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A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY OF NONCOMPLIANT BEHAVIORS IN
JAPANESE AND UNITED STATES HOSPITALS:
NONCOMPLIANCE AS A RESPONSE TO PERCEIVED THREATS OF
SHAME, EMBARRASSMENT, AND MANAGEMENT SANCTIONS

A Dissertation
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
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Doctor of Philosophy

By
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Norman, Oklahoma
1997
A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY OF NONCOMPLIANT BEHAVIORS IN JAPANESE AND UNITED STATES HOSPITALS:
NONCOMPLIANCE AS A RESPONSE TO PERCEIVED THREATS OF SHAME, EMBARRASSMENT, AND MANAGEMENT SANCTIONS

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
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BY

[Signatures]
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Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signature page</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copyright Page</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposes of the Study</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Compliance Theory in the Field of Communication:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory, Research, and Criticism</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial Compliance-Gaining Strategies</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Rational Choice Decision-Making Theory of Crime</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence Theory</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical View of Deterrence</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Sanction Threats</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Certainty and Severity of Sanctions</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures of Perceived Certainty and Severity</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Effects of Perceived Certainty and Severity</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Sanction Threats</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational Choice Decision-Making Theory of Crime</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 7: Models and Hypotheses ....................................................... 74
Chapter 8: Methods .................................................................... 76
  Data ................................................................................. 76
  Measures ................................................................................. 78
    Noncompliance with Organizational Norms ................... 78
    Shame, Embarrassment, and Management Sanctions ...... 79
    Culture ................................................................................. 83
    Control Variables ............................................................... 83
Chapter 9: Analysis ................................................................................ 85
  Plan of Analysis .................................................................... 85
    Cultural Differences in Perceived Levels of Sanction Threats ...... 85
  Cultural Differences in Future Intention to Participate in
  Noncompliant Behavior .......................................................... 86
  Cultural Differences in Deterrent Effects of Sanction Threats ... 87
  Analysis ............................................................................... 89
    Comparisons of Japanese and American Samples .......... 89
      Taking a Long Lunch or Break without Approval .......... 89
      Coming to Work Late or Leaving Early without
      Approval ........................................................................... 91
      Using Sick Leave When Not Really Sick ................. 93
    Bivariate Correlations ..................................................... 93
    Regression Analysis of Determinants of Perceived Sanction
      Threats ............................................................................. 100
      Culture and Shame ................................................................. 100
      Culture and Embarrassment ................................................... 102
      Culture and Management Sanctions ...................................... 104
  Regression Analysis of Determinants of Noncompliance
Tendencies ................................................. 107
   Taking a Long Lunch or Break without Approval ........ 107
   Coming to Work Late or Leaving Early without Approval ................................................. 111
   Using Sick Leave When Not Really Sick ................................................. 115

Interaction Effects ................................................. 119
   Taking a Long Lunch or Break without Approval ........ 119
   Coming to Work Late or Leaving Early without Approval ................................................. 121
   Using Sick Leave When Not Really Sick ................................................. 122

Chapter 10: Summary and Discussion ................................................. 123

Cultural Differences in Perceived Levels of Sanction Threats and Noncompliance Tendencies ................................................. 123

Summary ................................................................. 123

Shame ................................................................. 124

Embarrassment ................................................................. 124

Management Sanctions ................................................................. 126

Cultural Differences in Deterrent Effects of Sanction Threats ................................................. 128

Summary ................................................................. 128

Interaction Effects of Culture and Shame ................................................................. 128

Interaction Effects of Culture and Embarrassment ................................................................. 129

Interaction Effects of Culture and Management Sanctions ................................................................. 130

Sanctions ................................................................. 130

Conclusion ................................................................. 131

References ................................................................. 134

Appendix A: Questionnaire in Japanese ................................................................. 145

Appendix B: Questionnaire in English ................................................................. 161
List of Tables

Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Certainty, Severity, and the Product of Certainty and Severity of Shame, Embarrassment, and Management Sanctions ............... 81
Table 2: One-Tailed t-Tests Comparing Japanese and American Samples on Taking a Long Lunch or Break without Approval ................................................................. 90
Table 3: One-Tailed t-Tests Comparing Japanese and American Samples on Coming to Work Late or Leaving Early without Approval ............................................. 92
Table 4: One-Tailed t-Tests Comparing Japanese and American Samples on Using Sick Leave When Not Really Sick ......................................................... 94
Table 5: Correlations of Behavioral Intention to Take a Long Lunch or Break without Approval with Perceived Threats and Control Variables ............................ 96
Table 6: Correlations of Behavioral Intention to Come to Work Late or Leave Early without Approval with Perceived Threats and Control Variables ..................... 97
Table 7: Correlations of Behavioral Intention to Use Sick Leave When Not Really Sick with Perceived Threats and Control Variables ........................................... 98
Table 8: OLS Regression of Shame on Culture and Control Variables ....................................................... 101
Table 9: OLS Regression of Embarrassment on Culture and Control Variables ........................................... 103
Table 10: OLS Regression of Management Sanctions on Culture
and Control Variables ....................................................... 106
Table 11: OLS Regression of Behavioral Intention to Take a Long Lunch or Break without Approval on Independent Variables ....................................................... 108
Table 12: OLS Regression of Behavioral Intention to Come to Work Late or Leave Early without Approval on Independent Variables ....................................................... 113
Table 13: OLS Regression of Behavioral Intention to Use Sick Leave When Not Really Sick on Independent Variables ....................................................... 116
Table 14: OLS Regression of Behavioral Intention to Commit the Offense on Culture, Perceived Threats and Interaction Terms ....................................................... 120
A Cross-Cultural Study of Noncompliant Behaviors in Japanese and United States Hospitals:
Noncompliance as a Response to Perceived Threats of Shame, Embarrassment, and Management Sanctions

Abstract

Extending the concept of deterrence, emphasized in the rational choice decision-making theory of crime, to an organizational context, the present research examines empirically cultural differences in the perceived levels of punishment threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions, and, subsequently, the prevalence of noncompliant workplace behaviors in Japanese and U.S. university hospitals. Secondarily, the present study assesses the interaction effects for cultural difference (Japanese and American) and the three sanction threats on noncompliance.

In the research reported here, comparable measures are created of the perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions for three categories of occupational deviant conduct (taking a long lunch or break without approval, coming to work late or leaving early without approval, and using sick leave when not really sick). The effects of three punishment threats on people's intention to violate three organizational rules are then examined in merged samples of employees in Japanese and U.S. university hospitals. Compared to American employees, Japanese employees perceive greater threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions and, subsequently, are less likely to commit each of the three offenses. The lower likelihood of Japanese employees to take a long lunch or break without approval or use sick leave when not really sick is primarily attributable to their greater threat of shame. Despite their lower intention to commit the future offenses, the analyses indicate that all three sanction threats have less of a deterrent impact for Japanese employees than for American employees, and
these findings for interaction effects are not consistent with the predictions of the current research.
A Cross-Cultural Study of Noncompliant Behaviors in Japanese and United States Hospitals: Noncompliance as a Response to Perceived Threats of Shame, Embarrassment, and Management Sanctions

Chapter 1: Introduction

A societal emphasis on "collectivity" and perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions are presumably the main characteristics which have given Japanese companies a contemporary advantage in making the best use of talents of their employees to maximize conformity in a post-industrial society (Braithwaite, 1989; McMillan, 1982; Pascale & Athos, 1981). In the postwar period, it is, at least to some extent, Japanese managerial usage of the three types of sanction threats as deterrents that has secured employee compliance with organizational norms and, thus, produced the strongest economic growth. Focusing on the two dominant and competitive forces in the world market, the present research explores cultural differences in noncompliant workplace behaviors among employees in Japanese and U.S. organizations as a result of the perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions.

