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**UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA**

**GRADUATE COLLEGE**

**COPING WITH LIMITS:**

**RESPONDING TO REFORM IN OKLAHOMA**

**A Dissertation**

**SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY**

**in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the**

**degree of**

**Doctor of Philosophy**

**By**

**RICK FARMER  
Norman, Oklahoma  
1998**

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**COPING WITH LIMITS:  
RESPONDING TO REFORM IN OKLAHOMA**

**A dissertation APPROVED FOR THE  
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**

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## **ABSTRACT**

**As term limits were sweeping the country in the early 1990's, academics and pundits were speculating about the effects term limits would have on state legislatures. They could do little more than speculate, because most of the effects were still in the distant future. This dissertation is an early attempt to move beyond speculation and address, with empirical data, how legislative institutions are being affected by term limits.**

**The study brings together several lines of research: state legislatures generally, legislative reform, legislators' motivations, and term limits. Each of these literatures contribute to the development of a theoretical model of legislative reform. The results of this study inform and in some cases challenge the previous work that has been done in these areas of research.**

**The model of legislative reform posited here include internal factors like: members' characteristics, professionalism, and internal political culture. It also include external influences like: the constitution, the states' traditional political culture, the current political environment, and the length of the term limits.**

**Hypotheses were derived from the general theory that members seek to fulfill their ambitions within the workings of the legislature. Since members control the structure of the legislature, if they are unable to accomplish their goals within the current structure they will "twist it"<sup>1</sup> until they can. Links between**

members' motivations and other characteristics with their preferences toward legislative structure are tested, looking for changes that have occurred since term limits were imposed. Using Oklahoma as a case study controlled for the various environmental factors and facilitated the examination of hypotheses related specifically to term limits, membership characteristics, and preferences.

Oklahoma's 46<sup>th</sup> Legislature was an excellent laboratory for this study. Approximately 60 percent of the members were first elected before term limits were ever a public issue. The remaining 40 percent were first elected after term limits became a reality. This unique membership combination created two somewhat evenly matched comparison groups, easily accessible for survey research and interview purposes.

To test the hypotheses, motivations were scaled for each member. The results show that members' ambitions are a complex set of competing interests not easily captured in two dimensions or reduced to single minded office seeking, as posited elsewhere.

The key findings of this research indicate that partisanship is the most important predictor of formal processes in the legislature, while ambition and gender are better predictors of informal processes. Term limits have few direct effects on members' preferences toward legislative structure. They also have few effects on members' characteristics; a new breed of legislator is not likely to emerge.

The effects of term limits in Oklahoma will likely arise more from eliminating senior statesmen and replacing them with younger, less experienced

**members. While these effects are substantively important, in a state with a semi-professional legislature and which has a lengthy limit like Oklahoma the effects are not likely to be as dramatic as predicted by either proponents or opponents.**

**1. Schlesinger, 1966.**

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

**For several months Republican members of the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma House of Representatives debated a change in their caucus rules. The rule change created a new position known as minority leader-elect. Reform proponents claimed that there would be greater continuity within the caucus if the future leader was elected a year early and served an apprenticeship under the current leader. Opponents argued that it would be meaningless to elect a leader of a future caucus whose membership had not yet been determined. In December 1997 the rules were amended and a leader for the 1999-2000 legislature was elected. Even so, the action continues to be debated within the caucus. The rule change and the new leader were approved by a vote of 16 to 15, not a majority of all 36 members. Without the demonstrated support of the current or future membership, many Republicans are wondering if the election will be sustained in the next legislature.**

**This type of reform has been long anticipated by many term limits scholars. It was argued that such an apprenticeship would allow necessary continuity of leadership in legislatures where leaders could no longer spend years developing in the caucus ranks. However, this debate in the Oklahoma Republican Caucus was never about term limits, as few Oklahoma legislators**

have begun to even consider the inevitable consequences of term limits.

Insiders admit this rule change was about winning power. A block of members were simply maneuvering to get their preferred leader elected while they had the votes. In fact, as the debate dragged into the fall of 1997, support for the idea began to wane. At that point a sense of urgency developed among the reformers. They needed to move while they had the votes to win. Term limits were never a part of the debate or a consideration.

This rule change demonstrates several important points about how legislative structures change. First, it indicates that the purpose of reforms may be more about gaining and maintaining power than about other goals. Second, it reminds observers that the majority can and will make the rules to suit its own purposes. If the rules don't meet the desires of a majority of members, change may be imminent. In that regard, a third important point is that self imposed reform is not necessarily permanent. Finally, the fact that such a debate could transpire in a term-limited legislature, without the effect of term limits on leadership being discussed, indicates that mandatory retirements due to term limits (still six years away in Oklahoma) are not yet a conscious concern to most members. This latter insight is important since 18 state legislatures face term limits in the near future.

This dissertation examines how term limits affect legislative structure. It indicates that the effects of legislative reform emanate from a variety of sources in a dynamic process and predictions of the effects of term limits based on a simple linear model of legislative reform are overstated. As the discussion above



demonstrates, term limits may hardly be a consideration in some instances as reforms of the legislative structure are being debated.

### **Overview of This Research**

As the example above indicates, legislative structures are modified by legislators to accommodate the needs of legislators. Beginning in 1990 a movement that limited legislators' tenure swept the nation. As term limits begin to take effect across the country, state legislative structures will likely be altered to reconcile members' desires to this new reality. Generally, this dissertation asks how are legislative structures likely to change as a result of term limits? And, how are the characteristics of members changing as a result of term limits? It examines how one legislature is being affected by term limits and explores the factors that may lead to change. This case study provides insight into the broader issues of how reforms affect dynamic legislative systems.

At this early stage in the implementation of term limits, empirical cross state comparisons are difficult. Few states have actually experienced the effects of term limits. A case study of the Oklahoma Legislature is used here to provide an early glimpse at how effects are unfolding in that state. The results have implications far beyond Oklahoma.

Oklahoma's 46<sup>th</sup> Legislature was an excellent laboratory for this study. It provided a special combination of members who could be easily studied in a quasi-experimental design. Approximately 60 percent of the members were first elected before term limits were ever a public issue. The remaining 40 percent

were first elected after term limits became a reality. This membership combination created two somewhat evenly matched comparison groups, easily accessible for survey research and interview purposes.

The current legislative structure in Oklahoma was shaped significantly by other recent citizen imposed reforms. In particular, members' responses to mandated shorter legislative sessions have fostered a dysfunctional method of bill processing. Members' responses to term limits will be tempered by these reforms and the greater political environment.

A dynamic theoretical model of legislative reform (Figure 1.1) is posited later, integrating and expanding models previously developed. Importantly legislative reform occurs in an environment of several dynamic internal and external factors. Term limits are designed to replace the membership. Replacing the membership could lead to significant shifts in the legislative structure. It is the members who shape the institution and members' desires are primary in determining the institutional structure. However, these effects are tempered by internal factors such as organizational culture and professionalism, and external influences like the partisan electoral competition and political traditions. This is a dynamic process in which each factor affects and is affected by the others.

This conceptual model gives rise to testable hypotheses. Early speculation proposed that term limits would change the kind of person serving in the legislature. Shifts in membership characteristics, particularly motivations, likely would affect the legislative structure. Specific hypotheses are tested, and

the effects are mapped in the Oklahoma case using multivariate techniques.

First, the relationship between legislative structure and membership characteristics is examined. Then, the effect of term limits on this relationship is considered. By holding other environmental factors constant the case study allows examination of these specific effects.

Two complementary methods are combined to complete this investigation. A quantitative approach, involving a survey instrument, was used to test hypotheses relating to members' preferences, goals, and other important characteristics. A qualitative approach, involving interviews and direct observations, was used in the preparation of the survey and in the interpretation of the results.

Members' motivations, background, and orientation are examined. The analysis of members' motivations will show that they are a complex set of competing interests not easily captured in two dimensions (Barber 1965) or reduced to single minded office seeking (Mayhew 1974). It will also show that they are not as important as some other factors, like partisanship, in determining the shape of legislative structure that members prefer. Comparisons of pre-term limits and post-term limits cohorts reveal that a new breed of legislator is unlikely to emerge as a result of term limits.

Three aspects of the legislative institution are examined here: formal rules, informal practices, and the distribution of power. Much has been speculated about how term limits will affect these structures. Since future legislative structures cannot be measured directly, the proximate measure of

members' preferred legislative structure is used. Here, it will be shown that term limits have little direct effect on members' preferences for formal rules in the legislative process. In fact, partisanship is more likely to shape formal processes in the Oklahoma Legislature. The effects of term limits on preferences for formal processes tend to occur more often as interactions with other characteristics. Similar results for term limits will be shown regarding informal practices. However, here motivations and gender tend to shape members' desires. Finally, it will be shown that majority-minority status largely determines members' preferences regarding the distribution of power within the legislative process. An interaction between the post-term limits cohort and majority status hints that preferences for a less imposing majority may eventually dominate.

Some significant results for term limits will be shown. If the current electoral environment persists, forced open seats may result in Republicans and women gaining representation. As senior members are forced out of office, the legislature may become younger, and the style of representation may shift from trustees to delegates. Results also hint that the legislature's current trend toward democratization may continue. While these are not the dramatic effects that many observers postulated regarding term limits, these are significant developments with substantive implications for the people of Oklahoma. Generally, this research finds the effects of term limits emanate from a variety of sources in a dynamic process and early predictions were overstated.

The data collected, hypotheses tested, and the model developed in this dissertation are a valuable contribution to the discipline of political science and to

political practitioners. The results question some long standing theories regarding legislators' motivations and much of the speculation about the effects of term limits. The theoretical model developed here adds to the understanding of how reforms affect state legislatures. The implications of this study go well beyond the single case being examined.

In the sections that follow the plan of this research is described. Specific research questions related to legislative reform, term limits, and the Oklahoma Legislature are raised. Then, hypotheses designed to answer these research questions are proposed. There is a discussion of why Oklahoma was an appropriate place to conduct this research. Data collection methods are then discussed. The research questions raised here stand at the crossroads of several research traditions. Those various traditions are summarized in this chapter. A more complete discussion of each one is presented in appropriate subsequent chapters. A dynamic theoretical model of legislative reform is drawn from these literatures and posited. This model is briefly summarized here and described in greater detail in the final chapter. Finally, an outline of the remaining chapters is presented.

### **Research Questions**

The advent of term limits pose a variety of interesting questions for state legislatures. This dissertation focuses on a few specific questions related to the legislative structure. Generally, how are legislative structures likely to change as

**a result of term limits? And, how are the characteristics of members changing as a result of term limits?**

**These two questions are inexorably intertwined. Previous studies of legislative reform centered around legislators' motivations (Fowler 1993). When term limits are imposed, they limit legislators' ability to pursue their ambitions. Faced with limits, legislators can be expected to find new avenues for accomplishing their goals within the institution, altering the legislative structure. If term limits attract a different type of person to legislative service, then these new members, in pursuit of their goals, will be the ones to determine the legislative structure. In that regard members' characteristics and legislative structures are linked.**

**To address these questions within the Oklahoma case study the following specific research questions are raised: Is the Oklahoma Legislative structure likely to change as a result of term limits? Are term limits altering members' motivations or other characteristics in the Oklahoma Legislature? Are members' preferences toward legislative structure changing as a result of term limits? Are members' motivations or other characteristics related to their preferred legislative structure?**

**Since future structural changes cannot be directly measured, proximate measures are used. Members' preferences for specific structural changes are used in the examination of these questions. Empirical data, collected to address these specific research question, provide evidence to consider many of the hypotheses proposed by early term limits analysts. To date, little empirical data**

has been collected or analyzed regarding these issues. These data and the hypotheses tests they allow are a valuable first empirical step towards answer important questions regarding the effects of term limits.

### Hypotheses

Three basic types of hypotheses are derived from these research questions. First, it is hypothesized that term limits will affect membership characteristics of the legislature. These hypotheses test the early speculation of pundits and scholars (Price 1992, Moncrief and Thompson 1992). A second set of hypotheses propose that there is a relationship between members' characteristics, particularly motivations, and members' preferences toward the legislative process. This is a link proposed by various legislative reform models (Fowler 1993). Finding links between term limits, characteristics, and preferences would give rise to speculation about direct effects between term limits and preferences. These hypotheses are also tested. These latter hypotheses are tested using both bivariate and multivariate methods of analysis. The results of these hypotheses tests challenge much of the speculation and suggest how the model of legislative reform may be working in Oklahoma.

### The Oklahoma Case

The answers to these research questions are likely to vary by state based on the variations in term limits laws, legislative professionalization, and culture (Hodson et al. 1995); and little post-term limits data exist to test the speculation and hypotheses. Without post-term limits data, and in light of the wide variance

**in legislative conditions, a case study can provide some first clues as to how a legislature is likely to adapt to term limits. This research addresses these questions using Oklahoma as a case study.**

**Oklahoma is an important case study because it was the first state to impose term limits on state legislators. As a result Oklahoma has the longest history of legislative activity since adoption. Adaptations to reform evolve over time. This history is important in the study of term limits.**

**Oklahoma's term limits law is unique. No other state has the same 12 year lifetime limit on legislative service. This makes Oklahoma important to study in its own right. However, there are many other semi-professional legislatures, and several states have term limits of 8 years or more. What is learned in the Oklahoma case will provide clues for other states and vice versa.**

**Most importantly, Oklahoma provides an unique opportunity to collect and examine a different type of data than is available in other states. Three elections cycles have occurred since the limits began and a sizable cohort of new members have been elected. Yet, since the final implementation of the 12 year limit is still several years away, about 60 percent of the current legislature was first elected prior to term limits. Members elected since 1992 have known that they were seeking a limited legislative career. Term limits in Oklahoma were imposed by citizen initiative in September of 1990. (For ballot language see Appendix 1.) Candidate filings for the legislature in 1990 were long past when the term limits petition became official. Thus for comparison purposes, those**



initially elected before 1992 can be considered not to have been affected by term limits. Those elected in 1992 or later are a post-term limit cohort.

This comparison is particularly poignant because interviews revealed these two groups have very different attitudes about how term limits will affect their careers. The post-term limits group came to the legislature knowing that term limits were a part of their contract with the people. While they may not support term limits, they have accepted them as a part of the legislative career cycle. Pre-term limits members, on the other hand, continue to reject term limits. Generally, they just don't believe term limits will affect them. Pre-term limits members argue that term limits likely will be overturned by the courts as unconstitutional. If that doesn't happen, then they believe it is possible that the people will repeal term limits before they take effect in 2004. Finally, even if neither of those things happen, most members of the pre-term limits cohort expect to retire before 2004, as they would have on average 18 years of experience at that point and few expect to serve that long. In fact, most expected to retire by 2002.

This division allowed for two well-matched comparisons groups that were easily surveyed. Such a survey allowed for comparison of more than just demographic data. An in depth study of members attitudes toward a variety of legislative questions was possible through this case study. As states begin term limiting out current legislators, there may be few opportunities left to survey members where both pre-term limit and post-term limit cohorts exist.

Case study research also offers the opportunity to find exceptions that disprove the rule. Previous speculative cross-state and case study analysis of term limits have suggested a number of hypotheses about state legislatures and state legislators. Where this study conflicts with those earlier works, it raises important questions about the accuracy of those earlier claims.

Cross-state studies may allow analysis of the effects of different types of limits, but that must begin with a study of each case. This study will provide a foundation for that type of research in the future. The history, uniqueness of the case, and the opportunity to compare pre- and post-term limit cohorts make Oklahoma a valuable case study, which will lay the groundwork for further research.

### **Data and Method**

Seeking answers to the research questions posed above, both quantitative and qualitative methods were employed. A literature search revealed the state of the discipline regarding the various topics addressed here including: the Oklahoma Legislature, term limits, legislative reform, and members' motivations. This literature provided the theoretical framework and basic information necessary to engage these questions and begin data collection.

For about 18 months, from fall 1995 and continuing until spring 1997, 30 trips were made to the Oklahoma Capitol for observations and interviews. These observations, from committee rooms and chamber galleries, provided the basic

understanding of the legislative process that was necessary to consider how that process might be changing. The interviews provided knowledge of how members perceive the process and what about it they would most like to see changed. Twenty-six interviews were conducted with 21 members, ranging from freshmen to leadership in both political parties. Interviews were also conducted with 18 staff or long-term observers of the legislature. Appendix 2 provides a list of observations, interviews, and their dates.

Documents were also collected concerning the legislative process. Directories, House and Senate rules, caucus rules, committee documents, bills, and internal communications were all collected in an attempt to gain a complete understanding of the legislative process.

The literature, observations, interviews, and documents provided the basis for developing a survey instrument for members. This questionnaire was distributed to members through capitol mail and candidates through regular mail as part of a candidate survey in the summer of 1996. Of the 149 members of the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature (1997-1998), 74 responded.<sup>1</sup> The sample matched the overall membership in every comparable descriptive category. For example:

Sample: 68% Democrats, 32% Senators, 59% Pre-Term Limits, 92% Men;  
Members: 66% Democrats, 32% Senators, 62% Pre-Term Limits, 90% Men.

Data from this survey were matched with data from *Who's Who in the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature* to create a data base of members and their individual

characteristics and preferences. Appendix 3 provides a copy of the questionnaire used with House members.

The quantitative data were used to test specific hypotheses related to the research questions. The qualitative data were used to construct an in depth description of the legislative process (found in Chapter 2), develop the survey instrument, interpret the survey data, and provide additional evidence where appropriate.

These data fill several important gaps in the current knowledge of the Oklahoma Legislature, term limits, member characteristics, and member motivations. Prior to this research there was no complete description of the Oklahoma legislative process. There was also very little empirical data regarding term limits. Data on current member characteristics are available, but not compiled, outside of this study. Linda Fowler (1993) observes that little data exist about members' motivations and that such empirical data are critical to the study of term limits, if scholars hope to go beyond speculation. This research develops some of the data necessary to address these theoretically important issues.

### **Research Nexus**

This dissertation is at the convergence of several lines of research: state legislatures generally, legislative motivation, term limits, and legislative reform. These literatures inform each of the chapters that follow and they contribute to the development of the theoretical model that is posited. The results of this

study will inform and in some cases challenge the work that has been done in these areas of research. Below is a brief summary of those research traditions. More detailed reviews appear in subsequent chapters where appropriate.

### **State Legislatures**

This study focuses on legislative structures and behaviors. In 1996 Moncrief, Thompson, and Cassie assessed the state of legislative studies, using Jewell's (1981) assessment as a basis. Among the topics on which they focused were career patterns, organization and structure, and roles and norms. Each of these are relevant to the current discussion.

Much of the recent research on state legislatures has focused on professionalization and career patterns. In 1971, the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures established criteria for judging legislative professionalism. These standards became the yardstick by which legislatures were evaluated for most of the next two decades. Resulting reforms brought greater compensation for legislators, improved scheduling of legislative activities, more productive committee systems, better information processing facilities, and larger staffs (Hickok 1992). Professionalization also resulted in increasing demands for members' time and declining rates of turnover (Jewell 1981). Alan Rosenthal (1987) described the changes as the "congressionalization" of state legislatures. Citizen reaction to increased careerism may have been term limits (Moncrief et al. 1996).

Moncrief et al. (1996) divided legislative structures into four categories: leadership, committees, parties, and staff. They argued, "leaders' success

depend on their ability to satisfy the goals” of members. One way leaders attempt to accommodate the goals of members is through committee assignments (Hamm and Hedlund 1990). The work on party caucuses in the legislative process suggests that they are of little importance (Francis 1989); leadership and committees are thought to be much more important than parties in decision making. Kurtz (1992), observed that the size and type of staff is related to the professionalism of the legislature. These structures may be significantly altered by term limits.

Roles and norms in legislatures have been debated for decades. Four activity roles—lawmakers, advertisers, spectators, and reluctants—were found in the Connecticut Legislature by Barber (1965). Three representational roles—delegate, trustee, and politico—were found by Wahlke et al. (1962). While these are valuable distinctions, Jewell (1981) argued that these orientations have not been very successful at predicting legislative behavior. However, norms can be so powerful that legislators would rather fail than violate them (Kirkpatrick 1978).

Norms do change over time. Thompson, Kurtz and Moncrief (1996) discovered that citizen legislatures experience less norm change than hybrid or professional legislatures. They also found that institutional norms change more than group or interpersonal norms.

The study of state legislatures provides a backdrop for the specific case study engaged here. It also contributes a basic understanding of many of the concepts used in the later discussion.

## **Legislative Motivation**

Political motivation is at the heart of the discussion of legislative adaptation. Studying Congress, Schlesinger (1966) described political ambition in three forms: progressive, static, and discrete. Fenno (1973) categorized ambition as reelection, influence within the legislature, good public policy, a career beyond legislative service, and private gain. Parker (1992) argued that members simultaneously pursue numerous goals. Mayhew (1974) argued that among all of these ambitions reelection is the strongest. The way members attempt to balance these goals is at the essence of Barber's (1965) typology.

Current understandings of legislative reform suggest that members' motivations are central. Members' motivations are measured and analyzed in light of term limits.

## **Term Limits**

Term limits are a constraint on members' ability to fulfill their goals. Not only are they the ultimate end to static ambition as Schlesinger (1966) envisioned it, they force legislators to act more quickly on their other ambitions. Members must now learn to live with this constraint imposed by the voters. These changes may have significant effects on the legislature and its members.

As legislative term limits were sweeping the nation in 1992, Gerald Benjamin and Michael J. Malbin produced an excellent and broad ranging anthology entitled, *Limiting Legislative Terms*. These articles laid the foundation for much of the research that followed. Of course, in 1992 there could be little

more than history, speculation, and debate, since term limits would not take effect in any state for several years. The work of Dave Rausch and others (Copeland and Rausch 1993, Rausch 1994, Rausch 1996, Rausch and Copeland 1996, Rausch and Farmer 1998) provided extensive discussions of how the term limits movement emerged in Oklahoma and around the country. (For a current list of states and their provisions see National Conference of State Legislatures 1998.)

The term limits debate spawned much speculation regarding how the composition of legislatures would change after term limits became effective. Two schools of thought emerged. First, the competition for newly open seats was hypothesized to benefit certain groups electorally. If incumbent advantage is preventing these groups from taking full advantage of a changed political environment, then, by forcing incumbents out and creating open seat races, term limits would help these groups gain representation in the legislature. In the early 1990's most observers expected an increase in open seats to benefit Republicans (Moncrief and Thompson 1992). A similar argument was made for women and minorities (Fowler 1992, Moncrief and Thompson 1992, Karp 1995).

The second school suggested that a new kind of person would be attracted to legislative service. Before term limits, a prospective candidate could consider the legislature as a possible career. After term limits, the legislature could only be viewed as a career stepping stone or an interruption to another career. As a result, occupational differences could arise between those attracted to run for a term-limited legislature and those attracted to the legislature as a



career. (Much of this speculation arose from interviews with political practitioners, like those quoted by Price (1992)). Similarly, it was argued that senior citizens or those with well established careers would have more time to engage in temporary public service than younger people who are trying to establish their careers.

Speculation about changing demographics within the legislature raises the possibility of a new, post-term limits, type of legislator emerging. Moncrief and Thompson (1992) noted that professionalization and other reforms ushered in a new breed of legislators in the 1970's and 80's. Baker (1996) tested the proposition that the old breed was returning due to term limits, but found little evidence in Oklahoma to support such a claim. Carey et al. (1998) also found little evidence of a new breed.

Some dissenting voices (Fowler 1992, Price 1992, Malbin and Benjamin 1992) argued that long term career plans were not the primary motivation of those seeking office. Copeland (1992) pointed out that in Oklahoma a 12 year limit did not shorten most freshmen legislators' career intentions. These arguments suggest that the composition of the legislature may change very little due to legislative term limits.

Proponents suggest term limits will disperse power among the members (Price 1992). Opponents say there will be a loss of power by the leadership (Copeland and Rausch 1993). These two arguments may be simply two different spins on the same phenomenon. However, it remains to be seen if they are correct. The effects of term limits on leadership are likely related to three

things: the degree of legislative professionalism, institutional culture, and limitations imposed by each chamber (Hodson et al. 1995). Proponents claim the legislature will be opened up to new ideas. Others are concerned about a loss of institutional memory and policy expertise (Copeland and Rausch 1993). Opponents believe the legislature will become dependent upon lobbyists, staff, and the administration for policy information; therefore it will lose power to these groups (Fowler 1992, Copeland and Rausch 1993).

There remains an acute lack of data in the term limits discussion. Various attempts to predict the effect of term limits were collected by Grofman in 1996. Many of these works employed a rational choice approach to specify possible outcome. The result of this exercise were so speculative that Grofman subtitled his introduction, "Hypotheses in Search of Data." This dissertation begins to fill that data deficit.

### **Legislative Reform**

In a discussion of how the United States Congress might be affected by term limits, Linda Fowler (1993) notes that in the 1970's scholars like Fenno (1978) and Fiorina (1977) focused on individualistic candidate aspirations as the major impetus for institutional reform within the legislative body. Scholars of the late 1980's like Sinclair (1989) and Rohde (1991) believed public pressure changed the political environment in which Congress operated and the environmental pressure changed the way individual goals could be achieved. Although these models are said to come from two different schools of thought,

they both maintain that members' motivations are central to the reform process. Benjamin and Malbin (1992a) argue that institutional performance and personal goals are intertwined. Schlesinger (1966) took the discussion a step further by suggesting that if the structure of the legislature does not accommodate members' goals they will twist it until it does.

As Fowler (1993) points out, what is needed is a model of legislative reform that allows for both internal and external forces. An appropriate model also should consider member characteristics other than just ambition. Such a model is proposed here. The resulting model integrates each of the concepts expressed above.


### **Dynamic Model of Legislative Reform**

A dynamic theoretical model of legislative reform (Figure 1.1) is posited here integrating and expanding models previously developed. Some models focus exclusively on internal factors (Fenno 1978, Fiorina 1977). Others emphasize external public pressure (Sinclair 1989, Rohde 1991). There are two common elements in these models. First, the dependent variable in both is legislative structure. Reform is typically aimed at the rules and practices of the institution. Second, the key independent variable is members' desires. It is the members who shape the institution and members' desires are primary in determining the institutional structure. As a reform measure, term limits share these same characteristics. While term limits were designed to have direct effects on the membership, this will inevitably filter through to the legislative

**structure. Term limits are designed to replace the membership. Replacing the membership could lead to significant shifts in the legislative structure.**

**Importantly legislative reform occurs in an environment of several dynamic factors. Internal factors such as organizational culture and professionalism affect and are affected by the legislative structure, the members, and reforms. External influences like the partisan electoral competition and political traditions also affect reform. This is a dynamic process in which each factor affects and is affected by the others.**

**Figure 1.1: Dynamic Theoretical Model of Legislative Reform.**



**\_ This conceptual model provides a theoretical basis for understanding legislative reform. The Oklahoma case study provides an excellent opportunity to test much of the early speculation about the effects of term limits. The case study holds constant the various environmental factors, facilitating study of the members– their characteristics and their preferences. These hypothesized effects are mapped using multivariate techniques. The model provides a theoretical context for analyzing the results of these hypotheses tests.**

### **Chapter Highlights**

**Chapters 2 and 3 establish the baselines necessary for testing the proposed hypotheses. Chapter 2 provides an in depth description of the Oklahoma legislative process. It discusses legislative process from a theoretical prospective and provides historical context. Then, it describes in detail the formal rules governing current Oklahoma legislative process. There is also a behind the scenes view of how legislation is made. The picture that emerges is less than flattering. As members have adapted to previously imposed citizens reforms, the legislative process has become dysfunctional. This chapter provides the foundation for considering the changes that term limits will bring to the Oklahoma Legislature.**

**Chapter 3 describes the survey data that were collected from members of the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature. It offers descriptive statistics along with an explanation of how various items were derived. As might be expected, members are not descriptively representative of the population at large. A theoretical discussion of members' motivations is included. This study will demonstrate that**

motivations are more complex than previously described. These statistics lay the foundation for the quantitative analysis that follows.

Chapter 4 considers the linkages between members' ambitions and their preferred legislative structure. A theoretical model of legislative reform is posited. Hypotheses are tested. The results will show that majority-minority status is the best predictor of formal rules, while motivation and gender tend to affect informal practices.

Chapter 5 applies a measure of tenure to the previous analysis to determine if term limits might have an effect on structural preferences. Pre-term limits and post-term limits cohorts are compared. Few direct effects for term limits were found. However, there is some indication that previous trends toward a more democratic legislative process may continue.

Chapter 6 examines the implications of these findings. The findings challenge much of what has been written about political ambitions, adaptation, and term limits. While additional research should be completed after term limits have taken full effect, this first empirical study of the effects of term limits finds few direct effects are likely in Oklahoma.

### Conclusion

The purpose of this research project is to examine the effects of term limits on the Oklahoma legislative institutions. The study has implications that go far beyond Oklahoma. It develops a theoretical model of legislative reform and tests speculation proposed by pundits and scholars. Data collected shed light on much of the early speculation about the effects of term limits. It also provides

insight into the Oklahoma legislative process. The findings call into question some of what has been previously written about legislators' motivation, legislative reform, and term limits. Generally, this research finds the effects of term limits emanate from a variety of sources in a dynamic process and early predictions based on a simple linear model were overstated. The implications of this study affect the policy process and the study of legislatures.

### Notes

1. Throughout this analysis hypotheses are tested using large population estimates for the probability of error. However, Kachigan (1991) explains that when the sample is a large portion of the population there is a proportionate reduction in error. Because the total sample is 50 percent of the population the error estimates can be reduced by 50 percent. With this in mind hypotheses are tested using a .10 probability. When missing cases reduce the sample size the error is proportionately larger. However, the error estimate reported here are always less than the amount reported, often by as much as 50 percent.



## **CHAPTER 2**

### **UNDERSTANDING THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS**

**Senate Bill 1223 came before the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma State Senate for consideration on February 29, 1996. The acting president called on the author to explain the bill. The author explained, SB 1223 "is a shell bill for the health authority, just in case ..." they want to make some late session changes in the law. Shell bills are legislative instruments that contain no language, not even a hint of what they are intended to accomplish. This one passed the Senate and was sent to the House by a vote of 42-0. No member of the Senate, no one at the State Health Department, not even the bill's author knew what effect this legislation could have on the citizens of the State of Oklahoma, because it had not been written yet.**

**The language of a shell bill is usually developed in the corridors of the legislature and rushed to the floor of both chambers in the waning days of the legislative session for consideration as a conference committee report, allowing members almost no time to examine the effects. This sham of democracy, which raises many serious questions about the legislative process, is routine in the Oklahoma Legislature. According to observers at the capitol, this system developed as the legislature sought ways to deal with a 1989 citizens' initiative that limited the length of the legislative session.**

The legislative process has often been compared to that of making sausage. While you may enjoy the product, you probably don't want to know how it is made. This chapter is the story of how legislation is made in Oklahoma. As such, it illustrates the complexity of the system. It also explains how legislators manage these complexities, sometimes twisting rules beyond recognition, raising serious questions about the health of Oklahoma's legislative process. The current process is influenced by a variety of environmental factors, recent reforms, and members' response to those reforms.

A major research question posed in Chapter 1 was, "How are legislative structures likely to change as a result of term limits?" More specifically Chapter 1 asked: "Is the Oklahoma Legislative structure likely to change as a result of term limits?" This description of the current legislative process lays the foundation for the discussion of legislative adaptation to the new reality of term limits that follows in succeeding chapters.

This chapter begins with a review of legislative studies and their understanding of the Oklahoma legislature. The studies highlighted here focus on the issues to be discussed in later chapters and set the stage for an in depth look at the Oklahoma legislative process. This review also establishes a theoretical context for the issues raised in this work. A discussion of the historic context of Oklahoma's legislative process follows the theoretical review. This section discusses the evolution and helps to understand certain aspects of the current system. The history is followed by a description of how the legislature is organized. These facts are critical to points made in subsequent chapters.

The functioning of the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature was highly influenced by several recent citizens' reforms. Before describing the process in detail, these reforms and their impact are discussed. Using theory, history, and reform as a backdrop the current rules of the Oklahoma Legislature are explained. This description is the most comprehensive one available and was developed by integrating several legislative publications and interviews.

Once the rules are established, a description of informal practices of the legislature is provided. These practices demonstrate one way members adapted the institution to meet their needs. This chapter will explain why understanding the practices in Oklahoma is at least as important than knowing the rules. Specifically, we will see how the use of these practices threatens the deliberative process in Oklahoma.

