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LOOKING BEYOND THE HIJAB: AN ANALYSIS OF MUSLIM
ADAPTATION TO FRENCH CULTURE

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines Muslim cultural adaptation to French culture. Specifically, this project asserts the Muslim symbol hijab, or headscarf, is a religious and cultural symbol of Islam that is in direct clash with the French concept of secularism. In 2004 the French government passed a resolution forbidding the wearing of the hijab in French public schools. In response to this resolution Muslim men and women protested and have begun to argue for the establishment of a French-Muslim identity. Thus, this analysis closely examined the 2004 law in regard to how it has potentially impacted Muslim cultural adaptation into French culture.

The results of this study reveal cultural adaptation has failed in France, the Muslim and non-Muslim French populations are in an identity crisis and that in response to mounting pressures to assimilate, the French-Muslim community (ummah) has responded by closing its doors to outside influence. Moreover, this examination reveals how Islam is in a transformation stage, from a magic/mythic religion into a more perspectival religion. Ultimately, this analysis calls for a communicative society, one where all members of the culture will meet together and discuss the issue of Muslim immigration and French integration practices.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The co-existence between Muslims and non-Muslims in France has always been a precarious relationship (Silverstein, 2004). From the time of the Algerian conflict to protests at the end of the Algerian conflict, and also in the riots of 1968, race and religion have been key factors of contention. In 2005 this precarious relationship exploded in weeks of rioting and violence that gripped the French nation, causing the French government to issue a state of emergency, a provision allowed under an amendment to the French Constitution in 1958, and nationwide curfews (Rotella, 2005). The following picture shows the violence and destruction in Clichy-sous-Bois.

The proximate cause of these riots in October 2005 in the Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois was the electrocution of two Muslim youth who were hiding from police (Graff, 2005). Their deaths started riots in the town, and those riots later escalated when police fired tear gas into a mosque. This act sparked more than two weeks of rioting, car burning and violence throughout French suburbs, cities and in the countryside. The French government had to declare a state of emergency, a
provision added to the French Constitution in 1958 during the war between France and Algeria. This state of emergency was the first since 1968 when student riots gripped more than 300 towns across France (Mulrine, 2005). The purpose of the state of emergency in both 1968 and 2005 was to bring immediate stability to the cities and countryside.

While the 2005 state of emergency did put out the flames of violence and quell the rioting (at least temporarily), the underlying problems causing the uprising were not addressed. French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin said the root of the problem underlying the rioting and violence is more than the recent rioting, but the result of France's failure to provide hope to thousands of young people, most of them French citizens, the children of Muslim immigrants from northern Africa (Keaten, 2005). This includes the hope of getting a decent paying job, and being considered part of the French state. In December 2005 de Villepin proposed a plan to provide more job training and opportunities to youngsters living in suburbs, generally ethnic enclaves (Fontanaud, 2005). While these measures intend to address economic differences in France, the much larger issue of integration remains unaddressed by the de Villepin government.

De Villepin has stated the Republic, and its model of integration, which was founded on the equal recognition of all citizens is also at the root of the current violence and uprisings because the model does not specifically allow immigrants to have a co-cultural existence (Graff, 2005). His sentiments were echoed by Muslims in France who argue they want to be considered “French,” while at the same time, these Muslims want to maintain aspects of their Muslim heritage (Mulrine, 2005). The
balancing act between being French and Muslim is where most of the tensions stem from (Geary & Graff, 2005).

France does not keep official statistics of ethnicity or religious affiliation, due to the principle of laïcité and the 1905 law mandating the separation of church and state. Because of this 1905 mandate, and because of the rising sense of urgency for a unified national French identity in France (Flynn, 1995) the state does not provide or recognize religious or ethnic communities and groups as entities separate from the general population (Hargreaves, 2000). Therefore, estimates of the Muslim population in France are just that, estimates. The International Helsinki Federation (2005) estimates between 4-5 million Muslims reside in France, roughly 7-8 percent of the total population (Dilanian, 2005) Moreover, the Muslim population is reported to be the fastest growing ethnic group in France (Roy, 2005). The overwhelming majority of these Muslims live in suburbs near large metropolitan areas such as Paris, Lille, and Marseille (Islamic Institute for Human Rights, 2004; International Helsinki Federation, 2005).

Thus, as the Muslim population continues to grow and as tensions continue to mount, both Muslims and non-Muslims in France have said something needs to be done to ease the tension and to create a more cohesive, yet diverse French state. The French government has recently announced its solution to mounting ethnic tensions, and to bring the integration problems under control. The executive plan has many facets. De Villepin in November 2005 announced the plan would tighten immigration regulations (Fontanaud, 2005). The plan also involves extending the waiting period for citizenship to immigrants who marry French citizens, tougher selection
procedures for international students wanting to study in France, and decreased immigrant quotas from nations outside the European Union. The purpose of this legislation is to quell the violence by initiating “selective immigration.” Furthermore, the Lower House passed an anti-terror bill in November 2005, and this bill has clauses that pertain to surveillance in Mosques and other civic organizations (Picot, 2005).

In essence the French government appears to be taking measures similar to Foucault’s metaphor of the Panopticon, a state/prison in which it is virtually impossible to exist without the eye of the state watching (Foucault, 1975). The increased surveillance and heightened governmental powers are a threat to civil liberties in France (Schuck, 2005) and are further defining the divide between Muslim and non-Muslim France as ethnic, and economic and or political. Unfortunately, the steps by the French government in the wake of the November riots are indicative of rising racism and anti-Islamic fundamentalist fears in France.

Clearly, intolerance and problems with integration of Muslims have been issues in France for more than a century. While Muslims have been part of the French state for more than a century, intolerance against Muslims in France has been on the rise in recent years (Gaspard, 1995; Islamic Institute for Human Rights, 2004; Jelloun, 1999). Specifically, rising intolerance and violence against Muslims in France has been linked to anti-Muslim sentiments in a post September 11 world and a post riot France (Graff, 2005; International Helsinki Federation, 2005).

Not only have the anti-terror legislation and executive decrees been regarded as attacks on Muslim identity, but many Muslims in France assert the 2004 passage of
a law prohibiting “conspicuous” religious symbols in public schools, Law 2004-228, is a direct state sponsored attack against Muslim identity and religion (Islamic Institute for Human Rights, 2004). The law reads as follows: “Dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdit” or “In public school, colleges and universities, the wearing of signs or behaviors by which pupils express openly a religious membership is prohibited” (LegiFrance, 2005).

The French state argues such a ban on the wearing of religious symbols in public domains like schools is a defense of the French concept of laïcité, or separation of church and state (International Helsinki Federation, 2005). The French Organization against Islamophobia (CCIF) states the Muslim hijab, or headscarf is a target of anti-Muslim sentiment, hatred and fear (2005), and the ban on religious symbols in the public domain is a racist attempt by the French government (Bramham, 2004) to eliminate the formation of a Muslim identity in France, and instead encourage Muslims in France to adapt to French culture and adopt a solely “French” identity (Ganley, 2004).

The French government in response to protests against the 2004 law, and previous suspensions of young girls in French school for wearing the hijab, specifically in 1989 and 1994, has asserted steps to remove religious symbols from schools serve two purposes. First, bans on “conspicuous” religious symbols preserves the French ideal of laïcité in the French public school system and protects democracy (Feldman, 2003; Gaspard, 1995; Jeffries, 2005). Moreover, this kind of law is interpreted as a remedy to a growing question among many French citizens, “is
France still France” (Kuisel, 1995). Second, the ban is seen as a step toward integrating Muslims into the French culture. However, Muslims in France question these goals, and many Muslims in France assert the ban, and successive expulsions from school for young girls who defy the law (Bennhold, 2004) promote integration, but also the elimination of their religious identity.

While the struggles with integrating ethnic minorities is not a new problem to modern nation states and regions, such as Europe (Ahmed, 1992; Boulle, 2003; McGeary, 2005; Sepinwall, 2003; Stovall, 2003), the controversy surrounding the veil has spread outside of France, and other European states have begun to pass laws banning religious paraphernalia in public places. Within two months of the passage of the ban the cities of Berlin, Frankfurt, Moscow and Brussels, along with other states and cities proposed similar legislation (Jeffries, 2005). A German court in October 2004 ruled nuns could no longer wear the habits when teaching in public schools (Brahman, 2004). Bavaria, a southern state in Germany banned religious insignia in schools in November 2004 (Agence France Presse, 2004). In Denmark, the Supreme Court ruled in January 2005 that supermarkets could terminate the employment of women who refuse to remove their Muslim veil or other religious symbols (Agence France Presse, 2005). In states such as Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Luxembourg, Christian Europe has responded to the influx of Muslim immigrants and Muslim religious symbols by supporting such initiatives (Salhani, 2004). Such legislation represents the growing conflict between Christianity and Islam (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Gaspard, 1995). In all of these cases, parties in support of such bans have used the French state and its current ban as justification for new measures.
against religious symbols. Moreover, in the wake of the November rioting, nations such as Germany and Belgium have further asserted bans on the wearing of religious symbols in public schools and in government buildings are protections against violence and rioting (Croucher, 2005). It is ironic that the French government in particular has banned a garment that closely resembles the *bonnet phrygien* worn by Marianne, a prolific and powerful symbol of the French Republic.

Therefore, to better understand the current situation in France surrounding the banning of religious symbols in public schools, namely the Muslim veil or hijab, the following analysis addresses the following research questions:

**Research Questions**

RQ1: What does the hijab mean to Muslims in France?

RQ2: Has the meaning of the hijab changed for Muslim wearers and Muslim non-wearers of the hijab since the French ban was approved?

RQ3: Do Muslim wearers and Muslim non-wearers of the hijab deem the hijab to be a representation of their self-identity?

RQ4: Do Muslim immigrants in France believe the hijab can co-exist with the French concept of laïcité?

RQ5: What reasons do Muslims and non-Muslims attribute to the passage of law 2004-228?

RQ6: Do the majority of Muslims successfully culturally adapt to the French culture?

To answer these questions, this dissertation is divided into the following chapters. The second chapter provides a review of literature discussing the French state and its cultural symbols and cultural systems, and the historical and present
status and intersection between Islam and French culture. The third chapter describes the method of data collection proposed for this analysis. The fourth chapter reviews literature on cultural adaptation theory and offers results and analysis about the cultural adaptation of Muslims in France. The fifth chapter reviews literature addressing identity negotiation theory. This chapter concludes with results and analysis examining the salience and tedious nature of Muslim-French identity. The sixth chapter asserts the failure of Muslims to successfully culturally adapt to French culture is partially due to sociological and linguistic ideologies at work both within the Muslim ummah (community) and outside of the ummah. This chapter’s analysis also provides a model explaining the current state of the Muslim ummah in the wake of Law 2004-228 and increased Muslim immigration to France. The seventh chapter discusses the limitations, areas of future research and draws final conclusions from this project’s analysis.
CHAPTER 2

The following chapter provides a review of pertinent literature on French cultural symbols and systems, and on Islam within France. Specifically, this section first discusses French cultural symbols and systems by describing Marianne, and the significance of this French cultural icon. Second, this section analyzes the significance of the tri-color flag. Third, the concept of secularism will be applied to the French state. Fourth, the republican school system and its importance are analyzed.

This chapter’s second main focus is on Islam in the French state. In particular, the Algerian conflict will first be examined. Second, the status of Muslims in France will be explained. Third, an analysis of the Muslim veil or hijab is offered.

French cultural symbols and systems

Marianne and laïcité

The most significant symbol of power emerging from the remnants of Revolutionary period to the subsequent republics is Marianne. During the French Revolution personifications of liberty and reason appeared throughout France. These two personifications merged into one female figure. There are conflicting stories of how this new symbol earned her name. One legend attributes her naming to Barras, a member of the Directoire. It is believed he devised the name Marianne for the new French symbol one evening at Reubell’s. His hostess that evening was named Marie-Anne, and Barras said, it is a short simple name which befits the Republic just as much as yourself, Madame (Ozouf & Ozouf, 1997). Other more common stories of the naming of Marianne link her naming to codes used by secret societies under the
Second Empire, particularly one group whose members swore to overthrow the tyrannical regime of Napoleon III (Castelot, 1962). Throughout the years following the revolution until the present day, Marianne has in many ways embodied the spirit of the French Revolution, and represented the struggles and triumphs of revolutionary leaders.

The monarchy and aristocracy dominated French politics until the end of the 1780s. In 1788 Louis XVI called the Estates General in order to consult with the nation about France’s rising debt and tumbling economy. On June 20, 1789 the Third Estate held a public meeting. The meeting held on the tennis court at Versailles symbolized the unification of the Three Orders and the writing of the new French constitution. Specifically, the new assembly vowed to remain intact until a new Constitution was established guaranteeing equal rights to all of France (Jones, 1994). The New Constitutional Assembly, primarily middle-class intellectuals and clergy demanded recognition of the French commoner, as “everything” within the French state. The Constitutional Assembly, and its revolutionary outlook brought new meaning to the words “citizen” and “nation.” This meeting became known as the Tennis Court Oath, and symbolizes the coming of age of the French nation, and the beginning of the French Revolution.

While the French Revolution was about the peasant class, the bourgeoisie, and the monarchy, it was also about words and symbols, which saturated the daily life of French citizens. The old feudal system that controlled France for centuries was eroding under the pressure of a new revolutionary collection of words including: “citizen,” “nation,” and “liberty, equality, and fraternity” (Jones, 1994).
Before the calling of the Estates General in 1788, the word “citizen” did not carry much prominence, or significant connotations in the minds of most French men and women (Castelot, 1962). The new constitutional body empowered many French people. These same empowered individuals began to demand recognition, civil rights and protection under the law. Furthermore, the concepts of liberté, égalité and fraternité gained significance during, and after the French Revolution.

Liberté, or liberty was one of the paramount social values pontificated by the Revolution and its leaders. No longer were individuals to be subjects of the king, instead all French citizens were to have freedom from tyranny. The concept of égalité, or equality was also of significant importance since it assured all French citizens, regardless of social class would be treated as equals. This philosophy was a direct contradiction to the years of luxury enjoyed by the monarchy, aristocracy and clergy. Fraternité, or brotherhood is the third ideal expounded in the phrase liberté, égalité, and fraternité. Brotherhood was of importance to the founders of the Constitutional Assembly because it further demonstrated the egalitarian nature of the new French nation. Many members of the clergy wished to see this term raised to heightened status, before liberté or égalité, because it represented the twelve disciples and their brotherhood with Jesus Christ. However, with the increased emphasis on secularism, such an idea was counter to the secular ideals of the revolution.

After the initial foundation of the constitution, a coup d’état brought to power Napoleon Bonaparte in 1799. The Corsican mercenary and adventurer ruled as consul until 1804 when he crowned himself emperor. During his 15-year rule over
the First Empire, Napoleon restored social harmony lost during the Revolution, took steps to reconcile differences between the Catholic Church and France by signing the Concordat, developed the Napoleonic code, and developed secondary schooling. Unfortunately, Napoleon’s military campaigns cost the nation an immense amount of economic power, and as European resentment mounted Napoleon was deposed in 1814, only to return a year later for 100 days before a later expulsion. During his reign Marianne was still not a visible, named symbol, but the principles that brought her to fruition under the Third Republic were further solidified in the French culture, *liberté, égalité* and *fraternité*.

After the fall of Napoleon III in 1871, the Third Republic came to power in France. Under the Third Republic, Revolutionary symbols were glorified to solidify the Republic. In 1880 July 14, or Bastille Day (the destruction day of the Bastille, a bastion of tyranny destroyed during the Revolution in 1789) was declared a national holiday. In 1792 the “Marseillaise” became the national anthem and “the town halls of France were equipped with busts of Marianne, a symbol of the republic since the 1790s which emphasized unity rather than division” (Jones, 1994, p. 222). Gildea (2002) also emphasized the significance of Marianne as not only a symbol of optimism and strength, but also as a symbol of French unity.

In the eyes of Third Republic France, Marianne was the representation of simplicity, optimism, strength, and political power (Agulhon, 1989). In all municipal offices and in many commercial businesses, Marianne served as a beacon for French identity. She symbolized the triumph of the Republic. Hence beginning in the Third Republic, Marianne became a rallying point for the French people in times of national
peril (world wars, occupations, economic crisis), or in times of personal achievement and loss (weddings, graduations, funerals, court proceedings).

The 1894 trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French Army accused of spying for Germany brought Marianne into the political and religious limelight even further. Dreyfus was found guilty, with forged evidence and testimony forming the basis of the prosecution’s case (Kidd, 2000). He was retired in 1899 and pardoned by the French president in 1906 after all charges were found to be erroneous and false. During his trial, busts and images of Marianne were used in rallies in support of Dreyfus, because his trial was viewed by many as a religious attack, and in a secular state with liberté, égalité, and fraternité such discrimination should not exist (Hargreaves, 1999).

Normally, Marianne is presented with pride by the French citizenry, but this symbol of the Republic came under attack during the Vichy government. Gildea (2002) explains how during the Vichy regime Marianne was placed in chains, metaphorically of course. Pétain, and one of his deputy mayors Pierre Laval, ordered all busts of Marianne removed from town halls and schools to ensure citizen loyalty to the Vichy government. Marianne was viewed by the fascist regime as a Republican symbol, and a counter force to Vichy. In fact, Pétain had busts of himself produced, which were to take the place of Marianne as the uniting symbol of the “French State” (Jones, 1994).

Since the fall of the Vichy regime, Agulhon (1989) states: “le buste de la République ou de Marianne, installé dans la mairie, est aujourd’hui la plus connue des représentations de l’État” “the bust of the Republic or Marianne, installed in the
town hall is today the most known representation of the state” (p. 37). Marianne is ever-present watching over her citizens (Jones, 1994). In fact, her profile is on the official seal of the nation, engraved on coins, and drawn on stamps. However, she watches over the Republic in an unofficial manner, similar to the utilization of Ché Guevara as a symbol of struggle and perseverance in communist Cuba, or the bald eagle in the United States. In Cuba, Ché is a secular symbol, a symbol of a revolutionary mind, shown separate from any religious iconography. However, the bald eagle, which adorns US currency, postage stamps, and many other American icons, is regularly shown next to the phrase “In God we trust.” The juxtaposition of the bald eagle and Biblical references in the United States reveals the religious nature of the American nation’s founding.

While Marianne is the common emblem of France, she does not have official status. The tricolor flag of France is the only official emblem of the Republic described in Article 2 of the French constitution. Her status as a guardian of the people of France and an unofficial protector of liberty started around 1850 (Agulhon, 1989), and since then she has gained constitutionally unofficial status, but official preference within French cities and territories.

Since the 1790s Marianne has gone through many different incarnations, and there is no standard Marianne (Agulhon & Bonke, 1962). Dependent upon the city, municipal leaders, and the time period, Marianne is portrayed as a warrior, mother figure, Athena the Greek goddess of war and wisdom, a beacon of freedom like the Statue of Liberty in the United States, or a beautiful princess in one municipal office in Lille (Larkin, 1997). In his 1830 painting “The 28th July” Liberty Leading the
Eugène Delacroix depicted Marianne as a bare-chested female waving the tricolor flag, and wearing a red *bonnet phrygien* amidst a battle for liberty. This depiction of Liberty leading the people is one of the most well known renderings of Marianne, a commoner fighting for the French people. Her *bonnet phrygien* is an important symbol in French history, and to the nation state itself. The following is a picture of Delacroix’s painting.

The *bonnet phrygien* is a garment worn on the head that dates back to ancient Greece and Rome. During that time, freed slaves would wear the bonnet, and later their children would become citizens of Rome or Greece. Later sailors from the Mediterranean brought the bonnets to Paris. The red cap or *bonnet phrygien* gained popularity during the French "revolt of red caps," riots occurring in Brittany in 1675 against the taxes imposed by Colbert (the red cap was the ordinary cap of the farmers of Central Brittany), and its use in convict prisons, which had replaced the galleys, as a mark of infamy. Later during the French Revolution, the *bonnet phrygien* was still called the red cap. In 1789 the *bonnet phrygien* was initially used to cover the head of the goddesses Liberty and Nation, and became quickly the emblem of Liberty, and then the emblem of men and women who wanted to be citizens instead of subjects. In
1792, it was a normal part of the uniform of the *sans-culottes*, or street radicals.

On 20 June 1792, King Louis XVI was forced to wear the liberty cap by the crowd who invaded the palace of the Tuileries. After the fall of monarchy, the bonnet phrygien became ubiquitous, and was used on the representations of sitting or standing Liberty, pikes and flags as finial, Liberty trees, fasces of Unity, triangle of Equity and beams of the scales of Justice. All official documents included it, usually associated with the tricolor cockade. In 1793, wearing the Liberty cap was mandatory in the Assemblies of the sections of Paris.

As Marianne became an ever more emergent symbol of the Revolutionary nature and way of life, she continually wears the *bonnet phrygien* to symbolize the freeing of the people by the French Revolutions of 1789, 1830, 1848 and 1871, and to honor those lost in the battles for liberty, equality and fraternity.

During the 1960s Marianne gained pop culture status, as the Fifth Republic sought to modernize this Republican symbol. In 1968 Brigitte Bardot became the first known Marianne, then Mireille Mathieu, the singer/actress in 1978, Catherine Deneuve, the actress in 1985 and most recently Laetitia Casta, a Corsican born fashion model, in 2000. The 82nd Congress of Mayors of France chose Laetitia as the Marianne of the year 2000 to represent a modern and beautiful France. The selection of Laetitia is symbolic because she is Corsican, and choosing a Corsican as a new Marianne represents French control over the island of Corsica. Shortly after being chosen Laetitia relocated her residency to London, which caused a scandal in France over the departure of its new Marianne. After Laetitia, Evelyne Thomas, a talk show host, was chosen as the new Marianne in 2003.
French tri-color flag

The tri-color flag of France was developed in the July 1789 during the French Revolution. There are conflicting accounts as to the choice of the three colors (blue, white and red). One account asserts the flag was a combination of the colors of the Paris coat of arms (red and blue) and the royal color (white) (Jones 1994, p. 201). However, since the colors of Paris were no longer in use during the French Revolution, the Marquis de Lafayette may have adopted the three colors based on the flag of the United States (Ozouf & Ozouf, 1997). During the First Republic the flag was adopted as the official ensign of the state on February 15, 1794. Up until Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the tricolore was the official flag of France. With the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1815 the royal white flag with the fleur-de-lis replaced the tricolore. However, in 1830 Louis-Philippe, the Citizen King ascended to power and designated the tricolor once again to be the official flag of France (Agulhon, 1987). The following is a picture of the tricolore flag.

During the Third Republic, in fact from the 1880s onward the presentation of the tricolore has represented patriotic fervor (Chagny, 1988). The tricolores is flown over all municipal buildings in France, like the American flag. The French
constitutions of both 1946 and 1958, under the Fifth Republic, mandated (elevated) the *tricolore* to the national emblem of the Republic. Desecration of the flag, similar to desecration of the American flag is considered a taboo, and against the law in some cases. If the *tricolore* touches the ground, it is to be ritually destroyed. Whenever the president, or members of government make addresses to the people, the *tricolore*, like the American flag is the backdrop to represent unity and patriotism. In essence, to many French citizens, like some “patriotic” American citizens, the national flag has reached a magical status (Gebser, 1984). The flag is more than a symbol, it epitomizes and it is the French state, thus desecration or disrespect to the *tricolore* is desecration or disrespect to France directly. At least this is the case with those individuals who are patriotic or have a strong sense of history and cultural understanding. For other individuals, the American flag or the *tricolore* are important symbols, but not direct representations of the nation, mythic status (Gebser, 1984).

*Secularism*

During the French Revolution of 1789 the connection between the Catholic Church and the monarchy came under question by a large portion of the population. People saw the Church as being too powerful, having too many privileges, having too many political connections, and as too wealthy (Vovelle, 1998). The monarchy was also regarded as too strongly connected to the Church, especially after Louis XIV declared “l’état, c’est moi” [I am the state]. Thus, the concept of *laïcité* or a formal separation between church and state emerged as a fundamental principle of the Revolution to prevent privileged orders from controlling the people. In principle, this
concept insures the neutrality of the state towards religious affairs, and the neutrality of the church in political/economic affairs.

The importance of secularism was emphasized by various acts carried out by Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary leaders. In particular, four acts by Revolution leaders reveal the desire for secularism: the privatization of Church lands, the Oath of Allegiance, the creation of a new calendar and the acceptance of “The Marseillaise” as the French national anthem.

In 1789 the state nationalized Church property, approximately 6 to 10 percent of cultivable land in France. After being confiscated from the Church, these lands were sold to the bourgeoisie and wealthier members of the peasantry (Jones, 1994). This act not only generated a great deal of revenue for the floundering French economy, it was a highly symbolic act. The state taking over Church owned lands was seen by the Church as an attack against Christianity, while at the same time the newly liberated French people saw it as throwing aside the Church’s economic and political power (Vovelle, 1998).

The confiscation of church lands was the first in a series of events aimed at decreasing the power of the church. In 1790 the Civil Constitution of the Clergy served as an oath of allegiance to the state, not to religious hierarchy. Religious figures, priests, monks, nuns, etc., were required to either sign the oath and support the state over the Church, or refuse to sign the oath, support the Church and be exiled from France. Approximately half of the clergy signed the oath, and were later excommunicated by the Catholic Church. Many Church leaders signed the oath after receiving pressure from their parishioners who wished to avoid conflict with the state.
in their provinces (Carlyle, 2002). This oath was highly detested by the Papacy, who viewed it as its clergy being forced to choose between Christ and a false, secular deity, the new French Constitution. Those who refused to sign the oath were deemed enemies of the French state, counter revolutionaries who were a threat to the newly formed constitutional nation. Most of the clergy who refused to sign the oath lived in the north or west of France (Jones, 1994).

While privatizing Church land and requiring an oath of allegiance to the state were actions taken directly against religious figures and institutions, the creation of a new calendar and the adoption of “The Marseillaise” as the national anthem were more symbolic actions against the concept of religion. In 1793 Louis Lafitte created his Revolutionary calendar. The calendar did not include any references to Christian doctrine, such as the days of the saints. The first day of the year became September 21, 1792, the day the Republic was named. Instead of including month names from the previous calendar, new names for months were devised, which were more closely related to nature. For example, late January to late February became “Pluviose,” in reference to *pluie* or rain. This act symbolized the Revolutionary desire to throw off any and all connections with Christianity and its traditions.

The French anthem is also void of any religious references. “The Marseillaise” retells the glorious victory of French troops who deposed the French king and later marched to victory against Austrian and Prussian soldiers. In 1795 the anthem written by Rouget de l’Isle became the official anthem of the French people. It was later dropped in 1815 by Napoleon and readopted later in 1879. To this day the
symbolism of “The Marseillaise” is undeniable, it is a republican symbol of secularism and nationhood (Carlyle, 2000).

Probably the most significant or recognizable representation of religion in France is the cathedral of Notre Dame. This cathedral dating from the 1160s has served as a symbol of not only Gothic architecture, but also of religious power and prevalence in French culture. This symbol proved not to be an exception to the violence and vandalism that gripped France during the French Revolution. In fact the first reference to the word “vandalism” was in 1794 by Henri Gregoire, a priest who used the word to describe actions taken out at Notre Dame. In 1793 rioters converted Notre Dame into a “Temple of Reason” and destroyed sculptures on the west façade. The cathedral was raided once again in 1831, this time rioters broke and burned everything in the archbishop’s residence on the premises. Since 1831 the cathedral has served as more of a representation of French ingenuity and history, and less of a religious symbol in the minds of the French people. The ransacking of Notre Dame in its past does, however, represent a direct attack against the Church and everything it stood for in the eyes of the French people, pomp, indulgence and power.

After the Revolution, secularism did not lose any ground in France. In 1905, France passed a law mandating the separation of the Church and State. After the passage of the law, the state is now forbidden from funding religious activities, but funds some private religious schools as long as the schools teach the national curriculum. Moreover, religion cannot serve as grounds for governmental discrimination, since all religions are beneath the state, and religious motivations are generally kept out of the political process. This law serves as more than a ban on the
union of Church and State, it is a symbolic representation of France’s desire to foster secularism over religious doctrine. However members of religions other than Catholicism argue “the neutrality of the state towards different religious faiths, while in practice tends to favour the Catholic Church” (Kidd, 2000, p. 95).

The sentiments voiced in the 1905 separation of church and state law were also behind the formation of the French Republican school system in the 1880s. Therefore, the following section outlines the formation of the French Republican school system, discusses the current system, and discusses the purpose of the education system and reviews recent controversies and ethnic conflicts within the school system.

**Republican School System**

In the 1880s the French Republic set forth upon the formation of a school system to facilitate the expansion of ideals expounded by the Revolution. Jules Ferry, the minister of education passed educational reforms mandating a teacher in every French town, village or city to provide free education to French children. Under Ferry’s initiatives children were to be educated in more than reading, writing and arithmetic, but also on citizenship, and particular emphasis was placed on teaching standardized French to all school children (Kidd, 2000). The newly formed Republican school system served as a catalyst for linguistic proliferation across France and its colonies, and fostered a sense of national identity in French youth.

Two essential features rooted in the system since the 1880s form the foundation of the modern French educational system, and still serve as the basis of the Republican school system: lay schooling and linguistic uniformity. The first is
reflected in recurrent references to l’école laïque et républicaine, [lay schooling in accordance with the ideals of the French Republic]. This concept encapsulates the democratic ideal of equal access to education for all French citizens. School serves as a ground to build _la citoyenneté_, good citizenship. Thus, civic education classes, language classes and cultural courses attended by all French children help them embrace the ideals of social integration. This contrasts with the United States, where civic education is not as prominent, and language classes teach pass on grammatical structure without ideological undertones (Jones, 1994).

The French government after the Revolution needed uniformity to govern properly and linguistic uniformity aided in bringing the nation state together. Moreover, politics also played a role in the decision to adopt a national language. Regional dialects, and non-French languages were seen as sources of counter-Revolutionary ideas, and therefore forbidden by the new Republic. Therefore, to spread the French language, communes in many different departments were formed around France. The purpose of such communes was, and still is to teach the French language, and instruct the population in the principles of the Revolution.

The purpose of the education is to equip the population linguistically to approach texts which are religious not in the conventional sense but in the original sense of the word “religion” (binding together), texts which somehow define and constitute the group identity in which all share. The legacy of the Revolution, then, was to place the French language at the very core of the national identity; language became inextricably linked both to the values on
which the republic was founded and to one of the key institutions of the republic, l’école (Kidd, 2000, p. 131).

The Republican school system also enlisted the help of “Le Tour de la France par deux enfants” [the tour of France by two children] to spread French culture and language. The text first published in 1877 told the story of two boys on a journey to find their family. Through the story André and his brother Juilien introduce the reader to what is French. The book argues there are no differences in France, since all of France is the same. While the text does admit regional differences exist, proper educational training will assist these differences to slowly vanish over time into the French landscape (Ozouf & Ozouf, 1997).

These principles have carried forth into the modern French school system. Since the 1960s French children have gone through four educational phases: école maternelle, école primaire, collège, and lycée. Typically children from ages 2-5 attend nursery school or école maternelle. After completion of nursery school, students attend école primaire, or primary school. Upon completion of primary school students need to have passed national standards in French, mathematics, history, geography and civics. If their marks are satisfactory the student attends college, or the first stage of secondary education. At this time, (Auduc, 1998; Kidd, 2000) students are filtered into courses similar to advanced placement courses in the United States. The last step in the Republican school system is for students to complete training at a lycée. In their last year of high school, students embark upon the baccalauréat, an exam intended to determine whether students attend a university, or are more apt to participate in a community or technical training program.
The requirement that all school children learn French, and not a regional
dialect of French has been challenged repeatedly in Brittany. Bretons, who speak a
dialect of French, Breton, have argued they have a right to speak and maintain their
language, even though the French state asserts such requests are counter to
Revolutionary ideals and will not be tolerated (Nicolas, 2000). The Council of Europe
enacted the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages in 1992 to assist
the Bretons in France, and other groups in Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
All of these nations including Cyprus abstained from voting on the Charter. The
choice of the French government not to support the Charter has been an issue of
dispute between Bretons and the French state since 1992, and remains a rallying cry
for Breton self-reliance and identity against the Republican School System and
Revolutionary ideals.

