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A Reconsideration of "Christian Humanism" in the English Renaissance: Historicizing More, Elyot, and Spenser with a Focus on Tudor Nationalism

A Dissertation
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
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By
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A Reconsideration of "Christian Humanism" in the English Renaissance: Historicizing More, Elyot, and Spenser with a Focus on Tudor Nationalism

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A Reconsideration of "Christian Humanism" in the English Renaissance: Historicizing More, Elyot, and Spenser with a Focus on Tudor Nationalism

Abstract

I expect this dissertation to make a case for the necessity of historicizing the term "Christian humanism" to accurately appreciate the achievements of Tudor humanists—More, Elyot, and Spenser.

As a way of approaching the term, Chapter One tracks down its origin in the twentieth century and resituates its ideological freight in the English Renaissance by reviewing some of its important ideas. Christian humanism turns out to be an ideology in our time to identify Christianity in humanism, divinity or spirituality in man. The notion of human divinity evolves into a theory of human dignity, human cooperation with divine grace in salvation, and even political radicalism when applied to the Renaissance humanist. At the same time, the enterprise to subsume Renaissance humanism under the umbrella term "Christian" fails to identify the peculiar historical situations of the period. It erases the very real difference between various forms of cultural representation of Christianity in the Renaissance. Christianity had undergone a long journey of transformation in the English Renaissance, from the old Catholicism, to the Henrician Reformation, to the Elizabethan Protestantism, and to the Puritan Revolution. To avoid the ahistorical sense associated with the term and to specify each individual condition in the evolution of Christian humanism, I propose a differentiation between both the humanist and theological nature of Christian humanism in each distinct period.

Chapter Two addresses Sir Thomas More as a Catholic humanist, who represents English humanism before the Henrician Reformation and nationalism. Henry's break with Rome gave momentum to the development of Tudor dynastic nationalism largely centered around the monarch. It played a key role in transforming the cause of Catholic humanism in the interest of the nation.

Chapter Three sets up Sir Thomas Elyot as a transitional figure in terms of English humanism, caught in the religious and political drive of Henrician nationalism. He is basically Catholic but desires to take a vital role in nation-making. Elyot demonstrates the Morean Catholic humanism in transition.

Chapter Four defines Edmund Spenser as a Protestant humanist, whose nationalist cause is responsible for the Protestant cooptation of humanism in his work. In the age when the universal Church broke down and when the role of secular rulers became more
and more central to national affairs, humanist participation in national government was indispensable to create the mystique of monarchy and thus the unity of the nation. These humanists, who each fell under particular political, theological, and cultural regimes, reveal disparate strategies of Christian humanism.

As the conclusion of the study, the epilogue offers a summary assessment of the previous chapters and suggests the possibility of further reconsideration of Christian humanists in the seventeenth century like Donne and Milton.
Chapter One

Return to the Origin:
"Christian Humanism" in Its Historical Context

"[S]ince he has killed God, it is he himself who must answer for his own finitude; but since it is in the death of God that he speaks, thinks, and exists, his murder itself is doomed to die; new gods, the same gods, are already swelling the future Ocean; man will disappear." (Michel Foucault, The Order of Things)

Among the standard terms regularly employed to identify the spirit of Renaissance English literature is "Christian humanism." It is a received belief that writers like Sir Thomas More and John Milton chronicled a significant moment, one that inscribed the genius of Christian humanism, a cultural drive of their days. Critics generally agree that Christian humanists' concern for classical education and subsequent move to integrate human dignity with Christianity have contributed to the evolution of modern liberal humanism.

This long-established term of distinction seems to have recently faced a turn of fortune. It has lost hold of its special position in the Renaissance as well as in our time. Many scholars appear to be somewhat reluctant to use the term, some going on to disclaim the reality of humanism in the Christian humanist and to question its appropriateness as a critical term in the profession. Based on the recent archival research into More's public
career, Alistair Fox, for instance, calls More's humanist reputation into question in one of his books and in another reassesses English humanism as a whole. Among the several possible reasons for this turn, the general drift of anti-humanism today is not the least.

A disillusionment with humanity and humanism currently permeates in our culture. Humanism strikes as very puzzling those who doubt the presence of God or human values. To their eyes, God is dead and human myth is also being threatened. Thanks to modern science and technology, the secret of human nature has been unveiled: contrary to the myth of man as the self-sufficient center of the universe, man turns out to be small and insignificant within the vast and indifferent universe. The human animal is never free from biological restrictions and is destined to struggle with natural imperfections like desire and death. Human reason, accepted as a godlike faculty, betrays its control by social relations as well. Humanism provided a reasonable justification for the imperialism or colonialism of western Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Human deification in the image of God proves to be a fabrication constructed by humans themselves.

The foundation of anti-humanism can be detected in intellectual circles in France since the 1960s. Led by the generation of the 1960s thinkers—Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Barthes, Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, and others—French philosophy has relentlessly shattered the myth of humanism, forming one of the most influential intellectual trends of the present. In Lévi-Strauss' powerful statement from his 1966 book _The Savage Mind_, "the ultimate goal of the human sciences [is] not to constitute, but to dissolve man." This generation opposes the established idea that each sign has its own proper meaning. They believe instead that the meaning of every sign, including human language and action, is arbitrary and that relationships among signs are regulated by a structuring system. The primacy is thus placed on probing into the general rules of structure by which alone the meaning of each sign can be known rather than into the subjective man. Obviously, this school of thought differs from the subject-oriented phenomenology, existentialism, and
even Marxism of the preceding period. Man is situated in a certain mechanism like an object that can be examined and his consciousness, language, and action possess no meaning independent of that mechanism. The end result, as a critic like Vincent Descombes states succinctly, is that "the origin of meaning can no longer be located where the phenomenologists had thought to find it.... In the end, it is indeed the structure that decides what may--sometimes what must--be said on a given occasion. Not man, but structures are decisive! Man is nothing!"^4

The example of Michel Foucault (1926-84), one of the most influential thinkers of the generation, will suffice to establish the point in question here. In his seminal book *The Order of Things* (1966), Foucault follows in Nietzsche's footsteps and professes the death of man and therefore of humanism. He anticipates an event where "man will disappear" and where a new system of thought will come into being.^5 In Foucault's periodizing scheme,^6 "Man" replaces the classical knowledge system with a modern episteme--a system of ideas shaping the knowledge at a certain period--at the end of the eighteenth century. The order of words no longer represents the order of things, which is now determined by external relations with human beings; consequently, new studies related to Man as a new foundation of all knowledge like biology, economics, and philology arise. Yet this modern episteme is structured by an inherent contradiction. Man is placed in a position both "as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows"; namely, Man is aware of the fact that he turns out life, labor, and language but at the same time that his imperfection is "marked by the spatiality of the body, the yawning of desire, and the time of language":^7 Man cannot overcome unavoidable death; his desire is beyond his control; and he cannot master language, which is much older than he. The myth of human infinitude works with human finitude to ultimately demystify Man himself. By the end of his book, it is clear how Foucault conceives of human essence. His philosophical laughter characterizes his gesture of unmasking humanism as an ideology, the ideology of an episteme:

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To all those who still wish to talk about man, about his reign or his liberation, to all those who still ask themselves questions about what man is in his essence, to all those who wish to take him as their starting-point in their attempts to reach the truth, to all those who, on the other hand, refer all knowledge back to the truths of man himself, to all those who refuse to formalize without anthropologizing, who refuse to mythologize without demystifying, who refuse to think without immediately thinking that it is man who is thinking, to all these warped and twisted forms of reflection we can answer only with a philosophical laugh—which means, to a certain extent, a silent one.

This is the heart of Foucault's demythologizing message of humanism that participates in the humanist controversy. No doubt, his view of man is anti-humanistic. He plainly rejects humanist ideals as devices deployed for the control of humans themselves. Yet Foucault turns our eyes to body and desire, subjects that have been disregarded by traditional humanists and theologians but are constitutive of human beings. The body is Foucault's consistent subject and central to his critique of social institutions like hospitals, clinics, human sciences, prisons, and sex. Foucault consciously avoids humanist terminology, using "the body" in place of "the soul" and "discourse" instead of "language." In his estimate, the soul is not born but made out of "the effects of a certain type of power," and it is always the body, not the soul, over which power is exercised as the object of control in such a form as sovereign's torture or modern discipline. If we are to label him anti-humanistic, his anti-humanism should be sensed only in terms of his attack on the conventional humanist view of soul, reason, and essence. In this line of thought, Nancy Fraser addresses Foucault as a post-humanist, for his critique of humanism ultimately aims to liberate human beings from the distortion of humanist ideology. Foucault seeks to expose and warn against the enormous variety of ways in which humanist rhetoric has
been and is liable to misuse and cooptation.\textsuperscript{10} Whether Foucault is called anti-humanistic or post-humanistic, it is apparent that his aim is not to replace humanism by something non-human but to critique the economy of humanist discourse itself. One very profitable result is that critical analysis of this kind might unravel the governing rules and principles hidden behind the term humanism, thereby disclosing the term's historical and ideological freight and keeping it from possible abuse and appropriation.

If humanism has ideological bearings to be demystified, so does Christian humanism. Since its theoretical grounds draw at great length upon the very tenets of humanism, the term needs to be reconstructed in consideration of today’s anti-humanist perspective to renew its critical validity in the Renaissance; its myth related to both humanism and Christianity should be historicized. Apparently, very few undertakings have been made to tackle the problems of Christian humanism today. Studies on humanism’s rhetorical and theoretical aspects, however, have been well established since Thomas Greene’s magisterial work \textit{The Light in Troy} (1982). The humanist practice of writing and reading in the Renaissance is defined with respect to their changing aesthetics of mimesis, that is, to the way they make their arguments in intertextual relationships to classical texts as in rhetorical techniques such as argument \textit{in utramque partem} and the use of exemplary models.\textsuperscript{11} Yet the scholarly focus on rhetorical analysis, mainly influenced by deconstructive or reader-response theories, has paid little attention to the specifics of humanism’s theological and political aspects in their historical context. Besides its rhetorical value, Renaissance humanism is inseparable from the religious and political dynamics of the period, which need to be investigated. The relative neglect of scholarly effort of this kind in the current mainstream of Renaissance criticism is ironic. The practitioners of new historicism have tended to read literary texts largely in terms of political semiotics despite their claim for cultural studies.\textsuperscript{12} Attention is given mostly to institutions of monarchy like the court, to issues like censorship, punishment, surveillance,
and spectacle that supposedly represent power. New historicists have claimed that the scaffold scene, for instance, which appears frequently in Renaissance plays, is set as a spectacle, a device to inscribe the law on the body of the condemned, thereby operating to circulate the sovereign's absolute power. Because of this tendency, aspects of Renaissance culture other than politics have been relatively ignored. Inescapable is the absence of religious concern and matters relevant to it, including the Christian humanism that is intimately linked to the religious dynamics of the Renaissance.

This dissertation proposes to rethink the ideological charge of Christian humanism. We should respond to the present necessity of historicizing this term long accepted as quite natural in literary criticism, if we are to regularly use it. To this end, the dissertation tracks down the term's origin and historical context and resituates it in Renaissance England by examining its key ideas. Not knowing its origin, we cannot speculate as to the term's ideological freight, since a term like Christian humanism is not devoid of assumed values. This historicizing process expects to reveal some misconceptions incorporated in those values and thereby to provide critical guidelines useful to appreciate the real achievements of Renaissance humanists such as More, Elyot, and Spenser.

Christian humanism refers to a position that underlines human dignity in the Christian life, with its source and goal in the person of Christ as the embodiment of both Christianity and humanity. We can generally identify as Christian humanists all those scholars who accepted the teachings of Christianity regardless of noninvolvement in theological topics in their writings. In this broad sense, the tradition includes virtually all Renaissance humanists. In a more specific sense, Christian humanism is frequently involved in discussions of the pious northern humanists of Renaissance Europe, as against their Italian counterparts. Erasmus, Bude, More, Milton, and many others are considered to have applied their classical knowledge to religious matters. Studies of Christian humanism had been very influential in Renaissance scholarship with Douglas Bush of
Harvard University at the center along with many apostles like A. S. P. Woodhouse, Herschel Baker, and Hiram Haydn. For them, Christian humanists are defined by the attempt to accommodate the apparently conflicting elements of Christianity and humanity, like faith and reason.

Christian humanism originated in the early twentieth century and flourished well after the postwar period. It began very much as a defensive movement against earlier intellectual trends that had considered human beings from scientific and materialistic standpoints. The epoch-breaking works of Darwin, Marx, Nietzsche, and others of the previous century had changed the picture of man tremendously. Darwin's theory of natural selection, articulated in *The Origin of Species* (1859), put pressure on the conventional belief in man as a spiritual being. For the Darwinists man is animal by definition, his evolution simply controlled by the principles of natural selection and survival of the fittest. Another eloquent proclamation along this line of thought was Nietzsche's announcement of the death of God. He heralded the coming dissolution of Christianity that had long existed in western man's psyche. Still, the most formidable source of danger came from Marxist version of humanism. Labeling religion "opium," a product created by man himself, Marx sought to expose the materialistic nature of social structures and the inevitable alienation of man from them. The thrust of his rendition of humanism is that nineteenth-century capitalism had reduced man to a mere commodity, situating him in impersonal relationship to his once meaningful labor; hence, the ultimate goal is to emancipate man from the inhuman society of capitalism, restoring him to a classless one. The idea resulted in the Russian Revolution in 1917 and spawned Stalinism as a spin-off.

Generally, two reactions appeared to these provocative thoughts. On the one side, a movement of New Humanism emerged in the 1910s to 1930s that formed in opposition to the deterministic view of human nature held by scientific and naturalistic models. It was affected by the literary and social theories of Matthew Arnold and T. S. Eliot, with Irving
Babbitt, Paul Elmer More, and Norman Foerster as its leading figures. Human beings are viewed as radically moral and free, and human life as the source and measure of all values. They proposed to reinstate a morally conservative education grounded in the classics. On the other hand was Christian humanism. It targeted the materialist claim that humanism is incompatible with Christianity and that true humanists therefore are atheists. Christian humanism contended against this secular version of humanism with great vigor. For Christian humanist scholars, humanism was inseparable from the Christian faith. They counted faith in human spirituality as the true source of humanism. Their favored terms, like "soul," "faith," "reason," and "free will," well testify to the extent to which they were concerned with things spiritual in man. Man is restored to his dignity and spirituality once again by virtue of Christian humanism.

Naturally, Christian humanism was widely circulated first among theologians or theological philosophers. Their defense of Christianity must have been required most urgently in a period that tended to view in a negative way the presence of God, spirituality of man, and Christianity's use in actual human life. Russell Stafford, a minister, repeatedly employed the term Christian humanism in defense of Christianity throughout his book Christian Humanism (1928), a collection of sermons. While the term is not definitely established yet, says Stafford in the preface, by this term he means a primacy of the betterment of individuals and society in this world as a way of approaching the high mysteries of God. He demonstrates Christianity's value for the happiness of humankind in this world by arguing that Christianity does care about the human body, this world, and the education of man. As exemplified by Jesus Christ's embodiment of both Christianity and humanity, he notes, Christianity is not incompatible with humanity. Another defender of Christianity as inherent in humanism was Barry Ulanov. He attacked the solely man-centered deterministic and materialistic humanism as "humanism without Christianity ... paradise without Adam, humanity without Christ, redemption without a redeemer."
Jacques Maritain also called for an all-out war on the "antireligious humanism," proclaiming that "we did not await the interest aroused by the new Communist directives concerning socialist humanism to pose the problem of humanism." He instead put forward an "integral humanism" for "a new Christendom" that was simply another slogan for Christian humanism. Western humanism, to his eyes, was radically religious at its source.23

Douglas Bush's famous book *The Renaissance and English Humanism* (1939) set out Christian humanism as a critically viable term in literary studies, especially in Renaissance criticism.24 Bush challenges the established authority built by the Swiss scholar Jacob Burckhardt, who claimed, according to Bush, that the Italian Renaissance "embodied a rationalistic and naturalistic revolt of the individual against Christian faith and Christian ethics" and that the revolt was a triumph of individualism, a devotion to the rebirth of human dignity, which was a point of radical rupture from the Middle Ages and therefore of origin of modernity. Bush argues instead for "a historical continuity" between the Middle Ages and Renaissance, attempting to minimize the Italian origin of humanism.25 Italian humanists' respect for human reason, he continues, was indeed a heritage from Aquinas' rational theology that combined Aristotelian natural philosophy with Christianity in the thirteenth century. Renaissance humanism therefore was an extension of, not a break with, the Christian humanism in place since the Church Fathers. He also claims that Italian humanists were not pagan, but were no doubt all Christian, and dedicated much of their energy to the support of medieval religious orthodoxy. Renaissance humanism "was fundamentally medieval and fundamentally Christian."26 As a consequence, Renaissance humanism for Bush is equated with Christian humanism and is meant to harmonize or unify Christianity with ancient classics as his definition so aptly suggests:

Humanism in the Renaissance normally means Christian faith in alliance with God-given reason, which is the most human faculty. Humanism is that
way of life and thought which keeps man in union with God and above the biological level. It opposes both the irreligious scientific rationalism which would separate man from the divine, and the ethical or unethical naturalism.27

In support of Bush's theses of continuity and harmony of Christian humanism, on the other hand, Herschel Baker sought the historical dimension of Christian humanism in his book *The Image of Man* (1947). He described an evolution of Christian humanism from the Church Fathers like Augustine all the way down to Milton in the English Renaissance. Renaissance humanism, in his account, was a net result of the medieval thought system codified in Aquinas' natural theology.28

From this survey of the terms' origin and development, we realize that the term "Christian humanism" has ideological bearings that relate Christianity to man, that give a special accent on human Christianity or divinity in opposition to materialist or naturalist views of man. In other words, the term was mainly used for reasons related to a sense of crisis provoked by the left wing of humanism in the early twentieth century. The epithet "Christian" was coopted to distinguish the religiously directed humanism from the naturalist and materialist variations and thereby to justify the reality of Christianity and man's spirituality. Assuming that humanism is primarily religious at its source, Bush and others were able to locate a happy parallel in Renaissance humanists like Milton. Christian humanism was a cultural construct invented in a transitional phase from a God-centered to a human-centered period.

The term's twentieth-century origin and its ideological freight, then, raise questions regarding its usage in the English Renaissance. The term's application to Renaissance humanism must be historicized if it is to be identifiable in the Renaissance. Some considerations while undertaking this task:
First, there is a risk of anachronism when the twentieth-century term is applied in Renaissance situations. Christian humanism is a vested term in our time and its modern emphasis on human dignity or divinity might generate a distorted image of Renaissance humanism. Second, the harmony theory might produce quite a different picture when situated in the Renaissance. Bush continues to assert that the genius of Christian humanism lies in its effort to unify Christianity and humanity. Yet it is subject to examination whether humanism really did so in the period. Since Aquinas' justification of it, human reason has been conceived of as the site where human dignity is located, and this idea was adopted by Renaissance humanists. Nevertheless, it remains highly questionable whether they conceived of human reason in the way implied by the harmony theory, as the cooperative work for human perfection or salvation between Christian faith and human reason, or God's grace and man's free will. It is suspect even with Erasmus who is often pointed to as the most ardent advocate of the cooperation theory. Significantly, Erasmus finally returned to Catholicism after the famous debate with Luther about free will, to an attitude that puts human dignity under the strict control of Catholic doctrines. Furthermore, it hardly seems possible, especially after the Reformation, to address the harmony theory to humanists. The Reformation certainly held in check the ambiguity effected by the harmony theory, rejecting reason and free will as indications of human dignity and reinstating the rigid Augustinian sense of innate human depravity instead. Third, Bush simply assumes humanism's firm reality throughout the English Renaissance without any reservations. Preoccupied with spirituality in humanism, he just accepts as natural the continuity of Christian spirit in humanism and therefore pays little attention to significant historical changes in Protestant England, presupposing humanism's having no difficulty even with Protestant doctrines. The spirit of humanism endured, but many of its strands never outlived the austere Protestant doctrines of human depravity. If the continuity of humanism
is a historical fact all the same, we need to scrutinize the crucial transformation or adjustment of humanism after the Reformation from other angle such as Tudor nationalism.

1. Ideological Bearings

Inseparably linked to the issue of the ideological dimension of humanism is the long-standing controversy around confining the scope of Renaissance humanism: whether it should be seen as a general cultural movement that affects all aspects of life—political, theological, philosophical, moral, and others—or as limited to certain areas such as education. One can see Renaissance humanism as responsible for the foundation of all departments of social disciplines, a broad cultural movement like modern humanism. Another can view it narrowly as revitalizing classical liberal education. The limited sense is well established by P. O. Kristeller, one of the pioneering students of Renaissance humanism. He argues that Renaissance humanism never evolves a systematic philosophy, but remains an educational movement that features a limited area of studies:

[Renaissance humanism did not] originate in the field of philosophical or scientific studies, but it arose in that of grammatical and rhetorical studies.... This development ... finally affected the other branches of learning, but it did not displace them.

On the other hand, William Bouwsma objects to the definition of humanism simply as an option to the scholastic curriculum, claiming that humanism’s powerful drive for educational reform expresses "significant social change and even profound shifts in human values" after all. In the same vein, Charles Nauert supports the position that humanism’s influence, the spread of the classical culture, was visible in every phase of Renaissance life: "humanist influence was everywhere." In Quentin Skinner's more politically oriented argument, the appearance of a new genre of handbooks or conduct books is noticeable in
the Renaissance. With the rise of absolute monarchies in western Europe, humanists were hired to provide advice for the state and educate the prince and courtiers. The so-called "mirror of princes" is often used as a vehicle for humanists' political expression in the form of counsel. One of the most topical issues in this genre is "the problem of counsel," the difficulty with the humanist offering good advice to the prince at the risk of losing his favor in the corrupt court. The giving of advice itself, Skinner further argues, contains a radical implication. It qualifies for political leadership men of virtues achieved through humanistic training. Humanists put true virtue less in birth and title than in personal merit and excellence. As a result, the hereditary ruling class might be exempted from political leadership for lack of acquired virtues. Only the virtuous members of society, not necessarily the nobility, should be elected governors of the commonwealth.33 David Norbrook, another politically directed reader of humanism, insists eloquently on "the continued presence of such radical potential" in Renaissance humanists, poets in his terms who are politicians, a tradition that culminates in Milton's republicanism.34 The humanist radical position is taken as "an ideological break, a shift towards a more secular and individualistic world-view, [that] was precisely what was demanded in the mercantile city-states which had broken out of the feudal orbit."35

To answer the ideological issue, it would be profitable to trace the first use of the term "humanism"—Bush and other followers employ Christian humanism as synonymous with Renaissance humanism. The term humanism as such first appeared in the early nineteenth century behind the backdrops of the Enlightenment of the preceding century. The term, according to Kristeller, was coined in 1808 by a German educator, F. J. Niethammer, who held that Greek and Latin classics should be taken up in the curriculum of secondary education. Historians have applied the term humanism to Renaissance scholars since then.36 The term humanism therefore has a nineteenth-century origin and actually appears nowhere in the writings of the Renaissance. Instead we are only able to
spot the phrase "studia humanitatis" and its Italianized term "humanista." In his works the Roman orator Cicero (106-43 BC), an ideal model for Renaissance humanists, first used the term "studia humanitatis" as designating the subjects for liberal education--this use survives even today in the phrase "the humanities." In the late fourteenth century Italian scholars like Petrarch (1304-74), "the first modern man," attempted to revive classical literature and the term "humanista" began to be used to indicate a Latin master who undertook to naturalize Cicero's program of liberal education--especially rhetoric, grammar, and poetry.37

The revival of ancient learning was a response to various developments in every aspect of life of the day. The older medieval economy, the manorial mode of production, founded on agriculture, had been threatened by a new monetary mode of production based on commerce. Agricultural products, which had been on the increase around the 1350s despite famine and the attack of the Black Death thanks to the technological innovations of farming devices, wooling machines, and mining industry, needed to be traded. Money was used commonly in trade, promoting the expansion of towns, and consequently town-based wealthy merchants and bankers, such as the Medici of Florence and the Fuggers of Augsburg, arose. Significantly in this regard, humanism began in Florence, a city of commune, in the late fourteenth century.38 The economic upheaval produced a general expansion of trade after 1450. Also, the invention of printing in 1445 marked a historical event mainly answerable for the spread of classical learning, initiated by Italian cities, all over Europe. Popular education was made possible because many books were now more widely available, hence the wide currency of Latin and Greek classics.39 The cause of humanism was all the more advanced when many Greek scholars of Byzantium had to move to Italian cities with precious materials of antiquity at the collapse of the Eastern Empire of Rome in 1453. The fall stimulated Italian scholars, particularly the Florentines,
to have a general interest in Greek and Latin classics. The year 1453 or thereabouts has been conventionally considered the origin of the Renaissance and humanist scholarship.

A changing perception of the world and man, mostly in the area of education, emerged. Italian scholars started to realize the necessity of knowledge of human affairs in addition to learning related to theology. The new accent on liberal education challenged the traditional program constituted of logic, natural science, and metaphysics. Medieval schoolmen had made it a principle to take logic as important in perceiving and construing God's providence in the universe. Yet in the humanist's estimate, the scholastic method was insufficient to catch up with the increasing demand for practical knowledge about and skills in secular human matters. The nation's increasing need of specialists in human affairs as well as in theology, men well versed in such areas as diplomacy, law, and finance, called for a new educational curriculum where communication skills (rhetoric and literacy), like speaking and writing, were essential. The best way of achieving the skills was to study and imitate the classics; rhetoric, poetry, and history were considered the most profitable subjects to this end. Even theologians were advised to have a concern for pagan writings that would build up their minds for virtue and possibly lead to heavenly contemplation. Ecclesiastical authority was giving way to practical necessities that offered classical learning a place in education.

This background of the term humanism makes some significant points that command our attention. "Humanism" did not even exist as such in the Renaissance. The term indeed has no referent in sixteenth-century history. Renaissance humanism, as distinct from today's sense, is basically an educational movement. Exponents are simply Latin and Greek scholars and the very spirit is reaffirmed by the nineteenth-century coinage of the term in which the original educational sense remains intact. It is therefore only recently that this literary and pedagogical movement has become an ideological "ism" equated with the liberal exaltation of human nature.
Understood thus, the term is unlikely to pertain to a set of philosophical doctrines, nor be a vehicle for "an ideological break" as asserted by Norbrook and others. These critics take for granted the humanistic turn of social reform as a political theory that reflects radical middle-class morality against the established aristocracy. Yet it is hard to imagine that Renaissance humanism evolved to be such a powerful force that it was able to challenge the established order largely founded on hereditary and religious grounds. Humanism's political orientation may be recognized, but considering it "radical" proves to be an anachronism. Many ideas of radical humanism are tinged with its modern sense—modern humanism is very much an ideological movement that has its specific goals professed publicly, political, religious, and so on.

The Renaissance was a period when life and social values centered on God and were directed by the church as well as the state. Religion was not merely an individual faith but a cultural dynamic that produced and reproduced every meaningful relation in society, the way of thinking, cultural life, and so forth. As Fredric Jameson has observed, religion in the sixteenth century functioned as an ideology as does capitalism today. It is "the cultural dominant; it is the master code in which issues are conceived and debated; it is then ... the form taken by ideology in pre-capitalist societies." Had there been ideological struggles that drove the cultural dynamic of the period, they would be likely related to theological concerns. Indeed, a systematic and comprehensive cultural movement can be found more in Protestantism than in humanism. The Renaissance witnessed a global struggle for hegemony between Catholicism and Protestantism. The central importance of religion in Renaissance England has been supported by revisionist studies on the cause of the Civil War. According to John Morrill, the driving force of the war is detected more in the religious discord than in the alleged political dissension:

[T]he localist and the legal-constitutionalist perceptions of misgovernment lacked the momentum, the passion, to bring about the kind of civil war
which England experienced after 1642. It was the force of religion that
drove minorities to fight, and forced majorities to make reluctant choices. Religion was such a powerful code that humanism never intended to be a dominant cultural
force.

It would be also mistaken to assume that the new curriculum proposed by the
humanists replaced the old scholastic subjects completely. Humanists might attack the
absurdity of the scholastic program, but they never claimed to cover the whole educational
program--only certain areas of it. They viewed classical education as a bridge to higher
education like theology, law, and medicine, the standard medieval disciplines; the
traditional subjects remained at the center of Renaissance education. Humanism and
scholasticism, in Kristeller's statement, went together in university education. They
competitively "coexisted and developed all the way through and beyond the Renaissance
period as different branches of learning." It is well known that Copernicus had taught the
earth's rotation on its axis and revolution around the sun much earlier than he published his
book *On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres* in 1543. Yet significantly, the scholastic
world view remained strong until the later seventeenth century when a new physical
science, not the humanistic educational reform, took the place of Aristotelian natural
philosophy. It should be noted that Milton had kept his world view basically predicated on
the Ptolemaic system.

As reviewed, the attempt to link Christian humanism to political ideology is
anachronistic. The humanistic educational program was protean in its political potential, but
it did not develop into a new philosophical movement, nor a political ideology that would
supersede the current master code of theology. It remained principally an educational and
literary movement. Renaissance humanists conformed to the needs of the monarchs and the
established churches rather than evolved their ideas of virtues into a force to displace social
order. They must have been critical of absurd practices of the church and the state, but did
not challenge the existing hierarchical order represented by those institutions. Classical
learning appeared to be a vehicle to carry out education of the young for a higher goal of
attaining the ideal of the Christian commonwealth. Fox even argues that once the
differences between humanists have been properly established, it is hard to see that they
formed any "movement" at all, at the same time claiming that the Henrician Reformation
forced humanists to restrict themselves to either educational matters or religious concerns:

[T]here can be no doubt that humanism furnished a new ideal of what
constituted a gentleman, and that humanistic education prepared young men
for public life by training them in manners, virtue, and eloquence. But
whether humanism itself exercised any direct--as distinct from indirect--
influence on political decisions is seriously to be doubted. After the fall of
Cromwell, humanism had very little relevance to politics at all in the
remainder of Henry VIII's reign, except to qualify men for careers as
secretaries and pedagogues, or for writing propaganda.

2. Harmony Theory

Controversial in this connection is the harmony theory that claims to yoke
Christianity and humanism together. Christian humanist scholars argue that the humanist
emphasis on classical learning presupposes a regard for human values and an appreciation
of human faculties, such as reason and free will. With reason man examines alternatives,
and with will he chooses from those alternatives. Together, his freedom lies in his ability to
choose rightly, which would make him most human and therefore most nearly divine. They
appraise this aspect of humanism as human promotion to the level of working with God, an
indication of the elevation of human dignity if not related to the Burckharditian extreme of
the modern sense of individualism. The change of attitude toward man is indeed very
pregnant, for human values have been dismissed as sinful since Augustine. Yet they overlook the seamy side of the Renaissance humanist view of reason and free will. The liberal view of human dignity cannot escape criticism facing, for instance, the inhumanities of the so-called Christian humanist, such as More's severity with the heretics and Spenser's justification of the savage acts done to the Irish. Despite its attack on the positive idea of Burckharditian individualism, Christian humanism still holds on to Burckharditian optimism toward human nature.

