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NON-COMBATANT COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICES IN NORTHERN  
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By

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IRELAND

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE  
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION

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## Abstract

This dissertation in the area of Language and Social Interaction (LSI) study, approved by the University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board (IRB) as #2003-233, investigates language use and cultural identity of non-combatants in Belfast, Northern Ireland. The study uses multiple methods of investigation in the form of 17 open-ended interviews, minor participant observation, semiotic analysis of 80 photographs of political murals, and quantitative content analysis of 46 newspapers to show that individuals carefully choose labels for the people and places of Northern Ireland, create murals that mark identity and territory, and (re)present such symbols in the printed news media.

## CHAPTER ONE:

### NORTHERN IRELAND'S TROUBLES

#### *Overview of the Problem*

This dissertation investigates communication and cultural identity of non-combatants in Belfast, Northern Ireland. The study uses multiple methods in the form of 17 open-ended interviews, minor participant observation, semiotic analysis of 80 photographs of political murals, and quantitative content analysis of 46 newspapers to explore and understand how individuals from all sides of the sectarian division situate themselves and enact a culture of non-violence. The broader purpose is to explore, describe, and analyze how actors create and maintain identity through the manipulation of symbols, both verbal and non-verbal. This study uses Belfast, Northern Ireland as a test case and first step toward the creation of a comprehensive model of nonviolent communicative practices in specific trouble areas around the globe.

Examination of non-combatant Northern Irish communicative practices as a lens for understanding nonviolence is a communication topic by virtue of the ontological focus and theoretical approaches employed in the current study. Further, this work clearly fits into the Language and Social Interaction (LSI) branch of the Communication discipline. This work is relevant to the communication field for the following reasons: First, the work draws on theories that hold that communication is an enactment of culture rather than a mere tool employed by individuals "possessing" a culture. Second, the work extends the

idea that: the extant world is a social creation maintained through the actions of its inhabitants. Third, the work builds upon ideas of the ways in which culture is expressed in public and in private. Fourth, the work examines the way in which culture, power, and politics are embedded in images and language. Fifth, the work draws on the notions that the mass media engage in processes that influence how and what consumers think.

Although many have chosen a path of violence in Northern Ireland, others have deliberately eschewed this choice, favoring instead to live non-violently, and to either engage the politics of Northern Ireland through non-violence, or to ignore the politics completely. Since that second group (i.e., those who choose non-violence) comes from a variety of religious and ethnic starting points, and is typically isolated from one another until adulthood, the fundamental question driving this dissertation is the following: Given that individuals have renounced violence as a means of solution to the Troubles, is there an essential *way* of communication common to them? I believe culture to be a mutually accepted on-going activity of organizing and sense-making (which includes the material products of such activity). As such, this dissertation seeks to find language, symbolism, and ways of communication common to those who seek to live though non-violent means. As the Northern Ireland situation is complex, a brief presentation of the more relevant background is necessary.

### *A Brief Summary of Northern Ireland's Troubles*

Though occupied off and on from Roman times until the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century, Ireland was unified until the creation of the Irish Free State at the end of British rule in 1921 (O'Brien & O'Brien, 1997). The Anglo-Irish Agreement allowed six counties in the north of Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom (UK). The six counties of the north were the only 6 majority Protestant (66%) of all 32 Irish counties (O'Brien & O'Brien, 1997, p. 165). The Irish Free State, which later became the Republic of Ireland (ROI), became more successful socially and economically. Northern Ireland became associated with the sectarian violence known as "The Troubles" (Loughlin, 1998).

The Troubles began in 1969 as the civil rights movements of the US and Europe reached Irish shores. According to O'Brien and O'Brien (1997),

This spectacle reached the British and world public through the television camera and evoked a wave of interest in, and sympathy with, the Civil Rights demonstrators unprecedented in the history of Northern Ireland. In August 1969, the Catholic quarter of Derry – the Bogside – resisted a police attempt to force an entry into it. As a result, serious sectarian fighting broke out in Belfast where – as Catholics are outnumbered three to one – it mainly took the form of Protestant shooting at Catholics, and burning of Catholic houses. The British government then intervened, using the army, and placing the police under army control. (p. 172)

Northern Ireland of the Troubles became a deeply divided place, with flags (i.e., the British Union Jack or the Irish Tricolor) flown from any available pole, painted on the sides of buildings, mailboxes, doors, or even curbs, and banners hung across streets denoting territorial claims (Jarman, 1988). Though the flying

of flags in most areas is legal, it is often a means of intimidation as much as a territory marker, as not only are flags and murals used to tell "the other side" to stay out, they are frequently used by fighting factions of the same side as such markers (Jarman, 1988). That is, a competing group on the same side (e.g., the Real IRA) might use a mural to make its territorial claims against another group (e.g., the Provisional IRA).

*Sectarianism and segregation.* People, especially the lower classes, segregate themselves by neighborhood, and essentially live in their own ghettoized neighborhoods (Interviews 1 & 2, 2003). Amongst the lower class, whose ghettos are euphemistically called "estates," (*Spotlight*, 2003) and the working class, this arrangement continues today. The respective groups school their children separately, and live separately, as well (Interview 6; Interview 9). They shop in their own neighborhoods, eat in their own neighborhoods, pray in their own neighborhoods, and spend leisure time in their own neighborhoods (Interview 6). A neighborhood frequently has its own local newspaper, even if the neighborhood is only a few square blocks. As a result, the newsstands of Belfast, especially on Saturdays (when the weeklies go on sale) offer more than 14 local newspapers for a city of 277,200 people (Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of Statistics, 2002, p. 4). Even the Belfast City Cemetery is segregated – a nine foot wall, the *top* of which lies six inches under the ground, separates the Catholic side from the Protestant side. As one of the respondents said, "We're also segregated in terms of...of course, parochial schools...even death. We're

buried separately" (Interview 6, ll. 291-292). While the statement about burial is true in most places, the Belfast City Cemetery has a nine foot *underground* wall separating the Catholic and Protestant sections. The city has even evolved a segregated alternative to the notoriously undependable and expensive public transportation. The "Black Taxis" (or "Black Cabs") are London-style cabs that are operated by paramilitary groups (Interview 1) and run the same routes as busses, but charge a flat rate which is  $\frac{1}{2}$  to  $\frac{1}{4}$  the corresponding bus fare. The Black Cabs serve only their own sectarian area, so one cannot take a Black Taxi to anywhere in the city, from anywhere in the city.

There are only four places (or circumstances) wherein the respective populations typically mix. The first is the university, as most schools through high school are segregated. There are some (See Figure 1: Bigot's Beer poster, p. 160) who have tried to use the university as a cross-community forum (Interview 7). The second is the hospital, which for years has been the object of humor. One respondent said this of the Mater Hospital, "If you're not bleedin' when you come in, you certainly will be once you leave" (Personal conversation, January 2003). The third is the City Centre area, which consists of shops and restaurants, and has been the urban renewal project of the City Council. One area of the project has been to create a sports team of Belfast, but as one tour guide commented, it was difficult to find a sport each side did not think of as belonging to the other. For example, the Protestants play cricket, and the Catholics play Gaelic Football. The City finally decided on Hockey, and the Belfast Giants – all

Canadians except for one US American – play in the new civic center (Personal conversation, February 2003).

The fourth and final place where the populations mix is the workplace, which is frequently the site of sectarian intimidation and violence (Interview 6). Recent legislation prohibits all flags and emblems from the workplace and from its gates. Non-violence activists have been endeavoring to transform the workplace into a model of how to change society (See Figure 2: Anti-sectarianism poster, p. 161). As one respondent said, “The only place we choose to come together – for money, of course – is the workplace. It’s an area of massive potential for influence. Because the workplace and the community are not separate” (Interview 6, ll. 292-295). It could be that a major facet of capitalism is its ability to trump identity, an idea that will be illustrated later in this dissertation (p. 171).

Though the Troubles now appear to be dormant, the overt fighting continued until the Belfast Agreement, commonly known as the “Good Friday Agreement” because of the day on which it was signed in 1998 (Interview 8). At this point, the political leaders of the Protestant and Catholic communities, Gerry Adams and David Trimble, respectively, agreed to political reforms: the police force would be changed from an 85% Protestant majority to a 50/50 makeup (Ellison & Smyth, 2000), a Northern Ireland parliament would sit in Stormont outside of Belfast, and the IRA would begin decommissioning its weapons. No similar requirements were put into place over the Protestant paramilitary equivalents of the IRA. In part, that was because the largest one, the Ulster Defence [sic]

Association (UDA), though strong and active, was already illegal. Despite this, the majority of Northern Irish voters, including the Catholics, supported the Belfast Agreement. Goodman (2000) argues that this decision may be in the context of Europeanization embodied by the EU and the euro. Kockel (1995) asserts that "The majority in the South [ROI] tend to identify themselves with Europe" (p. 246).

### *Relevant Terms and Players*

As time has passed, Northern Ireland has become a land of initials. Groups make acronyms or abbreviations out of their names. Knowing who is who and which is which is essential for understanding the conflict as it currently stands. Though these labels carry with them political overtones that I will discuss in Chapter 3, I will briefly present them here. To begin with, there are two main camps of people, which are usually discussed, at least outside of Northern Ireland, using the religious designations of Catholics and Protestants.

*Unionist/Loyalist politics.* These are people who want to remain part of the UK. They are mostly, but not exclusively, Protestant, fly the Union Jack flag, and are politically either Unionists or Loyalists. The latter group is more radicalized and is associated with violence, while the former confines its battling to the political arena. Unionist and Loyalist political parties include the UUP (Ulster Unionist Party, led by David Trimble) and the more extreme DUP (Democratic Unionist Party, led by the Reverend Ian Paisley). While the UUP is willing to work with the other side, the DUP expresses very little willingness to do so.



*The Orange Order and Royal Black.* Another pro-UK organization is the Orange Order, which has an offshoot called the Royal Black Institution. These organizations are open to Protestant men only, and are known for their Unionist stance and their marches every summer. Members of the Orange Order are called Orangemen, and members of the Royal Black Institution are called Blackmen. The Orange Order is named for William of Orange, the Protestant king who won the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. The Royal Black Institution is open to members of the Orange Order only, so all Blackmen are Orangemen, as well. Both parts of the organization have strong religious components, and both have chapters in many countries, including the US (Interview 10).

*Loyalist paramilitaries.* In addition to the political parties, the Loyalists maintain several competing paramilitary organizations, many of which are associated with violence, murder, and crime (Spotlight, 2003). Some of the main organizations are the UDA (Ulster Defence Association), the UFF (Ulster Freedom Fighters), the UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force), LVF (Loyalist Volunteer Force), and the UYM (Ulster Young Militants). Loyalists will paint the curbs and sidewalks of their neighborhoods the red, white, and blue of the Union Jack, and cover the walls of their neighborhoods with political murals, often depicting masked men holding machine guns (Cox, Guelke, & Stephen, 2000). While members of these organizations share an overall vision, they frequently fight with one another, and the battles sometimes become deadly.

*Nationalist/Republican politics.* Another segment of the population, which happens to be predominately Catholic, and which wants to break from the UK and unite with the ROI is called either Nationalist or Republican. This segment of the population speaks Gaelic and flies the tricolor orange, white, and green flag of Ireland. Like their counterparts on the pro-British side, people usually draw a difference between Nationalist and Republican, a distinction I will more deeply explore in Chapter 3. In brief, Nationalists are discussed herein as more moderate, and Republicans as being more extreme. There are two political parties on this side. The largest is Sinn Féin, which affiliates with Marxism and is the more radical of the two. Sinn Féin is Gaelic for “ourselves alone” and is associated with the paramilitary organization IRA (Irish Republican Army). Though Sinn Féin leaders Gerry Adams, Gerry Kelly, and Martin McGuinness disavow such a connection, Loyalists and Unionists will often refer to Sinn Féin as “Sinn Fein/IRA.” The more moderate political party is the SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party), a socialist party lead by Mark Durkan and formerly run by John Hume.

*Republican paramilitaries.* The main Republican paramilitary group is the IRA, but internal rifts in the IRA over the years have resulted in the group splintering into several factions. The main faction is the Provisional IRA, which is also called PIRA or “the Provos.” When the initial group split off, those who came to be known as the Provos maintained the original organization. Those who opposed them, for reasons beyond the scope of this paper, are known as RIRA

(Real IRA). Another group is called INLA (Irish National Liberation Army), which was founded in 1974. Much like their Loyalist counterparts, the Republican paramilitaries are associated with crime, violence, and turf wars, and paint the curbs of their neighborhoods with the colors of the tricolor and cover the buildings with political murals.

### *Extremists and Icons*

The extremists on both sides have had their respective icons. The IRA has Bobby Sands, IRA commander and leader of the fatal hunger strike in the Maze prison in the 1980s. The UDA has Protestant William of Orange, namesake of the Orange Order (Kelly, 2000), who in 1688 replaced James II as King. Display of either became iconic to the respective supporting side and is provoking to the other. Each side paints murals of their heroes in their respective neighborhoods. These murals serve as markers of identity and territory as much as they are statements of political predisposition. As Eric Kramer (1997) shows, "All such markers of identity are idolically magical and symbolically mythical" (p. 97). By this, Kramer means that such markers have "magic" qualities that hold a certain internal power, much like an amulet or a crucifix would to the holder that believes in it. At the same time, the markers embody a certain mythology to the viewers. These multiple qualities of the markers serve to "ward off" outsiders through warnings, unify insiders through their understood power, and give rise to differing interpretations depending on the viewer's membership. Indeed, these murals became not only displays of politics, but were territory markers and

overt threats of violence. Kramer explains that, "Depending on the degree of identity with the markers, a person may go so far as to kill and die to protect the integrity of the marker" (p. 97). Indeed, violence, including killing in the service of what Kramer (2003) calls "identity maintenance" has become part of the world of the 'Troubles.'

Since the Belfast Agreement, the Northern Ireland (NI) ceasefire has resulted in a reduction of violence (Cox, Guelke, & Stephen, 2000; Bew, 2000). The governments of the United Kingdom (UK) and the Republic of Ireland (ROI) have worked together (Bew, Gibbon, & Patterson, 2002, p. 219) with the parties on the ground to implement the accords. Though sectarian violence has decreased, bloodshed has not entirely disappeared from the local scene. Part of the Good Friday Agreement stipulated the release from prison of the paramilitary leaders (von Tangen Page, 2000). In the early months of 2003, rivalries amongst the Belfast leadership of the largest Protestant paramilitary group, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) erupted into violence, culminating in the assassination of one of the UDA leaders, "Brigadier" John "Grugg" Gregg, and subsequent reprisals and forced evacuation of the followers of the responsible leader, "Brigadier" Johnny "Mad Dog" Adair.

## CHAPTER TWO:

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY

#### *Interviews in Northern Ireland*

Scholars have begun to listen to and publish the stories of residents of Northern Ireland in an attempt to understand the situation there. Stevenson (1996) embedded the personal accounts of 32 Northern Ireland militants into his history of "The Troubles." Though the title of Stevenson's book, *We Wrecked the Place*, demonstrates a sense of remorse, some of Stevenson's interviewees are presently involved in militant organizations. By contrast, Smyth and Fay (2000) presented 14 narratives of Northern Irish residents from both sides of the conflict. All of their interviewees, regardless of past involvement, were non-combatants at the time of the interviews. Though their works are valuable in that they present interviewees' points of view in their own words, they are atheoretical. As such, the situation demands a scholarly approach to its study.

#### *Explication of the Term Culture*

*A dictionary definition.* As culture plays such a vital role in this conflict, it is imperative to explicate the concept for inclusion in this dissertation. Culture is a slippery term that can embody many different meanings. The *Oxford Dictionary of Current English* (1998) offers five distinct definitions of the word:

- 1a. intellectual and artistic achievement or expression (*city lacking in culture*). b. refined appreciation of the arts etc. (*person of culture*).
2. customs, achievements, etc. of a particular civilization or group (*Chinese culture*).
3. improvement by mental or physical training.
- 4.

cultivation of plants; rearing of bees etc. 5. quantity of micro-organisms and nutrient material supporting their growth. (p. 206)

These five definitions provide five possibilities for use and understanding of this term, but is any one of them the right fit for this study?

We can dismiss the last two out of hand: the last one connotes a tissue sample taken by a doctor in order to make a diagnosis of the presence or absence of bacteria or similar item. A child with a sore throat has cells swabbed and 'cultured' in a Petri dish to check for streptococcus or staphylococcus, or other types of bacteria. Armed with the results of the culture, the doctor can prescribe the proper treatment regimen. Though we also speak of people as 'cultured,' this definition does not account for the process of human interaction typically underlying any communication scenario. Further, it is difficult to envision where commonly accepted (though not singularly defined) concepts of race, nationality, or ethnicity have any relevance here. The rearing of bees or the cultivation of plants presents culture as a verb (as occurs sometimes in definition 5, too). Though individuals engaged in such activities may indeed have certain attitudes or attributes in common that distinguish them from the general population, the definition itself, that is, the activity of *culturing*, does not help us understand any such attributes, presuming they do exist, nor does it suggest any way to elucidate or understand them.

Using the first meaning, "intellectual and artistic achievement," one could argue that culture is a product, either material or non-material, of a positive

nature. After all, 'an achievement' is something positive or significant (though to be honest some in Northern Ireland may claim that the Troubles are such an achievement) such as the *Winged Victory*, the *US Constitution*, or the *bas reliefs* on Hindu temples. All three examples are material, or in the case of the Constitution, are non-material (i.e., intellectual) achievements that have a tangible physical manifestation – the known copies of the Constitution, though on public display, are so in a controlled environment, enclosed in glass cases that retract into the ground in case of war or attack. Further, teachers and professors, the author included, swear a 'loyalty oath' to 'uphold and defend' the Constitution. A refusal to do so constitutes 'disloyalty,' but disloyalty to what? Certainly not to the actual physical documents ensconced in their climate-controlled glass cases in Washington, DC, but to the ideas (re)presented in those documents. Indeed, were I to show up in DC, rifle in hand, intent on defending the Constitution, my success would be far from guaranteed. This paradox exposes a problem with the first definition (or with the practice of keeping the Constitution in conditions better suited to religious relics) in that the loyalty lies not to a piece of parchment – for that to be true, the existence of the United States of America as a sovereign nation would have to presuppose the existence of the *original* documents, which surely cannot be the case, no matter how much we revere them – but to the ideals discussed in the document *and* to its history, the heroism of its authors and signers, the *belief* in those ideals, and the acceptance of US sovereignty. Indeed, were the loyalty oath literal, one would need to

question the sanity of its adherents. To be loyal to a piece of parchment seems silly and smacks of pagan fetishism or Jean Gebser's (1984) magic, which holds that an object is seen to possess some sort of power beyond its physical attributes.

The second part of this definition discusses the "person of culture" and introduces social class and 'breeding' into the equation. This definition implies a group of people, but the group is not formed according to some common origin such as location, belief, or physical characteristics typical to a common-sense view of culture. Rather, the definition implies an amount of socialization which creates a "refined appreciation of the arts etc." Here, there is a clear group: those with 'refinement' or 'taste.' As Pierre Bourdieu (1987) has shown in his study of the *habitus*, taste tends to be a self-perpetuating concept in that it is used by people as an influence them to make decisions that tend to reinforce taste itself. Nonetheless, this definition would certainly explain the shortcomings of the problems encountered with the previous one. Any person of refinement would *know* that we hold the ideals sacred, and while the document itself has sentimental, historical – the 'right' antiques are 'proper,' 'tasteful,' and quite expensive, which itself may be 'tasteful' – value, we remain loyal to the ideas, and not to the parchment itself.

The second definition, "customs, achievements, etc. of a particular civilization or group," seems to remedy some of the haziness of the first definition. Like the first definition, this one also has a materiality to it, but the 'products' now belong



to a particular group. The definition gives the example of "Chinese culture." Though the average reader can grasp the concept of 'Chinese culture' after encountering persons or artifacts from China, the definition does not adequately explain how such a culture, or any other, for that matter, comes into being or is maintained. The definition is circular. A closer look at it reveals the circularity of its reasoning: Chinese culture is defined as the customs, achievements, etc. of the Chinese. But what makes one Chinese *before* any such achievements, and what of those Chinese who produce no such achievements, or who deviate from the customs? Do they stop being Chinese? Likewise, if Caucasian northern Europeans adopt Buddhism and practice Tai Chi, do they somehow *become* Chinese? Using this definition literally, they might. Yet common sense would impel one to reject this notion out of hand.

The third definition, "improvement by mental or physical training," is strange in that it connotes that culture is somehow not inherent in people. Much like the prior notion of culture as related to refinement, this one presents culture not as an inherent state, as the previous definition (i.e., Chinese culture) does. If this is true, then all 'Chinese' are *not* born 'Chinese,' and in order to become 'Chinese,' they must enact some type of refinement, which will somehow improve them. In a sense, they must *become* Chinese through indoctrination. Who is supposed to do this, how it is done, the nature of the improvement, and a definition of the prior state are all questions left painfully unanswered by the definition. Finally, one might question the truthfulness of the notion that culture somehow makes

one better. In what way, for example, does the adoption (if adoption is even possible) of meat-eating, gluttonous culture *improve* the non-violence practicing, vegetarian, ascetic Tibetan Buddhist?

In sum, each of these definitions has nuances that help us think about human culture; none is adequate. One may think that a look at the scholarly literature may be more beneficial, yet examination of the scholarship of culture proves to be a frustrating task, in that the term 'culture' is defined differently by scholars, when they define it at all. Clifford Geertz (1973) was well-aware of the problems associated with improper or unsubstantial definitions of culture, noting that, "the term 'culture' has by now acquired a certain aura of ill-repute in social anthropological circles because of the multiplicity of its referents and the studied vagueness with which it has all too often been invoked" (p. 89). Unfortunately, both problems Geertz identified 30 years ago are still unresolved.

*Textbook definitions.* Rogers and Steinfatt's (1999) definition of culture does not appear until the third chapter (p. 79) of their textbook. Samovar, Porter, & Stefani's (1998) introductory intercultural text argues that there are many additional definitions since Kroeber and Kluckhohn's 164 in the early 1950s. Chen and Starosta (1998) offer a clear definition: "a set of fundamental ideas, practices, and experiences of a group of people that are symbolically transmitted generation to generation through a learning process" (p. 25). This seems clear and concise, but the authors then add that, "Culture may as well refer to beliefs, norms, and attitudes that are used to guide our behaviors and to solve human

problems" (p. 25). This sentence, which seems superfluous—ideas include beliefs and norms—is helpful in that it discusses the concept of guiding human behavior. Most people's definition of culture bears similarity to the US Supreme Court's definition of pornography: they know it when they see it. Some (Carey, 1992) offer the Zen-like definition: communication as culture. If this is the case, then one wonders if all communication is culture. If so, then what *isn't* culture, and would James Carey argue that the terms communication and culture are interchangeable? This is probably not the case, and we are left unfulfilled.

*Hall's view of culture.* Working from an anthropological perspective, E. T. Hall (1959) stakes the territorial claim of culture for anthropology, arguing that, "from the beginning, culture has been the special province of the anthropologist" (p. 31). At the time, this may have been truer than it is presently, at least in the social sciences, though it must be said that years prior to Hall's statement, Husserlian phenomenology, specifically the idea of "bracketing" preconceived notions, had already laid claim to what Hall proclaimed as the property of anthropology. Hall presages Carey in saying that, "culture is communication and communication is culture" (p. 169). Such a statement opens the door for communication scholars to explore culture as a topic. Hall continues, explaining that culture includes individuals, institutions, and language. Later in his career (1981) he adds human material artifacts to his definition, which he calls 'man's extensions.' He does not explicitly define culture, though he argues that its characteristics include that "it is learned," that its aspects are "interrelated—you

touch a culture in one place, and everything else is affected,” and that it delimits a set of people: “it is shared and in effect defines the boundaries of different groups” (p. 16). This definition augments Hall’s earlier version, in that each of these characteristics can only exist through communication. Valuable as it is, Hall’s later definition lacks precision, and though it includes important features such as being shared, learned, material, and interrelated, it remains unclear whether communication *reflects* culture or is a *reflection* of culture, both, or neither. Hall fails to explicitly discuss norms and expectations, which underlie and guide human interaction and sense-making. Finally, Hall, like others, describes culture in terms of product instead of process.

*Kim’s definition.* Y. Y. Kim is undoubtedly one of the most significant scholars of intercultural communication, and one of the few living ICA Fellows. Despite her deservedly high status in the field, Kim (2001) only fuzzily defines the term, claiming that culture is, “the ‘home world,’ which is associated closely with the family or ‘significant others’” (p. 46). Kim characterizes culture as outside forces operating on the impressionable young mind. She explains that humans possess no innate knowledge, but, “we *learn* to relate to our social environment and its culture” (p. 46). Kim’s terms are mystifying—do orphans, who have no “home life” in the typical sense have culture? What is the difference between social environment and culture, what is ‘social’ about the social environment? Is culture then a subset of the social environment? Given her phraseology, her terms seem to relegate culture to being something one possesses. Further, Kim

limits the window of opportunity one has to obtain this enigmatic 'culture' to one's first years on Earth: "The unwritten task of every cultural environment is to organize, integrate, and maintain the psychological patterns of the individual primarily in the formative years of childhood" (p. 46). Again, her terms obfuscate our understanding of culture. The environment, which she had described as the 'social environment,' is now referred to as the 'cultural environment,' which confounds the issue, since culture was previously implied to be a subset of social environment. Further, her definition of this new 'cultural environment' now has been anthropomorphized and given some sort of mysterious consciousness — and a task. Finally, it seems to work actively on us as children and then skulk away, peering at us from the shadows. In the end, we are not sure whether we *have* culture, whether culture *does* something to us, whether culture is *part of* an environment or *is* the environment, and, ultimately, what culture is.

*Communication as process: Pearce.* Though Pearce (1980; 1989) discusses communication rather than culture *per se*, he does so in a way that can be read as a discussion of culture. Pearce resists the idea of communication as a 'thing,' preferring instead to discuss communication in terms of a 'process.' This idea extends to the point where Pearce states that, "We live in communication" (1989, p. 11), and that our communication "constitute[s] the world as we know it" (p. 11). Pearce argues that communication is not important to our lived experience, it is paramount: "Communication is a *primary* social process, the material

substance of those things whose reality we often take for granted, such as our 'selves,' motives, relationships, what we would otherwise describe as 'facts,' and so forth" (p. 11). Though he cautions us against blindly accepting this view, and he is discussing communication, not culture, it is a small leap to make to apply the same ideas to the concept of culture. Given Pearce's (1980) argument that, "communication has always had a reciprocal causal relationship with culture" (p. 25) in that it shapes and is shaped by "basic cultural assumptions and mores," (p. 25), one can safely argue that Pearce's view of communication is more of something we do rather than something we strictly have.

