

**THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT**

By

VIVIEN L. EXARTIER

Graduate Business Degree

Ecole Supérieure de Commerce

Dijon, France

2006

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
May, 2006

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EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT**

Thesis Approved:

Dr. Joel Jenswold

Dr. Robert Darcy

Dr. Steve Miller

A. Gordon Emslie
Dean of the Graduate College

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

- CDM: Capabilities Development Mechanism (CDM)
- CEECs: Central Eastern European Countries
- CESDP: Common European Security Defense Policy
- CFSP: Common Foreign Security Policy
- DG: Directorate General
- EC: European Community (EC)
- ENP: European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
- ESDP: European Security Defense Policy
- EU: European Union
- ISPA: Pre-Accession Structural Instrument
- IPTF: United Nations' International Police Task Force (IPTF)
- EPC: European Political Cooperation
- EUPM: European Union Police Mission Bosnia Herzegovina
Capabilities Development Mechanism (CDM),
- EUFOR-ALTHEA: European Union Force in Bosnia Herzegovina
- EUJUST THEMIS: European Union Rule of Law Mission to Georgia
- EUJUST LEX: European Union Rule of Law Mission to Iraq
- HFC: Helsinki Force Catalogue
- HG: Headline Goal
- NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PHARE Program: Poland Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction of the Economy)

PSC: Political Security Committee

RELEX: '*Relations exterieures*' (External Relations)

RRF: Rapid Reaction Force

RRM: Rapid Reaction Mechanism

SAA: Stabilization Association Agreement

SAPARD: Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development)

SAP: Stabilization and Association Process

TEU: Treaty of the European Union

WEU: Western European Union

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War marked the return of Eastern European nations to their natural state: a return to the natural and geographical and historical boundaries of Europe¹. The European Union has been enlarging since it was created in 1952. It has grown from six, nine, and twelve to fifteen current Member States to finally absorb a big-bang enlargement of ten members. On May 1, 2004, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the Club. The European Union is today at the crossroads of its development. Either, it successfully integrates the new members, overcoming the challenges of the process by deeply reforming its current structure; or, it fails and it is a true stalemate for its future. The rejection of the Constitution by France and Netherlands hinders this process of deeper integration that would allow the European Union to adapt and function more effectively. What is ultimately at stake is the future of Europe and its capacity to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. Indeed, the European Union has a historical opportunity to reverse the division of the European continent and to contribute towards a stable and political and economic order throughout Europe resting on fundamental values and principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and minorities. It is also a unique opportunity for Europe to speak with a single voice on the international stage and become a true political player rather than just an economic giant ‘with

¹ K. M. Fierke and Antje Wiener. “Constructing Institutional interests EU and NATO enlargement”, *Journal of European Public Policy* 6:5, pp: 721-42, (1999), 730

soft teeth'. The question is how EU enlargement affects the current EU security structure. Specifically, what the European Union accession implies for the security of new members, how their accession affects the current structure of EU security and whether their security needs and interests of the new members have been taken into account by the current European Union institutions. However, despite a negligible involvement on the ground and an expected minimal security interest, the accession of New Member States has an impact on the security of European Union. The enlargement certainly poses problems for the identity of European security: it raises the question of where Europe's Eastern and Southern frontiers actually lie. The new members shift Europe's center of gravity to the East or in the blunt words of Secretary Rumsfeld during the 2003 transatlantic rift on Iraq, there is an 'Old Europe' and a 'New Europe'². The Iraqi crisis obviously highlighted not only the absence of a coherent foreign policy but also differences in perceptions on what European Security means. The EU Security Doctrine issued short after the crisis, tended to remedy those cleavages by 'imposing' standard views on European Union Members. But practically, it is hard to believe that in less than two years, the gap has been bridged and that there is a true common sense of security.

A preliminary chapter will present the hypotheses and the approach to test them. Before the presentation of the findings, it is however necessary to define enlargement: the history of the process, the impact on current Member States, European Institutions and New

² Scott Brunstetter, "A changing view of responsibility? German security in the Post-9/11 World" in *Old Europe, New Europe and the US*, Tom Lansford, Blagovest Tashev Ed., (Ashgate 2005), 30

Member States and how the literature covers it. The following chapters attempt to establish a definition of European security through a discussion of the literature on security, a presentation of the institutions and their mechanisms, including the debate on the relationship between the European Security Defense Policy and NATO. The 'findings' chapter shows how the responding population confirms that the new entrants definitely have an impact on European security and shows that true, the logistical commitment is negligible compared to current members and even Third states. The last chapter discusses the further implications of enlargement for European security, and ways to improve European security and foreign policy efficiency in general, by better integrating the needs of an enlarged Europe.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Despite a negligible involvement on the ground and an expected minimal security interest, the accession of New Member States has an impact on the security of European Union, states the theory. The hypotheses are the following:

H0: The involvement of New Member States in CFSP/ESDP is negligible and does not affect the outcome of ESDP operations.

H1: The involvement of new member states in ESDP operations is significant because it their national security.

H2: The involvement of new member states in ESDP operations is significant because it translates the willingness to be part of European Security.

A case study approach is chosen to test the hypotheses. Typically, a case study is where the researcher explores in depth a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one or more individuals. The cases are bounded by time and activity, and researchers collect detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time³. Here, the involvement of New Member States in current ESDP operations is reviewed. The timeframe is the operations launched between 2003 and now (pre-accession and post-accession). The sample population is the CEECS (Central Eastern European Countries) and the Baltic States, both former Communist countries and part of

³ John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Approaches*, ed. (Sage, 2003), 15

the big bang enlargement. A questionnaire submitted to security officials combined with hard data from fact sheets from the European Council and scholarly articles confirms that: despite a minimal commitment in numbers, New Member States' involvement is significant and translates their security interests.

The questionnaire consists of addressing the involvement in any ESDP operation of the respondent's country choice: in particular, the nature of the involvement (compliance with treaties, peacekeeping), the logistical and financial contribution (how many troops, budget, timeframe), the national security interest of the participant's country, the shaping of the decision-making process leading to the participation (collective, consulting with other member states...), the quality of the CFSP as a framework versus other entities and finally a review-comparison of the participation versus other operations (See Appendix). Regarding the responding population, the target is Central Eastern European Countries and Baltic States involved in at least two ESDP operations. The minimum of two ensures that there is not outlier in the data, and that the country is sufficiently involved with CFSP. Based on preliminary research, five countries match the requirements: Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Czech Republic. The second phase in the data collection is the choice of individual respondents and the institutions they represent: the respondents need to be officials as well as an expert opinion. The best places to tap were embassies to the United States, the European Union section of the ministry for foreign affairs of each country and the permanent representation of the country to the European Union. Within those institutions, officials in charge of ESDP issues or Political Security Committee issues are targeted. Participants are allowed to add comments on each questionnaire, which conveys the language and words of participants. There is then a validation stage where the responses from the questionnaire are compared with hard data. Official

documents from the CFSP, such as fact sheets, European Council minutes and website operations if available, as well as scholarly articles qualify as hard data and then help to validate the data.

CHAPTER III

HISTORY, SCOPE AND DEFINITION OF ENLARGEMENT

Historical process

The disappearance of the Iron Curtain in 1989/90 presented the countries of both Eastern and Western Europe with the challenge of completely redefining their relationship. Both sides seized the opportunity of finally overcoming the division of Europe. The EU decided to invite these countries to become part of the European Union and these countries were prepared to make the enormous reform efforts required to achieve this goal⁴. The philosophy of enlargement is to introduce stable institutions, changes of government on the basis of free and democratic elections, reinforced protection of human rights, including rights of minorities, and market economy principles. The EU aims at that "no new dividing lines will be drawn across our continent"⁵. Each New Member State brings to the EU its own political, economic, cultural, historical and geographical heritage, thus enriching Europe as a Union and has the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of Political, Economic and Monetary Union⁶. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe made use of this opportunity as follows: Hungary in March 1994, Poland in April 1994, Romania and Slovakia

⁴ German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, "The enlargement of the European Union", www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/index.html (2005)

⁵ Gunther Verheugen, "An unprecedented enlargement", Conclusion on regular reports 2001, Strategy Paper 2001, DG Enlargement, European Commission, <http://Europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index.html>, (2001)

⁶ European Commission, *More unity and more diversity: the EU's biggest enlargement*, (Directorate General for Press and Communication, 2003)

in June 1995, Latvia in October 1995, Estonia in November 1995, Lithuania and Bulgaria in December 1995, the Czech Republic in January 1996 and Slovenia in June 1996. Turkey had already announced its desire to become a member in April 1987. Cyprus and Malta had done likewise in July 1990⁷.

In order to join the Union, candidate countries had to comply with a set of criteria called ‘the Copenhagen Criteria’⁸. The ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ require stability of institutions, democracy, and the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. Newcomers were supposed to establish a functioning market economy and adhere to the aims of Political, Economic and Monetary Union. These principles were following the Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union: "The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law."⁹ These principles were emphasized in the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union¹⁰, which was proclaimed at the Nice European Council in December 2000¹¹. Now the technical process of membership had been defined by the Berlin European Council¹², which had set out a clear framework for the financial aspects of enlargement. The European Council of Nice had defined the framework for the institutional reform necessary for Enlargement¹³. Negotiations were conducted on the

⁷ German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, loc. cit.

⁸ Verheugen, loc. cit.

⁹ European Commission, “Human Rights Charter”, <http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html> (2005)

¹⁰ European Commission, “Charter of Human Rights”, http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/charte/en/rights.html (2005)

¹¹ European Commission, “Nice Treaty Conclusions”, http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice_treaty/index_en.htm (2005)

¹² European Union Council, “Berlin European Council Conclusions, 24-25 March 1999”, http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/mar99_en.htm (2005)

¹³ European Commission, “Nice European Council Summit conclusions”, http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice_council/index (2000)

basis of the existing *acquis*, divided in chapters¹⁴. These were the necessary and sufficient conditions defined at the outset for accomplishing the first accessions. The process did not happen overnight and since the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a succession of measures to progressively prepare the entrants. In 1989, the EU removed long-standing import quotas on a number of products, extended the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and, over the next few years, concluded Trade and Cooperation Agreements with Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. In the meantime, the European Community's PHARE Program (Poland Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction of the Economy)¹⁵, created in 1989, set out to provide financial support for the countries' efforts to reform and rebuild their economies. PHARE soon became the world's largest assistance program in Central Europe, providing technical expertise and investment support. In August 1990, the Commission proposed moving status with the so-called 'Europe Agreements'. By early 2000, ten Europe Agreements were signed with Hungary, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. The Europe Agreements aimed at gradually establishing free-trade by progressive abolition of tariffs¹⁶. The European Community had already established similar Association Agreements with Turkey (1963), Malta (1970) and Cyprus (1972). From 2000, the Community doubled its pre-accession assistance to over €3 billion a year. The PHARE Program was now accompanied by two new instruments, which prepared

¹⁴ DG Enlargement, "Negotiation Chapters", <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/> (2005)

¹⁵ Verheugen (2001): 41

¹⁶ Falkner Gerda, "Enlarging the European Union: the short-term success of incrementalism and Depoliticisation", Working Paper Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, (July 2000)

for the Structural Funds. ISPA¹⁷ (Pre-Accession Structural Instrument) allocates over €1 billion a year to investment in environment and transport infrastructure, and SAPARD (Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development) allocates over €500 million a year to agricultural and rural development.

But the biggest challenge for the candidates was not only to transform their institutions but to implement the '*acquis communautaire*' a set of 3,000 EU laws, sets and standards. The '*acquis communautaire*' commits the member states (or the future ones) to accept all previous and future centralizing measures. It includes not only the decisions of the Council of Ministers and the European Commission but also all the rulings of the European Court of Justice. The *acquis* covers 80,000 pages and often during the process, candidates would complain that the *acquis* is unsuitable to their system. In 2000, the Feira European Council¹⁸ recalled that "progress in the negotiations depended on the incorporation by the candidate countries of the *acquis* in their national legislation and especially on their capacity to effectively implement and enforce it", by strengthening their administrative and judicial structures. In June 2001, the Göteborg European Council¹⁹ stressed again the importance that candidate countries make continued progress in transposing, implementing and enforcing the '*acquis*', and that they pay particular attention to "*putting in place adequate administrative structures and to reforming their judicial systems and their civil service*"²⁰. In the study at hand, it is interesting to look at the transposition of the foreign policy '*acquis*'. Co-operation in justice and home affairs was a main concern, both in view of the fight against terrorism and organized crime and the longer-term discussions on the possible creation of common border control arrangements. The

¹⁷ Verheugen (2001): 16

¹⁸ Verheugen (2001): 31

¹⁹ European Council Swedish Presidency, <http://eu2001.se/eu2001.index>, (2001)

²⁰ <http://eu2001.se/eu2001.index> (2001)

‘Schengen Agreement’²¹ applies to all new Member States. Full participation in it is based on a two-step process. The New Member States first need to achieve a high level of external border control upon accession whereas the lifting of internal border controls with current Member States will take place only at a later stage, subject to a separate decision by the Council.

Despite a painstaking and lengthy process, the accession negotiations between the EU and ten accession candidates – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – were concluded at the European Council of 12-13 December 2002, also held in Copenhagen. The ceremonial signing of the Treaty of Accession with the ten accession countries took place in Athens on 16 April 2003 with the participation of the Heads of State and Government and the Foreign Ministers of the countries involved. The Treaty of Accession sets out the conditions of accession for the ten accession countries on 1 May 2004. Under Article 49 of the EU Treaty, the formal pre-conditions for the signing were the positive opinion of the European Commission (given on 19 February 2003), the approval of the European Parliament of each application for accession (granted with overwhelming majority for each country on 9 April 2003) and finally the decision taken by the European Council on 14 April 2003 to accept new member states²².

Definition of enlargement policy

Type of the enlargement policy

Within the EU, policy-making authority constantly swings between supranational institutions and Member States. Some policies are entirely in the hands of supranational

²¹ German Foreign Affairs Ministry, “The Schengen Agreement and the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement”,

<http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/en/willkommen/einreisebestimmungen/schengen.html> (2005)

²² German Foreign Affairs Ministry, “The enlargement of the European Union”, www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/en/index.html, (2004)

institutions such as competition where member States have a little say. These types of policies can also be identified as ‘negative integration’ policies²³ referring to the EU unique effectiveness in dismantling post-war controls of national governments over their own economic boundaries. In the fields of EU policy dealing with other countries, the patterns also vary. Trade has been strongly influenced by relatively extensive internal regime. But when it comes to foreign policy, the Member States have delegated very little to the EU institutions because security is a jealously preserved domestic domain.²⁴ The 1992 Maastricht Treaty’s creation of three pillars identified those policy areas related to the Union’s traditional core activities (pillar 1), the foreign and security policy (pillar 2) and the justice and home affairs (pillar 3). These areas are usually under the primary jurisdiction of the Council or Ministers and the supranational institutions were not allowed to exercise their usual powers in these fields. However since the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, asylum, immigration, judicial cooperation in civil matters were transferred to Pillar 1 and the Commission was given its traditional powers of initiatives in 2002²⁵. Scharpf characterizes those ‘polity building’ policies as ‘positive integration’ ones because they reconstruct a capacity for market-correcting regulations at the European level. They continue to depend on unanimity in the Council of Ministers and are easily blocked by conflicts of interests among these governments. The problem with enlargement is it takes a little bit of everything and it is difficult to categorize it as a specific policy.

²³ Fritz Scharpf, *Governing in Europe: effective and democratic?* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 2.

²⁴ Helen Wallace (2000) “The policy process: a moving pendulum”, in *Policy-making in the European Union*, Edited by Helen Wallace and William Wallace, (Oxford University Press, 2000), 45

²⁵ Alberta Sbragia, “Key policies”, in *The Institutions of the European Union*, Edited by John Peterson and Michael Shackelton, (Oxford university Press 2002), 130

The challenge and the need to devise a policy towards Eastern European Countries were very sudden due to of course the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union. Wallace reminds us of the dangers of assuming the relative stability of integration patterns at any given moment and of neglecting the outside world²⁶. This succession of events generated new policy for the EU agenda (rather than being dealt with bilaterally by the member states) in part because it was quickly agreed among EU governments and the Commission that the EU would be the best forum for response and also because politicians from the CEECs directed their expectations to the EU. Sketching and managing the new relationship required a significant degree of innovation, creativity, and strategic policy-making²⁷. The EU had to rethink its all functioning in order to absorb enlargement. Enlargement did not have a single location in the policy process and by nature could not be strictly supranational _where member states have surrendered their sovereignty to supranational institutions_ nor intergovernmental where Member States make the major decisions. Enlargement is a broad policy framework which draws from a range of distinctive policy areas. Sedelmeier identifies it as a ‘composite’ policy²⁸: he explains that it requires an analytical distinction between two dimensions of the policy: (1) decisions about the macro-level of policy, to determine the overall objectives and parameters of policy _for instance, an agreement on the direction in which the relationship should evolve (between standard external relations, special relationship or membership)_ (2) decisions about the specific detail and substance of policy, generally dealt with by the various policy makers that have the relevant technical expertise and

²⁶ Ulrich Sedelmeier, Helen Wallace. “Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?”, in *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Fourth Edition, (Oxford 2000), 429

²⁷ Sedelmeier, Wallace, op. cit., 428

²⁸ Sedelmeier, Wallace *ibid.*

decision-making competences _ for instance, the specific mechanisms through which the EU might consult the CEECs on foreign policy issues_. But policy towards Eastern Europe does not exist independently of those decisions, which make up these separate sub-policies. In other words, the macro-policy is composed of a range of distinctive meso-policies, “and it is these which define the substance of policy, and feed back into the overall policy”. The meso policies that constitute EU policy towards the CEECs are simultaneously parts of other policy areas. Instruments that this policy uses to achieve its objectives are at the same time instruments that are employed in other policy areas and for quite different purposes. This represents a challenge in terms of coordination. It implies that policy-making is less characterized by inter-state bargaining than by *‘bargaining between distinctive groups of policy-makers and by transgovernmental alliances and that it generates obstacles to strategic policy-making’*²⁹.