If we think of the issue by distinguishing reason from free will, human reason had already been given significant weight since St. Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-74) with his historical effort to read Aristotelian natural philosophy, based on logic like syllogism and dialectic, in Christian theology. Aquinas challenges the established notion that human reason is the vain effort of a sinner to know beyond what God chooses to reveal to him, which is sacrilegious. In Aquinas' rational theology, however, divine providence is so related to human law that man can locate a rational basis for Christian faith by reasoning the rules of the universe and the defects of human law are corrected by God's revelation. By restoring his reason to its dignity, Aquinas undeniably uplifts the status of man from merely a sinful being. Yet this does not mean Aquinas accepted the harmony between divinity and humanity. He never forgets to add that there is a certain unfathomable knowledge of God where human reason fails, to be reached only through faith or revelation—faith makes things perfect. This limited sense of human reason under the strict control of order and degree in the universe and ultimately aided by divine grace was taken up in the subsequent scholasticism, developed further in the form of humanism in the Renaissance, and remained virtually unchanged until the end of the Classical Age. "The Great Chain of Being," where human beings are situated hierarchically between God and beasts, dominated the entire European intellectual picture well until the end of the eighteenth century.
Italian humanism actually began in some measure in reaction to scholasticism's overemphasis on reason's role in the educational program. Italian humanists instead focused on new disciplines like rhetoric for practical use in human affairs, which involves the exercise of the human will. By this, of course, they never meant to challenge reason's usefulness in learning, but to give a new impetus to the will as another human faculty. Kristeller informs us that Petrarch and Salutati underlined the superiority of the will over reason and that Ficino later changed his scholarly interest from reason to will and love for their vital role in the soul's ascent to God.\(^\text{49}\) Machiavelli also came to the fore as a strong proponent of the exercise of the human will, even though it is subject to debate whether he is a proper humanist.

The concept of free will can fall in three categories. First, free will is absolute freedom of choice. Man's choice of whatever he wants is not determined by any force, including the divine. This modern sense of free will is diametrically opposed to divine predestination. Second, free will is voluntary necessity. The will has no power to choose, but does necessary acts set by God freely with responsibility for its actions. It depends on man to respond to the divine initiative. Third, free will is absolute necessity. Man virtually has no free will. All is determined completely by God.\(^\text{50}\) The second and third sense of free will are compatible with God's will as predestined, which is passed down from the medieval period. Freedom in its proper sense only belongs to God. Man's free will only exists to receive God's grace offered to him, excluding any capability for him to do something for salvation on his own.

For the traditional theologians, man's free will is considered "the possibility of man's receiving God's salvation," in P. S. Watson's phrase, but the idea of free will as receptive ability seems to have undergone a significant change in the Renaissance:
The freedom of the human will was understood, not simply in terms of receptivity, but as an ability in man to make an active contribution to his salvation in the form of merit.\textsuperscript{51}

We can observe this changing sense expressly in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-94), who pleaded for more capacity to man's free will. Pico asserts freedom of choice as a means to actively save himself, initiating the secular application of the theological sense of free will from receptivity of God's grace to capability of seeking it. His famous book \textit{On the Dignity of Man} (1486) is esteemed as one of the most excellent expressions of the human will in the Renaissance. Pico follows the formulation of the divinity of the human soul by Ficino who elevated the soul to a mirror held up to God and generated the idea that man could be assimilated to Him.\textsuperscript{52} Pico, however, deduces human divinity from his privileged gift of free will that can ascend toward the divine as well. According to Pico, God gave an injunction to man:

\begin{quote}
In conformity with the free judgment, in whose hands I have placed thee, thou art confined by no bounds; and thou wilt fix limits of nature for thyself. I have placed thee at the center of the world, that from there thou mayest more conveniently look around and see whatsoever is in the world. Neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal have We made thee. Thou, like a judge appointed for being honorable, art the molder and maker of thyself; thou mayest sculpt thyself into whatever shape thou dost prefer. Thou canst grow downward into the lower natures which are brutes. Thou canst again grow upward from thy soul's reason into the higher natures which are divine.\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

Man is no more a sinful being, but a designer and a creator of his self as a divine creature. He is a creature possessing God's image along with sinfulness within himself. He can either fall to a lower level of the brutes or become a godlike being in proportion to his
responsible exercise of the will. Pico even pushes man to take seriously all these "spiritual
and rational powers" because they are God's gift to man and to employ his right of free will
constructively to make his ideal for himself. The best Renaissance man therefore is defined
as one who is capable of using his free will to create his identity in a new world of wonder
and discovery rather than to simply play a given role as in the Middle Ages. The image of
God in man offers him one more divine faculty of free will in which human action is
justified.

By his assertion of the freedom of the will, Pico never aspired to challenge God's
authority over man nor to be blasphemous in the least. He never meant the modern sense of
free will, either, which denies divine predestination. Yet Pico's assertion was condemned
as an unorthodox idea by Pope Innocent VIII and his book was banned and never
published during his lifetime. 54

A similar case can be made with Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536), the "Prince of
Humanists." Erasmus is often addressed as the very embodiment of the harmony theory of
Christian humanism. His thought is often epitomized as humanistic theology--so-called
since his goal is to purify theology with the aid of humanistic tools. Erasmus undertakes to
achieve the true piety of Christian faith via purging the Church, including the Scriptures, of
wrong practices. He attacks superstitious ceremonies of the Church and schoolmen's
meaningless arguments based on corrupt texts, instead underscoring inner religion built on
individual faith and the Bible. 55 To attain this aim, he returns to the origin of all
authorities, to the early Fathers and Christian sources, and reconstructs them in a new way.
To construe the sources definitely, the aid of humanistic tools is necessary--the knowledge
of the classical languages like Greek and Hebrew. This is expected to lead to the true
source of Christ's thought in its purity. Hence Erasmus' theology is called "humanistic" or
"biblical."
The idea of free will is at the center of Erasmus' humanistic theology. As to the impact of the Fall upon human faculties, it is uncertain whether they are radically impaired or remain intact. Yet most of the schoolmen agreed, in Watson's estimation, that man is not merely animal; as a man, if fallen, he still keeps some images of God in himself. The real problem is whether salvation is determined by God's will alone or involves human cooperation. Watson observes:

[W]hat is this capacity worth as regards the attaining of salvation? Can man do anything toward his salvation without the help of grace? If he can, how much can he do? If he cannot, what measure of grace is needed to enable him?56

Very famous in this regard is the debate on free will between Erasmus and Luther. In "The Freedom of the Will" in 1524, Erasmus claims that a measure of freedom supposedly lost at the Fall was recovered at Christ's sacrifice, whereby man is able to attain eternal life (divinity) given the guidance of divine grace.57 Erasmus basically views man's freedom as a reflection of divinity in man, the development of which is essential in effecting Christian perfection, man's vocation in this world. This explains why Erasmus objects to Luther's idea that man has no significant place in salvation. Luther's notion of justification by faith alone denies the efficacy of the will in man, a denial which is equivalent to rejecting the divine image in man.58 In this way Erasmus is able to argue further, reminiscent of Pico's assertion of man's divine potential in free will, that it solely depends on man to respond to God's grace, so that he can rise up to salvation or fall to damnation:

By free choice in this place we mean a power of the human will by which a man can apply himself to the things which lead to eternal salvation, or turn away from them.59

Erasmus seems to make a great effort to harmonize divine grace with the human will, recognizing the role of free will for salvation. Yet he also never doubts the primacy of
grace over free will, faith over reason. He never considers the role of human faculties other than to reconstruct true faith. He speaks for individual faith based on the Bible and challenges the scholastic tradition which too much highlights reason's role in theology. As is indicated in his "Letter to Martin Dorp," Erasmus would even endorse Dorp if he holds that "all human learning should be despised out of love for true piety, and ... that everything else worth learning can be seen more fully in the light of faith than in the books of men." Erasmus is just asking for the recognition of the vital role of humanistic tools like "a knowledge of languages" to reach "a true understanding of theology." Cornelis Augustijn observes:

Erasmus did not intend in all this to magnify man's share in gaining salvation. At the beginning and at the end of the path to salvation—which is not, as it was in the view of the medieval theologians, determined by the sacraments—man is exclusively dependent on God's grace. As he treads this path, God's grace is the first cause, but human will is the second cause.

Erasmian humanistic theology was a target for attack all the same. His theology indeed initiated and stimulated the reform drive of the Church, but actual religious reform ran its course very differently. The age had to encounter a much more formal and professional theological movement that finally claimed to be responsible for the historical dynamics of the time. With Martin Luther's (1483-1546) posting of the Ninety-five Theses on the door of the Castle Church at Wittenberg in 1517 started the Reformation. Luther attacked the questionable indulgences, corrupt clergymen, and abusive practices of the Church. He also criticized Erasmus' methodology in approaching Scripture, the humanist exegesis of Christian sources. The issue of free will in particular became the heart of the debate between Erasmian humanists and Lutheran Protestants. Protestant reformers decidedly rejected the Erasmian idea of free will and insisted on human depravity instead.
Luther's response to Erasmus one year later in 1525, "The Bondage of the Will," turned out to be the theological mainstay of Protestantism. In Luther's theological framework, salvation is achieved by unmerited grace alone without any human cooperation. Restoring the strict Augustinian doctrines of original sin and the primacy of divine grace in salvation, Luther reaffirms that man is simply a sinner and that his rational faculties are destroyed at the Fall. Salvation therefore is not a matter of individual choice, but wholly dependent upon faith alone (sola fide). The idea is well illustrated in his famous metaphor of the beast and its riders, where the will is equated with the beast and its rider with God or Satan, so that the will (the beast) is entirely dependent upon its rider in either case:

The human will is placed between the two like a beast of burden. If God rides it, it wills and goes where God wills... If Satan rides it, it wills and goes where Satan wills; nor can it choose to run either of the two riders or to seek him out, but the riders themselves contend for the possession and control of it.63

For this reason Luther prefers to use the phrase "vertible choice" or "Mutable choice" in place of "free choice."64 For Luther, Erasmus' attempt to recognize divinity in man and to allow human participation in salvation looks presumptuous and blasphemous, for any such attempt simply delimits God's power:

On the authority of Erasmus, then, free choice is a power of the will that is able of itself to will and unwill the word and work of God, by which it is led to those things which exceed both its grasp and its perception.... [T]his plainly means attributing divinity to free choice, since to will the law and the gospel, to unwill sin and to will death, belongs to divine power alone.65

Luther considers the freedom of the will nothing but self-assertion that is in bondage to Satan.

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Protestant devaluation of free will is well supported in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English documents and literature. John Woolton, for example, associates free will with uncontrollable passion and sin in his treatise in 1576, observing that "directly against Reason, & judgement in the power intellective, the Will & hart do roush into al kind of mischeef, ... the divil addeth his poyson, sowing raging and furious affections in mans minde, and casting a thicke & dim myst in the vertue intellective." \footnote{66} Shakespeare's *Hamlet* (1601) can be a case in point that reflects the change. The following famous soliloquy of Hamlet has been often cited as one of the finest tributes of human beauty and greatness as a token of human dignity:

> What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god! The beauty of the world, the paragon of animals! (2.2) \footnote{67}

After these words, however, Hamlet immediately reverses his hymn for humanity: "And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust?" (2.2). Suggestively, detestation of human frailty is his sustaining theme throughout. Man might be granted the power of reason and free will, yet he is more vulnerable to satanic temptations than God's injunctions. This is certainly not about humanism but about recognition of God's absolute power and man's inevitable sinfulness. For the great physician Sir Thomas Browne (1605-82), too, man is considered both a god and a beast, "great and true amphibium, whose nature is disposed to live not only like other creatures in divers elements, but in divided and distinguished worlds" (part I, sect. 34). \footnote{68} An extreme case can be made with John Marston who intensely hates the innate foulness of man. His *Scourge of Villanie* (1599) is a savage reflection of Marston's misanthropy. Marston frequently identifies man with animals--goats, asses, and apes--and disparages the doctrine of human spirituality, "[t]hat souls of
men, from that great soul ensue" (VII), because he believes "Grace is infus'd/ By divine
favour, not by actions us'd" (IV).

Viewed from this vantage point, the conventional literary picture of the Renaissance
has a lot of room for reconsideration. The tragic heroes, for instance, who have been seen
as a humanist example of elevating human dignity, could be viewed as simply sinners to
the eyes of Reformation England. The heroes test the boundary set by their society, and
often transgress it, ending up with death or severe punishment. For the audience, their
assertion of the will and inability to control their passion are considered a danger to society,
almost associated with an act of crime. All human ambitions are basically considered
subversive and obedience is expected in the final analysis. Marlovian protagonists are
striking examples of the Renaissance tragic heroes. To take the case of Faustus, we can
find in him one characteristic embodiment of the Renaissance tragic heroes: bold and
unlimited in asserting his power of self, lack of self-discipline, and strong ambition, and at
the same time suffering anxiety, cruel torture, and finally death. Faustus himself is
confounded with the reality of this paradoxical principle that governs his life, raising a
question as follows:

If we say that we have no sin,
We deceive ourselves, and there is no truth in us.
Why, then, belike we must sin,
And so consequently die:
Ay, we must die an everlasting death.
What doctrine call you this? Che sera, sera:
What will be, shall be? Divinity, adieu! (1.1)

He ends his life condemned, the end result of his heroic self-assertion. He proves himself
to be a good demonstration of the inherent tension in humanism. Our sympathy attached to
him, driven by our modern sense of humanism, finally turns out to be misdirected. Human beings have their value only when they subordinate themselves to religious orthodoxy.

Of course, these examples do not necessarily denote predominance of Protestant theology in England after the Reformation. We should allow for a more complicated literary picture as a result of the incomplete process of religious conversion into a radical mode of Protestant theology. Yet Reformation England in general accepts the basic line of Protestant doctrines and the Protestant view of human dignity is principally skeptical and unsympathetic rather than harmonious and liberal. The apparent synthesis of Christian humanism is actually full of conflicts and tensions in the age of religious transition.

In short, the idea of human divinity in the faculties of reason and free will is not applicable to every humanist in the Renaissance, is in fact questionable even with Erasmus. This particular concern certainly attracted Ficino, Pico, and Erasmus who strove to strike an impressive balance between Christianity and humanism. Yet they never forget that the rational faculties are entirely contingent upon divine grace and also that faith is always superior to reason—in a way, their concern for human faculties might be incidental to their major concern, the study of the classics. The Reformation further undermines the applicability of the harmony theory to the Renaissance. It would be an overstatement to assert that since the Reformation the ambiguous and provocative assertion of human dignity or divinity was completely suppressed and submerged beneath the surface, but it is undeniable that the general current of Protestantism was unfavorable toward humanism. The harmony theory is only possible in theory; in reality it is but "a pure fiction."71 It turns out to be a myth generated by modern scholars' ahistorical sense of Renaissance humanism, a wish fulfillment of modern humanists for the harmony between Christianity and humanism. They overlook the conflicting forces internal to the theory in Renaissance context. The ways of understanding and approaching human faculties must have altered significantly in Reformation England.

28
3. Continuity Theory

Even this brief sketch of the harmony theory calls into question the continuity of humanism after the Reformation. As we have seen, Protestantism in general is not in line with humanism, so humanism as such must have suffered a heavy blow, with its assertion of human values being certainly held in check. Nevertheless, it would be an ahistorical fallacy as well to argue that humanism was arrested completely after the Reformation—it is still open to debate whether Protestantism played a key role in the progression or suppression of humanism. This position is refuted by the undeniable historical facts. We need to see through, as Alister McGrath argues, "both continuous and discontinuous aspects of humanism" in Reformation theater and account for the perpetuation of humanism under Protestantism from a different angle than do Christian humanism scholars.

We can safely say that at least the educational program outlived the theological rigidity of Protestant doctrines. In fact, humanist impact upon education was growing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Kenneth Charlton remarks, by the seventeenth century grammar schools were "fairly comprehensively distributed in both urban and rural areas of England." This development indicates that humanistic education itself was perceived as the way to religious reform even to Protestant reformers. In other words, Protestants saw that the humanist program of classical learning is very useful in reading and understanding the Bible, the exegesis of which is held as the key to Protestant doctrines. Classical training was also recognized as essential for university students to prepare for a professional career. We can catch a glimpse of the prevalence of humanistic education in higher institutions like Cambridge University in Lisa Jardine's report on its curriculum:
Under the reformed statutes, BA students following a four-year course focused on elementary dialectic (the humanist version of logic or formal ratiocination) and advanced rhetoric (proficiency in Latin grammar was the only entrance requirement—and even that was waived for choristers); they progressed through a program of reading in the major classical authors (Virgil, Horace, and Cicero, together with Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Politics) to natural philosophy (elementary science). To this was added some mathematics (bookkeeping), geometry (basic Euclid), and Greek, starting with the New Testament (providing opportunity for scriptural studies and catechism) and going on to some Greek oratory (Demosthenes and Isocrates) and possibly some drama (all studied in Greek-Latin parallel texts).75

This shows clearly that humanistic education was positively coopted into the Protestant frame of reference. Protestants found humanist studies useful as a tool for their own purpose.

Despite the steady spread of classical education, the humanist claim to human dignity seems never to become part of Protestantism in Reformation England. The strand of human dignity has to undergo a certain modification that, I argue, incorporates the budding spirit of Tudor nationalism, which recognizes the necessity of the humanist's aid to establish the nation. English Protestantism must make peace with the historical drive of English nationhood, which sets a new direction of humanism ever after.

The relationship of humanism to nationalism in the English Renaissance has received surprisingly little scholarly attention. Though often appreciated by sociologists, the historical significance of how humanist discourse participated in the formation of the nation-state and the English Church has not been discussed at full length in literary terms. Nationalism is indeed a relatively recent historical construct. Not until the close of the
eighteenth century did nationalism proper begin to be recognized as an important force determining the course of world history. Nonetheless, many scholars, such as Hans Kohn, Carlton Hayes, Louis L. Snyder, and others, have already appreciated that a movement to nationhood can be detected as early as in the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453), which withdrew England from France, confining English rule to Britain alone—the geographical advantage also played a part, protecting her from all attack across the channel. The Tudor dynasty united royal houses, centralized politics, promoted national economy, and built a truly national monarchy. Henry VII combined and stabilized the nation, laying a foundation on English nationalism, which was further intensified by the succession of Henry VIII. Scholars share a view that Henry VIII's (1509-47) break with Rome in 1532-34 in particular is most responsible for bringing about a consciousness of nationhood in England. As Snyder has observed: [N]ationalism began to take on its modern form in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries with the formation of the European national states. In the medieval era, one did not consider himself primarily a Frenchman, German, or Briton, but he was, on the contrary, a Catholic Christian with his sense of loyalty reserved for Rome. The sense of nationalism was crystallized as the modern nation-state emerged, when loyalty to country became the dominant political concern of Europeans. The urge was there but the formation was modern. The formation of the national state, indicated by the break of Henry VIII from Rome, was a basic factor that marked the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of modern times. In this new historical process, the Roman Catholic Church lost its dominant position in the governing structure of Europe and was succeeded by a combination of units called nation-states.
Recently, Liah Greenfeld has attempted to uncover the Tudor origin of the English nation by a thorough research into the evolution of the term "nation." Maintaining that "nationalism locates the source of individual identity within a 'people' as the bearer of sovereignty," she seeks to verify that this modern sense of "people" already comes into wide use by the early sixteenth century. The word nation ("nation" in Latin), in her account, initially was a derogatory designation for a group of foreigners as against the citizens of Rome, transforms its meaning to a "community of opinions" of students in medieval universities, then to a political and cultural representative, namely, a social elite in medieval church councils, and finally to a people "as the bearer of sovereignty" in the 1530s, the realization of which is only made in England. The changing sense of the word finds its linguistic synonyms in the vocabulary of "country," "commonwealth," and "empire" that was used identically with "nation" to mean "the sovereign people of England." By 1600 English national identity and consciousness become "a fact." In this way, the word nation is linked to the notion of "a community of free and equal individuals." The equal status, she argues, guarantees equal participation in political decisions. The idea of the nation accordingly assumes "the exaltation of oneself as a human being--a free, rational individual--and therefore, the exaltation of human dignity, humanity in general." This she sees as a humanist contribution.

The beauty of Greenfeld's theory lies in the fact that she successfully demonstrates the currency of the word "people" already in the early sixteenth century and identifies it with such words as "country," "commonwealth," "empire," and "nation" as an index of the pervasiveness of national consciousness in England of the period. When she goes so far as to link the notion of people to that of liberal individualism, however, she seems to fall into anachronism. She simply reads Renaissance humanism in a modern sense without any qualification. As we have noted previously, the link between Renaissance humanism and individualism is very flimsy. By "nation" sixteenth-century Englishmen might mean "a
people" similar to our sense of it, but sixteenth century nationalism is markedly divergent from its modern variety. Actually, the movement to nationhood is less geared to the needs of the people than to those of kings or queens; the nation exists more for sovereigns' interest than those of the people. Notice that a nation was originally founded by a dynasty that represents "an earlier conquest" through wars, marriages, or treaties, and therefore that technically a realm or kingdom was the property of the King or Queen—people who live in the King's estate as occupants became his subjects. There might be a linguistic process of transformation in the meaning of "realm" from the King's private estate to a people's commonwealth in Tudor times, but its initial sense still remained stronger than she has sensed. Elyot, for example, doubted the idea of a people's nation in his belief that the realm is basically the King's possession, and many humanists, including Spenser, maintained a very negative view toward the common class of people.

It would be mistaken, then, to identify Tudor nationalism too strongly with the modern sense of popular nationalism. The nation was still conceptualized as the monarch's private realm, or kingdom, and identified precisely with the crown. The age witnessed the establishment of a national church led by a strong-willed monarchy and the monarch's increasing power in determining national affairs. The court became a national center of gravity, producing government and politics focused on the prince. David Starkey identifies this situation as "the court politics of personal monarchy." The dynastic nature of Tudor nationalism also justified the growing concentration of cultural energy on the sovereign that transposed the previous forms of culture molded by the Church of Rome. The sovereign's personal matters, preferences, or desires had a commanding effect upon shaping the course of cultural formation. Tudor monarchs appropriated the cause of nationhood in their interest, as a result providing momentum for the construction of national consciousness. In a sense, Tudor England remained a precursor of the modern nation.
Nationalism of this kind—I call it "dynastic nationalism" as against the modern sense of popular nationalism—was, in fact, a general tendency with European dynasties of the time. Wars and marriages were waged and contracted frequently for family or dynastic reasons, say, to obtain a royal house of another country as in the Habsburg-Valois wars. The state was less identified with the people than with the monarch and his dynasty. The prince's personal matter was itself a grave interest of the nation. According to Hayes:

Nor were [European monarchs] at all scrupulous about confining their ambitions to peoples of their own language and nationality. They frequently conquered territory inhabited by "foreigners," and they bartered peoples to and fro like cattle.... [L]oyalty to king was associated with, and proved a stimulus to, popular consciousness of nationality.83

It is for this reason that Eugene F. Rice and Anthony Grafton go on to make an argument that "[t]he new monarchies were sovereign states, not national states. The aims of their rulers were not national aims. The state was identified with the person of the monarch and with his dynasty.... [H]is purpose normally was to further no interest larger than that of his own family."84

Highly suggestive in this respect is the nature of Henrician nationalism. It was primarily led by the King, not by the people, and motivated by the King's private or family matters, not by the interest of the people. To put it another way, Henrician nationalism evolved from more superficial events than is commonly supposed: Henry VIII's break with Rome was, in nature, purely accidental, totally unplanned, as a source of momentum for English nationhood. In matters of religion, for example, Henry never imagined himself in rebellion against Rome. He earned himself the title of Fidei Defensor (Defender of the Faith) from Pope Leo X for his tract for the supremacy of the Catholic Church in 1521, which denounced Luther sharply. Yet shifting his early position, he turned the tables and sought the aid of Protestant reformers later. The heart of the matter lay in his personal
problem, his wish for divorce and a new marriage. His wife Catherine of Aragon had given him no male heir, whose absence painfully reminded him of the dynastic crisis of the previous century. The dynastic problem for him was itself a national problem, driving him to dare to cut the papal bond that had tied England to medieval universalism and to establish a national church independent of Rome. With the help of Thomas Cranmer, the Act of Supremacy took effect in 1534, and Henry declared himself supreme head of the Church of England. The dissolution of monasteries in 1536 and the subsequent administrative reform followed under the guidance of Thomas Cromwell.

Some points regarding English humanism in this transitional period must be made before discussing the development of Tudor nationalism under Elizabethan Protestantism. A gradual shift in the direction of humanism around Henry's decisive action seems apparent. With the sharp and increasing sense of nationhood, humanists are asked to participate in the making of a nation, to attune themselves to the needs of the monarch and the nation. They are mostly preoccupied with the matter of divorce and the break with Rome. The humanist's literary endeavor is largely associated with propaganda for national government. More's execution is symbolic in this regard, since he denied the secular participation in nation-making. Elyot, who has a background of humanistic training similar to More's but eagerly seeks after government service, sharply draws the line, indicating the already transformed direction of English humanism. Utopia is built on the unknown, whereas governors live on national soil. By the Elizabethan period, humanism is virtually identical with English patriotism for many Elizabethan intellectuals.

The Church of England certainly served to provide a theoretical justification fundamental to the later formation of Tudor dynastic nationalism with the Queen at its center. The official tenets of the national Church became too constitutionally fused with nationalism to tell them apart. The Elizabethan Settlement of Religion reaffirmed Henry's and Edward's basic doctrines and laid firm grounds for the English church as a national
one. The 1559 Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity endorsed Elizabeth I (1558-1603) as "Supreme Governor" of both church and nation and established the Book of Common Prayer (1559) as the basis for national religious uniformity. This move indicates some effort to unify the nation with common religious practices on the one hand; the Church, for example, required her subjects "to be baptized in infancy and, as adults, to be confirmed and to receive Holy Communion at least three times a year ... in their parish churches." On the other, the Church provided some justification for sacralizing the Queen, offering her absolute power. One of the sources was the Thirty-nine Articles, which held key doctrines for her divine authority. Article XXXVII, for instance, affirmed the Queen's power as anointed by God:

[The prerogative] we see to have been given always to all godly princes in holy Scriptures by God himself; that is, that they should rule all estates and degrees committed to their charge by God.... The Bishop of Rome hath no jurisdiction in this Realm of England.

The Elizabethan homilies that stressed unity centered around the Queen also stressed that "the high power and auctoritie of kinges, with their makyng of lawes, judgementes, and officers, are the ordianunces, not of man but of god." Obedience to kings is imperative because they served the nation as God's ministers, so that it is not allowed "to withstand them, although they abuse their power," since this is to commit "treason, conspiracie, or rebellyon, agaynst his soveraigne Lord the King, ... [and] agaynst God, the commonweale, and the whole realme." According to Lawrence Stone, Bishop Aylmer in 1559 even proclaimed that "God is English" and this doctrine was furthered by John Foxe's *Book of Martyrs* that linked the accession of Queen Elizabeth with God's providence.

Specifically facing threats from Catholic Europe, including internal ones, the nation required a firm union centered around the Queen. The glorification of the Queen as a
unifying figure is an inevitable process to protect the Protestant nation. Some machinery of allegiance needs to be contrived to this end, which works to promote loyalty, obedience, and unity in the subjects. The glorification is well manifested in the cultural artifacts, such as processions, festivals, icons, paintings, plays, poetry, and so on that are commissioned to inscribe her mystique and power.

To design this mechanism, the national and royal mythology, is part of the task of the humanists, who can manipulate classical myth into a political vocabulary. Particularly in times of national crisis, where survival of the nation must be a national priority, the humanists are drawn into this historical task of justifying and glorifying the deeds of the prince to lend support to the sovereign's nationalist cause. As an invented tool, a myth—by definition, it represents the elementary economy of the universe or of moral and philosophical ideas in which characters are raised to the point of divinity—is frequently associated with nationalism. It is employed largely to express the glorious origin of the nation in the form of a historical fiction, linking the mystique of the nation's heroic past to present cultural bases and establishing a spiritual principle, namely, national identity or nationality, the essence of which lies in a sense of common ancestry. In so doing, it mainly seeks to draw the people's loyalty to the nation and the sovereign, or to implant national solidarity in the people, or to justify the state's policy or cause. Greek mythology suited the task of mythologizing and deifying the Queen. Elizabeth is frequently invested with the mythical authority of Greek goddesses like Astraea or Artemis. Her favorite goddesses are virgins like her, possessing both human and divine qualities.

The Queen is often depicted as having absolute free will and grace like God: she is omnipotent, capable of doing whatever she desires and of granting grace to the subjects, so that they aspire to obtain her grace that depends on her will. Salvation is in the hands of the Queen as a figure of grace. Edward Forset gives a clue to how the prince's will was appreciated at the time. The sovereign has a godlike absolute will and grace:
The will of the Soveraigne in the decreeing or enacting of Lawes, holdeth the like right as the will of the soule doth in the perfourming the resolves of reason. Allow that the Soule were now in his first cleere sighted innocencie, it could not will or affect any thing that were not absolute reason: So, were Soveraignes uncorrupted with that all-taynting canker of sinne, and free from every humane infirmitie, their will alone were undoubted law & Justice.

The godlike image of the prince often finds its literary expression in terms of theatricality. Spectacles, such as processions, are arranged to this effect, functioning as symbols of wealth and the grandeur of the sovereign. This is a new cultural feature largely influenced by the trend of nationalist deification. The ruler is expected to be a strong prince to establish a powerful government, one who knows how to use his free will and grace, how to create his royal self effectively. Taking the example of Shakespeare's play Richard II, Richard is disqualified as the King of the absolute state, for he is incapable of manipulating the royal theatrical power that the age demands urgently. Richard is punished for his failure in creating his royal self, losing his kingship. His tragedy lies in his belief that he can retain a king's divine power without any theatrical engineering of royal authority in a changing world. Shakespeare locates the ideal Renaissance prince in those like Prince Hal who can employ his power of theatricality to create his absolute power. Elizabeth is required to recognize this theatrical sense in statecraft and to employ it creatively and purposefully. Her sense of the theatrical nature of kingship is well known: she is well aware of herself as an actor, creating multifarious selves in a ceremonious way.

Humanism outlives the strict doctrines of Protestantism by accommodating itself to the nationalist cause. Christian humanist scholars have paid little attention to this alliance. Protestantism in an English context has to sanction the nascent dynastic nationalism centered on the prince, and for this reason its emphasis on human depravity makes the
prince an exception. Its doctrines contribute to the legitimation of the nationalist reign, allowing the glorification of the prince's divinity in a humanist manner. Christian humanism continues its life but in a different form, which needs to be explained differently.

In this sense, the qualifying label "Christian" blurs a meaningful distinction in the evolution of Renaissance English humanism. The umbrella term "Christian" erases the very real difference between various forms of cultural representation of Christianity in the Renaissance. Christianity had undergone a long journey of transformation in the sixteenth and seventeenth century in England from the old Catholicism, to the Henrician Reformation, to the Elizabethan Protestantism, and to the Puritan Revolution. More's humanism must have reflected a different quality of humanist culture from that of Spenser's. To seek to identify all aspects of transformation of English humanism under a single rubric "Christian" would be uncritical and unhistorical--one might use the term for a special distinction between the Italian humanists and their Northern counterparts, but such a distinction might be unnecessary as well because every humanist was Christian. Renaissance humanism is not intelligible without considering religious faith. To be a humanist in the Renaissance means to be Christian basically, including the Italian humanists, except possibly Machiavelli. Christianity and humanism are inseparable. The epithet "Christian" has little critical value that specifies the evolution of English humanism in the Renaissance.

