts where local resources include child sponsorship. Duplicative registries across organizations would undermine the legitimacy of the organizations on both sides.

Centralized and federative organizations both identified need and resources as key elements of decision-making. Hybrid organizations interviewed also emphasized the importance of these, but added a third component to the discussion. Hybrid

organizational structures were concerned with feasibility as well, the assessment of which is developed through dialogue between the organizational units. This raises an interesting point concerning decision-making, which is how TNGOs weight various components against one another. In addition, how the likelihood of success fits into the conversation is also important. For example, levels of need may be high in certain areas, but infrastructure and access must be present to make the project effective, efficient, and ultimately successful.

Proposition 1c stated that hybrid TNGOs followed an incremental decision-making strategy that incorporates two-way communication. The contingency frameworks propositions fit well with the responses obtained during interviews with U.S.-based international development TNGOs. Centralization in hybrid organizations is low. Country offices retain a degree of autonomy in exchange for open communication, knowledge-sharing, and moderate formalization. Formalization primarily takes shape in policies concerning financials and human resources. Socialization is necessarily high due to the open communications that move in both upward and downward as information is shared and incorporated into the decision-making process. The framework posits that hybrids are most likely to fit highly complex environments in which there are high local resources. The respondents in the interviews did not indicate high levels of local resources, however, this may be a gap in the data obtained or it may be an opportunity to fine tune the framework to TNGOs. The latter is most probably, given the socio-economic reality of less developed countries and the logic driving the presence of TNGOs there in the first place.

Social Entrepreneurs

The focus of this dissertation is on U.S.-based TNGOs. This chapter presents a case study on a subset of these organizations that specialize in international development. It is worth noting that organizations working to advance public benefit now includes social entrepreneurs, not only nonprofits and government agencies. Social entrepreneurs include both for-profit entities with a social mission as well as nonprofits that incorporate business strategies in order to advance their mission. These organizations share some characteristics with their nonprofit counterparts in decision-making. One subject indicated that the level of need is a driving factor in location decisions, particularly for expansion. This mirrors one of the primary explanations for location in the nonprofit sector. At the same time, opportunity and success also occupy a significant part of the conversation. Location choices are market driven, contingent, and collaboration is less common than among nonprofits. The profile of risk tolerance in for-profit versus nonprofit organizations is also a distinguishing factor.

Social enterprises must also consider the complexity of the operating environment. Both TNGOs and social enterprises make decisions based on amelioration of the condition of beneficiaries. This distinguishes them from other for-profit organizations that may award more weight to profit than to precautionary safety. For example, a taxi company that identifies a market need for late night service, despite increased crime and risk to drivers. Social enterprises and TNGOs must also examine environmental complexity and pursue management policies to minimize harm to the organization. Financial management best practices, such as receipts or electronic

payments, may minimize corruption. A secondary outcome of such steps is better accounting and reporting to shareholders and Boards of Directors.

The representativeness and staffing of social enterprises most closely aligns with the hybrid model discussed earlier. Interviews for this chapter includes two social enterprises, or 10 percent of the data. One of the organizations self-identifies as a hybrid structure, but was re-categorized following further analysis.[21] Due to the small sample size, the observations presented here are anecdotal. However, that social enterprises operating in the international development space would require more local knowledge is unsurprising.

In total, the staff at social enterprises interviewed is primarily Ugandan nationals; however, Western expatriates hold the executive positions (CEO, CFO, COS). The parallels between U.S.-based TNGOs and social enterprises, at least in the international development sector, appear to dominate the comparative narrative. This raises an interesting question for organizational structure and decision-making: what drives the decision to organize as a nonprofit or for-profit where there is a common mission and set of objectives? The contingency framework suggests that environmental complexity is a driving factor, however, TNGOs outnumber social enterprises in international development. Other external factors, including the state of the economy,

[21] One organization operates as a for-profit social enterprise, offering microloans, while the other operates as a nonprofit social enterprise. It offers agricultural and technical services. The nonprofit self-identifies itself as a hybrid organization, however, it was re-categorized following comparative analysis with other hybrid TNGOs.

may play a role. Attention to types of leadership in the nonprofit sector shows how this can shape organizations. Incorporating this element when examining the for-profit and nonprofit divergence may help to explain such variation and further develop propositions into theory.