Explaining Enlargement with integration theory

Another approach to explain integration and enlargement independently from the institutions is the speed and the scope of it, and according to some scholars, there is one factor which has always conditioned the EU unification process: ‘multilayered internal cleavages’. These divisions concern the scope of integration which is desirable to pursue, the role the United States should play within Europe, and the style of diplomacy which the EU should adopt, conditioned by member States’ stances: ‘big’ versus ‘small’, ‘Atlanticist’ versus ‘Europeanist’³⁰. These elements suggest that the concept of ‘variable geometry’ was intrinsic to the European unification process from the start and resulted in building coalitions among different member states according to the issue. Wallace refers to a ‘multi-tier community’,

²⁹ Sedelmeier, Wallace, op. cit., 430

³⁰ Victoria Curzon Price and others. *The Enlargement of the European Union*, (Routledge 1999), 18

similar to Delors 'concentric circles', in which a core of Member States accomplishes the objectives set by the EU while the others tag along. Each core member has its own foreign policy concerns which leads in turns to other circles of states linked to the EU with various degrees of intensity³¹. 'Variable speed' or variable 'geometry' refers to the process of having some Member States moving more rapidly than others. One could even go as far as suggesting 'à la carte' integration, according to which members can choose their own integration policies. Denmark, Sweden and the UK opted out for instance from the Euro. 'Flexibility' is a competing term used by the Commission. It captures a situation in which a sub-group of Member States moves towards deeper integration than the others, on the premise that all member states will one day do reach the same destination. The CEECs for example are not obliged to sign up for all EU obligations at once. Germany, France and more reluctantly Britain back flexibility. The inner core provides the leadership and direction of the EU, ensures the continued commitment of larger countries, and avoids the possibility that the slowest ship could determine the pace of the convoy. The inner core pools their sovereignty, pushes towards a common currency, a common defense and foreign policies and a common set of laws. It traditionally includes Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The second circle would include Britain and some other member countries, which would remain at their present level of integration. A final outer circle would contain other member and aspirant states.

The most ambitious enlargement ever: comparison with early enlargements

³¹ Curzon Price and others. Op. cit., 18

Past experiences show that widening has not been a politically easy task. Enlargement as ‘joining and truly adhering to the integrated conditions of the member states has been a painfully slow and internally combative process’³². A relevant round to compare is the Mediterranean enlargement, in terms of development and regime legacies. In both cases democratic reforms preceded the discussion about accession to the EU. In both cases, GNP per capita was much lower than that of the EU. In both cases, opposition to the new members by some of the old members was not negligible, especially with regard to the agricultural sector³³. However, CEECs are still poorer than the Mediterranean countries and transition from central planning to market economy is still on the way. Therefore, redistribution demands are still very high, especially with regard to the Common Agricultural Policy. As we said previously, in some sensitive sectors such as agriculture, steel, textiles and some chemicals, CEECs have comparative advantages that threaten EU industries. Threatening East West migration complicates the picture considerably says Vosgerau. There are public fears of importing crime, large-scale migration and social dumping. Similar worries were expressed at the Mediterranean enlargements in 1981 and 1986. Those fears turned out to be unjustified. The partnership approach was however different. Since the first Mediterranean widening, the new entrants have regularly had prior bilateral trade agreements with the Union. It was not the case with the Mediterranean members. The Greek Association Agreement with the EC was signed in 1961, suspended during the military regime and then reinstated at the end of the tyranny. Spain and Portugal had concluded bilateral trade agreements with the EC before their

³² Gerda Falkner, “Enlarging the European Union: the short-term success of incrementalism and Depoliticisation”, Working Paper Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, (July 2000)

³³ Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau and others. “Joining the club: options for integrating Central and Eastern Countries into the European Union” in Black Stanley (ed), *Europe’s economy looks East*, (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 9

accession, starting negotiations in 1978 and 1979 respectively³⁴. Confronted with the changing geopolitical situation, the Union slightly modified its approach with CEECs. As we mentioned earlier, the process of pre-accession and financial assistance was lengthier and wider.

More generally, this enlargement is also truly different from a geopolitical perspective. First, the Union is not enlarging with a ‘residual element’ of a fragmented or split Europe. All earlier enlargements, even including to some extent the latest one, were based on the assumption or the reality that Europe was divided into two parts³⁵. This enlargement ends the artificial division of Europe. It is a true reunification of a model based on a set of shared values and practices going back to the Enlightenment and the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century. In the words of Foreign Minister Melescanu from Romania: ‘Today’s Europe is to be found where its democratic, liberal and humanist values and practices succeed in shutting the door on the nightmare of authoritarian regimes, command economies and a disrespect for human rights and fundamental freedoms³⁶. Second, the EU had to consider enlargement in a global framework. How will the Eastern enlargement help the EU in the current distribution of capabilities? Central and Eastern Europe provides a large number of new production locations and cheap labor. The region has a high level of flexibility, following the destruction of the old system. Flexibility, institutional organization, innovative capacity and social tolerance are among the most important factors of competitiveness of the twenty-first century.

³⁴ Falkner, op. cit., 9

³⁵ Andras Inotai, “Reflections about the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, European Institute, (Economic Policy Institute 2000)

³⁶ K. M. Fierke., Antje Wiener. “Constructing Institutional interests EU and NATO enlargement”, *Journal of European Public Policy* 6:5, (December 1999), pp: 721-42, 728

This Enlargement is also a challenge of integration. It raises the problem of how much diversity the EU's foundation can tolerate³⁷. The only way to 'manage this diversity' is to take into consideration several factors: first to reinforce and reaffirm the concept of solidarity, second, to focus on governance as of a crucial importance in this post-accession phase, third, to rethink the institutions and structure of the Union and fourth to foster an integrated neighborhood policy. However, the new entrants are often seen different by reason of history, level of development and lack of democratic traditions. On the other side, the worries for the Eastern countries are the fear of westernization, in a bad way. Eastern European citizens fear that customs and traditions might be eroded by permissive "Western" values and norms, that their weaker economies might be undermined by competition and that their social welfare will deteriorate or become too expensive. As the reflection group points out, candidate countries want to be reassured they will be treated 'as full and equal partners, not second-class members.'³⁸

This Enlargement is finally more a two-way relationship in comparison with earlier rounds. It is not only the EU that imposes a set of rules. There is true interaction between EU institutions and new members. Brigid Fowler notices within the candidate countries close to join, a set of highly complex and dynamic interrelationships, in which the EU influence is mediated through a range of other factors, both domestic and international, and embedded in much wider processes of change³⁹. National cultures and traditions, bureaucratic and party politics are shaping the impact of the EU in the CEECs, sometimes reinforcing existing features

³⁷ Jean-Luc Dehaene and others. "The Political Dimension of Enlargement: Looking towards Post-Accession", Robert Schumann Center of the European University Institute - Italy and the group for policy advisors of the European Commission – Belgium, <http://www.iue.it/RSC/pdf/dehaenereport.pdf> (2000), 3

³⁸ Dehaene (2000), 4

³⁹ Wallace Helen and others. "Enlargement of the European Union: Impacts on the EU, the Candidates, and the 'Next Neighbors'", ESCA Forum (2001).

as much as changing them. This helps to explain diversity of outcomes among the candidate states, despite the toughness and extent of EU conditionality.

Weaknesses in the enlargement literature and significance of the study.

However, the literature on enlargement suffers from several weaknesses⁴⁰. It often analyzes policy-oriented studies of single cases, such as single enlargement rounds of single organizations, single member or accession countries, or even single policy areas. Schimmelfennig identifies four main reasons: first, the isolation of the study of EU enlargement which separates it from the study of other international organizations, second the lack of comparative research designs, third an under-specification of independent variables and a neglect of exploring alternative explanations. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier suggest four main dimensions of enlargement that generate separate dependent variables for the study of enlargement. First, the applicant enlargement politics: the question here is why and under which conditions do non-members seek accession to a regional organization? The second aspect relates to the politics of Member States. It addresses the reasons why a Member State of a regional organization favors or opposes enlargement to a particular country. These studies usually focus on one member only. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that cross-country would benefit the literature. The third aspect is EU enlargement politics. The question here is: “under which conditions does the regional organization admit a new member, or modify its institutional relationship with outside states?” There are two dimensions here: first a macro dimension⁴¹ addressing the reason why the organization prefers to admit one state rather than another, and why it offers membership versus a partnership. Again, an emerging body in this

⁴⁰ Frank Schimmelfennig, Ulrich Sedelmeier. “Theorizing EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research”, *Journal of European Public Policy* 9: 4 , (August 2002), 501

⁴¹ Gerda Falkner, “How pervasive are Euro-politics? Effects of EU membership on a new member state”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38 (2) (2000): p. 223-250.

literature has only focused on single cases. There have been some cross-sectional comparisons of international organizations, over a round of enlargement, mainly between the EU and NATO⁴². These comparisons usually raise the issue of why some states are member of one but not another and why do some organizations have a larger membership and integrate more quickly than others. The substantive or policy dimension of EU politics seeks to explain the specific outcomes of accession negotiations in distinctive policy area, but also the nature of pre-accession conditionality. The key question is to what extent outcomes reflect the preferences of certain actors, such as the applicants, member states, societal interest groups or institutional actors. Again, the literature has neglected it and there have been very few informed comparisons between policy areas or across enlargement rounds. Finally, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier look at the impact of enlargement that affects both the organization and the state to which its institutional rules are extended. The main questions here are: how does enlargement change the identity, the interests and the behavior of governmental and societal actors? How does enlargement affect the distribution of power and interests in the organization, and the effects on deepening integration? This dimension has been neglected in theoretical studies of enlargement. The Europeanization has analyzed the effects of membership on new members but there are mainly single case studies as well as comparisons between 'new' and 'old' Member States. Regarding the Eastern enlargement, there is little cross-analysis between theoretical studies of the impact of international organization; the Europeanization literature; the theoretical literature on the transformations in the CEECs and the mainly descriptive literature on the effect of the EU candidates which is often limited to single countries and single policy areas.

To summarize, the literature has focused on EFTA applicants' politics and the EU macro

⁴² Falkner, *ibid*

politics on Eastern enlargement. The greatest deficits are in the study of the policy dimension and the impact of enlargement and the comparative analysis of member states politics

CHAPTER IV

THE CURRENT STATE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

European responses to the Iraqi Crisis

The diplomatic rift within Europe on the hawkish US stance, which led to the invasion of Iraq, illustrates the differences in perceptions of European security. The crisis was a true pre-accession test for an enlarging EU to be. It was expected that having ten new members would considerably alter the structure of European security, and there was some dissension on what stance to follow on Iraq. In the Iraqi crisis, the 15 member (to become 25) EU has not spoken with a single voice but more in a cacophony.

The split

On January 27, 2003 after lengthy negotiation, Mr. Solana, CFSP (Common Foreign Security Policy) High Representative finally succeeded in reaching agreement for a common policy on Iraq for all 15-member states. It had been a painful exercise but Member States could at least agree that the United Nations inspectors were in Iraq and should be allowed to carry out their work.⁴³ A few days before, at the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the 'Elysee Treaty', France and Germany declared their common anti-war position. It shifted the national Atlanticist German position in the anti-war camp. President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder came out with a joint statement urging restraint and respect for the United Nations without

⁴³ Gerard Baker and others. "The rift turns nasty: the plot that split old and new Europe asunder", *The Financial Times*, (May 28, 2003)

warning their colleagues. President Chirac declared: *“For forty years, each decisive step was taken in Europe thanks to the motor that Germany and France represent...Experience shows that when Berlin and Paris agree, Europe can move forward; if there is disagreement, Europe marks time.”* On January 30th, the ‘Letter of Eight’ was published. The letter signed by eight European heads of state (Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) expressed support for the US military intervention. They did so without even attempting to consult the other countries in the enlarged European Union. It caused consternation around Europe. From now on, a clear division between those who supported war and those who opposed it was laid. A couple of days later, a new letter of support for US intervention was published. This letter, known as the ‘Vilnius 10’ had been signed by ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), all future members or candidates of the European Union. It showed that there was indeed a different view between an “old Europe” led by France and Germany, and the “new” entrants emerging from the Warsaw Pact.

It showed that none of the procedures of the EU had been followed: neither Greece, holding the rotating EU presidency, nor Javier Solana, the “High Representative” for Foreign Policy, had been informed. The 1991 Maastricht Treaty also binding EU member states to *“refrain from any action which is contrary to the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations”*⁴⁴ was not respected. The common foreign policy was now in shambles.

Immediate explanations of the European behavior.

⁴⁴ Daniel Dombey Daniel, George Parker. “Giscard lambastes European leaders divisions over Saddam”, *Financial Times*, (February 8, 2003)

Charles Kupchan⁴⁵ explains that preserving the Atlantic link has been one of the key motivations inducing Spain, Britain and the Eastern countries to side with the US. Britain and France have two conceptions of the world. Britain traditionally sees a unipolar world where Europeans should generally support the US on security issues. Prime Minister Blair declared⁴⁶: “*We need one polar power which encompasses a strategic partnership between Europe and America*”. Blair thinks that a multipolar world would develop into rival centers of power. France holds a multilateral vision of the world, where Europe is a major pole and should not hesitate to oppose the US when they are wrong⁴⁷. At the time, Chancellor Schröder believed that Germany is an important country and should be respected as such -by the European Commission, by other EU partners but also by the US⁴⁸. As Kupchan summarized it: “*Europe is too strong to be Washington lackey but too weak to be either an effective partner or a formidable counterpart*”. Spain and Britain shared a resentment of the traditional behavior of France and Germany in setting the EU agenda³. The ‘Letter of Eight’ was therefore an opportunity to put France and Germany in their place. It was a chance for Mr. Blair to show that there was an alternative leadership pole in Europe. For Mr. Aznar, it was also a means of getting back at Mr. Chirac, who had in effect sided with Rabat over the Moroccan occupation of the island of Perejil. And for all signatories, it was a signal that the enlarged Europe could produce alliances with enough votes in the European Council to outweigh the Paris-Berlin axis.

The new members certainly supported the US but it did not necessarily mean that they would ally to Washington on every issue⁴⁹. The test of loyalty over Iraq came at an awkward

⁴⁵ Charles Kupchan, “The Atlantic Alliance lies in rubble”, *The Financial Times*, (April 10, 2003)

⁴⁶ Tony Blair, interview by Philip Stevens and Cathy Newman, *The Financial Times*, (April 25, 2003)

⁴⁷ Charles Grant, “Europe and America put off their divorce”, *The Financial Times*, (July 23, 2003)

⁴⁸ Christoph Bertram, “Germany will not become America’s vassal”, *The Financial Times*, (May, 5, 2003)

⁴⁹ Heather Grabbe, “The newcomers”, *The Future of Europe, Integration and Enlargement*, edited by Fraser Cameron, (Routledge 2004), 75

moment. The US Senate was at the time considering ratification of the second enlargement of NATO. The 'Letter of Ten' issued by the candidates for NATO membership was orchestrated by the American Bruce Jackson who had lobbied effectively to have those members join NATO. In the near future it was expected that new members would more likely tip the balance towards support for NATO and away from France and other countries wanting to create a European counterweight to American power. Neither letter supported the use of force or offered the US '*carte blanche*'. Their position was more Blairite than pro-Bush, in trying to promote multilateral cooperation.

European Security: the weakest link?

