THE VIABILITY OF SOUTH AMERICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION: BOLIVIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS

By

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2006

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College of the Oklahoma State University In partial fulfillment of The requirements for The Degree of Geography MASTER OF SCIENCE July, 2010
THE VIABILITY OF SOUTH AMERICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION:

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to my patient, caring, adventurous, and understanding husband, Jack D. Titchener, who has supported me and dealt with me during this entire process. Muchas gracias por tu apoyo.

I would like to thank my family (Rick, Sherry, and Ian) for their understanding and backing throughout life and graduate school, and to my family-in-law (Dru, Dan, and Dru) for always supporting us, and our love of travel. Thanks very much to my father and husband for all their editing help. I would like to thank my dear aunt, Shelley Jackson, who has generously helped me through graduate school. Additionally, I would like to thank my dear uncle, Joseph Keelty for his continued generosity.

I would like to thank Dr. Dale Lightfoot for his help in recent months, his always-insightful questions, feedback, and guidance, his passion for travel, and the always-welcoming feeling that graduate students notice in our department.

I would like to thank Dr. Jackie Vadjunec for her help in recent months, help with contacts in South America, and her guidance and suggestions during a readings course on Bolivian identity and identity politics. Her help was especially insightful in understanding first the complex nature of identity, and second the consequences of identity within the Latin American context.

To Dr. Joel Jenswold, I thank you for the many years of guidance, support, encouragement, and fantastic classes you lead. I enjoyed them all and always wished I could take more of your classes.

I would like to thank Dr. Reuel Hanks for persuading me to apply to this geography program and for suggesting to me the potential of political geography in my academic career. I would also like to thank Dr. Hanks for his help in the creation and previous guidance of this project.

I would like to thank the Department of Geography at Oklahoma State University for all the financial support, recognition, teaching experience and guidance, and opportunities that I have been presented with by enrolling in this program. I would like to thank all of the faculty and staff of the department who have made my experience very positive, informative, and challenging. I would like to again thank Dr. Stephen Tweedie for the Tweedie Travel Scholarship I received in 2008. The scholarship helped immensely in the preliminary research phase of this thesis. Finally, I would like to thank all the Bolivian survey respondents who participated in this investigation. Gracias a todos que me han ayudado en este proceso.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Various regional integration efforts have gained momentum in the past two decades in Latin America, including the Andean Community, the Southern Common Market, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, the Union of South American Nations, and the most recent addition, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. In other parts of the world, such as the European Union, joining into regional integration organizations often requires the states involved to sacrifice or surrender certain elements of national sovereignty and identity. In the European Union case, some states involved in the economic union have ceded their national currencies, a form of national sovereignty, to the European Union.

Supranational integration efforts affect national as well as local economies, politics, and questions surrounding identities. Governments across Latin America have signed on to many of these accords including those organizations mentioned above. The citizens of these countries, however, have long been left out of any formal decision making process on joining these organizations and what elements of national identity and sovereignty they are willing to sacrifice or surrender in the process. In large part, the viability of South American regional integration may be influenced by how the common citizens perceive the process, or if they are even aware of these regional integration
efforts.

While these regional integration organizations have become commonplace in Latin America in the past two decades, Bolivia, a state with a chaotic history and a complex ethnic composition, has experienced many internal changes in state and civil society during that same time period. A cohesive national identity in Bolivia has historically been an elusive goal. As a result, Bolivians have complex and multiple notions of what it is to be Bolivian. Recent transformations, including the rise of the popular indigenous party *Movimiento al Socialismo*, the exile of former President Sánchez de Lozada to the United States, the election and re-election of President Evo Morales in 2005 and 2009, and the creation of the new Constitution in 2009, have left “Bolivian identity…in a state of flux; many Bolivians were ‘redefining’ and even questioning what it meant to be Bolivian, thanks in part to Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales” (Armstrong 2007, 34).

In relation to all these changes that Bolivia has experienced in the past fifteen years, it is the purpose of this research to first understand if Bolivians are even aware of this process of regional integration occurring in South America. Second, it the purpose of this research to understand whether Bolivians are willing to surrender certain aspects of their national identity (currency, anthem) and sovereignty (control over the territory’s borders) to a supranational institution in order to join in regional organizations such as the Union of South American Nations, the Southern Common Market, etc.
Research Questions

The guiding research questions of this study are:

1). Are Bolivians even aware of this process to integrate economically and politically the continent of South America?

2). Are Bolivians willing to maintain or surrender certain elements of national sovereignty and identity (passport & border control, the national currency, and the national anthem) in the integration process?

The main objectives of this study are:

1). To understand if Bolivians have any knowledge of the current regional integration efforts in South America, including the Southern Common Market, the Andean Community, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, the Union of South American Nations, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, all of which organizations Bolivia is a member (full or associate).

2). To understand what elements of national sovereignty and identity (national currency, border control, passport control, and national anthem) Bolivians are willing to surrender in this integration process for increased membership in these above mentioned organizations.

3). Employing a geographic perspective (through the use of mapping software), to understand whether any geographic patterns exist either supporting or rejecting increased regional integration efforts.

4). To understand what symbols of identities (local, national, or supranational) are most prevalent across the Bolivian landscape.
Study Area

Although the title of this research is the viability of South American regional integration, it is beyond the scope of this project to address the perspectives of all South Americans. I therefore focused only on taking a sample of Bolivian citizen’s perspectives on identity and proposed regional integration.

The area under study in this investigation is the Pluri-national State of Bolivia, a landlocked country in central South America (See Figure 1). Bolivia is located near the center of the South American continent and covers an area of approximately 1,098,581 square kilometers (CIA 2010). Bolivia is bordered by Brazil to the northeast, Paraguay to the southeast, Argentina to the south, Chile to the west, and Peru to the northwest. The population of Bolivia is 9,775,246 as of July 2009 (CIA 2010). Within Bolivia, more than approximately sixty percent of the population self identifies as indigenous (Albo 2008).
Bolivia is a physically diverse country- with nearly half of the territory in the highlands and valleys of the Andes Mountains and the other half covering the lowland Amazon basin (See Figure 2). It is a country of extremes- having one of the highest cities in the world (Potosí), one of the largest salt deserts in the world (Salar de Uyuni), as well as many tributaries of the world’s largest river, the Amazon.

Bolivia has two capitals, the administrative or de-facto capital of La Paz, where the Congress and President are located, and the constitutional capital of Sucre, where the judicial branch of the government is located. The country is divided into nine departments including Beni, Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, Pando, Potosí, Santa Cruz, and Tarija. The majority of the population lives in the highland and altiplano.
cities of La Paz, El Alto, Sucre, Potosí, Oruro, Cochabamba, and the lowland commercial hub of Santa Cruz.

Figure 2. Topographical Map of Bolivia (Source: Klein 1992, 5)
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL IDENTITY, REGIONAL INTEGRATION, AND BOLIVIA.

Introduction

Part of understanding the viability of South American regional integration efforts depends on the nation-states involved in these processes. Some of the countries involved in these efforts, like Bolivia, have struggled in establishing stable and functional governments and cohesive civic national identities. The concept of a national identity assumes that there is an internal level of trust between the government and the population living within that territory. If a nation-state lacks a unified civic national identity, the citizens of that state may not trust the government and may be more willing to surrender certain notions of national identity and national sovereignty to a higher authority, simply because these elements of identity and sovereignty are not prominently tied to the personal identity of those citizens.

In other words, in countries like Bolivia, because of the historic mistrust between the people and the government, other identities- local, religious, gender, class, regional, etc. may take on a stronger role than the civic national identity created by the government. In other countries, such as Argentina, that perhaps possess a more unified national identity, the citizens may be opposed to ceding certain elements of their national
identity and sovereignty to a supranational power, perhaps because the notion of a national identity is largely intertwined with the personal identities of those citizens.

In Latin America, some scholars argue that nation-states have developed largely in relation to a wider regional identity set forth by the Iberian colonial powers (Masur 1966, Whitaker and Jordan 1966). This has provided common ground in many of the regional integration efforts throughout the region. A short review of the ideas behind regional integration, as well as examples of regional integration efforts in Latin America, and more specifically South America, will help set up the context of this investigation. The final part of this chapter summarizes Bolivia within this context.

**Background on Regional Integration Efforts**

Regional economic integration ideas stem from a structuralist framework, a prominent theory in international political economy, and are a clear example of the idea that increased trade among neighboring states will create long term shared interests and relative peace (Spero and Hart 2003). Belassa (1961) and Glassner and Fahrer (2004, 348) note that economic integration is a process with several steps, leading towards the goal of “complete economic [and political] integration.” The first step is a free trade area, where the tariffs on commerce are reduced between two or more countries, while tariffs to external parties remain intact (Glassner and Fahrer 2004). The second step in this process is a customs union, where a common external tariff is agreed upon, in addition to the abolishment of tariffs between member countries (Belassa 1961). The third step is a common market, basically “a customs union plus the free movement” of people, goods, and capital throughout the member states (Glassner and Fahrer 2004, 348). The fourth step is an economic union, where common economic and monetary policies,
uniform business laws, and a common currency are the objectives (Glassner and Fahrer 2004). The last step is total economic and political integration, which requires the establishment of supranational institutions that have authority over the member states (Belassa 1961). The European Union is the most widely studied example of this type of regional integration.

Of all the steps towards economic regional integration, surrendering sovereignty to a supranational power is the biggest challenge for many regional integration efforts, even in the European case. As Belassa (1961, 3) notes, “political obstacles can be singled out as the main causes for failures of these projects to materialize.” Joining together and compromising political interests is much more difficult than entering into an economic integration effort, in essence merely reducing trade barriers. Political integration involves first coordinating, compromising, and re-negotiating interests, relationships, agendas, and identities. Second, it requires trust among neighbors. Last, it involves surrendering some elements of national sovereignty to a higher supranational institution.

Although many countries join regional integration efforts for mainly economic reasons, a degree of political unity is also necessary for any successful integration effort. Glassner and Fahrer (2004, 348) agree, noting an “economic union without some form of political union is probably impossible.” Etzioni (2004) argues for the need for equal parts of economic and political integration for any successful, long-term regional integration effort.

Political integration requires extensive binding measures and supranational institutions that can enforce such measures. Etzioni (2004, 179) defines supranationality as a way
“to characterize a political body that has acquired some of the attributes usually associated with a nation, such as political loyalty and decision-making power—based not on an aggregate of national decisions or those by representatives of the member states, but rather on those made by the supranational bodies themselves.”

In large part, supranational institutions are needed to carry out decision-making (without being entirely reliant on the nation-state members), to produce supranational laws (not subject to national government’s decisions), and to be able to enforce such laws and make the member states abide by these laws (Etzioni 2004). The institutions themselves must be independent of the governments of the member states.

This also implies that individual nation-states will have to give up some of their decision-making power and sovereignty to the supranational institutions. As Etzioni (2004, 180) notes, “supranationality presumes some surrender of sovereignty by the member nations.” Although this is a give and take process, Deustch (1968, 187) writes of the importance of the “deliberate transfer of sovereignty” that nation-states give these institutions, in large part providing the foundation of credibility and legitimacy of that regional integration effort. The key to any viable regional integration effort is that the nation-state must be willing to give up some responsibilities and sovereignty to a supranational entity.

**Regional Integration in Latin America**

The idea of joining together the sovereign South American nation-states is not a contemporary idea. Although South America boasts two major geographic obstacles, the Andes Mountains and the Amazon River basin, early on the poor and often isolated countries of the continent realized that by pooling all the resources of the continent together, as well as increasing political cooperation and trade, collectively the nation-
states would prosper. The idea of joining the South American nation-states together has been a prominent theme in the political and economic discourse of the continent since the nineteenth century, the era of Símon Bolívar (Vanden and Prevost 2009).

After many Latin American countries achieved independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century, some of the revolutionary leaders, including Símon Bolívar and José de San Martín, proposed wider regional entities such as Gran Colombia, a supranational entity encompassing today’s Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia (Masur 1966). Since then, scholars, politicians, and revolutionary leaders have all debated this idea of joining the South American states into a continental entity, tied together by a common identity.

During the nineteenth century, these ideas did not produce any results, however, as internal challenges, such as nation building and civil wars, and external problems such as the U.S. Monroe Doctrine, took top priority. By the early twentieth century, Latin America was largely isolated from the rest of the global community and economy (López-Alves 2000). As a result of this situation, Latin America economically stagnated for much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As a reaction to this situation of economic isolation and the desire for Latin America to dominate its own future, the idea to join together economically and politically became more viable. The characteristics of common languages and Iberian colonial legacies held in common, and the loosely established regional Latin American identity, facilitated people coming together to discuss this idea of integrating the region.

On a wider regional scale, many proposals have been advanced for Latin American regional integration. However, most of these efforts have only been attempts
at regional integration, meaning that although the nation-states of the region share, in part, a common identity, something has prevented the countries of the region from further political and economic integration. Many organizations exist on paper (such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, etc.). See Table 1.

**Table 1.** Comparison of Regional Integration Efforts in Western Hemisphere, 2010.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Originating Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Central American Common Market</td>
<td>CACM</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Community</td>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Common Market</td>
<td>Mercosur</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American Free Trade Association</td>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Trade Area of the Americas</td>
<td>FTAA</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivarian Alliance for the America</td>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of South American Nations</td>
<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
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The significance of such actions shows that from early on, there existed an inclination towards joining together the sovereign Latin American nation-states. Yet, increased integration has proved an elusive goal for the region.

**Recent Latin American Regional Integration Efforts**

The Latin American nation-states, relatively weak by themselves in the international community, sought regional integration as a way to combine interests, to promote Latin American unity, and to gain agency in their own development. Since the mid-twentieth century, the Latin Americans have attempted many efforts to join the region together.¹ The Latin American Free Trade Association (L.A.F.T.A.) was created

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¹ There is a need to differentiate between Latin American integration efforts and South American integration efforts. Latin America encompasses all the countries from Mexico to Patagonia. It includes Mexico, some of the Caribbean countries, as well as the Central and South American nation-states.

The first round of Latin American regional integration efforts, including those mentionedabove, failed for many reasons. The era from the 1960s through the mid 1980sin Latin America was a time much like that of the interwar period in Europe—withconflicting nationalisms, military dictatorships, failing democratic regimes, andstagnating economies. It was a period of protectionist economic policies, through importsubstitution measures, and a focus on all things national (economy, identity, politicalagenda, reputation, etc.) (Cardoso and Falletto 1979). During this time, these problems wereespecially commonplace in South America.

**South American Regional Integration Efforts**

Several authors, such as Cason and Burrell (2002, 458) and Lowenthal (1993, 74)refer to the 1980s in South America as the “lost decade,” due to the fact that manyinternal civil problems as well as national economic and political crises were routine during the 1980s (Cason and Burrell 2002). In many South American nation-states(namely Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Peru) military regimes,dictatorships, and struggling democracies were the norm. Additionally, between the

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South American integration efforts involve only those nations located in South America (Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Suriname, and Guyana. French Guiana is excluded, as it is a French overseas department) (Source: Clawson 2006).
various countries of South America, conflicting ideologies, geopolitics, and competing nationalisms were also common at that time period (Somavia 1985; Knox and Agnew 1989). Argentina’s Dirty War and the invasion of the Falkland Islands serve as only a single country’s examples that most attention during the 1960s through the end of the 1980s was focused inward- on enlarging the national interests, creating a stronger national economy or military, or increasing the consciousness of that state’s national identity (Cason and Burrell 2002).

In recent decades, due to de-militarization and re-democratization in South America, there has been renewed interest in South American regional integration (J. Dominguez 2007). The end of the Cold War and the increasing interdependence of the early 1990s in the international community and global economy proved that the protectionist stance and the inward views that most of South America adopted during this time were no longer functional. The idea for a strictly South American regional association, rather than another full Latin American attempt, came about as a product of first, the re-democratization period in the Southern Cone area in the late 1980s (Hufbauer, et al. 1994), and second, geographic proximity and the commonalities of a “continental” or regional Latin American identity (Masur 1966, 68).

The Southern Common Market

In the late 1980s, Argentina and Brazil both sought regional support in their democratization process by tying their economies and political agendas to the wider regional integration process (Pion- Berlin 2000; Coffey 1998). As a result of Brazil and Argentina’s desires, in 1991, the Southern Common Market (Mercado Comun del Sur) or Mercosur was established (Kennes 2000, Arieti 2006). This customs union has four
original members: Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Peru are associate members (Jovanovic 1998).

The stated “goals of Mercosur are to eliminate trade barriers, establish a common external tariff, coordinate macroeconomic policies, and develop the harmonization of laws” (Arieti 2006, 764). The plan for Mercosur to evolve economically from a free trade area to a customs union, and eventually to a common market, has been a slow process. Arieti (2006) notes of temporary institutions that have limited the growth of this organization. These ad hoc institutions include three main structures.

The institutions of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) are the Common Market Council (Consejo del Mercado Común or CMC), in charge of coordinating the meetings of national Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economics, and other ministries (Vervaele 2005). The Common Market Group (Grupo del Mercado Común, or GMC) is the main executive body and runs most of the working groups, as well as meetings of the Heads of State (Preusse 2004). The final institution of Mercosur is the Administrative Secretariat, in charge of daily administrative tasks (Preusse 2004). Carranza (2006, 817) notes of Mercosur’s “nomadic style of decision making” where the meetings and leaders are always rotating among the countries. As J. Dominguez (2007, 109) notes, “Mercosur’s only permanent institutions are its Administrative Secretariat.” The Common Market Group and Council do not have established headquarters. In fact, the Secretariat is the only one of the three institutions that is based in one country, located in Montevideo, Uruguay (Preusse 2004).

Another major challenge for the regional integration effort deals with the Mercosur institutions’ lack of supranational powers. All pending legislation must be
ratified and accepted by individual national governments before they can be put into

Mercosur law (J. Dominguez 2007). As Vervaele (2005, 394) notes, the

“application of Mercosur law is one of the major problems. Only forty percent of always-unanimous decisions have been effectively incorporated by all states parties and have therefore entered into force. There are no supranational Mercosur institutions charged with the supervision of compliance with Mercosur law.”

Carranza (2006) calls Mercosur an intergovernmental organization, because the institutions lack authority over the nation-states. Vervaele (2005, 392) agrees, noting,

“Mercosur is an intergovernmental organization with community objectives, but not a supranational organization.” In essence, Mercosur has largely been a state-led regional integration effort, which means that it still relies heavily upon the historic leaders of the Southern Cone area, Argentina and Brazil.

Although Mercosur has been an integral player in promoting wider regional integration in South America, it is itself somewhat limited from expanding into a larger political union (Arieti 2006). Arieti (2006, 765) notes, “because neither the Treaty of Asunción nor the Ouro Preto Protocol contemplated the expansion of Mercosur’s membership, the common market lacks formal procedures for admitting new members.” Originally, only the four member states could participate in the organization’s institutions, meaning that the associate member states were not considered real members of the customs union. This shows the shortsighted goals of this organization were only to integrate these countries economically, and nothing further (Cammack 1999).

In sum, Mercosur has provided a strong example in the South American context that the rest of the continent, and other regions in the developing world, can identify with, follow, and build upon. However, it is severely limited in its potential expansion. The
short sighted goals of Mercosur, coupled with the lack of solid supranational institutions, as well as the continuing reliance upon the nation-states for authority and legitimacy are a few reasons why Mercosur has experienced limited success. As a result of these issues, the organization lacks credibility and legitimacy, as it is unable to enforce any laws or make member-states abide by Mercosur's norms.

*The Andean Community*

Another current example of regional integration in South America is the *Comunidad de Naciones Andinas* or the Andean Community. Originally formed under the *Cartagena de las Indias* Agreement in 1969 as the Andean Group, the Andean Community is the longest existing regional integration effort in South America (Clawson 2006). It reorganized as the Andean Community in 1996 and is headquartered in Lima, Peru. Currently, the members of this customs union are Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, with Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil as associate members (Andean Community 2009).

In large part an imitation of the European Community, the *Pacto Andino* created supranational structures, including the Andean Council or administrative body; the Andean Commission or decision-making body; the Andean Parliament; and the Andean Court of Justice, based largely upon the European Court of Justice (Hufbauer, et al. 1994, 233). Andean leaders have agreed that the goal of the Andean Group is to establish “an integrated economic group like the European Community” (Hufbauer, et al. 1994, 233).

By tying the economies of the member countries together, the Andean Group attempted to facilitate trade relations and pushed joint industrial development. These attempts did not succeed in large part because economic integration was implemented
during the 1970s, when many Andean nations were reacting to previous policies of import substitution and high external tariffs (Clawson 2006). These two policies prevented foreign investment from being included in the Andean nation’s industrialization process, thus stagnating regional integration efforts. Furthermore, the Andean Group attempted to integrate in a process in which individual sectors of national economies were entirely integrated before moving on to another sector (Nogues and Quintanilla 1993). Bulmer-Thomas (1997, 245-246) notes,

“The Sectoral Programme of Industrial Development (SPID)… was designed to distribute new industrial capacity among the member countries in such a way as to exploit economies of scale and ensure the participation of all countries.”

However, because not all member states were on the same level economically, those countries with already established infrastructure and industries received the majority of the funding by the SPID (Bulmer-Thomas 1997, 246). This policy tended to favor the more economically stable countries and almost provoked Bolivia’s withdrawal from the Andean Group in 1980 (Bulmer-Thomas 1997).

