

ETHNICITY, RELIGION, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND SECURITY:
THE CYPRIOT OFFSHORE DRILLING CRISIS

By:

GREGORY A. FILE

Bachelor of Science Political Science

Oklahoma State University

Stillwater, Oklahoma

2010

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
Master of Arts
May, 2012

ETHNICITY, RELIGION, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND SECURITY:
THE CYPRIOT OFFSHORE DRILLING CRISIS

Thesis Approved:

Dr. Nikolas Emmanuel

Thesis Adviser

Dr. Joel Jenswold

Committee Member

Dr. Reuel Hanks

Committee Member

Dr. Sheryl A. Tucker

Dean of the Graduate College

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
Synopsis.....	1
Literature Review.....	5
Why Alliances Form.....	5
Regional Security Complex Theory.....	6
Ethnic Similarity.....	6
Religious Similarity.....	8
Hydrocarbon Trade.....	10
Security Concerns.....	12
Culture and Non-Culture Theory.....	14
Culture.....	14
Non-Culture.....	16
Methods.....	18
Small – N.....	19
Case Selection.....	19
Methodology.....	21

Chapter	Page
II. CYPRUS: THE PIVOT.....	28
History.....	28
The Demographics of Cyprus.....	33
The Grievances.....	36
The Offshore Drilling Crisis.....	38
Conclusion.....	40
 III. THE TRADITIONAL ACTORS: GREAT BRITAIN, GREECE, AND TURKEY	
	42
Great Britain.....	42
Ethnicity.....	43
Religion.....	45
Hydrocarbons.....	47
Security.....	49
Conclusion.....	51
Greece.....	52
Ethnicity.....	52
Religion.....	54
Hydrocarbons.....	56
Security.....	59
Conclusion.....	61

Chapter	Page
Turkey.....	62
Ethnicity.....	62
Religion.....	65
Hydrocarbons.....	67
Security.....	70
Conclusion.....	73
IV. THE NEW ACTORS: RUSSIA AND ISRAEL	74
Russia.....	74
Ethnicity.....	75
Religion.....	77
Hydrocarbons.....	80
Security.....	81
Conclusion.....	84
Israel.....	84
Ethnicity.....	85
Religion.....	87
Hydrocarbons.....	90
Security.....	92
Conclusion.....	97

Chapter	Page
V. CONCLUSION.....	98
REFERENCES.....	104

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1 Division of Cyprus.....	113
2 Cypriot Offshore Hydrocarbons.....	114
3 British Bases.....	115
4 Leviathan Field.....	116

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1 Data.....	117
2 Results: Great Britain.....	118
3 Results: Greece.....	119
4 Results: Turkey.....	120
5 Results: Russia.....	121
6 Results: Israel.....	122
7 Results Summary.....	123

Chapter 1

Introduction

I. Synopsis

On September 18, 2011, the Republic of Cyprus began offshore drilling in conjunction with Noble Energy (*BBC*, 2011). Once the offshore drilling began, events quickly escalated into a crisis. Moments after the announcement was made by the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus granted drilling concessions to the Republic of Turkey. The Turkish government then sent a naval team into the disputed waters (*Al Jazeera*, 2011). Turkish intervention led to responses by both Israel and Russia. Israel backed the right of the Republic of Cyprus to drill for offshore resources in their Exclusive Economic Zone (or EEZ)¹ and even offered to send their air force to protect the Republic of Cyprus from perceived Turkish threats (*Jerusalem Post*, 2011; *Debkafile*, 2011). This has led to harassment between the Turkish navy, and the Israeli navy and air force (*Debkafile*, 2011; *Today's Zaman*, 2011a). Russia entered the fray on the side of the Republic of Cyprus. Russia has sent two submarines to Cyprus and dispatched their lone aircraft carrier battle group to support the claims of the Republic of Cyprus (Fenwick, 2011; *Hurriyet*, 2011).

It is imperative for political scientists and policy makers to understand the underlying issues that resulted in the final alliance configurations. The formation of these alliances led to

¹ The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Russia are signatories to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas which delineates the EEZ. Turkey, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and Israel are not parties to the agreement (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, 1982). This has made the ownership of the Eastern Mediterranean Resources more problematic. This will be discussed further in the Israel chapter since it impacts them the most.

the development of the central research question: What factors are responsible for the formation of these alliances and specifically, which of these factors have led to the current alliance of nations in the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis? Examining this question will shed light on why states aligned the way they did during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis. By understanding these relationships, policy makers and academics will be able to propose policies to mitigate conflict escalation.

A brief survey of the literature is warranted as to what triggered this recent crisis. The trigger is the impact of natural resources on conflict and alliances. Many scholars have found that the presence of natural resources serves as an aggravating force between two hostile actors. Especially among resource poor groups, natural resources have led to fierce competition. Natural resources have provided the money needed for an actor to modernize or equip its fighting force. The desire for the wealth that comes with natural resources has triggered numerous conflicts (Humphreys, 2005; Herbst, 2000; Bannon and Collier, 2003; Le Billon, 2001; Renner, 2003). It appears that the drilling undertaken by the Republic of Cyprus has geopolitical consequences for the region.

Alliances are an important factor in the study of conflict. Scholars have found that nations form alliances for the primary reason of security. Alliances are formed in order to deter attack from another hostile country. This is known as the deterrence effect. One country will not attack another country if that country knows the target country has an array of allies willing to fight to defend it (Walt, 1985; Leeds, 2003). Under the umbrella of alliances, there are many different factors that influence the formation of these alliances. These factors will be incorporated as the different hypotheses tested in this study. These factors are: ethnic similarities, religious similarities, hydrocarbon trade, and security.

The first component of alliance formation is similar ethnicity. This occurs when a country intervenes to help another actor that shares the same ethnicity (Davis and Moore, 1997; Petersen, 2004). Traditionally, this intervening to help a kindred ethnic group has been equated with irredentist policies. This occurred in the 1930s when Germany intervened in Czechoslovakia to protect the German ethnic group living in the Sudetenland. In 1979, China intervened in Vietnam to protect the interests of the ethnic Chinese residing in that country (Ambrosio, 2001; Kornprobst, 2008). This ethnic component will form one of the factors leading to the current alignment of nations during the offshore Cypriot drilling crisis.

The second component of alliance formation is similar religion. This term is used to denote an alliance between two actors due to a religious commonality. Usually this is done between similar religious factions in order to block the threat of another religion (Lewis, 1998; De Juan, 2009). A country will form an alliance with another group that has similar religious beliefs in order to protect the religious liberties of that particular group. Historical examples include the Russians offering protection to their fellow Orthodox Christians in Constantinople in the 1800s, or the French offering protection to the Maronite Catholics in Lebanon in the late 1800s to the early 1900s. Both of these examples were undertaken by powerful Christian majority countries to protect the minority Christians living under Muslim rule (Bugbee, 1877; Spagnolo; 1977). Since this could be the case in this particular instance, the role of religious similarities will be studied as a component in this analysis.

The third component influencing alliance formation is trade, specifically trade in hydrocarbons. There have been studies conducted to see how trade influences alliance formation. The global environment is divided between those who have resources and those who are resource poor. States use their resources to attract other states to their cause. In return for

their support, those resource poor states will gain trade benefits (Long, 2003; Long and Leeds, 2006; Fordham, 2010; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa and Mansfield, 2004). The impact of trade on the formation of alliances will also be included in the analysis.

The final component influencing alliance formation is security concerns. This is traditionally cited as the main cause for alliance formation. In this type of alliance, actors join together for protection. The theory is that having a large protection alliance will deter any hostile acts from hostile actors. This type of alliance forms when a state believes they are under siege. That state will seek out other actors to form an alliance in order to offset this fear (Walt, 1987; Sorokin, 1994a; Rozmer, 2008). This type of alliance will also play an important part in this analysis.

September 2011 witnessed a crisis off the waters of Cyprus because of the decision of the Republic of Cyprus to recover the hydrocarbons in their Exclusive Economic Zone. Turkey has protested this action and has sent a naval squadron to lay claims for Turkish exploration. The crisis has also brought in Great Britain, Russia, and Israel. In this analysis, the factors that have led to the involvement or abstention of countries in the September 2011 Cypriot Crisis will be examined. The components, as previously mentioned are ethnic, religious, hydrocarbon trade, and security considerations. The following sections will go into greater depth on the existing literature and how it fits into this project. A mixed culture/non-culture theory and four hypotheses will be proposed to answer the question of what caused the formation of alliances in the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis. A qualitative research design will test the theory and hypotheses of the analysis. Finally, the theory will be tested using the cases of Great Britain, Greece, Turkey (the traditional players) along with Russia and Israel (the new players). At the

end of this study, it will be clear what factors led certain states to choose a particular side during the offshore drilling crisis.

II. Literature Review

Before proceeding to the theoretical section, it is necessary to understand the base literature that the theoretical framework is based upon. There are four areas/traditional theories that will be examined in this section. The first area deals with the formation of alliances. This is important to understand why states form alliances and with whom. The other areas of the literature review deal with the current literature working with the factors influencing the formation of alliances: ethnic similarities, religious similarities, hydrocarbon trade, and security concerns. After reviewing the existing literature, it will be shown how these factors apply to this particular puzzle.

Why Alliances Form

Due to the complex nature of this project, it is necessary to define the term “alliances.” There are many different definitions in the field of alliances. These alliances range from treaties (i.e. formal alliances) to informal, diplomatic, and military alliances. For the purposes of this study all types of alliances will be included. Basically if a state asks for assistance and another state provides assistance during a crisis, then the action is classified as an alliance. An alliance is present if a state demonstrates that it is threatened by another state and asks for assistance to ensure its security (Siverson and Tennefoss, 1984; Skaperdas, 1998; Sprecher and Krause, 2006). Due to the importance of the Regional Security Complex Theory to these cases, its contributions will be discussed in this section (Buzan, 1991). The rest of the literature review will focus on the four main factors commonly cited as reasons for alliance formation: similar ethnicity, similar

religion, resource trade (specifically trade in hydrocarbons), and security (Chong, et al., 2000; Gulati, 1995; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Sprecher and Krause, 2006).

Regional Security Complex Theory

One theory of alliance formation is particularly useful in this analysis. That theory is the “Regional Security Complex Theory” (Buzan, 1991; Buzan and Waever, 2003). This theory was developed in the early 1990s by the Copenhagen school. The scholars believed that alliances are clustered in geographic areas. The scholars found the reason for this phenomenon was due to the geographic feature of distance. States are more likely to be threatened by the actions of their neighbors rather than the actions of some state located across the globe. This means that other states will face a similar threat in the same region. This leads to the formation of alliances and explains their geographical clustering (Buzan, 1991; Lake and Morgan, 1997; Buzan and Waever, 2003). This theory will play a dominant role in justifying the selection of cases later in the paper.

Ethnic Similarity

One of the factors cited in the formation of alliances is similar ethnicity. Before the literature is reviewed on this topic, it is important to define ethnicity. There are numerous definitions of ethnicity. One’s language, religion, and ancestry have all been cited as the basis for ethnicity. For the purposes of this study ethnicity is classified as based on a common language and ancestry (Ross, 2007; Huntington, 1997). For example, a person is defined as a Turk because they speak Turkish and are of Turkish ancestry. The same format is applied to the other cases in this study.

The rise in ethnic conflicts has fueled the literature that looks to the effect of ethnicity on alliances (Horowitz, 1985; Davis and Moore, 1997; Petersen, 2004). Ethnic conflict usually

occurs at the intrastate level. Different ethnic groups will compete with each other for control over the resources or politics of a country (Horowitz, 1985). However, this kind of conflict has not been contained only to intrastate conflict. It has been found that if a similar ethnic group is divided amongst numerous countries, and that group is attacked by a different ethnic group then the kin of the ethnic group attacked even though located in another country, will come to the aid of their brothers who have been attacked. Africa is a prime example of this occurrence. Rwanda has been drawn into conflicts with its neighbors in the course of protecting the Tutsis in neighboring states (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Davis and Moore, 1997; Petersen, 2004). Another term has historically been used to describe a nation states intervening militarily to help their ethnic brothers in another country. The term is irredentism.

Throughout history there have been many examples of states coming to the aid of other states based on a common ethnicity (Chong et al, 2000; Gulati, 1995). Germany has been involved in irredentist policies leading up to the Second World War. Germany used its military might to come to the aid of ethnic Germans who were supposedly mistreated by the French, Poles, and the Czechoslovakians (Kornprobst, 2008). The Chinese intervened militarily against Vietnam due to the perception that the Vietnamese were mistreating the Han Chinese minority living in Vietnam (Ambrosio, 2001). It appears that ethnic alliances are in play as nation states intervene in the affairs of other states to protect their ethnic kin living in that foreign state.

This literature dealing with ethnic alliances will prove crucial in showing support for why nations aligned the way they did during the Cyprus drilling crisis. Turkey has been viewed as the titular homeland for the Turkish ethnic group. As a result, Turkey takes a strong interest in protecting the rights of Turks. For some, this ethnic tie between the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots explains Turkey's interventions on the island (Fox, 2001; Landau, 1981). Greece has

also used ethnic ties to intervene in the affairs of Cyprus. Greece has employed diplomatic coercion in mitigating the role Turkey plays on the island, mainly by blocking Turkey's bid to join the European Union. This action was undertaken because both the Hellenic Republic and the majority of the people of the Republic of Cyprus share the same Greek ethnicity (Kitromilides, 1990). The factor of ethnic similarity will be employed later on in the analysis to test if ethnic similarities are responsible for the alignment of nations in the Cyprus drilling crisis. The next factor examined for alliance formation is the similarity of religions.

Religious Similarity

There has been a debate in the field over the measurement of religion. How does one measure religiosity? Is it based on the number of times a person prays? Is it based upon how often they attend their mosque, church, or synagogue? Or perhaps it is measured based on how devout the person is in keeping with religious law. For the purposes of this paper, religion is defined as the belief in a certain deity, none of the other factors matter. The person must identify themselves as belonging to either the Christian, Jewish, Islamic, or non-religious groups. Sects have no bearing in this study (Hayden, 1997; Huntington, 1997).

This aspect of alliances can be tricky since it has not appeared in the forefront of literature dealing with current alliance formation. If one wants to look at the influence of religion on alliance formation, one is usually forced to look at religious examples. Religion is one of the commonalities that can be used to explain alliance formation between states (Hayden, 1997; Hasenclaver and Rittberger, 2000). Common religious beliefs are one of the foundations used in forming an alliance. A state will form an alliance with another state if the first state is of the same religion. For example, Christian states are more likely to join in alliances with other Christian states rather than ally with Islamic states. The same is true of Islamic states (Calbert,

2009; Kaplan, 2007; Huntington, 1997). Now that the theoretical basis has been provided, it is necessary to provide examples of this theory occurring in the “real” world.

The driving factor behind the theory is to protect the people of similar faith from being dominated by adherents of an outside faith. A religious state will aid a co-religious state (i.e. Christian aids Christian, Muslim aids Muslim, etc.) when they are threatened by a state that follows a different religion. This has led some states influenced by religion to claim protectorates over alien territory to protect their religious brethren from attack and/or exploitation (Bugbee, 1877; Spagnolo, 1977). There are numerous examples of this kind of alliance being used to justify states entering a conflict on one side or another.

There are two prime examples of religion playing an important part in alliance formation during a conflict. The first is the Thirty Years War in Europe. This war occurred as a result of the fighting between the Catholics and the Protestants over religious freedom. The Protestants wanted to be able to follow their own version of the Christian faith. However, the Catholics wanted to keep everyone in the Church and suppress what they considered heresy. The fighting centered on the different principalities in Germany. The Spanish joined the Holy Roman Empire in trying to stamp out Protestantism. Meanwhile, the Protestant Swedes joined the Protestant Germans in order to keep them free from the authority of the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman monarch (Wedgwood and Grafton, 2005; Steinburg, 1967). The other example of religious similarities playing a role in alliance formation and conflict was more recently the Bosnian war. While religion can not explain the side taken by NATO (i.e. Christians siding with Muslims against Christian Serbia), it does explain the alliances between Muslims. During the conflict, Muslims in Chechnya, Iran, and Turkey volunteered to fight with their fellow Muslims against the Christian Serbs. These countries also provided military and economic aid to help the

Bosnian Muslims defend their independence movement from the Serbians (Burg and Shoup, 1999; Shatzmiller, 2002). Throughout history it appears that religion is a factor that can be utilized to explain alliance alignment.

From the literature analyzed it appears that religion can be a factor in explaining the alignment of nations in their alliances. What is missing from this literature is how religion plays a role in the drilling crisis off Cyprus. Religious similarities between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Turkey could account for why Turkey supported North Cyprus in this crisis. There is also a religious similarity between the Republic of Cyprus with both Greece and Russia. In the analysis section, this factor will be tested to see how significant it is in explaining alliance patterns. The next factor that can be used to explain the alignment of nations in an alliance is the role of natural resources or hydrocarbons.

Hydrocarbon Trade

Natural resources carry a broad definition. It can mean anything from timber, to water, to wind, to hydrocarbons, etc. Basically anything that is produced by nature that man can use to create energy. However, such a definition is too broad for the scope of this analysis. As a result, a narrower definition was employed. For the purpose of this paper the term natural resources are strictly limited to hydrocarbons (i.e. oil and natural gas). The justification is simple. The fight over Cypriot resources is not one over pomegranates, or agriculture, etc., it is over hydrocarbons. The Republic of Cyprus is claiming legitimacy to extract their offshore natural gas deposits. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is also fighting to have a share of the offshore natural gas fields off the island (*BBC*, 2011). The focus of this crisis provides justification for the use of hydrocarbons in explaining the formation of alliances.

Traditionally natural resources has been utilized to explain the formation and escalation of both inter and intrastate conflict. The theory usually holds that if a state or actor is resource poor and if their neighbor is resource rich, the resource poor actor will attack the resource rich actor in order to obtain the material wealth. These resources can then be used to power an economy or help equip a military for future conquest (i.e. Japan conquering oil rich countries in Asia). From these studies it appears that natural resources have an impact on escalation of hostilities and the outbreak of hostilities between two groups (Ross, 2004; Russett, 1981; Klare, 2001). What is usually overlooked is how natural resources can be employed in the formation of alliances.

Fortunately there have been studies (albeit few) that have explored the relationship between natural resources and alliances. It is true that there are states and actors that possess rich hydrocarbon reserves. There are also states and actors that are resource poor (Russett, 1981; Klare, 2001). Contrary to the common thought that competition for resources leads to conflict, natural resources can in fact lead to cooperation and alliance formation. The literature suggests that states use hydrocarbons to attract allies. A hydrocarbon poor state is likely to join an alliance if the other nation is resource rich and will allow it to partake in its hydrocarbons. Even if a country is resource rich, the prospect of gaining more wealth is an alluring factor likely to draw an actor into an alliance (Gowa and Mansfield, 2004; Clark et al, 2008; Zweig, 1995; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993). While most of these studies have focused on all natural resources or trade in general, this study diverts from that assumption. For this analysis, the idea of a state using its abundant resources (i.e. hydrocarbons) to entice another state to join an alliance will be examined.

Hydrocarbons, both as a trigger and a factor in explaining alliance formation, will play a key role in the analysis. Hydrocarbons set off this new round of hostilities between the two parts of Cyprus as well as attracting neighboring states to the crisis (*BBC*, 2011). This concept ties into the regional security complex theory. The discovery of these hydrocarbons had the greatest impact on the states that borders these offshore hydrocarbon fields (Buzan, 1991; Buzan and Waever, 2003). Hydrocarbons could be a lever both the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus could use to attract allies to their cause. Since the extraction of offshore Cypriot hydrocarbons is new, the analysis will contribute to the existing literature pertaining to natural resources and alliances.

Security Concerns

The difficulty with the field of security lies within the definition. What is security? How can one know if it is present? How do states react to this concept? This list goes on. Granted this is a difficult term to define, but a definition has been found for this study. Security is the level of fear in a state in regard to the actions of another state. If a state is fearful for its existence, then it is classified as being insecure. If a state is not concerned about its safety, then it is classified as secure (Walt, 1985; Smith, 1995). For the purposes of this analysis, security will follow this definition.

As noted in the section dealing with why alliances form, the traditional explanation for the formation of alliances is security. As the previous literature has shown, ethnic, religious, and hydrocarbon factors are all rooted in the need of an actor to be secure (Davis and Moore, 1997; Burg and Shoup, 1999; Gowa and Mansfield, 2004). In this section of the literature review, a review of the role of security on alliance formation will be analyzed. The final factor of alliance formation discussed for the purpose of the analysis is security.

Security alliances form when there is a difference in power between two states or actors (i.e. one state is stronger than another state). This causes the weaker state or actor to fear that the more powerful neighbor will exploit them, or invade them and annex them. The weaker state will then pursue like minded states to form a defensive alliance. It is hoped this alliance will have enough members and resources to deter the other side from attacking (Walt, 1985; Smith, 1995; Sorokin, 1994a; Axelrod et al; 1995; Sorokin, 1994b). Throughout history there have been several cases of security alliances forming.

After the end of the Second World War, the world was divided into two camps: the West and the East. Each camp assumed the other side was about to invade them to destroy their ideology. As such, defensive alliances were created. The West had NATO and the East had the Warsaw Pact (Levy, 1981). The concept of security is responsible for many alliances in the Middle East. Fearing Soviet encroachment on their territories, the countries of Turkey and Iran formed an alliance with the West to secure their territory. The Arab states formed an alliance against Israel to better their chances of deterring Israel from attacking them (Walt, 1988). This type of alliance has also driven Israel in its search for alliances. Israel perceives itself to be surrounded by much stronger hostile neighbors. As such, they are constantly looking for allies to defend their country from attack (Sorokin, 1994b). The case of Israel is especially important to this analysis as Israel is one of the cases that is incorporated into this analysis. The drive for security will also be important in understanding the needs of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to find allies to protect them from invasion.

In the analysis section of this paper, each factor of alliance formation may prove to be critical in explaining the current alignment of nations in the Cyprus drilling crisis. In the next section, the literature will be built upon by further developing a theory that explains alliance

formation during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis. This literature will also allow hypotheses to be derived to test the theory. All this will lead up to the analysis explaining the alignment of states during the Cyprus drilling crisis.

III. Culture and Non-Culture Theory

In the previous section, the extensive literature dealing with the formation of alliances was surveyed. While this literature covers much ground, all of these factors have not been considered together to explain a case of alliance formation. In this section, these factors will be combined into a mixed theory. The mixed theory will consist of a cultural angle and a non-culturist angle. From the literature presented above, and from a cursory reading of the events surrounding the Cypriot drilling crisis, four hypotheses will be formulated to test this combined theory to see if it can explain the formation of alliances during the offshore Cypriot drilling crisis.

