MILITARY-ISLAMISTS RELATIONS IN THE

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA:

CONFRONTATIONS AND

CONTAINMENT

By

SUZANE MNEIMNEH

Bachelor of Arts

The Lebanese University

Beirut, Lebanon

1999

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
May 2005

MILITARY-ISLAMISTS RELATIONS IN THE

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA:

CONFRONTATIONS AND

CONTAINMENT

Thesis Approved:

Joel Jenswold
_____
Thesis Adviser
David Nixon
_____

Bob Darcy
_____

A. Gordon Emslie
_____
Dean of the Graduate College

PREFACE

Are Islamists willing to accept a modern state system, secular political order, modernization, and democracy in order to establish non-violent relations with the military? Armed forces and political Islam are in constant confrontations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Islamists in the MENA region have been steadily moving towards acceptance of the mentioned concepts. In fact, many Islamists (individuals and parties) succeeded in entering the political order in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Kuwait and many other countries. In doing so, some demonstrated a willingness to work within the system and with various political forces especially with the military in pursuit of common goals, like regime liberalization. Others used democracy only as means to reach power and threaten modern state system; thus, invoked military interference in politics to prevent them from reaching power.

The participation of self-identified islamically oriented groups in elections and in modern political processes in general aroused considerable controversies. Armed forces, who believe in secularism and separation of religion and politics, perceive Islamist groups as threats to their values. The Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) participation in 1991-1992 elections provides a good example. The FIS campaigned for building an Islamic state and rejecting all Western principles such as democracy, secularism, and modernity while participating in elections to reach power. Consequently, the military intervened and canceled elections.

On the other hand, the current leadership in Turkey, Justice and Development Party (AKP), though it comes from Islamic origins, was able to succeed in 2002 elections and stay in power ever since with out military interference. They campaigned for freedom and democracy and promoted them as important dimensions of an Islamic society.

This controversy leads to asking how can Islamists reach power and stay in power under without military interface. The answer to this question lays in the Islamist orientation of Islamists groups.

AKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. Joel Jenswold for granting me the opportunity to improve my carrier skills by working with him in the current study. Apart from his thorough scientific surveillance, I would like to highlight his encouragement, and inspiration.

I would like also to show my thanks and appreciations to my Doctoral committee members, Dr. David Nixon and Dr. Bob Darcy for their professional guidance and help.

My deepest gratitude is also paid to the Department of Political Sciences for the excellent academics I received during my work.

Last, in this moment, I would like to remember the people who supported me during the moments I truly needed support, namely my husband, and my family to whom I express my deepest love and cherish.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1
Introduction: Military & Islamists' in Contemporary MENA Politics

Many authors, such as Huntington, consider military in both developed and developing countries as one of the most powerful institutions that have significant effect on internal and external security policies. Generally, civil-military relation is defined as "the relationship between the armed forces of the state and the larger society they serve—how they communicate, how they interact, and how the interface between them is ordered and regulated" (Hooker JR. Winter 2003-04).

However, the extents of military functions and effects differ between developed and developing countries. In developed states, the constitution and political norms clearly define military's role and functions in relation to state and society. Nonetheless, politicians still believe the military tends to challenge civilian authorities (Pfaff 2002).

In the case of developing countries, the military role and functions are complex and problematic in relation to state and society. The military has greater influence and decisive role not only in the field of national security policy formulation but also in internal security policy (Rubin 2002, 1-21).

Therefore, it is important to assess the role of militaries and their relations to state and society in developing countries of MENA based on the theoretical framework laid down by western scholars, such as Huntington, on civil-military relations.

The focus will be to determine the military's role in the domestic sphere that includes the government and society and then to find the area of interaction between Islamists, military and

state. The dynamics of establishing an Islamist government in secular states guarded by military officers cannot be understood well without comprehending the role of Islamist and military institutions at the domestic level. Their interaction in a political framework has direct effects on a country's future especially when the former attempts to rule.

Samuel Huntington's classic book, *The Soldier and the State*, discusses the implications of civil-military relations upon national security affairs. He argues that in a democracy, those who govern have power by virtue of legal and democratic elections. However, the military, although not similarly elected, also holds power. Consequently, successful and non-violent civil-military relations are crucial to those seeking to create stable government that reflects people's will. The key issue remains how a democratically elected government can be safe from military intervention and exert control over the military, rather than the other way around. This is specifically important since many MENA countries witnessed several coup d'état. In such cases, the military formed the government, such as the cases of Egypt and Libya, or directly ruled the country such as the case of Yemen, Sudan, and Turkey 1980-1983 (Rubin 2002, 1-16). In other cases, the military was considered guardian or supporter of the civilian government such as the cases of Jordan and the Gulf Arab monarchies (Rubin 2002, 1-16).

Since late nineteenth century, Islamists searched for a solution to the political, cultural, and religious crisis caused by Western, specifically European, imperialism and the post-independence modernization and secularization attempts. Islamists believed that the secularists' ruling elite and officer corps were responsible for the deteriorating moral and religious status of Muslim communities. They called for the rejection of the Western ideologies and values, non co-

2

operation with the new secular rulers, and holy war '*jihad*' against them and the secular state system (Rubin 2002, Owen 2004, Weitzman & Inbar 1997). Secular rulers saw Islamists as a threat to modern state and political order. In this sense, the Military was used by many MENA governments (in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) to advocate the separation of religion from the state in the context of the Western model of state and the constraint of the influence of Islam in state and society. Armed forces also tended to suppress Islamists, sometimes by violent means, to prevent them from defying the modern state system and from achieving their goals. Therefore, the officer corps, as the regime guardians, banded, jailed, and executed many Islamists.

When the difficulty to overcome military repression by violence became better understood, Islamists began to come up with strategies that are more creative and methods, which best utilize the available political opportunities. Many Islamist movements such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria worked within the state system and participated in democratic elections. Nevertheless, they still tried to change state and society towards rejecting secularism and adopting Islamic constitution. They ended up overthrown from government by military coup in 1992. Other Islamists, such as the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) worked within the system with out posing any threat to the state or ruling elite. They managed to stay in government until present day.

Military- Islamists relations focus on several dynamics. These dynamics include the military function as the state guardian, military intervention, and influence in state and society, military participation in politics, and societal impacts on militaries. This leads us to the question

this paper is trying to answer: How can Islamists establish non-violent relations with the military in order to reach power without military intervention or coup d'état to interrupt their success?

The hypothesis examined in this research is, Islamists could reach power, form or participate in governments and parliaments, and stay in power by making some sacrifices concerning their Islamist orientation. Islamist must compromise if they want to establish non-violent relations with military to secure their success in elections. To do that, they must not constitute any threat to the values protected by the military.

To test this hypothesis, comparative analysis, through focusing on military-Islamists relation in two states (Turkey and Algeria) has been used to examine the effects of the military ideology and its perception of its role in state and society on Islamists prospects of reaching power and ruling. Analysis is based on comparing the case of the AKP and its success in wining 2002 election, forming government, and staying in power until present day with the case of the FIS frailer in reaching power though it succeeded in the first round of 1991-1992 election. The aim of this comparison is to find out the conditions under which non-violent relations could be established between military and Islamists.

The purpose of this research is to look at the varying factors that conditioned the relationship between Islamists and armed forces in Turkey and Algeria. As with any dynamic aspects of societal and political interactions, military-Islamists relations change rapidly and randomly.

The purpose of this research, however, goes beyond merely reporting on particular situations where the military intervened in politics and prevented or allowed Islamists to reach power. Instead, this research offers an analysis of the effects the military role in MENA societies have on its interaction with Islamists and the effects of Islamists ambitions and ideology on this interactions and on the prospects of their integration in the political order.

Military-Islamists relation here means the ongoing negotiation for power in which the military and Islamist groups compete, sometimes violently and occasionally peacefully, for control of politics (Rubin 2002, Schulze 2000). The way to measure non-violent military-Islamist relation is by assessing the Islamists' attitudes and views towards the values that the military is guarding. Thus, threatening them might produce a violent relation with the military and vise-versa might lead to non-violent military-Islamists relation.

Military-Islamists relation can be studied from a variety of approaches. However, this research focuses on Huntington's theoretical framework on civil-military relations. Huntington assumes that his framework could apply on all societies (Huntington 1957, viii). Unfortunately, his theoretical framework is based on analyzing western history that might not fit perfectly the historical conditions of the MENA region.

A difficult way to consider military-Islamists relations is to compare them across the types of political systems in which they exist. Yet, by analyzing and comparing the cases of Algeria and Turkey, the likely finding is that non-violent relations could be established if

Islamists did not pose any threat to the values the military is guarding. This way, Islamists could reach power and govern without fearing military coups.

This paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter, introduction, summarizes the discussion of this research and specifies the problem, research question and hypothesis, methodology, and the purpose of this study.

The second chapter discusses research design and methods with detailed explanation of the comparative analysis used in this paper and the sources of data. It also discusses the variables that are civil-military relations (independent variable) and military-Islamists relations (dependent variable). Furthermore, to understand clearly the dependent variable, this chapter illustrated the meaning of Islamism/Islamists.

The Third chapter (Military-Islamists Relations: Theoretical Framework), examines Huntington's civil-military relations theory specifically military's relations to state, society, and democracy. In the same time, it demonstrates empirical implementation of his theory of the MENA region. Furthermore, this chapter examines Islamists-civil relation specifically Islamists' attitudes and views towards state, society, and democracy. At the end, this chapter articulates a theoretical framework for military-Islamists relations.

The forth chapter presents the two case studies Turkey and Algeria. Both case, demonstrate military interaction with state, society, democracy, and Islamists. Finally, chapter five discusses the findings and conclusions deduced from comparing the two cases.

Chapter 2

Methodology, Research Design, and Analytic Framework

Comparative research methods have long been used in cross-cultural studies to identify, analyze, and explain similarities and differences across societies. Whatever the methods used, research that crosses national boundaries increasingly takes account of socio-cultural settings. This is an important factor in this research since one of the aims is to examine the effects of the military ideology and its perception of it role on state and society especially that most of the literature written on civil-military relation is based on western experience. Thus, incorporating comparative research methods is important to find out how the of civil-military theories could explain civil-military relations in developing countries, such as those in MENA region, on the one hand, and examine military-Islamists relations in the region, on the other hand. It is also important because although Turkey and Algeria are countries in the MENA; yet, their historical, economic, social, and political development affected their militaries and societies differently.

This paper is based on examining the military-Islamists relations in two situations: the first is the success of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) in reaching power and ruling by wining Turkey's 2002 elections. The second situation represents the failure of the Algerian Islamic Salvation front (FIS) in reaching power and ruling though they won the first round of elections in 1991. Both countries are famous for military intervention in politics. In the first case, although military coup overthrew the most recent government headed by an Islamist party, the Welfare Part, in 1997, they did not intervene when the AKP formed a majority government headed by it leader Recipe Tayeb Erdogan. In the second case, military, who ruled the country through the National Liberation Front (FLN), canceled the electoral process in 1992, annulled

the elections results, and banned the FIS. Comparing the two cases will facilitate finding out the conditions under which the military-Islamists relations could be non-violent.

In this study, the data are collected from two different sources: Arabic sources, mainly Abdul Hameed Braheemy's book "*The Origins of the Algerian Crisis: 1958-1999*" (2001) which provides a thorough analysis of the foundations of the Islamists involvement in Algerian politics and M. Hakan Yavuz book *"Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Religion and Global Politic"*. Other Arabic sources are the books of Ishmael Al- Shatty, Majdy Hammad, and Hydar Abraham Ali who discussed the issue of the role Islamists might play in the political system. In addition, statistics are taken from Aljazeera network as well as other Arabic newspapers and networks. The other sources of data are chosen from western literature specifically the work of Samuel Huntington "*The Soldier and the State*" in which he articulated the civil-military theory. In addition, there is the work of Barry Rubin "*Armed Forces in the Middle East*" through which he tried to apply the civil-military theories to the Middle East. Data were collected from western more than MENA literature.

Variables' Conceptualization

Since the focus of this paper is to examine the prospects of non-violent military- Islamists relations, the independent variable is civil-military relations and the dependent variable is non-violent military-Islamists relations. The dependent variable is measured by the Islamists acceptance of the modern form of state, principles of democracy, modernization, and secularism, and the engagement in peaceful competition and participation in the political system. Such elements represent the core of military values in most of the MENA countries.

Nation-state, democracy, and modernization constitute the main pillars of the contemporary epoch. This epoch witnessed the rise of pluralism and the spread of civil rights movements. Protecting human rights became the focal point of the international and regional institutions activities. These international values governed stats' development and relations. However, states who do not abide by such values are contained. For example, such states do not receive economic and technological aid and sometimes they suffer from economic sanctions. Many political regimes claim to be democratic and supportive of modernization, though they may not be, because this is their pathway to the modern world. In this sense, states or political movement could not explicitly reveal rejection towards democratic principles and modernization attempts (Ali 1999, 20).

From this perspective, the attitude towards democracy specifies how modernized is any ideology, movement, or political regime and the opposites also true. Today, an underdeveloped or regressive regime, ideology, or political movement could be measured by the extent to which it is remote from democracy and modernity (Ali 1999, 20).

This assumption constitutes an essential element in explaining the way Islamists react to nation-states, political order, modernity, and democracy. This is due to the fact that the pillars of the new epoch (democracy, nation-state and modernity) as concepts, institutions, ideologies, way of life and modern age philosophy occupied Islamists thoughts and influenced their activities towards state and society ever since the establishment of Islamism. Islamists always theorized about the methods of reacting to these pillars, violently or peacefully, or even about the ways,

they could adapt to modern world conditions. Their aim was always to fit in the new state system or transform this system to fit their aims (Ali 1999, 20).

In this sense, specifying Islamists attitude towards democracy, modern state system, and modernity is an important condition to find out the nature of the relationship between the military and Islamists in the MENA region. However, it is important to define the variables of this relation before examining it.

Civil-Military relation: Conceptual and empirical challenges

It has often been noted that military's distinctiveness in society is due to its responsibility in the management of violence. Harold Lasswell describes the military as a body composed of men skilled in the "management of violence" (Huntington 1957, 11). Yet, in most countries, many other groups are permitted to keep weapons such as militant wings of political parties in the Meddle East. Thus, the difference between military and such militant groups lies in their organization and training rather than in managing violence. In fact, Morris Janowitz argues that militaries are official bureaucracies legitimized by the national state (Janowitz 1977, 15). Furthermore, the military is not similar to any other social group. Members of the military are different from a doctor or a lawyer; they are taking on a whole way of life. Military has its own industries, schools, academies, courts, codes and so on and so forth.

Huntington believes that these characteristics constitute the essence of military professionalism. To understand what is meant by professionalism, he argues, "A profession is a

peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics." Those characteristics are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness (Huntington 1957, 7-10).

For Huntington then, professionalism is what distinguishes modern militaries from ancient warriors.

He argues that,

> "Modern officer corps is highly professional body. It has its own expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. The existence of this profession tends to imply, and the practice of the profession tends to engender among its members, a distinctive outlook on international politics, the role of the state, the place of violence in human affairs, the nature of man and society, and the relationship of the military profession with the state" (Huntington 1977, 6)

Professionalism is frequently reflected in the ways military views society and state. In other words, officer corpses are conscious that they are different from politicians as well as civilians.

Civil-military relation then reflects military interaction with state and society. Generally, it is defined as "the relationship between the armed forces of the state and the larger society they serve—how they communicate, how they interact, and how the interface between them is ordered and regulated" (Hooker JR. Winter 2003-04).

For Huntington,

> "The principle focus of civil-military relations is the relations of officer corps to the state. The officer corps is the active directing element of the military structure and is responsible for the military security of society. The state is the active directing element of society and is responsible for the allocation of resources among important values including military security. The social and economic relations between the military and the rest of society normally reflect the political relations between the officer corps and the state" (1957, 3)

11

From this perspective, the civil-military framework involves two dimensions: first, the civilian control of military; and second the role of military as a professional institution in society. Civil-military relation, in democratic, developed countries is mainly expressed in terms of civilian control over military institution (Finer 1962, 14). In these states, civil control of the military means the control by elected civilians. In other words, "civilian control means simply the degree to which the military's civilian masters can enforce their authority on the military services" (Hooker JR. Winter 2003-04). This dimension places the military within the frame of civil society. The history of western civil-military relations shows that civilian control helps in developing the military or as Huntington calls it "military professionalism" (Huntington 1957, 7-18).

In this sense, civilian control of the military enhances its professionalism. It guarantees that protecting the state and society's national security does not threaten the basic democratic principles such as majority rule, minority rights, and political rights and liberties. Decision-making process and its outcomes is the responsibility of civilian political leaders while the responsibility of the military is to obey the orders of civilian authorities and to implement their decisions (Huntington 1957, 7-18). Building on this notion of professionalism, Huntington argues that the military is more efficient as an "expert advisor" on security matters and therefore military officers are most effectual when they are completely neutral politically. He states, "Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism" (Huntington 1957, 71).

However, S.E. Finer argues that militaries engage in politics mostly to maintain their organizational ideology or interests (1962, 32-60). According to Finer, the motivations of military intervention depend on two aspects: disposition and opportunity. He explains disposition as the incentive to intervene which results from a combination of motives and mood. Military motives are one or a combination of the following:

1) "Manifest destiny of the soldiers"

2) National interest

3) Sectional interest, such as class, regional, communal, or individual self-interest

4) A combination of the above motives.

Finer explains the mood to intervene as a complex feature that can be provoked by two elements: a "sense of overwhelming power" or "high self-esteem".

