

DEVELOPMENT AND TEST OF A MODEL LINKING
EMOTIONS AND WORK BEHAVIORS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Emotion feelings are unique in their ability to *capture* and *dominate* the mind, to *preempt* information processing channels, color perception and cognition, and *influence our actions* (Bower, 1981; Isen et al., 1985; Niedenthal & Kitayama, 1994; Zajonc, 1980)” - Carroll Izard, 2002; pp.798, italics not in original, added for emphasis.

The above characterization of emotion points at its potency in almost every aspect of human functioning. This significance has been well documented in psychology research for almost one hundred years now (e.g., James, 1884; McDougall, 1908; Freud, 1930). In contrast, the advent of emotion research in management literature is only about three decades old (cf. Ashkanasy, Härtel & Daus, 2002). Emotions have been linked to important work outcomes such as job satisfaction, organizational citizenship behavior, workplace deviance behavior and task performance (Fisher, 2000; Fisher & Noble, 2004; Lee & Allen, 2002).

In spite of this progress, there are several serious concerns with emotion research (e.g., Briner & Kiefer, 2005; Beal, Weiss, Barros & McDermid, 2005). The first concern is a lack of consistent definitions of emotions (Briner & Kiefer, 2005). Second, misalignment of theory and the measurement of emotion threaten the validity of such research (e.g., Robinson & Clore, 2002; Beal et al., 2005). The third concern with emotion scholarship is that discrete emotions need to be studied rather than overarching positive and negative dimensions.

The traditional approach to the study of emotions tends to aggregate emotions into overarching positive and negative dimensions (cf. Briner & Kiefer, 2005) for the sake of simplicity. This practice is fraught with concerns, as each emotion is unique in its adaptational significance for the individual (see Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991). Moreover, each emotion has its own set of antecedents and consequences (Diener & Emmons, 1984; Diener, Smith & Fujita, 1995; Fisher, 2000; Lazarus, 1991; Lee & Allen, 2002; Weiss, Suckow & Cropanzano, 1999). This dissertation seeks to address these shortcomings in several ways. First, the definition and operationalization of emotions are rooted in basic psychological theory, thus conforming to the knowledge base in the area. Second, the research design incorporated herein, corrects for the misalignment of theory and measurement found in a vast majority of emotion scholarship (cf. Ashkanasy, 2003; Beal et al., 2005). Specifically, all emotions are dynamic reactions to another person, entity or event (Izard, 1991; Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988). As such, the measurement of emotion and its consequences are best represented by within person designs (Beal et al., 2005; Fisher, 2000; Miner, Glomb & Hulin, 2005). This dissertation takes a two-step approach towards achieving this goal; using both an event based lab design and a follow up critical incident based field study with repeated measures. Third, the focus is on four specific discrete emotions rather than overarching dimensions. In addition, I cast coping strategies as explanatory mechanisms that link emotions to behaviors. This type of explanatory research is deemed necessary, as management research to date has treated the processes that transmit emotions to behaviors as a black box. Emotional Intelligence (EI) is presented as the key ingredient

to understanding how emotions relate to coping strategies (see also Ashkanasy, Ashton-James & Jordan, 2004; Zeidner, Matthews & Roberts, 2006).

As noted earlier, we now recognize the importance of emotions in individual behavior (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Ashkanasy et al., 2002). Some scholars have even labeled this attention “the affective revolution” in organizational research (Barsade, Brief, & Spataro, 2003). This affective revolution has included all forms and definitions of mood, affect and emotion. A definition of emotion is first presented and the delineation between emotion, mood and affect follows.

Defining Emotion

Multiple definitions of emotion abound, ranging from the lay version of feeling a particular way to mood states (George & Brief, 1992) to physiological changes (Briner & Kiefer, 2005) to reactions to an event (Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991). Emotion is defined as an organized mental response to an event or entity (Izard, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988). The emotion response is characterized by physiological, experiential, motivational and cognitive components (Izard, 1991; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso & Sitarenios, 2001). Emotions are shorter and more intense than moods (Fisher, 2000; 2002). They not only arise in response to events, but also contain information about that event. This information is fed into our cognitive decision making processes (Gohm & Clore, 2002). In sum, emotions are transient, intense reactions to an event, person or entity (Diener et al., 1995; Fisher, 2000; Ortony et al., 1988). Some scholars have even suggested that emotions are primarily a social phenomenon because they arise out of interactions (Fischer & Tangney, 1995). Since emotions arise in response to an event and are more intense than moods, they are significant precursors to action (Frijda, 1986).

While most emotion scholars recognize the transient nature of emotion, an alternate point of view exists that emotions could be more than transient reactions (Frijda, Mesquita, Sonnemans & Van Goozen, 1991). Many debates in psychology center on the state vs. trait nature of emotion (Izard, 1971; 1991). Emotions could recur with every interaction that succeeds the first emotion-eliciting event. The effects of emotions could wear off with time resulting in a more diffused mood state (Izard, 1991). Here, I do not wish to enter that debate. Rather, I simply adopt the predominant scholarly point of view that emotions are short term, intense reactions to an event (e.g., Beal et al., 2005; Frijda, 1993; Fisher, 2000, 2002; Fisher & Noble, 2004; Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Mayer et al., 2001; Ortony et al., 1988; Weiss et al., 1999; Zelenski & Larsen, 2000). Individual and group emotion plays an essential role in individual and group functioning (e.g., Ashkanasy et al., 2002; Kelly & Barsade, 2001). A prime challenge facing the twenty first century manager is that of managing an employee's emotions in light of negative events such as downsizing, mergers and acquisitions, ethical scandals and technological insecurity (Barclay, Skarlicki & Pugh, 2005).

Emotions (e.g., anger, joy, pride, guilt) are short lived, intense reactions to an event and impact work behaviors (Parkinson, 1995). It is crucial to distinguish between emotion and other related constructs such as affect, mood and attitudes (e.g., job satisfaction). Regardless of how emotion is defined, it is short lived and influential in instigating action (Izard, 1991; Mayer et al., 2001; Zelenski & Larsen, 2000). This is an important distinction to make at this point because affect is a broad umbrella term that includes but is not limited to emotion (Fisher, 2000). Affect refers to longer lasting phenomenon characterized as positive or negative affect. These affect definitions include

mood. Moods are longer in duration than emotions yet shorter in duration than affect (Frijda, 1993; Fisher, 2000). They are more diffused than emotions and lack a specific target (Frijda, 1993; Fisher, 2000). Moods activate in an individual's cognitive background, have no specific target, are not as intense as emotions and persist for a longer duration (Briner & Kiefer, 2005; Fisher, 2000).

Attitudinal constructs such as job satisfaction and affective commitment might be “emotion laden constructs” (Briner & Kiefer, 2005), yet they are not emotion either as they are more diffused and longer lasting (Fisher, 2000; 2002). They also encompass a significant cognitive and evaluative dimension (Weiss, 2002). Empirical support for the above conceptual distinctions also exists. George (1991) found that state affect predicts helping behaviors beyond that possible by trait affect. Discrete emotions seem to predict organizational citizenship behaviors and workplace deviance behaviors over and above that indicated by overall affect (Lee & Allen, 2002). This section presented the definition of emotion as well as the distinction between emotions and related affective constructs. The following section presents a brief review of recent studies on emotion.

The instigating nature of moods and emotions in organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) and workplace deviance behaviors (WDBs) is well documented in organizational literature (Berkowitz, 1998; George & Brief, 1992; Isen & Baron, 1991; Staw, Sutton & Pelled, 1994; Staw & Barsade, 1993; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) found that both cognitive and affective influences drive productive and counterproductive behaviors. The most defining research support for the effects of emotion on OCB and WDB stems from a recent study conducted by Lee and Allen (2002). They found that WDB was better predicted by a discrete negative emotion

in the form of hostility than an overall negative affective state. Related research also indicates that positive emotions such as joviality, attention and interest are directly related to OCBs (Cropanzano, Rupp & Bryne, 2003). The experience of positive emotions has been linked to better cognitive functioning, physical and psychological health (Tugade & Frederickson, 2004). Similarly, negative emotion has been linked to unhealthy coping behaviors, lowered cardiovascular function and physical health problems (Frederickson, 2001). These findings have fueled a sudden surge of interest in affective influences on work behavior. This surge might have led to the sidestepping of certain fundamental issues, such as construct validity, in emotion inquiry (e.g., Briner & Kiefer, 2005; Beal et al., 2005). After almost three decades since the first research on emotion, one needs to take a step back and question the validity of inferences drawn from emotion research. With this goal as the broad underlying motive, the following section offers a critique of emotion research, thus setting the stage for this study.

A Critique of Emotion Research

Briner and Kiefer (2005) reviewed contemporary emotion research (2000-2004) from a range of sources including most top scholarly publications. They noted several serious flaws that threaten the validity of associated inferences. First, they found that most research does not define emotion in any valid fashion. Emotion definitions need to conform to the knowledge base in the area (i.e., basic psychological theories) and not tap into broad affective constructs. This review revealed that less than forty percent of 2606 papers explicitly stated and defined emotion. Either the remainder did not refer to well-established definitions of emotion or they referred to affect as emotion. The lack of

sound definition adhering to theory is potentially a serious issue as it casts doubt on accumulated research on emotion (Briner & Kiefer, 2005).

With these basic definitional problems plaguing emotion research, the measurement of this dynamic construct is also in question. Recall that emotion is defined as a short-lived, intense reaction to a specific event. Emotion measurement typically asks respondents to report on how they felt at some point in the past, or across some past period (e.g., last week, last month, last six months and so on)(e.g., George, 1991; Madjar, Oldham & Pratt, 2002; Pelled & Xin, 1999). Although, this measurement format is practical and relatively easy to implement, it is riddled by retrospective biases. Several scholars have called into question what they measure (Robinson & Clore, 2002; Beal et al., 2005). Consequently, it is useful to distinguish the sources of knowledge that are tapped using differing emotion measurement schemes. Robinson and Clore (2002) demonstrated that the traditional form of emotion measurement taps into semantic emotion knowledge. This type of knowledge reflects what people think they should have felt in the referenced period, rather than what they actually experienced. On the other hand, episodic emotion knowledge involves capturing emotional experiences very close to their actual occurrence (Beal et al., 2005; Miner et al., 2005). They are less colored by retrospective biases (Robinson & Clore, 2002). These authors recommend that both forms of knowledge are useful, albeit for differing research goals. If the goal is to tap one's memory of an emotional experience, then semantic knowledge could be useful. If the stated goal is to tap into the experience of emotion itself, then episodic emotional knowledge is the best source (Robinson & Clore, 2002). The first measurement issue concerns the contamination of data sources by retrospective biases.

The next issue plaguing emotion scholarship that emotion research tends to aggregate discrete emotions into an overall dimension of positive and negative emotion (Briner & Kiefer, 2005). This practice is easy to implement and simplifies the study of emotion. The scientific reason for such aggregation is based upon underlying common variance within each dimension (see also Izard, 1991). All positive emotions stem from a primary appraisal of a favorable event, interaction or outcome expectancy. All negative emotions are evoked primarily through an unfavorable interaction or event. Most importantly though, the common theme within each dimension is restricted to the eliciting event (Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991). Beyond the primary appraisal, each emotion is unique and rich in its own right. Conceptual foundations of discrete emotion theories suggest distinct effects for each emotion (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991). Each emotion triggers differing secondary cognitive appraisals and is unique in its adaptational significance (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). For example, anger and guilt both result from a primary appraisal of an unfavorable interaction or event. This primary appraisal is common to all negative emotions. However, anger and guilt differ in secondary appraisals and behavioral consequences. Anger results from a secondary appraisal of other blameworthiness for the unfavorable event. The individual might also foresee a less favorable future. Taken together, these appraisals translate into a core relational theme of a self-demeaning offense for anger. It is at this point of secondary appraisals that discrete emotions are labeled (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). Guilt, on the other hand, involves the secondary appraisals of self-blame and a less desirable future. These secondary appraisals translate into a Core Relational Theme (CRT) of violation of societal or personal standards. Furthermore, anger leads to emotion-focused coping and

aggressive behaviors whereas guilt leads to emotion-focused coping and compliance at the cost of personal well being (Izard, 1991). Similarly, all positive emotions stem from a primary appraisal of a favorable event or interaction. For example, pride and happiness both result from a primary appraisal of a favorable interaction or event. However, pride differs from happiness because it is elicited only in the event of a secondary appraisal of self-satisfaction. Research indicates a negative effect of excessive pride on task focus (Izard, 1991). The point of these illustrations is that while positive and negative emotions have common underlying features, each positive and/or negative emotion is sufficiently distinct to merit its own research agenda (Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; 1999).

Emotions are necessarily dynamic and any real test of emotion theories requires measurement at multiple points in time (Beal et al., 2005; Miner et al., 2005). Consider the Broaden and Build theory's (Frederickson, 2001, 2003; Frederickson & Joiner, 2002) position that positive emotion is self-reinforcing. Repeated experiences of positive emotions lead to beneficial health and cognitive effects. This theory further contends that resilient individuals use positive emotions to buffer negative emotions and cope with adversity (Tugade & Frederickson, 2002). This self-reinforcing effect cannot be tested for without a measurement scheme that captures emotion at several time points. Larsen and Frederickson (1999) point out that all emotion measurement is at best probabilistic in nature. In order to enhance the probability of capturing unique true score variance, measures at multiple points in time are required. A within person, event based design is essential to the alignment of levels of theory and measurement (Beal et al., 2005).

This research seeks to address the above concerns with emotion research in the following ways. First, this research defines emotion consistent with basic psychological

theories, specifically, the Cognitive Appraisal Theory. Second, I focus upon specific discrete emotions rather than overarching positive and negative emotion dimensions. Theory development in organizational literature with regard to such specific discrete emotions is scarce (cf. Briner & Kiefer, 2005). This research contributes theoretically by adopting a fine-grained approach to the study of emotion. Third, research design and measurement conform to the theory underlying emotion. This implies measurement close to the emotion experience and repeated measures of emotion. The following section addresses another component that deserves more attention in emotion literature. This component is the black box that links emotions to specific behaviors.

Coping with Emotions

The predominant concern of most organizational emotions research has been with the effects of emotion on behaviors. The more pertinent question for emotion scholars today is how do emotions translate into behaviors? Drawing upon Cognitive Appraisal Theory (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), I suggest that coping mechanisms are the immediate consequence of felt emotion, and it is these coping mechanisms that then drive behavior. A detailed account of Cognitive Appraisal Theory is presented in the next chapter. Here, I define and discuss coping only to help explain the overall research model. Coping is a process of self-regulation that includes cognitive and intended behavioral strategies, in response to the experience of emotion (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Several distinct conceptualizations of coping have emerged (e.g., Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1999; Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis & Gruen, 1986), however the common underlying theme of these conceptualizations identifies two distinct and unique forms of coping. These are

known as task-focused and emotion-focused coping strategies. Task-focused coping involves actively managing the event with a focus on resolution of the event. It includes five components such as active coping, planning, suppressing competing activities, restraint coping, and positive reappraisal (Carver et al., 1989). Emotion-focused coping is a strategy that is primarily symptom focused wherein the focus is on managing the emotion. It includes the five components of denial, behavioral disengagement, mental disengagement, alcohol and drug disengagement and venting emotions (Carver et al., 1989). In addition, four specific coping types do not consistently classify as either task or emotion-focused coping. These dimensions are seeking social support for instrumental reasons, seeking social support for emotional reasons, acceptance and turning to religion (Carver et al., 1989).

In general, it has been found that individuals use task-focused coping in response to positive emotions and emotion-focused coping in response to negative emotions (Park, Armeli & Tennen, 2004). A further corollary to this relationship is that task-focused coping is associated with productive behaviors, whereas emotion-focused coping is associated with greater incidence of counter-productive behaviors (Park et al., 2004). Cognitive appraisal theorists contend that people differ in their choice of coping strategies (Izard, 1991; Park et al., 2004). Yet, almost nothing is known about specific competencies that could lead to differences in choice of coping strategies. In this dissertation, I argue that some people will engage in task-focused coping even in the face of negative emotion. Similarly, some people might engage in emotion-focused coping even when they are experiencing positive emotions. What, then, might contribute to individual differences in choice of coping strategy? Recently, scholars have articulated

theoretical arguments for the vital role of EI in the coping process (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Jordan, Ashkanasy & Härtel, 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006). The following section presents a definition of the ability-based model of EI with an eye towards implications in organizational settings.

Emotional Intelligence

EI is an individual difference that reflects the ability to recognize the meaning of emotions and to use that information in reasoning and problem solving (Mayer, Caruso and Salovey, 1999). The construct has its roots in the multiple intelligences concept that began to take shape amongst psychometricians and psychologists in the early 1900s. Mayer and colleagues' conceptualization is theoretically driven by the early work of Thorndike (1920) and L.L Thurnstone (1941) (Jordan et al., 2002). Gardner (1983) further extended the concept of social intelligence to include eight different types of intelligence in his most recent work. The aspects of Gardner's work that find application in Mayer and colleagues' conceptualization are "interpersonal" and "intrapersonal intelligence". These two dimensions are woven into the current EI conceptualization, as a hierarchical multidimensional construct comprised of four areas of skills. These four skills are believed to load onto one universal factor, specifically EI (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso & Sitarenios, 2003). These four skills are briefly summarized in the next section. In illustrating the effects of EI on work behavior, I draw upon the hypothetical case of a positive and negative work event. The positive event involves an employee who has just received a promotion. The negative event involves an employee in a situation where s/he is reprimanded for

poor performance. The benefit of this critical storytelling technique is it aids the explanation of implications of EI.

Perception

Perception refers to the ability to be aware of one's emotions, identify them, and express them accurately to others. It also refers to the ability to perceive other's expressed emotion (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Emotional expressivity can occur through verbal and nonverbal channels. Effective managerial functions require understanding and responding to such communication. The ability to understand one's own and other's emotions is particularly germane to the current study. The first step in actively managing one's emotions is being aware of what one might be experiencing. An employee might experience joy and pride at the promotion, and the first step in managing these emotions effectively is recognizing them accurately. In the event of the supervisor's admonishment, the employee possibly experiences shame and/or anger. The first step in managing these negative emotions is perception of these negative emotions or, in lay terms, being emotionally self-aware.

Using emotion to facilitate thought

Using emotion to facilitate thought involves prioritizing an emotion as important or unimportant, classifying the sources of the emotion and being aware of how they influence the thought process (Mayer et al., 1999). It encompasses being able to adopt multiple perspectives to the problem or the stimulus, and making decisions in light of these perspectives (Mayer et al., 1999). By the very nature of the rationalization that takes place within this component, it is expected that individuals can use this information in making better decisions. In the same vein, stressful situations will be reported less

negatively by individuals higher on this component than individuals who are lower on it (Jordan et al., 2002).

Furthermore, where this ability really starts to matter in the current study is in its connection to the rationalization, which occurs in response to experience of an emotion. In the above illustration, the experience of anger can send an employee into a spiral of negative emotions. This could potentially lead her/him to emotion-focused coping (e.g., Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). Alternatively, being able to prioritize the anger into motivational energy can actually serve as an energizing force (cf. Fitness, 2000). An often neglected characteristic of negative emotions is they involve considerable motivational energy (Izard, 1991). The employee with high scores on both first and second dimensions of EI can recognize anger and shame as negative emotions with the potential for self-harm. This perception leads to rationalization that could, in turn, translate into extra vigilance (Izard, 1991). Likewise, in response to happiness or pride, the employee's perception and rationalization could lead to renewed vigor at work (Izard, 1991).

Understanding Emotion

Understanding emotion reflects the ability to recognize emotions that are more complex and the patterns in which they might occur. It also includes the ability to analyze the transitions from one emotion to another (Mayer et al., 1999). Mayer and colleagues propose that this branch correlates most with cognitive intelligence. The reason for this proposition is that emotional understanding is “most allied with cognitive processing and abstract reasoning, it is most cognitively saturated” (Mayer et al., 2001).

Recent empirical evidence supports the third branch's correlation with IQ (e.g., Roberts, Zeidner & Matthews, 2001).

This dimension is most critical when several emotions occur together. If a senior colleague was denied the same promotion that our employee obtained, s/he feels empathy and compassion for the other. Simultaneously, s/he might take pride in her/his achievement. If this employee was a high scorer on this dimension of EI, s/he understands the transitions between the complex emotion blends of empathy, compassion and basic pride. Similarly, this employee could experience anger, shame and perhaps sadness at the supervisor's admonishment. If this employee is a high scorer on this dimension of EI, s/he recognizes the transitions between anger, shame and sadness with the potential for differing consequences. This understanding is most critical to managing these emotions, as detailed in the next section.

I adopted a hierarchical perspective in illustrating these dimensions, suggesting that each branch builds on the previous ones. Therefore, now we have an employee as a high scorer on perception, using emotion to facilitate thought and understanding emotion. The first implication is emotional self-awareness. The second component implies rationalization stemming from self-awareness. The third component leads to enhanced knowledge of transitions between complex emotional blends. These three components taken together pave the way for effective emotion management (Mayer et al., 1999).

Emotion management

The fourth aspect of EI refers to emotion regulation. It is the ability to connect or disconnect from emotions based upon their usefulness in any given situation (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Management of emotion differs amongst individuals and can explain

variance in individual outcomes such as personal growth and favorability of social relations (Mayer et al., 2001). This domain of EI offers an interface of one's emotion abilities with the personality domain, because emotion regulation can vary by personality traits (Mayer et al., 2001). In the above illustration wherein the employee experienced empathy, compassion and pride all at the same time, s/he might engage in more helping behaviors if s/he acted upon her/his empathy or compassion. Alternatively, if s/he acted upon her/his pride only, s/he might isolate her/himself from coworkers because of a swollen head syndrome. If this employee were a high scorer on the previous dimensions as well as this one, s/he might choose to act upon her/his compassion. Consider the employee in the anger situation. For a high EI individual, one of two things could happen. S/he connects with felt anger and channels it into a motivational force (cf. Fitness, 2000). Else, s/he disconnects from this emotion temporarily in order to focus on the task. A low EI individual might have connected with anger and engaged in aggression towards the supervisor. S/he could also disconnect with that emotion by denial or distraction. The key is the ability to connect or disconnect with one's feelings in an adaptive fashion (Mayer et al., 1999). The common thread between the experience of both a positive and negative emotion for a high EI individual is the ability to engage in any form of coping that is self-beneficial. In summary, the four-branch model of EI offers promising insights into individual coping mechanisms. This section presented an overview of the definition and implications of EI. Research objectives of this study follow, culminating in a preliminary presentation of the overall research model.

Research Model

The first objective of this dissertation is to unravel the immediate cognitive consequences of felt emotion. Coping strategies as described earlier constitute these cognitive consequences, and serve as the mechanisms for translating emotions into behavior (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The second objective concerns the role of EI in the relationship between emotions and coping. People vary in their choice of coping strategy. Some of this variability might stem from the nature of the emotion experience itself. However, recent theoretical developments (e.g., Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006) indicate that the relationship between emotion and coping is contingent upon an individual's EI. Furthermore, EI could have direct effects on coping (Zeidner et al., 2006). Coping is then related to work behaviors such as task performance, organizational citizenship behavior and workplace deviance behavior. These ideas are broadly depicted in Figure 1.1.

Insert Figure 1.1 about here

A full discussion of each specific relationship contained in the model appears in the next chapter. This research differs from past emotion research in at least four fundamental ways. First, all theory and analyses will be at the specific discrete emotion level. Second, a repeated measures approach that more accurately captures the intraindividual variation in emotion will be used. Third, I start to address the black box between emotion and behaviors by examining the role of coping strategies. Fourth, by

introducing EI as a moderator of the relationship between emotion and coping, we start to place bounds on the beneficial effects of positive emotion and the detrimental effects of negative emotions.

Theoretical and Practical Contributions

This research incorporates current theory from the academic psychology and emotion literatures to present a more holistic approach to examining the meaning of and consequences of emotions. We tend to use the terms “courage, interest, joy,” and such other concepts rather frequently at work. Yet, rarely do we attribute the affective connotations that these constructs deserve. Instead, courage, joy, interest and many other emotions are mostly cast as job related cognition (cf. Ashkanasy, 2003). A paradigm shift of sorts has occurred in the management literature since the late eighties (Barsade et al., 2003). It is now well documented that emotions are prime motivators of human action (cf. Frijda, Manstead & Bem, 2000). This research contributes to the existing literature on several counts, as noted below.

The most important contribution of this study lies in unraveling the immediate cognitive consequences of emotion at work. In doing so, I rely on seasoned theoretical foundations such as Cognitive Appraisal Theory. Simultaneously, I also introduce EI as moderator of the relationship between discrete emotion and coping. While this study is grounded in the solid theoretical foundations of cognitive appraisals, it also introduces a novel perspective of the role of individual differences in emotion management. These two aspects answer scholarly calls for such theoretical development. Sutton and Staw (1995) called for sound theories that tell a good story and have explanatory power rather than predictive power only. The role of coping answers this call by offering explanatory

cognitive mechanisms between felt emotion and behaviors. The focus of most management research has been on uncovering the attitudinal and behavioral implications of emotion only (e.g., Barclay et al., 2005; Fisher, 2000; 2002; Fisher & Noble, 2004; Lee & Allen, 2002; Miner et al., 2005). This research starts to address how these effects unfold. Such an examination takes us a step beyond simple prediction of emotion-behavior relations.

House, Shane and Harold (1996) have called for the examination of stable dispositional influences on work - related variables. This research answers this call through the investigation of the role of EI. Academic psychology has already generated an impressive body of literature suggesting that lower EI is related to deviancy amongst youths and adolescents (Lopes, Salovey, Côté & Beers, 2005). The progress made in these related disciplines needs be built upon in organizational behavior (Brief, 2001). Given the significance of emotions in work life, the time is now ripe to investigate the role of individual differences that help us understand the effects of these emotions on work behaviors (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995).

The alignment of emotion definitions, measurement and analyses with the theory underlying it is another contribution regardless of actual results that might emerge. To facilitate this alignment, emotion is defined as per its knowledge base and theory is developed for each specific emotion. I incorporate a research design aimed at minimizing retrospective bias and capable of capturing intraindividual variability in emotion. Such an alignment is believed to be important, considering that most affective constructs are dynamic in nature, making the need for a correct measurement scheme even more pronounced (Beal et al., 2005). Consider an employee who is scheduled to

have a performance appraisal meeting. S/he might experience some degree of fear in anticipation. This fear might lead to poor customer service on this employee's part. During the appraisal meeting, this employee's performance is found to be exceptional. This event might lead to positive emotions such as pride and happiness. Two aspects are worth noting in this context. First, this employee's emotions have fluctuated considerably over the course of the day. This variability is treated as error in a between person design. Second, this employee's work behaviors have also fluctuated considerably. In the first instance, the customer might have been displeased with the employee's service. After the meeting, this employee's positive emotions might lead to exceptional service or, alternatively, real inattention to customers. If this employee could channel her/his pride (or joy) constructively, s/he could perform better. Alternatively, experience of positive emotion signals that everything is okay with the status quo and no additional effort needs be expended (Izard, 1991). In this scenario, the employee might make mistakes and be inattentive to customer needs. In neither case are the performance fluctuations and associated triggers documented in the typical appraisal. The reason for such within person research is even more pronounced by a recent finding regarding employee mood states. Specifically, a recent study found that over half of the variance in mood states on the job occurred within person (Miner et al., 2005). These authors concluded that between person research in affective constructs are limited, as they ignore half of the variance by design. They and other scholars have sounded calls for more within person research in affective based constructs (Beal et al., Briner & Kiefer, 2005; Miner et al., 2005). This dissertation answers the call for such research.

As for practical contributions, with this research model, our knowledge of what precedes work behaviors could be augmented. If the relationship between unhealthy coping and deviant behaviors (that are undoubtedly costly to the organization) is supported, then that information has managerial implications. If the relation between healthy coping, task performance and OCBs is supported, then that information is potentially valuable. In the event that these relations do hold, how exactly does it matter to practitioners? One needs to consider the “so what” aspect of this research. One straightforward implication is that employees could be trained to engage in healthier forms of coping. Such training could be administered through stress prevention and management programs that have already gained prominence in organizational settings (e.g., Myers & Betchel, 2004; Murphy & Sauter, 2003).

More pertinently, though, the “so what” aspect of this research is heavily dependent on the role of EI in the relationship between felt emotion and coping. Organizations might offer training that helps individuals manage their emotions better. EI is a form of intelligence and is believed to result from genetic and environmental factors (Mayer, 2006). Interventions might be designed to impart knowledge even though any form of intelligence itself is relatively stable over an adult’s life span. While one might not be able to develop EI, s/he could develop their knowledge regarding emotional information (Mayer, 2006).


From a practical standpoint, most performance interventions take a between person approach (e.g., applicant selection, job redesign, pay structures) (Beal et al., 2005). These interventions have their place in organizational research. However, there is also a growing need to examine within person variability and causes of such variability

(Beal et al., 2005). This is all the more pertinent as some results indicate that the within person component rivals in magnitude the between component in performance variations (Deadrick, Bennett, & Russell, 1997; Fisher & Noble, 2004). Future research could help pinpoint events in an employee's work environment that trigger positive and negative emotions. Specifically, studies pinpointing negative work events that lead to lower productivity are the next logical step of this research. This next step falls within the bounds of a related stream of research, Affective Events Theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). This theory posits that employees experience uplifts and hassles at work everyday and an accumulation of these events predicts their attitudes and behaviors (Fisher, 2000). Ashkanasy et al., (2002) contend that managing these events is the most pertinent challenge for managers today. Research results indicate that such management could occur through incorporating more uplifts (positive interactions) that buffer the effects of hassles (negative interactions) (Grzywacz & Marks, 2000; Miner et al., 2005). Organizations might benefit from pinpointing negative work events, and this knowledge could in turn lead to behavioral interventions that promote more conducive work climates.

In conclusion, reason and emotion are the two pillars driving human behavior (e.g., Izard, 2002; Mayer, 2006; Tomkins, 1962). To exclusively focus upon one at the cost of the other is to impede the scientific development of behavioral knowledge. This study is poised at the cusp of cognition and emotion. Philosophically, one could contend that it places equal emphasis on reason and emotion, possibly two of the most potent process variables that affect employee behaviors. In order to achieve the study objectives, chapter two presents a review of the cognitive appraisal and EI literatures and

develops the study hypotheses. Chapter three details proposed design, measurement and analyses strategies. Chapter 4 covers data analyses and results. Chapter 5 offers a discussion of results and implications for further theory and research.

Figure 1.1: Emotion, Coping, Work Behaviors and the Moderating Role of EI*



*Emotions are referred to as a broad category here only for clarity, however all hypotheses will incorporate specific discrete emotions.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter begins with a discussion of the Cognitive Appraisal Theory. A brief review of controversies in the EI literature follows. I offer a comment on these controversies and a justification of the ability based model of EI. Finally, I develop specific hypotheses, culminating in a discussion of the overall research model.

Cognitive Appraisal Theory

In studying the effects of discrete emotions on behaviors, one inevitably has to turn to underlying cognitive processes that link emotions to the potential for action. Cognitive Appraisal Theory was the first formal statement of scientific laws governing the elicitation and experience of emotions (Lazarus, 1999). Contrary to popular beliefs that emotions are unpredictable, Lazarus and colleagues have generated an impressive body of research suggesting that emotion and cognition are deeply intertwined. Cognitive Appraisal Theory makes formal statements about specific cognitive antecedents and consequences of each discrete emotion (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991). Scholars have interpreted this theory in many forms over the years (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1966, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984). However, there exists agreement amongst scholars on the basic cognitive processes underlying the elicitation, experience and consequences of emotions. This description of Cognitive Appraisal Theory follows the work of Lazarus and colleagues (cf. Lazarus &

Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991, 1999). This theory posits that each emotion is unique in its person-environment interaction and adaptational significance for the individual. Every emotion is defined by its own CRT. This CRT refers to the range of cognitive appraisals that people make in response to an event. It includes both a primary and a secondary appraisal process (Lazarus, 1991). To illustrate the cognitive processes underlying the experience of emotions, I outline specific appraisals in Table 2.1.

Insert Table 2.1 about here

The appraisal process in response to an event includes two stages, primary and secondary appraisal. Primary appraisal includes two components, goal relevance and goal congruence (Lazarus, 1991). Goal relevance helps an individual decide if a particular event is personally relevant or not. Goal relevance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for emotion elicitation (Lazarus, 1991). Goal congruence includes an overall judgment of the event for personal well being and consistency with one's valued goals (Lazarus, 1991). Primary appraisal culminates in an overall experience of positive or negative affective state (Lazarus, 1991). Experiencing an unfair procedure could lead to a primary appraisal of goal obstruction, thereby inducing a negative affective state. Consequently, secondary appraisal sets in (Lazarus, 1991). Secondary appraisal includes three basic issues: attribution of responsibility, perceived coping potential and future expectancy (Lazarus, 1999). An attribution of agency occurs in the form of assigning responsibility for the event. Blame and/or credit require a judgment about who or what is responsible for the event. At this point, along with an overall affective state, there is an

attribution of responsibility. Perception of goal congruence leads to a favorable future expectancy while goal incongruence leads to an unfavorable future expectancy (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). One then proceeds to evaluate her/his coping potential. Discrete emotions start to crystallize in response to these appraisals (Lazarus, 1999). This two-stage appraisal process characterizes the experience of specific discrete emotions. The appraisal process contains several components that offer partial meaning to the complete emotional experience (Lazarus, 1999). These individual components are combined into a core relational theme (CRT), which offers a synthesis of the whole meaning underlying each emotion (Lazarus, 1999). Lazarus (1999) further points that the CRT is a “short hand summary of the global relational meaning” underlying each emotion (1999: 95).

As an illustration of this two - stage appraisal process for each emotion, consider that an unfair procedure could lead to goal incongruence and an overall negative affective state. An unfavorable future expectancy and other blame results in anger directed at the agent of the unfair procedure. In this illustration, if one assigned blame to oneself, the resulting emotion is guilt. A fair procedure combined with goal congruence leads to happiness. In the event of a fair procedure and self-credit, pride would result. Positive emotions generally lead to actual task-focused coping and negative emotions lead to actual emotion-focused coping (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991). Note that the appraisal process includes an evaluation of perceived coping potential but not actual coping. The evaluation of coping potential along with other appraisals combines to elicit a specific emotion. However, actual coping occurs after the experience of emotion (Lazarus, 1999). While I lay this out as a sequential process, these appraisals occur almost instantaneously, within seconds if not quicker (Lazarus, 1999).

Formulation and testing of this causal sequence has been the most daunting aspect in cognitive appraisal research. Most people might not even be conscious of such processes unless prompted to think about them (Lazarus, 1999). Cognitive appraisal research has made remarkable progress in identifying the appraisals and CRTs associated with specific emotions in a fine-grained fashion (Lazarus, 1999).

There are several components associated with the experience of discrete emotions (e.g., goal relevance, goal congruence, blame/credit, coping potential and future expectancy). All of these components are cognitive appraisals that inform one's choice of coping strategy (Lazarus, 1999). Yet these appraisals do not constitute actual coping (Lazarus, 1999). The point of these comments is to clarify the distinction between perceived coping potential (a cognitive appraisal) that along with all other appraisals culminate in a specific emotion experience (Lazarus, 1999). Actual coping is distinct from such perceived coping potential because coping is the cognitive self-regulation strategy that one uses in dealing with an emotion (Lazarus, 1999). Actual coping is closest to behavior. All the aforementioned appraisals build up in ultimately informing one's choice of coping (Lazarus, 1999). In order to understand the coping process, it is essential to pinpoint what the individual might be thinking and feeling at each point in the emotion experience (Lazarus, 1999). This is where each of the aforementioned appraisal components serves to inform coping strategies. Extensive reviews of these coping mechanisms appear in the stress literature (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991). Here, I only consider those that are most pertinent to this research.