Culture

In international relations, a variable that has often been overlooked is the cultural variable (Lebow, 2008; Lichbach and Zuckerman, 2009). By omitting this variable, valuable data and conclusions have been overlooked. This analysis will contribute to filling the gap left by the existing literature dealing with culture. The first half of this theory consists of a cultural theory to understand international political behavior. Lebow argues that a cultural theory of international relations will allow one to understand the causes of international state behavior (Lebow, 2008). Unlike Lebow, the cultural theory of this analysis does not deal with the concept of honor *per se*. While honor is an important cultural construct as to why actors might behave irrationally, it does not have an impact on this study. This theory of culture is more like the theory of culture advocated by Ross. Ross defines culture as being made up two separate and

distinct parts. Those parts are religion and ethnicity (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 2009; Ross, 2007; Huntington, 1997). While ethnicity and religion are employed as two factors in the culture theory, it differentiates from Ross in that this analysis is not looking at these two factors in explaining conflict between groups. The cultural half of the theory of this analysis focuses on ethnicity and religion. From these two components, two hypotheses are derived to test their influence on the formation of alliances.

The first factor considered in this analysis is the factor of ethnicity. Based on the literature regarding ethnicity and the formation of alliances, the first hypothesis is formulated.

H1: States with similar ethnic makeup will form alliances with one another.

This relationship holds that if one state has a similar ethnic makeup of another state in the international environment, those two states will form an alliance to guard their ethnic brethren from attack by a third ethnic group or state (Davis and Moore, 1997; Lake and Rothchild, 1998). This hypothesis could explain the sides taken by Greece and Turkey during the Cypriot drilling crisis. According to this hypothesis, Greece joined the Republic of Cyprus due to the fact the both of these states are made up of ethnic Greeks (Kitromilides, 1990). Likewise the Republic of Turkey supported the position of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus due to the fact that both states are overwhelmingly constituted by the Turkish ethnicity (Landau, 1981). While similar ethnicity can be a factor in explaining the formation of alliances, it is only the first component of the culture theory used in this analysis.

The second component of the culture theory used in this analysis is religion. Based on the survey of the literature, a second hypothesis was derived to test the role of religion on the formation of alliances.

H2: States with similar religious beliefs will form alliances with one another.

This relationship holds that if one state has similar religious beliefs with another state, the likelihood of both forming an alliance with each other increases. In addition to alliances forming between states that practice the same religion, the religious factor also includes protecting their religious brethren from attack from a state that adheres to a different religion (Bugbee, 1877; Spagnolo, 1977). This hypothesis reinforces the ethnic hypothesis previously mentioned. Greece and Turkey took their respective sides in the conflict due to sharing religious similarities with each state that constitutes the island of Cyprus. The reason for this alignment could be protecting their religious brethren from domination from a different religious group. This hypothesis can also explain the alignment of Russia in this crisis. Russia is Orthodox Christian as is the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore, according to this hypothesis, Russia would side with the state that shares their religion. While both of these hypotheses contribute to the formation of alliances, one must look outside the realm of culture to the realm of the material.

Non-Culture

In this approach, two main factors are included that have been identified in the formation of alliances that form outside of the culture realm. While culture is an important theory to explain alliance formation, the literature clearly demonstrates there are factors outside of culture that influence the formation of alliances. Those two main factors are hydrocarbon trade and security (Zweig, 1995; Walt, 1985). Since these are outside the culture realm, these two factors are termed as non-cultural. From the non-culture half of the theory two additional hypotheses are formulated that in addition to culture provide a complete picture on the formation of alliances.

The first factor of the non-culture theory that will be tested is the role of hydrocarbon trade. Based on the existing literature, a third hypothesis has been developed regarding the formation of alliances.

H3: States will use their hydrocarbons to entice other states to join their alliance.

Since some states in the international system are hydrocarbon poor, it stands to reason that states that have an abundance of hydrocarbons can use those resources to entice other states into their alliance (Russett, 1981; Clark et al, 2008). This could be the case in explaining the alignment of Greece and Turkey. In order to draw allies to back their claims to the oil and natural gas deposits off the coast of Cyprus, both the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would promise concessions to their allies. This would also play into the culture theory. One side would not choose to help the “other” in terms of ethnicity and religion at the expense of their cultural brethren. This could also explain the alignment of Israel in the conflict. Israel has recently discovered a substantial natural gas field off its Mediterranean coast. Their claim has subsequently been challenged by Lebanon and supported by Iran and Turkey. Therefore, Israel would align with Cyprus to protect their drilling rights in the area (*Jerusalem Post*, 2011). While this hypothesis inches us closer to the full picture, one still has to look at security concerns.

The second factor of the non-culture half of the theory is the security factor. Based on the existing literature covering alliances, a fourth hypothesis has been developed to test the impact of this factor in the formation of alliances.

H4: States will form alliances with another state in order to ensure their security.

Security concerns are the primary factor driving the formation of alliances and it would be remiss to not include this factor in the analysis. According to this hypothesis, states form alliances with other states in order to protect themselves from attack by a third state (Walt, 1985;

Smith, 1995; Burg and Shoup, 1999). When examining this factor in conjunction with the other three, one gets a complete picture regarding the formation of alliances. This factor is especially important in regards to the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus since each side fears the other. The Turkish Cypriots fear Greek invasion and domination. The Greek Cypriots fear Turkish invasion and annexation of their island to Turkey. As such, both sides could seek alliances with other states to ensure their security (Hoffmeister, 2002; Souter, 1984; Wolfe, 1988). This same factor also holds true for Israel. Since their fallout with Turkey over the Gaza flotilla incident, Israel is missing a major Mediterranean ally needed for its security. As such, they are looking for other Mediterranean states to ally with to secure their Mediterranean holdings (*Jerusalem Post*, 2011; *Debkafile*, 2011).

The two factors of the non-culture half of the theory compliments the two factors of the cultural half of the mixed theory. Utilizing the combined theory of culture and non-culture new light will be shed on factors that influence the formation of alliances. From this mixed theory, four hypotheses were formulated. Each hypothesis will test a major component of culture and non-culture. The next step in this analysis is to demonstrate how this mixed theory and the four hypotheses will be tested.

IV. Methods

Theory and the hypotheses will be tested using a qualitative case study approach. The cases that will be analyzed will be presented along with the justification as to why these cases were selected. The next stage in this section will be discussing the method of analysis used to test the four hypotheses: content and historical analysis. The data for each factor will be identified. Finally, the justification for determining the results will be discussed.

Small – N Analysis

In previous studies of alliance formation, the analysis employed has been large-n quantitative analysis (Ross, 2004; Ross, 2007; Long, 2003; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993, Gowa and Mansfield, 2004). While this has provided useful insight into alliances, it neglects identifying the specifics of case or region. A small-n, qualitative case study analysis allows researchers to examine a case with more detail to see if the theory can be proved or disproved (Lijphart, 1971). The other benefit for employing a qualitative case study approach is the usefulness it provides to policy makers. The international system is complex with no two cases exactly matching. In order to help policymakers make informed decisions on how to mitigate conflict between two countries, it is imperative for them to know the specifics of those countries. This can only be achieved through the case study approach (Johnson, 1997; Lustick, 1997; Sartori, 1970; King, et al, 2005). This analysis will examine the cases of Cyprus, Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, Russia, and Israel to ascertain if the theory has any merit.

Case Selection

The impact of the Cypriot conflict has numerous ramifications throughout the international sphere. These include the impact of this offshore crisis on the E.U. (which the Republic of Cyprus and Greece are members and Turkey is trying to get in), the impact on NATO (NATO members Greece and Turkey have taken different sides during this crisis), and the impact on the U.N. and the U.S. (the effect of the crisis on the likelihood for settlement). The list goes on, and if each state that took a position during this crisis was analyzed, this would quickly become a multivolume work. In order to scale down the scope, case selection was employed. The five cases of Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, Russia, and Israel were chosen due

to three factors. The first is the traditional approach. The second is employing Regional Security Complex Theory. The final factor employed in case selection is salience.

The traditional approach helped select the cases based on their presence in previous studies dealing with the Cypriot conflict. Great Britain was selected due to its traditional role as an actor in the Cypriot conflict. They are the former imperial power of the island, a signatory to the Treaty of Guarantee which allows them to intervene in the affairs of the island, and have two military bases located on the island (Fox, 1993; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Hakki, 2007). Greece and Turkey were selected during this phase due to their historical and cultural ties to the island. In addition, they are both signatories to the Treaty of Guarantee which allows them to intervene in the affairs of the island. Finally, reviewing the cases on the Cyprus conflict, these two countries are always present (Ker-Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Hakki, 2007; Fox, 1993).

The Regional Security Complex Theory holds that alliances are more likely to occur when states are in geographical proximity (Buzan and Waever, 2003; Buzan, 1991). This allows for the inclusion of the cases of all five cases. Great Britain was chosen due to their military presence on the island (Hakki, 2007). Greece, Turkey, and Israel were selected due to their geographic proximity to the island (Borowiec, 2000; Fox, 1993; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011). Finally, Russia was selected because of their naval presence in the Mediterranean. They have bases in Syria and any tensions on the island of Cyprus could affect their fleet (Fenwick, 2011; *Hurriyet*, 2011).

The final factor for case selection is salience. Great Britain has a strong stake on the island because of the presence of their two military bases. They do not want to be caught in the crossfire if a conflict breaks out, so they have a strong motive for keeping the peace on the island (Smith, 2008; Oliver and Smith, 2010). Greece and Turkey have a stake due to their obligations

to protect the political rights of their ethnic kin (Treaty of Guarantee, 1963). Israel has a stake due because of the importance of having Cyprus protect their claims to the Leviathan natural gas field (*UPI*, 2011; Keinon, 2010; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011). Finally, Russia has a stake due to their commercial and military interests in the region (Hurriyet, 2010; Fenwick, 2011). With all of the factors taken into consideration, the selection of these five cases (Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, Russia, and Israel) is justified.

Methodology

For the purposes of this study, a mixed methodology including both qualitative content analysis along with historical analysis will be employed. Each will complement the other by providing evidence for the different factors. The factors of content analysis incorporated into this analysis are: selecting the data to be analyzed, discussing the nature of the content, contextualizing the information, discussing the reliability of the results, and ascertaining validity (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 2004). This will be supplemented by the historical analysis to provide scholars and policymakers a complete picture of the formation of alliances in the recent Cyprus drilling crisis (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; George and Bennett, 2005).

What is content analysis and why is it employed in this analysis? Content analysis is a tool available to both quantitative and qualitative researchers. Both look at the content of speeches, interviews, etc. in order to explain political actions. One of the most frequent forms of quantitative content analysis counts certain words (i.e. action verbs) in order to determine the importance a speech or interview has on an audience (Klotz and Prakash, 2009). Qualitative content analysis looks at the speech, interview and/or policy statements and looks for the meaning of the content. For example, a leader stated a preference and the qualitative scholar

wants to know how that translates into policy (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; Holsti, 1969; Mayring, 2000; Kracaver, 1962; Kohlbacher, 2006). Since this analysis looks at how speeches, interviews, and policy statements translate into the formation of alliances, the qualitative aspect will be used.

The first step in content analysis is selecting the data that will be employed. This is a crucial step, since the content sources selected here affect the other steps in setting up the qualitative content analysis (Holsti, 1969; Kracaver, 1962). The content for each of the four hypotheses (ethnicity, religion, hydrocarbon trade, and security) will be taken from the major regional and global news networks. These include the *New York Times*, *Jerusalem Post*, *Today's Zaman*, *Defence Greece*, *Debkafile* (analysis of the news of the Middle East as analyzed by Israeli geopolitical specialists), *Famagusta Gazette*, etc. These were selected due to a LexisNexis and major internet search engine search of news media. This allowed for the filtering of hyped media (i.e. blogs) and it allowed the researcher to determine the news sources that carried the most impact. It must be noted that these media outlets are in English and that could be a problem on measuring the impact of these stories. However, in this paper, it is assumed that the stories in the English versions are the same as the stories reported in the native tongue of the news outlet. The other problem with measuring the impact of these articles could lie with the fact that more Americans/foreigners are reading them than the native audience. This is addressed by the assumption that this crisis does not affect the foreigners who do not have a vested interest. Therefore, the high readership will come from the countries that are listed as case studies in this analysis. For the complete listing of the news sources used for the content analysis, please see table 1.

The second step of content analysis methodology is discussing the nature of the content analyzed. There are many sources of content available to content analysis scholars. There is the

possibility of looking at speeches (public, private, or both) interviews (effect depends on the audience), and finally foreign policy statements (statements put forth by leaders in order to justify their position on a particular policy issue). Each has its strengths and weaknesses (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; Holsti, 1969). For the purposes of this study all three will be employed. Speeches, interviews, and policy statements will all be utilized to see if leaders used one of the four hypotheses to explain why their country aligned with the state it did. Leaving out one of the three, could lead to the omission of crucial data that could have an effect on the hypotheses.

The third step in the process of building a content analysis methodology is contextualizing the information. This is a crucial step because it deals with the complexities of using speeches, interviews, and policy statements. It addresses the questions: is a leader being truthful or are there other factors that a leader takes into consideration that he does not share with the public (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; Krippendorff, 2004; Kracaver, 1952; Kohlbacher, 2006)? Since this analysis employs speeches, interviews, and policy statements these questions need to be allayed. The background factors (i.e. elections, trying to make their policies appease someone higher up (Medvedev with Putin)) will not play a crucial role in this analysis. If a leader makes a speech, gives an interview, or releases a policy statement and subsequent policy is implemented as outlined in the speech, then that is all that is needed to show the tie between content and justifying one's policies based on the four hypotheses. Who is the source of this information is important to determining the context of the information. For the purposes of this study, if a leader was quoted in a major regional or global news media outlet, then it is assumed that they are an authoritative figure on explaining governmental policy.

The second concern is based on if a leader is being truthful. It is also tied with the fourth step in establishing a content analysis methodology: reliability (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; Holsti,

1969; Mayring, 2000). This is resolved by the concept of commitment. The sources used are major regional and global news media. This means anything a leader says goes straight to the populace, the opposition, and to other leaders. It acts as a signal to let the audience (both intended and unintended) know their justifications for political policy. This accomplishes two criteria. The first is that the audience believes their justification, and uses it to explain why the leader acted in a particular way. The second is due to the costs associated with lying. If a leader backs down from their position, or uses a different position then they are in danger of having the domestic and foreign opposition use this to remove them from power (Fearon, 1994; Mearsheimer, 2011). Since leaders are committed to following through on their statements to the public, and if subsequent policy is implemented based on these statements, this resolves the concern of reliability associated with using content analysis.

The final step in establishing a methodology for content analysis is ascertaining the validity of the content. Validity is how well one's analysis helps one learn about the subject matter. This is important, because if the results are not valid, then analysis is meaningless (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; Krippendorff, 2004; Holsti, 1969). Leaders could simply be making statements to appease certain domestic and international actors, but they have no intention of following through on their statements. For example, the U.S. talks about the need to end political repression in China to satisfy the demands of human rights groups; however, they are hesitant to employ policy to make China change its policy due to the economic dependence between the two. For the purpose of this study; speeches, interviews, and policy statements are used. However, they have to be tied to justifying implementation of certain policies (i.e. forming an alliance). If there is no tie, then that content was not included in this analysis. This demonstrates the validity of the content analysis performed in this section.

While content analysis plays a large role in understanding why states aligned the way they did, there are supplemental methods that assist in providing a complete picture. The main supplement is historical analysis. This means looking to past events to understand how they affect the policies of the present (Klotz and Prakash, 2009; George and Bennett, 2005; Levy, 1988). Historical data will add credibility to the statements and actions of leaders. It will also help fill in the gaps left by the content analysis. Historical analysis is present for each of the ethnicity, religion, and security hypotheses. In addition to history, there are other types of supplemental data used in this study. For ethnicity, census and scholarly research will supplement the historical and content data. Census data, journal articles, and books written about the effects of religion on each case will supplement the content and historical data. Geological reports and academic journals will supplement the content analysis performed for the hydrocarbon hypothesis. Finally, journal articles will supplement the historical and content data for the security hypothesis. For a complete listing of the data sources, please see table 1. By combining these supplemental data sources to the content analysis, one is able to get the full picture of why states form alliances.

The final step in the methodology section is demonstrating how each hypothesis will be tested. Census data will be used to determine if states share the same ethnicity. If they do not, the presence of ethnic lobbies will be examined. Ethnic lobbies are another way for an ethnic minority group to pressure the host government to enact certain policies (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007; Ambrosio, 2002). If an ethnic lobby is not present then this hypothesis will be problematic. If there is ethnic similarity, or if an ethnic lobby is present, then the content analysis of the speeches/interviews/policy statements will be examined to determine if ethnicity

was a cause for alliance formation. This result will be strengthened by past state behavior on forming alliances.

The religious hypothesis will proceed in three stages. The first is using the census data to determine if the religious makeup of each state is the same. The next step will be testing the number of adherents over a ten year period. This is an arbitrary number chosen due to its proximity to the present. If one goes too far back, then the data is in danger of no longer being relevant to this case. If the number of adherents is high and constant over those ten years, then the final test will commence. The speeches/interviews/policy statements will be examined to see if religion was cited as a cause for the formation of alliances. This conclusion will be backed by the historical analysis looking at why states aligned with others in the past.

The hydrocarbon hypothesis will first be tested by examining the geological reports of the states. This will determine if a state is rich or poor in hydrocarbons. This will help back the assumption that a rich hydrocarbon state will use its abundance to entice a hydrocarbon poor state to join an alliance. Using this information, the speeches/interviews/policy statements of the leaders will be examined. This comparison will allow one to determine if a state uses its resources, or wants hydrocarbons, in return for their alliance with the hydrocarbon rich state.

The final hypothesis tested in this analysis is the security hypothesis. The test will proceed in various stages. The first is establishing that the leaders of each state view the actions of another state as an existential threat to the security (Waeber, 1993). The next step is establishing that they both share a common enemy. The third step is determining if the leaders ask for assistance from another state. The fifth step is demonstrating that a state will come to the aid of another state in order to ensure their security. The security dilemma will be demonstrated by historical works, journal articles, and the speeches/interviews/policy statements given by the

leaders of each state. If all of these steps are present in the data (presented in table 1), then the security hypothesis is viable.

Chapter 2

Cyprus: The Pivot

In order to understand the factors that have lead up to the alignment of nations during the 2011 offshore drilling crisis, one must look at the events and factors on the island of Cyprus. This chapter will serve as a case study of Cyprus. The history of Cyrus will be examined and used to understand the grievances by both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. Also examined will be the demographic makeup of the island. What percentage of the population is Greek, Turkish, or other? Where these ethnic groups reside on the island will also be considered. The grievances of both the Greek Cypriots as well as the Turkish Cypriots will be presented. Finally, all this will be tied together to the current offshore drilling crisis that has beset the island.

I. History

In order to understand the grievances of both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, it is imperative to understand their histories, or their psychonarratives (Ross, 2007). In this section, the history of Cyprus from its early settlements to the aftermath of Cyprus joining the European Union will be explored. As European Union ascension is the last significant historical event that aggravated the divisions of the island before the offshore drilling crisis, the history section concludes with that event.

The history of the island began with the Hittites, who established a protectorate over the island (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000). During the later period of this protectorate, when the Hittite power was declining, Greek migration to the island began. The first Greek settlers came to Cyprus from Asia Minor on rafts during the Stone Age (approximately 7,000 B.C). These settlers built unique beehive shaped houses and cities. The 11th and 12th centuries B.C. saw the arrival of the Achaean Greeks to Cyprus. They brought with them the Greek language, religion, and customs. These Greek colonists were responsible for building the cities of Amathus, Curium, and Kition. The Greeks attempted to establish first independent city-states and later kingdoms on the island. However, due to the strategic location of the island on the Mediterranean trade routes, it was often attacked by the Egyptians, Assyrians, and Persians. The Assyrians ruled the island from 709-669 B.C. Once the Assyrian Empire collapsed, the island was ruled by the Egyptians until 546 B.C. The Persians then dominated the island. However, the Persians constantly had to deal with the rebellious Greeks who sided against the Persians in the first Greco-Persian war. Persian rule was broken when the Persians were defeated by Alexander the Great (Fox, 1993). The island would stay under Hellenic control until the invasion of Rome in 58 B.C. Rome controlled the island until 330 A.D. but while in Rome's possession, the Greek culture flourished on the island. The most important influence of the island came when the Byzantines succeeded the Romans. The Byzantines considered themselves to be Hellenic and part of the Greek Orthodox Church, so both the Hellenic culture and the Orthodox Church formed the Cypriot identity during this time period (Borowiec, 2000). This dynamic was later changed by the Latin crusades.

Richard the Lionheart landed on the island in 1191 A.D. Justifying a war to bring the island under his control, he stated that he was not given a proper reception. Richard conquered

the island. However, due to the large debts that occurred during his crusade he had to sell the island to the Knights Templar. The Templars then turned the island over to Guy de Lusignan, the last king of Latin Jerusalem. The island remained under his household until the Venetians took over in 1489 as payment for protecting the island from Genoese assault. The Latin Kingdom drastically altered the ethnic landscape of the island. They persecuted the clergy of the Orthodox Church and stripped the Church from its dominant political position. The Latin Kingdom also suppressed the Greek culture of the island and tried to replace it with a Latin culture (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000).

The persecution by the Latin Kingdom against the Greek community ended with the invasion of the Ottoman Turks in 1570 A.D. After a brutal campaign that saw the slaughter of over 20,000 people in Nicosia, the Ottomans finally conquered the island. The Ottomans killed the Venetian governor due to the perception that he made women and children starve during the siege of Famagusta. The Ottomans evicted the Latins and the Catholic Church from the island. They restored the Greek Orthodox Church, and under the millet system allowed the Greek Archbishop to rule over the Greeks that lived on the island. However, the economy of the island stagnated during the period of Ottoman control. When Greece won its independence from the Ottomans in 1821, a revolt broke out in Cyprus to join the island with the newly independent Greek state. This was the beginning of the *enosis*, or union with Greece, movement. The Ottomans suppressed the revolt and executed the Orthodox Church leaders that were responsible. The movement was marginalized until the aftermath of the First World War. The main result of the Ottoman conquest was that it introduced the Turkish ethnicity to the island. Due to its close proximity to Turkey, and being an Ottoman province, Turkish migration to the island flourished. It grew to such a level that they became the second largest ethnic group on the island. However,

with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, the island would soon be offered to another power in exchange for protection (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000). The new masters of Cyprus were the British.

