NATIVE AMERICANS, PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY AND OUTGROUP FAVORITISM

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Bem's (1967) self perception theory states that we know ourselves the same way we come to know others; we objectify ourselves and examine our behavioral interactions with others. That is, we compare ourselves to others, learning how we are the same and how we are unique. Festinger (1954) more directly addressed the necessity of comparison in his social comparison theory which postulates that humans have an innate need (or more appropriately a drive) to evaluate themselves in terms of their abilities and opinions and, in the absence of absolutes, these comparisons must be made relative to social groups. What has emerged from much of the social psychological research on social comparison is the realization that personal and group identities are inextricably intermeshed.

The Ingroup Bias Effect

One of the most consistent findings in the literature regarding intergroup relations is the phenomenon of ingroup favoritism, or the *ingroup bias effect*. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Brown, 1978**)** suggests that ingroup bias is driven by social identity needs and emanates from group members' attempts to achieve positive distinctiveness (i.e., favorable evaluation) of their group. Indeed, the mere act of categorizing oneself as a member of a particular group is often sufficient to produce a preference for ingroup characteristics relative to those possessed by a comparison

outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). It has also been suggested that because personal and group identity are so closely linked, identification with, and preference for, ingroup traits serves the dual purpose of achieving both positive group distinction and individual self-esteem.

The Outgroup Bias Effect

Although social identity theory has been successful in clarifying many of the processes underlying ingroup favoritism, it has failed to account for one of the more perplexing findings in the social psychological literature, namely, the *outgroup bias effect* among members of disadvantaged groups. In contrast to the ingroup bias effect, outgroup bias is the preference for outgroup characteristics, more specifically the favoring of higher status group values and beliefs by members of lower status groups. Ingroup favoritism among high status groups and outgroup favoritism among low status groups is well documented. Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992) reported a meta-analytic integration of 137 tests of ingroup favoritism showing unanimous (100%) ingroup favoritism among high status group members; in contrast, low status members demonstrated only 15% ingroup favoritism and 85% outgroup favoritism on dimensions typically associated with the higher status group.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the outgroup bias phenomenon is that members of disadvantaged groups demonstrate a tendency to favor the values of higher status groups, even when such endorsement compromises their own personal and group interests (Jost & Banaji, 1994). This often results in members of disadvantaged groups construing their social outcomes in a manner that legitimizes their disadvantaged position (i.e., justifies their lower status). Moreover, minority group members with the lowest

status (i.e., those with the most to lose) are also the most likely to endorse an outgroup preference for personal dimensions associated with high status groups (Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002).

System Justification Theory

In the mid to late 1990s, System Justification Theory emerged as an integrative theory unifying and extending other perspectives (e.g., Social Identity Theory, Conflict Theory), articulating a motivation to legitimize the status quo, or the need to believe that the world in which we live works the way it does because it is just and even natural (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Indeed, system justification theory postulates that the *outgroup bias effect* results from the tendency for people to: (a) perceive the status quo as just and (b) attach greater value to domains in which higher status groups excel resulting in *status value asymmetry*. In other words, for members of dominant majority groups there exists a congruency between group-based values (what works best for them) and the larger system values; they are the same. However, for minority group members there is an inherent inconsistency, because what is socially and economically advantageous for the self and one's group often conflicts with what works best for the larger system. As a result, members of minority groups often construe their social standing in ways that simultaneously devalue dimensions on which they excel and concede preferential value for higher status outgroup dimensions.

Due in part to the pervasive tendency for people to justify existing status hierarchies, members of lower status groups are in the unenviable position of endorsing status quo social arrangements resulting in the simultaneous valuation of characteristics possessed by members of high status groups and devaluation of domains which

characterize their own group. This tendency to defend existing social hierarchies leads to the prediction that members of low status groups are less likely to attribute inequitable outcomes to prejudice and discrimination, but rather to their own personal inadequacy (Major, McCoy, Schmader, Gramzow, Levin, & Sidanius, 2002). In this way, perceptions of lower status group members are consistent with those in higher status groups and serve to maintain the stability of the larger social system, one that often works against the best interests of subordinate groups (Major, 1994; Major & Schmader, 2001).

Early attempts to understand the *status value asymmetry* phenomenon derive from the works of Marx. Fundamental to Marxism is the dominant ideology hypothesis (Marx & Engels, 1946/1970). The dominant ideology hypothesis states that as a consequence of being able to structure a socioeconomic system with an inequitable distribution of economic benefits the majority group is able to legitimize their values and beliefs by orchestrating the intellectual and cultural content in education, religion, and communication, thereby controlling the production of ideas available for discourse and determining the parameters of what constitutes appropriate discourse. Through these seemingly innocuous, everyday processes the majority group's values (e.g., individual responsibility, personal causation, and personal merit) are legitimized as privileged cultural narratives and serve to mask potential group-based (e.g., racial) inequities, creating the appearance of a fair and just social system.

Gramsci (1971) described a theory of hegemony which is foundational in its influence on system justification theory and status value asymmetry (Jost, 2001). Hegemony is from the Greek word meaning "to lead"; its contemporary usage, however, denotes the dominance of one group over another. Theories of hegemony are concerned

with how group dominance is achieved and how majority groups maintain power through the persuasion of subordinate classes to internalize majority group values and beliefs to sustain the status quo.

Gramsci's theory emphasizes the fact that consent from subordinate groups is not automatic and that ideological domination must be manufactured. In Gramsci's hegemony theory, majority group domination is accomplished initially through coercive repression by state institutions, followed by persuasion through established civil institutions. Being able to create political power by dominating intellectual and moral leadership, in effect, allows rulers to manufacture consent from subordinates to be ruled (Zelditch, 2001). It cannot be emphasized enough that the stark reality of hegemony functions like an ambient light, just below the surface and subtle enough to exist without distinction. This makes it all the more powerful and effective because the concomitant internalization of inequity is accomplished largely outside awareness. The result is a *false consciousness* (Marx & Engels, 1946/1970) that legitimizes the dominant-subordinate relationship, which would not be possible without the willing endorsement and participation of the subordinate group in this process.

System Justification Theory attempts to describe this super-ordinate process that functions to legitimize existing social hierarchies and bonds self and social identity. System Justification Theory explains both the *outgroup bias effect* and the *status value asymmetry effect* in terms of three predominant variables which be discussed here. They are: status beliefs, perceived legitimacy, and group identity. There are specific structural preconditions for the emergence of status-beliefs and for understanding their significance in the context of system justification. First, structural inequality between social groups is

the critical precondition for the development of status beliefs; inequality being inherent in the very definition of the word status. Indeed, simply making a distinction between people is enough to foster beliefs that favor one's own group (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Greenwald, McGee, & Swartz, 2003). Second, structural inequality produces an inequitable distribution of valued resources, such as wealth and access to educational opportunities with concomitant privilege and social power (Weber, 1947). Third, group-based social hierarchies are the most pronounced structural feature of all human cultures (Brown, 1991; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and the most identifiable functional consequence of this is oppression and exploitation. Fourth, a group-based hierarchical system reflects social arrangements in which individuals enjoy power, prestige, and privilege simply by virtue of their membership in particular socially structured groups (Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, & Levin, 2004).

The structural inequality inherent in these hierarchies creates social distinctions that organize social relations, which also represent status distinctions (Sidanius, 1993). Typically, these distinctions are widely held status beliefs regarding competence and worth that favor one category of the social distinction (e.g., men) over others (e.g., women) (Burgess & Borgida, 1998). In this way, status beliefs represent cultural schemas, or heuristics, for organizing social relations, but unfortunately on unequal terms (Ridgeway, 2001).

Status beliefs are unique and differ from mere ingroup favoritism in two ways. First, by definition, status beliefs ascribe greater worth and competence to one social category as compared to another. Interestingly, status beliefs also impute lesser valued, but subjectively positive, characteristics (warmth, nurturance) to the status disadvantaged

group (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Glick & Fiske, 2001). Thus, status beliefs bind the socially devalued group to the collective social reality; not only by persuading them to accept that they are less competent, but also that they are distinctively better in other, less important ways (Eagly, 1987). As cultural schemas, status beliefs simultaneously include the disadvantaged as people of some value and justify their lesser position in society.

Status beliefs are also uniquely different from ingroup favoritism in that they are consensual. In other words, people in all categories of social distinction must agree, or at least concede, that one class in the social hierarchy is considered to be *superior* (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Ridgeway, 2001). In essence, status beliefs are beliefs about what *most people* think. Importantly, because status beliefs are consensual, it is the beliefs held by members of the devalued group that are essential to the successful formation and maintenance of status beliefs. To illustrate, in a series of five survey studies Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, and Sullivan (2003) showed that for a variety of system beliefs (i.e., willingness to limit freedom in defense of the system, trust in the government, belief in disproportionate wealth as beneficial, and belief in a meritocracy), members of low status groups were uniformly more likely to express satisfaction with the existing system and their own socioeconomic status despite the fact that these principles often do not serve to promote their own best interest and limit important discourse regarding group-based inequities. Thus, members of devalued social categories must overcome the natural tendency to favor their ingroup and accept that, as a matter of social reality, the majority group is more respected and competent.