In the chapters following, based on the above review of the Christian humanist positions, I propose to rethink the so-called Christian humanism in sixteenth-century England, demythologizing its ideological freight and rebuilding its original sense with a focus on Tudor nationalism. More, Elyot, and Spenser are taken up for specific studies as relevant to the present task. They are important Christian humanists of the sixteenth century, who struggle to harmonize Christianity with the new philosophy of man.
As a member of the first generation of English humanism, Sir Thomas More is probably closest to the conventional definition of Christian humanism. In addressing the disruption and ills of the Catholic Church, More recognizes the possibility of restoring Christian social order via proper conduct of reason in *Utopia*. Yet a closer investigation betrays modern misconceptions of his humanism. Behind his recognition of the vital role of reason in human affairs is More's basic stance that strictly subordinates human faculties under Catholic faith. Particularly in spiritual matters like salvation, he suspects the integrity of human faculties and restores the principles of faith and grace. Humanism may be instrumental in solving the age's problem, but by defending humanistic education, More hopes for the unity of Christendom against the current dissension of the Catholic world, revealing his basic motive as Catholic oneness or universality. To build up a cosmopolitan world in Utopia in this way points to a distinction between Morean Catholic humanism and humanism that inclines toward particularistic nationalism, which was developing as a new humanist culture where loyalty to country became the dominant humanist concern. More's final condemnation results from his confrontation with the new nationalist drive. To incorporate these historic dynamics and avoid the anachronistic association with the epithet "Christian," I expect to identify More's humanism as "Catholic," which promises to be more accurate and historical.

Sir Thomas Elyot represents a transition in English humanism at the threshold of England's emergence as a nation-state, that is, a shift from the universal Morean Catholic humanism to nationalistic Protestant humanism. While his humanism works with the spirit of Catholicism, Elyot registers a clear divergence from Morean humanism in practice. In contrast to More, he accepts the age's changing dynamic, attempting to remodel the universal nature of Catholic humanism for the specific national situation. *The Book named the Governor* chronicles this undertaking, essentially an anti-Utopian theory, from a nationalist vantage point. Morean "common weal" in *Utopia* is problematized as an
expression for a commonwealth of people against monarchy. Instead Elyot claims a "public weal" that is equated with the English nation under King Henry VIII. More's humanistic education is for Christendom as one big nation guided by the Universal Church, while Elyot's precisely targets the English ruling class to be the sovereign's perfect courtiers. Elyot represents Morean Catholic humanism in transition.

Edmund Spenser crosses a clear theological line from the previous Catholic humanists, More and Elyot. Spenser follows the basic doctrines of the national Church, which is officially Protestant. In his national epic The Faerie Queene, he sees things related to Catholicism as the Other to be alienated and destroyed: Ireland, Spain, and characters such as Duessa, Archimago, Orgoglio, Radigund, and so on. He frequently expresses the necessity of checking human will by virtue of divine grace. In principle, humanism is not a possibility under Protestant doctrines. Nevertheless, in order to admit the reality of humanism in Spenser, it should be explained and termed otherwise. In fact, Protestantism has to come to terms with the English conditions: the nation faces the unprecedented situations entailed by the threat of Catholic forces along with a dynastic problem. As a ruler Elizabeth must master a theatrical sense of power for the security of the nation, acting out diverse self-representations, including masculine ones. Spenser elevates the heirless virgin queen as having godlike grace and absolute free will, embedding her authority in her body. This process allows humanist license, the exceptional secular expression of the Queen's absolute free will, for the consolidation of the Protestant nation. From a frame of reference of Tudor nationalism, the Spenserian symbiosis between Protestantism and humanism can be reconstructed, which the Christian humanist perspective failed to notice. The nationalist strain of English humanism is initiated by Elyot and advanced by Spenser, so to speak.
Notes

Chapter One: Return to the Origin


4 Descombes 104-05.


6 Foucault divides historical periods into four epistemic modes: 1. the Renaissance knowledge system from the sixteenth century to 1660, marked by representation of resemblance; 2. the Classical Age from 1660 to 1800 characterized by representation of difference; 3. the Modern period from 1800 to 1960, which features modes related to Man; 4. a new episteme in gestation since the 1960s.

7 See Foucault, *Order of Things* 312-15.

8 Foucault 342-43.


allusion, and parody in a continuing literary history (1), thereby acquiring a new self-consciousness, "the historical self-consciousness" (270). With a more specific focus on reading, on the other hand, Cave advances a theory of creative reading in Renaissance literary works: "imitation as a theory of writing contributes to a change in habits of reading" (156). The Renaissance, he contends, witnesses a radical shift in the relationships between writer, text, and reader, largely as a result of the Protestant theories of scriptural reading and the rise of techniques of irony and paradox, which ask the reader to see through the intertextual network of the text (151). This reader-oriented theory of imitation is developed further in Kahn and Hampton, who stress the practical side of the humanist rhetoric that aims to morally and politically educate the reader. With an accent on "the activity of interpretation" (10), Kahn claims an alliance between theory and practice (prudence). Her assumption is that "reading is a form of prudence or of deliberative rhetoric and that a text is valuable insofar as it engages the reader in an activity of discrimination and thereby educates the faculty of practical reason or prudential judgment which is essential to the active life" (11). This is achieved through the humanist rhetoric of argument in utramque partem—argument on both sides of a question—as a political act to promote social and political consensus (22). Instead of Kahn's rhetorical technique in utramque partem for the direction of action, Hampton's theory of reading uses heroic figures from history, wherein past exemplars illustrate the questions of history and politics and new modes of depicting the self. The changing representation of historical exemplars registers Renaissance texts as new models of interpreting history and representing virtue, ones that rearticulate the self in relationship to ideal images from the past (3-5).

12 Among the most representative new historicist works are Jonathan Goldberg, *James I and the Politics of Literature: Jonson, Shakespeare, Donne, and their Contemporaries* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1989), and Leonard Tennenhouse, *Power on


14 Debora Shuger might be an exception to this tendency. She deals with the relationship between culture and theology and between politics and theology in persons like Lancelot Andrewes, Richard Hooker, George Herbert, John Donne, Fulke Greville, King James, and William Perkins. She voices her criticism of new historicists' "almost total neglect of society's religious aspects in favor of political ones." In her account, religion's role in the Renaissance is defined as more than is simply sensed in the theological dimension: "in the Renaissance religious discourse enfolds more than such specifically theological concerns as the manner of eucharistic presence, the necessity of church elders, or the fourfold senses of Scripture. Religion during this period supplies the primary language of analysis. It is the cultural matrix for explorations of virtually every topic: kingship, selfhood, rationality, language, marriage, ethics, and so forth." See Debora Kuller Shuger, Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance: Religion, Politics, and the Dominant Culture (Berkeley: U of California P, 1990) 5, 6.


19 See Russell Henry Stafford, *Christian Humanism* (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Colby, 1928) 2-6. He details the criticism made against Christianity by the materialist camp. The following is an abstract of propositions, against which Stafford's defense is set: first, "they [humanists] regard the Gospel as a system of metaphysics, chiefly concerned with the next world, and so belittling man's life on earth"; second, "[h]umanism, in search of the Good Life, is concerned, first, for the well-being of the body; for the body is the foundation of our life in this world. And it is often alleged that Christianity cares nothing for the body"; third, "the humanists sometimes declare that Christianity has been hostile to education; not indeed to formal instruction in its own dogmas, but to the free cultivation of the mentality" (2, 3, 6).

20 Stafford, preface.

21 Stafford 3.


24 Another source of influence upon Bush's Christian humanism is Italian scholar Giuseppe Toffanin who viewed humanism as fundamentally Christian that is as old as the Church Fathers. See Giuseppe Toffanin, *History of Humanism*, trans. Elio Gianturco

25 Bush 21, 30.

26 Bush 68-69.

27 Bush 54-55.


29 As is suggested in its etymology—"ideas" and "logos" (discourse or word)—ideology is a set of ideas governing discourse, namely, a coherent world view or a system of beliefs specific to a particular class, race, or gender. Ideology is supported by political power; otherwise, it would lose its significance and could not be differentiated from, say, an individual's peculiar eating philosophy. Religious or political doctrines are good instances of ideological thinking. Ideology serves to legitimate dominant political power by excluding other challenging ideas. See James H. Kavanagh, "Ideology," *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 1990), and Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (N.Y.: Verso, 1991).

30 Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought* 100.


33 See Quentin Skinner, *Foundations of Modern Political Thought: The Renaissance*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1978) 213-17, 222-24, 236. Another classic authority in this line of argument is Fritz Caspari, who finds in the materialization of a new social class, the gentry, the most pivotal change during the sixteenth century, a change which humanistic education has brought to effect. He contends that a series of events—royal divorce, transformation of religion, and dissolution of the monasteries—lent themselves to the rise of the gentry. Grounded in the new learning, he continues, they became the mainstay of Tudor and Stuart regimes. They served to contain powerful nobilities as well as to establish a centralized civil government. Thomas More, Thomas Cromwell, and William Cecil all were of humble gentry origins but rose to powerful positions through their education and intelligence. Yet Caspari basically sees humanists’ ideal government as aristocratic—see Fritz Caspari, *Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor England* (Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 1954) 2-4.


35 Norbrook 23.


37 See Kristeller 9-10; Bouwsma, *Culture of Renaissance Humanism* 7; Nauert, Jr., *Humanism* 8-9, 12-13. Nauert informs us in great detail of the evolution of the "studia humanitatis." He credits Cicero with first using "the humanities and letters" (studia humanitatis aclitterarum) in his *Pro Archaia*, a defense of poetry's usefulness. By "studia humanitatis," he observes, Cicero intended the subjects appropriate for the development of the potential of young Roman citizens. The educational curriculum was based on the traditional seven liberal arts. A future government administrator was asked to study grammar and rhetoric for the enhancement of oratory skills, and history and ethics to build
up morals and obligations. In short, Cicero's "studia humanitatis" was a curriculum for the general education of the ruling class of the Roman republic.

38 For further reading about the emergence of a limited type of early capitalism and the development of towns, cities, and communes, see Carlo M. Cipolla, *Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy, 1000-1700*, 3rd ed. (N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993) 119-22. Cipolla remarks that in western Europe the nobility tended to remain entrenched in their country castles, while many of the feudal nobility in northern Italy took up residence in the cities, building palaces and towers. They created the commune, the union among all burghers, as an ideal of new society. They enjoyed their legal freedom from the control of the rural world ruled by the aristocracy, being able to form their own culture and values: "Stadtluft macht's frei," town air makes one free.

39 Eugene F. Rice, Jr. and Anthony Grafton, *The Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 1460-1559*, 1970. 2nd ed. (N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994) 7-8. The significance of the invention of printing in relation to humanism is fully discussed in the book. The authors claim that printing liberated students from memorizing. Since copies of the text were not easily accessible, medieval students had spent much of their time taking down what the teacher lectured in school in order to go it over at home. Thanks to printing, however, students were able to save their time and extend their interests to other fields. Also, printing changed scholarship. In the medieval period, manuscripts were entirely in the care of the scribes, who were notorious for inaccuracy. Humanists charged the inaccuracy as textual corruption and so argued for the return to the origin and the restoration of great ancient texts to their initial integrity.

that the Renaissance is an age ultimately controlled by God and that things are ordered by their resemblance to one another, knowledge therefore being constructed by interpretation, or imitation, of that resemblance, namely, of God's invisible signs in it. Everything, including language, things, and even the human body, is an analogy (resemblance) of divine providence (18).


43 Fox and Guy, *Reassessing* 22.

44 Fox and Guy 33.


46 Aquinas' new discovery of human reason was a revolutionary act challenging the authority of St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo (354-430), who supposedly laid the foundation for the Catholic theology that long dominated the fabric of medieval thought. In Augustine's theocentric universe, everything existed for the fulfillment of God's will. Will was considered the primary force that dominates the universe since God Himself is a creature of will, not reason: "What God wills must be good because He wills it, not because it is rational." Augustine, therefore, paid little attention to human reason, that is, to the vain effort of a sinner to know beyond what God chooses to reveal to him, which is sacrilegious. See Baker, *Image of Man* 173-74, 176-77.

47 Baker 198.


52 Marsilio Ficino (1433-99) could be held as the only philosopher of humanism, if any, who attempted to synthesize the dynamics of the humanist movement. He strove to integrate Platonism, the ideas of which were recently available thanks to the migration of Greek scholars since the fall of Constantinople, and reformulate Christianity. Ficino's important ideas come down to two: the unity of the world in the soul and its inner ascent toward God through contemplation. Ficino contended that man is the microcosm of the universe possessing differential qualities from other creatures and that his soul is divine and therefore immortal, linked to the universal soul, that is, God, through the mediation of pious thought or "Platonic love"--the term was coined by him to signify spiritual love. In short, Christianity for Ficino is a revelation of man's spiritual life. See Baker, *Image of Man* 245, and P. O. Kristeller, *Renaissance Concepts of Man and Other Essays* (N.Y.: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972) 59.


very useful for grasping a general sense of Erasmus' thought in comparison with Luther's. Gelder argues that there were two Reformations around the early sixteenth century: the Lutheran reformation, which he estimates as "minor," and the Erasmian reformation, which is "major" in terms of its impact upon modernity. The Lutheran reformation brought about a more immediate but short-term effect on modernity, while the Erasmian one had a more far-reaching and lasting effect upon modernity. The former was more theologically oriented, merely covering a religious area, whereas the latter addressed all areas, including art, philosophy, ethics, philology, and others, producing modernity (4-5).

56 Watson, "The Lutheran Riposte" 15.


59 Erasmus, "The Freedom of the Will" 47.


61 Erasmus 80.


63 Martin Luther, "The Bondage of Will," Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation 140.

64 Luther 170.

65 Luther 173.


71 Luther, "The Bondage of Will" 104.

72 See Fox and Guy, *Reassessing* 19. Also see Margo Todd, *Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987) 21. Todd deals with Puritan social ideas with reference to humanism, such as education, the family, discipline, work, welfare, biblicism, the commonwealth, the economy, and others. In Todd’s argument, Christian humanist social theory was transmitted in the form of Puritanism during the Civil War and Interregnum.


79 Greenfeld 4-5, 30-33.


81 Greenfeld, *Nationalism* 35-36.


83 Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* 34.

84 Rice, Jr. and Grafton, *The Foundations* 135-36. Indeed, prior to the development of English nationhood, conditions had already been favorable for the rise of the sovereign national state throughout Europe. A new system of monetary economy
became a chief financial source for the Crown, weakening the landed nobility by means of taxation and licensing of mercantile enterprise. Also, thanks to the innovation of firearms, a new form of warfare emerged that easily destroyed the feudal castles and therefore the Knight class (10-11). Together, these developments worked to tip the power balance in favor of the King, dissolving feudal lords who were absorbed into the King's court.


88 "Homily on Obedience" 62, 64, 67-68.


Chapter Two

A Reconsideration of More's Catholic Humanism in Utopia

"They must also learn prudence [knowledge] in human affairs, something which is so far from being useless to a theologian.... And I doubt that any study contributes as richly to this practical skill as the study of poets, orators, and histories. Indeed, some plot their course, as it were, to the contemplation of celestial realities through the study of nature, and progress to theology by way of philosophy and the liberal arts." (Sir Thomas More, "Letter to Oxford")

"[T]he whole island is like a single family." (Sir Thomas More, Utopia)

Sir Thomas More (1478-1535), the "man for all seasons," has long been controversial for his ambiguous attitude toward humanism. In Utopia (1516), well known as an embodiment of his humanism, More attacked many absurd practices of the Roman Catholic Church of his day, upholding notions like divorce and marriage for priests, and yet he died a martyr in the cause of the old Catholicism. He considered serving princes as a counselor undesirable for a humanist, but later accepted Henry VIII's offer of a governmental position. Recent research into More's later works makes the picture the more complicated because it unearths the dark side of More the humanist in his persecution of heretics.¹
A number of scholarly endeavors have attempted to contain the baffling nature of More's humanism in *Utopia* within a single critical framework. Some—largely a politically oriented camp of Morean criticism—call the book a masterful representation of humanism. Others make the more sophisticated claim that *Utopia* is not merely a defense of "humanism" but of "Christian humanism," for More's humanistic program is designed eventually to draw up an ideal Christian commonwealth. Still others, the revisionist critics, have recently advanced an idea that the work is an exercise grounded in neither humanism nor Catholicism but is simply an ironic statement.

In political terms, *Utopia* could boil down to a humanist blueprint for a new social order. The very subtitle of the book suggests More's having in mind "THE BEST STATE OF A COMMONWEALTH."² Drawing English humanism in line with Italian quattrocento republican humanists, such critics as Fritz Caspari, Quentin Skinner, George Logan, and David Norbrook basically take this position. Norbrook's chapter on More's *Utopia*, entitled "The Utopia and Radical Humanism," asserts the radical nature of More's Utopian assumptions: election of the King and public officials, communism, toleration of diverse religions, allowing priests to marry, and so on. To express these new ideas, Norbrook continues, More had to restore a rhetorical device to its original political role as a structure of "oscillation" between the rootless individual Hythlodaeus and the narrator More the family man, between challenging ideas and received beliefs, and between the ideal and the real, to protect the implied radicalism of the Utopian system. This technique worked as an integral part of a "political satire" to undermine orthodox values, fully sponsoring Hythlodaeus' program.³ The radical implication of the book is further extended by proponents of a socialist viewpoint such as Karl Kautsky, who contends that More addresses *Utopia* from the vantage point of the middle-class, the London merchant, which culminates in Hythlodaeus' notion of communism. More, who himself arose from the middle-class, is credited with having anticipated the coming of modern socialism.⁴
It is highly questionable whether Utopian communism resembles the modern idea of socialism. The Utopian community contains so many exceptions to this communist connection, such as a hierarchical social structure, including a potential ruling class and slaves, and families under strict patriarchal authority that the idea can easily break down under the weight of the evidence. These limitations are what advocates of Christian humanism, which has so far constituted the mainstream of Morean criticism with J. H. Hexter at its core, including Douglas Bush and Edward Surtz, argue against. Hexter attempts to correct the political reading of Utopia in his greatly celebrated introductory article to the 1965 Yale edition of Utopia. The political direction for him looks very vulnerable to anachronism. He warns modern scholars of the tendency to impart extended significance to Morean communism. More's mention of Utopian communism or the problem of enclosure, he claims, never aims at what modern communism stands for. A closer look at the Utopian community would rather reveal a strong religious motive that takes firm root in a system similar to a medieval monastic community. The Utopian community is a defensive gesture against the onset of capitalist individualism in the rising middle-class, which is far removed from any line of modern communist thought, at least in its particulars. Hexter in this way proposes to see More both as a committed Christian and a humanist reformer, whose aim is to set up an ideal Christian community by humanist methods. Utopia may be devoid of Christian institutions, but its moral virtue, based on human reason, directs the Utopians far closer to true Christianity than any other European country. Hexter is taking Utopia to be founded on the harmony between Christianity and humanism.

The most recent development of Morean studies, on the other hand, seems noticeably negative toward More's humanism or Christianity and toward the harmony between them as argued by the Christian humanist group. It simply deprives More of humanistic or Christian aspects that have been assumed as natural by scholars. The
revisionist notion first came from historians led by G. R. Elton, whose studies on More's later career as a Catholic controversialist were followed up by John Guy and Alistair Fox in the 1980s. In Elton's revealing reevaluation, "the real Thomas More" turns out to be a man of intolerance, cruelty, and ambition unlike the conventional image of humanist and saint. Throughout his career More maintains the medieval view of man as sinful: man is corrupted by original sin and therefore in constant need of discipline and salvation. Despite its peaceful outlook, Utopian life is notable for, Elton notes:

its lack of diversity, lack of color, indeed lack of anything dynamic. This is ...

... a very restrictive commonwealth, subduing the individual to the common purpose and setting each man's life in predetermined, unalterable grooves.... [W]hy did More think it necessary to erect so rigid and oppressive a system for the sake of preserving his supreme good--peace and justice? And the answer lies in his identification of the wrong at the heart of all existing human communities. This wrong is the nature of man, fallen man, whom he regarded as incurably tainted with the sin of covetousness. Greed, he argued, underlay everything that troubled mankind. Wealth, and the search for it, ruined the human existence and all possibility of human contentment; the only cure that could work must remove all opportunity of acquiring wealth by prohibiting all private property and allowing to each man his sufficient subsistence at the hands of an all-wise, and despotic, ruling order.8

Constructed thus, More not surprisingly loses his temper when faced with heresies in his later years. Unacceptable to More is repudiation of the Church, for it is, for him, the only institution chosen by God to control and guide the sinful man toward salvation. Therefore, More's defense of the Church, to Elton's eyes, is a logical conclusion "not from a change
of mind but from the same ultimate convictions which had earlier led him to attack it," an idea that rests on "an inexorably pessimistic view of fallen man."^9

Elton's revisionist cause is further advanced by Alistair Fox's book-length studies on More's humanism. Fox contends that More's later ambiguity as a humanist betrays itself even in works as early as *Utopia*, which is, he argues, an early projection of the division in More's mind between the serious mode of the humanist and the ironic (or comic) one of the realist. By 1533 More has little in common with what can be associated with Christian humanism.10 Fox's contention that More is a non-humanist, of course, does not mean to return to the long line of the hagiographic tradition since More's son-in-law William Roper wrote *The Life of Sir Thomas More.*11 More's polemic works also raise questions about his popular reputation as a saint, exposing his deep political ambition and unsaintly personality. Together, Fox denies both More the humanist and the saint.12

In Fox's revisionist reading, the More figure plays a critical part in *Utopia*. He believes the need to justify the figure's apparent detachment from Utopia consciously makes it difficult to sustain Hythlodaeus' Christian humanist doctrines and therefore reminds us of Utopia's impossibility in this world. Fox is obviously rejecting Norbrook's attempt at relegating the persona More to merely a rhetorical role. Identifying Hythlodaeus solely with the author might deliver a reductionist reading, removing the rich and complex texture of the work. Certainly the persona More is more than a kind of safety valve in the long rhetorical convention like Chaucer's retraction at the close of his secular tales. Yet Fox does not clearly define the tension that, he argues, is triggered by the figure More. It is not clear whether the tension lies within Hythlodaeus' mind or between the idealist humanist Hythlodaeus and the persona More, a practical and ambitious lawyer. On the one hand, Fox argues that *Utopia* is the end result of the conflicting impulses of the Catholic and the humanist More in the transition from the old Catholicism to a newly rising humanist
movement. On the other, he ambiguously identifies the tension as lying between Christian humanist and realist, between Hythlodaeus and the character More.13

A similar case can be made with Stephen Greenblatt, who should be credited with bringing to light the pivotal role of the fictional More in *Utopia*, turning critical attention from Hythlodaeus to him. He identifies the tension in *Utopia* more clearly in the pair of opposing forces of Hythlodaeus and Morus. Both are viewed as More's alter ego, representing the earlier humanist and the later Catholic non-humanist, humanistic self-fashioning and Catholic self-cancellation, "intellectual ambition and self-effacement, Christian humanism and Realpolitik, radicalism and the craving for order, reforming zeal and detached irony, confidence in human power and misanthropy, expansiveness and the longing for strict confinement."14 More's later cancellation, consequently, is identified with the triumph of his Catholic self over his humanistic one, and Morus over Hythlodaeus. *Utopia* therefore becomes a deliberate ironic play, "the [early] expression of a longing for self-cancellation."15 An irony, however, is that Morus in Greenblatt's formulation is equated with Realpolitik and at the same time with Catholic misanthropy, so that More is canceling Hythlodaeus who is actually associated with Catholicism—is it really Hythlodaeus whom More rejects later, or the Morus figure? Behind this thinking lies another fallacy of Greenblatt's. He sees Catholicism primarily as a force unfavorable for humanistic self-fashioning, undoubtedly separating Catholicism from humanism and perceiving them as irreconcilable:

[I]n the sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process. Such self-consciousness had been widespread among the elite in the classical world, but Christianity brought a growing suspicion of man's power to shape identity: 'Hands off yourself,' Augustine declared. Try to build up yourself, and you build a ruin.'16
As we have investigated in the previous chapter, however, Renaissance humanism is confined largely to classical education within a Christian frame of reference. Humanism and Christianity are quite unlikely to be in conflict or separation as we moderns would imagine. The humanists in the Renaissance are themselves Christian; despite Greenblatt's argument, we cannot separate Catholicism from Hythlodaeus' humanism. Both are essentials of Renaissance humanism. The confusion of Fox and Greenblatt arises from their ahistorical sense of Renaissance humanism—a sense not far removed from that held by both the political and Christian humanist camps—which should be differentiated from its modern version of liberal humanism.

In this chapter, I attempt to redefine both More's humanism and Christianity. First, situating More's humanism in its original Renaissance sense exposes modern misconceptions. More's humanism in *Utopia* reflects the power of religion in the Renaissance, a force which kept humanism principally an educational and literary movement. What the modern sense of humanism might involve, such as liberal individualism or political radicalism, never plays a dominant part in Utopian society. More consistently hints at the priority of Christian faith over human faculties or values. Second, I resituate the Christianity of More's humanism, arguing that the genius of Morean humanism lies in its cosmopolitan (Catholic) assertion of oneness or universality. More endorses such creation of a monastic and disciplinary community as foundational to the Utopian social structure, where more value is placed on communal unity than individual liberty. This registers a desire to restore the unity of Christendom against the dissension of the Catholic world. The construction of a cosmopolitan world in this way identifies More precisely as a Catholic humanist and points to a distinction from the particularism of nationalistic or Protestant humanists, who emerge later as representatives of a new humanist culture. Third, this definition, I assert, is also advantageous in addressing the classic issue in discussions of *Utopia*: how to define the relationship or commitment of
More's humanism to Catholicism. Many consider the relationship within a frame of conflict or competition, particularly in connection with More's later career. The presence of the figure More, for example, is held responsible for the tension between Catholicism and humanism. In Renaissance situations, however, to be a humanist means to be Christian basically. Renaissance humanism is inseparable from Christianity. Thus More's humanism is not a contradiction to his fundamental Catholic faith: his commitment to both Catholicism and humanism is indisputable. The tension should be considered in terms of a new direction of humanism that asks humanists to participate in national and secular affairs, thereby differentiating itself from the old idealism of Catholic humanism. The problematic More figure then is an indication of More's early recognition of the changing humanist current, a move to integrate the two impulses of humanism, Catholic idealism and a new realistic secularism. More's later withdrawal from public life results from his recognition of the impossibility of harmonizing them, for his realistic humanism led to the request for his participation in Henrician nationalism, which is diametrically opposed to what Catholic humanism represents. His execution does not necessarily entail the arrest of humanism, but a cancellation of his realistic secular humanism.

More is obviously a Renaissance humanist both in his advocacy of classical learning and in his recognition of reason's pragmatic use. He believes knowledge of the classics is very profitable to "prepare man for virtue" compared with the curriculum of the previous age which was largely centered on theology and natural philosophy. In his letter to Oxford, often quoted to this end, he defends the use of ancient learning as follows:

[A]s for secular learning, no one denies that a person can be saved without it, and indeed without learning of any sort. But even secular learning, as he calls it, prepares the soul for virtue. And however that may be, certainly no one disputes that learning is virtually the one and only incentive that draws people to Oxford.... Furthermore, not everyone who comes to Oxford
comes just to learn theology; some must also learn law. They must also learn prudence in human affairs, something which is so far from being useless to a theologian that without it he may be able to sing well enough for his own pleasure, but his singing will certainly be ill suited for the people. And I doubt that any study contributes as richly to this practical skill as the study of poets, orators, and histories.  

More must have felt the age's new need for a knowledge of human affairs that could be useful even to a theologian and that could be drawn mostly from poets, orators and historians. His earlier works well demonstrate such experimentation with secular learning. He composed a number of Latin epigrams as well as a few poems in English. He wrote a declamation in reply to Lucian's *Tyrannicide* (1506) and a historical biography *The History of King Richard III* (1514-18) that claims to provide the main source for Shakespeare's play.  

He also energetically translated a biography of Italian philosopher Pico della Mirandola as well as Greek poems and four works by the Greek ironist Lucian.  

*Utopia* is a culmination of these humanistic experiments. Like his contemporary humanists, More gives special weight to education. Every citizen in Utopia is subject to education (158). Utopian education is characterized by the humanistic program, which is believed to help men build up virtue. More makes a long list of Greek authors for various subjects. The curriculum includes studies of language, biology, grammar, poetry, history, medicine, and philosophy (181-83). Plenty of opportunities for learning are provided: "public lectures are daily delivered in the hours before daybreak" for those who seek them (128).  

All this learning is premised on the possibility of training human reason as the guiding light of man's conduct to what is good. More equips the Utopians with a philosophy of reason leading to virtue and happiness:
After this life rewards are appointed for our virtues and good deeds, punishment for our crimes. Though these principles belong to religion, yet they hold that reason leads men to believe and to admit them.... That individual, they say, is following the guidance of nature who, in desiring one thing and avoiding another, obeys the dictates of reason. Now reason first of all inflames men to a love and veneration of the divine majesty, to whom we owe both our existence and our capacity for happiness. Secondly, it admonishes and urges us to lead a life as free from care and as full of joy as possible. (163)

Human reason serves as a guide toward conforming men to nature's rule, which leads to the happiness of all persons.

More's appreciation of reason's usefulness in learning, however, does not necessarily entail a wholehearted endorsement of human reason. While More believes in reason's potential, he is not so positive toward reason's perfectibility, specifically in religious matters like salvation. More may admit the vital necessity of humanistic education, but firmly sets some qualifications upon human reason, pregnant with religious connotations:

They believe that human reason can attain to no truer view, unless a heaven-sent religion inspire man with something more holy. (179)

As Catholics would have it, More warns that reason alone is not sufficient to cultivate virtue and happiness. Man needs to discern the existence of divine providence that controls the universe, and an afterlife that is destined by God for a life of felicity, so that his good deeds as well as sins will be either rewarded or punished. Human reason needs to be guided by the far holier grace of God, after all.

Given these reservations, More uses the word "reason" quite differently from our sense of it. It would be therefore mistaken to impose liberal implications on More's notion.
of humanistic education—for instance, it is ahistorical to assume that the educational movement of humanism naturally leads to some kind of reform to be accomplished by a politically radical act. John Fisher, who died for the same cause as More, made it clear that classical languages are only tools for the study of theology that "as the statutes state, was the goal to which all other studies led."\(^{19}\) John Guy also points out that originally, humanism "understood in the strict sense of the study of humane letters reached England in the fifteenth century," and "the study of Greek literature [was regarded] as the means of better understanding and writing."\(^{20}\) This definition of humanism was perfectly current in More's day as well and so until the nineteenth century.

More's ultimate doubt of the integrity of man's reason, not to mention free will, is due to his belief in the reality of evil in man's heart. More maintains that Christ the Savior would have brought Utopia in this world long before without "Pride" that "entwines itself around the hearts of men and acts like the suckfish in preventing and hindering them from entering on a better way of life" (243-45). This statement discloses More's deep anxiety about man's pride and greed, recalling the medieval sense of man as incurably tainted with sin. More believes the abuse of human faculties to be the source of social ills in the Christian community; hence, it is necessary to establish social institutions that should guide man in the right direction.

More finds the key expression of reform in the idea of communism opposed to the onrush of pride and greed in a transitional age. The global economy of Europe before the sixteenth century had been led primarily by Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands—Antwerp, the backdrop of Utopia, was the nerve center of international trade. Compared with these "developed" countries, England lagged behind economically and culturally. In the sixteenth century, however, England saw her economy grow to replace the old wool industry of Italy and the Netherlands and to produce the best wool in Europe.\(^{21}\) The most significant development for the expanding woolen manufacture was the transformation of land into
pasture that was engaged in raising sheep for wool instead of farming. The industry's growing demand for wool turned manorial landlords into capitalist farmers, who farmed the whole estate commercially with hired labor, separating and appropriating land by fencing it with hedges. The enclosure movement led landlords to be prosperous and many peasants lost their land. The shortage of land for food crops, in turn, caused the rural population to be pauperized, drove them to migrate to towns, and became a major social concern of More's day.  