*Imagined communities.* Another way to look at culture is to use not a psychological lens, as the previous scholars do, but a sociological one. The creation and reification of separate communities—separate nations even—creates what Anderson (1995) calls "imagined communities." The first part of Anderson's idea is that while societies have within them a degree of imagined-ness, in that, with little exception, a member of a society will not personally know all other members of the society, even if the member feels exceptionally patriotic or feels high ethnic identification. As Anderson states, "it is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (p. 6). In this sense, Anderson believes that communities exist because people fancy themselves as connected. Further, Anderson argues that the imagined community has limitations such as borders

and boundaries. While certain societies may be envisioned as empires, even world empires, one is want to find an empire—even one with global ambitions—that considers conquered peoples are members of the nation, possessing equal status to the conquerors. Finally, Anderson contends that the imagination extends to concepts like sovereignty, freedom, and even being inspired by a supreme being. As Anderson puts it, “Nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so” (p. 7).

The second part of “imagined communities” is the “communities.” Anderson takes a critical perspective, arguing that, “Regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (p. 7). While I find such absolute pronouncements (e.g., “always”) generally troublesome, Anderson’s point, however unconfirmed, is thought provoking. Anderson’s point is not that communities do not exist—to argue such would be silly—but that they in fact *do* exist, though their inception and existence stem from social agreement. Wars and struggle to create nations are also physical extensions of a cultural metaphysic. In this sense, nations are communities that exist through struggle rooted in belief and, I would add, through *communication*. Along similar lines, Golden (2002) found that new immigrants to contemporary Israel create a sense of community through storytelling.

### *My Working Definition of Culture*

Each of the above views of culture presents worthy ideas, though none seems to be broad enough to encompass all the relevant aspects of the phenomenon while remaining focused enough to provide a realistic guiding heuristic. As such, I propose the following definition of culture which I hope will allow for a more cogent understanding and investigation of Northern Ireland and other areas of the world: *Culture is a range of expectations of enacted behavior, beliefs, and ideas, and their resulting material creations, shared by a group of people who may or may not be confined to a limited geographic area.*

*First part: Culture is a range of expectations.* Breaking this definition down, the first concept is that culture is a *range of expectations*. By this, I mean simply that culture entails not a singular, uniform mode of being, but rather a range of ways of being. This aspect of my view of culture is in direct opposition to the commonly-held perception scholars have of culture as a thing that can be plotted on a bell curve. Scholars who hold the opposing view to mine (cf. Gudykunst and Kim, 1997, p.55) speak of intercultural understanding as bridging the gap between the mean of one culture and the mean of another. Doing so is dangerously erroneous, as it assumes that if culture can be plotted on a curve—an idea with which I do not agree—then any sojourner or intercultural communication scholar will embody the “typical” or “correct” behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs (i.e., “norms”) of his or her own culture, and that the



scholar or sojourner will encounter the “typical” or “correct” behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs of the “stranger” culture, personified perfectly by those of the foreign culture. Common sense tells us that this is patently false. To begin with, scholars are not at the center of the bell curve, neither in terms of educational attainment, nor in terms (often) of intelligence. Even the non-scholarly sojourning US American is atypical of the population that tends to confine travel to domestic destinations. As such, it is incorrect to argue that I, as scholar or lay traveler, represent the “normal” US American. If this is so, how can one possibly assume with any certainty, that those I encounter will be representative of the top of their cultural bell curve? For all I know, they are also outliers of any cultural norm I choose to study. This would simply be an error in thinking were it not for the scholarly vicious circle of basing entire theoretical systems on such assumptions, which in turn become naturalized through the selfsame narrow view of “science” they embrace. It becomes dangerous when we make theory or policy on such erroneous assumptions, for it essentializes people based on the notion that there is “one way to skin a cat” in each culture, and those who deviate are somehow abnormal.

Instead, culture should be looked at as a range of behaviors, beliefs, and ideas. The size of the range may depend on the particular people, as some cultures seem more tolerant of diversity than others. Additionally, viewing culture as a range rather than a “standard normal curve” allows for acceptance of the notion that the “oddballs” and “eccentrics” are still part of the culture. It still allows us

to make cultural observations and comparisons, but bases them not on some supposed, static, and unsubstantiated mean, but on an understanding of culture as organic, enacted, and dynamic. Regardless of how wide the range of expectations may be, however, violating those expectations brings unpleasant consequences, the severity of which also vary from place to place and situation to situation.

*Second part: Culture is enacted.* The second aspect of my definition is that culture is *enacted*. This is to say that I *do not* hold, like some of the above-mentioned theorists, that culture is something one *possesses*, but rather that culture is something that one *does*. This behavior varies in degree of consciousness, as some of what we do as culture is quite performative in nature (e.g., funeral rituals) while other aspects may occur without thought or intention (e.g., how we react/do not react when someone sneezes). Regardless, even unconscious behavior is enacted behavior. In a sense, this is a corollary to and clarification of Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson's (1967) argument that "one cannot *not* communicate," in that I am arguing that one cannot *not* enact culture. And this point precisely underscores my previous argument about the cultural bell curve: every member of a group of people enacts culture in his or her particular way. For someone, especially an outsider scholar, to mathematically divine the "correct" way of being of that culture, negates the ontology of any possible "stranger" encountered, in that the outsider-scholar has determined what is "normal." What can (but admittedly does not automatically) result from

such bell curves, is the false dichotomy that what is not "normal" is "abnormal." Ideas like this squelch variety and diverse ways of being and knowing.<sup>1</sup> Such thinking is arrogant and dangerous and has been used as justification for the mistreatment or murder and genocide of "others" throughout history. It is not surprising that some of the namesakes (e.g., Pearson and Galton) of popular social statistics were themselves proponents of Social Darwinism; Pearson was the first Chair of Eugenics at the University of London, a position established in accordance with the will of Francis Galton. According to the University of London website (<http://>

<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/stats/history/pearson.html#biography>)

Galton died in 1911 and left the residue of his estate to the University of London for a Chair in Eugenics. Pearson was the first holder of this chair, in accordance with Galton's wishes. He formed the Department of Applied Statistics, into which he incorporated the Biometric and Galton laboratories. (n.d., n.p.)

Pearson held this position for more than 20 years. The ugliness of eugenics would be more fully understood in the years after Pearson's death as ironically, he died in 1933, the same year Hitler was elected Chancellor of Germany.

*Third part: Culture is the enactment of beliefs and ideas.* The next aspect of my definition is that culture is the enactment of *beliefs* and *ideas*. Again, one must see a range here rather than a mean and standard deviation, for there is seldom

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<sup>1</sup> There is also a logical problem with this point of view: In becoming familiar with the Stranger, his or her Otherness disappears. The paradox presents itself like this: either I am an outsider-scholar ("the Stranger") who is strange *precisely because* of my outsider-ness or strange-ness, and I therefore do not understand the "strange" ways I encounter, or I learn the ways of the culture, and as I do, I cease to be "the Stranger," for I am now inside, and the ways have ceased to be "strange."

uniformity of belief or idea within a culture, especially longitudinally. For example, some Christians believe in a literal understanding of the Bible, while others take a metaphorical view. Are the latter group somehow less Christian than the others? While each group may have opinions or criticisms of the other, both are still seen as Christians. This is so because they both enact beliefs and ideas that are accepted as Christianity, however disparate those beliefs and ideas may be.

*Fourth part: Culture includes material creations.* In this sense, Hall was right. Artifacts become part of culture in that they are the expression of behavior, ideas, and belief. For example, the skyscraper is a physical manifestation of the Western ideal of humankind's conquering of nature and each other just as the city grid is the physical manifestation of modernism's quest for orderliness and control (Arnfeld, unpublished paper, 2003). Sometimes they also give rise to continued behaviors, ideas, and beliefs: the Statue of Liberty and American flag both express US Americans' love of freedom while they perpetuate this idea, just as a religious object, the Jewish phylacteries, for example, are associated with precise rituals that cause one to engage with ideas in order to use them. It is interesting that in both cases, members of the groups "US Americans" and "Jews" have a variety of ways of understanding these objects, as evinced by the move toward criminalizing burning of the US flag, and the emerging trend of women who wear phylacteries, traditionally a male obligation. Though their use

changes as enacted culture adjusts, these objects, as physical manifestations of enacted behavior, are *culture*.

*Fifth part: Culture is shared by a group of people.* In the late 1950s, it made sense to view culture as a phenomenon describing a particular group, tribe, or nation occupying a particular space. Malinowski's Trobriand Islanders were conveniently located in one place. However, given the migration and cross-pollination of ideas in our postmodern world, it no longer makes sense to divide the world into cultural cantons. Indeed, it may not have made sense to do so the first time Chinese explorers conquered the open seas or the since the Jews were forced into the Babylonian Exile, since in both cases, those who left did not cease to enact their respective cultures, regardless of how they may have changed doing so as a result of contact with those they encountered. With travel and migration so common today, it makes even less sense to define culture as primarily national. Is the Bangladeshi professor American after living and teaching in the US for five years? Or ten years? Or twenty? Is she US American? Furthermore, and more importantly, how far from the supposed central tendency of Bangladeshi or US American can one go before crossing some sort of threshold? Again, common sense tells us what theorists' definitions do not: if culture is what you do, rather than what you have, you continue to do it when you move about this world. Further, if culture is enacted rather than possessed, one can more clearly see how culture is transmitted through media such as film and television, and why non-Westerners are angry about US cultural hegemony.

If our enacted culture exposes Saudis to beliefs and ideas counter to their enacted culture, their anger is as reasonable as the perceived view some US Americans have of France imposing its *Weltanschauung* on us.

*Recap.* Thus, I re-state my definition of culture to be used in this work: *Culture is a range of expectations of enacted behavior, beliefs, and ideas, and their resulting material creations, shared by a group of people who may or may not be confined to a limited geographic area.* In the case of this dissertation, Northern Irish culture can be seen enacted in the murals and the newspapers I analyze just as much as it is in the words of the people I interview. It is not uniform or singular, and the same ideas are seen differently by co-religionists and by those of different backgrounds. Culture is both a battleground and a 'playspace' where ideas and beliefs take shape and are enacted, where ideas about truth and falsehood (i.e., beliefs) and about moral right and wrong (i.e., values) are discussed, fought over, attacked, and defended. It is the site of struggle and definition of individuals, and as such, reflects the spectrum of behavior exhibited by those individuals and takes shape in aggregate form.

#### Overarching Research Question

We have seen that although many have chosen a path of violence in Northern Ireland, others have deliberately eschewed this choice, favoring instead to live non-violently, and to either engage the politics of Northern Ireland through non-violence, or to ignore the politics completely. Since that second group (e.g., those who choose non-violence) comes from a variety of religious and ethnic starting

points, and is typically isolated from one another until adulthood, the fundamental question driving this dissertation is the following: Given that individuals have renounced violence as a means of solution to the Troubles, is there an essential *way* of communication common to them? That is, this dissertation seeks to find language, symbolism, and ways of communication common to those who seek to live through non-violent means. As I have stated earlier, I believe culture to be a mutually accepted on-going activity of organizing and sense-making (which includes the material products of such activity). Thus, though they are essential elements of interest, I must look beyond the words and phrases (the sounds) and broaden my analysis to include the imagery and media of Northern Ireland (the sights). However, one cannot employ the same research tools to a newspaper as one does to a mural or to a respondent. Therefore, I have elected to employ multiple methods to uncover the various ways in which non-violence is communicated in Northern Ireland. As such, each of the three methods I use zeroes in on a different aspect of Northern Irish communication, and each entails different sub-areas of the grand research question.

### Methods

This dissertation employs multiple methods: in-depth interviews with limited participant observation, semiotic analysis, and quantitative content analysis. Multiple methods can be used to take advantage of the strengths and to compensate for the weaknesses of various methodologies (Keyton, 2001). In this

section, I will explain and illustrate my chosen procedures. In addition, I discuss the methods used herein at the end of the Justification section later in this paper.

### *Interviews*

*Interview overview.* I conducted 17 in-depth interviews. Because of the inherent danger present in Northern Ireland, and the potential danger of the interviews, the University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board (IRB) stipulated that interviews be completely anonymous, and that I should not collect the names of the respondents. This protocol essentially meant that I was unable to follow up interviews by contacting the respondents to ask for revision of interview transcripts. Given the ambient danger of the area, and the risk of accusations of traitorousness, this is likely a reasonable precaution.

*Sampling.* All subjects were between 18-65 years of age, none was in any of the IRB protected classes. Using "snowball" sampling, I began with the director of a community service organization I found on the Internet. In speaking with her on the telephone from Oklahoma, I learned that her organization is a UK government-sponsored umbrella for community groups and social workers throughout north Belfast, the most divided part of the city. The director provided me with a list of contacts which lead me to several community members on a tour. From this tour, I contacted persons mentioned to me by those I met. In addition, I sought out the student leader who created an anti-sectarianism poster seen on the Queen's University campus, a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), a well-known scholar on the Troubles,



and lay members of the community. Further, I was careful to include a balance of Catholics and Protestants, as well as people not belonging to either group.

Data collected elucidate myths and language use common to non-combatants, though I acknowledge that I encountered two groups: the non-combatant citizen and the “professional” activist. Quotes from any members of the latter group are identified in the dissertation so their answers can be viewed to properly discern any differences from those of the former group. As these individuals have consciously rejected the sectarian violence around them, the resulting analyses should yield common patterns of communication that can be used as the basis of a model of peaceful coexistence to be applied to this and other wars and inter-ethnic conflicts.

*Interview protocols.* Each subject was met in a place of his or her own choosing. The subject read the voluntary consent letter issued and approved by the University of Oklahoma IRB. Subjects were then asked a battery of questions in an open-ended 30-60 minute interview. The interviews were recorded through note-taking and digital audio. Respondents had the ability to ask any questions, decline to answer any question, decline the interview, terminate the interview at will, answer any item “off the tape,” or agree to the interview but decline being recorded. All interviews used the IRB approved list of questions, though the answers were open-ended and thus the resulting discussions were not identical. In addition, no personal identifiers (e.g., names, addresses, names of family or friends, coworkers or places of employment) were taken or recorded. Any such

information given, even voluntarily, was replaced in transcription by pseudonyms and substitute information so that interviewee identity is impossible to ascertain from reading the study.

Following the interviews, the recordings were transcribed, including repeated words and vocalized pauses (e.g., "um," "uh"). Transcripts were broken down by question and answers probed for patterns of language use and message content. Resulting patterns (or the lack thereof) are noted and reported and compared to the backgrounding context of participant-observer fieldnotes. In particular, I analyze how the respondents describe their identities, how they describe the Troubles, how they discuss peacemaking and peacemakers, and how they envision community in Northern Ireland.

### *Semiotic Analysis*

As Belfast is replete with murals, this dissertation includes a description and semiotic analysis of approximately 80 photographed images.<sup>2</sup> Images were organized according to type (i.e., political or non-political), side (i.e., Loyalist, Unionist, Nationalist, or Republican), outlook (i.e., pessimistic, neutral, optimistic), affect (i.e., confrontational or conciliatory). Additionally, images are organized on the basis of visual categories (e.g., dominant colors, size, and common imagery), text (i.e., words in the murals), and symbolic value (i.e.,

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<sup>2</sup> As mentioned above, there are hundreds of murals in Belfast, almost exclusively in the lower-class areas. Murals were found as I traveled throughout the city, usually on foot. I photographed them using a digital camera. At no point was I ever approached by any individual or group before, during, or after photographing the murals, which I did very publicly, taking time to line up the shot, usually standing in the street. It is a fair guess that the murals are so frequently photographed that doing so is an expected act.

signification and representation). The semiotic section features an analysis of the images themselves and their respective representative value in the political and territorial context. Representative images are included as appendices.

### *Content Analysis*

In the interest of multiple methods and epistemological balance, I conducted a quantitative content analysis of 8 days of print news coverage of events in Belfast. As the press is factionalized, there are approximately 15 local newspapers printed on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis. Given that fragmentation exists not only along sectarian lines but within the Catholic and Protestant communities themselves, a content analysis of the images and stories in the press may reveal additional insight into identity and community in Belfast. Though many content analyses use on-line versions of newspapers, this one uses paper versions, which typically carry all stories rather than selected ones.

The content analysis was conducted using the procedures I sketch below. First, copies of newspapers were purchased in Belfast. All sections except the front section were removed and the remaining front sections were hand carried to the US. Copies of the papers and stories were given a code number. The papers' code numbers distinguish between daily and weekly editions. Three paid coders were trained and given codebooks (attached as Appendix G: Content Analysis Codebook, p. 172) to use for scoring. All coders were trained together and thus received identical instructions. Codebook questions were based on interview answers (e.g., names of "peacemakers" were made answer choices

based on responses to interview questions about Northern Ireland's peacemakers). One day's paper, not reported in the results of this study, was used as a training paper and was used as a pilot to test inter-coder reliability. Completed coding sheets were examined by the researcher for general correctness and consistency, and then data were processed using SPSS, scored using the measures lambda and phi, reported, and analyzed.

### Justification

Examination of non-combatant Northern Irish communicative practices as a lens for understanding nonviolence is a communication topic by virtue of the ontological focus and theoretical approaches employed in the current study. By this, I mean simply that while scholars from other fields could examine specific practices (e.g., a political scientist could look at paramilitarism or a scholar of art history could analyze political murals), a communication scholar is in the unique position, by virtue of our being at the nexus of many fields, of simultaneously examining many aspects of culture concomitantly. Additionally, our field's embrace of multiple methodologies and epistemological perspectives allows me to answer this question in a way not limited by only one way of seeing. Further, this work clearly fits into the Language and Social Interaction (LSI) branch of the Communication discipline. In this section, I shall present arguments justifying the current study in the Communication discipline. First, the work draws on theories that hold that communication is an enactment of culture rather than a mere tool employed by individuals "possessing" and "transmitting" a culture *sui*

*generis*. Second, the work extends the idea that: the extant world is a social creation maintained through the actions of its inhabitants. Third, these actions, including speech acts, are interpretable and meaningful. Fourth, the work builds upon ideas of the ways in which culture is expressed in public and in private. Fifth, the work examines the way in which culture, power, and politics are experiences as manifest in images and language. Sixth, the work draws on the notions that the mass media is a semiotic process by which culture is created and which engages how and what consumers think. Finally, this study is necessary and justified because of its social importance. Northern Ireland's "Troubles" are well known; they are depicted everywhere from cinema to textbooks of intercultural communication, yet scholars of intercultural communication tend not to focus on resolving this conflict. This study seeks to remedy that.

#### *Coordinated Management of Meaning*

This is a communication topic for several reasons. First, scholars (e.g., Pearce & Cronen, 1980; Pearce, 1989; Carey, 1989) have argued that rather than simply being a tool used by humans, communication is the basis for and expression of human existence. The famous proclamation that "One cannot not communicate" (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967), debated in nearly every Introduction to Graduate Studies course across the country, presents a case for the fundamentality of communication to human existence. As Barnett Pearce (1989) explains, "Persons live *in* communication rather than standing outside it and 'using' communication for other purposes" (p. xv). These purposes may be as

varied (e.g., remaining in the UK, uniting with the ROI, maintaining a “cold peace,” intimidating the “other side”) as the tactics (e.g., political campaigning and voting, Gandhi-inspired tactics<sup>3</sup> of non-violence) employed. In any climate where violence is normative behavior, the deliberate decision to pursue non-violence is perspectival (Gebser, 1984). This is so because the *Weltanschauung*, and the decision to engage in a contravening way, are both grounded in privately held views. Looking at communication as constitutive of culture necessitates an exploration into the communicative practices of people in Belfast to understand their cultural practices and the constituted culture enacted through those practices. While Northern Irish culture has been and continues to be a legitimate topic of study for scholars from a variety of other disciplines (e.g., Politics or Anthropology), Communication as a discipline is uniquely poised, by virtue of its focus on communication, as a lens through which to view this topic.

Pearce and Cronen draw on an epistemological tradition that includes a strain that began with Kant and has continued through Nietzsche and Gadamer, and a second strain that began with Husserl’s phenomenology and gave rise to Heidegger, Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. Pearce and Cronen hold that social realities are created and recreated through people’s ontological “enmeshing” (1980, p. 119) in many social systems and roles. Successful communication occurs when parties hold mutual understandings of the symbols used. The present work begins to explore whether meaning is shared across

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<sup>3</sup> Though as Kramer (2000) points out, Gandhi’s tactics were certainly influenced by Thoreau.

sectarian lines in Northern Ireland. This is an interesting question given 30 years of violence: Could it be that the parties do indeed, at least in their violence, co-construct their world in mutually understandable ways?

### *Social Constructionism*

The second reason this is a Communication topic is related to, draws on, and extends the literature of Social Constructionism. This tradition was created by the phenomenological circles in Germany and was continued by Schutz and by Gurwitsch (1979), who distinguished the community from the group, the former relating to emotional attachments which the latter lack. This thread was picked up by ethnomethodologists such as Garfinkel and Wieder, who “analyze everyday activities as members’ methods for making those activities same activities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical-purposes” to be understood as “organizations of commonplace everyday activities” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. vii), and by sociologists like Goffman (1959; 1986). Berger and Luckmann (1966) argued that the world exists through the socially created and agreed-upon realities shared by its inhabitants. Reality, in such a world, is and takes shape *as it is mutually understood* by the interactants (cf. Gadamer’s (1960/1989, p. 383) notion of common sense).

In the case of a large-scale conflict such as the one in Northern Ireland, and especially in light of a cease fire situation such as the one currently in effect in Northern Ireland, the social world is difficult (or even impossible) to understand from an outsider’s perspective. The “practices of everyday life” (de Certeau,

1984) may be the best way to begin to understand how the conflict is understood and enacted by the participants. The communication discipline provides the best tools and perspectives to thoroughly examine the communicative practices of the individuals on the ground in order to expose and understand the socially constructed world of Northern Irish conflict. Further, the qualitative methods I employ in this study prevent problems of a shallow sociology. I make this statement on the premise that, as stated above, the words—whether spoken or in print—and the mural images, *are* the data. In other words, the strength of this dissertation, and what prevents it from being shallow sociology, is the ways in this I am letting the people of Belfast speak for themselves. While I am providing an organization and imposing some analysis, the true structure of the culture practices I discuss here comes from the Northern Irish. This having been said, I take full responsibility for any errors I make in my interpretation. It is my hope that by I can reduce some of those errors by using “thick analysis” of interview transcripts. By this, I mean that I go beyond simple description of that I observed to present more of a systematic attempt of understanding. Through multiple methods, I engage in analysis that moves beyond simple observation.

*Public and private roles.* Theoretical conceptualization of a socially constructed world is one thing; empirical study and description of such a world is entirely another. Philipsen’s (1975) ethnographic study of men’s speech behavior and identity in the “Teamsterville” area of Chicago allowed us a view into a particular community’s rules of lived experience. Philipsen demonstrated how



the men of Teamsterville varied their communication behavior according to a complex set of social rules that had emerged in the community. While the specific communication behavioral patterns are not necessarily generalizable to all communities worldwide, the strengths of Philipsen's study relevant to this one are threefold: first, Philipsen used qualitative methodology and rich empirical data to make definitive claims about a specific population; second, Philipsen empirically demonstrated the existence of the social world in this community, and; third, Philipsen showed that community members behaved and framed themselves in the social frameworks defined by their shared social world, and that such social rules had real power over the people of the community. Thus, the Philipsen study possesses generalizability of a sort: while the behavioral rules Philipsen describes do not pertain to all men everywhere, the social patterning process he found does. Further, Philipsen's work gracefully demonstrates the power of qualitative research to generate such findings. In the case of Northern Ireland, Philipsen's work provides a strong example of methods and assumptions that can be utilized to produce a definitive understanding of the complexity of a community.

*Language and symbol.* From the earliest work by de Saussure (1915/1966), scholars have problematized the relationship between language and culture. The semiotic stream took root in North America with the pioneering work of Peirce. Peirce recognized that the symbols we use shape (and are shaped by) social forces beyond our control. Charles Sanders Peirce's work provided

scholars with a model for understanding the relationship between words and the things they symbolize, which presupposes a socially shared, if not socially constructed, communicative world. Such a world is (re)created through communication and can best be studied by looking at the communication that (re)shapes it. This line of thought has been utilized by scholars for the last century, from Sapir to Whorf to Agar's (1994) notion of languaculture, to Kramer (1998) and in the approach known as "language ideologies." Thus, exploring language use in discussions of peace, identity, and nonviolence in Northern Ireland will reveal the languaculture of the region. Communication is perhaps the best way to do so.

#### *Media Influence*

Any study of intercultural conflict in the contemporary world must at least consider the role of the media in the social milieu, and should include an analysis of media content. An important mass communication theory, Framing, may be of particular use here because of the contentiousness of the Northern Ireland situation. This particular theory may be especially well-suited to the Northern Ireland situation because of the extremely high number of newspapers (18) printed each week in Belfast alone. This theory views mass media as influential over their consumers and holds that media managers influence the "reality" known by the news-consuming public through the way stories are presented. As such, they shape our attitudes and thoughts. In the media-saturated

environment of Belfast, where many of the factions print their own newspaper, this theory is useful.

### *Interviews as Methodology*

This section will present and explain my three methods of study: interviewing and minor participant observation, semiotic analysis, and content analysis.

As textbooks are one of the primary tools for introducing students to the practices of a scholarly discipline, I offer what some of the more common communication textbooks say about my chosen methods. The use of interviews is somewhat skeptically endorsed by Frey, Botan, and Kreps (2000), who claim that, "For a small group of people who are easy to access, personal interviews work well" (p. 103). While Watt and van den Berg (1995) warn that drawbacks to interviews include expense and respondent fear, these are not a concern in this particular study. In an interview-driven study of individuals affected by the Northern Ireland political Troubles, Smyth and Fay (2000) explained that their interview respondents

Wanted to talk, to tell us about their experiences and the effects their experiences had on them. They barely needed our questions, they only required our attention. Most didn't want our help, although some accepted small services that were offered. Simply to listen was enough. (p. 3)

The same is true in this case. The respondents are eager to tell their stories and relish the opportunity to do so. Using interviews allows them to do so in a non-threatening environment, because interviews of the sort employed here allow the

respondent control over what to voice. As such, interviews of this form allow for the manifest expression of the respondent's reality.

*Validity in interviews.* This is sort of a contradiction in terms. An interview is given by the respondent. If it is presented verbatim or at least in a way that does not change the meaning of what the respondent says, it is *prima facie* valid.

However, in light of the loud voices of the neo-positivist paradigm in the academy, it may be necessary to situate this method in terms of validity.

