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UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

PERSPECTIVES ON THE RACIAL THREAT HYPOTHESIS:
TESTING A THEORY OF SOUTHERN POLITICS

A Dissertation
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

By
Scott Eugene Buchanan
Norman, Oklahoma
1999

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
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PERSPECTIVES ON THE RACIAL THREAT HYPOTHESIS:

TESTING A THEORY OF SOUTHERN POLITICS

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY



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This dissertation has been a long, usually difficult, process that began my first year in graduate school at the University of Oklahoma in 1996. The topic originated as an idea of my dissertation chair, Keith Gaddie. Naturally, the concept has evolved quite extensively over the past three years. I would like to thank Keith for helping me through this arduous task and for giving me the idea initially. Additionally, my friends Craig Williams and John Van Doorn were gracious enough to offer their insights during the writing and revising of this dissertation. Special thanks go to Craig for helping by serving as an independent coder to verify the reliability of the content analysis in Chapter 6.

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

PERSPECTIVES ON THE RACIAL THREAT HYPOTHESIS: TESTING A THEORY OF SOUTHERN POLITICS

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Doctor of Philosophy, December 1999
(M.A., Auburn University, 1995)
(A.B., The University of Georgia, 1992)

Directed by Ronald Keith Gaddie

This dissertation examines the continuing role that race plays in the politics of the American South. The focus of this study is the concept of racial threat voting, which argues that certain conditions conspire that cause white voters to feel “threatened” by black voters and black populations. Thus, racial motivations affect their vote choice. Most of the prior literature on the topic of racial threat voting focuses on geographic proximity to large black populations. In this dissertation, we examine racial threat voting in three dimensions: physical proximity, culture, and the media. We also explore the role of racial threat in Republican Party success. Finally, the dissertation addresses the question of whether racial threat is a new model of voting behavior, or does it fit within existing models? By studying racial threat in this manner, we gain a greater conceptualization of the phenomenon.

To study racial threat voting, the dissertation examines selected gubernatorial campaigns in Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina in a period from 1994-1998. A variety of statistical techniques are used in this study. We utilize ordinary least squares (OLS) to analyze county-level data in Chapter 4 where we examine physical proximity racial threat voting. Chapter 5 uses logistic regression to analyze opinion poll data when studying cultural racial threat voting. In Chapter 6, we use content analysis to analyze the print media coverage of campaigns to explore the role that the media plays in the existence of racial threat voting.

Three major findings emerge from this study. First, racial threat occurred at varying levels across the three states. Physical proximity racial threat voting occurred in South Carolina in 1994 and Georgia in 1998, but it was not present in the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election or the 1998 South Carolina election. Cultural racial threat voting occurred in Louisiana during the 1995 campaign. Unfortunately, the proper polling data was unavailable for the other two states, making it impossible to test. When analyzing the media coverage, none of the newspapers was portraying campaigns as racial. Thus, we cannot claim that the media was driving this phenomenon.

Second, political context is vital to the existence of racial threat voting. Without the proper political environment and candidates, racial threat voting did not occur. Therefore, we would not necessarily expect racial threat to rear its head in every election. Rather, racial threat appears only in certain types of elections. Claims that racial threat voting always exists in southern elections are unfounded.

This requirement of political context also makes it unlikely that the Republican Party can forge a durable realignment solely on race. Whites with negative racial attitudes are already predisposed to vote for the GOP. Republican candidates who try to appeal to these racially threatened whites and other groups simultaneously face a difficult prospect.

Third, this dissertation places racial threat within the context of existing models of voting behavior. Based on this research, racial threat should not be considered a separate model of voting behavior. In some ways, racial threat is part of the issue literature begun by *The American Voter* (1960). Racial threat also fits within the cultural approach to voting behavior as well, but racial threat does not warrant inclusion as a separate model of voting behavior.

By studying the phenomenon of racial threat voting in the South, we make discoveries that allow us to understand better the complexities of it. As we see in the coming chapters, one best understands racial threat in various dimensions rather than a simple geographic phenomenon. By viewing racial threat on different planes, we gain a better understanding of how racial threat affects white voters in the South. If racial threat does exist in ways besides simple physical proximity, then racial threat may influence white voters elsewhere, potentially making this problem a national phenomenon instead of a strictly regional one.

CHAPTER 1

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

“In its grand outlines, the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro” (Key 1949, 5). Fifty years have elapsed since V.O. Key wrote these words in the seminal study of the region’s politics, *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. Enormous political and social changes have come to the South over the ensuing decades. The region no longer practices *de jure* segregation, and minorities are now free to take an active role in politics unlike the past. Despite these political and social changes however, scholars continue to study what Key argued was the axis of southern politics: the race question.

Certainly, politics in the southern states at the end of the 20th century continues to maintain a racial structure. Black voters still show an overwhelming preference for Democratic politicians, and a majority of southern whites routinely vote Republican for president (Black and Black 1992). Few blacks run as Republicans, and few Republican candidates openly court black votes. Just because elections show a racial structure, however, does not necessarily mean that race remains an explicit issue in politics (Bullock and Campbell 1984). Observers would need some outward expression of racial voting to substantiate such a claim that race still plays a defining role in the voting behavior of white voters.

Such an expression of racial voting reared its head in Louisiana in the early 1990s. The strong political performance of former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke in Louisiana politics reignited interest in race-based campaign appeals in southern politics. During his statewide campaigns for the U.S. Senate and later the governorship, Duke showed that candidates could still achieve political success in the South by appealing to the racial attitudes and biases of white voters. Duke's success in Louisiana raises questions about the role that race plays in the politics of the southern states today.

If race has returned as a political issue, at what level is it likely manifested? Black (1976) finds that racial voting was more likely to take place at the statewide level than at the local level, because statewide officials were traditionally the vanguards of segregation and the racial status quo. Voters were less likely to be as concerned about racial issues in local races. Accordingly, this study will confine itself to the examination of statewide campaigns. To explore the potential role of race in southern politics today, this dissertation examines selected gubernatorial campaigns to explore the relevance of an old thesis of political behavior which has been the subject of renewed interest in the 1990s: the racial threat hypothesis.

THE BLACK BELT THESIS

When V.O. Key analyzed southern politics, he posited the black belt thesis. According to Key, the presence of large numbers of blacks influenced practically every aspect of southern politics. White voters, especially those of the black belt,

feared black political empowerment. Although southern states had disfranchised blacks in the 1890s, blacks still played a pivotal role in determining the structure and character of southern politics. While parts of the South featured heavy concentrations of blacks, some southern states did not have large black populations. How could blacks affect the political system in such a fashion if blacks were not a large proportion of the population in some states? The fear of white voters who lived in close quarters with high black populations polarized the white electorate into collective action during elections. This collective action resulted in the black belt controlling state politics under certain conditions.

The black belt, rural counties where 40 percent or more of the population is black, featured the most conservative white politicians and the most reactionary white voters in the South. Key argues that the black belt counties controlled the politics of their state, even though black belt counties were not the majority in most southern states. As Key states, "the hard core of the political South--and the backbone of southern political unity --is made up of those counties and sections of southern states in which Negroes constitute a substantial proportion of the population" (Key 1949, 5).

Although outnumbered, the black belt counties voted as a solid bloc in elections, and these black belt counties were usually able to elect officials of their choosing in most states. Key presents the example of Alabama as a Deep South state that had internal divisions due to race. The central portion of Alabama contained the black belt counties, where white voters overwhelmingly supported the

most conservative candidates available. Since north and south Alabama did not contain as many blacks as a percentage of the population, these two areas usually voted for more progressive candidates. Key argues that this is due to race: white voters in the black belt were the most concerned with keeping the status quo regarding blacks and therefore opposed progressives who moderated on issues of race, while white voters outside the black belt often voted on the basis of issues other than the race question. When black belt whites voted as a solid bloc, they were usually able to control statewide contests since north and south Alabama voters were not as united when casting their votes. The states with the largest number of black belt counties are the Deep South states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, and these states were the most influenced by racial politics. The other six states of the South are the Rim South, which tended to pay less attention to racial matters since they had smaller black populations, although these states contained black belt counties as well. The Rim South was not as preoccupied with race since their overall black populations were relatively small. However, the Rim South was not immune to racial politics. In North Carolina, race did influence politics at times, and there is evidence of continued racial stimulation of that state's politics (Eamon 1990; 1994).¹

¹The North Carolina black belt has a history of political insurgency against the establishment leadership of the state. Due to this factor, North Carolina political leaders were able to avoid race-baited contests during the period of disfranchisement and segregation. On occasion, the black belt was able to elect a governor of their own choosing if the more progressive parts of the state split their vote among several candidates (Key 1949).

THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH

Key (1949) asserts that the legacy of the one-party Democratic South was directly attributable to the political behavior of black belt whites. Since segregation and disfranchisement preoccupied black belt whites, the idea of two parties was abhorrent to political leaders of these areas. The danger was always present in a two-party system that one party might appeal to blacks for support. The Republican Party was not the favored choice of most Southerners at this time, due to the legacy of Reconstruction. Immediately after the American Civil War, the Republican Party, consisting of Northerner carpetbaggers and southern sympathizers called scalawags, controlled state governments in the South. When federal troops left the region in 1876, white southern Democrats reclaimed political control, and the Republican Party became associated with blacks and Northerners. As U.S. Senator Benjamin Hill (D, Georgia) once put it, any white supporters of the Republican Party “should be driven from the white race, as Lucifer was driven from Heaven into a social Hell” (Bartley 1983, 59). Sentiments such as this clearly indicate that white civic culture left little room for a Republican Party.

It was in the black belt that political leaders became the most staunchly Democratic because a two-party system created the spectre of black political control in these areas given the large black populations in those counties. The worst fears of black belt political leaders concerning a two-party system were confirmed in the 1890s when the Populist movement gained strong support in some areas of the South. Manifested in the Populist movement were the fears of these

white Democrats. The main areas of support for the Populists were outside the black belt regions of the Deep South. A key to the Populists' brief success was the appeal to black political support because the Populists resorted to appealing to black voters since they could not defeat the Democrats without more electoral support.

Despite some initial successes, the Populist revolt eventually died around the turn of the 20th century. Sundquist (1983) argues that the Populist movement ebbed because of two factors. First, the Democrats, under William Jennings Bryan, co-opted many of the platforms of the Populists, making the Populist position untenable. Second, most of the Populists outside of the South supported a fusion with the Democratic Party because it was easier to influence one of the existing major parties than mold a third party into a legitimate national power. The triumph of William Jennings Bryan and his followers in control of the Democrats made such an absorption more appealing since Bryan was "a Populist in all but name, and the Democratic platform had a Populist ring..."(Sundquist 1983, 139). Southern populists, however, generally did not support absorption into the Democratic Party. The motive behind this southern resistance was the fear that the Bourbon Democrats, conservative black belt white Democrats who opposed Populist policies and more importantly a two-party system, would quash Populism. As one Populist leader put it, "if we fuse, we are sunk" (Pollack 1962, 140).

The Racial Legacy of the Democratic South

With the end of the Populist movement around 1900, Bourbon Democrats soon regained control of state Democratic Parties into the 1960s. After they quelled the Populist revolt, Bourbon Democrats led a successful move to disenfranchise black voters. Although Mississippi was the pioneer in barring blacks from political life, doing so in its 1890 state constitution, the remaining southern states did not successfully prevent blacks from voting until after the Populist movement (Woodward 1974).

At the time of Key's research, few blacks could vote in the southern states, leaving no voice for the suppressed minority. Bartley and Graham (1975) suggest that only 10 percent of eligible southern blacks were registered to vote as recently as 1960. Since states were so successful in disfranchising blacks, the Democratic Party was able to ignore the concerns of black voters. During the first half of the 20th century, the Democratic Party in the South stood for ideas and policies that were beneficial to white citizens while neglecting black citizens. This, too, was another reason that southern Democrats were the vanguards of segregation and black disenfranchisement at this point in history. This control of the electorate by white political leaders produced a vicious cycle for black citizens. While many state policies were harmful to black voters, black citizens were helpless to do anything about them given the fact that 90 percent of blacks could not vote, posing no challenge to established political authority.

White domination of southern politics began to change with the coming of desegregation. The initial federal involvement in the area of education soon expanded to encompass other aspects of the segregated South including voting rights. The 1950s and 1960s saw drastic increases in the number of blacks registered to vote, especially in urban areas where blacks found it easier to register. The black belt counties were the most recalcitrant to black registration. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) directly targeted the rural areas where local officials steadfastly denied blacks the right to vote. In the wake of these new opportunities for black electoral participation, black voters soon outnumbered white voters in black belt counties. With this growth in black political empowerment, politics in the black belt, and the region as a whole, underwent a massive change. Despite the return of blacks to the electorate, this did not mean that race disappeared as a political issue.

EVIDENCE OF CONTINUING RACIAL VOTING

Given the increased political activity of black voters beginning in the 1960s, one might assume that Key's black belt hypothesis would have become dated. On the contrary, it survived after blacks registration and desegregation had taken place. Even after these two monumental events occurred, scholars continued to find evidence that racial voting and racial appeals aimed at white voters by political candidates were taking place in the southern states (Black 1976; Knoke and Kyriazis 1977; Glaser 1994). Research still supports Key's hypothesis when one

looks at the southern counties that George Wallace carried in 1968; Wallace's core support traced the black belt (Lipset and Rabb 1969; Crespi 1971; Schoenberger and Segal 1971; Wasserman and Segal 1973; Black and Black 1973; Wrinkle and Polinard 1973; Wright 1977).

Since race was continuing to play some role in the voting decisions of some southern white voters, a hypothesis, known as racial threat, was developed to frame the dynamics of race in the post-Jim Crow era. Racial threat is a variant upon Key's black-belt hypothesis. When Key wrote in the 1940s, white voters in the black-belt monopolized political power. Since Key's time, segregation and the disenfranchisement of black voters are no longer legal. Therefore, white voters in the black belt are now outnumbered within the electorate. However, racial threat contends that white voters in the black belt will automatically cast a vote for whomever the Republican candidate is, because the GOP better represents the interests of those white voters.

In 1968, Alabama Governor George Wallace ran for president on the American Independent Party label. By running as a third party candidate, Wallace hoped to prevent either the Democratic or Republican presidential candidates from winning a majority of the electoral vote, resulting in an election in the U.S. House of Representatives. Although not successful in this sense, Wallace became the most successful third party presidential candidate in history, garnering forty-six electoral votes.

Wallace won the Deep South states of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana as well as winning Arkansas' electoral votes. If not for Senator Strom Thurmond's endorsement of Richard Nixon, Wallace might have carried South Carolina as well (Black and Black 1987). Wallace combined a blatant racial appeal to black belt whites with a law and order pitch. At the time, the social climate of the 1960s disturbed many of these conservative black belt whites. While Nixon too stressed law and order in his campaign, it was the combination of law and order and racial appeals that attracted many black belt whites to the Wallace camp.

THE CHANGING POLITICS OF THE BLACK BELT

In many ways, the Wallace movement in 1968 was the last gasp of the political dominance of whites in the black belt. Although black registration had increased since the VRA, white voters still outnumbered black voters in most black belt counties in 1968 (Lamis 1988). By 1970, black registration began to surpass white registration in most of the black belt. Many black belt counties have supported every Democratic presidential nominee beginning with George McGovern in 1972 because of black political empowerment.

Despite newfound political power by black voters in the black belt, an examination of demographic figures reveals that the black belt has been losing population both white and black. Black and Black (1987) argue that because of population loss the black belt does not hold the pivotal role that it did during Key's day. Simultaneously, the black belt has lost political power due to this population

loss. Has the racial tone of the area disappeared completely? Perhaps the black belt counties have not had an openly racial appeal from political candidates to whom to respond. Figures 1.1 through 1.5 illustrate the general decline in the black belt between 1960 and 1990.

Figure 1.1
Alabama Black Belt




Figure 1.2
Georgia Black Belt





Figure 1.3
Louisiana Black Belt

1960



1990




Figure 1.4
Mississippi Black Belt





Figure 1.5
South Carolina Black Belt



The overall pattern of these states during this thirty-year period reveals the population loss in the black belt counties of the Deep South. Black and Black (1987) state that most of this population loss is a result of economics. As fewer people are directly involved in agriculture in today's economy, more people have migrated from the black belt into metropolitan areas of the region. With this migration, the population of black belt counties has declined with each census since 1950. Along with this population loss, a loss of political power has arrived as well. Black belt counties no longer control an election's outcome as they could during Key's day. Although blacks vote in overwhelming numbers for Democrats, candidates cannot depend solely on the black belt for political victories because of the decreasing population in the region.

The Biracial Democratic Coalition

If the decreasing population of the black belt dictates that Democratic candidates cannot rely too heavily on the region, how can the Democrats win southern elections? As early as the 1950s, Heard (1952) argued that a progressive Democratic Party would only emerge if the conservatives in the South bolted to the GOP for some reason. Heard states, "it is precisely if and when they lose this avenue of [conservative] political expression that they will feel the greatest compulsion to break away...to the Republican Party" (Heard 1952, 247). As we have seen, most conservatives bolted to the Republicans in the 1960s over the race issue.

As these conservatives left the party, it left room for moderates and liberals in the Democratic Party to take control. This was evident throughout the 1970s and 1980s as successful Democratic candidates in the South appealed to a biracial coalition of black and white voters. As blacks re-entered the political process by 1970, Democratic candidates soon found that they could win elections by appealing to black voters plus a sizable minority of the white vote (Black and Black 1987). Appealing to this coalition meant that the Democrats could retain political power after a bumpy period between 1964 and 1970. Secondly, this Democratic biracial coalition left little room for Republican success at the state level. Even if a Republican candidate carried 40 percent of the white vote in a Deep South state, he still might have faced defeat if the biracial coalition had provided enough votes for the Democratic candidate.

Lamis (1988) argues that since the early 1970s the race issue has been in abatement. After integration came, some traditionally Democratic white voters became less preoccupied with the race issue, which was disastrous for Republican candidates in the South during the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1960s, Republicans in various Deep South states had enjoyed varying degrees of success as a consequence of Barry Goldwater carrying the Deep South in the 1964 presidential election. Initially, these statewide Republican candidates attempted to play the race card by appealing to disgruntled white voters who traditionally voted Democratic. After achieving some limited success, the Republicans soon found themselves at a disadvantage.

This biracial coalition was enormously successful for the Democratic Party at the state level in the Deep South during the 1970s and 1980s. While most Democratic statewide candidates during this period were white, they appealed to black voters by supporting policies and programs beneficial to blacks. Simultaneously, these successful candidates kept moderate white voters in the Democratic party by not advocating stances that would alienate these voters. In this manner, the Republican Party at the state level was not able to capitalize upon the new racial environment immediately after the enfranchisement of black voters.

The biracial coalition had an ideological effect on the Democratic Party as well. Black and Black (1987) argue that this coalition has had a slight moderating influence upon the Democratic Party. Because they must appeal to black voters, Democrats have been forced to take on some "liberal" stances. Yet, Democrats were still able to retain conservative platforms because they are necessary to retain white support. Simultaneously, the Republicans found themselves hamstrung by ideology. While Democratic candidates had the luxury of taking moderate positions, Republican candidates were forced to take conservative positions to hold onto their base of support, which resulted in Republican candidates having little success in appealing to moderate white or black voters.

Further exacerbating the problem, Republican candidates at the state level had few candidates to offer that had direct experience in government, while the Democratic Party had a plethora of experienced candidates. For the Republican

Party to achieve great success at the statewide level in the Deep South, some event would have to occur that would weaken the Democrat's coalition.

THE RETURN OF RACIAL-THREAT VOTING

At the state level, the biracial appeal of southern Democrats was evaporating by the 1990s. While scholars had questioned how much of the biracial appeal of Democrats still existed in the late 1980s, events in Louisiana provided a shocking answer. In 1990, David Duke, a former Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan and former chairman of the American Nazi Party, ran against incumbent Democrat J. Bennett Johnston for the U.S. Senate in Louisiana. Surprisingly, Duke claimed 44 percent of the statewide vote. In 1991, Duke ran for governor, but he also lost this race garnering around 40 percent of the runoff vote after forcing an incumbent Republican governor out of the primary.

Giles and Buckner (1995) analyze Duke's statewide races at the parish-level. Using socioeconomic variables such as urbanization, education, youth, and immigration to Louisiana, Giles and Buckner statistically examine Duke's run for the U.S. Senate in 1990 and his 1991 gubernatorial bid. In Duke's Senate bid, the authors found that a black population of 30 percent or more in a parish led to white support of Duke at a rate of 20 percent more than whites in parishes with low numbers of blacks. In the 1991 gubernatorial campaign, Giles and Buckner discovered that black belt whites were fifteen percent more likely to support Duke than non black belt whites.

While Duke himself never mentioned race in his campaigns, both of the Duke campaigns contained an underlying racial element. Much of Duke's campaign stressed the economic plight of white voters in Louisiana. Duke campaigned against affirmative action, and he favored further curbing of social welfare programs. Although such issues have become the mainstay of the GOP in the late 1990s, Duke was the first major candidate to advocate such positions.

If an overtly racial candidate like David Duke has such appeal to black belt whites, what effect do less blatant candidates have upon these same white voters? The authors examine the vote outcome of the 1988 presidential vote among the same parishes previously examined to determine the impact of a candidate who makes no open racial pleas. The authors found that support for George Bush was 10 percent greater among black belt whites than their less "threatened" white brethren in parishes with fewer blacks. While George Bush was hardly a race-baiting candidate in the tradition of David Duke, Bush advocated policies, such as welfare reform, supported by white voters. Simultaneously, black voters were against these same programs. Support for Bush was greater among some of the same "threatened" white voters who cast votes for David Duke a few years later.²

Giles and Buckner (1995) conclude from their findings that race has not disappeared as a factor in southern politics. Under the proper circumstances,

²Giles and Buckner (1995) attribute some of Bush's success with Louisiana whites to the infamous Willie Horton ads that accused Michael Dukakis of being soft on crime. Some whites may have taken a racial cue from the ads since Horton is black.

overtly racist candidates can expect to find support among white voters who live in proximity to large concentrations of blacks. However, fewer whites live in majority-black counties than in 1950. Consequently, the David Dukes of the world may die a quiet death in the foreseeable future. The rise of a conservative tide against entitlement government and the welfare state in 1994 indicates that, in many respects, the substance of Duke's campaign foreshadowed a successful strategy for Republican candidates in the mid-1990s.

The other conclusion is that candidates who are not avowing a racial platform can still draw support from white voters based upon race. While these candidates would not be of the ilk of Duke, they could still draw support from "threatened" white voters. For instance, David Duke was one of the first serious challengers for statewide office who called for an end to affirmative action and welfare. Many Republican and Democratic officials and candidates today espouse these two positions. Giles and Buckner concede that candidates like David Duke are increasingly relegated to the past, but that race nonetheless will continue to play a part in southern elections through the support of less overtly racial candidates.

While Giles and Buckner (1995) argue that racial threat voting is taking place in David Duke's 1990 and 1991 elections, Voss (1996) disputes their findings. Voss argues that measurement error led the authors to mistaken conclusions about the reality of racial threat. Specifically, Voss criticizes Giles and Buckner for (1) using 1980 census data, (2) clumping all metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) counties

together when measuring black density, and (3) utilizing ordinary least squares (OLS) regression at the parish-level given the great differences in the populations of individual parishes.³

Voss argues that clumping of MSA counties for the purposes of measuring black density of the population was unjustified. Giles and Buckner (1995) take the average of the black population in a MSA and record that average for the black population of each metropolitan county. Voss maintains that white voters are more concerned about the parishes in which they live. Consequently, Voss does not advocate “clumping,” which can lead to distorted outcomes.

To control for the differences in population among the parishes of Louisiana, Voss uses generalized least squares (GLS) regression.⁴ By correcting what he perceives to be the three shortcomings of the original Giles and Buckner research, Voss contends that racial threat is no longer at work in Louisiana or southern politics as a whole.

In rebuttal, Giles and Buckner (1996) replicate their original model using GLS, and they find that the indication for racial threat is even stronger.

³Due to the great variations in population size of different parishes, Voss argues that it would be more advantageous to undertake an aggregate study of racial threat at the precinct-level, since precincts tend to be more racially homogeneous.

⁴Autocorrelation occurs when the error terms among variables are correlated with each other. When autocorrelation exists, the best linear unbiased estimates (BLUE) are not produced. Since OLS regression is not equipped to deal with the problems associated with autocorrelation, GLS regression is utilized because this method is capable of correcting for autocorrelation, resulting in BLUE estimators (Gujarati 1995).

Furthermore, the authors argue that “clumping” the MSA data was justified due to prior research that shows white voters in metropolitan areas do not simply think of a city as ending at county (i.e. parish) boundaries. Rather, these voters think of an entire metropolitan area as contiguous for the purposes of racial threat.

A goal of the dissertation will be to shed new light upon this debate. Besides testing racial threat as an extension of one’s physical proximity, subsequent chapters will examine racial threat in other dimensions. In addition, this study proposes to apply the racial threat model to statewide races in a variety of states, not just Louisiana. This should give a more solid perspective for the continued usefulness of the racial threat model.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

What determines voting behavior and whether an individual bothers to vote? In essence, the racial threat hypothesis is an attempt to understand the voting behavior of certain southern white voters. Namely, white voters who live in close physical proximity to large black populations are affected by race when they cast a vote. Where does racial threat stand in the voting behavior literature? Some scholars argue that racial threat voting is a model of voting behavior. In past research, some authors (Giles and Buckner 1995; Voss 1996), treat racial threat as a distinct view of voting behavior that is separate from other theories. Perhaps, existing models of voting can explain racial threat behavior. For example, racial threat may not be a separate model, but instead an extension of issue voting in

which blacks are the issue. After a brief discussion of how racial threat may be compatible with other voting behavior models, we examine whether racial threat should be viewed as a distinct theory of voting behavior.

Racial Threat as a Manifestation of Issue Voting

The American Voter (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960) influenced much of the research in the field of voting behavior. Also referred to as the Michigan model, it is a socio-psychological argument that scholars developed by studying presidential elections in the 1950s. These scholars studied three elements: (1) a voter's attachment to party, (2) voters' orientation towards issues, and (3) a voter's orientation towards candidates. The model found that party identification was the most important factor in a person's voting behavior. While issues and candidates are short-term influences, party identification is the important long-term factor.

Praise for *The American Voter* is not universal. Some scholars assert that the research portrays Americans as too ignorant concerning politics. Key (1966) argues that Americans are not as oblivious to issues as the Michigan model suggests. Rather, issues held by the parties are so similar that the voters simply have no choice. According to Key, the onus for issue voting lies with the parties, not the voters. Another major criticism of the model is the fact that party identification has been declining in importance since the 1960s and 1970s.

One area of research that the Michigan model influences is issue voting. The original Michigan model conceptualizes the American electorate as a group primarily unaffected by issues. According to the Michigan model, party identification is more important in the decision for whom to vote, but identification can indirectly influence issues. Issues-influence behavior requires that: (1) voters know an issue, (2) voters have some feeling about an issue, (3) voters perceive that one party is closer to a person's belief on an issue. Yet, a majority of the U.S. population fails to meet all three conditions. The Michigan authors survey a sample on issue familiarity. Thirty-three percent fail to know an issue and the government's position on an issue. Lack of knowledge and concern leads to individuals who do not distinguish differences between the parties. In sum, the authors find little evidence that people care or know partisan stances on many issues.

Issue voting is rare according to the Michigan model. Later scholars began to question the absence of issue voting. Perhaps, the Michigan scholars had not been examining issue voting in the proper manner. One of the most notable changes in the studying of issue voting was the restatement of it by Carmines and Stimson (1980; 1981; 1989). Carmines and Stimson (1980) refine the concept of issue voting, by defining two different types of issues: hard and easy. Perhaps, voters perceive and act upon some issues and not others. Hard issues are complicated and beyond the comprehension of many in the electorate. The authors argue that hard issues are the province of political elites and policymakers, not the masses. While hard issues are difficult for the average voter to conceptualize, easy

issues are readily understood by most in the electorate. The following characteristics define easy issues: (1) these issues are "symbolic rather than technical," (2) easy issues deal with policy outcomes not implementation, (3) easy issues are "long on the political agenda" (Carmines and Stimson 1980, 80).

Based on this classification of issues, easy issues elicit the type of appeal that a majority of voters can base their vote. These easy issues are undemanding to grasp as opposed to hard issues that are more technical and complicated. Since most voters do not spend long hours contemplating hard issues, expecting voters to base their vote on hard issues is illogical. Consequently, easy issues are more likely to influence individuals in their voting decisions.

Carmines and Stimson (1980; 1981) argue that race is an example of an easy issue, and the least educated and lower classes of society are more likely to be easy issue voters. Carmines and Stimson (1989) find that more easy issue voting takes place in the South than in any other region of the country, and the authors believe that the racially-influenced easy issue voters benefit the Republican Party.

Since race is an easy issue, one may argue that racial threat is the logical extension of issue voting. In this scenario, blacks are the issue upon which threatened white voters cast their votes. Instead of being a new approach to voting behavior, racial threat may be part of a school that argues that issues are important. However, those issues must be simple enough for the common person to understand. Racial threat also fits into the realm of an easy issue because less

educated whites are more prone to vote Republican based on race (Giles and Buckner 1995).

Racial Threat as a Product of Culture

Another view of racial threat might be that it is a product of culture. The Columbia School was one of the first systematic attempts to study voting behavior in the 1940s. The Columbia model uses a consumer preference model, which perceives political parties as presenting a product to the public. In effect, the political campaign is the advertising campaign, and voters choose their preferences through elections. The problem with this model is that people often decide how to vote before campaigns get under way. Polls from the 1940s reveal that the majority of voters had already decided to vote for Franklin Roosevelt before the 1940 presidential campaign began.

Instead of a consumer preference model, the Columbia model ultimately explains voting behavior with a sociological model that stresses socioeconomic analysis. The model argues that individuals' socioeconomic status, religion, and whether one lives in a rural or urban setting is important in understanding people's voting behavior (Niemi and Weisberg 1993). Since socioeconomic factors play a role in racial threat voting, perhaps it can be part of this sociological model as well. Racially "threatened" white voters are less educated and among the lower socioeconomic class (Campbell 1971; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). In

addition, a majority of these white voters live in the black belt counties of the South that are overwhelmingly rural (Giles and Buckner 1995).

Another aspect of the Columbia model is the cultural explanation of voting behavior. In essence, one's culture influences the way in which one is raised. Again, examining prior research reveals that the majority of cases in which racial threat is in operation occurs in rural areas where tradition plays a large role. Consequently, we might expect to see voters' opinions mirror those of their parents in large part. This idea that tradition and culture leads to individual's voting behavior is a contention of *The American Voter* as well.

Perhaps, we can understand racial threat as a product of one's culture and upbringing. Sears and Funk (1999) find in a longitudinal study conducted on four occasions between 1940 and 1977 that the racial attitudes of their parents influence respondents. In the 1960s and 1970s as race became a polarizing issue, the authors discover that respondents' latent racial views are activated as a response to the racially-charged political environment. When race became an issue, the majority of these voters reacted in a manner that was consistent with their long-held racial views. Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman (1997) also find that white voters' racial attitudes are long-standing. In an analysis of white respondents' answers on various racial policies and racial candidates, the authors ascertain that race is the primary determinant in their beliefs. For example, an individual who is born and raised in the black belt will likely absorb the racial attitudes and mores of his parents. In turn, this individual may cast his votes guided by his racial attitudes.

On this basis, racial threat may be a logical extension of political culture. If so, racial threat could be part of a sociological approach of voting behavior that the Columbia study began when studying the 1940 presidential election. If true, one must raise the question of how reliable racial threat can be for political candidates, because white voters would need some cue to spark latent racial tendencies into vote choice. If the proper political context was not present, it may not matter the stances that candidates actually take. If so, this raises the question of how effective candidates can be in using race as a winning issue from election to election.

The Effect of Physical Proximity on Racial Threat

Another dimension to racial threat may have to do with physical proximity to large concentrations of black voters. This aspect of racial threat can be related to the Columbia model's contention that one's place of residence affects voting behavior. The idea of physical proximity is the basis of Key's (1949) black belt thesis, which argues that white voters who live in close physical proximity to blacks are the most racially conservative of southern white voters. This preoccupation with race led black belt whites to be the most loyal Democratic bloc voters in the region. In the regions that had less black residents, however, white voters were not as concerned with the race issue. Thus, their support for racial candidates was less extreme.

Prior research demonstrates that the strongest support for racial candidates continued to originate from black belt whites through the 1960s. As mentioned previously, the last gasp for black belt whites in the Deep South was their overwhelming support for the George Wallace presidential bid in 1968. After this election, black voters gradually began to outnumber white voters in much of the Deep South due to the implementation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As time passed, the white population of the black belt began decreasing due to population shifts (Black and Black 1987).

Prior to 1964, Carmines, Huckfeldt, and McCurley (1995) find that physical proximity did have an effect upon white voters at the presidential level. The long-held Democratic presidential loyalty of black belt whites evaporated due to Lyndon Johnson's advocacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This desertion of the Democratic Party continued after 1964, although much of the Deep South cast their votes for the independent Wallace in 1968. Carmines et al. (1995) find that the Democratic presidential loyalty among black belt whites has disappeared since 1964 at a level higher than that of southern whites living outside the black belt. Here, the actual physical proximity of high concentrations of blacks appears to have a significant influence upon the voting behavior of whites in those areas.

As mentioned previously, Giles and Buckner (1995) find the highest support for David Duke among whites in the black belt. Simultaneously, whites outside the black belt did not demonstrate the same levels of support for the Duke candidacy.

This appears to be another indication that physical proximity may play a large role in racial threat.

Why can racial threat be seen in terms of physical proximity? Past research indicates that whites near high black populations demonstrate more racially motivated voting than their counterparts outside of high black population areas. If culture influences racial threat, perhaps physical closeness also plays a factor in not only racial threat, but also influences the culture in which one is raised, a culture in which racism is reinforced by physical proximity to another race. For instance, white voters in the black belt are reared with certain attitudes about race. Given the choice to vote for a candidate supported by black voters or another candidate, these hypothetical individuals may choose the candidate not favored by black voters solely on the basis of racial attitudes, which physical proximity has influenced.

Such an interpretation of racial threat raises interesting questions. First, is it possible that racial threat only exists among whites in heavily black counties, or could racial threat take place in other areas like predominately white suburbs near cities with a high black population? Second, if racial threat is dependent upon the white population in the black belt, how much longer will racial threat exist? If racial threat is based solely upon black belt whites, then it may not have much life left because the white population in the black belt counties is decreasing due to intergenerational replacement and migration to urban and suburban centers in the South.

RACE AND REALIGNMENT IN THE SOUTHERN STATES

A modern application of racial threat assumes that whites who live in areas of high black concentration will automatically vote for Republican candidates. As stated before, most black voters and black candidates are Democrats. This leaves “threatened” white voters with the Republican Party. Has there been a realignment of white Southerners to the GOP?

Types of Realignments

Before attempting to answer the question concerning race and the Republican Party in the South, it is necessary to operationalize the concept of realignment. Traditionally, scholars define realignments as either critical or secular (Key 1955, 1959; Sundquist 1983; Bullock 1988). Critical realignments involve a mass shift among voters from one party to the other. Corresponding to these critical realignments, critical elections lead to this massive shift in party loyalties. These critical elections hinge upon a highly salient issue that disrupts previous party coalitions and leads to a realignment. Most of the acknowledged critical elections involve economic issues. For example, the pro-Republican realignment of 1896 revolved around the question of monetary standards. The most recent critical election was that of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. FDR’s election ushered in the New Deal coalition that brought together various groups that favored an activist government, particularly with respect to interventions in the private economic sector.

Secular realignment is the antithesis of critical realignments. The nature of secular realignments is that electoral change is slow and gradually occurs over decades. Key (1959) argues that secular realignments featured generational replacement rather than critical and abrupt changes in the partisan make-up of the electorate. Consequently, particular elections are irrelevant to the progress of secular realignments. Subsequent research seems to support Key's assertion concerning realignments (Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1983; Brady 1988; Shafer 1991).

While Sundquist (1983) offers some support to Key's assertion regarding secular realignments, he is critical of Key's contention that realignments occur every 28-36 years in the United States. Examining the history of the party system in this nation, Sundquist finds little evidence that realignments fit such a neat cyclical pattern. Rather, partisan stances on major issues dictate the occurrence of realignments. Instead of realignments being completely dependent on voter preferences, parties also play a role in realignments. If a party takes the "wrong" stance on an issue like racial or economics, then voters may abandon one party for the other.

Although racial issues were extremely divisive in the 1960s, Sundquist (1983) argues that race cuts across partisan lines, making a realignment based upon racial issues unlikely. If a realignment were to take place based on race, then race would have to become an issue that either the Democratic or Republican party would have to seize as their own. Based on Sundquist's discussion of realigning

issues, perhaps the Democratic Party lost control of the race issue not during the 1960s but in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As demonstrated above, prior research discusses the potent Democratic biracial coalition that subsequently disintegrated in some southern states during the 1990s. If Sundquist's model is accurate, this might help to explain the relationship between racial threat voting and realignment.

Nardulli (1995) argues that critical realignments have validity, but he believes that political scientists have examined realignments in the wrong manner. Instead of treating realignments as national events, we should perceive them as subnational events. Nardulli provides evidence that there has never been a true national realignment. Even the vaunted New Deal realignment was not national in scope. Rather, it was a series of realignments between 1928 and 1936 in which the New England region and the West switched to the Democratic Party. The South did not align Democratic because it had already done so in the 1870s. Nardulli asserts that various regional realignments have taken place since 1836.

Race and the GOP in the South

The crucial issue for a southern realignment in favor of the GOP would be the issue of race. As mentioned above, Carmines and Stimson (1980) argue that race is an example of an easy issue, and the least educated and lower classes of society are more likely to be easy issue voters. The authors believe that the racially-influenced easy issue voters benefit the Republican Party. Carmines and

Stimson (1980) find that realignment is the most likely to hinge on an easy issue. The authors also argue that realignment has taken place among the two parties over the issue of race (Carmines and Stimson 1989).