The Ottoman state was weakening due to domestic revolts, corruption, and foreign wars. The Ottoman sultan found he could no longer withstand the attacks from Russia without foreign assistance. Therefore, he turned to the British for help. In return for their aid against a Russian invasion, the Ottomans were willing to allow the British to administer the island of Cyprus while the sultan still retained official possession. The signing of the Cyprus Convention in 1878 saw the transfer of Cyprus to British rule. The British used the island as a base to protect their economic interests in the Mediterranean. When World War I broke out in 1914, the Ottomans joined the Germans in the war against the British. As a result, Great Britain annexed Cyprus as a crown colony. They first offered Cyprus to King Constantine I of Greece to entice him to join the allies. He refused preferring to keep Greece neutral. In 1923, Turkey renounced its claims to the island in the peace of Lausanne. Many Greek Cypriots hoped that Cyprus would be united with Greece. However, when it became apparent that would not be the case, armed conflict broke out. The Greeks fought the British to have the island joined with Greece. The Turkish Cypriots fought the Greeks to keep that from happening. Some Turkish groups even pushed to have the island partitioned with their part being re-united with Turkey. As with Israel, this violence led Great Britain to work with the moderates of both sides to establish an independent state of Cyprus. Cyprus gained independence in 1960 following the signing of a treaty between Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey all agreeing to recognize the new island state (Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Hakki, 2007). Independence did not end the conflict on the island.

The Cypriot constitution of 1960 was a power sharing document between the Turk and the Greek Cypriots. A quota system was implemented to fill the governing positions of the island. The Turkish community would have a permanent veto over legislation. Turkish Cypriots were guaranteed 30% representation in parliament and the administration. Great Britain retained bases for its armed forces on the island. Both Greece and Turkey were tasked with making sure that their respective ethnic groups were not mistreated by the other group (Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005). However, the Greek Cypriots were not satisfied by these terms. Under the Presidency of Archbishop Makarios III, a new constitution was proposed that would do away with the power sharing agreement and allow the Greeks to completely control the government. The Turks were forced into enclaves to mitigate their political power. This led the Turks to fight back. The conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots was called the intercommunal conflicts. Turkey threatened to intercede, but the U.S. blocked the Turkish proposal. In 1974, the Cypriot National Guard staged a coup to bring the island into a union with Greece. This led to the Turkish invasion. The fighting ended with the partition of the island. The northern 1/3rd stayed under Turkish control, while the southern 2/3rds stayed under Greek Cypriot control (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000). The island remains divided to this day.

The 1974 Greek Cypriot National Guard coup and Turkish invasion divided the island into two parts. After civilian rule was restored in the southern 2/3rds, it was allowed to take on its duties as the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus that was established in 1960. The northern 1/3rd was under the control of Turkey. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the area that they controlled. It is only recognized by Turkey (Hakki, 2007; Borowiec, 2000). The international community has tried to resolve the crisis and reunite the island. The closest attempt was the 2004 Annan plan. The Annan plan

called for a federal system in Cyprus. It called for power sharing between the two ethnic communities. It called for the removal of foreign troops from the island. Finally, it called for the abolishment of the army on the island so that conflict would not occur between the two sides. If both sides adopted the proposal, then Cyprus would be admitted into the European Union. Turkey, under the AKP (Justice and Development Party), supported the plan and urged the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to agree to the plan. The Greek Cypriots; however, rejected the plan. The result was the Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly approved the plan. It failed due to the Greek Cypriots voting overwhelmingly to defeat the plan. As a result, Greek Cyprus was admitted to the European Union and became responsible for passport allocation to the Turkish Cypriots. The Turks cried foul. They had agreed to the unification plan, yet they were being punished (Ker-Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008). The reasons for this plan's failure will be further explored in the grievances section.

II. The Demographics of Cyprus

Demographics play a central role in this analysis. In this section, the distance of Cyprus to the different homelands of the ethnic groups will be examined. This is important in understanding the relations Cyprus has with these two states. Then how this correlates to the ethnic population percentages in each section of the partitioned island, and the location of the ethnic groups and how they came to be in those locations will be examined. These factors, along with the histories of both Cypriot ethnic groups, will contribute to the grievances section. The factors displayed in this section will also shed light on the current drilling crisis. The ethnic ratios, the location of the offshore hydrocarbons, and the ethnic grievances combined have contributed to the further hostility between the two ethnic groups.

The geography of Cyprus plays a crucial role in the ethnic makeup of the island. Cyprus is located approximately 695 miles south east of Greece. This relatively short distance facilitated the migration of the Achaean Greeks to the island. This also influenced where the Greeks settled, mainly in the parts of the island closest to their homeland (Fox, 1993). Cyprus is located approximately 283 miles south of Turkey. This factor facilitated both Greek and Turkish migration to the island. The short distance allowed Greeks from the city states in Asia Minor and later Byzantium to migrate to the island. Once Byzantium and Cyprus came under the dominion of the Turks, this short distance facilitated the migration of the Turks to the island. The Turks settled in the north closest to their ethnic motherland (Borowiec, 2000). This will come into play later in the analysis.

After the 1923 treaty was signed between Greece and Turkey ending the war between the two, there was a population exchange between the two countries. The Greeks in Turkey were “relocated” to Greece and the Turks in Greece were relocated to Turkey. However, this population exchange did not change the ethnic ratio of Cyprus since it was under the control of the British (Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Borowiec, 2000). However, the homogeneity of the population was disrupted by the intercommunal violence. The fighting between the two groups led to ethnic enclaves throughout the island. This began the process of segregating the island into a Greek part and a Turkish part. The final division occurred with the Turkish invasion of 1974. The Turks fled to the northern 1/3rd of the island that was under the control of the Turkish military. The Greeks fled to the southern part of the island that was not under the control of the Turkish military (Fox, 1993; Hakki, 2007). This act resulted in the current division of the island that has lasted until the present day (see figure 1 for a map showing the partition of the island).

The southern 2/3rds of the island are under Greek Cypriot control. Their portion of the island is named the Republic of Cyprus. It is generally viewed by the international body as the legitimate government of the island (Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008; Hakki, 2007). The location of this portion of the island is identified in figure 1. According to the census data available through the Central Intelligence Agency, the Greeks on this portion of the island make up 77% of the island's total population of 1,120,489 (July 2011 estimate). There is also the "other", which makes up 5% of the island's population (this corresponds to Maronites, Jews, Armenians, and other ethnicities). The dominant religion of the Republic of Cyprus is Greek Orthodox, which corresponds to the Greek ethnic group on this portion of the island. The Maronite Catholics and the Armenian Apostolic Church make up 5% of the island's total religious confession. These two groups are mainly located in the Republic of Cyprus. Islam is virtually nonexistent in the Republic of Cyprus (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011).

The northern 1/3rd of the island is under the control of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots named their portion of the island the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is only recognized by the Republic of Turkey (Borowiec, 2000; Hakki, 2007; Fox, 1993). The location of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is identified in figure 1. According to the census data made available through the Central Intelligence Agency, the total number of Turks living on the island makes up 18% of the island's total population of 1,120,489 (July 2011 estimate). The Turkish Cypriots live entirely in the section of the island that is under their control. Corresponding with the Turkish Cypriot population is the percentage of adherents to Sunni Islam. 18% of the population of Cyprus adheres to Sunni Islam, and this is because it is the faith of the Turkish Cypriots. There are no other recognized faiths that operate in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011).

Geographic and demographic factors play a central role in Cyprus. As shown in this section, distance to Greece and Turkey is important to the current ethnic makeup of the island. In the next chapter dealing with Greece and Turkey, distance and ethnic makeup will be a key component of the analysis. The intercommunal violence and the Turkish invasion of 1974 that partitioned the island into two entities also play a central role in the analysis. In the next section, the relocation of ethnic groups and how it affects their grievances towards one another will be examined. The location of the two ethnic groups is also important in exploring their dispute over drilling rights for the offshore hydrocarbons of Cyprus.

III. The Grievances

The historical and demographic factors play a crucial role in the grievances of each ethnic group on the island of Cyprus. Due to their differing versions of the history of the island (i.e. psychonarratives) and the results of the intercommunal conflicts and the Turkish invasion of 1974, both sides are left with a list of grievances against the other ethnic group (Ross, 2007; Hakki, 2007; Borowiec, 2000). In this section, the grievances that both ethnic groups have with one another will be listed. This will set the framework for how these grievances played out during the offshore drilling crisis.

There are four main grievances of the Greek Cypriot community against the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey. The first grievance is that the Turks stand in the way of *enosis*, or union of the island with Greece. They feel the island is theirs since they were the first to settle there and have the longest continual presence on the island. Therefore, it should be up them to decide if their island is reunited with their motherland. The Turks have fought to keep this from occurring. As long as there are Turks on the island, to the Greeks, *enosis* is impossible. The second grievance is the overrepresentation the Turks demand. The Greek Cypriots see the

Turkish Cypriots as a minority that has been given too much political power by ethnic quotas for the government. They believe this diminishes their political voice. This is one of the reasons why the Greeks wanted to amend the 1960 constitution. They wanted to make it fairer in their eyes (Borowiec, 2000, Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005). The third grievance is the right of return. After the 1974 Turkish invasion and subsequent partition of the island, many Greeks fled their homes in the North rather than live under Turkish rule. Their land was appropriated by the Turks of the North and settled by those Turks fleeing from the south and by the Turks migrating from Turkey (which in of itself is a grievance). Finally, the fourth grievance is the presence of Turkish troops on their island. In the eyes of the Greek Cypriots, the military presence of Turkey on the island is the main reason why peace and reunification has not been achieved. They feel once the Turkish military is gone, the force that divides the island will be removed. This will allow for easier reunification (Ker-Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008; Hakki, 2007; Borowiec, 2000). The concerns of the Greek Cypriots are also mirrored by the Turkish community living on Cyprus.

There is one major grievance that the Turkish Cypriot community has against the Greek controlled Republic of Cyprus. That grievance is discrimination. Once Cyprus became an independent state in 1960, the Turkish community faced harassment by the Greeks trying to silence their opposition to *enosis*. The Turks especially felt threatened when the Greeks proposed to take away their guaranteed voice in government by amending the constitution to eliminate ethnic quotas in the government. The coup in 1974 led many Turks to believe that their home was about to become a part of Greece, wherein they would be persecuted further. Therefore, they turned to Turkey to prevent this from occurring (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000; Hakki, 2007). Even after partition of the island, the Turkish community still faced

discrimination. They were not recognized by the international community as their own independent state. As such, they had to go to the Republic of Cyprus to obtain passports to conduct international travel. The Turks claim that the Greek Cypriots are discriminatory when issuing passports to the Turks. Another example of discrimination is the Annan plan and the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. Urged by Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots voted overwhelmingly in support of the Annan plan to unite the island and gain membership into the European Union. In spite of this support, the Greek Cypriots voted against the plan and killed it. The end result, the Greek Republic of Cyprus was admitted to the European Union and the Turkish part of the island was ostracized. The Turkish community in North Cyprus views the Greek Cypriots demanding the concessions, through the European Union, that the Turkish community believes will further reduce their status in a united Cyprus (Hakki, 2007; Ker-Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008). The next section will analyze how these grievances are manifested during the offshore drilling crisis. It also plays a factor in the alignment of nations during this crisis.

IV. The Offshore Drilling Crisis

History, especially the partition, plays an important role in understanding the two sides of the offshore drilling crisis. The demographics also play a key role by showing where the proposed drilling and exploration sites are located in relation to the two parts of the island. Finally, the grievances play a key role in explaining the actions of both sides during the offshore drilling crisis. The causes for the drilling can be explained in the framework of the grievances listed in the previous section. In this section, it will be analyzed how these factors have come together. This will help one understand the actions taken by both sides during this offshore drilling crisis.

Before the grievances of the crisis are addressed, it is important to look at the facts as they stand so far. In 2007, the Republic of Cyprus opened bids to explore their offshore hydrocarbons. The winning bid went to Noble Energy headquartered in Houston, Texas. Noble Energy began drilling in Block 12 on September 18, 2011 (*BBC*, 2011). The area where Noble is drilling is identified in figure 2. As one can tell, Block 12 falls located south of the Republic of Cyprus. In response to this exploration, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus granted Turkey the right to explore for hydrocarbons off their coast (*Al Jazeera*, 2011). In November 2011, Turkey granted Royal Dutch Shell the permission to begin offshore drilling off of Cyprus (Dombey and Kavanagh, 2011). The area that will be explored by Royal Dutch Shell lies between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey. This is indicated by figure 2. Logically, one would not see a problem here. Both sides are drilling in the areas that are adjacent to their parts of the island. However, grievances by both sides have led to the current crisis between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

The grievances held by both the Greeks and the Turks are responsible for the crisis between the two over the offshore drilling. In this paragraph, the analysis deals with the grievances by the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots believe that the Turks are withholding energy independence for the island. They have the resources to bring in these offshore hydrocarbons and they should be allowed to exploit those resources (*BBC*, 2011; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011; *Defence Greece*, 2011a). The Greek Cypriots also accuse the Turks of demanding more than their fair share of the offshore hydrocarbons (Kanli, 2011; *BBC*, 2011). This harkens back to the historical grievance that the Turks are receiving more per capita than are the Greeks. They see this as unfair. The Greek Cypriots are also angered that the Turkish Republic of Northern

Cyprus has allowed Turkey to exploit the offshore hydrocarbons that belong to the island. They strongly object to an outsider getting their resources (*BBC*, 2011; *Defence Greece*, 2011a).

The Turkish Cypriots also have a grievance against the Greek Cypriots drilling for offshore resources. They see this as a continuation of discrimination against them by the Greek Cypriots. According to the view of the Cypriot Turks, the decision by the Greek Cypriots to drill means that they are denied the revenues that will come from this exploration. They insist that the 20% that the Greek Cypriots offered is not enough. They demand an equal share to ensure that they are not taken advantage of as they have been in the past (Kanli, 2011). The reason why they allowed Turkey to explore their offshore hydrocarbons was due to the fact that they needed someone with the capital to attract drilling firms. Also, this arrangement would ensure that they would receive a fair share of the profits (*Al Jazeera*, 2011; *Today's Zaman*, 2011a). One can see how the historical psychonarrative plays an important role in shaping the policies of the Turks in Northern Cyprus.

V. Conclusion

The chapter dealing with Cyprus is critical in understanding the relations between the two ethnic groups on the island. Understanding how the two groups interact also plays a role in the alignment of foreign nations during the 2011 offshore drilling crisis. The history of the island ties it to Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The conflict between the two also spills over to invite outside intervention. In the next two chapters, the analysis will explore how the relations between the two ethnic groups on the island affect the alignment of nations, especially during the 2011 offshore drilling crisis. Chapter 3 will deal with the traditional actors: Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. History plays an important role in the involvement of Great Britain. History and ethnic grievances involve both Turkey and Greece. Chapter 4 deals with the new

actors: Israel and Russia. Their involvement will play off the religion and security issues of the Greek Cypriot side of the conflict. Throughout the analysis, one will be able to see how the factors discussed here play a crucial role in the foreign relations of the island.

Chapter 3

The Traditional Actors: Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey

This section of the analysis seeks to understand the alignment of the traditional actors during the 2011 Cyprus offshore drilling crisis. Each one of these states has a strong connection to the island. Greece has dominated the island from early settlements up to the Byzantine period. The Turks held control over the island from the 1500s to 1878. Finally, Great Britain possessed the island from 1878 until 1960 (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000). When one thinks of the disputes on the island, these three states are at the forefront. The situation is no different in regards to the current offshore drilling crisis. The involvement of these three states is relative to their historical ties to the island, as well as their position as guarantors in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Hakki, 2007). This chapter of the analysis will test the four hypotheses in order to gain a more complete understanding of why the states chose the sides they did during the 2011 Cyprus offshore drilling crisis.

I. Great Britain

The first case of the empirical analysis of this project is Great Britain. Great Britain is the most recent actor compared to the historical legacies of both the Greeks and the Turks on the island. However, Great Britain is important to this analysis for a variety of

reasons. The first point being that Great Britain had possession of the island from 1878 till 1960 so there is a historical connection (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000; Hakki, 2007). Second, Great Britain is a signatory to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. By the provisions of this treaty, Great Britain reserves the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the island in order to make sure ethnic harmony is achieved (*Treaty of Guarantee*, 1960). Finally, in the recent offshore drilling crisis, Great Britain announced its support of the right for the Greek controlled Republic of Cyprus to explore its offshore resources (*Cypriot Chronicle*, 2011a; Papapostolou, 2011; Barber, 2011). Now the question becomes, why did Great Britain side with the Greek Cypriots on this particular matter? By testing the four hypotheses of this analysis, the answer can be found.

Ethnicity

According to the first hypothesis, belonging to similar ethnic groups could explain why Great Britain supported the rights of the Republic of Cyprus to explore its offshore hydrocarbons. In order to test this hypothesis, one needs to explore the ethnic composition of both states. According to the census data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, 83.6% of the Great Britain's population belongs to the British ethnic group, 8.6% belongs to the Scottish ethnic group, 4.9% belongs to the Welsh ethnic group, with 2.9% belonging to the Northern Irish ethnic group. Only 1.6% of the population is classified as "other" (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). The "other" category is where one finds the Cypriot population. According to the census data from the *British Broadcasting Company*, the special interest section of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus located in the Turkish embassy, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, there are 300,000 Cypriots living in Great Britain. 130,000 are Turkish Cypriots and 170,000 are Greek Cypriots (*BBC*, 2005; *TRNC Info*, 2001; *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development*, 2008). This correlates to approximately .0047% of

the British population of 62,698,362 as being Cypriot, while 95% of the population of Cyprus identify as being Cypriot (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). The data suggests that there is no ethnic similarity between the two states to explain why Great Britain supported the offshore drilling of the Republic of Cyprus. However, ethnicity can play an important role via the power of interest groups.

Interest groups play an important role in making sure that the government is aware of the needs of the minority (Burstein and Linton, 2002; Lohmann, 1998). This has been capitalized by ethnic minorities to ensure that their current state of residence pursues favorable policies towards their homelands (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007; Ambrosio, 2002). The impact of ethnic interest groups on British foreign policy will be explored. The main Cypriot interest group is the Cypriot Federation. The goal of this group is to represent the interests of Cypriots living in Great Britain, as well as to push for a unified Cyprus and the withdrawal of Turkish forces from the island (cypriotfederation.org/uk). This group has strong ties to the conservative party currently administrating British politics. Soon after the offshore drilling crisis began, this interest group held an event that included the conservative Ministers of Parliament. At the event, the conservative government pledged to support the rights of Cyprus to explore its offshore resources. They also decried Turkish meddling in the matter as destabilizing reunification efforts between the two parts of Cyprus. Minister of Parliament Tannock called Turkey's actions "bullying and unnecessary pressure" and that "Turkey has no right to say that this drilling should stop" (*Cypriot Chronicle*, 2011b). This translated into policy as the conservative government of Great Britain publicly supported the offshore exploration and drilling of the Republic of Cyprus, and condemned the actions of Turkey in the region in separate statements to the *Greek Reporter* and to the *Famagusta Gazette*. This is what the British Foreign Minister had to say over the

matter “as the Minister has said we support fully and unequivocally the rights of Cyprus to its EEZ. That has been reaffirmed in the Commonwealth; it has been reaffirmed in the EU on many occasions in the past. So, we support that without any qualification and we want that to be well-known and understood in all countries” (Papapostolou, 2011; Barber, 2011). This is an example of how a statement to appease the Cypriot Federation was translated into policy a couple of days later. In this light, the data supports the hypothesis that ethnicity has played a role in the decision of Great Britain to support the Republic of Cyprus in its offshore exploration and drilling.

Ethnicity has been cited as a consideration for the choices a state makes in an international dispute (Horowitz, 1985; Davis and Moore, 1997). This concept was tested in the case of Great Britain. The first test was to see if the ethnicities were similar in both countries. The data shows that the ethnicities of the two states are indeed different. Therefore, the ethnic hypothesis is problematic in this regard. In spite of this, the test continued by looking at the impact of ethnic lobby groups. The Cypriot Foundation is one of the most powerful lobbies in Great Britain due to its connection with the ruling conservative party. The data supports that the efforts of this lobby is responsible for the government of Great Britain supporting the right of the Republic of Cyprus to conduct offshore exploration and drill for offshore hydrocarbons. While hypothesis one is supported in this instance, the other three hypotheses also need to be tested.

Religion

The second hypothesis of the analysis holds that religious similarity could be responsible for the alignment of nations during the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis. In order for this hypothesis to be validated, the religions of the two states must be similar as well as religion playing a role in foreign policy decisions. This hypothesis is supported by the early historical relationship between Great Britain and Cyprus. According to the Cyprus Convention, Great Britain received

Cyprus in order to protect the Christians living on the island. “In return, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary Reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government, and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories” (Cyprus Convention, 1878). During this time period, both states were under strong religious leaders. The archbishop of the Orthodox Church ruled the majority Greek Cypriots, and the British queen was the head of the Anglican Church. This led to Britain taking the island under their control in order to make sure that the Christians living on the island were not mistreated (Fox, 1993; Hakki, 2007). However, in the present, religion becomes more problematic.

In order to determine the impact of religion, a ten year survey was conducted. The results show the changes in religious adherence. This allows one to determine the impact of a religious populace on its leaders. According to the data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, of the religious population in Great Britain in 2000, approximately 95% were Christian (*CIA World Factbook*, 2000). Eleven years later in 2011, the Christian population of Great Britain decreased to approximately 71.6% of the population, according to the reports provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). This is evidence of the trend of secularization in Great Britain that started after the Second World War. Religion appears to be playing less of a role in the politics of Great Britain as a result of this trend of secularization. As Britain becomes more secular, religion plays a smaller role in politics especially in foreign affairs (Gilbert, 1980; Bruce and Glendinning, 2010; Shakman Hurd, 2006). True to the findings of these scholars, a search of LexisNexis, internet search engines, and the major news media could not find quotes by British leaders to indicate that religion played any role in Great Britain’s support of the

Republic of Cyprus' right to conduct offshore exploration and drilling. As such, the data to support the second hypothesis is problematic.

