GENDER AND ECONOMIC NEOLIBERALISM: AN

ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

While Europe has been working to institutionalize liberalized trade since the 1950s, the

formation of the European Union in 1993 sparked a rapid economic progression through

a political and economic union of its 27 member states. The European Union has

developed a single market through a standardized system of laws which apply in all

member states, guaranteeing the freedom of movement of people, goods, services and

capital (European Commission 2009). It maintains common trade, agricultural, and

regional development policies. Not only has the EU opened trade within Europe, but it

has also helped open Europe to the rest of the global market. The creation of a common

market and promotion of free market policies with the rest of the world is just the

beginning however. The EU has consistently pursued neoliberalism on many fronts.

The European Parliament has a wide range of powers that allow this institution to

influence the economic direction of the European Union. It has been shown that the

European Union is pursuing neoliberal economic policies among its member states as

well as with the rest of the global economy. It also has a relatively high proportion of

women as Members of Parliament. By analyzing roll-call voting by gender from the

European Union, two questions can be answered. First, have women as a group of legislators voted differently than their male counterparts on neoliberal policies in the EP? Second, if there is a difference, has it been significant enough to alter the economic direction of Europe? Before analyzing neoliberalism in the context of the EU, it is crucial to understand neoliberalism and its various dimensions.

WHAT IS NEOLIBERALISM?

Neoliberalism is an ideological and theoretical framework that promotes capitalism mainly in the form of free market and unlimited capital mobility policies. It is often referred to as the "Washington Consensus," a term coined by John Williamson to describe a set of ten economic policy prescriptions of a standard reform package for developing and crisis-wrecked countries. While the United States itself does not directly push such policies on nations, it has incredible influence over the policy direction of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank which aid in the development of undeveloped nations. This aid is often tied to the implementation of neoliberal economic policies. The Washington Consensus is not merely a definition. It stipulates the manner and situation in which the neoliberal policies are implemented. This work will not analyze neoliberalism from this perspective, but it is necessary to make a distinction between the idea of the "Washington Consensus" and the economic policy aspects of neoliberalism.

Debate continues regarding the definition of the Washington Consensus, and whether it even exists. Many issues regarding neoliberal economic policies today, however, are still

best understood by using the term as a reference point. The ten policy prescriptions

described by Williamson are a useful guide to defining neoliberalism in any context,

including the European Union. As such, the following bulletins will be used as a partial

definition for neoliberalism:

- Fiscal policy discipline.

- Redirection of public spending from subsidies (especially indiscriminate subsidies) toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary education, primary health care, and infrastructure investment.

- Tax reform in the form of broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates.

- Interest rates that are market determined and positive, but moderate, in real terms.

- Competitive exchange rates (a competitive rate is one that is not overvalued). Competitive exchange rates create growth because it will increase demand for exports and import substitutes and will therefore boost aggregate demand.

- Trade liberalization: The liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions. Any trade protection is to be provided by law and relatively uniform tariffs.

- Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment.

- Privatization of state enterprises.

- Deregulation. Abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudent oversight of financial institutions.

- Legal security for property rights.

(John Williamson 1990)

In addition to these ten economic policy prescriptions, economist Dani Rodrik explains

that in order to fully explain contemporary neoliberal issues, the list should also include

the following:

- Corporate governance

- Anti-corruption

- Flexible labor markets

- World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements

- Financial codes and standards

- "Prudent" capital-account opening

- Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes

- Independent central banks/inflation targeting

- Social safety nets

- Targeted poverty reduction

(Rodrik 2001)

These economic policies all operate in an attempt to achieve a market that is undisturbed by trade restrictions, tariffs, corporate abuse, volatile exchange rates, capital and labor mobility restrictions, corruption, anti-trust issues, or state intervention. Each of the mentioned economic policy prescriptions will be used as a definition for neoliberalism throughout the rest of this article.

NEOLIBERALISM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Memories of the Great Depression, and the condition of post-war Europe left the free market and capital mobility agenda largely discredited. The post-war reconstruction of Europe, led by the U.S. with the European Recovery Plan and the Marshal Plan, created an era of state coordinated development and welfare programs as opposed to market

coordinated development. Keynesian economic theory prevailed as the theoretical

foundation for macroeconomic coordination (Hermann 2005: 8). In fact, it was not until

the late 1950s that free trade become prominent in European economic policy discussion.

The signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 brought about the establishment of the

European Economic Community (ECC). Article 3 of the original treaty shows that

member states were committed to the development of "a common market free of

distortions to competition" (Cini and McGowan 1998: 17). The term distortion was

limited to tariffs and trade restrictions without addressing the main restrictions placed on

capital and labor mobility. The ECC merged with other European organizations to

become the European Communities (EC) in 1965, but this organization achieved little in

the furthering of neoliberal economic principals until the 1980s. This was changed by the

ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 which put the goal of a single

market permanently on the European agenda. The SEA established the idea of an

international market discipline, and neoliberalism was then institutionalized in Europe

(Hermann 2005: 8). It also increased the responsibilities and powers of the European

Parliament as an advocate for the single market agenda. These responsibilities and

powers will be further discussed in the next section. The SEA paved the road for a

European competition policy, structured by the foundations of neoliberalism, the

formation of the European Monetary Union, and ultimately the official establishment of

the European Union in 1993.

Today, the European Union continues to pursue and preserve a single European market

through the elimination of trade barriers, customs regulations, capital and labor mobility

restrictions, as well as attempting to establish a union wide policy for agriculture, energy, infrastructure, education and research, environmental issues, and competition. The European competition policy seeks to ensure that the free market is permitted to operate undistorted by corruption, anti-trust issues, or state aid. In addition to promoting neoliberal policies within Europe, the EU has worked to remove trade restrictions with the rest of the world. Thus, it is the overall economic objective of the EU to promote a free market that is unimpeded by trade restrictions, capital or labor mobility restrictions, state intervention, including state-owned enterprises, along with eliminating exchange rate volatility through the use of a single currency. It is clear that the European Union is operating within the ideological and theoretical framework of neoliberalism as defined by Williamson (1990) and Rodrik (2001).

THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The European Parliament, based in both Strasbourg and Brussels, is the only directly elected legislative body of the European Union. The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union form the bicameral legislative body of the EU. The two bodies practice what is known as co-decision; this means that each branch shares equal power with regard to passing or amending legislation. The European Parliament began 1952 as the Common Assembly for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Nineteen seventy nine marked the first time that members of the European Parliament were directly elected and also initialized its role in drafting proposals regarding the functioning of the EU.

Since the establishment of the European Union, the European Parliament has been granted greater power through various treaties. It is important to note, however, that neither the Council of the European Union nor the European Parliament has the power of legislative initiative. The European Parliament does not have the ability to draft or propose laws or legislation; this right is reserved for the European Commission. The European Commission acts as an executive of the European Union. The body is responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions, upholding the Union's treaties and the general day-to-day running of the EU. The European Parliament's powers lie in amending, passing, or rejecting legislation drafted by the European Commission. Such legislation includes regulations, directives, and decisions that are directly applicable in their entirety to either the EU and all members or particular member states. The Parliament is also responsible for approving all developmental grants, including those overseas. The legislative branch officially holds the Union's budgetary authority, powers gained through the Budgetary Treaties of the 1970s. The EU's budget is divided into compulsory and non-compulsory spending. Compulsory spending is that resulting from EU treaties and international agreements; the rest is non-compulsory. The EP is even provided with a certain amount of control over the executive offices of the European Union. Unlike most Parliaments within European Union member states, there is a system of checks and balances within the executive and legislative bodies, making the European Parliament resemble the United States Congress as opposed to the European parliamentary system. While a president is nominated by the European Commission, it is the duty of the Parliament to approve the election of the President. The Parliament also has the ability to censure the European Commission which obtains the

power of legislative initiative. A two-thirds majority vote by the Parliament would force the resignation of the entire European Commission. Supervisory powers are given to the EP as well; the EP has the ability to set up a Committee of Inquiry, Committee of Petitions, and place executives within institutions such as the European Central Bank. While there are many other responsibilities dedicated to the EP, this brief explanation of their functions and powers outlines its extensive role in Europe. The powers of the European Parliament are far reaching and of great importance to the functioning of the European Union as a whole.

For a better understanding of the European Parliament's legislative powers, it is necessary to explain the four types of parliamentary procedures that will be included in the analysis in order to fully understand the nature of each vote. Each vote will coincide with one of the following procedures:

Assent Procedure: Requires the European Council to obtain the European Parliament's assent before certain important decisions are taken. The European Council is the highest political body of the European Union. It comprises the heads of state or government of the Union's member states along with the President of the European Commission. Parliament may accept or reject a proposal but cannot amend it. If Parliament does not give its assent, the act in question cannot be adopted. Examples of assent procedures include specific tasks of the European Central Bank (ECB), amendments of statutes of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) / European Central Bank, Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds, the uniform electoral procedure for the European Parliament,

certain international agreements, the accession of new member states, and approval of the President and the other members of the Commission.

Codecision Procedure: Gives the European Parliament the power to adopt instruments jointly with the Council of the European Union. It has the effect of increasing contacts between the Parliament and the Council, the co-legislators, and with the European Commission. It has strengthened Parliament's legislative powers in the following fields: the free movement of workers, right of establishment[1], free movement of services[2], the internal market, education, health, consumer policy, trans-European networks, environment, culture, and research.