Furthermore, the placement system for French students has also come under
fire by many immigrants and ethnic minorities in France as being discriminatory and
outside their reach. The primary group claiming to be discriminated against by the
French school system and the French government is the Muslim population. Muslims
claim the French Republican school system does not allow their children to maintain
their ethnic identity because that identity is not French (Limage, 2000). Two main
instances of conflict have stemmed from the apparent refusal to accommodate
Muslim children in French schools and the refusal of Muslim children to adjust to
French Republican school ideals: the 1989 veil affair and the 2004 ban on religious
symbols in French schools.
France and Islam

Algeria

In the eleventh century Arab invaders brought Islam to Algeria, a land of Berber tribes. Knauss (1987) states “the gradual Islamicization of the Berber peoples took place in a social context that was tribal” (p. 4). When the Moors were pushed out of Spain in 1492 the retreating Moorish tribes and armies moved eastward toward Algeria. The Ottoman sultan, at the insistence of the Algerian elders, dispatched infantry and artillery to Algeria, thus beginning approximately 300 years of Ottoman rule (Ciment, 1997). Under Ottoman rule Algeria was dominated by an urban elite who saw themselves as a separate race above the commoners in Algeria. Furthermore, this group of elites were involved in failed economic/trade negotiations before the French invasion of Algeria between 1830 and 1837. Before the invasion many French business leaders attempted to negotiate contracts with Algerian nobles, and these negotiations resulted in French offers being turned down by the Algerian upper class. During this invasion the French government sought to protect its economic interests, and “quiet its critics with a foreign venture” (Ciment, 1997, p. 30). The Algerian population saw the military invasion in different ways. The business elite in Algeria saw the invasion as an economic benefit, while the common Algerian saw the invasion as a violent assault.

After the invasion many Algerian tribes were relegated to reservations, similar to those of Native Americans in the United States. Businesses and lands were confiscated from Muslims. The Grand Mosque in Algiers was transformed into the cathedral of Saint-Phillipe, a move that the archbishop of Algiers hoped would
convert Muslim barbarians into Christians (Laffont, 2004). The Muslim population of Algeria, like most other Muslim cultures coming into conflict with European powers, was deemed an Oriental culture (Said, 1979). In this sense, the actions of the Muslims were regarded as exotic, and in many cases barbaric. The Orientalization of Algeria brought French business and colonists to the land to experience life in a different culture, but with the same amenities of France being developed on a daily basis with rigorous urban and rural development programs (Silverstein, 2004). Ultimately the purpose of land confiscation, employment regulations, and religious discrimination revealed Muslim culture as being “relegated to gradual extinction” (Ciment, 1997, p. 31).

Over the next 80 years French rule continued in Algeria while Algerian nationalism rose. After World War I the Islamic Reform Movement gained momentum in its demands for Algerians to return to the roots of Islam, and to combat the rising influence of Western modernism (Ahmed, 1992). The movement emphasized the innate Islamic nature of Algerian culture and society. This movement along with the actions of the National Liberation Front (FLN) culminated in November of 1954 with the outbreak of war in Algeria. During the next eight years between 200,000 and 1,000,000 Algerians died (Silverstein, 2004). Not only was the war hard-fought militarily, it was also a political/ideological war. The FLN used Islam as a weapon against the French. Ben Bella, founder of the Special Organization, a guerilla group, and later Algerian president urged Algerians to have national pride in not only Algeria, but also in Islam. He stated:
It’s an error to believe that our nationalism is the nationalism of the French Revolution. Ours is a nationalism fertilized by Islam…All of our political formulation is a Koranic formulation. Thus Algerian nationalism and Arab nationalism is a cultural nationalism essentially based on Islam. (Knauss, 1987, p. 74)

In March 1962 France granted Algerian independence and the war was over. While the war was over, the conflict did not end entirely. Since Algerian independence citizenship conflicts, racism, violence, political tensions and economic hardships have encapsulated French-Algerian relations (Mercier, 2003). Since France considered Algeria to be more than a colony, but part of France proper, Algerian nationals have historically been granted full French citizenship. However after the war many French citizens no longer supported this practice. Algerian citizenship and political rights came under attack during the 1960s and 1970s as racism and discrimination against Algerians increased (Wall, 2001). The loss of Algeria, and of approximately 25,000 French troops in the conflict left scars difficult to heal (Silverstein, 2004). Algerian nationals who were born and raised in France were no longer considered French by many of their fellow Frenchmen because of their ethnicity and religion.

This xenophobia against Algerians and other North African peoples continued to grow, especially with the rise of the National Front in the 1980s and 1990s. As Le Pen’s party, a right-wing party, which advocates a return to “classical” French conservatism and a decrease in immigration among many other things, gained political influence in France, the rise in anti-immigrant rhetoric increased
dramatically and attacks against North African immigrants almost tripled between the 1980s and 2002 (Silverstein, 2004). Derogatory statements such as “there are one million unemployed and two million immigrants” are common in political debates and discussions.

_Muslims in France_

Between 1915 and 1918 France recruited approximately 150,000 laborers from its colonies in North Africa. These laborers were transported to France as workers, and were later granted citizenship under French law (Fetzer, 2000). Along with North African workers, most of which were Muslim, Spaniards, Poles, Italians and Portugese immigrants were recruited for work. During the Second World War many immigrants to France returned to their native country, especially North Africans. Yet after the war, the North African population in France skyrocketed, as France suffered a labor shortage due to an economic boom.

From 1946 to 1974 France was in a period known as the _Trente Glorieuses_. Most of the labor at this time was drawn from Italy, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Spain and Portugal. Approximately two million workers were brought to France and employed in rebuilding the war-torn French infrastructure (Togman, 2002). Many of the North African men, (typically only men recruited for such work), established their own lives, then many called upon their families to join them in France. It is those who immigrated to France during this period who now make up the majority of second and third generation North African immigrants currently residing in France (Favell, 2001).
Today North Africans make up the largest ethnic group in France and Islam is the second, and fastest growing religion (Levine, 2004). The rapid growth of Islam in France has led to ethnic tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims. Tensions have revolved around demands for Muslim recognition, economic opportunities and educational opportunities.

As previously mentioned France is a secular state, with a clear distinction between the state and religion. Islam poses a dilemma for many individuals within the French government and with many of the French people because adherents of Islam do not normally recognize the complete separation of church and state, since within the Muslim faith a state should initiate policy to follow the basic tenets of the Koran (Ahmed, 1992). Furthermore, the growth of Islam in France also poses difficulty for France because the overwhelming majority of the Muslim population in France is not Caucasian, and thus are generally more physically identifiable than Christians in France. The observance of Muslim holy days is one issue that causes recognition arguments between Muslims and the French state. Muslim holy days are not recognized by the French state as official holidays, or as days of religious observance. Thus, Muslims are permitted to take the day off during Ramadan but are not protected from employer retribution in the form of lost wages (Derderian, 2004). Christians, on the other hand, have recognized holidays such as Christmas, Easter and Good Friday, in which they are permitted to take time off without lost wages. This is just one example of ethnic tension between Muslims and the French state. The following are examples of other tensions.
One, during the 1970s economic difficulties hit the French economy. Unemployment increased, inflation increased and the value of the French franc decreased (Togman, 2002). To protect France from rising unemployment and rising prices, the government passed a ban on immigration in 1974. While this ban remains in place, it has become more symbolic in its power and enforcement. Since the end of the Trente Glorieuses North Africans have composed the largest group of unemployed workers in France (approximately 15%), and made up the lowest paid class in France (Hargreaves, & Soper, 2004).

Two, since so many North Africans make up the lowest echelon of the French economy, the quality of their health care has been brought into question. Many North African Muslims assert they are discriminated against in hospitals (Silverstein, 2004) and unable to achieve medical equality to “Christian-French men and women” (Silverstein, 2004).

Three, aside from economic and medical opportunities an issue garnering a lot of attention over the past 15 years has been Muslim access and opportunities within the French education system. Specifically, conflicts over the wearing of the Muslim veil have encapsulated the French populace and signified the growing tensions between the secular French state and Islam. The first Muslim veil affair took place in 1989. In Creil, a suburb of Paris three school girls (two Moroccans and one Tunisian) were expelled from school for refusing to remove their hijabs, veils that cover the head and hair, but not the face (Kidd, 2000). The girls argued wearing the hijab was in observance of their religion, and the headmaster of the school claimed the wearing of religious clothing was incompatible with the French concept of laïcité (Gaspard,
The parents of the girls appealed to the federal government and eventually the Council d’Etat ruled the girls were within their rights to wear religious attire. The justices claimed since Catholic school children had always been allowed to wear crucifixes, and Jewish boys had always been allowed to wear yarmulkas (Gaspard, 1995) that Muslim girls should also be allowed to practice their religion and its customs freely without state interference. Ultimately the decision of the Council d’Etat reinforced laïcité by reasserting the role of the state as an entity that will not control religion.

Later in 1994 Françoise Bayrou, the Minister of Education attempted to ban the wearing of veils in schools. His regulation banning “ostentatious” religious symbols was widely challenged since this new law still directly challenged the religious freedom of Muslims, and not other religions, even though a small vocal Jewish population also voiced concern over this legislation (Gaspard, 1995).

In 2004 this issue resurfaced with the French government passing a ban on all overtly religious symbols in France. The new law passed in March 2004 forbids school children from wearing religious symbols such as hijabs, yarmulkas, and large crucifixes in public schools. Muslim groups view this new law as not directed toward Catholics or Jews, but as a carte blanche way of banning the Muslim faith from public schools through equal legal restrictions (Gentleman, 2004).

Since the passage of the law Muslim groups have been divided on how to respond. Some members of the Muslim community have argued the veil ban is an attack on Islam and prevents Muslim women from freely expressing their religious
beliefs. Other Muslim groups have asserted the ban frees Muslim women from tyrannical Muslim doctrine that objectifies women.

The Muslim veil

*Veils in History*

The word hijab according to Al-Munajeed (1997) comes from the Arabic word hijaba, which means to shield or make invisible by using a shield. However, the practice of veiling women pre-dates the formation of Islam as a religious faith. The veil is actually a product of Judaism, as women in ancient Judea were required to wear a veil over their heads when praying to God, or Jehovah. Men, on the other hand, in Judea could worship without a veil, since man was created in the image of God (Parshall & Parshall, 2002). This practice coincided with the belief in Christianity and Judaism that women are incomplete, not being created in the image of God, and only completed with a veil, or by a husband who accompanies her to worship, justifying many acts of oppression against women (Saadawi, 1980). Even the Virgin Mary, the mother of Jesus Christ, the savior in the Christian faith, in all depictions, wears a veil over her hair. The tradition of Christian women wearing the veil carried forth into modern times as female monarchs and leaders of nations who visit the Vatican are also required by Catholic doctrine to wear veils in the presence of the pope.

Furthermore, before the establishment of Islam, and the writing of the Koran in the early seventh century, men and women in numerous Nomadic tribes in the Middle East, and communities in other parts of the world including China and parts of Africa wore various kinds of veils. Ironically it was the men of the Tuareg, a
nomadic tribe of the Niger and Algerian desert in Africa, who wore and still wear a
veil over their faces after reaching puberty, while women go barefaced. Brooks
(1995) conducted interviews with this group, who are now practicing Muslims, and
these individuals assert men wear the veil so enemies cannot see their face, which can
give an advantage in battle. Women on the other hand have nothing to hide in battle
or life, especially their sexuality, which is free. In Arabic, Tuareg comes from “the
abandoned of God,” showing the discontent many Muslims have for this ancient
group.

In antiquity numerous examples of veiled women exist. Ancient Assyrian
kings introduced the seclusion of women into the royal harem, and also brought into
fashion the wearing of the veil for women in the royal harem. Slaves and prostitutes
were forbidden from wearing any kinds of veils, since veils were seen as a mark of
royalty and class. Women in ancient Greece wore linen veils over the back of their
heads. Roman women wore a palliolum, a veil that covers the hair and is draped over
the shoulders. During the reign of Elizabeth I in England, white bridal veils, similar to
the head covering worn by the Virgin Mary and other Christian women, became

In Spain, the mantilla, usually black or white, is worn by women on their
head. It drapes onto the shoulders like the palliolum of ancient Rome. However, it is
in the Muslim faith that the practice of veiling became institutionalized by religious
practice, and some would argue, by religious doctrine in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. The following pictures illustrate different kinds of veils worn in the Muslim
world.
Sexuality and Fitna in Islam

The following section examines the Islamic veil as it has been defined over the past two hundred years. Specifically, this section first discusses how sexuality is defined in Islam. A definition of sexuality in Islam is offered because the wearing of a veil is an issue intrinsically linked to sexuality (Roald, 2001). Second, this section explains the different terms used to define the act of veiling. Various terms exist in various languages to describe the act of veiling, and the different kinds of veils worn by Muslim women. Third, this section addresses the argument whether there is Koranic justification for the veil. Scholars are divided on whether the Koran calls for women to be veiled, or if Koranic verses are interpreted in a fashion to favor male hegemonic norms. Last, this section elaborates on the significance of the veil in
modern culture and examines the religious and political significance of the veil is addressed.

In the Christian faith, and in other Western religions, man and woman are torn between good and evil, between heaven and hell. However, in the Muslim faith this is not the case; instead individuals are torn between raw instincts that are neither good nor bad (Mernissi, 1985). Whether instincts are good or bad is dependent upon the social context and shari’a, or religious law. If an act is within the demands of religious law, then the act is permitted. However, when individual acts, especially sexual acts, are counter to shari’a, fitna can occur. Fitna is disorder, chaos, or a beautiful woman, hence the French term femme fatale who makes man lose self-control.

*Fitna* is to be avoided at all costs in the Muslim world. Thus, seclusion of women by the wearing of a headscarf, or hijab (something that separates one thing from another) argues Amin (1928) and Roald (2001) is the best way to protect society from *fitna*, which is normally initiated by women:

If what men fear is that women might succumb to their masculine attraction, why did they not institute veils for themselves? Did men think that their ability to fight temptation was weaker than women’s? Are men considered less able than women to control themselves and resist their sexual impulse?…Preventing women from showing themselves unveiled expresses men’s fear of losing control over their minds, falling prey to *fitna* whenever they are confronted with a non-veiled woman. The implications of such as
institution lead us to think that women are believed to be better equipped in this respect than men. (Roald, 2001, p. 65)

The Muslim Veil and Koranic Verse

There are numerous arguments both favoring and opposing the wearing of hijab. Both sides claim the Koran and the words of Muhammad (Hadiths) support their arguments. Perhaps this debate is because there are few Koranic verses that directly address the wearing of the veil. The scripture most often quoted on the subject of the veil is Surah 24:31:

And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and be modest, and to display of their adornment only that which is apparent, and to draw their veils over their bosoms, and not to reveal their adornment save to their own husbands or fathers or husbands’ fathers, or their sons or their husbands’ sons, or their brothers or their brothers’ sons or sisters’ sons, or their women, or their slaves, or male attendants who lack vigour, or children who know naught of women’s nakedness. And let them not stamp their feet so as to reveal what they hide of their adornment.

The main emphasis of this verse is to advocate female modesty (El-Saadawi, 1980; Hawking, 2003). This verse is regularly cited as the main support for hijab (Mernissi, 1975; 1987; Parshall & Parshall, 2001; Roald, 2001). However, Abul A’la Maududi (1993), a Muslim theologian asserts the Koran only addresses the need for desire, but does not impose hijab on women.

A person who considers carefully the words of the Quaranic verse, their well-known and generally accepted meaning and the practice during the time of the
Holy Prophet, cannot dare deny the fact that the Islamic *Shari’ah* [religious law] enjoins on the woman to hide her face from the other people, and this has been the practice of the Muslim women ever since the time of the Holy Prophet himself. Though the veil has not been specified in the Quran, it is Quaranic in spirit. The Muslim women living at the time of the Holy Prophet to whom the Quran was revealed had made it a regular part of their dress outside the house. (Maududi, 1993, p. 194-195)

This verse has been used to support the enforcement of veiling in nations such as Iran, Afghanistan and Oman. However, Islamic historians like Mernissi (1975, 1987) and Lewis (2003) assert this verse is open to interpretation since it is not specific in its prescription for women, nor does it specifically explain why women during the day of Muhammad wore veils. In fact, in the time of the Holy Prophet, Muhammad, his wives wore veils less for religious purposes, and more for practical purposes. His wives were expected to display pure behavior, and avoid worldliness, since worldliness would decrease the promise of eternal life (Mernissi, 1987; Parshall & Parshall, 2001). Thus, the wearing of a veil for the wives of Muhammad was an attempt to protect them from being portrayed by the public as less than pure. Moreover, the wives of Muhammad wore veils to protect them from potential abduction or molestation in public (Lewis, 1998; Mernissi, 1987).

While there is no concrete Koranic edict mandating the veil for women millions of Muslim women still wear the hijab (Coucher, 2005; Lewis, 2003). To address the various reasons as to why Muslim women and in particular converts to Islam choose to veil (without sound Koranic justification) Zuhr (1992) conducted
surveys among women in Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan and the United States. Her research found numerous reasons as to why women continue to wear the veil. She found nine categories that help illuminate reasons as to why women hijab: religious, psychological, political, revolutionary, economic, cultural, demographic, practical and domestic (p. 105).

Ultimately, this chapter offered a brief discussion of French cultural history and policy, (in France and in Algeria) and examined Islamic history and tradition. The main purpose of both of those discussions was to explicate two of the most-prominent issues underlying French-Muslim cultural adaptation and the controversy over the Islamic hijab. An understanding of these issues sets the backdrop for the remainder of this analysis.
CHAPTER 3

The following chapter describes the data collection procedures used in this study. Specifically, this chapter first discusses a semiotic analysis conducted to ascertain the various interpretations of the Muslim veil, in both Muslim and non-Muslim populations. Second, this chapter will discuss the location/setting in which interviews took place. Third, the participants will be described. Fourth, the interview protocol is discussed. Fifth, transcription and translation procedures are defined. Sixth, grounded theory is defined, since the researcher allowed the transcripts to dictate the conclusions drawn within this analysis. Seventh, the coding procedure for analyzing the interviews is explained.

Semiotic Analysis of the Muslim Veil

To facilitate a greater understanding of the Koranic meaning of the veil, and the perceived Muslim perceptions of the veil, I conducted a semiotic analysis of one kind of veil, a veil made to look like the French tri-color flag, one is pictured below.

Noth (1990) asserts “the core of non-verbal communication is the semiotic function of the human body in time and space” (p. 387). In defining non-verbal communication as semiotics, Noth says non-verbal communication is the use of the
human body as a signifier. Moreover, non-verbal communication is also considered by Noth (1990) and Harrison (1974) to be communication minus language. The study of non-verbal communication is not limited to a single discipline, and can be studied from numerous research perspectives. The earliest analyses of non-verbal communication come from studies of theater, rhetoric, anthropology, biology, and cultural history. In more modern research, non-verbal communication is studied primarily from a sociological, or psychological perspective. Noth (1990), Goffman (1963) and Harrison (1974) all assert the wearing of clothing is a significant semiotic process.

Furthermore, the validity of semiotic analyses stems from the examination of the overriding context surrounding a visual sign. As Barthes (1974) discusses, visual signs are more than the signs themselves, the sign is composed of the historical and cultural context defining the sign. Barthes provides the example of a black soldier saluting the French tricolor flag. He asserts the image is more than a simple display of “patriotism,” since there are many other issues involved in the picture that are not evident to the viewer. For example, the soldier’s personal story, or the country in which he lives, as well as the importance of the tricolor flag needs to be understood by a viewer. Ultimately, this image as well as any other image needs to be analyzed and understood within the context in which it is presented. Therefore, the use of semiotics as a tool of analysis is appropriate for analyzing the veil because this analysis will outline and analyze the importance of the overarching societal, cultural, political and economic contexts.
While generating my interview protocol, I conducted a semiotic analysis to address the research questions posed earlier. This analysis not only revealed that many Muslims and non-Muslims regard the veil as a different kind of symbol, but also illustrates how conflict can arise because of what Gebser (1984) calls magic, mythic and perspectival cultures. When I was conducting preliminary analysis and interviews over the flag veil, I learned a lot about how people regard the veil as a symbol, specifically how significantly individuals regard the veil as a part of their cultural heritage and livelihood. The following excerpts from interviews conducted in both the United States (with French Muslim students) and France on the wearing of the tri-color flag veil provided a foundation for my analysis of the veil as a cultural symbol of Islam, and facilitated the formation of open-ended interview questions.

One interviewee who lives in Lille, near the Belgian border in the north of France, asserted she is consistently faced with pressures to look and act like a typical French woman, and this role includes the removal of her veil. She also described how she wears her flag-veil in the privacy of her home. (For future reference all interviews conducted in French will first be provided in French verbatim, and italicized. The French transcript will be followed by an English translation. If an interview was conducted in English it will be provided verbatim, and no efforts will be taken to correct grammar; the interviews are left in their original form to protect the integrity of exactly what the interviewees said during the interview.)

I work in a school here in Lille. I do not teach, but work in main office. I not allowed to wear any veil at work. I was told when I got job I must act more French, and was told to act like other people in office. All other people in
office are white, I not white. Because of work, when I go home I wear my flag veil, I protest when protest happens, and wear my flag veil to be Muslim and French.

A college student in the United States said, “I feel power when I wear and have my tri-color hijab. I smile when I wear it.” Another interviewee expressed how her wearing of a flag-veil gives her agency. She said “I feel like I has a choice when I made my tri-color veil. I changing French culture with my way I think and with the words I use.”

Ultimately these three women, along with the others I spoke with before I finalized my interview questions all pointed to a few key issues: cultural isolation, social and face identity, adaptation, and agency. These concepts served as the foundation for my research and interview questions.

Setting

Interviews were conducted in May and June 2005. The interviews took place in the following French cities: Lille, Lyon, Bordeaux, Clichy-sous-Bois (where the November 2005 riots began) and Paris. These cities were chosen for three reasons. First, the cities represent different geographic regions of France, from Lille in the Northwest to Lyon in the Southeast, to Bordeaux on the Atlantic coast. Second, these cities have a varied number of Muslim inhabitants. Cities such as Paris, Clichy-sous-Bois, and Lille have high concentrations of Muslims. While cities such as Bordeaux and Lyon have small but growing Muslim populations. The third reason these cities were chosen is because of a contact in each city.
Before research began a representative from the Islamic Human Rights Commission was contacted, and this representative brought me together with four imams throughout France. I met each of these imams individually in their respective city. Our initial meetings involved me describing my research, explaining the research procedure and answering any other questions they might have had. These meetings typically took place in an office within a Mosque or in the imam’s personal office at their home/apartment.

The importance of these imams in this project cannot be underestimated. In the Islamic religion and Muslim culture an imam is a religious teacher, a position similar to a Jewish rabbi. Furthermore, an imam serves as the prayer leader at a Mosque. These individuals, all men, are believed to be divinely chosen and appointed by Muhammad. Traditionally, imams were only teachers and served as counsel for Muslims, but in Western Europe and in the United States, the role of an imam is shifting. Roy (2005) explains how imams are taking on more and more political and leadership roles in the emerging Muslim community or umma. These men now carry political influence, and are beginning to serve as intermediaries between the Muslim faithful and God. In essence, as the power and purpose of an imam changes, it changes with the development of structured Muslim communities.

Until recently, Muslim communities, or ummahs, were more of a metaphor, and less of a physical/geographic entity. However, as more and more Muslims in predominantly non-Muslim nations begin to unite for political, economic and social stability, ummahs are becoming more pronounced and visible, while maintaining some metaphorical elements. It is now common to see a quasi-Muslim part of town in
many French, German, British and American cities. These newly emerging ummahs afford the imams and the Muslim community more religious, political, economic and social influence (Roy, 2005).

During this research, the imams I met with, located in the aforementioned cities, served as intermediaries between the interviewees and me. Since each imam is the prayer leader in a respective mosque in each city these imams were in direct contact on a daily and/or weekly basis with local Muslim men and women.

Having these imams as contacts was vital to the success of this research. Not only did the imams put me in contact with interview participants, but they also assured these participants, and their male family members that I was respectful and would not harm their family. In some cases participants told me they only met with me because an imam said it would be alright (religiously acceptable and not politically or economically dangerous), and that I would not disrespect them in anyway. When I met with participants they all commented on the words of their imam and said he told them to be honest and sincere with me, and that I would be the same. Therefore, whenever I met a participant I was considered an acceptable person, “someone to trust” as one participant put it. In essence, these imams opened the door for me into this community, and as Philipsen (1992) and Anderson (1991) both assert, gaining access to a community can often times be the hardest part of data collection. Without these imams telling their fellow Muslims community members that I was approved by the Mosque, and respectable to Islam, I probably would not have been able to conduct as many interviews as I did, or the interviews might have been less open and developed. Furthermore, I learned in conversations with several imams that
an open-ended interview is an acceptable and appropriate way to conduct research on
the Muslim population. Several of the imams told me it would be disrespectful to
appear in an ummah with a survey, since as the imams said, putting a feeling into a
number is not possible and shows disrespect for the heart and for emotions.

My interviews began in Lille, a city near the Belgian border in the northern
part of France. This city is primarily an industrial city, which until the 18th century
was occupied by France and the Netherlands at differing times. It was not until before
the Revolution that the city became and remained a French city. The overall
population according to 2000 census reports is approximately 1.7 million inhabitants,
including the city of Lille and its surrounding area, making it one of France’s five
largest cities. The city has a relatively large Muslim population, approximately 7-10
percent of the city of Lille and the surrounding community. While the Muslim
population continues to grow in Lille, racial tensions are relatively low, even though
there have been a few incidents of discrimination against veiled Muslim women
(Fontanad, 2005).

After Lille, interviews took place in the Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois.
This suburb is composed of primarily lower-class working class immigrants, most of
African or Southeast Asian descent. The majority of the residents live in apartment
complexes, which resemble the American projects of Philadelphia, Detroit or New
York City. Unemployment is greater than 15 percent (Mulrine, 2005). The suburb has
a high crime rate, almost double the French average, and in November 2005 this city
was the starting location for a series of riots that gripped the entire French nation.
Lyon was the third city I traveled to for interviews. Lyon is located in Southeast France, in the Rhone region, not far geographically from the French and Swiss Alps. Lyon is the second largest metropolitan area in France. The city has been part of France for approximately 1000 years. Lyon is known for its cuisine, literature and vineyards. While the city has a history of immigrants coming to it for work, the city has a relatively low number of Muslim inhabitants, less than five percent (Kedward, 2006).

The fourth city was Bordeaux. Bordeaux is located in Southern France on the Atlantic coast. The city has been a cultural hub of French society since the 15th century. The region is known for its vineyards, architecture, fishing and textiles. The majority of its immigrant population traces its heritage to either France or Portugal (Jones, 2004). The population of the city and its surrounding area is approximately 950,000, of which around 100,000 are students. The city is known as a center of education in France. The Muslim population in Bordeaux is small, with less than an estimated 5 percent of the population claiming the Muslim culture.

The final city in which interviews were collected was Paris, the capital of France. Paris is France’s largest city, with an estimated 12 million people in the metropolitan area, with more than 85% of the population living in Parisian suburbs. The city dates back to the days of ancient Rome, Gaul and the Franks. Since then Paris has served as the capital and cultural center of the French state. Throughout history, and even today Paris has been a multi-cultural city, a 1999 census estimated 19% of the city population to be foreign born (LegiFrance, 2005). The city is the economic, political, and cultural center of modern-day France.
Participants

Muslim Participants

Forty-two Muslims were interviewed for this study, including 27 women and 15 men. For a table providing the demographic information and pseudonyms of all interviewees see Appendix A. All participants were of North African descent. All interviewees were either first or second-generation Algerian (17), Tunisian (10), Moroccan (7), Libyan (2) immigrants to France, or born in France (5). Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 57. Of the 27 women, 20 wore a hijab in one form or another, six were completely veiled, while the remaining 14 wore a headscarf that only covered their hair. The remaining seven women said they chose not to veil for various reasons, which will be detailed later in this analysis.

The primary language of the majority of the participants (35) was French, while the remaining participants’ (7) primary language was Arabic. All of the participants were versed in a second language, 25 in English and 17 in French. Interviews were conducted in the interviewees’ language of choice, out of the 42 interviews 27 requested English and 15 requested French as the interview language. It is interesting that so many of the native-French speakers chose English for their interviews. This choice intrigued me when I was doing my research, and I eventually asked a few respondents why they chose English and not French, considering French was their native language and I speak both French and English. They said they wanted to practice their English with a native-English speaker. After encountering this phenomena a few times I consulted with two academic contacts about this
phenomenon. Both individuals told me it is common for individuals to want to
practice a foreign language with an individual from that foreign nation.

Of the 42 interviewees, 15 (10 men, 5 women) held degrees from French 2 or
4-year universities: 10 (5 men and 5 women) held the equivalent of a high school
diploma, and 17 (all women) had not completed high school. The discrepancy in the
number of males versus the number of females who have completed high school or
have advanced degrees is commensurate with the national average for Muslims and
other ethnic minorities in France (Venner, 2005).

Non-Muslim Participants

An additional twenty-three non-Muslim men and women were interviewed for
this study including, 13 men and 10 women. All of these participants were born in
France. Their ages ranged from 19 to 63. The primary language of all of these
participants was French. Twenty of the interviews were conducted in both English
and French; for example the participant would use a French phrase when he/she did
not know the English equivalent. The remaining three interviews were conducted
solely in French. Fifteen of the participants were practicing Catholics, four were
Jewish and the remaining four were non-practicing Protestants.

Interview Protocol

Interviews are often used in intercultural communication research to gain an
understanding of cultural and linguistic difference, and interviews have been used by
numerous scholars in investigations of intercultural phenomena (Briggs, 1986;
Croucher, 2003; Giles, Bourhis & Taylor, 1977; Hall, 1989; Miller et al., 1997).
Patton (1990) asserts open-ended interviews are the basic form of interviewing. There
are three approaches to open-ended interviews: informal conversational interviews, general interviews and standard open-ended interviews. This project utilizes standard open-ended interviews, which are “arranged with the intention of taking each respondent through the same sequence and asking each respondent the same questions” (Patton, 1990, p. 280). When the same general questions are asked of each interviewee, Bernard (1999) argues the researcher is able to reduce interviewer effects and the researcher can develop consistency across each interview, which makes analysis easier and more reliable. Moreover, Briggs (1986) argues an interview should be adapted to local communicative norms, and analyzed as a meta-communicative event. Standard open-ended interviews allow the researcher to slightly modify questions after conducting interviews, to better match the questions with what has been discovered in previous interviews. Thus, interview questions may change slightly to further understand newly emerged phenomena within the setting. Such interviews can produce rich or thick descriptions of ethnic or communal groups (Anderson, 1991; Philipsen, 1992; Spradley & McCurdy, 1972). It is up to the researcher thus to learn from interviews and from contacts in order to better formulate future interactions and to analyze the meta-communicative events taking place. In this study, I learned from the imams that interview questions were acceptable, instead of a survey. I also learned to let the participants speak on subjects that were important to them, and to not pigeonhole them into a non-negotiable question and answer session.

The interview questions were divided into five thematic sets, demographic, definition of veil, justification for the veil, the 2004 ban on religious symbols in French schools, and the veil and oppression. These six sets of questions were
included for a couple of reasons. First, research conducted by various scholars on the hijab (Gaspard, 1995; Mernissi, 1975, 1987; Parshall & Parshall, 2002) assert justification for the hijab is questionable, how the veil is defined is not consistent and the veil is deemed as both oppressive and liberating. Second, since law 2004-228 was just passed in 2004 no research had yet been conducted on the public’s perceptions of this ban, therefore questions about the ban itself were essential.

*Interview Questions*

A. Demographic Questions

1. How long have you been living in France?
2. Where did you live before France, if you are an immigrant?
3. Does your entire family live in France?