Although “the Andean Pact has developed the most elaborate institutional structure” of all the Latin American regional integration efforts, the Andean Group faced, and as the Andean Community continues to face many challenges (Kennes 2000, 157). First, the member states did not readily accept the binding notion of Andino law. As Vervaele (2005, 390) notes “the States parties were not prepared to accept the binding effect of Andino law.” This required that every decision created by the Andean Group had to be approved by the national governments before it could become law, a process that led to much frustration and Chile’s eventual withdrawal from the organization in
1976. The legislative process of the Andean Community is a challenge that the remaining nation-states have yet to overcome.

Second, supranational institutions in the Andean Community still heavily rely on nation-state power and policy for implementation and action. This is clear in the fact that decisions made at the supranational level must be accepted by national governments before they become Andino law (Vervaele 2005). This is a serious limitation to the effectiveness and viability of the supranational institutions of the Andean Community, and ultimately, in becoming a full economic union (Glassner and Fahrer 2004).

Third, geopolitical disputes were and still are influential among some of the members of the Andean Community, as well as throughout Latin America (Kacowicz 2000). Salgado Penaherrera (1985, 175) notes “a territorial dispute, with the serious problems that this entails for economic integration, occurred when there was an armed confrontation between Peru and Ecuador” in 1981. More recently, when Colombian officials crossed into Ecuador in March 2008 to kill a wanted FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) leader, Ecuador argued that its territorial sovereignty had been violated. Both Ecuador and Venezuela quickly threatened to break off diplomatic relations and possibly counteract with an attack (Lafuente 2009). This rift also led to Venezuela bailing out of the Andean Community and becoming a more active member in Mercosur, as well as to the creation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (Bellamy Foster 2007).

In short, the Andean Community was a byproduct of previous regional integration efforts, such as LAFTA, in which the smaller Andean nation-states voices’ were not heard, nor were their needs addressed. The Andean Community has had limited success
in creating a viable regional integration organization over the past four decades for various reasons. Although an imitation of the European Community in institutions and structure, the Andean Community has been plagued by external problems such as the economic crisis of the mid 1980s as well as internal problems such as legal and legislative handicaps, commercial and industrial issues, as well as trust and territorial disputes between member states. Furthermore, the organization’s institutions seriously lack coercive or supranational power to make the countries abide by the organization’s rules (Vervaele 2005). For these reasons, the Andean Community never could fully count on the support of its members. Instead of regional integration, the Andean Community has experienced regional disintegration with the loss of Chile (1976) and Venezuela (2005) as member states (Hufbauer, et al. 1994, J. Dominguez 2007).

*The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas*

The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (*Alianza Bolivariana para las Americas* - ALBA) is another recent regional integration effort created by Cuba and Venezuela in 2004, in part to counterbalance the U.S. sponsored Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Thus far, the more left leaning administrations in Latin America, including Bolivia, Honduras, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and the Caribbean island states of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and San Vicente and Grenadines have joined this effort (PortalAlba 2009). ALBA’s main goals are mostly social, which include reducing region wide poverty and smoothing out the region’s disparities and inequalities (Banús Vidal 2007). They are also economic, with the Bank of the South providing an alternative to the way Latin America nation-states deal with loans, external debt, international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as
well as the way these developing countries interact with the more powerful, industrialized countries of the world (Alarcón 2007). Yet, the principal goal of the ALBA is increased regional integration, joining together the nation-states of Latin America and the Caribbean, providing a “real alternative to neo-liberalism with a strong social and human content” (Alarcón 2007, 3).

ALBA’s stated goals are first, “to foster a model of regional integration where the interests of the people are above those of the market” (F. Dominguez 2007, 4). Second, the goals of ALBA are to establish a regional economic union, with a common currency called “the Sucre” (Hart-Landsberg 2009, 10). In terms of regional integration aims, the goals of ALBA for the long-term have more to do with further social, political, as well as economic integration rather than just increased access to national and world markets.

The main institutions of the ALBA are the Presidential Council, the main decision making group, and the Ministerial Council or legislative body (Hart-Landsberg 2009). An “advisory council of social movements” also helps to keep the other two institutions accountable and to promote popular participation in the integration process (Hart-Landsberg 2009, 8).

The Bank of the South, or Banco del Sur, is another institution under the umbrella of the ALBA that provides an alternative source of funds to the developing economies of South America. Rather than the stringent policies and loans sponsored by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization, Latin American nation-states are able to obtain favorable loans without all the strings attached (Banús Vidal 2007). As F. Dominguez (2007, 7) notes, “The Bank of the South is seen as a key instrument in the ongoing process of regional integration.” However, rules and
norms concerning organizational structure of the Bank, members’ participation in proposal setting, project pushing, and decision-making, etc., have yet to be decided (Hart-Landsberg 2009). Therefore, the Bank of the South has yet to function fully.

The ALBA strives to be a different form of regional integration in Latin America and the Caribbean through increased accountability of national and regional leaders, and augmented transparency in national governments, regional organizations, and multinational corporations. It also promotes the idea of increased popular participation in decision making at all levels. Suarez Salazar (2006, 30) notes that the ALBA does promote greater democratic participation and accountability. Although the goals of ALBA do include sections on transparency and corruption, the top down approach of the ALBA leaves the “transparency, participation, and accountability” in question (Mallen 2007, 7). In short, as Hart-Landsberg (2009, 8) notes, the ALBA emphasizes “state-directed activity,” leaving little room for popular participation and leaving ample room for elite led initiatives and, furthermore, corruption.

The ALBA was in large part created by Venezuela and it remains quite reliant on the leadership of Venezuela, under Hugo Chavez, to provide the rhetorical and financial backing for the organization. Hart-Landsberg (2009, 11) notes, “ALBA remains heavily dependent on the decisions of the Presidents of the participating countries.” The new organization’s reliance on the nation-states (especially Venezuela and Cuba) for decision making and for setting agendas and priorities makes the new organization especially vulnerable to the “leadership and financial generosity” of Venezuela (Hart-Landsberg 2009, 11). Suarez Salazar (2006, 31) concurs, noting the ALBA is “dependent on the evolution of Venezuela’s political and economic situation.” Another problem lingers on
the fact that Venezuela’s wealth is largely earned through the sale of hydrocarbons on fluctuating world markets, thus also making the ALBA incredibly vulnerable to shifts in the international economy. In turn, this also makes the other members of the ALBA vulnerable to changes in Venezuela’s administration and in the international economy.

Although serious challenges do exist, the ALBA represents the “first time that several countries join together to promote a cultural strategy. It’s unprecedented in the history of our continent” (Sierra 2008, 4). As Banús Vidal (2007, 50) argues, ALBA’s “objective is not to create a common market or promote neo-liberal economic development but to cooperate with the integration of Latin America countries to correct social inequalities and ensure a growing quality of life.” In this statement, the author provides a simple definition of the ALBA’s ambitions, which do not specify any supranational institutions, or refer to the transfer of national sovereignty in this process.

As Banús Vidal (2007, 50) notes, “the Bolivarian Constitution does not refer to [state] sovereignty nor to the creation of communal bodies, or “supranationals,” as is the case of the European Union or the Andean Community.” She goes on to add, “Thus, ALBA cannot be considered yet as an integration scheme” (Banús Vidal 2007, 50). Although still in its infancy, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas does not yet appear to be a viable long-term regional integration effort.

The Union of South American Nations

Another effort in South American regional integration is the Union of South American Nations. In addition to Chile, Guyana, and Suriname, the nation-states of Mercosur and the members of the Andean Community joined together on May 23, 2008 to create the most extensive and comprehensive regional integration effort in South
America thus far. *La Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas* or the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is a supranational and intergovernmental union that plans to tie two of the existing customs unions (*Mercosur* and the Andean Community) together (Andean Community 2009). The Union of South American Nations has twelve members, including all of the South American countries with the exception of French Guiana (Sotomayor 2008).

The stated goals of UNASUR are to evolve into a full economic and monetary union (Andean Community 2009). As Pereira Valadão (2007) notes, the goal of UNASUR is to unite and integrate culturally, politically, economically, and socially the peoples of South America. As Sotomayor (2008, 2) adds, “the central objectives of UNASUR are the strengthening of political dialogue between member states and the deepening of regional integration.” This includes coordination of infrastructure, environmental and energy policies, financial and industrial integration, “economic and commercial cooperation,” the creation of a common South American identity and citizenship, and cooperation in common defense matters (Pereira Valadão 2007, 502).

The proposed institutional bodies for UNASUR include the Council of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Delegates, and the General Secretariat (UNASUR 2009). The Council of Heads of State is the highest institution within UNASUR. It will coordinate the annual meeting of the Heads of State and has the responsibilities to research, debate, and push policies, projects, and proposals (UNASUR 2009). The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is charged with overseeing the integration process, as well as the responsibility to “develop and promote political dialogue and coordination on themes of regional and international
interest” (UNASUR 2009, 68). The Council of Delegates will be responsible for the implementation part of the legislative process, in essence putting the decisions of the Council of Heads of State and the resolutions of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs into action (UNASUR 2009). The General Secretariat will be in charge of the many administrative tasks, in addition to “executing the mandates conferred upon by the organs of UNASUR” (UNASUR 2009, 68). As UNASUR has only existed for a year and a half, all these institutions have yet to truly develop and function.

Pereira Valadão (2007) notes that a South American Parliament is in the process of being established. In coordination with the legislative institutions of Chile, Guyana, and Suriname, the Andean Community Parliament, Mercosur’s Common Market Council, and the new South American Parliament (under UNASUR) is attempting to include the voices of all current organizations. Additionally, a Pro-Tempore Presidency will rotate among the member-states for one-year period (UNASUR 2009). The Presidency will have the responsibilities of representing UNASUR in international events as well as presiding over the meetings of the various organs of UNASUR (UNASUR 2009).

As UNASUR plans to tie the two existing customs unions (Mercosur and the Andean Community) together, it will be challenged by some of the existing issues and problems associated with Mercosur and the Andean Community. The Andean Community, as noted previously, has been plagued by territorial disputes and general mistrust between the member states. The twenty-two ongoing territorial disputes causing tension between South American nation-states clearly display this festering mistrust (CIA 2010). Also as noted previously, Mercosur has largely been led by Argentina and Brazil,
in large part leading to a power struggle between the national governments within the Southern Cone and thus stagnating further integration. Banús Vidal (2007, 51) notes, “in order to be successful, an extremely high level of affinity and trust between the Latin American governments” must exist. This level of trust and affinity does not seem to be very high between some Latin American countries, as land grabs, territorial disputes, and general competition among the states for access to resources have been common throughout South American independent history. For example, the on-going dispute between Venezuela and Colombia recently provoked Venezuela to send troops to its border with Colombia, thereby increasing the already tense relationship (Margolis 2009, 6).

Another major challenge to the viability of UNASUR is the “terrible asymmetry between the productive capabilities of the Andean countries and the Southern Cone countries” (Hidalgo Martinez 2007, 51). The two regions have vastly differing industrial structures and economic capabilities, which will be a hurdle to reconcile in the future. Although UNASUR is still in its infancy and is still a credible and legitimate effort, as it seeks to combine the two existing customs unions (Mercosur and the Andean Community), each bringing its own set of problems and issues, UNASUR faces many challenges in becoming a viable and successful regional integration effort.

All four of these organizations (Mercosur, the Andean Community, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, and the Union of South American Nations) exist concurrently at the moment. The latest example of regional integration efforts in the region was created the 23rd of February, 2010, when the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States was established. Hennigan (2010) notes, “It is the latest example of a
decade-long drive within the Americas to deepen continental integration and lessen the once overwhelming influence of the United States on politics and economics.” Mexican President Felipe Calderón noted that the newly established organization “will consolidate and globally project a new Latin American and Caribbean identity” (quoted in Rodriguez 2010). The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States was created with the intention of providing a forum for developing countries’ issues and will not replace any of the already existing regional organizations. The formal establishment of the new organization is to be carried out in July 2011.

Although not all of these regional integration efforts have been successful, each of these examples shows a continuous, region-wide desire for regional cooperation and integration. Although many Latin American and specifically South American regional integration attempts have existed, the viability and success of these integration efforts is dependent on the events, conflicts, and debates occurring at the national level of the countries involved. In recent years, Bolivia has experienced dramatic changes within state and civil society, including the change of power through six Presidents in fifteen years, major protests, such as the 2000 Cochabamba Water War and the 2003 Gas War that gained international coverage, and the rise of popular based political parties such as the Movimiento al Socialismo. The historical background of Bolivia within this context and within a cultural and political ecology framework, is especially helpful in understanding Bolivia’s role in these regional integration efforts.

Bolivia within this context

Bolivia has a high population of indigenous peoples, the major groups being the Quechua and the Aymara (Davis and Harrison 2007). Bolivia is estimated to have the
fourth largest indigenous population in Latin America (Vanden and Prevost 2009, 84). As a percentage of population, Bolivia has the highest among all the Latin American countries (Vanden and Prevost 2009, 84). As mentioned previously, in Bolivia, more than approximately sixty percent of the population self identifies as indigenous (Albo 2008).

Like in many of the Andean states, the elite *criollo* and *mestizo* groups of Bolivia have long dominated the state and society. Until the first decade of the 2000s, the majority of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia were largely segregated from direct participation in the national government, the formal economy, and mainstream society (Albo 2008). As a result of this historic segregation of the majority of the Bolivian population, and the many challenges this created in the process of nation building, Bolivia has experienced a very volatile history, full of revolutions, social unrest, and dramatic regime changes (Grindle and Domingo 2003). Crabtree and Whitehead (2008) attribute the continuous resistance and conflict in the Bolivian state and society to many factors including Bolivia’s struggling political system, the many legacies of colonial rule, including the mining and *latifundio* legacies, and as well as continuous conflicts over ethnicity, identity, and inclusion.

The political setup of the Bolivian state has been called a “Swiss cheese state” as it is a state that governs heavily in certain areas (urban) and very lightly in other (rural) areas (Crabtree and Whitehead 2008, 4). As a result of this “Swiss Cheese state,” in certain areas (specifically rural areas), social and political groups have had the opportunity to develop and organize grassroots organizations, largely unnoticed by the

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2 Bolivia has had over 100 revolutions in its independent history (Armstrong 2007).
central government (Crabtree and Whitehead 2008, 4). The legacies of colonial rule, including *mestizaje* and the subsequent social stratification of Bolivian society, and the forced labor institution of *pongeaje* on *haciendas* throughout Bolivia, have led to uneven development between the highlanders (*kollas*) and lowlanders (*kambas*), between urban and rural areas, between rich and poor sectors of society, as well as between *mestizos*, *criollos*, and *indigenas* (Klein 2003).\(^3\)

Crabtree and Whitehead (2008) also attribute the continuous conflict in Bolivian state and society to the complex notion of ethnicity that is present in Bolivia. To give an idea of this ethnic diversity, in the January 2009 Constitution, thirty-eight languages, along with Spanish, are included as national languages of the Bolivian state (Gobierno Boliviano 2009). See Figure 3 for an illustration of the ethnic diversity of Bolivia.

Spanish colonization of South America and the subsequent mixing of Spanish colonizers with indigenous peoples, and later with imported African slaves, made the social situation in Bolivia quite complex. As discussed previously, conflicts over ethnicity and identity began early on due to the Spanish (and continued with the Bolivian national government’s) policy of assimilation and *mestizaje*. Calderón (1977, 190) argues “the entry of the Aymara and Quechus into the colonial system began their twofold subjection, as peasants and as Indians.”

\(^3\) During the colonial era, and after independence, *pongeaje* or “personal service obligation” was required of many Andean Indians to the owners of haciendas (Klein 2003, 233).

\(^4\) To give an overview of the social stratification in Latin American colonial society: At the top of this hierarchy were those born in Spain (*peninsulares*); Under them were those of Spanish descent born in the Americas (*criollos*); Below were those of mixed Spanish and Indian blood (*mestizos*); Under them were those mixed *mestizo* and Spanish descent (*castizos*); the Indian population (*indigenas*) were on the lower end of the socio-economic ladder, just above the blacks (*negros*). Source: Burkholder and Johnson (2001, 198-207).
Figure 3. Map of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia (Source: La Razón 2008).

Albo (2008, 18) argues that during the Republican period, after 1825, the “asymmetric dualism of colonial society persisted and in some respects became even
more pronounced with the advent of republican neocolonialism.” By “asymmetric dualism,” Albo (2008, 18) is referring to the dualing identities that Bolivian indigenous people took on after the *mestizaje* process was initiated- that of being an *indígena* (person of indigenous descent) as well as a *campesino* (rural peasant). Calderón (1977, 200) concurs with Albo, arguing that during the Republican period “the problem continued to worsen, and social reintegration was not feasible in a dependent, under-developed economy.” In fact, the indigenous peoples of Bolivia were not actively incorporated into Bolivian state and society until the state needed soldiers to fight against Paraguay in the Chaco War (1932-1935) (Klein 1992). Even then, not all indigenous people were recognized as citizens, only those who had fought in the war.

As a result of this situation, the Bolivian state has been plagued by persistent asymmetries, including the lack of political representation and participation of the majority of the population, and disparities in access to wealth, education, and state resources. The subordination of indigenous peoples in Bolivia by the dominant elite culture continued into the late twentieth century, until the recent mobilization of indigenous political groups. Even the 1952 National Revolution did not fix these societal structural problems.

5 Furthermore, dualism has another connotation within the Andean context- that is that many indigenous people still live by dualing social structures (Astvaldsson 2000). On the one hand, many indigenous Bolivians still live their daily lives guided by the indigenous social system they grew up with in the rural areas of Bolivia, guiding spiritual and daily life, through daily customs, dress, language, belief system, etc. (Astvaldsson 2000). On the other hand, many indigenous Bolivians have moved to urban or peri-urban areas (such as El Alto) where they have adapted to the national culture, adopting new forms of dress, *castellano* (or Spanish as the national tongue), and new values (Goodale 2006).

6 The Bolivian National Revolution was in large part provoked by the long established agricultural system (*latifundia*) that kept the majority of the Bolivian population from owning, farming, or working land. In April 1952 the Bolivian state collapsed and the civilian militia groups disarmed the army and armed the masses, in essence provoking a “massive social revolution” (Klein 1992, 232).
In fact, the National Revolution further complicated Bolivian citizens’ notions of identity. Albo (2008, 21) argues, “The 1952 state deprived people of their *originario* identity, this being the necessary price for achieving full citizenship.” Albo (2008, 21) further notes, “the ideal of the 1952 state was to build a society that was more inclusive, but also more homogeneous, through the adoption of *mestizo* culture.” Although the largely excluded indigenous peoples of Bolivia were finally officially recognized by the Bolivian state as citizens, the indigenous classification was replaced with an emphasis on class identity as *campesinos* (peasants).

Although the 1952 National Revolution, in theory, granted citizenship to all Bolivians, or rather, recognized all Bolivians as citizens for the first time, the other policies of the Revolution further isolated and subordinated certain sectors of the population. The major policy change provoked by the 1952 National Revolution was the 1953 Agrarian Reform Law, which on the one hand, redistributed land (Calderón 1977) but on the other hand, had uneven consequences for the country. Major changes (in terms of land owning and land use) had occurred throughout rural Bolivia, while little changed within the cities. Calderón (1977, 208) discusses how this “led to substantial changes in the countryside and to a very unbalanced development of the agrarian economy: dynamic growth in the east, near stagnation in the valleys and *altiplano*.” Calderón (1977, 208) goes on to add that the National Revolution realized “some degree of national unity” but at the same time, differences between the highlands and the lowlands grew, as well as those between urban and rural areas. This furthered the competition over state resources and animosity between the lowlanders (*kambas*) and highlanders (*kollas*).
The 1952 Revolution raised expectations with the recognition of all Bolivians as citizens. As a result of the subsequent disappointment following the lofty ideals of the Revolution, Albo (2008, 22) argues that since the 1952 Revolution, a “reemergence of identity” has gradually occurred. This reemergence of identity first started with the Aymara and peasant based Katarista movements of the 1960s and later in the trade unions (miners and coca growers) of the 1970s and 1980s (Klein 1992).

The Katarista movement in the 1960s through the 1970s was the “first real expression of this new spirit” of indigenous identity (Albo 2008, 22). Katarismo “implied going beyond the “short memory” that extended no further than the 1953 Agrarian Reform Law. In its place, it invoked a long memory that harked back to the (neo) colonial state” and the subjugation of indigenous peoples since the time of colonization (Albo 2008, 22-23).

During the 1970s and 1980s, a mass migration from the rural altiplano to the cities (El Alto, La Paz) and to the Chapare region of Cochabamba followed the tin crisis of 1985 and the massive layoffs in the state mining industry (Sullivan 1994). Migrants to El Alto were mostly of Aymarans descent and as a consequence, Aymaran social movements as well as political parties emerged in El Alto and La Paz (Sullivan 1994). Migrants to the Chapare region were of both Quechua and Aymara descent, but took on more of the Quechua traditions, language, and identity (Sullivan 1994). As a result of this migration, many of these indigenous migrants diffused their dueling social structures, as well as indigenous political organizations and trade unions.

