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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE REBIRTH OF CIVIL SOCIETY: ELITE CONVERGENCE, MOBILIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

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A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE

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thousands miles away). To their joy and relief, I can finally admire the view from the top of the mountain. And it is quite a magnificent view, indeed!

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Abstract

This doctoral dissertation represents an attempt at reevaluating theoretical thinking about the role of religion in political and socio-historical processes, and at demonstrating that religion mattered in the democratic transition of east central European societies. More specifically, this research examines how the Catholic Church contributed to the reemergence of civil society, and by extension to the democratic transition of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The role of the Catholic Church in these two countries was the result of a unique and complex combination of factors. When the Church started to acknowledge the significance of civil society in its diplomacy and put a greater emphasis on the defense of human rights, it set in motion a process of elite convergence and mass mobilization in both Poland and Czechoslovakia. Indeed, as the Church reevaluated its approach toward Eastern Europe, secular dissidents, who became disillusioned with communism, came to conclusions of their own. Their quest for freedom, they realized, demanded the reclaiming of the public sphere and the rebuilding of a civil society on the basis of a rediscovery of moral values and the transcendent. This attempt to live in the truth in essence was not so different from the discourse of the Catholic Church on human rights. In fact, the Church participated in diffusing the very ideas that secular elites were fighting for. Thus, after decades of anticlericalism, secular elites acknowledged that their path had to cross that of the Church. Abandoning their anticlerical stance, secular elites opened the door for an eventual dialogue with the Catholic Church. Such a process, however, only became a reality, because of the constant efforts of a group of individuals, who were strategically located at the junction of both religious and secular spheres.

In addition to these developments at the elite level, the Church also nurtured moral and religious values at the grassroots level, sometimes in difficult conditions such as in Czechoslovakia. The stronger and more visible position of the Polish Church served as a source of inspiration to Czech and Slovak underground activists. After years of relentless efforts and an intricate process of diffusion, this action at the grassroots level participated in the rebirth of civil society. It catalyzed the larger mobilization of the popular masses, and eventually contributed to the collapse of communism.

Ironically, the 1989 revolutions and the transformations that followed, revealed that both the ambition a morally vibrant civil society and the Catholic contribution to the reclaiming of the public sphere were linked with the fate of communism. They did not survive the reality of power and liberal democracy. The socio-economic environment created by political and economic reforms indeed changed the priorities of east central European societies. Factors which had contributed to the positive role of the Catholic Church in the phase of democratic transition, disappeared during the stage of democratic consolidation. The Church failed to assess the significance of these changes and to adjust to them. Consequently, it suffered a backlash. Elites and the Church parted way, while popular masses expressed a growing resentment against what they perceive to be too activist a Church.

In the end, the Church seems to have a lost a unique opportunity to build upon the moral capital accumulated during the years of struggle against communism. And if it still wants to participate positively in the democratic consolidation, it must now face the difficult challenge to find a new position for itself and learn to adapt to a pluralist environment.

Introduction

Le vingt et unième siècle sera spirituel, ou ne sera pas.
André Malraux.

For it is one thing to see the land of peace from a woodedridge
...and another to tread the road that leads to it.
St. Augustine, Confessions, VII, xxi.

A. Subject and Significance:

Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, western democracies applauded as authoritarian regimes around the world fell one after the other. Nowhere was this wave of democratization[1] more dramatic than in Eastern Europe. After a reign of nearly forty-five years, communism finally collapsed from within. These 1989 revolutions not only came unexpectedly, but they also substantially reordered political and social life in eastern European countries. Most of these changes represented a rather astonishing turn of events. For instance, for about four decades communist Eastern Europe had waged a relentless war against religion. These very same atheistic regimes were now agonizing, while the world was witnessing the flourishing of religious activities and the return of religion into the European public square.

This twist of history raises fundamental questions. Did religion return because of citizens exercising their new found freedom? Or was it there all along, perhaps contributing to the demise of communism, and now claiming the victor's reward? In other words, were events, such as the election of a Polish Pope in 1978 or the activities of the Polish Priest Jerzy Popiełuszko isolated phenomena, or did they represent the trees that hide a denser forest.

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[1] Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1991).

It is the ambition of this dissertation to bring forth some answers to these questions and to reevaluate theoretical thinking about the role of religion in political and socio-historical revolutions. More specifically, it represents a theoretical endeavor to demonstrate that religion mattered in the collapse of communism. This research examines the role and the influence of the Catholic Church in the reemergence of civil society during the process of democratic transformation of central and eastern European countries. This study is not limited to the transition *stricto sensu*, viz. the fall of communist regimes. Since the 1989 events only marked the climax of an evolutionary process, it is also necessary to trace back the role of religion in the emergence of civil society.

This work aims at mapping territories that have been neglected by researchers. In the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions, the return of religion to the European political stage rapidly generated a lively debate about the appropriate place of churches in post-communist societies.[2] Far less consideration has been devoted to the role of religion as an explanatory factor in the collapse of communism. In fact, the growing literature on the breakdown of communism, which enriches our understanding of these events, generally overlooks the relevance of religion in studying democratic transitions.

B. Review of the Literature:

Numerous works have tried to explain the collapse of communism. The current body of literature roughly encompasses at least three types of explanations.

A first set of explanations looks for endogenous factors. Some commentators emphasize the role of structural factors, such as the economy. In their view, the

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[2] Adam Michnic, "The Church and the Martyr's Stake in Poland," *New Perspectives Quarterly* vol. 10 (Summer 1993) no. 3, 32-37; Sabrina Ramet, "The New Church and

functioning of centrally-planned economies intrinsically was flawed. Instead of accumulation and growth, eastern European countries rapidly experienced shortages and an endemic economic crisis.[3] This economic inefficiency became fatal, because the communist world could not keep up with the advance of its arch-enemy. As capitalism quickly embarked in a challenging era of accelerated technological and communication developments in the 1970s, the communist world seemed to be afflicted by stagnation and even economic regression. In essence, "the fall of [communism]," indicates Katherine Verdery, "[resulted from] the collision of two [contradicting] constituted temporal orders."[4] As the communist sphere declined economically, the legitimacy of its political regimes (or what was left of it) evaporated accordingly.

Strongly influenced by the work done on Latin America, a second group of authors points to the strategic role played by elites. When it becomes apparent that the regime is crippled by economic problems and corruption, and can no longer impose its rule by force, elites must confront the need for reforms. According to this line of reasoning, it is the position of these very elites, which define the type of democratic transition. As the crisis of the communist system indeed became critical, factionalism within the party drastically increased. Since orthodox communists held on to structures of power and opposed any sort of political changes, reformers looked for possible interlocutors outside the system. As a dialogue unfolded with oppositional elites,

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State Configuration in Eastern Europe," *East European Politics and Societies* vol. 5 (Spring 1991) no. 2, 247-267.

[3] Valerie Bunce, "Two-Tiered Stalinism: A Case of Self-Destruction," in *Constructing Capitalism: The Reemergence of Civil Society and Liberal Economy in the Post-Communist World*, ed. Kazimierz Z. Ponanski (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 25-45; Janos Kornai, *The Socialist System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); See also the April 1994 issue of *Theory and Society* devoted to the causes of the demise of communism.

[4] Katherine Verdery, "What was Socialism and Why did it Fall?" *Contention* vol. 3 (Fall 1993) no. 1, 20.

countries could embark on a negotiated transition. Such was the destiny of both Hungary and Poland for instance.

When the reformist wing remained too weak in countries such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia, oppositional elites were propelled to the front stage as popular mobilization took place. As the hard-core leadership vacillated under popular pressure, the communist regimes needed to reach out to oppositional elites to avoid complete chaos. These oppositional elites eventually displaced communist leaders. The transition could also be initiated from inside the party, when reformers replaced orthodox communists in the heights of power. Bulgaria nicely illustrated that third case.[5] However, when there were no real political and economic forces in the opposition, and more significantly an absence of reformist forces within the party transition happened in the form of a "revolutionary upheaval" such as in Romania.[6]

A third school of thought attributes the cause of the 1989 revolutions to the awakening of civil society. "A regime does not collapse," writes Adam Przeworski, "unless and until some alternative is organized in such a way to present a real choice for isolated individuals."[7] Although, as we shall see further, dissidents denied any claim of representing a political alternative to communist regimes, it is the very pressure

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[5] See John Higley and Jan Pakulski, "Revolution and Elite Transformation in Eastern Europe," *Australian Journal of Political Science* vol. 27 (March 1992) no. 1, 114-119; Russell Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective," *World Politics* 44 (October 1991) no. 1, 113-138; Also, Huntington, *The Third Wave* (especially chapter 3) where he distinguishes three different types of elite involvement.

[6] Grzegorz Ekiert, "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration," *British Journal of Political Science* vol. 21 (July 1991) no. 3, 307.

[7] Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions*, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 52, cited by Sabrina Ramet in *Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The*

exercised by a renascent civil society that brought about democratization. Poland is the most common example used by this kind of analysis.[8]

Apart from domestic causes, a second set of explanations emphasizes the international dimension of the collapse of communism. In this regard, it is worth noting that the literature on democratic transition in Eastern Europe departs from the analysis in the context of Latin America and Southern Europe. Although these latter studies do not completely discard the existence of an international dimension in the process of democratic transition, they consider international factors to be secondary. Compared to endogenous factors, such as the role of elites or issues of economic development, international factors "tend to play an indirect and usually marginal role."[9] Yet, in the context of Eastern Europe, the consideration of exogenous factors is unavoidable. As Kumar points out, "the 1989 revolutions were an international phenomenon right from the beginning."[10]

Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation 2nd ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 9.

[8] Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society, Toward Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* vol. 5 (July 1994) no. 3, 5-6; Michael H. Bernhard, "Civil Society and Democratization in the East Central European Context," in *The Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals and Oppositional Elites, 1976-1980* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

[9] See Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 5. For a critique of this branch of the literature on democratization, see Geoffrey Pridham, "The International Dimension of Democratization: Theory, Practice and Inter-Regional Comparisons," in *Building Democracy? The International of Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe*, eds. Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Sanford (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 7-31; also Dean McSweeney and Clive Tempest, "The Political Science of Democratic Transition in Eastern Europe," *Political Studies* (1993) XLI, 408-419.

[10] K. Kumar, "The 1989 Revolutions and the Idea of Europe," *Political Studies* (September 1992), 441, cited by Pridham in "The International Dimension of Democratization," 8.

For some writers, change was the direct consequence of western policies, such as the military emphasis of American foreign policy under the Reagan Administration. Renewal of the arms race, which actually meant re-actualizing the Cold War, exhausted the meager resources of both the military and economy of the Soviet Union, thereby compelling Gorbachev to undertake significant reforms.[11] For others, change was more intimately linked to Gorbachev's leadership. His political choices, rather than any type of western pressures, contributed to the fall of communism. According to this analysis, the policies of *Glasnost*, *Perestroika*, and more significantly of *New Thinking* precipitated the breakaway of eastern European countries. By renouncing the conservative policy of his predecessors, the Soviet leader undermined the position of Orthodox East European communist elites. Orthodoxy was no longer legitimate. The new spirit of the time, viz., reform, brought new expectations among the people.[12] The impact created by the changes initiated by Moscow unleashed forces that Gorbachev could not control. His own acceptance of the Sinatra doctrine (i.e., the refusal to interfere in the internal affairs of other socialist countries) as early as March 1988 constituted a turning point in the fate of eastern European countries. It marked the end of the Soviet imperial era in Eastern Europe.

Among other noted international factors was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, especially the Helsinki Final Act: by reinforcing principles of civil liberties, these international forums constituted the first

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[11] Ivan Szelenyi and Balazs Szelenyi, "Why Socialism failed: Toward a Theory of System Breakdown -Causes of disintegration of East European State Socialism," *Theory and Society* vol. 23 (April 1994), 224-225.

[12] Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Michael G. Roskin, "1989: The Gorbachev Factor," in *The Rebirth of East Europe* 2nd ed. (Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1994), 126-147; Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post Communist Transition," 113-138; Ralf Dahrendorf, *Reflections on the Revolution in*

step toward the rebirth of civil society that was so essential in the process of transition.[13] Yet, for another cluster of writers, this international explanation involved a much wider range of causes. As Kumar indicates,

> The causes of the revolutions and the conditions of their success were largely external (changes in Soviet Policy); the ideas were mainly derived from external sources (western liberal ideas going back to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution); and the fate of the revolutions in the individual countries is, by general consent, dependent to a large degree on the reactions and intentions of the international community towards the new regimes.[14]

Yet, a third much more compelling set of explanations, as some writers have argued, is found in a combination of causes.[15] "The system breakdown," Ivan and Balazs Szelenyi insist, "was the result of the interaction of several factors, endogenous [elite fragmentation] and exogenous [international and military competition], which happened to be present almost by accident at the same time and at the same place."[16] Not so differently from meteorologists, who study climate phenomena, these two authors argue that the collapse of communism was not necessarily inevitable; that change resulted from the conjunction of multiple factors at one particular point in time. According to this analysis, the inability of eastern European authorities to reform their declining economies in the mid-1970s compelled these countries to look for external

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Europe (Toronto: Random House, 1990), 16-17; Richard Sakwa, *Gorbachev and His Reforms: 1985-1990* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1990).

[13] Laurence Whitehead, "East-Central Europe in Comparative Perspective," in *Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratization in Eastern* Europe, eds. Pridham, Herring and Sanford, 46-51.

[14] Kumar, *loc. cit.* For a review of the literature on the international dimension in democratic transition theory, see Geoffrey Pridham, *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 1-28. Also, Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization* (Autumn 1978), 881-911.

[15] Huntington, 31-108.

[16] Ivan Szelenyi and Balazs Szelenyi, "Why Socialism failed," 221.

solutions, such as foreign credit. By the early 1980s, communist regimes were confronted with a triple dilemma. While their previous economic problems remained unsolved and even worsened, eastern European countries were now heavily in debt. Their economies were unable to compete in a world market and by no means in a condition to face the challenges of a new technological era. It is the conjunction of both internal and external dismal economic conditions which contributed to a fragmentation of elites. The emergence of reformers was facilitated by the coming of age of a new generation of bureaucrats. Born out of the post-Stalinist period, these elites were not only receptive to the necessity of structural change, but were less inclined to the use of brutal force. In some countries, this uncertainty at the elite level allowed society to reclaim portions of the public sphere either in the form of a secondary economy like Hungary or trade unions like Poland. However, these changes were only possible because the Soviet Union itself initiated reforms and eventually renounced its hegemonic position in Eastern Europe. The result was a succession of transformations, in which each stage affected the subsequent one in a snowballing effect. Thus, none of the 1989 revolutions were identical. Since in each country, each factor had a different weight, each revolution, like each storm was produced by a different combination of interacting factors.[17] Laszlo Bruszt and David Stark have made a similar argument. They have argued that in 1989, there was not one type of transition, but rather a "plurality of transitions with diverse paths to different type of political institutions."[18] One of the reasons for theses differences according to them has the been the fact that

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[17] Huntington, 31-108.
[18] Laszlo Bruszt and David Stark, "Remaking the Political Field in Hungary: From the Politics of Confrontation to the Politic of Competition," in *Eastern Europe in Revolution*, ed. Ivo Banac (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 16.

transitions in Eastern Europe were not simultaneous, but occurred in sequence, each experience affecting patterns of change in the subsequent transformations.

Despite the inherent qualities of the works heretofore mentioned, they pay very little or insufficient attention to the contribution made by religion as an explanatory factor. Religion has been neglected because of conventional assumptions in the social sciences concerning its irrelevance, if not obsolescence. Through modernization, development and secularization theories,[19] as Jose Casanova bemoans, social scientists have propagated "the myth that [...] history [is] the progressive evolution of humanity from superstition to reason from belief to unbelief, from religion to science."[20] In other words, religion is expected to wither away. If it does not completely disappear, religion will at least be expelled from the public square and ultimately confined to the private sphere. Or in the words of Hans Kohn, "religion [will] retreat into the intimacy and spontaneity of the individual conscience."[21]

It is then hardly surprising to find the same argument in the scholarly literature. In *The End of History and the Last Man*, for instance, Francis Fukuyama can brush aside the significance of religion without facing too much criticism. He contends that, the 1989 revolutions represent the triumph of liberalism. Since "liberalism [has]

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[19] See for instance, Harvey Cox, *The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective* 3rd. ed. (New York: Collier Books, 1990); Neil J. Smelzer, *Sociology: An Introduction* (New York: Wiley, 1973); *Brian Wilson, Religion in Secular Society (Baltimore: Penguin, 1966)*; Harry Eckstein and David Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York: Free Press, 1963); Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

[20] Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 17.

[21] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Backgrounds* (New York: Collier Books, 1967), 24.

vanquished religion in Europe,"[22] there is no real need to dwell on religious issues. In response to Huntington's observations on the role of Catholicism in the most recent wave of democratization, Fukuyama closes any possible discussion by merely indicating that "religion *per se* did not create free societies; Christianity in a certain sense had to abolish itself through a secularization of its goals before liberalism could emerge."[23] It is certainly true that no single factor can explain the unfolding of the 1989 events. Nonetheless, to discard the relevance of the religious factor so quickly is to deny social science one of the pieces of the puzzle. Otherwise, how should scholars of comparative politics account for the fact that some of the highly political acts of resistance in Eastern Europe happened to be religious events, such as the Velehrad pilgrimages in Czechoslovakia?

To be fair, it must be acknowledged that a few authors have taken notice of the religious factor in the transformations of central and eastern European societies. A first group of writers and journalists, has offered contributions that remain chronological and descriptive.[24] Barbara Von der Heydt, for instance, provides the reader with a series of individual testimonies which highlight the importance of religious beliefs.[25] Similarly, George Weigel, unveils the spiritual nature of the 1989 revolutions. Yet, he fails to anchor his analysis to a theoretical framework, and tends to attribute the bulk of

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[22] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1992), 271.
[23] *Ibid.*, 216.
[24] Most of these accounts are journalistic in nature. See Sergio Trasatti. *La Croce e la Stella: La Chiesa e I Regimi Comunisti in Europa dal 1917 a Oggi* (The Cross and the Star: The Church and the Communist Regimes in Europe from 1917 until Today) (Milano: Arnoldo Mondatori, 1993); Bernard Lecomte, *La Vérité L'emportera toujours sur le Mensonge* (Truth will always Win over Lie) (Paris: JC. Lattès, 1991); Bud Bultman, *Revolution by Candlelight* (Portland: Multinomah, 1991).
[25] Barbara Von der Heydt, *Candles Behind the Wall: Heroes of the Peaceful Revolution that Shattered Communism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993).

responsibility for the 1989 revolutions only to John Paul II.[26] Such an approach underestimates the complexity of the religious factor, and limits its explanatory power by more or less implying a church-state frame of analysis. As to Stehle, he updated his 1979 history of diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the communist world, but without addressing the causes of the collapse of communism.[27]

Only a handful of writers have tried to tackle the issue of religion from a theoretical point of view. Huntington, for instance, indicates that "roughly three quarters of the countries that transited to democracy between 1974 and 1989 were Catholic countries."[28] In his view, this phenomenon can be explained by various causes.[29]

First, he argues that economic growth, not Catholicism itself, contributed to democratization. The conventional wisdom about the special relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, or Protestantism and democracy, Huntington suggests, fails to provide a satisfying explanation. While historically Catholic countries have been economically poorer, they have experienced a strong economic development in the 1950s and 1960s, thereby catching up with their Protestant counterparts. In other words, Catholic countries have met a crucial requirement (viz., a sufficient level of economic development) for the unfolding of a democratic transition. However, this point does not necessarily explain variations of transformations among Catholic countries.

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[26] George Weigel, *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and The Collapse of Communism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
[27] Hansjakob Stehle, *Geheimdiplomatie im Vatikan: Die Päpste und die Kommunisten* (Secret Diplomacy in the Vatican: The Popes and the Communists) (Zürich: Verlag, 1993). This work was originally published in 1975 under the title, *Die Ostpolitik des Vaticans, 1917-1975*, and translated in its English version in 1979.
[28] Huntington, 73.
[29] *Ibid.*, 72-85.

Second, he emphasizes that the Catholic Church underwent internal changes following the Second Vatican Council. From the mid-1960s on, the Catholic Church not only embraced the democratic ideal, but also became an outspoken advocate of human rights. The major problem with this argument is that it does not take into account the complex nature of the Catholic Church. This transnational institution is far from being a monolithic actor. And the explanation sketched by Huntington only seems to apply to countries located outside of Europe, mostly in Latin America. However, even there, he does not give any justification for the support of Liberation Theology and Marxist ideals by certain segments of the Church in countries such as Nicaragua. I will argue that there is a genuine difference between the Latin American and European contexts. On the European continent, the acceptance of democracy by the Catholic Church actually can be traced to the 1940s when the Vatican decided to support postwar Christian Democratic Parties. By denouncing totalitarianism, and by playing by the rule of democratic structures, the Catholic Church implicitly and essentially adopted a policy of defense of human rights.

In the context of Europe, the Catholic Church did not wait until the mid-1960s to oppose communist regimes. The Vatican issued its first explicit condemnation of the Soviet Union and communism in the 1937 *Divini Redemptoris* Encyclical. On this occasion, Catholics were even asked not to cooperate with communists. When communism was established in Central and Eastern Europe after the Second World War, leaders of the Catholic Church in several of these countries became outspoken opponents of these regimes. Some even paid a harsh price for their opposition.[30]

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[30] Along with Josef Beran in Czechoslovakia, Alojzije Stepinac in Croatia, József Mindzenty in Hungary, and Stefan Wyszyński in Poland, numerous bishops and theologians were sentenced to prison.

Actually, it was not until the 1960s that –for the sake of its survival– the Vatican gave up its systematic opposition to communist leaders for a new form of dialogue. The *Ostpolitik*, as it was called, paralleled internal church developments triggered by the Second Vatican Council. Notwithstanding the problem of timing of Huntington's argument in the European context, the thrust of his reasoning remains compelling. This author indeed argues that ideas and discursive opposition shaped in the language of human rights can play the role of catalyst in the struggle against authoritarian regimes. Nonetheless, more information is needed to understand and precisely explain why the language of the Church became relevant in the 1970s in Eastern Europe, and how this influence operated in Europe and not necessarily in Latin America.

In this regard, Huntington makes another interesting argument. According to him, the Catholic Church has been able to play a role in the democratization process for two reasons. On the one hand, this religious organization has provided a space free of communist interference for grassroots mobilization and politicization. On the other hand, the Church is a transnational organization, which can foster widespread support throughout the world. These two points briefly treated by Huntington deserve further consideration. It is thus the purpose of this dissertation to build upon and expand on these arguments. Such an analysis is justified for empirical and theoretical reasons.

First, popular mobilization or the reawakening of civil society, as indicated earlier, played a role in triggering democratic transition in some countries. Nevertheless, this was not the case in every country. Therefore, there is a need to understand how this mobilization and politicization operated in various national contexts. Since the Catholic Church is present in virtually every eastern European country, it can serve as a reference to assess the strength civil society and the difference

of mass mobilization across countries in the democratic transformation. To reach this objective, it is crucial to hear from the actors themselves in their own settings.

Second, the transnational aspect of the Catholic Church needs to be studied because it can bring a new and interesting light upon the relationship between international factors and domestic actors. With regard to civil society, very little is known about the interaction of internal and external variables. As the literature on democratization indicates, overcoming the artificial boundaries between the fields of Comparative Politics and International Relations could prove to be essential for a better understanding of democratic transitions. Robert Putnam strongly urges political scientists to change their research approach, and

> to move beyond the mere observation that domestic factors influence international affairs, and vice versa, and beyond simple catalogues of instances of such influence, to seek theories that integrate both spheres, accounting for areas of entanglement between them.[31]

By its very nature, the study of the Catholic Church offers such an opportunity.

Besides Huntington's contribution, Sabrina Ramet's work on religion and politics has broken new ground for researchers. In one of her contributions, she offers her theoretical explanation of the collapse of communism. Using Crane Brinton's scheme of analysis,[32] Ramet contends that:

> The pressures for changes in Eastern Europe built up over years because of the communist regime's inability to solve the central problem of legitimization and these pressures found multivarious outlets --in culture, in religious organizations, even in rock music, while simultaneously exciting tensions along latent axes such as those of an ethnic nature (as in Kosovo) or of class nature (the Polish trade union being a case in point).[33]

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[31] Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of Two Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988), 433.
[32] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1965).
[33] Ramet, *Social Currents*, 3-4.

It is the coming together of various groups (trade unions, grass-roots movement, religious groups, intellectuals, artists, etc.) which brought about democratization. Her work focuses on the social currents responsible for "cultural drifts," [34] that is the change in people's values that was behind the loss of legitimacy of communist regimes. Nevertheless, her approach to religion still somehow remains confined to a church and state approach. She does not consider the internal mechanics of the religious mobilization and how the latter coalesced with other social forces.[35] Even in her examination of the parallel society, there is no direct reference concerning the contribution made by the Catholic Church. Her focus on institutional relationships limits the ability of social science to tackle the contribution of religion in the process of democratization. More specifically, it cannot account for the significance of the Catholic Church in the emergence of civil society.

In this respect, the work by Jose Casanova opens new horizons. In his work *Public Religions in the Modern World*,[36] Casanova argues that religion throughout the world has embarked on a process of "deprivatization"[37] to reenter "the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society." For him, the phenomenon of "deprivatization"

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[34] Ramet borrows that term from Herbert Blumer; see his "Social Movements," in *Studies in Social Movements: A Social Psychological Perspective*, ed. Barry Mclaughlin (New York: Free Press, 1969), 9 cited by Ramet, *Social Currents*, 25.
[35] See in particular her discussion of East-German Churches in chapter 3 in *Social Currents*; See also Sabrina Ramet, ed., "Adaptation and Transformation of Religious Policy in Communist and Post Communist Systems," in *Adaptation and Transformation in Communist and Post Communist Systems* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); or "The New Church and State Configuration in Eastern Europe," *East European Politics and Societies* vol. 5 (Spring 1991) no. 2, 247-267; Pedro Ramet, *Cross and Commissar: The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and The USSR* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).
[36] Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
[37] See Casanova, especially chapters 1, 2 and 8.

represents an historical option for religions to reenter the public sphere and to challenge the claims of the state and the market. It occurs when religion shifts from a pre-modern to a modern status by accepting disestablishment, pluralism and freedom of religion. In those cases, religion can help modern societies to confront normative issues. However, deprivatization is more likely to happen when religions mobilize against what they perceive to be a threat from the state. Since his study remains an analytical introduction, there is a need to learn more about this process. The study the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe will help us to achieve this goal. According to Casanova's definition, the Church's action toward civil society in this context constituted an instance of religious deprivatization, because it ultimately aimed at challenging the pervasive nature of the communist state. Determining how the Catholic Church contributed to the reemergence of civil society in Poland and Czechoslovakia will thus help us to understand the internal dynamics of this process of deprivatization. It will also enhance our understanding of the collapse of communism.

C. Research Method and Theoretical Hypotheses:

The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the role played by the Catholic Church and some of its members in the reemergence of civil society, and by extension in the democratic transition of eastern European countries. The thesis of this dissertation can be put as follows:

1. The Catholic Church played a role in the reemergence of civil society and mass mobilization, which eventually contributed to the 1989 revolutions. Although the Church's influence started at different points in time and varied in strength in the various countries under consideration (Poland and Czechoslovakia), its contribution resulted from an action at two levels: first, the Church interacted with secular elites, and second, it helped crystallize a mass mobilization.

2. The Catholic Church was a special contributor to the rebirth of civil society, because it was able to play a two level game (national/transnational). It was this ability to depend upon an international/transnational organization which differentiated the Catholic Church from other religious organizations. In addition, the Church shifted its approach to international politics and came to acknowledge the significance of civil society. In so doing, it supported notions of human rights and an ethics of responsibility, thereby contributing to the development of a frame of ideas that would serve as a foundation for its convergence with secular elites and the latter mobilization of people.

3. In the process of mobilization, the convergence of secular and religious elites constituted an important threshold. The realization of this convergence became possible because a certain number of individuals were uniquely situated at the junction of secular and religious elites and acted as a linchpin for both groups. The action of this group strategically located allowed secular elites to realize that their fight for the defense of fundamental human rights and the reclaiming of the public sphere coincided with the action of the universal of the Church. Because of their constant effort, a convergence of interest and action between the Church and secular elites became possible and led to a common front against the communist regime.

4. If the shift observed in Vatican diplomacy and the convergence of elites was almost simultaneous (at least in Poland), this elite convergence had to take place before popular mobilization could occur.

5. Religious identification and activities could be assimilated to political identification, because of the very nature of the communist regimes. By invading and monopolizing the public sphere, communism in essence politicized any activity not recognized as legitimate. Moreover, as the Catholic Church offered a safe haven indiscriminately to all those rejected or persecuted by the authorities, and developed an

alternative discourse, participation in Catholic activities, such as pilgrimages, was regarded as a manifestation of ones' opposition to the communist system.

6. The action of the Catholic Church, however, was limited by structural environmental constraints, such as the national context. Variations in national circumstances help explain the difference in timing in the convergence, and the mobilization process.

7. The process of convergence allowed both secular and religious elites to suspend former grievances to fight against communism. However, the 1989 revolutions did not necessarily mean that the Church and secular elites would remain on the same path afterwards; and that the period of democratic consolidation would not mark a return to forms of anti-clericalism.

8. The Catholic Church was a force in the struggle against authoritarian regime; However, it does not imply that it can play the same positive role in the phase of democratic consolidation.

The construction of these various theoretical points emerged out of the study of the rich and textured factual context of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the assessment of the contribution of the Catholic Church in the process of democratic transition called for an "interpretivist approach." The latter entails contrasting different contexts of transition in which religion, and more specifically the Catholic Church intervened. Interpretive method, as Charles C. Ragin reminds us, is about "making sense out of different cases by piecing evidence together in a manner sensitive to chronology and by offering limited historical generalizations that are both objectively possible and cognizant of enabling conditions and limiting means of context."[38] In

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[38] Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 3.

other words, behind the choice of this interpretivist methodological approach lies the desire to shed light on the particularities of a few case studies with the hope of extracting some general propositions on the role of religion in transitional politics.

To restate our objectives, after having introduced the subject, the significance, and the state of the literature in this first chapter, the second chapter will explain how religion fits into the emergence of civil society; it will also introduce the various actors to be considered.

The third chapter will examine the international milieu, viz., the transnational and international significance of the Catholic Church. This discussion will include the functioning of Vatican diplomacy, and especially the evolution of the so-called Ostpolitik. This part will also assess the significance of the change of political perspective at the head of the Holy See after the election of John Paul II.

The fourth chapter will study the convergence and settlement between religious and secular elites.

The fifth chapter will address the question of Catholic activism at the grassroots. It will explain how the nurturing of an alternative Catholic values in pre-political hinterlands eventually led to a mass mobilization in the Polish and Czecho-Slovak national contexts.

The sixth chapter will address the democratic transition after 1989, and how the path of elites, masses and the Church diverged. It will analyze the evolution of the role of the Church since the collapse of communist regimes. That discussion will add to our understanding of the significance of religion in the process of transitions toward democracy. Indeed, in the years following the 1989 revolutions, the Church has not been able to translate the support it gained for its struggle against communism into major political benefits. One significant question in relation to this transition remains

whether or not the Catholic Church can adjust to a new environment, that of Liberalism.

The concluding and seventh chapter will present the occasion to open this debate to larger issues. Three points will be of particular interest. First, it will assess what kind of lesson can be learned about the relation between the Catholic Church and civil society; and what do these entail for our understanding and definition of civil society; Second, this discussion will address the impact of moral revolution on civil society in general. Finally, this study will end with some remarks and some speculations about the role of the Catholic Church worldwide.

Chapter II

Setting The Stage

As briefly sketched in the introductory chapter, the fundamental goal of this dissertation is to explain how the Catholic Church contributed to the reemergence of civil society, and in turn to the democratic transition in Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, before discussing why the Catholic Church represents the heart of this study and which other actors were involved in this process, the connection between the Church and civil society must be explored. A first step in this direction is to understand why a perspective encompassing civil society is relevant to address the process of democratic transformation in these two countries.

A. Civil Society and the Generality of the Concept:

In order to grasp the significance of civil society, it is necessary to understand the meaning of this concept in the context of Eastern Europe. Civil society seems to take on a totally different meaning depending upon which side of the Iron Curtain one's political experience is based.

In the abundant literature triggered by the 1989 revolutions, civil society has become a prominent focus of inquiry. Resurrected from the work of Locke, thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel, the use of the concept of civil society has launched a remarkable debate.[39] Unfortunately, much of scholarly attention has revolved around matters of definition. The meaning of civil society has been

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[39] Michael Bernhard, "Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 108 (1993) no. 2, 307-326; Adam S. Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1992); Jean L. Cohen and Andrew

(over)stretched,[40] rendering it so confusing that a number of writers have found it necessary to introduce other terms, such as "political society"[41] or "parallel society."[42] Perhaps, this emphasis on conceptual meanings has contributed to the neglect of certain components of civil society, such as religion. Moreover, many of these studies fail to recognize the different nature of eastern European polities thereby applying western conceptual maps of little relevance.

To avoid this trap, it is first necessary to posit along with Steven Fish,[43] Ferenc Fehér, Agnes Heller and György Markus[44] that communism fostered the emergence of a different type of state, and thus a different relationship between state and society. In a western context, a political system can be roughly divided into three spheres (see Appendix IV, figure 1-1). First, it is possible to distinguish the private sphere, which represents the sanctuary of the individual. At the other extreme, there is the state, which is sovereign, autonomous, and omnipotent. Civil society in this scheme represents the various actors and groupings, which evolve in the public sphere situated between the state and the private sphere. The latter can be more or less important depending upon the complexity of civil society.

Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge: M.I.T University Press, 1992); J. Keane, *Civil Society and the State* (London: Verso, 1988).

[40] Giovanni Sartori, ed., *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984).

[41] Ekiert, 289-303.

[42] Ramet, *Social Currents*, 64-98. This author most probably used this term to refer to the "parallel polis" used by the Czech Václav Benda.

[43] Steven Fish, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution* (Princeton University Press, 1995), 21.

[44] Ferenc Fehér, Agnes Heller and György Markus, *Dictatorship over Needs* (London: Blackwell, 1983).

It is true that before the advent of communism, eastern European polities had developed only weak civil societies according to western standards.[45] What has been characteristic of these polities under totalitarian regimes is that the state invaded all the various domains of the public sphere. To paraphrase Fish, the state was a "predatory" animal "driven less by ideological or organizational imperatives than by the logic of its extractive, expansionist relationship toward society."[46] In this process, these totalitarian and post-totalitarian systems have imposed a new discourse in the public sphere (read ideological propaganda), thereby depriving these polities of a meaningful discourse and their legitimate identity (see Appendix IV, figure 1-2). The result was that the organizations or behaviors that are part of the western idea of civil society either disappeared or were carefully guarded in the private thoughts of individuals. It is one of the reasons why in the mid-1970s, eastern European societies could be defined as anomic. One of the few, if not the only significant actor, to avoid complete annihilation was the Catholic Church. In the case of Czechoslovakia, repression was so harsh that it drove the Church underground. In Poland, on the other hand, while some activities were undertaken in the underground, the Church succeeded in maintaining some public visibility.

The path toward democracy demanded that the public sphere be claimed anew. This realization, which came about in the aftermath of the Prague Spring, led to the emergence of an embryonic social movement aimed at (re)establishing civil society and at reclaiming the public discourse. Thus, the premise of this study is that religion was part of this social movement, and was an important contributor to the (re)emergence of civil society in Eastern Europe.

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[45] Schöpflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe.*
[46] Fish, 21.

Quite interestingly, though, dissidents, such as Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia, Adam Michnik in Poland or György Konrad in Hungary, never refer to the term civil society. Instead, what those writers are really describing in their works are the means to bring about a social movement, whose goal was to reclaim the public sphere and the public discourse, and not power. Such an objective stemmed from a severe diagnosis of eastern European societies. These dissidents realized that in their attempt to eradicate pluralism and to take control of the public sphere, communist regimes had uprooted eastern Europeans from their social and moral references; and that they had transformed them into anomic and atomized individuals stripped of their responsibilities by an all powerful paternalistic state. Thus, before reclaiming the public sphere, according to these dissidents, the seeds of change would have to be found in the transformation of society itself and its members. The latter would have to undergo an ethical rebirth. In the words of Havel, "the primary breeding ground for what might, [...], be understood as an opposition in the post-totalitarian system is living in the truth." It is to be found "in the fifth column of social consciousness, in the hidden aims of life, in human beings' repressed longing for dignity and fundamental rights."[47]

In order to reclaim the public discourse, dissidents understood that this "new consciousness," to paraphrase Michnik, had to grow outside of traditional politics, for the latter would legitimize both communist regime and discourse. Since their attempt at fostering the emergence of a responsible citizenry was not ultimately aimed at capturing power, eastern European dissidents defined their action as "anti-politics."[48]

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[47] Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in *Václav Havel: Living in Truth*, ed. Jan Vladislav (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 58.
[48] György Konrad, *Antipolitics*, trans. Richard E. Allen (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984).

Although the work of these writers (Michnik, Havel and Konrad) was parallel, their analyses revealed nuances of interpretation. The strong idealistic tone of Havel led him to focus more on the means to reestablish a genuine human identity and dignity. Those values were thought to be at the roots of responsibility. In Havel's view, the "opposition" should not be defined vis-à-vis communist regimes, viz. an attempt to replace a political regime by another. Rather, it should demonstrate a commitment to a moral stance.

> Dissidents do not consider themselves renegades for the simple reason that they are primarily denying or rejecting anything. On the contrary, they have tried to affirm their own human identity, and if they reject anything at all, then it is merely what was false and alienating in their lives, that aspect of living within a lie...[49]

Such a line of reasoning made the Czech playwright, as we shall see further, particularly opened to the discourse on human rights developed by the Catholic Church.

Michnic believed in the ideals of human rights and ethics, but his approach of a "better today" was more institutional to some extent. He understood that only pressure from below, that is from an organized society, would bring about change. In Poland it would take the form of "new evolutionism." In the words of the Polish dissident,

> ...an unceasing struggle for reform and evolution that [sought] an expansion of civil liberties and human rights [was] the course East European dissidents [could] take. The Polish example [demonstrated] that real concessions [could be won] by applying steady public pressure on the government...
>
> "new evolutionism" [was] based on faith in the power of the working class, which with a steady and unyielding stand, [had] on several occasions forced the government to make spectacular concessions...
>
> Pressure from the working classes [was] a necessary condition for the evolution of public life toward democracy.[50]

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[49] Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 78.
[50] Adam Michnic, "A New Evolutionism," *Letters from Prison and Other Essays*, trans. Maya Latynski (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 142-144.

However, he agreed with Havel that change would require a new political consciousness. As to Konrad, who coined the term of antipolitics, his understanding of the term meant that distrust of power should be applied universally. As he explained,

> antipolitics [is] the political activity of those who don't want to be politicians and who refuse to share in power; [...] the emergence of independent forums that can be appealed to against political power; it is a counter-power that cannot take power and does not wish to. Power it has already, here and now, by reason of its moral and cultural weight.[51]

Whatever interpretation was chosen, these writers believed in the need for moral renewal. The latter demanded a starting point that would be protected from possible communist interference. Any activity of moral renewal or movement dedicated to "live in the truth" thus had to take place in what Havel calls a "pre-political hinterland."[52] This term refers to all the domains in the private sphere where a new discourse, a new identity, or what Craig Charney calls "the unvoiced text of everyday resistance,"[53] could grow. In other words, these spheres would represent the sources or the seeds for a later mobilization. Culture represented one of these pre-political hinterlands where discourse and identity could be reclaimed. Since religion constitutes one of the major component of culture, it was bound to play a role. It is only in this perspective that outside observers can grasp the political significance of religion, and of the Catholic Church. In essence, for the dissidents, these pre-political spheres represented the point of departure from which people could reclaim pieces of the public sphere and foster the flourishing of civil society. (see Appendix IV, figure 1-3).

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[51] Konrad, 230-31.
[52] Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 65.
[53] Craig Charney, "Bringing the Actor In: Social Movements and Collective Identity in Regime Transitions," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the APSA, New York, September 1994, 11.

Political circumstances determined and shaped the role played by religion. Theoretically, in a democratic society, the simple act of worshipping, going to Mass or having one's children reared and educated according to one's religious beliefs should not become a matter of politics. Under a totalitarian or post-totalitarian system, the mere gathering of eight or ten people not sponsored by the state was perceived as a threat, and therefore became a political question. Moreover, if this meeting took place in the name of an organization (viz. the Church), which was targeted as a prime enemy of the system, this purely religious activity was transformed into a highly political event. No wonder, then, if going to mass, belonging to a small community base, or participating to a pilgrimage was equated to political dissidence.[54] This instance of everyday resistance would represent one of the sources of the grassroots mobilization toward the reemergence of civil society. In the shelter of their clandestine religious activities people engaged in actions that built the prototype for civil society. Underground gatherings required close connections and intense trust among fellow believers. Leaders who emerged out of these "formal, organized spheres of action,"[55] and engaged in interactions with other dissident clusters, came to embody a Christian alternative and learned how to represent the concerns of their fellow underground believers. The study of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe offers a unique opportunity to investigate the contribution of the Catholic Church in the dynamics of (re)emergence of civil society.

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[54] We shall see in this study that at times the line between the religious and the political spheres can be rather tenuous.
[55] Term borrowed from Jürgen Habermas; cited in Jan Pakulski, *Social Movements: The Politics of Moral Protest* (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991), 26.

B. Actors: Interactions and Strategies:

1.The Catholic Church:

In offering a comprehensive analysis on the role of religion in the emergence of civil society in Eastern Europe, there are several questions which must be raised. How significant were religious resources to the success of the various groups opposed to communism? Did religious leaders play an important role in the formation of civil society? How important was religious dissent in opposition to communist regimes? What are the particular contributions of Catholicism and of the Catholic Church?

Central and Eastern Europe offer a unique context to address these questions since the revolutions to be observed occurred within a single geographical unit with different religious traditions. Moreover, in each of these countries, communist regimes worked very hard at eradicating religious practices. Despite official efforts at suppression, religion remained an enduring phenomenon and demonstrated a vigorous presence in the 1989 events. One of the strengths of Catholicism over other religious denominations has been its representation in almost every country in Eastern Europe. According to statistical sources, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Catholics constituted 0.5% to 1% of the population in Bulgaria, 5% to 10% in Romania, 6% to 10% in the GDR, 38% to 45% in Czechoslovakia, 55% to 65% in Hungary, and 90% to 95% in Poland.[56]

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[56] Obtaining reliable and accurate religious data about religious affiliation during the communist era represents a challenge because communist regimes did not provide any information on this topic. Thus, the figures presented here represent an approximate combination of various sources. Among others, Marc Gjidara, "Le Statut des Religions dans les Etats Socialistes d'Europe" in *La Liberté Religieuse dans le Monde*, ed. J. B. d'Onorio (Campin: Editions Universitaires, 1991), 181-183; Carol Skalnik Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia-The Making and Remaking of a State 1918-87* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 294-295; *Kościół Katolicki w Polsce, 1945-1978* (Warsaw: Pallatinum, 1979), 21.

This dissertation only focuses on two of these countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The decision concerning this choice rests upon several considerations. First, as Clifford Geertz said, there is a strong advantage in contrasting only two countries because they "can form a kind of commentary on one another's character.[57] Second, focusing upon only two countries allows for an in-depth analysis and a focus upon the historical dimension. Third, a limitation to a small number of cases is a matter of necessity when time and resources are in short supply to gather data. Most of all, this study examines Poland and Czechoslovakia because it reflects the desire to find two countries where the Catholic Church was an influential actor, but where history has put it in a different position. The goal here is to take advantage of a difference of environmental context to assess whether or not the Church's action in Poland and Czechoslovakia showed a similar pattern of action with regard to civil society. In other words, although these two countries are not the most different, they are significantly different to allow this research to extract some significant findings concerning the role of the Church in the democratic transition.

In Poland, the Catholic Church remained a visible critic of the communist regime in an overwhelmingly Catholic country. Although protest against the government rose out of the workers' movement, the Catholic Church provided an essential linkage with Polish intellectuals and contributed to a mobilization of the masses.

In Czechoslovakia, communist repression was so harsh that there was little dissidence. Religious and secular resistance could only be organized underground.

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[57] Cited by Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers in "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22 (1980), 27 from Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 4.

Moreover, the Czech and Slovak lands were not as religiously homogeneous as their Polish neighbors for several reasons. First, there had been a traditional antagonism between Protestants and Catholics since the death of Jan Hus in 1415.[58] Second, secularization also had made serious inroads since the establishment of the Czechoslovak Federation.[59] Since Protestant and secular forces have been more prevalent in the Czech territory, and since Slovakia is not as predominantly as Catholic as Poland,[60] the Czechoslovak case actually offers the unique advantage of conducting a double layered comparison. To put it more simply, recognizing the significant differences between the Czech and Slovak countries allows this dissertation to account for the significance of three various institutional environments. One aim of this research is to highlight how the environment affected the ability of the Catholic Church to exercise its influence in terms of mobilization against communist regimes. As this work later reveals, Slovakia falls into an intermediate position between the Czech Republic and Poland.

The need to study the Catholic Church in the context of communism extends beyond its physical presence throughout Eastern Europe. The Catholic Church is characterized by peculiar institutional features which put it in a unique position in the

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[58] Although it is not numerically significant, the Protestant Community in Czechoslovakia has been at the center of important historical developments since the death of Hus (see chapter 4). Protestant denominations consists of the Evangelical Church of the Czech Brethren (1.2%), the Hussite Church (1.1%), the Slovak Evangelical Church (2.1%), the Reformed Evangelical Church of Slovakia (0.6%), and the Silesian Evangelical Church (0.3%); For the 1991 census, see *Svobodne Slovo*, June 29, 1991.

[59] In 1991, people with no church membership accounted for about 30 % of the population, and people not giving any church affiliation represented about 16.7%. The number of people with no church membership was even higher in the Czech Republic, with no less than 39.7%. See *Svobodne Slovo*.

[60] According to the 1991 census, there were about 39% Catholics in the Czech Republic and about 60% in Slovakia. See *Slobodne Slovo*. It also worth noting that in Slovakia, there are also about 3.4% of Greek Catholics (Uniates).

context of communism. It can be defined as a voluntary association. It is also a community of believers which, like any organization, functions according to Michels' iron law of oligarchy: lay men and women are led by a religious leadership which is structured according to a pyramidal principal. In other words, it is a highly institutionalized organization.

The Catholic Church does not fall into the category of interest groups because it is more entrenched. After all, the formation of the Catholic Church in this region has been closely associated with the emergence of the Czech and Polish nations.[61] Moreover, as Ramet remarks, "the combination of membership fluidity and doctrinal conviction makes religious organizations [such as the Catholic Church] especially resilient political actors."[62] In short, the Catholic Church is a mediating institution which adapts to the surrounding historical and political circumstances.

Another reason why the Catholic Church was a unique actor in the struggle against communism, was its existence beyond the confines of one particular state or even region. As an integrated and highly structured mediating institution, the Church is an international reality. Not only the top Catholic leadership seats in a distinct sovereign country, viz. the state of Vatican City, but its centralized institutions and leadership also allows the Church to speak with one strong authoritative voice on the international stage. As such it projects an image of unity. Such a position is reinforced by its doctrinal approach. Indeed, the Catholic Church has the advantage of strictly adhering to one coherent set of beliefs, which is defended by the Pope and the

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[61] Michael Petrovic, "Ethnicity and Faith," in *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, eds. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971).
[62] Pedro Ramet, *Cross and Commissar*, 183; See also Jörgen Ljung, *Ideology Based Activity: A Study of Free Churches in Sweden from an Organizational Perspective* (Ph.D. diss., Linköping University, Sweden, 1993), Abstract.

Congregation for the Propagation of Faith. Reality may be somewhat different on the fringes, but what matters is that the Catholic Church is perceived as a united international force.

Because of this peculiar international standing, communism deemed Catholicism to represent the highest religious threat. It is therefore not surprising if the Catholic Church became a primary target and the victim of the most severe persecution. Other religious traditions never have had the structural or numerical strengths of their Catholic counterpart. Except in the GDR, where they represented between 43% and 47% of the population, Protestant churches remained a minority in the rest of Eastern Europe.[63] Therefore, they were not in a position to mount a significant challenge against communist regimes. Although Protestant theology stresses the significance of individualism, which could be interpreted as a major quality to resist authoritarianism, that characteristic precipitated the undoing of Protestant churches. Indeed, the belief that individuals have a personal relationship with God and are able to interpret his religious message without the mediation from a clergy has led to a variety of interpretations, and of Protestant denominations. Communist regimes used this diversity of Protestant churches to their advantage, and acted according to the principle of "divide and conquer." Once separated from their brethren and thus weakened, Protestant churches were forced to submit to communist authorities in order to survive. Their fate was sealed: even though some individual Protestants pastors were involved in the struggle against communism like in East Germany, they could not rely upon the existence of a highly institutionalized and unified international structure.

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[63] 22% to 27% in Hungary, 0.1% in Poland, 6% to 7% in Romania, 7.1% in Czechoslovakia, and 0.4% in Bulgaria. See Gjidara, 182.

Although the Orthodox presence was significant in some countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania, where it constituted between 63% and 80% of the population, the hierarchy took the path of collaboration with communist regimes. Such a choice was not too difficult to entertain, since historically Orthodoxy had been characterized by an alliance of altar and throne. Furthermore, communist authorities were keen to buy the silence of the Orthodox Church by playing the traditional antagonism between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. The persecution and the ban imposed upon the Uniate (or Greco-Catholic) Church represented the reward for this policy of cooperation.

Throughout the communist era Islam's influence was limited by the very fact that Muslims constituted geographical pockets in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.[64] And even in Albania, where the majority of the population was nominally Muslim,[65] the repressive and autarkic nature of the regime isolated this community from its brethren.

As to Judaism, its numerical weakness in Eastern Europe prevented it from representing a serious threat to communism. After the decimation of Jewish Communities during World War II, Jews constituted less than 1% of the population in any country of the region.[66]

Thus, not every religious denomination was in a position even to consider the possibility of participating in this 'anti-system' movement represented by the

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[64] Muslim communities represented respectively 8.9% and 10% of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian population in the early 1980s. *Ibid.*; also Sabrina Ramet, *Balkan Balbel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia* 1st ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 167. Within Yugoslavia, Muslims were concentrated in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, where they represented about 39,5% and 77.5% of the population according to a 1981 census. See John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 330.

[65] Before 1989, the last recorded census indicating religious affiliation dated back to 1938. It indicated that about 70 percent of the population was Muslim. See Paul Mojzes, *Religious Liberty in Eastern Europe and the USSR : Before and After the Great Transformation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 116.

[66] Gjidara, *loc. cit.*

reawakening of civil society. Actually, this research postulates that the Catholic Church represented one of the vehicles used by the social movement aimed or reclaiming the public sphere. The Catholic Church occupied a unique position in each of these countries since it could rely upon the international and transnational dimension of Catholicism. The latter acquired a particular significance with the election of a Polish Pope, who was determined to transform the Vatican policy toward Eastern Europe. Using the arm of the Holy See/Vatican City State, the Catholic Church, to paraphrase Robert Putnam, was able to play a three level game (national, transnational and international).[67]

The traditional study of social movements which emphasizes the ability of movements to mobilize domestic political resources has been incapable of addressing efficiently the international dimension of social movements. This dissertation will remedy the defect of resource mobilization theory and will integrate these different dimensions (national, international and transnational), thereby shedding a new light on the relevance of international factors in the study of "transitology."[68] Similarly, it will also enable us to explain variations in resource mobilization among different countries. As Herbert Kitschelt points out, resources, organization and a good strategy do not

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[67] Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games," 427-460. Playing a two level game generally takes two forms. The first one, and certainly most traditional, is the way political leaders use either international issues for domestic purpose or the opposite. The second occurs within the context of transnational relations. Nye and Keohane explained for instance, that interaction and cooperation among various national elites within international organizations affect policy-making inasmuch as informal communication foster a sense of collegiality and induces the development of "flexible bargaining behaviors." See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organization," *World Politics* 27 (1974), 43-50.