B. Varying Definitions of the Veil

1. Do the women in your family wear the veil/hijab?
2. Why do they wear the veil?
3. Why do they not wear the veil?
4. What does the veil mean to you?
5. What does the veil mean to your elders (parents and grandparents)?
6. What does the veil mean to the younger generation?
7. Do women view the veil differently than men?
8. Why or why not do men and women view the veil differently?
9. Please describe how it feels to wear the veil? Or to see a women wearing the veil?
10. How do you feel about Muslim women who do not wear the veil?
11. Does the veil give women a sense of identity? Why or why not?
C. The Veil and the Koran

1. Please explain what the Koran says about wearing the veil.

D. The Veil and Law 2004

1. Have you noticed more or less people wearing the veil since France passed the ban on the veil in 2004?

2. What is your impression of this ban on the veil?

3. Why do you think the ban was proposed and passed by the government?

4. Do you think the ban is right? Why or Why not?

E. The Veil and Oppression

1. Is the veil a form of oppression? Why or why not?

2. Is the ban on the veil an attempt by the government to make Muslims be more French? Why or why not?

F. The veil, Islam and Identity

1. Do you have an identity or ethnicity?

2. What is your identity or ethnicity?

3. Do you have a different identity at home and in public?

4. Can your identity change?

5. Has your identity changed at all since you came to France?

6. Has your identity changed since the passage of the veil ban?

7. Is there a French identity? Can you explain it?

While these questions served as the foundation of my interviews (see Appendix B for a copy of the French interview protocol), after conducting interviews I began to learn even further what participants thought about the veil in France. This
new information slightly altered some of my questions in later interviews. For example, after three participants told me they were afraid to speak out against the ban I began to probe this issue more in further interviews. Also, four Muslim women told me to not only ask if the ban is right, but to ask if it is right, moral or even justified. Thus, my interview protocol changed to meet developing needs and to satisfy developing questions. Moreover, as each participant spoke with me I modified my interview questions to better relate to what the participants wanted to talk about. If a participant wanted to talk about the veil and their sense of self, I asked more questions about identity, and less about adaptation. This practice, modifying the protocol to better communicate with participants is standard in interviewing (Bernard, 1999; Patton, 1990; Philipsen, 1992).

Each interview by with me meeting a participant at a pre-determined location; the majority of these locations were public squares or cafés, while some interviews took place in private residences. The participant was allowed to choose the location; this choice was made to allow the participants a say in the interview process, and to allow the participant to choose a location where they would be the most comfortable. The interviews in public squares generally took place on a park bench, with the participant and me seated close to each other. When an interview took place at a café, the setting was in some cases very similar to what Americans see on television about French street cafés, where small tables are set outside, with 2-4 chairs. Generally, the cafés were located on the sides of busy pedestrian streets in major cities. In Lille, all of the café interviews took place at a café overlooking the Museum of the Hospice Comtesse, in the center of Lille. In Paris, café interviews took place in Montparnasse
and Montmartre. One café interview took place in Bordeaux, and it was held in a café/bar overlooking the opera.

No café interviews took place in Lyon or Clichy-sous-Bois Bois. In Lyon the interviews took place in the public square outside one of the mosques in the city. In Clichy-sous-Bois the interviews took place in the imam’s home. This location was chosen because of the economic condition of the suburb, and the lack of personal safety at outside eateries. There are few outside eateries and the suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois Bois is an economically poor area; thus participants felt more comfortable speaking in a home. Moreover, since the majority of my participants in this city were women, the women chose the imam’s home to avoid any perceptions of impropriety on their part; being seen in public with a strange man without a family member present can be viewed by some Muslim men and women as problematic. In the imam’s apartment, which was in the main city plaza, the interview took place in the dining room, which is adjacent to the kitchen. The participant and I occupied the table; the imam or another individual was never in the same room during an interview.

Interviews lasted between 20 and 45 minutes. During the interviews I took notes in a field journal and used two digital recording devices, which facilitates the transcription and translation stage, which occurred later.

Transcription and Translation of Interviews

Out of the 42 interviews, 25 were initially chosen for full transcription. Twenty-two of these interviews were in English and the remaining three were in French. Each interview was transcribed verbatim from its original language(s). The
French interviews were also translated into English from the verbatim transcript. All French to English translations were double checked for accuracy by another French-English bilingual. Upon completion of the interview transcriptions, the interviews were analyzed using grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). All interviews were analyzed in their original language(s) before translation took place.

Data Analysis-Grounded Theory

Glaser and Strauss (1967) define the four-part inductive grounded theory process or open coding as “the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing data” (p. 61). Through the process of inductive coding themes or “salient categories of information supported by the text” (p. 22) emerge from the analysis of texts, instead of being pre-chosen by researchers. Glaser and Strauss (1967) claim the researcher conducting a grounded theory analysis should observe the following four steps: (1) collects data from participants (in this case interviews), (2) takes copious notes during each interaction, (3) codes (writes) in the margins of transcripts the central theme or purpose of each line of an interview transcript, and (4) memoing, or the writing of generalized theoretical links between what is coded and established theory.

After these four stages are completed, which in some cases happens simultaneously, the researcher will sort all of the memos into broad theoretical categories, which Strauss and Corbin (1991) claim facilitates the researcher in making theoretical arguments and conclusions. Sorting was conducted after the coding and memoing of 25 of the interviews with Muslims conducted for this analysis, and 10 of the interviews from non-Muslims.
The sorting revealed three broad theoretical categories that the majority of the interviewees had in common when talking about the veil. First, the overwhelming majority of the respondents spoke of feelings of forced and failed cultural adaptation in France. Second, many of the participants voiced concern for their personal identity formation and negotiation. Third, many of the respondents described a “growing silence” over the veil ban, which is similar to the theory of spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1970) in regard to the reluctance of many Muslims to protest the French government’s passage of the ban on the wearing of religious symbols in public schools. Fourth, interviewees described how the veil as a symbol of Islam is in the midst of a shift in meaning, where its significance and meaning in both the Muslim and non-Muslim world are changing. The following four chapters will discuss these themes as they emerged from the data. They will also discuss how these issues are linked to and explained by theoretical perspectives as cultural adaptation, spiral of silence, face negotiation and social identity theory, and language ideology.
CHAPTER 4
Cultural Adaptation

This chapter outlines and defines cultural adaptation theory. First, a brief overview of cultural adaptation within the social sciences is provided. Second, cultural adaptation theory is defined. Third, interview transcripts are used to illustrate the different aspects of cultural adaptation’s theoretical framework. Fourth, interview transcripts are analyzed to argue Muslims in France regard French linguistic, cultural, economic and political regulations, such as the law against the wearing of the veil in public schools as forms of forcing the Muslim population to culturally adapt to French culture, a form of forced compliance. Fifth, forced compliance as discussed by Festinger is briefly discussed. Sixth, interview excerpts are used to illustrate the forced adaptation of Muslims taking place in France.

Cultural Adaptation within the Social Sciences

Since the conception of colonial expansion in the times of Ancient Rome and Greece to the Spanish and English colonial powers, how people from various cultures, from many lands, occupations, religions and environments could be melded together into one culture, one nationality, one identity, has been in dispute in many parts of the world such as Quebec (Croucher, 2003; Dickinson & Young, 2003), Southeast Asia (Gudykunst, 2001), Europe (Hooghe & Marks, 2001), and the United States (Buenker & Ratner, 1992, Jacoby, 2004). To attempt to answer these questions surrounding the new colonial identities, politicians, scientists and scholars have posed various theoretical models and explanations.
In the 1880s Herbert Spencer urged conformity to Victorian England. In the United States, President Theodore Roosevelt argued Anglo-conformity was the ideal toward which we should strive. Anglo-conformity means conforming to the Anglo culture and institutions, the dominant and standard way of American life (Yang, 2000). Roosevelt’s call for Anglo-conformity was repeated after World War I and again after World War II when assimilation became synonymous with cultural adaptation, or in the German state where assimilation became synonymous with the elimination of millions of Jews, Poles, gypsies, homosexuals, and other non-Aryan citizens of Germany and surrounding countries. Even after the fall of the Third Reich, the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, and the fight for Civil Rights in the United States, pressure from American politicians for assimilationist immigration policies flourished. In the 1960s US Senator Alan Simpson said:

if immigration is continued at a high level and yet a substantial portion of the newcomers and their descendants do not assimilate, they may create in America some of the same social, political and economic problems which existed in the country which they have chosen to depart (Hing, 1997, p. 161).

Intercultural communication scholars, primarily American, have taken a keen interest in studying the foundations and future directions of assimilation, as it is a descriptive process of cultural outsiders abandoning their cultural identities to better communicate with individuals in a dominant culture, normally that of the United States (Buenker & Ratner, 1992; Chun & Choi, 2003; Conklin & Lourie, 1983; Gudykunst & Kim, 2003; Kramer, 2003; Oh, Koeske & Sales, 2002).
Assimilation patterns of foreign immigrants into American society have been studied over the past one hundred years in the fields of anthropology, sociology, psychology, and communication. Cooley (1909) recognized the importance of communication in cultural adaptation as “the mechanism through which human relations exist and develop all of the symptoms of the mind together with the means of conveying them through and preserving them in time (p. 61). The department of sociology at the University of Chicago defined cultural adaptation/assimilation theory, whereby immigrants lose their ethnic culture and merge into the dominant culture. The *Penguin dictionary of sociology* defined assimilation as “a unidimensional, one-way process, by which outsiders relinquished their own culture in favor of that of the dominant society” (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1984, p. 22).

The process of culturally adapting was regarded by the sociological community as Social-Darwinism (Kramer, 2004). Within this context, Park, a sociologist at the University of Chicago developed his race relations cycle, an explanation of how immigrant groups can effectively conform or assimilate. Park’s theory is the foundation of modern assimilation theory within the social sciences. In the first phase, immigrants encounter the new, dominant, surrounding culture. In the second phase, competition develops between the immigrant groups and the dominant culture over resources. An accommodation phase follows the competition. Last, the weaker group’s culture, the immigrant culture, is assimilated into the dominant culture (Park, 1937).

In the study of immigrant adaptation to a host culture, the terms assimilation, cultural adaptation and acculturation are often used interchangeably. Redfield (1936)
published the first definition of acculturation as a part of cultural adaptation. He defined acculturation as:

Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first hand contacts, with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups (p. 149).

Redfield’s definition serves as a general outline for early 20\textsuperscript{th} century anthropological studies. Researchers in other disciplines expanded upon this definition. In the field of sociology Gordon (1964) proposed a seven-dimension assimilation process or continuum including: cultural assimilation, structural assimilation, marital assimilation, identification assimilation, attitudinal receptional assimilation, behavioral assimilation and civic assimilation. Gordon stated, “once structural assimilation has occurred, either simultaneously with or subsequent to acculturation, all of the other types of assimilation will naturally follow” (p. 37). Yet Gordon did note individuals could stop with the first stage in the continuum. Gordon, and others before him all based their ideas of assimilation on the predication that it was a linear, one-way process or continuum, where the host culture did not gain anything from the immigrant group.

Beal (1974) on the other hand, recognized the effect of the immigrant group on the host culture. He expanded assimilation defining it as “the process by which groups with diverse thinking, feeling, and acting are absorbed into the dominant group or cultures, forming a social unity and a common culture” (p. 22). The process of assimilation was a combination of three processes: acculturation, social integration,
and amalgamation. Acculturation “may be accomplished through one group completely taking over the culture of another and relinquishing its own,” social integration “involves a fusion of groups in the sense that social integration is no longer predicated on social or ethnic identity,” and amalgamation is a biological process where distinct racial and ethnic groups fuse together (Beal, 1974, p. 23-4). Social integration in Beal’s process allowed and predicted host culture/immigrant group integration, not total absorption of immigrant culture.

The field of interpersonal communication, and later intercultural communication took assimilation theory and modified it during the 1970s and 80s with the work of Kim, and later Gudykunst. Kim (1976) used a path model to determine the degree of immigrant adjustment to a new culture. By studying immigrant’s interpersonal relationships with the host society by the immigrant’s amount of social interactions with the host culture and membership in specific organizations, Kim argued immigrants who participate more in ethnic communication practices and ethnic organizations are less assimilated than those immigrants who regularly interact with the host culture. From this study, Kim developed specific relationships between interpersonal communication and “assimilation” (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 360).

Assimilation theory, as posited by Gudykunst and Kim (1997; 2003) has been extensively tested in the United States and Canada. Most of these tests have entailed examining newcomer groups from Southeast Asia, African-Americans and Native-Americans. The following list is an example of such studies, which focus solely on the US and Canada (Ansari, 1991; Bernam, et al., 1987; Berry & Kim, 1987; Berry &
Sam, 1997; Broom & Kitsuse, 1955; Eichhoff, 1989; Garcia, 1995; Kim, 1976; Kunjara, 1982; Murphy & Esposito, 2003; Oh, et. al, 2002; Sakdisubha, 1987; Teske & Nelson, 1974; Ward & Kennedy, 1994). While these studies have focused entirely on the US and Canada, Gudykunst and Kim (1997; 2003) assert this theory is appropriate for analyzing groups outside of the United States. Kramer (2003) and Croucher (2003; 2005) argue the theory should be tested for validity outside of the United States. Thus, since this cultural adaptation theory has been shown to be a descriptive theory of cultural adaptation, and its validity has yet to be thoroughly tested outside of North America, it is appropriate to use this theory as a lens through which to analyze the adaptation process of Muslim in France, and to evaluate the theory’s validity and reliability.

Kim (1977) asserted:

Interpersonal communication is one of the key elements of social communication, along with observation of one’s environment including mass media content. Interpersonal communication is generally considered more intense, direct, and has a detailed influence on the immigrant’s adaptation to the host socio-cultural system (p. 57).

Kim further argued functional interpersonal communication is an important channel through which immigrants learn about the dominant host culture. The culmination of this study, and later work after 1976 was the development of Gudykunst and Kim’s theory of assimilation/cultural adaptation. Gudykunst and Kim (2003) define assimilation as a “convergence of strangers’ internal conditions with those of the native and a minimum maintenance of the original cultural habits” (p.
The convergence of strangers around an internal condition of the native culture emphasizes the immigrant’s responsibility to find a way to function in their new environment. Gudykunst and Kim (1997) define functional fit as “the operational (or behavioral) capacity that enables a person to carry out behaviors externally in accordance with the host cultural patterns” (p. 342).

The attempt to mimic surrounding cultural norms and function “properly” in society creates flexible, passive and advanced immigrants (Gudykunst & Kim 1997). Kramer (2003) in his critique, equates these flexible, passive and advanced immigrants to “being user-friendly, easily reprogrammable, to being able and willing to deculturize, disintegrate, and unlearn one’s cognitive affective and operational self” (p. 16).

Happiness is another logical principle of assimilation advocated by Gudykunst and Kim (2003). They argue the only way for an individual to effectively overcome differences and be satisfied in their new culture is to abandon their previous cultural identity to facilitate overall cultural happiness and satisfaction (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003). They further asserted every “stranger” or newcomer to a culture must find ways to function in a new environment. Complete cultural adaptation is the ultimate, lifetime goal of assimilation (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997; 2003).

According to Kim’s cultural adaptation framework, or assimilation theory, individuals go through three (sociologically based) stages on their way to total assimilation: enculturation, deculturation and acculturation. At any one time, individuals are in only one of the following three stages, and the individual can go back and forth between stages, but the stages do not generally overlap. Kim presents
the three stages as variables. She asserts one acculturates only to the extent that they can deculturate, a zero-sum mentality (Croucher, 2005; Kramer, 2003). All in all, Kim sets up a continuum upon which individuals move from one stage to the other.

*Enculturation*

Enculturation is the adoption of the behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture. Kelvin (1970) describes the enculturation process as the socialization process of children and newcomers to the norms of their cultural milieu. Enculturation stems from sociological and educational research, examining the learning and developmental patterns of children. Gudykunst and Kim (2003) expand the concept of enculturation to include not only socialization but also communicative response, “socialization provides children with an understanding of their world and culturally patterned modes of responding to it” (p. 359).

The Muslim community in France described in different meetings and in different cities how they as children, and their children all go through a period of learning about their Muslim cultural heritage. Interviewee A, a 29-year old Muslim woman born in Algeria, now living in Lille, discussed how she was taught to respect the traditions of Islam above all other traditions as a child, and that she passes these ideas onto her young daughter and nieces. She said:

> When I young girl I learn Islam and Islamic law [pause] I learn about Koran. I learn from mother and from father what it mean to be Muslim woman. Muslim woman follow Koran and do what it say to do in Koran. If women not do what Koran say they not follow word of Prophet and live a good Muslim life [pause] and not have good life after death. I now teach daughter and
nieces [pause] I teach them they need be good Muslim women [pause] they uh need to know Koran and follow Koran [pause] and hijab.

Another participant echoed these sentiments. Interviewee F, a 36-year old Algerian born Muslim woman living in Lyon, described how when she was a young girl she was taught by her mother, grandmother and sisters the importance of the hijab as a part of Muslim culture, she continues this teaching with her daughters. She said:

Les femmes dans la famille m'enseignent au hijab. Ils enseignent cette pièce de hijab de pièce de l'Islam [pause] de ma culture. J'apprends alors ce qui il moyen d'ètre les femmes musulmanes, le bon hijab musulman de femme et [pause] la mauvaise femme musulmane non pauvre qui pas hijab. Aussi j'apprends comment agir avec les hommes et comment enseigner mes enfants à être de bons musulmans et à n'aime pas les mauvais musulmans. Il ma responsabilité d'enseigner des filles à être de bons musulmans [pause] sûr elles comprennent Koran.

Women in family teach me to hijab. They teach that hijab part of Islam [pause] part of my culture. I learn then what it mean to be Muslim women, good Muslim woman hijab and not poor [pause] bad Muslim woman who not hijab. I also learn how to act with men and how to teach my children to be good Muslims and not like the bad Muslims. It my responsibility to teach daughters to be good Muslims [pause] sure they understand Koran.

A 47-year old Muslim woman, Interviewee Q who was born in Algeria but lives in Paris further discussed how she learned a good Muslim woman is a Muslim woman who wears a hijab and does not show her entire face or hair. She said, “my
mother say good Muslim girls hijab [pause] and girls who do not hijab are not good Muslim girls. I tell daughter and granddaughter that now.” These women were not only taught by the women in her family the meaning of a Muslim, but they were also socialized into the societal differences and stereotypes between those Muslim women who do and those Muslim women who do not hijab. Moreover, they are taking their learned cultural norms and passing those onto their daughters, which is a classical element of the enculturation process; someone is socialized into a culture and passes that culture onto a younger generation.

Muslim men are also enculturated into the Muslim culture, specifically into the importance of the hijab as a representation of a “good” Muslim woman. Interviewee L, a 29-year old Algerian born Muslim male in Paris discussed how when he was a child in Algiers he learned from his father and mother the importance of marrying a Muslim women who wears a veil. They told him only “good” Muslim women veil, and women who don’t veil are therefore “bad” or “unholy” Muslim women.

My father say to me I need marry good woman who hijab. Woman who not hijab [pause] that uh not good Muslim woman. Koran say women need to hijab [pause] and I learn as child that women need to hijab. I teach my two sons that today [pause] they need find Muslim woman who hijab for wife when older [pause] other women not holy or traditional.

Aside from being enculturated into their original or native culture, Gudykunst and Kim (1997) assert that as immigrants enter a new culture they are confronted with new cultural practices, these practices in some cases may run counter to the
newcomer’s original cultural identity. Numerous participants vividly described this confrontation. Interviewee B, a 32-year old Muslims women born in France who lives in Bordeaux discussed how when her mother came to visit her in France from Tunisia her mother was shocked at not only the language difference, and the abundance of media, but also at the ways Muslims read the Koran. She explained:

My mother not think it possible to read Koran in language that [pause] not Arabic. In France that true a lot. Many people not read Arabic [pause] and are Muslim. This [pause] confuse my mother a lot [pause] she uh not know what to think about these [pause] Muslims who speak French and watch French television and read French books.

Interviewee D, a 57-year old Muslim woman born in Algeria who lived in Paris described how when she immigrated to France when she was 20 years old, she encountered numerous cultural practices that were different from her own.


When I come to France I see [pause] many people who act different than me. These people [pause] they all speak different language [pause] and most of
them not hijab. It was [pause] unusual to see women without hijab [pause] I
not see that in Algeria [pause] all women hijab then in Algeria. I even see
Muslims who not hijab [pause] in France [pause] I not understand it [pause] it
confused me. I must change to be like them.

This cultural confusion is common when a newcomer encounters new cultural
practices. In fact, Gudykunst and Kim (1997) argue when a newcomer encounters
situations counter to what they are used to, the newcomer will become confused and
then attempt to learn a new culture to replace their “less developed” culture in order
to become a “universal person” with a “transcultural identity” (p. 364). Some of the
participants in this project explained how they began to rapidly learn French culture
after emigrating from another country.

Interviewee J, a 39-year old Muslim woman born in Tunisia explained how
she had to quickly learn French culture when she immigrated to Lille. “I learn I must
speak French [pause] I take French lessons. I learn people like women with perfume
[pause] I buy perfume. I begin to act more French.” Her experience represents the
transition from the enculturation to deculturation phase of cultural adaptation, in
which a newcomer will begin to question cultural practices.

Deculturation

Deculturation describes the process individuals go through when losing their
socialized cultural identity. According to Brim and Wheeler (1966), during
deculturation, individuals learn new cultural habits from the host culture, and in turn
as individuals realize certain behaviors are more acceptable in the host culture, the
individuals question/unlearn their native cultural behaviors. In order to lose a
socialized identity an individual must unlearn the culture they were socialized into, inherently deeming their original culture as less worthy or important than the new surrounding culture (Kramer, 2003).

One participant, Interviewee R, a 29-year old Muslim male born in Morocco and living in Lille described when he first realized his cultural behaviors, specifically his choice of food, were not as acceptable as other behaviors (foods) in France. He stated:

When I come here [pause] I not think I have to be different. I use my language [pause] I eat my food [pause] but my food [pause] people not like my food [pause] they say my food not good [pause] they how you say [pause] odor [pause] smell my food on my skin and say I need to eat different food.

Another participant further elaborated on how when he first immigrated to France he was informed by his French neighbor that it was not acceptable for him to prevent his wife from attaining a part-time job. Interviewee W, a 62-year old Muslim male from Tunisia said:


My neighbor [pause] he [pause] uh tell me I not good to keep wife home [pause] but uh that uh what I think good [pause] why it not good I ask? I keep

Newcomers to a culture are also sometimes forced to question their behaviors for fear of not receiving a position or social benefit. Interviewee J, who does not directly deal with any customers, described how her employer told her that if she did not stop wearing native earrings (two inch silver loops with Arabic writing that stated “God be with you”) and other jewelry (a ring with the aforementioned phrase) that she would be fired and lose all of her benefits and salary. She said:


If these kinds of cultural behaviors or artifacts such as food or jewelry are deemed foreign, or non-functional within the dominant culture, many immigrants or newcomers will simply abandon the practices in favor of mimicking the dominant culture (Kramer, 2003) and enter Kim’s third and final stage of cultural adaptation, acculturation. Various scholars deem this process of deculturation leading to eventual acculturation as inevitable and beneficial (Brim & Wheeler, 1966; Deutsch & Won, 1963; Goffman, 1961; Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, 2003; Lysgaard, 1955). While others regard the process of acculturation as prescribed by Kim as limiting and failing to adequately take cultural factors under consideration (Chun & Choi, 2003; Croucher, 2005; Kramer, 2003; Murphy & Esposito, 2003).
**Acculturation**

When individuals abandon their previous cultural habits (deculturation) and adopt the behaviors of the host culture, the individuals are engaged in the final resocialization process of cultural adaptation known as acculturation. Acculturation is the final stage in the process of cultural change resulting from contact between groups with distinctive cultures (Oh, Koeske & Sales, 2002). Kim (2003) defined acculturation as the process when strangers “become acquainted with and adopt some of the norms and values of salient reference groups in the host society” (p. 359).

Acculturative change is achieved slowly over time, since the majority of individuals inherently want to retain some of their “foreign” cultural practices. Individuals must also use their former cultural skills, which they were supposed to unlearn during deculturation in order to integrate new information and integrate the new cultural repertoire into their lives (Kramer, 2003). Furthermore, researchers have demonstrated this process to become easier and quicker for newcomers in a host culture over generations, first, second to third, and so on (Buenker & Ratner, 1992; Conklin & Lourie, 1983; Oh, Koeske & Sales, 2002).

Countless examples abound in the interview transcripts demonstrating how many Muslim immigrants have acculturated to a certain point into the more dominant French culture. Numerous immigrants discussed how they first began to adopt “French” behaviors. Most of their adopting of French behaviors can be grouped into five categories: altering their language use, food selection, media usage, parenting and marriage practices, and clothing choices.
Altering of Language Use

Many of the participants in this study discussed how after they immigrated to France they began to realize the imperative nature of being fluent in French. An understanding of French is necessary for attaining decent paying, or long-term employment in France (Reynolds & Kidd, 2003). One participant, Interviewee F, an Algerian immigrant to France discussed how she was taught basic French in school, but did not speak it at home and thus her French ability was greatly hindered when she first moved to France. She said:

*Je viens en France et je ne parle pas français très bien. J'ai parlé l'arabe et anglais à la maison. Ma mère était une professeur anglais et mon père a travaillait dans l'usine. Après que je vienne en France qu'il était difficile de trouver un bon travail, parce que je n'ai pas parlé français. J'ai pris des leçons françaises à une école musulmane locale, et ai appris à parler français. Aujourd'hui ce mieux pour moi maintenant que je parle français [pause] maintenant que j'ai le meilleur travail et moi suis personne mieux française.*

I come to France and not speak French very well. I spoke Arabic and English at home. My mother was English teacher and father work in factory. After I come to France it was difficult to find a good job, because I did not speak French. I took French lessons at a local Muslim school, and learned to speak French. Today it better for me now that I speak French [pause] Now I have better job and I am better French person.
Another interviewee, Interviewee D, who was born in Algeria and immigrated to France 37 years ago described how she suffered discrimination because she did not speak French properly, and only spoke Arabic. She said the only job she could find was as a maid and she received a poor salary. After she learned French this situation changed.

*Quand je viens d'abord ici je travaillez en tant que bonne [pause] qui était le seul travail que je pourrais trouver. Je n'ai pas fait beaucoup d'argent. Après que j'apprenne le français et parle un certain français [pause] les gens me donnent le meilleur travail. Maintenant je travaille en tant que bonne dans trois maisons françaises [pause] et je fais plus d'argent. Le Français d'étude m'a donné pour avoir le bon travail.*

When I first come here I work as a maid [pause] that was the only job I could find. I did not make much money. After I learn French and speak some French [pause] people give me better job. I now work as a maid in three French homes [pause] and I make more money. Learning French gave me chance to have good job.

Overall, while native Arabic speakers assert they were better off economically after learning French, they also argue they are more accepted in social circles after learning French. Interviewee X, a 47-year old Libyan born Muslim woman said, “après j'ai appris le français il était plus facile de faire des amis en France. Maintenant, j'ai beaucoup d'amis qui sont libyens et aussi français” “after I learn French it easier to make friends in France. I now have many friends who are Libyan and who are also French.”
Muslim males and females also assert they have an easier time assimilating to their social and work environments. Interviewee R, a 29-year old Muslim male from Morocco said “after I learn French and English it better for me at work. I have more friends at work and I understand my work more.” Interviewee U, a 39-year old Muslim woman from Egypt said, “quand j'apprends à parler français les français m'acceptent plus au travail et quand je marche,” “when I learn to speak French the French people accept me more at work and when I go outside to shop or walk”

Not only do Arabic speaking Muslim immigrants interviewed for this research describe their need to learn French, but one also discussed how when she (a native English speaker) moved from the United Kingdom she needed to learn French as well. Interviewee H described how she took a pay cut to work in a French bank, and did not receive appropriate pay in her opinion until she gained some fluency in French. She stated:

I worked in an English bank for three years and then applied for a job in a French bank. I came here and had to learn French because I was working in a French bank [pause] it’s that simple [pause] if you work here you need to speak the language. I think it is virtually that way in every society today, if you can’t speak the language your opportunities are limited. It was the same when I was in England, if you did not speak English you couldn’t even get a job cleaning the floors.

Food Selection

Aside from the need to learn the French language, participants described how they had to adapt to the French food, and in many cases had to abandon their
traditional/native foods because their native foods were considered too exotic and they were unable to find the appropriate products. As Jandt (2004) states, food represents a powerful and resonant cultural artifact, and when a newcomer alters their eating behavior this change can be a very difficult and depressing decision. The overwhelming majority of the participants voiced the same sentiments in regard to adopting French food and abandoning their native foods. Interviewee A, an Algerian born Muslim woman commented on the difficulty of attaining the appropriate cooking materials. She said, “it is hard to buy many things that I need here in France to cook traditional foods [pause] or uh the foods are very expensive. So I have to eat more French foods, not choice [pause] I must buy French food.”

Interviewee Z, a 39 year-old Muslim male from Tunisia discussed how his neighbors and landlord all say his food has too strong of an odor, and thus he is not allowed to cook many native dishes. He equated their (French) perceptions of his native food to racism against Muslims and Tunisians. He said:

*Mes voisins dans mon bâtiment, ils disent ma nourriture a une mauvaise odeur [pause] que mon propriétaire a dite que je ne peux pas la faire cuire parce que l'odeur fait l'appartement sentir mal. Je ne pense pas qui est vrai [pause] ma nourriture différente [pause] il n’est pas mauvais. Mais ils le disent il est mauvais, je ne le font pas cuire souvent maintenant. Maintenant, je le manque. Les gens ici sont racistes en France et n'aiment pas des Tunisiens ou Musulmans, il sont simples.*

My neighbors in my building, they say my food has a bad odor [pause] my landlord said I couldn’t cook it because the odor makes the apartment smell
badly. I do not think that is true [pause] my food different [pause] it not bad. But they say it is bad, I do not cook it often now. Now I miss it. People here in France are racist and do not like Tunisians or Muslims, it is simple.

French Media Usage

Aside from their selection of foods and their language usage, many participants described how the longer they live in France, the more French media they consume. Many other participants discussed the opposite, usage of fewer French media outlets, the sentiments of these participants will be presented and analyzed in the end of this chapter, and also in the sixth chapter of this dissertation.

Numerous participants explained how when they first moved to France they did not read a lot of French newspapers or magazines, but as their time in France increased, so did their usage of French media. The participants stated their usage of French media increased over time for two reasons, they gained an understanding (or better grasp) of the French language and they wanted to learn about news and events in their region or in France proper.

“I learn English and French [pause] and now I like to read French newspapers and watch television. I read and watch about news, sports and other things. It easy also to find things in paper [pause] uh [pause] like [pause] uh jobs or things to buy” said Interviewee S, a 37-year old Muslim male born in Libya who lives in Lyon.

Another participant said she enjoys watching French television because she thinks she is more French when she watches French television. “J’aime la télévision française, quand j’observe [pause] je suis français [pause] j’écoute en français et j’aime des expositions françaises,” “I like French television, when I watch I am
French [pause] I listen in French and I like French shows,” said Interviewee Y, a Tunisian born Muslim woman.

Her sense of identity from being able to watch and understand French television is consistent with other studies that have found newcomers will have heightened attachment to a host culture when they identify with the host culture’s media (Hall, 1981; Hofstede, 1960). This increased usage of French media over time is also consistent with the results Kim (1977) found when examining the Korean community in and around Chicago. However, some participants voiced concern over their children not using media from their parents’ native culture. Interviewee V, a 63-year old Muslim woman from Morocco said:

*Je veux mes enfants savoir et regarder la télévision Arabe et lire les journaux Arabes [pause] mais il n’existe pas en France. Ils sont difficile à trouver. Ils faisaient lire les journaux Françaises et regarder la télévision Français. Leurs habitudes ne me rendent pas heureux*

I want my children to know and watch Arabic television and read Arabic Newspapers [pause] but these do not exist in France [pause] they are hard to find. They must read French newspapers and watch French television. Their habits do not make me happy.