Defining security

National security signifies protection of the nation's people and territories against physical assault and in that narrow sense is equivalent to the term defense. But national security also implies protection through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten the fundamental values and vitality of the state⁵⁰. Since power is widely distributed among the world's many actors and is of limited projectability, none of the participants is entirely sufficient; none of perfectly capable of fully satisfying its perceived security needs⁵¹. Therefore at one time or another, all have found it necessary to resort to one of several devices or approaches to compensate for national inadequacies. States use then collective security, alliances and coalitions and international law at one time or another, sometimes simultaneously, to

⁵⁰ Jordan Amos and others. *American National Security*, fifth ed., (John Hopkins University Press Baltimore and London 1999), 4

⁵¹ *ibid.*, 15

meet their perceived security needs or as means to advance national goals. Each approach can count both successes and both failures in avoiding armed conflict.

New thinking on security confirms the influence of different spheres. The Copenhagen school of international relations goes beyond the traditional state-centric focused definition which attempts to integrate economic, social and environmental threats along the political one⁵². This school of thought moves either up or down to the level of individual or human security, or up to the level of international or global security. Another school of thought has remained within a state-centric approach, but deployed diverse terms as modifiers to security in order to assess different forms of inter-state security co-operation. According to Karuse however, these different approaches seem to confuse ‘problems’ and ‘threats’. To the social scientist, the concept of security is an essentially contested one with multiple meanings and methodological, ontological and epistemological underpinnings. The concept of security is linked to the concept of identity. To Ernest Gellener, identity is a multi-faceted phenomenon derived essentially from a western conception of civilization. Identity is a ‘more or less fluid, more or less constraining resource through which actors identify themselves, with its fluidity or constraints depending on the facts of history and societal opinions’. New identities emerge as potential rivals to the state generated outside its control, thus changing the nature of security in a wholly new context of political behavior⁵³.

The EU security: Soft versus Hard Security

The European Union has steadily grown as an actor in international affairs, but its power and influence are predominantly of soft security argues Fraser⁵⁴. ‘Soft security’ is

⁵² Cameron Ross, *Perspectives on the Enlargement of the European Union*, (Brill 2002), 22

⁵³ Ross, *op. cit.*, 32

⁵⁴ Fraser Cameron, “What They Said: Fraser Cameron on CFSP, ESDP and the Balkans”, *Europe*, Issue 397, (June 2000)

basically looking at security in its widest context, that is, trying to promote democracy and the rule of law, protect minorities, and sustain economic development. The EU is by far the main provider of humanitarian assistance to the former republics of Yugoslavia and of economic aid to Russia, the countries of Central Europe, and the Palestinians. That has been the focus of EU external policy over the last several years. Fraser argues that the EU has to move on from soft security to take part in hard security. That is at least partly a reflection of the fact that the EU is much more credible as a commercial and economic power on a world stage than as a political player.

Security arrangements have undergone a period of rapid transition since 1989. The demise of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the movement towards a common foreign policy in the EU, and the triumph of western liberal democratic values have been much commented on both sides of the Atlantic⁵⁵. Pagedas⁵⁶ argues that between 1991 and 2000, Europe witnessed not only the end of the Soviet threat to Europe and its replacement by lower level, less intensive crises in the Balkans but also the sharp reduction of U.S. forces in Europe and Washington's reluctance to engage in European affairs militarily. But many of the certainties characterizing the Cold war were based on fragile underpinnings. There were tensions on both sides. On the Soviet side, Eastern European countries' economies demanded lots of attention from the Kremlin. On the Western side, there were tensions between Atlanticism and Europeanism and how the United States related to the Wet Europeans and vice and versa. All of those scars impact the current state of European security. Bipolarity has now given way to multipolarity and the fragmentation of the Eastern bloc has presented new

⁵⁵ Cameron Ross, *Perspectives on the Enlargement of the European Union*, (Brill 2002), 42

⁵⁶ Constantine Pagedas, "Post-Ismay Europe: Britain and the Rebalance of European Security", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, (12-4, 2001), 49

problems for the EU. The EU's foreign policy project is unsettled both in the sense that it lacks a definitive outcome.

The need to counterbalance an economic power with a political one is the main argument put forward by the proponents of a truly common foreign, security and eventually defense policy. There is a need for the EU to speak with a 'single voice'. It is in the Union's interest to create strategic space for itself in a world in which US strategies and tactics begin to seem very different from those that have been cultivated within the Union over time. An increasing disregard for European participation in strategic decisions that will affect Europe as well as the international system makes it harder to pursue European policies alongside the United States. American policy and its own shifting perceptions of its interests⁵⁷ could become a major strategic restraint on the success of the ESDP if the Europeans do not manage "to negotiate their way through the rapids" with skill and speed, and also with the courage of their convictions. The European Union Security Doctrine⁵⁸ drawn up by Javier Solana following the Iraqi crisis tries to address the need for a more muscular foreign policy to deal with weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and the conflicts of the post-cold war era⁵⁹. It is the first time in fifty-five years that the EU was able to draw up a common doctrine. The Big Three immediately endorsed the doctrine: Britain was anxious to deal with weapons of mass destruction, Germany strongly supported it because under an institutional umbrella, and France did so because the doctrine spelt how countries, including the US, could not act alone and expected to be effective. The ten candidate countries, the majority of which being Atlanticist

⁵⁷ Nye Joseph, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's only superpower can't go it alone*, (Oxford University Press 2002), in Ann Deighton Ann (2002) "The European Security and Defense Policy" *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol.40, Number 4, (November 2002)

⁵⁸ European Union Council "A Secure Europe in a better world, European Security Strategy", Brussels, 12 December 2003, CFSP web site <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (2003)

⁵⁹ Judy Dempsey (2003) "Big powers back more muscular foreign policy", *The Financial Times*, June 12, 2003

welcomed the doctrine because of the explicit support for the US and NATO. The doctrine specifies how the EU must put teeth on its traditional “soft power” tools of political, diplomatic and economic pressure. It also focuses on spending more on defense.

The ESDP-NATO relationship

There is a historical relationship between the development of NATO and the EU. The creation of Western institutions such as the European Community and NATO was inspired by a notion of security that was both economic and military. The European Coal and Steel Community was created to bind France and Germany in an economic partnership and reduce the possibilities of a military conflict. NATO was also established to protect Western Europe from the Soviet Union. The security provided by the EU was facing inward, while the security provided by NATO was facing outward⁶⁰. But both notions of security formation stress the importance of a ‘border of order’ provided by the two, which ran through the center of Europe, argue Fierke and Wiener. The ‘iron curtain’ represented a border of order for the EU and NATO, in so far as it played an important role in the process of identity formation for both organizations. Through political practice, NATO and EU member states have created a notion of belonging to a community with a particular order⁶¹. This order was built on liberal democratic principles that were, to a large extent, established and sustained by negative perception of the communist East. The collapse of the Soviet Union profoundly challenged the specific institutional identities. Enlargement is not simply a means to extend membership to member states from the other block; it also involves incorporating what was the ‘Other’. During the Cold War, the self-definitions and normative ideals of both NATO and the EU were

⁶⁰ K.M. Fierke and A. Wiener. “Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO enlargement”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 6, Number 5, 2, pp. 721-742(22), (December 1999), 726

⁶¹ Fierke and Wiener. Op. Cit., 727

defined in the opposition to the East. David Calleo envisions three pan-European Models⁶² projecting a different relationship between the EU and NATO in each case. In bi-polar Pan-Europe, the West claims its Cold war victories, and Western institutions enlarge; NATO and the EU include most of the CEECs, and financially helped a crippled Russia while keeping it under watch. In the second model, unified pan-Europe, the old East and West of Europe join to create a closely integrated Eurasian system. The EU and NATO extend Eastward, and eventually embrace rather than exclude Russia. In the third model, tripolar pan-Europe, the EU, Russia and the United States form three distinct but articulated poles. Each, while tied to the others, remains sufficiently distinct so as not to undermine its own cohesion. Neither the EU nor NATO becomes itself pan-European. Instead, each remains a critical Western element within a larger and looser pan-European superstructure. The EU for instance extends full membership only to Central and East European countries whose political economies are sufficiently convergent with the West to be absorbed successfully⁶³. The EU does not imagine including Russia but nevertheless develops close economic relations with it, and also with former Soviet States. The US remains present in Pan-Europe through NATO but less as the ultimate guarantor of Western Europe against a resumption of Russian aggression or an explosion of violence in the Near and Middle East. The US and Russia cultivate their common security interests in the Far East. NATO grows more European and less American-dominated, as the EU develops autonomous diplomatic and defense institutions, capable of acting effectively either inside or outside NATO. Russia does not actually join this more European NATO but cooperates closely with it through some overarching pan-European security

⁶² David Calleo, *Rethinking Europe's Future*, (Princeton University Press 2001), 342

⁶³ Calleo, op. cit., 342

structure⁶⁴.

Concretely, there are sharp differences over the ESDP-NATO relationship between France, Britain and Germany. True, the confluence of British and French foreign and defense policies have helped to create a European Security structure that promises to bridge the long-standing NATO-EU divide, but the proposals for a common defense before the Convention of Europe in November 2002 made by France, Germany and UK illustrate fundamental tensions over what kind of links ESDP should have with NATO. The proposals reveal the inherent ambiguities over the St Malo initiative launched by Britain and France in 1998. This was supposed to complement the EU's economic power with a defense and security arm. Instead, London saw it as an attempt to improve Europe's defense capabilities under the umbrella of NATO. Paris, on the other hand, saw it as an opportunity for the EU to develop its own security policy, with the US-led military alliance kept at a distance. True, it is often argued that the enlargement of both the EU and NATO will bring strategic advantage but functional loss.⁶⁵ There is a greater sense in having the two organizations with closely overlapping memberships, but that the practicalities of politics within these organizations will make them less manageable over time. However, a close membership overlap must overtime be the loss of one or other of these organizations, unless they become functionally different from each other. Finland and Sweden are among non-NATO members now considering NATO membership, so the issue can become increasingly problematic. The revival of the Franco-German axis during the Iraqi crisis obviously surprised, since that historically, defense is one of the rare topics where France

⁶⁴ Calleo, op. cit., 343

⁶⁵ Ann Deighton, "The European Security and Defense Policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.40, Number 4, (November 2002), 738

and Germany have different conceptions⁶⁶. The 1963 ‘Elysee Treaty’ proposed the idea of a European Defense Union, idea rejected by Germany, stating that the treaty should not affect Germany’s commitments to NATO. Similarly, when the French thought up the Eurocorps in 1992, they wanted it autonomous; but the Germans insisted on placing it in a NATO framework. When their security was at stake, the Germans always chose the US rather than France, though their overall policy was to be friends with both and a mediator between them. But the Iraqi crisis showed that Germany deliberately broke this historical pattern- and chose France over the US.

There are several possible models of European security based on ideology, culture or vision of the world. The relationship between the ESDP and NATO is the best illustration of which actors should be involved and how defense and security policies within the EU should be led. The absence of tradition of an independent European security structure combined with those ideological debates and the change in World Order affected the carving of European Union Security institutions. It seems there is a constant struggle of what European Security needs to achieve and how.

⁶⁶ Charles Grant and Ulrike Guerot. “A military plan to cut Europe in two”, *The Financial Times*, (April 17, 2003)

CHAPTER V

DEFINITION OF THE COMMON FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

The European Security Defense Policy

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was the first treaty to contain provisions on the EU's responsibility for all questions relating to its security, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had definitely been an impetus. At the time, the Twelve in August 1991 requested the Western European Union to assess options for deployment of a European interposition force of 30,000 troops without US or NATO support. But in September 1991, the Netherlands, Portugal and The United Kingdom vetoed WEU involvement arguing that military operations should exclusively remain of NATO competence⁶⁷. From the point of view of military capabilities, Europe's ability was never questioned: it always has been a political and ideological issue.

The Treaty defined these tasks as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. But the idea of having cooperation in terms of foreign policy had been brought up as early as in the 1970ies with the European Political Cooperation (EPC), a mechanism for foreign policy coordination among member states that dates from the early 70ies. EPC transformed into the CFSP, like a caterpillar in a butterfly, during the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference (ICG).

⁶⁷ Sven Biscop, "Able and Willing? Assessing the EU's capacity for military action", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 9: 509-527, pp.509-527, (2004), 512

The CFSP was established as the second pillar of the European Union in the 1993 Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht. The Treaty envisaged that the EU, having no military capabilities of its own, would request the Western European Union (WEU) to elaborate and implement planned military measures on its behalf. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated into the Treaty on the European Union, the WEU's "Petersberg tasks" establishing which types of military operations the EU can undertake. The most extended definition has been included in Article III-309 of the draft Constitution: "*joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.*"⁶⁸ This laid the treaty basis for the operative development of the ESDP.

The project of developing an independent European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was officially launched by the 1999 Cologne European Council. It had been agreed to embark on a Common Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) within the overall framework of the CFSP. The aim of ESDP was and still is to complete and thus strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention and crisis management⁶⁹. With the 1998 St Malo Initiative, France and Great-Britain developed "*the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces in order to respond to international crises.*" There was a stated desire for the EU to make decisions and approve military action where NATO as a whole was not engaged. The two governments

⁶⁸ Biscop, op. cit., p.512

⁶⁹ www.euractiv.com, "EU Security and Defence Policy", Policy Summary, <http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcaturi=tcm:29-117486-16&type=LinksDossier> (January 5, 2006)

also agreed to develop within the EU institutional framework the ability to deploy a European Rapid Reaction Force within sixty days (up to 50,000- 60,000 men). The German government, which occupied the presidency of the EU in the first half of 1999, welcomed the French-British declaration and quickly placed the strengthening of a common security and defense policy at the top of its EU agenda.⁷⁰ At the Cologne Summit on 3 June 1999, European leaders agreed on a common defense strategy. Their stated desire to incorporate the dormant WEU into the EU by the end of the year 2000 was effectively achieved by the Marseilles Declaration of November 2000. The Finnish presidency included the St Malo initiative in The Headline Goal (HG) agreed at the Helsinki European Council (December 1999). The Headline Goal aimed to make available to the EU necessary capabilities, including the necessary command and control, intelligence, logistics and air and naval assets, to enable the deployment of 60,000 troops within 60 days and for a sustainable year. Given the need to rotate forces the HG would require a pool of some 180,000 allowing for forces on stand-by and standing down equal to the force deployed. As defined in the Capabilities Development Mechanism (CDM), follow-up of the Headline Goal is ensured by a working group of experts, the Headline Goal Task Force (HTF), with the support of the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

The Treaty of Nice (2000) made the St Malo Initiative reality by creating the Rapid Reaction Force. Some Treaty amendments truly reflected the operative development of the ESDP as an independent EU project. We could argue that France and Britain were true engines of Defense integration despite their different visions on the role of NATO. However, in the midst of the Iraqi crisis, the traditional Franco-British axis was at strain.

⁷⁰ Constantine Pagedas (2001) "Post-Ismay Europe: Britain and the Rebalance of European Security", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, (12-4, 2001), 8

Instead of stopping European defense integration, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg took the lead launch plans for such a EU planning capability also known as the Tervuren initiative⁷¹. But because of its timing, and the strains in EU-US relations over the war in Iraq, the so-called Tervuren initiative was seen in London as a deliberate snub to Blair. German officials at the time said Mr. Blair dropped his earlier reluctance to the initiative in exchange for assurances that the club would remain open to other EU members at all times. At the summit held in Berlin in September 2003, despite the Iraqi crisis, the three major powers confirmed their attachment to common initiatives. An internal document approved by Britain, France and Germany said: “*The European Union should be endowed with a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources and capabilities. Our goal remains to achieve such a planning and implementation capacity either in consensus with the 25 (member states) but also in a circle of interested partners.*” About a year later, EU defense ministers agreed in November 2004 to establish 13 so-called battle groups that would be deployable rapidly for crisis management around the world outside the NATO framework at the request of the United Nations. The groups, each 1,500-strong (one battalion plus supporting units) can be deployed within ten days of the decision to launch an operation and are sustainable for 120 days until the termination of the operation or until relief by another, longer-term force, deployed by the EU, the UN or regional organization such as the African Union. By 2007, between seven and nine battle groups, either national or

⁷¹ Benoit Bertrand and others. “Blair backs EU plans for joint defense project”, *The Financial Times*, (September 22, 2003)

multinational, would be made available adding 10,500 to 13,500 rapidly deployable combat troops for high-intensity operations of the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC).⁷²

The evolution of ESDP does not betray its original purpose, which is to provide military and civilian assets for international conflict prevention and crisis management. Since the EU seeks to promote non-violent settlement of conflicts, alongside the military capabilities, the EU aims to emphasize the development of civilian capabilities which focus on the four priority areas (police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection capacities) adopted at the June 2000 Feira European Council. US decision-makers always felt reluctant to see the ESDP expand though ESDP seeks to strengthen and consolidate the EU's alliance with the US and Canada within the framework of NATO, and also by complying with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. ESDP's purpose is not to replace but to complement NATO. National armed forces remain under the control of the national commanders and will only be led by a military supreme commander for the duration of any EU mission.