Cooperation Procedure: Gives the European Parliament greater influence in the legislative process by allowing it two "readings". The cooperation procedure applies exclusively to the field of economic and monetary union. The cooperation procedure is always initiated by a proposal from the Commission forwarded to the Council and the European Parliament. In the context of a first reading, Parliament issues an opinion on the Commission proposal. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, then draws up a common position, which is forwarded to Parliament together with all the necessary information and the reasons which led the Council to adopt this common position.

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[1] Right of Establishment: Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms.
[2] Free Movement of Services: The freedom prohibits restrictions on free circulation of services within Member States. Services are defined in the negative, "they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons." (Art. 50 EC).

Consultation Procedure: Enables the European Parliament to give its opinion on a proposal from the Commission. In the cases laid down by the Treaty, the Council must consult the European Parliament before voting on the Commission proposal and take its views into account. However, it is not bound by the Parliament's position but only by the obligation to consult it. Parliament must be consulted again if the Council deviates too far from the initial proposal. The powers of Parliament are fairly limited under this procedure, in so far as it can only hope that the Commission takes its amendments into account in an amended proposal.

<center>WHY STUDY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT?</center>

With a basic understanding of the functioning of the European Parliament, one still may ask, why study the European Parliament in the context of women and neoliberalism? There are three main reasons for selecting the EP. First, the powers listed above do not simply imply political power, but also power in determining the economic direction of the European Union. While the Parliament does not propose legislation themselves, it has the ability to amend, approve, or deny any legislation dealing with economic issues within the European Union and, in some cases, with international trade issues. The EP's power over developmental aid as well as the ability to select executives for economic institutions such as the European Central Bank give the Parliament a great deal of influence in European economic policy. The second reason for studying the EP is the ability to distinguish the role of gender in institutional actions. Unlike other economic institutions of the EU, the decision-making process in the Parliament can be tracked for

<center>10</center>

each and every Member of European Parliament (MEPs). This can be accomplished through roll-call voting records which provide information regarding the legislation being voted on, the date of the vote, and exactly how each MEP voted.   The third reason, for studying the EP is the fairly high percentage of female MEPs which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.   These three points make the European Parliament a relevant institution by which to study women and neoliberalism.

WOMEN AS MEPS

The European Parliament has been directly elected since 1979, and the percentage of women represented has consistently increased through 2008. Beginning with 19% of women in the Parliament in 1979, the European Parliament consists of 31% female membership of 785 MEPs as of 2008. This is twice the percentage of women in the US Congress. With regard to senior positions, the EP is structured as follows:

- 6 women chair one of the 23 committees.
- 13 of parliament's 37 delegations for relations with other countries have female chairs.
- 5 of the 14 Parliament vice-presidents are women.
- 2 of the 6 quaestors (who look after MEPs' interests) are women.
- 2 of the 12 Presidents since direct elections in 1979 have been women - Simone Veil (1979-1982) and Nicole Fontaine (1999-2002).

(Europarl 2008)

There is a large range, however, from member state to member state with regard to female representation. Eight European Union members have greater than 30% female representation [(Sweden (47%), Finland (42%), the Netherlands (39%), Denmark, Spain, Belgium, Germany and Austria)]. There are also seven states with representation below

15% (Czech Republic, Cyprus, Ireland, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania and Malta) (Europarl 2008).

Figure 1

(EuroParl 2008)

The European Parliament has also gone to great lengths to not only improve gender equality throughout the European Union, but also within the European Parliament as well. The Parliament's dedication to gender equality is shown by the development of the EP Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality. The high percentage of women, along the dedication of gender equality by the EP, makes the Parliament a logical candidate for a study of gender and economics.

With an understanding of the function and makeup of the European Parliament, it is now necessary to examine previous literature for the existence of a possible gender gap in how

men and women view neoliberal economic policies. It is also necessary to examine the literature explaining how women function as legislators and the challenges they face. This will be reviewed in the proceeding section.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

IS THERE A GENDER GAP?

When examining possible sources for female distaste of neoliberalism one must mention

the field of feminist economics. Neo-classical economics are defined in masculine ways,

i.e. the accumulation of wealth and the maximization of its value. Even though wealth

maximization is motivated by selfish interest, the interest of the individual usually

translates into public interest. Macroeconomic policy is based upon these assumptions,

but these assumptions do not take into account the productivity of women that occurs

outside of the typical work place. Feminist economic theory focuses on the family and

ranges from the "recognition that unpaid work is also valuable (even when there is no

market for it)...to the problematic valuation of care-giving activities" (Dolfsma and

Hoppe 2003: 124). Female productivity outside the typical workplace is not strongly

valued and is not captured by usual economic measures such as GDP. The economic

policies of neoliberalism emphasize efficiency and growth while often ignoring women

as a group as a productive member of the economy.

The field of economics is also engendered by the way in which it is studied. Quantitative research, such as econometrics, is considered hard, firm, definitive, and masculine while qualitative methods are often considered soft, weak, ambiguous, and feminine (Nelson 1995: 139). While each form of research has its positive characteristics, the latter draws a negative connotation more regularly. This is crucial to understanding feminine opposition to neoliberal economic policy because the implementation and success of such policies are usually measured from the quantitative perspective. Economic success is often based upon mathematical equations of state expenditures and GDP growth while ignoring social consequences that only qualitative research can capture.

An examination of developmental psychology may help to shed light upon gendered economic perspectives. Gilligan explains a divergence in male versus female values during the early stages of development (Gilligan 1982). Females tend to experience a much closer bond with their mother, the primary caregiver, than males. This connection seems to breed an ethic of care and an emphasis on relationships within women while men tend to develop a more distinct and definitive ethic of justice. The female nature of compassion has implications that directly relate to neoliberal economic policy. Women tend to be less competitive than men because of their relationship-based world view; they tend to be more concerned with the impact of their success on those around them. Competition is the heart of neoliberal economic policy as it opens the flood gates of global competition. This undoubtedly means the failure of many domestic firms and possibly entire industries. Following Gilligan's logic, this would be more likely to deter women from aspects of neoliberalism than men.

Also, the ethics of care leave women more concerned with issues of welfare and public

services than their male counterparts (Paggione 2004, Conover 1988, Dabelko and

Hernson 1997). Women tend to be more liberal, and traditional liberal values include

welfare, social programs, union, affirmative action, and other things that make states less

economically efficient. This may again lead to female distaste for neoliberalism as

government spending is cut and large-scale privatization occurs. This usually means less

money for welfare related programs and the control of some public services turned over

to private hands. The privatization of such services is cause for concern, especially to

women, who tend to believe that the state rather than the market should be responsible for

the care of individuals (Sen 1996: 827). This does not imply a rejection of markets as

efficient methods of production and distribution, but it calls for the subordination of

markets to democratic objectives. Lourdes explains that "the goal is to place economic

activity at the service of human or people-centered development and not the other way

around" (Lourdes 2003: 77). This means striving for economic development and

productivity that is not achieved for its own sake but to increase the collective well-being.

This skepticism of the market's ability to act in the best interest of society indicates

skepticism of neoliberal policy's ability to act in the best interest of society.

The economic transition of CEE states since 1989 has brought many aspects of gender

discrimination into the light. Pailhe explains that labor discrimination within CEE states

has increased female skepticism of the rapid free-market policy implementation (Pailhe

2000: 522). The transition has left women as victims of discrimination in the workforce

without any preventative regulation. A survey performed by Pailhe shows high levels of unabated statistical discrimination in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. This discrimination is derived from a general mindset that women are not capable of matching the productivity of men in many employment settings. Gender is listed second only to lack of productivity as a reason to not retrench an employee. Neoliberal economics emphasize deregulated efficiency and growth which has often failed large segments of the population, particularly women who have borne the negative impacts of neoliberal policies. Onyejekwe explains that there is a need in this process to "institutionalize regulations and structures that will provide for women's welfare and empowerment" (Onyejekwe 2004: 30). Blatant gender discrimination in the workforce within CEE states has left women critical of the unregulated market transition and led to calls for intervention.

WOMEN AS LEGISLATORS

While previous literature implies that women may be less supportive of neoliberal economic policy than men, it does not necessarily mean that female Members of Parliament will be less supportive. They must be representative of their constituency which consists of both men and women. Their party affiliation may also inhibit their ability to vote in line with their ideals regarding neoliberalism. Research is shown that women can have enough influence to affect policy outcomes. Politics have generally been considered a "man's game" and a male dominated culture has created obstacles to the success and effectiveness of women as legislators. It is important to look at institutional and cultural factors within the European Parliament that may impact the way

in which women vote and their effectiveness as legislators. While this study is focused on the European Parliament, there is a great deal of literature regarding women as legislators in other legislative settings that is highly relevant.

Among legislative candidates, women tend to be more sympathetic to liberal concerns than men, but it is still not clear if a higher percentage of female representation leads or can lead to an alteration in agenda setting. When analyzing the British Parliament of 1987, Norris and Luvenduski find that women are first and foremost confined by party politics, but they explain that there is still a shift in support for feminine concerns with greater representation (Norris and Luvenduski 1989: 114). While finding strong evidence that women are substantively different to their male colleagues, Norris and Luvenduski do not find strong evidence that substantive differences directly result in public policy or agenda transformation. In spite of party politics, women are able to influence parliament in more indirect manners than voting such as written and oral questions, private correspondence, or select committee and adjournment debates. This has only limited success, however, as women are subjected to many institutional and non-institutional barriers that will be discussed in sections to follow. Norris and Luvenduski, among others, hypothesize that a "critical mass" of women must be reached in legislative bodies to overcome such barriers in order for true policy and agenda transformation to occur. This hypothesis is strongly debated in the literature.