[68] Philippe Schmitter, "Lessons from Transitology for Democratization," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, November 1993.

represent sufficient conditions for a successful mobilization. Institutional environment determines the structures of opportunities.[69] Institutionalized religion occupied a different position in every country in Eastern Europe. In Czechoslovakia, the Catholic Church faced a far more severe repression. On the eve of the collapse of communism, for instance, only three among the twelve Czechoslovak bishoprics were filled. In Poland, in contrast, the Church was able to maintain "visibility" and to function in relatively normal institutional conditions despite communist harassment. Such a situation implied differences in opportunities for and the extent of mobilization.

The need to bring an international dimension when studying the role of the Catholic Church in the democratic transition of Eastern Europe can be defended on several grounds. First, one of the lessons drawn from the 1989 revolutions is that in an international sequence of events, developments in one country affect developments in other countries.[70] Thus, it is important to assess how the status of religion in a country could influence political, social, economical or cultural circumstances in neighboring states. Second, it is difficult to ignore the impact of the Vatican diplomacy and the active involvement of John Paul II in Eastern Europe. Incidentally, the differences in the conduct of Ostpolitik resulting from the succession of various Popes demonstrates that contrary to structural functionalist assumptions individual actors do

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[69] Herbert Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* vol. 6 (1985) no. 1, 57-85.
[70] Stark and Bruszt, "Remaking the Political Field in Hungary."

matter at both national and international levels.[71] Yet, there are very few studies on the politics of the Vatican under successive Popes with regard to Eastern Europe.[72]

Third, adding an international dimension allows this study to trace the diffusion of ideas between secular and religious elites not only at the national level, but also at the transnational and international levels. In this regard, what made the contribution of the Catholic Church particularly original and powerful is its ability to instill a moral purpose in the battle against communism. As the body of literature on social movements and resource mobilization attests, successful leaders of social movements must foster some kind of moral commitment.[73] With its constant emphasis on the defense of human rights and human dignity, the Catholic Church not only offered such a moral incentive, but also provided the impetus for a burst of moral outrage. Without a perception of injustice and a strong moral conviction, notes Barrington Moore, transformation of the prevailing order cannot take place. In a sense, the religious pre-political hinterland offered a sphere where living in the truth actually would occur. It also participated in the attempt to reclaim the meaning and the discourse of the public sphere. Because the Catholic perspective intersected with the analysis of the secular elite,[74] an elite convergence became possible.

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[71] See for instance, Theda Skocpol in *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 18, where she emphasizes the superiority of objective relationships among groups, classes and nations over individuals.

[72] See for instance, Hansjakob Stehle, *Eastern Politics and the Vatican 1917-1979*, trans. Sandra Smith (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981); Dennis Dunn, *Détente and Papal Communist Relations, 1962-1978* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979). For a more recent account of the significance of the election of John Paul II, see Weigel, *The Final Revolution.*

[73] J. Craig Jenkins, " Resources Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983), 527-533.

[74] Albeit a little outdated, see Adam Michnic, *The Church and the Left*, trans. David Ost (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

Therefore, out of this process of diffusion, this dissertation can pay particular attention to the interplay between secular and religious forces in the struggle against communism and in the process of transition. Since some of these elites now are involved in the difficult task of bringing former Eastern Europe in the sphere of democratic countries, it is necessary to know more about elites that emerged out of the 1989 revolutions. The analysis is also of primary significance because, as O'Donnell and Schmitter have pointed out,[75] mass mobilization is not a sufficient criterion to ensure the consolidation of democracy after the fall of an authoritarian regime. Elites are an essential component of revolutionary processes. Moreover, revolutions are dynamic phenomena and thus always imply a transformation of elites.[76] Therefore, studying the role of the Catholic Church in its relationships with elites, can help us to look at the ways in which these elites are changing, but also to assess the potential influence of religion in the future polity of these various countries. Although a few studies examine elite transformation in a post communist era,[77] this dissertation examines the interaction between secular and religious actors at the elite level.

2. Elites:

The need to "live in the truth" arose in the early 1970s when intellectuals, such as Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia or Adam Michnic in Poland, realized that communism could not be reformed; that there was a need to bring about a new

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[75] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, eds. O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 65.
[76] Higley and Pakulski, 104.
[77] *Ibid.*, 104-119. Also Michael D. Kennedy, "The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies and Post Communist Regimes in Hungary and Poland," *Theory and Society* 21 (February 1992), 29-76.

consciousness, "a new evolutionism."[78] Ironically, drawing the same conclusions as secular elites and post-modern thinkers, the Vatican and some members of the hierarchy (most especially Pope John Paul II) became aware of the need to focus on civil society. Without the reconstitution of a viable civil society, Catholic leaders (primarily Pope John Paul II) understood that there would be no viable future for the Church. Perhaps considering the religious situation in the Holy Land, where a dramatic movement of Catholic and Christian emigration has been endangering the survival of the Catholic Church, they realized that without the people, the Church's presence would run the risk of being a vestige of the past. (see chapter three)

The similarity of the analysis made by the Church and secular elites paved the way for a collusion between secular and religious elites. In order to establish a common front against communism, secular and religious elites had to initiate a convergence - albeit temporarily. The latter represented the realization that without a reorganization of the relationships between both groups and an effort toward unity, there could not be effective mobilization. For the secular left, for instance, it meant abandoning anticlerical stances and developing some form of cooperation with Catholic elites. One of the assumptions behind this dissertation is that without this type of convergence, the path toward democracy would have been made more difficult.

The movement aimed at reestablishing civil society, like other social movements, needed some form of structured organization and leadership. Institutionalized religion was the only surviving mediating institutions under communism. As such it provided an elite, linkages with the outside world in the case of the Catholic Church, and valuable resources as a means --albeit weakened-- of mobilization. The literature on resource mobilization theory of social movements

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[78] Michnic, "A New Evolutionism," 135-148.

reveals that "centralized, formally structured movement organizations [such as the Catholic Church] are [...] more effective at mobilizing resources and mounting sustained challenges."[79] The Catholic Church is indeed a highly structured organization. As Piotr Sztompka points out, "the networks of interlinked associations or communities based on common religious [...] loyalties [...] are helpful in speeding up mobilization and recruitment to social movements once the occasion arise."[80]

Although it is quite difficult to identify which side initiated this convergence, it is worthwhile to analyze how this unlikely alliance took place (see chapter four). Beforehand, however, we need to identify what kind of elites were involved in this process. To understand what kind of elites are examined in this study, it is necessary to go back to some basic definitions. Classical elite theory in political science tends to define elite in terms of power. According to this school of thought, each society is divided into two groups, elites and masses. As Mosca explained:

> Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organizations, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies -from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies- two classes of people appear -a class that rules and a class that is ruled.[81]

However, power does not just structure political organizations: because of the necessary division of labor, all forms of human organization entail the emergence of an

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[79] Jenkins, "Resources Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," 528. See also Daniel V. Friedheim, "Bringing Society Back into Democratic Transition Theory after 1989: Pact Making and Regime Collapse," *East European Politics and Societies* Vol. 7 (Fall 1993) no. 3, 495; J. McCarthy and M. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977), 1212-41.
[80] Piotr Sztompka, *The Sociology of Social Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 287.
[81] Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), 50.

elite. As Michels postulated, "he who says organizations says oligarchy."[82] It is this second meaning which is more relevant to this research. The elites that constitute the focus of this study indeed are not political or governing elites, but persons in prevalent positions in the Catholic Church or the dissident movement broadly defined. They were not interested in political power for the sake of power. As previously explained, dissidents in Eastern Europe were not aiming at capturing power, but at reclaiming the public sphere and engaging in a discursive battle. Their efforts were not so much directed at the regime but rather at society at large. Put another way, their political significance did not derive from an ability to influence significantly power in the communist system or what Eastonians call the authoritative allocation of values,[83] but rather to mediate ideas of "new consciousness," and "of living in truth." Dissidents were thus "mediating elites."[84] More accurately, they constituted a "mediating counter-elite," since they rejected the legitimacy of the communist system. Dissidents wanted to become an example of individual responsibility and participate in shaping values and attitudes that would foster the reemergence of civil society.

This conceptual discussion, however, does not reveal what kind of individuals constituted these mediating counter-elites. They basically belonged to the religious and secular spheres, namely the Catholic Church and the dissident movement. The elite in the Catholic Church is constituted by the clergy. This latter group can itself be subdivided into three clusters: the high clergy constituted of bishops and other

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[82] Roberto Michels, La Sociologica del Partito Politico (Torino: 1912), 33 cited by Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* vol. 1 (Chatham: Chatham House, 1983), 149.
[83] Robert Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Englewoods Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1974).
[84] Sidney Verba, *Elites and the Principle of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden, and the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

preeminent positions of leadership in the Church, the lower clergy made of priests, and a third group made of theologians.

The difficulty in apprehending the role of the religious elite in the struggle against communism is that the Church and its elite do not constitute a homogenous and monolithic group. Indeed, as this research shall demonstrate later on, members of the religious elite did not react identically in the face of the communist threat. In Poland, where the Church opposed the repressive nature of the communist regimes, differences arose between the members of the Polish episcopate and priests operating at the grass-root levels. That difference in attitudes was even more prevalent in Czechoslovakia, where the main religious leaders were imprisoned after the communist takeover in 1948.

The position of the Czechoslovak clergy was influenced by a drastically unique set of historical circumstances. Shortly after the establishment of the communist regime, the uncompromising stance of the Church's leadership led to a confrontation: bishops, leaders of religious orders, numerous priests and nuns were sent to jail. In 1949, Prague's archbishop and leader of the Church in Czechoslovakia was arrested: he remained interned no less than sixteen years. His liberation in 1965, negotiated between the Vatican and Czechoslovak authorities was only obtained on the condition that Mgr. Beran leave Prague for Italy, and never return. His replacement, bishop František Tomášek remained a shy leader for many years. Because of years of persecution, imprisonment, old age and deaths, numerous positions of leadership in the Church became vacant. This vacuum of power in the Czechoslovak Church was aggravated by the unwillingness of communist authorities to recognize the designation of religious leaders made by the Vatican. According to eastern European regimes, these nominations were turned down because they were deemed unfriendly to the regime.

The weakness of the hierarchy thus affected the ability of the Church to resist the assaults of communism. By the mid-1960s, six of twelve bishoprics were already without a seating bishop, while numerous leaders of religious orders were still in jail.[85]

Therefore, for these fortunate members of the clergy to retain the right to serve as priests,[86] the price to be paid was either silence or collaboration. Although it is difficult to assess how many members of the clergy participated in tacit or overt collaboration, the important point here is that not every religious leader in Czechoslovakia yielded to communist dictates. In order to evaluate how many religious leaders were involved in activities banned or deemed subversive by communist authorities, and how strong religious resistance was, it is necessary to distinguish two different groups of religious elite in the underground. The first cluster represented what can be called the politically-minded religious leaders. The number of individuals included in this group represented a small minority. It consisted of priests or theologians, who took the risk of signing Charter 77 or being involved in the activities of the dissidents groups, such as VONS (Výbor na obranu nespravedlivě stíhaných, Committee for the Unjustly Persecuted). They were a selected few, who acted following their own conscience, despite the lack of early support of Mgr. Tomášek. Two priests, Václav Malý[87] and Josef Zvěřina were among the original signatories of Charter 77. By 1989, they were about 13 Catholic clergymen who had

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[85] They were not released until 1968. However, the ban on religious orders remained in effect.

[86] Communist regimes established a system of licenses to control religious activities. In Czechoslovakia, their monitoring was supervised by the Secretariat for religious matters, which was part of the Ministry of Culture. That particular bureaucratic unit was established in October 1949, and had representation throughout the country.

[87] Fr. Malý served as spokesman of Charter 77 from 13.1.1981 to 7.1.1982, and from 01.13.1981 to 01.07.1982; he was also one of the founding members of VONS, which was established on 04.24.1978.

signed. Out of the 1886 reported signatories, it represented less than one percent. In comparison to the Protestant participation (no less than 22 Protestant pastors signed the Charter and its attached documents), the presence of Catholic priests remained far too modest in proportion of its numeric significance in the Czechoslovak religious scene (see Appendix III).

However, this dissertation argues that if indeed the participation of Catholic religious leaders remained small, Catholic activism took many other forms, and had a higher potential for mobilization. Indeed, acts of dissidence cannot and could not simply be defined by participation to Charter 77 or VONS. Dissidents, such as Havel himself, recognized that dissidence or "living in the truth" was "an attempt to create and support the 'independent' life of society." Not everyone was expected to sign the Charter. However, an invitation was made to speak out and stand for one's beliefs. As Havel explained:

> Opposition here can also be understood as everything that does or can have an indirect political effect..., that is, everything the post-totalitarian system feels threatened by, which in fact means everything it is threatened by. In this sense, the opposition is every attempt to live within the truth, from the green grocer's refusal to put the slogan in his window to a freely written poem; in other words, everything in which the genuine aims of life go beyond the limits placed on them by the aims of the system.[88]

Therefore, according to this definition engaging into religious underground activities can be defined as opposition by the very fact that the communist regimes felt threatened and prohibited these. Similarly, using Albert Hirschman's concept of exit and voice, it can be asserted that in post-totalitarian societies, such as Czechoslovakia, exit from the communist system could take several forms: emigration, withdrawal into the private

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[88] Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 73.

sphere, or underground activities.[89] The population generally chose the second option. Emigrating, like signing documents like Charter 77, only concerned a small number of individuals. Yet, as Daniel Kroupa, a Catholic dissident remarked: "between this elite [who signed Charter 77] and the population in general, there [was] a gray zone."[90] It is in this gray zone that religious underground activities led by Catholic clergymen took place.

This second group of Catholic leaders only focused on purely religious matters. As previously explained, owing to the very nature of the communist system, these actions were deemed political and therefore subversive. Perhaps, the fears of activities taking place outside the sphere controlled by the state was not totally misplaced. In time, this religious underground work indeed played a role in grassroots (re) awakening. However, the Catholic religious leaders engaging in those underground actions did not constitute a unified group and could be subdivided in two distinct clusters.

The first one included priests, whose ordination either predated the communist takeover or occurred in full accordance with rules of canon law. Of course, those politically minded religious priests who participated in Charter 77 or VONS related activities were also involved in religious underground activities. Thus, they constituted a sub-group, whose action overlapped both the religious and political spheres.

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[89] Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1970).
[90] Interview with Daniel Kroupa, a Catholic dissident and signatory of Charter 77, and now a leading member of the Czech party ODA, December 20, 1994, Prague (trans. from German by this author).

The second group was represented by priests or even bishops who were ordained secretly in suspicious if not invalid conditions, according to Vatican rules.[91] Because the controversial debate about the validity of these ordinations goes beyond the scope of this study, this second group will be excluded from this research.

This classification of religious elites becomes extremely useful not only to distinguish what kind of underground activism took place in Czechoslovakia, but also to understand the fundamental difference existing between the Czech lands and Slovakia (see Appendix V, figure 2). It can be argued that the first type of religious elite, the politically minded one, was much more prevalent in the former, while the second type was more widely found in Slovakia. This pattern of elites coincides with the distinct frame of dissent noted by eastern European scholars. Political scientists have pointed out how most political activism took place in the Czech lands, and especially Prague. These analyses usually overlook the fact that in Slovakia dissent existed, but it was of a different nature. There were indeed a few members of the secular elite, who were involved in Charter 77, but most of the underground activism happened to be religious. As this dissertation will demonstrate, this different approach toward dissent stems from different historical and cultural circumstances. More traditional, more agricultural, Slovakia also had remained more religious. Therefore, like Poland, Slovakia was more inclined to chose the path of religious dissent.

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[91] After the collapse of communism, it was discovered that married men and a few women were ordained, which is contrary to Catholic doctrine. According to Franz Gansriegler, whose findings have been contested, there were twelve bishops, and at least 200 priests. See Franz Gansriegler, "Geheimkirchen in OstEuropa," *Jeder war ein Papst* (Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag, 1991), 63.

Apart from the religious sphere, there were two types of elites, secular and lay Christians (see Appendix V, figure 2).[92] In Poland, the secular elite was mostly found among the left, which consisted of recovering communists. These individuals at one time had been fervent believers in communism, but by the 1970s had become convinced that communist regimes could not be reformed. Since the mid-1950s, these intellectuals had been active in various groups, such as the Club of the Crooked Circle, Po Prostu, the Club of the Seekers of Contradiction, Ruch, or the scouts' group led by Jacek Kuroń and Karol Modzelewski, as they rose and fell over the years. Others chose to rally around academic circles led by Leszek Kołakowski, Edward Lipiński or Bronisław Geremek.[93] Eventually, in September 1976, some of these activists established KOR (Komitet Obrony Robotników), which unleashed a flourishing of underground activities (Appendix VI, figure 3).

On the other side of the spectrum, the dissident movement included circles of Catholic lay intellectuals. Their action evolved around the Club of Catholic Intellectuals (Klub Inteligencji Katolickiej, or KIK). These groups were established in the aftermath of the 1956 crisis. After the change of Polish communist leadership, the political system was loosened up. It opened possibilities for lay Catholics to become active. Five clubs of Catholic intellectuals were established at the time of Władysław Gomułka's resurgence to power. The returning leader sought a compromise with the Catholic Church and persecuted Catholics. In exchange for their support, Gomułka

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[92] These lay Christians were either Catholic or Protestant. Since this research specifically focuses on the role of the Catholic Church, the role of Protestant elites will not be examined.

[93] Jan Józef Lipski, *KOR, A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981*, trans. Olga Amsterdamska and Gene M. Moore (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 9-29.

hoped to undermine the position of PAX. This organization had been constituted by the communist authorities in the Stalinist period to break the hierarchical link between the Vatican and the Polish Church. PAX, a tool of the communist regime, however, tilted in favor of the Natolin pro-Moscow faction, which Gomułka wanted to neutralize. Intellectual Catholics thus were authorized to launch a new periodical Więź (Link) in Warsaw and to reopen the review Znak (Sign) and the Catholic newspaper Tygodnik Powszechny (Universal Weekly) in Kraków, which both had been founded after World War II. In addition to Warsaw and Kraków, three other authorized clubs were established in the cities of Poznań, Toruń, and Wrocław.

Following the surge of activism stirred up by the rise of Solidarity, the presence of KIKs grew stronger. In the months preceding the declaration of martial law, Poland counted more than fifty Clubs of Catholic Intellectuals. Their function was twofold: on the one hand, they worked to bridge over differences between Catholicism and the secular elite, on the other hand, their goal was to provide assistance to the worker's movement and to a reawakening civil society. Although their activities were brought to a halt during martial law, as the latter loosened up, the Catholic Clubs returned and developed anew.

In Czechoslovakia, and in the Czech lands in particular, both elites, secular and lay Christians, came to interact within the same organization, namely Charter 77 and related groups such as VONS. The premise upon which Charter 77 was founded, was the necessity to transcend ideological and political differences. As its inaugural declaration affirmed, "Charter 77 [was] a free informal, open community of people of different convictions, different faiths and different professions united by the will to

strive, individually or collectively, for the respect of civic and human rights."[94] There were basically three streams in this movement, the Christians, the cultural/writers group, and the socialist/communist circle. The formulation of Charter 77 was the result of a compromise based upon the lowest common denominator: the only true element these groups had in common was indeed their commitment to the defense of human rights and an ethics of responsibility. As Rector Radim Palouš, a representative of the lay Christians, recalls:

> some of them [members of Charter 77] were communist. Yet, after 1968, they had to leave the party. We were in the same ship. We had to respect them...Thanks to the persecution, we were a close team. We had to work together to support ourselves. Thus, to prepare documents, we had to negotiate, but we were friends. Formulation [of documents] had to be acceptable for everybody.[95]

As a philosopher, mathematician and dissident, Václav Benda concurs: "the idea of human rights, human freedom was the common basis...it was a small basis, but a good basis."[96]

Outside of the Czech lands, though, dissidents, like in Poland, evolved in distinct circles. While the few secular dissidents, such as Professors Miroslav Kusý or Jozef Jabloniský were more inclined to look toward Prague and Charter 77, lay Christians, such as Ján Čarnogurský or František Mikloško turned inward and worked to establish a Slovak Catholic politically active underground movement that would

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[94] Charter 77-Declaration January 1, 1977; see "Prohlásení Charty 77 (1. Ledna 1977)" in *Charta 77, 1977-1989: Od Morální k Demokratické Revoluci*, ed. Vilém Prečan (Bratislava: Archa, 1990), 12; for an English version of Charter 77's Declaration, see H. Gordon Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 211.
[95] Interview with Radim Palouš, former rector of Charles University, December 14, 1994, Prague.
[96] Interview with Václav Benda, a former spokesman of Charter 77, December 27, 1994, Prague.

parallel the purely religious underground activities of the Church- although at times the lines between the two would be blurred.

From the previous discussion upon the elite in Poland and Czechoslovakia, this dissertation will more specifically focus on two groups, the lay Christians and the politically minded religious elites. Indeed, this study contends that these two clusters played a pivotal role in the convergence of action between the secular elites and the Catholic Church. Their significance stemmed from their strategic location between the secular and religious spheres. By their action and example, they contributed to an unlikely rapprochement of forces, which historically had gone in opposite directions. Such a convergence of action became essential in the perspective of mobilizing forces against the communist regime. Although they probably were not fully aware of the impact of their action, Polish and Czechoslovak elites were setting the stage for an eventual collapse of communism. However, the latter could not become a reality without a mobilization of the people.

3. The Masses:

These same means, which appealed to the elites, were available to the masses as well. After years of work at the grassroots level, the Catholic Church played a role in the mass mobilization that brought about the reemergence of civil society. In Czechoslovakia, in particular, it took the form of small underground communities.

The significance of religion as a "political agent" in the mobilization process can be attributed to the fact that participating in underground activities entailed some serious risks. Under repressive regimes, dissident action in many cases- at least in the early stage- demands the faith of a "true believer." Religion can represent a powerful tool and provide moral strength that is necessary to undertake dissident activities under communist regimes. Acting in the name of God or for some idea of transcendence is a

valuable asset for mobilization and action. Religion serves as an ideological basis, while faith acts as an inexhaustible reservoir of motivation. In times of hardship, it helps activists to hold on. It also explains why some individuals may want to sacrifice their peace of mind or material comfort for a higher cause. It explains why dissidents, such as Václav Benda, were willing to take the risk of being sent to jail, losing their job, submitting their families to discrimination and enduring ostracism.

Moreover, in the context of communism, religion, and Catholicism in particular, could play other functions. As heretofore indicated, communist regimes caused the atomization of eastern European societies. Participating in religious mass mobilization, such as pilgrimages, or simply attending a small religious circle provided a sense of community and identity. Rituals, hymns, symbols, which are integral parts of religious practices, or discourses from religious leaders awoke deep seated emotions, and allowed for the development and sustenance of a collective identity. More significantly, they helped to build stronger boundaries, to create a better sense of "us" vs. "them." Under communism, Catholicism constituted a different sphere of legitimacy, one rooted in the history and traditional culture of eastern European societies, as it was closely intertwined with the development of these nations. Thus, practicing Catholicism could be identified as a means to differentiate oneself from communist regimes, thereby taking a political stance.

Furthermore, since the Church was basically the only organization able to offer a space devoid of or with limited interference from the communist system, religious activities played the role of substitute for secular secondary type organizations, that are so vital for the emergence of civil society. According to Robert Putnam, the emergence of a strong civil society rests upon the existence of a network of cross-cutting organizations. Participation in those various organizations enhances democracy for it

fosters horizontal linkages; for it encourages involvement, trust, and solidarity.[97] Since oppression called for less institutional and more pragmatic solutions, and since the Church shifted its attention to civil society in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the open space provided by the Church or Catholic circles allowed activists to nurture these values as they reached out to secular elites and participated in the embryonic movement aimed at recapturing the public sphere. The people who took part in the various activities organized under the auspices of the Church, openly or underground, were generally young men and women. In this regard, it is worth noticing that women often play a significant role in social movements, and in this peculiar case in democratic transition and the reemergence of civil society- a fact often overlooked by the scholarly literature.

However, the Catholic Church or Catholicism did not have an even geographic impact. Part of this variation is due to different structures of opportunities. The political, economical and social environment in a country determined how the population could express its grievances. In the context of communism, the level of repression and discrimination shaped the circumstances under which actors could operate. The control exercised by the communist authorities, however, was not uniform and varied across countries, and even across regions. This difference in the nature of the post-totalitarian state stemmed from the type of leadership, and communist circumstances. The Czechoslovak regime, for instance imposed a harsher rule than its Polish counterpart and handled its Czech and Slovak republics differently, for its leaders embraced a more orthodox view of communism; for the experience of the Prague Spring required to kill in the bud any potential anti-system movement. Since

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[97] Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (January 1995) 1, 64-77; Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic*

some of the Slovak demands, such as a more balanced federalism, made in 1968 could be somewhat accommodated without endangering the integrity of the communist regime, a more benign repressive rule could be applied to Slovakia. By all accounts, in the hierarchy of communist repression, Czechs were treated more severely than their Slovak brethren, who themselves had less room to express their grievances than their Polish neighbors. Thus, in addition to its numerical strength, the Church and religious activists were constrained by their environment and had to adapt accordingly. One logical consequence was the existence of different responses to communist rule in the three cases under consideration.

Another reason for the different impact of the Church and Catholicism resulted from more fundamentally diverse historic and geopolitical conditions. According to political psychologist Kathleen McGraw, people deal with ideas and information according to a system of on-line processing.[98] When they think, they conceptualize ideas in the form of pictures. People may forget about the overall details, but they retain a general image. Various historical events will transform the picture they hold in their mind. Thoughts at one particular point in time constitute the genealogical development of ideas that have been shaped by past historical events. In other words, past experiences shape the individual or collective consciousness. An actor or an action may occur in a similar fashion in two distinct territories, but its impact on the population will be different, because it will happen in contexts with various historical antecedents. That being said, the weight of history should not be exaggerated, and

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Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[98] See Kathleen McGraw, Milton Lodge and Patrick Stroh, "Processes of Candidate Evaluation: On Line or Memory Based? A Review and Synthesis of Four Experiments" State University of New York, Stony Brook, typescript cited in Kathleen McGraw, "Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts," *American Political Science Review* vol. 85 (1991), 1152.

envisioned as completely deterministic. The convergence of elites discussed in this dissertation is a case in point. Nevertheless, a sense of history and geography is necessary to account for spatial differences in the impact of the Catholic Church in Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Poland. It is those dimensions which will be explored further in chapters four and five.

However, before examining the different trajectory of the Catholic Church in the context of the Czech, Slovak and Polish territories, it is first necessary to dwell upon the overarching influence played by the Church at the international and transnational levels, and to consider how a change of international circumstances also affected its handling of eastern European countries.

Chapter III

The Catholic Church

as an International and Transnational Actor

Building upon a legacy of almost two thousands years, the Catholic Church has grown into a community of more than eight hundred million of believers spread in numerous countries throughout the world. Beside being the largest religious denomination in the world, what really distinguishes the Catholic Church from other religious groups is its ability to play a three level game: national, international and transnational. This chapter specifically examines the latter two aspects of Church activities. Indeed, the Catholic Church headed by the Holy See[99] is the only religious organization to be recognized as a subject of international law. As an international actor the Catholic Church has the ability to deal directly with the governments of other states. This privilege granted to the Vatican is very much a product of history and dates back to the decline of medieval Christendom and the rise of the nation-state.[100]

Moreover, the Catholic Church can also wear the clothes of a powerful transnational subject. According to Nye and Keohane, it can be defined as such insofar as the Catholic Church engages in transnational interactions, namely "the movement of tangible and intangible items across state boundaries."[101] In its care for the spiritual well-being of millions of Catholic believers, the Catholic Church can bypass national

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[99] The Holy See refers to the Pope, The secretary of state, the Secretariat of State and the other institutions of the Roman Curia. James A. Coriden, Thomas J. Green and Donald E. Heinstschel, *Code of Canon of Law: A Text and Commentary* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1985), Canon 361, 300.

[100] The Rise of nation-state is usually associated with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.

[101] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Transnational Relations in World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), xii.

governments through various channels. Its teaching and authoritative statements are diffused throughout the world in churches, during papal travels, via radio or television broadcasts, satellite communications, publications and more recently even via the internet. The Catholic Church can call up the moral and social conscience of the people worldwide. In so doing, it can encourage people to behave differently and eventually bring about social and political change.

The potential for such a mobilization cannot be overlooked in as much as the hierarchical structure and the sheer size of the Church imply the potential for actions of great magnitude. Other religious denominations, which are numerically smaller and less structured because of theological differences, cannot match the transnational significance of the Catholic Church. Protestantism, for instance, essentially focuses on the individual. Each believer is deemed to have a personal relationship with God and thus is entitled to develop his or her interpretation of the Sacred Book. This theological approach explains the existence of a multitude Protestant religious denominations and the lack of a centralized ecclesiastical institutions.

Although like Catholicism, Orthodoxy rests upon a hierarchically organized church, its potential for mobilization remains limited because of internal divisions. There is no universal Orthodox church, but rather many national or autocephalous Orthodox churches. Divergent historical trajectories have contributed to a lack of unity. Orthodox churches emerged with their respective nations and most often played the role of surrogate for the state in times of foreign invasions. Such was the destiny of the Serbian and Russian churches. The development of religious institutions along national lines has been exacerbated by these very invasions: in successive waves Mongols, Ottomans, and Austrians have divided Orthodox territories, thereby separating eastern European Slavs both from the cradle of their evangelization (Constantinople) and the Third Rome (Moscow).

As to Islam, despite its overall numerical strength[102] and the mobilizing power of Islamic fundamentalism, it is undermined by decentralized structures,[103] the existence of competing transnational organizations[104] and the persistence of a sharp divide between Sunni and Shi'i Muslim communities. A complete picture of the potential for mobilization of various religious groups would not be complete without a word on Judaism. It simply cannot compete with Catholicism: Judaism is a religious group scattered throughout the world, and its decentralized religious structures and leadership undermine any attempt to organize beyond the confines of the nation-state.

In other words, compared to other religious organizations, the Catholic Church enjoys a unique position. However, it has not always politically and diplomatically taken advantage of its transnational potential. It is only in the aftermath of Vatican II that the Catholic Church really rediscovered the virtue of emphasizing the transnational dimension of its world activities. Over the past centuries, the Church indeed primarily

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[102] Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world, and is expected to become the largest religion in the next century.

[103] Similarly to Protestantism, the concept of clergy or ulema (the learned ones) does not embody the idea of mediation between God and believers. If Muslim clergymen are leaders of their community, contrary to Catholic priests they are not indispensable. The Muslim clergy theoretically does not hand down the "powers of the key," and does not embody Muhammad in any way. Thus, the Catholic concept of "sacraments," that can only be administered by ordained ministers in virtue of their "icon of Christ priest" like function, has no equivalent in Islam. Thus, there is no Muslim hierarchy properly speaking. However, this description must be qualified. In the case of Shi'i Islam, some members of the clergy, who are descendants of the Prophet, are deemed to carry some of the Muhammadan essence. Moreover, the clergy is organized according to a hierarchical principle. At the apex of this religious structure, there are "Grand Ayatollahs," who are treated with great deference by the people. In some cases, one of these "Grand Ayatollahs" may even emerge as a *primus inter pares*.

[104] In addition to the networks of Muslim clergymen, who studied at the most prestigious Al Azhar University in Cairo, various transnational groups are competing to represent the Muslim community: beside the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood, it is worth noting the World Muslim League. Established under the leadership of the Saudi Royal family, which is in charge of protecting some of the Holiest sites of Islam, this organization has aimed at uniting Sunni clergymen.

had relied upon the traditional game of international politics, but in the late 1960s and early 1970s it shifted its attention toward civil society, thereby requiring a transnational approach. The changes introduced proved to be of tremendous significance, because at about the same time in Eastern Europe dissident voices emerged to reclaim the public sphere. Change in the geopolitical agenda of the Catholic Church timely contributed to a diffusion of ideas, thereby influencing the struggle against communism. Eventually, it would lead to the convergence of secular and religious elites in east central European countries.

Henceforth, this chapter first will examine the traditional approach of the Vatican diplomacy, and how it applied to the question of Eastern Europe. Then, it will explain the historical conditions which led the Catholic Church to enhance the transnational dimension of its activities. Finally, this analysis will describe the changes introduced in the functioning of Vatican diplomacy.

A. The Vatican Diplomacy in its Traditional Garb:

In order to understand the Vatican diplomacy, it is first necessary to explain under which premise the Catholic Church operates. As previously noted, the Holy See devotes a large amount of its activities to developing and maintaining relations with other states. Although the number of countries represented at the Holy See in the early 1950s did not differ from its pre World War II level,[105] by the early 1990s, the Vatican had succeeded in establishing more than 160 diplomatic representations.[106] This international contribution has been made possible by the 1929 Lateran Treaty. Signed

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[105] Prior to World War II, the Vatican was represented in about forty states; See Josef L. Kunz, "The Status of the Holy See in International Law," *American Journal of International Law* XIVI (1952), 311.
[106] Interview with a Vatican official, Summer 1993, Rome.

between the Italian government of Mussolini and the Holy See, this international agreement settled the international status of the Catholic Church, which had been raised and left unresolved after the movement of Italian national unification in 1870. This international instrument legally and formally endowed the Catholic Church with an international personality.

The status of Vatican City formally established by the Lateran Treaty provides the Church with a territorial basis over which it is sovereign. Armed with this legal fiction, the Church represented by the Holy See, can establish diplomatic relations with other governments. Such an international arrangement begs the question of what characteristics of the Catholic Church calls for this unique status. Certainly this treaty negotiated by Italy and the Catholic Church acknowledges the legacy of the Vatican in the history of international relations.

More significantly, it answers the primary concerns of the Catholic Church. Although it insists upon its distinct nature, the Church acts not so differently from states. Similarly to statesmen and diplomats, who make sure that the national interest of their country is protected, the representatives of the Catholic Church must act to defend its interests. The primary goal is to guarantee the survival of the Church as an institution, so that it can fulfill its mission, viz., the administration of the sacraments for the salvation of the faithful. In order to perform its function, the Catholic Church relies upon a hierarchical structure which involves over a hundred cardinals, hundreds of archbishops, thousands of bishops and hundred of thousands of priests, who are scattered to the four corners of the world. However, in order to preserve the hierarchical link between Rome, the clergy and the faithful, the Vatican must secure

access to the various territories, where Catholics can be found.[107] To accomplish this task, the Catholic Church possesses a unique weapon. It has developed a "foreign policy" that possesses similar characteristics to that of a secular state. The traditional foreign policy (ies) of the Vatican indeed has (ve) been centralized and resulted from the work of a highly institutionalized bureaucracy, a dedicated and remarkably trained diplomatic corps, and a realist understanding of world politics.

1. The Institutional Arm of Vatican Diplomacy:

The Catholic Church constitutes a pyramidal organization. At the apex of power stands the Pope. As successor of St. Peter, the Sovereign Pontiff is endowed "with full and supreme power in the Church."[108] In political science terms, his office can be defined as an absolute elective monarchy.[109] However, in order to efficiently use the vast amount of powers bestowed upon him, the Pope must rely upon a centralized bureaucracy. Thus, to manage Church internal and external matters, the Pope acts by means of the Roman Curia. According to the *Code of Canon Law*, which regulates Catholic legal questions, this institution consists of ministries, called dicasteries, tribunals, and various other bodies (see Appendix VII, figure 4).[110] All of these structures deal in some way or another with international or transnational issues because of the very nature of the Church. However, some of them are more

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[107] Ivan Vallier, "The Roman Catholic Church: A Transnational Actor," in *Transnational Relations in World Politics*, eds. Keohane and Nye, 131; See also the address by Pius XII delivered to the Foreign Correspondents' Association of Rome on May 1953 in Robert A. Graham, S.J., *Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of Church and State in the International Plane* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 6-7.
[108] Coriden, Green and Heinstschel, Canon 332, 270.
[109] The Pope is elected by a College of eligible Cardinals, that is to say those under eighty years old. Cardinals themselves are designated by the Pope.
[110] Coriden, Green and Heinstschel, Canon 360, 300.

specifically designed to handle formal relationships with the representatives of other states. Of particular significance is the Secretariat of State, which is the major dicastery of the Vatican governmental apparatus. Indeed, the papal Secretariat is in charge of administering the activities of the Church and coordinating the action of the bureaucracy. Its head, the secretary of state, has no real equivalent in world politics.[111] His office is nothing less than a super prime-ministership. Although he remains subordinate, the papal secretary works much more closely with the Pope than a prime minister would with a president under a semi-presidential regime. In the words of Mgr. Paul Poupart, he "is the eye, the heart and the arm of the Pope."[112] Yet, his duties extend beyond the role of special advisor.

Like any other head of government, the papal secretary must coordinate the action of various dicasteries, also called Sacred Congregations, [113] Councils and Commissions. To help him to carry this task, the secretary of state can rely upon a Sostituto, who constitutes a sort of vice-secretary of state. Like his western European counterparts, the papal secretary periodically calls meetings of the heads of all Sacred Congregations (or prefects) and oversees the good functioning of the bureaucracy. In addition, he heads the Pontifical Commission of Vatican City, which is responsible for the administration of the State of Vatican City.

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[111] For a detailed account of the evolution of the office of secretary of state, see Hyginus Eugene Cardinale, *The Holy See and the International Order* (Gerrards Cross: Colin Smythe, 1976), 131-135.
[112] Cited by Peter Hebblethwaite, *In the Vatican* (Bethesda: Adler & Adler, 1986), 66.
[113] There are nine Congregations: The Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, Congregation for the Oriental Churches, Congregation for Bishops, Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, Congregation for the Causes of Saints, Congregation for the Clergy, Congregation for Institutes of Consecrated Life and Societies of Apostolic Life, Congregation for Catholic Education, Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples (see Appendix VII, figure 4).

Notwithstanding this broad definition of competence, the primary concern of the papal secretary remains the international sphere. His duties include overseeing the work of papal representatives, handling most relations with diplomats accredited to the Vatican, negotiating with governments on behalf of the Pope, playing the role of emissary during delicate missions. The Secretariat is expected to provide him with logistical support in all domains. The staff assigned to administer international questions works in various services, such as the linguistic service, the service of international organizations, the traditional diplomatic domain of codes and ciphers. Between 1968 and 1988, part of the diplomatic groundwork was actually carried out by a distinct institution, the Council of Public Affairs.[114] The work of this council and its predecessor, the Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Affairs, consisted in addressing questions related to communist and sensitive countries and in the negotiations of possible concordats and other international agreements. Like any other Sacred Congregation, this body was administered by a prefect, in this case the secretary of state, a secretary, a vice secretary and by an assembly of cardinals, some of whom were heading other Vatican dicasteries.[115]

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[114] The Council for Public Affairs replaced the Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Affairs, which originally was established in 1793 to deal with the French Revolution and monitoring politically challenging countries. The Council was established separately from the Secretariat of State under the pontificate of Paul VI following the adoption of the apostolic constitution, *Regimine Ecclesiae Universae*, on August 18, 1967. This reform was implemented several months later in March 1968. This Council was reorganized and reintegrated in the Secretariat of State after the adoption of a new apostolic constitution, *Pastor Bonus*, on June 29, 1988. It is now called the Second Section of the Secretariat of State, or Section for Relations with States. See also Cardinale, *The Holy See and the International Order*, 135-136.

[115] Information concerning the personnel of the Vatican bureaucracy was gathered from the reading of the Osservatore Romano, the Annuario Pontificio (Pontifical Yearbook), and the Catholic Almanach.

Although several individuals were involved in the administration of the Council and in the shaping Vatican foreign policy, one diplomat, Mgr. Casaroli, became closely associated, if not identified, with the policy toward Eastern Europe. First named vice-secretary of the Council by John XXIII in 1961, and later promoted to the rank of secretary under Pope Paul VI in 1969, he was asked to initiate contacts with eastern European countries in the hope of resuming a dialogue with communist regimes. Taking advantage of a trip to Vienna in 1963, where he led the Vatican delegation to the United Nations Convention of codification on consular relations, Casaroli visited both the Hungarian and Czechoslovak capitals. These two visits marked the official beginning of the crafting a new and perilous oriental foreign policy.

Chosen for his diplomatic skills, he had the total confidence of his superiors. Secretary of State Villot admitted that "for all that [concerned] the policy of the Holy See toward the East, he [was] confident, because he [knew] that Mgr. Casaroli elaborated it."[116] From this remark, it can be argued that in the domain of eastern European affairs, the secretary of the Council had the upper hand over the secretary of state. Indeed, for better or for worse, Casaroli embodied the Ostpolitik, thereby becoming the target of criticism from the periphery. As a man who built his entire carrier within the Roman Curia and climbed up the Vatican diplomatic ladder, Casaroli was perceived as a man from the Vatican bureaucracy: he was nothing less than a Vatican diplomatic apparatchik, albeit an excellent one. His vision was that of the center, of a highly centralized and bureaucratic system. One his most vigorous critics at the periphery, Polish Cardinal Wyszyński thought the Vatican was ready to sell out

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[116] Quotation cited by Antoine Wenger in an interview with Alceste Santini; See Alceste Santini, *Agostino Casaroli: Uomo del Dialoguo* (Torino: San Paolo, 1993), 182 (trans. from the Italian by the author).

eastern European churches on the altar of the "Reason of Church," based upon an erroneous analysis of communism.

However, the Secretariat and the Council of Public Affairs have not held a monopoly on these questions. Other Vatican institutions have been involved in matters relating to external relations and of course communist countries. These other institutions usually have covered more specialized aspects of the policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For instance, the Sacred Congregation for Oriental Churches, which traditionally oversees the well-being of historical Christian churches, also monitors the situation of Greco-Catholics (or Uniates). Since these communities were denied the right to exist and forcibly integrated into national Orthodox churches, this Congregation had a special interest in keeping a close watch on the communist world.

Other agencies are worth mentioning insofar as they constituted other channels to gather information and to foster contacts with communist regimes. Founded in 1965, the Secretariat for Non-Believers was designed to study the phenomenon of atheism and develop channels of communication with non-believers. With regard to the situation in communist countries, this dicastery was compelled for years to confine its activities to research. It took almost ten years to open the door for a possible dialogue with communist countries. In 1974, Yugoslav authorities finally invited the head of the Secretariat, Austrian Cardinal Franz König, to participate in some discussion upon the pacific coexistence between Marxists and Christians. However, no real conversation took place until the 1984 Ljubljana and 1986 Budapest conferences.[117] The real

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[117] See Report on the twenty five year activities of the Pontifical Council for the Dialogue with Non-Believers issued by Mgr. Rodé and reproduced in the Council's publication: see Franc Rodé, "Les Vingt-Cinq Ans du 'Conseil Pontifical pour le dialogue avec les Non-Croyants': Un Fruit du Concile Vatican II," *Atheism and Faith* vol. xxv (1990) no.

contribution of the Secretariat was to compile valuable information about how atheism and Marxism operated at a social, historical, cultural and political levels. That work was facilitated by the development of a network of national consultants. Drawing upon the investigation of specific cases, the plenary assembly of the Secretariat was able to make suggestions about how the Church should act in the context of a Marxist and atheistic environment.

Less visible has been the Secretariat for Christian Unity, which was first established in 1960. Led by Mgr. Willebrands in its early years, this dicastery was used to established contacts with the leaders of the Orthodox Church. Because of the close collaboration between the Orthodox hierarchies and the various communist regimes, these contacts through the Secretariat offered an unofficial and informal channel between the communist world and the West.

In addition to these official structures of the Roman Curia, the Vatican also relied upon other entities. Although not directly influencing foreign policy-making, institutions located in Rome, such as the Russicum, the eastern European Colleges (Hungarian, Lithuanian, Nepomucene, Ukrainian, Polish and Slovene) in Rome, the Marxist Center of the Gregorian Pontifical University, or the Oriental Institute contributed to the gathering of information on communism and Eastern Europe.[118]

The Vatican has thus the ability to rely upon numerous Roman institutions (the Secretariat of State, the Sacred Congregation for Oriental Churches, the Secretrariat for

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2, 146-157. It is worth noting here that the Ljubljana Conference only included Yugoslav Marxists. A dialogue with the representatives of various eastern European and Soviet delegations was not truly achieved until the meeting in Budapest.

[118] See Dunn, 28; For a different angle upon the institutions involved in the Vatican Ostpolitik and a closer look at the role of particular Vatican representatives, see Hansjakob Stehle, "Papal Eastern Diplomacy and the Vatican Apparatus," in *Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies*, ed. Pedro Ramet (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 342-347.

Non-Believers, the Secretariat for Christian Unity, etc.) which are more or less specialized, to handle a wide variety of international issues. However, the efficiency of the Vatican diplomacy would be undermined greatly it was not able to rely upon a most highly skilled diplomatic corps.

2. Vatican Diplomatic Corps:

Like any other sovereign, in order to establish relations with other states, the Vatican depends upon a fully constituted diplomatic corps, which is almost exclusively constituted of ecclesiastics. The mission of papal representatives is usually twofold. First, like their secular colleagues, they represent the Sovereign Pontiff in the country to which they are accredited. Second, they have to fulfill their religious functions with regard to local communities. They must ensure that politically and spiritually, the authority of the Pope and the teaching of the Church are not threatened. In some cases, it may involve negotiations to name the members the Catholic local hierarchy. Vatican diplomatic representatives, who are generally trained at the very selective Pontifical Ecclesiastical Diplomatic Academy, distinguish themselves by their knowledge, expertise, skills and dedication. Their sense of loyalty probably is strengthened by the status of celibacy that characterizes Catholic priesthood. However, most certainly, "the advantage of the Holy See," as Second Councilor Damien Leider remarked, "is that Vatican diplomats know their subject very well. They do not move so often as diplomats of other countries; so they acquire experience, and thus can be very effective."[119]

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[119] Interview with Damien Leider, second councilor at the American Embassy near the Holy See, November 10, 1994, Rome.

Despite these remarkable qualities, two weaknesses particularly undermined the action of the Vatican diplomacy with regard to Eastern Europe. First, the members of the diplomatic corps, like the rest of the Roman Curia, traditionally were recruited from the Italian clergy. Only armed with their bureaucratic and institutional knowledge, they lacked practical experience of communism. Not so differently from other modern states, the Vatican bureaucratic apparatus and its personnel were and have been perceived as being remote and little concerned about the welfare of the lay population. Little wonder then if certain disillusion and even resentment among certain eastern European Catholics, surfaced with regard to the institutions of the Holy See. Recalling the attempt of Vatican representatives to establish a dialogue with communist authorities, a Transylvanian bishop did not mince his words to a Vatican visitor: "you came as diplomats without caring anymore about persecution."[120] In other words, the judgment of communism made in the Vatican was tainted by western, and particularly Italian experiences, thereby creating tensions and misunderstandings between the center and the peripheral "national" churches.[121]

Second, the traditional use of a diplomatic corps has been of little relevance in the absence of diplomatic relationships. Such was the case with most eastern European countries, which had severed their ties with the Vatican in the wake of the communist takeover.[122] The Vatican was not even authorized to send apostolical delegates.

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[120] Interview with a Vatican representative, November 1994, Rome.

[121] Properly speaking, there are no national churches in Catholicism, because of both premises of universality and hierarchy. However, for explanatory purpose, the Catholic Church in its local context will be described as a national church.

[122] The notable exceptions in Eastern Europe were Yugoslavia and Poland. The former reestablished diplomatic ties with the Vatican on August 14, 1970, thereby reaffirming its distinct position in the communist world. The latter remained prudent and confined its dealings with the Holy See to regular meetings. The ambitions of Polish leaders were much more limted and only aimed at establishing "permanent working contacts" in a

Although this type of papal envoy does not enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, these representatives usually are tolerated by authorities, which want to normalize their relationships with the Vatican. Communist regimes, which proclaimed to be atheistic, of course were not ready to concede anything which would even resemble a token legitimacy. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, traditional Vatican Diplomacy was severely limited. Even though the Holy See always proclaims its independent right to send his envoys wherever Catholic are, this principle was utterly rejected by communist authorities. Henceforth, no permanent Vatican diplomatic representative was granted access to eastern European and Soviet territories.[123] The freedom of movement and the means of Vatican diplomatic action were constrained and at the mercy of the good will of communist leaderships. The Vatican was thus compelled to work on *ad hoc* basis and to depend upon special emissaries. Between 1961 and 1979, for instance, Mgr. Casaroli and other prelates undertook various trips to Eastern Europe to negotiate piecemeal concessions for local churches,[124] with the ultimate hope of transforming these contacts into some kind of formal relationships. Other subterfuges had to be devised to increase the contacts with communist authorities. In the Fall of 1989, the Holy See acknowledged that for years Rome and Moscow had maintained contacts in Rome.[125] There is little doubt that similar practices had developed with the representatives of eastern European countries.

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remore future. See John M. Kramer, "The Vatican's Ostpolitik," *Review of Politics* vol. 42 (July 1980) no. 3, 293.

[123] Except in Yugoslavia, after 1970.

[124] These limited agreements mostly sought to extract from communist regimes the authorization to make some ecclesiastical appointments. Particularly noteworthy are the 1964 Agreement with Hungary, and the 1963, 1973 and 1977 Agreements with Czechoslovakia.

[125] See Osservatore Romano, December 5, 1989, 4-7. Also Stehle "Papal Eastern Diplomacy and the Vatican Apparatus," 342.

Whatever efforts were devoted in the attempt of securing access to communist territories, overall, Vatican diplomacy retained its traditional realist approach.

3. A Realistic Approach to International Relations:

In a rather ironic twist of history, the Vatican diplomacy has been characterized by its Machiavellian realism. As a legitimate actor of the world scene, the Holy See has acknowledged that states are indeed the only recognized and legitimate subjects of international law. Therefore, they constitute its primary interlocutor when the Vatican aims at securing access to other territories. Like any good realist, Vatican diplomats or members of the Roman Curia have learned that in an "anarchical society,"[126] such as the international society, the Church like states must try to maximize its own interest. Although the discourse of the Church contains religious elements, and thus inherently implies an idealistic component, which transcends this world, it cannot necessarily apply moral rules in its relations with other countries. To paraphrase Hans Morgenthau, "universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states [and in this particular case of the Catholic Church] in their abstract universal formulation, but ... must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place."[127] It is in this frame of realism that the action of the Church must be understood. In the context of its relations with the communist world, the Vatican remained faithful to the realist creed and followed an inter-state approach. Or more accurately, this traditional line was

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[126] Hedley Bull, *Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). According to this author, the international system constitute an international society insofar as states feel bound by certain interests, such as the development of notions of right and wrong. However certain elements of anarchy, such as war, conflict and competition remain deeply embedded in world politics, therefore this international society must be defined as anarchical.
[127] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* 6th. ed. (New York: A. Knopf, 1985), 12.

emphasized in two of the three periods, which have characterized Vatican diplomacy in Eastern Europe since 1945.

Historically, the issue of communism in Eastern Europe only became a concern for the Vatican in the aftermath of World War II. The communist takeover throughout Eastern Europe, and the rapid development of the East-West confrontation left the Catholic Church with little diplomatic choice. Whatever the legacy of interactions with the Soviet Union may have been during the Interwar period,[128] the Vatican, under the leadership of Pius XII, was compelled to adopt a policy of direct confrontation. The ideological rift between the Catholic Church and communism seemed incommensurable, especially at a time when the new eastern European communist regimes embarked into a policy of intense repression against churches.

