

THE NATIONAL-LOCAL INTERFACE OF SOCIAL
CONTROL: THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION AND THE WINSTON-SALEM
BRANCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

By

WENDY JEAN BRAME

Bachelor of Science
Brigham Young University
Provo, Utah
1992

Juris Doctor
University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas
1998

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
July, 2006

THE NATIONAL-LOCAL INTERFACE OF SOCIAL
CONTROL: THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION AND THE WINSTON-SALEM
BRANCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Thesis Approved:

Dr. Thomas E. Shriver

Thesis Adviser

Dr. Gary Webb

Dr. Tamara Mix

Dr. A. Gordon Emslie

Dean of the Graduate College

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank my thesis chair, Dr. Tom Shriver, for his encouragement during what turned out to be a rather long process. I am especially grateful for his patience with my rather independent research style. I also wish to thank my committee members, Dr. Gary Webb and Dr. Tamara Mix, for their invaluable contributions. I am indebted to my entire committee for their amazingly quick review of thesis drafts, and for making the whole thesis process both meaningful and enjoyable.

I am grateful beyond words that I was able to share this experience with my friend and classmate, Jennifer Correa. I thank her for her many suggestions, for the shared research, and for a sympathetic ear during those times that I thought I might never finish. I wish her the best as she moves on to her next grand adventure; she will be missed.

A million thanks to my parents, Pat and Terry Brame, for their constant support in my desire to pursue yet another degree. I owe my desire for an education to them, and I am so grateful for their good-humored acceptance when I left yet another profession to return to college again. Perhaps someday I will even finish for good.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE	6
Social Movement Theory.....	6
Social Control Theory.....	11
Social Control by Private Actors	11
Social Control by Governmental Organizations	12
Social Control Tactics.....	13
Allocation of Social Control	16
Effect of Social Control	17
Theoretical Framework for this Study	18
III. METHODOLOGY	
Document Analysis.....	21
Concerns Related to Document Source	22
Data Analysis	23
IV. FINDINGS.....	29
A History of the Black Panther Party	29
The Vertical History: The Civil Rights Movement	30
The Horizontal History: The 1960s	33
The Emergence of the Black Panther Party	34
The Black Panther Party in North Carolina	36
A History of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.....	38
The FBI and Social Control of the Black Panther Party	40
The FBI's Social Control Goals in North Carolina	41
The Official FBI Frame of the Black Panther Party	43
The Influence of Nationally Mandated Goals on Local Intelligence Gathering....	48
Warning of Impending Activity.....	48
Evidence for Prosecutions under the Smith Act of 1940.....	49
Evidence for Firearms Prosecutions	51

Intelligence Gathering in North Carolina	52
Use of FBI Intelligence in the North Carolina Area	52
Sharing of Information.....	53
Evaluation of the Actual Threat Level.....	53
Use of FBI Intelligence in National Social Control Efforts.....	56
Contributions to Possible Smith Act Prosecutions	56
Analysis of the Effectiveness of COINTELPRO Measures	57
Reinforcement of the Official Frame	58
Reinforcement of the National Frame.....	58
Charlotte Field Office Reporting Procedure	59
Impressions from Report Language.....	63
Challenges to the National Frame.....	69
 V. CONCLUSION.....	 74
 REFERENCES	 80
 APPENDICES	 87
Appendix A – Charlotte Field Office Documents	87
Appendix B – National FBI Documents	94
Appendix C – Documents from other FBI Field Offices.....	96

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table	Page
1. FBI Documents by Purpose.....	25
2. FBI Documents by Generating Office.....	26
Figure	Page
1. Change in Volume of Charlotte Field Office Documents by Month.....	27

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Social movements have played a significant role in shaping our recent human history (Andrews 2002; Burns 1990; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Tarrow 1998; Whittier 2003). The impact of a social movement may lead to revision of governmental or business policy, creation or repeal of law, or even the overthrow of a political system. The actors in a social movement, typically ordinary people with little individual power, seek to make their voices heard by acting collectively to bring about some change. These efforts to instigate change are often met with counteracting efforts to control the social movement and maintain the status quo.

In this project, I examine the social control response of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI or Bureau) to the Black Panther Party, one of the many organizations engaged in the struggle for civil rights during the 1960s and early 1970s. As the Black Panther Party emerged on the national scene, the FBI responded by declaring the Panthers a security threat, planning preemptive prosecutions of Panther members under firearm and sedition statutes, and attempting to create dissension both within the group and with other black activist groups (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990a; Burns 1990). These social control tactics have been credited with ultimately destroying the Black Panther Party (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990a). Through document analysis of

Federal Bureau of Investigation files, I will explore the interactions between the Black Panther Party and the FBI in North Carolina, the manner in which nationally mandated social control strategies were carried out at the local level, and the use to which information collected by the Charlotte (North Carolina) FBI field office contributed to the Bureau's overall social control goals with respect to the Black Panther Party as a national social movement organization.

The United States began with a social movement. Weary of the repression they experienced as a British colony, many of the colonists determined to declare their independence from the King of England. Their official statement read:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government [W]hen a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

These introductory paragraphs of the Declaration of Independence speak volumes about the founding of a nation premised on freedom. Yet, upon gaining their independence from Britain, the new nation was faced with establishing some form of law and government to replace British rule. As other groups had previously discovered, establishing a cohesive society subject to governmental rule is quite a different task than protesting an established order (Erikson 2005). The government that once had forcefully declared its independence from repression became instead the force of social control.

Social movements have occupied an important place in the social fabric of the United States. Burns (1990:xii) identifies two types of democracy that coexist in the United States: “electoral-representative democracy” and “grass-roots democracy.” He argues that social movements, “grounded in principled activism, moral passion, and commitment to substantive purposes,” have historically proven more able to bring about social change (Burns 1990:xii). More often than not, these two faces of democracy have been in conflict, a social movement agitating for change while the government seeks to maintain the status quo.

The balance between individual rights and freedom and the need for social regulation is delicate. Cries of oppression must be balanced against a government’s efforts to allocate scarce resources among citizens and secure social order. Social movements may compete for the same resources, seek incompatible outcomes, or lead to a countermovement that also demands to be heard. In any given case, there will likely be many who consider efforts at social control a justified protection of public interest.

Notwithstanding the government’s need to maintain order, social control in the United States has too often resulted in the repression of Constitutional rights and the use of undue force and deception. With the distance of time, we look back and wonder how the government could have denied women the right to vote for so long, or passed and enforced laws institutionalizing discrimination, such as the “separate but equal” doctrine and bans on citizenship, or interred Japanese-Americans during World War II, or opened fire on protesting students. In essence, just as a social movement has the capacity to influence governmental policy, so too a government has the capacity to encourage,

hinder, or even destroy a social movement through the intensity and strategy of its response.

Not long after the founding of the United States, activists began the long struggle toward equal rights for African Americans. During the century following the United States Civil War, African Americans fought for and slowly gained the right to vote, to serve in the military, and to eat, travel and be educated alongside white citizens (Ezra 2004; Markowitz 2004; Rubinson 2004b). However, these new legal rights did not end the prejudice and discrimination that blacks face on a daily basis.

In the latter part of the 1960s, some civil rights activists grew tired of waiting for non-violent strategies to achieve full equality. Militant groups began to form, vowing to seize equality through violence if necessary. One such group was the Black Panther Party. Founded in 1966, the Black Panther Party sought both to protect the rights of African Americans and to strengthen the African American community (Abron 1998; Jones and Jeffries 1998; Burns 1990). Membership in the Black Panther Party expanded rapidly, claiming more than 4,000 members and 33 chapters within its first four years (Hilliard and Cole 1993).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation responded to these demands for equality and suggestions of violence by declaring the Black Panther Party a threat to national security (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990b), while the Panthers' efforts to strengthen black communities were reframed as communist programs (Cable News Network 1996). Local FBI offices were directed to use informants to create dissension among Black Panther members and between the Black Panther Party and other black activist groups (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990a, Burns 1990), and to collect evidence for preemptive legal

prosecution of Black Panther members (FBI Files Parts 6a and 11b). These social control tactics of the FBI have been credited with weakening, and ultimately destroying, the Black Panther Party (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990a).

In this paper, I will explore the relation between national and local efforts at social control. First, I will review previous studies on social movements and social control. Second, I will explain the methodology of this study. Next, I provide a brief history of the Black Panther Party. Fourth, I present the data collected through content analysis of FBI files. In the final section, I will discuss my findings and propose some possibilities for further research in this area.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In the broadest sense, social movement theory seeks to provide an explanation of why some social movements succeed and others fail. As such, these theories are of great importance to scholars seeking to understand the decisions of agents of social control, as they endeavor to prevent the success of a social movement. This literature review will thus first provide a cursory examination of some of the major social movement theories which are most heavily implicated in the FBI's social control efforts, including resource mobilization, political opportunity, framing and development of a collective identity. I will then review previous studies on the specific topic of social control, particularly social control agents and tactics, social control allocation, and the effects of social control.

Social Movement Theory

The earliest work on social movements viewed them as collective behavior that emerged more or less spontaneously among crowds of people (Eyerman and Jamison 1991:11-15). Although views differed as to whether this should be seen as positive, adaptive behavior or as irrational and deviant, theorists were in consensus that a collective identity emerges in a group, an identity which cannot be explained by looking at the individual members of the group. Theorists who focused on the micro level of analysis looked for social learning and creativity, internal reform and emergent norms. On the other hand, macro level theorists focused instead on strains in society that led to collective behavior responses.

Although social movement theory has expanded beyond the early conceptions of collective behavior theory, Snow et al. (1998) recently returned to the strain aspect of collective behavior, considering the connection between the breakdown of aspects of everyday life that are taken for granted and the emergence of social movements. Snow et al. (1998) argue that breakdown theory, a variation on social strain theory, offers an explanation for the emergence of some types of social movements that more fashionable social movement theories lack.

While collective behavior spoke more to why social movements emerge, resource mobilization theory shifted the focus to how social movement actors mobilize (Foweraker 1995). Resource mobilization sought to answer such questions as how a movement organizes, particularly how a movement obtains and manages the resources necessary to maintain, and possibly expand, the movement. Resource mobilization theory also provided the means to analyze why some movements succeed where others fail (Eyerman and Jamison 1991). Further, Foweraker (1995:16) identified three ancillary arguments stemming from resource mobilization theory: “First, dense social networks make mobilization more likely. Secondly, more prosperity favours social mobilization by facilitating resource mobilization in different ways. Finally, levels of prior social organization influence the degree and type of social mobilization.”

With its focus on organization and rationality, resource mobilization generally proved more appealing to social movements scholars than the early collective behavior theories. However, the theory of resource mobilization did not develop without criticism. According to its critics, resource mobilization theory focuses too narrowly on

“instrumental rationality” and a rigid cost-benefit analysis, without sufficient reference to the social and political context (Foweraker 1995:17).

The lack of focus on the political context under the resource mobilization approach was corrected as scholars developed the political opportunity model (Foweraker 1995). Under this approach to social movements study, the political structure is seen as “condition[ing] the emergence, strategy and likelihood of success of social movements” (Foweraker 1995:19). Tarrow (1998:71) defines the scope of interest as “the levels and types of opportunities people experience, the constraints on their freedom of action, and the threats they perceive to their interests and values.” As potential social movement actors perceive an opportunity to bring about change due to the openness of the political system or the presence of elite allies, they become more likely to protest (Van Dyke 2003). Desai’s (2002) study of the women’s movement in India over three distinct phases illustrates the manner in which political structure both shapes a movement and impacts its ability to successfully achieve its goals.

In short, the political opportunity model sought to add to social movement theory through examining why movements occur and succeed during specific periods of history. This approach adds a new dimension to social movement analysis, but, like resource mobilization, it approaches social movements from a macro, structural point of view. To gain a well-rounded picture of a social movement, it is necessary to consider meso and micro levels of analysis as well.

Staggenborg (2002:125) suggests that the most appropriate approach to a study of social movements is to begin at the meso level of analysis, the level of “real action in social movements,” then link to micro and macro processes as appropriate. She argues

that it is critical to focus on meso level community structures to adequately explain social movement processes.

One area of focus for social movement scholars has been the concept of “framing.” Framing refers to the manner in which a social movement organization (SMO) presents the concrete issue or issues it has selected as a goal, in order to win support from those outside the movement (Swarts 2003). According to Williams (2002:249), “frames must tell movement participants what is wrong, what can be done to fix it, and why they should be involved. . . . People must have a sense of an unjust situation that must be corrected, a sense that they can have an effect in changing it, and an identification of who is responsible for the problem.”

Social movement scholars have also been concerned with the process of identity formation. Collective identity forms the basis for collective action, “a ‘shared definition of a group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences, and solidarity” (Reger 2002:173). Identity can be chosen and employed for strategic purposes, but is also shaped, and even sometimes imposed upon a social movement, by external forces (Bernstein 2002; Robnett 2002; Klatch 2002). The formation of a collective identity can be especially problematic for diverse groups, where the risk of factionalism is high (Reger 2002). Robnett (2002) has argued for a relational approach in studying collective identity, to allow for the interaction of challengers and authorities and the shifting of collective identity over time.

Another focus of social movements study has been on the strategizing of movements. Barker and Lavalette (2002) note that the strategy selected by a social movement can have an immense impact on the future of the social movement. Although

linked to the other social movements approaches, strategy does not fit cleanly within any of these approaches. Rather, it encompasses the actor's recognition of structural limits and opportunities and their active decision as to what can and should be done to further social movement goals (Barker and Lavalette 2002). Meyer (2004) further articulated the link between strategy and other approaches to social movement theory in her study of twenty-seven SMOs engaged in peace and conflict resolution in three distinct regions of the world. She theorized that variation in strategy between regions was most likely related to different political structures, while variation in strategy within a region could best be explained by the organization of the SMO.

The most recent development in social movement theory is toward a synthesis of approaches (Meyer 2003; Moodie 2003; Whittier 2003). Moodie (2003:48) criticizes social movement theory as developing "general propositions so abstract as to be either tautological or empty," while overlooking the aspects of agency and reciprocal relationships. Whittier (2003) argues that the distinction between the various approaches is largely invoked for literature reviews and theoretical frameworks, but not employed in the actual analysis. Further work must be done to integrate the internal processes of social movements not only with the exterior political structure, but also within the context of the dominant culture. Meyer (2003:4-6) notes that the most significant challenges to "bridge-building" include uniting perspectives and insights at different levels of analysis, linking identity and political process, developing a cross disciplinary approach, testing theories across multiple movements and contexts, retaining a focus on policy and valuing the ideal of social movements to improve the quality of life.

Social Control Theory

Social control is implicated in each of the preceding approaches to the study of social movements; it delineates the resources available for mobilization and the manner in which they are organized, it limits the political opportunities available, it shapes collective identity and strategy, it produces counter-frames to challenge those of the SMO, and so forth. However, the concept of social control predates social movement theory, dating as far back as the theories of Durkheim and Marx. Existing literature on social control is reviewed below.

Social Control by Private Actors

Although the majority of research into social control of movements has focused on control by the political state, Cress and Myers (2004) argue that such a limited focus on state control serves to also limit scholars' attention in the areas of movement strategy and outcome to those strategies and outcomes that are pitted against social control efforts. One significant area of private social control is through the organization of countermovements (Luders 2003), which provide a collective voice for opposing arguments. While sometimes violent, private repression is also accomplished through non-violent means. Earl (2004) argues that it is impossible to fully understand movement repression without considering the private response, noting the impact of the Ku Klux Klan, White Citizens Councils and lynchings on the Civil Rights movement. In addition to countermovements, Earl notes other forms of private social control as including private threats or the preference of elites to support specific protest goals or forms.

Ferree (2004) identified ridicule, stigma and silencing as potent forms of repression employed against women's movements. According to Ferree (2004), ridicule occurs at the micro level through verbal attacks and name calling, stigma is utilized at the meso level when connection to a group is disvalued thus discouraging identification with a movement and its aims, and silencing occurs at the macro level of society typically through denial of access to the media. Morris (1973) focused on a lack of media access in her study of coverage of the feminist movement, finding that the movement and movement activities receive scant coverage in two Los Angeles newspapers¹, and that the majority of coverage the movement did receive related to non-local events.

Thus, through countermovements, ridicule, and denial of access to the media or other privately controlled resources, private citizens are able to influence a social movement's opportunities for success. However, social control by governmental organizations is often larger in scope and more effective in deterring a social movement, due to the relative power held by governmental entities.

Social Control by Governmental Organizations

Existing research on social control by governmental entities addresses numerous issues, ranging from the success of social control efforts in destroying a movement to the role social control can play, intentionally or unintentionally, in a successful movement outcome (Barkan 1984; Cable, Shriver and Hastings 1999; Stotik, Shriver and Cable 1994). Other studies have focused on aspects or elements of social control itself, rather than studying the impact of social control on a specific movement (Earl, Soule and

¹ It should be noted that Morris included every mention of the women's movement in the selected newspapers, positive or negative, in her coding.

McCarthy 2003; Marx 1991, 1981, 1974). Klein (1992) considered the impact of surveillance of social movements not only on movement participants, but on the general public and its expectations of liberty and justice. McCarthy, Britt and Wolfson (1991) studied the control aspect of channeling mechanisms on social movements, such as the impact of the non-profit provisions of the federal tax code and state charitable solicitation laws, which limit the movement's organization and strategy through incentives rather than overt force. Earl (2003: 46-47) has suggested a multidimensional typology, focused on the identity of the repressive agent, the character of the repressive action and whether the repressive action is observable, as a framework for further study on the subject of social control. A brief review of the literature on repressive social control in the areas of social control tactics, social control allocation and social control effects follows.