Critical mass theory predicts that gender balance in legislative policy priorities and agenda will not be achieved in a male-dominated legislature, and that women are more

successful when the legislature is relatively balanced (Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1991). Michelle Saint-Germain explains that gender differences and the promotion of women's interests become amplified once the percentage of women reaches 15%. Thomas (1991) discovered through a survey of U.S. state legislatures that gender differences in legislation regarding women issues were minimal in states with a low percentage of women and more evident in states with a high percentage of women. Grey (2002) also noticed that female legislators were more actively involved in debates of women's issues when the legislative body has reached the critical mass number of 15%. Without this proportion of female representatives, legislative procedures are dominated by male issue priorities. According to this logic, women become tokens and less effective as legislators due to the male culture. These scholars are confident that an unbalanced legislature will greatly hinder the promotion of a more liberal feminine agenda until the magic 15% is reached.

The critical mass theory is debated, however, by several scholars (Kanter 1977; Bratton 2005).   Kanter (1977) argues that when women are an overwhelming minority in various settings, they embody a "token" status. This token status can lead to two different responses by women. The first is overachievement. Women may have a greater motivation to promote their priorities as they feel challenged to work against the status quo. This can actually lead to greater achievement on behalf of women as they are empowered as symbols for their category. The second and more common response is an attempt to limit visibility. Women may attempt to blend seamlessly into the male culture. Their gender already garners extra and unwanted attention and pressure, so a "fear of

visibility" is developed. So while women may still achieve a great deal, they do so

quietly. While Kanter's 1977 work is not focused on legislative bodies, it has been tied

to legislatures by several scholars. Bratton (2005) studies the lower house of state

legislatures in an attempt to discover the reach of Kanter's theory. Bratton finds that

these skewed settings often provide more motivation to promote women's issues, and

women are not only more active, but they are just as successful as male representatives.

She argues that a critical mass is not necessary for the individual female success as a

legislator, but a more equitable setting does provide a better environment for female

policy outputs. The results indicate that as the percentage of women increases in a

legislature, the chance for women's policy issues to be implemented increases. The

individual success of women is not dependent upon a critical mass, but a critical mass has

the ability to change institutional procedures themselves along with policy outputs.

A well balanced legislature, however, is not sufficient for significant policy outputs with

regard to women's issues. The social dynamics of a legislative body has profound

impacts on the ability for women to influence the legislative agenda and policy

implementation. Lyn Kathlene attempts to tackle the assumption that increased

representation of females and/or minorities legislatures will provide greater influence

over their issue priorities (1994). Through an analysis of Colorado state legislatures

Kathlene finds that even in well-balanced legislatures there tends to be an environment

that limits the progress of women. The author uses transcripts from twelve state

legislative committee hearings to examine the social dynamics. She analyzes

interruptions, position, and committee assignment to explain interactions as they relate to

gender. The findings reported suggest that women legislators, despite their greater legislative representation, "may be seriously disadvantaged in committee hearings and unable to participate equally in legislative committee hearings" (Kathlene 1994: 573). It turns out the women are just as successful as men when it comes to getting bills passed, but the process leading up to this is far from fair. The article shows that bills sponsored by women were more likely to be assigned to more than one House committee, were subjected to longer discussions in first committee hearings, and received twice as much hostile witness testimony. So while the number of women in state legislatures is increasing, they continue to face obstacles due to the social construction and male dominated culture.

Literature specific to female Members of European Parliament is fairly limited, so it is difficult to predict if women of the EP are subjected to similar environments as described in the various other legislatures. Jane Freedman sheds some light on this issue through a study using a questionnaire and survey answered by female MEPs (2002). Keeping in mind that the European Parliament does have what could be called a "critical mass" with 30% of MEPs being female, Freedman attempts to measure the attitudes and perceived effectiveness of female legislators. Freedman finds that women MEPs tend to "have a strong identification with women's issues and believe they can escape the structural constraints of their institution and make a difference to policy initiatives" (Freedman 188). The female legislators do point out, however, that the European Parliament is still not a perfect example of gender equality, and significant differences in member representation exist throughout the various member states. The questionnaire also shows

that female MEPs are motivated to bring the percentage of female representation closer to 50%. While female MEPs are still constrained by institutional and cultural barriers in the European Parliament, they are confident in their ability to promote their own interests and initiatives.

With 30% of the European Parliament membership is female, Freedman seeks to explain why women have an easier time being elected to the EP than their own national legislatures. Though she does not provide concrete evidence, she hypothesizes that the higher representation of women could "merely be a symptom of their undervaluation by politicians and parties in the member states" (Freedman 2002: 179). Parties are more willing to elect females to the European Parliament rather than their own national legislatures because the EP is perceived as less important and less powerful. This logic appears to suggest that where there is power there are not women, and where there are women there is not power. As seen previously, however, the European Parliament has continued to gain strength and influence in European politics and policies. So while women may be continued to be undervalued, their greater representation in the EP may unintentionally provide an opportunity for female MEPs to have a significant role in determining European policy.

While it appears that the European Parliament is more progressive than many national legislative bodies with regards to gender equality, scholars have found evidence that women may still encounter indirect discrimination in the EP. Work by Shaun Bowler and David Farrell suggests that women of the European Parliament may experience the

previously described challenges to a similar degree as those in national legislatures

(1995). Bowler and Farrell describe the organization and specialization of the European

Parliament and include gender as a variable for predictors of committee and position

assignments within the EP. Gender is statistically significant as a predictor of committee

assignments in economics, social affairs, and environmental issues. The coefficients

show that women are much less likely to be assigned to committees dealing with

economic issues and much more likely to be assigned to committees dealing with social

issues and environmental issues. While this will surely impact the amount of influence

women will have on economic policy, it is important to note that women can still have a

great deal of impact on the neoliberal direction of the European Parliament from social

and environmental committees.

In spite of these challenges faced by female MEPs, the European Parliament has shown a

dedication to gender equality. This is made clear by the formation of groups such as the

Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality and the Europeans Women's

Lobby. While the effectiveness and importance of such groups is debated, it is seen as a

crucial step towards equality, especially by women who do not have any such committee

in their own national legislative bodies. At the very least it has served as an example of

progress for EU member states. The committee has a strong dedication to women's

rights within Europe as well as women and elections within the European Parliament and

national legislatures throughout Europe.

WHAT'S NEXT?

Previous literature shows the potential for a gender gap in the way in which men and women perceive neoliberal economic policies. The literature also shows that women have a significant role in the European Parliament despite potentially facing greater challenges than men in policy and agenda influence. It is the objective of this study to discover if a potential gender gap in neoliberal economic issues translates into a gender gap in legislative voting on these issues. If there is a gender gap, it is important to discover whether or not the gap is significant enough to alter the direction of European economic policy. It is possible that even in the face of a gender gap, limitations in the culture and institution of the European Parliament could limit the ability of female MEPs to transform policy outcomes. The literature, however, leads to the hypothesis that women MEPs will vote differently than their male counterparts on issues relating to neoliberalism, and the difference will be significant enough to alter policy outputs, even in the face of adverse political conditions within the European Parliament.

HYPOTHESES

- Female Members of Parliament are more likely to vote against neoliberal economic policy than their male counterparts.
- The high representation of women in the European Parliament (31%) means that women have the numbers to impact neoliberal policy outcomes in the European Parliament.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

In order to determine whether or not women vote differently than their male counterparts

in the European Parliament, this study will utilize roll call voting records. This is the way

in which individual votes are recorded in various legislatures around the world. It is

known as the record of *yeas* and *nays* as it only records whether a particular legislator

voted for or against a bill. It has been argued that roll-call votes do not provide a

sufficient data base for determining a legislator's degree of support for legislation

because it requires the assumption that a legislator is indifferent between two pieces of

legislation, and the implied legislative preferences from roll-call votes is not equivalent to

a legislators' stated preferences (Gross 1979). Votes on the same bill are comparable

however. The data is abundant and available, and there is a long history of utilizing roll-

call data. Simon Hix, Abdul Noury, and Gerard Roland have put together a data set that

combines the roll call voting records with specific information about the individual

legislators and details regarding the subject of each vote (2006). This study will utilize

the data from these three scholars.

Using the details provided for each vote it is possible to distinguish which votes deal with

issues that will fall under the category of neoliberal policy. The selected votes range

from 1999 to 2004. These issues are not just limited to the economic arena as neoliberal policy incorporates government spending and free market imposition through social programs and environmental regulations. The data provides an opportunity to examine which way men and women voted on neoliberal policies. The definitions provided by John Williamson and Dan Rodrik will be used to determine if a vote deals with neoliberal policy. The following is a review of the neoliberal framework listed in Chapter I.

1) Williamson (1990)

– Fiscal policy discipline.

– Redirection of public spending from subsidies (especially indiscriminate subsidies) toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary education, primary health care, and infrastructure investment.

– Tax reform in the form of broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates.

– Interest rates that are market determined and positive, but moderate, in real terms.

– Competitive exchange rates.

– Trade liberalization: The liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions. Any trade protection is to be provided by law and relatively uniform tariffs.

– Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment.

– Privatization of state enterprises.

– Deregulation. Abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudent oversight of financial institutions.

– Legal security for property rights.

2) Rodrick (2001)

– Corporate governance

- Anti-corruption

- Flexible labor markets

- World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements

- Financial codes and standards

- "Prudent" capital-account opening

- Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes

- Independent central banks/inflation targeting

- Social safety nets

- Targeted poverty reduction

A vote that falls into at least one of these neoliberal guidelines may be included in the statistical analysis.