Institutional set-up

The EU's efforts to assume a political role have been handicapped by awkward institutional arrangements, designed to separate the CFSP from the usual EU decision-making process with its greater limits on national sovereignty. The CFSP is not like the Common Commercial Policy. The member states have not pooled responsibility for foreign and security policy, let alone defense policy in the EU. Foreign and Security policy is neither an exclusive EU competence nor an area of mixed EU-member state competence. Instead, CFSP remains the responsibility of member states, which have set up an elaborate system at the EU level in an intergovernmental pillar of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) to coordinate their

⁷² Biscop, *op. cit.*, 517

policies more closely and to attempt to devise common strategies, reach common positions, and take joint actions on a wide range of issues.⁷³ For example, the Commission is fully associated with the CFSP but does not have the exclusive right to submit initiatives. However, it has sole responsibility for Community actions in the areas of humanitarian, development assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction and sanctions regulations. The European Parliament is consulted by the Presidency on the fundamental choices of the CFSP and is briefed on how it is developing. The key role goes to the European Council. The European Council- Heads of State and Government and the Commission President- sets priorities and gives broad guidelines for EU policies, including CFSP. The European Council lays down the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP, and adopts common strategies. The Council is presided over for a period of six months by each member state in turn, in accordance with a pre-established rotation. The Presidency is assisted by the Council Secretariat and, since Amsterdam, the Secretary-General/High Representative. The High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, has three job titles. First, he is the Secretary General of the European Council, which is the principal decision making body in the European Union. Secondly, he is the Secretary General of the Western European Union, which is the quasi defense arm of the European Union. And thirdly, he is the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. He essentially has to deal with the political and military aspects of ESDP. In other words, he has to integrate as much of the Western European Union into the EU as is possible, set up the structures, and make sure the member states are meeting their targets on capabilities.

Improving the institutional efficiency of CFSP/ESDP

Who needs to be called?

⁷³ Dinan Desmond, *Ever closer Union: an introduction to European Integration*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, 510

Externally, the EU often sends three representatives to international meetings, one from the presidency, one from the Commission and Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief. Internally, there is no clear political leadership - no single individual able to drive change and act as a figurehead for the EU's citizens. Secretary Kissinger always wondered whom to call when a European foreign policy needed to be discussed. Internally and externally, there is no clear political leadership - no single individual able to drive change and act as a figurehead for the EU's citizens. Many would recommend for example to merge the post of Commissioner in charge of external relations with that of high representative; to give him more authority over some of the resources the Commission controls. The difference between him and the External Affairs Commissioner is that the Commissioner concentrates very much on financial and economic assistance, particularly for the Balkans, which is his number one priority at the moment. Patten, former External Commissioner called himself the "quartermaster of the European Union" and Solana is a kind of general.⁷⁴ The former President of the Commission Romano Prodi proposed taking some of the initiative in foreign policy away from member states, by placing the EU high representative in foreign affairs within the Commission. The high representative not the states would formulate policy, although EU leaders would decide to adopt it or amend it. Britain and France do not want nonetheless a foreign minister drawn too closely to the Commission, and away from the control of member states.⁷⁵

Another proposal is to elect a full-time chairman of the European Council (of heads of government) to end the farce of the six-month rotating presidency. This system may have worked for the original six member states but it does not now with 15 and cannot with 25. If

⁷⁴ Fraser Cameron (2000) "What They Said: Fraser Cameron on CFSP, ESDP and the Balkans", *Europe*, Issue 397, (June 2000)

⁷⁵ George Parker, "EU team moots building foreign policy under one minister", *The Financial Times*, (April 15, 2003)

we expect a US president to take the EU seriously, we cannot provide him with a different interlocutor every six months.⁷⁶ Such a person would be the spokesman for Europe and the proper intermediary for any US President. His job would be to ensure that Europe would have a common policy, consistently pursued and clearly presented: he would be the personification of a common foreign policy.⁷⁷ But the appointment of a Council president could also be contentious. “The sort of wrangle behind closed doors seen with other EU appointments would do little for the legitimacy of the new post”. Nor is it obvious that EU citizens, already disenchanted with Brussels, would easily relate to a former political figurehead (Tony Blair is often mentioned as a potential candidate) of one member state as their leader. Finally, the presidency debate raises important questions about how to improve the efficiency of the Council before enlargement to 25 or more members. There is much more on the agenda than a new public face for the EU.

A third scenario would consist of merging the Presidency of the Council and the Commission. This would serve to locate where the power lies in the Union, thereby setting the question of who speaks for Europe. It would also end the six-month rotating presidency. It would bring consistency and coherence to the work of the Council and would ease the fears of the smaller member states –that bigger states would have a stronger say. An integrated presidency would also create more synergy between the Commission and Council. Political decision-making would be more closely co-ordinated. The better management of the executive functions of the Union by a single, double-hatted presidency would enhance policy cohesion.⁷⁸

Tensions between the Commission and the Council

⁷⁶ Peter Hain, “Diplomacy by resolution is Europe's weakness”, *The Financial Times*, (April 15, 2003)

⁷⁷ Quentin Peel, “The President who speaks for Europe”, *The Financial Times*, (February 4, 2003)

⁷⁸ Andrew Duff, “Why Europe needs a President with two hats”, *The Financial Times*, (October 21, 2002)

There is a dangerous tension at the heart of CFSDP/ESDP. It reflects the contradictions between the ambitions of EU member governments to play a larger international role and their reluctance to move beyond an intergovernmental framework in doing so.⁷⁹ It results in a there constant power struggle between the Commission and the Council, since Member States are the primary decision-makers despite few responsibilities assigned to the Commission. Naturally, the Commission would like to see its prerogatives expand. From a theoretical point of view, effective integration in any of these fields would mark the crucial transition from political community towards federation. Under the impact of German unification, EU member states recognized the link between European Monetary Union, CFSP and Political Union. Twenty years later, the link between those in terms of integration has not been obvious. Euroskeptiks and intergovernmentalists argue that foreign policy must remain a matter for national governments. They refuse to see some responsibility over foreign policy given to the European Commission and European Parliament. Such school of thought champions reinforcing the Council to give the EU more legitimacy, because elected national politicians would take decisions.⁸⁰ The big member states traditionally resist the Commission's latest ambitious demands for wider powers at the expense of the Council. But smaller countries usually despise any proposal that appears to challenge the power of the Commission and see it as an attempt to undermine the body that protects their interests. However, the perception that the Commission is a secondary decision maker in foreign policy is not entirely true. The Commission is for instance highly involved in the conduct of EU's trade related external relations. The heart of the problem with the multi-faceted profile of EU's foreign policy is that the Commission has

⁷⁹ Christopher Hill , *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, London, (Routledge 1996) in Deighton, op. cit., 730

⁸⁰ George Parker, Daniel Dombey. "Dual ambitions", *The Financial Times*, (May 24, 2002)

never been invested with a similar central role in the CFSP⁸¹. Instead, as already explained, CFSP remains the responsibility of member states.⁸² Whereas the Commission enjoys the monopoly of the right of initiative in the first pillar, it must leave it in the second pillar to the European Council. The Commission has fought for a long time against its weak role in the CFSP, but has lost all major engagements. Thus it has succeeded neither in getting a Commissioner named as a High Representative, nor in having the Policy Unit placed under it. (The High Representative is placed under the authority of the Council of Ministers.)

Nevertheless, the balance of power between the Commission and the Council has been slightly shaking since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The Commission since Maastricht is ‘fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field’ (article 27 TEU) and since Amsterdam, active as part of the reformed troika in representing the EU externally. The Commission through informal and institutional measures increased its autonomy vis-à-vis the Council. For instance, the Commissioners entrusted with foreign affairs have always tried to coordinate and focus their efforts. The Council meetings are attended at least by six RELEX Commissioners (from the French *relations exterieures*). The Commission also takes part in meetings at the working levels of the Council (COREPER and working parties). On the international stage, the establishment of Independent General Directions for instance allows the Commission to benefit from network of 150 embassies worldwide. The creation of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism in February 2001 is another measure that allows the European Commission to dispatch community funds rapidly in case of an emergency. The

⁸¹ Gisela Muller-Branddeck-Bocquet “The new CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System of the European Union”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 7: 257-282, (2002)

⁸² Desmond Dinan, *Ever closer Union: an introduction to European Integration*, Lynne Rienner Publishers 1999, 510

creation of the RRM was a response to the new EWU development in crisis management, such as the Situation Center, within the Council.

But there is a constant feeling that the Commission might be left out and ignored by the Council. The External Relations Directorate General – that coordinates all aspects of the Union’s policy towards a country to make sure it does not encroach upon Commission responsibilities⁸³ - under Commissioner Patten was not a DG trying to push for more Commission visibility in the field of CFSP but rather was a DG trying to protect the competencies acquired in the past and to deliver efficient and effective policies. The Commission is extremely sensitive concerning any potential loss of competency in external relations. The Constitution draft, while rejected by France and the Netherlands, is another topic of concern. The wording is too vague to determine whether it is going to strengthen or weaken the influence of the Commission in the realm of foreign policy. Indeed, article III-197.3 of the Constitution proposes a new EU “external action service.” This would be comprised of Commission officials working alongside diplomats from member states. The Commission currently employs approximately 4,700 staff in delegations around the world. The goal would be to coordinate the EU’s different external activities – trade policy, aid policy, diplomatic relations and security policy - in one place. However, in some cases, the Commission has been proactive and crises had been solved under its leadership. For instance, the signature of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the Commission and the FYROM was a strong incentive that HR Solana used to pressure the two parties to reach a deal⁸⁴. Indeed the

⁸³ Claire Piana, “The EU’s Decision-Making Process in the Common Foreign and Security Policy: the Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 7: 209-226, (2002), 220

⁸⁴ Piana, op. cit., 223

SAA gives the FYROM the status of a potential candidate, thus opening up the possibility of future accession to the EU.

Decision-making and voting

The general principles of the CFSP are defined by EU leaders meeting in the European Council. Decisions are taken in the Council of Foreign Ministers, who must act unanimously except in the implementation of some joint actions. Until 1997, each Member State had a veto right over the formulation of a common position. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty seeks to resolve that problem with the introduction of the concept of "constructive abstention." Henceforth, a member state that does not like a proposal can abstain and not be obliged to apply the resulting decision. But the abstaining government must accept that the decision commits the Union and must refrain from doing anything that would conflict with the EU action.⁸⁵ Dinan argues that these reforms are more complicated than the original ones without necessarily being an improvement on them. Not only the emergency brake is a throwback to the Luxembourg Compromise but the codification of abstentionism and the introduction of various restrictions and qualifications seem likely to reduce rather than enhance the CFSP's effectiveness. Some scholars have speculated that some of the member states are now so desperately attached to majority voting as an ideology that they are prepared to pay any price for any sort of progress, even if this means sacrificing long-defended principles.⁸⁶ From a common perception, one would expect the major powers having the most difficulty with the majority vote concept. But, France, Britain, Spain and Germany are not alone in having

⁸⁵ Dale Reginald, "The search for a Common Foreign Policy", *Europe*, Issue 388 (July/August 1999)

⁸⁶ Jörg Monar, 'The European Union's Foreign Affairs System after the Treaty of Amsterdam: a strengthened capacity for external action?', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 2, no4 (winter 1997), 421

distinct, non-negotiable aspects of foreign policy⁸⁷. Ireland, Sweden, Austria and Malta are unlikely to accept a majority vote committing them to action that breaches their neutrality, recalls Minister Shane. Regarding the use of enhanced cooperation, Ireland, Sweden and Finland, three of the EU's four neutral countries also argue that it would end up being too exclusive- a view shared by Poland. They point out the draft constitution stipulates that only members of the Council of Ministers representing the states that participate in this core group could adopt acts.⁸⁸ Finland said it would "not oppose enhanced co-operation if it was taken to vote but did not like the idea. Sweden and Ireland were reluctant to support it.

The institutional set-up of CFSP/ESDP has been now reviewed. *"Unless a beautiful butterfly, the CFSP/ESDP is cumbersome and colorless and has great difficulty getting of the ground"* argues Dinan⁸⁹. Given the divergence of member states' foreign and security policy interests and orientations and the weakness of CFSP instruments and mechanisms, the CFSP cannot be as formidable as its name implies. It is a concern that the CFSP at fifteen is not very efficient: absorbing ten new members might worsen it. In our following chapter, we are going to specifically look at the practical implications of having our ten members involved in ESDP/CFSP operations and how their involvement might benefit or hamper the efficiency of European Union security structures.

⁸⁷ Dennis McShan, "A single European Foreign Policy is unfeasible", *The Financial Times*, (April 16, 2003).

⁸⁸ Judy Dempsey, "States look to Blair to take stand on EU defense", *The Financial Times*, (September 18, 2003)

⁸⁹ Dinan, *op. cit.*, 10

CHAPTER VI

TESTING AND FINDINGS

Findings

The state of European security and the quality of its institutions have been now presented as well as the problematic relationship between NATO and ESDP. The stakes of enlargement are crucial for the future of the EU and the big bang accession considerably modifies the balance of European power: it impacts current Member States, European institutions and new entrants themselves. Now, the practical effects of accession on the current EU security structure need to be discussed. Despite a negligible involvement on the ground and an expected minimal security interest, the accession of New Member States has an impact on the security of European Union, states the theory. As already presented in Chapter I, the hypotheses are the following:

H0: The involvement of New Member States in CFSP/ESDP is negligible and does not affect the outcome of ESDP operations.

H1: The involvement of new member states in ESDP operations is significant because it their national security.

H2: The involvement of new member states in ESDP operations is significant because it translates the willingness to be part of European Security.

The questionnaire had been sent to three institutions per country: the embassy to the

United States in Washington D.C., the European Union section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the permanent representation to the European Union in Brussels. Names of potential respondents had been identified on the three websites. Usually, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has a link for the Permanent Representation in Brussels as well as embassies since they depend from the Ministry. The goal was to obtain the most official response possible. All of the mentioned institutions represent the official voice of their country. When the questionnaire got sent, officials from one institution did not get informed that official from the other two institutions were also contacted. It was however expected that institutions might communicate with each other. For anonymity reasons, too much detail on who responded cannot be displayed. However, it is interesting to note that one country sent its responses copying officials from the other institutions. All the countries responded, sending two questionnaires except Slovenia for reasons mentioned in the questionnaire itself (one questionnaire) and Czech Republic sending three questionnaires (case where two separate institutions sent their response). The condensed results of the questionnaire are presented as follows: each country is abbreviated by its first three letters, and the name of the operation is associated with an underscore.

HUN stands for Hungary the name of the operation and added the name of the operation next to it. HUN-ALTHEA means participation of Hungary to EUFOR-ALTHEA, HUN-EUPM means participation of Hungary to operation EUPM.

LAT stands for Latvia and the operations are EUPM and EUJUST-THEMIS (EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Georgia) (code LAT-EUPM and LAT-EUJUST THEMIS).

SLO stands for Slovenia, and the operation is EUFOR (code SLO-EUFOR).

EST stands for Estonia and the chosen operations are EUPM and ALTHEA (code EST-EUPM, EST-ALTHEA).

CZE stands for Czech Republic and the Czech authorities returned three questionnaires for the following operations: EUPM, EUFOR-ALTHEA and EUJUST LEX (EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq) (codes CZE-EUPM, CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUJUST LEX). For some questions, the respondents added a comment. Each comment following the name of an operation is italicized since it is a direct quote from a respondent.

1. How many troops does your country have involved with this operation? How long have you been there?

0-100

EST-EUPM, EST-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUJUST LEX, LAT-EUPM: *‘Currently there are 3 (from 28 April 2006 – 2 persons) Latvian State police representatives but until the end of 2005 there were 4 policemen – as the mandate of the EUPM mission has ended in December 2005 and our experts have been in field for 2 years Latvia decided to rotate its personnel for the EUPM follow-on mission. The mandate for current mission (and also for the Latvian experts) is 2 years). LAT-EUJUST: ‘had 1 rule of law expert there – a judge for full mission, which is 1 year. His work was appreciated very much both by the EU and by the Georgian authorities, especially because he speaks Russian and could communicate with local authorities’ representatives without an interpreter.’*

SLO- ALTHEA: *‘94 troops in EUFOR as of today. We participate in EUFOR ALTHEA since the beginning of the operation in late 2004. We participate also before within IFOR and later SFOR, which transform to EUFOR Althea’.*

100-500: HUN- EUPM, HUN- ALTHEA

500-1000

1000 and over

2. What are the main assignments of your troops other there?

Peacekeeping: HUN-ALTHEA, SLO-ALTHEA, EST-EUFOR, CZE-ALTHEA, EST-ALTHEA

Compliance with International Treaties:

Police: HUN-EUPM, EST-EUPM, CZE- EUPM, HUN-EUPM, SLO-ALTHEA, HUN-EUPM, LAT-EUPM: *‘In line with the general objectives of the Paris/Dayton Agreement, EUPM seeks to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice. It does so in particular through monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities.’*

Assistance Local Authorities: LAT- EUJUST THEMIS, SLO-ALTHEA

3. Was your country involved in this operation before or after accession?

Before accession: EST-EUPM, HUN-EUPM, LAT-EUPM, SLO-EUFOR

After accession: HUN-ALTHEA, EST-ALTHEA, LAT- EUJUST, CZE-Althea CZE-EUPM

4. At what stage of the operation did your country get involved?

Planning: HUN-ALTHEA, EST-ALTHEA, SLO-EUFOR

When the fields operations began: HUN-EUPM, EST-EUPM, HUN-EUPM, LAT-EUJUST, SLO-ALTHEA, CZE-Althea, CZE-EUPM

After the fields operation began: LAT-EUPM

5. Would you consider that your country is an essential actor in the decision-making of the conduct of the operation?

Not important

Somewhat important: EST-EUPM: *'as we are member state of the EU'*, EST-ALTHEA H2- EUPM C1Althea CZE-EUPM, CZE-EUJUST LEX

Very important: LAT-EUPM: *'Taking into account that decision regarding ESDP missions has to be unanimous'*, LAT- EUJUST THEMISLO_EUFOR HUN-EUFOR HUN-EUPM: *'Every country (actually 25) is important in the decision-making, since it is taken unanimously'*.