Participant observation, according to Lofland and Lofland (1995), derives its "trueness" from Sanjek's (1990) "canons of ethnographic validity." Lofland and Lofland explain (pp. 150-151) that trueness depends on "theoretical candor," "the ethnographer's path," and "fieldnote evidence." Theoretical candor emerges from the author's complete and careful explanation of the process used to derive conclusions offered in the piece. That is, the author must be transparent in explaining how theories are used in the analysis. The second factor, "the ethnographer's path," clearly states how the ethnographer came into contact with the respondents, detailing the sequence and means they were reached. Finally, "fieldnote evidence" allows the reader to see how data were collected and processed, and actually presents empirical data (in the form of interview and fieldnote quotes) in the finished ethnography. Fetterman (1980) argues that the ethnographic validity lies in the overlap between the impressions of the ethnographer and the views of the natives. The "fieldnote evidence" criterion

satisfies this concern by allowing the reader to interact not only with my naïve impressions, but with actual quotes, as well.

*Reliability and validity through multiple methods.* In addition to the two qualitative methods, validity of this project is bolstered through the quantitative content analysis (Weber, 1990; Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 1998) of 63 issues of 18 local Belfast newspapers, covering 8 days' of coverage. These particular days have been chosen because a major leader of a Protestant paramilitary group was assassinated by another Protestant faction of the same organization. Following this story in the various Loyalist (Protestant) and Nationalist (Catholic) papers will elucidate the way the same story is carried by some of the different media outlets<sup>4</sup> in Belfast. In addition, supplementing the qualitative methods of participant observation and interview with the quantitative content analysis will allow for multiple methods and limited methodological triangulation. Keyton (2001) holds that such triangulation can be used "To further validate their outcomes and results" (p. 77). Cronen (1998) argues that reversing the emphasis in our research—using qualitative methods as primary and quantitative methods as secondary—is one way to "clean up the wreckage of the psychology project," which *to him* means the blind adherence to the quantitative perspective focused on internal psychological motivations of behavior. In this particular case, multiple method use serves this purpose and actually helps to strengthen the

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<sup>4</sup> It would be incorrect for me to say "all" the media outlets of Belfast, as such a study would necessarily include not only newspaper but also magazines, television, Internet sites, brochures, posters, pamphlets etc. Such a study would be gargantuan in task and is far beyond the scope or budget of this dissertation.

ethnographic validity à la Fetterman. Further, use of the content analysis provides an accepted quantitative measurement of reliability to the overall endeavor.

### *Social Importance*

Apart from the academic reasons offered above, this study is necessary and justified based on its social importance. Northern Ireland's "Troubles" are well known; they are depicted everywhere from cinema to textbooks of intercultural communication, often discussed as 'the textbook case' of the need for healthy and successful intercultural communication. Yet scholars of intercultural communication tend not to focus on resolving this conflict. Further, such scholars mistake violence for poor communication, when in fact it is frequently very successful in communicating cultural friction. Many studies in our journals focus on more mundane issues, or those that immediately benefit business — cross-cultural interview techniques, dinner table mores, and international negotiation. While these are legitimate topics and generally well-executed, I have always felt that pursuing such topics while large-scale conflict rages is akin to a physician putting a band-aid on a small cut on the patient with 23 broken bones. While the cut needs to be treated, it may not be the best place to start. If intercultural communication is to have any real significance, it must be applied to these areas of actual conflict. We need to comprehend the Northern Ireland situation in order to begin to solve it. Intercultural scholarship must be able to address this need to be relevant.

## Conclusion

This work is justified as a Communication study for the following reasons.

First, the work stems from the position that communication is an enactment of culture rather than a tool used by individuals “possessing” a culture. Second, it extends the idea that the world is a social creation maintained by its actors. Third, it demonstrates how culture is expressed in public and in private. Fourth, it shows how culture, power, and politics are embedded in images and talk and discourse, or Saussure’s *parole*. Fifth, it demonstrates how the mass media engage in processes that influence how and what consumers think. Finally, it applies Intercultural Communication to one of the most troubled parts of the world.

## Limitations

### *Content Analysis*

The content analysis portion of this study focused on the specific coverage of one event in the history of Northern Ireland. By using nearly all of the papers currently in circulation, the author’s intent was to present a comprehensive picture of the present situation. In such a study, one frequently chooses between the number of days covered and the depth of the study. Many scholars’ way of overcoming this problem is to use electronic versions of newspapers. Vincent (1997) used the Internet versions of the four newspapers in his study. Both the Riffe, Lacy, & Fico (1998) and the Weber (1990) textbooks suggest using Lexis-Nexis.

The present study rejects these approaches as misguided, as use of articles found electronically decontextualizes them from the newspapers from which they come. As such, the present study used the printed versions of the newspapers, which were hand carried from Belfast to North America. One week's worth of the papers weighed nearly 40 pounds and filled a large suitcase. The "heaviness" of the papers is metaphorical as well, and demonstrates both the strength and weakness of the study. Using such a variety of papers allows the researcher and coders to see the stories in the context of the papers, allows the team to see any symbols and images used in the papers, and allows the team to analyze papers too limited or small to have an Internet presence. Thus, the study does not overlook any paper, regardless of circulation size. This brings the study a great strength in terms of mapping the ecology of newspapers of this event.

This strategy also poses a weakness, in that the amount of time is extremely limited and its validity is weakened by historical issues. Also, one must concede what was mentioned in a footnote above: A comprehensive presentation of the full media ecology would have to include all other forms of media (e.g., Internet, books, television) excluded from this study for reasons of practicality. Thorough as it is, this study analyzed papers immediately following a significant event (the killing of one UDA leader). This content analysis includes the coverage itself as an area of study, because I believe that these extreme events precisely illustrate the predispositions of the various organs of the press. As such, one may draw meaningful and significant conclusions about the coverage and the framing



function of the Northern Irish press. A future study should supplement the strength of this one by application of a longitudinal focus to the in-depth approach of this study.

The papers included are dailies and weeklies. This is the nature of Northern Ireland, and as part of the mediascape, they were included. However, the framing power and function of the Northern Irish press may be confounded by the difference in frequency, as preparation and editorial decisions of a weekly certainly differ from dailies, not to mention from television, radio, or the like. Though there is no easy way to rectify this statistically, the results of this study must be interpreted with this fact in mind.

#### Organization of this Dissertation

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter Two, an analysis of the interview transcripts, looks at the interpersonal communication patterns of my respondents as they discuss identity, conflict, and peace in Northern Ireland. Chapter Three is the semiotic analysis of 80 Belfast murals from Catholic, Protestant, and neutral areas, both pro and anti-conflict. Chapter Four is the quantitative content analysis of coverage of the conflict in 8 days' worth of Belfast newspapers. The fifth and final chapter summarizes the work and suggests important future studies in this area.

## CHAPTER THREE:

### LANGUAGE USE IN BELFAST, NORTHERN IRELAND

#### Language and Culture, Speaking and Being: *Langue et Parole*

*Language in pure form.* Long before communication scholars “discovered” that language is “significant,” poets and theologians had built systems around this thought. Jewish scholars taught that the Creator made the universe through the words themselves. Christians taught that “in the beginning was the word,” and Moslem scholars taught that one must read the Qur’an in Arabic to fully understand it. Shakespeare asked whether a rose by another name would retain the sweetness of fragrance, and even Socrates decried the Sophists for hurting the cause of truth with their rhetorical knack. Centuries later, these ideas began to resonate with communication scholars.

*Sapir-Whorf: Language and culture as units of analysis.* The language perspective stream is generally thought of as originating with the pioneering work of Sapir in the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century, though Nietzsche commented that, “Consciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need for communication...

consciousness is really only a net of communication between human beings”

(1887/2001, p. 212). Nietzsche had previously discussed this idea in *Human, All*

*Too Human* (1882/2001):

Man, like every living creature, is constantly thinking but does not know it; the thinking which becomes *conscious* is only the smallest part of it, let’s say the shallowest, worst part—for only that conscious thinking *takes place in words, that is, in communication symbols*; and this fact discloses the origin of consciousness. (p. 213)

Almost 50 years later, Sapir posited that language has a cultural quality along with its phonetic aspect—the sounds we make are meaningful and are in a sense themselves artifacts of culture. As Sapir wrote, “The content of every culture is expressible in its language and there are no linguistic materials...which are not felt to symbolize actual meanings, whatever may be the attitude of those who belong to other cultures” (in Blount, p. 45). That is, the words we use have literal meanings that are grounded in culture.

Whorf built upon the work of his teacher, Sapir, giving us what has been since called the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis. The hypothesis basically holds that each spoken language helps to shape the speakers’ worldview and provides the speakers with the ability to articulate precisely what they need to say; no more, no less. The oft-cited (though incorrect) example is that Eskimos have 50 words for snow, because they need 50 words to describe all of the varieties that they encounter. By contrast, English speakers do not need such a vocabulary and thus they do not have one.

*Weakness of Sapir-Whorf.* Bonvillain (2000) argues that scholars adopt the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis in either “strong” or “weak” forms. According to Bonvillain, the strong version “suggests that language is ultimately directive” (p. 51) in the individual’s thought process. This is intriguing, but as Bonvillain points out, it is “clearly improvable” (pp. 51-52). By contrast, adherents to the weak version would likely believe that “some elements of language, for example,

in vocabulary or grammatical systems, influence speakers' perceptions and can affect their attitudes and behavior" (p. 51). Given the impossibility of proving the strong version, one is more prudently steered toward a weak application of the hypothesis.

*Linguaculture/lingualism.* In such a view, language is not simply a tool one uses to describe or even experience culture—language *is* culture, as Hall (1959; 1981) has pointed out. This phenomenon is what Michael Agar would later (1994) call "linguaculture," or what Kramer (1998) calls "Lingualism." Further, as scholars (Foucault, 1971/1972; Woolard, 1998; Silverstein, 1998) have demonstrated, language is not neutral. The way we express things reflects and shapes how we conceive of them. Relationships of power and worldviews are embedded in it. Bloomaert and Verscheuren (1998) have shown that language is instrumental (pun intended) in European nationalism. Exploring language use in discussions of peace, identity, and nonviolence in Northern Ireland will reveal the linguaculture of the region. Communication is perhaps the best way to do so.

### The Research Question

As previously stated, the grand research question asks whether there is an essential *way* of communication common to individuals who have renounced violence as a means of solution to the Troubles and who seek to live through non-violent means. In this section of the dissertation, I seek to find common

discursive symbolism, and communication patterns. Because this section of the major work focuses on language use, I ask the following sub-questions:

RQ1: In what ways, if any, do residents of Belfast situate themselves amongst others? By this, I mean to identify linguistic cues they use to identify themselves and others, independent of renunciation of violence.

RQ2: Related to the first question, what labels do residents of Belfast employ to categorize themselves and others, and specifically, do those labels carry any connotation or denotation of violence/non-violence?

RQ3: In what ways do people or organizations avoid using inflammatory language or language that provokes or engages such topics?

RQ4: How do those who reject violence describe the peace process, the political process, and their counterparts who have not chosen to reject violence?

It is my hope that the answers to these questions can be found embedded in the words of Northern Irish who have rejected violence as a means to solve the conflict. To that end, and to get to those words, I conducted the first part of this three-phase multiple methods study: the 17 in-depth interviews.

#### *Respondents and Sampling*

With the exception of 2 US American exchange students, the respondents (which I will also, for the purposes of variety, call interviewees) of these

interviews were all natives of Northern Ireland, and all either natives or long-term residents of Belfast. All respondents had lived in Belfast for at least 20 years except for one, who had been there 3 years. Respondents were all between the ages of 18 and 75 years. Of the seventeen interviews, 6 were with Protestants, 3 were with Catholics, 3 were with Jews, 2 respondents were the US Americans (who were Protestant, but were not included in the previous number) and 4 simply identified themselves as "white." The total number of respondents is 19, rather than 17, because 2 interviews were with conducted with 2 respondents each.

As I mentioned in Chapter Two, the sample was a combination of a "snowball" and convenience sample. The convenience sample was used in the following manner. Prior to arriving in Northern Ireland, I did a web search of "non violence in Northern Ireland" using the Google Search engine. This search led me to a social work organization in Belfast, which I contacted by telephone. Transferred to the Director of the organization, I identified myself as a PhD candidate from the University of Oklahoma coming to Belfast to work on a dissertation concerning non-violence in Northern Ireland, and asked for an appointment. The appointment was scheduled for a day shortly after my arrival in country. This interview took place with not only the Director, but with an associate, as well. The associate came with a list of contacts, both lay and clergy, professional and non-professional, Catholic and Protestant, for me for future

interviews. I contacted and interviewed most of the people on the list, who in turn suggested others I interview. This accounted for 8 of the interviews.

The convenience sample (which itself has elements of "snowball"ing) came about in this way: First, as a courtesy, I was extended guest computing privileges at Queen's University Belfast. While at the computer one day, I found myself next to two US American exchange students. I asked them for an interview, and they consented. Another interview was arranged through my contacts with the Jewish community in Belfast. I attended services, and a man offered to be interviewed. He then introduced me to 4 more men in the synagogue, who all offered to be interviewed. Though I ran out of time before I could interview all of them, this accounts for 3 of the interviews. Another respondent was the clerk in the corner store where I bought most of my groceries and my very large amount (more than 60) newspapers. The interview with the high-ranking police officer was arranged when I struck up a conversation with a police officer because I had lost my way. He directed me to where I wanted to go and told me to make a written request for an interview, which was granted the day before I left. This accounts for 1 interview. The final interview in this category was with a Catholic priest, and it came about because I saw a group of people setting up an anti-abortion protest in front of the shopping mall in the City Centre. I asked them if they were willing to be interviewed, but it began to rain. They gave me the name of their church and suggested I call their priest. When I phoned him, another priest answered and offered himself as a respondent.

Thus, the sample was a combination of 8 respondents acquired through "snowball" sampling and 10 respondents acquired through convenience sampling. The degree to which the sample reflects Belfast's population is a question, as most of the respondents were activists in some capacity, either as clergy, social workers, union people, or student workers, and most were highly educated. However, in an environment such as Belfast, where war and guerilla conflict, not just against an organized army, but against civilian populations, has been a real facet of life for 30 years, the decision to reject the violence is a break from the norm, and therefore anyone who makes such a judgment is, in a way, atypical. On the other hand, as the incidents of sectarian violence have declined over the past years, the non-violent choice is obviously more common, and thus the respondents are, despite their commitment, quite unremarkable. In every other way (i.e., age, sex) the respondents are no different from the population at large, and in terms of profession, 1 was a clerk, 1 sold insurance, 1 was an entrepreneur, 2 were university professors, 1 was a laborer, 1 a retired police officer, 1 a student worker, 4 were social workers, 2 were students, 1 a priest, and 1 a minister. Economically, this is a reasonable cross-section of the population.

#### *Interview Procedure*

All respondents were first contacted by telephone. I asked them for consent to be interviewed, and arranged a time and place. All respondents were given a choice of date, time, and location of interview. As I was staying in a modest boarding house, the interviews were held in either the homes or offices of all



respondents, with the exception of the one who picked me up in his car, and gave the interview as he drove me around Belfast for the better part of an afternoon, and 1 interview that was conducted in the synagogue. All others were conducted in the homes or offices of the respondents. All but 1 person asked for an interview consented; the person who refused said she did so because she had worked as a journalist and hated interviews. Ironically, this person ended up speaking to me longer than any of the respondents did. Though I made unofficial mental notes of our conversation, her words do not appear in this dissertation, in accordance with her wishes.

Interviews began with my reading the respondent the IRB-approved anonymous consent form. The university stipulated that, for reasons of respondent safety, the interviews should be completely anonymous. To comply with this, I recorded no names, either on tape or on paper. The respondent was then asked for permission to record the interview, and was informed that he or she had the right to stop the interview at any time, to refuse to answer any question, to answer any question "off mic" with the recorder stopped, to interpret any question as he or she saw fit, and to make answers as long or short as he or she wanted. All interviewees consented to the recording, and at only one time was the recording stopped for an answer to be given off mic. That answer involved accusing a local paramilitary member of being involved in the drug trade.

Interviews followed the IRB-approved questions, though they typically became more organic conversations. While the approved questions were included, the interviews usually included much more and were much richer. The average interview lasted forty-five minutes, though the longest was approximately two hours long. Interviews were digitally recorded on minidisks, and labeled only with numbers, which corresponded to codes which I emailed to myself each day. No written list of whose voice matched each number was ever created or kept in Northern Ireland. Once the name and code were sent by email, the slip with the name was shredded and discarded. The disks containing the recorded interviews were kept locked in a bag which was locked in the safe in my room.

### *The Questions*

The interview consisted of 10 questions (which are attached as Appendix B: Interview Questions) designed to tease out information about identity: the respondent's demographic information, how the respondent situates him or herself in the Northern Ireland population, both in terms of politics and identity. Additionally, questions asked about peacemaking and peacemakers in Northern Ireland, and about day to day life for those who opt out of a violent approach to life in Northern Ireland. Further, the questions asked the respondent to explain the history, the current situation, and projections of the future situation in Northern Ireland. All questions, but certainly the last few, called for the respondent's personal opinions and judgments rather than an objective

"Speaking for all of Northern Ireland-type of truth," though many of the respondents delivered their answers with a certitude that communicated to me the high degree of truth they ascribe to their views. The final question asked the respondent to think of anything that "had I, as an outsider, not been so ignorant, I would have thought to ask." This question sparked a great deal of interest, and allowed the respondent to elaborate on or introduce a topic important to him or her, and was frequently the beginning of a lively conversation lasting longer than that of some of the formatted question answers. Many of the respondents had positions they wanted to get across, and this final question gave them that opportunity. For example, the police officer emphasized the ways in which the police force is trying to redress past problems of personnel and policy. Likewise, some of the community workers expressed strong views about their particular community's social ills. The final question sometimes served as their opportunity to get their point across, and in so doing, frequently helped me to better understand their position and the conflict in general.

#### *On Respondent Truthfulness*

Though it is impossible to know for certain how truthful the respondents were in their answers, especially to those questions of a more sensitive nature, I attempted to devise interviews that would indirectly get to the information I needed. In general, I found that my outsider status as a non-Northern Irish, coupled with my vulnerability as a student helped me, as respondents were generous with their time and often included in the interviews very personal

stories and sometimes strongly-worded remarks that would offend other Northern Irish. Frequently, they would warn me one was coming, or explain that they had just made such a remark. Indeed, most people I encountered — those I interviewed and those I merely spoke with in passing — told me that “everyone here loves Americans” and is willing to speak with them. As university-level education, let alone doctoral-level studies, is not as common in Northern Ireland as in the US, respondents were generally willing to help, and indicated so point blank. Finally, as an outsider, I was able to repeat to respondents what prior respondents had said to check the degree of the respondents’ shared perspectives. Doing so allowed me to be true to my role as naïve outsider, and created a dynamic in which the respondent could educate me.

#### *On Interview Validity*

This process of analysis actually began before the transcriptions were completed, because patterns of speech behavior such as the ones listed above (e.g., common phrases, terms, or words and common places where the respondents stopped and substituted several words before settling on the “right” one) caught my attention during the interview phase of the study. Once such a pattern began to be noticeable, which happened as the interviews themselves were beginning to accrue, it was necessary to introduce into subsequent interviews points made by previous respondents. This was important to do for a few reasons. First, Lofland and Lofland’s (1995) criteria for ethnographic validity

are rooted in the "trueness" of the researcher's findings in the eyes of the respondent. In other words, as I arrived at tentative conclusions about languaculture/lingualism, I introduced those conclusions into the ensuing conversations I had with subsequent interviewees. The respondents' reaction to the idea frequently indicated to me how correct or true it was. In this I relied on both verbal and non-verbal cues. Typically, the respondents would openly declare whether they agreed or disagreed with the notions I tested.

The second reason I double-checked my tentative conclusions, especially about the group labels the Northern Irish used, was due to Wieder's statement about drawing conclusions regarding the meaning of names used by members of a society one chooses to study:

It has been the recurrent finding of ethnomethodology that, because everyday language use is characterized by the use of indexical or occasional expressions, everyday language is used in such a way that it is inappropriate to conceptualize its use in terms of a rulelike semantics. That is, in everyday talk persons constantly use expressions the sense of which is relative to the place in which it is spoken, what the hearer knows about the speaker, the time at which it is spoken, and an indefinitely extendable collection of other contextual matters. (1970, p. 108)

As an outsider who lacks the contextual history shared by the Northern Irish, I could not automatically assume that my understanding of a word, a term, a label, a name, or even an historical event, overlapped with that of the respondent. As Hilbert expands on Wieder's point, saying that, "a rule's having prescribed behavior involves an active determination, on the parts of members working artfully together...of...rules...oriented to as 'known all along' (1992, p. 62). In

other words, there are rules that insiders come to know, and that outsiders may not see, may see incorrectly, or may misinterpret. In the case of this study, doing so could potentially lead me to draw conclusions based on my outsider understanding of the item in question while completely missing the meaning the respondent or another person from Northern Ireland would take. To rectify this, I dispensed with the notion of rulelike semantics and used four principal strategies during the interviews. First, I asked the respondent to clarify points and terms he or she used. Second, I asked follow up questions to tease out the answer. Third, I paraphrased the respondent's answers and contrasted what that respondent said with what another respondent had answered, and asked for feedback. Fourth, I simply said that as an outsider I did not understand the point, know the person or event being referred to, or know the term the respondent used. This was frequently true, so my sincerity likely helped draw out answers or deeper explanations.

#### *Transcription and Pseudonyms*

The recorded interviews were transcribed word for word, using a simple format of verbatim transcription. All words, including repeated words and vocalized pauses (e.g., "uh") were transcribed. Short pauses or mid-sentence changes of thought were designated with an ellipse (...) and longer pauses, hand gestures, or other non-auditory cues were recorded in brackets ([ ]). All respondent names were changed, though Protestants were given stereotypical Protestant names, which are English (that is, from England), Catholics were

given stereotypical Catholic names, which are usually Gaelic names. In addition, all names or places mentioned in the interviews that could identify the respondent were also changed for transcription. The only exception to this was names of political figures. For example, one item asked respondents to identify a "Martin Luther King or Gandhi of Northern Ireland." For obvious reasons, the names they offered, if they were public figures, were not changed in the process of transcription.

### *Transcript Analysis*

Transcripts were analyzed in the following manner. All questions were examined *en masse*. That is, each question was examined, one by one, across all transcripts. Thus, I looked at how all respondents answered Question 1, then Question 2, and so on. The purpose of this was to look for discernible linguistic or speech patterns, such as where respondents tended to pause as they looked for "the right word," where speech became halting, or where words or phrases tended to be repeated by several respondents. Further, careful attention was paid to the terminology the respondents used in describing groups of people in Northern Ireland, as I very early on became aware that labels are an important facet of life in this part of the world, and the labels one uses for self and others usually carries with them strong and specific connotations. Resulting patterns were identified and are presented below, along with example quotes from interviews. Quotes are cited by interview and line numbers (e.g., Interview 6, ll. 21-24).

## Situating Identity

### *Identifier Questions*

In a multi-racial society, it is easy to figure out who is in your racial group and who is not. A simple glance will tell you what you need to know. The same is true if you are looking for other members of your sex, contemporaries of your age, or people of the same height. In-group religious membership or common national origin can sometimes also be easily detected. In an airport, I can usually spot other observant Jews. All I have to do is look for skullcaps (or fedoras) on men and scarves on women. Though once in a while I mistakenly pick a Mennonite, the obvious physical cues usually make the identification easy, and I am usually right. This is not so easy in a monoracial society, where the main difference between people is a subtle theological one. If the gulf between the people is wide, telling who is on "our side" and who is on "their side" becomes even more difficult, if not more important. If the conflict becomes violent, as it has in Northern Ireland, and one's life depends on being able to instantly tell the identities of people approaching you, such a skill is paramount. Consistent with Buckley's (1998) assertion that Northern Irish actively figure out who is who:

We would probably after five minutes' conversation with someone, we could...probably deduce whether they were Catholic or Protestant. (Interviews 1 & 2, ll. 313-314)

Another respondent, a Jewish man, explained the same phenomenon. As a minority in Belfast, he had his own particular perspective on it:



Alistair: That's right. You see...you may not...you may have come across this phenomenon...uh...or you may not. But I could say to you that it's absolutely guaranteed that if two people should meet for the first time, within five minutes they would have each other pigeonholed. They would know.

Dave: Do they do that with you as well? I mean, I've been told by people, they can go by your name. If you're Fiona or Sean or...

Alistair: Your name, or what school you went to, or indeed, particularly in the working classes, what district you live in. Now, we're lucky. We're middle-class people, and we live in mixed areas in better quality housing.

Dave: Do they pigeonhole you, though?

Alistair: Oh, I...I mean, the fact that my name is Goldberg [laughs] in some way goes a long way. (Interview 12, ll. 412-422)

Another respondent put it this way:

Margaret: People would have been very aware of safety issues, finding out who you were in order to ascertain whether they could disclose certain things to you.

So...um...things like what school did you go to. You know, there's like five standard questions about...you know...what's your name and there were certain names you gave which gave away...what's your school...what pub do you drink in...so there were sort of indicative....or indicator questions...

Dave: Do people still ask those questions?

Margaret: Yes. Yeah, they do. And I think that's the real challenge for us knowing that we can live in peaceful segregation, or we can make the official push for...uh...true inclusivity. (Interview 10, ll. 151-161)

I found that nearly unanimously, my respondents use these questions in their daily lives. In this section, I will present the questions respondents use to identify any interlocutor.

*Accent.* Though the two groups live literally side by side, they maintain different accents. As such, accents are a primary identifier, and are different

enough for the outsider to perceive. To the native, they are an easy way to tell who is who. This exchange from Interviews one and two, conducted with a Protestant man and woman, illustrates this point:

Elisabeth: Accents.

Dave: Well, I...I...I moved to...

Elisabeth: And pronunciations.

Richard: We would just ask you to...to spell out the alphabet.

Dave: Really, and that would be enough?

Elisabeth: Yes. Once you got to the letter "H," that would be enough to know.

Dave: So the Catholics say "haich," is that it?

Elisabeth: Good man, you're not naïve at all. (ll. 316-323)

The Catholic accent, which is reminiscent though not identical to the accent of the ROI, uses the aspirated "h." By contrast, the Protestants emulate a high-class British accent, in which the same letter is pronounced as it is in the US. Using the "haich" is an indicator that the speaker is Catholic, or from the ROI. Even Protestants from the ROI are perceived to be Catholics when they use the "haich," and they face the same negative consequences in the Protestant areas, as this exchange with a respondent from the ROI shows:

Dave: And...something that you said before the interview, when we were just chatting in the shop. Um...you said that you're reluctant sometimes to even speak in public because of the accent.

Orla: Um-hum [yes].

Dave: Does that prevent you, then, from making social contacts?

Orla: It would do, because I'd be very conscious of who I was speaking to and where I was speaking. But then again, it's like everywhere else, you won't go into certain areas. There's certain areas around here I wouldn't walk in, and if I did walk in, I wouldn't speak.

Dave: So, in a sense, the answer about religion playing a role is both yes and no at the same time.

