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POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN COCHABAMBA, BOLIVIA AS AN
AMELIORATIVE POLICY TREATMENT AFFECTING PUBLIC EDUCATION

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degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

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
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A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND POLICY STUDIES


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
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Abstract

Popular Participation is a public policy characterized by decentralization and devolution of responsibility and resources for a wide range of public services, including public education, from the national to the municipal level, with the objective to solve or ameliorate three historical and typical problems of Latin American developing nations: corruption in government interactions, lack of government legitimacy and an enduring rural/urban divide. This study analyzes the effectiveness of the Bolivian Popular Participation law (1994) through policy study from 2000–2004, including fieldwork in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in 2002. The policy research focused on Popular Participation and successive policy initiatives that modified or impacted public services, particularly public education. The fieldwork in Cochabamba focused on civil society and government interactions regarding public education. This study finds that in the Bolivian response to development initiatives, Popular Participation is not functioning as intended. Rather than reducing corruption, the research found a tendency toward increased bureaucratization which nullified civil society's ability to monitor government. Rather than increasing the legitimacy of the government, the trend has been toward an increase in normalization of relations between government and civil society, in that the political space created by Popular Participation has been systematically marginalized or co-opted. The rural/urban divide has not been reduced; rather, the study reveals a tendency to recast active participation as passive observation, particularly in policy documents, and this passive observation occurs so late in the policy process as to be ineffective. Poststructuralist critiques of the development discourse offer a useful framework for understanding Popular Participation in the Bolivian context.

Prologue

Spring semester 2001 I lived in Cochabamba, Bolivia, and worked as an English as a Second Language (ESL) instructor and University of Oklahoma liaison at the *Universidad Privada Boliviana*. I fell in love with Cochabamba, which reminded me in many ways of my hometown, Oklahoma City: both cities have about the same population, roughly 750,000; both are capital cities in their respective country's agricultural areas; both have four distinct seasons—though the seasons are reversed—with hot, humid summers and bone-chilling winds in winter; and both have downtown business centers surrounded by a wide variety of neighborhoods, from very wealthy to very poor. However, there are also plenty of differences between Cochabamba and Oklahoma City: Spanish colonial influences abound in Cochabamba, while Native American influences are omnipresent in Oklahoma City; Cochabamba is at roughly 8,000 feet elevation, while Oklahoma City is at only 1,000 feet elevation; the siesta hour (actually three to four hours on the clock) is alive and well in Cochabamba, while a 30 minute lunch break is considered a luxury in Oklahoma City; the pace of life in Cochabamba is thoroughly Latin and noticeably slower and more humane than the frenetic American pace in Oklahoma City. The most disturbing difference for me, though, was the amazingly high level of poverty that existed in Cochabamba, both relative to other Latin American countries as well as “absolute” international standards. I found this somewhat surprising; although Bolivia is the poorest country in the Americas, many International Monetary Fund and World Bank documents (that I had read previously for various classes) promoted Bolivia as a model for other less developed countries to emulate; Bolivia was attributed with making tremendous strides in poverty

alleviation, especially through its decentralization law, Popular Participation, which was passed in 1994. My inability to find any of those alleged gains in Cochabamba, the second largest city in the country, peaked my interest.

My purpose in undertaking this research was to try to understand why Popular Participation did not seem to be working. Despite the fact that Popular Participation was a fairly radical departure from the way government was previously conducted—and the way in which government and civil society interacted—it seemed to me to have stalled. During my first month in Bolivia there was a violent clash between the coca growers in the *Chapare* the agricultural valley outside Cochabamba, and the military. The *cocaleros*, as the coca growers are known in Latin America, had been staging protests for a while over the creation of a special US-funded branch of the Bolivian military whose only responsibility was coca eradication. No one is sure what precipitated this particular confrontation; some news stations said the problem was a soldier harassing a *cocalero* who was trying to travel from the *Chapare* to Cochabamba, others claimed the *cocalero* attacked the soldier in retaliation for the death of another *cocalero* the month before. Whatever the reason, the conflict quickly escalated; the soldier shot and killed the *cocalero*, the *cocaleros* attacked the soldiers, and by the time the dust settled three weeks later, nearly 20 people had been killed. Under the terms of Popular Participation there should have been multiple chances for the *cocaleros* to engage local and national government to voice their objection without the conflict becoming deadly; furthermore, top-down, authoritative action on the part of the federal government should have been severely circumscribed.

I came home with the intention of writing my prospectus in the summer and returning in the fall to conduct research. As I delved deeper into both the history of Popular Participation and its subsequent modifications, I realized that 1) this was a “cornerstone” piece of legislation, one upon which several other large policy pieces depended, including nearly all the educational reform legislation, 2) there seemed to be an abundance of policies modifying Popular Participation, including several intriguing ones that were just emerging in 2001, 3) there was very little research on Popular Participation in Bolivia, and none of it was conducted in urban areas and 4) among those few who had noticed that Popular Participation implementation had gone awry, none could really say why, only that there were “unintended consequences.”

As an Educational Studies major whose academic specializations were international development and policy analysis, studying the implementation of Popular Participation seemed the perfect dissertation topic. Given the large number of public works that Popular Participation devolved to the municipal level, a comprehensive survey was simply not possible; for me the public education system was the most logical choice for focusing my study of Popular Participation. However, I want to be very clear about the fact that I was *not* interested in studying “schooling practices,” but in addressing Popular Participation itself as a form of education. I was not concerned with how children were being schooled—which was fortunate given my Institutional Review Board’s concerns for vulnerable populations like minor children, which will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3—nor how teachers taught or how directors directed; my interest was in studying how the public education system, as a necessary but not particularly “sexy” public work, could or could not provide empirical evidence for the Popular

Participation implementation and policy issues that were emerging from my prospectus research.

An unexpected eye surgery waylaid me for several months, but I was able to complete my prospectus by December 2001 and return to Cochabamba in January 2002. Because of my extended stay in the States, I was able to work a little longer at my teaching job at OU and save enough money to finance my own trip to Bolivia; during my five month stay I supported myself with my savings and my only “job” was dissertation research. What issues and evidence I found surrounding Popular Participation implementation—and how it relates to three policy trends that emerged from critically reading the mountain of policy documents attached to Popular Participation before, during and after my 2002 fieldwork—is contained herein.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Introduction to the Problem

Bolivia is uncomfortably close to melting down politically and descending into anarchy. This is an alarming development in and of itself, but even more so when one considers that less than ten years ago Bolivia was being promoted as a model of development and growth for other less developed countries to emulate. Its vaunted status was due in large part to the popularity and success of a program instituted by then-President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, affectionately known as Goní, called the *Plan de Todos*, or Plan for All. The keystone policy was a sweeping decentralization law, *Participación Popular*, or Popular Participation, which devolved tremendous authority and resources for public infrastructure to the municipal level; it also created significant opportunities for civil society to participate in its own governance on an unprecedented scale. The intent of Popular Participation was to respond to problems like unemployment, lack of access to education and the exclusion of rural populations from development by addressing government's legitimacy, deeply entrenched corruption and the rural/urban divide. Furthermore, subsequent policy treatments, including *Reforma Educativa*, or Educational Reform¹, were predicated on the structures established by Popular Participation, especially those that provided for civil society participation.

¹ Educational Reform is the policy that addresses curricular, methodological and pedagogical issues in Bolivian public education. Its ability or inability to effect substantive change in the content and practice of public education, though, depends in large part on the structures of Popular Participation; as the *a priori* policy, Popular Participation was chosen for study over Educational Reform, even though Popular Participation deals with educational infrastructure and government/civil society interactions only.

In October 2003 Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, the man who created and passed Popular Participation and was re-elected President in June 2002, resigned his presidency and fled to the United States, where he is currently living in exile. He was forced from office by the citizenry for a long list of grievances, but chiefly for pursuing, against civil society's wishes, a natural gas pipeline that crossed Chile for the purpose of selling natural gas to the United States. He even went so far as to call out the military and use troops and tanks to disperse demonstrations, leading to the death of over 40 people by the time he left office. His vice president Carlos Mesa assumed power, but he did so with the understanding that the country's patience had worn thin and he was on a very short leash².

Background to the Problem

The roots of the Bolivian people's unrest and unhappiness stretch deep into history and center on the perpetual exclusion and poverty to which a majority of the population, especially the indigenous population, is subject—and cannot escape (World Bank, 2001; World Bank, 2002; World Bank, 2003; World Bank, 2004). Most development efforts seem to have minimal positive impact and frequently have numerous negative repercussions (Escobar, 1995; Escobar, 1997; Illich, 1997; Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997). The majority of these treatments focused on economic issues, hence the vitriol in the citizenry's response to the natural gas pipeline, but there have been others,

² See Anonymous, 13 September 2003; Rohter, 13 October 2003; Rohter, 14 October 2003; Rohter, 17 October 2003; Rohter, 18 October 2003; CNNenEspañol, 19 October 2003; CNNenEspañol, 20 October 2003; and Rohter, 23 October 2003.

including education³. One of the major reasons cited by development officials for continuing problems in Bolivia—and the rest of Latin America—has been the underdevelopment of a majority of the human resources of the country and the structure of public institutions that exacerbate this problem (World Bank, 2002). Popular Participation was meant as a way to address both problems.

In contrast to other regions of the world, where there is a lack of schools, or where families are simply too poor to afford formal education for their children, Latin America has long overcome the problem of access to schools...[n]early all children in South American countries enrolled for the first year of school. But by the fifth year, nearly 40 percent of the poor had dropped out, while 93 percent of the richest kids were still in the system. By the ninth year only 15 percent of the poorest students remained in school, compared to 58 percent of the richest...[by] retirement age, better-educated Latin Americans may be earning 10 times more than their unschooled brethren (Bate, 1998, 1-2).

It is important to note that the situation is worse for girls than for boys, particularly poor rural girls, and that Bolivia exists in the lowest distribution of this group. Because of the rich natural resources in the area—which include not only natural gas but also metals and agricultural products—there has historically been little incentive to develop human resources in Latin America, including Bolivia. Depletion of those

³ For example, the Inter-American Development Bank has awarded at least 10 separate educational loans in the last 10 years; frequently these loans are part of a larger World Bank program. See Inter-American Development Bank, November 1994; Inter-American Development Bank, June 1995; Inter-American Development Bank, February 1996; Inter-American Development Bank, October 1996; Inter-American Development Bank, October 1998; Inter-American Development Bank, March 2001; Inter-American Development Bank, October 2001; Inter-American Development Bank, December 2001; Inter-American Development Bank, June 2003.

resources, environmental problems frequently associated with their extraction and the global shift to a (First World) information economy have highlighted the need to improve education, but centralized bureaucracies at the national level have made change difficult. “Among the common traits of these systems...is that all key decisions are made by bureaucrats in a capital city, *usually far from where parents, teachers and school administrators can have any influence*. Moreover, these systems do little to encourage schools to improve teaching or to enroll and retain more children (Bate, 1998, 2, emphasis added).” These bureaucrats, while far removed from civil society, are heavily influenced by multinational agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Their policy initiatives have historically shown the footprints of these multinational agencies that, unfortunately, are even further removed from parents, teachers and school administrators. However, international aid agencies are realizing that greater involvement of stakeholders (those affected by development) is needed, and they have recently begun promoting and supporting decentralization programs (Wolfensohn, 12 January, 1999; World Bank, June 2001).

Bolivia passed the Plan for All, which included a sweeping administrative decentralization law and a capitalization law, as well as Popular Participation, in 1994. The Bolivian people quickly embraced Popular Participation—despite the fact it was mandated decentralization, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter—largely because it decentralized tremendous authority and resources to the municipal level and provided ways for civil society to interact with government at that level. The nature of that authority, the formulae for allocating and disbursing those resources, and the criticisms of both, are covered more fully in Chapters 2 and 4.

Statement of the Problem

Despite its best efforts, Bolivia continues to experience protracted economic, political and social problems (see Chapter 4 for further discussion). Furthermore, the breakdown of the system in late 2003 indicates that civil society and government are not communicating or working together at any level. Finally, the fact that most demonstration and civil disobedience activities took place in the nation's capital, La Paz (which literally means "peace"), suggests a re-centralization of attitudes and tendencies, particularly with respect to governance. It should be noted that there were also several small demonstrations held in Cochabamba; demonstrations in both cities will be discussed more fully in Chapter 5. The thesis that is defended in this dissertation, based on the author's policy research, conducted from 2000 to 2004, and fieldwork in Cochabamba, Bolivia, conducted in 2002, is that over the last several years Popular Participation does not appear to have significantly impacted any of the problems it was intended to address. It has mutated from a new way for civil society and government to work together to a more "normal" combative, pre-Popular Participation relationship. There are three forces driving this phenomenon. First, the normalization of relations between actors, particularly between the federal government and multinational agencies like the IMF and the World Bank, has crowded out the space reserved for non-traditional actors like civil society; this exclusion fosters a perception of less government legitimacy, not more. Second, government practice has become increasingly bureaucratized by successive policy initiatives since the passage of Popular Participation and the added bureaucratic layers have minimized civil society's watchdog capabilities, particularly

with regards to corruption. Third, there has been a pervasive tendency in policy documents to recast “participation” as passive observation that typically occurs too late in the policy sequence to be of any consequence, and this inability of the populace to advocate on its own behalf has seriously hampered redressing the marginalization of several populations, including the rural, indigenous and poor populations.

There have been two major studies of Popular Participation, both of them conducted in rural areas of Bolivia, and both of them identifying implementation as the cause of unintended consequences that are hampering development. One study (Pierce, 1998) stated that a preference for high-visibility, politically advantageous projects and improper administration (corruption and low participation) were a major cause of difficulty, while another (Miró i Pascual, 2000) blamed the unanticipated actions of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for impeding progress. However, no one has studied the implementation of Popular Participation in the urban areas of Bolivia—particularly La Paz, Cochabamba or Santa Cruz, the three largest cities in the country—which are also department capitals and stood to lose tremendously when they were bypassed in decentralization. This research project studied whether or not Popular Participation has been successful at ameliorating any of the problems it targeted by examining the activities and relationships around public education in Cochabamba, Bolivia. Cochabamba was chosen because it is the second largest city in the country and the capital of the Cochabamba Department (roughly the equivalent of an American state). It not only captured a major urban area and a department capital at the same time, it was a city the researcher knew from previous work in Bolivia. Public education was chosen for two reasons. First, it is the researcher’s field of study. Second, as a public work that is

vitally important to the national interest but neither highly visible nor politically advantageous, it provided a much more accurate picture of the extent to which Popular Participation was or was not addressing the issues it was intended to address than many of the other, more politically viable projects that have been undertaken by politicians, such as parks and statues.

Research Question

This study was guided by the following research question:

Has Popular Participation, viewed through the lens of public education, ameliorated any of problems it was intended to address, namely government's legitimacy, corruption and/or the rural/urban divide?

Significance of the Problem

Bolivia can ill afford to return to its days as a succession of crushing dictatorships, when the only change in government occurred by means of a bloody coup. However, Bolivia can hardly continue as it has been recently, with the majority of its population suffering horrible poverty and exclusion. Should the current political situation become untenable or unsustainable, the reverberations will be felt globally. South America and the rest of the world would suffer from a weak Bolivian state overrun by drug lords looking to gain control of the *Chapare* the large coca -growing region in the Cochabamba department. If they felt threatened, it is highly likely that indigenous populations would consider armed resistance groups like *Sendero Luminoso*, or Shining

Path, in Peru. And the country is certainly no stranger to rogue military and paramilitary militias.

Beyond the specific case of Bolivia, concerns about the legitimacy of a given government, corruption and rural/urban divide are issues for a large number of countries, not just Bolivia. Many of those countries are engaged in their own decentralization efforts (World Bank, July 2001; International Monetary Fund, September 2003). And many of those countries have the potential to suffer even more horrific implosions. Additionally, there are other human disasters, such as the AIDS crisis, slavery and sex trafficking that are facilitated by desperation and poverty. For the sake of the majority of the human population, governments need to work properly and have the confidence of their respective citizenries.

Finally, the development enterprise has become heavily invested in decentralization (International Monetary Fund, September 2000; International Monetary Fund, September 2003; International Monetary Fund, n.d.1; Wofensohn, 21 January, 1999; World Bank, n.d.1). Should decentralization succeed, and less developed countries develop, the development enterprise would be out of a job. At first glance, this appears to be a conflict of interest and a compelling reason for development to sabotage decentralization. However, the development enterprise appears to be genuinely interested in seeing decentralization work, particularly given the lackluster results of earlier methods of development. The enthusiasm of the multinational agencies involved in development, though, may well be their downfall. In their efforts to make decentralization work, development professionals and their agencies seem to be suffocating it with an excess of policies, rules and regulations and procedures. Indeed,

their drive to adapt new ideas and programs to the existing administrative structure of the development enterprise, rather than vice versa, is inexorably drawing Popular Participation further and further into the discourse of development. Poststructuralist critiques of the discourse of development appear to explain best the trends identified in this research project and are discussed more fully in Chapter 6.

Implications

Understanding the mechanisms by which Popular Participation has failed to impact the issues it sought to redress is critical for the future health and well being of Bolivia and its citizens. It is equally important for the other nations and peoples following Bolivia down their own decentralization paths. Because of decentralization's importance to governance as a whole, should it fail it will take down with it a whole host of other policy initiatives that are predicated on its governance structures, including many in the vitally needed social safety net.

The development enterprise could also use a success story to bolster its increasingly poor image around the world, particularly among those it seeks to help. The field of development has a long and storied history of failure, dating back to some of its earliest activities at the end of World War II. While the failure of decentralization would probably not be as catastrophic for development agencies as it could be for some of its member nations, it certainly has the potential to be the beginning of the end for development.

Assumptions and Limitations

There are a few assumptions and limitations to be considered.

1. Guba (1983) states that policy is not defined in any uniform way and that most authors assume their audience shares their implicit definition of policy. This is problematic not only for communicative reasons, but also because any particular definition of policy determines the questions asked, the data sources, methodology and policy product. The definition of policy used herein is policy as *a strategy undertaken to solve or ameliorate some problem*. This definition dictates that the implementers of said policy be the main data source and qualitative inquiries such as interviews, observations and records analyses be the methodology (Guba, 1983). Choosing another definition of policy would require different data sources and methodologies that would likely lead to different conclusions about the efficacy of the policy.
2. Because of the uniqueness of the context (Bolivia is the poorest and most indigenous country in South America) any generalizations beyond the city of Cochabamba and the country of Bolivia must be undertaken cautiously.
3. This study assumes the veracity of respondents.
4. Given the volume of policy documents included in this study, only the sections most relevant to the study are included in the discussion. Many such policies, however, are large, sweeping pieces of legislation that cover significantly more than decentralization and/or education (for example, communication infrastructure, roads, tourism, sustainable development, health and the like).

5. Bolivia has an ongoing problem with corruption and lack of transparency that most likely affects availability and/or veracity of documents and some respondents.

Conclusion

In less than ten years, Bolivia has moved from a model of development to a country dangerously close to self-destructing. The majority of the population has lost patience with the government and multinational aid agencies; neither has produced the promised gains in their standard of living. One of the most important—and popular—policy treatments of the last several years, a decentralization law called Popular Participation, does not appear to be producing satisfactory results. This research examined public education in a major urban area to see if Popular Participation had ameliorated any of the problems it was intended to address. It is vitally important for Bolivia, other less developed countries that are pursuing decentralization and the entire development enterprise to understand why decentralization is having difficulty remediating problems and what, if anything, can be done to address that.

Chapter 2 of this dissertation discusses the history of decentralization as a tool for development as well as the history of Popular Participation. Chapter 3 outlines the policy implementation analysis methodology employed in this study. Chapter 4 discusses the policy context in effect at the time of this study. Chapter 5 presents research findings and Chapter 6 analyzes the policy and research data. Chapter 7 presents conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis.

Chapter 2

Historical Contexts for Decentralization and Popular Participation

Introduction

Chapter 1 introduced the relationship between underdevelopment and education on a global scale and the specific case of Bolivia. The discussion included Bolivia's latest effort, the Law of Popular Participation, implementation difficulties in rural areas and the need for research on urban areas. This chapter discusses the history of decentralization as a tool for development, and the history and current activities of Popular Participation.

Decentralization for Development

Although decentralization seems to be a relatively new concept in development, it actually has been around since the 1970s⁴. McGinn and Welsh identify three major reasons for the increasing interest in decentralization during that time. First, the political and economic debates of Keynesian economics resulted in a shift away from highly centralized governments. Second, economic and financial globalization and the rise of supranational organizations combined to further weaken centralized governments. Finally, new information and communication technologies made possible the strong control of decentralized management (1999, 27-28). With the increased interest in management issues came an increased concern over the democratic participation of broader segments of society, mostly articulated by the United Nations.

⁴ See Ashford, 1976; Bird, 1981; Sharpe, 1979; Rojas, 20-22 June, 1999.

Democratic Participation

As early as the 1950s, activists and field workers were bandying about participation as a concept important to development. Rahnema (1992) notes that there was some publication on the topic during the 1950s and 1960s, though it was sporadic at best. One of the earliest stand-alone documents advocating democratic participation is a monograph written by Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith in 1979. These men advocated participation in decision-making, implementation, benefits and evaluation. Furthermore, they felt it was most important to include the rural poor majority. Finally, they measured how participation occurred according to initiative, inducements, structure, channels, duration, scope and empowerment. The work identifies potential pitfalls in local elites co-opting power, mismanagement, regional disparities and the attitudes of bureaucrats.

A basic commitment of the international development strategy is progress in the integration of all members of society, including less advantaged groups, into the process of development through their active participation in political, economic, social and cultural institutions of their countries on the basis of equality with due respect to social justice...[i]n developing countries with market economies, 'development' is mainly understood to be an uplifting process in which each individual or group is encouraged to seek equal access to existing political, economic, social and cultural institutions (United Nations, 1987b, 3).

To that end, the United Nations advocated popular participation in basic human needs, especially health, education and shelter. It was important to have local participation in these activities for a variety of reasons: a needs-oriented strategy called for

knowledgeable redistribution of resources to disadvantaged groups; participation in allocating those resources—including resources for education—would make services provided more relevant; and cultural strengthening and development through interchange would facilitate integration and national identity (United Nations, 1987a and 1987b). It is interesting to note that among the “important reasons” for popular participation, learning to live in a democratic society through participation rather than instruction, as educators such as John Dewey and Paulo Freire advocated, was not included.

It was also important to bring people into the participation process in a manner that would encourage its continuance, and the United Nations had very specific ideas about how that would be achieved. First, popular participation needed the support of a national policy. Second, an organizational structure for citizen participation was needed, and third, citizens’ initiation into local decision-making had to be autonomous if the goals of participation were going to be relevant. Fourth, information flow was important for informed participation and finally, material support, such as technical and financial assistance, was needed to insure full participation. The UN also identified several factors that could inhibit popular participation. They were short-term fixes rather than long-term plans; extreme disparities in wealth, income, power and status; divisions along ethnic, linguistic, sex and age lines; and finally, heavy dependence on foreign investments and credits (United Nations, 1981). As will be shown below, Bolivia did most things right, but they still had significant obstacles to overcome.

Many nations⁵ appear to have heeded the words of Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith and the United Nations, including Bolivia. Popular Participation, as detailed below, is

⁵See, for example, Rosenbaum, 1998; Schonwalder, 1997; Clark, 1995; Stiefel and Wolfe, 1994; Shepro, 1986; and Robinson and Norsworthy, 1988.

intended to facilitate the involvement of disadvantaged groups in proposing, planning and implementing social service programs. It provides a way for communities' representatives to evaluate programs and make recommendations. Finally, it gives them the power to budget and allocate money for themselves.

Deregulated Markets

With the shift away from centralized governments—and markets—to more decentralized ones, it became necessary to help countries reorganize their economies. Much of the assistance came from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the form of structural adjustment lending. “Structural adjustment lending is characterized by:

- privatization of government corporations and severe ‘downsizing’ of public employment and government bureaucracy, exacerbating unemployment and tend to affect public service ministries most (health, education, transport, housing, environment, et cetera) through drastic budget reductions;
- promotion of exports of raw materials and of export industries to earn foreign exchange; import liberalization and elimination of trade barriers or quotas;
- elimination or sharp reduction in subsidies for agriculture, food staples, health care, education, and other areas (generally excluding the military, however);
- restrictive monetary policies and high interest rates to curb inflation;
- a reduction in real wages (especially for lower wage earners), which is called ‘demand management’, also intended to control inflation.

Structural adjustment loans invariably encourage the free-market, competitive, individualistic ethos broadly known as Thatcherism in the UK or Reaganomics in the US (George and Sabelli, 1994, 18-19).” Needless to say, the widespread privatization and downsizing led to a fair amount of *de facto* decentralization, and with the tandem erosion of the social safety net, the most vulnerable in a country were left with very few options. Because of the resulting civil strife, in recent years the IMF and the World Bank have begun to develop mechanisms for decentralizing, both liberalizing *and* increasing services and participation, in a manner very similar to, and in some cases seemingly modeled on, Popular Participation.

The IMF and the World Bank have, within the last few years, begun a new breed of comprehensive reforms that seek to relieve debt and maintain the social safety net, while promoting economic development and growth. The initiatives are the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). Because of the short time span since their inception there is limited information published about them, but they bear a striking resemblance to Popular Participation, as detailed below.

The HIPC “is designed to provide exceptional assistance to eligible countries following sound economic policies to help them reduce their external debt burden to sustainable levels (IMF, September 2000, 1).” The initiative is based on a continued effort toward economic adjustment that is supported by a focus “on ensuring additional finance for social sector programs—primarily basic health and education (IMF, September 2000, 2).” To be eligible for HIPC, a country must 1) be eligible for concessional assistance from the IMF and the World Bank, 2) have an unsustainable debt burden and

3) have an established track record of reform through IMF and World Bank supported programs. Additionally, the country seeking assistance must have adopted a PRSP *through a participatory process* by the decision point in the HIPC. Since Bolivia was one of the first countries considered for the HIPC, Bolivia was also one of the first countries to write a CDF and a PRSP.

The CDF originated in the World Bank with Bank President James Wolfensohn. Based on the hardships incurred by structural adjustment in the past, he saw a “clear need” for a program that would incorporate “the structural, social and human aspects” (Wolfensohn, 21 January 1999, 5). He proposed a more inclusive form of development in which the macroeconomic and financial were considered with the structural, social and human, and which was determined by the countries themselves. Furthermore, he felt that several levels of government should be involved in the process, especially the local, as well as aid agencies, non-governmental organizations and most importantly, civil society. “In all its forms, civil society is probably the largest single factor in development. If not in its monetary contribution, then certainly in its human contribution and its experience and its history” (Wolfensohn, 21 January 1999, 25). He concluded by saying the CDF was meant to be a long-term, holistic approach that brought all the various sectors together and that the process should be participatory, transparent and accountable. The first country to complete a CDF was Bolivia, included in his discussion draft as an example.

Immediately following CDF, in September 1999, was the PRSP. “PRSPs describe the country’s macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs over a three-year or longer horizon to promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well

as associated external financing needs and major sources of financing” (IMF, September 2003, available on-line). There is a Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook, in several volumes, intended as a guide for developing PRSPs. The chapter (in volume 2) on education alone is nearly sixty pages, but it offers sound methodologies for identifying, analyzing and evaluating education performance and reforms that are participatory—and manageable. Among the suggestions for policy options are

- community-based construction of schools
- equitable funding across schools (per-student allocations)
- producing local teaching materials
- empowering stakeholders in school affairs
- greater school autonomy
- involving mothers in school committees
- involving parents in school councils with decision power
- making the school calendar compatible with local economy activity and
- community libraries (World Bank, 2001, 29).

As with the CDF, Bolivia was one of the first countries to complete a PSRP, in large part because it is a prerequisite for full participation in the HIPC. It seems somewhat oxymoronic that “participation” needs to be suggested—even managed—by multinational agencies who are *not* members of the societies to whom they recommend “participation.” The lack of “participation” in setting the agenda—especially the education agenda—is also questionable. If the multinationals’ intent for civil society is to learn experientially, that is to learn through the participation of the individual in the social (Dewey, 1897), civil

society's exclusion from making the decision to engage in "participation" is highly problematic and fundamentally undemocratic.

The newest wave of reforms, combining participatory mechanisms with neo-liberal growth and based on the unique historically determined needs of a particular country, seems very similar to Popular Participation. The following discussion shows that very specific historical, cultural and economic forces combined to create the situation Bolivia was facing when Popular Participation was passed. However, some of the problems it sought to rectify were problems faced by a number of developing countries, and its apparent acceptance by the Bolivian population seems to have encouraged the multinational organizations to include decentralization as a viable path towards development.

Popular Participation in the Bolivian Context

Historical Antecedents

Popular Participation as a policy initiative began in the early 1990s, but many of the tenets upon which its rationale is based, as well as the problems it was meant to address, stretch much further back into history. Popular Participation was intended to address three major problems, all of which had deep roots in Bolivia history.

The first problem was the problem of nationalist legitimacy: Bolivia has a long history of regionalism, dating back to pre-Inca Empire periods. Because centralism had failed in the past, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, the President who initiated Popular Participation, proposed that "municipalization with significant support from the central government offered a way of penetrating the national territory more fully and realizing

the existence of a national state that provided a lifeline for local development (Grindle, 2000, 118).”

The second problem was corruption. Sánchez de Lozada hoped decentralizing would solve the problem of corruption by bringing it closer to the people, so they would be in a better position to hold accountable those responsible. Failing that, the corruption would at least distribute jobs and money locally, rather than only in the major cities.

Finally, Popular Participation was intended “to counteract centrifugal tendencies that came from the department capitals” (Grindle, 2000, 118). Decentralizing to the department level would have put too much power in the hands of regional economic elites and deepened the urban/rural divide in the country.

The Problem of Nationalist Legitimacy

Pre-conquest Quechuas and Aymaras were organized into *ayllus*, communities that held land and other resources in common. *Ayllus* are frequently associated with the Inca Empire, from which this Quechuan word originates. However, existing archeological evidence shows the transition to agriculture, with some animal husbandry, in small communities exhibiting a great deal of regional variation in Latin America as early as 7000 BC. The first evidence of organized society in southern Peru and Bolivia is the *Paracas* period dating from 900 BC. It was immediately followed by the *Nazca* period around 200 BC, which shows in its pottery a highly organized society, but one with continuing great regional variation. Shortly after the end of the *Nazca* period is the beginning of the *Tiahuanaco* period about 600 AD. Although there was a strong unifying religion based on worship of the sun, its dominance began to slip after only a few

hundred years, and “around 1200 AD the forces of regional diversity obtained ascendancy once more” (Mörner, 1985, 13).