Problem or task-focused coping is essentially the same construct with two differing labels used interchangeably in the literature. This form of coping involves

actively managing the event with a focus on resolution of the event. It includes five components such as active coping, planning, suppressing competing activities, restraint coping, and positive reappraisal (Carver et al., 1989). Emotion-focused coping is a strategy that is primarily symptom focused wherein the focus is on managing the emotion. It includes the five components of denial, behavioral disengagement, mental disengagement, alcohol and drug disengagement and venting emotions (Carver et al., 1989).

The above discussion explicitly draws attention to task-focused coping as a healthy form of coping and emotion-focused coping as an unhealthy form of coping (Aldwin, 1994; Brown, Westbrook & Challagalla, 2005; Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Terry & Hynes, 1998). An emerging perspective in coping research is known as the goodness of fit hypothesis. It suggests the importance of aligning specific coping efforts with the demands of the situation (Park et al., 2004). This implies that emotion-focused coping might be better suited when events are not under one's control. Although this idea is theoretically intriguing, empirical support for this position is scarce. Task-focused coping has been consistently related to productive behaviors while emotion-focused coping has been related to maladaptive functioning (Brown et al., 2005; Park et al., 2004). However, might there be stable individual differences that contribute to variability in coping in response to emotion? One such potential individual difference is reflected in an individual's EI, addressed next.

Emotional Intelligence

Ever since the introduction of EI (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), a number of controversies have surrounded the construct in psychological (e.g., Roberts et al., 2001)

and organizational behavior (e.g., Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005; Becker, 2003; Daus & Ashkanasy, 2005; Landy, 2005; Locke, 2005) circles. The debates in psychology have centered on the plausibility of EI as intelligence, its factor structure and psychometric properties. Intelligence theories require that any form of intelligence be ability-based and correlate with general cognitive intelligence (Sternberg, 1997). Any new intelligence should contribute unique variance beyond that of established constructs in that nomological network (Sternberg, 1997). The most important aspect of intelligence is the capacity for abstract reasoning (Sternberg, 1997). The differentiating aspect amongst multiple intelligences is the input information that precedes such abstract reasoning (Sternberg, 1997). For example, verbal intelligence involves abstract reasoning regarding language. Spatial intelligence includes abstract reasoning about the position and movement of objects in space (Mayer et al., 2001).

EI meets the standard criteria for intelligence theories in the following ways (Mayer et al., 2001). It is ability based as noted in the previous chapter. It involves the capacity for reasoning about emotional information (Mayer et al., 2001). This type of reasoning, as with other intelligences, draws upon one's knowledge base to a certain degree (Mayer et al., 2001). This knowledge base develops with age as emotions contain information about interrelationships (Mayer et al., 2001). EI correlates with general cognitive intelligence ($r = .30$) (Mayer et al., 2001). It is sufficiently distinct to merit inclusion in the intelligence nomological network as a construct in its own right (Mayer et al., 2001). It has discriminating power beyond general intelligence and the big five personality dimensions (Mayer et al., 2001; Mayer et al., 2003).

The debate in psychology also concerns EI's operationalization, psychometric properties and factor structure. The MSCEIT v.2.0 represents the latest operationalization of EI; it succeeds the MSCEIT research version 1.1 and the MEIS (Mayer et al., 2001). Preliminary evidence from a number of studies indicates that the MSCEIT demonstrates acceptable reliabilities at the individual factor and overall scale level (Cronbach's alpha values at specific dimension and overall scale levels have exceeded .8) (cf. Giganac, 2005; Mayer et al., 2003). Two week test-retest reliabilities were relatively high ($r = .86$; Brackett & Mayer, 2003), indicating support for the stability of the MSCEIT. The underlying four factors detailed earlier are reasonably intercorrelated and yet distinct from each other ($r = 0.17 - 0.59$). Confirmatory factor analyses indicated better fit for an a priori four-factor structure as compared to two-factor and three-factor solutions (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Mayer, Salovey, Panter, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2005). Further research concerning EI's psychometric properties and, most importantly, predictive validity for work outcomes is needed.

Preliminary evidence for the predictive validity of EI has started to emerge. EI is positively related to prosocial behavior in a non-work context and is negatively related to deviance such as drug and alcohol abuse (Brackett, Lopes, Ivcevic, Mayer & Salovey, 2004). EI has been linked to quality of social relations amongst college students (Brackett et al., 2004). These results remained statistically significant after controlling for intelligence and personality characteristics (Brackett et al., 2004). Conceptually, EI has been related to emergent visionary leadership and motivational criteria that enhance personal well being and growth (Brackett et al., 2004).

Organizational research on EI is just beginning. Preliminary results identify that emotionally intelligent individuals maintain a positive outlook even in the face of negative work events (Ashkanasy & Dasborough, 2005). EI positively relates to performance and challenge appraisals on a math task (Lyons & Schneider, 2005). This relationship remained statistically significant after controlling for GMA, thus indicating incremental validity for the MSCEIT (Lyons & Schneider, 2005). In another study, higher EI was positively related to higher leadership effectiveness (Rosete & Ciarrochi, 2005). It was also found that EI explained variance beyond personality and IQ (Rosete & Ciarrochi, 2005). The promise of EI lies in its novel theoretical suppositions. One of these is that emotionally intelligent individuals do not necessarily experience only positive emotions all the time. However, given two individuals, one with high EI and another with low EI, the high EI individual is more likely to manage emotion effectively (Mayer, 2006). This difference in ability to understand and reason through one's emotional experiences could help explain individual differences in coping. The most pertinent predictive capacity of EI for this study is the consequence for coping. Conceptually, EI should explain the ability to successfully cope with life's challenges and decrease the incidence of maladaptive coping behaviors (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Brackett et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; and Zeidner et al., 2006). Choice of coping strategies in turn leads to behaviors. The impact of EI in the relationship between emotion and coping is addressed next.

Emotions are temporary reactions to an event while EI is a relatively stable competence that helps individuals channel emotions in useful ways. While both high EI and low EI individuals might equally experience positive and/or negative emotions,

higher EI individuals are more adept at managing those emotions effectively (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Brackett et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006). In organizational research, inequity has been related to greater incidence of counterproductive behaviors (Barclay et al., 2005). Such inequity leads to anger, sadness and maybe the need for revenge against the organization for unfair treatment (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Barclay et al., 2005; Lee & Allen, 2002). In such scenarios, how does an individual's EI make a difference? Drawing upon EI's theory, one could suggest that higher EI could lead to more task-focused coping (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Brackett et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006). This proposition stems from EI's theoretical position that it reflects the ability to engage in beneficial emotion management (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Brackett et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006). In one study, higher EI was related to challenge appraisals rather than threat appraisals (Lyons & Schneider, 2005). High EI individuals cope with negative emotions better by buffering them with positive emotions (Tugade & Frederickson, 2002). The point of this discussion is that higher EI does not necessarily lead to the experience of positive emotions only. However, the relationship between individual emotions and their coping strategies could vary by the level of their EI (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Brackett et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006). This is because higher EI individuals are better able to reason about emotional information than low EI individuals are (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Brackett et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006). This position is supported by a recent finding that emotionally intelligent individuals tend to maintain a positive outlook even in the face of negative work events (Ashkanasy & Dasborough, 2005). This positive outlook is reflected in responses such as seeking other opportunities

or developing new skills. The low EI individual is not as adept at managing her/his negative emotion and is more likely to engage in dysfunctional coping (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Brackett et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002; Zeidner et al., 2006).

Several self-reported measures and conceptualizations of EI have been circulating in the popular press. These models are mixed models as they offer a medley of all personality characteristics known to academia. Such a constellation of personality traits might predict work criteria, yet is not intelligence (Mayer et al., 2005). The discerning power of these mixed models with regard to the big five personality traits is not supported either. The majority of skepticism (e.g., Becker, 2003; Landy, 2005; Locke, 2005) in academic debates is uninformed by the ability-based conceptualization of EI. The criticism leveled against EI stems from the popular press version of EI. Even when scholars recognize the ability-based model, they are tainted by the non-scientific approach of the mixed models. The following viewpoint on the conceptualization of EI clarifies some of the debates:

“The Mayer and Salovey definition of Emotional intelligence is the recognized standard for scholarly discourse. This status is reflected in the inclusion of Mayer et al., (2001) in the inaugural issue of the new APA journal, Emotion. Scholars who wish to contribute to the mainstream literature on Emotional intelligence need to be absolutely clear on this point” (Jordan, Ashkanasy & Härtel; in *AMR dialogue* 2003).

Hypotheses Development

The focus of this project is on four emotions: anger, guilt, happiness/joy, and pride. I readily acknowledge the importance of studying other discrete emotions (e.g., disgust, envy, and fear). The focus on these four emotions is primarily driven by several concerns. The first concern is parsimony. Moreover, while there might be some commonality in consequences of the emotions studied here, the mechanisms through

which these consequences come about are different for each emotion. The story behind the elicitation and consequences of each emotion is distinct and unique. In the theory development that follows, the working assumption is that the emotion literature needs more depth than breadth (Briner & Kiefer, 2005). This goes back to the critique of emotion research. We already know a lot about emotions in a very superficial fashion. The need for the explanatory mechanisms that translate felt emotion into behaviors cannot be ignored. Had I adopted such a fine-grained analysis with a large number of emotions, parsimony could be severely compromised. At the same time, I acknowledge that other emotions are also relevant to work settings. In the interest of parsimony though, I defer the study of other emotions to future research. The second concern driving my focus on these four emotions is their potential for action. These four emotions are high activation and intensity affective states (Izard, 1991; Ortony et al., 1988; Zelenski & Larsen, 2000). They are distinguished from other low activation emotions (e.g., sadness, empathy) by their potential for action readiness (Izard, 2002). Third, these four emotions have prior precedent in organizational literature (Weiss et al., 1999).

In the theoretical development that follows, there are two levels of analyses. Following the critique of emotion research presented in the previous chapter, all theory for emotion, coping and behaviors is at the within-person level. The role of EI as a stable between-person attribute is addressed at the between-person level. The rationale for using shorter, more focused work periods as coping and behavioral referents is to isolate specific sources of within-person variance (Beal et al., 2005). The tentative link between affective based constructs and behaviors stems from model misspecification (Ashkanasy,

2005; Beal et al., 2005; Fisher & Noble, 2004). Behaviors are normally conceptualized as a between-individual variable and emotion is presumed stable to help facilitate simple analyses (Beal et al., 2005). Such within-person variability in work behaviors is traditionally treated as error (cf. McCloy, Campbell & Cudeck, 1994). This type of model misspecification is minimized by correctly aligning the definition of emotion with its measurement (Beal et al., 2005). The specific structure of the within- and between-person design employed in this project will be detailed at a later stage.

The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Anger

Anger is a frequently used term in the everyday expression of one's feelings. Research on the experience and expression of state anger is at best sparse in organizational literature (cf. Fitness, 2000). Yet, several scholars agree that anger is one of the most potent of all negative emotions (Izard, 1991). It is an interesting yet intriguing emotion for its underlying cognitive complexity and motivational potential for action (Weiss et al., 1999). Ortony et al., (1988) indicate that anger results from two consecutive appraisals. The primary appraisal is that the event is potentially damaging to one's goals. The secondary appraisal is that blameworthiness for the event rests on another (see also Lazarus, 1999). Weiss et al., (1999) also contend that anger results from a primary appraisal of an undesirable event and a secondary appraisal of *other* blame. The CRT for anger is a self-demeaning offense (Lazarus, 1991). Our concern here is with the cognitive appraisals that constitute other blameworthiness. This appraisal affects an individual's coping strategy, task or emotion (Lazarus, 1999).

It is worthwhile to note one important relationship between task-focused and emotion-focused coping before delving further into conceptual development.

Considerable research support exists for the inverse relationship between task-focused and emotion-focused coping (Carver et al., 1989; Folkman & Lazarus, 1985).

Theoretically, the reason for this negative association or mutually exclusive relationship is that people engage in only one form of coping only at a time (Carver et al., 1989).

However, within each main type of coping there might be several components that could be interrelated. For example, active coping and positive reinterpretation, both components of task-focused coping, are positively related (Carver et al., 1989).

However, the use of task-focused coping necessarily precludes the use of emotion-focused coping (Carver et al., 1989). This position is a working assumption in much of the theory development presented here.

The experience of anger is first contingent upon the appraisal of a self-demeaning offense. Secondly, the individual holds another event or agent responsible for that offense. Coping with anger is the next immediate step. This includes both emotion-focused coping and task-focused coping. Conceptual and empirical evidence indicates that anger is positively associated with emotion-focused coping and negatively associated with task-focused coping (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).

Conceptually, this relationship is driven by the appraisal of a threat that is common to all negative emotions (Lazarus, 1999). In such a situation, the instinctual reaction as per Cognitive Appraisal Theory is to minimize the potential for self-harm resulting from the threat (Lazarus, 1999). Thus, most people manage the symptoms of an event rather than actively trying to change the event or that particular interpersonal interaction (Lazarus, 1999). Consider evidence from one empirical study cited in Izard (1991). In this study, it was found that twenty-eight percent of study participants reported feeling vengeful,

destructive and likely to attack others in response to anger. In terms of cognitive effects, about half the study participants (50.1%) reported thinking about revenge, attacking others, expressing anger either verbally or physically and destruction. Many of these behavioral intentions are characterized as emotion-focused coping. They include components of distraction from the task and denial of task requirements. Simultaneously, it indicates a lack of task-focused coping. In sum,

Hypothesis 1: Anger is positively related to emotion-focused coping.

Hypothesis 2: Anger is negatively related to task-focused coping.

Insert Figure 2.1 about here

In the same study cited above (Izard, 1991), not all study participants were prone to such emotion-focused coping. Thirteen percent of the participants reported thinking about ways to regain self-control and changing the event. This denotes task-focused coping. In terms of behavioral intentions, the results are even more revealing. Only a third of the study's participants revealed action tendencies directed at changing the situation and maintaining self-control. Most scholars would agree this third of study participants (Izard, 1991) coped with anger "intelligently". What might separate the action tendency towards destructive coping from those that seek to reframe the situation in self-beneficial ways? I contend that the choice of coping strategy is contingent upon an individual's ability to intelligently deal with anger.

It is worthwhile to revisit the theoretical rationale of EI at this stage. It is the ability to actively recognize and manage emotions in a self-beneficial fashion (Mayer et

al., 1999). In the results cited above, it would make sense to distinguish the last third of all individuals who actively rechannel their anger into task-focused coping from the first two thirds who were inclined to behave aggressively. Since EI indicates the ability to manage felt emotions, it influences the cognitive and coping implications of felt anger (Ashkanasy et al., 2004). One who experiences anger and is a high EI person might recognize the felt emotion as anger and engage in task-focused coping. For example, s/he might channel anger into extra vigilance with regard to her/his performance. Several scholars acknowledge that negative emotions like anger have a purpose (Lyubomirsky, King & Diener, 2005). They activate our motivational and cognitive bases to act in more cautious ways (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). An individual with high EI would think about her/his anger and perhaps decide that s/he would never let such an event or agent demean her/him again. S/he might engage in a coping strategy that facilitates changing the situation and being more vigilant in her/his work. This case is illustrated by the hypothetical case of an employee in a negative work event. A supervisor who reprimands an employee for low quality might personally attack that employee. This employee experiences anger, as this attack is self-demeaning. If s/he is a high EI individual, s/he will most likely point out to the supervisor that the personal attack is not very welcome. S/he is more vigilant with regard to the task so that the same situation never occurs again. This illustration comes with an interesting sidebar that is related to the individual's EI. The emotionally intelligent individual not only tries to actively manage the emotion and perform better at her/his task, but also minimizes repeated occurrences of the event (Mayer et al., 2001). This points at our innate tendency to minimize the experience of negative emotion, as it is associated with pain (Izard, 1991).

On the other hand, consider the other two thirds of participants reported in the Izard (1991) study. The tendency for dysfunctional coping is explained by low EI. To play out this scenario fully, the employee with low EI would process anger as a self-demeaning offense and think of ways in which to assuage that emotion. S/he might not concentrate on the task because of emotion-focused coping. Such emotion-focused coping is primarily aimed at assuaging felt anger. This focus upon assuaging anger led most participants to fantasize about hurting the offending agent in some manner. The following section offers illustrations of the ways in which emotion-focused coping is associated with focusing one's energy on intended behaviors that could alleviate the wrongdoing.

Anger related research in organizations reveals that people focus upon intended behaviors as a form of emotion-focused coping (cf. Fitness, 2000). Sometimes, this type of intended deviant behavior might not be directed towards the offending agent yet could be directed towards a symbolic representative of the offending agent (Fitness, 2000). One might question the need to harm or retaliate against someone or something that is not the object of anger in the preceding illustrations, such as the organization. The answer lies in recent results that a subordinate might not always be able to retaliate against the supervisor (cf. Fitness, 2000). This is because most employees are wary of upsetting the power balance (cf. Fitness, 2000). People are also cautious about overtly causing damage to organizational resources (Douglas & Martinko, 2001). Moreover, organizational display rules discourage the expression of anger at work (Fitness, 2000). The employee might resort to intended revenge behaviors against anything that is symbolic of the organization (cf. Barclay et al., 2005; Fitness, 2000).

Anger is not always tied to intended aggressive behavior (Lazarus, 1999). Studies have shown that most anger experiences lead to psychosomatic and other physiological symptoms (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). Over a period of time then, the innate tendency for survival requires some form of release of anger to offset these physical symptoms (Lazarus, 1999). More pertinently, even if most angry people are not explicitly aggressive (and admittedly few are), most will still try to assuage their anger by at least focusing thoughts of revenge against the offending agent or event (Lazarus, 1999). The point of this discussion is that not everybody deals with anger in the same manner. It is worthwhile to unravel individual differences that contribute to different coping consequences of anger. One such individual difference is EI, an ability to actively process and manage emotions. High EI individuals might well report experiencing anger about the same as low EI individuals. However, the four hierarchical dimensions of EI as discussed earlier aid the higher EI individual in actively coping with anger and their tasks. The theoretical rationale underlying such beneficial management of anger by high EI individuals is drawn from recent theoretical propositions of Ashkanasy and colleagues on the one hand (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Jordan et al., 2002) and Zeidner and colleagues on the other (Zeidner et al., 2006). However, this work differs from theirs in that their work is in the domain of stress while this work is at the level of discrete emotions. Emotions are one component of the stress system; as such, their framework is more overarching while the current theoretical development is more molecular with regard to emotion effects.

The higher EI individual accurately perceives that the felt emotion is anger (i.e., emotion perception) (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). This perception leads

to rationalization regarding felt anger (i.e., using emotion to facilitate thought). In this instance, the higher EI individual might realize that expression of felt anger is potentially harmful as per prior experiences (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). S/he could rationalize that anger is diverting their attention away from task focus and thus self regulate. S/he may choose to disconnect from anger in order to better focus upon tasks or alternatively use the meaning of anger as a self-demeaning offense as the impetus for task-focused strategies (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). Anger is frequently accompanied by other emotions such as frustration, anxiety or fear (e.g., Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1999). The third dimension of EI (understanding emotion) contributes to recognition of the experience of these emotions simultaneously and prioritizing them as either important or unimportant in that particular situation. The fourth dimension (emotion management) builds on the third dimension and helps an individual connect or disconnect from anger based upon its usefulness for personally favorable outcomes. Taken together, each dimension of EI informs the next higher dimension culminating in overall EI, which differentiates individuals in the relationship between anger and coping. For example, expression of anger leads to unfavorable interpersonal relationships at work (Fitness, 2000). The higher EI individual would then disconnect from anger. Alternatively, the experience of anger could provide considerable motivational energy (Fitness, 2000). In this instance, the higher EI individual would connect with anger (presumably without expressing it) and channel it into task focus (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).

The low EI individuals will focus more on emotion coping and, because of the exclusive relationship between emotion- and task-focused coping, will lose task focus.

This position is intuitively appealing as fantasizing about revenge, retaliation and such other forms of deviance take up considerable cognitive resources, diverting attention away from the task. Thus, the experience of anger results in different coping consequences for the more emotionally intelligent individuals when compared to the less emotionally intelligent individuals.

Hypothesis 3: EI moderates the relationship between anger and task-focused coping such that this relationship is positive for higher EI individuals and negative for lower EI individuals.

Hypothesis 4: EI moderates the relationship between anger and emotion-focused coping such that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for lower EI individuals.

The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Guilt

Like anger, guilt results from a perceived displeasure at a specific action, event or interpersonal interaction (Lazarus, 1999). The pattern of proposed relationships is similar to that of anger. Hence, I represent these relationships together in Figure 2.1. Guilt is distinct from anger because of its blameworthiness. In guilt, one assigns the responsibility of the specific displeasure to oneself (Lazarus, 1999). The core relational theme of guilt is perceived failure of living up to certain personal or societal standards (Lazarus, 1999). The experience of guilt is tied to core evolutionary and biological mechanisms (Izard, 1991). Most adults have a system of internalized values. A violation of these values and self-blame leads to guilt (Izard, 1991). Guilt is a basic existential emotion (Lazarus, 1999). It serves as a moral compass without which most people would

not be able to act on their sense of right and wrong (Izard, 1991). Guilt is the most essential emotion in the development of an individual's cognitive-affective structure of conscience and the cognitive-affective-action structure of moral behavior (Izard, 1991).

Guilt motivates one consequence in almost every instance. It is the motivation to correct the wrongdoing in some way or the other (Lazarus, 1999). The causes of guilt stem from psychoanalytic and social learning theories. Regardless of how guilt actually comes about, there exists agreement amongst scholars that guilt results from wrongdoing (see Izard, 1991). This wrongdoing can take the form of trust betrayal, violation of a personal standard or simply harm to another (Lazarus, 1999). It is easy to see that such causes readily present themselves in organizational settings. An employee who receives a bonus might feel happy at the outcome. If s/he learns that the process used to allot that outcome was unfair, s/he experiences guilt along with happiness at the outcome (Weiss et al., 1999). The most interesting feature of guilt is the imperative for action. This action impulse is described next drawing heavily upon psychology research.

Two consequences of guilt have been reported by a number of studies (cf. Izard, 1991). The first is that guilt leads to compliance. In a series of experiments designed to elicit subject's behavioral responses to guilt, it was found that high guilt individuals were more likely to comply with requests that demanded time and resources *even* if there was no immediate material benefit to them (Izard, 1991). The second consequence of guilt is intense self-reproach (Ortony et al., 1988). Self-reproach could debilitate the normal functioning of the human mind (Izard, 1991). Consider an employee who is promoted because of affirmative action laws. This employee might experience guilt if s/he perceives that this promotion was not based upon equitable standards. S/he might be

engulfed by self-doubt since the promotion was not merit based. Strategies for resolution of self-reproach involve some form of emotion-focused coping. Compliance at the cost of personal well-being, the most common consequence of guilt, is an example of emotional coping as it involves abandonment of responsibility for one's own well-being. In sum, the research on guilt in organizational literature is scarce. However, findings from psychology indicate that guilt leads to more compliance, temporary debilitation, denial and withdrawal from normal tasks (Izard, 1991). The experience of guilt primarily causes people to engage in more emotion-focused coping (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). Simultaneously, they are distracted and disengaged from the task. This distraction and denial takes focus away from the task. Alternatively stated, guilt as a self-reproach emotion involves emotion-focused coping. This form of coping comes at the expense of associated decrements in task focus.

Hypothesis 5: Guilt is positively related to emotion-focused coping.

Hypothesis 6: Guilt is negatively related to task-focused coping.

Individuals who are higher on EI recognize guilt for what it is and seek to rectify feelings of self-reproach. This last contention is based upon EI's theoretical formulation that it is the ability to manage emotions in ways that are beneficial to the individual (Mayer et al., 1999). The experience of this negative emotion shares the vigilance component with other negative emotions and results in higher task-focused coping where it is managed. The high EI person, with an eye towards personally beneficial outcomes at the tail end of the emotional episode, is prone to task-focused coping as outlined in the case of anger (Zeidner et al., 2006). The hallmark characteristic of guilt is abandonment of responsibility for personal well-being (Izard, 1991). In response to such feelings of

compliance at the cost of personal well being, let us consider the effect of EI that could alter one's coping strategies under guilt. The first step is accurately recognizing that one is experiencing guilt and self-reproach (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). This leads to rationalization regarding the self-reproach. This rationalization might lead the employee (who is promoted because of affirmative action laws) to self-regulation aimed at proving oneself rather than abandoning responsibility for personal outcomes (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). Similarly, the same employee experiencing guilt because of a non-merit based promotion might also feel proud and happy at a favorable outcome. The third dimension of EI helps the individual recognize these multiple emotions and prioritize each as important or unimportant (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). The fourth dimension, drawing upon the preceding dimensions, now leads the employee to either connect or disconnect with guilt based upon its usefulness. For example, this employee might choose to connect with guilt and channel its motivational force into enhanced task focus. Alternatively, if s/he perceives that guilt is obstructing task focus, s/he might disconnect from guilt and connect with pride, thus leading to enhanced task focus (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). In sum, EI leads to the realization that the tendency for compliance at the cost of personal well-being is not beneficial. Where guilt is not actively managed (low EI), it results in temporary debilitation of the individual's cognitive facilities and is characterized as emotion-focused coping (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). This form of coping is characterized by compliance at the cost of personal well-being. The mental states of such individuals revolve around fear of punishment for the wrongdoing, internal

censure and lowered self-esteem (Izard, 1991). The focus is on the emotion experience itself rather than effective resolution (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006).

Hypothesis 7: EI moderates the relationship between guilt and task-focused coping such that this relationship is positive for higher EI individuals and negative for lower EI individuals.

Hypothesis 8: EI moderates the relationship between guilt and emotion-focused coping such that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for lower EI individuals.

The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Joy

The appraisal structure of joy is straightforward. Joy results from an appraisal of goal congruence (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). The interesting feature of this basic emotion is in its consequences for coping and, subsequently, behaviors. Joy and happiness are used interchangeably herein. Some authors refer to an entire class of emotions that are pleasurable as joy (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Others have reserved the use of joy/happiness for an intense positive emotion resulting from desirable outcome expectancy (Ortony et al., 1988). Joy is a positive emotion stemming from goal congruence. One could be happy for another or for oneself. In this research, I include both self- and other-directed joy.

It is worthwhile to consider certain consequences of joy from the standpoint of psychological theories. Izard (1991) points out that joy results in an appreciation of the world around us. It leaves an individual confident of who they are and leads to savoring every object in the world (Izard, 1991). This intense appreciation is accompanied by not wanting to change anything. Alternatively, there is a degree of contentment with the

status quo. Happy individuals are less prone to dissecting and analyzing things, as they are not driven to change things (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Izard (1991) further notes that joy is associated with strength, vigor, confidence and competence. Joy forges social bonds because the happy individual feels at one with their environs (Izard, 1991; Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).

The experience of joy has significant implications for individual physical, psychological and behavioral health. Frederickson and colleagues (2001, 2003) propose unbounded beneficial effects of joy. They posit that the experience of positive emotions such as joy is crucial to an individual's cognitive and psychological resources (Frederickson, 2001; Tugade & Frederickson, 2002). Individuals who experience these positive emotions more frequently are more likely to function better over a period of time. The repeated experience of positive emotion widens cognitive interests and builds psychological resources (Frederickson, 2001). These propositions are known as the Broaden and Build theory (Frederickson, 2001). Happy individuals are more resilient and more successful in all spheres of life (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Empirical support for this theory has started to emerge. For example, happy individuals have been shown to fight distress symptoms better and recover from illness more smoothly (Tugade & Frederickson, 2002). An extensive review of research on joy shows that joy leads to life satisfaction and superior functioning across all life domains (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005).

One question that deserves further examination is what psychological and cognitive processes unfold after the experience of joy? Much research support exists for the positive consequences of joy, but very little research addresses the intervening black box of cognitive processes (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Cognitive Appraisal Theory has

formulated and found empirical support for the position that joy/happiness is positively associated with task-focused coping and is negatively associated with emotion-focused coping (Park et al., 2004). In line with these findings, Lyubomirsky et al., (2005) reported that joy is associated with more effective coping in the face of challenges. Such active coping strategies typically involve an approach orientation in which happy individuals pursue goals and draw upon skills accumulated in the past (Miller & Schnoll, 2000). Positive reframing of events, a form of task-focused coping, is related to joy (Miller & Schnoll, 2000). Research to date reveals a pattern of task-focused coping in the face of joy (e.g., Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). People are less likely to engage in avoidance strategies while experiencing joy (Izard, 1991). The pattern of relationships for joy are depicted in Figure 2.2.

Hypothesis 9: Joy is negatively related to emotion-focused coping.

Hypothesis 10: Joy is positively related to task-focused coping.

Insert Figure 2.2 about here

Most cognitive psychologists are quick to point out that joy is a rare emotion (e.g., Izard, 1991). One who is constantly happy might be doubted for their mental health and might not function very effectively (Izard, 1991; Tomkins, 1962). Joy leads to slower performance because it is accompanied by physiological (e.g., increased heart rates, systolic blood pressure) and psychological changes (Izard, 1991). There exists a certain threshold to the healthy experience of joy (see also Frederickson & Losada,

2005). Individuals cannot constantly experience joy and be expected to function better. Broaden and Build theorists now contend that the healthy emotion experience is characterized by both positive and negative emotions (Frederickson & Losada, 2005). They further argue that the critical ratio of positive to negative emotions is 3:2 for optimal functioning. It is interesting to note that this is the fundamental proposition of EI as well. High EI individuals tend to experience joy about the same as low EI individuals (Mayer, 2006). High EI individuals experience joy and recognize it for that (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). They actively manage joy such that they are successful, implying task-focused coping.

Does joy always lead to task-focused coping? Some studies have found that this is not always the case (Isen, 1991). One school of thought has conceptualized and found support for the position that positive emotions lead to decreased performance on tasks involving complex mental activity (Melton, 1995). Positive emotions seem to encourage individuals to take shortcuts in the mental processing of information (Melton, 1995). The mood congruence literature found that negative moods (admittedly not emotions) lead to more creativity and better performance in some domains (George & Zhou, 2002; Isen, 1991). Results on the effects of joy on task performance have been largely mixed (e.g., Isen & Means, 1983). The experience of positive emotion fosters pursuit of activities that prolong the positive emotion (Izard, 1991). Izard describes this tendency as viewing the world through “rose colored glasses” (1991:161). He suggests that joy leads to rather paradoxical effects in cognitive patterns for some individuals. He argues that a positive event (e.g., a good performance) can cause joy and yet take away from subsequent task focus by slowing down problem solving and cognition. This discussion raises an

interesting issue for the current research. Might it be that the research to date has not addressed the impact of stable individual differences such as EI?

Lyubomirsky et al., (2005) concluded their review on joy by suggesting that joy could lead to better task focus *if* the happy individual is motivated to perform well at the task. An alternative perspective of why negative effects stem from joy is drawn from Ortony and colleagues (1988). They contend that positive emotions can sometimes lead to the inability to cope. They cite common references such as “crying happy tears”, “out of control” and “beside themselves with joy” as lay descriptions of the inability to cope. They question why some people tend to engage in expressive behavior characteristic of negative emotions, while feeling happy. They suggest that such expressions are triggered by an evaluation of the inability to cope. Of course, these evaluations of the inability to cope occur so quickly that in many instances we might be unaware of them.

EI affects the relationship between joy and coping in the following manner. First, an individual’s perception of joy feeds this information to the second dimension, using emotion to facilitate thought. This dimension of EI leads to rationalization and the needed motivation for the individual to remain task focused. The third dimension helps her/him prioritize the experience of multiple simultaneous emotions. Finally, all of this information builds up to inform emotion management. This last dimension, along with other EI dimensions culminating in overall EI, signals the individual to be careful and vigilant with regard to tasks (Zeidner et al., 2006). EI informs the individual that denial of workload, distractions and disengagement from the task (all forms of emotion-focused coping) are ultimately harmful (Zeidner et al., 2006). It is reasonable to expect that high EI individuals engage in more task-focused coping while low EI individuals are more

prone to emotion-focused coping. This position derives from the theoretical foundations of cognitive appraisals and EI (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). Cognitive appraisals involve reasoning about emotional information. EI indicates a set of competencies that aid such reasoning about emotional information (Zeidner et al., 2006). Thus, the high EI individual might better reason about emotional information and engage in adaptive coping (Zeidner et al., 2006). A low EI individual who experiences joy is more likely to engage in emotion-focused coping, accompanied with a positive future expectancy and decrements in task focus. Such an individual might be more prone to the “rose colored glasses” syndrome described by Izard (1991).

Where this point of view differs from previously cited research is that we start to place bounds on the benefits of feeling happy. The “happier and wiser” experience is differentiated from the “happier but dumber” experience by an individual’s choice of coping. Recall that joy leads to increased heart rates and other physiological changes (Izard, 1991). An individual has to regulate these changes at the very least before attending to task demands. Such coping then is contingent upon an individual’s EI, which directs her/him to task-focused coping strategies because they are ultimately self beneficial. Where EI does not aid such coping (low EI), people might be more prone to emotion-focused coping.

Hypothesis 11: EI moderates the relationship between joy and task-focused coping such that this relationship is positive for higher EI individuals and negative for lower EI individuals.

Hypothesis 12: EI moderates the relationship between joy and emotion-focused coping such that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for lower EI individuals.

The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Pride

Pride is considered especially important to organizational research because of its potential to initiate action towards achievement (Weiss et al., 1999). Pride is similar to joy in that it includes a primary appraisal of goal congruence (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). The pattern of relationships for pride is similar to that of joy. Hence, I depicted these relationships together in Figure 2.2. Pride differs from joy in that an attribution of self-agency occurs for such goal congruence (Lazarus, 1991; 1999; Ortony et al., 1988). Consider an employee who has received a bonus or a promotion. This would make the employee happy. Secondly, if the employee perceives that s/he has put in a lot of effort and has produced quality work, s/he takes pride in that accomplishment. Pride is a self-attribution emotion and it emerges when one perceives that s/he has done something praiseworthy (Ortony et al., 1988).

The core relational theme for pride is self-satisfaction (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). Pride is associated with an individual's appraisal that credit for the praiseworthy action lies with her/him. This leads to self-satisfaction. It is important to note that the elicitation of pride is complex, as what one defines as praiseworthy is sometimes in question (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). There could be cultural differences in what constitutes praiseworthy action. There could be a discrepancy between personal perceptions of praiseworthiness and societal standards for the same (Ortony et al., 1988). One's personal perceptions of praiseworthiness and organizational standards could be in

conflict, resulting in situations where pride is not elicited. The few studies in the domain of pride have mainly focused upon the antecedents of this emotion (e.g., Weiss et al., 1999). Pride is associated with goal congruence, perceived fairness, and low situational demand (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). This study further revealed that pride led to more task-focused coping than anger or shame. In general, positive emotions such as pride are associated with more task-focused coping because there is no perceived harm or threat to one's well being (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). The individual is free to focus her/his energy on the task rather than managing the emotion itself. Moreover, pride is characterized by an approach motivation towards one's task and leads to greater task focus (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). Simultaneously, pride also triggers lesser emotion-focused coping than anger and shame (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002).

Hypothesis 13: Pride is negatively related to emotion-focused coping.

Hypothesis 14: Pride is positively related to task-focused coping.