Because of the consensual nature of status beliefs, they take on a sense of legitimacy or conventional acceptance. It is this social validity that objectifies status beliefs for people making them seem like inevitable social facts that must be dealt with, regardless of the negative impact on them or their social group (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). It is primarily the social validity element that legitimizes status beliefs and elevates them to such a level that they are bestowed moral value, capable of encouraging behaviors that support them and constraining behaviors that dissent from them. Legitimacy perceptions derive from the individual perceiving his or her own situation as just or unjust. That is, legitimacy appraisals are subjective perceptions of fairness or justice regarding the distribution of wealth, status, or power. Although these subjective perceptions are held individually, they gain their power to legitimize social inequality and provide a "cushion of support" (Rasinski, Tyler, & Fridkin, 1985, p.386) for the status quo through their collective endorsement within a culture (Major, 1994).

There is considerable evidence to suggest that when outcomes, including negative ones, are perceived as legitimate, individuals are more likely to construe these outcomes as fair, just, and deserving (Schmader, Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001). In other words, members of disadvantaged groups are less likely to attribute negative and potentially discriminating outcomes to unfair treatment if those outcomes are perceived as deserving or legitimate. Likewise, disadvantaged group members are more likely to consider these same outcomes as due to discrimination and unfair treatment if they are seen as unjust or illegitimate (Major & Schmader, 2001).

In addition to status beliefs and legitimacy appraisals, in-group identification is also important to understanding the outgroup bias phenomenon. Indeed, because the

conflict between one's group interests and larger system interests lies at the heart of both the outgroup bias effect and status value asymmetry, the extent to which an individual sees him/herself as an integral member of the subordinate group can affect the degree of observable outgroup preference (Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001). Jost and Banaji (1994) point out, for example, that under circumstances of extreme ingroup identification, system justification motives can be overwhelmed by personal and/or group identification needs. In this instance, unfavorable comparisons of one's group with a superior outgroup can function to strengthen ingroup bias as a means of reaffirming group worth and individual social identity (Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001).

Conversely, members of low status groups who only weakly identify with their group may be more likely to accept the inferiority of their group and to express outgroup favoritism (Jost et al., 2001). There is evidence to suggest that, indeed, individuals who show weak identification with their own low status group are less likely to stick with their group, *and* are more likely to simultaneously acknowledge their group's inferiority and identify themselves as exceptions to the group's inferior status in response to threat by a higher status outgroup (Ellemers, 2001; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997).

Since the first observation of the outgroup bias effect, studies have explored this phenomenon in a number of marginalized minority groups, including African Americans, Latino Americans, and indigent populations (e.g., Jost et al., 2003). However, consistent with other areas of the psychological literature, there is a complete absence of research examining the outgroup bias effect, or social cognition more generally, in Native Americans. The outgroup bias effect may be particularly salient in Native American groups for two reasons. First, Native Americans are the most disadvantaged racial

minority group in America (US Census Bureau, 2002). As a number of authors have pointed out, minority group members with the lowest status are the ones most likely to endorse an outgroup preference for personal dimensions associated with the higher status majority group (e.g., Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002). As the most socioeconomically oppressed ethnic group in this country, Native Americans may be acutely vulnerable to the pressure of favoring dominant group values and the inadvertent endorsement of unequal status quo arrangements.

Second, historically the larger culture's dealings with Native Americans are most aptly characterized as unabashed attempts to silence traditional Native culture and assimilate Native Americans into the mainstream culture. Whether it was early settlers gaining the trust of and then exploiting the *primitive savage*, the Federal Government's forced removal of thousands of Indian citizens onto reservations, or the boarding schools' attempts to strip children of their traditional names, customs, and language, the message has been clear: assimilate, stay in your place, or die. Faced with these options, it is little surprise to find that Native Americans have come to internalize the larger system's beliefs, including negative perceptions of themselves (e.g., Fryberg, 2002).

Because Native Americans represent one of the most socio-economically oppressed racial groups in the history of this country and because of the continued marginalization of the Native American culture, it would be expected that system justification theory predictions regarding outgroup favoritism and status value asymmetry would be pronounced for members of this group. In this paper an attempt will be made to demonstrate the importance of perceived legitimacy for understanding ingroup-outgroup preference for both status-relevant and status-irrelevant traits and the role of group

identity in this process. Further, a study is proposed that will examine this social cognitive process in a sample of Native American college students. To accomplish this, an overview of the system justification literature will be provided in Chapter II, followed by an operational description of the present study and hypothesized outcomes in Chapter III.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

What has emerged from much of the social psychology research on social comparison is the realization that personal and group identities are inextricably intermeshed. Because personal and group identity are so closely linked, it has been suggested that identification with and preference for ingroup traits emanates from group members' attempts to achieve both positive distinctiveness (i.e., favorable evaluation) of their group and individual self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In fact, one of the most consistent findings in the literature regarding intergroup comparisons is the phenomenon of ingroup favoritism, or the *ingroup bias effect*. In other words, all other things being equal, members of groups typically show favoritism for beliefs, values, and attitudes that are similar to their group and devalue those that are dissimilar from their group.

Given that group members typically prefer qualities similar to their ingroup, perhaps one of the most perplexing findings in the social psychological literature is the tendency for members of disadvantaged groups to simultaneously endorse unequal status quo social hierarchies *and* devalue dimensions on which their group excels, while conceding preferential value for higher status outgroup traits (Jost & Burgess, 2000). This *outgroup bias effect* often results in members of disadvantaged groups construing their social outcomes in a manner that legitimizes their disadvantaged social and/or economic position. Interestingly, disadvantaged group members with the lowest status (i.e., those

with the most to lose) are also the most likely to endorse an outgroup preference for dimensions associated with high status groups (Rudman et al. 2002).

System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) proposes that, unlike members of the dominant majority group, disadvantaged group members face an inherent inconsistency between group-based values and larger system values, because what is socially and economically advantageous for the self and one's group often conflicts with what favors larger dominant system values. Thus, members of lower status groups are in the unenviable position of accepting status quo social arrangements, potentially resulting in the simultaneous valuation of characteristics possessed by members of high status groups and devaluation of domains which characterize their own group.

Jost et al. (2003) sought to test the hypothesis that those who are the most disadvantaged by the system are also those most likely to justify the system by supporting and defending its legitimacy. The strongest form of system justification theory derives from the logic of cognitive dissonance theory and predicts people who are the most disadvantaged by the status quo will experience the greatest need to reduce ideological dissonance in order to maintain their beliefs. This suggests that authority figures who represent the larger dominant system should be viewed as above reproach and that inequality among individuals and groups are not only justified but necessary. Jost et al. (2003) sought evidence for these predictions in five survey studies.

The first survey sought to examine the influence of income, race, and education on individuals' perceived willingness to limit criticism of the government. Their hypothesis was that more disadvantaged groups would be more inclined to favor limiting personal freedom and criticism of the government. In a 1976 telephone survey of 1345

employed and unemployed workers from 150 metropolitan areas, participants were asked: a) if they would be willing to limit criticism of the government by the press in order to better solve the nation's problems, and b) if they would also be willing to limit the rights of citizens to criticize the government. Logistical regression analysis revealed a reliable negative linear effect in support of the prediction of greater willingness on the part of low-income individuals to limit personal freedom for the good of the larger group. With regard to race it was found that African Americans were more likely than European Americans to support such limitations. With income controlled, it was found that though the effects were somewhat marginal, the less educated were more defensive of the system. No effects for gender were observed.

The second survey compared poor and wealthy American Latinos examining their agreement with, and trust in, government. In a 1989 survey, 2485 Latino-Americans were asked two questions regarding their trust in the government: a) how much of the time they thought government officials could be trusted to do what is right, and b) whether they thought the government was run by the few looking out for their own interests or for the benefit of all. For the first question regression analysis yielded a reliable linear effect indicating that less affluent Latinos were significantly more trusting of government officials to do the right thing. Analysis of the second question also revealed a linear trend, with increased poverty accompanying increased belief in the government being run for the benefit of all. Both of these outcomes support the ideological dissonance prediction.

Survey three examined the relationship between income and the belief that large differences in pay are necessary: a) to get people to work hard, and b) as an incentive for

individual effort. In two different surveys of US households between 1983 and 1987 a total of 1396 people were asked if difference in pay was necessary to motivate effort. The surveys asked slightly different questions. The first was phrased "In order to get people to work hard…" and the second was worded to the effect, "Only if differences in income are large enough…" (Jost et al., 2003, p. 18). The majority of all respondents believed that large income differences are necessary. Moreover, as in the previous studies, regression analysis revealed a significant negative linear effect; the lower the income the stronger the belief.

African and European Americans living in the Northern and Southern United States were compared in the fourth survey. The hypothesis deduced from system justification theory was that the more disadvantaged the group, the greater the likelihood that they would endorse the meritocractic, a belief that success accompanies hard work. Because poverty has both racial and geographic associations, Southern Blacks would be expected to be doubly disadvantaged. In other words, according to the ideological dissonance hypothesis, they should also be the most likely group of all to embrace the justification of the system. Responses from 1048 people were obtained regarding their belief that: a) anyone who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding, and b) if people work hard enough they can make a good life for themselves. Analysis revealed that African Americans earned significantly less than European Americans and Southerners earned marginally less than Northerners. Results showed that Southern African Americans and poorer African Americans are more likely to endorse meritocratic beliefs than were Northern African Americans and affluent African Americans. Further, as predicted, comparisons of poor and more affluent Southern African Americans

revealed that the relationship between poverty and beliefs in the myth of hard work and success were more pronounced for poor Southern Blacks.