This chapter serves dual purposes. Each of the sections in this chapter lays an important foundation for discussions that will follow in other chapters. Together these sections provide a critical examination of the current legislative process in Oklahoma. Hopefully each is an important contribution.

### **State Legislative Studies**

This section focuses on issues in state legislative research that are relevant to this dissertation. It seeks to place recent research on the Oklahoma Legislature in a larger research context. It provides a basis for understanding the description of the legislative process that follows and raises issues which are addressed in other sections and chapters.

Much of the recent research on state legislatures has focused on professionalization. In 1971, the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, a non-profit organization formed by leaders from business, education, labor, agriculture, and government, issued a report entitled *State Legislatures: An Evaluation of Their Effectiveness*. In this report they established criteria for an ideal type legislature and then used those criteria to make recommendations for improving each of the 50 state legislatures. This discussion became the point of departure for much of the research that followed, including two major studies of the Oklahoma Legislature (Kirkpatrick 1978, Morgan et al. 1991). Professionalism became the standard by which legislatures were evaluated for most of the next two decades.

Reforms of the 1960's and 1970's brought greater compensation for legislators, improved scheduling of legislative activities, more productive committee systems, better information processing facilities, and larger staffs (Hickok 1992). These changes tended toward greater professionalization in the state legislatures. In 1987, Alan Rosenthal described the changes as the "congressionalization" of state legislatures. By 1998, many of these reforms had come full circle, with the advent of tax revolts and term limits, and Rosenthal was discussing "deinstitutionalization."

In an earlier critical review of our knowledge of state legislatures, Malcolm Jewell (1981) shaped the research agenda for the next decade. He observed, "State legislatures are changing, and we ought to be studying the causes and consequences of these changes." Among the specific areas on which Jewell

suggested studies should focus were: career patterns, legislative structures, and roles and norms.

Regarding career patterns, in 1981 Jewell noted increasing demands for members' time and declining rates of turnover. Yet, in many states legislating was not a full-time pursuit. Kurtz (1990) suggested that a hybrid state legislator was emerging: one who was not an amateur, yet not full-time. In Oklahoma, Kirkpatrick found, in 1978, that 61 percent of members did not want the legislature to become a full-time job. Morgan et al. reported in 1991 that "almost all" legislators still considered themselves part-time. They also noted that in Oklahoma "careerism has been offset by the large number of incumbents who failed to win reelection." This would suggest that at last report, Oklahoma legislators were more amateurish than full-time in Kurtz's hybrid.

Squire (1988) found that career patterns tend to follow the opportunity structure. Some legislative structures are more conducive to long term careers, others are springboards to future public service, and some encourage temporary citizen legislators. These career patterns were also related to membership stability (Squire 1988a).

Research into legislative structures were divided by Moncrief et al. (1996) into four categories: leadership, committees, parties, and staff. In 1981, according to Jewell, we knew almost nothing about the leadership selection process or leadership styles. Since then, Moncrief et al. (1996) note studies have found that the path to leadership has become longer and more institutionalized. Most importantly, they argue, "These studies show that leaders' success depend on their ability to satisfy the goals of members."

A change in the leadership selection process in Oklahoma to the very public pledge card system in the 1986 Oklahoma House of Representatives made it easy for an unpopular leader to gain reelection as Speaker (Morgan et al. 1991). But he was ultimately dethroned, in part because of his strong arm tactics. These events would suggest that in Oklahoma leaders must meet the needs of their members or in the long run they will not be successful.

As a result of research on committees, Hamm and Hedlund (1990) have shown that one of the ways that leaders attempt to accommodate the goals of members is through committee assignments. Gender has also been shown to be a critical determinant of leadership style among committee chairs (Rosenthal 1995). An earlier study showed that experienced committee leadership may actually be detrimental to a committee's success (Ray 1977). Hamm (1982) notes that members' unrecorded committee votes are often inconsistent with their recorded floor votes. Morgan et al. (1991) suggest that it is difficult to trace members' work on conference committees in Oklahoma because few records are kept. The State Senate has recorded committee votes since 1981, but committee votes are not recorded in the House.

The general work on party caucuses in state legislative processes indicates that they are of little importance (Francis 1989). Leadership and committees may be much more important than parties in decision making. However, the work of Morgan et al. (1991) tends to couch most legislative issues in Oklahoma in partisan terms. This may simply be a function of how legislatures are organized. It is difficult to separate the majority party functions, from those of the leadership and committee leaders.

Little has been written about state legislative staff. A recent survey of veteran legislators indicated that most thought the influence of committee staff had increased during their tenure (Moncrief, Thompson, and Kurtz 1996). Moncrief, Thomas and Cassie (1996) echo the sentiments of others by suggesting that term limits may cause an increase in staff influence. However, this argument is counter intuitive to Kurtz (1992), who observed that the size and type of staff is related to the professionalism of the legislature. If staff is larger in more professional legislatures, and term limits creates less professional legislatures, then logic would dictate that perhaps staff would shrink in a term limited legislature. Those who expect staff to grow under term limits are thinking that for the legislature to continue to function at its present level someone other than career legislators must do the work and those people would be staff. But, the effect of term limits could be to bring in a group of legislators who are suspicious of government and who may actually prefer that less work get done. Certainly the evidence is strong that less professional legislatures have smaller staffs. Morgan et al. (1991) noted that while Oklahoma's legislative staff was middle sized when compared to the nation, a 1984 Governor's commission on reform argued that the staff was gaining too much influence.

Roles and norms in legislatures have also been researched for decades. In 1965, Barber examined the Connecticut Legislature and found four types of legislators-- lawmakers, advertisers, spectators, and reluctants. These roles were found by comparing members' activity levels and desire to remain in the legislature. Kirkpatrick (1978) applied Barber's typologies to the Oklahoma Legislature. Oklahoma, at that time, had more lawmakers and advertisers, and

fewer spectators and reluctant than Barber found in Connecticut, in other words Oklahoma legislators were more active according to Kirkpatrick's measures. Kirkpatrick also examined the representational roles developed by Wahlke et al. (1962). About 40 percent of Oklahoma lawmakers described themselves as *politicos*— acting as both trustees and delegates. Only about 11 percent saw themselves as purely delegates. More recently, Morgan et al. (1991) found an increased number of delegates in the Oklahoma Legislature. While these may be valuable distinctions, Jewell (1981) argued that these orientations have not been very successful at predicting legislative behavior.

McLemore (1973) and Kirkpatrick (1978) identified several norms of behavior within the Oklahoma Legislature. These norms were related to partisanship, floor behavior, specialization, and relations with the governor and interest groups. An example of a partisanship norm was that members were more likely to approve of the behavior of a colleague who usually, but not always, supported the party leadership in procedural votes. Members who acted otherwise received stern disapproval from their peers. Norms were so powerful in Oklahoma that legislators would rather lose a political battle than violate the behavioral norms of the legislature Kirkpatrick (1978). Unfortunately, there are many problems associated with identifying legislative norms, making this line of research difficult for comparison (Moncrief et al 1996).

The research described above provides a useful context for exploring the Oklahoma legislative process. It also leaves many unanswered questions. The



information that follows will help to answer some of those questions and update our understanding of others.

### Historical Overview

Adaptation is part of an evolutionary process. To understand the changes that are currently taking place in the Oklahoma Legislature it is important to consider changes that have taken place in the past. What follows is a brief discussion of how power has shifted within the Oklahoma Legislature. It provides an historic context for understanding the current process and how reforms have affected it.

The structure of the Oklahoma Legislature, its rules and practices, have evolved over the state's 90 year history. The Oklahoma Legislature is a relatively young body compared to other legislatures in the U.S. Oklahoma was the 47<sup>th</sup> state, admitted to the Union in 1907. As with many emerging systems of representative democracy, the early history was wracked with conflict. Relationships between institutions needed to be established and precedents needed to be set in place to govern these relationships.

These conflicts in Oklahoma were often rural vs. urban, and rarely partisan in nature. They did, however, involve power struggles between the legislature, the governor, and the courts. Two governors were impeached, as were three supreme court justices. At one point the governor called out the national guard to prevent the legislature from meeting. It is through this conflict that the traditions that currently govern legislative action in Oklahoma emerged.

(An excellent chronology of these conflicts can be found in Morgan and Morgan 1984.)

The Democratic Party dominated Oklahoma from inception. Ninety percent of the delegates elected to the Constitutional Convention were Democrats. The first general election held in the state was also dominated by the Democrats as they captured the governorship and both houses of the legislature. With the exception of the Harding landslide of 1920, Republicans did not become a force in Oklahoma until the 1960s. (For a discussion of the Republican Party's emergence in the 1962 election see Jones (1974).) In the late 1990's Republicans continued to play a minor role in the Oklahoma Legislature.

Roger Randle, former President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma State Senate, in an interview argued that early in the state's history party unity led to a strong executive. Democratic legislators, who dominated the process, and who saw the governor as the elected head of their party, allowed the Democratic governor unusual powers including the right to appoint the legislative leadership. This meant that, although the constitution made the governor a weak figurehead, he exercised considerable power over state policy through the legislative process.

However, all of that changed in 1959 when J. Howard Edmonson became governor. Edmonson was a reformer and legislative leaders were "old guard" Democrats. They refused to accept his leadership and organized their respective chambers without his input. Following Edmonson's governorship, Henry Bellmon, a Republican, was able to take advantage of a divided

Democratic Party and win the governor's race with only 47 percent of the vote. Bellmon, first Republican governor in the state's history, was succeeded by Dewey Bartlett, another Republican. During this period Democratic members of the legislature did not have a governor to look to for leadership. As a result by the time the Democrats regained the governorship in 1970, with David Hall, the tradition of the governor appointing the legislative leadership had been lost. Legislators had become too independent of the executive branch to let that happen again.

As a result, following J. Howard Edmonson, the governorship declined in political clout and the legislature became increasingly important in the policy making process. Subsequently, Oklahoma experienced several dictatorial Speakers of the House of Representatives, who in their time became among the most powerful political figures in the state.

Two of these powerful Speakers ran afoul of the law, a third was ousted by his membership. J. D. McCarty became first Speaker to serve under a Republican governor in 1962. McCarty was able to use his influence over Democratic legislators to push his own agenda ahead of Governor Bellmon's. However, in 1966 he failed to win reelection from his home district and soon after was convicted of tax evasion for failing to report his bribes as income (Holloway 1993). In 1982 Speaker Dan Draper left the House after being convicted of vote fraud in a campaign where his father was a candidate. (This conviction was later overturned.) His successor, Jim Barker, was so heavy handed in the House that he was ousted from the speakership by his colleagues mid-session in 1989 (see Morgan et al. 1991).

**This rebellion against the strong speakership lead to a kinder-gentler leadership. Under both Steve Lewis and Glen Johnson the minority was able to negotiate minor concessions on committee assignments and agenda items. The Governor and the President Pro Temp. of the Senate became more equal players in the legislative process. The Oklahoma House of Representatives is still the major battle ground for public policy decisions and its Speaker still holds one of the most powerful positions in the state. But, few inside or outside the legislature live in fear of the speaker as they once did.**

### **Organization of the Oklahoma Legislature**

**A complete understanding of the legislative process must include a description of how it is organized. What follows is basic background information; however, the information discussed here provides a basis for answering some of the questions raised earlier.**

**Patterned after the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution establishes three separate branches of government: the legislative, executive, and judicial. These branches function independently and yet concurrently as one governmental structure. The bi-cameral legislature includes a House and a Senate.**

**The 1997-98 legislature was the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature. Sessions in odd numbered year are referred to as the First Session and those in even numbered years are described as the Second Session. The Constitution limits regular legislative sessions to 90 working days. The governor has the power to**

call special sessions if necessary. Before a 1966 amendment to the state's constitution, the legislature was restricted to one session every two years.

Members of the House serve two year terms and are elected in November of even numbered years. Members of the Senate serve four year terms. These terms are staggered such that one half of the Senate is elected in each state wide general election. Current Senators in even numbered districts were elected in 1994 and those in odd numbered districts were elected in 1996.

The two parties organize the leadership of both chambers. The majority leaders are nominated in the party caucuses and elected by their respective house memberships. The Senate is led by the President Pro Tempore and the House is led by the Speaker of the House. The Oklahoma Constitution makes the Lieutenant Governor the President of the Senate, but by tradition she only serves in that capacity on ceremonial occasions or to break tie votes.

Historically, the Democratic Party has dominated the Oklahoma Legislature. Only in 1921-22 did Republicans muster a majority, in the House. In the 46<sup>th</sup> Legislature there were 65 Democrats and 36 Republicans in the House, and 33 Democrats and 15 Republicans in the Senate. There were 15 women in the legislature, nine in the House and six in the Senate. The average age of all legislators is 51 years old.

Currently, the majority House leadership includes 16 members and the minority House leadership includes nine members. The Senate majority leadership includes six members, while the minority leadership includes four. The rules of each chamber's Democratic Caucus limit the Speaker and the President Pro Temp. to two terms as leader (four total years).

Oklahoma does not have a normal line of succession to majority leader like some other states and each caucus has its own rules for electing its leaders. The Senate Democrats use a pledge card system to elect the Pro Temp. Candidates for leader approach members for official signatures on pledges. Once one candidate has sufficient signatures to be elected, a caucus meeting is called and the leader is declared. Secondary leaders are then appointed by the Pro Temp. and ratified by voice vote of the caucus. House Democrats used the pledge card system as recently as 1986, but they now have a secret ballot to determine the Speaker. A secret vote also elects the Speaker Pro Temp. and the Caucus Chairman. The Speaker appoints lower level Democratic leaders. House Republicans also use a secret ballot to select their minority leader and floor leaders. Senate Republicans use a draft/rotation system. There are so few members in this caucus, and several of them have served together for many years, so the senior members rotate the leadership among themselves. At an organizational meeting they draft a willing subject who has not served as leader recently.

There are three distinct leadership groups in the each chamber: the floor leadership, the committee leadership, and the leadership team. The formal leadership positions for the majority include the Speaker or President Pro Temp., Majority Floor Leader, Assistant Floor Leaders, Whips, Caucus Chair, and others. The committee leadership includes the committee chairs, vice-chairs, sub-committee chairs, and sub-committee vice-chairs. The leadership team is an informal brain trust that the majority leader selects. They are his inner-circle or kitchen cabinet advisors. As an informal group, membership in the leadership

team can be fluid; yet, this group is stable enough that these members are recognized as among the most powerful in the legislature.

Both chambers operate extensive committee systems. Committee chairs are selected by the Speaker and the President Pro Tem. The House has 26 standing committees, the Senate has 19. Of the 149 legislative members, 104 serve as a committee or sub-committee leader. Thirty-seven of the 45 members who do not have committee leadership assignments are Republicans. The remaining 8 Democratic members were all elected before 1990.

Legislators were paid \$32,000 annually in the 46<sup>th</sup> Legislature. The Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tem. received an additional \$14,944. The majority and minority floor leaders received an additional \$10,304. Members also receive travel allowances and per diem while at the Capitol or on state business.

Both chambers have permanent staff. Members of the Senate, who request them, are a given year round, full-time secretary. Other Senators have a personal secretary only during the sessions. When not in session they share a secretary with other Senators. House members, not in leadership, share secretaries both during and after sessions. Both chambers have an extensive administrative staff. They serve the leadership, committees, and the general membership of their body. The Senate has an administrative staff of 101 and the House has a staff of 98.

With these base lines established, it is now time to turn to the Oklahoma legislative process. Recent citizen initiatives have altered the political

environment of the Oklahoma Legislature. An understanding of the process must begin with a discussion of these changes and their effects.

### **Oklahoma's Changing Political Environment**

The bicameral Oklahoma Legislature as an institution must work within the constraints placed upon it by the state constitution and by the people. Through the power of initiative the people of Oklahoma recently created three new restrictions for the state legislature. Each of these reforms are affecting the legislature's operation and have forced the institution to adapt.

Voters reaffirmed their desire for a citizen legislature by enacting these new constitutional constraints. In 1989 they required that their part-time legislature complete its 90 days of business between the first Monday in February and the last Friday in May. In 1992 they further required that all tax increases be approved by 75% of each house of the legislature or be subjected to a popular referendum. In 1990 a constraint was placed on legislative membership. The public created lifetime limits on the number of years a member can serve in the Oklahoma Legislature. While the full impact of this twelve year restriction will not be felt until 2006, term limits are fast becoming a necessary part of any discussion of legislative behavior.

Of these restrictions S.Q. 620, limiting the length of the legislative session, is the one that has had the most immediate impact. Sessions were always limited to 90 days, but prior to S.Q. 620 they were not required to complete business by a date certain. Members would meet officially in session only a few days per week, thereby stalling business well into June or even July. These



**days out of session allowed time for committee meetings, personal conversations, and thoughtful consideration of bills pending before the legislature.**

**However, the Oklahoma public did not understand why 90 day legislative sessions started in February and lasted until mid-June. Adding to the public perception problem was the fact that the session generally ended with a flurry of budgetary conflict. Public outrage reached a fevered pitch when on June 30, 1988 the legislature remained in session for 27 hours in order to complete the business of its 89th day. The 90th day then occurred on July 12. This late resolution of the budget created problems for state agencies whose new fiscal year was to began on July 1. The public was dismayed by the end of session conflict and the flagrant effort to lengthen the session beyond its constitutional limits, so they took the certain action of limiting the legislative calendar, to insure that members' completed their business in a timely manner. Demonstrating the level of public anger, the initiative carried all 77 counties capturing 75 percent of the total statewide vote.**

**In an attempt to manage the new calendar restrictions, both houses imposed stringent deadlines for moving legislation from one stage to another. A bill that does not clear a deadline is considered dead, unless the rules are suspended by a two-thirds of both houses to resurrect it. In 1998 deadlines for drafting and introducing legislation expired before the official opening of the legislative session and the deadline for reporting bills out of committee was just three weeks after the session began. The use of shell bills, described at the**

beginning of this chapter, is just one of many responses to these legislative constraints.

In 1992, State Question 640 required that all tax increases be approved by 75% of each house of the legislature or be subjected to referendum. The impact of this reform was not immediately felt. Oklahoma has enjoyed increasing revenues from its current tax system since that time. However, in 1997 the governor proposed a tax reduction. Turning the tables on advocates of lower taxes, opponents of the tax reduction proposal argued that once reduced, taxes could not be easily reinstated when it might be necessary.

Both of these constraints directly affected the way the legislature functioned. A less direct constraint was imposed in 1990. Yet, its affect on the legislature likely will be just as consequential. State Question 632 imposed 12 year lifetime limits on a member's service in the Oklahoma Legislature.

These term limits will not affect legislative reelections until 2004. According to the Oklahoma Attorney General's Office (interview), the law allows those members who were serving on January 1, 1991 to finish that term before their 12 years began to accumulate toward the limit. Since legislative terms start in November, fifteen days after the election, those elected in 1990 were allowed to finish that entire term before they were affected. For House members continually elected from November 1990 their 12 year limited career will span from November 1992 until November 2004. For Senators continually elected from November 1990 their 12 year limited career will span from November 1994 until November 2006.

If the 12 year limit were imposed at the end of this Legislature, 30 percent of current legislators would be prevented from seeking reelection because they have completed 12 years of service. Almost 40 percent of the current legislators have 6 or less years of experience. Members of the Senate tend to have more legislative experience than members of the House. Forty percent of current Senators are former House members.

These external reforms, by citizens' initiative, are affecting the legislative process and the institution. Limiting the session has had the most dramatic impact, because the effects were immediate, but when the need to raise revenues becomes acute and when members begin to be removed from office the greater effects of these later reforms will be felt.

#### How a Bill Becomes a Law: Legislation 101

In politics there are the rules, and then there are the ways things are done. What follows are two descriptions of the legislative process. The first is a description of the formal process as described in the rules of the House and Senate. The second is a more analytical discussion of how these rules are implemented by the members of both chambers.

#### **Rules**

Bills proceed through the Oklahoma House and Senate in a manner very similar to the U.S. Congress. To become law, bills must pass both chambers with identical language and be accepted by the governor. This is a very complex process that provides opponents of a proposal many opportunities to prevail. Passage in each chamber requires the cooperation of many gatekeepers and

the support of a majority of the membership. Few bills survive the process to become law. In 1995 only 425 of 2032 bills introduced (21 percent) were enacted by the legislature (Terplin 1998).

The legislative process is governed by several documents. Of course, the Constitution of the United States is the supreme document that determines generally what is permissible. More specifically the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma grants the legislature certain privileges and imposes many restrictions. Both the House and the Senate have specific rules to govern their respective chambers, and there is a set of joint rules, primarily to regulate joint bill processing. Each party caucus, the House Democrats, House Republicans, Senate Democrats, and Senate Republicans, have rules that in effect regulate the legislature. Because of the overwhelming Democratic majority in each chamber, the Democratic Caucus rules directly affect legislative activities. When these various rules need interpretation the presiding officer generally turns to the Clerk of the House or Secretary of the Senate for advice. These officers rely on Mason's Manual of Legislative Procedure (Mason 1989) for direction.

The complexities of the process are such that Senate Parliamentarian Lance Ward says few understand it fully (interview). Of course, the rules govern the practices of members, but the interpretations, precedents, and traditions that have arisen around those rules structure the legislature. These traditions are the system that new members come to understand through the socialization process. In that regard, what follows is a description of the most common legislative processes. It does not attempt to address every possible contingency and in that sense is not comprehensive. The actual norms and traditions of the

legislature are addressed in the next section. What is described here is the rules that underlie basic bill processing in Oklahoma.

This picture of the legislature is derived from a variety of documents, interviews, and observations (See Appendix 2). No complete description of the legislative process currently exists. The House provides a handout that summarizes some of this material. The Senate also has a version. However, each of these descriptions leave out important pieces of the process and in places seem to conflict.<sup>1</sup> While it would be impractical, if not impossible, to discuss every possible legislative contingency, what follows is the most complete picture of how the legislative process in Oklahoma works, produced to date.

The process begins just days after the general election and unfolds rapidly over the next 7 months. The experience of the 46<sup>th</sup> Legislature illustrate this well. Members of the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature were elected on November 5, 1996. Members were sworn into office two weeks after the election on November 20. Within days of the election the party caucuses met to elect leaders. On January 7 members convened to organize the Legislature. At that time the Speaker and President Pro Temp. were formally elected.

Due to the limitations on the legislative calendar (SQ 620), both the House and the Senate imposed strict deadlines on bill processing. If a bill failed to meet a deadline it was considered dead for the remainder of that legislative session, unless the rules were suspended by the membership for the purpose of reviving it. It took a two-thirds vote to suspend the rules in each respective chamber.

The deadline for filing legislation with the House and Senate Clerks respectively, for the First Session was January 30, 1997, just 86 days after the

**election. The deadline for requesting staff assistance in drafting legislation was January 16. Legislation can be introduced by any member without limits in their respective chamber.**

**The First Regular Session of the 46th Oklahoma Legislature was convened for business on February 3. Every bill enacted by the legislature must be given four readings. The First Reading occurs on the first business day, in this case February 3. This consists of the Clerk reading the title acknowledging that the bill had been introduced. However, in some cases First Readings are accomplished by just noting a bill in the daily journal. The Second Reading is a similar formality usually the next legislative day. On Second Reading the bill is officially referred by the Speaker or President Pro Temp. to one or more committees.**

**But, committee work actually began two weeks before the session. Bills that had been filed early were assigned to committees by the Speaker or President Pro Temp. in anticipation of the session. At the request of the majority leaders, the committee chairs call their members together and begin hearing bills on January 20. These were unofficial meetings and no official votes were taken. However, the desires of committee members were expressed and the fate of some bills was largely decided in these presession meetings.**

**Once a bill was referred officially to a committee, official committee hearings commenced. The committee chair has great discretion about which bills will be heard and which will not. Some chairs in the interest of fairness attempt to hear all of the bills assigned to their committee, others use their power capriciously. Committee chairs are powerful gatekeepers. A two thirds vote of**

the membership could have withdrawn a bill from a committee and brought it to the floor on General Order, but this rarely happened. In the House half of the members of a committee could force a committee vote by requesting in writing that a bill come to a vote.

Committees could act in one of several ways. They could recommend passage, make amendments and then recommend passage, substitute their own language and recommend passage, recommend not passage, or report "due progress". When a committee reported "progress" on a bill they were indicating that they did not intend to act on the bill, without killing it completely.

Committees could schedule public hearings on bills it was considering, but this was rare. The more common occurrence was for the committee to schedule a bill for consideration. At that time the author of the bill appeared before the committee and discusses the need for the bill. Committee members would ask the author questions. Occasionally interested parties, for example representatives of an affected agency, would also appear. Only those guests recognized by the chair could make statements. Following these statements and questions, members would discuss the proposal and amendments could be offered. When the discussion was complete, a member of the committee motioned for action. If a second to the motion was found, a brief debate may occur between members of the committee. Following the debate a vote was taken and action was determined. In the Senate this vote was an officially recorded vote. In the House these votes were not recorded, although some minority members began taking notes and unofficially recording committee votes.

**Bills were required to be reported from committee to the house of origin by February 20, 17 days following the opening of the session. All bills were required to have both a House and Senate sponsor to be reported out of committee. Bills not reported by the deadline were considered dead for the remainder of the session unless the chamber voted to suspend the rules.**

**Once reported from committee, bills were placed on General Order. A bill was brought before the chamber on General Order by the majority floor leader. The floor leader asked the presiding officer to recognize the author of the bill for an explanation. Following the author's explanation members were allowed to ask questions of the author. Amendments could be offered, and language could be substituted. After all questions were asked, and all amendments considered, the author moved for unanimous consent to consider the bill engrossed and placed on Third Reading and Final Passage. Engrossment was a formality that refers to incorporating all amendments into the bill so it could be considered in its current state as a single item.**

**Once given the Third Reading a bill could no longer be amended. Members of the chamber debated the bill and an electronic vote was recorded. If a bill received a majority of all members it was then physically engrossed, printed in final form, and signed by the presiding officer. The bill was then forwarded to the other chamber for consideration. The deadline for bills clearing the chamber of origin was March 13.**

**If a bill failed, any member could call for reconsideration. The reconsideration needed to occurred within three days. Members could also vote to have a bill returned to committee for further consideration, however if this was**



after the deadline for reporting bills out of committee, then the bill was effectively dead for the session.

The House expedited the processing of some non-controversial bills by using a consent calendar. Bills were put on the consent calendar by the committee or the Speaker. If no member objected within 4 legislative days, the bill was brought to the floor for final passage and was not amendable or debatable. Since it only took one member to prevent a bill from proceeding through this expedited process, the process was only for measures that had virtual unanimous consent.

Once in the opposite chamber a bill must start over again. The house leader assigned bills to committees for consideration. Committee hearings were conducted on the bill. The bill needed to be reported out of committee by March 27.

To remain viable a bill from the opposite chamber needed to have completed Third Reading by April 17. To be forwarded to the governor a bill must be passed by both houses in exactly the same form. In almost every case a bill is amended by the second chamber before Third Reading. If a bill did pass the second chamber without amendments, the engrossed version was signed by the presiding officer and it was returned to the house of origin. In the house of origin the bill was referred for enrollment, to be printed in final form. After enrollment it was signed by the presiding officer of the house of origin, then of the opposite chamber. This signing was considered the Fourth Reading. After the Fourth Reading it was forwarded to the governor for his action.

**Bills receiving amendments in the second chamber were returned to the house of origin for action on the amended language. If the amendments were accepted by voice vote, then the bill was given a Fourth Reading and a recorded vote was taken for Final Passage. If it was successful at winning final passage the bill was enrolled, signed by both presiding officers, and forwarded to the governor.**

**If amendments were rejected, as was often the case, then the bill could be assigned to a conference committee. Conferees were chosen by the leader of each chamber. When agreement was reached between half of the members of the committee from each chamber the bill was reported back to the floor of the original house. The deadline for filing conference committee reports in the First Session was April 30. They were unable to meet this deadline so the leaders postponed the date for one week to May 7. In the Second Session (1998) this deadline was completely eliminated.**

**Once reported out of the conference committee and brought to the floor by the leadership a vote was taken to adopt the conference committee report. Members could reject the conference committee report and send the bill back for further consultation. If the conference committee report was adopted, the bill was given a Fourth Reading and presented for Final Passage. If it passed then it moved to the other chamber where a similar process took place. If passed by both chambers, then the bill is enrolled, signed by the presiding officer in each chamber, and forwarded to the governor. Instead of rejecting a bill outright, a chamber can refer a bill back to a conference committee for more work.**

**Bills can be recalled from the governor's desk for reconsideration before he signs it by a concurrent resolution in the house of origin or by a joint resolution. This rarely occurs.**

**The budget is generally one of the most contentious matters before the legislature each year. Appropriation bills are introduced into the House and pass through the process described above. They ultimately find their way to the General Conference Committee on Appropriations and Budget (GCCA). This is a very large committee. It is often said, "Everyone is on it." The Senate President Pro Temp. appointed all 47 other Senators to this conference. The budget is worked out through this conference committee process and brought to the floor for passage in the closing days of the session.**

**If at anytime a bill is voted down it is dead for the entire legislative term. If a bill is left laying at any stage it can be revived in the Second Session. As a result, few bills are actually voted down. Most fail to meet one of the various deadlines and are left on the table indefinitely.**

### **Traditions**

**Much of the current bill processing system is based on informal practices that have developed around the rules. A majority of bills passing through the Oklahoma Legislature are declared emergencies. Emergency bills become law immediately upon the Governor's signature (or a successful veto override). Ordinary bills become law 90 days after the legislature adjourns. An emergency requires the support of a 2/3 vote in each house. If the Governor vetoes an emergency clause 3/4 of both houses are required to override the veto. This**

**super majority requirement, based solely on tradition, keeps the partisan balance important to the functioning of the legislature, even though the Democratic Party controls large majorities in both houses.**

**Two other super majority requirements are the 3/4 required for tax increases and the 2/3 required to override non-emergency vetoes by the governor. For 8 of the past 12 years Oklahomans have experienced divided party government. Republicans have controlled the governorship while Democrats have maintained large majorities in both houses. This has led to a record number of vetoes. House Republicans currently have one more vote than needed to sustain a gubernatorial veto or block an emergency. In the Senate Republicans have just one vote over the necessary 1/4 votes to prevent tax increases or emergency clauses veto overrides.**

**The legislative deadlines have created their own set of practices. A member who wishes to reserve the right to initiate legislation on a topic must introduce a bill before the first day of the session, even if the bill has no language in it. These shell bills, discussed previously, contain only a title and a number. The number of legislators engaging in the practice of introducing numerous shell bills has contributed to an increased number of bills being introduced each session. The number of bills has more than doubled in the past 10 years. Faced with more bills to process in less time, most legislators see the session as a mad dash with little time to fine tune legislative proposals, resulting in a shoddy product that often needs to be revisited in the next legislative session.**

**Members complain that early deadlines and the volume of legislation clog the committee process. In the rush to beat the deadlines, committee chairs put**

bills on the calendar that are not carefully written. When committee members ask questions of a bill's author about its contents, the author often responds, "Is that what it says? That is not what I meant!" The author promises to fix it and the committee often votes to move it along.

Knowing that most legislation will not make it onto the chamber floor, committee chairs often allow bills out of their committee just to let the author claim credit for the effort. Similarly many members introduce legislation knowing it has no chance of passing but hoping to claim credit for the effort. Both of these practices contribute to the volume of legislation and clog the process.

Bills, incomplete in form, are then scheduled on the chamber floor. They are often passed with little debate other than the author begging colleagues to advance the bill with a promise to work out any problems while the bill is in the other chamber. Sometimes they are sent to the other chamber with the expectation that they will die, but the author can take credit for the effort.

The processes are similar in both houses and vague proposals are generally written into enactable legislation in conference committees. However, most conference committees never meet, except on paper. The author of a bill works with conferees, leadership, and other members to develop a legislative proposal that is acceptable to the committee and on the floor of both houses. Then, a staff person collects signatures of committee members on a conference report.

The deadlines of the session, the volume of legislation, and the knowledge that a bill can not become a law until it passes through both houses, a conference committee, and both houses again provides the incentive to have

members introduce shell or otherwise inadequate vehicles and independently work them into substantive policy proposals as they move them through the process, without the deliberation of their colleagues.