Social entrepreneurs as an organizational model might best be categorized as a hybrid. Entities organized in this fashion are market driven and therefore see a high level of local resources relative to other countries or regions; however, the interviews conducted presented some discord along the centralization dimension. In the for-profit case, the organization can be characterized as centralized. Information and decisions flow from the U.S.-based founder, with some freedom for country directors on day-to-day decisions. The nonprofit case, however, represents moderate centralization that has more in common with a federative model. Finally, formalization in both organizations is high rather than moderate as proposed by the contingency framework. This presents an opportunity to develop a proposition that incorporates social entrepreneurship into the contingency framework.

4.6: Discussion

The contingency framework's propositions about MNCs transfers to U.S.-based TNGOs. It provides greater nuance than the typology proposed by Young et al. (1999), in which nonprofits are categorized as unitary corporate structures (centralized), federations, of membership organizations. This typology describes organizational structure, yet overlooks additional means of organizing by focusing only on global

associations. Furthermore, it approaches TNGOs from the outside in, overlooking the internal implications of organization as well as variation across environments.

However, the contingency framework as proposed by Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) cannot be applied to TNGOs wholesale. There are several significant caveats necessary to adapt the framework to TNGOs. First, the level of local resources available to TNGOs should be re-conceptualized to include non-monetary sources of wealth. These may include collaborative opportunities, impact, or manpower. This not only better describes the reality of TNGOs, it also is a more accurate description of TNGO reality. More specifically, TNGOs are nonprofits established to advance social or political change. This distinguishes them from for-profit models in which the goal is to enrich shareholders. Monetary resources are, of course, incredibly important to TNGOs, but wealth can be described in a number of different ways. TNGOs looking to select feasible locations or to stretch a dollar must consider all avenues. Furthermore, the concept of local should be re-examined. Does local mean the country of implementation or does it refer to the country of origin in the case of TNGOs?

TNGOs, especially in international development, are engaged in less developed or emerging countries in which the capacity of the state and potential individual donors is at a lower threshold. There is also a weaker tradition of philanthropic giving in these places. As a result, most funding is secured from private foundations, government agencies, and individuals in developed countries. Several interviewees highlighted this point, acknowledging that resources flowed from north to south and that, in at least on instance, developed country offices bore the primary responsibility of fundraising.

Second, the concept of environmental complexity should be adapted to TNGOs. For MNCs, environmental complexity means the ability to operate at a profit. For TNGOs, the level of environmental complexity should be measured using barriers to entry, financial security, and conflict. Like local resources, these measures should correspond with the reality of TNGOs.

Third, the social entrepreneurship model should be placed within the context of the contingency framework. Not only is this an emerging and significant model for TNGOs, it is becoming more prevalent in the for-profit sector. Thus, its incorporation is beneficial for both TNGOs and MNCs. Social entrepreneurship should be fit along the dimensions of high local resources due to the market-driven nature of such organizations and low environmental complexity. While social entrepreneurs may be less risk averse than traditional TNGOs, they would place profits in danger if they operated under the same assumptions as TNGOs. One example of this is a TNGO entering a conflict zone whereas a social enterprise would be reluctant to do so.




Figure 4.4: Predicted Organization Structure by Fit Adapted to TNGOs

Finally, the identity of an organization may also figure greatly into the decision-making of a TNGO. The mission and identity of an organization embody its values and permeate its culture. Therefore, the sensitivity of an organization to environmental complexity may vary from organization to organization and not just by environment. For example, Doctors Without Borders is an organization in which emergency response is central to its identity and mission. This identity shapes its internal decision-making and communication, as well as its public identity.