The *Tiahuanaco* period was followed by the Inca Empire, which gained ascendancy in the 15th century. The Incas started in the modern state of Peru and quickly spread throughout western South America. They entered Bolivia through Lake Titicaca and quickly conquered several villages there. Their policy was to impose Inca political and civil structures, as well as the Quechua language, but the process was neither as smooth nor as successful as many believe. Inca records show a large number of uprisings that the army had to quell as the borders expanded. There were several areas, mostly tropical and semi-tropical, that the Incans would not enter for fear of disease. Most striking of all is the survival of the Aymara language and culture in northwest Bolivia, despite Incan occupation. *Ayllus* became much more clearly defined during this period, and were largely organized along familial/kinship lines.

Another more important feature to survive from the Inca Empire is its governance structure. Communities were organized into quarters, or *suyos*, which were further divided into provinces. Each province had a governor, called *curaca* in Quechua and *mallku* in Aymara, who was responsible for the families within that province, particularly the local indigenous (pre-Inca) elite (Mörner, 1985; Barton, 1968; Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1997). This form of traditional self-government continues today and was one practice that the creators of Popular Participation wanted to include in the legislation, largely due to the presence of Vice-President Victor Hugo Cárdenas, a self-identified Aymara Indian.

The Problem of Corruption

With the introduction of Spanish colonial rule, administrators changed, but structures remained intact. Much of the local governance was left intact by the Spaniards, in large part because they were busy treasure hunting. Although a colonial governance structure was put in place (the Viceroyalties and *Audiencias*) the Spaniards' attempts to centralize and coordinate rule quickly faltered, leaving a troubled colonial state—with strong local and regional identities—that was plagued by greed and corruption.

The current state of Bolivia had been incorporated into the Inca empire by the time the Spanish arrived in the 16th century. By 1533, the Inca empire was under the control of the Spaniards and the first European settlements in Bolivia were founded in 1538. The current urban centers in Bolivia soon followed, with La Paz founded in 1548, Santa Cruz in 1561 and Cochabamba in 1574. The discovery of silver in 1545 made Bolivia critical to the occupying Spanish, but there were other resources the Spaniards coveted.

From the beginning of Spanish colonial rule, the *curacas* had been incorporated into the colonial *encomienda*s, in order to facilitate the extraction of agricultural surpluses. When the indigenous populations were not subsistence farming or pressed into service for transportation and mining, they were forced into cultivation for the Spaniards. The *curacas* did little to stop the colonists, because as long as they produced the tribute the Spaniards were expecting, they were preferentially treated. Additionally, people clung to their pre-contact administrative structures because the Catholic Church, with support from the army, worked hard to dismantle pagan religions and the kinship dimensions of the *ayllus*. Predictably, the proselytizing was supported because the

Spaniards raided temples of their riches (especially gold) and individuals were more cooperative when their loyalties lay with a government rather than with their families (Mörner, 1985; Pierce, 1998; Barton, 1968). When the declining silver output from 1650-1750 caused a crippling depression (the general population had no surplus or safety net), there was trouble on all fronts, particularly with the indigenous inhabitants who had been pressed into work.

In response, the Spanish created the *Audiencia de Buenos Aires* and the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata in 1776, mostly to control the indigenous populations. The highly centralized administration quickly encountered difficulties and became heavily dependent on more regional administrations. It was followed in 1784 by the *Ordenanza de Intendentes de Buenos Aires*, which recognized the autonomy of nuclei of the Viceroyalty and created eight *Intendencias* (administrations). Four of the administrations, Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz and Potosí, make up the current state of Bolivia.

Regional autonomy helped pave the way for independence, though a problematic one to say the least. Three of the administrations broke away to form the States of the Federal Republic of Argentina, one became Paraguay, and the four above joined Santa Cruz and Tarija to form the Republic of Bolivia. The government that was created following independence essentially transformed the *Intendencias* into departments, with no real change in the oligarchy that had ruled during colonization, nor in its behavior. The ruling structure had very strong ties to the colonial government; unfortunately it also shared Spain's hunger for territory and resources (Pierce, 1998).

The feudal-colonial system that had existed before 1809 had been left so intact it persisted until modern times. Lawlessness increased as soldiers of fortune correctly gauged that a weak government could become a source of riches for them. Claiming participation in the government was due them for having freed the country, they used the spoils of office to build political power bases. These soldier-politicians maintained themselves in office as president, protector or dictator through outlandish promises to their supporters. Only when they fell to quarreling among themselves did the **caudillos**, as the political chiefs were called, suffer from a change of government. Elections seldom had any effect on changing the party or form of government in the early years of the Republic (Barton, 1968, 175).

The fighting was not just among rival factions within the Bolivian government, but also between Bolivia and neighboring countries. Through several wars following independence, Bolivia lost nearly half its land to neighboring Peru, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil. The modern state was left roughly half the size it was immediately following independence, and much poorer economically for the experience. In the War of the Pacific, Bolivia lost to Chile over 150,000 square kilometers containing silver, gold, copper and various other export goods. In the Chaco War, Bolivia lost a newly discovered source of petroleum to Paraguay. Other smaller wars cost Bolivia additional natural resources. Many of the wars were conducted by military dictators and unscrupulous soldiers of fortune attempting to increase their wealth (Barton, 1968).

The battle for independence from Spain, which formed part of the wider Andean struggle led by Simón Bolívar, left behind in 1825 a country

divided by geography and ethnicity. For most of the period prior to the 1870's, it is difficult to speak of Bolivia as a country in any sense of the word. It was, until then, little more than a setting for locally centered enclaves dominated by landed elites, rural baronies ruled by warlords, mining camps that maintained their own social and economic order, and indigenous peoples who continued pre-Columbian traditions of self-government (Grindle, 2000, 98).

As limited as the state's presence was, it was continually undermined by coups, countercoups and corruption.

The Problem of Decentralizing to Departments

For the weakened nation, continual battles over territories defined by resources specific to unique ecological and/or geological niches compounded the problem of largely intact (pre)colonial governance structures. The confluence created a population that identified with regional and departmental governments more so than with the national government. Furthermore, many of the departments and their capitals had a long history, dating back to independence, of not paying their full tax debt and of operating more independently than the federal government would have liked.

Following the last major war, the Chaco War from 1928 to 1935, many of the mostly Aymara and Quechua foot soldiers became aware that there was a Bolivia outside their high plains and began to associate with other indigenous groups. One political party, the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR), or Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, mobilized various marginalized groups that had begun associating and took the country by violence in 1952. The revolutionary government began nationalizing

private enterprises, particularly the tin mines and the *haciendas*, and began to create social welfare programs administrated by a much stronger central government (Boris, 1998; Molina and Arias, 1995). The programs had the unfortunate result of accelerating inflation while draining state resources and cutting domestic subsistence production. Fearing the government would flounder, Bolivia asked the United States for help. The US provided massive amounts of capital and food, but began pressing for repayment of loans made decades earlier. While the government was stabilizing, the military was growing and becoming increasingly convinced it was better able to lead development.

An Air Force General, Rene Barrientos, ran for Vice President in 1964; shortly after taking office he and another military leader took control in a coup. Barrientos replaced many government officials with men loyal to him from the indigenous population who refocused their efforts on local matters, to the exclusion of national ones. Barrientos died in 1969 and self-proclaimed “General” Hugo Banzer Suárez came to power in 1971. For eight years he led an oppressive military state that catered to the right-wing regional elites who helped put him in office. During this time the cities, particularly the department capitals, were booming, but the rest of the nation suffered horrible poverty. Anyone who attempted to protest faced death. The government was opened to democratic elections in 1979 and Siles Zuazo was elected president. He tried to overcome the economic challenges inherited from Banzer, but was unable to do so and left office a year early.

In 1985, Victor Paz Estensborro was elected President. Paz minimized the role of the state, which was not responding to either centralization or regionalization efforts, and proposed the New Economic Plan to both stabilize and liberalize the state. He let the

market operate much more freely and made drastic cuts among federal employees, but he also created an Emergency Social Fund (ESF) to soften the blow. The ESF “was a short term program aimed at providing employment and social services to those affected by the adjustment plan and government downsizing” (Boris, 1998, 7). Local governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) submitted proposals for infrastructure development. Not only did the ESF deliver services more efficiently, it strengthened local government’s institutional capacity (Boris, 1988; Grindle, 2000). However, services were not reaching the citizens most urgently in need of assistance. The principal architect of the program, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, wanted a new reform program building from the Emergency Social Fund. He got his chance when he was elected President in 1993.

Genesis of Popular Participation

When Sánchez de Lozada took office, Bolivia had experienced centuries of successful local governance followed by decades of unsuccessful centralized and/or regional rule. It also had found some success with a program that provided a space for local participation.

Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, from the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR or Nationalist Revolutionary Movement), was elected on the strength of his *Plan de Todos* (Plan for All) which was intended to address the major problems then facing Bolivia.

...the highest priorities for the future of the country were those that would respond to unemployment, low salaries, lack of access to decent education

and health services, corruption, and the failure of the country's development to reach the countryside. The Plan de Todos outlined three strategic pillars to deal with these problems. First...a process dubbed 'capitalization' to counter nationalist concerns about selling what was regarded as the national patrimony. Second, the capitalization of these enterprises would generate funds for a social development foundation that would respond to the needs to improve education, health, and social services, particularly in the poorest areas of the country...Third, the plan called for popular participation of communities in their own development planning as a way of localizing the benefits of development investments (Grindle, 2000, 115).

Additionally, Sánchez de Lozada's running mate was Victor Hugo Cárdenas, a self-identified Aymara Indian and important member of the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberación* (MRTKL or Tupac Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement).

Sánchez de Lozada's proposal was vague; the true content was left unfinished until after the election. Even before taking office, he established a committee to flesh out the plan. The committee was led by a young academic named Carlos Hugo Molina, and included a representative of the *Movimiento Bolivia Libre* (MBL), or Free Bolivia Movement, a group of democratizing leftist intellectuals, and the leader of the MRTKL (Grindle, 2000; Melgar Rioja, 1995). The committee could be largely characterized as either foreign-trained technocrats focused on sustainable, neo-liberal reforms (Molina) or indigenously-influenced intellectuals (MBL and MRTKL) (Pierce, 1998). The group

brought together a commitment to municipalization, knowledge of indigenous forms of organization and local self-government, and knowledge of traditional peasant and ethnic claims for local autonomy. In September 1993, the committee began meeting daily to draft the details of how Popular Participation would work.

However, the committee worked in isolation. The leader of the ruling party was not involved, and the unions and ministers from other areas of the government were excluded. Although there were some very general consultations with party and union leaders, civic groups and organized interests, there was largely no public discussion. The committee felt it had good reasons for this. In November 1993, the Santa Cruz civic committee accidentally viewed an early draft. The committee immediately opposed the plan, largely because it bypassed departmental decentralization in favor of local decentralization. They claimed that a country as poor and backward as Bolivia did not have the capacity for local government, especially considering that illiteracy rates were high and relatively few in the rural areas spoke the national language. They simply could not imagine anyone producing plans and budgets on a regular, ongoing basis (Grindle, 2000; CEDOIN, 1994). The Santa Cruz civic committee's poor attitude about the ability of local government and civil society to participate in their own governance is sadly consistent with the Popular Participation writing committee's actions; their inability and/or unwillingness to include others in the policy drafting process intimated an equal disdain for local government and civil society's policymaking and legislative abilities. What is perhaps most confounding is the notion that Popular Participation could be brought about without popular participation. The idea that participation can be learned

without fully participating is counterintuitive for education, for participation and for democratic governance (Dewey, 1897; Dewey, 1916; Freire, 1970; Freire, 1973).

When the law was finally sent to Congress, there was considerable discussion in the media. The economic elites, unions and civic committees were all strongly opposed to it. Even the *Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores de Bolivia* (CSUTCB), the governing structure for much of rural Bolivia, was concerned. Much of the resistance was centered on the neo-liberal aspects of the law and the perceived loss of power by various segments of the population. The resistance focused on:

- regressive aspects of distribution (per capita, which favored the cities)
- exclusionary nature of its structure (largely a concern for national advocacy groups like unions)
- the amount of volunteer and unremunerated work required to participate in the governance structures (which placed an insurmountable burden on the very poor)
- lack of rural experience in self-governance and expertise in the technical aspects of management (e.g., preparing budgets and prioritizing needs)
- the impact on women and indigenous populations (forcing them to function in Westernized ways to which they were unaccustomed to and/or were incompatible with traditional customs)
- the very idea of mandated popular participation.⁶

Those who expressed concern or were resistant to Popular Participation had legitimate worries, particularly about the burden of unremunerated work and lack of technical expertise, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5. However, much of

⁶ See Foro Económico, 1994; Lenz, 1999; Ayo Saucedo, 1999; Serrano Torrico (Ed.), 1996; Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular, 1995; CEDOIN, 1994; Terán Carreón, 1997.

the intelligentsia supported the cause, as did several government agencies and sectors.

Support for Popular Participation revolved around the themes of:

- increasing democratic representation and participation (to address the problems of legitimacy, corruption and rural/urban divide),
- introducing new political actors (to keep corruption in check),
- revitalizing local space, particularly indigenous forms of self-governance (versus concentration in Westernized departmental capitals),
- redistributing investments (all three problems mentioned above),
- providing opportunities for women and minorities, especially indigenous, and
- the continuation of economic liberalism combined with social safety nets introduced by the New Economic Plan.⁷

Much of the supporting documentation included a wide variety of charts and graphs showing the level of poverty in Bolivia compared to the rest of Latin America, as well as the level of intra-country disparity, particularly rural/urban. The charts and graphs were accompanied by others showing the projected improvement with Popular Participation.⁸

The government also did a fair job of presenting both sides of the argument in several

⁷ See Foro Económico, 1994; Molina and Arias, 1996; Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1997; Bedregal Gutiérrez, 1994a and 1994b; Melgar Rioja, 1995; Centellas, 1994; Rojas Ortuste (Ed.), 1996; Serrano Torrico (Ed.), 1994; Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular, 1995; CEDOIN, 1994; Quiroga Viscarra, 1995; Medina, 1995; Rojas Ortuste and Verdesoto Custode, 1997; Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1996a.

⁸ For example, in 1993, the city of La Paz received nearly B108 million (Bolivianos, the national currency), but in 1994, received only B74.5 million and in 1995 B77.2 million. The total for the La Paz Department in 1993 was only B110 million, but in 1994 the total was B128.6 million and in 1995 B202.8 million. The cities of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz gained slightly in absolute dollars, but showed similar losses in the proportion of funding for the department (Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1995).

publications regarding the debate, but unsurprisingly, most concluded with a recommendation for Popular Participation.⁹

Despite the public uproar, opposition parties in Congress were largely indifferent to the law, and debate lasted less than a day. On April 20, 1994, the Popular Participation Law was passed, but in many ways the battle had only begun. As Merilee Grindle (2000) stated, “The result of a process of closed-door decision making and lack of full debate about the initiative was a piece of legislation with an uncertain future (122).”

*Law 1551*¹⁰

On April 20, 1994, Popular Participation was passed as *Ley 1551, La Ley de Participación Popular*. It is a sweeping decentralization law that devolves much of the central government’s authority to 311 municipal governments, which are held accountable by Grassroots Territorial Organizations (*Organizaciones Territoriales de Base*, or *OTBs*) and a Vigilance, or Oversight, Committee (*Comité Vigilancia*). It also provides for revenue sharing funds from the National General Treasury. Its stated objective is “aimed at improving the quality of life of Bolivian women and men through a fairer distribution and better administration of public resources (Miró i Pascual, 2000, 319).” This was intended to address both gender inequality and the rural/urban gap. To that end Popular Participation established the provincial section as the territory and jurisdiction of the municipal governments and transferred “to them the physical

⁹ See Foro Economico, 1994; Melgar Rioja, 1995; Exeni R., 1996; Rojas Ortuste (Ed.), 1996; Serrano Torrico (Ed.), 1994; Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, 1995.

¹⁰ All English quotes of the Popular Participation law come from Josep María Miró i Pascual’s translation. For Spanish versions of the law see Bolivia, 1994a; Bolivia 1994b; Bolivia 1995a; Bolivia 1995b; Bolivia 1997a; Bolivia, 1997b; Franco L., 1994.

infrastructure for education, health, sports, local roads, [and] micro-irrigation systems, along with the obligation to administer, maintain and renew them (Miró i Pascual, 2000, 320).”

Popular Participation goes on to define the subjects of the law as the OTBs, “which are rural communities, indigenous populations, and neighborhood councils, organized according to their traditional practices, customs or statutory disposition (Miró i Pascual, 2000, 320).” Each Organization is required to register for juridical, or legal, status by presenting documentation from the community along with a recommendation from their Municipal Council. The registration process is relatively quick and simple—particularly for Latin America—and is provided free of charge to the Organizations. The Organizations have a long list of rights, among which are:

- to propose, request, control and supervise the works and the provision of public services according to the needs of the community in the areas of education, health, sports, basic sanitation, micro-irrigation, local roads, and urban and rural development
- to represent and obtain the modification of actions, decisions, works or services rendered by the public agencies, whenever these are contrary to the interests of the community
- to propose the dismissal or ratification of education and health authorities within their territory.

The Organizations also have a long list of duties, the most important ones being:

- to identify, set priorities, participate and cooperate in the implementation and administration of projects for the public welfare, giving preferential attention to

formal and informal education, the improvement of housing, health care, widespread practice of sports, and the improvement of the methods of production

- to inform the community of actions undertaken on their behalf
- to coordinate administrative and judiciary resources to defend the rights acknowledged by this Law.

Most municipalities have multiple OTBs, and the coordinating body between them and the municipal government is the Vigilance, or Oversight, Committee. “An Oversight Committee shall be formed for each Municipal Government for the purpose of linking the Grassroots Territorial Organizations and the Municipal Government in the exercise of the rights established in this Law.” The Committee is composed of canton or district representatives (smaller administrative units within a municipality) elected by the Organizations. The main functions of the Committee are acting as liaison and offering opinions and advice on budgeting Popular Participation resources in the municipality, expense reports and investments. The Committee is allowed to “determine its own organization and work, as well as the election of its directors (Miró i Pascual, 2000, 323).”

The final level of governance is the municipal government itself. Popular Participation transferred all the public services listed above, free of charge, to the municipal governments, including all public primary and secondary schools. It expanded the municipal government’s responsibility to include:

- to furnish the equipment, furniture, didactic materials, inputs, and supplies, including medicine and food in the health area, to supervise their use, for

adequate operation of the infrastructure and the provision of health services, basic sanitation, education, culture and sports

- to supervise, in accordance with the respective regulations, the performance of the educational authorities, the directors and teachers, and to propose their continuation to the Departmental Educational Authority, for good performance, or their removal on justifiable grounds, either directly or at the request of the Grassroots Territorial Organizations and the Oversight Committee
- to provide and build new infrastructure for the areas of education, culture, health, sports, local roads, and basic sanitation
- to attend to the complementary feeding programs, including the school breakfast program
- to respond to the petitions, representations, requests, and oversight of the Grassroots Territorial Organizations and the Oversight Committee.

It is critical to note that Popular Participation dealt *only* with the infrastructure of education. It did not devolve any responsibility or authority for curriculum, pedagogy, methodology, scheduling, matriculation requirements—in short, the content and practice of public education. One interesting caveat of Popular Participation is that the Executive Authority (the executive branch of the federal government) retains responsibility “for defining the policies for the sectors of health, education, culture, sports, local roads, micro-irrigation, as well as governing the technical-pedagogical services in the fields of education and health (Miró i Pascual, 2000, 325);” for education that is the Ministry of Education. According to the Popular Participation Law, the personnel responsible for implementing such policies are to be kept under the authority of, and remunerated by, the

national government to ensure “uniform provision of these social services (Miró i Pascual, 2000, 325).” Additionally, Popular Participation allows other civil society organizations, such as civic organizations, unions, non-governmental organizations, and others present in the municipal areas, to participate in meeting the Popular Participation objectives.

The disassociation of educational infrastructure from content and practice is fundamentally flawed, particularly if “participation” in infrastructure decisions—but not in decisions which could introduce participation as an educational practice—is meant to constitute education in participation as well as participation in governance. As John Dewey stated in *Democracy and Education* (1916), the whole notion of a democratic education prohibits aims of a particular process from being set up outside that process. Or as Paulo Freire put it, “Nothing threatened the correct development of popular emergence more than an educational practice which failed to offer opportunities for the analysis and debate of problems, or for genuine participation; one which not only did not identify with the trend toward democratization but reinforced our lack of democratic experience (1973, 36).”

The last important piece of Popular Participation is the funding mechanism, revenue sharing. Listed in Popular Participation are the national revenues of the state deposited into the National Treasury and available to fund Popular Participation.

They are:

- the value-add tax (VAT)
- VAT's complementary regimen
- the tax on the assessed revenues of the corporations
- the transactions tax
- the tax on specific consumptions
- the Consolidated Customs Tax
- the tax on inheritance
- the tax on departures to foreign countries.

Of the above listed monies, 20% is assigned to the municipal governments to fund Popular Participation. Furthermore, at least 85% of the revenue sharing funds must be used for “public investment,” and “all expenses incurred as a result of responsibilities assigned by Law 1551 will be considered investment, with the exception of salaries (Miró i Pascual, 2000, 329).” In order to receive funds from the national government, each municipal government must prepare and submit an Annual Operating Plan and Municipal Budget, as well as reports on the previous year's budget and expenditures. Revenue sharing funds are distributed on a per-capita basis, and the number of inhabitants of any given municipality are determined every five years by national censuses (conducted every 10 years) and inter-censal demographic studies. The initial numbers came from the 1992 National Population and Housing Census, the next study was a 1996 inter-censal demographic study and the most recent numbers come from the 2000 National Census.

*Supreme Decree 23813*¹¹

Supreme Decree 23813 came just a few months after Popular Participation and was largely repetitive, though there were some significant pieces to it. It was concerned with the rules and regulations for the Popular Participation Law. First, the Treasury Department was given responsibility for determining the correct division of the national population into municipalities. Furthermore, the Treasury Department was explicitly designated as the government ministry responsible for evaluating the correct execution of the Annual Operating Plans and for verifying the correct utilization of Popular Participation funds. Also, the percentage of funds mandated for public investment rose from 85% to 90%.

With regard to education, the municipal responsibility for education was expanded to all state educational institutions, including pre-school, primary, secondary and alternative education, although public universities remained a separate entity. The municipalities were also given responsibility for the furniture and didactic material for education. Additional assistance for these expanded responsibilities was to come from the National Secretary of Education, who was charged with providing technical assistance, donations and credit, using both national and international resources, within the constraints of its own budgetary resources.

Finally, this decree laid out the municipalities for the country. There are nine departments (states) in Bolivia, and the breakdown of municipal areas is as follows.

- La Paz 74
- Santa Cruz 46

¹¹ Supreme Decree translations are from the author and Dr. Tom Owens. For Spanish versions of Supreme Decree 23813 see Bolivia, 1995a; Bolivia, 1995b; Bolivia 1997a.

- Cochabamba 44
- Oruro 30
- Potosí 38
- Chuquisaca 27
- Tarija 11
- Beni 14
- Pando 15 (although two exist only on paper)

This number is lower than the current 311 municipalities, because there were a few municipalities that were founded after the fact, the river ports were given their own municipalities and an ethnic municipality was created (Pierce, 1998).

*Supreme Decree 23858*¹²

This followed in September 1994 shortly after the first decree. Decree 23858 was concerned with rules and regulations for the Grassroots Territorial Organizations and Oversight Committees. Again, much of this decree repeated the Popular Participation Law, although there were some important aspects of the law that were operationalized. First, what constituted an indigenous population, rural community or neighborhood council was clearly defined. An indigenous population is a population descended from pre-conquest/colonization populations, that possesses “history, organization, language or dialect and other cultural characteristics” with which its members can be identified, as well as a functional territorial bond. A rural community is the basic social organization unit for families that share a common territory “in which they develop their productive,

¹² For Spanish versions of Supreme Decree 23858 see Bolivia, 1994; Bolivia, 1995a; Bolivia, 1995b; Bolivia 1997a.

economic, social and cultural activities.” A neighborhood council is the association of people whose primary domicile is within a specified neighborhood. Its purpose is “conserving, demanding and obtaining the benefit of public services, [and] developing its productive, economic, social and cultural activities with its territorial space.”

The steps for gaining juridical status were also delineated. A Grassroots Territorial Organization must present to the Municipal Council documents that identify it as a legitimate representative of the territorial space it is claiming. Such documents include minutes from meetings and/or public assemblies as well as acts or statutes that designate representatives. The Municipal Council must verify these documents and, if they are in order, provide a favorable resolution for the petition. The documents and the resolution must then be taken to the Municipal Government, which has 15 days to publicize the petition. If there is no dispute, they also must provide a favorable resolution. The documents then go to the Department Prefect (a position roughly corresponding to our state governor). Once the documents are on file in the Prefect, the Organizations can immediately begin operating within the Popular Participation framework. The final step in the process is for the Prefect to forward the papers to the National Secretariat for Popular Participation.

The Oversight Committee was also addressed in the decree. As was stated in Law 1551, the Organizations elect Oversight Committee representatives who serve one-year terms with the possibility for re-election. The Committee is to be provided offices and the means for transportation free of charge by the municipality, in order to keep the Organizations informed of municipal government activities. To that end, the Committee can request documentation of activities from the municipal government and make

recommendations on behalf of the Organizations. To be eligible for the Oversight Committee, a person must be a citizen of Bolivia, nominated by an Organization and a member of the community he/she will represent.

*Supreme Decree 24447*¹³

While the early decrees immediately followed Popular Participation and were concerned with creating the proper national environment and local governance structures, respectively, the next major document came a few years later, in 1997, and was more concerned with services and uses. Health, education, sports, sanitation and culture were addressed in this document. With respect to education, Decree 24447 created the Local Directorate of Education, charged with managing services for formal and alternative education within the municipal jurisdiction. The Directorate is composed of 1) the mayor or his representative, 2) the District Education Director from the Prefect and 3) a representative from the Oversight Committee; and is charged with the following functions:

- propose to the municipal government the final budget for the administration and maintenance of the educational infrastructure, as well as the provision of basic services and supplies of educational materials for formal and alternative education services
- to manage, in the presence of the Prefect Educational Authorities, the sufficient allocation of items for the population's educational needs
- effect the continuation and evaluation of educational management

¹³ For Spanish versions of Supreme Decree 24447 see Bolivia, 1997a and Bolivia 1997b.

- propose and manage the subscription of agreements for the provision of formal and alternative educational services with private institutions for social development, religious institutions, foundations and non-governmental organizations
- channel the requests for ratification or change of education authorities
- promote resolution of conflicts that cannot be solved in the neighborhood schools
- develop and approve the Directorate's working rules and regulations.

This decree also created in each municipality a Center for Pedagogical Resources, composed of a library as well as materials and equipment intended to aid the educational process. The National Secretariat for Education is responsible for co-financing the acquisition of materials, which are to be transferred to the municipalities as part of the infrastructure and educational equipment. The municipal government is responsible for providing physical space for the Center so area schools can access the materials, the administration of the Center and the maintenance and replacement of Center materials and equipment.

Intended Implementation

The Bolivian government had very specific ideas about how Popular Participation was intended to work, and they put significant resources into educating the population on the program and its proper implementation. In August 1994, the *Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Medio Ambiente* (Ministry of Sustainable Development and Environment) published a comprehensive implementation plan. The plan covered two years, from October 1994 to December 1996, and included everything from mapping the

districts to assisting with administrative, legal and economic adjustments, to a massive educational and promotional program for Popular Participation. Because public services that are considered vitally important, especially health and education, were being turned over to the municipalities, the federal government wanted to be sure that local governments thoroughly understood both their responsibilities and rights. To that end several promotional and instructional materials were published¹⁴ and educators were dispatched to all parts of the country. The specific objectives of the educational program were promoting Popular Participation, elaborating juridical/legal issues and legislation, strengthening municipal governments and Grassroots Organizations and assisting with economic and financial issues, such as the revenue sharing program.

The work took place in a variety of seminars and workshops. According to the implementation plan, education began with a series of general workshops. General Workshop A was conducted for pre-existing institutions (such as Regional Development Corporations) and covered the new legislation. General Workshop B was conducted for the municipal governments and also explained the new legislation. Finally, General Workshop C was a similar workshop for civil society (churches, academicians, etc.). Following the general workshops was a series of specialized workshops organized around specialized work areas and presented in stages. The first area covered was territorial administration and focused on the municipalities and districts. The second focused on the Grassroots Organizations and covered the entire two-year training period. The third dealt with municipal government and covered many of the bureaucratic aspects (e.g., project management and information dissemination) of Popular Participation. The final area

¹⁴ See Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1996b; Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Medio Ambiente, 1994; Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1995.

covered was economic-financial aspects and dealt with issues such as capitation formula, money transfers from revenue sharing and investment and evaluation (Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Medio Ambiente, 1994). The more formal educational aspects were complemented by an extensive mass media campaign, including radio broadcasts, television programs, pamphlets and bulletins, including some pictorial materials for those who are illiterate and/or do not speak Spanish, and over half a million copies of the law itself. By most accounts the education program was a success¹⁵. The subsequent policies, however, did not receive the same fanfare as Popular Participation, despite the fact that many of them made substantive changes to it. Furthermore, the lack of civil society participation in setting the Popular Participation training agenda cast a shadow across the whole process, calling into question how truly educative and democratic such a process can be (Dewey, 1897; Dewey, 1916; Freire, 1970; Freire, 1973).

Analyses of Popular Participation

It would seem, after such an intensive and extensive training program, that implementation would proceed rather smoothly, but the few studies conducted so far indicate that has not been the case. There have been a few slim discussion papers published in Bolivia on Popular Participation, almost all of which have been based on empirical participant and non-participant observation of implementation in rural areas. Most of the papers (Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1996c; Lenz B., 1999; Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1997; Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificación, 1998) have noted districting problems, particularly the fact that the district and the Grassroots

¹⁵ See, for example, Margaret Hollis Pierce's discussion of knowledge of Popular Participation in her dissertation.

organizations are not always coterminous. This situation begins to create conflicts of interest and competition for municipal resources among groups that should ideally be working together. It also opens the door for people who live outside the district or canton—who are nonetheless associated with some social group or Grassroots Organization—to assume leadership positions outside the areas in which they were meant to participate. Others (Blanes Jiménez, 2000 and Andersson, 1999) have noted that new relationships engendered by the implementation of Popular Participation, particularly the Grassroots Organization-Oversight Committee-Municipal Government chain of command, are more hierarchical and combative than before. Furthermore, since many of the people initially elected were the pre-existing local elite, the favoritism and corruption continued unabated. Only two instances of research were found that discussed urban areas (Lenz B., 1999 and Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificación, 1998). Both studies dismissed the urban areas as too large and heterogeneous to be participatory and democratic.