Those who had migrated to the cities had another source of frustration- their past rural ethnic identity vs. their recently acquired mestizo, nationally educated, urban,
Bolivian identity. In general, people possess many identities (such as occupational, gender, class, etc.). In terms of identities, as Canessa (2007, 150) notes, “these recent migrants or children of migrants live between the Aymara-speaking agricultural world of their parents and grandparents dominated by community life and ritual, and the Spanish speaking world of schooled, but underemployed people struggling to make a living.” Much like Chicanos in the United States, they were not truly recognized by either group – the rural indigenous communities, or by the urban *mestizo* middle class and *criollo* elite. This lack of identification with the larger state created two challenges for the Bolivian regime- legitimacy of the state and cohesion of the nation.

This lack of acceptance and identification with the larger Bolivian state and society provided even more reason for the political movements, trade unions such as the COB (*Central Obrera Boliviana*) and the CSUTCB (*Confederacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia*), and other indigenous groups to further organize, mobilize, and gather political support (Healey 2006). This, coupled with demilitarization of the Bolivian state in the late 1970s, led to an increase in Katarista (Aymara) and other indigenous based trade unions and movements, such as the miners and coca growers union, in urban areas during the 1980s and 1990s (Crabtree and Whitehead 2008). By the 1990s, the Katarista groups “were increasingly organizing not only as peasants, miners, and coca growers, but as indigenous people” (Canessa 2007, 151). The use of ethnic identity helped to transcend individual and cultural differences (especially between the Aymara and Quechua, who traditionally loathed one another) and to consolidate indigenous support (Calderón 1977).
In the case of many indigenous groups, ethnic identity becomes a means of power, which the groups then use to negotiate political objectives, and both national and international support (De la Cadena 2005). As Sullivan (1994, 37) notes “because they are discriminated against as Indians, the recovery and affirmation of indigenous identity becomes a strategy in the struggle for social justice.” The use of ethnic identity is a highly effective tool, much more so than just screaming “oppression.” Hooker (2005, 303) notes, “instead of making claims for group rights as an oppressed minority group, they have based their demands on their identity as distinct ‘peoples’ with inherent rights to the territories that they have inhabited prior to the arrival of the current states.” This fact gave these groups legitimacy, something that severely challenged the Bolivian state.

As Sullivan (1994, 36) states that “the new generation of indigenous movements perceived more intensely the exclusion and marginalization of Indian values, behavior, and forms of organization from the power structure of the elite minority.” She adds “the new generation of Indians, who are mestizo-educated, fulfill military obligations, [and] are urbanized, perceived with increasing sensitivity the continuation of the same dominant oligarchical criollo ideology which has subordinated the indigenous Andeans since colonial times” (Sullivan 1994, 36). This new understanding, combined with the use of ethnic identity as a cohesive factor among the diverse ethnic groups of Bolivia, paved the way for major changes in Bolivian state and society in the early 2000s.

At the same time that the indigenous groups were gaining political experience and national support, structural changes also allowed the political sphere to open up and the traditional political party system to fragment. Van Cott (2003) and Domingo (2005) argue that because of the governmental reforms of the 1990s, in part, indigenous groups
have been allowed to participate. First, the 1994 Law of Popular Participation helped transform the Presidential unitary system to a more decentralized system with local representation (Van Cott 2003). Domingo (2005, 1733) argues that this “facilitated the incorporation of the (largely excluded) rural and indigenous population to political life and has included the legal recognition of indigenous communities.” The change towards a decentralized governmental system helped decision-making powers to be granted to local authorities, thereby giving these local groups the experience and time to learn how to cooperate and govern (Van Cott 2003).

Second, a shift in political actors gave the new indigenous groups an opportunity to participate in national politics (Van Cott 2003). Domingo (2005, 1739) attributes this structural change, allowing the participation of the new ethnically based political parties such as the Movimiento al Socialismo, to a “multilayered process of democratization.” The traditional political parties (such as the MNR, MIR, and ADN), who largely served their own interests, lost much popular support and legitimacy during the 1990s. The transformation in political space and actors helped these indigenous based groups to gain experience, support, and legitimacy.

The third structural change that Van Cott (2003) notes is the United States interference in Bolivian affairs, through neoliberal policies, coca eradication programs, and verbally attacking Evo Morales in the early 2000s. All these interferences in combination led to an increase in “nationalist sentiments” among Bolivians and to the erosion of legitimacy of the Sánchez de Lozada government, which had largely adopted all American policies (Van Cott 2003, 772).
The combination of these factors, first the indigenous use of ethnic identity as a form of power (and counter-power), second, the struggling Bolivian state (under the Sánchez de Lozada administration), and third, the increasing American presence in Bolivian affairs, made the situation right for a viable change in Bolivian state and society. Van Cott (2003, 768) notes that, “by the 2002 national elections, the indigenous movement had become one of them most dynamic and consolidated social movements in the country.” This led to a dramatic change in the potential for new political parties in Bolivia, bringing the question of ethnicity to the forefront of Bolivian society and politics for the first time in centuries.

Additionally, tapping into the national memories of the Bolivian state has turned into an effective tool in indigenous mobilization and popular support. These groups have been effective in gaining nationwide support and attention because in part, they are tapping into the national Bolivian memory. Historically, indigenous people are an integral part of the collective national memory of many Andean nation-states. As Hooker (2005, 301) notes, “national ideologies in Latin America have in most cases envisioned the nation as the product of a mixing process that has often been portrayed as taking place exclusively between Spanish men and indigenous women, resulting in a predominately Spanish culture with some indigenous contributions.” Hooker (2005, 301) further adds, “in such cases, indigenous people occupy a certain place in the national symbolic universe as ancestral contributors to the new, hybrid _mestizo_ nation and culture, even if they are seen as marginal and traditional in the present.” In Bolivia, although the majority of the indigenous population had long been excluded from state and society, this
population still fulfilled an important role in the Bolivian national memory, and thus were an integral part of the Bolivian national identity.

Once indigenous groups realized this, they were able to benefit from their integral role in the national memory. Consequently, they also were able to gain support from a wide section of the population. Most importantly, as Canessa (2007, 151) notes “the emergence of [and mobilization around] new kinds of indigenous identity was one of a number of factors that combined to expose the weakness of the state and the political party system, leading to increasingly outright challenge to the state.” The culmination of these efforts can be seen in the election of the first indigenous Bolivian President in 2005, Evo Morales, “the first Bolivian President to win an absolute majority since electoral democracy was reinstated in 1982” (Healey 2006, 2).\(^7\) Morales was re-elected on 6 December 2009, where he again won by a landslide (El País 2009).\(^8\)

**Conclusion**

Part of understanding the viability of South American regional integration efforts depends on the viability of national integration of the nation-states involved in these efforts. Until the beginning of the 2000s, Bolivia was a highly divided country, with the society stratified along socio-economic, geographic, as well as ethnic lines. A historic mistrust still existed between the Bolivian people and the government. The economy was in shambles after neoliberal policies, implemented in the 1990s and early 2000s, cut welfare funding and privatized national assets. After implementing these policies, the

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\(^7\) Morales obtained 53.7% of the vote in December 2005. (Source: Vanden and Prevost 2009, 589).

\(^8\) Morales obtained 62.1% of the vote in December 2009. (Source: El País, 2009).
Bolivian state in the 1990s and early 2000s seriously lacked legitimacy among the population. The country continued to lack a strong and cohesive national identity.

In terms of regional integration, the citizens of a country lacking a strong national identity may be more willing to transcend the national level and join in a supranational organization. If this is the case, then Bolivians might be more willing to sacrifice certain elements of national sovereignty and identity in return for increased regional integration, than say a country that possesses a more cohesive or strong national identity (think Argentina). As a result of these recent structural, political, and social changes within Bolivia, it is likely that Bolivians’ sense of personal as well as national identity has been altered. At the same time as these changes have occurred, as discussed previously, various regional integration efforts have gained momentum, perhaps also influencing Bolivian national identity. It is this complex relationship between increased regional integration and the recent history of Bolivia that will be analyzed in this investigation. In order to carry out a thorough investigation, it is now necessary to review the pertinent literature on identity, national identity, regional integration, and identity politics within the Latin American context.
 CHAPTER III

 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

 Introduction

 In recent years, interest has shifted from a class-based framework during the Cold War to a growing field of research on ethnic, fractured, hybrid, and multiple identities in Latin America (Anderson 2006). In part due to an increase in geographical works by cultural and political ecologists such as Peet and Watts (1996), Bebbington (2008), and Robbins (2004), another one of the reasons behind this dramatic increase in interest and research on Latin American identity, as Hale (1997) mentions, is that indigenous uprisings and political movements have become influential players in many nation-states in Latin America, including Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil, and Bolivia. To fully understand the current situation in Bolivia and to carry out a thorough academic investigation on the recent changes in Bolivian identity, it is necessary to first review the pertinent literature on identity, national identity, Latin American national identity, and the ways in which identity is used for political or social objectives, or identity politics. As regional integration efforts have increased in the past few years in Latin America, it is also necessary and important to review the scant literature that does discuss this relationship between regional integration and changes in national identity.
Studies on Identity

Healey (2006, 4) defines identity as “a sense of belonging that derives from shared origins or characteristics.” Religion, gender, occupation, class, geographic region as well as ethnicity are generally important parts of one’s identity (Smith 1991). Historically, identity has been portrayed as a simple concept (Healey 2006). However, identity is a highly contested, complex subject that greatly depends on the conditions of time, space, audience, and purpose of such identity (Jackson and Warren 2005). Jackson and Warren (2005, 561) note, “identities are not just fluid, not just multiple, they are fluidly multiple and always relational” to time, location, and to other actors. Identity is also situational, meaning that people use their levels of identity in differing situations for diverse reasons and/or objectives. Goodale (2006, 641) argues that “one’s identity is defined by a series of constituent (sub) identities; each sub identity is distinct from the other” and is utilized for a differing objective with various audiences. One’s identity, therefore, is not defined by one single attribute. Instead, as Smith (1991, 4) argues, “the self is composed of multiple identities and roles, familial, territorial, religious, ethnic, and gender.”

Smith’s last statement shows that identities may be personal, or collective which involves a group uniting together over shared histories or common characteristics. Collective identities can be subdivided down into ethnic collective identities (such as the Aymara or Quechua in the Bolivian case) as well as civic collective identities, mostly called national identities, based on responsibilities and common characteristics tied to the

The interest in collective identity in Latin America has grown since 1980 for various reasons. Throughout the region, dramatic economic, political and social changes have occurred, including de-militarization, the re-democratization of many countries, and the growth of social and identity based movements. New forms of collective identity, both ethnic and civic, have emerged including the international environmental movement, indigenous movements, micro-banks, and Okupas (modern day squatters in Spain and Latin America).

Many of the recent social movements in Latin America are largely based on shared identities, such as ethnicity, rights to territory, class, occupation, and socioeconomic status. And with the new forms of collective identity comes increased interest in “group agency and political action” (Cerulo 1997, 386). Although many scholars have researched how these movements have utilized these collective identities to obtain social, economic and political gains in recent years, the study of the use of identity as a political device is nothing new. Scholars, such as Anderson (2006), Deutsch (1963), Smith (1991) and Gellner (1994) have long investigated this phenomenon of identity (and collective identity) and its important relationship with the nation-state, as national identity.

Studies on National Identity

Since national identity and nationalism rose to direct global events (culminating in World War II), many scholars have explored these concepts. Today, national identities are still a major guiding force in the international community and in nation-states’
decision-making. No study on national identity is complete without a review of the works of Ernest Gellner (1994), Karl Deutsch (1963), Anthony Smith (1991), Benedict Anderson (2006), and other scholars.

Ernest Gellner’s (1994) work is especially important in understanding the rise of national identity and nationalism during European industrialization. Using a Marxist framework, Gellner (1994) argues that national movements came about in part in combination with class-based movements. He states, “it is only their conflation which does so, in the condition brought about by industrialism” (Gellner 1994, 197). Although useful in understanding European industrialization, Gellner’s use of a Marxist framework to explain these phenomena has invited broad criticism from those trying to explain such concepts outside of Europe. This has been especially true since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Moving beyond an ideological framework, Karl Deutsch’s (1963) early work on nation-building and national identity highlights the important role of a common language uniting the peoples of a nation. Since the mid 1960s, other scholars have acknowledged Deutsch’s contribution and have attributed various other elements of national identity to be more important binding forces of nations. In contrast to Deutsch’s (1963) emphasis on language as the binding force of a nation, Smith (1991) attributes it to the long memory of a location’s unique history and geography, as well as to the important role of national symbols in making people feel they are a part of the nation. He argues, “In many ways, national symbols, customs and ceremonies are the most potent and durable aspects of nationalism. They embody its basic concepts, making them visible and distinct for every member, communicating the tenets of an abstract ideology in palpable, concrete terms that evoke instant emotional responses from all strata of the community” (Smith 1991, 77).
Smith further adds, “By means of the ceremonies, customs, and symbols every member of a community participates in the life, emotions, and virtues of that community” (1991, 78). Symbols play an important role in creating and sustaining sentiments of national identity and a feeling of belonging to the nation.

A major theorist in this field of identity, Anthony Smith (1991) discusses national identity and nationalism, however, in a very general sense. Although he studies the phenomenon of national identity rather than individual national identities, Smith does acknowledge the differences in national identities and the limitations to an overarching, general theory explaining all national identities and nationalisms. Umut Özkirimli (2000, 61) follows this same line of thought, “arguing that no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible” even though “some scholars continue to espouse the view that the best way to deal with nationalism is to develop typologies. In their view, nationalism is a chameleon-like phenomenon, capable of assuming a variety of ideological forms.”

With the increased specialization of the field of national identity and nationalism (with new topics such as migration, multicultural identities, hybrid identities, ethnic conflict, etc.) in recent years, Özkirimli (2006) argues that no overarching theory can cover all these identities. One reason no overarching theory can encompass all the diverse notions of national identities is due to the diversity of local factors that influence national identities. Furthermore, due to the wide-ranging types of national identities and nationalisms present in the world, Özkirimli (2000, 61) concludes that, “it is not possible to account for all these variations in a single ‘grand’ theory.”

Another reason that no overarching theory can exist is due to what Scott (1963, 77) calls the “problem of identity,” noting that “the lack of any strong sense of personal
identity” creates diverse needs for a larger collective identity. And collective identities depend on local factors and desires. Francis Fukuyama (2006) argues that the other problem with identity is the desire to be recognized. To some degree, every human strives to be recognized (Fukuyama 2006). Smith (1991, 177) argues,

“until these needs are fulfilled through other kinds of identification, the nation with its nationalism, denied or recognized, oppressed or free, each cultivating its own distinctive history, its golden ages and sacred landscapes, will continue to provide humanity with its fundamental cultural and political identities well into the next century.”

Of all the ways that humans identify themselves (religion, gender, class, ideology, geography, etc.), Smith (1991, 175) argues, “national identity does in fact today exert a more potent and durable influence than other collective cultural identities.” Every day events in the international community still portray the wide array of independent interests, agendas, needs and desires of nation-states around the world.

**Studies on Latin American National Identity**

Benedict Anderson (2006) is one of the few major theorists of national identity and nationalism that directly discusses the unique nature of Latin American national identity. Other scholars, such as Gellner, Smith, and Deutsch do not directly address Latin America and rather just apply over-arching national identities theories to this region. Anderson (2006) notes that Latin America historically lacked a middle class. Although Latin America boasts its share of class based movements historically and now, according to Anderson, Ernest Gellner’s explanation of national identity formation does not hold true in the Latin American case. The Latin American colonial experience produced far different social structures than in Europe, which influenced later national identity formation in Latin America.
Anderson (2006, 50) points out the irony of the process of creating national identities in Latin America with one question: “why did such colonial provinces, usually containing large, oppressed, non-Spanish speaking populations, produce creoles who consciously redefined these populations as fellow-nationals?” In addition to this irony, Anderson attributes this difference to the role of foreigners in nation-building in Latin America, including the impact of clergy and the influx of immigrants to the Americas. He also highlights the importance of local newspapers in making unique Mexican, Chilean, Argentine, etc. experiences out of regional events (Anderson 2006, 63). Similar to Deutsch, Anderson (2006) emphasizes the role that language plays in uniting groups of people and in building cohesive national identities.

Although Latin American countries share a common history and many colonial legacies, Whitaker and Jordan (1966) argue that national identity and nationalism within the region are not monolithic or static overtime. Many scholars, such as Brown (2006), López- Alves (2000), Burkholder and Johnson (2001), and Boyer and Spurling (2000) have researched the creation of national identities in Latin America. Boyer and Spurling (2000, 1) analyze historic colonial Latin American documents “which give vivid glimpses of the profound impact of economics, ecological, religious, and cultural processes” of colonial life. In doing so, Boyer and Spurling use primary documents to understand Latin American identity formation during the colonial period. In contrast, Burkholder and Johnson (2001) document the economic, political, social, and territorial changes in colonial Latin American society and how these changes in turn influenced notions of regional as well as later, national identities.
Moving outside the colonial period, López-Alves (2000) discusses the process of state formation throughout Latin America. He explains that individual national identities grew out of the unique historic experiences and ethnic makeup of each Latin American nation-state. Conversely, Brown (2006), like Anderson (2006) places emphasis on the role of foreigners (immigrants, merchants, clergy, soldiers, etc.) in the creation of individual Latin American national identities. Brown argues these foreigners (such as immigrants, clergy, soldiers, and merchants) provided a sense of “other” for Latin Americans and served as an important and influential factor in the nation-building process. Brown (2006) also suggests that nationalism in Latin America has long grown in relation to desires for economic development, a point other scholars such as Whitaker and Jordan (1966) and Masur (1966) also make.

Guibernau and colleagues (2006) address the various forms of nationalisms and national identities present in Latin America today. They emphasize a point that was already highlighted by Miller (2006) and Brown (2006)- that is that Latin American states have established and developed national identities in a far different way than, say, Europe or other parts of the developing world. Guibernau, et al. (2006, 199) note, “the region has a long history of thinking differently about nationalism, and merits closer attention than it has often received from theoreticians of nationalism.”

Additionally, Guibernau and colleagues (2006) provide a review of the latest and newest types of investigations on Latin American identities. For example, much like Deutsch (1963) and Anderson (2006), Miller (2006) discusses the role of language in the formation of national identity. In the Latin American case, where an overarching language (Spanish and Portuguese) was established during the colonial period, Miller
(2006, 203) argues that “the incorporation of vocabulary, inflections, and rhythms from indigenous languages… has also been significant in developing a sense of national distinctiveness.” Not only does Miller’s statement suggest that language has been an integral force in binding Latin Americans together, it also implies that individual countries within Latin American have attempted to differentiate themselves through dialect.

Another example of a recent investigation on identity in Latin America is the work of Valéria Salgueiro (2006), who researches the role of public architecture and its influence (as visual representations of the state) on the creation of Brazilian national identity. Additionally, Escolar, Quintero Palacios, and Reboratti (1994) address the role of political geography in the formation of Argentine national identity. They define national community as any nation that possesses an identity and a territory, thus tying geography to the foundation of national identity (Escolar, et al. 1994).

In reviewing the history of national identity and nationalism, other than Benedict Anderson (2006), Miller (2006, 203) notes that, “few of the major theorists and comparative historians of nationalism have said much about Latin America. Leaders in the field… have either ignored Latin America altogether or relegated it to an uneasy footnote, acknowledging that it does not really ‘fit’ any of their schemas.” One reason that Latin America is rarely included in the major theorist’s ideas is because of the early independence movement of Latin America, compared to other former colonial holdings. Brown (2006, 224) also notes, “the early independence of Spain’s continental American colonies in 1810-1830 is rarely integrated into overarching theories of the birth of
modern nations, which tend to focus on earlier developments in Europe and later
decolonization in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere.”

Another likely reason that Latin America did not fit in to these categories of
nationalisms and national identities is due to the colonial legacy of mestizaje or the
mixing of races, that occurred early on in Iberian colonization and the subsequent social
stratification that continues to this day throughout Latin America (De la Cadena 2005).
The mixing of indigenous peoples with Iberian colonists and imported African slaves
throughout Latin America means that instead of a national identity within one country,
there are many national identities in said country, depending on the individual
background, socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, heritage, experiences, etc. Although
often portrayed simplistically, Latin America poses a much more complicated field of
research in national identities than previously thought.

Miller and Brown’s statements indicate a need for more research on the varying
forms and degrees of identity in Latin America. Since Latin America has largely been
skipped over or over-arching theories have been applied monolithically to the region by
the major national identity and nationalism scholars, other more regionally based scholars
(Latin Americanists) along with political ecologists (Bebbington 2008, Rocheleau and
colleagues 2001, Keeling 2004, Perrault 2001) have filled in the gaps in this literature on
individual national identities. In short, regional scholars have produced works on the
diverse types of national identities and nationalism in Latin America (Hooson 1994,
Dijkink 1996). However, few scholars have produced much work on the recent changes
in national identity in Bolivia, a country that has long been understudied (Morales 2009).
Studies on Bolivian National Identity

Bolivian national identity evolved by mixing elements of Quechua, Aymara, and other native groups’ culture with the imposed characteristics of Iberian culture. Inherent in any discussion of Bolivian identity is the notion of ethnicity (Morales 2009). Albo (2008) contends that although there are fuzzy boundaries surrounding ethnicity in general, it is especially pronounced in Bolivia. As Masur (1966, 93) concurs, noting “the Andean bloc presents a mosaic of problems, largely due to its ethnic structure.” He further notes, “if a nation is composed of people who communicate with each other more intensely than with others, Bolivia cannot be called a nation before the twentieth century” (Masur 1966, 110). From independence throughout the Republican period, the diverse ethnic and linguistic makeup was a challenge in Bolivia because of the plethora of languages that are spoken in the region (Masur 1966). In fact, use of a common language in Bolivia to unify the diverse country proved problematic until the mid 1970s. Klein (1992, 265) notes, “finally, the percentage of Spanish speakers had risen to such an extent that by 1976, it was finally to become the majority language of Bolivia for the first time in republican history.” This statement suggests that Bolivia was not a cohesive state until the late twentieth century, when it finally achieved a common language.