Orla: It's not as much about religion, because even if I was a Protestant from Southern Ireland, I would be assumed to be a Catholic.

Dave: Because you have the accent.

Orla: Yeah. A girl that lived with me, she worked in a Protestant part of town and she hated it, because she was Protestant, but she was from Southern Ireland...they just assumed...you know.

Dave: And what did that mean? What did they do?

Orla: I think you have to prove yourself a little harder.

Dave: What...what do you mean?

Orla: Well, you'd have to work harder, kinda get more attention. For the same work maybe a Protestant person did, or a native person did, they'd get more recognition than you'd get. And I think I find...I would find that in my workplace. Not in the extreme, because it's a more upclass than the likes of a restaurant, you know? More posh.

In this case, the respondent's Protestant roommate was perceived by the Protestants to be Catholic because of her Republic of Ireland accent. Thus, the accent test has real consequences. In other circumstances, the fate of one marked as different could have been much more dire than having to work harder to get recognition at work. Accent carries with it connotations of affiliation, loyalty, and status – the shibboleth, that those who speak differently do not belong, they are not part of “us.” It is an easy identifier.

*Names.* Another identifier used is the name of the person. As Protestants typically have English names, and Catholics typically have Gaelic names, discerning background from the person's first name is rather easy. This respondent explains the process is not always easy, especially

If you're a Stanley, or a Billy, or that sort...Alan, David, I suppose, would be a neutral one. But if you're a Seamus or you're a...you know, they know exactly. (Interview 10, ll. 362-363)

In such a case, where the name is a neutral one, such as David, the person doing the sizing up has to find another way to identify the "other."

John: I know it's strange there, but even if they are in company, they would steer around it in a way, which school you went to, or what area...

Dave: So they're always trying to figure out. (Interview 10, ll. 364-366)

Thus, if the use of accent and name do not sufficiently allow one to detect the other person's identity, another question must be asked.

*School history.* With very few exceptions, schools in Northern Ireland are segregated by religion. Historically, this is because the United Kingdom has a state religion, a Protestant Church, which is integrated into the school curriculum. As a reaction to this, some families, Protestant and non-Protestant, send their children to private schools which teach other religions or no religion at all. In Northern Ireland, the Catholic community operates its own parochial schools, and Catholic children attend these schools. Protestant children go to public schools, where they receive a Protestant education along with their secular coursework. Additionally, there are a small number of private schools that do not cater specifically to one or another religious group, and thus a small number of Belfast children attend these mixed schools. It is also to these schools that non-Christians typically send their children. Unless the child attends one of these specifically mixed schools, the child will never have a classmate from another religion until that child reaches university, as universities are mixed. In this case, that means that the child who goes to the "normal" school and never

attends university will never encounter a child from the “other side” except in confrontation. Because very few children attend these mixed schools, the school one attended becomes another identifier question:

John: I have always disliked that there are schools for Protestants and schools for Catholics. Thankfully my two, who are grown up now, I sent them to private school...

Dave: ...mixed school...

John: ...so that they could be mixed. And each of their schools, there, they had Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Moslems, the whole thing.

Dave: Good. So when they size up your children, then, by asking them what their names are and where they went to school, your kids really confuse them.

John: They are really confused. (Interview 10, ll. 388-396)

Since schools are typically indicative of one’s background, removing this as a potential identifier will often cause the information seeker to move to another question, that of which pub the interlocutor frequents.

*Pub choice.* The neighborhood pub is a normal facet of life in the British Isles. More than just a bar, it has what Barthes (1972) might call a “totemic” quality, in that the pub is a meaningful place: It represents the neighborhood and its values, and only those who are perceived to “belong” there are made to feel welcome. Interviewee 10 explained that she had to “show” patrons of a pub that she was not a spy from the “other side” before they would accept her. In contrast to the typical US American bar, where adults over the age of 21 go to have a drink and maybe shoot pool or play darts, the Irish or English pub is more of a family affair. Pubs are open to children, and one frequently sees entire families inside. Pubs serve entire meals (“pub grub”) which are typically much less expensive

than restaurant food. The informal atmosphere allows friends and neighbors to spend hours there, engaged in conversation, watching a soccer match—the pubs in my neighborhood were packed whenever a game was on—or dancing to music, either played live or on the jukebox. In addition, pubs have longevity atypical of US American bars. One can purchase tourist guidebooks that list only pubs, describing their histories, fare, and atmosphere.

Because the pub is a neighborhood establishment that is, in a way, an extension of the home, it is frequented by its crowd, and the pub one chooses reveals much about his or her identity. This is true for the pubs one selects, and the ones that are deselected, as one interviewee explained:

Minister: There is a boycott in the Orange community here of the shops in the Green area.

Dave: Meaning just down here?

Minister: Just down here. Because...because of the...this is part of the on-going legacy of the protest. I will make it...I make it part of my business on a regular basis to go to the shops. Uh...everybody down there knows me.

Dave: So you make a point in going to those shops. Isn't that traitorous in your own congregation there?

Minister: Well, no, you see, it's not, because part of—and we're into very nuanced stuff here—part of my positioning in the community is to be part...is to be in the community, to be part of the community, but not to be trapped by the community. (Interview 16, ll. 828-840)

What allowed this respondent to disobey the boycott was his status as a member of the clergy. His words reflected the social conventions, however, in that he can “be part of the community” without being “trapped by the community.”

Laypeople often do not have that luxury, and are bound by the social rules of where to drink.

    Mikey: ...they would have met at work, or at the city centre, or in events where...you can get away with not identifi'n' yourself. But pubs, for instance, people went to certain pubs, or certain places of entertainment. Or you can shop in your areas, so there's a line drawn.

    Dave: Is it still like that?

    Mikey: It is. Very much so. (Interview 6, ll. 277-282)

As the respondent pointed out, going to the pub requires a person to self-identify, because the pub is a place for insiders. It is difficult to remain anonymous in the pub, as I personally found out. Each time I visited a pub, regardless of which pub I visited, I would be asked where I was from. When I told them I was from the US, people would generally ask my reason for coming to Northern Ireland, and then they would tend to leave me alone. Never did I enter a new pub (which I did nearly every day as the food was inexpensive) without being asked these questions.

People who want to enjoy pub culture in mixed company have two choices. They can either visit a pub in a neutral area, such as the university district or the downtown area, or they can join a private club that is open to people of various backgrounds. One respondent does just that. He is a member of a bowling association, the members of which are a mixture of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. The association has its own pub, and the little socializing the members do is on the premises. As he put it,

    Dave: They don't go for a pint after the game.

Alistair: They don't go for a pint...well, they might at the actual club.

Dave: On neutral ground.

Alistair: I mean, they wouldn't say, 'Do you want to go to the theater tomorrow week?' Or whatever... (Interview 12, ll. 458-462)

In many cases, socializing, especially in the "wrong" pub or venue, can lead to serious consequences, which can range from an interrogation by other patrons to outright violence. One respondent illustrated the former:

Margaret: No, and...um...if...I suppose that's one thing...it's that kind of shared understanding of how things work...um...that's...like...I recently went to a pub that I know to be Republican. I would not...my accent would not perceive...be perceived to be Republican, my name would not...um...be perceived to be Catholic or Republican, and I knew I had to establish credentials in the pub, so I...I...they found out where I was from...um...which would be a Protestant town...um...and there was another guy in the group who was from this town. So I was able to say a person I would know would be well-known in that community. And in some way, that's me establishing...

Dave: So you have credibility with them?

Margaret: Not so much credibility but I'm not...an informer. I'm not security. Um...and that is a real...whereas, if I were walking in there as an American...um...they probably don't need to check me out in the same way. (Interview 10, ll. 376-388)

Thus, the respondent knew that the occupants of the pub would question her identity and status, it was matter of mutual understanding.

It is that "shared understanding" that reflects the enacted behavior aspect of culture. The members of the communities, and of the community at large, understand the rules of territory, and also know the consequences of breaking those rules. This respondent had merely to "establish" that she was not a spy or



police officer. Had she been unsuccessful, the consequences could have been more dire, as this respondent relates in a story about a making a speech in a pub belonging to the other side:

So, and I have been. I addressed a hundred UVF men in a pub in Ballymena, which is a really tight area. Uh...and they all knew I...about my background. And they gave me space and I got...responded to positively, but...I entered my car from the passenger side when I left [laughs] in case there was a bomb on the driver's side. But those are things you have to...be serious about. (Interview 10, ll. 341-345)

One may be moved to wonder why it matters at all what pub a person chooses to patronize, and why this rule continues to be followed. A possible reason for the maintenance of the separation was offered by another respondent, a police officer, who said that, "Perception is a good term to use because perception is — people's perceptions are people's realities. And no more is that true than in Northern Ireland" (Interview 15, ll. 70-72).

*Language use.* In addition to the battery of questions many people ask, language itself has political and cultural overtones to it, and is a point of contention in Northern Ireland. The argument lies in which language will be spoken. In the ROI, the two official languages are English and Gaelic. All official documents are printed in both, as are signs on roads, in buses and taxis, even the markings on sewer covers and water valves in front of houses. In Northern Ireland, the official language is English, as the province belongs to the UK. Those aligned with the English, namely the Loyalists and Unionists, vehemently oppose the introduction of Gaelic into public life. Many wanting a united

Ireland use Gaelic whenever possible, putting up unofficial street signs in Gaelic, attempting to bring it on to university campuses, and painting the Gaelic word *saoirse* (freedom) on buildings and on murals (Kenney, 1998; O'Reilly, 1998).

Murals are discussed further in Chapter 4. Regarding language choice, O'Reilly (1998) maintains that the resurgence of interest in Gaelic demonstrates the degree to which the Gaelic language itself is symbolic, not in the sense that all languages are in Saussure's *langue/parole* sense, or in the *paradigmatic/syntagmatic* functions, but that use of Gaelic instead of English is in itself a symbolic choice. That is, choosing to learn and speak Gaelic is taken as an act of Catholic defiance of UK rule, and indeed it often is.

That language should have political overtones is not unique to Northern Ireland. The language ideologies strain of research (Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskrity, 1998; Agar, 1994) has identified how language reveals is political. Sandel (in press) has shown how language itself becomes political because it embodies competing identities or state interests. One need consider Official Language legislation in any country. For example, there is currently a movement afoot to make English the official language of the State of Oklahoma. Apart from the ironic aspects of instituting English as the official language of a state named in a Native American dialect, it must be said that Oklahoma has no dominant minority group, no historical dispute of sovereignty, no great influx of immigrants, no large government expenditure of capital on documents in languages other than English. When a similar bill was discussed in California,

proponents pointed to the fact that the driver's handbook was translated and published, at state expense, into more than 20 different languages. Nothing like that happens in Oklahoma, and yet the issue of language is raised. Why? Because language is tied to identity, and challenges to language represent challenges to identity. Sandel's piece mustered large amounts of empirical evidence, in the form of interviews, to show how language is culture. Sandel found that Taiwanese choose what language to speak with their children, and that choice is related to the speaker's history and that of the speaker's people. One could infer from Sandel's conclusion that attacks on language could be taken as attacks on the identity and personhood of the speaker of that language.

#### *Recap*

The point made by the police officer, that people's perceptions are their realities, makes identification of self and others a necessary ritual. This ritual is performative in nature, and we have seen that it is accomplished through communication. Members of Northern Irish society situate themselves by actively establishing the identity of the other. They accomplish this through gauging the person's accent, name, what school they went to, and where they live and play, and through the language they choose to speak. Doing so is a conscious and deliberate act, and is predicated upon communication, using the skills of listening and active engagement through questions. Though some Northern Irish, by virtue of circumstance or by deliberate avoidance, can elude detection on one measure, eventually their interlocutor will find a way to detect

their identities. As such, the Northern Irish—Catholic and Protestant alike—share discursive practices and speech acts that, paradoxically, they all use to reveal their differences.

## Labels

### *Choosing the Right Label*

Situating another person in relation to one's self is further complicated by the plethora of labels used in Northern Ireland to describe differing nuances or iterations of the same phenomenon. By this I mean that there are several terms for political designations, and people will use one term or another for varying reasons. For example, those who want to stay with the United Kingdom might be called by the terms identified earlier on in this dissertation: Unionists or Loyalists, but they might also be called Protestants, or even Orange people. Those who wish to break from the UK might be called Nationalists or Republicans, but they might also be identified as Catholics, or Green people. It is also true that people from any designation may self-identify as such. Each term has a different shade of meaning, though some people use them interchangeably, while others prefer one term over another for reasons different from someone else who also prefers the same term. In this section, I will explore the ways in which the various labels are used or avoided, and discuss theoretical reasons for such choices. Doing so will help elucidate other ways in people construct identity through speech acts, both those who embrace violence and those who reject it.

*Catholic and Protestant.* As terms, these are the easiest to understand.

However, many people in Northern Ireland deliberately avoid using these terms to describe the dimensions of the conflict. This is because at the root, these are theological designations. A Catholic is someone who practices the Catholic faith, and a Protestant is one who practices the Protestant faith. The use is simple, and the difference between the two is theological. Further, politically, the majority of Catholics vote to break from the UK, while the majority of Protestants vote to remain a part of the UK. In fact, none of the respondents interviewed prefer to use this term, though for differing reasons.

The priest and minister both argued that religion is being used as an excuse by many involved in the conflict. They called it an excuse because, as they both point out, religious observance is diminishing. Using the word 'Nationalism,' the priest explained why 'Catholic' might not be the most accurate term:

I have a feeling that Nationalism has moved beyond its boundary with religion. I mean, they don't really care what the Church says anymore. We're sort of...we're almost autonomous. (Interview 9, II. 205-207)

In essence, the priest said almost the same thing as the minister, who told me, as the priest did, that church attendance is dropping, but some people continue to use religious terms rather than political ones. The minister's complaint about this was that it confuses a political conflict with a theological disagreement – a statement he makes, though without empirical proof. According to the minister,

Minister: This is not entirely straightforward, as you indeed noted.  
You can define, it depend – fundamental to answering

your question is whether you define Catholic and Protestant in religious terms or in cultural terms.

Dave: Right. Theology is a, a—it's not about theology, is it?

Minister: No, it's not. It's a, there is a—so, what you are, and there's real, there's a real difficulty in using, uh, in using the language Catholic and Protestant. (Interview 16, ll. 467-473)

When asked whether Orange and Green were synonyms of Loyalism and Nationalism, respectively, the minister answered that, "Unionism and Loyalism...um...and Protestantism are not synonyms for each other. Though, on...um...though they...they will...those people will tend to vote Orange" (Interview 16, ll. 124-126). Again, the difference in word choice reflects political designations, not theological differences.

Another respondent who objected to the terms Catholic and Protestant was an Orangeman and high ranking Blackman (Interview 14). His objection to the terms were rooted not in the complaint that people are taking advantage of religious designations as an excuse for political strife, but that the terms are not accurate:

My feeling is that the religious terms are used as a shorthand way of describing people. It's simplistic. It defines people according to where they go or are supposed to go to in order to worship their God. My feeling is that that's an absolutely personal thing, whatever way people choose to worship, is their choice. (Interview 14, ll. 58-62)

The Orangeman rejected the idea on separate grounds, as well. He argued that the terms imply that all members of a given denomination have identical political beliefs, which, he maintained, they do not. He continued, "There are

those who have nationalist aspirations who would belong to the church which I belong to, which happens to be the Church of Ireland – the Anglican Church in Ireland. I...I know those who have nationalist aspirations. That's their choice" (Interview 14, ll. 77-81). Again, this passage illustrates his belief that voting behavior – which expresses political commitment and belief – calls into question what constitutes identity. It is clear that the conflict is not purely theological, yet voting behavior seems to be consistent in religious communities. Still, one should not take from this that religion is totally irrelevant to the conflict. Rather, religion is a facet of the conflict.

For completely different reasons, the police official I interviewed was also opposed to the use of religious labels. His argument was rooted in the economic causes of the conflict, which he thought superceded religious differences. He told me that,

This is a symptom of the culture of the society in Northern Ireland. And, I mean, if you want me to get into the sociological perspective, a lot of these are run down working class areas. And I didn't say 'Catholic' or 'Protestant.' It's irrelevant. You look at a lot of places. Either side of the divide there is poor working class areas. I mean [laughs] it's not wealthy on one side and poor on the other. (Interview 15, ll. 483-488)

That the police officer would point to non-sectarian causes of the conflict is not totally surprising, given the government's push to remove all religious and ethnic identifiers from the workplace and from hiring practices. The UK has Fair Employment Laws much like those in the US. Ironically, one of the few UK workplaces where ethnicity and religion are actively considered at present is the

very agency for which this respondent works. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 50/50 Agreement mandates that the PSNI achieve a total balance between Catholics and Protestants. Given the prohibitions from discussing religion in the workplace, and the prolific use of substitute terms for religion, this is a challenging proposition.

Viewing religious labels as unhelpful is made especially difficult in light of the results of an empirical study of voting patterns related to me by a professor of ethnic conflict:

Professor: In that sample of two thousand, there wasn't a single person who said, 'I'm a Protestant and I support a Nationalist political party.' Not a single one.

Dave: Not a single one?

Professor: Not a single individual. Amongst people who said they were Catholics, there was one solitary individual who said, 'I'm a Catholic, and I support the Ulster Unionist party.'  
(Interview 8, ll. 460-465)

These findings, while 13 years old, completely contradict the views expressed by the Orangeman – when he claimed that some Catholics vote Unionist and some Protestants vote Nationalist – and make the police officer's conclusions difficult to accept. The Orangeman argued that purely religious labels are irrelevant and impinge on personal religious privacy. The police officer argued that the issue is economics, not religion, which he claimed is irrelevant. However, the study results contradict this, if indeed only one Catholic out of the sample of 2,000 people supported unionism and not a single Protestant supported nationalism.



*Unionist and Nationalist.* The terms Unionist and Nationalist, respondents told me, are political designations rather than religious ones. Indeed, the two major political parties (i.e., UUP and DUP) of those wishing to remain part of the UK have the word Unionist in their party names. The same cannot be said for either major political party of those who wish to break from the UK. The largest party is Sinn Féin (SF), the party organ of which is called *An Phoblacht*, or “Republican News.” In the case of SF, the self-definition is “Republican” rather than “Nationalist.” The other major party is the SDLP, which uses the term Nationalist, as did Mark Durkan, SDLP leader in a speech delivered April 26, 2003, and archived on the SDLP Web site, (<http://www.sdlp.ie/media/speeches/prdurkanirishassocspeech.shtm>).

As a Nationalist, I am 100% for a united Ireland, just as I am 100% for the Agreement. I believe unity can be attained. In unity I believe the Agreement can and must be sustained.

Durkan’s statement illustrates the difference between Nationalism and Republicanism. While both strive for a united Ireland, meaning that both want to break from the UK, Nationalism seeks to do that in a gradual process, signing and honoring agreements such as the Belfast Agreement. In contrast, Republicanism is seen as less willing to compromise, less willing to make deals.

*Loyalist and Republican.* These terms, as opposed to the last pair of terms, unionist and nationalist, are a bit more confusing to decipher. To some, these terms have more of a hard-line connotation than the previous two:

Minister: Unionism and Loyalism...um...and Protestantism are not synonyms for each other. Though, on...um...though they...they will...those people will tend to vote Orange.

Dave: How are Loyalism and Unionism different?

Minister: Unionism...uh...Loyalism is usually expressed...is usually sympathetic to paramilitarism.

Dave: Loyalism is?

Minister: Loyalism.

Dave: And Unionism is less so.

Minister: Is much less so. Now, there are nuances in that, but broadly speaking, when you are talking about Loyalism, you are talking about urban...urban...the urban...uh...people with a Protestant background...you are not talking about the middle class farmers in County Antrim. (Interview 16, ll. 124-136)

This respondent draws a clear distinction between the two sets of terms, the gist of which is that Loyalism entails violence while Unionism is a political movement. However, others use the two sets of labels interchangeably. One respondent situated the police as belonging to neither group, arguing that the three Northern Ireland groups are "The Nationalist Republican dimension, and that's not...that's a broad church in itself, there's the Unionist Loyalist dimension, which is a broad church in itself, and the third one's the police" (Interview 15, ll. 205-208). The police officer acknowledged that the first two groups, "Nationalist Republican" and "Unionist Loyalist," are "broad churches," which may imply the differences the previous respondent identified. Such differences are not always clearly made, or are made in a circumspect, if not, self-serving way. Consider the following excerpt from the Orangeman's interview:

William: In my younger day...uh...there wasn't this great concentration on Unionist politics. But we have learned on reflection that there has always been an undercurrent of

Nationalist Republican activism working, working, and working down through the years, until it emerged into the...uh...the political strength that we know today, which reveals itself in the...uh...particularly the Republican aspect of Sinn Féin—I should say Sinn Féin/IRA, because they're two in the one, and, of course, their...uh...bedfellows the SDLP, as they have now emerged. (Interview 14, ll. 189-195)

The Orangeman makes several interesting and revealing statements here. First, he lumps Nationalism and Republicanism together, both in terms of vocabulary and political intent. While he does later say, “particularly the Republican aspect of Sinn Féin,” which might be linguistically marking a differentiation between the Republicanism of Sinn Féin and the more Nationalist orientation of the SDLP, he negates that possibility when he calls the SDLP Sinn Féin’s “bedfellows.” This statement makes his position very clear, that there is no difference between Nationalism and Republicanism, neither in ideology nor action.

Rhetorically, the Orangeman equates pro-unification political activism with the violence and bloodshed of Republicanism, and effectively stifles and invalidates any political action to that end, as linking the two symbolically makes the two synonymous—being a political activist now equals being a person committed to violence. And since civilized people do not deal with violent ones, Nationalism is untouchable as a goal and illegitimate as a political movement. This is made all the more transparent given that the Orangeman did not include the term Loyalism with the term Unionism at the beginning of the statement. Maybe it was an oversight on his part and the omission was insignificant, as he mentions Loyalists later in the interview as we discuss paramilitaries, which he

condemns. Still, he does not extend the distinction he makes between law-abiding Unionists and criminal paramilitaries to the other side. Seemingly, for him, there is no legitimacy to be found in their position.

*Orange and Green.* Yet another set of terms used by some are the colors Orange and Green, where Orange describes those who are pro-UK and Green describes those who are pro-united Ireland. This labeling scheme is in a sense less precise than using Nationalist or Republican for the pro-united Ireland point of view and Unionist or Loyalist for the pro-UK point of view. If those terms (i.e., Loyalist and Republican) do indeed carry with them indications of one's acceptance or rejection of violence, then abandoning them for the color terms lumps together the violent with the non-violent, which in a sense rhetorically renders the choice of violence as equivalent to that of non-violence—change by bullet is as much an option as change by ballot.

I do not believe, however, that the particular individuals who used these terms did so with the intention of legitimizing violence. Indeed, the two who did were a community worker involved in brokering cease fires in “interfaces” between Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods, and a Protestant clergy member known for holding prayer services with Priests at the sites of flare-ups when tensions are highest. Because both the respondents risk their lives trying to engage the two sides to reconcile, it seems inconceivable that the rhetorical outcome (of eliminating a specific label of those who choose a path of violence) is intentional. The minister told me that he uses the color terms because they

remove religion from the argument, which he believes is based in politics. The community worker who used the color terms also used religious labels, and may have used the color terms to clarify a point.

*Summary.* This section presented four sets of labels used to classify the major self-segregating groups of people in Northern Ireland. While the respondents acknowledged that the labels Catholic and Protestant are in broad use, most preferred to use the other sets: Nationalist/Unionist, Loyalist/Republican, or Orange/Green, and while there was general consensus that the terms Loyalist and Republican connote more radical beliefs or actions, the designation between mainstream and radical did not always exist for the “other” group in the eyes of these respondents. It is also important to know that there are people in Northern Ireland who apply *each of the four* labels to themselves. That is, Protestant paramilitaries refer to themselves as Loyalists, and some include the term in their group’s names, as the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) does, just as the IRA embraces the term Republican, which is the word for which the middle initial in its name stands. As such, any negative connotation the non-violent associate with these terms is not shared by those who actively choose to describe themselves as such. While these labels might be used as epithets by the non-violent, they are not viewed as self-deprecating by those who self-identify as such.

## History

This section draws on many sources, as the “correct” history of Northern Ireland is a topic of contention. As such, this section presents facets of that controversy I encountered in interviews, personal conversations, newspapers, and television and radio. Even the guide on a city tour took time to explain *multiple* perspectives on the soldiers we saw on patrol. It is both current and undercurrent, in that one finds that people are discussing it even when they are discussing another topic—the identities of people stem from their perceptions of the past. As an example, the local television shows political talk programs on most nights. These programs feature elected officials or community activists such as social workers discussing issues facing the community, such as the role of police or the drug trade. More often than not, the discussion turns to one of the historical legacy of problems (e.g., drug abuse is the result of the poverty thrust upon us by a discriminatory system) or even the controversy over whether cities should be called by their English or Irish Gaelic names. The latter is discussed in detail below.

### *Naming Northern Ireland*

*Naming the place.* Just as the “correct” label for the people is difficult to determine, one finds the place being called different things by different individuals. A prime example of this occurred while I was there. Sinn Féin politicians won the majority of city council seats in the city of Londonderry, and one of their first acts was to change the name of the city to Derry, dropping the

"London" from its name. On one BBC television program, Unionists condemned this as something meant to provoke, saying that changing the name of the city in such a way is a political move. The Nationalist panelist countered that the British had done precisely that, years ago when they changed the original name, which was *Duire*, to Londonderry, an act the Nationalists claim was designed to play politics. Thus, the Nationalists claimed, they were, after hundreds of years of British oppressive rule, merely righting an old wrong, and that people were free to call the city Londonderry if they wished. Others, including some journalists covering the story on the evening news, chose to call the city by its nickname, "The Maiden City." At various times, I dropped the "wrong" name to people in conversation. That is, I deliberately used the name Derry when I spoke with Protestants and Londonderry when I was with Catholics. In nearly every instance, I was corrected. I imagine that the correction was as gentle as it was because I was perceived to be an ignorant American. Nonetheless, the whole affair seemed to be both irritating and uncomfortable to the respondents, as they themselves were not sure what to call Derry/ Londonderry, as in this exchange:

Dave: Would you go anywhere?

John: Uh...in the city I would be very selective.

Dave: How about Derry?

John: Uh...I wouldn't go there. I don't like London...Londonderry [laughs]. The Maiden City, whatever you want to call it.

Dave: So you wouldn't go there? Would you stay on one side of the river?

John: Um...no. I...I would have no necessity there, to go to Derry.  
(Interview 13, ll. 245-251)

In contrast, the Orangeman called the city Londonderry. Another respondent seemed to wrestle with what to call the city, as he explained that, "If you weren't a Unionist...it was perceived in certain sections of the...of the north – particularly in Derry, in Derry City – that you didn't get a house" (Interview 9, ll. 242-244). Yet this difficulty was not universal. Another respondent, a self-described Protestant Unionist, effortlessly called the city Derry. Again, perhaps this was because, as an outsider, there were no perceived contextual associations of the name for me, or maybe the name issue is not as salient for some as it is for others.