The final survey in this series also examined beliefs regarding the larger system as meritocratic among economically disadvantaged individuals. However, this survey tested the hypothesis that individuals with strong meritocratic beliefs will also be more likely to express satisfaction with their own economic situation, thereby reducing ideological dissonance. A sample of 788 respondents to a 1987 survey was used to examine "legitimization of economic inequality" (pg. 27). Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which they believed large differences in income are necessary for America's prosperity. Other survey items were used to assess meritocratic ideology and the personal characteristics necessary to achieve success. Economic satisfaction was measured for satisfaction with job, financial situation, and life in general. Relationships among these variables were assessed using a structural equation model. Results indicated that, as predicted, socio-economic status was inversely related to legitimization of inequality such that individuals with lower income were more likely to perceive economic inequality as just. Further, greater endorsement of meritocracy was positively related to economic satisfaction, as would be expected by the dissonance hypothesis. Interestingly, African Americans were less satisfied with their economic situation, but more likely to perceive economic inequality as legitimate. In combination, these five studies provide strong support for the suggestion that enhanced system justification among the disadvantaged is motivated by the ideological dissonance resulting from social inequality. This explains the paradox of why those who would profit most from not trusting the system, questioning its worth, and changing it are the least likely to do so.

There is abundant evidence that low status minorities exhibit outgroup favoritism by endorsing the status quo, paradoxically, to their detriment. However, the question as to why this might be so has been largely unexplored until recently. Proponents of Social Identity Theory (e.g., Turner & Brown, 1978) recognized the problem early on by suggesting that group members' need for positive distinctiveness and ingroup favoritism is more likely if their low status is not perceived as "inherent, immutable or fully legitimate" (pg. 207). However, Social Identity theorists failed to specify the conditions that would lead to these perceptions or what outcomes are likely in the presence of such perceptions of legitimacy. System Justification Theory researchers have examined specifically the significance of perceived legitimacy to understanding outgroup favoritism.

Jost and Burgess (2000) examined ingroup-outgroup bias in low status groups and the role of legitimacy appraisals in a sample of 131 undergraduate students at the University of Maryland (UM). These authors also distinguished between status-relevant traits (i.e., those related to achievement) and status-irrelevant traits (i.e., socioemotional traits unrelated to achievement). In this study, group status was experimentally manipulated by providing participants with bogus statistics regarding socioeconomic success for their alumni and for alumni from the University of Virginia (UV). Half the participants were led to believe their alumni were more successful than those from the rival school (i.e., high status condition) and half were led to believe their alumni were substantially less successful (i.e., low status condition). Following this induction phase of the experiment, students were asked to rate each of the schools on both status relevant and status irrelevant characteristics. Status relevant items were: intelligent, hard working,

and skilled at verbal reasoning; status irrelevant items were: friendly, honest, and interesting.

Results revealed that students assigned to the higher status condition displayed ingroup favoritism on status relevant traits. In other words, relative to those assigned to the lower status group, participants who were led to believe that UM alumni were more successful than UV alumni tended to rate their own group (UM) as possessing more traits associated with socioeconomic advantage. The opposite pattern was observed for students assigned to the lower status group. Relative to those assigned to the higher status group, participants who believed UV alumni were more successful than UM alumni rated the outgroup (UV) higher on traits associated with socioeconomic advantage.

In addition to assessing ingroup/outgroup favoritism, Jost and Burgess obtained assessments for fairness, justifiability, and legitimacy regarding the socioeconomic success differences between the two universities. These were combined into a general index of perceived legitimacy. Results revealed that perceived legitimacy was positively correlated with increased ingroup favoritism on status relevant traits (i.e., status value symmetry) for participants in the high status condition. For participants in the low status condition, increased perceived legitimacy was associated with both lower ingroup favoritism and higher outgroup favoritism on these same status relevant traits (i.e., status value asymmetry).

A follow-up experiment reported by Jost (2001) replicated this procedure at a different university and incorporated a manipulation for perceived legitimacy. Students at the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB) were first informed that their alumni were less socioeconomically successful than a comparison group from the

University of California – Los Angeles (UCLA). They were then exposed to essays supposedly written by members of their own ingroup designed to reaffirm (i.e., legitimize) or alter (i.e., delegitimize) their perceptions of the socioeconomic status data. Participants then provided ingroup and outgroup ratings on both status relevant (i.e., achievement) and status irrelevant (i.e., socioemotional) traits.

Twelve percent of the participants were not persuaded by the essays. However, the remaining students who believed that the essays were either legitimate or illegitimate displayed effects similar to those found in Jost and Burgess (2000). Specifically, students who read essays affirming their lower socioeconomic status (high legitimacy condition) demonstrated greater outgroup favoritism on status relevant (achievement) traits such as intelligent, hard-working, and skilled at verbal reasoning, compared to those in the low legitimacy condition. High legitimacy participants also showed less ingroup favoritism on status irrelevant (socioemotional) traits (e.g., honest, friendly, interesting) relative to low legitimacy participants.

Schmader et al. (2001) reported the results of two studies demonstrating outgroup bias and status value asymmetry under conditions of assumed legitimacy and one experiment showing that perceived illegitimacy can mitigate the outgroup bias effect. In all three studies students at the University of California Santa Barbara (UCSB) were given a 50-item test for a fictitious personality trait called *surgency*, which was described simply as a positive characteristic related to academic success. The test consisted of a wide variety of personality questions to mask the trait that was supposedly being measure. While the test was being scored participants were told that the goal of the

research was to examine possible differences in surgency among students at different universities and colleges.

In the first study, the relative status of the ingroup was manipulated by varying the comparison school. Specifically, in the low status condition, students were told the comparison school was Stanford University. In the high status condition the comparison school was identified as the local City College. In addition, students were provided with a summary sheet adapted from Jost and Burgess (2000) describing socioeconomic differences between the schools. Following this induction phase, participants were given performance information for the surgency test. In the low status ingroup condition, surgency scores were reported to be much higher at Stanford; in the high status condition, UCSB scores were reported as significantly higher than the local City College. The primary dependent measures assessed the perceived general value of surgency and the perceived utility of surgency for both status relevant (i.e., career) and status irrelevant (i.e., social) success.

As predicted a status value asymmetry effect was observed for perceived value of surgency. Specifically, greater ingroup valuing of surgency was observed when UCSB participants were told their group surgency scores exceeded City College. Less valuing of surgency was observed when they were led to believe their surgency scores were lower than City College scores. When comparing themselves to Stanford students, no differences were observed in the valuing of surgency. In fact there was a small but nonsignificant greater value placed on the surgency attribute when Stanford students' surgency scores were reported as higher than the UCSB ingroup.

Perceived utility showed a similar pattern. Surgency was perceived as being important to career success when UCSB students were told they scored higher on surgency than the City College group. Perceived utility of surgency for career success was lower for UCSB students when they were led to believe the City College group obtained higher surgency scores. Surgency was also seen as more relevant to career success when participants were told Stanford students scored higher on surgency than UCSB students. Interestingly, the social utility of surgency was viewed as useful when UCSB students were told they scored higher on surgency regardless of high-low comparison group (City College or Stanford). Results of this study demonstrate the tendency to place greater value on traits related to success when they are associated with members of higher status groups.

The second study was not an experiment, but sought to replicate these status value asymmetry effects comparing a sample of 79 male and female college students from the University of Minnesota. It was hypothesized that men would devalue surgency if they were told that women scored higher on this attribute, but women would value the domain when led to believe men scored higher. The procedures and measures were identical to Schmader et al. (2001; Study 1). Results revealed that men valued surgency to a greater degree when they were led to believe that they scored higher than women and devalued it when told that women scored higher. Women valued surgency both when they thought they scored higher and when they thought men scored higher. With regard to career utility, men perceived surgency as relevant only when they were told they scored higher on this trait than women; women rated surgency as high in career utility regardless of who scored higher. Men saw surgency as equally related to social utility, whereas women

saw surgency as having greater social utility only when they were told they scored higher than men. In Study 1, surgency was considered relevant only to career utility. However, in this study surgency was perceived as relevant to career success for men and to social success for women, perhaps because men and women are generally stereotyped relative to these two dimensions.

The status value asymmetry effects observed in these two studies were assumed to be a function of the perceived legitimacy of the status hierarchy information presented (i.e., academic, achievement potential). Study 3 was designed to test this directly by manipulating perceived legitimacy. Using the same procedure as in Study 1, an additional manipulation was added in which participants were provided with information that either legitimized or discredited the status differences in intelligence and academic potential at the comparison schools.

Similar to Study 1, results indicated that UCSB students who were provided with information legitimizing the status differences between the two schools tended to devalue surgency when they were told that City College students had higher surgency scores, but not when Stanford students scored higher. However, when information was provided that discredited (i.e., delegitimized) the validity of the status differences between students at the respective schools, status value symmetry rather than asymmetry was observed. In other words, surgency was not considered a valuable trait by the UCSB students when the status difference was seen as illegitimate or invalid, even when both low status (i.e., City College) and high status (i.e., Stanford) students scored higher on surgency.

In addition to status beliefs and legitimacy appraisals, in-group identification is also important to understanding the outgroup bias phenomenon. There is considerable

evidence that, among members of low status groups, weak group identification can result in the tendency for individuals to acquiesce to their group's inferiority, to see themselves as exceptions to their group's lower status, and to abandon the group when threatened by a higher status group (Ellemers, 2001; Spears et al., 1997).

Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1997; Experiment 1) examined the extent to which high versus low ingroup identification determines individuals' commitment to a low status ingroup. In this experiment, participants completed a bogus task designed to give them the impression that, based on their responses, the computer could calculate the degree to which they identified with their ingroup (i.e., high-identifiers versus low-identifiers). Manipulation checks determined the extent to which participants felt committed to their assigned group. Following ingroup identification manipulation, participants received feedback about the two groups' (high versus low identifiers) performance on a problem-solving task. Feedback was manipulated such that the participant's ingroup always performed more poorly than the outgroup, regardless of whether they were in the low or high identifier group. Participants were given instructions that either the group would remain the same throughout the course of the experiment or that some participants would be allowed to change groups. Dependent measures assessed perceived group homogeneity, commitment to the group, personal identification with the group, and desire to leave the group.

Results revealed that, relative to the high identification group, participants in the low identification group perceived their ingroup as less homogeneous and expressed a greater desire to leave the group. Conversely, stronger commitment to the group was observed among high identifiers. Results indicated that, among low status group members, high versus low group identification directly influences individuals'

commitment to their ingroup and the desire to abandon the ingroup in favor of the higher status outgroup, respectively (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001).

Cadinu and Cerchioni (2001) examined the influence of group identity on ingroup and outgroup favoritism across status relevant and status irrelevant traits. Emergency medical service volunteers were asked to rate themselves as to their level of identification with their professional association (i.e., ingroup). They were then given bogus positive, negative, or no feedback regarding their association's response time to an emergency call as well as the response time of other regional associations (i.e., outgroups). Participants were then asked to provide ratings regarding professional (status relevant) and personality (status irrelevant) characteristics for both their ingroup and either a high or low performance outgroup. They also rated how similar they felt to other volunteers in their professional association.

Results indicated that when high ingroup identifiers received negative feedback in the professional domain (i.e., low status condition) they tended to compensate by increasing ingroup favoritism in the personality (status irrelevant) domain. Low ingroup identifiers did not show this compensatory tendency. Instead, low identifiers distanced themselves from their group (i.e., endorsed lower self-group similarity ratings) following negative ingroup performance feedback. Taken together, these experiments suggest that, for both arbitrary and socially meaningful group designations, ingroup identity plays an influential role in determining the degree and direction of ingroup/outgroup preference.

The current study

Members of minority groups with the lowest status are most likely to demonstrate a preference for characteristics associated with higher status outgroups (Jost et al., 2003).

System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) attempts to explain this phenomenon by postulating a motivation, or tendency, on the part of individuals to legitimize the status quo, which serves to galvanize existing status beliefs and perpetuate unequal status hierarchies. The inequality inherent in these hierarchies creates social distinctions that organize social relations by ascribing greater worth and competence to one social category as compared to another, binding the socially devalued group to a collective social reality that induces them to accept that they are less competent, but also that they are distinctively better in other, less important ways (Ridgeway, 2001).

Because of the consensual nature of status beliefs, they take on a sense of legitimacy or conventional acceptance. It is this social validation that objectifies status beliefs and legitimizes them. For this reason, perceived legitimacy is crucial both for understanding the outgroup bias phenomenon and for maintaining existing structural inequalities (e.g., Jost, 2001; Schmader et al., 2001). In addition to status beliefs and legitimacy, the extent to which individuals identify with the subordinate ingroup influences ingroup/outgroup preferences. Members of low status groups who only weakly identify with their group may be more likely to accept the inferiority of their group, distance themselves from the group, and express less ingroup favoritism (e.g., Cadinu & Cerchioni, 2001; Ellemers et al., 1997).

Although the outgroup bias effect has been examined in a number of marginalized minority groups (e.g., Jost et al., 2003), there is a complete absence of research examining this phenomenon, and social cognition more generally, in Native Americans. Because Native Americans are the most disadvantaged racial minority group in America (US Census Bureau, 2002), Native American individuals may be acutely vulnerable to

the pressure of favoring dominant group values and the inadvertent endorsement of unequal status quo arrangements. Also, because of the tremendous assimilation pressures placed on Native Americans throughout their history, Native Americans often internalize the larger system's beliefs, including negative perceptions of themselves (e.g., Fryberg, 2002). It is for these reasons that a study is proposed to examine the outgroup bias effect in a sample of Native American college students.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Participants

There were 182 Native American participants in this study, 116 females and 66 males. Their average age was 22.09 years with a standard deviation of 5.55. Participants were contacted by electronic mail using addresses for Native American students provided by the university's academic affairs office. These potential participants were sent an electronic mail describing a study examining academic achievement and learning styles among university students. Participants were entered into a raffle for various prizes in exchange for participation. Information regarding the purpose of the study, requirements, and estimated length of participation were provided in the recruitment email. Participants were able to perform the web-based experiment from any computer connected to the internet and accessed at http://osu.cmapsych.net .

In terms of educational demographics the participants had 2.77 years of college. Their parents were also well educated 44% of their fathers and 43% of their mothers had graduated from college. Another 23% and 24% of their mothers and fathers respectively had at least some college experience. Only 2% of the mothers and 1% of the fathers had not graduated from high school.

Experimental Procedure

Surgency Test. During the experimental portion of the procedure, all participants were informed:

> The primary purpose of this study is to understand why differences in social and economic success exist between Native American and Caucasian college students. Specifically, we are interested in students' performance on a newly identified personality factor known as "Surgency". Although the research on "Surgency" is fairly new, it has been shown to be a positive personality trait and correlates with academic achievement and college success. Please take a few minutes to complete the 25 item Surgency Test.

Participants then completed a 25-item personality test purported to measure a characteristic called surgency (Schmader & Major, 1999). This bogus personality instrument was adapted from the original 50-item surgency test developed by Schmader & Major, 1999. Questions on the surgency test came from a variety of personality measures and did not have a consistent theme thus making it difficult to identify what the test was measuring.

After completion of the surgency test, participants were told, “As mentioned earlier, one of the goals of this study is to examine possible differences in "Surgency" between Native American and Caucasian college students. While the computer is scoring your Surgency Test, we would like you to review some recent data and a press release.” Participants viewed data tables that show comparisons between Caucasian and Native American college students on major indexes of academic achievement and economic success post graduation (see Appendices A & B). The following statement also

accompanied the data table, “From this table, the data clearly demonstrate that Caucasian college students consistently out perform Native American college students following graduation. They enter into higher paying and higher status jobs upon graduation and they tend to reach higher levels of promotion than Native students. This may be due in part to the higher rates of admission and years of education in postgraduate training programs.”

All participants were then asked the same two questions to ensure attention to the task. The first question asked was, “Post graduation, Caucasian students earn ____ compared to Native students.” The correct response was, “three times as much.” The second question asked was, “The rate of graduate admission for Caucasian students is almost _____ the rate for Native students.” The correct response is, “five times.” If either question was answered incorrectly the data sheet reappeared. Once participants studied the data sheet again they were asked the questions again. This procedure was repeated until both questions were answered correctly. The data table questions were the same for both conditions.

Legitimacy Manipulation. For participants assigned to the *legitimate* condition, the data tables were accompanied by a press release from a fictitious organization, the National Association of Teaching Indigenous Values in Education (NATIVE Council) which read:

> The National Association of Teaching Indigenous Values in Education released its findings today. Spokesperson, Randall Yazzie (Navajo), stated, "The conclusion we draw from this research is that Caucasian college students appear to have greater academic ability and intelligence

than Native college students. The fact that they tend to be more successful in their careers after college is due to superior ability and intellect, and is not simply due to perceptions held by employers and graduate schools that Caucasian students are more intelligent than Native students." Yazzie went on to say that the research suggests that it is these superior abilities that place Caucasian students at a distinct advantage. In short, the Council found clear evidence that the higher status obtained by Caucasian students is a function of superior academic abilities (NATIVE, 2004).

Following presentation of the press release, participants were asked two more multiple choice questions regarding the information they just received: The NATIVE Council concluded that Caucasian students are more successful because of _____ ?" The correct response was, "superior intellect." The second question asked was: "The NATIVE Council found clear evidence that the high status obtained by Caucasian students is a function of _____ ?" The correct response was, "superior academic abilities." As with the data table questions if participants did not answer the questions correctly the press release reappeared and they were allowed another opportunity to answer the questions. This procedure was repeated until the questions were answered correctly.

For participants in the *illegitimate* condition, the data tables were accompanied by a press release by a fictitious organization the United States Council on Higher Education (USCHE):

The US Council on Higher Education released its findings today. Spokesperson Phillip Martin stated, "The conclusion we draw from this

> research is that Caucasian college students **do not** have more academic ability or intelligence than Native college students. The fact that they tend to be more successful in their careers is probably due to the perception held by employers and graduate schools that Caucasian students are more intelligent than Native students." Martin went on to say that the research suggests that this perception is inaccurate and places Native students at an unfair disadvantage. In short, the Council found no evidence that Caucasian students deserve higher status than Native students based on superior academic abilities (USCHE, 2004).

Following presentation of the illegitimate press release, participants were asked two more multiple choice questions regarding the information they just received: "The USCHE Council concluded that Caucasian students are more successful because of _____ ?" And: "The USCHE Council found clear evidence that the high status obtained by Caucasian students is a function of _____ ?" Correct responses to the two questions were, "biases held by employers" and "biases held by graduate schools", respectively.