Social Control Tactics. Social control literature frequently focuses on the various types of control exercised by authorities, such as appeals to the majority (Cable, Shriver and Hastings 1999; Carley 1997), a direct attack on the social movement (Adamek and Lewis 2004; Barkan 1984; Carley 1997; Marx 1981; Stotik, Shriver and Cable 1994), or intelligence gathering (Carley 1997; Marx 1981). In their study of social control at a nuclear reservation, Cable, Shriver and Hastings (1999:78) found that the government's "economic dominance in the region and its monopoly on information flow" gave the government an effective means of social control, even *after* government errors and cover-ups came to light. Carley (1997:168-171) identified "opinion control"—the provision of disinformation, propaganda and media manipulation—to be a primary element of the FBI's counterintelligence program with respect to the American Indian Movement. Marx (1979) provided an overview of tactics frequently used to undermine social movements,

including the provision of disinformation or propaganda, interference with resources, recruitment, and planned public action, or encouragement of conflict within a group or between groups.

Direct attack on a social movement can take many forms. Two common forms of direct attack are physical attack and legal attack. In their study of the American Indian Movement, Stotik, Shriver and Cable (1994:66) attributed the failure of the movement, at least in part, to direct attack social control efforts of a severe nature, including “legal action, FBI infiltration and surveillance, and murder.” Similarly, Carley (1997:166), in his study of the American Indian Movement, identified physical and legal attack as two of the means of social control employed by the FBI through its counterintelligence program. Carley noted that the effectiveness of a legal attack on a social movement depends as much on the disruption court proceedings cause for a social movement as on actual legal success.

The state can also indirectly influence a social movement through its treatment of countermovements (Luders 2003). Noting that some southern states experienced a significantly greater number of instances of public violence toward civil rights protesters, in spite of having a similar number of non-violent protest events, Luden theorized that the state response to public violence must play a role. He found that states which made some effort to control the white response to protest experienced a much lower overall number of violent responses, while states which overlooked or encouraged a violent white response experienced significant public violence.

According to Marx (1979), the “largest single activity of control” and “prerequisite for most other activities” is information gathering. Intelligence gathering

can involve tactics as diverse as the use of informants, physical surveillance, tracking of computer usage and electronic tracking, with new technology frequently creating new means of undercover information gathering (Marx 1991). Informants not only provide information that can be used for social control measures, but also can encourage unlawfulness through cooperating in illegal acts or generating motive or opportunity to act illegally (Marx 1981:231). Infiltration by informants played a role in the FBI's counterintelligence program with respect to the American Indian Movement, with informants able to encourage the decision to undertake reckless actions, and to create dissent and suspicion within the movement (Carley 1997:167-168).

Marx (1974) also questioned why an informant would agree to participate in the social control of a movement. According to Marx (1974), civilian informants may be motivated by patriotism, coercion, financial reward or disaffection with movement aims or efforts. The escalation from mere informant to agent provocateur is a natural progression, as informants desire to become privy to valuable information and justify their position as an informant. Informants can play an essential role in collecting evidence of conspiracy to commit a crime or similar non-violent criminal activity before an actual crime occurs, thus allowing the instigation of court action without danger to police or the neighboring public. Additionally, informants can simply act as a means of harassing social movement activists, even where no violation of law has occurred (Marx 1974).

Churchill and Vander Wall (1990a) developed a detailed typology of both the forms and functions of various FBI counterintelligence actions. Cunningham (2003b:55) extended their typology, treating form and function independently to create a matrix of

possible form-function pairs, which he then used to analyze FBI actions against the New Left. The top 3 functions of the FBI counterintelligence program identified by Cunningham under this methodology were the hindrance of individual participation in group activities, restriction of the ability to protest and creation of a negative public image. By far, the most common form of action that Cunningham identified was the supply of information to officials. The form-function pair of hindering individual participation through supply of information to officials occurred at a rate nearly triple the next most frequent form-function pair (Cunningham 2003b), thus emphasizing the significant role of information in the Bureau's strategy for social control.

Allocation of Social Control. Recent studies have looked at the allocation of social control. Cunningham (2003a) tested the common assumption that there is some level of rationality to social control efforts. His study of the FBI's counterintelligence program with respect to the New Left concluded that, in fact, the presumed element of rationality was absent in the case of the New Left. Because FBI decisions were largely made at the national level, social control at the local level in some locations bore little correlation to the threat posed by the local social movement unit. Cunningham's study also provided an explanation for the fact that national movements were more frequently the target of the FBI than local movements, even where the activities of the local movement might more logically merit control action (Cunningham 2003a:233-234).

Further work by Cunningham (2003b) has addressed the assumption that social control is an overt response to social movement activities. Again using the FBI counterintelligence program as an example, Cunningham argues that social control can also be covert and proactive, seeking to prevent protest activities rather than just police

them. Cunningham and Browning (2004) analyze the creation of official frames by authorities to justify the allocation of social control; for example, counter-subversive actions were justified against communist groups to protect the political and economic structure of the United States, while black nationalists merited such tactics to counter their supposed violent tendencies and proclivity for social disorder.

Earl, Soule and McCarthy (2003), in contrast, tested the common belief that police in the 1960s responded to protest activity almost universally with violence and repression. Their study concluded that police forces on the whole only infrequently even attended protests, and that police response to protest incidents was, as would seem logical, closely related to the threat posed by the protesting group (Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003).

Effects of Social Control. Another area of concern for social movement scholars has been the effect of social control efforts on movements. Barkan (1984) conducted a comparative study of the effectiveness of physical and legal attack, comparing the effectiveness of violent reactions to the southern civil rights movement with reactions involving legal proceedings. In areas where protest was met with violence, he found that the protesters were likely to become sympathetic to others outside the movement, thus drawing greater support. Conversely, in areas where protest was met with legal action, repression of the social movement acquired a sense of legitimacy. Barkan concluded that, at least with respect to the specific example of the southern civil rights movement, legal control proved a more effective means of social control (Barkan 1984: 562).

Other studies of direct attacks as a means of social control have focused on increasing deviance or radicalization as a result. Adamek and Lewis (1975: 671), in their

study of Kent University student activists, found that violent force utilized as a means of social control “generally has a radicalizing effect on participants. Moreover, [the] research indicate[d] that this radicalization is relatively long lived.” Similarly, Marx (1981: 222) discussed the risk of escalation, where law enforcement efforts actually lead to increasing deviance, in frequency, in severity and in level of commitment. Marx’s study of escalation clearly correlates with social control activities, where repression can lead to increasingly frequent and extreme efforts to draw attention to a cause, and to a movement participant’s increased commitment to that cause. Moreover, when society becomes frightened of social movements and demands more control, increased dissent and violence may occur as a natural result of a broader definition of deviance (Marx 1974: 431).

Theoretical Framework for this Study

Previous literature in the area of social movements and social control provides the framework for this study. In particular, I draw upon Cunningham’s (2003a) work on the allocation of social control at national and local levels, and the work of Cunningham and Browning (2004) on official frames. Together, these two works suggest the need for further consideration of the interaction between national and local agencies to establish and carry out social control efforts.

Cunningham (2003a) proposed that decisions regarding the allocation of social control resources by agencies such as the FBI are made on a national basis, thus allocating more resources to social control of national social movements at the local level, even where local branches of the national social movement would not seem to

merit the level of social control. Building upon this premise, I explore the impact of the FBI's decisions regarding social control of the national Black Panther Party on the level of social control exerted by a local FBI field office on a local branch of the Black Panther Party within North Carolina.

Somewhat similarly, Cunningham and Browning (2004) suggested that an important part of social control at the national level is the employment of official frames of a social movement that would justify the allocation of higher levels of social control and the use of more extreme social control tactics. Whereas a social movement must establish a frame to explain "what is wrong, what can be done to fix it, and why [people] should be involved" (Williams 2002:249), these official frames serve as a counter-frame to a social movement's framing of the issues, reinterpreting the social movement's goals and motivations. Building upon this concept, I examine the FBI's national frame of the Black Panther Party as a violent and extremist group that posed a threat to the United States political system. Further, I analyze the impact of this official frame upon the social control activities of the FBI's Charlotte, North Carolina field office. Finally, I explore the manner in which the Charlotte field office intelligence reports to the FBI headquarters served to either reinforce or challenge this official frame.

Based upon these previous studies, I have constructed the following research questions:

1. How did the social control goals and tactics established at the national level shape the process of information gathering at the local level?

2. What information on the Black Panther Party was gathered at the local level, and how was this information used to contain the social movement activity of the Black Panther Party both locally and nationally?
3. How did the process of information gathering and reporting create and reinforce the local and national frame of the Black Panther Party that the FBI sought to establish?

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Document Analysis

In this project, I will use document analysis of FBI files to examine the interaction of national and local FBI forces to repress Black Panther Party activity locally and nationally . Weber (1990:9) defines content analysis as “a research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text” about the sender, the audience and the message itself. Content analysis may be quantitative, such as categorizing and counting textual frequency or other methods to enable statistical analysis of text (Ahuvia 2001; Hogenraad, McKenzie and Normand 2003). Content analysis may also take a more qualitative approach, moving beyond transforming text into numerical data. Altheide (1987:67) contrasts quantitative and qualitative approaches to content analysis along several dimensions, noting that qualitative analysis is more reflexive and remains focused on the narrative and textual analysis, rather than numerical data for statistical analysis.

For this project, data collection will be by means of qualitative document analysis of FBI files. According to Espland (1993:297), “formal documents produced by an organization are revealing sources for understanding how power is exerted, legitimated and reproduced.” Further, because document analysis allows the analysis of a longer time period than many other methods of analysis, it can reveal changes in the

organization, including differences in the type of information collected. Bailey (1978) observed that document analysis makes available for study subjects that would otherwise be inaccessible, and additionally provides inexpensive access to data.

On the other hand, the lack of context in bureaucratic documents “obliterates social relationships,” while standard categorization can mask the differences in events, causing them to appear similar (Espland 1993:299). Additionally, the choice of language in official documents can obscure conflict and add an illusion of impartiality. Another potential disadvantage associated with document analysis is that the initial author of the document determines the scope of the material; subsequent research is limited by the information the author elected to include, as well as any bias of the author.

Concerns Related to Document Source

Data for this paper has been taken from FBI files which have been publicly released in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This source of data presents some limitations. First, the “completeness of the released files” must be questioned (Cunningham 2003: 215). While it would be difficult to verify that no documents were secretly withheld from the file when it was posted, or that no documents were lost or removed in previous decades, the FBI file appears to be reasonably complete. When sorted by date, there are no obvious gaps in the date sequencing to raise suspicion. Moreover, the exceptions built into FOIA allow the FBI to remove or redact published documents when necessary in the “interest of national security” or for other enumerated reasons (Cunningham 2003:216). While this creates a second issue in analyzing the

documents, the ability to legally withhold certain information should increase confidence that documents are not simply missing.

Redacted and withheld information under FOIA does create some difficulty in coding (Churchill 2003b; Cunningham 2003:216). Where entire pages, or possibly entire documents, are withheld under a FOIA exception, the FBI file contains a single sheet noting the FOIA exception. For purposes of this study, withheld pages/documents have been ignored. Redacted portions pose less of a problem, as in almost every case it was still possible to determine the nature of the documents. However, such redactions create difficulties in performing document analysis, as some of the content of the documents is not available.

A final problem, as is possible with any document source, relates simply to legibility. Portions of many of the documents are not entirely legible, but it was possible in all but one case to determine the general nature of the document from the portions that were legible. The one document that was so illegible as to be unclassifiable was discarded for purposes of this study.

Data Analysis

The FBI file for the Winston-Salem branch of the Black Panther Party is posted on the website of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Electronic Reading Room (<http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/bpanther.htm>). The file, consisting of 2,895 total pages, is posted as 15 separate parts in PDF format. When referenced in this paper, FBI documents are identified by part and by PDF page number within the part.

The file was separated into individual documents, ranging from a single page to lengthy reports. In total, I identified 724 separate documents, which were then sorted according to date² and purpose, either intelligence gathering/reporting, internal procedural matters, or non-intelligence court documents. Documents which fit within multiple categories were placed within the category of their primary purpose.

Documents designated as internal procedural matters include instructions to the Field Office from the Director of the FBI regarding emphasis on particular categories of information and submission of reports, as well as associated responses or requests for direction from the Field Office which do not contain factual intelligence information. Also included in the internal procedural category are communications between the FBI and other agencies or members of the public which do not contain factual intelligence material. Documents placed in the non-intelligence court related category pertain to court proceedings directly involving the FBI. In one instance, the documents relate to a lawsuit filed against the FBI and other governmental agencies stemming from a search and arrest. In a second instance, the documents concern a subpoena served upon an FBI agent as a witness for several Panthers on trial. In each case, the documents reflect the logistics of trial proceedings rather than any intelligence efforts. Documents which include intelligence materials relating to prosecutions of the Panthers or civil court proceedings by private citizens against the Panthers are not included in this category.

² When available, the original document date was used. If the original date was illegible or redacted, the date on which the document was stamped as “received” was used instead. In the few instances when the alternate date was used, it appeared likely that the document year remained the same as the year of the original date. One document posed a slight problem in that there was no distinguishable date on the document. However, as it was located in a subpart consisting entirely of 1969 documents, I felt reasonably confident that the document could safely be included in the 1969 totals.

The remaining documents fall within the intelligence category. This category includes all standard, regularly submitted Field Office reports to the Director as well as all other intelligence related material, such as non-standard reports of special events. Table 1 reflects the separation of documents into these three categories by year, 1968 to 1976. As reflected in Table 1, the vast majority of the documents in the FBI file reflect intelligence gathering activity.

Table 1

Year	Intelligence	Procedural	Court	Total
1968	3	0	0	3
1969	99	6	17	122
1970	212	13	2	227
1971	222	2	10	234
1972	76	6	0	82
1973	20	0	0	20
1974	12	2	0	14
1975	17	4	0	21
1976	1	0	0	1
TOTAL	662	33	29	724

Additionally, the FBI file was broken down into documents generated by the Charlotte field office, documents generated by other FBI field offices throughout the United States, and documents generated by FBI headquarters. Although documents provided to the Charlotte field office are certainly an important part of the intelligence gathering activity and social control efforts of the FBI, their inclusion in annual document totals distorts the level of activity within the Charlotte field office. As shown in Table 2, documents generated by other FBI field offices constitute from 25 to 44 % of the total documents for the years 1969 to 1972. All but nine of these documents were produced by the San Francisco FBI field office, which had investigative responsibility for Oakland, California, location of the Black Panther Party headquarters. The majority of the San

Francisco documents consisted of short memos documenting phone calls made to Panther headquarters from North Carolina or shipments of the Black Panther Party newspaper to the North Carolina group. Full details of all the documents summarized in Table 2, including the document date, file part and PDF page number, are set forth in Appendices A, B and C.

Table 2


Year	FBI Headquarters	NC Field Office	Other FBI Field Offices	Total
1968	0	2	1	3
1969	18	73	31	122
1970	12	123	92	227
1971	7	124	103	234
1972	1	58	23	82
1973	0	19	1	20
1974	2	12	0	14
1975	4	17	0	21
1976	0	1	0	1
TOTAL	44	429	251	724

For purposes of this study, I have focused largely on reports submitted to FBI headquarters by the Charlotte field office, with some attention as well on documents produced by FBI headquarters. I have used a qualitative approach, reviewing the documents for emerging themes centered around the above stated research questions. With respect to documents generated by FBI headquarters, I identified sections of documents which fell within three general categories: (1) general directions for investigation, (2) statements which contribute to an official frame of the Black Panther Party as violent and/or extremist, and (3) statements which contribute to an official frame of the Black Panther Party as engaged in illegal activities other than violence and

sedition. Documents identified as generated by FBI headquarters did not contain any statements that even remotely appeared to reflect positively on the Black Panther Party.

Charlotte field office generated documents were reviewed for content falling into any of five categories. The first category consisted of references to the North Carolina branch of the Black Panther Party as violent and/or extremist, while the second category consisted of references to illegal but non-violent actions. These two categories of content frequently overlapped throughout the documents, as it was very rare to find a reference to illegal activity which was not connected in some way to violent or extremist activity. The third category included any references to financial matters of the North Carolina group. Finally, the fourth and fifth categories aim to identify statements on the North Carolina group that should fairly be considered as neutral, in the sense that there is no reference to illegal or deviant behavior, or as reflecting positively on the North Carolina Panthers.

For general reference, to illustrate the ebb and flow of intelligence reporting activity by the Charlotte field office, Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the change in number of documents produced on a month-by-month basis for the full eight years of documents contained in



the FBI files. Peaks of reporting activity can generally be associated with specific events,

such as a “funeral for justice” planned for August, 1969, or the “Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention” in late 1970. Document totals for these months are inflated due to numerous short reports updating changes in schedules and travel plans with respect to these events. January of 1971, on the other hand, appears to simply have been a very busy month for Black Panther activity in North Carolina.

How did the information gathered at the local level contribute to social control efforts at both the local and national level? Did the framing of the Black Panther Party as a significant national threat appear to influence the manner in which the Charlotte field office reported on the actions of local Black Panther members? Did the local office report activity which challenged the national FBI frame? These questions will be addressed in the following section of this paper.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

In this section, I will first provide brief histories of the Black Panther Party and of the FBI, as a background for the data analysis which follows. Next, I examine the social control goals of the FBI in North Carolina, as conveyed by documents from FBI headquarters to the Charlotte field office, with particular focus on the official FBI frame of the Black Panther Party as a violent and extremist organization which merited the strictest of social control measures. With this foundation established, I then return to the research questions laid out above and endeavor to illustrate some possible answers through data selected from FBI documents originating in the Charlotte field office.

A History of the Black Panther Party

To fully understand a social movement, one must orient the movement in history (Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Green 2000). Like many other social movements, the Black Panther Party has both a vertical and a horizontal historical influence. The Black Panthers were clearly influenced by the long civil rights struggle, dating back to the end of the Civil War. However, they were also shaped by their emergence in the 1960s, an era of significant social protest. The vertical and horizontal history of the Black Panther Party is discussed in turn below.