Concerning military's opportunity to intervene in politics, Finer argues that it depends on two aspects:

1) An increased civilian reliance on the military or the effect of the security environment

2) The popularity of the military (Finer 1962, 28-73)

Morris Janowitz also argues that professional military cannot escape being politicized because to be effective it must be skilled in managing violence as well as skilled in dealing with security issues and the ambiguous politico-military nature of the security environment within the civil context (Sarkesian 1984, 156)

The second dimension of civil-military framework in developed countries is military's role in state and society. The military in developed and democratic countries is considered an

interest group, which gets involved in domestic and foreign decision-making (Bienen 1971, 1).

In fact, Huntington argues that in modern, developed societies, which are "characterized by

relatively high institutionalized political structure and patterns of rule", the military is

characterized by "relatively high institutionalized and professionalized officer corps"

(Huntington 1977, 6)

In a developed democracy, the military exists to protect the national security of state and

society. Huntington divided the concept of national security into three levels:

1. External security, which represents threats coming from other states or actors
   exterior to the nation's political and social institutions

2. Internal security, which represents threats coming from within the state aiming at
   destroying or weakening the political order

3. Situational security, which reflects threats that result from long-term social,
   political, and economic decay of the state (Huntington 1957, 1)

The military function is to protect national security according to the people will, which is

expressed through their legal representatives. The military does not represent or support any

political viewpoint or ethnic and social group. It is subordinate to the legally elected government.

From this perspective, the military devotes all its capabilities to the nation, to the rule of law, and

to the principle of democracy (Huntington 1957, 7-18).

In this sense, civil-military relations in democratic, developed countries involve devotion

to the principles of democracy, modernity, and nation-state. The military is barred from

involving in politics and placed under civilian control.

Based on this framework, civil-military relation is understood as a duality. First is the power concerns; military must be subordinate to democratically elected civilians. Civilians are responsible for making decision in all areas of state policy, including national security and defense policy. Second is the issue of professionalism in the roles, organization, and missions assigned to the military. Armed forces must not be bias to any political institution, group, or ideology.

However, the civil-military relation framework in developed countries differs from that in developing countries, or Third World nations. In developed countries, it is commonly assumed, as previously noticed, that it is natural for the military establishment to be subordinate to civil control and to obey politicians. However, in the MENA, this is far from being the normal pattern of events. Since 1945, for instance, more than three quarters of the countries of MENA have experienced varying levels of military intervention. Some states such as Turkey, Syria, and Pakistan have been repeatedly hosts to a coup d'état (Rubin 2002, 1-16).

Thus, civil-military framework involves two different dimensions than the ones previously mentioned. The first dimension relates to "military interventions in politics through coup d'état" and the second dimension relates to "military rule of the polity once the military have seized power and decide to keep it" (Bienen 1971, 1-28 & Huntington 1977, 6).

To elaborate, in many MENA countries, the military has intervened in the political process and sometimes overthrown the constitutional civilian authority. Moreover, in many

situations the military, once politicized, declared itself superior to elected politicians, such as the case of Turkey's military coup in 1980 (Bienen 1971, 1-28). The Military interference in politics refers to the "substantial and purposeful involvement of the armed forces in the making and allocation of wealth and of social and political values, including national security" (Watson & Danopoulos 1996, XV). Accordingly, analyzing the armed forces intervention in politics is primarily linked to the process of modernization in developing countries and the military role as a modernizing institution (Bienen 1971, 4). The reason behind this link is that military intervention is not isolated from other political institution and processes and social groups. Consequently, by studying the relationship between the armed forces, state, and society in the context of modernity and development we can "better assess the prospects for the future evaluation of the armed forces in society" (Bienen 1971, 4).

MENA countries have a long history of military rule. The military played an important role in initiating and carrying out the process of modernization. According to D. Rustow, modernization "denotes rapidly widening control over nature through closer cooperation among men. It transforms both man and society, but most of all man's mind". This process includes "all the more specific changes such as industrialization, rationalization, secularization, and bureaucratization" (1967, 3). Rustow saw modernization as a revolutionary process that reconstructs the intellectual, technological, and social aspects of any society. Based on this understanding of modernization, the military was the only force capable of carrying out such processes in the new independent state in MENA (Rubin 2002, 10). Even Huntington agreed on the modernizing role of the military in MENA when he stated that "in Turkey, the Young Turks in 1908 and the Kemalists in the 1920s played highly progressive reforming roles similar to

those which the military after WWII assumed in other Middle Eastern countries" (1968, 219). Military, then, was a key political and economic actor in the regimes of a variety of MENA countries. It has always enjoyed a special status in state and society because it has seen itself as the guardian of secular, reformist, and democratic goals that almost all MENA sought to achieve after independence (Rubin 2002, 1-20).

Many of the MENA regimes came into power through coup d'état and policies were set by officer corps. For example, after the Arab defeat in war against Israel in 1967, new military-led regimes were established in "Iraq in 1968 and in Syria in 1970 as well as the succession of President Sadat in Egypt in 1970" (Owen 2004, 181). Military junta was due to social disorder and political corruption, which undermined civil governments during the period of state-building (Rubin 2002, 10).

In this sense, there are two frameworks for civil-military relations. The first could exist in developed and democratic societies where civilians are in control. In such societies, military officers are professionals. They restrict themselves to democratically accepted boundaries though ready to defend their interests against civilian violation. The second framework could exist in developing and, to a certain extent, undemocratic societies where political institutions are developing and modernizing. Such institutions are characterized of being weak and lacking legitimacy. In these societies, the military gradually expand its influence, become politicized, and sometimes directly take over the state replacing the civilians.

The second framework is more applicable to the case of MENA region because as Huntington claims " the more backward a society is, the more progressive the role of its military"(Huntington 1968, 221). Specialists of MENA draw on both Huntington and his critics when discussing civil-military relations in the region. Barry Rubin demonstrates that military involvement in politics is produced from both the internal characteristics of the military institution (ideologies and values) and the political environment in which it operates (2002, 1-20). The political environment in developing countries is characterized of being "less highly institutionalized and differentiated"(Huntington 1977, 6).

Based on this framework, the definition of civil-military relations in MENA region must take into consideration not only the initial conditions of military ideology, values, and privileges, but also the inclinations of the officer corps. These inclinations are expressed, on the one hand, in the attitudes of the corps and its role in democracy, and on the other hand, in the interaction between the armed forces and politicians and civilian actors in the security environment.

In this sense and for the purpose of this research civil-military relations are defined, according to Samuel P Huntington and Andrew J Goodpaster, as: "… representing a complex set of inter-relationships, established norms and practices between the Armed Forces and other Social structures" (Huntington & Goodpaster 1977, 31).

Islamism/Islamists: between religion and politics

In this research, the term ' Islamism' refers, in general, to the political ideology of some groups who connect themselves to the religion of Islam; thus, they are labeled as Islamists (Ali

1999, 42-53). However, before going any further in defining Islamism it is necessary to distinguish between Islam and Islamism.

Islamism is separated in many important ways from the Islamic tradition -the religion of Islam (Hammad 2001, 7-14). Due to the circumstances that Islamists were born in, traditional Muslim scholars see Islamism as a response and a symptom of modernization and secularization, colonialism, and identity crises. Colonial powers enforced political and economic changes as well as cultural modifications. Colonialists fought Islamic traditions, values, and practices in the territories they occupied (Ali 1999, 42-53). For example, during the French colonialism in Algeria, natives were not granted citizenship unless they abandon Islam (Schulze 2000, 85).

Islamism started in the early twentieth century with the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna and the Islamic Society in Pakistan in 1941. Both movements called for re-establishment of the Islamic state and the applications of the Islamic law. They worked to spread their teaching through MENA societies by establishing branches in many states (Ali 1999, 42-53). Yet, extremism started with Sayyed Qutb[1] who was an activists Marxian before he converted to radical Islamism. He never acquired knowledge from scholars. All of his ideology is the result of his own personal interpretation and understanding of manuscripts, which label him in the scholars' standard as a pseudo-scholar. Qutb believed that there is no separation between state and religion because God provided us with all the necessary rules to regulate our political, economic, social, and religious aspects of life. Thus, authority and state are parts of society as a whole. From this perspective, Qutb differentiated between Islamic

---

[1] an early leader of the Brotherhood and the writer of "In the Shade of *Quran*" which was considered the unquestionable constitution of Islamists

society and ignorant society. He claimed that the international arena would witness clashes between the two societies at the end of which the Islamic society will win due to its ideology and beliefs (Ali 1999, 191).

In Islamism, individuals do not recognize any authority, religious or not, apart from leaders of their own groups, thus they reject the authorized interpreters of the Islamic law (Ali 1999, 23-40). To explain this, Muslims in general and *Sunni* in particular do not see Islam as an organization dependent on a centralized religious leadership. Traditional scholars are not necessarily the rulers in society. Islamists, on the contrary, see their leading militants as the Islamic guidance and the rulers at the same time, thereby eliminating the need to refer to traditional scholars for guidance (Ali 1999, 23-40).

In this sense, the Islamists subordinate religion to politics. They carry out their political activities, though they are in many cases contrary to the teachings of Islam, and justify them by Islam (Ali 1999, 23-40). A clear example is al-Qaedas bombing of the World Trade Center in September 11, 2001. Bin Laden claimed he performed his act in the name of Islam, while we find that Muslim scholars, like the famous Annawawy, of the 10th century and others alike, mention in their widely known literatures that Islamic rules forbid the aggression against non-Muslims (by Muslims) who enter their territories with their authorities' approval. Bin Laden, classifying himself as a scholar, did not follow this traditional teaching; rather, he only followed his group's interpretations and views regardless of whether it disagrees or not with the main Islamic verdict (Ali 1999, 23-40).

Khalid Duran notes the distinction between traditional Islam and its political counterfeit, Islamism, by underlining their different understandings of the relationships between religion and politics:

> "Whether Islamists like the term fundamentalists or not, their understanding of religion resembles the fundamentalists in other religions. This is not to say that Islamists are more religious or more genuinely Islamic than other Muslims are . . . Islamism is late 20th century totalitarianism. It follows fascism and communism, picking up from those and seeking to refine their methods of domination . . . "Few Muslims would deny that political commitment is part of Islam ethics, but most disagree with the Islamist insistence that there exists a clearly defined 'Islamic system', different from all other political systems"(Duran 2000, 27-28).

Not only does Islamism reject those aspects of the Islamic tradition that do not fit with its political outlook and agenda, but it also regards most Muslims to be infidels. Islamists consider their groups and militants as the sole guardians of the mission for Islamizing the world. Whoever criticizes them (whether a Muslim or a non-Muslim) is immediately accused of being infidel and subjected to punishment. That is why in many cases, Islamists wage wars, within their society, on fellow Muslims because they abided by the state's laws such as the case of Algeria where almost one hundred thousand Algerian (mostly Muslims) were killed since 1992 (Ali 1999, 23-40). In this sense, the international society as well as many domestic political actors in MENA considers Islamism as a dangerous, extremist, and even terrorist ideology.

In the same context, Islamism is separate from fundamentalism. Fundamentalism refers to a return to the roots of Islam, to the origins and basics. These roots represent the original religious texts, mainly the *Quran*, *Hadith*, and the interpretation of the Islamic scholars (*Ijtihad*). Islamism, on the other hand, refers to the political ideology of those groups who adopt their own interpretation of Islam, which, in many ways, is not related to the original texts (Ali 1999, 23-40).

For example, the previously mentioned Sayyed Qutb published his book "In the Shade of *Quran*" in which he interpreted the context of the Holy *Quran* without having the necessary religious studies and qualifications that an interpreter should have. The qualified interpreter of the *Quran* should have the following characteristics: First, the interpreter should be well educated about the Arab language (the language of the Holy *Quran*), literature, and vocabulary to differentiate between synonyms of the same *Quranic* words. Second, since the *Quran* contains two types of verses, story verses and ruling verses, the interpreter should know the mode of use of ruling verses i.e. general or exclusive. He should also know the speeches of the Prophet that were not a body text of the *Quran*, in order to avoid a conflict between the interpretation of those speeches and that of *Quran*. He must also know the verdicts of Islam that came as a unanimous agreement between all scholars in order to avoid the violation of such agreements during his interpretation (Lewis 1996, 52-63).

Many Islamists often have fundamentalist beliefs; however, they are not all necessarily fundamentalist. Most Islamists believe in traditions that do not have a direct textual basis. They mainly follow the instruction of the group leader and believe in his political ideology as if it came directly from the Islamic text (Ali 1999, 23-40).

The reason behind explaining the separation between Islam and Islamism is to show that the Islamists can adjust their political ideologies according to circumstances. Islamists has twisted many principles within Islam that deal with politics, economics, and military affairs into a sustained and systematic program. Whereas, Islam is sacred law cannot be adjusted or changed. Muslims must follow all its principles and not select whatever suits their surroundings. By

remembering that Islam Pluralism is, in principle, compatible with democracy nothing necessitate the adjustment of Islam (Ali 1999, 23-40).

An example of Islamists changing their agenda can be seen in the case of Sudan. Traditionally a Christian was allowed to drink alcohol while a Muslim is prohibited because Islamic law applies only to Muslims. However, the present government has prohibited alcohol for every Sudanese (Pipes 1998). On the contrary, in traditional Islam drinking, even manufacturing and selling, alcohol is forbidden to all, Muslim or non-Muslim, since the days of the prophet and till the end of days.

For the purpose of this study then, Islamism is defined as the political and social doctrine that was newly born in Muslim communities due to social and ideological clashes with western ideologies and values. Islamism uses Islam as a technique to mobilize the public in accordance to its aims (Ali 1999, 23-40).

Moreover, Islamist groups are defined as those politicized groups who employ Islam in political speeches or use Islam as a political symbol in order to increase their popular support to reach power and induce change in government and society. Islamist groups place their revolutionary behavior not principally in a spiritual, but in social and political rejection of the oppressive order around them (Ali 1999, 23-40).

<u>Military-Islamists relations: conceptual framework</u>

In many MENA countries, military was the only efficient and stable institution after independence. Thus, military "played an important role in maintaining internal security". In fact, the officer corps functioned as the guardian of nation state, secularism, modernization, and regime (Rubin 2002, 10-11). Islamists, on the other hand, worked hard to reintroduce Islam to society and state. They rejected the modern state system, secularism, and modernity. In some cases, such as the assassination of President Sadat in Egypt in 1981 by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamist militant used extreme violence to overthrow a secular authoritarian regime and establish an Islamic republic.

Due to the clash of interests, there were many confrontations between Islamists and armed forces in most MENA countries during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Even after the end of the Cold War, the military tackled with Islamists in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan (Rubin 2002, 1-16). The armed forces intervened in politics to preserve the state system and political order from Islamists.

From this perspective, in MENA countries where Islamists are pressing for greater part in the political system and the military is opposing such ambitions, politics are shaped by the dynamic of Islamist-military relations as well as their relation to the state and society. In this sense, and for the purpose of this study, military-Islamists relation is defined as the ongoing negotiation for power in which the military and Islamist groups compete, sometimes violently and occasionally peacefully, for control of politics (Rubin 2002, Schulze 2000).

The aim of this study, then, is to find out the conditions under which military-Islamists relation could be non-violent. The way to measure non-violent military-Islamist relation, as mentioned previously, is by assessing the Islamists' attitudes and views towards nation-state, democracy, and modern society. These elements represent the values that the military is protecting. Thus, threatening them might produce a violent reaction by the military and vise-versa might lead to non-violent military-Islamists relation.

Remarks on Data

Several problems in obtaining relevant data were encountered during the course of this research. The first problem is based on the sensitive nature of the project. There were few figures and very few generally accepted facts regarding the Algerian Islamist movements and especially the FIS. There exists little primary information (i.e. specific actual figures about the size of popular participation in the elections in 1991). In addition, due to the rule of an authoritarian regime, it is forbidden to give such information by governmental institutions, or to find out the real size of the FIS popular base, the number of their active members, or other critical information.

The second problem involves author's bias. In writing this study, and due to fact that the issues discussed here, especially those relate to Islam and Islamists, are very sensitive issues, author bias might be noted. Thus, to control this problem, data is mainly collected from western or neutral literature (not from Islamic basis even if it was from Arabic origin) on the issues that were considered.

The third problem relates to external validity. Since each Islamist group differs from others in their environments, it is hard to assume that the factors that assist Islamist groups in reaching power in MENA are the same in all countries. The findings of this study are only one scenario and not to be generalized. In some MENA countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain UAE, and Syria, political parties are banned thus, it is hard to gather data about these factors. When talking about Islamist groups in these countries we only refer to individuals and not officially established parties. In other MENA countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan, Islamist groups are allowed to form political parties and to participate in elections. Some of them actually acquired seats in the parliaments. However, those groups are still politically too weak. They even cannot compete in elections such as the Islamic Jihad in Lebanon.

Chapter 3

Military-Islamists Relations: Theoretical Framework

Exploring Huntington's Civil-Military Theory

Huntington provided theoretical analysis of the civil-military relations in his book" *The Soldier and the State"*. In order to understand the complications of civil-military relations in any society he provided two methodological assumptions:

> "First, it is assumed that the civil-military relations in any society should be studied as a system composed of independent elements. The principal components of such a system are the formal, structural position of military institutions in the government; the informal role and influence of military groups, in politics and society at large; and the nature of the ideologies of military and nonmilitary groups" (Huntington 1957, viii).