Although elements of the indigenous cultures were used to create a Bolivian national identity, indigenous people themselves have largely been excluded from this Bolivian national identity. Whitaker and Jordan (1966) note that Bolivian national identity originated from a complex and chaotic history, one that fostered ethnic strife and territorial losses. Furthermore, they argue that Bolivia’s role as an exporter economy in the international community invited foreign interference in Bolivian economic and
political affairs, a common thread that has, historically, provided power to unite this diverse country. As a result of this messy history, in Bolivia, national identity evolved to take the form of “revolutionary nationalism,” a form of patriotism based on the political party Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario and its first leader, Victor Paz Estenssoro (Whitaker and Jordan 1966, 139).

Historically, the Bolivian criollo elites have used foreign ideas in combination with Bolivian national identity to obtain and to further economic and political objectives. As Whitaker and Jordan (1966, 5) note, “Nationalism is a tool and the things we need to know about it are who uses it, and why, how, and with what results.” This manipulation of Bolivian national identity began when Bolivia was first exposed to the world market, fulfilling the position of an exporter economy. Calderón (1977, 204) argues,

“The crisis of the enclave economy induced a profound crisis in the political power structure, which led in turn to a readjustment of the class structure and of the political representation of the various classes and social strata. This in turn involved the basic question of national unity with nationalism and socialism as ideological and political alternatives.”

Since independence, crises in the Bolivian political structure have been commonplace. Thus, national identity and nationalism were created by Bolivian elites in response to these potential threats. The problem with this situation, as Sullivan (1994) notes, is that the majority of the population was excluded from this national identity. This exclusion of the majority of the population further negated the state’s legitimacy.

Changes in the late 1990s and early 2000s in both Bolivian state and society have attempted to address these issues. The 2005 election of an indigenous President, who also won the highest percentage of votes since Bolivia’s return to democracy in 1982,
shows a widespread desire to change the course of Bolivia’s future. Canessa (2007, 146) notes:

“Evo Morales’ election represents profound and dramatic changes in the social and political landscape of Bolivia. It is a major change in how state power is wielded in a county where whites, be they Spanish colonists or their Creole descendants, have ruled over a majority of indigenous population for five centuries.”

Canessa (2007, 146) argues that such dramatic political change also “has consequences for peoples’ sense of who they are as Bolivians and as indigenous people.” These changes, coupled with the mass migration of Bolivians to urban areas during the late 1980s and 1990s, have transformed Bolivians’ sense of identity. As Albo (2008, 32-33) states,

“The net effect of this is that the majority of those defining themselves as belonging to indigenous groups now live in urban areas. To some extent, therefore, the strength of migratory flows shifts the rural-versus-urban contradiction to one of rural plus impoverished and ethnically defined urban peripheries versus wealthier, more central, and criollo urban areas.”

Goodale (2006) provides an excellent example of this change in locals’ conceptions of identity. Some scholars such as Lazar (2008) and Read (2008) note that El Alto, sitting just above La Paz, is the largest indigenous city in the Western hemisphere. Through rap music, the Aymara and Quechua youth in El Alto have connected with the global rap scene and have transcended their society to bring the problems of the indigenous majority to the forefront of Bolivian society (Goodale 2006). The young rappers are integrated in the global rap scene, as are the various Aymara and Quechua groups included in other international organizations such as environmental, anti-globalization, and class based movements. The local rappers are all accepted at a local level among most other indigenous peoples in El Alto and La Paz.
Yet, historically these Aymara and Quechua rappers, and other indigenous peoples in Bolivia, have been excluded from participating in national politics or society. By combining ethnic identity with new forms of inclusion through rap, technology, and education, many indigenous groups have made the problems of Bolivian society understandable to people who normally would not be able to participate (Goodale 2006). Through that understanding, a broad swath of the population, who previously did not participate in national political discourse are changing the way politics is conducted in Bolivia. This evolution has created “fractured” identities in Bolivia, where at one scale one’s identity is fully accepted and embraced (Haraway (1994, 196), Goodale (2006)). Yet, on another scale, in another situation, in front of a different audience, one’s identity is not recognized. This has recently provoked changes in Bolivian national identity, something that has always matured in relation to a wider Latin American regional identity.

Studies on Latin American Regional Identity

Commonly referred to as hispanoamericanismo, “continental nationalism,” or Pan-Latin Americanism, many scholars, such as Masur (1966, 68) and Whitaker and Jordan (1966), argue that a Latin American regional identity has existed since the 1820s. Although this common identity has lost ground to other identities, it is based on Iberian colonial legacies and other common characteristics of mutually intelligible languages (Spanish and Portuguese), religion (Catholicism), and the political (elitist) and economic (mercantilist) structures left by former Iberian colonial powers (De Soto 1989). Other common historic and geographic factors also exist that tie the region together culturally.
The Law of the Indies (1573) dominated much of the geographic and administrative details of Spanish colonization in the Americas (Nostrand 2001). The Spanish precisely laid out the colonial towns, cities, and provinces, based on *presidios* (defensive fortresses), the Catholic Church, *mitas* (the mining tradition) and the rural social and economic institutions of *latifundios* and *haciendas* (Nostrand 2001). Throughout their colonies, from North America to Patagonia, Nostrand (2001) notes that the Spanish settlements were geographically very similar. This similar geographic layout of the region made Latin America relatively homogeneous in the way the colonial government was spatially organized, how it conducted business, collected taxes, and how it was connected to other towns through the hierarchy between the colonial establishments. Although obvious differences did occur, depending on the local physical and human geography of a place, as well as the influence (or lack thereof) of imported Africans and the indigenous peoples of the Americas, in terms of economic, political, and social systems, the Spanish governed the colonies extensively and somewhat cohesively (Nostrand 2001, Clawson 2006).

Additionally, as Spain had administered many regions of its South, Central, and North American colonies in geographically similar ways- first sorting the areas into regions as one large territory, such as the Viceroy of New Spain or the Viceroy of Peru, (which were then subdivided into *audiencias* and further into *provincias*)- the peoples of the newly founded South American countries possessed a natural inclination towards a larger regional entity (Burkholder and Johnson 2001). This can be seen in the ideals of Simón Bolívar, the leader of some of the South American independence movements, who “attempted to create a new state of Gran Colombia, uniting Venezuela, New Granada,
and Ecuador” just after independence (Vanden and Prevost 2009, 46). Having been part of a largely decentralized wider system, where all involved used the same trading networks, the same language, the same currency, etc., many of the nation-states of South America, unlike those of Europe, have had previous experience under a similar supranational situation. In effect, the Law of the Indies provided a geographic commonality among most of the Iberian colonies.

Much like the Law of the Indies, another cultural similarity throughout the Spanish and Portuguese colonies was the process of *mestizaje*, or the mixing of peoples (De la Cadena 2005). *Mestizaje* had a large impact on the subsequent subdivisions (both social and economic) of many Latin American nations (De la Cadena 2005). In fact, *mestizaje* was one of the most culturally significant legacies of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial experience in the Americas because of the social stratification it produced. As Burkholder and Johnson (2001, 204) note, “miscegenation among Spaniards, Indians, and Africans produced a large racially mixed stratum in colonial society.” By mixing with indigenous peoples across the Americas, the Spanish in effect created a new caste of people, the *mestizo* (De la Cadena 2005). In Bolivia, *mestizaje* (biologically) only influenced a small part of the population- the small group of elite *criollos* and *mestizos*. However, in terms of social stratification and segregation, *mestizaje* greatly influenced the current complexity of ethnicity and identity in Bolivia.

Furthermore, by creating the caste-like system of *mestizaje* in Latin America and by consolidating all the diverse indigenous peoples into one group, “Indians” the Spanish in part homogenized these peoples and complicated people’s sense of self and identity (Sullivan 1994). This notion of multiple identities, produced out of the social
stratification of Latin American society along with the exclusive political and economic systems discussed earlier, has since challenged the process of nation building throughout Latin America (Scott 1963).

Indeed, the main challenges in the Latin American process of nation building stem from colonial legacies. As Scott (1963, 74) notes,

“The Spanish and Portuguese empires were really little more than mirrors of the semi feudal and preindustrial mother countries, so that most of the same social and political factors which have impeded national integration on the Iberian peninsula have operated to delay nation-building during the nearly fifteen decades of independence enjoyed by most of the Latin American republics.”

Since independence, some Latin American countries have struggled in establishing inclusive nation-states with cohesive national identities, always doing so in reference to this larger regional identity. As Miller (2006, 216) notes, Latin American “national identities have developed in complex relationship with a transnational regional identity-\textit{hispanoamericanismo}- that has acted as a crucial reference of both sameness and difference and that has functioned as more of a complement to national identities than a competition to them.” This context of colonial legacies and a regional identity left in place by the Portuguese, Spanish, and other European powers, provided commonalities that lead one to believe that the region would easily integrate economically and politically. However, historic and cultural commonalities aside, as mentioned previously, the region has not had much success in integration to the level of a common market or an economic union to date.
Studies on Regional Integration and National Identity


Other scholars, such as Cammack (1999), Cason and Burrell (2002), Di Filippo (2006), and Pion-Berlin (2000) have looked at the various efforts, both past and present, of regional integration in Latin America. Pion-Berlin (2000) and Coffey (1998) argue that regional integration efforts in Latin America have been driven largely by the regional desire to develop economically. In contrast, Cammack’s (1999) study on Mercosur highlights the reasons behind Mercosur’s establishment in 1991, including tying the Argentine and Brazilian domestic agendas to the wider regional economy. Similarly, Cason and Burrell’s (2002) analysis helps to explain the recent events in Mercosur, looking at the role of domestic politics and society issues in the process of integration. Di Filippo (2006) argues that the best strategy for long term Latin American regional integration is to begin with South American regional integration, noting that this will only function if the corresponding nations of people across the continent participate in this process.
In short, many scholars have investigated the various levels, agreements, and issues involved in regional integration in general and more specifically in Latin America. Many intellectuals have assessed regional integration in Latin America and many others have investigated national identity in Latin America. Few researchers, however, have looked at this crossroads between national identity and regional integration worldwide. Anthony Smith (1991) briefly addresses the notion of a larger collective identity based on the joining together of states. Smith argues that national identities will always be of utmost importance to nations. Therefore, a successful “Pan-nationalism” is that “which overarches but does not abolish individual nations” (1991, 175). In Laura Cram’s (2009b) recent article “Identity and European integration: Diversity as a source of Integration,” the changes in national identities since the establishment of the European Union are discussed. Tobias Theiler (2005) similarly addresses the formation of political identity within the context of expanding European regional integration. Both authors suggest that instead of an overarching regional identity, what has occurred with increased European regional integration is the reinforcement of local (or sub-national) and national identities.

Cram (2009b, 110) adds, “European integration facilitates the flourishing of diverse national identities rather than convergence around a single homogeneous European identity.” This in part is due to the fact that a regional European identity has not historically held the region together. Certainly, much of European culture is based on Greek and Roman legacies of democracy, Christianity, etc. But the nations of Europe have long histories of fragmentation, conflict, and war. As Smith (1995, 139- quoted in Cram 2009b, 113) notes, “without shared memories and meanings, without common
symbols and myths, without shrines and ceremonies and monuments, except bitter reminders of recent holocausts and wars, who will feel European in the depths of their being?” Rather than converging around a European identity, this historical legacy, coupled with Union expansion, has reinforced European national and sub-national identities, as can be seen with, for example, the Catalan and Basque identities in Spain.

Although an evolving European identity has been studied widely, Cram (2009b, 115) notes, “What has been less examined is the long term effect that this has had on national self perceptions and how these may have shifted overtime.” In essence, more research is needed on how increased regional integration is affecting national and sub-national identities. Furthermore, Cram (2009a, 107) argues, “the synergistic relationship between the European Union’s role in supporting, reinforcing, or even creating national identities, the process of European integration and the emergence of a European Union identity is under-researched.” Cram’s article suggests that although the European Union has been around for nearly sixty years, few scholars have taken on the task of researching how national identities in Europe, with increased integration, have changed over time.

Furthermore, since regional integration in Latin America has existed for about the same length of time without the success of the European Union, far fewer researchers have looked at this relationship between national identity and regional integration in Latin America. Nicola Miller (2006) briefly reviews the history of this relationship in Latin America while Manuel Alcántara Sáez (2000) discusses the elite perspective on regional integration in Latin America. Mitchell Seligson (1999) addresses the popular sentiment for regional integration across Latin America. Seligson (1999, 131) notes,
“while European opinions on the EU have been extensively studied, far less is known, however, about other regional integration schemes. With the exception of NAFTA, the role of public opinion in regional economic schemes in Latin America has been largely devoid of study.” While both Seligson (1999) and Alcántara Sáez (2000) address Latin American sentiments about increased regional integration, neither addresses how increased regional integration is affecting identities (civic, national, collective), what consequences this will have on the individual nation-states and the larger regional integration efforts currently at play in the region, and whether these efforts are fostering a regional Latin American or South American identity.

At the same time that these regional integration efforts have matured, identities (civic, collective, national, occupational, ethnic) have increasingly become a political tool in many parts of the world. Some of the most vocal groups have been based in Latin America, increasing academic interest in identity in the region. Consequently, “identity politics” has taken on an increasingly important role in the analysis of recent social movements and changes in many societies across Latin America (Hale 1997, 568). Hale (1997, 568) defines identity politics as “the collective sensibilities and actions that come from a particular location within society, in direct defiance of universal categories that tend to subsume, erase, or suppress that particularity.” Conversely, Jackson and Warren (2005, 554) call this the “politics of recognition” where “identity itself is turned into a strategy, a political opposition structure.” Under the guise of many labels, identity has been turned into an effective political tool that indigenous, environmental, class based and other groups across Latin America have used to further their political objectives and to obtain opportunities to participate in and affect national politics (Hooker 2005).
Cultural and Political Ecology Studies on Identity Politics

Studies on identity politics and new social movements based on shared identities in Latin America have saturated much of the social science literature in recent years. The increase in the use of terms such as “hybridity” (Hale 1997, 569) multiple identities, “fractured identities” (Haraway 1994, 196), or dualing identities, shows this shift in the study of identity politics over the past fifteen years. Social science scholars have produced recent works on these differing terms of Latin American identities: De La Cadena (2005) also explores the idea of hybridity, while Healey (2006), Sullivan (1994), Astvaldsson (2000), and Goodale (2006) all investigate the notion of Andean dualism.

Using cultural and political ecology as a guiding framework, geographers such as Peet and Watts (1996), Bebbington and Batterbury (2001), Perrault (2001), Jokisch (2002), Keeling (2004), Rocheleau and colleagues (2001), Robbins (2004), and Bebbington (2008) have produced much research on the recent changes in livelihoods and identities throughout the world. Based on the human-environment interaction, transnational networks, and multi-scalar analysis, cultural and political ecology seeks to “explain livelihoods in terms of their relationships with these other transnational social spaces” (Bebbington and Batterbury 2001, 374). Geographers, combining the notions of space and place to complex transnational networks and subsequent changes in identities, have been especially prolific in the study of identity politics.

Cultural and political ecology has been an especially useful framework of analysis for studies on identity in Latin America, due to the historic study of transnational networks, multiple scales of analysis, as well as a focus on livelihoods and identities. Latin America in general, and the Andes more specifically, “with its peculiar history, is
in many ways one of the most globalized and integrated regions in the world” (Robbins 2004, 191). Due to its unique highland landscape, agricultural practices, and traditional cultures, with a long history of European resource exploitation and migration flows, the Andes are a region particularly apt for research in political ecology. Furthermore, Robbins emphasizes that, “the region is also notable for the ways in which social movements and ethnic identity have been closely intertwined with changing crops, technology, and labor relations in the past few decades” (Robbins 2004, 191).

Many other scholars, such as Bebbington (2008), Bebbington and colleagues (2008), Becker (2004), Greene (2006), Jokisch (2002), and Perrault (2001), concur with Robbins and have produced recent works focusing on identity-based movements in the Andean region in particular.

In Latin America, as mestizaje included African, European, and Ameridian elements, the mixing of peoples subsequently produced complex notions of identity. Early on, the Spanish identified most Latin American indigenous groups as solely Indians, which partially stripped these people of their unique indigenous or ethnic identities, while people of mixed backgrounds (mestizos) faced other identity challenges, such as “fractured identities” (Haraway 1994, 196). Jackson and Warren (2005) argue that fragmented identities were wrought from not really belonging to either the indigenous side or the Spanish criollo side.

In recent decades, Greene (2006) provides an example of fractured identities in the South American context. He argues that in Peru, where indigenous movements have previously lacked any real significance at the national level, they have held great significance and influence in international movements, as well as among other
international actors (including the World Bank and the United Nations). Greene (2006) argues that these groups were able to transcend their national governments and affect the international community by voicing common concerns about the Amazonian basin and its traditional peoples. The use of their ethnic identities, tied to their natural environment (the Amazon) provided the reason that these groups were successful in gaining international support.

Identity politics and this local-global relationship that Greene (2006) highlights, are two subjects that have been well researched by cultural and political ecologists, such as Bebbington (2008), Rocheleau and colleagues (2001), Peet and Watts (1996), and Robbins (2004). By analyzing local adaptations to global forces, political ecology provides an alternative way to understand globalized relationships and explain the consequences they have on local landscapes and identities. It is within this framework of cultural and political ecology where geographers have produced a substantial amount of work on identity in Latin America.

**Conclusion**

With the exception of Benedict Anderson, many of the leading national identity scholars such as Deutsch (1963), Gellner (1994), Smith (1991), and Özkirimli (2000) have long skipped over fully explaining national identity in Latin America, as national identities in Latin America rarely fit into the scenarios of the prominent national identity theories. In fact, geographers in general, and cultural and political ecologists in particular, have filled in many of the pre-existing gaps in the literature on changing identities within the Latin American context. Moreover, few researchers, such as Cram
(2009b) and Miller (2006), have investigated the relationship between increased regional integration and national identities throughout the world.

These conditions serve as evidence that a need exists for more research on national identity in Latin America, especially within this context of increased regional integration. Using cultural and political ecology as a framework will allow this study to more aptly explore and understand the changes occurring in South America with regard to the ongoing regional integration process, and if this process is prompting any changes in allegiances and identities. As the cultural and political ecology framework seeks understanding of phenomenon occurring on multiple scales and across vast transnational networks, it is especially apt for this study as allegiances to identity in any regional integration process are many, and exist on multiple scales (local, national, supranational, regional, etc.). Furthermore, a cultural and political ecology framework in this study also acknowledges that identities within this context are multiple, complex, sometimes complimentary, and sometimes contradictory. In short, this framework serves as a starting place to observe, understand, and hopefully explain this complicated relationship between national identity and regional integration in South America. The aim of this research, therefore, is to look at the relationship between Bolivian national identity and increased integration, which will be explored and discussed in the following methods section.
CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

To initially research the changes in Bolivian national identity and the influence of increased South American integration efforts in recent years, approval was first obtained by the Institutional Review Board to do research with human subjects in May 2008 (See Appendix A). With that initial approval, preliminary research and data collection was carried out in Bolivia and Peru in May - June 2008. With continued approval from the IRB (May 2009), in the summer of June 2009, people were surveyed in La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Sucre, Potosí, Uyuni, and Oruro, Bolivia.

To investigate the Bolivian perception of increased efforts of South American regional integration, this research was conducted using two methods. First, using open-ended surveys and interviews, this research builds on the research of Alcántara Sáez (2000), who investigated the mostly elite perspective on regional integration. Using the opportunistic sampling method, seventy-seven Bolivians throughout the country were surveyed and interviewed in universities, hotels, government buildings, banks, local post offices, cafés, parks, plazas, internet cafés, at street vending carts, as well as on the street, about their opinions and knowledge of regional integration efforts currently at play in South America.
Second, to better understand the differing and complementary degrees of Bolivian identity, and building on the research of Rose (2008), Bartram (2008), and Waitt (2005) the other method used in this investigation was a content analysis of photographs of symbols of local, national, and supranational identity. These symbols were noted and photographed throughout the Bolivian landscape. Two-hundred and seventy four photos were taken in Bolivia, in cities, on the road, on trains of the passing rural landscapes, etc. The author of this investigation determined all the definitions of symbols of local, national, or supranational identity. A content analysis was then conducted to determine which level (local, national, or supranational) was most prevalent across the Bolivian landscape.

Survey Demographics

Using the first method described above, two separate sets of surveys and interviews were carried out in Bolivia. The first set of surveys was conducted by the author in June 2008 in La Paz and Copacabana, Bolivia. This set produced 16 survey responses. The second set of surveys was conducted in June-July 2009 in La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Sucre, Potosí, Uyuni, and Oruro, Bolivia. The second set of surveys produced 66 responses. The combined total was 82 surveys, but five survey responses had to be removed because the respondents were not Bolivian citizens. This left 77 responses to be analyzed in this investigation.