The Vertical History: The Civil Rights Movement

Following the United States Civil War, a series of Constitutional amendments outlawed the practice of slavery and granted African Americans citizenship (Ezra 2004). However, new legal restrictions that effectively discriminated against African Americans quickly sprang up, particularly in the South, while lynching and other terrorizing measures were used to discourage blacks from exercising any rights. It quickly became apparent that the end of slavery had not brought equality. Even at this early time the fledgling civil rights movement did not share a common vision, with some seeking a return to Africa, some seeking autonomy within the United States, and still others seeking an equal place in the U.S. society (Ezra 2004).

In 1910, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was founded, focusing initially on defending the rights of African Americans and stopping the practice of lynching (Rubinson 2004a). The NAACP experienced success both in courtroom battles and through lobbying efforts. The organization also joined in the fight for equal access to military service for blacks, although the treatment of African American soldiers and regiments fell far short of equality while serving during the First World War. This same decade saw an eruption of race riots throughout the country, and the significant migration of blacks from the South to other parts of the United States. Even as many African Americans found new hope with their improved economic situation, racial tensions throughout the country continued to worsen. The Black Nationalist movement, seeking separation and independence for African Americans, continued to grow, while a black labor movement began fighting for worker's

rights. African Americans were also recruited and welcomed by communist and socialist movements in the United States (Rubinson 2004a).

In the 1930s, the NAACP began a series of legal challenges to the “separate but equal” doctrine (Markowitz 2004). Although the lawsuits failed to secure a change in the law at the time, they were an important step toward the ultimate success with *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954). Another significant event in the 1930s was the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany. While the extreme racism espoused by Hitler and his Nazi followers found some supporters in other parts of the world, it also “undermined the legitimacy and normality of racist ideas and practices for millions of Americans” (Markowitz 2004:164). As with the First World War, the Second World War saw racial discrimination with the armed forces and protest and rioting on the home front.

Markowitz (2004) argues that the Cold War era following World War II proved an important era for the civil rights movement. At the same time the U.S. government and its allies were fighting communism, they also recognized that the communist anti-racist stance could prove appealing to oppressed minorities in the United States. Cold War sentiments provided a foundation for increased repression, and many of the militant civil rights defenders were targeted. Blacks also lost economic ground following the war, earning on average only 54% the income of whites. At the same time, however, African Americans were increasingly represented in federal and state governmental positions and continued to win important court rulings toward equality. Furthermore, the federal government established a commission on race relations that prepared a report in defense of equal rights. All of these factors, and indeed the entire history of struggle for racial

equality, combined to prepare the way for the rampant activism of the 1960s era (Markowitz 2004).

In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*, overturning the “separate but equal” doctrine that had been in effect for more than 50 years (Rubinson 2004b). Although the *Brown* decision would take more than a decade to be fully implemented and enforced, the ruling ushered in an era of increased protest. Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a bus, leading to an organized bus boycott that drew upon the existing social movement network in the area. Black students persistently returned to formerly white schools in an effort to enroll, despite significant threats of bodily harm. Numerous sit-in protests were held in segregated lunch counters, parks, and so forth. “Freedom Riders” organized integrated bus rides into the South. Civil Rights groups also organized marches in various locations, sometimes using children as young as six years old. Throughout all of these efforts, the Civil Rights groups hoped for non-violent means of expressing their resistance to segregation, even as they expected and often encountered violent reactions from the local public and the police. Civil Rights leaders hoped that these violent responses, captured and broadcast on television in many instances, would win the support of moderate viewers (Rubinson 2004b).

Although the strategy of non-violent protest led to some victories, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, some in the movement grew tired of struggling and waiting for the legal changes to effect real change in attitudes and interactions (Rubinson 2004b). In spite of the new laws, racism and oppression *de jure* had merely been traded for racism and oppression *de facto*. Different factions of the

Civil Rights movement turned toward a more militant stance, seeking black power over the earlier goals of harmonious integration. One of these militant Civil Rights organizations was the Black Panther Party.

The Horizontal History: The 1960s

Burns (1990:xi) credits the social activism of the 1960s era with “abolishing legal segregation, ending the Vietnam War, dislodging racial and sexual discrimination, and altering traditional gender roles,” or at least with establishing the impetus to reach these goals in the near future. As with the fight for Civil Rights, most of the social movements that coalesced during this time period had their own rich history of struggle. Further, although significant social change was brought about during this period, the struggle for equal rights for minorities continues to this day. However, there can be no question that the era of the 1960s was marked by significant social activism. While the various movements had different goals, they were also linked, sharing common ideals and a mutual influence. At the same time, there was disagreement among factions within various social movements, as disagreement as to strategy and tactics emerged.

One of the driving forces behind social movements in the United States has been the conflict between social reality and the proclaimed American values of justice, liberty and equality for all (Burns 1990:xiv). This clash of values and reality moved to the forefront in the period following the Second World War, as white males achieved an increasing prosperity while racial minorities and women were largely excluded from the expanding industry. Additionally, mass media, particularly television, changed the way news was disseminated, allowing movements to reach a larger audience. Regardless of

each movement's success in achieving its expressed goals, Burns (1990:174) argues that the collective impact of the 1960s era "reshaped the political and cultural landscape."

The Emergence of the Black Panther Party

The Black Panther Party was born in this era of social activism, founded by Bobby Seale and Huey Newton in October of 1966 (Hayes and Kiene 1998:159). The black panther, which was already in use by another organization, was adopted as the fitting symbol of their beliefs. According to Newton, a cornered panther would try to escape to the left or right, but eventually would come out fighting to escape oppression, just as the new organization intended to do (Cable News Network 1996). The Black Panther Party sought to enforce rights under the U.S. Constitution and existing law, infamously patrolling the police to guard against police brutality (Burns 1990:49). Newton, a law student, researched California law so that the Panthers would be certain to remain within its limits (Cable News Network 1996).

Weary of what they considered to be minor progress by non-violent civil rights activists, Seale and Newton demanded power and equality, and voiced a determination to protect their rights with violence as necessary (Cable News Network 1996; Public Broadcasting Service 1998). The Black Panther Ten-Point Program, a statement of key grievances, illustrates the founders' objections to the current state of affairs in the United States:

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our black community.
2. We want full employment for our people.
3. We want an end to the robbery by the capitalists of our black community.
4. We want decent housing fit for the shelter of human beings

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day situation.
6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.
7. We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people.
8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.
9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.
10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace.

(Source: Appendix A, The Black Panther Party [Reconsidered]). Interestingly, the Black Panther Party incorporated parts of the Declaration of Independence into their Ten-Point Program, effectively declaring that the United States had not lived up to the ideals on which it was founded.

While people are generally familiar with the Panthers' views on the necessity of armed resistance (Jones and Jeffries 1998: 27), the Panthers also espoused a commitment to community service, including programs to provide breakfast to children, provide clothing and food to the poor, and medical programs including sickle cell anemia research and testing and an ambulance service (Abron 1998; Jones and Jeffries 1998). Moreover, the Party encouraged its members to be self-reliant (Rubinson 2004b), discouraged use of narcotics and unnecessary violence, and required its members to abide by set rules and principles covering everything from being polite to becoming politically knowledgeable (Jones and Jeffries 1998).

In its first four years of existence, the Black Panther Party claimed growth from twelve members, producing a sporadic newspaper and with no survival programs in place, to four thousand members in thirty-three chapters, a weekly newspaper, and with survival programs ranging from free Breakfast for Children to legal and medical services

(Hilliard and Cole 1993: 3). There can be no question that the platform established by Newton and Seale appealed to many black activists. One study comparing characteristics of black youth who supported the Black Panther Party with black youth who supported the NAACP found that:

Panther supporters were more distrustful of whites, more inclined to support separation of the United States into 'two nations, one black and one white,' less favorable toward the police, more inclined to reject non-violence, more inclined to see 'guerilla warfare' as a means to help black people, less expectant that black-white problems will be peacefully and constructively resolved, and more fatalistic about the chances that 'people like me' have to succeed in life.

(Levine et al. 1973: 31). Thus, the Black Panther Party established a voice for those who rejected the non-violent approach of earlier generations.

The Black Panther Party in North Carolina. In 1969, the Black Panther Party began purging members who were suspected of being informants; as an associated measure, the Black Panther Party initiated a ban on new membership for a time (Calloway 1977: 69). Although the FBI file labels the Winston-Salem group as members of the Black Panthers from the beginning, the documents within the file reflect that the group was not officially affiliated with the Black Panther Party at the opening of the file in October of 1968 (FBI Files, Part 1, pp. 130-133, 73-79). The Winston-Salem group first affiliated with the Black Panther Party as a chapter of the National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF) sometime in late 1969 (FBI Files, Part 5c, pp.63-64). Although the precise date is not clear, at some subsequent point the Winston-Salem group became an official chapter of the Black Panther Party.

The FBI files paint an interesting picture of the Winston-Salem branch of the Black Panther Party. The chapter suffered significant financial difficulties throughout the investigation period, borrowing money from Black Panther Party headquarters and frequently falling behind on its payments for the Black Panther newspaper, rent and phone bills (FBI Files, Part 6c, pp. 22-24, 64-65). A need for bail money for members was frequently cited as a reason for the money shortages (FBI Files, Part 11b; pp. 91-92; Part 13b, 62-63). The branch stole a meat truck at one point, leading to the arrest and prosecution of several members (FBI Files, Part 9b, pp.4-5), and at another time allegedly contemplated armed robbery to ease its financial woes (FBI Files, Part 12, pp. 162-165).

Additionally, the branch had at least two violent run-ins with law enforcement or local citizens. In August of 1969, after a local restaurant owner allegedly attacked a member who refused to leave the premises, members of the group reportedly returned to the restaurant with guns and shot at the owner and his son (FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 67-71). Five teenaged members were also involved in a shootout with police officers in February 1971, when the officers attempted to evict the group from an apartment (FBI Files, Part 11b, pp. 27-29).

In spite of these difficulties, the Winston-Salem chapter initiated a number of Black Panther community service programs, including the Breakfast for Children program (FBI Files, Part 13a, pp. 22-25), a sickle cell anemia program (FBI Files, Part 14b, pp. 12-13) and a free community ambulance service (FBI Files, Part 15c, pp. 30-31). In sum, the Winston-Salem chapter appears to adequately illustrate both the militant and community service orientations of the Black Panther Party as a whole.

A History of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

The FBI was founded in 1908 as a small group of special agents working under the Department of Justice (Office of Public and Congressional Affairs 1994). Originally named the Bureau of Investigation, it focused on “violations of laws involving national banking, bankruptcy, naturalization, antitrust, peonage, and land fraud” (Office of Public and Congressional Affairs 1994:2-3). While the organization increased in number of agents over the next few decades, even temporarily expanding in scope during the World War I years, big changes did not come until the appointment of J. Edgar Hoover as Director in 1924 (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1990). Hoover is credited with bureaucratizing the organization and instituting new training requirements and investigative procedures (Office of Public and Congressional Affairs 1994). Conversely, Hoover has been criticized for the level of power and control he seized once established as Director (Theoharis and Cox 1988:158-169).

The FBI increased in power as fear of communist groups increased and World War II became a real threat. Hoover was a strong supporter of the Smith Act of 1940³, the anti-sedition statute that provided, in essence, a legal foundation for FBI investigation of anyone Hoover deemed a threat to national security (Gentry 1991). This fear of communist forces would continue throughout the war and into the decades following, providing both focus for the Bureau and justification for its continued growth. In the period before the United States entered World War II, Hoover reportedly secured near-blanket Presidential permission to conduct secret wiretapping surveillance on anyone suspected of subversive activities (Theoharis and Cox 1988:171). Subsequently, in 1956

³ The current version of the Smith Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2385.

under Hoover's direction, the FBI moved beyond simple investigation and into counterintelligence programs, actively seeking to destroy the selected subjects (Gentry 1991). Hoover was purportedly able to avoid much of the oversight to which the FBI theoretically would have been subject through claims that such oversight could compromise the Bureau's work, and in other cases kept separate records of the FBI's more questionable and potentially politically harmful activities (Theoharis and Cox 1988:258, 267).

By the arrival of the 1960s era, "[b]ecause of the crime, the violence, the civil rights issues, and the domestic intelligence consequences" (Office of Public and Congressional Affairs 1994:15), or alternatively because of the propaganda and illegal activities Hoover engaged in (Theoharis and Cox 1988:328-332), the FBI was in position to play a huge role in the social control efforts directed toward numerous emerging social movement organizations.

Hoover died on May 2, 1972, approximately half way through the investigative period of the Charlotte Black Panther files, having served as Director of the FBI for nearly 48 years (Office of Public and Congressional Affairs 1994). Although the FBI grew in power and authority exponentially during his tenure, the subsequent Director would not control the same empire, due to changing laws such as the Freedom of Information Act (Theoharis and Cox 1988:431), and the changing political and social environment of the country. However, by this time, the FBI had largely succeeded in damaging the Black Panther movement and other targeted social movement organizations of the Sixties era.

The FBI and Social Control of the Black Panther Party.

The Black Panther Party triggered extreme efforts at social control at a national level. Churchill and Vander Wall (1990a:63) quote a “Special Report” in 1970 as describing the Black Panther Party as “the most active and dangerous black extremist group in the United States.” Hoover referred to the Panthers as “the greatest threat to the internal security of the country” (Gentry 1991:618; Churchill and Vander Wall 1990b:123). Even the apparently positive social programs were attacked, with Hoover referring to the Breakfast for Children program as “communist-inspired” (Cable News Network 1996), and an “effort to create an image of civility . . . and to fill adolescent children with their insidious poison” (Gentry 1991). He reportedly instructed his agents “to exploit all avenues of creating . . . dissension within the ranks of the BPP . . . recipient offices are instructed to submit imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP” (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990a:63). Churchill and Vander Wall (1990a) credit the FBI counterintelligence program as playing a key role in the deaths of several high ranking Panthers. Grady-Willis (1998) thoroughly details the history of arrests and incarceration of Black Panther Party members, whom he considers to be political prisoners. Alternatively, Jeffries (2002) provides an in-depth look at the scope of repression levied against the Black Panther Party’s Baltimore chapter, including legal, covert and violent repression.

The FBI also sought to derail any level of cooperation among Black Nationalist groups and to increase dissension among civil rights factions (Burns 1990; Churchill and Vander Wall 1990b). One favored tactic was the use of anonymous mailings to sow distrust between groups, which on occasion provoked violent battles between groups.

FBI informants also provided information to facilitate raids on Panther offices and residences, sometimes resulting in the injury or death of Panther leaders and members. The FBI further reportedly encouraged criminal prosecution of Party members whenever possible, with the trials disrupting the organization even when acquittals followed. Within the Party itself, the FBI spread rumors that various members were FBI infiltrators to create distrust and forged documents to produce suspicion of each other among Panther leaders (Burns 1990; Churchill and Vander Wall 1990b). The scope of FBI tactics portrays a focused and unrelenting effort to destroy the Black Panther Party. Interestingly, in spite of all the documentary evidence cited in studies such as those reviewed herein, the “Abridged History of the Federal Bureau of Investigation” published by the Department of Justice claims that “[w]iretapping and other intrusive techniques were discouraged by Hoover in the mid-1960s . . .” (Office of Public and Congressional Affairs 1994).

The FBI’s Social Control Goals in North Carolina. FBI documents included in the file for the Winston-Salem branch of the Black Panther Party clearly indicate the social control goals of the Bureau. One purpose behind intelligence gathering was to be forewarned of planned activities, particularly incidents which had the potential to become violent:

You should in the future advise the Bureau by appropriate expeditious communication of ***information developed which could lead to confrontation between police and members of the BPP. . . .***

With the establishment of a “Community Information Center,” in High Point, North Carolina, by the Winston-Salem, North Carolina NCCF chapter, you should ***intensify your informant coverage at both locations so that you can be informed in advance of what actions are***

contemplated by members and officials of this organization. It would have been highly significant to know in advance whether or not members plan to engage in a shoot-out if local authorities attempted to serve eviction notice. . . .

(FBI Files, Part 11b, pp.20-21; emphasis added).

However, the FBI was not solely interested in the prevention of violence, but also hoped to find grounds to legally prosecute Panther members:

. . . Both offices should bear in mind the possibility subjects' presence in the Charlotte area may be in furtherance of BPP organizational activities in that area and that their efforts in this regard, as well as in connection with any violent activities arising out of local school integration policy demonstration, may constitute violations of Federal laws including the Antiriot statutes.

. . . [A]lso be alert to the development of information in his regard to indicate possible violations of existing Federal firearm statutes. . . .

(FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 80-81). Instructions to track shipments of Black Panther newspapers and other publications also provide insight into the Bureau's more covert goal:

The Department, *in connection with efforts to develop a prosecutive theory against the BPP for the violation of security statutes*, has previously requested this Bureau to develop evidence regarding documents of the BPP which urge its revolutionary doctrines and to also develop evidence showing a cohesion or unity between national headquarters of the BPP and its chapters and affiliates. . . .

It is anticipated that in the event of prosecution of the BPP, it may be extremely important to be able to conclusively prove that a specific BPP publication containing revolutionary doctrines was in fact shipped by the BPP to various BPP members and/or supporters. Accordingly, it is essential that this Bureau develop evidence of this nature in order to support possible prosecution of the BPP. . . .

(FBI Files, Part 6a, p.73; emphasis added).