Figure 4.5: MSF Advertisement in Washington DC (February 5, 2016)

Examining the characteristics of the organizational structures outlined above should include development of governance structures, administrative strategies, financial management mechanisms, and national and sub-national structures. For example, a deeper look at federative organizations would identify patterns across types of Boards of Directors and best practices. Administrative strategies would improve information sharing across organizations, bolstering transparency internally and externally. Analysis of regional structures would improve collaborative opportunities.

Table X illustrates patterns observed among the U.S.-based international development TNGOs interviewed for this chapter.

Type	Centralized	Federative	Hybrid	Social Entrepreneur
Governance	Board of Directors	Country Offices	Country Units / Board of Directors	Board of Directors / CEO
Administration	Central staff to Board; country offices report to headquarters	Country offices and sub-units self-contained; umbrella organization reports to Board	Country offices and headquarters engage in participatory administration	Country and central staff report to CEO; CEO reports to Board/shareholders
Finance	Grants and contracts; centralized development team	Grants and contracts; country offices responsible for fundraising	Grants and contracts; country offices fundraise with centralized support	Investors and contracts in for-profits; Grants and contracts in nonprofits; centralized development team
Membership	No formal members	Country units may be considered members	Country units may be considered members	No formal members
Regional Structures	Limited autonomy at local level; centralized strategic decision-making and communication	Locally autonomous chapters; exclusive use of name/logo/mission of umbrella organization; bottom-up communication	Locally autonomous based on formalized rules or financial thresholds; participatory decision-making	Limited autonomy depending on size of organization; centralized strategic planning with decision-making in consultation with headquarters and country office

Figure 4.6: Structural Models for TNGOs

Implications for Practitioners

Organization priority setting and communication flows, as well as organization structure more broadly, are of interest to practitioners in three ways. To TNGOs, the manner in which priorities are set and communicated directly addresses the effectiveness of an organization. Streamlining this process may create parsimonious strategy, but overlooks the importance of fit. As the contingency framework highlights,

fit is especially important in the complex environments in which TNGOs operate. Furthermore, better understanding of administrative structures and decision-making motives aids practitioners in improving the organization internally by facilitating communication and knowledge sharing. In addition, it also helps practitioners deliver better services and goods to beneficiaries.

Second, the organizational structure and its implications highlight issues lurking below the administrative surface. This is particularly important in the context of human resources. Among donors and the broader development community there are calls for program sustainability and the development of local human resources. This has climbed the agenda so that it is now an element of many grants. In fact, local-international collaboration is a requirement of all USAID grants. The opportunities for development and advancement presented to national staff contribute to this goal. Analyzing how to deliver these opportunities while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls that create the void of opportunity in the first place will help practitioners advance this objective. Also important is consideration of what development and compensation of staff means for the public institutions that TNGOs backfill. More specifically, is there a strategy to create greater opportunity and development for nationals without further damaging the state institutions that create the opportunity for TNGOs to implement and survive?

Third, acknowledging organizational structure and its influence on the agenda of TNGOs, the priorities that are advanced, and the manner in which these are communicated relates directly to upward and downward accountability. Upward accountability to donors reflects greater formalization and the roles of expatriate staff. In addition, it also touches upon the question of development and sustainability for local

staff. Donors exhibit an increased interest in collaboration with local TNGOs, however, more than one interviewee indicated that they do not and will not partner with such organizations due to capacity and corruption. Donors should inform themselves about the environment complexity and how it relates to such demands. They should also be aware of potential outcomes and accountability measures if they decide to make demands. Internally, organizations can use this knowledge to improve management strategies and ultimately accountability to donors.