Another participant said, “my children know French cinema and television, but they do not know Algerian cinema, television or literature. I want them to know their history, and not forget it.” While Interviewee Q acknowledges her children know French media, she still expresses her desire for them to remember and not forget their native culture. Interviewee N, a 54 year-old Moroccan born Muslim
woman also discussed how her children have forgotten the culture of their parents and grandparents, through their media usage. “My children do not know Moroccan literature, or cinema. All they know is French, and this is a problem to me because they do not know their heritage now.”

This dichotomy shows how when many newcomers to a culture, and their successive generations try to adapt to a dominant culture, their traditional values and beliefs can and often come in direct conflict with those of the more dominant culture (Croucher, 2005; Kramer, 2003). Another cultural practice that regularly comes into direct conflict with the values and beliefs of the dominant culture is parenting practices.

Parenting and Marriage Practices

A large portion of the Muslims who were not born in France described how their parenting behaviors have changed since they immigrated to France. In a traditional Muslim family, the man is the head of the household, while the woman of the house is still a highly respected member of the family unit (Roald, 2001). Interviewee L, a Muslim man born in Algeria described how when he was a child he was taught by his mother and father to respect both male and female members of his family. “My father say to me I must respect [pause] honor my mother and him. My mother important person in family.” Interviewee A, a Muslim woman born in Algeria explained her mother and father also told her to respect both parents. “When I child my uh [pause] mother say father love us [pause] but father work and busy. My father also [pause] he uh [pause] say mother work hard at home [pause] she love us too. We need to honor her and him [pause] Prophet said it must be [pause] honor parents.”
While these participants explained their socialization into the Muslim culture as including lessons into the familial honor structure, other participants expressed worry for the younger generation born in France. These participants equated a perceived decrease in respect for family with children in France growing up to be too French, or too Western by nature. Interviewee D, a Muslim woman born in Algeria said:

\[ J'enseigne mes enfants en Algérie à respecter et honorer des parents. \]

\[ Aujourd'hui les enfants ne respectent pas ou n'honorent pas leurs parents. \]


I teach my children in Algeria to respect and to honor parents. Today children do not respect or honor their parents. My grandchildren [pause] they do not speak properly to their mother or father. They think they are adults when they are children. Where is the respect for family and parents today? Children not learn honor in France [pause] they too French [pause] too Western.

Another participant, Interviewee J, a Muslim born Tunisian woman echoed these aforementioned remarks and said, “it hard to protect children. They [pause] uh [pause] want to be like French children [pause] and they uh say what they want [pause] uh [pause] uh [pause] and my son has friends who do not respect their
mothers [pause] where is the honor?” These participants perceive the French culture as somehow taking away their children’s respect and honor for familial structures.

When asked why they blamed the French culture, the answers were very similar. Interviewee A said, “children want freedom [pause] do not want parents say what they do or not do. French teens have a lot of freedom [pause] can uh do many things Muslim children cannot [pause] like marry without uh father or mother approval. Interviewee J added:

the friends of my son [pause] they are French children [pause] they watch French television [pause] they have bad words to say [pause] the words on French television. They uh [pause] they uh also learn to do what want when they marry [pause] this not good [pause] it uh confuse many children and family.

Other participants also voiced similar sentiments when explaining why Muslim children born in France do not respect their parents: too much freedom for French children and the ability of French children to marry whomever they please. Overwhelmingly interviewees voiced concern over more and more Muslim children refusing to participate in arranged marriages. This shift from accepting or not voicing open opposition to arranged marriages represents a shift in Islam from a magic/mythic religion into having some perspectival tendencies. In many Muslim nations it is not uncommon to have arranged marriages for both male and female children. The importance of arranged marriages stems from the desire within the Muslim faith that the ideal relationship is between a man and woman in the bonds of
marriage. Yet, an increasing number of unmarried Muslims refuse to be part of arranged marriages.

Interviewee B, a French born Muslim woman said:

I do not live in Muslim country [pause] I do not have to uh [pause] have arranged marriage [pause] I uh can uh [pause] marry the man I want. This is [pause] uh not something my parents like [pause] but I make choice [pause] I can make choice in France. Choice I cannot make in Muslim country.

Interviewee AC, a 40-year old French born Muslim male said, “J'ai un choix en France [pause] que j'ai un choix pour marier qui je veux. Mes parents n'ont pas eu que [pause] ainsi je fais à un choix et ne pas marier qui les parents disent que je dois me marier.” “I have a choice in France [pause] I have a choice to marry who I want. My parents did not have that [pause] so I make a choice and not marry who parents say I have to marry.”

Interviewee AF, a 37-year old Algerian born Muslim woman said, “I can marry and date man I want in France [pause] I not need to have permission or arranged marriage like parents [pause] permission and arranged marriage old tradition [pause] not new way to think [pause] not French way to think.” Interviewee AA, a 29-year old French born Muslim male, further supported her sentiments. He said, “mes parents ont eu un mariage dispose[pause] qu'ils ne se sont pas mariés qui ils m'aiment [pause] marient qui j'aime [pause] est qui ce que les gens en France [pause] et je suis français.” “My parents had an arranged marriage [pause] they did not marry who they love [pause] I marry who I love [pause] that is what people in France do [pause] and I am French.”
While the second and successive generation of Muslims living in France do not support the tradition of arranged marriages, the first generation Muslim immigrants still hold this tradition in high regard. Interviewee T, a 63-year old Muslim male born in Algeria stated, “children today not want arranged marriages. They not think they work [pause] but they work, and it tradition to marry for family [pause] it not bad choice.”

Similarly, Interviewee T, a 57-year old Muslim woman from Tunisia said, “ma fille a fait ne pas vouloir un mariage dispose [pause] mais à mes petits-enfants [pause] ils uh des mariages disposés, et ma fille me dit bien [pause] pour ne pas comprendre. Ils doivent se rappeler Coran et l'Islam comme important pour la vie.” “My daughter had an arranged marriage [pause] but my grandchildren [pause] they uh not want arranged marriages, and my daughter says ok [pause] I not understand. They need to remember Koran and Islam as important to life.”

Interviewee AB, a 46-year old Muslim woman born in Morocco summed up the sentiments of first generation Muslim immigrants to France nicely. She said:

Je pense que les enfants aujourd'hui dans les enfants musulmans de la France [pause] et les jeunes adultes [pause] ils ne se rappellent pas l'Islam et Coran. La famille de respect de parole de Coran [pause] s'est chargée du mariage [pause] qu'est la manière de respecter une famille. Si jeunes les musulmans disent que je ne veux pas un mariage dispose [pause] qu'ils ne respectent pas leur père ou la mere [pause] ils respectent seulement eux-mêmes [pause] ceci est un mauvais problème avec de jeunes musulmans.
I think children today in France and young adults they do not remember Islam and the Koran. Koran say respect family arranged marriage that is the way to respect a family. When young Muslims say I do not want an arranged marriage they do not respect their father or mother they respect only themselves This is a bad problem with young Muslims.

Clearly there is a difference between how the first generation Muslim immigrant and successive generations view arranged marriages. The overall sentiment of the younger generation of Muslims living in France do not hold to the tradition of arranged marriages, while the first generation of immigrants (the older Muslims) do hold to these traditions to be an important part of being a Muslim. This difference of opinion, or worldview is also evident in how first and successive generation Muslims regard the choice of what kind of clothing to wear in public.

Clothing Choices

Noth (2000), Gebser (1984) and Hall (1977) all assert clothing is a powerful cultural and symbolic symbol for any culture. Thus, when the Koran prescribes Muslim women and men should wear clothing that is modest and does not draw unnecessary attention to their bodies, this prescription is culturally and symbolically significant. Since clothing is an important part of the Islamic faith, in many Muslim nations and traditional Muslim households it is not uncommon to see Muslim women wearing a hijab (whether full, headscarf or burqa), and a Muslim male man wearing a white or other light colored garment/robe. However, as Islam becomes more and more Westernized, as its followers immigrate in greater numbers to Western nations.
and as new technology and new fashions are introduced to many Muslims, the
standard Muslim fashion has become anything but standard. Roald (2001) described
how an increasing number of Muslim women in Western nations are substituting
traditional Muslim attire for more Western clothing such as slacks, jeans and skirts.
This transition is generally well accepted within the young Muslim population, but
strongly opposed within the older Muslim population.

Younger Muslims, second or successive generations, equate the wearing of
Western clothing with liberation and self-identification (perspectivalism). Interviewee
B, a 32-year-old Muslim woman born in Paris said, “I not hijab or wear clothes that
many Muslim women wear in Muslim countries. I [pause] uh [pause] think I am
Western free woman who is also Muslim [pause] so I [pause] uh [pause] wear
Western clothes. My favorite is jeans.”

Interviewee L, an Algerian born Muslim male discussed how he does not wear
traditional clothing because of his job and his desire to be more like other French
people.

I need to wear what I like wear [pause] if I wear other clothes [pause] I uh
[pause] not me. I also not allow to wear traditional clothes at work [pause]
traditional clothes not good for work. People at work are French [pause] I
want to look like them [pause] so I wear French [pause] or uh [pause] Western
clothes.

Earlier in the interview, this participant expressed his desire to find a wife
who wore traditional clothing, specifically the hijab. When asked why he needs to
find a wife who hijabs, while he does not need to wear traditional clothing he said, “it
different for men [pause] men not have be modest [pause] we be men [pause] women need be modest [pause] need hijab.”

Another participant, Interviewee AE, a 28-year old French born Muslim woman agreed with his desire for self-identification, but disagreed with his assertion that only women need to wear traditional clothes. She said:

*I like to wear Western clothes. Western clothes [pause] they uh [pause] they make me feel Western [pause] I feel Muslim and French. I can make my decision in life [pause] and not do what old Muslims [pause] what family [pause] or old book says I must do or wear. I am free a Muslim. If I want to hijab I hijab [pause] if I do not want to hijab [pause] I not hijab. Men [pause] they have same choice [pause] we all free here [pause] we all [pause] uh have choice [pause] not only men [pause] but women also have choice.

This issue of whether to hijab or not will be examined extensively in the next chapter, which addresses the hijab as a form of identity and face negotiation in
France. Aside from the issue of whether women should hijab or not, or if Muslims should follow Koranic traditions of modesty, participants also expressed that the older Muslim generation (first generation immigrants) do not understand the younger generation’s desire for individuality and self-identification. Interviewee A, said, “I want mother and I [pause] uh [pause] want father to understand [pause] to know that I good Muslim [pause] but I [pause] uh [pause] like Western clothes [pause] I like be individual [pause] I like them [pause] parents understand me [pause] but they not understand me [pause] it make me sad.”

First generation immigrants regularly voice opposition to their children’s and grandchildren’s wearing of Western clothes. Interviewee J, a Tunisian born Muslim woman said, “I not understand young Muslims [pause] they not like tradition now [pause] I like them wear good Muslim clothes [pause] but they not [pause] they uh [pause] wear Western [pause] American clothes.”

Clearly, the issue of what clothing is appropriate for Muslims is debated within the Muslim community or ummah. This debate represents a clash between those who want to culturally adapt to Western ways of dress (perspectivalism), and those who want to hold onto religious, historical and cultural traditions that are questioned in the Western culture (magic/mythic). This clash also reveals how many Muslims refuse to culturally adapt, and instead become further entrenched in tradition. The reluctance of these Muslims to culturally adapt (in numerous ways) to a more dominant French culture is not accounted for in Kim’s (1977) cultural adaptation framework. Therefore, the following section discusses some of the criticisms and potential weaknesses of Kim’s cultural adaptation framework.
Criticisms of Cultural Adaptation

When assessing the strengths and weaknesses of cultural adaptation theory, the strength of this theory lies in its ability to be easily understood and applied. The tenets behind the theory are easy to understand, have been adopted by many scholars, and in practice, some level of cultural adaptation produces a more cultured individual. According to Gudykunst and Kim (1997), an assimilative state creates “evolution” to “intercultural personhood,” which is also deemed being a “universal person” with a “transcultural identity” (p. 364).

However, a few of the logical propositions establishing this theory have been questioned and are still unresolved, including the absolute necessity for deculturized human beings and the lack of allowances for multiculturalism within the various assimilation stages. Scholars further contest three premises, or effects of assimilation: the promotion of self-hatred, the inherent acceptance of all individuals wishing to assimilate (host culture receptivity, and animosity toward adapters. Furthermore, this theory has rarely been tested outside of the United States, and rarely outside of Asian communities.

Deculturalization

A logical proposition of assimilation is the deculturing of individuals. In fact, according to Gudykunst and Kim, it is absolutely imperative individuals allow themselves to be deculturized. In essence, as Kramer (2003) points out, the ultimate goal under Gudykunst and Kim’s theory is “a totally deculturized human being” (p. 6). Gudykunst and Kim (2003) assert cultural adaptation, which they refer to as assimilation in their 1997 and 2003 texts, creates the model minority, one that can fit
into society. In practice, an immigrant who understands the surrounding culture and abandons their previous culture is mimicking the dominant culture to become as similar to the host culture as possible (Buenker & Ratner, 1992; Chun & Choi, 2003; Croucher, 2005; Gudykunst and Kim, 2003; Kramer, 2003; Oh, Koeske & Sales, 2002).

Muslims in France discussed how native members of the French culture have mocked them for trying too hard to become and act French. Interviewee R, a Moroccan born Muslim male said, “when I learn French people laugh at me. They say I try be French [pause] but will not be French [pause] because I Muslim. People make fun [pause] laugh at my accent.”

Another participant, Interviewee F described how when she was learning French she was laughed at as well. She said:

People laughed at me, and I did not appreciate it. I am a well-educated woman from the United Kingdom and many people here in France said I was a dirty Muslim who could never be French [pause] why do they think or even say that? I want to be real French Muslim woman [pause] not pretend woman.

Interviewee S’s story is a bit different. He described how he was not criticized for learning French, but currently experiences difficulties from some native French over his love of French television. He said:

I love to watch French television. When I come here I not watch Arabic television [pause] only French television [pause] but people laugh at me [pause] people at work say I only watch television [pause] I watch the Farm [pause] to be French and like them [pause] but I do it because I like it [pause]
I love French television. I not like Arabic television now [pause] it not French [pause] it not good television.

Essentially deculturalization forces individuals to abandon their self-identity and become what Kramer (2000) calls robots, robots mocked for trying to be like the dominant culture. Kramer (2000) uses the metaphor of the robot to describe the “model minority” posited by Kim, an immigrant who will conform to any order without question. This robot lacks independent thought, or dialectical reasoning. Due to the irrationality of complete conformity without contestation, a “model minority” does not exist, just like a rational and analytical robot does not exist. Thus, newcomers are forced to mimic a dominant culture. This process of copying or mimicking the dominant culture is not easy, and it can cause personal stress and be detrimental to an individual’s self-identity. The detrimental effects to a person’s self-identity are evidenced in the following interview excerpts.

Interviewee A described her deculturation as “a difficult time for [pause] a time when I did not think I was French or Muslim. French people laugh at me for try act French [pause] I ask what am I? French [pause] Muslim [pause] Algerian [pause] all [pause] or uh not one.”

Interviewee Q said she still does not know who she is, even though she has lived in France for 30 of her 47-years. She said:

Interviewee B explained how she does not think people in France will ever accept her as truly French. “I speak French and English. I intelligent woman [pause] I want to be French [pause] but when I speak French people laugh [pause] when I say I French people say I not French. If I not French [pause] what am I?”

Deculturalization leads to a decreased sense of self in many newcomers. Kramer (2003) argues Gudykunst and Kim still follow the thinking of Adler (1987) and claim:

the experience of stress consequent of encountering cultural difference as a “disease,” to be cured by adaptive development (the elimination of difference through assimilation). Such a decultured universal person will not only escape being maladjusted but “rise above the hidden forces of culture” and “overcome cultural parochialism” by “approaching the limit of many cultures and ultimately of humanity itself” (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, p. 366).

By abandoning all previous cultural traits and habits, individuals are forced to become part of the dominant culture, and therefore attempting to function better in that culture, without the constraint of their previous cultural milieu clouding their judgment (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997: 2003). The creation of robots following a new culture without question destroys multiculturalism, minimizes individuality and gives the dominant culture overwhelming political and cultural power. As stated by Murphy and Esposito (2003):

One group has the power to demand that all others abandon their cultures. As part of this process, some are compelled to suppress their language and heritage and even alter their physical appearance. Those who reject this
process of inferiorization are ostracized from society (p. 36-37).

Unfortunately many Muslim immigrants still try to culturally adapt, even though they will lose their culture. Ultimately, these Muslims and other minority groups choose to try and adapt, even though they may lose who they are and have no sense of self-identification because of hopes of elusive equality and “upward mobility” (Murphy & Esposito, 2003, p. 37).

I contend deculturalization should not be an absolute proposition or ultimate goal within cultural adaptation, not only is it impossible, but it is morally unjust. Instead, individuals should have the ability to choose whether or not they want to be deculturized individuals, quasi-deculturized individuals, or not deculturized at all. Allowing individuals to choose whatever level of their previous culture they want to retain will enhance cultural adaptation/assimilation theory by making the theory more accepting and encompassing. The result of this deculturalization modification will assist cultural adaptation/assimilation theory in relating to more individuals and aid in the theory’s general acceptance.

Multiculturalism in assimilation

Aside from deculturizing individuals, a key logical proposition of assimilation theory is the absence of multicultural backgrounds being brought into the process of cultural adaptation. Multiculturalism itself is a contested term, with various scholars and governments disagreeing on a practical definition. I choose to use a definition of multiculturalism from political science because cultural adaptation as advocated by Gudykunst and Kim (1997; 2003) inherently implies not only a social hierarchy, with the dominant culture dictating culture to immigrant groups, but the theory could also
serve as a theoretical argument behind governmental policies pertaining to culture,
and citizenship. Guttmann (1993) defines multiculturalism as “the state of a society or
the world containing many cultures that interact in some significant way with each
other” (p. 171).

The cultural adaptation/assimilation process does not make allowances for
multicultural upbringings. This fact is evident in the enculturation and deculturation
stages of cultural adaptation. In the enculturation stage, the development of children
into a cultural milieu is clearly defined and outlined, but it does not effectively
address the impact a multicultural upbringing has on children. Specifically, a
multicultural background adds another variable, or “property of a thing that may be
present in degree” (Dubin, 1978, p. 44). With the cultural mosaic of many nations in
constant flux, and with more multicultural families developing, the enculturation
stage of assimilation should address the socialization process of these children, who
are enculturated into more than one culture at a time.

Furthermore, the deculturation stage, like enculturation, does not consider the
variable of multiculturalism. Cultural adaptation assumes individuals will completely
abandon their cultural norms in both private and public lives, and in turn adopt only
one culture, the dominant culture. Newcomers must adapt entirely and have only one
culture because according to Gudykunst and Kim (1997; 2003) individuals are
incapable of learning one culture while at the same time maintaining another, a zero-
sum argument. Through their reasoning if a person learns one thing, they must
unlearn another thing, this logic does not take into consideration the cognitive
complexities of the human brain (Kramer & Ikeda, 2000).
Since, individuals are able to be cognitively complex, many will temporarily abandon or ignore certain cultural habits in public more than when in private, in an effort to fit into the dominant societal order. This practice of occasional/temporary public adaptation while maintaining traditional cultural practices is common within the Muslim-French community. In particular, many first and second-generation Muslim immigrants to France will speak French in public, and Arabic in private, wear Western clothes in public, traditional clothes in private, and negotiate familial relationships as they think French families do in public, but retain a traditional Islamic family hierarchy in private.

Interviewee AD, a 47-year old Algerian born Muslim woman described how while she teaches the younger generation of women in her family to hijab and follow other Islamic traditions, she also teaches them they need to speak French in public and not Arabic, which is reserved for home use only. She explains this decision in the following exchange:


Croucher: Pourquoi ils doivent parler seulement français l'en public?

Interviewee AD: “I follow the Koran but I know in France I need to speak French when with the public. I teach daughter and nieces that they need to know Arabic for home but when French people near they need to speak only French.”

Croucher: “Why do they need to only speak French in public?”

Interviewee AD: “French people they like French words. If daughter and nieces speak French life it not hard it more easy people accept them more.”

An Algerian male concurred with Interviewee A when he asserted,

I teach son Muslim women Muslim women they speak French. When uh when speak in public. In home they speak Arabic many. No Arabic in public it show they not want be French. No Arabic at home it show they uh not want be good Muslim.

Both of these participants exhibit a public and private self, dependent upon whether they are in public or not in public. As they attempt to negotiate these two identities or roles, they reveal how many Muslims will publicly appear to be culturally adapting in order to make life “easier” or to become more “French.” The act of acting one way in public and another in private demonstrates how many
newcomers are “passing” for members of the dominant culture (Rainwater-McClure, Reed & Kramer, 2003). This negotiation demonstrates the cognitive complexities of these individuals. While they have learned the French language, they are still able to retain their Arabic and to teach successive generations the same practice. Moreover, many Muslims in France will also temporarily wear more Western clothing in public and in private wear more traditional clothing.

Interviewee B further discussed her mother’s first visit to France. She described how she encouraged her mother to not hijab in public because of anti-French sentiments toward the hijab (the visit took place in 1990, shortly after the first major controversy in a public school over the hijab/foulard in 1989).

Interviewee B: I tell mother it not popular [pause] it not liked to wear hijab in public [pause] but wear at home [pause] We wear at home to be good Muslims [pause] but in public we [pause] uh choose be good French people.

Croucher: How did she respond to that advice?

Interviewee B: She not like it [pause] she uh say I not good Muslim [pause] I uh must be good Muslim at home and with public people [pause] But I say I be both [pause] good Muslim and good French woman.

Croucher: So you do not hijab in public [pause] but do in private?


This participant clearly reveals the desire to retain native cultural habits, and the tensions caused by not being able to retain these habits. Many immigrants, as
Buenker and Ratner (1992) argue, do not fully abandon their culture. Instead these immigrants choose or attempt to adopt a multicultural being, as they “hold onto their culture in private, but play the role of the good immigrant in public” (p. 201). Thus, the individual becomes multicultural, an unattainable and unvalued status within cultural adaptation theory. Requiring individuals to abandon all cultural traits is flawed. Cultural adaptation/assimilation theory is a Cartesian dichotomy of either/or, either a person abandons who they are, or they must be unhappy or mentally and emotionally retarded. More and more individuals around the world are not only from bi or multicultural backgrounds, but these individuals are capable of cognitive complexity. Therefore, altering cultural adaptation to represent diversity will allow individuals to be multicultural when entering the process, remain multicultural or cognitively complex during all phases of cultural adaptation, ultimately abandon Kim’s theory of assimilation.

Self-Hatred

Scholars have also argued the cultural adaptation process can foster self-hatred because a person is told if they cannot or do not want to adapt that something is wrong with them and they lack the cognitive and emotional skills to “fit in” (Croucher, 2005). As Chun and Choi (2003) argue, the alteration process in which an individual adapts to or assimilates into a dominant culture is not easy: “to gain acceptance, many persons engage in both physical mutilation and cultural evisceration to hide their ethnicity” (p. 78). Persons engage in mutilation or evisceration because individuals who looks and acts differently from the norm, is deemed an outcast by the dominant culture and by themselves (Chun & Choi, 2003).
Many Asian immigrants have surgery to “correct” their eye sockets. Immigrants from African nations have been known to have skin augmentation surgery to lighten their skin in order to better fit into dominantly Caucasian cultures. Three participants in this research project discussed friends and family who have had skin augmentation performed to appear more “white.”


Interviewee AB said:

J'ai beaucoup d'amis [pause] beaucoup d'amis qui uh [pause] qui font beaucoup de choses pour sembler blancs. Une femme elle porte le maquillage pour sembler blanche [pause] et elle teint ses cheveux pour être blonde. Uh [pause] que je pense qu'elle semble ridicule. Elle a des problèmes maintenant avec sa peau [pause] qu'il n'est pas bon maintenant. Elle ne semble pas tunisienne maintenant [pause] elle ne semble pas musulmane maintenant I have many friends [pause] many friends who uh [pause] who do many things to look white. One woman she wears makeup to look white [pause] and she dyes her hair to be blonde. I uh [pause] I think she looks ridiculous. She has
problems now with her skin [pause] it is not good now. She does not look
Tunisian now [pause] she does not look Muslim now.

Interviewee C, a 29-year old Muslim male from Morocco said:

I know men who want be white. They uh [pause] they want look and be white.
I know many who wear makeup in public [pause] who dress and see doctors
to look and be white. It cost a lot of money for them look white.

Other participants discussed how they and others have experienced times in
which they feel ashamed of their ethnicity, physical appearance, language, and other
cultural traditions/habits (once again showing how some individuals are unable to
assimilate). Interviewee D said: “Je souhaite que je ressemble des caucasiens [pause]
mais je ne suis pas blanche, je suis noire [pause] et je n’aime pas le noire.” “I wish I
look like Caucasian people [pause] white [pause] but I not white [pause] I black and I
not like black.”

Interviewee X said, “Il est plus facile en France si vous êtes blanc et [pause]
si non musulman. Mais je ne suis pas blanche [pause] je suis musulman et je ne peux
pas changer ces choses au sujet de moi [pause] qu’elles sont moi maintenant et pour
toujours.”

“It’s easier in France if you are white and [pause] not Muslim. But I not white [pause]
I am Muslim and I cannot change these things about me [pause] they are me now and
forever.”

Interviewee Y equated being North African with being less than human in
France. She said, “si vous êtes le Maghreb [pause] si vous n’êtes pas français vous
n’êtes pas un bon citoyen [pause] que vous n’êtes pas important [pause] je voulez
“soyez important [pause] mais ne pouvez pas être important ou Français parce qu'il le Maghreb.” “If you Maghreb [pause] if you not French you not good citizen [pause] you not important [pause] I want be important [pause] but cannot be important or French because I Maghreb.”

All of these individuals clearly express their remorse and frustration for being who they are, and not what they think they have to be in life. This remorse and frustration is not necessary, and this self-hatred is not healthy (Chun & Choi, 2003; Croucher, 2005). Within the logic of assimilation, the more a person assimilates the more they will internalize the dominant culture’s beliefs and values including the assertion that they are inferior. Therefore, the more “truly” assimilated an individual is, the more they will hate themselves. Ultimately, one of the primary goals of assimilation is happiness. Yet when individuals hate themselves for not being able to successfully assimilating, or are hated by others for trying to mimic the dominant culture, happiness is not fostered. Assimilationists would argue the newcomers are not trying hard enough to fit in, and that is why they have self-hatred, and not satisfaction. However, this is where the fourth criticism of assimilation comes in, the theory’s assumption that mankind is accepting of all individuals who want to be part of a dominant society.

Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism, or the belief that ones culture is superior to another culture is not factored into cultural adaptation theory (Berry & Sam, 1997; Brodwin, 2003; Chun & Choi, 2003; Kramer 2000; Murphy & Esposito, 2003; Oh, Koeske & Sales, 2003; Croucher, 2005). Assimilation assumes if individuals want to become part of a
culture, and hence mimic the culture, the dominant culture will accept their advances. However, as Kramer (2003) asserts persons trying to mimic the host culture may suffer a backlash, “an outsider can actually be rejected as a weirdo for acting and talking too much like the locals” (p. 5).

Interviewee P, a 68 year-old Muslim woman born in Tunisia discussed this backlash. She described how many people said she was mocking the French culture when she tried to speak the French language, and when she tried to wear “more” French clothes. She said:


People laugh at me [pause] they say I do not speak French well [pause] I speak incorrectly, and I must stop. When I speak French [pause] they say I pretend I am French, and I am not French and when I pretend they get mad at me. I also have people mad at me when I wear French clothes. They say you are Muslim [pause] you are black [pause] why do you wear our clothes? You try be French [pause] but you are not French.

Brodwin (2003) adds that some immigrants are called “unworthy,” “dirty,” “strange,” and “stupid” while trying to assimilate into dominant cultures. Interviewee G said, “Je m’appelle un Arabe sale par des personnes dans des rues. Ils ne m’aime
pas parce que je ne suis pas français [pause] je suis musulman.” “I am called a dirty Arab by people in streets. They do not like me because I am not French [pause] I am Muslim.” Another participant, Interviewee T said, “Je connais beaucoup de musulmans [pause] comme moi qui s'appellent stupides et paresseux parce que nous sommes musulmans. Comment allons nous pour avoir l'égalité des droits quand nous nous appelons stupides et paresseux.” “I know many Muslims [pause] like me who are called stupid and lazy because we are Muslim. How are we to have equal rights when we are called stupid and lazy?”

Analyzing the attempts by many African-Americans’ to attain “model minority” status and breakthrough ethnocentrism, McIlwain and Johnson (2003) asserted:

Despite the growing social interaction between blacks and whites in the job market, college classroom, and bedrooms, many African Americans found that indeed what they were told they would gain was not completely realized. They found that even though the new criteria for attaining model minority status promoted by the motto “be like us [whites],” seemed easy to follow; in fact, many whites rejected their advances. Furthermore, blacks had to endure the resulting rejection not only by whites but also from members of their own in-group (p. 119).

Ultimately, as much as many do not want to admit it, ethnocentrism is a pervasive problem in American and in other societies, such as France. Even after having skin augmentation surgery, and taking other steps to alter one’s physical appearance, some immigrants will never be accepted by the dominant culture,
because their skin is a different color, or their body looks different (Horowitz, 1992; Noiriel, 1992).

Not only do many newcomers experience ethnocentrism while trying to culturally adapt, but many also feel the brunt of racism from their own in-group while trying to assimilate (Hing, 1997). The following two Muslim immigrants to France discuss the racism they have suffered at the hand of other Muslims. Interviewee V said, “Les personnes de musulmans [pause] rient de moi parce que je parle français que j'ai les amis français. J'ai les amis français [pause] que je parle français pour être français, mais je ne pas m'oublier suis également musulman.” “Muslim [pause] people laugh at me because I speak French I have French friends. I have French friends [pause] I speak French to be French, but I not forget I am also Muslim.”

Another participant, Interviewee Z said:

Je sais beaucoup de musulmans qui disent ils me pensent ne suis pas musulman parce que je pas hijab [pause] qu'ils disent que je ne suis également pas un musulman parce que je parle français et anglais. Les gens disent que je travaille trop dur pour être français et j'oublie l'Islam, mais moi n'oublie pas l'Islam.

I know many Muslims who say they think I am not Muslim because I do not Hijab [pause] they say I am also not a Muslim because I speak French and English. People say I work too hard to be French and I forget Islam, but I do not forget Islam.

These two individuals, and others interviewed for this project such as Interviewees A, C, F, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, AB, AD and AF all feel as if they
have been mocked by the dominant culture for trying to become more French, while at the same time they have also experienced racism and taunting from other Muslim for trying to fit into the French culture, an “Oreo-effect” (Kramer, 2003) Clearly, their experiences demonstrate how the cultural adaptation process does not take ethnocentrism into consideration.

After examining the detrimental effects of the cultural adaptation process on Muslim immigrants and residents of France, it is evident that total assimilation cannot and should not be an ultimate goal of cultural adaptation. While some level of cultural adaptation is necessary to function within a society, total assimilation is impossible and extremely detrimental to those who attempt it. Negative and violent community reactions to government sponsored forced cultural adaptation policies in numerous countries such as France, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Spain and Israel.

Typically when a government, like the French government takes it upon itself to impose religious, linguistic and other cultural adaptation policies on a minority group, Rex (2000) argues the result will fall into one of four categories. First, some policies will result in the exclusion of immigrants in ghettos, or ethnic enclaves (e.g. Poland under Nazi control). Second, immigrant groups could be seen as a threat to societal order unless entirely assimilated (e.g. Russian peasants under Stalin). Third, society could be divided into two groups, those who are full citizens, and those who are denizens without political rights (e.g. Hmong in Southeast Asia). Fourth, as in the case of the United States before the Civil Rights Act was approved, multicultural policies could be regarded as a political process “which minorises minority groups and marks them for inferior treatment or for special forms of manipulation and
control” (p. 69). Immigrant populations do not normally support such government policies.