In most cases if a committee chose not to advance a bill, a member moved to report progress. This kept the bill alive for possible consideration later. Members need to keep bills alive for several reasons. One reason is the deadlines in the process. By keeping a bill alive, it provides a legislative vehicle that can later be used to insert needed language if the occasion arises. Another reason is so that the bill's author can claim credit among constituents for having a bill at the Capitol attempting to solve some concern that they have.

When bills came to the floor on General Order, if any member had any substantive concern about the language, the bill was usually withdrawn from consideration. Early in the session the bill was returned to the committee for further work. After the committee deadline had passed, the author could withdraw the language and produce a floor substitute. When the bill was re-presented for consideration, the floor substitute was adopted on General Order. Floor substitutes allow the author to singlehandedly make wholesale changes in the legislation as it progresses through the process, so long as he or she can gain the consent of his or her colleagues. Bills were often laid over for 24 hours while the author work to resolve others' concerns. Not everyone's concerns could be fully incorporated into many proposals, but the courtesy of laying a bill over for 24 hours was extended by the author to any member in almost every case. All that was required to do so was a motion, usually by the author, and a voice vote. This vote was always pro forma. As described above, another

**solution often employed was for the author to move to strike the title of the bill and to implore members to keep the bill alive while promising to fix it before it returns to the floor for final passage.**

**Although bills must pass through many stages, generally they were debated at only one point. Debate could have occurred on Third Reading when the bill proceeded through the chamber the first time, but generally it was only debated when considering the conference committee report. If the report was adopted then the process moved directly to a vote on Fourth Reading without further debate.**

**When a conference committee report was published, if the author found the need to make additional changes in the bill, he or she came to the floor and asked unanimous consent to have the bill returned for further consultation. The author could then substitute the needed language and again collect the signatures of the conferees.**

**When the bill returned to the chamber floors often few members have read it and almost no one, other than the author, has been intimately involved in its development. It is at this point when members, often privately, but occasionally publicly, stop to ask, "When did we deliberate on this important change we are about to enact into Oklahoma law?" The answer they continually return is, "We didn't!"**

**As a result, for much legislation, at no point in the formal process does the system actually work. At no point does any body (committee or chamber) seriously deliberate on the issue. This process often yields flawed legislation**

which then returns to the legislative process the following year to be cleaned up, again contributing to the volume of legislation that clogs the system.

Members of the Oklahoma Legislature and their leadership perceive S.Q. 620 to be the reason for the dysfunctional system. However, the problem may be more with their perception of S.Q. 620 than with its actual restrictions. The number of bills introduced into the Oklahoma Legislature has been steadily increasing over the years, from 722 in 1986 to 1638 in 1996. However, Oklahoma's session restrictions are no harsher than those of most other states. At least, 25 states have greater restrictions than Oklahoma. Ten of those states handled a greater volume of legislation in 1994 and 1995 than Oklahoma. Three handle more than twice as much (Book of the States 1996). Since Oklahoma's process is no more restrictive than others and the volume of legislation is not greater than many, the problem of processing legislation through more normal channels may be more perceptual than real.

Perhaps part of the problem in Oklahoma is not the restrictions themselves, but making the transition to the more restricted session. Interviews with members indicate that newer members are less inclined to describe the session length as a problem than more senior members, perhaps indicating senior members have not yet learned how to work within the time limits that newer members see as natural. Another possibility is that the restrictions do make the process difficult, but newer members don't recognize the problem because they are less involved in developing major legislation. Regardless,



legislators say they are reacting to S.Q. 620 by engaging in this dysfunctional process.

In their outrage the public did not consider how the legislature would respond to the new restrictions of S.Q. 620. They just wanted to force their part-time legislators to complete their business and adjourn. In its attempt to cope with the people's requirement the leadership also may have failed to fully consider how the actions of individual legislators would change as a result of leadership's more restrictive deadlines. Members believe the current legislative process severely limits the number of bills that can be processed through normal channels. So members twist the democratic process in an attempt to accomplish their goals. This twist circumvents many of the natural safeguards in the legislative process and presents many opportunities for abuse.

### Conclusion

Making legislation is a complex process. It has evolved over time, as the political environment has changed and as various reforms have taken effect. In Oklahoma the informal practices allow an almost secretive, behind the scenes process, to overshadow the official, much more public, process. This alternate process is the result of members' response to recent reforms.

Ultimately, this work seeks to discuss how the process is changing as a result of the term limits reform. To begin that discussion, this chapter set the theoretical and historical context for understanding the Oklahoma legislative process. It provided a description of the changing political environment and the

current system of law making. With these basics established about how the system has evolved and currently works, attention can now turn to the individual members and their attitudes toward the system in Chapter 3. As this chapter indicates, their attitudes and actions have a great deal to do with the institutional reaction to reform.

#### **Notes**

1. Ultimately these versions were integrated with the help of Lance Ward, Parliamentarian and Secretary of the Senate.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **MEMBERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS AND PREFERENCES**

The typical member of the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature was a Democratic white male, 51 years old, a college graduate, whose annual family income was \$79,000. On average the members of the legislature are older, better educated, and earn more money than the average Oklahoman. However, few members are average.

This chapter provides a broad description of the current members of the Oklahoma Legislature. These data develop a composite snap shot of members' characteristics and preferences which provides the foundation for answering the research questions posed earlier. One major research question asked, "How are the characteristics of members changing as a result of term limits?" Related questions included: "Are term limits altering members' motivations or other characteristics in the Oklahoma Legislature? Are members' preferences toward legislative structure changing as a result of term limits?" And, "Are members' motivations or other characteristics related to their preferred legislative structure?" Data presented here are used in subsequent chapters to test hypotheses related to these questions.

Data described in this chapter are based on a mail survey of members of the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature and information available in their directory, *Who's*

*Who in the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature (1997).* (The survey questionnaire is available in Appendix 3, and a more complete description of how the data base was developed can be found in Chapter 1.) Of the 149 members of the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature (1997-1998), 74 responded. The sample matched the overall membership in every comparable descriptive category. For example:

Sample: 68% Democrats, 32% Senators, 59% Pre-Term Limits, 92% Men;  
Members: 66% Democrats, 32% Senators, 62% Pre-Term Limits, 90% Men.

This chapter discusses how the various survey items were developed and generates descriptive statistics from the full data base, taking each category of variables– 1) characteristics: ambitions, priorities, position, background, orientation, seniority; and 2) preferences: leadership selection method, power distribution, leadership qualities– in turn. Implications of the descriptive findings are also discussed.

### Characteristics

Several characteristics of members are relevant to this study. They include: motivations, priorities, position, background, orientation, seniority. Most of these are measured using simple survey questions or *Who's Who*. However, ambitions were measured using a factor analysis of 15 items, and priorities were measured by combining a series of forced choice survey items. Together these characteristics provide a valuable picture of the current Oklahoma Legislature.

## **Ambitions**

Since the 1960's political scientists have engaged in an extensive discussion of legislators' motivations. At the heart of this discussion is the idea that political leaders are, as Madison suggested in *Federalist #57*, by their very nature ambitious. Yet, there have been various interpretations as to what kinds of ambitions they hold.

Studying Congress, Schlesinger (1966) described political ambition in three forms: progressive, static, and discrete. Progressive ambition is the desire for higher office. Static ambition is the desire to keep one's current position. Perhaps in a term limited legislature this should be redefined as the desire to serve a full career. Discrete ambition is the desire to serve for a specific period of time and then leave elective politics. Copeland (1992) suggests that term limits turn static ambition into discrete ambition. However, in a state like Oklahoma, which has a 12 year limit, an important distinction can be made between those who wish to serve the full limit as distinct from those who desire to serve fewer years. Fenno (1973) argued that ambition may include goals other than just election. He categorized ambition as reelection, influence within the legislature, good public policy, a career beyond legislative service, and private gain; although he only chose to study the first three extensively. Fenno and Schlesinger's ambitions can be summarized by the following: reelection, higher office, good public policy, legislative leadership, and outside interest.

Mayhew (1974) argued that among all of these ambitions reelection is the strongest. Jacobson (1983) suggested that members who are not constantly

seeking reelection, or as he termed it "running scared," are vulnerable to defeat. Hibbing (1991) found that as members progress through their careers they generally become less concerned about reelection and begin to give greater attention to other goals. He also notes that this can lead to electoral vulnerability. Parker (1992) argued that members simultaneously pursue numerous goals. The actions that they take are designed to balance these competing desires and maximize the benefits. While some goals may have priority over others, members are willing to make trade offs from priorities to lesser goals if the payoff are substantial enough. The priorities that legislators assign to each of these ambitions could affect their actions and thereby policy.

Looking specifically at freshmen state legislators, Barber (1965) found four types of members in Connecticut: lawmakers, advertisers, spectators, and reluctants. This typology was developed using a standard two by two table, with measures of legislative activity and the desire for reelection. He found that members within these groups had distinctive motivations.

Kirkpatrick (1978) attempted to recreate Barber's categories using legislators' perceptions of their activities rather than actual measures of activity. He found that 40 percent of Oklahoma legislators could be classified, at that time, as lawmakers, 23 percent were advertisers, 25 percent were spectators, and 12 percent were reluctants.

Members' motivations were measured in two ways in this study. First, the dimensions of legislative ambition in Oklahoma were established through a factor analysis. Additionally, five major goals were placed in direct confrontation with

one another and members were asked to choose a priority. Responding members were asked to rate the importance of each of 15 goals that capture the essence of the prior discussion of motivations. These responses were then factor analyzed to determine the dimensions of members' motivations in Oklahoma. The individual items and the aggregate results are reported in the Table 3.1.

<b>Table 3.1: Prioritized Items for Factor Analysis of Members' Motivations.</b>		
As a member you have a variety of interests to balance while you serve in the legislature. These concerns relate to your family, your district, the state, and even the legislature itself. Think about your own desires as a legislator. <i>The following questions use a scale 0 to 5, with 0 meaning "not at all important" and 5 meaning "extremely important."</i>		
As a legislator how important is it to you	Mean	S.D.
1) to serve your fellowman?	4.76	.74
2) to sponsor legislation that helps your district?	4.59	.83
3) to protect your district's interests?	4.59	.91
4) to sponsor legislation that helps the whole state?	4.45	.82
5) to sponsor major policy initiatives?	3.88	.99
6) to be perceived as a leader in your district?	3.74	1.36
7) to be a committee chair or vice-chair?	3.38	1.34
8) to get reelected next time?	3.11	1.52
9) to have informal influence with your peers?	3.05	1.59
10) to serve in your party's leadership?	2.96	1.50
11) to serve a full 12 years?	2.04	1.51
12) to position yourself to seek higher office?	1.47	1.25
13) to expand your business connections?	1.18	1.41
14) to create options for yourself when you leave the legislature?	1.12	1.42
15) to find current business opportunities?	1.10	1.35
*Items listed by members' priority.		

These items indicate that members' priorities are to represent their constituents and pursue policy. Career concerns and outside interests are less important. Interestingly, these means tend to fall into four distinct groups. Table 3.2 reports the rotated factor matrix with factor loadings. The motivations of

members of Oklahoma's 46<sup>th</sup> Legislature were captured by four factors, rotated to account for the maximum amount of variance (varimax rotation) in the items.

<b>Table 3.2: Rotated Factor Matrix of Members' Motivations.</b>				
<b>Item</b>	<b>Representation</b>	<b>Policy Influence</b>	<b>Political Career</b>	<b>Outside Interest</b>
1)	.762	.115	.054	-.014
2)	.857	-.003	-.012	.050
3)	.844	-.024	.156	.022
4)	.607	.146	.101	-.077
5)	.385	.595	.068	-.243
6)	.247	.604	.037	.473
7)	.350	.026	.576	.005
8)	.362	-.416	.409	.305
9)	-.030	.775	.118	.236
10)	.020	.066	.533	.155
11)	.129	-.016	.774	.117
12)	-.081	.099	.769	.225
13)	-.078	.021	.260	.866
14)	-.035	-.077	.271	.835
15)	.010	.257	.085	.793
Eigenvalues	3.796	2.767	1.616	1.110

Since this study is not an exact replica of any other study and factor analysis is very sensitive to instrumentation, differences between these results and that of previous work could be expected. In fact, the factors found here were unique to this study. Nonetheless, these factors indicate that members' motivations are a complex set of competing goals that are not easily explained simply by the desire for reelection or by the desire for action as suggested elsewhere. Below is a description of the factors and the motivations that they represent.



### ***Factor 1: Representation***

The items that loaded highly on the representation factor probe a member's desire to serve in a representative capacity. They include both an interest in local needs and in policy more generally. Sponsoring legislation for the district (Item 2) loaded .86 on Factor 1 and protecting the interest of the district (Item 3) loaded .84. Two more policy goals loaded strongly on this factor, sponsoring legislation for the whole state (Item 4) at .61, and sponsoring major policy initiatives (Item 5) at .38. Some instrumental items also loaded moderately on this factor: the importance of reelection (Item 8) at .36, the importance of being a committee leader (Item 7) at .35, and the importance of being seen as a leader in the district (Item 6) at .25. Finally the desire to serve fellowman (Item 1) loaded .76 on Factor 1. The relationship between these items suggest a motivation to serve both the local interests and the state's needs, a motivation to be a representative of the people.

### ***Factor 2: Policy Influence***

Items that loaded highest on the policy influence factor related to the importance of being influential with peers to accomplish policy goals. Having influence with peers (Item 9) loaded most highly at .78. Being perceived as a leader in the district (Item 6) loaded .60. And, a desire to sponsor major policy initiatives (Item 5) loaded .60. Interestingly enough, Item 8, the desire for reelection, loaded -.42 on this factor, indicating that the desire for reelection ran counter to policy goals in this factor. This factor represents members desire to gain informal influence and accomplish policy goals.

### ***Factor 3: Political Career***

On the third factor, items load highly that express a member's desire for a career in politics. The highest loading items involved electoral success. Fulfilling a static ambition of serving a full 12 years (Item 11) loaded .77. Pursuing progressive ambition or positioning oneself to seek higher office (Item 12) also loaded at .77. The importance of simply being reelected (Item 8) loaded .41. Other items that loaded highly involved leadership roles within the legislature. Being a committee chair or vice-chair (Item 7) loaded .58, and serving in the party leadership (Item 10) at loaded .53. The desire to achieve career-oriented goals for their own sake is the essence of this factor.

### ***Factor 4: Outside Interests***

Items that loaded highly on this factor probe a member's interest in using their position in the legislature to enhance their personal business prospects. Item 13, the importance of expanding business connections loaded .87 on this factor. Item 14, the importance of creating future business options loaded .84. And, Item 15, the importance of finding current business opportunities loaded .79 on this factor. Three other items that suggest a desire for power and influence loaded moderately on this factor: the importance of reelection (Item 8) at .31, the importance of influence with peers (Item 9) at .24, and the importance of seeking higher office (Item 12) at .22. Clearly this factor represents the desire for outside interests and personal gain.

These four factors represent the dimensions of legislators' motivations in Oklahoma's 46<sup>th</sup> Legislature. They demonstrate that members are not just single

minded seekers of reelection. Also, members should be considered more than just willing and active, or unwilling and inactive. Members have a variety of competing goals to be balanced, beginning with a desire to represent their constituency well.

Table 3.3 provides the mean, range, and standard deviation for each of the factors when aggregated for all respondents, as used later in the analysis. The mean scores of the individual items, shown in Table 3.1, suggested that representation was the highest priority of members. Policy influence was the second highest priority. Career considerations were third. And, outside interests were fourth.

<b>Table 3.3: Motivations Factors Descriptives (n=67)</b>				
	<b>Mean</b>	<b>S.D.</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
<b>Representation</b>	.018	1.019	-5.325	1.009
<b>Policy Influence</b>	.049	.983	-1.951	3.148
<b>Political Career</b>	.025	.954	-2.128	2.011
<b>Outside Interests</b>	.043	.972	-2.403	2.335

### Priorities

Because competing desires require tradeoffs, members were also asked in the survey to make forced choices among five competing goals. These choices were derived from the goals described by Fenno (1973)– reelection, influence within the legislature, good public policy, and career outside the legislature– and Schlesinger (1966)– progressive ambition. Fenno's private gain

was not included because it was unlikely that members would admit that private gain was a greater priority than other legislative goals. These forced choices provided a separate measure of members priorities. Table 3.4 shows the actual number of respondents choosing each option.

<b>Table 3.4: Forced Choice Priority Responses.</b> (actual number of respondents choosing each option)	
If a situation arose where you had to choose between the following actions which would you choose to do? <i>(For each of the following groups choose one from each pair.)</i>	
<u>11</u> serve in leadership <u>49</u> pursue your major policy objective	<u>52</u> get reelected <u>5</u> seek higher office
<u>14</u> enhance your position outside legislature <u>46</u> serve in leadership	<u>47</u> pursue your major policy objective <u>13</u> get reelected
<u>60</u> pursue your major policy objective <u>0</u> enhance your position outside legislature	<u>59</u> pursue your major policy objective <u>1</u> seek higher office
<u>7</u> seek higher office <u>51</u> serve in leadership	<u>13</u> serve in leadership <u>45</u> get reelected

Members' priorities were determined by comparing the number of times each goal was chosen over the others in Table 3.4. Table 3.5 provides the frequency distribution and descriptive statistics for each priority. These priorities are used later as continuous variables.

<b>Table 3.5: Priorities Descriptives, Percent of the Time Each Priority Was Chosen.</b>							
	<b>3 Always</b>	<b>2 Usually</b>	<b>1 Sometimes</b>	<b>0 Never</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>S.D.</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>Policy</b>	68.3	21.7	10.0	0.0	2.58	.67	60
<b>Re-election</b>	19.0	56.9	17.2	6.9	1.88	.80	58
<b>Leader</b>	3.4	31.0	56.9	8.6	1.29	.68	58
<b>Higher-Office</b>	1.8	3.5	10.5	84.2	.23	.60	57
<b>Outside Interest<sup>1</sup></b>	-	0.0	23.3	76.7	.23	.43	60

These choices would suggest that most members are in the legislature because they desire to make good policy. As can be seen in Table 3.5, 68 percent of the members chose “pursue your major policy objective” over all other choices. Getting reelected is, of course, critical to making policy. Fifty-seven percent of members chose getting reelected over all of the other choices except one. Career and personal interests are secondary concerns for most members. Three quarters of members never chose seeking higher office or outside interests over other priorities. These data do not suggest that all members are selfless public servants, but they do argue that for many members career goals including reelection are secondary. In fact, interviews with members suggest that reelection is a means rather than an end for most members. These results are very consistent with the individual item mean scores used in the previous factor analysis and described Table 3.1.

## Position

Three kinds of leadership positions are readily identifiable in the Oklahoma Legislature: party leaders, committee chairs, and committee leaders. Committee leaders include: chairs, co-chairs, sub-committee chairs, and sub-committee co-chairs. As discussed in Chapter 2 little is known about members in leadership positions (Jewell 1981). Various leadership positions in the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature are listed in the *Who's Who* directory. Dummy variables were established for each of these positions. The frequency and percent of those who held leadership positions are reported in Table 3.6. Later, in the analysis these variables become important independent and control variables.

Thirty-five of 149 members (23 percent) held formal leadership positions in either the majority or the minority. Almost one third of all members, 45, were committee chairs. Remarkably, 70 percent of members or 104 of 149 are committee leaders: chair, co-chair, sub-committee chair, or sub-committee co-chair. One member suggested, in an interview, that almost everyone held a committee post because, as more members wanted to be a committee leader, the leadership sought to keep them happy by creating more committees for them to lead.

<b>Table 3.6: Member Characteristic Descriptives.</b>			
	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Total n</b>
<b>Position</b>			
Leadership	23	35	149
Committee Chair	30	45	149
Committee Leader	70	140	149
<b>Background</b>			
Gender (Male)	90	134	149
Race (Non-White)	10	7	72
Occupation Law	23	16	69
Occupation Business	26	18	69
Occupation Legislator	12	8	69
<b>Legislative Orientation</b>			
Delegate	35	25	71
Trustee	49	35	71
Politico	16	11	71
Full-Time	56	40	71
Chamber (Senate)	32	48	149
Both Chambers	13	20	149
Party (Democratic)	66	98	149
<b>Seniority</b>			
Post-Term Limits	38	57	149

### Background

Much of the early speculation about term limits suggested that a different kind of person, a new breed, would be attracted to legislative service. To examine that possibility and to measure and control the effects of members' varying backgrounds, demographic information was collected. Gender

information was published in several sources including *Who's Who*. Race information was only available for survey respondents. Table 3.6 reports descriptives for these two dummy variables.

Of the 149 members only 15 were women. This leaves 90 percent of the legislature men. Similarly, only 10 percent of the survey sample identified their race as other than caucasian. Obviously, this indicates that in 1998 the Oklahoma Legislature is overwhelmingly white and male.

Members' ages were also published in *Who's Who*. Education and income levels were measured in the survey. These variable were collected and analyzed as continuous variables, whose mean are reported in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7: Age, Education and Income Descriptives.		
	Mean	n
Age	51.05	148
Education	16.70	73
Income (000)	78.62	63

The average age of the members of the legislature was 51 years. The mean level of education for the sample was just above baccalaureate. Average family income was \$78,620.

An attempt was made in the survey to determine members' occupations. Responses to an open-end question, "What is your occupation?" were collapsed into several categories. Ultimately only three of these categories proved



important to the analysis. They were used as dummy variables and are described in Table 3.6.

These dummy variables indicate that 23 percent of the 69 members who reported their occupation said they were an attorney, leaving 77 percent who claimed some other occupation. Similarly 26 percent reported an occupation that was considered business. Together business persons and attorneys comprised 49 percent of the sample. Another 12 percent reported their occupation as legislator.

These results are consistent with those found by Morgan et al. (1991). They found that 19 percent of the legislature were attorneys and 29 percent were business people. They point out, as does Kirkpatrick (1978), that the Oklahoma Legislature does not mirror well the demographics of the state in general. This could be seen as a problem by those who believe that descriptive representation is a key measure of representativeness (Pitkin 1967).

### **Legislative Orientation**

Members come to the legislature with different conceptions of their responsibilities as legislators. Some of these ideals about the role of legislatures and legislators are reflected in the orientations discussed below. These orientations include members' conception of representation and the time it takes, the chamber in which they serve, and the political party with which they associate. How each of these express an orientation is described below.

To examine the different conceptions of representations, members were asked to make forced choices between two types of representation, delegate or trustee, as defined by Wahlke et al. (1962). However, of the 71 respondents, 11 wrote "both" in the margin of the survey. This group was too large to ignore, creating a third category, politico.<sup>2</sup> Dummy variables were created for the various response categories of each question. Table 3.6 reports descriptive statistics for these variables.

These data indicate that 35 percent of the sample considered themselves to be instructed delegate representatives, primarily following the wishes of their constituents. Forty-nine percent considered themselves trustees, following their own conscience. Almost 16 percent insisted it was their job to be both at various times. This would suggest that at least half of the members consider it their job to do what they think is right, rather than follow their constituents dictates. These results are consistent with the earlier findings of Kirkpatrick (1978) who found that approximately 49 percent of members were acting as trustees. However, they conflict with Morgan et al.'s (1991) later finding that only 26 percent were acting as trustees.

A second survey question asked if members considered themselves full-time or part-time legislators. Table 3.6 indicates that 56 percent of the sample considered themselves full-time legislators, while 44 percent considered themselves part-time. This stands in stark contrast to Morgan et al.'s (1991) finding that "almost all" members considered themselves to be part-time. This signals a major shift in the way members see their job in only a few years.

Members of the Senate have a very different orientation to the legislature than members of the House. There are twice as many House members and their terms are only half as long as Senators. Members openly talk about the differences in the culture of the two chambers. There is not open animosity between them, but there is a clear recognition that “they do things differently over there.” Members who have switched chambers have an experience that is different from all others. Partisan orientation is also important in the legislature. Obviously, members could be expected to have different philosophical approaches to the legislature based on their party affiliation. Their place in the power structure of the legislature, as well as their beliefs about how government should operate are reflected in this identification. These orientation descriptors are widely published, including in *Who's Who*. To measure and control their effects in the later analysis dummy variables were established for each one. Table 3.6 presents descriptive statistics for these variables.

The number of members in each chamber are set by the legislature at the time of redistricting every decade. There are 48 members of the Senate, 32 percent of the 149 total members. The House of Representatives has 101 members. Twenty members or 13 percent have switched from one chamber to the other. Only one member went from the Senate to the House. All 19 others were Senators who were once House members. The Democratic Party controls exactly two-thirds of the membership with 98 of 149 members.

## Seniority

The primary independent variable in this study is election before or after term limits. *Who's Who in the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature* provides the year in which members were first elected. Oklahoma's term limits initiative was passed in September of 1990. Candidate filings for that year occurred in early July, while the petition was still being circulated. As a result those members elected before 1992 are considered, here, to have been first elected before term limits had an effect on their career decisions. Those elected in 1992 or later were elected after term limits became state law. Table 3.8 shows the number of current members first elected in each year. Members elected before 1992 are described here as pre-term limits and those elected in 1992 or later are described as post-term limits.

Table 3.8: Year Elected Frequencies (n=149).			
Year Elected <sup>3</sup>	Members	Percent	Cumulative Percent
52	1	.7	.7
66	1	.7	1.3
70	1	.7	2.0
72	1	.7	2.7
74	1	.7	3.4
76	2	1.3	4.7
78	6	4.0	8.7
80	4	2.7	11.4
82	6	4.0	15.4
84	6	4.0	19.5
86	15	10.1	29.5
88	24	16.1	45.6
<u>Pre-Term Limits</u> 90	<u>24</u>	<u>16.1</u>	<u>61.7</u>
Post-Term Limits 92	15	10.1	71.8
94	23	15.4	87.2
96	19	12.8	100.0

These data show that 62 percent of the members of the current Oklahoma Legislature were elected before term limits, indicating that for most members term limits were not a consideration in their decision to enter the legislature. Table 3.6 reports a dichotomous dummy variable where members are divided into pre- and post-term limits. Of the 149 members, 57 who were elected after 1990, 38 percent of the total. If term limits are altering the make-up of the legislature, as has been hypothesized, that transition is only 38 percent complete.

Also, as demonstrated by Table 3:8, if the 12 year lifetime limit was imposed at the end of the current 1997-1998 legislature, only 30 percent would be barred from seeking reelection. These data suggest that term limits would have minimal effect on the overall tenure distribution within the legislature. However, losing the top 30 percent potentially has serious implications which are discussed in Chapter 6.

### Preferences

This study is an attempt to assess changes that are likely to occur in the future. Since it is impossible to directly measure future change in legislative structures, the proximate measure of members' preferred legislative structure is used. This is a good measure because it is, after all, the members who make the rules and create the structure. If a majority of the members prefer a different structure, imminent changes can be expected. This has been the guiding principle for a large number of studies on legislative reform since the 1970's.

These studies focused on legislators' motivations and preferences, and changes in the membership (Fowler 1993). They examined the changes that occurred in the United States Congress following the 1972 election. They found that many backbench Democratic members wished to change the rules that governed the legislative process. However, these members did not have the clout to institute their preferences until there was an influx of new members following Watergate. Once the numbers shifted in favor of these newer members, they took immediate steps to implement their preferred structure. In effect, these were easily identifiable, stated, preferences that were implemented soon after the majority shifted. A similar occurrence happened in 1994. In the Contract With America, Republican Congressmen and candidates stated clear intentions to change the procedures of the House. Within days of capturing the majority these preferences were implemented.

Similarly, in several states where the majority has shifted recently there have been a variety of procedural changes. In California, where term limits have created rapid turnover in the membership, a minority Speaker took control of the Assembly. This led to a variety of procedural changes in 1995 as part of a power sharing agreement (Ayres 1995). Similarly, in the 1990's several states have experienced chambers with an equal number of Republican and Democratic members. These states (most recently Virginia) have also instituted procedural changes as part of power sharing (see Erickson 1998). These examples indicate that structural changes often occur in legislature when the characteristics of the majority change, and not just when the partisan majority

shifts. The changes that occur can often be traced directly to an increase in clout of certain minorities and their stated preferences.

My open-ended survey measures are the stated preferences of members. Interviews reveal that the many minority members in Oklahoma have a clear sense of how they would like to change the legislative process, if they only had the votes to implement their preferences. There is every reason to believe that these stated preferences would become the rules if the majority shifted to support these intention.

The preferences that are relevant to this project include preferences related to leadership selection, leadership style, and the distribution of power in the legislative process. Very little has been written on legislators' preferences regarding these. The measure used here arise primarily from open-ended questions which ask, "What is the most important...." These measures provide a rare view of what members think about the legislative process.

### **Leadership Selection Method**

Leadership selection preferences were used as a measure of members' desires for change in the formal legislative structure. Three different kinds of leaders are examined here– party leaders, secondary party leaders, and committee chairs. Extensive interviews with members of the Oklahoma Legislature suggested that some members in both political parties would like to see major changes in the organization of their chambers. They believed the leadership selection process was an impediment to accomplishing their goals. Generally, these members felt the leadership was not responsive to their needs.

**They believed that changes in the leadership selection process could bring about more responsive leadership.**

**Open-ended questions were asked on the survey regarding members' most preferred leadership selection method. (See Appendix 3 for exact question wording.) Those results were then collapsed into categories that reflected members' preferences. These categorical variables were then treated in two ways in the analysis. They were used as dependent variables in polychotomous multivariate logistic regression and as individual dichotomous dummy variables.**

**Table 3.9 provides descriptive statistics for members preferred selection method for the party leader- either the Speaker of the House, the President Pro Temp. of the Senate, or the Minority Leader in each house. When responses were collapsed three major preferences emerged. These three preferences accounted for 94 percent of all responses.**

**Fifty-eight percent of respondents said they preferred to select their party leader by a secret vote. Twenty-five percent preferred to have an open vote. Eleven percent were in favor of using a pledge card system. These data indicate that almost 60 percent of members preferred a system that would make it difficult to identify supporters of the opposition. Only 36 percent preferred a system where defectors are required to show themselves publicly. As Chapter 2 indicates, currently, secret ballots are used in both House caucuses. Senate Republicans use an open process and Senate Democrats use pledge cards.**



<b>Table 3.9: Preferred Selection Methods.</b>			
	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Total n</b>
<b>Party Leader</b>			
Secret Vote	58	41	71
Open Vote	25	18	71
Pledge Cards	11	8	71
<b>Secondary Party Leader</b>			
Secret Vote	54	31	57
<b>Committee Leader</b>			
Speaker Appoints	53	35	66
Party Leaders Appoint	23	15	66
Other	24	16	66

Similar results were found for the selection of secondary party leaders—floor leaders, whips, caucus chairs, etc. In this case pledge cards were never used and therefore they were never an issue. Members responses easily separated into those in favor of a secret vote and those in favor of an open vote. Descriptive statistics for the dummy variable representing those who preferred a secret vote are presented in Table 3.9. Fifty-four percent of respondents were in favor of a secret vote, while 46 percent preferred an open vote. Currently, House caucuses use secret ballots. Senate caucuses use open votes.

The selection of committee leaders presented a very different set of options. Traditionally the speaker appoints committees and their leadership. Some members believed that this limited minority voices on committees. They proposed in interviews that each party be allowed to appoint its own members to

committees. This would include the minority being allowed to appoint committee co-chairs. When presented with an open-ended survey question their responses collapsed into the three categories described in Table 3.9.

Most members, 53 percent, continued to support the current system of the Speaker and Pro Temp. appointing all committee leaders. Only 23 percent subscribed to the idea of allowing the minority to appoint certain committee leaders. Another 24 percent had wide ranging suggestions about how the process could be altered. While a majority supported the status quo, there is a strong sentiment for changing the way committee chairs are chosen. There is, however, no agreement on the alternative means.

#### **Power Distribution**

A second measure of legislative structure was members' preferences about the power distribution within the legislature. Many have speculated that the power distribution would be altered by term limits (Price 1992, Fowler 1992, Copeland and Rausch 1993). Those hypotheses were used to develop the 10 items whose descriptive are reported in Table 3.10. Members were asked to rate how much more or less power each actor should be given in the legislative process. The items are presented in order of priority.

**Table 3.10: Prioritized Items for Factor Analysis of Members' Preferred Power Distribution.**

*The following questions use a scale 0 to 5, with 0 meaning "much less power" and 5 meaning "much more power."*

Considering the current balance of power in the legislature and your personal preferences, should the following people be given more or less power?