Surgency Feedback. Following the legitimacy manipulation, participants in both conditions received their surgency test profile (see Appendix C), which showed their individual score (32.5), the cumulative average scores obtained by other Native American students (34.5), and the cumulative average scores obtained by Caucasian students (72.5) on a 0-100 scale. Participants then complete the primary dependent measure.

Dependent Measure

The primary dependent measure was derived from a 16-item scale that instructed participants to rate on a 7-point Likert scale (1= Not At All to 7= Extremely) the extent to

which they think each of the words listed describes Native Americans and Caucasian Americans in general (See Appendix D and E). The words were derived from pilot testing of undergraduates who were asked to list the most common stereotypes they have heard about Native American and Caucasian American individuals. The 16 items comprising the dependent measure were the most frequently listed positive stereotypes in that survey. Eight of the 16 items are status irrelevant, or socioemotional, traits (e.g., friendly, warm, peaceful); eight of the 16 items are status relevant, or achievement, traits (e.g., intelligent, competitive, ambitious). The order of presentation was counterbalanced, such that half of the participants provided ratings for Native Americans first; the other half rated Caucasian Americans first.

Jost and Burgess (2000) and Jost (2001) recommend using difference scores to simplify the assessment of ingroup and outgroup favoritism. This is accomplished by subtracting participants' outgroup (i.e., Caucasian American) ratings for each item on the dependent measure from the respective ingroup (i.e., Native American) rating for that same item and then averaging these difference scores separately for status relevant and status irrelevant items. A positive difference score reflects greater ingroup preference for that domain; negative scores reflect an outgroup preference for that domain.

Cultural Identification

While the participants were providing demographic information, cultural identification was also assessed. Four questions from Oetting and Beauvais' orthogonal measure of cultural identification (1991) were used. Participants were asked to rate their identification with both Native American and Caucasian American culture on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*A lot*) to 4 (*Not at all*). The questions were, "Do you live by

or follow the American Indian way of life", "Do you live by or follow the Caucasian American way of life?"; "Will you be a success in the American Indian way of life," "Will you be a success in the Caucasian American way of life," "Does your family live in the American Indian way of life," "Does your family live in the Caucasian American way of life?"; and "Is your family a success in the American Indian way of life", "Is your family a success in the Caucasian American way of life?" Reliability estimates of this 4-item scale have shown to be at least in the .70s (Oetting & Beauvais, 1991).

Hypotheses

Primary Hypothesis $Ho_{(1)}$: The primary hypothesis was that participants would demonstrate significantly less ingroup favoritism on ratings of status relevant (achievement) traits under conditions of feedback legitimacy. In other words, the Native American minus Caucasian American difference scores on status relevant traits following legitimacy feedback should be significantly less than the Native American minus Caucasian American status relevant trait difference following illegitimate feedback.



$Ho_{(1.a)}$: Similarly, it was hypothesized that ratings on status irrelevant (socio-emotional) traits should not differ significantly as a function of (il)legitimacy feedback. More specifically, there should be no significant difference on ingroup favoritism ratings on status irrelevant traits between participants in the legitimate and illegitimate feedback condition.

Cultural Identification Hypothesis $Ho_{(2)}$: It was hypothesized that participants who endorse lower Native American identification on the cultural identification scale would demonstrate less ingroup favoritism on the trait rating measure. Specifically, lower Native American identification would be significantly associated with lower Native American minus Caucasian American trait differences for both status relevant and status irrelevant dimensions regardless of legitimacy feedback.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

Data Preparation

The primary dependent measure used to assess ingroup/outgroup favoritism was the difference scores derived from participant ratings for Native American descriptors minus ratings for Caucasian Americans descriptors. A positive difference between ratings reflects an ingroup preference for Native Americans and a negative difference between ratings reflects an outgroup preference for Caucasian Americans on that characteristic. Previous studies examining ingroup-outgroup bias have used this methodology (e.g., Jost & Burgess, 2000). Means for these difference scores were then computed for the eight characteristics comprising the Achievement (status relevant) and Socioemotional (status irrelevant) domains. A 2 (Legitimate/Illegitimate) x 2 (Achievement/Socioemotional) between/within mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyze the mean difference scores and simple effects analyses were used to further examine significant interaction effects. Pearson product-moment correlations were used to test the relationship between Native American cultural identification and ingroup favoritism for both status relevant (Achievement) and status irrelevant (Socioemotional) characteristics.

Results

Primary Hypothesis

The hypothesis of status value asymmetry varying as a function of legitimacy was tested using NA minus CA difference scores in a 2 (Legitimate/Illegitimate) x 2 (Status Relevant/Status Irrelevant) between/within mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1 and the results of the analysis are presented in Table 2, and the interaction means are depicted graphically in Figure 1.

Only the main effect for Status was significant with a moderate effect size. Participants rated themselves as possessing more status relevant (M =.77) than status irrelevant (M =.19) traits, $F_{(1,180)} = 86.58$, p=.001, $\eta_p^2 = .325$, regardless of legitimacy manipulation. The main effect for Legitimacy and the Legitimacy x Status interaction were both nonsignificant. Although participants did show some decrease in status relevant ratings when exposed to legitimate feedback this decrease was not significant. It was, however, in the predicted direction.

In order to more closely examine these data, a 2 (Legitimate/Illegitimate) x 2 (Status Relevant/Status Irrelevant) x 2 (Native American/Caucasian American) between/within/within mixed design ANOVA was performed. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3 and the results of the analysis are presented in Table 4. The interaction means are depicted graphically in Figure 2.

Main effects for both Status and Race were significant, with small effect sizes. Participants rated status relevant traits (M = 4.97) significantly higher than status irrelevant traits (M = 4.80), $F_{(1,180)} = 25.45$, p =.001, , $\eta_p^2 = .120$, regardless of legitimacy condition or target group (Native Americans /Caucasian American). They also rated

themselves (M = 5.15) significantly higher than Caucasian Americans (M = 4.62), $F_{(1,180)}$ = 49.43, p = .001, η_p^2 = .215 on both status relevant and status irrelevant dimensions independent of legitimacy manipulation.

In addition to these two main effects the interactions between Legitimacy x Race and Status x Race were also significant. The two-way interaction means for Legitimacy x Race are shown in Figure 3. Comparing interaction means using a simple effects analysis revealed small effect sizes and showed that in the legitimate condition Native Americans (M = 5.12) rated themselves significantly higher, across status domains, than Caucasian Americans (M = 4.75). They also rated themselves (M = 5.17) significantly higher than Caucasian Americans (M = 4.50) in the illegitimate condition. It can also be seen from Figure 3 that the ratings for Caucasian Americans was significantly higher under conditions of legitimacy (M = 4.75) than illegitimacy (M = 4.50). Native Americans ratings of themselves was not significantly different whether given legitimate (M = 5.12) or illegitimate (M = 5.17) information.

The two-way interaction means for Status x Race are shown in Figure 4. Subsequent simple effects analysis revealed low medium to small effect sizes. There was a significant comparison for Status, with participants rating themselves higher on status relevant traits (M = 5.38) than status irrelevant traits (M = 4.91); however, when rating Caucasian Americans, ratings for status relevant traits (M = 4.55) were not significantly different from the ratings for status irrelevant traits (M = 4.70). Within the status relevant domain, participants rated themselves (M = 5.38) significantly higher than Caucasian Americans (M = 4.55). For status irrelevant traits, effects were not as large, but again

participants rated themselves ($M = 4.91$) significantly higher than Caucasian Americans ($M = 4.70$).

Secondary Hypothesis

It was also hypothesized that participants who endorsed lower Native American identification on the cultural identification scale would demonstrate less ingroup favoritism as measured by Native American minus Caucasian American trait difference scores for both status relevant and status irrelevant dimensions regardless of legitimacy feedback condition. The prediction was partially supported in that greater identification with Caucasian American culture was associated with less ingroup favoritism regardless of status domain or legitimacy condition. Correlations between Caucasian cultural identification and group favoritism (NA – CA ratings) were significant for Status Irrelevant traits in both the legitimate ($r = .21$, $p = .004$) and illegitimate ($r = .18$, $p = .02$) conditions. Similar significant correlations were observed for Status Relevant traits under conditions of legitimacy ($r = .25$, $p = .001$) and illegitimacy ($r = .27$, $p = .001$). It is also important to point out that the mean rating for identification with Native American culture was 2.86 ($SD = .95$) and 1.37 ($SD = .60$) for Caucasian American culture. This difference was significant ($t_{(180)} = 21.23$, $p = .001$) and indicated a stronger identification with Caucasian American culture than with Native American culture.

In general the data revealed that Native American participants in this study strongly identified with Caucasian American culture and valued status relevant achievement characteristics over status irrelevant socioemotional characteristics. They also perceived status relevant achievement characteristics to be more descriptive of

Native Americans than Caucasian Americans. Under these circumstances the legitimacy manipulation had only a minimal nonsignificant effect.

Exploratory Analysis

Cultural Identification. In light of the importance of cultural identification to the findings, further examination of the cultural identification measure was carried out. LaFromboise, Hardin, Gerton and Gerton (1993) delineated seven process variables which can be used to differentiate between the various models of cultural acquisition.