Is there a dark side to pride? As with joy, I propose that pride needs to be managed effectively. Pride is one of the emotions that might signify a “too much of a good thing” effect unless one is able to actively manage it (Ortony et al., 1988). This goes back to the CRT of pride, specifically self-satisfaction. Pride is associated with confidence, higher self-esteem and self-satisfaction (Izard, 1991). It is not hard to imagine that in some cases such feelings of self-satisfaction could easily lead to “being smug” and “acting in a condescending manner”. A typical employee who feels smug or secure is unlikely to exert more effort. S/he is not motivated to act, as there is no biological signal for action. This smugness denotes a form of avoidance coping. Ortony et al., (1988) point out that the inability to cope with pride is characterized as “smugness” and “suffering from a

swollen head”. These are everyday references to excessive pride, bordering on self-absorption. This type of self-absorption could result in being distant and condescending to coworkers. This describes a form of emotion-focused coping.

When does this swollen head syndrome set in and what differentiates the ability to cope from the inability to do so? EI could help people cope with pride effectively. The low EI individual is more likely to indulge in smugness and not cope beneficially with pride. As noted in the case of each emotion earlier, the underlying EI dimensions contribute to the relationship between pride and coping through overall EI (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). First, perception of pride occurs, which in turn enables rationalization. Such rationalization could involve trying to be humble and realizing that smugness could isolate one from their environs. The third dimension enables one to prioritize the experience of multiple emotions. Finally, the fourth dimension, emotion management, contributes to effectively managing pride in a manner that is self-beneficial. The high EI individual will likely engage in task-focused coping and not display the same form of smugness as the low EI individual. This stems from the high EI individual’s understanding that distancing oneself from coworkers is not personally or organizationally beneficial.

Hypothesis 15: EI moderates the relationship between pride and task-focused coping such that this relationship is positive for higher EI individuals and negative for lower EI individuals.

Hypothesis 16: EI moderates the relationship between pride and emotion-focused coping such that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for lower EI individuals.

Emotional Intelligence and Coping

In addition to the specific hypotheses set out above, EI has been consistently related to adaptive functioning in many domains (e.g., Mayer, 2006). For example, higher EI is related to lower incidence of maladaptive coping such as drug and alcohol abuse in the child and counseling psychology domain (Mayer, 2006; Poulu, 2005; Tsaousis & Nikolaou, 2005). From a conceptual standpoint, higher EI individuals are better able to perceive and reason through emotional information and resolve the event in a fashion that facilitates beneficial outcomes (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). Higher EI individuals are less likely to engage in maladaptive or dysfunctional coping such as denial, distraction and withdrawal (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). They are more likely to positively reappraise even negative work events and adopt functional coping mechanisms (Jordan et al., 2002). Zeidner et al., (2005) suggest that the higher EI individual more accurately appraises the emotion-inducing event and is more cognizant of ensuing emotional changes. This type of emotional sensitivity allows the higher EI individual to steer away from maladaptive coping and focus more on adaptive coping (Zeidner et al., 2006). In keeping with this emerging body of research on EI and coping, one might also expect main effects of EI on coping strategies. Thus,

Hypothesis 17: EI is positively related to task-focused coping at the between person level.

Hypothesis 18: EI is negatively related to emotion-focused coping at the between person level.

Coping and Behaviors

The previous section outlined the effects of emotion on coping strategies and the role of EI in the relationship between emotion and coping. In this section, I present the effects of coping strategies on work behaviors. Task-focused coping involves actively managing the event with a focus on resolution of the event. It includes five components: active coping, planning, suppressing competing activities, restraint coping, and positive reappraisal (Carver et al., 1989). Emotion-focused coping is a strategy that is primarily symptom focused wherein the focus is on managing the emotion. It includes the five components of denial, behavioral disengagement, mental disengagement, alcohol and drug disengagement and venting emotions (Carver et al., 1989). In this project, my focus is on three forms of work behaviors: task performance, organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB) and workplace deviance behaviors (WDB).

Task performance is defined as an individual's successful completion of a particular task. This definition derives its roots from early conceptualizations of an individual's worth to the organization in terms of the tangible outputs (Borman, 1991). Aspects of task performance are inclusive of but not limited to task proficiency, completion, quality of outputs, quantity of outputs, and similar task-related criteria. Task performance or in-role behavior is critical in the evaluation of employees. It is well documented in organizational research that other employee behaviors contribute to overall organizational effectiveness (Motowidlo & Van Scotter, 1994). One such voluntary behavior on the part of employees is Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) (Organ & Ryan, 1995).

OCB scholars have generated multiple definitions (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Organ, 1988, 1997) in the extant literature on the topic. One common thread runs across all these definitions. OCB represents any employee discretionary behavior, though not critical to the task, which facilitates organizational functioning. Alternatively stated, the multiple conceptualizations of OCB have one theme in common, that OCBs are behaviors that are not a part of an employee's task requirements though they benefit the organization (cf. Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Organ, 1988, 1997). They include components such as, but not limited to, helping behaviors, sportsmanship, initiative, loyalty, compliance, civic virtue and self-development (cf. Lepine, Erez, & Johnson, 2002). In this dissertation, I adopt a two-dimensional conceptualization of OCB that includes OCBs directed towards other individuals (OCBI) and those that are directed towards the organization (OCBO) (e.g., Lee & Allen, 2002). This conceptualization is not in conflict with the earlier described forms of OCBs; however, it follows prior precedent in literature that has examined the effects of emotions on OCBs and WDBs simultaneously (Lee & Allen, 2002).

More recently, workplace deviance behavior (WDB) has taken on a certain prominence in organizational research (Barclay et al., 2005; Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Fox & Spector, 1999). This prominence is attributed to the bouts of downsizing, technological insecurities and other challenges faced by many organizations (Barclay et al., 2005; Fitness, 2000). Workplace deviance is defined as any voluntary counterproductive behavior that violates organizational norms and causes harm to organizational functioning (Robinson & Bennett, 1995; 1997). It threatens the well-being of superiors and coworkers (Robinson & Bennett, 1995; 1997). Barclay et al., (2005)

found that layoffs lead to anger and hostility towards the organization. This hostility was found to cause retaliatory behaviors. This result indicates a direct link between felt negative emotions and retaliatory behaviors. In affirmative action justice research it was found that even when an outcome is favorable, individuals could perceive the procedures that were used to determine the outcome as unfair or untimely (Heilman & Alcott, 2001; Heilman, Block, & Stathatos, 1997). This, in turn, leads to emotions that could cause retaliatory behaviors such as badmouthing the employer, seeking revenge against the manager and taking legal action. Research on WDB subsumes workplace aggression research (Douglas & Martinko, 2001). WDB as conceptualized in this study follows the precedent set in prior research in that it includes all forms of aggressive behaviors and antisocial workplace behaviors (Martinko & Zellars, 1998). They are conceptually similar and indicate behaviors that cause harm to organizational functioning and/or threaten the well-being of coworkers and superiors.

Earlier I described coping as the immediate cognitive consequence following experienced emotion. Here, I extend that causal sequence a bit further and examine the effects of coping on behaviors. Task-focused coping involves actively managing the event with a focus on resolution of the event. It includes the five components of active coping, planning, suppressing competing activities, restraint coping, and positive reappraisal (Carver et al., 1989). By the very definition of task-focused coping, one could expect positive effects on task performance. Empirical support for the positive association between task-focused coping and task performance increments exists (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). This result has been extended to other forms of success in general. Bennett, Martin, Bies and Brockner (1995) found that individuals who used task-focused

coping in the face of a layoff were more successful in seeking alternative employment opportunities. Task-focused coping involves an approach motivation towards challenges and tasks and is therefore associated with better task performance (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Park et al., 2004).

Emotion-focused coping is a strategy that is primarily symptom focused wherein the focus is on managing the emotion. It includes the five components of denial, behavioral disengagement, mental disengagement, alcohol and drug disengagement and venting emotions (Carver et al., 1989). In such cases, task performance decreases as the individual is more focused upon managing the emotion itself. This causes neglect of the task. Emotion-focused coping leads to task performance decrements (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). Bennett et al., (1995) found that layoff victims who engaged in emotion-focused coping were less successful in seeking alternative employment opportunities. It is reasonable to expect a replication of the negative association between emotion-focused coping and task performance.

Hypothesis 19: Task-focused coping is positively related to task performance.

Hypothesis 20: Emotion-focused coping is negatively related to task performance.

The relationship between positive mood states, positive emotions and OCBs is well documented (Lee & Allen, 2002). Positive moods have been conceptually linked to organizational spontaneity in the form of helping coworkers, protecting the organization, making constructive suggestions, and developing abilities that aid organizational functioning (George & Brief, 1992). While these results support a direct link between the said mood state and OCB like behaviors, it is reasonable to assume a relationship

between emotions and OCBs as well. With task-focused coping, one seeks to focus upon the task, positively reframe the situation and approach a problem rather than avoid it (e.g., Brown et al., 2005). Task-focused coping involves an approach motivation rather than avoidance motivation. With this approach motivation as the energizing base, an individual who is presented with a request for help is more likely to comply with that request even if it is not a part of her/his job description. This argument further suggests that an individual is more likely to direct her/his approach motivational energy to helping coworkers, assuming extra responsibilities and such other behaviors known as OCBI. The same approach motivation causes her/him to be a good organizational citizen, make beneficial suggestions, and take any minor setbacks in stride. This indicates that the same approach motivation could energize one towards more OCBOs. Thus, conceptually, one might expect a positive association between task-focused coping and both forms of OCB. In emotion-focused coping, the motivational base is mainly avoidance. As such, the individual is more likely to deny the gravity of the event and withdraw from coworkers. In this case, one employs a more repressive form of coping, which essentially isolates her/him from the environs. One's energy is focused upon the ongoing emotion experience. In this frame of mind, an individual is less likely to engage in both forms of OCBs.

Hypothesis 21: Task-focused coping is positively related to OCBI.

Hypothesis 22: Emotion-focused coping is negatively related to OCBI.

Hypothesis 23: Task-focused coping is positively related to OCBO.

Hypothesis 24: Emotion-focused coping is negatively related to OCBO.

With regard to WDB, one would expect exactly the opposite effect of both forms of coping. This is related to the approach and avoidance motivation of each coping strategy. In task-focused coping, the focus is on dealing with the task, which takes away the motivation to engage in deviant acts. In emotion-focused coping, one is primarily involved in managing the symptom. The focus shifts from the task to assuaging the felt emotion. An individual who engages in emotion-focused coping seeks to restore a sense of equity by retaliation, slighting coworkers, stealing office supplies and aggression against the wrongdoer. Similarly, emotion-focused coping resulting from narcissism could lead to work withdrawal, demeaning coworkers, bad mouthing the organization and so on. The main idea here is that emotion-focused coping involves managing the emotion experience itself and not the task.

Hypothesis 25: Task-focused coping is negatively related to WDB.

Hypothesis 26: Emotion-focused coping is positively related to WDB.

The Full Model

In this section, I attempt to put together the full model comprising the causal linkages discussed thus far. This piecemeal approach helped clarify all linkages in a coherent fashion. However, in reality, all of the above-described processes occur sequentially and the entire model is shown in Figures 2.3 - 2.6. This set of figures offers a complete perspective on the relationships between each emotion, coping, EI and behaviors.

Anger

In the theoretical development of anger, I suggested that it results in emotion-focused coping. The angrier a person gets, the less they engage in task-focused coping. EI indicates the ability to reason through and manage one's emotions (Mayer et al., 1999). A high EI individual manages anger beneficially and engages in task-focused coping along with a decrease in emotion-focused coping. This stems from her/his understanding that neglecting the task and giving in to managing the symptom could lead to adverse future consequences. S/he also understands that successful completion of a task is personally beneficial. This position is consistent with the theoretical foundations of EI, which indicates that higher EI enables people to engage in effective coping strategies even in the face of negative work events (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). Following the precedent set in the coping literature, I suggested that task-focused coping is associated with performance increments (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), OCBs and a lowered incidence of WDB. Emotion-focused coping leads to performance decrements (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), WDBs and a lowered incidence of OCBs (see Figure 2.3).

Insert Figure 2.3 about here

Guilt

Drawing upon the theoretical development in earlier sections, guilt is positively related to emotion-focused coping and negatively related to task-focused coping. The unique consequence of guilt is compliance at the cost of personal well-being (Izard, 1991). Compliance at the cost of personal well-being is a form of emotion-focused coping as it involves the avoidance motivation. Individuals with lower EI are more likely to succumb to this motivation. This allows them to focus on things other than the task. The high EI individual refuses to abandon responsibility for personal well-being (Ashkanasy et al. 2005; Zeidner et al., 2006). S/he engages in task-focused coping with an eye towards beneficial outcomes. Task-focused coping is associated with performance increments (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), OCBs and a lowered incidence of WDB. Emotion-focused coping leads to performance decrements (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), WDBs and a lowered incidence of OCBs (see Figure 2.4).

Insert Figure 2.4 about here

Joy

As depicted in Figure 2.5, the experience of joy will in general lead to either task-focused or emotion-focused coping. Past literature has shown support for the positive

association between joy and task-focused coping (e.g., Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Similarly, joy leads to lowered emotion-focused coping (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). This result indicates that joy should lead to beneficial outcomes at all times. However, I suggest that, contrary to commonly held beliefs, joy might not always be beneficial. Rather, the experience of joy and its effects on work behaviors might be contingent on how an employee reasons and manages her/his joy. The choice of coping strategy in response to joy is contingent upon an individual's EI. Low EI individuals are prone to maladaptive coping even with positive life events (Ashkanasy et al., 2004; Zeidner et al., 2006). Higher EI individuals will engage in task-focused coping. Task-focused coping is associated with performance increments (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), OCBs and a lowered incidence of WDB. Emotion-focused coping leads to performance decrements (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), WDBs and a lowered incidence of OCBs.

Insert Figure 2.5 about here

Pride

This emotion is important to organizational studies because of its potential to initiate achievement-related behavior (Weiss et al., 1999). The primary appraisal for pride is perception of a favorable outcome. The secondary appraisal is that credit for the outcome is attributable to the self (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). As depicted in Figure 2.6, pride leads to greater task-focused coping and lesser emotion-focused coping ((Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). However, not everyone handles pride in this manner. Some people

might suffer from extreme self-absorption and narcissism while feeling proud (Ortony et al., 1988). The ability to manage pride is contingent upon EI. High EI individuals manage pride beneficially, thus engaging in greater task-focused coping. Low EI individuals are not adept at channeling the motivational energy of pride into useful outcomes. They engage in greater emotion-focused coping. Task-focused coping is associated with performance increments (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), OCBs and a lowered incidence of WDB. Emotion-focused coping leads to performance decrements (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), WDBs and a lowered incidence of OCBs. All the hypotheses are summarized in Table 2.2.

Insert Table 2.2 and Figure 2.6 about here

Caveats

There are certain caveats to the theoretical development set forth here. First, emotions have always been directly related to behavior (Barclay et al., 2005; Lee & Allen, 2002). In this theoretical treatment, there are no direct effects of emotion on behavior. I posit that emotions lead to coping and that coping leads to behaviors. This position is consistent with Cognitive Appraisal Theory of Lazarus and colleagues (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991; 1999). I expect the effects of emotions to fully pass through coping before they affect behavior. Second, there could be differential effects of underlying EI dimensions (e.g., Jordan et al., 2002). In the interest of simplicity, I do not delve into those differential effects here. This research is positioned

as an initial study of the role of EI. In as much as theory suggests an overarching construct, the first step is to examine the effects of the same. Differential effects of each underlying dimension will be examined from a supplemental analyses perspective.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I first defined and discussed the Cognitive Appraisal Theory. Next, I presented a discussion of controversies surrounding EI research. This is necessary as much skepticism surrounds EI in academic circles (e.g., Becker, 2003; Landy, 2005). Hypothesis development for specific discrete emotions (anger, guilt, joy, and pride) followed. Their implications for coping and the role of EI were addressed. Finally, coping was related to work behaviors. Throughout, I addressed each emotion in an isolated manner, as if each emotion occurs separately. This is only to simplify the presentation of the conceptual treatment of discrete emotions. In reality, several emotions could occur simultaneously. People could experience joy and guilt, joy and sadness, pride and anger and so on. This issue is addressed from a measurement perspective in Chapter 3.

Table 2.1: A Cognitive Appraisal Approach to Emotion*

Emotion	GC	BC	FE	CRT	EFC	TFC
Anger	low	Other	negative	Self demeaning offense	high	low
Guilt	low	self	negative	Failure to live up to personal and/or societal standards	high	low
Joy	high	-	positive	Goal congruence	low	high
Pride	high	self	positive	Self satisfaction	low	high

GC: Goal congruence; BC: blame/credit; FE: Future expectancy; CRT: Core relational theme; EFC: emotion-focused coping; TFC: Task-focused coping.

*Adapted from Lazarus and Folkman (1984) as well as Herrald & Tomaka (2001)

Table 2.2: Summary of Hypotheses

Number	Hypothesis
1.	Anger is positively related to emotion-focused coping.
2.	Anger is negatively related to task-focused coping.
3.	EI moderates the relationship between anger and task-focused coping such that this relationship is positive for higher EI individuals and negative for lower EI individuals.
4.	EI moderates the relationship between anger and emotion-focused coping such that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for lower EI individuals.
5.	Guilt is positively related to emotion-focused coping.
6.	Guilt is negatively related to task-focused coping.
7.	EI moderates the relationship between guilt and task-focused coping such that this relationship is positive for higher EI individuals and negative for lower EI individuals.
8.	EI moderates the relationship between guilt and emotion-focused coping such that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for lower EI individuals.
9.	Joy is negatively related to emotion-focused coping.
10.	Joy is positively related to task-focused coping.
11.	EI moderates the relationship between joy and task-focused coping such that this relationship is positive for higher EI individuals and negative for lower EI individuals.
12.	EI moderates the relationship between joy and emotion-focused coping such that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for lower EI individuals.
13.	Pride is negatively related to emotion-focused coping.
14.	Pride is positively related to task-focused coping.
15.	EI moderates the relationship between pride and task-focused coping such that this relationship is positive for higher EI individuals and negative for lower EI individuals.

16.	EI moderates the relationship between pride and emotion-focused coping such that this relationship is negative for higher EI individuals and positive for lower EI individuals.
17.	EI is positively related to task-focused coping.
18.	EI is negatively related to emotion-focused coping.
19.	Task-focused coping is positively related to task performance.
20.	Emotion-focused coping is negatively related to task performance.
21.	Task-focused coping is positively related to OCBI.
22.	Emotion-focused coping is negatively related to OCBI.
23.	Task-focused coping is positively related to OCBO.
24.	Emotion-focused coping is negatively related to OCBO.
25.	Task-focused coping is negatively related to WDB.
26.	Emotion-focused coping is positively related to WDB.

Figure 2.1: Anger, Guilt, Coping and EI




Figure 2.2: Joy, Pride, Coping and EI






Figure 2.3: The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Anger




TP: Task Performance; OCBI: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards other individuals; OCBO: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards the organization; WDB: Workplace Deviance Behavior

Figure 2.4: The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Guilt




TP: Task Performance; OCBI: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards other individuals; OCBO: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards the organization; WDB: Workplace Deviance Behavior

Figure 2.5: The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Joy



TP: Task Performance; OCBI: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards other individuals; OCBO: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards the organization; WDB: Workplace Deviance Behavior

Figure 2.6: The Appraisal Structure and Consequences of Pride



TP: Task Performance; OCBI: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards other individuals; OCBO: Organizational Citizenship Behaviors directed towards the organization; WDB: Workplace Deviance Behavior

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This chapter offers a discussion of the research methods used to test the hypotheses detailed in the previous chapter. First, a brief discussion of the research setting and design for Study 1 is presented. Data collection procedures and operationalization of study variables is then discussed, followed by the analytical techniques for Study 1. The above is then repeated for Study 2.

The pursuit of causal linkages among study variables is one of the stated goals of this research. In this project, I adopted a two-stage research design in order to ensure some degree of confidence in internal and external validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). I first draw on a laboratory setting. This is necessary for several reasons. First, a laboratory setting better facilitates elicitation of specific emotions (e.g., anger, guilt, joy and pride). One concern with a field setting is that spurious affective constructs could contaminate the experience of target emotions. Employees might also be biased against reporting such intense emotions in organizational settings. Second, temporal precedence of independent variables over dependant variables cannot be fully ascertained in field settings. However, with a laboratory setting, one has more confidence in the causal ordering of study variables as the elicitation of key independent variables drive changes in dependent variables. A third and perhaps most

pertinent reason for a laboratory study is that it offers a high degree of rigor with regard to controlling for plausible alternative causal mechanisms. This is achieved through control discussed in full detail below.

Study 1

The sample for Study 1 is drawn from undergraduate business students at a large Midwestern university. Participation was voluntary and confidentiality of responses was assured. The target sample size for this study was 200. Student samples have been severely criticized, especially when combined with the laboratory setting, for artificiality and lack of generalizability (Gordon, Slade, & Schmitt, 1986; 1987). However, my main concern here is if the causal relationships proposed *can* happen, not if they actually *will* happen in work environments. As such, generalizability to a work setting is not a goal of this lab study. To improve confidence in the external validity of this work, a field study (Study 2) was conducted. With that said, the phenomenon under investigation is psychological in nature and lab studies might be more relevant for examination of such psychological relationships (Greenberg, 1987). The main strength of using such a controlled setting is that causal mechanisms can be better isolated. This is more difficult, if not impossible, in field settings. Thus, from an internal validity perspective, this lab study is essential to ensuring some degree of confidence in the associated causal inferences.

This study was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, students were randomly assigned to dyads. Each dyad consisted of one participant and a confederate. They then worked on a task that required rank ordering items for survival on the moon. Participants were told that this task had correct answers and they would be scored based

upon expert ordering of the same items. Each dyad had the opportunity to win or lose in completing the task. Manipulations designed to elicit anger, guilt, joy and pride were built in. An opportunity to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors directed towards other individuals (OCBI) was presented. Participants also reported on their intended OCBI. The confederate rated each participant on actual observed behaviors. This entire procedure was repeated in the second phase, using different participants, with the only difference being that an opportunity to engage in deviance rather than OCBI was presented. Performance was assessed after the target emotions were elicited via an anagram task that has been reliably used to measure task performance in earlier research (Erez & Isen, 2002). Despite hypotheses, OCBOs were not assessed in Study 1, as they are not relevant to a simulated setting such as this where there is no organization to direct citizenship behaviors toward. All outcomes, including OCBOs, were assessed in Study 2.

Design and Procedure

The emotion-eliciting event in this study was a manipulation of procedural justice perceptions drawn from Weiss et al., (1999). In one condition, the confederate suggested that a friend had already completed the task and shared some of the correct answers (biased procedure in favor of the participant). In another condition, the confederate suggested that s/he overheard the other dyad stating that they had some prior knowledge of the correct answers (procedure biased against the participant). Dyads then completed the tasks and were given feedback about their performance. Outcomes were manipulated as well, creating two possible outcome conditions, a win (positive outcome) or a loss (negative outcome). This task setting created four emotion-eliciting conditions (see

Figure 3.1). The emotions then acted as the independent variables for coping as discussed in later sections. Participants were offered the opportunity to engage in OCBI.

Insert Figure 3.1 about here

In phase one, 100 participants reported to the lab in exchange for extra credit in an undergraduate business course. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four emotion conditions, resulting in 25 participants per condition. Two confederates were scheduled for each session along with two participants per session. Confederates were recruited from differing colleges and majors (except business) at the university. I met with each confederate beforehand and ensured suitability for the role of the confederate. Furthermore, each confederate was given the same emotion condition script to portray and was given approximately 3 sessions to practice and train before the start of the actual sessions. The confederate in each case dressed and acted like an undergraduate. Participants first reported to a laboratory waiting room. Participants had no knowledge that the confederate was working with me. Fifty such sessions were conducted over a four-week period. Each session last approximately 35 – 40 minutes.

After assigning participants to dyads, each dyad was moved to a separate room and was asked to fill out a questionnaire assessing state affect. Then I explained that the first task was designed by NASA to examine the dynamics of team performance. It required each dyad to imagine that they just landed on the moon and that their spaceship had run out of fuel. They were to rank order a list of fifteen items in order of importance for their survival. This task is attached in Appendix 1. The criterion for rank ordering is

perceived usefulness of each item for survival in that scenario. Participants were further instructed that NASA's experts provided the correct ranking. A win or loss would be determined by comparing their rank order to that of the other dyads, with both being compared to the rank order of NASA's experts. They were also told that the winning team would receive a \$20 cash prize from NASA, to make this task more relevant to them. The scheduled time for completion of this task was seven minutes, and I left the room after giving these instructions. During this period, the confederate made comments to begin manipulating procedural fairness. I collected the responses after seven minutes and left the room, purportedly to score the responses. I then returned with the results, and told each dyad that they either won or lost. This completed the intended manipulation of emotions. At this stage, participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire designed to assess emotions generated in response to the fair/unfair procedure and positive/negative outcome. The instructions for this questionnaire asked respondents to indicate how they felt right at that instant.

In one condition (cell 1 in Figure 3.1), participants who were subject to a favorably biased procedure and a positive outcome should have experienced joy because of perceived goal congruence. In the same condition, guilt should have been elicited because the positive outcome violated personal and societal standards of fairness. In another condition (cell 2), participants who were subject to an unfavorably biased procedure and a positive outcome should have experienced both joy, because of goal congruence, and pride, as the positive outcome was attributable to the self. Participants should have attributed credit for the positive outcome to themselves as the positive outcome occurred in spite of an unfavorable procedure; the win was of their own doing

(e.g., Weiss et al., 1999). In the next condition (cell 3), participants who were subject to a favorably biased procedure and a loss should have experienced shame or anger. If one assigned blame for the loss to oneself then shame should have resulted (not of interest), but if one attributed blame to the confederate then anger should have resulted (cf. Lazarus, 1999). In the last condition (cell 4), participants who were subject to an unfavorable procedure and a loss should have experienced anger, as agency for the negative outcome was attributable to the procedure and not to oneself. This procedure has reliably elicited the target emotions in past research (Weiss et al., 1999). It is important to recognize that this procedure was only used to elicit variance in emotions. The actual triggering event that elicited each emotion was not important. As such, whether or not specific emotions were elicited in a pattern consistent with the manipulations was irrelevant because the emotions themselves served as the independent variables.

After completion of the emotion questionnaire, participants were asked to individually work on an anagram task for ten minutes. This anagram task has been reliably used in past laboratory studies as a valid measure of performance on a mentally challenging task for undergraduate students (Erez & Isen, 2002). This test used 10 anagrams that were to be solved in ten minutes. The test has right and wrong answers. After task completion, they were asked to complete the coping questionnaire. After completion, I faked malfunction of the laptop computer that was in the room that was purportedly to be used for an online survey. I commented that I needed to get it up and running to complete the session. As I left the room to call for help, the confederate in each dyad suggested to the participant that they could help repair the computer as s/he

has expertise in the area, but the confederate stated that s/he would need help from the participant to do so. Five minutes were allowed to pass to enable enactment of such helping behaviors. At this stage, I returned to the room, and administered the OCBI questionnaire. Each participant reported on intended OCBI while the confederate rated him or her on actual helping behaviors. Participants were then debriefed and given an information sheet with a website address, user id and password to complete the MSCEIT. The Wunderlic (GMA measure detailed below) data was collected as a part of class time. The measure of GMA was necessary to help support incremental validity of the MSCEIT over a measure of general intelligence.

In phase 2, another 100 participants reported to the laboratory. The entire design and procedure described above for phase one was repeated in phase two except that the end focus was on the opportunity to engage in deviant behavior. In the second phase, after completion of emotion and coping questionnaires, I left the room appearing upset that the laptop computer had failed. At this stage, the confederate suggested that they steal the \$20 cash prizes that were mistakenly left in the room. Five minutes were allowed to pass to enable enactment of such deviant behaviors. After this period, I returned and administered the intended WDB questionnaire. Participants reported on her/his intended deviance while the confederate rated them on observed deviance. Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their participation. The MSCEIT and a questionnaire designed to assess general mental ability (GMA) were administered as a part of class time. Note that it is essential to have two phases of data collection in order to isolate the sources of variance of each outcome behavior, OCBI and WDB. Moreover, the opportunity to engage in two extreme forms of behaviors (OCBI and WDB) presented

within the same experimental setting spaced just a few minutes apart might not have been very credible nor taken seriously enough by participants. For example, it might have seemed dubious for a confederate to suggest they help the experimenter first and then five minutes later suggest some form of deviance.

In this design, capturing data from more than one source (e.g., self and peer reports) and at different points in time served to minimize common method variance. For example, each participant reported emotions, coping and intended OCBI and WDB. The confederate assessed observed OCBI and WDB. The MSCEIT and GMA measure were administered at different points than the emotion, coping and intended behaviors questionnaire.

Measures

All measures used in this study are well validated in past research. Each of these is addressed in turn. Appendix 2 includes a list of all scales used in Study 1 and Study 2 in their original form. Appendix 3 includes the surveys used in Study 1, while Appendix 4 includes the surveys used in Study 2.

Emotion

A questionnaire developed by Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson and O'Connor (1987) and later modified by Weiss et al., (1999) was used in this study to assess discrete emotions. The original questionnaire has 213 emotion words grouped under each discrete emotion category. Following Weiss et al., (1999), the emotion questionnaire used here was a shortened version of the original Shaver et al., (1987) measure. This measure included 86 emotion words that included the four target emotions (anger = nine items; guilt = four items; joy = thirteen items; pride = three items) and other emotions.

The instructions for each emotion word read, “Please indicate how you feel right now”. The response format used a seven-point Likert scale (one = “not at all” to seven = “very much”). In addition to the four target emotions of interest to this study, several other basic emotions such as fear, love, disgust and embarrassment were also included. Such a scheme reduces the demand bias for the target emotions. Psychometric evidence for this measure appears in the Shaver et al., (1987) study and the reliabilities from Study 1 are presented in the next chapter. The surveys used in the lab study are included in Appendix 3.

Coping

The origin of coping measures traces back to the work of Lazarus and colleagues (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; 1985). Their measure, known as the Ways of Coping questionnaire, has been widely used and examined in the stress literature. This measure has been severely criticized for psychometric problems. First, it does not display a factor structure consistent with its theoretical foundations (Carver et al., 1989). Specifically, several studies reported that more than two factors emerged, even though theoretically it is meant to assess two forms of coping, task and emotion (e.g., Aldwin, Folkman, Schaefer, Coyne, & Lazarus, 1980; Aldwin & Revenson, 1987; Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Scheier, Weintraub, & Carver, 1986). Second, the Ways of Coping questionnaire lacks face validity with regard to certain items (Carver et al., 1989). The third and perhaps most fundamental problem with this measure is that it was developed empirically rather than theoretically. Items believed to represent any form of coping were randomly selected and subjected to factor analysis. The results of factor analysis revealed certain dimensions that are not strongly theoretically linked (Carver et al., 1989). These authors

also noted that the same problems apply to other popular measures of coping (e.g., Billings & Moos, 1981; 1984; Stone & Neale, 1984).

In response to these issues plaguing the operationalization of coping, Carver and colleagues (1989) developed a theoretically based measure of coping, known as the COPE inventory. The COPE inventory has demonstrated reliability with Cronbach's alpha for each component underlying task-focused and emotion-focused coping exceeding .7. The factor structure that emerged from exploratory factor analysis was consistent with theoretical predictions, though no confirmatory factor analytic results were reported. However, Carver et al., (1989) indicated that the COPE inventory demonstrated convergent validity by way of theoretically expected associations with measures assessing similar constructs. For example, components of task-focused coping (active coping and planning) were positively correlated with trait optimism and hardiness and negatively associated with trait anxiety and type A personality (correlations in the | .25 - .30 | range) (Carver et al., 1989). Similarly, components of emotion-focused coping (mental, behavioral, alcohol and drug disengagement) were positively associated with trait anxiety and negatively associated with trait optimism and hardiness (correlations were in the | .25- .35 | range) (Carver et al., 1989). They further reported that the results of exploratory factor analysis supported the distinctness of the COPE inventory from these personality constructs, as expected (cf. Carver et al., 1989). Other studies have reported both a factor structure consistent with its theoretical predictions and acceptable reliabilities (Cronbach's alpha values exceeding .8) (cf. Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Penley, Tomaka, Goldsmith, Herrald & Palacios-Esquivel, 1997).

The instruction for this inventory asked respondents to think about which of the following strategies they most used in dealing with a specific event (i.e., the anagram task that followed emotion elicitation). Respondents rated their coping strategy on a four-point scale (one = “I did not do this at all” to four = “I did this a lot”). It included five components under task-focused coping: active coping, planning, suppression of competing activities, restraint coping and positive reinterpretation. Emotion-focused coping included five components: denial, behavioral disengagement, mental disengagement, alcohol and drug disengagement and venting emotions. In addition, the COPE inventory assesses the following dimensions that do not load on either task or emotion-focused coping: seeking social support for instrumental reasons, seeking social support for emotional reasons, acceptance and turning to religion. These four dimensions are not of interest in this study.

Theoretically, some of the focal dimensions should be modestly correlated while others should not be correlated (Carver et al., 1989). For example, the polar opposite dimensions of acceptance and denial were weakly correlated. Carver et al., (1989) contend that this pattern lends credence to Cognitive Appraisal Theory’s position that people engage in a wide range of coping responses. I also note that the COPE inventory assesses a wider range of coping responses than are theoretically of concern to the current study. This feature is especially attractive as it casts a wider net to capture coping responses that might go unassessed by other measures discussed earlier. A copy of the original COPE inventory is attached in Appendix 2.

Task Performance

Task performance was assessed via the anagram-solving task used in Erez and Isen (2002). The task includes ten anagrams to be solved in ten minutes. Every anagram on the test has only one correct answer. Performance is computed as the number of correct answers on the test with a minimum of zero and a maximum possible score of ten. This test appears in its entirety in Appendix 2.

Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (OCB)

OCBs were assessed using fifteen items (eight for OCBI and seven for OCBO) taken from previous OCB scales. Past research that has examined the effects of discrete emotions on OCBs has used this measure and has found it to demonstrate acceptable reliability (Lee & Allen, 2002). Sample items include “show genuine concern and interest toward other participants/coworkers” and “willingly gives her/his time to help other participants/coworkers”. Confirmatory factor analysis of these fifteen items indicated loadings as hypothesized across two factors, OCBI and OCBO (Lee & Allen, 2002). The wording of these items were changed to reflect intended OCBI reported by each participant (one = “very slightly or not at all” to five = “definitely”). The confederate rated the participant’s helping behaviors towards the confederate on a dichotomous scale (one = “did help” and zero = “did not help”). The OCBO items are not relevant to this lab study and so were not assessed. Items appear in Appendix 2.

Workplace Deviance Behavior (WDB)

WDB was measured using a 28-item scale developed by Bennett & Robinson (2000). This scale was psychometrically tested and used in Lee and Allen (2002). Sample items include “cursed at someone at work”, and “told someone about the lousy

place where you work”. This measure included a five- point response format (one = “very slightly or not at all” to seven = “definitely did this”). The reliability of this measure was .84 in the Lee and Allen (2002) study. The target participant reported on intended deviance on items that are relevant to this simulated setting (20 of the possible 28 items were used). The confederate rated each participant’s deviance on a dichotomous scale (one = “engaged in this behavior” and zero = “did not engage in this behavior”). This scale was used in its entirety in the field study (Study 2). This measure appears in Appendix 2.