Few political scientists disagree about the role of race and the growth of the southern Republican Party in the 1960s. Black and Black (1992) argue that the 1964 presidential election was a pivotal election for the Republican Party in the South. Barry Goldwater drew support from middle and lower class whites based on race (Cosman 1966). Prior to 1964, a minority of upper class, urban whites voted Republican. Beginning in 1964, many rural white voters began voting Republican at the presidential level (Bartley and Graham 1975). Prior to 1964, some blacks still harbored support for Republican candidates, but the combination of the Goldwater candidacy and Lyndon Johnson's civil rights stand drove most black voters to the Democratic Party (Cosman 1966; Carmines and Stimson 1989).

Carmines, Huckfeldt, and McCurley (1995) not only find evidence that black mobilization led to southern whites to abandon of the Democratic Party in 1964, but the authors also discover that the southern white desertion of the Democratic Party in presidential elections has continued in all post-1964 presidential elections. Interestingly, the heaviest desertion rate comes among white voters in the black belt.

Divergence exists among other scholars about whether racial or social issues have stimulated the rise of the Republican Party in the South. Some research reports that it was not a white backlash but the Great Society that led

many white voters to the Republican fold (Beck 1977; Wolfinger and Arseneau 1978; Wolfinger and Hagan 1985; Stanley 1987; Stanley and Castle 1988). Schulman (1991) contends that the Republican Party also needed the influx of Northerners into the South, which has taken place since the 1960s to sustain any long-term growth.

Other scholars argue that the rise of the GOP in the South is directly attributable to racial issues (Carmines and Stimson 1981; Lamis 1988; Black and Black 1992). The Republican Party needed to cultivate the average white middle and lower class Southerners to have any kind of success in presidential elections (Edsall and Edsall 1991).

Miller and Shanks (1996) argue that a combination of factors has led southern whites to become increasingly Republican. While the Goldwater candidacy and Johnson's push for civil rights led to the initial southern white migration to the GOP, other factors kept southern whites away from the Democratic Party. During the 1970s and 1980s, Democratic positions on economics and foreign policy led to a secular realignment among white Southerners in favor of the Republican Party. Despite the fact that Jimmy Carter won all of the South in 1976 and part of the region in 1980, his presence was not enough to lead a majority of southern whites back to the Democratic fold.

Carmines and Stimson (1989) assert that a fundamental requirement of realignments is a change in party loyalties among the electorate, and party loyalty changes in two ways. First, an issue must fit the classification of an easy issue

previously mentioned. Furthermore, a plethora of impulses such as major political events, shifts in public opinion, and input of party elites combine to produce defection from one party to the other. Carmines and Stimson (1989) argue that race is just such an issue that has caused a majority of white voters in the South to convert to the Republican Party. Initially, the Goldwater shift and the move among Republicans to a plank of racial conservatism led to such a shift at the national level. Eventually, this move to the GOP has been felt at the state and local level. The authors posit that race has been the prime, possibly the sole ingredient in the growth of the GOP not only in the South but to the nation as a whole.

Before any conversion can take place, voters must have some catalyst to switch parties. Carmines and Stimson (1989) argue that political candidates are the individuals who help lead to change in party affiliations. For instance, the 1958 U.S. Senate elections were critical for the Democratic Party to move to the left on the racial issue. The senate freshman class of 1958 featured northern Democrats who were racial liberals. Thus, the stage was set for the eventual passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Simultaneously, the nomination of Barry Goldwater for the Republican ticket began an unabated trend to the Republican Party becoming the home of racial conservatives. These developments led to a change among many voters in party loyalties. As Black and Black (1992) note, the Goldwater candidacy is an illustration of a candidate revolutionizing partisanship. Barry Goldwater's conservative stance on civil rights policy led many southern white voters to associate with the GOP.

Part of the focus of this study involves determining whether racial threat voting is drawing certain white voters into the Republican Party. The emphasis is on white voters who traditionally vote Democratic. Is there a breaking point at which these types of voters go to the Republican Party? If racial threat is operating, then one would expect this breaking point to occur when a Republican candidate is making appeals to race. In the next section, we explore the relationship between racial threat voting and a possible Republican realignment in the South.

Racial Threat's Role in a Republican Realignment

As discussed previously, much attention has focused upon the role that race played in the rise of the Republican Party in the South. Based on the prior literature, it would appear that race definitely played a large role in the initial Republican breakthrough in the Deep South. How far did race affect the political loyalties of southern white voters beyond this? Debate abounds on the answer to this question. If race has played a role in southern white voting behavior below the presidential level, how pervasive is this racial impact? Is racial threat enough to sustain a true realignment of southern whites to the Republican Party at all levels?

Undoubtedly, the South has become a two-party region, but it would be hazardous to proclaim that racial threat is leading this shift without a closer examination of available data. It is possible that the Republican Party can only go so far in appealing to white voters on the basis of race. Then, the Republicans are faced with the inevitable task of trying to attract the support of other voters. Since

the numbers of white voters influenced by racial threat are unlikely to be a majority of an electorate in a state, the prospects for the GOP become even dimmer.

While race was the issue that led to the Republican Party being viable in the South, could it be that the GOP has to move away from this issue to remain a perennial challenger to the dominance of the Democratic Party? As we have seen from prior research, the Republicans were eventually blocked from great political success at the state level in the South due to the effectiveness of the Democrats forging a biracial coalition of moderate white and black voters. Even as this biracial coalition has shown fractures in the 1990s, it seems reasonable that the Republicans can still only appeal to a limited number of whites on the basis of race. Possibly, the Republicans cannot build a true realignment on the basis of racial threat considering these factors. The findings from the following chapters should help give us a clearer answer to these questions.

METHODOLOGY

Unit of Analysis

The intent of this research is to provide an overarching framework by which we examine the role of race in statewide campaigns for governor. Prior research shows that race historically influences statewide campaigns (Key 1949; Black 1976; Black and Black 1987). This research examines selected gubernatorial campaigns from 1994-1998, because these contests occurred during a reemergence of racial tensions in the 1990s. Gubernatorial elections from three of the five Deep South are

included: Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina. These Deep South states are the areas where racial threat has the greatest potential impact upon elections given the much higher black populations as compared with the Rim South. Unfortunately, due to the lack of readily available data, Alabama and Mississippi are not included in this analysis.⁵ As we will see, this data limitation seriously constrains the application a racial threat model in these states.

Time Frame for Examination

As mentioned previously, this study examines gubernatorial campaigns between 1994 and 1998. Black and Black (1987) as well as Lamis (1988) find that successful southern Democratic politicians were able to forge a biracial coalition made up of moderate to liberal whites and blacks during the 1970s and 1980s. In most of the South, except Tennessee, South Carolina and Virginia, no viable Republican Party existed. Consequently, little opportunity was present for viable race-baiting politicians during the period. However, some Republican candidates now may be making racial appeals in gubernatorial campaigns, warranting inclusion in this study. Accordingly, we examine the contests presented in Table 1.1.

⁵Neither Alabama nor Mississippi maintains racial turnout data which excludes both states from the analysis in Chapter 4. Additionally, no statewide opinions polls are conducted during gubernatorial election years in Mississippi. While some polling data does exist for Alabama, none of the questions queries respondents about race or racial attitudes, making it impossible to test for racial threat based on the polls. Consequently, these states are eliminated from the dissertation completely since including it in the analysis of Chapter 6 would not provide any baseline with which to compare those findings.

Table 1.1
Campaigns To Be Examined

Year	State	Candidates	Percentage of the Vote
1998	Georgia	Roy Barnes (D) Guy Milner (R)	52.5 44.1
1995	Louisiana	Mike Foster (R) Cleo Fields (D)	63.5 36.5
1994	South Carolina	David Beasley (R) Nick Theodore (D)	50.4 47.9
1998	South Carolina	Jim Hodges (D) David Beasley (R)	53.1 45.1

Framework for Analysis

To explore whether race still structures the voting behavior of southern whites, this research conceptualizes the topic of racial threat in different ways. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the historical role of race in the South, while Chapter 3 provides a brief history of the political development in the three individual states since the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In Chapter 4, we examine racial threat as a product of whites living near large populations of black voters. Accordingly, this chapter analyzes the issue of racial threat as previous authors have done.

Can racial threat be a source of culture and not proximity? In other words, do southern whites have to live in a black belt county or an inner city to have their vote influenced by race? This is a question that scholars relying solely on election analysis often neglect. Therefore, Chapter 5 approaches the problem from a cultural premise, and we study racial threat in the context of a cultural explanation.

Is it possible that the media trigger racial threat voting? Chapter 6 explores the media coverage from the appropriate statewide newspapers to ascertain if the media are portraying certain campaigns as racially based. The analysis investigates whether threat voting is based upon cues from the media or whether threat voting is an internal mechanism that needs no cues from the media.

Finally, Chapter 7 provides a conclusion to this examination and summarizes the findings. Perhaps, we can better understand racial threat by viewing it in different dimensions. Instead of racial threat existing solely as a localized phenomenon based on physical proximity, one's culture might spark racial threat

voting or by media coverage of the campaigns. In the concluding chapter, we examine the findings to see what they say about the dimensions of racial threat. Finally, we discuss the applicability of these findings to the country as a whole.

Research Design

Using any type of experimental design where the researcher has a control group and administers race to an experimental group is not plausible, since it is impossible to change individuals' long-held racial attitudes. As past research indicates, individuals are raised with certain racial attitudes that can potentially affect their voting behavior later in life (Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman 1997; Sears and Funk 1999). Consequently, the research design is non-experimental in nature. Furthermore, the research design is a combination of a cross-sectional design and case studies. We examine all of the variables in the framework at the same point in time. However, this study explores only certain elections from certain states. This allows the researcher to have a quasi-experimental design since certain cases are excluded from analysis (Johnson and Joslyn 1995). In this study, we exclude non-southern states.

Much of the analysis is quantitative in nature, and this study utilizes various statistical techniques to examine the selected campaigns. Based on past research, this study analyzes available data at the county-level using OLS regression.⁶ This

⁶Voss (1996) argues for the use of a generalized least squares technique on the 1990 Duke contest in Louisiana, in order to correct for heteroskedasticity in the model. Tests of heteroskedasticity revealed no threat in the data examined in this dissertation. Therefore, OLS regression is sufficient for this analysis.

technique is appropriate, and the most often used, to analyze the relationship between physical proximity and racial threat voting. With the advent of black political empowerment, the campaigns in the 1990s do not feature an exclusively white electorate as they did prior to 1960. To net out the black vote to study white voting behavior, we need racial turnout data. This technique allows the researcher to derive the white vote for Republican candidates. Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina provide racial turnout data, which is used to compute a white Republican vote. Using the white vote for Republican candidates as the dependent variable allows us to get a more precise understanding of the relationship between race and the Republican vote. This variable is especially helpful when determining the strength of racial threat voting at the county-level.

When testing racial threat as a consequence of one's culture, the dissertation utilizes political opinion polls from the appropriate states when possible. By analyzing the raw opinion poll data, the researcher can attempt to ascertain the impact that culture has upon the prevalence of racial threat voting. In this case, a combination of OLS and logistic regression is used to analyze the polling data. Since we are trying to discern the impact of culture and the decision to vote for a Democrat or a Republican, OLS regression is not appropriate in all cases. When dependent variables are dichotomous, logistic regression is utilized because it provides a probability of the relationship between the independent variables and a dependent variable. In this circumstance, we use logistic regression to test the relationship between a variety of independent variables,

including race, and the decision to vote for a Republican or Democratic gubernatorial candidate.

Raw polling data from statewide opinion polls is available in Louisiana. Unfortunately, polling data could not be obtained from elections in Georgia and South Carolina. Therefore, these states are not included in that analysis. To supplement the polling data from Louisiana, data from the National Elections Studies (NES) in 1994 and 1998 is used to examine the relationship between the culture of racial threat and GOP identifiers.

By analyzing media coverage, this dissertation explores the motivations behind racial threat voting. Does racial threat voting take place as an internalized function of certain whites who need no outside impetus, or is racial threat voting enhanced when the media depicts a campaign as racial in nature? Various statewide newspapers are analyzed using a content analysis codesheet which examines the newspaper coverage from various states. In Chapter 6, I present research that shows that newspaper coverage plays a larger role in informing voters about statewide campaigns, leading me to focus on the coverage of selected newspapers in the selected states. From this content analysis of newspaper coverage, I investigate whether external cues trigger or enhance racial threat voting. Does newspaper coverage lead to racial threat voting, or are newspapers simply reporting the issues stances of candidates and their campaigns? By exploring this question, I should obtain a clearer comprehension of the relationship between racial threat voting and the media.

Qualitative methods, especially historical context, also plays an extensive role in this research. One problem with an overreliance on quantitative methods is anomalous findings that cannot be readily explained. For example, the theoretic framework might state that race should have an impact that does not appear in statistical output. Historical context can help explain statistical findings that otherwise seem contradictory or incoherent. To use the previous example, history can tell the researcher that for whatever reason race has never played a large role in a state or county.

RELEVANCE OF THIS RESEARCH

The goal of this research proposal is to answer two questions. What role, if any, does race play in southern politics today? Has race been a major factor in the growth of the Republican Party in the South? Evidence exists that race has not disappeared as an issue in the South. In this research, I ascertain the extent to which race is still a political issue. Related to the issue of race, are racial issues facilitating the growth of the Republican Party in the southern states? I also intend to address a broader question: is it possible that racial issues are a potential hindrance to future Republican growth?

Furthermore, much attention has focused on David Duke's candidacies for the existence of racial threat voting. Is a particular set of elections in Louisiana representative of the forces at work in other southern states? Another contribution of this dissertation is exploring further the role of racial threat voting outside of

Louisiana as well as another Louisiana gubernatorial election which did not feature David Duke as a major candidate. By applying the racial threat model in this manner, we obtain a more precise view of the pervasiveness of racial threat voting.

Perhaps racial threat is only at work when an openly racial candidate like David Duke. Perhaps, though racial threat voting is not dependent upon racially divisive candidates like Duke. It is possible that candidates who make less blatant appeals to race may also find fertile ground among some white voters. The coming chapters examine the issue of racial threat in greater depth.

Beyond these two larger questions, the dissertation tests racial threat within the context of other mainstream theories of voting behavior. Some research in the past has a tendency to view racial threat as a distinctly different model of voting behavior. In this dissertation, we examine whether such a distinction is appropriate. Instead of existing as a separate model of voting behavior, is it possible that racial threat voting fits within other traditional models of voting behavior?

Finally, in the coming chapters, this study explores the role that political context plays in the prevalence of racial threat voting. Is racial animus of selected white voters enough to lead to the presence of racial threat voting? In all probability, racial threat voting needs the proper political environment in which to operate. This does not correlate to a candidate always being a David Duke-clone either. Rather, candidates, who run in a racially-charged atmosphere caused by an opposition to social welfare programs and affirmative action, controversy over Confederate symbols, or other factors, may benefit or hurt candidates from such a

context. Also, candidates may couple with this atmosphere issue stances which appeal to certain white voters. Yet, how vital is the political context for racial threat voting to operate in a large enough scale for Republican candidates to benefit? All of these questions are explored in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 2

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IMPACT OF RACE ON SOUTHERN POLITICS

To understand the South and its politics, one must recognize the role that blacks occupied both historically and contemporarily in the region's politics. This chapter presents a brief description of race relations in the South. The time frame for this chapter ranges from the slavery era to the dawn of the 20th century, by which time all southern states instituted formal segregation of society (Kousser 1974; Woodward 1974). During this chapter, we see how race relations evolved over time. This evolution is sometimes surprising because the relationship between whites and blacks did not always take an easily predicted path, especially from Reconstruction until the 1890s.

In the end, a basic comprehension of the evolution of race relations in the South is necessary to realize the importance that race has played upon politics in the region. The rigid caste system established in the decade between 1890 and 1900 helps to explain the atmosphere that led state Democratic officials before the 1960s to defend segregation at all costs. As we see in this chapter, segregation was only the first step in legalized discrimination of black citizens. Once formal segregation was installed, white political leaders moved to disfranchise black voters as well. Further, a basic understanding of the evolution of southern race relations

during this period helps to explain partially the reaction of many white Southerners in the 1960s, especially those in the black belt, when outside forces pressured for an end of legal segregation in the region. Ultimately, this resistance to societal change ironically led many southern whites to the Republican Party as the Democrats began to change their position on race.

HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS

The history of race relations in the South, and the nation as a whole, is characterized by several crucially different phases: slavery, emancipation, segregation, and civil rights. Events during each of these periods had drastically different impacts on the nation's politics, but it is in the South where the impact of race was the most profound. Of these four phases, none shares much relationship to the other three, except that the principal political and policy questions revolved around the status of blacks in society, and the role of the government in determining that status.

Slavery

Slavery was first introduced in this country soon after English colonization. While slavery initially existed in the entire nation, debates began to rise about slavery as early as the American Revolution. By the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, some northern delegates wanted to end slavery through constitutional means. Southern delegates opposed such an initiative, and the resolution of this debate was the 1808 Compromise, which allowed Congress to

outlaw the foreign slave trade no earlier than 1808. Nevertheless, the Constitution did not give Congress the power to end slavery domestically, although most northern states abolished slavery by the mid-1830s.

The practice of slavery continued in a variety of states until the American Civil War. While the agrarian economy of the southern states made it especially dependent upon slavery, abolitionist sentiment was rising by the midpoint of the 19th century. With the rise of this growing social movement, slavery came under increasing assault. In response to this challenge, the position of the South hardened. It would take the secession of the South and their eventual reincorporation into the Union before the slavery issue was settled. The ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 made slavery illegal in the entire United States.

While slavery was practiced in the South until the mid-1860s, slavery did not go hand-in-hand with segregation. In his seminal study of segregation, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, C. Vann Woodward (1974) demonstrates that segregation did not always exist in the South. The very nature of segregation is to have public facilities, residential areas, and populations separated by race. Slavery was the antithesis of segregation. Woodward states that whites and blacks had to be in close contact with each other in order for slavery to work, and this proximity did not stop at the end of the workday. This interrelation between white and black structured all aspects of southern society and life although blacks were hardly on an equal plane with whites. During this antebellum period, segregation was not

conceivable. Contact with black slaves was mandatory for two reasons. First, most slave owners worked with their slaves in the fields (Woodward 1974). Second, white owners could not have known what was going on in the fields without this contact. Of course, this relationship between master and slave was hardly egalitarian. Still, the separation of white and black was not characteristic of the South at this time.

Ironically, the north was the home of segregation at this time. While most northern states abolished slavery by the middle of the 19th century, this did not mean that the region was any more supportive of equality for blacks (Woodward 1974). On the contrary, many politicians north of the Mason-Dixon line made it a habit to argue against black equality. One of the more famous of these political leaders who advocated the inequality of blacks was Abraham Lincoln. One of Lincoln's 1858 speeches contained the following passage

I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people, and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will for ever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race (Woodward 1975, 21).

The bias of some Northerners towards blacks did not escape the attention of foreign observers either. In his classic study of American politics and society, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that “the prejudice of race appears to be stronger in the states that have abolished slavery than in those where it still exists” (Woodward 1974, 20).

Woodward argues that American segregation began in northern cities. When northern states abolished slavery, a majority of these newly freed slaves moved to northern cities for economic opportunities. With this influx of blacks, practically all northern cities began creating laws that forced segregation of public facilities and residential areas (Wade 1964). Woodward (1974) states that the South borrowed directly from the North the segregation model employed during the first half of the 20th century. Another consequence of segregation in northern cities was the ghetto. Since most northern cities severely restricted blacks in terms of residence and economically, they were forced to live in certain areas of a city. This led to the growth of ghettos that were nonexistent in southern cities of the time (Wade 1964).

None of this is to say that the North had a monopoly on the discrimination of blacks. The subjugation of blacks in the slave states was hardly desirable, but a consequence of the maltreatment of blacks in northern cities gave southern states an example to follow during the formation of segregation laws in the 1890s.

Emancipation and Reconstruction

An outcome of the postbellum period was the emancipation of black slaves where slavery still existed. Until 1877, the southern states endured a legacy that it shares with no other region of the nation: military conquest and occupation. During the Reconstruction period of 1865-1877, federal troops were present in all southern states. While Union Armies occupied the states that had seceded and formed the Confederacy, the occupation took on varying degrees of severity during this time. Conclusions about the impact of Reconstruction on race relations in the South differ wildly.

Boles (1999) argues that three different phases of Reconstruction existed. The first phase was Lincolnian Reconstruction that was in force from 1863 to Abraham Lincoln's death in 1865. The second phase of Reconstruction occurred between 1865 and 1867, in which Lincoln's successor, Andrew Johnson, followed the course that Lincoln had wished of peaceful reconciliation with the South. While both phases of Reconstruction under Lincoln and Johnson advocated a warm welcome for the South's return to the Union, the Reconstruction phase that lasted from 1867 to 1877, the Congressional phase, was far less lenient. The "Radical" Republicans in the U.S. Congress directed this phase.¹ Congressional

¹Boles (1999) defines Radical Republican as a group of Republican congressmen whose primary intention was "to remold the South so a future secession would be impossible" (365). The Radicals believed that Lincoln's attitude toward Reconstruction had been too forgiving. Initially, the Radicals were a minority among Republicans in Congress, but Moderate Republican congressmen formed a coalition with the Radicals after Johnson became president.

Reconstruction treated the southern states harshly before the southern states re-entered the Union, and Congress justified their control over Reconstruction by citing that the Constitution gave Congress the power of admitting new states into the Union.

Under congressional direction, Reconstruction took on a harsher tone. Congress divided the South into five military districts, and a military governor controlled each district. These military governors had the power to overrule any actions of state or local courts or proceedings. For a state to gain readmission to the Union, the military governor conducted a census of eligible registered voters, which included all black males and those white males who had taken an oath of allegiance to the U.S. Constitution and then later sworn allegiance to the Confederacy. This census resulted in about 90 percent of all potential white voters in the South being disqualified from voting (Boles 1999). After the census had established the number of eligible voters, the military governor would call a state convention to draft a new state constitution that had to forbid slavery, disavow all Confederate debts, and promise the franchise to black citizens. By 1868, Congress readmitted eight of the Secession states, but it would take until 1870 for Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas to rejoin the Union.

Since the military was present in the southern states during Reconstruction, white Southerners did not have complete freedom over the conduct of race relations. With the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, all black males gained

the right to vote.² During Reconstruction, these newly franchised blacks allied with northern “carpetbaggers” and southern “scalawags” to control southern state governments, leading to Republican control of all southern states.³ Black sympathies laid with the Republican Party since a Republican administration had overseen their emancipation.

Perman (1984) views southern politics during Reconstruction differently from this conventional wisdom. He sees politics at this time as various factions competing for political power. Within the Democratic and Republican parties, rival factions attempted to gain control of the respective parties. Initially, two factions divided the Democrats between those who wanted to appeal to black voters, the conservatives, and those who opposed an appeal to black voters, the Bourbon Democrats. Among Republicans, “regular” Republicans were mainly carpetbaggers and scalawags tied to federal patronage, and the ones who actively sought to recruit black voters. “Moderate” Republicans were native Southerners who opposed secession and had been pro-Whig before the war. Perman (1984) argues that by 1872, conservative forces defeated the moderates in both parties. Sundquist (1983) states that the defeat of moderate forces in one or both parties

²Women of all races were denied the right to vote in federal elections until the passage of the 19th Amendment in 1919.

³Carpetbaggers were northern Republicans who came to the South to take advantage of the impoverished conditions in the South, and they sought to take control of state governments with the aid of newly franchised blacks. These Northerners were named carpetbaggers because they carried all of their belongings in carpet bags. Scalawags were white Southerners who cooperated with the carpetbaggers.

leads to realignment. With the defeat of moderates in both parties, the Bourbons were firmly in control of the Democratic Party, while the regulars had pushed moderates out of the GOP. The result was two parties controlled by conservative factions who sought to appeal exclusively to one race or the other.

While the Republican Party remained in power during Reconstruction by appealing to black support in a region where few whites could vote, the Republicans' days were numbered. Once federal troops left the region in 1877, forces conspired to doom the southern Republican Party to extinction. During the penultimate decade of the 19th century, Bourbon Democrats took control of all southern state governments, and they began a slow process of disfranchising black voters. The result was a politically impotent Republican Party that would cease to exist in most of the Deep South until the 1960s.

Race Relations Post-Reconstruction

It took the disputed presidential election of 1876 to end Reconstruction in the South. The two presidential candidates, Democrat Samuel J. Tilden and Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, ran an extremely close race. In three southern states, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Tennessee, a dispute erupted as to who the winner was due to massive political fraud. In exchange for supporting the Republican candidate, Hayes agreed to end federal occupation of the South. In 1877, the last federal troops left the region, giving political control back to native white Southerners. This withdrawal of troops became known as "Redemption," and

the Redeemers were southern Democrats who presided over this agreement since they had given the region back to its citizens (Woodward 1974).

Yet, race relations did not immediately go sour (Woodward 1974). Throughout the remainder of the 1870s and 1880s, the status of race stayed remarkably unchanged from the Reconstruction period. Although some segregation had begun during Reconstruction, southern political leaders did not immediately attempt to expand legal segregation for fear that the federal government might intervene once again. Many northern observers and former slaves traveling through the South after Redemption remarked at the tranquility between white and black. Former slaves often commented that they encountered no mass discrimination, nor were they forbidden from public facilities or transportation. During the 1880s, many former abolitionists remarked that the close contact and proximity between white and black in the South repulsed them (Woodward 1974).

Contrary to popular myth, states did not instantly strip blacks of voting rights, although this process did have its meager beginnings in the 1880s. It was not until the 1890s that disfranchisement of blacks took place on a systematic basis. In some states, blacks continued to hold public office as they had during Reconstruction. Most black officeholders were members of the Republican Party, and they drew their strength from blacks and a few white voters. All southern states had black officeholders at some point from Reconstruction to 1900. Even Mississippi, which became the vanguard of segregation in the 20th century, had black Congressmen and one black U.S. Senator during this period.

Clearly, racial discrimination did exist in the southern states. The 1880s and 1890s saw the highest incidence of black lynchings than any other era (Cash 1941). Some whites intimidated blacks from voting, although blacks did vote in large numbers until disfranchisement. It was not until Mississippi took the lead in the 1890s that legally mandated segregation, or *de jure* segregation, began to operate in the South.

Woodward (1974) describes three different theories that existed to address black political involvement in the South until the advent of Jim Crow laws. The first philosophy was the white conservative view. The conservatives did not stand for segregation *per se*, but white conservatives sought to preserve the political system as it was. In the conservative viewpoint, whites should cultivate black voters to support this cause. Underlying the white conservative viewpoint was a paternalistic *noblesse oblige* attitude. White conservatives of the period believed history taught that all civilizations consisted of a superior and subordinate class, and in this instance blacks were the subordinated class. While white supremacy was a major feature of white conservatism, most white conservatives felt that degradation of blacks was unnecessary. Instead, whites should educate blacks and make them into "better individuals." Thomas Jones, a conservative Democratic governor of Alabama in the 1890s best articulated the paternalistic philosophy of these whiggish Southerners,

The Negro race is under us. He is in our power. We are his custodians . . . we should extend to him, as far as possible, all the civil rights that will fit him to be a

decent and self-respecting, law-abiding and intelligent citizen . . . If we do not lift them up, they will drag us down (Woodward 1974, 49).

White conservatives appealed to black voters for political support by arguing that other white leaders were not as concerned with the welfare of black citizens. The white conservatives did not support segregation laws, nor did they advocate disfranchisement of blacks. Through the 1890s, white conservatives enjoyed support in most southern states.

The white liberals articulated the second viewpoint concerning race relations. These individuals advocated complete civil rights and equality for black citizens. Unlike the conservative paternalism, white liberals sought to demolish all barriers of inequality both formal and informal. This liberal movement supported equality not only in politics, but also in the private sector and in the judicial system. White liberals vehemently opposed the establishment of segregation laws in any form, believing that all citizens should enjoy the same access to public facilities. In contrast to white conservatism, the liberal philosophy did not support white supremacy in any form, the myth of the slave plantation, or *noblesse oblige* (Woodward 1974). While some white liberals did win political office in urban areas, their influence in rural areas was nonexistent. Unlike the patriarchal beliefs of white conservatism, this liberal viewpoint never enjoyed statewide support in any southern state.

The third doctrine of race relations during this period was that of the radicals, who called for a platform of white supremacy that stripped blacks of political power. The southern radicals also supported a system that placed blacks into a social category similar to the infamous apartheid system of South Africa (Woodward 1974). It was the viewpoint of these radicals that ultimately won out and predominated in southern race relations until the 1960s. Unlike the first two viewpoints, radicals felt no obligation to treat blacks with any respect, and the idea of equality between the races was anathema to adherents of radicalism. In the 1880s, southern radicals did not gain widespread success. One reason for the lack of success of the radicals was the fear among most southern whites that the Republicans would send federal troops to reoccupy the South if they persecuted blacks. As the appeal to the bloody shirt of secession waned and southern radicals felt secure from northern intervention, segregation took hold, especially in the Deep South. In black-belt counties, segregation became total, complete, and inviolate (Key 1949).

The event that allowed the radical view to ultimately prevail was the Populist movement in the 1890s. The Populist movement was a widespread agrarian revolt that began in the Midwest during the 1870s due to a drop of commodity prices which led to an economic depression for farmers (Sundquist 1983). By the final decade of the 19th century, populism had arrived in the South. Due to the combination of a weak economy and bad farm harvests, many poor white farmers in the South began to support populism and the People's Party that preached

populist rhetoric. For the era, populism was color-blind. It appealed both to whites and blacks for political support. The populists advocated policies that challenged both the conservative and radical viewpoint concerning race.

Inherent in populist rhetoric was an attack on the elite of southern society: large landowners, industrialists, and financiers (Woodward 1973; 1981; Goodwyn 1976). Populist leaders attacked these individuals for living off the labor of the poor and farmers. The populists appealed across races, and some populists preached of a conspiracy that existed among the upper echelons of southern society to maintain the racial status quo. Tom Watson, who ran for President on the Populist label in 1896, detailed this belief in the following speech

You are made to hate each other because upon hatred is rested the keystone of the arch of the financial despotism which enslaves you both. You are deceived and blinded that you may not see how this race antagonism perpetuates a monetary system which beggars you both (Woodward 1974, 63).⁴

Populism gathered support at first before dying out around the turn of the century (Sundquist 1983). Yet, this movement was enough to send shockwaves through the ranks of both southern conservatives and radicals. The populists attacked not only the welfare of upper class whites, but they also advocated true equality between white and black. In the view of both conservatives and radicals, this equality could not take place. Thus, the lasting impact of the Populist

⁴It is worth noting that Watson went into a state of political isolation after making these comments. He would not be elected to any political office again until the 1920s when he won election to the U.S. Senate from Georgia. By this point, Watson had reconverted to the Democratic Party, and he proclaimed white supremacy.

movement in the South was the establishment of segregation laws and the disfranchisement of not only blacks, but also poor whites.

Segregation

The final outcome of the Populist revolt was formal segregation of the black and white races through the 1960s. While white conservatives remained in political power after they quelled the populists, the conservatives adopted the racial beliefs of southern radicals. The western states of the Deep South were the first states to enact segregation laws in the 1890s. Mississippi was the pioneer of *de jure* segregation. Even before the Populist movement, the Magnolia State began segregating public facilities such as schools, hotels, restaurants, hospitals, restrooms, and even water fountains (Woodward 1974). So engulfing was segregation in Mississippi that the state required Jim Crow Bibles in courtrooms. While Mississippi was the earliest state to initiate segregation laws, it was hardly the only southern state eventually to segregate society. With time, all of the South would segregate, although the states of the Atlantic coast were the last states to succumb to the segregationist fever of the era. By the early 20th century, all southern and border states had enacted legislation mandating segregated public schools (Price 1957).⁵

⁵The border states included Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. All of these states required statewide segregation as of May 1954 (Price 1957).

Woodward (1974) asserts that besides the Populist movement another reason existed for the initiation of segregation laws. By the 1890s, the United States was becoming an imperial power. On the eve of the 20th century, the U.S. controlled several territories such as Cuba, Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, and all of these holdings contained majority nonwhite populations. Many leaders in the federal government began to acquiesce quietly to the idea of white supremacy and manifest destiny. In this sense, the preoccupation with colonies worked to the advantage of the southern radicals who wished to segregate all of southern society. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court cleared the way for southern states to segregate public schools in the *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) decision in which the Court ruled that segregated schools were constitutional if they were “separate but equal...”

The first institution to fall under Jim Crow was the railroad industry. By 1900, all southern states required separate cars for rail travel, and separate waiting areas for black travelers. Streetcars were no exception either. By 1905, all southern states required that separate seating be set aside for blacks. Alabama began to mandate completely separate cars for blacks by 1906 (Woodward 1974).

Transportation was only the first sector to come under the jurisdiction of Jim Crow laws. Segregation quickly regulated employers and industry as well. Most southern states mandated that white and black workers could not work in the same room, nor could they use the same doorway, pay window, or bathroom. The only exceptions to this separation of the races in a work environment were firefighters

and repairmen, but only in cases of extreme emergency (Woodward 1974). Textile mills were practically the only form of industry in the South during the early 20th century, and these mills hired blacks to perform only the most menial of jobs at grossly low wages.

Hospitals also fell under the segregation leviathan. The entire South had segregated hospitals, nursing homes, and orphanages by 1910. Alabama even had a law that prohibited white nurses from caring for black patients and vice versa. Ten southern states segregated prisons as well. Even the infamous chain gangs of the era practiced segregation. Jim Crow laws also mandated separation of the races at sporting events, circuses, and fairs. By the 1940s, most southern states prohibited college teams from playing opposing teams with black players. Georgia even went so far to segregate certain state parks.

It was in urban residential areas that segregation was the most rigid. Certain sections of cities were either white or black, and no intermingling took place in these areas. If they agreed to help them at all, realtors would simply not show blacks housing in white neighborhoods. A consequence of this caste system among housing was the proliferation of ghettos in southern cities, harking back to the northern experience in the mid-19th century. As mentioned previously, ghettos were almost unheard of in the South before 1900, but the new segregation fever led to the increase of ghettos. Some towns even had an exclusively black populace due to the separation of the races.

By 1920, Jim Crow had segregated the South in almost every conceivable way from transportation to housing to courtroom battles even to telephone booths. Yet, this bipolar society had not existed before the 1890s. It took the Populist movement for the southern radicals to win control of the political system. One of the tragedies of Jim Crow was that blacks did not enjoy a stable position in society. With each passing year, new segregation laws were placed on the books that pushed blacks even further down the societal ladder. This Jim Crow era would last until the 1960s before outside forces led to its abolishment. The irony of the entire segregationist era was that by the 1960s most southern whites defended the system as one of Divine creation begun in the aftermath of the War Between the States, but legally mandated segregation had in actuality existed for only fifty to sixty years.

Civil Rights

One can ultimately trace the beginning of the civil rights movement to the end of World War II. What began initially in the late 1940s would gather momentum in the 1950s and 1960s. The eventual outcome of this movement was not only the elimination of *de jure* segregation, but also black citizens slowly regained the political rights that southern states had stripped from them in the 1890s.

Upon returning home, many black soldiers returned expecting better domestic treatment after helping to defeat the Axis powers, but the southern states

were still committed to segregation despite the events that had unfolded on the world stage. Several highly publicized events demonstrate the resistance of the southern white power structure to a lessening of Jim Crow. In one case, a returning black veteran was assaulted and blinded by a South Carolina police chief after an argument with a white bus driver (Berman 1970). While such events were barely covered before the 1940s, the federal government was again interested in the issue of equal treatment of blacks during the postwar period. The first victory for civil rights was the integration of the armed forces by Harry Truman. The recalcitrance of some in Congress forced Truman to issue an executive order to achieve integration. The particular resistance of southern members of Congress revealed that the civil rights movement was destined to be a lengthy, torturous battle.

The landmark case in the struggle for civil rights was *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*, heard by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1954. In an unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court ruled that segregation in public schools was unconstitutional. The Court reversed itself and overturned the *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision of 1896. Chief Justice Warren wrote the opinion that stated "segregated schools are inherently unequal..." (347 U.S. 483). As one might imagine, an instantaneous uproar arose in the southern states most affected by this ruling.

This ruling by the Supreme Court had different implications to the South. On the surface, the decision struck at the heart of the caste system that was present in the region. At another level, however, the decision sparked an awakening for

black citizens. In this ruling, black leaders saw that one of the branches of the federal government was supportive of increased black rights. Likewise, white leaders could see that the Supreme Court was steadfastly against the Jim Crow system that regulated social and political life in the South (Black and Black 1987). A disruption of this system had differing outcomes depending upon one's position. For white citizens, the demise of Jim Crow meant the end of white dominance of the region, especially in the black belt, while black citizens could see the end of Jim Crow as a rebirth for black interests and rights.

To combat the *Brown* decision, Harry Byrd, the senior U.S. Senator from Virginia, devised a plan that initially had great success before the South was forced to integrate. Senator Byrd developed the doctrine of massive resistance that stated that all southern states should stand together and massively resist federal integration policies (Bartley 1969; Wilhoit 1973; Black 1976). In the minds of southern politicians, the federal government had lost interest in southern affairs after Reconstruction. Therefore if the South stood together, then the federal government would again lose interest.

Originally, massive resistance worked remarkably well, because two events allowed the doctrine and policy to enjoy initial success. First, the Supreme Court had only stated that segregation was unconstitutional, but it had not set up a framework for desegregation. In fact, the Court was rather slow in enforcing desegregation. Second, President Eisenhower did not favor using federal power to force the race issue (Lamis 1988). Eisenhower took the viewpoint that the states

should handle race relations. Additionally, Eisenhower felt that the equal treatment of the races was a moral issue, not a political one. Therefore, it was necessary to appeal to people's morality, which was not the role of government in Eisenhower's view (Sundquist 1983; Bass and DeVries 1995).