Two dissertations written on Popular Participation both studied rural areas. In her dissertation, Margaret Hollis Pierce found many of the same problems that the Bolivian researchers found, including districting problems, which she characterized as problems with 1) jurisdiction and border disputes, 2) parallel leaders, leadership disputes and civil society and 3) recentralization. She also noted administrative problems that she characterized as problems with 1) weak vigilance committees, 2) paternalism, 3) lack of planning and implementation capacity, 4) corruption, 5) increased costs and 6) low levels of participation (1998). Josep María Miró i Pascual also found that districting posed problems for Popular Participation and that the problem was one of scale; the physical

territories upon which Popular Participation's municipalization scheme was based were not functionally representative. Creating a dualism between peasant society and state made it impossible for the peasants to become the state. He also found that in Mizque, where he conducted his research, NGOs had assumed a leadership position and popular participation was, in fact, merely social involvement (2000). With regard to projects that actually were undertaken, both researchers noted a preference for high-profile, politically motivated projects at the expense of substantive, desperately needed infrastructure projects.

The dissertations that studied rural areas have written off the urban areas as continuing to conduct business as usual. In her study of Tupiza, Margaret Hollis Pierce noted that

the large, previously well-funded municipalities (i.e., La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz) already have established budget allocation processes, as well as substantial local tax revenues, and appear to see no need to include their constituency in decisionmaking. Apparently, 'the politicians know best.' The phenomenon was described by a Bolivian scholar as a case of not being able to teach an old dog new tricks (Pierce, 1998, 95).

Pierce goes on to describe La Paz's funding of aesthetic, rather than substantive, initial projects, in much the same way her rural municipality did. She did not, however, explore the implications of "business as usual" in the urban areas, nor did Miró i Pascual. This should have caused some concern among researchers interested in implementation, because all major urban areas had been redrawn to include some rural districts within the

urban municipalities. That a differently incorporated urban area would not experience at least a hiccup or two in governance should have been a red flag, not only for researchers, but also for government administrators and civil society. While large municipalities do have the budget and governance structures in place Pierce described, they nonetheless would have had to be modified somewhat. Furthermore, civil society participation is not something local governments could have easily ignored, especially during the initial period of implementation, which saw significant civil society engagement.

The perceived lack of change in urban areas suggests that those in power have found some way to appropriate the implementation process. And if those in power in the urban areas have usurped power as they did in rural areas, then the infrastructure of public schools—which are wholly the responsibility of the municipal government, but where programs are not immediately visible nor politically beneficial—should be suffering from the same districting frustrations and implementation co-opting problems as the rural areas. Furthermore, if it is indeed business as usual, there should be evidence of continuing problems with legitimacy, corruption and a sharp divide between the urban and rural districts within the municipalities. Finally, there should be evidence of some kind of retrenching and/or increased control on the part of the local government, which most likely would also exclude civil society. Unfortunately, all of these phenomena are easily found in Cochabamba.

Conclusion


This chapter introduces decentralization as it is understood and advocated by the international development community. Decentralization for development should

combine both popular democratic participation (devolving some of the centralized government's powers) and a mechanism for promoting economic growth (deregulating markets). Recent initiatives such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, the Comprehensive Development Framework and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers are introduced and briefly explained.

The chapter includes a discussion of the historical antecedents, genesis and intended implementation of Popular Participation. Please see Figure 1 for a flowchart showing the expected relationship between the various actors. The text of the Popular Participation Law and its major Supreme Decrees, particularly as they related to education, are also discussed. Finally, the chapter presents a discussion of the few studies of implementation in the rural areas and the need for research on implementation in the urban areas.

The following chapter introduces a definition of policy that locates it in the implementation process and the resultant ethnographic work required to obtain the data for evaluation of policy-as-implementation. Chapter 4 discusses the policy context in which implementation took place during the time of study. Chapter 5 presents the data obtained from research. Chapter 6 analyzes the data and Chapter 7 presents the conclusions.

Figure 1. Flowchart of Popular Participation Governance Structure.



Chapter 3

Methodology

Introduction

Chapter 1 introduced the global relationship between underdevelopment and education, as well as the specific case of Bolivia. Bolivia's latest effort, the Law of Popular Participation, was also introduced, as were the implementation difficulties in rural areas and the need for research on urban areas. Chapter 2 focused on the history of decentralization in development, including several new initiatives in the last few years. Furthermore, the history of Popular Participation, the legislation itself and the most important codifications of it were presented, as well as the few studies that have been conducted on Popular Participation in Bolivia so far.

This chapter provides the definition of policy that guides the analysis of Popular Participation in Bolivia and the rationale for the definition. It outlines the research design dictated by the definition and the concomitant ethnographic methodology: observations, interviews and documentary analysis.

Definition of Policy

Guba (1983) states that policy is not defined in any consistent way, and in fact is rarely defined at all. Most authors have their own implicit definitions in mind and assume that readers know what they mean when they use the word "policy." The assumption not only leads to miscommunication and confusion, but the assumed definition of policy "determines the kinds of policy questions that are asked, the kinds of

policy-relevant data that are collected, the sources of data that are tapped, the methodology that is used, and, finally, the policy products that emerge (33).” Because this study is concerned with how Popular Participation is implemented in an urban area, it utilizes Guba’s definition of policy as *a strategy undertaken to solve or ameliorate some problem* (Guba, 1983, 64). The data sources most appropriate for this definition are the various implementers of the policy and the most appropriate methodologies include interviews, observations and document analyses. In the policy implementation literature, to the extent that the researcher articulates a view of policy that focuses on implementation, the methodology is remarkably consistent. Below are several examples of publications that 1) define policy, or at least the aspect of policy being studied, as implementation and 2) that rely on qualitative data for their analyses.

Reimers and McGinn made an observation similar to Guba’s, that “different types of policy analysis and dialogue will be appropriate depending on the issues which they address (1997, 39),” and consider a valid definition of policy to be “the product of competing internal and external interests (36).” This definition considers organizations as actors in the policy process and as the most appropriate unit of analysis. Furthermore, they see policy analysis taking place in a “dialogue space” where multiple stakeholders interact, and it is in this space that observations and interviews can be made.

Hall and Loucks, in a publication that predates Guba, conducted a study to measure the implementation or non-implementation of educational innovations. While not explicitly identifying implementation as the policy instrument under analysis, they did make explicit their study’s critique of the idea that “implementation of the innovation is assumed once the adoption decision has been made, or it is included with little

description in the adoption/adaptation phase (1977, 264).” They proposed using a scale called the Levels of Use that is measured through focused interviews with teachers. Such interviews helped create the levels and criteria for the scale.

In a similar study, Michael Knapp looked at systemic reforms in math and science in the US, and considered systemic reform as policy implementation a valid viewpoint. “This line of thinking pays special attention to the interaction of policies with their contexts at each stage in the process...and argues, in effect, that contextual factors exert ultimate control over the actual direction of policy as ‘delivered’ to ‘service recipients’ (1997, 251).” Much of the context Knapp discusses is created by attributes of individuals and organizations that are accessed through observing and interviewing actors in the policy process.

A parallel study conducted by Cohen and Ball, in a “special issue [that] probes the relations between instructional policy and classroom practice” (1990, 348), studied how mathematics reform in California was implemented in classrooms. The methodology employed in the study combined classroom observations and interviews with teachers and state and local officials.

In the last study of specific cases presented here, Tim Mazzoni conducted a meta-analysis of 20 existing case studies on Minnesota educational issues from 1971 to 1991. The case studies largely applied a “systems orientation to state policy making. The emphasis is on influence relationships among key actors—*individuals, groups, and coalitions*—as demands are converted into decisions. Particular attention is given to actor involvement in the processes of initiation, formulation, aggregation and *enactment* (1993, 359, emphasis added).” He went on to note that all the case studies, except possibly one,

conducted interviews and observations frequently complemented by documentary analyses.

Finally, Milbrey McLaughlin, in his analysis of the policy implementation literature, found that the second-generation analysts, as he called them, “began to unpack implementation processes and to zero in on relations between policy and practice (1987, 171).”

A related lesson from detailed studies of the implementation process is that change ultimately is a problem of the smallest unit. At each point in the policy process, a policy is transformed as individuals interpret and respond to it. What actually is delivered or provided under the aegis of a policy depends finally on the individual at the end of the line, or the ‘street level bureaucrat’ (1987, 174).

One can see that in the instances where the stated objective is to study policy implementation, or implementation as policy, the research methodology required is qualitative study of individuals and/or organizations through observations, interviews and documentary analyses.

Unit of Analysis

Accordingly, the unit of analysis for this study is organizations (see Figure 1 in Chapter 2 for the organizations involved in Popular Participation) and individuals. Organizations, specifically Grassroots Organizations, are the defined subject of Popular Participation, but they are organizations composed of people who share a common territory and, it is assumed, common goals. Furthermore, Popular Participation provides

for an individual, not the whole of the organization, to represent the group's interests in dialogue with the Oversight Committees, local, regional and national government and private organizations. As such, it is the interaction of individuals, both between and within groups that was observed, the observations were complemented with interviews and juxtaposed against written records. In order to 1) keep this project to a manageable size in a major urban area, 2) study a public service for which the municipal government has complete responsibility and 3) study an aspect of development that all the actors (from individuals to supranational organizations) have identified as necessary and required, the study examined the implementation of Popular Participation with regards to the public education infrastructure in Cochabamba.

Research Question

Given the definition of policy used and the unit of analysis it dictates, the research question guiding this study is:

Has Popular Participation, viewed through the lens of public education, ameliorated any of problems it was intended to address, namely government's legitimacy, corruption and/or the rural/urban divide?

Design

Defining policy as a strategy to undertaken to solve or ameliorate some problem necessarily constrains choices of research design and methodology. Because the study is of the implementation of Popular Participation, particularly given its genesis and introduction, its focus is on the various actors. The policy analysis documents that accept

implementation as a valid definition are strikingly similar in their advocacy of ethnographic work as an appropriate methodology (Reimers and McGinn, 1997; Hall and Loucks, 1977; Knapp, 1997; Cohen and Ball, 1990; Mazzoni, 1993; McLaughlin, 1987). Therefore, the key elements of this research project are observations, interviews and documentary analyses.

Observations

The original intention was to observe in schools in Cochabamba, as well as in the surrounding community. However, observations in schools would have included a vulnerable population (minors) in the research project. The University of Oklahoma's Institutional Review Board had some concerns about including said vulnerable population in this study, even incidentally, which necessitated removing observations *in* schools from the research protocol and substituting observations *of* schools as public institutions and as a part of their respective communities. Additionally, some school administrators in Bolivia expressed concern about student safety and confidentiality when asked about possible brief tours of school grounds, making the change a fortuitous one. The communities surrounding the schools were also observed.

The communities, properly known as districts within a municipality, were purposively chosen. This method was employed over random sampling for two reasons. First, sample communities and schools were to serve a specific purpose, namely to gain as complete a picture as possible of diversity and heterogeneity in Cochabamba. Previous visits had shown that different sections of the city gave widely varying results with regard to income, sex and ethnicity of those involved in education. Second,

purposive sampling allowed for sampling flexibility in the field (Creswell, 1998; Bernard, 1995). This was critical because several documents, including the Ministry of Education's list of public schools, the municipality's list of OTBs and maps of the communities disqualified some initially identified cases but also provided new ones.

The initial stratification was by location within the municipality of Cochabamba limits. Location is strongly correlated with socioeconomic status and ethnicity. Once districts were identified that covered the various types of neighborhoods within the city and a variety of socioeconomic groups, the districts were checked against the most recent list from the Ministry of Education for the presence of a public school within the district. The Cochabamba municipality did not have, or would not provide, a list of the schools for which it was responsible. Rural districts had to be disqualified because they had no public school within their boundaries, according to the Ministry of Education's list of schools, although there probably are *convenio* schools in those districts. *Convenio* schools are public schools that are provided at the request of the community and having appreciably more community or private support than a traditional public school. The closest analogy in the United States is a charter school.

Once districts and schools were identified, observations began. The researcher did not live in any district identified for this study and was not a teacher or parent at any of the schools; therefore the observations were direct and reactive. The study examined districts for 1) the socioeconomic status of the neighborhoods, 2) the presence or absence of public works maintenance, which is the responsibility of the municipality, 3) signs of civil society activity, such as office spaces for civil society organizations, flyers or posters announcing meetings or events, propaganda supporting or denouncing activities

undertaken in the district and 4) other issues that emerged. For the poorer districts in particular, other issues included the form of campaigning and political propaganda for the upcoming presidential election (held the month after research ended). With regard to schools, the information sought included 1) evidence of municipal attention or inattention, such as the overall condition of physical facilities, the location of the school within the district and the size of the school, 2) any overt evidence of civil society participation in education, such as a meeting or resource room for parents, the presence or absence of parents in the school and flyers or notices for meetings and 3) other issues that emerged during the study.

Interviews

The interview protocol, like the observation protocol, was also modified. The original plan was to conduct unstructured interviews with civil society, use the data from those interviews to construct a semi-structured interview schedule and then conduct semi-structured interviews with various government officials. Three issues arose in the field. First, only about 20% of the civil society representatives identified for the study responded to requests for interviews (see Chapter 5), and they were among the last to respond although they were among the first to be approached. Therefore, building a semi-structured interview protocol from their responses simply was not feasible. Second, institutional board approval was sought and given for the unstructured interview protocol only. Third, there were some very interesting responses to interview questions, both in terms of how the questions were understood and how the questions were answered (or not answered) that led the researcher to conclude open-ended questions were more

appropriate for the information being sought. “Unstructured interviews are based on a clear plan that you keep constantly in mind, but are also characterized by a minimum of control over the informant’s responses (Bernard, 1995, 209).” Given the three issues, the researcher decided in the field to conduct unstructured interviews only.

Above and beyond those three issues was an IRB concern for the safety and confidentiality of interview respondents. In order to provide research participants the greatest possible confidentiality, no names were collected, nor were any respondents allowed to say their name or anyone else’s during the interview; if a name was accidentally mentioned the researcher stopped the interview, rewound the tape to the point where the name was mentioned and recorded over that section. The analysis of interview comments in Chapter 5 is just that, an analysis of the *comments*—the respondents are not described or discussed. Appendix B contains my general impressions of the teachers and school directors who participated in this study; they were the only interview respondents with whom I had multiple visits and of whom I was able to form some kind of impression. A great deal more data about the interview respondents exists in the field journal, the field diary and in the researcher’s memory, but IRB concerns and restrictions prohibit the inclusion of that information in this dissertation.

Considering that Popular Participation was intended to address government legitimacy, corruption and the rural/urban divide through facilitating the involvement of civil society in issues of planning, management and funding of public social services including education, the interview questions dealt with these specific issues:

1. Do you think access to education has been improved by Popular Participation?
2. Do you think education practice has been improved by Popular Participation?

3. Do you feel education is adequately funded by Popular Participation?
4. Do you feel you and your community's concerns are being addressed?
5. Are there any other outcomes or changes you desire?

As most of these questions can be answered with a simple yes or no, when the researcher received only “yes” or “no” in response to a question, she would prompt with the question “Why do you think...?” The majority of interview respondents provided detailed answers without prompting; the few who were prompted typically responded to the first prompt with a candor equal to those who did not require prompting. No one said they were uncomfortable answering a question, although a few did decline to respond because they did not know the subject matter very well.

Questions one and two address government legitimacy by gauging the perceived level of government concern about, and response to, civil society's needs. In Bolivia, any parent who can afford it sends their child to a private school. The perception of public schools is that they are unresponsive, indifferent government institutions that offer an inexcusably inferior education, and the only children who attend public school are children whose parents value education but lack the means to provide a quality one. As a general rule, parents of public school children are somewhat politically aware and involved in their communities, but they lack the resources to occupy traditional positions of power. To the extent that a public institution like a school is responsive to the needs of this particular segment of the citizenry, the government is perceived as legitimate—or at least making a legitimate attempt—by a substantial segment of society.

Question three measures public perception of corruption. There are two important reasons why *funding* is used as the proxy for corruption. First, to ask a Bolivian if the

government is corrupt is to ask an insultingly simple minded question that will call into question the intent of the researcher and stymie the conversation, not encourage it. All Bolivians believe the government is corrupt, and given the government's poor performance both historically and currently (see Chapter 5), this belief certainly seems to be substantiated. Second, although many Americans see bribery and corruption as largely overlapping—at times even interchangeable—Bolivians see them as two separate things, based mainly on who initiates the activity. A bribe is something any ordinary citizen can use to get an important task done and/or to get out of trouble. Everyone knows bribery occurs and most people have developed highly effective means for using bribery to their advantage. Anyone who is in trouble with a government official or agency because of something like missing papers, speeding, or being in the country illegally need only say “¿Podemos arreglar esto?” which literally means “Can we fix this?” but is code for “How much is this bribe going to cost?” The government official, after a few exploratory questions, will name a figure for a “fine” that makes the problem disappear. On the other hand, a corrupt official is someone who takes money from government programs—before a bribe can be offered—and/or stops a project altogether for what appear to be purely selfish or malicious reasons. In order to gauge whether or not civil society believes corruption is being ameliorated, their perceptions of funding for a project or program are much more appropriate than their attitudes about expenditures.

Question four was originally intended to assess the rural/urban divide by comparing urban district responses to rural ones. As no rural districts were included in the study that obviously could not take place. The researcher was fortunate enough,

however, to talk to a few teachers who live in rural areas as well as a very few conscientious government officials.

Question five was meant to give interview respondents the opportunity to expound on answers given to a previous question or to cover any topic he or she felt was not adequately covered by the preceding four questions. While many respondents took this question as an opportunity to share information and opinions not related to Popular Participation, other provided some very valuable points of clarification.

In Bolivia, the researcher hired a research assistant who was primarily responsible for supporting transcription and translation efforts. Every person who agreed to participate in the interviews, which were conducted on a voluntary basis only, was given two letters in Spanish. The first was an informed consent letter/letter of introduction from the University of Oklahoma and the second was a letter of introduction from the *Universidad Privada Boliviana*, a private university in Cochabamba where the researcher previously worked. Additionally, all respondents were provided with the interview protocol in both Spanish and English and were given the opportunity to decline participation and/or taping. Completed respondents' interviews, the tapes on which they had been recorded, signed informed consent letters and the laptop computer on which work was done were kept locked at home. All physical and electronic data were coded so that no person's name appeared on any research material save the informed consent letters, which were kept separate from the interview tapes.

Documentary Analyses

Finally, documentary analyses both set the stage for and complemented the observations and interviews. According to Jenny Ozga, “[u]sing policy texts as a research resource is one of the most accessible forms of research on education policy, and is to be commended not just for its accessibility, but because close reading of policy texts helps to generate critical, informed and independent responses to policy. Reading and interpreting texts can be an act of engagement with policy, for the researcher and those with whom she or he works (2000, 107).” Critically reading and re-reading policy documents reveals key words and phrases which expose the assumptions of policymakers, while analyzing the tone of documents reveals how and when policymakers believe things should happen (Ozga, 2000). Since the study’s definition of policy revolves around and is located within implementation, it defined policy documents very broadly to include all documents produced by, or because of, the implementation process. The documents included budget recommendations, budgets, operating plans, legal forms (such as registration for juridical status), training materials and, of course, the actual policies and regulations themselves. Also included were all documents created in the course of the research project, specifically the researcher’s field journal, diary and the interview responses. Because of the stir Popular Participation caused when it became law, and the public debate it engendered, the study employed relevant newspaper articles for contextual information, particularly *Los Tiempos*, the major daily newspaper published in Cochabamba. The most telling documents, though, were undoubtedly the papers prepared by and for the multinational agencies.

Triangulation

Because the data for this project were qualitative data and not especially amenable to the same validity and reliability measures as quantitative data, the researcher used triangulation to check all work. Triangulation uses multiple sources of data to check the accuracy of other work (particularly interviews) to corroborate information and to confirm hypotheses or conclusions (Creswell, 1998; LeCompte and Schensul, 1999a and 1999b; Reinharz, 1992; Fraenkel and Wallen, 2000). “Triangulation involves confirming or cross-checking the accuracy of data obtained from one source with data collected from other, different sources” (LeCompte and Schensul, 1999b, 131). Specifically, data from interviews were cross-checked with documentary data.

Conclusion

To conduct a policy analysis, policy must be clearly defined. The definition of policy under which one operates constrains the types of questions asked and the methodology employed to answer them. For this research project, policy is defined as a strategy undertaken to solve or ameliorate a problem. The qualitative research methodology required by the definition includes observations, interviews and documentary analyses. Observations were conducted in the community and the organizations contained within it, as well as the organizations representing it. Observations were also conducted of the public schools. Interviews were conducted with representatives of organizations, as well as with representatives of various levels of government. Finally, documentary analyses were used to triangulate results of both observations and interviews. Table 1 below presents the initial organizational matrix of

the research project, Table 2 presents the final data matrix. The next chapter discusses the policy context within which the project was carried out, and Chapter 5 presents the data generated by this study. Chapter 6 analyzes the data from Chapters 4 and 5, and Chapter 7 presents conclusions and recommendations based on it.

Table 1 - Initial Data Source Matrix

	Observations	Interviews	Documentary Analysis
Community	X		Field journal
Schools	X	Teachers Administrators	Field journal Interview notes and transcripts
Center for Pedagogical Resources	X	Administrators	Holdings Field journal
Grassroots Organizations	X	Members O.C. Reps	Meeting minutes Budget recommendations Field journal
Oversight Committee	X	Members	Meeting minutes Budget recommendations Field journal
Private and Non-governmental Organizations		Administrators	Proposals Information sheets and bulletins Promotional materials
Municipal Government		Mayor's Office	Annual Operating Plans Municipal Budgets
Local Directorate for Education		Officers	Budget recommendations
Regional Government		Education officers	G.O. registrations
National Government		Treasury Dept. VPPFM Natl. Sec. for Ed.	Policies Supreme Decrees

Table 2 - Final Data Matrix

	Observations	Interviews	Documentary Analysis
Schools			newspaper articles
School 1	X	Director	field journal & diary
School 2	X	Dir. & Teachers	field journal & diary
School 3	X	Director	field journal & diary
School 5	X	Teacher	field journal & diary
School 8	X	Director	field journal & diary
School 10	X	Teacher	field journal & diary
TTI & PO			
Unv. San Simón	X	Professor	field journal & diary
Normal Católica	X	Professor	field journal & diary
Casa Pedagógica	X	Director	field journal & diary training materials
Fed. de Maestros		declined to be interview	
Civil Society			newspaper articles
OTB 1 & District	X	did not respond	field journal & diary
OTB2 & District	X	group interview	field journal & diary
OTB3 & District	X	did not respond	field journal & diary
OTB5 & District	X	declined to be interviewed	field journal & diary
OTB 8 & District	X	group interview	field journal & diary
OTB 10 & District	X	does not exist	field journal & diary
Vigilance Comm.		did not respond	
ICDF		unable to locate	
Save the Children		unable to locate	
CIPDC		unable to locate	
CSESRB		unable to locate	
CSHED		unable to locate	
Ed. Audiovisuals		unable to locate	
RCMS		unable to locate	
CINEP		doesn't work in Cochabamba	
CEBIAE		employee	field journal & diary
Municipal Govt.			annual operating budgets strategic development plan newspaper articles
Health & Ed. Prom.		employee	field journal & diary brochures
Municipal Council 1		employee	field journal & diary
Municipal Council 2		employee	field journal & diary
Dist. Dir. of Ed.		Director	field journal & diary
Civic Comm.		member?	field journal & diary
Ctr. for Ped. Rsrce.		does not exist	

State Government			
SEDUCA		employee	field journal & diary
State Off. for PP		declined to participate	
National Govt.			policies newspaper articles
Treasury Dept.		unable to locate	
VPPFM		declined to be interviewed	
Ministry of Ed.		employee	field journal & diary
Multinatl. Orgs.			policies newspaper articles
IMF		did not respond	
World Bank		did not respond	
IDB		unable to locate	

ICDF–International Children’s Defense Fund

CIPDC–Center for the Investigation, Promotion and Development of the City

CESRB–Center for the Study of the Economic and Social Reality of Bolivia

CSHED–Center for Social, Health and Educational Diagnosis

RCMS–Regional Center for Multidisciplinary Studies

CINEP–Popular Education and Investigation Center

CEBIAE–Bolivian Center for Educational Investigation and Action

SEDUCA–Departmental Secretariat for Education

VPPFM–Vice-Ministry for Popular Participation and Financial Management

IMF–International Monetary Fund

IDB–Inter-American Development Bank

Chapter 4

Current Policy Context

Introduction

Chapter 1 presented the relationship between education, the condition of underdevelopment in Bolivia, Bolivia's policy effort for remediation, the Popular Participation Law and the need for research on Popular Participation in urban areas. Chapter 2 provided the historical context of decentralization in development and the Popular Participation Law. Chapter 3 presented the definition of policy employed for this research project and outlined the qualitative methodology developed from the definition.

This chapter discusses the international, national and local policy contexts for the implementation of Popular Participation in Cochabamba. In particular it shows, by tracing through time the policy environment created by successive documents, that Popular Participation is being increasingly marginalized by the heavy bureaucratization required by later policy documents, particularly those originating at the national and especially the multinational level. These policy trends support, and in turn are supported by, the observations and interviews from Cochabamba presented in Chapter 5.

One very important caveat that must be stated is that this chapter describes the policy context only as it relates to Popular Participation and education. Many of the policy documents considered herein are large, comprehensive documents covering a variety of topics: roads, communication infrastructures, ecological and environmental issues, tourism and various other public works. To attempt comprehensive coverage of every policy associated with Popular Participation would produce a chapter too long and

convoluted to be comprehensible. Therefore this study purposefully limits the discussion to the intersection of Popular Participation and education and the policy documents that are the most relevant to that intersection. This chapter is not a comprehensive policy review. Even if that were the intent, it would not be possible. Given continuing problems with corruption in Bolivia, time lag in authoring and electronically posting documents and the inevitable technology problems, this chapter is solely a discussion of policies and policy issues relevant to the research project during the research period.

International Context

Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America. There are fairly standard measures of poverty, including size of the economy (Gross National Product [GNP] and GNP per capita), quality of life indicators (prevalence of child malnutrition, life expectancy at birth, and adult illiteracy rate), percentage of population living below international poverty lines, educational indicators (public expenditure on education, net enrollments, expected years of schooling, and percent of an age cohort reaching grade 5), health indicators (public expenditure on health, infant mortality rate, maternal mortality rate, contraceptive rate, and total fertility rate), balance of payments, and aid and financial flows. For all the indicators, Bolivia consistently ranks among the lowest in the Americas and has numbers closer to sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2001; World Bank, 2002; World Bank, 2003; World Bank, 2004). Table 3 shows selected indicators for Bolivia, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. In the face of such tremendous obstacles, it comes as no surprise that Bolivia is heavily dependent on foreign aid. Because of Bolivia's great need, its creditors wield considerable influence over domestic

policy through conditionalities attached to loans. It is important to understand the larger context in which Popular Participation and education are being conducted in Bolivia, especially when one considers the significant resources the loans contribute to the implementation of Popular Participation and the exercise of education.

Table 3. Comparison of Select Development Indicators

Country	Size of Economy		Quality of Life Indicators				Educational Indicators				Health Indicators					Aid	
	GNP (\$b)	GNP per capita (dollar)	child malnutrition	life expect at birth	adult illit rate		pub spend on ed (% of GDP)	net enroll in primary	expect years of school	% cohort to grade 5	public expend on health	infant mortal	mater mortal	contra-ception rate	fertility rate	balance of pay (\$m)	net aid (\$m)
Bolivia	8.2	1010	8	63	14	38.6	4.9	97	--	--	4.9	77	550	49	4.1	-675	729
Argentina	277.9	7600	--	74	3	--	3.5	100	--	--	4.7	19	85	--	2.6	-7335	151
Peru	60.3	2390	7	69	10	41.4	2.9	94	--	--	2.8	39	240	64	3.1	-1484	451
Mexico	428.8	4400	8	73	9	37.7	4.9	100	--	86	2.5	29	65	65	2.8	-13,056	75
Haiti	3.6	460	17	53	50	--	--	--	--	34	2.4	123	1100	18	4.3	-12	166
Latin America & Caribbean	1954.9	3840	--	70	12	--	3.6	94	--	--	3.3	34	--	59	2.7	--	5985
Angola	2.7	220	--	47	--	--	--	35	7	--	2.0	260	1300	--	6.7	-1317	268
Zimbabwe	6.1	520	13	40	11	64.2	--	93	--	79	3.1	123	610	48	3.7	-346	159
Botswana	108	3240	13	39	23	61.4	8.6	80	12	93	3.8	110	480	--	4.2	120	29
Lesotho	164	550	18	44	17	65.7	8.4	69	10	87	5.2	132	530	23	4.6	234	54
Zaire (Congo)	150	670	--	51	19	--	6.1	78	--	78	1.5	108	1100	--	6.0	-460	75
Sub-Saharan Africa	320.6	500	--	47	39	--	4.1	--	--	--	2.5	171	--	21	5.4	--	13,933

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are Bretton Woods Institutes created after World War II. On December 27, 1945, 29 countries attending a conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire signed their charters, or Articles of Agreement. According to the IMF website,

The IMF was created to promote international monetary cooperation; to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade; to promote exchange stability; to assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments; *to make its general resources temporarily available to its members experiencing balance of payments difficulties under adequate safeguards*; and to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members (IMF, 5 September 1999, available online, emphasis added).

The World Bank, also created during the Bretton Woods conference, is actually five groups that work closely together: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which provides loans and development assistance; the International Development Association (IDA), which supports poverty reduction projects; the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which finances private sector projects and provides technical advice to governments; the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which encourages foreign direct investment by providing technical assistance and guarantees against loss to foreign investors; and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which assists in resolving investment disputes between foreign direct investors and host countries (World Bank,

available online). Generally speaking, when people refer to World Bank development projects, they are talking about IBRD and/or IDA projects. According to the World Bank website, the five groups that work together as the World Bank are

...the world's largest source of development assistance, providing nearly \$30 billion in loans annually to its client countries. The Bank uses its financial resources, its highly trained staff, and its extensive knowledge base to individually help the poorest people and the poorest countries, but for all its clients the Bank emphasized the need for:

- *Investing in people, particularly through basic health and education*
- Protecting the environment
- Supporting and encouraging private business development
- *Strengthening the ability of the governments to deliver quality services, efficiently and transparently*
- Promoting reforms to create a stable macroeconomic environment, conducive to investment and long-term planning
- *Focusing on social development, inclusion, governance, and institution-building as key elements of poverty reduction* (World Bank, available online, emphasis added).