Downward accountability is more difficult to measure, but equally important. The contingency framework can be used to improve downward accountability through knowledge-sharing practices. These best practices can only improve the delivery of goods or services, thereby increasing TNGO downward accountability to beneficiaries. This might also include collaborative propensity with local TNGOs in order to develop expertise and management knowledge, ultimately creating an improved long-term social and political outcome.

4.7: Future Research

While the comparative analysis of decision-making and organizational models provides insight into who sets priorities and how priorities are communicated within TNGOs, it leaves some questions unanswered. For example do these models travel well to other countries or beyond the international development? Is one model more advantageous in the courting or donors or policymakers? With the push for greater sustainability at the local level and the knowledge we have about participatory policymaking, why are there not a greater number of hybrid models? In addition,

continued development of the propositions outlined in the framework should be subjected to statistical analyses for significance to ensure that the conceptual categories are meaningful.

Finally, research in Uganda in summer 2015 was prescient. Shortly before arriving in June, a policy aimed at curtailing the activities or TNGOs and local TNGOs was introduced for debate. The bill targeted subversive methods of work and preceded the 2016 presidential election; similar bills were introduced preceding elections in 2006 and 2008, and a Public Order Act was introduced in 2011. The most recent iteration was passed by parliament in November 2015. The Non-governmental Organisations (TNGO) Bill, 2015, established a National Bureau for TNGOs and gave it expansive powers. The bill enables the bureau to refuse to register TNGOs, to issue or revoke permits, and to restrict the employment of foreign nationals (ICNL 2016). This policy was directly related to the February 2016 presidential election in which President Yoweri Museveni will seek re-election for another five-year term after 30 years in office. During this period, Museveni brought economic growth and political stability to Uganda, and also spearheaded one of the most effective responses to HIV/AIDs in sub-Saharan Africa. However, more recent constitutional changes that extend presidential terms, human rights abuses, and limits places on political pluralism have raised concerns[22], particularly across civil society.

[22] This is the direct result of the The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which disrupted peace and stability in northern Uganda in the mid-1990s and continued a low-level conflict until the mid-2000s.

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Chapter 5 : Conclusions, Implications, and Directions for Future Research

5.1: Conclusions

This dissertation was motivated by a lack of scholarship on international nonprofits in public administration, in broader field of nonprofit studies, and the need to better understand how and why TNGOs make certain location decisions. In its three empirical chapters, it outlines factors that drive U.S.-based TNGO location choices, including country attractiveness; U.S. government attention and foreign policy agendas; and the organizational structure and sector. Existing explanations for TNGO location decisions are singular and are dominated by resource dependency. Although resource dependency offers a foundation for decision-making theory, revisions must be made to build a more complete picture of TNGO location and decision-making and to test the generalizability of existing explanations across cases in a more dynamic fashion. Furthermore, greater attention should be given to the diversity of the TNGO sector. Specifically, theoretical updates should include sector variation and weight which factors matter most and for what reasons.

The project began by reviewing previous research on the decision-making, location, TNGOs, and related topics. This revealed that several literatures address either TNGOs or decision-making. However, it also illustrated the lack of synthesis between these literatures and the lack of attention to international cases in nonprofit studies, public administration, and public policy. Furthermore, this review underscored the low levels of cross-pollination between the pieces of scholarship on TNGOs, location, and decision-making. While development studies, comparative politics, and international

relations regularly incorporate TNGOs as units of analysis, they are concerned with the external environment rather than the inner-workings of such organizations. Theories of decision-making include individual level and organization level explanations, yet they overlook international case studies. Nonprofit studies, public management, and public administration highlight the significance of administration and links to the policy sphere, but overwhelmingly focus on Western cases. Consequently, this dissertation offers first steps toward not only understanding location decision-making, but also an opportunity to compare and test the generalizability of nonprofit theories.