The issue is centrally dealt with in Book One in the episode of Hythlodaeus and John Cardinal Morton, Archbishop of Canterbury, for whom More had served as a page for two years. They discuss the problems the enclosure incurred: the landlords' abuse of tenants and the problem of vagabonds. The English nobility is blamed for ruthlessly seeking their own interests, ruining the peasants into poverty and crime. The consequence is the man-eating sheep:

'Your sheep,' I answered, 'which are usually so tame and so cheaply fed, begin now, according to report, to be so greedy and wild that they devour human beings themselves and devastate and depopulate fields, houses, and towns. In all those parts of the realm where the finest and therefore costliest wool is produced, there are noblemen, gentlemen, and even some abbots, though otherwise holy men, who are not satisfied with the annual revenues and profits which their predecessors used to derive from their estates.... They leave no ground to be tilled; they enclose every bit of land for pasture; they pull down houses and destroy towns, leaving only the church to pen the sheep in.' (65-67)

A remedy for those ills emerges in the abolition of private property and the establishment of communism. Permitting private property is the root cause of the social corruption that undermines Christendom as a whole: "wherever you have private property and all men
measure all things by cash values, there it is scarcely possible for a commonwealth to have justice or prosperity" (103). Thus the notion of eradicating private possessions is put forward: "no just and even distribution of goods can be made ... unless private property is utterly abolished," and the idea of communism with a special emphasis on equality is asserted (105). Utopian society is recalled as the ideal where all men possess all things in common "with equality of distribution" (103).

This state-controlled and equality-based communism could be associated with modern socialism, yet deviates from it in a significant way. The apparent equality of Utopian communism is restricted considerably by provisions, such as slavery (185) and the caste system (133). More establishes the social distinction between "the rank of workingman" and "the class of men of learning." By law permanent exemption from work is granted to the class called "Barzanes" or "Ademus," out of which "they choose ambassadors, priests, tranibors, and finally the governor himself" (133, i23). More never threatens the social hierarchy. Utopia rather seems to need a hierarchical order ruled by a few elites that are rationally and morally trained. More believes only those elites, like Plato's philosophers, can prevent political and social disorder or corruption. This social hierarchy is strictly observed in the family as a primary social unit as well: young men and women are definitely subordinated to their paterfamilias (137). Utopia indeed has many egalitarian features but is actually ruled by the intellectual aristocracy. More's Utopian system seems significantly different from the ideal of modern socialism or democracy.

The economically self-contained Utopian community instead depends upon a Catholic motive. The tenor of Hythlodaeus' communism generally fits better with a community patterned after medieval monastic life than its modern type. More's earlier career with the Carthusians before becoming a lawyer is interesting in this respect. In James McConica's account, More seriously considered the priesthood as well. More was closely associated with two houses, the London Charterhouse and the Bridgettine
monastery of Syon, known for monastic discipline of the most exacting kind. It is believed that More's four-year reflection with the Carthusians found its expression in his unfinished meditation *Four Last Things* (1522), based on the traditional Catholic view of man's limitations in this world.\(^{23}\)

We do not know why More chose a legal career as a married layman after his monastic experience, but it is no accident that his youthful Catholic piety is retained in the monastic cast of *Utopia*. There is a certain monastic asceticism and discipline in the Utopian simple life opposed to luxury and greed, not to say monkish celibacy. As monks do, "all citizens wear "garments" of "one and the same pattern" (127). They all do work for six hours per day except for a few special people (127). Their meal is given at fixed hours in refectories, "the common halls" (129). They believe in the office of Christian charity, because good works will increase their chances of happiness and freedom after death. So for all their being busy with work, Utopians are willing to make their labor available "to repair whatever public roads are in bad order" (135). Behind this belief lurks More's firm faith in the reality of an afterlife, the immortality of the soul, and its bliss after death:

The soul is immortal and by the goodness of God born for happiness. After this life rewards are appointed for our virtues and good deeds, punishment for our crimes. (161-63)

If there is no reward after death, it would be hopeless for a man to devote his entire life to good works, which is "the extreme of madness" (163). Therefore, the Utopians will not count as citizens those who think there is no hope of life after this world and nothing to fear but the public laws" (221). In this way, More can stress "cheerful death," that God can hardly be pleased with the coming of one who meets his dying reluctantly (225). More's ideas of man's immortality and happy death, according to Lawrence Stone's historical periodization, were perfectly current in More's time:
Conventional wisdom was that happiness could only be anticipated in the next world, not in this.... Individual freedom of choice ought at all times and in all respects to be subordinated to the interests of others, whether lineage, parents, neighbors, kin, Church or state.\textsuperscript{24} Based on this strand, such a critic as Enno van Gelder goes on to claim that More even imagines that "people long for death in order to taste this happiness." This is, Gelder continues, because "More essentially remains true to the view of Christianity as a religion of salvation, while the mysterious salvation process according to the Catholic view plays an ever increasing part in his thinking."\textsuperscript{25} Taken together, Utopia looks like one great monastery organized with exact regulations, not in the least socialist nor democratic.

The impression Utopian life leaves on the reader is very revealing in this respect: characteristically, the idea of oneness or universality is emphasized throughout. As the very word "Catholic" implies, meaning "general" or "universal," this feature is typical of Catholicism.\textsuperscript{26} Catholicism claims to have only one true universal Church that exists "everywhere, always, and by all" and that possesses unity, indefectibility, universality, and sanctity; sectarianism rather than Protestantism is most directly opposed to Catholicism.\textsuperscript{27} As a distinct doctrine, religious universality is an attitude that attempts to transcend chauvinistic national loyalties or parochial prejudices. The true Christian therefore is not a citizen of any one state but of Christendom as a whole.

The idea of the underlying unity of mankind was actually introduced by pagan antiquity in terms of cosmopolitanism. Greeks distinguished themselves from barbarians by taking their polis (city-state) as the entire cosmos or the whole world. Since the fourth century BC, the Stoics had dropped the traditional distinction and asserted instead that all people partake of, and are subject to, one common divine logos (reason). Therefore, the ideal true citizen belonged to the whole world, not being limited to any one state. The symbol of citizenship was carried over from the polis to the world at large.
Cosmopolitanism of the later Roman period was maintained by Latin's use as the world language of scholarship and religion, by the international universities of Bologna, Paris, and Oxford, and, most of all, by Roman Catholicism with its universal frame of reference, which proclaimed salvation for the entire human race because all men were equal before one God. During the Renaissance, global exploration thanks to scientific inventions and technological advances broadened the cosmopolitan perspective to the other side of the world. It inspired Richard Hakluyt "to finde himselfe [a] Cosmopolite, a citizen ... of ... one citie uniuersall, and so consequently to mediate on the Cosmopolitcally governement thereof." At the same time the Catholic world was challenged in the Renaissance by the development of the burgeoning spirit of nationalism that was upheld by religious pluralism. There was a sense of crisis in Erasmus' and More's time. A sequence of critical events encroached upon the long-standing prestige of the Roman Catholic Church: the Babylonian Captivity (1309-77)—the exile of the popes at Avignon in France—the subsequent Great Schism (1378-1415) between Rome and Avignon, and conciliarism—the general council's control over the Papacy. The dissension of the Catholic world was augmented by the downfall of the Roman Empire, which transformed Europe into a mosaic of German-Romanic states. The sense of crisis coexisted with that of a strong hope for reform and unity of the Church: the One Church. Intellectuals like Erasmus were called upon for their dedication to the solidarity of Christendom. As a cosmopolitan, Erasmus proposed a theory of world government that transcends all local governmental boundaries. He rejected national patriotism as contrary to the truth that is unique and transcendent and as responsible for war instead of peace and discord instead of concord in the world. A critic like Roland Bainton outlines Erasmus' cosmopolitanism as follows:

Erasmus himself was a cosmopolitan, in the sense that he loved every country and belonged to none. He would praise all and criticize all.... He could speak of "my France" and "our Germany."... When twice invited to
become a citizen of Zürich, he answered, "I wish to be a citizen of the world, not of a single city." ... Nationalist touchiness appeared to Erasmus to be incredibly silly. He would reiterate, "The whole universe is my fatherland."32

More thinks along the same lines. More's construction of Utopia certainly bears with it a sense of the current crisis of the Church and echoes his wish for Catholic oneness or universality. In other words, his anxiety about the threat to the ideal of unity of the Church is reflected by a utopian longing, a nostalgia for a world of perfection and integrity even though it might not exist in this world but only in the afterworld--More's "utopia" means "nowhere" in Latin. The feature of oneness or universality most establishes More as a Catholic humanist.

Many indications reveal More's cosmopolitan note in Utopia. The book was first published in Louvain in 1516 in Latin, the international language--its vernacular English translation appeared only in 1551. Utopia is set in an unknown country and filled with narrators of diverse foreign origins. Peter Giles is a citizen of Antwerp who is More's friend and Erasmus' disciple. He is also known as a poet and editor of Latin texts. Raphael Hythlodaeus is a native of Portugal, the type of man who travels to learn. He knows a good deal of Latin and is particularly learned in Greek. Hythlodaeus is possibly the ideal model of the Renaissance humanist who embodies both the humanist concern for classical literacy and the religious and moral commitment to the unity of a Christian commonwealth.

The environments of the Utopians manifest the same spirit as well. Words such as "one," "identical," "same," and "whole" repeatedly appear in the description of Utopian social practices. The fifty-four cities are all "identical in language, traditions, customs, and laws. They are similar also in layout and everywhere, as far as the nature of the group permits, similar even in appearance" (113), so that "[t]he person who knows one of their cities will know them all, since they are exactly alike" (117). Besides living in identical
houses in identical cities, citizens regulate all social activities in common. The Utopians all wear the same style of clothes (127); they all rise at four o'clock in the morning to receive academic lectures, the attendance at which is "compulsory" (129); they all work six hours a day with no exemption, three hours before noon and another three hours in the afternoon (127); their one primary occupation is agriculture (125); they all have supper in the common halls while listening to literature being read aloud; they all go to bed at eight o'clock and sleep eight hours (127). The Utopian commonwealth looks like one great large family: "the whole island is like a single family" (149).

The Utopian economy is also structured in response to the import of oneness. The underlying ideas of More's communism, grounded in the practices of medieval monastic orders, expressly demonstrate More's defense of the public good against the advance of the growing individualism. The self-seeking capitalism of the age is looked upon as a danger to the community as a whole, the main source of "a mass of troubles" (243). By such a preventive measure, More aims at materializing a spirit of unity that does not acknowledge the claim for private property since "everything belongs to everybody" in Utopia (239).

In this respect, war works against the establishment of the common good of a Christian commonwealth. As the crippled Church had been losing its hold, war became endemic in Europe, destroying the unity of the Christian world. Hythlodaeus denounces war since it is waged mostly in the cause of selfish national interests. As is indicated, for instance, in Hythlodaeus' account of foreign relations, treaties between nations are considered very dubious, a demonstration of the arbitrary network of alliances or hostilities of the European nation-states. They are constantly making, breaking, and renewing treaties according to their changing interests (197). As a consequence, common men are apt to think that "all justice is only a plebeian and low virtue which is far below the majesty of kings" (199). The royal habit of keeping treaties badly leads the Utopians never to make any treaties at all. They are well aware that "treaties and alliances between kings are not
observed with much good faith" (197). In the French court Hythlodaeus gives the King his advice to give up waging wars to enlarge territory by any means available, opposing the other councilors' proposals for war. He cites the case of the Achorians, who seized a neighboring country but found it very troublesome; rebellions and plundering were everywhere, morals were corrupted, and order and law were destroyed. So they returned it to the natives. As is expected of the European court, Hythlodaeus' counsel is not adopted (87-91). Contrary to the self-seeking European nations, the wise Utopians despise war "with utter loathing" and consider it "an activity fit only for beasts" (199). While they do fight whenever necessary--but by using mercenaries rather than their own citizens--they will do everything to avoid battle, even buying off enemies or exercising diplomatic skills to undermine opposing regimes (149-51).

The Utopian criticism of war and defense of peace recall a Catholic motive, a peaceful and harmonious order of the world based on the Christian principle of brotherly love. Note the Utopian priests' agape, their acts of kindness even for defeated enemies (231). The Utopians see brothers and sisters in an extending circle from self to humanity as a whole, including even enemies. This is an index of More's passion for the construction of a peaceful and unified Christian commonwealth. More's pacifism is firmly rooted in the spirit of Catholic unity.

The desire for unity can be found more convincingly in More's religious or theological view. There is a strong longing for religious oneness in Utopia. It is true that an air of Utopian freedom exists in religion. Priests are allowed to get married (227) and it is possible for a woman to become a priest, if rarely (229). Even worshippers of the Sun or Moon are tolerated (217). King Utopus leaves the whole matter open, declaring that anyone may choose freely what he should believe, provided he accepts the soul's immortality in the next world and divine providence that rules the universe. Yet behind the religious freedom, there is actually Utopus' firm belief that eventually one true religion will prevail "by its own
The utopian hope that they will at last be united in one single authoritative and omnipotent God and Church that would accommodate the beliefs of all the different sects:

[All the other Utopians too, though varying in their beliefs, agree with them in this respect that they hold there is one supreme being, to whom are due both the creation and the providential government of the whole world. All alike call him Mithras in their native language, but in this respect they disagree, that he is looked on differently by different persons. Each professes that whatever that is which he regards as supreme is that very same nature to whose unique power and majesty the sum of all things is attributed by the common consent of all nations. But gradually they are all beginning to depart from this medley of superstitions and are coming to unite in that one religion which seems to surpass the rest in reasonableness.]

(217)

Both atheism and sectarianism are forbidden in Utopia after all. As a reformed religion, Utopian religion may be grounded in reason without any knowledge of Christian faith or revelation, yet not in terms of individual liberty but of communal unity. For all its heathen aspects, Utopian religion seems much closer to the ideal of Christianity than that of Christian Europe does by conforming to the fundamental principles of Christianity.

Constructed thus, due attention to the narrator More, who argues for the necessity of transmitting the Catholic idealism of unity and order to Realpolitik, thereby making an ironic effect in the book, must be finally drawn because he seems to contradict Catholic humanist idealism.

In Greenblatt's and Fox's arguments, the More figure enters the picture as another aspect or the very core of the real More. Implicit in the discussion is the fact that More revised the original Utopia before his entrance into the service of government, which
suggests strongly that More originally intended the first part to be a finished work but changed his mind just after returning to London. He must have felt compelled to adjust his humanist idealism, largely designed after the universal spirit of Catholicism, to fit a new situation on English soil. The Yale edition informs us that the introduction in Book One (46-58) and the Discourse on Utopia in Book Two (110-236) were first written in Antwerp, and the Dialogue of Counsel in Book One (58-108) along with the conclusion in Book Two (236-46) were completed in London.\(^3\) Despite the revelation of Catholic idealism through the Utopian community, the Dialogue of Counsel discusses the importance of humanists' participation in Realpolitik. The concluding part of Book Two finds the persona More unlikely to follow Hythlodaeus' Utopian system on several accounts, particularly disagreeing with the Utopian moneyless economy, on which Hythlodaeus' main focus is placed: for it takes away "all the nobility, magnificence, splendor, and majesty which are, in the estimation of the common people, the true glories and ornaments of the [nation]" (245). The persona More's position is attested by the critical reception Utopia drew and More's response to it. More's humanist friends were mostly intrigued by the idea of communism for its novelty and radicalism. More seems to have felt uneasy over the single reception, so that he took great pains to protect his work from being taken too seriously. More's second letter to Peter Giles, for instance, particularly hints at More's wish for keeping some ironic slant in the book (251). Utopia for the More figure is impossible in this world—perhaps possible only in an afterlife, if all are subject to original sin and therefore human limitation. In a way, Hythlodaeus is a speaker of nonsense, and Utopia is nowhere in the final analysis.\(^3^4\)

All these devices, then, including the dialogue of counsel, the concluding part, and the ironic letters, are contrived not merely to protect the idealism of Hythlodaeus' tale.\(^3^5\) They are More's designs set for his anticipated secular career. We know, based on Erasmus' letter to Ulrich von Hutten in 1519, that before joining Henry's service, More
had a distaste for "a court life and ... any intimacy with princes, having always a special hatred of tyranny and a great fancy for equality.\textsuperscript{36} In principle, More hated the court life but in reality hoped for royal service in the name of humanist duty, in the dream of accommodating Christian ideals to England. Indeed, More became Henry's secretary in 1518 and knighted Under-Treasurer of the Exchequer in 1521. Henry must have been an exceptional prince who governed very well and whose policy was attractive to More.\textsuperscript{37} Or More might have had financial difficulties or felt bored with legal work since returning to London.\textsuperscript{38}

The situation can be made abundantly clear when seen from the vantage point of a new direction of humanist secularism. Catholic humanism was based on theories of universal idealism, but this way of thinking changed with sixteenth-century humanists who began to show their interest in the particular as well as the universal, affairs of their nations as well as of Christendom, their own vernacular languages as well as the international Latin, and secular laws as well as sacred ones. \textit{Utopia}, for instance, reveals More's concern about English matters in Book One as well as articulates the ideal of Christendom in Book Two.

The two humanist trends actually coexisted in Renaissance humanism. As a representative Catholic humanist, Erasmus, who considered himself a "citizen of the world" and Latin the language of that world, lamented that the vision of a cosmopolitan Europe was being menaced by national interests. Any sense of national identity was a hindrance to his cosmopolitan vision. On the other hand, to other humanists, especially to German and Swiss ones, vernacular languages were central in promoting a sense of national identity. Such Swiss humanists as Glarean, Myconius, and Xylotectus, according to Alister McGrath, took it as a sacred duty to establish Swiss identity by literary means.\textsuperscript{39} This humanist trend against the cosmopolitan idealism was not yet recognized in connection with a movement of nationalism. In England's case, it is hardly imaginable to think of
nationalism before Henry's break with Rome (1532), which provides decisive momentum in the evolution of English nationalism. We can only say that those emerging humanist cultures, even though More did not identify them precisely as nationalistic, must have prevailed in England and conflicted More himself when More wrote the book, as reflected in More's interest in English affairs and the figure More's assertion of the humanist participation in Realpolitik in Book One. While ultimately More is characterized as a Catholic humanist because he tries to solve the national problems in terms of the universal community of Utopia, the figure More is anticipating a new development of humanist culture in England.

The realistic trend of humanism had been already anticipated in the classic issue for the Renaissance humanist, the call to counsel. It was a humanist dilemma whether "to serve, or not to serve," namely, whether to choose a secular vocation or a sacred one. To our modern eyes, it would be an honor to work for the government, but it was the other way around in the Renaissance; they still thought it ideal to work for Christendom as a whole, not for their particular countries. It was believed that the life of negotium, the life of activity and business, cannot avoid intrinsic corruption. To be a courtier was equivalent to living in a web of flatteries and intrigues that keeps advice of wisdom and learning from the path of approval and that instead seeks, say, disgraceful violations of treaties. It was not expected that a humanist could be a good counselor to a king in court, so a humanist was supposed to remain outside of court to fulfill the cosmopolitan mission--reforming and thereby rebuilding a Christian commonwealth. This is the rival ideal of otium, the life of contemplation and freedom. The noble task of the humanist was to become an educator of Christendom directly by teaching or indirectly by his writings. No wise or virtuous man should choose a public career at the cost of a life of scholarship.

The two humanist positions find a place in the debate between the contrasting positions of Hythlodaeus and of the fictional More and Giles in the dialogue of counsel in
Book One. The three men debate the duty of a man of experience and learning to take an active part in national and royal affairs as the prince's aide, covering the pressing English issues of poverty, crime, and enclosure. Their focus on these social issues, which seem to have been English humanists' most concern, indicates the currency of humanist secularism of More's day.

Hythlodaeus responds to Giles' surprise at his not entering the King's service for the advancement of his interest and of friends' and relatives', arguing that this is not the way of gaining "riches" or "power" but slavery. He simply desires to live as he pleases, unlike so many intellectuals of the time, who seek favors from the great (55-57). His cosmopolitan inclination is behind the assertion that Utopian society could not work in England as he criticizes her absurd social practices. Hythlodaeus also objects to the character More's argument for court service in "the public interest" even at "some personal disadvantages," because kings misuse wisdom, merely following the arts of war to acquire new territories. The public would not be any better off (57). So any philosophical advice would be of no good unless kings themselves became philosophers, or vice versa, as Plato indicates (87).

This exchange expressly lays bare the two different perspectives of Hythlodaeus and the fictional More and by extension their different views of humanism. It would be unimaginable for Hythlodaeus "[t]o speak falsehoods" in the presence of princes, as the More figure would do "for accommodation to the play at hand" in the name of the public good (101). Free speaking for truth, Hythlodaeus cries, cannot be deterred from the will of the secular sovereign. It is against the grain of the humanist vocation to dissemble Christian doctrines that must be preached openly:

    [I]f all the things which by the perverse morals of men have come to seem odd are to be dropped as unusual and absurd, we must dissemble almost all the doctrines of Christ. Yet He forbade us to dissemble them to the extent
that what He had whispered in the ears of His disciples He commanded to be preached openly from the housetops. (101)

Hythlodaeus is certainly aware of the humanist duty to earthly princes, but there is a still greater duty for him, a sacred calling for establishing the cosmopolitan ideal of Christendom through the teachings of Christian philosophy.

For Giles and the More figure, however, Hythlodaeus' defense of the humanist's sacred obligation actually seems to beg the question. As Giles pinpoints it, Hythlodaeus' irony is that nevertheless, there is no other way so useful as the advice of the learned for the general public good:

[W]hatever name you give to this mode of life, ... it is the very way by which you can ... profit people both as private individuals and as members of the commonwealth. (55)

Since there is no way to cure social wrongs without philosophers' help, they should remain in court despite the fact that kings do not care to look to their wise advice. The fictional More appears to come up with more insight into the point. He suggests to Hythlodaeus, in the same breath with Giles, that the learned are inescapably obliged to offer good advice to princes at the cost of private life because it is for "the common weal" (87). Therefore the life of an unattached intellectual is meaningless for the More figure. An intellectual owes public service to his fellow men.

If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the root, if you cannot cure according to your heart's desire vices of long standing, yet you must not on that account desert the commonwealth. You must not abandon the ship in a storm because you cannot control the winds. (99)

To this effect he tells Hythlodaeus how to act in such a corrupt court, a possibility of applying some philosophy to national affairs. The courtier needs to adapt himself to the given situation, performing a role like an actor as best as he can. Role-playing is actually
the modus operandi of the councils of princes and in the commonwealth. This philosophy of theatricality divulges More's acute sense of Realpolitik, which he asks Hythlodaeus' idealism to embrace:

"[T]here is another philosophy, more practical for statesmen, which knows its stage, adapts itself to the play in hand, and performs its role neatly and appropriately. This is the philosophy which you must employ. Otherwise we have the situation in which a comedy of Plautus is being performed and the household slaves are making trivial jokes at one another and then you come on the stage in a philosopher's attire and recite the passage from the Octavia where Seneca is disputing with Nero. Would it not have been preferable to take a part without words than by reciting something inappropriate to make a hodgepodge of comedy and tragedy? You would have spoiled and upset the actual play by bringing in irrelevant matter—even if your contribution would have been superior in itself. Whatever play is being performed, perform it as best you can, and do not upset it all simply because you think of another which has more interest." (99)

The fictional More seems confident that the advice of the learned could have good effects if radical or strange ideas are not forcefully thrust upon kings and if the situation is handled "tactfully" and "by the indirect approach" (99-101).

Penetrating the changing dynamics of humanism, More had attempted to entertain the realist view of humanism by making room for it in his work, until he was asked to aid the nationalist cause by Henry VIII, for which More would have to give up his allegiance to the Catholic Church. Evidently, More never imagined that his humanism would be implicated in nationalism. He seems not to have realized the potential later development of his realist version of humanism before he had to drop it. When disillusioned, he had to resign from the public office that he had desired to take, recognizing the two contending
impulses of his humanism as irreconcilable. He had to discard his practical version of humanism, the very More figure who was skeptical of Hythlodaeus' Catholic idealism and made a way for More to enter Henry's court earlier. This is not a total rejection of humanism itself but of its realistic impulse initiated by the figure More.

Neither More nor Henry realized the historical course of the time. Henry attacked Luther in 1521, earning himself the title of Fidei defensor, and later More took Henry's place, writing Responsio ad Lutherum in 1523 designed to accuse Luther of individual interpretation of the Bible, the sole right to which was claimed by the Catholic Church. In the same breath, Henry ordered the arrest of Tyndale, who, as an English priest in exile in Germany and the Netherlands, was a proponent of Luther's ideas and first undertook to translate the New Testament into English in 1525. Henry ironically found Tyndale's book The Obedience of a Christian Man (1528) very useful for his cause of reformation, designating it "a book for me and all kings to read." Tyndale recognized kings as God's vicars ordained, their absolute authority in this world, their superiority over the Church, and therefore obedience to kings as a foremost duty of their subjects. Having doubted the legitimacy of his marriage and insecure over having no heir, Henry began proceedings to file for divorce in 1527. A series of acts followed up. The Submission of the clergy in 1532 and the Act of Succession and Supremacy of 1534 made the King of England head of the Church of England, establishing the King's authority over that of the Pope.

The "great matter" required More to take sides, namely, to endorse Henry's independence from the Church. This was nationalism, contrary to Catholic universality, that severed the bond which had tied England to Christendom as a whole. This was religious individualism which he had launched severe attacks against. As a Catholic humanist, he would not subscribe to the nationalistic cause at the expense of the Catholic Church, since only the universal was true to him. More was persistent to the last in the principle of the unity of Christendom: he observed in his letter to Thomas Cromwell in
1534 that "sith all Christendom is one corps, I cannot perceive how any member thereof may without the common assent of the body depart from the common head."

With the increasing spread of Henrician nationalism, however, humanists were drawn into the government service in a new way; they were asked to contribute to the making of a nation centered on the sovereign. A practical application of humanist knowledge, particularly the knowledge of civil law over canon law, was demanded, which became "a hallmark of Henry VIII's platform during the Reformation." Henry's separation from Rome accelerated the secularization of humanism, which had profound effects in all areas and ultimately led to the transformation of both the course and tenor of English humanism. In the process of compromising with Tudor nationalism, English humanists became more nationally and practically oriented. Ascham's profound distrust of things Italian, for example, was notable. Elyot saw the national community clearly and the humanist participation in national affairs as a duty to the benefit of the state: "to profyte therby to my natural countrey ... [w]hereunto ... we be most specially bounden." It was a commonplace of Tudor humanists that they should serve their king with their experience of learning. Hence, Arthur Ferguson argues, the traditional humanist dichotomy between the contemplative life and the active life no longer existed as an alternative. The humanist's learned thought "must be applied in order to realize its potentiality" in the service of national affairs.

This new feature of English humanism should be distinguished from what Christian humanism stands for. Humanism that requires practical adaptation to the demands and needs of the nation is surely distinct from the kind that stresses the universal character of the humanist ideal and aims at a peaceful and harmonious order of the world as a whole. The humanist ideal was shifting from the contemplative life to the active one, at least in Tudor England.
If the first generation of English humanism is made up of the Oxford Reformers like William Grocyn (c. 1446-1519), Thomas Linacre (1460-1524), and John Colet (1466-1519), who all had studied in Italy, and to some extent Erasmus through his several visits to England since 1499, the next generation of English humanism can be represented by Sir Thomas Elyot (c. 1490-1546), Thomas Lupset (c. 1495-1530), Richard Morison (c. 1510-35), and Thomas Starkey (1495/99-1538), who were under the power of the spirit of Henrician nationalism that would come into full blossom in the Elizabethan period.

As their contemporary, More seems to stand somewhere in between in this historical process of nation-making. Certainly some potential of this kind is latent in him. The persona More indicates the changing picture of humanism of the period and therefore of More's conflict between idealistic cosmopolitan solutions and practical political concerns, between contemplation and action, and between what More has been taught and what is demanded of him by new circumstances. More has to incorporate this new dimension of humanism into his ideal Catholic humanism. *Utopia* is a site where the competing positions of humanism are tested: one involves how to materialize the universal ideal of Catholic humanism and the other expresses the realist aim of humanism advanced by humanists such as Elyot, who makes an effort to nationalize Morean humanism later on. The real More is between these two positions.

More belongs to the old rather than the new. More is situated in a transitional phase from the period of divine cosmos to that of nation-state. His condemnation to death for treason is symbolic of a struggle between the two contrary positions: More "the pre-nationalist" versus Henry VIII "the nationalist," in Liah Greenfeld's terms. His identity is so built on the humanist ideal of indivisible Christendom as a source of truth that he fails to perceive a historical point of break with the old vision, unlike many other contemporaries who adopted a new national faith. In a sense, More is much nearer to the Oxford intellectuals, whose intellectual tradition More took; such a critic as David Starkey calls
More an "amateur," or "an early example of the English intellectual's dislike of his own country" for his lack of insight into the rising spirit of nationhood. Major humanists of the 1530s like Elyot shared an intellectual backdrop similar to More's, but all took the matter of nationhood seriously, in contrast to More. More is a Renaissance medieval man in the last analysis.
Chapter Two:  
A Reconsideration of More's Catholic Humanism in *Utopia*


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definite change." Logan also places More's *Utopia* in the same vein. *Utopia*, he thinks, is one of the best humanist political works, an exercise to contend with the classical political masterpieces of Plato and Aristotle.

4 Karl Kautsky, *Thomas More and His Utopia* (N.Y.: Russell & Russell, 1959) 171. For more ideas related to More's Utopian communism, see W. E. Campbell, *More's Utopia & His Social Teaching* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1930), and Russel Ames, *Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1949). Campbell contrasts Hythlodaeus' coercive state communism with More's "Catholic Social Philosophy." Due to its compulsory nature, he argues, Hythlodaeus' communism strays from Catholic social philosophy's emphasis on being disciplined and reenergized by the grace of God. From a somewhat different angle, Ames reads *Utopia* as a middle-class humanist defense of capitalism and republicanism. His basic assumption is that More's *Utopia* is a construct of his class position and the social relations of his age. Being himself a member of the middle-class rising from under-sheriff of London to Henry's envoy, More represents the interest of the city of London, the middle-class's capitalism, through Utopian practices that might have had sympathetic readers in London.

is similar to what is conventionally known as "Christian humanist." While not focusing on *Utopia*, Douglas Bush traces the tradition of English Christian humanists from More to Milton in *The Renaissance and English Humanism* (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1939).

6 Surtz and Hexter, eds., *Utopia* lxvi-lxvii.


8 Elton 199.

9 Elton 200.

10 See Fox, *History and Providence* 52, and *Reassessing* 20-21.


12 See Fox, *Reassessing* 33. Fox's argument is related to his arrest theory of English humanism after the Henrician Reformation, namely, the impetus of English humanism is metamorphosed into forms of either classical education or Protestant theology.

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13 See Fox, *History and Providence* 3-4, 52.


15 Greenblatt 54.

16 Greenblatt 2.


18 The authorship of the text may be in some question. Nevertheless, no one has claimed that More did not write the book. See Peter C. Herman's contribution to *Early Modern History*, an Internet forum, on July 2, 1997 under the subject of Sir Thomas More.


22 Rice, Jr. and Grafton 70-71.


Finlay & F. I. L. Harrogate (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964) 183. Chambers also
remarks that More's concept of "the true business of life is meditation upon death.... [T]he
whole world is a prison. And he is a prisoner waiting till the summons comes to
execution." See Chambers, Thomas More 199.