A January 5, 1970, teletype from the Director requested that Charlotte arrange interviews with informants and an attorney appointed to “evaluate prosecutive potential under Smith Act” (FBI Files, Part 4b, p 63). The Smith Act, an anti-sedition statute, prohibits advocating the overthrow of the government, publishing any printed matter which advocates the overthrow of the government, or organizing any group which advocates the overthrow of the government. Previous versions of Sedition Acts during the history of the United States frequently had been used to prosecute and incarcerate critics of government policy, even where such critics had done nothing more than voice objections through speech or print (Kohn 1994; Miller 1951), so it is within reason to speculate that the Bureau hoped to prosecute members of the Black Panther Party even absent any violence on their part. At the time of the FBI investigation into the Black Panther Party, violation of this statute was punishable by a fine of up to \$20,000.00 or a prison sentence of up to 20 years. The FBI’s references to the Smith Act of 1940 and instructions from the Director to keep in mind possible weapons violations and security statutes illustrate the FBI’s goal to find evidence under which members of the Black Panther Party could be prosecuted criminally.

The Official FBI Frame of the Black Panther Party. The FBI’s official frame of the Black Panther Party as violence prone, extremist and a significant threat to national security has been referenced throughout this paper. This same official frame is established within the Charlotte field office files in documents produced by FBI headquarters. The earliest dated document from headquarters includes a statement that “[t]he violence-prone, black extremist BPP has recently sent organizers to Greensboro,

North Carolina, where BPP was organized, a guerilla training session was held on a college campus and plans were discussed to shoot police with rifles” (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 116). Other Headquarters documents provide characterizations of Black Panther members as “practically threatening” local government officials (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 111) or as being in possession of a weapon at all times (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 107). A letter over the signature of Hoover to an unidentified citizen of Winston-Salem, who had written to complain about the Panthers, states “the FBI conducts a considerable amount of investigation regarding the activities of those individuals and organizations which seek to undermine our basic freedoms and threaten the internal security of our country” (FBI Files, Part 4b, p. 1).

The majority of regular Charlotte field office reports (excluding short memoranda documenting breaking intelligence) include the attachment of an Appendix containing a characterization of the Black Panther Party. Based upon instructions from FBI headquarters to the Charlotte office to update their version of the appendix (FBI Files, Part 15b, p. 41), it would appear likely that these appendices either originated from FBI headquarters or were implemented nationwide following development in one of the field offices. The original Black Panther Party characterization, included with reports from the inception of the file through late 1970, stated that co-founder Huey Newton was imprisoned on a manslaughter conviction in connection with the death of a police officer, indicated that violence toward police is a central aspect of the Black Panther Party, tied the Black Panther Party to communist teachings, and included a quote from the Black Panther Party newspaper regarding the overthrow of the United States Government (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 61). The items included in this one-page characterization of the Black

Panthers clearly demonstrate the official frame put forth by the FBI. Of note, there is no mention in this characterization of the Panthers of any of the community service programs the Black Panther Party had enacted.

An updated characterization of the Black Panther Party, for attachment to reports, appears in the file near the end of 1970. The revised version dropped the information regarding Huey Newton's manslaughter conviction and imprisonment, as his conviction had been reversed on appeal, but retained references to guerilla tactics and violence toward the police. Additionally, the new appendix adds quotes from new Panther leaders David Hilliard:

We advocate the very direct overthrow of the government
by way of force and violence.

and Emory Douglas:

The only way to make this racist US government administer justice to the people it is oppressing, is . . . by taking up arms against this government, killing the officials, until the reactionary forces . . . are dead, and those that are left turn their weapons on their superiors, thereby passing revolutionary judgment against the number one enemy of all mankind, the racist U.S. government.

(FBI Files, Part 8a, p. 12). This modification of the standard characterization of the Black Panther Party certainly does not represent any softening in the official frame of the group. Again, there is no mention of any of the positive aspects of the Panther platform.

A new appendix appears at the end of a Charlotte document dated September 16, 1974 (FBI Files, Part 15b, p. 40). In this version of the appendix, the official FBI frame finally acknowledges the Black Panther Party community programs and the less militant stance of the later years. However, the overall picture of the Panthers continues to be of a revolutionary group seeking the overthrow of the U.S. government:

. . . The Party operates the Black Panther International News Service (BPINS), which publishes a newspaper called “The Black Panther,” which at one time openly advocated the use of guns and guerilla tactics in a revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people, but since early 1971 has spoken for a survival program pending revolution.

David Hilliard, quoted in the “New York Times,” edition of September 13, 1969, stated, “We advocate the very direct overthrow of the Government by way of force and violence.”

In the April 25, 1970, edition of “The Black Panther,” an article advocated the taking up of arms against the Government, killing officials, “thereby passing revolutionary judgment against the number one enemy of all mankind, the racist U.S. Government.”

During the years 1971-1973, the Party leadership has avoided such extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the established order and urging unity in the black community. . . .

However, during an interview in January, 1972, Newton commented that the current social system will probably have to be destroyed in the long run, but “we can’t deal with it before it is time to deal with it.”

In an interview appearing in the May, 1973 edition of “Playboy” magazine, Newton said that the Panthers’ “chief ambition is to change the American government by any means necessary,” but said he felt that “ultimately it will be through armed violence, because the American ruling class will not give up without a bitter struggle.”

(FBI Files, Part, 15b, p. 40). It is interesting that, while acknowledging at least an outward change in the Panthers’ stance “since early 1971”, this characterization of the Black Panther Party retains quotes from 1969 and 1970 that paint the Panthers as a violent group. Moreover, even in acknowledging the change in the groups’ approach to bringing about change, the appendix leaves little doubt that the FBI still considers the Black Panther Party a revolutionary threat.

The official characterization of the Black Panther Party was updated again in early 1975. With this revision, the quotes from the Panthers' early years were dropped in favor of the following statements:

. . . While openly advocating direct overthrow of the U.S. Government by force and violence until 1971, leaders have since avoided extreme statements in favor of calling for action within the established order. Newton, in an interview appearing in the May, 1973, issue of "Playboy" magazine, stated the Panthers' chief ambition is to change the American Government by any means necessary but that ultimately the change will be through armed violence.

Despite its claimed dedication to community service, indicators of the BPP's continued attraction to violence persist. . . .

(FBI Files, Part 15a, p. 63). Two items are of particular note in this version of the appendix. First, where the "Playboy" magazine quote from Huey Newton in the previous version of the appendix indicated that Newton "felt" the desired change in the government would result from violence, this version of the appendix indicates that Newton said the change "will" result from violence. While this is only a small difference in wording, in the first instance there is the implication that Newton personally believes violence will be necessary, while in the second instance the implication is that the Black Panther Party continues to plan a violent revolution. The second item of note in this version of the appendix is the reference to the Panthers' "claimed" focus on community service, a rather strong suggestion that the community programs started by the Black Panther Party were nothing but a cover.

The final version of the appendix characterization of the Panthers is found attached to the penultimate Charlotte field office report. This version is almost identical to the previous version, except that the final paragraph documenting the Panthers' "continued attraction to violence" has been deleted from the characterization. However,

the final version of the appendix does retain the Huey Newton “Playboy” magazine quote, with its reference to a violent revolution. Thus, although the official characterization of the Black Panther Party went through several revisions during the investigative period of the Charlotte field office files, the FBI frame of the Panthers as a violent and extremist revolutionary group persisted.

The Influence of Nationally Mandated Goals on Local Intelligence Gathering

The first research question proposed in this study asks how the social control goals and tactics established at the national level shaped information gathering at the local level. Charlotte field office documents closely follow the FBI goals identified previously as (1) to warn of impending activity, (2) to provide evidence for prosecutions under the Smith Act, and (3) to provide evidence for possible weapons violations charges under local and state statutes. Each of these goals is addressed in turn.

Warning of Impending Activity.

The FBI Files include many informant reports of imminent violent episodes, which the Charlotte office was then able to share with other local law enforcement agencies. In May of 1969, Charlotte reported on a planned rally, with organizers hoping for a “police confrontation,” adding a note at the end of the report that “local and state authorities [were] cognizant. Military and secret service advised” (FBI Files, Part 1, pp. 65-66). Similarly, a November 1972 letter in the file indicated that the Winston-Salem Panthers were planning some form of violence in connection with the December trial of

several members, and also advised that the Panthers were believed to have conducted their own surveillance activities on FBI agents (FBI Files, Part 14a, pp. 36-37).

FBI reports were not limited to events where violence was anticipated. Rather, the Charlotte field office also reported on and shared intelligence regarding planned rallies and demonstrations (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 66; FBI Files, Part 2b, p. 45; FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 12-14; FBI Files, Part 3b, p. 83; FBI File, Part 4a, pp. 32-34).

Interestingly, I did not locate any reports within the Charlotte files which would suggest that any identified plans for violence were actually carried out, nor that any such informant warnings allowed either local police forces or the local FBI office to prevent a violent episode that the Black Panther Party had allegedly planned. However, this would still seem to be a legitimate FBI activity, as one would not expect a law enforcement agency to ignore intelligence of possible violent or confrontational activities planned by any group. On the other hand, the remaining stated goals of the FBI, collecting evidence for possible preemptive prosecutions under sedition and firearm statutes, have more of a feel of active repression than mere law enforcement.

Evidence for Prosecutions under the Smith Act of 1940.

The Charlotte field office unquestionably followed instructions to search out evidence for possible use in the prosecution of members of the Black Panther Party under the Smith Act of 1940. The FBI Files reveal 7 reports⁴ designed specifically to collate information allegedly evidencing a conspiracy to commit sedition, and these are

⁴ FBI Files, Part 6c p. 70-Part 6d p. 20; FBI Files, Part 7a, pp. 62-98; FBI Files, Part 7b, pp. 36-98; FBI Files, Part 8a, pp. 42-78; FBI Files, Part 8b, pp. 30-55; Part 10a, p. 3-Part 10b, p. 87; FBI Files, Part 12, pp. 3-146;

consistently the most lengthy and comprehensive reports in the file. Smith Act reports were submitted by the Charlotte field office in May, August, September, October and November of 1970, and January and April of 1971.

The Table of Contents for each of these reports sets forth the same five categories of information to be included: (1) Revolutionary Program and Policies as Expressed by Black Panther Party Leaders, (2) Acts in Furtherance of the Revolutionary Program or Policies, (3) Teaching of the Revolutionary Program, (4) Documents Urging the Revolutionary Program, and (5) Evidence of National Unity. Copies of letters and summaries or transcripts of speeches and press conferences largely constituted the category of Revolutionary Program and Policies as Expressed by Black Panther Party Leaders. Under the category of Acts in Furtherance of the Revolutionary Program or Policies, the Charlotte field office summarized violent activities that occurred during the investigative period of the report which were reported in the Black Panther Party newspaper, including copies of articles with each summary. Teaching of the Revolutionary Program typically focused on summaries of the political education and liberation school programs, as well as identifying new participants in these programs. The fourth category, Documents Urging the Revolutionary Program, included copies of leaflets, pamphlets and flyers which appeared in the local area during the reporting period. The final category of Evidence of National Unity provided additional articles from the Black Panther Party newspaper, particularly articles regarding events in the North Carolina area, along with a general statement regarding newspaper sales in the area.

This emphasis on reporting intelligence specifically in the context of Smith Act violations illuminates just how seriously the FBI stressed the goal of a preemptive prosecution for sedition. The Charlotte field office Smith Act reports for the most part do not include unique intelligence information, but rather synthesize previously reported information that has evidentiary value for a Smith Act prosecution in a single document. The most logical explanation for the continued submission of these reports is that Charlotte was following a national mandate to collect this information.

Evidence for Firearms Prosecutions.

Although the FBI Files are unclear on whether FBI intelligence ever actually provided evidence for a legal prosecution of North Carolina Panthers, the Charlotte field office documents reflect a constant focus on the question of possession of weapons by North Carolina Panthers. Reports frequently include a section devoted to the topic of weapons acquisition, with entries such as “observed in possession of a small caliber pistol” and “each carrying a shotgun. [Redacted] had on a hunting jacket with shotgun shells in the designated slots in the jacket” (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 33). In September of 1970, the Charlotte office reported that the Panthers were barricading their local headquarters, except for “gun ports,” based upon “[a] composite of information from confidential sources” (FBI Files, Part 7a, p. 30). Ten days later it was “reported that the BPP Headquarters has been sandbagged inside with the windows barricaded with plywood and heavy screens placed over the outside of the first floor windows. An undetermined number of shotguns with shells were observed inside the headquarters” (FBI Files, Part 8b, p. 1).

Interestingly, when the North Carolina Black Panther headquarters were severely damaged in a fire, leading to the entry and inventorying of the premises by various governmental agencies, only a “limited number of firearms in headquarters” were found (FBI Files, Part 8a, p. 22). Similarly, the official inventory report by the Winston-Salem police department, following entry with a search warrant for stolen goods, identified only “two U.S. model one nine one seven thirty point zero rifles and one twelve gauge shotgun along with numerous items of office equipment, including typewriters, duplicating machines, and two cameras” (FBI Files, Part 9a, p.81). A report in June of 1971, while it indicates the group was in possession of approximately a dozen rifles and shotguns, expressly notes that none of the weapons constitute a violation of firearms law (FBI Files, Part 13b, p. 83).

Intelligence Gathering in North Carolina

The second research question proposed in this study concerns the information actually collected by the Charlotte field office and its significance in the social control efforts at both the local and national levels.

Use of FBI Intelligence in the North Carolina Area.

Intelligence gathered by the Charlotte field office served two significant purposes at the local level. First, the information gathered was frequently made available to other law enforcement agencies, including local police forces. Second, the scope of the information gathered, particularly with regard to internal financial affairs and other

struggles, revealed to the Charlotte field office that the Winston-Salem branch of the Black Panther Party did not pose much of a threat as a social movement.

Sharing of Information. Numerous documents in the file contain statements to the effect that FBI intelligence was shared with local police forces or some other law enforcement agency. For example, a January 12, 1971 report of planned sniper attacks on police forces indicates that “Chief of Police on duty, Captain and Forst Countyso, have been advised and this matter is receiving aggressive attention” (FBI Files, Part 9a, p. 78). Similarly, with the transfer of a Panther member under arrest from the local hospital to the local jail, the Charlotte report indicates that “High Point PD alert to possible escape and rescue attempt” (FBI Files, Part 11b, p. 47). Reports of a possible armed robbery were also shared with other law enforcement authorities (FBI Files, Part 12, p. 163), as were numerous reports of planned rallies and demonstrations (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 66; FBI Files, Part 3b, p. 12; FBI Files, Part 3b, p. 83; FBI File, Part 4a, pp. 32-34).

This sharing of information among different law enforcement agencies assisted each agency in their social control efforts. For example, the FBI was able to occasionally warn the local police force of potentially violent events, while police investigation of the Panthers contributed to the FBI’s efforts to monitor and track Panther activity.

Evaluation of the Actual Threat Level. By the midpoint of 1970, Charlotte reports regularly contained information that the financial condition of the North Carolina Panthers was poor to desperate. Various reports in July of 1970 provide somewhat contradictory information: that the group had such difficulties that members were reduced to one meal per day (FBI Files, Part 6b, p. 18), that the group was reduced to

charging food for the Breakfast for Children program (FBI Files, Part 6a, p. 23), but that the group still had sufficient resources to get along (FBI Files, Part 6, p. 54). In August of 1970, the Charlotte office documented that the Winston-Salem group's telephone had been disconnected for nonpayment, but suggested that the group was still able to pay its rent (FBI Files, Part 7b, p. 103). A September 21, 1970, report referred to the state of their finances as "deteriorating," adding that "contributions from the general public have decreased" (FBI Files, Part 7a, p. 35). By November 20, 1970, Charlotte informant reports indicate that "contributions are nonexistent, finances are poor, they are having difficulty paying their bills and at times use the newspaper money for expenses. BPP Headquarters is upset because they cannot afford a telephone and their newspaper sales are down" (FBI Files, Part 8a, p. 89). Reports of similar financial difficulties appear in December, 1970 (FBI Files, Part 9b, p. 25) and January, 1971 (FBI Files, Part 11b, p. 87). By April of 1971, informants were reporting that the group was considering armed robbery as a means of escaping their financial difficulties (FBI Files, Part 12, p. 94), while a July 1971 report indicated the members were trying to obtain food stamps from an ex-member as they were "starving" (FBI Files, Part 13b, p. 48). With the exception of a few short periods, this financial difficulty appears to have been a perpetual problem for the Winston-Salem group (FBI Files, Part, 14a, p. 28).

Information reported by the Charlotte field office also suggests that the Winston-Salem Panthers were having less success with their programs than the Panthers publicly claimed. For instance, one report indicates that the group claimed to feed forty children per day through the "Breakfast for Children" program, while agent surveillance placed the number of participating children at only half that (FBI Files, Part 4a, p. 81). Later

reports place the number of participating children at approximately fifteen, again against Black Panther Party claims of feeding thirty to forty children (FBI Files, Part 6a, p. 40). As the financial difficulties of the group reportedly increased, reports of the Breakfast for Children program began to indicate that no more than ten children were being fed, while the Party members were consuming food themselves which had been donated for the breakfast program (FBI Files, Part 13a, p. 25).

Intelligence on the Liberation School would have likewise shown the Charlotte field office that the Panthers were not finding a great deal of success. The initial launch of the Liberation School reportedly failed due to lack of participants (FBI Files, Part, 14c, p. 5). A subsequent report in August, 1972, indicates that only eight to ten children were attending, and that “with the inducement of receiving a free lunch prior to each class” (FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 21).

Similarly, although the Panthers’ Free Ambulance Program started off well with funding through a large grant, subsequent reports demonstrate that the Charlotte field office was aware that this community program was also in great difficulty. For example, one Charlotte report on a funding drive for the ambulance program refers to it as “a complete failure” (FBI Files, Part 15b, p. 1). Another report states:

During May and early June, 1974, donations to the Party were good, and the Free Ambulance Program was able to operate on a full-time basis, seven days a week, 24 hours a day, and Panther members were able to pay monthly bills on time without difficulty. Since early July, 1974, funding has again become difficult and the BPP’s ambulance was forced to come to a complete halt during August and early September, 1974, for lack of funds, and additionally, the liability insurance on the ambulance was allowed to lapse because of lack of payment

(FBI Files, Part 15b, p. 19).