In short, both the IMF and the World Bank are committed to the development and growth of member nations, and to providing assistance to member nations that need it. It is vitally important to note that both institutions are concerned with the impact of such domestic activities as governance or budgets on the international community, and that

both institutions involve themselves in domestic policies of debtor member nations¹⁶, particularly through the “conditions or conditionalities (de Moura Castro, 2002, 392)” tied to the money they lend. Conditionalities are structural adjustments (e.g., make markets open to foreign direct investment) that must be in process or met by a debtor nation in order to have loan monies disbursed. And while the IMF and the World Bank have very different responsibilities, they work very closely together to carry out those responsibilities.

In his article on the World Bank, a former employee, Claudio de Moura Castro, makes the argument that the multinational institutions “simply are not powerful enough to impose [reform] on the heavily bureaucratic and unresponsive machinery of a social ministry (2002, 397),” although he reaches that conclusion after conceding that conditionalities are a common feature of loan packages, and that the interests of richer creditor nations do have some influence, though they are not omnipotent. Most telling of all, he locates the banks’ “powerlessness” to impose reform in their inability to influence mid-level bureaucrats and local politics, and their inability to learn what works and what does not with regards to *implementation* (2002). “Discovering” an inability to accomplish something, such as to influence domestic policy, implies an effort was made to do so; therefore the policies of multinational organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the Inter-American Development Bank, in place during the time period for this research project, need to be carefully considered, especially with respect to conditionalities that could directly impact Popular Participation and/or education.

Policy documents were collected continuously from late 2000 to early 2004. During that time Bolivia was funded under four major programs through the IMF and the

¹⁶ see Frigotto, 1995; Ianni, 1996; Monteiro, 2000; and Torres, 2000—all are cited in de Moura Castro, 2002

World Bank: its third Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility/Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility(ESAF/PRGF), the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and Bolivia's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which operationalized the World Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). Additionally, under the auspices of these umbrella loan packages, multiple smaller loans were being made to fund various components. The majority of funding for projects specifically related to Popular Participation and education came from the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, and the most important of those are highlighted (see Figure 2).

Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility/Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility

The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility/Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (ESAF/PRGF) "is the IMF's low-interest lending facility for poor countries (IMF, September 2003, available online)." The intent is to make poverty reduction and growth more central to IMF and World Bank lending operations that support macroeconomic policies and to strengthen governance.

Bolivia's ESAF/PRGF was in force from 1998-2001 (IMF, 2000, available online). With regard to Popular Participation, education and decentralization, the ESAF/PRGF sought to increase social and rural development investment from 3.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 3.7% of GDP. With these funds, the government allocated greater resources for basic education, seeking thereby to improve efficiency, expand access and improve primary school completion ratios. The loan was also intended to improve school management and *involve parental and teacher participation* in forming and adopting curriculum and schedules. The targets to be met for education included modified teacher compensation that linked remuneration to performance;

decentralization of wage payment and management of teachers to the municipal level; and support for other education targets set under the HIPC. Additionally, the ESAF/PRGF sought to increase coverage and efficiency of rural development and poverty programs, to improve fiscal decentralization through better coordination between various levels of government and to privatize all remaining public enterprises (IMF, 1998, available on-line). Although the ESAF/PRGF was technically completed by the time field research began in 2002, successful performance on this and the previous two ESAFs was a prerequisite for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative

The HIPC Initiative is a relatively new program for the IMF and the World Bank. It was proposed in September 1996, approved in September 1999, and initially offered to 41 countries, including Bolivia. The purpose of the HIPC Initiative is “to provide exceptional assistance to eligible countries following sound economic policies to help them reduce their external debt burden to sustainable levels” (IMF, September 2000, available on-line). The criteria for eligibility are: be eligible for concessional assistance from the IMF and World Bank; face an unsustainable debt burden (greater than 150%); have adopted a PRSP; and establish a track record of reform through IMF- and World Bank-supported programs (IMF, September 2000, available on-line). When the assessment for Bolivia’s eligibility for HIPC assistance was completed in 1997, Bolivia’s external debt was 270% of GDP (IMF and IDA, 27 August 1997, available on-line).

Bolivia’s first¹⁷ HIPC document was the “Final Document on the Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)” from August 27, 1997. This paper was the

¹⁷ This document makes reference to a preliminary HIPC document, which is unavailable, and the 1997-1999 Policy Framework Paper, which is the 1998-2001 ESAF/PRGF.

IMF's and the World Bank's assessment of Bolivia's eligibility for HIPC assistance, which they granted. Within the assessment, the IMF and the World Bank praised Popular Participation, Administrative Decentralization, Capitalization, Education Reform and the ESAF/PRGF as positive aspects of structural reform, and went on to say that "Bolivia has among the best records for many structural performance indicators (6)."

There were multiple conditionalities attached to the program, including those concerned with social programs. "The government will continue to implement social reforms in key areas, including education and health, and will implement programs to develop rural areas, which are extremely poor (10)." The specific actions to be taken included increasing spending on basic education, thereby increasing efficiency and improving coverage (the same as the ESAF/PRGF), and expediting Educational Reform and "*adapting the reform to popular participation and decentralization* (10)," which included involving the educational community in developing projects at the school level. The remaining actions for education were decreasing spending on higher education, improving coverage of rural areas, especially for females, increasing the number of children who finish primary school, improving the quality of basic education, and improving access to early childhood education (IMF and IDA, 27 August 1997).

The second document was the "Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Completion Point Document" from September 4, 1998. The document was an assessment of how Bolivia performed under the HIPC Initiative, and Bolivia's significant progress was reported in glowing terms. The sole education action that had not been completed nor was in progress was adapting Education Reform to Popular Participation and Decentralization. The Ministry of Education, at the time of the Completion Point

Document, was in the process of drafting a proposal to devolve education administration to the municipal governments, which they intended to pilot in 1999. This action was not only to align domestic policies, it also would “allow for better school management and more parent participation (IMF and IDA, 4 September 1998, 6).”

The next document was the “Decision Point Document for the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative” from 13 January 2000. The document was a final assessment of the first HIPC program and approval for a second, enhanced HIPC program. The document highlighted the fact that all education actions had been met, but failed to explain how the action for increasing the number of children completing primary education was not in the 2000 document, nor how the action for improving the quality of basic education was expanded to three discreet indicators. Because of the tremendous success in education, it was no longer considered a critical area. Although education still received attention, the emphasis shifted to health and roads (IMF and IDA, 13 January 2000). It also required a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in order to schedule a completion point.

The final HIPC document was the “Completion Point Document for the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative” from 21 May 2001. In order to reach the completion point Bolivia not only needed to show continued improvement through structural adjustment and a PRSP, but it also needed confirmed participation from Bolivia’s other creditors. Bolivia’s largest creditor was (and is) the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to whom Bolivia owed \$307 million in 2001. Next were the World Bank with \$140 million, the IMF for \$55 million, the Andean Development Corporation for \$53 million and other multilateral creditors for \$31 million. In 2001

Bolivia owed \$268 million to various bilateral creditors and commercial banks, but the majority of the loans were necessarily for profit-generating ventures, unrelated to public works like education.

There was tremendous focus on poverty reduction and the PRSP in this document, not only because the PRSP was required for funding, but because the document was generated so soon after the IMF and the World Bank evaluated the PRSP. The priority areas determined in the PRSP were productive infrastructure; support for production, education, health and land tenure; a transparent mechanism for distributing HIPC resources to the municipalities; and social oversight by civil society in monitoring the utilization of HIPC resources. The HIPC document also highlighted weaknesses in the *implementation* and monitoring of the strategy, the solution for which was to “increase the buy-in to the strategy both within and *outside* the government (IMF/World Bank, 21 May 2001, 9, emphasis added).”

Another reason civil society was (and is) important to the IMF and the World Bank is the weakness of the Bolivian government with regards to data collection and data quality. The IMF and the World Bank cited several related concerns in the document. It is not surprising that the involvement of civil society was important to them, given the oversight and monitoring role they envisioned for civil society. It is important to note that the multinationals assigned a rather passive and removed supervisory role to civil society, while Popular Participation allows for a more active, participatory role (see Chapter 2).

Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)

James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, originally proposed the Comprehensive Development Framework in January 1999. The program he envisioned was “a holistic approach to development that balances macroeconomic with structural, human, and physical development needs...a framework anchored on four key inter-related principles, pursued at the country level (World Bank, 2000, 2).” The four principles are long-term vision and strategy; enhanced country ownership of development; more strategic partnership among stakeholders; and accountability for results. By enhanced country ownership and more strategic partnership, the World Bank meant that all levels of government, civil society and the private sector needed “to own and manage the development agenda (2).” In his discussion draft, Wolfensohn went on to say that the largest single factor was civil society, including indigenous and local groups organized for various projects.

Depending on local political circumstances, civil society has a greater or lesser voice, but our experience is that by *engaging* civil society in projects and programs, better results are achieved both with design and implementation and usually greater effectiveness, including more local ownership. I think we all recognize more and more that local ownership is the key to success and project effectiveness (Wolfensohn, 21 January 1999, 26, emphasis added).

While it is commendable that the multinational agencies want to “engage” civil society, it is important to remember that their vision of participation is much more passive than Popular Participation. Because these agencies are populated by

development “professionals,” their tendency is to rely on their technical and managerial expertise to get projects done, and to teach others how to work within the system they know and control.

Bolivia was one of 12 countries that piloted the CDF, and the only one in the Americas (the Dominican Republic was the only Caribbean country). It was, in fact, the first to complete a CDF matrix, which was appended to Wolfensohn’s discussion draft. Given that Bolivia had several years experience working with civil society under the auspices of Popular Participation, they were able to complete a matrix quickly. Indeed, World Bank’s discussion of Bolivia’s CDF mentioned the “high degree of commonality between [Popular Participation] and...the comprehensive development framework (World Bank, available online).” Bolivia’s CDF included explicit statements about civil society’s ownership of the CDF and its implementation; fighting corruption, especially through reforming civil service in hiring, pay and tenure; supporting decentralization; and supporting the educational reform’s efforts to involve parents, students and the community, thereby promoting ownership and strengthening participation (World Bank, available online). The July 2001 Country Assessments showed that Bolivia had made the greatest progress of any country, taking action on every target to be met, and having already largely developed or put in place half of the indicators (World Bank, July 2001, available online).

At the September 1999 meeting of the Boards of Governors of the IMF and the World Bank, both Boards endorsed the proposal that Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers be prepared by national authorities of recipient countries as a way to operationalize the CDF principles, since both programs were built around the same guiding ideas.

This Committee emphasized that the strategies set out in the new Poverty Papers should be country-driven, be developed transparently with broad participation of elected institutions, stakeholders including civil society, key donors and regional development banks, and have a clear link with the agreed international development goals—principles that are embedded in the Comprehensive Development Framework (World Bank, available online).

Bolivia also became one of the first countries to write a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)

The PRSP is a way for countries receiving aid to be proactive and have a greater voice in their own development. It describes current programs and policies over the upcoming years, and how they are intended to promote growth and reduce poverty. The PRSP includes financing needs and funding sources and is updated every three years. It is a document “prepared by the member countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders as well as external development partners, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF, available online).” In order to aid countries in writing such a comprehensive document, the IMF and the World Bank have printed and made available to member countries a *Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook*, which encompasses several volumes. The handbook for education, in Volume 2—Macro and Sectoral Issues, Unit 3—Human Development, Section 3.3—Education, is more than fifty pages long (World Bank, 20 June 2001). Among the key policy options countries are encouraged to consider are community-based construction of

schools; equitable funding across schools, based on per student allocations; local teaching materials; stakeholders empowered in school affairs; greater school autonomy; involving mothers in school committees; and involving parents in school councils with decision-making power (World Bank, 20 June 2001). The handbook points to decentralization and school-based management as some of the most powerful institutional strengthening processes available to reach these ends. Many of the options listed (e.g., community responsible for infrastructure, stakeholder involvement and decentralization) are features of Popular Participation that are reinforced in Bolivia's PRSP.

Bolivia first prepared an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) on 13 January 2000. The I-PRSP was to “summarize the current knowledge and analysis of a country's poverty situation, describe the existing poverty reduction strategy, and lay out the process for producing a fully developed PRSP in a participatory fashion (IMF, available online).” Its first sentence announced the Bolivian government's intent to hold a national dialogue later that year, built upon a process started in 1997, but roundly criticized as not sufficiently participatory (Uriona, et. al, June 2002). Also on the first page was the government's statement that basic conditions for fighting poverty were reducing segregation and exclusion and improving human capital, thereby facilitating economic growth, ideas already articulated in Popular Participation. The Bolivian government proposed an integrated approach that placed equal emphasis on economic development and the promotion of human capital, including greater involvement of civil society. It highlighted Administrative Decentralization, Popular Participation and Educational Reform policies already in place and made explicit connections to them in the “Conceptual Framework of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (36).” However, it

introduced a subtle change in civil society control to civil society oversight. The section on promoting participation highlighted the “Local Government Strategic Plan” designed, among other things, to “deepen the processes of participation, *control*, and social dialogue (21, emphasis added).” However, in a later discussion of the institutional framework, the section defined local control of the municipalities by civil society as “control of their activities...overseen by the Vigilance Committees which have the authority to *denounce* irregular processes to the state and to the legal bodies (23, emphasis added).” The tone of the document, though prepared by Bolivian authorities, was more aligned with multinational concerns about civil society providing *oversight* than Popular Participation, giving civil society much less room to be pro-active and hands-on.

The next document is the Bolivian PRSP. To its credit, Bolivia recognized its continuing problem with effective support for civil society.

Despite the changes resulting from the decentralization and Popular participation [sic] programs, the poorest segments of the population, particularly the indigenous peoples...are still marginalized from decision-making, do not participate effectively in the allocation of resources, and are not adequately represented politically. This seriously calls into question the foundation of Bolivia’s democracy and governance (Bolivia, March 2001, 1).

The Bolivian government gave prominent attention to the 2000 National Dialogue and the contributions of civil society through the process. They noted that it was a bottom-up strategy, originating at the municipal level, then moving to the state and national levels.

Based on this dialogue, the government proposed four interrelated strategies to combat poverty: expansion of employment and income opportunities, capabilities building, increasing security and protection for the poor, and promotion of integration and social participation. “Capabilities building” includes improvements in the quality of primary education and promoting decentralized administration. “Promotion of integration and social participation” includes deepening Popular Participation and Decentralization through the creation of advisory councils (*consejos consultivos*) in each municipality and linking development projects and citizen participation, though the document fails to specify how citizens might participate.

The semantic shift from active participation to oversight participation continues in this document. In the section “Institutional Framework and Social Control of the BPRS [Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy],” Bolivian authorities acknowledge the “current weakness of the Bolivian State (14),” intending to address it by increasing transparency, fighting corruption, promoting institutional strengthening and recognizing explicit *social control*—not participation—mechanisms. The document further states that vigilance committees will be strengthened, specific mechanisms for monitoring public services will be promoted, and the Roman Catholic church has begun working with civil society to promote transparency and access to information. Unfortunately, details for all of these programs are lacking.

At the request of the Bolivian Government, the IMF and the World Bank conducted a Joint Staff Assessment of the PRSP. One of their first comments acknowledged the document as a balanced treatment of poverty, and named its strong points as the focus on fiscal decentralization, *the commitment to developing social*

monitoring—again, not participation—and the National Dialogue. They noted further that the government’s lack of capacity to implement the program constituted a major risk. To mitigate the risk, “the monitoring of the poverty reduction strategy will be enhanced by the planned social oversight of anti-poverty programs (IMF and IDA, 10 May 2001, 6).” In particular, the authors highlighted plans to strengthen the Vigilance Committees, although they, too, failed to specify how strengthening would occur. The authors characterized the proposed strategy as consistent with identified needs, but pointed to a lack of prioritization of the proposed list of actions. Further, neighborhood oversight committees needed to be strengthened, and in particular that “these groups [need] sufficient power if they are going to have an impact on spending choices (IMF and IDA, 10 May 2001, 10).” Finally, the assessment noted that anti-corruption strategies were hampered by entrenched interests, and that civil society buy-in remained limited. Overall the authors felt the plan provided a solid framework that could succeed if impediments to implementation were handled. They recommended the IMF and World Bank accept the PRSP. Few suggestions were given, however, on facilitating implementation or how the Bolivian government might give sufficient power to social oversight groups.

In an article published in *Finance and Development*, an IMF magazine, five people who participated in the National Dialogue and the PRSP discussed their observations and experiences. Juan Carlos Requena, lead coordinator of the Bolivian poverty reduction strategy, and Juan Carlos Núñez, Deputy Secretary of the Episcopal Pastoral Social Commission, offered two of the most damning critiques of National Dialogue and the PRSP. Requena noted that

...there were different views on the appropriate level of participation by civil society. Some international cooperation agencies expected that civil society would participate fully and actively throughout the process (including the drafting of the strategy itself), while *the government assumed that it would take the results of the dialogue and then proceed with the drafting of a document for discussion* (Uriona, et. al., June 2002, 5, emphasis added).

Núñez went on to say that while National Dialogue was based on social, economic and political agendas, the poor were only able to participate in the social dialogue.

Furthermore, the dialogue methodology was controlled and closed, and the people invited—particularly at the municipal level—were not the poor, but powerful members of the political system. Finally, the main political leadership elected not to attend, and the PRSP does not require action at the municipal level. One final note is that the IMF Mission Chief to Bolivia, Wayne Lewis, the final contributor to the article, reiterated the Joint Staffs’ comments about limited buy-in. His suggestion was wider dissemination of information and more inclusion in the next dialogue (Uriona, et. al., June 2002).

It is interesting that Requena, a Bolivian, felt that international cooperating agencies wanted the full participation of civil society, when the trend in fact has been towards marginalization. This trend is easiest to identify in Inter-American Development Bank documents, as is shown below. This is most likely because Inter-American Development Bank loans are to operationalize specific programs or projects that are part of the more global activities approved and funded by the IMF and the World Bank. Additionally, the “social control” activities left to civil society are increasingly

concentrated in the Vigilance Committee, with no mention of the OTBs, who are the subject of Popular Participation. That the Bolivian government would assume civil society would not be involved in the technical aspects of drafting the legislation seems a legitimate (though lamentable) assumption based on the arc of recent multinational policy documents.

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

The IDB is Bolivia's largest creditor and is the international agency that has funded a large portion of the individual public sector projects addressed above. As of 2002, the IDB had made 160 loans to Bolivia, totaling \$3.138 billion, and had disbursed over \$2.5 billion (IDB, available online). IDB is heavily involved in education, but that involvement typically concerns such issues as curricula, efficiency and coverage. As a result, many projects are more closely related to Educational Reform than to Popular Participation, although many of the mechanisms for civil society involvement in Education Reform stem from structural changes associated with Popular Participation. Presently, though, civil society has not been legislated the right to participate in activities such as writing curricula or measuring efficiency. Therefore, only educational loans that specifically address decentralization, governance and/or participation, or infrastructure loans that mention education, are highlighted here.

Education Reform Program

The main thrust of this loan, approved in November 1994, was to support a 20-year reform effort. Included in that effort were administrative reforms (from Popular Participation), training and orientation for parents and community members and

incorporating community participation in administration (IDB, November 1994, available online).

Social Investment Fund

Funded in June 1995, the Social Investment Fund is a social safety net program from Popular Participation, intended to support the poorest segments of the population. It includes training for civic participation, strengthening municipalities and the Social Investment Fund, promoting equality and participative planning, and providing basic education and training services (IDB, June 1995, available online).

Program to Provide Schooling to Working Children

This program was approved in February 1996 and like the ones before it, focused on institutional strengthening and parental involvement. However, this was an effort to reinforce family ties and protect the welfare of children (IDB, February 1996, available online).

Social Management Support Program

The social management support program was approved in October 1996 and sought to facilitate the decentralization process and provide support to the various levels of government involved with delivering social programs such as education and health. It also sought to support civil society through ongoing training, disseminating information to civil society and promoting participation and modern methods of administration (IDB, October 1996, available online). No mention was made of building on indigenous models as in Popular Participation.

Program for Fiscal Adjustment and Maintenance of Social Spending

This program was funded October 1998 and was part of the first HIPC. It was a quick disbursement of funds to protect social spending on priority programs like education and health and was meant to support ongoing reforms. It is interesting to note that this loan summary had a well-developed section on potential risks; included in that section was the following acknowledgement:

The possibility of **resistance to the program-supported social reforms** on the part of groups affected in the political and labor-union sphere is a risk that will be minimized, especially as regards reform actions involving potential conflicts, by establishing a climate of dialogue in which the *social ministries will exercise an important influence for promoting a sense of ownership of the reforms among those affected by them* (IDB, October 1998, 3, italics added).

The focus was on government persuading civil society to support its program—according to Popular Participation influence should be flowing in the other direction. Following the adjustment and maintenance program, there was a break in funding for education, possibly reflecting the success of meeting educational targets in the first HIPC.

Fiscal Development and Fiscal Accountability Program

Not funded until March 2001, this program sought to increase municipal management efficiency, including management of education and other public services. A major risk associated with the program is the fact that it makes transfers more transparent, “requiring that the projects submitted be decided upon with the participation

of the communities. The challenge lies in the response capacity of small communities and the willingness of government agents to support them (IDB, March 2001, 5).”

Program to Strengthen Technical and Technological Training

The technical and technological training program dealt more with alternative education than with formal public education. It did, however, continue to promote a participatory process in decision-making, albeit one that was much more a consensus-building effort on the part of the government to generate support for its programs than an effort to advocate true participation.

Social Sector Program in Support of the Poverty Reduction Strategy

The program was approved December 2001. Its main objective was to support Bolivia’s PRSP through funding of social sector programs. Like the PRSP, it required social oversight to counter an important potential risk, the weakness of the Bolivian state. Furthermore, a conditionality attached to the funds was that equity be a focus. However, the sector program did not require the inclusion of marginalized groups in the policy-making process. “...[D]isbursements will be conditional upon preparation and implementation of policy instruments and activities to guarantee *appropriate treatment* for indigenous and aboriginal peoples, and to consolidate gender equity as a focus of public policy (IDB, December 2001, 2, emphasis added).” This document lists potential benefits from the program to be gained through “promoting participation by civil society in decision-making, and supporting the establishment of social supervision and control mechanisms, [that] will help strengthen democracy and the sustainability of public policies (IDB, December 2001, 4).” Although it mentions participation, the intent is much more passive and observational.

Education Reform Program: Stage 2

This final program was approved June 2003 and was a mid-term support for the continuing educational reform begun in 1994. In addition to curricular issues, it aimed to strengthen decentralized management of education, particularly through a pilot program (in only a few municipalities) in participatory educational planning involving the educational community as a whole (IDB, June 2003, available online). According to Popular Participation and Educational Reform, this “pilot program” should have been nearly ten years old and well established. Furthermore, according to this document the educational community need not include the Grassroots Organizations (*Organizaciones Territoriales de Base*, or OTBs) or the Vigilance Committee.

In these documents, like the IMF and World Bank documents listed above, it is possible to see a change over time from active participation to social oversight. Furthermore, the instrument of the oversight is not identified in these documents; it need not be the OTBs or even the Vigilance Committee.

National Context

In addition to the abundance of multinational policies, there were Popular Participation and its supporting policies to consider. Popular Participation was one of three policies instituted by Sánchez de Lozada, known collectively as the Plan for All, in an effort to promote growth and development in Bolivia. Since their institution, the Educational Reform Law was passed, and there are other policies to consider when discussing the national context. The additional policies have either reshaped, or been reshaped by, Popular Participation. As with the international policies, only the most

relevant documents available at the time of this study are discussed, and only the sections within the relevant documents that related to Popular Participation and/or education were considered.

Popular Participation

As noted in Chapter 2, this April 1994 law decentralized most public works, including education, to the municipal level. It also created the OTBs, giving them the right “to propose, request, *control and supervise* the works and the provision of public services...[including] education (emphasis added).” Among the OTBs’ duties are “to identify, set priorities, *participate and cooperate* in the implementation and administration of projects for the public welfare (emphasis added).” Popular Participation also created the Vigilance Committee as an oversight body. Finally, municipalities were explicitly directed to assume as part of their new responsibilities

furnish[ing] the equipment, furniture, didactic materials, inputs, supplies...to supervise their use, for adequate operation of the infrastructure...to supervise, in accordance with the respective regulations, the performance of the educational authorities, the directors and teachers, and to propose their continuation...or their removal on justifiable grounds, either directly or at the request of the Grassroots Territorial Organizations and the Oversight Committee...to provide and build new infrastructure for...education...to respond to the petitions, representations, requests, and oversight of the Grassroots Territorial Organizations and the Oversight Committee.

As you can see, the policy does try to build on indigenous models of local governance and depends heavily on civil society participation for proper implementation. However, it also gives considerable authority to the municipal government, and presents it as a final authority, one that can ultimately act independently of civil society.

Supreme Decree 23813

This decree, passed in June 1994, set the rules and regulations for Popular Participation and established the municipalities. With respect to education, it devolved responsibility for *all* state education—pre-school, primary, secondary, and alternative—to the municipal level.

Supreme Decree 23858

In September 1994 Decree 23858 was passed and it set the rules and regulations for the OTBs and Vigilance Committees. It defined indigenous populations and neighborhood councils and delineated the steps for gaining juridical (legal) status.

Supreme Decree 24202

Like a number of decrees before it, this December 1995 decree reiterated the list of municipalities created by Popular Participation. The significant difference of this decree was that it finally set 1 January 1996 for monies to be disbursed to the municipalities as co-participation funds.

Supreme Decree 24447

This decree was passed December 1996 and addressed public services and their local governance structures. A Local Directorate of Education was created which was responsible for formal and alternative education and composed of the mayor (or his representative), the state's District Education Director and a Vigilance Committee

member. Among their responsibilities were proposing budgets, managing the allocation of items, evaluating educational management, channeling requests for ratification or change of educational authorities and developing its own working rules and regulations. The decree also established a Center for Pedagogical Resources in each municipality, co-financed by the Ministry of Education (formerly the National Secretariat of Education). The OTBs were not mentioned.

Supreme Resolution 216961

This resolution, passed in March 1997, set the standards for participatory municipal planning and stated that the process should promote and effectuate social participation. Further, *social control* was to be exercised by the OTBs and the Vigilance Committee, with the OTBs as the principal actors. The OTBs had the right to identify and prioritize needs; participate, cooperate and monitor program execution; and propose and suggest changes. The resolution gave Vigilance Committees the right to monitor plan execution, especially to ensure that the OTBs were allowed to participate and to monitor the investment of municipal Popular Participation funds.

However, the resolution effectively gave veto power to the municipal government. Government and public institutions “have the *obligation* to direct, carry, and manage sustainable development in their jurisdiction (Arias Durán, November 2001, 141, emphasis added).” The municipal governments were to control project execution, assure technical compatibility and be responsible for promoting social participation only in planning, not execution. Moreover, the OTBs were dependent on the Vigilance Committee to safeguard their right to participate.

Administrative Decentralization

Administrative Decentralization was passed July 1995 and established the organizational structure of the prefect, or state, during the process of decentralization. The state was generally responsible for promoting Popular Participation, channeling resources to the municipal level, decentralizing technical and administrative functions, promoting coordination with municipal governments and promoting community participation. This law also gave the states authority for registering juridical status and for paying public servants' salaries, including teachers.

Supreme Decree 24997

Decree 24997 came a few years later, in March 1998, and presented the rules and regulations for departmental offices. Among the offices it operationalized were the Departmental Secretariat for Human Development, which included the Education Directorate, and the Departmental Secretariat for Participation. The Education Directorate was responsible for integrating the Education Reform Law into public education, while the Departmental Secretariat for Participation was responsible for consolidating administrative capacity at the municipal level and facilitating relationships with civil society. The state was also charged with helping municipal governments elaborate sectoral plans. It would transfer knowledge, practices and planning methodologies, as well as programs and projects, to the municipal level; and help municipal governments manage human resources for public services, including education. In short, the technical and procedural knowledge for participating in government as it was conducted before Popular Participation (and still is) was to be shared with municipal government. At the same time, civil society participation was to

be promoted, though not enabled with technical or procedural knowledge. This benefits the existing power structure at the expense of Popular Participation and civil society.

Capitalization

Capitalization, passed March 1994, was actually the first of the three laws Sánchez de Lozada passed, but it was the one with the least to do with the transfer of control of education to municipalities. This law began the process of privatizing the largest state ventures (oilfields, electricity, communications, railways and the tin mines) through an international public bidding process¹⁸. Foreign interests could only own half of the enterprises; the other half was passed to the Bolivian people. Hydrocarbons stayed with the state. Capitalization also reformed the government pension fund.

Educational Reform

The Educational Reform Law of July 1994 was directed toward the use of education as a means to address inequality and exclusion in Bolivian society. To that end, the law promoted largely curricular avenues for inclusion (e.g., bilingual education and multicultural curricula) and depended on one very important aspect of Popular Participation to facilitate these inclusion activities, the OTBs. The Educational Reform Law based its form of community organization and participation on Popular Participation and the OTBs. Building from the ideas—and in some cases the same personnel—as the

¹⁸ The privatization of a wide range of public ventures, including not only the ones mentioned above but also water, telephones and the national airline, has created its own civil society unrest, independent of the decentralization and devolution of municipal services mandated by Popular Participation. A substantive analysis of the problems associated with privatization is beyond the scope of this research project, but a particularly instructive example can be found in the protests and subsequent government actions that surrounded the privatization of water services in Cochabamba, November 1999-April 2000. See Assies, 2003; Nickson and Vargas, 2002; Farthing and Kohl, 2001; Marvin and Laurie, 1999; Kohl, 2002; and Schultz, 2003.

OTBs, the Educational Reform Law established school boards (*juntas escolares* and *juntas distritales*) and educational councils responsible for participating “in the *planning, management, and social control* of educational activities, and the *administration* of those educational services within their scope (Serrano Torrico, 1996b, 51, emphasis added).”

The driving idea behind the law was that by involving the community in their children’s education, education not only would be more relevant, but also more efficient, more equitable and less corrupt.