The name of Northern Ireland in general is subject to some debate. Though the place is officially referred to in this way on UK government documents, and all British passports include the words "Northern Ireland" on them, there are some in the Protestant community who will refer to Northern Ireland as Ulster, the Ulster Province, or simply "the Province." While I did not ask anyone why they preferred this designation, and in truth, the pattern only became apparent to me as I transcribed the interviews after returning to the US, one can safely surmise why some Protestants might make such a choice: to call the area Northern Ireland implies that it is somehow a section of Ireland. Such a designation carries with it the implication that Ireland is divided, and anything that has been divided can be "un-divided." Since the voting study cited by the respondent above established that Protestants do not support such a move, it



stands to reason that they might prefer a different term. While this is speculation on my part, there is another reason I make this conclusion.

People from the ROI refer to Northern Ireland simply as “the North” or “the North of Ireland.” Regardless of whether they want to see a united Ireland, and surveys show that most do not (my respondent from the ROI did not, nor do my own family members still in Dublin), Irish tend to call Northern Ireland by these terms. Calling it “the North” carries the same set of implications that rebuff the Protestants. What was divided can be reunited, and this lies at the very heart of the conflict.

What is ironic about the Protestants’ preferred term, Ulster, is that Ulster is indeed the ancient name of the province, one of the four provinces of Ireland. However, as one respondent explained, what we call Northern Ireland, and the Protestants call Ulster, is not *all* of Ulster, as the UK changed the border in the 1920s for political purposes:

The only thing was, in setting up the north...Ulster, which is a province of the four provinces in Ireland. Ulster is actually nine counties. But [laughs] because there weren’t enough Protestants living in those other three counties, it became six counties. It was a gerrymander. It was so they’d always have a Protestant majority. (Interview 13, ll. 290-294)

To the Nationalists, the artificiality of Northern Ireland is underscored by the way the borders of the province were changed for political hay. By contrast, a Protestant will likely call Northern Ireland Ulster, and often refer to him or herself as an “Ulster Scot” (Interview 16), or an “Ulster man” (Interview 14). As

the Ulster Scots were the Protestants brought to Ireland by the British in the seventeenth century, the very term that stands for Protestant victory and unity conjures images of defeat, occupation, and years of legal discrimination for the Catholics.

*Naming the police.* One area in which this anti-Catholic discrimination occurred was law enforcement. Historically, the police enforced discriminatory laws barring Catholics from the same legal rights as Protestants, and the police were thus seen as the “arm” of the British. It did not help that the name of the Northern Ireland police force was the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). As the previous section indicated, Ulster is a political term, and the word “Royal” was a constant reminder to the Catholics of the British Crown, a drawing of which was on the hats and insignias of the RUC. This negative Catholic opinion of the police was exacerbated by the fact that Catholics made up only a very small minority of the police force.

The issue of policing was such a political dividing point that police reform was, and continues to be, a central part of the peace process. The Patten Report highlighted areas of necessary change in the police force, and The Fifty/Fifty Agreement, discussed earlier in this dissertation, stipulates that the police force must change its ratio of Catholics to Protestants through a 50:50 proportion of hiring and recruitment. Further, as part of the policing reforms, the name of the RUC was changed to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), positions were created in the police force to oversee the reforms and to uphold standards

of a non-discriminatory workplace. As a high-ranking police officer explained to me,

Police Officer: The Patten...Patten Report, which you're...which you're aware of...was an independent commission which reviewed policing arrangements in Northern Ireland and came up with one hundred seventy five recommendations, so the viewpoint was that I oversee that change program for the Chief Constable.

Dave: Wow.

Police Officer: Um...I don't do it all. It's all farmed out to various departments. And some of it's done...there's about one hundred and twenty recommendations yet to be completed, but we're well on the way. (Interview 15, ll. 17-25)

Part of implementing these reforms has been a certain admission of past guilt, which the police officer discussed several times, saying:

We're still not there yet, we still don't do things right (ll. 81-82).

Let's be on tape and on record: We do not get it all right all the time. We get it right most of the time, but as soon as we make one cock-up, it's in the newspapers, the ombudsman's investigating (ll. 229-231).

And we don't always get it right. I would love to be able to say to you that every police officer acts totally appropriately in every set of circumstances. We're human beings and we make mistakes. (ll. 348-350)

Because, remember, Ireland *per se* was a colony at one stage, at one part, of the empire, etc. etc. I'm not going to get into that, right or wrong, whatever (ll. 384-386).

This has been a predominately Protestant organization. Uh...because Roman Catholics didn't feel we were an employer of choice. Hopefully, now, that's changing. (ll. 516-518)

Historically, we've been...we've been largely Protestant. Um...I'm certain that people have behaved inappropriately to each other (ll. 536-538).

If you look back from 1922 onwards, I mean...uh...the discrimination against the Catholic community was rife and clear, and it's well documented. Uh...uh...it was despicable, absolutely despicable. (ll. 676-678)

These seven quotes illustrate the candor with which the police officer, who is in the supervisory role of overseeing the implementation of the Patten recommendations, has owned up to the past. Though I did not ask him directly, using the cues I discussed earlier in this chapter, I deduced that he himself is from a Protestant background, which makes his statements about anti-Catholic discrimination all the more noteworthy, as they seem to indicate that the officer has deeply grasped the shortcomings of the policing organization and of Northern Irish society at large.

#### *Origins of the Northern Irish*

As if the confusion over what to call the people and places of Northern Ireland were not enough, there is also dispute over the origin of the population. Most respondents, when asked to explain the past history of Northern Ireland, discussed the Catholic civil rights struggle, the landing of the Protestant gentry in the 1700s, and the Troubles. There was one exception to this, however, and this alternate version of history is significant because it was related to me by the Orangeman, who, as was previously mentioned, is one of the highest ranking Orangemen and Blackmen in the world. As such, one can safely assume that his

perspective on history is shared by some of his fellow Orangemen and Blackmen.

In his view of history, Protestant Scots did not come to Ireland and subjugate the native Irish Catholic population. Rather,

Well, we can go back, as some people wish to...um...for their own political ends...uh...to...uh...develop a story of underprivileged, disadvantaged, discrimination, and go back six hundred years. You can go back further than that to the Picts and the Scots. Actually, the Scots came from here and went to Scotland and then came back. The Picts were the...the "painted people" in Scotland, pre-civilization days, if you want to go back that far. But that's not sort of...uh...extended beyond what is reasonable. My understanding is – and it's based on fact – that 1921 Northern Ireland was set up because it was the wish of the majority of the people in this part of Ireland, in the northern nine counties, known as Ulster, the province – the ancient province – of Ulster, who really were always at loggerheads with the rest of Ireland. It was ongoing, tribal conflict within Ireland before the British ever came here in the fifteenth, sixteenth century. The northern province of Ulster decided that they wanted to remain part of the United Kingdom. (Interview 14, ll. 345-358)

In this version of history, the Scots, ancient ancestors of the present-day Ulster Scots, the respondent included, were the original inhabitants of Ireland, and thus had the right to settle it in the 1700s, and maintain that right today. Further, the division of Ireland into the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland was at the behest of the population of the Ulster province. Though it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to confirm or deny the veracity of this narrative, I must point out that it stands in sharp contrast to the other version of history I was told, in which Protestants were brought to Ireland, took land from the impoverished indigenous population, and instituted discriminatory laws and economic practices.

*Section summary.* Regardless of which version of history is the truth, the telling of history is communication. This is so because like the phenomena I enumerated here, the labeling choices for people, the name of the area in dispute, and the contradictory versions of history, are all communication based in and express culture. The people of Northern Ireland are using symbols based in their shared, or not shared, understandings of history and of the world. The meanings of the symbols are very real to those who use them, and while we as outsiders may not fully comprehend the subtleties between Derry and Londonderry, or between Nationalist, Green, and Republican, the natives who manipulate those symbols view them as pregnant with historical, denotative, and connotative meanings. The degree to which those meanings overlap, if at all, or the "place" where they are not shared, becomes a site of conflict. As we have seen, word choices can be rhetorical salvos fired by one side at the other, and labels can manifestly express and name the conflict, giving it a mode of being. This mode may or may not be "legitimate" in the eyes of parties inside or outside of the conflict, and it may or may not be purposeful. Labels can also subsume the conflict, as we have seen with labels that deliberately obscure or deny the religious roots of political positions or historical discrimination. Finally, labels can also intensify the situation when they are used as epithets.

#### *Denying the Conflict Through Language*

*Mandated polite conversation.* The agonizing and confusing search for the correct label, as discussed in the previous section, is, for many, one manifestation

of this. Community workers tend to favor using terms that eschew exclusivity. This is especially true in the public sector, where classifying people based on religion is forbidden, except for circumstances of redress, such as in the hiring of new police.

As discussed earlier, the PSNI has been actively engaged in trying to implement the Patten recommendations. Associated with that has been the creation and enforcement of strict rules prohibiting sectarian epithets in the workplace. On its face, this seems like a perfectly logical idea, and the police force has “zero tolerance” for such behavior. According to the police officer in charge of managing the changes to the PSNI, there are strictly followed official procedures to deal with inappropriate talk in the workplace:

If anyone uses sectarian language or sexist language or racist language or behaves in such a way that would be discriminatory, our internal discipline processes are there, and it's flagged up. And I mean, I...I sit on discipline panels where we can actually sack people. And, I mean, no pension, no nothing. Just out the door. (Interview 15, ll. 567-571)

This policy applies to unwanted joking as well as the friendly give-and-take type of exchanges in the workplace. Though the people involved may not find the talk objectionable, the officer explained that the PSNI will still enforce the policy, as it is tied to professionalism:

I think, as we become more professional, there's less and less scope for people to behave inappropriate to each other. I don't believe in office...I don't believe in office banter. If there's banter, then somebody's getting abuse, of some form. It may be minimal, and they may be quite happy with it, and they may be able to give abuse back. But in the end of the day, it's inappropriate. We are all

paid to do a job—to work. And we come here to be professional.  
(ll. 577-582)

In making this argument, the officer has taken the talk, which was seen by the parties involved as humor, ribbing, or banter, and redefined it as “unprofessional” and “inappropriate.” This is an interesting strategy, as it punishes the talk not solely (or perhaps not even) because it is somehow a reflection of bigotry, but because it is in contravention to the atmosphere of productivity. In so doing, it becomes as suitable to the workplace as playing a tuba at one’s desk. It is wrong because it is not conducive to doing the job. This is an interesting strategy additional to the one in lines 567-571, which objected to the language because it is “sectarian,” “sexist,” “racist,” or “discriminatory.” Doing this adds a dimension to language, that of defining certain speech acts as professional / unprofessional, which lies outside the dimensions of discriminatory / nondiscriminatory. Thus, even if one protests that the language he or she used was not hateful, it is still classified by the system as “bad” because it is unprofessional. Its goodness need not be rooted in morality, but in productivity.

*Backlash: teasing.* Not everybody is pleased with this system. Another respondent, a retired police officer, complained about the rigidity of what can be said by police officers, claiming that being a police officer in Northern Ireland puts one in a special category, as Catholics tend to feel like the police are symbols



of the history of oppression, and the of British rule, and Protestants tend to feel like the police have betrayed them. As such, he said that police officers,

become a third entity. You're not a religion or anything like that. You're something...no one likes you. (Interview 13, ll. 124-125).

This sentiment was echoed by the police official, who said that,

if you add to it the threat issues in Northern Ireland from, you know, elements on both sides of the community, and the fact that we're predominantly middle class, per se, that takes us out of those, you know...uh...communication networks. So police officers would socialize together. (Interview 15, ll. 615-619)

That police would tend to "cocoon" themselves in this way is not surprising given the danger they perceive for themselves and their families.<sup>5</sup> One respondent put it this way:

It's deeply ingrained in us...not...I mean...for me, like somebody whose father is a policeman has it...you know...in them from age zero...of, you know, three or four...don't say what your dad does for work, because if you say that....a friend of mine....if you say that...this is her experience, that if you say what your daddy does, he may not come home one night, and it would be your fault. (Interview 10, ll. 209-214)

It is clear that the police feel that they are in danger, and that they must be very careful. The police official told me that officers were overjoyed once clothes dryers became affordable, because they no longer had to hang their easily-identified uniforms outside to dry where everyone could see. That a clothes dryer serves to preserve an officer's professional anonymity, and therefore help

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<sup>5</sup> Indeed, scholars (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987; Van Maanen, 1978) have demonstrated how police linguistically cast themselves as separate or as part of a larger drama. The Trujillo and Dionisopoulos piece used dramaturgical analysis to show how the "tough talk" of police officers insulates them and underscores their role as able protectors. Van Maanen's piece can be used to make the case that police exist in a separate category from the rest of society.

keep the officer and family alive reveals volumes about the level of stress and fear that runs through the force.

The strict rules forbidding sectarian comments, even welcome ones, was a major point of contention for a retired police detective respondent. In this long exchange, the retired officer explains the necessity for such comments and his disdain for the new policy:

John: It has changed by virtue of the fact...not just through this...uh...that Belfast Agreement or anything like that, but...uh...through this political correctness and human rights and stuff like that.

Dave: What do you mean by that exactly?

John: Um...the fun as gone out of it. I would...I would have said--

Dave: --Because you can't make fun of things?

John: You can't...actually it was a way there...a way of getting through the day, there.

Dave: Sort of to relieve tension?

John: That's really all it was. Friendly banter between one and the other. I...I served with Catholic fellows, and...like...J.J. was my name: John the Jew [laughs]. Well, I didn't take offense at that. I know there was nothing...uh...shall we say, meant.

Dave: But now that the 50/50 Agreement has taken place--

John: --People are afraid to say that. For habit...we used to...at nights, in the summertime, there, we would go with the uniformed personnel. And we would have a barbeque, something like that. And the boys always knew that I...they would joke... 'He doesn't eat...he doesn't eat pork.'

Dave: And with the Catholics and the Protestants, would there be jokes like that?

John: Yes. It's not that we were all the same, but just that we were all of the same one-ness. And, the Catholic fellows that I knew really well, I'd say that the joking part of it was...uh...they were not only the main brunt...they didn't have to be...the main brunt of any fun or derogatory remarks. But they would do the same to us: 'That Protestant bastard there!'

Dave: But now...now things have changed. People are afraid to say that kind of thing.

John: They can't say that no, because...uh...you have to understand. This was the fun part. I know it may not sound fun now, but at the time--

Dave: No, I understand, though. You've got to blow off steam. And would people would lose their jobs now if they were to engage in that kind of humor?

John: Yes. Oh, yes. Very much so now. (Interview 13, ll. 131-159)

The retired officer's reason for the jokes, because "It's not that we were all the same, but just that we were all of the same one-ness," (ll. 149-150) cuts to the heart of what the banter meant to him, and presumably to his friends.

Unlike the police official's conception that such talk is bad because it diminishes professionalism and productivity, the retired officer identified 2 different *functions* of the humor. One was to release tension caused by the danger and ostracism from all facets of society lived by the police in Northern Ireland. The other was to enact the "same one-ness" they felt. In a sense, though the semantics of "That Protestant bastard there" (l. 153) seem to be an epithet, the symbolic meaning of the sentence was that 'despite our differences, we are in this together, and we depend on each other for survival.' In this case, both of the retired office's functions of the jokes situated a fellow officer as the "You" in Buber's (1970) I-You relationship. Both parties affirmed their sense of togetherness, paradoxically, by using the selfsame words of hatred that would be hurled at one's hated enemy.

### *Chapter Summary*

This chapter has illustrated some of the ways that language is used by people in Northern Ireland to categorize and describe themselves, others, the place in

which they live, the history of the place, and the police. The discussion has shown the polysemy of language, that terms are imbued with symbolic meaning that can be interpreted in a variety of ways, and that ultimately, language is an enactment and expression of culture. The chapter attempted to address several questions. The first asked how residents of Belfast situate themselves amongst others. We have seen that residents use a combination of overt and covert symbols, such as accent and name, together with information gathered about home neighborhood or school, to ascertain where the other stands. The second question explored the various labels residents of Belfast employ to categorize themselves and others, and showed how certain labels imply acceptance or rejection of violence. The third question asked how people avoid using inflammatory language or language of provocation or engaging in such topics. Interview transcripts bear out a deliberate and sometimes legally enforced strategy of avoiding certain types of verbal interaction. The final question asked how those who reject violence describe the peace process, the political process, and their counterparts who have not chosen to reject violence. We have seen that this is typically rooted in their historical understandings and how those impressions are conveyed.

As the police official explained, perception is reality, and language exchange forms a great deal of the basis for our perception. Our world view is subsumed in what is communicated to us, and what we communicate to others. What is important to note is that even those who have rejected violence as a means to

solve the Northern Ireland political unrest still struggle with the feelings, the prejudices, and the legacies of their history, and that struggle is reflected in the language they use, the terms they test and reject, and the humor they employ.

What is apparent after reading all the transcripts is that rejection of violence does not mean that the parties have renounced all claims in the conflict, nor does it imply that the non-violent Northern Irish are free from the emotional baggage, prejudice and even hatreds that lead others to commit violent acts. Instead, many of those who choose to reject violence as a path still harbor animosity. They just choose to express it through non-violent means such as parades, community competence building, or cross-community outreach. When asked if there is a Martin Luther King or Gandhi of Northern Ireland, most replied that they hope and pray that someday there will be. Until that day comes, they will continue to enact their values and expectations, using language to both conceal and reveal values, beliefs, and expectations.

## CHAPTER FOUR:

### BELFAST'S POLITICAL MURALS AND POSTERS

#### *Language and Symbol*

*Saussure.* From the earliest work by Saussure (1915/1966), scholars have problematized the relationship between language and culture. Saussure's work was significant in that he pointed out the arbitrariness of words as signs. Saussure demonstrated that the relationship between the word and the concept the word signifies is a tenuous one, which remains only for the group that believes it, and only for as long as they do. Consider the case of four people: one from the US, one from France, one from Germany, and one from Israel, standing under the shade of a large tree during a hot, sunny day. The word "tree" exists, as does the object it signifies, but it (the word "tree") is used to designate the large, living but stationary, woody object with leaves, currently providing shade. Those standing under said object could (and do) instead call the object in question *arbre*, *Baum*, or *etz*, were they speaking about it. Doing so would not cause the tree to change its nature, nor its meaning to them.

What Saussure did not clearly state is that each word choice is equally correct, though potentially unhelpful if the co-conversant does not understand it. As such, each "word" consists of verbal and thought components, rather than some absolute, eternal correctness. The term that corresponds to an object originates and derives its validity (my term, not Saussure's) from its shared understanding. That is, if we both speak German, *Baum* is the appropriate word. If we do not,

*Baum* has no meaning at all. The word has become a nonsense syllable because I cannot find correspondence between its phonic and any recognizable thought. This is significant, and Saussure's work has allowed for two very important streams of research and thought in the communication field: semiotics and language perspectives.

*Peirce's North American semiotics.* The semiotic stream took root in North America with the pioneering work of C. S. Peirce. In discussing Peirce's semiotic, Hoopes (1991) explains that it, "Allows for realistic recognition that human life and society are to a significant degree a matter not only of freedom but also of constraint" (p. 12). That is, Peirce recognized that the symbols we use shape (and are shaped by) social forces beyond our control. (That Peirce presaged Derrida by 60 years is a fact sadly often overlooked.) Regardless, Peirce's work provided scholars with a model for understanding the relationship between words and the things they symbolize.

Unlike Saussure's dualistic model, Peirce's three component model (See Figure 3: Peirce's Triangle, p. 162) described three interacting factors. First is the "word" (e.g., tree), which Peirce called the "Representamen." The Representamen describes the second part of the model, an "Object" (e.g., the tall brown thing with leaves). Thus far, Peirce is identical to Saussure. However, Peirce argued that the relationship between the Representamen and the Object also requires an "Interpretant," which is the mental aspect the human brings to create the process of signification. The idea of Interpretant is similar to the

phenomenological concept of "consciousness," in that one must be conscious of *something*. Likewise, the Interpretant is the direction of signification in the mind.

*Similar streams in communication theory.* Eco (1979) likens Peirce's model to Ogden and Richards' model, which came after, as well as to Frege's 1892 *Sinn-Zeichen-Bedeutung* triangle. Like these models, the one created by Peirce is relevant to communication as he discusses the symbol as "A sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification" (Peirce, 1991, p. 240). This definition presupposes a socially shared, if not socially constructed, communicative world. Such a world is (re)created through communication and can best be studied by looking at the communication that (re)shapes it.

#### *Question Addressed by this Chapter*

As human beings, Belfast's residents are symbol manipulators. Symbols they use include words and non-verbal communication including (but not limited to) gestures, art, music, space, clothing, and other ways in which they express themselves. Because political murals are such a large facet of Belfast life, this chapter asks how non-violence is expressed in murals. To answer the question, this chapter looks at three major topics: mural symbolism, central figures, and mural colors.



## *Symbols and Identity*

Buckley (1998) edited a book called *Symbols in Northern Ireland*. His introductory essay covers many important aspects of symbolism, and I will weave parts of it into this section of my discussion. First, he contends that the purposes of symbols are to “clarify, define, and give structure to identity, to who a person is” (p. 5). The difficulty about discussing identity, let alone in relation to symbols, is that, as Goffman (1974, cited in Buckley, also cited directly in this dissertation) explains, we are many things simultaneously: we hold occupations, engage in hobbies, affiliate with social and/or religious groups, are members of families, hold citizenship, and may categorize ourselves in many other ways. Intercultural scholars would call these co-cultures (Samovar, Porter & Stefani, 1998) or sub-cultures (Gudykunst & Kim, 1998), but most mainstream theory, while acknowledging the existence of our complex selves, fails to adequately fully integrate such complexity of identity into its models (cf. Kim, 2002). While some social theories (e.g., Double Consciousness; Cultural Hybridity, Cultural Fusion) attempt to fully account for complex identities, most do not.<sup>6</sup> This is a problem because it belies what most people already know: They are more than *just* Catholic, *just* Venezuelan, or *just* a teenager. As Buckley says, “It is not always clear who *any* person may be at any given moment” (p. 5) as any of the

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<sup>6</sup> While this is so in our field, it is not universal in the social sciences. For example, Symbolic Interactionism holds that the self is a composite of one’s multiple roles and levels of status.

simultaneous things we are could be dominant at one moment and dormant the next.

Given this background—or perhaps because of it—we tend to try to situate ourselves *vis à vis* others. As Buckley points out, and my respondents discussed in Chapter Three, people in Northern Ireland tend to do so by means of four questions: name; school attended; home neighborhood; pronunciation of the letters “a,” “h,” and “r.” To this list, Buckley adds a few more: preferences in “music, sport, politics, and so forth” (p. 5). In this sense, all of the above, while being phenomena in and of themselves (e.g., my primary school’s empirical existence is not dependent on its symbolism to me in particular), these things are also symbols, and they hold a certain mythical (Gebser, 1984) power. I reflect them, and in doing so, my identity is somehow fixed in your eyes as part of a larger story involving good and evil. To you, I am the other, Buber’s Thou (1970) and you identify me by virtue of your understanding of the meaning of those symbols.

*Symbolism and ideology.* Mannheim (1949) contrasts ideology with utopia. Ideology, he says, enforces the status quo. It causes us to embrace what is—in politics and society, particularly—and in so doing prevents us from moving beyond the here and now. Ideology favors doing things “the way they’ve always been done.” Utopia, on the other hand, embodies imagination and demands change. Utopia is *pursued*, ideology is *held*. These verbs are not chance occurrence; they are descriptions of the essence of each term. Our symbols

smack of each. For the two, I would argue, exist in opposition. The desire for the status quo and the desire for change often are reactions to one another. They are also frequently represented by our symbols, though sometimes unintentionally.

*Symbols and boundaries.* To the outside observer, who perhaps lacks the ability to discern the more subtle symbols (e.g., accent), the most obvious ones are the hundreds of murals found in Belfast. These murals appear throughout the sectarian areas, and seem to increase in intensity at the boundary areas, where the Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods meet. Here, the murals frequently take on their strongest tone. Appendix F: Selected Mural Photographs contains a few examples, including Figure 4 (p. 163) the mural at the entrance to the Tiger's Bay neighborhood, featuring a three-story high masked man brandishing a Kalachnikov AK-47 assault rifle and the caption, "You are now entering Loyalist Tiger's Bay." There can be no mistake about the point of the message. It is a territorial marker. The extent to which it is also other things (i.e., utopian v. ideological) is worthy of study. Likewise, the painting of curbs (See Figure 5, p. 163) green, orange and white by Catholics to mark their neighborhoods and red, white, and blue by Protestants to mark theirs, is a clear, though not as forceful, symbol of identity.

*Figure of mural as central: King Billy.* As Peirce noted, the symbol corresponds not only to an object in space, but also to a set of mental associations we have with that object. Language scholars frequently divide such associations into neat categories like denotation (i.e., the dictionary definition) and connotation (i.e.,

emotional baggage associated with the word). However, as Barthes (1972; 1978) and others have noted, symbols frequently derive their meaning from historical context. This is especially true of symbols of particular persons or events from history. In such cases, they are interpreted differently depending on how one views that event.

Sometimes, the figure depicted in the mural is of central importance. As an example, King William of Orange, referred to in the language chapter of this work, is a pivotal figure in the Protestant understanding of Northern Irish history, and he is frequently the subject of murals in Protestant areas (See Figure 6: William of Orange mural, p. 164). Yet the symbolic value of King William is far from universal. At the most superficial level, to Protestants, he represents the 1690 victory over Catholic James the Second at the Battle of the Boyne. To Catholics, he represents the conqueror in a long-ago battle, fought long before anyone currently living was born. On a deeper level, the symbols take on different meanings. Peirce's Representamen (the symbol), in this case, King William, is not monosymic – to Protestants, he is known by the diminutive "King Billy," as the Orangeman interview respondent indicated. This name would not be used by Catholics, as they do not have the same affinity for him, as their conqueror. As such, despite the fact that the Object (the actual King William/Billy) is the same, the Interpretant differs. The semiotic square (cf. Martin & Ringham, 2000) of William of Orange, (p. 164) illustrates this. Similar squares can be drawn for murals of Queen Elizabeth (Figure 9, p. 165) and the

late Queen Mother (Figure 10, p. 166). Indeed, these multiple understandings are illustrated by Figure 8 (p. 165), a semiotic square of the perspectives of the use of common Protestants in the Orange murals. Figure 8 contends that a Protestant citizen may see the images of the Protestant supporters of King Billy as loyal subjects, while a Catholic viewer may see the same persons depicted as thugs and aggressors.