In order to capture a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds, the situations in which surveys and interviews were collected were not limited to only one area (compared to only doing this research on university campuses, for example). The surveys were mostly carried out in cities, where the majority of the Bolivian population lives (La Paz,
Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Potosí, Sucre, and Oruro). No small villages or rural areas were surveyed in this analysis. Therefore, the results of this analysis have a geographical bias attached to them, as certain areas are well represented (such as Santa Cruz, La Paz), while other departments were underrepresented (such as Chuquisaca, Beni, Pando, Tarija).

Survey Design

The survey instrument was initially created in English and then translated into Spanish (See Appendix B for the English original version and Appendix C for the Spanish translation). The survey instrument was used in interviews as a guide of conversation. The survey took approximately fifteen minutes for applicants to complete.

In the first part of the surveys and interviews, the participants were asked for some basic demographic information, including gender, age, citizenship, hometown, and socio-economic status. Hometowns were then aggregated with the other responses, in order to map and understand if any geographic patterns exist. Additionally, participants were queried to identify which languages they spoke at home, if they had any religious affiliations, if they identified themselves with any particular ethnicity, as well as their personal employment and their parents’ occupation(s). The participants were also asked to rank their level(s) of identities (local, national, or supranational).

In the second part of the survey instrument, the participants were asked about their knowledge on current regional integration efforts at play in South America and their view on cooperation and proposed integration with Bolivia’s neighbors. The first part of these questions asked the participants if they see Bolivia very connected, dependent on other nations and institutions, independent, or isolated from the global community. In
order to understand if the recent changes in Bolivia have impacted the changes in national identity, or whether increased integration has influenced the notion of Bolivian national identity, participants were asked whether they were aware of any regional integration efforts currently at play in South America. Additionally, the participants were asked if they think that regional integration in South America is a possibility in the future, and if they are in favor of having a European Union style agreement in South America - that of open borders with the free flow of people, money, and commodities.

The final part in this series of questions asked the participants if they would be in favor of surrendering some, if any, characteristics of national sovereignty and national identity. These characteristics include Bolivia’s national currency (*el boliviano*), the country’s commodity control at the borders, passport control, and the Bolivian national anthem. The reason that these particular elements of national sovereignty were chosen is to gauge how far individuals were willing to go to become members in these regional organizations. On the one extreme is passport control and border control, two features that many regional integration organizations push to open up the free trade area in the early years of these organizations. On the other extreme are two key elements of any national identity and two key features of national sovereignty: the national currency and the national anthem. The national currency of a country embodies the independent power of that nation-state to plan and choose its own economic path in the future. By ceding a national currency for a regional one, like the Euro, countries in part are surrendering their independent economic sovereignty.

The national anthem of a country generally has the history of that state in the words of the anthem. Therefore, national anthems are very unique to their particular
nations. Few, if any, of the functional regional integration organizations have ever required countries to give up their national anthems. However, the national anthem is an interesting variable in this survey to gauge how far citizens of Bolivia are willing to go for increased regional integration and to what extent they are willing to surrender elements of national identity and sovereignty.

After data collection, the surveys and interview responses were grouped into three categories:

1). Those participants who were for integration and willing to sacrifice all characteristics of national sovereignty and identity in return for membership and benefits in a regional integration organization.

2). Those participants who were against regional integration and not willing to sacrifice any elements of national sovereignty and identity, even if benefits were to be gained in a regional organization.

3). Those participants who were willing to sacrifice certain national characteristics, but not willing to give all elements of national sovereignty and identity to any supra-national institutions (i.e. those who had mixed feelings on sacrificing elements of national sovereignty).

Participant’s responses were then tallied and calculated into percentages using the total number of responses.

Using subtitles for each question, the surveys were then categorized into three nominal groups: (1) For regional integration, (2) Against regional integration, and (3) Those with mixed feelings, or those who were willing to sacrifice some, but not all elements of national sovereignty and identity. The next step was to map the spatial
variability of the responses to see if any geographic patterns for or against regional integration exist. After the responses were divided up into nominal groups, mapping software (ArcGIS from ESRI) was implemented to map and analyze the participants’ responses. There were too few responses in both the For and Against regional integration categories. The Mixed feelings category portrayed patterns illustrating citizens’ willingness to sacrifice certain elements of national sovereignty and identity, such as passport control at the borders and the national currency, el boliviano. This same category also showed that citizens were against surrendering border control, or the flow of goods and money across Bolivian borders, and the national anthem, points that will be touched on and elaborated on later in this investigation.

First, shape file data for Bolivia was obtained, including town, city, and province data. Second, a spreadsheet was created containing the number of survey responses from each location in Bolivia. Latitude and longitude coordinates were also obtained for each of these locations. The spreadsheet was then joined to the Bolivia shapefile and after using the select by attributes feature, maps were made to analyze the survey responses. Using ArcGIS allows one to visually portray the survey responses, for example, according to region, gender, or ethnicity.

Additionally, the survey responses were tallied using the total number of response to obtain percentages. Information from survey responses (such as age, gender ratio, and languages spoken at home) was then compared to statistical data from the 2001 Bolivian Census to first understand how accurately the survey data represented the overall Bolivian population, and second to give an overall better understanding of the wider Bolivian population, the subject of this investigation.
Content Analysis Design

Using the second method described in the introduction of this chapter, detailed field notes and photographs were taken of symbols of local, national, and supranational identity throughout Bolivia and a content analysis was conducted to determine which level of identity is most prevalent nationwide and why.

Building on the works of Valéria Salgueiro (2006), Phil Kinsman (1995), and Gillian Rose (1995), this study looked at symbols of local, national, and supranational identity throughout the Bolivian landscape to understand what symbols Bolivians experienced most. Geographers have long studied visual representations, including postcards, photographs and more recently, media messages on television and in print, to better understand complex phenomena across landscapes. While some authors use photographs as a means of explaining tourist landscapes (Crang 1997), others such as Kinsman (1995) look at the influence of symbols on national identity. Salguiero similarly (2006) researches visual uses in the creation of national identity, looking at the influential role of public architecture in the creation of Brazilian national identity. Gillian Rose (1995, 1996, 2008) has written numerous articles about “visualized geographies” (Rose 1996), giving both a theoretical background in this area of qualitative study, as well as methodological suggestions for further use in geography.

To understand which level of identity Bolivians experience most, it is necessary to first define what symbols of local, national, and supra-national identity are in Bolivia and South America. The author alone determined the criteria to define the levels of
identity (local, national, and supranational) and the symbols that portray those levels of identity.

**National Identity**

National identity symbols included the Bolivian national flag and national shield (See Figure 4).

![Figure 4. Bolivian National Flags, Crest, Shield, and Símon Bolívar statue, Sucre, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009).](image)

In addition to the traditional tri-color Bolivian national flag, the *Wiphala* (See Figure 5 was adopted in the January 2009 Constitution as another national Bolivian flag, representing the diverse indigenous background of the Bolivian nations (Gobierno Boliviano 2009).
Other common symbols of Bolivian national identity are the national currency (*el boliviano*), the national anthem, the Catholic Church and syncretism, national representatives of the government, including politicians, police, and military officers, government institutions and monuments. An example of national identity is syncretism – the mixing of local, indigenous beliefs with Catholicism. Orta (1999) suggests that the majority of Bolivians practice syncretism. For example, a Catholic monument with rocks atop is an example of syncretism (See Figure 6). This photo, for instance, shows the blending of Catholic icons and traditions (the Cross) with indigenous, nature based beliefs (the rocks). Rocks placed at the highest point in the landscape are said to show that a worshipper is closer to his/her God. Other forms of syncretism are the use of Catholic holidays for traditional celebrations (for example the celebration of San Juan – June 24th), when people across the country burn firewood to ward off evil. Another example may be the use of Saints for non-traditional Catholic customs, such as *el Tío*, the God of the underworld in Potosí’s Cerro Rico mountain.

**Figure 5.** The *Wiphala* (Mercado, 2008).
Figure 6. Syncretism at pilgrimage site in Copacabana, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2008).

Government institutions include national level governing bodies as well as commemorative statues and monuments showing Bolivian national history, including the Bolivian National Revolution Museum in La Paz (See Figure 7).
Military representatives refer to any national-guard force that defends the Bolivian state, including the Bolivian police (See Figure 8).

Another example of national identity is graffiti, public art, and other messages and symbols in public spaces that display strictly national messages or support. National
messages would include those that reference a national movement (such as Movimiento al Socialismo), touch on the regionalism or the kolla vs. kamba divide, highlight or reject national level politicians such as Evo Morales, or show Bolivian nationalism (See Figure 9).

**Figure 9.** “Sovereignty for Bolivia- Unite” Oruro, Bolivia (Source: Stiller Titchener, 2009)

*Local identity*

Examples of local identity are symbols such as indigenous influenced dress, architecture, and agricultural practices. Indigenous influenced dress refers to any of the diverse traditional clothes that some of the Bolivian people continue to wear, such as the elaborate costumes seen in *La Entrada Universitaria* parade, celebrating the diverse ethnic groups of Bolivia (see Figure 25), a more fancy form of the pollera (See Figure 10), or weavings with traditional patterns and colors of the particular indigenous groups.
Figure 10. Cholitas (indigenous urban Bolivian women) in traditional dress (Stiller Titchener, 2009)

Indigenous architecture refers to the original housing of the highland indigenous groups that was circular rather than square (See Figure 11).

Figure 11. Indigenous architecture, Potosí, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener, 2009)

Indigenous agricultural practices refer to traditional or mestizo practices of animal rearing, crop cultivation, and production practices that indigenous peoples, as well
as *mestizos*, across Bolivia still practice. Indigenous agricultural practices can be defined by the use of traditional techniques (See Figure 12) and the cultivation of traditional crops, such as quinoa.

![Figure 12. Indigenous agricultural practices (Stiller Titchener, 2009)](image)

In addition, city and provincial flags and decorations will serve as symbols of local identity. Figure 13 below illustrates Paceño pride, with the many city flags of La Paz (red and green only) largely outnumbering the national flags (red, green, and yellow). City and local flags were generally hung next to national flags, but in some cases, the sheer number of local or municipal flags outnumbered the national Bolivian flag. Flags that showed the colors of the local province (red for Sucre, blue for Uyuni, for example) were considered local flags, whereas any flags that had solely the colors of the national flag (red, yellow and green) or mirrored that of the Wiphala were considered national flags.
Figure 13. *Paceño* identity, La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener, 2009).

Other examples of local identity are graffiti, public art, and other messages and symbols in public spaces that had a local message or local image. Figure 14 below is an example of a local image with a local message: Indigenous or *Cholita* women with the name “colla” (or *kolla*) portraying the ethnic as well as geographic divide dominating Bolivia presently. This could be interpreted in one of two ways: The first is that this graffiti shows pride of being a *colla*, or a highlander. Second, the graffiti could be interpreted as an insult against the highlanders, or *collas*. An insulting message is portrayed in Figure 21- “Colla Maldita” is “damn highlander.” Other messages of local identity found in public space included graffiti taggings, political messages in spray paint supporting the local candidates or political parties, as well as neighborhood murals showing neighborhood pride, local soccer teams, local politicians, etc. Any messages or graffiti showing support or rejection of Latin America, South America, or Bolivia were excluded from this grouping.

9 All translations from Spanish to English were done by the author.
Figure 14. Graffiti images of *cholitas*, La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener, 2009).

Supranational Identity

Examples of supra-national identity are the flags of the regional integration associations (See Figure 15) previously discussed, including *Mercosur*, the Andean Community, the Union of South American Nation, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, etc.

Figure 15. The Union of South American Nations Flag (Andean Community 2009).
Another example of supranational identity is the regional institutions themselves, such the Andean Community headquarters in Lima, Peru (See Figure 16), or the Andean University in Cochabamba, Bolivia or Cuzco, Peru.

![Andean Community Headquarters, Lima, Peru](stiller-titchener-2008)

**Figure 16.** Andean Community Headquarters, Lima, Peru (Stiller Titchener, 2008).

In addition, an example of supra-national identity may be graffiti and other messages and symbols in public spaces for *hispanoamericanismo* or South or Latin American pride (See Figure 17).
Once these levels of identity were identified and defined, the field notes and photos were divided up based on their content and a content analysis was conducted. Field notes were mostly collected randomly. In most locations visited, the author took notes of any symbols of national, local, and supranational identity as well as those that showed multiple levels of identities observed during my time in that particular location. In most cities, including Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Sucre, Potosí, Uyuni, and Oruro, field notes and photos were only taken in an ad hoc manner, meaning that there was no set time frame or set trek, and therefore the observations noticed in these particular locations were done in a random manner.

Only in La Paz was a more systematic approach taken. The author traveled to the more indigenous city of El Alto, sitting just above La Paz, taking a specific route through El Alto, and observing my surroundings for three hours. The author also traveled to the affluent area of La Paz called Zona Sur, where symbols of identity were also observed during a specific trek through the suburb and for a specific time period- three hours.
The results of the content analysis, therefore, may be skewed by what was actually observed and what was not observed. Also, the results of the content analysis may be skewed geographically because the author only traveled to select areas of select cities, in select provinces. Furthermore, the lines between local, national and supranational symbols of identity do cross and identities are often embedded or nested within other identities. And reactions to the first indigenous Bolivian President, coming to power only in 2005, may have also influenced the amount of symbols seen throughout the landscape. Such identities are hard to categorize into three nominal groupings (local, national and supranational). Therefore, the author categorized these symbols to the best of her ability.

Acknowledging the complexity and embedded nature of identity, and the multiplicity found using a cultural and political framework, another approach was taken to dividing up the photos into a separate category, called Hybrid, as many of these contained multiple and embedded levels of identity. This category included all photos that contained more than one level of identity. Figure 17 is a great example of this, as the overall graffiti is portraying Latin American pride. However, two of the major elements of this graffiti show Bolivian miners, a historic symbol of the Bolivian people, and hence a symbol of national identity.

In each location visited, field notes were taken when a symbol of one of these levels of identity was observed randomly. Any photos with symbols showing strictly Bolivian identity were grouped into the national category. All photos of only local symbols of identity were grouped into a similar selection, while all the photos with only
symbols of supra-national identity were grouped together as well. From there, these nominal groups were further subdivided.

National Identity Symbols

For the national identity symbols, the photos and detailed field notes were subdivided into five main categories.

1). The first grouping was flags, which included the Bolivian national flag, the Bolivian national shield and crest, as well as the Wiphala. Because so many flags were observed, the author decided to separate this grouping from the Bolivian government.

2). The second category was the Bolivian government. This was a general category, which included government buildings, monuments, government officials, military officials, police officers, government signs, government run transportation, etc.

3). The third grouping was graffiti, paintings, and murals, which included all art, messages on walls or other areas, national murals, free lance paintings, as well as graffiti and other street art.

4). The fourth grouping was the Catholic Church, which included all crosses and churches themselves, and examples of syncretism.

5). The last category of national identity symbols was Evo Morales, his political party Movimiento al Socialismo (M.A.S.) and messages, propaganda, and graffiti about the January 2009 constitution. I decided to separate this last category from the general government grouping and flag grouping because Evo Morales is a controversial character in Bolivia and many of these symbols portray or suggest the lowland vs. highland divide. Furthermore, his is just one administration in a
long history of Bolivian leaders, so he temporarily represents the government, but
does not fully signify the Bolivian government as well as some of the other
symbols do.

Local Identity Symbols

For local identity symbols, the photos and detailed notes were subdivided into
four categories. These were indigenous culture, indigenous architecture, local flags, and
local graffiti.

1). The first grouping was indigenous culture, which included both indigenous symbols
and practices. Under symbols, all decorations or icons that showed
representations of indigenous figures, historic depictions of suns and faces of the
various indigenous groups, etc. were grouped together. Under practices, any local
markets, indigenous crop cultivation such as quinoa, people weaving, people
participating in parades with local costumes, such as the *Entrada Universitaria*\(^1\),
music, and dance, and decorations that portrayed indigenous practices were
included. Native dress, such as the costumes seen in *La Entrada Universitaria*, as
well as traditionally worn weavings (with particular patterns and colors for
particular groups) were also included in this grouping, as the customary dress of
the various indigenous groups is one of the most distinguishing features between
them.

2). The second group was indigenous architecture, which can be distinguished from
modern architecture in the fact, first, that most structures were round, before the

\(^1\) *La Entrada Universitaria* is a parade in La Paz in late July, where all university
departments dress up in traditional costumes of one particular indigenous group and
celebrate their traditional dance, food, and music. This celebration lasts over 24 hours.
Spanish arrived in Bolivia, rather than square as more contemporary buildings are constructed. Secondly, native architecture can be also distinguished from modern architecture by the building materials involved. Those buildings made of natural materials, such as straw, mud bricks, etc. - were considered as indigenous architecture in this study.

3). The third grouping was local flags, which included provincial as well as municipal flags. Local or municipal decorations (or decorations that only included the municipal colors) were also included in this grouping.

4). The last grouping within local identity was local graffiti, which was subdivided into four categories.

   A). First was autonomy. In recent years, there has been an intense debate and heated protests about eastern autonomy from La Paz. Signs for and against autonomy were quite visible throughout the media luna, or the eastern provinces with the regional capital of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

   B). The next sub-grouping was the kollas vs. kambas divide. In this category was graffiti from around the country either for or against kollas.

   C). The third grouping within this subdivision was city pride, which included decorations representing the individual municipalities. Flags were not considered in this grouping.

   D). The last grouping in this subdivision was graffiti as well as local propaganda in one of the recognized thirty-eight indigenous languages (Aymara, Quechua, etc).
For symbols of supranational identity, the photos and detailed notes were divided into three categories: graffiti, statues, and institutions.

1). The graffiti category included all public murals and messages supporting *hispanoamericanismo*, or Latin American and/or South American pride.

2). The statues category included Símon Bolívar statues - as he was the independence leader for the region, not only Bolivia, and was the first leader to promote the idea of Latin American regional integration. Although he may have pushed for independence for Bolivia, he is largely seen within Bolivia as a supranational figure, not only pushing for Bolivia’s independence from Spain, but also the region’s independence from Spain.

3). Last was the category of institutions, which included the buildings and flags of the South American regional integration institutions, such as the Southern Common Market (*Mercosur*), the Andean Community, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, the Union of South American Nations, etc.
CHAPTER V

FINDINGS

Introduction

Through the methods described in the previous chapter, the survey data was analyzed to get an understanding of the current sentiments on regional integration in the region. The main objective of analyzing this survey data is to understand how aware Bolivians are of the current efforts at regional integration, as well as what elements of national sovereignty and identity Bolivian citizens are willing to surrender. Although many benefits are thought to be gained by becoming more involved in regional integration efforts, what are Bolivians willing to give up in this integration process? Is increased regional integration even thought to be desirable for the people of Bolivia? Are Bolivians even aware that Bolivia is a member of many regional integration organizations in South America? Are they willing to give up control of the flow of goods and money over national borders? What about passport control over who enters and leaves Bolivia? Are they willing to give up national economic policy, embodied by a national currency? What about the Bolivian national anthem, essentially the history of the country?

Another important objective of this study is to understand which level of identity
(local, national, supranational, or hybrid- meaning two or more levels) is most prevalent in the Bolivian landscape. Once these questions have been answered, further inferences can be made about the Bolivians’ perspective on the viability of South American regional integration.

Bolivia has long been a divided or fragmented nation-state with little to no cohesive national unity or identity (Roca 2008). Bolivia has long been weighed down by socioeconomic and ethnicity issues. It has also been plagued by a deep regionalism between the highlanders of the west (Kollas) and the lowlanders of the east (Kambas) (Roca 2008). If this deep regionalism still persists, it may influence whether a Bolivian national identity, the smaller sub-national identities, or both predominate in Bolivia. Bolivia also only recently gained its first indigenous President, Evo Morales, in 2005 that helped to pass a new constitution in 2009. These factors, in turn, may also affect whether Bolivians support or reject the idea of increased South American regional integration.

In this findings chapter, the first section will include a comparison of the survey population to the larger Bolivian population (based on 2001 Census Data, the latest available). This information was included as it helps to show the relationship between the survey data to the diverse Bolivian population. Before any inferences can be made, it is important to understand how representative the survey population is of the larger Bolivian population in terms of gender, age and languages spoken at home.

In the second section, the locations of the survey respondents’ hometowns will be discussed, and the perspectives of the survey population on surrendering elements of national sovereignty will be reviewed. An overall snapshot of what the survey population
is willing (or not) to give up in this process of integration will suggest to what extent Bolivians are willing to integrate with their neighbors.

In the third section, a discussion of the survey respondents’ opinions on regional cooperation and increased integration is included. First, the total survey population’s opinions on cooperation with the neighboring countries will be covered, and whether the participants want a similar agreement like that of the European Union, with the free flow of people, goods, and money in South America. Second, a discussion of the percentage of survey respondents who are aware of any regional integration efforts in South America follows.

In the last section, the results of the content analysis will be discussed, showing which level of identity (local, national, supranational or hybrid) dominates the Bolivian landscape.

**Comparison of Survey Data to Bolivian Census Data**

To fully analyze the survey data, first it is essential to compare the collected survey data with recent Bolivian census data (2001 Census Data), as to ensure that the collected survey data accurately represents the larger Bolivian population.