Ultimately, the case study of French-Muslims and Muslim immigrants reveals all four of Rex’s categories. Due to economic reasons and discrimination Muslims have been in many cases delegated to ghettos. The right-wing political parties regularly paint the Muslim population as the root of social problems in France and calls for their full assimilation or removal in order to alleviate potential threats. Many Muslims are denied full rights as citizens, such as religious expression in public schools and in workplaces. Last, current policies such as Law 2004-228 inherently single out Muslims and to a lesser degree Jewish males (since many wear a yarmulkas) as needing to quit proselytizing in public schools and at work, even though this is not the reason these two groups wear any religious symbols to school or work. The ultimate effect of failed French-Muslim cultural adaptation is more than just self-hatred, and a poor standard of living. Those who are unable to successfully and completely adapt, the overwhelming majority, also experience confusion over their identity. However, when their sense of self is challenged, as was the case in the November 2005 riots, their identity becomes salient enough to lead many to riot in the streets of France. The following chapter examines identity further, by offering theoretical definitions of identity, identity formation and identity maintenance. Then, the chapter utilizes transcripts from interviews with Muslims in France to demonstrate the potential effects of cultural adaptation on identity.
CHAPTER 5

Identity Negotiation and Maintenance

The following chapter defines identity, and applies the concept of identity negotiation to Muslims living in France. Specifically, this chapter details how the veil or hijab is intertwined with Muslim identity. The first section offers definitions of identity, and defines identity negotiation theory as posited by Ting-Toomey (1993). The second section applies the tenets of Ting-Toomey’s theory to transcripts from interviews conducted for this analysis. The final section of this chapter argues identity negotiation theory, and other communicative theories of identity maintenance or negotiation, are inadequate representations of identity or how an individual negotiates or attempts to control their identity as such theories do not recognize the importance of cultural variability; furthermore such theories do not recognize negotiation that takes place before interpersonal or intercultural communication. The last section incorporates Heidegger’s concept of dasein, as well as phenomenological consciousness to reveal the importance of the “pre-negotiated self” in understanding an individual’s attempts at controlling, not negotiating their identity.

Identity

Identity, or an individual’s self concept is built on cultural, social and personal identities (Lustig & Koester, 2003). Hall (1992) asserts there are three approaches to the study of identity. The first approach coming from the Enlightenment period sees identity as a relatively fixed, and static sense of self. This sense of self is immune to outside influence. The second approach places emphasis on the social construction of reality or symbolic interactionsim. The third most recent approach views identity as
an open and constantly changing form of self. A fourth approach that needs to be added to this list comes from the Hermeneutic and Phenomenological schools of thought, that identity is a form of consciousness. A person is not always aware of his/her identity. It is not until his/her identity is challenged, that he/she becomes conscious of this unconscious perspective. This fourth school of thought will be detailed further in the end of this chapter.

It is from the third approach that Ting-Toomey developed her identity negotiation theory. Ting-Toomey (1993) states identity is “the mosaic sense of self-identification that incorporates the interplay of human, cultural, social and personal images as consciously or unconsciously experiences and enacted by the individual” (p. 74). Within this definition of identity, Ting-Toomey differentiates between human, cultural, social and personal images or identities. Cultural identity is an individual’s sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group or culture. Personal identity is a conglomeration of the personal differences that make each member of a culture unique (Triandis, 1989).

Carbaugh (1996) explains that cultural identity stems from three different, and often complimentary idioms: biological identity, psychological identity, and cultural identity. Biological identity is best equated with a “blood quantum,” such as with Native American tribes, where an individual must have blood that contains a certain amount of Native American blood in order to be “part of the tribe” (Carbaugh, 1996). Psychological identity refers to an individual’s personal psychological traits. Carbaugh uses the example of someone being a bit neurotic, depressed or obsessive, and identifying himself/herself with film director Woody Allen. The third idiom for
Carbaugh is cultural/social identity. This idiom is where individuals identify themselves with a group based on shared habits, norms, rules or customs. All three of these idioms often overlap and can in some cases contradict one another on first analysis. However, the key to these three idioms is that each human being has a unique self-identification.

A personal difference, the idea that each human is unique in his/her own way, yet also similar in many other ways, is similar to Heidegger’s concept of *dasein*. Heidegger (1969) defines *dasein* as being there, human being, or being human. The key word in all three of these definitions is “being.” He often spoke of the “*dasein* of man” or the being of man. This being (*dasein*) encompasses our tangible body, and our more abstract sense of self, the sense of self that can only be understood by the individual. This existence places us in our own minds and in turn aids in our placement of ourselves into the social world and in our development of a social identity. Overall, the place or time when being shows itself is Heidegger’s *dasein*.

Social identity involves different connections individuals have to particular social groups within their culture. Ting-Toomey (1993) argues the negotiation of social identity is integral to effective intercultural communication competence. She states there are eight assumptions that make up her identity negotiation theory, or the effective negotiation “between two interactants in a novel communication episode” (p. 73). Gudykunst and Kim (2003) identify Ting-Toomey’s eight assumptions as:

1. everyone has multiple images concerning a sense of self; 2. cultural variability influences the sense of self; 3. self identification involves security and vulnerability; 4. identity boundary regulation motivates behavior; 5
identity boundary regulation involves a tension between inclusion and differentiation; (6) individuals try to balance self, other, and group memberships; (7) managing the inclusion-differentiation dialectic influences the coherent sense of self; and (8) a coherent sense of self influences individuals’ communication resourcefulness. (p. 121)

Ting-Toomey (1993) asserts these eight assumptions are all integral parts of the identity negotiation process. The first assumption is that humans carry multiple images of themselves, some of these images are articulated, and others are not (Ting-Toomey, 1993). Articulated images of self are aspects of ourselves that we emphasize when our sense of self is challenged, or when we want to assert ourselves as a distinctly identifiable person. On the other side of the self-image continuum are unarticulated images, unconscious images or ways of living our daily lives and maintaining our self-identification. Unarticulated images generally are enculturated into young children during their socialization into their native cultural milieu.

Turner (1987) states the process in which individuals maintain and frame their self-identification is shaped through communication, re-creating, affirming and enhancing our self-identification with others. Turner (1987) adds individuals can and often do have multiple selves, because of competing role demands, and societal norms. For example, an individualistic woman might have a different self when at home, as opposed to when she goes to a job with primarily collectivistic individuals. This dichotomy between collectivism and individualism makes up an integral part of the second assumption of the identity negotiation process, that cultural variability influences self-identification.
As Geertz (1973) argues, whether discussing self-identification, or our particular worldview, the logic and meaning we attach to these processes are culturally bound. Essentially, culture serves as one of the, if not the most important influencer of how we evaluate our sense of self, and how we analytically differentiate between our private and public selves. One dimension of culture that has received a great deal of attention in intercultural communication research is the individualism and collectivism continuum. Numerous studies have discussed the cultural differences between a collectivistic and an individualistic culture, the following is a collection of only a few references (Goffman, 1963; Hall, 1980; Hofstede, 1980; Gallois, Giles, Jones, Cargile & Ota, 1995; Chang & Holt, 1997; Gudykunst & Kim, 1997; Gudykunst, 2004).

Individualism is the tendency of individuals to emphasize individual identities, rights and needs over group identities, rights or needs (Triandis, 1990). Hofstede (1991) conducted research on numerous nations around the world and identified the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands cultures as ranking high on the individualistic side of the continuum. In an individualistic culture an autonomous self is emphasized by individuals (Ting-Toomey, 1993). It is this autonomous self that governs how individuals think, feel and act in an individualistic culture. The independent self-construal of individuals in an individualistic culture leads to individuals seeing themselves as agents of their own actions (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Collectivism on the other hand is the tendency of individuals to emphasize group identities, rights and needs over individual identities, rights and needs. In a
collectivistic culture what is best for the ingroup, or the group that shares the same
values and beliefs as the individual, is best for the individual. Hofstede (1991) and
Hall (1989) identified Columbia, Panama, Ecuador, China, Venezuela and Japan as
collectivistic cultures. Members of a collectivistic culture make decisions based on
their connection within a group. Thus their identity is interconnected with their
normally prescribed societal, familial or cultural role or status. This
interconnectedness (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) is also known as an interdependent
self-construal, where the self is dependent upon the norms and explicit and implicit
expectations placed on an individual by his/her group.

The third assumption postulated by Ting-Toomey (1993) is that “our self-
identifications involve both structure and process, and that while the structure of our
self-identifications reinforces our sense of existential security, the change process of
our self-identifications promotes existential vulnerability” (p. 81). Essentially, our
sense of self-identification is intrinsically linked to our feelings of security and
vulnerability. If individuals are secure in their sense of self, then their identification is
stable; if they are insecure, their identification can become threatened and cause
distress or even depression.

The fourth and fifth assumptions of identity negotiation pertain to how
individuals are motivated to communicate in order to reinforce their identity
securities or to reinforce identities through boundary regulation (Ting-Toomey,
1993). These boundary regulations lead to the needs for inclusion or differentiation.
The placement of boundaries around identities creates a zone of comfort or separation
between the individual and in and outgroup members. In a collectivistic culture
boundary regulations are associated with loyalty and mutual face protection for the ingroup.

The sixth assumption states effective identity negotiation depends on how successfully an individual can negotiate the dichotomy between inclusion and differentiation, and between self and other. This balancing act, according to Ting-Toomey (1993), represents how individuals must constantly negotiate their motivation for inclusion into or differentiation from the dominant culture. This negotiation is a difficult act, since inclusion and differentiation are not distinctly different processes in many cultures. In fact, in many cultures there is no difference at all between inclusion and differentiation (Gadamer, 2003). In regard to differentiation and inclusion Gadamer (2003) added:

> [l]ife is defined by the fact that what is alive differentiates itself from the world in which it lives and with which it remains connected, and preserves itself in this differentiation. What is alive preserves itself by drawing into itself everything that is outside it. Everything that is alive nourishes itself on what is alien to it. The fundamental fact of being alive is assimilation.

> Differentiation, then, is at the same time non-differentiation. The alien is appropriated. (pp. 252)

The need for inclusion is similar in rational to Tajfel’s social identity theory and Brewer’s optimal distinctiveness theory.

Tajfel (1978) defined social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to the
membership” (p. 63). Essentially, when an individual is part of a social network, whether in an individualistic or collectivistic culture, he/she will have a social identity that will reinforce his/her personal identity and increase his/her sense of inclusion in the surrounding culture. These groups become salient to an individual, and lead to a more positive self-identity for the individual.

Similarly, Brewer (1991) argues social identity comes from the tension between human needs for validation and similarity. He states:

The idea that individuals need a certain level of both similarity to and differentiation from others is not novel. In general, these models assume that individuals meet these needs by maintaining some intermediate degree of similarity between the self and relevant others. Social identity can be viewed as a compromise between assimilation and differentiation from others, where the need for deindividuation is satisfied within in-groups, while the need for distinctiveness is met through intergroup comparisons…Instead of bipolar continuum of similarity-dissimilarity, needs for assimilation and differentiation are represented as opposing forces. (p. 477)

A balance between an individual’s need for differentiation and his/her need for inclusion is vital to successful social identity formation and negotiation. This balance is regulated by whether the individual is part of an individualistic or collectivistic culture, or has an independent or interdependent self-construal. Individualistic cultures emphasize the distinct differences between differentiation and inclusion, while collectivistic cultures focus more on how these two sides of this dichotomy can be complementary. For an independent self-construal, the balance
between inclusion and differentiation is one where an individual feels belonging to a group and independence from the group as well. An interdependent self-construal balance depends on feelings of group security and harmony (Ting-Toomey, 1993). Overall, the needs for inclusion and differentiation both serve important roles in maintaining an individual’s sense of coherence and self-worth.

The seventh and eighth assumptions of identity negotiation theory assert an individual’s balancing of the inclusion differentiation dichotomy affects his/her sense of coherence and self-esteem. Thus, this balancing impacts one’s cognitive, affective, and behavioral resourcefulness. Coherence, according to Ting-Toomey (1993) and Antonovsky (1987), has three components: comprehensibility, manageability, and meaningfulness. Comprehensibility is the extent to which an individual sees his/her self-identification as making cognitive sense. Manageability is the feeling that sufficient resources are available for the individual to adequately maintain his/her self-identification. Meaningfulness, which Antonovsky states is the most important component, is the extent to which life and a person’s self-identification makes emotional sense. While there are going to be rough times in life, these times are still worth engaging in because a person’s sense of self is emotionally important and relevant.

Self-esteem, according to Ting-Toomey (1993), is a cultural creation. As children we are all enculturated into what makes a “good” or a “bad” child. This enculturation develops in children the sense of self-esteem because we do not typically want to be the “bad” child. Furthermore, children are taught at a young age that they are important, that they are special and worthy of life. Thus, children, and all
individuals for that matter need self-esteem in order to understand and appreciate their place in society. Gadamer and Hegel would argue self-esteem is a form of consciousness that all individuals innately have, and because it is innate, they are not always conscious of its existence. Not only are individuals not always conscious of their self-esteem, but also self-esteem as studied in cross-cultural comparisons has been found to have different meanings dependent upon the culture(s). Self-esteem might be more of a folk belief, and less of a universal cultural norm (Sandel citations).

Ting-Toomey (1993) adds that a person’s sense of global self-esteem consists of personal and collective self-esteem. Personal self-esteem refers to our ability and habit of experiencing positive and negative emotions. Collective self-esteem relates more specifically to identity or identities that are tied into social membership in different social groups.

The more effectively someone can negotiate the security and vulnerability dichotomy, as well as the inclusion-differentiation dichotomy, the more likely they are to have a heightened sense of self-worth. This heightened sense of self-worth will strengthen his/her identity and create a more positive sense of self.

Along with the eight assumptions, Ting-Toomey outlines 20 propositions, all of which assist in explaining the identity negotiation process. These assumptions can be grouped into three main categories (a) those pertaining to self-identification, (b) those dealing with the security/vulnerability or inclusion-differentiation dichotomies, and (c) those examining resourcefulness of communication, affect, or behavior.

Four of the propositions (1, 2, 8, 9) pertain to self-identification.
Proposition 1: “The more secure we are in self-identification, the more open we are to stranger interactions.”

Proposition 2: “The more vulnerable we are in self-identification, the more anxiety we experience in stranger interactions.”

Proposition 9: “The more secure we are in self-identification, the higher our global self-esteem.”

All three of these propositions propose our security or vulnerability of self-identification affects how we interact with others and view our selves.

Five of the propositions (3, 4, 5, 6, 7) relate to two identification dichotomies, inclusion-differentiation and security-vulnerability.

Proposition 3: “The higher our security need, the more vulnerable we feel in encountering strangers.”

Proposition 4: “The higher our inclusion need, the more value we place on relational/ingroup membership boundaries.”

Proposition 5: “The higher our differentiation need, the more distance we place between self and other, and/or ingroup and outgroup relationships.

Proposition 6: “The more effective we are in managing the security-vulnerability dialectic, the more resourceful we are in identity negotiation with others.”

Proposition 7: “The more effective we are in managing the inclusion-differentiation need, the more resourceful we are in identity negotiation with others.”
Collectively these propositions assert the more secure we are with our self, the more likely we are to feel self-assured, and more successful at negotiating our identities.

The remaining eleven propositions (10-20) all pertain to our communicative, affective, cognitive and behavioral resourcefulness.

Proposition 10: “The higher our personal self-esteem, the more resourceful we are in approaching strangers.”

Proposition 11: “The higher our membership esteem, the more resourceful we are in approaching strangers.”

Proposition 12: “The more motivated we are in approaching strangers, the more likely we seek out communication resources to deal with strangers.”

Proposition 13: “The greater our cognitive resourcefulness, the more effective we are in identity negotiation.”

Proposition 14: “The greater our affective resourcefulness, the more effective we are in identity negotiation.”

Proposition 15: “The greater our behavioral resourcefulness, the more effective we are in identity negotiation.”

Proposition 16: “The more diverse our communication resources, the more effective in interactive identity confirmation.”

Proposition 17: “The more diverse our communication resources, the more effective in identity coordination.”

Proposition 18: “The more diverse our communication resources, the more effective in interactive identity attunement.”
Proposition 19: The more diverse our communication resources, the more flexible we are in co-creating interactive goals and relational contexts.”

Proposition 20: “The more diverse our communication resources, the more effective we are in developing mutual identity meanings and comprehensibility.”

Each of these abovementioned propositions will serve as a lens for analyzing interview transcripts that detail active and passive identity negotiation among Muslims in France.

Ultimately identity negotiation theory asserts “the more secure individuals’ self-identifications are, the more they are open to interacting with members of other cultures” (Gudykunst & Kim, 2003, p. 121). Not only are individuals more apt to interact with members from other cultures, but also successful identity negotiation establishes and preserves ethnicity. While identity negotiation theory does include this argument, it does not take into consideration patriotism during a war for example. When a nation is at war, such as the US and the war on terror, ethnocentrism can be a very visible and pervasive byproduct of “secure individuals” not wanting to interact with members of other cultures.

Ethnicity comes from the Greek *ethnikos* and the Latin *ethnos*, meaning a nation or race (Petersen, Novak & Gleason, 1980). There are many different ways to define ethnic and ethnicity, and each definition has some similar and unique elements. The following definitions are only a sampling of the many ways to define ethnicity. Ethnicity can be based on race, religion or national origin (Gorden, 1964). Ethnicity can be viewed as “those individuals who identity themselves as belonging to the same
ethnic category” (Giles & Johnson, 1981, p. 202). Gadamer (2003) states identity, or a sense of place in the world, which can be deemed ethnicity, understanding oneself in history. Blumer (1986) sees memories of a shared past and/or collective memory as the key elements of a person’s ethnicity. Ratcliffe (2004) states ethnicity can be regarded as either primordial (based on recognized facts of history) or as situational (dependent upon context). Petersen, Novak & Gleason (1980) assert ethnicity is a multifaceted concept that includes an individual’s race, language and region, all of which are integral to the formation and maintenance of an ethnic identity within an ethnic group.

Yinger (1994) outlines three ingredients to defining ethnic groups:

1. the group is perceived by others in the society to be different in some combination of the following traits: language, religions, race, or ancestral homeland with its related culture;
2. the members also perceive themselves to be different; and
3. they participate in shared activities built around their (real or mythical) common origin and culture. (p. 3-4).

The difficulty in defining ethnicity with one succinct definition (this researcher does not think such a definition exists or should be postulated due to interpretation and context) also makes it difficult to succinctly define an ethnic group. While Yinger has three ingredients to an ethnic group, Fenton (1999) adds five categories that define an ethnic group: (1) urban minorities, (2) proto-nations or ethno-national groups, (3) ethnic groups in plural societies, (4) indigenous minorities, and (5) post-slavery minorities. Even these categories as argued by Ratcliffe (2004) oversimplify and stick individuals into only one category. Ultimately, for the
purposes of this research project, an ethnic group will be defined following the
definitions set forth by Ratcliffe (2004) and Petersen, Novak and Gleason (1980), as a
group of individuals who consider themselves to be part of the same group based on
their feelings of unity based on their race, language and region.

The importance of an individual’s identification with one, or multiple ethnic
groups cannot be underestimated. Not only does ethnicity affect how people view
themselves in regard to the surrounding culture (Gudykunst, 2001), it is also closely
related to ethnolinguistic vitality (Van den Berg, 1992), media portrayal of
international affairs (Rivenburgh, 2000), political acceptance of immigrants
(Hargreaves, 1995) and immigrant acculturation (Gudykunst, 2001; Gudykunst &
However, while ethnic identity and relation to a specific ethnic group is important to
many individuals, Tuan (1998) states ethnic identity does not always equal the
maintenance of ethnic traditions. Many newcomers to a culture will maintain a level
of ethnicity from their original culture, while still adopting ethnic traditions and
practices from the new surrounding culture (Levine, 2004).

*French-Muslims identity negotiation and formation*

I decided to use Ting-Toomey’s (1993) identity negotiation theory as a model
for analyzing the identity negotiation and formation of Muslim immigrants in France.
To facilitate this analysis, I used the six assumptions of identity negotiation theory, as
posited by Ting-Toomey (1993)...

The first assumption of Ting-Toomey’s identity negotiation theory is that all
individuals carry different images of themselves, which can be articulated or
unarticulated (1993). Unarticulated images are ones that are unconscious to the individual, while articulated images are ones that come to our attention when called into question by others or by a communication event. This is when an individual forms their initial sense(s) of self-identification.

To explore the issue of articulated or unarticulated self-identification I asked the French-Muslim participants questions about their identification. I wanted to ascertain their sense of self-identification (if they had one), if that identity was expressed through the hijab (for women and men), if their identity had changed in the wake of recent anti-Muslim rhetoric, how they negotiated their identities in private and public, did they perceive a French identity as different from their own? To address these issues I started off a sequence of questions about identity with the same question in the majority of my interviews: “Do you have an identity or ethnicity and what is it?” I included both identity and ethnicity in this question because in the French culture and language the term identity does not have the exact same connotation as in the American culture and English language. The French language has the term *ethnie* to denote individuals bound by racial, cultural, and sentimental ties, a synonym for identity or self-identification.

The following interview excerpts are the results of that initial question about *ethnie*. Each excerpt reveals how the concept of *ethnie* was first not very clear to many of the participants, since identity is generally unconscious (unarticulated) to most French people, since all people in France are “French,” and not a hyphenated identity. France does not keep official statistics of ethnic identification. In fact, the French census does not include a question about ethnicity, since all French people are
considered French under the guises of the law (Roy, 2005). Knowing this fact, further questioning was necessary to ascertain the participants’ sense of *ethnie*. After further questioning the participant stated their *ethnie* or identity was linked to where the individual was born, whether that person was born in France or not in France. Interviewee A said, “I not understand the question. What you mean? I born in Algeria [pause] I Algerian, that easy.” Interviewee AA said, “I not know [pause] I born in Paris, well I [think] I French.” Interviewee G said, “*Je pense que je comprendre [pause] Je suis née en Tunis [pause] je suis Tunisienne*” “I think I understand [pause] I was born in Tunis [pause] I am Tunisian.”

Each participant except Interviewee H did not immediately answer the question, since the other participants having grown up in either France or a North-African nation have never been introduced to the concept of a conscious self-identification. Unlike other participants, Interviewee H, who was born in Britain, said her identity was not linked to where she was born. Interviewee H said, “I am British, and I am Muslim. I am a British-Muslim woman.” When the participants were further asked if their *ethnie* was at all linked to Islam or France (if they were not born in France), many participants elaborated on whom they think they are, and with which social, cultural or ethnic groups they see themselves relating to in France, their articulated self-identification.

Interviewee A said, “yes I born in Algeria [pause] but I also French woman. I also Muslim.” Interviewee AL, a 24-year-old male born in Tunisia said, “I many *ethnie*. I Muslim man born in Tunisia, and I now French citizen who work and uh [pause] live in France.” Interviewee AF said, “I born in Algeria [pause] I Algeria, and
I French [pause] and I Muslim. I many,” Interviewee S, a Libyan born male concurred and said, “I am France, and I am Libya [pause] and I am Islam. I many people in one.” Every single participant identified themselves with their nation of birth, where they live currently (they all live in France) and as Muslim. Thus their identification is multi-dimensional, deriving from their birthplace, current citizenship nation and their religion.

The second assumption of Ting-Toomey’s (1993) identity negotiation theory is that cultural variability impacts the locus of self-identification. One of the key cultural variables as argued by Ting-Toomey is the individualism-collectivism continuum. Individualistic cultures typically encourage individual identity over group identity, while collectivistic cultures normally emphasize a “we” identity over an “I” identity (Hall, 1989; Gudykunst & Kim, 1997; 2003).

France, unlike most Western nations generally follows a collectivistic mindset (Jandt, 2000; Croucher, 2005). Hofstede (1991) placed France in the middle of the individualism and collectivism continuum. The emphasis on “Frenchness,” the emphasis on all citizens following and upholding a French ideal and the staunch governmental disregard for ethnic differences reveals a tendency toward collectivism, as opposed to nations like the US and England that emphasize and encourage ethnic and cultural differences. France is an aggregate of individuals. Moreover, the Muslim faith, lends itself toward a more collectivistic mindset (Roy, 2005) because it encourages the importance of community and family more than the individual and personal achievement (Aslan, 2006). This difference between the French ideal and the Muslim community it the essence of racial conflicts between Muslim and non-
Muslims in France. The Muslim community emphasizes family and community more than non-Muslim French. This emphasis also places great importance on the concepts of obligation and honor to family, concepts, which are more a part of the Muslim moral than non-Muslim.

In numerous interviews participants suggested their self-identification as linked to the identification of their family and community. For many of the Muslims in fact, they identified their family and community as France. Interviewee AL, from Tunisia said, “I [pause] and family, we French. We live in France [pause] and we uh speak French, so we uh [pause] we uh French who go to mosque and be Muslim.”

Interviewee F, an Algerian woman described her sense of self as being given to her by her family and by the state. She said:


I am Muslim [pause] but [pause] my father and mother [pause] we were born in Algeria and now we live in Paris. We are French my father and the government said because we pay taxes. So [pause] we are French.

Another participant, Interviewee AN a Moroccan born male further elaborated on how his family, like so many other Muslim immigrant families are French because they live and work in France. A key word in his discussion of his identity is the term “we.” In four sentences he used the word “we” to refer to his family and community six times. He said
My family, we uh [pause] all come to France together. We uh [pause] live

together, we all French together. Friend families like me, work and uh live in
France. We work in France, so [pause] we work and buy things, we French.

Other participants further emphasized this “we” mentality, when answering a
question about their personal ethnie, not the ethnie of their family. Interviewee C
said, “we live in Paris, family and me. We French family.” Interviewee T said, “nous
sommes Français, ma famille et moi” “we are French, my family and me.”
Interviewee M said, “nous avons une famille, et [pause] nous sommes Françaises
maintenant parce que nous habitons en France” “we have a family, and we are
French now because we live in France.” The “we” mentality of these Muslim
immigrants to France reveals their connected selves. According to Ting-Toomey
(1993) in a collectivistic culture an individual’s identity is linked to moral standards
and norms of their social group, which is often their family. Collectivists see the
nation as a great family (Japan and China); while France generally sees the state as
the other (Croucher, 2005).

Furthermore, collectivistic cultures generally reveal more of an interdependent
an interdependent self-construal includes:

attentiveness and responsiveness to others that one either explicitly or
implicitly assumes will be reciprocated by these others, as well as the willful
management of one’s other-focused feelings and desires so as to maintain and
further the reciprocal interpersonal relationship. One is conscious of where
one belongs with respect to others and assumes a receptive stance toward
these others, continually adjusting and accommodating to these others in many aspects of behavior. (p. 246)

Therefore, our self-construal, particularly an interdependent construal of self affects how we process our self-view and how we interpret the self-presentations of those around us. In a Muslim community, like those in France, participants described how their self-identities are not only linked to their community (“we”) but also how they are conscious of where they belong in the community and how they adjust to please the community. Interviewee B, a Muslim woman who was born in France of Algerian parents said:

I learn as child who I am. I uh [pause] learn from mother and from father that I live in France and I am French. I French today and do things to look French to family and community [pause] because that what community want of me. I change if community change, that life I think.

From a different perspective, that being a non-native born French citizen, Interviewee Q described how she taught her children to be like their community and family, which both continually strive to be French. She said:

I teach my children [pause] I teach my children they are French children. They do things to be like other Muslim children that live today in France. That important, it [pause] important that they be in community and look and be French. That [pause] who they be.

Overall, the collectivistic nature of the Muslim-French community greatly impacts their sense of self-identification. This group/community is more apt to refer to themselves within an ingroup by using “we” instead of “I.” The usage of “we”
reveals the interconnectedness of this community and the interdependent construals of self. Moreover, the more connected an individual is to their group/community, the more likely that person is to feel secure in their sense of self-identification. This sense of security is integral to Ting-Toomey’s third assumption.

The third assumption of Ting-Toomey’s identity negotiation theory is that humans need security in their sense of self-identification. Furthermore, individuals regularly experience vulnerability in their sense of self-identification, especially when their self-identification security or sense of completeness is challenged. Too much security in self-identification can bring boredom, while not enough security can create depression and self-questioning. Individuals learn how to balance feelings of identity security and vulnerability from family and peer/support groups. Typically, at least as found within the Muslim-French community, Muslims did not learn they have a specific cultural, ethnic, social or personal identity that they should be proud of and that this identity should be differentiated from other social groups. This identity is found more on a subconscious level. Thus, many participants voiced concern and depression over not knowing how to negotiate the security/vulnerability dichotomy set forth by Ting-Toomey (1993). In fact, when French-Muslims were asked if they learned to defend or alter their identity based on threats or a sense of security, many said they had never been taught, by their family or peer/social group, how to manage such a task.

In the following interaction, Interviewee AH and I discussed her ethnie and if she knew how to alter it or protect it from questioning or challenges. When asked if her family taught her about her ethnie she said, “we not talk about ethnie or who we
are when I child. We uh [pause] not talk of what we are.’’ I then asked her if she could be something other than French. She replied, “we French now and if I not said be French by people [pause] I not know what I be.’’ I then asked if she had ever been told she was not French, and she described one incident and how she reacted to it. She stated:


From this interview it is clear that this woman did not have the cognitive or emotional resourcefulness to respond to this attack against her identity. She did not say anything in response to his statements and instead was confused by his assertion. In the end of the statement she even questioned her identity by saying “that correct I think?’” Clearly, she had not been taught the skills to respond to identity vulnerability, and she is not alone.

Interviewee B, who was born in France to Tunisian parents discussed how a few months before our interview in the summer of 2005 she was told in a store by a friend that she was more Tunisian than French. She said:

I shop and on phone I say to friend I and [pause] other French people think same about issue in newspaper. French Catholic friend in front me [pause] she said where you born? I [pause] say France. She said [pause] where were your parents born? [pause] I say Tunis. She said you Tunisian not French, you only
French citizen, but I more French than you are, that what people think she said. I not understand why she say that to me. I always think I French. After we talk at store, I uh [pause] think maybe I not French [pause] maybe I Tunisian. But I born in France. I not understand that, it hard today to understand that.

Interviewee AA expressed a similar story. His girlfriend’s father told him that he was Libyan, and not a “real” French person. He said:

her father [pause] he say to me I Libyan because my mother and my father, they born in Libya and come to France after married. I explain I born in France and I never go to Libya. He say you Muslim from Libya not French for my daughter. I not understand [pause] what he mean I not French? I think I French, but he older man than me, maybe he correct, [pause] I not know.

In both of these examples, the participants voice how vulnerable their identities are, because they both question who they are after a communicative event. Both participants said they think they are French and that the person questioning them might be correct in questioning whom they think they are. In both of these cases the interviewees did not respond to the other individual, nor did they leave the communicative event with a more secure sense of self. The inverse happened, they left with a more vulnerable self-identification. However, not only is the security of an identity questioned in one on one interaction, but many of the interviewees expressed times when they have felt as if their sense of self-identification has been challenged by French media or politicians.
Three of the interviewees discussed how they, the Muslim community, have been called not French, and a problem for “true” French people. Interviewee C said:

I do not like it when there is election in France. Politicians on right [pause] they uh say there is Muslim problem. That we Muslims, that we uh not French, we different. I not like and I uh not understand what they say. I citizen of France, I uh [pause] vote, what they think I not French?”

Another participant, Interviewee R said political rhetoric is increasingly anti-Muslim and more exclusionary of Muslims from French culture. He said:


It is not good today. Many politicians, [pause] they say Muslims are not real French people and Muslims are a problem to the state. I not understand this, [pause] we work hard, [pause] we vote, [pause] we pay taxes, but [pause] we are not French? Do they want Muslims to not be with Christians? Do they want to have Muslim separate from other people? I am very confused.

These Muslims clearly see that some politicians want to exclude them from the perceived “true” French populace. However, in the midst of this rhetorical exclusion and differentiation, these Muslims are unsure of how to react and how to
defend their self-identification. Unfortunately, political rhetoric is not the only form of exclusion taking place, participants asserted media coverage of the European Union referendum and stories related to Muslims are slanted to exclude Muslims and deny their sense of self-identification.