Emotional Intelligence

The MSCEIT v.2.0 represents the latest operationalization of EI. It succeeds the MSCEIT research version 1.1 and the MEIS. The following description of the content in the MSCEIT is drawn from Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2004). The MSCEIT is a 141-item mental ability test with eight different sets of tasks. Two sets of tasks are used to measure each of the four branches of EI. Branch 1, perception, is measured through a faces task, in which participants are asked to identify emotions in faces, and pictures, in which participants are asked to identify emotions conveyed by landscapes and designs. The second branch, using emotion to facilitate thought, is measured through two subsets of tasks. The first is sensations in which participants are asked to compare emotions to other tactile and sensory stimuli. The second set of tasks is known as facilitation, in which participants identify specific emotions that might best facilitate a certain type of thinking. Changes and blends measure the third branch, understanding emotions. Changes test a participant’s ability to understand under what circumstance emotion intensity increases or decreases and how one emotion changes into another. Blends

assess the ability to identify complex emotion blends. The fourth branch, managing emotion, includes emotion management and emotion relationships. Emotion management presents participants with hypothetical scenarios and asks how they might maintain or change their emotions. Emotion relationships assess the ability to manage self and other's emotions so that a desired outcome is achieved (Mayer et al., 2004).

One issue that deserves mention is the scoring method of the MSCEIT. The scoring methods employed in the MSCEIT are expert and consensus based. Hitherto, controversy about these forms of scoring was rampant, as the two forms of scoring did not correlate. This inconsistency between consensus and expert scores was partly due to the use of just two experts in the earlier versions of the MSCEIT (cf. Mayer et al., 2001). However, recently, Mayer and colleagues have switched to the use of twenty-one well-known emotion experts (Mayer et al., 2003). The correspondence between expert and consensus scoring ranges from a low of .94 to a high of .99 for each of the eight tasks described earlier (Mayer et al., 2005). Thus, the controversy surrounding the scoring method seems to be resolved, at least for now.

Preliminary evidence from a number of studies (e.g., Giganac, 2005; Mayer, et al., 2003) indicates that the MSCEIT demonstrates acceptable reliabilities at the individual factor and overall scale level (Cronbach's alpha values at specific dimension and overall scale levels have exceeded .8). Two week test-retest reliabilities were relatively high ($r = .86$; Brackett & Mayer, 2003), indicating support for the stability of the MSCEIT. The underlying four factors detailed earlier are reasonably intercorrelated and yet distinct from each other ($r = .17 - .59$). Confirmatory factor analyses indicated better fit for an a priori four-factor structure as compared to two-factor and three-factor

solutions (Mayer et al., 2005; Brackett & Mayer, 2003). The MSCEIT correlates with general cognitive intelligence ($r = .30$). It has shown discriminant validity beyond general intelligence and the big five personality dimensions (Mayer et al., 2001; Mayer et al., 2003). In keeping with prior research, a total (composite) EI score as well as underlying dimensions are examined in all analyses (e.g., Mayer et al., 2003).

Control variables

In this section, I will briefly describe the operationalization of study controls. The first of these are state positive and negative affect. This measure of baseline mood is required to facilitate statistical control of pre experimental levels of mood. State PA and NA were assessed using the profile of Positive and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). Such state affect measurement is necessary to improve confidence that mood effects do not contaminate emotion reports and is in keeping with the precedent set in past emotion research (cf. Brown et al., 2005; Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Weiss et al., 1999).

As with any new and developing research domain, the discriminant and incremental validity of EI over existing measures of intelligence needs be supported, specifically so with this set of work outcomes. Several studies have now reported that the MSCEIT is distinct from general mental ability and verbal intelligence. Correlations between the MSCEIT and GMA typically are in the .3-.4 range (cf. Brackett & Mayer, 2003). However, the test authors recommend partialling out the variance of GMA before making predictive validity inferences regarding the MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2005). In keeping with these recommendations, general mental ability is used as a statistical control in this study.

General mental ability was assessed using the well-validated Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT). It consists of fifty questions designed to assess one's general reasoning and problem solving skills. The duration of the test is 12 minutes. Correlations between this short measure of general mental ability and much longer measures such as the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale have exceeded .7 to .8 (Table 15, WPT Users' manual). As such, the WPT is believed to measure general intelligence accurately. Furthermore, the WPT has demonstrated acceptable reliabilities and predictive validity for important work and life outcomes (see WPT users' manual). For example, a comprehensive meta analysis of accumulated research on the WPT indicates that validity coefficients with college grades, biodata, education and interview outcomes range from a low of .11 to a high of .33 (cf. Hunter & Hunter, 1984).

Analytical Techniques

First, descriptive statistics for all study variables and their reliabilities were computed. Simple bivariate correlations were computed to ensure that all study relationships are in the expected direction. All hypotheses, including the moderating role of EI in the relationship between emotion and coping, were analyzed through moderated multiple regression (MMR). Two MMR models, one with each form of coping (task and emotion) as dependent variables, were run with all four emotions and EI as simultaneous predictors. In the first step, state affect and GMA (control variables), all four emotions and EI were entered. In the second step, the four interaction terms (emotion * EI) were entered. In the absence of interactions, main effects were examined. The models for these regression runs were as follows:

$$\text{TFC} = b_0 + b_1 (\text{anger}) + b_2 (\text{guilt}) + b_3 (\text{joy}) + b_4 (\text{pride}) + b_5 (\text{EI}) + \text{error} \quad (3.1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{TFC} = & b_0 + b_1 (\text{anger}) + b_2 (\text{guilt}) + b_3 (\text{joy}) + b_4 (\text{pride}) + b_5 (\text{EI}) + b_6 (\text{anger} * \text{EI}) + b_7 (\text{guilt} * \text{EI}) \\ & + b_8 (\text{joy} * \text{EI}) + b_9 (\text{pride} * \text{EI}) + \text{error} \end{aligned} \quad (3.2)$$

Note that the sample size for these regression runs was 200. In the preceding discussion of analytical strategies, control variables were not included in equations 3.1 and 3.2 for the sake of clarity and simplicity. State affect and GMA were included in equations 3.1 and 3.2 in the actual analyses. In equation 3.1, coefficients $b_1 - b_4$ capture the main effects of each emotion (anger, guilt, joy and pride) on TFC (Hypotheses 2, 6, 10, 14 respectively), while b_5 in equation 3.1 captures the main effect of EI on TFC (Hypothesis 17). In equation 3.2, coefficients $b_6 - b_9$ represent the interaction effect of each emotion (anger, guilt, joy and pride), respectively with EI. If any of these coefficients are significant and there is a significant improvement in R^2 from equation 3.1 to 3.2, then there is support for the moderation of EI on the relationship between emotion and TFC (Hypotheses 3, 7, 11 and 15, respectively). If the interactions are not significant, main effects of each emotion (coefficients b_1 through b_4 in equation 1) and EI (b_5 from equation 1) were interpreted. Similar models were run to test the hypotheses related to emotion-focused coping (EFC) as an outcome.

Next, two more OLS regression models were estimated. The first model included task and emotion-focused coping as predictors of actual OCBI, while the second model used intended OCBI as the outcome. Note that the sample size for each of these regression runs was 100. In the first instance, the dependent variable, actual OCBI, was dichotomous. Hence, logistic regression was used to estimate this model. Intended OCBI was modeled using OLS regression. The regression models are as follows:

$$\text{OCBI (actual)} = b_0 + b_1 (\text{TFC}) + b_2 (\text{EFC}) + \text{error} \quad (3.3)$$

$$\text{OCBI (intended)} = b_0 + b_1 (\text{TFC}) + b_2 (\text{EFC}) + \text{error} \quad (3.4)$$

OCBI indicates organizational citizenship behaviors directed towards individuals (the confederate in this case). In equations 3.3 and 3.4, coefficients b_1 and b_2 capture the effect of each form of coping on OCBI (Hypotheses 21 and 22, respectively). Similar models were run for actual and intended WDB.

Study 2

The setting for the field study was a municipal police department (site 1) and a college campus police department (site 2). At the time of the study, site 1 had 110 active employees: 71 sworn police officers and 36 civilians with a paramilitary-based command structure including a Chief of Police, Major, Captains, Lieutenants, and various administrative supervisors. Site 1 included two overarching functional classifications, operations and services. The operations division included subunits such as criminal investigations and detection unit, special projects investigations team (SPIT), special operations team (SOT), drug abuse resistance program (DARE), patrol, animal control and jail supervision. The services division included thirty-one civilians who perform a variety of functions such as dispatch, record maintenance, information specialization, training and firearms specialization. Demographic characteristics of the overall sample are as follows: 102 White, 3 African American, 1 Asian-Pacific Islander and 4 American Indian. The average age was 39.01 years with 83 men and 27 women. The average tenure with the site 1 is 11.45 years.

Site 2 had 42 full time employees at the time of the study with four employees deployed in conflict and/or on medical leave. Demographic data for this site were not available. Overall, the total possible sample size for the field portion was approximately 148. I conducted a number of informal interviews with study participants, including the

deputy chief of police at site 1 and chief of police at site 2, to understand the nature of the setting and determine qualitative answers to certain questions about the sample. These observations regarding the nature of the sample are summarized briefly and tie into the design proposed next.

Do intense emotions such as anger, guilt, joy and pride occur in such a setting?

I observed an officer for an entire day (10 a.m. to 8 p.m.). Several incidents occurred throughout the course of this observation. In one such incident, a victim of a traffic accident complained that the officer had misrepresented the events of the accident in writing a report of the same the previous day. The officer admitted to a mistake and assured the victim that the report was now corrected. In spite of this assurance, the victim accused the officer of being careless and threatened to complain to his chief. The officer calmly apologized for the inconvenience and reassured the victim. After the phone call ended, he was visibly angry as he claimed the victim had insulted him in spite of his best efforts to ameliorate the situation. This anger was expressed through verbal and physical channels. In another instance, the officer was able to resolve a domestic dispute satisfactorily and this led to admitted joy expressed through light-heartedness and renewed vigor in responding to a partner's request for help. In one last instance, this officer prevented an older woman's home from being burglarized. Interestingly, he first expressed guilt that the woman's personal space was violated. He claimed that law enforcement had failed in its duties as a law-abiding civilian's property was threatened in broad daylight. At the end of the episode, which lasted approximately five hours, the officer said he was proud of his investigative skills, as the woman was safe. These instances point to the possibility of intense emotion occurring regularly in this setting.

Range restriction and non-response bias

The other issue concerns the cynical nature of a vast majority of this sample. Interviews with the Deputy Chief and individual officers pointed at the intensely suspicious psyche of police officers. This suspicious nature could potentially translate into range restriction on reporting of their partner's behaviors (e.g., task performance, OCBs, WDBs). This is because of loyalty to their partners, fear of management accessing this information, and cynicism associated with giving such information to an outside investigator. Furthermore, participants might not respond to the survey items, as they are intensely protective of their own and each other's well-being. While this issue is by no means novel to this study, as it faces nearly every field researcher (cf. Roth, Iddekinge, Huffcutt, Eidson & Bobko, 2002; Sackett & Yang, 2000; Borman, 1991), it seems particularly threatening in this sample. Several steps were taken to minimize this type of range restriction and non-response to the extent possible.

Towards this end, I engaged in a series of credibility building exercises with the police officers without disclosing the intent of the study. For example, during a ten-hour "ride along", I was able to dispel one officer's suspicions regarding my intent in observing him. After a frank discussion in which I assured him that I was not a management plant, this officer's attitude changed dramatically. This attitude change was marked by a more open discussion of police duties and frustrations, culminating in this officer convincing a few of his fellow officers that I was trustworthy. Similar exercises with a number of key informal group leaders were attempted to gain their confidence and convince them that the study was completely confidential. I acknowledge that this might not have completely dispelled their suspicions, yet might have encouraged their

participation. Moreover, such issues are characteristic of most field research and it is the responsibility of the researcher to anticipate and ameliorate them to the greatest extent possible. The final step in ensuring accuracy in reporting will concern the design of anchors for each measure, and these are described in detail below.

Research Design

This study was a longitudinal field study with repeated measures taken on each participant for five consecutive days. The definition of emotion as a dynamic construct necessitates two aspects in its measurement. First, the measure of emotion should be as close to its actual occurrence as possible to minimize retrospective bias. Second, it is a reaction to a particular event or entity. To accommodate these two aspects, participants reported on the most critical work event at the end of the same day. This ensured that the emotion measure is based on an event and captured very close to its actual occurrence. Research support exists for the position that participants can accurately recall their specific emotions for the same day but not for the past week, month and so on (Amabile, Barsade, Mueller & Staw, 2005).

One alternative for such episodic measurement relies on the Experience Sampling Method (ESM). The ESM technique involves the sampling of emotion experiences several times a day at either predetermined, equally spaced or random intervals. This type of emotion measurement is not suitable to the current research goals for several reasons. First, emotions such as anger, guilt, joy and pride are intense and occur at unpredictable times in the natural environment. Random sampling ensures the accuracy of capturing low intensity affective states, yet might ignore the most emotionally demanding events of the day. Second, the ESM technique is prohibitively expensive as it

typically involves the use of hand held PDAs. Moreover, recently Green, Rafaeli, Shrout, Bolger and Reis (2006) have shown the equivalence of data obtained from ESM and paper and pencil Daily Reconstruction Methods (to be described later). The third concern with ESM is that it might hinder the responsibilities of this study's participants. For example, a police officer that is in active pursuit of a suspect might not be able to respond to survey questions when the ESM prompts her/him to do so. In fact, the only time when they might be able to respond to ESM prompts is if they were on patrol. My experience with their job structure suggests that this is a rather rare occurrence for most officers. Generally, they are in active pursuit of suspects based on a tip from dispatch.

An alternative technique is episodic measurement, which requires structuring the participants' days around specific work episodes. Beal et al., (2005), the original proponents of this approach in the management literature, suggested that episodes could be structured around goals to be achieved in each work episode. This technique is not feasible either, as structured episodes that could be predetermined are not plausible for this sample. For example, a university professor's job could be split into episodes as follows: teach class from eight-ten, office hours from ten-twelve, lunch from noon-one, research activity from one-three, faculty meeting from three-five, and so on. However, police officers typically respond to events as they happen and each episode has no clear beginning and ending point. In most instances, the beginning and ending point of their workdays cannot be predetermined either. While each shift is meant to last for ten hours, very rarely do shifts end in such an organized fashion. In one instance, a police officer that reported to a shift at 7 a.m. was meant to get off at 5 p.m. However, this officer was able to sign off only at 10 p.m., as they were in the middle of an incident that started

around 4 p.m. and ended at 8 p.m. After the incident, he returned to the office to complete all paperwork, which took another couple of hours. In light of these contextual considerations, the best-suited approach to this sample is the critical work event (incident) technique. The procedure for data collection using this technique is detailed below.

Data Collection Procedures

The Daily Reconstruction Method (DRM) requires respondents to reconstruct their day as a series of episodes, and it has been shown to be a valid means for accessing affective processes (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004). This technique has been used to study affective processes in the management literature with slight modifications (Amabile et al., 2005). In the current study, respondents were asked to reconstruct the most critical work event for that day in as much detail as possible. They then reported their emotions and coping mechanisms in response to that event. This procedure is detailed below.

The chiefs of site 1 and site 2 sent out a memo supporting the study and requesting that all employees consider participating in this survey. They further clarified that this study was being conducted for academic purposes and only I would have access to data (i.e., confidentiality was assured). Next, each sergeant or supervisor similarly requested employees to participate as well. Small gifts were given to each participant after questionnaire completion for the 5 days. Prior research suggests that small incentives for each participant elicit better response rates than a raffle or drawing with prizes (e.g., Porter & Whitcomb, 2003). I was present on site each day for five days at each shift change to administer and retrieve the completed questionnaires. While

administering the questionnaire, I met with each employee, explained the overall purpose of the study (e.g., stress research in law enforcement settings), and solicited their participation. They were further instructed to drop off their completed surveys in a locked drop box centrally located in the PDs and to which only I had access. The employee's name and badge number were used for purposes of identification and matching of surveys. All participation was voluntary and completely confidential. At the end of their shift each day, respondents were asked to fill out the above-mentioned questionnaires. In this questionnaire, participants were instructed to think about the most critical work event for that day. The instructions for this part, used in past research (Amabile et al., 2005; Kahneman et al., 2004), read as follows:

“Please choose one event from today in which you worked with another officer and that stands out in your mind as particularly demanding or important. Think of this event as a continuous series of scenes like in a film. Give each scene a brief name to help you remember it (e.g., interrogated suspect, searched suspect, background check on suspect). Try to remember as much detail as possible about each scene. Describe this event in detail, kind of like writing in your diary. Now, describe your feelings about the event, your work on the event and your fellow officer's feelings about the event. Add anything else you would like to report about this event.”

Note that this portion (known as the free response section) did not ask participants to think about the target emotions of this study at all. They were specifically asked to focus on that day's event rather than provide retrospective reports. Thus, this type of reporting called for specific events close in time to when they happened, with no prompting, and since confidentiality of participation was assured, these reports could be

thought of as largely accurate descriptions of events, thoughts and emotions that participants could have experienced (Amabile et al., 2005). This portion of the questionnaire was qualitative only and not used for any statistical analysis. This type of data collection combines the critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954) and DRM (Kahneman et al., 2004). This method is routinely used in psychology research on affective processes (e.g., Flanagan, 1954) and, more recently, in management literature on affective processes and their effects on creativity (Amabile et al., 2005).

Next, participants were asked to think about how they felt about that critical work event. A list of emotion words as described in Study 1 was presented. The response format used a five-point Likert scale (one = “very slightly or not at all” to five = “very much”). In addition to the four target emotions of interest to this study, several other basic emotions such as fear, love, disgust and embarrassment were also included. Such a scheme reduces the demand bias for the target emotions. Participants then filled out the COPE inventory as discussed in Study 1.

Each participant was then instructed to think about the fellow employee that s/he most closely worked with during the critical work event. They were instructed to give that employee a packet containing the task performance, OCB and WDB survey. The packet that each employee gave a coworker included a slip on the outside that described the event that the target employee had referred to as the critical event, time and location of the event. This ensured that responses on the event, emotions, coping, and behaviors were matched. On occasions where an employee worked on an event by her/himself then, they were instructed to fill out the behavioral ratings themselves. Approximately 33% of all returned behavioral surveys were self rated, while the remaining 66 % were

other rated. I provide specific details about each behavioral outcome in the next chapter. The MSCEIT was completed online by the employees during a four-week period. All surveys used in Study 2 appear in Appendix 4. Twenty nine usable surveys were returned that could also be matched up with MSCEIT data. Thus the response rate for study 2 was 20%.

Measures

Most measures used in this study were identical to that of Study 1. However, some measures were different to help accommodate the accurate assessment of behaviors in this sample. First, the coping, OCB, WDB and EI assessments were the same as in Study 1. For the emotion measure, the 86-item emotion measure used in Study 1 was cut down to 46 words in this study. The reduction was accomplished through the deletion of non-focal emotion words. The anchors for OCB and WDB scales were changed to encourage enough variance in ratings as participants might be biased towards the more positive anchor in the traditional response format. Additionally, this type of anchoring was designed to minimize non-response and invalid responses to the greatest extent possible. For the WDB scale, the response format employed a five-point scale (one = “very slightly or not at all” to five = “definitely did this”). For the OCB scale, the response format utilized a five-point scale (one = “did not do this at all” to five = “definitely did this a lot”). As noted earlier, this change in anchoring was meant to encourage respondents to report on their partner’s behaviors.

Task performance

Patrol performance on the focal task was observed by the partner and was reported by the partner. The measure that was used was developed from a standard

measure currently in use at this organization. This measure meets the industry standards for performance appraisals in law enforcement. This measure was slightly modified and shortened to make it more suitable to the current study's requirement of performance appraisal for a single event. The instructions for this scale asked respondents to indicate, on a seven-point scale (one = "acceptable" to seven = "exceptional"), the observed behavior for the target officer for that particular event. An additional anchor on the seven-point scale was NO, which stands for "not observed". This would be an appropriate response when a particular behavior is not relevant to a given situation. For example, a traffic related incident might not elicit any behavior relating to criminal procedures, thereby eliciting a NO rating. This measure consisted of three components, specifically, knowledge, performance and relationships. The knowledge dimension includes the following five items: departmental policies/procedures, criminal statutes, city ordinances, traffic codes, and code of criminal procedure. The performance dimension includes the following twelve items: driving skill, orientation and response time to calls, field performance, investigative skills, interview/ interrogation skills, officer safety, control of conflict, problem solving, decision making, radio usage: listening and comprehension, radio usage: appropriate use of codes/procedures, and radio usage: articulations of transmissions. The relationships dimension includes the following three items: with citizens in general, with ethnic groups other than one's own, and with other department members. This patrol performance measure was only used with site 1. Task performance for all civilian employees and all employees of site 2 was measured using a seven-item measure developed by Williams and Andersen (1991). The instructions for all behavioral outcomes asked that the target person be rated on the behaviors described

in the timeframe during the incident or immediately thereafter. Sample items included “adequately completed assigned duties” and “performed tasks that are expected of her/him”. These measures appear in Appendix 2.

Analytical Techniques

Preliminary investigations of the data included computation of descriptive statistics, simple bivariate correlations and reliabilities for scales. The analysis of longitudinal data presents significant challenges compared to analyses of cross sectional data. Bliese and Ployhart (2002) note that such complexity is both conceptual and methodological in nature. Conceptually, one needs to determine the specific goals of analyzing data from a particular methodological perspective. The goal is to uncover patterns of covariation as detailed in hypotheses 1-26 (e.g., covariation between each emotion and coping on the one hand, and covariation between coping and behaviors on the other). Such within person variability represents level one of the analyses described below. The next conceptual goal is to examine if the emotion-coping patterns are contingent upon an individual’s level of EI. This represents level two of the analyses because EI is an inter individual difference that is hypothesized to moderate the intra individual relationship between emotions and coping. EI is also expected to affect coping directly.

The analytical technique for this study was a repeated measures analysis using the Random Coefficient Modeling (RCM) framework (e.g., Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). RCM is superior to basic regression for two important conceptual reasons. First, data using repeated measures captures intraindividual variability over time, and the observations at

each period (e.g., time t_1) are not independent of observations at another time point (e.g., time t_4). Multiple responses from an individual will tend to be correlated. As such, the assumption of independence of observations that underlies most statistical techniques is violated. Failing to account for this violation can result in biased significance testing. RCM can account for this non-independence. Second, repeated measures with non-independence can often yield complex error structures that, if not accounted for, can bias significance testing. RCM allows for such complex error structures. Regression cannot accommodate these methodological factors of non-independence of study observations and complex error structures. RCM allows level one coefficients to randomly vary across individuals. These estimates are based on pooled estimates of all observations on that individual for all the periods under consideration and an estimate based on data from all other individuals.

Level 1

With regard to terminology, I reserve the use of RCM in referring to the class of models used for simultaneously modeling intraindividual relationships with interindividual predictors (cf. Ployhart, Holtz & Bliese, 2002). Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Bryk, Raudenbush & Congdon, 1994) is used to refer to one of the software programs adopted to run these RCM models (Ployhart et al., 2002). The following section presents models at level 1 and level 2 in RCM using HLM terminology (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Bryk et al., 1994).

First, I estimated the basic null model in which task-focused coping is only modeled as a function of the individual. This partitions variance in the outcome into within and between person components. From the null model, if the ICC (between

person variance/total variance) values exceeded .10 for the focal outcome, examination of the RCM model is justified as the between individual variance is substantial enough to justify repeated measures analyses (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). The model for level one relationships between task-focused coping and each of the four emotions takes the following form:

Level 1

$$(TFC)_{ij} = \pi_{0j} + \pi_{1j}(\text{anger}) + \pi_{2j}(\text{guilt}) + \pi_{3j}(\text{joy}) + \pi_{4j}(\text{pride}) + r_{ij} \quad (3.5)$$

In this equation, *i* is used to denote time (e.g., 0-4), *j* denotes respondent, π_{0j} represents the intercept, π_{1j} - π_{4j} the slopes relating emotion to TFC, and r_{ij} is the within person residual error. However, the most important step is to uncover inter individual differences in coping in response to emotion. Such differences are modeled by EI in my model, and this represents level two of this analyses as EI is a between person difference that could potentially affect the nature of emotion-coping relationships at the within person level.

Level 2

$$\pi_{0j} = \beta_{00} + \beta_{01j}(\text{EI}) + u_{0j} \quad (3.6)$$

The β_{01j} coefficient in equation 3.6 captures the main effect of EI on TFC with TFC pooled across all five times. As such, this coefficient provides a test of Hypothesis 17. Now, introducing EI as a predictor of slope variability captures the moderating effect of EI as follows:

$$\pi_{1j} = \beta_{10j} + \beta_{11j}(\text{EI}) + u_{1j} \quad (3.7)$$

$$\pi_{2j} = \beta_{20j} + \beta_{21j}(\text{EI}) + u_{2j} \quad (3.8)$$

$$\pi_{3j} = \beta_{30j} + \beta_{31j}(\text{EI}) + u_{3j} \quad (3.9)$$

$$\pi_{4j} = \beta_{40j} + \beta_{41j}(\text{EI}) + u_{4j} \quad (3.10)$$

From equation 3.7, β_{21j} indicates the moderating effect of EI on the relationship between anger and TFC, thereby providing a test of Hypothesis 3. Similarly, in equations 3.8 -3.10, β_{21j} , β_{31j} and β_{41j} capture the interaction effects of each of the other emotions (guilt, joy and pride, respectively) with EI. These coefficients offer a test of Hypotheses 7, 11 and 15, respectively. This completes the analyses of the effects of emotions on task-focused coping, and the main and moderating effect of EI on the relationship between emotion and task-focused coping. This entire series of analyses was repeated using emotion-focused coping as the outcome to test the hypotheses concerning the effects of emotions on emotion-focused coping, and the main and moderating effect of EI.

Finally, the relationship between each form of coping and behavior needed to be modeled. The first step was to run a null model. An appreciable ICC value will justify further RCM analyses. Task performance is modeled as follows:

$$(\text{Task performance})_{ij} = \pi_{0j} + \pi_{1j}(\text{TFC}) + \pi_{2j}(\text{EFC}) + r_{ij} \quad (3.11)$$

$$\pi_{0j} = \beta_{00} + u_{0j} \quad (3.12)$$

$$\pi_{1j} = \beta_{10} + u_{1j} \quad (3.13)$$

$$\pi_{2j} = \beta_{20} + u_{2j} \quad (3.14)$$

β_{10} from equation 3.13 and β_{20} from equation 3.14 capture the effects of TFC and EFC on task performance, respectively, thereby providing a test of hypotheses 19 and 20. Similar equations were estimated for OCBI, OCBO and WDB. With these set of equations, we have now modeled intra individual change in coping as a function of emotion and intraindividual change in behaviors as a function of coping mechanisms.

**Figure 3.1: Prediction of Discrete Emotions from Manipulation of Procedural
Fairness***

	Favorably biased	Unfavorably biased
Outcome	(Cell 1) joy guilt	(Cell 2) joy pride
	(Cell 3) anger shame	(Cell 4) anger
	Procedure	

* Adapted from Weiss, Suckow & Cropanzano, 1999.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

In this chapter, I first present results from Study 1 and then results from Study 2.

Study 1

Study one consisted of two phases of data collection. Phase one included WDB as an outcome while phase two included OCBI as an outcome, with each phase using different subjects. First, descriptive statistics for all study variables and their reliabilities were computed. Simple bivariate correlations were computed to ensure that all study relationships were in the expected direction. These results are presented in Table 4.1 on the main diagonal. All Chronbach's alphas were over 0.70 and most were over .80. All bivariate correlations were in the expected direction. I only discuss the most important correlations here in the interest of conciseness, but Table 4.1 presents all correlations for variables included in this study.

Insert Table 4.1 about here

Anger positively correlated with guilt ($r = 0.46$; $p < 0.01$), negatively correlated with joy ($r = -0.30$, $p < 0.01$), positively correlated with EFC ($r = 0.15$, $p < 0.05$) and positively correlated with intended workplace deviance ($r = 0.25$, $p < 0.01$). Similarly,

guilt was negatively correlated with joy ($r = -0.14, p < 0.05$), positively correlated with EFC ($r = 0.25, p < 0.01$) and positively correlated with intended workplace deviance ($r = 0.22, p < 0.01$). Furthermore, a negative correlation was found between EI and guilt ($r = -0.14; p < 0.05$). These preliminary analyses suggest that guilt related to each study variable stronger than did anger.

Joy and pride were also strongly positively correlated ($r = 0.71, p < 0.01$), suggesting that these two discrete emotions co occur quite a bit. Joy ($r = 0.20, p < 0.01$) and pride ($r = 0.26, p < 0.01$) were associated with TFC in the expected directions. Rather surprisingly, EI was not related to either TFC or EFC. However, EI did reveal a negative correlation with intended WDB ($r = -0.29; p < 0.01$) and a positive correlation with task performance ($r = 0.26; p < 0.01$). TFC was positively correlated with EFC ($r = 0.15; p < 0.05$), indicating that TFC and EFC co occur, at least to some degree. This suggests that people could engage in both forms of coping simultaneously. TFC was positively correlated with intended OCBI ($r = 0.30; p < 0.01$), intended WDB ($r = 0.12; p < 0.10$) and task performance ($r = 0.26; p < 0.01$).

EFC was positively correlated with intended WDB ($r = 0.27; p < 0.01$). Interestingly, EFC was negatively correlated with the understanding emotions dimension of EI ($r = -0.15; p < 0.05$). This relationship supports of my original theorizing wherein I had suggested that individuals with higher EI would engage in less EFC. While that relationship did not appear at the overall EI level, it does seem to exist at the underlying dimension level. This also indicates the value of examining underlying EI dimensions in addition to overall global scores.

In terms of outcome behaviors, intended WDB displayed negative correlations with each dimension of EI: perception ($r = -0.20$; $p < 0.01$), using emotion to facilitate thought ($r = -0.24$; $p < 0.01$), understanding emotions ($r = -0.20$; $p < 0.01$) and managing emotions ($r = -0.25$; $p < 0.01$). Task Performance was positively correlated with each dimension of EI: perception ($r = 0.21$; $p < 0.01$), using emotion to facilitate thought ($r = 0.16$; $p < 0.05$), understanding emotions ($r = 0.29$; $p < 0.01$) and managing emotions ($r = 0.14$; $p < 0.05$).

In addition, correlations amongst the dimensions of EI and gender are also reported in Table 4.1 for the sake of completeness.

Analytical Overview

The moderating role of EI in the relationship between discrete emotions and coping was analyzed through ordinary least squares regression. Two hierarchical moderated multiple regression (MMR) models, one with each form of coping (task and emotion) serving as dependent variables, were run with all four emotions and EI as well as their interactions, as simultaneous predictors. For all analyses to follow, in the first step, the control variables (state affect, General Mental Ability (GMA)) and the predictors (all four emotions and EI) were entered. In the second step, the four interaction terms (emotion * EI) were entered. Following Aiken and West (1991), all terms included in creating the interaction term were mean centered prior to creating the interaction terms. With regard to interpretation of the results for each run, a cutoff of $p < 0.05$ is used for significance. However, given the restrictive sample size ($n = 185$ for emotion to coping and intended behaviors; $n = 90$ for actual behaviors) combined with the number of predictors (eleven in model 3 of each MMR run), I also interpreted

marginally significant effects ($p < 0.10$). In all supplemental analyses, the same analytical approach was used.

Significant interactions within each MMR run were interpreted if the following three conditions were met: the term comprising the interaction effect in model 2 of the MMR run was significant or marginally significant (Aiken & West, 1991; Baron & Kenny, 1986; Bedian & Mossholder, 1994). Drawing upon Bedian and Mossholder's (1994) arguments, there are several rationales for interpreting significant interactions in the absence of a significant improvement in the R squared and/or the F statistic. First, this requirement for a significant F statistic is applicable to simultaneous multiple regression and not necessarily MMR. Second, the logic advanced by Bedian and Mossholder (1994) applies to theoretically specified interactions only. The significance of the F statistic ensures alpha level protection for the model, thus ensuring that the results are not an element of chance. However, when one enters main effect terms in model 2 of an MMR, these are entered first to eliminate the shared variance from the interaction term. Alternatively stated, the interaction term is composed of variance unique to the product term with the main effects' variance partialled out. The significance of the interactions is indeed a test of significance of this set in the MMR model. Hence, the improvement in R squared from the previous step might not be significant, yet there still might be meaningful information which would go undetected if one were looking strictly at the overall F statistic and significant improvement in R squared. Moreover, the F statistic in model 2 of such an MMR run provides an omnibus significance test of the overall model (in this case all eleven variables) and would be unnecessarily restrictive. Very simply put, an overall F test in this context tests the fit of

a single regression line to the underlying data. In the case of an interaction, theoretically we are suggesting that not one but two or more lines could fit the underlying data. As such, the notion of a significant F statistic does not make too much conceptual or statistical sense.

Where such significant or marginally significant interactions exist, main effects not included in the interaction are also interpreted from model 2 of the MMR run. In the absence of interactions, main effects are interpreted from model 1 of the MMR run, which omits the interaction terms, when model 1 generates a significant or marginally significant overall F. In summary, I interpreted significant or marginally significant interaction effects even if they were accompanied by a non significant change in R squared and/or F statistic. However, I only interpreted significant or marginally significant main effects (in the absence of significant or marginally significant interactions) in the presence of a significant or marginally significant F statistic.

In testing the coping → behavioral outcomes part of my research model, I applied OLS regression tests only as there are no theoretically specified interactions here. In these hypothesized tests, all variables were simply entered in a simultaneous regression run. Again, the procedure used in interpreting these effects were the same as noted above ($p < 0.10$ is marginally significant, $p < 0.05$ is significant). The significance levels for these interpretations are the same as noted above.

Hypotheses Testing

The model being tested with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent variables was as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
TFC/EFC = & b_0 + b_1 (state\ PA) + b_2 (state\ NA) + b_3 (GMA) + b_4 (anger) + b_5 \\
& (guilt) + b_6 (happiness) + b_7 (pride) + b_8 (EI) + b_9 (anger * EI) + b_{10} (guilt * EI) \\
& + b_{11} (happiness * EI) + b_{12} (pride * EI) + error \qquad \qquad \qquad (equation\ 4.1)
\end{aligned}$$

The results with TFC serving as dependent variable are reported in Table 4.2. It is customary to interpret interaction effects before main effects and, hence, the test of the hypotheses is not in the same order as listed in Chapter Two. Hypotheses 3, 7, 11 and 15 posited a moderating role of EI in the relationship between each discrete emotion (anger, guilt, joy and pride, respectively) and TFC. These analyses revealed no support for these interaction effects. Since the interactions were not significant, main effects of each emotion and EI were interpreted from model 1. Hypotheses 2 and 6 posited negative effects for anger and guilt, respectively, on TFC, while Hypotheses 10, 14 and 17 posited positive effects of joy, pride and EI, respectively, on TFC. Hypotheses 2, 6, 10 and 17 were not supported. Pride had a marginally significant positive effect on TFC ($\beta = 0.17$; $p < 0.10$), indicating some support for Hypothesis 14.