Thus, the intelligence gathered by the Charlotte field office demonstrated in a fairly clear manner that the Winston-Salem branch of the Black Panther Party was not a significant threat as a social movement organization. The group simply did not have the funds, the membership numbers, or the community support necessary to make much of an impact on the social structure of the North Carolina.

Use of FBI Intelligence in National Social Control Efforts.

At the national level, intelligence gathered in North Carolina contributed to the body of evidence for a possible Smith Act prosecution against national Black Panther leaders and provided feedback on the effectiveness of COINTELPRO measures. Each of these is discussed in turn.

Contributions to Possible Smith Act Prosecutions. As discussed above, the Charlotte field office files reflect a significant focus on gathering evidence for the possible prosecution of Black Panther Party members for seeking to overthrow the U.S. government. For example, an April 1975 report states:

This investigation is based on information which indicates that [redacted] in view of his affiliation with the Black Panther Party (BPP) (See Appendix), is engaged in activities which could involve a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2383 (Rebellion or Insurrection), 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy), or 2385 (Advocating the Overthrow of the United States Government).

(FBI Files, Part 15a, p. 46). Another report, which is captioned “Black Panther Party, Racial Matters, Smith Act of 1940, Seditious Conspiracy, Rebellion and Insurrection,” discusses the purging of a former Black Panther member (FBI Files, Part 3a, pp. 18-24).

Although not stated so overtly, numerous other reports provided possible Smith Act evidence through tracking the association of individuals within the Black Panther Party (FBI Files, Part 1, pp. 80-82; FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 16-21; FBI Files, Part 7b, pp. 22-23; FBI Files, Part 8b, pp. 64-65). Other evidence was provided through transcripts of speeches made by Black Panther Party members (FBI Files, Part 5a, p. 58 through Part 5c, p. 50; FBI Files, Part 6d, pp. 30-70). Yet additional potential evidence was obtained through the collection and validation of handwriting samples of different Panthers (FBI Files, Part 4a, pp. 87-88; FBI Files, Part 4b, p. 33). In fact, the FBI considered association with the Black Panthers to be such a serious matter that in one instance the Charlotte office issued a memo to explain the presence of white Yale college students acting as pallbearers at the funeral of an assassinated Black Panther Party leader, so that the students would not be considered in sympathy with the Black Panthers (FBI Files Part 1, p. 6).

While it does not appear that any Black Panther Party members were actually charged with sedition, North Carolina intelligence certainly contributed to the decision of whether a Smith Act prosecution was a feasible goal. Further, the Charlotte field office's part in tracking travel of the members, and in transcribing speeches and press conferences which occurred in North Carolina, contributed to the general body of FBI knowledge on the Black Panther Party.

Analysis of the Effectiveness of COINTELPRO Measures. Another contribution of North Carolina intelligence is found in regular reports on the effects of COINTELPRO measures, particularly the FBI's efforts to create dissension within the Black Panther Party. Beginning in 1971, Charlotte reports regularly comment on the loyalty of the

Winston-Salem Panthers to the Huey Newton faction of the Black Panther Party (FBI Files, Part 13a, p. 32; FBI Files, Part 13a, p. 94; FBI Files, Part 13b, p. 65; FBI Files, Part 13b, p. 92; FBI Files, Part 14a, p. 22; FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 7; FBI Files, Part 14c, p. 4; FBI Files, Part 15c, p. 59). Although evidence of a split in the national Black Panther Party is lacking in the Charlotte files, the continual reporting back on any factionalism illustrates the importance that FBI headquarters placed in that particular strategy of social control. The local reports thus assisted in measuring the effectiveness of such tactics in destroying the Black Panther Party as a national social movement.

Reinforcement of the Official Frame

The final research question proposed in this study asks whether the reporting of locally gathered intelligence serves as a reinforcement of the national official frame. In this section, I first discuss the manner in which Charlotte field office reports reinforced the official FBI frame, first by means of the repetitive reporting of violent events, and second through the use of language to convey a negative image even where objectively Black Panther Party actions seem to have been neither violent nor extremist. I then discuss some instances in which the Charlotte reports actually seem to challenge the official frame.

Reinforcement of the National Frame.

The reports from the Charlotte field office to FBI headquarters reinforced the official frame of the Black Panther Party as a violent, extremist group in two significant ways. First, the established reporting procedure created a situation in which the same

negative information was provided repeatedly to FBI headquarters, while positive or neutral information, or identified potential threats which never came to pass, tended to be reported only a single time. This served to keep episodes of violence at the forefront, even when no new violence had occurred, and also to give the impression that a greater number of violent incidents had occurred than the actual number of violent incidents. Second, the use of language in the Charlotte field office reports more often than not tended to reinforce the official frame, even when reporting on the absence of violent or extremist activity. Each of these is discussed below.

Charlotte Field Office Reporting Procedure. FBI instructions on reporting procedures state “[i]n the event you do not submit an airtel or teletype containing significant intelligence information within any two-week period of your investigation, submit at the end of that two-week period an airtel summarizing the significant developments during the period” (FBI Files, Part 1, p.115). The Charlotte field office interpretation of these instructions appears to have included an immediate report of instances, very often a follow-up report with greater details of the incident, periodic follow-up with each new development, and inclusion in periodic reports. Because of this, a single incident, or even an informant report of a possible incident, was likely to appear in the FBI Files on multiple occasions.

For example, a January 29, 1969 report, apparently based on informant information,⁵ stated:

Black Panther Party members now in Greensboro had recently discussed the following. They suggested that some sort of disturbance be formulated in the Negro section of Greensboro, and that when a police car answered the call

⁵ As is frequently the case, the identity of the person providing the information has been redacted.

that rocks and bottles would be thrown at the police car. This in turn would cause additional cars to come to the area and, when a fairly large congregation of police had assembled, then the Black Panthers would “cut down on them” with rifles from hidden positions.

(FBI Files, Part 1, p. 123). This same information is subsequently included in a February 7, 1969 report (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 119). It was then incorporated in a report dated January 5, 1970, in which the plan was connected with a March 1969 confrontation at a local university during which police officers were fired upon (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 74). This then lent additional credence to an informant report on January 12, 1971 of “plans to send out sniper teams tonight to retaliate against police for todays [sic] raid on BPP Headquarters” (FBI Files, Part 9a, p. 78), in spite of the fact that no hard evidence was ever developed that the North Carolina group had ever utilized snipers against police.

Another example of the repetitive nature of the Charlotte field office’s reporting procedures began with an armed confrontation between a group of Panther members and a local restaurant owner. On the date of the incident, August 16, 1969, the Charlotte office submitted an urgent report (FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 67-71). Subsequent reports on the confrontation were also provided on August 26, 1969 (FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 7-8), and on October 29, 1969 (FBI Files, Part 3a, pp. 4-5). This matter was then incorporated in a January 5, 1970 report on “Violent Acts” in North Carolina (FBI Files, Part 4a, pp. 71-72).

Yet another example of repetitive reporting involved a shootout between police and Panther members when the police attempted to evict the Panthers from a residence they were renting. The initial incidence was reported on February 10, 1971 (FBI Files, Part 11b, p. 39), with a more detailed report of the incident provided later that same day

(FBI Files, Part 11b, pp. 27-29). An additional report of this matter was provided on February 12, 1971, including information on criminal charges filed against the five Panther members present at the time of the shootout, all of whom were teen-agers(FBI Files, Part 11b, pp. 41-45). Yet further reports appear on February 14, 1971, updating information on one of the Panther members who had been slightly injured in the confrontation (FBI Files, Part 11b, p. 47), and on February 17, 1971, reviewing the incident and reporting on arrests made in connection with it (FBI Files, Part 11b, pp52-54). A recap of the incident also appears in the April 1971 Smith Act Report (FBI Files, Part 12, pp. 136-137). Finally, in May of 1971, the file contains yet another report, this time particularly concerning the trial of the matter, but also including a recap of the incidence itself. (FBI Files, Part 13b, pp. 95-97). The file continues to contain brief mentions of the matter as the trial progressed, each with a short reference to a shootout with the police (FBI Files, Part 13b, p. 24; FBI Files, Part 13b, pp. 31-33; FBI Files, Part 13b, p. 42). Thus, a single incident involving only five Panthers, all of them very young, appeared in at least ten different documents over a period of more than six months. While a violent confrontation with police is certainly newsworthy, in none of the subsequent reports is there any mention of further violent acts or plans for reprisals. The continual reporting of this matter can only serve to create and reinforce the frame of the Black Panther Party as a violent group that targets law enforcement.

A particularly interesting example of repetitive reporting involves an informant report that the Winston-Salem Black Panthers, in dire financial straits, were considering armed robbery. The first mention of armed robbery occurs in an “urgent” April 14, 1971 teletype, which is based on information from someone “with whom there has been

insufficient contact from which to judge reliability but who is in a position to furnish reliable information.”

[I]t was determined that the group is considering committing armed robberies to raise money due to their financial difficulties. During the conversation, the possibility of bringing in outside Black Panther Party members to commit these robberies [was] discussed noting major portion of the local Black Panther Party members are well known to law enforcement.

Source stressed that no actual target has been pointed out, however, this is general discussion among the members and in the event their financial situation becomes more desperate, the possibility exists that the group will plan further in this regard.

(FBI Files, Part 12, pp. 162-163). The April 1971 Smith Act Report, dated approximately one week later, states:

[redacted] other members of the Black Panther Party at Winston-Salem, North Carolina, it was determined that the group is considering committing armed robberies to raise money due to their current financial difficulties. Also discussed was the possibility of bringing in outside Black Panther Party members to commit these robberies, noting that the group at Winston-Salem, North Carolina, is well known to the local police and other law enforcement and appear to be “laying low.”

(FBI Files, Part 12, p. 94). A third mention of possible plans for armed robberies occurs in an April 28, 1971 report, consisting of nothing more than a brief mention (FBI Files, Part 12, pp. 151-152). Although it is impossible to be sure, it appears likely that these three reports of possible plans for armed robbery all stem from a single piece of informant information, and from a source whose reliability was somewhat questionable. Moreover, the second and third reports of this matter do not contain the information in the first report that no target was mentioned or that this “planning” was at the stage of a general discussion of the possibility. However, there is no point in the files where a

potential target is named, nor is there any reference to an actual armed robbery by the group.

These examples demonstrate a pattern of reporting within the FBI files in which violent incidents, or even mere threats of violence, between members of the Winston-Salem group and law enforcement or other citizens of the area were included in reports repeatedly over the following months. At a minimum, this process would serve to keep examples of violence at the forefront, constantly reinforcing the idea that the Black Panther Party was violence prone. However, due to the frequent repeating of these incidents, it is also possible that recipients of these reports received the impression that the Black Panther Party engaged in even greater levels of violence than can be factually supported.

Even where Charlotte reports do not contain references to incidences of violence or to statements the FBI classified as extremist, the reports still paint the Black Panther Party in a negative light through the use of warning statements and qualifying words in what are otherwise fairly harmless sounding reports. These uses of language are discussed in the following section.

Impressions from Report Language. Many Charlotte field office reports are accompanied by a standard characterization of the Black Panther Party attached as an appendix, regardless of the nature of the material in the report. As described above, these appendices clearly frame the Black Panther Party as violent and extremist. Assuming that these appendices were, in fact, provided by FBI headquarters, it is interesting that the FBI would subsequently require their attachment to reports to be submitted to FBI headquarters. With headquarters fully aware of the contents of the appendices, it would

seem that their inclusion with nearly every report could serve little purpose beyond reinforcing the official FBI frame of the Black Panther Party.

The use of captions on reports also suggests a reinforcement of the official frame. For example, an October 10, 1969 report captioned “Black Panther Party, Racial Matters, Smith Act of 1940, Seditious Conspiracy, Rebellion and Insurrection” actually contains information on a former Panther who had be purged from the group, with no apparent reference to any activity by current Panther membership, seditious or otherwise (FBI Files, Part 3a, pp. 18-24). Another report, captioned “Black Panther Party (BPP), RM, Smith Act of 1940,” reported on a single purchase of the Black Panther Party newspaper (FBI Files, Part 4a, pp. 15-20). Yet more reports, captioned “Black Panther Party (BPP) – Document ‘Revolution and Education’ by Eldridge Cleaver, Racial Matters – Seditious Conspiracy Smith Act of 1940,” concerned the residency of possible Panther members in New York (FBI Files, Part 4a, pp. 62-63; Part 7b, pp. 33-34). A February 18, 1970 report with the almost identical caption suggested merely that a specified individual would be unlikely to cooperate with an interview request (FBI Files, Part 4a, pp. 77-79), while a March 16, 1970 report with the almost identical caption discusses efforts to obtain a handwriting sample (FBI Files, Part 4a, pp. 87-88). And yet, despite the relatively innocuous content of these documents, their captioning reinforces the idea of the Black Panther Party as a seditious organization.

A cautionary warning included in many of the early documents also serves to reinforce the official frame of the Black Panther Party as violent. An August 25, 1969 document includes this warning on both the first and last pages:

EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED DURING
ALL ENCOUNTERS WITH MEMBERS AND

ASSOCIATES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AS THEY ARE REPORTEDLY ATTEMPTING TO PREARRANGE THE LOCATION OF INTERVIEWS IN ORDER TO KILL FBI AGENTS. DUE TO THEIR PROVEN RECORD OF ATTEMPTS TO KILL POLICE OFFICERS, ALL BLACK PANTHER MEMBERS AND ASSOCIATES ARE CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

(FBI Files, Part 3b, pp. 30, 34, emphasis in original). Of note, this particular document includes no mention of violence either having occurred or being planned for the future. This same blanket warning appears on additional reports which include no mention of violence (FBI Files, Part 3a, p. 21; FBI Files, Part 3b, p. 16; FBI Files, Part 3b, p. 23; FBI Files, Part 3b, p. 49; FBI Files, Part 4b, p. 45). Moreover, the inclusion of such warning in reports to the Director of the FBI would seem to have little protective potential for a man who was unlikely to ever deal directly with Black Panther Party members, yet the warning clearly would serve to reinforce the idea that Panther members are particularly violent.

Later reports include a similar warning:

The Black Panther Party (BPP) is a black extremist organization started in Oakland, California, in December, 1966. It advocates the use of guns and guerilla tactics to bring about the overthrow of the United States Government.

(FBI Files, Part 14a, p. 66; FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 26; Part 14c, p. 13). As this blanket statement conveys no new intelligence information about the Black Panther Party in North Carolina, it is difficult to see what purpose its repeated inclusion in reports serves beyond reinforcing the official FBI frame.

Even with regard to the Panthers' Free Ambulance Program, which the FBI acknowledged was generally viewed positively by the local community (FBI Files, Part

15a, p. 49), the Panthers were painted as confrontational and unlikely to cooperate with local government:

As a result of BPP meetings with County officials, the BPP will be permitted to respond to emergency calls in the future if requested by the caller and where the call is not being handled by the County Ambulance Service. Any decisions in this matter will be made by the County Ambulance dispatcher and not by BPP personnel. The potential for confrontation continues, however, as the BPP has indicated that it will respond to all calls from the black community.

(FBI Files, Part 15b, pp. 81-82), while a similar report suggested “[redacted] advised BPP’s intention is to go ahead with emergency ambulance program with or without commissioner’s approval as BPP desires confrontation with local police in effort to further test community support” (FBI Files, Part 15c, p. 24).

The documents also contain numerous instances of interesting language choice and language interpretation, which would suggest that the writers of the reports construed everything in the least positive light for the Black Panthers. For example, after quoting an alleged Panther member statement that if white merchants did not move from an area following a boycott, the Panthers would do the “next best thing,” the report continues on to state that the “next best thing” “obviously meant tearing the place up or burning it down (FBI Files, Part 1, p. 44). However, there is no explanation in the report for why this conclusion should be so obvious. Another report states “[t]hey hold political education classes and “liberation schools” where BPP matters are discussed, calling for abstinence from alcohol and drugs as this would affect the members’ effectiveness in the coming revolution” (FBI Files, Part 7b, p.39). Abstinence from drugs and alcohol, an act

that would seem to be more positive than the alternative, is thus cast in a negative light by its association with revolutionary activity.

A report in January, 1973, includes a reference to the appointment of a member of the Panthers as a neighborhood coordinator in a city program. With reference to this employment, the report states that “Mrs. MACK does not hold a decision-making position regarding how funds are spent within the program, and there is no indication *at this time* of BPP efforts to subvert the activities of the Model Cities Program or to control its funds” (FBI Files, Part 14a, p. 5, emphasis added). Although this report at its base level indicated that the Panthers had not done anything wrong in this situation, the phrase “at this time” suggests that the Black Panther Party must continue to be monitored for this type of interference in city government. This same report states that “[s]ources report that the BPP plans to continue its Survival Day Program as a means of winning over the black community” (FBI Files, Part 14a, pp. 6-7), yet another suggestion that the community service programs were established to mask the revolutionary intent of the Panthers.

The use of qualifying language in other reports more directly calls the actions and motivations of the Winston-Salem group into question. A July 1972 report states that:

The BPP chapter suspended their free breakfast for children program during June, 1972, when schools were closed for the summer. The BPP chapter, however, periodically operates a day care center at BPP headquarters principally for children of BPP members who are fed at headquarters. For this reason, the BPP chapter continues to solicit cash and food donations under the guise of collecting for the free breakfast for children program.

(FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 34). A June 1972 report spoke of a dance to “raise money for the *so-called* survival programs,” (FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 61, emphasis added), while an August 1972 report indicates that the “North Carolina BPP Chapter increased its efforts to promote various *so-called* community survival programs” (FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 20, emphasis added).