Massive resistance reached its zenith in Norfolk, Virginia during the 1958-1959 school year. So that none of the public schools would be desegregated, school officials in Norfolk closed all public schools for one year. As the academic year passed, it became obvious the ultimate implication of ending public education in the city. Without public schools, Norfolk and potentially the rest of the South faced the possibility of having a generation of illiterates. After one year, Norfolk reopened the public schools. Various surveys showed that a majority of white citizens came to the realization that desegregated schools were better than no schools at all (Campbell 1961).

Gradually, the civil rights movement did receive help from the federal government. In 1957, Eisenhower sent federal troops to enforce a court order requiring that the Little Rock high school integrate. Also, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1957, making it the first civil rights bill to pass since 1875 (Carmines and Stimson 1989). While the bill was weak, for the first time it gave the U.S. Attorney General the ability to investigate civil rights violations in the South.

It was the election of John Kennedy in 1960 that gave an enormous boost to civil rights. Despite having some reservations about pushing civil rights too hard, Kennedy's attorney general, Robert Kennedy, had no such qualms. Coinciding with

the election of Kennedy, a large number of northern Democrats had been elected to Congress in 1958 and 1960. All of these newly elected Democrats were racial liberals as opposed to their southern counterparts (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Historically, southern members of Congress served extremely long tenures due to the one-party system in the South. With reelection, members gained seniority which gave them committee chairmanships. Through 1960, southern members of Congress disproportionately controlled key committee chairs. This enabled the South to kill most civil rights proposals without a floor vote. The new influx of racially liberal Democrats began to place pressure on southern members who were no longer able to control civil rights measures as they once had.

Congress passed another civil rights law, the Civil Rights Act of 1960, which gave the attorney general more freedom to investigate discriminatory practices in the South. It also created the Equal Opportunity Commission which investigated civil rights violations. Congress passed the most comprehensive civil rights bill in 1964. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ended segregation of public facilities. Despite the *Brown* decision, this case did not apply to anything but public schools.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) applied to all aspects of society (Rodgers and Bullock 1972). No longer could restaurants or hotels refuse service to blacks. Gone also were the Jim Crow Bibles and separate restrooms. Congress enforced this act by utilizing their constitutional duty of regulating interstate commerce. If a public facility was engaged in interstate commerce, then the CRA covered it. Since

interstate commerce covered practically everything related to public facilities, owners were forced either to integrate or go out of business.

Reaction among a majority of southern whites to the CRA was full of vitriol (Black and Black 1987; 1992; Lamis 1988). None of the civil rights acts until 1964 had been popular among most southern whites, but the CRA was enough to push many whites to vote for a Republican presidential candidate. In the general election of 1964, the Republican presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater, carried all of the Deep South states. Furthermore, Republican congressional candidates fared quite well. In some states, Republicans were elected to represent their respective states in Congress for the first time since Reconstruction.

Although the CRA was a landmark civil rights law, it did not cover discrimination in politics. It would take a separate act of Congress to address this problem (Bass and DeVries 1995). In the next chapter, we turn our attention to the disfranchisement of black voters and their eventual return to the electorate.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provides a brief overview of the importance that race has played in the politics of the South. By examining race relations from Reconstruction through today, one can get a flavor for how much the race issue has changed over time. Contrary to many misconceptions, it was not an inevitable outcome that the blacks in the South would undergo racial discrimination and political alienation after Reconstruction. As detailed previously, race relations remained remarkably good

immediately after Reconstruction (Woodward 1974). However, it was the triumph of southern white radicals that led to the rigid caste system for which segregation was known by the mid-20th century.

These radicals won control of the Democratic Party from conservatives and liberals who had sought a different accommodation with blacks. The force that led to the triumph of white radicals was the Populist movement. As the populists became more popular and more competitive with the Democrats, some populists appealed to black voters for support. At this point, many white voters became frightened at the prospect of black voters choosing candidates over the choice of white voters. The radicals within the Democratic Party moved to disfranchise blacks and segregate society to prevent any possibility that blacks could enjoy political empowerment.

The impact of the radical view led to the system of discrimination that the South continued to practice through the 1960s. When Key (1949) discusses the power of the black belt, it was almost sixty years after the triumph of the radicals in the Democratic Party. As time passed, many white citizens assumed that segregation and disfranchisement had always been entrenched in southern politics and society. When challenges came to this system in the 1950s and 1960s, some white Southerners reacted violently, while others fought change in every way possible. The tragedy and irony of this hostility to change was that the system of segregation had formally and legally existed only since the 1890s. By the 1960s, external forces, led in part by two Democratic presidents and non-southern

members of Congress, were challenging southern white society. These events were enough to force many white Southerners into an unthinkable position: voting Republican. As already discussed, much of the greatest change at the presidential level since 1964 has occurred among black belt whites. Given this profound shift in party loyalties, it is helpful to understand the rise and fall of *de jure* segregation and how it relates to this change in white southern voting behavior.

The southern states did not stop with the implementation of legal segregation, the radical elements of the Democratic Party in the South moved to disfranchise black voters in the 1890s. All states of the South gradually prevented blacks from voting or registering to vote. Through intimidation and legal requirements, many blacks gradually found it impossible to meet registration requirements. Whether it was grandfather laws, literacy tests, or poll taxes, all of these legal prohibitions on black registration were extremely effective. It would take the implementation of federal civil rights acts in the 1960s to restore the political rights of black citizens. However, all of the South, especially the Deep South, was resistant to any changes in the political status quo for blacks. As the next chapter illustrates, it took the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) to bring blacks back into the political system for the first time since the latter 19th century.

An era of race-based subjugation and the reinforcement of the latent racial disharmony cannot be set aside with ease. The end of *de jure* segregation did not cast off the race issue. For a white southern population ingrained with the inherent rightness of segregation and economic subjugation, black political empowerment

was anathema. Simply because federal law struck down the technical maneuvers to limit black political influence, it did not follow that racial issues would disappear from the political debate. Instead, white fears, whether real or imagined, would manifest from time to time in the new biracial politics.

CHAPTER 3

OVERVIEW OF RACE AND POLITICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH STATES

While Chapter 2 examines the evolution of race relations in the South, this chapter studies the role of race upon the politics of the Deep South states. Traditionally, a minority group shaped no other region's society and politics to the extent that blacks did in the South. Ironically, the very segment of the population that had such an impact on the South for most of American history did not enjoy the full benefits of citizenship. Through intimidation, and at times violence, white political leaders systematically denied blacks the right to vote and other means of political participation.

It is important to understand the role that race played on the voting behavior of Deep South whites as well as the role of disfranchisement. As blacks began to re-enter the political system in the 1960s, many white Southerners abandoned the Democratic Party which most blacks identified with after the 1930s (Kousser 1974). As discussed in Chapter 1, race led this white flight to the GOP in large part. In this chapter, we see how race had such a large impact upon the politics of the Deep South. Finally, we examine the three states that serve as units of analysis to see how the issue of race played differently across these states.

IMPACT OF RACE UPON VOTING IN THE DEEP SOUTH

While Jim Crow laws dealt primarily with segregation, Bourbon Democrats enacted other laws that limited the involvement of blacks in politics. First, all southern states took steps to establish voting requirements. Second, state governments created stringent registration requirements that effectively kept blacks out of southern politics until the 1960s. The discussion of how the South disfranchised black voters follows. Then, we examine how federal legislation brought blacks back into the political system through federal intervention.

Disfranchisement

While southern states were enacting Jim Crow laws around the turn of the 20th century, the methodical disfranchisement of black voters was taking place in the South. Again, Mississippi was at the forefront of the disfranchisement movement (Woodward 1974). All southern states used a combination of property and literacy qualifications and poll taxes (Kousser 1974). These were three hurdles created as barriers to black voting power. Often, these requirements were “bent” for whites, though Virginia was a state noted for its use of the poll tax to prevent poor whites from voting in significant numbers (Key 1949). Kousser (1974) argues that the overwhelming pressure to disfranchise blacks came from whites in the black belt, while moves to exclude poor whites from political life came from counties that were majority white.

An examination of the disfranchisement movement in Louisiana illustrates this phenomenon. In 1896, Governor Foster J. Murphy pushed through a state constitutional amendment to allow literate voters and voters who owned property to retain the right to vote, but the amendment also gave the state legislature the power to change voting qualifications by a 2/3 vote (Kousser 1974). With the amendment passed, the state legislature passed a law that restricted the franchise, and the state legislature called a constitutional convention to restrict voting rights even further. Foster argued that

The aggregation of the mass of ignorance, vice and venality, without any proprietary interest in the State, real or personal, is a standing menace to good government, when thrown as a body into the scales of popular elections. The elimination of this force of brute members is, and must be the paramount question on the solution of which the success of a truly representative government must turn (Kousser 1974, 160).

Such an attitude reveals the fear behind Democratic calls for disfranchisement of most potential voters in society. Some poor whites and black voters had joined together to oppose the Louisiana Democrats in 1896, and the Democrats narrowly retained control of state government. By 1900, the Democratic governor and legislature had disfranchised a majority of voters in the state. Table 3.1 illustrates the decline in black and white registration after the passage of disfranchisement laws in Louisiana.

Table 3.1
Effect of Disfranchisement Laws on Louisiana Voter Registration,
1896-1904

Year	Percentage of White Males Registered	Percentage of Black Males Registered
1896	96.3	93.0
1897	103.2	95.6
New Registration Laws		
1898	46.6	9.5
New State Constitution		
1902	58.9	2.9
1904	52.5	1.1

Source: J. Morgan Kousser. 1974. The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restrictions and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910. New Haven: Yale University Press.

As the table demonstrates, these laws limited not only black registration and participation, but also the political activity of some white voters as well. While other southern states achieved similar results during this time, it is difficult to get precise numbers in many states since registrars did not keep permanent records.¹

In order to vote, one must be registered to vote. However, registration does not guarantee that a person actually votes. For the rare blacks that remained on the registration lists, few actually voted (Key 1949). Through the use of intimidation, and at times violence, blacks were effectively prevented from voting in many rural bailiwicks well into the 1960s (Kousser 1974). Cities were the only areas in which any sizeable amount of blacks voted, and this number was minuscule through the 1940s (Bartley and Graham 1975).

Another device used as a deterrent to black voting was the white primary. As the name suggests, this primary was for white voters only. By 1915, most southern states had instituted the use of the white primary.² When the Democratic Party enjoyed one-party dominance, elections were effectively settled in the

¹The exact number of black registrants is difficult to discern. All southern states kept inaccurate records during this time. In addition, there were no federal laws requiring states to keep registration data for a specified amount of time. Consequently, registrars would often destroy records after an election. Mississippi holds the record for being the worst record-keepers in the South. In 1965, when federal registrars began combing the records of southern states looking for black registration data, they found in Mississippi that the records had been destroyed "by fire" in 72 of Mississippi's 82 counties (Political Participation 1968).

²Key (1949) elucidates that all southern states with the exception of Florida, North Carolina, and Tennessee required by state law the use of a white primary. Virginia's white primary law was struck down by a lower federal court, but the state had not appealed this decision.

Democratic primary. The occasional exceptions to this rule were North Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia, but even those states hardly featured a vibrant two-party system.

Despite being targeted at blacks, Price (1957) and Kousser (1974) argue that the white primary had a negligible effect on black turnout during the early 20th century since most blacks considered themselves Republicans until the New Deal. While states barred blacks from the Democratic primary, usually those few blacks who had the franchise had no Republican candidate for whom to vote for in the general election. States justified the use of this type of primary by arguing that the Democratic party was a private entity that could establish its own criteria for exclusion (Key 1949; Black and Black 1987).

The success of the disfranchisers was overwhelming during this period. As the previous discussion revealed, the disfranchising movement was extraordinarily successful in all of the South. While stripping blacks of the franchise was foremost in the minds of some, the Democratic Party also championed disfranchisement to preserve their power in the South (Kousser 1974). Along with this push to strip blacks of the right to vote, many poor whites also found it difficult, if not impossible, to vote as well. This fact led to an oligarchy of middle and upper class whites controlling the region's politics (Key 1949; Kousser 1974). The extraordinarily low turnout rate for which the South was known continued until the midpoint of the 20th century.

Refranchisement

The first breakthrough in the refranchisement of black voters came via a Supreme Court case. In *Smith v. Allwright* (1944), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the white primary was unconstitutional. This case originated in Texas which had used the white primary since the early 20th century (Key 1949). The *Smith* case had two important outcomes on southern politics. First, the case served as a major impetus to black registration. Since the Supreme Court abolished the white primary, blacks could now vote in elections provided they met qualifications to register. Although blacks had originally identified with the Republican Party, the New Deal led many blacks to the Democratic fold, which promised increased black activity, if blacks could register. To understand the enormity the *Smith* case, comparing black registration figures between 1940 and 1960 is helpful.

Table 3.2
Estimated Number and Percentages of Blacks Registered
to Vote in the South, 1940-1960

Year	Estimated number	Percentage
1940	250,000	5
1947	595,000	12
1952	1,008,614	20
1956	1,238,038	25
1958	1,266,488	25
1960	1,414,052	28
1964	1,907,279	38
1966	2,306,434	46

Source: Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro. 1966. *Negroes and the New Southern Politics*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.

The total number of black registrants in 1940 stood at 151,000 in all eleven southern states. By 1952, that number had skyrocketed to 1,009,000 black registered voters (Matthews and Prothro 1966). Despite this jump in registration, roughly four-fifths of the southern black population remained unregistered (Bartley and Graham 1975).

Black and Black (1987) argue several reasons explain why the abolition of the white primary had such a comparatively small effect on black registration, the most prominent being the stringent qualification laws present in the southern states. From 1900 through the 1960s, the entire South used a combination of literacy tests, “good character” tests, and poll taxes to thwart black political empowerment (Kousser 1974). At the midpoint of the 20th century, Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia all required literacy tests and poll taxes to vote (Key 1949). Georgia, Louisiana, and North Carolina mandated the use of literacy tests alone, and three states, Arkansas, Tennessee and Texas used poll taxes alone (Black and Black 1987).³ Only Florida use neither a poll tax nor a literacy test (Black and Black 1987). Key (1949) attacked the literacy test as “a fraud and nothing more” (579),

³Until the 1940s, Georgia used a cumulative poll tax in addition to the literacy test. If a potential voter failed to pay the poll tax in a particular year(s), then the voter was required to pay the back taxes and interest in order to vote (Kousser 1974). In Louisiana, the grandfather clause was first used beginning in the late 1890s, and soon a majority of southern states followed Louisiana's lead. Key (1949) argues that the grandfather clause was used more to disfranchise poor whites than black voters who were already excluded through other means such as poll taxes, literacy tests, or intimidation and violence. The grandfather clause was declared unconstitutional in all states in litigation originating in Oklahoma (Key 1949; Kousser 1974).

because county registrars applied these tests unevenly across the South. Often, registrars did not give white voters these tests, while potential black voters always fell victim to them.

The second major impact of the *Smith* case, however, had more long-term consequences for southern politics. The Rim South states (Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Texas) were less resistant to abolishing the white primary than their Deep South cohorts (Key 1949). Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina all were hostile to the abolition of the white primary, and a second round of court decisions ultimately ended the white primary in the Deep South (Black and Black 1987). Key (1949) discerned this division within the supposedly "Solid South." Here, one begins to see that the impact of race was slowly beginning to change in the Rim South by the 1940s. The Rim South was much less concerned with race when compared with the Deep South, a trend that has continued to this day. This crack in the racial resolve of the South had profound implications for the future of southern politics.

A 1946 congressional special election in Atlanta illustrates the impact of the white primary on white control of politics. In early 1946, Georgia held a special election in Georgia's Fifth Congressional District to replace Robert Ramspeck who had resigned his seat. Instead of calling for the traditional "whites only" primary, the Democratic Party simply called for a general election. This allowed black voters in Atlanta to vote in this special election. According to Rick Allen (1996), black

registration was around 3,000 at the outset of 1946. By February 1946 when the state held the special election, black registration had risen to 7,000.

On the basis of high black support, Helen Douglas Mankin won election to fill the remainder of Ramspeck's congressional term. The fact that Mankin had won with the help of black support sent many white political leaders and voters into a frenzy. By the summer of 1946 when the Democrats held their primary, voters defeated Mankin in her bid to win the nomination to serve for two more years, mainly on the basis of white backlash.

While the abolition of the white primary was the beginning of a gradual enfranchisement of black voters in the South, black voter participation was still negligible in many rural counties in the early 1960s (Matthews and Prothro 1966; Voter Participation 1968; Black and Black 1987). It would take the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) to open the floodgates of black voter registration (Bartley and Graham 1975; Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995). Through a variety of voting tests, southern states kept a majority of the black voting age population unregistered. The VRA was the first legislation invoked by Congress that allowed the federal government to take an active role in the registration of blacks.

Under provisions of the VRA, federal registrars were sent to southern states to ensure the registration of eligible voting age black citizens. One portion of the VRA was section V, which became known as the "trigger" mechanism. Among other requirements, if less than 50 percent of the voting age population was registered to vote and turnout was less than 50 percent in the last election, then

those localities would be subject to the VRA. At this point, federal registrars could intercede and oversee voter registration. Under provisions of section V, the VRA covered the entire states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, and parts of North Carolina and Virginia. Besides the supervision of voter registration, affected areas were also subject to preclearance, meaning that any proposed changes to election laws had to be precleared with the United States Justice Department before states could implement the changes.

We again can see a pattern to the political subjugation of black citizens. In the Rim South, black registration rates were generally higher, although variation existed across the region. Tennessee boasted the highest stated black registration rate of 59 percent, while Virginia had lower registration rates primarily because of the use of the poll tax. The Deep South featured even lower registration rates, especially in rural counties. Table 3.3 demonstrates the differences in black registration rates before the passage of the VRA, while Table 3.4 illustrates the immediate effect of the VRA by presenting the post-Act registration figures.

Table 3.3
Patterns of Voter Registration by State Prior to 1965

	1960 Voting Age Population		Number Registered		Percentage	
	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite
Rim South						
Arkansas	848,393	192,629	555,944	77,714	65.5	40.4
Florida	2,617,438	470,261	1,958,499	240,616	74.8	51.2
N. Carolina	2,005,955	550,929	1,942,000	258,000	96.8	46.8
Virginia	1,876,167	436,718	1,070,168	144,259	61.1	38.3
Deep South						
Alabama	1,353,122	481,220	935,695	92,737	69.2	19.3
Georgia	1,796,963	612,875	1,124,415	167,663	62.6	27.4
Louisiana	1,289,216	514,589	1,037,184	164,061	80.5	31.6
Mississippi	751,266	422,273	525,000	28,500	69.9	6.7
S. Carolina	895,147	371,104	677,194	138,544	75.7	37.3

Source: United States Commission on Civil Rights. 1968. *Political Participation*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Note: Registration figures in 92 of 100 North Carolina counties were missing, while county-level figures were destroyed "in a fire" in 52 of Mississippi's 82 counties.

Table 3.4
Patterns of Voter Registration by State Immediately after the VRA

	1960 Voting Age Population		Number Registered		Percentage	
	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite	White	Nonwhite
Rim South						
Florida	2,617,438	470,261	2,131,105	299,033	81.4	63.6
N. Carolina	2,005,955	550,929	1,602,980	277,404	83.0	51.3
Deep South						
Alabama	1,353,122	481,220	1,212,317	248,432	89.6	51.6
Georgia	1,796,963	612,875	1,443,730	322,496	80.3	52.6
Louisiana	1,289,216	514,589	1,200,517	303,148	93.1	58.9
Mississippi	751,266	422,273	589,066	181,233	91.5	59.8
S. Carolina	895,147	371,104	731,096	190,017	81.7	51.2

Source: United States Commission on Civil Rights. 1968. *Political Participation*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Notes: All of the post-Act registration figures represent data gathered by federal election examiners under authority delegated by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Examiners gathered data in 1967, but data was not available in 1967 for either Arkansas or Virginia.

The VRA was successful in its goal of registering large numbers of black voters as well as increasing white voter registration. However, this growth in black registration did not automatically equate to a corresponding influx of voter participation rates in these states. While the date varied from state to state, it was not until the early 1970s that newly registered black voters began to vote in large numbers in southern elections. Once blacks entered the electorate in large numbers, they began to have an impact upon political candidates in the Democratic party (Black and Black 1987).

Changing Democratic Representation

Although the Democratic party had been the protector of racial discrimination since the 1890s, the party began to shift with the reality of large numbers of black voters in the southern electorate. Democratic candidates after 1970 began to make appeals to black voters for political support. Lamis (1988) describes the biracial coalition that Democratic candidates formed to win office in the new post-VRA atmosphere. No longer could the Democrats afford to alienate and persecute black citizens. Now, Democratic candidates began making overtures to black citizens.

Simultaneous to the Democratic party reaching out to blacks since the 1970s, the Republican party began to emerge as a political force in the South (Bass and DeVries 1995). As discussed in the first chapter, the Goldwater candidacy was crucial to the GOP in the South. Goldwater's opposition to the civil rights acts of the 1960s had a twofold consequence. First, it led to greater southern white

support for the party (Cosman 1966; Miller and Shanks 1996). Second, it drove the few remaining black supporters out of the party (Carmines and Stimson 1989). While Democrats were courting black voters after 1965, Republicans were not (Bass and DeVries 1995). The lone exception to this was Winthrop Rockefeller who won the governorship of Arkansas in 1966 and 1968 on a biracial coalition of mountain white voters and Delta black voters (Lamis 1988). Once Arkansas Democrats saw the success of appealing to black voters, they too began to court black voters.⁴ In the entire South, the biracial coalition of the 1970s and 1980s was a recipe of success for the Democrats, with the Republican Party in the South left to court those white voters who were often dissatisfied with the political gains made by blacks in the 1960s (Black and Black 1987; Lamis 1988).

From this discussion of the impact of race on voting, several themes become clear. First, the abolition of the white primary in 1944 revealed fractures in the "Solid South" (Key 1949; Black and Black 1987). While the South historically stood together on the race issue, one began to see cracks in the resolve of some southern states on what Key (1949) termed "the question of the Negro" (5). Second, the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 fundamentally changed southern politics. No longer were blacks systematically denied the right to vote as they had been previously. The VRA not only expanded the voting rolls in the South, but it also led to a profound change for each party in the region.

⁴This biracial coalition propelled the careers of three successful Arkansas governors in the 1970s: Dale Bumpers, David Pryor, and Bill Clinton.

The Democrats were successful in adapting to this new era by winning offices on the basis of a coalition of white and black voters (Black and Black 1987; Lamis 1988). Also, the Democratic Party at the national level began to abandon the southern white vote (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Black and Black 1992). Yet, the Republicans were not immediately successful in the South below the presidential level until the 1990s, because most white southerners in the postwar era have been more anti-Democrat than pro-Republican (Sundquist 1983).

EXAMINATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH STATES SINCE THE VRA

We now turn our attention to the political environment of the Deep South states included in this dissertation after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which entirely covered these states under section 5. According to Black and Black (1987; 1992), the 1960s were a crucial time for southern politics. It is during this decade that the Republican Party begins to carry the Deep South states at the presidential level, a trend that has continued through the 1990s. Yet, Republican success below the presidential level was not instantaneous. In fact, the Republican party had a difficult time below the presidential level throughout the 1960s and 1970s in most of the Rim South and all of the Deep South (Bartley and Graham 1975; Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995).

By the 1990s, however, a majority of southern whites had converted to the Republican Party (Miller and Shanks 1996). Tables 3.5 and 3.6 demonstrate the gradual success of the Republican Party at the gubernatorial level in both the Rim

and Deep South, while Table 3.7 illustrates the changing partisan identification of white Southerners during the same period. By briefly examining the politics of these states from the mid 1960s, we can get a sense of what the political environment was like in each state before the 1990s and how such a Republican conversion took place over the past thirty years.

Table 3.5
Partisan Gains at the Gubernatorial Level in the Rim South, 1965-1998

Victor's Party and Percentage of the Vote						
Year	Arkansas	Florida	North Carolina	Tennessee	Texas	Virginia
1965	—	—	—	—	—	D 47.9
1966	R 54.4	R 55.1	—	D 81.2	D 72.8	—
1968	R 52.4	—	D 52.7	—	D 57.0	—
1969	—	—	—	—	—	R 52.5
1970	D 61.7	D 56.9	—	R 52.0	D 53.6	—
1972	D 75.4	—	R 51.0	—	D 47.9	—
1973	—	—	—	—	—	R 50.7
1974	D 65.6	D 61.2	—	D 55.4	D 61.4	—
1976	D 83.2	—	D 65.0	—	—	—
1977	—	—	—	—	—	R 55.9
1978	D 63.4	D 55.6	—	R 55.6	R 50.0	—
1980	R 51.9	—	D 61.9	—	—	—
1981	—	—	—	—	—	D 53.5
1982	D 54.7	D 64.7	—	R 59.6	D 53.2	—
1984	D 62.6	—	R 54.3	—	—	—
1985	—	—	—	—	—	D 55.2
1986	D 63.9	R 54.6	—	D 54.2	R 52.7	—
1988	—	—	R 56.1	—	—	—
1989	—	—	—	—	—	D 50.1
1990	D 57.5	D 56.5	—	D 60.8	D 49.5	—
1992	—	—	D 52.7	—	—	—
1993	—	—	—	—	—	R 58.3
1994	D 59.8	D 50.8	—	R 54.3	R 53.5	—
1996	—	—	D 56.0	—	—	—
1997	—	—	—	—	—	R 55.8
1998	R 60.0	R 55.0	—	R 69.0	R 69.0	—

Source: Alice V. McGillivray, Rhodes Cook, and Richard M. Scammon. 1999. *America Votes 23: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.

Table 3.6
Partisan Gains at the Gubernatorial Level in the Deep South, 1966-1998

Victor's Party and Percentage of the Vote					
Year	Alabama	Georgia	Louisiana	Mississippi	South Carolina
1966	D 63.4	D 46.2 ^a	----	----	D 58.2
1967	----	----	----	D 61.9	----
1968	----	----	D 100.0	----	----
1970	D 74.5	D 59.3	----	----	D 51.7
1971	----	----	----	D 77.0	----
1972	----	----	D 57.2	----	----
1974	D 83.2	D 69.1	----	----	R 50.9
1975	----	----	D 100.0	D 52.2	----
1978	D 72.6	D 80.6	----	----	D 61.4
1979	----	----	R 50.3	D 61.1	----
1982	D 57.6	D 62.8	----	----	D 69.8
1983	----	----	D 100.0 ^b	D 55.1	----
1986	R 56.3	D 70.5	----	----	R 51.0
1987	----	----	R 100.0	D 53.4	----
1990	R 52.1	D 52.9	----	----	R 69.5
1991	----	----	D 61.2	R 50.8	----
1994	R 50.3	D 51.1	----	----	R 50.4
1995	----	----	R 63.5	R 55.6	----
1998	D 57.7	D 52.5	----	----	D 53.1

^aAlthough the Republican candidate won a plurality, the Democratic candidate won because the election was decided by the Democratic-dominated legislature.

^bIn 1983 and 1987, there was no primary runoff.

Source: Alice V. McGillivray, Rhodes Cook, and Richard M. Scammon. 1999. *America Votes 23: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.

Table 3.7
Party Identification of Non-Black Voters in the South, 1952-1988

Years of Education	Generation	Democratic				Independent				Republican			
		52-60	64-68	72-80	84-88	52-60	64-68	72-80	84-88	52-60	64-68	72-80	84-88
0-11	Pre-New Deal	62	76	50	*	9	8	16	*	29	16	35	*
	New Deal	70	64	64	54	17	22	20	26	13	14	17	20
	Post-New Deal	---	*	(54)	(48)	---	*	(36)	(44)	---	*	(10)	(8)
12	Pre-New Deal	(52)	*	(39)	*	(21)	*	18	*	(27)	*	44	*
	New Deal	75	50	47	46	12	27	32	35	13	24	21	19
	Post-New Deal	---	*	39	42	---	*	27	28	---	*	30	29
13+	Pre-New Deal	65	(52)	(32)	*	25	(20)	(20)	*	11	(28)	(43)	*
	New Deal	61	54	35	36	17	30	33	36	23	16	33	29
	Post-New Deal	---	*	34	31	---	*	37	34	---	*	29	36

() 50>N>20.

* N<20.

Source: Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks. 1996. *The New American Voter*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 174.

As one can see from the Tables 3.5 and 3.6, the Republican Party has had increasing success in gubernatorial elections in the South since the mid-1960s. The lone exception to this is Georgia, where no Republican has won control of the governorship.⁵ As Sundquist (1983) argues, a realignment of southern whites to the Republican Party initially took place at the presidential level, while a realignment at lower levels did not come immediately. Table 3.7 illustrates the growing Republican partisan identification among white southerners. White voters, socialized politically after the New Deal generation, fueled this Republican conversion (Miller and Shanks 1996). All three of these tables underscore the massive changes in party identification among southern whites since the mid-20th century. Therefore, we first examine the Republican growth in these states at the presidential and congressional level. Then, we explore gubernatorial politics of these three Deep South states.

GEORGIA

V.O. Key (1949) characterized Georgia politics as the “Rule of the Rustics.” In Georgia, the rural regions of the state have traditionally dominated the state’s politics (Key 1949; Bartley 1970; Bartley and Graham 1975; Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995; Bullock 1998). While rural sections in other southern states dominated politics as well, Georgia had an unique system of ensuring rural

⁵In 1966, the Republican candidate won a plurality of the vote, but failed to win 50% of the vote. This allowed the overwhelmingly Democratic legislature to choose the governor. This incident is explained further later in the chapter.

dominance.⁶ This ruralism affected the Republican Party as it developed in the 1960s (Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995). Although Republicans have done well in the state's urban and suburban areas, the Democratic Party remains dominant in rural areas (Bullock 1998). As illustrated in the following discussion, the Republican Party has not always been able to parlay the natural conservatism of rural white Georgians into GOP success (Lamis 1988; Bullock 1998).

Republican Growth, Decline, and Renaissance

As in all of the Deep South states, the Goldwater candidacy was a breakthrough event for Republicans in Georgia (Black and Black 1987, 1992; Lamis 1988). Any illusions that white Georgians were suddenly loyal Republicans were smashed four years later. In 1968, independent candidate George Wallace won the state's electoral votes, while Richard Nixon received only 30 percent of the vote, down from his 37 percent share of the vote in 1960 (Bass and DeVries 1995). Lamis (1988) stresses the fact that most of Georgia's white voters who voted for Goldwater in 1964 abandoned the party for Wallace in 1968. Though most of these white voters returned to the GOP fold in 1972, they abandoned the Republicans in

⁶Georgia used a method of nominating statewide Democratic nominees known as the county-unit system until a federal court order banned its use in 1962. Under the system, the rural counties were able to dominate the urban and suburban counties through control of unit votes. The system was similar to the Electoral College in the sense that the unit vote was more important than the popular vote. Each county received a set amount of unit votes no matter their geographic size or population. By the 1960s, the rural counties only consisted of 32 percent of the statewide population, but they controlled 59 percent of the total number of unit votes (Buchanan 1997).

favor of native son Jimmy Carter in 1976 and 1980. Since 1980, Georgia has become increasingly Republican at the presidential level, deviating only in 1992 when Bill Clinton won the state's electoral votes (Bullock 1998).

At the congressional level, the Republicans have taken much longer to convert this presidential success into any large gain. Aistrup (1989) argues that the Republican Party, below the presidential level, is the weakest in Georgia when compared with any other state in the region. In 1964, Howard "Bo" Callaway became the first Republican since Reconstruction to win a congressional seat, and the Republicans managed to carry two Atlanta districts in 1966 (Bartley and DeVries 1995). Despite these initial successes, the 1970s and 1980s were not kind to the congressional hopes of Georgia Republicans. The total proportion of Georgia Republican congressmen never reached more than 20 percent during these two decades (Bullock 1998).

In the early 1990s, the Republicans fared better at the congressional level when they added three U.S. seats besides the one already held by Newt Gingrich. In 1994, the Republicans picked up an additional three seats, giving them their first majority in the state's congressional delegation since Reconstruction, and in early 1995, Democrat Nathan Deal converted to the Republican fold. External forces undoubtedly helped Georgia Republicans, though. Bullock (1998) asserts that the Republicans would not have won so many seats without federal control of the state's congressional map. The VRA requires that all southern states, except Arkansas and Texas, must receive approval on any proposed change in

congressional districts. During 1991 and 1992, the Georgia General Assembly went through three rounds of redistricting before the Department of Justice, who oversees this portion of the VRA, approved the changes. The result was three majority-black congressional districts, which resulted in eight predominately white districts. This change in racial composition benefitted the Republicans. Although Georgia redrew congressional districts, minus the majority-black 11th District, in 1995 after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the 1992 map to be unconstitutional, Georgia Republicans have held onto their advantage through the 1998 elections.⁷

In the U.S. Senate, the GOP has won only three elections since 1964 (Bullock 1998). The initial Republican break at this level came in 1980 when political novice Mack Mattingly defeated longtime Senator Herman Talmadge, the son of four-time governor Eugene Talmadge. The Republican victory was not so much a vote for Mattingly as a vote against Talmadge, whose personal problems contributed to his defeat (Lamis 1988). Coupled with this was a belief that Talmadge had lost touch with the explosive growth of the Atlanta metropolitan area (Bullock 1998). A Talmadge speech criticizing Republican Mattingly during the campaign illustrates this point

My opponent came down here from Indiana a number
of years ago. Now we're glad he came down here to settle.
But he wasn't content with that. He got a hired gun from
Washington, D.C., to serve as his campaign manager.
Then he got an advertising man all the way down from Detroit.
The whole thing has been an invasion similar to Sherman's

⁷When Newt Gingrich resigned his seat in early 1999, Republican Johnny Isakson won his seat in a special election.

march to the sea. A long time ago, they were called carpetbaggers (Lamis 1988, 103).

Apparently Talmadge was oblivious to the fact that much of the population explosion in metropolitan Atlanta had come from an influx of northern residents. While Talmadge's rhetoric was popular among his traditional bloc of rural voters, voters in the Atlanta area swept Talmadge from office, where Mattingly won by margins of two to one (Bullock 1998). En route to victory, Mattingly was able to carry a majority of the black vote in the state, a new phenomenon for Georgia Republicans (Lamis 1988). Arguably, Talmadge's historical baggage on the race issue caused blacks to have no great affection for Talmadge, resulting in a vote for Mattingly.

Proof of how fragile the Republican coalition was in the 1980s came in 1986 when Mack Mattingly ran for reelection to the Senate. In that campaign, Democrat Wyche Fowler defeated Mattingly. Although a majority of black voters had voted for Mattingly in 1980, they abandoned him for Fowler in 1986. Fowler, whom Republicans often accused for being too liberal for Georgia, was unable to hold onto the seat in the 1992 elections.

In an odd fluke, Fowler found himself in a general election runoff with Republican challenger Paul Coverdell. Due to the presence of a Libertarian candidate, Fowler was unable to garner 50 percent of the vote, which was required according to Georgia election laws at the time. In the runoff, Coverdell defeated Fowler, primarily due to a low black turnout in the runoff (Bullock and Furr 1994).

In Georgia, low black turnouts drastically improve the chances of the Republican Party (Bullock 1998). In 1998, Coverdell was able to win reelection to Talmadge's old seat in the U.S. Senate, something that no individual had done since 1974.

In 1996, Democrat Sam Nunn retired from the U.S. Senate, creating an open seat election for this seat. While the Republicans were hopeful of winning an additional Senate seat, Democrat Max Cleland narrowly defeated 1994 Republican gubernatorial candidate Guy Millner. Again, a Libertarian candidate was present which resulted in Cleland winning less than 50 percent of the vote. Due to the Democrats' loss of the Senate in 1992, the state legislature changed the general election runoff law so that a runoff only occurred if nobody received 45 percent of the vote. As Bullock (1998) states, as Republicans become stronger in the state, the Democratic state legislature has a propensity to change election laws to damage Republican chances.

In the state legislature, the Republicans have made steady gains after the nadir of the 1970s. Most of this Republican growth has come in urban and suburban areas of the state, while the rural areas have remained the most loyally Democratic regions (Bullock 1998). As recently as the 1960s, only 1 percent of the state legislature consisted of Republicans. Now, Republicans make up 40 percent of the legislature. Bullock (1998) argues that the GOP is poised to take control of the legislature by 2002 at the present rate of growth, with some conservative Democrats willing to jump ship to the Republican fold if the Democrats lose enough seats.

As we prepare to examine the gubernatorial scene in Georgia since the VRA, the Republicans made some gains in 1964 and 1966, but the 1970s and 1980s did not hold much promise for the state GOP. The Democratic Party managed to remain the dominant party in state politics into the 1990s via the biracial coalition. In fact, Lamis (1988) argues that in the South, the biracial coalition is the strongest in Georgia. Even at the dawn of the 21st century, the Democrats remain dominant at the county-level, although their strength has eroded at the presidential level. Still, the Republicans have made substantial inroads at the congressional level and in the state legislature. As the next section illustrates, the Republicans still have not had a breakthrough at the gubernatorial level, however.

Gubernatorial Politics

Due to the tremendous success of Goldwater who carried 54 percent of the vote in Georgia and the election of a Republican congressman, Georgia Republicans were confident in their ability to win the governorship in 1966. The Republican gubernatorial nominee was Howard “Bo” Callaway, wealthy son of the founder of Callaway Gardens, a prestigious resort in Pine Mountain, Georgia. Callaway had won a congressional seat in 1964, and he was an advocate of continued segregation (Bass and DeVries 1995).

In the 1966 gubernatorial contest, the Democrats nearly opened the door for the Republican Party (Bartley 1970). Two frontrunners vied for the Democratic nomination. James H. Gray, owner of a television station in Albany, was the former

chairman of the state Democratic Party, and Gray was considered the front running conservative candidate. The other frontrunner was Ellis Arnall, a former governor who had served between 1942-1946. Arnall was a liberal, and he was making a political comeback that most observers had expected for the last several gubernatorial elections (Henderson 1991). Besides Gray and Arnall, two other major candidates were seeking the nomination: Lester Maddox, and Jimmy Carter. One of these remaining three, Maddox would eventually become the governor through a bizarre series of events.