6. What kind of military presence do you have there? Please specify how large for each category

Army: HUN-EUPM: *'144 (military and police components'*, EST-ALTHEA: *'32 troops'*, CZE-ALTHEA, SLO-ALTHEA

Navy

Air Force: CZE -ALTHEA

Other: CZE EUJUST LEX: *'It is not a ESDP military operation'*. LAT-EUPM: *'This is a civilian mission thus we don't have any military presence there in a context of this particular mission. However Latvia has 3 National armed forces representatives (until the end of this year) in BiH within EU military operation EUFOR ALTHEA'*. Same for LAT- EUJUST

7. What is your financial contribution to the total cost of the operation?

0-20%: HUN-ALTHEA, EST-EUPM, EST-ALTHEA, HUN- EUPM, LAT- EUPM: *'LV State police expenses in 2004 for 4 policeman deployment in mission were*

approximately 272 428.00 euro, I suppose it goes under this position', SLO-ALTHEA, CZE-ALTHEA, CZE –EUPM, CZE-EUJUST LEX

20-50%

50% and more

Other: LAT-EUJUST THEMIS: *not familiar with expenses for this mission as the mission salary and per diems were paid from the CFSP budget and Latvia had to pay for expert's travel expenses, insurance.*

8. Was the participation to this operation relevant to the security of your country?

No: LAT- EUJUST-THEMIS

Somewhat: EST- EUPM, EST- ALTHEA, HUN-EUPM, LAT- EUPM: *'not very much however the information about our policemen participation in EU mission had resonance in mass media thus the reputation (sense of security from police?) of our State police could increase)', CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, CZE-EUJUST LEX*

Yes: HUN-ALTHEA, SLO-ALTHEA: *'The stability of the neighboring Balkan's region is of most importance for the security of our Country and broader – of EU and Europe.'*

9. Was your participation relevant to the security of the European Union?

No

Somewhat: CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, CZE-EUJUST LEX

Yes: HUN-EUPM, HUN-ALTHEA, EST- EUPM, EST- ALTHEA, HUN- EUPM, LAT- EUPM: *'As the EU Police Mission in BiH represents further tangible evidence of the development of the ESDP and of the EU's contribution to the international community's efforts to promote stability and security and as it was the first ESDP*

operation launched by the EU (in 2003) our contribution is relevant to the common security)’, SLO-ALTHEA

10. Did the EU authorities influence your decision?

No: HUN-EUPM, EST-EUPM, EST-ALTHEA, LAT-EUJUST, SLO-ALTHEA, CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUJUST LEX

Somewhat: CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, LAT-EUPM: *‘The only case when EU authorities somehow influenced our decision regarding participation in this mission was the acknowledgement letter from the Head of Mission regarding our policemen work there and an invitation to second personnel for next 2 years. All following decisions were made independently at national level.’*

Yes

11. Besides CFSP officials, have officials from other EU institutions influenced your decision to participate?

No: HUN-ALTHEA, EST- ALTHEA, HUN-EUPM, LAT- EUPM, SLO-ALTHEA, CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, CZE-EUJUST LEX.

Somewhat

No: EST- EUPM

12. If yes, which institutions influence your decision to participate?

The European Commission

The European Parliament

Other

13. Has your country consulted other Member States about the decision to participate in this operation?

No: HUN-ALTHEA, EST- EUPM, EST-ALTHEA CZE-EUPM CZE-EUJUST LEX

Somewhat: SLO-ALTHEA: *‘To assure the right approach and deployment of troops which are needed in some operation, there is always important to consult with other operation participants / countries in a sense of military, political, intelligence situation and cooperation. About influencing on decision whether to join operation or not, the decision is taken autonomously within the government.* HUN- EUPM CZE-Althea CZE-EUPM

Yes

Comment: LAT- EUPM / LAT-EUJUST THEMIS: *‘(p.s. I can’t comment as I didn’t work with these issues at that time. But in general it is each country’s independent decision whether to take part in mission or not’.*

14. If yes, how many member states have you consulted?

0-5: HUN- EUPM CZE-ALTHEA

5-10

10-15

Comment: SLO-ALTHEA: *‘Depends what you define under "consulted". In regard to mil-to-mil consultations we did consult all (or majority) of the countries which participate in EUFOR’.*

15. Has your country consulted other New Member States about its decision to participate?

No: HUN-ALTHEA, EST-EUPM, EST-ALTHEA, CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, CZE-EUJUST LEX

Somewhat: HUN- EUPM, SLO-ALTHEA: *‘same explanation as 13.’*

Yes

16. If yes, how many other New Member States have you consulted?

0-3: HUN- EUPM

3-6

6-10

Comment: SLO-ALTHEA: ‘Same explanation as 14’. Estonia:

‘I would like to turn your attention to couple of aspects relating to this subject. First, about the consultations with other member states of the EU on taking part in different operations (questions 13-16) - I marked that we did not consult with other partners, however, on unofficial level and also at bilateral meetings we have consulted with other states, including the host-countries. There have been no special consultations; the subject of operations has been just one among other subjects on the agenda. Therefore, it is very difficult to determine, how many member states we consulted with.’

17. How will your involvement affect your national security in the near future?

It will not affect it: LAT- EUPM: *‘Will not affect our national security directly but see Q8’*, LAT- EUJUST THEMIS, CZE-ALTHEA

It will affect it somehow: EST-EUPM, EST-ALTHEA, HUN-EUPM, SLO-ALTHEA: *‘The stability of our neighborhood will increase our national security in the near future as well on the long term. CZE-EUPM CZE-EUJUST LEX CZE-ALTHEA (conflicting opinion).’*

It will affect it a lot: HUN-ALTHEA

18. Do you think that the CFSP/ESDP was the most appropriate framework to handle this operation?

No

Somewhat: HUN-EUPM: *‘but did not address all the concerns of the mission’*

Yes HUN-ALTHEA: *‘Yes – As a transition from NATO to EU, EUFOR represents good example of Berlin + model of cooperation and interoperability of the forces with the stress on peace- and institution building mechanisms’.* EST- EUPM, EST- ALTHEA

LAT- EUPM : *Taking into account that there are/were many different actors in BiH already)* LAT- EUJUST THEMIS, CZE-EUJUST LEX, CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM

19.If not, what do you think would have been a better framework?

NATO

The UN

A combination of the EU and NATO

A combination of the UN, NATO and the EU

A combination of the UN and NATO

Other: SLO-ALTHEA: *‘EUFOR-ALTHEA is the "successor" of the SFOR, which means NATO, which is, besides UN, present in Sarajevo today as well. The right framework is a combination of the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE, with the right cooperation level and complementarities on the field.’*

20. Generally, do you think the ESDP/CFSP is the right structure to address the needs of EU security?

No

Somewhat: LAT- EUPM: *'From civilian crisis management perspective yes – it is my personal view!'*, L2 EUJUST SLO-ALTHEA: *'Somewhat in the complementarities with NATO'*, CZE-ALTHEA.

Yes: HUN-EUPM, EST-EUPM: *however other options NATO, OSCE and UN have to be considered* EST- ALTHEA, HUN-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, CZE-ALTHEA (conflicting)

21. What other operations are you involved with?

EUFOR-ALTHEA: HUN, EST, SLO, CZE, LAT

EUPM: HUN, EST, CZE

EUPM Proxima (FYROM): HUN, EST, CZE, LAT: *"1 policeman but till the end of 2005, we had two"*.

EUJUST LEX Mission for Iraq: HUN, SLO: *'presence with NMT-I'*, CZE, LAT: *'We had 1 human rights lector in EUJUST LEX mission who participated in 2 Senior Management Courses organized by Denmark'*.

EUPOL Kinshasa

EUSEC DR Congo: HUN, SLO: *'probably soon'*.

EU Support to AMIS II (Darfur): HUN: *'financially'*, SLO: *'probably soon'*.

Comment from Latvia: *'also in Georgia (Although the mission has ended we had 1 rule of law expert (a judge) there who also was invited to continue work for 6 months (September 2005 – March 2006) as rule of law expert in EU Special Representative office in South Caucasus.) Latvia also has 6 experts (5 border guardians and 1 customs inspector) in EU border assistance mission on Moldova-Ukraine border, however it is not ESDP mission (European Commission's mission)'*.

Comment from Estonia: *‘There are more ESDP operations going on: Assistance Mission in Rafah (Palestine), Border Assistance Mission in Moldova/Ukraine, Police Assistance Mission EUPOL COPPS (Palestine), Aceh Monitoring Mission (Indonesia). Estonia is taking part in all of them except Aceh Monitoring Mission’.*

22. Among the operations you are involved with, would you consider that one or some is/are more important than others?

No: HUN- EUPM, CZE-ALTHEA (Conflicting)

Somewhat: HUN-ALTHEA, EST- EUPM, EST- ALTHEA, LAT- EUPM: *‘more important for Latvia to participate and to ensure stability in neighboring countries and region’.*

More important: CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM, SLO-EUFOR: *‘depends on the size and stage of the conflict, but each has its specific’.*

23. If another operation is more important, please rank the following reasons

National Security Interest HUN-EUPM, EST- EUPM, EST-ALTHEA, CZE-ALTHEA
CZE-EUPM

Military Presence: CZE-ALTHEA, CZE-EUPM

Financial Contribution: CZE-Althea CZE-EUPM

Other: LAT- EUPM: *‘making decision regarding participation in any mission is taking into account regional criteria and our contribution’s efficiency criteri’.*

SLO-ALTHEA: *‘Do not know how to rank e.g. Military Presence – is this meant as our perception of importance by sending MP in the conflict territory? Reasons of importance cannot be defined that easily, as I said, there are specific situations of the conflicts. Decisions, whether to join or participate in some operation on not, are reached in*

capitals after consideration of many criteria like: national interest, alliance opportunities, current presence of international forces there, countries availability of resources/capabilities etc.'

Additional comments from Slovenia: *'Slovenia considers its contribution to be most effective in the region of the Balkans because of its sensitive stage of stabilization. We pay a lot of importance on regional cooperation for strengthening transition and transformation in Europe. We are active in several peacekeeping operations round the world (EUFOR, ISAF, KFOR, UNTSO, NMT-I) but EUFOR is the only EU lead operation in which we participate. Therefore I fill up only one Questionnaire'.*

The following section summarizes and points out the main findings of the questionnaire. Question 1: The question on number of troops involved shows some disparities but all of our respondents have something on common. The countries did not commit more than 150 troops. The choice of civilian missions does not facilitate the comparison since civilian missions usually involved fewer troops than military ones. The scope of operations differs drastically. EUJUST THEMIS is rather small compared to EUFOR ALTHEA for example.

Question 2: The interesting aspect of this answer is the non choice of 'compliance with international treaties', usually a reason to declare war. However, the goals of the mission have been established by treaties or agreements: the objectives of EUPM were established by the Paris/Dayton Agreement. It also shows that helping local authorities through law and order is the primary objective of ESDP operations and stresses the civilian flavor of most ESDP operations even when they involve military troops.

Question 3 and 4: For one operation out of two, the countries got involved before accession. It means that there was an interest for them to be involved and there was an interest for the Union to ask them to participate. A possible reason could be the geographic proximity but it is not true in the case of Latvia and Estonia: both of them got involved with EUPM before accession. We assume that their participation was necessary for logistical support. Now the participation related to the stage of the operation shows that our countries did not take part in the planning phase except for operation ALTHEA.

Question 5: All of the responding population considers itself important actor in the decision-making due to ESDP decision-making mechanisms. Every country is important in the process since decisions regarding ESDP missions have to be taken unanimously, comment stressed that two respondents. To the population, it is important to stress that they are not secondary decision makers. It is a rule as soon as you join the club. As non-members, the countries have not been necessary involved in the planning but as members, their decision counts.

Question 6: Mostly, the presence is army and police. As we mentioned early, EUJUST LEX and EUJUST THEMIS are civilian operations. The only country with Air Force involved in these operations is the Czech Republic in BiH.

Question 7: the budget confirms a minimal involvement since all of them checked the first bracket 0-20%.

Questions 8 and 9 are the most interesting findings of the questionnaire. Question 8 asks whether the participation to the operation was relevant to the security of the country or not. It would have been expected 'mostly no' because the only neighboring situation is Slovenia with EUFOR. But the majority is somewhat-yes (six somewhat, two yes). The

Czech Republic sees its involvement in Iraq as important for its security for instance. The comment of Slovenia on the fact that the Balkans stability is not only important for Slovenia but also for the whole continent shows that new members go beyond their own security and value a sense of European Union security. Question 9 reinforces the message from Slovenia. New members see their involvement in ESDP operations as essential to the security of the European Union, which validates the hypothesis stating that their impact is significant. It reflects the 'esprit de corps' mentality and an understanding of the significance of ESDP missions.

Questions 10, 11 and 12: For a majority, the EU did not influence the decision of the responding countries to participate, though the decision to launch an ESDP operation is taken unanimously. The only somewhat is from Latvia where the Head of the mission recognized the performance of their police personnel and invited them to commit for a longer period. It is hard to believe that no representative from the CFSP Secretary had any influence.

Question 11 supports this finding. According to the respondents, not a single official from any other institutions has influenced their decision to participate. Meaning no one from the Commission, which as a reminder was closely involved with their accession, or the Parliament influenced their decision. Question 12 has then no point since none of the institutions influenced the respondents.

Question 13-17: This series of questions supports and at the same time contradicts the precedent questions dealing with the involvement of institutions. For five operations, there had not been any consultation with other member states. For three operations, there has been somewhat consultation, and for two there has been consultation. It would have

been expected that for planning reasons (as explained by Slovenia) or risks and opportunities of such involvement, each of our participants would consult with other member states. But the other argument presented by Latvia is ‘that it is each country’s independent decision whether to take part in mission or not). A third option exposed by Estonia stating that there are consultations and bilateral meetings with other states, including host countries. But what is striking here is the fact that Czech Republic is the only respondent that claims military consultations with all the other member states. Another interesting finding from Question 13 is the rather minimal level of consultation with ‘similar’ states. New Member States did not really consult each other about getting involved, except Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary for EUPM. Hungary specifies that this consultation has been done with less than five members only.

Question 17: For eight operations, the involvement will affect the security of the country, for one operation, it will affect it a lot, and for only two operations, the involvement will not affect the respondents’ security a lot. As expressed before, new member states see their involvement in ESDP operations as important for their security.

Questions 18, 19 and 20: The respondents praise the quality of CFSP as a framework for the operations at hand but still value the cooperation on the ground with other organizations. The CFSP according to our respondents is not entirely autonomous: it did not necessarily ‘address all the concerns of the mission’, represents a good transition following NATO, and remains above all good at ‘peace and institution building’, implying that ESDP is still not perceived as a true military power. Slovenia offers a good summary. *‘The right framework is a combination of the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE, with the right cooperation level and complementarities on the field’*. To sum up: the more

multilateral, the better. It still shows based on the responses from 18 that there is no full trust in CFSP to handle security concerns, that CFSP remains is above all a civilian power and the respondents like the fact that there is usually support from other organizations on the ground, such as NATO or OSCE.

Question 21: the respondents are involved in numerous operations. One of the criteria for selection was a minimum of two operations for each respondent. The table shows that the respondents are involved in almost each operation and that they are planning to get involved in more operations. Another interesting finding is that the size or military power is not a determining factor for participation. Estonia and Slovenia are small states, and they are involved in almost every single ESDP operation. Some other operations could have been included such as Assistance Mission in Rafah (Palestine), Border Assistance Mission in Moldova/Ukraine, Police Assistance Mission EUPOL COPPS (Palestine), Aceh Monitoring Mission (Indonesia). Finally, it is striking that the respondents have such an interest in being involved in a far abroad: Iraq, Congo and Sudan. It shows that the new member states have a true interest in promoting the ideals of European security in the far abroad, beyond neighboring countries or traditional zones of influence.