Every day we confront a variety of norms and rules and are expected to conform to them, ranging from severe sanction-captive legal ones (e.g., prohibition of homicide and stealing) to sanction-free moral ones (e.g., obedience to parents and teachers). Nevertheless, it is quite natural that we, as creatures with emotional motives to gain rewards, should feel tempted to engage in illegal and/or immoral behaviors. Eventually, in the face of temptations, some individuals violate norms while others do not. Some are not deterred from wrongdoing while others are.
This is a central issue which has been addressed by criminologists with their emphasis on the concept of deterrence in social control process. Recently, scholars have articulated a "rational choice decision-making theory of crime," attempting to answer the question: "Why do some people not engage in criminal behaviors?" (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993). Grounded in the utilitarian perspective, this theory assumes humans are rational thinkers who act on the basis of their estimates of potential costs from projected behaviors (Geerken & Gove, 1975).

Typically, researchers have focused on the three potential costs of shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions that emanate from three different sources—conscience, significant others, and state legitimacy—and possess two dimensions of certainty and severity of the punishment. Shame, or guilt-feelings, is a self-imposed informal cost individuals might experience when they offend their conscience by engaging in an act they consider morally wrong. Embarrassment is a socially imposed informal cost individuals might experience when they lose respect from significant others by violating norms supported by those people (e.g., teachers, parents, employers). Legal sanctions are a state-imposed formal cost individuals might experience in the form of material and physical deprivations (e.g., fines and incarceration). Evidence is accumulating that these three punishment threats (shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions) operate independently as deterrents which individuals take into account in their decision to commit or not to commit a crime (e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993).

From the sociological point of view, these three perceived punishment threats have been restricted to U.S. society. The rational choice decision-making theory of crime gives no account of why people in some societies might perceive higher threats of these punishments and, therefore, be less noncompliant than people in other societies. Since scholars and researchers have exclusively examined the utility of the theory for explaining
crime among adults in the U.S., they have failed to speculate about the relationships between societal conditions and perceived sanction threats.

Besides, the examination of the deterrent effects of these punishment threats has been confined to the domain of criminality. The sole focus of attention has been on projected criminal acts or "noncompliance with legal norms." In view of ubiquitous norms in all social settings, however, there is no theoretical reason why these perceived sanction threats cannot be extended to other types of noncompliant behaviors. In particular, deterrence in the workplace is an important area of inquiry. It is important because it fosters employee compliant behaviors—and compliant behaviors, as a central element of organizational structure, subtly but directly affects the achievement of corporate profits. Organizations, in fact, have a vested interest in minimizing employee noncompliant behaviors (Hollinger & Clark, 1982).

During the past 30 years, a plethora of studies of occupational compliance have been conducted in the field of communication. Since two influential studies by Marwell and Schmitt (1967a, b), much effort has been devoted to developing classification schemes of compliance-gaining strategies and identifying the rationales behind selection of strategies (Seibold, Cantril, & Meyers, 1985). The emphasis has been on superiors, with hardly any theory and research concerning why and how employees reach the decision to comply and act accordingly. Communication scholars and researchers have failed to seriously explore the deterrent effects of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions that employees might take into account in their decision-making process about compliance with organizational norms across cultures.

**Purposes of the Study**

As a first step to productive theorizing about deterrence in the workplace, the present research conceptualizes the deterrent effects of perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions on noncompliance with organizational norms. These three types of sanction threats are theoretically important in predicting and
explaining rational choices made by employees and their subsequent behaviors. Drawing on the rational choice decision-making theory of crime (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990), shame, or guilt-feelings, refers to a self-imposed informal cost employees may experience when they offend their conscience by involvement in a noncompliant act they consider morally wrong. Embarrassment refers to a socially imposed informal cost employees may experience when they lose interpersonal respect for violating norms endorsed by significant other employees (e.g., supervisors and colleagues). Management sanctions refer to an administratively imposed formal cost employees may experience in the form of material and physical deprivations (e.g., fines, discharges).

As a second step toward theorizing about deterrence in the workplace, the current research empirically examines cultural differences in noncompliant workplace acts as a result of cultural differences in the perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions. Culture, as a crucial factor in programming our perceptions (Gudykunst & Kim, 1991), would seem to wield a powerful influence on the extent to which each of the three sanction threats is perceived in the workplace (c.f., Braithwaite, 1989) and, subsequently, determine the prevalence of noncompliant behaviors. The present study explores, therefore, the extent to which cultural differences in noncompliant tendencies are linked to cultural differences in the perceived levels of punishment threats of shame, embarrassment, and formal management sanctions for employees in Japanese and U.S. organizations.