He claims that based on this assumption there must be an equilibrium between "the authority, influence, and ideology of the military, on the one hand, and the authority, influence, and ideology of the nonmilitary groups, on the other" (1957,viii). Huntington's second methodological assumption claims that:

> "Starting from certain premises concerning the nature and the purpose of military institutions, it is possible to define in the abstract that particular type of equilibria - "objective civilian control" - which maximizes military security. It is possible to analyze the extent to which the system of civil-military relations in any society tends to enhance or detract from the military security of the society. It is also possible to suggest the changes in the component elements of the system, which would be necessary if the system, were to approximate more closely equilibrium of "objective civilian control". (1957, viii)

To elaborate, Huntington argues that civil-military relations constitute an important element of national security policy (1957, 1). He claims that the purpose of national security policy is "to enhance the safety of the nation's social, economic, and political institutions against

threats arising from other independent states" (1957, 1). In this sense, he identified three forms

of this policy. The first pertains to military security policy which is "the program of activities

designed to minimize or neutralize efforts to weaken or destroy the nation by armed forces

operating outside its institutional and territorial confines"(1957, 1). The forms of civilian control

over military affect the state's foreign policy especially in cases of threats. Tension between

soldiers and political leaders may lead to defeat. Thus, it is important to outline the framework of

civil-military relations in this area.

The second form of national security policy is situational security policy. This policy "is

concerned with the threat of erosion resulting from long-term changes in social, economic,

demographic, and political conditions tending to reduce the relative power of the state" (1957, 1).

However, this paper is not interested in military security policy or situational security

policy; it is more interested in the third form, which is internal security policy. According to

Huntington, internal security policy deals with "the threat of subversion - the effort to weaken or

destroy the state by forces operating within its territorial and institutional confines" (1957, 1).

Such forces could operate from within state system by establishing civil associations and in

some cases political parties. They might have radical agendas that aim to destroy the existing

political order and reestablish a new one that suits their goals. This might be the case of many

Islamist groups in the majority of Muslim countries. Nevertheless, before analyzing Islamist-

military relations in the context of internal security policy it is necessary to understand military's

relations with state, society, and democracy, on the one hand, and Islamists' relations with state,

society, and democracy, on the other, both theoretically and in practice.

Military-State Relations

According to Huntington, "the principal forms of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state" (1957, 3). He considered officer corps as the modern military "professional body and the modern military officer is a professional man"(1957, 7). For him, the conflict in the modern officer and political leader relation is rooted in the essence of professionalism.

Huntington understands professionalism as characteristics of the modern officer that distinguish him for yesterdays warrior (1957, 7). These characteristics are "expertise, responsibility, and corporateness" (1957, 8). Modern officer corps should be equipped not only with advanced technology but also should be expert "with specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor" (1957, 8). Such characteristic cannot be acquired but through high levels of education and skills especially that officers are responsible for the specialized use of violence.

Modern officer corps is responsible for devoting its skills and knowledge to serving and protecting society and state (1957, 9). This responsibility is related to its expertise and knowledge in the specialized implementation of violence. Yet, it is not responsible for the management of violence. Managing violence is the responsibility of the state. Thus, officer corps cannot impose decisions on the state or force it to adopt certain orientations concerning any form of the national security policy. Officer corps can only explain his views and needs and provide

his advices to the state and aid the latter in the decision it makes (1957,16). To a certain extent, Huntington argues, "officer's behavior towards the state is guided by an explicit code expressed in law and comparable to the canons of professional ethics of the physician and lawyer. To a larger extent, the officer's code is expressed in customs, tradition, and the continuing spirit of profession" (1957, 16).

Modern officer corps corporateness refers to the "share sense of organic unity and consciousness" between the corps members, as they perceive themselves as "a group apart from laymen" (Huntington 1957, 10). In this sense, officers corps possess "high degrees of specialization of labor and responsibilities within the profession" (1957, 10). Military is a closed organization. It has its own hospitals, markets, schools and housing, industries, and even military police and courts. This made the military autonomous more than any other institution in the government or society.

Due to this autonomy, certain values and ideologies developed among officer corps, which Huntington might refer to as the 'military mind'. Military mind, according to him, is characterized of being conservative, realistic, and pessimistic about human nature (1957, 59-79).

He adds that ""the military function is performed by a public, bureaucratized profession expert in the management of violence and is responsible for the military security of the state" (1957, 61). In this sense, military officer's responsibilities affect his attitude towards the state in many ways:

(1) He "views the state as the basic unit of political organization,

(2) He tends to "stress the continuing nature of the threats to the military security of the state and the continuing likelihood of war",

(3) He tends "to emphasize the magnitude and immediacy of the security threats" (1957, 64-5).

In Huntington's view, on the level of decision-making:

> "The military man rarely favors war. The military man will always argue that the danger of war requires increased armaments; he will seldom argue that increased armaments make war practical or desirable. He always favors preparedness, but he never feels prepared. Accordingly, the professional military man contributes a cautious, conservative, restraining voice to the formulation of state policy" (1957, 69)

In fact, according to Huntington, "if the statesman decides upon war which the soldier knows can only lead to national catastrophe, then the soldier, after presenting his opinion, must fall to and make the best of a bad situation" (1957, 76)

It is clear that Huntington emphasizes the supremacy of state in the military-state relation. Modern officer corps should devote all his knowledge, experience, and skills to serving the state. In fact, he argues that "the existence of a military profession depends upon the existence of nation-states…the military man consequently tends to assume that the nation-state is the ultimate form of organization" (1957, 65).

Yet, he distinguishes between a democratic country that is ruled by civilians and a totalitarian one that is ruled by military force. Civilian control or state supremacy is "identified

with democratic government, military control with absolutist or totalitarian government" (1957, 82). He argues that,

> "In democratic countries… policy is determined by persuasion and compromise; in absolutist countries it is determined by force and coercion. Hence, the military who control the most powerful instrument of violence, will be more powerful in totalitarian countries than in democratic ones" (1957, 82)

However, this assumption is not applicable to all countries (democracies or totalitarian). Huntington argues that,

> "In a democratic country, the military may undermine civilian control and acquire great political power through the legitimate processes and institutions of democratic government and politics. In a totalitarian regime, on the other hand, the power of the military my be reduced by breaking the officer corps up into competing units, establishing party armies and special military forces, infiltrating the military hierarchy with independent chains of command (political commissars), and similar techniques" (1957, 82)

To sum up Huntington's thoughts on military-state relations he argues, "The state is the active directing element of society and is responsible for the allocation of resources among important values including military security" (1957, 3).

The military-state relations in many MENA countries fit, to a certain extent, Huntington's totalitarian countries framework. Barry Rubin gives a description of military-state relations in the MENA during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Most countries in the region were emerging as independent states after long decades of European colonialism. Thus," the armed forces were the most effective national institution and, at times, the armed forces were the most effective one"(Rubin 2002, 1). He argues, "Every military officer could hope to become his country's ruler

some day. The armed forces were highly politicized and rulers field to control them" (2002, 1).

To understand this trend, Roger Owen specifies, "Most Third World armies were originally modeled on the European military organizations and used to fight colonial wars with European weapons and tactics" (2004, 179). After independence and during the period of state building the first reforms introduced in an effort to modernize the state were also army reforms on a European model (Finer1962, 221). Officer corps was thus among the first institutions in the state to adopt western ideologies of nationalism, secularism, westernization, constitutionalism, socialism and science. Yet, consolidating independence was not an easy task in the new independent states. "Incompetent and corrupt" governments carried out reforms and development as "state system had not yet stabilized and institutionalized itself" (Rubin 2002, 1-10).

Military officers saw that weak governments created a power vacuum that only the military could fill (Finer 1962, 242). They argued, "Politics was too important to be left to the politicians, whom they saw -by no means inaccurately- as incompetent and corrupt" (Rubin 2002, 1). Politicians circumvented development process to build their particularistic patronage networks. In this sense, the military, as the only well organized institution, was drawn into the power vacuum.

The Military responsibilities in many MENA countries were not only to protect the state from external threats (what Huntington calls military security policy). In fact, the military of many MENA states proved to fail in this area, such as the cases of wars against Israel 1948,

1967, and 1973. After 1973 and due to the Israeli acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, the function of Middle Eastern military became prestigious more than protective.

In this sense, the military had new functions to perform such as "to maintain internal control and stability, to serve as a symbol of independence, to perform certain modernizing functions, and to uphold the honor of the state"(Bill & Leiden 1979, 50-1). Yet, perhaps the most important role of MENA militaries is "maintaining a regime in power". In this role, the military devotes all its capacities and capabilities to protect the government from "its potential or actual internal foes"(Bill & Leiden 1979, 251). Usually in such situations the military declares a 'state of emergency' under which repressive measures are taken to put down turbulence, end hostilities, eradicate opposition, and apply strict rules on people. Many MENA countries lived through this state of emergency such as "Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Libya, Syria, Algeria, and Morocco". In addition, there is the example of "Jordan's King Hussein who has owed his throne repeatedly to the loyalty of the military" (Bill & Leiden 1979, 251).

From this perspective, the military main function in the MENA became the "regime's guardian rather than its principle challenger" (Rubin 2002, 10). This fact is very clear in case of Turkey. The Turkish military interfered many times in politics to preserve the secular state system and to ensure the implementation of *Kemalism* in Turkey's state and society. A similar case can be found in Algeria. When the victory of Islamists in the first round of elections threatened of creating an Islamist government, the military interfered and cancelled the electoral process (Rubin 2002, 10).

Due to the increasing influence of military in politics, the region witnessed significant number of military coups or military interventions during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. For example, in July 1952 Egypt witnessed a military coup led by Jamal Abdel Nasser who removed King Faruk and founded the republic of Egypt. In Syria, November 1970 Hafez Assad, leader of the *Ba^ath* Party and a military officer, overthrow the president of Syria. Sudan had military coups in 1958, 1969, and 1989. In Yemen, "the latest military coups was in 1979 and led by Ali Abdullah Al-Salah who promoted himself to field marshal" (Rubin 2002, 3). In Iraq, July 1958, inspired by Jamal Abdel Nasser, officers led by brigadier Abdul-Karim Qassem overthrow the Hashemite monarchy and proclaim a republic. In Turkey, 1980, military coup put the republic under the rule of national Security Council for almost three years.

A group of military conspirators might carry on coup d'état due to many reasons such as "profound economic distress, political corruption, political stalemate, affronts to military corporate values, threats of injury to the military corporate, or for no reason other than a thirst for power" (Karsten 1998, 225). The first three reasons are common in most MENA countries. For example, Turkey witnessed a military coup on March 12, 1971, which overthrew the elected government due to "anarchy, fratricidal strife and social and economic unrest" (Hale 1994, 184). The government had failed to deal with widespread political violence and chaos generating from conflict between Marxist and ultra-right forces, and unsuccessful social and economic reforms (Hale 1994).

Rustow and Huntington argue that motivations leading to military interventions or coups are not to be found in "history of armies or of wars but in the relationship of the military with the

remainder of the political structure" in the context of political modernization (Rustow 1967, 175). MENA countries initiated political modernization in order to reach ultimately a system where, on the one hand, the government is able to deal effectively with social, economic and political problems, and on the other hand, the people has the political platform to evaluate the government performance. This will make them view it as a legitimate source of authority, and therefore do not resort to radical opposing groups.

Military interventions and coups are the product of one specific aspect of modernization, which is "the general politicization of social forces and institutions" in the absence of effective political institutions that could coordinate their interactions (Huntington 1968, 194). In other words, in underdeveloped countries, such as most of the MENA, civil society is politicized. The increasing and uncontrolled involvement of agencies such as clergies, universities, bureaucracies, corporations and, the military with 'general political issues' and not specific to their interests is due to the lack of "autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability" of political institutions (Huntington 1968, 194). In this sense, the extensive political participation increases chaos because actors that are more social are becoming deeply involved in general political issues without any coordination between them. In such an institutional vacuum, social groups resort to their own methods in organizing and dealing with political issues, the military resorts to the method of a coup.

To sum up, the military in developed and developing countries is deeply committed to the state security and survival. In developed countries, the military is characterized of being professional. It is experienced, well organized, and responsible of state's external, internal, and

situational security without imposing or forcing his decisions on political leaders. Contrary to this, military in developing countries is devoted to protecting the existing regime from internal threats, especially those coming from opposing groups. It is the regime's guardian.

Military-Society relations

Since the military is responsible for the safety of the state, then it is responsible for the safety of society "individually and collectively" as well (Huntington 1957, 9). Due to the importance of these functions, the military acquires special skills and values, such as the capacity for organizing, using violence, corporateness, and self-sufficiency. The military's unique structure facilitates fast decision-making process and professional execution of decisions. These institutional characteristics (expertise, responsibility, and corporateness) provide the military with the capability to carry out social action other than external or internal defense functions (Huntington 1957, 14-18).

In this sense, the military, due to his professionalism, is generally capable of assisting society in modernizing. In fact, there exist deep "relations between armed force organizations and societies in the transition to relatively modernized states" (Levy 1971, 66).In societies experiencing modernization, the military plays an important role in social mobilization. For example, Egyptian military served as an important socialization agent in Egyptian society since 1952. In the military, modernity education was employed with traditional background and placed in a classless framework, which provided the soldier with the prospect of social mobility through promotion based on advantages and skills rather than class/kinship aspects (Levy 1971, 66-8).

However, social mobilization might lead different social actors (groups or individuals) into the political arena. Some actors will try to intervene in the political order and push for political or economic change in their favor. Martin Needler explains this situation as he argues that:

> "It may be interpreted to the military by those trying to secure their intervention as a threat to the personal interests of military officers. Such as challenge in the economy at large, to the military in its role of preserver of domestic order, or, most likely, as a long-term threat to the special statues and privileges, and even continued existence, of the military institution" (Needler 1971, 84)

In this sense, political and economic development, in other words modernization, of social groups has a profound effect on society-military relations. Rustow argues that modernization is a revolutionary process that reconstructs the intellectual, technological, and social aspects of any society or group in society (D. Rustow 1967, 6). In many Third World societies, mobilized social groups threaten the military and to face such threats military takes certain measures such as:

> "(1) military intervention which increasingly takes the form of an attempt by the possessing classes to maintain the status quo
> (2) Military intervention, which is directed against legally, elected 'governments' heading constitutional regimes
> (3) Interventions to forestall the election and inauguration of reforming 'governments
> (4) Popular resistance to military intervention resulting in greater likelihood that a military coup will lead to open fighting" (Needler 1971, 84-5)

To a certain extent, this viewpoint describes the situation in many MENA societies. The military was the only well organized institution after independence and due to its responsibility as the regime guardian; military intervened in politics to contain social groups who, by

participating in state politics such as elections, threatened its interests. Clear example is seen in case of Turkey. Turkish military sees himself as the guardian of the secular republic and Kemalists secular reforms. In addition, he sees himself as a force that integrates people from all orientation, classes, and social backgrounds in one nation. Yet, when the Welfare Part threatened the military's interests in preserving the secular state system, he forced Welfare leader and his party out of the government in 1997 (Rubin 2002, 9-12).

To sum up, the military-society relation is asymmetry relation. The military plays a great role in mobilizing, modernizing, and integrating social groups in the political order he guards. Yet, when social groups are politically mature and try to carry on political development and even political changes that might threatens military interests, he intervene, in some cases, to preserve the status quo.

Military-Democracy Relations

Huntington argues, in one of the approaches to analyzing 'military mind' he mentioned in his book "*The Soldier and the State*", that a military man is "thought to be opposed to democracy" and in favor of organizing "society on the basis of a chain of command". He also "favors aggressive and bellicose national policies" (1957, 60). Yet, he argues, this is not the case in developed countries, which are mostly democracies. In democracies, professional military devotes all his skills and capabilities to serving the state and the nation but never leads them. Huntington asserts that officer corps advises political leaders, who are elected leaders, and carry out their decisions without forcing his own. Only civilian government, which is elected by the

people, has the authority and the responsibility to decide and manage the use of violence (Huntington 1957, 16 & 59-79).

Huntington's emphasis on civilian control over military highlights a fundamental principle of democracy. This principle is that the people elect those who have the authority to govern people and decide the fate of the nation.

In addition, professional military is responsible for protecting state and society from external and internal threats. Thus, it is not bias to any social, ethnic, or religious groups or political viewpoints. Its loyalty is to the state, to the political order, to the rule of law, and to principles of democracy (Huntington 1957, 14-16).

The situation in most MENA countries is very different. The military is seen, as mentioned previously, as the most effective institution in society that produces the best-educated individuals. Thus, the military functions exceeded defending state and society to performing functions such as "set up state-controlled economies, introduce a just distribution of wealth, and promote a new citizenship based on democracy and political participation" (Picard 1993, 552). Thus, the military became more politicized.

MENA regimes headed by ex-military officers such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Pakistan are mainly ruled by one-party system and power is concentrated in the president's hands. These non-democratic regimes rely on the military as their guardian. In monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and the Gulf States, the military also supports the rulers. In Turkey, the

only democracy in the region, although the military is clearly controlled by the civilian authorities; yet, the military still intervene in politics when he sees a threat to the state system (Rubin 2002, 1-21).

From this perspective, the military acts as a representative of the state who maintains the right to veto decisions it considers dangerous to the external or internal security of the state. At the same time, the military do not interfere directly in day-to-day affairs of the people. Military also acts as a guardian, where it intervenes occasionally to put things in order, then returns to the barracks. Finally, it can set up a ruler regime where it intervenes directly, assumes power, and runs the country (Rubin 2002, Owen 2004, Bill & Leiden 1979).

To sum up, the military interference in politics in many of the MENA countries constituted obstructed the process of democratization, if existed. Its function as the regime guardian and its loyalty to the rulers rather than the state, nation, and law made him get in the way of legislative process, such as elections. Clear examples could be seen in the cases of Turkey 1960, 1971, and 1980 and Algeria 1991-1992.

Islamists-Civil Relations:

Conceptions of State, Society, & Democracy

The end of World War I (WWI) marked the beginning of a new era in the history of the MENA region. The last Muslim political dynasty, the Ottomans, ended in the aftermath of the war. The Ottoman Empire, a German ally, was defeated, divided, and occupied by the victorious great powers (mainly France and Great Britain). The *sultanate* was formally eradicated in Turkey by the secular reformists in order to establish the new Turkish nationalism led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In other part of the MENA, the Qajar dynasty in Iran was ousted and Reza Shah, the new leader, worked to create a new state system (Cleveland 2004, 175-192).