For Pius XII, post-World War II developments in Eastern Europe confirmed the lack of redemptive elements in communism. In the eyes of east European communist leaders, the Catholic Church was too closely identified with western countries culturally, socially, economically, and geopolitically. In other words, in this first period, the Catholic Church was trapped into the Cold War paradigm. Thus, on July 1949 the Holy Office instructed Catholics not to support or vote for communist parties, not to read books, periodicals or flyers, which sustained the doctrine and practice of communism. For those unwilling to abide by this injunction, the penalty was quite severe: believers, who did not comply were to be denied sacraments. And if the message of the Holy Office was not clear enough, the Vatican specified that Catholics, who not only professed communism, but also spread and participated in the

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[128] For a fuller historical account of the 1917-1948 period concerning the relations between the Vatican and the communist regimes, see Trasatti, 3-142; Weigel, 59-64; Stehle, *Eastern Politics and the Vatican*, 1-262; Dunn, 1-21.

communist propaganda, would be considered apostates.[129] A year later, Pius XII exhorted Catholics to combat what he called "atheistic propaganda."[130] Following this line of reasoning, the Catholic Church encouraged the emergence and the mobilization of the laity behind Christian democratic parties. For the remainder of Pius XII's pontificate, the Vatican diplomacy would be intransigent. Not surprisingly, the Pope would find himself even more at the forefront of the Cold War, when he would stand on the behalf of the victims of communism[131] and denounce the lack of energetic response in face of the 1956 Hungarian events.[132]

The election of a new Pope in 1958 brought significant changes in Vatican foreign policy. This second period however was no less realistic than the previous one. Under the leadership of John XXIII, the Catholic Church modified its diplomatic approach and introduced a policy of "détente." The lessons drawn by John XXIII and his successor Paul VI very much paralleled the political analysis developed by western

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[129] 1949 *Responsa ad dubia de communismo*, decree of the Holy Office (more recently renamed the Congregation for the Propagation of Faith). See Trasatti, 143.
[130] Pius XII, *Anni Sacri* (On a Program for Combating Atheistic Propaganda throughout the World) March 12, 1950 available at http://listserv.american.edu/catholic/church/papal/pius.xii/p12-anni.txt. 04/08/96.
[131] See Pius XII's following encyclicals: *Meminisse Iuvat* (On Prayers for the Persecuted Church) published on July 14, 1958 available at http://listserv.american.edu/catholic/church/papal/pius.xii/p12memin.txt. 11/16/96; *Ad Apostolorum Principis* (on Communism and the Church in China) published on June 29, 1958 available at http://listserv.american.edu/catholic/church/papal/pius.xii/p12-apos.txt. 11/16/96; *Luctuossimi Eventus* (On Prayers for the People of Hungary) published on October 28, 1956 available at http://listserv.american.edu/catholic/church/papal/pius.xii/p12luctu.txt. 11/16/96; *Laetamur Admodum* (Renewing Exhortation for Prayers for Peace for Poland, Hungary and the Middle East) published on November 1, 1956 available at http://listserv.american.edu/catholic/church/papal/pius.xii/p12laeta.txt. 11/16/96; *Datis Nuperrime* (On Condemning the Ruthless Use of Force in Hungary) published on November 5, 1956 available at http://listserv.american.edu/catholic/church/papal/pius.xii/p12datis.txt. 11/16/96.
[132] Vatican Radiobroadcast, November 10, 1956.

leaders, such as Willy Brandt. They realized that a policy of direct confrontation was leading the Catholic Church to a dead-end: it started to appear costly and counter-productive for its survival. After the closing of numerous churches, convents, monasteries, and charitable institutions, such as hospitals, or schools, the massive arrests and expedited judgments of bishops, priests, nuns and monks, Catholic communities were facing an even greater danger; they were on the verge of losing their hierarchical link with the Roman Apostolical See, as eastern European countries denied the right of the Holy See to make ecclesiastical appointments. After the devastating effects of the communist persecution in the 1950s, the Vatican was looking for a way to rescue already extremely weakened eastern European churches. The Catholic Church sought to buy time. Unfortunately for the Holy See, communism looked as if it was here to stay. This assessment of Church circumstances in the geopolitical context of the early 1960s demanded a new strategy.[133] Thus, a new vision presented in the form of a dialogue with communist regimes was devised. In the mind of its Vatican diplomats, these contacts with communist leaderships were expected to produce a compromise, or at least small concessions that would allow eastern European hierarchies and churches to survive. In the words of Vatican Secretary of State Villot:

> It [the Vatican foreign policy toward Eastern Europe] [consisted] of ensuring that Catholics in those countries [had] a sufficient breathing space for the professing of their faith. The oriental policy thus [was] not a modus vivendi with states, but a modus non moriendi for Catholics in eastern European countries.[134]

This policy of détente, also mistakenly nicknamed Ostpolitik according to Vatican officials, was pursued until the death of Paul VI in 1978.

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[133] For a complete analysis of the motivations behind the Vatican policy of "Détente," see Dunn, 30-38.

Actually, a third and last period in the Vatican diplomacy regarding Eastern Europe was already in the making even before the election of John Paul II in 1978. This new historical phase overlapped Paul VI's Pontificate. Starting in the 1970s, fundamental changes in the premises of the Ostpolitik were introduced. The Catholic Church did not repudiate its policy of negotiations with communist regimes altogether, but rather it grew more sophisticated, richer and fuller. Most significantly, the Catholic Church, both at the center in Rome and at the periphery with certain national episcopates playing a more active role, started paying attention to civil society. As the papacy elaborated a new language for its foreign policy, mainly in the form of human rights and the defense of democracy, it was able to challenge a bipolar understanding of international relations: depending upon the issue at stake, the Church was ready to stand against a different set of countries. Thus, the Holy See was found sitting on the side of the West against communism, but also of the South against the North in matters of poverty and economic development, and even most recently cooperating with Islamic countries in matters of moral issues, such as abortion.[135] In other words, the Vatican shifted toward a more pluralistic approach of international relations, with a prominent transnational dimension. Realism was tempered, and changes were introduced. Human rights and democracy took the center stage of Vatican diplomacy. New strategies and techniques were considered as the significance of non-state actors was recognized. Eventually, under the leadership of John Paul II, civil society, as a

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[134] Interview of Cardinal Villot cited by Antoine Wenger in "La Politique Orientale du Saint Siège," in *Le Saint Siège dans les Relations Internationales*, ed. Joel-Benoit d'Onorio (Paris: Cerf, 1989), 165.
[135] See the controversy between the United States and the Holy See at the 1994 Cairo United Nations Conference on Population and Development, and the 1995 Beijing United Nations Conference on Women.

fundamental piece of democracy, became a substantial component of a more sophisticated papal diplomacy.

B. Toward the Development of a Pluralistic Diplomacy:

1. Circumstances of Change:

This shift of emphasis in the Vatican diplomacy did not occur in a vacuum. It took place in the context of wider changes developing within the Church. Over the last century, the Catholic Church's acceptance of democracy and defense of human rights evolved greatly. The political, philosophical and theological understanding of both concepts developed in parallel. For instance, Leo XIII was the first Sovereign Pontiff to accept- albeit timidly- the idea of democracy, when he declared "[...] it is not of itself wrong to prefer a democratic form of government [...] Of the various forms of government, the Church does not reject any that are fitted to procure the welfare of the subject."[136] A few decades later, Pius XII, who was deeply influenced by the work of Jacques Maritain,[137] denounced totalitarianism. In his encyclical, *Ad Summi Pontificatus* (On the State in the Modern World), the Pope simply stated: "to consider the state as something ultimate to which everything else should be coordinated and directed, cannot fail to harm the true and lasting prosperity of nations."[138]

By 1944, when the Pope addressed the world in his now famous Christmas message, the Catholic Church's definition of democracy was clearly developed in

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[136] Leo XIII, *Libertas Humana* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1941), 27; *Libertas Humana* was issued on June 20, 1888.
[137] See for instance, his *Man and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), *Christianisme et Démocracie* (New York: Maison Française, 1942) and *Humanisme Intégral* (Paris: Aubin, 1936).
[138] This encyclical was issued on October 20, 1939; See Gerard F. Yates, S.J., ed., *Papal Thought on the State: Excerpts from Encyclicals and Other Writings of Recent Popes* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958), 98-114.

opposition to totalitarian regimes. Thereupon, the Catholic Church fully embraced democracy. No doubt could be left when Pius XII declared that "the democratic form of government appeared to many a postulate of nature imposed by reason itself." The Pope further elaborated his position, indicating that "a healthy democracy" was a political system in which individuals "[were] in fact and [ought to] continue to be [the] subject, [the] foundation, and [the] end [of the social order]."[139] Progress in the Catholic thinking explains why after the Second World War the Catholic Church supported the emergence of Christian democratic parties particularly in Germany and Italy. However, until Vatican II, the focus of the Church seemed to be restricted to forms of government and institutions. The Second Vatican Council brought a new focus on the individual, and by extension to civil society insofar as it stressed the need for the laity to take a more active and distinctive role not only in the Church but also in the midst of the political, economical and social community.[140] This change only occurred because the democratic evolution paralleled the evolution of the Church's position on human rights.

Like democracy, the issue of human rights emerged on the agenda of the Church at the end of the nineteenth century, as the impact of the industrial revolution was deeply felt by the working class. With the concurrent emergence of socialism during this period, the Catholic Church was compelled to address the plight of the workers, whose working and living conditions were abysmal. In his famous 1891 encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, Leo XIII laid the foundations for the Catholic social

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[139] This Christmas Message (On Democracy and Lasting Peace) was broadcasted on December 24, 1944; See Pius XII, *Democracy and Lasting Peace* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1945), 8.
[140] See in particular *Gaudium and Spes* (Pastoral Constitution: on the Church and the Modern World) issued on December 7, 1965 and available at http://listserv.american.edu/catholic/church/vaticanii/gaudium.etspes. 04/03/96.

doctrine, as he proclaimed the necessity of justice in the economic and social realms. In short, the Pope acknowledged the existence of social rights. In this regard, the state was expected to offer protection:

> For the nation, as it were, of the rich is guarded by its own defenses and in less need of governmental protection, whereas the suffering multitude, without the means to protect itself, relies especially on the protection of the state. Wherefore, since wage workers are numbered among the great mass of the needy, the state must include them under its special care and foresight.[141]

This social vision was further expounded by Pius XI in his 1931 *Qradragesimo Anno* Encyclical. While addressing the issue of private ownership, the Sovereign Pontiff warned against "the twin rocks of shipwreck," namely individualism and collectivism.[142] Acknowledging that "the riches which are so abundantly produced in [this] age of industrialism,..., [were] not rightly distributed and equitably made available to the various classes of the people," he forcefully encouraged humanity "to strive that at least in the future the abundant fruits of production would accrue equitably to those who are rich and [would] be distributed in ample sufficiency among the workers."[143]

Most significantly, the Pope stressed the significance of the principle of subsidiarity, arguing that "it [was] wrong to take away from individuals what they can accomplish by their own ability and effort and entrust it to a community." This declaration not only had an economical and social content, but it also entailed some political consequences. Although he recognized that "many things which were done by small association in former times [could not] be done now save by large associations,"

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[141] Leo XIII cited by Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno* (On Reconstruction of the Social Order); That encyclical was issued on May 15, 1931 and is available at http://listserv.american.edu/catholic/church/papal/pius.xi/p11quad.txt, 5. 04/08/96.
[142] Pius XI, 9.
[143] *Ibid*, 12.

the philosophical principle of subsidiarity should remain "fixed and unshaken." Pius XI notably explained that the state should not be involved in certain activities, if individuals could carry these at their own level. The state should refrain from expanding at the expense of individual freedom. "It is an injustice," Pius XII explained, "and at the same time both a serious evil and a disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do." According to this analysis, the action of the state should be limited, because by "its very nature," it ought to contribute to social activities by "[supplying] help to the members of the social body, but never [by destroying] or [absorbing] them."[144]

The gap still existing in the treatment between the economic and social, and the political sphere was fully bridged under the papacy of John XXIII. His 1963 encyclical, *Pacem in Terris*, was no less than an official recognition of human rights broadly conceived: right to life, right to a decent standard living, freedom of choice, right to work, right to economic initiative, freedom of association, freedom of movement, right to take part to public life, etc.[145] John XXIII even indicated that "in the juridical organization of states [...] the first requisite was that a charter of fundamental human rights be drawn in clear and precise terms and that it be incorporated in its entirety in the constitution."[146]

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[144] *Ibid*, 15-16.
[145] Gorgio Filibeck, *Les Droits de L'Homme dans L'Enseignement de L'Eglise de Jean XXIII à Jean Paul II: Recueil de Textes du Magistère de L'Eglise Catholique de Mater et Magistra à Centesimus Annus* (Human Rights in the Teaching of the Church from John XXIII to John Paul II: A Collection of Texts of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church from Mater et Magistra to Centesimus Annus) (Cité du Vatican: Librairie Editrice du Vatican, 1992), 71-74.
[146] See John XXIII's *Pacem in Terris* issued on April 11, 1963 and available at http://listserv.american.edu/catholic/church/papal/john.xxiii/j23.pacem.txt, 11. 04/08/96.

Eventually, the evolution of the discourse on the defense of human rights would converge and merge with the stream of thought on democracy. Out of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), where this process took place, would emerge a new Catholic understanding of democracy: from thereon human rights would be at the core of the definition of democracy. This transformation opened a new era for the Catholic Church. By defending democracy and human rights, the Catholic Church allowed itself to move away from institutional and governmental concerns to focus more decisively on civil society.[147] In terms of foreign policy, it meant that the Vatican would move away from a pure realpolitik approach centered on inter-state relationships toward a strategy combining a tamed realism with the defense of human rights and democratic aspirations of societies. To that end, the Holy See's shift toward a more transnational diplomacy would require some adjustments in the way the Vatican institutions functioned.

2. Toward a Closer Attention to Civil Society:

a. From Paul VI to John Paul II:

The Church started implementing this new vision in the aftermath of Vatican II. Starting with John XXIII and with quickening pace under Paul VI, a diplomat by training, the Holy See participated in the development of an increasing number of international fora. This strategy, for instance, allowed the Vatican to be present at several major conventions of international codification, such as the United Nations Convention on the law of the sea. Most significantly, the Catholic Church played an active role in the Helsinki Convention on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which

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[147] As we shall see later on, the Catholic Church does not necessarily use the specific term of civil society, but recognize its existence and significance.

led to the adoption of the 1975 Final Act. This conference gave the Vatican a particular opportunity for action. Indeed, in most cases the Holy See merely has a status of permanent observer.[148] In this instance, the Holy See did not just sign the Helsinki agreement (also termed the Declaration of Principles guiding Relations between Participating States), it also played a major role in the writing of the seventh principle, which calls for the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, of religion and belief. Beyond the influence exercised in the elaboration of the final document, the Vatican representatives could use this type of forum to develop formal and informal relations with other state representatives, including those coming from the East.[149] However, the bulk of changes did not take place until the election of John Paul II in 1978.

b. A Restructuring of the Vatican Diplomacy toward Eastern Europe:

Building upon the foundation of his predecessor, the Polish Pope brought changes in the policy toward Eastern Europe with quickening pace. From then on, civil society would become an important preoccupation of Vatican foreign policy. This commitment was reflected in a new philosophy of Vatican diplomacy, changes in the functioning of institutional structures and an attempt to develop new channels to transmit information.

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[148] Among the major international organizations, the Holy See has a status of permanent observer in the Council of Europe, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Organization (UNO) and the World Organization (WHO).

[149] See *Osservatore Romano*, 5 December 1989, 4-7; Also Stehle, "Papal Eastern Diplomacy and the Vatican Apparatus," 342 and 353-354.

A New Diplomatic Philosophy:

This commitment of the Polish Pope to civil society can be explained for two major reasons. First of all, according to the few indiscretions that filtered out of the second 1978 conclave, Karol Wojtyła was primarily chosen to be a pastoral Pope, but also as a man of compromise between the conservative and progressive factions in the Church.[150] After all he had taken an active part in the Second Vatican Council. The College of Cardinals, which has the duty to elect the Sovereign Pontiff, obviously showed a firm intention to move away from the traditional career path usually expected from potential candidates to the throne of St. Peter. Except in the case of John Paul I, who only served 33 days, Karol Wojtyła has been the first non diplomat to be elected Pope since Benedict XV (1914-1922).

Moreover, as a Pole, who had lived under communism, the new Pope understood the necessity to place the interests of the people before that of the institutional Church. In brief, he recentered the traditional premise of Vatican diplomacy. His own experience made him aware that the Catholic Church was not just an institutional structure and an ecclesiastical hierarchy, but also a community of believers; that without it, the Church, especially in Eastern Europe, could not survive. In her study of the Catholic Church in Poland, Mary Jane Osa explains that the Polish hierarchy understood well the significance of civil society and pastoral mobilization. She argues that in the course of this century, Polish bishops, particularly under the leadership of Cardinal Wyszyński, had learned that

> Compromises made by religious authorities responsible for the organizational interests of the Church [results] in a loss of popular

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[150] Tad Szulc, *Pope John Paul II: The Biography* (New York: Scribner, 1995), 269-280; Also see "A Foreign Pope," *Time* October 30, 1978, 84-97; Kenneth L. Woodward, Loren Jenkins, Elaine Sciulino and Paul Martin, "A Pope from Poland," *Newsweek* October 30, 1978, 78-82.

> support; [that] normal institutional self interest weakens the church-society link because the Church is expected to act altruistically in the interest of the Polish nation. [That] one important way the bishops manage to stem defections is to engage in extensive pastoral mobilization.[151]

Therefore, for the Pope, beside traditional inter-state relationships, it was also imperative to reach out to the community of believers, and beyond to civil society. In other words, he believed in a more balanced diplomacy. This view eventually led to a two dimensional approach, that is a combination of an altered international approach with a visible transnational dimension. And it is this latter aspect, that would allow for a pluralistic discourse on human rights and democracy. In order to conduct his diplomacy on these new premises, John Paul II introduced several significant changes in the way the Catholic Church operated.

As indicated earlier, to carry the Vatican diplomacy, the Pope has relied upon the secretary of state, the papal Secretariat of State, and a corps of diplomatic representatives. Thus, like any French president under the Fifth Republic, one of the first tasks of a new Sovereign Pontiff is to designate a new secretary of state. However, according to Antoine Wenger,[152] the newly elected Pope did not want a secretary of state, or even a pro-secretary of state.[153] Jean Cardinal Villot, who had served as Paul VI's secretary of state and who was Camerlengo for the two 1978

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[151] Mary-Jane Osa, *Pastoral Mobilizationl and Symbolic Politics: The Catholic Church in Poland, 1918-1966* Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, June 1992 (Ann Arbor:UMI, 1992), 13.

[152] Interview with Antoine Wenger, Rome, November 3, 1994 (trans. from French by the author). Antoine Wenger is an Assomptionist priest, and a former diplomatic councilor at the French Embassy near the Holy See.

[153] A pro-secretary of state is an acting secretary of state who has not been given the title of cardinal yet.

conclaves,[154] informed John Paul II of the absolute necessity for him to hire a secretary of state sooner or later. As previously noted, this office not only deals with the delicate task of establishing relations with other states, but also must oversee the work of the nine other dicasteries and various Pontifical Councils. Actually, there has been one case in the past, when a Pope spared himself the trouble of going through a process of nomination. After the death of his secretary of state, Pius XII just chose not to replace him and took over his function.[155] However, there is a major difference between these two situations: Pius XII was a former diplomat and had served as secretary of state under Pius XI, while Pope John Paul II had not received any particular diplomatic training. Thus, Cardinal Villot offered a third solution. He would continue to serve in his position, until a suitable candidate could be found. When the French cardinal unexpectedly died in March 1979, John Paul II decided to replace him with the man who embodied the Ostpolitik, Mgr. Casaroli.[156] Despite the concession to this Vatican state of affairs, John Paul II intended to be in firm control. As Wenger pointed out, under this pontificate, the Secretariat of State has lost its autonomy: "the Pope decides and the Secretariat executes."[157]

A good instance, which illustrates both the will of John Paul II of not yielding to the Roman Curia, and the desire to reach out to civil society was his decision to travel to Poland. It was one of the first decisions made by the Polish Pope in a matter of diplomacy, and he took it against the advice of both Villot and Casaroli. This

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[154] The Camerlengo is the person officiating over the good functioning of the conclave. The latter is constituted by the members of the College of Cardinals, who are eligible to elect the Pope.
[155] Hebblethwaite, 66.
[156] Casaroli was named pro-secretary of state in April 1979. Two months later, upon his receiving the red hat of cardinal, he officially became secretary of state.
[157] Interview with Antoine Wenger.

approach had major consequences in the way Vatican affairs were conducted. Casaroli was officially the secretary of state, but in practice John Paul II took care of eastern European questions personally.[158] This situation is confirmed by comments made by Casaroli to Peter Hebblethwaite during a trip to Zaire. At this occasion the secretary of state expressed some concerns that his duty to accompany the "pilgrim" Pontiff throughout the world was keeping him away from his dossiers.[159] Furthermore, according to Councilor Cuni, the Pope paid a particular attention to the Polish and eastern European prelates he had brought in the Vatican. Changes in the diplomatic philosophy thus were also the result of some institutional transformation.

Institutional Change in the Vatican Apparatus:

Indeed, one of the major characteristics of this pontificate has been to pursue and intensify the internationalization of the Vatican bureaucracy. The Roman Curia and more specifically the Secretariat of State, as heretofore mentioned, have been traditionally a "reserved domain" for Italian clerics. Generally speaking, the Polish Pope has made a great effort to diversify the recruitment for high ranking positions in the Church in order to reflect the diversity of the world Catholic community, but also to make the Vatican institutions more responsive. One of his priorities has been to enlarge the geographic representation in the College of Cardinals: Between 1979 and 1995, John Paul II named 120 cardinals bringing the number of countries represented in the College of Cardinals to more than sixty. These nominations are important, because cardinals are asked to be involved in the work of the Roman Curia. Moreover, depending upon their hierarchical rank, they are more or less involved. The highest

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[158] Interview with Henri Cuni, councilor at the French Embassy in Italy, November 2, 1994, Rome (trans. from French by the author).

hierarchical rank is represented by the cardinal bishops, a selected few, who are working full time for the central administration of the Roman Curia. Next in order of precedence are the cardinal priests: although they constitute the bulk of the College, they only serve in one or several departments, and not on a full time basis. The rest of cardinals belongs to the group of cardinal deacons. This cluster includes a small number of individuals who are working full time and who for the most part have worked their way up through the Vatican bureaucracy.

Before the election of John Paul II there were only six eastern European cardinals, whose involvement in the administration of church affairs remained confined to one or two areas of specialization. Only one, Franjo Seper from Yugoslavia, headed a major department in the Roman Curia.[160] After 1978, this situation was altered in a manner reminiscent of the reshuffling of high civil servants practiced by some secular states when a new government takes office. By 1989, the number of cardinals was doubled. Three of them were cardinal deacons. Mgr. Władysłav Rubin (Poland) was named to head the Prefecture of the Congregation for Oriental Churches.[161] Mgr. Andrzej Deskur (Poland), who had been the president for the Council on Social Communications for numerous years, was elevated to the rank of cardinal deacon in 1985, and therefore became active in other curial departments. Mgr. Jozef Tomko (Slovakia) joined this group the same year and was selected to lead the Congregation for the Evangelization of the Peoples.

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[159] Hebblethwaite, 69.
[160] Franjo Seper, a cardinal priest, was the prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith and the president of the Theological Commission. He was also involved in the work of the Council for Public Affairs, of the Sacred Congregations for Bishops, for Divine Worship and Discipline of Sacraments, for the Clergy and for Catholic Education.
[161] Mgr. Rubin also became a member of several deparments, such as the Sacred Congregations for the Doctrine of Faith and for the Causes of Saints, and the Secretariat for Christian Unity.

Moreover, below the rank of secretary of state, eastern Europeans filled six of the twenty-two most significant offices in the Vatican dicasteries (see Appendix VII, figure 4).[162] This opening to the East therefore was not significant because of the number of individuals it involved. Rather, its importance stemmed from the fact that it affected particularly strategic dicasteries such a the Council for Public Affairs and the Sacred Congregation for Oriental Churches. These changes in personnel are significant to consider in as much as beside a concern for diversity, they also suggest an attempt to give more priority to the issue of communism and Eastern Europe.[163] These transformations also indicate a desire to rely upon individuals who knew the local situation of particular countries. In other words, they represent an attempt to modify the traditional channels designed to transmit information from the grassroots level to the apex of power, namely the Pope.

Toward new Channels of Communication and a more Responsive Bureaucracy:

The necessity to hire diplomats with practical knowledge of eastern European countries stemmed from the need to learn about and assess the real condition of civil society. Without that kind of information, it was difficult to address the needs of these communities properly. Eastern European representatives not only had the advantages of a deeper knowledge, but they were probably more likely to have broader contacts at the local level.

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[162] In addition to the prefect, who has rank of cardinal, a Sacred Congregation is usually administered by a secretary and one or two vice-secretaries.
[163] It is worth noticing that after the collapse of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, communism has not disappeared from the diplomatic agenda of the Vatican. Rather, its focus has shifted toward Cuba and China.

In addition to the injection of new blood in the Vatican bureaucracy, John Paul II has been able to circumvent the influence of the Roman Curia in other ways. In addition to having a Pole as his personal secretary, the Pope has tried to keep some kind of formal and informal contacts with people external to the Vatican bureaucracy on a much broader basis than his predecessors. This method consisted in hearing directly from lay and religious people visiting to and from Eastern Europe. These meetings took the form either of audiences or private conversations. Behind the anecdotal aspect of inviting various individuals beyond the limelight of officialdom, John Paul II could depend upon a different channel of information concerning the situation of eastern European countries. The possibility of bypassing the traditional means of communication of the Vatican was important. In his study, Dunn noted the problems of distortion that may occur in the transmission of information to the head of the Catholic Church.[164] Despite the veil of secrecy that wraps everything in the Vatican, a keen observer cannot fail noticing that inside the Vatican institutions embrace conflicting views concerning how the Catholic Church should act. In a way, the Vatican bureaucracy appears very similar to any other kind: it has to deal with the existence of groups with different vested interests. Therefore, the possibility given to John Paul II to rely upon less traditional sources of information helped him to keep the risk of distortion to a minimum. It also probably gave him the means to contain the influence of the Roman Curia.

This unconventional approach, by Vatican standards, entailed some major consequences in the way John Paul II was going to handle diplomatic affairs. In effect, the Holy See headed by the Pope developed a double layered strategy. The first layer was to be international and the second transnational.

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[164] Dunn, 28.

c. John Paul II's Papal Diplomacy in Practice:

According to French Councilor Cuni, John Paul II demonstrated a political will which was different from previous Popes. He did not have a particular scenario leading to the collapse of the communist empire. However, at the same time, this Pope put communism, which he considered to be like a disease at the heart of Europe, on the top of his agenda. Therefore, he tried to score points against communism anywhere it was possible.[165] Or in the words of a Vatican official, "he wedged open the door against communism."[166] In practice, it meant the introduction of modifications in the way the Vatican diplomacy, especially the Ostpolitik, was conducted. Since 1961, Mgr. Casaroli, then secretary of the Council for Public Affairs had developed a cautious policy of negotiations with communist regimes in the hope of extracting concessions one agreement at a time. This long term strategy was to ensure "the *esse* [...], the *bene esse* [...], [...] and the *plene esse* of the Church [...]"[167] Eventually, it was thought, relatively normal conditions could be restored for the Church to perform its function, i.e., the proper care of the faithful. Under the leadership of John Paul II, the premise of this policy was not abandoned. Rather, the Polish Pope added a new level of sophistication. From that time forward, there would be some type of division of labor between the Sovereign Pontiff and other Vatican diplomats. In the words of Cuni, "the diplomacy developed by John Paul II curiously looked like the diplomacy of eastern European countries."[168] Or perhaps more accurately, he took on the communist regimes at their own game.

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[165] Interview with Henri Cuni.
[166] Interview with Vatican official, Summer 1993, Rome.
[167] Hebblethwaite, 68.
[168] Intervuew with Henri Cuni.

Communist regimes usually approached negotiations in two rounds. The first round consisted in sending inflexible diplomats, such as Andrei Gromyko, who would turn down every proposal put in front of them. Then, in a second round of talks, communist countries would send polished and British like individuals. They would accept minor concessions, but everybody would lose no time in accepting these in self congratulations.[169] Similarly, the Pope stood firm on the question of human rights, unwilling to grant any concession to communist regimes. He appeared even ready to take the offensive and accept confrontation, in the hope of knocking the ramparts of communism. In his wake, the secretary of state was sent to deal with eastern European regimes. He was known to be more conciliatory and asked for small favors. The communist regimes at that point were eager to give anything, for fear the Polish Pope would become even more daring politically.

Communist leaders realized the danger represented by John Paul II. It was not a coincidence if the Soviet Union dispatched Gromyko to Rome shortly after the election of the new leader of the Catholic Church.[170] The Soviet authorities worried about the potential of social mobilization represented by the election of a Polish Pope in a country where the Catholic Church remained an unavoidable force. The decision of the Polish government to let John Paul II visit his country in the Spring 1979 could only add to Soviet nervousness. According to Edward Gierek, then first secretary of the Polish Communist Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR, or literally

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[169] *Ibid.*
[170] Gromyko met John Paul II on January 24, 1979, see *Osservatore Romano* (French edition no. 49), 5 December 1989, 4-7.

Polish United Workers' Party), Brezhnev perceived the coming of John Paul II into communist territories as a "strategic danger."[171]

If this situation was not bad enough, the election of Ronald Reagan to the American presidency in the Fall of 1980 confirmed the strengthening of the Vatican position. Indeed, in the new American president, John Paul II found an ally. The interests of the Vatican and the US came to coincide in the willingness to be tougher with communist regimes. "Although the idea of a conspiracy between the Vatican and the United States is completely ludicrous," commented Damien Leider, "there was certainly an exchange of information after all."[172] This second councilor at the American Embassy further explained that in countries, such as Poland, for instance, members of western embassies were extremely restricted in their freedom of movement. When they wanted to go somewhere, they had to ask for an authorization from communist authorities.[173] There were no such constraints on the representatives of local churches. The assistance provided by the Vatican only dealt with a certain type of information. Needless to say, concerning questions, such as armaments, the United States could rely upon satellites to know about their position. However, as Leider further noted, concerning the mood in certain areas, decisions, or actions, the Church obviously had more people, and they could know more about what was going on in the country.[174] Nothing in this admission should be surprising: statesmen in various states have long known the invaluable contribution of the Vatican as a sanctuary for exchanges of information away from the public eye. However, in this case, the United States and the Holy See have shared a similar interest, that of condemning the

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[171] Janusz Rolicki, *Edward Gierek: Przerwana Dekada* (Warzsawa: Wydawnictwo Fakt, 1990) cited by Szulc, 299.
[172] Interview with Damien Leider.
[173] *Ibid.*

communist policy in matters of human rights. Thus, the Vatican could either rely upon the support of the United States in international fora, or provide the knowledge, the expertise and the experience of its high skilled diplomats to western countries.

The major goal of John Paul II's diplomacy was to use every opportunity to address the question of Eastern Europe. First, it meant using traditional channels of diplomacy, such as contacts with state representatives. In his second address to the Diplomatic Corps on January 1979, for instance, the newly elected Pope lost no time in mentioning the East and the will of the Apostolical See to serve in the rapprochement of nations.[175] During times of crises, such as the declaration of martial law in Poland, John Paul II would devote long segments of his discourses about the threat to the inviolable rights of man in his native country.[176] In some cases, direct references to communist regimes would be omitted. However, the argument would remain as sharp and compelling as the actors involved would understand the nature of the allegations implied by Rome. In a letter to the heads of state and heads of government present at the Madrid Conference on European Security and Cooperation, John Paul II made a plea for the respect of human rights and fundamental liberties.[177] In so doing, he mentioned the plight of millions of people, who still endured "suffering and bitterness, moral and material hardship," because of violation or restriction of religious freedom.[178] Because of the very nature of this conference (except for the United States

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[174] *Ibid.*
[175] *The Holy See at the Service of Peace: Pope John Paul II, Addresses to the Diplomatic Corps* (Vatican City: Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 1988), 30.
[176] See John Paul II's 1982 Address to the Diplomatic Corps in *The Holy See at the Service at Peace*, 59-60.
[177] See John Paul II, *Freedom of Conscience and of Religion: Letter on the eve of the Madrid Conference on European Security and Cooperation* Vatican City, September 1, 1980.
[178] *Ibid.*, paragraph 6.

and Canada, only European countries were invited to participate), everyone knew the leader of the Holy See was alluding to communist Europe.

However, John Paul II's favored approach was to address the people, and to bypass these traditional diplomatic means of communication. Thus, the Pope tried to reach out to eastern European populations during public audiences, or via impromptu discussions with journalists during his travels throughout the world. References to the situation in Eastern Europe was constantly emphasized. A close reading of the back issues of the *Osservatore Romano*, the official newspaper of the Vatican, reveals the difference in the activities of the Sovereign Pontiff or the references to Eastern Europe between the pontificate of Paul VI and that of John Paul II. While, under Paul VI, there were occasional references to this part of the world, since the election of the Polish Pope, there has not been a week without some kind of attention about eastern European countries. Any excuse, celebration of religious figures embodying national symbols, such as St. Cyril and St. Methodius, or a prayer to intellectual workers, was good enough. At times, these reminders would become more frequent. During the martial law in Poland, every week the Pope would hold a prayer to the Lady of Jasna Góra, a symbol of Polish pride and resistance. As a political message of support, certain days would be devoted to Solidarity, to Poland, or to the question of human rights in Poland. John Paul II kept the promises he had made in one of first public appearances after his election: with him, the Church of silence was no more.[179]

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[179] On November 4, 1978, as John Paul II met the crowd at the Basilica of St. Francis of Assisi, he was asked by an anonymous voice about the Church of silence, which had come to refer to eastern European churches under communism. The Pope simply replied: "ma la Chiesa del silencio ora non existe piu. Ora parla con la voce del Papa" (The Church of silence does not exist anymore, it speaks with the voice of the Pope). Anecdote reported by Trasatti, 279, and translated by this author.

If people could not come to him in Rome, the Pope would go to the people. From January 1979 to October 1989, John Paul II undertook no less than forty trips abroad, visiting 85 different countries. By the end of 1983, the leader of the Catholic Church already had been to Germany, Austria and twice to Poland,[180] trying to make his voice heard on the other side of the Iron Curtain. To this end, John Paul II used all types of medium (television, radio, newspapers), thereby leading the papacy to the new era of world communication.[181]

In his attempt to reach out to and awaken eastern European populations, while chastising communist regimes, John Paul II revealed a strong will. When possible, he has not hesitated to use the few "weapons" he had at his disposal. A good case is illustrated by his handling of canonizations. This policy of canonization did not deal only with Eastern Europe. However, for these countries, it helped reaffirm the need to respect fundamental human rights. It was also an occasion to express signs of moral support and witness. The 1982 canonization of Maksymilian Kolbe, a Polish Franciscan who died in a Nazi camp, demonstrates this point.

The ceremony of his canonization took place on October 10, 1982. With regard to Vatican tradition, this canonization was obtained faster than Vatican practice is in such cases. It usually takes years, and most often than not decades for an individual to be beatified. Beatification represents the stage below canonization, which itself requires a similar amount of time. In the case of Kolbe, his canonization was pronounced less than ten years after his beatification in 1971. Although it is difficult to prove that the Polish Pope actually used his authority to speed up this process, it is

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[180] During his first trip to Poland, the Pope traveled a distance of 6 782 km and pronounced 59 public discourses in fifteen days (information provided by the Osservatore Romano, Italian edition). It is also worth noticing that during these trips John Paul II always tried to say a few words at the attention of other eastern European nations.

noteworthy that under his pontificate a record number of beatifications and canonizations have been pronounced. It is also important to remember that, after his nomination, John Paul II had secured strategic positions for eastern Europeans in the Congregation for the Causes of Saints. The way this procedure was expedited could be pure coincidence, but its timing and symbolism were compelling. Therefore, all the persons who attended this ceremony expected something to happen in as much as martial law was still enforced in Poland at the time.

Of course, due to the circumstances, the Polish communist regime had sent an official delegation led by the deputy speaker of the Polish Sejm, Jerzy Ozdowski. This event gathered a huge crowd, which filled the immense St. Peter's Square and even overflowed into the Via della Conciliatione. "Tension was high," remembers Cuni, "usually, this type of ceremony is extremely precise." Describing the celebration, he adds:

> There was the Pope's sermon on the marian cult. As he was delivering his speech, he did not venture outside the religious sphere. At the end, everybody was convinced that the papal outburst would not occur. The organ started playing. Then, suddenly, with a sign of his hand, the Pope asked for the music to stop, and started to speak. As he referred to Solidarity, the Pope vigorously and continuously hammered the podium, denouncing the Polish situation in front of the whole Polish delegation.[182]

This speech was both a message of support for the Polish population and the members of Solidarity, and a humiliating critique of the communist government in front of an international audience.

The story did not end there. Tradition demands that the representatives of the country honored by a canonization meet the Pope at the end of the ceremony. So a

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[181] To this end, a Polish monthly was added to the *Osservatore Romano* in 1980.
[182] Interview with Henri Cuni; see also Vatican broadcast of October 9, 1982 cited by *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, Lexis-Nexis, October 12, 1982.

shaken Polish delegation waited for John Paul II. When he came by, Ozdowski hurried to beg him not to leave the Polish representatives on this sour note. According to Cuni, the Pope refused to talked to them and went his way.[183] In this episode, the Supreme Pontiff demonstrated his concern for Poland and his uncompromising view on communism.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to unmask the deliberate strategy of John Paul II. This approach has been both subtle and parsimonious. Cases have been few in numbers, but have been selected carefully. Canonization represents the highest recognition by the Church conferred to an individual for his particular Christian contribution. Once recognized a saint, this person becomes an example of a virtuous life. In the context of communism, the process of canonizations came to serve another function. It prompted eastern European nations to reclaim their past and their culture in the hope of counteracting the influence of communism. The canonization of Agnes of Bohemia was supposed to play that role for Czechoslovakia. In a rather unexpected turn of events, it coincided with the beginning of demonstrations which eventually participated in bringing down the Czechoslovak communist regime. The real face of this strategy, however, did not appear clearly until after the 1989 eastern European revolutions.

In his 1993 *Veritatis Splendor Encyclical*, Pope John Paul II expounded his view on the role of canonization. As he explained,

> the Church proposes the example of numerous Saints who bore witness to and defended moral truth even to the point of enduring martyrdom, or who preferred death to a single mortal sin...

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[183] It is worth noting that the Polish press made no mention of these incidents, only indicating that the Polish delegation had been received by the Pope. See *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, Lexis-Nexis, October 12, 1982.

> Although [this example of] martyrdom represents the high point of the witness to moral truth, and one to which relatively few people are called, there is nonetheless a consistent witness which all Christians must daily be ready to make, even at the cost of suffering and grave sacrifice. Indeed, faced with the many difficulties which fidelity to the moral order can demand, even in the most ordinary circumstances, the Christian is called,[...], to a sometimes heroic commitment.[184]

Thus, he hoped that by recognizing saints in carefully chosen countries, the Church could encourage people to stand for their beliefs, to live within the truth. Such an approach could have stayed rather unnoticed, if John Paul II had not extended this approach to other countries beyond Eastern Europe. Since 1989, the Pope has turned his attention to some of the last bastions of communism, such as China and Cuba, revealing a trend.[185] Like in Eastern Europe, he has decided to use the policy of canonizations. In proclaiming the existence of Chinese saints, the Pope explained that he wanted to offer a sign of hope and pay tribute for those Catholics suffering there.[186] He even suggested his readiness to see more Chinese canonized so that they can serve as inspiring examples.

The papal attempt to develop a transnational diplomacy was not restricted to public discourses. It also included the transfer of information and resources. As Dunn explained, it is quite a challenging task to trace precisely how the Vatican channels its material and financial assistance.[187] The Catholic Church indeed relies upon its own resources. The Pontifical Councils Cor Unum and Justitia and Pax, for instance, are usually involved in helping Catholic aid and human development and promoting justice and peace around the world respectively. According to a Vatican official, enormous

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[184] John Paul II, *Veritatis Splendor* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993), 64-65.
[185] Interview with a Vatican official, July 1993, Rome.
[186] "Missionary Killed in Opium War Canonized," *New York Times*, 3 June 1996, A6.
[187] See Dunn's footnote in Dennis Dunn, "The Vatican: Global Reach," *Wilson Quarterly* (6 Autumn 1982), 117.

amounts of money are used to these ends in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe.[188] An undetermined amount of resources (in various forms) was channeled to help churches even before 1989. In addition, the Catholic Church can depend on a vast network of charitable organizations. Among these various groups, the international organization called "Kirche in Not" (Church in Need, Aide à L'Eglise en Détresse) seems to stand out. This group, which was established by Father Werenfried van Straaten in 1947 in Flanders and whose headquarters are in Koenigstein, helped finance projects to distribute food and bibles first in East Germany, and later throughout Eastern Europe.[189] The Church in Need admits having received substantial sums of money and enormous quantities of products in kind to help eastern European populations. Part of these were directly sent to the territories under communist rule, while another was channeled through the Vatican. In 1978, for instance, this organization publicized a donation of $100,000 to the newly elected Pope.[190] The Church in Need simply wanted to bring its assistance to a new level. Back in his diocese of Kraków, Cardinal Wojtyła had witnessed first hand the contribution made by this group in the struggle against communism. One of the most visible contributions of the Church in Need was its participation in the building of the Church of Nowa Huta, a symbol of communist resistance in the steel mill city outside of Kraków.[191]

The transfer of resources through the Church or Church affiliated organizations was quite sophisticated in some cases. A good illustration of how elaborate some programs of assistance were, is provided by the project devised by the Polish Church

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[188] Interview with a Vatican official, July 1993, Rome.
[189] *L'Eglise Catholique en Europe de L'Est: Persécution, Liberté et Renaissance* (The Catholic Church in Eastern Europe: Persecution, Liberty and Rebirth) International Congress, Schönstall (March 27-29, 1990), 11.
[190] For that very same year, the Church in Need collected no less than $ 33.3 millions. See *Catholic Almanach* (Huntington: Our Sunday Visitor, 1980), 121.

to help private farmers in Poland. After the loosening of martial law in Poland, the Polish Church in collaboration with its western European, American, and Canadian counterparts tried to coordinate agricultural assistance to Polish farmers. The major idea behind this program was to improve the position of private farmers. By helping rural areas, the Church strengthened its basis of support, and consequently weakened the communist regime. This plan aimed at establishing a private foundation controlled by the Church, which would purchase equipment and supplies in the West and sell them to farmers in Poland. The first phase of the project (1984-86) was expected to garner as much as $ 28 millions.[192] In its search for western contributions, the Polish Church was able to secure American support. Congress indeed appropriated $ 10 millions for the 1985-1986 fiscal year. This aid destined for Polish farmers was to be managed by a foundation run by the Catholic Church.[193] The program eventually started in 1987.

Another type of transnational linkage established by the Catholic Church was the transfer of information between Eastern Europe and Rome. As heretofore mentioned, John Paul II made a particular effort to keep channels of information open with Eastern Europe. Indeed, with its network of priests and bishops, the Catholic Church's "intelligence service" probably represents one of the best in the world. As Councilor Leider remarked: "for such a small entity [the Vatican], they are pretty well informed."[194] According to Carl Bernstein, priests were playing the role of

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[191] *Osservatore Romano* (French edition), 28 November 1978, 9.
[192] US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *S3000, A Bill to authorize the Provision of Foreign Assistance for Agricultural Activities in Poland*, hearing, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 20 Sept. 1984 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1984), 1-28.
[193] See "Aid to Polish Farmers" *Congressional Quarterly* vol. xl (1984), 398; also *Congressional Quarterly Weekly* vol. 42 (1984) no. 39, 2403.
[194] Interview with Damien Leider.

messengers between the Holy See and the members of Solidarity.[195] Although the Vatican denied these allegations, there is reason to believe that part of this information is true. Some respondents in Eastern Europe, for instance, mentioned that help and contacts with the West was mainly maintained through Poland and East-Germany, and sometimes via Hungary.[196] These countries offered the advantage of being relatively less repressed by communist regimes. For people who had links with Catholic intellectuals at Tygodnik Powszechny and Znak in Kraków, or Więź in Warsaw, for instance, it was relatively easy to have their situation brought to the attention of the Sovereign Pontiff. It is worth remembering here that Jerzy Turowicz, the editor in Chief of Tygodnik Powszechny just happens to be an old friend of John Paul II, which gave him and his collaborators the chance to travel to Rome.

"By the late 1980s," notes one interviewee, "John Paul II knew the situation. It was possible to send letters to Poland."[197] However, links with Rome were also possible through Germany, mostly Erfürt and Berlin. Joachim Meisner, who was bishop of Berlin,[198] was really helpful to eastern Europeans. First, he had access to Rome. Perhaps more important, he was the bishop who could cross west and east Berlin.[199] Formal and informal means of communication were obviously functioning. These channels not only informed the Holy See and John Paul II, but most certainly also benefited other western states.

These transnational linkages and the focus on civil society emphasized by John Paul II came to demonstrate the willingness of the Vatican to steer away from a more traditional and realistic diplomacy. However, these changes beg the question of their

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[195] Carl Bernstein, "The Holy Alliance," *Time*, February 24, 1992, 34.
[196] Interviews with Church representatives, January 1995, Prague.
[197] Interview with a Church representative, January 1995, Prague.
[198] Joachim Meisner was named cardinal in 1983, and archbishop of Cologne in 1988.

significance for Eastern Europe, particularly for elites and masses in these various countries. In order to assess the real impact of the universal Church, it is thus necessary to turn our attention first to the elites and second to the process of mass mobilization in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

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[199] Interviews with Church representatives, January 1995, Prague.

Chapter IV

An Unlikely Alliance:

Convergence of Secular and Religious Elites

Throughout most of the twentieth century, elites in both Poland and Czechoslovakia have been divided along a steep religious faultline. Although the rift between secular and religious elites took various forms in these two countries, it most obviously manifested itself in the mutual distrust, if not outright contempt and hostility, defining the relationship between the Catholic Church and the secular elites. This state of affairs, which stemmed from the political development of these two states, was reinforced with the advent of communism in Eastern Europe after World War II. The schism was so profound, that to any student of eastern European affairs in the 1950s or even the 1960s, any discussion of a possible alliance between secular and religious elites would have appeared ludicrous. Yet, in the 1970s and the 1980s, the unthinkable became possible. The goal of this chapter is thus to explain how the Catholic Church contributed to the convergence of religious and secular elites in the 1980s.

To overcome the legacy of history, it took a particular set of circumstances, i.e., a shift in the thinking of intellectuals and a transformation in Vatican politics. However, to comprehend fully the significance of these changes for both actors, it is crucial to dwell upon the historical underpinnings of this unlikely alliance.

A. An Historical Note: the Origins of Mutual Distrust:

In order to understand how the shift in the Vatican diplomacy contributed to the convergence of secular and religious elites in both Poland and Czechoslovakia, it is first necessary to examine the historical context. Choosing a starting point in a historical account can be quite arbitrary. Both Czechoslovak and Polish histories have been

closely associated with Christianity. Traditionally, the birth of the Polish nation is linked with the baptism of Prince Mieszko in Gniezno in 966, while the Christian conversion of Czechs and Slovaks is connected with the decision of Prince of Ratislav of Moravia (846-870) to embrace Christianity for the sake of his kingdom a century earlier. Despite their common Christian roots, the union of Czechs and Slovaks was to be short-lived. Defeated at the battle of Bratislava in 907, Slovakia was integrated forcibly into the Hungarian Kingdom, later to be destined to become part of the Habsburg Empire.[200] Except between 1526 and 1699, when Slovakia was spared from Turkish expansion, its fate was sealed with that of Hungary until the end of World War I. Whatever historical vicissitudes fell upon the Polish, Czech and Slovak peoples, they belonged to the sphere of western Christendom.

Nevertheless, it is well acknowledged that one of the historical turning points, which has played a major role in defining the position of the Catholic Church in the contemporary history of Eastern Europe has been the Counter-Reformation in the seventeenth century. It is also at this particular point that the trajectories of both Poland and the Czech lands started to diverge dramatically.

Once the battle against the Reformation was over, the Catholic Church in Poland found itself in a dominant and autonomous position. During the partition (1773-1918), the Church saw its political role further refined. Acting as a surrogate for the defunct Polish State, the Catholic Church became a sanctuary for the Polish nation. Standing as a rampart against Russian and Prussian efforts at assimilation, the Church helped to preserve Polish national identity. In some instances, this historical function

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[200] Although in 1526 the Habsburg monarchy took control of both the Kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, the Czech and Slovak lands remained two distinct entities controlled by two different administrative systems. Actually, the Czech Kingdom retained a certain autonomy until 1627.

was understood in a very practical way. Some priests of the lower clergy did not hesitate to participate in the movement for Polish national independence or in the rebellion during popular uprisings. As we shall see further this activism against foreign rule served as a precedent for future battles.

This particular historical contribution of the Church set the stage for a twentieth century confrontation with anti-clerical forces. After the restoration of an independent Poland after World War I, the Catholic Church was granted a privileged status in recognition of its role during the partition and even in the struggle against the Red Army in the early 1920s. Trying to improve its reach of society, the Church did not hesitate to intervene in the political realm. This interference into political affairs by Catholic activists and members of the Catholic hierarchy nurtured an anti-clerical climate among political elites.[201] These sentiments were exacerbated among the secular left when in the 1930s the Catholic hierarchy abandoned the Christian Democrats in the hope of a closer collaboration with the authoritarian regime of Piłsudski.

The Church constituted a conservative institution endowed with earthly possessions and vast landowning interests. Fearful of losing its privileged status, the Church, a symbol of the old order, saw its duty to withstand the assaults of communism and even liberalism. Like its European counterparts, the Polish Church had witnessed -what it perceived to be- the dreadful consequences of the French Revolution, the rise of liberalism in the nineteenth century and the recent victory of communism in Russia. A certain besieged mentality prevailed in the ranks of the Catholic hierarchy. It is worth remembering here that from 1870 until 1929, the Pope

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[201] During the Second Republic (1918-1939) lay Catholics found themselves involved in various movements, such as the Christian Democratic Party, Christian trade unions, or the theoretically neutral Catholic Action, whilst some bishops expressed their sympathy for the nationalist right wing party, the National Democratic Party.

lived in seclusion inside the Vatican, after the papacy had lost its territories during the movement of Italian unification. Determined to avoid a similar situation, the Polish Church aimed at protecting its interests by negotiating with state authorities. Because of this strategy, secular elites looked at the Catholic Church as a reactionary force. The subsequent suffering of the Catholic Church during the Nazi occupation did not change these views.

The situation in the Czech lands evolved in a very different manner. In the course of history, and in the collective consciousness of the people, the Catholic Church came to be perceived as an enemy of the Czech national aspirations. The rift between the Czech people and the Church was caused by two particular events. First, there was the death of Jan Hus in 1415. A Czech Reformer and rector at Charles University, Hus had called for changes within the Church and for the right of individual conscience. Identified as a threat by ecclesiastical authorities, he was excommunicated and condemned to be burnt at the stake. However, the major watershed came a little later with the Protestant revolt in Bohemia in 1618, which ignited the Thirty Years War in Europe. Crushed in 1620 by the Habsburg monarchy, the Czechs were subjected to a forced recatholization and to German domination. In the eyes of Czechs, Catholicism therefore became associated with foreign rule. It is also during this dramatic period that the seeds of a strong anti-clericalism were planted in the hearts of many. These feelings sprung into the open particularly among the elite.