These process variables have relevance in determining which model best describes the Native Americans participants in the present study. The first four of these process variables are concerned with culture of origin, they are: contact with the culture of origin, loyalty to culture of origin, involvement with the culture of origin, and acceptance by members of the culture of origin. Questions on the Oetting and Beauvais (1991) cultural identification instrument most directly related to these process variables are "Do you live by or follow the American Indian way of life", and "Do you live by or follow the Caucasian American way of life?" (1 = *A Lot* to 4 = *Not at all)*. Mean responses on these items were 3.00 and 1.30 for American Indian and Caucasian American, respectively. With regard to the American Indian way of life 72% responded with a 3 or a 4; and for the Caucasian way of life 98% responded with a 1 or 2. This clearly indicates that most of the Native Americans in this sample had little contact and involvement with their culture of origin.

The remaining process variables address second culture involvement, they are: contact with the second culture, affiliation with the second culture, and acceptance by members of the second culture. The Oetting and Beauvais (1991) instrument asks the

questions, “Will you be a success in the American Indian way of life,” “Will you be a success in the Caucasian American way of life,”? Response means were 3.02 and 1.31, respectively. Only 29% of Native American participants thought they would be successful in the American Indian way of life, whereas 96% thought they would be successful in the Caucasian American way of life – indicating substantial involvement and affiliation with the majority culture.

Status Domain. To gain a more precise description of participants’ perceptions of domain items, an exploratory factor analysis was used to isolate the traits contributing most significantly to perceived status irrelevant domains for Native Americans and status relevant domains for Caucasian Americans. Because the illegitimacy manipulation could introduce a confounding bias in the ratings, the factor analysis excluded these participants. Separate principle component analyses, using a varimax rotation with a two factor solution, were conducted for status irrelevant trait ratings of Native Americans and status relevant trait ratings of Caucasian Americans. While this was an exploratory analysis the two factor solution was chosen because there were two levels of the independent variable manipulated and it was expected that the loadings would be distributed accordingly. A separate analysis without forcing two factors produced results that were not substantially different from those from the two factor solution. For this reason the results from the two factor solution are reported here. The varimax rotation is traditionally described as useful in cleaning up the factors because it yields factors that have high intra-factor correlations and low inter-factor correlations making the interpretation of the factors easier.

The inter-correlations among items are given in Table 5 and the factor loadings from the factor analyses are presented in Table 6. The KMOs for these analyses were .88 and .82 for Native Americans and Caucasian Americans respectively. The first component in the analysis of the item ratings for Native Americans accounted for 49% of the variance. In this component two status irrelevant traits predominated, noble with a loading of .81, and peaceful, with a .68 loading. The first component in the analysis of item ratings for Caucasian Americans accounted for 42% of the variance and revealed two predominant status relevant traits, ambitious (.69), and intelligent (.66).

Using these traits, ambitious/intelligent for status relevant and noble/ peaceful for status irrelevant, the data were reanalyzed using a 2 (Legitimate/Illegitimate) x 2 (Status Relevant/Status Irrelevant) x 2 (Native American/Caucasian American) between/within/within mixed design ANOVA. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 7 and the results of the analysis are presented in Table 8. The interaction means are depicted graphically in Figure 5.

Of the three main effects only Race was significant with participants rating themselves (M = 5.37) significantly higher than Caucasian Americans (M = 4.67), $F_{(1,180)}$ = 65.88, p =.001, η_p^2 = .268 (i.e., collapsing across Status and Legitimacy). The Status x Race two-way interaction was also significant, $F_{(1,180)}$ = 269.89, p =.001, , η_p^2 = .600, a comparatively large effect size. The means for this interaction are depicted in Figure 6.

The analysis of simple effects revealed medium effect sizes and showed significant comparisons within both the Status and Race variables. For Status participants rated themselves higher on irrelevant traits (M = 5.89) than relevant traits (M = 4.84) and rated Caucasian Americans higher on relevant traits (M = 5.20) than irrelevant traits (M =

4.14). Comparing Races, participants rated themselves (M = 5.89) significantly higher than Caucasian Americans (M = 4.14) for status irrelevant traits and significantly lower on status relevant traits (M = 4.84 as compared to 5.20). That is to say, these participants evidenced strong ingroup favoritism for the socioemotional traits of noble and peaceful, and to a somewhat lesser extent demonstrate outgroup favoritism for the achievement traits of ambitious and intelligent.

Using these traits and the NA – CA difference calculations as proposed in the primary analysis, clearly shows this pattern of status value asymmetry, with ingroup favoritism for status irrelevant traits and marginal outgroup favoritism for status relevant traits (see Figure 7). The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 9 and the results of a 2 (Legitimate/Illegitimate) x 2 (Status Relevant/Status Irrelevant) between/within mixed design analysis of variance are presented in Table 10. The main effect for Status was significant, with participants rating themselves higher on status irrelevant traits (M = 1.75) than status relevant traits. The opposite pattern was observed for ratings of Caucasian Americans (M = -.36), $F_{(1,180)} = 269.89$, p=.001, $\eta_p^2 = .600$, a large effect size. The main effect for Legitimacy and the interaction of Legitimacy x Status were both nonsignificant.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) attempts to explain why members of minority groups often exhibit a preference for characteristics associated with higher status groups even at the expense of their own group. In so doing, members of lower status groups justify existing status hierarchies which serve to perpetuate inequality. The status beliefs which maintain these hierarchies: a) create social distinctions regarding the competence and worth of higher status groups relative to lower status groups, and b) ascribe positive, but less valued, characteristics to the subordinate group as compensation. The consequence of this motivation to justify the system produces an internalization of inequality which unites those who are socially devalued with a collective social reality legitimizing their low status. Consensus beliefs about status are in this way objectified and socially validated. This means that perceived legitimacy is crucial in understanding the phenomenon of outgroup bias.

System Justification Theory predictions of outgroup favoritism and internalized inequality have been extensively investigated among a number of marginalized groups including African American, Latino Americans, and lower socioeconomic populations (Jost et al. 2003); however, it has not been demonstrated among Native Americans. It is because Native Americans represent one of the most disadvantaged and

socioeconomically deprived racial minority groups in America, combined with the absence of research on this population, that the present investigation was undertaken.

Replicating a procedure developed by Schmader et al. (2001), perceived legitimacy of status beliefs was manipulated regarding Native and Caucasian American achievement. Following this legitimacy manipulation, participants rated Native and Caucasian Americans on status relevant (achievement) and status irrelevant (socioemotional) characteristics, with the expectation that achievement characteristics would be perceived as more descriptive of Caucasian Americans and socioemotional characteristics would be perceived as more descriptive of Native Americans in the legitimacy condition.

From the primary analysis, there was no evidence that legitimacy manipulation influenced participants' perception of status relevant/irrelevant traits. First, the simplest explanation is that the legitimacy manipulation and, consequently, the illegitimacy feedback was not significantly robust to discount the message that Native Americans under achieve because they are intellectually inferior. In other words, the participants embraced the stereotype so firmly that the illegitimacy manipulation failed to provide adequate counterfactual information to undo the stereotype.

Another potential explanation for the findings is that the outgroup bias effect does not hold for Native Americans, as it has been demonstrated for women, African Americans, and other minorities (e g. Jost et al., 2003). Alternatively, it may only hold for specific Native American populations who identify strongly with their culture and not for Native Americans who do not. The one unambiguous conclusion to be drawn from these data is that the Native American college students participating in this study

identified very little with Native American culture and/or way of life. The data clearly demonstrate that this sample identified more strongly with Caucasian American culture compared to Native American culture.

For this reason, the absence of an outgroup bias effect may have resulted from participants ascribing a number of status relevant achievement characteristics (e.g., efficient, dependable, and competitive) more readily to their own group than they did to the hypothesized Caucasian American outgroup. In other words, because this sample was so highly acculturated, the status relevant trait preferences observed were in all likelihood based on participants' self identification of Caucasian culture. Under these circumstances a status value asymmetry effect would not be predicted.

The predictions from System Justification Theory would be most relevant for Native Americans who are *not* acculturated, that is, Native Americans who adhere more closely to minority status beliefs due to disadvantage in terms of material resources and opportunities. The relatively high degree of identification with white culture suggests that the Native American participants in the present study probably do not fit this description ideologically, socially, politically, and/or economically. This suggests strongly that the present sample was not comprised of traditional Native Americans, but rather highly acculturated individuals. That is Americans first, with a Native American ancestry. Thus, from the perspective of System Justification Theory it seems reasonable to assume that because participants identified so closely with dominant culture they did not experience the ideological dissonance associated with outgroup favoritism. Consequently, they did not demonstrate the status value asymmetry effect.

In addition, it is evident from the comparisons of individual items that the operational definitions for the status domains used in this study are suspect, at least for these participants. Compared to other studies of outgroup bias the primary outcome trait measure included in the present study may have included too many items that did not accurately reflect the desired socioemotional and achievement domains. This lack of commonality among items may have further mitigated the outgroup bias effect. This is also part of the reason why the observed effect sizes were low. From comparisons of Native and Caucasian Americans on each individual item, the two socioemotional traits that were most frequently endorsed to describe Native Americans were noble and peaceful; and the two achievement traits which emerged as most descriptive of Caucasian Americans were ambitious and intelligent. The remainder of the traits which produced differences were distributed across the domains.