Four hypotheses are posited concerning cultural differences in the noncompliant behaviors. The first three hypotheses to be tested are that Japanese employees perceive higher levels of threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions than do American employees. It is argued that "collectivity" is a central factor in creating these expected cultural differences in the perceived levels of sanction threats. It logically follows, then, that cultural differences (American vs. Japanese) may indirectly affect overall workplace deviance tendencies through perceived threats of shame,
embarrassment, and management sanctions in a direction suggesting that employees in Japanese organizations are less noncompliant than are those in U.S. organizations. The theoretical reasons to expect less noncompliance among Japanese than American employees are summarized as follows: (a) noncompliance is a function of all three sanction threats and (b) all three threats are perceived as more likely among Japanese employees than among American employees. To justify these theoretical links, two major theories are integrated: (a) cultural variability on the individualism-collectivism dimension of Hofstede (1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) and (b) rational choice decision-making theory of crime by Grasmick and his colleagues (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993).

A third step toward theorizing about deterrence in the workplace is to realize that culture may affect not only the perceived level of but also the magnitude of the deterrent effect of each of the three sanction threats. To explain employee noncompliant behaviors, a theory is required which recognizes that the deterrent effects of the three sanctions might vary in magnitude across cultures. Secondarily, therefore, the present research explores statistical interaction effects for culture and the three sanction threats. It is predicted that the threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions are stronger deterrents for employees in Japanese organizations than for those in U.S. organizations. Again, cultural variability on the individualism-collectivism dimension of Hofstede (1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) is intertwined with the rational choice decision-making theory of crime by Grasmick and his colleagues (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993) to offer rationales for the predictions.

Significance of the Study

The implications of the current research are significant theoretically and practically. Theoretically, the present study will enrich rational choice decision-making theory (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990), expanding it beyond the study of crime in U.S. society. The
theory will become richer because, along with the generalizability of conclusions from previous studies, many new statements regarding contextual and cultural "specifics" will be added to the statements of presumably "universal" deterrent effects of informal and formal sanctions. The deterrent effects observed among employees in Japanese organizations will help demonstrate generalizability and, perhaps, will provide a perspective for integrating contextual and cultural "specifics" into the theory in a way that strengthens its predictive and explanatory power.

Equally important, the present study will offer communication scholars theoretically vital information not only about why, but also how employees, as active information processors, reach the decision to comply or not to comply with organizational norms. The emphasis on perceived sanction threats as deterrents will advance our knowledge of noncompliance from the influencee or compliance-providers' perspectives.

The pragmatic significance of the study lies in its utility for specialists interested in multinational and international organizational development, as well as for management practitioners who are losing to foreign competition even on their home ground. If the hypotheses that the three types of perceived sanction threats operate as deterrents are confirmed, it follows that to secure compliance, specialists and practitioners should focus more on emotional pains of shame and embarrassment, as well as material and physical deprivations of management sanctions. Specifically, findings about the hypothesized cultural variabilities in the perceived levels of and in the magnitudes of deterrent effects of three sanction threats will help practitioners and organizational leaders become aware of their culturally programmed assumptions (Etzioni, 1975), increase cultural knowledge (Gudykunst & Kim, 1991), and aid the development of managerial persuasive strategies. Indeed, these can become managerial strategic advantages.
Chapter 2:
Compliance Theory in the Field of Communication:
Theory, Research, and Criticism

Theory

The communication model of compliance draws on the elements of social influence and control to make predictions concerning individual differences in the use of compliance-gaining strategies. It is assumed that the accuracy of our predictions of compliance-gaining behavior may be furthered, at least to some degree, by joining it with the notion of social control and influence—a view supported by Marwell and Schmitt (1967a, b).

The assumptions of Marwell and Schmitt (1967a, b) established a solid basis for current compliance-gaining theory and, as the theoretical stimulus, sparked a flurry of empirical research in the field of communication. Their argument is built on the social psychological perspective that all behavior is goal-oriented. They argue that all actions are attempts to restructure the environment to satisfy some desire. As people try to get others to act in ways they desire, they vary in the ways they exercise interpersonal influence or control. Thus, Marwell and Schmitt conclude that individual usage of social and interpersonal control in pursuit of compliance should be translated into selection of compliance-gaining strategies.