**Gender Comparison**

**Table 2. Gender Comparison of Bolivian Census Data to Survey Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Comparison (Source: INE, 2002)</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivian Population 2001</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Population 2008 and 2009</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey sample n= 77

---

11 In all the tables that follow, the numbers in parenthesis represent the number of survey respondents.
In terms of gender, the survey population does not directly correspond to the larger Bolivian population. The survey population is comprised of 35% female and 65% male respondents. The results, therefore, are skewed towards the male perspective as 50 out of the 77 survey responses are from males, with only 27 from females. There are a few reasons to explain this discrepancy between the survey data and the Bolivian census data in terms of gender.\(^\text{12}\)

Although the Bolivian population is roughly equal in terms of gender, traditional gender roles are largely still practiced, meaning while men mainly work outside of the home, Bolivian women still largely fulfill an integral domestic role, although they sometimes also work (sometimes in the informal sector) outside the home. As Clawson (2006, 202) notes, “the traditional roles of women in Latin America have been those of faithful mothers, wives, and homemakers.” Such social stigma meant that women in Latin American society have historically had limited educational opportunities. Furthermore, there was little professional education that was historically offered to women, as Clawson goes on to add: “female participation in the formal economic sector has been limited to teaching, nursing, and secretarial-clerical jobs that fit the cultural stereotype” (Clawson 2006, 204).

This trend continues as the United Nations Human Development Report on Gender in Bolivia (2003, 1) notes that Bolivian “women have lower levels of human development than men and their education and income levels are below those of the masculine population.” Education plays a big role in this social stigma, as boys, and hence men, are generally the children of the family that are educated (to some degree) in

\(^\text{12}\) When approached and asked about their opinions on national identity and regional integration, many women in Bolivia would shy away from me and offer their husbands to answer the survey questions.
traditional Bolivian homes. In Latin America, politics and economics are two subjects in which women are just now finally participating (at all levels of government, business, at a grassroots level, and in academia).\textsuperscript{13}

The focus of this investigation is regional integration and national identity. Bolivian women, who have historically had limited educational, political, and economic opportunities, may have had little contact with these concepts. This may help to explain why Bolivian women first have little to no knowledge of these concepts and therefore offered their husbands to answer the survey questions. And in comparison to the larger Bolivian population, this may also help to explain, in part, why the survey results are skewed to the male perspective.

\textbf{Age Comparison}

The survey data was also compared to 2001 Bolivian Census data (the latest available) in order to determine if this survey population accurately represents the age distributions of the larger Bolivian population.

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
0-9 yrs & 26.5\% & 0.0\% \\
10-19 yrs & 23.0\% & 10.4\% \\
20-29 yrs & 16.8\% & 28.9\% \\
30-39 yrs & 12.0\% & 15.6\% \\
40-49 yrs & 9.1\% & 23.4\% \\
50-59 yrs & 5.9\% & 10.4\% \\
60-69 yrs & 3.7\% & 10.4\% \\
70 + yrs & 3.0\% & 0.9\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Age Group Comparison of Bolivian Census Data to Survey Data (Source: INE, 2002).}
\end{table}

Survey sample n =77

The median age of the survey population is 37.2 years. The median age of the Bolivian population (as of 2010) was 22.2 years (CIA Factbook 2010). The survey population in general is slightly older than the average age in Bolivia, where much of the

\textsuperscript{13}This can be seen in recent years with the election of Michelle Bachelet, the first female President of Chile, or the election of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina (Vanden and Prevost 2009).
population is under 30 years of age (INE 2002). The breakdown of age comparisons shows that the survey population does not directly correspond with the age distributions of the entire Bolivia population. There are several reasons to explain this discrepancy. First, as the Institutional Review Board requires that all subjects be of legal age (18 years+), I was only able to survey people 18 years and older, making only two years valid for this age distribution and no one in the 0-9 yrs. category for the same reason.

Second, arguably, the younger generations of Bolivians may have less knowledge about regional integration efforts at play in South America and less general awareness of the impact of the recent events and changes in Bolivian state and society. As discussed in chapters two and three, Bolivian identity has changed in the past fifty years. Many members of the younger generations have less of an understanding of what it meant to be a Bolivian during the 1952 Revolution or even the 1985 Tin Crisis, than do many of the older generations of Bolivians.

Third, in general, older Bolivians were much more willing to give their opinions and perspectives than were the younger generations. This also helps to explain why the survey population has a higher percentage of respondents in the 30-39 yrs., 40-49 yrs., 50-59 yrs., and 60-69 yr. age distribution groups than the larger Bolivian population.

**Language Comparison**

Finally, in order to determine if this survey population accurately represents the larger Bolivian population in terms of ethnicity and indigenous languages spoken, the survey data was also compared to the 2001 Bolivian Census data (the latest available) on the languages spoken in Bolivian homes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language Comparison</th>
<th>Quechua</th>
<th>Aymara</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Guaraní</th>
<th>Foreign Languages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivian population 2001</td>
<td>21.2% (12)</td>
<td>14.6% (11)</td>
<td>61.3% (48)</td>
<td>0.5% (1)</td>
<td>2.4% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey population 2009</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>62.3%</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
<td>6.4% (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey sample n = 77

In terms of languages spoken at home, the comparison between the survey and Census data suggests that the survey population does indeed represent the larger Bolivian population. The percentage of Bolivians who speak Spanish at home is nearly identical from the 2001 Census data to the survey population. The percentage of Bolivians who speak Aymara at home is also nearly identical in both the survey and larger Bolivian population. There are two small discrepancies between the survey population and the Bolivian population, in Quechua speakers as well as those speaking foreign languages at home. While there is no clear reason for these discrepancies, one reason may be the fact that the Quechua speaking peoples of Bolivia are spread to diverse areas of the Bolivian altiplano (refer to Figure 3). However, in terms of the majority of languages spoken at home, the survey population does indeed represent the larger linguistically diverse Bolivian population.

It is clear from the results from this section that there are limitations to this survey data, as it does not accurately represent the larger Bolivian population in every category. Now that it has been established how accurately (in terms of languages spoken) and inaccurately (in terms of age distribution and gender ratio) the survey population represents the larger Bolivian population, a more in depth analysis of the survey data can be carried out on their opinions on regional integration, national sovereignty, and identity. Due to the limitations of this investigation (geographic bias, gender bias, and
small sample size) the results must be interpreted with some degree of caution. However, the results of this investigation are representative of this sample and do shed some light on some of the complexities of Bolivia.

Locations of Respondents

Figure 18. Map of respondent’s hometowns across Bolivia
### Table 5. Hometowns of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Respondents, by hometown</th>
<th>Number of People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beni *</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimate</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>10% (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copacabana</td>
<td>4% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuevo</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Alto</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huarina</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>23% (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Yungas</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murillo</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>15% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>4% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td>10% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munecas *</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Borja</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz *</td>
<td>15% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sucre</td>
<td>3% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sur Yungas</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija *</td>
<td>3% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uyuni</td>
<td>3% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vallegrande</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey sample n = 77
(Those denoted by an * are located in the lowlands of eastern Bolivia).

In terms of hometowns, 23% of the survey population originates from La Paz. Being the capital and the largest city in the country, it was somewhat expected that La Paz would have a higher percentage of people calling it home. Fifteen percent of the survey population named Santa Cruz as their hometown. Ten percent of survey respondents called Cochabamba and Potosí their hometowns, respectively. Four percent of the survey population originates from the border town of Copacabana, while another four percent of respondents were from the former mining town of Oruro. Three percent of the population came from Sucre, Uyuni, and Tarija, respectively. Fifteen percent of survey respondents did not answer this question. These results show that this survey
sample is geographically skewed to more of the urban areas, and to specific departments, including Santa Cruz, La Paz, etc. Other, more rural departments are underrepresented (Beni, Pando, etc.). The significance of this urban bias is that an urban population is more socially aware and generally more progressive, and perhaps may have higher levels of acceptance for regional integration efforts currently at play in South America. This urban bias is significant in this study as it may skew the results towards acceptance of regional integration, although many rural Bolivians may not tolerate it or even be aware of it.

In terms of regions within Bolivia, kambas (or lowlanders) represent 28% of the survey population, while kollas made up nearly 72% of survey respondents (See Table 5). This means that the survey results will be skewed towards a kolla (or highlander) opinion. This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the majority of the Bolivian population lives in the highland altiplano and valleys (66%), while a smaller portion (34%) of the population lives in the eastern lowlands centered around Santa Cruz (INE, 2002).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>National Percentage</th>
<th>Survey Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beni *</td>
<td>4.38%</td>
<td>2.60% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>6.42%</td>
<td>3.90% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>17.59%</td>
<td>16.88% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>28.41%</td>
<td>33.77% (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>4.74%</td>
<td>3.90% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando *</td>
<td>0.63%</td>
<td>2.60% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td>8.57%</td>
<td>14.29% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz *</td>
<td>24.53%</td>
<td>18.18% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija *</td>
<td>4.73%</td>
<td>3.90% (3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Those denoted by an * are located in the lowlands of eastern Bolivia).
Compared to the 2001 Census, this data somewhat mirrors the national population distribution within Bolivia. The eastern provinces of Beni, Pando, and Tarija have relatively low population percentages in both the 2001 Census and the survey data. The two departments with the two major cities, La Paz and Santa Cruz, boast the majority of the population in both the 2001 Census data as well as the survey data. For the town of Potosí, the survey population was higher than the 2001 Census data. Cochabamba, Oruro, and Chuquisaca all have lower percentages in the survey data, compared to the national percentages from the 2001 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Population: Ethnicity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aymara</td>
<td>23.4% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiquitano</td>
<td>2.6% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarani</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leco</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llalloca</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>27.3% (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>23.4% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>16.8% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urus</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey sample n =77

In terms of ethnicity, the survey population is comprised of nearly equal amounts of mestizos (27.3%) or people who identify with a mixed ancestry, people who identified as Aymara (23.4%), and those participants who do not identify with any particular ethnicity (23.4%). This high number of responses that did not identify as ethnic in any way may be explained by the fact that some participants may have misunderstood the question, as etnia (ethnicity) is somewhat of a loaded term in Spanish and could have multiple meanings. Furthermore, due to the urban bias of these results, having surveyed many people in urban areas, mestizos or criollo Bolivians may not have any known ethnic affiliation. Quechua participants made up 17% of the survey population, whereas the
smaller, less represented ethnic groups, such as Urus, Leco, Llallocoa, Guaraní, and Chiquitano only made up one to two percent of the survey population (refer to Figure 3 for ethnicity map).

**Opinions on Elements of National Sovereignty**

One of the objectives of this research is to understand what elements of national sovereignty and identity Bolivians are willing to sacrifice for increased benefits in one of the continental integration organizations, including the Andean Community, Mercosur, ALBA, UNASUR, etc.

**Table 8. Willingness of Bolivians to Surrender Elements of National Sovereignty**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sacrifice Elements of National Sovereignty?</th>
<th>National Currency</th>
<th>Border Control</th>
<th>Passport control</th>
<th>National Anthem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>48.1% (37)</td>
<td>49.4% (38)</td>
<td>37.7% (29)</td>
<td>70.1% (54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44.1% (34)</td>
<td>42.8% (33)</td>
<td>54.5% (42)</td>
<td>7.8% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>7.8% (6)</td>
<td>7.8% (6)</td>
<td>7.8% (6)</td>
<td>22.1% (17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey sample n = 77

**National Currency- el boliviano**

Out of the total survey population, 48.1% were against giving up the boliviano if a common South American currency were to be introduced. 44.1% of respondents were willing to sacrifice the national currency, while 7.8% of the respondents did not answer this question. It is understandable within this context of increased regional integration and the recent changes in Bolivian state and society that nearly half of the survey respondents were for sacrificing the national currency, while nearly the other half were against giving it up. One respondent had an interesting comment, saying, “Why give away our sovereignty when we do not have it now? It is the hands of foreign politicians...
and institutions.” Although a monetary note, a national currency identifies the nation-state, as currencies are generally full of symbols of historic national figures, events, and places, unique solely to that country (Shore 2000). It is also a symbol of economic sovereignty, showing that the state is in control of its own economic future (Shore 2000).

This may help to explain why half of the survey respondents were willing to sacrifice this symbol of national identity, while nearly the other half of the survey respondents were not willing to give up this element of national sovereignty. One respondent noted that by giving up the national currency, the boliviano, “We would lose more than we would gain.” Another respondent noted, “The elders, as well as those who cannot read or write, would not know the value of our money if we were to change it. So why change it?”

In addition to the challenges integration poses to nation-states’ identities, integration also has many economic benefits, which may drive some participants to be more willing to surrender the currency than others. One respondent noted, “The economy and the development of Bolivia are more important than nationalist aspirations.” However, in the European Union example, currency was one of the last elements of national sovereignty that most countries were willing to sacrifice, showing that this is still a contentious issue (Shore 2000). Still to this day, some EU countries have not exchanged their national currency for the regional one (i.e. Great Britain) (Redwood 2001).

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14 All quotations in this findings chapter have been translated from Spanish by the author.
Border control

49.4% of the survey respondents were against opening Bolivian borders to the free flow of money and commodities. A common reason cited in these responses was the problem of narco-trafficking. One survey respondent noted, “Narco-traffickers, with open borders, will more easily enter and leave Bolivia.” Another survey respondent said, “There has to be some sort of control- otherwise narco-traffickers, drug and crime cartels, and money laundering will become the norm in our country.” Bolivia allows the cultivation of coca for traditional Andean uses. However, over the past twenty-five years, the Chapare region of Cochabamba province has become a major cultivating center of coca, and both Cochabamba and Santa Cruz de la Sierra have become centers of cocaine production (Armstrong 2007). This has led to an increase in international drug trafficking and foreign involvement in Bolivian affairs (Vanden 2004). These issues are at the forefront of the hesitation to open up Bolivian borders to the free flow of money and goods.

Still, other survey respondents noted that relaxing the flow of goods and commodities over the borders would be favorable to Bolivians. One respondent noted that, “Due to diplomatic problems with the United States, Bolivia cannot sell its good to the U.S. So, increased free trade with other South American countries will alleviate some of Bolivia’s export problems.” In fact, 42.8% of the survey population was willing to open Bolivian borders to increase trade with the neighboring countries. Reducing trade barriers is often cited as one of the first steps in any regional integration efforts (Belassa 1961). And as previously discussed, the Andean countries have long had trade relations,
institutionalized by the Andean Pact of 1969. 7.8% of the survey respondents did not answer this question.

Passport control

37.7% of the respondents were against removing passport control at the borders. The main reason cited by these respondents was again the problem of narco-trafficking in the region. One respondent noted that Bolivia should maintain its passport control as to keep out “people who do not respect others.” Another respondent said, “Passport control is something that is very much the responsibility of each nation to administer and maintain the state’s territorial integrity.”

However, 54.5% of respondents were willing to remove passport control at the borders. The reason for this majority in support of sacrificing passport control is because to a certain degree, passport control has already been partially relaxed between neighboring South American countries. With their national identification cards, Bolivians can enter into neighboring countries (Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Chile). Another reason the majority of Bolivians were for removing passport control is due to the un-employment and underemployment situation in Bolivia, as well as higher wages in neighboring countries like Brazil and Argentina. One respondent said that decreasing passport control would allow “more exchange of workers across the borders,” something that would greatly help Bolivians. Transnational migration and remittances already play an integral role in the Bolivian economy. By further removing passport and visa restrictions, Bolivians would be allowed to seek employment outside of the country, thus strengthening the familial as well as national economies.
Furthermore, other respondents noted the importance of working on diplomatic relations, by opening the borders between former adversary countries of Bolivia- Peru and Chile. One respondent noted that, “the exchange of people across borders would help to break old prejudices.” Another responded that “neighbors should pass national borders to get know other peoples, other places, as to open up one’s mind.”

National anthem

70.1% of the survey respondents are against giving up the Bolivian national anthem. Many respondents noted that they would be willing to gain a continental wide national anthem, but not sacrifice the Bolivian national anthem. One respondent noted, “As long as the idea of a Latin American identity is maturing, why not create a South American anthem, in addition to the Bolivian one?” Only 7.8% of the survey population are willing to sacrifice the national anthem if a South American one were to be created. One of the respondents in favor of giving up the national anthem stated, “The national anthem does not form part of the nation of Bolivia. It was something imposed upon the people during the process of de-colonization, during war-time, to help create more castes within our society. The flag is the same. It came from the gangs that de-colonized Bolivia.”

22.1% of the survey respondents did not answer this question. Part of the reason for such a high number that did not answer was due to the wording of the question on the first survey instrument used in 2008. It read as national song (canción nacional) rather than national anthem (himno nacional). This may help to explain why the first round of survey respondents did not answer this question: it did not make sense to them.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15} Other participants seemed insulted by the very question of asking whether they were willing to surrender the country’s national anthem. Some may have not answered that question in protest.
These results suggest that the majority of the survey population is against sacrificing the national anthem. In large part, national anthems are the history of a country, combined with a melody. Many of the survey participants responded that the Bolivian national anthem belonged to Bolivians and no one else. One participant noted, “Because in the words of the national anthem, it is said what Bolivia is and who we are as Bolivians.” Others noted that the anthem was “sacred” and that it has the turbulent history of Bolivia in the words, so that only Bolivians could identify with it. One respondent noted, “It is part of the identity of Bolivians. It identifies us as Bolivians.” Another said, “It is a historical event that belongs only to us, the Bolivians.” Another response was “It is something sacred of each nation.” A respondent noted, “Our anthem is very important to all of us Bolivians. Together with our flag, the anthem represents much for us because it is part of the mother country.” In essence, the Bolivian national anthem identified them as Bolivians, and at the same time, it helped to differentiate them from other Latin Americans.

In terms of regional integration, in the case of the European Union, all member states still retain their individual national anthems while a wider European anthem was also created, as to help foster a European identity (Shore 2000). So, results of this analysis portray a similar popular sentiment against sacrificing one’s national anthem for a supranational one (Shore 2000).

**Opinions on Regional Integration**

To better understand how much knowledge Bolivians have on the current regional integration organizations, several questions on the survey aimed at gauging this level of awareness. The first asked about whether the participants wanted further cooperation
with neighboring countries and in what areas (such as infrastructure, health, education, higher education, technology transfer, energy, communications, transportation, etc.). The second question asked if the participants were aware of any regional integration efforts currently in South America. Participants were asked to name any efforts they were aware of. This was an open-ended question. The third asked if the participant is in favor of an arrangement like that of the European Union, with open borders between member states and the free flow of people, money, and products across neighboring countries’ borders.

| Opinions on Regional Integration, Cooperation, totals |
|----------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|
| For Cooperation | Awareness of Reg. Int. Efforts | For EU setup |
| Yes             | 98.7% (76)      | 26.0% (20)    | 67.5% (52)     |
| No              | 1.3% (1)        | 74.0% (57)    | 32.5% (25)     |

Survey sample n = 77

Awareness of regional integration efforts in Table 9 above shows that nearly every participant (98.7%) responded in favor of increased cooperation with the neighboring countries. Common areas of increased cooperation noted by these participants were primarily in health (building of hospitals) and education, especially in higher education. One respondent noted, “Cooperation could help the enormous problem in Latin America of abject poverty.” Another participant stated, “It would be great if cooperation led to the construction of schools for children with few resources, because many are illiterate in Bolivia.”

Additionally, many of the survey respondents cited technology and free trade as areas they would like to see further cooperation with other South American countries. Two areas noted by the majority of participants were transportation and infrastructure,
two key components of any regional integration effort. One interesting comment on increased cooperation was that “it may help to overcome the regionalisms and nationalisms that plague this continent.” Other respondents noted specific countries, such as Peru and Chile, former adversaries of Bolivia, to further promote cooperation.

Although such a high percentage of survey respondents are in favor of more state to state cooperation, only 26% of survey respondents are aware of any regional integration currently at play in South America. Of the 26% that are aware of one of the regional organizations, the most commonly cited example is the Andean Community, followed by the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), then the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, and then the Union of South American Nations. 74% of the survey respondents have no knowledge of any current continental integration efforts. This suggests that the general public is not aware of the movement to integrate the continent. It also suggests the need for education programs on this subject.

One limitation to the survey instrument was that participants had all open-ended questions. Although most citizens are probably aware of localized projects tied to these supranational organizations, in this particular question, it would have been more beneficial to list the current regional integration efforts and have them check mark or rank the ones with which they are familiar rather than have to come up with the names of these efforts currently at play.

A majority (67.5%) of survey respondents are in favor of establishing an arrangement like that of the European Union, with the free flow of money, goods, and people. To a certain degree, this is already happening in parts of South America. Bolivians (and other South Americans) can enter into their state’s neighboring countries
with only their national identification cards, not a passport. To go to a non-neighboring
country, a passport is required. Furthermore, as Bolivia is a member of the Andean
Community and an associate member of Mercosur, Bolivia already has preferential
trading agreements with the majority of its neighbors, meaning that there is movement
towards a borderless system to a certain degree, at least in terms of commodities and
passport control. One respondent noted that, “this process will happen, just like in
Europe, but possibly even more so here as there is less cultural difference between one
country and the others.” Conversely, another respondent noted that, “It worked in Europe
because the people are educated. Something bad could happen, for the lack of education,
order, and self-discipline, this process will not work here because people do not respect
others’ rights and territories.”