The second hypothesis dealing with religion as the variable explaining Great Britain's support of the Republic of Cyprus' decision for offshore drilling was tested in this section of the analysis. During the early years of the relationship between Great Britain and Cyprus, religion played a dominant role. This is evidenced by the wording of the Cyprus Convention transferring administrative control of Cyprus from the Ottomans to the British. However, the secularization trend in Great Britain makes the hypothesis a problem. The increasing secularization of British politics means that religion plays a negligible role in justifying foreign policies. This was evidenced by the lack of religious reference on the part of the leaders of Great Britain in supporting the offshore drilling of the Republic of Cyprus. It is therefore safe to conclude that in the regard to the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis, religion played no role in the decision of Great Britain to support the Republic of Cyprus.

Hydrocarbons

The third hypothesis holds that hydrocarbons could be responsible for the alignment of nations during the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis. In order for this hypothesis to work, a state must have abundant hydrocarbons and another state must be lacking those hydrocarbons. It is also imperative that the state with the resources be willing to allow the other state access in order to secure their support. The resource poor state must also be willing to negotiate for those resources instead of using coercion to gain said resources (Gowa and Mansfield, 2004; Clark et al, 2008; Zweig, 1995; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993).

The first part of the test is to establish that one state is resource rich and the other state is resource poor. In the case of Cyprus, geologists estimate that the potential reserves of 7 trillion

cubic feet are enough to make Cyprus energy independent as well as becoming an exporter of hydrocarbons (*BBC*, 2011; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011; *Defence Greece*, 2011a). Great Britain's significant hydrocarbon field is located in the North Sea. According to geologists, the high demand in hydrocarbons has led to a reduction in their reserves. The region has dropped from 400 meters bbl per day to 180,000 bbl per day. As a result, through British Petroleum (hereinafter referred as BP), Britain has had to satisfy its energy needs through international drilling (Tharoor, 2010; Forsyth and Kay, 1980; Ferrier, 1982; Hammond and Mackay, 1983). Since the condition for this hypothesis is present, it is time to test to see if the hypothesis explains the alignment of Great Britain during the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis.

The main oil and gas company that satisfies the energy of Great Britain is BP (Tharoor, 2010; Ferrier, 1982). In order for the third hypothesis to be supported, there must be a transfer of potential energy from Cyprus to Great Britain via BP in exchange for the support of Great Britain. BP does have operations in Cyprus; however, their operations mainly deal with distributions rather than in exploration and drilling (*BP Cyprus*, 2011). A search of LexisNexis, the major internet search engines, and the major news media does not yield any results for BP drilling off Cyprus any time soon, or the Republic of Cyprus promising hydrocarbons to Great Britain in return for their support of their offshore exploration and drilling activity. However, according to a report published in *Globes*, Cyprus is currently in the stages of proposing another round of concessions (*Globes*, 2011). This means that in the future, BP can drill for the offshore resources of Cyprus and that Great Britain might benefit from such an excursion. The results of the second concession plans could validate this hypothesis. Great Britain's support for the drilling activities of the Republic of Cyprus may translate into concessions to the benefit of Great Britain.

The third hypothesis holds that hydrocarbon trade could be responsible for Great Britain aligning with the Republic of Cyprus during the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis. Conditions are present to support this hypothesis. The Republic of Cyprus would have enough potential energy to export to Great Britain to secure its support. Great Britain needs these resources. However, the data does not support this hypothesis at the time of the writing. Perhaps the actions taken by Great Britain to support the Republic of Cyprus' offshore drilling will be beneficial in the second concession round. The Republic of Cyprus may reward Great Britain for its support by giving BP the right to drill off its coasts and export some of the extracted materials back to Great Britain. This will be resolved through future research.

Security

The fourth and final hypothesis holds that security concerns could explain why Great Britain sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis. In order for this hypothesis to hold true, the Republic of Cyprus would ask Great Britain for support of their drilling activities due to fear of Turkish intervention. Great Britain would become involved because the events could affect their security. Security has certainly played an important role in the past between the two states. The 1878 Cyprus Convention gave Cyprus to Great Britain in exchange for Great Britain's protection of the Ottoman Empire from an attack by Russia. "If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the Definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms" (Cyprus Convention, 1878). The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee also allows Great Britain to retain two sovereign military bases (Aktrotiri and Dhekelia) in Cyprus to protect the interests of Great Britain in the Eastern

Mediterranean. A map with the location of the two bases is represented in figure 3 (the bases are shaded red). Plus, the treaty ensured that Great Britain would act as a guarantor to make sure that neither ethnic group would take advantage of the other Cypriot ethnic group. “In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of the provisions” (*Treaty of Guarantee*, 1960).

During the Turkish invasion of 1974, the British military base at Dhekelia was used to transfer fleeing Greek Cypriot refugees from the North to the South. The Turkish army did not attack the bases, nor did the British army engage the Turkish army. This was done to prevent conflict between the two states and NATO allies (Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Hakki, 2007). However; after this instance, Great Britain has not taken an active part in the security of the island. After the end of the colonial era, the bases are no longer viewed as necessary. There was nothing for the bases to protect. Also, the events of 1974 showed that the British would not militarily intervene to protect the government of the island. According to *The Times*, these factors have led to the discussion in the British Parliament for the dismantling of the bases due to budgetary concerns (Oliver and Smith, 2010). The current President of the Republic of Cyprus, Christofias, in a public speech reported in *The Guardian*, has called for the removal of the British troops due their failure to protect the territorial integrity of the island following the Turkish invasion. In his speech, Christofias calls the presence of the British troops “a colonial bloodstain” that needs to be removed in order to get the colonial Turkish troops to withdraw as well (Smith, 2008). Based on this data, it appears that security hypothesis is not supported. The President of Cyprus wants the troops removed since he considers them “a colonial bloodstain” and will pressure Turkey to remove their forces from the island as well (Smith, 2008). Coupled

with Great Britain discussing base closures (Oliver and Smith, 2010), the data for security being a current factor in the explanation of why Great Britain sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling dispute presents a problem.

The results for the fourth hypothesis are mixed. In the past, security played a crucial role in the relations between Great Britain and Cyprus. However, the end of British colonialism coupled with the actions of Great Britain during the 1974 Turkish invasion and subsequent partition of the island has made security more of a problem as an explanatory variable. The desire of the Republic of Cyprus to have the British withdraw in order to ensure a Turkish withdrawal, coupled with discussion in Great Britain to close its bases lends evidence to this assertion. Based on the available evidence, it is safe to conclude that security played a negligible role in the decision of Great Britain to support the offshore exploration and drilling efforts by the Republic of Cyprus.

Conclusion

The purpose of this case study was to answer the question why Great Britain sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis. The answer was found by testing four hypotheses. At first glance the first hypothesis was problematic since the ethnic makeups of the two states are not similar. However, the hypothesis was validated when the impact of the Cypriot interest groups was taken into consideration. The second hypothesis was true in explaining the relations between the two states at the beginning. However, due to secularization in Great Britain, this hypothesis was not supported by the data. The third hypothesis held potential since hydrocarbon rich Cyprus could buy the support of hydrocarbon poor Great Britain. Ultimately, there was no data to support this hypothesis, though the results of the second concession could validate the hypothesis. As with the second and third

hypotheses, the fourth hypothesis dealing with security was a satisfactory explanation for relations between Cyprus and Great Britain from 1878 until 1974. However, the results of the 1974 invasion, ensuring the withdrawal of the Turkish military and budgetary problems demonstrates that in the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis, security played a negligible role as well. The analysis of this section supports the role of ethnicity, in the form of interest groups, in explaining the alignment of Great Britain with the Republic of Cyprus during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis. See table 2 for a summary of the findings for the case of Great Britain.

II. Greece

The second traditional actor that has become involved in the Cyprus drilling dispute is Greece. The Hellenic government expressed its support for Cyprus stating that it is a right of the Republic to Cyprus to explore and develop its own resources (Papandreou, 2011; *The National Herald*, 2011). This led to friction with Greece's historic antagonist Turkey. Due to the current financial crisis, Greece has tried to work with Turkey to figure out a compromise to the problem (Kumova, 2011), yet Greece has also accused Turkey of exasperating the situation and the Greek Government has called on Turkey to withdraw its exploratory team from the disputed waters (*The National Herald*, 2011; *Cyprus News Agency*, 2011). It is apparent that Greece has sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the crisis. Now it is time to understand why Greece supports the Republic of Cyprus during this dispute.

Ethnicity

Some scholars believe that states form an alliance with another state during a dispute due to similar ethnicity (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Petersen, 2004). In order to determine if this has any bearing on this case, this theory has been incorporated into this analysis as hypothesis two. According to this hypothesis, if the ethnicity of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are similar

than this could account for why Greece chose to support the drilling rights of the Republic of Cyprus. If the ethnicities are the same, then the speeches by the Greek government will be analyzed to see if ethnicity is cited as a reason for the support between the two states.

The first step is to identify if the ethnicity of the two countries are similar. According to the census data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, 97% of Greece's population belongs to the Greek ethnic group. The other 3% belong to various other ethnic groups (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). According to the Ethnic Encyclopedia of Europe, out of the population living in Greece, 60,000 hail from Cyprus (Cole, 2011). This constitutes .0056% of Greece's total population. This is hardly enough to put pressure on the Greek government to support the Republic of Cyprus. The Cypriots living in the Republic of Cyprus are ethnically Greek. According to the census data from the Central Intelligence Agency, 96% of the inhabitants of the Republic of Cyprus belong to the Greek ethnic group (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). From the data collected and analyzed, the dominant ethnicity of both states is Greek.

Since it has been established that Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are constituted mainly of the Greek ethnic group, it is time to see if ethnicity is cited as a factor to why Greece supports the Republic of Cyprus during the drilling crisis. The former Greek Prime Minister at the start of the crisis, Papandreou, was quoted saying the following at a press event "we have made a clear distinction between financial problems and *national* causes" (Papandreou, 2011). The term national has been italicized. National in this context is another word for ethnicity. Prime Minister Papandreou and the Greek government have made similar statements in interviews with *Today's Zaman*, *The National Herald*, and *Cyprus News Agency* (Kumova, 2011; *The National Herald*, 2011; *Cyprus News Agency*, 2011). This has followed the historical

record between the two. Greece has been a strong supporter of the Republic of Cyprus due to their shared Greek ethnicity (Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Hakki, 2007; Borowiec, 2000).

One possible explanation for why Greece supports the drilling rights of the Republic of Cyprus would be their similar ethnicities. The census data provided showed that both Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are mainly constituted of the Greek ethnic group. Interviews and statements by the Greek government have supported this hypothesis. Further evidence was provided by the historical narrative. The analysis has lent evidence that ethnicity has been employed by Greece to justify their support of the Republic of Cyprus extracting the hydrocarbons off their coast.

Religion

Scholars in the field of alliances have theorized that similar religious beliefs can cause states to form alliances during a crisis (Hayden, 1997; Hasenclaver and Rittberger, 2000). Due to the historical evidence that this factor contributed to alliance formation between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, it has been incorporated as the third hypothesis in this study to determine if it still holds true. In order to test this hypothesis, the religious identification of both states will be analyzed to see which religions, if any, both states share. The analysis will also test to see if religion has become more or less prominent in the two states during a ten year period. Finally, the actions and speeches of the leaders (both secular and religious) will be analyzed to determine if religion is responsible for Greece siding with the Republic of Cyprus during the drilling crisis.

In order to determine if the religious hypothesis is viable, it is important to understand if religion plays a crucial role in both states. This will be determined by analyzing the growth, decline, or stability of religion in these two countries from 2000 to 2011. According to the data

provided by the Central Intelligence Agency in 2000, the religion of Cyprus was 96% Greek Orthodox Christian. The other 4% were constituted of Maronite, Armenian Apostolic and other Christian faiths (*CIA World Factbook*, 2000). The Central Intelligence Agency reported in 2011 that the religious makeup of the Republic of Cyprus was 96% Greek Orthodox Christian. The other 4% are Maronite, Armenian Apostolic and other Christian denominations (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). In 2000, the Central Intelligence Agency reported that 98% of the population in Greece identified with the Greek Orthodox Church (*CIA World Factbook*, 2000). In 2011, the Central Intelligence Agency reported that 98% of the Greek population adhered to the Greek Orthodox Church. 1.3% of the population identified themselves as Muslim, and .7% identified themselves as other (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). The data indicates that in both Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, Greek Orthodox Christianity has enjoyed high stable support. This high level of adherents in both countries could be responsible for why Greece aligned with the Republic of Cyprus during the oil drilling crisis.

It is important to briefly discuss the hierarchy of the Greek Orthodox Church. The headquarters of the Church is located in Istanbul, Turkey. The Patriarch of the Church, who is ethnically Greek, is required by Turkish law to be a citizen of the Turkish Republic. Turkey has used this law to make sure that the Patriarch stays loyal to the Turkish state. If there are problems with Greece or Cyprus, then the Patriarch is punished as was the case of the Hakki seminary closing (Demir and Gamm, 2011). While the formal leadership has been mute on religious justifications, the Church leaders in Greece and the Republic of Cyprus along with their followers have not been neutral. Reports from the European Commission and scholarly journals demonstrate that the countries of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are the most religious in Europe. This has translated into policy as the people put their faith into practice (Stepan, 2000;

European Commission, 2005). This is highly evident in Cyprus, where the first President was the archbishop of the island. Currently, the present archbishop of Cyprus is head of the right wing National People's Front (ELAM) party and has close ties with Greece. According to a report in *The Greek Cypriot Daily*, the Archbishop of Cyprus claims that the reason why Greece supported the Republic of Cyprus is due to their religious ties (Evripidou, 2010; Fox, 1993; Hakki, 2007). While there are no interviews or statements issued by either the Greek or Republic of Cyprus governments indicating that religion is the cause for Greek support in this particular case, the historical evidence compiled indicates that this factor is a covert explanatory variable (Fox, 1993; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Hakki, 2007).

One possible explanation for why Greece aligned with the Republic of Cyprus during the oil drilling crisis is similar religious ties between the groups. The data collected and analyzed showed that adherence to Greek Orthodox Christianity is high and is not in danger of decline anytime soon. This has translated into political policy of supporting the other state in each in both Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. The data presented in this analysis seems to support the theory that religious ties are responsible for Greece supporting the Republic of Cyprus during the oil drilling crisis.

Hydrocarbons

Another theory that hopes to explain the alignment of nations is hydrocarbons. Instead of serving as an aggravating factor, scholars claim that a state can use its resources to entice a resource poor state into aligning with the resource rich state (Gowa and Mansfield, 2004; Clark et al, 2008; Zweig, 1995; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993). This theory has been incorporated into this analysis via hypothesis three. In order for this hypothesis to be viable, it must meet two conditions. One, Greece must be poor in hydrocarbons (i.e. oil and natural gas) and the Republic

of Cyprus must be rich in those resources. Two, there must be agreement between the two states for oil and natural gas to flow to Greece in return for Greece's assistance in supporting the Republic of Cyprus right to extract those resources. If both of these conditions are present, then this hypothesis is a supporting factor for why Greece supported the Republic of Cyprus during the oil drilling crisis.

In order to test the utility of the third hypothesis in this case, it is imperative to show a need of hydrocarbons (i.e. oil and natural gas) in Greece. According to the geological reports of International Energy Agency, Energy Delta Institute, and the Central Intelligence Agency, it is made known that Greece is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon imports. Their only petroleum deposit is in the Prinos field in the Aegean, and it only produces 1 kb/d, far short of satisfying the demand of the island. They are entirely energy dependent and must primarily rely on Russia for their energy needs. They have to import over 99% of their hydrocarbon needs from Russia (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011; *Oil and Gas Security*, 2010; *Energy Delta Institute*, 2011). The data shows that Greece is poor in hydrocarbons. This translates into support for the first half of part one of the hypothesis to be viable. In order for the second part of the first condition to hold true, the Republic of Cyprus must be rich enough in hydrocarbons to export to others. Analyzing the geological reports released by the *British Broadcasting Company*, *Jerusalem Post*, and *Defence Greece* shows that the 7 trillion cubic feet of reserves located in Block 12 are enough to meet the energy needs of the Republic of Cyprus as well as export these hydrocarbons to other states (*BBC*, 2011; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011; *Defence Greece*, 2011a). The data supports the first condition in making the third hypothesis viable. Now the second condition will be tested to see if the third hypothesis is viable in this case.

In order for the second condition to be met, there must be an agreement between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus for the Republic of Cyprus to supply hydrocarbons to Greece. There are two oil refineries in Greece: one in Aspropyrgos owned by Hellenic Petroleum which processes 7.5 million tons annually (*Hellenic Petroleum*, 2012), the other in Corinth is operated by Motor Oil Hellas and has the capacity to refine 100,000 barrels per day (*Motor Oil Hellas*, 2012). Both of which can be used to refine the hydrocarbons extracted from the Republic of Cyprus. This is important for the Republic of Cyprus since their refinery capabilities are limited to only one refinery (*Cyprus Petroleum Refinery*, 2012). While it is too early to determine if Greece will receive Cypriot hydrocarbons or will be allowed to refine it, there is evidence this will be the case. When Israel developed its hydrocarbons, Israel sent those resources to Greece to be refined. Israel also opened a market with Greece allowing Greece to purchase Israeli hydrocarbons. In return, Israel has cultivated a new alliance (Pruder, 2011). The case with Israel parallels the case with Cyprus, so it will be no surprise if the Republic of Cyprus allows Greece to refine some of their oil and open up Greek markets for Cypriot energy.

The goal of this section of the analysis was to determine if the third hypothesis, hydrocarbon trade, had any bearing on Greece aligning with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. In order for the hypothesis to be viable two conditions had to be met: Greece needed to be energy poor and Cyprus needed to be energy rich, and in exchange for Greek help Greece would receive Cypriot oil. The data shows support for the first condition. While the data is not completely present for the second condition, there is enough secondary evidence that it will be borne out in the near future. The analysis, thereby concludes, that there is support for the third hypothesis in being a contributing factor explaining the alignment of Greece with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.

Security

One of the main reasons cited for alliance formation is security reasons (Davis and Moore, 1997; Burg and Shoup, 1999). It would be remiss if such an important factor was not incorporated into this analysis. In order to determine if this security theory explains this case, it has been incorporated into the study as the fourth hypothesis. In order for this hypothesis to be viable in this case study; conditions must be met. The first condition is determining if the Republic of Cyprus faces a security threat; the second is whether Greece can provide the security to offset the threat to the Republic of Cyprus, and the third condition is that Greece is willing to provide security to the Republic of Cyprus to eliminate the security threat. If all these conditions are met, then the fourth hypothesis is viable in explaining why Greece aligned itself with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.

In order to test the fourth hypothesis, the three conditions need to be tested. The first condition tested is determining if the Republic of Cyprus faces a security threat. There is evidence to support this is the case. Scholarly reports suggest the presence of Turkish troops in Northern Cyprus is viewed by the Southern Cypriots as a threat to their national sovereignty (Ker-Lindsey and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008; Hakki, 2007). The statement made by the Turkish government to the *British Broadcasting Company* that "[t]his work will be carried out together with the [navy] escort," increases Cyprus' fear of Turkish military intervention to prevent their desire to become energy dependent (*BBC*, 2011). According to a report published in *Al Jazeera*, "the Turkish Piri Reis was sailing in international waters south of Cyprus, about 80km away from a Greek Cypriot gas rig and between two plots that Cyprus has mapped out for exploration" (*Al Jazeera*, 2011) This caused concern for the security of the

Republic of Cyprus' drilling platforms. The evidence supports the first condition that the Republic of Cyprus is facing a security threat.

The second condition tested in order to determine the viability of the fourth hypothesis is if Greece can provide the support necessary to address this crisis. The answer is found in the Treaty of Guarantee and in the historical relations between the two states. According to the Treaty of Guarantee, “[i]n so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty” (*Treaty of Guarantee*, 1960). This means that Greece has an obligation under international law to intervene to protect the interests of the Greek Cypriots. The Republic of Cyprus has also counted on the Greek government to extend diplomatic pressure to keep them secure. This has been historically manifested in Greece's voice in the European Union (Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005). The data obtained from the Treaty of Guarantee and other historical documents supports the second condition that Greece can provide support to the Republic of Cyprus to help alleviate security concerns.

The third, and final, condition that is tested in order to determine the viability of the fourth hypothesis is if Greece has tangibly supported the Republic of Cyprus. In regard to military assistance, Greece has failed to deliver. Greece has not sent troops to the island, despite the invitation from Turkey during the communal violence (Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Borowiec, 2000). During the offshore drilling crisis, Greece has not extended military support to the Republic of Cyprus to defend their offshore drilling. However, Greece has extended diplomatic pressure on Turkey in order to achieve Turkish retreat from drilling in Cypriot waters. The Greek government has issued many statements to *Today's Zaman*, *The*

National Herald, and the *Cyprus News Agency* indicating that they are putting diplomatic pressure on Turkey not to harass the offshore drilling conducted by the Republic of Cyprus. Here is an example of a statement from the Greek Foreign Minister to *The National Herald*: “Recent Turkish statements and actions in response to Cyprus’ sovereign right to exploit its natural resources are in conflict with international law and order and undermine stability in the region, causing grave concern” (Kumova, 2011; Papandreou, 2011; *The National Herald*, 2011; *Cyprus News Agency*, 2011). However, this has been a lukewarm response. The Greek Government toned down their rhetoric in order to continue their thaw in relations with Turkey. This is evidenced by a report in *Today’s Zaman* and the *Daily Hurriyet* that neither side wants this crisis to stall their talks on normalization of relations (Kumova, 2011; Kanli, 2011). Based on these interviews and reports, this hypothesis is problematic. With regard to military assistance, Greece has not provided any assistance and in regard to diplomatic assistance, Greece’s response has been lukewarm.

Conclusion

This section of the analysis has answered the question why Greece sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. The answer was found by testing the four hypotheses. The data supported the claim that ethnic similarity was responsible for Greece supporting the right of Cyprus to explore and exploit its offshore resources. The data regarding religion showed support for the religious hypothesis being viable in this case. For the third hypothesis, the conditions are there also to make it plausible. However, it is too soon to say with complete certainty that hydrocarbons are the reason Greece aligned with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. Finally, the data found that the Republic of Cyprus’ security is threatened and that they look to Greece for protection. The Greek response has been mixed.

Greece has not provided military assistance to protect the offshore drilling platforms of the Republic of Cyprus, and has exerted only gentle diplomatic pressure on Turkey to protect its ally. See table 3 for a summary of the findings for the case of Greece.