26 F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone, eds., The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian


29 Thomas J. Schlereth, The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought: Its
form and Function in the Ideas of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694-1790 (Notre Dame:

30 Lewis W. Spitz, The Renaissance and Reformation Movements (Chicago: Rand
McNally & Company, 1971) 16. On the details about the religious situations of the period,
see his excellently presented chapter two. "The Church in Crisis."

31 See Schlereth, Cosmopolitan Ideal xxii-xxiii.

32 Roland H. Bainton, Erasmus of Christendom (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1969) 114.

33 Surtz and Hexter, ed, Utopia xxi. In his letter to the German humanist Ulrich
von Hutten, Erasmus mentioned the style inequality between Utopia Book One and Two:
"[h]e had written the second book at his leisure, and afterwards, when he found it was
required, added the first off-hand. Hence there is some inequality in the style." See Adams,
ed., Utopia 132.

34 See notes to Adams, ed., Utopia 5, 3.

35 See Adams, ed. 108.

37 Adams, ed. 128.
47 See Greenfeld 30.
Chapter Three

Catholic Humanism in Transition:
Elyot's *The Book Named The Governor* in a Nationalist Framework

"A public weal is a body living, compact or made of sundry estates and degrees of men, which is disposed by the order of equity and governed by the rule and moderation of reason. In the Latin tongue it is called Respublica." (Sir Thomas Elyot, *The Book Named The Governor*)

It is widely held that Sir Thomas Elyot (c. 1490-1546) played a key role in the evolution of English humanism in the early sixteenth century. He is credited with making a great contribution to the practice of continental humanism in England. As a popularizer of humanism, he attempted to shape the English ideal of a gentleman in all particulars by a thorough educational program. *The Book Named The Governor* (1531) set the tone of a new genre of courtesy book that would become very popular in Elizabethan and Jacobean England. Elyot also translated *The Doctrinal of Princes* (1534), which conveys Isocrates' counsels to noblemen. In this book, the earliest translation from Greek into English, he hoped to bring to the English public the greatness of the classics or Italian works. Elyot is highly acclaimed for a keen concern for the English language as well. He compiled a Latin-English *Dictionary* (1538), creating and developing many new words for the vernacular.
The Book Named The Governor, above all, has drawn most critical attention thanks to its massive influence upon the direction of later English humanists. The book is the first important theory of humanistic education for the ruling class, including the prince, written in English. Lehmberg informs us that it was so popular as to have been reprinted at least seven times by 1580 and to affect many works on political theory, education, and virtue in the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods. It was even taken up as one of the textbooks for the education of James VI and may have contributed to his later formation of the idea of divine kingship. One representative work from the next generation of English humanists, Spenser's The Faerie Queene (1590), certainly retains Elyot's curriculum for the development of the ideal gentleman. Shakespeare also appears to be a beneficiary of the book, as his passages on political theory in Henry V (1599) and Troilus and Cressida (1601) resemble the political ideas that inform the first two chapters of The Governor. 2

Elyot's humanist features in The Governor are often discussed with reference to Erasmus, who is considered the embodiment of Christian humanism. Elyot could fall in the group of the Christian humanists, in that the basis of his teachings evinces the sound union of Christian virtues and classical wisdom. 3 In James McConica's account, The Governor is "a magisterial statement of the Erasmian educational and political programme"--he also notes that Elyot's voice is critical in an Erasmian way in his objection to the royal divorce in Pasquil the Plain (1533). 4 In the same vein, Alistair Fox connects The Governor with Erasmus' Education of a Christian Prince (1516), arguing for a close resemblance between them. For Elyot, as for Erasmus, monarchy is the most preferred form of government: both ask servants of the state to equip themselves with such qualities as courtesy, wisdom, integrity, self-control, and mercy. Fox therefore finds in Elyot's educational program a reworking of Erasmus' educational prescription. Elyot is termed "a committed Erasmian" who believes in the learned's obligation to serve the common weal. 5
As is the case with Erasmian humanists, Fox argues further, Elyot struggles over the conflict between the ideal of humanism and its ineffectiveness in reality. Similar to the philosophy of the More figure of Utopia—who asserts necessity to adjust Hythlodaeus' humanist idealism, generally grounded in Catholic universality, to a new situation on national soil and who prescribes a practical way of serving the prince in a corrupt court using an indirect approach and theatrical adaptation to the given situation—Elyot initially struggles to make himself agreeable to the situation, applying the More figure's prescription of theatricality in favor of political expediency, yet he soon discovers the indirect approach unfit for Realpolitik. Here Fox highlights the fact that Elyot was replaced by Thomas Cranmer in the office of ambassador to the Emperor Charles V in 1532 for the failed mission of promoting Henry's position on the divorce—Charles was Catherine of Aragon's nephew and an apostle of the cause of the Catholic Church, and Elyot's duty was to detect what the Emperor had in mind about the divorce and to dissuade him from trying the case at Rome. Thus Elyot's two dialogues on the problem of counsel in 1533, Pasquil the Plain and Of the Knowledge which Maketh a Wise Man, Fox insists, express a kind of remonstrance with Henry about the matter, a plea for his seclusion from the counsel, a criticism of flatterers, a warning of the dangers of tyranny, and an account of the true office of a good counselor. They are reflections of what is expected of the idealistic Erasmian humanist.\(^6\) Fox sees Elyot's idealism fail for lack of effective prescriptions against the Realpolitik of the Tudor regime; hence, "Elyot's ideal state ... is a humanist wish fulfillment fantasy." Elyot's eventual failure to compromise demonstrates the inescapable dilemma central to the experience of the Erasmian humanists.\(^7\)

Elyot may have failed in his political career, yet it would be problematic to attribute the personal fiasco to the Erasmian idealistic nature of his humanism. A much needed check must be placed on the general tendency to account for the nature of Elyot's humanism in terms of Erasmian idealism. Contrary evidence questions whether his humanism is
idealistic in any sense that links it to Erasmian humanism, and in any sense that involves the Morean tension in *Utopia*.

As opposed to Erasmian idealism, the practical strands of Elyot's humanism must be emphasized. Following the observations of Fritz Caspari, a practical spirit is Elyot's main achievement in the development of English humanism, an endeavor to make humanistic learning serve the actual problems of England. Caspari finds a much closer affinity between Elyot's governor and Castiglione's model courtier than with Erasmus' Christian prince. The Erasmian model draws at great length upon the ideals of contemplative and cosmopolitan life, ignoring the particular questions of a nation. On the other hand, Castiglione's courtier is one who essays to realize the humanist ideal through both contemplation and action, and learning and practice. The courtier has definite political duties: while there is some difficulty exercising his independent function under the prince's arbitrary power, the courtier should guide him to the path of virtue; namely, the learned must engage themselves in the government and aid the prince in accomplishing his tasks. Castiglione's *The Book of the Courtier* (1528) is designed for such a courtier who is an actual policy maker in court. Similarly, Arthur Ferguson sees a growing sense of the humanist's active involvement in real politics as a duty, claiming that it was a commonplace of the early Tudor pamphleteer that a man of learning and experience put his knowledge and wisdom to use for the good of the country.

Elyot's *Governor* certainly follows this practical line of humanist thought. He speaks highly of wisdom in action, disapproving of that merely in contemplation. He maintains that wisdom from experience needs to be put into action through consultation:

[K]now that the name of a sovereign or ruler without actual governance is but a shadow, that governance standeth not by words only, but principally by act and example; that by example of governors men do rise or fail in virtue or vice. And, as it is said of Aristotle, rulers more grievously do sin

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by example than by their act. And the more they have under their governance, the greater account have they to render, that in their own precepts and ordinances they be not found negligent. (165-66)

Elyot deals with a diversity of subjects related to human affairs throughout the entire book, where the realistic use of letters is greatly stressed. For instance, he lays a special emphasis on "the learning of the laws of this realm," suggesting its necessity to complete the education of gentlemen (51-56). The idea, according to John Guy, was in effect acknowledged by the institution of the Inns of Court as a third university during the second half of the sixteenth century. This practical strain of Elyot's humanism has its basis in his personal career experience. In a sense, The Governor is a mirror of the social picture of Tudor England, specifically, of the wisdom acquired from working in local government as Clerk to the Justices of Assize for the Western circuit in 1511-26 and as Clerk of the King's Council under Wolsey from 1526 to 1530. His career must have presented him with the actual problems of English life, and from this firsthand experience, he must have devised his own answer in terms of an ideal model of a governor. Therefore, it would be misleading to insist on the ineffectiveness of his humanism in light of Erasmian idealism, for his humanism is essentially utilitarian in its aim. To call him merely a Christian humanist would neglect changing nature of English humanism of the period.

Still, there is more in Elyot's humanism than what Caspari or Ferguson perceive as a practical adaptation of Erasmian idealism to the English condition. I propose that the pragmatism of Elyot's humanism would make better sense from a nationalist vantage point. The real humanist drive of Elyot's day lies in a nationalist trend rather than in pragmatism. Moreover, the nationalist perspective distinguishes Elyot's humanism most precisely from Erasmian or Morean humanism, whose main concern is the humanist contribution to the building of a cosmopolitan ideal for Christendom. What Elyot has done, however, is transform the cosmopolitan ideal of the Christian prince into a governor of a particular
country of England, creating a new humanist norm in a transitional period. I will call this feature of Elyot's humanism "nationalistic."

The historical significance of Elyot's humanism, the nature of a shifting focus in the transformation of English humanism, has not been fully discussed yet. This chapter reframes Elyot's humanism with reference to Henrician nationalism, suggesting that his humanism is a new development distinct from Erasmian or Morean Catholic humanism. To tackle the task, the ideas in *The Governor* are readdressed in a way that brings to light Elyot's conscious anti-Utopianism in both humanism and Christianity from a nationalist perspective. Unlike More, Elyot attempts to incorporate the nationalist drive of the period in his humanism, and therefore despite his recognition of himself as Catholic, his Catholicism is not identified with the frame of the Roman Catholic Church. Elyot is tested by the same historical dynamics that required More's final choice, but he takes a different course in life and politics and consequently differentiates himself from More, ushering in a new age of humanism.

The 1531 publication date of *The Governor* might call a nationalistic motive into question, considering that Henry's final decision to break with Rome as decisive momentum for Henrician nationalism was made in 1532. Yet, a series of events before that year certainly indicate "the English Reformation already set in motion."¹² Henry had already attempted to settle his "great matter" diplomatically over four years: he desired to divorce the heirless Queen Catherine of Aragon. His initial effort to have the divorce trial in England aborted when Pope Clement VII recalled the case to Rome in January 1529. The revocation was responsible for both Cardinal Wolsey's fall from power and Elyot's dismissal from his clerkship in the King's council—Wolsey was his patron. Instead, in 1530, Elyot was appointed a justice of the peace for Cambridgeshire at Calton, where, free from government service for the first time, he began to write *The Governor*. In the meantime, the English clergy, meeting in convocation at Canterbury in February 1531,
recognized Henry VIII as supreme head of the Church of England. So "[w]hen he wrote, the break with Rome was all but accomplished."13 Elyot's text reflects these current situations, along with his almost twenty years of government experience.

Stanford Lehmberg offers persuasive evidence that Elyot's motive for writing the book at this critical juncture was political by identifying an inconsistency in subject and tone between the first three chapters of Book One on monarchy and the rest on the education of gentlemen. Lehmberg contends that Elyot first wrote a treatise on gentlemen's training and then attached three chapters to commend monarchy for some reason, and later added Books Two and Three about the virtues desirable for magistrates and kings.14 Lehmberg further argues that Elyot inserted the praise of monarchy either for personal ambition, to win the King's favor and remove his former association with Wolsey, or for propaganda, to support Henry's present cause. Thomas Cromwell was seeking a propagandist to write about unlimited royal power to get independence from Rome when William Tyndale, who opposed the royal divorce based on the cause of the Catholic Church, became an apparent threat to Henry's policy. Cromwell, a long-standing friend of Elyot's, asked him to justify the assertion of royal power. This view, according to Lehmberg, is supported by the fact that The Governor was published by Thomas Berthelet, the King's printer who was responsible for the subsequent publication of Henrician propaganda.15

Despite the stylistic distinction, the entire book, including the educational portion of Book One, seems to be designed for the King eventually, because Elyot intends to educate young gentlemen befitting the King's court. The Governor addresses the prince and the ruling class alike. By governors, Elyot does not designate exclusively the gentlemen of the governing class. In the concluding statement about exercise in Book One, Elyot observes that his prescriptions apply to all:

98
I conclude to write of exercise, which appertaineth as well to princes and
noblemen as to all other by their example, which determine to pass for their
lives in virtue and honesty. (94)

Royal power is reinforced by the examples of its representatives. We can only find
"collapsing identity" between them. Elyot declares in this regard that all books aim at
providing the best counsel, namely, for the prince:

THE END of all doctrine and study is good counsel, whereunto as unto the
principal point, which geometricians do call the centre, all doctrines (which
by some authors be imagined in the form of a circle) do send their effects
like unto equal lines ... which is in form of a consultation, useth his
persuasions and demonstrations by the certain rules and examples of sundry
sciences, proving thereby that the conclusion and (as I might say) the
perfection of them is in good counsel, wherein virtue may be found. (238)

Elyot's special focus on the King is corroborated by the intensity of his praise of
royal power in the first two chapters, not to mention his dedication of the book to Henry. A
tribute of this kind has been a commonplace in political theory. What Elyot does for his
version, as Lehmberg also points out, is make it "strikingly one-sided" by leaving out the
theory's corollary "tyranny warning," a conventional theme of medieval Catholicism in the
discussion of monarchy; hence, his affirmation of the prince's absolute power had
"unusual strength." 17

Whether Elyot wrote to regain royal favor or for political propaganda to justify
Henry's absolute authority, the book evidently pleased Henry, coming out when such a
strong praise of monarchy needed to be rearticulated, "when it was becoming clearer and
clearer that only some drastic assertion of the King's power could settle Henry's 'great
matter.'" 18 Elyot was rewarded by being appointed ambassador to the Emperor Charles V
in that year, who had a great influence upon the divorce matter. Henry's appointment of
Elyot to such an important position betrays his trust in him for his present cause; Elyot was at the center of Henrician Reformation. In short, the series of events around the publication of *The Governor* bespeak Elyot's early recognition of the coming event. The book therefore "stands as one of the earliest implicit justifications of the English Reformation."\(^1\)

At this threshold of the English Reformation, humanists were urgently asked to establish England's own national identity against the traditional Latinate culture grounded on medieval Catholicism. A concern for things vernacular already prevailed in every aspect of society, along with tight censorship against things related to Rome and the Papacy. Cultural activities of the day, in Liah Greenfeld's account, were almost invariably motivated by patriotism: there was a Chaucerian revival by William Thynne's edition of Geoffrey Chaucer's manuscripts; Sir Thomas Wyatt wrote that "My King my Country alone for whom I lyve"; and in his *A Dialogue Between Reginald Pole and Thomas Lupset*, Thomas Starkey asked Cardinal Pole to dedicate his life to the Commonwealth.\(^2\)

As a humanist, Elyot was no exception to the general current of the cultural transition. Elyot emphasizes things English in his humanist program, initiating a new direction of humanism applicable to actual English situations. *The Governor*, the first humanist treatise on education written in English, argues for a public weal against a common weal, a notion that demonstrates the difference between Elyot's religious and humanist world views and the previous humanists' such as More's. More's humanism aims at Christendom as a whole, whereas Elyot's aims at England as a nation. Elyot experiments with humanism in the best interests of the nation with a conscious mindset.

Elyot's use of the vernacular is the surest badge of the changing spirit of English humanism. A new thrust is given to the development of the national language that will shape and, in turn, reproduce English nationality. To set forth knowledge for "my natural country," Elyot thinks, is a sacred "duty" to his country. In his dedication of the book, written in a "vulgar tongue," to Henry, Elyot lays open his aim explicitly in its proem:
I LATE considering (most excellent prince and mine only redoubted sovereign lord) my duty that I owe to my natural country with my faith also of allegiance and oath, wherewith I am double bounden unto your majesty, moreover the account that I have to render for that one little talent delivered to me to employ (as I suppose) to the increase of virtue, I am (as God judge me) violently stirred to divulgate or set forth some part of my study, trusting thereby to acquit me of my duties to God, your Highness, and this my country.... I have now enterprised to describe in our vulgar tongue the form of a just public weal. (proem, viii)

He later comments on his use of English in the book in the proem of Of the Knowledge which Maketh a Wise Man as follows:

I intended to augment our Englyshe tongue, wherby men shulde as well expresse more abundantly the thynge that they conceyved in theyr harts (wherfore language was ordeyned) havyng wordes apte for the pourpose: as also interprete out of greke, latyn/ or any other tonge into Englysshe, as sufficiently/ as out of any one of the said tongues into an other.21

Elyot here unfolds a desire to emulate Greek and Latin, to uplift English sufficiently to meet all literary needs. He assumes the supreme of learning contained in those ancient tongues can be available in the vernacular as well. Elyot in this regard is deservedly known as a neologizer of English. He adds many new words to the English language in the course of translation both inevitably and deliberately in order to find appropriate English vocabulary. This tradition was adopted by many Elizabethan translators and innovators, including Spenser, who claims to make the national language and literature rank among the classical ones. The use of the English language grew rapidly in this period at the expense of the international Latin that had been exclusively used before Elyot's days.
Writing in the vernacular, Elyot is well aware of what it means to address the English people, not an international audience. He repeatedly states the fundamental commitment of his works to his "natural country," not to all of Christendom which Erasmus or More would have had in mind. He critiques the abuse of foreign tongues in an apology for his preference of English in the proem to the third edition (1541) of the medical treatise The Castle of Health (1534)—a popular regimen of health. In the tract, current self-seeking physicians are charged with writing their treatises in Latin to keep the secrets of their craft from being known to the public. He argued that "if phisitions be angry, that I have wryten phisike in englyshe, let thym remembre, that the grekes wrate in greke, the Romanes in latyne, Avicena, and the other in Arabike, whiche were their owne propre and maternal tonges." For a more general readership, the language barrier was a real problem. In the proem of The Doctrinal of Princes, Elyot's rendition from Greek into English, he also makes it clear that the translation is done for the general public to provide them with the wealth of knowledge hoarded in Greek and Latin:

"The chiefe cause of this my little exercise was: to the intent that thei, which do not understande greeke nor latine, shoulde not lacke the commoditee and pleasure, whiche maie be taken in readeyng therof."

Elyot's thorough humanist curriculum, the first among its kind in England, is also programmed to this end. In principle, Elyot walks in the footsteps of the idealism of Catholic humanists. He pays special attention to studies of classical literature, the ancient languages of Greek and Latin, logic, rhetoric, history, and philosophy, and such virtues as justice, mercy, friendship, loyalty, wisdom, patience, and temperance. The subjects and virtues are held important to prepare the ruling class of governors, who are expected to aid the prince and offer good counsel. Significantly, however, these studies and virtues are designed to fit the English situation, not Christendom, specifically to train English
governors for Henry's court. He makes a clear reference to England as a separate entity and polity when he mentions a "public weal":

This realm always having one prince like unto his Highness, equal to the ancient princes in virtue and courage, it shall be reduced (God so disposing) unto a public weal excelling all other in pre-eminence of virtue and abundance of things necessary. (12)

Elyot aims at cultivating governors acclimated to "the public weal of their country," thereby constituting England as an ideal public weal, the ancient states of Greece and Rome:

[T]hey shall always be able to serve honorably their prince, and the public weal of their country, principally if they confer all their doctrines to the most noble study of moral philosophy which teacheth both virtues, manners, and civil policy: whereby at the last we should have in this realm sufficient of worshipful lawyers, and also a public weal equivalent to the Greeks or Romans. (56)

A fair number of chapters are assigned to music and dancing as both physical and mental exercises for governors. These exercises, taken as especially vital in the making of gentlemen, are Elyot's peculiar concern for their usefulness in Henry's court, not merely for their part in the general liberal education of governors. It is well known that Catherine loved dancing and was proud of her dancing skill—several records show that she and her ladies danced in a Spanish style before Henry who also loved dancing. Henry was also a music enthusiast. He was a passionate musician and an excellent critic, playing the organ and the lute and even composing some charming pieces. In order to work for Henry's government or court, therefore, it must have been necessary to acquire such court manners as music and dancing. To put it otherwise, these exercises aim at training governors or courtiers to be useful servants for Henry, to adjust themselves to the taste of Henry and his queen.
The discussion of archery is another indication that Elyot had Henry in mind. Elyot takes the role of "shooting in a long bow" as "principal of all other exercises" (91), lamenting its decline by importing handguns and crossbows. He critiques the failed attempt to enforce the laws already enacted to restore the use of the longbow. Most criticized is the lack of the muscular exercise involved in using the longbow, for its exercise is very useful to prepare war and game skills (92-93). Elyot's defense of reinstating the longbow is related to Henry's taste as well. We know that Henry was a passionate archer and good at shooting the longbow and that he had lasting interest in it.25

Elyot's concern for physical exercises reflects not only the taste of Henry and his court but also points to a distinction from the previous humanist view. Elyot stresses the usefulness of the exercises in preparing governors to serve in war by developing their strength. Consideration of war in a humanistic program would be unthinkable for Morean or Erasmian humanists of pacifism; the Utopians, for example, try to avoid war as much as they can. Yet, it is only too natural for Elyot to train governors to prepare for wars as part of humanistic education, for the training is the source of strength of the nation in war. Hence, Elyot says, "undoubtedly it [wrestling] shall be found profitable in wars" (60), and "therein [in hunting] is the very imitation of battle" (66).

Elyot's nationalist way of thinking about humanistic education is most observable in the discussion of law. When he speaks of the study of law in the book, it does not refer to universal law but the law for and about Englishmen. This idea is drawn from his felt experience himself as a lawyer to the Justices of Assize and the King's Council. Elyot was deeply concerned about the languages used in English law. He wishes the country to employ legal languages "in a more clean and elegant style" (52), so that English law is "not only comprehending most excellent reasons, but also being gathered and compact ... of the pure meal or flour sifted out of the best laws of all other countries" (52). English law then would emulate the supreme of Greek and Roman laws (56). He evidently levels at the
humanistic education for the nation-state, not for the whole Christian world as did the Erasmian or Morean humanistic program in their cosmopolitan orientation.

All these features differentiate Elyot's humanism from More's. More and Elyot apparently share a similar background in terms of humanist interests. They were both trained as lawyers, became members of Parliament, and served as key governmental officials under Henry. Both had high regard for strict justice and humanistic education and learning. Yet, their world views part direction, and as a result, their humanisms are fundamentally opposite. The touchstone is the attitude toward nationhood that draws a clear line between them. For More, as for Erasmus, Latin is the correct medium in writing, and his *Utopia* was published in a foreign city, Louvain, and was not translated during More's lifetime—Ralph Robinson's English translation came out in 1551. On the other hand, Elyot's *Governor* first appeared in London and was written in English, and went through many editions.

When forced to test cultural boundaries, More takes his stand against Henry's supremacy over the Church and resigns from the government post that he thinks is incompatible with his humanist idealism. Elyot is also well aware of the tension between Christian conscience and allegiance to the King in the early 1530s. Yet he sees possibilities for adjusting humanist values to the spirit of the nationhood and ends up coming to terms with it. In other words, he finds little difficulty accommodating his humanist ideal to the court. This tendency accounts for why Elyot continues to seek public office throughout his life, even after his dismissal from the position as Charles's ambassador in 1532 seemed to isolate Elyot from Henrician politics for good. As is well indicated in the letter to Cromwell of 1538, Elyot had had a close friendship with Cromwell since 1519, who, as the chief engineer of the Henrician Reformation, apparently had less in common with Erasmian idealism than Machiavellian real politics. Based on this friendship, Elyot persistently asked his friend and patron for an opportunity to return to a governmental work. Elyot's letters to
Cromwell recorded how desperately Elyot looked to him for his influence upon the King to his benefit:

I am animate to importune your goode lordship with moste harty desyres to contynue my goode lorde in augmenting the kinges goode estimacion of me, whereof I promyse you bifore godd your lordship shall never have cause to repent.27

It is also well known that Elyot was persistent in dedicating works to Henry in a bid for his patronage. He addressed *The Governor* to the King in 1531, *The Dictionary* in 1538, and *The Banquet of Sapience*, a collection of wise sayings from the Scriptures, in 1539.

A close association between More and Elyot is often pointed out. As a member of the More circle, Elyot made many acquaintances at More's home in Chelsea like Thomas Linacre and Hans Holbein the Younger, who made drawings of him. His wife, Margaret, attended More's school as a pupil (v). Based on these facts, it is argued that the situation depicted in the two dialogues of the counsel of 1533 might have reminded the English reader of More's plight of the time: the English clergy in Convocation acknowledged Henry to be supreme head of the Church in England on May 15th, 1532 and subsequently More resigned from the Chancellorship giving the excuse of ill health. John Major goes so far as to contend that the dialogues were designed "to succor [More] and to gain for him the King's pardon."28

Yet, we are simply nonplused at Elyot's later plain repudiation of his friendship with More after his execution for treason in 1535. In a letter to Cromwell in 1536, Elyot proclaimed:

I therefor besieche your goode lordship now to lay a part the remembrance of the amity betwene me and sir Thomas More which was but Vsque ad aras, as is the proverb, consydering that I was never so moche addict unto
hym as I was unto truthe and fidelity toward my soveraigne lorde, as godd is my Juge.29

It is very hard to imagine that Elyot, who chose political expediency over principle, wrote the dialogues to challenge Henry’s authority that cast off More. The issue can be better illuminated when approached in terms of the divorce matter and Elyot’s dismissal from the ambassadorship, both of which seem to be intimately related to each other. Elyot probably remonstrated with the King about the grand matter when he returned from his embassy to further the cause of Catherine of Aragon, as Pasquil and Plato lay an injunction upon counselors to tell the truth.30 Elyot might criticize Henry, objecting to the divorce, but his criticism must be at the level of general advice to the prince, as was commonplace in the genre of the mirror of princes. We know that Elyot’s name appeared in the list of knights and gentlemen at the long-delayed coronation of Anne Boleyn on June first, 1533,31 and that he firmly approved of Henry “as supreme heed of the churche of Englande nexte under CHRIST.”32 Elyot kept sympathy with Catherine against the royal divorce, but unwaveringly stood by his king. Elyot wrote the dialogues less to aid More covertly than to plead his own case, lamenting his dismissal from the office and justifying his own counsel for the Queen.

The apparent denial of the friendship with More provides room for reading an anti-Morean sentiment in The Governor. Indeed, many contrasts are observable between Utopia and The Governor: the Utopian principles of equality, popular elections, and communism are quite different from Elyot’s ideals of social distinction by strict hierarchy, defense of monarchy, and allowance of private property. Ruth Mohl analyzes Elyot’s theory of the divine origin of government and of social classes, and briefly distinguishes Elyot’s definition of res publica from More’s.33 Nevertheless, he does not see Elyot’s ideas of res publica significantly from an anti-Morean perspective. It is Major who has been credited with labeling The Governor an “anti-Utopia” in the sense that it is “a defense of the
traditional structure of English society against proposals that would sweep away that
structure and erect in its place a modified democratic community with elected rulers,
communal ownership of property. In the end, however, he somewhat confusingly
concedes little difference between the two on the grounds of the intimate religious link
between them—their mutual opposition to heretics—and of their similar humanist cause of
learning and education. Pearl Hogrefe affirms Major's point, since 'Elyot's attack on
communism is only a small detail ... in a complex book. Probably More would have agreed
with most of the other ideas in The Governor. Both men had in common one large aim:
they wished to improve society and government.... More was not urging the adoption of
communism in England—in the opinion of this writer, at least.'

Recently David Baker investigates the issue in a philological study of the word
"divulgate" that figures in the proem of The Governor and concludes that More's influence
upon Elyot was both positive and negative. By "divulgate," following Baker's argument,
Elyot meant to "make a thing common" to the public (vulgus), to distribute knowledge to
them. In a period of political and religious turmoil, it also had a connotation of "the wide
accessibility of the translated Bible" in a vulgar tongue to the hands of the ignoble
commoners—the Latin vulgus often denotes a sense of "mob." In this connotation of the
term, Elyot's anti-Utopian sentiment is exposed; it reveals his deep distrust of the
commoners, a sense that Elyot must have had about More's Utopian communism built on
equality. Briefly, in Baker's appraisal, Elyot opposes the Utopian society's "distribution of
tangible property" to the commoners, but he is aligned with More's communism "at the
level of the intangible" in his commitment to the communal distribution of intellectual
property: "divulgate or set forth." And this is why Elyot takes great pains to make a
distinction of "public" from "common" in his definition of res publica.

The anti-Utopian theme of The Governor, however, becomes more evident from
two fundamentally different views of humanism. More's cosmopolitan humanism and
Elyot's nationalistic one contrast in the use of Latin and English, the development of the unknown Utopia versus England, the universal educational aim and the national one, and the priority of Christendom and that of the nation.

We are not sure how Elyot's anti-Utopian sentiment evolved. Personally, Elyot might have been unhappy with More the Chancellor who had him discharged from the clerkship. Elyot had served as the clerk to the Council under Wolsey's patronage for six and a half years without being paid at all—the request for an adequate fee became one persistent theme in his letters to Cromwell ever after. Wolsey's fall in 1530 rewarded Elyot only with the order of Knighthood. More's splendid but problematic *Utopia* might have been unsettling to Elyot. There were many uncertainties about More's *Utopia* in Elyot's times. As indicated in the previous chapter, we know from his letters that More himself was very sensitive to the critical reception of his book; the idea of communism, in particular, drew the most critical attention from contemporary humanists. Given his intention to be fairly faithful to the line of traditional Catholicism, More's book became all the more problematic in a climate of religious upheaval in the 1530s. Worried about his communism, More openly indicated his wish for burning *Utopia* rather than having it translated and open to misconception.

Elyot's anti-Utopianism begins with a definition of the Latin term "*res publica*" different from More's, which is central to all the points of distinction between them. Elyot is following the Ciceronian rhetorical tradition to the letter, where all literary exercise begins with a definition of key words from which flows every systematic development of a subject. Initially, *res publica* was a religious term denoting a Christian common weal, applicable to Christendom as a whole:

> In the first 15 centuries of the Christian Era, the ideal was the universal world-state, not loyalty to any separate political entity. The Roman Empire had set the great example, which survived not only in the Holy Roman
Empire of the Middle Ages but also in the concept of the *res publica christiana* (Christian republic or community) and in its later secularized form of a united world civilization. As political allegiance, before the age of nationalism, was not determined by nationality, so civilization was not thought of as nationally determined. During the Middle Ages civilization was looked upon as determined religiously.\(^{41}\)

More's notion of *res publica* lies in this tradition of medieval Catholicism. As the "best state of a commonwealth" (*res publica* in More's translation),\(^ {42}\) More's Utopia, modeled on an ideal medieval monastic community, is precisely where communism is a basic principle of society. It is not built for a certain social class or a nation but for the general public of Christendom. Thus after completing the description of Utopian life, Hythlodaeus can claim "the structure of that commonwealth" to be:

> not merely the best but the only one which can rightly claim the name of a commonwealth. Outside Utopia, to be sure, men talk freely of the public welfare--but look after their private interests only. In Utopia, where nothing is private, they seriously concern themselves with public affairs.\(^ {43}\)

We should be careful not to equate More's communism with modern socialism, yet his sense of *res publica*, a commonwealth, certainly entertains possibilities that could make other contemporary humanists, noticeably Elyot, anxious if the communism implies the transfer of power from the aristocracy to the common people.