Kemal Atatürk and Reza Shah, secularist leaders, worked to limit the influence of Islamic traditions, principles, and institutions in state and society. In most of the rest of the MENA countries, similar Westernizing reforms and the development of more secularist nationalism and westernized elites dominated. Herein, Islam was not seen as an obstacle to westernizing and modernizing attempts, but it did not fit the framework or political agenda of the emerging Arab, Turkish, Persian, and many other forms of nationalism that appeared in the region, such as the rise of the Egyptian nationalism under Sa'd Zaghloul (Bill & Leiden 1979, Schulze 2000, Cleveland 2004).

Islamists-State relations

In the post World War II (WWII) era, MENA countries became politically independent as the European imperialism ended. The rise of nationalism as well as Westernization was the most noticeable political dynamics in the region.

After independence and the establishment of western-like states and regimes,

> "Islam was the chief vehicle of political opposition in North Africa and the Middle East, regardless of official state ideology, political system, or leadership. Weather in communist Afghanistan, socialist Algeria, revolutionary Libya, secular Tunisia, 'socialist and then' pro-Western Egypt, divided Lebanon or puritanical Saudi Arabia, the generalization holds true" (Hynes 1994, 64)

In another places, "in states as diverse as Turkey, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Trinidad, Islamic groups strained the relationship between governments and governed"(Hynes 1994, 64).

In this sense, the role of political Islam and Islamists became increasingly essential for the political stability of the region. Modernizing MENA societies were "characterized by strong patterns of religious influence" (Bill & Leiden 1979, 74).

The question then becomes; what do Islamists want? On the one hand, Islamists call for "partial or total rejection of Western values, lifestyles, legal systems, and ideologies". On the other hand, they call for "strict(er) observance of Islamic codes of personal conduct and demands for the enforcement of the *Shari^a*. Generally, there is dissatisfaction with the political and

economic status quo and the common political and economic corruption of ruling elite". In other words, "the goal of all Islamic movements may be some form of Islamic state"(Hynes 1994, 64).

Almost all political Islam scripts agree that establishing an Islamic state is a necessity. In fact, it is an obligation on Muslims because through this state they could implement the Islamic law (*Shari^a*) and spread Islamic teachings through society (Ali 1999, 120). The focus of such scripts was the importance to take all measures in order to restore the Islamic Holy codes (*Shari^a*) to face the increasing influence and the widespread of alien ideas (mainly western ideologies and values) in Muslim societies. This cannot be done except through a strong Islamic state. In this sense, the establishment of an Islamic state became crucial to protect Islam and ensure its continuity (Ali 1999, 120).

Yet, questions become, what type of state is the Islamic state? Is it a theocracy? Islamists scholars were concerned of finding answers to such questions. Among them was the Syrian Islamist thinker 'Mohammad Rashid Rida'[2] whose "conception of an acceptable did not differ profoundly from Ayatollah Khomeini's". This conception was built on two main factors: "the restoration of rule by an Islamic leader and the paramountcy of *Shari^a*" (Haynes 1994, 66). From this perspective, Islam is not separate from the state, which is governed by a religious leader. In fact, many Islamist scholars, such as Fahmi Howaydi[3], refuse labeling the state of being Islamic or a nation-state because this classification infer the idea of separating Islam from the state (Ali 1999, 122-3). They argue that if a state is categorized of being a civil state this does not necessarily means the state and society are governed by secular civil laws and not by

---

[2] Died in 1935 (Haynes 1994, 66)
[3] A contemporary Egyptian Islamist thinker (Ali 1999)

44

Islam. Contrary to this, they argue, if the state is categorized of being Islamic this does not mean that the state is not civil. Howaydi and others like him distinguished between the executive authorities, whose responsibility in the Islamic state is to implement *Shari^a,* and the social contract that is called the state. As the *'Shari^a'* is implemented, the form, type or label of the state does not matter (Ali 1999, 122-3). This thought of a theocracy can be summarized in Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (1929), declaration that "Islam is a state and a religion at the same time" (Ali 1999, 123).

Many other Islamist scholars, such as Mohammad Imarah[4], argue that Muslims are not obliged to establish an Islamic state. Yet, they argue, in order for Muslims to practice their religion in today's world they need to establish a state that is governed by Islamic rules (Ali 1999, 124). However, the Islamic state they call for is not a theocracy. A theocratic state conception assumes that there is a particular religious authority or group within the Islamic tradition that has exceptional privilege given to them by God and therefore has the right and power to impose divine will in state and society. This conception is also based on the history of Europe in the dark ages when the Pope (heading a religious hierarchy) was considered as the representative of God on earth; thus, all his rules were considered divine without questioning their sources. For *Imarah* and other Islamists who share his belief, this is where the argument fails in relation to Islam, because the Islamic tradition, at least in the majority *Sunni* teaching, does not recognize a pope-like figure, nor does it preach the establishment of a religious class that has special access to divine will (Ali 1999, 118-131).

---

[4] An activist Islamist thinker in Egypt (Ali 1999, 124)

In addition, they believe that after the Prophet Mohammad, there is no one who has direct access to God's revelation, and therefore no individual or group has the authority or the right to declare unquestionable decrees in the Muslim community. Thus, an Islamic political system is not an inherently theocratic. It is guaranteed that the laws, principles, and spirit of the *Quran* and *Hadith,* which serve as the complete and total sources of a constitution in an Islamic state, bind the Islamic political system (Ali 1999, 118-131).

Although Islamists do not agree on the specific details and form of the Islamic state, all of them agree on the necessity of establishing an Islamic state that applies the Islamic law. In this sense, they reject the existing state order, which separates religion from the state.

Islamists-Society Relations

Islam has always been a vital element in Muslim communities. It affected the political, socioeconomic, and cultural dynamics of the modernization processes while in turn being affected by them. During the period when the Ottoman Empire became very weak and European colonialists occupied many of its territories, Muslims started soul-searching for the causes of decline of the Muslim Empire and societies. Many Muslims concluded that drifting from the path of Islam and its teachings had been responsible for the loss of the past glory. Their prescription for restoring this glory was a return to Islam as well as elimination of foreign ways. In this sense, the Islamic resurgence was a religious response to the loss of independence and sovereignty (Ali 1999, Schulze 2000, Cleveland 2004).

After WWII, in the independent states of the MENA region, Islam had to face the alien concepts of nation-state, nationalism, secularization, and westernization. Society was governed by nationalist and, in many cases, secular elite who worked to reduce the influence of Islam in state and society. In these societies, Muslims were citizens and believers at the same. In other words,

> "Nationalist elites attempted to give the nation a modern political meaning in seeking to deprive religion of its role as the organizing principle of society. A cultural significance was given to national affairs by using Islam as a control mechanism, which served to legitimize the established order and functioned as means of identity designed to reaffirm endogenous cultural values" (Allam 2004).

Due to this fact, Islam played a dual role in society. On the hand, ruling elite incorporated Islam in their state apparatus in order to legitimize their rule. On the other hand, Islam was the main theme that "gathered individuals as a structural means of identity" (Allam 2004). Yet, "two elements that were destined to deprive religion of its role as a central element of society were secularization and nationalism. Secularization sought to replace religion as the main foundation of identity, loyalty, and authority, while nationalism proposed that religion be replaced by the nation as the new cult object"(Allam 2004).

By containing Islam and limiting its influence in society, rulers carried out their secularization and modernization reforms. In fact, "the de-Islamization of the public definitely corresponded to a need for international recognition" (Schulze 2000, 125). People in the MENA societies were caught by such reforms while at the same time trying to hold on to religious and cultural beliefs. Thus, the rise of Islamism was mainly the result of modernization and secularization attempts (Bill & Leiden 1979, 62-9).

To face these attempts, Islamists created civil association such as the establishment of the Muslim Brother in Egypt (1929) and the Islamic Society in India (1941). Since the beginning, Islamists tried to establish branched in other societies such as the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. They succeeded in Syria in 1945 when "several Syrian neo-*Salafi* (Fundamentalists) organizations, among them the Syrian Society of Muslim Youth and an older group of Muslim Brothers from Damascus formed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Mustafa al-Siba^i (1915-1964)" (Schulze 2000, 127). Muslim Brotherhood also succeeded in establishing branches in Palestinian territories in 1946, the Islamic liberation movement in Sudan in 1947, and the Society of Muslim Brothers in Iraq during the same period. Yet, they failed to establish branched in Saudi Arabia because the Saudis claimed, "the Muslim brotherhood was inconsistent with the Saudi Arabian law of associations" (Schulze 2000, 127). However, neither one of the Islamist associations could offer any alternative to modernization or nationalism. They could not even help other Muslims, in India, Indonesia, and many other places in MENA, in facing the pressure of secular rulers and modern states (Schulze 2000).

With the rise of socialism in many MENA countries after WWII, Islamists were able to co-exist in society with this ideology since it had "no bearing up on the social order of Islamic societies" (Schulze 2000, 129). Due to the spread of socialism, Islamists started to pay more attention to social issues. Still, they focused their efforts to transform society into a society governed by *Shari^an* .In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted "socialist arguments and loudly declared themselves for an Islamic socialism"(Schulze 2000, 129). This labeling was mainly motivated by the belief that the West is attempting to destroy Islam. Yet,

Islamists did not care whether the head of state was a monarch or a military officer, whether he cooperated with the United States or the Soviet Union because for them the ruling elite's goal was to crush them and contain Islam.

Many types of Islamists exist in MENA societies. Analyst Barry Rubin (1998, Vol. 2) classified Islamist groups into three types: revolutionaries, national liberationalists, and reformists.

(1) Revolutionaries are those who use violence in order to induce change in society and government. For example, Islamist groups in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq are carrying out armed resistance to overthrow the existing governments and to transform society. Rubin argues, "aside from Algeria, these are all relatively small underground organizations though they have larger circles of supporters. The most repressive states-- Syria and Iraq--have had the greatest success in suppressing such insurgencies, which embody grievances which are otherwise barred from expression, much less solution"(Rubin 1998). He noted that the Syrian and Iraqi Islamist movements represent ethnic-national sects. The same holds for Saudi Arabia, where radical Wahhabis groups also organized violent attacks.

On the other side, Rubin argues that Algeria is facing a complete revolution because of the military's refusal to allow "a broad-based, reformist Islamic group, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), to attain an electoral victory"(Rubin 1998). The FIS are, to some extent, willing to negotiate with the government and compromise. In addition, some other revolutionary Islamist groups negotiated successfully with the government like the

Islamic Brotherhood, which made a compromise with the Egyptian government. Rubin argues that the Egyptian government "let the Brotherhood participate in electoral politics, hold parliamentary seats, and function as a movement. However, the permissible lines are clearly set. Periodic repression and vote-rigging demonstrate to the Brotherhood that it will not be permitted to gain power and will be crushed if it seems to pose a threat of seizing power"(Rubin 1998). On the other side, more extreme Islamist groups, like the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria, reject any compromise.

(2) National liberationists: This type refers to the groups that launch violent activities against other nations. Rubin gives the examples of the Palestinian (*Hamas* and *Islamic Jihad*) and Lebanese (*Hezbollah*) groups. He claims that they have a dual purpose. On the one side, they wish to establish an Islamic state among their own people; yet, their main concern has been fighting others. Rubin argues, "*Hamas* and *Islamic Jihad* have launched terrorist attacks on Israelis while competing for popular support with the PLO- ruled Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA arrests their activists and refuses to let them seize power, but there is also a strong measure of mutual tolerance to prevent a civil war"(Rubin 1998). In addition, he mentions, "within Lebanon, *Hezbollah* attacked Israel and its allies in southern Lebanon. At the same time, *Hezbollah* tries to seize power within the *Shi^as* community and in the country as a whole"(Rubin, 1998).

(3) Reformists: The last type refers to Islamist groups who "avoided violence and act as social and parliamentary movements"(Rubin 1998). In Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Tunisia, Turkey, and Pakistan Islamic parties have largely participated in the political processes

and opposed the regime from within the system. Rubin argues, "Acting within the legal system allows them to have influence and bring about some changes"(Rubin 1998). The Islamists argue, "These techniques win followers and provide a springboard for seizing power in the future"(Rubin 1998).

In MENA society today, the Islamist segment is composed of a wide range of associations whose objective is maintaining and spreading the Islam in society. These associations are among the most active and widespread informal institutions in society. This is because they provide "charitable and social services such as medical care, education, employment assistance, teaching, as well as religious instructions and spiritual guidance" (Hawthorne 2004). Some of these associations relate back to the old branches established by Islamists early in the twentieth century such as those established by the Muslim Brotherhood in many MENA states. However, most of them are new "being part of the Islamic resurgence"(Hawthorne 2004). Yet, not all new Islamist associations are free from governmental control and political orientations. Some Islamist organizations are directed and funded by "state religious establishments and they propagate mainstream religious doctrine through education and charity work"(Hawthorne 2004). Other associations are free from governmental control. At the far boundaries of the Islamist segment there are "radical movements, such as Egyptian *Islamic Jihad* and *al Qaeda* that employ terrorism and indoctrination to achieve their vision of a properly "Islamic" society" (Hawthorne 2004).

To sum up, Islamists believe that their society has drifted apart from the traditional Islamic path due to colonialism, modernization, westernization, and nationalism. They want to

change this situation and restore what they feel is the authentic Muslim society that had been mutated by European colonialists. At the most basic level, Islamists believe that their societies should be founded upon, organized, and run according to Islamic law as found in. Moreover, they emphasize that the moral corruption of the modernization and secularization attempts [5]should be minimized in their societies through strict moral codes.

Islamists-Democracy Relations

The goal to establish an Islamic state has been dynamic factor that motivated all Islamist groups throughout the Muslim world effectively since the inter-war period. However, in the independent, secular, and national MENA states that emerged following the de-colonization of Muslim countries, this goal faced the challenge of political repression and authoritarianism. The post-colonial history of most MENA involved a "passage from a brief period of competitive elections to several decades of one party rule, followed, in some cases at least, by the revival of a more open political system in the 1980s and 1990s" (Owen 2004, 131). Establishing democracy in the Muslim world has always been hard and sometimes bloody. Military coups, westernized elites, and tribal/traditional leaders usually exclusively control state power. In addition, improvement in liberalizing societies, modernizing institutions, and developing democratic infrastructures was generally slow and limited. This situation led to a combination of political and economic stagnation, and the dissatisfaction of many people who had no democratic platform to reform the system. As a result, a fertile ground was created for Islamists to grow and gain more strength.

---

[5] Freedom to do things rejected by Islam such as immodesty, sexual promiscuity, drinking, drug use, greed, secularism, vulgarity…etc

In the early stages of Islamists political activities, Sayyed Qutb (1906-1966) was the first extremist's scholar to declare that democracy is blasphemy (Al-Turaby et al 2003, 60-3). His political belief was built on two foundations: first, the supremacy of God's rules; and second, the rejection of fabricated rules. He believed that God's rules organize the human life in all its political, social, economic, and religious aspects. Therefore, he argued, all nations (Islamic or non-Islamic) and all states (Islamic or non-Islamic) should yield to the Islamic perception of the world and religion (Al-Turaby et al 2003, 60-3). From Qutb's perspective, Islamic law governs all political rights and liberties. The state has moral, collective, and political functions that are carried out within the Islamic context. Thus, the state has no right in establishing new political or pluralistic rights, liberties, or innovations (Al-Turaby et al 2003, 60-3).

For Qutb, liberties, public welfare, and nation's autonomy are all united in the Islamic ideological framework. He argued that democracy does not allow this to take place because it spreads immoral concepts of liberties and individuality that threatens the social fabric of the Islamic state. In fact, he agued, pluralism opens the door for society's and Islam's enemy to reach authoritative office. Such positions could be used to fight Islam from within and to weaken the Islamic state and the nation's unity (Al-Turaby et al 2003, 60-3). From this perspective, Qutb rejected democracy and specifically liberal democracy (Al-Turaby et al 2003, 60-3).

Another Islamist scholar who adopted the same political orientation is the Algerian FIS leader Abbassi Madani. He followed the Muslim Brotherhood's political perception in rejecting democracy. He believes that Islam has its own form of democracy, which is *Shura* (consultation).

Thus, God's rule *Shura* should be the law applied in Muslim countries not some exported

western ideology (Al-Turaby et al 2003, 60-4).

To sum up, Islamists believe that democracy gives sovereignty or power of rule to

people, while Islam gives sovereignty or power of rule to God even in *Shura*, which would not

allow for a 'government by the people'. The laws, principles, and spirit of the Quran and Hadith,

which serve as the complete and total sources of a constitution in an Islamic state, bind the

Islamic political system. In this sense, breaking or defying any sacred teaching of Islam could

not be accepted in an Islamic political system, for doing so would be going against the sources

of the constitution. Therefore, in the Islamic legislations God is the sole giver of divine laws.

Military-Islamists: Confrontations & Containment

Since late nineteenth century, Islamists searched for a solution to the political and religious crisis caused by Western, specifically European, imperialism. They also searched for an answer to the question of why did the Ottoman Islamic Empire decline and what had gone wrong with Muslim society. Islamists believed that the secularists' elite were responsible for this situation. They supported the rejection of the Western ideologies and values, non co-operation with the new secular rulers, and holy war '*jihad*' against them and the secular state. Secularists' elite in turn blamed traditional Islam for the decline. They saw Islamists as a threat to modern state and political order, advocated the separation of religion from the state in the context of the Western model of state, and worked to limit the influence of Islam in state and society. They also tended to suppress Islamists, sometimes by violent means, to prevent them from defying the system and achieving their goals. To carry out this aggressive policy towards Islamists, governments relied heavily on military forces.