Lester Maddox was an Atlanta restaurant owner who had dabbled in politics since the 1950s. Maddox was famous for the fried chicken that he served at his restaurant, the Pickrick. He also dispensed his extremely conservative political philosophy in restaurant advertisements in the *Atlanta Journal*. Maddox had unsuccessfully run for mayor of Atlanta in 1958. In 1962, Maddox had won a spot in the Democratic runoff for lieutenant governor, but he again lost.

In 1966, Maddox ran for governor, but he was no longer the laughingstock that he had been before 1964. When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requiring all public facilities to integrate, Maddox, a fiery segregationist, refused service to black customers. He ran blacks out of his restaurant with a pick handle in one hand and a pistol in the other. In defiance of the federal government, Maddox closed his restaurant and began selling pick handles know as "Pickrick Sticks." Maddox's popularity soared among rural, white Georgians who were disgruntled with the civil rights gains of black citizens (Bartley and Graham 1975;

Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995). Maddox's campaign platform was one of segregation and states' rights.

As the Democratic primary drew near, Maddox was becoming increasingly popular among rural, white Democrats, which was harming Gray's basis of support (Bartley 1970).⁸ A few weeks before the primary, Gray reportedly offered to buy off Maddox by paying his campaign debts in return for Maddox dropping out of the race and endorsing Gray (Henderson 1982). Maddox, who had a reputation of being brutally honest, denounced Gray's attempt to buy him out on television. When the primary rolled around, Maddox shocked everyone by winning a majority of the vote among the five candidate field, with Arnall coming in second. In the runoff, Maddox defeated Arnall for the Democratic nomination.

In the general election, voters were presented with Lester Maddox and Bo Callaway, both of whom were conservatives and staunch segregationists. Some urban voters undertook a write-in campaign for Ellis Arnall. Apparently, enough urban voters were upset with the two party nominees for governor. On Election Day, Callaway won a bare plurality of 3,000 votes over Maddox, but Arnall's write-in campaign prevented Callaway from having more than 50 percent of the vote. Georgia law at the time required that general election winners receive one more vote than 50 percent to win the office (Bullock 1998). If no candidate attained 50

⁸Maddox would go about rural Georgia nailing onto telephone poles campaign signs proclaiming, "THIS IS MADDUX COUNTRY." When his opponents began taking down the signs, Maddox re-attached them at a great height standing on his car using an extra-long handled hammer.

percent, the Georgia legislature decided the winner. Since the General Assembly was overwhelming Democratic, Maddox won the governorship.

Unlike Arkansas and Florida, the Republican party in Georgia had not appealed to newly enfranchised black voters to win the governorship (Bullock 1998). While Georgia Republicans had been so close, the 1970s and 1980s were torturous decades for Republican candidates. The biracial coalition, which all successful Democratic gubernatorial candidates were effective in using, was such that the Republican Party made no substantial gains at the gubernatorial level during this period, despite the increasing Republicanism of these same states at the presidential level (Lamis 1988).

Contrary to the fears of some, Maddox's tenure as governor did not set back the state in terms of racial relations. Integration continued to take place, and Maddox oversaw the largest increase of black employment in the state workforce in history (Bartley 1970). In 1970, former Governor Carl Sanders and state Senator Jimmy Carter sought the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Sanders had a reputation as a progressive who sought more business investment in the state (Cook 1993). Carter's main platform was the reform of state government, and he promised to reduce the number of state agencies through consolidation. Although most political pundits saw Sanders as the frontrunner, Carter managed to win a plurality of the primary vote and force a runoff with Sanders. During the campaign, Carter began calling Sanders "Cuff-Links Carl" because of Sanders' great wealth, and Carter's moniker was extremely effective among rural, Georgia voters (Lamis

1988). In the runoff, Carter defeated Sanders for the Democratic nomination by winning 59.4 percent of the vote compared with Sanders' 40.5 percent in the runoff.

The Republican candidate in 1970 was Hal Suit, an Atlanta news anchor. Suit had won the Republican nomination over Jimmy Bentley, then the state comptroller general. Bentley, along with four other statewide constitutional officers, had converted from the Democratic to Republican party in 1968. Bentley apparently had the potential of forging a Republican coalition. He was from rural Georgia and had great support in his election to comptroller general (Lamis 1988). Although he was also well-liked by urban voters (Bass and DeVries 1995), Bentley was unable to win the gubernatorial nomination in 1970.⁹ Echoing some observations about the southern Republican Party that V.O. Key had made in 1949, a disgruntled Bentley later remarked

The Republicans in this state...keep themselves restricted to small groups and small pockets. They're far more interested in internal Republican politics than in external Republican politics. I didn't give a damn who the state chairman of the Republican Party was...The Republicans just couldn't see that. They could never grasp that vision....I told them they'd either take over the state government in 1970 or they'd lose it for twenty years....(Lamis 1988, 97).

As it turns out, Bentley's words were prophetic. Between 1970 and 1990, no serious Republican candidate challenged the Democrats for control of the governor's chair. In 1974, former state legislator George Busbee easily defeated his Republican challenger, and Georgia voters reelected Busbee in 1978 under a

⁹The other four defectors all lost re-election bids in 1970.

new constitutional amendment that allowed Georgia governors a maximum of two terms. During Busbee's tenure, more business investments began coming to the state. Both moderate to conservative white voters and black voters supported Busbee (Lamis 1988).

In 1982, the state constitution forbade Busbee to run for a third term, but the Republicans had no legitimate chance of capturing this gubernatorial election either. Joe Frank Harris, another former state legislator, easily won election over his Republican opponent. Much like Busbee, Harris successfully forged a coalition of both black and white voters, and Harris easily won reelection in 1986 (Lamis 1988).

By 1990, Georgia politics were again undergoing change, and the Republican Party was gaining more strength (Bullock 1998). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the urban sprawl of Atlanta led to the spread of suburbia in a ring known as the Atlanta Doughnut. In these suburban regions, Georgia Republicans made their first substantial gains at the state level. Also, fewer white Georgians lived in the rural areas as compared with the 1960s and 1970s. Many of these voters had moved to suburban regions and were beginning to vote Republican as well (Lamis 1988).

In 1990, the Democrats nominated Zell Miller, the lieutenant governor since 1974, and the Republicans nominated Johnny Isakson, the minority leader in the Georgia House of Representatives. Miller was the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination although former Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young was also a strong

candidate. Being Georgia's first black candidate for governor in this century, Young drew support from Georgia's black voters, but Miller pulled even greater support among black voters because of his support of a state lottery to fund education (Bullock 1998). Even though Miller and Young were in a runoff, Miller still pulled extraordinarily high black support over the lottery issue.

Isakson was the first legitimate chance for the Republican Party at the gubernatorial level since Callaway in 1966. Despite running a hard campaign, Miller defeated Isakson with 55 percent of the vote, mainly riding a crest of popularity over a proposed state lottery. The Republicans were optimistic after the 1990 election. Isakson had garnered 45 percent of the vote against a popular Democrat, which represented the highest levels of support for a Republican candidate since Callaway's run.

In the 1990s, the partisan balance of Georgia voters is nearing an equilibrium. Since Georgia does not maintain registration data, one is forced to rely on survey data to gauge party identification among the state's voters. According to recent surveys, 38 percent of Georgia voters considered themselves Democrats, 34 percent Republicans, and 29 percent Independents (Bullock 1998). Blacks remain overwhelmingly Democratic, and successful statewide Democratic candidates can win election by carrying the black vote and 40 percent or more of the white vote (Bullock 1998). In 1994, Miller was able to win reelection on the basis of this coalition against a surprisingly strong Republican candidate, Guy Millner.

In 1998, Georgia Republicans again nominated Guy Millner for governor. By this time, Millner was now a veteran of statewide elections, having been the gubernatorial nominee in 1994 and the Republican nominee for U.S. Senate in 1996. Although he lost to Democrat Max Cleland by a very close vote, Millner was still considered strong enough to win the governorship in 1998. Although opinion polls showed Millner defeating any of the potential Democratic nominees early in 1998, he eventually lost to the Democratic nominee, state House member Roy Barnes, who had run for governor in 1990. In a campaign that was especially bitter, many Georgia voters seemed dissatisfied with both men. In the end, Barnes defeated Millner soundly. Crucial to Barnes' victory was an extraordinarily high black turnout statewide. We analyze this campaign in depth in Chapters 4 and 6.


Georgia is a state that had a tradition of rural domination of statewide politics. Unlike her sister states in the Deep South, Georgia had a mechanism, the county-unit system, that maintained this domination of statewide elections in an extreme form until 1962. Like the other Deep South states, 1964 was a breakthrough year for the Republican Party in Georgia, but Georgia was arguably the most Democratic southern state until the 1990s (Lamis 1988; Aistrup 1989; Bullock 1998). The Republicans have yet to elect either a governor or lieutenant governor. Georgia's black population, which is around 30 percent, plays a large role in this continued Democratic success. If a candidate can win a majority of the black vote and 40 percent or more of the white vote, then the Democrats have been able to maintain their superiority over the Republicans. The Republican Party's

best chance at winning the governorship came in 1966. When they lost, the Republicans began a downward spiral at the statewide level. In the 1990s, the Republican Party has gradually become competitive with the Democrats at the congressional and state levels.

LOUISIANA

Undoubtedly, Louisiana is the most colorful state in the South, if not the most colorful state in the Union. To understand Louisiana politics, one needs to understand two factors. First, Louisiana is the most religiously diverse state of the South (Key 1949). Unlike the other southern states, a substantial minority of Louisiana citizens is Roman Catholic. Most of the Roman Catholics are in the Acadiana region of the state and New Orleans, where displaced French settlers from Newfoundland settled in the 18th century. North Louisiana looks like the rest of the South, Protestant and primarily Baptist. Figure 3.1 illustrates the Acadiana region of the state.

Figure 3.1
Acadiana Region of Louisiana



This religious division has profound implications for state politics. Historically, north Louisiana was the haven of conservative, segregationist candidates, while Acadiana was more tolerant and less supportive of segregation (Bass and DeVries 1995). If one examines the registration of blacks in Louisiana at the parish-level, blacks registered in much greater numbers in the southern parishes than in the northern ones (Lamis 1988).

The second factor that drove Louisiana politics for several decades was the Long machine. Huey P. Long was first elected governor in 1928. Long's message was that of the populist, and he avoided racial issues in his rhetoric (Bartley and Graham 1995). He campaigned for the support of the downtrodden, while attacking big business, mainly the oil industry. Long was a polarizing figure in Louisiana politics. For the next thirty years, these two factions divided state politics into Long and Anti-Long factions. V.O. Key (1949) discussed this factionalization of state politics arguing that "Louisiana factionalism more nearly approaches the organizational realities of a two-party system than that of any other southern state" (301). By the 1960s, this factionalism of state politics had begun to dissolve into multiple factions (Landry and Parker 1982; Lamis 1988).

Initial Republican Growth

The Republican Party developed into a viable presidential party more quickly in Louisiana than any other Deep South state, with the state going Republican for the first time in a presidential election in 1956 (Parent and Perry 1998).

Eisenhower's win was not a protest based on civil rights. Rather, the Eisenhower administration believed that offshore gulf oil deposits belonged to the states not the federal government. This position was the main reason that Louisiana voters cast its electoral votes for Eisenhower (Black and Black 1992). In 1964, Louisiana cast her electoral votes for Barry Goldwater, as did all Deep South states (Black and Black 1987; 1992; Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995).

Like the remainder of the Deep South, George Wallace carried Louisiana in 1968 based largely on the support of white voters in north Louisiana. In 1972, Louisiana cast its electoral votes for the Republicans. Richard Nixon won 70 percent of the vote statewide, mainly on the support of those who voted for Wallace in 1968 (Bass and DeVries 1995). Although the state went narrowly for Jimmy Carter in 1976, Louisiana supported Republican presidential candidates during the 1980s. The 1990s have seen a shift in Louisiana presidential politics, with the state being the only one in the Deep South to cast its votes for the Clinton-Gore ticket in both 1992 and 1996 (Bullock and Rozell 1998). While Louisiana was the first Deep South state to go Republican at the presidential level, its future as a GOP presidential stronghold remains in question.

At the congressional level, the Louisiana Republican Party has enjoyed the most success (Parent and Perry 1998). Although Louisiana in 1975 was the last southern state to elect a Republican to the U.S. House, the GOP track record since then has been more favorable (Lamis 1988). During the 1970s, the Republicans won three seats, and that number gradually rose during the 1980s. In the late

1990s, of the seven congressmen from the state, five are Republican (Parent and Perry 1998).

In the U.S. Senate, Louisiana Republicans have not fared quite as well. The first serious Republican senatorial candidate placed third in the general election of 1972, winning 20 percent of the vote. Louisiana's other U.S. Senator at this time was Russell Long, son of Huey Long. Long never received a Republican challenge during his career. When Long retired in 1986, the Republicans had their best opportunity to that point to win a seat in the Senate. Democratic Congressman John Breaux won election to this seat, although his Republican opponent, fellow Congressman Henson Moore was leading Breaux in the late into the campaign. The state's black electorate helped in large part to get Breaux elected after a news story broke late in the campaign that the Republicans were trying to purge black voters from the voting rolls (Parent and Perry 1998).

During the 1990s, controversy has surrounded U.S. Senate races in the state. In 1990, incumbent Bennett Johnston received a stiff challenge from former KKK member-turned-Republican David Duke. During that election, Duke won nearly 44 percent of the vote against Johnston, raising questions about the role that race played in the decision of white Louisiana voters (Kuzenski, Bullock, and Gaddie 1995). In 1996, Republican Woody Jenkins came within 6,000 votes of becoming the first Republican senator from Louisiana in the 20th century. Despite charges of massive vote fraud in favor of Democrat Mary Landrieu, the Senate allowed her election to stand (Parent and Perry 1998).

In the state legislature, the Republican Party has faced a long uphill climb similar to the experience of Republicans in Georgia. Over the years, the Republicans have gradually won seats, mainly in the state's urban and suburban areas, but the Republicans only account for 28 percent of the total legislative seats (Parent and Perry 1998). In the state Senate, the GOP controls 14 of 25 seats, but the numbers in the state House are less encouraging, where Republicans occupy 27 of 77 seats. Still, the Republicans have been claiming more seats in the 1990s, with a pickup of eight seats in the 1996 elections.

The Louisiana Republican Party is one of early success in the Deep South with the state going Republican for the first time in 1956, but the Democratic Party has won the state's electoral votes in the last two presidential elections. At the congressional level, the Republicans first gained notable success in the 1970s. Although the state has yet to elect a Republican senator, the Republican Party holds five of seven U.S. House seats. Increasingly in the last decade, the Republicans have begun to enjoy greater success at the state level. We can see the gradual success of the state GOP when we examine the gubernatorial level in the next section.

Republican Fortunes at the Gubernatorial Level

Unlike her sister states, it did not take Goldwater to prompt strong Republican candidates to run for governor. In March 1964, Republican Charlton Lyons ran against Democrat John J. McKeithen, garnering only 38.5 percent of the

vote (Lamis 1988).¹⁰ While Louisiana was one of the first states to have a serious Republican gubernatorial nominee, it would be 1972 before another serious Republican opponent appeared on the gubernatorial scene.

The 1971-1972 gubernatorial campaign featured two candidates who dominated state politics for the next two decades. Edwin Edwards, the flamboyant Cajun from south Louisiana, won the Democratic nomination for governor. His opponent was David Treen, a conservative Republican from suburban New Orleans. Edwards defeated Treen by a 52-48 percent margin, with Edwards primary support coming from black voters and poor white voters, while Treen was more successful at winning the middle and upper class white vote (Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995).

The 1972 gubernatorial election, however, was technically the last Democrat-Republican election. Governor Edwards proposed a change to gubernatorial elections in Louisiana that the state legislature accepted (Bass and DeVries 1995). The change in election laws benefitted the sitting governor because, beginning in 1975, all gubernatorial candidates run against each other in a nonpartisan open primary (Hadley 1985). While they do not note partisan affiliation on the ballot, politically attuned individuals know the partisan affiliation

¹⁰At this time, the Democratic gubernatorial primary in Louisiana was held in December preceding a presidential election year, with the runoff taking place one month later in January. The general election was held two months later in March of the presidential election year.

of the candidates. If no candidate wins a majority of the vote in the open primary, then the top two candidates, regardless of party, face each other in a runoff.

The potential exists that the top two candidates could be of the same party. Governor Edwards advocated this system in the name of fairness. Bass and DeVries (1995) write that to Edwards it was unfair “for Democrats to fight through two politically bloody primaries and then face a fresh Republican opponent” (181). Another consequence of this system, however, has been the tendency for political moderates to be excluded with the runoff featuring candidates on the opposite ends of the political spectrum (Parent and Perry 1998).

In 1975, Edwards easily won reelection, but 1979 became the breakthrough year for the Republican Party in Louisiana. In that year, David Treen was elected governor in what Lamis (1988) states “in the annals of recent southern elections, there is none stranger” (115). Treen was the lone Republican in a field of six candidates. Treen barely won a plurality of the vote in the primary, and he narrowly defeated his Democratic opponent in the runoff. The other four losing Democratic candidates all openly endorsed Treen against his Democratic runoff opponent. Upon entering office, Treen appointed all four to posts in his administration.

Despite Treen’s election in 1979, one can interpret his victory in different ways. The Republican Party saw Treen’s election as a major boost for their party, while the Democrats pointed out that Treen had won by only 9,000 votes statewide. Also, the defection of the four Democratic opponents to Treen had some impact. Lamis (1988) points out that an analysis of the voting returns reveals a definite

patter of friends and neighbors politics. In Jefferson Parish, Treen rolled up a huge majority in his home parish of 37,000 votes. Nevertheless, the election of Treen boosted the Republican Party.

The 1983 election shattered any illusions about the strength of the GOP when Treen lost his reelection bid. His opponent, Edwin Edwards, won almost 62 percent of the vote against Treen. The prime factor in Edward's overwhelming victory was the black vote. Although Treen attempted to win black support, he received practically none (Lamis 1988). Edwards was simply too popular with black voters, and they helped propel him past Treen in the election.

In 1987, Buddy Roemer, a Democrat, won election as governor. During his term, he converted to the Republican Party. Although initially popular, Roemer alienated the more conservative wing of the GOP because of his refusal to sign a bill restricting abortions in the state (Parent and Perry 1998). In 1991, Roemer drew opposition from Edwin Edwards and another new political face, David Duke. The 1991 election became watched nationwide due to the presence and possible election of David Duke, a former member of the Ku Klux Klan. In the primary, Roemer placed third to Edwards and Duke. In the runoff, David Duke faced Edwin Edwards, but neither candidate was well-liked. Edwards had ethical problems while Duke had problems with his past, but Edwards won easily when voters were given the choice of Edwards or Duke. An important outcome of this election was the support for Duke by white voters living in black belt counties and suburban

areas leading to claims that race was still a prominent factor in southern politics (Giles and Buckner 1995).

The 1995 gubernatorial election, which we examine at great depth, saw the victory of a Democrat-turned-Republican, Mike Foster.¹¹ His Democratic opponent was former Congressman Cleo Fields. Foster defeated Fields in a landslide. Two factors led to this Republican victory. First, Fields and Mary Landrieu, another Democratic candidate, feuded during the open primary. Second, the Republicans were able to win the support of both pro-business Republican voters and socially conservative religious voters (Parent and Perry 1998).

This campaign between Foster and Fields is important to the racial threat literature because Fields was a black candidate. Racial threat argues that white voters may vote in a highly racial mindset because this election featured a white candidate in Foster versus Fields (Sears and Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and Funk 1999). If racial threat voting is taking place among white Louisiana voters, one would expect to find such behavior accentuated due to the circumstances of this particular election.

In closing, the Republican Party has faced a slow, uphill climb to power in Louisiana (Lamis 1988). While the Republicans won at the presidential level in Louisiana in 1956, statewide power mirrored the unevenness found in other Deep South states. The Republicans scored an early gubernatorial victory in Louisiana

¹¹Foster was a member of the state House of Representatives. Foster did not switch to the GOP until the day that he filed for candidacy (Parent and Perry 1998).

when David Treen won in 1979, but voters defeated him soundly in 1983. In the 1990s, the success of the Republicans at the gubernatorial level has rested upon the ability to mobilize pro-business voters and socially conservative religious voters (Parent and Perry 1998). The election of Mike Foster in 1995 revealed the force that these groups of voters represent.


SOUTH CAROLINA

In South Carolina, Republicans gained their earliest and strongest foothold at the state level than any other Deep South state (Lamis 1988). In 1964, not only did Goldwater carry the state, but also U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond converted to the Republican Party. Undoubtedly, Thurmond's conversion gave the growing Republican Party a sense of legitimacy at the state level that it lacked in other states (Bass and DeVries 1995). Kuzenski (1998) describes the South Carolina Republican Party as one which has "two birthdays." The first birthday was the group of white voters who had come to the party in the 1950s because of the appeal of the fiscal conservatism of the Eisenhower administration (Sundquist 1983; Nardulli 1995). The second birthday was the migration of traditional white Democrats whom the civil rights movement disgruntled. Strom Thurmond's conversion led this migration to the GOP. Topping, Lazarek, and Linder (1966) describe these new converts to the Republican fold as "mad Democrats" who came overwhelmingly from small towns and the rural portions of South Carolina. Thus, South Carolina was at the forefront of growing Republicanism in the South. Of all

the Deep South states, South Carolina was the only one to cast its electoral votes for Richard Nixon in 1968 (Bartley and Graham 1975; Bass and DeVries 1995).

South Carolina has a tradition of regionalism between the Piedmont section, those counties north of the fall line where industry employed a majority of whites in industry, and the black belt section of the state. After the Republican breakthrough in 1964, the Republican Party at the state level started to gain a greater following. Traditionally, voters of the Piedmont had been among the most loyal to the Democratic Party, in large part because of working-class concerns (Bartley and Graham 1975). While working-class voters in the Piedmont had traditionally been more progressive, white voters of the Black Belt had been among the most conservative and reactionary in the state. This was accentuated by the fact that South Carolina had historically low turnout rates for white voters (Kuzenski 1998). After 1964, one begins to see a shift. The Piedmont has become arguably the most conservative region of the state, while the Black Belt has become the most loyally Democratic section. This transformation of the Black Belt came in large scale after the implementation of the VRA in which black voters began to make their voice heard. Figure 3.2 illustrates the Piedmont counties and Black Belt counties.

Figure 3.2
South Carolina Urban and Piedmont Counties in 1960



Early Republicanism

While things were beginning to look promising for South Carolina Republicans, the Democrats began to recover. Unlike Mississippi, where the state Democratic Party remained split over race, South Carolina Democrats made a conscious effort to form a biracial coalition to combat the growing Republican Party (Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995; Kuzenski 1998). The Democrats have attempted to appeal to black voters and moderate to liberal white voters. Kuzenski (1998) argues that this has not been a winning combination in the state, although the Democrats are certainly in no danger of dying. The 1998 election demonstrates that the Democrats can still win gubernatorial elections, but white voters have become Republicans *en masse* since the 1960s. It now takes some fundamental misstep by the Republicans to lose statewide elections.

At the presidential level, South Carolina has become a bedrock state for the Republican Party. Since 1964, only Jimmy Carter in 1976 has carried the state for the Democrats. Even during this victory, Carter only narrowly won the state (Lamis 1988; Black and Black 1992). Most observers attribute the high success of the Republican presidential tickets in the state to the early conversion of Thurmond to the GOP (Lamis 1988; Graham and Moore 1994; Bass and DeVries 1995; Kuzenski 1998).

In the U.S. Senate, South Carolina has had a Republican member since Strom Thurmond's 1964 conversion. In fact, Thurmond still serves in the Senate, but the Republicans have not won the state's other Senate seat. Since 1966,

Democrat Ernest (Fritz) Hollings has been the junior senator from the Palmetto State. Although Hollings is in his 70s, he still is not the senior senator from the state due to Strom Thurmond's longevity. During the 1970s, Thurmond moderated on the race issue to the point that blacks have no real reason to vote against him, even if they have no great love for him (Bass and DeVries 1995). By contrast, Hollings started his Senate career as a conservative on the race issue. In 1967, Hollings even voted against the nomination of the first black member to the U.S. Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall (Bass and DeVries 1995). Within a few years though, Hollings moderated on the race issue. Over time, Hollings has built a remarkable biracial coalition that he has ridden to reelection for over thirty years (Lamis 1988; Kuzenski 1998).

In congressional elections, the Republicans saw an early gain in the U.S. House when Democrat Albert Watson converted to the Republican Party in 1966. Due to his support of Barry Goldwater in 1964, House Democrats stripped Watson of his seniority (Bass and DeVries 1995). Watson resigned and successfully ran for election as a Republican (Kuzenski 1998). During the 1970s and 1980s, the state GOP made gradual inroads in congressional elections. The 1990s have been kind to the fortunes of the Republicans in the South Carolina House delegation. Much like Georgia, federal intervention in redistricting had a positive impact on the Republican Party. After redistricting, Republicans occupy four of the six congressional seats. Due to the majority-black 6th Congressional district, four of the state's other districts contain white majorities of over 70 percent. Only the 5th

Congressional district has a white majority of less than 70 percent. Significantly, the four Republicans all come from the overwhelmingly white districts (Kuzenski 1998).

Republican growth in the state legislature has been more successful than in any other Deep South state. In the early 1960s, no Republicans controlled legislative seats. Since the early 1970s, the numbers of Republicans in both the state House and Senate have increased with each election. Since 1995, the Republicans have controlled a majority of seats in the state House, and the GOP was only four seats short of controlling the state Senate after the 1998 elections (Partisan Composition of State Legislatures 1998). This Republican control of the state legislature is even more important in South Carolina because the state legislature possesses great power in controlling state government (Key 1949; Bass and DeVries 1995). Comparatively speaking, South Carolina has a history of weak governors while the state legislature has considerable power.

While the Republican Party enjoyed greater success much earlier than the other Deep South states, the Democratic Party did not go away. Like the other southern states, the state Democratic Party began appealing to a biracial coalition. Unlike her sister states, South Carolina Democrats began appealing to moderate whites and blacks in the late 1960s (Bass and DeVries 1995; Kuzenski 1998). Such a move prevented a split of the Democrats between white and black, like in Mississippi (Lamis 1988). Although the Republicans have had greater success at the state level, Kuzenski (1998) reports that South Carolina Republicans are facing

the challenge of appealing to voters both economically and socially. If the social conservatives take control of the party, then the Democrats might begin to win more elections. As we examine the gubernatorial politics of the state, we see that the 1998 gubernatorial election reveals the fractures in the state's Republican coalition.

Mixed Republican Success at the Gubernatorial Level

The Republicans ran their first gubernatorial candidate in the 20th century in the 1966 election. Republican nominee Joseph Rogers, Jr. lost his bid to defeat the Democratic nominee, Lieutenant Governor Robert E. McNair. In his losing effort, however, Rogers received almost 42 percent of the vote. Rogers ran a campaign that was conservative and pro-business but avoided exploiting the issue of race.

In 1970, the state Republican Party faced a momentous trial. The GOP nominee was Albert Watson, the segregationist Democrat congressman turned Republican, and Watson was the last gubernatorial candidate to run an openly racial campaign (Graham and Moore 1994). Watson's racial appeal did not work for him, and the Democratic nominee, Lieutenant Governor John West, defeated Watson. Results of this election show that the pro-business wing of the Republican Party abandoned Watson, who did the best among rural whites and low-income whites in urban areas. This served as a lesson to the state Republican Party. They could count upon the support of middle and upper class white voters if they avoided the race issue (Lamis 1988; Kuzenski 1998).

The remainder of the 1970s and 1980s saw Republican gubernatorial nominees who ran as fiscal conservatives avoiding the race issue (Graham and Moore 1994). In 1974, South Carolina became the first Deep South state since Reconstruction to elect a Republican governor. Foreshadowing the experience in Louisiana discussed earlier in this chapter, this initial Republican gubernatorial victory came at the misstep of the Democratic Party. The Democratic nominee was a young Charles (Pug) Ravenel, who had defeated ten-term Congressman William Dorn in the primary, but the state Supreme Court ruled in September that Ravenel did not meet residency requirements. Consequently, the nomination went to Dorn by default. Republican nominee James Edwards, a Charleston oral surgeon, managed to defeat Dorn by winning 50.9 percent of the vote (Bass and DeVries 1995).

In 1978, the Democrats regained the governorship. The Democratic nominee was Richard Riley, who was well respected among the black community. The Republican nominee was Edward Long, but Long could not carry over the success of 1974. Riley won 61 percent of the vote. Lamis (1988) argues that Riley demonstrated what the biracial coalition in South Carolina could do with the right Democratic candidate running. Despite making appeals to black voters, Long was unable to sway many blacks to the Republican fold. Carroll Campbell, a young Congressman at that point, stated that the Democrats had to have a moderate candidate to win statewide elections, and Riley was a perfect example of a moderate candidate who was able to appeal to enough moderate voters to win the

election (Kuzenski 1998). In 1982, Riley won a sweeping reelection bid in which he won nearly 70 percent of the vote. The Republicans nominated a sacrificial lamb who received the remaining portion of the vote. Potentially strong candidates, like Campbell, declined to make a run against Richard Riley.

The state constitution did not allow Riley to run for a third term as governor. The 1986 gubernatorial election was a Republican year in South Carolina with Riley's departure. Former Congressman Carroll Campbell received the GOP nomination for governor and faced Democrat Mike Daniel. In his victory over Daniel, Campbell appealed to whites of all classes through his fiscal conservatism. As governor, Campbell preceded to build further upon the reforms enacted in the Riley years. Education, business development, taxes, and health care were all reformed during Campbell's first administration. In 1990, Campbell won reelection in a landslide winning 69 percent. Even more significant was that Campbell pulled in 25 percent of the black vote (Lamis 1988). In South Carolina, Republicans have built a large coalition when they avoid the race issue (Kuzenski 1998).

In 1994, the Republicans maintained their control of the governorship. However, the Republican candidate in 1994 was unlike Carroll Campbell. David Beasley was a Democratic convert to the GOP. In the mid-1980s, Beasley became a born-again Christian, and his politics reflect this religious experience. He appealed more to Christian conservatives than past Republican candidates (Kuzenski 1998). While Beasley won the governorship, he did so only with a scant 50 percent. This relatively weak showing, coming in the year that Republicans

were doing very well across the region and the nation, indicates that the Republican conversion among white voters down the ticket is far from complete. We examine this election in greater depth in the coming chapters.

CONCLUSION

The Republican Party in all Deep South states experienced a rapid burst of political power in 1964. Barry Goldwater became the first Republican candidate to carry all five Deep South states, and this fundamentally changed the Republican Party. After the Goldwater candidacy, the Republican Party moved towards a stance of racial conservatism and outward opposition to civil rights laws (Carmines and Stimson 1989). However, as we have seen, the Republicans found it difficult to follow up on this initial 1964 success. While Republican gubernatorial candidates ran in all three states examined after 1964, no Republican candidate won a governorship until 1974. In Louisiana and South Carolina, the breakthrough for Republican gubernatorial candidates depended in large part to some fundamental misstep among the Democratic Party, while Georgia has yet to elect a Republican governor in the 20th century.

Once federal registrars, authorized by the VRA, began registering black citizens, blacks began to make an impact on the Democratic Party. While the Democrats had become the vanguards of the Jim Crow system during the one-party South era, they had to adapt quickly to maintain office. By examining Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina in the post-VRA era, we see that the Democrats

were more effective in some states than others. Overall, however, the Democrats maintained political control of all three states well into the 1980s and 1990s. One of the reasons for this is the biracial coalition that brought together black voters and moderate white voters (Lamis 1988). By running moderate candidates who appealed to voters of both races, the Democrats were able to maintain their grip on power.

It is only in the 1990s that one begins to find any sustained Republican success below the presidential level in these three states. As detailed in the first chapter, some observers see the success of southern Republicans in the 1990s as dependent upon the race issue. According to this view, the Republican Party is dependent on the support of white voters who vote for Republican candidates on the basis of race. In the coming chapters, we explore the gubernatorial elections in these three states to discern the impact that race may or may not have played in the fortunes of Republican gubernatorial chances in the South.

CHAPTER 4

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGNS IN GEORGIA, LOUISIANA, AND SOUTH CAROLINA

This chapter examines the most recent gubernatorial elections in Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina to determine the role that physical proximity plays in racial threat voting. The analysis in this chapter is primarily quantitative in nature. We perform research at the county-level in all three states. In the next section, we explore the proposed hypotheses and then discuss the results of the quantitative analysis that follows.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As discussed in the first chapter, Key (1949) posited the black belt hypothesis which states that white voters in black belt counties, rural counties whose black population totals 40 percent or greater of the population, are the most adamant about maintaining the status quo with regard to segregation and race relations due to the presence of large black populations. Consequently, the most reactionary white voters, with regard to race, came from the black-belt counties.

At the core of Key's black belt thesis is physical presence. Whites who live in close proximity to large concentrations of black voters are the most influenced politically by those black citizens. During Key's time, black citizens, who had such

an impact upon the voting behavior of white voters, did not enjoy the right to vote. Bartley and Graham (1975) estimate that black registration region wide was at a maximum of 10 percent before the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).¹

Since the time of Key, vast changes have come to the South. Civil rights laws protect blacks from discrimination, and blacks can now freely vote unlike forty years ago. Even after these two events, scholars continued to find evidence that racial voting and racial appeals aimed at white voters by political candidates were taking place in the southern states (Black 1976; Knoke and Kyriazis 1977; Glaser 1994). Research has shown that Key's hypothesis is still valid when one looks at the southern black belt counties that George Wallace carried in 1968 (Lipset and Rabb 1969; Crespi 1971; Schoenberger and Segal 1971; Wasserman and Segal 1973; Black and Black 1973; Wrinkle and Polinard 1973; Wright 1977).

When one examines demographic figures, the black belt has clearly been losing population both white and black in recent years. Black and Black (1987) argue that because of population loss the black belt does not hold the pivotal role that it did during Key's day. Has the racial tone of the area disappeared completely though?

¹The exact number of black registrants is difficult to discern. All southern states kept inaccurate records during this time. In addition, there were no federal laws requiring states to keep registration data for a specified amount of time. Consequently, registrars would often destroy records after an election. Mississippi holds the record for being the worst record-keepers in the South. In 1965, when federal registrars began combing the records of southern states looking for black registration data, they found in Mississippi that the records had been destroyed "by fire" in 72 of Mississippi's 82 counties (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1968).

Racial threat states that race still plays an important role in southern politics. It contends that whites who live in areas of high black populations feel threatened by these black voters. Consequently, these white voters vote for the most racially conservative candidates available. If racial threat is at work, one would expect to find it in the black belt counties of the southern states. We would also expect to see such a racially motivated vote to favor the Republican Party since most blacks do not support the GOP (Miller and Shanks 1996). Unlike Key's black belt hypothesis that pertained only to rural counties, the racial threat hypothesis contends that urban residents are less likely to have their vote influenced by racial threat. Urbanism has often been associated with greater tolerance on racial issues (Black 1973; Abrahamson 1980). Accordingly, we include urbanism in the analysis to determine whether urbanism has an effect upon voting.

Giles and Buckner (1995) found racial threat at play in the David Duke candidacies of 1990 and 1991 in Louisiana. We examine Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina to determine the role that race plays upon the voting behavior of white voters in these states. As discussed previously, Georgia, Louisiana and South Carolina have election turnout figures based upon the race of the voter, while the other two Deep South states of Alabama and Mississippi maintain no such data.

Due to varying forms of data and the timing of elections, we examine different elections in these three states. In Georgia, the state has maintained racial turnout data only since 1996, allowing for an examination of the 1998 gubernatorial election in Georgia. In Louisiana, we analyze the 1995 gubernatorial campaign.

Finally, in South Carolina, we have the opportunity to analyze both the 1994 and 1998 elections. This is also desirable because David Beasley, the Republican candidate on both occasions, won in 1994 but lost his reelection bid in 1998. As we will see, racial issues probably played a factor in both Beasley's victory and subsequent defeat.

If racial threat appears in southern elections, we would expect for the Republican Party to benefit since blacks are overwhelmingly Democratic (Lamis 1988; Miller and Shanks 1996). The literature abounds with discussions of how the Republican Party has gradually gained fertile ground in most of the South. Undoubtedly, racial issues initiated this Republican conversion (Cosman 1966; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Black and Black 1992; Carmines, Huckfeldt, and McCurley 1995; Miller and Shanks 1996). If racial threat does motivate some white voters, does it always exist on the basis of physical proximity to large black populations? We attempt to answer this question in the remainder of this paper.

HYPOTHESES

In 1994 and 1995, the Republican nominees for governor should do well among white voters in black belt counties. In these counties, white voters are more likely than other white voters to cast a vote for the GOP candidate based upon race. In black belt counties, white voters may feel threatened by the large number of black residents. Consequently, these whites may be more likely to vote for the

Republican candidate. We might also expect this racial voting to occur in suburban counties where white voters may have fled from from more diverse urban areas.

Education often affects one's voting behavior (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Miller and Shanks 1996). Giles and Buckner (1995) found that less education made one more susceptible to racial threat voting. The second hypothesis involves the education of white voters. In all probability, college educated white voters, who live near large black populations, are less likely to vote for the Republican nominee in these two states because of a reactionary response to large black populations.

Since previous studies have argued that urbanism makes one more tolerant to racial diversity, we examine the role of racial threat upon urban voters. The third hypothesis states that voters in urban areas are less likely to support Republican candidates because of racial threat. Due to the greater racial toleration of white voters in urban areas, one would not expect to see the same patterns of behavior among urban whites as opposed to rural, or even suburban white voters.

DATA AND MEASURES

The percentage of white persons with college experience are whites with some type of college education. These figures include post-secondary educational attainment ranging from some college to a Ph.D. (U.S. Census 1990).

We obtained the percentage black of a county's (or parish's) population from the U.S. Census. The term black belt counties and parishes refer to those counties

and parishes where blacks made up the highest percentage of the population.²

Urban counties and parishes are those defined by the U.S. Census, which includes any town larger than 2500 in population. Dividing the number of urban residents by the county's total population, results in the percentage of residents in a county that reside in an urban area.