This potential danger is demonstrated in Elyot's painstaking effort to differentiate "common" from "public" in the definition of *res publica* in the opening part of *The Governor*. Elyot basically sees the vexed term as a "public weal," giving his own definition of it as follows:

> A public weal is a body living, compact or made of sundry estates and degrees of men, which is disposed by the order of equity and governed by
the rule and moderation of reason. In the Latin tongue it is called Respublica. (1)

According to him, the term res publica has long been misconstrued as a "common weal" where "everything should be to all men in common, without discrepancy of any estate or condition" (1). A common weal could refer to the body politic or a state where the people are invested with supreme power: a republic or a democratic state. As suggested in his definition, however, res publica for Elyot is not constituted by people of equal social rank or estate but of diverse degrees and estates, so that he claims to employ the word "public" instead of "common," the sense of which he argues is adequate for the translation of "res plebeia":

[T]he proper and true signification of the words public and common, which be borrowed of the Latin tongue for the insufficiency of our own language, shall sufficiently declare the blindness of them which have hitherto holden and maintained the said opinions. As I have said, public took his beginning of people, which in Latin is Populus, in which word is contained all the inhabitants of a realm or city, of what estate or condition so ever they be. Plebs in English is called the commonalty, which signifieth only the multitude, wherein be contained the base and vulgar inhabitants not advanced to any honour or dignity, which is also used in our daily communication.... And consequently there may appear like diversity to be in English between a public weal and a common weal, as should be in Latin between Res publica and Res plebeia. And after that signification, if there should be a common weal either the commoners only must be wealthy, and the gentle and noble men needy and miserable, or else, excluding gentility, all men must be of one degree and sort, and a new name provided. For as...
much as Plebs in Latin, and commoners in English, be words only made for the discrepancy of degrees, whereof proceedeth order. (2)

Elyot takes "public" to signify all the people in the realm, whereas "common" refers only to the common people; a public weal therefore is for the good of a community, and a common weal is for the good of the commoners. This distinction is upheld by his defense of the institution of monarchy. He claims that there should be one sovereign in a public weal, rejecting the idea of the rule by people. The second chapter of Book One is mainly engaged in this issue, surveying various governmental forms and finally making a strong assertion of the superiority of monarchy over all other forms of government. Elyot warns of the "damage" of the democratic or republic polity "where a multitude hath had equal authority without any sovereign" (6). Democracy "might well be called a monster with many heads ... the rule of the commonalty" (6). Monarchy is the only natural and proper form of government in the world agreeable to the principles of order and degree set by God:

Wherefore undoubtedly the best and most sure governance is by one king or prince, which ruleth only for the weal of his people to him subject; and that manner of governance is best approved, and hath longest continued, and is most ancient. For who can deny but that all thing in heaven and earth is governed by one God, by one perpetual order, by one providence? One sun ruleth over the day, and one moon over the night; and to descend down to the earth, in a little beast, which of all other is most to be marvelled at, I mean the bee, is left to man by nature, as it seemeth, a perpetual figure of a just governance or rule: who hath among them one principal bee for their governor, who excelleth all other in greatness, yet hath he no prick or sting, but in him is more knowledge than in the residue. (7)
In sum, a humanist like Elyot still understands people (*plebs* in Latin) in the sense of rabble and deeply suspects that the commoners are a danger to aristocratic society. The term "common weal," therefore, comes down to a misdirected version of *res publica*, whose sense might cause social order and degree to break apart.

The distinction between "common" and "public" is pivotal for the further deployment of Elyot's theory of a public weal against that of More's Utopian commonwealth. Elyot's idea is based on the Great Chain of Being, the governing principle of the world of order and degree. He has a firm faith in the divine order of the universe sustained by a hierarchical system where man is situated lower than God and higher than all other creatures on earth. Thus Elyot states that "in everything is order, and without order may be nothing stable or permanent" (3), and warns that "where all thing is common there lacketh order, and where order lacketh there all thing is odious and uncomely" (5).

Upon this principle he rests his idea of justice, differentiating it from the Morean notion. The Utopians all are treated equally regardless of their social rank or function and get their rewards from their labor despite individual difference of ability. All goods and property in the state are shared mutually and no one expects a shortage of food or clothing. Yet this notion of justice as equality is unthinkable from Elyot's frame of reference where order is kept in due degree. For Elyot, equality merely means equity, or distributive justice. And the distributive justice is established only when property is given out in proportion to individual merits:

[U]nto men of such virtue by very equity appertaineth honour, as their just reward and duty, which by other men's labours must also be maintained according to their merits. For as much as the said persons, excelling in knowledge whereby other be governed, be ministers for the only profit and commodity of them which have not equal understanding; where they which
do exercise artificial science or corporal labour do not travail for their superiors only, but also for their own necessity. (4)

In such a strictly hierarchical society where equality is not secure, the Utopian sense of justice becomes meaningless. Elyot believes instead that justice can only be realized in equity and in a society where rewards are properly distributed according to individual excellence.

Elyot may well contend that a man of more understanding should get more rewards than a man of less. He has a firm faith in inequality between superiors and inferiors by the degree of disposition of understanding that tells the gentleman from the vulgar people (4, 224). He warns that "the inferior person or subject ought to consider that ... he ... [in] the powers and qualities of the soul and body, with the disposition of reason, be not in every man equal" (166). As a result, the governing class naturally deserves more rewards than the governed. His public weal is where there is due degree and where rewards (or wealth) are distributed in direct proportion to the quality of individual understanding, a system that he believes in turn draws reverence and obedience from the commoners. Differential rewards are necessary to keep the order and degree of a public weal:

[I]t is only a public weal where, like as God hath disposed the said influence of understanding, is also appointed degrees and places according to the excellency thereof; and thereto also would be substance convenient and necessary for the ornament of the same, which also impresseth a reverence and due obedience to the vulgar people or commonalty; and without that, it can be no more said that there is a public weal than it may be affirmed that a house without his proper and necessary ornaments is well and sufficiently furnished. (5)

It remains open to further discussion whether Elyot had a correct sense of Morean communism, but the consciousness and deliberateness of his attempt to differentiate it from
his own make a very interesting point: by his staunch opposition to the communal ownership suggested in *Utopia*, he makes it clear that a public weal belongs to the King. Elyot's belief manifests itself in his use of the words "realm" and "estate," equated primarily with the King's property. Elyot uses those words repeatedly throughout with reference to the property of the King. In the proem he identifies "the public weal" with "this your most noble realm" (proem, xiii) and after one paragraph regards "this world as your royal estate (my most dear sovereign Lord) and the public weal of my country" (proem, xiv). In the letter to the Duke of Norfolk written on his way to the Netherlands to apprehend Tyndale, Elyot makes clear the sense of the royal realm by addressing the country as "his [king's] Realm."45 We can imagine how unsettling a notion of More's commonwealth was to Elyot for whom a nation—from Elyot's phrases of "a public weal" and "sundry public weals," his public weal means a nation (228)—still meant the King's property.

Elyot's way of justifying the wealth and right of the sovereign leaves the impression that he is an absolutist who ventures to make the prince's power divine and hence absolute. This would be inconceivable to More. In his defense of monarchy (7), Elyot obviously sees the King's rule of the country as comparable to that of God's rule of the universe, stating that the King within the realm is like God and that, by implication, the royal power is absolute, unlimited, and divine. Elyot points out, taking advantage of the authority of Scripture, that "the hearts of princes be in God's own hands and disposition" (12). The idea of divine kingship is even more clearly expressed elsewhere. It deserves to be quoted in full:

> [T]he Royall astate of a kynge here in erth, next unto god, is of men moste to be honoured, loved, and feared in an incomparable degree and faction. For no man havynge the free use of reason, beholdynge at his eien the disposition moste wonderfull sette by divine provydence in thynges above

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us, and undernethe us, with the sondry alternations of tyme, wyll denye, to be of those thynges one principall ruler and moderatour, by whose eternall sapience all thynges ben governed. Unto that office of governance is (as it were by the generall consent of al people) one name appropried, in the which although by diversitie of langages, the letters and syllables are oftentymes chaunged, yet the worde spoken hath one signification, which implieth as moche as a KINGE in englyshe, as it may appere to them, which do rede holy scripture, and will marke howe often god is there callid kinge, and also the prophètes do so frequently name hym.... [F]or the similitude of that divine office men dyd attribute unto their soveraygne governours that excellent denomination, calling them semblably kynges, and assigning to them the commune distribution of Justyce: Wherby the people under their governaunce, shulde be kepte and preserved in quiete lyfe, not exercysed in bestiall appetite, but passed forth in all partes of honestie, they fynally shuld of god be rewarded with immortalitie. This wel consydered, it shall be to all men appareant, that they, whiche rebell agaynst kynges, be ennemies to god, and in wyll confounders of naturall order and providence. But above all thinges, I have in mooste admiration, the majestic of you, whiche be verye kynges raygnyng in Justice, whan I consyder, that therin semeth to be a thynge supernaturall, or (if it may be spoken without derogation unto goddis honour) a divine influence or sparke of divinitie: whiche late appered to all them that behelde your grace syttynge in the Throne of your royal astate, as supreme heed of the churche of Englande nexte under CHRIST.46

No revenge may be taken by subjects despite the king's tyranny. Elyot makes it unmistakable that Brutus and Cassius, "of excellent virtues" who murdered Caesar, are
devils. Their disloyalty eventually brings about "confusion and civil battles" and their
death. (178-79). Elyot therefore stresses patience rather than revenge in another section
(191-92). The King's divine right suggested above echoes the political theories of Luther,
Tyndale, or the Elizabethan homilies, which warranted national relativism as opposed to
Catholic universality.47

Whether or not Elyot's idea has some connection with Luther's or Tyndale's
theories, he evidently made efforts to inscribe absolute sovereignty on Henry. Elyot may
reiterate the conventional political theory of absolutism but in a conscious mindset that
reflects national interests in a new situation, setting forth his theory when it was most
needed. Elyot displays the typical symptoms of the early development of nationalistic spirit
centered on the King who takes the place of the traditional forms of allegiance that has been
made to the Catholic Church or the Pope.

The stress on absolute monarchy could question Elyot's religious faith in his
humanism. Yet, for Elyot, "faith is the foundation of justice," so that "faith is both the
original and ... principal constitutor and conservator of the public weal" (181). Elyot is
basically Catholic. He expresses the sense of "Catholic" positively in numerous places. He
makes frequent references to Catholic faith by citing "the wordes of the Catholike Churche"
in demonstration of his argument48 or by observing that "the most catholic and excellent
learned men" are "to "the church of christ a necessary ornament" (231). The following
statement on the belief in an afterworld is particularly reminiscent of More, disclosing a
glimpse of Elyot's Catholic way of thinking:

[A]s a precious stone in rich brooch they shall be beholden and wondered
at, and after the death of their body their souls for their endeavour shall be
incomprehensibly rewarded of the giver of wisdom, to whom only be given
everal glory. (241)
As to the matter of religious controversy of the time, Elyot seems rather conservative like More. He is very prudent concerning theological issues; *The Governor* contains very few theological treatments. For instance, the book escapes such an issue as how to interpret the Bible, an issue that caused a heated debate among Catholic and Protestant theologians or humanists of the period. Elyot may look to the Bible as a storehouse of examples of the virtues he attempts to inculcate, but this is not a significant move in light of theological doctrines. We know elsewhere that he is quite negative toward Protestants, counting them as heretics. In the preface to the *Bibliotheca Eliotae* (1542), Elyot declares that it is "necessary to enterlace the detestable heretykes, with theyr sundry heresyes, concernynge the substance of our catholyke faythe justly condemned by the hole consent of all true chrysten men." This attitude can also be found in his report about Nuremberg, which he visited to explore what the new Lutheran city of freedom is like. His accounts of the mission to the Duke of Norfolk are laden with charges of the corruption of ethical and sexual mores of German cities such as Worms.

Nevertheless, this does not guarantee that Elyot still retains the spirit of Erasmian or Morean Catholic idealism. Elyot's key concept of a "public weal" itself is a notion that derives from his religious world view distinct from More's: More's Catholicism is directed toward Christendom as a whole, whereas Elyot's is toward a specific nation, England. While this distinction does not necessarily entail Elyot's total rejection of Roman Catholicism, Elyot's nationalized Catholicism is obviously different from it. Despite the strong praise of the King's unlimited authority in the opening chapters, Elyot seems to impose limitations on it in the spirit of Catholic idealism by way of the virtues in Book Three, where he makes many references to the hierarchy between God and man and where he occasionally cautions men in power to exercise their power moderately because they are but men ultimately. To take one example:
O creatures most unkind and barren of justice that will deny that thing [honor] to their God and Creator, which of very duty and right is given to Him by good reason afore all princes which in a degree incomparable be His subjects and vassals. (163)

Is this a sign of Elyot's conflict or confusion of his Catholic idealism with the sense of divine kingship? He does not provide any further insight into his intention, but the attempt to restrict man's power expresses simply an assertion of fundamental moral principles that he probably thought would never counter his elevation of king's power. To put it somewhat differently, even if there is any ambiguity about Elyot's religious view, it is not a token of Elyot's wavering religious loyalty but a fallout from the historical dynamics of the period, one that tested More's faith in much the same way.

The ambiguity really belongs to the period. The polity of Henrician religion was too complicated not to be defined as either the old Roman Catholicism or a new Protestantism. It was almost impossible to speak of Catholicism at the moment without qualifications, because the new Church of England was not fully established until the enforcement of the Elizabethan Settlement in 1559. Henry was a true example of such ambiguity: he executed the adherents of the old Catholic Church like More and Fisher and at the same time new radical Lutheran Protestants like Tyndale. Elyot was discreet regarding his disapproval of the royal policy about religious matters. He endorsed the royal supremacy over the Church and the dissolution of monasteries, an approval that he must have understood as not a denial of Catholic faith itself but merely the Papacy, not of the Catholic but of the Roman Catholic. He kept Catholicism attuned to the King's interests and his nationalistic orientation. Elyot's sense of humanism differs from More's not in kind (Catholic) but in direction (Tudor nationalism).

The Henrician reformation tested the humanists, forcing them to endorse the divorce matter and the break with Rome and to join in the historical mission of making a
nation. This event shifted the orientation of English humanism, producing a focus on national affairs. Highly symbolic at this historical juncture was the execution of More who refused to subscribe to Henry's policy. His death, however, does not entail the arrest of humanism, for a new direction of English humanism was in embryo largely as a result of the secular participation of humanists. The most characteristic expression is found in Elyot who evolved English humanism with a nationalist slant in the 1530s. Elyot eagerly sought to serve the King with an insight into the rising spirit of nationhood in contrast to More's retreat and reluctance to follow the present cause. It would be fair to say that More is prenationalist, and Elyot is caught in the religious and political drive of Henrician nationalism. Elyot may not influence the course of the nationalist movement, but does initiate a new direction of humanism to be applied to actual English situations. This is certainly a new development in English humanism.

Elyot nationalizes Morean Catholic humanism, and in this way he is distinct from the first generation of the English humanists counting More. The development of this humanist direction will be finalized in the Elizabethan period of a more stable culture. We possibly see its perfection in Spenser, one of the representative Elizabethan humanists: nationalism surfaces more conspicuously, the ambiguous religious attitude settling down and the new development of humanism completed.
Chapter Three:
Catholic Humanism in Transition

1 Stanford E. Lehmberg, *Sir Thomas Elyot: Tudor Humanist* (Austin: U of Texas P, 1960) 184. The book has been thus far accepted as a definitive edition of Elyot's biography. Lehmberg covers substantial parts of Elyot's works in this book, giving special weight to Elyot's political theory. For another authoritative biography of Elyot but from a more literary and moral vantage point, see Pearl Hogrefe, *The Life and Times of Sir Thomas Elyot, Englishman* (Ames: Iowa State UP, 1967). One significant difference between the two is that contrary to Lehmberg, Hogrefe denies Elyot's educational career at Oxford before his entering the Middle Temple, one of the Inns of Court.

2 Sir Thomas Elyot, *The Book Named the Governor*, ed. Stanford E. Lehmberg (London: Everyman's Library, 1962) vii. All the pages within the text refer to this edition, and a shortened title *The Governor* is employed to indicate the book throughout.

3 See Hogrefe, *Life and Times* 184-85. See also John M. Major, *Sir Thomas Elyot and Renaissance Humanism* (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1964) 53. Major sees Elyot's Christian humanism in a conventional way, stating that "as a Christian humanist Elyot saw no essential conflict between Christianity and the nobler teachings of the classical moralists and poets ... [T]he Christian religion was actually supplemented and strengthened by the moral wisdom of antiquity."


6 See Fox and Guy 45-46. To abstract the theme of each book, *Pasquil the Plain* is a three-way debate on the duty of an adviser. Gnatho, a mere flatterer, argues in favor of expediency, that the counselor should not say anything unpleasant for his master. Harpocrates believes that to say nothing is the best way in all occasions. Pasquil, who apparently speaks for Elyot, sees it as a duty that an adviser should speak frankly to his master even in adversity—he should warn the prince when he loses his mind. The philosophical basis of *Pasquil the Plain* is set forth in *Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise Man*. A man of wisdom is well aware that his soul and understanding become imperfect when controlled by bodily desires and perfect only when contemplating the divine. This definition of wisdom can be employed to tell a true king from a tyrant. The disorder caused by a ruler who casts off his counselor for his disagreement with him will extend to the entire kingdom. See Lillian Gottesman, ed., *Four Political Treatises: The Doctrinal of Princes (1533), Pasquil the Playne (1533), The Banquette of Sapience (1534), and the Image of Governance (1541)*, by Sir Thomas Elyot (Gainesville: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1967) x, and Hogrefe, *Life and Times* 198-99.

7 See Fox and Guy, *Reassessing* 52-53.


13 Rude xxix.

14 Lehmberg, *Sir Thomas Elyot* 39. There are also different points of view about the book's inconsistency in subject and tone. Major questions Lehmberg's theory of inconsistency on the grounds that actually Elyot follows faithfully "a chronological order of topics in the *Governor*[:] Book One takes the future governor through childhood and adolescence; Books Two and Three treat matters that concern the older youth" (Major, *Sir Thomas Elyot* 23). Hogrefe argues along the same lines as Major. Likening the absolutist theory to that of the Machiavellian extreme, she argues, Elyot never suggests "that expediency, concealment, or complete duplicity" beyond the principles of reason and justice (Hogrefe, *Life and Times* 140).

15 See Lehmberg, *Sir Thomas Elyot* 45-51.


18 Lehmberg 45.

19 Lehmberg 51.


22 Elyot 59; also cited in Major, *Sir Thomas Elyot* 14.
23 Elyot 43.

24 It is known that the Inns of Court—Elyot was trained at the Middle Temple—were "a kind of academy of all the manners that the nobles learn. There they learned to sing and to exercise themselves in every kind of harmonics. They are also taught ... to practice dancing and all games proper for nobles." See Hogrefe, *Life and Times* 150-52.

25 See Hogrefe 152-55.


27 Elyot 30.


31 Hogrefe 187.


33 Ruth Mohl, *The Three Estates in Medieval and Renaissance Literature* (N.Y.: Columbia UP, 1933) 158.


35 Major 139.


38 See Baker 52-53.

39 See Chapter Two 76.

40 Baker 47.

42 The term *res publica* was often translated as a "common weal," with which the phrases like "general weal," "public weal," and "weal-public" were used side by side synonymously in the sixteenth century. In many instances, as is the case with More, a common weal could be interpreted both ways: 1. the common well-being, public good, or general welfare; 2. the whole body politic, the state, community, or the commonwealth. See "common weal," *Oxford English Dictionary*, 1996 ed.


44 Indeed, the notion that the realm (or kingdom) is the estate of the King, the subjects being related to it as tenants, was not new in Elyot's day. Yet it would be problematic to argue that this notion disappeared completely at least by the reign of Edward VI with the changed meaning of "realm" or "estate" to a polity of "a collective enterprise." See Greenfeld, *Nationalism* 36-37.


46 Elyot 60-61.

47 See Martin Luther, "On Secular Authority," *Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority*, trans. & ed. Harro Hopfl (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991) 6. See also Quentin Skinner, *Foundations of Modern Political Thought: The Age of Reformation*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1978) 14-15. Luther encourages princes to use their secular authority to remedy the current ills of the Church, offering a reasonable justification for the exercise of kings' right in this world. In Luther's account, the secular authority is sanctioned by God and kings are His vicegerent. The office of the Papacy is only to convey God's word and is not related to worldly authority. As for Tyndale and the Elizabethan homilies, see Chapters Two 82 and One 36.

49 Elyot 67.

50 See Elyot 2-3.

51 Lehmburg, *Sir Thomas Elyot* 37.
Chapter Four

Spenserian Humanist License:
The Nationalist Drive of Protestant Humanism in *The Faerie Queene*

"Ne let his fairest Cynthia refuse:/ In
mirrors more then one her selfe to see."
(Edmund Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 3.
proem 5.5-6)

No one questions that Edmund Spenser (c. 1552-99) is among the representatives of English humanism in the second half of the sixteenth century. If we think of the essence of Renaissance humanism as principally linked to the issue of education, Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* (1590, 1596) seems to fit nicely into the tradition. The book claims to rank among the major humanist works of the period along with Sidney's *Arcadia* (1580). In the letter to Sir Walter Raleigh (1589), Spenser proclaims that the general end of the poem is "to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline."¹ The goal is a commonplace of the Renaissance humanist who attempts to instill a new philosophy of man in Christian princes and gentlemen. The book certainly stands in the tradition of the courtesy book like Castiglione's *The Book of the Courtier* (1516) and Elyot's *The Book Named the Governor* (1531). It is well known that Spenser follows the educational prescription in Elyot's *Governor*: virtues like justice, honor, friendship, temperance, chastity, courtesy, and wisdom are consciously programmed as desirable attributes of
gentlemen, if not methodologically structured in all practical details as in Elyot's educational curriculum.  

When it comes to the other aspect of Renaissance humanism, that is, Christianity, as suggested in the term "Christian humanism," Spenser might be viewed as less pious than the so-called Christian humanists like Erasmus, More, and Milton. In general, he tackles Christian virtues more in light of a moral or ethical philosophy than of theological doctrines. His active use of classical imagery with its secular emphasis is remarkable in this regard. One of its most unsettling aspects is that sometimes no poetic justice is given to the pagan evils employed. The fact that the Blatant Beast symbolic of anti-courtesy gets away at the last moment in Book Six could be read in "a happy confusion" between Christianity and humanism, or taken as an index of a radical criticism of humanist politics aiming at the Queen and her corrupt court in another context. 

These views are not the case with Spenser. As is anticipated of the Renaissance humanist, his humanism is not alienated from Christianity. While there is little doctrinal concern in the work, his Christianity is indisputable, always working in the background of his humanism. The religious factor in Spenser's poetry and prose has been relatively disregarded by the mainstream interest in its literary value or political significance. Only recently has a new scholarly impetus been given to the theological matter. The change came from the so-called revisionism movement, initiated by historians reviewing sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English history, ecclesiastical history in particular. The point of departure, with historian Margo Todd as our guide, was the old debate on the relationship between Anglican conformists and Puritan radicals in Reformation theater. It is customarily believed that England became a Protestant nation in the wake of the Henrician Reformation which, as its natural correlative, also lent itself to the evolution of a Puritan movement later in the Elizabethan age: Puritans, "the hotter sort of Protestants," rebuked the English Church as half reformed and the conformists as Protestants yet ceremonial; they charged
the Church with tepid reform that kept Popish rituals and vestments—kneeling at communion, wearing copes and supplices, using organs, and so forth; they opposed the episcopacy ruled by bishops for church government, instead voting for a Presbyterian system run by elders on the basis of evangelical discipline; and they also planted the seeds of the eventual Civil War and Revolution in the seventeenth century. The picture, however, has been redrawn by revisionists who have misgivings about the old conflict theory between Anglicans and Puritans in the period. They argue that actually a general religious consensus prevailed by the middle of the reign of Elizabeth. Puritans were "more consensually Protestant than the old version of 'Puritan versus Anglican' had it." Puritans were separate from the established Protestant Church but part of that order. Most of them conformed to the national Church. Having different views of church ceremony or ecclesiastical organization did not necessarily indicate variance in terms of theology. The received myth on Puritanism as a radical substructure of the Church turns out to be misguided. The revisionists even cast doubt on the reality of the concept of Puritanism itself, of a distinctly Puritan social theory, which led to the Revolution, after all. The nature of the civil war therefore must be explained differently. It was a war of religion that resulted from the confrontation of the established Calvinist doctrines with the Arminian theological innovations undertaken by Archbishop Laud, who rejected the Calvinist doctrines of grace and predestination and restored the old Catholic rituals. The old idea of the Puritan revolution as "a struggle of the godly reformed against resurgent popery in Laudian guise" is dismissed. The war was less revolutionary than conservative in nature. For these reasons, the use of the terms like "Puritan" or "Anglican" is consciously avoided in favor of the umbrella term "Protestant," which conveys concord rather than conflict within the Church of England in these periods.5

One offshoot from this new scholarly movement is a current of reevaluation of Spenser's theology, which has taken over the main line of Spenserian criticism today.
Traditionally, Spenser's theology was subsumed under the label of either Anglican or Puritan, but now these positions are themselves questioned.

Spenser's theology was predominantly viewed as Anglican. The Anglican position is made by pointing up deviations from Calvinism or Puritanism that more closely approximate Catholicism as seen in the poetic presence of monasteries and hermitages and in the approval of candles, incense, and organs in church services. In Virgil Whitaker's estimate, Spenser is a staunch Protestant both theologically and politically and endorses the episcopal organization in practice. Another case can be made that Spenser is Puritan. The proposition originates with a camp that stresses the presence of Calvinism in his poetry led by early Spenserian critics such as F. M. Padelford, general editor of the variorum edition of Spenser. He favors grouping Spenser among Calvinist writers, taking Book One to be a stronghold of fundamental Calvinist principles: for example, he finds the Calvinist expression of grace over good works in the first stanza of Canto 10, which contains Spenser's clear denial of man's ability to save himself. Anthea Hume also defends the Puritan Spenser, arguing that Spenser's theology is defined as Puritanism "of the militant variety," which materializes mostly in The Shepheardes Calender.

Both Anglican and Puritan positions, on the other hand, are repudiated by John King who dismisses the assumptions set for the Puritan Spenser by Hume in all particulars and who also claims that it is simply anachronistic to address the Elizabethan Settlement as Anglican, since Anglicanism was very much an intellectual system evolved out of an effort to restore Catholicism within the Established Church, led by John Henry Newman at Oxford University in the nineteenth century. Spenser shared, he argues instead, a comprehensive consensus in terms of the Elizabethan Settlement, a consensus that leaves the Anglican-Puritan dichotomy useless. Like the revisionists, King seeks to redefine Puritanism in light of Protestantism and rather lends weight to viewing Spenser as Protestant in a broader sense. In short, Spenser's theology confines itself to neither
radical Calvinism as the source of the Puritan Revolution nor conservative Anglicanism that tends to be closely associated with Catholicism. To explain these complexities of Spenser's religious aspects, the epithet "Protestant" in a general sense is more appropriate.

This new development in Spenserian criticism corroborates the ever-present and all-pervading Christianity in Spenser and itself becomes a touchstone in reconstructing Spenser's Christian humanism. Given the prevailing concord in Protestantism in the Elizabethan period, labeling Spenser's humanism Puritan or Anglican would be misguided. Alan Sinfield proposes to call Spenser "the Puritan humanist" due to a tendency not to "maintain a Protestant control of pagan imagery" all the time. Spenser's humanist drive sometimes goes "beyond accepted Protestant principles" up to a general disillusionment with them, often implying "a radical validity in pagan imagery." This claim draws largely upon an ahistorical misconception of the relationship of Protestantism to humanism in Spenser's time. Sinfield's sense of the Elizabethan theology is basically built in terms of the conventional fundamental conflict between Anglicans on the right wing and Puritans on the left. Thus his select Puritan humanists, such as Sidney, Spenser, and Milton, all are experiencing "a divided allegiance." Considering that Christianity is not separable from humanism in Renaissance situations, however, Spenser's fusion of pagan imagery with the divine does not result from confusion but from the complex nature of Protestant theology in the English setting.

The same touchstone can be tested with David Norbrook's argument. He finds the radical aspect of humanism in Spenser expressed in terms of Protestant politics or ideology. The term "Puritan" is not directly addressed to Spenser, but by implication he is defined as a Protestant radical. Norbrook takes the point to an extreme in seeing the literary enterprise in "Spenser's feigned commonwealth,' Faerie land" as an attempt to undermine the Queen's authority. The praise of the Queen's divinity is simply designed to elevate an ironic effect, to stress the difficulty of achieving the divinity because of the illusiveness of
divine images. We see here another use of Protestantism in the sense of conflict with established authority.

One of the most striking counterarguments to these perspectives, namely, the argument for the conservative Spenser, can be supported in the idea of equality in the Giant episode of Canto 2, Book Five. The Giant, with a pair of scales, would "weigh the world anew,/ And all things to an equall to restore" (5.2.34.1-2). He judges the present situation of the state to be "out of order" (5.2.37.3) and makes a nearly revolutionary statement:

Therefore I will throw downe these mountaines hie,

And make them leuell with the lowly plaine:

These towring rocks, which reach vnto the skie,

I will thrust downe into the deepest maine,

And as they were, them equalize againe,

Tyrants that make men subject to their law,

I will suppressse, that they no more may raine;

And Lordings curbe, that commons ouer-aw;

And all the wealth of rich men to the poore will draw. (5.2.38)

Artegall is prompt to repudiate such egalitarian and communist ideas as "vncontrolled freedome" (5.2.33.5) in the cause of the old social distinction and hierarchy. He asserts that "evey one doe know their certaine bound,/... All change is perillous, and all chaunce vnsound" (5.2.36). He makes it clear that by God's law, the subject must obey the sovereign (5.2.41.6). Consequently, the subsequent popular uprising in reaction to the slaughter of the Giant is condemned as an act of "lawless multitude," and, more revealingly, he sends Talus to subdue the rabble in order to avoid staining "his noble hands... / In the base blood of such a rascall crew" (5.2.52). Spenser's view of equality here almost sounds like Elyot's. For Spenser, as for Elyot, people can secure equality only when they acknowledge due degree and social order ordained by God. Against this
principle, he claims, is the egalitarian sense of economic justice and the rule by common people. He reveals a deep hatred for the "vulgar" and their revolt against the sovereign, as it disrupts the order of the universe as well as the state. Here Spenser is reaffirming the current official view of the state and society, the Elizabethan fabrics of monarchy and social hierarchy.

The point in question is then how to define the character of Protestantism in Spenser's humanism. Considering Spenser a Protestant humanist from the revisionist perspective seems appropriate, yet the issue remains of how to account for the apparently divergent aspects in his humanism in terms of the Protestant consensus. Protestantism in general arose in challenge to the traditional Catholic Church with an attack on its abuse of doctrines and practices. Accordingly, the budding humanism that had been growing under the umbrella of Catholicism suffered a severe blow. By stressing predestination and grace over free will, Luther and Calvin made clear human depravity over human dignity, directly targeting the Catholic humanist position. Under the Tudor dynasty, however, Protestantism has to make peace with the English circumstances of the sixteenth century, the emerging spirit of English nationhood. To establish or consolidate the nation, Tudors actively seek humanist learning. Spenser contributes to the mystique of the Queen through mythological representations of her, such as the chaste Diana and the virgin goddess of justice Astraea in The FQ. Spenser transforms pagan images and classical mythology, which are fundamentally in the tradition of humanism, within the frame of nationalized Protestantism.