III. Turkey

As in the previous case studies of Great Britain and Greece, diplomatic pressure was exerted to try to settle the offshore drilling dispute favoring the Republic of Cyprus (*The National Herald*, 2011). The remaining three case studies differ in the means of their support for their respective sides. They have utilized more tangible means of support for their respective allies (mainly the employment of force). Turkey entered the Cypriot offshore drilling dispute on the side of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Since they are not a signatory to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Seas, Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus' claims to its offshore hydrocarbons (*U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas*, 1982; *BBC*, 2011). After signing an agreement with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Turkey dispatched its own hydrocarbon exploration vessel to Cypriot waters to explore and recover any hydrocarbons they could find. Turkey also dispatched naval vessels to protect this expedition from interference from the Republic of Cyprus or any other foreign party (*Al Jazeera*, 2011; *BBC*, 2011). The question needs to be answered, why did Turkey support the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during this dispute? The answer comes again by testing the four hypotheses of this analysis.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity is an important construct. It is useful as an explanatory variable for various political policies. Such is the case with alliances. Some scholars believe that ethnicity is the main cause for alliance formation (Horowitz, 1985; Davis and Moore, 1997; Petersen, 2004). As

such, this concept was incorporated into this analysis via hypothesis one. In order for this hypothesis to be a viable explanation of the actions of Turkey aligning with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, two conditions need to be met. The first condition is to prove that the ethnic compositions of both countries are similar. The second condition is that there must be evidence, both historical and present, to support the claim that Turkey allied with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus due to ethnic similarity. If both of these conditions are met, then ethnicity is a plausible explanation for why Turkey entered the Cypriot offshore drilling dispute on the side of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

The testing of the hypothesis will proceed in two parts. The first part is to examine the data to see if the first condition of ethnic similarity is verified. According to the census information provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, the ethnic composition of Turkey is as follows: 75% Turkish, 18% Kurdish, and 7% other. According to the census data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, the ethnic composition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is 99% (conservative estimate) Turkish (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). There are also a large number of expatriates living in each country. Ever since Turkey recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the 1980s, Turkish immigration has increased to the island (Ker-Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008). There has also been a significant migration of Turkish Cypriots to Turkey. According to the recent census data provided by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, it is estimated that there are between 300,000 to 500,000 Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey (*TRNC Info*, 2001). So, the data has supported the first condition that there is strong ethnic similarity between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In addition, the significant expatriate communities living in the other country cements the bond between the two states.

Now that the data has been presented to support the first condition, one can move on to test the second condition. Historical and current evidence will be examined to see if ethnicity has any impact on Turkey aligning with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Examining the historical record, one finds data that supports the second condition of the first hypothesis. The Treaty of Guarantee allows for Turkey to protect its ethnic kin in Cyprus “[i]n so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty” (*Treaty of Guarantee*, 1960). Turkey has justified its numerous interventions on the island of Cyprus as protecting their ethnic brothers (Hakki, 2007; Borowiec, 2000; Fox, 1993; Landau, 1981). While the Turkish leaders have not stated outright that the reason for their support is due to ethnic similarities, one can see that ethnicity is implicit in their statements of support for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey has claimed the acts of the Republic of Cyprus are “provocative” and they will take the necessary steps to protect the interests of the ethnic kin on Cyprus to both the *British Broadcasting Company* and to *Al Jazeera* (BBC, 2011; *Al Jazeera*, 2011). From the evidence gathered, there is support for the second condition of the first hypothesis.

In order for the first hypothesis to be viable in this particular case study two conditions had to be met. The first condition was that the ethnic composition of the two states had to be similar. The evidence suggests that this is the case. The second condition that had to be met was that the leaders employed ethnicity to justify their actions. Both historical and present day evidence suggests that this condition has been met. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that ethnicity plays a role in explaining why Turkey sided with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis. While ethnicity has played a role, it is

important to test the other hypotheses to determine if they also can explain Turkey's alliance with the Turks of Cyprus.

Religion

Religion has commonly been neglected as a factor in the studies dealing with alliance formation. However, it has been making a comeback as an important variable in the consideration of alliance formations (Hayden, 1997; Hasenclaver and Rittberger, 2000). Thus, it has been incorporated into the analysis via hypothesis two. In order for this hypothesis to be plausible in explaining why Turkey chose to ally with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, three conditions need to be met. The first condition is that the confessional adherence of both states is similar. The second condition that needs to be met is that the number of adherents to the shared religion must be high. The third condition is that the leaders of the two states use this high level of religious similarity in explaining their alliance. If all these conditions are met, then the second hypothesis is viable in explaining this particular case study.

The first condition tested is religious similarity. According to the religious data compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency, both Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus adhere to Sunni Islam (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). Therefore, the first condition is most definitely met. The second condition that needs to be met is that there are a high number of adherents of Sunni Islam in both countries. In order to test the viability of this hypothesis, a ten year period will be examined. This examination will show if there is a change in religious adherents as well as how these numbers correspond to the government basing policy on religious justifications. According to the religious data from the Central Intelligence Agency, in Turkey, 99.8% of the population adheres to Sunni Islam. This has been constant over a ten year period. The census data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and travel guides demonstrate that

for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 99% of the population adheres to Sunni Islam. This has also been constant over a ten year period (*CIA World Factbook*, 2000; Darke, 2009; *CIA World Factbook*, 2011). This data supports the presence of high levels of Sunni Islam adherents in both countries and that the number has been stable over a ten- year period. As a result, the data presented here supports the first and second conditions needed to make the second hypothesis viable. Now that the two conditions are present in this case, it is time to test the third condition.

In order for the third condition to be viable, the high numbers of Sunni Muslims in both countries needs to translate to policy justifications for supporting the alliance. At first glance this would appear to be a problem due to Turkey's secular constitution. However, one notices a shift in Turkey's orientation towards religion in the governmental sector. When the Islamic sympathetic AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in the 2003 elections, Turkey became more religious in its outlook. Restrictions against Muslims were either eased or lifted entirely and the foreign policy of the AKP administration became involved with the Muslim countries across the globe. In his book, Foreign Minister Davutoglu explains the case for using Islam to justify Turkey's involvement with the East (Tepe, 2005; Ozbudun, 2006; Davutoglu, 2001). The data supports the third condition for Turkey presently, but in order for it to truly work it must also be present in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. According to the 1997 report in the *Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report*, while 99% of Turkish Cypriots adhere to Sunni Islam, they are largely secular and do not use religion to justify government policy (Boyle and Sheen, 1997). As such, the third condition is not viable since it can not account for the actions of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The result being, that no

documents (either news media or historical) could be located to demonstrate that the alliance between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is grounded in religion.

The second hypothesis of this analysis holds that religion could be a reason why Turkey sided with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. In order for this hypothesis to be viable, it had to meet three conditions. The first condition was that there had to be similarity between the religions of the two states. The data proved that there are indeed religious similarities between the two. The second condition that had to be met was that there had to be high levels of adherents. This is needed in order for religion to shape public policy. The census data collected supported the second condition. The third, and final condition, held that religion had to play into the policies of both states. The historical data shows that this is true for Turkey in the present, but can not account for past support when Turkey was a secular state (Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Borowiec, 2000). The data from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus regarding the tie of religion and state does not support the third condition. Since the third condition did not hold, religion is not considered a strong explanatory variable for this particular case.

Hydrocarbons

Natural resources are one of the most studied causes of conflict. However, some scholars believe that resource trade can lead to the formation of alliances between states (Ross, 2004; Russett, 1981; Klare, 2001; Gowa and Mansfield, 2004; Clark et al, 2008; Zweig, 1995; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993). As a result, this notion that hydrocarbons can be used to form alliances has been incorporated into this analysis as hypothesis three. In order for this hypothesis to be viable in explaining why Turkey allied with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis, certain conditions will need to be met. The first condition that needs to

be met is to show that Turkey is hydrocarbon poor and that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is hydrocarbon rich. The second condition is that there must be an agreement between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to provide hydrocarbons to Turkey in exchange for protection of their offshore hydrocarbons. If both of these conditions are met, then the third hypothesis could be viable.

In order for the hypothesis to be viable, conditions must be established. The first condition is that Turkey must be hydrocarbon poor and that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus must have enough hydrocarbons to export to Turkey to entice their support for their offshore drilling. According to the geological reports published by Cooley, Starr, Cornell, and Shaffer, Turkey is indeed hydrocarbon poor. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey has to import its entire demand of hydrocarbons from Iran, the Caspian Sea, and from Russia (Cooley, 2008; Starr and Cornell, 2005; Shaffer, 2006; *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 2011). Due to being energy poor, Turkey is constantly looking for markets to fulfill its energy needs. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this is a top priority for the state of Turkey (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). As such, the first factor to proving condition one is present. In order for the second factor to be present, data needs to be presented to show that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will have enough hydrocarbons for its own needs and enough to export to Turkey. According to preliminary geological results released to the *British Broadcasting Company*, *Al Jazeera*, and *Today's Zaman*, the 7 trillion cubic feet of hydrocarbons is enough to meet this condition (*BBC*, 2011; *Al Jazeera*, 2011; *Today's Zaman*, 2011b). Therefore, the geological data shows that the two factors are present, thereby making condition one probable.

Now that it has been established that condition one for the first hypothesis exists, it is imperative to test the second condition. In order for this condition to hold true there must be an agreement between the two states for the transfer of the offshore resources. The government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has signed an agreement with the government of Turkey allowing Turkey to drill its offshore resources. This was reported by the major news media the *British Broadcasting Company* and *Al Jazeera* (*BBC*, 2011; *Al Jazeera*, 2011). According to a report released to the *Today's Zaman*, the deal allows Turkey to market the extracted resources (presumably for their own consumption) and provide just compensation to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (*Today's Zaman*, 2011b). The data provided by the *British Broadcasting Company*, *Al Jazeera*, and *Today's Zaman* supports the second condition needed for the third hypothesis to be viable in this particular case.

In order to incorporate the idea that hydrocarbons can be used to create alliances, the third hypothesis of this analysis was formulated. It holds true that a resource rich state can use its resources to attract other states into joining an alliance. In order for this hypothesis to be viable two conditions had to be met. The first condition was establishing that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is rich in hydrocarbon and that Turkey is poor in hydrocarbon. The data collected and analyzed supports this condition. The second condition that needed to be met is an agreement between the two parties ensuring Northern Cypriot energy in return for Turkish assistance. The data collected and analyzed supports this condition as well. Since the evidence supports both of the conditions, hypothesis three is a viable explanation as to why Turkey allied with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.

Security

The next hypothesis tested in this study deals with security. . In order for this hypothesis to be viable in explaining Turkey's alliance with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis, three conditions need to be met. The first condition is determining if the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus faced a security threat that caused it to call on Turkey for assistance. The second condition is determining if Turkey can provide said assistance. The third, and final, condition is if Turkey acts to protect the interests of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. If all three conditions are met, then this hypothesis is viable in explaining this particular case.

In order for the fourth hypothesis to apply to this particular case, the first condition needs to be met. It is necessary to demonstrate that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus faces a security threat. This can be accomplished by examining the historical and present evidence. Ever since declaring independence, the Turkish Cypriots have felt that they are being discriminated against at best and persecuted against by the Greeks at worst. This situation led to their attempts to create their own republic in order to feel secure (Fox, 1993; Borowiec, 2000; Hakki, 2007). This fear of Greek domination continues to the present and has recently manifested itself over Turkish Cypriot concerns about offshore drilling conducted by the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots feel that the Greek Cypriots will not give them their fair share of the oil proceeds. This is demonstrated by the following interview published in the *Daily Hurriyet*: "Greek Cypriot leader Demetrius Christofias "generously" ultimately agreed that if gas was to be found, the share of Turkish Cypriots would be 20 percent; American friends, however, have suggested that Turkish Cypriots should be given a full 50 percent share in any find off the island" (Kanli, 2011). This demonstrates that the Turkish Cypriots believe that the

Greek Cypriots are trying to deny them their fair share of the hydrocarbons. The historical data along with the interview found in the *Daily Hurriyet*, demonstrates that the first condition is present.

The second condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to show the fourth hypothesis is plausible is that Turkey be willing to provide assistance to the Turkish government of Northern Cyprus. The answer can be found in the Treaty of Guarantee. This treaty allows Turkey to intervene on the island in order to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriots: “[i]n so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty (*Treaty of Guarantee*, 1960). Throughout the relations between the two states, Turkey has shown a willingness to come to the aid of the Turkish Cypriots. This has come in the forms of the 1974 invasion to protect the Turkish Cypriots and utilizing diplomatic techniques to ensure the protection of the Turkish Cypriots (Hakki, 2007; Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005; Borowiec, 2000). This has also manifested during the offshore drilling crisis, as the government of Turkey has exerted influence on the Greek government in order to stabilize the region. This was evidenced by a report to *Today’s Zaman*: “Turkish Deputy Prime Minister for Cypriot Affairs Beşir Atalay, meanwhile, considered the Turkish initiative on Thursday a move to protect the rights of Turkish Cypriots, for whom Turkey acts as a guarantor state” (Kumova, 2011). This statement demonstrates that Turkey is willing to provide assistance in order to ensure the security of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

The third and final condition that needs to be met is that Turkey must be willing to extend diplomatic and other tangible assistance to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in order to offset their security dilemma. It first needs to be demonstrated that Northern Cyprus is essential

to Turkish security as well. Studies have found that the Turkish government believes that Cyprus is key at securing its borders from a possible Greek and Israeli threat (Ruysdael and Yucel, 2002; Larrabee, 2007). Due to a lapse in relations with Israel, Turkey believes that Israel's alliance with the Republic of Cyprus is a security threat. This is according to reports released by *Debkafile* and from the Turkish government's interview with *Today's Zaman*. "An Israeli military helicopter also flew over the Turkish research ship, Piri Reis, on Thursday night, according to the daily, as it was in the Aphrodite gas field, off Cyprus' southern coast and adjacent to the larger Leviathan field. The helicopter flew low over the ship for a long time, the report said" (*Debkafile*, 2011; *Today's Zaman*, 2011a). The presence of Israel's military poses a security threat to Turkey. Now that it is established that Northern Cyprus is vital to Turkish security, the test of the third condition can commence. Turkey has shown that it is willing to send forces to Northern Cyprus to defend the interests of the Turkish Cypriots living there (Mallinson and Mallinson, 2005, Borowiec, 2000). Scholarly reports show that the Turkish military maintains 17,000 troops (reduced from 40,000, but still more than the Greek Cypriot forces) on the island to defend the northern government from attack (Ker-Lindsey and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008; Hakki, 2007). As recent events have demonstrated, Turkey has also sent its navy to protect the offshore resources of the Northern Turkish Republic of Cyprus as both the *British Broadcasting Company* and *Al Jazeera* have reported (*BBC*, 2011; *Al Jazeera*, 2011). According to this evidence, the third condition has been verified in this case.

The idea that security can be an explanatory factor in the alliance of Turkey with the government of Northern Cyprus has been incorporated into the analysis as the fourth hypothesis. In order for this hypothesis to be viable for this case, three conditions had to be met: 1) Northern Cyprus had to face a security threat, 2) Turkey had to be willing to provide assistance, and 3)

Turkey had to act to protect Northern Cyprus. The data collected and analyzed showed that all three apply. As such, it is safe to conclude that security reasons are at least, in part, responsible for Turkey aligning with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.

Conclusion

This case study attempted to answer the question of why Turkey sided with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. Four possible explanations were identified. These possible explanations were incorporated into hypotheses and tested. The results supported the first hypothesis that ethnic similarities are responsible for the alliance. Hypothesis three (hydrocarbon trade) and hypothesis four (security) were also validated by the data in this analysis. However, there was insufficient evidence that hypothesis two (religion) is responsible for the alliance. Therefore, the reason for Turkey's support of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis is found in ethnic similarities, hydrocarbon trade, and security hypotheses. See table 4 for a summary of the findings for the case of Turkey.

Chapter 4

The New Actors: Russia and Israel

The previous case studies (Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey) are the traditional actors considered when analyzing the Cypriot conflict (Borowiec, 2000; Hakki, 2007). However, the offshore drilling crisis has brought two new actors to the arena: Russia and Israel. Unlike the actions of Great Britain and Greece who took a more diplomatic stance, Russia and Israel (like Turkey) have pledged military forces to protect the drilling interests of the Republic of Cyprus (*Defence Greece*, 2011a; Fenwick, 2011). The purpose of this chapter is to examine the motivations of these states in their alliance with the Republic of Cyprus during this crisis. This chapter of the analysis tests the four hypotheses in order to understand their choice of alliance during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis. The results contribute to the current literature dealing with the Cyprus conflict by examining the motivations of the two newest players. The first actor examined is Russia.

I. Russia

Russia's involvement with Cyprus is relatively new. True, Moscow recognizes the Republic of Cyprus as a state and has a diplomatic mission in Nicosia (Drath, 2008). However, Russia has not played a significant role in the Cyprus conflict until now. This changed when Dimitry Christofias was elected President of Cyprus in 2008. President Christofias is the leader

of the communist AKEL party. During his youth, Christofias studied in Moscow. Due to these connections, Christofias has warm relations with the Kremlin (Drath, 2008; Dunphy and Bale, 2007). The election of Christofias is the trigger that opened the door for more Russian involvement in the Republic of Cyprus. When the Republic of Cyprus began drilling in Block 12 and Turkey was threatening their drilling activities, Russia extended diplomatic support as well as dispatching two submarines and its sole carrier group in support of the claims made by the Republic of Cyprus (Fenwick, 2011; Debkafile; 2012; Defence Greece, 2011). This begs the question, why did Russia enter the fray on the side of the Republic of Cyprus? The answer could partially be found by Christofias' warm relations with Moscow; however, it does not adequately explain Russian motivations. In order to determine those motivations, the four hypotheses will be examined.

Ethnicity

As it has been discussed in previous case studies, ethnicity is an important variable in explaining the formation of alliances (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Petersen, 2004). Following the path of the previous case studies, this theory has been incorporated into the analysis as hypothesis one. In order for this hypothesis to be viable in explaining why Russia allied with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis, it must meet several conditions. The first condition to be met is to determine if the ethnicity of the two states are similar. If it is, then the second step is to determine if ethnicity has been employed as a justification for the response of Russia. If the ethnicity is not the same between the two states, then it is imperative to examine the other ways in which ethnicity can be used to gain an alliance (i.e. ethnic lobby groups).

The first step in determining the viability of the ethnic hypothesis is to determine if the majority ethnic groups of each state compliments the other. According to the census data available from the Central Intelligence Agency, for the Republic of Cyprus, 97% of the population is Greek and the other 3% is distributed among other ethnic groups (CIA World Factbook, 2011). According to the census conducted by the Republic of Cyprus in 2001, there were 4,952 Russians living in Cyprus (*Population Census*, 2001). According to the *Famagusta Gazette* by 2011 that number has increased to 100,000 (Ament, 2011). This means that Russians compose 8.9% of the population of Cyprus. Ethnic Russians comprise 79.8% of the population and 12.1% of the population belonged to other ethnicities in the Russian Federation (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). According to the census data for Russia compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency, the number of Greek Cypriots living in Russia is negligible for the purposes of this study (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). The census data illustrates that the first condition is not present in this case. However, ethnicity can play a role in other ways.

Another way in which ethnicity plays a role is via ethnic lobbies. This theory holds that if there is a powerful ethnic lobby in a country, it can persuade the host country to enact friendly policies towards the host state of that ethnic lobby (Burstein and Linton, 2002; Lohmann, 1998). In order for this condition to be met, it must be demonstrated that there is a powerful Cypriot lobby in Russia. Conducting a search via the main internet search engines, LexisNexis, and the major world and regional news media, no evidence could be found of a Cypriot lobby in Russia. While it appears that this information has disproved the hypothesis, there is still another test that needs to be performed. As demonstrated earlier in the census report published by the *Famagusta Gazette*, Russians currently make up 8.9% of the population of Cyprus (Ament, 2011). The government of Russia has demonstrated their willingness to get involved in the affairs of other

states in order to protect the ethnic Russians living abroad. In fact, this is built into their constitution. However, this is somewhat of a problem, as this clause was meant to only protect the ethnic Russians living in the “Near Abroad” (Stone and Dennis, 2003; Porter and Saivetz, 1994; Kolsto, 1999). In addition, there were no speeches or policy statements that indicated that Russia intervened due to this clause in their constitution.

The first hypothesis held that if there was ethnic similarity between the two states, then this could be an explanation for the formation of their alliance. In order for this hypothesis to be viable, it had to meet certain conditions. The first condition was not met since the majority ethnic groups of the two states are different (Greek and Russian). Ethnic lobbying was also examined to see if it was a viable explanation. It was discounted due to the lack of a Cypriot lobby in Russia. A promising bit of data surfaced about Russia intervening to protect the interests of Russians living abroad. However, there was no evidence to back this claim. This has led to the conclusion that the first hypothesis is not viable in explaining why Russia sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.

Religion

As previously noted, religion has been making a comeback in the field of alliance formation. Some scholars argue that religion can be used to explain alliance formation. These scholars contend that states will form an alliance with another co-religion in order to protect them from the influence of an alien religion (Hayden, 1997; Hasenclaver and Rittberger, 2000). This analysis recognizes the potential of religion as an explanatory factor in this analysis, so it has been incorporated as the second hypothesis. In order for this hypothesis to be viable, it must meet three conditions. The first is that the religions of the Republic of Cyprus and Russia are the same. Second, it must be demonstrated that religious adherence is high and constant over a ten

year period. This strengthens the use of religion being used to satisfy the hearts of the masses. Finally, religion must be used as a justification for Russia allying with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.

In order for the second hypothesis to be viable, it must first meet the first condition. According to the census data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, 15-20% of Russia's population adheres to Orthodox Christianity. In the Republic of Cyprus, 96% of the population adheres to Orthodox Christianity (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). At first this appears to be problematic; however, since Orthodox Christianity is the majority religion of both states the second condition will be examined. According to the data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, in 2000 the percentage of the Russian population that adhered to Orthodox Christianity was estimated between 15-20%. The Republic of Cyprus also held steady at 96% (*CIA World Factbook*, 2000). While it shows that the adherence to Orthodox Christianity has been stable for a decade, the data also shows that Orthodox Christianity has never enjoyed the majority of the Russian population adhering to its faith since the fall of communism. From the data presented here, it appears that the first and second conditions have been discounted. However, on the elite level this hypothesis could still be viable.