One report gave an aura of dishonesty to the group, suggesting that Panther members were misleading potential donors as to the purpose of donations:

[T]he BPP Chapter at Winston-Salem made a concerted effort to solicit donations under the guise of raising an appeal bond for the three members of the High Point Four . . .

(FBI Files, Part 14c, p. 30). Similarly, other reports indicated that the Black Panther Party was misusing donations given for a particular purpose:

The BPP Chapter continues to solicit food from local merchants to support the Free Breakfast for Children Program. The Pet Milk Dairy has been donating milk on a regular basis, and the Merita Bakery, which is located in a black neighborhood, has continued to donate food for this program. Sources report that the BPP members themselves have been eating most of the food that is donated leaving very little for the children.

(FBI Files, Part 14c, p. 77), and:

During May, 1973, sources reported that the National Episcopal Church approved a \$35,700 grant to the Winston-Salem branch of the BPP for the purpose of operating a non-emergency medical transportation project in Winston-Salem, N.C. . . . An unknown amount of the church money was forwarded to BPP Headquarters, Oakland, California, and utilized in Bobby Seale’s run-off campaign for Mayor of Oakland. Also, some of the money is projected for recruiting and organizing activities within the Winston-Salem BPP. Additionally, \$2,200 of the church money has gone for a project known as “Everybody

Is A Star.” This is a profit motivated black business venture, instituted and controlled by the BPP

(FBI Files, Part 15c, p. 34).

Another report suggests that the Black Panther Party staged stories for newspaper articles:

The 1/29/72, issue of “The Black Panther” newspaper contains an article on Page 9 captioned “Angela Davis Day Care Center Raided.” This article relates to a raid on 1/4/72 and 1/6/72, by the High Point, N.C., PD and has photographs of Eva Thompson [redacted] and Haven Henderson [redacted] along with several children. . . . [T]he children appearing in the photograph in “The Black Panther” newspaper were probably neighborhood children rounded up to pose for a photograph for this article.

(FBI Files, Part 14c, pp. 49-50).

As with the repetitive reporting of violent incidents, the use of captioned warnings to caution of violent tendencies would serve to reinforce the official FBI frame. Similarly, through the use of qualifying language, and through providing alternative rationales for Black Panther Party actions, the Charlotte reports continue to fit comfortably within the national frame, even when reporting on matters that seemingly do not fit within the concept of the Black Panthers as violent and extremist. However, on occasion the Charlotte documents did include statements which challenged the official frame. These instances are discussed in the following section.

Challenges to the National Frame.

Truly positive statements regarding the Black Panther Party do not appear in the FBI Files until mid-1971. The Charlotte field office reported in September of 1971 that “[t]here has been no confrontation between the BPP and police and the group appears to

be actively promoting their newly adopted ‘community image,’ and have been sprucing-up their personal dress as well as the appearance of their headquarters” (FBI Files, Part 13a, p. 84). An October 1971 report states that “the BPP members who appeared in the courtroom during the above trial were very well-dressed and well-behaved, apparently in carrying out their new peaceful image. There has been no confrontation by the BPP and police during the past month” (FBI Files, Part 13a, p. 33). A report from the following month indicates that the North Carolina group “continues to follow their new peaceful image of community service and there has been no confrontation by the BPP and Police during the past month” (FBI Files, Part 13a, p. 25). An October 1972 report regarding a Black Panther Party sponsored community rally states:

. . . None of the above speakers made any comments regarding confrontations with police and followed the opening line of LARRY LITTLE about working within the political system. There were no weapons in evidence among the BPP members present and the gathering was very peaceful. . . .

A show of force and firepower would not help them improve their image at this time. . . .

(FBI Files, Part 14a, pp. 70, 75). A report dated a full two years later, October of 1974, similarly states:

During this period the BPP has made a conscientious effort to maintain a non-violent image and no weapons have been observed at the BPP headquarters, *however, it is not known whether or not any weapons are maintained at the 1106-D East 19th St. pad.*

(FBI Files, Part 15b, p. 11, emphasis added).

Even in these generally complimentary statements, there is the implication that this “peaceful image” is nothing more than an image, particularly when enclosed in quotation marks as the phrase “community image” was presented in the above referenced

September 1971 report. It is particularly striking that, even after more than two years of non-violence, report language continues to speak of the Panthers as presenting an “image,” and, as in the October 1974 report, to suggest that this image merely hides the true, violent nature of the Black Panther Party.

Furthermore, in spite of this period of apparently peaceful behavior, FBI reports continued to contain cautionary warning to the effect that the Black Panther Party was “an extremist organization” that “advocates the use of guns and guerilla tactics” (FBI Files, Part 13, p. 43; FBI Files, Part 14a, p. 35), and to frequently include the attachment of the standard FBI characterization of the Black Panther Party.

However, some of the new community programs were presented in what can only be described as a positive manner. A June 1971 report indicates that “[t]he group is adopting community service attitude and a number of the members are attending first aid classes” (FBI Files, Part 13b, p. 66). In August, a report provides follow-up documentation that “[s]everal of the BPP members have gotten first aid cards so they can legally help in medical situations in the poverty areas of Winston-Salem, N.C.” (FBI Files, Part 13a, p. 95).

An August 1972 document reported on a Survival Rally held the previous month, calling it “the most ambitious project undertaken by the North Carolina Chapter to date,” and recounting that “1,000 bags of groceries and several hundred pairs of childrens tennis shoes” were given away at the rally, while the Panthers also provided sickle cell anemia tests and the opportunity for voter registration. Similarly, a September 1972 report stated:

During August, 1972, the BPP Chapter’s efforts were directed towards soliciting food for a Survival Day Rally

which was held on 8/27/72, on the corner of Oak and 10½ Streets, Winston-Salem, N.C., one of the poorest neighborhoods in Winston-Salem. Through personal and telephonic contact with local merchants, BPP members assembled 100 bags of groceries which were given away at the 8/27/72, rally. They also gave free sickle-cell anemia tests and encouraged voter registration at the rally.

(FBI Files, Part 14b, p. 2). Unlike earlier mentions of community service programs in Charlotte field office reports, these reports of Survival Day Rallies contain no suggestion that they were sponsored only to promote a new and peaceful image.

The final document in the FBI file, in which the Charlotte field office indicated its intent to move investigation of the Black Panther Party to an inactive status, states:

This matter is being placed in an RUC status within the Charlotte Division in view of the fact that activity on the part of the BPP at Winston-Salem, N.C., has been non-violent in nature and no information has been received indicating the BPP maintains or has maintained in the past fortifications or weapons. Additionally, no information has been received indicating support for or control by the BPP in Winston-Salem, N.C., from its national headquarters in Oakland, Calif. It should be noted that information in the past indicated that national headquarters of the BPP had requested the BPP in Winston-Salem, N.C., to close down and members come to national headquarters, however, the Winston-Salem unit refused to comply with instructions from national headquarters. At the present time, no BPP sponsored activities are functional in Winston-Salem, and Larry Little, former leader of the BPP, since its inception in Winston-Salem, N.C., is no longer associated with the unit and BPP has no means of support other than the sale of BPP newspapers. The BPP in Winston-Salem does not present any real or imagined current threat to the security of the country and individual members of the BPP in Winston-Salem at the present time have been contacted by the FBI in the past for purposes of interviews and no productive results have been obtained.

(FBI Files, Part 15a, p. 4). This final document challenges the official frame of the Black Panther Party in many respects. Not only does it indicate that the Winston-Salem group

is currently non-violent, it also discounts the idea that the group had stockpiled weapons previously, contradicting a suggestion contained in numerous prior reports. Furthermore, the document plainly states that the Winston-Salem group is not a security threat, challenging the presentation of the Black Panther Party as extremist and in violation of the Smith Act of 1940. The document also suggests that the group continues to experience financial difficulties and that it has been unsuccessful in maintaining community programs, two areas which had formed the basis of numerous previous reports.

Yet, in a significant sense, this final document also preserves the official frame by removing the Winston-Salem group from the national Black Panther Party. By indicating that the Winston-Salem group was no longer under the control of the national Black Panther Party, and in fact had defied at least one order from Panther headquarters, the report strongly implies that the Winston-Salem group is functionally no longer a part of the national Black Panther Party. This suggestion is strengthened by the statements that none of the community programs sponsored by the Black Panther Party remain operative in the community and that the former leader has left the group. According to this final report, the only continued tie to the Black Panther Party at that time appears to have been the sale of the Black Panther Party newspaper. Thus, in the end, the Charlotte field office reports arguably continued to reinforce the official frame of the national Black Panther Party as violent and extremist, even while allowing that the Winston-Salem group did not fit within this frame.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The Black Panther Party emerged in the late 1960s as a social movement organization dedicated to ending discrimination against African Americans. Although this goal did not differ from many of the earlier Civil Rights social movement organizations, the tactics espoused by the Panthers did. Where earlier participants in the Civil Rights Movement preached non-violence and patience, the Black Panther Party urged freedom at any cost and spoke of a coming revolution (Abron 1998; Jones and Jeffries 1998; Burns 1990). However, the group also instituted numerous community service programs, which were intended to strengthen the black community and relieve the suffering of those living in poverty (Abron 1998; Jones and Jeffries 1998).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation reacted to the rise of the Black Panther Party in 1968 by calling it “the greatest threat to the internal security of the country” (Gentry 1991:618; Churchill and Vander Wall 1990b:123). National FBI documents framed the Panthers as a violent, extremist group, dedicated to the overthrow of the United States government at all costs. Black Panther community programs received little public attention from the FBI, and when such programs were mentioned it was with the suggestion that the programs were “communist inspired” (Cable News Network 1996) and purposely designed to mislead the public into supporting the Panthers’ cause (Gentry

1991). Throughout the duration of the Black Panther Party movement, the FBI devoted a large amount of resources toward its effort to destroy the social movement organization.

This research has examined the social control efforts of the FBI toward the Black Panther Party through document analysis of files maintained by the FBI's Charlotte, North Carolina, field office. The Charlotte office had primary intelligence gathering responsibility with respect to a branch of the Black Panther Party based in Winston-Salem North Carolina. Although this branch of the Black Panther Party remained largely out of the national spotlight, it was active locally and made efforts to establish the main Black Panther Party community programs in North Carolina. The FBI files on the Winston-Salem group are comprised of 724 identifiable documents spanning nearly an eight year period.

Significant research has been conducted in the area of social movement theory. Previous work on resource mobilization, political opportunity and framing in particular illuminate the Black Panther Party's efforts to advance its goals. Significantly, these same social movement theories are also implicated in the FBI's social control efforts, as FBI intelligence gathering focused in part on the financial and political resources available to the Panthers. Further, the FBI continually sought to frame the Black Panther Party in a negative light.

Social movement research has also been directed toward the specific area of social control, with particular focus on social control tactics of both private individuals and governmental entities. Many of the more extreme social control tactics described in the literature were utilized by the FBI, such as creating false internal movement documents to sow mistrust within the group or between two social movement

organizations, or using the legal system to tie up movement leaders and resources in questionable court battles (Jeffries 2002; Churchill and Vander Wall 1990a). Other research into social control has focused on how decisions regarding the allocation of social control are made and on the effects of social control on social movement activity. In particular, previous work on the social movement theories of framing and allocation of social control provide the foundation for this paper.

Instructions from FBI headquarters to the Charlotte field office reflect three specific goals of the FBI in its social control efforts. First, intelligence was gathered to forewarn law enforcement agencies of planned Black Panther Party activity, particularly activity which could lead to potentially violent confrontations. Second, the Charlotte field office was directed to gather evidence for possible preemptive prosecutions under the Smith Act of 1940, an anti-sedition statute which makes it a felony to advocate for the overthrow of the U.S. government. Third, Charlotte agents were also to gather evidence for possible prosecutions under existing firearm statutes. These three goals had a direct impact on the intelligence gathering activity of the Charlotte field office, with reports to FBI headquarters focusing largely on these three areas.

Intelligence information gathered by the Charlotte field office served an important role in the social control effort, both at the local level and nationally. Locally, information of potentially violent situations was regularly shared with local police departments, improving the ability of local law enforcement agencies to monitor and control Black Panther Party sponsored events. Moreover, the intelligence gathered by the Charlotte field office provided a means to evaluate the actual threat posed by the Winston-Salem branch of the Black Panther Party as a social movement, over and above

any isolated threats of physical violence. On the national level, intelligence on Black Panther activity in North Carolina contributed information toward the FBI effort to prosecute Panther leaders under the Smith Act and other statutes, and thus weaken the social movement. Local intelligence also contributed valuable feedback on the effectiveness of the Bureau's COINTELPRO measures, especially the FBI's efforts to cause dissension among national Black Panther Party leaders.

Finally, Charlotte field office reports also illustrate the impact of the official FBI frame on local reporting procedures. During the majority of the investigative period, the Charlotte reports mirror the national frame of the Black Panther Party as a violent, extremist, revolutionary group, regardless of the current actions and statements of the Winston-Salem group. This reinforcement of the official frame is accomplished in part through repetitive reporting of isolated events of violence, which serves to maintain the idea of the Black Panther Party as a violent group even through peaceful periods, and also to create the impression of greater violence than actually occurred in North Carolina. Moreover, qualifying language used within the Charlotte reports serves to discredit any potentially positive reports regarding the Winston-Salem Panthers. It is only near the close of the Charlotte field office files that unquestionably positive information emerges to challenge the national FBI frame.

This study contributes to the body of social control work through its exploration of the connection between national and local social control efforts. It examines the implications of social control decisions made at the national level for local social control activity, thus expanding upon the work on the allocation of social control carried out by Cunningham (2003a). Furthermore, this study analyzes the impact of a national frame on

local intelligence gathering and reporting procedures, thus contributing to the work of Cunningham and Browning (2004) on official frames as a justification for social control activity.

The use of historical documents as a single data source imposes some limitations on this study. First, it is possible that relevant documents are missing, although this does not appear to be a significant issue in this case. Second, without interviews with the document authors, it is difficult to determine the intent behind the document content. In this particular case, it would be particularly helpful to know whether the official FBI frame of the Black Panther Party was shared by Charlotte field agents, or whether instead the Charlotte field agents felt compelled to report information consistent with the frame in spite of conflicting personal opinions. Moreover, with a single data source, it is impossible to make any judgment as to the objectivity, or lack thereof, of the FBI documents.

Further study is needed in this important area of social control. An expanded project, utilizing FBI files maintained by other field offices and cross-checking the FBI information against records maintained by the Black Panther Party or local newspapers, would serve to confirm or disprove the conclusions reached in this study. Additional consideration of the national-local interface of social control in the context of other agents of social control is also necessary to confirm or disprove the conclusions reached herein. Similarly, comparative case studies with other national social movements which have been the subject of social control are needed to consider the possibility of a master social control frame. Further consideration of the implications of official frames for

social movement organizations is needed to fully understand the place of such official frames in social control theory.

As discussed in this research, documents from the FBI files demonstrate a pattern of mutual reinforcement, wherein local FBI reports were closely tailored to meet national direction, thus reinforcing national frames and encouraging the escalation of social control activity. In an era when the issue of national social control has returned to the high profile experienced during the 1960s, it is clearly worth revisiting the implications of social control activity, both for social movement actors and for others who may be prevented from hearing a fair representation of the social movement's message due to social control goals, frames and tactics.

REFERENCES

- Abron, JoNina M. 1998. "'Serving the People': The Survival Programs of The Black Panther Party." Pp. 177-192 in *The Black Panther Party [Reconsidered]*, edited by Charles E. Jones. Baltimore, MD: Black Classic Press.
- Adamek, Raymond J. and Jerry M. Lewis. 2004. "Social Control Violence and Radicalization: Behavioral Data." *Social Problems* 22(5): 663-674.
- Ahuvia, Aaron. 2001. "Traditional, Interpretive, and Reception Based Content Analyses: Improving the Ability of Content Analysis to Address Issues of Pragmatic and Theoretical Concerns." *Social Indicators Research* 54: 139-172.
- Altheide, David L. 1987. "Ethnographic Content Analysis." *Qualitative Sociology* 10(1): 65-77.
- Andrews, Kenneth T. 2002. "Creating Social Change: Lessons from the Civil Rights Movement." Pp. 105-123 in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bailey, Kenneth D. 1978. *Methods of Social Research*. New York: The Free Press.
- Barkan, Steven E. 1984. "Legal Control of the Southern Civil Rights Movement." *American Sociological Review* 49(4): 552-565.
- Barker, Colin, and Michael Lavalette. 2002. "Strategizing and the Sense of Context: Reflections on the First Two Weeks of the Liverpool Docks Lookout, September-October 1995." Pp. 140-156 in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bernstein, Mary. 2002. "The Contradictions of Gay Ethnicity: Forging Identity in Vermont." Pp. 85-104 in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Burns, Stewart. 1990. *Social Movements of the 1960s: Searching for Democracy*. Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers.

- Cable News Network. 1996. "Make Love Not War: Bobby Seale, Co-founder, Black Panther Party." Atlanta, GA: Cable News Network, Retrieved October 14, 2005 (<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/13/interviews/seale>).
- Cable, Sherry, Thomas Shriver, and Donald W. Hastings. 1999. "The Silenced Majority: Quiescence and Government Social Control on the Oak Ridge Nuclear Reservation." *Research in Social Problems and Public Policy* 7: 59-81.
- Calloway, Carolyn R. 1977. "Group Cohesiveness in the Black Panther Party." *Journal of Black Studies* 8(1): 55-74.
- Carley, Michael. 1997. "Defining Forms of Successful State Repression of Social Movement Organizations: A Case Study of the FBI's Cointelpro and the American Indian Movement." *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 20: 151-176.
- Churchill, Ward and Jim Vander Wall. 1990a. *Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret War Against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement*. Boston, MA: South End Press.
- , 1990b. *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents From the FBI's Secret War Against Dissent in the United States*. Boston, MA: South End Press.
- Cress, Daniel M., and Daniel J. Myers. 2004. "Authority in Contention." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 25: 279-293.
- Cunningham, David. 2003a. "The Patterning of Repression: FBI Counterintelligence and the New Left." *Social Forces* 82(1): 209-240.
- , 2003b. "State Versus Social Movement: FBI Counterintelligence Against the New Left." Pp. 45-77 in *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, edited by Jack A. Goldstone. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cunningham, David, and Barb Browning. 2004. "The Emergence of Worthy Targets: Official Frames and Deviance Narratives Within the FBI." *Sociological Forums* 19(3): 347-369.
- Desai, Manisha. 2002. "Multiple Mediations: The State and the Women's Movements in India." Pp. 66-84 in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Earl, Jennifer. 2003. "Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression." *Sociological Theory* 21(1): 44-68.