Tomáš Garrigues Masaryk, first president of the soon to be born Czechoslovak Republic and major figure of the Czech intelligentsia, led the charge against Catholicism denouncing clericalism and the detrimental influence of the institutional Church in Czech history. It is therefore in the midst of an anti-Catholic atmosphere encouraged by the elite that the Czechoslovak Republic was brought into being. Actually, an anti-

Catholic wave literally engulfed the newly established state. It took many forms: defection from the Catholic Church,[202] harassment of priests or tearing down of monuments. At the elite level, the anti-Catholic backlash mostly was convened through inflammatory discourses in and outside the Parliament.

These acts of violence were expressed in reaction to the stance taken during World War I by most Catholics, who had maintained their loyalty to the Austrian monarchy until the very end of the conflict. As in France, the institutional Catholic Church stood so firmly on the side of the old monarchic order and still regarded democracy with suspicion, that the Czech elite found it imperative to curb its influence. In order to secure the foundation of a democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia, secular elites deemed necessary to introduce certain measures aimed at diminishing the impact of the Church on society, such as marriage laws, land reform, removal of crucifixes from schools, etc. The Czech authorities under the leadership of Masaryk even tried to impose a separation of church and state but in vain. Since the elites believed it was the price to be paid for national construction, almost all parties participated in this anti-Catholic campaign.

Although the anti-Catholic atmosphere abated after 1920, the progressive integration of Catholic political forces into the political life of the new state did not wipe out anti-clerical sentiments, especially among the elites. It is worth noting here that anti-Catholicism did not affect Slovakia. After all, the Slovaks had a different historical experience. Kept under the domination of the Hungarians for a thousand years, the Slovaks did not perceive the Counter-Reformation as a threat to their identity. On the contrary, Catholicism was closely associated with the culture of the majority of the

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[202] A certain number of these defectors joined the newly established Czechoslovak Church.

Slovak population. Furthermore, owing to the efforts of both Catholic and Protestant clergymen, Slovak developed into a full-fledged language.[203] In this era of national awakening, language and faith for a majority of the people soon combined to shape Slovak identity. Like for their Polish neighbors, Catholic piety allowed the Slovaks to survive as a distinct people. This function of Catholicism became particularly relevant in the nineteenth century, as the Hungarian authorities attempted to enforce a policy of Magyarization upon their minorities. Actually, members of the Slovak clergy played a crucial role in the awakening of a Slovak consciousness. Since in Slovakia the nobility was Hungarian, the Slovak elite was limited to Slovak priests and the leaders of the Protestant community. It is thus hardly surprising if one of the major leaders of the Slovak national movement was a priest, viz. Father Andrej Hlinka. Therefore, in Slovakia, Catholicism was judged in much more favorable terms.

The Interwar period did not change this attitude. If anything, Slovaks came to grasp their differences with their Czech brethren. Indeed, the events associated with the anti-Catholic campaign in Czechoslovakia following World War I probably caused some of the first misgivings between Czechs and Slovaks. Of particular relevance in our discussion of elites was the nomination of Slovak authorities after the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic. First, the leadership was imposed by Prague. Second, a majority of these offices were given to Protestant Slovaks. In addition to this tactless decision and strategic mistake, Slovaks were particularly annoyed by the attempts to undermine the Catholic Church, whereas the latter was so entrenched in their way of life. Particularly sensitive was the issue of schools.[204]

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[203] Peter Brock, *The Slovak National Awakening* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976).
[204] Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1995), 160-161.

As the 1920s unfolded, demands for Slovak autonomy grew stronger. Led by the Slovak People's Party (Slovenska Ludova Strana, SLS), Slovak elites moved closer to the right, thereby drawing apart from their Czech counterparts, but also from democratic forces. By the time of the 1938 Münich agreement, the leaders of the Slovak Peoples' Party were so thirsty for independence that they were ready to drink the poisonous water of Nazism. In March 14, 1939, Slovakia became independent. One day later, German troops invaded what was left of Czechoslovakia. Slovak independence remained a mere facade, since the regime of Mgr. Jozef Tiso was nothing less than a fascist puppet regime. This historical experiment left deep scars in the consciousness of the people. Despite the existence of Slovak movements of resistance as early as 1943, the collaboration of Tiso, of members of the clergy and some prominent Catholics deeply tarnished the image of the Church. The traditional contempt of Czech intellectuals toward Catholicism and clericalism was reinforced. So was the suspicion toward their Slovak brethren.

In the aftermath of World War II, no signs of redemption for the Church were in sight. Although numerous members of the clergy and Catholics had suffered greatly at the hands of the Nazis and their collaborators, the Catholic Church was not held in high regard by the surviving members of democratic eastern European elites. In Poland, the heritage of the Second Republic (1918-1939) was a heavy burden to carry. "According to secular elites," explains Adam Szostkiewicz, "the Second Republic [had been] a failure politically and socially; it was characterized by injustice rather than social peace; minorities were second-class citizens, etc."[205] In their minds, the views propagated by the Catholic Church had been partly responsible for this situation. The

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[205] Interview with Adam Szostkiewicz, redactor at Tygodnik Powszechny, February 22, 1995, Kraków.

memory of these events had lingered on. It was clear that secular elites were not interested in close contacts with the Church.

The Church could not even rely upon political allies anymore, partly because the old elite had been greatly enfeebled, if not decimated in the particular case of Poland. Those who had survived could hardly come to the rescue. The specter of disgrace was haunting the right wing members of the old elite.

Moreover, even though some members of the democratic forces were not inherently hostile to the Church, they were not necessarily in a position to respond to the challenge of the communists. If they had tried to protest, political retaliation would have been likely. The pre-communist and communist periods were characterized by an atmosphere of escalating suspicion. The mere shadow of a doubt about one's connections during World War II could entail irremediable consequences for one's political survival, or more simple for one's freedom. As Schöpflin noted,

> All non communists had to find a kind of alibi as to what they were doing under Nazi occupation, for in the communist mind-set everyone was guilty -but even when they were accepted as temporary allies by the communists, they could be forever blackmailed by the threat of 'reaction.' The communists were very adept in disarming the social democrats in particular by claiming that a given course of action or support for a given policy of which they disapproved would help the 'reactionaries.'[206]

Of course, according to communist ideology, the Catholic Church fell into the latter category. For the elites who had joined the communists, the Church constituted the symbol of the old order -the bourgeois order- which had to be annihilated to make place for the utopian communist society. Perhaps disillusioned with the West after the treason of Münich, members of eastern European elites were ready to embrace

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[206] Schöpflin, 71.

communism. As described by Czesław Miłosz in *the Captive Mind*,[207] various intellectuals succumbed to the sirens of communism, as it assured they would be on the side of progress and history. This "new faith" promised them certainty after years of turmoil.

However, the establishment of the new order demanded the destruction of the old one. As Konrad and Szelenyi pointed out, "the basic purpose [of communism in its early stage] was to destroy traditional forms of social organization, hierarchical structures, and cultural regulatory systems, and to create a new social structure appropriate to the emerging economic system."[208] The Church obviously fit that description. When the communists initiated their anti-religious campaign, i.e., closing of religious communities, schools, hospitals, and other institutions affiliated with the Church, the elites watched the onslaught against the Catholic Church without protest. The wave of massive arrests of bishops, priests, nuns, members of the religious orders, their internment in "convents of concentration," and even their trials at the height of Stalinism did not particularly stir tremors of concerns among intellectuals.

With such a legacy, the very idea of a convergence between religious and secular elites could not have flourished even in the most imaginative minds. Burnt by the experience of too much interference with politics, and having developed a deep seated resentment toward secular elites, members of the hierarchy could not even fathom the possibility of such an alliance. Two major shifts contributed to the unthinkable. First, eastern European elites gradually became disenchanted with communism. Second, the changes that had been in the making within the universal

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[207] Czesław Miłosz, *The Captive Mind*, trans. Jane Zielonko (New York: Random House, 1981).
[208] George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1979), 187.

Church throughout the twentieth century suddenly became apparent and thus provided a new hope for the new opposition to communism. After decades of distrust, a new era of possible cooperation seemed at hand. Before analyzing how this convergence occurred, it is necessary to retrace the changes that affected the elites and the Church and that helped them to find their way toward each other.

B. Circumstances of Change:

1. State of Dissidence:

a. The Road toward Dissidence:

For those members of the elite who adhered body and soul to communism after 1944 in Poland and 1948 in Czechoslovakia, the awakening to the bleak reality of communist regimes was a long and painful journey. The first signs of doubt arose after the death of Stalin and the denunciation of his crimes by Khrushchev at the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956. In the aftermath of this revelation and the various uprisings (Czechoslovakia, 1953; East-Germany, 1953; Hungary 1956) which punctuated this period, some members started questioning and criticizing the methods used to impose communism. They did not repudiate their beliefs, rather they believed that Stalinism corrupted their ideal. Reform was needed to return to the really legitimate road of socialism. As noted by Ivan Szelenyi and Balasz Szelenyi, from the time of Stalin's death until 1968, the communist elite underwent a differentiation of its membership.[209] Beside the hard-line Stalinists trying to hang on to their grip of power,

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[209] Ivan Szelenyi and Balasz Szelenyi, 226.

a new brand of communists emerged on the political scene. It was composed of two groups. The first one consisted of a bureaucratic elite, which had climbed the ladder and which was more interested in bringing rationalization in the state than implementing policies of the Stalinist type. The second cluster was comprised of intellectuals who had escaped or survived the purges. Although they condemned the excesses of Stalinism, they certainly had not abandoned the hope of seeing real socialism implemented. The myth of Stalinism was destroyed, but the faith in communism remained. Reform, they thought, would help eastern European countries get back on track to build a genuine communist society. They still somehow subscribed to the notion that intellectuals had a particular role to play in this historical development.

The opportunity to be at the forefront of revolutionary action had pushed so many eastern European intellectuals into the arms of communists after World War II. Szelenyi and Konrad underscored:

> The intellectuals were being called upon for their expert knowledge in the construction of the new social order...The intellectuals hailed their new situation as the realization of their own transcendence. They could finally rise above the service of particular interests, the role assigned to them in bourgeois society, and undertake to serve the universal interests of the new collective owners, the whole working people, and ultimately even the goals of world history.[210]

Actually, in this attempt at recovering the real path to socialism, a certain degree of moral consciousness started to reappear among intellectuals in particular. They initiated a self-examination of their responsibility. It marked a sharp contrast with the previous Stalinist period. Although socialism theoretically entails an ideal of justice because of its goal to establish equality, its implementation is devoid of moral concerns. The premise under which the communist revolutionary operates is that the new social

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[210] Konrad and Szelenyi, 204-205.

order cannot be established as long its foes have not been defeated. The Church was one of them. After the 1948 *coup d'Etat* in Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald had declared the Church enemy number one, thereby launching a policy of massive repression against its representatives and followers. None of these events cast a shadow of doubt in the minds of intellectuals. Two reasons explain this lack of concern.

First, to paraphrase Reinhold Niebuhr, communist terror "[could not] be intrinsically evil if it [could] be proved to be an efficacious instrument for the achievement of a normally approved end."[211] In other words, for eastern European intellectuals, communist ends justified the means.

Second, intellectuals participated in a revolutionary process, that pretended to defy ordinary system of references. Communism, in a pernicious way, had developed its own moral system: it had none. Everything had to be subjected to the realization of a communist society. For the true believers of communism, as Peter Hruby points out,

> all was acceptable that supposedly helped the sacred cause [...]They claimed that their historical mission absorbed them from any personal responsibility and feelings of guilt since the "bourgeois" morality of truth, human rights, and justice was just a prejudice based on class interests and had to be discarded as such.[212]

Such considerations were abandoned in the wake of Stalin's death. Intellectuals came to realize the level of suffering inflicted upon eastern European populations in the name of communism. Young communists, such as Michnik, noticed and denounced the discrepancy between official propaganda and the living reality of communism. Using the space opened up by the loosening of post-totalitarian regimes, intellectuals started to

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[211] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Scribner, 1932), 171.
[212] Peter Hruby, *Fools and Heroes: The Changing Role of Communist Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia* (New York: Pergamon, 1980), 2.

develop a critical discourse,[213] while still remaining in the specified parameters of approved communism. This limited freedom was granted to them in the hope of legitimizing the system. New issues, albeit in a limited framework, were tackled. As for those intellectuals who had fallen into disgrace, post-Stalinism offered new possibilities of dissent as well insofar as the repressive nature the communist regime had decreased.

Despite their efforts to advance the goal of political freedom and to construe a new political reality, the intellectuals were ignored. In Poland, under the regime of Gomułka, the idea of reforms were simply not on the agenda of the communists. More accurately, despite claims of bringing about reforms, these declarations remained pious wishes. In Czechoslovakia, where the reforms focused on the economy after the crisis of the early 1960s, hard-line communists tried very hard to prevent change from occurring. Such an obstructive position fostered the reaction of various Czechoslovak reformist forces. Their involvement eventually culminated in the Prague Spring and the attempt to establish socialism with a human face. Eager to propagate their views, intellectuals participated in the changes that brought down the Novotný government, and subsequently provoked a military reaction from the ranks of the Warsaw Pact. 1968 proved to be for both Polish and Czechoslovak elites a major turning point in their world-view.

1968 indeed represented a crucial year. The toppling of the Czechoslovak Prague Spring and the restoration of the communist order by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces represented a psychological catalyst. In the wake of massive expulsions from the Czechoslovak Communist Party, many reformist elites, shed off their last illusions, decided to cross the Rubicon and fully join the ranks of the opposition, where they

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[213] *Ibid.*

joined the victims of various waves of communist repression. With the invasion and the imposition of the normalization, the last hopes of reforming communism were cruelly dashed. In Poland, similar conclusions were reached. Despite the hopes engendered by the advent of Gomułka to power, the 1960s did not bring the expected reforms. Poland found itself in a stalemate. The events in Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine, which proclaimed the virtual impossibility of eastern European societies to decide about their own destiny, brought chills throughout Eastern Europe. In Poland, the feeling of hopelessness with regard to communism was compounded by the bitterness caused by political developments earlier that Spring. Following a Soviet veto against a play titled *Forefather's Eve*,[214] which recounted the story of persecution during Adam Mieckiewicz's youth in Wilno, students and intellectuals rose in protest to demand cultural freedom. Polish authorities answered by sending the police and using brutal force against the demonstrators. Shortly thereafter, the government launched an anti-Semitic campaign targeted at intellectuals. Many of those, not the least being the famous philosopher Leszek Kołakowski, lost their jobs.

All these events called for a reappraisal of the action and the views of the oppositional elites. Coming to grips with the reality of post-totalitarianism forced the members of the opposition to confront two facts. First, without a sense of unity, or at least a convergence of interests, their activities would remain futile. Second, rather than confronting communist regimes, efforts should concentrate on reclaiming a space for civil society by exploiting the inherent weaknesses of communism. For the elites, this new resolution would be reflected in their discourse and in their deeds. Nevertheless, the necessity of convergence did not sink in the minds of secular

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[214] The play presented at the National Theater stirred up anti-Russian feelings among the Polish audiences. Such a demonstration of hostility toward the Soviet Union infuriated

oppositional elites immediately after 1968. This process entered in the realm of the possible, but took several years to crystallize.

b. 1968 and its Aftermath: Reading the Signs of the Times:

Before interacting with members of the secular elites, both Catholic intellectuals and the Church had to travel their own path. In Poland, Catholic intellectuals, like their secular counterparts had to come to grips with the impossibility of substantially reforming communism from inside. Following the 1956 compromise between the communist regime and the Catholic Church, which saw the resurrection of some Catholic publications -with Znak, Tygodnik Powszechny and the brand new Więź- and the establishment of various Catholic Clubs of Intellectuals (KIKs), Catholics were offered an opportunity to be represented in the Polish Parliament (Sejm). The leaders of Warsaw based Więź, Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Janusz Zabłocki contacted Kraków's group, made of those working at Znak and Tygodnik Powszechny, and poet Jerzy Zawieyski. After negotiations with the government, the members of the Znak parliamentary group, as they came to be known, agreed to submit a list of candidates for the 1957 Polish parliamentary elections. These were elected by a commission of the most active members of KIKs. The first team of Catholic deputies to be chosen consisted of Antony Gladysz, Stefan Kisielewski, Zbigniew Makarczyk, Stanisław Stomma and Jerzy Zawieyski.[215] Although it later became clear that the presence of Catholics in the Sejm constituted a token representation, it provided a forum to voice concerns about rights of the Church and human rights in general. These Catholic

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Soviet representatives.

[215] Tadeusz Mazowiecki joined that team a little later, and served as a deputy between 1961 and 1971.

intellectuals believed that their participation could actually affect the course of the communist regime. These noble aspirations notwithstanding, every time Znak firmly stood against governmental positions, the communist regime made sure that in subsequent elections outspoken Catholics would be weeded out and replaced by more complacent ones. Similarly to secular elites, 1968 marked a watershed line. The events of that year severely shook the illusions harbored by Catholic intellectuals to influence and change communism from within. It also opened new horizons for an eventual rapprochement with the secular opposition.

The incidents of March 1968 gave an opportunity to Catholic lay intellectuals to publicly shake off old stereotypes. After the beating of students not far away from the office of Warsaw KIK and Więź, and the anti-Semitic overtones of the purges targeting intellectuals, Znak vehemently protested. For instance, Zawieyski, who also served as a member of the Council of State, addressed the Sejm and condemned the action of the government. Mazowiecki, for his part, read a letter from students of Wrocław, his district. These actions, which relegated to the past the grim history of tense relations between Catholics and Jews, did not make unanimity. One of Znak deputies, Zabłocki, who was more conciliating with the authorities, differentiated himself by not condemning the anti-Semitic campaign conducted by the Polish regime. This difference of opinion caused a scission between Mazowiecki and Zabłocki. Overall, though, this development served the cause of lay Catholic intellectuals. The courageous stance of Znak deputies cost Zawieyski his representation in the Council of State and his seat in the Sejm; Mazowiecki experienced a similar fate a little later in 1971. The punitive measures the communist regime took against these Catholic intellectuals in fact drove them closer to secular oppositional forces.

The second event deepening the soul-searching among intellectuals was the 1970 uprisings on the Baltic coast. Workers, who protested against price increases were crushed brutally by the police forces and the militia. Unfortunately, in their battles, the workers of the Lenin shipyards remained alone. Intellectuals, whose standard of living was not necessarily hurt by the governmental decisions, did not show any sign of compassion. At that time, the gap among the various sections of Polish society (intellectuals, workers, peasants) remained quite clear, despite the limited protests formulated by Catholic intellectuals.

Notwithstanding this lack of unity, several steps were taken in the direction of a convergence. In 1971, Warsaw KIK started hosting a discussion group between secular and Catholic intellectual circles.[216] These conversations initiated an effort at mutual understanding. Out of these efforts came a first article by Kuroń titled *Christians without God*. In this essay, he acknowledged that doubts about the existence of a personal god did not preclude from living ones' life in a Christian way, viz., according to moral principles.[217] However, the real synthesis of all forces only started to take shape in the mid 1970s around two particular events.

First came the constitutional issue. The Polish Communist Party indeed had decided to amend the constitution to include specific provisions pertaining to the close friendship between Poland and the Soviet Union and to the role of the party and the military. These proposals fostered vivid reactions from the opposition, the Church and

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[216] See Interview with Jacek Kuroń in Jonathan Luxmoore and Jolanta Babiuch, "The Road to Damascus: Three Eastern European Intellectuals on the Dilemma of Faith and Ideology," *Religion, State and Society* vol. 21 (1993) no. 3 & 4, 343; also from the same authors, "In search of Faith: The Metaphysical Dialogue between Poland's Opposition Intellectuals in the 1970s," *Religion, State and Society* vol. 23 (1995) no. 1, 1995, 86.
[217] Jacek Kuroń, "Chrzescijanie bez Boga" (Christians without God), *ZNAK* no. 250-51, April-May 1975 cited by Luxmoore and Babiuch in "Three European Intellectuals and the Dilemmas of Faith and Ideology," 340 & 344.

the public at large. It also provided one of the first visible signs of active cooperation between secular and lay Catholic elites, when members of both groups signed petitions such as the List of the 59 and the Letter of 101. The esteem garnered by the stance taken by Catholic intellectuals grew even stronger when the amendment came before the Sejm in 1976. Stomma, the only original Znak deputy not having been demoted after the 1968 and 1970 crises was the only member of the parliament to abstain on the vote. It is worth noting that the privileged bond to be inscribed in the constitution was already political reality. Relations with the Soviet Union took the priority. Stomma demonstrated Znak's unwillingness to see this amendment become part of the constitution, for political consequences for Poland would have been tremendous. In so doing, he reinforced Znak's standing in the eyes of the members of the opposition.

While this convergence was occurring, the Polish Catholic Church acted on its own, issuing its own set of protests. Since the late 1960s, under the influence of Vatican II and the constraints imposed by the political regime, the Church had progressively clothed its defense of Polish society in the language of human rights. Each crisis (1968, 1970) led the Polish episcopate to defend the victims of communism and to further elaborate its moral discourse. The 1976 constitutional crisis was in no way different. In January 1976, in the third part of his trilogy of sermons, called sermons of the Holy Cross,[218] Cardinal Wyszyński stressed:

> The just right of the Nation is above all the right to preserve its national and territorial individuality...Our Nation has the right to preserve its own native culture and national independence within the borders of the country, the right to preserve its own national or state of life and existence.[219]

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[218] These sermons were delivered in Warsaw at the Church of the Holy Cross (kościół św. Krzyża).

[219] Andrzej Micewski, *Cardinal Wyszyński: A Biography*, trans. William R. Brand and Katarzyna Mroczkowska-Brand (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), 364.

The second opportunity for a convergence of action among intellectuals came a few months after the constitutional reform, when a new series of strikes in Ursus and Radom, and protest in various cities, such as Lódź, Gdańsk, Poznań broke out. Once again, the protests raised by the workers met with sweeping measures by the communist authorities. Massive arrests and severe sentences ensued for those involved in these events. This time, though, repression did not go unnoticed.

Although the reaction of the Catholic Church remained cautious, the Polish hierarchy asked for the respect of human rights and an amnesty of the workers. It implored the communist regime to show some compassion. As to the oppositional elites, they embarked on a humanitarian mission to help the workers and their families, to offer legal councils for those detained and prosecuted, and even to denounce police repressive methods. In September 1976, fourteen intellectuals coming from various backgrounds, issued an appeal in favor of the workers, titled *Appeal to the Society and Authorities of the Polish People's Republic.*[220] At this occasion, they established the Worker's Defense Committee (or KOR).

Although at first, members of KOR were mostly of left humanist orientation, later on, activists of Catholic orientation joined in. They were probably encouraged by the support demonstrated by Catholic intellectuals after the arrest of KOR members in 1977. To demonstrate their solidarity, fourteen persons, including Mazowiecki, participated to a hunger strike in St. Martin's Church in Warsaw. This single act of protest undertaken under the protection of the Catholic Church symbolically illustrated the convergence of secular, lay Catholic and religious elites. The same year, Adam

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[220] These fourteen intellectuals were Jerzy Andrzejewski, Stanisław Barańczak, Ludwik Cohn, Jacek Kuroń, Edward Lipiński, Jan Józef Lipski, Antoni Macierewicz, Piotr Naimski, Antoni Pajdak, Józef Rybicki, Aniela Steinsbergowa, Adam Szczypiorski, Father Jan Zieja and Wojciech Ziembiński.

Michnic in his book *The Church and the Left* (Kościół-Lewica-Dialog)[221] called the members of oppositional elites to acknowledge the role of the Catholic Church in the defense of human rights and to cooperate with it. A few months later, on January 22, 1978, secular and Catholic intellectuals, such as Michnik, Kuroń, Geremek, Bohdan Cywiński, Mazowiecki, Adam Stanowski, etc., came together to participate to the work of the flying universities (or more officially, TKN, Towarzystwo Kursów Naukowych, Society for Scientific Courses) with the full support of the Church.[222]

Following these various initiatives and the visit of John Paul II, various Catholics joined the ranks of KOR,[223] whereas other groups appeared on the scene, such as ROPCiO (Movement in Defense of Human and Civil Rights, Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka I Obywatela) in 1977, the Young Poland Movement (Ruch Młodej Polski) in 1979, the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN, Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej). From then on, as Consul Czarlewski noted, "it was not important to know who was who (read who was Catholic or not). What really mattered was the moral force behind our action."[224] By 1980-1981, the convergence of elites and the groundwork at the grassroots level nurtured by the activities of the Church, as we shall see in chapter five, had opened the way for a massive anti-regime mobilization.

In Czechoslovakia, the situation after the 1968 looked rather gloomy. The process of normalization undertaken by the Husák regime imposed a harsh repression.

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[221] Adam Michnik, *The Church and the Left.*
[222] Interview with Mrs. Stanisława Grabska, for mer vice-president of KIK Warszawa, March 6, 1995, Warszawa (trans. from French by the author).
[223] Quite often, young people associated with the various KIKs helped the work of KOR without officially joining it.
[224] Interview with Polish Consul Slawomir Czarlewski, October 19, 1994, Lyon (trans. from French by the author).

Massive expulsions from the Communist Party helped swell the ranks of the opposition, although it took several years before these oppositional forces emerged as a united front. Some of the problems encountered by the dissidents was their isolation. Their action seemed circumscribed to urban centers, and mostly Prague. Moreover, the Czech lands and Slovakia were affected differently by the consequences of the Prague Spring. First of all, repression was not as harsh in Slovakia, where intellectuals were not the primary target of normalization. Second, the Slovak involvement in 1968 was motivated mainly with national demands. When some of their federal requests were granted, Slovaks ceased to regard the Husák regime unfavorably.

The first major initiative of the dissident movement took place after the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act. The activities that later led to the establishment of Charter 77 were linked with legal council and support. Like their Polish counterparts, Havel and other dissidents found themselves helping people prosecuted by the communist regime. Contrary to the Polish situation, though, workers were not the primary concerns of these intellectuals. Rather, it was the fate of young musicians which served as a rallying point for the opposition.

Two rock music bands, the Plastic People of the Universe and DG 307 became the target of the authorities. Their music did not respect the rather puritan artistic canons imposed by the communist regime, and was thus labelled as subversive. Since they represented an alternative source of expression, these young artists represented a threat to the post-totalitarian regime and had to be arrested. It is the prosecution of these young musicians, which triggered the reaction of oppositional elites. For intellectuals, like Havel, who attended the trial, the parody of justice displayed by the communist judicial system marked a turning point in their thinking. For them, the

communist regime had reached the limits of absurdity. Commenting on the second day of the trial held in Prague, Havel explained:

> It does not happen often, and it generally happens at moments when hardly anyone expects it: something goes awry and a certain event-thanks to an unexpected interaction of its own inner conditions and of more or less coincidental external circumstances-suddenly oversteps the bounds of its position in the context of every day events, breaks through the shell of what is supposed to be and what seems to be, and unexpectedly, reveals its innermost, hidden, and in a certain sense its symbolic significance. Something that originally was nothing out of the ordinary suddenly illuminates its time and the world we live in with an unexpected light, bringing its fundamental questions surprisingly to the fore.[225]

For intellectuals like Havel, the Kafkaian aspects of the communist regime had reached a critical mass, and called for action. This realization convinced them to rally in support of these young musicians. Echoing the Czech playwright, Patočka talked about an awakening of consciousness:

> we, the older ones, the ones who have fallen into our routines and have our own perspectives, used and worn, have the opportunity, indeed the necessity to revise ourselves, to examine ourselves anew, in short to renew ourselves...What greater joy than to see that ever again the struggle is renewed against ease, against comfort, against dragging others down to the lowest of levels, against dishonesty to self and others, against deluding oneself with untruths and confusions.[226]

Beyond the protests and the actions generated by the trial, the outrage of the oppositional elites led to the birth of Charter 77. Because of the indiscriminate nature of the communist regime, oppositional elites came to understand that despite their differences, they were in the same boat. Cooperation was needed to defend human rights. Comforted in the legitimacy of their struggle by the very existence of the Helsinki Final Act, intellectuals representing three different streams of thought

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[225] Václav Havel, "The Trial, October 11, 1976," in *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, ed. Skilling, 201.
[226] Jan Patočka, "On the Matter of the Plastic People of the Universe and DG 307, December 1976," in *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, 206-207.

(Marxist, cultural, Christian) decided to join forces. The public release of Charter 77 officially marked the coming together of oppositional elites. However, cooperation meant working on the basis of the smallest common denominator. The willingness to respect the various world-views among the chartists was exemplified by the choice of having each group represented by a specific spokesman.[227] This initiative represented the first step toward a convergence. Shortly after, in 1978, some members of Charter of 77, such as Havel, Benda or Father Malý decided to establish a movement for the defense of human rights, the Committee for the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS). Although several priests signed Charter 77 and participated in these efforts, the members of the Church hierarchy -or what was left of it- were not ready to provide moral support. The leader of the Czechoslovak Church, recently named cardinal, Mgr. Tomášek even issued a declaration against the chartists. The Church remained wary of any type of political involvement. First, it is worth remembering the institutional weakness into which the Catholic Church was plunged. For years, despite the efforts of the Vatican under the auspices of the Ostpolitik, the communist authorities refused to fill vacant bishoprics, after the death or retirement of their former occupants. Furthermore, beside the continuous policy of harassment from the communist regime, the members of the clergy had to watch out for enemies from within. Out of the surviving bishops, Mgr. Vrana, for instance, was known for his collaboration with the government.

Second, suspicion toward the presence of communists, even the reformist type, among the Chartists ran high among the clergy. The legacy of the communist

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[227] Among the 38 spokesman between 1977 and 1990, the Christian group was represented by Jan Patočka, Ladislav Hejdánek, Václav Benda, Miloš Rejchrt, Václav Malý, Radim Palouš, Marie Rút Křížkova, Eva Kantůrková, Jan Litomiský, Dana Němčova, Petruška Šustrova. See Prečan, 477-485.

repression after 1948 was difficult to disregard. So was the suspicion of secular oppositional elites. After all, the first Czechoslovak Republic had been established in direct opposition to the Catholic Church. Because of the weakness and shyness of the Czechoslovak Church, the trend toward convergence was stalled, thereby leaving dissidents isolated. It would resume in the mid-1980s, as the members of the hierarchy, especially Mgr. Tomášek, changed their mind and reversed their opinion concerning dissident activities. The same factors, which had played a significant role in bringing about the unlikely rapprochement between secular, lay and religious elites would contribute to change Czechoslovakia, albeit at a later time.

2. A New State of Mind:

The realization of this unlikely alliance did not merely stem from the unfolding of historical forces. Members of the oppositional elites undertook journeys in which they reexamined their political stance and their philosophical world-view. As a result, they modified their own discourse. And in this path toward self-reactualization, intellectuals encountered the new face of the Catholic Church through the mediation of individuals evolving at the intersection of the secular and religious spheres.

a. A Shift in Intellectual Discourse:

Of course, as actors, oppositional elites were influenced by environmental circumstances. However, the shift of their thinking characterized individual decisions and trajectories. In the light of the 1968 events, intellectuals reached critical conclusions. They re-oriented their action and their thoughts around several principles. Among these were a commitment to use peaceful means of action, and a refusal to envision an ideal polity. Instead, they wanted to focus on rebuilding civil society, on

reintroducing morality, redirecting action toward the promotion of human rights, freedom, an ethics of responsibility, openness, and the rediscovery of culture and History.[228]

The new commitment to peaceful means of opposition was the direct consequence of the 1968 events. The crushing of the Prague Spring confirmed the uselessness of armed confrontation with 'the brotherly community of the Warsaw Pact. As Michnik explained:

> To believe in overthrowing the dictatorship of the party by revolution and to consciously organize action in pursuit of this goal is both unrealistic and dangerous. As the political structure of the USSR remains unchanged, it is unrealistic to count on subverting the party in Poland. It is dangerous to plan conspiratorial activities...Revolutionary theories and conspiratorial practices can only serve the police, making mass hysteria and police provocation more likely.[229]

More significantly, the legacy of Stalinism had taught dissidents that violent attempts to force upon societies an utopian vision entailed too grave consequences. The communist experiment was a living example of the human suffering inflicted on the altar of an ideal political order. Thus, not only dissidents took a peaceful approach, but they also consciously failed to address the question of a post communist political system. Although some, like Michnik believed that "the democratic opposition [had to] formulate its own political goals and alternative programs,"[230] overall dissidents, like Havel, understood that in the context of Eastern Europe:

> Abstract projects for an ideal political or economic order do not interest [people] ...because everyone knows how little chance they have of succeeding, but also because today people feel that the less political policies are derived from a concrete and human 'here and now' and the more they fix their sights on an abstract 'someday', the more easily they

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[228] Other principles, such as truthfulness, autonomy of action, trust, solidarity, love also have been identified. See Jonathan Schell's introductory chapter in Michnik, *Letters from Prison*, xxvii-xxix; also Weigel, 50-54.
[229] Michnik, "A New Evolutionism," 142.
[230] *Ibid.*, 147.

> can degenerate into new forms of human enslavement. People who live in the post-totalitarian system know only too well that the question of whether one or several political parties are in power, and how these parties define and label themselves, is of far less importance than the question of whether or not it is possible to live like a human being.[231]

Hence, people and civil society were to become the focus of attention, not the nature of the future political system.

As dissidents turned their attention to the rebuilding of civil society, they became preoccupied with the visible moral crisis experienced by eastern European societies. According to their diagnosis, those societies had lost their moral fiber. Communism had worked very hard to pull up people by their moral and historical roots, and in some ways succeeded. By the mid-1970s, communist societies were characterized by various ills: alcoholism, absenteeism from the workplace, stealing from community property, lack of trust, extremely low work ethic, lack of social cohesion, etc. These problems were all the more exacerbated as communist regimes imposed a materialist view and denied any link to a higher order of being. Furthermore, propaganda had killed the meaningfulness of the public discourse. Newspeak had taken its toll and claimed its victims. Uprooted from any moral references, communist societies became anomic. In order to build a sound civil society, dissidents argued that it was necessary to change this situation. A first step would be to restore a sense of morality. Explaining the objectives of Charter 77, philosopher Jan Patočka stressed that:

> No society, no matter how good its technological foundation can function without a moral foundation, without conviction that has nothing to do with opportunism, circumstance and expected advantage. Morality, however, does not exist just to allow society to function, but simply to allow human beings to be human. Man does not define

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[231] Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 70.

> morality according to the caprice of his needs, wishes, tendencies and cravings; it is morality that defines man.[232]

Only the recognition of a transcendent reality provides for the defense of fundamental human rights. "Participants in Charter 77," explains Patočka, "[...] aimed exclusively at cleansing and reinforcing the awareness that a *higher authority does exist*, to which they are obligated. Individually, in their conscience, to which states are bound by their signatures on important international covenants;"[233] Without this consciousness of a higher order of being, individuals lose any sense of moral reference and even restraint, thereby eroding the safeguards protecting freedom. Communism rejected such a premise. In the name of science and history, communism claimed for itself the ability to reshape the world without any consideration for transcendence. As Havel lamented: "Man is simply not God, and playing God has cruel consequences."[234] The Stalinist period illustrated this point tragically.

The battle to reintroduce a moral sense into eastern European societies took on two particular aspects: the defense of human rights and the reintroduction of an ethics of responsibility. The primary goal of the dissidents was to ensure that fundamental rights and individual freedom would be respected. They simply wanted to remind communist authorities of their international responsibilities, as communist regimes had signed several international agreements. By signing these treaties, Patočka pointed out,

> [communist regimes were] bound not only by expediency according to the rules of political advantage and disadvantage, but [...] their signatures there [meant] that they [accepted] the rule that politics [was] indeed subject to law and that law [was] not subject to politics.[235]

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[232] Jan Patočka "What Charter 77 is and What It is not," in *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, ed. Skilling, 218.
[233] *Ibid.*, 219.
[234] Havel, "Politics and Conscience," in *Václav Havel: Living in Truth*, ed. Vladislav, 142.
[235] Patočka, "What Charter 77 is and What It is not," 219.

When injustice is done, individuals should stand up. The members of Charter 77, VONS or KOR, for instance, understood that their duty was not to surrender themselves to the system and to help the persecuted. For the common good, they had to remind communist authorities of their legal and moral obligations.

The real power of this moral stance, was the ability to rely on an ethics of responsibility. Regaining their sense of responsibility would allow individuals not to surrender to the system. As a result, they would become autonomous and free. People would not become free to do anything, but free to be accountable for their actions; free "to be subject to the sovereignty of moral sentiment, [that thing] unqualified above them, [...] bindingly sacred and inviolable for them [...]"[236] The corollary of this principle of responsibility also entailed the possibility of getting no reward, or even of experiencing great suffering for one's actions. A good illustration of this new spirit was the stance of openness adopted by dissidents. When they established KOR in Poland or Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, oppositional elites signed their name and gave their address and phone number, fully aware of the potential consequences of their actions. As Patočka emphasized, being responsible is "[to be] determined not to surrender the obligation to stand up for [oneself]."[237]

In this moral endeavor, dissidents dealt with notions of absolute, freedom, truth, dignity and compassion. This intellectual reassessment brought them to the realization that the Catholic Church was trying to defend these very same values. Progressively, oppositional elites acknowledged the necessity to respect the Catholic Church as a legitimate actor. Before even considering the possibility of a cooperation, they expressed their esteem and respect for the suffering endured by the Catholic

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[236] *Ibid.*, 218.
[237] *Ibid.*, 219.

Church at the peak of Stalinism. The price paid by the Church for its refusal to yield to communist dictates were considered under a new light. The Church had stood up, not surrendered to the system. Perhaps, it stood up to defend its interests, but symbolically it resisted in the name of the common good. The 'martyrdom' of leading Catholic figures as well as the harsh conditions of imprisonment imposed upon thousands of members of the clergy now were regarded as a testimony to the need to defend fundamental human rights. The suffering of the Catholic Church, in their view, bore witness to the suffering of their nations. The sacrifice had not been in vain.

Furthermore, oppositional elites understood that their discourse about human rights would remain meaningless if their concept was not applied universally. Therefore, it had to encompass the Church. As Michnik remarked:

> The point is that our affection for civil liberties would be rather suspect were we to desire them only for ourselves. Our morality would then be the morality of Kali; 'When Kali steals, that is good, but when Kali is robbed, that is bad.' Therefore, it is the political responsibility of those of us in the secular Left to defend the freedom of the Church and the civil rights of Christians, regardless of what we think of the role of the Church forty years ago, or the role it may play forty years from now. Human rights must exist for everybody- or they do not exist for anybody.[238]

This reappraisal of the Catholic Church was facilitated by the very changes occurring within the Church both at the international and national level. The Vatican transnational policy, the leadership of John Paul II, the discourse of the Catholic Church all contributed to the convergence of secular, lay Catholic and religious elites.

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[238] Michnik, *The Church and the Left*, 131.

b. The Impact of a refined Vatican Diplomacy:

Change became noticeable in the wake of Council Vatican II and the public release of Paul VI's encyclicals. Since the time of John XXIII, the vindication against secular and atheist forces had abated and had been replaced by an emphasis on a universal defense of human rights. Perhaps more attractive to oppositional elites who were in search of a third way, was the deliberate effort of the Vatican to move away from a pure alignment with western positions.[239] Secular intellectuals became aware that the trajectory of their thinking was intersecting with that of the Church. Such an occurrence was not "due to a similarity of world-views, but to a growing feeling of responsibility for a humanity whose very existence is now threatened."[240] Notwithstanding these changes, the real breakthrough psychologically occurred with the election of John Paul II. The Vatican diplomacy and developed by the Polish Pope played a role at two levels.

First, the transnational emphasis of the Vatican diplomacy had a psychological impact. The election of John Paul II in itself created a shock wave: it affected both non-communists and communists. One eastern European source in Rome simply explained:

> We had the feeling that something would change. An intuition. Here was a man who was coming from within communist regimes. Therefore, he would not make any concessions to communism. We expected a clear and uncompromising policy, even before he had even spoken a word.[241]

Radim Palouš, Catholic spokesman of Charter 77 and former rector at Charles University, fondly remembers when he broke the news to the fourteen persons gathered in Havel's apartment in the company of Havel's brother. "Several of us were

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[239] J. Bryan Hehir, "Papal Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* 78 (Spring 1990), 34.
[240] Anton Slonimski, *Obecność* (Presence) (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1973), 9-11 cited by Michnic, *The Church and the Left*, 121; for similar pessimistic worldviews among dissidents, see Havel, "Politics and Conscience;" or Konrad, *Antipolitics*.

on their knees."[242] Havel reportedly wrote that he and his Catholic friend Jiří Němec, danced when they learnt that Wojtyła had become Pope.[243] The news about the election of a Polish Pope was a great impulse for non-believers and secular elites as well. John Paul II appealed to intellectuals: not only because he had experienced communism and did not accommodate the regime, but also because he was a well-educated man, a philosopher versed in phenomenological works. In some ways, he was one of them. Moreover, several dissidents had had the opportunity to meet him when he was still a bishop in Kraków.

The psychological shock created by the election of Karol Wojtyła somehow served as a catalyst. In the words of Rector Palouš, "it gave people courage."[244] Obviously John Paul II worked very hard at keeping this hope alive through his discourses, and his actions. As one respondent admitted:

> Everything the Pope said, we read it as a criticism of communism, even though he was speaking about something else. There was an expectation. Even though at times it was exaggerated, talks about human rights, respect of minorities, defense of national traditions were understood to be critical of communist regimes. In an obscured way, everything the Pope said, was interpreted as a determined will to overthrow these regimes.[245]

Expectations ran high among intellectuals. When John Paul II's first encyclical, *Redemptor Hominis*, became available, they were not disappointed. "It was a real delight," commented Jan Sokol.[246] The impact of John Paul II on eastern European elites became even more apparent during his first trip in Poland. Despite communist

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[241] Interview with a Church representative, October 31, 1994, Rome.
[242] Interview with Rector Radim Palouš, December 14, 1994, Prague.
[243] Interview with Tomáš Halík, president of the Czech Christian Academy and former underground priest, January 3, 1995, Prague.
[244] Interview with Radim Palouš, December 14, 1995, Prague.
[245] Interview with a Church representative, October 31, 1994, Rome.

constraints, immense crowds convened to greet and listen to the returning prodigal son of Poland. Suddenly, the Poles became aware of the collective. After years of living in an atomized and anomic communist society, they realized the power of number. The papal visit created a moral and psychological atmosphere which laid the foundations for subsequent developments, such as the emergence of Solidarity. Even secular skeptics, such as Michnik, could not help but to notice the changes taking place:

> Julian Stryjkowski's phrase 'Poland's second baptism keeps coming to mind insistently. Indeed, something odd did happen. The very same people who are ordinarily frustrated and aggressive in the shop lines were metamorphosed into a cheerful and happy collectivity, a people filled with dignity. The police vanished from the main streets of Warsaw and exemplary order reigned everywhere. The people who had been deprived of their real power for so long all of a sudden regained their ability to determine their fate. This is how the social consequences of John Paul II's visit pilgrimage can be sketched.[247]

"It was a real psychodrama for eastern Europeans like us," declares Halík. "It was a shock to see the independence of the Polish nation. And it was very visible that the Pope was the man in power in Poland."[248] As this comment indicates, the influence of John Paul II did not stop at the Polish borders. In fact, in the eyes of the Polish elites and their neighbors, the Pope, who had been elected by a College of Cardinals from various countries, was the embodiment of legitimacy. His coming to Poland, in the very heart of communist Eastern Europe, had shattered the last hopes of these regimes to rebuild a semblance of legitimacy. In countries, such as Czechoslovakia, where these events were not broadcasted, people went near the borders. They gathered in friends' apartments in cities, such as Plzen, where they could receive Polish or western

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[246] Interview with Jan Sokol, signatory of Charter 77 and son in law of Jan Patočka, December 21, 1994, Prague.
[247] Michnik, *Letters from Prison*, xxxiv.
[248] Interview with Tomáš Halík.

televisions. For the subsequent papal trips, the most courageous ones would travel through the Tatras mountains to see and listen to John Paul II.

The second major factor responsible for John Paul II's impact was his discourse itself. The various themes he used between 1978 and 1989 seem to have echoed the thinking of various dissidents throughout Eastern Europe. Indeed the papal discourses and writings focuses on four major themes which not only have struck a chord among eastern European oppositional elites, but also have helped to promote this convergence of national oppositional elites. These four themes encompassed John Paul II's conception of freedom and self-determination, the role of culture, the principle of peaceful opposition, and his social vision.

John Paul II's definition of freedom comes out of his philosophical and phenomenological understanding of the individual in society. Indeed, the Polish Pope underlines the necessity for a real self-determination of the individual. "Only the one who has possession of himself and is simultaneously his own sole and exclusive possession can be a person."[249] This right of self determination, which allows individuals to surpass themselves, can only be achieved if they are free. At the Vatican general audience on January 24 1984, John Paul II declared: "Man must always and anew look inside himself in order to discover evidence of his own dignity in his capacity to surpass himself as a person -that is to say to decide about his life freely and truly."[250]

Such conditions, however, were denied to citizens in Eastern Europe. Under communist regimes, the most basic freedoms, such as freedom of speech, freedom of

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[249] Karol Wojtyła, "The Acting Person," *Analecta Husserliana*, trans. Andrzej Potocki vol. X (1979), 105.

movement, freedom of association were squashed in the name of a totalizing ideology. Except for the private sphere, no domain was expected to escape the control of the party. Communist propaganda taught people to conform to a system and to surrender their personal autonomy. Against this post-totalitarian reality, John Paul II relentlessly advocated for freedom as the necessary condition for self determination. "Human beings are totally free," he writes, "only when they are completely themselves in the fullness of their rights and duties."[251] In other words, there cannot be freedom and thus self-determination without a genuine respect for fundamental human rights. Individuals have a right to self determination not only for themselves, but also as members of a community. In January 1988, John Paul II reminded the members of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Vatican that:

> One must take into account a desire [...], that every nation, even the least powerful, be responsible for its own affairs, that it be the subject of its own development and not only the object of negotiations of interests to others or condescending solicitude on the part of other nations.[252]

This desire is recognized in a collective right of self-determination. The latter which grew more strongly in the papal discourse over the years, was a direct attack against Soviet and communist hegemony, and more significantly against the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty.[253] John Paul II refused to accept the meaning of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. He challenged the Soviet Union's the right to control the destiny of eastern European nations under the false pretense of protecting

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[250] Excerpt from John Paul II's discourse at the General Audience in Filibeck, 127.
[251] John Paul II, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* available at http://Listserv.american.edu/catholic/church/papal/jp.ii/jp2solli.txt, 31. 06/20/96.
[252] Address made by John Paul II to the Diplomatic Corps on January 9, 1988 in *The Holy See at the Service of Peace*, 137.
[253] By the late 1980s and early 1990s, John Paul II's concept of the right of self-determination of the People matured enough to cover the right of nations to decide about political autonomy or secession.

the commonwealth of socialist countries. While addressing Polish dignitaries at the Belweder Palace in Warsaw, John Paul II asserted:

> Peace and rapprochement among peoples can only be built on the principle of respect for the objective rights of the nation, such as its right to existence, to freedom, to its own social and political subjective reality, and to the creation of its own culture and civilization.[254]

This line of reasoning very much paralleled the emerging discourse of eastern European dissidents. "Opposition in the post-totalitarian system," writes Havel "is living in the truth."[255] This statement must be understood as an appeal not to compromise one's innerself by participating in the communist system. By refusing "to surrender their human identity in favor of the identity of the system," by conforming to the communist system, individuals can regain the possession of themselves, that is their right of self determination. John Paul II seemed to draw the same conclusion as eastern European dissidents. Not surprisingly, the Pope advocated the same remedy, encouraging the rebirth of civil society.

This subject was of particular concern to writers, such as Michnik. In his view, the main purpose of the dissident action was not to discuss or even challenge the communist regime. In fact, as eastern European intellectuals had learned from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, there was no point in confronting communist regimes or to fight them on the premise on which they were established. The real focus of attention had to be civil society, or at least these pre-political spheres where a new identity and a new consciousness would be developed. Culture, a second theme in the papal discourse, was to be the major vehicle to bring about this new ethos. As the Polish Pope argued early on,

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[254] Speech delivered by John Paul II to Edward Gierek and other Polish leaders at the Belweder Palace in Warsaw on June 2, 1979 and reported in from *The Pope In Poland* (Münich: Radio Free Europe Research, 1979), 69.

> Culture is the life of the spirit, it is the key that gives access to the deepest and most jealously guarded tenets of the life of peoples; it is the fundamental and unifying expression of their existence, because, in culture are found the riches, almost inexpressible, [...], of religious convictions, history, the literary and artistic heritage, the ethnological substratum, the attitudes and 'forma mentis' of peoples. In short, to say 'culture' is to express in one word the national identity which constitutes the soul of these peoples and which survives in spite of adverse conditions, trials of all kinds, historical and natural cataclysms, remaining one and compact throughout the centuries [...]
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> If culture is the expression par excellence of the spiritual life of peoples, it must never be separated from all the other problems of human existence[...][256]

In order to see civil society reemerge, both dissidents and the Church would have to anchor their action to the culture of their nations, for culture was the means to challenge the post-totalitarian threat. In the mind of John Paul II, no proof of the powers of culture was better illustrated than the history of Poland. As he forcefully remarked:

> The nation exists 'through' culture and 'for' culture, and it is therefore the great educator of people in order that they may 'be more' in the community. It is this community which possesses a history that goes beyond the history of the individual and the family[...] I am the son of a Nation which has lived the greatest experiences of history, which its neighbours have condemned to death several times, but which has survived and remained itself. It has kept its identity, and it has kept, in spite of partitions and foreign occupations, its national sovereignty, not by relying on the resources of physical power, but solely by relying on its culture. This culture turned out in the circumstances to be more powerful than all other forces.[257]

Religion being an important component of culture was the primary 'weapon' of papal diplomacy. One of his main goals was to awaken the heart and soul of eastern Europeans and to help these societies reappropriate their national symbols and their language. The canonization of saints, such as Maksymilian Kolbe or Agnes of Bohemia, was not just a purely religious exercise.

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[255] Havel, "The Power of the Powerless,"58.
[256] Address delivered by John Paul II to the Diplomatic Corps on January 12, 1981 in *The Holy See at the Service of Peace*, 46-47.

It gave the occasion to a lot of eastern Europeans to travel outside the communist world. It also was about reacquainting these populations with their own sense of history, and thus their identity. Communism had tried to make *tabula rasa* of the past. It had worked very hard at reconstructing history and culture to its own advantage.[258] The roots with the past had to be severed, as it was necessary to eliminate the attachments to the superstructures deemed responsible for exploitation. The Catholic Church headed by the Pope was engaged in a battle of symbolism to recover both historical and national meaning.[259] To communism which had succeeded in emptying the political discourse, John Paul II offered an alternative. As Gale Stokes nicely writes, "in that atmosphere of falsity the Pope's vibrant Christian rhetoric delivered in a stylish literary Polish that sharply contrasted with the stereotyped hackneyed communist idiom, flew like an arrow to the emotional and spiritual heart of millions of Poles."[260]

Not only was the effort to reclaim the cultural sphere aimed at recapturing historical memory, it also fundamentally undermined the legitimacy of communism by emphasizing historical continuity. Communists, who believed they had history on their side, strove to establish a new era and to create a new generation of men and women. However, these changes were to take place in opposition to the traditional history of these countries. The Church headed by John Paul II was advocating the need to relink with the past, for true freedom requires Man to exist in his full integrity. As the Polish Pope explained at a Mass in Kraków in June 1979,

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[257] *Ibid.*, 47.
[258] Schöpflin, 95-96.
[259] Jan Kubik, "John Paul II's First Visit to Poland as an Example of the Ceremonial Transformation of Society," *The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1994), 129-152.