The Muslim Brotherhood[6], "has been the ideological and institutional epicenter of fundamentalism[7] in the Arab sphere and the Islamic world" (Derkmejian 1995, 73-4). Under the pressure of economic, social, and political crisis under British colonialism, many Egyptians joined the Brotherhood in search for "solutions for their psycho-spiritual, social, and economic problems". In this sense, they became "committed to revival of Islamic community without regards to sectarian or political divisions"(Derkmejian 1995, 75). In fact, the Muslim

---

[6] founded in Egypt in 1929 by *Hasan Al-Banna*

[7] The writer means by fundamentalism "a search for the fundamentals of faith, and foundations of Islamic polity and the bases of legitimate authority". He argues, "Such formulation emphasizes the political dimensions of Islamic movements more than its religious aspect" (Derkmejian 1995, 4). Thus, his definition of fundamentalism is close to this paper's definition of Islamism.

Brotherhood "emphasized its commitment to a moral order transcending politics" and specifically "attempted to build an *Ummah*- an Islamic state within the Egyptian state" (Derkmejian 1995, 76). With such goals, the Muslim Brotherhood became a threat to the ruling regime and to the state itself (Derkmejian 1995, 76). Therefore, the Brotherhood was banned and government's agents assassinated Al-Banna.

Yet, the Brotherhood continued its activities secretly. They collaborated with the military officers who carried out the 1952 revolution against king Faruk. At first, the Muslim Brotherhood relations with the military corps were "cordial and often friendly" (Derkmejian 1995, 77). However, it became apparent very soon after the revolution that Nasser's military regime was "moving toward a secular state rather than an Islamic polity" (Derkmejian 1995, 77). Therefore, the Brotherhood carried out activities against Nasser's regimes such as joining domestic opposition, leading demonstrations that called for civilian government, seeking help from regional opposition such as Jordan, and most importantly attempting to assassinate Nasser in October 26, 1954. The military corps, led by Nasser, response varied from crushing their opposition demonstrations, purging the Brotherhood sympathizers from the officer corps, repressing the Brotherhood Islamists through out the country by banning their activities and arresting their leadership along with "over four thousand member"(Derkmejian 1995, 77). Six members of the Brotherhood leadership were executed by Military council constituted of Jamal Salim, Hussein al-Shafi^i, and Anwar Al-Sadat, who were members of Nasser's military corps. Other Muslim Brotherhood leaders were imprisoned for life (Derkmejian 1995, 77).

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, like Egypt's, came out of social, economic, and political hardship under colonialism (French) and called for "the establishment of a comprehensive Islamic order. The Syrian Brotherhood was "suppressed by Colonel Adib al-Shishakli[8] in 1952"(Derkmejian 1995, 106-8). During the 1950s, the Brotherhood's activities were seen as dangerous by *Ba^thists*, Nasserites, and communists. The Brotherhood opposed the United Arab Republic (constituted of Egypt and Syria as one united Arab state in 1958) because of their "ideological opposition to Nasser"(Derkmejian 1995, 107). Nevertheless, no sever measures have been taken against them. However, when *Ba^thists* returned to power in 1963 they contained the movement and banished its leader "Isam al Attar". Due to this escalation, the Muslim Brotherhood became the "implacable opponent of the Ba^ath" (Derkmejian 1995, 107). Soon after Hafiz al-Assad came to power in 1971, the pressing focus of the Brotherhood opposition to the regime was the demand that Islam be declared the state religion in the constitution. Yet, Assad's regimes failed to meet the Islamists demands. In this sense, they viewed the constitution as the product of a secular, *Ba^thists* ruling elite. Muslim Brotherhood militants staged a series of uprisings in February 1973 in predominantly Sunni cities, where the majority of their supporters reside, such as *Hamah* and *Homs*. A huge number of Islamists were killed and wounded in clashes between the troops and demonstrators (Derkmejian 1995, 103-118).

In Iraq, the Islamist movement was dominantly *Shi^as*, contrary to the Syrian and Egyptian Islamists who were predominantly *Sunni*. Their counterparts in Iran weather under Shah or Khomeini (Derkmejian 1995, 121) mainly influenced them.

---

[8] leader of the military corps who ruled Syria between 1949-1954

Since the beginning, *Shi^as* opposed the Iraqi *Ba^thists* leadership who constituted an officer corps. For example, "the *Hizib al-Fatimi* brought together *Shi^it* intellectuals and officers of Arab and Iranian origins to oppose the *Ba^thi* regime during the early 1970s"(Derkmejian 1995, 121). Yet, vicious opposition came from the *Shi^as* Islamic call Party (*Hiab al-Da^wah*) in1968. They adopted violence and militancy against *Ba^thists* regime because "they considered the government's secularist policies as being against Islam" they accused the government of "selling pork, bringing Islamic schools under government control, suspending religious publications, obstructing mosques repairs, and persecuting *Shi^it* clergy"(Derkmejian 1995, 122). The *Ba^thists* officer corps who lead Iraq responded by repressing, expelling, executing, and imprisoning many of the Islamists. Yet, *Shi^it* Islamists continued to call for the establishment of an Islamic state especially after the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979. However, when Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979, he arrested the Hiab al-Da^wah leader Baqir al-Sader and his sister Binit Al-Huda and executed them in April 1980 (Derkmejian 1995, 123).

Iraq, Syria, and Egypt constitute three cases, among many in the MENA, in which Islamist came in direct and deadly confrontations with the officer corps. In these cases, Islamists main goals were the establishment of an Islamic state and the application of the Islamic law. Secular officer corps considered such goals as threatening to the state and the ruling regime. In the case of Egypt, Nasser's regime adopted radical socialism that was considered by the Muslim Brotherhood as an alien western ideology. They pushed for they pushed for establishing an Islamic state but ended up jailed, exiled, or executed. The same goes for the Iraqi and Syrian whose officer corps adopted the socialist, secular Ba`thist ideology. Islamists in both countries had the same goals and faced the same fate as their counterparts in Egypt.

Toward the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, to overcome the drastic effects of their stiff policies in the 1970s, most Islamist movements started a process of broad reevaluation and revision of their strategies and goals. They attempted to resolve their traditional legality crisis and to fit themselves into a more flexible framework. What is significant about these reevaluations is their rapidity in absorbing tremendous overlapping circumstances in Islamists' surrounding environment.

Islamists' rigid policies were largely based on the writings of Sayyed Qutb. His teachings laid the groundwork for the principle of social isolation by focusing on the belief that whoever is not loyal to what he called the Islamic Brotherhood (and his interpretation of Islam) is considered, by him and his group, infidels. Consequently, he helped in establishing static movements able neither to adapt to political changes in their societies nor to interact with their environment (Derkmejian 1995, 75-9 & 84-8).

However, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Islamist movements grew closer to their surroundings by increasing their interaction with society, and adopting more productive and peaceful strategies and projects. They attempted to update their political ideology and to bring its framework into a new scope. They tried to disperse all concerns within their surroundings to win the trust of all classes of these societies. Their success in this strategy brought the movements from shade to light, from isolation to openness, and from defeat to success (Hammad 2001).

In their attempts to reevaluate their political goals and strategies, the Islamists went through two main stages. The first was during the 1980s. This represented what is called the stage of broad Islamic awareness in which the movements shifted from the state of religious preaching to mobilize people to the state of political speeches that address social, economic, and political issues as well as moral and religious issues. The second stage was during the 1990s where most of the Islamist movements, such as the Islamists in Jordan, discovered the shortcomings of the use of violence as means to achieve their political goals. In particular, the strategy of violence led them to lose many vital opportunities of growth and legitimacy, as they were subject to governmental repression and social backlash (Hammad 2001, 230-4).

Consequently, these movements adopted strategies of peaceful involvement in the political process, regardless of the aims they are seeking after wining. These included working within the political system, participating in elections, and entering the parliament or even the government if it was possible. Such strategies were very different from the strategies of violence and contestation by weapons and assassinations that they had previously implemented (Hammad 2001, 234-241).

The changes in the Islamist movements' political goals and strategies were not universal; rather they differed from one movement to another. These changes may converge or diverge depending on the maturation, strength, and the political ideology of a particular movement (Hammad 2001, 234-241). Among these changes adopted by many Islamist movements was the transformation into political parties. The reason for such change is to gain an official legitimacy under the state's law after being known only as a group that is legally unprotected by law and

subject to cancellation at anytime by the state. Among those groups who transformed into a political party are the group of Justice and Welfare in Morocco (Hammad 2001, 234-241).

The goals of many Islamists changed as well. Instead of fighting fiercely to reestablish the Islamic state, the main common demands of the reformed Islamists became to put an end to the rule by the corrupt un-Islamic rulers and return to the purity of early Islam via the democratic means provided by the western political thought. They wanted to reach a compromise between their original goals, which they failed to reach, and the secular political order. In other words, instead of opposing violently the state they wanted to work within its system (Hammad 2001).

In most countries of the MENA, the Islamists manifestos are becoming more frank in demanding government reform and more insistent that communities conform to Islamic standards of morality and not more than that (Hammad 2001). Most Islamists are shifting their behavior from a militant and extremist context that believes in destroying the system through violence and terror, to more moderate, peaceful, diplomatic, and accommodationist context that chooses to work within the political system (Hammad 2001). Their purpose is to bring justice, democracy, and equality to society after long periods of repression and dictatorship. Good examples could be seen in Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, and Yemen, where Islamists are trying to engage in the political process to shape the institutions of civil society, establish Islamic law, and monitor government actions (Hammad 2001). Nevertheless, some Islamist groups still believe in violence as their only recourse to reach power and build the Islamic state. This includes the extremist factions in Algeria (GIA), *al-Gama^t al-Islamiah* and *al-Jihad* in Egypt, and elements of *Hezbollah* in Lebanon (Hammad 2001).

Another change is about the concept of Islamists itself. Some movements undertook an advanced initiative by omitting the Islamist headline from their agenda, often for symbolic reasons, yet their political ideology remains intact (Hammad 2001, 234-241). The main reasons for such change is to refute the claim that the movements are monopolizing the name of Islam for political reasons and are justifying for themselves what is not permissible for the others under the name of Islam. An example of the movements that made such a change was previously know as the Islamic Orientation Movement in Tunisia, now known as the Movement of Renascence *Nahda*, also what was previously known as the Islamic Society of Morocco, now known as the National Recuperation Party (Hammad 2001, 234-241).

Yet, the most important change is in the Islamists' political ideology which is the shift in their attitude towards Western values and ideologies specifically democracy. The concept of democracy was the most remarkable point of argument and the most open-ended issue in the past dialogue of Islamists. Many negative aspects were seen in it, including the freedom of belief, which was seen by the Islamists as a threat to the Islamic society and promotion to secularism (Hammad 2001, 234-241).

Recent readings of the political speech of these movements show an important transformation toward the acceptance of the idea of democracy in spite of the general belief that it contradicts the Islamic political hierarchy. Weitzman and Inbar claim that this new trend in the Islamists political orientation "was not a solely Turkish phenomenon. The tactics of most groups who seek an Islamic solution to their societies' social and political problems changed in the

1980s, from unalterably opposing western notions of democracy to waging democratic campaigns against their states authoritarian regimes"(Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 66). The dominating current idea is that democracy has many positive elements, including its guarantee of the peaceful and smooth transfer of power to the majority. Islamists also view democracy as a guarantee to changing authority by elections. Thus, they could use democracy as means to apply the Islamic consultation (*Shura*). Democracy also promotes human rights that Islamists could use to protect themselves from repression of authoritarian regimes in most of the MENA countries (Hammad 2001, 234-241).

The change in their ideological thinking encouraged many Islamist movements to engage in politics. For example, in Jordan, the Islamic Activity Front won 22 seats in the parliament in 1989, and 16 seats in 1992 (Aljazeera Center of Researches & Studies, 2004). In Algeria, the Peaceful Society Movement, a moderate Islamist group created in 1989, won 69 seats in the parliament (2004) and it has three ministers in the Algerian ministers council(Aljazeera Center of Researches & Studies, 2004). In this sense, Islamist movements or parties seized to be a threat to the state.

However, many MENA states ban the establishment of any political party even if it was not Islamist such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emerits, Qatar, Oman, and Libya (Aljazeera Center of Researches & Studies, 2004). Thus, it is hard to know the orientations of Islamists as a political movement or party.

Not all Islamists adopt the same beliefs when it comes to democracy. Some Islamist parties, such as the FIS in Algeria (which is one of the two case studies examined in this paper) believed that democracy is basically a Western ideology and therefore essentially at odds with the values and principles of Islam. They believed that people in the MENA region have to choose between their religion and democracy (Schulze 2000, 268-272). Other Islamists groups, such as the AKP in Turkey (which is the other case study in this paper), tend to be more receptive to democratic ideas, practices, and institutions. The AKP is convinced that democracy is compatible with Islam (Abdul-Majed 2002).

In another case, since the late 1980s, the Jordanian Islamists worked within the secular system by participating in elections since 1989 with no intentions to replace or destroy it. In fact, the Islamists have "espoused an ideology that has generally been consistent with democratic values". Their political agenda was "economically and socially rather conservative, supportive of Jordanian sovereignty and Hashemite rule, pro-*Shari^a* (Islamic law), and strongly against corruption and ostentation" (Robinson 1997). Contrary to many Islamists who "have publicly stated that they view democracy as a tactic, and once in power would abolish democracy in favor of an Islamic theocracy" such as the Algerian FIS, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood were "careful to link Islam with democracy itself" (Robinson 1997). In other words, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has "been temperate in language and sober in its analysis of what was politically possible and desirable". In this sense, they represent what is called "political moderation"(Robinson 1997). This political moderation meant that the Islamists have demonstrated "both in language and in action, a respect for the democratic process and support for the existing regime". The leader of the Muslim Brothers in Jordan, Muhammad al-Dhunaybat,

confirmed that, "There is nothing in the Brethren's strategy or policy that calls for toppling the regime. We are advocates of reform, gradual reform. We never believed in violence or intellectual terrorism" (Robinson 1997).

To sum up, the conflict between secular officer corps and the Islamists in the MENA region persisted for decades. Many Islamist movements resorted to opposition, demonstrations, assassinations, and violence in order to establish an Islamic state. Mostly they were considered as a threat to the existing rulers and state. Therefore, the officer corps, as the regime guardians, banded, jailed, and executed many of them. When the difficulty to overcome military repression by violence became better understood, Islamists began to come up with strategies that are more creative and methods, which best utilize the available political opportunities. Many Islamist movements such as the Welfare Party in Turkey worked within the state system but still tried to change it towards rejecting secularism and adopting Islamic constitution they ended up overthrown from government by military coup in 1997. Other Islamists, such as the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, worked within the system with out posing any threat to the state or ruling elite.

In this sense, it seems that the military-Islamists relation is function of both: the Islamists political agenda and speeches on the one hand, and the military role as the regimes guardian on the other. This leads us to the question this paper is trying to answer: How can Islamists establish non-violent relations with the military in order to reach power with out military intervention or coup d'état to interrupt their success?

By examining the theoretical bases of civil-military relations and the historical aspects of this relation in the MENA region the probable method for Islamists to reach power and form governments is by playing down their Islamists roots and abandoning their Islamists dreams of building an Islamic state on the ruins of the secular state. If they merge with the existing political order and use legislative means to represent and defend their interests as any other political parties then the officer corps will no long see them as a threat to the regime. In this sense, officer corps, as the regime guardian, will not intervene in the political process that might lead Islamists to rule.

This paper attempts to support the previous assumption by examining two case studies: Algeria free elections in 1991-1992 and Turkey's free elections in 2002.

Chapter 4

Context & Circumstances: The Military & Islamists

In Turkish & Algerian Politics

At the end of the 20th century, Islamist groups have become active participators in the political process all over the MENA region. A new class of modern-educated elites leads them. This neo-Islamist revivalism became more politicized than before as it engaged in establishing parties and participating in elections. Yet, this movement still aims at implementing a more Islamically oriented state and society. In this sense, officer corps, as the state and regime guardian, had to prevent Islamists from reaching their goals.

This chapter will examine two cases: the first case is Turkey's Islamists Justice and Development Party (AKP) who won elections in 2002 and managed to stay in power until today. The second case is the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) who won great majority in the first round of elections in 1991 but failed to reach power due to military intervention. Comparison between the two cases aims at finding the conditions or factors that helped Islamists in reaching and staying in power in the first case and the factors that prevented them form-reaching power in the second. The objective then is to find if there is a peaceful and perhaps cooperative framework for military-Islamist relations.

Military Tolerance of AKP in Turkey Elections 2002

Introduction

The Turkish independent republic was declared in 1922 after the abolition of the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk or Father of Turk) headed the new state and undertook the job of completely remaking the Turkish society. Atatürk was a military officer who had introduced reforms, which he considered of vital importance for his country to be recognized internationally as a modern state. In his program of modernization reforms,

> "Secular government and education played a major role. Making religious faith a matter of individual conscience, he created a truly secular system in Turkey, where the vast Moslem majority and the small Christian and Jewish minorities are free to practice their faith. As a result of Atatürk's reforms, Turkey -unlike scores of other countries- has fully secular institutions" (Atatürk website 1999)

By the time Atatürk died in 1938, a constitution had been adopted, Islam was removed as the state religion, Constantinople became Istanbul, and women obtained the right to vote (Sakallioglu 2002).