A key insight that Marwell and Schmitt (1967a, b) brought to this topic is the idea of a behavioral "repertoire" of compliance-gaining strategies. They directly investigate how people strategically vary in their attempts to gain compliance of others. As they acknowledge (1990), findings restricted to specific forms of compliance-gaining behavior had already existed. For example, French and Raven (1960) had published a very influential research piece concerning the bases of social power. Jones (1964) had introduced the notion of "ingratiation." Weinstein and Deutschberger (1964) had described
the effects of "altercasting" in interactions. Learning theories had predicted the effects of reward and punishment. However, no systematic attempt had been made to generate a list of potential compliance-gaining behaviors.

Marwell and Schmitt's attempts to create an inclusive list of compliance-gaining strategies are apparent in their two articles published in 1967. In their often overlooked Sociological Quarterly article, Marwell and Schmitt (1967a) drew on "interpersonal control" exemplars from general social influence literature (e.g., Etzioni, 1961; French & Raven, 1960; Goffman, 1969; Skinner, 1953) to offer a synthesis that consists of six compliance-gaining strategies: physical force, aversive stimulation, punishment, reward, pointing up reward contingencies, and manipulating situational stimuli. Although they were aware that this list was preliminary, they nonetheless felt comfortable in asserting that "most, if not all, actors will be able to use each strategy to at least some minimal degree" (1967a, p. 326).

In their widely cited Sociometry article, Marwell and Schmitt (1967b, p. 351) presented "clusters of compliance-gaining techniques that empirically covary through actors in terms of their perceived probability of enactment" to derive strategies. They reviewed a wider set of power and influence literature (e.g., Etzioni, 1961; French & Raven, 1960; Goffman, 1969; Kelman, 1961; Parsons, 1963; Weinstein & Deutchberger, 1963) and deductively selected 16 potential compliance-gaining behaviors: promise, threat, positive expertise, negative expertise, liking, pregiving, adverse stimulation, debt, moral appeal, positive self-feeling, negative self-feeling, positive altercasting, negative altercasting, altruism, positive esteem, and negative esteem. To generate clusters of techniques that covary, they then provided a sample of college students with a list of the 16 techniques. The college students were asked to indicate the likelihood that they would use each of the 16 techniques in four situations: job, family, sales, and roommate.

Factor analysis indicates five categories of compliance-gaining behaviors. The first factor consists of three techniques—pregiving, liking, and promise. Since these three
represent active manipulation of the target's environment in a positive way, Marwell and Schmitt (1967b) define this factor as a "rewarding" strategy. The second factor includes two techniques—threat and aversive stimulation. According to Marwell and Schmitt, these two refer to explicit negative manipulation of the target's environment and, therefore, are labeled a "punishing" strategy. The third factor consists of both expertise techniques, positive and negative, and, accordingly, is titled an "expertise" strategy. The fourth factor includes four techniques—negative self-feeling, positive altercasting, moral appeal, and positive self-esteem. These are defined as "activation of impersonal commitments." The last factor consists of four techniques that appear, at least on the surface, in sharp contrast to the techniques involved in the fourth factor—altruism, negative esteem, debt, and negative altercasting. These are characterized as "activation of personal commitments."

Avoiding any reference to strategies or techniques in the taxonomy proposed in their 1967a article, Marwell and Schmitt (1967b) conclude that these five factors correspond with the bases of power identified by French and Raven (1960) as follows: "rewarding activity" with "reward" power; "punishing activity" with "coercive" power; "expertise" with "expert" power; "personal commitments" with "referent" power; "impersonal commitments" with "legitimate" power. They argue that the observed differences in technique usage by their respondents probably reflect strategic differences in the use of interpersonal "power" the respondents believe they possess in the four situations. In their view, exercise of interpersonal power underlies selection of compliance-gaining strategies.