This curious symbiosis of humanism and Protestantism can be explained from the perspective of the new driving force of Tudor dynastic nationalism. Richard Helgerson also sees the significant role of nationalism in Spenser's literary undertaking, but from a different viewpoint. As indicated in Spenser's proclamation to "have the kingdom of our own language," he argues, the poet recognizes a tension between the two competing claims.
of the state and poetry, between the state contingent on the exigencies of monarchy and the poetic self-representation to emulate the greatness of antiquity. The result, he contends, is a poetry that articulates "a national community whose existence and eminence would then justify [his] desire to become its literary [spokesman]." This process, he continues, projects a shift of the nature of nationalism "from an essentially dynastic conception of communal identity ('the kingdom') to an assertion of what we recognize as one of the bases of postdynastic nationalism ('our own language')," from the dynastic sense of pre-modern nationalism to the democratic ("humanistic" in his terms) sense of modern nationalism. Obviously, Helgerson situates Renaissance humanism in terms of conflict or competition with sovereign authority, seeing humanism as a way to construct the individual self against the overwhelming force led by monarchy, thereby identifying Renaissance humanism as a primary force leading to modern popular nationalism.14

It would be misleading, however, to characterize Tudor nationalism using the modern sense of popular nationalism. As examined in the opening chapter, the nation was principally identified with the monarch and his/her dynasty rather than the people because the nation was still viewed as the monarch's private realm or kingdom. The monarch's private matters or interests therefore were themselves grave interests of the nation, shaping national consciousness as Henry VIII's example demonstrates: his private or dynastic matter motivated the development of English national consciousness itself.15 The situations of the Elizabethan period rearticulated Tudor nationalism as dynastic at its foundation. Queen Elizabeth's unique condition--she remained a virgin queen without an heir to the throne--haunted the nation through her entire reign. This issue directly involved national security, a matter that would break into a civil war and that was related directly or indirectly to Catholic threats and war with Spain. Desire for national unity and security in turn generated an opportunity for political loyalty and religious unity around the Queen,
accelerating the cause of nationalism. She was often equated with the nation as a unifying center.

An investigation into these historical conditions in Spenser's *FQ* is the subject of this chapter, where the Spenserian symbiosis between Protestantism and humanism is reshaped within the frame of reference of Tudor dynastic nationalism. I suggest that Spenser takes the basic lines of the official Protestant doctrines of the English Church, yet he finds it useful to make Elizabeth divine in a humanist way, equipping her with godlike grace and absolute free will as a way of coping with current royal and national problems. While painting the Queen's power as possessing divine grace and absolute will is a political commonplace, Spenser is unique in that he sees the theological grace and free will in a more secularized sense in terms of humanism. The transformed notions of grace and free will make possible a humanist license, the theatrical representation of the diverse selves of the Queen. In an extended consideration of the interplay of this humanist license, the ensuing argument focuses more on Book Three than the other books, and since humanist education was welcome even to Protestants, attention is mainly given to the way the humanist strand of human faculties, like free will and reason, survive the Reformation. In terms of humanism, Book Three of *The FQ* is largely unread, compared with Books Two, Five, and Six, well-known for their obvious humanist strains: Book Two deals with nature against grace based on the Aristotelian virtue of temperance, Book Five treats the favorite humanist theme of justice or Machiavellism, and Book Six is about the humanist virtue of civilizing courtesy. In painting Spenser the Protestant humanist with reference to Tudor dynastic nationalism, however, Book Three is more advantageous in that the humanist license is epitomized in a female knight, Britomart. She represents the chaste queen in all aspects, who, like Britomart, exercised masculine power in times of war and strove to perpetuate the nation.
Spenser basically tends to agree with the Protestant spirit. Man is considered sinful—
-but salvation is open to all by grace, even though few are chosen (2.8.1-2, 1.9.53).
Spenser never fails to see through the "infirmity/ Of the fraile flesh, relenting to their rage"
and its exercise of "bitter tyranny/ Upon the parts, brought into their bondage:/ No
wretchednesse is like to sinfull vellenage (2.11.1.5-9). The "dignitie and natie grace" of
man is conceded but is in constant need of "sober gouernment" to keep itself from "misrule
and passions" (2.9.1).

As human reason, not itself perfect in essence, is vulnerable to the attack of
passion, so is human will; hence the will needs to be curbed properly. This necessity
manifests itself in the necessity that Guyon's "wrathful will" (3.1.11.4) be moderated by
the disguised Britomart and also in Scudamour's "greedy will" that keeps him from passing
through the fire unlike Britomart (3.11.26.3). These cases indicate clearly that Spenser
adopts the basic tenets of Protestant doctrine that give absolute primacy to grace over free
will in salvation as distinct from the position of the Catholic humanists. The doctrine of free
will is a hot issue to Protestants, since it is susceptible mostly to the Catholic humanists'
interpretation of it as indicating human dignity. The issue was the source of the hectic
debate between Erasmus and Luther in the early sixteenth century and again became an
issue with Laudian Arminians and conservative Protestants in a different context in England
a century later. The point in question is whether to approve of human effort as a
cooperative agent with divine power in salvation. For the Catholic humanist, justification
involves meritorious works, and then corresponding grace finalizes the salvation process
for remission of sin. For Protestants, however, the Catholic way of salvation, specifically
the role of good works, is suspect. The official doctrine of the Thirty-nine Articles of the
Church of England (1563, 1571) makes it clear that good works done before Christ's grace
"cannot put away our sins, and endure the severity of God's Judgement" (Articles 12,
Article 10 well defines the Protestant sense of free will. Corrupted in original sin, man is incapable of his salvation:

[Man] cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and good works, to faith and calling upon God: Wherefore we have no power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us, when we have that good will.

Based on the supremacy of grace, Article 17 defines the Protestant economy of salvation in the following way: first comes election (the divine choice of certain persons for salvation, which is predetermined), next calling (God's awakening of the elect), then justification (forgiveness of sin), then adoption (as sons of God), finally sanctification (restoration of God's image in man) and glorification (perpetual felicity).

It is frequently pointed out that the experiences of Redcrosse the Knight of Holiness in general parallel the salvation process by grace foundational to the Protestant theology. The Knight's progress includes his recognition of original sin through repeated errors, the suicide impulse driven by Despair at the knowledge of his sin, his recovering faith in the elect, of which Una reminds him: "Why shouldst thou then despeire, that chosen art?" (1.9.53.5). He comes to entertain the vital role of divine grace, without which no good works can be done:

What man is he, that boasts of fleshly might,

And vaine assurance of mortality,

Which all so soone, as it doth come to fight,

Against spirituall foes, yeelds by and by,

Or from the field most cowardly doth fly?

Ne let the man ascribe it to his skill,

That thorough grace hath gained victory.
If any strength we haue, it is to ill,
But all the good is Gods, both power and eke will. (1.10.1)
The Knight makes headway toward justification, sanctification, and glorification in the House of Holiness with the help of Dame Caelia and her daughter Fidelia (Faith). Under the guidance of Fidelia who teaches from "her sacred Booke"--the Bible as the book of faith is symbolic of Protestant theology which places primacy on individual faith over ceremonies or rituals of the Church--Redcrosse learns the true meaning "Of God, of grace, of justice, of free will" (1.10.19).

Spenser's notion of grace (salvation) is mainly addressed to divine figures in the poem who personify the Queen. The dominance of these divine grace figures in the entire framework of the poem suggests that Spenser is concerned with the idea of grace in less a theological than a secular dimension. Gloriana, "the mighty Queene of Faerie," who works throughout as a centripetal force to each knightly quest behind the scenes, is recurrently deified as a grace figure (2.9.4). It is a critical commonplace to associate the Gloriana of grace and divinity with Queen Elizabeth. As Spenser explicitly states in both the "Letter to Raleigh" and the poem, Gloriana supposedly mirrors the Queen's public person, the body politic; on the other hand, Belphoebe figures the private person of the virtue of chastity (737; 3. proem 5). Clearly, Spenser is consecrating the Queen as "Goddesse heauenly bright,/ Mirrour of grace and Maiestie diuine" (1. i^0em 4).

The feature of divine grace materializes in Belphoebe more discernibly and dramatically. Her grace takes effect with Timias, Arthur's squire, who was wounded by forester brothers. He looks to the sky for divine grace to come to his rescue, but finds it beside him in the presence of "[t]he goodly Mayd full of diuinities,/And gifts of heauenly grace" (3.5.34.8-9). Awakening, Timias wonders:

Mercy deare Lord (said he) what grace is this,
That thou hast shewed to me sifnfull wight,
To send thine Angell from her bowre of blis,
To comfort me in my distressed plight?
Angell, or Goddesse do I call thee right?
What service may I do vnto thee meete,
That hast from darkenesse me returned to light,
And with thy heauenly salues and med'cines sweete,

Hast drest my sinfull wounds? I kisse thy blessed feete. (3.5.35)

Despite Belphoebe's immediate refusal to be addressed as "Angell, or Goddesse,"
Spenser's description of her dwelling place thereafter is obviously divine symbolism. She
resides in a valley surrounded by mountains and mighty woods, which looks "like a stately
Theatre," hence "an earthly Paradize" (3.5.39-40).

An even more obvious secularized version of divine grace can be found in the grace
figure of Britomart. Britomart's beauty is described as one that leads to the "contemplation
of divinitie" (3.9.24.4). The culminating expression of her divinity comes in the revelation
scene in her confrontation with Artagall. As he succeeds in striking her helmet partly off,
Artegall is struck by her appearance almost as much as seeing a goddess unveiling herself
(4.6.19). No less impressed is Scudamour who, coming near, identifies her with a
"heauenly image of perfection" and strives to turn his fear into devotion, worshipping her
"as some celestiall vision" (4.6.24). Overpowered, Artegall falls on his knees and asks her
pardon:

And as he himselfe long gazing thereupon,
    At last fell humbly downe vpon his knee,
    And of his wonder made religion,
    Weening some heauenly goddesse he did see,
    Or else vnweeting, what it else might bee. (4.6.22.1-5)
Artegall conceptualizes her physical manifestation in distinctly religious terms. He obviously feels guilty for the attack on a divine figure made by "his errour frayle," causing "trembling horrour" (4.6.22). Britomart may well consider punishing him for the sacrilegious act (4.6.23). The revelation is not simply that of *imago Dei* in man, but a more intense religious feeling, namely, Britomart's deification. The effect of the revelation becomes the more significant when she is linked to Queen Elizabeth. Britomart may not be matched precisely with Elizabeth—no statement is made as explicitly as in the cases of Gloriana and Belphebe—yet it is hard to dissociate her from a representation of Elizabeth. When the "royall Mayd" (3.3.33) Britomart first reveals herself, Spenser likens her beauty to that of "faire Cynthia," the most favorite image for Elizabeth of the period (3.1.43.1). This comparison is very apt, since Britomart represents the chaste goddess in Book Three as Elizabeth does.

Given the confluence of divine and princely grace in the Queen's doubles, Spenser is apparently apotheosizing Elizabeth and offering her heavenly grace. In other words, in Spenserian Protestantism princely grace becomes virtually equivalent to divine grace, with the unlimited secular building up of the Queen's divinity. If anything, Spenser seems to be interested more in the idea of a secularized grace than a theological one, the images of which prevail over the entire poem.

In the same spirit, the queen figures in the poem also possess a secularized absolute free will, thereby allowing the humanist forging of the divine mystique of Elizabeth's power above the doctrinal strictness of Protestantism. This is based on the humanist realization of the shifting sense of human free will. As shown in the opening chapter, such humanists as Pico and Erasmus attempt to reinterpret the theological meaning of human free will in a more secular sense. They identify the will as the human ability to make an active contribution to salvation, as distinct from the one of merely receiving God's grace. Pico, for example, asserts the secular sense of free will that can ascend toward the divine
according to its responsible use. Man is no more considered a mere actor in this sinful world as in the Middle Ages but is capable of using his free will to create his identity. This transformed sense of the will, which is close to the modern sense of the freedom of the will, becomes particularly apt when applied to monarchs in the age of nationalism. The age demands that they master how to manipulate royal power to erect a strong government in a changing world to advance royal and national interests, justifying the royal use of force and illusion. The display of diverse spectacles, conscious ceremonies, processions, and various theatrical self-representations is performed to this effect. This secular use of human free will, the humanist rhetoric of royal theatricality, is licensed for its usefulness to promote political and cultural consensus, a perception that enables the sovereign to play diverse roles befitting given situations. Spenser's humanistic poetics in the work materializes in a way that reveals or helps to build up the Queen's theatrical self-representation.

Spenserian humanist license is expressed in the work in terms of theatrical devices like cross-dressing (transvestism)—specifically the woman's wearing of man's clothes—female warriors (Amazons)—women of male-like power and aggressiveness—and hermaphrodite—a body having both male and female sex organs. These mechanisms, embodying masculine power, social and physical, in a female body, thereby blurring the typical distinction of both sexes, were actually widely practiced in the English Renaissance. Transvestism was "a social reality" of the period in Simon Shepherd's terms. Linda Woodbridge states that women's fashion appropriating masculine attire was in real life "a recurrent phenomenon in Elizabethan times and a fairly permanent feature of the Jacobean landscape." Therefore, she continues, a steady interest in female manliness or male effeminacy was reflected in the current literature including Spenser's FQ and Elyot's Governor, even. Drama is a notable case; consider the transvestite disguise of many
Elizabethan heroines. Viola's disguise as Cesario is the central dynamic of Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night*, as is Rosalind's cross-dressing as Ganymede in *As You Like It*.

It should be noted that Renaissance society, however, still remained one where the principles of order and degree in notions of state, society, family, and gender were strictly observed. Despite the well-meant attempt at achieving perfection by the union of both sexes, transvestism was basically considered a cultural trespass on sex roles, a challenge to the very foundation of Renaissance society. According to Woodbridge, transvestism had been a social issue since the 1570s. George Gascoigne wrote a formal satire of "the new fashion" of feminine attire in *The Steele Glas* in 1576. Later Phillip Stubbes (*Anatomy of Abuses*, 1583) and William Averell (*A Mervailous Combat of Contrarieties*, 1588) all identified the man-clothed woman respectively as "Hermaphrodita" and "Androgini," both calling them "monsters." The deeply rooted abhorrence and fear of masculine women extends to dismissing them as unnatural subversive monstrosity.

In this respect, the official reaction to the first edition of *The FQ* that ends with the hermaphrodite union of Scudamour with Amoret as Spenser's view of ideal love, spiritual and physical oneness between man and woman, is highly suggestive. It is believed that the criticism was made by a grave man of the state, probably William Cecil, Lord Burleigh, the Queen's favorite councilor, who charged Spenser with being too much preoccupied with love. The censure might be responsible for the deferring of the union of Scudamour and Amoret in the second edition of 1596, even though Spenser sticks to the hermaphrodite image in different ways through the whole poem. Spenser's spirited defense of love ensued in the 1596 edition, attacking "[t]he rugged forhead that with graue foresight/ Welds knigdomes causes, and affaries of state" (4. proem 1.1-2) for his lack of perception of the true sense of love he intended:

Such ones ill iudge of loue, that cannot loue,

Ne in their frozen hearts feele kindly flame:
For thy they ought not thing vnknowne reproue,
Ne naturall affection faultlesse blame,
For fault of few that haue abusd the same.
For it of honor and all vertue is
The roote, and brings forth glorious flowres of fame,
That crowne true louers with immortall blis,
The meed of them that loue, and do not liue amisse. (4. proem 2)

The fact of the surprising prevalence of the practices despite the official criticism warrants our critical attention here. Given that this factor culturally prevailed in the period and that many Elizabethan writers implicitly or explicitly employed the image, it has to do with the unique situation of the time. Investing Elizabeth with all the authority of a religious symbol in this way seems to have been required at the time for some immediate reasons.

As reviewed previously, an incipient form of nationalism had been established since Henry's decisive break with Rome. England had to be independent of Rome and construct its own church that would endorse the sovereign as its head. After experiencing a temporary setback under "Bloody Mary" (1553-58), Tudor nationalism was considerably intensified by the unprecedented conditions of Elizabeth's reign, where national unity around the Queen was the number one priority. According to T. O. Lloyd, with geographical exploration and trade expansion, which was part of the historical move of western Europe, many English companies or colonies were founded in foreign countries--the Levant Company and Raleigh's colony of Virginia, for example. England was expanding her national interests over the world. Lloyd even views the year 1588 as a point of departure of the British Empire--the sense of England as an empire in the sixteenth century, of course, is not the same as ours, a group of nations under one emperor/empress, but just "a sovereign state independent of the Pope's judicial authority."27 The growth of foreign trade also conduced to the rapid advance of the early forms of capitalistic society,
and in turn quickened the centralization of government, financial concentration, and progress of the court, all with the monarch at the center. This centralizing trend around the crown functioned as an absolute condition for the growth of national identity, making English nationalism dynastic at its foundation. To take one example of the changes, when national affairs increasingly became conducted on a court basis, every nobleman began to have a house or two in and around London to participate in the court, which effected a phenomenal development of London in the period. Galler Waller remarks that Spenser wanted to be a courtier throughout his life as displayed in *The Shepheardes Calender* despite his criticism of court, affirming that the court in Spenser's time played a vital role as a dominant and major social institution, a center of power spectacles.

Another key to the national consolidation around the Queen was the religious circumstances of the time. Catholic factions, internal and external, remained a threat to national unity. A series of critical events from 1569 to 1572 were very much an index of the restless situation of the period. The Northern Rebellion in 1569 mirrored the northern Earls' hostility to Elizabeth's policy, combined with the succession problem linked to Mary Queen of Scots. The Papal excommunication of Elizabeth in 1570 by Pope Pius V ensued, which made an occasion for the Ridolfi Plot of 1571, a failed attempt to enthrone Mary under the support of Spain. These events in turn had the effect of the Elizabethan justification for political loyalty and religious unity around the Queen, accelerating stricter Protestant position and the cause of nationalism. As John Guy reports on the aftermath of the Northern Rising and Excommunication, every member of parliament who met in 1571 had to take the Oath of Supremacy. The execution of Mary in 1587 under the peril of Spanish invasion was an inevitable procedure for national security, since she became the very source of all Catholic schemes. Spenser's Una in this connection is often pointed out as a figure standing for the unity of the national Church as her name suggests: the One, or oneness.
These threats found their culminating expression in terms of war, among other things. A real crisis came from outside, from Spain, the then superpower of Catholic Europe. The war with Spain dominated all national affairs in the latter half of Elizabeth's reign: it continued since 1585 through the Armada of 1588 until James's peace effort in 1603. With the victory the national spirit was boosted, but England nevertheless had to live in anxious expectation of another Armada invasion. The government required subjects to obey the monarch and the established social order more strictly than ever. The war also exposed the friction with Catholic Ireland. Before the complete conquest of Ireland in 1603, Irish resistance was a headache to the English Protestant control because of possible intervention from the Catholic forces of Europe. Spain actually aided the Irish rebels, threatening England behind the scenes, and an all-out engagement with the Catholic forces in Ireland followed. Spenser seems to allude to these historical events centrally in Book Five in an effort to justify England's victory over the tyranny of Catholic Philip II and her other foreign policies. In the so-called Armada Canto 8, Mercila (Queen Elizabeth), who is under subversive attack from the Souldan (Spain), is finally rescued with the help of Arthur, the flash of whose magic shield overthrows the Souldan's chariot to his death (5.8.38). For the task of saving Irena (Ireland) from the tyrant Grantorto (Spain), Artegall, the apostle of Justice is assigned, whom Astraea the virgin goddess of Justice herself had instructed. Artegall liberates Irena by cutting off Grantorto's head with Chrysaor the special sword given by Astraea (5.12.23). The triumph over the Catholic forces must have lent reassurance to Elizabethans' belief in the national Church founded on Protestantism and in the need for national unity centered on Queen Elizabeth. The wars operated to harden the direction of Tudor nationalism since Henry VIII.

All these situations are linked directly or indirectly to the unique position of Elizabeth herself as the single most important source of the absolute loyalty to the sovereign and national unity. Elizabeth remained a virgin queen without an heir to the throne, a
situation that haunted the nation throughout her entire reign. The nation was reminded of
the bitter memory of the previous century and also the problems Henry had had to face.
Elizabeth's accession passage--Elizabeth's royal entry from the Tower of London to
Westminster the day before her coronation in 1559--eloquently reveals the theme of unity
as the nation's primary concern. The first pageant, for instance, recalled to the Queen the
sense of "unitie" or "concorde" with reference to the civil war between Lancaster and York:

And all emptie places thereof were furnished with sentences concerning
unitie. And the hole pageant garnished with redde roses and white and in the
forefront of the same pageant in a faire wreathe was written the name, and
title of the same, which was The uniting of the two houses of Lancastre and
Yorke. This pageant was grounded upon the Queene's majestie's name. For
like as the long warre betwene the two houses of Yorke and Lancastre then
ended, when Elizabeth daughter to Edwarde the fourthe matched in marriage
wyth Henry the seventhe heyre to the howse of Launcaster: so synce that
the Queene's majestie's name was Elizabeth, and forsomuch as she is the
onelye heire of Henrie the eyght, which came of bothe the houses as the
knitting up of concorde, it was devised that like as Elizabeth was the first
occasion of concorde, so she another Elizabeth might maintaine the same
among her subjectes, so that unitie was the ende wherat the whole devise
shotte, as the Queene's majestie's names moved the firste grounde.34

If Elizabeth were to leave no issue, the crown could pass to either of two principal heirs
presumptive, Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, or Lady Catherine Grey of Suffolk. From the
start, this was not merely a legal controversy but directly involved national security, for it
was a matter of whether the nation should follow the cause of Catholicism (Mary Stuart) or
Protestantism (Catherine Grey), a matter that would make a disruptive civil war or national
consolidation. Thus the issue, Mortimer Levine says, became the key concern of
Elizabethan writings. It is believed, for example, that the issue was centrally treated and performed before Elizabeth in the form of tragedy, *Gorborduc* (1561/2), "the first Elizabethan succession tract," by the lawyers and gentlemen of the Inns of Court—it was the collaboration of Thomas Norton and Thomas Sackville of the Inner Temple. Yet her typical indecisiveness about marriage and succession resulted in a persistent national apprehension about the future.

The Elizabethans were well aware of the devastating consequence of civil war in undermining social order both from the French and Dutch religious and civil wars and from their own in the previous century. Absolutely required to survive the dangers of the time was the unity of the nation that is to a larger extent depended on the monarch. The nation's desire for security enabled Elizabeth to become the center of gravity in national affairs and cultural activities. Writing for the nation meant writing for the Queen. She was commonly equated with the nation as a unifying symbol that could settle all social, religious, and political discords. The government consciously used and controlled writings to create beliefs and to secure the allegiance of their subjects through state apparatuses, such as spectacles, patronage, censorship, imprisonment, execution, and so on. The task of writers, including Spenser, was to provide a theoretical model to perpetuate the nation and the authority of the Queen, who stayed heirless without marriage. Elizabeth served as a cultural constant in framing the Elizabethan cultural paradigm.

These national and royal situations explain why the humanist license was allowed over official Protestant criticism. National unity was the number one national concern. The Queen was called upon to be a strong ruler, to know how to exercise power and create and play multiple roles out of her royal selves in various conditions. Elizabeth was well known for her recognition of the necessity for her diverse images. They were reflected in current literary practices embodying her different virtues and offices in a number of distinct figures. She was addressed by several names like Pandora, Gloriana, Cynthia, Belphoebe,
Elizabeth's awareness of the theatrical necessity was also well registered in her supreme sense of the theatrical nature of kingship. Elizabeth acted out an image of a warrior as a woman in the famous Tilbury speech in 1588. In response to the sense of urgency confronting the Spanish Armada, the Queen herself sat on horseback to cheer up her troops at Tilbury, habited in steel plate like a warrior, and said eloquently that she had "the body but of a weak and feeble Woman" but "the heart and stomach of a King."

Britomart comes closest to this theatrical sense of the multiple representation of the Queen in Spenserian theater, representing Spenserian humanist license most. Like an actor on the stage, she sometimes plays a chaste goddess, other times a man-like warrior, and still other times, a merciful ruler. She has both male strength and female virtue as a composite of the Queen's multi-mirrors: "Wise, warlike, personable, curteous, and kind" (3.4.5.9). This image recalls Guyon's description of his "Queene of Faerie" on his shield, revealing the Queen's various virtues:

She is the mighty Queene of Faerie,

Whose faire retrait I in my shield do beare;
She is the flowre of grace and chastitie,
Throughout the world renowned far and neare,
My liefe, my liege, my Soueraigne, my deare,
Whose glory shineth as the morning starre,
And with her light the earth enlumines cleare;
Far reach her mercies, and her prayses farre,

As well in state of peace, as puissauce in warre. (2.9.4)

In the proem 5 to Book Three, Spenser clearly states that he will mirror the Queen's body in multiplicity: "Ne let his [Sir Walter Raleigh's] fairest Cynthia refuse,/ In murrors more then one her selfe to see." In theory, Gloriana and Belphoebe are the figures personifying
the Queen, representing her body politic and the body natural respectively—he pronounces this explicitly in both the same poem and the letter to Raleigh. In practice, however, neither of these types seems to be fully realized in the poem. The theory of the so-called queen's two bodies, in fact, is further expanded in Spenser's poem. Spenser celebrates the power of the Queen in almost unlimited ways through Britomart, who combines the masculine and feminine virtues as of Elizabeth. As a female knight, only she is invested with both qualities of man and woman, unlike other figures who stand for feminine virtues alone. As suggested in her name, Britomart amalgamates "Brito" with "Mars," signifying "the Britonesse" (3.1.58.5) and at the same time "Faire martiall Mayd" (3.2.9.4). Also, the name is associated with the nymph Britomartis from Virgil, *Ciris*, who is linked to the chastity of Diana. Therefore, Britomart can be marked by Gloriana's divine glory and grace, Belphoebe's chastity and beauty, Mercilla's justice and mercy, and it is even foretold that as a royal maid her issue will be related to Elizabeth:

Yet these, and all that else had puissaunce,
Cannot with noble Britomart comapre,
Aswell for glory of great valianunce,
As for pure chastitie and vertue rare,
That all her goodly deeds do well declare.
Well worthy stock, from which the braches sprong,
That in late yeares so faire a blossome bare,
As thee, O Queene, the matter of my song,
Whose lignage from this Lady I deriue along. (3.4.3)

Britomart's theatrical transformation is made possible only through her disguise as a male knight. Cross-dressing is justified as a strategy for her to enter the male world and carry out the dynastic role, the "enterprize" (3.3.51.6), prophesied to her by Merlin: she is destined to marry Artegall. Out of their union, "a royal virgin" Queen Elizabeth shall be
born eventually, who will unite the country from "warlike minds" and "ciuile armes," protecting the low countries and winning a great victory over Spain (3.3.49). Her squire Glauc (the old nurse disguised) proposes to Britomart that "nought our passage may empeach/ Let vs feigned armes our selues disguize,/And our weake hands (whom need new strength shall teach)/ The dreadfull speare and shield to exercize," and Britomart turns into "a mayd Martiall" (3.3.53).

In addition to the advantage of protection from the harsh world, the device works to liberate Britomart from her culturally set gender role. In the hierarchical and patriarchal society of the Renaissance, love and marriage were under the male's control. Yet Britomart goes through a man's experience in Fairyland, where she has the power to control love and marriage as Elizabeth did. It is well known that marriages in Elizabeth's court were subject to her judgment and consent. Any secret affair became an occasion for punishment and loss of her grace. It is believed that Elizabeth had the intention of marrying Robert Dudley to Mary Stuart when creating him Earl of Leicester in 1564, but that the plan was thwarted by Mary's unexpected marriage to Lord Darnley, the union of the Stuart lines accelerating Mary's slim chance for the English throne. In the case of Catherine Grey who secretly married the Earl of Hereford in 1560, Elizabeth cruelly imprisoned her until her death—the unfortunate couple is believed to have become the source of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet. Raleigh, who had a scandalous relationship with Elizabeth Throckmorton, one of the Queen's maids of honor, was disgraced for failing to remain chaste at court. This event is often compared to Belphoebe's banishment of Timias for kissing the unconscious Amoret (4.7.36).

The theme of love and marriage is centrally treated as in the couple of Amoret and Scudamour. As the twin sister of Belphoebe, Amoret is adopted by Venus, the goddess of love, replacing her missing son Cupid, and brought to the Garden of Adonis. There she was raised in a way that represents perfect womanhood in chaste love and marriage,
namely, "trained vp in true feminitee:/... In all the lore of loue, and goodly womanhead" (3.6.51). Unlike Belphoebe whom Diana brought up in perfect chastity, Amoret needs a kind of education to prevent all the dangers with which love is associated: chaste love must check the advance of fleshly lust. Amoret has become a true femininity standing for love and married chastity:

In which when she to perfect ripenesse grew,
Of grace and beautie noble Paragone,
She brought her forth into the worldes vew,
To be th'ensample of true loue alone,
And Lodestarre of all chaste affectione,
To all faire ladies, that doe line on ground. (3.6.52.1-6)

She moves later to the Temple of Venus where she is won by the knightly prowess of Scudamour who defeated twenty knights in single combat as his name signifies--the shield of love: "Blessed the man that well can use his blis:/ Whose ever be the shield, faire Amoret be his" (4.10.8.8-9). He is literally a protector of love. Yet on the wedding day Amoret is abducted by the vile enchanter Busirane, the very example of unchaste lust.

At this stage, ironically, it is Britomart, not Scudamour, who enters the picture and plays the rescuer. A disguised female takes man's place of safeguarding love. Scudamour is rather in need of control of his "greedy will" and therefore of submission to Britomart in recognition of her divine power. As Guyon smashed the Bower of Bliss in the second book, Britomart must destroy the castle of Busirane, rich with golden tapestries painting the illicit loves of various gods (3.11.29), and keep chaste love (Amoret) from lustful desire by slaying Busirane (3.12.38). Amoret is freed from Busirane's enchantment and reunited with Scudamour--in the revised 1596 edition Amoret still remains in separation from Scudamour throughout to bring forth further but similar adventures where she is again rescued from Lust by Belphoebe (4.7) and by Arthur (4.8). The knight of chastity
fulfills her task of shielding the couple from the opposite force of lust, leading to the true definition of love and marriage.

By transvestism Spenser provides for Britomart not only the spirit of masculinity but actual man's strength for a rescue role. Britomart is basically a knight, a warrior whose martial feat culminates in confrontation with, and in the defeat of, the Amazon Radigund. In fact, she is designed as a type not only for love or chastity but for martial acts in her capacity of a "warlike Britonesse" (4.1.36.1). She is repeatedly addressed as "the warlike Mayd" (3.1.63.6), "the warlike Damzell" (3.11.18.2), "the warlike virgin" (4.1.10.5), and so forth. She is a female warrior of Britain, possessing masculine power in her feminine amity: "she was full of amiable grace, And manly terror mixed therewithall" (3.1.46.1-2). Spenser justifies masculine force in a female, admitting the reality of the martial feats of female warriors of antiquity and blaming for the present disappearance of feminine prowess the envy of men that curbed the liberty of female warriors (3.2.1-2). In times of war, the Queen's sex was certainly a problem as a ruler, and so a masculine force must have been a necessity to fight adversaries and protect the nation. It was a commonplace of the day, Shepherd reminds us, to see Elizabeth "play the soldier-queen" and that the image stuck in the figure of Minerva or Pallas. Elizabeth, as seen in the Tilbury speech, was well aware of the theatrical sense of being a warrior.