> The whole historical process of a person's knowledge and choices is closely bound up with the living tradition of his or her own country. A human being make his choices with knowledge and with internal freedom. Here tradition is not a limiting factor but a treasure, a spiritual freedom [...][261]

Being aware of their past, John Paul II believed, would help eastern Europeans realize that they belonged to the European world, not the Soviet sphere. This theme was particularly dear to the ears of eastern European dissidents. For the latter, the idea of a possible return to Europe meant to embrace the ideals of democracy, and human rights. Thinkers, such as Michnic, had come to realize that Europe and the Christian tradition were historically linked; that Christianity had been at the foundation of the democratic values defining the common European heritage. As Michnic noted,

> One cannot reject the Christian tradition with impunity. For by rejecting Christ's teachings of love for one's neighbor, one rejects the canonical foundation of European culture. By rejecting these teachings, we lose the foundation of our belief in the autonomous value of truth and human solidarity [...] But belief in the hallowed nature of Christ's commandments is the duty of all, because it is the light that protects human freedom and dignity against violence and debasement against nihilism and the hell of solitude.[262]

The emphasis on the European theme helped reinforce the understanding that communism was an alien system imposed upon eastern European populations against their will. And no geopolitical circumstances should be used as a pretext to maintain such illegitimate political systems. "The fact of divisions into spheres of hegemony," the Pope explained, "which may have had their origin in particular and contingent

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[260] Gale Stokes, *The Walls came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 34.
[261] Sermon delivered by John Paul II at a pontifical Mass in Kraków on June 10, 1979. See excerpt in *The Pope in Poland*, 65.
[262] Michnic, *The Church and the Left*, 123.

situations, should not justify their continuance, all the more so if they tend to limit the sovereignty of others."[263]

Yet, the return to Europe was expected to be a long journey. Beforehand, however, eastern Europeans would have to recover their Slavic identity. To this end, John Paul emphasized the theme of Pan-Slavism. He included all Slavic populations in his concerns and discourses, or he evoked common Slavic themes, such as languages, culture and traditions. John Paul II challenged and undermined the legitimacy of the communist regimes of Soviet inspiration.

The third and fourth themes developed by the Polish Pope were also of particular significance, because they addressed the requirement of a peaceful opposition and the need to defend the rights of the worker. Theses issues were of primary interests to intellectuals, as indicated earlier. Some of them had embraced the ideals of communism earlier in their life, but had been forced to confront the obvious failure of communism to provide the material improvement promised to the workers. They also had been convinced that a peaceful approach was the only available option. The writings and the discourses of John Paul II seemed to echo the ideas they had been advocating. Thus, the themes addressed by the Pope were well received by dissidents, because they provided elements necessary to the rebuilding of civil society. In the end, the papal shift of emphasis toward civil society reinforced the position of intellectuals. In addition to Vatican support, the Pope also strengthened the position of intellectuals by legitimizing their action. Indeed, the activities of the Catholic Church contributed to a diffusion of ideas and hereafter led to a convergence of elites. Moreover, with the

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[263] Address delivered by John Paul II to the Diplomatic Corps on January 16, 1982 in *The Holy See at the Service of Peace*, 60.

logistical support provided by the transnational policy of the Vatican, mobilization would eventually start from below.

Yet, this diffusion of ideas would have been less remarkable without the presence of unsung mediators.

3. Tale of Unsung Mediators:

The unsung mediators represented a pivotal cluster of individuals, who acted behind the scenes. They played a significant role because their activities were located at the junction of the secular and religious spheres. This involvement in different circles contributed to a diffusion of ideas, a mutual understanding, and even a rapprochement among the elite. These priests, theologians or active lay Christians represented an essential wheel in the dissident movement, and later in the mobilization against communism. They were the shapers of ideas, although their power was only one of suggestion and witness. Moreover, their actions have been overlooked. For explanatory purpose, this dissertation will portray only the most prominent and representative Czechoslovak and Polish individuals, who constituted this group of shadow mediating elites. Among these mediators were František Mikloško and Ján Čarnogurský of Slovakia, Václav Benda and Tomáš Halík of the Czech Republic, and some of the leaders of the Catholic Clubs of Intellectuals.

a. František Mikloško:

Tall, blond, František Mikloško, who became vice-chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia, and the president of the Slovak parliament after 1989, is a stylish charming leader with nobility of heart. Most of all, though,

Mikloško is a devout Catholic, who played a preeminent role in the Slovak underground.

In 1966, the young Mikloško left the city of Nitra to study mathematics at the University of Bratislava. After his arrival in the Slovak capital he made his first encounter with the religious underground. In one of the deciding moments of his life, he met Vladimír Jukl, a lay Catholic, who had suffered first hand from the communist regime. Because of his religious beliefs, Jukl had been condemned to spend no less than twenty five years in communist jails. Following their first meeting in the tramway, he introduced Mikloško to an underground religious movement that he and his old friend, Dr. Silvester Krčméry were developing for the students of the University of Bratislava. The decision to join this group marked the first step toward student activities that would later blossom with the organization of large scale mobilization such as pilgrimages or the 1988 Protest of Good Friday. Indeed, Mikloško got progressively involved. After his studies, he started organizing and leading his own group of students. For the next twenty years, he would oversee the movement born out of the University, that eventually developed throughout Slovakia.

Soon, though, his action expanded beyond the mere gathering of young Slovak Christians. Later, he became involved in the dissemination of information throughout Slovakia. With the help of his friend and dissident, Ján Čarnogurský, and another friend, Dr. Lauko, who after 1989 became the general procurator in Bratislava, both as co-redactors, Mikloško became the chief redactor of a religious samizdat titled "Religion and Present" (Náboženstvo a Súčasnost). This publication, the first of many more to come, started circulating in 1982.

Mikloško and Čarnogurský did not limit their work to the Slovak horizon. In addition to listening to the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, or Radio Vatican

every week, both dissidents were able to channel information to the West with the help of various individuals, including Catholic students. Information mainly transited through West Germany, where they kept contact with a Slovak émigré, a priest called Anton Hlinka. Ties with the western world were also maintained through Vienna, Austria. The main contribution that Mikloško brought to the dissident movement, though, was his ability to move at the intersection of two spheres. First, he interacted with Catholic activists like Jukl and Krčméry, and more significantly developed a close collaboration with Ján Chryzostom Korec, who had been ordained a priest and consecrated secretly as a bishop in the early 1950s. Mikloško had met Korec in the underground while he was still a student. Bishop Korec paid a particular attention to the student movement. Perhaps his training as a Jesuit made him particularly aware of the significance of education. Fascinated by Korec's personality and most certainly by the religious message he was distilling in the underground, Mikloško eventually found himself closely working with him. Bishop Korec even became his guardian and spiritual leader for about twenty years. The two of them would meet on a weekly basis, and Mikloško would assist Korec on projects, such a the organization of pilgrimages. He would also inform Korec of student underground activities. Recounting this period, Mikloško remarked: "he was stable, and had a strong experience. We were young and aggressive. It was a good combination."[264]

Second, Mikloško was also involved in more secular -opposition activities with his friend, Čarnogurský. Mikloško's work alongside his friend Čarnogurský took place without the knowledge of Bishop Korec, who was strictly opposed to any involvement that could even remotely be stamped as political. For the secret bishop,

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[264] Interview with František Mikloško, former KDH vice-chairman, January 27 and

the recent history of Slovakia demonstrated the dangers of meddling with politics. During the short-lived and infamous Slovak Republic, the President, Jozef Tiso was a priest, and numerous members of the clergy sat in the parliament. That legacy was difficult to dismiss.

Furthermore, according to Mikloško, Korec did not really believe that communism could collapse abruptly. For him the war against the communist regime would be a long one. Thus, it was futile to harshly and directly confront the communist system. Yet, Mikloško's involvement in more typically political activities was not necessarily lost. Since his thinking upon the political and the religious were inter-related, his very contribution to the brainstorming of the religious underground represented a potential source of influence. Consciously or not, he participated in a diffusion of ideas. The organization of petitions and most of all of the 1988 Bratislava's demonstrations offer two cases in point. Although both events aimed at defending religious freedom, they borrowed from the arsenal of political activism (signatures' drives and mass demonstrations). Moreover, these events could not have occurred without the assent of Korec. Mikloško and Čarnogurský, the organizers of the Bratislava's rally obviously had to convince the Slovak bishop of the significance of this demonstration.

For the secular circles, Mikloško not only bore witness, but also brought with him the logistics of the religious movement. In that regard, his close connection with Čarnogurský was essential. Yet, if Mikloško's power of suggestion was more potent with the religious circle, Čarnogurský's impact was most essentially girded toward the more political and secular circle.

February 2, 1995, Bratislava.

b. Ján Čarnogurský:

Serious, dedicated to his work, and yet a bit introverted, Čarnogurský possesses personal qualities that served him well in the underground, and helped him to become one of the most prominent dissidents in Slovakia. Contrary to some underground activists, he did not discover politics with the communist repression. Since his infancy, Čarnogurský was aware of the world of politics, as he grew up in a political home: His father, Pavel, a Slovak historian, was himself a member of parliament under the Tiso regime. In addition to his political awareness, he also brought precious skills to the underground. Trained as lawyer, and fluent in several foreign languages, he devoted his time to advise and defend individuals who were prosecuted by the communist regime. As he remarks, "the stupidity of communists was that they turned traditional religious activities into political activities. Everything that was not done under the cover of communism, such as attending a mass, became political. So, if teachers or physicians were seen attending church, they were fired."[265] As a practicing Catholic and a lawyer, he saw as his duty to stand on the side of those who were discriminated for political and religious reasons.

Contrary to Mikloško, who was deeply involved in religious circles, Čarnogurský was more interested in the political aspects of dissidence. For instance, he organized in his flat a Slovak version of the Polish flying universities. With the help of the Jan Hus Foundation and Roger Scruton, Čarnogurský was able to get sponsors from the United Kingdom, and even get speakers to Bratislava. In one occasion, he was able to receive a Jesuit from Oxford. Overall, this educational trust allowed him to

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[265] Interview with Jan Čarnogurský, chairman of KDH, January 30, 1995, Bratislava.

arrange the visits of six to eight lecturers from Great Britain. These lectures tended to be put together informally, which was extremely important to survive in the underground. For the Slovak dissident, too much organization was dangerous. The police would find a sophisticated network by interrogating the weaker people.

The involvement of Čarnogurský in the underground was quite diversified: for instance, he helped in the transportation of documents, for which he was once apprehended by the police. His contribution was not restricted to Slovakia. During his trips to Prague, he would keep in touch with members of Charter 77. As previously noted, his association with Mikloško was extremely important. Together as a team, they acted as a bridge between two spheres, thereby building respect between the liberal and Christian oriented dissidents. Both Professors Miroslav Kusý and Jozef Jabloniský[266] acknowledge that they kept contacts with the Čarnogurský/Mikloško circle, viz. with the political wing of the Catholic underground. Kusý remembers when the young Čarnogurský came to him to inquire about Charter 77. A former member of the Communist Party, he indicates that interaction and cooperation worked essentially at the individual level.[267] He had contacts with Mikloško and Čarnogurský, when these two engaged in their more secular oppositional activities. In practice, it thus meant that access to logistical support that purely belonged to the religious underground was difficult. Mikloško and Čarnogurský faced the difficult challenge to keep the political and purely religious somehow in separate domains, while at the same time try to cooperate and share ideas with other dissidents.

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[266] Professors Miroslav Kusý and Jozef Jabloniský, respectively philosopher and historian at the University of Bratislava, were two of the few secular Slovak dissidents; Although Jabloniský developed ties with the Czech dissident circles, only Kusý became a signatory of Charter 77.
[267] Interview with Professor Miroslav Kusý, May 15, 1995, Raleigh-Durham.

There was no goal of building an overarching movement joining secular and Christian oppositional elites, just an attempt to cooperate on one on one basis in an informal and flexible way. Both Čarnogurský and Mikloško wove a web of contacts, as circumstances commanded. Professor Jabloniský, a historian of the National Slovak Movement, came to know Ján Čarnogurský, and by extension Mikloško, during his visits to the elder Pavel Čarnogurský. He started exchanging documents with the two Catholic activists. Jabloniský avows that it was a different experience for him, who is atheist. "It was a different company. They prayed a lot. Yet they offered me a peace of mind. It was tolerance" in a communist environment, which had none. "We were all in the same boat."[268] As these links developed, Jabloniský was instrumental in arranging the unusual meeting of Pavel Čarnogurský and Miroslav Kusý.

Links with secular dissidents, who had signed Charter 77, also helped to extend connections in the underground. In particular, Jabloniský remembers when one day Father Malý rang at the door wearing shorts. After introducing himself as a Catholic priest, he explained that he was interested in developing relations with Catholics in Slovakia. He wanted to develop his contacts in the underground. Malý asked if Jabloniský knew Čarnogurský. The former obliged his guest and explained to him how to contact the Slovak dissident. That meeting was not an isolated event. They indeed met again.

One time at Čarnogurský's home, Jabloniský recalls, his host wittily pointed out the unusual relations that the post-totalitarian had produced: a communist wearing jeans and a Catholic priest wearing short pants. As Jabloniský explains, it was extraordinary circumstances and the progressive persecution conducted by the

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[268] Interview with Professor Jozef Jabloniský, February 3, 1995, Bratislava.

communist regime, that led these individuals into dissidence and eventually to cooperate. "Each of us entered into these movements on an individual basis. One does not become dissident overnight. The secret police observed us, interrogated us, and progressively separated us from the mainstream society. It is very much like entering a lake. First, it is pleasant, as the water rises above the knees, it becomes more difficult."[269] Once drawn into dissidence, it became important to break isolation. Hence, ties with people, who experienced a similar situation, even though they were of different ideological make-up became essential.

A few months after his first encounter with Father Malý, Professor Jabloniský received a similar visit from Václav Benda. He later arranged a meeting with Čarnogurský at his home. Thus, that secular-religious elite connection increased interaction, built respect, and eventually led to a convergence of views on the need to defend human rights.

This pattern of relations however was not limited to Slovakia. Similar individuals came to play a similar role in the Czech lands.

c. Václav Benda:

To the outside observer, a rapid glance at the room where Václav Benda receives his guests may help to grasp the essence of this famous dissident. In the nicely and simply decorated lounge, any visitor cannot help but notice the wall of books covering one side of the room and the silent and yet overwhelming presence of a gigantic Christ on the cross. Both powerful symbols attest to Benda's strong faith and intellectual orientation. A philosopher and a mathematician, who stood up for his political and religious beliefs at an early age, Benda quickly became a target of the

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[269] *Ibid.*

communist regime. Like many of the dissidents in Czechoslovakia, he lost his job. Dismissed from his teaching position in philosophy at Charles' University, Benda became a computer programmer a few years later after his retraining in mathematics, but eventually ended up working as a stoker in Prague. Notwithstanding these difficulties, and despite the pressure imposed on his family, Benda refused to yield to the communist system. In 1977, he signed Charter 77, for which he became a spokesman in 1979. In 1978, alongside Havel and Malý and other dissidents, he participated into the establishment of VONS. For these activities and his contribution in the samizdat literature, he paid a heavy price. Arrested in 1979, Benda was sentenced to several years in prison. Even after his release, the Czech dissident and his family had to endure constant harassment from the authorities which inevitably contributed to a certain social isolation.

The presence of a figure like Benda in the dissident movement was essential for the image of Catholicism. Indeed, through his actions, he became a leading figure not only of the Christian wing of Charter 77, but of the dissident movement as a whole. He contributed actively to dissident discussions, particularly via the samizdats. In collaborating with secular dissidents of various political strides Benda helped to forge a positive image of Christians and Catholicism, namely by demonstrating that the latter could be on the side of the fight for human rights. His presence served as a witness, and his intellectual input contributed to a fruitful stimulation of ideas. In addition to specific articles on Catholicism,[270] Benda sponsored the idea of a "parallel polis,"[271]

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[270] For a French version of "Katolicismus a Politika-Kořeny a Perspektivy Současné Situace," see Václav Benda, " Le Catholicisme et La Politique: Sources et Perspectives de la Situation aujourd'hui," *Istina* vol. xxviii (1983) no. 1, 31-45.
[271] See Václav Benda, " Parallelní Polis," in *Charta 77*, ed. Prečan, 43-51. For an English translation of Benda's Parallelní Polis, see H. Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson,

which provoked broad and extensive commentaries. Moving beyond the moral stance of Charter 77, he called for a more active reclaiming of the public sphere, inviting his fellow dissidents

> ...to join forces in creating slowly but surely, parallel structures that [were] capable, to a limited degree at least, of supplementing the generally beneficial and necessary functions that [were] missing in the existing structures, and where possible, to use those existing structures to humanize them.[272]

Benda suggested the possibility of focusing upon the spheres of education, science, scholarly life, information based upon the model provided by the second culture.

His contributions, however, went beyond embodying a Catholic presence. With the help of other dissidents, such as Radim Palouš and Josef Zvěřina, Benda's action was also important to win over the institutional leadership of the Czechoslovak Church, and most especially his primary leader, Mgr. Tomášek. Indeed, to the Catholics actively engaged in the Charter, such as Father Malý or Father Zvěřina, the archbishop of Prague's refusal to grant his assent to dissident activities represented a blow. Particularly disheartening was the condemnation of any involvement from members of the Catholic clergy. Yet, priests and lay Catholic activists refused to take "no" for an answer, and continued their action. Some, such as Father Zvěřina even expressed their disapproval of the leadership position through open letters.[273] These events, however, brought a positive development. In an attempt to clarifying their

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eds., *Civic Freedom in Central Europe: Voices from Czechoslovakia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 35-41.

[272] Benda, "Parallel Polis," 36.

[273] Fr. Zvěřina addressed two letters to Mgr. Tomášek, one on January 24, 1977, and the other on February 11, 1977. According to Halík, though, the circumstances surrounding this controversy remain suspect. Pressure from the authorities, if not tricks from the police contributed to this public confrontation. However, there is little doubt that whatever the circumstances of this publication. The archbishop of Prague disapproved of the participation in the movement of priests, such as Václav Malý or Josef Zvěřina.

respective positions, Mgr. Tomášek invited Father Zvěřina to talk about the matter of involvement in the Charter. That meeting allowed the two men to initiate a constructive dialogue. According to Halík, this exchange is one of the factors which contributed to changes in Tomášek's thinking.[274]

However, in the meantime, the institutional Church remained weak. According to Benda, the Church's failure to support the movement of Charter 77 exemplifies the overall position of the Church throughout most of the 1970s. Yet, this situation started to evolve more favorably after the election of the Polish Pope and the shifting of the Vatican Ostpolitik. These changes opened new horizons for Catholics. Hopes ran so high that Catholic dissident and signatory of Charter 77, Marie Rút Křížkova decided to address her concerns directly to John Paul II.[275] Interestingly enough, in the early 1980s, after the required *ad limina* visit[276] of the Czechoslovak bishops to the Vatican and the simultaneous release of the decree of the Sacred Congregation for the Clergy, *Quidam Episcopi*, the position of the Vatican seemed to answer these eastern European concerns. The Vatican decree specifically forbade priests from being involved in political priestly organizations. In Eastern Europe, it was aimed at those individuals participating in the activities of state sponsored organizations, such as PAX in Poland,

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[274] Interview with Tomáš Halík.

[275] See "Lettre de Mme Rút Křížkova au Pape Jean Paul II," (letter by Mrs. Rút Křížkova to Pope John Paul II) in *Liberté Religieuse et Défense des Droits de l'Homme en Tchécoslovaquie: L'An Deux de la Charte* (Paris: Istina, 1979), 317-319.

[276] *Ad Limina* visits are trips to Rome undertaken by bishops every five years. In theory, this visit to the Vatican is designed to allow Catholic bishops to visit the tombs of St. Peter and St. Paul. The more practical purpose of these trips is to meet with Vatican leaders, including the pope. Bishops usually come with a delegation representing their rexpective countries. Their stay in Rome give them a unique opportunity to report on the state of affairs of their diocese. When authorized by communist authorities, these visits were crucial for eastern European countries whose clergies, except for Poland were usually restricted in their ability to travel.

or Pacem in Terris in Czechoslovakia.[277] More significantly, though, following this visit, to everyone who cared to notice, the old archbishop of Prague came back from Rome literally transfigured.

Yet, the radicalization of Mgr. Tomášek did not just stem from Vatican and papal encouragement, but also arose from his progressive interaction with prominent Catholic signatories of Charter 77. The visits to the archbishop started in 1983. That very year, one of the most active women of the dissident movement, Marie Rút Křížkova became spokesman of the Charter, as the representative of the Christians.

More significantly, in the rapprochement of secular and religious elites, Křížkova had developed ties with Mgr. Tomášek. Following his declaration disavowing Charter 77, like Father Zvěřina and others, she had taken upon herself to protest directly to the archbishop by addressing him a protest letter. This initiative gave her the opportunity to later meet with him. This first encounter opened the way for other visits. This access to Mgr. Tomášek allowed her to introduce Benda, when the latter replaced her as the new spokesman and representative of the Christian wing of Charter 77.[278] After that visit, each new spokesman met with Mgr. Tomášek to discuss with him and ask for his blessing, as he had done so for Křížkova. According to Benda, at first, these meetings remained rather formal. However, progressively, there were more of these visits, and discussions became more substantial. From that point on, a certain cooperation developed between church and civic activities. This relation

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[277] These organizations had been established with the approval of the communist regimes in the hope of controlling Catholic hierarchies and severing ties with Rome.
[278] For a more detailed description of Marie Rút Křížkova's recollection of these events, see *Kardinal Tomášek: Zeugnisse über einen behutsamen Bishof und einen tapferen Kardinal* (Leipzig: Benno, 1994), 76-77; also in its Czech version, *Kardinál Tomášek:*

was not just one-sided. It was dynamic and reciprocal. The dissidents contributed to Tomášek' s understanding of the work undertaken by Charter 77 and VONS. "He could not be radical without our support or pressure from us," stresses Benda. "At the same time, the radicalization of Mgr. Tomášek helped to strengthen the development of an anti-regime position."[279]

By participating in those meetings with other Catholic dissidents, Benda contributed not only to a diffusion of ideas, but to a certain rapprochement between Charter 77 and the Church. Eventually, that convergence of views concerning the communist regime led to a total support of the people and the opposition in the 1989 Revolution. Yet, like in Slovakia, the impact of such a figure as Benda was paralleled by the influence exercised by religious underground figures upon secular elites. Such a role was played by Halík.

d. Tomáš Halík:

In some strange coincidence, it can be argued that Tomáš Halík played the same role for Mgr. Tomášek as Mikloško played for Bishop Korec, except that he was not a layman. Ordained secretly in East-Germany,[280] Father Halík became a close advisor to the archbishop of Prague with the help of two theologians, Oto Mádr and Josef Zvěřina. The three of them maintained regular contacts: letters were exchanged. They tried to provide the archbishop with some feedback about the situation of the Church and society at large. They were actually part of a larger circle of advisors that the

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Svědectvi o dobrém Katechetovi, bojácném Biskupovi a tatečném Kardinálovi (Praha: ZVON, 1994), 67-68.

[279] Interview with Václav Benda.

[280] Halík did not admit that very fact to the archbishop of Prague for about ten years.

archbishop came to rely upon in the 1980s. That group included members of the religious underground, particularly the provincials of illegal orders,[281] such as the Dominicans, Salesians or Franciscans. All these individuals formed a brain trust for Tomášek, and Halík was a particularly influential member. In the mid-1980s, for instance, he suggested to Tomášek the adoption of a ten year long spiritual renewal following the Polish model. Like in Poland under the leadership of Wyszyński, it was hoped that this spiritual program would contribute to public mobilization. In some ways, Halík helped to convey the idea of reshaping civil society in the manner suggested by Charter 77. Once again, interaction with politically minded religious leaders, namely Malý and Zvěřina and political dissidents played its way out on Halík, and transitively on Tomášek.

Halík also evolved around political dissidents, although he found impossible to take a public stand with regard to Charter 77. Since he was a product of the underground structures, it was difficult for him to be openly engaged in dissident activities. To have signed Charter 77, for instance, would have attracted the attention of the authorities, and hence endangered the underground. Yet working in the shadow did not preclude him from partaking in underground activities broadly defined. Like Brno and Bratislava, Prague was the seat of flying universities. Among the various subjects tackled by these small underground circles was philosophy. For instance, for about ten years, Radim Palouš hosted weekly philosophical discussions. In those meetings, Halík would interact with about nine other persons. Although many of the participants were Catholic, some were drawn from the secular dissident circles. The very exposure to these various meetings allowed for a ferment and diffusion of ideas.

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[281] In the Catholic Church, the jurisdiction of religious orders is divided in provinces,

Recounting a weekly intensive seminar at Václav Havel's cottage, in which participants tackled the works of Erich Voegelin, Hannah Arendt or Michael Novack, Halík remarks that Havel himself was mostly listening, and yet some of the ideas raised in those meetings would later appear in his writings. Out of these interactions, in other words, both secular and Christians gained new insights and respect that they would later apply in their own thoughts and actions.

The contributions of these Czechoslovak mediators followed a pattern that was not so different from the one observed in Poland except in terms of magnitude.

e. The Contribution of the Polish Catholic Clubs of Intellectuals (KIKs):

The presence of five KIKs throughout Poland allowed the continuous visible presence of Catholic intellectuals under a communist regime. Like their counterparts in Czechoslovakia, they were strategically located between a traditionally conservative Church and a growing secular opposition. Although some individuals became quite well-known, such as Mazowiecki, it is more as a group that Polish Catholic intellectuals were able to exercise influence. The protecting shadow of the Church allowed more people to be involved and to operate in the open. The circle of Catholic intellectuals, who mostly gravitated around the cities of Kraków and Warsaw, actually originated from two distinct groups.

The first group came to be associated with the work at Tygodnik Powszechny[282] and Znak[283] in the city of Kraków, the cultural heart of Poland. The

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which are headed by a provincial superior.

[282] This weekly newspaper first appeared in 1945; Its team included Stomma, Zawieyski, Golubiew. However, following the refusal of chief editor Jerzy Turowicz to publish an eulogy of Comrade Stalin, the team of Tygodnik Powszechny was forced to relinquish its control of the newspaper. Subsequently, it was replaced by a group of Catholics more loyal to the communist regime.

individuals who joined this circle shared a common intellectual heritage. During the Interwar period, they had participated in a movement called "odrodzenie" (rebirth), which was dedicated to the study and promotion of the work of French Catholic thinkers, such as Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier.[284] This Catholic heritage also known as Christian personalism belonged to what can be considered a progressive stream of thought within the Church.

The second group, which later would lead to the creation of Więź in Warsaw, was born of a split within the PAX movement. Soon after the establishment of the communist regime in Poland, the government had tried to organize a Catholic movement named PAX that would be loyal to the regime and encourage the Church to severe its ties with Rome. This movement fell under the control of Bolesław Piasecki, who before World War II had been involved in an extreme right-wing movement, the Falanges. Dissatisfaction with Piasecki's leadership, however, forced some members to break away shortly after the death of Stalin. Among the dissenters was Mazowiecki, who went on to participate in the foundation of the Warsaw based monthly Więź. As explained earlier, the Znak parliamentary representation emerged out of both these Warsaw and Kraków groups.

These Polish intellectuals played a crucial role in the convergence between the secular elites and the Church for several reasons. Within the Church, as was previously stated, they represented a progressive tradition. They embodied a humanistic and pluralistic vision of society and a stream of thought, which outside of Poland was already working to transform of the universal Church. Thus, their

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[283] Znak, a monthly periodical, came into being in 1946, it also developed into a publishing house. However, four years later, Znak was closed down.
[284] Stefan Wilkanowicz, *Znak dans la Pologne de L'Après Guerre*," unpublished manuscript, 1.

presence in the Polish Church slowly but surely contributed to the acceptance and tolerance of secular minded intellectuals. It was not an easy task in a traditionally conservative environment, which also had to endure repressive communist policies. The Polish Primate himself, who was devoted to foster religiosity among the masses, had very little affinity for the more internalized and intellectual Mounier style.[285] In fact, at first, Cardinal Wyszyński was suspicious of these intellectual groups, who were willing to engage into a dialogue with Marxism. As Antoine Wenger stressed, "Wyszyński was irreducible. For him, communism was the enemy of faith and Poland. Communism, that is the Soviet Union, sought to exploit Poland."[286]

Hence, it is hardly surprising if the archbishop of Warsaw and Gniezno early on showed some reservation about the action of these Catholic intellectuals, and warned them about the potential risks of being entangled with the communist regime.[287] Yet, the cardinal maintained close contacts with these Catholic intellectuals circles, especially those who were politically involved in the work of the parliament. Retaining these ties was important to advance the cause of pluralism and personalism within the Church. Despite his reservations, the primate supported these Catholic intellectuals and granted the protection of the Church. These Catholic circles indeed had a religious mission. They could voice the concerns of the Church to the authorities. They also strengthened the presence of Catholicism in Polish society. Indeed, the Clubs of Catholic Intellectuals also had a grassroots purpose. They operated in close association with parishes. One of their priorities was to focus on families. For the cardinal, KIKs contributed to maintain and develop the religious fabric of Polish society. Anyhow,

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[285] Interview with Andrzej Potocki, former president of KIK Kraków, February 14, 1995, Kraków.
[286] Interview with Antoine Wenger.
[287] Micewski, 164.

suspicions concerning the political activism of Catholic intellectuals eventually evaporated in face of a growing communist repression. With Stomma's vote in 1976, individuals associated with Więź, Tygodnik Powszechny and Znak became de facto full -fledged members of the opposition.[288] As communist repression indiscriminately targeted both lay and secular members of the opposition, it helped the Church, and Cardinal Wyszyński in particular, to stand on the side of these elites and to further the rapprochement encouraged by Catholic intellectuals.

One person closer and more receptive to the brand of Catholicism and the political approach defended by Catholic intellectuals was Bishop Wojtyła. For one thing, he personally had contributed to Tygodnik Powszechny early on. This close collaboration with the Kraków circle led to long-lasting friendship and fruitful intellectual exchanges, which no doubt later influenced the thinking of the Polish Pope. Moreover, his philosophical training as a phenomenologist made him particularly akin to the issues raised and debated by these intellectual circles. The ties that he developed in Kraków persisted beyond his election to the head of the Catholic Church and proved crucial.

When the Catholic intellectuals were authorized to come to Rome, they were invited to visit the Polish Pope. The Vatican provided them with a legitimate reason to travel to Rome. These excuses were extremely important for two reasons. First, possibilities to travel west of the iron curtain were limited, as communist regimes tried to keep a tight control on their populations. Second, visits to the Vatican allowed to

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[288] For Zabłocki and his allies, which had differentiated themselves from Więź, but had remained part of Warsaw KIK and the Znak parliamentary representation, the constitutional crisis brought significant changes. Their vote in favor of the constitutional reform indeed marked the formal separation between Zabłocki's group and the group of Catholic intellectuals regarded as legitimate by the Church.

diffuse information outside of the communist sphere. For instance, in 1986 under the cover of the Pontifical Council for Culture, Catholic intellectuals participated to a conference devoted to the fortieth anniversary of Znak. These trips to Rome allowed Catholic intellectuals to have private meetings with the Pope, sometimes at the occasion of a dinner. As Professor Jacek Woźniakowski recalled, "we sketched the picture of Poland's situation. In Rome, there are many people, who do not dare to tell the truth. One nun used to blame me for bringing bad news."[289] By explaining the predicament of Solidarity and the opposition, they continued to further the cause of a convergence of views and action between elites and the Church. Owing to their intercession, the Church was more inclined to extend its protective arm. When Catholic and secular intellectuals cooperated and worked alongside in the Polish flying universities for instance, the episcopate supported the legitimacy of their action without discriminating. Hence, Catholic intellectuals played the role of proxies. That contribution, though, was only possible because Catholic intellectuals had also directed their efforts at presenting a more positive view of the Church to secular elites.

This better image of the Church was the result of a patient work going back to the end of World War II. In the perspective of the Polish reconstruction Catholic intellectuals had vowed to reach people beyond the Catholic sphere. Not only did they open their arms to members of other religious faiths, they also expressed their intentions to discuss with representatives of the Marxist world. More significantly, they actually tried to carry out these ambitious projects. Catholic intellectuals, for instance, explored sensitive issues concerning the Church's past: they tried to discuss

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[289] Interview with Jacek Woźniakowski, former professor of history of art and philosophy, and former director of Znak, February 14, 1995, Kraków (trans. from French by the author).

the question of anti-Semitism, as memories of the Interwar period lingered on.[290] For members of the secular elite, some of whom were of Jewish descent, these gestures as well as invitations to contribute to the Catholic press or denunciations of anti-Semitic communist policies were important in changing the image of the Church. This spirit of tolerance and the sophisticated intellectual debate taking place within these Catholic circles helped to erase the labels of 'backwardness' or 'reactionary' that used to be attached to the Church among the secular circles before World War II.[291]

This willingness to establish a dialogue with Marxism and even maintain a Catholic presence in the political system allowed these intellectuals to follow a parallel track to the secular opposition. Like the Kołakowski, Kuroń, Michnik, Lipski, Lipiński, these Catholic intellectuals had entertained the hope of affecting the communist system; they experienced the same disillusions about the inability of the regime to reform itself. After 1968 and 1970, the 1976 constitutional crisis signified the end of the participation of Znak to the Polish political process. Since they incarnated open-mindedness and moral values, such as the defense of human rights, and had gone through a similar personal evolution, Catholic intellectuals could meet and cooperate with their secular counterparts. As previously noted, that convergence was initiated in the aftermath of 1968. Both groups intellectually met on a common ground. As Kuroń explained:

> In general, I think the Catholic intellectuals helped us to give a name to certain phenomena, to read the gospel and understand the Church. But we were already on this path. They merely gave us some help. As for our own contribution, I think we helped our Catholic partners to gain a sensitivity towards certain issues. I don't want to say they lacked this in

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[290] Tadeusz Mazowiecki, "Antysemityzm ludzi łagodych I dobrych (Anti-Semitism of Honest People) originally published in Więź in 1960 and reproduced in Tadeusz Mazowiecki, *Un Autre Visage de L'Europe*, trans. Eric-Morin Aguilar (Montricher: Editions Noir et Blanc, 1989), 75-98 .
[291] Interview with Andrzej Potocki.

> the first place- and in that sense we may really have given them very little. But I think we sharpened their awareness of how these issues might effectively acted upon.[292]

Perhaps, at times, secular elites may have entertained too idealistic a vision of the Church. As Woźniakowski reminded to his friend Michnic, the Church is not an homogenous entity; although within certain limits it accommodates various visions. However, like in Czechoslovakia, Catholic intellectuals contributed to a convergence of action between secular oppositional elites and the Church.

As seen throughout this chapter, the convergence of religious and secular elites in the 1970s and 1980s was facilitated by a particular set of historical circumstances in Czechoslovakia and Poland, a shift in the discourse of the Catholic Church, a new mindset among oppositional elites, and the contribution of a group of mediators strategically located at the junction of the secular and religious spheres. This convergence was an important threshold in the reclaiming the public sphere, since it helped to unify an alternative discourse to communism. However, a reclaiming of the public sphere could not solely be based on words alone. It had to entail an aspect of mobilization to which the Catholic Church also lent its support.

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[292] Interview with Kuroń in Babiuch and Luxmoore, "The Road to Damascus," 338.

Chapter V

Mass Mobilization in National Contexts

Rebuilding civil society and recapturing the public sphere were not just a matter for elites. It also involved an aspect of mass mobilization. However, before mobilization could reach full development, some groundwork had to take place at the grassroots level. In other words, the seeds of activism had to be sowed, nurtured, before they could blossom into a mass movement. Since communism had invaded the public sphere and limited alternative forms of discourse, the starting point of any movement aimed at reestablishing a civil society thus implied working in the pre-political hinterland out of the reach of the regime. Re-establishing a civil society implied patience and perseverance in the hope that the multiplication of pre-political spheres would contribute to a progressive reconquest of the public sphere.

When people reinvested pre-political spheres, such as culture or religion, they did more than recreating a space freed from communist interference. By attending their needs and interests and by standing for their beliefs and values, they also developed a new consciousness, and rediscovered the virtues of dignity, trust, responsibility and social interconnectedness. Participation in these pre-political hinterlands in essence represented the first step toward the reconstitution of a responsible citizenship that is required in a full-fledged civil society.

Nothing better illustrates this process of mobilization than the contribution made by Catholicism. Despite, or perhaps even because of, communist repression, efforts within the confines of the Catholic Church were made to work at the rank and file's level. People sought to establish their own realms of activities, adapting the Church to a post-totalitarian reality. In turn, the Church provided assistance. By focusing on small circles or addressing specific individual concerns, Catholics gained in strength

and confidence, and eventually helped in the mobilization of eastern Europeans against the communist regime.

A. A Tale of Everyday Resistance: Catholicism as Pre-Political Hinterland:

The argument presented here is built upon the principle that political and social phenomena must be weighted in the light of national circumstances. It is only with this caveat in mind that a true comparison of the contribution made by the Catholic Church in the reemergence of civil society in Poland and Czechoslovakia can be developed. Indeed, one of the difficulties encountered when comparing Poland to other eastern European countries is to look beyond sheer numbers. Most often, the nature of opposition to communist regimes has been gauged in terms of quantity, using Poland as an instance of massive mobilization. Yet, that approach does not take into account the difference in environment or the nature of opposition itself. As Havel remarked,

> More important than any general or absolute measure of the independence of these communities and their activities is...their relative significance - that is, the degree of independence they have against the background of the particular social situation of the country and time they are operating in. What may appear, from another country, as a very modest, limited and cautious kind of independence, may not necessarily seem that way on the spot...Thus an expression or activity that in one country or at a given moment in time could go unnoticed among analogous and more thoroughgoing expressions and actions, may in another country and at another moment practically shake society to its roots...[293]

Thus, this section will demonstrate that the Church in both countries embarked on a similar approach; but that it occurred at different times and in distinct historical and structural contexts. Following the political compromise of 1956, the Catholic Church in Poland indeed could act in a semi-visible manner, and witness the fruits of its action

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[293] Václav Havel, untitled in *Civic Freedom in Central Europe*, eds. Skilling and Wilson, 61-62.

as early as the 1960s. In Czechoslovakia, on the contrary, the Church as a community of believers was prevented from organizing itself up until the late 1960s. Furthermore, after the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion, normalization forced Catholic activists to go underground.

1. The Birth of the Czech and Slovak Undergrounds:

One of the major characteristics of the religious underground which emerged in the late 1960s in Czechoslovakia, was its division along national lines. Although cooperation existed between the Czech Lands and Slovakia, it is possible to talk about two distinct undergrounds, with different leaderships and structures.

a. A Matter of Leadership:

Behind the birth and especially the success of every social movement stand individuals with initiative and particular leadership skills. In the case of the Slovak religious underground,[294] its original leaders consisted of a small cluster of individuals: Jukl, Krčméry, Korec, Mikloško and Čarnogurský. However, the very idea of an underground movement was truly the brainchild of both Jukl and Krčméry, two devout lay Catholics. The stamp of legitimacy and the tie to the institutional Church was provided by the support of a regularly -albeit secretly- ordained bishop, Mgr. Korec. The organizational and leadership support was provided by Mikloško and Čarnogurský.

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[294] Information about the Slovak underground was gathered from a series of interview with Vladimír Jukl, Silvester Krčméry, František Mikloško, Ján Čarnogurský, and activists of an underground printing press. The latter interview was conducted on February 1, 1995 in Bratislava.

Jukl and Krčméry took their first steps toward the establishment of an underground shortly after their release from communist jails, respectively in 1965 and 1964. Their idea was to organize small groups of students. First, they would work at one faculty[295] with the hope of extending their influence to other faculties within the university, then to the whole university, and beyond to the wider Slovak world. Theirs was an attempt to put into practice the teaching of their former spiritual leader, Tomislav Kolakovič. The legacy of this Croat priest played a crucial role in the development of the underground. Kolakovič had moved to Slovakia during World War II. He was convinced that the Soviet Union could be re-evangelized and that Slovakia could serve as a stepping stone for this task. His strategy was to establish a movement called "the Family" (rodina), like the spiritual family of Christians. Since Kolakovič's ultimate goal was the Christian reconquest of the Soviet territories, he had to prepare his followers for conditions of harsh communist repression and for the life of the underground. Toward that end, his movement was based on the formation of small groups of young people. His ideas were derived from the western European experience of the Young Christian Workers (JOC, Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne) with which he had been acquainted during a stay in Belgium. However, Kolakovič departed from the JOC method by focusing on specific groups, such as students or workers, rather than mixing individuals from the same age cohorts as was done with youth groups. The goal was to foster cohesion.[296] However, his leadership was cut short

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[295] In Europe, the term faculty does not refer to the teaching staff. Rather, it represents the equivalent of a college in American universities.

[296] This account about the role of Kolakovič was compiled from the various interviews conducted with František Mikloško, Silvester Krčméry, Oto Mádr and Václav Vasko in Bratislava and Prague. For further information about the influence of this Croat priest, see František Mikloško, *Nebudete Ich Môcť Rozvrátiť: Z Osudov Katolíckej Cirkvi na Slovensku v Rokoch 1943-89* (Bratislava: Archa, 1991), 25-36.

abruptly in the postwar turmoil. Arrested by the State Security in early 1946, and released a few months later, Kolakovič finally left Slovakia that same Summer leaving behind him his followers. With the advent of communism, though, the latter were forced to interrupt their work. During the sweeping repression against churches in the early 1950s, the closest disciples of Kolakovič were arrested, condemned for spying, and sentenced between fifteen and twenty-five years, and in some cases even for life.[297] They eventually were released from the mid to late 1960s. Not discouraged by their prison's experience, and reaffirmed in their faith through their suffering, Jukl and Krčméry were soon ready to rebuild an underground network.

Interestingly enough, the influence of Kolakovič did not remain limited to Slovakia. The Croat priest also traveled to Prague, where he established circles similar to those existing in the Slovak land. Out of these Czech structures emerged individuals, who played a significant role in the religious underground after 1968. Among them were two theologians, Mádr and Zvěřina, whose personal experience with communist jails closely resembled that of their Slovak counterparts.[298] However, after their liberation from communist jails, they could not rely upon the support of a religious leader whose hierarchical position and authority could serve as the rallying point of the underground. In other words, there was no equivalent of Bishop Korec in the Czech lands. The Czech Catholic hierarchy was too weak to support an underground initiative, or to provide a stamp of legitimacy. As in Slovakia, it had been decimated by years of repression, but no single leader had emerged from the mist of the underground. In 1972, out of the thirteen dioceses (seven in Slovakia, six in Bohemia and Moravia), only one had a sitting bishop, Mgr. Štěpán Trochta (Litoměřice), who

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[297] Jukl was condemned to 25 years, Krčméry to 14 years.

eventually died in 1974. Even after the compromise reached between the Vatican and Czechoslovak government in the early 1970s, nomination of four new bishops did not alleviate the plight of those priests and believers opposing communism.

First, three of the new nominees were put in charge of Slovak bishoprics (Július Gábriš in Trnava, Ján Pásztor in Nitra and Jozef Feranec in Banská Bystrica). Second, the Prague Archdiocese remained vacant. Following the departure of Mgr. Beran in 1965 and his death in 1969, Mgr. Tomášek only held the title of Apostolic Administrator. Moreover, his official nomination as cardinal and archbishop of Prague in 1977 did not seem to strengthen his determination against the communist regime. Mgr. Tomášek remained a weak leader until his metamorphosis in the early 1980s. To be fair, it must be acknowledged that he actually faced an uncomfortable situation. After the death of Trochta, he became the only bishop who was not a member of the communist Trojan horse, viz., Pacem in Terris. His high visibility as Beran's successor and later as the de facto highest ranking Catholic clergyman in Czechoslovakia put him under close scrutiny from the authorities and open to political pressures. This environment thus made difficult any leadership of underground activities. In addition, in the first years of Charter 77, Tomášek also opposed the involvement of priests in what he saw as political activism. Part of his early distrust of the dissident movement stemmed from the presence of former communists, who previously had condoned the policy of persecution against the Church. As seen in chapter, it took the dedication and work of mediators to win over the support of the archbishop of Prague. This constrained position of Mgr. Tomášek entailed some major effects on the organization and functioning of the Czech underground.

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[298] Mádr for instance was sentenced to life.

b. Underground Structures:

The Czech Experience:

The main characteristic of the Czech underground was its loose organization and the lack of long-term strategy. Underground activities grew in a spontaneous manner. Small clusters of ten or twelve people would gather around a religious leader. Among the religious leaders who entered the Catholic sacerdoce in full accordance with canon law, there were basically three groups of activists. The first one was constituted of the old generation, who had been ordained before the communist takeover. They had experienced the hardship of Nazi occupation. The two prominent representatives of that generation were Mádr and Zvěřina, who also belonged to the family of Kolakovič followers. The second group was represented by a younger generation of priests. They did not come from the underground. Rather, they had followed the traditional path toward ordination, and had attended one of the only authorized seminaries in Czechoslovakia. These two institutions, Litoměřice for the Czech lands and Bratislava for Slovakia, were infiltrated by members of security forces and were subjected to a stringent control by the communist authorities. Admissions were filtered and limited to a minimum. Despite these constraints, some of the graduates managed to survive this state controlled environment, and went on to defy communist authorities by exercising their priestly duties beyond the strict limits set by the regime. Under communist guidelines, religious practice had to be circumscribed to liturgy. Hence, they subsequently lost their state license. Such was the fate of Father Václav Malý, Father František Lízna, Father Josef Kordíck or then Father Miloslav Vlk.[299] It is out

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[299] After the Velvet revolution, Father Vlk rose from the ranks. First named bishop of České Budějovice in 1990, he was chosen to replace Mgr. Tomášek as archbishop of Prague in 1991. He eventually received the red hat of cardinal in the Fall of 1994.

of these two groups that most politically minded religious leaders emerged. The third group included those individuals who were secretly ordained in East Germany or Poland, such as Father Tomáš Halík or Miloslav Fiala. A substantial contingent within that last cluster belonged to religious orders, such as the Dominicans, Franciscans, Salesians, or Jesuits.

The consequence of this diversity was the existence of parallel structures, but a lack of coordination among them. During the 1980s, however, the archbishop of Prague started to consult with two groups of advisors, one made of the provincial of illegal orders and one constituted of the triumvirate, Mádr, Zvěřina and Halík. These contacts occurred parallely to his interaction with the prominent Catholics of Charter 77. Henceforth, the Czech underground could be described as a patchwork of religious groupings. Members of the orders, or priests, who had been influenced by movements, such as Foccolare, Oasis, Neocatechumen tended to orient their work toward youth activities. Certain groups, for instance, organized youth gatherings in the mountains or the countryside. Other individuals, such as Mádr and Zvěřina focused more on thematic activities, such as theological and philosophical lectures. According to Halík, Zvěřina had many students (priests and lay people) throughout the country. With his car, he would travel and meet with them.[300]

The participation in the underground religious circles allowed these various individuals to live within the truth. By creating a space out of the communist reach, in which they could pray, discuss religious matters, study papal documents or practice their faith, in effect they contributed to the embryonic emergence of civil society. As Martin Palouš reminds us, it is by attending to matters that are important to the

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[300] Interview with Tomáš Halík.

community -those pre-political matters of reason, truth and the soul- that in pure Socratic tradition citizens can eventually endeavor to reclaim the public sphere.[301] Furthermore, although the focus of these circles were mostly religious and spiritual, at times, lines of distinction were blurred as discussions also dealt with social and political issues.

These kind of activities were of course more easily conducted in towns than in the countryside as cities provided a higher level of anonymity. Over the years, groups met periodically. As Mgr. František Lobkowicz, auxiliary bishop of Prague recalls: "we would meet once a month, when children were asleep. The idea was to find a pretext, such as a birthday, to meet."[302] Other groups, such as those hosted by the very active Kaplan family, met on a weekly basis. In addition to prayer meetings, they would welcome theologians, and foreign guests from France, Belgium, Germany or the Netherlands. These meetings were also the occasion to practice ecumenism. Occasionally, retreats in the mountains and the countryside would be organized. Despite all these initiatives, the Czech underground did not grow to be as efficient, extensive and sophisticated as its Slovak counterpart.

The Slovak Experience:

Like their spiritual leader, Jukl and Krčméry with the support of Korec and Mikloško, focused their attention on small groups of students. From their early interaction with Kolakovič, they had learned to move in small and closely knit circles. The virtue of these groups was to foster a stronger sense of cohesion and allow for

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[301] See Martin Palouš, "Jan Patočka versus Václav Benda," in *Civic Freedom in Central Europe*, eds. Skilling and Wilson, 124-125.
[302] Interview with Mgr. Lobkowicz, December 27, 1994, Prague (trans. from German by the author).

deeper relationships. That experience came to represent a valuable asset for survival in the Czechoslovak post-totalitarian environment. Opposition or activities in the underground demanded trust and secrecy, which are easier to accomplish in smaller units. Moreover, Jukl, Krčméry, and Mikloško believed that their actions would be more efficient in small groups as their goal was to target a specific population. Indeed, contrary to their Czech neighbors, these Slovak leaders had a long term strategy. Their ideal primarily was to provide religious and spiritual guidance to the young generation, and to teach them how to live as Christians. In the Winter, they would organize skiing trips, while in the Summer, Jukl and Krčméry would lead hiking activities into the Tatras mountains. These activities allowed members of the Slovak youth in Bratislava to act according to a set of beliefs distinct from communism, to develop a better sense of community, and reshape a new consciousness. In other words, in Havelian terms, they were taking the first steps to reclaim an inner sense of dignity and responsibility. They were trying to "live within the truth," participating in a "real everyday struggle for a better life."[303] In order to achieve these tasks, the movements also had to rely upon priests who agreed to provide the proper religious environment and dispense sacraments. Each faculty thus ended being placed under the care of its own priest. The whole movement was based on the understanding that building a network of followers would take time.

First, security required small and loose structures, because they would be harder to be uncovered by the authorities. Even in case of infiltration, the discovery of small units would not endanger the whole network. The leaders of the underground had learned the same lessons as all revolutionary movements, including that of a certain Vladimir Ilyich Ulianov (Lenin).

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[303] Havel, "The Power of Powerless," 88.

More significantly, smallness was of the essence to build trust and a sense of community. The drawback of that approach of course was that building a network on the principle of small circles implied a long-term time frame. Focusing first on students at the University, and later in secondary schools provided the hope that in time they could develop connections throughout Slovakia. The rationale was that once students would graduate from the University, leave Bratislava, and return to their home regions, they would spread the good word. To mark the significance and the solemnity of this transition and perhaps underline the symbolism of the action undertaken in Bratislava, young activists were invited to celebrate and to attend a farewell mass conducted by Bishop Korec. Usually masses took place in private apartments.[304]

By the 1980s, the movement had sufficiently developed to include groups for each year of study in each faculty. Representatives for each year within a specific department, such as mathematics would meet at their level. One of them would be chosen to participate in gatherings at the faculty level. And the representatives of each faculty would report to the head of the whole structure, Mikloško.[305] Overall there were between 70 and 100 groups totaling roughly 500 and 1,000 University students.[306] It was still a small percentage of the overall 42,000 student population at the University. Yet, these young people were expected to form the basis of a larger network that would trickle throughout Slovakia. It was hoped that graduates would in turn contribute to the development of small groups in their local surroundings. As centers indeed developed outside Bratislava with the help of local priests, young Slovaks, who were planning to attend the University were directed toward Christian

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[304] Interview with Juraj Kohutiar, international secretary of KDH, January 27, 1995, Bratislava.
[305] Interview with Slovak activists at a former Bratislava underground printing press, February 2, 1995, Bratislava.

university circles upon the recommendation of the leaders of the regional centers. That strategy ensured the constant flow of new students and the future of the movement.