Supreme Decree 23949

Reiterating that the school boards were organs of popular participation, this February 1995 decree further stated that department councils, Original Peoples councils, the National Council for Education and the National Congress for Education were *consultative* organs, and set the rules and regulations for both. School boards would raise the educational demands and expectations of communities. They would *approve and supervise*—not suggest, plan or manage—in cooperation with educational authorities and teachers, the execution of the annual educational plan and budget. Boards would also oversee the administration of resources in the schools and solicit the municipality, through the OTBs and the Vigilance Committee, to channel resources for infrastructure and equipment from educational units and the Center for Pedagogical Resources. The educational councils were to *advise* educational authorities in forming educational policies and to assist in the development of curricular and extracurricular activities. No mention of participation in management and/or administration was made.

Supreme Decree 23951

This decree, passed in February 1995, dealt mainly with curricular administration, and dealt with it as separate from the community participation mechanisms created by Popular Participation, although it outlined the new responsibilities for the District Director of Education under decentralization. The District Director was to direct planning for educational management, supervise educational functions, present infrastructural and curricular requirements to the proper municipal office, coordinate all public and private agents in charge of providing services for children and maintain a constant link with the district school board, *to attend to and process requests and proposals* (Serrano Torrico, 1996b). It is important to note that the District Director was to be hired as a municipal government employee and not required to be an advocate for civil society, only a receptacle for requests.

Law of Municipalities

The October 1999 Law of Municipalities was a fairly comprehensive statement on the rights and obligations of municipal government, as well as a roster of rules and regulations for carrying out those rights and obligations. The municipal government had the authority to generate, collect and invest resources; to issue ordinances and resolutions determined by municipal policies and strategies; and responsibility for programming and execution of all management functions. The Municipal Council was the designated final authority for municipal government. It had tremendous oversight authority for the municipal government, and with respect to Popular Participation it was charged with approving Municipal Development and Annual Operating Plans, and issuing ordinances

to register OTBs. The Mayor was the final executive authority, and with respect to Popular Participation he or she was required to keep the Vigilance Committee *informed* on the use of resources and economic activities (Arias Durán, November 2001). The Mayor was not, however, directed to be particularly receptive or inclusive.

Both the Mayor and the Municipal Council—as well as the rest of municipal government—were repeatedly directed to “guarantee the integration and participation of citizens in planning and sustainable human development (275);” “promote citizen participation (276);” “solicit public help (288)” to carry out duties; and ensure participative municipal planning was coordinated with civil society. For its part, civil society had the right to organize into OTBs, to demand proper functioning of municipal services, to bring problems to the attention of the Mayor and the Municipal Council and to petition the municipal government. It had all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution and Popular Participation. However, nowhere in this document was the people’s active participation requested or ensured. The most powerful civil society group in this document was the Vigilance Committee, and even it was relegated to a supervisory role. The Vigilance Committee was responsible for facilitating citizen participation, supporting participative municipal planning and evaluating the performance of policies, plans, programs and projects. The Law of Municipalities also created a Municipal Social Control Fund controlled by the Vigilance Committee, but its resources came from OTBs and community associations, foundation contributions and co-participation funds equal to 0.25% of the municipality’s share.

Finally, the law gave the municipal government a veto power of sorts over civil society. While the government was charged with protecting participation (in this

legislation, participation was relegated to an advisory role), it was also charged with ensuring that plans were executed “in accordance with state and national laws and technical criteria (276);” “to supervise, in accordance with the regulation, the designation of authorities (277);” and to supervise the use of resources by educational services. While adherence to technical criteria had been mentioned in some earlier policy documents, this is one of the first instances in which technical criteria and technocrats are given so much attention. It is important to note that this was the first major policy document to be written following IMF and World Bank board approval of the HIPC Initiative and James Wolfensohn’s proposal of the CDF. Many laws, rules and regulations, especially at the national level, are heavily influenced and/or outright mandated by conditionalities attached to loans used to fund these projects, hence the importance of “technical criteria.” The municipal government continued to be responsible for educational infrastructure.

Supreme Decree 26130

Decree 26130, passed March 2001, reiterated that the Vigilance Committee would control the Social Control Fund created by the Law of Municipalities. It set the rules and regulations for resources and execution. The fund was complementary to any other funding sources of the Vigilance Committee. It was to be administered transparently and it could not be used to pay any member of the Vigilance Committee. However, it could be used for meetings with OTBs and other groups, to lend to municipal services and to support other Popular Participation activities. The decision to fund or financially support OTBs and other groups was at the discretion of the Vigilance Committee, despite the fact the OTBs and other groups contributed to the fund.

National Dialogue

The National Dialogue Law, repeatedly referred to by the multinational organizations, was passed 31 July 2001. National Dialogue was the process by which civil society could bring government attention to the concerns of constituents through municipal roundtables. The information was then taken to departmental roundtables and finally to a national discussion. Among other things, this law “establish[ed] the scope and mechanisms for the exercise of *social control* over programs and strategies intended to reduce poverty, and to institute the National Dialogue as a permanent mechanism of *social participation in the design, continuation and adjustment of the policies* intended to reduce poverty (Bolivia, 31 July 2001, 1, emphasis added).” At this point, participation as social control has been limited to poverty reduction programs and no political space has been provided for civil society to have any involvement in administration or evaluation.

With regards to education and citizen participation, the National Dialogue Law created a Common Municipal Fund for School Education and Public Health, jointly housed in the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Provision. The fund was intended to address the funding shortfall for education and health, approximately \$27 million annually. Accompanying this fund for each municipality was a Local Selection Committee, made up of a municipal government representative, the Education Unit Director for the municipality, a representative from the District Education Directors and a representative from the respective school board(s). The school board representative was the only member of civil society who participated in

the fund. This advisory committee was to nominate teachers for employment (actually forward their names for incorporation in the pay form of the Ministry) and abide by the rules and regulations of the Ministry for Education, Culture and Sports.

The Dialogue Law also created the Special Dialogue 2000 Account, housed in the General Treasury and managed by the Finance Ministry. The account housed the funds from the Enhanced HIPC (see above), the funds dedicated to poverty reduction. The law further reconstituted the National Fund for Regional Development (FNDR) and the National Productive and Social Investment Fund (FPS), both built on earlier models, decentralizing them to the department level—not to the municipal level. Additionally, the law reordered these funds into the Sole Directorate of Funds (DUF). The DUF was to consist of the President of the DUF, assigned by the President of Bolivia; one representative each from the Ministries of the President, Sustainable Development and Planning, and Treasury Department, for a total of three; and three municipal government representatives, one from department capitals and cities of more than 200,000, one from cities between 20,000 and 200,000, and one from cities less than 20,000. There were also three non-voting members (*con voz y sin voto*); two Vigilance Committee representatives, one of whom must be a woman, and one other civil society representative to be designated at the national level.

The DUF was charged with applying the Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (see above), and the FPS was the *only* office that could channel funds to municipalities. Within the FPS, there was a Departmental Committee for Project Approval, consisting of the Fund Director, a departmental government representative and three municipal government representatives. There were also three non-voting members, two Vigilance

Committee representatives and one other civil society representative designated at the department level. The monies that flowed through the FPS were disbursed according to a very specific formula. The funding formula was 10% health, 20% public education and 70% productive and social infrastructure. Within the 70%, 30% was divided equally between the nine departments, while the remaining 70% was distributed according to the poverty reduction formula: (population with basic needs met)(-1) + (population on the threshold of poverty)(0) + (population in moderate poverty)(1) + (population of indigenous poor)(2) + (population in absolute poverty)(3).

The law put in place safeguards for social control. Those exercising social control had “the right, as organizations and institutions of civil society, to know, supervise and evaluate *the results and impact of the public policies and participative processes for decision-making*, as well as access information and analysis of social control instruments (Bolivia, 31 July 2001, 9, emphasis added).” At the municipal level, social control was concentrated in the hands of the Vigilance Committee, through which all other civil society organizations would work. The Vigilance Committee had the right to watch over and check all resources, or as stated by a government publication explaining National Dialogue:

For the municipal level, a great advance is the right that the National Dialogue law gives to the Vigilance Committees to have social control of 100% of the municipal resources. That is to say, according to this law, not only control of Popular Participation funds, but also all the resources the municipal government manages, including their own resources and the monies to fight poverty (Choque and Quispe Acarapi, January 2002, p.25).

This law constitutes the most comprehensive dismantling of Popular Participation structures yet. To begin with, participation as social control is firmly entrenched. Additionally, all the new administrative structures exist at the department or national level. Furthermore, what few civil society representatives outside of the VC that are present are chosen at the department or national level, not the municipal level—and these very few civil society members are non-voting members of advisory committees. Civil society has been left no mechanism by which they can be proactive.

Unfortunately, without civil society having any real input participation has been reduced to rubber-stamping government programs. Furthermore, the subjects of Popular Participation, the OTBs, are glaringly absent. The only other avenue of participation is the municipal roundtables which, according to the National Dialogue Law, must be held at least once every five years. By the time civil society's concerns have gone through all the necessary layers to reach the national roundtable, however, there is a very real chance they would be significantly modified or eliminated.

Supreme Decree 26301

This July 2001 decree reiterated the funding schedule for the distribution of resources and established the percent for each municipality according to schedule. According to the funding table, in 2001 Cochabamba had a population of 425,081, with a school-age population of 125,405. Of the total funds available for the country, Cochabamba received 0.66% for health, 1.2% for education, and 0.92% for productive and social infrastructure (0.2% from the department share and 0.72% from the poverty formula). In total, Cochabamba received 2.82% of the total available monies, and 17.8% of the monies for the department of Cochabamba (Arias Durán, November 2001).

Municipal Context

Last, but certainly not least, the context on the ground in the city of Cochabamba needs to be considered. With regard to Popular Participation and education, the current development plan and the operating budgets were critical documents. An equally critical document was the Annual Operating Plan, but it was unavailable; this despite the fact that it is a public document, should have been written cooperatively with civil society and should have included their concerns and input. Finally, in the presidential election, other important figures from Cochabamba as well as Sanchez de Lozada, ran for office.

Strategic Development Plan

The current Strategic Development Plan was formulated from July 2000 to March 2001 and was printed November 2001. The discussion of education in the strategic development plan began with a diagnostic of the current educational situation in Cochabamba, based on figures from 1999. The public school system (*educación fiscal*) enrolled a total of 120,672 students; 78% of the school-going population. Preschools enrolled 9,964 students, primary schools enrolled 84,555 students, and secondary schools enrolled 26,153. The report drew adequate attention to the fact that only 12% of boys and 7.9% of girls enrolled in primary school went on to secondary school.

Discussing the needs of the educational system, the Strategic Plan first stated that 82 public schools and 65 *convenio*, or charter-like, schools were transferred to the municipality. The municipality was responsible for the infrastructure of the public schools, but not the *convenio* schools. The only municipal responsibility to the *convenio*

schools were educational services (e.g., school breakfasts). 52 schools had their infrastructure needs met, including 10 new schools built by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The remaining 30 schools had unmet needs totaling \$2.8 million. The municipality had the capacity to build four new schools per year and maintain or improve 45 per year at a cost of \$2.24 million. At that rate, it should have been possible to meet the municipality's needs in 1.1 years. The educational need was expected to grow at the rate of five schools per year, adding an additional \$335,272. By 2002, the forecast was for 56 educational institutions with infrastructure needs totaling \$4.53 million. The Strategic Plan noted that JICA had considerably reduced the educational infrastructure deficit.

To address needs, the Strategic Plan articulated six directions for growth: solidarity and participation, prosperity, equality, habitat/environment, identity and information. Underlying the six directions were the “great orientations of the Strategic Plan (Municipalidad de Cochabamba, November 2001, 256),” which revolved around the theory of construction of four kinds of capital: natural, physical, human and social. Within social capital, the goals are to form and strengthen citizen participation organizations in public management; form inter-municipal organizations; strengthen public and private institutions, and social organizations; and improve communication and information. Within human capital, the goals include improving opportunities for the public to access services, including education; improving security and protecting citizens' rights; improving access to health services; and preserving cultural heritage (Municipalidad de Cochabamba, November 2001).

Finally, it is critically important to note the absence of the OTBs and the Vigilance Committee from the Strategic Plan. In the discussion of the elaboration of the Strategic Plan, of the fairs and consultations with the citizenry over its content, of any of the actions to be pursued or goals to be met, only once was there a reference to the OTBs or the Vigilance Committee. In discussing specific objectives and concrete actions to be taken, Objective 5 is “To promote the participation of civil society and its organizations in local management.” One of the concrete actions to be taken was “to revitalize the spaces for participation, endowing them with legitimacy and representativeness, such as the OTBs, Vigilance Committee, public inquiries, and others; [and] to guarantee the effective functioning of the Vigilance Committee’s consulting council, in accordance with the law (Municipalidad de Cochabamba, November 2001, 226).” They were given no responsibility, nor were any of their rights guaranteed. They were simply listed as examples of organizations or consultants.

Operating Budgets

In Supreme Decree 24202, co-participation funds were first disbursed to the municipalities in January 1996. Since the Strategic Development Plan used 1999 figures, the intent for this study was to start the budget history for Fiscal Year (FY)1999. However, the budgets for 1999 and 2000 have been “lost,” and could not be obtained through either official or unofficial channels. Therefore, the budget discussion herein covers FY2001 and FY2002 only.

For FY2001, Cochabamba budgeted B10,089,900 for educational infrastructure: B3,456,800 from Popular Participation funds and B6,633,100 from private donations.

For educational services, such as school breakfasts, equipment, or various materials, the municipality budgeted B31,535,000. Of that money, B5,454,000 came from Popular Participation, and B26,081,000 came from an unspecified line of credit, most likely from a multinational agency. The municipality's contribution to education from its own resources was *zero*, despite the fact the municipality can collect taxes and has the second largest tax base in the country. Overall, the FY2001 budget was B191,630,100 and Popular Participation contributed B52,331,500 (27.3%).

Table 4. FY 2001 Education Budget Data

FY 2001 Educational Budget	
Educational Infrastructure	
<i>Funding Source</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Popular Participation	3 456 800
Private Donations	6 633 100
Total	10 089 900
Educational Services	
<i>Funding Source</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Popular Participation	5 454 000
Line of Credit	26 081 000
Total	31 535 000
Total Spent on Education	41 624 900
Municipality Funds Contributed to Education	0
% of Education Budget Contributed by Municipality	0%
FY 2001 Budget Total	191 630 100
Percent of Total Budget Spent on Education	21.7%
Percent of Total Budget from Popular Participation	27.3%

For FY2002, Cochabamba budgeted B61,034,000 for educational infrastructure:

B6,000,000 from Popular Participation, B161,000 from its own resources, B32,140,500 from private donations, B14,401,200 from HIPC funds and B8,331,300 from FPS. For maintaining educational units, the municipality budgeted an additional B2,000,000, all of which came from Popular Participation. For educational services, Cochabamba budgeted

B22,783,000; B20,133,000 from Popular Participation, B650,000 from its own resources and B2,000,000 from a line of credit. The municipality's contribution to education was B811,000; less than 1% of the total education budget. Overall, the FY2002 budget totaled B496,374,800, with Popular Participation contributing B51,166,500 (10.3%). The total contribution from HIPC funds was B18,909,500 (3.8%) and the total from FPS was B9,879,700 (2%). It is interesting to note that the total budget more than doubled with the influx of poverty funds, especially given the relative affluence of Cochabamba compared to the surrounding municipalities and the country in general. It should also be noted that spending on education more than doubled, and the increase was slightly less than the percentage increase of the overall budget, though the percentage of the budget spent on education decreased nearly 5%. It is most interesting to note that Popular Participation funds slightly *decreased* from FY2001 to FY2002; although the municipality did receive additional funds from HIPC and FPS, neither of these funds should impact, positively or negatively, the co-participation funds disbursed for Popular Participation as they come from different funding sources.

Table 5. FY 2002 Education Budget Data

FY 2002 Educational Budget	
Educational Infrastructure	
<i>Funding Source</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Popular Participation	6 000 000
Private Donations	32 140 500
HIPC	14 401 200
FPS	8 331 300
Municipal Resources	161 000
Total	61 034 000
Maintaining Educational Units	
<i>Funding Source</i>	
Popular Participation	2 000 000
Total	2 000 000
Educational Services	
<i>Funding Source</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Popular Participation	20 133 000
Line of Credit	2 000 000
Municipal Resources	650 000
Total	22 783 000
Total Spent on Education	85 817 000
Municipality Funds Contributed to Education	811 000
% of Education Budget Contributed by Municipality	0.9%
FY 2001 Budget Total	496 374 800
Percent of Total Budget Spent on Education	17.3%
Percent of Total Budget from Popular Participation	10.3%
Percent of Total Budget from HIPC	3.8%
Percent of Total Budget from FPS	2.0%

Presidential Election

Presidential elections were held in Bolivia on 30 June 2002. During the campaigning, on 18 February 2002, the Cochabamba daily newspaper, *Los Tiempos*,

began including *Usted Elige* (You Choose)¹⁹, an insert in every Monday edition. On Monday, 7 May 2002, the insert became daily until the election on 30 June 2002. The insert was devoted to the presidential election—recapping the previous week’s activities, reporting polls on the most pressing topics and frequently including an interview with one of the candidates. There were 11 candidates for president:

1. Ronald MacLean, Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN)—National Democratic Action),
2. Felipe Quispe, Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP)—Pachakuti Indigenous Movement,
3. Jaime Paz Zamora, Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR)—Revolutionary Left Movement,
4. Gonzalzo Sánchez de Lozada (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR)—Revolutionary Nationalist Movement,
5. Manfred Reyes Villa, Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR)—New Republican Force,
6. Rolando Morales, Partido Socialista (PS)—Socialist Party,
7. Alberto Costa Obregón, Libertad y Justicia (LJ)—Liberty and Justice,
8. Evo Morales (Movimiento al Socialismo—Movement for Socialism),
9. Johnny Fernández, Unidad Cívica Solidaridad (UCS)—Civic Solidarity Unit,
10. René Blattman, Movimiento Ciudadano para el Cambio (MCC)—Citizen Movement for Change, and
11. Nicolás Valdivia, Conciencia de Patria (Condepa)—Native Conscience.

¹⁹ The following description of the election is drawn from the inserts I collected while in Cochbamba. See *Los Tiempos*, 18 February 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 4 March 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 8 April 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 15 April 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 22 April 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 22 April 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 29 April 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 7 May 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 10 May 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 11 May 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 13 May 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 14 May 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 15 May 2002; *Los Tiempos*, 16 May 2002.

The three candidates who were the most familiar to residents of Cochabamba, and therefore received the most local attention in the elections, were Reyes Villa, Morales and Sánchez de Lozada. Reyes Villa, a former mayor of Cochabamba, was an early leader in the polls (Lifsher, 1 July 2002). Morales, on the other hand, was (and still is) the spokesman for the coca growers (*cocaleros*) in the Chapare, the Cochabamban countryside. At the beginning of the campaign, Morales was an invisible. By the time the votes had been counted, he was second to Sánchez de Lozada, and the vote was so close that it was up to Congress to decide the winner. Given Bolivia's dependence on foreign aid and the unpopularity of Morales and his occupation among donors, it came as no surprise that Congress elected Sánchez de Lozada the new president (CNNenEspañol, 2 August 2002; CNNenEspañol, 5 August 2002).

Unfortunately, Sánchez de Lozada was never able to recapture the popularity he enjoyed during his first term as president. Given the close vote, he was only able to rule through a coalition that faced stiff opposition from the start. The breaking point came when Sánchez de Lozada insisted on pursuing a natural gas pipeline across Chile to provide gas to Mexico and the United States²⁰. Since losing what little coastline they had to Chile, most Bolivians still harbor deep resentment toward Chile. They have an equally deep distrust of the United States and its motives. The pipeline was added to a long list of grievances against the US, including its coca eradication program and economic reforms. Finally, the Bolivian government has a very poor record of spending revenues in support of the populace.

²⁰ See Anonymous, 13 September 2003; Rohter, 13 October 2003; Rohter, 14 October 2003; Rohter, 17 October 2003; Rohter, 18 October 2003; CNNenEspañol, 19 October 2003; CNNenEspañol, 20 October 2003; and Rohter, 23 October 2003.

The anti-government demonstrations began in September 2003, led by Evo Morales by most accounts, and with abundant popular support. By October, Sánchez de Lozada had ordered the military to disperse street demonstrations and restore order. By 14 October over 40 people had been killed and by 17 October Sánchez de Lozada had resigned as president and fled to the United States, where he currently lives in exile. His Vice President, Carlos Mesa, assumed power.

Discussion

Three problems were identified by Sánchez de Lozada that Popular Participation was intended to address: government legitimacy, corruption and the rural/urban divide. Successive policy initiatives have steadily eroded multiple aspects of Popular Participation, thereby minimizing its potential and its effectiveness. Three distinct corresponding trends can be identified from the policy environment: normalization of relations between actors, increased bureaucratization and passive observation as active participation, respectively. It is important to understand, though, that there is significant overlap between these three problems and these three trends. For the sake of clarity and readability they are presented in three separate sections and appear to be three distinct issues, but in reality they are very closely intertwined.

Table 6. Policy Context Matrix

Issue	Trend	Policy Evidence
Government Legitimacy	Normalization of Relations	Erosion of political space created by Popular Participation; increased focus on management and/or technical compatibility
Corruption	Increased Bureaucratization	Insertion of new administrative layers between civil society and government
Rural/Urban Divide	Passive Observation as Active Participation	Diminution of authority granted by Popular Participation; creation of advisory and/or non-voting positions for civil society

The Problem of Government Legitimacy and the Trend of Normalization of Relations between Actors

The problem of government legitimacy was intended to be redressed by Popular Participation through creating a political space for non-traditional actors, namely civil society and its representatives, in which they could advocate on their own behalf in the policy process. As was seen in many of the policies passed after Popular Participation, this space has been steadily eroded; whatever space has not been usurped outright has been placed under the tutelage of technocrats whose profession is “development.”

This trend unfortunately started immediately after the passage of Popular Participation; one could even argue that in some segments it never really took hold. IDB began funding projects that would “train” people for civic participation as early as 1994, immediately after Popular Participation was passed. Among the training programs it funded were programs in disseminating information and modern administration. The IDB took care in later policy documents to highlight the need for ministries to exercise

influence over constituencies and to focus on consensus building, albeit a consensus driven by government, not civil society.

The other multinational documents are relatively innocuous until 2000. At that point the PRSP was written and submitted. The World Bank provided a sourcebook, in several volumes, to help member debtor nations write their PRSP; while not narrowly prescriptive, it did include a range of preferable activities for achieving poverty reduction and did not encourage member debtor nations to step outside those boundaries. The PRSP itself stated in the opening remarks that segments of the population “are not adequately represented politically (Bolivia, March 2001, 1).” It went on to state that Popular Participation and Administrative Decentralization would be strengthened through the creation of advisory councils in each municipality, though details on how civil society might participate in or with these advisory councils was lacking. Finally, the article in *Finance and Development* (June 2002) noted that participation was by invitation only and that the poor were only invited to participate in the social dialogue—they were excluded from the political and economic ones. Small wonder that the HIPC documents following the submission of the PRSP focus on increasing buy-in, not protecting political space.

The Bolivian government is not blameless in this trend; even within some of the Supreme Decrees following Popular Participation itself there are problems. To start, they did not disburse any of the co-participation funds until 1 January 1996; as was discussed in Chapter 3, withholding money for programs is an government tactic much older than Popular Participation and one which is intended to control civil society, not be more responsive to it. By 1997 the municipal governments had effectively been given veto power over civil society in the name of technical competency and compatibility.

But Popular Participation was not the only culprit. One of the Supreme Decrees for Administrative Decentralization directed the departments to share technical and procedural knowledge of how government is run, and was run before Popular Participation, with municipal governments. The Law of Municipalities designated the mayor and the municipal council, not the OTBs or the Vigilance Committee, as final authorities in governance matters. It also created the Municipal Social Control Fund, but it expected the OTBs and private organizations to contribute—and gave the Vigilance Committee, not the OTBs control of the purse strings. The National Dialogue Law also created new funding sources as well as re-ordered several administrative bodies, but assigned each new entity its own advisory council, rather than utilizing the existing governance structures. Even the Cochabamba municipality played its part in normalizing relations; the Strategic Plan focused heavily on what technical knowledge was available, rather than input from civil society, in making long-term plans for the municipality. Finally, Congress chose Sánchez de Lozada for president rather than Evo Morales, who has demonstrated on multiple occasions that he has more civil society support than any other political figure.

One would be hard pressed to identify the instigator in eroding the political space for civil society and normalizing relations between the policy actors. The earliest evidence is in IDB documents, but the IMF and the World Bank typically drive those programs. There are also a few disturbing points of order to be found in the Supreme Decrees immediately following the passage of Popular Participation. And even the point at which the process accelerated, the PRSP, was a Bolivian document required by the

multinational agencies. What is abundantly clear is that whatever political space may have been carved out for civil society in 1994 began shrinking almost immediately.

The Problem of Corruption and the Trend of Increased Bureaucratization

Corruption was, and continues to be, arguably the most urgent problem for Bolivia. The solution envisioned by Sánchez de Lozada and Popular Participation was to move government closer to the people, reduce as many administrative and bureaucratic barriers as possible, then have the citizenry police the government. And even if corruption could not be completely halted, at least it would be closer to civil society, giving civil society more of a chance to access resources, particularly money.

There have been multiple policy initiatives that have insidiously added new bureaucratic obstacles to civil society's participation, largely through the creation of new government offices or reordering existing ones. Most have occurred relatively late in the policy stream, starting around 2000, although one Popular Participation Supreme Decree created a new municipal office, the Local Directorate of Education, in 1996 and an Education Reform Supreme Decree created the District Director of Education position in 1995. There is no mention of specific measures intended to mitigate corruption in IMF, World Bank or IDB documents on Popular Participation and/or education, which is curious given the importance they place on transparency and accountability—and their stated intent to depend on civil society to facilitate both. The multinational documents that do address corruption are documents that have been authored by Bolivia (such as the CDF and PRSP) as a requirement for participating in a particular multinational funding program. It is important to remember though, particularly with respect to IDB, that the

only policies included in this study are policies that deal specifically with education and Popular Participation. Given the multinational agencies' propensity to view societal problems as separate and disconnected, rather than enmeshed and connected, there are hopefully other documents and funding streams dedicated to eradicating corruption. That they are separate from a public works like education is discouraging nonetheless.

The vast majority of the bureaucratic hurdles have been put in place by the Bolivian government, which would seem to support both the multinational agencies' and civil society's concerns about corruption. Furthermore, there was a rash of them instituted in 2000 and 2001 with the authoring of the PRSP and the passage of the National Dialogue Law, which was used to shore up the PRSP as a paper created through a participatory process with civil society. As mentioned earlier, the amount of "participation" from civil society was minimal at best; the poor were only allowed to participate in the social dialogue—not the economic or political ones, which are where the vast majority of corruption exists—and "participation" was by invitation only. It should come as no surprise that Wayne Lewis, IMF Mission Chief to Bolivia, stated that the next dialogue should be more inclusive, nor that the IMF-World Bank Joint Staff Assessment noted that anti-corruption strategies were being hampered by entrenched interests and that civil society buy-in was limited at best.

By far and away the worst offender was the National Dialogue Law. It created the Common Municipal Fund for School Education and Public Health—at the national level—and only allowed one civil society representative in each municipality's Local Selection Committee. National Dialogue also created the Dialogue 2000 Special Account, administered at the national level. It reordered the National Fund for Regional

Development and the National Productive and Social Investment Fund into the Sole Directorate of Funds and the only civil society representatives involved in the Directorate are non-voting members. Finally, the Social Investment Fund, which is the *only* government organ that can channel PRSP funds to municipalities, has a Departmental Committee for Project Approval, whose three civil society members are also non-voting. The only money that civil society controls at the municipal level is the Municipal Social Control Fund, created by the Law of Municipalities. Its resources come from OTBs and community associations, foundation contributions and Popular Participation co-participation funds that are only 0.25% of the municipality's share—none of the money comes from poverty reduction funds.

In order to participate in the newest government initiatives—in a non-voting capacity—the prospective civil society representative must be visible enough at a regional or national level to be noticed by the government and appointed to a position. The time and effort needed to gain that kind of visibility would almost certainly require an absence from local and municipal activities. It most likely would also require someone with sufficient resources to dedicate that kind of time and effort, not to mention the travel to and time spent in La Paz, which excludes the vast majority of civil society. The physical and mental distance required to participate in the newest government initiatives would almost certainly create enough dissonance between the individual and their community to divide the would-be representative from his or her community and constituency. The strategy employed is a simple but brilliant one—divide and conquer. It is unclear if this strategy is the objective of the newest policy initiatives or merely an unfortunate side effect, but the disconnect between civil society and governance is an undeniable result.

Despite the lack of civil society advocacy space with regards to funding, Cochabamba does not seem to have suffered much from a lack of funds. The municipal budgets showed a sharp increase in funding from poverty reduction monies, although the municipality of Cochabamba was one of the more affluent municipalities in the country. There are other municipalities that have a much greater, much more dire need for poverty reduction funds. Additionally, the lack of availability of municipal budgets—despite the fact they are supposed to be public documents—and the claim on the part of the municipal government that the budgets for some years have been “lost” does not bode well at all for corruption eradication efforts.

The Problem of the Rural/Urban Divide and the Trend of Passive Observation as Active Participation

Popular Participation was intended to address one other problem, the rural/urban divide. Generally speaking, those who were of European descent and/or not living in poverty and/or already in possession of some measure of political power lived in the major urban areas, concentrating wealth and power there. In attempting to redress the rural/urban divide, Popular Participation was effectively attempting to redress the grossly unequal distribution of wealth and power. This was to be accomplished through purposefully drawing municipalities to include rural as well as urban districts; creating the OTBs and Vigilance Committees as a way for civil society to participate in governance and requiring them to apply for juridical status; and providing OTBs the right to ask for the dismissal of any government authority that was being exclusionary or

unresponsive, as well as charging them with the duty to defend their rights under Popular Participation.