Despite acculturation and measurement issues, it is interesting that some evidence for outgroup bias was observed when trait factor scores were used. As with the analysis of individual items, the exploratory factor analyses revealed ambitious/intelligent as the most prominent status relevant traits used to describe Caucasians and noble/peaceful as the most prominent status irrelevant Native American traits. Subsequent analyses using these domain traits demonstrated a status value asymmetry effect with, strong ingroup favoritism for noble/peaceful and a smaller outgroup bias effect for ambitious/intelligent. These results suggest that future research should use fewer and more salient items reflecting domain specificity.

In future research it would also be interesting to use character traits reflecting opposite poles of a dimension such that favorable and unfavorable ratings could be

obtained for each trait. This procedure would make it possible to use measures developed by Jost and Burgess (2000) to assess ingroup ambivalence; that is psychological conflict resulting the valuing of status relevant ideals and ingroup favoritism. Another methodological modification of benefit would be to change the procedure such that participants are less likely to develop a response set by using a limited hold requiring that each item be viewed for a fixed amount of time. The cultural identification instrument could also be modified to include items design to gain a better perspective on the dynamics of Native American assimilation by incorporating content concerning the process variables identified by LaFromboise et al. (1993). It remains to be seen whether the assimilation identified in this study is unique to these participants as a stratified segment of the Native American population or reflects the assimilation of Native Americans in general.

In sum, results of this study neither confirm nor disconfirm the primary hypothesis. Perhaps this outcome is unique to Native Americans as a people because they are more acculturated, relative to other racial minority groups. Conversely it could be argued that because the current study did not access a demographically deprived group it lacks external validity. It could also be argued that the study lacked internal validity in that the analysis of individual items revealed contradictory results across status domains. Future endeavors should rely on normed data for operationally defining status relevant and irrelevant traits and draw from samples that fit the profile of individuals who highly identify with Native American culture.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Legitimate Condition Data Table

From this table, the data clearly demonstrate that Caucasian college students consistently outperform Native college students following graduation. They enter into higher paying and higher status jobs upon graduation and they tend to reach higher levels of promotion than Native students. This may be due in part to the higher rates of admission and years of education in postgraduate training programs. Please review the follow table. You will be asked two brief questions concerning the table.

Surgency

Table 1. Comparison of Caucasian and Native American College Students on Major Indexes of Academic Achievement and Economic Success Post-Graduation

	CAUCASIAN	NATIVE
INCOME (1ST JOB)	$36,000	$18,000
STATUS OF PROFESSIONS ENTERED 1 = MANUAL LABOR/SERVICE 2 = ENTRY LEVEL BUSINESS/RETAIL 3 = MANAGEMENT/ADMINISTRATION 4 = PROFESSIONAL	3	1.5
CAREER PROMOTIONS	5	2
RATES OF ADMISSION TO GRADUATE SCHOOL (MASTERS, PH.D., M.D., LAW)	62.5%	13.4%
YEARS OF POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION COMPLETED	5.5	2.5

Source: National Association of Teaching Indigenous Values in Education (NATIVE, 2004)

Appendix B

Illegitimate Condition Data Table

From this table, the data clearly demonstrate that Caucasian college students consistently outperform Native college students following graduation. They enter into higher paying and higher status jobs upon graduation and they tend to reach higher levels of promotion than Native students. This may be due in part to the higher rates of admission and years of education in postgraduate training programs. Please review the follow table. You will be asked two brief questions concerning the table.

Surgency

Table 1. Comparison of Caucasian and Native American College Students on Major Indexes of Academic Achievement and Economic Success Post-Graduation

	CAUCASIAN	NATIVE
INCOME (1ST JOB)	$36,000	$18,000
STATUS OF PROFESSIONS ENTERED 1 = MANUAL LABOR/SERVICE 2 = ENTRY LEVEL BUSINESS/RETAIL 3 = MANAGEMENT/ADMINISTRATION 4 = PROFESSIONAL	3	1.5
CAREER PROMOTIONS	5	2
RATES OF ADMISSION TO GRADUATE SCHOOL (MASTERS, PH.D., M.D., LAW)	62.5%	13.4%
YEARS OF POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION COMPLETED	5.5	2.5

Source: United States Council on Higher Education (USCHE, 2004)

Appendix C

Surgency Feedback

Surgency Test Profile

Subject Sample: 268 **Group**: Native American
Study Cite: OSU **Session Number:** 8

The following chart represent your score on the Surgency test: 32.5



For comparison purposes, the cumulative average scores obtained by other Native American students and cumulative average scores obtained by Caucasian students are also shown below:





OSU Sample 268; SESSION #8

Appendix D

Dependent Measure

On the scale below **check the box** corresponding to the number that indicates the extent to which you think each of the words describes Caucasian Americans **AND** Native Americans in general. Please rate each word for both Caucasian Americans and for Native Americans.

EXAMPLE:	**Caucasian Americans**							**Native Americans**						
Experienced	**1**	**2**	**3**	**(4)**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**(4)**	**5**	**6**	**7**

	Caucasian Americans							**Native Americans**						
	Not At All						***Extremely***	***Not At All***						***Extremely***
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
1. **Warm**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
2. **Hardworking**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
3. **Friendly**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
4. **Ambitious**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
5. **Spiritual**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
6. **Competitive**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
7. **Honorable**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
8. **Responsible**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
9. **Peaceful**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
10. **Efficient**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
11. **Proud**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
12. **Practical**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
13. **Noble**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**

14. **Dependable**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**		**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
15. **Traditional**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**		**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
16. **Intelligent**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**		**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**

Appendix E

Dependent Measure

On the scale below **check the box** corresponding to the number that indicates the extent to which you think each of the words describes Caucasian Americans **AND** Native Americans in general. Please rate each word for both Caucasian Americans and for Native Americans.

EXAMPLE:	**Native Americans**							**Caucasian Americans**						
Experienced	**1**	**2**	**3**	**(4)**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**(4)**	**5**	**6**	**7**

	Native Americans							**Caucasian Americans**						
	Not At All						***Extremely***	***Not At All***						***Extremely***
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
1. **Warm**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
2. **Hardworking**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
3. **Friendly**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
4. **Ambitious**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
5. **Spiritual**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
6. **Competitive**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
7. **Honorable**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
8. **Responsible**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
9. **Peaceful**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
10. **Efficient**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
11. **Proud**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
12. **Practical**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
13. **Noble**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**

14. **Dependable**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**		**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
15. **Traditional**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**		**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
16. **Intelligent**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**		**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**

TABLE 1

Legitimacy x Status Means and Standard Deviations for NA – CA Difference Scores.

	Status Relevant	**Status Irrelevant**
Legitimate	.68(1.18)	.07(.80)
Illegittimate	.85(1.11)	.31(.89)

TABLE 2

Legitimacy x Status Analysis of Variance Summary for NA – CA Difference Scores.

Source	SS	df	MS	*F*	*p*	η_p^2
Legitimacy	3.84	1	3.84	2.28	0.13	0.012
Error	303.40	180	1.69			
Status	30.36	1	30.36	86.58	0.00	0.325
Legitimacy x Status	0.10	1	0.10	0.29	0.59	0.002
Error	63.12	180	0.35			

TABLE 3

Legitimacy x Status x Race Means and Standard Deviations.

	Status Irelevant		Status Relevant	
	NA	**CA**	**NA**	**CA**
Legitimate	4.91(1.16)	4.84(1.27)	5.33(1.05)	4.65(1.00)
Illegitimate	4.92(1.20)	4.56(1.02)	5.43(1.02)	4.45(.98)

TABLE 4

Legitimacy x Status x Race Analysis of Variance Summary

Source	SS	df	MS	*F*	*p*	η_p^2
Legitimacy	1.62	1	1.62	1.08	0.300	0.006
Error	270.87	180	1.50			
Status	4.76	1	4.76	25.45	0.000	0.120
Legitimacy x Status	0.27	1	0.27	1.47	0.228	0.008
Error	33.67	180	0.19			
Race	49.91	1	49.91	49.43	0.000	0.215
Legitimacy x Race	4.06	1	4.06	4.02	0.046	0.021
Error	181.75	180	1.01			
Status x Race	17.42	1	17.42	96.87	0.000	0.349
Leg x Status x Race	0.00	1	0.00	0.01	0.904	0.000
Error	32.37	180	0.18			

TABLE 5

Inter-correlations among Items for both Native Americans and Caucasian Americans.