In order for the third condition (or elite factor) to be viable it must be demonstrated that the Russian leaders have employed Orthodox Christianity as a means for Russian support for the Republic of Cyprus. According to a report published by the *Daily Hurriyet*, during his first visit to the island, the first by a Russian leader in Cypriot history: "Medvedev said that Russia and Greek Cyprus remained bound by a shared Orthodox Christian religion and that Moscow would do all in its power to support Greek Cypriots secure a just resolution of the island's 36-year division" (*Hurriyet*, 2010). During the offshore drilling crisis, Russia again cited support for the

Republic of Cyprus due to their shared Orthodox Christian beliefs. The Russians stated that they will protect their fellow Orthodox Christians from Islamic Turkey's encroachment on their offshore energy reserves. This statement was found in an interview with *Pravda*. According to him (Medvedev), Russia's relations with Cyprus "have always been very good, spiritually close and based on mutual respect and friendship" (*Pravda*, 2011). Again spiritual similarity has been given as a justification of the alliance between the Republic of Cyprus and Russia. From the data compiled from the *Daily Hurriyet* and *Pravda*, it appears that not only is the third condition viable, but that the whole hypothesis is supported by this evidence.

These statements by the Russian government could be viewed as a problem. There is evidence that Russia has not claimed similar religious ties as a reason to intervene in the affairs of Ukraine, and the other former Soviet Republics. However, Russia has a strong historical legacy of using religion in regards to opposing Turkey. In order to gain more territory from the Ottoman Empire, Russia would claim that it was intervening to protect their fellow Orthodox Christians from Muslim exploitation. There was also the claim that Russia was the successor of the Byzantine Empire due to the marriage between the ruler of Russia and a Byzantine princess. Therefore, Russia had an obligation to intervene in the lands they claimed were their own (Bugbee, 1877; Huntington, 1997).

It was claimed that in order for the second hypothesis to be viable in explaining why Russia allied with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis, three conditions had to be met. The first condition was that the religions of the two states had to be similar. It was a stretch but this was proven to be the case. The second condition stated that religion had to be important. This was not upheld by the data. The third condition was to be upheld only if religion was cited as a reason for Russia's actions in supporting the Republic of Cyprus. The

data collected and analyzed shows this is the case. As a result, it is safe to conclude that the second hypothesis is viable in explaining this case.

Hydrocarbons

The first hypothesis of the non-culture aspect of the theory focuses on the role of hydrocarbons. Scholars have argued that a state can use its abundant resources in order to gain allies for their cause (Zweig, 1995; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993). This has been incorporated into the analysis as the third hypothesis. Like the other hypotheses tested in this analysis, certain conditions have to be met in order to show that this hypothesis is viable in explaining this case. The first step is to demonstrate that the Republic of Cyprus has enough hydrocarbons to entice other states to support their claims. The second step is to show that Russia is in need of Cypriot energy. Finally, this must translate to justifying Russia's intervention on the side of the Republic of Cyprus (i.e. concessions). If all these conditions are met, then this is a viable hypothesis.

To begin with, the first condition will be tested to see if it is present. Geological reports released by the *British Broadcasting Company*, *Jerusalem Post*, and *Defence Greece* have shown that the 7 trillion cubic feet of hydrocarbons located off the Republic of Cyprus is enough to fulfill their own energy needs, as well as having excess to export to the international market (BBC, 2011; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011; *Defence Greece*, 2011a). This satisfies the criteria of the first condition. The second condition is more of an issue. It holds that Russia must be in need of Cypriot energy due to its low hydrocarbon production. The geological data shows that this is not the case. According to the reports compiled by Milov et al and Stulberg, Russia is a net exporter of oil and natural gas due to their reserves of 45 trillion cubic meters. They have built numerous pipelines to export their energy to international markets (Milov et al, 2007; Stulberg, 2007). Since the second condition is problematic, what about the third? In order for this condition to

hold true, there must be a concession by the Republic of Cyprus towards Russia for offshore drilling. The data supports this condition. According to a report released to *Asia News*, “Moscow also wants some licenses to develop some of the fields and is in favour of a cooperation agreement with Cyprus” (*Asia News*, 2011). It is still too early to determine if the concession is to a state owned company or if it will be taken in conjunction with other western based companies. Given this evidence, when the second round of concessions is announced later in 2012, Russia will have an advantage due to their support of Cyprus during this crisis.

The third hypothesis holds that a hydrocarbon rich state will use its resources to entice other states to join in an alliance. In order for this hypothesis to be a viable explanation for this case, three conditions had to be met. The first was to demonstrate that the Republic of Cyprus had enough hydrocarbons to export. The geological and news media data supported this condition. The second condition was not as clear-cut. In order for it to be viable, Russia needed to be hydrocarbon poor and the geological data shows that it is not. The third condition was tested anyway. It was validated by the fact Russia is asking for an offshore drilling concession in response to its support of the Republic of Cyprus. When the second round of concessions is announced, it is expected that Russia will gain their concession. In light of this evidence, it is safe to conclude that the third hypothesis is viable in explaining the actions of Russia.

Security

The last hypothesis for this particular case study involves security. Scholars have argued that security is the *raison d’etre* for alliance formation. They hold that if a state feels that its security is threatened that they will balance with other states in an alliance to offset this security threat (Davis and Moore, 1997; Burg and Shoup, 1999). This theory has been incorporated into this analysis in order to examine if it is a reasonable factor in explaining why Russia decided to

back the offshore drilling claims of the Republic of Cyprus. In order to prove that this is a reasonable hypothesis, certain conditions have to be met. The first is that Russia and Cyprus view the actions of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as threatening to their security. The second condition that must be met is to show that Russia has acted upon this threat. If both of these conditions are present, then this hypothesis is a valid explanation.

As demonstrated in the previous case studies, the Republic of Cyprus does indeed view the actions of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as threatening to their security. They feel that these two countries are stealing their energy which they need in order to feel secure. This was demonstrated in the statement to the *Daily Hurriyet*: Turkey, “ha[s] suggested that Turkish Cypriots be given a full 50 percent share in any find off the island” (Kanli, 2011). By diverting these hydrocarbons away from their consumption, the actions of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots force Cyprus to rely on others for their hydrocarbons. According to the Republic of Cyprus official with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement to *Today's Zaman* “[i]t cannot in any way be associated with the self-evident sovereign right of the Republic of Cyprus to move forward and utilize its natural resources” (Kumova, 2011). The scholarly articles of Ker-Lindsay and Webb along with Faustmann and Kaymak, demonstrate that the larger Turkish military force on the island has led to apprehension that this force will be used to conquer the Republic of Cyprus and assimilate them into the Republic of Turkey (Ker-Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008). These statements, along with the studies regarding the effects of the Turkish military on Cyprus, have led to the conclusion that the Republic of Cyprus is facing a security threat.

What about Russia? Russia also sees the actions of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as threatening. This is evident by the speeches given by Russian officials to

Pravda and to *Hurriyet*. The following came from the *Daily Hurriyet*, "[Greek] Cyprus is effectively the offshore financial services center for Russia," said Chris Weafer, chief strategist at Russia's UralSib investment bank." The piece builds off this statement by showing how Turkey's policies in the region have upset Russia's commercial interests (*Hurriyet*, 2011). This shows that Turkey's actions are detrimental to the economic interests of Russia. In the military realm, Russia views the presence of the Turkish navy in this dispute, to be threatening to their interests. In the *Cyprus News Report*, it was claimed that Russia sent two submarines to protect the drilling platforms from Turkish interference (Fenwick, 2011). In an interview with *Pravda*, Russian President Medvedev stated that "the actions of NATO" (i.e. Turkey) has not successfully solved the Cyprus issue", therefore in order to stabilize the region, Russia is going to take a more prominent role (*Pravda*, 2011). Due to the evidence analyzed, it is safe to conclude that the first condition has been met.

In order for the second condition to be met, it must be demonstrated that Russia has acted to preserve the stability of the region and to protect the Republic of Cyprus. Examining the data, this condition is upheld. The Russians have used diplomacy in order to protect the interests of the Republic of Cyprus (*Pravda*, 2011; Fenwick, 2011). The Russians have also ordered two submarines and their sole aircraft carrier fleet to protect the offshore drilling of the Republic of Cyprus from the Turkish navy (Fenwick, 2011; *Hurriyet*, 2011). Since Russia has used the available tools at its disposal (diplomatic and military) and has acted upon those tools, the second condition has also been met.

The fourth hypothesis holds that the security dilemma can be responsible for the formation of alliances. In order for this hypothesis to be a valid explanation for this case study, two conditions had to be met. The first condition holds that Russia and the Republic of Cyprus

both faced a security dilemma based on this crisis. The interviews, scholarly reports, and historical evidence that have been analyzed support this claim. The second condition holds that Russia had to act on these concerns to protect its own security, and that the Republic of Cyprus had asked for this support. The statements from *Pravda*, *Hurriyet*, and *Cyprus News* were examined and it was found to support this condition. As a result of both of the conditions being met, it is safe to conclude that the security hypothesis is a plausible explanation as to why Russia supported the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.

Conclusion

During the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis, Russia ordered its aircraft carrier battle group to defend the right of the Republic of Cyprus to drill off its coast (Fenwick, 2011; *Hurriyet*, 2011). This begs the question, why did Russia side with the Republic of Cyprus? The answer was found by testing the four hypothesis of the analysis. The data did not support the first hypothesis since the two states are comprised of different ethnicities. At first the second hypothesis appeared to present a problem. However, the elite factor ended up providing support that the second hypothesis is viable in explaining this case study. While the second condition presented a problem for the third hypothesis, the other three ended up showing that hydrocarbon trade is a viable explanation. Finally, the fourth hypothesis was tested. The data examined and analyzed also shows that this hypothesis is viable in explaining why Russia allied with the Republic of Cyprus during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis. See table 5 for a summary of the findings for the case of Russia.

II. Israel

Like Russia, Israel is new to the scene of the Cyprus conflict. Historically the states of Israel and the Republic of Cyprus have had less than cordial relations. This is due to the Israel's

traditional alliance with Turkey, the rival of the Republic of Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus, as a result, has taken a more sympathetic stance towards the cause of the Palestinians (Sharon, 2011; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011). However, due to the worsening ties with Turkey (more on this later), Israel has become friendlier towards the Republic of Cyprus and the feeling of good will has been reciprocated. During the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis, Israel has offered its navy and its air force to the Republic of Cyprus to protect their right to exploit their offshore hydrocarbons (*Jerusalem Post*, 2011; *Defence Greece*, 2011). Like the previous case studies before it, the question must be asked, why did Israel ally itself with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis? The answer may be found by testing the four hypotheses of this analysis.

Ethnicity

As has been pointed out previously in this analysis, ethnicity is a critical component in determining what causes alliance formations between two states. Scholars have argued ethnicity causes alliances to form due to a shared ethnic background. Therefore, one ethnic state will come to the defense of a sister ethnic state (Horowitz, 1985; Davis and Moore, 1997). Since this is a critical component included in the previous literature, it would be remiss to not include this variable in the analysis of this particular case study. In order for this hypothesis to be a viable explanation of why Israel sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis, two conditions need to be met. The first condition that needs to be met is to determine if Israel and the Republic of Cyprus are ethnically similar. If they are, then the analysis can proceed to condition two. If there is not an ethnic similarity, then it is imperative to establish other types of ethnic ties (i.e. minority groups, ethnic lobbies, etc.). If the first condition is met, then the second condition will be examined. If there is evidence that Israel supported the Republic of Cyprus due to ethnic considerations, then the first hypothesis will be validated.

The first task is determining if the first condition is present in this case study. Ethnic composition data will be examined to determine if there is ethnic similarity between the two states. According to the census data available from the Central Intelligence Agency, in the Republic of Cyprus, 97% of the population belongs to the Greek ethnic group. In Israel, 76.4% of the population belongs to the Jewish ethnic group (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). This data demonstrates that neither state shares the same dominant ethnic group. Next, it is important to test if there are small pockets of ethnic exclaves of the other ethnic group located in each country. According to the census data from the *Rabbinate of Cyprus*, there are only 350 Jewish families living in the Republic of Cyprus (*Rabbinate of Cyprus*, 2012). The implication of this small number means that the Jews living on Cyprus do not have the political power to influence Cypriot policy. According to the data from Central Intelligence Agency, in Israel 23.6% of the population belongs to an ethnic group that is different from the Jews. Most of these are Arabs (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). The number of Greeks residing in Israel is too small to allow them to politically organize and influence Israel's policy towards the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore, support for the first condition is not present.

This is not to say that ethnic lobbies do not have an impact (Burstein and Linton, 2002; Lohmann, 1998). In order to test this idea, an internet search of the major search engines, LexisNexis, and the major news media was conducted. However, no Greek Cypriot ethnic lobby could be found in Israel. However, the search did demonstrate that there is a type of Jewish lobby on the Republic of Cyprus. It is the Rabbinate of Cyprus. However, this lobby deals primarily with ensuring that the religious rights of the Jews on the island are protected (*Rabbinate of Cyprus*, 2011). Since it has not been active in the realm of improving relations

between Israel and the Republic of Cyprus, there is no connection suggesting that this lobby was responsible for Israel aligning with the Republic of Cyprus during this particular crisis.

The first hypothesis tested in this case study held that due to similar ethnic identification, an alliance between Israel and the Republic of Cyprus was bound to occur. For this hypothesis to be viable, two conditions had to be met. The first condition was identifying an ethnic link between the two countries. The census data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Rabbinate of Cyprus showed that this was not the case. While there was an expectation that the ethnic lobby of the Rabbinate of Cyprus could explain the ties between the two countries, no evidence could be found to support the claim. Based on the data analyzed and the evidence presented, it is safe to conclude that the first hypothesis is not a viable explanation as to why Israel allied itself with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis and may be dismissed.

Religion

As the literature review and previous case studies in this analysis have shown, religion can be a useful explanatory variable in explaining why alliances form. This variable has been included in this analysis via hypothesis two. In order for this hypothesis to hold true in this particular case, several conditions have to be met. The first condition is demonstrating that the two states adhere to the same religion. The second condition is that religion plays an important aspect in the political scene. Finally, the cause of the alliance must be justified on the grounds of religion. If the last condition is met, then the second hypothesis holds promise in explaining the actions of Israel towards the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.

In order to test the first condition, it must be demonstrated that the religions of the two states are identical. According to the data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, the

religion of the Republic of Cyprus is Greek Orthodox (96%), while the dominant religion of the state of Israel is Judaism (75.6%) (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). Taken at face value, the first condition appears to be problematic. However, it is imperative to establish if there are any Orthodox Christians in Israel and if there are any Jews in Cyprus. According to the religious data from the Rabbinate of Cyprus, the number of practicing Jews in Cyprus is about 350 families (*Rabbinate of Cyprus*, 2011). According to the Central Intelligence Agency the religious data for Israel shows that around 1% of the population adheres to the Orthodox Church (*CIA World Factbook*, 2011). This is not a promising bit of information since the Christians in Israel are mainly Arab and relations between the two have not been good (Peled, 1992).

Even though the first condition is problematic, the other two conditions will still be tested. The second condition holds that religion holds a prominent place of policymaking of the two states. In order to determine if this is true, it is imperative to demonstrate high levels of religion in both countries, and that it holds steady or increases (not decrease) over a period of ten years. This demonstrates how often political leaders use religion to justify their policies. According to the data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, the level of adherence to Orthodoxy in the Republic of Cyprus has held steady at 96% during the ten year period. In Israel, 80.1% of the population adhered to Judaism in 2000 and 2.1% adhered to a Christian belief. This has dropped to 75.6% and 2% respectively (*CIA World Factbook*, 2000; *CIA World Factbook*, 2011). Based on this data it appears that the second condition is not viable. But by examining the role of religion in the two societies, a different picture emerges. Religion plays an important role in the politics of the Republic of Cyprus. According to the *Journal on Democracy* and the European Commission, there is a strong tie between the church and state (Stepan, 2000; *European Commission*, 2005). The same is true in Israel according to articles published in the

Journal of Politics and Jewish History. Parties dominated by religious Jews ensure that at least some Israeli policies are favorable towards their religious objectives (Akzin, 1955; Bartal, 2006). Based on this evidence, it appears that the second condition has been met.

The third condition that must be met in order for this second hypothesis to be viable is demonstrating that religion is responsible for the informal alliance between Israel and the Republic of Cyprus. There is evidence of a religious alliance between the two states. According to an article in the *Jerusalem Post*, the agreement between the Cypriot Orthodox Church and the Jewish leaders have allowed the two states to strengthen their alliance by dealing with any problems that might arise between the two (Sharon, 2011; *Rabbinate of Cyprus*, 2012), this occurred after the offshore drilling crisis. Since this factor occurred after the warming of relations, this hypothesis is not applicable.

This section of the case study set out to test the viability of the second/religious hypothesis. It was determined that if this hypothesis was to be viable, it had to meet three conditions. Those conditions were religious similarity, religious influence in politics, and religion be cited as a justification for the informal alliance between Israel and the Republic of Cyprus. All three of the conditions were then tested. The first condition was an issue as was the first half of the second condition. However, the second half of the second condition was upheld by the existing data. Despite this promising find, no concrete evidence was found to support the hypothesis that religion was responsible for the alliance between Israel and the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore, it is safe to conclude from the analysis that the second hypothesis does not explain why Israel defended the right of the Republic of Cyprus to extract its offshore hydrocarbons.

Hydrocarbons

From the evidence presented so far, it appears that the culture aspect of the theory has not explained Israel's actions. Therefore, it is up to the non-culture aspect of the theory to explain the case of Israel. Scholars have argued that a resource rich state can entice a resource poor state into forming an alliance by promising the resource poor state a share of the resources (Gowa and Mansfield, 2004; Clark et al, 2008; Zweig, 1995; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993). In order for this hypothesis to be a viable explanation in explaining the informal alliance between Israel and the Republic of Cyprus, two conditions have to be met. The first condition needs to demonstrate the Republic of Cyprus is hydrocarbon rich and the state of Israel is hydrocarbon poor. The second condition is demonstrating there is a transfer of hydrocarbons from the Republic of Cyprus to the state of Israel in exchange for Israel's assistance in defending the Republic of Cyprus' drilling platforms. If both of these conditions are present, then the third hypothesis is viable.

First it is important to test and see if the first condition is present. The first part of the condition holds that the Republic of Cyprus must have enough hydrocarbons to satisfy its own domestic needs, and have enough left over to entice international powers to support their cause. The geologic evidence provided to the *British Broadcasting Company*, *Jerusalem Post*, and *Defence Greece* demonstrates that the 7 trillion cubic feet of estimated reserves is enough to satisfy both conditions (*BBC*, 2011; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011; *Defence Greece*, 2011). The second part of the condition holds that Israel must be energy dependent in order for the third hypothesis to be a viable explanation. The evidence states otherwise. Israel has discovered a large oil and natural gas field (dubbed Leviathan) off its Mediterranean coast (see figure 4). Geological estimates from Helman, Bronner, and *AFP* shows that Leviathan has 25 million cubic feet of natural gas reserves (Helman, 2010; Bronner, 2010; *AFP*, 2010). The result of this discovery in

Israel has enormous ramifications. For the first time in its history, Israel is hydrocarbon independent. They do not have to rely on hydrocarbons from the hostile states of the Middle East. Nor do they have to worry about the logistics of importing their hydrocarbons from Russia and the Caspian region (Helman, 2010; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011). However, since Israel is not a signatory to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, its legal claim to these Mediterranean hydrocarbons is in doubt. This is especially true since Lebanon is a signatory to the treaty, and as a result has more legitimacy to these gas fields than Israel (*U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas*, 1982; Ungerleider, 2010; Karam, 2010). While Israel is hydrocarbon independent, it faces a threat that undermines that security. This concept will be given further consideration in the security section.

The second condition holds that the Republic of Cyprus will grant drilling concessions (or promise energy exports) to Israel in return for their support. Conducting a search using the main internet search engines, one could not find any news articles that would support this condition. The LexisNexis database was also searched to see if there were any newspaper articles that dealt with concessions or potential export of Cypriot energy to Israel. Unfortunately, no articles were found to substantiate this condition. Due to the problems associated with the first condition, combined with the lack of news media and policy statements to support the second condition, it is safe to conclude that the third hypothesis is not a viable explanation for this particular case study.

The third hypothesis of the analysis holds that a resource rich Republic of Cyprus would use its resource wealth to entice a resource poor Israel into forming an informal alliance. In order for this hypothesis to be viable, two conditions had to be met. The first condition was to demonstrate that the Republic of Cyprus was hydrocarbon rich and Israel was hydrocarbon poor.

The data shows that indeed the Republic of Cyprus is rich in hydrocarbons, but the data also shows that Israel is as well. This makes the first condition problematic. The second condition holds that there will be drilling concessions or energy exports to Israel in return for their support of the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. The data shows that the evidence is lacking to support this condition. Therefore, the third hypothesis is not viable for the purposes of this case study. However, hydrocarbons do play a significant role in the security issues faced by both states.

Security

Since the previous three hypotheses have been discounted in this particular case study analysis, it is up to the final hypothesis to shed light on why Israel chose to support the Republic of Cyprus during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis. Scholars have argued that the pre-eminent cause of alliance formation is rooted in security concerns. States join in alliances to balance external threats, thereby improving their own security situation (Walt, 1985; Smith, 1995; Sorokin, 1994a; Axelrod et al; 1995; Sorokin, 1994b). Certain conditions need to be met for this hypothesis to be a viable explanation. The first condition is to demonstrate that both states face security threats. The second condition is to demonstrate that the two states can work together to alleviate their security threat. The third, and most important, condition is to demonstrate that the two states have enacted policies to protect their security. If all these conditions are met, then the fourth hypothesis is a viable explanation as to why Israel allied with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis.

First off the data will be examined to see if there is any support for the first condition. The first half of the first condition states that the Republic of Cyprus must be facing a security threat. This was demonstrated in the statement to the Daily Hurriyet: Turkey, “ha[s] suggested

that Turkish Cypriots be given a full 50 percent share in any find off the island” (Kanli, 2011). By diverting these hydrocarbons away from their consumption, the actions of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots force Cyprus to rely on other for their hydrocarbons. According to the Republic of Cyprus official with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement to Today’s Zaman “[i]t cannot in any way be associated with the self-evident sovereign right of the Republic of Cyprus to move forward and utilize its natural resources” (Kumova, 2011). The scholarly articles of Ker-Lindsay and Webb along with Faustmann and Kaymak, demonstrates that the larger Turkish military force on the island, has led to apprehension from the Republic of Cyprus that this force will be used to conquer their state and assimilate them into the Republic of Turkey (Ker-Lindsay and Webb, 2005; Faustmann and Kaymak, 2008). These statements, along with the studies regarding the effects of the Turkish military on Cyprus, have led to the conclusion that the Republic of Cyprus is in fact facing a security threat.