This information suggests that most survey respondents think cooperating and
integrating economically and politically with other South American countries is a good
idea. However, nearly three quarters of the survey respondents are not aware that Bolivia
is already in the process of further cooperation and integration with other South and Latin
American countries, in UNASUR, ALBA, Mercosur, the Andean Community and soon
with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Perhaps this may be
explained by the lack of transportation or infrastructure connecting many of these
countries. Maybe this may be explained by a lack of a public relations campaign by these
regional organizations or education campaigns within Bolivia. Furthermore, as many
Bolivians still live in poverty and many still do not possess the skills of reading and
writing, perhaps this may be explained by the fact that some Bolivians have no access to
news media or technology. Additionally, as stated previously, regional integration and
national identity are concepts that are political and economic in nature, and may be concepts that the majority of the population are not aware of or have never been educated about.

Alcántara Sáez (2000) suggests that the elite of South America, or people in business and politics, perceive regional integration favorably. Seligson’s (1999) investigation of over 18,000 opinions on regional integration suggests that, in general, Latin Americans hold a positive view of increased regional integration based on the European model. Seligson (1999, 138) notes, “Overall, then, policy makers in South America who wish to press for regional economic integration can be confident that in every country majorities of those holding an opinion would support it and in most countries only less than a fifth of the population opposes economic integration.” In his analysis, Bolivians were at odds, with 72.3% for, 17.5% against, and 10.2% with no opinion (Seligson 1999, 138).

This current investigation of Bolivians’ sentiments on integration, although much smaller in sample size, shows that 67.5% of the population is for, while 32.5% of the survey population is against the idea of regional integration in South America. Seligson’s analysis is based on 1996 data, whereas the data used in this study is from 2009. This discrepancy may suggest that fewer Bolivians now, than in 1996, are in favor of increased integration in South America.
Regional Comparison

Table 10. Comparison of kollas’ (highlanders) and kambas’ (lowlanders) awareness of integration efforts & opinions on increased regional integration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinions on Regional Integration, Cooperation, by region</th>
<th>Awareness of Reg. Int. Efforts</th>
<th>For EU setup</th>
<th>Against EU setup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kambas</td>
<td>22.1% (17)</td>
<td>7.8% (6)</td>
<td>19.4% (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kollas</td>
<td>76.6% (59)</td>
<td>18.2% (14)</td>
<td>48.1% (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.3% (1)</td>
<td>74.0% (57)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey sample n = 77

More highlanders (kollas) were for increased regional cooperation than were the lowlanders (kambas). In this sample, kollas in general are more aware of regional integration efforts than are the kambas but this may be explained by the fact that more kollas were surveyed than kambas, as six out of the seven cities visited during the summer of 2009 were in the highlands. The only city visited in the lowlands was Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Furthermore, 74% of participants who had no knowledge of any regional integration efforts which show that either the survey instrument was flawed with open-ended questions on this particular question, or that citizens generally have no knowledge of these supranational efforts taking place, even though they are more aware of the local projects associated with these larger efforts.

Overall Opinions on Regional Integration

Table 11. Overall Opinions on Regional Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinions on Regional Integration</th>
<th>Mixed Feelings</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>81% (63)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16% (12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey sample n = 77

Out of the total survey population, 81% had mixed feelings on surrendering elements of identity and sovereignty, meaning that they were willing to sacrifice some, but not all elements of national sovereignty and identity. Only 3% or two out of 77
respondents were for sacrificing all these elements. Twelve out of 77, or 16% of respondents were against sacrificing any elements of national identity and sovereignty to a larger supranational entity.

One way to interpret this data is to look at Bolivia’s history to help understand the current sentiments on national sovereignty and Bolivians’ sense of identity. The country has experienced over 100 revolutions since its independence from Spain in 1809 (Armstrong 2007). Like Colombia, in recent years Bolivia has been at the forefront of the American sponsored war on drugs. This has led to foreign intervention in Bolivian political and economic affairs, producing unintended social problems. Miller notes “the socially disruptive effects of organized crime, primarily relating to drugs trafficking, and the state’s compromised attempts to control it, mean that many Latin Americans, particularly the poorest, live in the midst of what is effectively a state of war” (Miller 2006, 210). Foreign demand for coca-derived products has led to foreign involvement on Bolivia territory. Miller (2006, 210) argues, “all of these factors meant that the sovereignty of Latin American nation-states was often highly compromised.”

Furthermore, on the domestic front, Bolivia in the last decade has also somewhat faced the issues of ethnicity, inclusion in state and society, and a cohesive national identity. Having finally gained agency in its own path of development, Bolivia in recent years is trying to re-assert its sovereignty. This re-assertion of Bolivian national sovereignty can be seen in various actions, such as the nationalizing of the gas and oil industries, along with the airline and train companies. This can also be seen in Bolivia re-asserting territorial sovereignty by removing the United States Ambassador (Chávez
2008), and rejecting the use of Bolivian soil for foreign military operations (as was established in the 2009 Constitution), etc. (Gobierno Boliviano 2009).

As a result of the long history of “compromised sovereignty” in Bolivia, it is understandable that 16% of the survey population was completely against sacrificing any elements of national sovereignty and identity to any larger entity (Miller 2006, 210). It is also understandable that the majority (81%) of the survey population has mixed feelings about sacrificing some and/or any of these elements of national sovereignty and identity. One respondent questioned “why would Bolivia give up any element of its national sovereignty, especially after it just gained back a large portion of its territorial sovereignty from foreign companies and governments?” The only answer provided by the respondent was that Bolivia would continue to gain sovereignty before it would sacrifice or surrender any further elements of its national sovereignty.

**Content Analysis Results**

Using the methods described in the previous chapter, a content analysis was conducted on the various symbols of national, local, supranational and hybrid identities observed throughout the Bolivian landscape. In addition to how Bolivians self identified in the surveys and interviews, the content analysis of symbols throughout the country helps to provide a better understanding of what symbols Bolivians experience the most. Referring back to the historical overview chapter, symbols and visual representations are often used by states (and other entities such as organizations and companies) to create a sense of belonging (Smith 1991, Guibernau 1996).

The content analysis does have skewed results, in part because of the fact that the author did not travel to certain departments of the country, only traveled to select cities,
and within those select cities, only traveled to certain parts of the cities. Therefore, the content analysis results are skewed geographically, as they did not include any photos or field notes from cities in Pando, Beni or Tarija departments. Additionally, the results of this content analysis may be skewed as there were limitations of what was noticed and documented, and what was not observed within each of the cities visited.

Given that the results may be skewed, symbols of national identity dominated the landscape throughout the country, although this was more pronounced in the altiplano and valley cities (La Paz, Cochabamba, Sucre, Potosí, Uyuni, Oruro) than it was in the eastern lowland city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. This may be explained by the fact that the eastern lowlands (media luna) are striving to obtain autonomous agreements with La Paz.

Table 12. Percentages of symbols observed throughout the Bolivian landscape

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content Analysis Results</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Hybrid (2+)</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Supranational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41.6% (114)</td>
<td>35.8% (98)</td>
<td>20.4% (56)</td>
<td>2.2% (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In total, 274 photos were reviewed and categorized depending on which level (local, national, supranational, or hybrid) of identity dominated. Of the four categories, symbols of national identity dominated the Bolivian landscape- in urban, rural and peri-urban areas, in the barren and inhospitable altiplano and even (to a lesser degree) in the eastern lowlands. Of the 274 photos reviewed in this content analysis, 114 contained elements of national identity.

**National Identity**

Symbols of national identity are created to help tie the state and nation together and to make citizens feel that they are a part of the larger nation (Smith 1991). The Bolivian state has long struggled with legitimacy among the population. As Guibernau
notes, in illegitimate states, national symbols must be sustained over time to continually invoke the feelings of belonging and to gain legitimacy. An example of this continuous showing of the state’s symbols was the adoption of the Wiphala (see Figure 11) as another national flag through the 2009 Constitution (Gobierno Boliviano 2009). As Mach (1993, 106) notes, “Radical change in a political system, like revolution, generally brings changes in the symbolic system of a state which consists…in the introduction of those symbols which represent the new ideology and the new political group which took over.” In the Bolivian case, the Wiphala is that symbol- showing the indigenous backgrounds, still intact and not blending with one another. Mach further adds, “Old symbols are often revived in new contexts and meanings. The idea behind such symbolic manipulation is to identify the new state with the nation, or at least, with those segments and social forces of the nation whose support is sufficiently important to the new ruling elite” (1993, 106). The Wiphala has historical meaning for many of the indigenous groups of Bolivia. Evo Morales and the M.A.S have effectively recreated the Wiphala to solidify support from the majority of the population, a group that before rarely identified with the Bolivian national flag. Now, a common symbol to them is also a national flag representing Bolivia. This has been effective in rallying people around a new Bolivian national identity, one based proudly not only on the criollo past, but also the indigenous past.

Furthermore, symbols of national identity were commonplace, especially in the two capitals, La Paz and Sucre. In nearly every placed visited (with the exception of Santa Cruz de la Sierra), national flags, shields, historic figures and statues, plaques, plazas, government buildings (see Figure 19), catholic churches, murals depicting the
Bolivian national revolution, the national tin mining industry and their role within the Revolution, graffiti in support of Bolivian sovereignty and independence, and police and military officers were visible in every place visited.

Figure 19. Government Buildings, Plaza Murillo, La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009)

Even in the high, inhospitable *altiplano* between Uyuni and Potosí, symbols of national identity were present in the landscape (see Figure 20).
Table 13. Content Analysis Results: Categories of symbols of national identity throughout the Bolivian landscape (n =114).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Symbols</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivian government</td>
<td>40.4% (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivian flags</td>
<td>29.8% (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evo and MAS</td>
<td>14.0% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graffiti</td>
<td>8.8% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Churches</td>
<td>7.0% (8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the five categories that the national symbols were divided into, the Bolivian government was the most prominent, making up 40.4% of the national symbols observed. Representatives, symbols, and buildings of the government were prominent landmarks across Bolivia. Secondly, Bolivian flags comprised 29.8% of the national symbols observed throughout the landscape.
Opinions regarding Evo Morales (see Figure 21) made up 14%, while graffiti and murals (of the National Revolution, the War of Independence, the Tin Crisis, etc.) made up 8.8% of the total national symbols viewed.

![Graffiti about Evo Morales, “Evo – damn highlander” shows kolla vs. kamba divide, Santa Cruz, Bolivia. (Stiller Titchener 2009)](image)

The Catholic Church was the least prominent in this category, making up only 7% of the total number of national symbols analyzed in this section, the majority of which were found in Potosí. Armstrong (2007, 259) notes that over 80 churches were built in the aftermath of the silver mining of Potosí of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But for the Spanish, as Armstrong notes, Bolivia was the source of great riches, not for religious conversion. Perhaps this factors into why so few Catholic Churches were observed.

**Hybrid Identities**

Hybrid or multiple identities were observed throughout the Bolivian landscape and were visible in 98 out of the 274 photographs analyzed in this content analysis. This represented 35.8% of the photos, the second highest category. These 98 photos contained
images in which more than one level of identity was observed or one level of identity was embedded within one of the others. This hybridity or use of multiple levels of identity was seen in graffiti, murals and most commonly in local (43 photos) and national (49 photos) levels of identity. With a total of fifteen images, the grouping of paintings, murals, and graffiti of national symbols were especially embedded with other messages, integrating more than just the national level of identity with local as well as supranational identities. Half of the photos (6 out of 12) containing supranational symbols of identity also contained national or local symbols.

The reasoning behind such a high number of hybrid or multiple levels of identity present throughout these photographs is first, because levels of identity are not easy to categorize into neat groupings. Identities are not neatly defined into groups and certainly, images or symbols representing such identities are neither easily categorized into four nominal groups. Identities overlap, as do the symbols that represent identities. Again, Figure 17 is a wonderful example of hybrid identities. The graffiti, in the words, shows Latin American pride. However, the picture of this graffiti portrays Bolivian miners, a historic symbol of the Bolivian people, and a symbol of national identity. Figure 23 is another example of this, as the language of the graffiti is in Aymara, an indigenous language, and much of the subject of the graffiti places emphasis on local movements and traditions. Still, the graffiti shows a symbol of Bolivia- the miners- seen in the middle of the graffiti.

Second, because of the recent changes in Bolivian state and society, as mentioned previously, Bolivian notions of identity are changing, and in that process, Bolivians are using new found symbols such as the Wiphala, mentioned above, as well as using old
symbols such as the national and municipal flags. Figure 26 also shows multiple levels of identity next to one another with the Bolivian flag next to the Uyuni and Potosí flags (See also Figure 28).

**Local Identity**

Out of the 274 photos taken and analyzed, 56 were found to contain elements of local identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Symbols</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous practices</td>
<td>46.4% (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graffiti</td>
<td>17.9% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local flags</td>
<td>17.9% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous symbols</td>
<td>10.7% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous architecture</td>
<td>7.1% (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Local symbols were also notable throughout the country. Indigenous practices, including indigenous dress and costumes, decorations, agricultural practices, markets practices with women selling weavings and food stuff made up 46.4% of the total local symbols viewed (See Figure 22).

*Figure 22. Market in Oruro, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009).*
Local graffiti (in indigenous languages- see Figure 23) and murals depicting local customs comprised 17.9% of the local symbols observed, most common in Oruro and Potosí, and to a lesser extent in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Sucre.

![Figure 23. Local graffiti, Oruro, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009)](image)

Symbols of indigenous art were observed in La Paz (see Figure 24) and Oruro, but to a lesser extent in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Sucre, Uyuni, and Potosí.

![Figure 24. Indigenous art in La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009)](image)
The *kolla/kamba* divide was also prevalent throughout the big cities in the *altiplano* and valley cities as well as in Santa Cruz in the East in graffiti, in local decorations, and in costumes in the many parades observed while in country (see Figure 25).

**Figure 25.** *Kolla* pride, *La Entrada Universitaria*, La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009)

In nearly every city visited, a municipal flag was seen flying next to the Bolivian national flag (see Figure 26). Local flags made up 17.9% of the local symbols observed throughout the landscape.
Uyuni and Santa Cruz (see Figure 27) boasted more local pride than other cities such as Oruro and Potosí, two former economic powerhouses of Bolivia (Armstrong 2007).

**Figure 26.** Local Uyuni flag next to Bolivian flag, Uyuni, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009).

**Figure 27.** Top: “Always Free Cruceños We Will Be,” flag reads “Our Anthem is Sacred,” Santa Cruz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009).
In both La Paz and Sucre, local symbols were not as visible as the national symbols of identity. Also, as 2009 was the Bicentennial for Bolivia’s independence from Spain, symbols of national identity might have been exaggerated in an effort to celebrate this two hundred years anniversary (see Figure 28).

![Figure 28](image)

**Figure 28.** From right: Local La Paz flag with Bolivian national flag and Bicentennial Banner, La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009)

Indigenous architecture made up only a small portion (7.1%) of the local identity symbols, and was only visible in the province of Potosí (see Figure 5). This can be explained in part by the fact that the author did not travel to many rural locations, where perhaps this type of architecture may be more visible.

**Supranational Identity**

**Table 15.** Content Analysis Results: Categories of symbols of supranational identity throughout the Bolivian landscape (n =6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supranational Symbols</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statues</td>
<td>50.0% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graffiti</td>
<td>16.6% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>33.4% (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the 274 photos and field notes reviewed in this content analysis, only 12 showed supranational identity or messages, but six also contained other levels of identity, making only 6 photos out of the 274 show only supranational identity. In total, only 2.2% of all the photos and detailed field notes portrayed symbols of supranational identity. Statues of Símon Bolívar, the founder of the independence movement for the entire region, were the most common symbols of South or Latin American identity. As the founder of the Bolivian state and as the revolutionary leader of the Andean region, statues of Bolivar are commonplace throughout the region.

Murals depicting Latin American pride were common in the altiplano cities of Uyuni and Potosí (see Figure 17), but were not observed in any other places in Bolivia. Last, regional integration organizations were only visible in select cities, such as Cochabamba, where these organizations’ institutions are located.

Overall, the lesson learned throughout this content analysis is that identities overlap and are often embedded within other identities. Symbols representing those identities also overlap which was found to be common in Bolivia. As mentioned previously, after recounting the photos to determine which contained multiple levels of identities, a total of 98 out of 274 showed this integration of various levels of identity, representing nearly 36% of the photo analyzed.

Scope, Limitations, and Suggestions

The scope of this analysis was quite large, studying regional integration across a continent, while the size of my sample within one country in the entire continent was quite small (only 77 responses). A random sample was not conducted equally across the entire Bolivian territory. Therefore, the data of this analysis does contain a geographic
bias, as certain departments, such as La Paz, Cochabamba, or Potosí are well-represented while others, such as Beni, Pando, Tarija, and Santa Cruz are underrepresented.

Additionally, this data set contains an urban bias, as the author visited no villages and few rural areas. This study also contains a gender bias, as far fewer women were surveyed than men. Consequently, the results of this analysis do possess their limitations and results should be interpreted with caution. However, these results are representative of this sample and shed some light on the complexity of identity in Bolivia. More time in the field in Bolivia in each location as well as in more rural areas around the country may have produced different results. Less than ten weeks in this complex country was not nearly enough.

In the content analysis section of this investigation, there were limitations to the author’s definitions of each level of identity (local, national, supranational, and hybrid). Additionally, this part of the analysis was limited as grouping photos of complex landscapes, with overlapping scales of identity in each into neat categories, proved a difficult task. The content analysis does have skewed results, in part because of the fact that the author did not travel to certain departments of the country, only traveled to select cities, and within those select cities, only traveled to certain parts of those cities.

Furthermore, there were also limitations of what was noticed and documented, and what was not observed within each of the cities visited.

The suggestions for a further survey of Bolivians’ opinions on regional integration in South America would include changing the wording, the language, and the form of the questions on the survey instrument. Instead of all open-ended questions, providing some questions with examples already given may be more helpful, including
some binary (yes/no) questions, checking all that apply questions, as well as ranking questions may have provided much more discernible results. An important question missing from the survey instrument was education level. Education level and urban exposure are two of the leading factors in determining political attitudes. Certainly, education level would have provided important results in this study.

Furthermore, this survey instrument only aimed at gauging the larger (or supranational level) regional integration efforts- meaning institutions, meetings, regional goals, etc. Another limitation of the survey instrument is that it did not allow participants to differentiate between local level regional integration efforts that have grown out of these larger efforts, such as, for example, *fronteras libres.*

I would also conduct survey testing by including various locals’ reactions into the survey instrument, as to attain the exact translation necessary to extract this information, before starting this project again. Another important lesson learned during this process is to ask for locals’ help. My Spanish is from Spain- a long way from Bolivia, where the colloquialisms, slang, dialect, etc. is quite different. Also, the survey instrument contained much academic writing in it, which was confusing for some participants. A basic knowledge of Aymara and Quechua, and translations of the survey instrument into these languages would prove immensely helpful as well. Additionally, I would ask more people more questions about why they answered the surveys in the ways that they did (i.e.- why did they feel an attachment to one identity over the others?). Through this process, I learned a great deal about cross cultural dealings while in Bolivia, including how to approach people, how to find contacts, what contacts expect, what participants
expect, etc. I learned how to diplomatically approach people and show them what I had to offer while not appearing like I wanted to only extract information from them.

There were many lessons learned during this process, one of which was to have many backup plans. When doing work abroad, and especially in Latin America, politics and events on the ground can change very quickly while everyday happenings in Latin America move very slowly- so being prepared, flexible, and patient were important lessons learned during my two trips to South America. My limited survey instrument and my shyness proved to be two challenges that showed a need to take more qualitative classes, as to be more comfortable surveying and interviewing people.

Funding a trip abroad for research was another important lesson learned during this process and one that showed the integral need for grant writing, proposals, and money for research. I also learned of the importance of research ethics in this process and dealing with the Institutional Review Board.

Lastly, I learned that a project like this has the ability to take on a life of its own. The scope of this study was huge, but for my first international research project and with limited funding, I was only able to take on this idea in Bolivia, and even there with limited success. With these experiences and insight, this study may likely lead to a bigger project in the future.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The objective of this investigation has been to understand the opinions of Bolivian citizens who have lived through, arguably, one of the most dynamic periods of Bolivian history, the past fifteen years. At the same time, regional integration organizations have been established in recent years, while others have re-organized in an effort to tie the South American continent together economically and politically. The survey respondents of this study have provided insightful opinions from a grassroots perspective on regional integration in South America. Furthermore, their opinions have given insight as to what has most influenced Bolivian national identity in recent years—changes at the national level or increased regional integration efforts.

To promote solidarity or to access more markets, driven by national or regional interests, for many reasons both economic and political, Latin Americans are attempting to fully integrate the region. Victor Raul Haya de la Torre once said, “Latin America is the Patria grande (Great Fatherland) of which each of its component states is an inseparable and interdependent part” (quoted in Whitaker and Jordan 1966, 161). Historically, this may have been and still is the dominant thought in Latin American debates. Yet, until the challenges, tensions, and issues at the national level are fully resolved, regional integration efforts in the area will continue to stagnate.
Long a divided country and lacking a cohesive national identity, this analysis reveals interesting results about Bolivia, as the majority of respondents now identify in terms of national identity, as Bolivians. One way to interpret these results is to think about all the national changes that have occurred in Bolivia since 1996, the year from which data was used in Seligson’s analysis.

To give a brief overview of these national changes, in 1993, President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada took office, implementing neoliberal reforms (Shroeder 2007). In 1997, Hugo Banzer assumed the presidency and in 1998, implemented forced coca eradication programs with “Plan Dignity” (Morales 2009, 585). This provoked coca growers unions and worker-peasant unions to set up roadblocks and carry out strikes.