To move from the simple rank of participants to the role of activists in the movement required time and dedication. Beyond participation in meetings and religious related activities, potential recruits for riskier matters were gauged. When they had earned the trust of their leaders and were deemed worthy, they were introduced to new circles. In ten to fifteen years of underground activities, the network grew to the point where it could rely upon nineteen centers.[307] Meetings at these centers would occur about the same time. In so doing the leaders of the underground thought that they would compel the authorities to deploy a high level of force in the event they would decide to take repressive measures. More significantly, the growth of the Slovak network allowed its leaders to take on the organization and mobilization of Slovaks in large public gatherings, such as pilgrimages, and the distribution of samizdat literature. However, whatever the extent of this movement, the result of these underground activities did not become visible until the mid-1980s. Such was not the case in Poland, where priorities were quite different.

2. Poland and the Nurturing of Civil Society:

In Poland, the Catholic Church occupied a vantage position to fight communism. Contrary to what had happened in Czechoslovakia, the Stalinist era in Poland on the whole was less destructive upon the institutional apparatus of the Church. To be sure the 1948-1956 period brought its share of repressive measures with the loss of landed property, the imprisonment of the archbishop of Gniezno and

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[306] Interview with Dr. Silvester Krčméry, physician, January 24, 1995, Bratislava.

Warsaw and other Catholic leaders, or the closing of Catholic schools, seminaries and other institutions.

However, the political turmoil of 1956 opened some room from which the Church was able to rebuild its strength. Indeed, in search of support to stabilize his new leadership against pro-Moscow forces, Gomułka struck a compromise and granted the Church some "privileges," that were nowhere to be found in the rest of Eastern Europe. In exchange, the Catholic hierarchy called the population to participate in the 1957 elections. As a result, the Catholic Church not only was allowed to maintain its hierarchy, but it also regained some autonomy over the designation of church leaders. The communist government agreed to give up the power of full designation it had assumed since 1953 for a more benign right of veto. Although new restrictions were imposed a few years later, the Catholic Church had secured a basis to spring back. It had salvaged its presence in various aspects of Polish life, such as publishing, education or charitable activities in hospitals or prisons. The survival of religious orders and convents, seminaries, the Catholic University of Lublin or the reappearance of Catholic oriented newsprint, such as Znak, Więź or Tygodnik Powszechny attested of the resilience of Catholicism in communist Poland. This visible presence in the Polish life would prove to be crucial, especially in the darker years of the state of emergency.

For one thing, it allowed the nurturing of values, symbols and a discourse, which were antithetical to the communist ideology. In time, these would be used by the Solidarity movement. In other words, Catholicism cultivated the roots of a culture of opposition, and later the fruits of that action were harvested by the Solidarity

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[307] The most important cities were Komárno, Nitra, Lučenec, Banská Bystrica, Trenčín, Poprad, Prešov and Košice.

movement. By trying to respond to the needs of the population, the Catholic Church in effect had participated in sowing the seeds for the reflourishing of civil society.

The action conducted by the Catholic Church benefited from a hierarchy, which contrary to the Czechoslovak situation had survived the assaults of Stalinist communism. The clergy was able to contribute in two ways. At the grassroots level, priests provided support to oppositional activities, while the members of the hierarchy developed a discursive frame for societal grievances.

The members of the upper clergy, the Polish Primate and the various bishops, by virtue of their position of leadership in the Church were compelled to play a two level game of their own. On the one hand, they had to continue their difficult dialogue with the communist authorities. On the other hand, they had to offer their pastoral care to the Polish nation. The major contribution of the Catholic hierarchy henceforth was to stand as an example of moral resistance against the communist regime and in engaging in a fierce discursive battle. The courage demonstrated by its primary leader, Mgr. Wyszyński in his famous rejection of the Stalinist takeover of the process of religious appointment, which caused him to spend three years in internment, strengthened the moral authority of the Church. Building upon that moral capital, Polish bishops under the charismatic leadership of the Polish Primate engaged in a discursive transformation not so different from that occurring at the level of the universal Church. As Polish society witnessed the mobilization of various groups (students, intellectuals, workers), acting in some sort of synergy with these developments, the Church shifted its 1960s focus on freedom of religion to a broader defense of human rights.[308] A good in case in point is provided by the letter published

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[308] Interview with Jerzy Turowicz, chief editor of Tygodnik Powszechny, February 20, 1995, Kraków (trans. from French by the author).

by the Polish bishops in the wake of the strikes of December 1970. In this statement which is worth quoting at length, they laid out major democratic principles:

> The recent events have made it amply apparent that the nation's right to existence and independence must include: the right of freedom of conscience and freedom of religious life, with full normalization of relations between the Church and the State; the right of our nation to free cultural activity, consistent with the spirit of the Christian principles of social cooperation; the right to social justice, expressing itself in the fulfillment of justified demands; the right to truth in social life, to truthful information, and to freedom of expression regarding opinions and demands, the right to material conditions that assure a dignified existence for every family and citizen; the right of citizens to be treated without abuse, unfair injury, or persecution.[309]

As the sermons, episcopal letters, and other public statements of the Polish hierarchy echoed the growing demands of various sections of Polish society, or condemned the brutal repression conducted by the government, it conveyed a sense of convergence of purpose and compassion. Furthermore, the discourse of the Church helped to challenge the communist system by attacking it on its ideological foundation. The communist world indeed was built upon the claim that it represented the interests of the working class. Yet, as the various statements of the hierarchy throughout the 1970s pointed out, not only communism failed in its duty, but it also undermined the welfare of the workers. Referring to the strikes of December 1970, Cardinal Wyszyński noted that despite the claims of communism workers had to pay dearly the simple affirmation of worker's rights. As he stated:

> At this moment, our feelings lead us particularly in the direction of our workers brothers, who suffered greatly undertaking a difficult task that has cost them much. They had the courage to lay claims to the equitable rights guaranteed in all of law and nature- the right to a just, fitting existence- because a worker deserves his pay...[310]

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[309] Letter from the episcopate titled *All Compatriots of our Common Motherland*, issued on December 29, 1970 and quoted in Bodgan Szajkowski, *Next to God: Politics and Religion in Contemporary Poland* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 32.
[310] Micewski, 317-318.

And in the end, workers had to face the brutality of police forces. The Church did not simply point out these contradictions, it also offered an ideological alternative in the form of the Catholic social doctrine of the Church. For instance, in the same 1970 declaration, the Polish Primate followed the tradition of *Rerum Novarum*. He recalled that the Church had a special vocation and interests in social welfare:

> We are not economists, but Christ told his apostles, "Give ye them to eat" -therefore teach and admonish, so that there will be bread for every mouth...We do not want to organize official life, but at the same time, in the name of Christian and human moral principles, we must speak for the common good from the most evangelical, human and social position, which is always linked to morality. There is an admirable proximity between the morality of the Gospel and the labor codex. We can even say that all labor legislation, no matter what its authorship, that makes up the great socio-economic struggle of labor in the last century, derives from the spirit of the Gospel.[311]

Leaders such as Wyszyński or Wojtyła were particularly well placed to lead this discursive battle as both had experiences with the working world in their earlier years. The former had worked with labor unions in the 1930s,[312] while the latter had worked for a chemical company first at a limestone quarry and later in the plant itself.[313]

The elevation of Kraków's archbishop to the seat of St. Peter brought a new dimension to the defense of the working class, as the new Pope carried the authority and imprimatur of the whole Church. His own contribution to the expounding of the social doctrine of the Church through his speeches and most of all his 1981 *Laborem Exercens* Encyclical embraced the cause of the workers and civil society in Poland. Even during the martial law at the occasion of his second trip to Poland, John Paul II insisted upon the right of the workers to form unions. On June 20, in Katowice, the heart of Silesia and a region of iron and steel industries, the Pope asserted that:

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[311] *Ibid.*, 318.
[312] *Ibid.*, 19-21.
[313] Szulc, 11-123.

> Modern trade unions have grown out of the struggle waged by workers, the working world, primarily industrial workers for their just rights in relation to the owners of the means of production. Their task is to defend the welfare of the working man in all spheres in which his rights come into prominence. Historical experience teaches us that organizations of this type constitute an indispensable component of social life, especially in modern industrial societies...They are the expression of the struggle for social justice, for the just rights of the working man in various trades.
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> Here in Poland, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński said, "when the right of people to associate is at stake, then this is not a right which has been bestowed upon people by somebody. This is the people's innate right. That is why the state does not give this right to us. The state merely has the right to protect it, to see that it is not breached.[314]

In essence the Pope and the Polish episcopate advocated for nothing less than civil society.

While the upper clergy established the framework of action for the Church, the lower clergy was involved in the everyday struggle to win out space and foster social interaction beyond the reach of communist authorities. Being in close contacts with the population, priests came to play an important role. In concordance with the priorities set out by the Church leadership, and not so differently from the religious Czechoslovak underground, members of the lower clergy paid particular attention to strategic groups, such as the youth, the workers, and the farmers. The attention devoted to the young is particularly worthy of note for two reasons. First, it offers a good basis of comparison with Czechoslovakia. Second, it points to the will of religious leaders to think about long term developments. Nurturing values about the polis among the younger generation is an essential step for the rebirth and the sustenance of civil society.

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[314] Papal speech delivered on June 20, 1983 and quoted in Tadeusz Walendowicz, "the Pope in Poland," *Poland Watch* (1983) no. 3, 8.

After the eviction of religious instruction from schools in the late 1950s, Polish Church leaders understood that the battle for the young minds was crucial. Like any other social organization, the Church had to insure that membership would be renewed and perpetuated. One of the best way to achieve this goal is to socialize the young into the ways of Catholicism. As the Church tried to maintain a relationship with the youth, it incidentally contributed to develop patterns of social interaction and interconnectedness, two important assets in the reshaping of civil society. Two groups of priests were very central in the pastoral of the Polish youth.

The first one was constituted by the priests belonging to the Dominican order, who were in charge of providing university students with chaplains. Within the confines of the university, they offered a space not controlled by the state where they could interact and socialize. As Father Wojcieh Giertych of Kraków explains,

> One of the tasks of my religious order, the Dominican Order, is a Christian presence in a university setting - the pastoral care of students and university professors. Now, at a time when a university was very much an institution controlled by the Communist Party and used by the Party as a center for the spiritual subversion of the individual to the state, the presence of chaplains -the church- in the universities created a haven, a place where people could meet freely, could speak and discuss Christian philosophy.
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> We had an antidote for the Marxism which was being taught at the university. And the student chapel, where I was active, created a place were students could meet and pray and undertake a certain limited social activities, which were not controlled by the Party.[315]

These circles were crucial to nurture alternative thoughts and activities, and to awaken a desire about being involved in the matter of the polis. In fact, out of these groups

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[315] Interview with Father Wojciech Giertych, Dominican priest in Kraków reported in Augustin Hedberg, *Faith under Fire and the Revolution in Eastern Europe-Transcripts of Interviews Conducted for the PBS Film Faith under Fire* (Princeton: Sturges, 1992), 111.

emerged a young generation of activists, who entered the ranks of dissidents, such as KOR, ROPCiO or the Young Poland Movement.[316]

Another aspect of the pastoral care for the young took place within a Catholic charismatic association, OASIS, also called Light and Life movement. That religious movement grew so big that its influence extended beyond the Polish borders. It became particularly active in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, where youth religious gatherings were organized. Part of their popularity stemmed from their ability to offer Summer camps for high school students outside of the communist reach. Although OASIS was mostly a religious organization, it certainly allowed at times discussions on social and even political matters, and thereby sowing the seeds of a future active citizenry. A good illustration is provided by the declaration issued by the OASIS delegates gathered in Jasna Góra in 1980. That public statement was the occasion to acknowledge that the foundation for a good polity rests upon the participation of its citizens. In full agreement with the principles enshrined in the *Gaudium et Spes* Encyclical (On the Church and the Modern World), the OASIS delegates stressed that:

> The principles which Catholics should adopt toward political life were clearly defined in the documents of the ecumenical council, especially in the fourth chapter of the Pastoral Constitution about the Church in contemporary like. Basically, political activity is understood as activity for the general good and it is evaluated positively, so that to an extent it is even a responsibility of believers.[317]

Thus, in addition to religious and spiritual encounters, the Polish youth who participated in movements like OASIS also learned about the significance of citizen participation and responsibility in the public sphere. In other words, they were

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[316] Jan Józef Lipski, *KOR, A History of the Worker's Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981* trans. Olga Amsterdamska and Gene M. Moore (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 19. Also interview with former Kraków KIK president, Andrzej Potocki, February 14, 1995, Kraków.
[317] Lipski, *KOR*, 410.

exposed to the basics of civil society. Therefore, it is hardly surprising to learn that in 1983 young students in the town of Miętno stood up for their beliefs and defied the authorities by protesting against the taking down of crosses in their schools. For several months, these young Polish were at the center of a controversy over the display of crosses in classrooms. The issue eventually was settled with a compromise. More significantly, that episode allowed students to carve a space to address their concerns, and to take responsibility for their actions. In their own way, they lived by the Havelian principle of living in truth.

However, the involvement with the young, the farmers or the workers had some unintended consequences. Indeed as these various groups became mobilized in Solidarity activities, some priests became associated with this awakening of civil society. The most visible example of this involvement of course was the support they brought to the striking workers of the Baltic shipyards. There is always a tenuous line between support and involvement. And for some priests, the distinction was hard to maintain. Actually, members of the lower clergy were not immune to the winds of public mobilization, and some succumbed to it.

Following the establishment of martial law, the arrest of Solidarity leaders, and the running underground of Solidarity activities, only the Church stood as a social institution distinct from the communist state. Perhaps influenced by their interaction with Solidarity activists, groups of young priests found their duty to defend the cause of a muzzled civil society. The authorities identified no less than 69 priests and two bishops guilty of these "subversive activities."[318] The group of most visible activist priests included Father Teofil Bogucki (Warsaw, St. Stanisław Kostka), Father

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[318] Maya Latynski, "The Church between State and Society," *A Poland Watch* (1984) no. 5, 16; Ramet, *Social Currents*, 187-190.

Stanisław Małkowski (Warsaw), Mieczysław Nowak (Ursus), Father Jerzy Popiełuszko (Warsaw, St. Stanisław Kostka), Father Jan Sikorski (Warsaw, St. Joseph), and Father Henryk Jankowski (Gdańsk, St. Brigyda). The action of these priests paralleled the support given to Solidarity by certain bishops. Among them were Bishop Damian Zimoń (Katowice), Bishop Henryk Gulbinowicz (Wrocław), Bishop Tokarczuk (Przemyśl) (see Appendix VI, figure 3). Some of these bishops sometimes even followed the initiatives of these activist priests. For instance, in 1983, Father Popiełuszko started a pilgrimage for the workers at Jasna Góra. By 1985, the pilgrimage had grown from 100 in 1983, to 20 000 in 1984 and about 50 000 in 1985. That very year, the pilgrimage was led by these same bishops, who were most sympathetic to Solidarity's cause.[319] Among the various activities organized by these activist clerics, the monthly masses for the motherland at the St. Stanisław Kostka Parish of Father Popiełuszko became by far the most obvious instance of public defiance. In one of his typical sermon, the young priest, soon to be murdered by security forces, asked his audience,

> [to] remember...the innocent deaths of the miners from Wujek, the deaths of [its] brothers from Lublin, Nowa Huta and elsewhere, the cruelty of the crime committed against Grzegorz Przemyk. [To] remember [its] many brothers and sisters who [had] been beaten and whose dignity [had] been trampled on. [To] remember the internment camps scattered all across Polish soil, the tears of mothers, fathers, children, wives and husbands; the leaders of Solidarity and the Workers' Defense Committee imprisoned without trial for two years now...[to] remember those thrown out of work and concerned about the material situation of their families; the young people forced to remove crosses from the walls of their schools, crosses that are symbols of

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[319] See in particular, Michael T. Kaufman, "Polish Clerics, Praising Solidarity, Greet Workers," *New York Times*, 16 September 1985, A1 and A8. For activism of the clergy, See, Jackson Diehl, "Polish Church Keeps Faith," *Washington Post*, 14 December 1986, A1 and A46; John Kifner, "Warsaw Cardinal Transfers a Militant Priest," *New York Times*, 16 February 1984, A12; and *New York Times*, 2 December 1984, A5.

> faith. [To] remember the teachers who [had] been dismissed from their jobs because they [wanted] to teach young people the healthy principles of patriotism. [To] remember the use of the mass media to disseminate slanders about people who enjoy the respect of society...[320]

These speeches from the lower clergy were not so different from those delivered by the Pope. At his arrival in Poland in June 1983, the first words of John Paul II were directed to those who could not attend. In the eyes of his compatriots, the leader of the Catholic Church implicitly was referring to those Solidarity and KOR activists still imprisoned. John Paul II brought a sense of hope to Polish society, when he declared at the welcoming ceremony at Okęcie airport:

> I ask those who are suffering to be particularly close to me. I ask this in the name of Christ who said: 'I was sick and you comforted me; I was in prison and you came to me." I cannot personally visit all the sick, imprisoned, suffering--but I ask them to be close to me in spirit, to assist me as they always do.[321]

The same day, while addressing the question of redemption during his sermon at St. John's Cathedral (Bazylika św. Jana) in Warsaw, the Pope reiterated his support for those suffering in that difficult period:

> Together with all my compatriots, especially with those who are most acutely tasting the bitterness of disappointment, humiliation, suffering, of being deprived of their freedom, of being wronged, of having their dignity trampled upon, I stand beneath the cross of Christ...[322]

If the position of the Sovereign Pontiff allowed him to take a moral stance against the military regime of General Wojciech Jarulzelski, the vocal agitation of the lower clergy particularly annoyed the Polish bishops, especially the successor of Cardinal Wyszyński, Mgr. Józef Glemp. The Polish episcopate was indeed engaged in a

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[320] Sermon delivered by Father Popiełuszko on November 27, 1983 see "Murder of Father Popiełuszko," *Poland Watch* (1985) no. 7, 1-2.
[321] For excerpts from the speech delivered by John Paul II at Okęcie airport on June 16, 1983, see *Radio Free Europe, Background Report* (1983) no. 153, 3.

process of negotiations with the authorities to soften the restrictions imposed upon Polish society by the martial law. While this institutional approach delegated to the Polish episcopate seems to fit the division of labor already observed earlier in the study of Vatican diplomacy, the activism of the lower clergy was not included in the scenario. And at times, these priests were even willing to cross a political line that even the Pope was not ready to endorse. In 1984, for instance, following the appeal of solidarity leader, Zbigniew Bujak, Father Popiełuszko called for a boycott of the local elections. Justifying this call to his parishioners, the Polish priest explained:

> We are guilty of our enslavement when we consent to evil and vote for mechanisms for its functioning...If we do not oppose their creation, we help legalize them...Woe betide a society whose actions are not guided by courage, for they will become slaves."[323]

Although the action of these priests was well received by the masses and attracted crowds in the thousands in the case of Popiełuszko, for the upper clergy, or at least Mgr. Glemp, they represented an uncontrolled aspect; they inherently entailed a danger of radicalism and extremism, something not unknown in the history of the Catholic Church as the activism of the lower clergy in the nineteenth century demonstrated.

As the "protégé" of Cardinal Wyszyński, the new archbishop of Gniezno and Warsaw probably shared the worries of his mentor about an eventual skidding of the social crisis into bloody confrontations. Although Cardinal Wyszyński supported the demands of the opposition or the workers throughout the 1970s and up until his death in 1981, his declarations always contained words of caution, which in several

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[322] John Kifner, "Pope in Warsaw makes a firm plea for the Wronged," *New York Times*, 17 June 1987, A1 and A9; also *Radio Free Europe, Background Report* (1983) no. 153, 3.

occasions were interpreted as ambiguous.[324] It is important to bear in mind that during the period preceding the establishment of Solidarity, the Polish Primate was concerned by the increasing tensions within Polish society and the possible break-out of an open conflict. In a letter dated October 31, 1976, addressed to an old acquaintance, Father Antoine Wenger, the cardinal pointed out the worsening of the Polish economy and the dangers of civil war lurking in Poland.[325] Mgr. Glemp perhaps inherited these concerns. He most certainly believed in the principle of strict obedience of the lower clergy. Thus, the decision to admonish or even sanction these activist priests, such as Father Mieczysław Nowak, who was transferred from the Ursus parish near Warsaw to a more modest parish away from the Polish capital, indicated that there were limits to the involvement of clergymen in the battle for the public sphere. In this regard, it is worth knowing that the decision to take sanctionary measures was well perceived by some members of the Vatican bureaucracy, which saw this activism of the lower clergy as a thorn in the greater diplomatic scheme devised by the Catholic Church.

In addition to the religious leadership of the Church, the quest for the reemergence of civil society was also the concern of Catholic intellectuals. Their actions were not solely directed at the secular oppositional elites. Indeed, members of the Clubs of Catholic Intellectuals played a significant role in assisting workers to bring about the Solidarity trade unions throughout the country. In effect, they participated in the birth of a mediating institution, which is one of the fundamental steps toward the

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[323] Sermon delivered by Fr. Popiełuszko on May 27, 1984, see *Reuters*, Lexis-Nexis, May 27, 1984.
[324] For a discussion upon the interpretation of Cardinal Wyszyński's declaration on January 27, 1971, see Kubik, 120; For a discussion upon the sermon delivered by Cardinal Wyszyński at Jasna Góra on August 26, 1980, see Szajkowski, 95-97.
[325] Interview with Antoine Wenger.

rebirth of civil society. Their first contribution was one of moral support. Following the 1976 strikes and the ensuing massive arrest of workers, individuals linked with the KIKs attended the court proceedings that followed these imprisonments. They wanted to demonstrated their solidarity.

However, 1980 marked a turning point in the relationship between Catholic intellectuals and workers. While during the Summer strikes the workers were busy organizing and establishing an Inter-Factory Strike Committee (Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy, MKS), intellectuals perceived a unique opportunity for action. The Warsaw club took the lead. Its members wrote an appeal urging the government to open a dialogue with the workers. Armed with this document signed by 64 persons, Mazowiecki, the chief editor of Więź, and Geremek, a historian, drove to the Baltic coast to offer their support and assistance. Bogdan Borusewicz, a KOR activist and former participant in the Catholic ministry for university students helped them to penetrate into the naval shipyards.

Catholic intellectuals were at the forefront of this initiative because members of the opposition such as Jacek Kuroń were in jail. The workers welcomed that initiative, and under the leadership of Lech Wałesa, they asked intellectuals to stay and serve as advisors for the negotiations with the communist authorities. Hence, a team of experts was established. Two other Catholic intellectuals were asked to join the group; Bohdan Cywiński of ZNAK and Andrzej Wielowieyski secretary of Warsaw KIK.[326] Part of the demands that these intellectuals helped to bring about was the release of those who remained unjustly imprisoned. By then, links between Gdańsk and Warsaw became

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[326] In addition to Geremek, the other members of the team were Dr. Tadeusz Kowalik, economist and former party member, Dr. Jadwiga Staniszkis, sociologist and Dr. Waldemar Kucziński, another economist.

extremely difficult, because the authorities had cut the phone lines of the opposition. Fortunately, the phone at the Warsaw club and that of its vice-president, Mrs. Grabska kept functioning. Using these, the activists of Warsaw KIK could feed information to Gdańsk, such as a list of individuals still in jail.[327]

In fact, the various KIKs came to play a crucial role in the establishment of Solidarity trade unions. The Catholic intellectuals did not restrict their visits to Gdańsk, but also brought their assistance to the various locations, where workers were mobilizing. When the Solidarity movement mushroomed throughout the country, establishing local Solidarity organizations, the presence of Catholic intellectuals was extremely valuable. Their office provided places for the workers to meet, discuss and plan their action. Wałesa, for instance, used the Warsaw club to give his press conference. The members of KIKs basically helped with the technical and legal aspects of establishing a trade union. Since the workers also insisted upon establishing unions that would function according to democratic principles, the assistance of intellectuals was essential to set the ground rules. Moreover, they offered words of advice on how to react to the action undertaken by the authorities. "Time given by KIKs to council and support the workers was important," recalls Potocki, "because it demonstrated that the action of the workers mattered. They also knew that the KIK network was trustworthy. In essence, this action brought people together."[328] In the end, the Solidarity trade unions allowed the involvement of individuals from various social backgrounds. They interacted together, learned to trust one another. In a word, civil society was reemerging.

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[327] Interview with Mrs. Grabska.
[328] Interview with Andrzej Potocki.

The comparison of Poland and Czechoslovakia certainly indicates a difference in historical circumstances. Yet, at the same time, it already reveals that in both countries Catholics followed a similar strategy, focusing their attentions on particular groups, especially the youth. If Poland benefited from a more favorable environment, which provided individuals (religious or lay) associated with the Catholic Church more freedom of action, in Czechoslovakia activism could not be undertaken without a system of logistical support. The Church in Poland or the Czechoslovak religious underground provided the means for the reclaiming of the public sphere.

3. Resources and Logistics:

The Czechoslovak religious underground or the Catholic Church in Poland performed several functions. First, they provided a sanctuary devoid of any state interference. Participating in activities under the umbrella of these structures provided a sense of community which was strengthened by the presence of religious symbolism. Second, they offered a network to communicate information, which otherwise was not available owing to communist censorship. Third, they opened a space for leadership for individuals, who were denied this opportunity by the communist system. The sustenance of these functions could not be accomplished without any resources, whatever they had to be (moral, material or financial). Thus, survival demanded some kind of logistical support. Under the repressive regime of Czechoslovakia, access to resources demanded particular qualities on the part of leaders, such as, time, patience, energy and courage. Faith, no doubt, provided a sense of purpose, which helped these actors to get through the difficult task of organizing the support system of the movement. One aspect of the challenge faced by the leaders of the religious underground was to find courageous souls who would volunteer to host gatherings. As the network expanded, it also became imperative to get legitimately ordained priests

who could administer religious sacraments and offer spiritual guidance. In that respect, the religious underground was able to rely upon members of religious orders, such as the Dominicans, Salesians, Franciscans. It is not a coincidence that in the early 1980s, communist authorities found it necessary to target and arrest members of religious orders.

However, since communist repression had caused a severe depletion among the community of priests, and severely limited the emergence of a new generation of religious leaders by controlling access to the two remaining seminaries, the religious underground had to look beyond the Czechoslovak borders for support. In this regard, the Catholic Church in East Germany and Poland played a crucial role for the survival and development of the underground. Bishops of these two countries would secretly ordain new Czechoslovak priests, who mainly belonged to religious orders.[329] Before becoming Pope, Cardinal Wojtyła himself conducted some of these ordinations. The injection of this religious blood under the East German and Polish influence also contributed to the emergence of new Catholic movements, such as Foccolare, Oasis, Neocatechumen, which in time would participate in larger mobilizations. Nonetheless, these newly ordained priests were under the specific injunction of not revealing their status to the official leaders of the Church in Czechoslovakia, probably for fear of being betrayed to the communist authorities. For instance, Tomáš Halík, who served as an advisor to Mgr. Tomášek, only revealed his situation to the cardinal in 1988.[330]

After the ordination of priests destined to serve the underground, it was also necessary to provide some kind of religious and theological continuous education. Thus, paralleling the framework of the flying universities, special seminars were held.

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[329] Interview with Tomáš Halík.
[330] Kardinal Tomášek, *Zeugnisse über einen behutsamen Bishof*, 122.

For instance, Father Mádr and Father Zvěřina led secret theological lectures in Bohemia and Moravia. Incidentally, Zvěřina's involvement in Charter 77 allowed political dissidents to use this underground network of people.

As previously noted, the Catholic Church in Poland did not face a problem of manpower and leadership, because it had been able to salvage its institutional hierarchy. The first advantage of preserving the institutional Church under such strong leadership was that it allowed bishops and priests to make Catholic structures available not just to believers but the whole society. Most appreciated, particularly among intellectuals (secular or lay Catholics) was the willingness of the clergy to offer churches as safe heavens. When the opposition launched the flying universities, some of their sessions were held in churches. In Kraków, for instance, Cardinal Wojtyła invited TKN participants to use churches, arguing that in doing so "perhaps they [the communist authorities] would leave them alone."[331] By providing meeting places, the members of the clergy incidentally helped to foster a parallel culture. Before the appearance of the flying universities, they even started organizing what became known as the weeks of Christian culture. Thus, parishes became spaces where exhibitions, debates and concerts not responding to the aesthetic dictates of the communist regime could exist. Orders and diocesan priests offered meeting places for people of different social or political backgrounds. The tolerance and pluralism which characterized these events contrasted with the monopolistic assertion of communism. These examples of pluralism within the spaces offered by the Church were essential to nurture the roots of civil society.[332] By 1989, these initiatives had allowed Polish society to grow large.

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[331] Interview with Jacek Woźniakowski.
[332] *Ibid.*; see also interview with Andrzej Potocki.

However, the Church did not just provide space. Owing to the historic tradition of Church autonomy in Poland, the clergy could raise its own resources. In Czechoslovakia, which was accustomed to the Habsburg system of paying members of the clergy, the communist takeover meant dependence for the Church. Underground activists had to rely upon a population, for which the idea of supporting its religious leaders and institutions was foreign. Poland did not face that dilemma. Thus, in addition to aid from abroad, the Catholic Church, for instance, could count on the generosity in time and resources of its flock. These resources were helpful in supporting actions, such as the battle to construct churches, since the communist authorities denied many of the necessary materials to prevent the erection of new religious buildings.

More significantly, that precious support system played a crucial role during the period of martial law. It allowed the Church to provide assistance to members of Solidarity who had been arrested and to their families. In Warsaw, the Primate was thus able to establish a committee for charitable and social assistance. That committee was in fact the successor of a similar organization that had been set-up by his predecessor in the aftermath of the 1976 strikes. It had been created to help raise resources from parishes throughout the country and assist both internees and their families. It was then called the Primate Committee for Help to Internees and their Families. This name was later changed to that of the Primate's Committee for Political Prisoners. During martial law, the tasks of this organization sponsored by the Church served five functions, providing pastoral care for prisoners, delivering of packages to those who were imprisoned, helping their families, organizing legal counsel for those unjustly persecuted and gathering information. Each task took place in a different location. For instance, legal counseling and news gathering took place respectively at St. Alexander's church, and St. Anne and St. Martin's churches in Warsaw.

Similar initiatives slowly spread throughout the country, after the appeal made by Mgr. Glemp.[333] In Kraków, for instance, this type of committee started with three or four persons. They began gathering information about the nature of help to be dispatched. Soon, the archbishop, Mgr. Franciszek Macharsky offered the protection of the palace of the archdiocese. Information about the needs of internees' families, underground activists, and even underground publications were consigned in notebooks. To organize assistance from a national perspective, information was passed along to Warsaw. And as these notebooks became filled, they would disappear. According to former Kraków KIK's president, this action was important during the state of emergency. It provided moral and material support to internees and their families; it organized a system of information and it helped to keep alive the action of Solidarity in the underground."[334]

Communication thus was another important function of Catholic activism. Depending upon the nature of the message, it took various forms. Internally, the main means of communication in Czechoslovakia was provided by samizdats and underground publishing houses. The underground press, particularly in Prague, allowed a certain cooperation among Catholics, non Catholics and non-Christian dissident circles. Among the most important Czech Catholic samizdats were *Informace o Církvi* (Information on the Church), *Teologické Texty* (theological Texts) and *Vzkříšení* (Resurrection). Father Mádr, who became the publisher and redactor of *Teologické Texty*, *Duch a Život* (Spirit and Life), *Přátelé* (Friends), *Orientace*

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[333] See for instance, the homely of Mgr. Glemp delivered at the evening mass on the day of the epiphany at St. John's Cathedral in Warsaw in January 1982, and reported in the *Osservatore Romano* (index 1982).
[334] Interview with Andrzej Potocki.

(Orientation) and other underground publications noted the rudimentary beginnings and the craftsmanship involved in the production of samizdat literature. As the Czech theologian recounts, his own contribution started very simply. Around the time of the establishment of Charter 77, Mádr started to write texts on his typewriter and pass them around. Soon, these came back along with demands for more. Out of that dialogue, a samizdat was born.

In Slovakia, the reproduction of printed materials also started modestly. However, with support from western Christian groups, the Slovak underground progressively grew rather sophisticated. The production of samizdat was scattered throughout the country in connection with the various regional underground centers. There were at least seven printing centers in Slovakia. For security reasons, printing, storage and distribution usually were undertaken in distinct locations. At first, the printing was handmade using rolls. Then, in 1986, the Slovak underground was able to acquire printing machines from the Netherlands. It is with a certain pride that former underground participants point out that by the late 1980s, they were able to print about 1,000 sheet in an hour and to construct fancy designs. Over time, they not only found it possible to use white paper and smaller printing fonts, but they also mastered the art of editing photographs. "One of the aspects of the underground press that annoyed the communist authorities the most," recalls a young activist" was the ability to use color on the cover of the printed material because it was quite a complicated a process."[335] On the eve of the velvet revolution, the printers of the underground press even started to use computers to construct their designs. Although the operation of samizdats in the Czech lands and Slovakia remained distinct, cooperation existed. Periodically, for

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[335] Interview with activists in charge of a printing center, February 2, 1995, Bratislava.

instance, members of the Slovak underground printing press met in Prague with Mádr and Zvěřina, the leaders of the Czech network.

The nature of the documents made available in the samizdat literature was quite diverse including journals, books, papal encyclicals, historical, philosophical and theological works. According to Slovak activists about ten to fifteen percent of the publications coming out of the religious underground were purely political. Journals were particularly important in as much as beside religious issues they provided information about activities, which were not mentioned in official organs of the press. They also noted what happened to people persecuted by the communist regime, if they were imprisoned or awaiting a trial. The function of information proved extremely useful in times of mobilization, since journals could be reproduced by the thousands. Moreover, the diversification of publications allowed to target particular groups. With *Psy*, *Salus* and *Universum*, for instance, Mádr was able to specifically address concerns of psychologists, physicians and natural scientists. In Slovakia, *Rodinné Spoločenstvo* (Community of Families) focused upon issues of interest to families. In Poland, the channeling of information did not face the same difficulties. First, as previously noted, the 1956 compromise allowed the -albeit limited- resurgence of a Catholic press. Although Tygodnik Powszechny, Więź and Znak had to submit to communist censure, this press offered an alternative to communist controlled news media. Thus, they played an essential role in disseminating Catholic views, and peculiarly the social doctrine of the Church. In 1980, for instance, Znak was allowed to print a 450 pages volume of papal encyclicals.[336]

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[336] Stefan Wilkanowicz, *Znak dans la Pologne de L'Après Guerre*.

They also provided an outlet for the publication of articles written by secular intellectuals, who were otherwise barred from official publications. Such articles were published in Znak under a pseudonym.The existence of an autonomous print media was not lost on Poland's neighbors. According to Turowicz, the editor in chief of Tygodnik Powszechny, the very existence of his newspaper encouraged people in Czechoslovakia to learn Polish in order to read this publication and have access to world news.[337] More significantly, after the election of John Paul II, and the addition of a Polish edition to the Vatican weekly, the communist authorities allowed the distribution of the *Osservatore Romano* in Poland. Although its access was confined to some chosen parishes, in effect, this newspaper represented the only uncensored medium in the whole Eastern Europe. In addition to bringing information about the outside world, it helped to diffuse papal discourse to an already attentive audience.

Indeed, with the emergence of samizdats in the second half of the 1970s, opposition activists demonstrated that they closely followed Church statements. The samizdat press associated with KOR included Church documents in its publications.[338] The Catholic presence in the mushrooming independent press of this period took many forms. Perhaps less noticeable than in Czechoslovakia because of the numerous secular publications emerging in the late 1970s, Catholic oriented press was available through publications, such as the Lublin *Spotkania* (Encounters), *Zgrzyt* (Grind), *Krzyż Nowohucki* (The Cross of Nowa Huta), *Wspólny Dom* (Common Home).[339] Because of their greater access to resources, Polish Catholic media were not restricted to a printed form. In fact, after the declaration of martial law, tape recordings of

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[337] Interview with Jerzy Turowicz.
[338] Lipski, 300-301.
[339] Szajkowski, 35.

sermons, such as those delivered by Popiełuszko and his fellow activist priests were circulated around.

Samizdat or printed literature, even in Czechoslovakia did not constitute the only channel of information, especially among activists. In the functioning of the underground, for instance, communication among the various units of the network always worked by word of mouth and remained compartmentalized. Recalling a time when he prepared a document with Catholic dissidents, Professor Jabloniský pointed out that afterwards Čarnogurský took care of the printing, publishing and distribution.[340] The fewer people were involved or knew about the functioning of underground structures, the more secure everyone was, because there were less risks of leaks to the authorities. Under the military regime of Jaruzelski, similar concerns existed. It is for this reason, as seen earlier, that the Church organized committees to gather information throughout the country and out of reach from communist authorities. Perhaps, the most remarkable and ingenuous means of transmitting information were those used to contact internees. Since priests were allowed to penetrate into prisons to exercise their ministry without being searched, under the cover of exercising pastoral care toward internees, they actually delivered messages. This type of action proved extremely valuable when members of Solidarity were imprisoned. As Mazowiecki later explained, "their robes carried more mail than many workers in our postal services."[341]

Another vital aspect of communication for the underground involved contacts with the western world. Feeding information to broadcasting media at destination of Eastern Europe via the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Vatican represented another means to bypass the communist censure. According to a survey

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[340] Interview with Jozef Jabloniský.
[341] John Elson, "Lives of the Pope," *Times* (December 26, 1994- January 2, 1995), 34.

conducted for Radio Free Europe in 1986, the most likely way to have access to alternative news came from western broadcasts.[342] Although it is difficult to assess how widely eastern Europeans tuned in to western Radio stations in the absence of extensive studies, a glance at the Polish situation can provide an approximate -albeit probably overestimated- guess of the potential eastern European audience. According to the Polish Press Agency (PAP), in 1987, 18% of respondents listened to the Voice of America, 12% to the BBC, 8% to Vatican Radio and 16% to Radio Free Europe.[343] To encourage people to tune in to Vatican radio, the Church did not spare its efforts. In 1978, for instance, Father Stefan Filipowicz was dispatched to Poland. He traveled throughout the country to discuss broadcasts for Polish audiences. In addition, Polish parishes provided their parishioners with extensive information about how to pick up Vatican short wave programs.[344]

Links with the western world were important for additional reasons. It allowed actors, such as the Vatican, to have a better grasp of the situation behind the iron curtain. According to Dr. Krčméry, in Slovakia, "at first, contacts with the Vatican were impossible. Then, later it was complicated, but always possible."[345] Certain believers served as messengers between Rome and Slovakia. In 1983, both Krčméry and his friend Jukl even received an invitation to meet with the Pope during his scheduled trip to Poland. Unfortunately, they were unable to honor this offer in person

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[342] The sample of eastern Europeans surveyed for Radio Free Europe included individuals temporarily outside their countries. Their answers revealed that about 45 percent of respondents had learnt about events, such as the Chernobyl accident by listening to western broadcasts. See *The Economist* June 6, 1987 reported in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, Lexis-Nexis.
[343] "Survey on Listening to Western Radio Stations," March 9, 1988 reported in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, Lexis-Nexis.
[344] "Polish program of Vatican Radio on February 12, 1979," February 14, 1979, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, Lexis-Nexis.

because scrutiny by the authorities was too intense.[346] In the last years of the communist regime, literature circulated between Rome and Bratislava. For instance, Jesuits from Canada or Rome printed documents for their Slovak counterparts.[347] Materials were smuggled either by cars with double walls or with the help of hikers across the Tatra mountains.

On the Czech side, links with the outside were most likely to transit via East-Germany or Poland. Crossing the borders represented a certain danger. Nonetheless, a few courageous individuals, including women dissidents, such as Dana Němčova, became quite active not only in organizing help for prisoners, but also in establishing contacts with Polish dissidents.[348] Certain East German bishops such as those of Erfürt and Berlin were particularly helpful in maintaining links with Rome. Polish bishops also suffered less restrictions in their ability to travel, and could also channel information to Rome. Similarly active religious orders, such as the Dominicans could rely upon the cooperation of their brethren in East Germany and Poland.

Ties outside of the communist sphere of course also constituted a means to provide material support. Help came in various forms and shapes. The Dominican Order of Czechoslovakia, for instance, became the recipient of western assistance with the help of private institutions, such as the Church in Need. Such donations, at times, could amount up to $ 10,000.[349] One remarkable example of Christian solidarity and

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[345] Interview with Silvester Krčméry.
[346] Interview with František Mikloško; see also Mikloško, *Nebudete Ich Môcť Rozvrátiť*, 76-77.
[347] Ján Korec, SJ., "Mes Expériences en tant qu'Evèque Clandestin en Slovaquie," (My Experience as a Secret Bishop in Slovakia) in *L'Eglise Catholique en Europe de l'Est*, 22-28.
[348] Interview with Fr. Jaroslav Dominicus Dukas, OP., January 11, 1995, Prague.
[349] Interview with Fr. Jan Rajlich, January 5, 1995, Prague; For similar recollections, see Jaroslav Dominicus Dukas, OP., "Collaboration et Survie des Ordres Religieux en Europe

ecumenism was given by the Dutch Evangelical Reformed Church. Volunteers from that Protestant church were responsible for providing the Slovak underground with valuable printing machines from the Netherlands. The latter was brought in small parts and reassembled in Bratislava. Subsequently, Dutch visitors came twice a year to provide maintenance and to bring ink, staples, and any other necessary components.

The development of the underground, the activism of the Church in Poland and the logistical support made available allowed believers to live in truth: they lived according to their Christian beliefs, sustaining the existence of an alternative culture, and even cooperating with other opposition groups. More significantly in the perspective of rebuilding civil society, all these activities laid the basis for a popular mobilization.

B. From the Pre-political Hinterlands to Mass Mobilization:

In the battle to reclaim the public sphere, the Catholic Church contributed to mass mobilization in both Poland and Czechoslovakia, albeit at different points in time. As previously discussed, different structural opportunities, such as the repressive nature of Czechoslovak communism, circumscribed Catholic activism to the underground for a long period, and thus delayed its impact. In their attempt to emerge out of the world of catacombs and to move beyond the reassertion of their beliefs and needs, Czechoslovak religious dissidents followed in the footsteps of their Polish neighbors. Drawing the lessons of the Polish mobilization encouraged by the Catholic Church, they tried to adapt the Polish model to Czechoslovak circumstances. It is therefore worth examining the approach followed by the Catholic Church in Poland to

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de l'Est" (Collaboration and Survival of Religious Orders in Eastern Europe) in *L'Eglise Catholique en Europe de L'Est*, 69-74.

understand how it contributed to the awakening of the masses, and how it could inspire a framework of action beyond the Polish borders.

1. The Polish Model of Mobilization:

In addition to issuing public statements condemning the atheistic and repressive policies of communism, the Church under the leadership of Cardinal Wyszyński launched a program of popular mobilization. Although this offensive, born in the mind of the Polish Primate during his captivity, was conceived primarily from a religious perspective, in the end, it carried a political weight of great significance. Cardinal Wyszyński envisioned a program of spiritual renewal that would prepare the Poles for the celebration of the millennium of the Polish nation, that is to say the celebration of the baptism of Prince Mieszko in 966. This program, also called Great Novena, was conceived for a nine year period from 1957 to 1966, and centered upon three concepts.

The first one consisted in an annual theme to be defined by the Church and meditated by the faithful. The second aspect of this program represented an invitation to take part in a formal annual vow to Mary, the mother of God in the Catholic faith and the patron saint of Poland. That public affirmation of religious allegiance was to be carried out during an annual pilgrimage to the site of Jasna Góra. The third component of that program of spiritual renewal took an even more audacious form. In a system where movement of individuals was closely monitored and severely limited, the Polish Primate decided to have the famous Black Madonna icon of Częstochowa travel throughout the country.

Behind this concept of Great Novena lay the ambition to preserve and rejuvenate religious piety in the hope that Polish society could fend off and repel the assaults of communism. The emphasis of the hierarchy was not only on society, but

also on its mobilization. The pastoral program of the Church indeed played on three strategic aspects, which implied three levels of mobilization. The first one played out political symbolism by relying upon the symbiotic relations between Polish Catholicism and nationalism. By resurrecting the concept of marian vow, and centering this mobilization on Jasna Góra, Cardinal Wyszyński drew upon a historical Polish precedent of great significance.[350] In 1655, the Jasna Góra monastery located in the city of Częstochowa, which had hosted the Black Madonna since 1382, came under siege, but resisted the Swedish assailants. Thereafter, Jan Kazimierz took a solemn vow before Mary and declared her patron saint of Poland. And of course, 1966 also symbolized the millennium of the close association between Catholicism and nationalism. Relying upon this religio-national symbolism not only played a significant role in reaffirming the historical and cultural roots of the Polish nation,[351] but also in contesting the legitimacy of the communist system by reinforcing its alien nature. For Church leaders communism simply did not fit Polish history.

In this regard, it is worth noting that many Catholic intellectuals at the time were skeptical, if not critical of this reviving of popular piety. They mostly feared that an emphasis on religious and nationalist symbols would resuscitate the dark aspects of nationalism such as xenophobia and anti-Semitism.[352] Despite these worries, this pastoral program initiated by Cardinal Wyszyński made a major contribution for another reason. It nurtured the rudiments of a civil society. The traveling of the icon

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[350] Micewski, 154-159.
[351] Weigel, 113-115. For other accounts of the Great Novena, see Osa, *Pastoral Mobilization and Symbolic Politics*, and Kubik, *The Power of Symbols*.
[352] Interview with Andrzej Potocki.

from town to town for more than two decades,[353] brought crowds and a sense of togetherness. It thus contributed to social cohesion and interaction among various social groups, as each community prepared and gathered to see the Black Madonna.[354]

At a third level, perhaps the most significant in creating a momentum toward the reemergence of civil society, was the ability to physically reclaim the public sphere. The result of the Great Novena was to foster a regular mobilization of vast Polish crowds, year after year, at a time when acts of religious faith could entail grave consequences, such as losing one's job. This ability to entice great displays of religious piety certainly allowed the Catholic Church to make great moral strides. More significantly, though, these annual celebrations and gatherings got Polish people into the habit of gathering in public places. To paraphrase Robert Bellah, they developed "certain habits of the heart." And these did not stop with the 1966 celebration of the Polish millennium.

Actually, religious pilgrimages attracted growing audiences particularly in the 1970s,[355] as the Church kept emphasizing the symbolism of Jasna Góra. These public manifestations of religiosity lowered the fear of assembling in a communist country, thereby easing the willingness of various groups, such as students, intellectuals and workers to invest the public sphere. In this regard, the papal visit of 1979, following the election of John Paul II should not be regarded as an isolated event. Rather, it should be interpreted as an attempt to build upon the foundation of the Great Novena

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[353] The traveling of the icon began in 1957, and extended beyond the celebration of the millennium. It ended in 1980.
[354] Chris Hahn, *A Village without Solidarity: Polish Peasant in Years of Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 112 cited by Kubik, 112; also Osa, 155.
[355] Lucjan Adamczuk and Witold Zdaniewicz, eds., *Kościół Katolicki w Polsce 1918-1990. Rocznik Statystyczny* (Warsaw: Głowny Urząd Statystycny, Zakład Socjologii Religii Sak, 1991) quoted by Kubik, 117.

and follow suit on using religio-national symbolism. Indeed, the first two papal visits in 1979 and 1983 were the result of difficult negotiations with the communist authorities, as John Paul II wanted these to coincide with the celebration of the nine-hundredth year after the death of St. Stanisław, former archbishop of Kraków who stood up against the tyranny of King Bolesław the Bold, and the six-hundredth anniversary of the Jasna Góra Monastery. Both were actually delayed by one month in 1978 and one year in 1982. The communist authorities tried very hard to prevent the Church from using the religio-nationalist connection particularly during martial law. In spite of the roadblocks erected by the Polish government, the three papal visits were not devoid of symbolism. In fact, each one of them perpetuated the Jasna Góra mystic by including a stage in Częstochowa. The papal journeys brought mobilization to new levels, particularly in 1979.

The first visit of newly elected John Paul II primarily allowed Polish society to move beyond sectional mobilizations. After all, the Great Novena and the demonstrations of 1968, 1970, and 1976 still did not involve wide cross-cutting representations of Polish society. It is the first papal visit which crystallized the mobilization of Polish masses and brought a sense of inner unity to the Polish nation. After years of sectional mobilization, through which Poles cultivated the habit of assembling, they finally came as one people. This gathering of great magnitude offered a unique agora experience. As Potocki remarks: "when thousands of people assembled in the field near Wavel castle for the Kraków papal mass, discipline was absolute. It was not a crowd. It was an assembly."[356] This positive experience energized Polish

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[356] Interview with Andrzej Potocki.

society and certainly served as a stepping stone for the Solidarity movement. The legacy of the religious mobilization initiated in the late 1950s permeated the workers' movement, as strikers went to confession and attended mass in the shipyards while striking. The 1983 and 1987 visits played a different role. The second papal trip helped to keep the spirit of Solidarity and of civil society alive, and breathe some hope under the duress of the martial law regime. As to the 1987 visit, it probably contributed to re-energize a society whose spirit had been undermined by the lingering effects of martial law and a worsening economy. It is perhaps no coincidence if a new wave of strikes erupted a year after this third papal trip. The deep impact exercised by the Catholic Church upon popular mobilization inspired Czechs and Slovaks to adopt this model and adapt it to their own circumstances.

2. Mobilization in the Czech and Slovak Contexts:

The appeal of the Polish model was not based solely on the success of the pastoral mobilization designed by Cardinal Wyszyński. Part of the renewed hope and inspiration for action also came from the leadership of John Paul II. The election of Karol Wojtyła gave to Poles a greater sense of dignity and self-appreciation, because one of them had been called to a higher destiny after so many historical vicissitudes. To other eastern Europeans, he opened new horizons. In his first trip to Poland, John Paul II stressed that his concerns were not restricted to his compatriots. Publicly reflecting on his mission during an homily in Gniezno, the Pope rhetorically asked:

> Is it not Christ's will, is it not what the Holy Spirit disposes, that this Pope, in whose heart is deeply engraved the history of his own nation from its very beginning and also the history of the brother peoples and the neighboring peoples, should in a special way manifest and confirm in our age the presence of these peoples in the Church and their specific contribution to the history of Christianity? [...]

> Is it not the design of Providence that he should reveal the developments that have taken place here in this part of Europe...[357]

Obviously, in his mind, there was no doubt. As he further explained, his duty as a Pope was "to come [...] to speak before the whole Church, before Europe and the world, of those often forgotten nations and peoples."[358] A little later on the last day of his visit, he specifically hailed various national groups:

> It gives me particular joy to welcome here groups of our kinsmen who come from the south, from beyond the Carpathian Mountains. May God thank you for being here. How much would I like to see others here too. May God thank you, brethren from Lusatia. How very much would I also like to see here, at the pilgrimage of the Slavonic Pope, our other brothers in language and historical destiny. If they are not here, if they are not on this field, may they remember that they are even more strongly in our hearts.[359]

John Paul II's sense of identification with eastern European populations and the masses was facilitated by his charisma and great sense of communication. In that regard, the Polish Pope has been very different from his predecessors. His style resolutely has broken the distance which traditionally had characterized previous papacies.