Insert Table 4.2 about here

Similar models were run to test the hypotheses related to EFC as an outcome. Hypotheses 4, 8, 12 and 16 posited a moderating role of EI in the relationship between each discrete emotion (anger, guilt, joy and pride, respectively) and EFC. These results are also reported in Table 4.2 and indicate no support for the interaction of each emotion with EI. Hypotheses 1 and 5 posited positive effects of anger and guilt, respectively, on

EFC, while Hypotheses 9, 13 and 18 posited negative effects of joy, pride and EI, respectively, on EFC. These hypotheses were not supported. Next, three more regression models were estimated as shown equation 4.2

$$\text{Task performance/intended OCBI/intended WDB} = b_0 + b_1 (\text{TFC}) + b_2 (\text{EFC}) + \text{error} \quad (\text{equation 4.2})$$

These results are reported in Table 4.3. Hypotheses 19 and 20 posited that TFC would positively affect task performance and that EFC would negatively affect task performance, respectively. Hypothesis 19 was supported as TFC was positively related to task performance ($\beta = 0.28$; $p < 0.01$). Hypothesis 20 received some support as EFC was marginally and negatively related to task performance ($\beta = -0.13$; $p < 0.10$).

Insert Table 4.3 about here

Hypotheses 21 and 22 posited that TFC would positively affect intended OCBI and that EFC would negatively affect intended OCBI, respectively. Of these, Hypothesis 21 was supported with a positive effect of TFC on intended OCBI ($\beta = 0.30$; $p < 0.01$) while Hypothesis 22 was not. Hypotheses 25 and 26 posited that TFC would negatively affect intended WDB and that EFC would positively affect intended WDB, respectively. Of these, Hypothesis 25 was not supported while Hypothesis 26 was supported with a significant positive effect of EFC on intended WDB ($\beta = 0.26$; $p < 0.01$).

Furthermore, recall that actual helping behavior and deviance were also measured through confederate ratings. Using these ratings as the dependent variable, Hypotheses 21 and 22 (TFC and EFC on OCBI, respectively) as well as Hypotheses 25 and 26 (TFC

and EFC on WDB, respectively) were retested. Here, OCBI was operationalized as helping to fix the equipment and WDB was operationalized as willingness to steal cash prizes. The dependent variables, actual OCBI and WDB, were dichotomous in this case. Hence, logistic regression was used to estimate this model and remains as is shown in equation 4.2. These results are reported in Table 4.4. Hypotheses 21, 22, 25 and 26 were not supported while using actual behavior as the dependent variable. This completes a test of all hypotheses for Study 1. In summary, pride was the only emotion that affected TFC. These analyses revealed promising results for the coping to behavioral outcomes part of the model.

Insert Table 4.4 about here

There could be two potential reasons for the lack of better results on the front end of this model. First, underlying EI dimensions, with their more specific factors, could relate more strongly to TFC and EFC than the overarching total EI scores, and play a stronger moderating role. Second, each discrete emotion might need to be examined separately, and I discuss the reasons for this more fully below.

Supplemental Analyses

In this section, I present an extension of the analyses presented above. I present results examining each discrete emotion in isolation, along with underlying EI dimensions and their interactions with the discrete emotion as simultaneous predictors. This analysis might be the most appropriate one for the following theoretical and methodological reasons. Theoretically, these discrete emotions co occur, yet they

contribute their own variance in affecting each form of coping. OLS regression is based on the variance partitioning approach that estimates the unique variance contributed by each discrete emotion. As such, this technique soaks out the shared variance. In doing so, substantial, albeit shared, trait variance associated with each emotion is lost. For example, guilt and anger share variance as indicated by their correlation ($r = 0.46$; $p < 0.01$). Yet when one experiences both guilt and anger, each emotion presumably has its own implications for that individual's coping strategies. One does not act upon the unique variance left behind by processing both guilt and anger. Instead, one perceives anger as a self demeaning offense and also feels intense self reproach as a consequence of guilt, and acts on both. Moreover, the emotions under scrutiny here are intense short-lived ones, and people act upon them instantaneously. Finally, I offer one more rationale for examination of each discrete emotion separately. The co-occurrence of emotions is an artifact of the study design, at least to some extent. Following Weiss et al., (1999), I adopted the best known procedure to create conditions favorable for emotion elicitation. However, like these authors, I also note that two or more emotions could co-occur in each condition of emotion elicitation. For example, when participants are exposed to a favorable outcome only, with no mention of an unfavorably biased procedure, theoretically we are attempting to elicit joy. However, in this study, and in the one cited, both joy and pride occur in this condition. Weiss et al (1999) also examined these discrete emotions as outcomes in separate ANOVAs rather than MANOVA, in effect looking at each discrete emotion in isolation as an outcome. The goal of this research is not necessarily the examination of unique variance contributed by each discrete emotion. Rather, it is to examine the effects of each discrete emotion (which might share variance

with another emotion) from the standpoint of cognitive appraisals. Alternatively, each emotion might have its own effects on each form of coping that could go undetected by entering them as simultaneous predictors within the same regression run. Finally, I present what is perhaps the most pertinent reason for such a separate examination of each discrete emotion. My level of theory is at the level of each discrete emotion and its consequences for coping as if they were occurring in isolation. My theorizing does not posit the simultaneous effects of these discrete emotions and that we measured them within the same setting is a matter of convenience only. The intent was not necessarily to study their simultaneous effects. I also note that this practice is not entirely uncommon in discrete emotion research (e.g., Herald & Tomaka, 2002; Izard, 1991) as no solid theory exists for the theoretical and measurement implications of simultaneous emotion experiences and their consequences for coping.

Furthermore, this type of analyses is also necessitated to accommodate all EI dimensions in the same regression run. EI is theoretically presumed to be a hierarchical multidimensional construct (Mayer et al., 1999). As such, every dimension feeds input to the next higher dimension. While the results above are promising and offer a glimpse of what overarching global scores on EI might contribute, a more complete insight might be gleaned by examining all EI dimensions within the same regression model. One might argue that such an analysis would ideally include three control variables, all four discrete emotions and four EI dimensions as well as their interactions within the same regression model. However, given the modest sample size ($n=185$), and the number of predictors (27 in each run), such an analyses would be severely underpowered. Hence, I examine

each discrete emotion separately in the supplemental analyses, which reduces the number of predictors to 12 in each MMR run.

Moreover, the supplemental analyses reported below augment the hypotheses testing reported above, yet answer different theoretical questions from a standpoint of future research and implications for theory and practice. The point is, each of these analyses offers a coherent stand-alone story on its own, and they offer a fuller understanding of how discrete emotions can interact with EI and its dimensions, thus affecting coping. I elaborate on the interpretation of these relationships in fuller detail in the discussion section.

Anger, TFC and EFC.

The moderating role of each sub dimension of EI in the relationship between anger and TFC and EFC was analyzed through ordinary least square regression. In much of the write up and equations to follow, note that I use the term “using” as an abbreviated form of the “using emotions to facilitate thought” dimension of EI, “understanding” as an abbreviated form of the “understanding emotions” dimension of EI, and “managing” as the abbreviated form of the “managing emotions” dimension of EI. To investigate the moderating role of each sub dimension of EI in the relationship between anger and TFC and EFC, the following model was tested:

$$\begin{aligned} TFC/EFC = & b_0 + b_1 (state PA) + b_2 (state NA) + b_3 (GMA) + b_4 (anger) + b_5 (perception) \\ & + b_6 (using) + b_7 (understanding) + b_8 (managing) + b_9 (anger * perception) + b_{10} \\ & (anger * using) + b_{11} (anger * understanding) + b_{12} (anger * managing) + error \end{aligned}$$

(equation 4.3)

Thus, this set of analyses included two regression runs, one with TFC and one with EFC serving as dependent variables. All four EI dimensions (perception, using,

understanding and managing) and anger, as well as their interactions, served as predictors. I note that this sequence of regression runs is repeated with each discrete emotion in the following sections. As seen in Table 4.5, these analyses revealed a significant negative effect of managing on TFC ($\beta = -0.22$; $p < 0.01$).

Insert Table 4.5 about here

As seen in Table 4.5, with EFC as the dependent variable, the interaction of perception and anger was significant ($\beta = -0.23$; $p < 0.01$), the interaction of using and anger was marginally significant ($\beta = 0.36$; $p < 0.10$), and the interaction of managing and anger was also significant ($\beta = -0.50$; $p < 0.01$). This model showed a significant improvement in R squared ($\Delta R^2 = 0.07$; $p < 0.01$) from the previous step and the overall F statistic was also significant ($F = 2.60$; $p < 0.01$; $R^2 = 0.15$). From Figure 4.1, the interaction of anger and perception was in the expected direction. It indicates that individuals with higher scores on perception engaged in decreased EFC as anger increased. Individuals with lower scores on perception engaged in increased EFC as anger increased. This interaction was further probed using the test of simple slopes (cf. Aiken & West, 1991). Also consistent with Aiken and West (1991), I probed this interaction at one standard deviation above and below the mean. This analysis revealed that the simple slope of anger on EFC was not statistically significant for one standard deviation above the mean ($\beta = 0.03$; $p > 0.01$). However, it was significant for values of the moderator (i.e., perception) at one standard deviation below the mean ($\beta = 0.43$; $p < 0.01$). This indicates that the positive relationship between anger and EFC is significant

only for lower scores on perception. The plot for the interaction of using and anger (Figure 4.2) was not in the expected direction in that higher scores on this dimension were associated with increased EFC and lower scores are associated with decreased EFC. A test of the simple slopes one standard deviation above and below the mean of using revealed that the simple slope of anger on EFC was statistically significant for one standard deviation above the mean ($\beta = 0.56$; $p < 0.01$). However, it was not significant for values of the moderator (i.e, using) at one standard deviation below the mean ($\beta = 0.09$; $p > 0.01$). This indicates that the positive relationship between anger and EFC is significant only for higher scores on using. The interaction plot (see Figure 4.3) for the interaction of anger and managing was in the expected direction. It shows that higher scores on managing emotions were associated with decreased EFC as anger increased. Lower scores on managing were associated with increased EFC as anger increased. A test of the simple slopes revealed that the simple slope of anger on EFC was not statistically significant for one standard deviation above the mean ($\beta = -0.18$; $p > 0.01$). However, it was significant for values of the moderator (i.e, managing) at one standard deviation below the mean ($\beta = 0.32$; $p < 0.01$). This indicates that the positive relationship between anger and EFC is significant only for lower scores on managing.

Insert Figures 4.1 - 4.3 about here

Guilt, TFC and EFC.

To investigate the moderating role of each sub dimension of EI in the relationship between guilt and TFC and EFC, the same model represented in equation 4.3 was tested with anger being replaced by guilt.

As seen in Table 4.6, these analyses revealed a significant negative effect of managing on TFC ($\beta = -0.23$; $p < 0.01$). With EFC serving as the dependent variable, the interaction of perception and guilt was significant ($\beta = -0.20$; $p < 0.05$) and the interaction of using and guilt was significant ($\beta = 0.34$; $p < 0.01$). This model showed a significant improvement in R squared ($\Delta R^2 = 0.04$; $p < 0.10$) from the previous step and the overall F statistic was also significant ($F = 2.36$; $p < 0.01$; $R^2 = 0.14$). These interactions are graphically depicted in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.

Insert Table 4.6 and Figures 4.4 and 4.5 about here

From Figure 4.4, it can be seen that higher scores on perception were associated with decreased EFC and lower scores on perception were associated with increased EFC as guilt increased. This interaction was in the expected direction. A test of the simple slopes revealed that the simple slope of guilt on EFC was not statistically significant for one standard deviation above the mean ($\beta = 0.05$; $p > 0.01$). However, it was significant for values of the moderator (i.e, perception) at one standard deviation below the mean ($\beta = 0.31$; $p < 0.01$). This indicates that the positive relationship between guilt and EFC is significant only for lower scores on perception. From Figure 4.5, it can be seen that higher scores on using were associated with increased EFC and lower scores on using were associated with decreased EFC as guilt increased. This interaction was not in the

expected direction. A test of the simple slopes revealed that the simple slope of guilt on EFC was statistically significant for one standard deviation above the mean ($\beta = 0.57$; $p < 0.01$). However, it was not significant for values of the moderator (i.e, using) at one standard deviation below the mean ($\beta = -0.22$; $p > 0.01$). This indicates that the positive relationship between guilt and EFC is significant only for higher scores on using.

Joy, TFC and EFC.

To investigate the moderating role of each sub dimension of EI in the relationship between joy and TFC and EFC, the same model represented in equation 4.2 was tested with anger being replaced by joy. As seen in Table 4.7, these analyses revealed a significant negative effect of managing emotions on TFC ($\beta = -0.21$; $p < 0.01$). This relationship was not in the expected direction. Joy had a marginally significant positive effect on TFC ($\beta = 0.14$; $p < 0.10$). This relationship was in the expected direction. No significant relationships were detected between the predictors and EFC.

Insert Table 4.7 about here

Pride, TFC and EFC.

To investigate the moderating role of each sub dimension of EI in the relationship between pride and TFC and EFC, the same model represented in equation 4.3 was tested with anger being replaced by joy. As seen in Table 4.8, these analyses revealed a significant negative effect of managing emotions on TFC ($\beta = -0.19$; $p < 0.05$) and a significant positive effect of pride on TFC ($\beta = 0.16$; $p < 0.05$). The negative effect of managing on TFC was not in the expected direction, while the positive effect of pride on

TFC was in the expected direction. No significant relationships were detected between the predictors and EFC.

Insert Table 4.8 about here

This completes all analyses of the emotion → coping relationship part of my research model both at overarching construct level as well as underlying dimension level. In summary, examining discrete emotions separately reveals a richer and more interesting pattern of results. A full discussion of all results appears in the next chapter.

One last set of analyses for Study 1 was conducted, specifically the examination of overall EI and its relationship with the outcome behaviors. While not a part of original theorizing, this is necessitated in the light of recent results supporting the linkage of EI with behaviors. EI has been shown to positively relate to prosocial behavior in a non-work context and negatively related to deviance such as drug and alcohol abuse (Brackett et al., 2004). EI positively relates to performance and challenge appraisals on a math task (Lyons & Schneider, 2005). In the light of these linkages, it was reasonable to investigate the relationship of EI to the outcome behaviors in this study. The model being tested in this case was as follows:

$$\text{Behavioral outcome} = b_0 + b_1 (\text{GMA}) + b_2 (\text{EI}) + b_3 (\text{TFC}) + b_4 (\text{EFC}) + \text{error}$$

(equation 4.4)

Three regression models, one with each kind of behavioral outcome (task performance, intended OCBI and intended WDB) serving as dependent variables, were run with all four predictors as shown in the above equation. As seen in Table 4.9, EI ($\beta = 0.23$; $p < 0.01$) and TFC ($\beta = 0.28$; $p < 0.01$) had significant positive effects on task

performance. These relationships are in the expected direction. Only TFC had a significant positive effect on intended OCBI ($\beta = 0.30$; $p < 0.01$). EI ($\beta = -0.24$; $p < 0.01$) had a significant negative effect ($\beta = -0.27$; $p < 0.01$) while EFC had a significant positive effect on intended WDB ($\beta = 0.24$; $p < 0.01$). These relationships are in the expected direction.

Insert Table 4.9 about here

Similar supplemental analyses were also conducted with actual behaviors (helping and deviance rated by the confederates) serving as the dependent variables in a logistic regression model. However, none of the aforementioned four predictors related to the dependent variable in these analyses and, hence, those analyses are not reported in tabled form in the interest of conciseness.

Study 2

First, descriptive statistics for all study variables and their reliabilities were computed. Simple bivariate correlations were computed to ensure that all study relationships were in the expected direction. All level one variables were aggregated to level two for computation of descriptive statistics. These results are presented in Table 4.10. All Chronbach's alphas were over 0.70 with the highest found for joy at 0.96. All bivariate correlations were in the expected direction. I only discuss the most important correlations here in the interest of conciseness, but Table 4.10 presents correlations amongst all variables included in this study.

Insert Table 4.10 about here

Anger was negatively correlated with joy ($r = -0.55, p < 0.01$) and pride ($r = -0.40, p < 0.05$), positively correlated with EFC ($r = 0.68, p < 0.01$) and negatively correlated with OCBO ($r = -0.40, p < 0.10$). Similarly, guilt was negatively correlated with joy ($r = -0.34, p < 0.10$). These preliminary analyses suggest that anger related to each study variable stronger than did guilt.

Joy and pride were also strongly positively correlated ($r = 0.75, p < 0.01$), suggesting that these two discrete emotions co occur quite a bit. Joy ($r = 0.51, p < 0.01$) and pride ($r = 0.56, p < 0.01$) were associated with TFC in the expected directions. Rather surprisingly, EI was not related to either TFC or EFC as expected. TFC was negatively correlated with EFC ($r = -0.43; p < 0.05$). TFC was positively correlated with OCBI ($r = 0.44; p < 0.05$) and OCBO ($r = 0.54; p < 0.01$). As expected, EFC was negatively correlated with performance ($r = -0.51; p < 0.05$) and OCBO ($r = -0.50; p < 0.05$).

Analytical Overview

The moderating role of EI in the relationship between discrete emotions and coping was analyzed through random coefficient modeling (RCM). I have already noted the appropriateness of RCM for this study and I refer the interested reader to pages 100-101 in chapter three for a discussion of the same. The most pertinent advantage of RCM is that it allows level one coefficients to randomly vary across individuals. These estimates are based on pooled estimates of all observations on that individual for all five

periods under consideration and an estimate based on data from all other individuals. Furthermore, it allows for the correlation of responses from the same individual across all five time periods of interest. Thus, level one in the following analyses captures within person variability in emotions, coping, and behavioral outcomes, while level two captures between person variability in EI.

For each set of analyses I first estimated the basic null model in order to estimate the ICC. Recall that, from the null model, if ICC values exceed .10, examination of the RCM model is justified (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). If an RCM model is justified, I move forward to test the full model at level 1 and where appropriate, level 2 (note that models specifying the behavioral outcomes do not include level 2 predictors). In terms of interpretation of results for each run, the cutoff $p < 0.05$ is used as a cutoff for significance. However, given the restrictive sample size (level 1 $n = 113$ and level 2 $n = 29$) combined with the number of predictors (9 in each RCM run), I also interpreted marginally significant effects ($p < 0.10$). In all supplemental analyses, the same analytical approach was used.

Hypotheses Testing

The model being tested with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent variables was as follows:

Level 1

$$(TFC/EFC)_{ij} = \pi_{0j} + \pi_{1j}(\text{anger}) + \pi_{2j}(\text{guilt}) + \pi_{3j}(\text{happiness}) + \pi_{4j}(\text{pride}) + r_{ij}$$

(equation 4.5)

In this equation, i denotes time (e.g., 0-4), j denotes respondent (1-29), π_{0j} captures the intercept, π_{1j} - π_{4j} the slopes relating each emotion to TFC/EFC, and r_{ij}

represents the within person residual error. However, the most important step was to uncover and model inter individual differences in TFC/EFC in response to emotion. This was the specified role of EI in my model, and this represents level two of this analysis, as EI is a between person difference that could potentially affect the nature of emotion-coping relationships at the within person level.

Level 2

$$\pi_{0j} = \beta_{00} + \beta_{01j} (EI) + u_{0j} \quad (\text{equation 4.6})$$

The β_{01j} coefficient in equation 4.6 captures the main effect of EI on TFC/EFC with TFC/EFC pooled across all five times. As such, this coefficient provides a test of hypothesis 17. Introducing EI as a predictor of slope variability captures the moderating effect of EI as follows:

$$\pi_{1j} = \beta_{10j} + \beta_{11j} (EI) + u_{1j} \quad (\text{equation 4.7})$$

$$\pi_{2j} = \beta_{20j} + \beta_{21j} (EI) + u_{2j} \quad (\text{equation 4.8})$$

$$\pi_{3j} = \beta_{30j} + \beta_{31j} (EI) + u_{3j} \quad (\text{equation 4.9})$$

$$\pi_{4j} = \beta_{40j} + \beta_{41j} (EI) + u_{4j} \quad (\text{equation 4.10})$$

From equation 4.7, β_{11j} indicates the moderating effect of EI on the relationship between anger and TFC, thereby providing a test of Hypothesis 3. Similarly, in equations 4.8 through 4.10, β_{21j} , β_{31j} and β_{41j} capture the interaction effects of each of the other emotions (guilt, joy and pride, respectively) with EI. These coefficients offer a test of hypotheses 7, 11 and 15, respectively. This completes the analyses of the effects of emotions on TFC/EFC, and the main and moderating effect of EI on the relationship between emotion and TFC/EFC. The results with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent

variables are reported in Table 4.11. From Table 4.11, it can be seen that the ICC value for TFC (0.46) exceeded the suggested 0.10 cutoff.

Insert Table 4.11 about here

It is customary to interpret interactions before main effects and hence I test for the interaction hypotheses first. These analyses revealed no support for the interaction effects of EI with anger, joy and pride. Thus, Hypotheses 3, 11 and 15 were not supported. The interaction of guilt and EI was significant ($\beta_{22j} = -0.02$; $p < 0.05$). The interaction plot of guilt and EI (see Figure 4.6) revealed that high EI individuals maintained the same level of TFC, while low EI individuals engaged in increased TFC as guilt increased. Thus, Hypothesis 7 was also not supported.

Insert Figure 4.6 about here

Since the interactions for anger, joy and pride were not significant, main effects of each emotion were interpreted. Hypothesis 2 posited a negative effect for anger on TFC, while, Hypotheses 10 and 14 posited positive effects of joy and pride, respectively, on TFC. β_{10j} , β_{30j} and β_{40j} in the level two equations capture the effects of each specific emotion (i.e., anger, joy, and pride, respectively) on TFC, thereby providing a test of Hypotheses 2, 10 and 14. Hypotheses 2 and 10 were not supported either. Hypothesis 14 was supported with a significant positive effect of pride on TFC ($\beta = 0.13$, $p < 0.01$).

Hypotheses 6 and 17 posit the main effects of guilt and EI, respectively, on TFC. They are not tested as guilt and EI were involved in a significant interaction as noted above.

Similar models were run to test the hypotheses related to EFC as an outcome. From Table 4.11, it can be seen that the ICC value for EFC (0.22) exceeded the suggested 0.10 cutoff. Hypotheses 4, 8, 12 and 16 posited the moderating role of EI in the relationship between each discrete emotion (anger, guilt, joy and pride, respectively) and EFC. These results are also reported in Table 4.11 and indicate support for the interactions of anger ($\beta = 0.01$, $p < 0.01$), guilt ($\beta = 0.02$, $p < 0.01$) and joy ($\beta = 0.01$, $p < 0.01$) with EI. The interaction plot of anger and EI (see Figure 4.7) indicates that both high and low EI individuals engaged in increased EFC as anger increased. This effect was more pronounced for higher EI individuals than lower EI individuals. The interaction plot of guilt and EI (see Figure 4.8) indicates that higher EI individuals engaged in increased EFC and lower EI individuals engaged in decreased EFC as guilt increased. The interaction plot of joy and EI (see Figure 4.9) indicates that higher EI individuals engaged in increased EFC and lower EI individuals engaged in decreased EFC as joy increased. These interactions, while significant, are not in the expected direction and hence, Hypotheses 4, 8 and 12 were not supported. The interaction of pride and EI was not significant and Hypothesis 16 was not supported.

Insert Figures 4.7 - 4.9 about here

Hypothesis 13 posited a negative effect of pride on EFC. This hypothesis was not supported. Hypotheses 1, 5, 9 and 18 posited the main effects of anger, guilt, joy and EI,

respectively, on EFC. These hypotheses are not tested as all of these variables were involved in significant interactions as noted above.

Next, four more RCM models were estimated with task performance, OCBI, OCBO and WDB as outcomes. The model was estimated as follows:

$$(Task\ performance/OCBI/OCBO/WDB)_{ij} = \beta_{00} + \beta_{10j} (TFC) + \beta_{20j} (EFC) + error$$

(equation 4.11)

In the above equations, β_{10j} and β_{20j} capture the effects of TFC and EFC on task performance, respectively, (or OCBI, OCBO, WDB), providing a test of hypotheses relating TFC and EFC to behavioral outcomes. These results are reported in Table 4.12. Hypotheses 19 and 20 posited that TFC would positively affect task performance and EFC would negatively affect task performance, respectively. From Table 4.12, it can be seen that the ICC value for task performance (0.54) exceeded the suggested 0.10 cutoff. From Table 4.12, Hypothesis 19 was not supported. Hypothesis 20 was also not supported, as the significant relationship between EFC and task performance ($\beta = 0.40$; $p < 0.01$) is in the opposite direction to what had been hypothesized.

Insert Table 4.12 about here

Hypotheses 21 and 22 posited that TFC would positively affect OCBI and EFC would negatively affect OCBI, respectively. From Table 4.12, it can be seen that the ICC value for OCBI (0.53) exceeded the suggested 0.10 cutoff. TFC had a significant positive effect on OCBI ($\beta = 0.22$; $p < 0.05$), providing support for Hypothesis 21. EFC

had a significant negative effect on OCBI ($\beta = -0.33$; $p < 0.05$), providing support for Hypothesis 22.

Hypotheses 23 and 24 posited that TFC would positively affect OCBO and EFC would negatively affect OCBO, respectively. From Table 4.12, it can be seen that the ICC value for OCBO (0.36) exceeded the suggested 0.10 cutoff. From Table 4.12, Hypothesis 23 was not supported. Hypothesis 24 is not supported as the significant positive effect of EFC on OCBO ($\beta = 1.49$; $p < 0.01$) is in the opposite direction to what had been hypothesized.

Hypotheses 25 and 26 posited that TFC would negatively affect WDB and EFC would positively affect WDB, respectively. From Table 4.12, it can be seen that the ICC value for WDB (0.68) exceeded the suggested 0.10 cutoff. TFC had a significant negative effect on WDB ($\beta = -0.11$; $p < 0.01$), providing support for Hypothesis 25. EFC had a significant negative effect on WDB ($\beta = -0.11$; $p < 0.01$). Hypothesis 26 was not supported as the direction of this relationship was in the opposite direction to what was hypothesized.

This completes a test of all hypotheses for Study 2. There could be three potential reasons for the lack of better results. First, underlying EI dimensions, with their more specific factors, could relate more strongly to TFC and EFC than the overarching total EI scores. Second, each discrete emotion might need to be examined separately, and I discussed the reasons for such a analyses earlier with respect to Study 1. Third, these results could be sample specific, and I discuss the characteristics of this particular sample that could have affected results in the next chapter.

Supplemental Analyses

In this section, I present one more extension of the analyses presented above. I present results for each discrete emotion and underlying EI dimension. The rationale for such supplemental analyses has already been noted with regard to Study 1.

Anger, TFC and EFC.

The model tested with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent variables took the following form:

Level 1

$$(TFC/EFC)_{ij} = \pi_{0j} + \pi_{1j}(\text{anger}) + r_{ij} \quad (\text{equation 4.12})$$

In this equation, i denotes time (e.g., 0-4), j denotes respondent (1-29), π_{0j} captures the intercept, π_{1j} captures the slope relating anger to TFC/EFC, and r_{ij} captures the within person residual error.

Level 2

$$\pi_{0j} = \beta_{00} + \beta_{01j}(\text{perception}) + \beta_{02j}(\text{using}) + \beta_{03j}(\text{understanding}) + \beta_{04j}(\text{managing}) + u_{0j} \quad (\text{equation 4.13})$$

The β_{01j} coefficient in equation 4.13 captures the main effect of perception on TFC/EFC with TFC/EFC pooled across all five times. Similarly, β_{02j} , β_{03j} , and β_{04j} capture the main effects of using, understanding and managing, respectively, on TFC/EFC. Introducing the EI dimensions as predictors of slope variability captures the moderating effects of EI dimensions as follows:

$$\pi_{1j} = \beta_{10j} + \beta_{11j}(\text{perception}) + \beta_{12j}(\text{using}) + \beta_{13j}(\text{understanding}) + \beta_{14j}(\text{managing}) + u_{1j} \quad (\text{equation 4.14})$$

From equation 4.14, β_{11j} indicates the moderating effect of perception on the relationship between anger and TFC/EFC. Similarly, β_{12j} , β_{13j} , and β_{14j} capture the interaction effects of using, understanding, and managing, respectively, on TFC/EFC.

Note that this set of analyses differs from analyses presented in the preceding sections in that this model has one level 1 predictor, four level 2 predictors and four cross level interaction terms. In the earlier analyses, there were four level one predictors, one level two predictor and four cross level interaction terms. The ICC values for TFC and EFC have already been presented earlier through the null model runs. I will not repeat them again here for the sake of conciseness. However, I note that with the appreciable ICC values seen previously, these further RCM analyses are justified.

The results for the analyses are reported in Table 4.13. With TFC serving as the dependent variable, the interaction of anger and managing was significant ($\beta = -0.01$; $p < 0.01$). The interaction plot (see Figure 4.10) revealed that individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in decreased TFC while individuals with lower scores on managing engaged in increased TFC as anger increased. This interaction was not in the expected direction.

Insert Table 4.13 and Figure 4.10 about here

With EFC serving as the dependent variable, the interaction of anger and using was marginally significant ($\beta = -0.003$; $p < 0.10$). The interaction plot of anger and using (see Figure 4.11) revealed that both individuals with higher and lower scores on using engaged in increased EFC as anger increased. This effect was more pronounced for

individuals with lower scores on using. The interaction of anger and managing was significant ($\beta = 0.01$; $p < 0.01$). The interaction plot of anger and managing (see Figure 4.12) revealed that individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in increased EFC, while individuals with lower scores on managing showed very little change in EFC as anger increased. These interactions were not in the expected direction.

Insert Figure 4.11 and 4.12 about here

Guilt, TFC and EFC.

The model tested with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent variables and guilt as a level 1 predictor was the same as represented in equations 4.12- 4.14, but with anger in equation 4.12 being replaced by guilt. The results for these analyses are reported in Table 4.14. With TFC serving as the dependent variable, the interactions of guilt and perception ($\beta = -0.02$; $p < 0.01$), guilt and using ($\beta = -0.02$; $p < 0.01$) and guilt and managing ($\beta = 0.06$; $p < 0.01$) were significant ($\beta = -0.02$; $p < 0.01$). The interaction plot of guilt and perception (see Figure 4.13) revealed that individuals with higher scores on perception showed very little change in TFC while individuals with lower scores on perception engaged in increased TFC as guilt increased. The interaction plot of guilt and using (see Figure 4.14) revealed that individuals with higher scores on using showed very little change in TFC while individuals with lower scores on using engaged in increased TFC as guilt increased. The interactions of perception and using with guilt were not in the expected direction. The interaction plot of guilt and managing (see Figure 4.15) revealed that individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in increased TFC

while individuals with lower scores on managing engaged in decreased TFC as guilt increased. The interaction of managing and guilt was in the expected direction.

Insert Table 4.14 and Figures 4.13 – 4.15 about here

With EFC serving as the dependent variable, the interactions of guilt and perception ($\beta = 0.01$; $p < 0.01$) and guilt and using ($\beta = 0.01$; $p < 0.01$) were significant. The interaction plot of guilt and perception (see Figure 4.16) revealed that individuals with higher scores on perception engaged in increased EFC, while individuals with lower scores on perception showed very little change in EFC as guilt increased. The interaction plot of guilt and using (see Figure 4.17) revealed that both individuals with higher scores on using engaged in increased EFC, while individuals with lower scores on using showed very little change in EFC as guilt increased. These two interactions were not in the expected direction.

Insert Figures 4.16 and 4.17 about here

Joy, TFC and EFC.

The model tested with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent variables and joy as a level 1 predictor was the same as represented in equations 4.12- 4.14, but with anger in equation 4.12 being replaced by joy. The results these analyses are reported in Table 4.15. With TFC serving as the dependent variable, the interaction of joy and managing was significant ($\beta = 0.01$; $p < 0.01$). The interaction plot of joy and managing (see Figure

4.18) revealed that individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in increased TFC while individuals with lower scores on managing engaged in decreased TFC as joy increased. This interaction was in the expected direction.

Insert Table 4.15 and Figure 4.18 about here

With EFC serving as the dependent variable, the interaction of joy and understanding ($\beta = 0.01$; $p < 0.05$) was significant. The interaction plot of joy and understanding (see Figure 4.19) revealed that individuals with higher scores on understanding engaged in increased EFC, while individuals with lower scores on understanding engaged in decreased EFC as joy increased. This interaction was not in the expected direction.

Insert Figure 4.19 about here

Pride, TFC and EFC.

The model tested with TFC and EFC serving as the dependent variables and pride as a level 1 predictor was the same as represented in equations 4.12- 4.14, but with anger in equation 4.12 being replaced by pride. The results for these analyses are reported in Table 4.16. With TFC serving as the dependent variable, the interactions of pride and using ($\beta = -0.01$; $p < 0.05$) and pride and managing ($\beta = 0.01$; $p < 0.01$) were significant. The interaction plot for pride and using (see Figure 4.20) revealed that individuals with higher scores on using engaged in decreased TFC, while individuals with lower scores on

using engaged in increased TFC as pride increased. This interaction was not in the expected direction. The interaction plot for pride and managing (see Figure 4.21) revealed that individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in increased TFC, while individuals with lower scores on managing showed very little change in TFC as pride increased. The high managing result was in the expected direction, while low managing result was not in the expected direction.

Insert Table 4.16 and Figures 4.20 – 4.21 about here

With EFC serving as the dependent variable, the interactions of pride and perception ($\beta = 0.01$; $p < 0.01$), pride and using ($\beta = 0.004$; $p < 0.01$), and pride and managing ($\beta = -0.01$; $p < 0.01$) were significant. The interaction plot of pride and perception (see Figure 4.22) revealed that individuals with higher scores on perception engaged in increased EFC, while individuals with lower scores on perception engaged in decreased EFC, as pride increased. The interaction plot of pride and using (see Figure 4.23) revealed that individuals with higher scores on using engaged in increased EFC, while individuals with lower scores on using engaged in decreased EFC, as pride increased. These interactions were not in the expected direction.

The interaction plot of pride and managing (see Figure 4.24) revealed that individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in decreased EFC, while individuals with lower scores on managing engaged in increased EFC, as pride increased. This interaction was in the expected direction.

Insert Figure 4.22 – 4.24 about here

This completes all supplemental analyses of the emotion → coping relationship moderated by EI part of my research model both at the overarching EI level as well as underlying EI dimension level. In summary, examining discrete emotions separately reveals a richer and more interesting pattern of results. A full discussion of all results appears in the next chapter. Similar supplemental analyses were also conducted with EI and the behavioral outcomes, as was done in Study 1. These results are reported in Table 4.17. EFC had a significant positive effect on task performance ($\beta = 0.42$; $p < 0.01$). TFC had a significant positive effect on OCBI ($\beta = 0.22$; $p < 0.01$), while EFC had a significant negative effect on OCBI ($\beta = -0.33$; $p < 0.01$). EFC had a significant positive effect on OCBO ($\beta = 1.55$; $p < 0.01$). TFC ($\beta = -0.11$; $p < 0.01$), EFC ($\beta = -0.12$; $p < 0.01$) and EI ($\beta = -0.002$; $p < 0.01$) all had significant negative effects on WDB.

Given, the complexity of findings, I summarized all supported hypotheses from both studies in Table 4.18. Similarly, Table 4.19 offers a summary of findings from supplemental analyses from both studies.