Interviewee AB described how media coverage of the European Union referendum in France has focused too much on the potential entry of Turkey into the European Union and the growing Muslim population in France. She said:

*les nouvelles en France, ils disent que la France a trop de musulmans et si la Turquie entre dans l'union européenne là sera plus de musulmans ici et les musulmans ne sont pas le vrai français. Les nouvelles indiquent également les travaux de Français de prise de musulmans. Je ne comprends pas ces arguments. Nous sommes les vrais français et nous aîmons la France. Mais, peut-être ils ont correct, peut-être nous ne sont pas de vrais Français s'ils ne nous acceptent pas.*

The news in France, they say France has too many Muslims and if Turkey enters the European Union there will be more Muslims here and the Muslims are not real French people. The news also says Muslims take French jobs. I not understand these arguments. We are real French people and we love France. But, maybe they are right, maybe we are not real French if they do not accept us.

Interviewee AJ said he is tired of news commentators reporting only negative things about the Muslim community. This male Muslim who lives in Clichy-sous-Bois, where riots broke-out in October 2005 said:
when I watch television, reporters on television, they uh [pause] only talk about bad things in Muslim world. Only talk about crime, not about good. One reporter, he said [pause] Muslims are problem to real French citizens. My family say we French but maybe we not French. Maybe [pause] it best Muslims not be here [pause] I not know answer.

Interviewee H, who was born in Britain said the French media paints the Muslim population as the enemy in order to sensationalize the news and to make viewers feel as if they are the chosen French people. She stated:

I do not like French news [pause] or media. They like to say Muslims are the root of all of the social problems in France. It is easy to do, [pause] because most of France agrees with them. When the media says the Muslim “visitors” [pause] are the reason we have unemployment and crime they uh [pause] make non-Muslim French people feel happier because they [pause] are the supposed “chosen” people. It makes me very angry, but I know who I am, I was taught to be proud I am Muslim [pause] and I am proud I am a Muslim woman.

She further added that she learned how to deal with challenges to her identity as a child in London and commented on how most Muslim in France do not know how to defend their identity. She said, “many other Muslims here do not understand Muslim pride, [pause] because they have fallen into a [pause] trap of being French. I know I will never be French, [pause] but most Muslims can’t just accept that [pause] and give up.” Her upbringing in Great Britain and not in France or a North African nation sets this woman apart from the rest of the participants. She grew up in an
individualistic nation, not a collectivistic nation, or a nation with collectivistic tendencies like France.

The lack of resourcefulness in responding to challenges to identity is not stupidity on the part of the Muslim population. It is instead a byproduct of their identity being more of a subconscious entity, and less of a conscious phenomenon, at least until challenged. When identity or *ethnie* is something that is taken for granted and not thought about consciously it is easy to not develop appropriate coping mechanisms for dealing with identity challenges, similar to Freud’s concept of maladjustment. Yet, many Muslims in this community used our discussions to bring to consciousness their sense of self-identification and to differentiate themselves from the non-Muslim French population.

The act of using communication to reinforce secure identities and to reduce vulnerability over an identity is the fifth, sixth, and seventh assumptions of Ting-Toomey’s (1993) identity negotiation theory. Ting Toomey asserts individuals partake in communication to also inadvertently identify boundary regulations, which reveals their conscious and subconscious sense(s) of self-identification. Boundary regulations bring forth certain communicative behaviors that enhance an individual’s need for inclusion or their need for differentiation. Boundaries are both visible and invisible zones that can protect from or encourage outside influence, and or reinforce internal influences within the individual. For example, the seeking or not seeking of affirmation from others is a boundary, and so is choosing or not choosing to follow social norms set forth by an ingroup.
For members of an individualistic culture, boundaries are likely to be associated with individual traits, habits, norms or attributes. For members of collectivistic cultures boundaries are typically associated with loyalty to an ingroup, mutual face protection and ingroup commitment (Ting-Toomey, 1993). Moreover, the dichotomy between inclusion and differentiation depends on a balance between self, other and group membership. Thus, an individual in negotiation whether they want more inclusion or differentiation must determine which is more important at any given moment, the self, the other or their group membership.

The overwhelming majority of the Muslims interviewed for this project expressed a desire to be included as part of the French culture. They also discussed how they want to retain some level of difference from the French culture. A physical symbol that embodies this desire for inclusion and differentiation is the Islamic hijab. Muslims want to integrate, which unlike how Gudykunst and Kim (1997; 2003) equate with self-extinction or homogenization, integration retains differences so there is something to integrate (Kramer & Ikeda, 2000). As previously discussed, the act of hijab, or veiling has questionable historic precedence, is a highly debated issue within the Muslim community, and is a clear, visual representation of the cultural clash taking place between Christian France and its Muslim immigrant population (Croucher, 2005). Many of the women interviewed for this project hijab: out of the 27 women interviewed 23 hijab, while the remaining four did not decide to stop hijab until after they attended at least one semester of college/university.

Both the women who hijab and those who do not asserted the hijab is an important part of who they are. The hijab symbolically includes the Muslim women
who wear it into Muslim culture while at the same time differentiates them from French-Christian culture. Those Muslim women who choose not to hijab are also differentiated from traditional Muslim culture. Moreover, the hijab for many Muslim women interviewed for this project, can be used as a fashion accessory that they perceive as assisting in their inclusion into what they see as a “hip” and “trendy” French culture. However, a recent ban against the wearing of the hijab in French public schools has brought the hijab under the political, judicial, religious and cultural microscope of scrutiny. The following excerpts from interviews conducted with French-Muslim women and men reveal the importance and precariousness of the hijab as a representation of Islam. Furthermore the following section is divided into three sections, the veil as integral to Muslim female security and identity, the hijab as a way to publicly show “Muslimness,” and the hijab as controversy as indicative of the conflict between Christianity and Islam.

For many of the Muslim men and women the hijab is important for Muslim female security and identity. For women who hijab, the hijab offers security from the outside world. This security also protects their sense of self-identification because they do not feel as if their self-identification is ever challenged. Interviewee I said:

The veil [pause] or the act of hijab is a way to protect women from the outside world [pause] and it also is way for women to protect themselves from other people who could dishonor them. It uh [pause] make women safer.

The concept of security from the outside world while wearing the hijab was further explained by Interviewee AF who said:

When I hijab [pause] I in public feel safe. I feel [pause] like people only see
people only see what I want them to see. I am free to walk, and people, people they uh [pause] move for me to walk and I not worry people stare at my body because [pause] I hijab.

Other female participants called the hijab a “shield” (Interviewees A, B, D, P, Q, T, V, AD). Interviewee B said, “quand j’huiab, j’ai un bouclier” “when I hijab I have a shield.” Interviewee Q said “I am shielded, protected when I hijab, I am free to be [pause] woman in public with hijab.”

Other female participants equated the hijab with a “shroud of protection” (Interviewees F, G, J, Y, AF). Interviewee J said, “I have shroud in public. I uh [pause] have protection from men, people and world with hijab.” Interviewee F said, “j’ai une monture de la protection comme Jesus Christ avec le hijab” “I have a shroud of protection like Jesus Christ with the hijab.” The fact that this participant includes Jesus Christ in her description is probably a reference to the shroud of Turin, the cloth in which Christ was wrapped in after his crucifixion. Essentially this interviewee is asserting the hijab protects her like the shroud protected the body of Christ before his resurrection as told in a Biblical tale. I assume this interviewee was trying to relate the hijab to a reference point that most Caucasian-Americans or French will understand, that being the tales of the Christian Bible.

Even males discussed the power of the hijab to protect and shield Muslim women. Interviewee C said, “I think hijab make city safer [pause] it make city better for women.” Interviewee R concurred and stated “I feel good when wife wear [pause] hijab because [pause] men not see all her and she not need feel unsafe in public or on the street.” Interviewee AI said “my daughter and granddaughters they hijab and
While many Muslims perceive the hijab as protecting them from the outside world, and protecting them from scrutiny, this protection also weakens their ability to respond to threats against their identity. Thus, when their identity is challenged, they do not have the resourcefulness to respond to the challenge(s). This failure to develop an effective response is similar to individuals not being inoculated against the flu or other viruses. When an individual receives an inoculation they receive a weakened form of a virus, in order to encourage their immune system to develop antibodies to the virus. Without this inoculation a person will generally become more ill when they contract the virus. It is the same with the hijab and defending our self-identification. When an individual is not prepared for this ideological dialogue/battle, the consequences will more than likely be greater than if they were prepared beforehand.

A few participants addressed this point, of not teaching French Muslims a conscious self-identity as children. Unlike perspectival cultures, which are encouraged to “find” themselves, magic and mythic cultures (like Islam) are not encouraged to “find” themselves. There is not need to do this. It is not within a magic or mythic lexicon. Thus identity crises do not generally exist. They said they are now beginning to remind and reinforce in their children and younger family members that they should be proud of their Muslim heritage, an effect of interaction with perspectival culture. This emphasis on increased Muslim pride is a new phenomenon in France, and will be discussed further at the end of this chapter. Interviewee AF said, “I teach family [pause] that it good to be Muslim man or Muslim woman. We
need be proud [pause] happy we Muslim. Follow Islam and [pause] be proud.”

Interviewee C said, “I teach children to be proud Muslims [pause] to uh [pause] follow Prophet and not be ashamed.” I asked one participant why some members of the Muslim community in France have begun to teach their children to be proud of their Muslim heritage and he responded:

[W]e need be proud today [pause] Islam not safe in France. Many French people, they uh [pause] not trust Muslims. They uh [pause] think all Muslims [pause] all Muslims terrorists. We not all terrorists, not many Muslim terrorists. We need be happy to be Muslim now to be together [pause] more now because we need together now community.

One way in which the Muslim community in France has begun to show their togetherness is through the public wearing and supporting of the hijab in response to Law 2004-228. The hijab is an evident, and highly symbolic representation of Islam (El Saadawi, 1980). This symbol of Islam, which did not appear in the Muslim ummah (community) until approximately 627 C.E., is considered a defining element of modern and historical Islam (Aslan, 2005). For many women in France, and throughout the world for that matter (Nashat & Tucker, 1998; Hawkins, 2003), the act of hijab or veiling identifies or labels a woman as Muslim to the rest of the world. Throughout my interviews with men and women in France, all asserted the hijab is Islam, and thus helps them be Muslim because the veil to this particular population represents the becoming of Muhammad’s wife and becoming a mother of the ummah, a very magic symbol. The act of putting on and taking off a hijab is not contingent,
but rather a transformative process, a difference French non-Muslims do not understand.

Initially, men and women voiced how the act of hijab helps women become the wife of Muhammad. In fact, Aslan (2005) described how donning the veil or *darabat al-hijab* is a synonym for “becoming Muhammad’s wife.” Interviewee AB described this process of becoming Muhammad’s wife. She said, “*quand je porte mon hijab j’exécute un acte que les épouses de Muhammad ont exécuté. Je deviens son épouse sur terre*” “When I wear my hijab I act like the wives of Muhammad acted. I become his wife on Earth.”

Numerous other women also detailed how the hijab brings them closer to Muhammad. Their feelings of closeness and connection with Muhammad is detailed by Interviewee B said:

> [W]hen I hijab I feel good. I feel [pause] near Prophet. I know I can remove hijab, but [pause] when I wear I show other people that I with him. I teach daughter to do same thing [pause] to show love for Prophet and hijab.

Interviewee J equated her wearing of the hijab with the wearing of a wedding ring. She said:

> it custom [pause] it normal for women and men to wear ring after they married. I wear hijab, it [pause] like ring with Prophet. I not have ring from Prophet. I uh [pause] have ring from husband. Hijab uh [pause] say I respect, that I uh [pause] follow his word.”

Interviewee L discussed how the closeness she feels to the Prophet is a beautiful way to live her life. She said:
I love husband and I love Prophet. I uh [pause] not think I have choose one as more or other. They uh [pause] different. But I say when I hijab that I uh [pause] beautiful woman and I uh modest and [pause] safe woman. Hijab is beauty it uh [pause] beautiful relationship.

Interviewee S described how he thinks his wife has more than one husband, him and the Prophet. He said:

I have wife choose to hijab [pause] or no hijab. She say yes to hijab [pause] and people know she Muslim and [pause] know she respect Prophet and she his wife here. She part of [pause] many wives here. I love her and Prophet love her also.

Another male, Interviewee AL added that not only does the hijab represent a connection with the Prophet; but also when a woman does not hijab she is empty of the Prophet’s love. He said, “when woman hijab [pause] she be with Prophet. When she not hijab [pause] she not with Prophet. She not have love of Prophet. She uh [pause] have space with nothing in it for Prophet love.”

Aside from the hijab representing the becoming of the Prophet’s wife, participants also said it represents their transformation from a woman into a mother within the umma, or Muslim community. Interviewee G said:

Quand je porte un hijab je suis l'épouse de Muhammad et je suis une mère à ma communauté. Les femmes vertueux hijab et seulement une femme vertueuse devraient être une mère. Donc, un hijab m'aide à montrer ma vertu et à être un bon exemple pour ma communauté.
When I wear a hijab I am the wife of Muhammad and I am a mother to my community. Virtuous women hijab and only a virtuous woman should be a mother. So, a hijab helps me show my virtue and be a good example for my community.

A male participant, Interviewee AN further elaborated on this point and said he is appreciative when he sees a woman in the umma who hijabs and feels very torn and angry at women who do not. He describes his anger and frustration:

I respect women to make decision. But when I have children [pause] I want my children to learn and watch women [pause] who hijab and not women who not hijab. Hijab show honor [pause] and respect for community. No hijab [pause] it uh not show respect and love.

The hijab has become more than a representation of a woman’s devotion to the Prophet Muhammad, or her commitment to her community. For many men and women in the Muslim community, and outside of the Muslim community, the hijab has become a symbol of the growing conflict between Islam and Christianity. For many Muslims it represents a way of life, and a symbol that shows their religion. To many non-Muslims in France it represents the disintegration of traditional French cultural values and norms. The following excerpts from Muslims and from non-Muslims all explicate this cultural divide, or cultural misunderstanding between Muslim and Christian France.

Interviewee J said the hijab is a very controversial symbol in France and she said it is increasingly evident that the non-Muslim population dislikes the Muslim population. She said:
People in France they not like Muslims today. People in France they not understand hijab. They see hijab they think Islam bad and we not develop like they do like we not good like them. They say Christians better than Muslims. I think it hijab is a thing of Islam people see and hate.

Interviewee AM, when he described a recent incident in a French hotel where he was refused service because his wife wore a hijab, further stated these sentiments. He said:

Je rendais visite à ma famille à Dijon et un garçon à l'hôtel n'aiderait pas mon épouse et moi. Il a aidé d'autres. Je lui ai demandé pourquoi il nous a ignorés et il a dit que je ne sers pas les musulmans sales. Si vous voulez le service enlevez son hijab et agissez français

I was visiting family in Dijon and a clerk at the hotel would not help my wife and me. He helped other people. I asked him why he ignored us and he said I do not serve dirty Muslims. If you want service remove her hijab and act French.

Other Muslim interviewees voiced similar stories and described similar feelings. In particular, Interviewee V discussed how her daughter and grand daughters are not allowed to practice their religion in school because of anti-Muslim feelings. She said:

Ma fille et mes filles grandes ils ont beaucoup de problèmes en France aujourd'hui. Ils ne peuvent pas porter le hijab au travail ou à l'école. Ils ont
My daughter and my grand daughters they have many problems in France today. They cannot wear the hijab at work or in school. They have rules in school and at the office against the hijab because French people do not like the hijab and do not like Islam.

Interviewee Q claimed the anti-hijab feelings of many French people are based on misunderstood stories and history. She said:

[M]any people in France not understand hijab. They [pause] uh think hijab bad [pause] but it not bad. It part of history and women choose to wear it. It [pause] not something French people understand [pause] so they say it bad and hate Muslim women who hijab.

Other Muslim women also used similar language. Interviewee A said the French population is “confused.” Interviewee H said many French non-Muslims are “simply racist and attack what they don’t understand.” Interviewee Q added “French think hijab oppress Muslim women [pause] but French people oppress also and oppress and not understand.”

Overall, most in the Muslim community equated policies against the hijab such as the 2004 ban on wearing religious symbols in schools, and other private regulations as results of not wanting to understand Muslim culture, an expression of French perspectival modernity. On the other hand, non-Muslim French citizens said the recent passage of anti-hijab policies and anti-Muslim rhetoric has nothing to do
with a lack of understanding, just a desire for Muslims to identify with the French
nation. Interviewee AP said:

Je comprends ce qu'est le hijab et pourquoi les femmes musulmanes le
portent. Je veux que les femmes musulmanes soient françaises, elles habitent
en France, elles doivent agir plus françaises, et ce des moyens qu'elles doivent
ne porter pas un hijab et n'être plus modernes

I understand what the hijab is and why Muslim women wear it. I want Muslim
women to be French, they live in France, they need to act more French, and
that means they need to not wear a hijab and be more modern.

Interviewee AS concurred with Interviewee AP and said he does not like
hijabs because they are bringing religion into public eyes and forcing religion on
others. He said, “nous sommes un pays séculaire et quand les musulmans hijab ils ne
sont pas séculaire. Ils doivent apprendre que la France est un pays séculaire et ne
pas un pays religieux” “we are a secular nation and when Muslims hijab they are not
secular. They must learn France is a secular nation and not a religious nation.”

Other non-Muslim participants further emphasized the importance of
secularism. Interviewee AW said “France is secular and Muslims are not, it is simple.
Muslims must [pause] follow French culture and laws. Interviewee AQ said:

La France est un pays séculaire, et a été séculaire depuis la révolution.

Pourquoi les musulmans la pensent-ils est-ils nécessaire pour porter les
vêtements religieux dans les écoles et au travail? Le Koran n'indique pas vous
devez hijab, il indique que vous devez être modeste. Les femmes peuvent être
modestes sans hijab.
France is a secular nation, and has been secular since the revolution. Why do Muslims think it is necessary to wear religious clothes in schools and at work? The Koran does not say you must hijab, it says you must be modest. Women can be modest without the hijab.

One participant, Interviewee AU, a French journalist who writes about minority issues in France and also researches immigrant groups for *Le Monde* (the French newspaper with the largest global circulation) said many Muslim and non-Muslim French do not understand the real issues under debate. He said, “we are secular here and that is France. Muslims can be Muslims but it is not necessary to wear religious clothes in public schools. School is a location to learn and not a location to be religious.”

He further discussed how while many non-Muslims do not understand Islam, that many Muslims themselves do not fully understand why women hijab. He said:

I know many Muslims who say I hijab because Koran says I must hijab. But it does not say women must hijab. It says women need to be modest. I also know non-Muslim French citizens who do think the hijab is forced on women and that women are militant when they hijab. This is not true. There are many misunderstandings and confusions.

In response to these critics’ responses about the hijab bringing religion into the classroom, Muslims asserted the hijab does not force religion onto other people. The hijab allows their women to follow their heart and be a “good” follower of Islam. Interviewee Q said:
Hijab not make other people [pause] want be Muslim. We not want new people to be Muslim [pause] when girl wears hijab in school [pause] or woman hijabs at work. These girls and women [pause] they hijab to be good Muslims. We know France not like religion [pause] but we follow Koran and love Prophet.

Interviewee AN added:


I read this comment about the hijab being a symbol of love, peace and Islam to a non-Muslim participant. Interviewee AV responded with the following statement.

*Si le hijab est un symbole de l'amour, de la paix et de l'Islam [pause] pourquoi je vois toujours les femmes musulmanes avec [pause] un hijab protestant contre le gouvernement? Pourquoi est-ce que [pause] je vois une photographie de l'les femmes musulmanes avec un hijab à la télévision après qu'un bâtiment soit détruit par une bom ? Si l'Islam n'est pas commandé en France [pause] qu'il détruirra la France et nous devons commencer à la commander tôt.*

If the hijab is a symbol of love, peace and Islam [pause] then why do I always see Muslim women [pause] with a hijab protesting against the government? Why do I see the photograph of a Muslim woman with a hijab on television
after a building is destroyed by a bomb? If Islam is not controlled in France it will destroy France [pause] and we must start controlling it early.

The assertion that France must control the spread of Islam early, in the schools, or else face further terrorist attacks and Muslim protests illustrates the conflict over Christianity and Islam, which is represented visually by the hijab. This idollic symbol is Islam and not only represents this struggle, but also as previously argued, it represents an attempt by many Muslim women to follow the Prophet Muhammad and rediscover their unconscious Muslim identity. It is the rediscovery, or the formation of a Muslim identity that the following section focuses on.

Specifically, the following section of this chapter asserts Ting-Toomey’s identity negotiation theory does not take two important factors into consideration: religion, and her framework assumes a conscious identity, when often an identity can be presumed unconscious.

Critique of Identity Negotiation Theory

*Religion is negated*

Within the framework set forth by Ting-Toomey (1993) she does not specifically address the impact of religion. Granted she asserts cultural variables can play a role in how an individual negotiates culture, but not all cultures “negotiate” culture, at least not in the way Ting-Toomey advances. Dependent upon the religion of the culture, or of the individual the negotiation of identity can differ substantially. In some religions (mainly Christianity in the Western world) many followers do not emphasize their religion as their main identification; instead their ethnic or national allegiance is emphasized as the main identification (Hargreaves, 1995).
The emphasis on national identification instead of religious identification in France has historical precedence. France, before the French Revolution was gripped by numerous religious struggles such as the 100 year war, and persecution of religious groups such as the Huguenots. Moreover, in the years leading up to, during and after the French Revolution of the 18th century, religious power was considered something to fear and to take away. Numerous edicts, such as the confiscation and sale of church lands in 1790 (Carlyle, 2002) and the clergy’s oath of allegiance to the French Republic in 1790 (Jones, 1994), revealed the French populace’s rejection of religious control and influence. Into the 21st century, there is still a distinction and separation between church and state laïcité; the French government does not officially recognize any religion, it only recognizes religious groups that promote religion while not disrupting civil order. Therefore, it is understandable that in France, a person’s religion, while it may be important to an individual, is not something the state tracks or even recognizes as an important aspect of public or self-identification.

In the United States this emphasis on ethnic, national and religious identities is emphasized more because an individual routinely has to delineate their identity on questionnaires, census reports, job applications, admissions papers and countless other documents. Furthermore, the US, unlike France, does not have a modern history of secularism, and the separation between church and state is not as delineated as in France.

It is also common within the field of social science research to negate the potential impacts of religion and to instead lump religion into other “cultural variables” such as individualism/collectivism, masculinity/feminity or
independent/interdependent self-construals for example (Kramer, 2002). However, religion is more important than such “cultural variables” since it is in most cultures a building block of civilization and holds a sacred or “magic” power over individuals (Gebser, 1980).

Articles addressing various theories such as identity negotiation theory (Ting-Toomey, 1993), cultural adaptation theory (Kim 1977, 2000), face-saving (Oetzel, Ting-Toomey, Masumoto, Yokochi, Pan, Takai, & Wilcox, 2001) and countless others do not take religion and consider it an important variable; it is ignored. Religion cannot be ignored when analyzing intercultural/cross-cultural communication. As Geertz (1973) posited, religion is an important factor that must be discussed and analyzed because it can greatly alter how one culture functions when compared to another culture.

Consider Islam and Christianity. In most Christian nations (the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Australia, Canada, Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), Christians primarily identify themselves as members of their ethnic or national culture (Croucher, 2005). However, in most Muslim nations (Indonesia, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia) or in Muslim communities like those in France, individual identification is usually intrinsically linked to an individual’s religion. This is not to say individuals in predominantly Christian nations do not identify with their religion at all, but instead their primary identification is usually not religious. Therefore, research needs to address the potential effects of religion on how one group functions in contact or in conflict with another group. If scholars, politicians and citizens knew the facts, understood the religious significance of the
hijab or the Jewish yarmulka, or could predict the potential ramifications of a ban on such symbols, maybe such bans would not be passed so easily, or the responses to such a ban would be better understood. Ultimately, the impact of religion must be addressed. In this study, numerous participants identified themselves by their religion first, and then their nationality. Saying things such as “I am Muslim and I am French” or “I am a Muslim-French woman or man.” This identification is strong, and no matter how often these Muslims hear comments like: “you need to be more French,” “you are French and then Muslim,” or “you can not be French because you are Muslim,” they will not give up their allegiance to Islam. In particular in the wake of the rise in anti-Muslim rhetoric after September 11th, and in the aftermath of the 2004 ban on wearing religious symbols, this community feels their religion is under attack. As long as they perceive their religion as under attack the more pronounced their sense of Muslimness will become and the more apt to be anti-French this group will also become.

Conscious identity assumed

The concept of religion being perceived as under attack brings to light a second critique of Ting-Toomey’s identity negotiation theory (1993), the presumption that all individuals have the lexicon or ability to articulate their identity. Identity negotiation says all individuals negotiate an identity on a daily basis. However, when I started this study I found that discovering an individual’s identity was not an easy task in France. France, unlike the United States does not include ethnicity on its census, and French citizens are not used to filling out numerous forms with their ethnic identification included. This practice is similar across the European Union,
where ethnic differences are not emphasized by national or supernational
governments, like the EU and its member states (Helsinki Federation, 2005).
However, for immigrant groups in these nations they unconsciously or consciously,
do not identify primarily with solely their nation of citizenship (Hargreaves, 1995).
Many immigrants in fact acknowledge their religion as very important to their way of
life (Silverstein, 2004).

Thus, when I went to France I had to find a new way to understand and
explain identity, that being *ethnie*. *Ethnie* is more closely synonymous with the
American ideal of ethnicity or national affiliation. It does not translate directly into a
person’s identity. Therefore, when I would ask individuals their *ethnie* I would
always get “French.” When I would dig deeper and ask with which social group do
you identity, they would then begin to expand their sense of *ethnie* into a more
Western idea of identity.

Essentially, participants have an identity, but like the work of Lutz’ (1988)
work on Micronesia and emotion, they lack the same words used in the United States
or other Western nations to express the concept. It wasn’t until I, the researcher,
explained to them in Western terms that they had an “identity” in Western terms that
they gained the words to articulate that identity within a Western framework. I, and
other researchers like Lutz, Kulick (1998), and even Philipsen (1992) offered them
the means to fit within an ethnocentric Western theoretical paradigm. In essence,
while these individuals did have a sense of self it was not until I challenged it that
they consciously began to think about it.
This concept of consciousness is similar to phenomenology (Kramer, 1997). The following example explains the essence of phenomenology, this example was provided by an adviser of this project, Dr. Eric Mark Kramer. An individual can be standing in front of a stained glass window and not even see the window or the snow falling outside the window until someone hits the window with a snowball. After the snowball hits the window the window and the snow are evident because of the sudden impact and the new conglomeration of snow and stained glass visible to the person looking at the window.

This example is similar to Bakhtin’s “surplus of vision.” Bakhtin asserts that in everyday experience our attempts to make meaning of the world encounter difficulties, especially in relation to remote or obscure phenomena (Morson & Emerson, 1999). The problem is that in trying to bestow meaning on the world around us we cannot envision ourselves from outside it; in order to do so we need another perspective in addition to our own. In other words, we have a unique perspective on the world, but cannot see the other, while the other can perceive things that we cannot see ourselves. So a kind of co-participation is required to see the social totality. Bakhtin links this process of reciprocity to the status of being truly human, since this arrangement facilitates a relationship of dialogue that benefits both parties. However, modernity precludes this development, since in scientific rationality we relate to the other, a subject, as an object; this leads to an impoverishment of human relations. Bakhtin calls this phenomenon a “surplus of vision” (Holquist, 1990). In the case of the interviews, I the researcher brought the issues of identity into the conversation and
gave them meaning. The giving of meaning aided the Muslim participants in seeing their “identity” through a new lens.

The Muslim participants in this study had an identity (typically Muslim) but were unaware of its strength or cogent existence until that identity was explored by an outsider (the researcher), challenged (by anti-Muslim rhetoric or the 2004 ban on the hijab and other religious symbols), or emphasized by a fundamentalist Islamic leader (which has not extensively happened in France as much as in other nations like Iran, Afghanistan and the Palestinian Authority). These events or individuals brought their identity from the subconscious and into their consciousness. Thus, when analyzing Ting-Toomey’s identity negotiation theory, researchers need to be careful of two false assumptions or disruptions. First, not all individuals are able to articulate their identity in the same way as prescribed by social scientific theories. Their identities may be multi-leveled or unidimensional. Yet, their sense(s) of who they are, are still vital and important to their lives and should not be dismissed. Second, researchers need to keep in mind that when exploring issues of identity that right or wrong, the researcher will impact the thought process of the research subject. By asking questions about identity and providing individuals with the lexicon to describe an identity in Western terms, the researcher is affecting the consciousness of the participant. Hopefully this impact is not significant, but it is something researchers should be aware of for future reference.

This chapter discussed the concept of identity and applied it to Muslims living in France. It first offered a discussion of Ting-Toomey’s (1993) theory identity negotiation. Second it applied this theory to interviews conducted with Muslims to
ascertain how Muslims identify themselves in France. Third, it revealed that the act of hijab, or wearing a veil is a contentious issue filled with issues about what is and is not French or Muslim and that the hijab represents the growing conflict between Christianity and Islam. Last, this chapter provided two critiques of identity negotiation theory; the first critique was that this theory negates the potentially profound impact of religion on identity negotiation; the second critique was that identity negotiation theory assumes individuals have the consciousness and ability to articulate their identity in Western terms. Ultimately, the Muslim faith poses an interesting dilemma for social scientists trying to study identity. If the religion is ignored, the research will probably not be as in-depth and not truly grasp the important issues.
CHAPTER 6
Community Alteration from Pressures to Conform

This chapter synthesizes the concepts of cultural adaptation and identity
negotiation with research in language ideology and argues all three of these
phenomena are working together to alter the perceived and physical space of the
Muslim ummah, or community. As pressures to conform to the dominant non-Muslim
French culture mount on the Muslim ummahs, community members perceive their
religious, political, cultural, linguistic, economic and social comfort zones as
shrinking. The hijab and “Islam” have become more than just religious acts or
traditions or words. Instead, these terms and practices have become ideological and
part of a political and cultural discourse that privileges one group (non-Muslim
France) over another (Muslims in France).

To facilitate an analysis of this phenomenon, the following chapter is divided
into five sections. The first section reiterates an earlier discussion on the symbolic
power and ideological power of the hijab. The second section provides a review of
literature on language ideology and expands this research past language to include
symbolic or non-verbal ideologies. The third section examines the importance of
space as a semiotic and intercultural phenomenon. The fourth section illustrates how
Muslims and non-Muslims in France perceive their respective community as
changing because of pressures to conform. For the Muslim ummahs this pressure to
conform comes from the dominant culture. For the dominant French culture, non-
Muslim French participants assert they have had to increase pressures to conform on
the Muslim community to protect the integrity of “Frenchness.” The fifth section
offers a model of this process. This model draws upon intercultural research and research on systems theory. Moreover, this final section will argue for and illustrate this model’s cross-communal or cross-cultural applicability.

Hijab

Earlier in this study, the historical and religious significance of the hijab was explained. This historical analysis revealed how the hijab predates Islam, and has been a symbol of many cultures around the world (the Hittites, the Assyrians, the Jews and the Christians). Furthermore, the historical analysis of this symbol of Islam discussed how the hijab is intertwined with ideology, political, religious, and sexual. Politically, the hijab has been an issue of political debate, oppression and/or liberation in numerous countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, France, Belgium, Russia, and the United States (Abdo, 2002; Brooks, 2002; Burns, 2003; Goodwin, 1995; Kaplan, 2002; Kapuscinski, 2002; Mernissi, 1987; Parshall & Parshall, 2001; Roald, 2001; Smith, 2003; Vollmann, 2002). Religiously, the hijab does not have an established doctrine. Within Islam some imams, or teachers, assert the Koran mandates the hijab, while other imams point to the Koran and argue it does not explicitly say a woman must wear a veil (Caner, 2003). Sexually, the hijab is both a symbol of female oppression and female liberation, all dependent upon a person’s worldview (Croucher, 2005). Chapter five of this analysis revealed that many Muslim women in France view the hijab as a form of liberation, and as a way to defend their Muslim identity and self. Ultimately, this hijab is an important symbol of Islam that is laced with ideology. As a symbol of the Muslim religion its significance should be explored, and I will explore this significance further as a language ideology. A language ideology perspective is appropriate for this analysis because (1) a language
ideology perspective pays attention to ideologies in and outside of a community, (2) ideologies are contentious issues that have been well-addressed by language ideology research, and (3) a language ideology perspective can bring forth counter discourses to a dominant ideology.