In order to grasp the influence of John Paul II, it is necessary to stress what differentiates him from his predecessors. His experience with communist Poland made him one of them. The peoples of Eastern Europe could identify with the Pope. Such a relationship was facilitated by three factors.

A close look at the papal discourses reveals that following the example of John Paul I, the Sovereign Pontiff decided to drop the use of the plural form "we" for the more democratic "I." A direct discourse was therefore much more powerful. Furthermore, his style has been much more approachable and simpler. Under his

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[357] John Paul II's homily in the Cathedral of Gniezno delivered on June 3, 1979. Excerpts reproduced in the 1980 *Catholic Almanac*, 59.
[358] *Ibid.*

pontificate, the last remnants of monarchic decorum, such as the tiara or the Sedan Chair have been relegated to the rank of museum items. Like professional politicians in an era of communication, John Paul II has not been afraid of mingling with the crowd. communist authorities were well aware of the dangers represented by the Pontiff's communication abilities. The Communist Party could not but remark with dismay that the Pope seemed to have adopted the pernicious method of American presidential campaigns:

> Due to his uncommon skills and great sense of humor he [the Pope] is dangerous, because he charms everybody, especially journalists. Besides, he goes for cheap gestures in his relations with the crowd, for instance puts on a highlander's hat, shakes all hands, kisses children, etc...[360]

This ability to identify with the people especially in time of difficulty raised expectations and encouraged initiatives such as those developed in the 1980s in Czechoslovakia.

The Czech and Slovak lands, though, had different historical roots, and thus could not rely upon the aura of a site as highly charged in symbolic meaning as Jasna Góra. To imitate and transpose the kind of religio-nationalist symbolism used in Poland also meant to adapt to Czechoslovak historical and cultural circumstances. It is in this perspective that the initiatives taken by Mgr. Tomášek must be regarded. Indeed, in 1980 the archbishop of Prague took upon himself to remind the Vatican of the unique contribution made to the Church by St. Cyril and St. Methodius.[361] The same year John Paul II named these two apostles patron saints of Europe to

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[359] John Paul II's sermon at a pontifical mass delivered in Kraków on June 10, 1979, and reproduced in *The Pope in Poland*, 72.
[360] Party instructions given to teachers in March 1979 in preparation for the first visit of John Paul II to Poland, published by an underground paper in "Jan Pawel II w Polsce. Wielka nadzieja" (John Paul II in Poland: A Great Hope) *Biuletyn Informacyjny* 30 April 1979 cited by Kubik, 134.

counterbalance the more western standing of St. Benedict. If Mgr. Tomášek's initiative only strengthened the relevance of a project already in the making, it was important because it signified a rallying of Czechoslovakia to the strategy of using the religious symbolism of historical events. In fact, after the 1980 papal announcement the celebration of the eleven hundredth year anniversary of the death of St. Methodius became the focus of a massive religious mobilization. To mark and perhaps increase the significance of this event, the archbishop of Prague even issued an invitation to the Pope, which eventually was denied by the communist authorities.

The preparation for this celebration, which was to take the form of a pilgrimage to Velehrad was an occasion to foster some cooperation between the Czech and Slovak religious undergrounds. It was also an opportunity for the Slovaks to provide some of the insights gained from their own attempt at pastoral mobilization. The leaders of the Slovak underground had tried to draw the lessons of the Polish example and to apply them to the context of Slovakia. Despite the modernization and the industrialization brought about communism, the Slovak population remained traditional in outlook and attached to its cultural and folkish roots. As in Poland, many Slovaks were still close to the land, as they were for the most part just one generation away from a life in the countryside. Thus, starting in the early 1980s, the Catholic Slovak underground tried to resurrect public interest in traditional pilgrimages. Annual gatherings to the cities of Šaštín, Levoča or Nitra attracted crowds of seemingly modest proportions. Yet 10,000 to 20,000 people in the context of Czechoslovakia represented significant instances of physical reappropriation of the public sphere. More interestingly, they had learned to be creative to eat away public space at the expense of the post-totalitarian regime. In

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[361] See exchange of letters between Vatican Secretary of State Casaroli and Mgr. Tomášek in *Kardinal Tomášek: Zeugnisse über einen behutsamen Bishof*, 109.

1984, for instance, under the leadership of Vladimír Jukl, the Slovak underground organized a night long vigil in prelude to the pilgrimage of Šaštín despite official obstacles.

Furthermore, as the communist authorities tried to clamp down on religious activism by arresting members of the clergy and activists, the underground reacted by using a traditional political weapon: it initiated a series of petitions. It is these experiences that Slovak activists brought to the preparation of the 1985 pilgrimage to Velehrad. Hence Czechs and Slovaks tried to gather signatures to pressure the authorities to let John Paul II participate in the celebration for the millennium. In Slovakia alone, 15,000 people associated their names with this public request. The number of signatures throughout Czechoslovakia totaled 18,000, thereby indicating a higher mobilization among Slovaks.[362] Despite this effort, the authorities refused to yield, although they agreed to the presence of a papal representative in the person of his secretary of state. As the Velehrad grew closer, the organizers of the pilgrimage decided to apply the strategy followed at the Šaštín gathering; a night long vigil would precede the celebration of the mass in honor of St. Methodius scheduled on July 7, 1985.[363] The result was a public gathering at a non-sponsored state event of about 250,000 persons, an event of unprecedented proportion in communist Czechoslovakia. That result strengthened the resolution of underground activists and the Church to pursue a program of mobilization.

In Slovakia, the focus remained on pilgrimages. 1987-1988 represented the next significant step for Catholic activists, as this year was dedicated to marian devotions. The organization of religious celebrations in honor of Mary were somehow

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[362] Mikloško, *Nebudete Ich Môcť Rozvrátiť*, 146.
[363] *Ibid.*, 128.

reminiscent of the emphasis placed on the Great Novena and other Polish religio-political manifestations. This increasing level of activism also allowed Catholic dissidents to stage the first significant political demonstration since the Prague Spring. Symbolically, Mikloško called for a rally on March 25 1988, a religious day celebrating the feast of the Annunciation.[364] That gathering, a thirty minutes silent candle vigil was to take place at Hviezdoslavovo námestie (Hviezdoslav square) in front of the Slovak National Theater in Bratislava to demand " for appointments of Catholic bishops of vacant dioceses in Slovakia...; for full religious freedom and human rights in Czechoslovakia."[365] In so doing, the Catholic dissident explicitly claimed the right of Slovak citizens to recapture the public sphere. Moreover, by referring to a right to assemble, in effect he challenged the communist regime to be true to the meaning of words inscribed in the constitution. To paraphrase Patočka, he reminded the communist power that law is not subject to politics, but to a higher authority that it is morally bound to follow.[366]

Despite the ban declared by the communist authorities, the imprisonment of leading dissidents to prevent them from attending the public demonstration, and the deployment of state police forces armed with sirens and water canons, and the obstacles placed to obstruct attendance, about two thousands gathered.[367] Others throughout the country took part in prayers to express their solidarity.

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[364] This meeting later became nicknamed Bratislava's Good Friday, although it actually took place two weeks prior to the actual Good Friday.
[365] František Mikloško, *Statement Calling for a Public Rally*, trans. R. V. Tatran, Bratislava, March 10, 1988.
[366] Patočka, "What Charter 77 is and What it is not," 219.
[367] This estimate was given by the *Voice of America* on March 25 and 26, 1988. Other accounts referred to several thousands persons. These people came from all over Slovakia. Many however were prevented from entering the square and from attending,

Before the dispersion of the demonstration by the police water-canons, the rally of the believers bore a striking resemblance to Polish demonstrations. Like the strikes in the shipyards or the papal visits, the rally of the believers revealed a fusion of religious symbolism with expressions of nationalism. Like the precedent in Niepolalanow, where Polish crowds sang a traditional patriotic song and modified it to ask that "their motherland be given back,"[368] Slovak demonstrators struck up the national anthem, the papal hymn and later prayed the rosary in the midst of calls from police forces to break up the rally. Eventually, participants in the Bratislava protest were beaten up and dispersed by the water-canons. However, despite the violence used by the authorities on this Friday of March 1988, an increasing number of Slovaks stood up to physically claim a piece of the public sphere. That very same Summer, the pilgrimage to Nitra attracted no less than 100,000 people.

In the face of this Slovak mobilization, the Czechs did not stay inactive. Indeed, a few months before the Summer pilgrimage to Velehrad, the idea of a decade of spiritual renewal germinated in the minds of two Czech underground priests, Halík and Petr Piťha. According to the latter, such a program of spiritual mobilization was directly inspired by the Great Novena launched in 1956.[369] However, the project submitted to and later adopted by Mgr. Tomášek offered a modified version of the Polish program of spiritual renewal. Since Catholicism in the Czech lands did not emphasize as much a devotion to Mary, adaptations had to be made. As in Poland,

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as police forces tried to filter cars, buses and trains, and eventually blocked the streets leading to Hviezdoslavovo námestie.

[368] Henry Kamm, "Pope honors the Saint of Auschwitz," *New York Times*, 19 June 1983, A12. A similar event was reported a few years earlier during a 1980 pilgrimage, *see Biuletyn Dolnośląski*, September 16, 1980 cited by Kubik, 118.

[369] Tomáš Halík, "Gespräch über das Dezennium der geistlichen Erneuerung des Volkes," *Du Wirst das Angesicht der Erde erneuern: Kirche und Gesellschaft an der Schwelle zur Freiheit* (Leipzig: Benno, 1993), 16-17.

each year was to evolve around a theme. Instead of pledging a vow to Mary, believers were asked to turn their attention to a different saint every year. Those, of course, were chosen among illustrious historical individuals with Bohemian or Moravian links. Adopted in 1987, this program started in 1988.

The first two years were devoted to Agnes of Bohemia and St. John Nepomucene Neumann, while the themes to reflect upon were titled *In the Service of Life* and *Belief in the Modern World.* As in Poland, the decade of spiritual renewal was conceived to prepare for the celebration of the millennium of a significant national figure. In Poland, it was the baptism of Prince Mieszko, which sealed the birth of the Polish nation. In the Czech lands, it would be the celebration of the death of St. Vojtěch (Adalbert).[370] The hope was that a momentum in mobilization similar to that observed in Poland in the 1960s and 1970s, would strengthen the position of the Church and society at large. Beside this program of renewal launched by the archbishop of Prague, one individual initiative came to play a significant role. On January 1988, on that first year of the decade of spiritual renewal, a thirty one point petition prepared by a long time Catholic dissident, Augustin Navrátil started circulating around the country. Although this petition essentially was aimed at the defense of religious rights, it eventually gained great political significance. First, it gathered an

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[370] Vojtěch, who lived in the tenth century, stood up against King Bolesław II asking for Church independence. Whereas the head of the Premysl family aimed at unifying the Czech lands, Vojtěch was forced into exile. Although Vojtěch had been traditionally regarded as a controversial figure, whose action contributed to the undermining of the early movement of national Czech unity, the context of communism allowed for a reassessment of his role. A new light could be shed upon his real affect upon the Czech political system. According to this new analysis, by standing for an autonomous Church, in essence, he had participated to the emergence of civil society. The choice St. Vojtěch thus gained political symbolism. For a historical account of the contribution made by Catholicism in Czech History, see Zdeněk Kalista, "Le Catholicisme dans l'Histoire Tchèque," *Istina* XXVIII (1983) no. 1, 5-30.

unprecedented 600,000 signatures, two thirds of which, Slovaks have been eager to emphasize, came from Slovakia. This massive support marked a new level in the reclaiming of the public sphere.

More significantly, the endorsement by Charter 77 at the occasion of a visit of its spokesmen to Cardinal Tomášek officially marked a convergence of action between intellectuals and the Church, and among forces of the opposition. What had happened a decade earlier in Poland started crystallizing in Czechoslovakia. The stage was set for a massive reclaiming of the public sphere and the reemergence of civil society. A few months later, events in neighboring eastern European countries, as well as the effervescence surrounding the canonization of Agnes of Bohemia both in Rome an Prague participated in the massive mobilization of November 1989, which eventually toppled the communist regime by the end of the year.

The comparative analysis of the resistance and later mobilization in Poland and Czechoslovakia revealed some very significant points. The first insight gained from this study is that Czech and Slovak activism must be distinguished. Although it has become fashionable to acknowledge the dissident movement in the Czech lands, and by inference to bemoan the passivity of Slovaks, this chapter establishes that Slovak activism existed as well. It took a different form, but it was real. It even demonstrated its strength and dynamism when Slovak initiatives significantly contributed to the phase of mass mobilization.

Second, the Catholic Church as a community played a role in the mobilization of society against the communist regime. One of its essential contribution was to offer a space, where people would learn to stand for their beliefs and to nurture the necessary values for the future re-establishment of a civil society. As religious activism grew, it

helped catalyze a mass mobilization for the reclaiming of the public sphere. However, this contribution remained uneven across countries: it differed both in magnitude and timing, because of different historical and structural differences. For instance, the harsher nature of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia made activism more difficult. The imprisonment of Catholic leaders until the mid-1960s, and the resulting weakness of the institutional Church prevented the emergence of activism until the late 1960s. Although religious freedom was allowed to briefly flourish during the Prague Spring, the process of normalization which followed forced oppositional activists to go underground. Consequently, Czech and Slovak underground activists could only arm themselves with patience for a long-term struggle. In Poland, the Church maintained a high visibility and was able to keep its hierarchical structure. It was thus in a better position to support secular oppositional activities and a reclaiming of the public sphere, even though tensions between the lower and the higher clergy arose in the 1980s as to the best means to fight communism. In these three cases, though, this resilience and ability of the Church to adapt to its environment would not have been possible without the courageous initiatives of these same Catholic lay and religious elites, which helped toward the rapprochement with secular elites.

Finally, despite the recognition of historical and cultural particularities, this analysis has demonstrated that there was a diffusion of ideas between Poland and Czechoslovakia. There was indeed a conscious attempt to export and transpose the lessons of a Polish model in the mobilization of the Czech and Slovak masses. Even before efforts at large mobilization were attempted, similar objectives were sought. A particular attention was paid to specific groups. The welfare of the young was deemed of primary significance, as it carried hopes for the future. In Poland, where the Church had a greater freedom of action, both workers and peasants' interests constituted a

matter of concerns. In both countries, the patient effort applied at the grassroots level, in the underground in Czechoslovakia and more in the open in Poland, offered a firm foundation to develop a frame of mobilization. In Poland, this effort at mobilization initiated in the late 1950s bore fruits in the 1970s. In Czechoslovakia similar action was not undertaken until the early 1980s, and became noticeable in the mid-1980s. In the end, the combination and fusion of religion, culture and nationalism in both cases served as a vehicle to open a breach in the communist monopoly of the public sphere; a breach oppositional elites and masses tried to engulf and enlarge in the early 1980s in Poland and late 1980s in Czechoslovakia.

That contribution to the reawakening of civil society, however, was not expected to stop with the great transformations of 1989. After all, a successful democratic transition and consolidation cannot and could not be expected without the continuous nurturing of values necessary for a viable civil society.

Chapter VI

The Unfulfilled Promises of the 1989 Revolution: From Convergence to Disagreement

As seen previously, over the two decades preceding the 1989 revolutions, the Catholic Church offered a multifaceted contribution in the struggle against communism. Most significant was its participation in laying the groundwork for the rebirth of civil society and helping in the mass mobilization, which eventually toppled communism. Through its interaction with both elites and masses and various acts of resistance, the Church rebuilt its moral capital. Thus, 1989 did not simply signal the official return of the Catholic Church to the center of the public square; it also brought the hope that it could make an equally valuable contribution in the challenging times of democratic transition and consolidation. Yet, a little less than a decade later, the promises of the 1989 revolutions so far have remained unfulfilled. More accurately, the role of the Catholic Church with regard to the consolidation of civil society has been challenged by changing environmental circumstances.

Like the rest of eastern European societies, the Church lost sight of its references. To borrow from Zbigniew Sonowski, the Church acted like an elephant which spent years in the *Animal Farm* of George Orwell and which almost overnight found itself in a china store.[371] The exercise of freedom in the new democratic environment indeed provoked some blunders. As a result, not only the elite convergence did not lead to a lasting settlement, but both elites and the Church parted

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[371] German translation by Rembert J. Schleicher of a lecture titled *Der Elefant und die Polnische Sache* given by Zbigniew Sonowski given at the general assembly of the Clubs of Catholic Intellectuals on March 18, 1993 in Warsaw.

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Furthermore, public opinion in both Poland and former Czechoslovakia showed little patience with a Church in search of its role in a transitional environment. Hence, in order to understand the dynamics of transformation after 1989, the erosion of the prestige of the Church and the divergent paths of secular and Catholic (religious and secular) elites, it is necessary to examine why the hopes for a genuine moral revolution entertained by oppositional elites and the Church did not survive the realities of power.

A. Oppositional Elites and the Reality of Power:

Speaking before students for the commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the velvet revolution, Czech President Havel bemoaned the withering away of the ideals, which had guided the action of the dissidents in the post-totalitarian era. As he explained,

> In the atmosphere of common brotherhood and enthusiasm characteristic of the November 1989 revolution, many of us hoped- and what is more, deeply wished- that a significant change in the very way that human beings coexist would take place. It seemed that people would crawl out of the egotistical shells into which they had been driven by the communist regime, and that all of social life would suddenly assume more humane features. It seemed that people would stop being unkind toward others and that a small portion of the feeling of brotherhood evoked by the revolution might even remain permanently within them. It seemed that such values as solidarity, a spiritual dimension of life, "love thy neighbor," tolerance, and civil society would experience some kind of renaissance.[372]

Instead of striving for a more spiritual and human society in the aftermath of the revolutions, eastern Europeans have had to contend with various scourges. The euphoria, which marked the collapsed of communism, has vanished, and has been

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[372] Havel, speech commemorating the fifth anniversary of the Velvet Revolution on November 17, 1994 reproduced in "Rival Visions: Civil Society after Communism," *Journal of Democracy* vol. 7 (January 1996) no. 1, 14.

replaced by disillusionment and a certain disarray. As the former Czech dissident explained,

> The crime rate is rising, although perhaps a bit more slowly now. It seems that the majority of our society has been infected by the virus of racism. Many people feel that freedom means the ability to do everything, and that the market excludes ethics...respect for law and legal consciousness are very low. Political culture and civil society frequently assume grotesque features. Many people whose previous value structure collapsed and who were incapable of either creating or finding a new one, have become frustrated and are accepting illusory proposals for simplistic solutions offered by various extreme nationalist pseudo-leaders. Instead of learning from the West about civic and political culture, we have been quick to acquaint ourselves with the empty world of inane commercials and even more inane television series, allowing them to plunder without resistance our lives and souls.[373]

Beyond commiserating comments about the social cost of the policies of democratization and privatization undertaken by eastern European regimes, Havel's discourse raises a haunting question about the essence of the 1989 events. It indeed asks a rather familiar question in the field of revolutionary studies, namely what has happened to the ideal of the dissident movement? Why did the common vision of a reborn civil society shared by the oppositional elites and the Catholic Church not become reality? Part of the explanation can be found in the rather rapid replacement of former oppositional elites by a more pragmatic and entrepreneurial cluster of individuals. The literature on revolutions reveals that such a process is by no means exceptional.[374] In the case of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, three factors account for this replacement of elites, viz., the purpose of the dissident movement, the unreadiness to grapple with a post-communist reality, and the ideological disintegration of oppositional elite unity.

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[373] Havel, "Rival Visions," 15.
[374] John H. Kautsky, "Revolutionary and Managerial Elites in Modernizing Regimes," *Comparative Politics* vol. 1 (July 1969) no. 4, 441-467.

1. The Purpose of Dissidence:

As indicated earlier, dissident activities aimed at the emergence of a new consciousness and the rebirth of civil society. The reclaiming of the public sphere did not simply imply the capture of power. The principle of living in truth only demanded that individuals act as responsible citizens, stand for their beliefs in their everyday lives, and partake of the activities of their community. Thus, it was hardly surprising to see many Czechoslovak or Polish dissidents resume their professional activities and continue their involvement in civic activities without becoming professional politicians. The guiding principle of anti-politics explains why various prominent spokespersons for Charter 77, leaders of the Slovak underground, or Polish intellectuals did not succumb to the sirens of the traditional world of politics. Recalling a dissident discussion led by František Pavlíček about the meaning of Charter 77, Kusý explains,

> 'To begin with I thought that it [Charter 77] was a temporary political tactic. Now I know that it has changed my whole life. Charter 77 [was] not politics, but an attitude toward politics.' I still believe this, and that's why I decided not to become a professional politician.[375]

Following a similar reasoning, individuals, such as rector Radim Palouš, philosopher Ladislav Hejdánek, historian Jabloniský returned to the university, while others, such as Michnik, Dr. Krčméry and Vladimír Jukl respectively became journalist or returned to their ordinary life. As to the members of the clergy, they returned to their parish[376] or their congregation. However, those who decided to cross the Rubicon and join the

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[375] Interview with Miroslav Kusý conducted by Peter Gomulcák on May 4, 1990 for Literárny Tyzdennik and reproduced under the title "Nationalism, Totalitarianism and Democracy," in *After the Revolution: Václav Havel and the New Leaders of Czechoslovakia Speak Out*, ed. Tim D. Whipple (London: Freedom House, 1991), 249.
[376] In the case of Catholic priests, becoming a professional politician was not an option, since running for an elective office or being active in a political party are strictly prohibited.

political fray soon found out that dissident activism hardly prepared them for post-communist politics.

2. From Dissidence to the Reality of Power:

Reflecting upon the failure of Solidarity elites to retain power, Radek Sikorski, deputy minister of defense in the first Polish government chosen by a freely elected parliament, simply noted that "heroes do not make good politicians."[377] Inferred from this statement is the idea that skills and principles of action which represented valuable assets in the dissident movement or the underground proved ill-suited to evolve in a democratic environment. For instance, the anti-political rhetoric adopted by the dissidents served them well in diffusing the accusation that their main objective was to overthrow the communist regimes. At the same time, their lack of aspiration for power left them ill-prepared to confront a post-communist world. They eschewed any debate about the concept of power, because such a discussion would have implied a search for the good society. They wanted to avoid the trap of zealous revolutionaries. Any conceptualization of a new utopia, dissidents argued, inherently contained the seeds of tyranny and totalitarianism as the communist experiment demonstrated. Hence, oppositional elites made a conscious effort not to address the organization of political and institutional structures of a democratic society. One major consequence was to leave them with no really significant political and economic strategy. Discussions about political programs did not really appear until the Fall of 1988, when the Movement of Civil Liberties (Hnutí Občanských Svobodů, HOS) was established for that very

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[377] Radek Sikorski, "How we Lost Poland: Heroes do not make good Politicians," *Foreign Affairs* vol. 75 (Sept.-Oct. 1996) no. 5, 15-22.

purpose.[378] And even when they engaged in a limited discussion about the functioning of the good society, their vision was by definition idealistic and offered no concrete means to maneuver in a transitional society. No map on how to reach a satisfactory political regime was developed.

Havel, for instance, envisioned a polity where traditional parliamentary parties would have vanished and be replaced by a set of "open, dynamic and small...organizations springing up ad hoc, infused with enthusiasm for a particular purpose and disappearing when that purpose [would be] achieved."[379] Although he conceded that the model of western liberal democracies could represent a "transitional solution,"[380] the Czech dissident did not indicate how the leap to his good society could be achieved. This reluctance to conceptualization certainly represented the legacy of communism: it probably also carried the hope that out of the social movement aimed at recapturing the public sphere, the seeds for a moral reconstitution of society would be rooted deeply enough to be allowed to flourish. Unfortunately, such a reasoning forgot that the capacity of individuals to carry on a high moral renewal is limited in time, especially when hardship strikes. Once the initial euphoria about the collapse of communism faded way, eastern Europeans were faced with the disrupting turmoil caused by the processes of democratization and privatization. Very quickly issues of morality took second place behind the more pressing questions of economic and social survival. Oppositional elites, such as Havel, had simply neglected one fact. The movement aimed at reclaiming the public sphere developed in a post-totalitarian environment, and was thus a product of communism. In the context of a democratic

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[378] Interview with Pavel Bratinka conducted by Tim Whipple on June 15, 1990 and reproduced under the title "Conservative Reflections on Czechoslovak Politics" in *After the Velvet Revolution*, ed. Whipple, 208.
[379] Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 118.

transition, a new set of rules would apply and civil society would have to evolve accordingly.

The absence of a post-communist strategy, the moral tone and the manichean vision of the world, which pervaded the oppositional discourse left dissidents unprepared to confront and compete against more entrepreneurial post-communist elites. Democratic politics calls for pragmatism and compromise if anything is to be accomplished. To former members of the opposition, who had learned to stand up against communism and not to compromise their beliefs at great risks, it became difficult to adapt. As former Solidarity leader and first freely elected President, Lech Wałesa discovered, 180 degree political turns are difficult to accomplish. Described as a "fingertip politician, a tribune of the Plebe and a folk hero,"[381] Wałesa came to believe he was the only one capable of bringing Poland to the shores of democracy and free market economy. The major problem, which proved to be disastrous for the reformers, is that he envisioned and conceived politics only in oppositional terms. Even after 1989, he was unable to work out compromises. In other words, whoever opposed his views was the enemy. First, his obstructive style aimed at pushing much needed reforms created some major rifts in the ranks of former Solidarity members, and later some tense confrontations with the government controlled by the reformed communists of the SdRP (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland) and their allies of the PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, Polish Peasant Party). The tragic fall from grace of Wałesa illustrates the difficulty of some dissidents to adapt to a democratic environment. In the words of Michnic,

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[380] *Ibid.*, 117.

> The logic of the struggle for freedom against dictatorship and the logic of the struggle for power in a democratic country differ greatly: The first demands courage, dignity, and a bit of fanaticism, cleverness and a good sense of circumstances.
> This is why people, who under a dictatorship, chose moral absolutism usually feel bad in democracy, among unclear alliances and equally unclear compromises. They worshipped democracy, struggled for it- but they are not comfortable in it.[382]

In concurring remarks, former Warsaw KIK vice-president Grabska explains,

> Before people dreamed about freedom, but they did not know anything about it. Today, nobody is able to make compromises. There is no experience with compromise. People involved in politics today lived all their political life in a communist environment. And in the fight against communism, compromise was not well regarded. Now, we must learn to be pragmatic, to make compromises. Preparing a demonstration, writing a manifesto or a petition, all those activities that were the core of dissident life, are easy. Organizing social and political life is something else.[383]

Consequently, in a matter of a few years in both Poland and the soon to be defunct Czechoslovakia, most of the former oppositional elites who had been elected in the founding elections in 1990 and 1991 have been replaced by more pragmatic and technocratic leaders. Many of these new elites are former communist bureaucrats or managers, whose lack of deep ideological commitment have allowed them to adapt more easily to a democratic environment and go through the motion of democratic practices. Their internalization of democratic values may be shallow, but expediency command them to play by new rules, thereby allowing them to survive. The art of remodeling one's image and selling it with the techniques borrowed from the West has saved a good number of communist elites from oblivion. As John Higley, Judith Kullberg and Jan Pakulski rightly noted,

> A significant number of political leaders, like Kwasniewski in Poland survived regime transitions by repackaging themselves as socialist and social-democrats.

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[381] J. F. Brown, *Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe after Communism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 36-37.
[382] Adam Michnik, "When the Majority Rejects Virtue," *Transition* (June 14, 1996), 33.
[383] Interview with Mrs. Grabska.

> This did not save them from being trounced in the first post-communist elections and plebiscites. But protestations that they too are firm democrats and market reformers have enabled ex-communists to capitalize on economic hardships and to stage electoral comebacks and return to power in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia.[384]

Even in the Czech Republic, where commitments to the drastic cure of shock therapy have been the strongest, a study conducted by Lubomír Brokl and Zedenka Mansfeldova reveals that after the brief 1990-1992 interlude, about half of parliamentary and governmental positions have remained or are in the hands of repackaged communist elites.[385] This disappearance of former oppositional elites in the political domain has been compounded by an inability to supplant former elites in bureaucratic and management positions. In a study about elite change in Russia, Poland and Hungary, Polish sociologist Jacek Wasilewski affirms that in some sectors the renewal of elites was not as high as could have been expected. Nearly 51% of the Polish economic elite, which had worked under communism, were still holding their jobs in 1993.[386] Again, the nature of oppositional activities can be blamed for this situation. Before 1989, no effort was made to prepare people to take over state and management apparatuses. All energies were directed toward the nurturing of morality and the rediscovery of an authentic way of life. Unfortunately, such priorities have been of little resource in the everyday running of post-1989 bureaucratic and management functions. This lack of pragmatic focus and the conscious attempt to encourage moral renewal at the grassroots, which proved so helpful in the struggle

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[384] John Higley, Judith Kullberg and Jan Pakulski, "The Persistence of Post-Communist Elites," *Journal of Democracy* vol. 7 (April 1996) no. 2, 137.
[385] Lubomír Brokl and Zedenka Mansfeldova, *Czech Political Elites and the Elites of Legislative Power* (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995) cited by Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski, 136.
[386] Jacek Wasilewski, *Communist Nomenklatura in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Winners or Losers of Transformation?* (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995) cited by Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski, 135.

against communism, ironically have been working against the former oppositional elites since then.

Moreover, after having risked their lives opposing the communist regimes, former dissidents are now accused of planning the establishment of another totalitarianism under the pretense of bringing a new ethics to political life. Havel himself, the living symbol of the anti-politics philosophy has been scathed along with his former dissident friends and the Catholic Church for willing to strive for a better and more humane society. As an exemplary embodiment of this more pragmatic elite, former Prime Minister Václav Klaus has not hesitated to condemn the moral ground taken by former oppositional elites, such as the Czech President. Warning his compatriots, he admonished:

> Some people,..., still want to take advantage of the collapse of communism to create something more than "just" a free society...For them, it is not enough that our country has free citizens-they would like it to have better citizens. They pretend to know what is wrong with us and why, and presume that they can straighten us out. In their eyes, we are too materialistic, too egotistical, too shortsighted, and too narcissistic. They do not believe that freeing people from their various shackles is enough. They would like to transform not only social institutions but human beings themselves.
> ...We have already had some experience in this area. Several decades ago, the violation of human nature by collectivism and state control created an Orwellian world here,...Today, the violation of human nature by moralizing, elitist, and perfectionist ambitions would create a Huxleyan "Brave New World."[387]

Not surprisingly, this feud has turned in favor of the pragmatists. These attempts at amalgamating the discourse of oppositional elites with the regime against which they fought have resonated well among the population. After all, the 1989 revolution

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[387] Václav Klaus, speech commemorating the fifth anniversary of the Velvet Revolution on November 17, 1994, reproduced in "Rival Visions," 14.

represented a revolt against ideology. And the voters recognized that a discourse on morality, if not cautiously handled, carries the risk of an ideologization of the political process.

More significantly, eastern Europeans seem to prefer the discourse of entrepreneurial politicians, because the latter are willing to tackle very practical economical and social issues at a particularly trying time. This backlash against the moral approach of former dissidents has been aggravated by internal divisions.

3. Ideological Disintegration:

Another significant reason for the rapid turnover of elites after 1989 indeed has been the internal feud which engulfed the oppositional elites and the arrogant perception they had that communist forces had been vanquished once for all. Instead of transforming their convergence into a settlement, former dissidents soon engaged in ideological confrontations. The umbrella organizations, such as Solidarity in Poland, Občanske Forum (OF, Civic Forum) in the Czech Republic or Veřejnost Proti Nasili (VPN, Public Against Violence) in Slovakia, which filled the vacuum left by ousted communist forces, quickly disintegrated; They disappeared from the political scene, as their leaders fell victim of their own personal ambitions. The former dissidents discovered that what united them against communism, their common opposition to the regime and a belief in fundamental human rights, was doomed to be short-lived. They were brought together by the smallest common denominator. Once the common enemy had been defeated, nothing existed to keep a common political front. For former dissident Radim Palouš, it was simply *felix culpa*. The severe blow experienced by communist forces in 1989 and 1990 in both Poland and Czechoslovakia legitimized the democratic transition and gave the new elites a mandate to undertake political and

economic reforms. As the new leaders were busy learning their new trade they underestimated the capacity of communists to recover, to adapt and use the resources of the former Communist Party to back up their political comeback. Reflecting upon the early phase of the democratic transition, Adam Szostkiewicz admits that in Poland,

> Unity no longer works. It is a song of the past. What was good at a time not normal by any means, is no longer needed. Unity was a condition to successfully oppose the brutal communist regime. [With freedom and transition] natural divisions, natural interests have come back to the surface. These were intensified by the process started in 1989, especially the war among leading figures, such as Wałesa and others. The mistake about this confrontation is that the people who won the war against the communists came to the conclusion that the communists were finished, that in a free society communism would have no significant role. They were wrong. There was an illusion in the politics of Solidarity after 1989. There was too much pride, too much certainty, too much of an attitude: we are the champions, we deserve to be treated as those who know better.[388]

In other words, former oppositional elites overlooked human resourcefulness and the complexity of society. This self-absorption into personal and ideological quarrels was exacerbated by the use of proportional representation, particularly in Poland. It also was aggravated by a certain political naiveté. Former oppositional elites were political amateurs called to the heights of power by a rapid unexpected turn of events. They were unprepared for the new responsibilities that were bestowed upon them. Trying to explain the breakdown of Civic Forum, Havel reflected:

> The responsibility is only with the extraordinary pace of history, when at any moment you have to resolve a whole range of problems at once, when each of these problems is interconnected with all the others. We're all swamped with work from morning till evening. We all found ourselves in a situation whose complexity we had no idea of beforehand- after all, we're not clairvoyant. In short, what ended up happening was inevitable, but it's not necessarily a tragedy.[389]

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[388] Interview with Adam Szostkiewicz.

[389] Interview with Václav Havel by Ivan Lemper, Jan Ruml and Zbynek Petracek conducted on April 24, 1990 for Respekt and reproduced under the title "Presidential Politics after the Revolution," in *After the Revolution*, ed. Whipple, 96.

This lack of experience led the former oppositional elites to underestimate the social discontent fueled by the economic hardship, and the ability of more pragmatic and politically aware politicians to take advantage of this situation. By 1992-1993 living embodiments of this new breed of leaders were taking over the political scene. The rise of a Václav Klaus in the Czech Republic, a Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia or Alexander Kwasniewski in Poland brutally illustrated the phasing out of the dissident cohort.

This reshuffling of elites has had significant consequences for the Church. Even though it had rebuilt its moral prestige in the eyes of the oppositional elites, it could not count upon their friendly support. Because of the progressive political elimination of former dissidents, the Church instead has had to face a new set of leaders, whose world views and aspirations it did not necessarily share. As to those elites who survived this tidal wave, they have been of little help. For the sake of their political survival, they indeed have had to learn to live by the rule of pragmatism. They came to realize that the imperative of truth at times collides with the democratic principle. As we shall see further, the involvement of clerics in controversial debates, such as those over abortion in Poland or nationalism in Slovakia, forced moderate Christian political leaders to differentiate themselves from the Church. While the Church witnessed the progressive elimination of its potential allies, it also had to come to grips with the grim reality of liberalism. Like the oppositional elites, the Catholic Church realized that it faced an uphill battle in its quest of a good and moral civil society. It not only had to endure the legacy of communism, but it also had to compete against the allure of western materialistic values. If liberal democracy promised to represent the genuine crucible, the Catholic Church would not give up without a fight. In its attempt to offer a moral voice in the process of democratic transition, though, the

Catholic Church antagonized and alienated both elites and masses, thereby missing out on a unique opportunity to capitalize on its contribution to civil society.

B. The Catholic Church and the Challenge of Democracy

The collapse of communism did not merely bring a new freedom. It also offered the possibility to the Catholic Church and its elites (lay and religious) to build upon the achievements of the previous decades. However, despite efforts directed at civil society, the Catholic Church soon got trapped in church-state controversies, which damaged its standing before both elites and masses. In order to understand why and how questions of institution-building undermined the capacity of the Catholic Church to positively influence the consolidation of civil society after 1989, it is necessary to retrace how it negotiated the democratic transition. To that end, it is crucial to examine the ideal civil society for which the Catholic Church has been striving; and why the means to achieve it did not necessarily coincide with the role elites and masses envisioned for the Church.

1. In Search of the Good Society:

The change of political and economic regimes in Poland and Czechoslovakia did not diminish notably the interest of the Catholic Church for civil society. In fact, in one of his first gestures toward the newly free countries of Eastern Europe, the Pope decided to accept the invitation of newly elected President Havel. In March 1990, John Paul II undertook his first trip to a former communist country other than Poland. This visit to Czechoslovakia gave him the occasion to directly address the population. A year later, in June and again in August 1991, the pilgrim Pontiff returned to his native Poland. Showing a continuing interest for the region and its people, the head of the Catholic Church went back to the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1995, and to Poland

in 1995 and 1997. Paralleling his trips to Eastern Europe, the writings of John Paul II have acknowledged all but in name the significance of civil society. In his *Centesimus Annus* Encyclical, the Pope explains that "the social nature of man is not completely fulfilled in the state, but is realized in various intermediary groups, beginning with the family and including economic, social, political groups, which stem from human nature itself and have their own autonomy..."[390]

The vision of the ideal society advocated by the Catholic Church and its supreme leader is one where morality, responsibility, human dignity, freedom and a respect for fundamental human rights should prevail; where excessive materialism should be replaced by the search for communal bonds and the respect of a transcendent order. Such program is certainly no different from the pre-1989 agenda of the Catholic Church and oppositional elites. The breakdown of communist regimes and the liberal tide which engulfed Eastern Europe, however, has revealed a more complex reality.

Before the collapse of communism, there was indeed a convergence of interests between the Catholic Church and secular elites. The common denominator which brought these forces together was a concern for and emphasis on the most pressing issues, such as freedom. Once the latter were achieved, and a new era of liberalism was trumpeted, a whole new set of issues such as consumerism, extreme individualism, abortion, etc. took priority on the agenda of the Catholic Church. And these were not necessarily what former dissidents and the masses had in mind.

Following his own logic, John Paul II, through his various discourses, sermons, and encyclicals has embarked on a crusade for a better civil society, one concerned with moral and ethical values. For him, the advent of freedom has not eliminated the threat of atomism, the risk of materialism, or the dilemma of

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[390] John Paul II, *Centesimus Annus* (Boston: St. Paul Books & Media, 1991), par 13, 21.

secularization. Liberalism merely supplanted communism as the driving force behind these phenomena. More specifically, the new liberal era promises to replace old Marxist materialism with more seductive versions, such as hedonism, egoism or consumerism. To drive this point home, at the occasion of his first visit to a truly free Poland, John Paul II warned against western sirens. "Do not let yourself get caught up by this civilization of desire and consumption," he admonished the crowd gathered in Włocławek, Poland, on June 7, 1991.[391] A little later during his trip to Czechoslovakia in April 1990, the Pope implored young crowds not to abandon the spiritual and religious dimension of their lives, because it would mean "to become strangers in (their) own land."[392] He forcefully argued that:

> To become deaf and blind to values such as faith, the Bible and the church (was to lose) the key to understanding... (to lose) the source of inspiration and moral energy for solving many of today's pressing problems and for building tomorrow's civilization. That civilization cannot rest on a restricted vision of man, such as that of materialism. We need to regain an integrated vision which takes man in all his dimensions: spiritual and material, moral and religious, social and ecological.... Without a sense of the transcendent, any type of culture remains a formless garment, like the unfinished Tower of Babel.[393]

The anathema against the material aspects of life has been at the core of papal thinking. Although he recognizes the merits of capitalism in his *Centesimus Annus* Encyclical, Pope John Paul II emphasizes the dangers of an "idolatry of the Market," [394]because certain human needs, he explains, cannot be identified as mere commodities. This point of view firmly indicates that the Holy See and its leader, the Pope, envision a church as guardian of morality in transitional societies of Eastern Europe; a church, which through its social teaching, can help to provide valuable boundaries against the

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[391] Jan B. de Weydenthal, "The Pope Appeals in Poland for a Christian Europe," *Report on Eastern Europe* (June 21, 1991), 21.
[392] John Paul II, "Overcoming the Tower of Babel," *Origins* 35 (May 1990), 799.
[393] *Ibid.*
[394] John Paul II, "Centesimus Annus," *Origins* 1 (May 1991), 16.

excesses of liberal economies. To Polish, Czech and Slovak populations, deprived of certain basic material goods for so long, the Church wants to demonstrate that freedom and democracy should mean more than mere possession. At the intention of these peoples Pope John Paul II has asserted that:

> It is not wrong to want to live better: what is wrong is a style of life which is presumed to be better when it is directed towards "having" rather than "being", and which wants to have more, not in order to be more, but to spend life in enjoyment as an end in itself.[395]

Possession for the sake of possession can become a form of alienation and enslave people. Yet, materialism is not the only concern of the Polish Pope. Also worrisome is the casual exercise of freedom. Speaking about abortion in a more recent encyclical, *Evangelium Vitae*, John Paul II noted that freedom and the rule of the majority had to be exercised within reasonable boundaries; that freedom is not absolute. In the words of the Sovereign Pontiff,

> Democracy cannot be idolized to the point of making it a substitute for morality or a panacea for immorality. Fundamentally, democracy is a 'system' and as such is a means and not an end. Its 'moral' value is not automatic, but depends on conformity to the moral law to which it, like every other form of human behavior, must be subject; in other words, it depends on the morality of the ends which it pursues and the means which it employs.[396]

In other words, the values and the principles which define democracy "cannot be provisional and 'changeable majority' opinions," but must exist in agreement with "objective moral,...this 'natural law' written in the human heart."[397] According to the Pope, there are indeed values which cannot be trampled upon. Quoting his predecessor Leo XIII, John Paul II reminded his audience in a widely publicized encyclical, *Veritatis Splendor*, that

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[395] *Ibid.*, 15.
[396] John Paul II, *Evangelium Vitae* (The Gospel of Life) (New York: Random House, 1995), 127-128.
[397] *Ibid*, 128.

> If one does not acknowledge the transcendent truth, then the force of power takes over, and each person tends to make full use of the means at his disposal in order to impose his own interests or his own opinion, with no regard for the rights of others...The human person, [...] is [...] by his very nature the subject of rights which no one may violate no individual, group, class, nation or state. Not even the majority of a social body may violate these rights, by going against the minority, by isolating, oppressing, or exploiting it, or by attempting to annihilate.[398]

In order to defend these views on the ideal civil society, the Pope called the Czech, Slovaks, and Polish to be actively involved and "participate in the life of society as a witness to the Gospel."[399] As the Pope emphasized elsewhere,

> Individuals, families, groups and associations, albeit for different reasons and in different ways, all have a responsibility for shaping society and developing cultural, economic, political and legislative projects which, with respect for all and in keeping with democratic principles, will contribute to the building of a society in which the dignity of each person is recognized and protected and the lives of all are defended and embraced.[400]

In addition to this lay involvement, the Pontiff is now also able to rely upon a totally reconstituted religious hierarchy. With the legal resuming of religious activities, the Catholic Church and the mushrooming Catholic organizations are devoted to pursuing their moral quest in the public arena. In the institutional spheres of the Vatican, this pastoral program toward society is expected to stay away from political entanglements. To this end, members of the clergy have been advised by the Polish Pope to maintain their distance from the world of political passions in general, and from political parties in particular. As John Paul II remarked, priests certainly have the right to have personal political opinions and to use their conscience in their use of their right to vote;

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[398] Leo XIII, "Libertas Praestantissimum" (June 20, 1888) *Leonis XIII PM Acta* VIII Rome 1889, 224-226 cited by John Paul II in *Veritatis Splendor* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993), par. 99.
[399] John Paul II, "Laity and Necessary Church Renewal," *Origins* 6 (June 1991), 97.
[400] John Paul II, *Evangelium Vitae*, 159-160.

however, they should limit themselves to their ministries.[401] Despite the political success of Christian Democratic Parties in the past, the Italian experience taught the leaders of the Vatican not to encourage close ties with such organizations. Beside running the risk of being embroiled in political scandals, such as the rampant corruption which afflicted the Italian Christian Democratic Party (Cristiana Democrazia, CD), the Church has to confront the shortcomings of the political realm. Everyday politics demands compromise, while the defense of moral values and truth do not offer too much ground for negotiation. As John Coleman accurately noted:

> To some extent, they [political parties] usurp the bishops' task of addressing issues of church and culture and tame the prophetic voice of the church. Although nominally ideological parties of Christian inspiration, they almost always become interest parties, as most political parties must be, and serve definite class constituencies, thus compromising the universal, transcendent moral claims of the church.[402]

Moreover, If they adopt the moral discourse of the Church in their program, these parties cannot always guarantee that legislation will ever yield to its moral tenets, or that voters will even follow the Church's dictates. The loss of referenda both in Italy and Ireland are good cases in point. Drawing the conclusions from past experiences, the Vatican has vowed to avoid meddling with political parties. As a Vatican representative indicated,

> The time of Christian democratic crusades is over. Christian Democratic Parties are a thing of the past. They lack the primary row material, the masses[...] It is necessary to educate motivated Christians who will get involved. What matters is the diffusion of values.[403]

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[401] John Paul II'speech on the clergy and civil society at the general audience of July 28, 1993 reproduced in "Il Presbitero e la società civile," *Osservatore Romano*, 29 July 1993, 4.
[402] John A. Coleman, SJ., "Spiritual Resistance in Eastern Europe," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 1 (1991), 126-127.
[403] Interview with a Vatican representative, August 1993, Rome.

If the Church has a message for the people and their governments, the hierarchy will convey it through other channels of communication.[404]

Despite the official rhetoric of the Vatican, though, these guidelines have not held up to the reality of Czech, Polish and Slovak transitional polities. In these various countries, the Catholic Church found it hard to avoid political involvement, thereby fueling political controversies. Consequently, it has antagonized elites and masses, and undermined the moral prestige of the Church.

2. A Story of Lost Opportunities:

a. Catholic Voices in a burgeoning Civil Society:

In the wake of the 1989 revolutions, the Catholic Church, Catholic intellectuals and the laity freely invaded the public sphere and enthusiastically participated to the explosion of civic activities. After securing its legal recognition, the Church strove to reestablish its presence in the Czech, Slovak and Polish lands. It reclaimed its place in the educational world, the media circles, but most significantly, it returned to its social and charitable activities. By 1994, it had opened or re-opened 154 welfare institutions (hospitals, dispensaries, retirement homes, homes for the handicapped, orphanages, etc.) in the Czech Republic, 2152 in Poland and 27 in Slovakia.[405] These charitable organizations have come to play an important role to supplement the action of states, as the latter have been forced to curtail their welfare activities. The lack of financial resources and the constraints imposed by the

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[404] The current model favored in some Vatican circles is the Christian education of future leaders. In Italy, for instance, some dioceses have opened centers of political education, where people are introduced to the functioning of the political system. Interview with a Vatican representative, July 1993, Rome.

[405] *Annuarium Statisticum Ecclesiae* (*Statistical Yearbook of the Church*) (Vatican City: Secretaria Status, 1994), 327-328.

privatization reforms indeed have not allowed Czech, Slovak and Polish governments to keep supplying the various social services offered under the communist regime. Religious organizations, such as the Catholic Church, can thus step in and partially substitute for the state. In the city of Kraków, for instance, the Church cooperates with state institutions, such as the Kraków Department of Social Services: it provides services such as shelter, while the city finances part of the cost.[406]

Another example of the positive contribution toward civil society has been the continuing support provided by the Church to rural activities. As seen earlier, the Catholic Church worked very hard to supply financial resources to Polish farmers in the 1980s. This effort allowed the establishment of non-governmental organizations, such as the Foundation for Water Supply to Rural Areas (WSF). In addition to solving practical agricultural problems, as Kevin F. F. Quickley rightly remarked, mediating institutions, such as WSF, have been essential for the nurturing of democratic values and civic engagement; they bring communities together and teach them how to take decisions through a participatory process.[407]

Outside the institutional Church, lay Catholics who had been actively involved in the struggle against communism, also helped to expand the sphere of action of civil society. In Poland, the number of the Catholic Clubs of Intellectuals has grown to about eighty. In 1989, an organization was set-up to develop cooperation among the various KIKs and exchange of information developed through the publication of a quarterly journal *Życie Klubów* (the Life of Clubs). The Church also encouraged the

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[406] Laura Brunell, "Gendered Dimensions of Civic Participation: Women and Building Social Capital in Poland," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 1996, 23.
[407] Kevin F. F. Quigley, *For Democracy's Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 53.

establishment of other Catholic lay organizations throughout the country. It even authorized the resurrection of the Catholic Action (Akcja Katolicka) in 1995.[408]

Moreover, the advent of pluralism allowed emerging political parties to compete for the privilege of embodying Christian values. In 1991, out of a plethora of political organizations, no less than five parties to win a parliamentary representation could claim a Christian orientation. The two smallest groups (with respectively only five and four seats among the 460 seats to be allocated in the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish parliament) were represented by Christian Democracy (Demokracja Chrześcijańska, DC) and the Party of Christian Democrats (Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów, PCD). The latter participated in the government coalition with the National Christian Union (Zjednoszenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe, ZChN) and the Center Alliance (Porozumienie Centrum, PC). The Christian National Union, an old type Catholic party with a nationalistic overtone and a certain disdain for ethnic minorities, won representation owing to the creation of an electoral coalition (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka, Electoral Catholic Action, WAK) with other various Catholic groupings. Altogether WAK won 49 seats. Actually, after the legislative elections of 1991, the political center stage was occupied by the Center Alliance (44 seats) and the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyzcna, UD, 62 seats) of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, both an emanation of Solidarity.[409] However, the inability of all these parties to coalesce and form a large political party severely penalized Christian democratic forces in the next round of legislative elections in the Fall of 1993. With the adoption of a new electoral

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[408] The Catholic Action was reestablished after Cardinal Glemp issued a decree during the 1995 Easter celebration: reported by *PAP* (Warsaw), January 6, 1996 in *Lexis*-Nexis January 8, 1996.

rule aimed at providing a stable majority in the Polish parliament,[410] their association with the increasingly unpopular consequences of the program of privatization, and their not always too subtle ties to an antagonizing Catholic Church, parties competing under Catholic colors proved unable to capture any seats.

After the dismal failure of Catholic oriented parties in the 1993 elections, and the defeat of right wing parties in general, political leaders of Christian democratic obedience tried to build a viable political alternative, which could bring back Christian oriented political forces into power. Members of the Democratic Union merged with the Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongress Liberalno-Demokratyczny, KLD) to establish Freedom Union (Unia Wolności, UW). More significantly, after several attempts failed at uniting right-wing parties, Marian Krzaklewski, chairman of the Solidarity trade union since 1990, succeeded in fostering the emergence of a successful Christian democratic movement, Akcja Wiborcza Solidarnosz (Electoral Solidarity Action, AWS).[411] After capturing a majority of seats in the Senate and becoming the largest party in the lower house with 201 seats in the 1997 legislative elections, AWS

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[409] For the 1991 electoral results in Poland, see *Eastern European Politics and Societies* vol. 7 (Fall 1993) no. 3, 571-576.

[410] The use of a pure proportional electoral rule in 1991 had resulted in a fragmented parliament, which included no less than 28 different parties. This political fragmentation and the fierce feuds among former Solidarity activists contributed to political instability and delayed the adoption of signifcant pieces of legislation. To solve this crisis, members of the Polish parliament adopted a new electoral rule for the 1993 legislative elections. The new rule maintained the system of proportional representation, but introduced a threshold of 5% for individual parties and 8% for electoral coalitions for the allocation of seats. As a result, small parties, such as those of Christian inspiration were penalized.