Two questions will be answered with the roll-call data pertaining to neoliberalism. First, do women tend to vote for or against neoliberal economic policies? Second, was the number of female voters significant enough to alter the outcome of the legislative vote? A couple of regression techniques will be used to determine if there is a significant difference in neoliberal voting as it pertains to gender. First, probit regressions will be used for each of the twelve votes which will provide coefficients for the binary dependent variables for the neoliberal legislation. Next, two scales will be created. One will include the legislative votes that are considered to be pro-neoliberal economic policy, and the second will include the votes that are considered to be anti-neoliberal. Two separate linear regressions will then be used with the pooled votes. This is done due to the fact that multiple issues are at play in each of the selected pieces of legislation. Neoliberal

economic policy is not the only aspect to each vote. Pooling the votes together as pro or anti-neoliberal may help to better distinguish a pattern with regard to gender and neoliberalism.

To answer the second question (was the number of female voters significant enough to alter the outcome of the legislative vote?), a summary will then be provided for legislation that was passed by a margin less than or equal to the number of female legislators. If a bill passed or failed by a margin of equal or lesser value than the number of female representatives, it will be labeled as strongly influenced by women. A percentage of neoliberal economic initiatives of this nature will be provided. Previous literature leads to the expectation that there will be a difference in men and women in terms of neoliberal voting habits, and this part of the analysis will determine if the difference is significant enough to influence policy outcomes.

Four important controls will be included in the regression. The first of these control variables will be the political party family which will be explained in greater detail in the "Regression Analysis" section. Previous research has shown that political party is a strong indication of policy preference and issue salience, in the U.S. (Lawless 2004), as well as within the European Parliament (Hix 2001). Research has also shown the existence of the same "left versus right" dimension that exists in domestic politics within the European Parliament (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006: 494). It has also been seen in the literature that both male and female MEPs are tied to party politics which may influence voting patterns. The second of these controls will measure age; different

generations had varying economic experiences. Some legislators have been part of a free

market economy for the duration of their lives, while other nations have experienced

communism and an economic transition from a command economy to an open economy.

Previous studies have shown age related patterns in political orientation including

economics (Watts 1999 and Laz 1998). The third control will be for nationality as

economic characteristics can change radically from state to state. Again, the different

member states of the European Union have a wide background of neoliberal policy

experience. Economic culture is also a function of the state. The fourth variable will

control for European Parliament Group to which each MEP belongs. European

Parliament Groups are organized based on loose ideology within the European

Parliament. With these variables controlled, the regression should effectively isolate the

impact of gender on neoliberal economic preference in legislative voting in the European

Parliament.

A brief description of the specific votes being used in the data analysis will now be given.

The information regarding each legislative action has been obtained from the official

European Parliament website archives (www.europarl.europa.eu). The votes have been

coded as 1 for a pro-neoliberal vote and 0 for an anti-neoliberal vote so that each separate

regression will measure gender's impact in the same direction. The votes have been

coded by their chronological ID from the aforementioned database.

Vote 1 (Resolution 3062): Broad economic policy guidelines - The sharp and partially

expected downturn in economic growth of the European Union that marked 2001 has

shown that the EU economy needs stronger co-ordination and an improved policy mix; the binding nature of the Stability and Growth Pact, in particular, the 3% threshold for national budget deficits and maintaining price stability, plays an important role both in stabilizing economic output and in creating European economic confidence, but further coordinated efforts on the second part of the Pact are needed in providing the necessary basis for an investment-friendly environment and high-quality jobs. The key to this resolution is the prescribed austerity measures as stipulated by the Stability and Growth Pact. Such austerity measure would decrease government budgets and spending on social programs.

Vote 2 (Resolution 4027): World hunger and the elimination of barriers to trade with the poorest countries. Apart from market access issues, including the non-tariff aspects, the Community should also address supply-side constraints and competitiveness, trade related areas, trade development measures, technology transfers, access to information and global networks, strategies to promote investment and private sector development. The elimination of trade barriers and the promotion of the private sector puts this resolution into the neoliberal category. Voting for this issue would be in favor of neoliberalism, while voting against it would be a stance against neoliberal economic policy.

Vote 3 (Order 81): This order deals with environmental standards regarding the quality of petrol and diesel fuels emissions from motor vehicles. This includes the regulation of emissions of commercial vehicles. This is an economic hindrance and a burden on business, especially those in the transportation industry. Voting for this order would be a

stance against neoliberal economic policy, while voting for this order would be in favor of neoliberal economic policy.

Vote 4 (Consultation 4475): This vote deals with the principle that aid should be conditional on non-productive criteria (relating to the environment, food safety, animal welfare and occupational safety) as a social imperative which contributes to reinforcing agricultural multi-functionality under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP combines a direct subsidy payment for crops and land which may be cultivated with price support mechanisms, including guaranteed minimum prices, import tariffs and quotas on certain goods from outside the EU. Nonetheless, it needs to be introduced carefully and rigorously, in order to ensure effective and uniform compliance with the 38 regulations and directives concerned while allowing administrations and producers enough time to adapt. Aid is contingent upon environmental concerns, food safety, animal welfare, and occupational safety rather than focusing solely on lowering trade barriers. Environment, food safety, animal welfare, and occupational safety act against productivity and overall economic competitiveness. Price minimums, import tariffs, and quotas are also seen as a hindrance to free trade. Voting *yay* in this consultation would be taking a stance against neoliberal economic policy, while voting *nay* would be a show of support for neoliberal economic policy.

Vote 5 (Resolution 3798): This Directive regulates the advertising of tobacco products in the media other than television, i.e., in the press and other printed publications, in radio broadcasting and in information society services. It also regulates the sponsorship by tobacco companies of radio programs and of events or activities involving or taking place

in several Member States or otherwise having cross-border effects, including the free or discounted distribution of tobacco products. Other forms of advertising, such as indirect advertising, as well as the sponsorship of events or activities without cross border effects, fall outside the scope of this Directive. Subject to the Treaty, Member States retain the competence to regulate these matters as they consider necessary to guarantee the protection of human health. This directive deals with government intervention and the hindrance of the tobacco industry. A vote for this bill would be a stance against neoliberal economic policy, while a vote against this bill would be in favor of neoliberalism.

Vote 6 (Resolution 3881): Adopting a competition policy as an indispensable condition to ensure the success of the strategic objective fixed in Lisbon for this decade, facing significant challenges, such as globalization and enlargement of the European Union. This resolution deals with a blanket form of government regulation with regard to competition policy throughout all of the European Union. A *yay* vote would take a stance against neoliberalism, while a *nay* vote would show favor to neoliberal economic policy.

Vote 7 (Resolution 4420): Noting the problems that developing countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) face due to the growing liberalization of international trade and their simultaneous participation in World Trade Organization negotiations and increasingly complex Free Trade Areas (FTAs), the inherent inequalities and the considerable difficulties these countries face in trade negotiations, which results in the need to increase negotiating capacities and safeguard national interests at all levels (especially when agreements involve economic and political giants like the EU and the US), and taking the view that trade objectives must be compatible with development.

This resolution deals with putting national interest above economic liberalization. Creating safeguards for developing countries would hinder free trade. Voting for this resolution would be a stance against neoliberal economic policy, while voting against it would show favor towards neoliberalism.

Vote 8 (Resolution 4421): Whereas the right of access – even non-reciprocal access – of the poorest countries to the markets of developed countries is quite insufficient to ensure real development of trade flows if steps are not also taken to strengthen their capabilities in terms of industrial and agricultural development, compliance with certification and standardization requirements – in particular with regard to health and plant protection regulations – in the importing countries, and knowledge of marketing channels. Because this resolution discusses non-reciprocal market access along with health and plant regulations, a *yay* vote would be a stance against neoliberalism, while a *nay* vote would show favor to neoliberal economic policy.

Vote 9 (Resolution 4418): When developing a trade policy with developing countries it is important to consider that customs duties constitute one of the main budget resources of developing countries (up to 70% in some Pacific countries) and these countries are therefore reluctant to conclude free trade agreements with their neighbors in the absence of alternative resources (in particular fiscal resources). This particular piece of the resolution asks the European Parliament to consider allowing developing states to maintain certain customs duties in order to preserve their national budget. This means trade barriers would be sustained. Voting for this resolution would be a stance against

neoliberal economic policy, while voting against this resolution would show favor towards neoliberalism.

Vote 10 (Resolution 4416): Calls on the Commission to place greater emphasis, within its development policy, on strengthening agricultural and trade capacities, knowledge of and compliance with the standards applied in the countries of destination – in particular with regard to health and plant protection requirements – and knowledge of marketing channels; calls on the Commission to lay down specific objectives in this respect within the country strategy papers. Because this resolution asks the European Commission to specifically regulate health and plant protection while providing market information, a *yay* vote would be a stance against neoliberalism. A *nay* vote would therefore show favor towards neoliberal economic policy.

Vote 11 (Strategy Document 1186): This document discusses employment policy regarding the mobility of labor within the European Union. It aims to ease restrictions on labor movement between member states in an attempt to improve employment rates and as well as the adaptability of the labor market within the European Union. Labor mobility is one of the pillars of neoliberal economic policy. Thus, voting for this strategy would show favor towards neoliberalism, while voting against it would be a stance against neoliberal economic policy.