Insert Tables 4.18 and 4.19 about here

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for Study 1

	Means (S.D.)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1.PA	2.78 (0.72)	0.85	0.15*	0.00	0.09	0.07	0.35**	0.32**	-0.08	0.23**	0.11	.14*	0.12	0.07	-0.05	-0.02	-0.10	-0.04	-0.09
2.NA	1.59 (0.59)		0.83	-0.01	0.34**	0.42**	-0.08	0.02	-0.11	0.01	0.24**	-0.05	0.24**	-0.01	-0.07	-0.15*	-0.07	-0.05	0.08
3. GMA	25.32 (4.91)			-	-0.09	-0.03	0.05	0.05	0.34**	0.01	-0.13*	0.07	-0.07	0.19**	0.04	0.29**	0.43**	0.32**	-0.03
4.anger	1.14 (0.30)				0.82	0.46**	-0.30**	-0.13	-0.09	-0.01	0.15*	-0.12	0.25**	-0.10	-0.09	-0.05	-0.13	0.03	0.02
5.guilt	1.19 (0.49)					0.86	-0.14*	-0.02	-0.14*	0.00	0.25**	0.03	0.22**	-0.12 [†]	-0.17*	-0.12	-0.04	-0.10	-0.07
6.joy	3.10 (.99)						0.93	0.71**	-0.05	0.20**	0.00	0.16*	-0.07	0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05
7.pride	2.92 (1.08)							0.79	-0.09	0.26**	0.04	0.08	0.05	0.02	-0.04	-0.05	-0.01	-0.16*	-0.15 [†]
8.EI	89.11 (17.39)								-	-0.03	-0.10	0.04	-0.29**	0.26**	0.67**	0.79**	0.79**	0.77**	0.18*
9. TFC	2.41 (.52)									0.84	0.15*	0.30**	0.12 [†]	0.26**	0.07	0.00	-0.02	-0.13 [†]	-0.07
10. EFC	1.74 (.58)										0.84	0.03	0.27**	-0.08	-0.01	-0.08	-0.15*	-0.08	0.22**
11. SROCBI	3.23 (.78)											0.85	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.09	-0.04	0.03	0.00
12. SRWDB	1.39 (0.38)												0.84	0.00	-0.20**	-0.24**	-0.20**	-0.25**	-0.04

	Means (S.D.)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
13. task performance														-	0.21**	0.16*	0.29**	0.14*	0.12
14. perception	98.15 (16.21)														-	0.49**	0.27**	0.26**	0.15 [†]
15. using	94.59 (18.00)															-	0.52**	0.55**	0.10
16. understanding	88.69 (15.09)																-	0.58**	0.03
17. managing	89.95 (18.13)																	-	0.29**
18. gender	-																		-

Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; [†]p < .10

Table 4.2: OLS regression results with TFC and EFC^a

Criterion	TFC		EFC	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
State PA	0.21**	0.21**	0.09	0.08
State NA	-0.03	-0.03	0.15 [†]	0.14 [†]
GMA	0.00	0.01	-0.11	-0.08
Anger	-0.02	-0.03	0.00	0.00
Guilt	0.02	0.03	0.12	0.15 [†]
Joy	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.03
Pride	0.17 [†]	0.16	0.00	-0.04
EI	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.08
Anger*EI	-	-0.05	-	-0.07
Guilt*EI	-	0.03	-	0.09
Joy*EI	-	0.00	-	0.05
Pride*EI	-	-0.02	-	-0.11
F Value	2.58**	1.72 [†]	2.09*	1.64 [†]
R ²	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.10
Δ R ²	0.10	0.01	0.09	0.01

Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; [†]p < .10; ^a Standardized regression coefficients are presented

Table 4.3: OLS regression results with intended OCBI, intended WDB and task performance^a

Dependent variable	task performance	intended OCBI	intended WDB
TFC	0.28**	0.30**	0.08
EFC	-0.13 [†]	-0.01	.026**
F Value	8.65**	9.58**	8.34**
R ²	0.08	0.09	0.08

Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; [†]p < .10; ^a Standardized regression coefficients are presented

Table 4.4: Test of coping to behavioral outcomes with confederate ratings

Dependent variable	Helping	Deviance
TFC	-0.48	0.18
EFC	-0.33	-0.50
Chi Square	2.24	1.06
Cox & Snell R ²	0.03	0.01
Nagelkerke R ²	0.03	0.02

Total n = 106; for deviance; n = 95 for helping N = 90

**p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10

Table 4.5: OLS regression results with anger, TFC and EFC^a

Criterion	TFC		EFC	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
State PA	0.29**	0.28**	0.08	0.07
State NA	-0.03	-0.03	0.19**	0.20**
GMA	0.04	0.04	-0.08	-0.06
Anger	-0.02	-0.06	0.05	0.14
Perception	0.10	0.11	0.03	0.00
Using	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.12
Understanding	0.07	0.06	-0.11	-0.12
Managing	-0.22*	-0.21*	0.00	-0.05
Anger*perception		0.02		-0.23**
Anger*using		-0.08		0.36 [†]
Anger*understanding		-0.07		0.17
Anger*managing		0.11		-0.50**
F Value	2.74**	1.88*	2.01*	2.60**
R ²	0.11	0.12	0.08	0.15
Δ R ²	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.07**

Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; [†] p < .10; ^a Standardized regression coefficients are presented

Table 4.6: OLS regression results with guilt, TFC and EFC^a

Criterion	TFC		EFC	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
State PA	0.28**	0.29**	0.08	0.09
State NA	-0.04	-0.04	0.15 [†]	0.15 [†]
GMA	0.04	0.05	-0.08	-0.11
Guilt	-0.01	0.01	0.14 [†]	0.10
Perception	0.10	0.10	0.05	0.02
Using	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.09
Understanding	0.07	0.07	-0.13	-0.13
Managing	-0.23**	-0.24**	0.02	0.00
Guilt*perception		-0.11		-0.20*
Guilt*using		0.15		0.34*
Guilt*understanding		-0.09		0.04
Guilt*managing		-0.01		-0.13
F Value	2.73**	1.98*	2.34*	2.36**
R ²	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.14
Δ R ²	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.04 [†]

Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; [†]p < .10; ^a Standardized regression coefficients are presented

Table 4.7: OLS regression results with joy, TFC and EFC^a

Criterion	TFC		EFC	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
State PA	0.23**	0.22**	0.09	0.08
State NA	-0.02	-0.01	0.20**	0.21**
GMA	0.03	0.03	-0.08	-0.08
Joy	0.14 [†]	0.14 [†]	-0.03	-0.02
Perception	0.10	0.11	0.03	0.04
Using	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.03
Understanding	0.07	0.07	-0.12	-0.12
Managing	-0.21*	-0.22*	0.01	0.00
Joy*perception		0.01		0.05
Joy*using		-0.05		-0.15
Joy*understanding		-0.01		0.01
Joy*managing		0.07		0.11
F Value	3.17**	2.12**	1.97*	1.51
R ²	0.13	0.13	0.08	0.10
Δ R ²	0.06 [†]	0.00	0.01	0.02

Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; [†] p < .10; ^a Standardized regression coefficients are presented

Table 4.8: OLS regression results with pride, TFC and EFC^a

Criterion	TFC		EFC	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
State PA	0.22**	0.22**	0.09	0.08
State NA	-0.03	-0.04	0.20**	0.19**
GMA	0.03	0.03	-0.09	-0.07
Pride	0.16*	0.16*	-0.01	0.01
Perception	0.10	0.10	0.03	-0.01
Using	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03
Understanding	0.05	0.03	-0.11	-0.14
Managing	-0.19*	-0.18 [†]	0.01	-0.01
Pride*perception		-0.06		-0.08
Pride*using		-0.07		-0.11
Pride*understanding		0.01		0.10
Pride*managing		0.14		0.00
F Value	3.34**	2.42**	1.95*	1.58 [†]
R ²	0.13	0.15	0.08	0.10
Δ R ²	0.06*	0.02	0.01	0.02

Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; [†]p < .10; ^a Standardized regression coefficients are presented

Table 4.9: OLS regression results with behavioral outcomes^a

Criterion	Task performance	Intended OCBI	Intended WDB
Predictor			
GMA	0.09	0.06	0.05
TFC	0.28**	0.30**	0.08
EFC	-0.09	0.00	0.24**
EI	0.23**	0.03	-0.27**
F Value	8.79**	5.08**	8.22
R ²	0.16	0.10**	0.14
ΔR^2	0.12**	0.09**	0.14**

Note: n = 185; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10; ^a Standardized regression coefficients are presented

Table 4.10: Descriptive statistics for Study 2

	Means (S.D.)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1. PA	3.00 (0.70)	0.91	- 0.30	-0.14	0.10	0.45*	0.61**	0.02	0.49**	-0.14	0.05	0.42*	0.40*	-0.40 [†]	-0.07	-0.01	-0.01	0.10
2. NA	1.41 (0.32)		0.82	0.37*	0.14	-0.02	-0.14	- 0.13	0.19	0.10	0.17	-0.04	-0.07	0.61**	0.02	-0.20	-0.02	-0.22
3. anger	1.62 (0.48)			0.90	0.24	- 0.55**	-0.40*	0.13	-0.24	0.68**	0.06	-0.16	-0.40 [†]	0.33	0.17	0.23	-0.01	0.04
4. guilt	1.18 (0.30)				0.81	-0.34 [†]	-0.17	0.13	0.25	0.16	0.04	-0.07	-0.04	-0.20	0.04	0.24	0.04	0.15
5. joy	2.14 (0.74)					0.96	0.75**	0.06	0.51**	-0.39*	0.00	0.36 [†]	0.45*	-0.13	-0.06	-0.21	0.18	0.04
6. pride	2.54 (0.99)						0.90	- 0.18	0.56**	-0.32 [†]	0.14	0.27	0.39 [†]	-0.20	-0.25	-0.15	-0.14	-0.02
7. EI	96.46 (15.27)							-	0.06	0.27	-0.18	0.19	0.13	-0.06	0.69**	.60**	0.67**	0.74**
8. TFC	2.50 (0.46)								0.88	-0.43*	0.17	0.44*	0.54**	-0.20	0.00	-0.05	0.06	0.14
9. EFC	1.14 (0.17)									0.82	- 0.51*	-0.31	-0.50*	0.17	0.26	0.27	0.04	0.19
10. task performance	4.42 (0.41)										0.79	0.42 [†]	0.48*	0.15	-0.32	-0.23	0.13	-0.19
11. OCBI	3.58 (0.91)											0.90	0.83**	-0.40*	0.10	0.00	0.13	0.16

	Means (S.D.)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
12. OCBO	3.66 (0.83)												0.86	-0.33	0.12	0.09	-0.06	0.08
13. WDB	1.23 (0.46)													0.73	0.07	-0.09	-0.04	-0.23
14. perception	103.21 (15.93)														-	0.298	0.153	0.24
15. using	96.92 (16.68)															-	0.14	0.44*
16. understanding	93.65 (11.76)																-	0.53**
17. managing	98.88 (16.50)																	-

Overall n = 29; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10

Table 4.11: RCM results with TFC and EFC^a

Estimates	TFC		EFC	
	Null model	Full model	Model 1	Model 2
Tau	0.15		0.02	
Sigma Squared	0.18		0.07	
ICC	0.46		0.22	
Beta ₀₀		2.51**		1.15**
Anger		-0.03		0.15**
Guilt		0.40**		0.07
Joy		-0.06		-0.02
Pride		0.13**		0.03
EI		0.00		0.003 [†]
Anger*EI		0.00		0.01**
Guilt*EI		-0.02*		0.02**
Joy*EI		0.01		0.01**
Pride*EI		0.00		0.00

Note: Level 1, n = 113; Level 2, n = 29; **p < .01; *p < .05; [†] p < .10

Table 4.12: RCM results for behavioral outcomes ^a

Estimates	Performance		OCBI		OCBO		WDB	
	Null model	Full model	Null model	Full model	Null model	Full model	Null model	Full model
Tau	0.28		0.52		0.41		0.17	
Sigma Squared	0.24		0.46		0.72		0.08	
ICC	0.54		0.53		0.36		0.68	
Beta ₀₀		4.51**		3.87**		3.67**		1.01**
TFC		-0.09		0.22*		0.17		-0.11**
EFC		0.40**		-0.33*		1.49**		-0.11**

Note: For performance: Level 1, n = 85; and Level 2, n = 24

For OCBI: Level 1, n = 83; and Level 2, n = 24

For OCBO: Level 1, n = 79; and Level 2, n = 23

For WDB: Level 1, n = 83; and Level 2, n = 23

**p<.01; *p<.05; † p<.10

Table 4.13: RCM results for anger, TFC and EFC

	TFC	EFC
Beta ₀₀	2.46**	1.12**
Anger	-0.15**	0.12**
Perception	0.00	0.00
Using	-0.01	0.00
Understanding	-0.01	0.00
Managing	0.01†	0.00
Anger*perception	0.00	0.00
Anger*using	0.00	-0.003†
Anger*understanding	0.01	0.00
Anger*managing	-0.01**	0.01**

Note: Level 1, n = 113; Level 2, n = 29; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10

Table 4.14: RCM results for guilt, TFC and EFC

	TFC	EFC
Beta ₀₀	2.47**	1.12**
Guilt	0.26†	0.07
Perception	0.00	0.004**
Using	-0.01	0.003†
Understanding	0.00	0.00
Managing	0.01	0.00
Guilt*perception	-0.02**	0.01**
Guilt*using	-0.02**	0.01**
Guilt*understanding	0.00	0.00
Guilt*managing	0.06**	0.00

Note: Level 1, n = 113; Level 2, n = 29; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10

Table 4.15: RCM results for joy, TFC and EFC

	TFC	EFC
Beta ₀₀	2.49*	1.11**
Joy	0.04	-0.04
Perception	0.00	0.00
Using	0.00	0.00
Understanding	0.00	0.00
Managing	0.01	0.00
Joy*perception	0.00	0.00
Joy*using	-0.01	0.00
Joy*understanding	0.01	0.01*
Joy*managing	0.01**	0.00

Note: Level 1, n = 113; Level 2, n = 29; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10

Table 4.16: RCM results for pride, TFC and EFC

	TFC	EFC
Beta ₀₀	2.51**	1.12**
Pride	0.12**	0.01
Perception	0.00	0.00
Using	0.00	0.00
Understanding	0.00	0.00
Managing	0.01	0.00
Pride*perception	0.00	0.01**
Pride*using	-0.01*	0.004**
Pride*understanding	-0.01	0.00
Pride*managing	0.01**	-0.01**

Note: Level 1, n = 113; Level 2, n = 29; **p < .01; *p < .05; † p < .10

Table 4.17: RCM results for behavioral outcomes with EI

	Task performance	OCBI	OCBO	WDB
Predictor	Full model	Full model	Full model	Full model
Beta ₀₀	4.51**	3.87**	3.59**	1.01**
TFC	-0.08	0.22*	0.14	-0.11**
EFC	0.42**	-0.33*	1.55**	-0.12**
EI	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.002**

Note:

Note: For Performance: Level 1, n = 85; and Level 2, n = 24

For OCBI: Level 1, n = 83; and Level 2, n = 24

For OCBO: Level 1, n = 79; and Level 2, n = 23

For WDB: Level 1, n = 83; and Level 2, n = 23

**p<.01; *p<.05; † p<.10

Table 4.18: Summary of supported hypotheses from Study 1 and Study 2

Number	statement	Study 1	Study 2	comments
H1	Anger → EFC	Not supported	Not tested	Significant interaction
H2	Anger → TFC	Not supported	Not supported	
H3	EI * anger → TFC	Not supported	Not supported	
H4	EI * anger → EFC	Not supported	Not supported	Significant, but opposite direction
H5	Guilt → EFC	Not supported	Not tested	Significant interaction
H6	Guilt → TFC	Not supported	Not tested	Significant interaction
H7	EI * guilt → TFC	Not supported	Not supported	Significant, but opposite direction
H8	EI * guilt → EFC	Not supported	Not supported	Significant, but opposite direction
H9	Joy → EFC	Not supported	Not tested	Significant interaction
H10	Joy → TFC	Not supported	Not supported	
H11	EI * joy → TFC	Not supported	Not supported	
H12	EI * joy → EFC	Not supported	Not supported	Significant, but opposite direction
H13	Pride → EFC	Not supported	Not supported	
H14	Pride → TFC	Supported	Supported	
H15	EI * pride → TFC	Not supported	Not supported	
H16	EI * pride → EFC	Not supported	Not supported	
H17	EI → TFC	Not supported	Not tested	Significant interaction
H18	EI → EFC	Not supported	Not tested	Significant interaction
H19	TFC → task performance.	Supported	Not supported	
H20	EFC → task performance.	Supported	Not supported	Significant, but opposite direction
H21	TFC → OCBI.	Supported	Supported	
H22	EFC → OCBI.	Not supported	Supported	
H23	TFC → OCBO.	NA		

H24	EFC → OCBO.	NA		
H25	TFC → WDB.	Not supported	Supported	
H26	EFC → WDB.	Supported	Not supported	Significant, but opposite direction

Table 4.19: Summary of supplemental analyses findings from Study 1 and Study 2

Emotion	Study 1	Study 2
Anger	anger * perception → EFC	anger * managing → TFC
	<i>anger * using → EFC</i>	<i>anger * using → EFC</i>
	<i>anger * managing → EFC</i>	<i>anger * managing → EFC</i>
Guilt	<i>guilt * perception → EFC</i>	guilt * perception → TFC
	<i>guilt * using → EFC</i>	guilt * using → TFC
		guilt * managing → TFC
		<i>guilt * perception → EFC</i>
		<i>guilt * using → EFC</i>
Joy	joy → TFC	joy * managing → TFC
		joy * understanding → EFC
Pride	pride → TFC	pride * using → TFC
		pride * managing → TFC
		pride*perception → EFC
		pride * using → EFC
		pride * managing → EFC
EI	EI → task performance	<i>EI → WDB</i>
	<i>EI → WDB</i>	
TFC	TFC → task performance	
	TFC → OCBI	
EFC	EFC → WDB	
Managing emotions	Managing → TFC	

Note: All findings common to both Study 1 and Study 2 are italicized. This implies that a particular relationship was significant in both studies but direction of relationships may vary.

Figure 4.1: Interaction of anger and perception on EFC




Figure 4.2: Interaction of anger and using emotions on EFC




Figure 4.3: Interaction of anger and managing emotions on EFC




Figure 4.4: Interaction of guilt and perception on EFC



Figure 4.5: Interaction of guilt and using emotions to facilitate thought on EFC




Figure 4.6: Interaction plot of guilt and EI on TFC




Figure 4.7: Interaction plot of anger and EI on EFC




Figure 4.8: Interaction plot of guilt and EI on EFC




Figure 4.9: Interaction plot of joy and EI on EFC




Figure 4.10: Interaction plot of anger and managing emotions on TFC




Figure 4.11: Interaction plot of anger and using emotions on EFC




Figure 4.12: Interaction plot of anger and managing emotions on EFC




Figure 4.13: Interaction plot of guilt and perception on TFC




Figure 4.14: Interaction plot of guilt and using on TFC




Figure 4.15: Interaction plot of guilt and managing on TFC




Figure 4.16: Interaction plot of guilt and perception on EFC




Figure 4.17: Interaction plot of guilt and using emotions on EFC




Figure 4.18: Interaction plot of joy and managing emotions on TFC




Figure 4.19: Interaction plot of joy and understanding emotions on EFC




Figure 4.20: Interaction plot of pride and using emotions on TFC




Figure 4.21: Interaction plot of pride and managing emotions on TFC




Figure 4.22: Interaction plot of pride and perception on EFC




Figure 4.23: Interaction plot of pride and using emotions on EFC





Figure 4.24: Interaction plot of pride and managing emotions on EFC



CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Based upon cognitive appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and the emerging research in EI (Jordan et al., 2002), I proposed two main ideas. First, I argued for the examination of discrete emotions rather than overarching positive and negative dimensions. Second, I argued that EI would play a significant role in the management of these discrete emotions, thus challenging conventional wisdom on the unbounded benefits of positive emotions and the perils of negative emotions.

In addition, I argued that emotions are necessarily dynamic constructs. As such, a proper examination should include designs that assess emotions in response to a specific event. Such arguments then set the stage for a laboratory (Study 1) and a longitudinal field study (Study 2). In this chapter, I first offer a discussion of results from Study 1, and Study 2 and then provide a discussion of integrated findings from both studies. I then present a commentary on theoretical and practical contributions of this research. I conclude with a discussion of limitations and future research directions that emerge from this research.

Study 1

The test of study hypotheses indicated support for only one discrete emotion, pride, and its relationship to Task focused coping (TFC). The positive effect of pride on TFC is consistent with previous studies demonstrating that pride is associated with goal

congruence, perceived fairness, and low situational demand (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Weiss et al., 1999). Pride is characterized by an approach motivation towards one's task and leads to greater task focus (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). I had proposed that this relationship would only hold for higher EI individuals because they manage their pride in a self-beneficial fashion. For lower EI individuals, I proposed that the darker side of pride (narcissism) could take over, resulting in lower TFC. This moderated relationship was not found. Although pride was positively related to TFC, it was not related to Emotion focused coping (EFC). This finding is not entirely uncommon because a positive emotion, such as pride, typically has stronger effects on TFC than EFC (c.f. Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The proposed relationships of anger, guilt, and joy with TFC and EFC failed to emerge, either as main effects or as moderated by EI.

Lack of support on the front end of the research model is largely driven by examination of global EI scores rather than the underlying dimensions. This is in line with arguments that such a dimensional level examination might be more appropriate (see also Mayer et al., 2003). Hypotheses were proposed at the level of overarching scores in keeping with prior work in this area (Côté & Miners, 2006). This viewpoint is further substantiated by the differing relationships each of the EI dimensions seem to have with the TFC and EFC constructs. In fact, some of the main effects of EI dimensions were not in the expected direction (e.g., negative relationship between managing emotions and TFC), suggesting that model respecification might be warranted from a future research standpoint. Alternatively stated, not all EI dimensions affected the coping constructs in presumed directions and, as such, uncovering those relationships at the overall score level might have been challenging. This issue is a limitation of my theorizing as well, and I

return to full discussion of this issue in the limitations section. To address this, I also conducted extensive supplemental analyses at the underlying EI dimensional levels to further investigate study relationships. These analyses seemed to support my reasoning above that most study relationships emerged at a finer level of detail than at the global level. I return to a full discussion of these supplemental analyses findings shortly, however, for now I note that examination of global EI scores combined with examination of all discrete emotions simultaneously might have played a role in the lack of support for the front end of my research model in Study 1.

On the back end of my research model (coping → behavioral outcomes), the results are a little more promising. Here, the most straightforward result is the positive relationship between TFC and task performance. TFC involves an approach motivation towards tasks and is therefore associated with better task performance (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Park et al., 2004). TFC includes active coping, planning, restraint coping, suppression of competing activities and positive reinterpretation and growth, all of which are presumed to enhance task focus (e.g., Carver et al., 1989). The negative relationship between EFC and task performance is also consistent with theory (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002). EFC is associated with lowered task performance because it is a coping strategy that is symptom-focused and includes an avoidance motivation. It involves denial, a focus on venting emotions, behavioral and mental disengagement and alcohol disengagement, which necessarily take away from task focus, thus causing decrements in task performance (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002).

The interesting and novel result for organizational research is the positive relationship between TFC and intended OCBI. The OCBI literature has long-standing

support for the positive relationship between OCBI and both positive moods and emotions (e.g., George & Brief, 1992; George, 1991; Lee & Allen, 2002). This study casts light on a potential intervening cognitive mechanism that helps explain how people translate the motivational energy provided by positive emotions into OCBI. TFC is characterized by an approach motivation that serves as an energizing base. This energizing base allows an individual to direct her/his approach motivational energy to helping coworkers, assuming extra responsibilities and other behaviors known as OCBI.

Past research indicated that negative emotions are positively associated with WDB (Barclay et al., 2005; Lee & Allen, 2002). Our knowledge of the intervening mechanisms that lead people to engage in WDBs is sparse. The positive relationship between EFC and WDB sheds light on these elusive potential intervening mechanisms. EFC is a strategy that drives people to alleviate the felt emotion. An individual who engages in EFC seeks to restore a sense of equity by retaliation, slighting coworkers, stealing office supplies and aggression against the wrongdoer. The proposed negative relationships between EFC and OCBI and the negative relationship between TFC and WDB failed to emerge. Next, I turn to a discussion of findings from the supplemental analyses.

Anger results from a primary appraisal of an undesirable event and a secondary appraisal of *other* blame (Weiss et al., 1999). The core relational theme (CRT) for anger is a self-demeaning offense (Lazarus, 1991). While experiencing anger, the overwhelming motivation for an individual is to correct the wrongdoing. It was proposed that higher EI individuals would respond to such a motivation with greater task focus because it is most self-beneficial, and lower EI individuals would respond to such a

motivation with greater emotion focus. I had also suggested the every dimension of EI will act in the same direction as overall EI (see pages 40-41). Although the relationships uncovered were mostly consistent with theory, a few counterintuitive relationships emerged as well.

The effects of anger on EFC were stronger than they were on TFC. In fact, anger was not negatively related to TFC as expected. First, with EFC serving as the dependent variable, the interaction of perception and anger was in the expected direction. Individuals who are better able to perceive anger engage in less EFC because they recognize the potential for self harm. The interaction of using emotions to facilitate thought and anger may seem counterintuitive because higher scores on this dimension are associated with increased EFC. However, this relationship is indicative of the idea that if one had higher scores on perception and was able to think through emotional information, then they would engage in EFC as the ability to manage emotions has not kicked in yet. Recall that the core theme of anger is a self demeaning offense and the overwhelming motivation provided by this emotion is to correct the wrongdoing, which could lead to venting, denial and disengagement, all forms of EFC. This would likely be the pattern if the EI construct did not include a higher ability that draws upon such emotional information and facilitates more adaptive forms of coping. This relationship emerges with the managing dimension of EI. The interaction between managing emotions and anger revealed that higher scores on managing emotions are associated with decreased EFC. Thus, an individual who perceives anger only (without thinking about what they are feeling or managing it) will likely engage in lesser EFC almost as an instinctual survival mechanism. However, the individual who perceives anger and thinks through

what they are feeling and how that anger came about might engage in higher EFC as a result of a partial (and incomplete) interplay between emotion and cognition. The individual that perceives anger, thinks through it and manages it effectively engages in lowered EFC, offering a complete interplay between cognition and emotion. One question that might occur to the general reader is why should we even account for the underlying EI dimensions in this instance when managing emotions seems to drive most of the total effects of anger on coping. I offer the suggestion that this information becomes relevant from a diagnostic and intervention perspective, and I address this in the implications section (see also Mayer et al., 2003).

From the analyses of anger and TFC, managing emotions had a negative relationship with TFC. This relationship is surprising in that I had posited that higher scores on this dimension would lead to higher TFC. However, that does not seem to be the case. Individuals with higher scores on this dimension would necessarily have higher scores on all lower EI dimensions (i.e., perception, using emotions and understanding emotions) because EI is a hierarchical, multidimensional construct (Mayer et al., 2003). This relationship seems to imply that perceiving anger, thinking about the emotion eliciting event, and understanding the transition from other emotional states to anger actually is associated with decrements in task focus. This relationship could also speak to one fundamental theoretical proposition in that higher scores on managing emotions ultimately will cause people to choose the *most self-beneficial* coping strategy (Mayer et al., 1999). Based on this position, I had proposed that TFC is a self-beneficial coping strategy and a positive relationship between managing emotions and TFC might be expected. In actuality, this relationship could indicate that individuals might not always

view TFC (e.g., actively coping, restraint coping, in this case) as the most self beneficial coping strategy. Consider restraint coping for example. Adopting restraint means not acting and waiting until the right opportunity to do so. However, individuals with higher scores on managing are better able to handle the emotion information (e.g., anger) and consequently might prefer resolving the event immediately. This is because suppression and accumulation of negative emotions such as anger eventually lead to negative health consequences (cf. Izard, 1991; Berkowitz, 1998), and that goes against the notion of what the managing emotions ability does to people. Even with another dimension of TFC such as positive reinterpretation and growth, similar arguments might be made. Over and above everything else, anger renders the individual very vigilant to the task at hand, and anger (like all negative emotions) drives people to closely analyze and scrutinize things (cf. Ortony et al, 1988). In such an instance, positive reinterpretation might act as a double edged sword in that it could reflect too rosy a worldview which the individual with higher scores on managing is not disposed towards. In sum, this relationship calls for some modifications to my original theorizing in that the relationship between managing emotions and TFC might not be as straightforward as I had expected. This recommendation is driven by two main thoughts. First, TFC might not always be the best coping strategy. Second, my original research model might be improved by taking into account the goodness of fit hypothesis (on page 28, I had alluded to this in my theorizing, but had not incorporated it for the sake of simplicity), which suggests that the choice of a specific coping strategy is contingent on the perceived control the individual has over the emotion event (Park et al., 2004).

In conclusion, perceiving emotions accurately, and thinking through them could actually lead people to engage in lesser TFC and more EFC. A more complete perspective is offered by the examination of managing emotions, which is partially consistent with theoretical predictions that individuals with the ability to manage emotions effectively will engage in lower EFC (because of potential self harm) and TFC (because it might not be the most self-beneficial) while experiencing a negative intense emotion such as anger.

Guilt results from a perceived displeasure at a specific action, event or interpersonal interaction (Lazarus, 1999). Guilt is distinct from anger because the blame for such displeasure rests with oneself rather than another (Lazarus, 1999). The core relational theme of guilt is perceived failure of living up to certain personal or societal standards (Lazarus, 1999). In the remainder of my discussion of relationships, I will discuss the relationships that are specific to that emotion. For example, the main effect of managing on TFC has been discussed above for anger, and for the sake of conciseness, I will not go over the same discussion again.

With EFC serving as the dependent variable, I note that the interactions of perception and guilt and using emotions and guilt on EFC follow the same pattern of associations as noted earlier on with anger. An individual who only perceives guilt (without thinking about what they are feeling or managing it) will likely engage in lesser EFC almost as an instinctual survival mechanism. However, the individual who perceives guilt and thinks through what they are feeling and how that guilt came about might engage in higher EFC as a result of a partial (and incomplete) interplay between emotion and cognition.

The appraisal structure of joy is straightforward in that it results from a primary appraisal only of perceived goal congruence and a favorable future expectancy (Lazarus, 1991). Consistent with theoretical expectations, joy had a positive relationship with TFC. As per cognitive appraisal theory, joy is characterized by a primary appraisal of goal congruence and a more favorable future expectancy. As such, those experiencing joy are free to focus their attention on task-related activities. This relationship, while in line with prior research (e.g., Herrald & Tomaka, 2001; Izard, 1991), is not novel to this study.

Pride and joy share the primary appraisal that causes them in that they both include a primary appraisal of goal congruence (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). But pride is distinct from joy in that the credit for such goal congruence is attributable to oneself (Lazarus, 1991; 1999; Ortony et al., 1988). Pride was positively related to TFC and this relationship has already been discussed fully before.

I now turn to a discussion of the relationships that emerged from the supplemental analyses relating coping to behavioral outcomes. EI was positively related to task performance. This relationship is in line with recently emerging literature that EI could predict task performance beyond general mental ability (Lyons & Schneider, 2005; Cote & Saveedra, 2006).

The results with intended WDB are novel and unique. EI was negatively related to intended WDB. Given the current interest in organizational literature on research focused to help curtail or manage WDB, this is an important finding. One might expect to see this relationship as EI has been linked to lesser deviance in the psychology literature (Brackett et al., 2005). Several scholars have recently echoed calls for research

focusing on individual difference variables that could relate to the potential for WDB (Barclay et al., 2005; Lee & Allen, 2002). This study answers such calls.

Study 2

Study 2 was conducted for two main reasons. First, I wanted to assess generalizability of findings from Study 1 to a work sample. Second, the study of discrete emotions in a field setting is sparse at best in the management literature. The few studies that have been conducted fail to account for the dynamic nature of discrete emotions, necessitating a longitudinal repeated measures design. This study contributes to the emotion literature on these two counts, at the least.

The findings from hypothesis testing were much better and richer than in the lab studies for the emotion to coping part of my research model. To the best of my knowledge, which includes a literature review, this is the first study of its kind to investigate the effects of anger and guilt in an organizational sample, and it yielded some interesting findings. The main plausible reason for the paucity of organizational research on anger and guilt is that they are intense and short lived by nature. Furthermore, guilt, especially, is hard to capture in field settings. From a theoretical standpoint, I posited that high EI individuals would engage in more TFC and less EFC when experiencing both anger and guilt. Likewise, I posited that low EI individuals would engage in more EFC and less TFC when experiencing anger and guilt.

The interaction findings with regard to guilt seem counter intuitive at first glance, as the interaction plot of guilt and EI (see Figure 4.6) revealed that low EI individuals engaged in higher TFC as guilt increased. The higher EI individual maintained the same level of task focus as prior to experiencing guilt. This finding indicates that higher EI

individuals are able to perceive and reason through guilt and maintain task focus. The vigilance motivation of guilt signals that all is not well and the high EI individual is task focused after experiencing guilt. The low EI individual engages in higher task focus, but the curious aspect of this relationship is the *sharp* increase in such task focus. Further examination of the interaction plot revealed that this effect is almost a perfect linear relationship. I think this relationship is a function of the CRT of guilt (the perceived failure to live up to personal or societal standards) and the low EI individual's efforts to assuage self blame. If one considered the context of this study, this relationship becomes somewhat more conceptually explicable. For example, one of the events driving an officer's guilt in this study was the discovery of a child sexual predator. This resulted in the officer expressing guilt, as he felt he had let down the children of the community. He further expressed disappointment at a world in which such things could occur, and the event description was marked by self reproach and regret. Yet, this officer had to attend to other events as well throughout the day (one of which was a press briefing) that demanded his attention. In such an instance, the low EI individual exclusively focuses on the one event that causes such self reproach and overcompensates on that task, maybe even at the expense of other tasks. However, the higher EI individual maintains the task focus (attributable to the vigilance component of guilt), yet also does not neglect other tasks at hand.

Moreover, recall that TFC is composed of such components as suppression of competing activities. In this sample, individuals have to attend to multiple tasks even while experiencing the target emotion, and as such, the ability to neglect other activities might not necessarily be the best strategy for their overall performance. In summary, I

find this relationship very interesting and novel as the effects of EI on coping might be more intricate than I had originally proposed. The above relationship seems to signal that the stability of task focus for higher EI individuals might be the most self-beneficial strategy for that individual. The marked increase in task focus for the low EI individual speaks to compliance (and overcompensation) at the cost of personal well being. This interpretation leads us to the findings related to the interaction of guilt and EI on EFC. The interaction plot of guilt and EI (see Figure 4.8) indicated that higher EI individuals engaged in increased EFC and lower EI individuals engaged in decreased EFC as guilt increased. The interesting aspect of this finding, when taken together with the finding regarding to TFC above, is that high EI individuals maintained their task focus and engaged in more EFC as guilt increased. This is a remarkable finding in that the ability to accurately perceive, reason through and manage emotions seems to have an effect beyond what I had originally conceptualized. These individuals seem to function at a higher level of coping than is normally presumed, even in the coping literature (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Ultimately, I think this further lends support to the most critical proposition of EI. It is an ability that helps people deal with emotions in the most self-beneficial fashion. In the case of guilt, that effect seems to be playing out with *both* stability in task focus (TFC) and simultaneous attempts at resolving the symptoms of the emotion (EFC).