Atatürk's successor, Ismet Inönü, managed unstable neutrality in World War II, and then directed Turkey through the transition to a true democracy. The opposition Democratic Party won the election in 1950. In 1960, and again in 1970, observant army officers, who considered the government's repressive ways a violation of the constitution, brought an overextended Democratic Party back into line. In 1980, political struggles and civil turbulence brought the country to a halt. Different groups caused chaos, supported on the one hand by the Soviet bloc and on the other by Islamists groups. In the centre, the two major political parties were blocked

from progress so badly that for months they could not elect a parliamentary president. The military stepped in again to induce common relief but at the price of authoritarian control and many human rights abuses. The leader of the military government, General Kenan Evren, resigned his military commission and became Turkey's new president (Jenkins 2001, 35-40).

In 1983, the free elections brought Turgut Özal (centre-right party) to power. He stabilized the country and supervised a business boom, which lasted through the 80s. Özal's death in 1993 removed a powerful figure from Turkish politics and led the country to uncertainty and instability. The rest of the decade has seen unstable coalitions formed between dubious parties and recharged support for the religious right. It has also seen the establishment of the first Islamists government led by the Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan in 1997. However, in early 1998, the officer corps initiated a 'soft coup' to overthrow the Islamist government. Turkey's Constitutional Court barred the Islamist Welfare Party, and along with it, previous Prime Minister Erbakan because the party was accused of working to weaken Turkey's secular democratic basis, but, ironically, the ban opened up the question of just how democratic Turkey is. A disturbing human rights record, an unstable economy, and the ongoing clashes with the Kurds further endanger Turkey's democratic bases (Jenkins 2001, 35-40).

Early in 2001, the Turkish economy collapsed dramatically. More than one million people lost their jobs. Moving away from the worst economic disaster in the republic's history, tourism-dependent Turkey was delivered a further harsh blow by the events of September 11. The International Monetary Fund stepped in with a transfusion (Abdul-Majed 2002). In November 2002, the newly established Islamic Justice and Development Party won a landslide victory. It is still ruling until present day without military intervention.

Military Role in Turkish State, Society & Democracy

Since its independence, Turkey was governed directly or indirectly by military. In fact, "the continued domination of Turkish politics by the country's military appears to be an anomalous anachronism, even an anathema" (Jenkins 2001, 5). Turkey has witnessed more free and popular parliamentary elections that led to civilian democratic rule than any other state in MENA (except for Israel). However, the military has intervened in politics almost every ten years in the name of protecting the state. Yet, after achieving its objectives, the military voluntarily handed power back to civilians (Jenkins 2001, 35-40).

The Turkish military role, as any other military in the MENA, is the guardian of the state system and political order mainly from internal threats and occasionally from external dangers. At the internal level, the military has the role of "moderating power responsible for protecting the country against squabbling civilian politicians". Although the military interfered in politics to fulfill this role, it has "traditionally been reluctant either to seize power or to participate in the civilian administration". The military intentions have never been to deal with day-to-day issues of the political life. It only aimed to restore order and protect the status quo (Jenkins 2001, 6). The military intervene in politics was due to its belief that it has a "sacred duty to protect an indigenous ideology, namely Kemalism[9]"(Jenkins 2001, 7). This perception of military's role in the state included not only internal and external security threats but also threats to Kemalism.

Kemalism refers to a Turkish form of modernizing. It represents a strict "commitment to secularism, territorial integrity, and cultural homogeneity"(Jenkins 2001, 7). For Kemalists there

---

[9] Kemalism refers to the principles and reform laid down by the founder of the Turkish republic Kemal Atatürk

70

was only a Turkish nationalist ideology, a Turkish race, and a Turkish language. Furthermore, there were one party (The Republican People's Party), one nation (Turks), and one leader (Atatürk) in the country. This ideology also identified internal enemies as communists, socialists, Islamists, Kurds, and other ethnic minorities such as Armenians, Lazes, Greeks, and Suryanis (Cleveland 2004, 175-184). In this sense, Kemalists perceived Islam as a potential danger for the modern national state.

It was crucial, during the first years of the new republic, to spread Kemalism throughout Turkey. It has been taught "with an increasing intensity in both civilian schools and military academies, initially in an attempt to create an ideological bulwark against communism, but more recently to counter the two most dynamic ideological forces, radical Islam and Kurdish separatism"(Jenkins 2001, 7). In this sense, the Turkish military has been trained to fulfill his function as both "the guardian of the nation and of Kemalist doctrine.

Corruption in the political and bureaucratic circles of Turkey has always been an impeding problem. Politicians have "a poor reputation, being almost universally regarded as venal, incompetent, unprincipled, and self serving". They damaged the government image in the eyes of the public especially when clashes between them obstructed the governments work many times (Jenkins 2001, 7). In this sense, Turkish public view the military as the only stable and efficient institution, which they could rely on.

This perception of the Turkish military rely on a social belief that "the military and military values lie at the heart of any definition of what it means to be Turkish"(Jenkins 2001, 9).

The notions of collectiveness, nationalism, and deep-rooted sentiment of belonging to the group affect Turkish society. Such notions are taught in history lessons to children in schools and to young people in universities and military academies with the emphasis that Turkish society is "like a huge family"(Jenkins 2001, 12). These history lessons stressed the role of the military and protecting the homeland. It pictured the military officer as an honorable worrier (Borthwick 1980, 242-6). In this sense, the Turkish military became "synonymous with the Turkish nation"(Jenkins 2001, 13).

Theoretically, Turkey led a multi-party democratic system since Atatürk died in 1938. Yet, the military intervened in politics during the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Its excuse was always to protect the national security of the state which is officially defined as "the protection and maintenance of the state's constitutional order, national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural, and economic interests on the international level, and contractual law against any kind of internal and foreign threat"(Sakallioglu 2002, 189). However, the military returns power to civilians after they secure the state and the political order. Due to military interventions, Turkey represents a country in which "the tradition of constitutionally elected government is both interrupted and deeply rooted"(Sakallioglu 2002, 194).

To sum up, Atatürk's desire to establish a strong nationalist modern Turkish state, based on western values and ideals turned into an ideology, *Kemalism*, which was adopted not only by the Turkish nation, but also by the military. In this modern republic, Turks perceived the military as the institution that won independence and laid the foundations of the new republic. Thus, the military was always seen as an honorable and stable institution, free from corruption. People

trusted the military. Such sentiments enhanced its role as the guardian of the state and nation.

However, the military role stretched to include protecting the constitution and most importantly

to protect Kemalism from any internal threat. Such threats are perceived by the army to be ethnic

and religious. On the one hand, there is the Kurdish separation attempt, which threatens the

autonomy of the nation and the integrity of the Turkish territories. On the other hand, there is

Islamist resurgence threat. Therefore, in order for the military to carry on its mission as the

system guardian, democracy had to be interrupted several times.

Military-Islamists Relations: Collisions & Peace prospects

In Turkey, officer corps controlled Islamic institution, principles, and traditions

soon after the establishment of the secular republic in 1923. Atatürk, who was a military general,

carried out several reforms aimed at limiting the role of Islam in state and society:

> "He abolished the *caliphate* (a high religious position) and the system of
> religious endowments and foundations. He switched from Islamic to the
> western calendar, established Sunday as the day of rest, and decreed that
> Turkish should be written in the Latin rather than Arabic script. The *Sharia*
> was replaced by Turkish adaptations of European legal codes, and the veil for
> women and the fez for men were banned. Religious schools and *Sufi* fraternal
> associations were outlawed. The Directorate of Religious Affairs was
> organized within the office of the prime minister, and given charge of
> appointment and certification of religious leaders"(Borthwick 1980, 237)

Islamic institutions, in that case, became public institutions whose employees are, to

certain extent, civil servants "mostly secular"(Borthwick 1980, 237).

Supporters of Islamizing Turkish society failed to deal with such reforms or prevent it.

Their attempt to stage an insurgence against the secular state in the 1920s and 1930s failed to

gain popular support. Atatürk and his military crushed it (Borthwick 1980). In general, Islamists

stayed secretive throughout the era of Atatürk's one-party rule. During the late 1940s, strict

Kemalist's reforms loosened and "the government started to relax its antireligious politics". The

ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) allowed the embellishment of religious schools that were

in charge of training clergies[10] . The party also allowed the establishment of a religious academy

in Ankara University "Faculty of Divinity"(Borthwick 1980, 237). Yet, Islamic teaching and

institutions continued to be controlled by the Kemalist government out of protecting the new

secular republic from re-adopting the Islamic heritage of the Ottoman Empire.

In the 1950 free elections, Turkey shifted to a multi-party system. Due to its

authoritarianism and specifically "harsh secularism", the ruling RPP was defeated by the

Democratic Party (DP) (1950-1960). The DP was more tolerant of Islamic orientations. The

party provided money "for the construction of mosques, permission was granted for the call to

prayer to be said in Arabic, religious instruction in the public primary schools was introduced on

an optional basis, and *Sufi* fraternal associations were allowed once more to function in public".

In addition, the government allowed adults to take courses in *Quran*, which helped in increasing

the rate of literacy especially in villages and rural areas (Borthwick 1980, 238). During this

decade of DP rule and due to its loose policies towards Islam, Islamists created secret as well as

open alliances with the government. Yet, the DP social and economic policies seemed to upset

the officer corps. In May 27, 1960 "the Turkish armed forced, under the command of General

Kemal Gursel, seized control of Istanbul and Ankara and arrested leading government

officials"(Cleveland 2004, 280-1). The officer corps claimed that the purpose behind the coup

was to "preserve the principles of Kemalism from which the DP government, in the opinion of

---

[10] *Imams* who are responsible for making prayers and leading worshipers in mosques

the military, had strayed" (Cleveland 2004, 280-1). When the military felt Kemalism is secured. It returned power to civilians in 1961.

The Islamists' political activities in Turkey began in the 1970s. In January 1970 Necmettin Erbakan, who had been identified with Islamic political activism, established the National Order Party (NOP), the precursor of the three subsequent Islamist parties. With the NOP, the Islamists for the first time had an independent party institute through which they could promote their agenda in Turkish society. Erbakan's Islamist party aimed at taking over Turkish political institutions at first, then "transforming the Turkish society in to an authentic Islamic one" (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 65). He intended to reach his goal through legal political activity from with the state system. In fact, Erbakan supported participating in democratic processes, especially legislative elections, "to which they were opposed in principle" (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 65).

Weitzman and Inbar claim that in Turkey "Islamist movements came to realize that under present conditions the best way to gain power was by participating in open elections". In this sense, Islamists learned to "use the system they opposed" (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 66). Nevertheless, accepting democracy was not included in Erbakan's party agenda until the 1980s though he participated in elections in the 1970s. In addition, Islamists did not approve the system of secular nation-state and called for the reestablishment of an Islamic state.

Since the NOP's establishment, the same Islamist party changed names to escape being banned by secular authorities. First, it was called NOP (1970-1971) which was banned by the

Constitutional Court after military pressure on the bases that it violated the principles of secularism laid down in the Constitution. Second, it was named National Salvation Party NSP (1972-1981) that grew to become a regular member of government coalitions. In 1973, the NSP became "the third largest party in the country" and in 1974, "NSP leader Necmettin Erbakan became a deputy prime minister under RPP leader Bulent Ecevit". Moreover, in 1975 *Erbakan* was "appointed minister in Suleyman Demirel's coalition government". By being a minister, Erbakan's party gained access and freedom to affect the Turkish public especially in educational and communication issues. (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 62)

The NSP explicitly supported a religious political agenda calling for the restoration of the Islamic state and the reduction of economic ties to Christian countries of Western Europe. Due to this political agenda and to the increasing political influence of this party in the government, secularists considered the NSP a threat to the Kemalist ideology and to the Turkish culture and society. Therefore, NSP was banned after the military coup in 1980 (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 65).

The NSP, like all other political parties on the Turkish scene, received a serious blow during the September 1980 military coup. The purpose of this coup was to end a long period of violence, which spread throughout the country, initiated by the coalition of extremist left wing and right-wing organizations due to the devastating economic conditions and repression. The coup was also intended to hold back the threat of Islamists embodied in the NSP. After the military take over, the National Security Council (NSC) ruled Turkey. The junta "carefully

revised the political parties' law and prepared a new constitution which severely limited political pluralism and freedom of expression" (Jenkins 2001, 39).

However, while the National Security Council NSC (ruled 1980-1983) succeeded in breaking up the extreme left and right. Yet, Islamist movement survived and even gained strength and importance during the 1980s. This was due to the new national curriculum that the NSC issued in an attempt to obstruct communism. This national curriculum made "the teaching of Islam compulsory in schools which, ironically and unconsciously, thus helped to fuel the rise in radical Islam" (Jenkins 2001, 39).

After the military returned power to civilians, the NSP changed its name to the Welfare Party (1983-1998). Yet, "officer corps attitude towards Islamists was ambiguous" in the sense that "on the one hand they opposed Islamic radicalism and on the other promoted Islamic activities" (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 68). However, this ambiguity soon became clear as a new strategy was adopted by the military based on an ideological concept the "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis". A group of right-wing intellectuals developed this approach. It represented an attempt to incorporate radical Islamists and the nationalists, Kemalists. The main idea was to contain the Islamist influence. Instead of constituting a threat to the government, Islamists will be integrated in the system to contribute to the territorial integrity of the Turkish nation-state and counter the revolutionary sentiments, especially among Kurdish youth. By adopting this strategy, the Islamists activities flourished, though under governmental supervision. They offered an attractive alternative for many Turks who were seeking salvation, even the ex-communists after the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 68-9).

By the early 1990s, it seemed that officer corps intervention in the Turkish political landscape ended. This tendency was due to the military "perception of the security environment" and not an abandonment of its role as the state and nation guardian (Jenkins 2001, 39).At the same time, Islamists continued being active in hope of reaching their goals. In 1991 elections, "Erbakan's Welfare Party won 16.7 per cent of the vote" and in 1993 it won "municipal elections in Istanbul and Ankara" (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 66).

Due to the growing electoral strength and political influence of Welfare Party through out the early 1990s, it finished first in December 1995 elections after wining 158 seats in the parliament (Swash 2002). Following a seven-month long period of political uncertainty and crisis, Erbakan managed to come to power through a coalition with the center-right True Path Party. It all began in September 1995, when the shaky two-year-old coalition between Prime Minister Tansu Çiller's (leader of the conservative True Path Party -TPP) and her junior partner, the social democratic Republican People's Party (RPP), collapsed. The result was a year earlier than scheduled parliamentary elections in December 1995.

At that time, the popularity of the Welfare Party was alarming. Most opinion polls had put the Islamists in advance of the two leading center-right parties (True Path Party and the Motherland Party (MP) led by Mesut Yilmaz). The results of the election were expected. Welfare Party won 21.3 percent of the vote and 158 seats out of the 550-member of the National Assembly. His leader, Necmettin Erbakan, succeeded in forming coalition government with the

help of the centralist True Path Party that allowed him to become the country's first Islamist prime minister of modern Turkey.

This victory created shock waves both at home and abroad. At home, secular Turkish voters feared consequences of the coalition government in which Welfare Party became the senior partner. They feared that Erbakan would use this opportunity to boost the role of Islam in Turkish society and politics (Sakallioglu 2002, 195-9). On the international arena, concerns were strong about the Islamists' harsh criticisms of Turkey's close ties with the West, its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and its efforts to join the EU.

However, Necmettin Erbakan's victory did not last for long. After two years the powerful officer corps had, him forced out of office and banned his Welfare Party. In 1998, the Turkish Constitutional Court banned the Welfare Party after accusing it of being axis of activities opposing the principle of secularism. The Court also banned six of its leaders from political party activities for five years. The military justification was that the growing influence of Islamists in Turkish society became a threat to the state and *Kemalism*. A one general puts it:

> "The reactionary sector has been continuing its activities towards broadening its power of appeal in the society through 19 newspapers, 110 journals, 51 radio and 20 televisions, over 1000 business corporations, 1200 student dormitories, over 800 private schools and courses. The figure of those attending officially registered Quran courses is 1,685,000 and this figure doubles every five years"(Sakallioglu 2002, 197)

What made the Islamists activity threatening in the military viewpoint is that they contradicted the core principle of the modern Turkish republic. They challenged the Turkish Western identity, secularism, and separation of religion and state (Sakallioglu 2002, 189).

Finally, Islamists did not give up. The Welfare Party became the Virtue Party (1997-2001) that was also banned in on Friday 22 June 2001. On that day, "the Constitutional Court ruled the closure of the *Fazilet* (Virtue) party for being a 'center of Islamic fundamentalism and a mere successor of the outlawed Welfare Party. It furthermore ordered the confiscation of the party's assets, the toppling from the Turkish Grand National Assembly of two of its MPs and the banning of further three members from political activities for five years" (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Press release 26.6.2001).

In November 2002, Islamists once again sent a clear message to the secular generals of the army by giving the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) plain and decisive majority. AKP won almost two-thirds of the parliamentary seats (363 seats) with 34.2 percent of the vote (Aljazeera net 2002). The main parties that ran the country in the 1990s, the center-left Democratic Left Party (DSP) of outgoing Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and former President Turgut Özal's centrist Motherland Party (ANAP) failed to pass the ten percent threshold needed to enter the parliament. Former Prime Minister Tansu Çiller's center-right True Path Party (DYP) also failed in winning representation in the parliament. Therefore, the AKP's victory declared it the first party in recent years to be able to govern without coalition partners (Aljazeera net 2002).

The sweeping victory of Turkey's AKP led to intense debate at home and abroad about the true nature of this untested Islamist political group. On the one hand, there is the claim that *Erbakan* is running the AKP, which emerged because of a split within Virtue Party, behind the scenes. In this sense, the AKP is perceived as the Trojan horse of political Islam in secular

Turkey (European press review 2002). On the other side, views that are more moderate believe that the AKP has no Islamic agenda and represents a new shift in Turkish politics (Dogan 2004).