Language Ideology

The concept of a language ideology is multifaceted. Various scholars have examined the concept, and defined it slightly differently. Silverstein (1979) defined a language ideology as a set of “beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use” (p. 193). Irvine (1989) asserted a language ideology is a “cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests” (p. 255). When analyzing both of these definitions of a language ideology, there are a few key ideas that need to be examined: speakers’ beliefs about language use, perceived language structure and use, social and linguistic relationships, and moral and political interests. Thus, the following examines these key concepts to gain a better understanding of what constitutes a language ideology. Specifically, this section has the following sub-sections: (1) an examination of the relationship between ideology and language use, (2) an analysis of how language ideology impacts language use and structure, (3) an overview of some key studies in the field of language ideology research, and (4) a discussion of how language ideology research and philosophy can and should be expanded to include non-verbal and/or symbolic ideologies.

Ideology and language use
French philosopher Destutt de Tracy coined the term “ideology” to explain the “science of ideas” and “conquest” taken by Napoleon, and subsequent leaders. Napoleon disregarded this term and considered it trite and of little importance (Woolard, 1998). Later scholars such as Marx and Thompson associated ideology with power, as “a direct link to inhabitable positions of power – social, political, economic. Ideology is seen as ideas, discourse, or signifying practices in the service of the struggle to acquire or maintain power” (Woolard, 1998, p. 7). Ideology can be “our” or “theirs,” signifying the importance of how ideology is regarded and to what ideology individual’s will fall under the control of in life.

When an ideology, may it be political, economic, social, cultural, legal or any other kind innately comes in contact with language(s), decisions are made as to what kind of language to use, how to use the language, what structure the language should follow, and what prestige should be afforded to the language and its users. If a language is in the political, cultural and economic minority, that language will carry less esteem (Kroskrity, 2000) and thus be regarded by the dominant society as less than the language used by the dominant group. This process is clearly evident by looking at the concept of indexicality.

Whenever a text is created, that text can be a verbal code such as a word, a non-verbal code such as a semiotic symbol or a form of media, interpretation takes place (Carroll, 1956). Individuals who produce, and individuals who receive the text to a certain extent interpret the text differently (Barthes, 1972). For example, the text “feminist.” This concept has multiple interpretations, all dependent upon the actors, and context. A “feminist” will be interpreted as a much different phenomenon on a
US Naval submarine, than it would be interpreted in a university sorority house. A Naval submarine, an all male ship, will look at a “feminist” through entirely masculine eyes and interpret it from a masculine perspective, of masculinity over femininity, thus giving males an ideological edge over women. On the other hand, in a sorority house at a university, which is made up entirely of women, the term “feminist” will probably take on a more favorable interpretation. Therefore when the women in the sorority index, or point to a woman dressed in everyday street clothes protesting discriminatory policies, it is not surprising they may call that woman a “feminist.” Thus, indexing that woman and also referring to her with a positive interpretation of what it means to be a “feminist.” However, when the men who work on the submarine see the same woman they will probably not point to her and call her a “feminist,” because she is not the epitome of what these kinds of men perceive as a “feminist.”

Boas (1911) asserts the purpose of a researcher is to examine this relationship between language use and user, since an individual cannot understand their own language use. Language ideology scholars have debunked this philosophy and instead focused on how a group can indeed understand their own language and the surrounding ideologies.

In the case of my master’s research in Montréal, Canada, I observed language ideology at work. Chinese shopkeepers in the Quartier Chinois, Montréal’s Chinatown are in the midst of a linguistic battle. Since the 1977 passage of a linguistic mandate in Québec stating the supremacy of the French language over all other languages, these shopkeepers have been battling with the provincial government
to maintain their usage of Mandarin, and other dialects such as Hakka. In the province of Québec, the French language carries more power, and thus has an ideological edge over other languages (Croucher, 2003). However, in this small community, the shopkeepers are attempting to maintain their ethnic identity and historical language at the expense of the dominant culture and language. Therefore, their (shopkeeper) choice of what language to speak at work is a direct representation of language ideology at work.

Impact of language ideology on language use and structure

To combat and also to facilitate language ideologies, individual groups create ideological representations of linguistic terms. These representations exemplify linguistic differences. Kroskrity (2000) explains how iconization involves the “transformation of the sign relationship between linguistic features (or varieties) and the social images with which they are linked” (p. 37). In the process of iconization, linguistic terms that represent a specific group come to be a direct representation of that group. For example, using the term “feminist,” it indexes a social group, and dependent upon what group in which the term “feminist” is uttered, the term will have a different connotation. This is similar to Richards’s (1936) concept of referent. Individuals who respect feminism will look fondly upon a “feminist.” While those who do not like feminism will think of a flannel wearing, boot wearing woman who does not shave her armpits.

The second semiotic process of ideological representation is fractal recursivity (1998). Fractal recursivity involves the creation of subcategories for different linguistic terms or social groups. Within one outgroup there are numerous ways to
describe that group, and these representations will all come from one original description, and like a crystal in the sun, refract the linguistic terms into different terms with different connotations.

The final semiotic process of ideological representation is erasure. This is essentially the eradication of a linguistic variety. For example, Native American languages such as Cherokee have virtually been erased from the vernacular of many individuals with Native American heritage. Since the days of “Manifest Destiny,” these native languages have been erased when these people have been assimilated into the dominant cultural milieu.

Language ideology in practice

Three studies in particular added to the foundation of this research project. The first study is Silverstein’s (1985) examination of the Quaker’s in 1600s, and their linguistic shift from the use of “thou” to the use of “you.” This shift Silverstein argues occurred because the egalitarian Quakers were in a struggle with the hierarchical British, and the British did not want to follow their linguistic practices, and thus the dominant culture began to use “you” instead of “thou.” Thus, Silverstein says, “thou” fell out of practical use. This study is important to this current project because it reveals the significance of how a community’s language use can change because of outside influence and pressure stemming from ideological bases, such as politics and economics.

The second major work in language ideology pertinent to this study is Kulick’s (1998) examination of tribal life and anger in Papua New Guinea. Kulick found that the language individuals use can hide intent, especially if they are
encountered with someone from an outgroup. Second, he found that anger is looked down upon, because of historical and cultural reasons. For example, villagers consider anger dangerous, in fact deaths are linked in part to past arguments had by the deceased and the living. The link between anger and death represents the magic/mythic nature (Gebser) of the Taiap speakers. Third, he stated language also included semiotic symbols, and non-verbal communication. Fourth, he said Papua New Guinea is in the midst of a language shift from the vernacular Taiap to the more “sophisticated” and accepted Tok Pisin. The Taiap speakers are associated with paganism and more magical forms of religion, since they are a magic/mythic culture. However, as the economy of Papua New Guinea develops, the multitude of different dialects are assimilating to Tok Pisin to have an economic chance at success, and in turn Christianity. His research shows how for ideological reasons, primarily economic, political, and religious, the Taiap language is dying, while Tok Pisin is becoming the lingua franca and the official language of Papua New Guinea.

This example is similar to the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in France. As many Muslim-French from non-French speaking nations find they must adapt in order to become economically viable and politically active, they have begun to adapt to French culture and began to use French as their primary language. While many are still holding on to their native tongues (Croucher, 2005), many others are adopting (by force in some cases) to the dominant discourse because it has become a lingua franca and a requirement for many to achieve employment.

A third language ideology study that helps in an understanding of this current project is Jane Hill’s (1998) examination of the Mexicano-Indian culture. She
analyzed verbs such as honor and found that these terms differ in tribes dependent on the outside influences. Hill found that dependent upon who is in the interaction, an ingroup or outgroup member, the language use would change. As the use of Mexicano as a language decreases as more and more users age and become deceased, the younger generation predominantly speaks Spanish. Hill found that some elders in the community regard the younger generation as having less respect and nostalgia for the past, because they are being taught and speaking Spanish and not Mexicano to one another and to their elders. Therefore, the use of Mexicano is seen as a way to look back on the past with nostalgia. The issue of nostalgia is also important when considering those who practice nostalgia, and those who participate in a counter discourse. Senior men, and middle-aged men who work outside the community are more apt to look back on the “old” days with nostalgia, while the women in the community do not have nostalgia for the “old” days. Poor men who do not look fondly upon the past also share the counter discourse of the women.

A counter discourse is a collection of arguments or a dialogue that takes specific aspects of a dominant, or politically salient discourse and exposes “them to explicit contradiction and, in the most interesting cases, parody” (Hill, 1998, p. 76). The issue of a counter discourse and how it develops is important when trying to understand the debate over the hijab and Muslim adaptation in France. While the dominant culture perceives the hijab as unnecessary and as a form of oppression that must be removed from the public eye, the Muslim community (the counter-discourse) views it as a sacred and historic symbol of Islam.
Language ideology is “a mediating link between social forms and forms of talk” (Woolard, 1998, p. 3). Whether it is Silverstein studying the you/thou dichotomy, or Hill studying honor in Mexicano-Indian cultures, the consistent element across all language ideology studies is the link a form of talk shares with the social/political, economic and other forms underlying the communication process.

**Non-verbal and/or symbolic ideology**

Aside from the emphases on language as a verbal code that can be intertwined with ideological weight, language can and should also be designated and studied as non-verbal or symbolic communication. Carroll (1956) asserts in his analysis of the writings of Whorf that Whorf argued language is more than verbal symbols that identify objects or processes; but language also constitutes non-verbal symbols and semiotic processes (Carroll, 1956). For example, the drawing of symbols in Mayan hieroglyphs, while not verbal, or symbolic representations of verbal linguistic forms. Saussure (1972) further added that language takes many forms including visual symbols and tangible items. Barthes (1964) expanded Saussure’s definition to include the importance of usage and matter in explaining the need, purpose and structure of a language.

The referential and symbolic/semiotic nature and power of language is not limited to verbal codes; this same power and nature can include anything from (just to name a few) music (Back, 1995), campaigns (Heng, 1999), literature (Thiong’o, 1986), and clothing (Barthes, 1972; Noth, 1990). A linguistic ideology perspective does not include all of the dimensions of a language, as it does not pay attention to communicative and non-linguistic non-verbal symbols. I assert the additions of non-
verbal symbols (such as cultural artifacts) into the same framework used by language ideology scholars will enhance the scholarship of language ideology research by allowing it to include under represented communicative forms, such as music, literature, and particularly clothing. In the case of France’s 2004 ban on the wearing of overtly religious symbols in French public schools, members of the Muslim and non-Muslim community have responded differently; however both have asserted the ban is ideological in nature and laced with elements of power, equality and difference. Therefore, I will examine the perceived ideologies behind the passage of the 2004 ban on the wearing of overtly religious symbols in public schools from a language ideology perspective. This analysis includes descriptions of the law and its rationale(s) from Muslims and non-Muslims, along with an analysis of how this ideological debate is framing the conflict between “Christian France” and “Muslim France.”

Space

Along with the symbolic and ideological significance of the hijab and Islam, the spatial significance of the hijab and the Muslim community should also be addressed. Hall (1959; 1966) asserted space or proxemics to be an important facet of human existence and comfort. In regard to a person’s perceived space, Hall and Goffman (1963) identified five different kinds of space: visual, auditory, olfactory, thermal and haptic (tactile) space. Casey (1996) from a phenomenological perspective and drawing on the works of Husserl, adds the concept of “sensation” as another form of space, one that does not include sensory signals, but is something individuals
“begin with.” As members of a community we feel we have a place or a space that is our own, even though we may not be able to describe it or physically touch it.

Casey (1996) further adds “there is no knowing or sensing a place except by being in that place, and to be in a place is to be in a position to perceive it” (p. 18). Since you must be in a place to perceive it, a place cannot be universal; it is cultural, regional, or historical. Thus, in order to describe a place or a space, an individual must experience it, must be a part of the phenomenon and understand the culture surrounding and within the space. Philipsen (1991) found this when he explored Teamsterville. Teamsterville is a blue-collar working community in Chicago. Philipsen found that as Chicago grew and as the younger generation began to leave the community in order to locate better employment and opportunities, that older members of the community felt as though their community was shrinking. Members of the community described their space as becoming smaller and less secure as the community began to change with the times.

In the case of the hijab, as detailed in chapter five of this study, many Muslim women and men perceive it as a protection from the outside world, a physical barrier protecting their space. While many non-Muslims asserted the hijab physically separated the women from advancement into French culture. Either way, whether supporting or not supporting the hijab, its ability to designate a specific place for a Muslim and non-Muslim is a given fact.

Moreover, the conglomeration of the hijab and other Islamic symbols and traditions signifies a specific place for the Muslims community, an ummah that can be both a real and or as Anderson would call it an imagined community (1990). The
following section takes these issues of space and ideology and reveals and analyzes the perceptions and comments of non-Muslims in response to the perceived or realistic existence of Muslim communities or ummahs in France.

French-Muslim and non-Muslim French perceptions

Throughout my interviews with participants in France (Muslim and non-Muslim) three common themes emerged when discussing their respective community’s response(s) to the 2004 ban on the wearing of overtly religious symbols in French public schools: (1) Law 2004-228 and others like it protect France from losing its sense of cultural identity from the growing Muslim population, (2) the Muslim ummahs are shrinking under pressures to conform like law 2004-228, and (3) laws such as 2004-228 lead to increased political, economic and cultural opportunity for Muslims. The following three sections provide interview examples that illustrate these arguments.

Pressure to conform protects France

Following and acting French in order to protect French culture is an argument many non-Muslims posed during interviews. Each non-Muslim participant voiced support for French cultural/linguistic policies and pressures for minority adaptation because they all deemed such policies as protections of French culture and society. Interviewee AY described how minority groups, such as Muslims, need to learn how to become French and to abandon demands for special privileges. She said:

Je ne comprends pas des musulmans. Les musulmans [pause] pensent qu’ils sont différents et [pause] ils veulent des privilèges spéciaux. Je ne pense pas que n’importe quel groupe devrait avoir des droits spéciaux dans une société
comme la France. Notre gouvernement passe des lois pour protéger la France et la communauté musulmane doit s'adapter en France.

I do not understand Muslims. Muslims think they are different and they want special privileges. I do not think any group should have special rights in a society like France. Our government passes laws to protect France and the Muslim community needs to adapt to France.

Interviewee AZ further elaborated on the need for France to pass legislation to protect its distinct culture. He said: “Il est important que la France protège sa culture et la France ne devrait pas permettre à des groupes de minorité de changer sa culture. S'il est nécessaire de passer des lois pour protéger notre culture, c’est d’accord” “It is important that France protects its culture and France should not allow minority groups to change its culture. If it is necessary to pass laws to protect our culture, that’s ok.”

Another participant, Interviewee AQ said legal restrictions against minority groups such as Law 2004-228 and other pressures put on minority groups to act more French are justified because such laws and pressures ensure the future of France and its culture. He said:

I want my children to live in a France that is French and not something different. If France does not protect its culture we will become like other countries that are not pure now countries that have many problems and do not have one idea of what they are as
people. My children and [pause] my grand children must be French and not like minorities.

Interviewee AQ clearly asserts his desire for his children to live in what he deems a “French” France. When he states a “French” France is “pure” and a France with minority influences has “problems” and will not be “pure” he is demonstrating a sentiment shared by many other non-Muslim French participants, racism against Muslims in France.

Another non-Muslim participant also said if France does not pass some cultural protection policies that terrorist sentiment will increase in France among the Muslim community. Interviewee AV said:

The French government must protect the French people from terrorism. To protect the French people from things like terrorism [pause] the government must stop Muslims and other groups from [pause] hurting France. All people in France must be French and not something different or [pause] we will see more terrorism on the French streets. France [pause] it need to control Muslims and watch Muslims.

Watching and controlling the Muslim population is a second important reason advocated by non-Muslims for legal restrictions ad pressures on minority groups such as Muslims. Numerous non-Muslims stated the French government needs to institute more legal and covert control/monitoring of the Muslim population. Interviewee AQ said:

I think government [pause] needs to have more laws that permit government to watch Muslims. I [pause] want to know what they do in the mosques.
Maybe they say bad things [pause] maybe they plan bad things. I do not know. 

I think government and people need to know. We [pause] need to know what they do and say.

Interviewee AA1 added the law banning the wearing of religious symbols in French schools like the hijab teaches Muslims their place in French culture. She said:

When France passed the law [pause] it was to say we are France and not a Muslim nation. Muslims here [pause] must do what is good for France and this law [pause] will make them not very strong and it will [pause] be easier to stop them from [pause] changing France. And it will be easier [pause] to watch the French.

Overall the non-Muslims interviewed for this project shared a few common arguments in regard to their perceptions and feelings about the Muslim population in France. Many of these men and women equated being Muslim with not being French, and specifically used language such as “us” and “them” to differentiate themselves from the Muslim immigrant population. Moreover many members of the non-Muslim group also equated being a Muslim with being a supporter of terrorism and suggested the best way to protect France is to “control” or “watch” the Muslims. Their sentiments have become the dominant discourse in France when it comes to a “Muslim problem.” These sentiments have been further reinforced by far right National Front politicians like Le Pen (Perrineau, 2000).

Ummahs shrinking under pressures to conform

In response to Law 2004-228 and others like it, which shrink the importance, and physical space belonging to the Muslim ummahs, many Muslims interviewed for
this study voiced a counter-discourse, or a discourse that points out contradictions or flaws within the dominant discourse. One of the imams interviewed for this project, Interviewee AJ, described a communal sense of the ummah losing importance within the larger French culture. He said:

It is now happening [pause] in community that many Muslims [pause] many Muslims think community not important to French people now. Law like this [2004-228] say Muslims need to be [pause] need to be controlled when in public. Before such law [pause] it normal to walk in public with woman in hijab. Now [pause] people not feel as comfortable, they uh [pause] prefer to remain home or close to home, not far from home now. They not comfortable or [pause] not happy in public now outside ummah.

His description of Muslims in his ummah as not feeling comfortable outside of their own community is similar to another imam in another city in France, more than 200 miles away. Interviewee AI said:

I know many Muslims [pause] many Muslims who say it not good to be in public now. They uh [pause] not think it safe outside ummah. Many Muslims they think people outside ummah look at them and not like them. Many Muslims think [pause] France want them to be French and not Muslim in public. They now think it better to stay close to home [pause] to be true Muslims.

Imams weren’t the only Muslims who voiced these concerns, of not feeling safe outside of the ummah. Interviewee A, a Muslim woman said, “Je ne veux pas laisser ma communauté parce que les français veulent que je reste dans ma
“I do not want to leave my community because French people want me to stay in my community. They have laws that are anti-Muslim and I do not think it is safe outside of the community.”

Interviewee AF described a recent trip to another part of Paris than her ummah. She discussed how she was very uncomfortable and the other Muslim women she was with at the time said it would be best for them to return home as soon as possible. She said:

We go to other place in Paris and I not like it. I think people there look at me and friends. We hijab in Paris and one woman she say other thing to her friend about hijab we wear. She say it ugly and it stupid and we stupid because we hijab. I say to friends we need go home now. Normally I strong woman but not when there. I not at home there in Paris.

This sense of insecurity is similar to the experiences Philipsen described in his analysis of young boys in Teamsterville. Philipsen (1992) found that when young boys in Teamsterville are on their “turf” they feel comfortable and are more secure in themselves than when they leave their “turf.” When the boys were taken to a different part of town, their verbal and non-verbal practices changed and revealed their insecurities in this new area, which was someone else’s “turf.” However, what is different between what Philipsen found and French Muslims is that the young boys in Teamsterville did not perceive themselves as legally unprotected outside of their community; they did not think Philipsen could protect them from unfamiliar boys or
men. In France, the Muslim community, in particular first-generation immigrants feel increasingly threatened not by strange boys whose “turf” they are violating, but by a French legal system set up to “punish their religion.”

Interviewee Q said, “when I leave ummah I not protect from French law. Law say I not good like French Christian. I worry a man or woman will take my hijab off me.” Interviewee I said, “I afraid for women who leave ummah because laws not good for Muslim women in France now. I think Muslims women need stay close to home now, it not safe outside community.” Interviewee N equated the recent string of “anti-Muslim legislation” to racism and said Muslim ummahs will close themselves to French influence if racism and such policies continue. She said:

People in France racist [pause] they not like Muslims. We uh [pause] are not bad people. I now say to children and grand children [pause] not to have French friends, and to not read French papers or uh [pause] not to watch French television. Muslims must be Muslim now [pause] and not be with France. Keep French out [pause] out of ummahs.

In this passage she not only accuses the French people and government of being racist, but also suggests purposeful Muslim exclusion from mainstream French culture. By rejecting French media and not participating in interpersonal relationships with non-Muslim French she recommends increased Muslim solidarity and a closing of the ummahs to outside French influence. She is not alone in her suggestion.

Interviewee S said:

It is time now [pause] it time now for Muslims to be Muslims and to not be French. Muslims should buy things [pause] you know things at stores [pause]
from Muslims and not French. Not sell things to French in our markets [pause] and not to talk to French now.

Interviewee AN concurred and further suggested Muslims should stop marrying the “French.” He said, “I think if France not like Muslims [pause] have laws not for Muslims [pause] Muslims need not to marry French people. Keep my blood and Muslim blood different and not French.” Interviewees D, M, N, P, W, X, AB, and AI agreed with AN and all encouraged keeping Muslim blood “pure” and “clean” of “French” blood.

Within these three passages two interesting elements emerged, the desire for these individuals to linguistically separate themselves from the rest of France, and the concept of blood purity. By saying we should not be French or sell things to French people they are differentiating themselves from non-Muslim French culture, without calling the non-Muslim population anything but “French.” Furthermore, by suggesting Muslims should not marry and/or breed with “French” in order to keep Muslim blood pure, this particular Muslim male is advocating a biological separation from the Muslim ummahs and the non-Muslim French community. Blood is an important element of culture, since it is considered an essence of a person’s being (Gebser, 1984). In fact in many nations or in many groups blood is a vital requirement for membership. In Germany for example an immigrant cannot become a full German citizen unless they are born in Germany and at least one of their parents moved to Germany before the age of 14 and has a residence permit (Gannon, 2004). In the Jewish faith status within the community is linked to the individual’s mothers side. In Native-American tribes membership, and in many cases state benefits are
contingent upon an individual being able to show a certain percent of their blood is
from a specific tribe (Dixon, 1995). By advocating the biological, economic, political
and cultural seclusion from “French” culture because of external pressures to conform
and perceived racism, the Muslim ummahs are attempting to close their communities
to outside influence, which is a common characteristic of a counter-discourse.

*Increased opportunity*

While many of the Muslims advocated this seclusion in response to perceived
pressures to conform, other Muslims, particularly the younger generation said recent
French laws and acts are meant to expand their economic and political opportunities.
Interviewee AL said the French government and people are trying to make it easier
for Muslims to adapt to French culture by removing some obstacles to adaptation. He
said:

I think [pause] Muslim women need choice to hijab or not to hijab. Many men
not give choice to women in family. Many men [pause] they say you must or
not hijab. Law in school good. It say to girls [pause] you have choice. This
make easier for girls [pause] make easier for girls to become French and get
good job when school finished.

Interviewee AA, who was born in France, agreed with Interviewee AL and
argued the new law against the hijab (2004-228) provides young girls with a choice
and this choice will help them gain independence sooner in France. He said:

I think law let girls choose. What bad with choice? They hijab at home and
not at home. When they [pause] learn to choose it easier for girls to be
independent and not dependent on family for many years. They have better job and go to better school.

While Interviewee H, who was born in Great Britain agrees with Interviewees AA and AL and asserts new policies offer partial choices, she says the biggest benefit is also a disadvantage for the French Muslim population. She described how laws now offer a choice but make them abandon a part of their religion and go against their family in many cases. She added:

it is a double-edged sword. They can become more French, but they risk losing part of their Islamic life. Yes they will [pause] get a better job if they are more French [pause] but at what cost? At the cost of Islam? [pause] at the cost of the family? It does give opportunities but [pause] it takes away a lot as well. But think about it, [pause] if you were Muslim and were told France would let you be French if you stop wearing a veil, [pause] many young people would make that decision.

In her discussion of the decision facing many young Muslim parents and young school children, she emphasized the perceived opportunities or benefits from losing the hijab in school. She also alluded to the rewards as being less than worthy, because in her opinion France has to let someone be French. The French government does have the power to determine citizenship requirements, but if a person is born in France, he/she is French by birth, and they may also be Muslim or some other ethnicity as well. Yet, recent legislation is perceived by many young Muslims as a chance to become more French and to have increased economic and political opportunity. Interviewees A, C, AG, and AO all added to the “opportunity”
discussion. Interviewee A added, “we live in France [pause] we should be French and do what people do in France [pause] and follow French ideas and rules I think to help France.”

Muslims interviewed for this study clearly disagree with the dominant discourse set forth by the majority of the French populace. The Muslims asserted they live in a state of fear, where they are afraid to go out in public because of potential reprisals for simply being a Muslim. Furthermore, this counter discourse also points out how the Muslim population knows they are not welcomed in France and that the French people are “racist” and that the Muslim population must keep the French “out of ummahs.”

Interestingly, shortly after the October 2005 riots, the French government passed legislation that made it easier for the French police to get warrants to search and to place cameras in mosques. The rationale behind this law, and other Patriot Act like rules approved after the riots was to increase the government’s ability to watch/monitor the Muslim population (Graff, 2005). Ultimately, the non-Muslim population in France and the Muslim population are at an impasse. Members of the Muslim communities throughout France perceive the dominant French culture as conspiring to eliminate Islam from France. While members of the non-Muslim dominant French culture perceive the best way to deal with the “Muslim problem” is to place pressures to conform on Muslim communities. In essence, the mounting pressures to conform placed upon the Muslim ummahs and the resistance and animosity from the Muslim ummahs have come together in a process of community alteration. The following section discusses this community alteration by applying a
systems perspective. This perspective is applied to both Muslim ummahs throughout France, and to show cross-cultural applicability to Chinese shopkeepers in Montreal, Canada.

Model of community alteration

In many of the Muslim ummahs throughout France, a relationship is perceived between their language and culture, and the surrounding cultural milieu, and its politics, economics and other factors. This relationship has also been discovered and examined in the Quartier Chinois of Montreal (Croucher, 2003; Croucher 2005; 2006). The connection between cultural symbols and language of communication and the language of communication or cultural habits/norms prescribed by the government is confusing and improper to many French Muslims and Chinese shopkeepers.

Hymes (1974) argues an ethnographer must analyze the entire system in which the communication is taking place. This entails looking at all of the other elements of the communication, the components of the communicative event, the relations among components, the capacity and state of components, the openness of the system, community/organizational subgroups, and the feedback the organization gets from the outside (Harris, 2002). Analyzing all of these elements together to gain a better understanding of the communicative acts taking place in Montreal and in France reveals that the manner in which the minority community talks about pressures to conform is integral to communal identification. Essentially, the linguistic laws placed on the immigrant population inhabiting the Quartier Chinois (Chinese, Laotian, Hmong, Korean and Vietnamese) define their communal living space, and
thus their linguistic space; while laws in place in France and rising racism against Muslims defines the limits of the Muslim ummahs.

Ultimately, the borders of the Quartier Chinois and Muslim ummahs in France are becoming both blurred and more solidified at the same time, linked to generation and economic success. Shopkeepers voiced concern over younger generations giving up their mother tongues, and adopting French or English in some cases as their first language of communication (Croucher, 2003). Many of the shopkeepers argued their linguistic community is shrinking, while younger generations in the Quartier Chinois argue their linguistic community is expanding outside of the Quartier Chinois.

In France, on one hand, many first-generation Muslim immigrants talked about their children forgetting a Muslim heritage, and becoming more French than Muslim. Second and successive generation Muslims, on the other hand, assert they are adapting to French culture because the adaptation is inevitable and the adaptation leads to greater political, cultural and economic success (Croucher, 2005). Younger Muslims perceive themselves as having a choice as to where and how they live. Instead of having to live the same life as their parents, and in the same space as their parents, many within the younger generation see themselves as being able to choose their future and what their religious or cultural space will be. This means that some of the younger Muslim population will leave their learned Muslim space, and join the dominant cultural space.

Blu (1996) discusses how a community can have blurred boundaries, boundaries not officially set forth on a map, but boundaries that are more symbolic or metaphorical. These boundaries can be based on numerous factors such as, to name
only a few, language, culture, and group affiliation (Houser & Ham, 2004). In the case of the first generation shopkeepers in Montreal and first generation Muslim immigrants in France, they recognize their communities have boundaries.

Approximately 15-20 years ago the only languages spoken in Montreal’s Quartier were immigrant languages like Mandarin and Korean for example. However, as linguistic laws have become more solidified, political pressure mounted, economic demands grown, and as children of the first generation immigrants have grown and been educated in the Québécois system, the Quartier has lost much of its linguistic comfort for first generation immigrants. Similarly, in France approximately 10-15 years ago more children understood Arabic and attended Mosque on a regular basis. Now Mosque attendance is down, and Arabic fluency has plummeted among second and successive generations (Croucher, 2006).

On the other hand, the children and grandchildren of the first generation immigrants assert their linguistic and ethnic comfort zone is expanding outside of the prescribed boundaries of their community, and into the dominant cultural milieu. A son of one of the shopkeepers described how his Canadian education and job have opened up opportunities for him economically. “I work for big company here in Montreal. If I still lived in the Quartier I would not have my job, or be part of the Canadian culture” he said. When asked if he was only part of the Canadian culture he responded, “I am in the middle, I am both Canadian or Québécois and Chinese, but I don’t speak Mandarin, that’s all. I still love my culture, but knowing French allows me to be in both cultures at the same time.” Four other children of shopkeepers I interviewed agreed with Zi, and said knowing French expanded their zone of
linguistic comfort. Their imagined community, to use a phrase from Anderson (1991) expands outside the Quartier Chinois, and into the Québécois community/culture.

Second and successive generation Muslim immigrants also explained how they see their chances for opportunity expanding as they become more and more French. One participant, Interviewee AG who went to a French university said, “I speak English and French, [pause] people know I am Muslim. But I am French first. I do not speak Arabic now. [pause] It is not necessary for me now. I have more in life than Islam.” This Muslim and others express their desire for “cultural independence and self-determination,” which is something France and its fear of “a Europe of tribes” will not tolerate (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1998).

I argue when a community has set boundaries, those boundaries may remain the same under external pressure to conform (linguistic, cultural economic, and political) but the imagined boundaries may shrink. The community can experience feelings of isolation, which can lead to a reconceptualizing of the community itself (Amit, 2002; Dawson, 2002; Kempny, 2002) The perceived boundaries of the community may metaphorically shrink for older residents of the community. Yet, as the imagined community shrinks, the same external pressures will open up the borders of the imagined community of younger generations linked to the original ethnic community.

Furthermore, drawing on the work of Giles, Bourhis and Taylor (1977), if an ethnic group has minimal social status, a small demographic presence, and little institutional support, that group will have weakened ethnolinguistic vitality, and therefore a greater chance of perceiving their linguistic comfort zone as shrinking. That group will also be more apt to adapt to the dominant culture or develop more
pride in their ethnic group, as a form of cultural resistance (Khalaf, 2001). I have included a preliminary diagram of this process. (see Appendix B) This diagram cannot grasp all of the variables taking place in this process of community alteration; instead it serves as a snapshot of what is currently taking place in two distinct ethnic communities, in two distinctly different nations on two different continents.

Ultimately, as external pressures to conform to the dominant cultures have mounted in Montreal and in France, the first generation of immigrants have responded through resentment, and through fear of losing their ethnic identity, while their children have in many cases embraced the dominant culture, or in some cases retaliated against the dominant culture into a form of “Asian or Muslim pride.” Clearly, the issue of how these two groups adapt to either Canadian or French culture is an important issue, since their rate of immigration continues to increases in both nations (Croucher, 2005; 2006). An understanding of the effects of pressures to conform, even if the minority group could misunderstand those “pressures,” is imperative to explaining how and why some immigrants will and will not or can and cannot adapt to a dominant culture. If the treatment and subsequent response of a minority community (counter discourse) is not recognized and explored, more riots and other acts of violence or tension could develop in nations that have competing discourses over racial/ethnic relations.
CHAPTER 7

Discussion

The following chapter draws conclusions and analyses from this research project. The first section addresses the research questions posed in the introductory chapter. The second section examines the results of this study to extrapolate two conclusions developing from this study. The first conclusion discusses the changing nature of Islam as a global religion and asserts the importance and influence of religion on French-Muslim cultural adaptation and French-Muslim and non-Muslim cultural interaction cannot be understated. This argument further asserts religion is a fundamental cultural issue that is mistakenly ignored by communication scholars. The second conclusion describes the current state of cultural integration in France and argues cultural adaptation is failing and a new, form of cultural integration and/or fusion is emerging.