More specifically, three missed opportunities are presented by a review of the existing literature. Each of these missed opportunities should be incorporated into existing theory to develop more robust explanations. First, resource dependency theory neglects external elements that should be incorporated in order to fully understand TNGO behavior. Drawing together research on the external environment from development studies and comparative politics, I first examined what makes a country more or less attractive to a TNGO. Analysis of the location of U.S.-based TNGOs and country characteristics provided support for existing explanations for TNGO and nonprofit density, including the level of need. However, there was also clear evidence that explanations of country attractiveness and TNGO location are more complex than purely need. However, the neediest countries were not the most attractive. Instead, the operating environment and political environment are also influential. This illustrates the challenges of existing explanations for location and decision-making in TNGOs. Their singular approach over-emphasizes one aspect of the environment and makes assumptions about what is most important to a TNGO. In this dissertation we see that

decision-making is a multi-faceted endeavor that varies by organization location, and importantly by sector. As such, the narrative about TNGO location is one that considers need, safety, and potential for success.

U.S.-based TNGOs are attracted to countries in which there is relative political stability compared to countries with less open regimes that engaged in coercion; for example, limitations on the freedom of speech or regimes that engage in extrajudicial killings as a means to maintain power At the same time, U.S.-based TNGOs are attracted to countries with higher degrees of conflict as well as countries with a higher number of borders. This suggests that different U.S.-based TNGOs may have higher or lower thresholds for risk tolerance. In addition, the proximity of a country to these conflicts may make a location more attractive to TNGOs possibly because of access and the stability offered by the country neighboring the conflict zone. I also posited that U.S.-based TNGOs required a certain level of infrastructure to communicate and operate. This proved to be untrue, raising a question about whether TNGOs follow infrastructure or whether infrastructure follows TNGOs. Considered as a whole, this narrative illustrates the challenges of existing explanations for TNGO location given their simplicity. Instead, location choices are more layered and complex. Although TNGOs are drawn to challenging environments, their assessments incorporate operational and political stability as well as the level of need.

One finding in Chapter 2 was that there are more U.S.-based TNGOs in countries with higher levels of U.S. foreign assistance. This is unsurprising when one considers the number of TNGOs with federal grants or contracts or the sheer number of foreign assistance dollars available, however, it begs the question of donor influence.

Are the location decisions of U.S.-based TNGOs influenced by government attention to particular countries? Turning to research on resource dependency among nonprofits and TNGOs, Chapter 3 examined whether signals from the U.S. government in key speeches and documents influenced U.S.-based TNGO location. There is a clear and strong relationship between TNGO location and country mentions in strategic documents.

Certain organizational characteristics made a TNGO more or less likely to be in a country that received government attention. Faith-based TNGOs were less likely to be in strategic initiative countries, providing evidence that supports previous findings concerning the relationship between government and faith-based organizations. Some sectors are also more likely to be in strategic countries, including TNGOs focused on agriculture and development. Older TNGOs are also more likely to operate in countries cited by the U.S. government.

The directionality of the relationship was unclear though. Were TNGOs acting as advocates that attracted government attention? Were TNGOs truly resource dependent and therefore subject to donor influence? Or is the explanation simply that TNGOs and the U.S. government have similar assessment strategies and interests where foreign assistance is concerned? To delve deeper into this relationship, data from the second chapter on country characteristics was incorporated into the analysis of government attention.

In the second model, government attention to a country was measured as the number of times that country was mentioned in a particular year rather than as a dummy variable. In this test, the number of times a country was mentioned in strategic

documents was negatively correlated with the total number of U.S.-based TNGOs in that country, meaning there are fewer U.S.-based TNGOs in countries that are frequently mentioned by the U.S. government. Considered in conjunction with the first set of findings, this suggests that TNGOs possess greater agency than resource dependency grants. Instead TNGOs assess location using more than resources. However, government attention may have more influence for certain countries or causes. It also likely matters more for organizations with an existing relationship with a government agency or for those with lower revenue diversification.