Much of theory and research on compliance-gaining in the field of communication follows assumptions by Marwell and Schmitt (1967a, b). Communication scholars and researchers support the view that attempting to gain the compliance of another is one sort of purposeful behavior. Seibold, Cantril, and Meyers (1985) elaborate this view as they state that theories and research on compliance-gaining in the field of communication start
with the following assumptions that:

(1) messages are generated from persons' intentions to communicate something about themselves, others, and the world they experience; (2) communication is instrumental in that sense, and may be functionally organized by the conscious and unconscious purpose; and (3) actors' behaviors reflect intentionally directed and deliberately organized efforts to accomplish specific, personally meaningful interactional goals (p. 554).

To achieve these goals, communication scholars and researchers maintain people must get others to act in ways they desire. As people decide how they want others to act, they go about wielding influence over the others—and the influence attempts are translated into the selection of compliance-gaining strategies. Thus, the interactional quality of compliance-gaining is control-oriented in nature. As Seibold, Cantril, and Meyer emphasize (1985, p. 551), it is especially control-oriented in terms of "strategic and tactical features of actors' regulative and persuasive communication influence attempts."

Indeed, there has been an extensive focus on anticipated and/or actual strategies—strategies that subsume specific (often multiple) message tactics appropriate to the compliance-seekers' instrumental purpose(s) (Seibold, Cantrill, & Meyers, 1985). Communication scholars and researchers concentrate on situations in which compliance-seekers' communication is strategically organized in the service of their instrumental objectives, especially inducing or persuading another to behaviorally comply with a specific recommendation or request.

Miller, Boster, Roloff, and Seibold (1977) are among the first scholars to extend Marwell and Schmitt's studies into the field of communication. They rely on the Marwell and Schmitt's (1967b) taxonomy of 16 compliance-gaining techniques as an aid in conducting the following trifold research: (a) identifying clusters of techniques, and classifying communication compliance-gaining strategies available for potential persuaders, (b) examining the effects of situational differences on choice of compliance-gaining strategies, and (c) assessing the relationships between individual differences of
potential persuaders and their selection of compliance-gaining strategies.

To achieve this, Miller et al. (1977) provided 168 college students with lists of the 16 strategies identified by Marwell and Schmitt (1967b). Respondents were asked to rate on eight-point Likert-type scales how likely they would be to employ each of the 16 strategies in each of four hypothetical situations. The situations varied in the extent to which they were interpersonal or noninterpersonal in nature and whether the outcomes in each influence situation carried short-term or long-term consequences for the persuader/persuadee relationship depicted. In accord with Miller and Steinberg's (1975) conceptualization, noninterpersonal situations refer to transactions where an interactant's ability to predict the probable outcomes of alternative message strategies is based solely on sociological and cultural data about another. Interpersonal situations, on the other hand, are defined as transactions organized on the basis of more discriminating predictions about another's unique, psychological characteristics and probable reactions to specific messages. The terms "long-term consequences" and "short-term consequences" refer to the longevity of the relational effects created by un/successful social influence.

Cluster analysis reveals that strategy selection is situationally determined and that no reliable smaller typology of strategies can be obtained across situations to serve as a basis for a taxonomy of compliance-gaining message strategies. Although a general preference for socially acceptable, reward-oriented strategies is found in all situations, considerable diversity is uncovered in the selection of other strategies across situations. For instance, while a greater reliance on threat tactics is reported in noninterpersonal situations, a greater variety in choice of other strategies is also observed in those situations. In conclusion, Miller et al. (1977) encourage others to more systematically analyze situational contexts, as well as roles of source characteristics in message selection and effects of situation-by-person interactions on compliance-gaining strategy choices.
Research

Much of research on compliance-gaining in the field of communication is an outgrowth of research by Marwell and Schmitt (1967a, b) and Miller et al. (1977). The most visible line of communication research on compliance-gaining is to systematically explore the range of compliance-gaining message strategies and tactics and to elaborate factors involved in their enactment. Researchers also have attempted to reduce the multitude of possible behaviors into meaningful clusters or strategies and, in so doing, to examine different rationales behind the selection of clusters.