The AKP's origins are Islamist just like the Welfare party, but unlike the Welfare, the political agenda they promoted during elections played down the Islamist tone. In their campaign, AKP leaders have emphasized predominantly social issues promising to lead Turkey out of a two-year economic depression and to end corruption in state structures. In addition, AKP leader adopted Turkey's ambition to join the European Union. The prospects for joining Europe help protect the AKP against possible military intervention to overthrow it, since that would be a fatal blow to the EU application. They also supported traditional ties with the United States and promised to cooperate with the International Monetary Fund.

As opposed to Erbakan, who visited Libya, Iran, and other Muslim countries directly after his appointment as Prime Minister, AKP leaders perceive as their main concern cultivating relations with the Christian West (Dogan 2004 & Aljazeera net 2002). On the other hand, AKP avoided carefully any explicit indication to religion. Party leaders stressed repeatedly "they were the successors of liberal/conservative Democrat Party of the 1950s and Motherland Party of the 1980s rather than Islamist Welfare Party (WP) and its successor Virtue Party". In addition, "readings of the party documents and official statements suggest that the AKP is determined to take a different approach in foreign affairs than the Islamist tradition from which the leaders have hailed". Nevertheless, many analysts claim that "AKP's moderate rhetoric is only a cover, and that the party is really not much different from RP- FP. They add that most of AKP's cadres, as well as Erdogan (AKP leader) himself, were trained within the RP-FP. Moreover, the increase

in AKP's popularity has paralleled a decline in the popularity of the other party with origins in

RP-FP, the more extremist SP" (Aljazeera net 2002).

       The AKP has presented itself constantly as a new brand of Islamist parties. It claims that

it is committed to the secularism of the Turkish state. At the same time, it opposes the exclusion

of religious symbolism from public life, such as the ban on women wearing headscarves in state-

owned buildings (such as universities). It labels itself, as is Islamist in the same sense that

Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe are Christian. From this perspective, the military,

until now, is not interfering in politics. However, it is carefully watching the AKP.

The Armed Forces-FIS Confrontation in Algeria Elections 1991-1992

Introduction

After eight years of savage resistance against French colonial rule, Algeria won independence at the cost of nearly one million lives. The revolution, unfortunately, devoured its own members. Once the French colonialists left, Algeria's leaders turned on each other. The heroes of the revolution, like Ben Bella and Belkasim Krim, ended up poisoned, jailed, shot, strangled, or exiled by their brothers in arms (Willis 1996, 35-7).

Algeria has been misruled, since independence in 1962, by juntas of army officers, under a disastrous system of state socialism. Algeria's oil and gas capital could not keep up with increasing population and it slipped into poverty. Faced with persistent high unemployment rates, no prospects of jobs, enormous government corruption, and vicious political repression, Algerians embraced newly formed moderate Islamist parties, notably the FIS that called for social justice, public morality, and an end to persistent French influence (Willis 1996).

Algeria's discouraged military allowed the nation's first free elections in 1992. The FIS won a total victory. Push for by France, (which gives the military junta US $1 billion annually) the army generals canceled the elections and declared marshal laws. France did not want an Islamist government in Algeria. This caused a savage civil war to explode between Islamist resistances groups (some moderate, some radicals) and the government (Willis 1996).

Military-Islamists relations: from Incorporation to Opposition & Confrontation

The Algerian society is heavily influenced by its colonial heritage. When France seized Algeria in 1830, it imposed French language and culture on the ancient Islamic society. Algeria was considered an integral part of France in 1873; yet, "Muslim Algerians were not considered citizens". In 1918, Algerians were promised citizenship if they abandoned Islam and all its traditions, principles, laws, and adopted European discourse (Schulze 2000, 85).

Islamist groups started their revolutionary activities in Algeria even before its independence. Islamists resistance movements were among many Algerian groups who carried out the fight against the French. This fight was done not only in the name of Algeria, but also of Islam. They were described as *jihads* (warriors) against infidel invaders. The French colonialists strengthened this conception of Islamic identity and fighting in the name of Islam. They did so by discrimination through distinguishing Algerians from the settlers, not by race, ethnicity, or nationality, but by religion (for the Algerians) and geo-ethnicity (for the settlers). Algerians were called 'Muslims' while French colonialists were called 'Europeans'. Therefore, Islam became for most of the Algerian fighters the basic identity and the motive for liberation (Willis 1996, 1-33).

In their fight for independence, the National Liberation Front (FLN) considered Islam as a deeply rooted social liberation feature in Algeria. They also perceived it as the uniting feature of Algerian struggle against colonial control and the "line drawn within society to differentiate French inhibitors from natives"(Schulze 2000, 162). The independent Algerian state, despite its strong socialist orientation, explicitly recognized Islam in the constitution as an essential element of state and society.

When colonial rule finally ended in 1962, a generation of Algerians who had been

brought up, educated and trained as Frenchmen, came to power. Though they looked like Arabs

and Muslims (which they were), they thought, spoke and acted French. Westernized elite were

completely alienated from the Islamic masses. These `brown Frenchmen' acted as substitutes, or

supervisors, for their former colonial rulers. In return, they were allowed to drain off the nation's

wealth (Schulze 2000, 85-6).

After independence, the FLN government led by Ahmed Ben Bella dominated Algeria.

All the pre-existing parties and political orientations were forced to subordinate to the Front that

organized the anti-colonial revolution. Ben Bella worked to "institutionalize a socialist centralism

in Algerian by eliminating what remained of the Islamic institutions" (Schulze 2000, 169). In

addition, Ben Bella wanted to limit the influence of military in the FLN and turn the party into a

civilian national party. Yet, a military coup led by the Minister of Defense, Houari Boumedienne

overthrew Ben Bella. Boumedienne ruled until his death in December 1978. The army obtained

control over the FLN (Willis 1996, 38).

The FLN supported by the new party hierarchy controlled political activism as well as

Islamic trends. In fact, "the army coup of Boumedienne rehabilitated the Islamic public and

provided it with clearly defined functions in the new state system" (Schulze 2000, 170). These

defined functions meant the inclusion of Islamic orientations in the state-party apparatus as

means for recruitment and propaganda. This was considered an important condition for the

success of the FLN strategy of gaining political legitimacy. The FLN leadership recognized the

importance of Islam "not just through its contribution to independence struggle but also through

its contribution to the construction of the independent Algerian state"(Willis 1996, 62). In this context, ministry of religious affairs was established to supervise and regulate religious activities. Furthermore, to guarantee ideological agreement, Islamic scholars were turned into civil servants of the state in order to discourage any Islamic activity outside this 'official framework' (Schulze 2000, 170-1).

After the Boumedienne military coup, the state failed at the national level to consolidate its legitimacy specifically with the absence of democracy and the widespread of corruption. The Algerian authorities, starting from President Ahmad Benbella until President Hawwari Boumidyan, supported the ethnic political orientation, which helped in transforming the Islamist movements that supported the government to opposition and in creating new opposing Islamist groups. After Boumidyan death in December 1978, the FLN named Colonel *Chadli Benjedid* secretary general of the party and candidate for president in January 1979. On week later, he was elected the president in national election when 94 percent of FLN special congress voted for him. Boumedienne's successor, Chadli Benjedid, was an army commander, which revealed the continuing strong influence of the military on Algerian politics through controlling the FLN (Willis 1996, 38).

After his election, Benjedid initiated a series of democratization processes and reforms concentrated mainly on structural changes and economic liberalization. The new regime also carried out an anticorruption campaign. This enhanced the legitimacy of the regime and enabled Benjedid to remove much of the opposition that was loyal to Boumedienne's legacy, thus strengthening his political control (Willis 1996, 69-105).

By the late 80s, Benjedid engaged in political liberalization and promoted free-market principles. He started by building a strong civil society in Algeria through legitimizing independent associations, and expanding the new 'freedom to organize' to the Algerian League of Human Rights that had constantly disapproved of the regime records of human rights especially its repression of public political activity and demonstrations (Willis 1996, 69-105).

Unfortunately, democratization outcomes were completely the opposite then the originally intended. Algeria found itself in a critical position politically and economically in 1988 as economic and political crisis erupted in the most violent and widespread public demonstrations since independence. The chaos and hostilities were protest against corrupt and incompetent government and questioned party conduct. They were the outcome of declining living standards, rapidly increasing unemployment, and frequent food shortages (Willis 1996, 69-105).

To face this boiling situation, Benjedid approved a number of reforms that were earlier proposed in national referendum, on November 3, 1988. He also announced plans for applying new amendments in the national constitution. The reforms included separation of party and state, free representation in local and national elections, and redefinition of the executive powers (Braheemy 2001, 172-204).

The amended 1989 constitution encompassed democratic elements especially concerning political participation and civil society associations. It allowed for the creation and participation of competitive political associations, reinforced executive powers, and reduced the role of the

military in the political triangle. Following these reforms, the government issued a new legislation legalizing political parties and establishing a system of proportional representation in preparation for the country's first multiparty elections (Braheemy 2001, 172-204).

Under these circumstances, the FIS was created in March 1989 by an elderly sheikh, Abbassi Madani who became the leader of the Front in Algeria and a charismatic young mosque preacher, Ali Belhadj. The FIS was legalized in September that year. It benefited from the discontent of younger, lower class Algerians and middle class traders who felt left out of the economy, in order to increase its popular base. Thus, the FIS soon became the largest and most active political opposition party in Algeria. They accomplished rapid success in local elections particularly in the working-class districts of Algiers and other cities (Willis 1996, 115-137).

The FIS campaigned for an Islamic state in which society is governed by the *Shari^a* law and for an arabization of society. However, the slogan of building Islamic state on the ruins of the secular state remained vague and lacking comprehensive political and social agenda. The Islamist alternative to the existing regime was always articulated in ambiguous terms. This ambiguity attracted voters. The party avoided publishing a platform or issuing policy directives. Its economic program was also vague and limited to slogans claiming that solutions to the social crisis and wealth and prosperity will only come through Islam; Islam is the solution. In addition, the FIS acceptance of democratization was also vague and suspected. FIS leader Ali Belhadj confirmed this suspicion as he declared that when the FIS reach power there would be no more elections because God will be ruling (Willis 1996, 138-148).

FIS leaders did not reveal their first formal agenda in March 9, 1989. In this agenda, the FIS emphasized wealth redistribution and solutions to the economic crisis. However, their economic program remained unclear. The FIS has never published a detailed economic program (Willis 1996, 138).

The vagueness in the FIS political agenda was due to the dual leadership (Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj) and the lack of a clear set of guidelines that the FIS needed as a political party. Abbassi Madani, a moderate Western-educated professor of comparative literature at the University of Algeria, represented a conservative orientation within the party based on using the democratic system to build the Islamic state and implement the FIS Islamist code. Supporters of this orientation included "small-business owners as well as wealthy merchants, civil servants as well as dissidents of the FLN"(Middle East Policy Council 1998 & Willis 1996, 147-8).

Ali Belhadj, a high school teacher known for his militant preference and radical notions of the role of political Islam, represented an aggressive orientation in the FIS based on the immediate imposition of Islamic law even if it meant resorting to violence. Supporters of this orientation contained hopeless urbanized young, victims of unemployment, the socially marginalized, and generally the non-educated, who the FIS easily influenced and mobilized (Middle East Policy Council 1998 & Willis 1996, 147-8).

Between Madani and Belhadj supporters, there was a third section constituted of "university professors, physicians and lawyers, either blocked in their social ascent by a system of nepotism or revolted by the degradation of morals blamed on cultural invasion". Those

professionals represented a nationalist orientation based on "the desire to establish an Islamic state expresses a nationalist quest for identity and responds to moral, cultural, and political exigencies. Their reasonable ambition is to become a full part of the establishment, not necessarily to overthrow it"(Middle East Policy 1998).

Based on this, many members of the FIS had little in common. They were only united by the hope of building an Islamic state and overthrowing the secular ruling class. For this reason, the FIS was not able to articulate a clear and comprehensive political agenda. However, the more ambiguous there agenda is the more support they got from different social groups (Middle East Policy Council 1998 & Willis 1996, 147-8).

Beginning with municipal elections in 1989, the FIS won control of over two-thirds of all local village, town, and city councils, including the capital of Algiers. In June 12, 1990, FIS won a clear victory to the ruling FLN in local elections, with 65% against 28 % (Willis 1996, 158-9). The government then tried to weaken the FIS by obstructing funds to the councils and changing the rules for the parliamentary elections, scheduled for June 1991. The FLN who still controlled the parliament, sought to modify the electoral boundaries to the advantage of its candidates. The principal challenger for the FLN, the Islamist FIS, believed that this would ruin their chances of victory. Their and respond came in by *Belhadj's* preaching that called for a general strike and organizing street demonstrations to protest the maneuverings of the FLN official. Abbassi Madani and Belhadj were arrested and imprisoned. Immediately after their arrests, the FIS won the first round of the legislative elections in December 26, 1991 seizing 188 seats out of 220 (Willis 1996, 171-182).

In response, the army stepped in and annulled election results and canceled the electoral process. Although the military role in politics (after the constitutional amendments) was limited, "most of Algerians senior military figures that were largely trained abroad in secular states such as the Soviet Union and France were essentially hostile to the ideas of Islamism. This idea was seen as a threat to the foundations of the Algerian state as well as to their own positions, should it achieve political power" (Willis 1996, 183). In 1991, the military joined forces with the government to confront the FIS success in elections.

Their justifications for canceling the legislative process were that the only way to protect democracy from an Islamist government is by terminating the democratic process and that there is a persisting "need to restore public order and reduce the power of the FIS" (Willis 1996, 185).

The situation deteriorated rapidly after the cancellation of the elections. President *Chadli* resigned and a state of emergency was declared on 9 February 1992 that remains in force. The FIS was declared illegal in March 1992 and many of its leaders and members were arrested. Mohammed Boudiaf, a respected veteran of the 1954-62 war, was selected by the military to lead the new Council of State. Soon after he was selected, *Boudiaf* gave his orders to restrain the demonstrations and protests and to arrest those responsible. Under his commands, almost 10,000 Islamist supporters were detained in huge camps in the desert. As a respond, Boudiaf was assassinated on public television.

To sum up, Islam was more an identity to the Algerian people in the face of the French colonialists than a religion. This importance was recognized by the FLN, which was mainly controlled by the military since its members were among many who led armed resistance against the French. The FLN incorporated Islam in its regime as a mean to gain legitimacy. Yet, confrontations between the military and Islamists did not intensify until the Islamists opposed the state system and threatened the military interests. The FIS dramatic victory in the first round of elections meant only that an Islamist government would govern Algeria, if the FIS won the second round. In this sense, Military-Islamists relations turned to be violent as the military arrested and imprisoned the FIS leadership, cancelled elections and banned the FIS. The FIS never reached power.

Chapter 5

Military-Islamists Relations: Challenges & Prospects

Findings

The secular rulers' attempts to eliminate Islam from Turkish society failed. *Kemalism* could not abolish the Ottoman Empire heritage. For many, Islamism was the only way to preserve Islam in Turkish society. Islamists, even the moderate and non-violent, suffered from continuous repression, which spread through secular institutions, such as the military and the Supreme Court.

The generally inefficient governance and widespread corruption that characterized most civilian governments in Turkey enhanced the military role as the regime guardian. In addition, it gave the military more liberty in intervening in politics especially to prevent Islamists from reaching or keeping power. It also affected the public opinion, as Turks trusted the armed forces more than they trusted the politicians they democratically elected.

In 2002, Turks viewed all of the old governing parties as incompetent. The AKP was the only party to avoid Turkish people contempt. This party was newly established and has never been part of the government; hence, it was not blamed for governmental corruption. In this sense, people chose the AKP to be their new ruler even with its Islamist roots.

Many factors collaborated to support AKP's dramatic success in 2002 elections; yet, the most important reason that helped the AKP gather votes from the secularists as well as Islamists is the change its political speech and strategies presented. Since its establishment in 2001, the

AKP leaders aggressively promoted it as a conservative or even liberal- conservative party rather than an Islamist one. In accordance with this position, AKP has spread moderate messages to the public through out 2001 and 2002. Unlike Welfare Party and Virtue Party, AKP avoided challenging and clashing with the military. It avoided threatening secularism, nation-state, and existing political order or even implying that it will do so in the future.

The new strategies applied by the AKP leadership in their campaign helped it attract defectors from many secular parties as well as votes from different social groups ranging from Istanbul's middle class to Inner Anatolia's rural nationalists. In addition, considerable number of Welfare Party's former supporters has backed up the AKP as well.

In the Algerian case, as with Islamists elsewhere, the whole emphasis of FIS was on achieving political power on the ruins of secular state system. The conflict between secular rulers (FLN) backed by the military and Islamism put the armed forces in direct confrontations with Islamists. These confrontations reflected deep cultural segregation. Algerian people have a profound affection toward Islam. In fact, Islam has always been associated with patriotism in Algeria. This feeling was strengthened during the French colonization between 1830 and 1962. The Algerian regime tried, between 1962 and 1988, to follow the path of the French colonialists by exploiting the name of Islam to promote secular views and measures. This was the time when many clashes took place between the pro-Islamic and the pro-secular waves, especially between military and Islamists.

Officer corps claimed that they were the ones to liberate Algeria. They are the heroes of the progressive act in Algeria. They recognized the pro-Islamic as the people of shadow. This meant in their standard; the enemies of modernized culture and education. Many in the younger generations found themselves alienated from these notions. Islamists found fertile recruiting grounds among Algeria's disproportionately young population. The worn-out, anti-colonial themes used by the regime to legitimate its authority no longer resonate with the people.

Another important factor that helped the FIS win the first round of elections is authoritarianism that suppressed civil society associations and corruption. Algeria suffered under a legacy of years of mismanagement and strict authoritarian control by the army and the FLN that had ruled the country since independence in 1962 and held onto power through force. The military backed FLN government banned opposition parties, suppressed the press, and smothered independent trade unions, youth organizations, Islamists activities, and agriculture collectives. The inevitable result was riot and violence that erupted across the country in 1988.