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>S.D.</u>
1) individual members	3.37	.94
2) the minority	2.95	1.17
3) the leadership	2.85	.97
4) committee chairs	2.85	1.15
5) the majority	2.83	1.28
6) senior members	2.71	1.24
7) new members	2.60	.90
8) the governor	2.43	1.39
9) staff	1.92	1.23
10) lobbyists	1.54	1.12

\*Items listed by members' priority.

As might be expected, members believed the individual members should have more power. The minority also ranked highly. Not surprisingly, staff and lobbyists were thought to deserve considerably less power than they currently have.

These 10 items were factor analyzed to determine more generally who members thought should have more or less power. Three groups emerged from the varimax rotation: the majority, the minority, and other actors. Table 3.11 presents the factor loadings for each item.

**Table 3.11: Rotated Factor Matrix of Members' Preferred Power Distribution.**

		<b>Majority Democrats</b>	<b>Minority Republicans</b>	<b>Other Actors</b>
1)	individual members	-.281	.317	.070
2)	the minority	-.401	.753	.039
3)	the leadership	.727	-.350	-.042
4)	committee chairs	.761	-.217	.144
5)	the majority	.881	-.187	.000
6)	senior members	.551	.414	.305
7)	new members	-.095	.675	.158
8)	the governor	-.090	.843	-.029
9)	staff	.106	.090	.903
10)	lobbyists	.010	.073	.925
Eigenvalues		3.182	2.151	1.084

The factor loadings indicate clearly the composition of the of these three factors. Below is a description of each factor.

*Factor 1: Majority-Democrats*

The items that loaded highly on this factor indicate a members support for the majority Democratic party. More power for the majority (Item 5) loaded highest on this factor at .881. Power for committee chairs (Item 4) and the leadership (Item 3) also loaded very highly at .761 and .727 respectively. Senior members (Item 6) loaded .551. Included in this factor was a desire to reduce the power of the minority (Item 2), which loaded at -.401, and to reduce power for individual members (Item 1), which loaded at -.281. These items all demonstrate a desire to strengthen the leadership and the current power structure at the expense of the minority and individual action. Clearly these items represent a desire to increase the power of the Democratic Party.

### ***Factor 2: Minority-Republicans***

The items that loaded highly on this factor proposed more power for members of the Republican Party. A desire to give more power to the governor (Item 8) loaded highest on this factor at .843. The governor was a Republican and provided the minority with its only real source of legislative power. Power to the minority (Item 2) loaded second highest at .753. New members (Item 7) also loaded highly on this factor at .675. Republicans have done well in recent elections and make up a greater share of new members. Both seniors (Item 6) and individual members also loaded strongly on this factor at .414 and .317 respectively. This factor included reductions in power for the leadership (Item 3; -.350), committee chairs (Item 4; -.217) and the majority (Item 5; -.187). These items represent a desire to increase the power of the Republicans at the expense of the Democratic power structure.

### ***Factor 3: Other Actors***

The items that loaded highly on this factor represent a desire to increase power for other actors in the legislative process. A willingness to provide more power for lobbyists (Item 10) loaded highest on this factor at .925. Also, more power for staff (Item 9) loaded at .903. Power for senior members (Item 6) also loaded highly on this factor at .305. These items indicate a willingness to share power with others in the legislative process.

These three factors were used in the later analysis as continuous dependent variables to describe members' preferred changes in the legislative power distribution. Table 3.12 provides descriptive statistics for these variables.

<b>Table 3.12: Power Distribution Factors Descriptives (n=57).</b>				
	<b>Mean</b>	<b>S.D.</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
<b>Majority-Democrats</b>	-.015	.988	-2.852	2.629
<b>Minority-Republicans</b>	-.047	1.075	-2.928	1.900
<b>Other Actors</b>	-.017	.985	-1.701	1.659

### **Leadership Qualities**

As a measure of the informal structure of the legislature, members were asked to identify the leadership qualities that were most important to them in each of three leadership areas– party leaders, secondary party leaders, and committee chairs. Open-ended questions produced a lengthy lists of desired leadership qualities for each set of leaders. (See Appendix 3 for specific question wording.) These lists were then collapsed into categories that captured the most preferred leadership qualities for each group. The categories were then used in the analysis as polychotomous and dummy variables. Table 3.13 displays descriptive statistics for the categories of preferred leadership qualities of party leaders, such as the Speaker, President Pro Temp., and minority leaders.

Of the 51 respondents to the question about preferred leadership quality of the party leader, 37 percent said leadership skills were the most important

quality. These responses included items like "leadership skills," "ability to run a meeting," and "ability to move an agenda." Another 35 percent said reputation was most important. This included qualities like "integrity" and "character." Twenty-seven percent said work ethic was the most important quality in a party leader. Work ethic included items like "willingness to spend time."

<b>Table 3:13: Preferred Leadership Qualities.</b>			
	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Total n</b>
<b>Party Leader</b>			
Leadership Skills	37	19	51
Reputation	35	18	51
Work Ethic	27	14	51
<b>Secondary Party Leaders</b>			
Leadership Skills	49	28	57
Reputation	19	11	57
Work Ethic	21	12	57
Loyalty	11	6	57
<b>Committee Chairs</b>			
Leadership Skills	57	29	51
Reputation	20	10	51
Work Ethic	24	12	51

Table 3.13 also presents descriptive statistics for the dummy variables that describe the preferred leadership qualities of secondary party leaders. Leadership skills were cited by almost half of the members as most important in these party leaders. Of the 57 respondents to this question, 49 percent said

leadership was most important. Reputation was most important to 19 percent. Work ethic was cited by 21 percent. Eleven percent said loyalty to the party leadership was most important.

Also found in Table 3.13 are descriptives for the dummy variables that represent preferred leadership qualities in committee chairs. Well over half , 57 percent, of the 51 respondents said leadership skills were the most important quality. Twenty percent said reputation was the most important quality. Work ethic was most important to 24 percent.

While leadership skills were the top priority at all levels, they were most important for committee chairs. Reputation was the third priority for lower level leaders, but a very close second for the party leader. Work ethic eclipsed reputation in importance for lower level leaders. Loyalty was only a major consideration for those secondary party leaders, who make up the party leader's floor lieutenants. These differences suggest that some members expect different attributes from leaders at different levels. For lower level leaders, leadership skills and work ethic are particularly important, but for the party leader reputation is very important.

### Conclusion

This chapter provided a snap-shot of the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature, its characteristics and its preferences. These data lay the foundation for the analysis that follows, in pursuit of the research questions and relevant hypotheses. The



picture drawn here reflects that members are not very descriptively representative of the state population, and they tend to be rather independent of their constituency in their actions. However, they appear to be motivated by a desire to represent their constituents well and a desire for good public policy. Two-thirds of members are Democrats, and two-thirds hold formal committee leadership positions. Only about one-third have served more than 12 years. Members value leadership skills and reputation among their leaders, and most prefer to keep the leadership selection votes in the open. However, they would like to see greater power diffused to the individual members.

Correlations and other comparisons of these data are discussed in later chapters. Chapters 4 and 5 use these measures to examine the relevant hypotheses and draw appropriate conclusions. Chapter 6 uses these measures to consider other hypotheses found in the early literature and further develops implications of the data.

### Notes

1. Because Outside Interest was selected so seldom, it is not included in the analysis of the other four goals, resulting a scale from 0 to 3. To have included it would have resulted in some goals with a scale from 0 to 4, some from 0 to 3, and one from 0 to 2. Even though it was not included in the analysis of the other goals, it is reported because it represents one of the factors. This result also suggests that dropping private gain from the original survey was appropriate.
2. This option was originally excluded for fear too many members would choose the middle ground, rendering the measurement useless.
3. As can be seen from Appendix 4 some adjustments were made to accommodate those members whose service was not continuous.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **TESTING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CHARACTERISTICS AND LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE PREFERENCES**

**In modern American politics few can achieve a major political office unless they are ambition driven (See among many: Schlesinger 1966, Fowler and McClure 1989, Ehrenhalt 1991, Dye 1995). A logical connection exists between ambition and action. Legislators have acted to fulfill certain ambitions by seeking election. These members can be expected to act to fulfill other ambitions while serving in the legislature (Parker 1992). If the legislative institution restricts their ability to accomplish their goals, then they can be expected to alter the institution, "twist it" if necessary, to meet their needs (Schlesinger 1966).**

**In this chapter a theoretical model of legislative reform is developed based on the idea that legislators have ambitions and are willing to act to achieve them. However, many other internal and external factors must be considered for the model to be complete. Early speculation about the effects of term limits center around a simpler model of membership characteristics and legislative structure. One of the research questions posed in Chapter 1 was, "Are members' motivations or other characteristics related to their preferred legislative structure?" This chapter tests the necessary hypotheses to answer this research question, by correlating members' characteristics, as identified in**

Chapter 3, with their preferences. The results suggest that the link between legislators' motivations and their preferences for legislative structure should be questioned.

The chapter begins with a theoretical discussion of legislative reform. From that discussion a dynamic model of legislative reform is developed. The model is applied to the Oklahoma term limits case and the links within the model are tested. Both theoretical and practical implications of the findings from these tests are discussed.

### Legislative Reform

The study of institutional reform to a constraint like term limits usually follows one of two models. In a discussion of how the United States Congress might be affected by term limits Linda Fowler (1993) notes that in the 1970's scholars like Fenno (1978) and Fiorina (1977) focused on individualistic candidate aspirations as the major impetus for institutional reform within the legislative body. Scholars of the late 1980's like Sinclair (1989) and Rohde (1991) believed public pressure changed the political environment in which Congress operated and the environmental pressure changed the way individual goals could be achieved. Fowler concludes that neither of these models are sufficient to explain legislative reform and that data on candidate motivation do not exist to use them as predictive models of institutional response to term limits. Davidson and Oleszek (1994) argued that an organization must adapt to both its internal needs and external environment in order to survive. Fowler (1993)

concur arguing that a model of legislative reform is needed that includes both internal and external factors.

Using Davidson and Oleszek's framework, Thompson and Moncrief (1992) discuss how legislatures adjust to external pressures through consolidative behavior. They suggest that consolidative adjustments are intended to "accommodate as much as possible the individual needs of members." They identify these needs as greater electoral security, an efficacious position within the legislature, and career opportunities. Studying state legislatures Pound (1992) argued, "Changes in the legislative career are both causes and consequences of institutional reforms." Benjamin and Malbin (1992a) state that institutional performance and personal goals are intertwined. Squire (1989) points out that career minded legislators try to mold the organization to meet their needs and this affects the rules and norms of the institution. He believes legislative career opportunities are directly related to the legislative structure (1998). Fenno (1973) argued that when there is a consensus of career goals members will shape their institutions to facilitate the fulfillment of those goals. Schlesinger (1966) said if the structure of the institution does not accommodate members' goals it will be twisted until it does.

This literature suggests that a dynamic model of legislative reform is needed which includes both internal and external forces. This model would maintain legislators desires as the central focus, but it would allow for many other factors to influence the legislative structure. Such a model is posited here.

### **Dynamic Theoretical Model**

A debate has developed in Political Science over the key factors affecting legislative reform. Some models focus exclusively on internal factors (Fenno 1978, Fiorina 1977). These models suggest that reform occurs when members find their own reasons for making changes in the institution. Others emphasize external environmental factors (Sinclair 1989, Rohde 1991). These models indicate public pressure encourages members to make changes. There are two common elements in each of these models. First, the dependent variable in both is legislative structure. Reform is typically aimed at the rules and practices of the institution. Second the key independent variable is members' desires. It is the members who shape the institution and members' desires are primary in determining the institutional structure. Other effects tend to be indirect, in that they affect the members who shape the institution.

As a reform measure, term limits share these same characteristics. Term limits have direct effects on the membership and this leads to indirect effects on the institution. However, term limits are much more than just public pressure for internal reform. Term limits are an externally imposed, constitutionally mandated reform designed to replace the membership. In fact, when term limits are imposed, reform of the legislative structure is a two step process. First, term limits are a reform that affects the members, which creates additional reforms as membership changes.

The reforms that term limits precipitate within the legislature are likely to vary, depending upon a variety of other factors. These factors are both inside

and outside the institution and they have dynamic effects on each other. For that reason, a dynamic model of legislative reform, that integrates the previous internal and external models and adds effects of direct external reform, is needed to analyze the effects of term limits on legislative institutions.

The dependent variable in the model, posited here and depicted in Figure 4.1, is the legislative structure. These formal rules and informal practices are important because legislative policy making is influenced by the legislative process and reform is ordinarily aimed at changing the process.

The key independent variable in this model is members. Members establish the important aspects of the legislative structure for their own purposes. Once established, the structure channels members' desires into outcomes. When members' desires cannot be fulfilled within the structure, sometimes members alter their desires, sometimes they alter the structure. It is a dynamic process of change, with each modifying the other. For this reason previous models have focused heavily on members' motivations. Term limits were designed to replace the people in the legislature. If the mix of member characteristics, particularly motivations, is affected by this reform, then changes in the legislative process can be expected.


Other internal factors include the professionalism of the legislature and the overall organizational culture (Hodson et al. 1995). These cultural factors shape attitudes within the institution about what is appropriate. Once again this is a dynamic process. Members, particularly leaders, create the organizational culture. The culture is both reflected in and shaped by the legislative structure.

**Yet, the culture affects each of these. Professionalism, although a part of the organizational culture, is important enough to the effects of term limits to be recognized separately. In fact, term limits may have been a public reaction to the increased professionalism of the 1970's and 1980's (Moncrief et al. 1996).**

**The external influence being studied here is a citizen imposed, constitutionally mandated, requirement that members serve a limited number of years. The length of the limit and other restrictions vary by state. This variance is likely to generate significant differences in the effects of term limits on the membership. Effects on membership will affect the legislative structure and in turn professionalism and culture. However, the current structure, professionalism, and culture will temper the effects in a dynamic process.**

**Other external factors may include long term forces like the traditions of the political culture and the constitution, moderate range forces like the overall partisan electoral competition, and short term forces like the current political environment. These forces affect each other. They also affect the internal workings of the legislature generally and specific aspects of the legislative institution. For example, the partisan electoral competition affects the partisan composition of the legislature and the constitution sets certain rules which constrain legislative actions. The actions of the legislature also affect the external environment, particularly the current political environment and the partisan electoral competition.**

**Figure 4.1: Dynamic Theoretical Model of Legislative Reform.**



The specific factors mentioned here are not all inclusive. Other important aspects of the external or internal political environment may need to be considered. Many of these factors may be specific to each state. The model



does not include lines to show effects because the effects are dynamic, with effects going in many directions. The specific effects may also vary by state or reform. However, this model does provide a general conceptualization, drawn from previous studies, about how legislative reforms affect the entire political system and the legislative structure.

This model answers Fowler's (1993) concern that a reform model is needed that considers both legislators' responsiveness to the political environment and their responsiveness to their own political desires. It also addresses Benjamin and Malbin's (1992a) concerns that a model consider how the effects of term limits will filter through individual members into the institution and ultimately affect the greater political system. By incorporating all of these items this model is more complete than those previously proposed.

Legislative reform is a dynamic process. There are many factors involved and each of these factors affect the others. By integrating these various theories of legislative reform a more complete model can be constructed. This model is not necessarily specific to term limits. At the state legislative level, a variety of reforms may be imposed by the citizens, i.e., limiting the legislatures ability to raise taxes or its ability to meet in session. In a dynamic process these reforms would send ripple effects through the system. The recognition that legislative reform is a dynamic process that involves a variety of factors, each affecting the other, is a useful conceptualization for studying other phenomenon as well.

### **Mapping the Effects**

Testing effects in a conceptual model requires building links one at a time. In a dynamic model like this one it is impossible to test every possible effect. What is possible is to identify specific relationships of interest and map those effects in a specific instance. The Oklahoma case study provides an excellent opportunity to test much of the early speculation about the effects of term limits. The case study holds constant the various environmental factors, facilitating study of the members— their characteristics and their preferences. Mapping these effects using multivariate techniques requires beginning with the dependent variable and the variable that is most closely associated with it. Once those relationships are identified the next link can be added. This chapter will map the relationship between members' preferences for legislative structure and membership characteristics. Chapter 5 will add the relationships with term limits. The scope of this project is limited to these specific effects. While they are not comprehensive, they are a strong first empirical step in understanding the effects of term limits.

### **Bivariate Data Analysis**

Here hypotheses are tested to determine if different types of members in the Oklahoma Legislature prefer different legislative structures. Specifically ambitions, position, background and legislative orientation are correlated with methods of leadership selection, desired leadership qualities, and preferred power distribution. In the following sections dependent variables are examined

using each independent variable in turn. These bivariate relationships will indicate if further multivariate analysis is necessary. A full description of how each variable analyzed here was derived can be found in Chapter 3.

### **Leadership Selection**

The model would suggest that members with differing ambitions or differences on other characteristics are likely to prefer different rules and norms within the legislature. The formal selection process of leaders is used here as an indication of whether or not members with different characteristics may prefer different formal rules. Desired method of leadership selection was determined for three types of leaders: party leaders, secondary party leaders, and committee leaders. For each type of leader, members were asked to state their most preferred leadership selection method. These methods were then collapsed into dummy variables that represented the major categories of leadership selection. Bivariate relationships between members' preferred leadership selection processes and members' characteristics are summarized in Table 4.1 and reported below.

**Table 4.1: Significant Bivariate Relationships Between Members' Preferred Leadership Selection Method and Members' Characteristics.**

<i><b>Independent Membership Characteristic</b></i>	<i><b>Dependent Leadership Position</b></i>	<i><b>Selection Method</b></i>	<i><b>r=</b></i>	<i><b>p=</b></i>
<i><b>Motivations</b></i>				
Political Career	Committee Leaders	Leader Appoints	.261	.046
Political Career	Committee Leaders	Party Appoints	-.258	.044
Political Career	Secondary Party Leaders	Open Vote	.271	.052
Policy Influence	Committee Leaders	Other	.326	.010
Priority Leadership	Committee Leaders	Leader Appoints	-.274	.048
Priority Reelection	Committee Leaders	Leader Appoints	.291	.036
Priority Reelection	Committee Leaders	Other	-.263	.060
<i><b>Position</b></i>				
Committee Chairs	Committee Leaders	Leader Appoints	.279	.024
Committee Chairs	Committee Leaders	Party Appoints	-.383	.002
Committee Leaders	Committee Leaders	Leader Appoints	.259	.036
Leadership	Party Leader	Open Vote	.281	.018
<i><b>Background</b></i>				
Gender (Male)	Committee Leaders	Leader Appoints	-.239	.054
Income	Committee Leaders	Leader Appoints	-.262	.052
Occupation Legislator	Party Leader	Pledge Cards	.206	.098
<i><b>Orientation</b></i>				
Chamber (Senate)	Party Leader	Pledge Cards	.435	.000
Chamber (Senate)	Party Leader	Secret Vote	-.352	.002
Full-Time	Committee Leaders	Leader Appoints	.287	.020
Full-Time	Committee Leaders	Party Appoints	-.207	.098
Politico	Party Leader	Open Vote	.207	.082
Both Chambers	Committee Leaders	Party Appoints	.206	.098
Both Chambers	Party Leader	Pledge Cards	.296	.012
Trustee	Committee Leaders	Leader Appoints	.236	.062
Trustee	Committee Leaders	Other	-.288	.022

#### ***Method of Leadership Selection by Motivations***

Motivations of members were assessed in two ways. The first method was a factor analysis of 15 items related to members' goals as legislators. This revealed four types of ambition in the Oklahoma Legislature. The second method was a comparison of a series of items that forced members to chose priorities when various goals were in conflict. From this, each of five goals were prioritized for each respondent.

Comparing the ambition factors with the leadership selection method dummy variables revealed few significant relationships. Members who expressed a strong interest in their overall political career were more likely to desire the majority leader appoint chairmen and co-chairmen of committees ( $r=.261$ ) and conversely they did not desire each party leader to appoint their own committee leaders ( $r=-.258$ ). They also preferred secondary leaders be chosen by an open vote ( $r=.271$ ). Only these careerists showed any consistent preferences. The only other significant relationship was that the higher members scored on the policy factor the less likely they were to choose a method for selecting committee chairs that was described as "other" ( $r=-.326$ ). The 28 remaining insignificant relationships ranged from a magnitude of .004 to .217, with 15 of them being weaker than .100. These relationships would suggest that except for those seeking a career in the legislature or politics more generally members' ambitions as measured by the factors do not explain the variance in members' desired leadership selection methods.

The priority measures revealed similar results. Those with reelection as a high priority preferred that the majority leader appoint committee positions ( $r=.291$ ) and conversely did not prefer a method categorized as other ( $r=-.263$ ). Members who placed serving in leadership as a high priority did not prefer that the majority leader appoint committee leaders ( $r=-.274$ ). The remaining 38 relationships were not significant, ranging in magnitude from .000 to .205, with 24 less than .100.

### ***Method of Leadership Selection by Position***

Positions in the legislature were measured using a series of dummy variables that registered members who were committee chairs, had any committee leadership positions, or were in a leadership position. These variables also revealed surprisingly little about members preferences for leadership selection methods. Those with committee positions ( $r=.259$ ) and committee chairs specifically ( $r=.279$ ) preferred committee chairs be selected by the majority leader. Conversely, committee chairs did not prefer committee leaders be chosen by the respective party leaders ( $r=-.383$ ). The only other statistically significant relationship was that members in leadership preferred leaders be selected by an open vote in caucus ( $r=.281$ ). The other 21 correlations ranged from .006 to .188 in magnitude, with 12 below .100, and none were statistically significant.

### ***Method of Leadership Selection by Background***

A number of demographic variables were used to determine if members with differing backgrounds prefer different leadership selection processes. These included income, education, gender, race, and several dummy variables for various occupations. Of the 72 relationships measured only 3 were statistically significant. Women were more likely than men to prefer the majority leader appoint committee leaders ( $r=-.239$ ). Similarly, those with lower incomes preferred the majority leaders appoint committee leaders ( $r=-.262$ ). The only occupational variable to reach significance was Legislator. Those who

considered the legislature to be their occupation were more likely to preferred that chamber leaders be chosen by pledge cards than by other means ( $r=.206$ ). The other 69 measured relationships ranged from .002 to .208, with 45 less than .100, and none were statistically significant.

#### *Method of Leadership Selection by Legislative Orientation*

Some variables were measured that involve how members perceive themselves in the legislature. These include party, chamber, whether or not they had served in both chambers, whether they considered themselves a full-time legislator, and dummy variables for delegate, trustee, and politico. Those who consider themselves full-time ( $r=.287$ ) and those who think a member should be a trustee ( $r=.236$ ) were more likely to prefer that the speaker select committee leaders. Conversely, those who considered themselves full-time were less likely to prefer that each party leader appoint their respective committee leaders ( $r=-.207$ ) and those who thought members should be trustees were less likely to prefer some other method of selecting committee chairs ( $r=-.288$ ). Those who switched chambers were more likely to prefer committee leaders be selected by each party's leader ( $r=.206$ ).

Senate members ( $r=.435$ ) and those who had switched chambers ( $r=.296$ ) were more likely to prefer that their leader be chosen by pledge cards. Conversely, Senate members were less likely to prefer their leader be chosen by secret ballot ( $r=-.352$ ). Politicos, on the other hand preferred that the leader be chosen by open vote ( $r=.207$ ). These orientations account for 8 of the 48

relationship tested so far. The remaining 40 ranged in magnitude from .000 to .183, with 24 less than .100, and none were significant.

The variable political party did, however, prove an important predictor of almost every leadership selection variable. As Table 4.2 indicates, Democratic members were more likely than Republican members to prefer that chamber leaders be selected by pledge cards. Conversely, Republicans were more likely to prefer secret ballots. For selecting secondary leaders Democratic members were more likely to prefer an open vote in caucus while Republicans were more likely to prefer a secret vote. Similarly, Democratic members were more likely to prefer that the majority leader appoint all committee leadership positions, while Republicans preferred that each party leader appoint their respective committee leaders.

<b>Table 4.2: Correlation Between Political Party and Members' Preferred Leadership Selection Process.</b>							
	<b>Party Leader</b>			<b>Secondary Leaders</b>	<b>Committee Leaders</b>		
	<b>Pledge Cards</b>	<b>Secret Vote</b>	<b>Open Vote</b>	<b>Secret Vote</b>	<b>Leader Appoints</b>	<b>Each Party Appoints</b>	<b>Other</b>
<b>Demo. Party</b>	.247*	-.287**	.127	-.349**	.713**	-.666**	-.180

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

Fifty-eight percent of members preferred their party leader– majority and minority leaders– be chosen by secret vote (see Table 3.9). Data presented



here indicate that these members are proportionally more likely to be House members and Republicans. Both caucuses in the House use this method, as explained in Chapter 2. Those who preferred open votes were politicians and members of leadership. Only 11 percent preferred pledge card, but these members tended to be Democratic Senators, who have switched chambers, and those who considered their occupation to be legislator. Senate Democrats use this system. The fact that leaders are more likely to prefer an open vote than members may suggest that leaders would like to be able to easily identify their friends and enemies when the votes are taken. The fact that secret votes are used in the House anyway, may suggest that the current system meets members' current desires. Before these conclusions are drawn a multivariate analysis of members' preferences toward how their party leader is chosen is in order.

Fifty-four percent of members preferred their secondary party leaders be chosen by secret vote (see Table 3.9) Proportionally, Republicans were more likely to want a secret vote than Democrats. Members who had a high interest in a political career were more likely to prefer an open vote. In the House a secret vote is used by both parties. To determine and compare the magnitude of these effects a multivariate analysis is needed.

Most members, 53 percent, preferred all committee leaders– chairs, co-chairs, subcommittee chairs, and subcommittee co-chairs– be selected by the Speaker or Pro Tem. (see Table 3.9). This is the current method used by both Chambers. However, 47 percent of members had other ideas about how

committee leaders should be chosen. Members preferring the majority leader select committee leaders were more likely to be Democratic, women, and committee chairs or committee leaders themselves. They are also more likely to consider themselves trustees and full-time, and to have lower incomes. These members were more likely to score highly on the career factor and had a priority for reelection, but not for leadership.

Twenty-three percent of members preferred that the leader of each party be allowed to appoint some committee leaders. These members were more likely to be Republicans, to consider themselves part-time, to have switched chambers at some point in their career, and to not be committee chairs. Members with a strong interest in a political career were less likely to prefer this option.

A substantial number of members, 24 percent, had other– wide ranging– suggestions about the best way to select committee chairs. These members tended to be interested in policy and were less likely to be concerned with reelection. They were also less likely to consider themselves trustees. These multiple effects on committee leaders selection preferences call for a multivariate analysis.

Four things stand out in this examination of preferred leadership selection methods and members' characteristics. First, relatively few relationships exist. Second, many of those relationships that do exist involve how committee leaders are chosen. Attitudes about the majority leader appointing leaders seem to be the most clearly defined. Third, most of the remaining relationships focused on

the selection of the majority or minority Leaders. Fourth, the only variable that effects all of three types of leadership selection is political party. Much of the variance in each can be explained by party. Democratic members prefer to keep power consolidated by using methods that expose defectors. Republican members prefer to fragment power by creating methods that would allow defectors to act while remaining in the closet. A multivariate analysis will allow these various effects to be compared.

### **Distribution of Power**

Legislative structure was examined using another set of variables. Members were asked which actors in the legislature needed more or less power. The responses for the various actors were recorded on a 6 point scale and then factor analyzed, as described in Chapter 3. The resulting 3 factors were then taken to represent members preference for increased power to the majority, the minority, and others. The bivariate relationships between members' preferred distribution of power and members' characteristics are summarized in Table 4.3 and presented below.

**Table 4.3: Significant Bivariate Relationships Between Members' Preferred Distribution of Power and Members' Characteristics.**

<u><i>Independent</i></u> Membership Characteristic	<u><i>Dependent</i></u> Group	<i>r</i> =	<i>p</i> =
<i>Motivation</i>			
Political Career	Majority-Democrats	.466	.000
Priority Leadership	Other Actors	-.284	.036
Priority Leadership	Minority-Republicans	.263	.052
Priority Reelection	Minority-Republicans	-.309	.022
<i>Position</i>			
Committee Chairs	Minority-Republicans	-.292	.028
Committee Leaders	Minority-Republicans	-.375	.004
Leadership	Minority-Republicans	.246	.064
<i>Background</i>			
Education	Other Actors	.286	.032
Income	Other Actors	-.337	.020
Occupation Business	Other Actors	-.285	.036
Race (Non-White)	Majority-Democrats	.296	.026
Race (Non-White)	Other Actors	-.274	.042
<i>Orientation</i>			
Chamber (Senate)	Minority-Republicans	-.233	.080
Full-Time	Majority-Democrats	.437	.000
Full-Time	Minority-Republicans	-.363	.006
Party (Democratic)	Majority-Democrats	.426	.000
Party (Democratic)	Minority-Republicans	-.653	.000
Trustee	Minority-Republicans	-.270	.048

#### *Power Distribution and Motivations*

The power factors were correlated with the ambition factors to determine if members with different ambitions were likely to prefer a different distribution of power within the legislature. This produced 12 relationships, only 1 of which was statistically significant. Members who scored highly on the desire for a career in politics were more likely to score highly on increasing power to the majority ( $r=.466$ ). The others ranged in magnitude from .030 to .214 with 5 less than .100.

Measuring motivations by priority found a slightly greater relationship between ambition and preferred distribution of power. Members whose priority

was to get reelected were less likely to want the minority to have more power ( $r=-.309$ ). Members whose priority was to serve in leadership were more likely to want the minority to gain power ( $r=.263$ ) and less likely to want others actors to gain power ( $r=-.284$ ). The remaining relationships ranged from .010 to .198 in magnitude, with 8 of the 10 below .100, and failed to reach statistical significance at the .05 level.

#### *Power Distribution by Position*

Preferences on the distribution of power were examined for those with positions within the legislature. Members who held committee leadership positions ( $r=-.375$ ) and committee chairs more specifically ( $r=-.292$ ) were less likely than other members to want the minority to have more power. On the other hand, those with leadership positions were more likely to wish the minority more power ( $r=.246$ ). The remaining 6 relationship ranged in magnitude from .002 to .129, with 3 less than .100, and none were statistically significant.

#### *Power Distribution by Background*

Members' desires for power distribution were correlated with variables representing members' backgrounds to determine if members with differing backgrounds preferred different distributions of power within the legislature. Five of the 21 bivariate relationships were statistically significant. Members reporting higher incomes ( $r=-.337$ ) and those whose occupation was business ( $r=-.285$ ) were less willing to offer more power to other actors in the legislative process. Those with higher education levels were more likely to want more power for these other actors ( $r=.286$ ). Non-white members were more likely than white

members to want more power for the majority ( $r=.296$ ) and not for other actors ( $r=-.274$ ). Other actors include lobbyists and staff. Clearly opinion is divided on the need to give these groups more power. The remaining relationships ranged in magnitude from .030 to .208, with 6 of the 16 below .100.

#### *Power Distribution by Legislative Orientation*

While members' backgrounds were somewhat related to their willingness to offer power to other legislative actors, members' orientations were more related to their desired distribution of power among the parties. Members of the Senate ( $r=-.233$ ) and those who believe a member should act as a trustee ( $r=-.270$ ) were likely to prefer giving the minority less power. Members who consider themselves full-time not only tended to prefer the minority have less power ( $r=-.363$ ), they also tended to prefer that the majority have more ( $r=.437$ ). Of the 18 relationships discussed only these 4 were statistically significant. The remaining ranged from .023 to .231 in magnitude, with 6 below .100.

Once again members' political party was the strongest predictor of desired legislative structure. Here, obviously, as Table 4.4 demonstrates, Democratic members were more likely than Republican members to prefer more power for the majority and vice versa for power for the minority.

<b>Table 4.4: Correlation Between Political Party and Members Preferred Distribution of Power Within the Legislature.</b>			
	<b>Power to the Majority</b>	<b>Power to the Minority</b>	<b>Power to Other Actors</b>
<b>Demo. Party</b>	.426**	-.653**	.173

\*\*p<.05

Overall, there were few statistically significant relationships between members' characteristics and their preferences regarding the distribution of power. Most of the relationships that did exist involved power for the minority. Since many of these included a dichotomous independent variable, they indicate that one group of members is more willing to share power with the minority than another group. For example, Republicans were more likely to desire greater power for the minority than Democratic members, and House members were more likely to offer additional power to the minority than Senators.