In 2000, Bechtel Corporation privatized water in the Cochabamba valley, which provoked the “Water War” protests (Morales 2009, 586). Following the incident, martial law was imposed in that city for two months (Morales 2009). That same year, peasants blocked the road from El Alto to La Paz for a month, essentially isolating the capital La Paz from the rest of the country.

In 2001, President Jorge Quiroga assumed office, canceled the Bechtel contract, and continued to promote neoliberal policies in other areas of the economy (Morales 2009). In 2002, the Bolivian Congress kicked out the leader of the largest coca growers union in Bolivia, Evo Morales, which further solidified support for him and his party, Movimiento al Socialismo (Morales 2009).

In 2002, Sánchez de Lozada again assumed the presidency and attempted to further privatize national assets. In 2003, a “gas war” over privatization of Bolivia’s
natural gas reserves provoked massive protests and forced Sánchez de Lozada to flee Bolivia and take up exile in the United States (Morales 2009, 586).

Carlos Mesa took office as interim President in 2003. By 2004, Mesa already encountered trouble, after he held a referendum on the gas reserves where “80 percent of voters approved the proposed Hydrocarbon Law” (Morales 2009, 586). Mesa however, did not sign the measure into law and subsequent protests forced him to call for new elections in 2005.

In the elections of 2005, Evo Morales won the presidency with a majority vote (Vanden and Prevost 2009). One of the first measures this administration sought to accomplish was the “renationalization” of Bolivia’s hydrocarbons and energy minerals (Morales 2009, 586). However good his intentions were, Evo Morales has been unable to please everyone. The eastern lowlands, the area most affected by the renationalization of Bolivia’s oil and gas industries, have experienced the majority of the loss of foreign direct investment. Ever since, the eastern lowlands (known as the media luna, or half moon) have proposed and fought for regional autonomy agreements from La Paz.

Furthermore, Morales’ call for a new Bolivian constitution provoked bloody protests in Sucre in 2007 (Morales 2009). The new constitution was voted on and accepted by the majority of the Bolivian population in January 2009 (Gobierno Boliviano 2009). Although there have been some upsets and many issues remain, voters overwhelmingly supported Evo Morales in another landslide victory in December 2009 (El País 2009).

In short, in the past fifteen years, Bolivia has experienced a lot in terms of political, economic, and social change. Bolivia has had six Presidents in fifteen years.
The country has experienced the effects of the U.S. sponsored eradication programs and neoliberal policies, which cut state spending on domestic needs such as welfare and education (Shroeder 2007). As a result of these policies, Bolivians have carried out many protests in the past fifteen years and have experienced three “wars”- first the war on drugs, second the water war of 2000, and third the gas war of 2003 (Morales 2009, 585-586).

Because of the scale of protests in the past decade, Bolivia has become the focus of the international community as a leader against globalization and neoliberal policies, and for indigenous rights (Shroeder 2007, Vanden 2004). All of these factors have certainly provoked changes in Bolivian state and society. With these changes, questions about ethnicity, identity, and inclusion in society have come to the forefront of Bolivian state and society. This may explain why Bolivians now are less in favor of increased regional integration than in Seligson’s (1999) article based on 1996 data.

Although no exact reason is discernable from the present data, it is clear that national events have been at the forefront of Bolivian society for the past decade. Although Bolivia has progressed in overcoming some of the real challenges in the nation and state building process in recent years, other challenges still remain. Four tensions remain that have yet to be resolved. First, is the large tension between ethnic identity (or identities) and a unifying national identity. Albo (2008, 30) states that this cleavage is the “oldest and most enduring conditioning factor affecting both politics and social formation in Bolivia.” He further adds “neither biological mestizaje during the colonial period, nor the subsequent period of cultural mestizaje has managed to replace it” (Albo
This tension of national vs. ethnic identity is one that has yet to be resolved, but is currently at the forefront of Bolivian politics.

The second tension Albo (2008) identifies is that between ethnicity and class as identity, something that in Bolivia has historically been intricately tied together. The cooperation between the worker-peasant unions and the coca growers unions after “Plan Dignity” was implemented in 1998 shows how these two groups, as well as class and ethnic identities, are still tied together in Bolivia (Morales 2009, 585). The third tension Albo (2008) notes is the urban-rural tension, although this has become much more complex by the mass migration to urban areas, as discussed previously.

The fourth tension Albo (2008) notes is the regionalism between the highland *kollas* and lowland *kambas*. Albo calls this tension currently the most divisive, stating “in its current form, this dualism has taken on a new aspect which according to some, could break asunder the viability of Bolivia as a country” (2008, 33). This tension is based on the important role that local and regionalized identities have historically played in Bolivia. Lacking a cohesive national identity and even a common language until the mid 1970s, Bolivians historically identified in terms of their ethnic or sub-national identities.

This last tension is based on long standing divisions: “the ecological, cultural, socioeconomic, and political differences between the Andean macro region and the lowlands goes back to pre-colonial times and have persisted with only minor changes” (Albo 2008, 33). With such historical legacies, this strain currently presents the biggest obstacle in Bolivian national cohesion. This tension was visible in the landscape, as all cities except Santa Cruz de la Sierra boasted many symbols of national identity.
Conversely, the few symbols of national identity in Santa Cruz were government buildings and churches, with only a few flags, decorations, etc. supporting the Bolivian state. In Santa Cruz, local, autonomous based identity was the only symbol highly visible in graffiti, in posters, murals, and in local flags.

As previously stated, the issue of ethnicity, long a sore spot in Bolivian state and society, has recently been acknowledged and somewhat dealt with. This tension between the eastern lowlanders (kambas) and the western highlanders (kollas), however, is still festering. These tensions are the real challenges the Bolivian state must face to become a stable state and a cohesive nation. It is a great step for Bolivia to have its first majority winning, indigenous President. As Albo states, however, “we continue to confront problems and issues which have long historical roots” (2008, 34). Historical cleavages are difficult to reverse with only a break with the past, as was the election of Evo Morales in 2005. This remains the true challenge that Bolivia must face to overcome in its long list of political, social, and economic differences among its population and in the Bolivian attempt to create and sustain a cohesive national identity.

Only a few decades ago, Bolivia lacked a common language spoken by the majority of the population, and most Bolivians identified themselves in terms of local or ethnic identities. Bolivians today view the past fifteen years as a continuation of the ideals of the 1952 Bolivian National Revolution, as fulfilling some of the promises of a legitimate state with an inclusive national identity, shared by all Bolivians. Changes in the Bolivian political structure, along with foreign involvement in Bolivian affairs greatly changed the political atmosphere in the late 1990s and early 2000s, paving the way for
the entrance of new political actors. However, Bolivia only recently gained full control over its own territory, assets, and affairs.

Through the use of mostly qualitative methods, including open-ended surveys and a content analysis of visuals observed throughout the Bolivia landscape, this study sought to understand first the awareness of Bolivians of regional integration efforts taking place in South America. Second, this study sought to understand whether Bolivian citizens were willing to surrender any elements of national sovereignty and identity to this supranational cause. Third, this study sought to understand what level of identity Bolivians experience most in the landscape.

The final results of the surveys were that the majority of Bolivians thought further cooperation and increased integration were good for Bolivia. Bolivians today hold a favorable view of regional integration in South America. However, the majority of the respondents had no knowledge of any specific regional integration efforts currently at play in South America. The vast majority of the survey respondents have mixed feelings on sacrificing or surrendering any elements of national sovereignty in exchange for membership in one of the regional organizations. Bolivians were more willing to give up passport control than any other element questioned in this investigation in part because the free flow of people across South American borders is already occurring to a certain degree. The importance of these findings is that it shows that Bolivians are at least willing to make concessions in the integration process, even if they are unaware of specific regional integration efforts in their area. This is an important first step towards integrating the South American continent.
The final results of the content analysis on visuals observed throughout the Bolivian landscape were that more national symbols were noted than hybrid, local or supranational symbols. This may suggest that Bolivians are experiencing a reinforcement of Bolivian national identity through the symbols they see most often. However, identities do overlap and symbols representing those identities were multiple and often overlapping in the photographs analyzed in the content analysis. In fact, 98 out of the 274 photos analyzed in this section contained overlapping levels of identities, suggesting that the Bolivian notions of identity may be more complex than just local, national, and supranational identities.

As mentioned previously, identities may have been influenced by the events of the past decade, including the Water War and Gas Wars of the early 2000s, the subsequent protests, the rise of the first indigenous President of Bolivia, and the implementation of a new Constitution in 2009. As complex and fragmented as Bolivia has historically been, it may take a longer time for a real cohesive national identity to develop. Perhaps the results of this content analysis (showing the majority of symbols observed throughout the landscape as national) suggest that Bolivians are working towards creating an inclusive Bolivian identity, common to all Bolivians. It is clear through the results of this analysis that the complex notion of identity, seen throughout Bolivian history, remains true to this day in Bolivia.

In conclusion, by using a cultural and political ecology framework, this study sought to investigate and analyze current South American regional integration efforts and affects of these efforts on Bolivians’ sense of national identity. Previous studies, such as Seligson (1999) and Alcántara Sáez (2000), were often limited in their analyses and
explanations of South American integration because they lacked a framework that allows for multi-scalar analysis, the study of transnational networks, as well as a focus on identities in these processes. As mentioned previously, both Seligson (1999) and Alcántara Sáez (2000) address Latin American sentiments about increased regional integration, yet neither scholar seeks to explain how increased regional integration in the region is affecting identities (civic, national, collective, etc.), and what consequences this will have on the individual nation-states and the larger regional integration efforts currently at play in the region. Seligson acknowledges that even his study does not devote enough attention to the notion of national identity in the integration process. He states, “nationalism in Latin America has frequently been underestimated because of the relative infrequency of international wars in the region during the present century. Perhaps nationalism will fade along with the militarism and dictatorship of the past, [but] the present data set does not allow the exploration of that probability” (Seligson 1999, 150). Seligson’s statement further acknowledges the need for more research on this complex relationship between increased regional integration and changes in allegiances and identities.

Additionally, by using a cultural and political ecology framework, this investigation sought to reveal the complexity of the integration process and the peoples involved. People simultaneously hold varying and differing levels of allegiances and identities, tied to the nation, the state, gender, occupation, family, neighborhood, province, etc. And as mentioned above, identities are not static over time. Considering the recent changes in Bolivia, the subsequent transformations in Bolivians’ notions of national identity, and Bolivia’s role in the ongoing process of South American regional
integration, this study sought to shed light on the complex relationship between the obstacles Bolivia faces in the integration process and the changes these might provoke in identities in Bolivia. Furthermore, this study has emphasized the need for further study, using a cultural and political ecology framework, on the relationship between national identities and regional integration efforts, especially within the Latin American context.

Finally, my suggestions for policymakers within this region are that identities in Bolivia are complex, multiple, and overlapping. Increased regional integration, and the surrender of certain elements of national identity and sovereignty, may have implications on these already complex notions of Bolivian identity. Policy makers in South America and within Bolivia need to be aware of this.

Assumed by the author throughout this investigation is the fact that regional integration is seen as desirable and needed for the South American countries to develop politically stable and economically sound structures in the future. It is also assumed that regional integration will provide desired results for all the citizens involved. These assumptions, however, are not necessarily true, and each country thinking about further integration must balance the advantages and disadvantages seen in such an arrangement. If this process is seen as valuable and worthwhile, then citizens may understand why there is a need to surrender certain elements of national identity and sovereignty to a larger entity. If this process is not seen as needed, then citizens may not be willing to cede these elements. This all depends on the relationship between the state and the people living within that state and the level of trust between the two.

In Bolivia, a state that has traditionally lacked popular legitimacy, there is a great need to promote a public awareness and education campaign about this idea and the
benefits to be obtained and the disadvantages to be experienced in the integration process. Although this investigation shows that the majority of Bolivians surveyed were willing to make concessions in this integration process, the lack of education on these issues to the general public is a major obstacle in the future promotion of these efforts.
REFERENCES

Books and Articles


Stiller Titchener, Kelly. 2009. Travel Photos. La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Sucre, Potosí, Uyuni, and Oruro, Bolivia.


APPENDICES

Appendix A: Institutional Review Board Approval Letter

Oklahoma State University Institutional Review Board

Date: Wednesday, May 07, 2008
IRB Application No: AS0833
Proposal Title: The Viability of South American Regional Integration

Reviewed and Processed as: Exempt

Status Recommended by Reviewer(s): Approved

Principal Investigator(s):
Kelly Still* Reuel Hankes
5978 East 20th St. 211 Scott Hall
Tulsa, OK 74114 Stillwater, OK 74078

The IRB application referenced above has been approved. It is the judgment of the reviewers that the rights and welfare of individuals who may be asked to participate in this study will be respected, and that the research will be conducted in a manner consistent with the IRB requirements as outlined in section 45 CFR 46.

The final versions of any printed recruitment, consent and assent documents bearing the IRB approval stamp are attached to this letter. These are the versions that must be used during the study.

As Principal Investigator, it is your responsibility to do the following:

1. Conduct this study exactly as it has been approved. Any modifications to the research protocol must be submitted with the appropriate signatures for IRB approval.
2. Submit a request for continuation if the study extends beyond the approval period of one calendar year. This continuation must receive IRB review and approval before the research can continue.
3. Report any adverse events to the IRB Chair promptly. Adverse events are those which are unanticipated and impact the subjects during the course of this research.
4. Notify the IRB office in writing when your research project is complete.

Please note that approved protocols are subject to monitoring by the IRB and that the IRB office has the authority to inspect research records associated with this protocol at any time. If you have questions about the IRB procedures or need any assistance from the Board, please contact Beth McTernan in 219 Gordell North (phone: 405-744-5700, beth.mcternan@okstate.edu).

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Shelia Kennison, Chair
Institutional Review Board
Appendix B: English language survey

Investigation Questions:

*The Viability of South American Regional Integration: Bolivian National Identity in the Integration Process.*

1. What is your gender? _________ Female _________ Male

2. How old are you? ________________

3. Are you a Bolivian citizen? Yes _______
   No _______ (Where are you from?) ________________

4. Do you have any ethnic affiliation(s)? ____________________________
   ___________________________________________

5. Where is your family’s hometown? ________________________________________

6. What is your level of income? _________ Wealthy _________ Middle Class
   ____________ Poor _______ No income.

7. What language(s) do you speak in your home? ________________________________
   ___________________________________________

8. What religion(s) do you practice? ________________________________________
   ___________________________________________

9. What are your parents’ employment? ________________________________________

10. What is your employment? ______________________________________________

11. How would you describe yourself? Which level is most important to you?
    ____________ Bolivian ____________ South American
    ____________ Other Identities (Paceño (La Paz locals), Cochabambino (Cochabamba
    locals), Sureño (Sucre locals), Cruceño (Santa Cruz locals) etc.

12. Do you think that Bolivia is in control of state resources as well as the future of the
country? Do you see Bolivia well connected or dependent on other countries or
institutions?
   ____________________________________________
   ____________________________________________

13. Would you like to see more cooperation between Bolivia and its neighbors of South
America? In what ways?
   ____________________________________________
   ____________________________________________
14). Are you aware of any regional integration efforts in South America?
________________________________________________________________________

15). Do you think that South American regional integration is a possibility in the future? Why or why not?
________________________________________________________________________

16). The European Union has an arrangement of open borders with the free flow of people, money, and commodities. Are you in favor of a similar agreement in South America? Why or why not?
________________________________________________________________________

17). Are you willing to sacrifice some elements of sovereignty, if in exchange, Bolivia gains membership and benefits in one of the South American regional integration efforts, like UNASUR? Of the four elements here, which are you willing to sacrifice?

*The national currency- el boliviano: Yes_______ No____________
Reason:________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

*Control of money and commodities at borders: Yes _______  No ____________
Reason:________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

*Passport Control: Yes ______________  No __________________
Reason:________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

*The national anthem:  Yes__________ No___________
Reason:________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Do you want to receive final analysis results? If so, please add your address here to receive results in May 2010:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Appendix C: Spanish language survey

Preguntas de investigación:

La viabilidad de integración regional de Sudamérica: La identidad nacional de Bolivia en el proceso de integración.

1). ¿Cual es su sexo? ________ Feminino ________ Masculino

2). ¿Cuantos años tiene usted? __________________

3). ¿Es usted ciudadano/a de Bolivia?  Si ________
   No ________ (¿De Donde es Usted Pues?) _______________________

4). ¿A cual etnia pertenece usted? _____________________________
   _______________________________________________________

5). ¿De donde es su familia?
   ____________________________

6). ¿Cual es su nivel de ingreso? ________ Adinerado ________ La media clase
   _____________ Pobre _______ sin ingresos.

7). ¿Cual(es) idoma(s) se habla(n) en su casa? ______________________________
   _______________________________________________________

8). ¿Cual(es) religión(es) practica usted? ______________________________
   _______________________________________________________

9). ¿Que es el empleo de sus padres? ______________________________________

10). ¿Que es su empleo? _________________________________________________

11). ¿Como usted se describía a si mismo/a?  ¿Que es lo más importante para Usted?
   _________ Boliviano/a _________ Sudamericano/a
   _________ Otro (Paceño, Cochabambino, Sureño, Cruceño, etc?)

12). ¿Usted piensa que Bolivia está en control de los bienes del estado asi como el futuro
    mismo del país? ¿O lo ve como muy conectado o dependiente en los demás naciones e
    instituciones?
    ____________________________

13). A usted, ¿le gustaría ver mas cooperación entre Bolivia y los vecinos de
    Sudamérica? ¿En cuales maneras?
    ____________________________
14). ¿Usted se ha enterado de algún esfuerzo para integrar económicamente su país con otros vecinos de Sudamérica?

________________________________________________________________________

15). ¿Piensa usted que la integración regional de Sudamérica es una posibilidad en el futuro? ¿Por qué sí o por qué no?

________________________________________________________________________

16). La unión europea tiene un acuerdo de fronteras abiertas, con el paso libre de trabajadores, dinero, y bienes. ¿Usted estaría en favor de un acuerdo parecido en Sudamérica? ¿Por qué sí o por qué no?

________________________________________________________________________

17). ¿Usted estaría en favor de ceder algún grado de soberanía, si en cambio, Bolivia gana calidad de miembro en una organización regional de los países de Sur América, como UNASUR? De los cuatro temas aquí, ¿cuál(es) de ellos a usted, no le importaría ceder?

*La moneda nacional- el boliviano:* Si_______ No____________
Porque:__________________________________________

*Control de la corriente de dinero y bienes:* Si _________ No __________
Porque:__________________________________________

*Control del pasaporte:* Si _____________ No _______________________
Porque:__________________________________________

*El himno nacional:* Si____________ No____________
Porque:__________________________________________

¿Usted quiere recibir los resultados del análisis final? Por favor, aña de su dirección aquí donde quiere recibir los resultados en Mayo 2010:

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
VITA
Kelly C. Stiller Titchener
Candidate for the Degree of Geography
Master of Science

Thesis: THE VIABILITY OF SOUTH AMERICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION: BOLIVIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS

Major Field: Geography

Biographical:

Education:
- School Year Abroad, Zaragoza, Spain and Booker T. Washington High School, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 2001.
- Bachelors of Arts in Spanish and Political Science, magna cum laude, Oklahoma State University, 2006.
Completed the requirements for the Master of Science in Geography at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in July, 2010.

Experience:
- Teaching Assistant, Physical Geography Laboratory, Department of Geography, Oklahoma State University (August 2008 through May 2010)
- Local Bilingual Reporter, La Semana del Sur Newspaper, Tulsa, Oklahoma (September 2009 – June 2010)
- Translator, Planned Parenthood, Tulsa, Oklahoma (2006-2007)
- Researcher, American Central Gas Technologies, Inc. (2003)

Professional Memberships:
- Association of American Geographers
- National Scholars Honor Society
- Phi Beta Delta, International Scholars Honor Society
- Sigma Delta Pi, Spanish Honor Society
Name: Kelly C. Stiller Titchener                                              Date of Degree: July, 2010

Institution: Oklahoma State University                             Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma

Title of Study: THE VIABILITY OF SOUTH AMERICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION: BOLIVIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS

Pages in Study: 153                                               Candidate for the Degree of Master of Sciences

Major Field: Geography

**Scope and Method of Study:** Through the regional associations of the Southern Common Market, the Andean Community, the Union of South American Nations, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, and the proposed Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, Latin American regional integration is slowly becoming a fact of life. For Bolivia, this increased regional integration comes at a time of great political and social change within the Andean nation. Consequently, Bolivian allegiances to national identity are changing. The purpose of this study is to determine what level of identity (national, local, supra-national) Bolivians experience most and why. A secondary objective is to determine what elements of national sovereignty and identity, if any, Bolivians are willing to surrender in return for increased regional integration. Using a cultural and political ecology framework, the methods used to collect data in Bolivia were mostly qualitative, including surveys and personal interviews, and a content of analysis of photos of the Bolivian landscape.

**Findings and Conclusions:** The conclusion of this study is that the vast majority of those surveyed had little knowledge of any regional integration efforts currently at work in Latin America and, more specifically, in South America. Bolivians were willing to sacrifice some elements (passport control, currency) much more than others (such as national anthem, border control). However, the significance of these findings is that Bolivians are willing to make concessions and compromises in terms of national sovereignty and identity, which is the first step in any integration process.