Unfortunately, policymakers began recasting the more active participation envisioned in Popular Participation as passive observation and “oversight” without any real authority almost immediately. It was actually some of the Supreme Decrees attached to Popular Participation itself that were among the earliest offenders. Supreme Decree 24202 set the date for disbursement of co-participation funds as 1 January 1996–20 months after the policy was enacted. It is very difficult to participate and make participation work if it is not funded. The Local Directorate of Education created in December 1996 allowed for the participation of a Vigilance Committee member, but not an OTB member; it also was empowered to engage in activities such as proposing budgets and channeling requests, but not to be particularly hands-on or pro-active. By 1997, Supreme Resolution 216961 advocated for “social control” by the OTBs and Vigilance Committee, but effectively gave municipal governments veto power over civil society. Similar trends can be seen in supreme decrees attached to Administrative Decentralization, which directed government to promote, but not enable, participation and Educational Reform, which designated the new District Director of Education as a municipal employee, not a member of civil society. As for the multinational organizations, IDB documents focused on “training” citizens for participation and management can be found as early as 1994. There was no semantic shift from active to passive, but there was a focus on training citizens how to work with government rather than on training government workers to be responsive to civil society. Additionally,

these methods of management were built on Western models, whereas Popular Participation was allegedly built on indigenous ones.

The shift to “social control” as opposed to “participation” accelerated in 1999. The CDF focused on “engaging” civil society, but not necessarily ensuring their participation in governance. Local ownership of projects was to be pursued, but civil society agenda-setting with regards to projects was not. The HIPC was relatively innocuous until 2001, when Bolivia was participating in a second, enhanced HIPC. This HIPC document required a PRSP. Both documents focus on social control, which the PRSP defines as the Vigilance Committee’s right to denounce irregular local government practices to state and legal authorities—but not to pursue legal action or to hold them in any way accountable to civil society. It goes on to propose strengthening Popular Participation and Administrative Decentralization through local advisory councils that have no authority or power whatsoever. And the IDB documents after 2000 also focus on social oversight. It is interesting that the multinational agencies would want social oversight as a way to mitigate the weakness of the Bolivian state, and then support efforts that undermine the authority civil society was given by Popular Participation.

The National Dialogue Law built on this trend. It built multiple advisory committees for new and reordered government agencies at all levels of government. It created precious few positions for any civil society member, made all civil society positions non-voting ones, and then dedicated most of those positions for Vigilance Committee members. This was after the Law of Municipalities established vigilance committees as supervisory organizations—not governance organizations—that supported and evaluated municipal plans and policies. The Vigilance Committees were also

charged with facilitating citizen participation, though the only activities left to civil society were to organize into OTBs, and to demand proper functioning of municipal services and bring problems to the attention of the Mayor and Municipal Council—apparently only the vigilance committees can access state and legal authorities, and the act of doing so most likely fulfills their responsibility to facilitate citizen participation. Finally, in the Cochabamba Municipality Strategic Plan, both OTBs and the Vigilance Committee are notably absent.

Like the problems of legitimacy and corruption, the change in the structure and function of civil society participation changed most noticeably with the PRSP. The call for civil society to act as government's watchdog while simultaneously closing their avenues to pursue due process, confront offenders directly and/or report activities to a higher or extra-governmental authority is a conundrum that is very difficult to explain, and apparently harder to resolve in practice as will be seen in Chapter 5.


Conclusion

This chapter set the policy context for Popular Participation. Bolivia works under multiple multinational policies, chief among them being the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). Within these two umbrella programs are multiple smaller programs funded by the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. These policies complement, and are complemented by, various national policies that also intersect Popular Participation. Finally, there are some policy documents generated at the municipal level, particularly budgets and strategic development plans, that must also be considered.

Within this policy context it is possible to see three distinct trends closely corresponding to the three problems Popular Participation was intended to redress. With respect to the effort to legitimize government, there has been a policy trend toward normalizing relations with civil society. With respect to the effort to eliminate corruption, there has been a trend toward increased bureaucratization. And with respect to the effort to redress the rural/urban divide, there has been shift from active participation in governance to social oversight of it.

The following chapter describes the data generated by this research project, namely how Popular Participation is being implemented in the municipality of Cochabamba. Chapter 6 offers an analysis of that data, particularly within the policy context described in this chapter. Chapter 7 discusses the conclusions drawn from this research and recommendations for future research.

Figure 2—Master Policy Timeline



Chapter 5

Popular Participation Implementation in Cochabamba

Introduction

Chapter 1 described the relationship between education and the condition of underdevelopment, the specific case of Bolivia, the country's policy remedy, Popular Participation and the need for research on Popular Participation in urban areas. Chapter 2 discussed the historical contexts of decentralization in development and of Popular Participation. Chapter 3 presented the definition of policy for this research project and the ethnographic methodology that flows from the definition. Chapter 4 discussed the global policy context in effect during the research period, using policies from international, national and local sources.

This chapter details and discusses the data generated by the research project, particularly in light of the policy context described in the previous chapter. The observations and interviews are triangulated with documentary evidence.

Districts

To explore as thoroughly as possible the diversity of the Cochabamba municipality and at the same time, limit the project to a manageable size, this study identifies six districts to study—roughly half the districts in the municipality and sufficient to sample the various neighborhoods. Work began with a list of public schools published by the Ministry of Education (Secretaría Nacional de Educación, 1996) and a street map

of the entire municipality. For every school on the list, the street address and the district in which the school was located were identified. There were public schools for every district except 7, 9 and 13. There are 14 districts: 12 urban and two rural. Districts 9 and 13 are the two rural districts. District 9 is a floodplain along the south side of town, while District 13 is a mountainous area north of town. District 7, the smallest and least densely populated urban district, is south of the lake and includes a large fairground and market area. Apparently none of the three districts has a large enough population to support a public school, at least according to the list of schools published by the Ministry of Education (Secretaría Nacional de Educación, 1996). The fact that two of the three are the only rural districts in the municipality does not speak well of Cochabamba's efforts to address the rural/urban divide and the intent of Popular Participation.

After identifying all schools by district, the researcher polled various local acquaintances to determine the districts with the greatest socioeconomic diversity. The list of districts (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 10) was remarkably consistent across respondents and with the researcher's recollection of the municipality. After a walking tour of all the recommended districts and visits to the remaining districts having public schools, the researcher settled on Districts 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 and 10 for study. The districts covered the entire socioeconomic spectrum of Cochabamba, from the wealthiest, most European neighborhood to the poorest and most indigenous.

After selecting a district for each class, the researcher randomly selected from the list of schools one school for each district. Once the school was identified, and it had agreed to participate in the study, the researcher located the OTB for that school and its neighborhood. In a field journal districts and neighborhoods were described according to

socioeconomic class: wealthy, upper-middle, middle, lower-middle, working and poverty, relative to each other. The terms used as descriptors for the neighborhoods were based on the researcher's frame of reference and observations and were intended as *relative* socioeconomic descriptors, not absolute ones.

The wealthy neighborhoods have large showcase homes, with swimming pools, satellite dishes and tall fences (some were four to five meters tall), professionally built with a metal spike or other trespassing deterrent across the top. There were many expensive, high-end cars. In passing these homes, one often finds multiple domestic employees, typically in charge of landscaping or housekeeping. Neighborhood streets are either paved or well-kept cobblestone. Frequently, access to the neighborhoods is restricted (by gates and/or private security) and they are strictly residential areas.

The wealthy neighborhood for Cochabamba was in District 2. The neighborhood studied was bisected by the border between Districts 1 and 2. It is the richest neighborhood in Cochabamba and has the only gated community in the municipality. The surrounding areas are solidly upper-middle class, with the exception of the eastern neighborhood, which is served by the only public school in the area. The eastern neighborhood is undeniably at the poverty level, with many homes built of scrap tin sheets and homemade mud bricks.

The school is the only public school in the entire neighborhood and is beautiful. Someone (whether it was the wealthy community members, the Mormon Church immediately north of the school or the residents of parents petitioning the municipal government), raised significant funds for this school. It is easily the most expensive and best kept of the six schools included in this study. The buildings are brick, there is a

large area in back for the children to play and there are multiple basketball/athletic courts on the school grounds. The only children who attend this school, however, are poor residents of the eastern neighborhood. The children of the wealthier residents attend private schools and frequently go overseas for college.

Upper-middle class neighborhoods have large, well-kept homes (though not as large as wealthy homes), professionally built fences (usually two or three meters tall) and typically one or two nice cars. There are usually fewer luxury items, such as satellite dishes or swimming pools. The homes and grounds are usually beautifully kept, but the domestic staff do not seem to be live-in staff (as in wealthy homes) and are more difficult to spot while wandering around the neighborhood. The roads are well-kept concrete or cobblestone, with an occasional gravel road, and while these neighborhoods are mostly residential, there is an occasional *tienda*, or convenience store of sorts.

District 1 has the upper-middle class neighborhood included in the study. It is the northeasternmost district in Cochabamba. It is closest to Sacaba, the municipality to its east, and is also closest to the Chapare, the agricultural area in Cochabamba where much of the coca is grown. The neighborhood selected for study in District 1 is a very heterogeneous district; it is predominately upper-middle class, with some middle-class homes interspersed with working-class homes and squatter settlements. Quite a few of the squatters are Quechuan farmers who have traveled from the Chapare to Cochabamba. The majority have come because they can no longer survive as farmers. The most common reasons they give for leaving include being forced off their land by the military, the US Drug Enforcement Administration (USDEA) or by *cocaleros*, an inability to

survive on coca replacement crops or having their crops and land destroyed, usually by fires set by the military and/or USDEA.

The school in District 1 is a fair reflection of the neighborhood. It is located on one of the more modest corners, although the school's buildings are solidly constructed and well-kept. There is a basketball court where students can play; the court does not have any large cracks or breaks and the hoops have metal nets attached to them. However, there is no real landscaping to speak of, and the fence is only 1.5 meters high, so it can be seen over. Overall, it is a rather basic, though well-kept school.

Middle class neighborhoods have medium-sized homes (usually three bedroom-sized homes) and nice fences (usually two meters tall), although some of these fences have broken bottle shards or barbed wire cemented into the top of the fence by the owner. Typically there is a car in the drive that is well cared for, but not a new luxury car, and no real luxury items are apparent. The roads are sometimes paved, although the pavement is frequently cracked or broken, and there are some cobblestone roads and dirt roads. There are also many more small mom-and-pop type businesses (e.g., restaurants, beauty shops and convenience stores) than in the wealthier neighborhoods.

District 3 contains a middle-class neighborhood. It is located on the northwest side of town and is bordered by District 2 on the north, District 4 on the south, District 12 on the east and the municipality of Tiqipaya on the west. The neighborhood studied is a solidly middle-class neighborhood. Not only are there beautiful homes and a thriving business community, there were also several billboards advertising new apartment complexes under construction in the neighborhood.

The school in District 3 is a bit of a surprise. It is hidden behind a tall (3-meter) fence, with broken glass cemented into the top and there are no signs identifying it as a school. Furthermore, when one knocks on the gate door, a groundskeeper answers. Unless the caller is a parent or someone having a good reason for being there, admittance is not granted. On the researcher's first visit, the director herself came to the gate to review papers and listen to the introduction before allowing a visit on school grounds. The school complex is sizeable, although it has seen better days. Things are clean, but fairly spartan, and although the teachers and students are very personable, there are relatively few of them, especially for the size of the school they occupy.

Lower-middle class neighborhoods have medium-sized and small homes that are not as well kept as middle class homes. The fences are shorter (maybe one meter tall) and may or may not be topped by bottle shards. The grounds not very well kept and there are very few cars. There are many small convenience stores and some small businesses, though not many, and quite a few vendors on street corners. One interesting detail is that many of the *tiendas* have locked waist-high gates. One must get the attention of the storekeeper to place an order; there is no shopping or browsing in these stores. Streets are typically poorly kept concrete or cobblestone, and there are a fair number of dirt roads.

District 10 encompasses the downtown area and is the lower-middle class neighborhood in this study. The downtown neighborhood studied was largely lower-middle class with some working class elements. This part of downtown is more residential than business, although a fair number of people were using the courtyard area in the front of their homes for some type of business. The business district (such as it is)

is to the west and is generally better-kept than this side of town. For example, while all the roads downtown are paved (although as you head south they abruptly change to dirt roads), the roads and sidewalks on the west side are fairly intact, while the east side has significant damage, especially to the sidewalks. One of the reasons traffic moves so slowly in this part of downtown is because of all the people who periodically step off into the street when the sidewalk becomes impassable.

The school for District 10 is a fitting reflection of its neighborhood. It is housed in the same type of building as most of the homes and businesses (two or three story buildings, with smooth exterior walls, heavy wooden doors and few or no exterior windows). The school is covered with the strangest amalgamation of posters, flyers and graffiti, as is much of downtown. Inside the school, things were crowded and harried.

Working class neighborhoods have mostly small homes, many in disrepair. Owners have done their best to shore up homes with whatever materials might be at hand, such as tin sheets and homemade bricks. Very few people own their own automobiles, although bus drivers and taxi drivers appear to live in these neighborhoods, judging by the large number of buses and taxis parked outside homes and on the streets. There are a few convenience stores in these neighborhoods, almost all of them gated, and large numbers of both abandoned buildings and street vendors. There are almost no small businesses. Most roads are poorly kept, and the percentage of dirt roads increases sharply in these neighborhoods.

District 5 is the working class neighborhood included in this study. It is located in the south-central part of the municipality. It is bordered by District 10 (downtown) to the north, Districts 6 and 8 to the east, the airport to the west and District 9 to the south. The

neighborhood studied is mainly lower-middle class and working class. The further south and west one goes, the poorer the neighborhood becomes.

The school for District 5 was reflective of its surroundings; an older school that could have stood a good cleaning and some repairs. Everything seemed dusty and crowded, although the people were very friendly and helpful and the students in high spirits during the researcher's visits. There was ample room in the classrooms and on the school grounds for the students, classroom materials and equipment, but not nearly enough materials, equipment or students to fill the available space.

Poverty neighborhoods have small homes constructed mainly of homemade brick and other materials that may be available. There are multiple squatter settlements in abandoned buildings and open fields. Many homes have no fences to speak of, and more than one home is missing windowpanes, doors, walls or a roof. While there are a few very small *tiendas* in these neighborhoods, the few businesses are mainly industrial (e.g., concrete, tires or tools), and most businesses have been closed. Roads are almost exclusively dirt roads and it is not uncommon to find ruts so deep or so badly washed out that they are impassable. It is also not uncommon to find children wandering the streets during school hours. Finally, a fair number of people in traditional Quechua dress can be found in poverty neighborhoods, whereas such persons are typically not found in the other neighborhoods.

District 8 houses the poverty neighborhood included in this study. It is located in the southeastern part of the municipality. It is bordered by District 14 to the east, Districts 5 and 9 to the west, District 6 to the north and Capinota to the south. The neighborhood studied in District 8 is abjectly poor. Several buildings were missing entire

walls, and a few were missing roofs. Even the buildings and homes that were intact were clearly improvised with strange combinations of building materials, many of them homemade. Additionally, there is a large oil refinery nearby, and the smoke and smell permeates much of the neighborhood.

The school for District 8 is a *convenio* school, a school the municipality agreed to put in place at the request of the community. It has, therefore, more community support than would be expected for a regular public school. The closest analogy in the United States would be a charter school. This is the only type of school available in District 8, and there may be *convenio* schools for the three districts that had no public schools listed with the Ministry of Education. The walls of the fence around the school are tin, not the concrete or plaster most other fence walls are made of, and get so hot in the sun that children must use their shirt sleeves to push the gate open to go home after school; if the children touched the fence with their bare hands they would get blisters. The researcher, unaware of the temperature of the metal, received two nasty blisters on her hand during her first visit to the school. The buildings on the school grounds are nice enough—although the classroom buildings look prefabricated—but there is precious little in them for the teachers or the students. There is no landscaping to speak of, only loose dirt. The children are delighted to be here though, and considering how many children in such circumstances must work to supplement their family's meager income, or who become street children in larger cities like La Paz or Cochabamba, it is readily apparent why they so enjoy school and the chance to attend it.

Observations

Each district included in this study was visited no fewer than six times during the research period, and every effort was made to make the visits as distinct as possible. For example, every district was visited at least once during the week and once on the weekend. The two southern districts, Districts 5 and 8, were the only districts that were not also visited at least once during the evening; this was due to the lack of reliable bus or taxi service into or out of the district after dark.

District 1

District 1 was an interesting place to visit. There seemed to be a somewhat confused and chaotic quality to neighborhood included in the study, as though the residents could not decide whether this place should be an arty suburb or a poor rural fringe area. It was not at all uncommon to see a lovely, custom-built two-story home next to a crumbling hull of a building sheltering squatter settlements hidden behind wall remnants and sheets of tin whistle. Curiously, there were rarely any people in the squatter settlements, just their few meager belongings; this was not the case in the other squatter settlements encountered during this study.

The neighborhood seemed a lively enough place, although there were not that many people out on the streets. Most homes had healthy little squares of lawn out front and occasionally you could here a mother talking to her children through an open window, but by and large people kept to their homes. There was a neighborhood park that had nice equipment, but the landscaping left something to be desired and it did not seem that many residents utilized it. The one visit during which the playground was

being used, it was occupied by three teenage boys who scattered as soon as an adult arrived.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the 2002 presidential elections took place during the research project. In District 1, there were almost no political signs or graffiti to be seen—no posters, no billboards, no banners or flyers; not even any fence walls painted the color of one or another of the political parties. The only visible sign of political affiliation was a light pole painted pink, the color of MNR.

District 2

The neighborhood in District 2 that housed the school was a fairly intimidating place to outsiders; huge estates, uniformed security, five meter tall fences and gates and security systems. Everything about the neighborhood oozed money and power. The neighborhood was also very quiet; a somber kind of quiet, as though the homes themselves knew and understood their social standing. The homes were the only things in the neighborhood, apart from the house staffs, that were there to make any kind of noise. The only people out and about during the researcher's visits were hired help. A few cars drove by on the streets and a few women in aprons were coming from or going to the grocery store, but no one was out walking their dog, playing with their children, tending to their gardens, etc.

The very layout of the neighborhood itself discouraged visits from outsiders. The streets meander through the neighborhood, with lots of curves and switchbacks, but very few street signs. Even with a detailed city map—in which half the street names on the

map did not correspond to the few street signs up in the neighborhood—it took at least three visits to learn the basic layout of the neighborhood.

As beautiful as the neighborhood where the school was, this was not the neighborhood served by the public school. The population served by the public school lived on a sliver of the far east side of the neighborhood in abject poverty. Whereas the homes around the school could comfortably hold several families, the homes in the eastern neighborhood barely seemed fit for livestock, but were in fact housing several families, or at least several generations of one family. The homes were literally held together by chicken wire and/or mud; one home even had a child's tricycle on the roof to hold down one corner of the metal sheet that was keeping out the worst of the wind and rain.

This area was as quiet as its much richer neighbor, but this silence felt oppressive. It were as though the residents were too exhausted or too beaten down to have the energy for anything other than recuperating and preparing for the next back-breaking day. There were signs of children everywhere, but the children themselves were nowhere to be seen.

There was no political propaganda in this neighborhood, not even in the eastern neighborhood. This was not surprising for the richer section of the neighborhood, which conveys the impression that such activity would not be befitting the residents' social statures, but it is somewhat surprising for the eastern section because in the other poor districts, political propaganda abounds.

District 3

This neighborhood actually resembles many suburban neighborhoods in the United States—streets laid out in a grid pattern, free-standing homes with nice yards and corner stores that sell bread, milk and eggs. There is a major artery on the north side of the neighborhood and traffic moves at a lively pace. There are also many thriving businesses lining the artery and bordering the residential areas. It is very easy to see people out and about conducting their daily business, such as shopping or going to the beauty salon, although the deeper into the residential area you go, the quieter it becomes.

There is also a lot of new construction in this neighborhood, including several high-rise apartment buildings. There are multiple billboards around District 3 with the contact information for the various builders, should anyone decide they would like to buy a unit. The overall impression of the neighborhood is that it is a vibrant, growing community, with energy and ambition to spare.

Given the drive that seems to exist in District 3, it was a bit surprising to find that as in District 2, there was no sign of political campaigning or propaganda. Judging by the business activity, one would think there would be plenty of civic and political involvement, but there was no evidence of it in the residential area.

District 5

District 5 is a dusty collection of homes and mom-and-pop businesses scattered among abandoned storefronts south of downtown. There is a major north-south artery running through the neighborhood, but unlike the road in District 3, this one is clogged with buses and taxis and conveys the impression that the travelers are harried and anxious

to move on. The businesses also suggest struggle and strife; what small businesses are there are things like convenience stores with locked gates. There is a striking absence of businesses that would suggest growth, such as beauty salons, service centers, clothing stores and the like, all of which can be very easily found in District 3.

Unlike the neighborhoods previously discussed, this neighborhood had an abundance of political propaganda. The majority of it was bright pink, the color for MNR, Sánchez de Lozada's political party. The second most popular color was purple, for NFR, Reyes Villa's political party. These colors are everywhere—light poles, fences, doors, almost anything that can be painted. The further south one went, the poorer—and pinker—the neighborhoods became.

District 8

This neighborhood is undeniably poor. From the main road out of town, the neighborhood would appear to be hanging on, but just a few lots into the neighborhood one can see how truly in need this population is. The concrete from the main road into the neighborhood rarely lasts more than two blocks, at which point it becomes a dirt road. Navigating this neighborhood takes considerable effort. There are almost no street signs, many of the roads are impassable and the creek that bisects the neighborhood cannot be crossed in a vehicle; the only way to get from the northern half to the southern half is to drive back out to the main road and re-enter the neighborhood or walk across a flimsy-looking piece of PVC pipe embedded in the dirt above the ravine. Since the pipe is both very smooth and very circular, there is very little tractable surface and the crossing is even more nerve-wracking than appearances would lead one to believe. The researcher

walked across the pipe one time only, and traveled back and forth to the main road after that.

This neighborhood is as quiet as District 2, but seems even more downtrodden and exhausted. Most of the homes here are in disrepair and many abandoned buildings have squatter settlements in them. In walking the neighborhood it is possible to see barrels people use to store water and small piles of wood scraps that are apparently used for making fires in the evening; at night the neighborhood looks completely dark and abandoned, suggesting that even those few houses that are relatively intact are also lacking electricity and possibly running water as well.

On the main roads into this neighborhood there is an abundance of political propaganda, almost all of it for MNR. Once into the neighborhood, however, the colors disappear. The absence is not due to lack of interest, but rather to lack of resources. The people in these neighborhoods rarely have enough to eat or adequate clothes to wear. They have no money to spend on paint or banners, nor can they spare time away from work to put up such materials.

District 10

Downtown Cochabamba is quite similar to many downtowns in the US; there is a business section, a posh downtown-renewal residential section and several neighborhoods that have seen better days. One of those faded neighborhoods was the downtown neighborhood for this study. It was close to the main east-west street, so there was always plenty of noise and activity. The homes at one time had been large, beautiful two-story homes, but at the time of the study just seemed well-used and worn out; most of

them could have stood a couple of coats of paint, and many had chips and chunks missing from the walls and doors. Most residents kept their doors tightly closed and locked, and suspiciously regarded anyone who happened to be walking on the sidewalk when they were entering or leaving their homes.

As one might expect from a downtown area, there is an abundance of political propaganda and graffiti around the school. The downtown area seems to be pretty evenly split between the MNR and the NFR, although there are significant amounts of advertisement and support for the other major political parties; MBL, MAS, ADN and L&J. Most weekends, citizens out campaigning for their political party and/or candidate(s) overran the business district. During the week though, civic involvement usually took the form of various marches and strikes on a wide variety of topics ranging from education to corruption to a group of neighbors who wanted bus or taxi service. Downtown was also where wealth and poverty uncomfortably met and was the stage upon which political campaigns, worker strikes and indigenous issues were displayed for the citizenry.

Interviews

Initially the researcher identified 20-25 interview prospects for the study. Once in Cochabamba, the potential list increased to 40 with the identification of several NGOs and multiple government offices. The final number of completed interviews, though, was only 26. Table 2 - Final Data Matrix in Chapter 3 lists all the organizations included in the study as well as those that did not participate. The interviews themselves and those who declined to be interviewed will be discussed in greater detail below.

Each school was visited at least three times. This was done not only to provide multiple snapshots of the school, but in five of the six cases it took at least three visits in order to complete an interview. Generally speaking, the first visit served as an introduction. The second visit was inevitably cancelled because of some urgent, more pressing appointment—about half of the appointments were with parents, the other half with municipal education officials. The third visit typically resulted in a completed interview and a tour of the school grounds accompanied by a school official, but the time spent sitting in the office during the previous two visits waiting on school officials was frequently much more instructive than the interview and tour.

Most of the other interviews were completed on the first or second visit, although there was a significant amount of red tape associated with the municipal government interviews. The Mayor's office would only grant an interview with a letter of introduction from a local organization (which UPB kindly provided). Further, they required a second letter from a local organization, naming the office I wanted to see and the nature of my business with them, and yet a third letter to be issued by the Mayor's Office (with a resolution number) that was the researcher's pass into municipal department offices. Combined with the researcher's letter of introduction from the University of Oklahoma and the interview protocol, the Mayor's office required a total of five letters for an interview with a municipal employee. This does not reflect well on accountability and transparency efforts, which calls into doubt anti-corruption efforts as well.

Schools

The researcher spoke to the directors at each school identified for this study. For Schools 1, 2, 3, and 8, the school director was interviewed. For Schools 5 and 10, the directors referred me to a teacher. Additionally, the Director at School 2 asked for volunteers among the teaching staff, and seven teachers provided written responses to interview questions, bringing the total number of responses to 13.

Given the relatively large number of respondents, there was a predictable variation in responses. When asked if access to education had been improved, seven respondents said “yes,” and all of them addressed *the participation of the parents*, not the children’s ability to enroll in school. Of the six who did not say yes, only one said no outright. The remainder stated that either Popular Participation was still in progress or that it had no effect on education.

One very interesting teacher from School 2 used most of the interview questions to expound on the lack of integration of rural districts into the municipality. For example, in response to question one the teacher wrote, “I think the Popular Participation resources still have not made it to all the zones, especially the ones farthest away, which are the ones with the greatest need. There is no new school construction and the schools that are already there have improved little or none.”

When asked if educational practice had been improved, nine respondents answered affirmatively. All of them noted that improvement was an ongoing process and there was still a great deal of work to be done. Of the four who said “no,” three also acknowledged Popular Participation was a work in progress. The respondents were evenly split on where educational practice had improved or was improving. The areas

cited were lack of information/communication, insufficient or improper participation on the part of the parents and teacher accountability to the parents and community. Only two respondents commented on teacher quality and/or classroom practice.

The third question about funding elicited the most interesting responses. Eight of the 13 respondents stated that funding was insufficient. Three of the 13 respondents stated that funding was sufficient, but all of them supported the statement by citing the participation of parents in education. The final two responded to the question about funding with comments on personal responsibility and organization. It is important to note that in Latin American cultures it is considered impolite not to respond to a question or to say one doesn't know. As a general rule, people will offer a guess or an incorrect answer in an effort to be polite²¹. Given that situation, answers which seem to be non-answers or not to address the question should be understood as a polite effort to speak on an unfamiliar or unpleasant topic, rather than a knowledgeable or well-thought out response.

The director at School 1 stated there was "not enough money to improve effectively education and development," while one of the teachers at School 2 went so far as to say funding "is in crisis." The most telling comment, however, came from the director of the *convenia* school in District 8 who stated, "There is still a little missing. We are a community school as well as a public school and we have been denied cleaning materials, infrastructure assistance, classroom furniture, things like this; they did not tell us either, we had to buy them."

The fourth question regarding attention to community concerns provided the most consistent answers. 11 of the 13 respondents stated that their concerns were in the

²¹ For example, see Barnstone, October 1993.

process of being addressed, but not all had been attended to. Six of the 11 stated that the difficulty in attending to concerns was a lack of information; the director at School 2 stated simply “not completely, because of a lack of information and communication,” while one of the teachers went on to say “we still lack information on Popular Participation.” The teacher at School 2 who was concerned with the continuing division between the urban and rural districts stated, “I don’t think so; in my community we have many needs, but the Popular Participation office does not have sufficient information.”

The next pressing problem was a lack of parental participation, cited by the other five respondents. The two who said their concerns had been addressed cited their school boards as the reason their schools were having so much success addressing needs. It is important to note that the school boards (*juntas escolares*) are a feature of the Educational Reform Law, not of Popular Participation.

The final question, concerning other outcomes or changes, was surprisingly consistent. Eight of the 13 respondents wanted more and/or better cooperation from parents and the community, including local government. Two others wanted more fairness and equality in the process, although they did not mention cooperation or participation specifically. Another two wanted better information about Popular Participation, and the final respondent wanted the municipal government to take more responsibility for infrastructure.

The director at School 3 had a very interesting response to the question, which astutely associated the lack of information with the lack of transparency. “I would like for the distribution of Popular Participation funds to be fair for education, to be honest and transparent—don’t just talk about it. I would like the community to have full

knowledge, besides what they are told. I think when the parents, when everyone sees how the funds are managed for education, they will participate.”

The school interviews provided glimpses of all three problems Popular Participation was intended to address. The teacher at School 2 who wrote so extensively on the needs of outer, rural zones provided outstanding evidence of the continuing rural/urban divide. The various comments on lack of information and/or communication with various government offices demonstrate there is an ongoing problem with the government being perceived as supportive of the people and therefore somewhat legitimate. And finally, comments by the directors at Schools 3 and 8 discuss continuing funding problems, which suggests continued difficulties with corruption.

OTBs

In addition to schools, the researcher also identified the OTBs for the neighborhoods in which sample schools were located, though it proved to be an unexpected challenge. The list of OTBs and the areas they cover are supposed to be public documents available to anyone, but it took more than a month to find a friend of a friend of a friend of a friend who worked in the municipal government and could get a copy of the OTB list and maps of the areas they had incorporated. Furthermore, the researcher was clearly and explicitly told by the friend (who delivered the documents to a downtown lawyer’s office where supervised photocopies could be made) that under no circumstances could the name or title of the person who provided the documents be revealed. This provided yet another example of the continuing problems with transparency and corruption.

One neighborhood, the one for District 10, had yet to incorporate an OTB for the neighborhood; indeed, most of downtown was without an OTB. One district, District 5, declined to participate in the study. Two others, Districts 1 and 3, failed to respond to requests for interviews. Only OTBs from Districts 2 and 8 completed interviews. It is important to note that they are the OTBs for the two poorest neighborhoods in this study (the OTB for District 2 served only the eastern neighborhood), and both declined to be audiotaped, leaving only the researcher's written comments as interview records. Additionally, both interviews were conducted in groups, with more than one person contributing comments.

In response to the first question about access, both OTBs responded with comments about resources. OTB 2 said that Popular Participation provided resources for activities such as building schools, while OTB 8 stated Popular Participation had better success in managing resources than in improving access.