Vote 12 (Resolution 4414): This resolution deals with EU trade policy whereas FTAs, particularly those between more than two parties within a geographic region (the Member States of the EU are collectively a single negotiating party) and between two or more regional groupings (region-to-region FTAs), serve primarily to integrate regional

markets, they also aim to increase regional political stability, generate good relations and

trust among neighbors and bring together countries of different levels of development,

institutional structures and capabilities - differences that may in the long run be evened

out. Whereas bilateral FTAs, namely those between two parties (the EU again being

defined as a single entity), can be considered as possible "path-finders" that serve as

benchmarks for trade liberalization in the region and may even boost the momentum of

regional integration, as long as the scope of these agreements can then be replicated to

other countries within the region. This resolution is a proponent of economic

liberalization while also explaining that FTAs can serve to even out economic

development levels. A *yay* vote on this resolution would show favor towards

neoliberalism, while a *nay* vote would be a stance against neoliberal economic policy.

It is interesting to note that there were far more anti-neoliberal votes in the massive

database than pro-neoliberal votes. This could suggest a trend or predisposition of the

European Parliament regarding neoliberal economic policy.

REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Each of the twelve votes will be run in a separate probit regression using Stata/IC 11.0.

Initially, the use of the *dprobit* function was considered because it displays the marginal

effects of gender and voting habits. While the marginal effects can be useful, they can

also be quite misleading since they only hold for a single point which may not even be

close to a real voter in this case. In each of the twelve regressions, the vote variable is

used as the dependent variable with gender and the other control variables being run as

independent variables. All of the *jointly significant* control variables will be included in each of the twelve probit regressions. A *Wald Test* will be conducted with each control variable to determine its joint significance. A Wald Test is a post-estimation test for simple and composite hypotheses about the parameters of the most recently fitted model. If Wald Test does not show significance of the control variable, those coefficients will not be shown in the *Findings* section, but they will be available in appendix.

The two scales will then be run in a linear regression. Two separate tables will be provided, one showing the findings for the pro-neoliberal votes, and one showing the findings for the anti-neoliberal pieces of legislation. Again, because each piece of legislation contains more dimensions than simply neoliberalism, this scale approach may highlight aspects of a gender and neoliberal relationship that the first set of regressions may not present.

The control variable for age is coded as the MEP's birth year subtracted from 1900. Thus, an MEP born in 1935 will be coded as 35. The control variables for European Parliament Group, national party, and member state refer to discrete, and one particular category is not necessarily an upgrade over another. With this in mind it is necessary to create dummy variables for each category to include in the probit regression. One of these newly created variables is then deleted and a wildcard is used in order to efficiently include the new variables. If one of the new dummy variables is not omitted from each set, then perfect collinearity will be induced. This appears as an error, but it is a logical error on the part of the researcher.

In the previously mentioned data set (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2004), the 28 European

Parliament Groups that are included are divided into eight different categories based on

common core principles. The groups have been divided as follows:

Group 1 - coded as ep1

Independents for a European of Nations
Europe of Democracies and Diversities

Group 2 – coded as ep2

European Democrats

Group 3 – coded as ep3

European People's Party
European People's Party-European Democrats

Group 4 – coded as ep4

Forza Europa
Socialist Group
Party of European Socialists

Group 5 – coded as ep5

Progressive European Democrats
European Democratic Alliance
Union for Europe
Union for a Europe of Nations

Group 6 – coded as ep6

Liberal and Democratic Group
Liberal Democratic and Reform Group
European Liberal Democratic and Reform Party
Green Group

Group 7 – coded as ep7

Communist Group
European United Left/Nordic Green Left

European United Left

Group 8 – coded as ep8

Left Coalition
Technical Coordination of Democrats and Independents
Non-attached
Technical Group of Independents

Each MEP belongs to one of these European Parliament Groups. The inclusion of this variable into the regression should show whether or not MEPs are bound by the common principles and agendas of these EP groups. A dummy variable is used for each group listed above coded as 1 if the MEP belongs to this group and 0 if the MEP does not belong to this group.

There are 170 different national parties recorded for the 696 MEPs in the data set. This number is too large to expect any meaningful results in a regression. National parties have been grouped into national party "families" based on the characteristics of the parties. These families include the following:

Anti-European Union (coded as pf1) – These parties are characterized by a general skepticism of European Union integration. These parties generally favor greater national sovereignty.

Christian Democratic (coded as pf2) – This refers to a party which seeks to apply Christian principles to public policy. They are often considered conservative on cultural, social and moral issues and progressive on fiscal and economic issues.

Conservative (coded as pf3) - Refers to various political and social philosophies that support tradition and the status quo, or that call for a return to the values and society of an earlier age, the status quo ante (McClain & McMillan 2009).

Green (coded as pf4) – Refers to political ideology which places a high importance on environmental goals, and on achieving these goals through broad-based, grassroots, participatory democracy.

Independent (coded as pf5) – Independent parties vary in ideology, but these parties consider themselves outside of the typical liberal and conservative labels of their national opponents.

Left (coded as pf6) - Refer to parties which tend to support change in traditional social orders or the creation of a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and privilege.

Liberal (coded as pf7) – Refers to the belief in the importance of individual freedom. The rule of law and equality before the law are fundamental to liberalism.

Regional (coded as pf8) – These parties generally consist of a political ideology that focuses on the interests of a particular region or group of regions, whether traditional or formal (administrative divisions, country subdivisions, political divisions, sub-national units). Regional parties often focus on increasing the region's influence and political power, either through movements for limited form of autonomy (devolution, states' rights, decentralization) or through stronger measures for a greater degree of autonomy (sovereignty, separatism, independence). They also often favor loose federations or confederations over a unitary state with a strong central government.

Right (coded as pf9) - Refers to parties which tend to support the preservation of traditional or cultural values and customs or maintaining some form of social hierarchy or private control of the means of production.

Socialist (coded as pf10) – Generally refers to the economic organization advocating public or direct worker ownership and administration of the means of production and allocation of resources, and a society characterized by equal access to resources for all individuals with a method of compensation based on the amount of labor expended (Newman 2005).

This variable should help to determine the extent to which Members of Parliament are bound by their national parties' ideology. As mentioned earlier, political parties are a nominal category making it necessary to use dummy variables for each political family (coded as 1 if a MEP belongs to this political family or 0 of the MEP does not).

Because this data set was created in 2004, only 15 member states will be included in the data as the accession of the other members had not yet occurred. These member states are coded as follows:

Austria – ms1
Belgium – ms2
Germany – ms3
Denmark – ms4
Spain – ms5
Finland – ms6
France – ms7
Greece – ms8
Italy – ms9
Ireland – ms10
Luxembourg –ms11
Netherlands – ms12
Portugal – ms13

Sweden – ms14
United Kingdom – ms15

Again, a dummy variable is used for each member state, and they are coded as 1 if the

MEP belongs to the member state and 0 if the MEP does not.

The dependent vote variables have been simplified to only include *yes* and *no* votes. The

roll call votes actually account for MEPs being absent, abstaining, or not being a Member

of Parliament at the time of the vote, but these observations have been omitted from the

vote variables.

The probit regression will show the relevance of gender with regard to the selected EP

votes that relate to neoliberal economic policy. If gender is relevant for a particular vote,

it will then be decided of the number of female MEPs was significant enough to change

the outcome of the vote.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

The probit and linear regression results begin on the following page. A few technicalities jump out right away. First, the *socialist party family* has been omitted in order to avoid perfect collinearity in the data as explained in the methodology section. Other variables have been omitted because the binary variables happen to predict success perfects and must be dropped. The *Wald Tests* were run on the control variables for member state, European Parliament Group, and party family. Only party family proved to be jointly significant as a control variable. The controls for member state and European Parliament Group are not jointly significant, and they have been dropped from the probit regression as well as the linear regression with scales. Following the *Wald Test* results, the dependent variables for vote and the control variables for gender, age, and party family are all included. The *Wald Test* results are available in the appendix section

Figure 2 – Probit Regression (Votes 1 – 4)

	Vote1 (3062)	Vote 2 (4027)	Vote 3 (81)	Vote 4 (4475)
Gender	-.3348018*	0.119	0.00494	-0.132
	(-2.06)	(0.83)	(0.02)	(-0.96)
Age	.0115877	-0.00775	0.0179	-0.0131
	(1.24)	(-1.09)	(1.62)	(-1.89)
Anti-EU party family	0.177	-1.043***	omitted	omitted
	(0.56)	(-3.46)		
Christian Democratic party family	1.047***	-0.145	omitted	-0.370*
	(3.69)	(-0.81)		(-2.09)
Conservative party family	1.243***	-0.216	2.551***	0.250
	(4.48)	(-1.30)	(5.21)	(1.40)
Green party family	-0.511*	omitted	0.574	-0.817**
	(-2.04)		(1.95)	(-2.84)
Independent party family	0.520	-1.230	0.656	0.610
	(0.80)	(-1.61)	(0.71)	(1.05)
Left party family	-0.178	0	0.821*	0.952***
	(-0.74)	(.)	(2.52)	(3.29)
Liberal party family	1.255*	-0.282	omitted	0.0144
	(2.41)	(-0.86)		(0.06)
Regional party family	-0.0789	-0.724	1.085**	0.142
	(-0.25)	(-1.89)	(2.78)	(0.41)
Right party family	0.946*	-0.771*	1.575*	1.166*
	(2.14)	(-2.30)	(2.20)	(2.49)
Socialist party family	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
Chi square	67.27	21.54	63.54	47.61
Loglinear	-183.0342	-251.58295	-109.95178	-273.33647
Psuedo R2	0.1552	0.0411	0.2242	0.0801
N	343	473	217	442