The second part of the first condition holds that Israel must also face the same security threat. This common enemy facilitates the formation of an alliance. As shown by figure 4, the Leviathan energy field lies close to the border with Lebanon. Lebanon, controlled by Hezbollah, has threatened Israel’s hold on these energy deposits. Lebanon’s claims are bolstered because they are in fact signatories to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas. This demarcates their Exclusive Economic Zone to 200 nautical miles. Coincidentally, this covers the Leviathan natural gas field that Israel claims. Israel is not a signatory to the treaty, so this means that their claim to this natural gas field lacks legitimacy (*U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas*, 1982). This is complicated since the claims of Hezbollah/Lebanon are backed by the government of Turkey (Ungerleider, 2010; Karam, 2011). While Israel and Turkey have enjoyed warm relations in the past, the Gaza flotilla incident has soured those relations (*Jerusalem Post*,

2011). According to the *British Broadcasting Company* “Turkey rejected that deal [with the Republic of Cyprus and Israel], because it does not recognise the Greek Cypriot government” (*BBC*, 2011). The evidence presented demonstrates that both Israel and the Republic of Cyprus have a common enemy in Turkey.

While the first condition has been supported by the data, it is now time to examine if there is evidence to support the second condition. The second condition needs to show that the two states are willing to work together in order to alleviate this common threat. As with the first condition, this one also has two parts. One part deals with the Republic of Cyprus and the other with the state of Israel. For part one to have support, there must be evidence to show that the Republic of Cyprus has sought the support of the state of Israel vis-à-vis Turkey. Statements made by the Republic of Cyprus back this claim. According to *UPI*, "Cyprus and Greece had had indifferent ties with Israel but a compelling commonality of interests is sailing into view. A realignment of regional powers is taking place in the eastern Mediterranean, the leitmotif being the 'containment' of an increasingly assertive Turkey" (*UPI*, 2011). According to *Defence Greece*, the Republic of Cyprus sees the utility of Israel's military in protecting their offshore hydrocarbons from Turkish interference (*Defence Greece*, 2011b). This shows that the Republic of Cyprus is willing to seek the aid of Israel to protect their offshore hydrocarbon discovery.

The second part of the condition is that Israel recognizes that it needs the support of the Republic of Cyprus. Since the row with Turkey over the Gaza flotilla incident, and Turkey's resultant hostility towards Israel's as projects in the Mediterranean, Israel needs outside support to defend its drilling claims. Since Block 12 lies next to the Leviathan energy fields (see figures 2 and 4), the Republic of Cyprus has presented itself as an ally to defend Israel's energy claims from foreign interference. Statements made to *UPI*, *Jerusalem Post*, and the *Middle East*

Quarterly by the government of Israel, all mention the need of Israel to have Cyprus' support in securing their title to the Leviathan natural gas field. "The agreement reached by Israel and Cyprus in 2010 delineating their maritime boundaries and their respective exclusive economic zones, and saying that beginning work to extract the gas should be done quickly "for the benefit of both sides" (*UPI*, 2011; Keinon, 2010; Inbar and Sandler, 2001; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011). From the interviews and news sources analyzed in this section, it appears that there is evidence to support the second condition as well.

Finally, since the other two conditions are present, it is time to test the third and final condition. This condition holds that the two states have enacted policies meant to bolster the security of the other state in regards to Turkey. Again, this condition proceeds in two parts. One part deals with the Republic of Cyprus and the other deals with the state of Israel. In regards to the first part of the condition, the evidence supports its claim. The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus has made the following statement to *UPI* and the *Jerusalem Post*: "With her country locked in a nasty tiff with Turkey over maritime gas exploration rights, Cypriot Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis came to Israel Wednesday looking for signs of support on the matter from Jerusalem, and received it in the form of statement put out by the Prime Minister's Office" (*UPI*, 2011; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011; Keinon, 2010). This demonstrates that the government of Cyprus has asked for an alliance with Israel in order to protect their offshore hydrocarbons, and they have received it.

For the part of Israel, the evidence suggests that the third condition holds in this case as well. Israel has defended the right of the Republic of Cyprus to drill and exploit its own offshore resources without international interference. This was evidenced by the following quote made to the *Jerusalem Post*: The Republic of Cypriot Foreign Minister came asking for support for their

offshore drilling and “received it in the form of statement put out by the Prime Minister’s Office” (*Jerusalem Post*, 2011). Israel has also offered to open an air base on the island so that its air force can protect the Republic of Cyprus from Turkish threats. According to reports made by both *Defence Greece* and *Debkafile*, “Israel asked the Cypriot permission to use the ‘Andreas Papandreou’ in order to protect the offshore hydrocarbons of both the Republic of Cyprus and Greece from Turkish interference” (*Defence Greece*, 2011a; *Defence Greece*, 2011b; *Debkafile*, 2011). From the data provided by these news sources, it is clear that the third condition has been met.

The fourth hypothesis of this analysis holds that by facing a common security threat, Israel and the Republic of Cyprus will join into an alliance in order to secure their own security interests. In order for this hypothesis to be viable, three conditions had to be met. The first condition was to demonstrate that both Israel and the Republic of Cyprus face a common security threat. The data shows that both of these states share a common security threat manifested by the policies of the Republic of Turkey. The second condition holds that there must be a willingness on both the part of the Republic of Cyprus and on the part of the state of Israel to work together to alleviate this common security threat. The data examined and analyzed shows that the two states are pursuing policies in conjunction with one another in order to minimize the security threat emanating from Turkey. Finally, there must be support that the two states have implemented policies to help bolster the security of the other state. The data presented in this section also shows that this is the case. It is safe to conclude that the security hypothesis is viable for explaining why Israel sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis.

Conclusion

Israel has sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Israel has offered its air force and its navy to help secure the drilling platforms of the Republic of Cyprus and safeguard them from possible Turkish interference (*Defence Greece*, 2011a; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011; *Debkafile*, 2011). This, of course, begs the question, why did Israel choose to ally with the Republic of Cyprus? The answer was found by testing the four hypotheses of the analysis. The first hypothesis presented problems and while the second hypothesis did have some support, it was difficult to determine if a religious alliance between the two was a cause or an effect. The evidence was not there to support the third hypothesis, though the hydrocarbon trade did play a significant part in the final hypothesis. Finally, the fourth hypothesis dealing with security was tested. The data supports that this hypothesis was a valid explanation as to why Israel sided with the Republic of Cyprus during this crisis. As a result of these tests, it is concluded that the fourth hypothesis is the explanation for why Israel defended the right of the Republic of Cyprus to exploit its own offshore energy resources. See table 6 for a summary of the findings for the case of Israel.

Chapter 5

The Conclusion

On September 18, 2011, the Republic of Cyprus began offshore drilling in conjunction with Noble Energy (*BBC*, 2011). This decision quickly escalated into an offshore drilling crisis that involved four international actors. Moments after the drilling commenced off the coast of the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus granted drilling concessions to the Republic of Turkey. The Turkish government then sent a naval team into the disputed waters to explore and extract the hydrocarbons (*Al Jazeera*, 2011). Turkey's actions led to responses by both Israel and Russia. Israel backs the right of the Republic of Cyprus to drill off their waters for hydrocarbons. They have even offered to send their air force to protect the Republic of Cyprus (*Jerusalem Post*, 2011; *Defence Greece*, 2011a). This has led to repeated harassment between the Turkish navy and the Israeli navy and air force (*Debkafile*, 2011; *Today's Zaman*, 2011a). Russia has also entered the fray supporting the Republic of Cyprus. Russia has sent two submarines and their lone aircraft carrier battle group to support the claims of the Republic of Cyprus (Fenwick, 2011; *Hurriyet*, 2011). One of the questions posed to both academics and policy makers is: What factors caused the states to ally the way they did? The purpose of this analysis was to answer that question.

The literature examined has offered several different explanations as to why alliances form. One theory holds that a state will come to the aid of its fellow ethnic state when that state is facing an external threat (Davis and Moore, 1997; Petersen, 2004). Another theory holds that religious similarity between two states explains alliance formation. These scholars contend that a state will protect its fellow adherent from domination from an alien religion (Lewis, 1998; De Juan, 2009). The third theory deals with natural resources. According to this mode of thought, a resource rich state will use its abundant resources to entice a resource poor state into forming an alliance (Long, 2003; Long and Leeds, 2006; Fordham, 2010; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Gowa and Mansfield, 2004). The final theory, that underlies many of the previous theories, is security. If a state is threatened, then it will form an alliance in order to offset this security threat (Walt, 1987; Sorokin, 1994a; Rozmer, 2008).

While each of these theories has made significant contributions to the field of alliance study, there is one major drawback. These theories usually claim that their factor is the predominant explanation for alliance formation. This precludes both scholars and academics from seeing the full picture. As such, a theory was proposed that covered all these approaches. It included a culture section to include the first two theories (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 2009; Lebow, 2008). The last two theories were incorporated under the non-culture half of the theory (Zweig, 1995; Walt, 1985). Each traditional theory was then translated into a hypothesis. Each of these four hypotheses was tested in a qualitative analysis. The test was carried out using the case studies of the countries involved in the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis. Data was gleaned from historical sources, newspapers, secondary interviews, geological surveys, and academic journal articles. The results were unique to each case study.

The first case study of the empirical analysis focused on Great Britain. The question was why did Great Britain side with the Republic of Cyprus during the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis? The answer was found by testing four hypotheses. At first glance the ethnic hypothesis was not viable since the ethnic makeup of the two states is not similar. However, the hypothesis was validated when the impact of the Cypriot interest groups was accounted for. The religion hypothesis was supported in explaining the relations between the two states at the beginning. However, due to secularization in Great Britain, this hypothesis could not be supported by the data. The hydrocarbon trade hypothesis held potential since energy rich Cyprus could buy the support of energy poor Great Britain. Ultimately, there was no data to support this hypothesis either, though the results of the second offshore concession could validate the hypothesis. As with the second and third hypotheses, the fourth hypothesis dealing with security was a satisfactory explanation for relations between Cyprus and Great Britain from 1878 until 1974. However, the results of the 1974 invasion, ensuring the withdrawal of the Turkish military and budgetary problems demonstrates that in the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis, security played a negligible role. The analysis of this section supports the role of ethnicity, in the form of interest groups, in explaining the alignment of Great Britain with the Republic of Cyprus during the 2011 Cypriot drilling crisis.

This second study focused on the Hellenic Republic (i.e. Greece). The empirical section answered why Greece sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. The data supported the claim that ethnic similarity was responsible for Greece supporting the right of Cyprus to explore and exploit its offshore resources. The data regarding the religious hypothesis provided support for the religious hypothesis also being viable in this case. For the hydrocarbon trade hypothesis, the conditions are there to make it plausible as well. However, it is too soon to

say with certainty that hydrocarbons are the reason Greece aligned with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. Finally, the data found that the Republic of Cyprus' security is threatened and they look to Greece for protection. The Greek response has been mixed. Greece has not provided military assistance to protect the Cypriot offshore drilling, but Greece has exerted diplomatic pressure on Turkey to protect its ally. Therefore, the ethnic and religious hypotheses were the explanatory variables. It is too soon for the hydrocarbon trade hypothesis to make a determination, and the security hypothesis was problematic.

The third case study answered the question of why Turkey sided with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis. Four possible explanations were identified, incorporated into hypotheses, and tested. The results supported the first hypothesis that ethnic similarities are responsible for the alliance. Hypothesis three (hydrocarbon trade) and hypothesis four (security) was also validated by the data in this analysis. However, there was insufficient evidence to support that hypothesis two (religion) is responsible for the alliance. Therefore, the reason for Turkey's support of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis is found in ethnic similarities, hydrocarbon trade, and security hypotheses.

During the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis, Russia ordered its aircraft carrier battle group to defend the right of the Republic of Cyprus to drill off its coast (Fenwick, 2011; *Hurriyet*, 2011). This requires answering the question, why did Russia side with the Republic of Cyprus? Testing of the four hypotheses, revealed data which did not support the ethnic hypothesis since the two states are comprised of different ethnicities. At first, the religion hypothesis appeared as if it would present problems. However, the elite factor ended up providing support that the second hypothesis is viable in explaining this case study. While the second condition was an

issue for the hydrocarbon trade hypothesis, the other three hypotheses showed that hydrocarbon trade is a viable explanation. Finally, the security hypothesis was tested. The data examined and analyzed also shows that this hypothesis is also a viable factor in explaining why Russia allied with the Republic of Cyprus during the Cypriot offshore drilling crisis.

Israel has sided with the Republic of Cyprus during the offshore drilling crisis between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Israel has offered its air force and its navy to help secure the drilling platforms of the Republic of Cyprus and safeguard them from possible Turkish interference (*Defence Greece*, 2011a; *Jerusalem Post*, 2011; *Debkafile*, 2011). The question again must be posed, why did Israel choose to ally with the Republic of Cyprus? The answer was found by testing the four hypotheses of the analysis. The ethnic hypothesis was definitely problematic. While the religious hypothesis did have some support, it was difficult to determine if a religious alliance between the two was a cause or an effect. The evidence was not present to support the hydrocarbon trade hypothesis, though the hydrocarbons did play a significant part in the final hypothesis. Finally, the fourth hypothesis dealing with security was tested. The data supports that this hypothesis was definitely a viable explanation of why Israel sided with the Republic of Cyprus during this crisis. As a result of these tests, it is concluded that the fourth hypothesis is the explanation for why Israel defended the right of the Republic of Cyprus to exploit its own offshore hydrocarbon resources.

This analysis has valuable contributions to make to both the policy making and academic fields. The first contribution deals with the results. The results from the case studies demonstrates that not one of the factors tested is solely responsible for explaining the formation of an alliance. It also shows that some of the factors are not even viable in explaining certain

variables. This should serve as a warning to scholars that one theory cannot explain all global events.

The second contribution deals with how other studies can build off this analysis. The results of this analysis can be used to further the study of how ethnic conflicts can become internationalized. The results are also important as they contribute to the existing scholarship dealing with the Cyprus conflict due to its inclusion of the recent offshore hydrocarbon find and the introduction of two new players (Russia and Israel). Finally, the results can be translated into the study of geopolitics. It will be interesting to see how offshore hydrocarbons and geographical location will affect the geopolitics of the region. It was the intention of this project to help both policy makers and academics understand the factors at play during the recent Cypriot drama. If this has been accomplished, then this project can be deemed a success.

References

- AFP. December 29, 2010. "Israel has enough gas 'to become exporter'."
<http://www.france24.com/en/20101229-israel-has-enough-gas-become-exporter>.
- Akzin, Benjamin. 1955. "The Role of Parties in Israeli Democracy." *Journal of Politics* 17 (4): 507-545.
- Al Jazeera. September 26, 2011. "Turkey begins gas exploration off Cyprus."
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2011/09/2011926214325694197.html>.
- Ambrosio, Thomas. 2001. *Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
- Ambrosio, Thomas. 2002. "Congressional Perceptions of Ethnic Cleansing: Reactions to the Nagorno-Karabagh War and the Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups." *Review of International Affairs* 2 (1): 24-45.
- Ament, Carol. December 4, 2011. "Russians in Cyprus head to polls for new Parliament." *Famagusta Gazette*. <http://famagusta-gazette.com/russians-in-cyprus-head-to-polls-for-new-parliament-p13692-69.htm>.
- Asia News. October 5, 2011. "Turkey, Israel, Greece and Russia mobilising over Cyprus gas." <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Turkey,-Israel,-Greece-and-Russia-mobilising-over-Cyprus-gas-22820.html>.
- Axelrod, Robert, Will Mitchell, Robert E. Thomas, D. Scott Bennett and Erhard Bruderer. 1995. "Coalition Formation in Standard-Setting Alliances." *Management Science* 41 (9): 1493-1508.
- Bannon, Ian and Paul Collier. 2003. *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
- Barber, Cem. November 12, 2011. "Britain Pledges Full Support for Cyprus Drilling." *Famagusta Gazette*. <http://famagusta-gazette.com/britain-pledges-full-support-for-cyprus-drilling-p13478-69.htm>.
- Bartal, Israel. 2006. "Messianism and Nationalism: Liberal Optimism vs. Orthodox Anxiety." *Jewish History* 20 (1): 5-17.
- Borowiec, Andrew. 2000. *Cyprus: A Troubled Island*. Westport: Praeger.
- Boyle, Kevin and Juliet Sheen. 1997. *Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report*. London: Psychology Press.
- British Broadcasting Company. September 19, 2011. "Cyprus begins controversial oil and natural gas drilling." <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14968737>.

- British Broadcasting Company*. 2005. "Cyprus. Born Abroad: An Immigration Map of Britain." http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/born_abroad/countries/html/cyprus.stm.
- British Petroleum Cyprus. Accessed 3 Dec. 2011. <http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=478&contentId=7023029>.
- Bronner, Ethan. December 30, 2010. "Gas Field Confirmed Off Coast of Israel." *The New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/31/world/middleeast/31leviathan.html?_r=1.
- Bruce, Steve and Tony Glendinning. 2010. "When Was Secularization? Dating the Decline of the British Churches and Location its Cause." *British Journal of Sociology* 61 (1): 107-126.
- Bugbee, James McKellar. 1877. *Russia and Turkey*. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company.
- Burg, Steven L. and Paul S. Shoup. 1999. *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
- Burstein, Paul and April Linton. 2002. "The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns." *Social Forces* 81 (2): 380-408.
- Buzan, Barry. 1991. "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century." *International Affairs* 67 (3): 431-451.
- Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. 2003. *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Calbert, Gregory. 2009. "An Approach to Modeling and Inference based on Axelrod's Ising Model of Alliance Formation." *18th World IMACS Congress*. <http://mssanz.org.au/modsim09>.
- Central Intelligence Agency. 2000. *CIA World Factbook*. Washington, D.C: Project Gutenberg.
- Central Intelligence Agency. 2011. *CIA World Factbook*. Washington, D.C: Project Gutenberg.
- Chong, Seungwha, Harbir Singh and Kyungmook Lee. 2000. "Complementary, Status Similarity, and Social Capital as Drivers of Alliance Formation." *Strategic Management Journal* 21 (1): 1-22.
- Clark, David H., Timothy Nordstrom and William Reed. 2008. "Substitution is the Variance: Resources and Foreign Policy Choice." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (4): 763-773.
- Cole, Jeffrey. 2011. *Ethnic Groups of Europe: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC.
- Cooley, Alexander. 2008. "Principles in the Pipeline: Managing Trans Atlantic Values and Interests in Central Asia." *International Affairs* 84 (6): 1173-1188.
- Cypriot Chronicle*. April 12, 2011a. "Britain Supports Cyprus in Oil Drilling Dispute." <http://www.thecypriotchronicle.com/home-news/britain-backs-cyprus-in-oil-drilling-dispute>.
- Cypriot Chronicle*. April 12, 2011b. "Conservative Assure British Cypriots of Coalitions Reunification Effort." <http://www.thecypriotchronicle.com/home-news/conservatives-assure-british-cypriots-of-coalitions-reunification-effort>.
- Cypriot Federation. Accessed 3 Dec. 2011. <http://www.cypriotfederation.org.uk/>.
- Cyprus Convention. 1878.

- http://www.kyrenia.com/Documents/items/cyprus_convention_1878.htm.
Cyprus News Agency. October 6, 2011. "Greek President Turkey Cyprus."
http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/2011/11-10-06_2.cna.html.
- Cyprus Petroleum Refinery*. Accessed 17 Jan. 2012. <http://www.cyprus-net.com/detail.php?id=358>.
- Darke, Diana. 2009. *North Cyprus*. Brandt Travel Guides.
- Davis, David R. and Will H. Moore. 1997. "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior." *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1): 171-184.
- Davutoglu, Ahmet. 2001. *Stratejik Derinlik Türkiye 'nin Uluslararası Konumu*. Istanbul: Küre Yayınları.
- De Juan, Alexander. 2008. "Pact with the Devil? Elite alliances as Bases of Violent Religious Conflicts." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31 (12): 1120-1135.
- Debkafile*. October 2, 2011. "Turkish warships harass Israeli freighters. Israeli missile boats off Cyprus." <http://www.debka.com/article/21352/>.
- Defence Greece*. September 26, 2011a. "Israel asks airbase in exchange for air defense." <http://www.defencegreece.com/index.php/2011/09/israel-asks-airbase-in-exchange-for-air-defense/>.
- Defence Greece*. August 26, 2011b. "Cyprus wants Israeli support in offshore drilling spat." <http://www.defencegreece.com/index.php/2011/08/cyprus-wants-israeli-support-in-offshore-drilling-spat/>.
- Demir, Gul and Niki Gamm. 2011. "The never ending story of Halki Theological Seminary reopening." *The Daily Hurriyet*.
<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11457790.asp>.
- Dombey, Daniel and Michael Kavanagh. November 16, 2011. "Turkey Hopes for Shell Exploration Deal." *The Financial Times*. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/149b0044-1073-11e1-8010-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1eTp6kyof>.
- Drath, Viola Herms. 2008. "New Thinking in Cyprus." *American Foreign Policy Interests* 30 (5): 337-342.
- Dunphy, Richard and Tim Bale. 2007. "Red Flag Still Flying?: "Explaining AKEL – Cyprus's Communist Anomaly." *Party Politics* 13 (3): 287-304.
- Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. and Claudia Bird Schoonhoven. 1996. "Resource Based View of Strategic Alliance Formation: Strategic and Social Effects in Entrepreneurial Firms." *Organization Science* 7 (2): 136-150.
- Energy Delta Institute*. Accessed 13 Dec. 2011. "Country Gas Profile – Greece." <http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/edi-intelligence-2/our-services/Country-gas-profiles/country-gas-profile-greece>.
- European Commission*. 2005. "Social Values, Science and Technology." *Eurobarometer*.
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_report_en.pdf.
- Evripidou, Stefanos. December 29, 2010. "Archbishop is cultivating fanaticism." *The Greek Cypriot Daily*.
<http://www.trncpio.org/trncpio/en/index.asp?sayfa=haberdetay&newsid=899>.
- Faustmann, Hubert and Erol Kaymak. 2008. "Cyprus." *European Journal of Political Research* 47: 939-946.
- Fearon, James. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International