In the models, the white vote for the Republican candidates is extrapolated based upon the racial turnout data that the three states keep examined. To arrive at the dependent variable, the percent of white GOP voters, we take the black ballots and multiply by .10 to give us a GOP black vote. Since blacks are overwhelmingly loyal to the Democratic Party, this assumption seems to be a safe one (Miller and Shanks 1996).³ Overall, black loyalty to the Democratic Party tends to be the highest in the black belt counties of the Deep South (Black and Black 1987; 1992; Lamis 1988; Bullock 1998). Next, we take the total number of GOP ballots and subtract the GOP black vote. This gives us the closest possible approximation for a GOP white vote. To compute the percentage of GOP white

²Parishes are administrative units analogous to counties. Louisiana has 64 parishes.

³Lamis (1988) presents data on the historic loyalty of southern blacks to the Democratic Party. More recently, blacks voted for Democratic gubernatorial candidates at extraordinarily high rates. In the 1998 Georgia campaign, Roy Barnes garnered 90 percent of the black vote (CNN/AllPolitics Exit Poll 1998). South Carolina has featured similar patterns. In 1994 and 1998, Democrats Nick Theodore and Jim Hodges respectively won 92 percent of the black vote in both elections (CNN/AllPolitics Exit Poll 1994; 1998). In 1995, Democrat Cleo Fields won 95 percent of the black vote in Louisiana (University of New Orleans Poll 1995).

votes for a Republican candidate, we divide the GOP white vote by the total number of white ballots cast.

CASE STUDIES AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

We now test the hypotheses detailed above in the three states that this chapter examines. Unlike the gubernatorial campaigns during the segregation era, mainstream candidates generally make no blatant racial appeals (Black 1976; Lamis 1988). Today, many blacks find Republican proposals such as welfare reform and elimination of affirmative action to be objectionable, but some white voters may vote for a Republican candidate based solely on ideas that they perceive as anti-black.

Georgia 1998

Georgia has been among the most loyal states to the Democratic Party (Lamis 1988; Aistrup 1989). Since the end of Reconstruction, no Republican candidate has won a gubernatorial campaign in the state. Yet, to say no inter-party competition took place in the state would be misleading. Unlike Arkansas that Key (1949) found the most solidly Democratic state, factions within the Georgia Democratic Party have existed. In fact, Georgia has a long legacy of bi-factionalism (Key 1949; Black 1983; Lamis 1988).⁴ From the 1930s through the 1950s, Georgia

⁴Key (1949) defines factionalism as “any combination, clique, or grouping of voters and political leaders who unite at a particular time in support of a candidate (16). In some states like Florida, factions appear for only an election or two, while states like Georgia and Louisiana featured factions that were long-lasting. In the states with durable factions, the factionalism usually revolved around a candidate,

featured a bi-factionalism that resembled in some ways a two-party competition, with the Talmadge faction, whom the rural areas supported, versus the Anti-Talmadge faction, a more progressive urban faction (Key 1949; Bartley 1970; Black 1983; Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995).

As the pretense of two-party competition within the Democratic Party was disappearing, the Republican Party slowly began to grow in the state beginning in the 1950s. As in much of the South, Georgia had no organized Republican Party until the 1960s. The only Republican candidates came from extreme north Georgia and typified Key's (1949) discussion of "mountain Republicanism" in a few southern states. Beginning in the 1950s, some Republicans sought office in urban areas of the state, primarily supported by upper-class white urban voters looking for an alternative to the rural Democratic candidates (Bartley 1970; Bass and DeVries 1995). In 1964, the Republican Party arrived on the scene in a monumental way with the Goldwater landslide and the victory of Howard "Bo" Callaway in the 3rd congressional district.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Callaway came extremely close to winning the governorship in 1966, but he lost by a provision of the state constitution that threw the close election into the Democratic-dominated State House (Bullock 1998). After this near-win in 1966, the Republican Party at the state level fell into a chasm from which it would not emerge until the 1990s. The next serious Republican gubernatorial candidate came in 1990 when Johnny Isakson won 45

like Talmadge in Georgia or Long in Louisiana (Black and Black 1987).

percent of the vote against Democrat Zell Miller. In 1994, first-time candidate Guy Millner, a wealthy Atlanta businessman, nearly defeated Miller, mainly due to Miller's controversial proposal to remove the Confederate battle flag from the state flag.

In 1998, Millner was again the Republican gubernatorial nominee, while Roy Barnes, a longtime member of the Georgia General Assembly, was the Democratic nominee.⁵ While Millner had the advantage of running against a weakened Miller in a very Republican year nationwide in 1994, Millner did not face the same environment in 1998. Since the 1994 election, Miller had become one of the most popular governors in Georgia history, and his popularity carried over to Barnes. Black voter turnout was extremely high in the 1998 election, an event which is always beneficial to Democratic candidates in Georgia (Lamis 1988; Bullock 1998). Simultaneously, Barnes and Millner disgruntled many white voters due to the negativity of television commercials run by both candidates. Consequently, Millner lost to Barnes, only garnering 44 percent of the vote.

Figure 4.1 illustrates the statewide vote for both Barnes and Millner. Table 4.1 lists descriptive statistics for each variable, while Table 4.2 demonstrates all significant and non-significant findings after we test the model. We test the hypotheses, using OLS regression, to see the impact that race played in this election.

⁵Georgia governors have been limited to two consecutive four-year terms since 1977. Thus, Zell Miller could not run again in 1998.

Figure 4.1
County-Level Vote Returns




Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics for Georgia Model Variables

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Median	Range
Black percentage of county population	27.42	17.33	27.70	79.40
Republican normal vote	52.84	8.59	53.40	50.53
Urban counties	29.75	27.15	27.70	97.48
Percentage of whites with college experience	21.83	8.26	19.73	46.66
Percent of white votes for Millner-1998	51.52	8.15	51.68	43.34

Table 4.2
Regression of Percent of White Votes for Millner

Percent of white votes for Millner-1998	
Black percentage of county population	.273**** (.064)
Republican normal vote	.725**** (.124)
Urban counties	-.038 (.024)
Percentage of whites with college experience	.387**** (.086)
Constant	-1.946
R ²	.40
Adjusted R ²	.38
N	159

Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001

Based on the results of the multivariate analysis, it appears that physical proximity racial threat voting was taking place among white Georgia voters in 1998. Overall, the model is successful in predicting 38 percent of the variance in the dependent variable, the white vote for Millner. The average error made when predicting the white vote for Millner is 6.5. As we see from Table 4.2, a large part of the strength of the model derives from the strength of the white collegiate variable, but the association is in the opposite direction from the hypothesis. Therefore, it is dangerous to read too much into the overall strength of the model due to this factor.

Among white voters in Georgia's black belt counties, race was having an effect upon voting patterns. The first hypothesis suggests that white voters in the black belt are more susceptible to racially influenced voting than their counterparts elsewhere. The findings are in a manner consistent with the hypothesis. The unstandardized coefficient had an impact of .27 on the dependent variable, the percentage of the white vote for Guy Millner.

In an attempt to take into account white voters who may not normally vote Republican, we use a Republican normal vote. The GOP base vote is an average of the percentage of votes received by Republican presidential candidates in the last three elections. Past research indicates that such normal votes are effective in determining voters who typically vote a particular political party (Bond, Fleischer, and Talbert 1997). Of course, the GOP base vote has an extremely strong positive correlation with the Millner vote. The Republican base vote had a positive

relationship of .73 with the dependent variable, but the independent variable, percent black of a county, still had a strong positive impact on the dependent variable despite the presence of the base vote. Again, this suggests that living close to large concentrations of black voters had an impact upon white Georgia voters in the 1998 gubernatorial election, beyond the long-term presidential base vote.

The urban variable shows a negative impact on the Millner vote at $-.04$. The urbanization hypothesis suggests that racial threat does not influence urban white voters to the extent of their rural counterparts. While a negative association exists between urbanism and the Millner vote, the strength of the relationship is not statistically significant. This might suggest that urbanization does not play as great a role as thought in mitigating racial attitudes. Prudence demands that one is guilty of interpreting too much in this relationship due to its statistical insignificance, but it does appear that physical proximity threat voting is not endemic of only rural areas.

In a surprising finding, college education did affect the white vote for Millner, but in a manner contrary to our hypothesis. The education hypothesis contended that some amount of college education would lessen the impact of physical proximity racial threat voting. According to the model, the relationship is in the opposite direction than we might expect. The relationship between college educated white voters and the Millner vote was .39. Further, this relationship was significant at less than the .001 level. Past research indicates that white voters with

less than a college education are prone to racial threat voting (Giles and Buckner 1995). In the 1998 Georgia gubernatorial election, this is not the case. Perhaps, college education has less of an impact on racial attitudes than assumed, or it is closely related to other measures such as the GOP normal vote. A bivariate correlation revealed that an association of .54 at less than the .001 level existed between the GOP normal vote and some college education. This helps to explain some of the relationship between the dependent variable and college education. As we will see in the Louisiana and South Carolina models, both of these states have fewer college educated white citizens, making it more likely that the larger Georgia collegiate population might act in ways contrary to the ways of those in Louisiana or South Carolina.

In summary, it appears that racial threat as activated by physical proximity to large black populations was present in the 1998 Georgia gubernatorial election. According to the model, it also appears that physical proximity's impact is not relegated solely to rural areas. The impact of some college education also had an influence upon the Millner vote, and the impact was positive. The educational hypothesis suggests that college education would possibly decrease the effect of physical proximity on racial threat voting. One cannot read the significance of this relationship between college education and the white Millner vote as indicating education did not lead to racial threat voting. Instead, college education was highly correlated with the GOP normal vote, helping to explain this strong association.

Louisiana 1995

Much like Georgia, Louisiana has a history of bi-factional politics (Key 1949; Black and Black 1987; Lamis 1988). The Longs and the Anti-Longs were factions that clashed within the Louisiana Democratic Party. Unlike the Talmadge/Anti-Talmadge split in Georgia, the Longs and the Anti-Long competition was a conflict of longer duration. Through the 1960s, the Long camp was usually the victor in statewide elections, but the Anti-Longs never really died out despite their lack of widespread success. By the 1970s, both factions had ceased to exist (Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995). The last Long candidate to hold statewide office was Russell Long, son of Huey, when he retired from the U.S. Senate in 1986.

As we saw in the last chapter, the Republican Party in Louisiana developed more quickly than any other Deep South state. In 1956, Louisiana became the first Deep South state to vote for a Republican presidential candidate, due to Eisenhower's position on offshore oil deposits (Black and Black 1992). Also, viable Republican gubernatorial candidates preceded the Goldwater landslide of 1964. Despite this initial success, it would take Louisiana Republicans until 1979 to win the governorship. As Lamis (1988) discusses, David Treen, a Democrat-turned-Republican, won the governorship in 1979, but the election was odd, even by Louisiana's standards. Treen was the beneficiary of being endorsed by popular Democratic politicians. Although he won in 1979, he lost by a wide margin in his 1983 reelection bid.

Since 1975, Louisiana uses a nonpartisan primary to determine governors.⁶ This provides for a battle royale between multitudes of candidates from both parties. The two candidates with the highest vote totals from the primary face each other in a runoff. The 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial runoff pitted Republican Mike Foster against Democratic Congressman Cleo Fields, who was black. The fact that there was a white candidate running against a black candidate might have provided for even heightened racial threat voting among some white voters. Additionally, one might expect to find heavier black turnout due to the presence of a black candidate (Bullock, Gaddie, and Kuzenski 1995). Foster won the election with 63.5 percent of the vote in route to winning to winning 58 of the state's 62 parishes. Figure 4.2 illustrates the statewide vote for both candidates.

Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in the Louisiana model, and Table 4.4 displays the results of regression analysis for the Louisiana model. Like our analysis of Georgia, we use a GOP base vote to net out white voters who might not usually vote Republican. Given the religious division in the state, the model also uses a Roman Catholic control variable. The variable takes a percentage of those residents that are Roman Catholic as compared with the overall parish population. Since Fields had represented two different versions of the racially drawn 4th congressional district, we include a dummy variable for those

⁶All gubernatorial candidates run against each other in a nonpartisan primary. The two candidates with the highest percentage of the primary vote face each other in a primary runoff. The winner of the runoff becomes the governor. No consideration is taken into account for parties. It is possible that two candidates in the runoff may be of the same party (Lamis 1988).

parishes that Fields once represented. The reason for the creation and inclusion of this variable is based on the rationale that white voters in the old 4th district might not cast votes based on racial threat since Fields had represented them in the past. Since a black congressman had represented them, some of the fear that leads white voters to cast a vote based on race alone might have been absolved.

Figure 4.2
County-Level Vote Returns




Table 4.3
Descriptive Statistics for Louisiana Model Variables

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Median	Range
Black percentage of parish population	30.45	14.10	29.50	60.10
Fields control variable	.46	.50	.000	1.00
Republican normal vote	51.10	7.93	51.98	33.40
Roman Catholic control variable	24.95	26.22	10.10	84.18
Urban counties	42.37	28.33	37.41	99.89
Percentage of whites with college experience	20.29	6.55	18.53	30.73
Percent of white votes for Foster-1995	85.25	8.42	86.86	63.47

Table 4.4
Regression of Percent of White Votes for Foster

	Percent of white votes for Foster-1995
Black percentage of parish population	-.223* (.119)
Fields control	2.492 (2.327)
Republican normal vote	.408* (.200)
Roman Catholic control	-.036 (.049)
Urban parishes	-.040 (.047)
Percentage of whites with college experience	-.626* (.233)
Constant	81.979
R ²	.26
Adjusted R ²	.18
N	64

Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.10

**p<.05

***p<.01

****p<.001

The results from the model indicate that racial threat voting is not occurring. Overall, the model predicts 18 percent of the variance in the dependent variable, white vote for Mike Foster. The standard error of the estimate is 7.68.

According to the model, white voters in black belt parishes were less likely to vote for Foster. While the relationship between parishes with greater numbers of black residents is significant with the white vote for Foster, the direction of the relationship is in the opposite direction than the hypothesis predicts. Indeed, living in a parish with a high black population appears to make white voters less likely to vote for Foster.

While the association between the urban parishes and Foster's percentage of the vote is negative, the relationship is neither large nor statistically significant. While white voters in urban parishes were less likely to vote for Foster according to the model, reading too much into the relationship would be hazardous due to its minuscule size and its insignificance. Perhaps one reason for this relative weakness of the variable is that the only urban parish that Foster did not carry was Orleans Parish.

White voters with college education were more likely to cast a vote for Cleo Fields. This hypothesis did perform in the expected direction. The relationship was $-.626$ between whites with a college education and a vote for Foster. A bivariate correlation reveals that an association exists of $-.379$ on at the $.001$ level between white voters with a college education and a high black percentage of a parish's population. While college educated white voters live in black belt parishes, they

were not as many as in metropolitan areas. Still a negative impact exists, as predicted.

The Roman Catholic control variable had little impact upon the dependent variable. The Roman Catholic parishes were less likely to vote for Foster, although the relationship was not statistically significant. While Foster is from South Louisiana, he is Protestant. Given Foster's conservative stands on social issues like abortion, one might expect Roman Catholic voters to be more receptive to Foster. A bivariate correlation between the Catholic control variable and the GOP base vote reveals a relationship of $-.34$ at the $.01$ level. As the percentage of a parish's population that is Roman Catholic rises, the support for Republican presidential candidates decrease. Given this information, it is not as surprising that Foster did not fare well among Roman Catholic voters.

Finally, we tested the parishes that Fields represented in either configuration of the 4th congressional district. One might expect those white voters in these parishes represented by Fields would be more familiar with him. Consequently, they may not feel threatened by the fact that he was black. The finding in Table 4.4 reveals a positive association between the Fields control variable and the Foster vote, although the relationship was not statistically significant. Due to the unstable nature of this relationship, it would be dangerous to draw any conclusions from this result.

In Louisiana, racial threat based on physical proximity to large black populations apparently was not at work in the gubernatorial election of 1995. In

fact, the relationship between whites in the black belt and the Foster vote was a negative one, which was in the opposite direction predicted by the hypothesis. Although Giles and Buckner (1995) found racial threat voting operating in the 1991 gubernatorial runoff between David Duke and Edwin Edwards, this analysis provides no evidence that this was the case in 1995. This may underscore a basic necessity of physical proximity racial threat voting: political context sets the stage for racial threat voting. Without explicitly racial issues or candidates, it may be that the likelihood of racial threat voting based on physical space lessens, despite this election having a white candidate and black candidate in the runoff. Although such a racial difference between these two candidates might have some other type of racial appeal, it did not figure prominently in the physical proximity analysis. In Chapter 5, we take a closer look at the potential impact of the fact that a black candidate was running against a white candidate.

One of the factors that may have hurt Fields was the feud within the Democratic Party (Parent and Perry 1998). Fields had fought a bitter campaign against Democrat Mary Landrieu in the open primary. When Fields placed second to get into the runoff against Foster, Landrieu refused to endorse him. This may have led some white voters to vote for Foster. This again suggests that physical proximity racial threat voting does not occur in all cases, even when a black candidate is running against a white one. The political climate must be conducive to physical proximity racial threat voting. Otherwise, other issues will come to the forefront.

While the statistical analysis does not support a conclusion that race had a definitive impact in the 1995 gubernatorial election, it might be possible that the electorate was so racially polarized that Foster received the bulk of the white vote regardless of racial threat (Parent and Perry 1998). In part, we examine this question further in the next chapter when exploring the role of symbolic racial attitudes in racial threat voting. Religion apparently had no significant role either. Although Foster was the candidate of the Christian Right, this apparently was not enough for him to sway Roman Catholic voters. In the past, religion has often played an equally important, if not more important, role in Louisiana politics (Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995). The 1995 election apparently was not one of them.

What may have been more important than anything else in 1995 was public image. Although Mike Foster is a millionaire, he portrayed himself as a working man with a common sense approach to government. To underscore this image, Foster appeared in campaign ads wearing a welder's cap and engaging in outdoor recreation (Parent and Perry 1998). Foster also portrayed himself as a gun owner and a Christian. Foster was also the author of Louisiana's concealed handgun law, which made it easier for law-abiding citizens to receive such a permit. Given Louisiana's propensity towards populism (Key 1949; Lamis 1988), this alone may have been enough to mobilize the working class in the state to cast their votes for Foster, preventing race from becoming an openly mobilizing factor in this particular campaign.

South Carolina 1994

Historically, race played an important role in the politics of the Palmetto State.⁷ As Lamis (1988) details, South Carolina Democrats did not break down into constant race-baiting characteristic of Mississippi, where the state's white Democratic leaders in the 1960s refused to court black votes resulting in black citizens creating the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. The main reason for this was that the Republican Party within the state received a huge boost in the 1960s. Besides the Goldwater sweep in 1964, United States Senator Strom Thurmond was an early convert to the Republican Party, which led to some early success for the Republicans within the state. With Thurmond's conversion, many white voters disgruntled with the civil rights movement began voting Republican in large numbers (Topping, Lazarek, and Linder 1966). As discussed in the previous chapter, South Carolina was the first Deep South state since Reconstruction to elect a Republican governor when James Edwards was elected in 1974.

Since the initial gubernatorial breakthrough for the GOP, the period from 1974 through 1994, both parties had held the governor's seat equally. From 1978 to 1986, Democrat Richard Riley was governor. Succeeding Riley, Carol Campbell was the Republican governor from 1986 to 1994. The 1994 South Carolina gubernatorial election featured Republican David Beasley and Democrat Nick Theodore. Beasley was a candidate unlike Campbell who appealed to

⁷Only Mississippi has a greater percentage of its population that is black than South Carolina.

conservative fiscal voters and business leaders. In contrast, Beasley was more appealing to Christian conservatives. This trend was a new one in South Carolina Republican politics (Kuzenski 1998).

In addition, Beasley ran on a promise to keep the Confederate battle flag flying over the State Capitol. Since the Brown decision in 1954, the state has flown both the battle flag as well as the state flag atop the State Capitol.⁸ Many blacks see the battle flag as a racial issue while many white voters, especially those in the lower socioeconomic class, support the flying of the flag (Clark 1997). Therefore, we might expect to see some racial voting among white voters due to this stand alone. In a very good year for Republicans, Beasley won with only 51 percent. Contrast this with Campbell's reelection number of 69 percent in 1990, and Beasley was not as successful in holding together the coalition built by Campbell.⁹ Figure 4.3 illustrates the counties won by both candidates.

Table 4.5 presents descriptive statistics for the South Carolina model variables, and Table 4.6 displays the results of the model. Like the previous two states, we utilize a GOP base vote. The GOP base vote has an extremely strong positive correlation with the Beasley vote. Overall, the model predicts 38 percent of the variance in the dependent variable, the white vote for David Beasley. The standard error of the estimate is 5.69.

⁸Alabama followed the same practice until 1995. Both Georgia and Mississippi have the battle flag incorporated into their state flags.

⁹Campbell won 25 percent of the black vote in 1990 against a black Democratic candidate (Lamis 1988).

Figure 4.3 1994 County-Level Returns



Table 4.5
Descriptive Statistics for South Carolina Model Variables

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Median	Range
Black percentage of county population	37.58	16.18	36.81	60.71
Republican normal vote	53.30	9.22	53.83	35.57
Urban counties	37.44	21.67	33.95	87.98
Percentage of whites with college experience	23.26	8.61	22.02	32.90
Percent of white votes for Beasley-1994	65.09	7.20	63.80	29.52
Percent of white votes for Beasley-1998	58.85	11.10	57.98	74.72

Note: Only the figures of the Beasley vote in 1994 and 1998 changed during the two elections. Thus, all descriptive statistics for the South Carolina models are included in this table.

Table 4.6
Regression of Percent of White Votes for Beasley-1994

Percent of white votes for Beasley-1994	
Black percentage of county population	.680**** (.136)
Republican normal vote	1.213**** (.261)
Urban counties	-.035 (.062)
Percentage of whites with college experience	-.225 (.221)
Constant	-18.597
R ²	.43
Adjusted R ²	.38
N	46
Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.	
*p<.10	**p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001

The first hypothesis, which posits that white voters in counties with large concentrations of blacks are more likely to vote for Republican candidates for racial reasons, is tested on South Carolina. Based on regression analysis, support exists for the racial threat hypothesis at work in the black belt counties of South Carolina. In fact the support of the black belt hypothesis is very strong with the unstandardized coefficient being .680. Some of this feeling may be connected to support for Confederate symbols as promised by Beasley.

Regarding the urbanization hypothesis, no statistically significant relationship exists between the urban counties and the Beasley vote, although the results did have an impact in the predicted manner. It does not appear that the urban white voters were voting under a feeling of racial threat in large numbers, but we cannot say that race was affecting urban white voters. The only two urban counties that Beasley carried were Greenville and Spartanburg, both of which are in the Piedmont section of the state that has a history of being supportive of the GOP (Lamis 1988).

Among whites with a college education, there was a negative impact of $-.225$ with the Beasley vote, although the relationship was not statistically significant. Apparently these more educated white voters did not feel threatened. Also, support for Confederate symbols often declines among more highly educated white voters (Clark 1997).

As expected, the GOP normal vote was extremely significant with the Beasley vote. This variable had an impact of 1.21 on the dependent variable, the

white vote for Beasley. For every unit increase in the GOP normal vote, there was a 1.21 increase in the Beasley vote. This indicates that Beasley's election hinged upon white voters who normally voted Republican. It also underscores that not many white Democratic voters crossed party lines to vote for Beasley, but most white South Carolinians now affiliate with the GOP (Lamis 1988; Kuzenski 1998).

In South Carolina, one facet of the model is upheld. In 1994, some racial threat voting was taking place in counties with high black population, but the data do not support the other hypotheses. Although the relationships were in the predicted direction, neither college education nor urbanism was statistically significant predictors of the Beasley percentage of the vote. Still, white voters in the black belt and white voters who normally voted Republican were crucial to Beasley's election. By selecting only black belt counties in the model, the bivariate correlation between the white percentage of a black belt county's population and the Republican normal vote reveals a relationship of .83 at the .001 level. This indicates that white voters in the South Carolina black belt are very loyal to the Republican Party. It is not surprising that Beasley had such great success among white voters there. The 1994 election indicates that Beasley's electoral base was extremely tenuous. In 1998, Beasley discovered the hard way just how fragile his basis of support was.

South Carolina 1998

Since South Carolina maintained racial turnout data for both elections during the dissertation's time frame, we are able to test the model again. In 1998, Beasley was the incumbent governor seeking a second term, and his Democratic opponent was Jim Hodges. During his first term, Beasley attempted to remove the Confederate battle flag from the State Capitol. Many white voters, especially lower socioeconomic class rural white voters, support the continued flying of the battle flag in South Carolina. The state legislature rebuffed Beasley's attempt at removing the flag, and it continued flying over the Capitol (Kuzenski 1998).

Promising in 1994 to keep the flag flying, Beasley reneged and paid a heavy political price for this effort. Many of his white supporters became disgruntled. In fact, some whites adorned their cars with bumper stickers proclaiming, "Dump the Governor—Keep the Flag!" (Kuzenski 1998). Given Beasley's rather narrow victory in 1994, political pundits predicted that Beasley might be headed for trouble in 1998. As it turned out, Beasley lost his reelection bid, garnering only 45 percent of the vote against Democrat Hodges. Figure 4.4 illustrates the counties won by each candidate. We tested the same model used in 1994 on the 1998 contest. Table 4.7 presents all significant and insignificant relationships between the dependent variable, white vote for David Beasley.

Figure 4.4
1998 County-Level Returns




Table 4.7
Regression of Percent of White Votes for Beasley-1998

	Percent of white votes for Beasley-1998
Black percentage of county population	.142 (.275)
Republican normal vote	.435 (.527)
Urban counties	-.070 (.126)
Percentage of whites with college experience	-.021 (.446)
Constant	33.442
R ²	.024
Adjusted R ²	-.071
N	46
Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.	
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001	

Clearly, the identical model that explained 38 percent of the variance in the white vote for Beasley in 1994 was not effective at explaining his vote in 1998. At 11 percent, the 1998 model explains very little of the dependent variable, while the standard error of the estimate is 11.49. Clearly, the political environment in the state was drastically different in 1998 than it was in 1994.

The first hypothesis which argues that white voters in the black belt are more likely to vote for Republican candidates was not statistically significant. The relationship between this variable and the dependent variable was .142. While the relationship was in the expected direction, the relationship is not statistically significant. Again, Beasley's retreat on the Confederate flag may explain the precipitous decline among black belt whites who were strongly supportive of Beasley just four years earlier.

The urbanization hypothesis was not a good predictor of the Beasley vote in 1998 either. While the urbanization variable did have a negative impact of $-.07$, the relationship was not statistically significant. Again, an unsurprising finding, but interesting nonetheless. According to the model, the relationship between urban white voters and Beasley percentage of the vote dropped slightly. This indicates that perhaps some less educated urban white voters were abandoning Beasley as well.

Among white voters with some college education, the relationship between this variable and Beasley's percentage of the vote was negative. The impact of these two variables was $-.021$, although no statistical significance was present in

the relationship. Given the lack of a solid relationship, one must interpret this figure with caution. Some white voters with college education were slightly more supportive of Beasley in 1998.

In a finding that was indicative of Beasley's vulnerable position in 1998, a meager .435 relationship existed between the GOP base vote and the Beasley vote. This relationship was not statistically significant. Compared with the significant 1.213 impact of the GOP base vote in 1994 to the small relationship in 1998 gives one an idea of how Beasley had alienated white voters who typically vote Republican in South Carolina. To gauge the change in support for Beasley, we ran additional analysis using the difference in Beasley's support from 1994 to 1998 as the dependent variable. Table 4.8 features the results of this analysis.

Table 4.8
Regression of Difference in the White Vote for Beasley, 1994-1998

	Difference in white vote for Beasley	
	<u>Full Model</u>	<u>Bivariate Model</u>
Black percentage of county population	-.534** (.250)	-.192* (.097)
Republican normal vote	-.254 (.594)	----
Urban counties	-.065 (.116)	----
Percentage of whites with college experience	.139 (.408)	----
White vote for Beasley-1994	-.564 (.377)	----
Constant	54.130	.976
R ²	.19	.08
Adjusted R ²	.09	.06
N	46	46

Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.10

**p<.05

***p<.01

****p<.001

Overall, these two models explain 9 and 6 percent of the variance respectively. Still, it appears that race had an effect on white support for Beasley in 1998. As the table demonstrates, Beasley lost support among his two most important bases of support: white voters in the black belt and white Republicans. The only variable to reach statistical significance was among white voters in South Carolina's black belt region. It is clear that these white voters abandoned Beasley *en masse* during the 1998 campaign. While only the black percentage variable was statistically significant, overall the model indicates that Beasley lost large amounts of support from loyal white Republicans, urban voters, whites in the black belt, and the 1994 Beasley backers. The bivariate regression reveals that alone whites in the black belt turned on Beasley in 1998. Again, this suggests that most of the drop in Beasley's support was due to race.

In 1998, the model that was moderately successful in 1994 was not a good predictor of the Beasley percentage of the vote. None of the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variables were statistically significant. In 1998, racial threat voting was not taking place as it may have been in 1994. The model again underscores a prerequisite for physical proximity racial threat voting. Political context plays a large role in the presence or absence of racial voting. In 1994, one of the political issues that may have led white voters to vote under a feeling of racial threat was Beasley's promise of keeping the Confederate flag flying despite the protests of some black voters.

By 1998, Beasley broke that promise by trying to take the flag down from the State Capitol. Although unsuccessful, Beasley paid a price for his change of heart because many white voters abandoned Beasley over his gaffe. In addition, the Democratic nominee made a promise that he would make no attempts to remove the flag from the Capitol. This may have led some white voters to abandon Beasley for Hodges. Again, this may reiterate that political context plays a large role in racial threat voting.

CONCLUSION

After testing the models in these elections, the findings indicate mixed results. The 1998 Georgia gubernatorial election lends support to the idea of physical proximity racial threat voting. In that model, three of four independent variables had a statistically significant impact upon the white vote for Guy Millner, although one of these variables, whites with a college education, performed in a direction opposite than the hypotheses predicted. The lone insignificant variable was urbanism. While Millner was not a blatantly racial candidate, he did have issue stances that were not pleasing to black voters. Foremost among them, Millner supported a rollback of affirmative action programs in the state and sharply curbing welfare programs in the state. These stances alone may have been enough to activate some white voters into voting for Millner.

The analysis of the 1995 Louisiana election indicates that physical proximity racial threat voting was not taking place at a discernable level. This might come as

a mild surprise given the previous findings of racial threat voting in David Duke's 1990 and 1991 statewide elections (Giles and Buckner 1995). Despite the election featuring a white Republican nominee and a black Democratic nominee, race apparently played no large role in influencing white voters. In fact, white voters in the black belt parishes were less likely to support Republican Mike Foster, and a negative association existed between black belt whites in Louisiana and the likelihood to cast a vote for Foster. It would appear that ideology may have played a larger role in this election. Foster portrayed himself as a common sense conservative with the same values of Louisiana's working class, while Fields portrayed himself as more liberal on the issues.

In South Carolina, the 1994 gubernatorial election suggested that racial threat was a factor in vote choice of whites. Among white voters in black belt counties, greater support existed for the Republican nominee and winner, David Beasley. Black belt whites may have supported Beasley for his stated position for the continued flying of the Confederate battle flag over the State Capitol.

Just four years later, South Carolina displayed a drastically different outcome. David Beasley was running for reelection. During his first term, Beasley had given up the ghost and tried to remove the Confederate battle flag from atop the State Capitol in Columbia. Beasley was unsuccessful in getting the state legislature to go along with this plan, but Beasley had mortally wounded himself. Many white voters became angry and disgruntled with Beasley, and Beasley's Democratic opponent in 1998, Jim Hodges, promised to leave the flag alone. The

result was an overwhelming defeat for Beasley. It also underscored the predicament of South Carolina Republicans: they could not go too far in alienating their white base of support, or voters would defeat them at the polls.

In three of the four models, the other three variables, urbanism, college education, and the Republican normal vote behaved as predicted by the hypotheses, while the college education vote did not have an association in the expected direction in the Georgia model. Urbanism had a negative impact upon the white vote for all Republican candidates in the observed elections, although the coefficients were so small and insignificant that no meaningful trends can be drawn from these associations. College education, as well, had a negative impact in Louisiana and South Carolina. Only in Louisiana though did college education have a statistically significant negative association, and in the Louisiana model no physical proximity racial threat voting was detected. Of course, the GOP normal vote had a strong relationship with these Republican candidates, although it was the weakest for David Beasley in 1998.

What do these analyses say about the prevalence of physical proximity racial threat voting? Based upon the analysis of these four separate elections across these states, we can conclude that racial threat voting does not exist in a vacuum, oblivious to political candidates and issues. Political context plays a vital role in the presence or absence of physical proximity racial threat voting. Certain types of candidates and issues lead white voters to vote based upon race. When these white voters, who may be susceptible to racial threat voting, are presented with

candidates and issues that are not openly racial, it seems that they use other cues to decide their vote choice. For example, ideology may have played a more important role for Mike Foster's victory in 1995, a concept that we explore in the next chapter.

When blatantly racial candidates or issues are present, it would appear that physical proximity racial threat voting is still in operation during the 1990s in Georgia and South Carolina. One could argue that Louisiana had blatantly racial candidates given the fact that one candidate was white and the other black, but the analysis does not bear out a significant relationship between physical proximity and racial threat voting in 1995. It might be possible that racial threat is operating in another dimension in this election. We explore this possibility further in the next chapter. In Georgia, it is likely that some of Millner's issue stances may have been enough to mobilize some white voters. Clearer evidence of this exists in South Carolina. In both 1994 and 1998, race played a large role in the vote choice of white voters. In 1994, Beasley's support of the Confederate flag likely helped sway many whites. Conversely, race had a negative impact upon Beasley in 1998 after his retreat on the flag issue. Here, rural white voters abandoned Beasley for his Democratic opponent due to his reversal.

These findings underscore that physical proximity racial threat voting needs certain types of candidates or issues to become activated. Without them, race does not matter as much. With racial candidates or issues, physical proximity racial threat voting operates, and the stark differences in the two South Carolina models

support this conclusion. In the next chapter, we examine racial threat voting as a product of one's culture.

CHAPTER 5

EXAMINATION OF RACIAL THREAT AS A CONTEXT OF CULTURE

The previous chapter examined racial threat as a product of physical proximity. When racial threat voting is influenced by living near high concentrations of black voters, white voters cast racially-influenced votes because of the physical proximity aspect. Yet, is this physical proximity the only influence on racial threat voting? Perhaps, racial threat voting can occur as a product of one's culture. Predispositions which individuals hold for long periods of time may influence cultural racial threat voting. Sears and Funk (1999) find evidence that racial attitudes are deeply ingrained in some individuals as a result of their formative years. The racial attitudes of family or friends can have a large impact upon one's political and racial attitudes. Sears and Funk (1999) assert that racial attitudes often need certain catalysts to stimulate racial voting. The authors argue that the civil rights movement served as a catalyst for many white voters in the 1960s to cast racially-influenced votes.

Given the importance that family has upon the formation of political attitudes, one's rearing may be extremely important to the existence of racial threat voting. Numerous studies have found evidence that family has a large influence on the formation of political attitudes. If racial threat is a consequence of one's rearing,

then some voters may cast a racially-influenced vote wherever they live. If so, this would not relegate racial threat voting to just the black-belt and urban areas with high black populations.

If one's heritage does lead to certain racial attitudes, it could be symbolic racial gestures by political candidates trigger that racial threat. If so, then political candidates would not have to take blatantly racial stances to have racial threat voting occurring. Instead, muted issue stances could lead to racial voting by white supporters. For example, a candidate's support for curbing affirmative action or social welfare programs may be enough to lead some white voters to cast a vote for this candidate. Also, one might expect that an election, like Louisiana in 1995, in which the contest featured a white candidate versus a black candidate might trigger racial threat voting due to cultural reasons. Before testing these hypotheses, we need to examine the prior literature on the phenomenon of symbolic racism to understand better the dynamics of this concept.

PRIOR RESEARCH

An extensive literature exists on the topic of symbolic racism. Symbolic racism differs from traditional, or biological racism, which is based on the premise that blacks were somehow biologically and genetically inferior to whites. With traditional racism, whites could rationalize the existence of slavery and later racial segregation (McConahay 1986). Since the civil rights movement, opinion polls have shown that the number of adherents of traditional racism has been declining

(Sears and Kinder 1971; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). Yet this decline in tradition racism does not mean that race has evaporated as an issue for some whites. Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo (1985) found that certain issues, like affirmative action and welfare policies, are strongly opposed by some white voters. Further, black candidates have not had great success in attracting white voters unless black candidates are conservative and downplay racial issues (Perry 1996).

Further research attests that race is still present as a political issue. Edsall and Edsall (1991) state that at the presidential level certain issues like crime and welfare are in reality outward signs of the race issue at work. White voters continue to oppose social welfare programs that target specifically blacks as a whole, while they are less opposed to welfare programs that help all races (Bobo and Kluegel 1993). White opposition to affirmative action, forced busing, greater welfare spending, and support for strict law-and-order issues all have their root in deeply-held racial attitudes (Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980; McConahay 1982; Sears and Citrin 1982; Gilens 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997). Further research indicates that whites have a propensity to be more harsh in their views towards black welfare recipients as opposed to white ones (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997).

Evidence also exists that the racial attitudes of white voters have played a significant factor in opposition to black mayoral candidates (Sears and Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sears 1981). Abramowitz (1994) found similar findings about white

racial attitudes in their opposition to the Jesse Jackson presidential candidacy. Other authors have also found that a candidate stressing racial issues can also activate long-held racial attitudes among white voters (Kuzenski, Bullock, and Gaddie 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996).

Support for the continued prevalence of racial attitudes among white voters has not been universal. Hagen (1995) asserts that polling data reveals that most Americans do not mention race as an important problem in America, nor do most Americans cite race as a political issue. The data derived from opinion polls shows us what Americans claim, but it is impossible to determine if these answers are the unqualified truth. Other authors argue that white opposition to welfare policies and affirmative action are due to ideology, not race (Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Abramowitz 1994; Abramowitz and Sanders 1998). Roth (1994) also contends that most white Americans are not supportive of what they see as liberal policies, while Carmines and Merriman (1993) assert that white opposition to welfare programs is more indicative of rugged individualism than racial attitudes. Others maintain that a mixture of race and conservatism lead to white opposition to affirmative action (Kuklinski, Sniderman, Knight, Piazza, Tetlock, Lawrence, and Mellers 1997).