The second question concerned improving practice, and both OTBs answered "yes." OTB 2 very specifically stated that the money from Popular Participation had been used for all sorts of materials and equipment, while OTB 8 did not elaborate on its response.

The third question about funding provided still more surprising answers, not in and of itself, but in relation to questions 4 and 5. OTB 2 stated that funding was adequate and there had been significant benefits for health, education and other basic services. OTB 8 stated that in *theory* the funding was adequate, but in practice 50% of the money was missing. However, in the fourth question on addressing community concerns, both said that their community's needs were not being met *because* of a lack of resources.

OTB 2 stated, in response to the question, “Unfortunately no. We are in process, but managers and administrators spent the money poorly; some money has been lost and corruption continues to be a big problem.” OTB 8 stated resources were insufficient. Additionally, in the last question on desired outcomes, both OTBs wanted increased resources. OTB 2 went on to state its desire for a public high school, not a private one, and OTB 8 wanted economic decentralization to be augmented.

The lack of participants—and the neighborhood that had yet to incorporate an OTB—is distressing given the latest policy trends discussed in Chapter 4, but also somewhat predictable given the erosion of political space engendered by those same policies. It also does not speak well of integration efforts, be they rural/urban or government/civil society. The fact that the two OTBs that did respond both wanted a group of people present and declined to be interviewed when discussing Popular Participation suggests suspicion about policy and research, which does not bode well for government legitimacy. Finally, the comments on funding and corruption also are discouraging with respect to progress made by Popular Participation.

Teacher Training Institutions and Professional Organizations

There are three universities in Cochabamba. One, the *Universidad Privada Boliviana*, a private university at which the researcher worked in 2001, is the only university without an education program. The other two, *Universidad de San Simón* and *La Católica* both had professors who agreed to an interview. *San Simón* is more concerned with training administrators and with education as a field of study, while *Católica* incorporated the normal school and teacher training responsibilities. With

regard to professional organizations, the teachers' federation declined to participate and instead referred me to another professional organization, *La Casa Pedagógica*, which agreed to an interview.

In response to the first question, no one felt that educational access had been improved. The closest to an affirmative answer was that the community's participation had raised awareness about educational needs, which improved access at a very basic level. The representative from *Casa Pedagógica* stated, "One cannot say if Popular Participation has improved access to education; there are too many factors to study. We have not had enough chats, conferences, etc, with the families; we have not explained Popular Participation to the families."

In response to the second question, only one person felt educational practice had been improved. Another felt that teacher *efficiency* had been improved, though the mechanisms of Popular Participation were hindering efforts to improve educational practice. The third was still waiting for satisfactory results, which she expected to see long-term.

The third question concerned funding and elicited a response from one person who said funding was adequate, because the law very clearly explained the procedures for carrying out Popular Participation. The other two felt it was not funded adequately. The *Casa Pedagógica* representative went on to say "It is not going very well. The lack of information, courses and workshops for parents has distorted everything a little bit. The parents should be better informed, they should be able to dictate workshop courses, not told 'This is what you should do and say' like now." No one commented on money or financial resources.

The fourth question was the only one on which all three participants agreed. All agreed that the community's concerns were not being met, although they did agree it was in process. The professor from *Católica* stated "in Bolivia the community is very complex and transmitting ideas is very difficult. There is no full integration of the work the state approved to improve quality and extend the changes in the educational structure." The representative from *Casa Pedagógica* went on to state "Here in the city where I work, and I continue visiting establishments, I can't say yes. There is still resistance from the parents and from the teachers; popular participation is good but the law is not."

The final question elicited a continuation of earlier comments from each of the respondents. The respondent who felt community participation had improved access and practice wanted more and better participation from the community and parents, in educational aspects addressed by Popular Participation and those of Educational Reform. She also wanted greater international connections, to broaden perspectives. The respondent who had noted administrative shortcomings and problems in the mechanisms of Popular Participation wanted a more agile, less bureaucratic state structure, one that would promote full democratic participation.

Above all the administrative structure. We need a more agile state structure, less bureaucratic. The municipality should not limit itself to infrastructure improvement; it should be concerned with advancing education, improving municipal structure to generate a new citizen consciousness. Validate citizens' rights and responsibilities, which are

fundamental to democratic practice, because now there is no full

democratic participation. We should all work to promote democracy.

The final respondent, who felt there were too many factors to study and expected to see results long-term, wanted a questionnaire and evaluation of Popular Participation to determine what was succeeding.

Given that the few education professionals outside of the public schools that participated in this research could find no real improvement in access or practice—not to mention their comments on parents and communities—it would seem they perceive a continuing societal divide. Interestingly though, they fault parental and teacher resistance as much as the lack of information on the part of the government. They all declined to comment on money and corruption, although one did note that the municipal government was unwieldy and unresponsive, giving the impression the municipal government was a hindrance to, not a facilitator of, participation and democracy. This suggests a lack of government legitimacy.

Local Governance

There are multiple organizations at work on the municipal level to ensure Popular Participation works as intended, in general as well as for education. As for government employees whose job functions include Popular Participation matters, they can be found in the various departments at the Mayor's Office, the Municipal Council and the District Education Office. The elements of civil society that work at the municipal level are the Civic Committee, which pre-dates Popular Participation, and the Vigilance Committee.

As was detailed above, there were considerable bureaucratic obstacles to be overcome in order to speak to someone in municipal government. Apparently, transparency and accountability have yet to become high priorities for the Cochabamba municipality, although they are priorities for Popular Participation. Once allowed to speak to someone in the Mayor's office, the researcher conducted an interview with a member of the Municipal Education and Health Promotion Department staff. The researcher was also able to complete interviews with two employees of the Municipal Council, although no Council member elected to take part in the study, and with a District Education Director in the District Education Office.

There was also an interview of sorts completed with a member of the Civic Committee. At the Committee office the researcher introduced herself and asked if a Council member might participate in the study. The secretary took the letters of introduction and interview protocol, asked me to have a seat and went to find a council member. A few minutes later she returned with an interview she had conducted over the phone with one of the council members! The response is a very brief one and somewhat suspect, given no one associated with the study conducted it. The final interview at the municipal level, with the Vigilance Committee, was never completed. The Municipal Council Secretary's office provided the contact information for a gentleman who was not available by phone or at home and did not return phone calls or messages. It is very telling that none of the OTB representatives knew how to contact him; they all referred the researcher to the Municipal Council. It seems likely his absence from civil society interaction, especially when coupled with the unavailability of the Civic Committee, facilitates the lack of accountability at the municipal government level. This is

particularly troubling when one considers the policy trend of concentrating what responsibilities are left to civil society in the hands of the Vigilance Committee.

For the first question, three of the five respondents—all of them municipal employees—stated that access had improved, and attributed the improvement to municipal investment in educational infrastructure. The fourth respondent stated that Popular Participation “is a mechanism of fiscal control, to make the administration serve the public goals. We are missing knowledge and socialization about these laws; there is a danger of it becoming too politicized.” He intimated the program had not been very successful. The fifth respondent said Popular Participation had not improved access to education.

The second question concerned educational practice. Four of the five persons interviewed responded positively. Three of the four, however, also credited Educational Reform’s partnership with Popular Participation for the improvement. The fourth respondent did not explain or support his answer. The final respondent stated Popular Participation had not improved access, impacting infrastructure investment only. The respondent also said the program had improved conditions for parents to participate.

Interestingly, one of the Municipal Council employees, who stated that practice had been improved with the assistance of Educational Reform, went on to say, “but it has not done enough. There is still a difference between rural and urban districts within the municipality; it has improved for some, but maintained the rules for another.”

The third question about funding generated some telling non-answers. All three of the municipal employees sidestepped the question, saying that the municipality’s money is for infrastructure only. Two of the three also made a point of explaining that

teachers' salaries come from the department level, not the municipal level. Additionally, one municipal employee stated, "the social organization representatives still have not assumed responsibility for education, which is a co-responsibility." The remaining two respondents felt education could be better funded by Popular Participation. Both commented that the process could work, although it needs to be better suited to realities on the ground in Cochabamba.

The fourth question addressed community concerns and elicited a similar response pattern as the third question. All three municipal employees stated that Cochabamba was in the process of addressing its needs. One person did not elaborate on her answer. Another said parent committees and school boards, features of Educational Reform, not Popular Participation, should assume their full responsibility. The third person cited limited availability of resources. The fourth respondent said needs in his community are being addressed because they were identified in his district's annual operating plan (he did not have a copy available) and his district was attacking the causes of the problems. The fifth respondent stated needs were not being addressed because of minimal management of the situation.

The final question produced similar answers. When asked what other changes or outcomes they would like to see, four of the five said they would like to see greater participation. One wanted municipal and department governments to work together better, but the other three wanted greater citizen participation. The final respondent's only comment was that there had been achievements, and that goals remain to be met.

These interview responses differ sharply from those of civil society. Whereas civil society was generally more concerned with better information and better

communication with government, the municipal government faulted civil society for not living up to their responsibility. This “he said, she said” exchange is indicative of a lack of trust and legitimacy, especially considering one of the municipal government respondents plainly stated there was a lack of information for civil society. This same person also noted there was a lack of *socialization*, which suggests a shift in attitudes similar to the semantic shift in policy documents.

The deflection of questions about funding, and rather dogmatically repeating the need for civil society to assume its responsibility, suggests transparency and accountability are not high municipal government priorities, which seriously calls into question anti-corruption efforts. Finally, it would appear from one of the Municipal Council employee’s comments that addressing the rural/urban divide is faring as poorly as the other two issues.

State Governance

There were only two offices at the department (state) level to interview: the Departmental Education Service (SEDUCA) and the Office for Popular Participation. The department level was largely circumvented by Popular Participation, which was a devolution from the national to the municipal level. The state is, however, responsible for salaries, including teacher salaries. The Office for Popular Participation declined to participate, stating it had virtually nothing to do with education. The representative from SEDUCA answered the first three questions from the interview protocol, but declined to answer the last two because she felt a parent would be better able to answer those questions.

In response to the first question, the SEDUCA representative said that Popular Participation had permitted participation and enhanced students' matriculation, especially at the elementary level. In response to the second question on educational practice, she said practice had been improved in some ways—such as children and teachers becoming more constructivist—and that there was fairly good support for it. However, she noted the community did not see the changes it would like from the Ministry of Education. For the third and final question, the SEDUCA representative answered that she felt education was funded adequately by Popular Participation, but even better by Educational Reform, and that the laws for Popular Participation were promoting Educational Reform. Her comments, while interesting, were not particularly illuminating.

National Governance

Three national offices were identified for inclusion in this study: the Ministry of Education, the Vice Ministry for Popular Participation and Financial Management (VPPFM) and the Treasury Department. The Ministry of Education granted an interview, but the VPPFM declined to participate, saying they didn't really have anything to do with education. The researcher was unable to locate the Treasury Department. No one seemed to know where the Treasury Department was, though many were willing to take a guess and the researcher had the opportunity to traverse La Paz several times in search of it. The office is most likely in the *Banco Central* (Central Bank) building, in which case the Treasury Department interview would not have been completed anyway. Access to the building is greatly restricted and efforts to gain entrance to the building to talk to the IMF for another interview were unsuccessful.

The Ministry of Education representative, in answer to the first question, stated that Popular Participation had improved parent participation in schools' administrative affairs. In response to the second question he thought practice had improved somewhat, but could not say by what percentage since research had not been done. He went on to say "teachers now know that parents will be monitoring their performance, observing them and exercising *social control* over them." When asked about funding, the Ministry of Education representative said education was funded appropriately according to society, but that the money hasn't made it to the classrooms yet. In response to the question about Cochabamba's concerns being addressed, he made a few derisive comments about the focus on school breakfasts ("the school breakfast in Cochabamba is sacred") to the exclusion of other, more worthy goals. He also felt they had accomplished more with JICA-built schools than with Popular Participation resources. The Ministry of Education representative's response to the final question on other outcomes or changes he would like to see was very instructive.

We wish teachers would stop resisting change, stop resisting reform. We wish they would accept social control, because it is a form of quality control. We would also like for society not to confuse its responsibilities and exceed its limits. We are decentralized so they have a certain administrative control, but they do not control teachers' attendance. *I wish people understood it is only to watch and inform and report—not to take action.* This is natural because of a lack of information, lack of training for the parents; the teachers have a marked tendency to retaliate when the school board adequately completes its functions. Another problem is the

low pay of teachers, which can lead to corruption and the children see it, they learn corruption in school.

This interview is the most clearly aligned with the policy environment detailed in Chapter 4, including the same buzzwords like “social control.” It is particularly instructive with respect to recasting participation as observation, as the above quote shows. It is also interesting that the Ministry of Education representative would say Popular Participation is funded adequately, but that the money has not made it to the classrooms yet. It would appear he places the blame for corruption on the municipal government, not the federal government; this would make sense if one shared his conviction that corruption is a skill people learn in school, not in dealing with government officials in everyday life.

NGOs

Perhaps the most frustrating of all groups to try to contact were the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Cochabamba. Initially the researcher asked a Bolivian friend, who is an economist for an NGO working in Cochabamba, if he knew of a list of NGOs currently working in Cochabamba. He said he would try to get the list, but was unsuccessful. Apparently, he contacted several people in various offices, but the people who said they could help either did not have the list or had reservations about sharing it. After several weeks, the researcher decided to pursue alternatives. Eventually the CEDIB (Center for Documentation and Information–Bolivia) office on the south side of downtown was able to provide assistance. They had a list, dated 28 February 2000, of NGOs working in Cochabamba (Ministerio de Hacienda, 28 February 2000). Seven NGOs were identified and were to be contacted for interviews for this study. Six of the

seven (Intl. Children's Defense, Save the Children, Center for the Investigation, Promotion and Development of the City, Center for the Study of the Economic and Social Reality of Bolivia, Center for Social, Health and Educational Diagnosis, Educational Audiovisuals and the Regional Center for Multidisciplinary Studies) were no longer at the address or phone number listed in the publication, nor could anyone say to where they had moved. The final NGO, the Popular Education and Investigation Center (CINEP), located at the address listed in the directory, worked exclusively in the countryside and therefore declined to participate.

The sole NGO interview was with the Bolivian Center for Educational Investigation and Action (CEBIAE), to which the researcher was referred by both the gentleman at CINEP and the *Católica* professor. CEBIAE is located in La Paz, and the representative interviewed was Argentinean. The respondent was very knowledgeable about Popular Participation, but not about Cochabamba, so she only answered four of the five questions.

In answer to the first question, the respondent said Popular Participation had definitely modified the educational situation and had improved access somewhat, mainly at the primary level. She did not see any real improvement in access to secondary education, nor did she think municipalities were placing as much emphasis on access as they should. In response to the second question, she noted that Popular Participation seemed to improve parent participation, but while parents reported they participated in pedagogical projects at a rate of about 15%, the federal government reported their participation rate at around 80%. She went on to say that "apparently curriculum is still controlled by the state, therefore we can say the state still retains a little power—the power

to define curriculum, define content and the participation in pedagogical aspects is very scant.” She also stated that it seemed to her educational autonomy is an ongoing discussion as Popular Participation is an ongoing process of implementation. She concluded by reiterating that secondary education was being slighted in the process.

In response to the third question, she stated

There is a great amount of money—I do not know how much. Definitely the larger municipalities are going to get more money. The money that is destined for the municipalities goes for primary education, not early childhood or secondary, nor alternative education. Even though there is a law for alternative education projects, they are not recognized because people do not know what to do with the money.

The respondent declined to answer the fourth question, saying she did not know enough about Cochabamba to answer properly. The final question concerned other outcomes or changes and the respondent focused on knowledge and participation. She felt there was a lack of printed materials on Popular Participation; there was nothing that could be given to parents or teachers. She went on to say “we need information. No one can read the law, there is no reading culture. We think that participation is below optimum level. There is no negotiated participation, no consensus, no articulation of needs, how they can be achieved, etc. Definitely Popular Participation is in the law, it is in discourse, but very little is in the people.”

This interview provided an interesting on-the-outside-looking-in perspective. There is civil society participation, but not at the rate the federal government claims, nor in the manner they would like; this makes government and its claims look less legitimate

and more suspect. There is money, but the large municipalities get a disproportionate share and spend the funds on only a small portion of the available projects, which does not bode well for either anti-corruption or integration/equalization efforts. Finally, she noted the lack of participation on the part of civil society from an apparent lack of information.

Table 3–Interview Responses

1. Do you think access to education has been improved by Popular Participation?

Respondent	Response	
Schools & TTI/PO	yes (8) no (3) other (3)	parents/participation (7) children (0)
Civil Society (OTBs and NGO)	yes (2)	other (1)
Government	no (2) infrastructure (3)	administration (1) participation (1)

2. Do you think education practice has been improved by Popular Participation?

Respondent	Response	
Schools & TTI/PO	yes (8) no (4) other (2)	parents/participation (6) information (2) efficiency
Civil Society (OTBs and NGO)	yes (3)	parents (2)
Government	yes (5) no (1)	other (1) parents/community (4)

3. Do you feel education is adequately funded by Popular Participation?

Respondent	Response	
Schools & TTI/PO	yes (2) no (7) other (4)	parents/participation (2) process problems (3)
Civil Society (OTBs and NGO)	yes (2)	no (1)
Government	yes (1) no (2)	other (3) lack of funds from others (i.e., department) (3)

4. Do you feel you and your community's concerns are being addressed?

Respondent	Response	
Schools & TTI/PO	yes (5) no (8) other (3)	parents/participation (6) information (6)
Civil Society (OTBs and NGO)	no (2)	no answer (1)
Government	yes (1) no (2)	in process (3) community (3)

5. Are there any other outcomes or changes you desire?

Respondent	Response	
Schools & TTI/PO	parents/participation (5) government (3) Education Reform (3)	administration (1) evaluation (1)
Civil Society (OTBs and NGO)	resources (2)	information (1)
Government	government leadership (2) community (1)	teachers (1) other (1)

Documents

Most of the observations made during the research period, and many of the interview comments, are amply supported by documentary evidence. To begin, the poor integration of rural districts into the Cochabamba municipality and the continuing poverty in certain urban districts is supported by documents. In the Strategic Development Plan, illiteracy and the provision of educational services is compared by district. In the poorest districts, the rural ones excluded because of a lack of public schools, illiteracy was over 10%. Illiteracy was also over 10% in District 8 (12.3%), the poorest district included in this study. The next highest illiteracy level was for District 5 (8.3%), followed by District 2 (7.5%), District 1 (6.5%), District 3 (5.9%) and finally District 10 (4.3%). Student enrollment in public schools versus private schools followed the same pattern. Student enrollment in public schools in Districts 7, 9, and 13 was 100%, with most of those schools most likely *convenia* schools. For the districts included in this study, the greatest numbers of students enrolled in public schools was in District 8 (100%). Others were District 5 (91.65%), District 3 (91.82%), District 2 (82.4%), District 1 (80.49%) and District 10 (68.13%). The farther away from the center of the municipality (District 10 downtown) the less likely a district was to be provided adequate services. Finally, the municipal government, as evidenced by its operating budgets, seemed reluctant to invest its own resources in education.

That reality was further supported by occasional stories in *Los Tiempos* in a section called “*Desde el Barrio*” (From the Neighborhood). In a story on 15 April 2002, the community of Tirani in District 13 was highlighted. The neighborhood school served over 500 students, but it lacked the infrastructure to provide courses to the students. One

classroom might hold 60 students and several different grades. The assistance the school received was from JICA, not from the municipality (Los Tiempos, 15 April 2002).

The comments on corruption are abundantly supported by documentation. There were very candid discussions of ongoing problems with corruption in the HIPC documents and the PRSP, as well as multiple remediation efforts (e.g., transparency and accountability mechanisms, civil service reform and efforts to update local governance and reporting structures). Furthermore, during the research period a favorite topic of discussion was the considerable money the municipal government had stolen from Popular Participation. On 6 March 2002, a story ran in *Los Tiempos* about municipal governments “misusing” nearly \$13 million dollars in co-participation funds during 1994-2001. The 15 largest municipalities, including Cochabamba, had misspent \$7.6 million (Los Tiempos, 6 March 2002a; Los Tiempos, 6 March 2002b). The public immediately began calling for an audit of the municipal government. Two days later, someone broke into the Controller’s Office and “stole” the two computers that stored budget data—and nothing else (Los Tiempos, 8 March 2002a; Los Tiempos, 8 March 2002b). The competing hypotheses proposed in the article were 1) someone wanted to harm the government and 2) someone staged the theft to avoid prosecution. Popular opinion was firmly with hypothesis number two, despite the municipal government’s declarations that the theft was the work of delinquents (Los Tiempos, 9 March 2002a; Los Tiempos, 9 March 2002b; Los Tiempos, 13 March 2002). Finally, in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Indices for 2002 and 2003, Bolivia scored 89th out of 102 countries and 106th out of 133 countries respectively (Transparency International, 28 August 2002; Transparency International, 7 October 2003).

The continuing lack of government legitimacy is also amply supported by documents. The newspaper articles about the misuse of Popular Participation funds and the subsequent “theft” of municipal computers speak to the lack of legitimacy as well as corruption. There was also some discussion in the newspapers about poverty and the recent influx of HIPC funds. The discussion centered on how the majority of the population lived in poverty and the government’s apparent inability to make any real progress in poverty alleviation (Los Tiempos, 27 April 2002a; Los Tiempos, 27 April 2002b; Los Tiempos, 27 April 2002c; Los Timepos, 12 May 2002). One article noted that the capitals received more money than other municipalities and that the budgets for most of the urban areas, including Cochabamba, had doubled or tripled (Los Tiempos, 29 April 2002), despite the fact that the rural municipalities are much poorer than the urban ones and most of them did not see a triple-digit increase in funding. The FY2002 budget for the Cochabamba municipality showed a funding stream of over 14 million bolivianos, or more than two million dollars, from HIPC funds, which more than doubled the budget from the previous year.

The lack of government legitimacy is perhaps most apparent in the reporting of the school year. School was scheduled to start the first of February, but was delayed until 18 February by teacher strikes. The problems, widely reported in the newspapers, centered around school security, teacher pay and provision of teaching equipment and materials (Los Tiempos, 18 February 2002a; Los Tiempos, 18 February 2002b; Los Tiempos, 19 February 2002a; Los Tiempos, 19 February 2002b; Los Tiempos, 19 February 2002c)—all items that are the responsibility of the various levels of government to provide. In March, a group of teachers marched from Oruro to La Paz, a journey of

more than 100 miles, to protest teacher pay (Los Tiempos, 21 March 2002), despite the fact that teacher salaries are paid by the departments, not the federal government.

Arguably the most glaring example of the lack of perceived government legitimacy occurred in early April when the Ministry of Education fired 31 teachers for allegedly missing too many school days. The story was covered extensively in the local paper (Los Tiempos, 4 April 2002a; Los Tiempos, 4 April 2002b; Los Tiempos, 4 April 2002c; Los Tiempos, 5 April 2002a; Los Tiempos, 5 April 2002b). The public outcry was so great that just two days later, all 31 teachers were reinstated (Los Tiempos, 6 April 2002a; Los Tiempos, 6 April 2002b; Los Tiempos, 6 April 2002c; Los Tiempos, 7 April 2002a; Los Tiempos, 7 April 2002b; Los Tiempos, 8 April 2002). This “layoff” occurred at the same time that urban teachers were demanding a pay raise; they eventually got a nominal bonus, but no raise (Los Tiempos, 9 April 2002). The very next day, students and parents from District 8 were demonstrating outside SEDUCA for teachers (Los Tiempos, 10 April 2002; Los Tiempos, 13 April 2002).

Popular Participation and Education in Cochabamba

The Problem of Government Legitimacy and the Trend of Normalization of Relations between Actors

The field work in Cochabamba provided ample evidence of the continuing problem of government legitimacy and the normalization of relations between government and civil society. To begin, civil society access to government officials at any level is very tightly regulated. In order to even gain access to an office to conduct an interview, the researcher was required to produce five different letters explaining the

research project and asking for permission to speak to government officials. This process was much more protracted, and much more deeply entrenched, in the municipal level of government than it was at the federal level. And even once entrance was gained, there was no guarantee of having problems handled swiftly and courteously. An article in *Los Tiempos* (11 May 2002) characterized the municipal employees in the Cochabamba municipality as some of the surliest and least helpful in the country, and showed the customer service training that those employees who deal with the public were being required to take. There was also the researcher's inability to gain access to the Central Bank building, although one of the guards stated security had been tightened since 9/11; as the fieldwork took place in early 2002 this probably was a legitimate reason for restricting access and not simply an excuse offered.

Even for those interviews that were completed, respondents from all of the various populations noted that there was a lack of information and communication flowing between government and civil society, with each side blaming the other. It is not at all unreasonable to expect the flow of information to slow once Popular Participation had been established, but it seems from the interview comments, as well as the lack of recently published Popular Participation materials, that the information flow has halted altogether. This, unfortunately, is in keeping with typical government practice in Bolivia and lends further strength to the evidence of continuing legitimacy problems.

Finally, with regard to education specifically, there were no fewer than six observed teacher strikes and parent and student demonstrations downtown. The school year failed to start on time because of teacher strikes, and this process has become so commonplace that no one expects school to start as scheduled in early February.

Apparently, education and other infrastructure issues are not being addressed by the municipality as intended by Popular Participation, and civil society has decided that striking, not working through the OTBs, is the best response. Given the shrinking political space for OTBs this is not that surprising. Strikes were the preferred method for voicing displeasure or dissent before Popular Participation and their continuance lends further strength to the idea that government has continued legitimacy problems and that relations between civil society and government are normalizing to a pre-Popular Participation mode.

The Problem of Corruption and the Trend of Increased Bureaucratization

Fieldwork in Cochabamba also yielded significant evidence of continuing problems with corruption and a trend toward increased bureaucratization. The letters needed to gain access to municipal employees, discussed above as indicative of legitimacy problems, are equally indicative of increased bureaucratization. The more corrupt—and in the citizenry's view, less legitimate—the government is, the greater the number of bureaucratic hurdles that must be cleared and the more subterfuge it takes to get things done. Even public documents that should be easily accessed and readily available for civil society take a tremendous amount of work and patience to acquire, as evidenced by the difficulty the researcher had in acquiring something as simple as a list of OTBs. Once documents had been presented to the researcher, it was not uncommon to hear a long tale about how someone had to sneak the papers out of the office while the boss was at lunch, in a meeting, etc, and the necessity for making copies quickly so that the papers could be replaced before the boss noticed they were gone. There is an element

of those stories that smacks of inflating oneself and one's importance, but there was undoubtedly some truth to the stories as well; while waiting to conduct municipal government interviews the researcher observed several instances of managers being rude and abusive towards subordinates. The researcher also endured multiple cases of surly customer service herself, although once all the bureaucratic hurdles had been cleared and a municipal resolution number obtained, interaction with government employees improved. Like the problem with legitimacy, this problem was much more pronounced at the municipal level than at the federal one.

The interview comments, particularly those of civil society, also indicated that corruption was a continuing problem. Although most respondents did not equate the two, it was interesting to see that the majority of the respondents who felt funding was a problem also mentioned the lack of information and communication with the municipal government. They also felt that the breakdown was the government's fault and that government was responsible for the current impediments to successful government/civil society collaboration. Only the teacher in School 2 who was so concerned with the lack of integration of rural districts and the OTB 2 representative linked funding problems with administrative problems, although both of them treated the issue gently; the former said there needed to be better organization while the latter stated only that some money had been spent poorly. For government's part, all levels of government acknowledged that lack of information was a problem, but that did not seem to stop them from blaming civil society and/or another level of government for funding problems. Nor did they seem to realize that their "pass the buck" mentality and propensity for referring people to other government offices and/or civil society organizations conveys the impression that

government is disorganized at best, outright corrupt at worst. And the running around entailed by visiting all the offices to which one is referred would certainly seem like increased bureaucratization to the average citizen.

There is also substantial documentary evidence of corruption. The most notable were the stories covered in *Los Tiempos* about missing Popular Participation funds, the “theft” of computers that no one believed was the act of random vandals and the disbursement of HIPC funds. And the mechanisms and formulas for disbursing those funds discussed in Chapter 4 are strongly indicative of increased bureaucratization.

The Problem of the Rural/Urban Divide and the Trend of Passive Observation as Active Participation

The very layout of the municipality of Cochabamba itself, not to mention the division and support of districts within the municipality, demonstrates a continuing problem with the rural/urban divide. Without exception, the wealthiest neighborhoods are on the north side of town, and, as one moves south, the neighborhoods become incrementally poorer, with the poorest neighborhoods farthest to the south. The circumstances seem to be of long standing, suggesting that Popular Participation has yet to remedy some of the inequalities that provided the impetus for its creation. Most telling of all, the rural districts have yet to be integrated into or supported by the urban areas. As previously stated, there were no public schools listed for the rural districts, and they were therefore excluded from the study. The poor integration of the rural populace into the urban areas, further evidenced by the lack of road maintenance, buses and other

transportation services and lack of migration to the rural areas, provides even stronger empirical evidence that abiding divisions exist between rural and urban districts.

Another interesting body of evidence was the different types of involvement in the presidential election, particularly in campaigning for a candidate or party. In the wealthier districts there is scant evidence of political affiliation to be seen in the residential neighborhoods, but the citizens who regularly took over downtown on the weekends to campaign appeared to be residents of these districts, judging by their dress and comportment. In the poorer districts though, evidence of political affiliation abounded, and residents had no compunction about painting public property such as telephone and light poles. These people were rarely seen campaigning though. The sharp contrast in type of campaigning, as well as political affiliation, was indicative of continuing divisions between rich and poor, rural and urban; it also offered a glimpse of the more passive role the poorer populations have been assigned versus the wealthier ones.

The interviews—and those that did not participate in the interviews—also provided evidence of continuing divisions. The researcher's inability to contact the Vigilance Committee representative, who was apparently available to the Municipal Council but not the OTBs, was indicative of the division between civil society and their representative at the municipal level. The lack of interest and participation on the part of two-thirds of the OTBs also demonstrated that division, as well as the less active role civil society is already playing in governance. The comments from the teacher in School 2, who lived in a rural district not being served by the municipality, were certainly instructive of the continuing divide, as were the comments from the director at School 8 which showed that

not just rural districts, but also poor urban districts, were being systematically marginalized. Finally, nearly all of the respondents commented on the lack of information and communication between civil society and government, but not one person had any suggestions about how civil society could be more pro-active; those that did not bemoan government neglect chastised civil society for not knowing their responsibilities and participating correctly.