- , 2004. "Controlling Protest: New Directions for Research on the Social Control of Protest." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 25: 55-83
- Earl, Jennifer, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy. 2003. "Protest Under Fire? Explaining the Policing of Protest." *American Sociological Review* 68(4): 581-606.
- Erikson, Kai T. 2005. *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance*. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc.
- Espeland, Wendy. 1993. "Power, Policy and Paperwork: The Bureaucratic Representation of Interests." *Qualitative Sociology* 16(3): 297-316.
- Eyerman, Ron, and Andrew Jamison. 1991. *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Ezra, Michael. 2004. "Civil Rights Movement 1865—1910." Pp. 111-121 in *Encyclopedia of American Social Movements, V. I*, edited by Immanuel Ness. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1990. *FBI: Facts and History*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.
- Ferree, Myra Marx. 2004. "Soft Repression: Ridicule, Stigma, and Silencing in Gender-Based Movements." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 25: 85-101.
- Foweraker, Joe. 1995. *Theorizing Social Movements*. Boulder, CO: Pluto Press.
- Gentry, Curt. 1991. *J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
- Grady-Willis, Winston A. 1998. "The Black Panther Party: State Repression and Political Prisoners." Pp. 363-390 in *The Black Panther Party [Reconsidered]*, edited by Charles E. Jones. Baltimore, MD: Black Classic Press.
- Green, James. 2000. *Taking History to Heart: The Power of the Past in Building Social Movements*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Hayes, III, Floyd W. and Francis A. Kiene, III. 1998. "'All Power to the People': The Political Thought of Huey P. Newton and the Black Panther Party." Pp. 157-176 in *The Black Panther Party [Reconsidered]*, edited by Charles E. Jones. Baltimore, MD: Black Classic Press.

- Hilliard, David and Lewis Cole. 1993. *This Side of Glory: The Autobiography of David Hilliard and the Story of the Black Panther Party*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.
- Hogenrad, Robert, Dean P. McKenzie, and Normand Peladeau. 2003. "Force and Influence in Content Analysis: The Production of New Social Knowledge." *Quality & Quantity* 27: 221-238.
- Jeffries, Judson L. 2002. "Black Radicalism and Political Repression in Baltimore: The Case of the Black Panther Party." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25(1): 64-98.
- Jones, Charles E. and Judson L. Jeffries. 1998. "'Don't Believe the Hype': Debunking the Panther Mythology." Pp. 25-56 in *The Black Panther Party [Reconsidered]*, edited by Charles E. Jones. Baltimore, MD: Black Classic Press.
- Klatch, Rebecca E. 2002. "The Development of Individual Identity and Consciousness among Movements of the Left and Right." Pp. 185-207 in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Klein, Lloyd. 1992. "Big Brother is Still Watching You: The Impact of Political Surveillance Programs Against American Citizens." *Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology* 20(1): 91-97.
- Levine, Daniel U., Norman S. Fiddmont, Robert S. Stephenson, and Charles Wilkinson. 1973. "Differences Between Black Youth Who Support the Black Panthers and the NAACP." *The Journal of Negro Education* 42(1): 19-32.
- Luders, Joseph. 2003. "Countermovements, the State, and the Intensity of Racial Contention in the American South." Pp. 27-44 in *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, edited by Jack A. Goldstone. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Markowitz, Norman. 2004. "Civil Rights Movement 1930—1953." Pp. 158-172 in *Encyclopedia of American Social Movements, V. 1*, edited by Immanuel Ness. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc.
- Marx, Gary T. 1974. "Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the Informant." *The American Journal of Sociology* 80(2): 402-442.
- , 1979. "External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Social Movements: Some Patterns, Explanations, Outcomes, and Complications." In *The Dynamics of Social Movements: Resource Mobilization, Social Control, and Tactics*, edited by Mayer Zald and John D. McCarthy. Boston, MA: Little Brown & Co.

- , 1981. "Ironies of Social Control: Authorities as Contributors to Deviance through Escalation, Nonenforcement and Covert Facilitation." *Social Problems* 28(3): 221-246.
- , 1991. "The New Surveillance." *National Forum* 71(3): 32-37.
- McCarthy, John D., David W. Britt, and Mark Wolfson. 1991. "The Institutional Channeling of Social Movements by the State in the United States." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 13: 45-76.
- Meyer, David S. 2002. "Opportunities and Identities: Bridge-Building in the Study of Social Movements." Pp. 3-27 in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Meyer, Megan. 2004. "Organizational Identity, Political Contexts, and SMO Action: Explaining the Tactical Choices Made By Peace Organizations in Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa." *Social Movements Studies* 3(2): 167-197.
- Moodie, T. Dunbar. 2002. "Mobilization on the South African Gold Mines." Pp. 47-65 in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Morris, Monica B. 1973. "Newspapers and the New Feminists: Black Out as Social Control?" *Journalism Quarterly* 50: 37-42.
- Office of Public and Congressional Affairs. 1994. *Abridged History of the Federal Bureau of Investigation*. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.
- Public Broadcasting Service. 1998. *Frontline: The Two Nations of Black America*. Alexandria, VA: Public Broadcasting Service, Retrieved October 14, 2005 (<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/race/interviews/ecleaver.html> and <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/race/interviews/ecleaver2.html>).
- Reger, Jo. 2002. "More Than One Feminism: Organizational Structure and the Construction of Collective Identity." Pp. 171-184 in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Robnett, Belinda. 2002. "External Political Change, Collective Identities, and Participation in Social Movement Organizations." Pp. 266-285 in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Rubinson, Paul. 2004a. "Civil Rights Movement 1910—1930." Pp. 136-147 in *Encyclopedia of American Social Movements, V. 1*, edited by Immanuel Ness. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc.
- , 2004b. "Civil Rights Movement 1954—1970." Pp. 173-201 in *Encyclopedia of American Social Movements, V. 1*, edited by Immanuel Ness. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc.
- Snow, David A., Daniel M. Cress, Liam Downey, and Andrew W. Jones. 1998. "Disrupting the 'Quotidian': Reconceptualizing the Relationship Between Breakdown and the Emergence of Collective Action." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 3(1): 1-22.
- Staggenborg, Suzanne. 2002. "The 'Meso' in Social Movements Research." Pp. 124-139 in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stotik, Jeffrey, Thomas E. Shriver, and Sherry Cable. 1994. "Social Control and Movement Outcome: The Case of AIM." *Sociological Focus* 27(1): 53-68.
- Swarts, Heidi J. 2003. "Setting the State's Agenda: Church Based Community Organizations in American Urban Politics." Pp. 78-106 in *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, edited by Jack A. Goldstone. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Theoharis, Athan G., and John Stuart Cox. 1988. *The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Van Dyke, Nella. 2003. "Protest Cycles and Party Politics: The Effects of Elite Allies and Antagonists on Student Protest in the United States, 1930—1990." Pp. 226-245 in *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, edited by Jack A. Goldstone. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- United States Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. *Black Panther Party—Winston-Salem, NC*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved October 20-25, 2005 (<http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/bpanther.htm>).
- Weber, Robert Philip. 1990. *Basic Content Analysis*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

- Whittier, Nancy. 2002. "Meaning and Structure in Social Movements." Pp. 289-307 in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, Rhys H. 2002. "From the 'Beloved Community' to 'Family Values': Religious Language, Symbolic Repertoires, and Democratic Culture." Pp. 247-265 in *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*, edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press.

APPENDIX A

Following is a chronological listing of all documents in the FBI file which were generated by the Charlotte field office:

1968 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
10/29/1968	1	135	12/31/1968	1	131-133

1969 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
1/23/1969	1	124-130	6/10/1969	2b	72-78
1/29/1969	1	123	6/11/1969	2b	82
2/7/1969	1	117-122	6/27/1969	2b	53-54
2/17/1969	1	13-15	7/1/1969	2b	70
2/21/1969	1	9	7/2/1969	2b	67
2/24/1969	1	11-12	7/18/1969	2b	44-46
3/4/1969	1	7-8	7/18/1969	2b	48
3/7/1969	1	6	7/23/1969	2b	47
3/28/1969	1	102-106	7/24/1969	2a; b	3-end; 1-
4/18/1969	1	91-97	7/24/1969	2b	55-56
4/22/1969	1	86-87	8/5/1969	3b	87-89
4/22/1969	1	88	8/15/1969	3b	84
5/6/1969	1	81-83	8/16/1969	3b	67-71
5/8/1969	1	73-80	8/16/1969	3b	83
5/9/1969	1	84-85	8/19/1969	3b	72-76
5/12/1969	1	67-71	8/21/1969	3b	37-39
5/19/1969	1	65-66	8/22/1969	3b	79
5/22/1969	1	16-17	8/23/1969	3b	62-66
5/23/1969	1	23-64	8/23/1969	3b	77-78
5/28/1969	2b	51	8/25/1969	3b	11-16
5/29/1969	1	19-22	8/25/1969	3b	30-36
6/2/1969	1	18			

1969 Documents (cont.)

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
8/25/1969	3b	40-47	10/2/1969	3a	34-35
8/25/1969	3b	48-54	10/7/1969	3a	25-27
8/25/1969	3b	55-61	10/10/1969	3a	18-24
8/26/1969	3b	2-10	10/24/1969	3a	10-12
8/27/1969	3b	24-29	10/29/1969	3a	3-9
8/28/1969	3b	17-22	10/30/1969	5c	67-73
8/29/1969	3b	23	11/3/1969	5a-5c	58-; all; -50
9/15/1969	3a	79-80	11/10/1969	5c	53-54
9/16/1969	3a	73-75	11/10/1969	5c	58-62
9/17/1969	3a	44-63	12/16/1969	4b;5a	68-90; 2-45
9/17/1969	3a	71-72	12/16/1969	5a	47-48
9/19/1969	3a	70	12/17/1969	4b	66-67
9/26/1969	3a	28-32	12/17/1969	5a	46
9/29/1969	3a	42-43	12/23/1969	4b	42-46
10/1/1969	3a	39-41	12/31/1969	4b	51-56

1970 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
1/5/1970	4a	70-76	5/5/1970	4a	31
1/8/1970	4b	27-31	5/6/1970	4a	15-20
1/23/1970	4b	41	5/6/1970	4a	29-30
1/29/1970	4b	32-36	5/13/1970	4a	13-14
2/12/1970	4b	18	5/17/1970	4a	23-28
2/18/1970	4a	77-79	5/22/1970	4a	3
2/26/1970	4b	10	5/27/1970	6d	30-70
3/12/1970	4a	47-48	5/28/1970	6c; 6d	70-end; 1-20
3/13/1970	4a	45-46	5/28/1970	6d	75
3/13/1970	4a	80-86	6/1/1970	6d	27-28
3/16/1970	4a	87-88	6/2/1970	6d	21-22
3/19/1970	4a	66-67	6/5/1970	6c	62-63
3/19/1970	4a	68-69	6/9/1970	6c	60
3/30/1970	4a	62-63	6/11/1970	1	3-4
4/3/1970	4a	36-38	6/12/1970	6c	59
4/15/1970	4a	39-44	6/17/1970	6c	47-50
4/30/1970	4a	32-34	6/17/1970	6c	57-58
5/3/1970	4a	35	6/18/1970	6c	42-46
5/5/1970	4a	5-10	6/19/1970	6c	28-32

1970 Documents (cont.)

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
6/19/1970	6c	38-40	9/4/1970	8b	56-60
6/19/1970	6c	41	9/4/1970	7a	53-58
6/19/1970	6c	55-56	9/11/1970	7a	42
6/22/1970	6c	25	9/11/1970	7a	45-46
6/26/1970	6c	26-27	9/14/1970	7a	52
6/26/1970	6c	36	9/18/1970	7a	39
7/7/1970	6b	16-20	9/21/1970	7a	32-36
7/8/1970	6c	11-18	9/24/1970	7a	30-31
7/8/1970	6c	21	9/29/1970	7a	37-38
7/8/1970	6c	22-24	10/1/1970	7a	24-29
7/13/1970	6b; 6c	27-end; 1-6	10/2/1970	7a	21-23
7/14/1970	6c	7-10	10/5/1970	8a	97-end; 1-2
7/16/1970	6b	1-10	10/5/1970	7a	9-14
7/17/1970	6b	21-26	10/7/1970	7a	19-20
7/26/1970	6c	15	10/12/1970	8b	83-90
7/27/1970	6b	74-77	10/15/1970	8b	91-93
7/27/1970	6b	13-14	10/15/1970	7a	4
7/28/1970	6b	11-12	10/16/1970	8b	75-80
7/30/1970	6a	99-100	10/17/1970	8b	96-97
7/31/1970	6a	3-70	10/20/1970	8b	61-63
8/3/1970	7b	101-105	10/20/1970	8b	18-23
8/4/1970	7b	33-34	10/21/1970	8b	69
8/5/1970	7b	36-98	10/23/1970	8b	64-65
8/10/1970	7b	24	10/26/1970	8b	30-55
8/11/1970	7b	22-23	10/28/1970	8b	12-17
8/12/1970	7b	30-31	10/28/1970	8b	26-29
8/14/1970	7b	19-21	10/30/1970	8b	3
8/19/1970	7b	9-12	11/4/1970	8a	15-18
8/19/1970	7b	3-5	11/6/1970	8a	92-96
8/20/1970	7b	13-14	11/16/1970	8a	40-41
8/20/1970	7b	15-16	11/17/1970	8a	79-86
8/24/1970	7b	2	11/18/1970	8a	37-39
8/25/1970	7b	1	11/18/1970	8b	4
8/31/1970	7a	105	11/20/1970	8a	87-89
9/1/1970	7a	103-104	11/20/1970	8a	9-14
9/2/1970	7a	59	11/25/1970	8a	42-78
9/2/1970	7a	99	11/27/1970	8a	19-20
9/3/1970	7a	62-98	11/27/1970	8a	22-23

1970 Documents (cont.)

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
11/27/1970	8a	33-36	12/18/1970	9b;c	34-end; 1-56
12/3/1970	9c	73-78	12/22/1970	9b	23-25
12/4/1970	9b	6-9	12/24/1970	9b	26
12/4/1970	9c	60-72	12/24/1970	9b	29
12/11/1970	9b	30-33			

1971 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
1/4/1971	11b	75-77	2/10/1971	11b	62-63
1/4/1971	9b	16-17	2/12/1971	11b	6
1/6/1971	9b	18	2/12/1971	11b	41-45
1/7/1971	9a	73-74	2/13/1971	11b	55-56
1/7/1971	9b	13-15	2/14/1971	11b	47
1/8/1971	9a	77	2/15/1971	11b	61
1/8/1971	9a	79-80	2/16/1971	11b	46
1/8/1971	9b	10	2/18/1971	11b	34-35
1/12/1971	9a	68-69	2/22/1971	11a	87-89
1/12/1971	9a	78	2/23/1971	11b	33
1/12/1971	9a;9b	81-end; 1-2	2/26/1971	11a	97
1/12/1971	9b	4-5	3/1/1971	11b	11-12
1/13/1971	9b	3	3/1/1971	11b	13-19
1/14/1971	11b	69-70	3/2/1971	11b	7
1/14/1971	9a	6-56	3/3/1971	11b	8-10
1/15/1971	9a	70-72	3/5/1971	11a	83-84
1/18/1971	9a	75-76	3/7/1971	11b	4-5
1/19/1971	9a	3-4	3/8/1971	11a	54-57
1/19/1971	9a	59-60	3/8/1971	11b	1-3
1/19/1971	9a	61-63	3/9/1971	11a	85-86
1/20/1971	11b	85-87	3/10/1971	11a	65-78
1/22/1971	11b	73-74	3/19/1971	11a	41-47
1/22/1971	10a;10b	3-90; 1-87	3/22/1971	11a	38-40
1/25/1971	9a	57-58	3/23/1971	11a	52-53
1/29/1971	11b	95-96	3/23/1971	11a	50-51
1/29/1971	9a	5	3/29/1971	12	175-177
2/4/1971	11b	22-26	4/5/1971	12	166-169
2/10/1971	11b	27-29	4/7/1971	11a	3-33
2/10/1971	11b	39	4/8/1971	11a	34-35