The findings of the first two empirical chapters prodded further exploration. Combining literatures on organizational structure, nonprofit identity, federative organizations, and multi-national corporations, Chapter 4 develops a framework of TNGO organizational structure, communication, and decision-making. This framework draws from contingency theory to propose four models of decision-making and organizational structure based on the environmental complexity and resource availability. Contingency theory posits that organizational structure is dependent upon local resources and environmental complexity. To transfer to TNGOs, certain adaptations have to be made to the framework. This includes the addition of social enterprise as an organizational structure. The framework was further adapted based on interviews with international development TNGOs conducted in Uganda.

TNGOs may organize in one of four ways: centralized, federative, hybrid/integrative, or social entrepreneurship. Each structure is characterized by different levels of autonomy for country offices, socialization within the organization, and formalization. This shapes the internal dynamics of the organization, including who

makes decisions and how these are communicated. For example, centralized organizations exhibit the lowest autonomy for country offices, whereas federative and hybrid organizations exhibit the highest level of autonomy for country offices. This suggests that organizations with less opportunity to raise funds at the country level or organizations in which resources are already concentrated at headquarters are more likely to be centralized structures that follow a top-down decision-making and communication process.




Figure 4.4: Predicted Organization Structure by Fit Adapted to TNGOs

Socialization is highest in hybrid organizations, which engage in open communication and participatory decision-making. This means that feedback from the U.S. headquarters flows down to the country units, and input from country units flows back up to headquarters. This creates an incremental model of decision-making and greater equality between the organization's units. In contrast, socialization is lowest in federative models. Country offices make decisions independent of headquarters and other units; however, there is a cohesive brand, mission, and message. This brand

legitimates country units and is managed by the umbrella entity. Formalization, or how well policies and procedures are defined, is low to moderate in most instances. Federative organizations, however, are characterized by high degrees of formalization. Figure 8 illustrates the characteristics and fit for each organizational structure.

This updated model takes into consideration an adapted definition of environmental complexity for U.S.-based TNGOs, including consideration of nonprofit identity and the addition of a new organizational structure. It is a first step toward understanding variation in structure among TNGOs. Such a framework is useful for understanding how TNGOs interpret identity and how fit is subject to the scope of work in which they are engaged. Furthermore, it informs the decision-making findings concerning location first and second empirical chapter by incorporating internal and external drivers of location decision-making.

These findings provide a strong and original body of evidence that help to explain factors that influence U.S.-based TNGO location selection. By synthesizing scholarship across disciplines and taking both external and internal drivers into consideration, this dissertation provides empirical support for some pieces of existing explanations and encourages further analysis of others. In addition, the dissertation as a whole provides a foundation for building theory about TNGO decision-making related to location.

5.2: Implications

Scholars and practitioners who are interested in what drives TNGO density and how these decisions are made should reconsider their understanding and approach to

these questions. Location decisions specifically are understudied in the scholarship summarized in this dissertation. However, location has direct implications for effectiveness and efficiency. For example, nonprofit density is often examined through the lens of program specialization. Location is equally important for donors and organizations seeking to maximize their impact and who wish to avoid duplication of services.

Scholars will be particularly interested in the finding concerning government attention and TNGO location as it relates to resource dependency. This presents an opportunity to further develop narratives surrounding resource dependency. It also creates an opening for advocacy research and comparative analysis of nonprofit and government attention and agenda setting.

The finding that TNGOs are attracted to countries that present some challenges, but are not the neediest will also be of interest to scholars and practitioners. For scholars, this offers a new avenue of exploration in service provision, especially where government failure is concerned. For practitioners and donors, it may help to build accountability and transparency. The finding that many TNGOs do not collaborate with local TNGOs, despite pushes by donors to do so, and that nationals are often limited to implementation positions will also be of interest. A better understanding of motives and environment of decision-making is important for sustainable relationships between the two. It is also necessary to maximize impact and to generate the desired long-term change.