Research Questions

The first research question of this study asked: What does the hijab mean to Muslims in France? As illustrated in chapter five of this project, the hijab carries many meanings for Muslims in France. To some of the Muslims interviewed for this project, the hijab represents the religion of Islam. For other Muslims it symbolizes a holy, almost matrimonial bond between a woman and the Prophet Muhammad. Moreover, some participants asserted the hijab is a way for Muslim women to protect themselves from outsiders who might “take away their modesty” and make them less comfortable in public. Still, other Muslims voiced opposition to the hijab, and called it a symbol of masculine oppression, and advocated women having a choice as to
whether they should wear the hijab or not. Ultimately, this analysis reveals that the hijab is multi-dimensional, and that it does not have one set interpretation within this particular population.

The second research question asked: Has the meaning of the hijab changed for Muslim wearers and Muslim non-wearers of the hijab since the French ban was approved? In addressing this issue, many of the participants in this study stated they think more about the purpose and meaning of the hijab since Law 2004-228 was passed. Participants argued this law and perceived mounting anti-Muslim rhetoric and racism has led to a development in “Muslim pride.” Within this sense of “Muslim pride” many Muslims asserted they wear or support the hijab because it is a Muslim tradition that runs counter to French secularism and reinforces a Muslim identity in France. Thus, for many of the Muslim men and women interviewed during this project, the meaning of the hijab has indeed intensified in the wake of the passage of Law 2004-228.

The third research question related to the issue of the hijab and identity. This question addressed: Do Muslim wearers and Muslim non-wearers of the hijab deem the hijab to be a representation of their self-identity? As examined in chapter five, many individuals within the Muslim community said they did not have a strong or vocalized self-identity, at least not until their religion and culture were placed under “attack” by French secularism and legal policies. Many of the participants said after Law 2004-228 was passed that they began to look at themselves in the mirror and realize that they were indeed different from the rest of the French culture. While this group also stated they were always considered different and treated differently, since
Law 2004-228 was passed they have had a common reason to unite as a Muslim community. Uniting in protest to Law 2004-228 and arguing their Muslim selves cannot and should not be excluded from French society brought forth a mainly subconscious, and unarticulated self-identity. Therefore, the hijab has become a visible and tangible way for the Muslim-French community to exclude or to include themselves with the French or Muslim communities.

Research question four addressed the issue of laïcité and asked: Do Muslim immigrants in France believe the hijab can co-exist with the French concept of laïcité, or a separation of church and state? In this case, the hijab served as a symbol for Muslim immigrant adaptation into a secular French state. Within chapter four Muslims discussed how they do not feel welcomed in France because they are different from the French ideal of a citizen. These immigrants look different, many come from North Africa, and they practice a religion very different from the dominant religion in France, Christianity. Due to the religious difference between the Muslim population and the dominant French culture, the participants in this population at least, asserted they currently, and will continue to find it difficult to co-exist with the French concept of laïcité, because their religion is the key differing factor for their group. These immigrants argue it is impossible to exist in France without the influence of Islam. However, they feel pressured to abandon their religion because too much religious affiliation and reliance, they perceive, is considered a weakness and incompatible with French cultural beliefs and norms. Overall, this group claims laws and policies such as Law 2004-228 are a direct attack on Islam and
an attempt by the French government and people to eradicate Islam from the French hexagon, a metaphor for the French state.

The argument that Law 2004-228 is an attack against Islam is the response many Muslims gave to research question five: What reasons do Muslims and non-Muslims attribute to the passage of Law 2004-228? The overwhelming majority of the Muslims interviewed for this project argued the law is a direct, not covert, attempt by the French government and people to remove the influence and presence of Islam within France. Participants called the policy “racist” and directly targeted “toward the Muslim people.” Some Muslims even went as far to say that France does not want the Muslim population and that Law 2004-228 was an attempt to push them out of France, or to make them leave the country voluntary for increased religious freedom.

Non-Muslims, on the other hand, disagreed with the Muslims to an extent, but also reinforced some of the suspicions voiced by Muslims. A few non-Muslims said Law 2004-228 was written to protect secularism, and that it removes all religious symbols, including Jewish and Christian symbols. However, other non-Muslim French said Law 2004-228 is an attack against the Muslim population, and this group provided numerous justifications. First, some non-Muslims said Islam is associated with terrorism. Second, some participants said Muslims must abandon the religion of Islam and become culturally French. Third, non-Muslim participants argued Law 2004-228 and others like it would protect the “purity” of the French race and culture. These three arguments were also used by non-Muslims when addressing research question six.
Research question six asked: Do the majority of Muslims successfully adapt to the French culture? The answer to this question, at least from this study and this researcher’s perspective, is no. The overwhelming majority of Muslims in France do not successfully adapt to French culture for a multitude of reasons illustrated in chapter four. To reiterate these reasons, the failed adaptation is due to Muslim reluctance or inability, and host culture receptivity.

First of all, many Muslims are reluctant to fully adapt to French culture because they perceive this adaptation involving an erasure of their Islamic heritage and culture. Thus, many within the Muslim community attempt to retain their Muslim heritage while also mimicking the dominant cultural milieu. This concept of mimicking has been further addressed in other research (Kramer, 2003; Croucher, 2005; 2006). Many members of the Muslim community also perceive themselves as unable to adapt to French culture. Many of the participants interviewed for this study stated they do not know what they are expected to do in order to be French, are too old to fully learn the language and cultures, and are not welcomed when trying to adapt to French culture. A few of the participants said they are not welcomed in French culture and must remain on the outside looking in. Members of the host culture, non-Muslim French, also described the issue of host culture receptivity. Every non-Muslim French person interviewed for this study said the Muslim population must act more French, but each person also said France will not accept their advances. Non-Muslims said the Muslim population is “too different” to become French, they look different, eat different foods, and practice a different religion. One participant said he would never consider a Muslim to be a French citizen (Interviewee
Clearly, if the Muslim population does not have the willingness and/or ability to adapt to French culture, and if the French culture will not accept their adaptation advances then Muslim cultural adaptation will be generally unsuccessful in France. Instead of adapting and becoming part of the French culture, many members of the Muslim community are emphasizing the importance of their Muslim communities or ummahs, and withdrawing from mainstream French culture. The result of this withdraw signals a closing of the Muslim community from the rest of France, which will most likely lead to isolationism and increased cultural misunderstandings.

After analyzing the results of the six research questions, and examining the common trends that emerged within chapters four, five and six, there are three conclusions that develop from this work. The first conclusion examines the concept of Frenchness, and asserts Muslims and non-Muslims in France are in the midst of an identity transition. The second is that religion as a cultural variable is an important variable that should not be ignored. Specifically in regard to the Muslim faith, religion is the most important cultural factor. Furthermore, Islam is in the midst of a transformation, from a magic religion to a mythic religion in response to aperspectival cultural pressures. The third conclusion pertains to the failure of French-Muslims to culturally adapt to the French culture. In particular, this conclusion argues what is happening in France is a conglomeration between forced compliance and cultural fusion. This conclusion also illustrates the reasons behind non-Muslim-French refusals to allow Muslims to become culturally French.
Conclusions

French Identity Crisis

France is in the midst of an identity crisis. France has a strong sense of “nation” that goes all the way back to the French Revolution when the modern day French state was established (Carlyle, 1995). Since the fall of the French monarchy the idea of a French “nation” has been synonymous with French identity (Hargreaves, 1995). However, that identity has been splintered in recent years as France experiences a rapid influx in immigration from nations that are predominantly non-Western, and non-Christian. With this influx, French Christians are afraid of losing their French culture and identity to encroaching minority populations (ethnic and religious). Minority populations on the other hand, especially the Muslim populations from North Africa and Turkey, want to retain part of their Muslim self, while also becoming and participating in French culture (Croucher, 2005).

Muslims in France are in the midst of an identity crisis that not only pertains to their religion, and nation of birth, but also to their concept of sexuality, freedom, expression and the family. Gaspard (1995) conducted interviews with young Muslim girls and found that their ideas of what it means to be a Muslim woman are changing. Girls described how they were torn between their Muslim sense of self, and their ability to be a modern French girl. Women interviewed for this project expressed similar sentiments. Interviewee J said:

I can be Muslim woman in France [pause] and I also [pause] I want to be French. I think it possible [pause] but I want be modern French woman and also modern Muslim woman too at same time. I want [pause] Muslim family
and French family.

French-Christians on the other hand are not in a conflict over their sexuality, freedom, expression or family. Instead, they are in a growing conflict over their ideal French culture changing under the saturation of minority populations. Interviewee AF1 said:

I think France must protect France. It [pause] good for France to have different people [pause] but France need protect France. We different but my children [pause] they must not have be not French. French children need be French and not French and other things also. If France become not French [pause] there be many problems [pause] many problems in France. France Christian nation and [pause] it need be Christian nation.

This issue of religion is an important factor in the cultural conflict-taking place in France. As the French Muslim population grows in France, and becomes the second largest religious group in France, religion has become a fundamental and controversial issue of cultural debate (Croucher, 2005). Religion as a fundamental cultural variable cannot be underestimated.

*Religion as a Cultural Variable*

As previously mentioned (in chapter five) religion is an important cultural variable that most communication scholars ignore, or mistakenly lump with other, less influential cultural variables such as masculinity/femininity, individualism/collectivism or patriarchal/matriarchal. Since the majority of social scientific communication research comes out of 1960s and 1970s psychological research many of the same tenets as psychology are followed. Thus, it is not
surprising that the overwhelming majority of studies in intercultural or cross-cultural communication ignore religion (this critique focuses on these two areas of communication only, while other areas of study in communication such as interpersonal, organizational and political communication also generally neglect the potential effects of religion).

The following is a list of 25 important (meaning often cited) studies in intercultural and cross-cultural communication. This is not a complete or an exhaustive list; it is not intended to be a complete or an exhaustive list of the “important” intercultural pieces, it serves as a snapshot of the inattention of communication scholars when it comes to addressing religion and how it impacts various communicative processes. This list includes original theoretical works on theories from anxiety/uncertainty management to identity negotiation to cultural adaptation; this list also includes synopses of the discipline of intercultural and cross-cultural communication: (Anderson, 1991; Berry & Kim, 1987; Carbaugh, 1996; Cupach & Imahori, 1993; Geertz, 1973; Giles, Bourhis & Taylor, 1977; Goffman, 1967; Gudykunst, 1995; 2001; Gudykunst & Kim, 1997; 2003; Gudykunst & Lee, 2003; Hall, 1989; Hofstede, 1980; Kim, 1976; 1988; 2000; 2003; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oetzel, Ting-Toomey, Masumoto, Yokochi, Pan, Takai & Wilcox, 2001; Philipsen, 1992; Tajfel, 1978; Ting-Toomey, 1993; Trubisky, Ting-Toomey & Lin, 1991; Wiseman & Horn, 1995).

What these studies, and others demonstrate is that for more than forty years intercultural and cross-cultural communication research has yet to explore the potential effects of religion on communicative events or acts. Such an exploration
could reveal astounding results. In this particular study, religion was deemed to be the most important and in most cases the determining factor as to whether the Muslim immigrant would be able to fit into the French cultural ideal. While religion is a part of a person’s culture, this study reveals that a person’s religion influences how they interpret cultural artifacts, rationalize political acts and this study demonstrates how a person’s religion affects their self-identification (social identity theory) and the way in which they attempt or reject cultural adaptation. It would be prudent for other studies to at least explore religion, and to learn about the religion and its potential impacts on a population.

While doing this research I not only learned how Muslims and non-Muslims differ culturally, communicatively or religiously, I also learned a great deal about Islam: where the religion came from, its current status and where it is heading in the future. Discovering that Islam is transforming from a primarily magic to a more mythic religion aided in analyzing the interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims because this transformation offered a further grounding for comparison. The following section describes this transformation of Islam and explains why an understanding of this transformation is essential to the examination and analysis of this study’s findings.

*Changing Nature of Islam from Magic to Mythic Religion*

In the preface of his 2004 book, Olivier Roy states: “globalised Islam refers to the way in which the relationship of Muslims to Islam is reshaped by globalization, westernization and the impact of living as a minority” (p. ix). Islam has indeed gone global, and as of 2001, the global Muslim population was approximately 1.2 billion
adherents around the world (CIA Factbook, 2006). In the wake of Muslim expansion, Islam increasingly encounters Western governments and ideologies. The issue of modernity within Islam, and the adaptation of Islam into a more Western/useable religion is a paramount concern among Muslim scholars and adherents (Kassim, 2005). Muslim teachers and followers are in the midst of a religious transformation, from a traditional Islam (focusing entirely on the Koran) into a modern form of Islam that adapts to its respective Western culture/nation. This transformation is taking place in how Muslims interpret the holy scriptures of the Koran, in how Muslims around the world interact with the dominant cultures in which they find themselves to be a minority, and in the decreasing emphasis on Arabic as the language of Islam.

A major transformation-taking place within Islam is an alteration in the emphasis and interpretation of Koranic verses. As many Muslims begin to identify more with their nation of residence, and identify with Islam on a mainly religious and not cultural level (Roy, 2004), their interpretation of Koranic verses has become more “Western.” Roy (2004) provides the example of divorce. Within the Koran a man is justified in divorcing a wife (polygamy is not forbidden but encouraged in the Koran if a person is a traditionalist). However, in many mosques around the world imams, or holy teachers are beginning to tell their fellow Muslims that divorce is a sin, and something that should be avoided. The adoption of the Judeo-Christian doctrine against divorce is a direct result of Muslim communities living as minorities within Western cultures.

Moreover, the language used when addressing female issues within Islam has also taken on a “Western” rhetoric. Kassim (2005) asserts phrases such as “equal
rights,” and “social relations” are a direct result of the Westernization of Islam. As Islam has become increasingly globalized, the educational level of many Muslim women has increased, and “awareness of women’s rights and their role in the Muslim societies” has also increased (Kassim, 2005, p. 108). Kassim adds, “women’s roles are not confined to the traditional sphere of religious observances . . . Now they enter into the sphere of social relations . . . and have relatively more impact in the social aspects than they used to in the past” (2005, p. 108). The increasing role and importance of women within Islam is not only a result of the globalization of Islam, but also a result of more Muslim men interpreting the Koranic verses on women to be what modernist Islamic imams would call “supportive” of women’s rights. In fact, Stowasser (1994) argues that out of the three major global religions, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, Islam by its holy book is the most supportive and liberating toward women. However, traditionalist Muslim scholars and imams have been using archaic interpretations of the Koran to subjugate women since the death of the Prophet Muhammad.

A second transformation taking place within Islam is the increased focus on successful and complementary negotiation and co-existence with other religions, especially Christianity. While there are still sects of Islam, and splinter groups like Al Qaeda who call for the destruction of the West, Roy (2004) argues the overwhelming majority of Muslims do not follow this doctrine. Instead the overwhelming majority of Muslims have learned (or improved) how to co-exist with the West. Roy (2004) asserts the majority of Muslims around the world live as minorities in non-Muslim nations. The existence of large groups of Muslims in non-Muslim nations
necessitates the co-existence and cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims. Nourallah (2002) states the average Muslim in the 21st century has learned or will have to learn how to forget religious differences in everyday interactions with the West, and to avoid the calling of Westerners “infidels.” Unfortunately, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, this same group of global Muslims living as minorities have been forced to minimize their profile. Unlike other religious minority groups such as Jews, or ethnic minority groups like African-Americans in the United States, Muslims are unable to politically or economically unite behind a common cause. Their union according to Roy (2004) would be seen as a danger to most nations, and will cause unrest because a unified Muslim community in a Western nation will bring forth ideas of terrorism, jihad and Osama bin Laden. Thus, even though Muslims have learned how to peacefully co-exist as a minority group in Western nations, they have been recently forced to keep a low profile.

A third kind of transformation taking place in Islam is the separation between an understanding of Arabic, and being a Muslim. The Koran was originally written in Arabic, and for centuries an individual had to be able to write and read Arabic in order to read the Koran, since translations were viewed as blasphemous. However, in the 20th century the Koran was translated into virtually every major language. The translation of the Koran was a profoundly important event because it took Islam from a magic into a mythic religion. A religion that is magic (Gebser, 1984) is one in which the speaking of the words in the original language can bring the words to life. For example, speaking the name Muhammad in Arabic can bring Muhammad (metaphysically) to the event, or saying or drawing the symbol for the word “eagle”
in a Native American magic religion can concoct an eagle. Therefore, when the Koran was translated from Arabic into other languages, this act tore down the magical nature of Islam and placed it into a mythical period. The main difference is that in a mythical religion saying a word will not mean the word can come to life, it means the word is still important but it is separate from the act of speaking or writing it. Thus, when a person still says Muhammad they are speaking of the Holy Prophet and must be respectful, but the uttering of his name will not bring him to the physical presence of the speaker/writer.

In essence, translating the Koran has had a similar effect to the printing and subsequent translation of the Christian Bible. Before the printing of the first Christian Bible by Gutenberg in the 1450s, the only way a Christian in the Roman Catholic West could learn and be a Christian was to attend Mass. During the Mass, the only person who knew the verses of the Bible, and could speak or write the language of the Bible (Latin) was the priest. The priest would speak the words in the Bible, while the parishioners faced the opposite direction, because they were not divine or holy enough to witness the transformation of the priest into a vehicle for God. The speaking of the words in the Bible elevated the priest as a vehicle for God. However, after the Bible was printed and later translated into German, English, and Greek in the 1490s and early 1500s the transformation from magic to mythic religion began. No longer was a priest the only one who could read or understand the Holy Scripture, but after the printing and translating, anyone who could afford a Bible, or read would participate as well. This participation transitioned Christianity from a magic religion
to what it is today, a mythic religion where the word of God in the Bible is still sacred, but open to interpretation, translation, scrutiny and individual experience.

One caveat must be posed however; Islam has not completely transitioned into a mythic religion. The February 2006 printing of cartoon depicting the Prophet Muhammad by a Danish newspaper is an example that caused riots, protests and violence in numerous Middle Eastern nations and Muslim countries. Within the Islamic faith it is forbidden to depict the Prophet Muhammad in any likeness. The reaction of many Muslims to these cartoons reveals the magical power of Muhammad as a figure. Muslims did not see his depiction as editorial commentary or free press, but instead as a direct representation of the Prophet, which was dishonored through humor. The reaction of the Muslim world to these cartoons was swift and severe, and the response left many in the Western world scratching their heads and asking, “What happened?” The failure of many Westerners to understand why drawing Muhammad would cause such an uproar reveals the conflict between magic, mythic and perspectival cultures. The West, which is a mainly perspectival culture (Gebser, 1984; Kramer, 2003; Croucher, 2005), cannot relate or understand how this image would cause distress among a magic/mythic culture.

Clearly, Islam is in a transition period, whether it is a post 9/11 transition, or a natural transition as more and more Muslims interact with the West. What must be understood is that this transition must be studied, observed and analyzed. Communication scholars stand at an optimal point to conduct this work. Communication research examines how individuals communicate with the world and society around them. There is currently a religious, cultural, political and social
transformation-taking place in Islam that will forever impact how Muslims communicate with one another, and how they communicate with other religions such as Christianity (meaning Western nations and cultures). This research study is one step in this analysis; by analyzing how the hijab is transforming for many Muslims there is a tangible example of communicative change and alteration. This change warranted analysis.

*Failure of French Cultural Integration*

A second conclusion stemming from this analysis is that France and its Muslim and non-Muslim populations are in the midst of failed cultural integration. Instead of the Muslim population overwhelmingly adopting French culture, many are resisting and blaming French racism and lack of French acceptance for their failed integration. What I assert is happening is that French covert and overt anti-Muslimism is coming forth in everyday and political rhetoric in response to numerous historical and current events in France and throughout the world. As the collective subconscious emerges against the Muslim population, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Muslims and non-Muslims in France to co-exist and become one nation.

To facilitate this argument I will first discuss how adaptation never worked in France. Then I will illustrate how in response to failed cultural adaptation the French government is enacting institutional instruments to force cultural adaptation. Next, I will examine the hermeneutic horizon that is taking place in France, how specific historical and current events reinforce pre-conceived French prejudices and fuel anti-French Islamicism.
Adaptation Never Worked in France

Initially, it is imperative to realize that the majority of Muslim immigrants to France have not successfully adapted to the French culture. In fact, most Muslim immigrants, and even second and third-generation Muslim immigrants born in France exist in a state of limbo, where they are not fully French, and are not fully Muslim (Roy, 2004; Croucher, 2005). As previously discussed, the Muslim population in France has experienced difficulties adapting to French culture primarily because of their religion and skin color. Interviewee H stated: “because my skin is darker I do not think I will ever become fully French. Too many French people think that you must be white to be French, and Muslims are not white normally.”

Since the Muslim population looks different, typically with darker skin, and are not Christian, Jewish or secularists, they have never been truly welcomed in France. Moreover, the Muslim community in France has also demanded recognition for Islam, which is something not tolerated or even expected in a secular France (Gaspard, 1995).

What has happened, instead of the Muslim community adapting to French culture, the majority of the Muslim community has learned how to mimic the French culture. Interviewee I said: “I learn what I need do to have people think I French. I [pause] need to be French when in public but Muslim when home.” Kramer (2003) discusses this process when he asserts many newcomers to a culture will not fully adapt to the culture, but will instead mimic the dominant culture in an effort to “fit in.” Overall, the Muslim-French population is stuck between wanting to be considered a French citizen, while at the same time wanting to retain their native
cultural traits, which is deemed unworthy and unacceptable with the cultural adaptation framework as set forth by Gudykunst and Kim (1997; 2003).

**Institutional Adaptation**

In response to failed Muslim cultural adaptation, or assimilation, the French state has begun a policy of institutional cultural adaptation. Institutional adaptation is when a government places laws and creeds in place to force a minority group to become more like the dominant group. Looking through the annals of history, there are many examples of institutional forced cultural adaptation, or attempts by the dominant culture to make the minority cultures become or appear more like the dominant culture, or to eradicate the minority culture(s) all together: all captured subjects of the Roman empire were considered Roman and required to volunteer for military service, Peter the Great required that all men in Russia shave off their beards in order to appear more European, Mao Tse-Tung mandated all Chinese citizens read his red book and vow allegiance, and even worship him, the British government mandated English education and training in India during its occupation, and most recently France passed legislation outlawing the hijab and other religious symbols in public schools and in government buildings.

While these examples run the gamut from extreme cases to more mild instances of institutional adaptation or eradication, each does reveal how a dominant group through government means can force a minority group to act like the dominant group, at least in public. In each of the cases, individuals acted one way in public, and another way in private. This is happening in France. Many Muslims are publicly removing their hijabs, in order to function in French society, but re-veiling when they
are in the confines of their homes. Not only were such stories revealed in Gaspard (1995) but also in this study. Interviewee AG described how: “I have one me at home and [pause] another me when I not at home.” This dual reality, of mimicking the French when in public and being “more” Muslim in private is common among immigrant groups (Kramer, 2003). One thing that each of the aforementioned cases has in common, while each is very different and unique, is that each new piece of legislation or restriction stemmed from a deep-seated, pre-conceived prejudice against a minority group.

Hermeneutic Horizon

Europe has had difficulties accepting Islam since the Crusades. When European royalty went to liberate Jerusalem they took the flag of Christianity to a Muslim world and fought against Islam in the name of Christianity. Since then, Christian Europe and the Muslim world have been at odds (Tholfsen, 1984). During the 20th century, with the increasing number of Muslims immigrating to Europe, and with the global rise of Islam, Europe has had to live with Islam within its borders on a daily basis. This co-existence has not always been peaceful.

What I intend to argue with the following examples of historical events is that these events collectively added to a pre-conceived prejudice within Christian Europe against Islam. Each event not only added to the pre-conceived prejudices, but these events collectively have given many individuals in Christian Europe self-validation for their prejudices. This list is not completely exhaustive, since it is only a snapshot of certain events, particularly events within Europe, and within the past fifty years. I have chosen this time frame because this is when a large portion of the voting public
in France was either in formative years, or their parents were in their formative years; and since it is the voting public, which enacts institutional cultural adaptation, it is necessary to understand why the voting public acts in one manner over another.

Over the past fifty years Europe and the world have seen the rapid expansion of telecommunications. With the development of telecommunications news events happen, and a moment later they are available for public consumption. The advancements in telecommunications (television, cable, phone, internet) has brought analysis and potential ammunition to pre-conceived anti-Muslim prejudices because events are now immediately transmitted to the public, where an image is seen and an image made. The following five events that involve Islam in one way or another have stuck with the French consciousness. I have chosen to exclude the 2005 riots because those were described in greater detail earlier in this analysis; however, these riots did and will continue to have a lasting impact on French Muslim and non-Muslim relations.

From 1954 to 1962 France was engaged in the Algerian War of independence. The former French department in Africa demanded independence from France and a war broke out that cost somewhere between 300,000 and 1.5 million lives (numbers are estimates because the Algerian and French governments both report a different number of casualties). Throughout the war, French citizens read about Algerians attacking and killing French troops, and even saw pictures of the war in Le Monde. These images still resonate long after the end of the war and Algerian independence in 1962. Silverstein (2004) asserts French people will not forget the Algerian War, and continue to hold this war against Algerians and other Muslims. He adds that the
Algerian Civil War gave the French another reason to hate Muslims. The following picture is an image that was printed in the June 19, 1956 image of *Le Monde*.

Another event that took place in Europe that still resonates with many individuals is the 1972 Olympics massacre in Munich. Eight members of Black September kidnapped eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team. The eleven Israelis died in a botched rescue attempt at the Munich airport when the kidnappers detonated grenades and shot the hostages (Morris, 2001). This event was televised around the world. Even in France, the loss of the Israeli athletes was a tremendous loss, since their death represented one of the most violent (at that time) terrorist acts on European soil (Reeve, 2001), and thrust the Palestinian cause into the limelight, a cause that has mistakenly been linked to Islam without a complete understanding of either Islam or the Palestinian cause (Morris, 2001). For the members of Black September the kidnapping was in response to the unlawful incarceration of approximately 230 Palestinians into Israeli jails. The following image was broadcast on television networks around the world on September 5, 1972.
A third event that offered self-validation for anti-Muslim prejudice was a
collection of terrorist attacks from 1973 to 1985, all planned or perpetrated by “Carlos
the Jackal,” or Ilich Ramirez Sanchez. The “Jackal” terrorized France for more than a
decade: during that time he bombed three French newspapers took airline passengers
hostage, attempted to destroy two El-Al flights leaving Paris airports and he led an
attack on an OPEC meeting in Vienna (Follain, 1988). With each terrorist attack, and
with each attack being covered by the French media. The “Jackal” validated the pre-
conceived prejudices against Islam and epitomized what many Christians in Europe
considered the “terrorist-Muslim” (Follain, 1988). The following image is of one
detonation perpetrated by “Carlos the Jackal” in November of 1979.
A fourth event was the December 21, 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. This event further emphasized the ruthlessness of international terrorism. The bombing brought down Pan Am: images of the destroyed jumbo jet in the city of Lockerbie were broadcast around the world, and these images made people in other countries like France feel remorse for the loss and anger toward the bombers, who were thought to be of Muslim origin (Sheridan and Kenning, 1993). During the investigation into the crash, investigators identified two Libyans as responsible for the bombing, confirming the link between terrorism and Islam. One bomber was convicted; a member of Libyan intelligence, and the other was acquitted. The following image is of the cockpit of Pan Am flight 103.

A fifth, and the final event I will discuss is the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Terrorists brought down four planes on September 11, one in a Pennsylvania field, another crashed into the Pentagon and two planes were flown into the World Trade Center in New York City. The World Trade Center was completely destroyed, and the Pentagon suffered immense damage. In total, 2986 people died in the attacks, including the 19 hijackers. This was the worst terrorist attack ever on US soil. All of the hijackers were of Middle Eastern descent, and practicing Muslims
following the orders of al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden. The following image was aired on CNN on September 11, 2001.

In the wake of these attacks, Islam was put under global attack (Roy, 2004). Crimes against Muslims throughout the world increased (Helsinki Federation, 2005). Nations like France, Germany and the United Kingdom immediately passed anti-terror legislation, which froze bank accounts of potential al-Qaeda operatives, and these nations soon afterwards passed legislation, similar to the United States’ Patriot Act (Hamilton, 2002). The attacks of September 11, 2001 affected how Europeans look at terrorism and the Muslim world. It is not uncommon to hear average individuals calling Muslims terrorists (Roy, 2004); this was also illustrated in this analysis by interviews with non-Muslim French citizens. Interviewee AX said: “Muslims are dangerous. Many Muslims [pause] support terrorism. Look at the United States. You have September 11, all Muslim men.”

These images serve as snapshots for pre-conceived prejudices that were validated for holders of these prejudices. These events reinforced subconscious and conscious suspicions that were already powerful with the added impetus. Law 2004-228, and the 2005 acts taken by the French government in response to the 2005 riots
all exemplify how when validated, and realized, prejudices can become law and racial
inequality and misunderstanding legalized and sanctioned. So the question must be
posed, what’s next?

Dialogue for a “Communicative Society”

France and its Muslim and non-Muslim populations must become what
Habermas calls a “communicative society” (Habermas, 1973). In order to achieve this
end, the dominant and minority cultures must create public spheres where members
of all groups can voice their opinions and concerns. These programs (television,
radio, internet, print) must be in good faith, and genuine debate and not sound bytes
should be the goal in order to flush out the true heart of the matter for a peaceful co-
existence to emerge.

Dialogue must take place. This dialogue can take the form of informal
communication at numerous locations such as train stations, or cafés, during television
or radio programs, via web blogs, in editorials, columns, or through other public
locales. Muslims need to dialogue with the Jewish-French population and realize they
are facing a similar situation. Mosques have been destroyed in France and throughout
Europe, and synagogues have also been bombed and destroyed too; both groups are
minorities in dominant cultures. Muslims must also dialogue with non-Muslim
Christians in France, since these two groups (Muslims and non-Muslims) are the
main two groups in conflict. The Non-Muslim French Christian population needs to
dialogue among itself about what they really want in France. Throughout this analysis
non-Muslims stated they did not want Muslims at all in France. Other individuals
share these sentiments, while others disagree. France needs to determine if it is
willing and able to accept Muslims into the “French ideal.” One interviewee put it best when she said:

I [pause] think we must see that France is not one people. France [pause] is something we uh all have. Example [pause] we all think Marianne important, you ask me earlier about her. Marianne is France, and uh [pause] Marianne is me also. We live together. We uh [pause] we uh all need talk to other people.

This research project is now officially part of this needed dialogue. I realize that some individuals will read this dissertation and disagree with the conclusions and arguments I have made. That is expected and acceptable. An argument should develop debate and encourage discussion (Foss, 2004). My argument is one representation of a social reality, a social reality I encountered and observed in France. There are going to be competing realities, that is a given (Habermas, 1973). However, this particular social reality, this study is now part of the dialogue over French and Muslim co-existence; debate about it will foster more debate and in turn hopefully encourage further dialogue and consensus.
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## Appendix A

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Effect of Pressure to Conform to a Dominant Culture on an Ethnic Community

1\textsuperscript{st} Generation Immigrant Cultural, Economic, Political and Religious Comfort Zone

ETHNIC ENCLAVE – PRESCRIBED BY STATE/DOMINANT CULTURE

DOMINANT CULTURE

2\textsuperscript{nd} and Successive Generations

Pressures to Conform

1\textsuperscript{st} generation: elders feel their comfort zone shrinks. 2\textsuperscript{nd} and successive generations conform more to the dominant culture; thus their comfort zone may expand or they will develop “nationalistic-like” sentiments for community.