The interaction plot of anger and EI (see Figure 4.7) revealed that both high and low EI individuals engaged in increased EFC as anger increased. This effect was more pronounced for higher EI individuals than lower EI individuals. The interaction effect of anger and EI on TFC failed to emerge. However, the finding with respect to EFC might

yet reflect the nature of EI as an ability that helps people deal with emotions in the most self-beneficial fashion. I note here that much of my theorizing did not account for the goodness of fit hypothesis I referred to earlier in the discussion for Study 1 and in theoretical development. This point of view suggests that while experiencing emotions, the most self-beneficial strategy for an individual is contingent on the perceived control one has over the emotion eliciting event. Park et al., (2004) demonstrated that components of EFC such as avoidance (denial and disengagement in this research) and emotion approach (similar to focus on venting emotions) might be the more adaptive coping strategies when perceived control is low. In this sample, anger is elicited under extreme conditions. For example, consider one anger eliciting event in this study. An officer expressed extreme anger at a driver with an expired tag who also ran a stop sign. While the officer was trying to resolve the incident, this individual continued speaking on a cell phone, and the officer reported being angry and frustrated at the driver's attitude. Now, consider the components of EFC. It includes focus on venting emotion, denial, behavioral and mental disengagement, and alcohol disengagement. All of these components could be temporary adaptive coping strategies in this case, as the event in question was, including its timely resolution (as the driver refused to get off the cell phone and got mad at the officer for asking her to do so), a bit beyond the control of the officer. In this instance, the officer voiced disbelief (denial component of EFC) at the driver's attitude.

The interaction of joy and EI was also somewhat counter intuitive at first glance. This interaction (see Figure 4.9) revealed that high EI individuals engaged in increased EFC while low EI individuals engaged in decreased EFC as joy increased. This

relationship along with the findings, for anger seem to further support the goodness of fit hypothesis in that the context of the emotion eliciting event and perceived control make a difference as to which form of coping might be the most adaptive. Here, the high EI individual seems to favor EFC over TFC with the experience of most emotions.

Wherever plausible, higher EI individuals seem to engage in both TFC and EFC to a greater extent than low EI individuals. However, wherever this plausibly exceeds their psychological and cognitive resources, they seem to choose EFC. This idea of EFC emerging as the more adaptive coping strategy in this context will become somewhat clearer when I discuss the findings relating EFC to behavioral outcomes. In addition, I note that pride was positively related to TFC both in study 1 and this study. The positive effect of pride on TFC is consistent with theoretical predictions that pride is associated with goal congruence, perceived fairness, and low situational demand (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Weiss et al., 1999). Pride is characterized by an approach motivation towards one's task and leads to greater task focus (Lazarus, 1991; 1999). In summary, for the findings from emotion to coping hypotheses from study 2, I note that one interaction and one main effect were significant for TFC. However, three of the four proposed interactions were significant relating to EFC. EFC also seemed to emerge as the more adaptive coping strategy, and this is further explained below.

The results from the coping-to-behavioral-outcomes part of my model are even more surprising. Interestingly, EFC was positively related to task performance. This is unexpected, as I had earlier suggested that EFC would be negatively related to performance. But in retrospect and given this finding, I think this relationship suggests that when the emotional event is beyond the control of the individual, EFC might be the

most self-beneficial coping strategy. Again, I note here that much of my theorizing did *not* account for the goodness of fit hypothesis. This point of view suggests that while experiencing emotions, the most self-beneficial strategy for an individual is contingent on the perceived control one has over the emotion eliciting event. In this sample, emotions are elicited under extreme conditions and some components of EFC (e.g., behavioral and mental disengagement) might be the most self-beneficial strategy, at least temporarily. This is one explanation for the positive association between EFC and performance. I offer the following perspective from Carver et al (1989) to lend support to my position that EFC might sometimes be the most self-beneficial coping strategy:

“We should reemphasize that coping responses discussed in this section may well be beneficial for some people in some situations, whereas they might not be beneficial for other people or in other situations (c.f. Wortman & Lehman, 1985). To put it differently, a given coping strategy may not be intrinsically maladaptive, but may become dysfunctional if it is relied on for long periods when other strategies are more useful. This general question—when a coping response is adaptive and when it is not—would seem to deserve a good deal of additional attention from researchers.” (Carver et al, 1989, p. 269).

Next, I turn to a discussion of OCBI findings. As expected, TFC had a positive effect on OCBI. Task-focused coping involves an approach motivation rather than avoidance motivation. With this approach motivation as the energizing base, an individual who is presented with a request for help is more likely to comply with that request even if it is not a part of her/his job description. This argument further suggests that an individual is more likely to direct her/his approach motivational energy toward helping coworkers, assuming extra responsibilities and other such behaviors known as OCBI. The negative effect of EFC on OCBI was also as expected. In emotion-focused coping, the motivational base is mainly avoidance. As such, the individual is more likely to deny the gravity of the event and withdraw from coworkers. In this case, one employs

a more repressive form of coping, which essentially isolates her/him from the environs. One's energy is focused upon the ongoing emotion experience. In this frame of mind, an individual is less likely to engage in both forms of OCBs.

Interestingly, both EFC and TFC had a negative effect on WDB. The relationship for TFC with WDB is as expected, however the relationship between EFC and WDB seems a bit counter intuitive. This finding might indicate that as long as the individual is engaged in resolving the event itself or the symptoms of the emotion, they are less likely to engage in any form of extra role behaviors. Taken together with the findings from task performance, the pattern that emerges seems to be getting more informative. The choice of TFC as a coping strategy predisposes people to increments in OCBI and decrements in WDB. The choice of EFC as a coping strategy predisposes people to better task performance, decrements in OCBI and decrements in WDB. In sum, TFC seems to allow people to engage in extra role behaviors even at the expense of task related performance at times. This is because TFC involves approach motivation and it disposes people to be more compliant with regard to extra role behaviors. However, EFC allows people to perform better, yet not engage in extra role behaviors, whether positive or negative. I find this pattern very encouraging, as EFC includes vigilance motivation in addition to avoidance motivation as an energizing base. These findings indicate that vigilance motivation drives people to perform better, while avoidance motivation seems to isolate them from any form of extra role behaviors. Consider an example from an academic setting. A scholar might be incredibly well published and perform top rate research but might not necessarily engage in extra role behaviors that benefit the organization or coworkers. In fact, some might even argue that

such exclusion of extra role behaviors might be necessary in order to enhance task performance. Now, I turn to a discussion of findings from supplemental analyses. In the interest of conciseness, I will fully discuss findings that are unique up to this point. Where findings replicate Study 1 findings or the findings from the previous sections in Study 2, I simply make note of such similarity, presuming that the same interpretation applies.

The interactions of anger and managing resulted in lowered TFC for the individual with higher scores on managing. Simultaneously, I note that the interaction of anger and managing resulted in the higher EI individual engaging in increased EFC. These findings are consistent with the findings reported earlier for overall EI in that individuals with higher EI cope with the emotion eliciting event by focusing on the emotion itself, as this could be the most self-beneficial strategy, given the lack of perceived control over the eliciting event. The interaction finding with regard to anger and using emotions to facilitate thought revealed that individuals with both high and low scores on this dimension engaged in increased EFC, with this effect being more pronounced for those with higher scores. Taken together with the finding for managing emotions and, ultimately, overall EI, the individual with lower scores on using emotions might ultimately benefit from the ability to manage emotions effectively, as that seems to drive the increase in EFC.

The findings for guilt and the dimensions of EI are a little more complex. The direction of the interaction for perception and using showed that higher scores on these dimensions lead to decreased TFC as guilt increased. However, the interaction effect of managing emotions and guilt on TFC revealed that higher scores on managing led to

increased TFC as guilt increased, while the converse was true for lower scores on this dimension. This finding is counter to the one found for overall EI. I speculate that when taken together (i.e., all dimensions together), the negative effects of perception and using and the positive effect of managing emotion on TFC ultimately resulted in the stability of TFC for higher overall EI individuals. However, if one were only examining the effect of the managing emotions dimension, higher scores on this dimension drive TFC, at least for guilt. This could be a peculiar effect for guilt, with its heavy underpinnings of self reproach and overcompensation at the cost of personal well being. The findings for guilt, perception and using emotions to facilitate thought on EFC are more consistent with those uncovered for overall EI. Interestingly, those with higher scores on these dimensions engaged in increased EFC as guilt increased, while those with lower scores displayed stability in EFC as guilt increased.

The findings for joy are revealing as well. Here, I found that while experiencing joy, higher scores on managing led to increased TFC and higher scores on understanding led to increased EFC. Interestingly, when these two interactions are interpreted together, individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in greater TFC and those with higher scores on understanding engaged in increased EFC. This finding is consistent with earlier discussion on overall EI, wherein higher EI individuals engaged in increased EFC. Thus, individuals with higher scores on EI and higher scores on two of its dimensions (understanding and managing) engaged in both TFC and EFC as joy increased. This information might have relevance from a practical standpoint as noted later.

Managing emotions and pride interacted to produce a similar effect on TFC as in the case of joy. Here, I found that while experiencing pride, higher scores on managing led to increased TFC. However, using emotions to facilitate thought led to decreased TFC. These findings with regard to pride and TFC reveal that different EI dimensions do different things. If one were to think through the experience of pride and its implications for coping, then the individual with a higher ability to reason through pride related information (self satisfaction with no imperative for increased task focus) engaged in decreased TFC. However, if one were to be focused on managing the emotion, the individual with higher scores on managing emotions engaged in increased TFC. The interactions of pride with perception and using revealed that individuals with higher scores on these dimensions engaged in increased EFC as pride increased. Furthermore, the interaction of pride and managing revealed that higher scores on managing led to decreased EFC. Taken together with the findings for pride and TFC, higher scores on perception and using led to increased EFC and decreased TFC. However, managing emotions offers an interface of the intelligence component of EI with one's personality. Thus, the individual with higher scores on managing curbs the narcissistic side of pride by engaging in less EFC. For example, s/he might not talk so much about how proud they are (focus on venting emotions component of EFC) and not isolate themselves from coworkers or tasks (behavioral and mental disengagement). The reverse is true for the individual with lower scores on managing, with decrements in task focus and increments in emotion focus. Following Ortony and colleagues (1988), in Chapter 2, I had labeled such an effect the swollen head syndrome, and the individual with lower scores on managing seems unable to curtail it.

Overall Discussion

In this section, I attempt to integrate the findings from Study 1 and Study 2 and discuss the implications thereof. At this point in this document, the general reader is aware of the incredible complexity in findings from this research. My task at this stage is to offer a coherent take away message for management scholars. With this motive in mind, I first present a discussion of the coping to behavioral outcomes part of my research model as this does two things. First, it quickly points out the “so what” aspect of this research for management scholars. Second, it lends lucidity to the discussion of the emotions-coping part of my research model that will follow.

With regard to behavioral outcomes, from Study 1, TFC and EFC related positively and negatively, respectively, with task performance. TFC was also positively related to intended OCBI while EFC was positively related to intended WDB. The positive relationship between EFC and intended WDB sheds light on these elusive intervening mechanisms. EFC is a strategy that drives people to alleviate the felt emotion. An individual who engages in EFC seeks to restore a sense of equity by retaliation, slighting coworkers, stealing office supplies and directing aggression against the wrongdoer. EI was negatively related to intended WDB. Given the current interest in organizational literature on research focused to help curtail or manage WDB (e.g., Barclay et al., 2005), this is an important finding.

From Study 2, EFC was positively related to task performance. This relationship suggests that when the emotional event is beyond the control of the individual, EFC might be the most adaptive coping strategy¹. The goodness of fit point of view suggests that while experiencing emotions, the most self beneficial strategy for an individual is

¹ Assuming adaptive coping facilitates task performance

contingent on the perceived control one has over the emotion eliciting event. In this sample, emotions are elicited under extreme conditions and some components of EFC (e.g., behavioral and mental disengagement) might be the most self beneficial strategy, at least temporarily. This explains the positive association between EFC and task performance. Similarly, EFC was positively related to OCBO. I suspect that in this particular organization, OCBO is almost seen as a component of task performance as it includes items such as “show pride when representing the organization in public”, “express loyalty toward the organization” and “demonstrate concern about the image of the organization”. One of the stated missions of police officers is courtesy towards the general public (also courtesy from dispatch and communications employees) and law enforcement employees are, inherently, proud of their organizational affiliation. However, EFC was negatively related to both OCBI and WDB, indicating that individuals who engaged in EFC might outperform those who engaged in lesser EFC with respect to the task at hand. However, they do not engage in positive or negative extra role behaviors (i.e., OCBI and WDB). Those engaged in TFC do not accrue task performance related benefits, yet they engage in more OCBI and less WDB.

Summary: When the emotion event is perceived as controllable, TFC led to better task performance and intended OCBI. EFC led to lowered task performance and greater intended WDB. EI was negatively related to intended WDB. When the emotion event is perceived as less controllable, EFC led to better task performance, more OCBOs and less OCBI and WDB. TFC on the other hand, led to more OCBI only and less WDB. EI was negatively related to WDB.

Now, I turn to an integration of findings from both studies for the emotion to coping part of my model. In the interest of conciseness and coherence, I address overall EI findings where such effects were found first for TFC and then for EFC. Wherever such overall EI effects were not found, I discuss dimension level EI findings. First, I address the findings with regard to anger. From the lab study, it was found that the individual that perceives anger thinks through it and manages it effectively, engages in lowered EFC, offering a complete interplay between cognition and emotion. This finding is consistent with my theorizing in that individuals with higher scores on these dimensions of EI actually engaged in lesser EFC, even in the face of an intense negative emotion such as anger. This relationship is particularly appealing as EFC was negatively related to task performance, and positively related to intended WDB in this study.

From Study 2, it was found that both high and low EI individuals engaged in increased EFC as anger increased. However, this effect was more pronounced for higher EI individuals. This result might seem contradictory to that of Study 1. However, upon closer examination the following pattern emerges. Study 2 differed from Study 1 in the control that the target individual might have perceived over the emotion eliciting event. This point of view suggests that while experiencing emotions in real settings (not a simulated setting), the most self beneficial strategy for an individual is contingent on the perceived control one has over the emotion eliciting event. In this sample, anger is elicited under extreme conditions. The higher EI individual engaged in increased EFC as ultimately EFC is positively related to task performance and OCBOs, and negatively related to WDB. However, EFC was also negatively related to OCBI in this study. With

regard to dimensions of EI, the same general pattern emerged, i.e., higher scores on EI dimensions led to increased EFC.

Summary: For anger, where one perceives that the emotion event is under one's control, the individual with higher scores on EI (or its dimensions) engaged in lesser EFC than the individual with lower scores on EI (or its dimensions). Where one might not perceive as much control over the emotion eliciting event, the higher EI individual engaged in more EFC than the lower EI individual. From both studies, one finding would seem apparent and consistent: Higher EI individuals eventually pick the coping strategy that better facilitates task performance and reduces WDB. Where events are not under one's control, the higher EI individual acts in an almost selfish fashion by focusing exclusively on increments in her/his task performance, without necessarily performing extra role behaviors (specifically OCBI).

Guilt results from a perceived displeasure at a specific action, event or interpersonal interaction (Lazarus, 1999). Guilt is distinct from anger because the blame for such displeasure rests with oneself rather than another (Lazarus, 1999). From Study 1, the individual who more accurately perceives guilt and thinks through what they are feeling (perception and using dimensions of EI) and how that guilt came about engages in higher EFC as a result of a partial (and incomplete) interplay between emotion and cognition. From Study 1, it can be gleaned that the ability to accurately perceive and reason through emotional information is *actually detrimental* to the individuals' ultimate task performance (because of higher EFC) in the absence of the managing emotions ability.

From Study 2, the interaction of guilt and EI (see Figure 4.6) revealed that higher EI individuals showed a stable level of TFC, while low EI individuals engaged in higher TFC as guilt increased. The interaction of guilt and EI (see Figure 4.8) indicated that higher EI individuals engaged in increased EFC and lower EI individuals engaged in decreased EFC as guilt increased. The interesting aspect of this finding, especially when taken together with the finding with regard to TFC above, is that high EI individuals showed stability in TFC and engaged in more EFC as guilt increased. This is a remarkable finding in that the ability to accurately perceive, reason through and manage emotions seems to have an effect beyond what I had originally conceptualized.

Summary: When the emotion eliciting event is perceived as being under one's control, the ability to perceive and reason through emotion information (EI dimensions) was detrimental to that individual's task performance and led to greater intended WDB due to increments in EFC. When guilt is experienced in a real setting and events might be beyond one's control, the higher EI individual showed stability in TFC paired with higher EFC, which translates into better performance, more OCBI and OCBO and less WDB. For the low EI individual in the real setting, the experience of guilt results in a marked increase in TFC, leading to more OCBI, perhaps at the expense of task performance. This finding seems to speak to the CRT of guilt, in that low EI individuals overcompensate at the cost of personal well being.

From Study 1, joy had a positive relationship with TFC. From Study 2, the interaction of joy and EI revealed that high EI individuals engaged in increased EFC and low EI individuals engaged in decreased EFC as joy increased. This relationship along with the findings for anger seem to further support the goodness of fit hypothesis in that

the context of the emotion eliciting event and perceived control make a difference to which form of coping might be the most adaptive. Thus, individuals with higher scores on EI and higher scores on two of its dimensions (understanding and managing) engaged in both TFC and EFC as joy increased. Thus, with the experience of joy, the higher EI individual engaged in higher EFC, with associated increments in performance and OCBOs and lesser WDB. Only individuals with higher scores on managing emotions could channel the motivational energy inherent in joy into better TFC, while the individual with lower scores on managing showed decrements in TFC. This last result places bounds on the benefits of positive emotions such as joy for the individual with the lower ability to manage emotions. This has been my argument all along in that it challenges Broaden and Build theory's proposition of boundless benefits of positive emotions.

Summary: Note the change in patterns for TFC and EFC as we progress from an examination of the negative emotions (anger and guilt) to a more positive emotion, joy. The individual with higher scores on managing emotions and overall EI engaged in higher TFC and EFC, respectively, with associated improvements in task performance, OCBOs, OCBI and decrements in WDB, as joy increased.

From Study 1, pride has a positive effect on TFC. Since there were no interaction findings from Study 1, the discussion offered for Study 2 is relevant with regard to the interaction of pride and EI dimensions. From study 2, I found that while experiencing pride, higher scores on managing led to increased TFC. However, higher scores on using emotions to facilitate thought led to decreased TFC, while experiencing pride. If one were to think through the experience of pride and its implications for coping, then the

individual with a higher ability to reason through pride related information (self satisfaction with no imperative for increased task focus) engaged in decreased TFC. However, if one were to be focused on managing the emotion, the individual with higher scores on managing emotions engaged in increased TFC. The interactions of pride with perception and using revealed that individuals with higher scores on these dimensions engaged in increased EFC as pride increased. Furthermore, the interaction of pride and managing revealed that higher scores on managing led to decreased EFC. Taken together with the findings for pride and TFC, higher scores on perception and using led to increased EFC and decreased TFC. However, managing emotions offers an interface of the intelligence component of EI with one's personality. Thus, the individual with higher scores on managing curbs the narcissistic side of pride by engaging in less EFC. For example, s/he might not talk so much about how proud they are (focus on venting emotions component of EFC) and not isolate themselves from coworkers or tasks(behavioral and mental disengagement). The reverse is true for the individual with lower scores on managing, with decrements in task focus and increments in emotion focus. Following Ortony and colleagues (1988), in Chapter 2, I had labeled such an effect the swollen head syndrome and the individual with lower scores on managing seems unable to curtail it. These findings suggest that while, experiencing pride, individuals with higher scores on managing engaged in greater TFC and lesser EFC, thus engaging in more OCBI's (perhaps at the cost of task performance) and less WDB. Individuals with lower scores on managing engaged in less TFC and increased EFC, thus performing better with respect to the task at hand and engaging in more OCBO's (but not OCBI's). This effect of lower managing is consistent with narcissistic pride wherein these

individuals might be really good with respect to task performance but not pleasant to work with and/or not inclined to help out coworkers.

Summary: Pride differs from joy in that the motivational base of pride includes a substantial component of self satisfaction. The findings from pride indicated that individuals with a higher ability to manage emotions engaged in a lowered task focus, thus being more open to requests for help from coworkers and such other behaviors constituting OCBI. I see this effect as their (individuals with a higher ability to manage emotions) effort at managing the narcissistic side of pride. For the individuals, with a lower ability to manage emotions, pride brought about increments in EFC with associated increments in task performance and OCBI, but at the expense of OCBI.

Contributions to Theory and Practice

This research incorporates current theory from the academic psychology and emotion literatures to present a more holistic approach to examining the meaning of and consequences of emotions. This research contributes to the existing literature on several counts, as noted below.

From a theoretical standpoint, this study contributes to existing emotion literature by articulating the chain of events that unfold after the elicitation of four intense discrete emotions: anger, guilt, joy and pride. Sutton and Staw (1995) called for sound theories that tell a good story and have explanatory power. The role of coping answers this call by offering explanatory cognitive mechanisms between felt emotion and behaviors. The differing effects of anger, guilt, joy and pride in their implications for coping point at the value of examining discrete emotions.

Furthermore, from a theoretical standpoint, note that anger and guilt eventually result in different effects on behavioral outcomes via their effects on coping. More specifically, guilt and anger both seem to drive the high EI individual towards EFC, which in turn results in higher performance, OCBOs and less WDB. However, guilt differed from anger in that it was also associated with stability in TFC, thus implying that while experiencing guilt, high EI individuals were more likely to engage in OCBI than when they experienced anger. For the low EI individual though, there are no performance related benefits while experiencing anger and guilt. However, while experiencing guilt, low EI individuals show a marked increase in TFC, thus engaging in more OCBI, perhaps at the expense of performance. The reason I highlight the differences between the anger and guilt is that these differences point at the value of examining discrete emotions rather than overarching dimensions. For example, Lee and Allen (2002) found that the negative discrete emotion of fear was positively related to OCBI. This finding, along with the one for guilt in this research, suggests that certain negative discrete emotions might be drivers of extra role behaviors directed towards other individuals. These findings might have gone undetected by examining overall positive and negative emotion dimensions.

House, Shane and Harold (1996) have called for the examination of stable dispositional influences on work-related variables. This research answers that call through the investigation of the role of EI and its dimensions. Furthermore, this type of theorizing unraveled some implications of emotions and EI that have largely been unexplored in management literature. From both studies, the novel contribution of this research lies in the role played by EI (and wherever applicable, its dimensions) in

affecting the emotion to coping relationship. The overarching theme from both studies is that higher EI individuals manage emotions in ways that better facilitate task performance and lead to lowered WDB. This finding is a particularly important one on several counts. First, this is the first research of its kind to unravel these relationships between EI and behaviors in a field setting. Second, these relationships emerged in Study 1 even after controlling for GMA, thus pointing at the unique contribution of EI over GMA in helping explain variability in these outcomes.

Furthermore, even research examining discrete emotions previously found that negative discrete emotions such as hostility lead to greater incidence of WDB (e.g., Lee & Allen, 2002). However, as Lee and Allen noted, this effect ignored the influence of stable individual differences that might contribute to decrements in WDB, even with the experience of negative emotions. In this research, findings suggest that EI is one such individual difference, and that should, at the very least, cause us to re-examine prevalent theoretical propositions concerning the detrimental effect of negative emotions.

Had I stopped at Study 1, the more intricate pattern of findings from Study 2 would have gone undetected. However, Study 2 opened up some very interesting possibilities. For one, Study 2 revealed different patterns of relationships for emotions and coping. Study 2 highlights the significance of examining these relationships in real time settings. Much prior research in coping has been conducted in laboratory settings only (e.g., Herald & Tomaka, 2002), due to the inherent difficulty in capturing intense emotions very close to their actual occurrence in natural settings. This study achieved that goal, at least to some degree, and our knowledge of how natural settings can drastically affect the relationship between emotions and coping is advanced.

Alternatively, Study 2 could also reflect sample specific findings in that the emotion eliciting events in this sample are extreme, and law enforcement might subtly allow for a culture of denial, disengagement and alcohol disengagement (all components of EFC) to help people deal with such events. Even if it were the case that Study 2 findings are sample specific, these results might generalize to similar settings with intense emotion demands such as the healthcare, military and the travel industries. Consider a medical doctor who has to treat a patient with a terminal disease. This could cause the doctor some amount of frustration and grief, as ultimately, s/he might not be able to save that patient's life. Yet, from the perspective of performing better at the task at hand, the best possible coping strategy for that doctor might be to mentally and behaviorally disengage from the goal of ultimate survival towards offering the best patient care.

With that caveat in mind, I now forward arguments that dig a little deeper into coping responses, making the case for why TFC is more adaptive in laboratory settings, while EFC might be more adaptive in field settings. First, Carver et al., (1989) note this very same idea in their seminal work on the COPE inventory. Second, consider an example of EFC – behavioral and mental disengagement. Behavioral and mental disengagement is defined as follows:

“Behavioral disengagement is reducing one's effort to deal with the stressor, even giving up the attempt to attain goals with which the stressor is interfering. Behavioral disengagement is reflected in phenomena that are also identified with terms such as helplessness. In theory, behavioral disengagement is most likely to occur when people expect poor coping outcomes. Mental disengagement is a variation on behavioral disengagement, postulated to occur when conditions prevent behavioral disengagement (cf. Carver, Peterson, Follansbee, & Scheier, 1983). Mental disengagement occurs via a wide variety of activities that serve to distract the person from thinking about the behavioral dimension or goal with which the stressor is interfering. Tactics that reflect mental disengagement include using alternative activities to take one's mind off a problem (a tendency

opposite to the suppression of competing activities), daydreaming, escaping through sleep, or escape by immersion in TV.” (Page 269, Carver et al, 1989).

From a sociological perspective, such disengagement from goals, or helplessness, has long been viewed negatively in favor of actually dealing with a stressor (emotion eliciting event) directly. However, intuitively, the above description of disengagement in its many forms is a coping strategy that most people who are very successful actually use precisely towards that end: being more successful. Moreover, recent evidence in psychology suggests that such disengagement is actually a more adaptive coping strategy than many forms of TFC (e.g., planning) in many real life situations (i.e., outside the laboratory) (cf. Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003; Sprangers & Schwartz, 1999). Wrosch et al., (2003) note that this is because such disengagement frees up the individual’s cognitive and psychological resources to more freely attend to tasks at hand and redefine the stressor, thus resolving the event. I also note that the one thing that struck me about the field setting was the use of humor as a constant strategy to combat the events of the day. Most times, this brand of humor bordered on denial and disengagement from the task at hand, but now, I can almost see that maybe such humor could possibly be the police officer’s adaptive coping strategy. One could advance similar arguments for the adaptational significance of the other forms of EFC, but in the interest of conciseness, I will not lay out arguments for every dimension of EFC.

The alignment of emotion definitions, measurement and analyses with the theory underlying it is another contribution of this research. To facilitate this alignment, emotion was defined as per its knowledge base and theory was developed for each specific emotion. I incorporated a research design aimed at minimizing retrospective bias

and one that was capable of capturing intraindividual variability in emotion. Scholars have sounded calls for more within person research in affective based constructs (Beal et al., Briner & Kiefer, 2005; Miner et al., 2005). This dissertation answers the call for such research. Thus, from a research design and methodological perspective, this dissertation included a lab based study and a longitudinal field study. The lab study allowed for emotion elicitation in response to specific events, thus aligning level of theory with level of measurement. The field study allowed for examination of findings in a field sample and thus enhances the potential for generalizability of findings, while also aligning levels of theory and measurement. Furthermore, I note that this is one of the very few research projects (if not the only one) that includes both a lab-based study and a repeated measures field study. Typically, several researchers who have conducted lab-based studies have called for emotion research in the field (Weiss et al., 1999; Herrald & Tomaka, 2002) and field based researchers (e.g., Brown et al., 2005) have called for lab based studies. This research answers both those calls and extends what has been done in emotion research in the past by incorporating both designs.

As for practical contributions, with this research, our knowledge of the effects of discrete emotions at work and the implications of EI was advanced. For example, affective events theory suggest that positive interactions could buffer the effects of negative workplace hassles, and this could be one strategy managers use in helping manage negative emotions. My dissertation extends this perspective by suggesting that negative emotions (anger and guilt) might not always be detrimental. Rather, managers could focus on helping individuals better reason through emotional information and manage it, thus leading to adaptive coping strategies. For example, the officer who

reported guilt at a child sexual predator could have benefited from a discussion of what he was feeling and how that information (self reproach) could affect his coping strategies. Most pertinently, EI is an intelligence and cannot be developed, yet one could impart training related to the handling of emotional information. This might be so much more critical in work arenas that create conditions for intense emotions to arise, such as law enforcement, the medical profession and airline travel.

I cautiously advance some implications for the practical behavioral implications of this research. This caution is primarily driven by my reluctance to advance practical implications from one research project. While this project is comprehensive in many ways, it is but one piece of research, and practical implications should be advanced from accumulated research. The most straightforward implication, as noted earlier, is that individuals with higher EI will choose the most self beneficial coping strategy, and managers can direct the attention of lower EI individuals in a similar direction. Specifically, lower EI individuals could be alerted to the information provided by emotions and how they could potentially affect coping. The caveat in this regard is that the ability to accurately perceive and reason through emotions without the ability to manage emotions might actually be detrimental to some extent.

Affective Events Theory posits that employees experience uplifts and hassles at work everyday, and an accumulation of these events predicts their attitudes and behaviors (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Ashkanasy et al., (2002) contend that managing these events is the most pertinent challenge for managers today. In response to such a challenge then, research results indicate that such management could occur through incorporating more uplifts (positive interactions) that buffer the effects of hassles

(negative interactions) (Grzywacz & Marks, 2000; Miner et al., 2005). Taken together with this existing body of research, my dissertation offers one managerial implication that goes beyond the above reported research results. The traditional viewpoint in management (following sociology and psychology) has been that EFC coping strategies such as venting emotions, behavioral and mental disengagement and alcohol disengagement are necessarily dysfunctional (Bennett et al., 1995). However, that might not always be the case. Maybe sometimes the most functional strategy in dealing with emotions is allowing employees to talk about how they feel in response to both positive and negative events at work. In that same vein, managers who discipline employees for disengagement (such as daydreaming or fantasizing, and in the current business context, internet surfing) might do well to rethink that strategy. I also note that Ashkanasy et al., (2004) posited this idea in that they suggested that EFC might sometimes be the more functional response. First, this research offers the first empirical test of that idea. Second, this research extends Ashkanasy et al's., ideas by also incorporating behavioral outcomes that go beyond performance only. Specifically, I looked at a range of outcomes behaviors such as OCBI, OCBO and WDB.

The negative effect of EI on WDB is the most pertinent practical implication as it held up consistently across both studies. Organizations could benefit from screening individuals on EI where such WDB needs to be managed. Alternatively, organizations could offer training programs that alert individuals to understanding and managing emotional information better such that it results in decrements in WDB.

In summary, the first empirical work on EI to appear in a mainstream academic outlet (*ASQ*) recently found that ability based EI has a compensatory effect for

individuals with low cognitive intelligence (Côté & Miners, 2006) . Specifically, they found that when individuals have lower cognitive intelligence, those with higher EI perform better than those with lower EI. The current project falls within the same realm as the work of Côté and Miners (2006). However, it is also different in that those scholars employed one field-based cross sectional study to test their ideas. My work also examined a range of outcome behaviors. The bottom-line message seems to be that under conditions of high emotional arousal, and both with low and high-perceived control over the situation, higher EI individuals inherently choose a coping strategy that facilitates task performance. Furthermore, EI being negatively related to WDB is an important finding for managers who seek to minimize such behaviors in real settings. I cautiously note that having emotionally intelligent employees might benefit organizations in several ways, both with respect to performance and with respect to extra role behaviors. These findings, along with those of Côté and Miners (2006), start to offer some initial support for the predictive validity of ability based EI in organizational research.

Recently, Barsade and Gibson (2007) lamented the paucity of organizational research on discrete emotions and the role of ability based EI in explaining effects of such discrete emotions. This dissertation fills that important gap. However, as one journal editor noted in a research talk (Tom Lee, former editor of AMJ), the most interesting kinds of research not only fill research gaps but, most importantly, ask questions that challenge conventional wisdom in a scientific domain. With this dissertation, positing that EI would ultimately inform coping choices with the experience of positive and negative emotions falls under the purview of such a challenge. At first

glance, it is a bit hard to digest the finding that lower EI individuals engaged in lower TFC (from Study 1) even after experiencing positive emotions. Similarly, higher EI individuals engaged in higher EFC (from Study 2), thereby leading to better performance even after experiencing negative emotions. These findings, I believe are at the core of this dissertation's contribution to organizational research.

Limitations

The strength of this dissertation is that it included a laboratory-based study and a longitudinal field study. However, the downside of such a massive research project is that it is fraught with challenges and limitations. This research was replete with its share of both, though these do not necessarily affect our ability to draw valid inferences.

For Study 1, the primary shortcoming is that emotion, coping and intended behavioral data all came from the same respondent. This could imply common method bias for this portion of the research model. However, these constructs (at least emotion and coping) are psychological in nature, and there is no other way to measure them. In addition, the assessment of EI and GMA occurred using different techniques and at different points in time from the assessment of emotion, coping and intended behaviors. The significant interaction effects might thus be less prone to such common method bias as the method and time comprising the two terms that went into every interaction were different.

I also note the lack of results with actual behaviors in Study 1 as a limitation. However, this result is probably at least partly due to the artificiality of the lab setting in which a relative stranger (the confederate) asks for help (proxy for OCBI) or suggests the stealing of cash (proxy for WDB) to an undergraduate student who was only there for

extra credit. With that said, I was a bit surprised that almost 20 of the 90 respondents in the stealing condition were willing to do so. However, this was not sufficient to induce statistically significant results.

In Study 2, the main limitation was the sample size, with only 29 individuals returning all five days of emotion and coping surveys to match up with their EI scores. However, I note that the response rate is about 20-22%, and this is not entirely uncharacteristic of cross sectional field data collection. With five days worth of surveys and an added 45-minute long MSCEIT, the 20% response rate is not entirely surprising, and maybe quite good given the demands placed on the subjects. Furthermore, in my interactions with officers, several of them expressed interest in the project. However, they also noted that the sheer magnitude of paperwork was a major obstacle to their participation in this study. There was no way for me to get around that challenge in this study, given certain practical resource constraints. However, I note that the use of handheld PDAs is very attractive for this purpose in that individuals filling out surveys can do so when they are reminded of it. Nevertheless, given certain practical funding constraints, the use of PDAs was not feasible for this study. The major concern with low response rates in organizational research is if the non-respondents differ in meaningful ways from respondents in a way that affects the phenomenon under investigation. However, in a recent meta analysis on response rates and effect sizes in organizational research, Schalm and Kelloway (2001) pointed out that response rates do not adversely affect the validity of findings. As such, the general reader might have some degree of confidence in the inferences drawn from this study.

The peer ratings obtained in Study 2 (about 66% of all behavioral ratings were other rated) came from an officer or coworker who the target employee had worked with on a particular critical incident. One could argue that such peers could have rated the target employee more favorably. This is because they could be friends and/or due to the nature of this sample, which is very tightly knit. Furthermore, following Côté and Miners (2006), one could suggest that those with higher EI manage their impressions with others well, resulting in higher behavioral ratings. Future research could focus on an aggregation of peer ratings and/or supervisory ratings to get around these issues.

The use of peer ratings for WDB in Study 2 is also a limitation to some extent. Bennett and Robinson (2000) note that for assessment of deviance, self-ratings might be as valid (if not more valid) than peer ratings. This is because many deviant behaviors might go undetected by peers. Typically, self-ratings that are entirely anonymous are considered valid, but in this study, anonymity could not be guaranteed, as I had to identify respondents for purposes of matching up repeated measures of emotion, coping and behavioral ratings, their MSCJET scores and handing out cash prizes. In that vein, I also note that the use of a psychometrically sound WDB measure, which is well accepted in the literature on deviance, might in reality serve as a limitation in this study. Bennett and Robinson (2000) point out that some forms of deviance might be organization specific and might go undetected using a broad measure such as theirs.