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 3 – Probit Regression (Votes 5 – 8)

	Vote5 (3798)	Vote 6 (3881)	Vote 7 (4420)	Vote 8 (4421)
Gender	-0.225	0.00233	0.0339	0.132
	(-1.23)	(0.02)	(0.15)	(0.67)
Age	-0.00617	-0.00438	-0.0128	0.00704
	(-0.70)	(-0.61)	(-1.03)	(0.64)
Anti-EU party family	1.334***	0.156	-0.897*	-1.254***
	(3.41)	(0.29)	(-2.57)	(-3.44)
Christian Democratic party family	0.757*	-1.441***	omitted	1.101*
	(2.50)	(-5.89)		(1.97)
Conservative party family	0.502*	-1.385***	1.169**	-0.749**
	(2.12)	(-5.75)	(3.08)	(-2.78)
Green party family	-0.419	0.118	-1.113***	-1.551***
	(-1.12)	(0.22)	(-3.50)	(-4.49)
Independent party family	0.916	omitted	-0.713	-1.045
	(1.57)		(-0.98)	(-1.46)
Left party family	-0.339	-0.824*	-1.094***	-1.216***
	(-1.07)	(-2.24)	(-3.47)	(-3.97)
Liberal party family	0.532*	-1.563***	1.153	0.957
	(1.96)	(-5.57)	(1.93)	(1.62)
Regional party family	-0.130	-0.718	-0.781*	-0.920*
	(-0.32)	(-1.79)	(-1.96)	(-2.30)
Right party family	0.908*	-0.758*	-0.761	-0.626
	(2.45)	(-2.02)	(-1.92)	(-1.44)
Socialist party family	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
Chi square	37.19	78.25	68.65	63.88
Loglinear	-161.70795	-254.85491	-106.59115	-130.51891
Psuedo R2	0.1031	0.1331	0.2436	0.1966
N	374	440	210	248

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 4 – Probit Regression (Votes 9 – 12)

	Vote 9 (4418)	Vote 10 (4416)	Vote 11 (1186)	Vote 12 (4414)
Gender	0.0615	-0.201	-.0976	0.243
	(0.29)	(-0.98)	(-1.32)	(1.39)
Age	-0.000182	-0.00812	0.0164	0.00759
	(-0.02)	(-0.80)	(0.79)	(0.87)
Anti-EU party family	-1.008**	0.653	omitted	-0.0152
	(-2.90)	(1.82)		(-0.05)
Christian Democratic party family	0.834	2.286***	0.270	-2.586***
	(1.84)	(5.29)	(0.47)	(-5.10)
Conservative party family	0.159	omitted	-0.308	-2.040***
	(0.51)		(-0.62)	(-6.69)
Green party family	-1.488***	0.0303	-0.465	0.241
	(-4.45)	(0.10)	(-0.70)	(0.81)
Independent party family	-0.696	1.171	omitted	-0.355
	(-0.89)	(1.82)		(-0.52)
Left party family	-1.279***	0.0636	-1.585*	0.0196
	(-4.22)	(0.23)	(-2.28)	(0.08)
Liberal party family	omitted	2.339***	omitted	-0.443
		(4.19)		(-1.84)
Regional party family	-1.052*	0.399	-1.157*	-0.236
	(-2.52)	(1.11)	(-2.18)	(-0.73)
Right party family	-1.037*	0.914*	-1.928*	-1.711**
	(-2.48)	(2.08)	(-2.31)	(-2.64)
Socialist party family	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
Chi square	64.14	67.19	16.93	102.61
Loglinear	-116.1452	-134.76076	-33.899758	-176.22482
Psuedo R2	0.2164	0.1995	0.1998	0.2255
N	223	316	131	388

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

RESULTS

GENDER

The focus of this probit regression was the *gender* variable, and it was only significant for a single vote in this analysis. The findings of this project indicate that gender had little effect on how MEPs voted on neoliberal policies. Let us start by examining the pro-neoliberal votes (1, 2, 11, 12). If we look at the first vote we see that *gender* is significant at the 5% level. It is also a negative coefficient, indicating that women MEPs were more likely to vote against neoliberalism in this case. Voting no on *Vote 1* meant voting against a Growth and Stability Pact which includes measures of fiscal austerity. This first piece of legislation confirms the expectation that female MEPs would be less likely to support neoliberal economic policies. This is the one and only occasion in the probit regressions where this expectation is confirmed. When looking at *Vote 2* we notice that not only is *gender* not significant, but it also has a positive coefficient. This piece of legislation deals with the removal of trade barriers between the European Union and developing countries. There is very little difference between male and female voting patterns here. *Vote 11* follows the same pattern. This document discusses easing restrictions on labor mobility within the European Union. Gender has a small and negative coefficient and is not significant at the 5% level in this probit regression. The coefficient for gender in the regression with *Vote 12* is again small but positive. Gender is not significant at the 5% level. This vote is a resolution regarding Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with the European Union acting as a single entity in relation to other states.

Now we look to probit regression results of the anti-neoliberal pieces of legislation (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10). *Vote 3* is an order regarding environmental standards, specifically diesel fuel emissions and commercial vehicles. The coefficient for the gender variable in this regression is positive, but it is not significant at the 5% level. *Vote 4* is an EP consultation. This vote deals with the principle that aid should be conditional on non-productive criteria (relating to the environment, food safety, animal welfare and occupational safety). While the coefficient for the gender variable is negative, it is small and not significant at the 5% level, meaning that men and women did not deviate much in their vote on this consultation. Gender has a higher coefficient in the regression with *Vote 5* and is also negative indicating that women were more likely to vote against neoliberalism in this case. However, gender is still not significant at the 5% level. This piece of legislation deals with regulation of marketing in the tobacco industry. The probit regressions for votes 6, 7, 8, and 9 all produce very small and positive coefficients for the gender variable. None of these regressions have a gender variable significant at the 5% level. *Vote 6* is a resolution calling for a blanket form of government regulation with regard to competition policy throughout all of the European Union. *Vote 7* includes a policy to put national interest above economic liberalization by creating safeguards for developing states. *Vote 8* is a resolution for non-reciprocal market access along with health and plant regulations. *Vote 9* asks the European Parliament to consider allowing developing states to maintain certain customs duties in order to preserve their national budget. The gender variable for *Vote 10* produces a larger and negative coefficient than the previous votes. This suggests that women were more likely to vote against

neoliberalism in this case, but the gender variable is not significant. This resolution calls for regulation of health and plant protection.

Only one piece of European Parliament legislation dealing with neoliberalism showed gender as being a significant factor in determining the voting habits of MEPs. The gender variable for the other eleven votes have small coefficients and sporadic signs indicating no pattern with regard to gender and legislative voting on neoliberal economic issues.

AGE

For all twelve probit regressions, the coefficients for the age variable are very small and had sporadic signs. There is exactly the same number of positive coefficients as there are negative coefficients for this variable, and not a single coefficient is greater than 0.018. This shows no evidence for a relationship between the age of an MEP and his or her likelihood of voting for a neoliberal economic policy in the European Parliament. Despite evidence in the literature for a generational effect on economic perspectives, one has not been found in these regressions.

PARTY FAMILY

The *Wald Test* for the party family variable has shown that this control variable is jointly significant for all twelve of the votes. The results for these tests can be found in the

appendix. This is not a surprising result as a relationship between party and voting habits has been established in previous literature. Being a member of the *conservative* party family and the *left* party family appear to have the greatest effect on the voting habits of an MEP as they pertain to neoliberalism. As expected by the general political ideology of these two families, the *conservative* party family is more likely to vote for neoliberal economic policy, and the *left* party family is more likely to vote against neoliberal economic policy. This is not the case for every vote, but when looking at all of the twelve regressions, this is the trend. The other party families do not have a distinct pattern in their support or opposition for the neoliberal legislation. Regardless, it is clear that the party family variable is responsible for a significant portion of MEPs' voting habits for the twelve selected votes. This suggests that while parties do not necessarily vote consistently on neoliberal economic policy, the party members are more likely to vote along party lines than not.

Figure 5 – Pro-neoliberal

	Pro-neoliberal
Gender	0.293 (1.01)
Age	0.00782 (0.61)
Anti-EU party family	0.551 (0.77)
Christian Democratic party family	-0.480 (-0.66)
Conservative party family	0.519 (0.71)
Green party family	-3.070*** (-4.43)
Independent party family	omitted
Left party family	-2.117** (-3.09)
Liberal party family	-0.0383 (-0.05)
Regional party family	-0.140 (-0.20)
Right party family	omitted
Socialist party family	omitted
Adjusted R2	0.4189
N	37

Figure 6 – Anti-neoliberal

	Anti-neoliberal
Gender	-0.350
	(-0.50)
Age	-0.0581
	(-1.28)
Anti-EU party family	0.779
	(0.84)
Christian Democratic party family	1.367
	(1.37)
Conservative party family	3.231**
	(3.01)
Green party family	-3.618***
	(-4.70)
Independent party family	-2.647
	(-1.80)
Left party family	-3.669**
	(-3.69)
Liberal party family	-1.782*
	(-1.62)
Regional party family	0.989
	(1.04)
Right party family	2.041**
	(1.98)
Socialist party family	omitted
Adjusted R2	0.8162
N	18

For these linear regressions the votes have been pooled by type (pro-neoliberal or anti-neoliberal).

It is important to note the number of observations for each of these linear regressions.