Questions 22-23: seven responses for somewhat important and more important are counted. Latvia offers an explanation stating that geographic proximity makes some operations more important than others. But Slovenia has a more subtle answer: it always depends on the size and stage of the conflict. The assumption is that the more serious the conflict is, the more important the operation gets. The last question looks at possible causes for importance. For five operations, it is a matter of national security interest, which confirms the suggested explanations provided in question 21. The Czech Republic

rates importance according to the logistical involvement: military presence and financial contribution are the main attributes for importance. Slovenia once again offers a meaningful contribution: the decision of sending troops is a result of the consideration of a set criteria such as national interest, alliance opportunities, current presence of international forces there, country availability of resources and availability.

To conclude, some important findings of the questionnaire need to be summed up. The questionnaire validates the fact that the involvement on the ground is negligible. It is true from a logistical perspective, looking at the number of troops (usually between 0 and 100) and the budget contribution between 0 and 20%. However, it also validates the fact that the significance of their involvement is far from being negligible. The responding population thinks that their involvement in these operations is crucial not only for their security but for the EU security and for the region where they are involved. It is not surprising that most of the respondents chose EUFOR-ALTHEA and EUPM as operations because it is in the neighborhood and the stability of the Balkans is capital to the whole Union. There is a true sense of serving the purpose of European Security by being involved not only in the neighboring regions but also in the far abroad. The responding population does not hesitate to get involved in the far abroad. The perception stating that the security within Europe protected from possible threats such as the Russia or unbalanced neighborhood is not necessarily true. New Members act now as entirely part of the EU and have an urgency to be involved in the far abroad.

Finally, there is still a very unique perspective about the perception of CFSP/ESDP as a security actor. True, CFSP/ESDP is somehow the right framework to tackle security threats but not necessarily in a military way and not alone. NATO remains

an essential actor to handle security, and CFSP/ESDP seems very effective for civilian missions, such as police or rule of law. When operations are larger, the respondents think that other organizations need to be involved (Questions 13-17).

Validation of the findings with hard data.

The findings and responses need to be then validated with hard data. The used hard data are more official data and descriptions of the chosen operations. Based on fact sheets from the European Union Council, the WEU and the research done by the Institute for Security Studies based in Paris, information is gathered on the four chosen operations: EUPM, EUFOR-ALTHEA, EUJUST THEMIS and EUJUST LEX. The background information, the size, the budget and the number of troops involved give a framework to truly measure the involvement of the responding population.

EUPM European Union Police Mission Bosnia Herzegovina

Launched on 1 January 2003, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina represents the EU's first-ever civilian crisis management operation under ESDP. Taking over from the United Nations' International Police Task Force (IPTF), which had been in place since December 1995, the operation aims at supporting the local authorities in training their police forces to the highest European and international standards. 531 police officers – about 80 per cent from EU member states and 20 per cent from third states – perform monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities. The EUPM has a mandate for 3 years and an annual budget of €38 million, of which €20 million are financed from the Community budget⁹⁰. The EUPM, whose

⁹⁰ Giovanni Grevi and others. "ESDP Operations", Institute for Security Studies, <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf> (2003), 2

headquarters are located in Sarajevo, is divided in three departments, namely Operations, Planning and Development, as well as Administration and Support Services. In addition, the EUPM has been planned in such a way as to work alongside the Bosnia Herzegovina police force. It monitors and advises on all aspects of policing activities. The main objectives of EUPM are the following⁹¹:

→ Developing police independence and accountability by: de-politicising the police; strengthening the role of directors of police/police commissioners; monitoring performance of these officials; promoting transparency;

→ fighting organized crime and corruption by carrying out a joint strategy with the Office of the High Representative (OHR); supporting the local police with operational capacities; strengthening the investigative capacity of the local police; supporting the establishment of a state level police agency (SIPA);

→ Financial viability and sustainability of the local police by: supporting the efficiency and effectiveness of the local police; carrying out a financial audit of the affordability of local police forces; supporting efforts which lead to increases in police officers' salaries;

→ Institution and capacity building by: focusing on management capacity; supervising the establishment of local recruitment and promotion procedures; consolidating state-level agencies such as the SBS and SIPA.

The goals of the mission are mainly civilian as Latvia reminded it in the questionnaire. Such an operation does not need heavy military equipment by definition and despite the civilian nature of the operation the new member states have not committed many troops.

⁹¹ The WEU Assembly, The Interparliamentary Security and Defence Assembly, "The European Union in the Balkans: Althea and other operations", Document A 1919, http://www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2005/1919.html, (November 9, 2005)

The new member states represent 7% of the whole force, and account for only 8% of the EU troops (see table below). It definitely confirms that the logistical involvement is very negligible. There are even more troops from third countries than New Member States. The involvement of third states illustrates the capacity of the EU to keep non member under its leadership. The nature of the testing unfortunately does not provide any explanation on why new member could commit a limited number of troops in a civilian operation. However, the structure of the operation confirms three reasons new members would commit to such an operation. As already mentioned, they believe in the civilian capacity of the European Union. Second, the participation of the United Nations as the original framework gives legitimacy to the operation and more generally, they do not mind working with other countries.

TABLE I: Number of Troops in Operation EUPM

EU Member States before May 1, 2004	EU Member States, after May 1, 2004	Non Member States
Austria: 7	Czech Republic: 6	Bulgaria: 3
Belgium: 10	Cyprus: 4	Canada: 6
Denmark: 14	Estonia: 2	Iceland: 3
Finland: 23	Hungary: 5	Norway: 8
France: 85	Latvia: to be deployed	Romania: 9
Germany: 83	Lithuania: 2	Russia: 5
Greece: 11	Poland: 12	Switzerland: 4
Ireland: 5	Slovakia: 4	Turkey: 12
Italy: 47	Slovenia: 4	Ukraine: 5
Luxembourg: 3		
Netherlands: 37		
Portugal: 10		
Spain: 22		
Sweden: 15		
United Kingdom: 70		
TOTAL: 442	TOTAL: 39	TOTAL: 45

Source: Deployment of Police Officers, 24 April 2003, EUPM MHQ / Personnel Office

In addition, the EUPM has been planned in such a way as to work alongside the BiH police force. It monitors and advises on all aspects of policing activities. EUPM personnel are currently operational in a number of strategic locations in BiH. Their presence in the country's "central nervous system" ensures not only the full cooperation of the local authorities but also a level of monitoring, inspections and advice which will undoubtedly have a profound influence on the country's future administration. That aspect illustrates how much it is important for new members to strengthen the rule of law and have a safe and stable neighbor (comments from Slovenia). Furthermore, the EUPM's increasing cooperation with the ALTHEA mission ensures that the EU's role in BiH will continue after the EUPM mandate comes to an end⁹², and again it gives a certain guarantee to the new members that there is a true regional effort to promote stability

EUFOR-ALTHEA

Following the Council Joint Action (2004/570/CFSP) of 12 July 2004, the EU launched the military operation Althea on 2 December 2004, following the decision by NATO at the Istanbul summit in June 2004 to conclude the SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)⁹³. As EUFOR took over from NATO forces, it is carrying out the same missions and activities. In fact it can be said that since EUFOR is the same size, has the same structure and deploys the same assets on the ground, it is virtually identical to SFOR. In accordance with the Dayton/Paris agreement, the objectives of EUFOR ALTHEA are to contribute to a safe environment in BiH in line with its mandate, required achieving core tasks in the Office of the High Representative's Mission

⁹² The WEU Assembly, op. cit., 11

⁹³ Grevi and others, 6

Implementation Plan and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). The EU force also provides support, within means and capabilities, to the efforts of High Representative and of the international community, in fields such as the fight against organized crime and the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. EUFOR-ALTHEA represents the ideal operation for the new members. It meets all the conditions of a legitimate successful initiative for the new members and the respondents. EUFOR-ALTHEA is the same as SFOR, a NATO operation, with exactly the same goal and same structure. The questionnaire showed how much the respondents were still attached to NATO. EUFOR-ALTHEA aims at the compliance of the Dayton / Paris Agreement. There is international weight behind the operation including support from the United States. In the words of Hungary in the questionnaire: *‘As a transition from NATO to EU, EUFOR represents good example of Berlin + model of cooperation and interoperability of the forces with the stress on peace- and institution building mechanisms’*

Operation Althea is the largest in size ever launched by the EU, with 5,805 troops from almost all member states and a large number of third countries. In all, 33 countries contribute to the operation, including 22 EU member states and 11 non-member states, including most notably Morocco. Germany and the UK constitute the main troop-contributors with respectively 1,100 and 950 troops. Other major contributions are from France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. The ‘old’ EU member States represent more than 80% of the troops. One should note also that traditionally neutral EU countries (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) contribute to the operation, which includes also the neutral non-EU member state of Switzerland. The new Member States certainly have

more troops involved than in EUPM but still represent only 5% of the total contingent. Non-Member States represent about 13% of the total of troops. Common costs for the operation are administered by the ATHENA mechanism, by which contributions come from member states on a GDP-based key. The total cost of the operation is €71.7⁹⁴.

⁹⁴ Grevi, *op. cit.*, .7

TABLE II: NUMBER OF TROOPS IN OPERATION EUFOR-ALTHEA

EU Member States before May 1, 2004	EU Member States, after May 1, 2004	Non Member States
Belgium: 52	Czech Republic: 90	Albania: 71
Finland: 184	Estonia: 3	Argentina: 2
France: 463	Hungary: 142	Bulgaria: 36
Germany: 1014	Latvia: 3	Canada: 3
Greece: 88	Lithuania: 1	Chile: 23
Ireland: 51	Slovakia: 4	Morocco: 132
Italy: 955	Slovenia: 90	Norway: 17
Luxemburg: 1		New Zealand: 9
Netherlands: 384		Romania: 120
Portugal: 237		Switzerland: 23
Spain: 492		Turkey: 332
Sweden: 77		
United Kingdom: 706		
Total: 4703	Total: 333	Total: 768

Source: EUFOR-ALTHEA website, www.euforbih.org

It adds in a significant way to the EU's political engagement, its assistance programs with a view to helping BiH make further progress towards European integration in the context of the Stabilization and Association Process. It confirms the strategic interest of the New Members to get involved in the stabilization of the Balkans. Slovenia returned one questionnaire only based on the assumption that EUFOR ALTHEA is the most critical operation for their security. In terms of chain of command, the Council of the European Union takes basic decisions on the operation, assisted by the Secretary General of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises political control and ensures the strategic direction of the operation, under the responsibility of the Council. In turn the EU Military Committee (EUMC) monitors its proper implementation⁹⁵.

Operation Althea is carried out according to the Berlin Plus agreement between the EU and NATO. Consultation takes place with NATO on the application of the Berlin Plus agreements, and the PSC and the Chairman of the EUMC update NATO on the progress of Althea. The link with NATO is important in operational and command terms as well as for bolstering the credibility of the EU operation. Once again as expressed in the last questions of the survey, the participation of NATO gives credibility to an ESDP operation and confirms that New Member still do not blindly follow the EU when it comes to military involvement. However, operation Althea marks a new step in the development of ESDP in terms of size and ambition. It also confirms the rising role of the EU as a primary European security provider, with ever more responsibility in particular

⁹⁵ European Union Council, European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "EUFOR fact sheet" www.euforbih.org, (2006)

for stability in the Western Balkans⁹⁶. The contrast with European policy a decade ago, in 1994, could not be greater: EU member states are united and pursue common policy objectives. And it does not contradict the idea of having NATO involved. The responding countries stand by the European Union's foreign policy objectives. At the same time, one should note two challenges facing the operation. The first is that of credibility – in terms of being willing and able to back words with actions - and the second is that of coherence – in terms of the ability to weave Althea into the EU's wider objectives in BiH, including the EUPM operation underway since 2003.

According to a quarterly report issued by the Secretary General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy on 4 October 2005 and covering the period 1 June to 15 September 2005, the political and military situation has remained stable and noted some significant achievements. First of all, there had been a milestone agreement on a draft new BiH Defense Law and Law on Army Service signed by all Defense Reform Commissioners in 18 July. Furthermore, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) cooperation has continued positively since the beginning of 2005. But the most interesting for our study is the successful combination of EUFOR ALTHEA and EUPM. Both operations assisted the local authorities in maintaining a safe and secure environment over the period of the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre. EUFOR adopted a posture of "out of sight but not over the horizon". According to the report, EUFOR, in cooperation with the EUPM, continues to support the local police.

EUJUST THEMIS

⁹⁶ Grevi and others. Op. cit., 8

The European Union's has a longstanding effort to bolster peace and security in the South Caucasus and to assist in the transition of three states of the region: Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan⁹⁷. Since Georgia's independence in 1991, the European Union has been one of the biggest donors to the country. The European Community alone has already given more than €380 million since 1992. The 2003 European Security includes Georgia and the South Caucous as part of a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean, with whom the EU can enjoy close and cooperative relations, as a strategic objective. As part of this, the EU appointed a Special Representative for the South Caucasus in July 2003. Additionally, in June 2004, the EU agreed to involve the three states in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).⁹⁸

In June 2004, the Georgian Prime Minister invited the EU to assist the Georgian government by way of a EU Rule of Law Mission for a one year commitment. The Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP creating EUJUST THEMIS was approved by the European Council, and on 16 July, 2004, the mission was launched. It was no surprise since the rule of law and the criminal justice system had been a focus of European Community (EC) assistance since 2000 under the "Tacis" program⁹⁹. In the revised Country Strategy for Georgia 2003-2006, the rule of law had been identified as one of the core priorities for EC assistance, building on lessons learned from assistance in the past and using the present momentum of reform in the judiciary. The objectives of EUJUST THEMIS were

⁹⁷ Grevi and others. Op. cit., 5

⁹⁸ European Union, "Facts on EUJUST THEMIS", European Union Rule of Law Mission to Georgia, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/EUJUST_THEMIS-Factsheet.pdf, (2005), 5

⁹⁹ European Union, "Facts on EUJUST THEMIS", European Union Rule of Law Mission to Georgia, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/EUJUST_THEMIS-Factsheet.pdf (2005), 5

to assist the Government of Georgia in its efforts to reform the criminal justice system and improve legislative procedures. These improvements sought to align Georgia fully with international and European human rights standards. In particular, EUJUST THEMIS provided urgent guidance for the new criminal justice reform strategy, supported the overall coordinating role of the relevant Georgian authorities in the field of judicial reform and anti-corruption; supported the planning for new legislation as necessary; and supported the development of international as well as regional cooperation in the area of criminal justice. Here, participation is not based on quality of military equipment but on expertise of jurists. Latvia sent a judge whose work was appreciated very much both by the EU and by the Georgian authorities, because he could speak Russian and could communicate with local authorities' representatives without an interpreter. In terms of chain of command, similarly to EUFOR and EUPM, the Political and Security Committee exercised, under the responsibility of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the mission. The mission of a budget of €2,050,000 was executed with the expertise and experience of senior professionals through a supportive and advisory role to the Georgian authorities. EUJUST THEMIS was the first rule of law mission carried out by an ESDP civilian mission and confirms the development of new capabilities for the civilian dimension of ESDP. For a small mission, it is interesting to see that a small New Member such as Latvia would get involved. As mentioned earlier, expertise does not need troops! The mission falls in line with the Feira European Council (2000) decision to strengthen such civilian capabilities, especially with regard to the rule of law. EUJUST THEMIS reflects also the EU commitment to support the efforts of its neighbors in the South Caucasus to create a stable and secure region. The involvement in

EUJUST THEMIS was certainly not a top national security concern, but it shows that New Member States have a key role in the ENP (European neighborhood Policy) due to their former attachments to Russia or just by geographic proximity. Latvia Seen as a success despite a limited scale, EUJUST THEMIS definitely reinforced the credibility to the EU in civilian missions, claim made by all the respondents.

EUJUST LEX

Following the report of the Joint Council/Commission fact-finding mission for a possible integrated police and rule of law operation in Iraq, the Brussels European Council on 5 November 2004 recognized ‘the importance of strengthening the criminal justice system’ in Iraq, in compliance with the respect of human rights¹⁰⁰. To this end, the summit envisaged that the EU could contribute to the emergence of a stable, secure and democratic Iraq through an integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration mission. Following consultation with Iraqi authorities and based on a report of experts, as part of the implementation of the EU program of action for Iraq presented in November 2004, the operation was launched in the summer 2005. Czech Republic was the only country who chose Iraq in the survey.