1971 Documents (cont.)

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
4/9/1971	12	178	9/21/1971	13a	69-72
4/13/1971	12	170-171	9/21/1971	13a	58-59
4/14/1971	12	162-165	9/21/1971	13a	60-61
4/22/1971	12	3-146	9/22/1971	13a	73-74
4/27/1971	12	149-150	9/23/1971	13a	53-56
4/27/1971	12	148	9/23/1971	13a	65
4/28/1971	12	151-152	9/24/1971	13a	57
4/29/1971	12	153-157	9/27/1971	13a	62-63
5/5/1971	13b	90-92	9/29/1971	13a	48
5/5/1971	13b	99-100	10/4/1971	13a	30-33
5/7/1971	13b	95-97	10/7/1971	13a	44
5/27/1971	13b	85-89	10/14/1971	13a	28-29
5/31/1971	13b	81-82	10/20/1971	13a	34-37
6/3/1971	13b	83	11/5/1971	13a	22-25
6/4/1971	13b	64-66	11/5/1971	13a	20-21
6/15/1971	13b	69-76	11/5/1971	13a	26
6/29/1971	13b	56-58	11/5/1971	14c	95-96
7/7/1971	13b	38-40	11/9/1971	14c	88-94
7/19/1971	13b	46-48	11/10/1971	14c	69-70
7/20/1971	13b	41-44	11/12/1971	13a	9-10
7/20/1971	13b	49-50	11/12/1971	13a	11-19
7/26/1971	13b	31	11/19/1971	13a	3-6
7/29/1971	13b	22-27	12/7/1971	14c	65-68
8/6/1971	13a	92-95	12/8/1971	14c	82-83
8/13/1971	13b	14-15	12/14/1971	14c	87
8/17/1971	13b	10-12	12/15/1971	14c	85-86
8/19/1971	13b	1-3	12/17/1971	14c	84
8/26/1971	13a	96-97	12/20/1971	14c	76-79
8/27/1971	13a	99	12/22/1971	14c	72
9/1/1971	13a	87-88	12/22/1971	14c	73
9/7/1971	13a	82-84	12/22/1971	14c	74
9/18/1971	13a	75-78	12/22/1971	14c	75
9/20/1971	13a	79-81	12/22/1971	14c	80-81

1972 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
1/4/1972	14c	58-61	2/4/1972	14c	49-50
1/16/1972	14c	63-64	2/18/1972	14c	40-42
1/20/1972	14c	54-57	3/2/1972	14c	32-34
1/25/1972	14c	53	3/8/1972	14c	38
2/4/1972	14c	45-48	3/13/1972	14c	37
3/17/1972	14c	35-36	8/4/1972	14b	18-22
3/21/1972	14c	29-31	8/21/1972	14b	14-17
4/5/1972	14c	2-6	8/25/1972	14b	9-11
4/5/1972	14c	7-26	8/27/1972	14b	12-13
4/18/1972	14b;14c	98-end; 1	9/5/1972	14b	5-8
4/19/1972	14b	94-96	9/20/1972	14b	1-4
4/29/1972	14b	91-92	10/2/1972	14a	90-91
5/5/1972	14b	82-84	10/3/1972	14a	97
5/10/1972	14b	80-81	10/4/1972	14a	92-96
5/19/1972	14b	77-79	10/17/1972	14a	84-87
5/30/1972	14b	76	10/20/1972	14a	79-82
6/5/1972	14b	69-72	10/25/1972	14a	83
6/20/1972	14b	60-63	10/31/1972	14a	61-78
6/20/1972	14b	65-66	11/3/1972	14a	56-60
6/23/1972	14b	53-55	11/17/1972	14a	41-44
6/26/1972	14b	56-58	11/17/1972	14a	45-53
6/29/1972	14b	40-43	11/19/1972	14a	25-28
6/29/1972	14b	49	11/20/1972	14a	36-40
6/30/1972	14b	50	12/7/1972	14a	21-24
7/5/1972	14b	36-39	12/7/1972	14a	33-35
7/6/1972	14b	44-48	12/12/1972	14a	31-32
7/20/1972	14b	33-35	12/15/1972	14a	29-30
7/29/1972	14b	31-32	12/26/1972	14a	9-15
8/1/1972	14b	23-30	12/27/1972	14a	16-20

1973 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
1/4/1973	14a	3-7	6/29/1973	15c	32-38
1/4/1973	14a	8	8/30/1973	15c	30-31
1/15/1973	15c	82-86	8/31/1973	15c	18-22
1/19/1973	15c	79-81	9/7/1973	15c	26-29
2/5/1973	15c	71-78	9/10/1973	15c	23-25
3/2/1973	15c	66-70	9/11/1973	15c	15-17
3/20/1973	15c	63-65	9/13/1973	15c	10-14
3/22/1973	15c	61-62	9/28/1973	15c	3-6
4/2/1973	15c	57-60	10/3/1973	15b;15c	84-end; 1-2
4/12/1973	15c	39-56			

1974 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
1/3/1974	15b	78-83	7/3/1974	15b	43-47
1/23/1974	15b	76-77	7/30/1974	15b	48
4/2/1974	15b	49-53	9/16/1974	15b	35-40
4/2/1974	15b	56-75	9/30/1974	15b	12-34
5/16/1974	15b	54	10/4/1974	15b	7-11
5/16/1974	15b	55	10/25/1974	15b	4-6

1975 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
1/8/1975	15a;15b	87-end; 1-3	4/1/1975	15a	44-47
1/25/1975	15a	85-86	4/4/1975	15a	39-43
2/14/1975	15a	79-82	5/28/1975	15a	37-38
2/25/1975	15a	73-76	6/11/1975	15a	34-36
2/25/1975	15a	83	7/28/1975	15a	29-31
3/4/1975	15a	48-55	9/4/1975	15a	28
3/6/1975	15a	59-63	9/8/1975	15a	27
3/6/1975	15a	66-72	10/30/1975	15a	14-26
3/17/1975	15a	56-58			

1976 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)
4/5/1976	15a	3-13

APPENDIX B

Following is a chronological listing of all documents in the FBI file which were generated by the FBI headquarters:

1969 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
2/17/1969	1	115-116	7/10/1969	2b	57-59
3/13/1969	1	10	7/17/1969	2b	52
3/27/1969	1	107-110	8/14/1969	3b	80-82
3/27/1969	1	111-114	9/2/1969	3a	86
6/4/1969	2b	64-66	9/10/1969	3a; 3b	87-89; 1
6/16/1969	2b	63	9/30/1969	3a	68-69
6/16/1969	2b	79-81	10/2/1969	3a	36-37
7/2/1969	2b	60-62	10/3/1969	3a	38
7/8/1969	2b	68-69	12/1/1969	5a	54-55

1970 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
1/5/1970	4b	63-64	5/26/1970	6d	71-72
1/6/1970	4b	65	6/11/1970	6c	61
1/19/1970	4b	26	8/20/1970	7b	6-7
2/5/1970	4b	23-25	9/16/1970	7a	51
2/5/1970	4b	37-39	10/15/1970	7a	3
3/13/1970	4b	1-4	12/3/1970	8a	28-29

1971 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
2/2/1971	11b	83-84	9/27/1971	13a	49-50
2/17/1971	11b	20-21	9/29/1971	13a	51-52
3/31/1971	11a	48-49	10/21/1971	13a	38-39
9/21/1971	13a	64			

1972 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
10/16/1972	14a	88-89			

1974 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
8/7/1974	15b	42	9/27/1974	15b	4

1975 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
1/27/1975	15a	84	3/21/1975	15a	64-65
2/27/1975	15a	77-78	6/13/1975	15a	32-33

APPENDIX C

Following is a chronological listing of all documents in the FBI file which were generated by field offices⁶ other than the Charlotte field office:

1968 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
12/16/1968	1	134			

1969 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
4/1/1969	1	98-101	10/21/1969	3a	15-16
4/23/1969	1	89-90	10/21/1969	3a	17
5/15/1969	1	72	10/24/1969	3a	13-14
5/27/1969	2b	83-84	11/5/1969	5c	65-66
6/4/1969	1	5	11/6/1969	5c	63-64
6/19/1969	2b	71	11/13/1969	5c	55-57
7/15/1969	2b	49-50	11/18/1969	5c	51-52
7/30/1969	3b	90	12/1/1969	5a	53
8/12/1969	3b	85-86	12/2/1969	5a	50-51
8/19/1969	3a	64-65	12/5/1969	5a	49
9/9/1969	3a	81-85	12/11/1969	5a	52
9/15/1969	3a	66-67	12/18/1969	4b	49-50
9/17/1969	3a	76	12/23/1969	4b	57
9/18/1969	3a	77-78	12/23/1969	4b	58
10/2/1969	3a	33	12/31/1969	4b	59-62
10/9/1969	5a	56-57			

⁶ *New York field office, **Richmond field office, #Atlanta field office, ##Philadelphia field office, all other documents generated by the San Francisco field office.

1970 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)	
1/7/1970	4b	40	8/12/1970	7b	26	
1/8/1970	4b	47-48	8/12/1970	7b	27-28	
2/5/1970	4b	13-14	8/12/1970	7b	29	
2/6/1970	4b	19-20	8/12/1970	7b	35	
2/11/1970	4b	21-22	8/13/1970	7b	25	
2/13/1970	4b	15-17	8/18/1970	7b	8	
2/17/1970	4b	11-12	8/19/1970	7b	17	
2/26/1970	4a	55-56	8/19/1970	7b	18	
3/3/1970	4a	89-90	8/27/1970	7a	106	
3/6/1970	4b	7-9	9/3/1970	7a	100	
3/9/1970	4b	6	9/3/1970	7a	101	
3/13/1970	4b	5	9/3/1970	7a	102	
4/1/1970	4a	58-60	9/8/1970	7a	60-61	
4/2/1970	4a	61	9/11/1970	7a	47-49	
4/2/1970	4a	64-65	9/14/1970	7a	40-41	
4/13/1970	4a	57	9/14/1970	7a	43	
4/15/1970	4a	51-52	9/15/1970	7a	50	
4/15/1970	4a	53-54	9/16/1970	7a	44	
4/17/1970	4a	49-50	10/10/1970	7a	15-18	
5/7/1970	6d	73-74	10/14/1970	8b	94-95	*
5/8/1970	4a	21-22	10/15/1970	7a	5	
5/12/1970	4a	11-12	10/15/1970	7a	6	
5/18/1970	4a	4	10/15/1970	7a	7-8	
5/22/1970	6d	25-26	10/16/1970	8b	66	
5/27/1970	6d	23-24	10/16/1970	8b	68	
5/28/1970	6d	29	10/16/1970	8b	70-72	
6/9/1970	6c	66-67	10/16/1970	8b	73-74	
6/11/1970	6c	64-65	10/20/1970	8b	81-82	
6/12/1970	6c	68-69	10/23/1970	8b	67	
6/17/1970	6c	51-52	10/29/1970	8b	25	*
6/18/1970	6c	53-54	10/29/1970	8b	24	
6/19/1970	6c	34-35	11/6/1970	8b	7-8	
6/22/1970	6c	33	11/6/1970	8b	9	
6/26/1970	6c	37	11/6/1970	8b	11	
7/8/1970	6c	19-20	11/13/1970	8a	91	*
7/27/1970	6a	78-79	11/16/1970	8b	10	
7/31/1970	6a	71	11/19/1970	8a	90	
7/31/1970	6a	72-73	11/30/1970	8a	3-4	
8/10/1970	7b	32	11/30/1970	8a	7-8	

1970 Documents (cont.)

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
12/3/1970	8a	24	12/8/1970	9b	79-80
12/3/1970	8a	25	12/8/1970	8a	5
12/3/1970	8a	26-27	12/9/1970	9b	20-22
12/3/1970	8a	30-31	12/15/1970	9b	59
12/4/1970	8a	21	12/29/1970	9b	27
12/4/1970	8a	32	12/29/1970	9b	28
12/7/1970	8a	6	12/31/1970	9b	57-58

1971 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)	
1/12/1971	9b	11	2/17/1971	11b	52	
1/12/1971	9b	12	2/17/1971	11b	53-54	
1/19/1971	9a	64	2/17/1971	11b	60	
1/19/1971	9a	65	2/23/1971	11b	30-31	
1/19/1971	9a	66	2/23/1971	11b	32	
1/27/1971	11b	71-72	2/24/1971	11a	79-80	
1/27/1971	11b	78-79	3/3/1971	11a	90	
1/27/1971	11b	80	3/4/1971	11a	92	
1/27/1971	11b	81-82	3/4/1971	11a	93-94	
1/27/1971	11b	88-89	3/9/1971	11a	91	
1/27/1971	10b	88-89	3/9/1971	11a	96	
1/29/1971	11b	87	3/11/1971	11a	95	
1/31/1971	9b	19	3/16/1971	11a	82	
2/2/1971	11b	90-91	3/18/1971	11a	63-64	
2/2/1971	11b	92	3/19/1971	11a	81	
2/2/1971	11b	93	3/25/1971	11a	58-59	
2/2/1971	11b	94	3/25/1971	11a	60	
2/4/1971	11b	57-59	3/25/1971	11a	61	**
2/9/1971	11b	66	3/25/1971	11a	62	
2/9/1971	11b	67	4/6/1971	11a	36	
2/9/1971	11b	68	4/6/1971	11a	37	
2/11/1971	11b	64-65	4/6/1971	12	174	
2/13/1971	11b	40	4/13/1971	12	172	
2/16/1971	11b	36	4/13/1971	12	173	
2/16/1971	11b	48	4/24/1971	12	160-161	
2/16/1971	11b	50-51	4/26/1971	12	158-159	
2/17/1971	11b	37-38	4/29/1971	12	147	
2/17/1971	11b	49	5/6/1971	13b	101-102	

1971 Documents (cont.)

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)	
5/11/1971	13b	98	8/10/1971	13b	17	
5/20/1971	13b	93-94	8/10/1971	13b	18-19	
6/1/1971	13b	84	8/16/1971	13b	16	
6/15/1971	13b	77	8/17/1971	13b	4	
6/15/1971	13b	78-80	8/19/1971	13b	13	
6/22/1971	13b	67-68	8/25/1971	13b	8	
6/29/1971	13b	61	8/25/1971	13b	9	
6/29/1971	13b	62-63	8/30/1971	13a	98	
7/1/1971	13b	59-60	9/1/1971	13a	89-90	
7/14/1971	13b	53-54	9/1/1971	13a	91	
7/14/1971	13b	55	9/13/1971	13a	86	
7/15/1971	13b	52	9/15/1971	13a	85	
7/19/1971	13b	51	9/23/1971	13a	66	
7/23/1971	13b	45	9/27/1971	13a	67-68	
7/26/1971	13b	34	10/4/1971	13a	45-46	#
7/27/1971	13b	32-33	10/5/1971	13a	47	##
7/27/1971	13b	37	10/7/1971	13a	40-41	
7/29/1971	13b	36	10/8/1971	13a	42-43	
7/30/1971	13b	35	11/1/1971	13a	27	
8/3/1971	13b	28	11/30/1971	13a	8	
8/3/1971	13b	29	12/1/1971	13a	7	
8/3/1971	13b	30	12/8/1971	14c	97	
8/6/1971	13b	21	12/27/1971	14c	71	
8/9/1971	13b	20				

1972 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
1/4/1972	14c	62	5/4/1972	14b	90
1/24/1972	14c	51	5/8/1972	14b	88
1/25/1972	14c	52	5/18/1972	14b	86-87
2/15/1972	14c	43-44	5/22/1972	14b	85
2/29/1972	14c	39	6/12/1972	14b	75
3/22/1972	14c	28	6/15/1972	14b	73
4/5/1972	14c	27	6/15/1972	14b	74
4/20/1972	14b	97	6/20/1972	14b	51-52
4/26/1972	14b	93	6/20/1972	14b	59
5/4/1972	14b	89	6/20/1972	14b	64

1972 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
6/20/1972	14b	67	11/20/1972	14a	55
6/20/1972	14b	68			

1973 Documents

	File Pt.	Page(s)		File Pt.	Page(s)
10/4/1973	15c	7-9			

VITA

Wendy Jean Brame

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Science

Thesis: THE NATIONAL-LOCAL INTERFACE OF SOCIAL CONTROL: THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE WINSTON-
SALEM BRANCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Major Field: Sociology

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in South Bend, Washington, on May 10, 1971, the
daughter of S. Patrick and Teresa M. Brame

Education: Graduated from St. Helens Sr. High School, St. Helens, Oregon, in
June 1989; received Bachelor of Science degree in Social Welfare from
Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah, in December 1992, and Juris
Doctor from The University of Kansas in Lawrence, Kansas, in
December 1998. Completed the requirements for the Master of Science
degree with a major in Sociology at Oklahoma State University in July
2006.

Experience: Practiced law from 1999 to 2004; employed by Oklahoma State
University, Department of Sociology as a graduate teaching assistant,
1994 to present.

Professional Memberships: American Sociological Association, Oklahoma Bar
Association

Name: Wendy Jean Brame

Date of Degree: July, 2006

Institution: Oklahoma State University

Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma

Title of Study: THE NATIONAL-LOCAL INTERFACE OF SOCIAL CONTROL: THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE WINSTON-
SALEM BRANCH OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Pages in Study: 100

Candidate for the Degree of Master of Science

Major Field: Sociology

Scope and Method of Study: The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between national social control goals and the implementation of such goals at the local level. Through document analysis of Federal Bureau of Investigation files maintained on the Winston-Salem, North Carolina branch of the Black Panther Party, the FBI's official frame of the Black Panther Party and its national goals for social control are identified, and their effect on the social control efforts of the FBI's Charlotte, North Carolina field office are explored. Additionally, the manner in which social control efforts at the local level serve to either reinforce or challenge the national frame is considered.

Findings and Conclusions: The FBI's national social control goals shaped local control efforts through predefined categories of intelligence gathering. In execution of the FBI's national goals, the Charlotte field office focused on gathering forewarning of possible violence and collecting evidence for preemptive prosecution of Panther members under sedition and firearm statutes. Local social control activity thus contributed not only to control of local Black Panther Party activity, but also to national social control efforts aimed at dismantling the social movement. Additionally, the FBI's official frame of the Black Panther Party as a violent, extremist group which was a threat to national security helped to shape intelligence reports submitted by the Charlotte field office to national FBI headquarters. Intelligence reports submitted during the first half of the eight-year investigative period reinforced the national frame through repeated reports of isolated violent incidents and through language which cast fairly innocuous events in a negative light. Only toward the end of the investigative period did intelligence reports submitted by the Charlotte field office begin to contain material which would challenge the official FBI frame.

ADVISER'S APPROVAL: Dr. Thomas E. Shriver