However, the FIS centered its agenda, during the 1991-1992 elections, on the strict respect of Islamist ambitions. This meant that an Islamic state must be established and legislation has to be compatible with the principles of the *Shari^a* in all fields. The concept of democracy is associated with atheism.

Before the first round of the December 1991 parliamentary elections, one of the FIS leaders, *Ali Belhadj*, spoke of banning secular and socialist parties if there was FIS majority. The FIS was demanding a restoration of the original form of Islam, based on *Quran* and *Sunna*,

which they considered had been corrupted by the Algerian repressive military backed government, and abandoned by the majority of the population. In addition, the FIS condemned democracy while participating in the electoral process. Therefore, the FIS political agenda did not represent any change in their political ideology. FIS only used democracy and free elections as means to win seats in the parliament in order to implement its Islamist agenda.

The FIS was considered as a response to the deep felt resentment of the population towards an incompetent and unjust government. From this perspective, the Islamists agenda was seen as hope for change by the oppressed in Algeria and an extreme threat by the military. Change was something the majority of people longed for and Islamist political parties sought to achieve. Yet, change to an Islamist government was not what the armed forces and secular elite looked forward. Thus, they interfered in elections and prevented the FIS from reaching power.

By examining the two case studies, certain key parallels and differences could be found between the two cases. Both Turkey and Algeria suffered from on-going clashes between secularization/modernization and Islam/Islamists. In other words, between the military as a guardian of nation-state, modernization and secularism on the one hand and Islamists on the other. The power of Islamists movements (AKP, FIS) has grown after the military, which feared the establishment of an Islamic state and the collapse of the secular system, suppressed Islamists. Thus, deep conflict between armed forces and the forces of Islamism became part of the pre-colonization political landscape. Both countries, as many other countries in MENA, after winning independence and establishing a state, stood at the threshold of East and West, of

religious and secular nationalism. Mostly, the Islamist ideology constituted a challenge to the modernization project; thus, to the military which was a modernizing force.

Corrupted and weak civil governments enhanced confrontations between armed forces and Islamists. What happened in Algeria before 1991-1992 elections and in Turkey before 2002 elections was firstly the consequence of misguided long-term corrupted governance, which undermined the efficiency of the state apparatus. Governments in both countries were unable to perform routine economic and administrative functions.

However, Islamists in Turkey differed from those in Algeria in their political agenda and strategy. In Turkey, the AKP, a reformist Islamist group, accepted democracy, the existing political order, secularism, and nation-state. The AKP even declared that the party does not pose any threat to the secular state and it dose not have any intentions to change the existing political system or to apply an Islamic constitution and establish an Islamic State. The party emphasized economic development and European Union membership, which were not Islamist's hot issues but rather military hot issues.

Contrary to the AKP, the FIS were strict in their agenda. They wanted to implement Islamic law, establish an Islamic state, and fight secularism, modernism, and the Western influence in Algeria, in particular the French influence. Furthermore, the FIS criticized Western values (democracy) while participating in elections. They were only using democratic values as a mean to reach an end.

From this perspective, the AKP was able to win significant majority in 2002 elections, form a government headed by the AKP leader, and stay in power until the present day without military interference. On the other hand, although the FIS was able to win a great majority in the first round of 1991-1992 elections, its agenda was considered a threat to military and state system. Thus, military annulled election results, canceled the legislative process, and banned the FIS. The FIS then never reached power.

Conclusion

This paper examined both the theoretical bases of civil-military relations and an analysis of these relations in the MENA region. Samuel Huntington proposed a theoretical framework to examine civil-military relations based on developing a theory of military professionalism. He starts by defining the aspects of this relation in the context of national security policy. He also specifies the characteristics of a professional officer corps and its role in state, society, and in a democratic system. He concludes that the officer corps must be subordinate to civil authorities and that the political and military affairs of a state must be completely separate.

However, Huntington formulated this theoretical framework based on the study of the history and culture of western societies and specifically on the history of the United States armed forces. Civil-military relations in the MENA region are quite different. Military professionalism did not make the military apolitical and neutral as Huntington predicted. The more the armed forces were professionals the further they interfered in politics. In this regards, the very nature of professionalism, that Huntington characterized by expertness, social responsibility, and corporateness, often leads to military clashes with civilian authorities. Consequently, the military becomes politicized (Finer 1962, 22-27).

Due to its professionalism, then, military in the MENA region was "the one institution that had the cohesiveness and tools to take power" (Rubin 2002, 10). The Military became the guardian of the modern state system and the existing political regime as well as the force of spreading and protecting secularism and modernization in society.

The rise of Islamism came as a response to religious, cultural, and social crises. Islamists resisted the secularization policies of their governments, and advocated the restoration of pure form of Islamic state and laws. They condemned their ruling elites as deviants from the pure path of Islam, and criticized modernization attempts as imitation of Western imperialism. Islamists even believed that such modernization attempts constituted the basis of moral, social, and religious decay of Muslim communities. Islamism represented a serious political threat to secular regimes and modern state system by a combination of their propaganda and violent actions. In most of the MENA countries armed forces launched aggressive campaigns to crash Islamist groups and prevent them from reaching power and implementing their goals. In this sense, military-Islamists relations were mostly violent.

This paper tried to find out the conditions under which non-violent relations could be established between the military and Islamist that will allow the latter to reach and stay in power without fearing military intervention.

The assumption examined was that they could reach power by making some sacrifices concerning their Islamist orientation. Islamist must also compromise if they want to stay in power. Having introduced the relevant theoretical background and case studies with the analyses of cases findings, certain conclusions can be drawn.

It is hard to establish a valid causal relation between military repression and Islamists persisting attempts to reach power. However, a kind of non-violent relation between Islamists and military could be established on the bases that Islamists played down their ideological roots.

Islamists radical views and attitudes towards nation-states, secularism, modernity, and democracy constituted the main factors that affected military-Islamist relations.

Islamists who adopted a revolutionary doctrine that tended to view modern state system, secularism and democracy as a modern agenda by which the West hopes to establish its hegemony over the Muslim world provoked military antagonism and were not able to reach or hold on to power. Whereas, Islamist groups who were able to adjust their political ideology in accordance with the current tendencies in the modern state, such acknowledging the domination and the widespread of the Western values and accepting, not fighting these values were able to establish non-violent relations with the military. They were also able to hold on to power.

These groups tended to be more receptive to new ideas, practices, and institutions. They stress the need for continuity of basic Islamic traditions but believe that Islamic law (*Shari^a*) is historically conditioned and needs to be reinterpreted in light of the changing needs of modern society. Such Islamists groups, although obtained power based on their Islamic origins, did not frame themselves as religion-based parties. This shift in their ideology and strategy allowed them to reach and stay in power.

This paper finding showed there is a certain price Islamists must pay in order to reach power without fearing overthrown by the armed forces. The price is to give up their ambition in creating an Islamic state and applying the Islamic laws. In addition, they must give up hostilities against Western principles, especially democracy modernity and secularism because these values

are protected by the military. Threatening them will only lead to military interventions and confrontations.

Therefore, this research concludes that Islamist groups are more likely to establish non-violent relations with the military that could help them reach power by playing down their Islamist roots. Most importantly, they can achieve this goal by giving up their ambition is creating an Islamic state and applying the Islamic law and by accepting the values and ideologies that the military is protecting, specifically democracy and modernization. They need to accept these principles and do not attempt to work against it or to destroy the state system once they seize power.

Recommendations

In the last decade, many Islamists movements changed their policies towards the secular state and laws. They embraced some democratic principles, especially free elections, as few countries in the MENA witnessed limited extent of democratic transition.

In the countries that have experienced some degree of sustained political opening in recent years, namely, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Turkey, and Morocco, even in 'blocked' cases such as those of Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, many Islamists tried to interact politically and peacefully with governments. This led many to realize that repression provided fertile ground for militant Islamists' activities. The solution then is to democratize MENA countries.

This paper proved that Islamists, who played down their Islamist roots and embraced democratic values, were able to reach power and stay in power. Yet, questions become, if Islamists are willing to compromise what could MENA governments offer them in return? How are governments going to contain the Islamist problem?

The recommended points to be further investigated by future research: first, it is important to examine the political options through which MENA governments could integrate Islamists in the political system and eliminate their threat. Many countries in the MENA tend to resolve the Islamists problem through politics rather than violence especially that international powers' attention is focused on the region. Thus, allowing Islamists to represent their own kind, like any other party, in the parliament might be considered an essential political option.

Another point is to find out if there are any guarantees, other than the military, that the relationship between governments and Islamists will remain peaceful. There is always the possibility that governments might turn against Islamists and once again implement repressive policies. On the other hand, Islamists might use their position in the parliament or government to induce radical views or even threaten the secular state. Thus, it is important to find out if there are any democratic guarantees that governments and Islamists will not turn against each other in the end.

In today's world, the Islamist issue is one of the most important global problems. The international society is faced with the challenge of fighting violence and terrorism, most of which are related to Islamist groups. Hence, it is necessary to study the prospects and ways of dealing with the Islamist issue.

LITERATURE CITED

Abdul-Majed, Sa^ad, 2002. قضايا ساخنة في الانتخابات التركية (Crucial Issues in the Turkish Elections). Aljazeera Center of Researches and Studies: < http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/452B9025-F524-4BB9-8F80-0F9E4EED2A36.htm>

Ali, Hydar Abraham. 1999. التيارات الاسلامية وقضية الديمقراطية (Islamist Movements and Democracy Issues) Lebanon: Center of Strategic Studies

Aljazeera Center of Researches and Studies. 2004. *Political Parties in the Arab World* Aljazeera network: < http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/E166720D-22B9-4708-B1AE-18C42A16C1FC.htm>

Erdogan أردوغان ملتزم بخطى أتاتورك والمعارضة ترشحه للوزارة. (Aljazeera net. November 10, 2002) Carries on Atatürk's legacy). Aljazeera net:
< http://www.aljazeera.net/News/archive/archive?ArchiveId=42613.>

Allam, Fouad Khaled. 2004. " The State, Islam, and Civil Society in the Arab World". *The International Conference on Democracy and Human Rights | Sana'a, 10-12 January 2004-01-23*: < http://www.npwj.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=1580> (Feb 19, 2004)

Al-Turaby, Hassan et al. 2003. الاسلاميون و المسألة السياسية " (Islamists and the Political Issue). Lebanon: Centre for Arab Unity Studies

Atatürk website. 1999. "Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Social Reforms". *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk life* :< http://www.ataturk.com/reforms.htm>

Bienen, Henry. 1971."The Background to Contemporary Study of Militaries and Modernization". In *The Military and Modernization,* ed. Henry Bienen. New York & Chicago: Aldine ' Atherton.

Bill, James L. and Carl Leiden. 1979. *Politics in the Middle East*. 2nd ed. Canada: Little, Brown & Company.

Borthwick, Bruce M. 1980. *Comparative Politics of the Middle East.* London: Prentice-Hall, Inc

Braheemy, Abdul-Hameed. 2001. *في أصل الأزمة الجزائرية: 1958-1999* (The Origins of the Algerian Crisis: 1958-1999) Center of Strategic Studies- Lebanon
Cleveland ،William C. 2004 *A History of the Modern Middle East* .3rd ed. Colorado: Westview Press

Derkmejian, Hrair R. 1995. *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*. New York: Syracuse University Press

Dogan, Ebru. 2004. "Turkish PM's vote-winning formula". BBC News Online:

< http://news.bbc.co.uk/nolpda/ukfs_news/hi/newsid_3579000/3579467.stm >
Duran, Khalid. 2000. *L'abbaglio dell'immigrazione* (Muslims and Islamists in America). Rome: Institute di Formazione per le Scienze Antropologiche

Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network. 26.6.2001. Press release on "Ban on the Virtue Party in Turkey Contradicts Human Rights and Democratic Principles". <http://www.euromedrights.net/english/emhrn-documents/pressreleases/26_06_2001.htm

European press review. 2002. BBC News Online:
< http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2402875.stm>

Finer, Samuel E. 1962. *The Man On Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. London: Pall Mall Press

Hale, William M. 1994. *Turkish Politics and the Military*. New York: Routledge

Hammad, Majdy, et al. 2001. الحركات الاسلامية والديمقراطية: دراسة في الفكر و الممارسة (The Islamic Movements and Democracy: A Study of Intellect and Practicum). Lebanon: Center of Arab Unity

Hawthorne, Amy. March 2004."Middle Eastern Democracy: Is Civil Society the Answer?" Carnegie Paper No. 44. *Carnegie Endowment's Arab Reform Bulletin*. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:
<http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/CarnegiePaper44.asp?from=pubdate

Hooker, Richard D. Jr., "Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations," Parameters, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4 Winter 2003-04 <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03winter/hooker.pdf>

Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
_____ 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. London & New Haven: Yale University Press.

_____ 1977" .The Soldier and the State in the 1970s ."In *Civil-Military Relations* ،ed. Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel P .Huntington. Washington, D.C: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Hynes, Jeff. 1994. *Religion in Third World Politics*. Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

Janowitz, Morris. 1977. *Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Jenkins, Gareth. 2001. "Context and Circumstances: The Turkish Military and Politics".

Adelphi Paper 337, *The International Institute for Strategic Studies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Karsten, Peter. 1998. "The Coup d'état in Competitive Democracies: Its Appropriateness, Its Causes, and Its Avoidance". In *Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Peter Karsten. New York: Garland Publishing, INC.
Levy, Marion J. 1971."Armed Force Organizations". In *The Military and Modernization,* ed.

Henry Bienen. New York & Chicago: Aldine ' Atherton.

Lewis, Bernard. 1996. "Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview," in *Journal of Democracy* 7(2): 52-63

Middle East Policy Coucil, Volume V, January 1998, Number 4"Algeria's Islamist Revolution: The People versus Democracy?" Hamou Amirouche:
<http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/journal_vol5/9801_amirouche.asp>

Needler ‹Martin C. 1971" .Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America ."In *The Military and Modernization* ‹ed. Henry Bienen. New York & Chicago: Aldine ' Atherton.

Owen, Roger. 2004. *State, Power, and Politics in Making of Modern Middle East*. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge.

Pfaff, William. 2001 "Pentagon Alone Calls the Shots," Dawn: the internet edition, <http://www.dawn.com/2001/08/17/op.htm#3> (17 August 2001).

Picard, E. 1993"Arab Military In Politics: From Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State". In *The Modern Middle East*. eds, Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Pipes, Daniel.1998. "Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism". Center for Strategic and International Studies: < http://www.danielpipes.org/article/954 >

Robinson, Glenn E. Summer 1997. "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan". *The Middle East Journal* 51(3): 373-387.

Rubin ‹Barry. 1998".Islamic Radicalism in the Middle East: A Survey & Balance Sheet ."*Middle East Review of International Affairs* 2(2): 17-24

_____ 2002. "The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics". In *Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy*, ed. Barry Robin & Thomas A. Keaney. Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers.

Rustow ‹Dankwart A. 1967 .*A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* . Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Sakallioglu, Umit Cizre. 2002. "The Military and Politics: A Turkish Dilemma". In *Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy*, ed. Barry Rubin & Thomas A. Keaney. Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers.

Sarkesian, S. 1984. "Two Conceptions of Military Professionalism", in *The Military, Militarism, and the Polity*, eds Martin and McCrate., New York: The Free Press.

Sawash ،Nozat. 2002) . قصة الحكومات التركية .History of the Turkish Governments .(Aljazeera Center of Researches and Studies >:http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/08E4ED47-3334-46D1-8440-A3A63977B28A.htm#7<

Schulze, Reinhard. 2000. *A Modern History of the Islamic World*. Trans. Azizeh Azodi. New York: New York University Press

Watson ،Cynthia and Constantine P. Danopoulos. 1996" .Introduction ." In *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook* ،ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson. London :Greenwood Press.

Weitzman, Bruce M, and Efraim Inbar. 1997. *Religious Radicalism in the Great Middle East*. London: Frank Cass & CO.LTD.

Willis, Michel. 1996. *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A political History*. London: Ithaca Press/Garnet Publishing Ltd.

VITA

Suzane Abdulaziz Mneimneh

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Art

Thesis: MILITARY-ISLAMISTS RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH

AFRICA: CONFRONTATIONS AND CONTAINMENT

Major Field: Political Science

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Beirut, Lebanon, on august 30, 1976, the son of Abdulaziz and Maha Mneimneh

Education: Received a Bachelor of Arts in Political and Public Administrative Sciences from the Lebanese University, Beirut Lebanon. Completed the requirement for the Master of Art degree with a major in Political Sciences at Oklahoma State University, Department of Political Sciences in May 2005.

Professional experience: Assistant chief political editor: the weekly *Manar Al-Huda* and *Nida Al-Marifa* radio station, Beirut, Lebanon 2000-2002.

Name: Suzane Mneimneh   Date of Degree: May, 2005

Institution: Oklahoma State University   Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma

Title of Study: MILITARY-ISLAMISTS RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
              AFRICA: CONFRONTATIONS AND CONTAINMENT

Pages in study: 108   Candidate for the Degree of Master of Arts

Major Field: Political Sciences

Scope and Findings: This paper discusses military-Islamists relations in MENA with emphasis

    on military's functions and Islamists' orientations as they affect MENA stability and political

    development. This research highlights the boundary between Islamists and modern state and

    society and their relationship with the military. It recommends that Islamists must not

    threaten the values guarded by the armed forces if they wanted to reach power and form

    stable governments. It contends that the involvement of the military in political operations to

    prevent Islamists from reaching power is likely to decrease if Islamists complied with

    military values.

Advisor's Approval: Joel Jenswold