The mission was mandated to address the urgent needs of the Iraqi criminal justice system by providing training in senior management and criminal investigation to high and mid-level officials, with a view to promoting closer cooperation among the actors in the domain of criminal justice¹⁰¹. More specifically, the training targets 520

¹⁰⁰ Grevi and others. Op. Cit. 12

¹⁰¹ European Union, Facts on EU Rule-of-Law Mission for Iraq, (February 2005)
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Iraq_EUJUST_LEX-Factsheet.pdf, (February 2005), 5

judges, investigating magistrates, senior police and penitentiary officers in senior management and of some 250 investigating magistrates and senior police in the fields of management and criminal investigation. The mission aims at training 770 persons to be over a period of a year. An amount of €10 million from the EU budget has been intended to cover the common costs of the mission. Member States will contribute training courses and trainers. The Czech Republic sent about 100 personnel to contribute to the mission. Once again, New Members have legal expertise and support the civilian capacity of the European Union. The involvement confirms the importance of being involved in the Far Abroad for the New Members, who think it is somewhat important for their security.

The EU is not the only actor providing training to Iraqi officials: in the course of 2004, NATO has set up a sizeable training mission directed at the military, which aims to involve on an annual basis 1,000 officials within Iraq and 500 outside. The US and some EU Member States also conduct training activities. The EU has taken the lead on the reform of the criminal justice sector: a key challenge for the future stability of Iraq, considering that no proper criminal justice system existed before the war began in 2003. It is an adroit manner for the EU to get involved in an area where it refused to commit troops in the first place. It could be argued that New Member States see Iraq as a way to express their attachment to the transatlantic cooperation. Earlier in the paper was discussed how the unraveling of the Iraqi crisis was a difficult time for the New Members who supported the United States initiative but were candidates for accession. The involvement of NATO on the ground as already mentioned in other operations is a perceived as a positive sign of advanced multilateral cooperation. Czech Republic is also

somewhat an outlier in the responding population for its advanced military capacity compared to other New Members. The Czech Republic seems to have an energetic agenda to be seen as a main player in ESDP operations: the Czech contributed airplanes to EUFOR-ALTHEA for example. The Czech Republic also sees its involvement as critical because the capacity of the European Union to be perceived as an alternative credible player in the region and in the Far Abroad in general. In particular, the Commission has set up follow-up options to the ESDP mission under Community programs, so as to ensure the sustainability of the justice system and the strengthening of the rule of law. EUJUST LEX is to be set in the context of the major commitment of the EU to the reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq, including a €320 million package disbursed by the Community in the period 2003/2004, and an additional €200 million assistance program for 2005 including support to the economy, civil society and the political and constitutional process.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF ENLARGEMENT FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

A unique perception of European security and an original foreign
policy

The case study of the involvement of new Member States in ESDP operations as well as an analysis of the state of European security give an opportunity to further discuss the implications of enlargement for European Security and Foreign Policy. With the Mediterranean enlargement or the EFTA enlargement, the EU did not have to extensively worry about whether the new members would follow its foreign policy or not. There were a very few members at the time and even if entrants might have had different perceptions, they were still market economies and most of their neighbors turned out to be current EU members. This enlargement is different given its scope the historical tradition of the new block. The entrants' foreign policy is by tradition mostly focused on their neighbors rather than the wider world¹⁰². The involvement in Bosnia Herzegovina, Georgia and Moldova confirms it. However, the trend has been evolving. It is important for new members to be involved

¹⁰² Heather Grabbe, "The newcomers", *The future of Europe, Integration and enlargement*, edited by Fraser Cameron, (Routledge 2004), 75.

in their neighborhood but as the question on where else they are involved, it is interesting to see that they have a foot in a far abroad such as Iraq and Congo. However, the new members do not blindly follow the idea that European security should be autonomous. They still have a high opinion of NATO and one should not forget that over the last fifteen years, their priority has been the accession to the European Union and NATO.

The involvement of New Member States in their neighborhood and in the far abroad is hard to translate when it comes to further enlargement. Some of the new members could become rather ambivalent about further enlargement of the EU. So far, they have publicly supported Bulgarian and Romanian enlargement but are more divided over Turkey. Poland and Czech Republic have argued in favor of Turkey joining, but others are opposed. The key issue is whether the integration of further countries will divert EU funds away from them and diminish their status. But the most oppressing issue is definitely their neighborhood. Some new member states are already starting to use their membership to deal with non-EU neighbors¹⁰³. This enlargement creates new neighbors for the EU such as Russia and Ukraine, and the new member states will have their own ‘special interests’, including Polish and the Baltic states’ interest in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, Bulgarian interests in the Black Sea region, and Cyprus’ relations with Turkey¹⁰⁴. The accession of Sweden and Finland in 1994 had led to an

¹⁰³ Robin Sheperd, “New Members see Enlargement as hindering further integration”, *European Affairs*, (Fall 2004), 3

¹⁰⁴ Landau Prize, op. cit., p. 22

increased EU interest in northern Europe, as evidenced by the adoption of the Northern Dimension Action Plan at Feira in June 2000¹⁰⁵. It shows that this enlargement is likely for a variety of reasons to keep in the forefront of Union policy its relations with its nearer neighbors, and in particular the states of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in the Western Balkans, and the Partnership and Cooperation states to the east, including Russia and Ukraine¹⁰⁶. The stability of the Balkans is a top priority for the New Member States as expressed in the questionnaire by Slovenia and Hungary. As a result, security and regional issues are an important aspect of their relations with the EU and impacts the EU's emerging security and defense policy (CESDP) and its relationship with NATO. Security has been a reason pushing the CEECs to join the EU. Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania are currently members of NATO and the ten entrants are all now full members of WEU¹⁰⁷. Slovenia in the questionnaire explained that their involvement in the region through Althea is critical to its security but to the whole neighborhood in general.

Geopolitically, the Enlargement raises the question of the political impact of the reunification of Europe. The enlarged Europe will be engaged in a process of reshaping Europe as a whole and redefining its borders¹⁰⁸. The CEECs clearly distinguish between the actual security provided by the US through NATO and the prospects for security provided by the

¹⁰⁵ Marise Cremona, *The enlargement of the European Union*, (Oxford University Press, 2003), 199

¹⁰⁶ Cremona, *op. cit.*, 200

¹⁰⁷ Cremona, *op. cit.*, 201

¹⁰⁸ Grabbe, *op. cit.*, 73

EU¹⁰⁹. As Joshka Fisher mentioned it: “The US is a world power. The EU on the other hand is still a power in the making”¹¹⁰. Most of CEECs elite wonders if France and Germany or the EU for that matter can provide their security that they believe they need. As we mentioned earlier, perception of the world sharply differs whether you are a Western European or an Eastern European. All of new members have complex views about Russia and its relationship with the EU. They had different relationships with the Soviet Union during half of a century of communism, but there is little nostalgia for a closer relationship with Russia.¹¹¹ Some countries got invaded and the three Baltic States got annexed by the Soviet Union. To the CEECs the Paris-Berlin axis is not a concern: they are mostly preoccupied by the resurgence of a Berlin-Moscow axis which brings up painful memories of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact¹¹², and this another reason the CEECs sided with the US during the Iraqi crisis versus a French-German-Russian alliance. The Latvian president remarked in an interview in 2003: “Obviously, in the past the Berlin-Moscow axis had terrible consequences for our country and we hope that the axis that is now emerging will not be along those lines”. The close friendship between Chancellor Schröder and President Putin and the German lack of criticism towards the Chechnyan conflict did not help alleviate the concerns. The fear of the Russian specter and the concrete existence of NATO tend to make CEECs support NATO rather than the idea of a European counterweight to American power. The questionnaire shows that CEECs and Baltic

¹⁰⁹ Michael Mihalka, “Values and Interests: European Support for the Intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq”, Tom Lansford, Tashev Blagovest, *Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the post 9/11 Era*, (Ashgate 2005), 295

¹¹⁰ Grabbe, op. cit., 74

¹¹¹ ibid.

¹¹² Milhalka, op. cit., 296

States trust the EU as a civilian crisis management actor but still struggle with the concept of a EU as a military power. The findings show that CEECs and Baltic States feel safer when other actors are involved with the operation such as NATO or OSCE when it comes to Eastern European operations. A common cliché is to perceive New Member as ‘Atlanticist’ no matter what. The Iraq war was a special case and support for the US was an unwelcome dilemma for countries that want a strong Europe too. As explained earlier, the nature of the support was very political since NATO membership was at stake. When it comes to other issues, the CEECs tend to side with the EU not the US. They are strongly multilateralist, having suffered from the bipolar era. The new members certainly want a solid transatlantic alliance, but also want the EU to have an effective foreign policy especially in the Balkans and in the Neighborhood. In addition to Poland’s proposals for developing EU’s Ostpolitik, Hungary and Slovenia want to integrate the Balkans politically and economically into the EU. The enlarged Union’s periphery to the East and the South is of diminishing importance to Washington but is of vital concern to the new members¹¹³. On most international issues, the new members usually align themselves with the EU, on the Kyoto protocol, non-proliferation, and the death penalty. They usually vote with the other Europeans in the UN. These countries have become increasingly ‘socialized’ in the EU’s ways of doing business. Their political classes have grown to think like the EU’s current members, including on international issues. However, they are true supporters of NATO and multilateralism. A common fear in current member states such as

¹¹³ Grabbe, op. cit. , p. 73

France is that the new members will be pro-American and seek to turn the EU in a giant free trade area, but these countries had much of the economic benefits prior to accession. What the CEECs want from membership is full participation in the political decisions being made in the EU including foreign policy, security and defense. The CEECs do not see a contradiction between supporting NATO and advocating effective defense capabilities for the EU.

Beyond the Headline Goal and the necessity of further military cooperation

Member States are conscious of the need to pursue the transformation of their armed forces from territorial defense to expeditionary operations and are taking important steps. For budgetary and efficiency reasons, smaller member states are unable to provide the full range of capabilities in their army, navy and air force, and cannot maintain certain capabilities unless in cooperation with others. This is certainly true for the new member states, number of which has only just begun transformation. They do not need to carry full capabilities, as the range of necessarily small-scale (and thus inefficient) capabilities would not allow smaller –or medium-sized-states to implement autonomous operations, so they are dependent on other states anyway – although not all states concerned have yet come to realize this¹¹⁴. That could explain why the involvement on the ground is so limited. But being part of the EU and NATO at the same time should foster more cooperation.

Cooperation can entail joint procurement of equipment, pooling certain supporting

¹¹⁴ Biscop, *op. cit.*, 519

capabilities (such as logistics) in multinational units and/or creating multinational units and/or creating multinational combat units (such as multinational battle groups). Pooling can also mean creating collective capabilities that are no longer owned by the participating Member States but by the EU as such; this is probably the way forward to acquire capital-intensive assets such as space observation. Specialization implies that certain capabilities are no longer maintained and/or maintained only through participation in a multinational cooperation. Current small member states make the effort. For example, at the same time as reducing its number of mechanized brigades from three to two has decided to replace all tracked vehicles, including its entire stock of Leopard tanks, by more deployable wheeled armored vehicles; the Belgian and Dutch navies have been integrated under a single operational command. There is also a consciousness of the need to downsize forces in favor of usability and to deal with conscription.

The problem is with all these national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives is that decisions are being made without reference to any European framework- for the simple reason that apart from HG, none exists. Then the risk is that without coordination, in the end Member States' combined capabilities will represent an incoherent whole, with surpluses of one capability and shortages of another, that does not answer the needs of the EU. What is required therefore is a top-down planning and coordination at the EU level, starting neither from the limitations of the current HG nor from the comparison with the USA, but from the strategic objectives of the EU. The objectives expressed in the European Security Strategy could be translated into more detailed, quantifiable military ambitions: how many concurrent operations, at which scale and at which level of intensity does the EU want to be able to implement, in view of its commitments towards its neighborhood and 'effective multilateralism'? On that basis, a

comprehensive catalogue of capability requirements could be drawn up that looks beyond the HG and could serve as a framework for the further transformation of Member States' combined armed forces as a whole. For the smaller Member States, who are willing to continue transformation, such a framework is indispensable. Since NATO does not offer such far-reaching integration, the EU is the only option¹¹⁵.

The necessity of a firm and visionary leadership

It seems that it always come down to a right definition of European security, but since there are conflicting views of what European security should be made of, a true leadership is vital to the future of European Security. The commitment of the member states towards a common security policy needs to be assessed. For the time being, big member states need to show guidance but it is still difficult to figure out where most of them stand and whether they have a vision for European security. After thirty years of membership, the British still cannot make up their minds whether they really want to be full participants in the European Union¹¹⁶. In the Iraqi crisis, Tony Blair had perfect pitch in Washington, but the British Prime Minister's Atlanticist and multilateralist policy, admirable in principle, fell down because of his failure to establish a single, strong, coherent European position in prior consultations with Paris and Berlin. Britain has tried to play a leadership role in defense issues 'while signaling both a more flexible approach on some sensitive issues such as increased QMV and a readiness to engage in bilateral alliances to promote national interests'¹¹⁷. The Anglo-Spanish and Anglo-Italian alliances in the approach of the Lisbon agenda and the Anglo-German proposals to make

¹¹⁵ Biscop, op. cit., 520

¹¹⁶ Timothy Garton Ash and others. "Only a club of three can bring European unity", *The Financial Times*, (July 11, 2003)

¹¹⁷ Fraser Cameron, "Deepening and Widening", *The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement*, (Routledge, 2004), 13

European Councils more efficient were such examples. Britain has continually called for a Europe of Nation States even though Tony Blair has put forward his vision of 'Europe as a superpower, not a superstate'. Second, French political and administrative elites tend to think naturally that what is bad for the US is good for France and they tend to transfer their sense of frustration with Washington to their relations with their smaller European partners, be they from "old" or "new" Europe. True French ambition for Europe demands a sense of modesty and self-criticism. France is obviously weakened by domestic struggle with any reform initiative, the rejection of the referendum and by the end of a political era. Till 2007, presidential election year, France is not expected to provide true leadership. It also depends a lot on the German attitude towards European integration. One might wonder if Germany has a true ambition for Europe. Ten years ago, people were anxiously asking whether Europe could cope with a united Europe. Today, the question should be: can Germany cope with a united Europe? Germany needs to pursue new reformist goals as one of Europe's main driving forces. It needs to increase its defense budget to advance the project of enhancing Europe's military capability. But the German stance in the Iraqi crisis showed that Mr. Schröder wants to enhance Germany's European and global role¹¹⁸. The attitude of Mrs. Merkel is much more ambivalent. Mr. Schröder shared Mr. Chirac's views on the need to constrain the power of an increasingly unilateral US. He may also have come to share some of Mr. Chirac's fears of enlargement. The French President appears to believe that, in a Europe of twenty-five countries, only some sort of core –with France of course playing a preeminent role- can provide backbone and leadership.¹¹⁹ The integration process has always been for most of European integration history

¹¹⁸ Charles Grant, Ulrike Guerot. "A military plan to cut Europe in two", *The Financial Times*, (April 17, 2003)

¹¹⁹ Fraser Cameron, "Deepening and Widening", *The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement*, (Routledge, 2004), 14

driven by a strong Franco-German axis. When Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand left office though, the Paris-Berlin axis has been in trouble with open disputes over the future institutional structure of the Union, the reform of the CAP and the costs of enlargement. However, the fortieth anniversary of the Elysee Treaty in January 2003 (Franco-German Friendship), Chancellor Schröder and President Chirac made a point of resolving their differences on CAP and the costs of enlargement and issued a number of joint declarations on major themes at the Convention preparing the European Constitution and above all adopted a critical stance vis-à-vis the US position on Iraq. The re-emergence of the Franco-German axis was surprising because Chirac has often been ambivalent about the EU and has antagonized many old and new member states with his public utterances. Schröder has never displayed much enthusiasm or interest for European integration¹²⁰. Mrs. Merkel is very keen on the Franco-German axis but seems very open to new members and does not want to antagonize the United States, trying to repair a damaged relationship.

Italy and Spain were traditionally pro-integration countries without seeking any leadership role. But under Aznar and Berlusconi, those positions changed especially in regards to their strong Atlanticist stance. The Atlanticist position cost somehow the election to Jose-Maria Aznar (troops in Iraq and backlash from Al-Quaeda). Prime Minister Zapatero anti-Iraq stance did not translate in strong leadership on EU issues. The return to power of Mr. Prodi, former President of the European Commission will give a stronger European stance to Italy: certainly, Mr. Prodi's performance in Brussels was lackluster, but his experience will bring a lot to Italy on the EU stage. The Benelux was often influential in pushing ideas in the past but recent political disputes and the rejection of the Constitution Treaty have reduced the Benelux

¹²⁰ Cameron, op. cit., 13

voice in European Affairs. The Nordic countries have also failed to make much of a mark¹²¹. How active will the new members be in external policy-making? We have seen for instance that Poland wants to play a major role in foreign policy due to its size. Poland sent troops in Iraq. Poland has been to the fore in advocating the development of a stronger EU foreign policy¹²². Early in 2003, the Polish foreign ministry published a regional strategy for the EU to deal with the countries to its East. But even that policy paper was more about the country's immediate neighbors than about Russia. Hungary and Czech Republic have been extremely active, participating in many ESDP operations, including far abroad ones, but they cannot offset their junior status with size, like Poland. To conclude, the New Member states are still too young to provide leadership.