That TNGOs are attracted to conflict as well as countries with a greater number of borders holds implications for scholars interested in conflict, migration, and

international relief. Those studying the logistics and operations of TNGOs may also be interested. For example, convenience might be redefined as access to difficult areas that are also of interest to a TNGO. Practitioners and may benefit from further exploration of TNGO proximity to beneficiaries and borders, particularly where difficult to reach populations are concerned. This finding is also timely in light of the restrictive TNGO legislation discussed earlier as it may provide alternatives to displaced TNGOs.

This study leads to a more robust theory about TNGO location. Building on singular existing theories, this research draws together explanations for decision-making, attempting to clarify location choices. In addition, it seeks to detail which elements matter most to TNGO location. Resource dependency is a contributing factor; survival is a challenge that many nonprofits face as open systems. However, TNGOs possess greater agency than it permits. Rather than a principal-agent or principal-steward dynamic, TNGOs possess preferences and choose whether or not to engage, to be influenced as well as to influence, and a shrewdness about where their energy and resources are best spent.

5.3: Future Research

As discussed in the previous section, the findings presented in this dissertation contribute to the fields of nonprofit studies and public administration in three ways. First, it builds theory about location decision-making among TNGOs. Second, it expands the scope of public administration by adding international country case studies. Third, it contributes international organization cases. This allows existing explanations to be tested in a multi-national and multi-sector comparison. Beyond these fields, this

dissertation also contributes to development studies and comparative politics through its examination of organization structure and internal communication, creating a more complete and accurate description of TNGOs in the field. Lastly, it synthesizes literature from a range of fields that study TNGOs and incorporates external and internal drivers of location decision-making.

The results presented here should be treated as part of an ongoing research agenda subject to additional data collection, analysis, and refinement. As a first step in this direction, a study of this type should be conducted in a cross-sector domestic context to test whether the findings are specific to international nonprofits or whether they are more broadly applicable. This research would allow researchers to test for generalizability in the nonprofit sector. It may also yield interesting findings for nonprofit density and levels of need. For example, do service oriented nonprofits locate in or near beneficiaries with the most need? Alternatively, what benefit do nonprofits that act as pioneers of economic development in gentrifying urban neighborhoods bring to long-time residents?

Returning to the international context, next steps in this research should include further examination of country proximity to need. Do TNGOs locate in neighboring countries for safety, stability, and access? If so, this may hold implications for the host country as well as the targeted beneficiaries. This research would shed further light on location decision-making and perhaps provide predictive power for future conflict, minimizing duplication of services and saturation.

A study related to conflict and a future direction for research related to this dissertation is an examination of risk tolerance across TNGOs. Rather than focusing

only on conflict, this line of research should include natural disasters and complex emergencies. A survival analysis would provide an opportunity to explore which organizations join or drop out of emergencies. For example, how do TNGOs vary in their risk tolerance across sector and by emergency? This research might be used to improve response to emergencies. In addition, it could also be used to bolster accountability mechanisms through an understanding of who is present and how to best manage the response and resources in a collaborative manner. This analysis would be of interest to scholars, policymakers, and practitioners working on a number of topics.

A fourth direction of research is a two-part project. First, further analysis of the directionality of government attention and TNGO location is necessary. This research provides a better understanding of the drivers of location among TNGOs and a more nuanced explanation of resource dependency. Further study of location, government attention, and location should explore variation across subsectors in particular, as well as organizational characteristics. Interviews with country directors presented in the fourth chapter did not identify a clear pattern in the relationship between government attention and location, except that TNGOs with significant grants or contracts from USAID were especially influenced by that agency. Additional interviews to enlarge the sample may distill a pattern, and should certainly include U.S.-based executives and Boards of Directors. The second aspect of this research examines mission drift among TNGOs as it relates to government attention. The most obvious approach would be resource dependency. However, the finding concerning TNGO agency in Chapter 3 points in a different direction. Rather than assume resource dependency, new lines of research should approach TNGOs as entities that care both about survivability as well

as mission. As such, what types of agency do TNGOs exercise? To what degree do they spin their image and proposals to fit donor requirements, and does this constitute mission drift?