In a study using polling data from over forty years, Sears Van Laar, Carillo, and Kosterman (1996) find evidence that race is still around as a political factor. While traditional racism has been on the wane since the 1960s, the authors argue that symbolic racism is still prevalent in the United States. While formal racial

discrimination is no longer generally supported by most white citizens, it would be naive to argue that race no longer has an impact among some whites.

Symbolic Racism

With the decline in traditional racism, symbolic racism has taken its place. The concept was first articulated by Sears and Kinder (1971) when they were examining the 1969 Los Angeles mayoral election. In that election, the authors found that race was still affecting not only vote choice, but also the racial-influence derived from long-held political attitudes. As Kinder and Sanders (1996) argue, symbolic racism is not a constant. Rather, political context and candidates are vital in activating racial voting. Accordingly, most elections do not have racial threat voting, but occasionally some do.

What distinguishes symbolic racism from traditional racism? Sears, Van Laar, Carillo, and Kosterman (1997) conceptualize symbolic racism in three dimensions. First, symbolic racism is based on ideological grounds rather than blatantly racial grounds. Symbolic racism focuses instead on how white voters perceive that society should be structured. Symbolic racism also attempts to tie into the moral code and vision that white voters would like to see in this country.

Second, symbolic racism focuses upon social and welfare policies towards black citizens. Arguing that the time of legalized racial discrimination is nonexistent today, symbolic racism stresses that black citizens should work harder to better themselves in this country. Within this realm, blacks are often criticized for seeking

too much special treatment from government through various social and welfare programs (Sears 1988).

Third, symbolic racism appeals to the work ethic of white voters. An assumption of this appeal is “a negative socialization” among white voters about blacks as a whole (Sears Van Laar, Carillo, and Kosterman 1997, 21). In this aspect, symbolic racism assert that black citizens in some way “violate such traditional American values as the work ethic, traditional morality, and respect for traditional authority” (Sears Van Laar, Carillo, and Kosterman 1997, 22; also see Kinder and Sanders 1981).

Thus, symbolic racism appeals to white voters on three different levels. Unlike traditional racism, which appeals to voters out of hatred and a belief in the inferiority of blacks as a race, symbolic racism discounts any such discussions of traditional race relations. Rather, symbolic racism stresses that black citizens get special unwarranted treatment from government, that blacks do not work hard enough, and that blacks somehow violate the traditional moral fabric of the United States. In this manner, symbolic racism can appeal to many white voters who normally would not be receptive to a traditional racial appeal.

Sears, Van Laar, Carillo, and Kosterman (1997) argue that symbolic racism is often hidden from view by overlapping conservative principles about social welfare policies. A closer examination reveals that race is still very much a factor in the voting decisions of white voters. To reiterate, the political environment is key

to the strength of symbolic racism. It requires a certain economic climate, issues, and political candidates for symbolic racism to have great appeal.

This finding, that the political environment plays a significant role in symbolic racism, coincides with the previous chapter. In the case of physical proximity racial threat voting, political context was extremely important. With cultural racial threat voting, it may be that the same political environment is needed for it to flourish. For the balance of this chapter, we examine racial threat from this cultural aspect, through the use of polling data.

IMPACT OF SYMBOLIC RACISM ON PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Before exploring the role of symbolic racism at the state level, it would be beneficial to examine the role that symbolic racism plays on the formation of party identification both in the South and outside the region. Previous studies have argued that race has been pivotal in the growth of the Republican Party both in the South and in the non-South (Carmines and Stimson 1981; Lamis 1988; Edsall and Edsall 1991; Black and Black 1992), while others have argued that the growth of the Republican Party is more attributable to ideology than race (Beck 1977; Wolfinger and Arsenneau 1978; Wolfinger and Hagan 1985; Stanley 1987; Stanley and Castle 1988; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Abramowitz 1994; Abramowitz and Sanders 1998).

By examining polling data compiled by the National Elections Studies (NES), we can test the factors that lead white voters to form an attachment to the parties.

In this instance, we examine the factors that lead one to feel affinity with the Republican Party. An analysis of the NES data allows us to see if symbolic racism may be playing an underlying role in voter's attachment to the Republican Party. Unlike the data presented later in the chapter, the NES allows us to test this posit on both southern and non-southern respondents.

DATA AND METHODS

In this analysis of party identification, we utilized data from the NES 1994 and 1998 datasets, since these two years closely corresponded to the elections analyzed in this research. The polling was a combination of telephone interviewing and person-to-person interviewing between November and January of each respective year. The respondents were part of a national sample in which each region of the nation was represented. Since we are concerned with predicting the behavior of white voters, the following analyses use only white respondents from the two polls.

Symbolic Racism

To test the impact of symbolic racial attitudes upon white voters' party affiliation, the NES asked three questions of respondents in both 1994 and 1998 that proved useful to constructing a symbolic racism measure. Respondents were asked whether they agreed, disagreed, or had no opinion on the following statements:

1. Irish, Italians, Jewish, and other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
2. It's really just a matter of some people not trying hard enough. If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.
3. Some people say that because of past discrimination blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion is wrong because it gives blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your opinion – are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?

To derive a symbolic racism variable, two procedures were used.¹ First, the responses from the three questions were averaged to derive a symbolic racism figure. Next, we utilized confirmatory principal-components factor analysis to determine the effectiveness of the averaging the scores together. The graph in Appendix A demonstrates the extremely close relationship between the two procedures. Therefore, we utilize the symbolic racism variable derived by arithmetic averaging during the remainder of the statistical analysis in this chapter.

Other Variables

Besides symbolic racism, eight other independent variables were used in the analysis. While additional questions were asked in both years, these eight variables were chosen because they appeared in both samples. In addition to socioeconomic variables of age, education, income, and gender, we included four

¹For a complete discussion of the data manipulation and the procedures used in this chapter, see Appendix A.

other independent variables in the analysis. Ideology is a seven-point scale ranging from (1) which is extremely liberal to (7) which is extremely conservative. The question of government spending asked respondents to give their preferences on a seven-point scale about government services. The range proceeded from (1) spending more on government services to (7) cutting government services. The remaining two variables, foreign affairs and the economy, are questions which ask the respondents which of the two parties could best handle these problems. If the respondents did not believe that either party was best equipped to handle these issues, they were given the option of choosing neither party or no difference between the parties. By using these variables, we should gain some conception of what issues were influencing voters in both samples to identify with the Republican Party.

FACTORS LEADING TO PARTY IDENTIFICATION

We now turn our attention to testing the variables that might influence party identification. In the statistical analysis presented, the dependent variable is dichotomous. It is coded as 1 for those respondents who claim to be Republican, and 0 for all others. Since only two possible answers to this question exist, ordinary-least squares (OLS) regression is not appropriate in this case. Therefore, we use logistic regression, which is used when the dependent variable is dichotomous. In logistic regression, the procedure estimates the independent variables in a probability model which predicts values for the dependent variable,

Republican identification. We run the logit models for both the 1994 and 1998 NES datasets. In addition, the data for each year is divided into a southern subset, in which all respondents are white Southerners, and a non-southern subset in which the white respondents live outside the region.² The following four tables present the results of the logistic regressions.

²The NES considers the South to be a thirteen-state region defined by the Census as including the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, as well as the District of Columbia.

Table 5.1
Logistic Regression for Predicting Republican Party ID (Non-South 1994)

Independent Variables	b	S.E.
Symbolic racial attitudes	.286	.286
Age	.264	.180
Education	.129	.098
Income	.014	.153
Gender (Male)	.192	.385
Ideology (High=Conservative)	.342***	.147
Handling of Foreign Affairs	.095	.185
Government Spending	.232*	.133
Handling Economy	.866****	.180
Constant	-8.1660***	2.35
N	207	
Percent correctly classified	79.7	
Null prediction (percent)	65.3	
Pre	41.5	
Model Chi-Square	96.06 (df 9, p <.0001)	

Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 for Republican and 0 for all others. The model chi-square tests the posit that all coefficients in the logit equation are equal to zero.

*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.01; ****p≤.001

Table 5.2
Logistic Regression for Predicting the Republican Party ID (South 1994)

Independent Variables	b	S.E.
Symbolic racial attitudes	.830*	.064
Age	-.160	.205
Education	.258	.173
Income	-.032	.213
Gender (Male)	.857	.591
Ideology (High=Conservative)	.218	.281
Handling of Foreign Affairs	.554	.384
Government Spending	.108	.214
Handling Economy	.230	.229
Constant	-12.2777***	4.25
N	92	
Percent correctly classified	75.0	
Null prediction (percent)	76.0	
Pre	.04	
Model Chi-Square	26.94 (df 9, p <.001)	

Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 for Republican and 0 for all others.
The model chi-square tests the posit that all coefficients in the logit equation are equal to zero.

*p_≤.10; **p_≤.05; ***p_≤.01; ****p_≤.001

Table 5.3
Logistic Regression for Predicting the Republican Party ID (Non-South 1998)

Independent Variables	b	S.E.
Symbolic racial attitudes	.180	.178
Age	-.140	.122
Education	.003	.087
Income	-.042	.079
Gender (Male)	.239	.385
Ideology (High=Conservative)	.652****	.107
Handling of Foreign Affairs	.384***	.119
Government Spending	.094	.093
Handling Economy	.647****	.107
Constant	-8.5678***	1.25
N	471	
Percent correctly classified	81.7	
Null prediction (percent)	73.9	
Pre	30.0	
Model Chi-Square	205.52 (df 9, p <.0001)	

Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 for Republican and 0 for all others. The model chi-square tests the posit that all coefficients in the logit equation are equal to zero.

*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.01; ****p≤.001

Table 5.4
Logistic Regression for Predicting the Republican Party ID (South 1998)

Independent Variables	b	S.E.
Symbolic racial attitudes	.306	.270
Age	-.197	.170
Education	-.022	.129
Income	.038	.099
Gender (Male)	-.034	.398
Ideology (High=Conservative)	.659***	.184
Handling Foreign Affairs	.244	.159
Government Spending	.077	.134
Handling Economy	.529	.156
Constant	-7.3059****	1.73
N	178	
Percent correctly classified	75.3	
Null prediction (percent)	87.4	
Pre	95.8	
Model Chi-Square	72.18 (df 9, p <.0001)	

Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 for Republican and 0 for all others.
The model chi-square tests the posit that all coefficients in the logit equation are equal to zero.

*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.01; ****p≤.001

Based on the preceding four tables, symbolic racism was a significant predictor of Republican Party identification only in the 1994 southern subset. Of the nine variables, ideology was significant in three of the four analyses. Which party was best equipped at handling the economy was significant in two of the subsets. Finally, government spending was statistically significant in 1994, while handling of foreign affairs was significant in 1998. Neither government spending nor foreign affairs achieved statistical significance in both years though.

Logistic regression is a nonlinear statistical procedure. Consequently, we cannot read the coefficients in the previous tables in the same manner as the results of an OLS regression. To derive the figures into easily interpretable results, we can use the logit equation to discern the relationship of the independent variables on Republican identification. Using only the independent variables that achieve statistical significance, values can be substituted into the logit equation, while we hold the values for the other independent variables constant at their means. The predicted probabilities of the independent variables upon Republican identification are presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6.

Table 5.5
Predicted Probability of Republican ID for Whites (1994)

Independent Variables	Probability of Republican ID	
	<u>Non-South</u>	<u>South</u>
Ideology		
Extremely liberal	.08	—
Liberal	.12	—
Slightly liberal	.16	—
Moderate	.22	—
Slightly conservative	.28	—
Conservative	.35	—
Extremely conservative	.43	—
Handling the Economy		
Democratic Party	.06	—
Neither/no difference	.25	—
Republican Party	.65	—
Government Spending		
Desire more government services	.23	—
Maintain current levels	.32	—
Desire less government services	.43	—
Symbolic racial attitudes		
Low (-2 Standard Deviations (SD))	—	.03
Below average (-1SD)	—	.08
Average (mean)	—	.17
Above average (+1SD)	—	.32
High (+2SD)	—	.52

Notes: The above independent variables are those which achieved statistical significance in the logistic regression in Tables 5.1 through 5.4. Among the southern respondents subset, only symbolic racism achieved statistical significance. Figures above are the predicted probabilities of white voters identifying with the Republican Party.

Table 5.6
Predicted Probability of Republican ID for Whites (1998)

Independent Variables	Probability of Republican ID	
	<u>Non-South</u>	<u>South</u>
Ideology		
Extremely liberal	.02	.03
Liberal	.05	.07
Slightly liberal	.08	.13
Moderate	.15	.23
Slightly conservative	.25	.36
Conservative	.39	.53
Extremely conservative	.55	.68
Handling the Economy		
Democratic Party	.06	.12
Neither/no difference	.18	.28
Republican Party	.44	.53
Handling Foreign Affairs		
Democratic Party	.08	---
Neither/no difference	.16	---
Republican Party	.30	---

Notes: The above independent variables are those which achieved statistical significance in the logistic regression in Table 5.2. Figures above are the predicted probabilities of white voters identifying with the Republican Party.

In the 1994 analysis, ideology was the best predictor of party identification among the non-South subset. Not surprisingly, we can see that the probability of being a Republican was not great if one is extremely liberal, although the probability does seem high at 8 percent. On the opposite extreme, the probability of an extreme conservative identifying with the Republican Party was 43 percent. Again, the fact that this probability was not higher is unexpected.

The probabilities for the economic issue and government spending demonstrated no unexpected directions. As Table 5.5 illustrates, the probabilities followed party lines on the question of which party could best handle the economy. Among the non-southern respondents, those who felt the Democrats could best handle the economy were unlikely to identify with the Republican Party. Respondents who felt Republicans were best equipped to deal with the economy were extremely likely to identify Republican. With government spending, the expected directions were evident, but the magnitude was unexpected. Among non-southern respondents, those who wanted to increase government services were less likely to identify as a Republican, but the probability was still almost 25 percent. Those who wanted a cut in government services were more likely to identify with the GOP, but the probability was not even 50 percent, which was an unexpectedly low probability.

In the southern subset, the only statistically significant predictor of Republican identification was symbolic racial attitudes. Among southern white respondents with a low level of symbolic racism, the chances of identifying with the

Republican Party were around 3 percent, while those who had the highest levels of symbolic racism had a probability of more than 50 percent of identifying with the Republican Party. Since symbolic racism was the only significant variable among the nine tested, it would suggest that race played a larger role in southern white respondents' views of the two parties. Coupled with this is the fact that symbolic racism was not significant among non-southern whites, which illustrates the preoccupation that some southern whites seem to have with race.

In 1998, ideology was again a significant predictor of Republican identification. Unlike four years earlier, ideology was significant among the southern subset as well as the non-South. In this instance, we see that ideology was a more important cue among the respondents of both subsets. Those who were extremely liberal among both groups were most unlikely to identify as Republicans, while on the opposite extreme of the spectrum were very likely to feel affinity with the Republicans. In 1998, the strength of the probabilities was greater. Holding an extreme conservative position led to a probability of 55 percent that non-southern whites would identify Republican, while southern whites with the same views had a probability of 68 percent of being Republican.

The party that could best handle the economy was significant in both subsets. Like ideology, the economic issue was significant in the southern subset in 1998 but not 1994. When comparing the economic issue among non-southern whites in both years, we see that the magnitude of the probabilities is lower in 1998 among those who feel the Republicans can do the best job with the economy.

Among southern white respondents, the probabilities are in the expected direction. Overall, the degree of the probabilities is slightly greater when compared with the non-South subset.

In 1998, the handling of foreign affairs was a significant indicator of Republican identification among non-Southerners, but it was not significant among Southerners. Among the non-South respondents, those who felt the Democrats could best handle foreign affairs were unlikely to be Republican, while those who felt that the Republicans could best conduct foreign affairs were more likely to be Republican. Again, the magnitude of the probability is low when one examines those who support Republican control of foreign affairs. Believing that the Republicans could best handle foreign affairs led to only a 30 percent likelihood of being Republican. This may underscore that foreign affairs was a back burner issue when compared to the Clinton scandal in the fall of 1998.

Although past research indicates that racial threat leads to higher rates of Republican identification among southern whites (Giles and Hertz 1994), it appears from this research that symbolic racism is an inconsistent predictor of Republican identification among white southern respondents. Of the two years analyzed, only 1994 showed that symbolic racism was dictating party choice among southern white respondents. In 1998, symbolic racism did not approach statistical significance. Among the non-South respondents, symbolic racism was not a significant indicator of Republican identification in either year. From the analyses, it would appear that ideology was more important overall in party identification. In both 1994 and 1998

among the non-South, it was the most significant indicator, while it was the most significant among the South in 1998. Following closely behind, the question of which party could best handle the economy showed a similar pattern to ideology.

While this examination of party identification does not purport to definitively project the factors that lead to party identification over the long term, it does give us an idea of what was significant during the time period that this dissertation analyzes. Looking at the significance of symbolic racism in 1994 among the southern respondents, an observer might ponder why symbolic racism was not important in 1998. A possible answer might harken back to the previous chapter. Perhaps political context dictates the importance of symbolic racism on party identification. In 1994, discussion abounded about cutting welfare and affirmative action, and getting tough on crime. All of these issues are characteristics of symbolic racial attitudes. Since these issues were at the forefront in 1994, southern white respondents may have been more likely to be influenced by race than in 1998 when these issues were not as prominent on the political scene. If so, the role of political context in racial threat voting is again underscored. We now turn our focus to analyzing polling data from an individual state. By using statewide polling data, we can get a better sense of the dynamics of the race issue in individual gubernatorial elections.³

³Unfortunately, statewide polling data was not available in either Georgia or South Carolina for the appropriate elections. Statewide polling did exist to an extent in Georgia, but no racial questions were asked of the respondents which would allow us to test the impact of race upon the vote. In South Carolina, no

THE USE OF SYMBOLIC RACISM IN THE LOUISIANA GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN

Did symbolic racism play a major role in the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial campaign? After analyzing the details of the campaign, symbolic racism had the potential of playing a factor in the campaigning of the major gubernatorial candidates. Without having to mention race, the presence of U.S. Representative Cleo Fields, a black candidate, in the runoff against a white candidate, Mike Foster, would have been enough to trigger symbolic racial voting without candidates even mentioning racial issues (Sears and Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and Funk 1999). Even before the runoff between Fields and Foster, racial appeals were made to white voters, but the source came not from a Republican candidate but from one of the Democratic candidates. In the last weeks of the primary campaign, Mary Landrieu's campaign allegedly ran radio ads that argued that Fields, as a black candidate, would have no chance against the probable frontrunner, Mike Foster. Although Landrieu denied that her campaign ran these ads, the ensuing furor likely solidified black support behind Fields, propelling him into a runoff against Foster (Parent and Perry 1998).

Beyond the racial characteristics of the two candidates in the runoff, one can argue that appeals to symbolic racial attitudes were present during the runoff by Mike Foster's campaign. Many of Foster's campaign stances were characteristic of the discussion of symbolic racism. Among other issues which he championed,

statewide polling data was available, and attempts to obtain private polling from David Beasley's campaign were unsuccessful.

Foster stood for the elimination of affirmative action, reforming social welfare programs, and a constitutional challenge to the Motor Voter Bill. Further, Foster was publicly critical of the existence of the majority-minority congressional district which Cleo Fields had represented.

While Foster's stances may have been a subtle appeal for white votes, his comments about the problem of crime in New Orleans were even more blatant. During the last days of the campaign, he referred to New Orleans as "the jungle" where crime was rampant (Walsh 1995). In comparison, he cited predominately white suburban Jefferson Parish, which is adjacent to New Orleans, as an area with a low crime rate. Even more telling, was the fact that Foster was endorsed by David Duke, but Foster refused to renounce Duke's endorsement. Although Foster did not engage in blatantly racial rhetoric with the exception of "the jungle" comment, his refusal to distance himself from the endorsement may have also appealed to some white voters. It appears that some symbolic racism was used by the Foster campaign in 1995.

DATA AND METHODS

To discern the impact that symbolic racism was having upon white voters in Louisiana, public opinion polling data was utilized. The particular poll used was a statewide poll conducted by Survey Research Center at the University of New Orleans (UNO) between 8-14 October 1995. The survey was conducted via telephone interviewing, with the sample being randomly selected. All of the

respondents were registered Louisiana voters, and an equal number of white and black voters were called during the interview. Since this chapter is concerned with the impact of symbolic racism upon white voters, only the responses from white voters were used. The total number of white respondents in the poll was 498.

The model used in the analysis in this chapter is based upon the research of Knuckey (1997) who also examined the role that symbolic racism played in this particular election.⁴ For the remainder of this chapter, we use Knuckey's model to test this particular election. In the model, I added a variable which asked respondents if they had voted for David Duke in 1991. Otherwise, the chapter replicated Knuckey's research, who found symbolic racism in operation during the 1995 Louisiana election. The first task was to define symbolic racism based upon the questions asked in the UNO poll. Next, we examine the role that racial attitudes play upon the images that voters have of Fields and Foster. Finally, we explore the role that race played upon white vote choice in the 1995 gubernatorial runoff between Fields and Foster.

Defining Symbolic Racism

Among the questions asked in the 1995 UNO poll, four are particularly useful in conceptualizing symbolic racism for the purposes of this analysis. Respondents

⁴The author would like to thank and acknowledge Jonathan Knuckey for providing the UNO data which is vital to this chapter. Also, this chapter replicates Knuckey's model where he studied the same election.

were asked whether they agreed, disagreed, or had no opinion to the following statements:

1. Over the last few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
2. Irish, Italians, Jewish, and other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
3. It's really just a matter of some people not trying hard enough. If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.
4. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

The responses were used as a foundation of symbolic racism. Like the previous analysis, symbolic racism was defined by taking the responses from the four questions and arithmetically averaging to derive a symbolic racism figure.

Operationalizing Other Variables

Beyond symbolic racism, other variables were also defined using different questions in the UNO poll. First, the dependent variable, candidate comparison, was created using an additive index of four different questions. Respondents were asked whether Fields or Foster would do a better job at (1) improving education in Louisiana, (2) cleaning-up political corruption in the state, (3) dealing with the state's increasing gambling industry, and (4) handling the state budget. If Fields was the preferred choice on a question, it was coded as -1. If Foster was preferred,

the question was coded as 1. Those who had no opinion or did not know were coded as 0.

Two related dependent variables also derived by additive indices were candidate image variables for each candidate. Respondents in the poll were asked a series of four questions in which they were asked which candidate demonstrated the best personal qualities. The questions asked which of the candidates were best in (1) leadership, (2) knowledge, (3) honesty, and (4) caring for other people. The choices given the respondents were not well at all, not too well, quite well, or extremely well. Those respondents who had no opinion were placed in a middle category.

Other variables created from the questions included the dependent variable white vote for Foster which was coded as 1 or 0. One was a vote for Foster, while zero was a vote against Foster. Two other independent variables used in the analyses were also manipulated. Both partisanship and ideology were re-coded so that Republican was the high figure, while conservative was the high figure for ideology.

DATA ANALYSES

To test the impact of symbolic racial attitudes in this election, we use different types of statistical analysis. First, OLS regression is used to determine the impact of symbolic racism upon candidate comparison, Foster's image among white voters, and Fields' image among white voters. Next, the impact of symbolic racism

is tested upon white vote choice. Since the dependent variable, white vote for Foster, is dichotomous, nonlinear logistic regression is utilized.

Evaluations of Fields and Foster

To determine the role that symbolic racial attitudes have on white voters' images and appraisals of the candidates, independent variables are regressed onto three different dependent variables, candidate comparison, Foster's image, and Fields' image, which were defined previously. In addition to symbolic racial attitudes, the following independent variables were included in the analysis of the three dependent variables: education, age, gender, ideology, partisanship, and income. The results of the three analyses are presented in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7
Candidate Evaluations Among White Voters
in the 1995 Gubernatorial Election

Independent Variables	Candidate Comparison	Foster's Image	Fields' Image
Education	-.172** (.089)	.015 (.150)	.395** (.136)
Symbolic racial attitudes	.699**** (.102)	.740**** (.172)	-1.004**** (.156)
Age	.0098* (.006)	.024** (.010)	.0074 (.009)
Gender (Male)	.131 (.194)	.306 (.327)	-.602** (.296)
Ideology (High=Conservative)	.158* (.089)	.180 (.151)	.018 (.136)
Partisanship (High=GOP)	.186*** (.063)	.173 (.107)	-.417**** (.096)
Income	.058 (.045)	.113 (.076)	-.098 (.069)
Constant	-2.502**** (.661)	-3.277*** (1.114)	5.941**** (1.007)
R ²	.14	.07	.15
Adjusted R ²	.13	.06	.14
N	498	498	498

Notes: The candidate comparison variable ranges from -4, which is most favorable to Cleo Fields, to 4, which is the most favorable to Mike Foster. Both the Foster and Fields image variables are coded in a manner so that the high scores always represent a positive image.

Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001

When examining the results, symbolic racial attitudes is the only independent variable which is statistically significant in all three analyses. Symbolic racial attitudes have a very strong positive impact on white voters when comparing the two candidates and in the development of Foster's image. Conversely, symbolic racial attitudes have a strong negative impact on white voters in their assessment of Fields' image. In all three equations, symbolic racial attitudes are significant at greater than the .001 level, which indicates that a very significant relationship exists between symbolic racial attitudes and the three dependent variables.

Beyond symbolic racism, other independent variables achieved statistical significance, although none among all three dependent variables. Education had a negative impact upon the comparison of the two candidates, while education had a positive relationship on Fields' image. It appears that the more educated white voters were more likely to have a positive view of Fields than less educated white voters. Education had only a very slight positive impact upon Foster's image, although the relationship fell far short of a statistically significant relationship.

Age of white voters was significant in explaining candidate comparison and Foster's image. Of the two, age was a more significant predictor of Foster's image. Still the coefficients were small suggesting that while age did have an impact, it was not a definitive factor. Age had a slight positive impact on Fields' image, but this relationship was not statistically significant. When examining the impact of male voters upon these three dependent variables, gender had a very strong negative

impact upon Fields' image, while gender had non-significant positive relationships with comparison between the two candidates and Foster's image. White male voters had a strong negative opinion of Cleo Fields based upon this analysis. Possible explanations for this would be Field's stances on abortion and his call for more strict gun control laws, while Foster called for laws that would make it easier for law-abiding citizens to obtain concealed handgun permits, and Foster also called for limitations on abortions.

Two closely related variables, ideology and partisanship, demonstrated mixed results. Ideology, in which the high value was conservative, had a positive relationship on the candidate comparison measure, which demonstrates that white Louisiana voters did use ideology as a cue in assessing differences between Foster and Fields. Ideology was not statistically significant in explaining the image that white voters had of Foster and Fields, though.

Partisanship, which was coded so that Republicans represented the high value, was more significant in formation of candidate comparison, and Field's image. With candidate comparison, it appears that white voters were using party as a way of distinguishing between the two candidates. A very significant negative relationship existed between white Republican voters and Field's image, which should come as no surprise. What is somewhat unexpected was that partisanship apparently had little impact among white voters and their image of Mike Foster. One might expect this figure to be higher, but the relationship is not even statistically significant. An explanation for this might be the fact that Foster was a

lifelong Democrat who only became a Republican the day that he filed his candidacy for governor.

Finally, income did not have a significant impact upon any of the three dependent variables. In fact, income is the only independent variable which did not achieve statistical significance in some manner. One explanation for the lack of a relationship between income and the dependent variables was the reality that the Louisiana economy was in relatively good economic shape during this election. Thus, economic issues were not as important to voters in this particular instance.

From the analyses presented, symbolic racial attitudes were the most powerful factor of all tested. It would appear that race did have a large role in the opinions of white voters towards the two candidates as well as the perceived differences between the two, despite the fact that neither candidate blatantly appealed to race for support. After race, partisanship demonstrated strong relationships overall, but not to the extent of symbolic racism. Age, education, ideology, and gender had mixed results across the three analyses. Now that the impact of race upon assessments of the candidates has been tested, we turn our attention to the impact of race upon white vote choice.

Impact of Symbolic Racial Attitudes Upon White Vote Choice

While symbolic racism had a strong impact upon white voters' perception of Mike Foster and Cleo Fields, did these same racial attitudes have an impact on the vote choice of white voters? To determine the impact of race upon the decision of

the respondents to vote for Foster, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is not appropriate because the dependent variable, white vote for Foster, is dichotomous where the variable has two distinct options minus missing values. In the logit model, symbolic racial attitudes, age education, income, gender, ideology, and partisanship were included. These were the same variables included in the previous OLS regression. Additionally, five variables that tapped into current political issues of the campaign, government spending, government providing jobs, support for government-funded health care, government help for minorities, and support for handgun control, were included. Finally, whether white voters self-identified themselves as voting for David Duke in the 1991 gubernatorial election is included. Including this variable allows us to see whether the same voters who were attracted to David Duke in 1991 show similar support for Foster in 1995. The results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 5.8.

Table 5.8
Logistic Regression for Predicting the White Vote for Mike Foster

Independent Variables	b	S.E.
Symbolic racial attitudes	.705***	.257
Age	.006	.011
Education	-.167	.169
Income	.077	.086
Gender (Male)	.133	.346
Ideology (High=Conservative)	.246	.165
Partisanship (High=GOP)	.226**	.117
Government Spending	-.130	.105
Government Provided Jobs	-.083	.138
Health Care	.237***	.117
Help for Minorities	.265	.201
Handgun Control	.053	.073
Vote for David Duke in 1991	-.013	.124
Constant	-3.8095***	1.37
N	302	
Percent correctly classified	82.1	
Null prediction (percent)	63.8	
Pre	50.5	
Model Chi-Square	75.55 (df 13, p <.0001)	

Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 for Foster and 0 for Fields. The model chi-square tests the posit that all coefficients in the logit equation are equal to zero.

*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.01; ****p≤.001

Of the thirteen independent variables, symbolic racial attitudes, partisanship, and health care achieved statistical significance. Of the three, symbolic racial attitudes had the strongest impact in favor of Mike Foster. Partisanship and health care also demonstrated positive relationships with the Foster vote. Since the logistic results can not be interpreted in their present form, the same statistical manipulation performed above is used to derive easily interpretable results. The predicted probabilities of the independent variables upon the white vote for Foster is presented in Table 5.9, while Table 5.10 demonstrates the impact of symbolic racial attitudes, controlling for partisanship and health care, upon the Foster vote.

Table 5.9
Predicted Probability of the White Vote for Mike Foster

Independent Variables	Probability of Casting a Vote for Foster
Symbolic racial attitudes	
Low (-2 Standard Deviations (SD))	.40
Below average (-1SD)	.57
Average (mean)	.72
Above average (+1SD)	.84
High (+2SD)	.91
Partisanship	
Democratic	.72
Independent	.84
Republican	.89
Health Care	
Government-sponsored plan	.75
In-between/mix	.82
Private	.88

Notes: The above independent variables are those which achieved statistical significance in the logistic regression in Table 5.8. Figures above are the predicted probabilities of white voters supporting Mike Foster.

Table 5.10
Impact of Symbolic Racism on the White Vote Choice After Controlling for
Partisanship and Health Care

	Symbolic Racial Attitudes				
	Low	Below Average	Average	Above Average	High
Partisanship					
Democratic	.30	.50	.63	.78	.88
Independent	.40	.57	.73	.85	.92
Republican	.51	.68	.81	.90	.95
Health Care					
Government Plan	.40	.57	.73	.84	.92
Mix/In-between	.77	.87	.93	.97	.98
Private Plan	.95	.97	.99	.99	1.00

Notes: The three independent variables are those that reached statistical significance. Figures are the predicted probability of a white vote for Mike Foster. Entries were calculated from the logit equation in Table 5.8.

Based upon these two tables, it appears that symbolic racism had a significant role in the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election between Mike Foster and Cleo Fields. From the probabilities in Table 5.9, as one's degree of symbolic racism increased, so did the likelihood of voting for Foster. Even among white voters who demonstrated low levels of symbolic racial attitudes, the chances of them voting for Foster was still quite high. Not surprisingly, being Republican made it more likely for white voters to vote for Foster. What is surprising is the probability if one was a Democrat. The probability was nearly .75 among white Democrats. This would indicate that many white liberal voters were also casting votes for Foster. With the question of health care, the results again indicate that Foster was doing incredibly well with white voters. Even among white voters who supported government-sponsored health care, an issue which Foster did not support, the probability of voting for Foster was .75. All of this would seem to indicate an underlying symbolic racial attitude in operation if traditionally liberal voters are voting for archconservative Foster.

From the results in Table 5.10, we can understand how symbolic racism fares across partisanship and stances on health care programs. From examining symbolic racism across party lines, it is clear that voters who held moderate to high levels of racial attitudes could be found among Democrats, independents, and Republicans, with the GOP having the highest overall levels of symbolic racial voters. The rather high levels among Democrats gave Foster the ability to appeal to these voters without alienating hard-core Republican supporters (Knuckey 1997).

With respect to the question of how best to fund health care, a similar pattern is also found. Whites with moderate to high levels of symbolic racism could be found at all levels of health care from government control to private control. Again, this suggests that Foster was enjoying incredible support among white voters at all levels. This also freed Foster to champion positions that favored more private control of health care, while he still was receiving support a majority of white voters. At the same time, many of his white supporters might have disagreed with Foster's positions on health care.

This analysis of the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election indicates that symbolic racism was in operation among white voters. The fact that Foster was enjoying such high white support across the ideological and economic spectrum suggests that race played a pivotal role in the voting behavior of Louisiana whites in 1995. By using the concept of symbolic racism, we can get a sense of the impact that culture has upon racial threat voting.

This approach also illuminates a weakness in studying racial threat solely as a result of physical proximity. In the previous chapter, the county-level analysis indicated that race did not play a significant factor among Louisiana whites in 1995, while this chapter has demonstrated, through the use of survey data, that race did have a significant role in vote choice in 1995. While neither candidate made explicit appeals to race, racial attitudes as influenced by one's culture led a majority of white voters to use race as a cue to choose between Cleo Fields and Mike Foster. The simple fact that Fields was black and Foster was white may have been

the deciding factor among white Louisiana voters for whom to cast a vote. This finding would not have been possible if we studied racial threat voting simply as dependent on physical proximity. By realizing that racial threat voting can be influenced by culture, we can gain new insights into the motivations behind some white voters.

CONCLUSION

In closing, this chapter has examined racial threat from a cultural perspective as opposed to geography. The findings have illustrated that racial threat does not operate solely in one dimension. Rather, racial threat voting can operate simultaneously on different levels. Unfortunately, the only existent data was from the NES and statewide polling data from Louisiana conducted by the University of New Orleans. Polling data was not available in either Georgia or South Carolina. While this lack of data is disappointing, it does not prevent us from gaining new insights on the dynamics of racial threat voting.

Much of the research in this chapter rested on the previous findings from studies initiated by David O. Sears on the existence of symbolic racism, which is dependent upon culture. Symbolic racial attitudes are instilled in individuals at a young age by parents, relatives, and friends (Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980; McConahay 1982; Sears and Citrin 1982; Gilens 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997). Individuals carry these racial attitudes throughout life, and they can

be periodically activated by external forces (Sears and Funk 1999). Cultural racial threat voting operates in much the same manner as symbolic racism. Individuals have certain racial attitudes which they care with them. When circumstances are favorable, these racial attitudes can possibly lead these individuals to cast a vote under the auspices of racial threat voting.

The impact that race played upon whites party identification was tested using the NES datasets. Since the NES data is a nationwide poll, we were able to split the respondents into southern and non-southern subsets. The results revealed that race only had a significant impact on southern respondents party affiliation in 1994, but not 1998. While it was not significant in the non-South subset in either year, race did have a positive relationship on the likelihood that non-southern whites would be Republican. Since this relationship was not significant, we cannot say that race drives white voting behavior outside of the South, but it does illustrate that race and the Republican Party is not a strictly southern occurrence.

Secondly, the fact that race had a significant impact on southern respondents in 1994 alone suggests that racial threat voting is not a perennial phenomenon in southern politics. Only in 1994 did race have a statistically significant relationship on a southern respondent's probability of being Republican. In 1994, potentially racial issues, such as reforming welfare and eliminating affirmative action programs, were discussed quite frequently by Republican candidates in the South. Given this occurrence, race had a discernable role, but in 1998 when these issues were not at the forefront, race did not have a significant

relationship. This finding harkens back to the previous chapter where we discovered the importance of political context to the presence of physical proximity racial threat voting. In this case, it appears that cultural racial threat voting depends upon the political environment as well.

In addition to these findings regarding race and party affiliation, we also tested the Louisiana polling data to see how white Louisiana voters used race to judge the two candidates and its role in vote choice. We see that race was significant in the images that voters held of both candidates. Furthermore, race was important in determining the differences between the two candidates. While ideology and partisanship were also important in the images of the candidates and the difference between Fields and Foster, race was the only variable which was significant across all three dependent variables, suggesting the importance that race played in this election.

When analyzing the effects of race on vote choice, we see that racial attitudes had a statistically strong relationship between white respondents and their chances of voting for Republican Mike Foster. Of the three independent variables to reach statistical significance in the analysis, racial attitudes demonstrated the strongest relationship. This indicates that race was playing a role in the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election, despite the fact that the previous chapter found no evidence of racial threat voting occurring.

This finding underscores once again the fact racial threat voting is best understood in different dimensions. Examining racial threat voting from only one

perspective, such as geography, is shortsighted and fraught with danger. Although racial threat voting may not occur when examining it at one level, it does not mean that race is completely absent from the political landscape. Further, this chapter again underscores the importance that political context plays in the occurrence of racial threat voting. Both the NES data and the Louisiana poll indicate that political context, candidates, and issues do matter for racial threat voting to exist. Without this context, racial threat voting may not occur. The data also suggests that racial threat voting, while possible, is not a given in southern elections. Examining racial threat voting, without taking into account political context, leads to erroneous conclusions about the role of race in electoral politics.