Members who preferred more power be given to the majority were more likely to be Democratic, full-time, careerists, and non-white. Those who preferred more power for the minority tended to be Representatives, Republicans, part-time, members of leadership, or those who had a priority to serve in leadership. They tended not to be committee chairs or committee leaders, not to have a priority for reelection, and not to be trustees. Those who were willing to offer more power to other groups were more likely to be white, better educated, but have lower incomes. They were less likely to have leadership as a priority and less likely to have business as an occupation. A multivariate analysis will allow a comparison of the magnitude of these effects.

### **Leadership Qualities**

**As an indication of the informal practices of the legislature members were asked to state the most important leadership quality in each of the three types of leaders: party leaders, secondary party leaders, and committee leaders. These qualities were then collapsed into dummy variables that represented the major categories of preferred leadership qualities as described in Chapter 3. The bivariate relationships between members' preferred leadership qualities and members' characteristics are summarized in Table 4.5 and presented below.**



**Table 4.5: Significant Bivariate Relationships Between Members' Preferred Leadership Qualities and Members' Characteristics.**

<i><u>Independent</u></i> Membership Characteristic	<i><u>Dependent</u></i> Leadership Position	Leadership Quality	r=	p=
<i>Motivations</i>				
Political Career	Committee Leaders	Leadership Skills	.310	.034
Political Career	Committee Leaders	Reputation	-.338	.020
Outside Interests	Party Leader	Work Ethic	.278	.062
Outside Interests	Secondary Party Leaders	Loyalty	-.263	.056
Policy Influence	Party Leader	Leadership Skills	.380	.010
Policy Influence	Party Leader	Reputation	-.286	.054
Policy Influence	Secondary Party Leaders	Leadership Skills	.274	.046
Policy Influence	Secondary Party Leaders	Reputation	-.259	.060
Priority Leadership	Secondary Party Leaders	Leadership Skills	-.231	.090
Priority Leadership	Secondary Party Leaders	Work Ethic	.340	.010
Priority Outside Interests	Secondary Party Leaders	Work Ethic	-.281	.034
<i>Position</i>				
Committee Chairs	Party Leader	Reputation	.247	.080
Committee Chairs	Party Leader	Work Ethic	-.314	.024
Committee Leaders	Party Leader	Reputation	.244	.084
Leadership	Secondary Party Leaders	Work Ethic	.305	.020
<i>Background</i>				
Education	Committee Leaders	Reputation	-.311	.026
Gender (Male)	Committee Leaders	Work Ethic	-.283	.044
Gender (Male)	Party Leader	Reputation	.270	.054
Occupation Business	Party Leader	Work Ethic	.297	.040
Occupation Legislator	Party Leader	Reputation	.277	.056
Occupation Legislator	Secondary Party Leaders	Reputation	.233	.090
<i>Orientation</i>				
Chamber (Senate)	Committee Leaders	Work Ethic	-.275	.050
Chamber (Senate)	Secondary Party Leaders	Reputation	.242	.070
Delegate	Secondary Party Leaders	Reputation	-.244	.076
Full-Time	Secondary Party Leaders	Loyalty	.258	.054
Party (Democratic)	Party Leader	Reputation	.270	.054
Party (Democratic)	Secondary Party Leaders	Loyalty	.233	.082
Trustee	Committee Leaders	Leadership Skills	-.254	.082

### *Leadership Qualities by Motivation*

Stronger and more consistent relationships were discovered when members' ambitions, represented by the four ambition factors, were correlated with the dummy variables for preferred leadership qualities. Like the relationships with leadership selection methods, members' scores on the political

career factor were related to the qualities they desired in a committee leader. Members who scored highly on the career factor were more likely to prefer leadership ( $r=.310$ ) and not reputation ( $r=-.338$ ) as a leadership quality in committee chairs and vice-chairs. Members who were more concerned about policy had a similar preference for leadership in the party leader, Speaker or Minority Leader. They were more likely to prefer the party leader exhibit leadership ( $r=.380$ ) and not reputation ( $r=-.286$ ). Members who expressed an interest in personal business opportunities were more likely to prefer party leaders with a strong work ethic ( $r=.278$ ). For secondary party leaders these same business oriented members tended not to value loyalty ( $r=-.263$ ). Members who expressed a high interest in policy were more likely to prefer leadership ( $r=.274$ ) as a quality in secondary party leaders and not reputation ( $r=-.259$ ).

Each of the three types of leadership had preferred qualities related to one ambition factor. The policy factor predicted a preference for leadership over reputation in both party leaders and secondary party leaders. Together the policy and business factors were able to predict the occurrence of all three leadership qualities in party leaders. The representation factor was not related to any leadership qualities. Generally the ambition factors reveal very little about members' preferred leadership qualities. Of the 40 relationships between ambitions and leadership qualities that were examined only 8 were statistically significant. The remaining 32 ranged in magnitude from .000 to .201, with 20 below .100.

As with the preferred leadership selection method, singling out a members' priority revealed very little about preferred leadership qualities. Of the 50 relationships examined between preferred leadership qualities and ambitions measured by members priorities only 3 were statistically significant. Those who had a priority to be in leadership were more likely to prefer work ethic ( $r=.340$ ) as a quality in secondary party leaders and not leadership ( $r=-.231$ ) as a quality. Those with a priority for interests outside the legislature were less likely to prefer work ethic as a quality in a secondary party leader ( $r=-.281$ ). The other 47 statistically insignificant relationships varied in magnitude from .006 to .219, with 24 below .100.

#### *Leadership Qualities by Position*

When leadership quality preferences were considered for members in various positions only 4 statistically significant relationships emerged. Those in leadership were more likely to prefer secondary leaders with a strong work ethic ( $r=.305$ ). Committee leaders ( $r=.244$ ) and committee chairs specifically ( $r=.247$ ) were more likely to prefer a Speaker or Minority Leader with reputation. Committee chairs were less likely to desire work ethic in their party leader ( $r=-.314$ ). The remaining 26 relationships ranged from .010 to .212, with 12 below .100, and none were significant at the .05 level.

#### *Leadership Qualities by Background*

Bivariate relationships between member background variables and preferred leadership qualities revealed very little. Only 6 of 90 relationships

examined reached statistical significance. Men ( $r=.270$ ) and members who considered their occupation to be legislator ( $r=.277$ ) were more likely to prefer a party leader with a strong reputation. Members who considered their occupation to be business preferred a party leader with a strong work ethic ( $r=.297$ ). Those who considered the legislature their occupation were also more likely to prefer reputation in secondary party leaders ( $r=.233$ ). For committee leadership qualities reputation was less likely to be valued by those with higher education ( $r=-.311$ ). Also for committee leaders women were more likely to prefer work ethic as a quality than men ( $r=-.283$ ). The remaining 84 relationships ranged in magnitude from .000 to .226, with 43 less than .100.

#### *Leadership Qualities by Legislative Orientation*

Members who considered themselves full-time legislators were more likely to prefer secondary party leaders with loyalty as a quality ( $r=.258$ ). Those who thought legislators should act as delegates were less likely to want a secondary party leader with reputation ( $r=-.244$ ). Members of the Senate were more likely to prefer reputation among these leaders ( $r=.242$ ). For committee leaders, members of the Senate were less likely to prefer work ethic ( $r=-.275$ ). Trustees were less likely to value leadership skills in committee leaders ( $r=-.254$ ). Only 5 of the 60 relationships, reached statistical significance. The remaining 55 ranged from .000 to .231 in magnitude, with 32 below .100.

As with leadership selection, political party demonstrated a consistent relationship with preferred leadership qualities. As Table 4.6 shows Democratic

members were more likely than Republican members to prefer party leaders with reputation and secondary party leaders with loyalty. Party was not a factor in preference for qualities in committee leaders, with each of the relationships falling below a magnitude of .100.

<b>Table 4.6: Correlation Between Political Party and Members Preferred Leadership Qualities.</b>							
	<b>Party Leader</b>			<b>Secondary Party Leaders</b>			
	<b>Leader-ship</b>	<b>Reputation</b>	<b>Work Ethic</b>	<b>Leader-ship</b>	<b>Reputation</b>	<b>Work Ethic</b>	<b>Loyalty</b>
<b>Demo. Party</b>	-.071	.270*	-.212	-.012	.045	-.205	.233*

\*p<.10

Preferred leadership qualities for party leaders were somewhat evenly distributed (see Table 3.13): 37 percent preferred leadership skills, 35 percent preferred reputation, and 27 percent preferred work ethic. Those who preferred leadership skills as a quality were more likely to be very interested in policy. Those who most preferred reputation as a quality were more likely to be Democrats, men, committee chairs or committee leaders, to consider their occupation to be legislator, and not to have scored highly on the policy factor. Those who preferred work ethic were more likely to have outside interests and they were more likely to considered their occupation to be business. Committee chairs were less likely to prefer work ethic. These multiple effects can best be compared with a multivariate analysis.

For secondary party leaders almost half of the members preferred leadership skills as a quality (see Table 3.13). Members who had a strong interest in policy were more likely to value leadership skills. Those who had a priority to serve in leadership were less likely to pick leadership skills. Nineteen percent chose reputation as the most important quality. These members were more likely to be in the Senate and to consider their occupation to be legislator. They were less likely to be interested in policy and to consider themselves to be delegates. Work ethic was chosen by 21 percent of the members. These members were more likely to be in leadership and to have a priority for serving in leadership. They were less likely to have a priority for outside interests. Only 11 percent chose loyalty as the most important quality for secondary leaders. These members were more likely to be Democrats, to consider themselves full-time and not to have strong outside interests. A multivariate analysis will help to better define the magnitude of the various effects.

Well over half of the members, 57 percent, identified leadership skills as the most important quality in committee leaders (see Table 3.13). Members who had a strong interest in a political career were more likely to chose this quality, but those who considered themselves to be trustees were less likely to prefer leadership skills. Twenty percent of members preferred reputation as a quality. These members tended to score lower on the career factor and they had lower levels of education. Work ethic was the choice of 24 percent. These members were more likely to be House members and to be women. The extent of these effects can best be defined by a multivariate analysis.

These data indicate little relationship between members' characteristics and their preferred leadership qualities. In particular no one characteristic had an effect on preferred leadership qualities for all types of leaders. An interest in policy, and political party, did influence preferences on two. However, the few relationships that were found invite a multivariate analysis to determine the magnitude of their effects.

The lack of significant relationships between members' preferences and their motivations begins to call into question the validity of legislative reform that focus on this connection. If members' preferences for legislative structure are not related to their motivations, then many of the models posited previously need reexamination. Before drawing that conclusion further analysis is warranted. The following multivariate analysis will expose interactions and spurious finding.

#### Multivariate Data Analysis

In a dynamic model, like the one proposed here, a variety of effects may occur simultaneously. Using a multivariate regression analysis, the effects of each predictor above can be controlled and compared, and interactions can be sought. In the analysis below each of the measures of members' preferences were analyzed in this way. Interactions were considered for all relevant independent variables. Then, while controlling for the effects of these independent variables and interactions, those that were no longer significantly a part of the equation were eliminated. This process yielded the most parsimonious model for predicting the dependent variable. The equations

reported below describe the magnitude of the direct effect of each remaining independent variable, including interactions. For dichotomous dependent variables they also demonstrate the effect of the independent variable on the probability of the dependant variable being scored as 1. The implications of these findings are then discussed.

The bivariate relationships were used to determine which of the independent variables were likely to effect each of the dependent variables. The power factors, being continuous variables were then analyzed using OLS stepwise regression. The most parsimonious model for the preference variables, being polychotomous, was found using a two step process.<sup>1</sup> First, a multinomial logalinear backward stepwise model selection logit regression was used, which included each of the significant independent variables and all of their possible interactions for all categories of each polychotomous dependent variable. Using the -2 log likelihood statistic this analysis produced predictors for each polychotomous dependent variable generally. -2 log likelihood has a chi-square distribution and measures the goodness-of-fit for the model (Norusis 1994). Second, these predictors were then used in a binomial stepwise logit regression for each category of the dependent variable to produce regression coefficients and probability of occurrences. For most equations both forward and backward stepwise regression resulted in the same model. When these models differed the most parsimonious one was chosen (Norusis 1994). The most parsimonious models and the probability of occurrences are reported below.



### **Multivariate Leadership Selection**

Coefficients are reported for each of the variables that remained in the equations following the stepwise elimination procedure using the -2 Log Likelihood statistic. The coefficients of the independent variables are, for one unit increase in the independent variable, the increase in the log odds of a member preferring the method under examination rather than any other method when controlling for the other variables in the equation (Norusis 1994).

Statistical significance of these coefficients are indicated by table footnote references.

#### ***Party Leaders***

The multivariate analysis of leadership selection methods for party leaders produced the parsimonious equations presented in Table 4.7. The three variables in Equation 1 are dummy variables. The constant is the log odds of a House Republican who is not a leader preferring a secret vote to any other method of party leader selection. The coefficients indicate that being a leader, a Senator, or a Democrat reduces the odds of preferring a secret vote. Table 4.8 indicates how much the probability changes for each. Each of the coefficients is statistically significantly different from zero at the .05 level.

Equation 2 presents the log odds of preferring an open vote for party leader for a member in each of these same groups with one addition. These coefficients indicate that being a leader, a Senator, or a Democrat increases a members likelihood of preferring an open vote over the likelihood of a non-leader, a House member, or a Republican's preferring the same. The interaction

of a member being both in the Senate and a Democrat significantly decreases their likelihood of preferring an open vote. Equation 3<sup>2</sup> indicates that Senate Democrats and Senators who used to be in the House prefer the use of pledge cards as a leadership selection method. None of the variables in Equation 3 were statistically significant, probably because of the lack of variance in the variable Pledge Cards. Only 11 percent of members preferred pledge cards.

<b>Table 4.7: Logit Regressions of Preferring Various Selection Methods for Party Leaders (Speaker/Minority Leader) on Independent Variables.</b>			
<b>Selection Method</b>			
<b>Party Leader</b>			
	<u><b>Equation 1</b></u> <b>Secret Vote</b>	<u><b>Equation 2</b></u> <b>Open Vote</b>	<u><b>Equation 3</b></u> <b>Pledge Cards</b>
<b>Leader</b>	-1.7547**	2.1862**	
<b>Chamber (Senate)</b>	-2.2192***	3.3863**	
<b>Party (Democratic)</b>	-1.6409**	2.7139**	
<b>Chamber (S)*Party (D)</b>		-4.2086**	19.9883
<b>Chamber (S)*Both</b>			10.9750
<b>Constant</b>	2.5289	-3.6834	-20.9691
<b>-2 Log Likelihood</b>	70.397	61.172	12.892
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	.257	.217	.339
<b>% correctly classified by predictors</b>	75.76	78.79	95.45
<b>by constant</b>	<u>57.58</u>	<u>72.73</u>	<u>90.91</u>
<b>Improvement</b>	18.18	6.06	4.54
<b>n</b>	66	66	66

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

Three goodness-of-fit estimates are presented for these equations, due to a lack of consensus over which model fit statistic is most appropriate (Demaris 1992). -2 times the log of the likelihood of the equation fitting the data should

yield a small number if the model fits well (Norusis 1994). The Cox & Snell procedure produces an  $R^2$  estimate of goodness-of-fit interpreted similar to OLS regression's  $R^2$  (Norusis 1994). The most revealing statistic for these data is the improvement in the percent of predicted outcomes that were correctly classified. On some of the dependent variables there is little variance. Most members have the same preference. In these cases the constant alone correctly classifies much of the data and there is little predictive work left to the independent variables. So, while some equations may not have the best goodness-of-fit results they may prove to be the most useful. Using this measure Equation 1 appears to be the most powerful, while equations 2 & 3 seem of little value.

Table 4.8 shows the probability of a member preferring one leadership selection method to all others while controlling the characteristics that are included in the equation. The probability of a member, who is a leader, preferring the party leader be chosen by secret vote is .27. Non-leaders are much more likely to prefer secret votes with a probability of .67. This indicates that being a leader reduces a members probability of preferring a secret vote by .41. Similarly, Senators have a .23 probability of preferring a secret vote. House members have a .73 probability. Members of the upper chamber have a .50 less probability of preferring a secret vote for party leader. Democrats have a .44 probability of preferring a secret vote, while Republicans have a .80 probability. Democrats are .36 less likely to prefer a secret vote.

While leaders are less likely to prefer a secret vote, they are 47 percent more likely to prefer an open vote than non-leaders. Senators are 66 percent more likely to prefer an open vote than Representatives, and Democrats are 38

more likely than Republicans. However, Democratic Senators have a .41 lower probability of preferring an open vote than other members. Though it was not statistically significant, Democratic Senators had a .37 probability of preferring the use of pledge cards for choosing the President Pro Tem. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 clearly suggest that leaders, Senators, and Democrats are much more likely to prefer an open vote for party leader than are non-leaders, House members, or Republicans. The latter prefer a secret vote.

<b>Table 4.8: Probability of Preferring Various Selection Methods For Party Leader (Speaker/Minority Leader) by Independent Variables with All Others at the Mean.</b>			
<b>Selection Method Party Leader</b>			
	<b>Secret Vote</b>	<b>Open Vote</b>	<b>Pledge Cards</b>
<b>Leader</b>			
<b>Yes</b>	.27	.62	
<b>No</b>	<u>.68</u>	<u>.15</u>	
<b>Effect</b>	-.41	.47	
<b>Chamber</b>			
<b>Senate</b>	.24	.75	
<b>House</b>	<u>.74</u>	<u>.09</u>	
<b>Effect</b>	-.50	.66	
<b>Party</b>			
<b>Democratic</b>	.44	.43	
<b>Republican</b>	<u>.80</u>	<u>.05</u>	
<b>Effect</b>	-.36	.38	
<b>Chamber*Party</b>			
<b>Senate Democrat</b>		.01	.37
<b>Other</b>		<u>.42</u>	<u>.00</u>
<b>Effect</b>		-.41	.37
<b>Chamber*Both</b>			
<b>Senate*Both</b>			.003
<b>Other</b>			<u>.000</u>
<b>Effect</b>			.003

These findings would suggest that those currently in control of the legislature— leaders and Democrats— prefer a visible vote that allows them easily identify their friends and enemies, while those out of power— non-leaders and Republicans— prefer a secret system that allows defectors to go unidentified and therefore unpunished. Minority voices, obviously, have a greater opportunity to build winning coalitions when defectors can go undetected.

While controlling other effects, House members have a high likelihood of preferring a secret vote and both House caucuses use secret votes. This persists despite leadership's strong preference for an open vote. Senate Democrats are much more likely to prefer an open system or pledge cards and they use a pledge card system. These finding suggests that members' preferences are important in determining the leadership selection method. While these findings suggest that preferences are important, they also point out that motivations, which were not present in the parsimonious model, are not an important factor in determining preferences.

#### *Secondary Party Leaders*

Similar results were found for the process of selecting secondary party leaders. Members preferences fell into two categories: secret vote or open vote. In Table 4.9 the dependent variable and party variable are dummies in the parsimonious equation. The constant indicates the log odds of a Republican preferring a secret vote to an open vote. The logit coefficient for party indicates that being a Democrat reduces the odds. There was an interaction between members' score on the political career factor and being a Democrat. While

controlling for political party, the higher a Democrat scored on the political career factor the less likely they were to prefer a secret vote.

<b>Table 4.9: Logit Regressions of Preferring Various Selection Methods for Secondary Party Leaders on Independent Variables.</b>	
<b>Selection Method Secondary Party Leaders</b>	
	<b>Secret Vote</b>
<b>Party (Democratic)</b>	-1.6620*
<b>Political Career*Party (D)</b>	-.8789*
<b>Constant</b>	1.8709
<b>-2 Log Likelihood</b>	49.377
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	.204
<b>% correctly classified by predictors</b>	68.89
<b>by constant</b>	<u>62.22</u>
<b>Improvement</b>	6.67
<b>n</b>	45

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

Table 4.10 shows that members of both parties had a higher probability of preferring a secret vote to an open vote for secondary party leaders. However, Republicans were .33 more likely to prefer that method than Democrats. Scoring highly on the political career factor could reduce the probability of a Democratic member preferring a secret vote by as much as .65. For secondary party leaders careerism ambition had a substantial effect of members' preferences, but only when combined with party. This would suggest that ambition can have an important effect on preferences.

Table 4.10: Probability of Preferring Various Selection Methods for Committee Chairs by Independent Variables with All Others at the Mean.	
Selection Method Secondary Party Leaders	
	Secret Vote
Party	
Democratic	.52
Republican	<u>.85</u>
Effect	-.33
Political Career*Party (D)	
Max	.27
Min	<u>.92</u>
Effect	-.65

Preferences toward the selection of committee leaders showed a similar partisan flavor. Equation 1 in Table 4.11 indicates that thinking of oneself as a trustee, being a Democrat, and being a Democrat who scored highly on the policy factor increased the odds of a member preferring the majority leader appoint all committee chairs and co-chairs. The constant represents the log odds that a non-trustee, Republican preferred the majority leader have that power. Equation 2 demonstrates that Democrats are much less likely than Republicans to prefer that each party leader be allowed to select their own committee leaders. Equation 3 suggests that members who scored highly on the policy influence factor or thought of themselves as trustees were much less likely to prefer some other method. Being a trustee with a high income tended to raise slightly the probability of a member preferring another method. Based on improved predictive power Equation 1 appears to be powerful. The trends found in Equation 2 and 3 are consistent with the findings in Equation 1, confirming and

complementing the result. These results demonstrate that political party is an important predictor of preferring one of the various secondary leadership selection methods even when controlling for other factors.

<b>Table 4.11: Logit Regressions of Preferring Various Selection Methods for Committee Leaders on Independent Variables.<sup>3</sup></b>			
<b>Selection Method Committee Leaders</b>			
	<u><b>Equation 1 Leader Appoints</b></u>	<u><b>Equation 2 Party Appoints</b></u>	<u><b>Equation 3 Other</b></u>
<b>Policy Influence</b>			-1.8665***
<b>Trustee</b>	2.4081**		-6.8599**
<b>Party (Democratic)</b>	5.1239***	-4.1790***	
<b>Policy Influence*Party (D)</b>	1.3534*		
<b>Trustee*Income</b>			.0354*
<b>Constant</b>	-4.6150	.4418	-.7854
<b>-2 Log Likelihood</b>	35.479	40.288	27.978
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	.533	.370	.357
<b>% correctly classified by predictors</b>	85.96	84.85	83.67
<b>by constant</b>	<u>52.63</u>	<u>77.27</u>	<u>79.59</u>
<b>Improvement</b>	33.63	7.58	4.08
<b>n<sup>4</sup></b>	57	66	49

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

The probability of a member preferring the majority leader appoint committee leaders increased .82 for Democrats over Republicans, and Republicans were 59% more likely than Democrats to prefer each party leader appoint their own committee leaders, as Table 4.12 illustrates. The interaction between being a Democrat and the score on the policy factor increased the



probability in a range from .10 to .98. Members who described themselves as trustees had an increased probability of .54 for over those who did not. These findings clearly show that party is the most significant predictor of preferred methods of choosing secondary party leaders.

<b>Table 4.12: Probability of Preferring Various Selection Methods for Committee Chairs by Independent Variables with All Others at the Mean.</b>			
<b>Selection Method Committee Chairs</b>			
	<b>Leader Appoints</b>	<b>Party Appoints</b>	<b>Other</b>
<b>Policy Influence</b>			
Max			.00
Min			<u>.71</u>
Effect			-.71
<b>Trustee</b>			
Yes	.77		.00
No	<u>.23</u>		<u>.62</u>
Effect	.54		-.62
<b>Party</b>			
Democratic	.85	.02	
Republican	<u>.03</u>	<u>.61</u>	
Effect	.82	-.59	
<b>Policy Influence*Party (D)</b>			
Max	.98		
Min	<u>.10</u>		
Effect	.88		
<b>Trustee*Income</b>			
Max			.99
Min			<u>.01</u>
Effect			.98

Across these various measures of leadership selection process only one independent variable had a consistent effect, political party. When controlling for other factors Democratic members were more likely than Republicans to prefer party leaders be selected by open vote and less likely to prefer a secret vote.

The same was true for secondary party leaders. For committee chairs Democrats were more likely to prefer the majority leader appoint them, while Republicans were more likely to prefer each party leader appoint their own. These findings suggest the simple conclusion that members who are in power wish to retain power, while those out of power wish power was shared more evenly.

While members' characteristics clearly affect members' preferences, the effect of motivations is more suspect. Only the policy and career factors affected preferences. Policy had some effect on preferences toward the selection of committee chairs. Careerism had some effect on preferences toward the selection of secondary party leaders.

#### **Multivariate Power Distribution**

While political party appears to be the most significant variable in determining specific legislative leadership issues, Table 4.13 indicates that when controlling for other things party is not necessarily the most important factor in determining who members think should have more power in the legislative process. The dependent variable in these three equations is a factor representing a desire to increase power to the identified group. Equation 1 demonstrates that members who think of themselves as full-time legislators, those who scored highly on the political career factor, and non-white members were more likely to prefer that Democrats have more power. Equation 2 shows that members who think of themselves as trustees also believe that Republicans

should have less power. There are many participants in the legislative process other than just the political parties, including: staff, lobbyists, the governor, etc. Equation 3 indicates that white members, members with lower incomes, and those with higher education levels are more likely to favor more power for these other players. Political party was only a significant factor in the desire for Republicans to have more power. Predictably Democratic members were much less likely than Republican members to prefer this.

<b>Table 4.13: OLS Standardized Regressions of Preferred Power Distribution on Independent Variables.</b>			
<b>Power Distribution</b>			
	<u><b>Equation 1</b></u> <b>Majority-Democrats</b>	<u><b>Equation 2</b></u> <b>Minority-Republicans</b>	<u><b>Equation 3</b></u> <b>Other Actors</b>
<b>Political Career</b>	.357***		
<b>Race (Non-white)</b>	.197*		-.254*
<b>Education</b>			.288**
<b>Income</b>			-.285**
<b>Full-time</b>	.349***		
<b>Trustee</b>		-.178*	
<b>Party (Democratic)</b>		-.656***	
<b>Constant</b>	-.455	1.062	-1.415
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	.379***	.478***	.268***
<b>n</b>	51	49	44

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

Similar to the results in the previous selection the results here may indicate that those who wish to climb the legislative ladder prefer to enhance the current power structure. While Republicans, on the outside, want things to

change to their advantage. An important insight in these data is that some members see value in granting power to other actors.

### **Multivariate Leadership Qualities**

For each of the leadership groups, these equations analyze members' preferences toward leadership qualities. Using -2 Log stepwise logit the most parsimonious model was determined. The coefficients of the independent variables are, for one unit increase in the independent variable, the increase in the log odds of a member preferring the method under examination rather than any other method when controlling for the other variables in the equation (Norusis 1994). Statistical significance of these coefficients are indicated by table footnote references.

#### ***Party Leaders***

As in the bivariate relationships, a somewhat different picture emerges when examining leadership qualities. Political party is not a major factor in determining the style of leadership members prefer. Table 4.14 examines preferred leadership qualities in the majority and minority leader. Equation 1 indicates that the higher men scored on the policy influence factor the more likely they were to prefer leadership skills as a quality. Equation 2 suggests these same members are less interested in reputation. Men who were committee chairs or considered their occupation to be legislator valued reputation. Equation 3 shows that members who were not committee chairs or men were more likely to prefer work ethic in a party leader. Those who scored low on both the policy

influence and outside interests factors were also more likely to prefer work ethic. However, men who scored highly on the outside interests factor were more inclined to desire work ethic in a leader. Generally these findings could suggest that members who are more business oriented are also more task oriented while those who are policy oriented are more leadership oriented.

<b>Table 4.14: Logit Regressions of Preferred Leadership Qualities for Party Leader on Independent Variables.</b>			
<b>Leadership Quality Party Leader</b>			
	<b>Equation 1 Leadership Skills</b>	<b>Equation 2 Reputation</b>	<b>Equation 3 Work Ethic</b>
<b>Committee Chair</b>			-2.8351**
<b>Gender (Male)</b>			-3.6197*
<b>Outside Interests*Policy Influence</b>			-1.3454**
<b>Outside Interests*Gender (M)</b>			3.6265***
<b>Policy Influence*Gender (M)</b>	1.0438**	-.8118*	
<b>Committee Chair*Gender (M)</b>		1.5143**	
<b>Occupation Legislator*Gender (M)</b>		2.6709*	
<b>Constant</b>	-.3933	-1.5720	1.3454
<b>-2 Log Likelihood</b>	52.362	43.273	25.374
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	.163	.259	.391
<b>% correctly classified by predictors</b>	63.64	70.45	89.13
<b>by constant</b>	<u>56.82</u>	<u>65.91</u>	<u>78.26</u>
<b>Improvement</b>	6.82	4.54	10.87
<b>n</b>	44	44	46

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

Table 4.15 shows that for men scores on the policy influence factor can shift the probability of desiring leadership as a quality in a party leader from .08 to .95. This same combination also reduces their preference for reputation by

.64. Men who were committee chairs had a .34 greater probability of preferring reputation than other members, and men who considered their occupation to be legislator had a .58 increased probability over other members. Committee chairs were 9% less likely to prefer work ethic in a committee leader than other members. Women were 62% more likely to prefer work ethic than men.

<b>Table 4.15: Probability of Occurrence for Preferred Leadership Qualities of Party Leaders by Independent Variables with All Others at the Mean.</b>			
<b>Leadership Qualities Party Leader</b>			
	<b>Leadership Skills</b>	<b>Reputation</b>	<b>Work Ethic</b>
<b>Committee Chair</b>			
Yes			.07
No			<u>.16</u>
Difference			-.09
<b>Gender</b>			
Male			.05
Female			<u>.67</u>
Difference			-.62
<b>Outside Interests*Policy Influence</b>			
Max			.00
Min			<u>1.00</u>
Difference			-1.00
<b>Outside Interests*Gender (M)</b>			
Max			1.00
Min			<u>.00</u>
Difference			1.00
<b>Policy Influence*Gender (M)</b>			
Max	.95	.03	
Min	<u>.08</u>	<u>.67</u>	
Difference	.87	-.64	
<b>Committee Chair*Gender (M)</b>			
Max		.55	
Min		<u>.21</u>	
Difference		.34	
<b>Occupation Legislator*Gender (M)</b>			
Max		.82	
Min		<u>.24</u>	
Difference		.58	

In these equations ambition has an impact on members' preferences. These effects occur through interactions, meaning that ambition only had effects on members' preferences toward leadership qualities in party leaders when combined with other specific characteristics. The most prominent characteristic here was gender. Party had no identifiable effect.

### *Secondary Party Leaders*

For secondary party leaders a fourth quality emerged as important, loyalty. Table 4.16 presents the parsimonious models. Equation 1 indicates that members who scored highly on the policy influence factor were more likely to prefer leadership skills as a quality. Also, members who thought of themselves as full-time were more likely to prefer leadership skills. Democratic members whose priority was to serve in leadership were significantly less likely to choose this as the preferred quality. Equation 2 demonstrates that those who scored highly on the outside interests factor were less likely to prefer reputation as a quality. However, those whose actual priority was outside the legislature did value reputation. Equation 3 shows that these members were much less inclined to value work ethic. Those whose priority was to serve in leadership were more likely to value work ethic. Equation 4 shows two significant interactions that affect preferences for loyalty in a secondary party leader. Members who were both full-time and whose priority was to serve in leadership were more likely to value loyalty. But, among that same group, those who scored highly on the outside interests factor were less likely to seek loyalty in a secondary party

leader. These equations contained some effects that were not statistically significant.