In addition, I note that study 2 was based on a convenience sample. This violates the assumptions of random sampling germane to most multivariate statistics. One way around the limitations of a convenience sample is to mail surveys to randomly selected participants. However, given the nature of the phenomenon in question, i.e., measuring

emotions for five days along with coping and behavioral ratings, that type of mail survey design would have been next to impossible to conduct. Ultimately, I note that the use of convenience samples is widely prevalent in organizational research. For example, a recent paper studying the effects of EI on performance published in the *Administrative Science Quarterly* used a convenience sample of 175 full time university employees (Côté & Miners, 2006). While the prevalence of a particular technique does not yet address the issue above, I claim refuge in precedent (see Lee & Allen, 2005; Park et al, 2004).

From a theoretical standpoint, the major limitation of this study was not taking into account the goodness of fit hypothesis, as that could have better explained many findings from Study 1 and Study 2. I alluded to the idea of EFC being better suited under low control situations in my theorizing but had to hold that perspective constant in order to keep this project manageable. From a measurement perspective, I did not assess perceived control over the emotion event. That would have complicated an already complex study. However, thankfully, Study 2 included detailed event descriptions and intuitively (and qualitatively), I can make the inference that these events did not involve much perceived control². In retrospect though, that one assessment might have bolstered confidence in my inferences.

Another issue that deserves mention is the difficulty in pinpointing (and measuring) low versus high control situations in a setting such as this. For example, study 2 included a sample that by nature is trained to perceive control over their events.

²I have documented these event descriptions and can share that information with the interested reader.

Intuitively, I am suggesting that law enforcement employees are not inclined to report that they do not have control over a situation if that question were to be posed directly. This is a kind of egotistical representation of the self they carry and this issue might be relevant to some other professions as well (e.g., surgeons). In such conditions, the use of qualitative descriptions of the event might be the best clue regarding perceived control. Thus, it might have been useless to ask them that question directly.

Finally, across both Study 1 and Study 2, I note one theoretical limitation that deserves attention in future research. The study of discrete emotions is complex and multilayered as I noted elsewhere in this manuscript. In real settings, people experience several emotions at the same time and this is similar to the idea of emotion ambivalence if one were to be experiencing both positive emotions and negative emotions simultaneously. However, there is no guidance in the literature on how one could treat such emotion ambivalence conceptually.

Future research directions

This dissertation opens up a host of future research directions. I only discuss the immediate ones in the interest of succinctness. First, all theory and analyses in this project were at the level of overarching TFC and EFC dimensions. However, given the seeming support for the goodness of fit hypothesis, the next logical step would be to examine the effects of discrete emotions and EI and its dimensions on specific dimensions of TFC and EFC³. This is because certain dimensions of TFC and EFC might emerge as more adaptive than others. For example, active coping (a component of TFC)

³ I conducted such an analyses as well, and the results are even more promising. However, I ended up with a 200 + page results chapter and had to abandon that direction to keep this dissertation manageable and coherent.

might be more adaptive than planning or suppression of competing activities (also components of TFC). Next, this research only focused on four discrete emotions for the sake of conciseness and parsimony. However, several other emotions occur in organizational settings routinely. For example, it might be fruitful for future research to focus on the effects of basic emotions (e.g., fear), and more complex emotion blends (e.g., compassion). As noted earlier, the integration of the goodness of fit hypothesis seems crucial for future research.

Another area that is exciting is the role of emotion contagion. Since higher EI individuals are better able to perceive and reason through their own emotions and those of others, one could ask if these individuals are more likely to “catch” another’s emotion at work. Furthermore, is there such a thing as too much of a good thing effect with EI? For example, Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) found that the ability to accurately perceive positive emotions led to higher supervisory and peer ratings while the ability to accurately perceive negative emotions resulted in lower behavioral ratings. Can a similar mechanism be in effect for the higher EI individuals? Intuitively, it seems like the ability to constantly perceive emotions and disentangle emotion information might get mentally exhausting, at least at some point, and this could be an issue that deserves future research attention.

One idea that struck me in conducting these two studies is that people vary in their ability to “feel”. For example, some people are emotionally flat and they have a tendency to disconnect from the emotion event. Future research is required to assess individual differences in the ability to emotionally engage in work situations.

One also needs consider the generalizability of the theory and results from this research to field settings with low emotional arousal. Following Weiss and Cropanzano (1996), one could speculate that all workplaces might be emotionally charged, at least to an extent. However, the intensity of emotion experiences might differ from one setting to the next. For example, what about the constant experience of grief for caregivers in a medical setting? Are there certain coping strategies that are especially suited to the management of grief? This area deserves future research attention as well.

.The role of other individual difference variables such as gender might also be a fruitful future research avenue. For example, prior research has indicated that females consistently score higher than males on EI (Mayer et al., 2003). Introducing gender as a moderator of the moderated relationship between emotion and EI on coping might reveal three way interactions. One cannot ignore the influence of cultural differences either in examining emotions as they are largely driven by socially acceptable rules of experience and display (Yuki, Maddux, & Masuda, 2007).

Recently, Amabile and colleagues (2005) found that affect and creativity might be related in a non-linear fashion. My dissertation presumed and examined all relationships in a linear fashion only. However, future research might benefit from examining nonlinear trends in the emotion- coping relationship. In addition, one might also examine the unfolding of these relationships when creativity is the outcome. Similarly, Barsade and Gibson (2007) noted the dearth of research examining the effects of discrete emotions on decision-making outcomes. This could be a potential future research avenue as well.

I also note that this dissertation was focused only on work related behavioral

outcomes. However, psychology has a long standing history of examining the effects of emotion on health and psychological outcomes (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002; Ong, Bergeman, Bisconti, & Wallace, 2006). It might be interesting to investigate the effects of EI with regard to such health and psychological outcomes. The use of alternative measurement techniques such as ESM and work episodes might help either parallel the findings from this research or reveal interesting differences. The role of qualitative research designs in helping inform questions about emotion effects cannot be ignored either. Emotions are extremely hard to pinpoint and measure in natural settings and the use of techniques such as ethnographic study or structured interviews might reveal more interesting findings (see for example, Norgaard, 2006).

The discussion of emotions in work life is incomplete without considering the implications for and from leadership theories. Conceptual ideas regarding the positive association amongst EI and transformational leadership behaviors abound (e.g., George, 2000). However, this research sets the stage for examination of such leader EI on follower emotion experiences, displays and their consequent effects on behaviors. Furthermore, how might a transformational leader respond to EFC (such as venting and disengagement) as a coping strategy both within the self and followers? For example, a leader who is disengaged and/or is focused on venting negative emotions might not be seen as very inspirational, thus placing bounds on the generalizability of this study's findings to higher levels in the organization. Future research needs to address if the conceptual domain of transformational leadership and/or behavioral indicators of the same need be revisited in the light of positive effects of EFC on performance.

In that same vein then, this research leads us to the question of the effects of

discrete emotions, coping and the role of EI at multiple levels within the organization. Practically, one cannot help but wonder how EFC strategies such as disengagement, denial and focus on venting emotions could affect long-term organizational performance. For example, in customer service interactions, components of EFC, while beneficial for individual performance, might have other possible detrimental effects on organizational performance.

At this stage, the most pertinent future research implication stemming out this research is the examination of changes in EI. More specifically, we now know that EI affects coping, yet the research on exactly how training and development interventions might be designed to compensate for lower EI in real settings is almost non-existent. I make this observation with regard to the ability based EI model. Such training related programs abound in the popular press on the mixed model conceptualizations, and that information is not relevant to the current ability based conceptualization of EI.

Conclusion

This research introduced novel and comprehensive theory regarding the interplay of four discrete emotions, EI and their implications for coping and behavioral outcomes. The results indicate that EI does affect coping strategies such that higher EI individuals engage in more self-beneficial forms of coping. Such adaptive coping strategies, in turn, translated into better task performance, OCBOs and negative effects on WDB. The results for OCBI are mixed. The strength of this research (and its unique contribution) is in developing theory at the level of discrete emotions. Furthermore, I aligned levels of theory, measurement and analyses in this research through the use of a laboratory study, a longitudinal event based field study, and the use of random coefficient modeling.

Ultimately, the main contribution of this research lies in the findings that higher EI leads people to choose coping strategies (TFC or EFC) that eventually benefit their task performance and OCBOs and decrease their WDBs.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Laboratory Task.

Imagine you and your partner were on a spaceship that landed on the moon and your spaceship ran out of fuel. You both have to survive for three days after which some rescue teams might reach the moon to help you. As a team, please rank order the items below in order of importance for survival in this scenario. Your answers will be scored against the ratings of NASA's experts. The winning team gets a \$20 cash prize!

ITEM	RANK
Box of matches	
Food concentrate	
50 meters of nylon rope	
Parachute silk	
Solar-powered portable heating unit	
Two .45-caliber pistols	
One case of dehydrated milk	
Two 50 kg-tanks of oxygen	
Stellar map of Moon's constellations	
Self-inflating life raft	
Magnetic compass	
Fifty liters of water	

Signal flares	
First-aid kit including injection needles	
Solar powered, FM receiver/transmitter	

Appendix 2: Measures

State Positive and Negative Affect will be measured via the profile of Positive and Negative affective schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988).

Instructions to respondents: This scale consists of a number of words that describe how people feel. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you have felt that way today. Use the following scale to record your answers.

1 Very slightly or not at all	2 A little	3 Moderately	4 Quite a bit	5 Very much
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___ Interested	___ Irritable
___ Distressed	___ Alert
___ Excited	___ Ashamed
___ Upset	___ Inspired
___ Strong	___ Nervous
___ Guilty	___ Determined
___ Scared	___ Attentive
___ Hostile	___ Jittery
___ Enthusiastic	___ Active
___ Proud	___ Afraid

Emotions will be measured using a shorter version of a questionnaire developed by Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson and O' Connor (1987).

Instructions to respondents: This scale consists of a number of words that describe how people feel. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way **right now**. Use the following scale to record your answers.

1 Very slightly or not at all	2 A little	3 Moderately	4 Quite a bit	5 Very much
Amused		Anger		Aggravated
Blissful		Rage		Irritated
Cheerful		Outrage		Agitated
Gaiety		Fury		Annoyed
Gleeful		Wrath		Embarrassment
Jolly		Hostility		Humiliation
Jovial		Ferocity		Pity
Joyful		Bitterness		sympathy
Delighted		Hate		Exasperation
Enjoyment		Loathing		Frustration
Glad		Scorn		Grouchiness
Happy		Spite		Grumpiness
Jubilant		Vengefulness		Rapture
Elation		Dislike		Relief
Ecstasy		Resentment		Amazement
Euphoric		Disgust		Surprise
Enthusiasm		Revulsion		Astonishment
Zealous		Contempt		Despair
Zestful		Envy		Gloom
Excited		Jealousy		Grief
Thrill		Torment		Sorrow
Exhilaration		Guilt		Anxiety
Content		Shame		Panic
Pleasure		Regret		Nervous
Pride		Remorse		Tense
Triumph		Alienation		Uneasy
Eager		Isolation		Apprehension
Hope		Defeat		Dread
Self satisfied		Insecurity		

Coping will be measured using the COPE Inventory developed by Carver, Scheier and Weintraub (1989). † indicates items left out of Study 1 surveys which are presented in Appendix 1. * indicates items left out of Study 2 surveys which are presented in Appendix 4.

Instructions to respondents: Please think about any stressful event or incident you have experienced recently (within the last two months). Indicate the extent to which you did each of the following in dealing with that stressful event. Use the following scale.

1	2	3	4
I didn't do this at all	I did this a little bit	I did this a medium amount	I did this a lot

Active coping

I take additional action to try to get rid of the problem.
I concentrate my efforts on doing something about it.
I do what has to be done, one step at a time.
I take direct action to get around the problem.

Planning

I try to come up with a strategy about what to do.
I make a plan of action.
I think hard about what steps to take.
I think about how I might best handle the problem.

Suppression of competing activities

I put aside other activities in order to concentrate on this.
I focus on dealing with this problem, and if necessary let other things slide a little.
I keep myself from getting distracted by other thoughts or activities.
I try hard to prevent other things from interfering with my efforts at dealing with this.

Restraint coping

I force myself to wait for the right time to do something.
I hold off doing anything about it until the situation permits.
I make sure not to make matters worse by acting too soon.
I restrain myself from doing anything too quickly.

Seeking social support for instrumental reasons

I ask people who have had similar experiences what they did[†].
I try to get advice from someone about what to do.*[†]
I talk to someone to find out more about the situation.
I talk to someone who could do something concrete about the problem.[†]

Seeking social support for emotional reasons

I talk to someone about how I feel.
I try to get emotional support from friends or relatives.
I discuss my feelings with someone. †
I get sympathy and understanding from someone.

Positive reinterpretation & growth

I look for something good in what is happening.
I try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more positive.
I learn something from the experience. †
I try to grow as a person as a result of the experience. †

Acceptance

I learn to live with it. †
I accept that this has happened and that it can't be changed.
I get used to the idea that it happened.
I accept the reality of the fact that it happened.*

Turning to religion

I seek God's help.
I put my trust in God.
I try to find comfort in my religion.
I pray more than usual.

Focus on & venting of emotions

I get upset and let my emotions out.
I let my feelings out.*
I feel a lot of emotional distress and I find myself expressing those feelings a lot.
I get upset, and am really aware of it.

Denial

I refuse to believe that it has happened. †
I pretend that it hasn't really happened.
I act as though it hasn't even happened.
I say to myself "this isn't real."

Behavioral disengagement

I give up the attempt to get what I want.
I just give up trying to reach my goal. †
I admit to myself that I can't deal with it, and quit trying.
I reduce the amount of effort I'm putting into solving the problem.

Mental disengagement

I turn to work or other substitute activities to take my mind off things.

I go to movies or watch TV, to think about it less.*†

I daydream about things other than this.

I sleep more than usual.*†

Alcohol-drug disengagement

I drink alcohol or take drugs, in order to think about it less.

Anagram Task

Below are a series of anagrams. You have 10 minutes to solve all the anagrams. No foreign words, plurals or proper nouns can serve as solutions. Please start solving the anagrams.

kalfe _____

blentao _____

snilaoi _____

remude _____

ciimtv _____

loroc _____

sodpiee _____

ecepsa _____

elbmut _____

gegirrt _____

Organizational Citizenships Behaviors will be measured using a scale developed by Lee & Allen (2002), from previous OCB scales. † indicates items left out of Study 1 surveys which are presented in Appendix 1. * indicates items left out of Study 2 surveys which are presented in Appendix 4.

Instructions to respondents: Please indicate to what extent the target person engages in the following behaviors. Use the following scale.

1	2	3	4	5
Very slightly or not at all	A little	Moderately	Quite a bit	definitely

OCBI Items

1. Help others who have been absent.
2. Willingly give her/his time to help others who have work-related problems.
3. Adjust her/his work schedule to accommodate other employees' requests for time off.
4. Go out of the way to make newer employees feel welcome in the work group.
5. Show genuine concern and courtesy toward coworkers, even under the most trying business or personal situations.
6. Give up time to help others who have work or nonwork problems.
7. Assist others with their duties.
8. Share personal property with others to help their work.

OCBO Items[†]

1. Attend functions that are not required but that help the organizational image.
2. Keep up with developments in the organization.
3. Defend the organization when other employees criticize it.
4. Show pride when representing the organization in public.
5. Offer ideas to improve the functioning of the organization.
6. Express loyalty toward the organization.
7. Take action to protect the organization from potential problems.
8. Demonstrate concern about the image of the organization.

Workplace deviance behavior will be measured using a scale developed by Bennett & Robinson (2000). † indicates items left out of Study 1 surveys which are presented in Appendix 1. * indicates items left out of Study 2 surveys which are presented in Appendix 4.

Instructions to respondents: Please indicate to what extent the target person engages in the following behaviors. Use the following scale.

1 Very slightly or not at all	2 A little	3 Moderately	4 Quite a bit	5 definitely
-------------------------------------	---------------	-----------------	------------------	-----------------

1. Worked on a personal matter instead of work for your employer[†]
2. Taken property from work without permission
3. Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working
4. Made fun of someone at work
5. Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business expenses[†]
6. Said something hurtful to someone at work
7. Taken an additional or a longer break than is acceptable at your workplace[†]
8. Repeated a rumor or gossip about your company[†]
9. Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark or joke at work
10. Come in late to work without permission[†]
11. Littered your work environment
12. Cursed at someone at work
13. Called in sick when you were not
14. Told someone about the lousy place where you work
15. Lost your temper while at work
16. Neglected to follow your boss's instructions
17. Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked
18. Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person
19. Left work early without permission[†]
20. Played a mean prank on someone at work
21. Left your work for someone else to finish[†]
22. Acted rudely toward someone at work
23. Repeated a rumor or gossip about your boss or coworkers[†]
24. Made an obscene comment at work
25. Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job
26. Put little effort into your work
27. Publicly embarrassed someone at work
28. Dragged out work in order to get overtime

Task Performance will be assessed using a measure currently in use at the organization and one that meets industry standards for officer performance.

Instructions to respondents: Please rate the target officer on the following for the incident referred to.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NO
Acceptable	A bit more than acceptable	Moderate	good	Very good	Excellent	Exceptional	Not observed

1. Driving skill
2. Orientation and response time to calls
3. Field performance
4. Investigative skills
5. Interview/ interrogation skills
6. Officer safety
7. Control of conflict
8. Problem solving
9. Decision making
10. Radio usage: listening and comprehension
11. Radio usage: appropriate use of codes/procedures
12. Radio usage: articulations of transmissions.
13. Relationships with citizens in general
14. Relationships with ethnic groups other than one's own
15. Relationships with other department members
16. Knowledge of departmental policies/procedures
17. Knowledge of criminal statues
18. Knowledge of city ordinances
19. Knowledge of traffic codes
20. Knowledge of code of criminal procedure

In addition, the MSCEIT (a measure of EI) and WPT (a measure of general mental ability) will be filled out by each respondent.

Appendix 3: Surveys for Study 1

*This scale consists of a number of words that describe how people feel. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you have felt that way **today**. Use the following scale to record your answers.*

1 Very slightly or not at all	2 A little	3 Moderately	4 Quite a bit	5 Very much
-------------------------------------	---------------	-----------------	------------------	----------------

<input type="checkbox"/> Interested	<input type="checkbox"/> Irritable
<input type="checkbox"/> Distressed	<input type="checkbox"/> Alert
<input type="checkbox"/> Excited	<input type="checkbox"/> Ashamed
<input type="checkbox"/> Upset	<input type="checkbox"/> Inspired
<input type="checkbox"/> Strong	<input type="checkbox"/> Nervous
<input type="checkbox"/> Guilty	<input type="checkbox"/> Determined
<input type="checkbox"/> Scared	<input type="checkbox"/> Attentive
<input type="checkbox"/> Hostile	<input type="checkbox"/> Jittery
<input type="checkbox"/> Enthusiastic	<input type="checkbox"/> Active
<input type="checkbox"/> Proud	<input type="checkbox"/> Afraid

*This scale consists of a number of words that describe how people feel. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way **right now**. Use the following scale to record your answers.*

1 Very slightly or not at all	2 A little	3 Moderately	4 Quite a bit	5 Very much
-------------------------------------	---------------	-----------------	------------------	----------------

<input type="checkbox"/> Amused	<input type="checkbox"/> Anger	<input type="checkbox"/> Aggravated
<input type="checkbox"/> Blissful	<input type="checkbox"/> Rage	<input type="checkbox"/> Irritated
<input type="checkbox"/> Cheerful	<input type="checkbox"/> Outrage	<input type="checkbox"/> Agitated
<input type="checkbox"/> Gaiety	<input type="checkbox"/> Fury	<input type="checkbox"/> Annoyed
<input type="checkbox"/> Gleeful	<input type="checkbox"/> Wrath	<input type="checkbox"/> Embarrassment
<input type="checkbox"/> Jolly	<input type="checkbox"/> Hostility	<input type="checkbox"/> Humiliation
<input type="checkbox"/> Jovial	<input type="checkbox"/> Ferocity	<input type="checkbox"/> Pity

Joyful	Bitterness	sympathy
Delighted	Hate	Exasperation
Enjoyment	Loathing	Frustration
Glad	Scorn	Grouchiness
Happy	Spite	Grumpiness
Jubilant	Vengefulness	Rapture
Elation	Dislike	Relief
Ecstasy	Resentment	Amazement
Euphoric	Disgust	Surprise
Enthusiasm	Revulsion	Astonishment
Zealous	Contempt	Despair
Zestful	Envy	Gloom
Excited	Jealousy	Grief
Thrill	Torment	Sorrow
Exhilaration	Guilt	Anxiety
Content	Shame	Panic
Pleasure	Regret	Nervous
Pride	Remorse	Tense
Triumph	Alienation	Uneasy
Eager	Isolation	Apprehension
Hope	Defeat	Dread
Self satisfied	Insecurity	

Think about how you feel right now. If you were presented with a stressful event right now, indicate the extent to which you might do whatever each following statement says. Use the following scale.

1	2	3	4
I didn't do this at all	I did this a little bit	I did this a medium amount	I did this a lot

I might take additional action to try to perform better.
I might concentrate my efforts on doing something about anything bothering me.
I might do what had to be done, one step at a time.
I might take direct action to get around any problem.
I might try to come up with a strategy about what to do.
I might make a plan of action.
I might think hard about what steps to take.
I might think about how I might best handle the event.
I might put aside other activities in order to concentrate on this.
I might focus on dealing with this event, and if necessary let other things happening slide a little.
I might keep myself from getting distracted by other thoughts or activities.
I might try hard to prevent other things from interfering with my efforts at dealing with this event.
I might force myself to wait for the right time to do something.
I might hold off doing anything about the events in this experiment until the situation permits.
I might make sure not to make matters worse by acting too soon.
I might restrain myself from doing anything too quickly.
I might talk to someone
I might talk to someone about how I feel.
I might try to get emotional support from friends or relatives.
I get sympathy and understanding from someone
I might look for something good in what is happening.
I might try to see any problem in a different light, to make it seem more positive.
I might accept that the event has happened and that it can't be changed.
I might get used to the idea that it happened.
I might accept the reality of the fact that it happened.
I might seek God's help.
I might put my trust in God.
I might try to find comfort in my religion.
I might pray more than usual.
I might get upset and let my emotions out.
I might feel a lot of emotional distress and find myself expressing those feelings a lot.
I might get upset
I might pretend that it hasn't really happened.
I might act as though it hasn't even happened.
I might say to myself "this isn't real."
I might give up the attempt to win this task.
I might admit to myself that I can't deal with it, and quit trying.
I might reduce the amount of effort I'm putting into solving the problem.

I think of other things to take my mind off things happening.
 I might be daydreaming about things other than my tasks.
 I might be thinking about going to the bars in order to think about it less.

Please indicate to what extent you might engage in the following behaviors right now.

1	2	3	4	5
Very slightly or not at all	A little	Moderately	Quite a bit	definitely

- Would willingly help others.
- Willingly give your time to help your partner fix the AV equipment.
- Adjust your work schedule to accommodate such helping
- Go out of the way to be friendly to your partner.
- Show genuine concern and courtesy toward your partner, even under the most trying situations.
- Give up time to help anyone in need.
- Assist others with their duties.
- Share personal property with others to help them.
- Take property from the lab without permission
- Spend too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working
- Make fun of someone in the lab
- Say something hurtful to someone
- Make an ethnic, religious, or racial remark or joke
- Littered your environs
- Curse at someone
- Tell someone how lousy this experiment is
- Lose your temper
- Neglect to follow instructions
- Intentionally work slower than you can work
- Discuss confidential information with friends
- Play a mean prank on someone
- Act rudely toward someone
- Make an obscene comment
- Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol
- Put little effort into your task
- Publicly embarrass someone

In addition, participants will be moved to a different room to take the MSCEIT, WPT and provide the following demographic information.

Please circle one that applies:

Gender	Female	Male		
Race	Caucasian	African American	Hispanic	Asian
Education level	High school	College degree	Masters degree	

How many years of work experience do you have? -----

What is your age in years and months? -----

What year of college are you in? -----

Confederate survey: To be used on day one with OCB as an outcome.

Did your partner help you fix the AV equipment? Please circle the one that applies.

Did help	1
Did not help at all	0

Please add anything else about this participant related to her/his behavior during the task

Confederate survey: To be used on day two with WDB as an outcome.

Did your partner help you tamper with the AV equipment? Please circle the one that applies.

Did help	1
Did not help at all	0

Was your partner willing to steal gift certificates? Please circle the one that applies.

Yes	1
No	0

Was your partner willing to steal answer keys? Please circle the one that applies.

Yes	1
No	0

Please add anything else about this participant related to her/his behavior during the task.

Appendix 4: Surveys for Study 2

This survey is entirely confidential. Only the primary investigator will have access to this data. After all data is entered, all identifying information will be deleted. You can be assured of complete confidentiality. Anything you report here is only for academic research purposes. On this first page, please provide some preliminary information about yourself:

Name:

Badge number:

Shift start time:

Shift ending time:

When did you actually get off your shift?

Which department do you belong to?

*This scale consists of a number of words that describe how people generally feel. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you have felt that way **today**. Use the following scale to record your answers.*

1	2	3	4	5
Very slightly or not at all	A little	Moderately	Quite a bit	Very much

<input type="checkbox"/> Interested	<input type="checkbox"/> Irritable
<input type="checkbox"/> Distressed	<input type="checkbox"/> Alert
<input type="checkbox"/> Excited	<input type="checkbox"/> Ashamed
<input type="checkbox"/> Upset	<input type="checkbox"/> Inspired
<input type="checkbox"/> Strong	<input type="checkbox"/> Nervous

<input type="checkbox"/> Guilty	<input type="checkbox"/> Determined
<input type="checkbox"/> Scared	<input type="checkbox"/> Attentive
<input type="checkbox"/> Hostile	<input type="checkbox"/> Jittery
<input type="checkbox"/> Enthusiastic	<input type="checkbox"/> Active
<input type="checkbox"/> Proud	<input type="checkbox"/> Afraid

Please choose one event from today in which you worked with another officer and that stands out in your mind as particularly demanding or important. Think of this event as a continuous series of scenes like in a film. Give each scene a brief name to help you remember it (e.g., interrogated suspect, searched suspect, background check on suspect).

Event name:

Please write down the name and badge number of the officer who worked with you on this event:

Try to remember as much detail as possible about each scene. Describe this event in detail, kind of like writing in your diary.

Now, describe your feelings about the event, your work on the event and your fellow officer's feelings about the event.

Add anything else you would like to report about this event.

Please turn page only after you have completed this page.

Now, please think about you felt right after the incident you just described. Indicate to what extent you felt in the way described by each of the words below. Use the following scale to record your answers.

1	2	3	4	5
Very slightly or not at all	A little	Moderately	Quite a bit	Very much

Amused	Anger	Aggravated
Blissful	Rage	Irritated
Cheerful	Outrage	Agitated
Gaiety	Fury	Annoyed
Gleeful	Wrath	Embarrassment
Jolly	Hostility	Humiliation
Jovial	Ferocity	Pity
Joyful	Bitterness	sympathy
Delighted	Hate	Exasperation
Enjoyment	Loathing	Frustration
Glad	Scorn	Grouchiness
Happy	Spite	Grumpiness
Jubilant	Vengefulness	Rapture
Elation	Dislike	Relief
Ecstasy	Resentment	Amazement

Euphoric	Disgust	Surprise
Enthusiasm	Revulsion	Astonishment
Zealous	Contempt	Despair
Zestful	Envy	Gloom
Excited	Jealousy	Grief
Thrill	Torment	Sorrow
Exhilaration	Guilt	Anxiety
Content	Shame	Panic
Pleasure	Regret	Nervous
Pride	Remorse	Tense
Triumph	Alienation	Uneasy
Eager	Isolation	Apprehension
Hope	Defeat	Dread
Self satisfied	Insecurity	

Think about the incident you just described. Think about how you reacted to the events in this incident. Then indicate the extent to which you did whatever each following statement says.

1	2	3	4
I didn't do this at all	I did this a little bit	I did this a medium amount	I did this a lot

I took additional action to try to resolve the incident.

I concentrated my efforts on doing something about anything bothering me in this incident.

I did what had to be done, one step at a time.

I took direct action to get around any problem.

I tried to come up with a strategy about what to do.

I made a plan of action.

I thought hard about what steps to take.

I thought about how I might best handle the incident.

I put aside other activities in order to concentrate on this.

I focused on dealing with this incident, and if necessary let other things happening slide a little.

I kept myself from getting distracted by other thoughts or activities.

I tried hard to prevent other things from interfering with my efforts at dealing with this incident.

I forced myself to wait for the right time to do something.

I held off doing anything about the events in this incident until the situation permits.

I made sure not to make matters worse by acting too soon.

I restrained myself from doing anything too quickly.

I tried to get advice from someone who had similar experiences about what to do.

I talked to someone to find out more about the situation.

I talked to someone who could do something concrete about the problem.

I talked to my partner or friends about how I feel.

I tried to get emotional support from my friends and relatives

I discuss my feelings with someone.

I get sympathy and understanding from someone.

I looked for something good in what is happening.

I tried to see the problem in a different light, to make it seem more positive.

I learnt something from the experiences in this incident.

I try to grow as a person because of this experience.

I accept that this has happened and that it can't be changed.

I get used to the idea that it happened.

I accept the reality of the fact that it happened.

I seek God's help.

I put my trust in God.

I try to find comfort in my religion.

I prayed more than usual.

I got upset and let my emotions out.

I felt a lot of emotional distress and I find myself expressing those feelings a lot.

I got upset, and am really aware of it.

I refuse to believe that it has happened.

I pretend that it hasn't really happened.

I act as though it hasn't even happened.

I say to myself "this isn't real."

I gave up the attempt to resolve the incident.

I admitted to myself that I can't deal with it, and quit trying.

I reduced the amount of effort I'm putting into solving the problem.

I started to think of other things to take my mind off things happening on the job.

I was daydreaming about things other than the incident

I was thinking a cold alcoholic beverage might be welcome to help me better deal with the event.

Thank you. Please make sure you write the name of this incident on the slip provided on the package to be handed to your partner in this incident.

Partner Survey

Please recall the incident described by your fellow officer who handed you this package. Please indicate to what extent that officer engaged in the following behaviors during the incident s/he referred to. Use the following scale.

1	2	3	4	5	NA
might have done this	did this a moderate amount	did this	did this a lot	definitely did this a lot	Not Applicable

- Help others who have been absent
- Willingly gave his time to help others who have work-related problems.
- Adjust his work schedule to accommodate other employees' requests for time off.
- Go out of the way to make newer employees feel welcome in the work group.
- Show genuine concern and courtesy toward coworkers, even under the most trying business or personal situations.
- Give up time to help others who have work or nonwork problems.
- Assist others with their duties.
- Share personal property with others to help their work.
- Attend functions that are not required but that help the organizational image.
- Keep up with developments in the organization.
- Defend the organization when other employees criticize it.
- Show pride when representing the organization in public.
- Offer ideas to improve the functioning of the organization.
- Express loyalty toward the organization.
- Take action to protect the organization from potential problems.
- Demonstrate concern about the image of the organization.

Please indicate to what extent that officer engaged in the following behaviors during the incident s/he referred to. Use the following scale.

1	2	3	4	5	NA
always does this and did it this time	did this a moderate amount	did this a little bit	might have done this a bit	did not do this at all	Not Applicable

- Worked on a personal matter instead of work for your employer
- Taken property from work without permission

Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working
 Made fun of someone at work
 Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than he spent on business expenses
 Said something hurtful to someone at work
 Taken an additional or a longer break than is acceptable at your workplace
 Repeated a rumor or gossip about your organization
 Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark or joke at work
 Come in late to work without permission
 Littered your work environment
 Cursed at someone at work
 Called in sick when he was not
 Told someone about the lousy place where he works
 Lost his temper while at work
 Neglected to follow your boss's instructions
 Intentionally worked slower than he could have worked
 Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person
 Left work early without permission
 Played a mean prank on someone at work
 Left his work for someone else to finish
 Acted rudely toward someone at work
 Repeated a rumor or gossip about your boss or coworkers
 Made an obscene comment at work
 Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job
 Put little effort into his work
 Publicly embarrassed someone at work
 Dragged out work in order to get overtime

Now, please rate that officer for the same incident on the following Use the following scale.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NO
Acceptable	A bit more than acceptable	Moderate	good	Very good	Excellent	Exceptional	Not observed

1. Driving skill
2. Orientation and response time to calls
3. Field performance
4. Investigative skills
5. Interview/ interrogation skills

6. Officer safety
7. Control of conflict
8. Problem solving
9. Decision making
10. Radio usage: listening and comprehension
11. Radio usage: appropriate use of codes/procedures
12. Radio usage: articulations of transmissions.
13. Relationships with citizens in general
14. Relationships with ethnic groups other than one's own
15. Relationships with other department members
16. Knowledge of departmental policies/procedures
17. Knowledge of criminal statutes
18. Knowledge of city ordinances
19. Knowledge of traffic codes
20. Knowledge of code of criminal procedure

Oklahoma State University Institutional Review Board

Date: Monday, October 23, 2006
IRB Application No: BU0556
Proposal Title: Development and Test of a Model Linking Emotions to Work Behaviors

Reviewed and Processed as: Expedited

Status Recommended by Reviewer(s): Approved Protocol Expires: 10/22/2007

Principal Investigator(s)

Janaki Gooty
320 Business
Stillwater, OK 74078

Mark Gavitt
320 Business
Stillwater, OK 74078

The IRB application referenced above has been approved. It is the judgment of the reviewers that the rights and welfare of individuals who may be asked to participate in this study will be respected, and that the research will be conducted in a manner consistent with the IRB requirements as outlined in section 45 CFR 46.

The final versions of any printed recruitment, consent and assent documents bearing the IRB approval stamp are attached to this letter. These are the versions that must be used during the study.

As Principal Investigator, it is your responsibility to do the following:

- 1. Conduct this study exactly as it has been approved. Any modifications to the research protocol must be submitted with the appropriate signatures for IRB approval.
- 2. Submit a request for continuation if the study extends beyond the approval period of one calendar year. This continuation must receive IRB review and approval before the research can continue.
- 3. Report any adverse events to the IRB Chair promptly. Adverse events are those which are unanticipated and impact the subjects during the course of this research; and
- 4. Notify the IRB office in writing when your research project is complete.

Please note that approved protocols are subject to monitoring by the IRB and that the IRB office has the authority to inspect research records associated with this protocol at any time. If you have questions about the IRB procedures or need any assistance from the Board, please contact Beth McTernan in 219 Cordell North (phone: 405 744 5700, beth.mcternan@okstate.edu).

Sincerely

Sue C. Jacobs, Chair
Institutional Review Board

VITA

Janaki Gooty

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis: DEVELOPMENT AND TEST OF A MODEL LINKING EMOTIONS AND
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Personal Data:

Education:

Completed the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy in Business at
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Experience: None

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Name: Janaki Gooty

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Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma

Title of Study: DEVELOPMENT AND TEST OF A MODEL LINKING EMOTIONS
AND WORK BEHAVIORS

Pages in Study: 267

Candidate for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Major Field: Business

Scope and Method of Study: This dissertation investigates the effects of discrete emotions and Emotional intelligence on work related behaviors. The research design follows a laboratory based design and an event based field longitudinal study.

Findings and Conclusions: Emotional Intelligence moderated the relationship between four discrete emotions (anger, guilt, joy and pride) and coping strategies. Coping strategies (either task focused or emotion focused) in turn had effects on performance, workplace deviance behavior and organizational citizenship behaviors.

ADVISER'S APPROVAL: Mark Gavin