CHAPTER 6

THE ROLE OF MEDIA COVERAGE IN RACIAL THREAT VOTING

The previous two chapters have examined racial threat voting as a consequence of physical proximity and culture. This chapter extends beyond the previous models to study what if any role media coverage plays in racial threat voting. Voters rely upon the media for coverage of campaigns; perhaps media coverage can heighten the likelihood that racial threat voting may take place in various elections. If the media portrays a certain candidate or certain issues as racially-based, then some voters may be more likely to cast their votes in a racially-influenced manner. If so, the media may play an extremely important role in racial threat voting. Unlike physical proximity or culture, media coverage is fluid. The way in which the media chooses to portray a campaign may have profound implications upon the vote choice of white voters. We now turn our attention to past research on the role that the media plays in framing issues and candidates in elections.

THE AGENDA-SETTING ROLE OF THE MEDIA

Tradition models of voting behavior held that the media had relatively little influence upon vote choice (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). *The*

American Voter (1960) argues that social and economic factors were the most important factors in vote choice, while other research indicated that the way in which parties pitched candidates and issues was more important in the way that voters perceived issues and politics than anything else (Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Popkin, Gorman, Phillips, and Smith 1976; Carmines and Stimson 1980; Markus 1982).

Some have asserted that the media plays a much larger role in shaping the political scene than past scholars generally acknowledged. Media agenda-setting is a concept which argues that the media plays a crucial role in what the average voter perceives to be important issues in a campaign. Media agenda-setting is based upon two assumptions:

1. The press does not serve as a simple conduit or as a mirror held up to the world. In other words, the press does not reflect reality, but rather filters and shapes it, much as a kaleidoscope filters and shapes light.
2. Concentration by the press over time on relatively few issues and subjects, and certain aspects of those subjects, generally leads to the public perceiving these issues and subjects as more salient, or more important, than other issues and subjects (Weaver 1987, 176).

Thus, the media plays a pivotal part in campaigns in this nation. To ignore the role that the media occupies in our system is foolhardy at best. If the media is playing such a significant role in elections, then the media could potentially have a large impact upon racial threat voting.

McCombs and Shaw (1972) are the founding fathers of the media agenda-setting literature. In their research, the authors found that a direct relationship between media coverage of various issues and what the public perceived as important issues. In a 1968 poll conducted in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, the authors found in the vast majority of respondents that convergence existed between what the media reported as important issues and which issues the respondents perceived to be important. Second, when the media did not report on certain issues, the authors found that the respondents did not consider these issues to be important. Finally, media coverage of campaigns had an impact upon these respondents. When the media portrayed the George Wallace campaign as not having a chance in 1968, some respondents reported that they would not vote for Wallace because he did not have a legitimate chance of winning election.

Other research also indicates that the media plays a significant role in the shaping of political issues. Seymour-Ure (1974) argues that media coverage tends to focus on simple issues that are easy to grasp (see also Chapter 1 for a discussion of “easy” and “hard” issues). For example, the media usually focuses on issues that they can simplify into buzz words like “busing” or “detente.” The media is also likely in their coverage to cause rifts between candidates and look for controversial issues. Patterson (1980) found that in presidential elections the issues that were the most important to most voters were not necessarily issues that the candidates stressed. Instead, what voters claimed to be the most important issues were the same that the media was reporting as important.

MacKuen (1981) further refined the agenda-setting role of the media. One might conclude from some of the prior literature that the media has an almost dictatorial control of which political issue are the most important. MacKuen defines issues into two types: obtrusive and unobtrusive. Obtrusive issues are those that have a direct impact upon voters' daily lives. The prime examples would be the economy and employment. Unobtrusive issues are those that do not have a direct impact upon most voters. Examples of these types of issues include foreign policy, race relations, crime, energy, and the environment. With unobtrusive issues, MacKuen found considerable evidence that the media does have a great deal of power in agenda-setting, but very little on obtrusive issues. By refining the study of agenda-setting into obtrusive and unobtrusive issues, we obtain a greater understanding of the power that the media has over political campaigns in this country.

More recent literature on the impact of the media upon issues, candidates, and elections has provided further insights into the agenda-setting role of the media. Bartels (1993) argues that the impact of the media is much greater than political scientists generally believe. Due to measurement error, Bartels states that scholars have often underrepresented the role of the media in politics in this country. He finds that the media has enormous influence on voters' perception of political issues and candidates, especially "new" issues and candidates when public opinion is still extremely fluid.

In an examination of the 1992 presidential election, Hetherington (1996) argues that the media had a large influence on vote choice, and that media influence was beneficial to Bill Clinton. According to Hetherington, the media portrayed George Bush as unsympathetic to the economic woes of some Americans. The media also continued to portray the country in recession, when most economic indicators suggested that the economy had rebounded by early Fall 1992. Nevertheless, media reporting of the slow economy damaged Bush's reelection bid.

Mondak (1995) studied an unique scenario involving the political influence of the media. In 1992, the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* was not published for eight months due to a strike. Mondak studied this event to see the impact that an absence of newspaper coverage had on political discussions. If political discussions did decline, then would vote choice be greatly affected? Mondak found that discussions of politics between individuals did not substantially decline, nor did voter turnout substantially differ in the 1992 elections. While Mondak does ascribe to the media a significant role in politics, he also suggests that it may not be as prevalent as some have suggested.

Throughout the recent literature focusing on the political impact of the media, most authors acknowledge that the media does play a prominent role in our political system. Most concede that earlier studies on voting behavior had a tendency to neglect or minimize the media impact. Since the 1970s, research has indicated in varying degrees that the media plays a significant role in the framing of political

issues and candidates. While they do differ in how far the media impact penetrates, most scholars today acknowledge that neglecting the political power of the mass media can lead to distorted views of political reality.

THE IMPACT OF THE BROADCAST MEDIA VERSUS NEWSPAPER COVERAGE

In his study of the campaign intensity of U.S. Senate elections, Mark Westlye (1991) states that a common assumption when studying the media impact on political campaigns in this country is that television coverage is the most important. Such assumptions are not as clear as one might expect. While scholars generally believe that television has replaced the print media as the major actor in agenda-setting, considerable evidence exists that suggests that the print media under certain circumstances may have a more important role in setting the political scene and agenda than does television.

The second assumption about the impact of the media is that most voters pay more attention to the broadcast media than print. This belief rests in large part on a series of surveys conducted by the Roper organization. In those surveys, Roper (1983) found that since 1964, television coverage has surpassed the print media in the coverage that most people say is important to them. In 1980, two-thirds of those surveyed stated that they paid more attention to television news than any other source.

One of the criticisms of the Roper study is that no distinction exists between national elections and state and local elections. Further, the Roper surveys do not

ask questions about political news, but rather questions are directed at news in general. Finally, the questions allow respondents to give multiple responses, making it impossible to rank the order of media sources (Westlye 1991).

Because ambiguity exists about which media source is the most important in political news, we address these two points. First, does the literature argue that newspaper coverage is a better source of political news than television media? Second, do most people rely upon newspapers as their primary source of political news?

Television or Newspaper Coverage: Which Is Better?

In the last few decades, some scholars have assumed that television coverage has replaced newspaper coverage as the most important sources of political news in this country. Theodore White argues that television has dramatically altered coverage of politics in this country. In fact, White (1986) compares the development of television coverage of politics "as revolutionary as the development of printing in the time of Gutenberg" (in McDowell 1986, 242), but White's proclamation was within the context of presidential campaigns.

While research does exist that television coverage has changed the landscape of national elections in this country, does this apply for state elections? Leary (1977) argues that television coverage not only has affected state elections, but the broadcast media also spends more time on campaigns and commands more attention from voters. Robinson (1975) argues that television coverage has

become the better source of political news in U.S. Senate campaigns, although U.S. House elections are not as well covered since they are not statewide elections in forty-three states.¹ While candidates for the Senate are generally well-known and their campaigns extensively covered, the average voter does not know House candidates and campaigns frequently. Thus, one may conclude that television coverage provides the best coverage for statewide races as well (Campbell, Alford, and Henry 1984).

Westlye (1991) argues that these assumptions are not correct. Rather, television coverage of statewide elections “typically underrepresents the actual intensity” (Westlye 1991, 35). Newspaper coverage is more extensive in statewide elections for various reasons. Newspapers have more flexibility in filling space, while television news producers must make editing decisions because of the tight time frame within which they must operate.

While the time frame and flexibility requirements of the print and broadcast media differ substantially, Clyde and Buckalew (1969) found that television coverage is essentially the same types of stories and issues. The difference arises when one examines the depth of campaign coverage. On average, newspapers have more time and space to devote to all facets of a campaign. Thus, their coverage is typically more extensive than television coverage (Graber 1980).

¹Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming all have at-large U.S. House seats due to their small populations. In these states, the entire state is in the same congressional district.

In sum, newspapers are able to provide a more detailed examination of statewide political contests due to the differing realities of print media as opposed to broadcast media. Television news in this country has only a certain amount of time in each broadcast ranging from thirty minutes to one hour in prime time. Due to the time constraints involved with the broadcast media, it falls to producers to limit the amount of coverage that television news can provide (Ranney 1984). While the types of stories may not differ, television news simply cannot relay all of the details about every aspect of a candidate and his campaign like the print media. As Westlye (1991) argues, newspaper coverage is a better source of news concerning political campaigns as compared with the broadcast media. If one relied upon newspaper coverage of political candidates and their campaigns in statewide elections, past research would suggest that such a person would be better informed about politics in this country. This begs a question: how many people actually rely upon newspapers in this country as their main source of information regarding statewide political contests in this country?

The Primary Source of News for the Average Voter

Just as many have assumed that television news coverage of campaigns is better than print coverage, so the same premise exists about where most voters get their news. As mentioned previously, much of this belief is based upon a series of Roper polls that found that nearly two-thirds of respondents in 1980 cited television news as their primary source of information (Roper 1983). Yet Westlye (1991)

criticizes the Roper questions by arguing that these polls did not distinguish between national and local news, the questions did not distinguish between political news and other types of news, and it allows multiple responses from those interviewed, making it difficult to say definitively that television news is the medium that is the primary source for most Americans.

Robinson (1978) found that respondents are more likely to read a newspaper than to watch television news based upon a poll conducted by the University of Michigan. According to several Gallup polls in the 1970s, a majority of people reported that they were more likely to rely upon newspapers for news than television (Sterling 1984). The Roper polls (1983) found that more people were likely to focus on newspapers for information about local campaigns.

In addition, some research has indicated that those who read newspapers are better informed about politics than those who solely watch television. McClure and Patterson (1974) found that voters who regularly read newspapers were more likely to know more about the issues that candidates advocated. Patterson (1980) found similar findings when he discovered that voters who relied upon newspaper coverage had better conceptions of candidates' issues stances than those who relied solely on television coverage (see also Robinson and Levy 1986; Berkowitz and Pritchard 1989; Robinson and Davis 1990; Weaver and Drew 1993). Quarles (1979) found that television viewers on average were less informed about politics largely because of the shallowness of television news coverage. Clarke and Fredin (1978) found that voters in U.S. Senate elections were more likely to be better

informed about campaigns, candidates, and issues when they had read newspaper coverage. Finally, Mondak (1995) found that voters who read newspapers typically had a greater understanding of political issues and candidates, especially in statewide elections.

Given this discussion, it would appear that concluding that newspaper coverage is not important for a majority of voters is premature. Evidence exists that many individuals tend to rely more heavily upon newspaper coverage than some polls suggest. Furthermore, the importance of newspaper coverage is even more important for state and local elections as compared with presidential campaigns. Not only is newspaper coverage a source of political information for many people, but newspapers also give readers a more detailed knowledge of candidates, campaigns, and issues than television coverage does.

Based upon these findings, voters who regularly read newspaper coverage of the elections examined in the dissertation might be more likely to view certain issues or candidates as racial if newspaper coverage were portraying them in such a manner. Therefore, it is more appropriate to examine newspaper coverage of the selected elections to see if the media may be causing racial threat voting since research suggests that newspapers do a better job of covering campaigns and that a large number of voters still depend upon them for coverage of state elections.

METHOD

To discover if newspapers are possibly leading to racial threat voting, we examine selected newspapers from each state examined in Chapter 4. The newspapers selected are those with a statewide circulation in each state. Consequently, the following newspapers are used in this analysis: *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, *The Advocate* (Baton Rouge), *The Post and Courier* (Charleston), and *The Times-Picayune* (New Orleans). These are statewide newspapers in their respective states. Thus, informed voters in these states would be able easily to obtain copies of these papers unlike smaller daily papers in these states that may not have a very large subscription area.

The examined dates rely upon Westlye's (1991) method, which examined media coverage of U.S. Senate elections. As it pertains to this chapter, we use Westlye's method of content analysis on newspaper coverage. We study articles that appeared between 1 October and the day prior to Election Day.² Since the majority of newspaper coverage comes between these dates, the analysis is limited to these dates. Coverage before 1 October tends to focus less on the campaign and more on candidate appearances and limited analysis of campaign commercials. News articles and editorials are analyzed for possible portrayal of certain issues or candidates as racially-based. Articles that mention the candidate in a non-

²In the case of Louisiana, coverage begins on 23 October 1995 and continues through 18 November 1995 due to the unique primary system for electing governors in the state. Since no semblance of a two candidate election exists until the runoff, newspaper coverage did not focus as extensively on any candidate(s).

campaign context are excluded. Also, paid advertisements as well as letters to the editor are also ignored.

The articles from each of these newspapers are analyzed using content analysis. We derived a code sheet, which is presented in Appendix B, and a series of key issues was listed on the code sheet. As we analyzed the articles, an article was noted if it contained one of the issues. By using such a methodology, we can quantify the newspaper coverage by seeing how often these issues arose during the articles. The author coded the articles. As a test of validity, another individual coded a sample from 15 percent of each set of articles. The test revealed that we were both coding in the same manner 85 percent of the time. In the next section, we see the results of this content analysis.

ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER COVERAGE

Articles from the selected newspapers were coded based on certain issues. These issues ranged from social issues which included the topics of Confederate symbols, welfare reform, affirmative action, and other social issues like abortion, teen pregnancy, and the general breakdown of family. Finally, a topic of other racial issues, which included any coverage of other topics that some might construe as race-based, was coded. For example in Louisiana, whenever the media mentioned David Duke or his endorsement of Mike Foster, we coded the article as other racial issues.

A second category was economic issues. Two topics under this classification were the state of the economy and taxes. Any articles that dealt with improving the state economy or maintaining its current condition was coded under the state of the economy issue. To be coded under the taxes issue, an article must mention or analyze proposals to either raise or lower taxes within the state.

Finally, a third category dealt with education issues. Articles, which were concerned with the condition of public education within the state, were coded accordingly. Another issue in all three states, but especially South Carolina, was the question of whether a lottery and other forms of legalized gambling should be used to improve education. When articles discuss this topic, we code them appropriately. The results of the content analysis are presented in Table 6.1. Following the table, is an analysis of coverage by individual state.

Table 6.1
Content Analysis of Newspaper Articles (in percent)

	<i>Atlanta Journal-Constitution</i> (N=41)	<i>The Advocate</i> (Baton Rouge) (N=30)	<i>The Times-Picayune</i> (New Orleans) (N=31)	<i>The Post and Courier</i> (Charleston) (N=44) <u>1994</u>	(N=27) <u>1998</u>
I. Social Issues					
A. Confederate symbols	7.3	0.0	0.0	4.5	29.6
B. Other racial issues	21.9	50.0	48.3	25.0	11.1
C. Affirmative action	19.5	13.3	12.9	2.2	3.7
D. Social welfare reform	2.4	30.0	35.4	13.6	14.8
E. Law and order/crime	39.0	33.3	32.2	31.8	14.8
F. Other social issues	4.8	26.6	32.2	45.4	7.4
II. Economic Issues					
A. Status of state economy	31.7	13.3	16.1	22.7	33.3
B. Taxes	39.0	30.0	25.8	22.7	33.3
III. Educational Issues					
A. Status of public education	46.3	50.0	25.8	38.6	70.3
B. State lottery/legalized gambling to support education	21.9	23.3	16.1	27.2	92.5

Notes: Articles in the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* and *The Post and Courier* (Charleston) begin on 1 October and continue through the day prior to the general election. With both Louisiana papers, the coverage begins the day after the primary, 23 October 1995, and continue until the day before the runoff between Fields and Foster on 18 November 1995.

South Carolina-1994 and 1998

After examining the previous table, the articles mentioned Confederate symbols more frequently in 1998 than 1994 in South Carolina's coverage. One reason for this was the fact that David Beasley, the incumbent Republican governor, had in 1995 and 1996 attempted to halt the practice of flying the Confederate battle flag from atop the State Capitol in Columbia.³ Although Beasley was unsuccessful in his attempt, his Democratic opponent, Jim Hodges, made the most of this failure by criticizing Beasley for attempting to bring down the flag, and Hodges promised that he would leave the flag flying if elected.

In 1994, the only major racial issue covered by the media was an incident involving a black campaign worker for David Beasley. Democrat Nick Theodore's campaign attacked this worker for having a prior criminal record, although former Governor Carroll Campbell had pardoned her in 1987. While the articles quoted some black citizens in news coverage as upset about the attack, the incident was only mentioned twice during the remainder of the campaign. Much of the other coverage discussed the fact that Beasley had very low black support.

Affirmative action, social welfare reform, and crime are all issues which can potentially activate symbolic racism (Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980; McConahay 1982; Sears and Citrin 1982; Gilens 1995;

³South Carolina is the only state that flies the Confederate battle flag, also known as the St. Andrews Cross, over the State Capitol. The state legislature voted to fly the battle flag over the Capitol in the early 1960s as a show of defiance of Federal policies aimed at desegregating public schools.

Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997). Many white voters are resentful of affirmative action and social welfare programs, while some whites view crime as a racial issue due to the high percentages of blacks who commit violent crimes. For these reasons, we examined articles for the presence of these issues in newspaper coverage, but crime commanded little coverage in South Carolina in either 1994 or 1998. While David Beasley did advocate the curbing of some affirmative action programs, it was not pivotal to either of his campaigns.

The print media did not cover social welfare reform that extensively, although it did appear in more coverage than affirmative action cuts. Beasley advocated a two-year limit on welfare as well as other proposals like requiring able-bodied recipients to work on public projects to receive their benefits. In 1994, Beasley's Democratic opponent, Nick Theodore, did not support such calls for welfare reform, but Jim Hodges in 1998 did support some limited welfare reforms. Thus, white voters whom symbolic racial attitudes may have influenced would not have automatically voted for Beasley because of Hodges' stand on the issue as well.

The print media covered the crime issue quite extensively in South Carolina in 1994, but dropped the issue in coverage during the 1998 campaign. As discussed previously with symbolic racism, some white voters see crime as a cue to vote in a racial manner. The fact that the issue was so widespread in the coverage might lead one to suspect that race may have played a role on vote choice with this issue, but the crime issue did not breakdown into clear partisan

divisions either. In a pattern that we see in all three states, both the Republican and Democratic candidates took equally hard lines on the crime issue, making it difficult to say that race would have definitely led white voters to vote for the Republican candidate. In 1994 and 1998, David Beasley and both of his respective Democratic rivals called for more police enforcement and greater spending on prisons. Again, this makes it difficult to proclaim that newspaper coverage would have led some whites to vote automatically in a racial manner for Republican Beasley.

Finally, other social issues included abortions, teen pregnancy, breakdown of the family, and the general state of society. In the 1994 coverage, the articles featured these issues in 45 percent of the articles. During the 1994 election, part of the high level of other social issues was fueled by the fact that David Beasley was a born-again Christian fundamentalist who ran as the accepted candidate of the Christian Coalition. Beasley talked quite frequently about the need to eliminate abortions. He also lamented the state of society where families were not as cohesive as they once were and rampant teen pregnancy abounded, especially in the state's poorest areas. Since Beasley was running on a family values platform, this helps to account for the high levels of coverage on this category in 1994. In 1998, the print media did not cover other social issues in South Carolina. In South Carolina, we see in the coming discussion that both economic issues and education issues were more prominent than any social issue in 1998. This also underscores

that people tend to worry less about social issues when they are more preoccupied with the economy.

We coded two economic categories in the analysis. The first was the status of the state economy. While the economy was doing well in varying degrees among all of the states, it was still an important issue. In South Carolina, coverage of the status of the state economy was found in almost 23 percent of the 1994 articles and in roughly 33 percent of the 1998 coverage. In many cases, the media coupled coverage of this economic issue with education since many jobs created required higher-skilled and educated workers.

Closely related to the first category was the issue of taxes. In all cases, the Republican candidates across the three states called for varying degrees of tax cuts. In South Carolina, Beasley called for lower state income taxes and greater tax breaks for industry in both 1994 and 1998. Before rushing to claim lower taxes as a Republican issue, Hodges in his 1998 campaign also supported a lower income tax, although at a higher rate than Beasley supported. We now turn our attention to another set of issues that are often linked with economic ones, issues related to the topic of education.

Public education is always a concern in southern elections. Historically, state spending on public education in the South has lagged behind the nation. One of the education issues coded was status of public education. In South Carolina, education was covered almost 40 percent of the coverage in the 1994 election, but that coverage jumped to 70 percent in 1998. The other category within the

education issue was the question of state lotteries and other forms of legalized gambling to support public education. This gambling issue came to the forefront in the 1990s. Louisiana has had varying forms of legalized gambling since the early 1990s which proved enormously profitable for the state. In 1993, Georgia instituted a statewide lottery, the proceeds of which went exclusively to education. By the late 1990s, Georgia was spending greater amounts on education due to lottery proceeds.

In 1994, neither David Beasley nor Nick Theodore made the lottery the issue of their respective campaigns. Beasley opposed the lottery, while Theodore only tacitly supported it. Consequently, coverage in the 1994 articles on the lottery was at roughly 27 percent. In 1998, that figure had risen to an astounding 92 percent. Democrat Jim Hodges made the lottery the issue of his campaign much like Zell Miller had in his 1990 gubernatorial campaign in Georgia.

While Beasley still opposed the lottery in 1998, he did state that he had no problem with the people voting on the issue. Hodges, on the other hand, pointed to the success of Georgia's lottery as an example of what South Carolina could have. Thus, the extraordinarily high rate of coverage on the lottery issue. Hodges ran a television advertisement geared to those voters who supported a statewide lottery for education. The main character in this ad was "Bubba" who talked about how Georgia loved South Carolina due to the large numbers of the state's residents

who were crossing the state line to buy Georgia lottery tickets.⁴ Simultaneously, Beasley was arguing that the lottery would not work as well in South Carolina since it was a much smaller state in both geography and population compared with Georgia. Nevertheless, Hodge's campaign was extremely successful. Gaulden and Swindell (1998) argue that the key to Hodge's success against Beasley more than anything else was his call for a state lottery.

In closing, the two South Carolina elections covered show that race had slightly more coverage in the 1998 campaign as opposed to 1994. While the Confederate flag was essentially a non-issue in 1994, it had become an issue in 1998 due to David Beasley's reneging on a promise to leave the flag alone. After the state legislature rebuffed Beasley's attempt to remove the flag, Beasley opened himself up for attack from Hodges. The rest of the print media's focus on race was the fact that neither candidate seemed to be very appealing to black voters (Frazier 1998). In 1994, the only major racial issue covered by the media was the incident involving the black campaign worker for David Beasley.

Therefore, one cannot say that race was a defining issue in either South Carolina campaign based on the print media coverage. In 1994, other types of social issues like abortion and family issues were covered more extensively and were more central to that campaign. The fact that David Beasley was closely identified with the Christian Coalition added to this emphasis on social issues. In

⁴In 1997 alone, South Carolinians had spent an estimated \$75 million on Georgia lottery tickets, which in turn benefitted public schools in Georgia (Gaulden and Swindell 1998).

1998, educational issues, specifically calls for a state lottery to improve educational funding, dominated the news coverage. Hodges' call of a lottery modeled after Georgia's appears to have helped him defeat Beasley more than anything else, though our analysis in Chapter 4 indicated the flag pledge was also relevant.

While racial issues were covered to a limited extent, race did not dominate either of these campaigns. Some white voters could have taken the racial coverage, especially involving the Confederate flag, as a cue to vote based upon race. Nevertheless, race did not dominate the coverage. It appears that the lottery was the issue that dominated, and lotteries tend to be an issue that cuts across race with black and white supporters on both sides of the lottery issue. This may also account for the lack of explanatory power that we saw in the South Carolina model in Chapter 4.

Louisiana-1995

In Louisiana, racial issues were prominent in the print coverage of the 1995 gubernatorial runoff between Cleo Fields and Mike Foster. While no mention was made of Confederate symbols in the two Louisiana papers, discussion of race in other ways accounted for 50 percent of the articles in *The Advocate* and nearly 50 percent in *The Times-Picayune*, despite a promise by both candidates that they would not discuss race during the course of the campaign.

Race did inevitably come into play during the campaign though. A great deal of coverage focused on David Duke's endorsement of Mike Foster, who refused to

renounce that endorsement. When asked why he refused to distance himself from the Duke endorsement, Foster commented, "why are you going to say anything bad to someone who supports my conservative message?" (Shuler 1995, 4A). Besides the Duke endorsement, race came into play in the Foster campaign in other ways. Later in the campaign, Foster was discussing crime in a debate with Cleo Fields. Foster stated that Jefferson Parish, an adjoining suburban parish to New Orleans, "does a good job [with crime]—it's right next to the jungle of New Orleans..." (Dyer 1995, 8A). This comment caused substantial furor in the media, and Cleo Fields chastised Foster for the comment. Later, Foster apologized for the comment saying that it was a poor choice of words.

Despite their pledge not to mention race, both candidates nevertheless did mention race. Fields stated that Foster was playing the race card through his refusal to denounce the Duke endorsement as well as Foster's stances on affirmative action and welfare reform. Foster accused Fields of playing the race card during the campaign as well. In one instance, Foster attacked Fields' plans to give voters a ride to the polling place, although this was legal in the state. At another point, Foster attacked Fields for using racial rhetoric during a televised debate. Perhaps, the most illuminating potential that race had in the contest came from a white Louisiana voter who was a resident of the town of Central in which every precinct had given at least 50 percent support for Foster in the primary. This voter remarked

if you think that any whites in Central are going to vote for Cleo Fields, you're crazy. It is a strictly black-white deal. Ain't nobody cares about anybody's views on anything (Garland 1995, 1A).

This comment alone helps us to see how many white Louisiana voters may have been viewing the election. Certainly, the extensive coverage of race in the campaign had the potential of influencing some white voters who may be predisposed to vote based on racial attitudes.

While race was prominent in the newspaper coverage, it was not the only issue that was featured. Among the remaining categories of social issues, the print media mentioned affirmative action in about 13 percent of articles across both newspapers. Republican Mike Foster was vocal in his criticism of affirmative action while Democrat Cleo Fields defended the programs. Affirmative action programs are among those issues which can lead many white voters to cast votes in a racial manner.

Coverage in Louisiana focused more on social-welfare reform than any other state, based on the analysis of the print coverage. In all three states, Republican candidates advocated calls for limiting the number of years that an individual could be on welfare. In Louisiana, it seems that Mike Foster, who had been extremely vocal in his opposition to certain welfare policies, spurred the print coverage into greater attention to social welfare issues than any of the three states.

The crime issue appeared roughly one-third of the time in the print news coverage. Much like South Carolina, saying that Foster owned this potentially

symbolic racial issue would be hazardous. Both Fields and Foster took hard lines with the crime issue, and both called for greater prison spending. Divergence came on the death penalty which Foster supported, but Fields opposed.

Among the other social issues category, the majority constituted coverage of the abortion issue which is even more divisive in Louisiana given its large Roman Catholic population. Mike Foster called for the end of all abortions except for rape or incest of the mother, while Cleo Fields did not advocate any change in abortion policy. Fields did point out that he personally opposed abortions, though.

We now turn our attention to the coverage of economic issues in the 1995 campaign. By combining both economic categories, status of the state economy and taxes, we see that the two combined accounted for more newspaper coverage of any of the social issues with the exception of racial issues. The economy in Louisiana was in relatively good shape in 1995 after it had endured a statewide recession since the oil bust of the early 1980s. The articles coupled most of the discussion of the state economy with two other issues: (1) taxation, (2) education. Discussion of taxation revolved around tax incentives for businesses to locate in the state. Mike Foster also proposed an increase to the exemption on personal property taxes, while Fields opposed this. The candidates also discussed the economy together with education when discussing the needed for my educated and skilled workers.

Educational issues were also coded when the articles were analyzed. Overall, education illustrated the greatest disparity in the two papers. In *The*

Advocate, education appears in 50 percent of the coverage, but it consisted only 25 percent in the *Times-Picayune*. When the articles discussed the status of education, both candidates supported increases for educational spending, but they differed on the means. Foster sought to cut social programs to fund education at a greater level. Fields opposed such a move, arguing that the state might need modest tax increases to increase educational spending.

Given the success of legalized gambling and the lottery in Louisiana, coverage in the two newspapers did not pay a great deal of attention to this issue. Coverage tended to focus on the high sums of money paid by the gambling industry to influence state officials. No real debate beyond this took place because legalized gambling had existed for some time before 1995.

Race did dominate the print news coverage of the Louisiana gubernatorial election. Much of this dominance focused on two elements. First, the fact that David Duke's candidacy had occurred only four years earlier still had an impact on the election. Coupled with this was Duke's endorsement of Republican Mike Foster, who refused to renounce the nod from Duke. Despite Foster's repeated denials that he was not a racist, his tacit acceptance of the Duke endorsement undoubtedly raised questions among some voters.

Beyond the David Duke factor, the Louisiana election featured a white candidate versus a black candidate. When given this type of choice, symbolic racial attitudes will automatically influence some white voters (Sears and Kinder 1971). The simple fact that one of the candidates was black was enough to focus

the media coverage on this, and it was enough that neither candidate had to be blatantly racial to appeal to certain white voters. Perhaps the most illumination comment came from the white voter who stated that the race was all black and white.⁵ These two factors combined led the print media to cover racial issues to a greater extent than any other issue in 1995.

Georgia-1998

In Georgia, the print media did not cover racial issues to any great extent during the 1998 campaign. Discussion of the Georgia state flag, which incorporates the Confederate battle flag in its design, accounted for all of the discussion about Confederate symbols. While other racial issues did account for nearly 22 percent of the articles analyzed, most of that included articles detailing the lack of black support for Republican Guy Millner, part of a trend that we have seen is common in the South. Coverage also focused in on the need for an historically high black voter turnout if Barnes was to defeat Millner.

The only news coverage that painted Millner as an explicitly racial candidate came from two articles. One was coverage of a rally of the National Association for the Advancement for Colored Persons (NAACP) in which black leaders painted Millner as racist because of his opposition to affirmative action programs. The other article, an editorial by columnist Cynthia Tucker, attacked Millner for hiring homeless blacks to show up at Millner rallies as his supporters. Tucker attacked

⁵Exit polls in Louisiana showed Foster with 84 percent of the white vote (Parent and Perry 1998).

Millner's stances on affirmative action and the state flag as racist, although Democrat Roy Barnes also supported the current state flag. Tucker also compared Millner to the late General Sani Abacha of Nigeria who hired outside political consultants and supporters to appear at rallies so that he seemed to have popular support (Tucker 1998).

Much like Mike Foster in Louisiana, Millner attempted to turn the tables on Barnes regarding race. On several occasions late in the campaign, Millner attacked Roy Barnes for voting against the Martin Luther King holiday in 1989, when Barnes was a member of the Georgia Senate. Barnes diffused the issue by stating that he regretted that vote more than any other in his public career. Besides these articles, race was not the focus of the print media during this campaign.

Articles also discussed affirmative action in around 20 percent of the articles analyzed. In a familiar pattern, Republican Millner opposed affirmative action programs, and Democrat Barnes favored keeping the programs to an extent. While Millner was attacking the programs as racial quotas, Barnes stated that he did not support affirmative action because of race. Rather, he supported the programs because they helped women gain better jobs. Millner also attacked affirmative action as letting less-qualified minority students into the state's universities. Despite the discussion of affirmative action, reform of social welfare accounted for relatively little coverage. One reason for this might have been that both candidates supported welfare reform to varying degrees.

Thirty-nine percent of the articles focused on crime, and both candidates took hard lines on the problem of crime. Again, like affirmative action and welfare reform, crime has the potential of activating racial voting among some whites. In Georgia, Republicans could not claim crime as their issue. In fact, Roy Barnes arguably took a tougher stance on crime in one aspect. Guy Millner proposed early in the campaign that prisoners who worked in the prison system should have money paid into an escrow account that they would receive upon release. Accordingly, these prisoners would have some money and not have to go directly onto welfare upon release. Barnes blasted the idea saying that, "I want to work them [prisoners] for nothing" (Wooten 1998). Barnes went out to add that cities and counties have a right to work prisoners because they are repaying a debt to society.

In Georgia, the coverage did not focus on issues like abortion or family breakdown as in South Carolina in 1994 or in Louisiana in 1995. Republican Guy Millner did state that he opposed abortions, but he did not make it a hallmark of his campaign. His Democratic rival, Roy Barnes, did not make much of the issue either. One reason being may have been that Barnes ran as a pro-life gubernatorial candidate in 1990, but he stated his views had changed since then.

Combined, the two economic categories accounted for a greater share of print media coverage than any of the social issues by themselves. The status of the state economy accounted for nearly 32 percent of the articles, while taxes accounted for around 39 percent. Both candidates proposed ways to make Georgia's robust economy even stronger. Guy Millner proposed a series of costing

cutting measures that would free more money to cities and counties. When pressed on how he would cut the state budget, he stated that he did not know, but “experts” could help him with this job. Barnes, on the other hand, did not propose any significant changes to state government except one. Barnes proposed establishing a traffic authority that would oversee traffic congestion in all metropolitan areas, but the authority would focus extensively on Atlanta since it was the state’s largest city and had the greatest traffic problems.

On the issue of taxes, Guy Millner called for a repeal of *ad valorem* taxes and a lower personal income tax. Millner also called for tax breaks to attract new industry to the state. Millner noted that greater tax incentives would attract future industries to the state much like South Carolina and Alabama had respectively attracted BMW and Mercedes-Benz plants. Barnes called for an increase in the exemption rate for property taxes, and he also proposed a three-year moratorium on business paying unemployment taxes as a tax incentive to attract new industry. Barnes did not rule out raising taxes though. While he stated that Georgia’s current gas tax was probably enough for the roads, he was keeping his options open possibly to raise it if need be to built transportation alternatives to roads (Goldberg 1998).⁶

Almost half the articles focused on education. Most of the discussion between the candidates dealt with the best way to improve spending on education. Although Georgia’s lottery is very successful, both candidates proposed spending

⁶Georgia has the lowest state gasoline taxes in the nation.

more money on the greater use of technology in the classroom. Besides using more technology in schools, the candidates discussed the need to improve educational facilities in the state further. Part of the Georgia lottery goes to fund the Hope Scholarship which pays the tuition of Georgia high school students with a B average who go to a state-supported college or university. As a result, the state's institutions of higher learning, from universities to two-year colleges, saw substantial increases in enrollment leading to a need for more spending on higher education. Barnes also supported a plan to expand the state's technical colleges to provide more opportunities for students in the state.

Unlike South Carolina, the lottery did not occupy the majority of the coverage in 1998. Georgia had instituted a statewide lottery to improve educational spending in 1993, and it had proved enormously successful. In 1998, neither Barnes nor Millner opposed the lottery although both had opposed a lottery in the past. Most of the discussion of the lottery dealt with how best to use the proceeds to improve education.

In closing, while racial issues combined did comprise about 30 percent of the content in the print coverage, race did not dominate the 1998 campaign like it did in Louisiana three years prior. Part of the reason dealt with the fact that both candidates supported the current state flag, eliminating the possibility of a racial split on those grounds. The most racially divisive coverage came on affirmative action programs and the lack of black support for Guy Millner. Other than this, it would be a mistake to characterize the news coverage as focusing on racial issues.

Education accounted for the content of 46 percent of the articles. Most of the discussion focused on proposals by both candidates to improve education, primarily by increasing the use of technology in the classroom. Both candidates stated that they supported the lottery in 1998, and they sought ways of best allocating the proceeds to funding public education in the state.

Of all the issues, economic ones were the most extensively covered in this campaign. Both candidates focused on how to improve the state's strong economy, and they also supported lowering taxes in varying degrees. By 1998, Millner and Barnes were running in an extremely strong economy that had rebounded from the recession of the early 1990s. Factored into this strong economy was the fact that two-term governor Zell Miller was leaving office as one of the most popular governors in state history. In many ways, the 1998 election was a referendum on who could best continue the policies and direction set forth by Miller. Barnes portrayed himself as part of "a line of mind-the-store Democrats" (Baxter 1998). Even Republican Millner claimed that he could best follow-up the policies and direction which Miller was leaving. Thus, while economic issues did account for a majority of the coverage, in many ways this election was a referendum on maintaining the successes of the Miller Administration.

CONCLUSION

When examining the content analysis of the newspaper articles overall, a few trends emerge. In South Carolina, social issues played a more important role

in the 1994 election, while the lottery was the overwhelming story of the 1998 election. In Georgia, economic issues and the status of public education were the most important issues as covered by the print media. Finally, in Louisiana, social issues occupied the majority of coverage in the two Louisiana newspapers.

What of the racial issues? Was race dominant in the newspaper coverage? All three of the newspapers examined, covered racial issues, but the issue waxed and waned across the states. In Georgia, racial issues accounted for almost 30 percent of newspaper coverage when combining other racial issues and Confederate symbols. In the 1994 South Carolina election, race accounted for around 30 percent in that election as well. The election in 1998 was a different story for South Carolina where coverage focused on race in around 40 percent of the coverage. Interestingly, coverage of the Confederate flag issue rose from 4.5 percent to almost 30 percent during the two elections. We can attribute much, if not all, of this to Beasley's flip on his 1994 promise to keep the Confederate flag flying over the State Capitol. By 1998, he had tried and failed to remove the flag. Beasley's Democratic opponent, Jim Hodges, made the most of this failure, and Hodges also promised to leave the flag alone should he win election.