Finally, the framework presented in Chapter 4 is ripe for further conceptual tweaking and theoretical development. More specifically, the social enterprise structure should be fully integrated into the framework. Additional empirical observations should also be employed to build out the framework. Empirical observations can then be tested to determine if the typology is accurate and what adjustments are required.

This list is not exhaustive. There is significant room for scholarship on TNGOs in the nonprofit and public administration space that is useful to academics and practitioners alike. The questions asked in this dissertation and as part of future research do not apply only to international scopes of work. TNGOs can be examined from a domestic location or organizational culture perspective, or the questions asked here can be adapted to nonprofit organizations operating in the domestic sphere. My wish is that this dissertation serves as a starting point for future research and a guide for scholarship that has practical and theoretical implications. Most importantly, it and the research that follows should be used to improve nonprofit management and to create long-term public benefit.

Appendix A: U.S.-based TNGO Interview Protocol

Date:_____
Interview:_____

U.S.-based TNGO Interview Protocol

Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. As I described to you in my e-mail, I am working on a research project on where TNGOs locate at the country level. I am specifically interested in how and why organizations based in the U.S. choose to implement programs in certain countries. First, I would like to advise you that you may refuse to participate in this interview or stop this interview at any time. Would you like to participate in this interview at this time?

General Questions (sample prompts)

1. What is the name of your organization?
2. What is your role here?
    a. How long have you been with the organization?
    b. How long have you worked in this sector?
3. The IRS and NCCS categorize your organization as [**NTEE sector code**], is this categorization a good representation of your work?
4. Is the organization driven by commitment to a specific country, region, or demographic or is it issue driven?
5. I see from your website that your mission addresses [**summarize mission statement**]. Would your work be important no matter where it was located?

Location Questions (sample prompts)

1. I see from your organization's Form 990 that it works in [**number of countries**], is this accurate?
    a. What brought you to those areas/[**country**]?
2. Are you actively considering expansion? Where?
    a. What would have to happen to not expand?
    b. Does the work of other organizations come into consideration in location decisions?
3. External events such as the 2011 earthquake in Haiti can be important to some organizations when deciding to enter or exit a country. Do external events influence location decisions?
    a. In the news, several TNGOs decided to withdrawal international staff from areas affected by Ebola. How does risk figure into your organization's decisions to enter or exit?
    b. How does your organization assess risk?

Organizational Questions (sample prompts)

1. Some organizations have religious foundations that are a core part of the institution, and others because of donors. Tell me about how faith is (not) involved for your organization?
2. In some organizations the Board of Directors plays a formative role in meeting the goals of the organization, providing contacts, special skills, and passion for the cause. What is the Board of Directors role in program development and strategic planning?
3. Are decisions about programming and location participatory or made at the executive level?
    a. What is the role of in-country staff in decision-making?
    b. Do decision-makers value the views of staff?
4. How does your organization identify problems to which it can supply solutions?
    a. How do you prioritize programs?
    b. Does the process differ for countries you have never worked in compared to those where you already have a presence?
    c. Does program prioritization differ between the U.S. and field offices, or between sectors or countries?

Resources (sample prompts)

1. Where are the largest expenditures in the organization by program and country?
2. Within academia many discuss external influences on the type or location of work that TNGOs do. Do donors influence location choice? How?

Final Questions (sample prompts)

1. How can the decision-making process be improved in the future?
    a. What program areas/regions does your organization make the most difference in?
    b. Which program areas/regions is there the most improvement in?
2. Are there any other important factors that I have overlooked that you feel are important in determining where your organization works?
3. Is there anyone else you feel that I should talk to? You may provide me with their contact information, or I can give you mine so that they may contact me directly.