Germany, Britain and France are Europe's indispensable three. Their close co-operation is not a sufficient condition for Europe to have a serious foreign and security policy but it is a necessary one. As we saw over Iraq, if these three are divided, all Europe will be divided. There might be also "contact groups" on the big new challenges facing Europe, such as Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. These would always include British, French and German representatives but also other relevant powers. In the case of the contact group for the Balkan wars in the 1990s, these were Russia and subsequently Italy. New groups might include Poland when the issue concerns Eastern Europe, say, or Spain and Italy for North Africa. The groups would not be exclusive- but nor would they be open to all who just wanted a seat at the table for the sake of national prestige. Membership would have to be earned by proven competence, capability and seriousness. Nonetheless, small countries do not like the idea of a "*directoire*" of Europe. Small countries should realize that the only alternative acceptable to

¹²¹ Cameron, *ibid.*

¹²² Grabbe, *op. cit.*, 74

them is the lowest common denominator “mush and guff”, or nobody will profit. If the EU’s influence in the world is close to zero, theirs will be even smaller. The CEECs have often suffered from decisions made by great powers on their behalf¹²³. They know that, to be able to choose freely, you have to be on equal terms with your partners. They dread the idea of a ‘directoire’ of big countries bullying the others into submission. The CEECs do not want to be excluded from an ‘inner sanctum’. Moreover, France’s leaders had created resentment over the years. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was widespread francophilia in Central and Eastern Europe thanks to the dissidents who had spent time in France. But the reluctance of President Mitterrand to agree to Eastward enlargement in the nineties, the rift over the attribution of votes and seats within the European institutions during the 2000 Nice summit and finally the abrupt comments of President Chirac during the Iraqi crisis wiped out the sympathy capital for France¹²⁴.

The European Union does not seem ready to assume its position as a political player or only to a certain extent. The adjustments made to the CFSP/ESDP over the last few years are insufficient to absorb the CEECs for different reasons. First, the institutional structure of European Security is too inconsistent, the authority is fragmented and state bargaining influences decisions too heavily which makes the EU ill-adapted to 25 members. Ideologically, there are certainly conflicting perceptions of what European security and it is acceptable given different traditions and political cultures but those visions do not necessarily take into account the Eastward dimension of European security. Militarily, an effort in further cooperation and rationalization needs to be made. The European Union has certainly a true potential to be a ‘hard power’ if necessary, but not without streamlining its capacities. Finally there is no clear

¹²³ Grabbe, *op. cit.*, 74

¹²⁴ Grabbe, *op. cit.*, 75

leadership from a diverse enough group of countries. The idea of a '*directoire*' is not disturbing as long as it includes homogeneous players but new entrants need to step up to the plate and seek leadership responsibilities. Under those conditions, Europe will be able to speak more effectively to the world and co-ordinate more coherent foreign policies. This will depend not only on putting institutional structures in place but also on the will and capacity of the member states to act.

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APPENDIX A: ENLARGEMENT WAVES

Enlargement refers to the process of accession to the European Community, later known as the European Union. The original Europe of Six (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) has expanded in the following order into a Europe of 25:

- 1973: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom;
- 1981: Greece;
- 1986: Spain and Portugal;
- 1995: Austria, Finland and Sweden;
- 2004: Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

Enlargement now refers to this last wave of accessions culminating in the simultaneous membership of ten countries to the European Union on 1 May 2004. It has provided a unique opportunity to bring peace, stability and prosperity to the entire European continent.

There are four candidate countries which have applied to join the Union:

♦ Bulgaria and Romania: After officially recognizing their candidate status in 1997, the European Union opened negotiations with them in February 2000. In June 2004 the European Council reiterated the Union's intention to sign accession treaties with Bulgaria and Romania in 2005 paving the way for their accession in January 2007.

♦ Croatia applied for membership to the Union on 21 February 2003. The Commission delivered its opinion on this request in April 2004 recommending that accession negotiations be opened. In June 2004 the European Council officially recognized Croatia as a candidate country. The negotiations initially due to begin on 1 January 2005 are currently on hold and will remain so until there is full cooperation from Croatia with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

♦ Turkey submitted its application on 14 April 1987 and was officially recognized as a candidate country at the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999. At the European Council on 17 and 18 June 2004 the Union reaffirmed its commitment to start accession negotiations with Turkey without delay provided it complied with the Copenhagen political criteria. In its recommendation of 6 October 2004, the Commission concluded that Turkey satisfied the Copenhagen political criteria and recommended that accession negotiations be opened. Accordingly, the December 2004 European Council has planned to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005.

♦ The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia submitted its accession application on 22 March 2004 but has not yet obtained the official status of candidate country.

Source: European Commission

APPENDIX B: ACCESSION PARTNERSHIP

The accession partnerships concluded by the Council with each of the applicant countries bring together in one document the aid provided by the European Community to each applicant country, the conditions for granting the financing and the priorities for each sector in transposing Community law (the *acquis*). They are intended to assist the applicant country authorities in their efforts to comply with the accession criteria and they set out in detail the priorities for each country in preparing for accession, in particular implementing the Community *acquis*. The accession partnerships form the basis for programming pre-accession assistance from Community funds such as the Phare programme.

These programs and the accession partnerships are adjusted over time by the Commission and the country concerned. The accession partnerships served as a support for other pre-accession instruments, including the joint assessment of medium-term economic policy priorities, the pact on organised crime, the national development plans and other sectoral programmes necessary for participation in the Structural Funds after accession and for the implementation of ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession) and SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development). They were also the starting point for the development of action plans to improve administrative and judicial capacities in the applicant countries.

Following the signing of the Accession Treaty on 16 April 2003 and the official integration of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia into the European Union on 1 May 2004, the accession partnerships came to an end.

Source: European Commission.

APPENDIX C: *COMMUNITY ACQUIS*

The Community *acquis* is the body of common rights and obligations which bind all the Member States together within the European Union. It is constantly evolving and comprises: the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; the legislation adopted in application of the treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice; the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; measures relating to the common foreign and security policy; measures relating to justice and home affairs; international agreements concluded by the Community and those concluded by the Member States between themselves in the field of the Union's activities.

Thus the Community *acquis* comprises not only Community law in the strict sense, but also all acts adopted under the second and third pillars of the European Union and the common objectives laid down in the Treaties. The Union has committed itself to maintaining the Community *acquis* in its entirety and developing it further. Applicant countries have to accept the Community *acquis* before they can join the Union. Derogations from the *acquis* are granted only in exceptional circumstances and are limited in scope. To integrate into the European Union, applicant countries will have to transpose the *acquis* into their national legislation and implement it from the moment of their accession.

Source: European Commission

APPENDIX D: PILLARS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

In Community parlance people often refer to the three pillars of the EU Treaty. These three pillars, which form the basic structure of the European Union, are:

- the Community dimension, comprising the arrangements set out in the European Community (EC), European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) Treaties, i.e. Union citizenship, Community policies, Economic and Monetary Union, etc. (first pillar);
- the common foreign and security policy, which comes under Title V of the EU Treaty (second pillar);
- police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which comes under Title VI of the EU Treaty (third pillar).

The Treaty of Amsterdam has transferred some of the fields formerly covered by the third pillar to the first pillar (free movement of persons).

The European Constitution, which is currently being ratified, provides for a complete recasting of this system. The three existing pillars are to be merged, albeit with the preservation of specific procedures in the area of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including defence policy.

Source: European Commission

APPENDIX E: IRB APPROVAL FORM

Oklahoma State University Institutional Review Board

Date: Monday, March 27, 2006
IRB Application No AS0684
Proposal Title: Enlargement and the Implications for the Current European Union Security Structure

Reviewed and Exempt
Processed as:

Status Recommended by Reviewer(s): Approved Protocol Expires: 3/26/2007

Principal Investigator(s)
Exartier Vivien Joel Jenswold
3222 N. Street NW Suite 508 MSCS
Washington DC, 20007 Stillwater, OK 74078

The IRB application referenced above has been approved. It is the judgment of the reviewers that the rights and welfare of individuals who may be asked to participate in this study will be respected, and that the research will be conducted in a manner consistent with the IRB requirements as outlined in section 45 CFR 46.


The final versions of any printed recruitment, consent and assent documents bearing the IRB approval stamp are attached to this letter. These are the versions that must be used during the study.

As Principal Investigator, it is your responsibility to do the following:

1. Conduct this study exactly as it has been approved. Any modifications to the research protocol must be submitted with the appropriate signatures for IRB approval.
2. Submit a request for continuation if the study extends beyond the approval period of one calendar year. This continuation must receive IRB review and approval before the research can continue.
3. Report any adverse events to the IRB Chair promptly. Adverse events are those which are unanticipated and impact the subjects during the course of this research; and
4. Notify the IRB office in writing when your research project is complete.

Please note that approved protocols are subject to monitoring by the IRB and that the IRB office has the authority to inspect research records associated with this protocol at any time. If you have questions about the IRB procedures or need any assistance from the Board, please contact Beth McTernan in 415 Whitehurst (phone: 405-744-5700, beth.mcternan@okstate.edu).

Sincerely,


Sue C. Jacobs, Chair
Institutional Review Board

APPENDIX F: EXPLANATORY INTRODUCTION TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
APPROVED BY THE IRB

Vivien Exartier
3222 N Street NW Suite 340
Washington D.C.
(304) 685-4572

MA Candidate
Oklahoma State University

March 27, 2006

Re: Questionnaire on the participation of your country to two ESDP operations: Explanatory Introduction/
Consent Document

Dear Madam, Dear Sir,

My name is Vivien Exartier and I am a Masters candidate in Political Sciences at Oklahoma State University. I am currently writing a thesis on the implications of European enlargement for the European Union Security Structures.

My goal is to analyze the involvement of new member states, precisely Central Eastern European Countries and Baltic States in European Security Defense Policy operations.

Your service as is evidence of your expertise on the subject. Therefore, I am kindly asking you to fill up a short questionnaire of twenty-three questions on your participation to such operations. Your willingness to participate is entirely voluntary and I understand that, based on time or personnel constraints, you might not be able to commit or that you might reconsider your initial commitment. There will be obviously no penalty to discontinue your commitment.


To avoid an outlier situation and for better analysis, I ideally would like to see each respondent to fill up the questionnaire for two ESDP operations in which your country is involved. I ask each participant to fill up a questionnaire for two ESDP operations where his/her country is involved if it does not take too much of your time. These responses will help me to discuss the implications of enlargement for the current European Union security structure.

I add that there is no risk involved in this study. I am going to keep your identity strictly confidential and I am going to code your identity with a number. I will be the only one to have access to this coding table. I will be the only one to have access to this coding table. This coding table will be stored in my personal laptop. Once the responses communicated and analyzed, I will toss out the coding table.

You can fax me back the questionnaire at (202) 965-1018 or email me at vexartie@mix.wvu.edu. Ideally, I would like to collect the questionnaires by April 5, 2006.

If you have any question regarding the validity of the questionnaire, please contact Dr. Sue C. Jacobs, Oklahoma State University Institutional Review Board Chair at (405) 744-1676 or email irb@okstate.edu

I thank you for your time and helping me out in this research.
Sincerely yours,
Vivien Exartier



APPENDIX G: QUESTIONNAIRE TEMPLATE SUBMITTED TO THE
RESPONDENTS ON THE PARTICIPATION TO TWO ESDP OPERATIONS

Vivien Exartier
MA Candidate Political Sciences
Oklahoma State University

**Questionnaire on the participation of your country to two ESDP
operations: First Operation of your choice**

Name of the operation:

Questionnaire A₂₋₁

Please circle the right answer. Feel free to add any comments.

**1. How many troops does your country have involved with this operation? How long
have you been there?**

0-100
100-500
500-1000
1000 and over

2. What are the main assignments of your troops other there?

Peacekeeping
Compliance with International Treaties
Police
Assistance Local Authorities

3. Was your country involved in this operation before or after accession?

Before accession
After accession

4. At what stage of the operation did your country get involved?

Planning

When the fields operations began

After the fields operation began

5. Would you consider that your country is an essential actor in the decision-making of the conduct of the operation?

Not important

Somewhat important

Very important

6. What kind of military presence do you have there? Please specify how large for each category

Army

Navy

Air Force

7. What is your financial contribution to the total cost of the operation?

0-20%

20-50%

50% and more

8. Was the participation to this operation relevant to the security of your country?

No

Somewhat

Yes

9. Was your participation relevant to the security of the European Union?

No

Somewhat

Yes

10. Did the EU authorities influence your decision?

No

Somewhat

Yes

11. Besides CFSP officials, have officials from other EU institutions influenced your decision to participate?

No

Somewhat

No

12. If yes, which institutions influence your decision to participate?

The European Commission

The European Parliament

Other

13. Has your country consulted other Member States about the decision to participate in this operation?

No

Somewhat

Yes

14. If yes, how many member states have you consulted?

0-5

5-10

10-15

15. Has your country consulted other New Member States about its decision to participate?

No

Somewhat

No

16. If yes, how many other New Member States have you consulted?

0-3

3-6

6-10

17. How will your involvement affect your national security in the near future?

It will not affect it

It will affect it somehow

It will affect it a lot

18. Do you think that the CFSP/ESDP was the most appropriate framework to handle this operation?

No

Somewhat but did not address all the concerns of the mission

Yes

19. If not, what do you think would have been a better framework?

NATO
The UN
A combination of the EU and NATO
A combination of the UN, NATO and the EU
A combination of the UN and NATO
Other

20. Generally, do you think the ESDP/CFSP is the right structure to address the needs of EU security?

No
Somewhat
Yes

21. What other operations are you involved with?

EUFOR-Althea
EUPM
EUPM Proxima (FYROM)
EU Mission for Iraq
EUPOL Kinshasa
EUSEC DR Congo
EU Support to AMIS II (Darfur)

22. Among the operations you are involved with, would you consider that one or some is/are more important than others?

No
Somewhat
More important

23. If another operation is more important, please rank the following reasons

National Security Interest
Military Presence
Financial Contribution
Other

VITA

Vivien Louis Exartier

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Science

Thesis: THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
ENLARGEMENT

Major Field: Political Science

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Dijon, France, On December 30, 1975

Education: Graduated from Carnot High School, Dijon, France in June 1994; received a Business Graduate Degree from Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon, Dijon, France in September 1999. Completed the requirements for the Master of Science degree with a major in Political Science at Oklahoma State University in May 2006. Currently candidate for a Ph.D. in Political Science at West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia.

Experience: Employed as an Assistant Brand Manager at Unilever in 1999, Employed as Teaching Assistant and Graduate Assistant at Oklahoma State University in 2001 and 2002; employed as a Graduate Assistant at West Virginia University in 2004, 2005 and 2006. Employed as Assistant Coordinator of an internship program at the Washington Workshops Foundation, Washington D.C.

Professional Memberships: West Virginia Political Science Association, International Studies Association, Midwest Political Science Association

Name: Vivien Louis Exartier

Date of Degree: May, 2006

Institution: Oklahoma State University

Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma

Title of Study: THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
ENLARGEMENT

Pages in Study: 108

Candidate for the Degree of Master of Science

Major Field: Political Science

Scope and Method of Study: The study looks at what the European Union accession implies for the security of new members and for the current structure of European Union security. Despite a negligible involvement on the ground and an expected minimal security interest, the accession of New Member States has an impact on the security of European Union. The sample population is composed of three Central Eastern European Countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia) and two Baltic States (Estonia and Latvia) involved in at least two current European Security Defense Policy (ESDP) operations. Based on a questionnaire administered to security officials from each country involved combined to official documents from the European Council and the European Parliament, the involvement of those countries in ESDP operations is assessed.

Findings and Conclusions: The testing confirms that despite a negligible involvement on the ground and an expected minimal security interest, the accession of New Member States has an impact on the security of European Union. The study has further implications for European Security policy. The European Union does not seem ready to assume its position as a political player or only to a certain extent. The institutional adjustments made to the CFSP/ESDP over the last few years are insufficient to absorb the new entrants. Ideologically, there are certainly conflicting perceptions of what European security and it is acceptable given different traditions and political cultures but those visions do not necessarily take into account the Eastward dimension of European security. Militarily, an effort in further cooperation and rationalization needs to be made. The European Union has certainly a true potential to be a 'hard power' if necessary, but not without streamlining its capacities. Finally there is no clear leadership from a diverse enough group of countries. The idea of a *'directoire'* is not disturbing as long as it includes homogeneous players but new entrants need to step up to the plate and seek leadership responsibilities. Under those conditions, Europe will be able to speak more effectively to the world and co-ordinate more coherent foreign policies. This will depend not only on putting institutional structures in place but also on the will and capacity of the member states to act.

ADVISER'S APPROVAL: Dr.Jenswold