Broadly, communication researchers emphasize (a) situation perception and categorization, (b) personality traits and attitudes, and (c) demographic characteristics as potential rationales for the choice of compliance-gaining strategies (see Boster, 1990). Cody and McLaughlin (1985), for example, offer a number of situational dimensions which seemingly are relevant across various kinds of interpersonal persuasive situations. Among these are intimacy (Baxter, 1984; Clark, 1979; Fitzpatrick & Winke, 1979; Miller, Boster, Roloff, & Seibold, 1977), relational consequences (Clark, 1979; Cody, Greene, Marston, Baaske, O'Hair, & Scheneider, 1985; Cody & McLaughlin, 1980; Miller, Boster, Roloff, & Seibold, 1977; Miller & Steinberg, 1975; Roloff & Barnicott, 1978), right to persuade (Cody, Greene, Marston, Baaske, O'Hair, & Scheneider, 1985; McLaughlin, Cody, & Robey, 1980), personal benefits (Cody et al., 1985), resistance (Cody et al., 1985; Sillars, 1980), and situation apprehension (Cody et al., 1985).

There is considerable evidence that when the parties of the compliance-gaining transaction are close (characterized as an encounter of high intimacy), individuals are more inclined to employ emotional appeals and positive interpersonal strategies, and are more willing to negotiate. Clark (1979), for example, reported that when persuaders have a high desire for liking from target persons, they are more likely to rely on the strategy "offer assistance in solving problems" than when the persuaders have a low desire for liking from the target persons. These findings are supported by Fitzpatrick and Winke
(1979), as they observe that married individuals are more likely to use emotional appeals and personal rejection, while the casually involved are more likely to use a manipulative or non-negotiation strategy. Miller et al. (1977) also discovered that people are more apt to utilize a positive manipulation strategy in interpersonal situations, while they are more apt to utilize a justifying strategy in noninterpersonal situations.

Source characteristics, or personality traits and attitudes, function as another potential rationale for the selection of compliance-gaining strategies. Extensive research has been devoted to the impact of cognitive complexity (O'Keefe & Delia, 1979), communication apprehension (Koper & Boster, 1988; Lustig & King, 1980), dogmatism (Boster & Stiff, 1984; Neuliep, 1986; Roloff & Barnicot, 1979), and Machiavellianism (Boster & Stiff, 1984; Pandy & Rastogi, 1979; Roloff & Barnicot, 1978) on compliance-gaining strategies.

Two individual difference variables, Machiavellianism and dogmatism, have received a plethora of research attention. Roloff and Barnicot (1978) reported significant but moderate relationships between Machiavellianism and message selection. This personality trait was positively correlated with the use of pro-social and antisocial techniques. Using Roloff's (1976) conceptualization, pro-social strategies are defined by Roloff and Barnicot as strategies seeking relational and instrumental rewards by revealing information about the source's position and attitudes. Antisocial strategies, on the other hand, refer to strategies pursuing such rewards through force or deception. In another study, Roloff and Barnicot (1979) demonstrated significant but moderate correlations between dogmatism and selection of message tactics. As with Machiavellianism, dogmatism was positively related with the average use of pro-social and two antisocial techniques—psychological force and punishing activity techniques.

Williams and Boster (1981) verified several of these findings. First, in their reanalysis of Roloff and Barnicot's (1979) data, they demonstrated a significant but moderate positive mean correlation between dogmatism and compliance-gaining message
selection. Then, in their analysis of Williams and Boster's data, they found a significant but moderate positive mean correlation between dogmatism and message choices. Finally, incorporating many variables already explored in compliance-gaining research, Williams and Boster determined that negativism, perceived benefit to listener, and dogmatism had substantial effects on message choices, but Machiavellianism was an "experimental dead-end."

The third possible rationale behind the choice of compliance-gaining strategies is demographic characteristics, such as gender (Andrews, 1987; Bisanz & Rule, 1989; Burgoon, Dillard, Koper, & Doran, 1984; DeTurck, 1985; DeTurck & Miller, 1982; Falbo, 1977; Falbo & Peplau, 1980; Fitzpatrick & Winke, 1979; Instone, Major & Bunker, 1983; Luloffs, 1982; Offerman & Schrier, 1985), age (Clark & Delia, 1976; Clark, O'Dell, & Willihnganz, 1986; Delia, Kline & Burleson, 1979; Finley & Humphereys, 1974), and culture (Hirokawa & Miyahara, 1986; Neuliep & Hazelton, 1985).