Finally, there is documentary evidence of the continuing divide, namely the Strategic Plan and newspaper articles on outlying districts. In all cases, the rural and poor urban districts received significantly less support from the municipal government than did the wealthier urban districts. The fact that even the local newspaper credits an international agency like JICA with providing more assistance than the municipality provides a rather damning critique of integration efforts; it also provides a possible explanation why civil society seems to have accepted the disconnect from the political process—they have found other ways to address their needs. When it is a problem that only the government can address, however, like meeting school and teacher needs, civil society has reverted to strikes and demonstrations to address problems, rather than engaging the government through the OTBs and the Vigilance Committee. It is deeply problematic that civil society, rather than fight for what small amount of political space is left, seems to have willingly abdicated it in favor of old fallbacks like strikes—and in so doing agreed to occupy a role in governance that may allow them to be noisier, but absolutely limits their ability to be pro-active rather than reactive and to effect real policy change.

Conclusion

Observations, interviews and documentary evidence, the data gathered by the ethnographic research conducted for this project, were presented. All three provided empirical evidence that the three problems Popular Participation was intended to address, government legitimacy, corruption and the rural/urban divide, still exist. The data further demonstrated that all three policy trends associated with these problems, normalization of relations between actors, increased bureaucratization and recasting passive observation as active participation respectively, can be found in practice in Cochabamba.

The next chapter provides an analysis of the data. Chapter 7 presents conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter 6

Analysis

Introduction

Chapter 1 communicated the relationship between education, underdevelopment and the unique case of Bolivia. The Popular Participation Law, Bolivia's effort for remediation, and the need for research in urban areas, were also introduced. Chapter 2 discussed the history of decentralization in development as well as the history of Popular Participation. Chapter 3 presented the definition of policy and concomitant methodology used in this research project. Chapter 4 discussed the international, national and local policy contexts for the implementation of Popular Participation in Cochabamba, as well as policy trends that effect the implementation of it. Chapter 5 presented the observational, interview and documentary data generated by this project.

This chapter analyzes the data findings presented in the previous two chapters. Poststructuralist critiques of development as discourse provide the most appropriate underlying ideology and a lens through which to view the phenomena found in Cochabamba.

Analysis

As evidenced by the policy environment discussion in Chapter 4 and the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 5, Popular Participation does not seem to have significantly impacted any of the problems it was intended to address, namely government legitimacy, corruption and the rural/urban divide. In response to these three

problems there have been three corresponding policy initiatives that are inexorably moving Popular Participation back to a more “normal” pre-Popular Participation method of governance and government/civil society interaction—normalization of relations between political actors, increased bureaucratization and recasting active participation as passive observation, respectively.

With regards to government legitimacy, there has been a policy trend towards normalizing the relations between government and civil society, which has steadily eroded the political space for civil society carved out by Popular Participation. The policy environment has shifted towards increasing the roles for administrators and technocrats in the name of efficiency and/or technical compatibility. The most discouraging and problematic trend has been the most recent one of excluding the OTBs from governance and concentrating what little civil society authority that is left in the hands of a very few Vigilance Committee representatives and non-voting roles on national committees. This is especially problematic in Cochabamba given that this change has not been communicated to civil society, and citizens are in fact having difficulty getting the Vigilance Committee and/or the municipal government to share information or respond to petitions of any kind. Citizens have responded by reverting to pre-Popular Participation modes of behavior and civil society/government interaction; protests and strikes that bring public works like education, and even entire cities, to a screeching halt. This perceived inability to dialogue or work constructively with municipal government speaks of a lessening of government legitimacy, not an increase.

In response to efforts to ameliorate corruption, there has been a noticeable policy trend toward creating new administrative layers between civil society and government.

The vast majority of these layers has been added by the federal government, particularly in the National Dialogue Law, and not only creates new administrative layers, but also new committees that systematically exclude civil society. In Cochabamba no one who participated in the interviews had any access to these new committees, but they could clearly feel the fallout in trying to accomplish a task as simple as asking questions or obtaining information from a municipal government office. Even by going through all the channels and obtaining all the necessary paperwork and signatures, the researcher had difficulty obtaining documents that are supposed to be part of the public record and available to anyone upon request. And most civil society representatives, while declining to call the government corrupt outright, spoke extensively in interviews about the lack of communication with the government and the inability for sufficient funds to make their way into the schools and neighborhoods. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the withholding of funds from public works leads to a strong public perception of corruption.

In response to the problem of the rural/urban divide and the exclusion of large segments of civil society, there has been a policy trend toward minimizing civil society's authority and repositioning it far enough away from decision-makers and late enough in the policy process as to render civil society unable to be pro-active, only reactive. Over time power and responsibility have been systematically concentrated in smaller and smaller segments of civil society and civil society's responsibilities have shifted from "participation" to "social control" and "oversight." Furthermore, civil society has yet to be fully informed of the shift to social control. Training materials and other information on new policies, as well as modifications of old policies, are difficult to find. Additionally, materials produced now, such as the booklet on National Dialogue, promote

the changes and modifications as beneficial developments for civil society, to the extent they discuss the changes at all. In Cochabamba, the continuing divide can be seen in the utter lack of rural district integration into the municipality. Interviews with various school and community representatives also highlighted the continuing divide, particularly between the center of the municipality and those rural and urban poor districts that exist in the periphery. Even the different types of political campaigning between richer and poorer districts, and the poorer districts' reliance on third party assistance like JICA, show continuing divisions and a gradual civil society disengagement from the governance and policy making process. Most distressing of all is the majority of civil society that has already realized their political power has been diminished—without their knowledge or consent—and reverted to activities that repeatedly disrupted governance in the past, with an apparent eye to affecting the same result currently.

Sadly, this phenomenon has been noted in other contexts and is amply supported in the post-development literature. In *The Development Dictionary* (1999), Majid Rahnema offers a very compelling explanation for this trend from “participation” to “social control” seen across various levels of governance.

...planned macro-changes...are more the indirect result of millions of individual micro-changes, than of voluntarist programmes and strategies from above. In fact, they often represent a co-option of the unplanned micro-changes produced by others and elsewhere. When these reach a critical mass, and appear as a threat to the dominant knowledge/power centres at the top, they are co-opted and used by their professionals as an input for planned changes, *aimed at turning the potential threat posed to*

the top into a possible asset for it. Hence, major projects of change from above generally represent an attempt, by those very forces under threat, to contain and redirect change, with a view to adapting it to their own interests, whenever possible with the victims' participation (128, emphasis added).

The co-option of participation is only one small aspect of the discourse of development. The discourse of development is articulated by poststructuralist critiques of the development enterprise. According to this position, the organizing premise of development is the belief that all societies are advancing, from barbarism and irrationality to democracy and rationality, and furthermore that modernization is the only force capable of driving this progress (Shanin, 1999; Escobar, 1999). The critical elements are the process of capital formation (i.e., printing currency, establishing banks and monetary policies), the associated cultural considerations (i.e., the need to create consumers) and the creation of institutions capable of carrying out modernization. Development as a discourse arises from

“the establishment of a set of *relations* among these elements, institutions and practices and of the systematization of these relations to form a whole. The development discourse was constituted...by the way in which, thanks to this set of relations, it was able to form systematically the objects of which it spoke, to group them and arrange them in certain ways, and to give them a unity of their own (Escobar, 1997, 86-87, emphasis added).”

Further, such relations define the conditions for and set rules under which new material can be incorporated into the discourse. Principal among the rules is who has authority. International lending organizations, institutions such as the United Nations, the governments of poor countries, the leadership of rich countries and the experts created and employed by them, are all authorities. They continually identify problems, establish client categories and create abnormalities (illiteracy, malnourishment, landless peasants, etc.) to treat. Over time, the terms have changed and so have the problems, but the underlying structure created from 1945-1955 during the early period of development remains unchanged. The systemization of relations creates tremendous adaptability within development, “which allowed it to survive, indeed to thrive, up to the present...The forms of power act not so much by repression as by *normalization*; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by bureaucratization of social action (Escobar, 1999, 91, emphasis added).” Normalization and bureaucratization are expressed in the discourse through the producers of development tautologically proclaiming their legitimacy and authority—“I work for development therefore I develop...I speak the truth, because I can prove it (Perrot, 1999, 83)”—and the recipients of development accepting those statements on faith.

As Escobar (2000) stated, “[with] poststructuralist critiques...development was shown to be a pervasive cultural discourse with profound consequences for the production of social reality in the so-called Third World (11).” Rahnema (1999) explains, “when A considers it essential for B to be empowered, A assumes not only that B has no power—or does not have the right kind of power—but also that A has the secret formula of a power to which B has to be initiated. In the current participatory ideology,

this formula is, in fact, nothing but a revised version of state power (123).” The idea for Popular Participation came from a Western-educated politician and was created in closed-door committee meetings without civil society’s participation, in an effort to build on indigenous models and bring them forward to the 20th century. Its genesis suggests that Popular Participation was ensnared in the development discourse from its inception. By pursuing Popular Participation as a development alternative, rather than as an alternative to development, Bolivia conceded to the development discourse and unwittingly hobbled Popular Participation before it ever began.

It seems the architects of Popular Participation genuinely believed they were creating a new form of governance, based on indigenous South American models, which would revolutionize how government was conducted. Over time, however, entrenched interests in Bolivia and in the field of development have systematically co-opted Popular Participation, and the very concept of participation, to serve their own ends. Today, participation has become so accepted and promoted in the development community that “even very repressive regimes in the ‘Third World’, such as the ones led by Pinochet and Mobutu, have tried to promote [participation] as one of their objectives (Rahnema, 1999, 117).” Normalizing relations, increasing administrative responsibilities and bureaucracy and recasting participation as observation, facilitate this process. This can be seen in multinational policy documents, Bolivian policy documents and in the municipality of Cochabamba. All three have systematically marginalized civil society’s political space and re-inserted them in the policy process late enough as to be harmless to those in power, but still providing the illusion of power for civil society.

Participation has become so integrated, in fact, that in the *World Development Report 2000/2001*, one of the three pillars of the poverty reduction strategy, facilitating empowerment, was predicated on decentralization and participation. Rahnema (1999) offers six reasons for the growth of participation in development. First, participation is no longer seen as a threat, in large part due to the process outlined above. Second, it is a politically attractive slogan. Third, it has tremendous economic appeal in that civil society “volunteers” absorb a fair amount of the government’s costs. Fourth, participation is seen as a way to promote greater program effectiveness, particularly through local cooperation and networks. Fifth, participation is good for fund-raising. Sixth and finally, participation provides an avenue for the private sector to enter the development business.

So what does this mean for Cochabamba and Bolivia? The inability of Popular Participation to solve or ameliorate any of the problems it set out to address does not bode well for the future well being and stability of the country. The ouster of Goní from power—particularly how and why he was removed—is evidence aplenty of that. Given Bolivia’s dependence on foreign aid and the conditionalities attached to aid loans, combined with the fact that Bolivia has been a stable democracy for less than 20 years, sustaining constructive dialogue between government and civil society is critical for the country’s and its citizens’ survival. And beyond the specific case of Bolivia, there are many other less developed countries that are trying to make participation and decentralization work, as well as the development enterprise as a whole. For all their sakes, a way needs to be found that can accommodate the need for responsibility and

accountability on the one hand, and authentic participation on the other. A few possibilities for moving in that direction are explored in Chapter 7.

Conclusion

Popular Participation has not been effective in addressing government legitimacy, corruption or the rural/urban divide. Three pervasive policy tendencies were identified, the normalization of relations between actors, increased bureaucratization and recasting active participation as passive observation, and were shown to be part of the development discourse. Development as discourse emerged as a poststructuralist critique of development, showing how relations among elements are systemized in a way that benefits the existing power structure. Popular Participation is ensnared in that discourse, and the reality in Cochabamba demonstrates how extensively Popular Participation has been normalized as part of development and how it has proven ineffective in promoting civil society's participation in governance. The following chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations of this research project.

Chapter 7

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

Bolivia has continuing problems with government legitimacy, corruption and exclusion of large segments of society. A recent policy treatment has been Popular Participation, a sweeping decentralization law to devolve authority and resources for education and other public services to municipalities created by the government. The law was intended to make government more responsive to citizens and provide them with mechanisms for participating in own governance. The policy had the support of the development enterprise and its growing interest in participation as a tool for development. It also had Bolivia's strong history of localism and ties to indigenous forms of government underpinning it.

Most of the past research on Popular Participation has been conducted in rural areas. This is logical, given that the majority of the population is rural, including most of the population living in poverty. However, a significant segment of the population lives in urban areas and controls a disproportionate share of the country's money and resources. The creation of municipalities was purposively done in an attempt to diminish the urban/rural discrepancy in Bolivia. The redistricting and redistributing of resources had the potential to disrupt significantly the process of "business as usual." Given that a fair number of the earlier studies on Popular Participation found that problems and unintended consequences were arising from its implementation, a study of

implementation in urban areas was in order, and Cochabamba, Bolivia's second largest city, was selected as the research site.

This study explicitly defined policy as a strategy undertaken to solve or ameliorate some problem, and ethnographic research methods are best for obtaining the data called for by the definition. Given ethnographic research tends to be labor intensive for the researcher, this study focused only on the educational system, rather than examining all the public works for which the municipalities had become responsible. The researcher observed selected schools and their neighborhoods and conducted interviews with members of civil society and persons at various levels of government. A variety of documents were referenced to corroborate or disprove the data generated through observation and interviews.

The implementation of Popular Participation has been undertaken in an extensive and intensive policy context. Popular Participation impacts, or is impacted by, no fewer than 35 other policies. In the study of the policy environment across various levels and through time, three important trends emerged in response to the three major problems targeted by Popular Participation. First, in response to the problem of government legitimacy, there has been a policy trend towards normalizing relations between government and civil society. This was achieved largely through eroding the political space created for civil society by Popular Participation in the name of managerial and/or technical compatibility. Second, in response to the problem of corruption, there has been a policy trend towards increased bureaucratization. This was done through the insertion of new administrative layers between civil society and government. Third, in response to the problem of the rural/urban divide, there has been a policy trend towards recasting

active participation as passive observation. This was enabled by the diminution of civil society authority granted by Popular Participation and the creation of new civil society positions that are advisory and/or non-voting.

The data from Cochabamba amply demonstrated all of the implementation issues presented above. Relations between government and civil society have become so normalized, it is difficult to tell that Popular Participation had ever been introduced. Surly and obstructive municipal employees and government officials are the norm; everyone interviewed, including government officials, bemoan the lack of communication and information exchange; and protest marches and strikes have once again become the preferred venue for civil society to voice its frustrations. Increased bureaucratization can be seen in the tremendous difficulty citizens—and researchers—have in accessing public documents, not to mention public servants. Interview respondents, both civil society and government, agreed that insufficient funds for education had made their way to schools and classrooms, although they could not agree on who was at fault; public opinion, though, holds all levels of government and the ongoing problem with corruption to blame. Finally, the substitution of passive observation for active participation can be seen in the frustration of those who are still trying to get the municipality to support and integrate sufficiently the rural and urban poor districts into the municipality. It can even be seen in something as innocuous as political campaigning; wealthier districts get people out to campaign actively for their party and/or candidate(s), poorer districts simply use a can of paint to show their political affiliation. Most troubling of all, civil society in Cochabamba seems to have accepted this change in

its ability to engage the political process and embraced the normalization of relations and the concomitant activities such as worker strikes.

The poststructuralist critiques of development as discourse provided the best explanation for the phenomena witnessed in Cochabamba. Relations between levels of government, multinational organizations and donor governments have become so thoroughly systemized that they are impervious to the potential disruptive power of participation. Over time, participation has been appropriated the existing power structure, effectively putting participation to work in support of development, rather than challenging it. The implementation of Popular Participation in urban Bolivia, as studied through the public education system, shows that Popular Participation has become firmly embedded in the development discourse, nullifying its effective ability to criticize or challenge government. The real issue is much more pervasive; not whether Popular Participation is being implemented as intended, but that its very conception as a tool for development limited it before it ever began. For education in particular, the salient problem is the unexamined inclusion of formal education in the development discourse and the unquestioned assumption that all Bolivians need the education they are being offered, particularly in order to combat poverty and underdevelopment.

Recommendations

Despite the hurdles created by the co-option of popular participation by those in power, hope remains. Many grassroots groups, true grassroots groups that were not legislated, have had some success creating new forms of leadership and new forms of development. One such example to emerge from Cochabamba, albeit as a response to

privatization, is the *Coordinadora* that emerged during the protests over the concessionary contract to privatize water services in 1999-2000 and coordinated the activities of rural and urban groups, factory workers and farm workers, laborers and professionals. The *Coordinadora*, with truly awesome popular support, was able to pressure the government into rescinding the concessional contract and reinstating municipal water services (Assies, 2003; Farthing and Kohl, 2001; Shultz, 2003).

The experiences and lessons of the *Coordinadora* provide an excellent example of the educative possibilities provided by true participation, of what Paulo Freire calls conscientization (*conscientização*). In this process, those who are being excluded/oppressed do not strive to integrate themselves into the existing system, but rather they strive to transform the system itself, and in so doing reclaim their humanity (1973). As Escobar (1995) explains, “they are interested not in development alternatives but in alternatives to development, that is, the rejection of the entire paradigm altogether (215).” This is in no way a cure-all, and efforts to cast or understand it as such are trapped in the same discourse as development.

Ivan Illich (1997) calls for “counterresearch (sic) on fundamental alternatives to current prepackaged solutions (100).” One of the better tools currently available for counter-research is ethnography. Ethnographic research requires, to a greater extent than other methodologies, that the researcher endeavor to understand the phenomenon being studied *in context*. Ethnographic studies of local cultures, for example, provide a way to begin the search for alternative practices within grassroots organizations resisting development. One recommendation that logically flows from this is an ethnographic study of civil society in Cochabamba (and other municipalities), with particular focus on

neighborhoods never having incorporated an OTB, or whose OTB is now defunct, in order to understand local forms of resistance. Additionally, ethnographic study of sets of relations are critically needed. Such studies might involve the relationships between Popular Participation and Education Reform, between Administrative Decentralization and the Law of Municipalities, or between the IMF, the World Bank, IDB and the Bolivian government. An important study needed in Cochabamba would concern the relationship between the Vigilance Committee, the OTBs and the municipal government. And although this study focuses on Popular Participation, it views the policy through education, a favorite mark of poststructuralists. Perhaps the most important relationship to be studied is that between the formal educational system as a culture-producing enterprise, government as a modernizing institution and civil society.

It is important to remember that Popular Participation wedded participation and decentralization. Decentralization is experiencing a surge of interest and support in the development community, distressingly similar to that that surrounded participation. Additional areas of needed study include the myriad relations surrounding decentralization and the modifications, if any, it has recently experienced. Governments and societies that are encouraged to become more decentralized or participatory might well view such recommendations suspiciously, especially if they are presented as conditionalities to loans, and take care to read policy documents critically.

Those in government who sincerely want to effect a change in the discourse must safeguard political power for civil society, preferably through organizations outside the purview of government and multinational organizations. Additionally, political space must be provided for civil society to formulate and articulate its own alternatives to

development, and more importantly, to act on them. Finally, the 2002 Presidential election in Bolivia, in which Evo Morales finished a close second to Goni, also offers the hope that civil society will create its own opportunities to effect change from within the political system, as well as outside of it.

Last, but certainly not least, we must actively seek out and listen to the voices from the “Third World.” We who are “First World” researchers find ourselves entangled in the discourse to greater or lesser degrees, but entangled nonetheless. Much of our interest in development results because we perceive problems in less developed countries and want to “fix” them. It is those who are objectified by the discourse, and whose survival depends on escaping from it, who will create authentic alternatives. Our responsibility is to search vigilantly for them and support them in their efforts. Ironically, it was a municipal government employee, the District Education Director who participated in this study, who said it best.

There is no commitment to social change, it remains a phrase of figurative leadership—‘I’m the representative’ and it ends there; nothing happens.

Those results do not interest us, what interests us is change...We want commitment, not from the district director, not technocrats, authority, but from the community; what they do, they do because they feel like it belongs to them. *I want there to be a Bolivian reform for Bolivians.*

Epilogue

In writing this dissertation, I was struck by the institutional inertia of (hopefully) well-meaning organizations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, not to mention the Bolivian government. In their quest to participate in Popular Participation and to “fix” the problems—both real and imagined—that exist in Bolivia, they smothered a promising policy with a plethora of rules, regulations and oversight requirements. Popular Participation has been drastically changed, but the changes were scattered across a long enough period of time and a large enough number of policy documents so as to make them practically imperceptible; it is only in studying the policy environment both latitudinally and longitudinally that one can see the tremendous number of chefs who all have their spoon in this particular pot. However, the one group that should be executive chef—civil society—is noticeably absent.

Civil society’s frustration over its exclusion can be heard in the interview comments, if you are listening; so can its continuing desire to participate. There is very little anger in the interview responses, just a plea to be included, to be kept current on policy changes and events. However, as the process becomes more heavily managed—particularly by multinational organizations—the focus is drawn away from civil society and the spirit of Popular Participation, instead being brought to bear on those who control the purse strings. Most Bolivians feel—rightly I believe—that they should have some voice, some participation, in policies that significantly impact them and their quality of life.

I recently wrote to a friend who lives in Bolivia to ask for the latest information on the political in-fighting between Evo Morales and Carlos Mesa, and to make sure she

and her family were safe. She responded that she and her family were all safe and doing well, but to my disappointment she also stated that daily life had returned to normal, in the sense that civil society was once again a spectator to political wrangling over which they had no control and could not participate, but which deeply impacted them nonetheless.

This does *not*, however, mean the situation is hopeless. The experience of the *Coordinadora* shows the capacity and the potential of the Bolivian people. What I think is needed—and what true grassroots groups like the *Coordinadora* can provide—is experiential education and genuine development. As Freire (1968) explained in “Extension or Communication,” genuine dialogue is incompatible with extension services of any kind, including the process of conscientization. Development takes place when a society is a “being for itself (Freire, 1970, 143);” until then, it is a dependent society and the best it can hope for is an unequal modernization. The *Coordinadora* is an example of a society being for itself, a group that taught—through living—the principles of diversity, democracy and participation.

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Appendix A

List of Abbreviations

AND	National Democratic Action
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework
CEBIAE	Bolivian Center for Educational Investigation and Action
CEDIB	Center for Documentation and Information–Bolivia
Condepa	Native Conscience
CSUTCB	Bolivian Workers' Union
DUF	Sole Directorate of Funds
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
ESAF/PRGF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility/Poverty Reduction Growth Facility
ESF	Emergency Social Fund
FNDR	National Fund for Regional Development
FPS	National Productive and Social Investment Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICSID	International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
IDA	International Development Association
IDB	International Development Bank
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
LDC	Less Developed Country
LJ	Liberty and Justice
MAS	Movement to Socialism
MCC	Citizen Movement for Change
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MIP	Pachakuti Indigenous Movement
MIR	Revolutionary Left Movement
MNR	Revolutionary Nationalist Movement
NFR	New Republican Force
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OTB	Grassroots Territorial Organization
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PS	Socialist Party
SEDUCA	Departmental Secretariat for Education
UCS	Civic Solidarity Unit
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization
VPPFM	Vice-Ministry for Popular Participation and Education

Appendix B

Interview Respondents

Although I spoke to most government officials and civil society representatives only once, I had the opportunity to visit with most of the schools teachers and/or directors several times. Included in this appendix are descriptions of additional characteristics I noted during interviews or observed while in the schools. Two of the schools I visited, School 2 and School 8, were the only public schools in the entire neighborhood—therefore, to give too detailed a description of the directors and/or teachers in that school would violate the confidentiality they were guaranteed, so those descriptions must necessarily be a little vaguer than the others.

School 1

The director at School 1, a high school, was a very courteous, very professional gentleman. He was 40-ish, tall and lean, with tinted glasses, an impeccably groomed head of hair and equally trimmed and groomed mustache. He was very quiet, but had an air of authority about him. We sat down for the interview near the end of the school day; the children were loud and boisterous as they left their classrooms, but those who needed to come into the office for something were quiet and respectful.

The director gave the impression, through both his bearing and his interview comments, that he had a better grasp of the political realities of Bolivia in general, and Bolivian education in particular, than the average person. He was also very pragmatic about the political and educational situations in Bolivia, and this trait seemed to also carry over into his work. During my few brief visits there were never any parents in his

office; when his staff came in they stated the issue quickly and succinctly, received an equally parsimonious reply and immediately departed. For all his attributes, though, he seemed a little out of place; if he did live in the neighborhood he most likely lived in one of the very nice houses and it would not be surprising if his appointment to principal of this particular high school were not more a political decision than an educative one.

School 2

The director of School 2, an elementary school, reminded me of Chilly Willy, a wiry cartoon penguin who concocted all manner of schemes to escape from the South Pole to the South Pacific. This director fairly vibrated with nervous energy; when not bouncing from classroom to classroom, the director was visiting with parents, chatting with teachers in the hallways or hurrying children along to their next class. The general impression was of a person who could not, to save their life, sit still for more than a few minutes at a time and who would do just about anything to avoid being trapped in the office—or pinned down in any manner.

This was probably the most frustrating interview to complete. On the one hand, the director distributed the questionnaire to several teachers, and in so doing provided more information than almost all the other schools combined; on the other hand, the interview was a two-hour marathon event that yielded a final taped interview of barely five minutes. When not nervously answering questions—while eyeing the tape recorder with some suspicion, as the director agreed to be taped only because it would help with transcription and translation later—the director was forever being interrupted and could not, or would not, say no to anyone who wanted an audience. I lost count of how many

times the tape recorder was turned off during the interview because the principal needed “*un ratito*” (a moment) to talk to this parent, that teacher, this student, etc. Lurking below the nervous energy, though, there seemed to be a deeper-seated anxiety. Given that this school was in the wealthiest part of the city—though none of the wealthy children attended it—combined with the director’s propensity to jump at the slightest request, my best guess is that this director spent an inordinate amount of time kowtowing to the whims of the wealthy residents, whether or not their requests were relevant and/or appropriate.

School 3

The director of School 3, an elementary school, was the first person to grant me an interview. She was a short, middle-aged woman who had the look of a career teacher; her hair was nicely styled, although the style was a fairly low-maintenance one, she wore pants suits with sensible loafers, her makeup was light and she had an open, friendly face that you could not help but respond to with a smile. She was also fiercely protective of her teachers. The first date on which we had an interview scheduled the director had to cancel; the authorities at SEDUCA were hassling one of her teachers, so she was accompanying the teacher to the SEDUCA offices to straighten out the problem. This director was able to command the same respect as the director of School 1, but the way she interacted with her faculty and staff conveyed the impression that the relationship was one of trust, that the respect she had was earned in that building, not at a “professional” or political job somewhere else.

This director knew more about educational finance than any of the other directors I interviewed after her; it made the later interviews somewhat frustrating, but it also made me appreciate how diligent she had to have been to have acquired the knowledge she had. It also demonstrated her commitment to her students and her faculty that she actively pursued funding sources and additional opportunities for them—and the school needed all the resources the principal could find. It was squeaky clean, but rather basic and there just did not seem to be enough people or enough equipment to fill the available space.

The director was as proud and protective of her students as she was her teachers. She was one of only two directors to offer to give me a tour of the school, and everyone's face lit up as she passed them in the hall or came into their classroom. Although this was an elementary school filled with wiggly, energetic children, they listened when she spoke and did as she asked. When the interview and tour were over, I left this school in high spirits, knowing regardless of what may come, this director would take care of these students, this faculty and this school.

School 5

The director at School 5, a middle school, was an older gentleman with thinning hair who struck me as being as tired and worn-out as his school. Whereas most of the other directors I visited spent a fair amount of their time walking the school grounds and visiting classrooms, this man rarely left his office; even when I came in for an interview he had a student—who was apparently working as an office aide—show me to his office, and it was a teacher who participated in the interview and took me on a tour of the school.

There was absolutely nothing remarkable about either the director or the teacher, nothing I can remember of them or about them off the top of my head; I had to consult my field journal and my diary to remember what few details I have been able to dredge up. I do remember, though, that the director's listless attitude seemed to have infected his entire staff; the secretary at the front of the school did as little as humanly possible, the teacher with whom I conducted the interview spoke very slowly and in so quiet a voice she can barely be heard on the tape recording and the rest of the teachers seemed to shuffle and drag when they moved about campus. Fortunately, the students seemed to have an abundance of energy which even this environment could not sap.

School 8

The director at School 8, an elementary school, impressed me more than any other interview respondent—not because of what the director said, but because of what the director did (and does) for the students and their families. I remember sitting in the office waiting for the director to finish a phone call so we could start the interview. A rail-thin, exhausted woman, dressed in used clothes that were only a step removed from rags and wearing sandals whose straps were no longer attached to the soles, came to the office to negotiate a payment plan for her child's tuition, which was B10 a month, or not quite \$1.50. She was asking if she could pay B5 now and the other B5 later in the month when she got the money. The director, who had finished the phone call in time to hear enough of this conversation to realize what was happening, looked at me over the mom's shoulder and asked if our interview could wait a few more minutes—and I agreed it could.

About five or ten minutes later the mother came out of the director's office still looking exhausted, but considerably less anxious than when she did when she arrived.

The director was also an excellent interview respondent who was very diplomatic and circumspect with comments, but who nonetheless demonstrated a strong command of the political and financial situations in which this school, a *convenia* school, was required to function. This director, much like the director at School 3, struck me as someone who was a career educator; in this case, that experience translated into a quiet confidence that permeated the entire school atmosphere, including the kids. While the children—and the adults—in the poorer neighborhoods generally tended to regard me with suspicion, the teachers and students in this building seemed genuinely happy to have a visitor to whom they could proudly show their school. They would not have believed it had you told them they attended the poorest school included in this study; given the human resources they have in their top administrator and teachers, I must say I share their conviction that they attend a very rich school.

School 10

The director at School 10, an elementary school, was a very busy, very in-demand person, particularly among the parents. The director was in her 40s, smartly dressed, very professional and a master juggler who referred me to a teacher for the interview. Even though she simply could not get away from the crush of parents waiting in her office and outside her door, the director did make the time to check with me after the interview to make certain everything had gone well and that I had the information I needed.

The teacher with whom I conducted the interview struck me as a young old teacher; she had the attitude and conviction of a teacher nearing retirement that believes she has seen and done it all. She reminded me of career teachers I know in Oklahoma City who come to the conclusion, after a lifetime spent in the classroom, that whatever is wrong at school is all the kids' fault; if they would just take school seriously, do their homework, listen to their teachers, etc, then they would not have near the problems they have now. Her comments barely stayed on topic—she had other, more important things to say—and when we got to the last interview question she went about religion and responsibility, with very little to say about Popular Participation.