*Language as Symbol in Murals.* Indeed, these concurrent semiologies exist for every political mural that is based on cultural difference, especially in light of the working definition of this paper. If culture is an enacted set (or the material creations thereof) of shared expectations, beliefs, and behaviors, to paraphrase my own definition, then political and historic murals will be interpreted differently by the two groups *if* those two groups do indeed exist as separate cultures. I believe they do, and thus I maintain that while each *could* interpret the murals as the other does, they simply do not. Figure 11 (Semiotic Square of British Royalty in Murals, p. 166) shows how the images of the British Royal Family are particularly divisive symbols. Even the Orangeman I interviewed conceded, when showing me a "Royal Family Calendar" his group mass produced for the 2004 year, that some on both sides in Northern Ireland would take it as a political statement (personal conversation, February 2003).

Tat being said, it is clear that the mural painters are consciously aware of the effects the murals will have on the other side. Jarman (1998) calls the painting of murals "one of the most dynamic media for symbolic expression in the north of

Ireland" (p. 81). Figure 12 (p. 167), the UFF Eire Mural, provides strong evidence to support such a statement, as it shows a mural painted by the Loyalist UFF (Ulster Freedom Fighters) paramilitary which says, "Ulster Freedom Fighters will resist any Eire involvement in our country." This mural underscores the point of conscious action for two reasons: First, the word Eire is the Gaelic word for Ireland. For the Loyalist community to use Gaelic is a deliberate "shot," as the same community resists the public use of the language as Nationalist or Republican aggression, as discussed above. Figure 13 (p. 167) is a semiotic square juxtaposing views of the Red Hand of Ulster, which can simultaneously be seen as both a legitimate symbol of Ireland (as it is part of the historic flag of the province) and therefore accessible to both sides, and as a clear symbol of intimidation by Protestant paramilitary groups (as it is paired with violent text and other images, such as guns and paramilitary soldiers).

The degree to which some Catholics equate the use of Gaelic with their identities can be seen in Figure 14 (p. 168), the "Language Rights" mural, which asserts that the right to use Gaelic is a human right denied to Northern Irish Catholics. Blommaert and Verschueren (1998) note this situation elsewhere and state that language is "the battlefield of interethnic strife" (p. 202). Indeed, Figure 15 (p. 168), the "Eire is War Mural," says it very clearly. The Loyalist who painted this could not have made the case easier to understand. There can be no compromise, as Eire itself is war. In this case, there is no semiosis; *Eire is war*. Were it not so dangerous, this statement would be funny, as it turns on its head a

description of the northern part of Ireland dated c. 545-565: "The North is War" (Kockel, 1995). In the case of the first mural, "Eire involvement," to be sure we see it, however, the muralist has painted the word "Eire" green, both to set it apart and to make it the same color as the political affiliation of those not "Orange." This underscores the contention that the color green, like the color orange, is political in and of itself. As such, unlike the murals in which the subject him or herself is paramount (e.g., King Billy or Queen Elizabeth), there is a second type of case, in which the color of the mural is important.

*Political colors.* That colors have symbolic or political value is neither new nor unique to Northern Ireland. The color red has several symbolic meanings. According to international motoring convention, it is used as the color on stop signs. Red is the color of communism worldwide, just as it was the name of the Soviet Army. Red also connotes urgency. It is the color of blood, it is the color of fire engines in many places in the world, and that relationship has given a name to one particular shade, "fire engine red." In the most recent political election, red was the color of the states won by Republican candidate George Bush. Since then, commentators and conversationalists have sometimes spoken of the liberal desire to retake the "red states." Likewise, green, blue, and black each have symbolic value, at least in the English-speaking world. One can have a "blue day," which is not much fun, but not as bad as a "black day." One can see red, an unpleasant experience for those who may be in the person's path. One can also be green with envy, an unpleasant experience for the person him or herself.

In Europe and the Middle East, a blue movie is an adult film, which may make the producer see green and the viewer red in the face. In short, color has symbolic value.

*Northern Ireland color 'ownership.'* In Northern Ireland, certain colors seem to belong to one group or the other. Though red was the historical banner color of the Celts, who, incidentally, painted themselves blue when they went into battle, red has become the Protestant color, because it lies both in the Union Jack and in the "Red Hand of Ulster," which adorns the flag of the Ulster Province. As such, it appears in nearly every Protestant mural. Orange is another color claimed by the Protestants, as it forms part of William of Orange's name, though it was used by William to denote a place, not a color. Still, the Orangemen actually wear orange, and carry banners of the same color. Likewise, black also seems to belong to the Protestants, as the offshoot of the Orange Order mentioned in the language chapter, the Royal Black, symbolically claims another color for the Protestants.

*Winning the color war.* If winning the Northern Ireland conflict is to be measured in the number of colors each side has claimed, the Catholics will surely lose, for they seem to have claimed only green, white, and orange. As mentioned above, the Protestants also claim orange, which leads us to one of the great ironies of the Troubles: the orange in the tricolor, the ROI flag flown (and painted on curbs) by Nationalists and Republicans alike, much to the dismay of their Unionist and Loyalist neighbors, was chosen for the ROI because it symbolizes



the unity of the Protestants (i.e., orange) and Catholics (i.e., Green) in a shared space of peace (i.e., white). Explanations of this can be found in any ROI government publication or Website. So the Nationalists and Republicans fly a flag of defiance which symbolizes (though perhaps not to them) religious unity, and such a flag is rejected as divisive by the Unionists and Loyalists.

*Mural colors.* Having established the background of certain colors in Northern Ireland, we now look at the dominant colors in murals. As we began to discuss, red is a dominant color in Loyalist murals. It is easy to see why this color would be chosen. Apart from the historical associations mentioned above, red is a color of aggression, and its use makes sense in this case. The Loyalists' position is a tenuous one, as they see the Unionist leaders signing agreements with the other side. Figures 16 and 17 show how red is used in murals. In Figure 16 (p. 169), "Irish out," the "red hand of Ulster" catches the eye of any passer-by, and it literally frames the message. This is the hand on the Ulster flag. In Figure 17, "UYM," (p. 169) the color red is used again. In this case, it has several purposes. First, it gets attention. Second, it recruits young people as the UYM is a Loyalist youth movement. Third, and most importantly, it provokes. The combination of red and the militaristic symbols—the man painted on the building reminded me of Huey Newton's Black Panthers—present the message in unmistakable terms. That this storefront faces a Catholic neighborhood makes the message even clearer.

*"Peace mural green."* In contrast, many of the murals in the Catholic areas use blue and green as dominant colors. On one level, this is a reflection of the color-claiming discussed above. Loyalists use the red of Ulster's flag, and Catholics use the green associated with them. Yet green/blue has a different association than red. Green and blue are the colors of the ocean; blue is the color of the sky. These colors have been discussed by psychologists (Jung, 1976) as calming colors. It is for this reason that offices are frequently accented with blue or green. Perhaps it is no coincidence, then, that peace murals in Catholic neighborhoods use quite a bit of green and blue. For example, Figure 18 (p. 170), which I call *"Time for Peace,"* is a mural found on the Falls Road, and depicts a bird picking up a British soldier and flying the soldier home to Britain. Use of birds in Catholic murals was discussed by Kenney (1998). It is worth noting that the dove is the international symbol of peace and a bird is the major figure of this mural, a fact not unnoticed by Republican paramilitaries, who defaced the mural with their own name. Apparently, the call for peace in this mural is not a unanimous sentiment in this area.

Another example of the peace mural green archetype is Figure 19, the *Slán Abhaile* (p.170) mural, photographed in a Catholic neighborhood which depicts a British soldier on patrol in the neighborhood. The muralist has painted the buildings of the neighborhood, complete with recreations of their own murals, behind the soldier on patrol. The Gaelic *slán abhaile*, or *"safe home,"* is telling the soldier that he is not welcome in this neighborhood. While the sentiment behind

the mural might be identical to that of "Irish out," its expression is less confrontational.

*KFC: An interesting solution.* According to interview data collected, the Shankill KFC franchise was the site of a UDA mural. Though the story may be apocryphal, I heard it from several individuals who would have no way of knowing one another, so I report it here. According to the story, officers from KFC were dispatched from the US to do the routine franchise check, to ensure that the employees are conforming to corporate standards and the franchise agreement. When they arrived at the Shankill KFC, which is located almost literally across the street from Johnny Adair's neighborhood, they noticed the large UDA mural painted on the front of the building. The corporate officers informed the franchise owner that political displays violate the franchise agreement and that this would have to be removed or the license would be terminated. The owner and the paramilitaries found a compromise. The mural would be replaced with the KFC name, but a closer look at the wall reveals something very interesting: the colors were painted in reverse. That is, the KFC logo consists of a red background with white letters that have blue accents. This wall was KFC in white letters with red accents on a blue background (See Figure 20, KFC, p. 171). According to the story, this was no accident. The paramilitaries wanted to make a statement that they were willing to compromise a little to keep their local KFC, but that they still own the wall and the territory.

*Protestant peace murals.* While an Orangeman might argue that murals of King William or of the current British monarchy are non-political or are peace murals, most Catholics would likely disagree. The difficulty in finding Protestant peace murals is there are so few of them. Yet there is a very moving exception to this, which I present as Figure 21 (p. 171). This mural, which I call "Anti-sectarian Arkansas '57 mural," juxtaposes the 2002 attacks on Catholic grade school girls with the closing of Little Rock's Central High School to African American students in the 1950s, and is headed by the words, "Everyone has the right to live free from sectarian harassment." What is most remarkable about this mural, apart from the fact that it is in a Protestant area, is that it connects images from someone's else's ethnic problems with an event from their own. Perhaps it is easier for the people of Belfast to connect with an event in 1950s USA, as the event does not have the political baggage for them that it would for a US American. Additionally, interviews revealed that the attacks on the little girls were so horrific that even many Loyalists were stunned.

### *Conclusion*

This chapter has presented photographic evidence to make the case that the murals are a facet of culture, and despite the fact that most murals celebrate or threaten violence, that the non-violent residents of Belfast are attempting to make their cases through murals, as well. The images used by any muralist, violent or non-violent, do not hold universal and eternal meaning – that is, they are not fixed signifiers. Nonetheless, there are certain identifiable patterns, be they

colors used, subject matter, or even text, that can be used to try to understand the symbolic communication embodied in these murals and painted curbs. The colors themselves have historical significance and convey a sense of peacefulness or aggression. The figures used bring one community together by alienating the other. The choice of language used in the murals has heavy symbolic value, as it struggles for ethnic identity or challenges it. Even the mural that does not seem to be a mural at all has symbolic and political value. Overall, these murals express the motives, expectations, values, and beliefs of the people.

## CHAPTER FIVE:

### FRAMING IN BELFAST'S NEWSPAPERS

#### *Goffman's Frames*

Humans organize lived experience, according to Goffman, through "schemata of interpretation" (1974, p. 21) called "frames." Essentially, a frame consists of the basic elements of understanding one has of the world. As Goffman explains, "Definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events...and our subjective involvement in them" (p. 10-11). That is, individuals find ways of understanding what they perceive and encounter through mental categorization of experience. This is accomplished through frameworks, which allow us to, in the words of Pan and Kosicki (1992, unpublished) "actively classify, organize, and interpret life experiences to make sense of them" (p. 3). Doing so brings an order to the social world and to lived experience.

#### *Media Framing*

Tuchman (1978) applied this concept to the news media, as much of the "knowledge" of the outside world the average citizen possesses, he or she gets through the news media. As such, Tuchman argues, the news media structure our world through the themes, or frames, they feature in news reporting. What we know we know through the news, and as such, the media gatekeepers set our frames for us. Tuchman argues that the media affect our reality by manipulating

the public framework, which, in turn, affects how people see politics and what they discuss.

*The media war of position.* As such, the media are often the site of political struggle, or what Gramsci (1992, p. 88) called the “war of position,” in which foes attempt to place themselves in the proper form for the “war of maneuver” yet to come. In a politically contentious climate, the creating and manipulation of media frames is a manifestation of the battle (Edelman, 1988). As such, US political elections are frequently the focus of framing studies. In off years (i.e., non-election years), barring extraordinary circumstances, the US political climate tends to calm down, and media framing topics are reduced to “standard” issues like abortion (cf. Pan and Kosicki, 1992). However, the ramifications of framing in a more consistently (or unrelentingly) politically contentious environment are more tantalizing.

*Media studies in Northern Ireland.* In an attempt to uncover agenda setting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) trends in Northern Irish newspaper coverage, Vincent (1997) examined press coverage of the ‘Troubles’ in three NI papers (the Unionist *Belfast Telegraph*, the Nationalist *Irish Times*, the Republican *An Phoblacht*) and the ROI-published *Irish Times*. Vincent’s study was exploratory, and culminated in rich quantitative results including a factor analysis of dominant themes in newspaper coverage. In addition to the quantitative analysis, another strength of the Vincent study was the use of a variety of newspapers to gather a comprehensive picture of the situation. Despite the long

span of time Vincent used, his choice of newspapers was limited in that he used only 3 of the many circulated newspapers in Belfast. This may be oversimplifying, as Aughey (2000) points to an upswing in fragmentation in the Loyalist community since the Good Friday Agreement.

*Framing possibilities in Northern Ireland.* Given the fragmentation of Northern Irish society – not only is there friction between Catholics and Protestants, but within the communities, as well – one is moved to wonder how differently peacemaking and the Troubles are presented in the various daily Belfast newspapers. Were there intra-community on both sides, one might assume that the press would frame the conflict in black-and-white terms, posing “our” side as heroes and “theirs” as villains. However, there is fighting within the ranks on each side: Ian Paisley, a Loyalist politician and Protestant minister rejects not only the Belfast Agreement, but those Unionist politicians that signed and support it. As Alex Maskey, Lord Mayor of Belfast, told me (personal conversation, 2003) there are six seats on the Belfast City Council, and each is held by someone from a different political party. This represents a high level of fragmentation, and reflects an environment in which competing frames likely exist as politicians, paramilitary leaders, journalists, and other would-be power brokers attempt to shape the discourse.

*Framing the UDA feud.* The first week of February, 2003, saw events that transcended the “normal” Northern Ireland contentiousness. Rival leaders of the Ulster Defence Association, an illegal paramilitary organization on the Protestant



side, escalated their rhetoric and erupted into internecine violence. The self-named "Brigadiers," who have divided Northern Ireland into areas each controls, engaged in accusations of theft, sexual deviance, and disloyalty. According to the BBC Program *Spotlight* (2003, January 28), the Brigadiers became incensed with Johnny "Mad Dog" Adair's arrogance, and ousted Adair and his UDA group, "C Company." As the criticism of Adair mounted, his most vocal critic was John "Grugg" Gregg, the well-respected Brigadier famous for shooting Gerry Adams in the 1980s. The feud between Adams and Gregg culminated in Gregg's murder by Adair's followers in the beginning of February 2003.

### Research Questions and Hypothesis

The present study applies quantitative content analysis techniques to examine the coverage of the story of Gregg's death and its aftermath in several Belfast newspapers. Beginning with the day of Gregg's death, the present study examines coverage in 46 papers for a period of one week. The study asks the following research questions, all exploratory toward discerning basic differences in the press. While the questions focus on violence, and men of violence, rather than peacemakers, I feel it is important to explore the way in which violence is framed in the media. Understanding this will help to explain the degree to which non-violence is a deliberate choice of most people, or whether it is more commonplace than we might think. Additionally, the Gregg killing was a major story, as a brief glance at the papers shows. It was a front page story in nearly

every paper for more than one week. Because of this, and to overcome threats to validity due to history, the study will focus on these. Finally, the study focuses exclusively on the front pages of the 46 newspapers only. The reason for this is that framing as a concept has meaning only when taken in the context of the “interaction” between the stimulus, in this case, the newspaper, and the media consumer. With such a large variety of newspapers available, and given their fragmentation, in that each group seems to print its own newspaper, it is not reasonable to assume that the typical resident of Belfast would buy all the papers, but he or she may well glance at the front pages at the newsstand when purchasing his or her regular paper. As such, it makes sense to use the front pages as the unit of analysis, and contrast the coverage of this pivotal event.

RQ1: Is there a pattern of difference in the way the John Gregg story was carried by the various Northern Ireland newspapers?

RQ2: Is there a pattern of difference in the way the UDA or the UDA leaders are portrayed in the various newspapers?

RQ3: Are the so-called “neutral” (Vincent, 1997) newspapers qualitatively different in their coverage of the UDA feud and the Gregg killing?

In keeping with Tehranian’s (1999) assertion that “the mass media dichotomize, dramatize, and demonize ‘them’ against ‘us’” (p. 158), one must acknowledge that the Northern Ireland political situation is further complicated by the fact that the media proliferation reflects competing interests of political and non-political groups, including sectarian groups on both sides, and even peace

groups. In short, the Belfast mediasphere serves many interests, not merely strictly “political” ones. As such, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H1: “Neutral” newspapers will present more balanced coverage, reflecting a “move beyond sectarianism” (Liechty & Clegg, 2001).

### Method

*Newspapers.* This study examines 46 newspapers, which span the dates of February 1-8, 2003. These dates were a sample of convenience, as they include the time I was in Belfast. The papers themselves consist of all of the newspapers printed in Belfast, with the addition of Britain’s *Daily Telegraph* and the *Daily Mail*, which are used as control. The Belfast papers are dailies, weeklies, bi-weeklies, or monthlies, and typically serve a particular community, which is nearly always mentioned in the paper’s mission statement or on the paper’s Web site. In this study, the dailies are: the *Belfast Telegraph*, the *Irish News*, and the *News Letter*. Of the three, the *Belfast Telegraph* has a slight unionist leaning, the *Irish News* is a nationalist paper, and the *News Letter* is a unionist paper (McGarry & O’Leary, 1995, p. 223). The weeklies are: the *North Belfast News*, *The People*, the *South Belfast News*, the *Sunday Life*, *An Phoblacht*, and the *Sunday World*. The *North Belfast News* and the *South Belfast News* are nationalist papers, *An Phoblacht*, which is published by Sinn Fein, is a Republican paper. *The People* is unionist, *Sunday Life* is middle of the road, and published for Northern Ireland in Britain, and *Sunday World* is nationalist. The only bi-weekly is the nationalist

*Andersonstown News*, and the monthlies are the *Shankill Mirror* and the *Ulster Scot*, both unionist/loyalist papers.

*Instrument.* A code book was created to analyze the front pages of the 46 newspapers. The codebook, attached as Appendix G: Content Analysis Codebook (p. 172), consisted of 67 items, though many were contingent upon prior answers, so many of the items did not require answers in each case. Because of the large number of questions and potential confusion, all answers were recorded in the codebooks rather than on separate sheets. Items examined story placement (e.g., above or below the fold), length (i.e., in words), inclusion and tone (i.e., positive, negative, neutral) of the peace process; placement, length, inclusion and tone of paramilitary violence; placement, length, inclusion and tone of major political figures; placement, and tone of graphics or photos accompanying a story; and ratio of stories of violence (or of non-violence) to the overall number of stories on the page. Most items were coded as nominal values (e.g., answer choices to the question "Are paramilitaries mentioned in the headline?" were "1. Yes" and "2. No."), and were processed as such.

*Coders.* Three paid coders were used in the coding process. Two were upper-class undergraduate students, and the third was a university employee with a B.A. degree. All three claimed little or no knowledge of Northern Ireland, and all three were US Americans. One of the students and the staff member were female, and the other student was male, and all three were between the ages of 22-30.

*Procedure.* All three coders were trained together. Each coder was assigned a coder ID number, which appeared on every one of that coder's codebooks. Training consisted of an explanation of each item on the codebook, and each coder did the first few papers with the researcher. Coding was then temporarily halted, and initial scores were immediately checked using SPSS for intercoder reliability using Phi and Lambda. These measures were chosen because of the preponderance of nominal level variables. Reliability scores met or exceeded the .05 significance level, and coding was resumed.

Once coding was completed, all data were input into SPSS, several re-coding procedures were done. First, paper names, which were presented alphabetically and paired with sequential numbers in the codebook, were re-coded (See Table 1: Recoded Newspaper Names, p. 189) so that dailies, weeklies, and monthlies could be examined in 3 blocs, as editorial decisions in a weekly paper likely differ from those in a daily, and so on. Second, items that called for the coder to evaluate story tone appeared in the codebook as positive, negative, or neutral. These were recoded to appear as positive, neutral, or negative. Items were then checked for intercoder reliability. Items deemed unreliable were hand-checked for accuracy. In the case where an obvious clerical error was made (e.g., in inputting the scores) the score was amended. In cases where it appeared the coder may have made a mistake, such as putting a number in the wrong blank, the coder was contacted and asked for clarification. In cases where the Phi and Lambda scores still failed the significance test, those items were either thrown

out or interpreted as non-significant items. A case of the latter arose with story length (in words), as the longer the story, the greater the likelihood of error. Using a strict pass/fail criterion of reliability in this case seemed less sensible than re-interpreting these answers as reliable if they fell into a range. An arbitrary range of 10 words was set. That is, a word count of 520 and 525 were counted as reliable despite the fact that SPSS did not count them as such.

After intercoder reliability was established, and items were included or discarded as necessary, papers were checked for framing consistency over time, and were contrasted with the other papers. Chi-square tests were used on the nominal variables, while a test of multiple correlation was performed on the interval level variables. One one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was done, using paper name as the independent variable, and the quantifiable variables of headline size, number of UDA stories, number of IRA stories, number of peace process stories, and total number of stories as independent variables.

As stated above, in order to prevent the possibility of the results being confounded by collapsing all the daily, weekly, bi-weekly, and monthly papers into one category, all procedures were done for each category. That is, daily papers were compared to other dailies only, weeklies were compared with other weeklies only, and the monthlies were compared to other monthlies only. As there was only 1 bi-weekly, no comparison was run on this paper. The reason for this, as mentioned earlier, is that it is reasonable to assume that the editorial and content decisions of a weekly or monthly paper will be different from those of a

paper with a daily edition. Statistical results of all tests of paper content are reported here.

## Results

*Chi square.* The first test run was a chi-square on the variables: general headline tone, tone of headlines about paramilitaries, tones of headlines that name paramilitaries, tones of stories that name the UDA, tones of stories that name the IRA, tones of stories that name the RIRA, tones of stories that name the peace process, and the tone of the graphics presented. Of all variables listed, all but three were found to be significant. The findings are presented in Table 2: Chi-Square Results (p. 189).

Item by item, the results are as follows: Results were significant for general headline tone ( $\chi^2=55.261$ ,  $n=138$ ,  $df=4$ ,  $p<.000$ ). Results were significant for headline tone of generic headlines about paramilitaries ( $\chi^2=211.638$ ,  $n=138$ ,  $df=4$ ,  $p<.000$ ). Results were significant for headline tone of headlines that name specific paramilitaries ( $\chi^2=133.609$ ,  $n=138$ ,  $df=2$ ,  $p<.000$ ). Results were significant for story tone of stories about the UDA ( $\chi^2=14.722$ ,  $n=138$ ,  $df=3$ ,  $p=.002$ ). Results were not significant for story tone of stories about the IRA ( $\chi^2=0.000$ ,  $n=138$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p=1.0$ ). Results were not significant for story tone of stories about the RIRA, ( $\chi^2=1.0$ ,  $n=138$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p=.317$ ). Results were not significant for story tone of stories about the peace process, ( $\chi^2=1.0$ ,  $n=138$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p=.317$ ). Results were significant for the tone of the graphic accompanying stories, ( $\chi^2=17.049$ ,  $n=138$ ,

df=3,  $p=.001$ ). Again, IRA story tone, RIRA story tone, and peace process story tone were not significant. All others were.

*Correlations.* A test of correlation was run on the following variables: Paper name, headline size, story placement, total number of UDA stories, total number of IRA stories, total number of peace process stories, and total number of all stories. Results are presented in Table 3: Correlation Matrix (p. 190).

The matrix indicates that the following items were significantly correlated: paper name with story placement ( $r=-.335$ ,  $p<.000$ ), with total number of UDA stories ( $r=-.400$ ,  $p<.000$ ), with total number of IRA stories ( $r=.239$ ,  $p=.005$ ), with total number of peace process stories ( $r=.288$ ,  $p=.001$ ), and with total number of stories ( $r=-.270$ ,  $p=.001$ ). Headline size was correlated with story placement ( $r=.289$ ,  $p=.001$ ), total number of UDA stories ( $r=.623$ ,  $p<.000$ ), and total number of stories ( $r=-.207$ ,  $p=.015$ ). Story placement was correlated with paper name ( $r=-.335$ ,  $p<.000$ ), with headline size ( $r=.289$ ,  $p=.001$ ), with total number of UDA stories ( $r=.479$ ,  $p<.000$ ), and with total number of stories ( $r=.264$ ,  $p=.002$ ).

*Analysis of variance.* The ANOVA was run using newspaper name as the independent variable, and headline size, total number of UDA stories, total number of IRA stories, total number of peace stories, and total number of all stories as dependent variables. The eta-squared statistic ( $\eta^2$ ) of effect size was also calculated, and is listed after the  $F$  score. In addition, Tukey post-hoc tests were run on the results. Results of the ANOVA are in Table 4: ANOVA Results (p. 191). For headline size, the results were significant with the specific



newspapers ( $F=4.782$ ,  $df=10/127$ ,  $p<.000$ ,  $\eta^2=.274$ ). For the total number of UDA stories, the results were significant with the specific newspapers ( $F=4.699$ ,  $df=10/127$ ,  $p<.000$ ,  $\eta^2=.270$ ). For the total number of IRA stories, the results were significant with the specific newspapers ( $F=5.677$ ,  $df=10/127$ ,  $p<.000$ ,  $\eta^2=.309$ ). For the total number of peace process stories, the results were significant with the specific newspapers ( $F=11.260$ ,  $df=10/127$ ,  $p<.000$ ,  $\eta^2=.470$ ). For the total number of overall stories, the results were significant with the specific newspapers ( $F=6.268$ ,  $df=10/127$ ,  $p<.000$ ,  $\eta^2=.330$ ).

*Tukey HSD.* A post-hoc test, the Tukey HSD, was run on the results to tease out the specific relationships between the variables. As a post-hoc test, the Tukey statistic identifies details of interaction not revealed by an ANOVA, which reveal overall significant interaction. Tukey Tests found interactions between several of the papers. Tables 5-9: Tukey HSD Results (starting on p. 192) present the post-hoc results in the following format: groups that are significantly different ( $p<.05$ ) from one another, in this case the newspapers, have numbers in only one of the two columns. Groups found to be *not* significantly different have numbers in both columns. Typically, a Tukey Table features the numbers assigned to the dependent variable conditions in the left-hand column. For ease of understanding, I have replaced the newspaper numbers with their names.

The Tukey Tables provide more detailed information than the ANOVA, in that the *specific* newspapers whose coverage differed are identified, however, the Tukey Tables do not tell us *in what way* they differed. For that information,

Figures 27-31: Means Plots By Variable (starting on p. 192), identify the specific ways in which the papers differed for each variable.