Among the most theatrical and humanist ways of uniting masculinity with femininity is the use of the image of the hermaphrodite or androgyny, a design that is key to explaining Spenserian syncretism and that implicates the royal and national interests of Spenser's day. The story of the union of Hermaphrodite and Salmacis, who become a single being, in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* is known as the source of androgyny. The *FQ* is charged with such images. Venus in the Temple of Venus--significantly, she is a goddess of love and fertility--is an androgynous figure. She is believed to wear a veil for this reason:
The cause why she [Venus] was couered with a vele,
    Was hard to know, for that her Priests the same
From peoples knowledge labour'd to concele.
But sooth it was not sure for womanish shame,
Nor any blemish, which the worke mote blame;
But for, they say, she hath both kinds in one,
Both male and female, both vnder one name:
    She syre and mother is her selfe alone,
Begets and eke conceiues, ne needeth other none. (4.10.41)

In the 1590 edition, Spenser finalized both Book Three and the whole poem with the hermaphroditic union of Amoret and Scudamour, "that faire Hermaphrodite" (3.12.46.2). Similar images are also seen in the marriage between the Medway and the Thames (4.11.8-53), in the description of Nature (7.6.5), and in the cross-dressing of the couple of Britomart (3.3.53) and Artegaill (5.7.37).

The hermaphroditic image in the poem has drawn the attention of many scholars. Thomas Roche thinks it symbolic of the mystical union of souls, and Donald Cheney finds in the embrace of Amoret and Scudamour of the 1590 version a perfection or an ideal of marriage as indicated in Genesis 2.24, where man becomes "one flesh" through marriage. In challenge to these views, Gary Grund argues, the hermaphrodite Britomart is not "merely the champion of married love" but also an expression of martial puissance, as the paradoxical epithet, "martiall Mayd," signifies. She is a reflection of the author's effort to reconcile the dual aspects of the Queen's two bodies, public and private, masculine and feminine, martial puissance and chaste love, so as to "balance private fulfillment as a woman with public responsibility as a monarch." Elizabeth Bellamy, on the other hand, develops a theory of "unresolved androgyny" against the theme of "discordia concors," the harmonious androgyny, by reason of Britomart's ultimate cancellation of her warrior image.
by overthrowing the same androgynous Amazon Radigund in the end—hence no unity, no resolution. Constance Jordan goes further with a feminist slant, arguing for "political androgyny" that functions to authorize the female ruler to exercise male power under male-dominated society, Elizabeth being a man in political terms.

To make a sweeping generalization, these views are all concerned largely with the Queen's representation in a theoretical dimension based on the idea of the Queen's two bodies, either individual or political. They disregard the literally physical dimension of the image: it is simply a way of giving birth without marriage. Bruce Boehrer touched on the marriage motif in Book Three in a somewhat different context—he did not discuss it in light of hermaphrodites, arguing that the praise of (wedded) chastity is a displacement of the barren queen; in other words, the celebration is calculated to transpose the reproductive problem, since not marrying was considered abnormal by Elizabethan cultural standards. The problem is displaced in such forms as the concern with Britomart's lineage, with the birth of Belphoebe and Amoret, and with the union of Amoret and Scudamour. As to the marriage problem, what Spenser is doing, however, is sensed in a more extended and significant way than merely in the transposed terms of wedded chastity. He is offering a more immediate way of procreating issue by means of hermaphrodites. It is more closely related to the matter of succession than that of chastity. The focus of the matter, then, should be centered on Britomart's hermaphroditic image instead of Belphoebe or Amoret, for only Britomart among them most likely undergoes the androgynous experience in the poem.

We need to be reminded of the most immediate practical problem through the entirety of Elizabeth's reign at its foundation; namely, the Queen remained unmarried without an heir to the throne, which loomed large enough to be a national obsession. As a royal subject Spenser must have been haunted by the dynastic problem as well. Intimately relevant to this problem is his use of the image of a hermaphrodite who meets the dynastic
needs as well as displays the Queen's private or public person theatrically. The biform image has been employed in many marriage rituals as a symbol of sexual intercourse and therefore fertility. The image of the hermaphrodite strongly implies a self-sufficient way of procreation, a capacity of giving birth without the aid of a male partner. Very suggestive is the self-generation story of Chrysogone in Book Three, who conceived the twins Belphoebe and Amoret simply by exposure to the sun's beams and delivered them unconsciously:

Vnawares she them conceiu'd, vnawares she bore:
She bore withouten paine, that she conceiued
Withouten pleasure. (3.6.27.1-3)

It is not known precisely when Elizabeth determined to remain a virgin. We can speculate that she did at least by the time the last opportunity to create a dynasty turned out to be hopeless in 1578. The final proposal had been made by Duke of Alençon, younger brother of the French King Henry III, since 1572. Elizabeth's desire, however, met persistent protest by the Earl of Leicester and Sir Francis Walsingham, who opposed the match because of the chance of Catholic reinstatement. It is well known that Sidney, Leicester's nephew, lost Elizabeth's favor for writing to her a letter of objection. Spenser also appeared to oppose the French proposal for nationalistic reasons. Some allusions to Alençon as a lethal snake appears in The Shepeardes Calender; he is the foolish Braggadocchio in The FQ, and a frog in Mother Hubberds Tale.52

The failure seemed to shift the focal point of writing from marriage advice to a praise of Elizabeth's unmarried chastity, devising the theatrical back cloths of the mystique of such a monarch. Every writer was engrossed in these matters.53 Around 1582 when it became clear that Elizabeth's marriage was not a possibility, the Inns of Court revelers stopped lecturing Elizabeth in the person of Juno and began to mirror images of Astraea and Diana (Cynthia) to mainly represent Elizabeth's chastity. Sir Walter Raleigh and John
Lyly are probably two of the earliest writers who associate Elizabeth with chastity. Raleigh's poem, "The Ocean to Cynthia," was being written sometime in the 1580s, and Lyly's play *Endimion* was performed at court in 1586, in which Cynthia impersonates Queen Elizabeth.\(^{54}\)

Since the late Elizabethans accepted as a fact the impossibility of the Queen's marriage, it would be inconceivable that any advice on love and marriage were intended in the poem. We need to see the theme of love and marriage from a different point of view, which might account for why the proposed marriages in the poem are deferred without good reason. Indeed, several marriages related to the Queen directly or indirectly are expected in the poem—of Gloriana to Arthur, of Una to Redcrosse, of Britomart to Artegall, and so on. Yet it is not clear whether their union is consummated in the end. Instead, we can only witness it in other forms, in the androgynous form of a mythical union of the Queen with the nation that is almost always detected in all types of marriage in the poem. Marriage might be unnecessary if the Queen figures themselves are self-sufficient in terms of procreation.

Rather than describe the adventures directly related to love and marriage, therefore, Spenser is intent on tracing the genealogy of England and Elizabeth. A genealogical method was an epic convention in the Renaissance for the dynastic mythmaking of a nation that Ariosto and Tasso used after Virgil who had used it to trace the origin of Roman empire in *Aeneid*.\(^{55}\) The act of reviewing the past through chronicles, history, and genealogy expresses a wish to ultimately foresee the future, a hope for the future. This method is especially apt when dealing with a dynastic theme. Spenser's serves to justify the English nation and the Queen's legitimate ancestry by connecting the past with the present, projecting a vision of the nation's glorious future and assuring its continuous succession. The theme of the androgynous marriage of the Queen to the nation is established by way of the genealogical method as in the promised mythical union of Gloriana with Arthur. Arthur
reads his "Briton Moniments" in Canto 10, Book Two, where his lineage traces back to the line of the Trojan Brutus who was related to Aeneas, founder of Rome, and established Britain. Identified thus, Arthur passionately expresses his love for the nation:

At last, quite rauisht with delight to heare
The royall Ofspring of his native land,
Cryde out; "Deare countrey, O how dearely deare
Ought thy remembranç and perpetuall band
Be to thy foster Childe, that from thy hand
Did commun breath and nouriture receive?
How brutish is it not to understand,
How much to her we owe, that all vs gaue,
That gaue unto vs all what ever good we haue. (2.10.69)

British history, on the other side, involves a fusion of another line of faerie ancestry, the Welsh lineage. This is read subsequently by Guyon under the title of "Antiquetie of Faery Lond," where the descent of Gloriana is linked to the Trojan Brutus. Faery Land in this way is lifted to an ideal level despite its essentially pagan nature. Arthur's visit to the Faerie Queene, the mythical merging of two chronicles, therefore, is meant to unite England with Faery Land, the old British kings with the new Tudor monarchy, and by implication, becomes the marriage of England to Elizabeth.

The figurative use of the kingdom or the people as a spouse, in fact, was a metaphorical commonplace that the Queen employed to justify her virgin authority. Elizabeth demonstrably stated in response to the persistent marriage request: "To conclude, I am already bound unto an Husband, which is the Kingdome of England, and that may suffice you."56 In this regard, the androgynous symbolism of the wedding of the two rivers dissolving into one in Book Four is also very significant. Following Alastair...
Fowler's interpretation, it is purely allegorical, intimating the nation's marriage to Elizabeth, for the Medway is at the center of the naval operations of England.\textsuperscript{57}

This marriage theme is strengthened by the promised union of Britomart and Artesall, which appears in a genealogical way as well. The close parallel between the two couples, Gloriana and Arthur, and Britomart and Artesall, is generally acknowledged. The new couple replace many aspects of the old one as if a double. Artesall turns out to be identical with Arthur. Etymologically, Artesall means Art-egall, namely, "equal to Arthur," and also "[thou] art equal" as befits a knight of justice. These senses are historically confirmed: Artesall comes out as a maternal half-brother to Arthur (3.3.27).\textsuperscript{58} Yet in practice, it is Britomart who plays Arthur's role in many cases. Both are identified as noble Britons in search of their partners. Like "that most noble Briton Prince" (1. proem 2.6), "this Briton Mayd" (3 2.4.5) is seeking her spouse Artesall whom she saw in a vision similar to Arthur's. As Arthur did, she frequently rescues others in the course of her quest. The British chronicle read by Arthur, in fact, is consummated by Merlin's prophecy to Britomart (3.3.25-50). Merlin confirms that the Tudors were the descendants of Arthur and predicts that from Britomart will descend the line of Briton kings down to Queen Elizabeth.

The union with Artesall is not realized in the poem but suggested by Britomart's androgynous vision, in which she materializes her destiny predicted in Book Three--Britomart's offspring from the union with Artesall will be related to Elizabeth. Britomart's dream in the Temple of Isis culminates in a hermaphroditic fusion of both sexes in her single body. It is an experience of sexuality and procreation, where the phallic crocodile curls around her in a sexual embrace that gives birth to a mighty lion (5.7.16). The Isis' Priest reads her mysterious dream in an allegory of dynastic significance. The crocodile is Osyris symbolic of justice, an Artesall figure, while Isis stands for clemency figuring Britomart. Out of their union a lion-like son will be born as a successor to the throne:

... that same Crocodile doth represent
The righteous Knight, that is thy faithfull lover
Like to Osyris in all iust endeuer
For that same Crocodile Osyris is,
That vnder Isis feete doth sleepe for euer:
To shew that clemence oft in things amis,
Restraines those sterne behests, and cruell doomes of his.

That Knight shall all the troublous stormes asswage,
    And raging flames, that many foes shall reare,
To hinder thee from the iust heritage
Of thy sires Crowne, and from thy countrey deare.
Then shalt though take him to thy loued fere,
    And ioyne in equall portion of thy realme.
And afterwards a sonne to him shalt beare,
    That Lion-like shall shew his powre extreame.

So blesse thee God, and giue thee ioyance of thy dreame. (5.7.22-23)

As with other hermaphroditic figures, she is self-sufficiently procreative, and her androgynous experience has a dynastic effect, a Spenserian vision for or answer to the heart of the succession problem. As a way of generation without marriage, the hermaphroditic procreation justifies the Queen's unmarried chastity and at the same time perpetuates the dynastic succession. Hermaphrodism is understood as Spenser's way of representing Elizabeth's authority and coping with the dynastic matter.

Between the Protestant reluctance to admit cultural trespass and the national demand for a powerful reigning queen, Spenserian humanist license was sanctioned to provide her with magical power to work out the national and dynastic problems. The Queen needed to surpass the traditional limitations set for a woman. Such theatrical devices as cross-
dressing (female warrior or androgyny) certainly relate to the unique conditions of Elizabeth herself, since they are geared to empower a woman with maleness in her body. Transvestism can be seen as an attempt to endow her with masculine freedom: disguised as a man, a woman can do something beyond the feminine constraints of her day. Female warriors provide manly strength in times of war; moreover, androgyny suggests a solution to the succession problem, which replaces a marriage that would not likely happen during her reign, and therefore succession, without destroying the established cult of chastity.

By the humanist embedding of male force in a female body, Spenser successfully makes an exceptional being of the Queen beyond the boundaries of gender of the time. This may be considered a complete identification with the masculine, an identification that leads to social disorder. Yet the apparent violation of gender codes does not necessarily invert sex roles, or praise the feminine in a feminist way, or express uneasiness about gynecocracy as some scholars argue. The humanist exception is confined only to the Queen as the ruler, and the device is much more a means to cope with the national and dynastic situations of her day. Spenser intends to establish and praise the mystique of his queen, not of the feminine per se.

Despite her man-like power, Britomart is depicted as far from threatening to the old order founded on patriarchy. Arguably, she could reverse the normal order because she has such magical power as to play both man's and woman's parts. Yet she does not make everything mixed up. Despite Britomart's rescue of her life, Amoret as a virgin wife of another still feels insecure in the presence of a man (disguised Britomart) after all. At this point, Britomart reveals her gender and removes Amoret's fear by taking off her helmet after overthrowing a jolly knight, who claims Amoret for his love (4.1.13-15). Even the masculine attire does not hide a woman's nature. Disturbed by Redcrosse's question of the reasons that brought her to Faery Land, Britomart begins to cry and laments her life of hardship since babyhood. She expresses her wish to lead a womanly life:
I haue beene trained vp in warlike stowre,
To tossen speare and shield, and to affrap
The warlike ryder to his most mishap;
Sithence I loathed have my life to lead,
As Ladies wont, in pleasures wanton lap,
To finger the fine needle and nyce thread. (3.2.63-8)

The male principle reaches a climax in the Radigund episode, where Britomart herself reaffirms women's subjection to men's rule. Spenser's aversion to the Amazon Radigund is obvious, who uses her masculine strength for lustful ends turning the order of the common weal upside down:

Such is the crueltie of womenkynd,
    When they haue shaken off the shamefast band,
    With which wise Nature did them strongly bynd,
    T'obay the heasts of mans well ruling hand,
    That then all rule and reason they withstand,
    To purchase a licentious libertie.
    But vertuous women wisely vnderstand,
    That they were borne to base humilitie,

Vnlesse the heauens them lift to lawfull soueraintie. (5.5.25)

As the last line indicates, Spenser is conceding only the Queen as an exception to men's rule because she is ordained by divine law. By implication, Britomart is intimately identified as the exceptional ruler, who should be more of a divine than feminine figure in the poem. As an instrument of divine justice Britomart subdues Radigund, the seamy side of herself as a warrior woman, and rules the city of Radigund as Princess restoring its laws to the original male supremacy:

During which space she there as Princess rained,
And changing all that forme of common weale, 
The liberty of women did repeale, 
Which they had long vsurpt; and them restoring 
To mens subiection, did true Iustice deale. (5.7.42.3-7)

The transvestite disguise is simply a strategy to perform her task, and it does not intend to skew gender distinctions after all. Britomart is content to assume her womanly nature, coming to terms with patriarchal order.

Tudor nationalism, dynastic at its source, plays an important part in the curious symbiosis of Protestantism and humanism in Spenserian aesthetics. All the theatrical devices derive from the Queen's unprecedented situations as an unmarried virgin ruler in times of national crisis. The succession problem remained a strong presence throughout that might cause national disruption. The threat from the forces of Catholic Europe was finally realized in the form of the war with Spain, which led the nation to an unstable condition psychologically and socially for nearly twenty years. The nation needed to be united around the Queen to cope with the national problems. Spenser makes the Queen possess divine grace and unlimited free will in a humanist way beyond the Protestant social or theological norms set for human beings who are basically sinful in this world. The Queen's self-representation in multiple theatrical forms involves Spenser's belief in the humanist spirit of self-creation by the exercise of free will, a perception that we have witnessed in the cases of Pico and Erasmus. Technically, Protestant principles are observed as in the doctrines of faith, grace, and frailty of human reason and will; in practice, they are applied or appropriated for the consolidation of the nation and for the exaltation of the Queen in the nationalist cause. The FQ is Spenser's humanist inscription of the nationalist cause on the Queen over Protestant doctrines.
Chapter Four:
Spenserian Humanist License

1 Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton (N.Y.: Longman, 1977) 737. All references to the book are to this edition, and an abbreviated title, FQ, is used throughout.


6 Virgil K. Whitaker, The Religious Basis of Spenser's Thought (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1950) 10. In favor of this position, Naseeb Shaheen, with a special focus on the use of Scripture in The FQ, claims that a biographical survey of Spenser's career demonstrates that his important associates are all true blue Anglicans, not Puritans, and that Spenser's burial in the Westminster Abbey confirms his orthodoxy—Naseeb Shaheen, Biblical References in The Faerie Queene (Memphis: Memphis State UP, 1976) 44-50.


10 King 9-10.


12 Sinfield 33.


15 See the opening chapter 20-22.

17 Bicknell, ed. 172.


21 See the opening chapter 33-34.


24 Woodbridge 153-55, 140-41.


33 MacCaffrey 10-11.


35 See Mortimer Levine, *The Early Elizabethan Succession Question: 1558-1568* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1966) 1, 30, 39-40. To summarize, the play draws on the story of Gorboduc, King of Britain, pointing up the tragic end of a kingdom left without a recognized successor. The breaking up of a kingdom originates in a doting father who disregarded the principle of primogeniture and divided the realm to his sons. The younger killed the elder for greed and the Queen took her revenge on the younger but finally was killed with the King by the people in rebellion. The country fell to a civil war.


39 It seems a critical convention to refer to the doctrine of the King's two bodies when discussing the Queen's self-representation in the poem. On the evolution of the concept of kingship in western Europe during the Middle Ages and early sixteenth century, see Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957). Around the late eleventh century, he claims, an idea arose that the King is two persons—a body natural, which is subject to death, and a body politic, which is an eternal principle. When a monarch died, the body politic passes to a new monarch and so never changes (15-58).

Marie Axton, applying the doctrine to the reign of Elizabeth I, claims that Elizabeth embodied the same monarch in her body natural—see her *The Queen's Two Bodies: Drama and the Elizabethan Succession* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1977). She finds the debate of the Queen's two bodies in the early succession question raised by the lawyers of the Inns of Court as in *Gorboduc* and in its later development of secular plays and poetry, where the Queen's two bodies were represented in various and heightened forms. Related to them, for instance, were "double plots and the use of twinned characters" (x). In her estimate, Elizabeth well recognized the theory as indicated in one of her first speeches to the council: "And as I am but one bodye naturallye considered though by his [God's] permission a bodye politique to governe" (38). Literature was a valid means of advising the sovereign.

41 Cheney advocates analyzing Book Three from the vantage point of comic structure, similar to Shakespeare's comedies. In contrast to the preceding two books, he contends, Britomart's process does not follow the patterns of Redcrosse and Guyon but her passion for love and the pull of chastity. See Donald Cheney, "Spenser's Hermaphrodite and the 1590 Faerie Queene," PMLA 88 (1972): 197.

42 See Levine, Succession Question 165, and Axton, Queen's Two Bodies 55-56, 66.


44 Shepherd, Amazons and Warrior Women 22.

45 Strictly speaking, hermaphrodite is a single individual having sex organs of both genders and androgyny is one that combines the traits of both sexes. Since all hermaphroditic unions in the poem appear just symbolically, the two terms can be used interchangeably. Consider that Elizabethans called the image in both ways—see Chapter Four 142.

46 See Roche, Jr., Kindly Flame 134-36.


53 It was all the more natural that literary writings tended to be political allegory in times when entertainments did not exist for popular taste but for a small circle of the nobility and the monarch. A glimpse of the Renaissance notion of art can be caught in one episode of Elizabeth's accession passage. When her view was blocked in the middle of walking through a series of pageants, she was reported to have asked what "the personages representing the Kinges and Queenes" signify. She finally grasped the meaning of the allegory and promised to work for the unity of the nation (Kinney, *Elizabethan Backgrounds* 19-20). The episode plainly tells what role allegory played and what function art in general had in the Elizabethan period. It was inconceivable that Elizabethan art existed purely for a literary aim as is expected of most of modern art. It was supposed to represent with moral intention something related to national affairs and the Queen as a means of advice to her. Roy Strong points this out in terms of the profound significance of royal portraiture, "one aspect of the alliance of art and power" in the Renaissance—see Roy Strong, *Gloriana: The Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I* (N.Y.: Thames and Hudson, 1987) 10-12. Art in general was not a private possession of the author but belonged to the patron and ultimately to the prince. Rather than unfold social manners or individual emotions, Elizabethan art had more immediate political bearings that do not necessarily mean something radical, of course. It would be therefore a treason to use court entertainments for other purposes than to glorify the sovereign. Essex was to commit an offense when staging a drama for his own purpose, not for Elizabeth's. Hopkins says:

In putting on a pageant which cast himself and not Elizabeth as the central character, Essex had committed the cardinal sin of the Elizabethan court: he had forgotten that all its members and all its ceremonies existed solely for
the greater glory of the sovereign.... The offence of Essex in using a court entertainment for his own glory rather than that of the Queen had been the same as that of Lucifer.... For Elizabeth too, for her own court, was a kind of goddess, and the Accession Day tilts, like the other entertainments of her court, were a part of her ritual." (Lisa Hopkins, Queen Elizabeth I and Her Court (London: Vision P, 1990) 169.)

54 I have learned much of this information from Ficino, an Internet discussion group—see Peter C. Herman's query and the responses following about Elizabeth's moon imagery in the Oct. to Nov. logs of 1996. As to the transition of Elizabeth's praise, Cain's categorization of the cults of Elizabeth is very useful. According to him, they fall in four stages: 1. the earliest identification of Elizabeth with national heroines from the Old Testament—Judith, Esther, and the righteous judge Deborah; 2. the transposition of the medieval cult of the Virgin Mary to that of the Virgin Queen after 1570, who rules the realm successfully unmarried; 3. a more secular devotion patterned after Petrarchan courtly love as in the sonnet sequence or after the more otherworldly fairy queen; 4. the tendency to mythologize Elizabeth as Greek and Roman goddesses like Diana, Venus, and Astraea—see Thomas H. Cain, "Images of Elizabeth," A Spenser Encyclopedia 236. See also John N. King, "Queen Elizabeth I: Representation of the Virgin Queen," Renaissance Quarterly 43:1 (spring 1990): 30-74. King notes the shift of the emphasis of Elizabeth's encomium from the earlier marriageable virgin to the late perpetual virgin.

55 See Jane Hedley, "Genealogy," The Spenser Encyclopedia 438.

56 Axton, Queen's Two Bodies 38.

57 See Hamilton's note to 4.11.8 in Hamilton, ed., The Faerie Queene 508.

Epilogue

We have examined the term "Christian humanism" in sixteenth-century England, historicizing its ideological charge and modern misconceptions. The term turns out to be a strategy of twentieth-century humanist scholars to identify divinity or spirituality in man. As its logical conclusion, the notion of human divinity is frequently associated with the modern liberal sense of human dignity, going on to imply political radicalism when applied to the Renaissance humanist. Indeed, the Renaissance humanist perceives man in a way that underlines his ability to act using human faculties like reason and free will, different from the medieval concept of man simply as sinful.

The term, however, results in a distorted picture of Renaissance English humanism. Humanism was not accepted as a movement or a dominant force in society in general but in a limited area such as education. It might involve things political, but not in radical terms. The humanist reassessment of reason and free will never aspired to human perfection without the aid of a much superior agent of divine grace. The Christian humanist notion of the harmony between Christianity and humanity is not explicit even with Erasmus, the representative Christian humanist, and still less under the Protestant doctrine of human depravity. Protestants like Luther, who obviously attacked the Christian humanist contention of human dignity, instead asserted human degeneracy. If we nevertheless witness the continuous presence of humanism even under strict Protestant control, we need to explain it from a different viewpoint. The spirit of nationhood was responsible for the Protestant cooptation of humanism in the English context. Henry's separation with Rome
became momentum for the development of Tudor dynastic nationalism largely centered around the monarch. Henrician nationalism was reinforced during Elizabeth's reign, fully supported by the official Protestant doctrines of the national Church. In the age when the universal Church broke down and when the role of secular rulers became more and more central to national affairs, humanists' participation in national government was indispensable to create the mystique of monarchy of a new nation.

Renaissance humanism is unthinkable without recognizing theological principles in the background, but its theological nature must also be historicized and differentiated in each distinct period. The enterprise to subsume Renaissance humanism under the umbrella term "Christian" fails to identify the peculiar historical situations of the period. The special stress on human spirituality--Christianity--is an unnecessary criterion for Renaissance humanists, for they all were Christian at their heart with few exceptions. To avoid the ahistorical sense associated with the term Christian humanism and to account for each individual condition in the evolution of English humanism in a more history-specific way, we must view Renaissance humanism in its own terms. I propose to address Sir Thomas More as a Catholic humanist, who represents English humanism before the arrival of the Henrician Reformation and nationalism, and Edmund Spenser as a Protestant humanist, who represents the nationalist strand of English humanism after the Reformation. Sir Thomas Elyot stands in between as a transitional figure, who was basically Catholic but desired to take an active part in nation-making. These humanists, who each fell under particular political, theological, and cultural regimes, reveal disparate strategies of English humanism.

Probably More comes closest to what the twentieth-century term Christian humanism defines. On closer examination into the nature of his humanism, however, we realize that the idea of human harmony with divinity is not so manifest even with More and how closely he follows the basic lines of Renaissance humanism with its educational and
literary origin. He gives special weight to the vital role of reason in human affairs but also emphasizes its inevitable shortcomings in spiritual matters such as salvation. The integrity of human reason is ultimately denied for the principles of faith and grace. More's Christianity in humanism is essentially Catholic in his emphasis on oneness or universality. The humanist learning exists for the benefit of Christendom; it is not confined to a nation. The final refusal to recognize Henry as supreme head of the Church is closely related to this universal nature of his Catholic humanism. He attempts to accommodate his ideals of Catholic humanism with the newly rising spirit of humanist realism but eventually finds it impossible when asked to join in the nationalist cause led by Henry. His tragedy lies not in the confrontation of Catholicism with humanism but of Catholic humanism with the budding nationalism. More refuses to transform the new learning from its larger Catholic scope to a limited use for nationalist assertion.

In a sense, English humanism started with Elyot's enterprise to incorporate the universal ideals of Catholic humanism into the particular English situation. He could be defined as a Catholic humanist, but his humanism is different from More's not in principle but in practice or orientation. He crushes More's Utopian theory of a commonwealth for Christendom by his theory of the public weal for the English nation. His educational program explicitly aims at the English governing class vital for running the nation. Its goal is to train a perfect courtier for the King's court, which has evolved into the social or cultural center of the time. Contrary to More, Elyot follows the lead of the changing dynamics of the period with a receptive mind. This changing nature of English humanism is very significant in that it will prevail in the subsequent period and determine the character of English humanism ever after.

In theological terms, the Elizabethan Church is officially Protestant, which denies human free will and accepts predestination. Spenser follows the basic principles of the national Church, as he acknowledges the doctrine of grace and the necessity of checking
human will. He disclaims human dignity, even though he believes in salvation by grace, which counters the harmony theory of Christian humanism. In theory, humanism cannot work with Protestant principles, but in practice continues its life in the humanist ways of constructing the theatrical mystique around the Queen. The nation suffered its own inveterate dynastic problem, surrounded by the threats of Catholic forces, internal and external. As an unmarried female ruler, the Queen was required to command a theatrical repertoire of personae exercising royal power, including a masculine one, to cope with these national problems. These royal and national necessities make Spenser's humanist license possible, allowing the more secularized sense of grace and free will for the Queen. As a Protestant humanist, Spenser presents the Protestant cooptation of humanism in the age of dynastic nationalism.

In the dissertation, discussions of Christian humanism are limited to sixteenth-century English humanists, since its reevaluation draws basically on the conditions and implications of Tudor nationalism. Perhaps this idea could be extended to seventeenth-century Christian humanists as well. Tudor nationalism of dynastic nature seems to develop to the point of extreme absolutism in Jacobean and Caroline periods, solely concentrated on the representation of the sovereign. With the accession to the throne, James I plays a different role in the evolution of English humanism. As exemplified in his theory of divine kingship, James attempts to establish his absolute divine authority, consciously displacing the Elizabethan ways of constructing power. Very suggestive is James's special stress on patriarchal authority. He deliberately reverses Elizabeth's slogan of the virgin queen wedded to the nation. He instead claims that he is the husband or the father of the entire nation. As the natural correlative of the metaphor, the people as the children are bound to obey the father's care and government without question. The tighter control and censorship of the theater are a reflection of James's patriarchal policy: in contrast to Elizabeth, James virtually seized control within a few years of his accession, directly exercising royal
patronage on theater companies. Entirely different strategies of staging power are required for humanists to represent the absolute sovereign, like surveillance, punishment, and discipline as in Ben Jonson or religious symbolism as in George Herbert or John Donne. The Elizabethan self-asserting transvestite heroines, for example, are disciplined and punished in Jacobean writings, thereby reinscribing the unlimited sovereign power. Dramatizing the subjects' regulation is simply the flip side of the elevation of the sovereign's absolute power.

This excessive dynastic strand seems to meet a strong challenge eventually bodied forth in the form of the Puritan Revolution in 1642, which replaced the idea of monarchy at the center of the nation by that of the elect. This event is the end result of the evolution of the complicated theological picture of the day that originated in the confrontation of the conservative Protestants with the Laudian Arminians. Official Protestantism gives way to a more individualistic interpretation of theology, ultimately inducing another important transformation of Christianity in humanism. John Milton's work might give possible leads to a configuration of English humanism in these terms. Unlike the preceding humanists, his humanist aesthetics materializes a new concept of popular nationalism, nearing the modern form of nationalism based on the idea of people. He endorses the reality of free will in the elect as the mainstay of the nation, liberating human free will from the dynastic sense to that of people under his theological individualism.

Rethinking Christian humanism in the English Renaissance in this way, namely, reviewing the metamorphosis of Christian humanism with a focus on Tudor nationalism, will contribute both to the literary evolution of English humanism itself by tracing its origin and agency and to the historical appreciation of the discursive effect of the theological and political dynamics in that period.
Epilogue

1 In his speech to the Parliament in 1609, James I (1603-25) expressed his idea of kingship, asserting that "Kings are not onely Gods Lieutenants vpon earth, and sit vpon Gods throne, but euen by God himselfe they are called Gods." See James I, The Political Works of James I, ed. and introd. Charles Howard Mcilwain, 1616. (N.Y.: Russell & Russell, 1965) 307. This explains why James attempted to reject the Puritan petitions in 1604 and convert Presbyterian Scotland into episcopacy in 1610. Episcopacy was the only institution compatible with the idea of divine kingship. James replied to Puritans when asked to abolish the office of Bishop: "no bishop, no king." See Lisa Hopkins, Queen Elizabeth I and Her Court (London: Vision P, 1990) 18.
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