They number of observations has dropped dramatically. Because of the nature of the

pooled regression, it only includes observations (MEPs) who voted on all of the votes in the regression. This means that any Member of Parliament who abstained from a vote or were not present is not included in the regression. This small number of observations could significantly weaken the integrity of the results.

Figure 5 shows a linear regression with the pro-neoliberal votes (1, 2, 11, 12) pooled together with the same control variables from the probit regressions. The socialist party family has again been omitted to avoid collinearity with the binary variables. Other party families have been omitted because they happen to predict success perfectly. The votes are pooled into these groups because each vote has more to it than neoliberalism. They are more complex than one simple label can explain. Because of this, a linear regression with pooled votes could possibly highlight a relationship between gender and support for neoliberalism that the initial probit regressions could not. This expectation was not fulfilled, however, as the linear regressions with the pooled votes did not produce significantly different results than the probit regressions. Neither of the variables for gender ended up being significant. There is not even coordination in the direction of the coefficients as the pro-neoliberal regression produced a positive coefficient, and the anti-neoliberal regression produced a negative coefficient. Remember, the votes were coded so that 1 would express support for neoliberalism and 0 would express opposition to neoliberalism. This means that if there was a pattern of men and women voting differently on neoliberal issues, the two coefficients should at least have the same sign. No further evidence was developed for a relationship between age and support for neoliberalism as it was not significant in either regression. Again, party family proved to

be the most influential of the independent variables on voting habits. The *conservative*

and *left* party families show the same direction of support for neoliberal policies. Not all

parties were significant in impacting voting behavior, but as a whole, *party family* is the

single-most influential variable in determining which way an MEP will vote on the

twelve selected neoliberal issues.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

DISCUSSION

Gender

The focus of this study has been the impact of gender on neoliberal economic legislation within the European Parliament. The coefficients for the *gender* variable are only significant at the 5% level for one of the twelve selected pieces of legislation. Not only are the size of the coefficients sporadic, but the signs of the coefficient are also sporadic. This means that gender had little effect on voting habits, and it also shows that women do not consistently support or oppose neoliberal economic legislation based on the twelve selected votes. This probit regression has produced no pattern with regard to gender and the likelihood of voting for or against neoliberal economic policies in the European Parliament. This is an unexpected result as previous literature has found patterns in legislative bodies considering gender and voting. Previous literature has also suggested that women would have differing views on neoliberal economic policy itself as well as its implementation. No evidence has been found for such a relationship in this particular analysis. This does not necessarily mean that there is no relationship between gender and

neoliberal economic legislation, but one was not discovered here. The small sample size of legislation could be one cause of the sporadic findings.

What explanations other than parameter limitations could help shed light on the results of this regression? Why does the literature suggest that men and women think differently about economics while this study has shown men and women to not vote in a significantly different manner? A return to the idea of a European economic identity could provide some answers. As noted earlier, literature has examined the development of a European identity through the evolution of the European Union, but this has not been analyzed thoroughly from a purely economic perspective. It is possible that the goals and ambitions of economic unity within the European Union as well as a unified economic policy with the rest of the world may overcome trends in gender and economic ideology.

Another possible explanation lies in Carol Gilligan's theory of moral development (Gilligan 1982). Gilligan's theory of moral development in women and girls consisted of three levels. In the first level, moral reasoning is based entirely around what is best for one's self. A girl or woman in the second stage, on the other hand, makes decisions based on a sense of goodness as well as self-sacrifice. The third and most sophisticated stage of feminine moral reasoning, Gilligan held, valued truth as well as self-sacrifice; in this stage, women are able to reason through consequences and the impact that one's actions has on others. This self-sacrifice often pertains to relationships for women. In this sense, there could be a sacrificing of values in order to allow further progress of the European Union (or relationship) and its economic objectives.

<center>Control Variables</center>

Age: While previous literature shows a possible link to generation and political and economic ideology, this probit regression analysis has yielded no evidence to confirm this. The coefficients are consistently close to zero, and the signs vary from vote to vote. This means none of the relationships are statistically significant. Of course, this does not mean there is no connection. Not only is the voting sample for this regression analysis small, but the votes all fall into the category of neoliberal economic policy. Nonetheless, age has clearly shown itself to be a nonfactor in this particular regression.

If previous literature has shown a link between age and political ideology, why is there no evidence for it here? One possible answer may lie in the place of emphasis by previous literature regarding this issue. Literature has focused on the changing ideology of voters rather than the legislators' themselves. It may well have been incorrect to assume that legislators follow the same patterns as their constituencies. Those making a career in politics cannot likely afford to significantly alter their political ideology over time. Politicians with ideological shifts over time are often viewed as "flip floppers," and they are not considered to be confident in their values. This would not be conducive to re-election. Such deviations can be viewed as hypocritical or ambiguous by the voting population. If an MEP's political ideology remains relatively constant over time, it would make sense that political party would be a much greater indicator of neoliberal voting habits.

<center>56</center>

European Parliament Group: Because these groups are political coalitions of a number of European parties, national parties and independent politicians, it would be logical for this control variable to be correlated with the control for *party family*. This was not the case, however, as the EPG control variable was shown to not be jointly significant at the 5% level for any of the twelve selected votes. This was shown by the Wald Test performed for each individual vote.

Why is this the case? Upon review of the European Parliament Groups on page 35, it can be seen that these groups are not cleanly divided by political ideology. These coalitions are not formed solely on these ideals; there is a more complex strategy behind their formation. European Parliament Groups benefit greatly compared to individual MEPs. For example, a coalition between the European Greens and the European Free Alliance would yield much greater power than acting as stand-alone parties as their causes would attract greater support. Another important incentive for group formation is financial benefit. Financial subsidiaries are provided to Groups by the Parliament that are not offered to independent MEPs. Group members are also guaranteed seats on particular committees. With such important benefits for Group members, other strategic factors would be involved in Group formation. Strategic alliances would likely be formed with those who are not always ideologically identical on important issues, including neoliberal economic policy. This could explain the lack of joint significance as a control variable in this probit regression.

Member State: The control variable for member state was only found to be jointly

significant for *vote 7* in the regression. *Vote* 7 deals with safeguarding the national

interests of developing countries when faced with policies of trade liberalization and

WTO negotiations. The fact that member state is jointly significant for this vote at the

5% level appears to be a coincidence however. When looking at the other 11 votes in the

appendix section, member state does consistently have a larger coefficient than the

previous two control variables discussed. When analyzing the tables provided in the

appendix, there are votes in which a particular member state plays a significant role in

determining voting habits, but the results are high inconsistent and dispersed. It is fair to

conclude that an MEP's member state did not significantly affect their vote on the 12

selected votes in this regression.

Why is it that MEPs of a different culture, different historical background, and different

national interests can have such similar voting habits? Two possible explanations could

help to shed some light on this dilemma. The first explanation deals with socioeconomic

status. The idea that the politicians are, more often than not, financially privileged, may

influence their voting behavior, especially in the economic arena. This issue is discussed

in detail within the literature regarding "ambition theory." This theory deals with goal

orientation and motivation in attempting to overcome socioeconomic status. Simply put

by Pauline Stone, "it is almost an axiom of contemporary social science that human

aspirations are a function of where one is located in the social structure" (Stone 106). It

is possible that the shared privileged upbringing by MEPs is more influential than their

own borders in determining their position on the selected neoliberal economic policies.

The second explanation deals with the idea of an economic European identity provided by the European Union. Literature has discussed the slow formation of a European identity within the European Union (Rousseau and Van Der Veen 2005), but literature is sparse regarding an economic identity. It is likely that MEPs and other elites would be more likely than others to have a European identity as they are more informed of EU politics and have influence in their direction. It is important to remember that the European Union evolved from the European Economic Community (EEC) which formed a customs union throughout Europe. Thus, the European Union began with a purely economic agenda. It would make sense that a desire for economic unity may overcome one's own national identity and national background.

Party Family: The party family control variable was the only independent variable in this probit regression to be jointly significant at the 5% level for all twelve of the selected votes. Political party has been shown consistently by previous research to greatly impact legislators' voting habits, but the consistency found in this regression for the European Parliament was not expected. Party affiliation is certainly a function of political ideology, and this shows that MEPs are not deviating much from this ideology. It could have been hypothesized, however, that the overarching interests of the European Union may supersede party affiliation. This was not the case. The domestic political party of the MEPs is the single greatest predictor of neoliberal economic voting for the twelve selected votes. It is important to remember that the variable for political party was divided in party family groups. This greatly widens the ideological boundaries compared

to running a regression with each individual party represented. As mentioned before, this was not possible due to the large number of domestic political parties in relation to the number of MEPs. There may be stronger findings if party was measured more precisely.

The consistency of the *party family* coefficients is surprising for another reason. Voter turnout for European Parliament elections is generally lower throughout the member states of the European Union than their own domestic elections. Ann Olson explains that even though voter turnout for European Parliament elections "varies immensely among member states, the average EP-turnout has constantly been more than 20 percentage points lower than the average turnout in corresponding prior national parliamentary elections" (Olson 2006). The numbers have consistently declined since the formation of the European Parliament in 1979 which signifies declining interest. This low level of interest in European Parliament affairs could mean that there is less pressure by Parliament members to vote along party lines in order to please their constituency. The results of this regression show, however, that legislators are still voting in line with their party's ideology even at the European Parliament level.