### Discussion

*Headline Size.* The data showed the following patterns in headline size: the mean headline size of all papers was 5.7 words. Papers that fell significantly below that on this measure were *The South Belfast News*, and the *UK Telegraph*. *The People*, and the *Sunday World* had more “wordy” headlines than the others. This is not surprising, as those two papers are more sensationalistic in their coverage than the *UK Telegraph*, which is a broadsheet, and more typical of “professional” journalism. Specimens of the more sensationalistic papers are found in Appendix H: Selected Newspaper Front Pages (p. 181). A brief look at the papers reveals the degree to which they rely on shocking words and images to catch the reader’s eye and solicit sales. Examples included are representative, and were not selected because they were the most extreme. Only the high cost of scanning prevented more examples from being included. Whether they are (Figure 22, p. 181) discussing the sexual practices of Johnny Adair (e.g., “Adair in Gay Sex Shock”), displaying a photo, on the front page, of the bloody corpse (Figure 23, p. 182) of John Gregg, or threatening the life (Figure 24, p. 183) of Adair associate John White (e.g., “Dead Man Sunbathing”), the sensationalism is obvious. It is surprising that the *South Belfast News* measured below the average, as it, too, tends to lean toward sensationalism. A reason why it did not in this case may be because it is a Nationalist paper, and its editors were less concerned

with discrediting Johnny Adair or his deputies – as Loyalists, they had no clout with the Nationalist community to begin with.

*UDA story quantity.* The Tukey Test revealed four papers were different from the mean score of .5942 stories: the *South Belfast News*, *An Phoblacht*, the *Sunday World*, and *The People*. Of these, the first 3 ran fewer than average stories about the UDA, while *The People* ran more. This is interesting, as the Nationalist papers in this list (i.e., the *South Belfast News*, *An Phoblacht*, and the *Sunday World*) are the only Nationalist papers to show a significant difference. In the case of *An Phoblacht*, this is less surprising, because it is a Republican paper, and as such it is reasonable for it to be more hard-line, and thus devote more of its coverage to the “enemy,” which it sees not only in political, but in military terms. As a Unionist paper, *The People* was the only one of its persuasion to print more stories than the others. Again, the tabloid-style of the paper may account for this, as the stories were sensationalistic, often sandwiched between salacious stories of apolitical crime and sex.

*IRA stories.* This category showed difference from the mean of .0942 stories in every paper but one, the *North Belfast News*. This is particularly interesting, as north Belfast is the home of the IRA, and represented in the Stormont Parliament (when it is not dissolved by Westminster) by none other than Gerry Adams himself. Consistent with this is the fact that the Republican, Sinn Féin affiliated *An Phoblacht* printed significantly fewer stories. It may be that this is a deliberate attempt of Nationalists and Republicans to distance themselves from the IRA.

Additionally, the following papers printed fewer than the mean stories: the Nationalist papers the *Irish News*, *Sunday World*, *South Belfast News*; the Unionist papers the *NewsLetter*, *The People*, and the *Belfast Telegraph*; the *UK Telegraph* also printed fewer than typical IRA stories, but this may be because the paper is from the UK, where the IRA is not such a “hot topic” in everyday life since the cessation of terrorist acts in England. However, my conclusion may be erroneous, as the England-published *Mirror* ran fewer than average stories, as did the middle of the road *Sunday Life*.

*Peace Process.* This result was surprising, as every paper showed significant difference, and all but three featured fewer than the mean .0217 number of stories. Given the extremely low mean, this number reflects a great deal about framing: the peace process story is not framed as important. Were there peace—that is, were the peace stable and holding—this would not be extraordinary. However, since the peace process was stalled at the time of this research, as the parliament was dissolved, sectarian roadblocks were starting to reappear, the Lord Mayor was under fire for appearing in an IRA calendar, and Sinn Féin under major scrutiny and PSNI investigation for having in their offices lists of every cross-community contact by name, date, place, and topic discussed (the last of which was the most significant charge as the police warned those individuals in both communities that their lives may be in danger), the peace process was still a very real topic. Yet it was not given much press. The exceptions to this were the middle of the road *Sunday Life* and the Nationalist

*North Belfast News* and *Sunday World*. Given that, as mentioned in the last point, north Belfast is the home of Gerry Adams, the powerful members of that community may have an interest in what is published in the local paper.

However, the fact that *An Phoblacht* did not run stories on the peace process would tend to discount that theory, since it exists to present Sinn Féin's point of view.

*Total stories.* This is an interesting variable, as only three of the eleven papers showed any significant difference in terms of the number of stories run on the cover. Only one paper, the *UK Telegraph* published more than the mean of 3.41 stories, while the middle of the road *Sunday Life* and the Nationalist *North Belfast News* published fewer. However, once we review the types of stories run, this becomes more interesting. Since some papers, particularly those with a Unionist/Loyalist slant, printed more salacious stories about the Loyalist paramilitary leaders, they filled their front pages with such topics. The middle of the road and English papers tended to shy away from such coverage and from coverage of the Troubles at all, in many cases.

#### *Answers to Research Questions and Hypothesis*

*Coverage of Gregg killing.* Question 1 asked whether there was a pattern of difference in the way the John Gregg story was carried by the various Northern Ireland newspapers. The tentative answer is yes, in that the above discussion showed that the Nationalist and Republican papers covered the story less than the neutral or Unionist/Loyalist papers did. The chi-square data reveal that

most paramilitary (52/138, residual -14.6) stories had a negative slant, and UDA stories had a neutral (21/79, residual 11.3) to negative (11/79, residual -8.8) tone. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that the Protestant papers tended to cover the stories more, and in a negative way.

*Coverage of UDA/UDA leaders.* Research Question 2 asked whether there is a pattern of difference in the way the UDA or the UDA leaders are portrayed in the various newspapers. Again, the data show that this is so, that the sensationalism of much of the press, coupled with the frequency stories about the UDA and its leaders are run, creates a Protestant mediasphere saturated with stories, frequently negative, about these leaders.

*Neutrality of "neutral" papers.* The final Research Question and the single Hypothesis asked whether the so-called "neutral" (Vincent, 1997) newspapers are qualitatively different in their coverage of the UDA feud and the Gregg killing. In this case, the answer may be invalidated by the definition of neutrality used. As one respondent put it, "You have an opinion. No one is opinion-less. To portray yourself as opinion-less, you insult people" (Interview 6, ll. 332-333). As I said in the introduction to this chapter, the Northern Ireland political situation is complicated by the fact that the media proliferation reflects competing interests of political and non-political groups, including sectarian groups on both sides, and even peace groups. In short, the Belfast mediasphere serves many interests, not merely strictly "political" ones. This extends to England, which bears the enormous financial and security burdens, as well as

that of political violence from dissident groups. As such, true neutrality is likely impossible. However, recognizing these constraints, "relative" neutrality can indeed be seen in the press, as the England-published papers, as well as the *Belfast Telegraph* indicate a difference in the amount of space they devote, or do not devote, to the more sensationalistic types of journalism, and they tend to devote more space to the peace process than their Northern Ireland published counterparts.

#### *Study Limitations and Directions for Future Research*

While this study overcomes some of the limitations of the previous studies mentioned in the literature review, there are some problems that should be noted and fixed for future studies. First, given that this was a chapter in a multiple methods dissertation rather than a dissertation strictly of content analysis,<sup>7</sup> certain concessions to time and practicality were made. The study used front pages only, which did in fact reflect the exposure one who does not purchase the paper but sees it on the newsstand would have. However, we may be jumping to conclusions by not looking at the insides of the papers, as well. Future studies should examine more of the papers, not to try to ascertain the degree to which the papers influence the readers' as the non-readers would not see the insides. However, the editorial policies of the papers are better understood and classified by delving deeper into their pages.

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<sup>7</sup> However, it should be said that inasmuch as this dissertation examined the communicative practices of non-violence, those *parts* of the content analysis that zero in on this phenomenon are, in fact, triangulated.

Second, a future study should use coders more familiar with Northern Ireland. The choice of coders in this case was made based on the premise that people ignorant of the details of the conflict would have no specific agenda, and researcher bias (or coder bias) would not confound the results. Based on the post-coding discussions I had with the coders, this does not seem to have been a problem. However, that ignorance was a double-edged sword, as the coders' ignorance may have caused them to overlook nuances of a story that someone more familiar with the situation would have seen. As an example, they may have overlooked discussions about the peace process because it was not explicitly defined as such by the paper, since the papers are written for insiders who possess the background the coders lack. Better training may overcome this; use of parallel coding using a team of natives and a team of US Americans might alleviate this in the future.

History may have been more of a problem than I thought. It was my working assumption that the severity of the Gregg killing at the hands of another Loyalist would cause latent biases and editorial positions to be more evidently displayed, but I remain unsure about the correctness of this assumption. Perhaps a longer time span would help here. The problem with this is, as in the Vincent study, a longer term typically means fewer papers, and this dialectic is not easily overcome. Examining only the front pages of 46 newspapers, each of my coders worked between five and seven hours. Were the study expanded to more of the



papers or a larger number (i.e., time span) of papers, the task could very easily become unmanageable.

## CHAPTER SIX:

### CONCLUSION

#### *On Non-Violent Communication*

*The fundamental question.* The fundamental question driving this dissertation asked whether there is an essential *way* of communication, that is, language, and symbolism common to those who seek to live through non-violent means. In one sense, this question is best answered by contrast. Especially in the lower class areas (the "Estates"), where the murals are most prevalent and the paramilitary groups most active, the decision to engage in non-violent speech or produce non-violent art is a conscious one, as it breaks from the prevailing modes of communication. Where confrontational messages, either of a sectarian or internecine nature, tend to be the loudest, messages of a more conciliatory nature are less easily heard, even if they are more commonly sent.

What, then, can we distill from this work? Better put, what *is* non-violent communication in the Northern Irish context? Clearly, it is not the provoking type of communication illustrated by some of the murals (e.g., "Irish Out" or "Sandy Row") or the newspapers (e.g., "Dead Man Sunbathing") presented in this work. A pat answer might be that 'Non-violent communication is communication enacted by non-violent persons.' In one sense, this is true. Yet this answer is unsatisfactory, as 'non-violent' is itself an elusive category (as even terrorists have periods of inactivity) and violence itself is equally elusive.

*'The violent communicator.'* I have made the argument that murals, especially those depicting gunmen, are examples of violent communication. This argument relies on an implicit definition of violence broad enough to include threats and intimidation rather than a limitation of overt physical acts. If this is true, as I believe it to be, then the muralist must be included in the category of 'the violent,' as must all who employ symbols of violence in their communication. These symbols would include the aforementioned murals, as well as written and spoken words of violence, and flags, emblems, and curb paintings that are designed to intimidate, or would intimidate a reasonable person entering the areas in which they are displayed.

That having been said, the idea that non-violent is communication enacted by non-violent persons is limiting and empirically non-provable, as it presupposes that people are constantly violent or constantly non-violent. As we have mentioned, and as common sense shows, even those who engage in violent communication do so neither exclusively nor constantly. As such, a better definition of non-violent communication is needed.

*Focusing on the message.* A better approach, then, would be to argue that non-violent communication should be defined by the nature and effects of the message. This rubric allows us to examine the nature of the communication without the luxury of confirming intent, as I have had with the Bigot's Beer and Sectarian Jeans posters. Thus, we can include in our definition of non-violent murals that would seem non-threatening to a reasonable (in the legal sense)

person.<sup>8</sup> Doing so retains their study in communication, rather than handing it over to psychologists to interpret the mental state of the painters. Verbal and non-verbal communication can be classified along the same lines: Words and gestures that have the effect of provoking or instigating violence are violent. Those that do not, are non-violent.

Reliance on this classification creates two enormous categories of communication: One with angry, threatening, provoking speech, gestures, and words, and the other without these types. Of those two groups, one must then separate out that communication which does not relate to the political situation, for there is plenty of angry and threatening (i.e., violent) communication, in a variety of interpersonal situations, that is irrelevant to this dissertation. What remains, then, is the communication, violent and non-violent, related to the resolution to the political turmoil facing Northern Ireland.

On the violent side, one sees sectarian epithets, nasty teasing and taunting, words and images that provoke, threaten, or challenge one individual or group based on religious heritage, the use of flags and emblems as territory markers, and newspapers that make implied or overt threats. On the non-violent side, this work has shown use of the opposite: the deliberate avoidance of slurs, threats, and challenges, labels that do not mark people based on religion, murals that depict people and places designed to unite, rather than divide, the viewers.

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<sup>8</sup> Though, to be fair, even this definition has its limitations, as an otherwise reasonable person traumatized by past acts of violent victimization may perceive the most peace-invoking mural as threatening. Still, as in matters of law, it may be best to rely on what a reasonable person would or perceive in the same circumstance.

Although many committed to politics have chosen a path of violence in Northern Ireland, others have deliberately eschewed this choice, favoring instead to live non-violently, and to engage the politics of Northern Ireland through non-violence. Working from a definition of culture as a shared on-going activity of expectations, organizing and sense-making, which includes the material products of such activity, I have shown that the Northern Irish carefully choose their words and phrases, as well as deliberately construct images, both on the street and in the media, of Northern Ireland.

*On methods.* This dissertation used multiple methods (in-depth interviews, limited participant observation, semiotic analysis, and quantitative content analysis) to uncover the various ways, namely through interpersonal verbal and non-verbal interaction, through posters and murals, and through the mass media, in which non-violence is communicated in Northern Ireland. Each of the methods used zeroed in on a different aspect of Northern Irish communication, and each entailed different sub-areas of the grand research question. Further, multiple methods were used to take advantage of the strengths and to compensate for the weaknesses of the various methodologies (Keyton, 2001).

*The interviews and language data.* The interviews showed that even those who have rejected violence as a means to solve the Northern Ireland political unrest still struggle with the feelings, the prejudices, and the legacies of their history, and that struggle is reflected in the language they use, the terms they embrace or

reject, and the humor they employ. They enact their values and expectations, using language to both conceal and reveal values, beliefs, and expectations, and as a way to organize and respond to differing values and expectations of others. This is done by through the struggle of finding the most appropriate labels for the various groups (e.g., orange or unionist rather than Protestant and green or nationalist instead of Catholic) or attempting to completely forego the use of such labels. Additionally, we have seen the deliberate use of verbal and non-verbal cues to determine the identity of the interlocutor, yet the parties in an exchange admit that they attempt to ignore sectarianism whenever possible in order to curtail or prevent violence. Yet rejection of violence does not mean that the parties have renounced all claims in the conflict, nor does it imply that the non-violent Northern Irish are free from the motivations that lead others to commit violent acts.

The interview and language chapter illustrated some of the many ways various parties in Northern Ireland use language to categorize and describe themselves, others, the place in which they live, the history of the place, and the police. The discussion showed the polysemy of language, that terms are imbued with symbolic meaning that can be and often are interpreted in a variety of ways, and that ultimately language is an enactment and expression of culture. We have seen that residents use a combination of overt and covert symbols, such as accent and name, together with information gathered about home neighborhood or school, to ascertain where the other stands. We have examined various labels the

people employ to categorize themselves and others, and showed how certain labels imply the rejection of violence. Interview transcripts bear out a deliberate and sometimes legally enforced strategy of avoiding certain types of verbal interaction, such as using inflammatory or provocational language. We have also seen that people communicate what is deeply rooted in their historical understandings, and that their communication is shaped by their impressions.

*Semiotics conclusions.* This chapter presented photographic evidence to demonstrate that murals are a facet of culture, and despite the fact that most murals celebrate or threaten violence, that the non-violent residents of Belfast are attempting to make their cases through murals, as well. Images used do not hold universal and eternal meaning—that is, they are not fixed signifiers, but we can use certain identifiable patterns: colors, subject matter, or text, to try and understand the symbolic communication embodied in these murals and painted curbs. Colors are historically significant and convey a sense of peacefulness or aggression. Figures used may bring one community together and alienate the other. The mural's language has heavy symbolic value, as it struggles for ethnic identity or challenges it. Even the mural that does not seem to be a mural at all expresses political value. Overall, the murals are a reflection of the motives, expectations, values, and beliefs of the people. They are deliberate creations that constitute and articulate culture.

*Content analysis conclusions.* The content analysis revealed the complexity of the Belfast media environment, and showed that life on the ground is more

nuanced that one might imagine. Further, it revealed that media framing is sometimes a very subtle force, while at other times it is more apparent.

The study showed that there was a pattern of difference in the way the John Gregg story was carried by the various Northern Ireland newspapers. The Nationalist and Republican papers covered the story less than the neutral or Unionist/Loyalist papers did. The data reveal that most paramilitary stories had a negative tone, and UDA stories had a neutral to negative tone. The Protestant papers tended to cover the stories more, and in a negative way.

In general, there seems to be a pattern of difference in the way the UDA and/or the UDA leaders are portrayed in the various newspapers. The data show that the sensationalism of much of the press, coupled with the frequent stories about the UDA and its leaders, reflects a Protestant mediasphere saturated with stories, frequently negative, about these leaders.

The so-called "neutral" newspapers may or may not be different in their coverage of the UDA feud and the Gregg killing. The answer may be invalidated by the definition of neutrality used. Northern Ireland is filled with competing interests of political and non-political groups, including sectarian groups on both sides, and even peace groups, and the media are part of the larger scene. In short, the Belfast mediasphere serves many interests, not merely strictly "political" ones. This extends to England, which bears the enormous financial and security burdens, as well as that of political violence from dissident groups. As such, true neutrality is likely impossible. However, recognizing these



constraints, "relative" neutrality can indeed be seen in the press, as the England-published papers, as well as the *Belfast Telegraph* indicate a difference in the amount of space they devote, or do not devote, to the more sensationalistic types of journalism, and they tend to devote more space to the peace process than their Northern Ireland published counterparts. This idea of "relative neutrality" is one that should be explored in future research, as it can certainly exist in the press of many nations.

*Toward the future.* There is no guidebook for creating and maintaining peace in zones of sectarian conflict like Belfast. If one is to be written, it may indeed be the Northern Irish who write it. In a way, it is remarkable that, in the midst of the conflict, there are individuals who are conscious of the effects of the symbols they and others in their society employ. That individuals living in a society so replete with images and symbols of violence and conflict in their neighborhoods and much of their printed news can live peacefully, as most do, is a testament to their decency and dignity of their spirit.

This work began with a challenge that scholars in our discipline need to focus on solutions for problems like those of Northern Ireland. To that end, this work illustrated many communicative practices of non-violence in Northern Ireland. These include the use of non-sectarian labels, the avoidance of emblems or totems as provoking or threatening territory markers, the banishment of slurs and epithets from their vocabulary, and the attempt by some print and television journalists to present politics as a dialogue rather than a diatribe. Inasmuch as

this work has successfully isolated and explicated them, we are moving toward a solution. The next step is to build a model that clearly shows the array of these practices. Such a model should show people the choices they have (e.g., valuing dialogue over conflict, finding inclusive rather than exclusive labels, taking policy-driven and legal steps toward removing violent speech from the workplace) to create and maintain peace.

As this work has shown, the society that does this need not be utopian. We must very clearly restate that most, if not all, of the Northern Irish respondents indicated that they retain prejudice, but that they deliberately choose to interact in a way that does not exacerbate the conflict. This, in and of itself, may be the most concrete lesson one can learn from this project – peace is not equal to perfection of character, and it does not belong to those super humans who purge themselves of all ethnocentrism, bigotry, or bias. Rather, non-violent communication is a slow and deliberate effort made by people who acknowledge and attempt to overcome those very human frailties. This may be in marked contrast to the (probably impossible) color blind society espoused by many. By adopting the pragmatic but optimistic deliberate practices of the Northern Irish, we may be able to duplicate the success of Northern Ireland elsewhere.

Some may argue that efforts by the “non-violent” to identify the background of those they encounter (by use of the questions of name etc.) contradict or undermine the process, and that the harsh policies of the police service (PSNI) regarding sectarian language are evidence that the problems still exist. After all,

if religion did not matter, people would not need or want to “size up” those they meet, and the police service would not need such rules of conduct. However, I would argue the converse: society codifies into law those values that it deems important. Such rules translate those values into practice. In the case of Northern Ireland, these rules have been made by the population. Doing so creates the type of society that preserves those values. In such a view, the rules sanction what people do when they act in contravention of a common value of peace and co-existence, which is a far cry from simple sanctioning of “bad speech.” This is precisely why such a strategy can potentially work elsewhere, because it is not predicated upon religious parity or theological reconciliation. Rather, it is based on a principle of achieving peaceful relations. In race-based conflicts, such as that of the USA, this strategy could prove successful if, and only if, people here first engage in the honest soul-searching that the Northern Irish have. Most of the respondents to this study admitted their prejudice and that of their institutions. Only then could they begin to move forward. Thus, any future model must include the step of acknowledgement of the roots of their social problems.

Two further lessons from this study have to do with ethnic enclaves and housing. The areas of Belfast most adversely affected by violence are the Estates, which are segregated low-class housing. There are economic factors that contribute to the problem, in that unemployment in the estates is high and education low, while the mixed areas are filled with better educated people with

higher employment rates. Any model must then consider that economic success influences non-violence, and that ethnic separation does not in any way ensure peace. In the case of Belfast, it is the direct opposite: shared neighborhoods are the most peaceful.

However, this work is merely the first step toward building such a model. More data are needed from this site and others before any definitive statements about the category of non-violent communication can safely be made. Nonetheless, this work has presented a great deal of evidence about the conscious and deliberate attempts by many in Belfast to engage in communicative practices that invoke peaceful coexistence and eschew violence. The degree to which this can be observed as a grand phenomenon that is mirrored in other places has yet to be observed.

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## Appendix A: IRB Dissertation Approval Letter



### *The University of Oklahoma*

OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE  
HUMAN RESEARCH PARTICIPANT PROTECTION

January 28, 2003

Mr. S. David Zuckerman  
Comm  
Burt 101  
CAMPUS MAIL

Dear Mr. Zuckerman:

The Institutional Review Board-Norman Campus has reviewed your proposal, "Caught in the Crossfire: Non-Combatant Identity in Northern Ireland," under the University's expedited review procedures. The Board found that this research would not constitute a risk to participants beyond those of normal, everyday life, except in the area of privacy, which is adequately protected by the confidentiality procedures. Therefore, the Board has approved the use of human subjects in this research. Since the data collection will occur in a foreign country, it is incumbent upon the researcher to ensure that this research is conducted in compliance with the laws and regulations of the host country.

This approval is for a period of twelve months from January 28, 2003, provided that the research procedures are not changed from those described in your approved protocol and attachments. Should you wish to deviate from the described subject protocol, you must notify this office, in writing, noting any changes or revisions in the protocol and/or informed consent document and obtain prior approval from the Board for the changes. A copy of the approved informed consent document is attached for your use.

At the end of the research, you must submit a short report describing your use of human subjects in the research and the results obtained. Should the research extend beyond 12 months, a progress report must be submitted with the request for continuation, and a final report must be submitted at the end of the research.

If data are still being collected after three years, resubmission of the protocol is required.

Should you have any questions, please contact me at 325-4757 or [irb@ou.edu](mailto:irb@ou.edu).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Steven O'Geary".

Steven O'Geary, Ph.D.  
Director, Human Research Participant Protection  
Administrative Officer  
Institutional Review Board-Norman Campus (FWA #00003191)

JSO  
FY2003-233

Cc: Dr. E. Laurette Taylor, Chair, Institutional Review Board  
Dr. Eric M. Kramer, Communication

## Appendix B: Open-Ended Interview Questions

1. I would like to start with some basic demographic information.
  - a. What is your age?
  - b. What is your gender?
  - c. What is your ethnic/religious background?
  - d. Are you a Northern Ireland native?
    - i. If not, how long have you been here?
2. Do you have any thoughts or feelings you would like to share regarding the political situation in Northern Ireland?
3. Do you have any thoughts or feelings you would like to share regarding activists and activism?
4. What role does religion play in a person's social contacts in Northern Ireland?
5. Do you know any stories of non-activists in Northern Ireland?
6. Can you tell me about day to day life for those uninvolved in this conflict?
7. How would you explain the past Northern Ireland situation to someone in the USA?
8. How would you explain the current Northern Ireland situation to someone in the USA?
9. Do you have anything to share regarding the future of this region?
10. Is there anything else you would like to share regarding the topic or the interview itself?



## Appendix C: Bigot's Beer Poster



Figure 1: Bigot's Beer Poster. Anti-sectarianism poster created by National Union of Students UK - Union of Students in Ireland, and designed to be stolen by students for dorm rooms.

# **THE LABEL NOBODY WANTS**



**SECTARIANISM AFFECTS EVERYONE**  
**LIVE WITHOUT LABELS**

**PRODUCED BY COUNTERACT**

Design originated by Rachel Lee for the Health Education Development Agency, Medway Hospital, Kent

Figure 2: Anti-sectarianism Blue Jeans Poster, created by Counteract, designed for display in the workplace.

## Appendix E: Selected Mural Photographs and Semiotics Figures




Figure 3: Peirce's Semiotic Triangle



Figure 4: Masked gunman on Loyalist mural.



Figure 5: Painted curbs and banners of Loyalist neighborhood.



Figure 6: Mural of King Billy/William of Orange




Figure 7: Semiotic Square of William of Orange/King Billy Murals.




Figure 8: Semiotic Square of Protestants in King William Murals.




Figure 9: Queen Elizabeth mural in Protestant area.



Figure 10: Queen Mother mural in Protestant area.





Figure 11: Semiotic Square of Representations of British Royalty in Belfast Murals.



**Figure 12: Protestant mural against "Eire involvement."**

Red Hand of Ulster represents violent threats. Red is color of blood.

Anger and hostility directed against Irish people.

Use of Irish language by its Protestant foes symbolically strikes at Irish sentiment.

Mural tells Irish to leave.

Protestants are defenders supporting their community and the UK.

Red hand is part of flag, not particularly a paramilitary symbol.

Red hand symbolizes aggression and invasion of Ireland.

Red hand symbolizes defense of Ulster province and people.

The red hand of the Ulster province flag is used as a symbol by the Loyalist paramilitary organizations. It is a threat, especially when accompanied by anti-Nationalist (e.g., Catholic) text.

**Figure 13: Semiotic Square of Red Hand of Ulster Mural against "Eire involvement."**






Figure 14: Language rights mural.




Figure 15: Eire is War mural in Protestant area.



Figure 16: Irish Out mural.





Figure 17: UYM Headquarters.



**Figure 18: Time for Peace mural.**



**Figure 19: Slan Abhaile (*Safe Home*) mural.**



Figure 20: Lower Shankill KFC mural.



Figure 21: Anti-sectarian Arkansas '57 mural.

## Appendix F: Content Analysis Codebook

**DIRECTIONS:** For every question, write your answer in the blank on the left. The goal isn't to get "the right answer" but to evaluate the papers/stories as you see them. Use your judgment, because you're always going to be right even if you see things differently from someone else.