		Caucasian Americans														
		Warm	**Friendly**	**Spritual**	**Honorable**	**Peaceful**	**Proud**	**Noble**	**Traditional**	**Hardwrking**	**Ambitious**	**Competitive**	**Responsible**	**Efficient**	**Practical**	**Dependable**	**Intelligent**
	Warm		0.19	0.52	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.36	0.22	0.09	0.32	-0.11	0.08	0.34	0.17	0.13	0.17
	Friendly	0.44		0.25	0.32	0.13	0.24	0.31	0.51	0.23	0.37	0.02	0.35	0.29	0.43	0.05	0.40
	Spritual	0.57	0.42		0.36	0.21	0.32	0.43	0.39	0.22	0.29	0.12	0.23	0.42	0.27	0.18	0.34
	Honorable	0.38	0.69	0.50		0.11	0.55	0.16	0.41	0.14	0.35	0.15	0.06	0.18	0.38	0.03	0.53
	Peaceful	0.35	0.32	0.51	0.38		0.09	0.63	0.31	0.44	0.33	0.26	0.18	0.46	0.32	0.47	0.30
	Proud	0.15	0.37	0.22	0.49	0.45		0.20	0.30	0.11	0.31	0.13	0.11	0.15	0.29	0.04	0.57
	Noble	0.44	0.48	0.54	0.49	0.61	0.33		0.49	0.63	0.52	0.16	0.24	0.64	0.37	0.53	0.38
	Traditional	0.36	0.62	0.45	0.65	0.41	0.57	0.57		0.41	0.53	0.13	0.32	0.50	0.63	0.29	0.47
Native Americans	**Hardwrking**	0.41	0.34	0.46	0.44	0.68	0.34	0.62	0.49		0.44	0.26	0.33	0.50	0.34	0.63	0.27
	Ambitious	0.46	0.59	0.47	0.69	0.52	0.54	0.55	0.73	0.59		0.01	0.45	0.38	0.51	0.25	0.47
	Competitive	0.35	0.26	0.33	0.20	0.60	0.34	0.50	0.26	0.37	0.43		0.14	0.32	0.08	0.31	0.01
	Responsible	0.39	0.38	0.29	0.31	0.46	0.37	0.47	0.42	0.32	0.46	0.47		0.47	0.37	0.28	0.25
	Efficient	0.39	0.25	0.45	0.25	0.52	0.16	0.67	0.39	0.55	0.43	0.63	0.50		0.49	0.58	0.34
	Practical	0.50	0.64	0.49	0.64	0.45	0.36	0.58	0.79	0.54	0.68	0.25	0.41	0.46		0.30	0.55
	Dependable	0.30	0.20	0.35	0.23	0.78	0.35	0.45	0.30	0.64	0.48	0.57	0.39	0.50	0.37		0.26
	Intelligent	0.38	0.51	0.39	0.49	0.38	0.30	0.56	0.60	0.37	0.56	0.43	0.53	0.46	0.62	0.32	

TABLE 6

Factor Analyses for Native Americans and Caucasian Americans.

	Native Americans			Caucasian Americans		
		Component			Component	
		1	2		1	2
	Warm	0.12	0.74	**Warm**	0.36	0.30
	Friendly	0.09	0.73	**Friendly**	0.54	0.22
Status	**Spritual**	0.20	0.62	**Spritual**	0.47	0.37
Irrelevant	**Honorable**	-0.07	0.82	**Honorable**	0.82	-0.06
	Peaceful	0.68	0.22	**Peaceful**	0.04	0.67
	Proud	0.32	0.34	**Proud**	0.76	-0.06
	Noble	0.81	0.25	**Noble**	0.20	0.80
	Traditional	0.54	0.57	**Traditional**	0.64	0.42
	Hardwrking	0.68	0.19	**Hardwrking**	0.18	0.74
	Ambitious	0.45	0.67	**Ambitious**	0.69	0.21
	Competitive	0.77	0.05	**Competitive**	0.29	0.29
Status	**Responsible**	0.45	0.50	**Responsible**	0.54	0.25
Relevant	**Efficient**	0.78	0.25	**Efficient**	0.25	0.78
	Practical	0.43	0.65	**Practical**	0.47	0.48
	Dependable	0.83	0.10	**Dependable**	0.07	0.73
	Intelligent	0.33	0.58	**Intelligent**	0.66	0.17

TABLE 7

Legitimacy x Status x Race Means and Standard Deviations using Ambitious/Intelligent for Status Relevant and Noble/Peaceful for Status Irrelevant.

	Status Irelevant		**Status Relevant**	
	NA	**CA**	**NA**	**CA**
Legitimate	5.90(1.16)	4.18(1.27)	4.91(1.20)	5.25(1.02)
Illegitimate	5.88(1.05)	4.10(1.02)	4.77(1.00)	5.15(0.98)

TABLE 8

Legitimacy x Status x Race Analysis of Variance using Ambitious/Intelligent for Status Relevant and Noble/Peaceful for Status Irrelevant.

Source	SS	df	MS	*F*	*p*	η_p^2
Legitimacy	1.24	1	1.24	0.58	0.45	0.003
Error	383.03	180	2.13			
Status	0.01	1	0.01	0.02	0.88	0.000
Legitimacy x Status	0.27	1	0.27	0.48	0.49	0.003
Error	100.22	180	0.56			
Race	88.62	1	88.62	65.88	0.00	0.268
Legitimacy x Race	0.01	1	0.01	0.01	0.92	0.000
Error	242.12	180	1.35			
Status x Race	202.55	1	202.55	269.89	0.00	0.600
Leg x Status x Race	0.11	1	0.11	0.15	0.70	0.001
Error	135.09	180	0.75			

TABLE 9

Legitimacy x Status Means and Standard Deviations for NA – CA Difference Scores with the Status Relevant Traits Ambitious/Intelligent and the Status Relevant Traits Noble/Peaceful.

	Status Relevant	**Status Irrelevant**
Legitimate	-.34(1.43)	1.72(1.71)
Illegittimate	-.37(1.13)	1.79(1.45)

TABLE 10

Legitimacy x Status Analysis of Variance for NA – CA Difference Scores with the Status Relevant Traits Ambitious/Intelligent and the Status Relevant Traits Noble/Peaceful.

Source	SS	df	MS	*F*	*p*	η_p^2
Legitimacy	0.02	1	0.02	0.01	0.92	0.000
Error	484.23	180	2.69			
Status	405.10	1	405.10	269.89	0.00	0.600
Legitimacy x Status	0.22	1	0.22	0.15	0.70	0.001
Error	270.18	180	1.50			

FIGURE 1


Difference Scores
Native Americian - Caucasian American
Mean Difference Score
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.3
0.1
-0.1
0.68
0.85
0.07
0.31
Legitimate
Illegittimate
Status Relevant
Status Irrelevant

FIGURE 2


Legitimacy x Status Domain x Race
Mean Rating
5.60
5.40
5.20
5.00
4.80
4.60
4.40
4.20
4.00
4.91
4.92
4.84
4.56
5.33
5.43
4.65
4.45
Legitimate
Illegitimate
NA
CA
NA
CA
Status Irelevant
Status Relevant

FIGURE 3


Legitimacy x Race
Legitimate
Illegitimate
Mean Rating
5.40
5.20
5.00
4.80
4.60
4.40
4.20
5.12
5.17
4.75
4.50
NA
CA
Race

FIGURE 4


Status x Race
5.60
5.40
5.20
5.00
4.80
4.60
4.40
4.20
Mean Rating
5.38
4.91
4.55
4.70
Status Relevant
Status Irrelevant
NA
CA
Race

FIGURE 5


Legitimacy x Status Domain x Race
Legitimate
Illegitimate
Mean Rating
6.00
5.80
5.60
5.40
5.20
5.00
4.80
4.60
4.40
4.20
4.00
5.90
5.88
4.18
4.10
4.91
4.77
5.25
5.15
NA
CA
NA
CA
Status Irelevant
Status Relevant

FIGURE 6


Status x Race
Status Relevant
Status Irrelevant
6.00
5.50
5.00
4.50
4.00
Mean Rating
5.89
4.84
5.20
4.14
NA
CA
Race

FIGURE 7


Difference Scores
Native American - Caucasian American
Mean Difference Score
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
-0.50
-1.00
1.72
1.79
-0.34
-0.37
Legitimate
Illegittimate
Status Irrelevant
Status Relevant

VITA

Christina Marie Almstrom

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Science or Arts

Thesis: NATIVE AMERICANS, PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY AND OUTGROUP FAVORITISM

Major Field: Clinical Psychology

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Rapid City, South Dakota on November 10, 1978 to John and Colleen Harrington.

Education: Graduated from Putnam City High School, in Oklahoma City, OK in May 1997; received Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology from the University of Central Oklahoma - Edmond, Oklahoma, in May 2002; received Masters of Arts degree in Experimental Psychology University of Central Oklahoma - Edmond, Oklahoma, in May 2004. Completed requirements for the Master of Science degree with a major in Clinical Psychology at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, in May 2007.

Name: Christina Marie Almstrom Date of Degree: May, 2007

Institution: Oklahoma State University Location: OKC or Stillwater, Oklahoma

Title of Study: NATIVE AMERICANS, PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY AND OUTGROUP FAVORITISM

Pages in Study: 91 Candidate for the Degree of Master of Science

Major Field: Clinical Psychology

Scope and Method of Study: Since the first observation of the outgroup bias effect, studies have explored this phenomenon in a number of marginalized minority groups, including African Americans, Latino Americans, and indigent populations (e.g., Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003). However, consistent with other areas of the psychological literature, there is a complete absence of research examining the outgroup bias effect, or social cognition more generally, in Native Americans. The outgroup bias effect may be particularly salient in Native American groups because they are the most disadvantaged racial minority group in America (US Census Bureau, 2002). For this reason Native Americans may be acutely vulnerable to the pressure of favoring dominant group values and the inadvertent endorsement of unequal status quo arrangements. It would be expected therefore that predictions from system justification theory regarding status value asymmetry and its mitigation through delegitimization would be pronounced for members of this minority group.

Findings and Conclusions: The prediction of status value asymmetry, that is, ingroup favoritism for status irrelevant traits and outgroup favoritism for status relevant traits, was not observed among Native American college students under conditions where appraisal of the legitimacy for inequality was either justified or delegitimized. Cultural identification measures suggest that Native American as a descriptive designation most appropriately reflects ancestry rather than culture of origin for these individuals.

ADVISER'S APPROVAL: John M Chaney