<center>FURTHER RESEARCH</center>

While no pattern between gender and neoliberal economic voting habits in the European Parliament have been discovered in this analysis, there is a great deal of room for further study. A similar study conducted with a much larger sample of neoliberal economic legislation may provide different results. Further study regarding the existence of a unified European economic identity may also help to explain some of the results

produced in this analysis. Because gender has been shown to influence legislative voting in other legislative bodies, a study looking at gender with a wide range of other issues outside of neoliberal economic policy would show if the European Parliament acts against gender trends on a greater scale than neoliberal economic policy. If this is the case, then there may be other explanations for the lack of a relationship in this study and not discount the existence of a gender factor with regard to neoliberal economic policy in other political arenas.

A study including a bivariate regression between gender and party may better describe the relationship of these two variables. Women are more likely to join some political parties over others, which means that the *party family* control variable could be masking gender differences. It is possible that gender differences could be found when looking within European parties rather than looking at the two variables separately.

More research should be done before declaring that female MEPs do not act differently on neoliberal economic policy than their male counterparts. This research has simply shown that female MEPs do not *vote* in a significantly different manner than their male counterparts on the twelve selected pieces of neoliberal economic legislation, and it provides no evidence of a gender factor within the European Parliament with regard to such policies.

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VOTE 1 (3062)

Wald Test: Party Family

chi2 =   55.38
Prob > chi2 =   0.0000

The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 5% level for the

dependent variable for *Vote 1*.

Wald Test: European Parliament Group

chi2 = 4.97
Prob > chi2 = 0.6642

The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant at the

10% level, so the table will not be included in this section.

Wald Test: Member State

chi2 = 17.56
Prob > chi2 = 0.2274

The control variables for member states are not jointly significant at the 10% level for

Vote 1, so the table will not be included in this section.

VOTE 2 (4027)

Wald Test: Party Family

chi2 = 19.57
Prob > chi2 = 0.00

The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the dependent variable for *Vote 2*.

Two variables have been omitted and the observations dropped because they predict success perfectly.

Wald Test: European Parliament Group

chi2 = 4.47
Prob > chi2 = 0.7244

The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for *Vote 2,* so the table will not be included in this section. One variable has been omitted and observations dropped because it predicts success perfectly.

Wald Test: Member State

chi2 = 12.19
Prob > chi2 = 0.5912

The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for *Vote 2,* so the table will not be included in this section.

Vote 3 (81)

Wald Test: Party Family

chi2 = 39.83
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the dependent variable for *Vote 2*.

Three variables have been omitted and the observations dropped because they predict success perfectly.

Wald Test: European Parliament Group

chi2 = 2.39
Prob > chi2 = 0.9351

The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for *Vote 3*, so the table will not be included in this section.

Wald Test: Member State

chi2 = 11.07
Prob > chi2 = 0.6046

The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for *Vote 3*, so the table will not be included in this section.

Vote 4 (4475)

Wald Test: Party Family

chi2 = 38.59
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the dependent variable for *Vote 4*.

One variable has been omitted and the observations dropped because they predict success perfectly.

Wald Test: European Parliament Group

chi2 = 8.91
Prob > chi2 = 0.2590

The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for *Vote 4*, so the table will not be included in this section. It can be found in **Figure 4.2** in the appendix.

Wald Test: Member State

chi2 = 16.71
Prob > chi2 = 0.2128

The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for *Vote 4,*

so the table will not be included in this section. One variable has been omitted and the

observations dropped because they predict success perfectly.

Vote 5 (3798)

Wald Test: Party Family

chi2 = 32.70
Prob > chi2 = 0.0002

The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the

dependent variable for *Vote 5.*

One variable has been omitted and the observations dropped because they predict success

perfectly.

Wald Test: European Parliament Group

chi2 = 8.88
Prob > chi2 = 0.1807

The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for *Vote*

5, so the table will not be included in this section. One variable has been omitted and

observations dropped because it predicts success perfectly.

Wald Test: Member State

chi2 = 13.68
Prob > chi2 = 0.2510

The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for *Vote 5,* so the table will not be included in this section. Three variables have been omitted and the observations dropped because they predict success perfectly.

Vote 6 (3881)

Wald Test: Party Family

chi2 = 62.96
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the dependent variable for *Vote 6.*

One variable has been omitted and the observations dropped because they predict success perfectly.

Wald Test: European Parliament Group

chi2 = 6.14
Prob > chi2 = 0.5230

The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for *Vote 6,* so the table will not be included in this section.

Wald Test: Member State

chi2 = 10.04
Prob > chi2 = 0.7589

The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for *Vote 6,* so the table will not be included in this section.

Vote 7 (4420)

Wald Test: Party Family

chi2 = 55.08
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the

dependent variable for *Vote 7*. One variable has been omitted and the observations

dropped because they predict success perfectly.

Wald Test: European Parliament Group

chi2 = 5.57
Prob > chi2 = 0.5905

The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for *Vote*

7, so the table will not be included in this section.

Wald Test: Member State

chi2 = 23.15
Prob > chi2 = 0.0400

The control variables for Member State are jointly significant at the 10% for *Vote 7*. One

variable has been omitted and observations dropped because it predicts success perfectly.

Vote 8 (4421)

Wald Test: Party Family

chi2 = 51.03
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the

dependent variable for *Vote 8.*

Wald Test: European Parliament Group

chi2 = 4.72
Prob > chi2 = 0.6935

The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for *Vote*

8, so the table will not be included in this section.

Wald Test: Member State

chi2 = 19.59
Prob > chi2 = 0.1059

The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for *Vote 8,*

so the table will not be included in this section.

Vote 9 (4418)

Wald Test: Party Family

chi2 = 55.91
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the

dependent variable for *Vote 9.* One variable has been omitted and observations dropped

because it predicts success perfectly.

Wald Test: European Parliament Group

chi2 = 5.89
Prob > chi2 = 0.5532

The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for *Vote*

9, so the table will not be included in this section.

Wald Test: Member State

chi2 = 18.96
Prob > chi2 = 0.1245

The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for *Vote 9,*

so the table will not be included in this section. One variable has been omitted and

observations dropped because it predicts success perfectly.

Vote 10 (4416)

Wald Test: Party Family

chi2 = 51.26
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the

dependent variable for *Vote 10.* One variable has been omitted and observations dropped

because it predicts success perfectly.

Wald Test: European Parliament Group

chi2 = 5.20
Prob > chi2 = 5.20

The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for *Vote*

10, so the table will not be included in this section.

Wald Test: Member State

chi2 = 17.75
Prob > chi2 = 0.1671

The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for *Vote 10,*

so the table will not be included in this section. One variable has been omitted and

observations dropped because it predicts success perfectly.

Vote 11 (4414)

Wald Test: Party Family

chi2 = 77.46
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the

dependent variable for *Vote 11*.

Wald Test: European Parliament Group

chi2 = 5.47
Prob > chi2 = 0.6031

The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for *Vote*

11, so the table will not be included in this section. .

Wald Test: Member State

chi2 = 16.45
Prob > chi2 = 0.2258

The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for *Vote 11,*

so the table will not be included in this section.

Vote 12 (4475)

Wald Test: Party Family

chi2 = 38.59
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

The Party Family control variables are jointly significant at the 10% level for the

dependent variable for *Vote 12*.

Wald Test: European Parliament Group

chi2 = 8.91
Prob > chi2 = 0.2590

The control variables for European Parliament Group are not jointly significant for *Vote 12,* so the table will not be included in the regression.

Wald Test: Member State

chi2 = 16.71
Prob > chi2 = 0.2128

The control variables for Member State are not jointly significant at the 10% for *Vote 12,* so the table will not be included in the regression.

VITA

Ryan Patrick Vail

Candidate for the Degree of Master of Science in International Studies

Thesis: GENDER AND ECONOMIC NEOLIBERALISM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Major Field: International Studies: emphasis in International Trade and Development

Education

OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY, STILLWATER, OK: Attended August 2004 to December 2007.
Double Major: Spanish and political science (Bachelor of Arts to be awarded December 2007)
Overall grade-point average: 3.65/4.00

Currently pursuing a Master of Science in International Studies with an emphasis in International Trade and Development.
Expected date of graduation: Decemeber 2009.
Graduate College grade point average: 3.75/4.00

Experience

Political Science   Working with a group of faculty and students to develop
Research Fellowship   professional and original research projects in the area of
                              democracy and world politics through a funded research program.

Summary of Key Qualifications

Bachelor of Arts with a double major in Spanish and political science. Completed the requirements for the Master of Science or Arts in your major at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in December, May or July, Year.

Honors

Four time Academic All-American in cross country and track and field. Deans Honor Roll Fall 2004, 2006, 2007 and Spring 2005, 2006, 2007. President Honor Roll, Fall 2005 and 2007 and Spring 2008

Name: Ryan Patrick Vail   Date of Degree: December 2009

Institution: Oklahoma State University   Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma

Title of Study: GENDER AND ECONOMIC NEOLIBERALISM: AN ANALYSIS OF
          THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Pages in Study: 61   Candidate for the Degree of Master of Science

Major Field: International Studies: emphasis in International Trade and Development

Scope and Method of Study: A quantitative analysis of the relationship between gender
      neoliberal economic policies in the European Parliament

Findings and Conclusions:

By analyzing roll-call voting by gender from the European Union, two questions can be
answered. First, have women as a group of legislators voted differently than their male
counterparts on neoliberal policies in the European Parliament? Second, if there is a
difference, has it been significant enough to alter the economic direction of Europe?

This study has shown that gender has little effect on voting habits, and it also shows that
women do not consistently support or oppose neoliberal economic legislation.

ADVISER'S APPROVAL: Rebekah Herrick