It was in Louisiana, however, that race drew the most coverage. Perhaps, this should not be surprising since the racial tone of the 1991 gubernatorial election had torn the state. In 1995, neither of the two candidates in the runoff were blatantly racial candidates. In fact, the Democratic candidate, Cleo Fields, was black. Yet, it may have been the subtle racial tone of the runoff that led to such

extensive coverage of the racial issue. Although he was not present in the 1995 runoff, David Duke still commanded media attention in this election. Many articles mentioned the fact that Duke endorsed Mike Foster, and the fact that Foster refused to renounce that endorsement. Several newspaper articles discussed the fact that little white support existed for Fields, and the fact that no statewide Democratic officeholder endorsed Fields. Finally, a few newspaper editorials pleaded with the two candidates that this election not turn into a racial competition. All of this led the media coverage of the Louisiana contest to have the most distinctly racial flavor of any of the states.

Based upon the newspaper coverage from these three states, the print media coverage of these campaigns did have varying levels of racial flavor, but only in Louisiana did that racial coverage approach dominance. In Georgia and both South Carolina campaigns, the print media more frequently covered economic and educational issues. Undoubtedly, white voters could have interpreted some newspaper coverage as race-based, and the coverage may have indeed influenced some white voters susceptible to the influence of symbolic racial attitudes.

It should be noted that the results of the media coverage dovetail with the findings over the past two chapters. In Louisiana and South Carolina, racial threat voting is taking place based upon culture in Louisiana and geography in the 1994 South Carolina election. In the 1998 South Carolina election, the county-level analysis did not support the existence of physical proximity racial threat voting, and this is demonstrated in the newspaper coverage as well. Given David Beasley's flip

on the Confederate flag, many of his white supporters from 1994 abandoned him. Yet, race was not a significant factor in the analysis suggesting that some other factor was more important to South Carolina voters. As we have seen from this chapter, the other factor was the lottery. Finally, in Georgia, around 30 percent of the articles focus on racial issues. In the county-level analysis, race did have a significant positive factor on Guy Millner's success with white voters. The articles covered affirmative action quite frequently, which may account for even more of his white support, especially among black belt whites who are not in favor of affirmative action.

Does media coverage help to activate or cause racial threat voting? While saying with absolute certainty is impossible, it seems that the potential exists that media coverage could activate racial threat voting. It may be that voters who vote in a racially threatened manner use media coverage as a reinforcement rather than the cause. As the past research in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest, those who are likely to be susceptible to racial threat voting usually already have certain racial attitudes ingrained in their belief systems. In the case of physical proximity racial threat, the environment may lead white voters to vote based upon race. With cultural racial threat voting, one's belief system, not environment, can lead one to vote in a racial manner. The print media coverage may be a way of reinforcing these beliefs, but it may not cause racial threat to become activated. While media coverage can be a powerful tool, it seems that racial threat voting requires more than just media coverage to thrive.

CHAPTER 7

THE LESSONS OF RACIAL THREAT VOTING

In this dissertation, we have attempted to understand better the concept of racial threat, which argues that some white voters cast votes in a racial manner when they feel intimidated or threatened by black citizens. As discussed in the first chapter, racial threat is a variant on V.O. Key's black belt thesis. Key (1949) argues that the black belt counties controlled the politics of their state, even though black belt counties were not the majority in most southern states. Although outnumbered, the black belt counties voted as a solid bloc in elections, and these black belt counties were usually able to elect officials of their choosing in most states. The glue which held the black belt together was race because white voters in the black belt were the most concerned with keeping the status quo regarding blacks and therefore opposed progressives who moderated on issues of race.

Of course, Key wrote during a time when blacks were effectively barred from political participation in the South. As enormous changes came to the region after the Civil Rights movement, Key's thesis became outmoded since whites in black belt counties could no longer control the politics of their county or state since black mobilization had occurred. Yet, some scholars continued to find racial voting taking place among white voters, especially in the black belt areas. Racial threat argues

that race has not vanished as a political force in the South. According to most of the prior research on racial threat voting, white voters who live in close concentration to black populations may feel “threatened” by these blacks. Consequently, they cast their votes for the candidate who clearly would not be the favorite of black residents. In the South, this would usually mean a white vote cast for whomever the Republican nominee might happen to be. Is it a requirement that racial threat voting be contained solely to those regions, like the black belt, where whites live in close contact to large black populations?

The goal of this study has been to clarify the entire concept of racial threat. Past research has tended to examine racial threat voting only in geographic terms much like Key’s black belt thesis. Further, much of the research focused on one state which may or may not be indicative of a general pattern across the region. As mentioned at the outset, this study limited itself to the Deep South states because of the historical importance that race had played in defining the politics of those states. While race was important in the Rim South as well, it played less of a factor due to smaller black populations in those states. Unfortunately, two Deep South states, Alabama and Mississippi, had to be excluded from this study due to the lack of readily available data. The three states left, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina, were studied to determine the impact of racial threat on selected gubernatorial contests in these states.

A further refinement of racial threat was to conceptualize it in different dimensions. In addition to viewing racial threat as a consequence of one’s physical

proximity to counties where blacks make up a large proportion of the population, this dissertation has attempted to examine racial threat in two other dimensions as well. First, we have studied racial threat as a product of one's culture. Perhaps racial threat voting is not dependent upon where one resides. Rather, one's culture and rearing may instill certain racial attitudes in some white voters. Accordingly, racial threat voting could occur anywhere in a state, not just the black belt. Second, we have examined racial threat as possibly activated and fueled by media coverage of elections. As we discovered in Chapter 6, the impact of the media has often been discounted in voting behavior research.

Beyond this, this dissertation has attempted to answer the question of whether racial threat is a distinct different school of voting behavior literature, or could racial threat be viewed as an extension of previous theories of voting behavior? Later in this chapter, we discuss racial threat's placement in the voting behavior literature.

Finally, what does racial threat hold for the future of the Republican Party in the South? As noted above, when racial threat voting does occur, the beneficiaries of these racially-charged elections are usually Republican candidates. As mentioned in the first chapter, the breakthrough for the Republican Party in the South during the 1960s was based upon race. Can the party continue to use race to build a coalition in hopes of becoming the majority party in the region, or does a certain glass ceiling exist where racial appeal will eventually end? We discuss this prospect at the end of this chapter.

FINDINGS OF THE PREVIOUS THREE CHAPTERS

In the past three chapters, racial threat has been examined in dimensions of physical proximity, culture, and media coverage respectively. Reviewing the findings of these chapters will help to put the idea of racial threat into context. From the findings, we see the strengths and weaknesses of each approach to racial threat.

Physical Proximity

In the fourth chapter, racial threat, as defined by geographic environment, was tested using county-level analysis. Fortunately, data was available in all three states. The results of the analysis revealed a mixed pattern. In the 1994 South Carolina gubernatorial election, physical proximity racial threat voting was occurring among white voters. A significant relationship existed between those white voters in the black belt and support for David Beasley. None of the other independent variables were statistically significant, suggesting that race was a large factor among white voters in the black belt in their decision to support Beasley in 1994.

The other state in which physical proximity racial threat voting bore out a significant relationship was the 1998 Georgia gubernatorial election. Here, a positive association existed between the Republican Guy Millner and white voters in the black belt, but the relationship was not as powerful as the 1994 South Carolina election had been. Further, the only issue advocated by Millner that could have accounted for this relationship was his opposition to affirmative action

programs. This stance could have indirectly led to some racial voting, but beyond that no other issue could really account for this.

In the Louisiana gubernatorial election of 1995, physical proximity racial threat voting was not in operation according to the statistical analyses. This was mildly surprising given the highly racial content of the 1991 gubernatorial contest when David Duke ran. Prior research had also shown that racial threat voting did exist in the 1991 election among whites who lived in the black belt (Giles and Buckner 1995). Though neither Mike Foster nor Cleo Fields portrayed themselves as racial candidates, Fields was black and Foster was white possibly leading to some latent racial animosities leading to racial threat voting. In fact, the 1995 election was in many ways an ideological contest between these two candidates. Since neither was blatantly racial like a David Duke, it may have been that the factors necessary to activate race based solely on physical proximity was not there.

Finally, the analysis of the 1998 South Carolina gubernatorial election did not reveal any significant pattern of racial threat voting occurring based upon geographic proximity to black populations. One large reason for this lack of significance may have been David Beasley's reversal on a promise to keep the Confederate battle flag flying over the State Capitol in Columbia. Although Beasley failed, many white voters may have been angry at Beasley's attempt. Coupled with this was the fact that Jim Hodges, the Democratic nominee in 1998, promised to leave the flag alone if elected. This would also account for the drop in Beasley's support among some white voters.

Overall, the mixed results of the county-level analysis suggest that racial threat voting based on physical proximity to large black populations does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, physical proximity racial threat voting depends upon political context in order to function as a significant force in elections. In both cases where the county-level analysis demonstrated racial threat voting taking place, we could point to the political context as providing the impetus for this. Also, in the two cases where physical proximity racial threat voting was not taking place, political context again plays a role. In the 1998 South Carolina election, the fact that David Beasley had reneged on his promise about the Confederate flag was enough to cause some of his white supporters to abandon him. In Louisiana, the fact that neither candidate was blatantly racial was enough to keep racial threat voting from occurring based solely on physical space, although voting may have been so racially polarized that no variance in the white vote existed. In sum, physical proximity racial threat voting needs cues in order to function. Without the proper political environment, racial threat voting based upon geography will not operate.

Racial Threat as a Consequence of Culture

The fifth chapter examined racial threat voting in the context of one's culture. Perhaps, racial threat voting is not based on where a person lives. Rather, the mores and attitudes instilled in people by their culture could lead to certain attitudes that activate racial threat voting. Thus, physical proximity would not be as crucial to the presence of racial threat voting. Much of the literature in Chapter 5 was

based on research pioneered by Sears and Kinder (1971) in their study of symbolic racism, which asserts that one's rearing can lead to certain racial attitudes. In turn, these racial beliefs can affect one's voting behavior (Sears and Funk 1999).

When testing for this type of racial threat voting, public opinion polling data is the most appropriate method. Therefore, opinion polls were obtained where possible. Unfortunately, the only state in which raw polling data was available statewide was in Louisiana.¹ Consequently, data for the National Election Studies (NES) from 1994 and 1998 were used to supplement the findings of the Louisiana data. While it was not possible to use candidate choice as a dependent variable with the NES data, we were able to test the impact of race upon one's party identification for both a southern and non-southern subset.

By constructing a symbolic racism measure, we tested for the importance of race in individual white voting behavior. This would allow us to see the influence that race might have on the voting decisions of white voters wherever they might live, and use of polling data allowed us to test for the effects of race upon these elections even when racial issues were not mentioned frequently by the candidates.

Before testing for the role of race in Louisiana, the NES data was analyzed to determine the role that race has upon party identification, and it also allowed us an opportunity to compare the differences in race between the South and non-

¹The necessary statewide polling data was not available for either Georgia or South Carolina. While a statewide poll in Georgia does exist, no racial questions were asked making it impossible to construct any measure of race. No statewide polling is done in South Carolina. Attempts to obtain private polls done for David Beasley's campaigns were unsuccessful.

South.² The results revealed an overall negative pattern for the importance of race in Republican identity. Only in the 1994 southern subset did symbolic racial attitudes reach statistical significance. In neither non-southern subset nor the 1998 southern subset, did race play a significant factor in Republican identification.

This finding underscores two points. First, race does not appear to be a noteworthy factor among whites living outside of the South. Although a positive relationship did exist among non-southern whites between symbolic racism and Republican identity, it was not a statistically significant relationship. Secondly, symbolic racial attitudes only registered a significant relationship in the southern subset in 1994, revealing as misleading claims that race will always define Republican identification among southern whites. Again, it appears that variations exist, even among southern whites, in the role that race plays in party identification.

After testing the NES data, the statewide poll from Louisiana, conducted by the University of New Orleans was analyzed. As we saw in the previous discussion, physical proximity racial threat voting was not occurring in the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election. An analysis of the UNO poll data for the presence of racial threat voting based on culture was undertaken. If race was playing a large role in white support for Mike Foster, then racial threat may be occurring based upon culture, not geography. The results revealed that racial attitudes played a significant role in the 1995 gubernatorial election. White respondents used race

²White respondents only were used in the NES data. The respondents were broken into two subsets: South and non-South. The southern subset was an eleven state region as defined by the U.S. Census.

not only as a way of comparing differences between Mike Foster and Cleo Fields, but they also used race when forming opinions of each candidate. In the case of Fields, white voters who had a high level of symbolic racism had a negative image of Fields and a positive image of Foster. In fact, symbolic racial attitudes were the only variable that achieved statistical significance when testing all the independent variables for their importance on candidate image and differences between the candidates. While ideology was important in helping white respondents determine the difference between Foster and Fields and in Foster's image, it was not significant in how white respondents viewed Fields. These findings reveal a pattern where racial attitudes were important in the way that white voters viewed each candidate.

When analyzing for the role that race played in the likelihood that white respondents would cast a vote for Mike Foster, racial attitudes again showed high levels of statistical significance. Race was a definite factor in the voting behavior of Louisiana white voters. In addition to symbolic racial attitudes, ideology and health care attitudes were the other statistical significant variables. In the end, the analysis revealed an interesting finding. White Louisiana voters across the political spectrum were overwhelming in their support for Mike Foster. Even white liberal voters were more likely to vote for Foster. As Parent and Perry (1998) reveal, exit polls showed that Foster won with the support of about 55 percent of white voters. Also, white voters across the gamut of whether health care should be completely

private or government sponsored were also extremely supportive of Foster, despite the fact that Foster opposed government sponsorship of health care.

All of this suggests that race was the primary factor in the decision of white voters to cast a vote for Foster. More importantly, the findings also reveal a possible shortcoming of conceptualizing racial threat voting as solely a geographic phenomenon. The analysis, in Chapter 4, did not reveal the existence of racial threat voting based upon physical proximity. Nevertheless, race had a dominant impact upon the election when racial threat voting is viewed through the lens of cultural aspects, which suggests that racial threat voting operates on different levels. To view racial threat voting as solely geographic is like viewing a landscape with blinders on one's eyes. Racial threat operates in different dimensions and should not be viewed in only one aspect.

Racial Threat as a Media Phenomenon

Is it possible that racial threat voting is activated or instigated by the manner in which the media reports the issues and candidates of a campaign, or is it possible that media coverage supplements or verifies a person's preconceived notions about the role of race in a campaign? Chapter 6 addressed the role that the media plays in racial threat voting. The media coverage was limited to the print media, since scholars have demonstrated that newspaper coverage tends to be more important in statewide and local campaigns. Past research also reveals that convergence exists between those voters who rely upon newspaper coverage of

a campaign and what issues they consider important. As noted previously, much of the voting behavior literature tends to neglect the role that the media plays in voters' opinions and actions. Consequently, the media was included to determine their possible impact on racial threat voting.

After analyzing the news coverage of the three states, race was covered to varying degrees. In Louisiana, coverage of racial issues occupied around 50 percent of the articles in both newspapers. This demonstrates again that race was a significant factor in Louisiana in 1995. Much of the coverage also focused on the lack of white support for the candidacy of Cleo Fields. Both candidates initially promised to avoid mentioning race during the campaign, but they ultimately discussed the issue. Foster criticized Fields' campaign for planning to offer free rides to eligible voters on Election Day, although this is legal under state law. Fields accused Foster of running a racial campaign when Foster commented that New Orleans was a "jungle" and a haven for crime, insinuating that this was due to the high black population of the city. Perhaps the most telling commentary came from a white voter who said that the election was all black and white, and he believed that nothing else mattered besides race.

In South Carolina, race was covered approximately 30 percent of the time in the 1994 coverage. Most of this focus on race came from two sources. First, the articles throughout the campaign mentioned the low-level of black support for Republican David Beasley, and the coverage mentioned on several occasions the racial divide in the electorate. The other major source of racial coverage involved

one of Beasley's campaign workers who was black. Democrat Nick Theodore attacked this black campaign worker as a criminal because she had been convicted of a crime in the past, but she was pardoned of the crime in 1987. While a few articles focused on this incident in the midst of the campaign, it did not figure prominently in the coverage as Election Day approached.

Interestingly, the Confederate battle flag, which flies atop the State Capitol and is generally seen as racist by most black citizens, was not mentioned frequently in the 1994 coverage. Part of the reason may have been that both candidates stated that they supported the flying of the flag, which is supported by a majority of South Carolina whites. In the 1998 South Carolina coverage, racial coverage jumped to roughly 40 percent of the coverage. Around 10 percent of the racial coverage focused on the familiar pattern across the region of low black support for the Republican candidate, in this instance David Beasley. Coverage of the Confederate battle flag constituted 30 percent of this racial coverage. The reason for this dramatic increase was David Beasley's flip on the flag issue. During his first term, he had tried and failed to remove the Confederate emblem from the State Capitol, and this made him unpopular with many of his white supporters from 1994. When the 1998 election rolled around, Beasley was vulnerable to attack on this issue, but the assault did not come from within the Republican Party. Rather, the Democratic nominee, Jim Hodges, attacked Beasley on this flip-flop, and he promised to keep the flag flying if elected. As we have seen in Chapter 4, this set

of circumstances helps to account for the white flight from Beasley's camp, especially among rural white voters in the black belt.

Finally, racial coverage of the 1998 Georgia gubernatorial campaign accounted for about 30 percent of the articles examined. Discussion of the Georgia state flag which incorporates the Confederate battle flag in its design, accounted for only around 7 percent of the coverage, despite vociferous debates about changing the design over the past decade. Part of this can be attributed to the fact that both Democrat Roy Barnes and Republican Guy Millner stated that they supported the current design, and neither had any plans to change it.

The majority of the racial coverage came from several different sources. First, the articles, like the other two states, discussed the low black support for the Republican nominee, in this case Guy Millner. In fact, Millner's support among blacks was so low that his campaign paid blacks to appear at his rallies, a tactic which was attacked by an editorialist of the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* (Tucker 1998). The other major portion of this racial coverage dealt with Roy Barnes' 1989 vote against the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday.

To a greater extent than the other two states, coverage of the Georgia campaign focused on affirmative action around 20 percent of the time. Affirmative action is an issue that some white voters find particularly offensive (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). Republican Millner was opposed to affirmative action arguing that these were simply racial quotas for hiring, and he opposed the racial considerations that went into the admissions process at the University of Georgia.

Roy Barnes stated that affirmative action was not solely racial in nature, because they also applied to women, and he stated that he supported affirmative action because of gender, not race.

Overall, racial coverage varied over the three states. Did the newspaper coverage activate and make race an issue in these campaigns, or was the news coverage simply a mirror of what the candidates were discussing? Based on the content analysis of these four newspapers, the vast majority of articles reported racial issues as they were discussed by the candidates. On a few occasions, editorials would mention the race issue, but these occasions were the exception rather than the norm. It seems more plausible that white voters who were likely to vote based upon race would have used the newspaper coverage as justification in seeing an election as race-based. It seems unlikely that the newspaper coverage itself was the cause for racial threat voting.

Summary

In the end, how does racial threat theory fare under this scrutiny? It would be hazardous, at best, to pronounce the presence or absence of racial threat voting across a region or state by examining it only in terms of geography. As we saw when testing the idea of physical proximity racial threat voting, the models revealed that racial threat voting among whites in black belt counties was occurring in South Carolina in 1994 and Georgia in 1998. The county-level analysis did not reveal a statistically significant pattern of racial threat voting in either Louisiana in 1995 or

South Carolina in 1998. If one relied solely on the county-level analysis, one might be led to the belief that racial threat voting did not occur based solely on these findings in the latter two cases.

By examining racial threat in terms of cultural aspects, we see that, in Louisiana, racial attitudes exerted a strong impact upon white voters' behavior in 1995, whereas the county-level analysis suggested racial threat voting was not occurring. Herein lies one of the findings of this dissertation. Examining racial threat voting in only one dimension can lead to erroneous conclusions. Scholars would be well advised to take into consideration all three dimensions studied in this dissertation. By studying racial threat voting in context of geography, culture, and media coverage, researchers procure a more true and accurate picture of the dynamics of racial threat voting.

IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL CONTEXT

Another underlying theme of this study has been the role of political context in racial threat voting. Based upon the findings in the previous chapters, it would seem that racial threat voting does not exist in a political vacuum oblivious of the surrounding political environment. For racial threat voting to occur, the proper political setting is needed. For example, in the 1994 South Carolina gubernatorial election, both David Beasley and Nick Theodore ran on a promise to keep the Confederate battle flag flying over the State Capitol, but Beasley was more successful among black belt white voters since racial threat theory argues that

“threatened” whites are more likely to vote Republican since black voters are overwhelmingly Democratic.

Contrast this with the 1998 South Carolina election where racial threat based on physical proximity was suddenly absent. Again, political context is vital. In 1998, Republican David Beasley had attempted to remove the Confederate banner from the State Capitol, and he paid an enormous price for this. As a result of Beasley’s action, his white support base in the black belt abandoned him for his Democratic opponent. We might have expected threat voting to disappear if Beasley was a successful incumbent. The movement in the opposite direction indicates that threat may have undone Beasley on the flag issue. While other issues, especially the lottery, did have a role, undoubtedly the hot-button racial issue was a factor in this. Again, political context is important and suggests that racial threat voting is dependent on political issues of the day.

Political context also reveals itself to be important when analyzing racial threat from a cultural standpoint. The prime example for this is the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election. While neither candidate was blatantly racial like a David Duke, the physical characteristics of the candidates did play a factor, because this election was a contest between a white Republican and a black Democrat. This alone was enough to trigger some racial voting. Throughout the campaign, racial issues would occasionally rear their head. To view cultural racial threat voting absent of political context would again lead to a distorted view of how race operates in elections.

Finally, political context is important when examining racial threat voting in terms of media coverage of campaigns. By its very nature, media coverage relies upon the political environment, in part, for its stories. While research exists that the media can and does set the agenda to a limited degree, in most cases news coverage revolves and is dependent upon contemporary political issues. As discussed previously, most of the newspaper coverage of all three campaigns focused upon the candidates and campaigns more than they dictated the agenda. For the most part, newspaper coverage did not initiate discussions of race outside of the reporting of opinion polls or editorials and focused on the events of the candidate's campaigns. Thus, the media was not manipulating the political agenda as much as they were reporting what was occurring. While coverage of racial issues did exist in all of the newspapers examined, political context was driving this coverage, because the majority of these articles were simply reporting what candidates were saying.

In the end, political context is vital to the existence of racial threat voting. White voters who are prone to vote in a racially threatened manner need cues to activate this behavior. While some white voters undoubtedly do vote in a racial manner on all occasions, it would appear that the majority of white voters who fit the description of racial threat voting require some impetus to do so. Therefore in an election where racial issues are not mentioned frequently, it may be that racial threat voting will not exist. In elections featuring easy issues like affirmative action or Confederate symbols, it appears that racial threat voting thrives. Thus, it is vital

that the role of political context be considered when attempting to understand racial threat voting.

RACIAL THREAT'S ROLE IN THE VOTING BEHAVIOR LITERATURE

After this extensive analysis, should racial threat voting be considered a distinct school of voting behavior literature, or is it compatible with existing theories? Based upon the results, racial threat voting does not form a distinct school of voting behavior literature. Rather, it fits into previous theories and research on voting behavior.

On one level, racial threat voting is a logical extension of issue voting which flows out of the Michigan studies which have greatly influenced voting behavior literature. Since race is an "easy" issue, as defined by Carmines and Stimson (1980; 1982; 1989), one could make the argument that racial threat is the logical extension of issue voting. In this scenario, blacks are the issue upon which threatened white voters cast their votes. Instead of a new approach to voting behavior, racial threat may simply be part of a school that argues that issues are important, but those issues must be simple enough for the common person to understand. Racial threat would also fit into the realm of an "easy" issue because less educated whites are more prone to vote Republican on the basis of race (Giles and Buckner 1995).

On another level, racial threat could fit into that part of the literature which argues that one's culture and upbringing plays a large role in voting behavior.

Perhaps, we can understand racial threat as a product of one's culture instead of physical proximity. Sears and Funk (1999) found in a longitudinal study conducted on four occasions between 1940 and 1977 that respondents were greatly influenced by the racial attitudes of their parents. In the 1960s and 1970s as race became polarizing, the authors found that these voters were politically activated by their latent racial views. When race became an issue, the majority of these voters reacted in a manner that was consistent with their long-held racial views. Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman (1997) also found that white voters' racial attitudes were long-standing. In an analysis of white respondents' answers on various racial policies and racial candidates, the authors found that race was the primary determinant in their beliefs. For example, an individual who is born and raised in the black belt will probably pick up the racial attitudes and mores of his parents. In turn, this individual may cast his votes guided by his racial attitudes.

On this basis, racial threat may be a logical extension of political culture. If so, racial threat could be part of a sociological approach to voting behavior that was initially begun by the Columbia study of the 1940 presidential election. If true, one must raise the question of how reliable racial threat can be for political candidates, because white voters would need some cue to spark latent racial tendencies into vote choice.

What of racial threat and the media? Based on the newspaper coverage in the elections studied, it would not appear that racial threat fits into any of the media coverage literature. While the potential does exist that the media could play an

agenda-setting role with this issue, support for this does not exist in the media coverage in this dissertation.

Based upon the findings in the previous three chapters, racial threat's place in the voting behavior literature falls into two categories. First, if one is examining racial threat on the basis of geography, then racial threat fits into the literature on issue voting. In this case, race is the issue that activates and causes white voters in close physical proximity to large black populations to vote in a racial manner. Since race is an example of an issue which is easily understood by the average voter, then it becomes all the more plausible that racial threat voting is part of the issue voting literature. In addition, racial threat voting occurs more frequently among the least educated of white voters, and easy issues are more readily understood by less educated voters.

While racial threat on one level can be seen as an extension of issue voting, it can also be viewed as part of the literature that argues that culture has a large role in individuals' voting behavior. When examining racial threat as a cultural phenomenon, individuals' long-held attitudes about race which are formed in youth by one's culture suddenly become very important to the existence of racial threat voting. In this instance, it would appear that it was not easy or hard issues as much as heritage that plays a more vital role in the presence of racial threat voting. With cultural racial threat voting, the presence of a black candidate, like Cleo Fields in Louisiana, may have been enough to trigger racial threat voting based upon cultural aspects.

In the end, racial threat voting does not warrant inclusion as a new school in the voting behavior literature. Rather, its place in the literature comes out of various prevailing theories in the field. It depends in large part how racial threat is conceptualized that dictates its place in the prior literature. If racial threat is seen as a purely geographic occurrence, then racial threat belongs within the issue voting literature. In contrast, if racial threat voting is seen as purely cultural, then its place seems to belong within theories that cite the importance of culture in voting behavior.

As discussed earlier, though, racial threat is best understood if it is viewed in different dimensions rather than as solely geographic, cultural, or media-driven. In this case, racial threat voting is actually part of various different theories on voting behavior. Yet, racial threat voting does not substantially deviate from its various legacies to the point that it should be considered as a distinct school of thought within the voting behavior literature.

RACIAL THREAT'S ROLE IN A REPUBLICAN REALIGNMENT

As we discussed in the opening chapter, much attention has focused upon the role that race played in the rise of the Republican Party in the South. Undoubtedly, race did provide the initial jolt that made the GOP a viable party initially at the presidential level and later at lower levels (Cosman 1966; Carmines and Stimson 1981; 1989; Lamis 1990; Black and Black 1992). What role does race

play today though? More specifically, what role does racial threat voting play in the continued growth of the Republican Party in the contemporary South?

To answer this question, it is necessary to make a distinction between two types of realignment. One is critical realignment, which argues that some massive divisive issue comes along the political horizon which causes an instantaneous shift in support for the two parties. The second type is secular realignment where slow, generational replacement leads to a gradual shift between the two parties. While most of the literature seems to agree that race did lead to a critical realignment at the presidential level in 1964, what role has race played since this momentous date? Based upon research presented in previous chapters, southern whites below the presidential level have undergone secular realignment towards the Republican Party. Undoubtedly, race had some role in this although it would be hazardous to suggest that such a secular realignment was driven completely by race. Undoubtedly, ideology and other issues played some role as well.

Do these findings speak to the impact of racial threat in the Republican realignment of the South? It would seem that the Republican Party has reached a ceiling with regards to racial appeal as it relates to their ability to build a majority coalition. As it presently stands, a majority of southern whites who have strong racial beliefs that are not favorable to blacks are more likely to be Republican anyway. Thus, it would seem that Republican candidates have gone as far as possible in appealing to such white voters. The task of the Republicans then becomes to perform a difficult balancing act between appealing to white voters

who are not attracted to the Republican Party on the basis of race, while maintaining their basis of support among whites are less racially tolerant.

As some of the findings of this study suggest, racial threat voting is not a secure blanket for the Republican candidate in all cases. When David Beasley won election as governor of South Carolina in 1994, he did so with the overwhelming support of white voters who lived in the black belt. As we discussed previously, this is an example of physical proximity racial threat voting. Beasley's promise to keep the Confederate flag flying over the State Capitol was a message that was sufficiently potent enough to attract these white voters, but Beasley's defeat for reelection in 1998 reveals the volatile nature of racial threat voting.

After Beasley's failed attempt at removing the Confederate emblem from the State Capitol, the lion's share of his white support in the black belt abandoned Beasley for his Democratic opponent, Jim Hodges. Interestingly, Hodges ran on a promise to keep the Confederate flag flying over the State Capitol if he were elected. While it would be perilous to make the claim that race was the only factor in this shift, it certainly did have some impact. The lesson here is that racial threat voting is a dangerous and fleeting phenomenon on which to build a realignment. In most cases, southern whites with definite racial attitudes that are hostile or wary of blacks are most likely to support Republican candidates. The South Carolina example reveals that racial threat is volatile in that these same white voters will abandon Republican candidates if the political climate is right.

A lesson for the Republican Party would be that attempting to build a majority coalition on race alone is a road that is fraught with danger at every turn. Race is certainly an example of an easy issue which is required for a majority of voters to realign to the other party (Carmines and Stimson 1980; 1981; 1989), but race is also an extremely emotional issue which can often backfire on the party that attempts to seize and control this issue. If the Republicans continue to play with this Pandora's box of racial threat, it could eventually explode in their faces. Racial threat voting is generally beneficial to Republican candidates, but exceptions do exist.

Coupled with the volatility of racial threat voting is the fact that Republicans are limited in the amount of political capital that they can acquire from the race card. Most southern whites, who have discriminatory racial attitudes, are already more likely to vote Republican, making any new growth among this segment unlikely. This leaves southern whites who have low or moderate levels of racial attitudes to which the Republican must appeal if they are to build a long-lasting cohesive coalition. As we have seen in the chapters, political context is a necessary component to the existence of racial threat voting. If an election has little racial charge to it, then racial threat voting tends to be low or nonexistent. When this occurs, voters will use other cues in deciding how to vote. In such a scenario, Republican candidates may or may not be the beneficiaries.

In any event, trying to appeal to white voters with high racial attitudes is an enterprise that Republican candidates should contemplate at length. Due to the

volatile nature of racial threat voting, it is foolhardy for Republican candidates to run campaigns that attempt solely to appeal to whites who have high levels of racism. While such a strategy might win some elections, it is hardly the type of issue that can lead to a permanent and desirable realignment. Race was the issue that led to the Republican Party being viable in the South, but it would appear that the Republicans need to move past this issue to become the majority party on the southern political landscape below the presidential level.

THE ROLE OF RACIAL THREAT VOTING OUTSIDE OF THE SOUTH

While this dissertation has focused on the role of racial threat voting in southern gubernatorial elections, what do the findings say about racial threat outside of the region? Again, it depends upon the type of racial threat voting. If one is examining the geographic dimension of racial threat voting, then the findings do not say anything about politics outside of the South. As we discussed in Chapter 4, for physical proximity racial threat voting to exist, high concentrations of black voters are needed to activate the fears of white voters in those areas. In the southern states where the black belt is present, this requirement, large black populations, does exist. Of course, high black populations also exist in metropolitan areas of the South, which makes physical proximity racial threat voting possible there as well.

Of course, the South is not unique in having high black populations in metropolitan areas. Cities outside of the region have large minority populations.

While it certainly would be possible for geographic racial threat voting to occur among white voters in non-southern settings, it seems unlikely that it would occur to a high degree, because most non-southern states do not have high minority populations outside of urban areas. In this sense, racial threat voting is unique to the South.

If one examines racial threat voting in terms of culture, a different answer may arise. In cultural racial threat voting, it is not requisite that white voters live in close physical space to black populations. Instead, one's heritage and upbringing may lead one to have certain racial attitudes which may manifest themselves on occasion through voting behavior. In this case, racial threat voting has the potential to exist anywhere in the nation, not just the South. As we have seen, cultural racial threat voting in some ways is more powerful than physical proximity racial threat voting. Also, the focus of racial animosities outside of the South may not reside with blacks alone. For example, a state like California which has high Hispanic and Asian populations may provide for racial tensions based upon those ethnic groups rather than blacks. While white voters in these regions may have racial attitudes about other racial groups besides blacks, the operation of the concept of racial threat voting could potentially operate in the same manner.

Thus, some of the findings of this dissertation do have applicability outside the southern states. While physical proximity racial threat voting may be a peculiar occurrence to the South, cultural racial threat voting has the potential to exist anywhere in the nation. Further, racial threat voting does not have to involve racial

attitudes about blacks. Potentially, any minority group could be the focus of animus from white voters. Undoubtedly, racial threat voting, both physical and cultural, does occur more often in the South, but it would be a distorted view to say that racial threat voting is a distinctly southern problem.

THE FUTURE OF RACIAL THREAT VOTING

What does the future hold for racial threat voting? Is racial threat destined to die within the next generation, or will it thrive well into the 21st century? If one is asking this question of physical proximity racial threat voting, the answer would probably be that racial threat voting will disappear over time due to (1) population loss in the black belt region of the South, and (2) due to smaller white populations in majority-black areas such as counties or inner-cities. In this case, we could possibly proclaim the end of racial threat voting in the South in the next generation or two.

As we have seen, racial threat is not solely geographic in nature. It also has a cultural dimension to it. If asking this question about cultural racial threat voting, the answer is different. As long as racial attitudes hostile to minorities exist in the minds of white individuals in this country, the potential for racial threat voting remains with us for quite some time. As past research demonstrates, some issue or event is all that is needed to trigger the onslaught of cultural racial threat voting. While geographic racial threat voting may disappear due to populations shifts and migration, the causes of cultural racial threat voting will not vanish so easily. It is

always difficult to change people's deeply-held attitudes and opinions. Thus, it is possible that cultural racial threat voting could exist not only in the South, but also the entire nation for the foreseeable future.

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
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APPENDIX A

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY NOTES

This appendix further explains the statistical methodology which was utilized in Chapter 5 when testing racial threat as a consequence of culture. Two subjects need to be addressed. First, a symbolic racism variable was derived using three questions in the National Elections Study (NES) data from 1994 and 1998. Two options existed for deriving this variable. One way would be to use arithmetic averaging of the scores on the questions to arrive at racial score. The other method which could be used would involve confirmatory principal-components factor analysis. This procedure allows the researcher to identify underlying factors that explain the correlations among a set of variables. This method is often used to summarize a larger number of variables into one variable. The figure on the following page demonstrates the extremely close relationship between the factor analysis score for symbolic racism and the arithmetic average score. Since the relationship is so close, the arithmetic average score is utilized as the symbolic racism score in all of the analysis in Chapter 5.

Figure A.1
Relationship Between Arithmetic Average and Factor Analysis Score of
Symbolic Racism



APPENDIX B
Newspaper Coverage Content Sheet

Newspaper: _____ **State:** _____ **Date:** _____

Headline of Article: _____

Candidate(s) being discussed: _____

Partisanship of candidates in article: _____

Issues Stressed in Coverage:

1. Social Issues

A. Confederate symbols: _____

B. Other racial issues: _____

C. Affirmative Action: _____

D. Social welfare reform: _____

E. Law and order/crime: _____

F. Other social issues
(abortion, teen pregnancy, breakdown of family): _____

2. Economic Issues:

A. Status of state economy: _____

B. Lower taxes: _____

3. Educational Issues

C. Status of public school education: _____

D. State lottery/legalized gambling to support education: _____

Identifiable media bias? _____

In favor/against whom? _____

Overall tone of the article: _____

Content Analysis Code Sheet

- 01. Newspaper:** AJC=*Atlanta Journal Constitution*
TAB=*The Advocate* (Baton Rouge)
NTP=*New Orleans Times-Picayune*
CPC=*The Post and Courier* (Charleston)
- 02. State:** GA=Georgia
LA=Louisiana
SC=South Carolina
- 03. Date:** Date of article
- 04. Headline:** Title of Article
- 05. Candidates discussed:** Barnes=Roy Barnes
Beasley=David Beasley
Fields=Cleo Fields
Foster=Mike Foster
Hodges=Jim Hodges
Millner=Guy Millner
Theodore=Nick Theodore
- 06. Partisanship:** 1=Republican 2=Democrat
- 07-08.** Free
- 09. Confederate Symbols:** 0=No 1=Yes
- 10. Other Racial Issues** 0=No 1=Yes
- 11. Affirmative Action:** 0=No 1=Yes
- 12. Social Welfare Reform:** 0=No 1=Yes
- 13. Law and order/crime:** 0=No 1=Yes
- 14. Other Social Issues:** 0=No 1=Yes
- 15.** Free
- 16. Status of state economy:** 0=No 1=Yes
- 17. Lower taxes:** 0=No 1=Yes

- 18.** Free
- 19. Status of public schools:** 0=No 1=Yes
- 20. State lottery/gambling:** 0=No 1=Yes
- 21. Identifiable media bias:** 0=No 1=Yes 2=Unclear
- 22. In favor of whom:**
 Barnes=Roy Barnes
 Beasley=David Beasley
 Fields=Cleo Fields
 Foster=Mike Foster
 Hodges=Jim Hodges
 Millner=Guy Millner
 Theodore=Nick Theodore
- 23. Overall tone:**
 0=Unfavorable
 1=Favorable
 2=Ambiguous