<b>Table 4.16: Logit Regressions of Preferred Leadership Qualities for Secondary Party Leaders on Independent Variables.</b>				
<b>Leadership Quality Secondary Party Leaders</b>				
	<u><b>Equation 1</b></u> <b>Leadership Skills</b>	<u><b>Equation 2</b></u> <b>Reputation</b>	<u><b>Equation 3</b></u> <b>Work Ethic</b>	<u><b>Equation 4</b></u> <b>Loyalty</b>
<b>Policy Influence</b>	.6693*			1.5453
<b>Outside Interests</b>		-1.6865**		
<b>Priority Leadership</b>		4.4216***	1.4819**	
<b>Priority Outside Interests</b>			-8.6280	
<b>Leader</b>				-19.7130
<b>Full-time</b>	1.7121**			
<b>Delegate</b>		-13.0888		
<b>Priority Leadership*Full-time</b>				3.6513**
<b>Party (D)*Priority Leadership</b>	-1.3602**			
<b>Outside Interests*</b>				
<b>Priority Leadership*Full-time</b>				-1.2053**
<b>Constant</b>	-.0911	-2.4857	-3.2596	-6.1332
<b>-2 Log Likelihood</b>	59.017	23.741	35.649	18.090
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	.202	.335	.238	.309
<b>% correctly classified</b>				
<b>by predictors</b>	74.51	89.13	82.61	96.08
<b>by constant</b>	<u>52.94</u>	<u>82.61</u>	<u>78.26</u>	<u>88.24</u>
<b>Improvement</b>	21.57	6.52	4.35	7.84
<b>n</b>	51	46	46	51

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

As shown in Table 4.17 the policy influence factor created a range of probabilities from .20 to .88 for preferring leadership skills as a quality in secondary party leaders. Full-time members were .40 more likely to prefer leadership skills than part-timers. Democrats priority for serving in leadership



had a .67 effect on their desire to see leadership skills as a quality. Members' score on the business factor decreased their probability of valuing reputation in a leader by as much as .12. Having a high priority outside the legislature increased the likelihood of preferring reputation by as much as .06. Members, with a high priority to serve in leadership, increased their likelihood of preferring work ethic by .30. Full-time members with a high priority was to serve in leadership had an increased probability of .59 of valuing leadership skills over those with other priorities or who were not full-time. However, if those same members scored highly on the business factor their probability of preferring loyalty could decrease by as much as .07.

**Table 4.17: Probability of Occurrence for Preferred Leadership Qualities of Secondary Party Leaders by Independent Variables with All Others at the Mean.**

<b>Leadership Qualities Secondary Party Leaders</b>				
	<b>Leadership Skills</b>	<b>Reputation</b>	<b>Work Ethic</b>	<b>Loyalty</b>
<b>Policy Influence</b>				
Max	.88			.03
Min	<u>.20</u>			<u>.00</u>
Difference	.69			.03
<b>Outside Interests</b>				
Max		.00		
Min		<u>.12</u>		
Difference		-.12		
<b>Priority Leadership</b>				
Max			.31	
Min			<u>.01</u>	
Difference			.30	
<b>Priority Outside Interests</b>				
Max		.06	.00	
Min		<u>.00</u>	<u>.21</u>	
Difference		.06	-.21	
<b>Leader</b>				
Max				.00
Min				<u>.02</u>
Difference				-.02
<b>Full-time</b>				
Full-time	.66			
Part-time	<u>.26</u>			
Difference	.40			
<b>Delegate</b>				
Delegate		.00		
Other		<u>.18</u>		
Difference		-.18		
<b>Priority Leadership*Full-time</b>				
Max				.59
Min				<u>.00</u>
Difference				.59
<b>Party (D)*Priority Leadership</b>				
Max	.04			
Min	<u>.71</u>			
Difference	-.67			
<b>Outside Interests*</b>				
<b>Priority Leadership*Full-time</b>				
Max				.00
Min				<u>.07</u>
Difference				-.07

Motivations were among the most important characteristics that determined members' preferences on leadership qualities for secondary party leaders. However the results here were scattered and inconsistent, and involved many interactions. The effect of political party only occurred in one quality and only as an interaction.

#### *Committee Leaders*

Table 4.18 shows members' preferences for leadership qualities of committee leaders. Equation 1 indicates that members with higher levels of education are more likely to prefer leadership skills in a committee chair. Men were also more likely to prefer leadership skills as a quality than women. Those who consider themselves to be a trustee and scored highly on the political career factor, and Senators who scored highly on the political career factor, were more likely to prefer leadership skills as a quality. Equation 2 shows similarly, that members with greater education, and Senators who scored highly on the political career factor were less likely to prefer reputation. Equation 3 suggests that House members and women were more likely to prefer work ethic in committee chairs.

<b>Table 4.18: Logit Regressions of Preferred Leadership Qualities for Committee Chairs on Independent Variables.</b>			
<b>Leadership Quality Committee Chairs</b>			
	<b><u>Equation 1</u> Leadership Skills</b>	<b><u>Equation 2</u> Reputation</b>	<b><u>Equation 3</u> Work Ethic</b>
<b>Gender (Male)</b>	2.8888*		-1.8675*
<b>Education</b>	0.4687**	-.7610***	
<b>Chamber (Senate)</b>			-1.7958
<b>Political Career*Trustee</b>	1.6904		
<b>Political Career*Chamber (S)</b>	3.8220*	-6.3851**	
<b>Constant</b>	-9.9219	10.2768	.7719
<b>-2 Log Likelihood</b>	40.045	26.824	40.061
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	.374	.370	.149
<b>% correctly classified by predictors</b>	75.00	84.09	81.82
<b>by constant</b>	<u>54.55</u>	<u>77.27</u>	<u>77.27</u>
<b>Improvement</b>	31.45	6.82	4.55
<b>n</b>	44	44	44

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

Table 4.19 indicates that men are .56 more likely to prefer leadership skills as a quality in committee chairs than women, while women are .39 more likely to prefer work ethic. Those with greatest education are as much as .73 more likely to prefer leadership leadership than those with least education, while they are .76 less likely to prefer reputation.

<b>Table 4.19: Probability of Occurrence for Preferred Leadership Qualities of Committee Chairs by Independent Variables with All Others at the Mean.</b>			
<b>Leadership Qualities Committee Chairs</b>			
	<b>Leadership Skills</b>	<b>Reputation</b>	<b>Work Ethic</b>
<b>Gender</b>			
Male	.66		.16
Female	<u>.10</u>		<u>.55</u>
Difference	.56		-.39
<b>Education</b>			
Max	.87	.01	
Min	<u>.14</u>	<u>.77</u>	
Difference	.73	-.76	
<b>Chamber</b>			
Senate			.06
House			<u>.29</u>
Difference			-.22
<b>Political Career*Trustee</b>			
Max	.95		
Min	<u>.06</u>		
Difference	.90		
<b>Political Career*Chamber (S)</b>			
Max	1.00	.00	
Min	<u>.00</u>	<u>1.00</u>	
Difference	1.00	-1.00	

The background characteristics gender and education provided significant direct effects on members' preferences toward leadership qualities in committee leaders. Among ambitions, only political career had a significant effect and that effect was part of an interaction. Generally motivations were not very important predictors of these preferences.


Across all measures of leadership qualities only gender had a significant effect on more than one group. Women were more likely than men to prefer work ethic in party leaders and committee leaders. Men were more likely to prefer leadership skills as a quality for committee leaders. Motivations were

important predictors of leadership qualities when interacting with some other characteristic like gender. Only for secondary party leaders were motivations important alone. Party was rarely a factor in preferred leadership qualities.

#### **Principle Findings in Context**

The major effects identified in this chapter are depicted in Figure 4.2. Although a variety of membership characteristics were shown to have some impact on members' preferences for legislative structure, few consistent relationships were found. Only political affiliation and an interaction between gender and motivation had significant effects across various preference measures.

**Figure 4.2: Principle Effects of Membership Characteristics on Members' Preferred Legislative Structure.**



### Conclusion

A dynamic model of legislative reform was proposed in this chapter. The model allowed for both internal and external influences on legislative structure.

The Oklahoma case study, with the model as a theoretical backdrop, provided an excellent opportunity to test links between membership characteristics and members' preferred legislative structure and map the effects. The findings indicate that there are links between characteristics and preferences. The characteristics that most affected preferences for formal rules of the legislature were somewhat different from those that affected preferences for informal practices. Specifically, motivations and gender played a greater role in predicting desired leadership qualities than they did in predicting preferred leadership selection processes. Conversely, political party was a better predictor of preferences toward process than qualities.

Before elaborating further on the implications of these findings an additional link, term limits, is tested in Chapter 5. Changes taking place in the legislature resulting from term limits can be observe by examining differences between those who were elected before term limits and those elected after they were imposed. As term limits force senior members out of office, the preferences of junior members will become increasingly important.

### **Notes**

1. Polychotomous logit regression was not used for two reasons. SPSS-PC 7.1 Logit Loglinear Analysis does not support a model fitting function, and it does not provide coefficients for continuous independent variables. The described two step process is a reasonable substitute for polychotomous logit. It returns coefficients based on the same logic.
2. Interactions are possible between variables that are not otherwise in the equation (Draper and Smith 1998).
3. For Chair Method, all 12 variables were included in the logit of each dependent variable. The multinomial version of SPSS-PC logit was not capable of running the test. It could not handle the continuous variables, could not



handle more than 10 independent variables, and the machine did not have enough memory to run the analysis. Forward Stepwise regression was used because in the previous cases it yielded the same result and in this case backward regression would not work, either.

4. Because the  $n$  was so small, once the most parsimonious model was determined, these equations were run with just the needed variables.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **EFFECTS OF TERM LIMITS IN THE CURRENT MEMBERSHIP**

**A fully integrated model of legislative adaptation to reform includes both internal and external influences. Links between preferred legislative structures and membership characteristics were established in the previous chapter. Motivations and gender were found to have the strongest effects on informal structures, while political party identification had the most influence on formal structures.**

**In this chapter an external influence is examined. Through a citizens' initiative in 1990 legislators' terms were limited to 12 years in Oklahoma. This was a reform over which members had no control. It was entirely external to the legislature. As members learn to work within this new constraint reforms in the legislative process may occur. The shape of those reforms is the subject of this chapter. Specifically, the chapter will explore the following research questions, raised in Chapter 1: "Is the Oklahoma Legislative structure likely to change as a result of term limits? Are term limits altering members' motivations or other characteristics in the Oklahoma Legislature? Are members' preferences toward legislative structure changing as a result of term limits?"**

**Data presented in this chapter demonstrate few effects for legislative term limits in Oklahoma. In the few instances where differences are found between**

members elected before term limits and those elected after term limits, explanations other than term limits seem most plausible. However, the analysis of these data adds much needed empirical research to the term limits discussion by demonstrating that at least in Oklahoma many of the effects of term limits have been oversold.

Before testing the effects of term limits, a general discussion of this phenomenon is presented. It begins briefly with an historic context, followed by modern term limits activities and recent term limits research. The first effects of term limits to be considered are those on the composition of the Oklahoma Legislature, if limits were applied immediately. This provides an indication as to whom will be most affected by term limits. Bivariate and multivariate hypotheses directly related to the research questions above are then tested. Finally, implications of these findings are discussed.

### Historical Roots of Term Limits

Rotation of elected officials goes to the very heart of democratic theory. It has been debated from the days of Aristotle. However, until they reappeared on the political agenda very little had been written on the subject after the 1700's. (For a complete history of term limits theory see Petracca, 1992).

In Aristotle's era it was widely accepted that any citizen (although citizenship was not universal) could serve in government. Democracy, as he saw it, required short terms of office, restrictions on holding the same office twice, and reciprocity of ruling and being ruled in turn. At the time of American

colonialism, Locke was arguing for representatives to return to the state of ordinary citizens. The American Articles of Confederation included term limits and so did several early state constitutions. Rotation in office was the cause of considerable debate at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. However, the framers of the Constitution left it out. After the convention, Jefferson, Franklin, and others continued to argue for mandatory rotation and Washington opted to enact it by precedent. Andrew Jackson institutionalized rotation of appointed officials creating the spoils system. While the debate was never fully resolved, little substantive action was taken because rotation existed, if only by tradition.

When Franklin Roosevelt broke that tradition by seeking a third term as President in 1940 the 22nd Amendment was added to the U.S. Constitution. Later, twenty-nine states limited the terms of their chief executive with little controversy, including Oklahoma in 1966. The debate over legislative term limits waned, until 1990 when initiatives were proposed in Oklahoma, California, and Colorado to limit state legislators.

Overall legislative term limitations were not a part of the national or academic debate in the United States for many years. Then suddenly in 1990 an explosion of controversy ensued. A discussion that started in three states, about state legislators, has spread up the political ladder to Congress and down the ladder to local officials.

### **Modern Legislative Term Limits**

Oklahoma, then California, and Colorado, limited the tenure of their state legislators in 1990. Soon the idea spread across the United States. By 1998 eighteen states had limited their state legislators' length of service (National Conference of State Legislatures 1998). In almost every case voters used initiatives to enact term limits.

With 67% of the vote, Oklahoma voters approved an initiative Constitutional Amendment on September 18, 1990, to limit legislative terms. (For a description of Oklahoma's term limits initiative process see Copeland and Rausch 1993.) Protecting those current members by ignoring prior service, the measure limited members to 12 years of combined House and Senate service after January 1, 1991, not including then current and previous terms. According to Kevin Nelson of the Oklahoma Attorney General's Office (interview), this grandfather clause prevents the full implementation of term limits in Oklahoma until 2006.

Two states have already experienced partial implementation of term limits: California and Maine. California voters, in 1990, created a six year limit to service in the Assembly and an eight year limit in the Senate. All Assembly members elected in 1990 were barred from seeking reelection in 1996. Senators elected in 1990 will be removed in 1998. (For a description of California's term limits initiative process see Price 1992.) Maine passed a limit in 1993 that eliminated every legislator who had served more than four terms, starting in December 1996. Currently 74 percent of Maine's House members were elected

after the term limits law passed. Four more states will experience the first removals due to term limits in 1998 including: Colorado, Arkansas, Michigan, and Oregon. (For a current list of states and their provisions see National Conference of State Legislatures 1998.)

### Modern Term Limits Research

Most of the research published on term limits since the debate reemerged in 1990 has been highly speculative and in the form of case studies. Because of the recency of this phenomenon and the fact that term limits have not impacted many state legislatures, yet there have been few opportunities for empirical research. Because of the uniqueness of each state's situation, there has been even less opportunity to develop broader comparative studies.

As legislative term limits were sweeping the nation in 1992, Gerald Benjamin and Michael J. Malbin produced an excellent and broad ranging anthology entitled, *Limiting Legislative Terms*. These articles laid the foundation for much of the research that followed. Of course, in 1992 there could be little more than history, speculation, and debate. Rebecca Noah (1996) in an annotated bibliography of term limits research noted that Benjamin and Malbin's original collection set the agenda for most current work. Some of this speculation, like the piece on Oklahoma by Copeland, was informed by interviews with legislators and other political observers. However, all of it remained speculative.

At this early stage, some scholars began to write about the various state level initiative campaigns and the increasing organization of the term limits movement. The work of Dave Rausch and others (Copeland and Rausch 1993, Rausch 1994, Rausch 1996, Rausch and Copeland 1996, Rausch and Farmer 1998) provided extensive discussions of how the term limits movement emerged in Oklahoma and around the country.

Some attempts were made to understand why voters made the choice to support term limits. Using a survey of Oklahoma City voters, Farmer (1993) found that in Oklahoma party affiliation was the most important determinant along with voter alienation. Aggregate data from California also supported the idea that term limits were at least partially explained by party identification (Friedman and Wittman 1996). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) found similar results at the national level.

Early discussions about the effects of term limits began by suggesting that term limits would affect less than one-third of legislators across the country, because as legislatures are currently constructed few members' tenure reach the ceiling. However, demonstrating the difficulty in compiling cross-state comparisons between term limits laws, these works failed to consider the specifics of each state's term limits law, leading to inherent inaccuracies in their conclusions. Cynthia Opheim (1994) applied an eight year limit across all states. Benjamin and Malbin (1992) applied a 10 year limit. Farmer (1995) found that if Oklahoma's 12 year lifetime limits were applied to the 45<sup>th</sup> Legislature 20 percent of the House would be removed and 44 percent of the Senate. Because the

prominent leaders who control the legislature typically have long tenure, half of the leadership in the Oklahoma Senate and 32 percent in the Oklahoma House would have been removed. In fact, David Everson (1992) argues, these are the legislators that voters were targeting when they voted for term limits.

The term limits debate did not center exclusively on effects. Some argued about their constitutionality. Others contested the effects on representation and democracy of limiting voters' choices. These debates led to a discussion of the original Constitutional Convention and the wisdom of the founders. Proponents took a position seeking citizen legislators. (See Fund 1992 or Will 1992). Opponents sought a more professional legislature. (See Kesler 1992 or Fowler 1993.) Hibbing (1991) argued that in Congress most of the legislative work is completed by members with lengthy tenures. The debate was primarily a philosophical one over a glass half-full or half-empty. It has centered mostly around the desirability of the speculated effects and not the probability of the effects occurring. Not surprisingly, the debate occasionally became partisan, with the suggestion that Republicans supported the idea simply because they controlled few legislative bodies in the 1980's (Price 1992).

There remained an acute lack of data in the term limits discussion. Various attempts to predict the effect of term limits were collected by Grofman in 1996. Many of these works employed a rational choice approach to specify possible outcome. The result of this exercise were so speculative that Grofman subtitled his introduction, "Hypotheses in Search of Data." This dissertation also helps to fill the data deficit.



A recent article, by Carey, Niemi, and Powell (1998), provide some insight into the changes taking place. They found almost no effects for term limits on legislative demographic. There was some evidence of changes in the distribution of power within the legislature.

The first place to find empirical results of the effects of term limits is in the composition of the legislature. There are two ways to consider these effects. The first is simply to see who would be removed if the limit were imposed immediately. This provides evidence as to which groups would be most affected by removals. The other is to compare the characteristics of those first elected before the limit to those first elected after term limits. These electoral trends will show which groups are more likely to gain as term limits create open seats.

#### Changing Demographics

The most direct effect of term limits on the legislature will be its effect on the membership. Eventually every member will be rotated out of office. When long term incumbents are forced to retire, some groups will be more affected than others. While Oklahoma's limits will not take full effect until 2006, a measure of current long term incumbents can provide some indication as to how the legislature will be effected.

The 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature ended after a special session June 20, 1998. At that time approximately 30 percent of the members had served 12 years or more. Only 19 percent of House members had served 12 years or more

in the Legislature. However, 52 percent of Senators have completed 12 years of service. That was 4 more Senators than two years earlier.

Republicans would be less affected than Democrats. In the House, Republicans would lose 6 members (17%), but Democrats would lose 13 members (20%). In the Senate, Democrats would lose 19 (56%), and Republicans would lose 6 (40%) members. Two of the Senate's 6 women would be removed. None of the 9 women in the House have over 12 years experience.

Senators with previous House experience would be the most vulnerable. Nineteen Senators (39%) have previous House experience. Fourteen of those Senators (74%) are over the 12 year life-time limit. Largely because of this phenomenon the Senate will be affected significantly when term limits become fully effective. Experienced legislators may be reluctant to enter the Senate knowing that they can not have a full career there. This may cause the Senate to have few, if any, experienced freshmen in the future.

If Oklahoma's term limits took full effect at the end of the 46th Legislature 12 of 35 leaders would be removed. This would include the majority and minority leader of both houses. These 12 leaders combine for 200 years of experience. The 6 Senate leaders who will be over the limit represent 108 years of experience. The 6 House leaders that are over the limit represent 92 years of experience. Currently the House has 25 members in formal leadership positions and the Senate has 10.

Democratic leaders would suffer many more losses than Republicans. Republicans would only lose 3 members in both houses. Democrats in the

**Senate would lose 5 of 6 leaders, and Democrats in the House would lose 4 of 16 leaders. These losses amount to 83 percent of the leadership in the Senate, and 25 percent of the leadership in the House.**

**House committee chairs would be somewhat less affected by the immediate imposition of term limits than Senate committee chairs. The effect on Senate committee chairs is very similar to that of the full Senate, 11 of 19 (58%) would be affected. In the House 7 of 26 committee chairs (23%) would be removed by term limits. This is substantially lower than the 58 percent of Senate committee chairs.**

**Data presented above quickly lead to the conclusion that the Senate would be much more affected by the immediate imposition of term limits than the House. The Senate would lose 52 percent of its members, 60 percent of its floor leadership, and 58 percent of its committee chairs. While the House's losses would be substantial, they pale in comparison to the Senate. The House would only lose 19 percent of its membership, 24 percent of its leadership, and 23 percent of its committee leadership. Women of the Senate would also be heavily affected. Thirty-three percent of them would be removed. No women in the House would be removed. Term limits will have a dramatic effect on the current membership in Oklahoma Legislature. With most of its leadership and much of its membership gone, the legislature will have to adapt to the new reality.**

**These effects seem dramatic. They demonstrate that many key members of the current Oklahoma Legislature have served more years than the limit would allow. However, the full effect cannot be considered until something is known**

about who would replace these members. What are their backgrounds, ambitions, preferences? Does this loss of membership imply a change in membership? The next section examines the possibility that newer members arriving in the legislature may have different preferences toward the legislative structure than their more senior counterparts.

### **Effect of Term Limits on Members' Preferences**

As explained earlier, Oklahoma offers a rare opportunity to compare the preferences of members elected before term limits with those elected after term limits. Using the measures described in Chapters 3 and 4, the effect of term limits on members' preferred legislative structure is examined below. These preference measures were derived from open ended survey questions. (For exact question wording see Appendix 3.) Differences found here, though minor, suggest the direction that legislative reform may take as post-term limits members take over the leadership roles.

### **Bivariate Analysis of Seniority and Dependent Variables**

Correlations between members' preferences on how various leaders should be chosen and two measures of tenure are shown in Table 5.1. The first measure is simply the election year in which a member was first elected. The table indicates years of service is significantly related to some preferences. Members who have served longer tend to prefer the use of pledge cards for choosing their party leader, while newer members tend to prefer a secret vote. A similar result, also, holds for the selection of secondary party leaders. The

second measure is a dummy variable that divides members into pre-term limits members– those who were first elected before term limits (coded 0)– and post-term limits members– those first elected later (coded 1). The results from the two measures are similar. Again pre-term limits members tend to prefer pledge cards to a greater extent than do post-term limits members. For secondary party leaders post-term limits members tend to prefer a secret vote, while pre-term limits members tend to prefer an open vote. For the selection of committee leaders post-term limits members are more willing to give the minority some selection power than pre-term limits members. Pre-term limits members prefer to keep power in the hands of the Speaker or President Pro Temp.

<b>Table 5.1: Correlation Between Seniority and Members Preferred Leadership Selection Process.</b>							
	<b>Party Leader</b>			<b>Secondary Leaders</b>	<b>Committee Leaders</b>		
	<b>Pledge Cards</b>	<b>Secret Vote</b>	<b>Open Vote</b>	<b>Secret Vote</b>	<b>Speaker Appoints</b>	<b>Each Party Appoints</b>	<b>Other</b>
<b>Yr. Elected</b>	-.325***	.214**	.053	.351**	-.116	.113	.024
<b>'92-'96</b>	-.205**	.131	.109	.244*	-.172*	.191*	.013

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

These results would suggest that term limits may have a significant effect on the Oklahoma Legislature, when these post-term limits members come to power if they institute their preferences. However, the results need to be subjected to a multivariate analysis before such conclusions are readily accepted. Two alternate potential effects could be at work here. Since most

post-term limits members are not in leadership, they may prefer weaker leadership than their more senior counterparts. Also, the effect of recent Republican electoral gains may cause post-term limits members to appear to desire weaker leadership. In either case the effects recorded here would be more related to a members' location in the legislative power structure than term limits. Both of these could produce the above effects without having long-term effects on the legislative structure.

The measures of seniority were also correlated with the power preference factors previously described. Table 5.2 shows once again significant statistical relationships between term limits and preferred legislative structure. By both measures of seniority, post-term limits members were more willing than pre-term limits members to share power with the minority and others. On the surface, these findings would suggest major shifts in power may occur in the Oklahoma Legislature when the current post-term limits members become the senior leadership. However, these findings need additional examination.

<b>Table 5.2: Correlation Between Term Limits and Members Preferred Distribution of Power Within the Legislature.</b>			
	<b>Power to the Majority-Democrats</b>	<b>Power to the Minority-Republicans</b>	<b>Power to Other Actors</b>
<b>Yr. Elected</b>	-.100	.282**	.214*
<b>'92-'96</b>	-.060	.252**	.295**

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

Similar bivariate correlation hypotheses were tested between preferred leadership qualities and seniority. None of these 20 relationships were statistically significant. The correlations ranged in magnitude from .003 to .196. This may suggest that term limits has little to do with the style of leadership members prefer.

### **Multivariate Analysis**

The first step in determining if newer members' preferences on legislative structure are likely to affect the legislature is to see if those preferences remain significant when other variables are controlled. The multivariate equations developed in Chapter 4 demonstrate which characteristics of legislators predict their preferences on legislative structure. Here, those characteristics are used as control variables to determine if length of service has a direct effect on preferences. To simplify the analysis only one seniority variable was utilized in the these tests, the dichotomous variable that separated members into those elected before term limits and those elected after. This variable was chosen for two reasons. First, it provides a better illustration of how the legislature might be changing since term limits were instituted. Second, the direct effects of seniority were measured in multivariate equations using each term limits measure and the results were virtually identical.

### ***Leadership Selection***

Table 5.3 examines the effect of seniority on preferred methods of selecting the party leader. The direct effects in Equation 1 continue to indicate that House members are more likely than Senators, and Republicans are more

likely than Democrats to prefer a secret vote to choose their party leader. The interaction of being a leader and being a post-term limits member also significantly decreases the likelihood of preferring a secret vote. Equation 2 shows that leaders, Senators, and Democrats tend to prefer an open vote more than their counterparts. However, Democratic Senators are somewhat less likely to prefer this. The interaction of being a post-term limits Senator increases the likelihood of preferring an open vote. Equation 3 shows no significant effect of term limits on preferences for pledge cards.

<b>Table 5.3: Logit Regressions of Selection Methods for Party Leaders (Speaker/Minority Leader) on Independent Variables and Term Limits.</b>			
<b>Selection Method Party Leader</b>			
	<u><b>Equation 1</b></u> <b>Secret Vote</b>	<u><b>Equation 2</b></u> <b>Open Vote</b>	<u><b>Equation 3</b></u> <b>Pledge Cards</b>
<b>Leader</b>		1.8753**	
<b>Chamber (Senate)</b>	-2.0740***	2.4446*	
<b>Party (Democratic)</b>	-1.7576***	2.6627**	
<b>Chamber (S)*Party (D)</b>		-4.1514**	3.5629***
<b>Chamber (S)*Switched</b>			2.8851*
<b>Leader*Limits</b>	-1.7353*		
<b>Chamber (S)*Term Limits</b>		2.3493*	
<b>Term Limits</b>			-.6332
<b>Constant</b>	2.4103	-3.6526	-4.0202
<b>-2 Log Likelihood</b>	77.318	63.261	26.121
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	.239	.214	.286
<b>% correctly classified by predictors</b>	73.24	80.28	92.96
<b>by constant</b>	<u>57.75</u>	<u>74.65</u>	<u>88.73</u>
<b>Improvement</b>	15.49	5.63	4.23
<b>n</b>	71	71	71

\*p<.10  
\*\*p<.05  
\*\*\*p<.01



In Equation 1 the interaction of being both a leader and a post-term limits member reduces the probability of preferring a secret vote for party leader by as much as .40. When chamber and party are held constant at their means, post-term limits members who are leaders have a probability of .24. Under the same circumstances all other members have a probability of .64. In Equation 2 being a post-term limits Senator increases the probability of preferring an open vote for party leader by as much as .51. Post-term limits Senators have a probability of preferring an open vote of .69, when controlling other variables at their means. All other members have a probability of .17 under the same conditions.

There is a cautionary note in the amount of variance consumed by these equations. As seen in Chapter 3 there is very little variance on members' preference for pledge cards. The vast majority of members do not prefer that method. As a result, Equation 3 improves prediction by only 4.65 percent. Equation 2, also, produces little improvement, 5.63 percent.

Table 5.4 demonstrates that there is a direct effect of term limits on preferences for selecting secondary party leaders when controlling for other factors. Post-term limits members are more likely to prefer a secret vote than pre-term limits members. Pre-term limits members are more likely to prefer an open vote. When controlling other variables in the equation at their means post-term limits members have a .69 probability of preferring a secret vote. Pre-term limits members have a .56 probability. Term limits can affect the preference for a secret vote by as much as .28.

<b>Table 5.4: Logit Regressions of Selection Methods for Secondary Party Leaders on Independent Variables and Term Limits.</b>	
<b>Selection Method Secondary Party Leaders</b>	
	<b>Secret Vote</b>
<b>Party (Democratic)</b>	-1.6334*
<b>Political Career*Party (D)</b>	-.9468*
<b>Term Limits</b>	1.4365*
<b>Constant</b>	1.4661
<b>-2 Log Likelihood</b>	46.236
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	.258
<b>% correctly classified by predictors</b>	75.56
<b>by constant</b>	<u>62.22</u>
<b>Improvement</b>	13.34
<b>n</b>	45

\*p<.10

Members' preferences for the selection of committee chairs was largely unchanged by the inclusion of term limits in the analysis. Table 5.5 shows that only the category "other," displayed in Equation 3, was significantly affected. As compared to pre-term limits members, post-term limits members who scored below zero on the policy influence factor were more likely to prefer a method described as other, and those who scored above zero on the policy influence factor were more likely to have chosen one of the two methods- leader appoints or party appoints. Members who scored highest on the policy influence factor and were elected after term limits had a probability of preferring another method of .00, when controlling other variables at their means. However, post-term limits members scoring lowest on the policy influence factor had a probability of .99.

**This interaction could affect the probability of preferring another method by as much as .99.**

**While this is a statistically significant finding, that at the extremes seemed to have a major impact on members preferences, in fact it is of little substantive significance. Equation 3 represents preferences for a catch all category described as "other." Most of the post-term limits members scored above zero on the policy factor. So, the effect of the interaction is generally away from the category other. Equations 1 and 2 indicate that the most important characteristic in Table 5.5 is political party. Members preferences toward committee leadership selection are primarily influenced by political party. Democrats want the Speaker or Pro Temp. to control the selection, while Republicans prefer that the minority leader be able to appoint minority positions such as co-chair.**

<b>Table 5.5: Logit Regressions of Selection Methods for Committee Leaders on Independent Variables and Term Limits.<sup>1</sup></b>			
<b>Selection Method Committee Leaders</b>			
	<u><b>Equation 1</b></u> <b>Leader Appoints</b>	<u><b>Equation 2</b></u> <b>Party Appoints</b>	<u><b>Equation 3</b></u> <b>Other</b>
<b>Trustee</b>	2.1912**		-21.5571*
<b>Party (Democratic)</b>	5.0301***	-4.2189***	
<b>Policy Influence*Party (D)</b>	1.3268*		
<b>Trustee*Income</b>			.1193*
<b>Policy Influence*Term Limits</b>			-5.8656*
<b>Term Limits</b>	-1.0263	1.0395	
<b>Constant</b>	-4.0715	.0218	-.5158
<b>-2 Log Likelihood</b>	34.217	38.659	23.745
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	.543	.385	.410
<b>% correctly classified by predictors</b>	84.21	84.85	87.76
<b>by constant</b>	<u>52.63</u>	<u>77.27</u>	<u>79.59</u>
<b>Improvement</b>	31.58	7.58	8.17
<b>n<sup>2</sup></b>	57	66	49

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

Term limits had little direct effect on members' preferences toward leadership selection. In the selection of secondary party leaders the direct effect was clearly toward a system, secret voting, that would facilitate change. However, in the selection of the party leader the effect seemed to be the opposite. The interaction of being a leader and being a post-term limits member decreased the likelihood of preferring a secret vote. Perhaps this is because post-term limits members, who are already in leadership, owe their allegiance to the current leader.

### ***Power Distribution***

Table 5.6 indicates in Equation 1 that term limits had no significant effect on members attitude toward the power of the majority. However, Equation 2 holds an insightful twist. While Democratic members, for obvious reasons, are much less likely to prefer increased power for the minority than Republicans, post-term limits Democrats are more willing to share power with the minority than their more pre-term limits Democratic colleagues. The standardized coefficients in Equation 2 indicate that post-term limits Democrats are not willing to give Republicans the amount of power they would give themselves, but they are willing to give them more than pre-term limits Democrats are willing to give. Equation 3 indicates that non-whites and members with higher incomes are less willing to share power with outside groups, while those with greater education are willing to let others have a greater voice. This is somewhat counteracted by the fact that post-term limits members with higher incomes are more likely than other members to offer power to other groups in the legislative process. The magnitude of the standardized coefficients suggests that the income effect is minimal among post-term limits members.