- Disputes.” *American Political Science Review* 88: 577-592.
- Fenwick, Sarah. August 25, 2011. “Russia Sends Nuclear Subs to Patrol Cyprus Waters.” *Cyprus News Report*.
<http://www.cyprusnewsreport.com/?q=node%2F4540>.
- Ferrier, R.W. 1982. *The History of the British Petroleum Company*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fordham, Benjamin. 2010. “Trade and Asymmetric Alliances.” *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (6): 1-12.
- Forsyth, P.J. and J.A. Kay. 1980. “The Economic Implications of North Sea Oil Revenues.” *Fiscal Studies* 1 (3): 1-28.
- Fox, Jonathan. 2001. “Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West.” *Journal of Peace Research* 38 (4): 459-472.
- Fox, Mary Virginia. 1993. *Cyprus*. Chicago: Children’s Press.
- George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Gilbert, Alan D. 1980. *The Making of Post-Christian Britain: A History of the Secularization of Modern Society*. London: Longman.
- Globes. November 27, 2011. “Cypriot Government Launches 2nd Gas Licensing Round.” <http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000701048&fid=1725>.
- Gowa, Joanne and Edward R. Mansfield. 1993. “Power Politics and International Trade.” *American Political Science Review* 87 (2): 408-420.
- Gowa, Joanne and Edward R. Mansfield. 2004. “Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major Power Trade.” *International Organization* 58 (4): 775-805.
- Gulati, Ranjay. 1995. “Social Structure and Alliance Formation Patterns: A Longitudinal Analysis.” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 40 (4): 619-652.
- Hakki, Murat Metin. 2007. *The Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878-2007*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Hammond, G.P. and R.M. Mackay. 1983. “Projections of UK Oil and Gas Supply and Demand to 2010.” *Applied Energy* 44 (2): 93-112.
- Hasenclever, Andreas and Volker Rittberger. 2000. “Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict.” *Journal of International Studies* 29 (3): 641-674.
- Hayden, Brian. 1987. “Alliances and Ritual Ecstasy: Human Responses to Resource Stress.” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 26 (1): 81-91.
- Helman, Christopher. August 30, 2010. “Leviathan Oil Field Could Sustain Israel For Decades.” *Forbes*.
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2010/08/30/leviathan-oil-field-could-sustain-israel-for-decades/>.
- Hellenic Petroleum*. Accessed 17 Jan. 2012. <http://www.hellenic-petroleum.gr/online/index.aspx>.
- Herbst, J. 2000. “Economic Incentives, Natural Resources, and Conflict in Africa.” *Journal of African Economies* 9 (3): 270-294.
- Hoffmeister, Frank. 2002. “Cyprus vs. Turkey. App. No. 25781/94.” *American Journal of International Law* 96 (2): 445-452.
- Holsti, Ole R. 1969. *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*. Reading, MA:

- Addison-Wesley.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 508-537.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1997. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone.
- Hurriyet Daily News*. October 7, 2010. "Russian president reassures Greek Cypriots on Turkey ties." <http://archive.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=medvedev-visits-cyprus-amid-russian-investment-boom-2010-10-07>.
- Hurriyet Daily News*. September 30, 2011. "Russian aircraft carrier to carry out exercises in Med Sea." <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=russian-aircraft-carrier-to-carry-out-exercises-in-the-mediterranean-2011-09-30>.
- Inbar, Efraim and Shmuel Sandler. 2001. "The Importance of Cyprus." *Middle East Quarterly* 8 (2): 51-58. <http://www.meforum.org/29/the-importance-of-cyprus>. <http://www.volkangazetesi.net/koseyazisi3.asp?id=29484>.
- Jerusalem Post*. September 27, 2011. "Turks begin gas exploration, risk feud with Cyprus, Israel." <http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=239665>.
- Johnson, Clem.. 1997. "Preconception versus Observation, or the Contributions of Rational Choice and Area Studies to Contemporary Political Science." *Political Science and Politics* 30 (2): 170-174.
- Kanli, Yusuf. November 8, 2011. "Gas Reciprocity." *Hurriyet Daily News*. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=gas-reciprocity-2011-11-08>.
- Kaplan, Benjamin J. 2007. *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe*. Washington D.C.: Library of Congress.
- Karam, Zeina. July 26, 2011. "Hezbollah warns Israel against 'stealing' gas." *Yahoo News*. <http://news.yahoo.com/hezbollah-warns-israel-against-stealing-gas-195008274.html>.
- Keinon, Herb. August 23, 2010. "Relations with Cyprus never better." *Jerusalem Post*. <http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=179239>.
- Ker-Lindsay, James and Keith Webb. 2005. "Cyprus." *European Journal of Political Research* 44: 975-982.
- King, G., R. Keohane, S. Verba. 1995. "The Importance of Research Design in Political Science." *American Political Science Review* 89 (2): 475-481.
- Kitromilides, Paschalis. 1990. "Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus." *Middle Eastern Studies* 26 (1): 3-17.
- Klare, Michael T. 2001. "The New Geography of Conflict." *Foreign Affairs* 80 (3): 49-61.
- Klotz, Audie and Deepa Prakash. 2009. *Qualitative Methods in International Relations. A Pluralist Guide*. London: Paulgrave MacMillan.
- Kohlbacher, Florian. 2006. "The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research." *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 7(1): 1-30.
- Kolsto, Pal. 1999. "Territorialising Diasporas: The Case of Russians in the Former Soviet Republics." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 28 (3): 607-631.
- Kornprobst, Markus. 2008. *Irredentism in European Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge

- University Press.
- Kracaver, Siegfried. 1952. "The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 16 (4): 631-642.
- Krippendorff, Klaus. 2004. *Content Analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Kumova, Ceren. September 16, 2011. "Turkey and Greece Reciprocate Strategies in Cyprus Drilling Crisis." *Today's Zaman*. <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-256989-turkey-and-greece-reciprocate-strategies-in-cyprus-drilling-crisis.html>.
- Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild. 1998. *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lake David A. and Patrick M. Morgan. 1997. *Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Landau, Jacob M. 1981. *Pan Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism*. Hamden: Archon Books.
- Larrabee, F. Stephen. 2007. "Turkey Rediscovered the Middle East." *Foreign Affairs* 86 (4): 103-114.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. 2008. *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Le Billon, Philippe. 2001. "The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts." *Political Geography* 20 (5): 561-584.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *American Journal of Political Science* 47: 427-439.
- Levy, Jack S. 1981. "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Example of the Great Powers, 1945-1975." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (4): 581-613.
- Levy, Jack S. 1988. "Domestic Politics and War." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (4): 653-673.
- Lewis, Bernard. 1998. "License to Kill. Usama bin Laden's Declaration of Jihad." *Foreign Affairs* 77 (14): 14-19.
- Lichbach, Mark Irving and Alan S. Zuckerman. 2009. *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1971. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *American Political Science Review* 65 (3): 682-693.
- Lohmann, Susanne. 1998. "An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests." *American Political Science Review* 92: 809-827.
- Long, Andrew. 2003. "Defense Pacts and International Trade." *Journal of Peace Research* 40 (5): 537-552.
- Long, Andrew and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2006. "Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements." *Journal of Peace Research* 43 (4): 433-451.
- Lustick, I. 1997. "The Discipline of Political Science: Studying the Culture of Rational Choice as a Case in Point." *Political Science and Politics* 30 (2): 175-179.
- Mallinson, William and Bill Mallinson. 2005. *Cyprus: A Modern History*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Mayring, Philipp. 2000. "Qualitative Content Analysis." *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 1 (2): 1-7.
- Mearsheimer, John and Stephen Walt. 2007. *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*.

- New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Mearsheimer, John. 2011. *Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Milov, Vladimir, Leonard L. Coburn and Igor Danchenko. 2007. "Russia's Energy Policy, 1992-2005." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 285-313.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. May 2011. "Turkey's Energy Strategy." www.mfa.gov.tr/.../Mayis2011ing.docx.
- Motor Oil Hellas. Accessed 17 Jan. 2012. <http://www.moh.gr/resources/>.
- Oil and Gas Security: Emergency Response of IEA Countries. 2010. "Greece." http://www.iea.org/papers/security/greece_2010.pdf.
- Oliver, Jonathan and Michael Smith. January 24, 2010. "Officer Training Corps Faces the Axe." *The Times*. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6999920.ece>.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2008. "Country of Birth Database." <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/23/34792376.xls>.
- Ozbudun, Ergun. 2006. "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey." *South European Society and Politics* 11 (3-4): 543-557.
- Papandreou, George. September 12, 2011. "Greek PM backs Cyprus in drilling spat." *Famagusta Gazette*. <http://famagusta-gazette.com/greek-pm-backs-cyprus-in-drilling-spat-p12939-69.htm>.
- Papapostolou, Apostolos. November 9, 2011. "Britain: We Unequivocally Support the Rights of Cyprus to its EEZ." *Greek Reporter*. <http://eu.greekreporter.com/2011/11/09/britain-we-unequivocally-support-the-rights-of-cyprus-to-its-eez/>.
- Peled, Yoav. 1992. "Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State." *American Political Science Review* 86 (2): 432-443.
- Petersen, Karen K. 2004. "A Research Note: Reexamining Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior." *International Interactions* 30: 25-42.
- Population Census. 2001. http://www.cystat.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/index_gr/index_gr?OpenDocument.
- Porter, Bruce D. and Carol R. Saivetz. 1994. "The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the 'Near Abroad'." *The Washington Quarterly* 17 (3): 75-90.
- Pravda. September 10, 2011. "From Russia to Cyprus, with love." http://english.pravda.ru/world/europe/09-10-2010/115304-russia_cyprus-0/.
- Pruder, Joseph. December 12, 2011. "Greece and Israel: Reluctant Allies." *Front Page Mag*. <http://frontpagemag.com/2011/12/12/greece-and-israel-reluctant-allies/>.
- Rabbinate of Cyprus. Accessed 28 Jan. 2012. <http://www.rabbinatecyprus.org/>.
- Renner, M. 2003. "Natural Resources and Conflict: A Deadly Relationship." *USA Today* 132: 20-23.
- Ross, Marc Howard. 2007. *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ross, Michael L. 2004. "How do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases." *International Organization* 58 (1): 35-67.
- Rozmer, Andras. 2008. *Forging Security Alliances: Collective Responses of States to*

- the Political Violence of Non-State Actors*. Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Russett, Bruce. 1981. "Security and the Resources Scramble: Will 1984 be like 1914?" *International Affairs* 58 (1): 42-58.
- Ruysdael, Salomon and Vedat Yucel. 2002. *New Trends in Turkish Foreign Affairs*. Lincoln: Writers Club Press.
- Sartori, G. 1970. "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics." *American Political Science Review* 64 (4): 1033-1053.
- Shaffer, Brenda. 2006. "Turkey's Energy Policies in a Tight Global Energy Market." *Insight Turkey* 8 (2): 97-104.
- Shakman Hurd, Elizabeth. 2006. Negotiating Europe: the politics of religion and the prospects for Turkish accession. *Review of International Studies* 32: 401-418.
- Sharon, Jeremy. December 8, 2011. "Historical Agreement between Jews and the Orthodox Church." *Jerusalem Post*.
<http://www.jerusalem-religions.net/spip.php?article4034>.
- Shatzmiller, Maya. 2002. *Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-ethnic states*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Siverson, Randolph M. and Michael R. Tennefoss. 1984. "Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 78 (4): 1057-1069.
- Skaperdas, Stergios. 1998. "On the Formation of Alliances in Conflict and Contests." *Public Choice* 96: 25-42.
- Smith, Alastair. 1995. "Alliance Formation and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (4): 405-425.
- Smith, Helena. February 24, 2008. "Cyprus Elects its First Communist President." *The Guardian*. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/25/cyprus.greece>.
- Sorokin, Gerald L. 1994a. "Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries." *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (3): 421-446.
- Sorokin, Gerald L. 1994b. "Alliance Formation and General Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Model and the Case of Israel." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (2): 298-325.
- Souter, David. 1984. "An Island Apart: A Review of the Cyprus Problem." *Third World Quarterly* 6 (3): 657-674.
- Spagnolo, John P. 1977. *France and Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1914*. Oxford: Ithaca Press for the Middle East Centre.
- Sprecher, Christopher and Volker Krause. 2006. "Alliances, Armed Conflict, and Cooperation: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence." *Journal of Peace Research* 43 (4): 363-369.
- Starr, S. Frederick and Svante E. Cornell. 2005. *The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West*. Washington: Central Asia – Caucasus Institute.
- Steinburg, S.H. 1967. *The Thirty Years War and the Conflict for European Hegemony, 1600-1660*. New York: Norton.
- Stepan, Alfred. 2000. "Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations.'" *Journal of Democracy* 11 (4): 37-57.
- Stone, John and Rutledge Dennis. 2003. *Race and Ethnicity: Comparative and Theoretical Approaches*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Stulberg, Adam N. 2007. *Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia's*

- Energy Statecraft in Eurasia*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Tepe, Sultan. 2005. "Turkey's AKP: A Model "Muslim-Democratic" Party?" *Journal of Democracy* 16 (3): 69-82.
- Tharoor, Ishaan. June 2, 2010. "A Brief History of BP." *Time Magazine*.
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1993882,00.html>.
- The National Herald*. October 6, 2011. "Greece, Britain Support Cyprus Hydrocarbon Exploration, Ask Turkey to Back Down."
<http://www.thenationalherald.com/article/52117>.
- Today's Zaman*. September 30, 2011a. "Turkey denies Israeli jets harassed Turkish ship off East Mediterranean." <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-258413-turkey-denies-israeli-jets-harassed-turkish-ship-off-east-mediterranean.html>.
- Today's Zaman*. November 27, 2011b. "TPAO to start drilling in Gazimagusa, northern Cyprus." <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-264085-tpao-to-start-drilling-in-gazimagusa-northern-cyprus.html>.
- Treaty of Guarantee*. 1960. [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/484B73E4F0736CFDC22571BF00394F11/\\$file/Treaty%20of%20Guarantee.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/484B73E4F0736CFDC22571BF00394F11/$file/Treaty%20of%20Guarantee.pdf).
- TRNC Info*. May 2001. "Briefing Notes on the Cyprus Issue." <http://www.trncinfo.com/tanitmadairesi/2002/ENGLISH/BRIEFINGNOTES/070202BRIEFINGNOTES.htm>.
- Ungerleider, Neal. December 29, 2010. "Leviathan Gas Field Could Bring Catastrophe or Opportunity to Israel-Lebanon-Cyprus Borders." *Fast Company*.
<http://www.fastcompany.com/1713023/israel-cyprus-reach-agreement-on-leviathan-levant-basin-natural-gas-field-near-lebanon-and-g>.
- United Nations*. 1982. "Convention on the Law of the Seas."
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. Accessed 12 April, 2012.
- UPI*. August 26, 2011. "Cyprus, Israel move closer on East Med gas."
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2011/08/26/Cyprus-Israel-move-closer-on-East-Med-gas/UPI-62821314382019/#ixzz1giNvbEZj.
- Waever, Ole. 1993. *Securitization and Desecuritization*. København: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research.
- Walt, Stephen. 1985. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power." *International Security* 9 (4): 3-43.
- Walt, Stephen. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Walt, Stephen. 1988. "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia." *International Organization* 42 (2): 275-316.
- Wedgwood, Cicely Veronica and Anthony Grafton. 2005. *The Thirty Years War*. New York: Jonathan Cape Ltd.
- Wolfe, James H. 1988. "Cyprus: Federation Under International Safeguards." *Publius* 19 (2): 75-89.
- Zweig, David. 1995. "Developmental Communities on China's Coast: The Impact of Trade, Investment, and Transnational Alliances." *Comparative Politics* 27 (3): 253-274.

Figures


Figure 1 Division of Cyprus



2

² *BBC News*. 2006. "Cyprus Slams Turkish F1 'Trick'." <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5292914.stm>. Accessed 13, April, 2012

Figure 2 Cypriot Offshore Hydrocarbons



3

³ gCaptain. 2011. "Offshore Drilling, the Turkish Economic Zone, and Greek Cypriots... it's complicated." <http://gcaptain.com/offshore-drilling-turkish-economic/?30982>. Accessed 13, April, 2012.

Figure 3 British Bases



4

⁴ Central Intelligence Agency. 2011. *CIA World Factbook*. (Note: The Turkish military bases are not shown due to the fact that there is no international acknowledgment of Turkish leases in North Cyprus)

Figure 4 Leviathan Field



5

⁵ *Middle East War and Peace*. 2010. "Leviathan Gas Field Could Bring Catastrophe or Opportunity to Israel-Lebanon-Cyprus Borders." <http://www.middleeastwarpeace.info/2010/12/29/leviathan-gas-field-could-bring-catastrophe-or-opportunity-to-israel-lebanon-cyprus-borders/>. Accessed 13, April, 2012.

Tables

Table 1 Data

Factors	Data Sources
Ethnicity	<p>News Sources: <i>Al Jazeera; Famagusta Gazette; BBC; Cypriot Chronicle; Cyprus News Agency; Greek Reporter; The National Herald</i></p> <p>Census: <i>North Cyprus; BBC; CIA World Factbook, 2011; Ethnic Groups of Europe: An Encyclopedia; Population Census; Rabbinate of Cyprus; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; TRNC Info</i></p> <p>Journals: <i>Millennium: Journal of International Studies; Third World Quarterly; Publius</i></p> <p>Historical: <i>Cyprus: A Troubled Island; Cyprus; The Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878-2008; Cyprus: A Modern History; Treaty of Guarantee</i></p>
Religion	<p>News Sources: <i>Journal of Politics; Jewish History; The Daily Hurriyet; Greek Cypriot Daily; Pravda; Jerusalem Post</i></p> <p>Census: <i>European Commission; CIA World Factbook, 2000; CIA World Factbook, 2011; Rabbinate of Cyprus</i></p> <p>Journals: <i>British Journal of Sociology; American Political Science Review; Third World Quarterly; Publius</i></p> <p>Historical: <i>Cyprus: A Troubled Island; Russia and Turkey; Cyprus; Cyprus: A Modern History</i></p> <p>Other: <i>Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report; Stratejik Derinlik Türkiye 'nin Uluslararası Konumu; Cypriot Federation; The Making of Post-Christian Britain: A History of the Secularization of Modern Society</i></p>
Hydrocarbons	<p>News Sources: <i>AFP; Asia News; Financial Times; BBC; New York Times; Globes; Forbes; USA Today; Time Magazine; Today's Zaman; UPI</i></p> <p>Geological Reports: <i>Energy Delta Institute; British Petroleum Cyprus; Cyprus Petroleum Refinery; The History of the British Petroleum Company; Hellenic Petroleum; Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Motor Oil Hellas; Oil and Gas Security; The Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West; Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia's Energy Statecraft in Eurasia</i></p> <p>Journals: <i>International Affairs; Fiscal Studies; Applied Energy; Insight Turkey; Eurasian Geography and Economics</i></p>
Security	<p>News Sources: <i>Al Jazeera; BBC; Debkafile; Defence Greece; Cyprus News Report; Cypriot Chronicle; The Daily Hurriyet; Jerusalem Post; Yahoo News; Front Page Mag; The Times; The National Herald; Today's Zaman; Fast Company; UPI</i></p> <p>Journals: <i>European Journal of Political Research; Third World Quarterly; Publius</i></p> <p>Historical: <i>Cyprus Convention; Cyprus: A Troubled Island; Cyprus; Cyprus: A Modern History; Treaty of Guarantee</i></p>

Table 2 Results: Great Britain

Hypothesis:	Confirmed	Potential	Problematic
Ethnicity	X		
Religion			X
Hydrocarbons		X	
Security			X

Table 3 Results: Greece

Hypothesis:	Confirmed	Potential	Problematic
Ethnicity	X		
Religion	X		
Hydrocarbons		X	
Security			X

Table 4 Results: Turkey

Hypothesis:	Confirmed	Potential	Problematic
Ethnicity	X		
Religion			X
Hydrocarbons	X		
Security	X		

Table 5 Results: Russia

Hypothesis:	Confirmed	Potential	Problematic
Ethnicity			X
Religion	X		
Hydrocarbons	X		
Security	X		

Table 6 Results: Israel

Hypothesis:	Confirmed	Potential	Problematic
Ethnicity			X
Religion			X
Hydrocarbons			X
Security	X		

Figure 7 Results Summary

Cases:	Hypotheses			
	Ethnicity	Religion	Hydrocarbons	Security
Great Britain	X			
Greece	X	X		
Turkey	X		X	X
Russia		X	X	X
Israel				X

VITA

Gregory A. File

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Thesis: ETHNICITY, RELIGION, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND SECURITY: THE
CYPRIOT OFFSHORE DRILLING CRISIS

Major Field: Political Science

Biographical:

Education:

Completed the requirements for the Master of Arts in Political Science at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in May, 2012.

Completed the requirements for the Bachelor of Science in Political Science at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in 2010.

Experience:

File, Gregory A. "The Deadly Siren of Liberal Economic Theory: The Russo-Georgian Conflicts." *Presented at ISA Midwest*. November 12, 2012.

File, Gregory A. and Thomas Lassi. "The Lost Grail: Cultural Effects and the Attempts of Turkey to Join the E.U." *Presented at ISA Midwest*. November 11, 2012.

Professional Memberships: Pi Sigma Alpha, Phi Kappa Phi, Golden Key International Honor Society, National Society of Collegiate Scholars.

Name: Gregory A. File

Date of Degree: May, 2012

Institution: Oklahoma State University

Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma

Title of Study: ETHNICITY, RELIGION, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND SECURITY: THE CYPRIOT OFFSHORE DRILLING CRISIS

Pages in Study: 123

Candidate for the Degree of Master of Arts

Major Field: Political Science

Scope and Method of Study: Due to the limited time frame, small number of variables, and small number of cases utilized; a small-n qualitative case study approach was employed. The analysis employed a mixed methodology of content and historical analysis. This allowed the researcher to examine the policy statements, speeches, and interviews of the governmental leaders (backed with historical, census, geological, and scholarly data) in order to understand why states aligned the way they did in this particular instance.

Findings and Conclusions:

On September 18, 2011, the Republic of Cyprus announced it had begun the process of extracting offshore hydrocarbons. The announcement sparked a crisis. Great Britain, Greece, Russia and Israel voiced their support for the right of the Republic of Cyprus to recover their offshore hydrocarbon resources. Turkey sided with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and sent an exploration crew to the disputed waters to protect the claim of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This begs the question: What factors are responsible for the formation of these alliances? The answer is found by testing four hypotheses (ethnicity, religion, hydrocarbon trade, and security) under the mixed theory utilizing both cultural and non-cultural elements. The hypotheses are tested using the five cases of Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, Russia and Israel. The results are mixed, since each case is unique. Ethnicity explained the cases of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Religion explained the cases of Russia and Greece. Hydrocarbon trade contributed to the explanation in the cases of Turkey and Russia. Finally, the security hypothesis accounts for the cases of Turkey, Russia and Israel. The findings of this study contribute to the existing literature regarding the Cypriot conflict by adding the new actors of Russia and Israel, along with the new dimension that deals with the discovery of hydrocarbons. The findings can also contribute to the studies of internationalized ethnic conflict and geopolitics more generally.

ADVISER'S APPROVAL: Dr. Nikolas Emmanuel