[411] AWS was established in June 1996. By the Summer of 1997, this coalition counted 36 different organizations, including the Solidarity trade union. Like its opponent the Sojusz Lewici Demokratycznej (Democratic Alliance, SLD), the Solidarity Electoral Action represents an umbrella organization for political parties, trade unions and other groupings.

and its allies of UW formed a governmental coalition. Although this achievement does not bespeak of future electoral battles, it confirms that Christian democratic forces cannot be underestimated or written off.

In the Czech Republic, individual initiatives have allowed the emergence of new mediating institutions as well. In addition to the controversial revival of the historical People's Party in the form of the Christian and Democratic Union-Czech People's Party (Křestanska Demokraticka Unie-Československa Strana Lidova, KDU-ČSL),[412] former dissident Václav Benda founded the Christian Democratic Party (Křestanskodemocraticka Strana, KDS). Other examples of involvement into the public sphere include the establishment of a Christian Trade Union and the flourishing of Christian publishing ventures such as those pursued by former underground activist Oto Mádr at *Teologické Texty*.

In Slovakia, dissident Čarnogurský established the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (Kresťansko Democratické Hnutie, KDH); Relying upon the network structure inherited from the Christian underground movement, this new party was able to display its political strength in the early phase of the transition. In the 1990 Czechoslovak parliamentary elections, at the federal level, the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement was able to capture 25 seats in the Federal Assembly (with respectively 16.66% in the Chamber of the Nations, and 18.98% in the Chamber of the People), while it won 31 seats (i.e., 19.20% of the vote) in the Slovak National Council. Such results allowed KDH to become the second largest political force in Slovakia and to participate in a coalition government with Public Against Violence and

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[412] It is worth noting that under communism the People's Party had survived as a token satellite party to the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

the Democratic Party (Demokratická Strana).[413] Following internal divisions that caused their coalition partner, Public Against Violence, to split, the Christian Democratic Movement even found itself in charge of a new coalition government in April 1991, as its chairman, Čarnogurský, became prime minister. Particularly crucial for the consolidation of a civil society in Slovakia has been the emphasis put on the youth and the grounding of the party in local politics. These two characteristics, of course, are a legacy of the underground period, where a network of activities relied upon young students and villages throughout the country. It is not a coincidence if in local elections KDH fared better electorally than in national and federal elections, with 20.50% of the votes. More interestingly, it is in the counties such as Kosiče or Poprad where underground centers developed that the Christian forces experienced significant results.[414] This focus on local structures and the young through the Christian Democratic Youth of Slovakia (Kresťansko Demokratická Mládež Slovenska, KDMS) is essential for the development of the party and more significantly of civil society. Without the participation of active responsible citizens, no sound public sphere can flourish. An emphasis on local politics is important because most often it is the first step to build political involvement at the national level. Similarly, consulting and supporting the activities of KDMS and its more than ten thousands adherents support

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[413] Statistical sources are drawn from Jiří Pehe, "Slovak Nationalism Splits Christian Democratic Ranks," *Research Report on Eastern Europe* vol. 1 (March 27, 1992) no. 13, 13; Gordon Wightman, "The Czech and Slovak Republics," in *Developments in East European Politics*, eds. Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 53-56.

[414] For a study of the results of local elections for KDH, see Ľudmila Malíková, "Political Reflections on the Transformation of Power in Local Government," in *Localities and Politics in the Transformation Process: The Slovak and Czech Experiences: Conference Proceedings, Bratislava, June 8-9th 1995*, by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Bratislava: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1995) , 18.

the development of a reservoir or farm system of future Christian democratic leaders.[415]

Despite these notable achievements, the Catholic contribution to a post-communist civil society remains unacknowledged. Instead, the Catholic Church has been accused of overstepping its role, of becoming too much involved in political matters, and of trying to impose its norms and values particularly in Poland. In other words, instead of reaping the fruits of its past achievements, it has had to endure a backlash.

b. The Crucible of Democracy:

Signs of a growing antagonism between Catholic forces and Polish, Czech and Slovak societies have been manifold. First, political parties have not been particularly successful. In the Czech Republic, the Christian Democratic Party eventually joined Václav Klaus' Civic Democratic Party (Občanska Demokraticka Strana, ODS).[416] As to the remaining Christian democratic forces, they are confined to a very modest role since they are not representing more than 8.08% of the electorate at the national level. In Slovakia, despite promising results in 1990, KDH's support has dropped and stabilized at about 10% of national electoral support. As for Poland, since the 1990 presidential and 1991 legislative elections, parties which have been associated too closely with the Catholic Church, have done so at their own peril. Both in the 1993 legislative and 1995 presidential elections, candidates who embraced or were even

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[415] Interview with leaders of KDMS, January 27, 1995, Bratislava.
[416] Some of its parliamentary members rejected this merger and decided to join the ranks of the Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party. See David Olson, "The Experience of the Czech Republic," in *The Consolidation of Democracy in East Central*

remotely linked to the Church suffered electoral defeat. More troublesome has been the decline of confidence in the Church and of religious practice. In Poland, for instance, according to two polls conducted by the Polish Media and Opinion Research Department in October 1990 and January 1992 concerning the rate of confidence in eight institutions, the Church registered a severe drop of favorable opinion from 81% to 55%.[417] In 1993, its level of approval went even further down to about 38% according to a survey undertaken by the Public Opinion Polling Center (CBOS).[418] Since then, it has recovered slightly, increasing from 50% in 1994,[419] 59% in 1996,[420] to 57% in 1997.[421]

In Slovakia and the Czech Republic, a survey conducted by the Association of Independent Social Analysis in April 1994 revealed that only 58% of Slovak respondents and 32% in their Czech counterparts had at least some confidence in the Church far behind their trust in the media and the military.[422] Perhaps more alarming has been the decline in Church attendance. In 1991, about 40% of the Czech population professed to be Catholic; by 1994, only 30% of these self-proclaimed Catholics attended mass in Moravia, and only about 10% in the more secular Bohemia. In

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Europe, eds. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 179-180.

[417] *Report on Eastern Europe* 21 (May 1992), 62-63.

[418] *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, Lexis-Nexis, June 2, 1993.

[419] *PAP* (Polish Press Agency) *news Wire*, Lexis-Nexis, June 24 1994.

[420] Monika Scislowska, "The Catholic Church that fought Communism Adjusts to Democracy," *Associated Press*, Lexis-Nexis, October 29, 1996.

[421] CBOS' poll in *Polish News Bulletin*, Lexis-Nexis, February 11, 1997.

[422] Mary Cline and Sharon Fisher, "Czech Republic and Slovakia: Views on Politics and the Economy," *Research Report on Eastern Europe* (July 8, 1994), 34. For similar results, see OMRI survey conducted in March-April 1995, reported by David G. Gibson, "High Public Confidence in the Church," *Transition* (March 13, 1996), 20.

Poland, the rate of practice which was the highest in Europe with 85 to 90 % in the early 1990s, also has decreased sharply to about 65%.[423]

Furthermore, the number of baptisms, confirmations, and marriages, which are indicative of the health of the Church and of its future, have been declining since 1992 in those three countries.[424] These figures as well as the disappointing results of Christian democratic forces represent symptoms of the declining prestige of the Church. The latter can be blamed upon the difficult time the Catholic Church has had finding its place in a democratic environment. Several reasons explain this turn of events: the return of a church-state logic, tendencies toward triumphalism, manicheism and materialism, the legacy of years of mobilization, a reemergence of internal divisions within the Church, the parting of the way with secular and lay elites and the demobilization of civil society itself.

With the collapse of communism, the Catholic hierarchy in Poland, the Czech lands, Slovakia and the Vatican aimed at reestablishing normal institutional relations. The Vatican restored diplomatic relationships with Poland and Czechoslovakia.[425] As to the new eastern European authorities, they reinstated the juridical personality of the Catholic Church. Poland started this process when the Sejm passed three laws pertaining to church-state relationships on May 17, 1989.[426] Similar decisions were

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[423] Hanna Dangel Dowling, "Polish Elections," *The Irish Times*, Lexis-Nexis, November 29, 1995.
[424] See tables in *Annuarium Statisticum* Ecclesiae (Vatican City: Secretaria Status, 1994), 317.
[425] Peter Martin, "Czechoslovakia and the Vatican: Restoring Relations," *Report on Eastern Europe* (March 23, 1990), 8-10.
[426] The first law (no. 154) was dealing with the State's attitude toward the Catholic Church, the second law (law no. 155) with the guarantees of freedom of conscience and

taken in Czechoslovakia, where a bill of fundamental rights and liberties and a law on freedom of religion were adopted respectively in January 9, 1991 and July 4, 1991.[427] All these texts proclaimed more or less a right to profess one's faith freely, a right to set up and run charitable organizations, confessional schools, and seminaries -in short, at reestablishing all that had been taken away by communism. The Catholic Church could have accepted these laws and gone quietly to take care of matters of great urgency, such as providing relief in the domain of health and social welfare.

Instead, in each of these three countries, the Catholic Church decided to retain a high profile and to participate actively in the public sphere. First, it has been really hard for certain priests or bishops who used to be involved in the struggle against communism to accept the end of an era. Psychologically, it can be troublesome to stop being at the heart of political action. In the case of Poland, the historical legacy especially of the last two centuries make the attempt to brake traditional habits of involvement extremely difficult. As Bishop Pieronek, who has been portrayed as one of the bishops most well disposed with regard to democracy, explained: "The Church has always played a political role in Poland -and not always of our free will. During the communist era, the Church was forced to act in self defense. Now our critics would like to push us into the private sphere, and this we do not accept."[428]

Leaving the limelight becomes all the more difficult as the Catholic contribution to the collapse of communism has provoked attitudes of triumphalism. Similarly to the

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religion, and the third (law no. 156) solved the issue of social security insurance of Church personnel.

[427] Peter Martin, "The New Law on Freedom of Religion and the Churches," *Report on Eastern Europe* (September 6, 1991), 16-20.

dissidents, who took the defeat of the communists for granted, certain members of the clergy have self indulged into arrogance. They came to believe that their past actions gave them the right to impose their views. They thought the Church's resistance conferred it the right to guide post-communist societies. Such attitudes mostly resulted from the legacy of years of mobilization. And even when priests have accepted this new fact of life, citizens disoriented by the nature of pluralist politics have come to them in search of comforting pieces of advice.[429]

Second, it has been equally hard for the Catholic hierarchy, especially in Poland, not to fall into the institutional trap of church-state relationships. As the Church reconstituted its hierarchy in Polish, Czech and Slovak lands, and recovered a legal status, the democratic environment has facilitated a return into the comfort of the institutional game. In countries where the spiritual lessons of Vatican II have not penetrated the eastern churches in any depth and even have been resisted at times, the institutional logic appears more familiar and less threatening than the focus on civil society. Even though the logic of emphasizing civil society proved successful during the struggle of communism, it applied to an extraordinary set of circumstances. The return of freedom, for many, has meant an attempt to revive traditional patterns of behavior. The Catholic hierarchy has had misgivings about expanding further the impact of Vatican II. Compared to the vitality of the Polish Church, to many eastern European clerics, the pronounced secularization observed in countries like France and

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[428] Tom Hundley, "Post Communist Poland Debates Influence of the Catholic Church," *Chicago Tribune*, Lexis-Nexis, November 10, 1994.
[429] Interview with Father Krzysztof, February 23, 1995, Kraków.

the Netherlands is a reminder of the damages apparently caused by the conciliar reforms. Hence, they are reluctant to follow the logic of Vatican II to its very end.

The return to a pattern of church-state relations unfortunately has antagonized both elites and societies. In the Czech Republic, it is the issue of property restitution which proved the downfall of the Church. The Catholic hierarchy indeed angered the Czech population and the new regime by insisting upon the return of properties, which had been confiscated after World War II. The rationale of the resurrected Czech Catholic leadership was that without its properties, the Church could not fulfill its charitable and religious mission. In 1990 and 1991, the new regime adopted a series of legislations to tackle the controversial issue of restitution of properties. With the passage of law no. 298 on July 19, 1990 and two additional amendments in 1990 and 1991, the Church was given back 268 monasteries. Although its leaders had affirmed the unwillingness to have all former Church properties and estates returned,[430] because it would have been a heavy burden to sustain, the Czech Catholic hierarchy requested the return of Prague's St. Vitus Cathedral and other land properties.[431] The inability of the government to settle these issues and the insistence of the Catholic Church to ask for 175,000 hectares of land and numerous buildings contributed to give an impression of greed. While the discourse of the Church warned against the dangers of materialism, it seemed to fall prey to this very problem. It did not matter whether many of these properties were and are financial black holes and in desperate need of repair, or whether they were used for charitable activities, the perception was one of material self-interest

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[430] Martin, 18.

on the part of the Church. Hence, its demands have fueled anticlerical sentiments in the Czech Republic.[432] Criticisms against the material condition of the Church have been raised in Poland as well. In a period of economic difficulties where the average Pole struggles to find an apartment, buy a car or make ends meet, the vision of a clergy owning numerous buildings quite often located at the center of the city, as in Kraków, or driving nicer cars have created tensions and resentment.

Furthermore, in Poland the leaders of the Polish Church have run the gamut of possible interference in the political realm. After securing the material and financial position of the Church with the passage of a 1989 law, the Polish hierarchy has picked a series of controversial issues, such as the adoption of a restrictive law on abortion, the passing of a legislation on the recognition of Christian values by radio and television broadcasts, the signature of a Concordat between the Polish State and the Holy See, the issue of separation of church and state, and the *invocatio dei* in the preamble of the constitution.[433]

In fact, the Catholic Church can easily be described as one of the most powerful interest groups in Poland. In the instance of the constitutional debate, the Church has monitored carefully the discussions in the parliament. It has maintained a permanent

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[431] Land properties, about 200,000 hectares, were confiscated for the most part during the 1947 land reform. The legislation on restitution of properties in 1990 and 1991 only covered the period after February 25, 1948.

[432] In Slovakia, the speedily handling of property restitution by the new sovereign state avoided the type of tensions. A law on the restitution of Church property was passed in the Fall of 1993. See Sharon Fisher, "Church Stance on Slovak Politics Brings Troubled Relations," *Transition* (April 5, 1996), 39.

[433] For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see Sabrina Ramet, *Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Rebecca Pasini, *The Political Strategy of the*

observer in the constitutional commission to follow negotiations over the various drafts in circulation, while making its suggestions readily available to politicians.[434] Even more contentious has been the political intrusion during election times. It all started with the 1989 Polish elections, when the Catholic Church provided extensive logistical support to Solidarity, from collecting signatures after putting Solidarity candidates on an official list, to helping with transportation and accommodation through the blessing of candidates.[435] After years of political involvement, it has been difficult for some priests and bishops to resist the temptation of using the religious pulpit to offer guiding principles. In the Fall of 1991, on the eve of the presidential elections, a pastoral letter offered some criteria to help citizens to choose proper candidates. Polish bishops asked Catholics to vote "only [for] those political groups that [favored] protection of life from the moment of conception, that [respected] family rights, and that [demonstrated] by their activities deep concern about Poland and respect for tradition stemming from Christian roots."[436] By 1995, the bishops had abandoned subtle metaphors and did not hesitate to warn the population in two pastoral letters of the dangers of electing a reformed communist in the person of Kwasniewski. Commenting on the Church position, Bishop Pieronek, secretary of the episcopate simply explained:

Roman Catholic Church in Post-Communist Poland (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1996).

[434] It is worth noting that the question of the Church's position in the new institutional framework was so significant and controversial that in working documents of the constitutional draft its stance was listed in a separate section following parties' views. See *Working Document of the Polish Constitution*, 1995, photocopy, 10.

[435] For an extensive analysis of this role, see Krzysztof Kósela, "The Polish Catholic Church," *Religion in Communist Lands* 1 and 2 (Summer 1991), 124-37.

[436] Stephen Engelberg, "Polish Bishops Try to Regain their Political Role," *New York Times*, 21 October 1991.

> We fear a dramatic situation in which the configuration that was raised in a totalitarian system and that was part of the totalitarian leadership wants to take over power in our country (sic). What guarantees can we expect from people who had time enough to prove that they have ridded themselves of totalitarian habits, but who, it is clear, have not done this?[437]

Former activists, such as Father Jankowski in Gdańsk, even overtly called voters to vote for Wałesa in the second round of these presidential elections.[438]

In order to push these issues along, the Polish clergy has not spared its efforts to lobby political leaders and to influence both policy-making and the constitutional debate. That strategy, however, backfired, for it fueled a growing polarization in these eastern European societies. It occurred at a time when both elites and masses were experiencing changes of overwhelming proportion. The former underwent a pluralist differentiation. In more prosaic terms, elites abandoned their strategy of unity for the defense of various world-views. This elite fragmentation was shortly followed by a process of displacement, where the "revolutionaries of the first hours" were supplanted by more pragmatic and entrepreneurial leaders. In other words, dissident elites, which once had been sympathetic to the Catholic discourse, were disappearing from political positions of prominence. Politics became more pluralistic.

As to the masses, they became confronted with the challenges of economic and social restructuring required by the logic of free market economy. More to the point, the whole environment surrounding the Church was shifting, as both elites and masses entered the world of liberal democracy. As dissidents found out painfully, manichean

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[437] Interview with Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek by Cesary Gmyz in *Życie Warszawy* cited by FBIS-EEU (95-182), September 20, 1995, 46.
[438] "Church Behavior on Election Day," *Gazeta Wyborcza* November 6, 1995, 5 reported in FBIS -EEU (95-215), November 7, 1995, 33.

views of the world inherited from the struggle against communism, as well as the defense of moral values and of the transcendent do not fare well in a democratic context. In the world of liberal democracies, absolutism can be counterproductive. The insistence of the Polish clergy, for instance, to portray reformed communists as willing to restore the old system at a time when changes in society had reached a point of no return proved self-defeating. Contrary to the communist era, there are no more black and white answers, because eastern European polities have become more complex. As Martin Palouš remarked, "in the past, the Church was confronted with simple questions." It had to stand up against the communist challenge. The battle was staged in the straightforward "us" vs. "them" dichotomy. "Now it has to confront much more complex issues. And it has to assess how uncompromising views fit in a pluralist world."[439] This realization must come at the very time, where the Church must learn to share the spotlight. It is no longer the only voice in the public sphere, but it has to compete to get its point across. Part of the problem for the Church is that decades of communism have forced members of the clergy to develop a pronounced manichean world-view, while they acted for the salvation of Poland and Eastern Europe. And like the former dissidents, these religious leaders find it hard to shake their way of thinking. Such attempts are even more difficult for them, because the very mission of the Church is to announce the truth. And the truth does not accommodate itself easily to a world of multiple shades of gray.

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[439] Interview with Martin Palouš, former spokesman for Charter 77, currently professor of philosophy at Charles University in Prague, and Chairman of the Czech Helsinki Committee on Human Rights, December 14, 1994, Prague.

The inability of certain priests or bishops to adapt to this new environment consequently has caused divisions within the Church. It also forced moderate Christian political elites to dissent. Crusades in the name of the unborn, rallying support in favor of the *invocatio dei* in the preamble to the constitution, or defending the cause of nationalism have driven a wedge between religious and lay Catholic elites. In Slovakia, for instance, the issue of Slovak sovereignty literally pulled apart former underground allies. As Czechs and Slovaks embarked on the road toward democracy and free market economy in the early 1990s, they also realized the existence of differences. These crystallized around the issue of nationalism. First fanned by the hyphen war,[440] and later by the constitutional debate over the Federation, the principle of sovereignty came to shape the discourse in the Slovak public sphere. Sharp dividing lines emerged between federalists and nationalists. With the ascent of a nationalist faction in its ranks, the Church fell victim to this growing polarization in the polity. The nationalist wing in the Catholic clergy led by Bishop Korec himself, voiced its active support for Slovak independence. This stance did not just take the form of public declarations. It also included symbolic acts such as the ringing of the bells on the day of the declaration of

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[440] The Hyphen war refers to the dispute, which erupted in the Spring of 1990 between Czechs and Slovaks, when the new authorities decided to change the name of the country from "the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic" to "the Czechoslovak Republic." Similarly to its neighbors, the new Czechoslovak regime was anxious to eliminate any reminder of the communist era. However, the elimination of the term "socialist" reopened the constitutional question. Slovaks saw an opportunity to have the distinct but equal nature of the Slovak nation recognized-albeit in a purely symbolic manner. The proponents of this view argued in favor of placing an hyphen between the words "Czecho" and "Slovakia." The debate over the question of this punctuation became so intense that some Slovaks demonstrated their frustration in the streets of Bratislava. See Carol Skalnik-Leff, *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nations versus State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 129-132 and Václav Žák, "The Velvet Divorce-Institutional Foundations,"

sovereignty in July 1992 and the first day of effective independence on January 1993. As a result of this staunch support for Slovak sovereignty, former lay Catholic activists, such as Čarnogurský and Mikloško, and their former underground friend Bishop Korec became estranged.

Although the leader of the new Christian Democratic Movement participated in unleashing nationalist forces, when he announced his desire to see Slovakia join the European Union as "a sovereign and equal entity," later on Čarnogurský moderated his position. The former dissident came to advocate a loose federation and an eventual, gradual disengagement from the Czechoslovak Federation. Such a middle way solution resulted in some pernicious attacks against the leaders of KDH. Despite their former involvement in the religious underground, KDH's chairman and his party were now accused of being anti-Christian. Similar attacks were perpetrated against the person of Mazowiecki and other former Solidarity members in Poland, when they tried to eschew the issue of abortion or disagreed on political and constitutional issues. The position adopted by some Church leaders and their most fervent supporters in effect strengthened the opponents of Christian democratic forces in both Slovakia and Poland. This conspicuous interference in the political sphere ended up undermining the very positions the Church tried to defend. It also contributed to the perception of an overbearing presence.

The impression of an ubiquitous Church was reinforced by the demobilization of civil society. After a period of a genuine explosion of civic activities in the months following the toppling of communist regimes, many people went back to their regular

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in Jiří Musil, *The End of Czechoslovakia* (New York: Central European University Press,

lives. As the economic and social impact of reforms hit home, preoccupation with moral values took a back seat. Like the dissidents, the religious elites did not understand that moral revolution cannot be carried over for too long, especially in time of great hardship. In the words of Szostkiewicz, "east central European societies simply showed signs of moral exhaustion."[441] After so many years of suffering, people were yearning for the material well-being enjoyed in the West. When the reality of drastic economic reforms struck and crushed the expectations of many, eastern Europeans were faced with a more urgent concern: they had to struggle to make ends meet. Paradoxically, noted Dominik Dukas, a Czech Dominican priest, who shared Havel's cell, "under the paternalistic rule of communist regimes, people were free of material and financial questions. Today, they are forced to tackle them. Henceforth, there is less room for moral and spiritual considerations."[442] The hierarchy of needs developed by Maslow indeed reminds us that individuals need to take care of their basic needs, before they can engage in moral battles.[443]

Signs of this demobilization can be found in the relative decline of voter turnout particularly in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the former, the level of participation went from 90% in the 1990 Federal elections, to 85% in 1992, to 76% in the 1996 elections for the lower house and only 35% for the 1996 Senatorial elections. In the latter, the turnout rate went from about 85% for the 1990 and 1992 federal elections, to

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1995), 250-251.
[441] Interview with Adam Szostkiewicz.
[442] Interview with Jaroslav Dominicus Dukas.
[443] Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Metamotivation: The Biological Rooting of Value-Life," *Humanitas* 4 (1969), 301-343.

75.7% in the 1994 elections for the Slovak National Council. As for Poland, turnout has been steadily declining, except for the 1995 presidential elections.[444]

The other aspect to consider in this perceived decline of moral commitment is that the gratitude shown for the Church's action was similar to that of secular elites. It was based upon the smallest common denominator, the defense of freedom and human rights. When these goals were achieved and the Catholic hierarchy went to its next agenda, support disintegrated because there was no need for common action anymore.

C. Concluding Remarks

In the end, the unfolding of events since 1989 demonstrated that the building of civil society does not happen in a vacuum. It is very much constrained by environmental circumstances. Henceforth, the action of the Church had to be affected by these changing environments. The displacement of elites, the socio-economic disruptions created by economic reforms, and the transformation of the political scene demanded a new strategy. The inability to adapt rapidly to these sweeping changes or to read their significance negatively affected the contribution the Catholic Church could have made in the consolidation of civil society. Although it participated actively in various fronts, it was its political involvement which cast a shadow upon the Church. The significant error of judgment made by both dissidents and the Catholic Church has been their inability to recognize that the nature of a civil society is intrinsically bound to its surroundings. As Aleksander Smolar remarks,

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[444] Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl and Boris Shor, *Nations in Transit 1997* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1997), 122-211, 282 and 339.

> The existence of a civil society of resistance was dependent on the existence of a hostile state that offered no hope for compromise. As soon as this state disappeared, the civil society that opposed it disintegrated. The revolutionary civil society is by definition a transient phenomenon.[445]

In other words, new circumstances demand a different civil society. Hence, during the phase of democratic consolidation, a new strategy must be developed. In a similar vein, Michael Walzer has explained that the state -be it communist or democratic- "frames civil society...[and] fixes the boundary conditions and the basic rules of all associational activity."[446] Thus, the Church must learn to adapt to the rule of pluralism. It does not mean the Catholic Church should remain on the sidelines, as society transforms. Rather, it requires the Church to accept becoming one voice among many; it also implies that the Church has to find by trial and error what are the proper avenues to speak on matters of morality. There is indeed a difficult equilibrium to find between a highly visible involvement and being relegated in the private sphere. The whole question, which goes beyond the limits of this dissertation, then becomes whether or not the conditions for such a balance exist.

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[445] Aleksander Smolar, "Civil Society after Communism: From Opposition to Atomization," *Journal of Democracy* vol. 7 (January 1996) no. 2, 29.
[446] Michael Walzer, ed., "The Concept of Civil Society," *Toward a Global Civil Society* (Oxford: Berghahn, 1995), 23.

Chapter VII

Conclusion

At first glance, 1989 marked the return of God to the eastern European public squares. The tale of the Polish and Czechoslovak democratic transition demonstrate that religion, and more specifically the Catholic Church never left. Adapting to the harsh reality of communism and changing international circumstances, the Church changed its strategy. Limited in its ability to use traditional church state relationships, it came to realize the potency of civil society. As the Church reoriented its focus, it participated in the reclaiming of the public sphere, and by extension in the collapse of communist regimes in Poland and former Czechoslovakia. Civil society certainly does not explain the whole story of eastern European revolutions, but has represented the avenue for a Catholic contribution in the struggle against communism.

The role of the Catholic Church itself in Poland and Czechoslovakia was the result of a unique and complex combination of factors that interacted at both transnational and national levels. As an international and transnational actor, the Church was in a privileged position to affect the dynamics of eastern European forces. However, in the context of communism, the Church did not really start making strides until it transformed its approach to international politics. From a purely traditional and realistic understanding of international relations, the Holy See progressively shifted toward a more pluralistic and transnational force to respond to the demands of one increasingly interdependent world. This reorientation led the Vatican to consider the strategic significance of civil society and the need to emphasize it in its discourse on the defense of fundamental human rights. That very evolution paralleled the slow transformation of elites in Eastern Europe. Disillusioned with communism, secular

dissidents went through a personal introspection as many of them came to experience the dreary conditions of imprisonment or exclusion. Reassessing their environment, they envisioned the need to reclaim the public sphere and rebuild civil society on the basis of a rediscovery of moral values and the transcendent. This strategy of bringing back morality in the public discourse aimed at challenging the legitimacy of communism. As their conceptualization of civil society and a life within the truth took shape, the path of these secular elites crossed that of the Church. In this process of self-reexamination, they came to realize the evolution of the discourse of the Church toward the defense of human rights. They also appreciated more fully the suffering of Catholics and the acts of resistance of the Church. The Catholic Church, which had been repressed severely at the hands of communist regimes, continued to stand for freedom. Even though this battle proved extremely challenging in places like Czechoslovakia, the action of courageous Catholics demonstrated that the Church stood for the very principles secular elites tried to defend. As a result, dissidents abandoned their stance of anticlericalism, which had characterized elite circles in Eastern Europe for most of the century. They were ready for a convergence.

Such a process was facilitated by a diffusion of ideas across boundaries, but also by the rather unnoticed mediation of a group of Catholic lay elites, who were strategically located at the intersection of the political and religious spheres of action. The process of elite convergence between secular and religious elites put a temporary hold on old grievances to allow for a common front against the communist regimes of Eastern Europe.

Yet, the action of the Church did not just affect elite circles. It also implied a commitment to the masses. The emphasis given to civil society was also directed toward the people. The nurturing of moral and religious values at the grassroots level, sometimes in the difficult condition of the underground, sowed the seeds for the

reemergence of civil society. Overtime, this action catalyzed the larger mobilization of the masses, which eventually helped to foster the 1989 Revolutions. As noted earlier, the action of the Church was not even throughout the region. It was constrained by its environment. Because of the harsher nature of the Czechoslovak regime, the action and the impact of the Catholic Church were delayed. For one thing, Catholic activists in Czechoslovakia did not really get organized until the late 1960s: many Catholic leaders were imprisoned in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and were not released until ten or fifteen years later. Therefore, no substantive religious activism could be carried until then. Moreover, shortly after regaining their freedom, plans for future activism were disrupted by the crushing of the Prague Spring. Because of the political climate following the Soviet intervention, resistance was restricted to the underground, and therefore was slower to develop. However, if oppositional activism started later than in Poland, as time went by it grew as well, and in the end the Czechoslovak underground largely contributed to the burgeoning of a Czechoslovak civil society. Several fundamental lessons can be drawn from these events.

First, comparative analyses should not be discarded on external appearances. Political phenomena are complex animals that deserve to be examined closely. At a broad level, Poland and Czechoslovakia seemed to have vast differences. However, this research revealed that at a more basic level, ideas, principles of action and logistical support traveled across borders. This process invited actors in Czechoslovakia to pattern their action on that of their neighbors while adapting it to their particular environment. In essence, no polity is so exceptional as to deprive social scientists from meaningful comparisons. Along the same line of reasoning, it must be added that the significance of a phenomenon like civil society should not be assessed solely on the basis of its sheer quantitative value, but on its ontological value.

Second, the Church is not necessarily a sclerotic institution. Beyond the imposing weight of its institutions, at its core, it essentially remains a community of individuals. It is those individuals, or at least a number of these, whose courage and deep commitment to the Church, allowed it to adapt and stay a resilient actor. It is the action of those clairvoyant Catholics, which allowed the Church to survive communism and play such a significant role.

Third, the strict nature of communist regimes did not prevent the diffusion of ideas across boundaries. Thus, even though Czechs and Slovaks, for instance had to adapt the Polish lessons to their particular environmental circumstances, some of the strategies adopted by the Poles found their way into the Czech and Slovak undergrounds. Therefore, there is no such a thing as a completely hermetic post-totalitarian system.

However, the 1989 Revolutions and the transformations which ensued, revealed that both the ambition of a civil society grounded in moral foundations and the Catholic contribution to the reclaiming of the public sphere ironically were linked with the fate of communism. They were environmentally bound, because they intrinsically represented a product of communism. The factors, which had brought the convergence secular and religious elites, and later the mobilization of the masses ceased to exist after the change of regimes. For one thing, most revolutionary elites were progressively displaced by more pragmatic leaders. Then, the socio-economic environment created by political and economic reforms changed the priorities of eastern Europeans. In addition to these changes, the Church failed to assess the significance of these changes, and thus failed to act accordingly.

The theoretical implications of such an evolution are manifold. First, it confirms a point already well acknowledged in the literature of democratic transition.[447] It indicates that there is a distinction between the process of democratic transition and democratic consolidation. A factor which may positively affect the former phase of democratic transformations, may also play a neutral or no role at all in the latter phase. Thus, the Catholic Church could provide a positive influence with regard to the building of civil society in the struggle against communism, while its blunders in the post 1989 era have been perceived at best as an inability to adapt rapidly to its new environment, or at worst as a threat against democracy.

The context in which the Catholic Church operates thus determines its contribution to civil society. The significance of this argument is revealed when juxtaposed to the reasoning developed by Robert Putnam. In his seminal work, *Democracy at Work*, the American scholar argues that the strong presence of the Catholic Church had been detrimental to the development of civil society in southern Italy. This study of Poland and former Czechoslovakia demonstrates on the contrary that in particular circumstances the Church can play a positive role. Therefore, the relation between civil society and the Church is not an either/or proposition. It is more complex, and very much determined by the structure of opportunities. Such an approach helps to explain why at various points in time, some leaders within the Church may have viewed the significance of civil society very differently. It is worthwhile remembering the analysis developed in our study of the Vatican diplomacy (see chapter three).

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[447] Huntington, *The Third Wave*; Dankwart A. Rostow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* vol. 2 (April 1970) no. 3, 337-363.

Indeed, the Catholic Church is a very unique international actor. Over the centuries, its leaders have developed a realistic understanding of the Church's interests. The shift operated in the Vatican diplomacy since the late 1960s was conditioned by a reassessment of world politics. The emphasis put on civil society was one of the lessons drawn by the Church and its leadership in the context of the communist situation in Eastern Europe. Yet, the evolution in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia since 1989 also indicates that the Catholic hierarchy can adjust its position, as new circumstances command. The return toward the institutional logic to solve the issue of restitution of properties or to influence institutional building or policy-making demonstrates this internal logic. To quote Gramsci, it simply confirms that "when it finds it convenient, the Church is identified with society itself (at least 93% of it), and when not convenient, the Church is solely the ecclesiastical organization or even just the person of the Pope."[448] In other words, the commitment toward civil society depends upon environmental circumstances and structural opportunities.

A second theoretical lesson to be drawn here is that the convergence and the temporary appeasement between secular and religions elites brought about the circumstances of the fight against communism, is also typical of periods preceding revolutions. Although the latter mark the apogee of a unity of action among opposition groups, they also indicate the beginning of a return to the pluralism of forces. Furthermore, revolutions have a tendency to devour their own children, and leaders who helped bring about change end up being displaced by more pragmatic actors. In the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Church has had thus to confront a new set

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[448] Antonio Gramsci, *Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press, 1995), 106 cited by Stathis Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian*

of elites, who have not necessarily the same interests. Henceforth, the factors which contributed to the convergence and the appeasement among elites have not proved enough strong to indefinitely reverse the trend of confrontation between secular and religious elites which has existed throughout this century. Once the 1989 revolutions were achieved, both groups parted way and resumed their divergent paths. The emphasis on the transcendent and moral values only constituted a moment, whose viability was soon to be challenged by the reality of power and liberal democracy. In other words, the ability to bring morality into the workings of everyday politics failed to crystallize, because propitious conditions for its establishment disappeared.

A third point brought to light by this study is that there is a transnational dimension to the building of civil societies. The export or diffusion of principles, such as the defense of fundamental human rights have proved essential in the thought process of many dissidents. The Catholic Church's discourse and the forceful message delivered by John Paul II have participated in the legitimization of the ethos of living in the truth developed by eastern European elites. The question whether or not the moral discourse advocated by former dissidents and the Church during the struggle against communism can be fully internalized in post-communist societies is questionable. Religious leaders, which once stood for freedom and human rights, find it hard to live by democratic rules. More specifically, they have a difficult time sharing the spotlight with other emerging mediating institutions. The challenge for the Church is to learn to be one among many, and to accept that in the world of democracy, it cannot always achieve complete success. Furthermore, the Church itself, in Poland, the Czech

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Democracy in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 34.

Republic and Slovakia has to accept potential criticisms. During communism, the Church closed ranks to stand as a firm rampart against communism. Therefore, there was little room for contestations. Not used to being questioned, like the rest of eastern European societies, it cannot simply go through the motion and proclaim to be for democracy without accepting its premises. It has to submit to the process of pluralism and play by the rules of the game. As Father Czajkowski remarked,

> There has been disappointment and disillusion. Many priests, a few bishops thought that harmony would last; that intellectuals would stay with the Church. But not all of them did. They followed their own path and even came to criticize the Church. That is normal. It is the logic of a pluralist society. Paradoxically, communism protected the Church from pluralism. Many thought it would stay that way, that the Church would be exempt of criticisms. Yet in a normal society, Christians should expect criticisms and cannot avoid them.[449]

Adapting to this new environment may be challenging, but as Szoskiewicz noted, it is necessary and unavoidable:

> The Church cannot be immune from this process of questioning. It can be unjustified at times, and even painful sometimes. But we are in a free society. Debate is good. And it is even in the interest of the Church itself.[450]

The real question then is whether or not the Church is willing to open itself to the world instead of transforming itself into a besieged citadel, at the risk of losing grip with these various societies.

A fourth fundamental lesson to be raised is the role of religion in the building and consolidation of civil society. The Catholic Church through its actions in eastern Europe demonstrated that the infusion of moral and religious values could play a significant role in a process of political transformation. It definitively confirms the relevance of religion as an explanatory factor, but also opens a wide range of issues. It

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[449] Interview with Father Czajkowski, March 16, 1995, Warszawa.

is indeed relevant to consider whether or not the peaceful revolutions of 1989 marked the climax of the Catholic moment as suggested by Huntington.[451] As noted earlier, the particular role of the Church in Poland and former Czechoslovakia was certainly the result of a particular combination of factors. However, the strategy developed by the Vatican diplomacy can certainly be replicated elsewhere, as actions toward Cuba and China have shown in the 1990s. It might not necessarily lead to the same role, as factors present in our three countries under study may not be found. However, it can certainly try to create a catalyst for action. Another relevant issue to be raised with regard to the role of religion is whether or not religious influences on politics and civil society cut across different religions, confirming a larger trend of religious resurgence. Until recently, it was thought that only Protestantism was conducive to the emergence of a viable civil society. This research showed that Catholicism certainly can do as well in certain circumstances. In this perspective, the question of the possible contribution to the development of civil society by other religious denominations might offer possible avenues for future research.

Finally, this research is an occasion to discuss the value of religion for a sound civil society and democracy. Even though the moral discourse of former dissidents like Havel, and that of the Church so far have faired poorly, it would be an error to discard the significance of religion. If anything, in the face of a dehumanizing communism, the Catholic Church tried to offer a reference. As communist regimes tried to eradicate the memories of eastern European nations, the Church led by John Paul II strove to restore a sense of identity. Yet, the turmoil brought about political and economic reforms

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[450] Interview with Adam Szostkiewicz.
[451] Huntington, 76.

disrupted the few certainties east European politics possessed. And even the goals of democracy and free market economy are presented as the possible solution for the problems encountered by these countries, it does not respond to the perennial need of belonging and identity. As Ralf Dahrendorf commented:

> Democracy and the market economy are fine mechanisms to avoid the entrenchment of errors. They make changes possible which do not hurt unduly. They are eminently reasonable ways of organizing our affairs. But they do not offer people a home. Important human needs remain unsatisfied by the institutions of the open society.[452]

Democracy and the rules of free market economy indeed by themselves cannot solve the perennial quest of meaning in which every human is engaged. By answering this need, religion can act as the basic glue that holds civil society together. More significantly, it can provide limits against the excess of liberalism, because the recognition of a transcendent reality invites individuals to exercise freedom beyond the confines of pure self-interest. In that regard, James Madison reminds us that the fate of civil society is linked with the recognition of an overarching and transcending reality. As he noted:

> Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe: and if a member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate Association, must always do it with a reservation of his duty to the general authority, much more must every man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it as a saving allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.[453]

To the extent the Catholic Church can learn to accept the rules of a pluralist environment and to be one among many, it can play this role, and contribute positively to the

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[452] Ralph Dahrendorf, "Morality, institutions, and Civil Society" in *After 1989: Morals, Revolution and Civil Society* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 57.
[453] James Madison's declaration over the Bill on religious freedom in Virginia; Cited in Robert Bellah and Phillip Hammond, *Varieties of Civil Religion* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 10-11; for a discussion on the theme of religion, liberty and civil society, see Greg Russell and Nathalie Gagnere, "John Quincy Adams and Civil Theology: The Religious Foundations of American Liberty," paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1993.

edification of a sound civil society. Part of the challenge is that the demographic strength of the Church particularly in Poland and Slovakia make it harder for religious leaders to accept a more modest position in society, and particularly one placing it on the same level and in direct competition with other mediating institutions. Part of the necessity of the Church to adapt to these new conditions, is that it can help anchor eastern European polities to the world of democracy by providing a sense of identity to people; by acting within acceptable limits, it can offer a refuge against the flaws and excesses inherent in liberalism.[454]

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[454] Robert Booth Fowler, *Unconventional Partners* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1989).

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I: Methodological Note:

In order to accomplish this study, it was crucial to undertake a field research. Therefore, the evidence gathered to support the argument of this dissertation is in great part the result of a six months trip throughout Europe. This extraordinary journey that involved stays in Rome, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, was fundamentally about retracing the steps that led to the collapse of communism. This fieldwork involved collecting primary sources[455] and interviewing religious and secular elites.

Since my major sources for possible contacts in east central Europe came from inside the Vatican, and because there was a need to develop an overall understanding of the politics of the Catholic Church with regard to Eastern Europe, I first launched my investigations in Rome. I conducted interviews with diplomatic representatives from the Vatican and from several foreign embassies (such as France, the United States, etc.). I also met with priests who had been involved in east European affairs at some point over the last two decades. The latter individuals were essential for this study, because certain documents are not yet accessible for research. Their own account of historical facts concerning Eastern Europe helped me to corroborate pieces of evidence gained from other sources.

In east central Europe, my inquiry mostly focused on setting interviews with leaders of dissidents movements (such as Charter 77, Slovak Underground, etc.) and

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[455] These primary sources can be statements issued by leaders of the Catholic Church, discourses, or publications coming out of the Vatican.

Christian (lay or religious) activists engaged in the struggle against communism. Elites to be approached were determined on the basis a combination of positional, reputational and decisional analyses.[456] Moreover, following the so-called snowball technic, new interlocutors were added to my initial list, as my respondents pointed to me individuals worth considering with regard to the struggle against communism.

In addition, discussion groups were organized informally in various settings (family circles, groups of friends, members of the Christian underground, etc.) in order to provide a richer and deeper account of everyday life under communism.

All these interviews were face to face. They were conducted in English, French and German in various environments. In a few occasions, some interviews were conducted in the native language of the respondents with the assistance of an interpreter. There was no formal questionnaire properly speaking. Instead, I developed what I would call semi-structured discussions. The idea was to allow the interviewees to retrace their own involvement in the struggle against communism or their own account of historical facts. Nonetheless, they were also structured around three general themes.

First, with the diplomats of the Holy See on the one hand, and the actors in these East Central European countries on the other hand, I addressed the issue of the so-called Ostpolitik developed by the Vatican and the impact of the election of a Polish Pope. I was particularly interested in the perception by both religious and secular elites

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[456] For a description of possible elite analyses, viz. positional, reputational, decisional and snow-ball technics, see Robert Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*. A positional approach indicates that the subjects are chosen according to their position in the chart of their organization; A reputational analysis implies that the fame or reputation of the individual determines whether it will be included in the study; and the decisional approach reveals that for a peculiar event or decision, certain persons are more likely to be influential, while in other circumstances they are not. The goal of the researcher is to define for which events they become relevant for his or her work.

of the significance of this event. In a word, I examined how this change at the head of the Vatican affected the everyday struggle against communism.

Second, I enquired about the actors themselves and how they understood the convergence and the settlement between secular and religious elites. Put another way, I wanted to get a better sense of how this evolution came about.

Third, I investigated the types of support provided by the Catholic Church in the struggle against communism. What resources -albeit meager- were made available? Did these resources come from national or international channels?

The fundamental premise behind this process has been that even in such complex historical phenomena, such as revolutions, individuals matter. Engaging in intense two or three hours conversations proved to be particularly rewarding. These semi-structured interviews provide a unique opportunity to grasp the richness and complexity of individual experiences. Whatever form a discussion may take -- sometimes a gesture, an emotion, a silence or even the environment itself-- it enables the researcher to perceive and understand the intangible. This type of approach became all the more significant as the subject of this enquiry, i.e., the collapse of communism, is fundamentally entailed a moral principle.

Beyond formal interviews and the gathering of various documents. I tried to immerse myself in these various countries to gain a better understanding of the historical, social, economical and cultural environment. Thus, this research also included direct observation. I tried to take advantage of everyday life situations by approaching "common" people in various surroundings. This approach was facilitated by my decision to live with Czech, Slovak and Polish families during my stay in East Central Europe. The intrinsic value of these activities (discussion within small circles, such as families, groups of friends, parishioners) has been to provide me with a richer

and deeper account of everyday life under communism and of the complexity of the changes that have taken place over the last twenty five years. Ultimately, it allowed me to get a richer account of the role of religion by means of a dynamic process. Such an in-depth analysis would have been virtually impossible to get through a quantitative or a purely theoretical study.

APPENDIX II: Listing of Formal Interviews

1. Vatican Officials: 12

Officials of the Vatican requested not to be directly cited or identified.

2. Diplomatic Representatives 04

Henri Cuni, councilor at the French Embassy in Italy, November 2, 1994, Rome

Slawomir Czarlewski, general consul of Poland in Lyon, France October 19, 1994, Lyon, France

Damien Leider, second councilor at the American Embassy near the Holy See, November 10, 1994, Rome

Fr. Antoine Wenger, Assomptionist priest, and former diplomatic councilor for the French Embassy near the Holy See, November 3, 1994, Rome.

3. Spokesmen of Charter 77 04

Václav Benda, philosopher and Mathematician, December 27, 1994, Prague

Martin Palouš, professor of Philosophy at Charles University, and Chairman of the Czech Helsinki Committee, December 14, 1994, Prague

Radim Palouš, former rector at Charles University, December 15, 1994, Prague

Miloš Rejchrt, minister of the Czech Evangelical Church, January 9, 1995, Prague

4. Members of the Czech Elite 03

Daniel Kroupa, signatory of Charter 77 and leading member of ODA, December 20, 1994, Prague

Jan Sokol, signatory of Charter 77, philosopher and son in law of Jan Patočka, December 21, 1994, Prague

J. Svoboda, Czech vice-minister of culture, December 23, 1994, Prague

5. Members of the Czechoslovak Clergy 12

Fr. Dominicus Dukas, OP., January 11, 1995, Prague

Fr. Fiala, Theological Faculty at Charles University, January 14, 1995, Prague

Fr. Tomáš Halík, president of the Czech Christian Academy, January 3, 1995, Prague

Fr. Jandourek, underground priest, December 25, 1994, Prague

Fr. Petr Kolař, SJ., January 1, 1995, Prague

Mgr. František Lobkowicz, O. Praem, auxiliary bishop of Prague, December 27, 1994, Prague

Fr. Philip Lobkowicz, O. Praem, December 28, 1994, Mariánské Lásně

Fr. Oto Mádr, editor of Teologické Texty, December 15, 1994, Prague
Fr. Jan Rajlich, OP., January 5, 1995, Prague
Mgr. Rakovský, bishop of Plzen, January 2, 1995, Prague
Petr Rezač, student at the Theological Faculty at Charles University, Prague, January 6, 1995, Prague
Mgr. Jaroslav Škarvada, former secretary of Cardinal Beran, December 20, 1994, Prague
Fr. Skoblík, Theological Faculty at Charles University, January 5, 1995, Prague

6. Lay Members of the Czech Religious Underground 05

Mr-Mrs. Jiří Káplan, January 1, 1995, Prague
Jan Pousta, student in sociology, January 10, 1995, Prague
Václav Vaško, historian of the Catholic Church, editor of Zvon and member of the Kolakovič family, December 22, 1994, Prague

7. Members of the Slovak Underground 07

Ján Čarnogurský, KDH chairman, January 30, 1995
Prof. Jozef Jabloniský, historian, February 3, 1995, Bratislava
Juraj Kohutiar, international secretary of KDH, January 26 and 27, 1995, Bratislava
Dr. Silvester Krčméry, physician, January 24, 1995, Bratislava
Miroslav Kusý, signatory of Charter 77 and political scientist, Comenius University, May 15, 1995, Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina
František Mikloško, former KDH vice-chairman, January 27 and February 2, 1995, Bratislava
Peter Murdza, member of the Commission for Laymen of the Slovak Bishop Conference, February 1, 1995, Bratislava
Ján Šimulčík, engineer, February 1, 1995, Bratislava

8. Secular Elites in Poland 03

Kažimierz Chrzanowski, member of Sdrp and secretary of former Minister of culture Aleksander Krawczuk, February 21, 1995, Kraków
Jan Turnow, editor of Gazeta Wyborcza, March 15, 1995, Warszawa
Leszek Zielinski, spokesman of BBWR, February 11, 1995, Kraków

9. Polish Catholic Intellectuals 08

Mrs. Stanisława Grabska, former vice-president of KIK Warszawa, March 6, 1995, Warszawa
Krzysztof Kozłowski, senator and former minister for internal security, February 17, Kraków
Zbigniew Nosowski, editor at Więź, March 2, 1995, Warszawa

Andrzej Potocki, former president of KIK Kraków, February 14, 1995, Kraków
Adam Szostkiewicz, redactor at Tygodnik Powszechny, February 22, 1995, Kraków
Stefan Wilkanowicz, editor at Znak, February 17, 1995, Kraków
Jacek Woźniakowski, former professor of history of art and philosophy, and former director of ZNAK, February 14, 1995, Kraków
Jerzy Turowicz, chief redactor at Tygodnik Powszechny, February 20, 1995, Kraków

10. Members of the Polish Clergy 03

Fr. Czajkowski, March 16, 1995, Warszawa
Fr. Krzysztof, February 23, 1995, Kraków
Fr. Kubacki, SJ., redactor at Przegląd Powszechny, March 12, 1995, Warszawa

11. Miscellanious 04

Roman Bartoszcze, political Scientist, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, February 17, 1995, Kraków
Pavel Fisher, member of the Czech Presidential Press Office
Grigorij Mesežnikov, political scientist, Bratislava, January 24, 1995, Bratislava
Piotr Olav Żylicz, psycholog at the Theological Faculty of Warsaw, March 17, 1995, Warszawa

Discussion group with young leaders of KDMS, January 27, 1995 Bratislava

III. Religious Signatories of Charter 77:*

Catholic Clergy: 13

Zd. Bonaventura Bouše
Václav Diviš
Robert Gombík (Slovak)
František Korbela
Josef Kordík
František Lízna
Andrej Lukáček
Václav Malý (spokesman)
Milan Píša
Bohumil Šitavanc
Tomáš Vlasák
Marian Zajíček (Slovak)
Dr. Josef Zvěřina

Protestant Clergy: 21

Miroslav Balabár
Zdeněk Bárta
Edmund Bauer
Tomáš Bísek
Danila Brodsvká
Petr Brodský
Jan Dus
Pavel Hlaváč
Svatopluk Karásek
Jan Keller
Alfréd Kocáb
Marie Matzenauerová
Bohdan Pivoňka
Petr Payne
Miloš Rejchrt
Miroslav Růžička
Jan Šimsa
Vojen Syrovátka
Jan Tydlitát
Jakub Trojan
Miloslav Vašina

Olga Valešova (unknown denomination)

* This list was reconstituted out of the official listing of the signatories of Charter 77 listed in Vilém Prečan, *Charta 77 1977-1989: Od Morální k Demokratické Revoluci*, 489-514



1.Political System
Before Communism



2. Political System during
Totalitarian Stage



3. Political System
after 1968

Appendix IV: Figure1
Civil Society and Regime Transformation

APPENDIX VI:
FIGURE 3: ELITES IN POLAND



APPENDIX VI:
FIGURE 3: ELITES IN POLAND



APPENDIX VII:
FIGURE 4: VATICAN APPARATUS



IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)











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