Some questions depend on the previous answer. Those are indented, so that if the answer to Question X is Yes, you go to X1. If it's no, you skip X1 and go to Question Y. Look for this symbol (►). For any question asking "Positive, Neutral, or Negative," use the following guidelines:

- **"Positive"** means that you see the parties portrayed in the picture, headline, or story as being shown to be good people, heroes, or sympathetic. Figure that you would probably not see people portrayed so favorably in most major US newspapers, like the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*, which would try to be more "objective."
- **"Neutral"** means that the paper doesn't seem to be in favor or against the parties portrayed in the picture, headline, or story. Figure that you would probably see this type of portrayal in a major US Newspaper, like the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*.
- **"Negative"** means that you see the parties portrayed in the picture, headline, or story as being shown to be bad people, anti-heroes, or unsympathetic. Figure that you would probably not see people portrayed so unfavorably in most major US newspapers, like the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*, which would try to be more "objective."
- **"Mixed"** means that there are both positive and negative elements in the portrayal. Mixed is not the same as neutral, which means that the story is *neither* positive *nor* negative, but it describes more than takes sides.
- **If you are not sure**, look at the adjectives they use, the size of the people in the picture, the facial expressions, the lighting, or the situations the paper choose to report. If it still seems mixed, but you could make a case for it to go 61% one way, select that one way. If the question doesn't have a "mixed," choose an answer. If it's truly 50/50, choose "mixed."

\_\_\_\_\_ V1: CoderID: This is your researcher-assigned ID number.

\_\_\_\_\_ V1a: PAPERID - This is a researcher-assigned number of each newspaper. Paper numbers will be written on the papers themselves.

\_\_\_\_\_ V2: PAPERNAME - This is the name of the newspaper

Code Number

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

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9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

Newspaper Name

Andersonstown News

Belfast Telegraph

Daily Mirror/Sunday Mirror

Daily Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph

Guardian

Irish Independent

Irish News

Irish Times

The Mail

The News Letter

North Belfast News

The People

The Shankill Mirror

South Belfast News

Sunday Life

The Times

Ulster Scot

An Phoblacht

\_\_\_\_\_ V3: DATE - This is the story date (in MM/DD format. Ex: Jan 3<sup>rd</sup> is 01/03).

\_\_\_\_\_ V4: STORYID - This is the story number, which will be written on the paper by the researcher.

\_\_\_\_\_ V5: STRYPLCE - This is where the story is placed.

Code Number

1

1a

1b

Story Placement

First page if tabloid.

(If broadsheet) First page, above the fold

(If broadsheet) First page, below the fold

\_\_\_\_\_ V6: HEADSIZE - This is a measurement of the headline, in number of words.

\_\_\_\_\_ V7: HEADTONE - The tone of the headline is

1. Positive.
2. Negative.
3. Neutral.
4. Mixed.

\_\_\_\_\_ V8: PMHEAD - Are paramilitaries mentioned in the headline? (If yes then ► V8a; if no ► V9.)

1. Yes
2. No

\_\_\_\_\_ If V8 is yes, then V8a: PMHEADTN - What tone is the headline portrayal?

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral
4. Mixed

\_\_\_\_\_ If V8 is yes, then V8b: PMHDNAME - The paramilitary mentioned in the headline is:

1. UDA
2. UVF
3. UYM
4. IRA
5. RIRA
6. PIRA
7. Multiple \_\_\_\_\_
8. Other \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ If V8 is yes, then V8c: UDAHEAD - Are any of the following mentioned in the headline?

1. John "Grugg" Gregg (may not have nickname)
2. John/Johnny "Mad Dog" Adair (may not have nickname)
3. John White
4. Other \_\_\_\_\_
5. None of the above are mentioned in the headline.

\_\_\_\_\_ If V8 is yes, then V8d: IRAHEAD - Are any of the following mentioned in the headline?

1. Gerry Adams
2. Gerry Kelly
3. Martin McGuinness
4. Other \_\_\_\_\_
5. None of the above are mentioned in the headline.

\_\_\_\_\_ If V8 is yes, then V8e: PM - IF V9 mentioned a name, was that mention

1. Positive?
2. Negative?
3. Neutral?

\_\_\_\_\_ V9: PMSTRY- Are paramilitaries mentioned in the story? (If yes ► V9a; if no ► V10.)

2. Yes
3. No

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9 is yes, then V9a: PMNMSTRY - The paramilitaries mentioned in the story are:

1. UDA
2. UVF
3. UYM
4. IRA
5. Real IRA or RIRA
6. Provisional IRA or PIRA or Provos
7. Multiple \_\_\_\_\_
8. Other \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9 is yes, then V9a1: STRYSTONE - If the UDA is portrayed in this story, it is portrayed

1. Positively
2. Negatively
3. Neutrally
4. Mixed

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9 is yes, then V9a2: STRYSTONE - If the UVF is portrayed in this story, it is portrayed

1. Positively
2. Negatively
3. Neutrally
4. Mixed

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9 is yes, then V9a3: STRYSTONE - If the UYM is portrayed in this story, it is portrayed

1. Positively
2. Negatively
3. Neutrally
4. Mixed

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9 is yes, then V9a4: STRYSTONE - If the IRA is portrayed in this story, it is portrayed

1. Positively
2. Negatively
3. Neutrally
4. Mixed

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9 is yes, then V9a5: STRYSTONE - If the RIRA or Real IRA is portrayed in this story, it is portrayed

1. Positively
2. Negatively
3. Neutrally
4. Mixed

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9 is yes, then V9a6: STRYSTONE - If the PIRA or Provisional IRA or "Provos" is portrayed in this story, it is portrayed

1. Positively
2. Negatively
3. Neutrally
4. Mixed

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9 is yes, then V9b: UDASTRY - Are any of the following mentioned in the headline? (If 1-4 ► V9b1-4; if 5 ► V9c.)

1. John "Grugg" Gregg (may not have nickname)
2. John/Johnny "Mad Dog" Adair (may not have nickname)
3. John White
4. Other \_\_\_\_\_
5. None of the above are mentioned in the headline.



\_\_\_\_\_ If V9b is yes, V9b1: USTTRT1 – Is the mention of #1 above:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9b is yes, V9b2: USTTRT2 – Is the mention of #2 above:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9b is yes, V9b3: USTTRT3 – Is the mention of #3 above:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9b is yes, V9b4: USTTRT – Is the mention of #4 above:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9 is yes, then V9c: IRASTRY – Are any of the following mentioned in the headline? (If 1-4 ► V9c1-4; if 5 ► V10.)

1. Gerry Adams
2. Gerry Kelly
3. Martin McGuinness
4. Other \_\_\_\_\_
5. None of the above is mentioned in the headline.

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9c is yes, V9c1: ISTRT1 – Is the mention of #1 above:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9c is yes, V9c2: ISTRT2 – Is the mention of #2 above:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9c is yes, V9c3: ISTRT3 – Is the mention of #3 above:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ If V9c is yes, V9c4: ISTRT4 – Is the mention of #4 above:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ V10: PPHEAD: Is the peace process mentioned in the headline? (If yes ► V10a; if no ► V11.)

1. Yes
2. No

\_\_\_\_\_ If V10 is yes, V10a: PPHDTRT--Is the headline:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ V11: PPSTORY—Is the peace process (or the “Belfast Agreement”) mentioned in the story? (If yes, ► v11; if no ► V12.)

1. Yes
2. No

\_\_\_\_\_ If V11 is yes, V11a: PPTREAT: Is the peace process discussed:

1. Positively
2. Negatively
3. Neutrally

\_\_\_\_\_ If V11 is yes, V11b: PPAFFECT: Does the story look at the peace process:

1. Optimistically
2. Neutrally
3. Pessimistically

\_\_\_\_\_ V12: FIGURES – Are any of the following mentioned in the story or picture caption? (If yes ► V12a; if no ► V13.)

1. David Trimble
2. John Hume
3. Mark Durkan
4. Gerry Adams
5. Martin McGuinness

\_\_\_\_\_ If V12 is yes, V12a: FIGTRT1 – If #1 above is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ If V12 is yes, V12b: FIGTRT2 – If #2 above is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ If V12 is yes, V12c: FIGTRT3 – If #3 above is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ If V12 is yes, V12d: FIGTRT4 – If #4 above is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ If V12 is yes, V12d: FIGTRT5 – If #5 above is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral

\_\_\_\_\_ V13: STRYSIZE—What is the size of the story, in words?

\_\_\_\_\_ V14: POSADJ—The number of positive adjectives in the story is.

\_\_\_\_\_ V15: NEGADJ—The number of negative adjectives in the story is.

\_\_\_\_\_ V16: SOURCES—The following are used as sources in this story: (If yes ► V16a; if no ► V17.)

1. UK Government
2. UUP
3. DUP
4. UVF
5. UDA
6. SDLP
7. IRA
8. Real IRA (RIRA)
9. Provisional IRA (Provos, PIRA)
10. Sinn Fein
11. Sinn Fein/IRA or IRA/Sinn Fein
12. Other \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_ If V16 is yes, V16a : SCRTRT1—If source #1 is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Neutral
3. Negative

\_\_\_\_\_ If V16 is yes, V16b : SCRTRT2—If source #2 is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Neutral
3. Negative

\_\_\_\_\_ If V16 is yes, V16c : SCRTRT3—If source #3 is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Neutral
3. Negative

\_\_\_\_\_ If V16 is yes, V16d : SCRTRT4—If source #4 is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Neutral
3. Negative

\_\_\_\_\_ If V16 is yes, V16e : SCRTRT5—If source #5 is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Neutral
3. Negative

\_\_\_\_\_ If V16 is yes, V16f : SCRTRT6—If source #6 is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Neutral
3. Negative

\_\_\_\_\_ If V16 is yes, V16g : SCRTRT7 – If source #7 is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Neutral
3. Negative

\_\_\_\_\_ If V16 is yes, V16h : SCRTRT8 – If source #8 is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Neutral
3. Negative

\_\_\_\_\_ If V16 is yes, V16i : SCRTRT9 – If source #9 is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Neutral
3. Negative

\_\_\_\_\_ If V16 is yes, V16j : SCRTRT10 – If source #10 is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Neutral
3. Negative

\_\_\_\_\_ If V16 is yes, V16k : SCRTRT11 – If source #11 is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Neutral
3. Negative

\_\_\_\_\_ If V16 is yes, V16l : SCRTRT12 – If source #12 is mentioned, is the mention:

1. Positive
2. Neutral
3. Negative

\_\_\_\_\_ V17: GRAPHIC – Is there a graphic accompanying this story? (If yes ► V17a; if no ► V18.)

1. Yes
2. No

\_\_\_\_\_ If V17 is yes, then V17a: GRAPHIC2 – If yes, the graphic is a

1. Photograph
2. Drawing
3. Other \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ V17a1: GRTRT: The paper treats the graphic:

1. Positively (It seems to agree with it.)
2. Negatively (It seems to disagree with it.)
3. Neutrally (It doesn't seem to take a position.)

\_\_\_\_\_ If V17 is a photograph, V17b: PMGCAPT – Are any of the following in the caption?

1. John "Grugg" Gregg (may not have nickname)
2. John/Johnny "Mad Dog" Adair (may not have nickname)
3. John White
4. Gerry Adams
5. Gerry Kelly
6. Martin McGuinness
7. Other \_\_\_\_\_
8. None of the above is mentioned in the headline.

\_\_\_\_\_ V18: TTLUDAST – The number of stories about the UDA (or Ulster Defence Association) on this page is.

\_\_\_\_\_ V19: TTLIRAST – The number of stories about the IRA/RIRA/PIRA (or Irish Republican Army/Real IRA/Provisional IRA or Provos) on this page is.

\_\_\_\_\_ V20: TTLPEACE – The total number of stories about the peace process on this page is.

\_\_\_\_\_ V21: TTLSTOR – The total number of stories on any topic on this page is.




Figure 22: "Adair in Gay Sex Shock" cover of *Sunday Life*, February 1, 2003.


# THE IRISH NEWS

Orchard men on fire  
as Dubs hammered

Seven  
up shot


## 'Everyone is a target'

Reprisals  
'inevitable'  
after UDA  
chief killed



**By Michael Hayes**  
The killing of a UDA leader in the north of Ireland has triggered a wave of reprisals, with several other people being shot in the past few days. The UDA chief, John Gregg, was killed in a car bomb attack in the town of Carrickfergus. The attack was carried out by the IRA, who claim to be targeting the UDA leadership. The UDA has vowed to retaliate against the IRA, saying that 'everyone is a target' in the current climate of violence. The IRA has also claimed responsibility for the killing of Gregg, saying it was a necessary sacrifice to bring an end to the UDA's activities. The situation in the north of Ireland remains tense, with both sides claiming to be the only legitimate force in the region.

The killing of John Gregg, a senior UDA leader, has triggered a wave of reprisals, with several other people being shot in the past few days. The UDA has vowed to retaliate against the IRA, saying that 'everyone is a target' in the current climate of violence. The IRA has also claimed responsibility for the killing of Gregg, saying it was a necessary sacrifice to bring an end to the UDA's activities. The situation in the north of Ireland remains tense, with both sides claiming to be the only legitimate force in the region.



## Cold snap brings motoring misery

**By Michael Hayes**  
A cold snap has brought motoring misery to many drivers in the north of Ireland. The weather has been particularly harsh, with temperatures dropping below freezing and heavy snow falling in some areas. This has caused significant delays and cancellations of journeys, with many people stranded in their cars. The roads are icy and slippery, making driving extremely dangerous. Many drivers have reported difficulties starting their cars in the cold, and some have been forced to wait for hours before they could get moving. The weather has also caused a lot of inconvenience for people who need to get to work or school. The weather service has warned that the cold snap will continue for several more days, so drivers are advised to take extra precautions and avoid unnecessary travel.

**Don't miss out on  
Book Your First  
Driver's Theory!**

First Step

**Duffy's Garage**  
100-102 The Green, Carrickfergus, Co. Antrim

Figure 23: Irish News cover featuring full-color photograph of bloody corpse of John Gregg, February 3, 2003.




Figure 24: *Daily Mirror* prints UDA threat to Adair's followers, February 5, 2003.






Figure 25: North Belfast News coverage of Adair's C-Company disbandment, February 8, 2003.




Figure 26: *The People* cover story is a threat on the life of fugitive John White, February 9, 2003.

## Appendix H: Glossary of Selected Terms and Abbreviations

*Catholic*: Member of Roman Catholic Church, or the church itself. A religious, not political designation, though most Catholics are either Nationalists or Republicans. (See NATIONALIST; REPUBLICAN.)

*C-Company*: Breakaway faction of UDA headed by Johnny "Mad Dog" Adair until February 2003 when UDA violently broke up organization and members either renounced C-Company or fled the country. (See UDA).

*British*: Person or thing from England. People also known as "Brits."

*DUP*: Democratic Unionist Party. Hard-line Unionist party headed by Ian Paisley.

*Eire*: Gaelic name for Ireland.

*Falls Road*: Main Catholic street in Belfast.

*IRA*: Irish Republican Army. Republican (ultra-nationalist) paramilitary with origins in anti-British fighting in the 1920s. (See RIRA and PIRA).

*Loyalist*: Belief that Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK. Also refers to a person who holds that belief. Loyalism condones violence. (See C-Company; UDA; UFF, UVF, UYM). Differentiated from UNIONIST.

*Nationalist*: Belief that Northern Ireland should unify with the Republic of Ireland to make one Irish state. Also refers to a person who holds that belief. Differentiated from REPUBLICAN.

*NUS-USI*: National Union of Students UK-Union of Students in Ireland. Umbrella group of university students in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.

*Orange Order*: Protestant men's group named for William of Orange, Protestant king who beat Catholic James II at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. Members are known as Orangemen. Orangemen celebrate this victory by holding parades every summer during the "marching season." (See ROYAL BLACK.)

*Patten Report*: Report of Independent commission that made over 150 suggestions for improving policing in Northern Ireland. (See PSNI; RUC.)

*PIRA*: Provisional IRA. Also known as "provos." Group of IRA that remained committed to settlement after in-fighting in organization. "Provos" control much of Belfast and are now thought by many to be the main branch of the IRA.

*Protestant*: Member of protestant church or church itself. Largest group of protestants in Northern Ireland are Presbyterians, which Church of Ireland is also large. A Religious, not political, designation, though most Protestants are either Unionists or Loyalists.

*PSNI*: Police Service of Northern Ireland. New name of police force given as a result of peace talks.

*Republican*: Belief that Northern Ireland should unify with the Republic of Ireland to make one Irish state. Also refers to a person who holds that belief. Nationalists also hold this belief, but Republicanism condones violence to achieve goal of united Ireland, while Nationalism does not. Differentiated from NATIONALIST.

*RIRA*: Real IRA. Splinter group of IRA that continues attacks following IRA commitments of cease-fire.

*ROI*: Republic of Ireland. From 1922 until 1949, Ireland was known as the Irish Free State. The name then changed to the Republic of Ireland, or ROI.

*Royal Black Institution*: Sub-group of Protestant men's organization the Orange Order. Members are known as Blackmen. (See ORANGE ORDER.)

*RUC*: Royal Ulster Constabulary. Former name of police force. Name no longer in use. (See PSNI.)

*Sectarian*: Of or pertaining to religion, as in *sectarian violence*, which is perpetrated against someone because of the victim's religion. Movement against such acts is ANTI-SECTARIANISM.

*SDLP*: Social Democratic and Labour Party. Moderate nationalist party with labor/socialist agenda. Headed by Mark Durkan, formerly headed by John Hume.

*SF*: Sinn Féin ("Ourselves Alone"). Republican party headed by Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness. Unionists and Loyalists accuse Sinn Féin of being tied to IRA, a claim denied by Sinn Féin.

*Shankill Road*: Main Protestant street in Belfast.

*Tricolor*: Orange, White, and Green flag of the Republic of Ireland. This flag is often flown by Nationalists and Republicans in Northern Ireland.

*UDA*: Ulster Defence Association. Illegal Loyalist paramilitary organization run by five to six leaders called "Brigadiers."

*UFF*: Ulster Freedom Fighters. Illegal Loyalist paramilitary organization.

*UK*: United Kingdom. Country consisting of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.

*Ulster*: One of the four historic provinces of Ireland, Ulster consists of nine counties. The six that had a Protestant majority became Northern Ireland in 1922. Some Unionists and Loyalists refer to Northern Ireland as Ulster and themselves as Ulster Men or Ulster Women.

*Unionist*: Belief that Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK. Also refers to a person who holds that belief. Unionism is a political movement that does not condone violence. Differentiated from LOYALIST.

*Union Jack*: Red, white, and blue UK flag, flown by Unionists and Loyalists.

*UUP*: Ulster Unionist Party. Umbrella organization for many small Unionist factions. Headed by David Trimble.

*UVF*: Ulster Volunteer Force. Originally a volunteer army used by the British in wars. Now an illegal Loyalist paramilitary organization affiliated with certain factions of the UDA.

*UYM*: Ulster Young Militants. Illegal youth paramilitary organization.

## Appendix I: Content Analysis Tables and Figures

<u>Code</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Newspaper Name</u>
2	Bi-Weekly	Andersonstown News
10	Monthly	The Shankill Mirror
11	Monthly	Ulster Scot
20	Daily	Belfast Telegraph
21	Daily	Irish News
22	Daily	The News Letter
23	Daily	Daily Mirror/Sunday Mirror
24	Daily	UK Telegraph
25	Daily	North Belfast News
26	Daily	The People
27	Daily	South Belfast News
28	Daily	Sunday Life
29	Daily	An Phoblacht
30	Daily	Sunday World

**Table 1: Recoded Newspapers**

	Head. Tone	Paraml. Head. Tone	Paraml. Named Tone	UDA Story Tone	IRA Story Tone	RIRA Story Tone	Peace Proc. Tone	Graphic Tone
$\chi^2$	55.261	211.638	133.609	14.722	.000	1.000	1.0	17.049
df	4	4	2	3	1	1	1	3
Sig.	.000	.000	.000	.002	1.000	.317	.317	.001

**Table 2: Chi-square Results**

		Paper name	Head-line size	Story place	UDA stories	IRA stories	peace stories	TTL stories
Paper Name	r	1	-.150	-.335*	-.400*	.239*	.288*	-.270*
	Sig.	-	.079	.000	.000	.005	.001	.001
	SS CP	857.804	-251.087	-96.717	-69.522	23.978	14.457	-203.478
	Covar.	6.261	-1.833	-.706	-.507	.175	.106	-1.485
	N	138	138	138	138	138	138	138
Head Size	r	-.150	1	.289*	.623*	.101	-.001	-.207*
	Sig.	.079	-	.001	.000	.240	.988	.015
	SS CP	-251.087	3270.406	163.348	211.768	19.768	-.130	-304.768
	Covar.					.144	-.001	-2.225
	N	138	138	138	138	138	138	138
Story Place	r	-.335*	.289*	1	.479*	.047	-.019	.264*
	Sig.	.000	.001	-	.000	.585	.822	.002
	SS CP	-69.522	211.768	97.370	28.087	1.587	-.326	66.913
	Covar.	-.507	1.546	.711	.205	.012	-.002	.488
	N	138	138	138	138	138	138	138
UDA Stories	r	-.400*	.623*	.479*	1	-.036	-.077	.057
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000	-	.679	.370	.506
	SS CP	-69.522	211.768	28.087	32.275	-.725	-.783	8.725
	Covar.	-.507	1.546	.205	.257	-.005	-.006	.064
	N	138	138	138	138	138	138	138
IRA Stories	r	.239*	.101	.047	-.036	1	.462*	-.150
	Sig.	.005	.240	.585	.679	-	.000	.078
	SS CP	23.978	19.768	1.587	-.725	11.775	2.717	-13.275
	Covar.	.175	.144	.012	-.005	.086	.020	-.097
	N	138	138	138	138	138	138	138
peace stories	r	.288*	-.001	-.019	-.077	.462*	1	-.073
	Sig.	.001	.988	.822	.370	.000	-	.395
	SS CP	14.457	-.130	-.326	-.783	2.717	2.935	-3.217
	Covar.	.106	-.001	-.002	-.006	.020	.021	-.023
	N	138	138	138	138	138	138	138
TTL stories	r	-.270*	-.207*	.264*	.057	-.150	-.073	1
	Sig.	.001	.015	.002	.506	.078	.395	-
	SS CP	-203.478	-304.768	66.913	8.725	-13.275	-3.217	661.275
	Covar.	-1.485	-2.225	.488	.064	-.097	-.023	4.827
	N	138	138	138	138	138	138	138

Table 3: Correlation Matrix


		SS	df	MS	F	Sig.
Headline Size	BG	894.541	10	89.454	4.782	.000
	WG	2375.865	127	18.708		
	Total	327.045	137			
Total UDA Stories	BG	9.527	10	.953	4.699	.000
	WG	25.749	127	.203		
	Total	32.275	137			
Total IRA Stories	BG	3.638	10	.364	5.677	.000
	WG	8.138	127	.064		
	Total	11.775	137			
Total Peace Process Stories	BG	1.379	10	.138	11.260	.000
	WG	1.556	127	.012		
	Total	2.935	137			
Total all Stories	BG	218.519	10	21.852	6.268	.000
	WG	442.757	127	3.486		
	Total	661.275	137			

**Table 4: ANOVA Table**



Paper_Name	N	Subset for alpha = .05	
		1	2
<i>South Belfast News</i>	6	.0000	
<i>UK Telegraph</i>	21	1.5714	
<i>An Phoblacht</i>	3	4.0000	4.0000
<i>Sunday Life</i>	3	5.0000	5.0000
<i>North Belfast News</i>	9	5.5556	5.5556
<i>Irish News</i>	21	6.0000	6.0000
<i>NewsLetter</i>	24	6.5000	6.5000
<i>Daily/Sunday Mirror</i>	18	7.1667	7.1667
<i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	27	7.3333	7.3333
<i>The People</i>	3		11.0000
<i>Sunday World</i>	3		12.0000
Sig.		.125	.063

**Table 5: Tukey HSD Headline Size**



**Figure 27: Means Plot - Headline Size by Paper Name**

Paper_Name	N	Subset for alpha = .05	
		1	2
South Belfast News	6	.0000	
An Phoblacht	3	.0000	
Sunday World	3	.0000	
UK Telegraph	21	.2857	.2857
North Belfast News	9	.4444	.4444
Irish News	21	.6667	.6667
Daily/Sunday Mirror	18	.6667	.6667
Sunday Life	3	.6667	.6667
NewsLetter	24	.7500	.7500
Belfast Telegraph	27	.8519	.8519
The People	3		1.0000
Sig.		.051	.193

Table 6: Tukey HSD Ttl UDA Stories




Figure 28: Means Plot - Total Number UDA Stories by Paper Name

Paper_Name	N	Subset for alpha = .05	
		1	2
NewsLetter	24	.0000	
UK Telegraph	21	.0000	
The People	3	.0000	
South Belfast News	6	.0000	
Sunday World	3	.0000	
Irish News	21	.0476	
Belfast Telegraph	27	.0741	
Daily/Sunday Mirror	18	.1111	
North Belfast News	9	.4444	.4444
Sunday Life	3		.6667
An Phoblacht	3		.6667
Sig.		.097	.911

Table 7: Tukey HSD Ttl IRA Stories




Figure 29: Means Plot - Total Number IRA Stories by Paper Name

Paper_Name	N	Subset for alpha = .05	
		1	2
Belfast Telegraph	27	.0000	
Irish News	21	.0000	
NewsLetter	24	.0000	
Daily/Sunday Mirror	18	.0000	
UK Telegraph	21	.0000	
The People	3	.0000	
South Belfast News	6	.0000	
Sunday Life	3	.0000	
Sunday World	3	.0000	
North Belfast News	9	.1111	
An Phoblacht	3		.6667
Sig.		.814	1.000

Table 8: Tukey HSD Peace Process Stories




Figure 30: Means Plot - Total Number Peace Process Stories by Paper Name

Paper_Name	N	Subset for alpha = .05	
		1	2
<i>Sunday Life</i>	3	1.3333	
<i>North Belfast News</i>	9	1.7778	
<i>Daily/Sunday Mirror</i>	18	1.9444	1.9444
<i>South Belfast News</i>	6	2.0000	2.0000
<i>Sunday World</i>	3	2.0000	2.0000
<i>The People</i>	3	2.3333	2.3333
<i>An Phoblacht</i>	3	2.3333	2.3333
<i>NewsLetter</i>	24	3.0833	3.0833
<i>Irish News</i>	21	3.4762	3.4762
<i>Belfast Telegraph</i>	27	4.5926	4.5926
<i>UK Telegraph</i>	21		5.3333
Sig.		.101	.074

Table 9: Tukey HSD Ttl Stories




Figure 31: Means Plot - Total Number All Stories by Paper Name