<b>Table 5.6: OLS Standardized Regressions of Preferred Power Distribution on Independent Variables and Term Limits.</b>			
<b>Power Distribution</b>			
	<u><b>Equation 1</b></u> <b>Majority-Democrats</b>	<u><b>Equation 2</b></u> <b>Minority-Republicans</b>	<u><b>Equation 3</b></u> <b>Other Actors</b>
<b>Political Career</b>	.365***		
<b>Race (Non-white)</b>	.211*		-.281**
<b>Education</b>			.264**
<b>Income</b>			-.495***
<b>Full-time</b>	.336***		
<b>Party (Democratic)</b>		-.756***	
<b>Term Limits</b>	-.138		
<b>Party (D)*Term Limits</b>		.244**	
<b>Income*Term Limits</b>			.410***
<b>Constant</b>	-.359	.937	-1.085
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	.397***	.509***	.406***
<b>n</b>	52	54	48

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

These differences between pre- and post-term limits members suggest that something other than location in the power equation may be at work in legislators' preferences. Some post-term limits members, Democratic post-term limits members in particular, are willing to share power with other groups outside the majority. Since the post-term limits Democrats are likely to be the leadership in the near future, perhaps this foreshadows a change in the legislative power structure. Or, perhaps the findings simply signal a lack of socialization among post-term limits members.

### ***Leadership Qualities***

The effect of term limits on the informal structures of the legislature was also examined. For each type of leader— party leaders, secondary leaders, and committee leaders— the term limits measure was applied to the equations developed in Chapter 4 regarding preferred leadership qualities. It should be kept in mind here that none of the bivariate relationships between term limits and leadership qualities were statistically significant.

Term limits only produced a significant effect on preferences for reputation in a party leader. Equation 2 of Table 5.7 shows that men, who were post-term limits members, were more likely than other members to value reputation in a leader. When other variables were held constant at their means, men who were post-term limits members had a .78 probability of preferring reputation as the most important quality in a leader. Under the same conditions, other members had a .08 probability. The interaction of being a man and being a post-term limits member could influence the probability of preferring reputation by as much as .70.

<b>Table 5.7: Logit Regressions of Preferred Leadership Qualities for Party Leader on Independent Variables and Term Limits.</b>			
<b>Leadership Quality Party Leader</b>			
	<b><u>Equation 1</u> Leadership Skills</b>	<b><u>Equation 2</u> Reputation</b>	<b><u>Equation 3</u> Work Ethic</b>
Committee Chair			-3.6933**
Gender (Male)			-4.0536**
Outside Interests*Policy Influence			-1.4235**
Outside Interests*Gender (M)			4.2518***
Policy Influence*Gender (M)	1.1006**	-1.1269**	
Committee Chair*Gender (M)		3.1911**	
Occupation Legislator*Gender (M)		4.3016**	
Term Limits	-.0786		-2.2934
Gender (M)*Term Limits		3.6722**	
Constant	-.4358	-3.6043	2.4314
-2 Log Likelihood	53.764	32.877	22.177
Cox & Snell R <sup>2</sup>	.171	.415	.432
% correctly classified by predictors	63.04	75.00	86.96
by constant	<u>58.70</u>	<u>65.91</u>	<u>78.26</u>
Improvement	4.26	9.09	8.70
n	46	44	46

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

A similar finding is evident in Table 5.8. Term limits had its most profound effect on preferences for reputation in secondary party leaders. Equation 2 shows that post-term limits members, who had a priority for activities outside the legislature, were more likely than other members to prefer reputation as a quality in their secondary party leaders. Also, post-term limits members, who scored positively on the outside interests factor, were more likely than pre-term limits members to value reputation in a leader. Post-term limits members, who scored



below zero on this factor, were less likely than pre-term limits members to value reputation in a secondary party leader.

<b>Table 5.8: Logit Regressions of Preferred Leadership Qualities for Secondary Party Leaders on Independent Variables and Term Limits.</b>				
<b>Leadership Quality Secondary Party Leaders</b>				
	<b><u>Equation 1</u> Leadership Skills</b>	<b><u>Equation 2</u> Reputation</b>	<b><u>Equation 3</u> Work Ethic</b>	<b><u>Equation 4</u> Loyalty</b>
<b>Policy Influence</b>	.7695*			
<b>Outside Interests</b>		-1.0646**		
<b>Priority Leadership</b>			1.0870*	
<b>Priority Outside Interests</b>			-7.7709	
<b>Leader</b>				-11.1808
<b>Full-time</b>	1.8034**			
<b>Priority Leader*Full-time</b>				2.8728**
<b>Party (D)*Priority Leader</b>	-1.5915**			
<b>Term Limits</b>	-.9462		-.4141	
<b>Outside Interests*Term Limits</b>		2.4032**		-2.5290**
<b>Priority Outside Interests*</b>				
<b>Term Limits</b>		2.9428*		
<b>Constant</b>	-.3662	-1.7530	-2.4615	-5.7432
<b>-2 Log Likelihood</b>	57.244	38.595	46.303	20.174
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	.229	.246	.187	.280
<b>% correctly classified by predictors</b>	58.82	86.00	81.82	90.20
<b>by constant</b>	<u>52.94</u>	<u>78.00</u>	<u>78.26</u>	<u>88.24</u>
<b>Improvement</b>	5.88	8.00	3.56	1.96
<b>n</b>	51	50	46	51

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

Post-term limits members who scored highest on the outside interests factor had a .95 probability of preferring reputation in a secondary leader, when other variables were controlled at their means. Post-term limits members who scored lowest had a .00 probability. Post-term limits members with a priority for

activities outside the legislature had a .75 probability of preferring reputation.

Post-term limits members who did not seek outside interests had a .13 probability.

Equation 4 shows the opposite effect of the interaction between the outside interests factor and term limits on preferences for loyalty. Post-term limits members, who scored positively on the outside interests factor, were less likely than pre-term limits members to prefer loyalty as a quality in secondary leaders. Post-term limits members, who scored negatively on the outside interests factor, were more likely to prefer loyalty as a leadership quality. Post-term limits members who were high on outside interests had a .00 probability of preferring loyalty and those who were low on outside interests had a .40 probability.

Together Equations 2 and 4 suggest that post-term limits members who pursue outside interests are more likely to value reputation over loyalty in middle management leaders than do their pre-term limits counterparts, while post-term limits members who do not pursue outside goals are more likely to value loyalty over reputation. A note of caution here is that while these findings were statistically significant they only helped to increase prediction in Equation 4 by less than 2 percent.

Term limits had both direct and interactive effects on preferred leadership qualities for committee chairs. In Table 5.9, Equation 1 shows that term limits had a significant direct effect on members' preferences for leadership skills as a quality. However, post-term limits members with higher levels of education were less likely to value leadership skills. When other variables were controlled at

their means, post-term limits members had a 1.00 probability of preferring leadership skills in a committee chair and pre-term limits members had a .00 probability. However, this effect was tempered by education. Post-term limits members who had the highest education had a .00 probability of preferring leadership skills as a quality and while pre-term limits members had a 1.00 probability. These two effects may appear to cancel each other particularly among pre-term limits members. However, it should be kept in mind that the regression equation does not sum probabilities rather it sums z-scores and the equation increase prediction substantially.

<b>Table 5.9: Logit Regressions of Preferred Leadership Qualities for Committee Chairs on Independent Variables and Term Limits.</b>			
<b>Leadership Quality Committee Chairs</b>			
	<u><b>Equation 1</b></u> <b>Leadership Skills</b>	<u><b>Equation 2</b></u> <b>Reputation</b>	<u><b>Equation 3</b></u> <b>Work Ethic</b>
<b>Gender (Male)</b>			-1.7593
<b>Education</b>	0.8177**	-.7552***	
<b>Chamber (Senate)</b>			-1.8417
<b>Political Career*Trustee</b>	2.8258*		
<b>Political Career*Chamber (S)</b>	4.2965	-6.7394***	
<b>Term Limits</b>	17.1018**	.8156	.2132
<b>Education*Term Limits</b>	-1.1239**		
<b>Constant</b>	-12.2618	9.6739	.6501
<b>-2 Log Likelihood</b>	34.566	27.218	47.890
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R<sup>2</sup></b>	.447	.366	.141
<b>% correctly classified by predictors</b>	81.82	87.23	80.39
<b>by constant</b>	<u>54.55</u>	<u>77.27</u>	<u>77.27</u>
<b>Improvement</b>	27.27	9.96	3.12
<b>n</b>	44	44	44

\*p<.10

\*\*p<.05

\*\*\*p<.01

While term limits provided few effects overall on preferred leadership qualities, post-term limits members were more likely to prefer reputation as a quality among party leaders and secondary leaders, but they preferred leadership skills among committee leaders. Perhaps this says something about perceived differences in the job of party leaders and committee leaders from a post-term limits member's perspective.

### Seniority and Independent Variables

Most of the effects of seniority on legislative structure that were found could be easily explained away by a member's power position in the legislature. To demonstrate that term limits will create change in the legislative structure, characteristic differences between pre- and post-term limits members would be required. If significant differences exist between these two groups, an argument can be made that post-term limits members have different preferences because they are a different type of member.

When hypotheses were tested to determine if any of the motivation, background, or orientation measures were related to term limits only two characteristics met the test of inferential significance.<sup>3</sup> These two— delegate ( $r=.250$ ,  $p=.035$ ) and trustee ( $r=.219$ ,  $p=.065$ )— could be considered opposite components of the same relationship.<sup>4</sup> Three other characteristics— party, gender, and age— did not need inference since the measures represent 100 percent of the membership. The other 16 relationships ranged in magnitude from .197 to .008 and 12 were less than .100. None were statistically significant.

<b>Table 5.10: Significant Bivariate Relationships Between Members' Characteristics and Term Limits.</b>			
	<b>Pre-Term Limits &lt;1992</b>	<b>Post-Term Limits ≥1992</b>	<b>n</b>
<b>Delegate</b>	25.6%	50.0%	71
<b>Trustee</b>	58.1%	35.7%	71
<b>Party (Democratic)</b>	69.6%	59.6%	149
<b>Gender (Male)</b>	92.4%	86.0%	149
<b>Age (Mean)</b>	53.8yrs	46.6yrs	148

Table 5.10 indicates that post-term limits members are more likely to think of themselves as delegates, while pre-term limits members are more likely to think of themselves as trustees. This could represent a changing attitude in the legislature. However, it could simply illustrate a lack of electoral security among post-term limits members. Hibbing's (1991) study of Congress would suggest that post-term limits members act as delegates because they have yet to establish seats they believe are safe.

There is some evidence in Table 5.11 to support the latter conclusions. Seventy-five percent of the freshman members acted as delegates. Then as members gain seniority they tend more toward being trustees. Of those elected before 1984, 64 percent acted as trustees. These data do little to argue that change is occurring. In fact, this adds credence to an argument career contours explain the effects.

These results are opposite those found by Carey, Niemi, and Powell (1998). They found that post-term limits members tend to more often self-

identify as trustees. As the model suggests, these differences could be the result of other factors like the length of the limit or legislative professionalism.

The class of 1988 is an interesting anomaly in this trend. Nine of the 11 members, who responded to this question, view their job as that of a trustee. Perhaps this is because each of these nine serve in committee chair or co-chair positions, providing more evidence for the career contour argument.

<b>Table 5.11: Approach to Representation by Year Elected (n=71).</b>			
<b>Year Elected<sup>5</sup></b>	<b>Delegate</b>	<b>Trustee</b>	<b>Politico</b>
≤74 <sup>6</sup>	1	2	
78	1	1	1
80		1	
82		3	1
84	2	1	
86	2	5	2
88	1	9	1
<u>Pre-Term Limits 90</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>
Post-Term Limits 92	4	3	1
94	4	4	3
96	6	2	
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>11</b>

Post-term limits members also tend to be younger. This finding seems intuitive. Members who have served for some years are not as young as they were when they were first elected. For the age difference to be substantively significant there would need to be a difference in the age of members when they were first elected. Table 5.12 shows that the average age when elected of current members has fluctuated very little since 1988. As a result of the aging process, currently surviving members of the earliest classes tended to be somewhat younger when elected.


<b>Table 5.12: Mean Ages When Elected of Current Members by Year Elected (n=148).</b>		
	<b>Year Elected<sup>7</sup></b>	<b>Age</b>
	52	24
	66	35
	70	38
	72	29
	74	39
	76	38
	78	33
	80	38
	82	37
	84	38
	86	39
	88	43
<u>Pre-Term Limits</u>	90	<u>46</u>
Post-Term Limits	92	42
	94	43
	96	42

As pointed out earlier, Republicans and women made gains in recent elections. If these trend continue eventually they may have a significant impact on the makeup of the legislature. However, at this time both groups are so small that they are unlikely to have a significant effect on the legislative structure anytime soon.

#### Principle Findings in Context

The major effects identified in this chapter are shown in Figure 5.1. Term limits were demonstrated to be having an effect on several membership characteristics in Oklahoma. These effects tend to be more related to the removal of incumbents than to the kind of person attracted to legislative service. It is unlikely that a new breed of legislator will emerge in Oklahoma. Most of the effects of term limits on members' preferences were the result of interactions.

**Figure 5.1: Principle Effects of Term Limits on Members' Preferred Legislative Structure.**



When placed in the context of the dynamic model posited in Chapter 4, these findings would suggest that if the partisan electoral competition and current political environment remain relatively constant until 2006, gains by the



Republicans could make a difference. In the short run, only the fact that Republicans could gain the ability to block an emergency clause or sustain a veto could be important. However, if they gain that power and maintain the governorship, Republicans could have some chips with which to bargain for structural change.

### Effect of Term Limits

This analysis examined the effect of term limits on a member's preference toward legislative structure. The results indicate few effects. When selecting a party leader, post-term limits members who are leaders are less likely than other members to prefer a secret vote. Post-term limits Senators are more likely to prefer an open vote.

Regarding preferences toward leadership qualities, the effect of term limits was generally toward a preference for reputation. For party leader, post-term limits men were much more likely than other members to prefer reputation to other qualities. For secondary party, leaders post-term limits members who had an interest outside the legislature were more likely to prefer reputation. Similarly, those who scored highly on the outside interests factor also preferred reputation and not loyalty as a quality. However, post-term limits members who scored below zero on outside interests were more likely to prefer loyalty and not reputation. For committee leaders term limits had a direct effect for leadership skills as a preferred quality, but that was tempered by a members level of education.

The strongest effect of term limits on preferred legislative structures was in the selection of secondary party leaders. Post-term limits members were significantly more likely than pre-term limits members to prefer a secret vote. Pre-term limits members preferred open votes. Since many secondary leaders are post-term limits members and there was no interaction between leadership and term limits, as in the selection of party leader, this may suggest that post-term limits members prefer a less authoritarian system and that they may be more democratic when they come to power.

A second indication that post-term limits members may be more democratic is found in members preferences toward who should have more power than they currently have in the legislature. Democratic post-term limits members were significantly more likely than other Democrats to prefer more power for the minority. Similarly, post-term limits members with higher incomes were also more likely than other members to grant power to others in the legislative process.

All three of these findings suggest that post-term limits members, and post-term limits Democratic members in particular, currently have more democratic attitudes than their pre-term limits counterparts. There are two potential explanations for this phenomenon. It could be that post-term limits members are still outside the power structure and wish power would be shared with everyone including themselves. The other possible explanation is that there are true differences between those members who were elected in or before 1990 and those elected after. There is some evidence that new members are

different. There are more Republicans, more women, and they are younger. They tend also to define themselves more as a delegate and less as a trustee than pre-term limits members. However, as explained above members' age and approach to representation may also be functions of experience and term limits. These characteristics may shift as they become more integrated into the power structure.

Only the facts that Republicans and women are making gains suggest that post-term limits members may be different from pre-term limits members. Trends dependent upon Republicans or women may be far from consummation. Both groups have nowhere near enough power to force changes in the legislative process.

### Conclusion

Two possible effects could result in real changes. If post-term limits Democratic members continue to hold their current preferences when they rise to power in a few years, then the Oklahoma legislative process could become more democratic, allowing all members to participate more fully in the process. The other possibility is that Republicans could make enough gains in future elections to block emergency votes and sustain gubernatorial vetoes. If that happened Republicans could use their new bargaining power to open up the process. From the data presented here, the latter is the more likely scenario.

### Notes

1. For Chair Method, all 12 variables were included in the logit of each dependent variable. The SPSS-PC version of multinomial logit was not capable of running the test. It could not handle the continuous variables, could not handle more than 10 independent variables, and the machine did not have enough memory to run the analysis. Forward Stepwise regression was used because in the previous cases it yielded the same result and in this case backward regression would not work.
2. Because the  $n$  was so small, once the most parsimonious model was determined, each of these equations were ran with just the variables that were needed.
3. Multivariate tests for potential interaction or uncontrolled relationships between characteristics and term limits were all inconclusive. No statistically significant relationships were found.
4. While trustee and delegate may appear to be direct opposites that could be captured in a single dummy variable, they are in fact two categories of a three category variable because of the number of members who volunteered a politico response. As such, they are described here as separate dummy variables. Politico did not have a statistically significant relationship with term limits.
5. As can be seen from Appendix 4 some adjustments were made to accommodate those members whose service was not continuous.
6. These cases were combined to protect members anonymity.
7. As can be seen from Appendix 4 some adjustments were made to accommodate those members whose service was not continuous.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **IMPLICATIONS**

**The people of Oklahoma were seeking change when they imposed term limits on their legislators in 1990. The blunt instrument of term limits soon swept the nation, reforming legislatures that were perceived to favor powerful politicians over ordinary people. Term limits were explicitly intended to remove powerful long-term incumbents and replace them with citizen legislators. Proponents argued that by changing the kind of people in the legislature the process would be more open to citizen input. Implicit in this argument is the notion that a different kind of person would seek office and get elected in a term limited legislature. If, in fact, a different kind of person, a new breed of legislator, were to be elected significant changes could be expected in the legislative process, as legislative scholars have long recognized that members' desires were paramount in determining the process.**

**This dissertation examines the extent to which these changes are occurring in Oklahoma. Two major empirical research questions were raised in this dissertation: Generally, how are legislative structures likely to change as a result of term limits? And, how are the characteristics of members changing as a result of term limits? The premise of this research was that these two questions were related, because it was expected that changes in the legislative institution**

arise, in part, from changes in the characteristics of the members, particularly changes in their motivations. The dynamic model of legislative reform, posited here, includes a variety of internal and external environmental factors which were controlled in the case study. The links between legislators' characteristics, their preferred legislative structure, and term limits were mapped within this larger theoretical context.

The research questions are addressed by taking advantage of the unique opportunities to interview both pre- and post-term limits legislators in Oklahoma. Specifically, the following questions were raised: Is the Oklahoma Legislative structure likely to change as a result of term limits? Are term limits altering members' motivations or other characteristics in the Oklahoma Legislature? Are members' preferences toward legislative structure changing as a result of term limits? Are members' motivations or other characteristics related to their preferred legislative structure?

Data collected and hypotheses tested in pursuit of these questions have implications for a variety of theoretical and practical issues. They include implications for the study of legislative reform, legislators' motivations, term limits, the composition of the Oklahoma Legislature, and the Oklahoma legislative process. In this chapter those implications are explored.

The key findings of this research demonstrate that majority-minority status is the most important predictor of preferences for formal processes in the legislature, while ambition and gender are better predictors of preferences for informal processes. Term limits, as an outside influence, have few direct effects

on members' preferences toward legislative structure. They also have few effects on members' characteristics; a new breed of legislator is not emerging in the Oklahoma legislature. The effects of term limits arise more from eliminating senior statesmen and replacing them with younger, less experienced members. While these effects are substantively important, in a state with a semi-professional legislature and which has a lengthy limit like Oklahoma the effects are not likely to be as dramatic as predicted by either proponents or opponents.

This dissertation occurs at the nexus of several lines of research. The next several sections discuss the implications of these findings on the various research traditions. The specific research questions raised in Chapter 1 are then addressed, then broader implications of term limits for Oklahoma are discussed. A brief summary of the chapter conclusions is presented, followed by a discussion of the overall contribution of this dissertation.


### **Legislative Reform**

Previous models of legislative reform had focused on internal influences like members' goals, or they had focused on external effects like public pressure (Fowler 1993). The dynamic model proposed here integrated these two ideas and added a variety of membership characteristics. The model recognized that the various factors each affected the other in a dynamic fashion. Links were mapped between membership characteristics, structural preferences and term limits, controlling for environmental factors in the Oklahoma case. Figure 6.1 shows the model with the most prominent effects found in this study. Political party identification had a strong impact on members' preferences toward formal

**legislative structures. Members' motivations and gender had a substantial effect on informal legislative practices. The effect of term limits was mostly found when combined with other effects.**



**Figure 6.1: Dynamic Theoretical Model of Legislative Reform and Principle Effects of Term Limits on Members' Preferred Legislative Structure in Oklahoma.**



These findings suggest several important implications. It is majority-minority status that most influences the formal legislative structures, at least in Oklahoma. The numerous studies of legislative reform cited by Fowler (1993) all hinge on a discussion of legislators' motivations. Evidence was presented here which argues that party status is far more important than individual motivations in understanding formal legislative processes. Partisanship is so important that, despite members' other influences, they desire legislative rules that benefit their party. Obviously, they see their power in the legislature as tied directly to their party's strength.

However, regarding informal practices, which set the tone of the legislature, majority-minority status has little effect. Here gender and motivational variables are more important. These findings suggest that members' personal desires have a greater effect on informal practices than their partisan loyalties, in stark contrast to their choices about formal rules within the legislature.

Term limits were an attempt by the public to directly affect the legislative process, yet they are having few effects on members' preferred legislative structure. Their effects occur almost exclusively in conjunction with other internal variables. This finding may be an important indication as to how outside influences affect legislative reform in other instances.

#### **Legislators' Motivation**

In modern American politics the primary motivation of legislators is said to be reelection (Mayhew 1974). Data presented here suggest members are not

single minded office seekers. Members in Oklahoma ranked public policy and serving their district well ahead of reelection. That does not imply that reelection is not important, or not always on their minds, but it does suggest that reelection is not paramount in their decision making.

Data on members' motivations also suggest that in Oklahoma members interests are more complex than those proposed by Barber (1965). He found two dimensions to legislative behavior among Connecticut freshmen legislators—willingness to serve and activity levels. The factor analysis presented here illuminated four dimensions. These four include a desire to provide representation, to have policy influence, to develop a political career, and to build outside interests. These four provide a new perspective on legislators' motivations. Motivations proved to have an effect on the informal processes within the legislature. Using these new dimensions, perhaps future researchers will be able to find stronger links to legislative behavior than previously discovered.

### Term Limits

This research was designed to explicitly test the links between tenure, membership characteristics, and legislative structures. Implicit in this study were tests of several hypotheses posited in the term limits debate. Three kinds of speculation that can be address by these data emerged early in the term limits debate. The first suggested that this change in the rules of electoral competition would benefit certain groups. The second argued that a different kind of person—perhaps a new breed— would be attracted to legislative service. The third

claimed that power would shift among policy making institutions. Data presented here offer clues that may help to illuminate the national debate.

Because incumbency is an impediment to prospective members, it was argued that the open seats created by term limits would open opportunities for women and minorities (Fowler 1992, Moncrief and Thompson 1992, Karp 1995). Of course, in Oklahoma no open seats have been created. However, if current electoral trends persist, when open seats are created women may make serious gains in the Oklahoma Legislature. Women are increasingly winning election to the Oklahoma Legislature, without term limits creating open seats. Fifty-three percent of women currently serving were elected after 1990, compared to just 37 percent of men.

Speculation also suggested that over time minorities would benefit, although minorities may not be as well positioned politically to take advantage of the open seats right away (Moncrief and Thompson 1992). In Oklahoma there is only 7 percent non-white representation in the legislature. Forty-three percent of these members were elected after 1990, equal to that of white members.

In the early 1990's most observers expected an increase in open seats to benefit Republicans (Moncrief and Thompson 1992). Republicans were making legislative gains across the county and many seats held by long term incumbent Democrats were thought to be ripe for Republican candidates in open seat races. However, Linda Fowler (1992) disagreed that Republicans would benefit. She argued incumbency was not the GOP's only obstacle to election. Recent electoral trends have favored Republicans in Oklahoma. Forty-five percent of Republican members were elected after 1990 and only 35 percent of Democratic

members. However, this phenomenon could be temporary. An increase in open seats and an the resulting increase in electoral competition could make the composition of the legislature more responsive to short-term voter attitudes. Soon, those attitudes could favor once again the Democratic Party.

Many practitioners speculated that a new kind of person would be attracted to legislative service after term limits (Price 1992). Some scholars asked if a "new breed" of legislator would emerge (Moncrief and Thompson 1992, Baker 1996). The speculation ranged from more businessmen or professionals to more senior citizens. Some dissenting voices (Fowler 1992, Price 1992, Malbin and Benjamin 1992) argued that long term career plans were not the primary motivation of those seeking office. Copeland (1992) pointed out that in Oklahoma a 12 year limit did not shorten most freshmen legislators' career intentions.

It was suggested that professionals, like attorneys and insurance agents, who could use a temporary stint in the legislature as a career enhancing device, would find it easier than other citizens to accept a part-time temporary appointment to the legislature. These professionals could gain name identification and reputation simply by seeking the office. If they were successful, they could use the office for the same purpose. However, citizens whose careers depended on them being at work everyday would not be able to choose the term-limited legislature as an alternative career. Therefore, occupational differences could arise between those attracted to run for a term-limited legislature and those attracted to the legislature as a career. Data from Oklahoma are very instructive in this matter. (It should be noted that Oklahoma's

very long limit may have a different effect than that of other states.) There were no systematic differences between members elected after term limits were imposed in Oklahoma and those elected before on such personal characteristics as occupation, income, or education.

Similarly, it was argued that senior citizens or those with well established careers would have more time to engage in temporary public service than younger people who are trying to establish their careers. As a result it was suggested that the mean age of legislators could increase. Differences were found in Oklahoma between juniors' and seniors' mean age. However, the aging process itself causes members with considerable experience to be older than newcomers to the legislative process. Table 5.12 shows that there is not a systematic difference in the age of members who were getting elected in any specific year. Oklahoma data indicates that term limits will likely reduce the mean age of legislators, but the change in mean age will not occur because of a new type of member being elected. It will be because members will not be able to mature in age while in office.

Some institutional consequences were proposed, also. Proponents suggest term limits will disperse power among the members (Price 1992). Opponents say there will be a loss of power by the leadership (Copeland and Rausch 1993). These two arguments are simply two different spins on the same phenomenon. According to Hodson et al. (1995), the effects of term limits on leadership are likely related to three things: the degree of legislative professionalism, institutional culture, and limitations imposed by each chamber.

Data presented here suggest that junior members would prefer more power for individual members.

Proponents claim an influx of new members will open the legislature to new ideas. Others are concerned about a loss of institutional memory and policy expertise (Copeland and Rausch 1993). Opponents believe the legislature will become dependent upon lobbyists, staff, and the administration for policy information and therefore will lose power to these groups (Fowler 1992, Copeland and Rausch 1993). Data from Oklahoma indicate that on average some members—whites, better educated, and junior members with higher incomes—were more likely to allow lobbyists, staff, and the governor more power than senior members are willing to allow. This could indicate that some new members in Oklahoma are less suspicious of these groups than are more senior members. If these attitudes persist as they move into positions of leadership, these groups could become more powerful in the policy making process. Junior Democratic members expressed a willingness to grant the minority more power than their senior counterparts were willing to grant them.

Previous works had speculated that term limits would cause little change in legislative turn over (Benjamin and Malbin 1992, Cynthia Opheim 1994). While these studies used different criteria, they all produces similar results. They suggested that about one third of current legislators would be effected by term limits. Similar results were found for Oklahoma, where 30 percent of members would be effected. However, turnover is better measured by the number of new members being elected, than by those who have significant seniority. Oklahoma's 12 year lifetime limits would require an average minimum

turnover of 18 percent of the legislative seats each election cycle. In the 45<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature (1995-96) 20 percent of the members were freshmen. In the 46<sup>th</sup> Legislature (1997-98) 12 percent were freshmen. These data would suggest that term limits might force a minor increase in the number of freshmen legislators in some years.

These empirical findings are among the first to shed light on the early term limits speculation. They indicate that groups such as women and Republicans may benefit, at least in the short-term, from term limits. They challenge the idea that a new breed of legislator will emerge. They support the idea that the legislative process may both become more internally democratic and allow greater input from outsiders.

#### Composition of the Oklahoma Legislature

As explained in the previous section, in the future members of the Oklahoma Legislature are more likely to be Republicans, women, and younger than those in the past. These speculated changes raise interesting questions about other characteristics of these new members. For example, will new members be more likely to view themselves as delegates or trustees, and is this different from their predecessors? Are they more likely to see their legislative responsibilities as full-time? Will their motivations as legislators be different from those who were before them?

There was an important difference in members' approach to representation. Newer members were much more likely to consider themselves delegates and senior members were more likely to be trustees. As Table 5.11



pointed out it is difficult to determine if this is actually a difference precipitated by term limits or if it is simply a matter of experience and tenure. It is likely that newer members everywhere tend to see themselves as delegates. Even so, this could signal a change in future attitudes of the legislature, since members will have limited experience they may generally start to act more like delegates. No significant differences were found between junior and senior in their time commitments or with any of the ambition measures.

The composition of the Oklahoma Legislature is changing modestly. Two of the four differences highlighted here are more likely the result of experience than demographic shifts. However, these differences may be substantively significant to the policy process. An increase in the number of Republicans, women, and younger people is likely to make issues that are important to these groups more important. An increase in delegate representatives is likely to shift the representational style of the legislature.

### The Oklahoma Legislative Process

This study highlighted several important points regarding the Oklahoma Legislative process. First, the process as practiced ranges far from the process as defined in the rules. This has serious implications for the implementation of democracy. A process that largely takes place in the halls and offices rather than on the floor is ripe for deception and corruption. It leave little opportunity for citizen input. The system described in Chapter 2 is full of this danger, to the point that many members on both sides of the aisle worry openly about the process.

However, while the informal practices of bill processing have become extremely important, minority members attribute most of their legislative problems to the rules imposed by the majority. Minority members, perhaps naively, believe their bills could pass the full chamber if they could just get them to the floor. But, rules granting power to the majority leader and committee chairs prevent their "good ideas" from becoming law. Of course if they had the votes to make their ideas law, they would not be in the minority. Majority members tend to focus on other less partisan aspects of the process. This would imply that majority and minority members have very different perspectives of what makes the legislative process work.

Because of the minorities focus on partisanship in the rules, they tend to propose reforms that would weaken the majorities grip on the process. Minority members are more likely to favor secret votes for leaders and a process for selecting committee leaders that gives them some representation. In interviews some minority members even suggested that each member be given a quota of bills that could be brought directly to the floor without committee approval. While most majority members also favored secret votes for leaders, they were more likely to favor an open selection process that exposed defectors and strengthened the leadership. As a result, majority-minority status is the most important variable in explaining members preferences toward the formal rules of the legislature. Simply put, when it comes to the rules of the game, "Where you stand depends on where you sit" (Miles 1978), in this case, on which side of the aisle. Informal practices were much less partisan, members' motivations and gender mattered most.

Generally, four trends suggest the legislative process in Oklahoma may be becoming more democratic. If the recent electoral gains that Republicans have made continue, they may gain enough bargaining power to force the Democratic majority to open up the process. Even though Republicans control just over 1/3 of the House and just under 1/3 in the Senate, when they remain united they pose a significant threat because of Oklahoma's super majority requirements and traditions.

Another important trend was found among junior Democratic members. On several measures these members demonstrated a willingness to distribute the power more evenly in the process. They were more willing than their senior counterparts to share power with the minority. Perhaps they are only willing to do this because they are young and naive about the process and do not currently have any power to give away. However, as a result of term limits the junior Democrats will rise to positions of prominence very soon. If their current attitudes persist the entire process may become more democratic.

The trend toward delegate representation also suggests the process may become more democratic. As senior members who consider themselves trustees are replaced by junior members who will likely consider themselves delegates, the legislature will likely experience a major shift in representational style. Individually members may become more responsive to the public. However, as a body they may find it much more difficult to compromise and fulfill the public's desires.

A final trend that may move the legislature toward a more democratic process was already underway before term limits were ever considered.

Members had already revolted against strong leadership and moved toward a more democratic leader. Data presented here demonstrated that junior members were more likely to prefer party leaders and secondary party leaders with good reputations rather than strong leadership skills. This effect of term limits is likely to re-enforce the change that was already taking place.

### Research Questions

Several specific research questions were raised in this work that can now be answered. First, are term limits altering members' motivations or other characteristics in the Oklahoma Legislature? Few significant differences between members elected before term limits and those elected after term limits were found. A "new breed" is definitely not emerging. However, those differences that were found were substantively important. For example women and Republicans are likely to make strong gains. The mean age may also decline. These could effect the issue agenda in the legislature and the overall power structure. No significant differences were found among the various motivation variables and the measures of tenure.

Second, are members' preferences toward legislative structure changing as a result of term limits? And, are members' motivations or other characteristics related to their preferred legislative structure? Term limits had almost no direct effects on members' preferences for legislative structure. Motivation was not related to members' preferred formal structures. However, some relationship was found between motivation and informal practices.

Finally, is the Oklahoma Legislative structure likely to change as a result of term limits? Data presented here do not point toward major changes.

However, many changes are taking place in the Oklahoma Legislature. As term limits effect the composition of the legislature some changes may result. A trend toward greater openness and democracy seems likely to continue. Many changes are already occurring in the Oklahoma Legislature that are not directly related to term limits. The changes will affect the process. The dynamic model posited here indicates that these changes will interact with term limits to create numerous unforeseen effects.

These results provide some of the first empirical data on the two more general research question posed here: How are the characteristics of legislators changing as a result of term limits? And, how is the institution of the legislature changing as a result of term limits? Each state is unique and the Oklahoma case may not fit many other states, but the data gathered here allowed a look at the legislative process that would have been difficult to accomplished in other states or by comparing several states. This study provides a foundation for other research which can add to the empirical understanding of term limits and legislative adaptation.

#### Coping With Limits in Oklahoma

Some changes in representation are inevitable with term limits. After 2006 there will not be any legislators with more than 12 years of experience. These members are likely to be younger on average, simply because current

long-term members have aged in office. They are also likely to act more as delegates than trustees. Depending upon the electoral winds there could be more Republicans and women in the Oklahoma Legislature than there were before term limits. These are not dramatic changes. However, they may have serious implications for the Oklahoma Legislature and the people of Oklahoma. Members of the Oklahoma Legislature are just beginning to recognize term limits as a reality.

For example, if the mix of ages in the legislature changes that could have serious policy implications. In the early 21<sup>st</sup> Century many generational conflicts are likely to arise, as Baby Boomers begin to seek social services. With fewer legislators to represent their interests, these voters may find the effects of term limits counterproductive.

It is a natural part of the career cycle for senior legislators to feel more secure in their constituencies and begin to act more independently of the winds of public opinion. This was of course the founding fathers' purpose in creating representative government. However, it is also a part of what citizens of the populist state of Oklahoma were rebelling against when they voted for term limits. Under term limits fewer legislators will be in that secure situation. Once they reach that secure point they will be term limited out of office. Trustee legislators generally find it easier to compromise in the policy process. They also tend to have more time to devote to legislation, since they can spend less time concerned about reelection. While the voters are likely to get what they desire in terms of representation, it remains to be seen if they will get what they want in terms of legislation. Term limits had greater support among Republicans than

Democrats all across the country, including in Oklahoma. If this implies that term limits supporters favor limited government and prefer a system that provides more voice, but less action, then they are likely to get the desired result.

Current electoral trends are favorable to Republicans. If their success continues well into the next decade, as long-term entrenched incumbent Democrats are forced out of office Republicans may make some gains in the legislature. A few small gains could be significant. If the Oklahoma Legislature continues to declare most legislation an emergency, requiring a super majority for passage, small gains by the Republicans could significantly shift the balance of power. Such a shift would give Republicans greater bargaining power over both policy outcomes and the legislative process. Republicans clearly would like to change both. All of this is contingent upon Republicans making electoral gains in Democratic districts in the year 2004 and beyond.

Women are also enjoying increased electoral success. These trends are likely to continue as more women seek public office. This shift in representation may have a effect on policy outcomes. Also it could effect the tone of the legislature. Women tended to prefer leaders with work ethic over other leadership qualities.

One aspect of the legislature that is not likely to change is the type of person getting elected to office. There is little evidence here that a new breed of legislator is emerging. Pre- and post-term limits members in Oklahoma are not significantly different in background or motivation. As a result the effects of term

limits are likely to be from the natural processes described above than from any direct effects on who gets elected.

If there are direct effects in Oklahoma on the legislative process they are likely to occur in two ways. Post-term limits members are more likely to prefer that some party leaders be chosen through a secret process. This indicates that they are more willing to tolerate dissent. It seems to be especially true of Democratic post-term limits members. If these members continue to hold these views when they rise to positions of leadership themselves, then the legislature may become a more democratic institution.

There is a distinct difference in attitude toward the effects of term limits between pre- and post-term limits members. Interviews reveal that many pre-term limits members believe either they will retire before the limits catch them, or they believe the limits will be repealed or struck down. Few pre-term limits members seem concerned about the effects of limits. Post-term limits members tend to accept limits as part of the terms of their contract. These differences appear to be a result of the conditions under which they were first elected.

In fact, neither group is overly concerned about the effects at this time. Some possible reasons for this are: implementation is still several years away, some believe the restrictions will be removed, junior members are following the lead of senior members who are not concerned.

A group that is becoming concerned are those mid-range members who desire to serve in leadership. Some long-term incumbents have been waiting their turn for leadership for many years. They now realize that in just a few years



they will be out, so they need to take their turn soon. However, the mid-range group of members, who have not served as long but will also be removed from office in a few years, also must see their desires for leadership positions fulfilled soon. The next battle for leadership will likely engage this conflict.

This is an important battle because the leaders of the next decade must deal with the actual effects of term limits. The decisions that they make will set the precedent for how the term limited legislature will be structured. These decisions will filter through the entire political system affecting professionalism, the organizational culture, policy, and the entire state.

These leaders will likely find it necessary to facilitate the development of future leaders. One possible way is to create a line of succession similar to that of Florida or Michigan. In this process a party leader-elect would be chosen in advance and give the opportunity to apprentice under the current leader. House Republicans have already created such a system. Another possibility is to enhance the orientation sessions and offer more of them. Currently, freshmen get a brief orientation before their first session. Orientations could be offered for others, like new leaders and new committee chairs. Orientation sessions could become longer and more specialized. Colorado has already adopted increased orientation session as a means of dealing with term limits.

Some members have proposed limiting the number of bills that a member can introduce. This was primarily proposed to deal with the shorter session requirements. With both shorter careers and shorter sessions, this proposal may get more consideration. However, several current key members believe the ability to introduce legislation is a key principle of democracy. They feel capping

**the number of bills is like capping democracy. In the current environment this proposal is not likely to succeed. But, it will continue to be discussed as members address term limits.**

**In states where term limits are already forcing members to retire more dramatic effects are being found. Perhaps this is because of the shorter limit. Perhaps it is because it is crunch time there and not in Oklahoma. Once term limits become an imminent reality in Oklahoma, members' thinking may begin to change. Currently, few Oklahoma members are concerned.**

**One of the strongest effects found in other states is an increase in progressive ambition. In California, Colorado, Michigan and others, as term limits approached many members have begun to look for other electoral opportunities (see Bell 1998, Dire 1998). Data presented here found little evidence of progressive ambition. However, when members are faced with moving up or moving out there may be increase in electoral competition for some seats.**

**In fact, it is too early to tell if many shifts in the legislative process will actually occur. It is still 8 years until the full implementation of term limits in Oklahoma. In that respect, this study is also speculative. However, this is a first attempt to analyze the effects of term limits with empirical data. The Oklahoma Legislature is in transition. Data collected here are a snapshot of members' current attitudes. These attitudes provide a baseline for future comparison and a basis for current analysis. They do not predict all of the twists and turns of the next decade. What is clear, is that the effects of term limits on a semi-**

professional legislature with lengthy limits are likely to be minimal. Perhaps the effects of term limits have been oversold by both proponents and opponents, at least in Oklahoma. They will not be the panacea that proponents hoped, nor will they be the catastrophe that opponents feared. In fact, the overall assessment of term limits may depend largely upon one's partisan point of view.

### Conclusion

This dissertation attempted to illuminate legislative adaptation through a case study of the Oklahoma Legislature and term limits. The case study approach provided the opportunity to look deep into the legislative process, and to create comparison groups that are not readily available elsewhere. Chapter 1 raised specific research questions. The quantitative and qualitative methodologies used to examine the questions and their related hypotheses were also discussed.

Chapter 2 provided an in depth look at how legislation is made in Oklahoma. This is the most comprehensive description available, compiled from a variety of printed descriptions and interview sources. The chapter discussed the legislative process from a theoretical prospective. Then, it described in detail the formal rules governing the current Oklahoma legislative process. Formal rules, however, are only a part of the story. Chapter 2 also provided a behind the scenes view of the informal practices, based on observations of the process and interviews with the participants. The process that was uncovered was described by many participants as dysfunctional. Dissatisfaction with the

process, by those who have the power to change it, would suggest some changes are likely in the near future.

Chapter 3 described survey data that were collected from members of the 46<sup>th</sup> Oklahoma Legislature. It offered descriptive statistics along with an explanation of how various items were derived. These statistics laid the foundation for the quantitative analysis that was to follow, where the linkages between term limits, member characteristics, and desired legislative structure were examined. Members' motivations were among the characteristics examined. A factor analysis revealed four dimensions of legislative motivations among current Oklahoma legislators. These four— representation, policy influence, political career, and outside interests— were unique to this study and one of its contributions.

Chapter 4 developed a model of legislative reform by integrating the models proposed by Fenno, Schlesinger, Sinclair, and others. Together these works proposed that when legislators' ambitions are inhibited by public pressure or legislative rules reform will occur. The model proposed here included a variety of internal and external environmental factors and membership characteristics. Linkages between member characteristics, including motivations, and members' preferred legislative structure were mapped. While motivations had an effect on informal practices, motivations were not found to be a significant predictor of preferred formal structures. Political party was the most important predictor. Democrats, who currently control the process, tended to prefer a structure that made the leadership strong. Republicans tended to prefer a more open and democratic process. This called into question the models of legislative reform

that posit ambition as the basis for legislative reform. Rather, it suggests that members' places in the power structure are the most important determinants of their preferred structural changes.

Chapter 5 applied a measure for term limits to the previous analysis to determine if term limits might have an effect on structural preferences. The chapter began by discussing the rise of term limits and the possible effects posited by scholars and pundits during the term limits debate. Again, few significant relationships were found. Members elected since term limits were imposed prefer a more open and democratic system than do their more senior colleagues in two ways. When selecting secondary party leaders post-term limits members are more likely than pre-term limits members to prefer a secret vote, which allows defectors to go undetected by leadership. Also, junior Democratic members were more willing than senior Democrats to share power with the Republicans. These two relationships hint that when these junior members rise to power in a few years, if these attitudes persist structural changes could occur that would make the process more democratic.

Chapter 6 examined the hypotheses proposed by scholars and pundits in light of the data presented here. Many of the concerns expressed by observers are not emerging in Oklahoma, a semi-professional legislature with lengthy limits. Generally, the effect of term limits on the Oklahoma Legislature are likely to be mild. However, the implications of these data collected here reach into several research traditions.

### **Contribution**

Oklahoma is very early in the implementation process of term limits. For that reason it is difficult to say what will be the final result. However, Oklahoma provided an unique opportunity to compare members elected before term limits to those elected after term limits. These data are among the first empirical data available on legislative adaptation to term limits around the country. While it is early, the trends found here help illuminate the term limits debate.

This study stands at the nexus of several research traditions. The findings here provide a basis for future research in each of the areas. Those who wish to study the Oklahoma Legislature can find a wealth of information previously unavailable. These data provide a baseline for further study. Those who wish to study term limits on a broader scale can find desperately lacking empirical data and a framework from which to develop their own work. Those who wish to examine legislators' motivations can find a new set of measures for motivation and they can see how those measured worked in this particular case. Those who study legislative reform can gain from the dynamic model that was posited here. Most of all they can gain the insight that political party status has the greatest effect on formal structures.

As with most social science studies this dissertation raises more questions than it answers. The next generation of term limits studies must begin to compare the effects of term limits across states. That will be easier to accomplish once states begin to feel the full impact of term limits. Professionalism of the legislature and length of limits are obvious variables that need to be considered. Broader research is needed on legislators' motivations.

**This study demonstrates that most legislators in Oklahoma are not single minded seekers of reelection. Reelection is important but not paramount to most members. If that is true on a broader scale, then the study of legislative motivations has a long way to go. The study of legislative adaptation needs to continue to refine its model. Motivations have been the central component in previous models. The findings here indicate that motivations are not as important as previously thought. These results now need to be examined in other locations.**

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## **APPENDIX 1**

### **OKLAHOMA BALLOT INITIATIVE STATE QUESTION 632**

**Be it enacted by the people of the state of Oklahoma that Section 17 of Article 5 of the Oklahoma constitution be amended by adding an additional paragraph number 17A, to read as follows:**

**Section 17A. Any member of the legislature who is elected to office after the effective date of this amendment shall be eligible to serve no more than 12 years in the Oklahoma state legislature. Years in legislative office need not be consecutive and years of service in both the senate and the house of representatives shall be added together and included in determining the total number of legislative years in office. The years served by any member elected or appointed to serve less than a full legislative term to fill a vacancy in office shall not be included in the 12-year limitation set forth herein; but no member who has completed 12 years in office shall thereafter be eligible to serve a partial term. Any member who is serving a legislative term in office or who has been elected or appointed to serve a term in office on the effective date hereof shall be entitled to complete his or her term and shall be eligible to serve an additional 12 years thereafter. This amendment shall be effective on the 1st day of the year following its adoption.**

## APPENDIX 2

### INTERVIEWS AND OBSERVATIONS

#### **Interviews**

##### ***Legislators***

Rep. Larry Adair	Oct. 19, '95	Office	
Rep. Debbie Blackburn	Feb. 19, '96	Office	
Rep. Laura Boyd	June 20, '96	Norman	
Rep. Wayne Cozart	Mar. 4, '96	Office	
Rep. Bob Ed Culver	Oct. 16, '95	Office	
	Feb. 19, '96	Office	
Rep. Frank Davis	Nov. 1, '95	Office	
Rep. Joe Eddins	Feb. 19, '96	Office	
Rep. Larry Ferguson	July 3, '95	Office	
	Oct. 19, '95	Office	
	Nov. 8, '95	Office	
Rep. Todd Hiett	Nov. 8, '95	Office	
Rep. Joe Hutchison	Nov. 14, '95	Office	
Rep. M. C. Leist	Oct. 19, '95	Office	
	Mar. 4, '96	Office	
Rep. Matlock	Mar. 18, '96	Office	
Rep. Fred Morgan	July 3, '95	Minority Office	
Rep. Jim Reese	Jan. 12, '96	Office	
Sen. Helen Cole	July 3, '95	Office	
Sen. Howard Hendrick	Feb. 6, '96	Lunch	
	Mar. 27, '96	Office	
Sen. Cal Hobson	Oct. 19, '95	Office	
Sen. Herb Rozell	Mar. 27, '96	Office	
Sen. Don Rubbottom	Mar. 18, '96	Office	
Sen. Jerry Smith	Oct. 19, '95	Office	
Sen. Trish Weedn	Feb. 29, '96	Office	
 <b><i>Non-Legislators</i></b>			
Cynthia Banister	Nov. 9, '95	Office	Jim Dunlap's Secretary
Tom Clapper	Mar. 18, '96	Office	Senate Staff
Tom Cole	Nov. 2, '95	Office	Secretary of State
Black Cook	Mar. 18, '96	Office	Senate Staff
Bunny Chambers	Apr. 21, '96	Office	Leonard Sullivan's Secretary
Carol Danoff	Oct. 24, '95	Phone	State Election Board
Dick Howard	Feb. 4, '96	Lobby	Lobbyist
George Humphreys	Oct. 19, '95	Office	House Director of Research
Clinton Key	Nov. 2, '95	Hall	Governor's Chief of Staff
Tim Linville	Mar. 18, '96	Office	Senate Staff



Kevin Nelson	Oct. 25, '95	Phone	Attorney General's Office
Novie Grimwood	Oct. 17, '95	Office	Herb Rozell's Secretary
Roger Randle	Nov. 19, '96	Phone	Former Senate President Pro Temp.
Judy Rutledge	Nov. 1, '95	Office	Larry Adair's Secretary
Lorna Stillwell	Nov. 14, '95	Office	Cal Hobson's Secretary
Frosty Troy	Feb. 19, '96	Lobby	Editor of the Oklahoma Observer
Lance Ward	Feb. 29, '96	Office	Secretary of the Senate
Larry Warden	Nov. 16, '95	Office	Chief Clerk of the House

### **Observations**

House Revenue and Taxation Committee	Nov. 2, '95
House Appropriations Sub. Comm. On Public Safety	Nov. 14, '95
House Comm. on Public Safety	Jan. 22, '96
House Comm. On Small Business	Jan. 22, '96
Senate Comm. On Business and Labor	Feb. 19, '96
Senate Comm. On Agriculture and Rural Development	Feb. 12, '96
Senate	Feb. 28, '96
Senate	Feb. 29, '96
House	Feb. 5, '96
House	Mar. 4, '96
House Comm. On Public Safety	Mar. 18, '96
House	Apr. 3, '96
House	May 27, '96

## APPENDIX 3

### Survey of Members of the Oklahoma House of Representatives Department of Political Science University of Oklahoma

Your responses on this questionnaire are purely for academic purposes and are strictly **confidential**.

As a member you have a variety of interests to balance while you serve in the legislature. These concerns relate to your family, your district, the state, and even the legislature itself. Think about your own desires as a legislator. *(For the following questions circle the number that represents how important each is to you. Use the scale from 0 to 5, with 0 being "not at all important" and 5 being "extremely important.")*

	not important			extremely important		
As a legislator how important is it to you	0	1	2	3	4	5
to serve in your party's leadership?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to protect your district's interests?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to position yourself to seek higher office?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to sponsor legislation that helps the whole state?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to serve a full 12 years?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to be a committee chair or vice-chair?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to create options for yourself when you leave the legislature?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to sponsor legislation that helps your district?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to expand your business connections?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to get re-elected next time?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to have informal influence with your peers?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to be perceived as a leader in your district?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to find current business opportunities?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to sponsor major policy initiatives?	0	1	2	3	4	5
to serve your fellowman?	0	1	2	3	4	5

If a situation arose where you had to choose between the following actions which would you choose to do? *(For each of the following groups check one from each pair.)*

<input type="checkbox"/> serve in leadership <input type="checkbox"/> pursue your major policy objective	<input type="checkbox"/> get re-elected <input type="checkbox"/> seek higher office
<input type="checkbox"/> enhance your position outside legislature <input type="checkbox"/> serve in leadership	<input type="checkbox"/> pursue your major policy objective <input type="checkbox"/> get re-elected
<input type="checkbox"/> pursue your major policy objective <input type="checkbox"/> enhance your position outside legislature	<input type="checkbox"/> pursue your major policy objective <input type="checkbox"/> seek higher office
<input type="checkbox"/> seek higher office <input type="checkbox"/> serve in leadership	<input type="checkbox"/> serve in leadership <input type="checkbox"/> get re-elected

Beginning in 1997 how many more years do you hope to serve in the House? \_\_\_\_

The next set of questions deal with the way the legislature is organized. Think about how you would like to see it designed. (For the following questions circle a number to rate each on the scale from 0 to 5.)

In the selection of the Speaker or Minority Leader  
how important should be

	not important			extremely important		
seniority?	0	1	2	3	4	5
ability to get things done?	0	1	2	3	4	5
policy ideas?	0	1	2	3	4	5
willingness to spend time?	0	1	2	3	4	5
reputation among members?	0	1	2	3	4	5
leadership qualities?	0	1	2	3	4	5
ability to work with the other party's leader?	0	1	2	3	4	5
past loyalty to party?	0	1	2	3	4	5
committee experience?	0	1	2	3	4	5

What is the one most important criterion for choosing your party's leader? \_\_\_\_\_

How suitable as a method for selecting the party leader

	not suitable			extremely suitable		
is automatic succession of leaders?	0	1	2	3	4	5
is pledge cards?	0	1	2	3	4	5
is an open vote in caucus?	0	1	2	3	4	5
is a secret vote in caucus?	0	1	2	3	4	5

What is the one best method for your party to choose its leader? \_\_\_\_\_

Should there be limits on the number of years a member can serve as the party leader?  
\_\_yes \_\_no If so, how many years should they be allowed to serve? \_\_\_\_\_

How satisfied are you with the current process for selecting your party's leader?

\_\_very satisfied \_\_somewhat satisfied  
\_\_somewhat dissatisfied \_\_very dissatisfied

In the selection of committee chairs and vice-chairs  
how important should be

	not important			extremely important		
seniority?	0	1	2	3	4	5
ability to get things done?	0	1	2	3	4	5
policy ideas?	0	1	2	3	4	5
willingness to spend time?	0	1	2	3	4	5
reputation among members?	0	1	2	3	4	5
leadership qualities?	0	1	2	3	4	5
ability to work with minority leadership?	0	1	2	3	4	5
past loyalty to party?	0	1	2	3	4	5
committee experience?	0	1	2	3	4	5
ability to work with majority leadership?	0	1	2	3	4	5

What is the one most important criterion for choosing committee chairs? \_\_\_\_\_

How suitable as a method for selecting committee chairs and vice-chairs	not suitable			extremely suitable		
is the Speaker appoints?	0	1	2	3	4	5
is each party leader appoints their own?	0	1	2	3	4	5
is seniority?	0	1	2	3	4	5
is an open vote in caucus?	0	1	2	3	4	5
is a secret vote in caucus?	0	1	2	3	4	5
is the House votes?	0	1	2	3	4	5

What is the one best method to choose committee chairs? \_\_\_\_\_

Should there be limits on the number of years a member can be a chair of the same committee?  
 \_\_\_yes \_\_\_no If so, how many years should they be allowed to serve? \_\_\_\_

How satisfied are you with the current process for selecting committee chairs and vice-chairs?  
 \_\_\_very satisfied \_\_\_somewhat satisfied  
 \_\_\_somewhat dissatisfied \_\_\_very dissatisfied

When choosing your caucus leaders, other than the Speaker or Minority Leader, what should be the most important criterion? \_\_\_\_\_

By what method should your caucus leaders, other than the Speaker or Minority Leader, be chosen? \_\_\_\_\_

Considering the current balance of power in the legislature and your personal preferences, should the following people be given more or less power?	much less power			much more power		
the leadership	0	1	2	3	4	5
lobbyists	0	1	2	3	4	5
the minority	0	1	2	3	4	5
committee chairs	0	1	2	3	4	5
individual members	0	1	2	3	4	5
staff	0	1	2	3	4	5
senior members	0	1	2	3	4	5
the majority	0	1	2	3	4	5
new members	0	1	2	3	4	5
the governor	0	1	2	3	4	5

How much do you rely on lobbyists for each of the following functions?	not at all			a great deal		
write legislation	0	1	2	3	4	5
provide research	0	1	2	3	4	5
provide advice	0	1	2	3	4	5
entertainment	0	1	2	3	4	5

What is the one most important function you rely on lobbyists to perform? \_\_\_\_\_

How much do you rely on staff for each of the following functions?	not at all				a great deal	
handle the paper work	0	1	2	3	4	5
write legislation	0	1	2	3	4	5
help with constituency service	0	1	2	3	4	5
provide research	0	1	2	3	4	5
provide advice	0	1	2	3	4	5

What is the one most important function you rely on staff to perform? \_\_\_\_\_

What is the biggest problem with the way the legislature currently operates?

What are the one or two most important changes in the legislative process that you think would most improve the system?

What is the most important unwritten rule of the legislature?

How likely are you to someday run for the State Senate?  
 \_\_\_very likely \_\_\_somewhat likely \_\_\_somewhat unlikely \_\_\_not at all likely

Which of the following is a legislator's most important job?  
 \_\_\_doing what he/she thinks is right  
 \_\_\_representing the wishes of his/her constituents

What role did the existence of term limits play in your decision to run for office in 1994?  
 \_\_\_a very important role \_\_\_a somewhat important role \_\_\_not much of a role

Of which race do you consider yourself to be a member?  
 \_\_\_Caucasian \_\_\_African American \_\_\_Native American \_\_\_Hispanic \_\_\_other\_\_\_\_\_

What is the highest level of formal education you completed?  
                                   [ H.S. ][ Col. ][ Grad. ]  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

What is your occupation? \_\_\_\_\_

Do you consider yourself to be a full time legislator? \_\_\_yes \_\_\_no

Including your legislative compensation approximately what was your family income last year?  
 \$\_\_\_\_\_

Thank you for completing this confidential survey. Would you like to receive aggregate results of this study in January? \_\_\_yes \_\_\_no

## APPENDIX 4

### MEMBERS OF THE 46<sup>TH</sup> OKLAHOMA LEGISLATURE AND YEARS OF SERVICE

<u>Party-District</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Year First Elected</u>	<u>Total Service</u>
<i>Senate</i> <sup>1</sup>			
(D-43)	Ben Brown*	80	18
(D-46)	Bernest Cain*	78	20
(R-34)	Grover Campbell*	86	12
(D-26)	Gilmer Capps*	70	28
(D-4)	Larry Dickerson*	86	12
(R-40)	Brooks Douglass	90	8
(R-29)	James Dunlap	88	10
(D-18)	Kevin Easley*	84	14
(R-47)	Mike Fair*	66	20 <sup>2</sup>
(D-12)	Ted Fisher*	86	12
(R-51)	Charles Ford*	66	32
(R-22)	Bill Gustafson	90	8
(D-50)	Kelly Haney*	80	18
(D-10)	Berry Harrison	90	8
(D-31)	Sam Helton	92	6
(R-52)	Howard Hendrick*	86	12
(D-17)	Brad Henry	92	6
(D-42)	David Herbert *	86	12
(D-16)	Cal Hobson*	78	20
(D-11)	Maxine Horner*	86	12
(D-38)	Robert Kerr*	86	12
(R-49)	Owen Laughlin	96	2
(D-44)	Keith Leftwich*	82	14 <sup>3</sup>
(D-1)	Rick Littlefield*	82	16
(D-37)	Lewis Long	88	10
(D-32)	Jim Maddox	88	10
(R-24)	Carol Martin	94	4
(D-6)	Billy Mickle	88	10
(R-19)	Robert Milacek	76	8 <sup>4</sup>
(D-48)	Angela Monson	90	8
(D-21)	Mike Morgan	96	2
(D-20)	Paul Muegge	90	8
(D-23)	Bruce Price	92	6
(D-5)	Jeff Rabon	96	2
(D-14)	Darryl Roberts*	82	16
(D-9)	Ben Robinson	88	10

(D-3)	Herb Rozell*	76	22
(D-8)	Frank Shurden*	78	20
(R-39)	Jerry Smith*	72	26
(R-39)	Mark Snyder	88	10
(D-7)	Gene Stipe*	52	46
(D-2)	Straton Taylor*	78	20
(D-15)	Trish Weedn	88	10
(R-45)	Kathleen Wilcoxson	96	2
(D-13)	Dick Wilkerson	88	10
(D-33)	Penny Williams*	80	18
(R-35)	Jim Williamson	80	8 <sup>5</sup>
(R-54)	Ged Wright*	82	16

*House*

(D-86)	Larry Adair*	82	16
(R-80)	Scott Adkins	94	4
(D-50)	Jari Askins	94	4
(D-94)	Gary Bastin*	84	14
(D-61)	Jack Begley	88	10
(D-63)	Loyd Benson*	84	14
(D-60)	Randy Beutler	92	6
(D-88)	Debbie Blackburn	94	4
(D-55)	Jack Bonny	92	6
(D-23)	Betty Boyd	90	8
(D-44)	Laura Boyd	92	6
(D-52)	David Braddock	96	2
(R-70)	John Bryant	88	10
(R-95)	Bill Case	94	4
(R-101)	Forrest Claunch	94	4
(R-53)	Carolyn Coleman	90	8
(D-45)	Wallace Collins	96	2
(D-57)	James Covey	96	2
(D-97)	Kevin Cox*	80	18
(D-4)	Bob Ed Culver	90	8
(R-85)	Odilia Dank	94	4
(R-31)	Frank Davis*	78	20
(D-62)	Abe Deutschendor	94	4
(D-21)	James Dunegan	90	8
(D-78)	Mary Easley	96	2
(D-6)	Joe Eddins	94	4
(D-28)	Mike Ervin	94	4
(D-19)	Randall Erwin	92	6
(R-35)	Larry Ferguson*	84	14
(D-18)	Lloyd Fields	92	6
(D-15)	Bobby Frame	96	2
(D-72)	Darrell Gilbert	96	2

(D-65)	Jim Glover*	76	22
(R-84)	Bill Graves	88	10
(D-89)	Charles Gray	92	6
(R-54)	Joan Greenwood	88	10
(D-36)	James Hager	88	10
(D-3)	James Hamilton*	67	24 <sup>6</sup>
(R-79)	Chris Hastings	94	4
(D-12)	Jerry Hefner	88	10
(R-29)	Todd Hiatt	94	4
(D-22)	Danny Hilliard	90	8
(D-5)	Joe Hutchison	92	6
(R-34)	Terry Ingmire	96	2
(R-90)	Charles Key*	86	12
(D-32)	Don Kinnamon	88	10
(D-64)	Ron Kirby	92	6
(R-43)	Tony Kouba	90	8
(D-56)	Ronald Langmacher	92	6
(D-16)	MC Leist*	86	12
(D-93)	Al Lindley	96	2
(R-77)	Mark Liotta	96	2
(R-58)	Elmer Maddux	88	10
(D-17)	Mike Mass	90	8
(D-1)	Terry Matlock	90	8
(D-51)	Raymond McCarter	96	2
(R-46)	Doug Miller	94	4
(D-42)	Billy Mitchell*	84	14
(R-83)	Fred Morgan	94	4
(R-37)	Jim Newport	96	2
(R-40)	Mike O'Neal	94	4
(D-74)	Phil Ostrander	96	2
(D-92)	Bill Paulk	88	10
(R-69)	Fred Perry	94	4
(R-39)	Wayne Pettigrew	94	4
(R-100)	Richard Phillips	92	6
(D-25)	Bob Plunk	94	4
(D-59)	Clay Pope	94	4
(R-98)	Tim Pope	88	10
(R-47)	Dan Ramsey	94	4
(R-38)	Jim Reese*	86	12
(D-8)	Larry Rice*	86	12
(D-66)	Russ Roach*	86	12
(D-7)	Larry Roberts*	82	16
(D-73)	Don Ross*	82	16
(D-48)	Al Sadler	90	8
(D-68)	Shelby Satterfield	90	8
(D-96)	Mark Seikel	88	10



(D-13)	Bill Settle	90	8
(D-27)	Dale Smith	90	8
(R-67)	Hopper Smith	96	2
(D-14)	Barbara Staggs	94	4
(D-96)	Fred Stanley	90	8
(D-9)	Dwayne Steidley*	86	12
(D-2)	JT Stites	90	8
(R-71)	John Sullivan	94	4
(R-82)	Leonard Sullivan*	86	12
(D-10)	Gary Taylor	88	10
(D-20)	Tommy Thomas	88	10
(R-75)	Mike Thornbrugh	92	6
(D-99)	Opio Toure	94	4
(D-24)	Dale Turner	96	2
(D-30)	Michael Tyler	88	10
(R-81)	Ray Vaughn	88	10
(D-41)	Sean Voskuhl	90	8
(D-26)	Robert Weaver	88	10
(R-91)	Dan Webb	90	8
(R-76)	Don Weese	90	8
(D-33)	Dale Wells	92	6
(R-11)	Mike Wilt	96	2
(R-87)	Robert Worthen*	86	12

\* Members who would be prevented from seeking re-election if the current 12 year lifetime term limit law was effective in 1998.

Compiled by author from *Who is Who in the 46th Oklahoma Legislature*.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Senators with even numbered districts will face re-election in 1998, those with odd numbered districts face re-election in 2000.

<sup>2</sup> House '66-'68; '78-'86; Senate '88-'98.






<sup>3</sup> House '82-'88; Senate '90-'98.

<sup>4</sup> House '76-'82; Senate '96-'98. Milacek has only accumulated 2 years toward the lifetime limit.

<sup>5</sup> House '80-'86; Senate '96-'98. Williamson has only accumulated 2 years toward the lifetime limit.

<sup>6</sup> Senate '66-'76; House '84-'98.

# IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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