There is accumulating evidence concerning gender differences in the choice of message strategies. Luloffs (1982), for example, reported that males tend to rely more on threats in seeking compliance from male friends, while females tend to rely more on negative self-feeling and altercasting in seeking compliance from male and female friends, respectively. DeTurck and Miller (1982) found that males and females differ in their likelihood of use of four of Marwell and Schmitt's (1967b) techniques in a hypothetical class project situation. Females were more likely than males to choose positive and negative expertise appeals, whereas males were more likely than females to rely on promises and threats in seeking compliance from their classmates. Fitzpatrick and Winke (1979) also observed a number of significant gender differences in the use of compliance-gaining strategies in same sex friendship situations. Males were more apt than females to exercise non-negotiation strategies with their best friend. Females, on the other hand, were more inclined than males to seek compliance from their friends by the strategies of personal rejection, empathic understanding, or emotional appeals.
Prior to further review of the literature, it should be noted that there are three major procedures communication researchers follow to study compliance-gaining strategies: (a) message selection, (b) message generation, and (c) message behavior (see Boster, 1990). In the message selection procedure, researchers provide respondents with a compliance-gaining scenario and a list of messages. The respondents are then asked how likely they would be to use each message in a particular situation. These message lists are usually generated by the researchers (e.g., see Marwell & Schmitt, 1967b; Miller et al., 1977; Miller & Steinberg, 1975). In the message generation procedure, researchers present respondents with a description of a compliance-gaining situation. They then ask the respondents to report orally or in writing what they would say in order to gain compliance from the target person. These responses are then coded by the researchers into categories, rating scales, or both. Delia, Kline, and Burleson (1979), for example, coded the generated messages in terms of the extent to which each message was adapted to the listener (see also Clark, 1979). Finally, in the message behavior procedure, researchers examine compliance-gaining messages uttered in situations where the speaker and the target are engaged in message exchange. For example, Boster and Stiff (1984) analyzed the messages transmitted by experimental participants in negotiating the allocation of rewards following an anagram task. Lofthouse (1985) also investigated the message behavior of students arguing about a grade with their professors.

Managerial Compliance-Gaining Strategies

The exercise of influence or control is basic to organizational management because, at least to some extent, it serves both managers' and organizations' goals. As Kipnis, Schmidt, Swanin-Smith, and Wilkinson (1984) state:

Sometimes influence is used for such personal reasons as securing personal benefits . . . . Most often, however, it is used in the course of performing organizational roles that require influencing others—for example, to encourage others to perform effectively, to promote new ideas, or to introduce new work procedures. Frequently, a combination of personal and organizational reasons
underlie the exercise of influence (pp. 58-59).

Unfortunately, there exists little research that directly addresses questions about communication and interpersonal influence in organizational contexts. Kipnis et al. (1984, p. 59) assert that "despite the fact that the essence of managerial work is the exercise of influence, there is a paucity of systematic research on the ways in which managers attempt to change the behavior of others." To date, few researchers have given any systematic attention to the choice of specific managerial compliance-gaining strategies. That specificity is crucial if determination of types and effectiveness of compliance-gaining strategies is a goal. Riccillo and Trenholm (1983) concur with this analysis as they suggest that:

One of the most important decisions a manager must make in organizations today is that of determining effective communication strategies to influence subordinates. Notwithstanding Etzioni's findings that organizations like to specialize in certain modes of influence, managers differ in preferred style of leadership and power preference. Subordinates respond differently to different types of managerial influence and have definite preferences for certain forms of influence over others (p. 323).

Some communication research exists on interpersonal influence in the organizational context. Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson (1980), for example, examined tactics used by managers to influence their superiors, co-workers, and subordinates. Their study was conducted in two steps. In the first step, relying on a message generation procedure, these researchers provided managers with written descriptions of an incident in which they were attempting to influence either their superiors, co-workers, or subordinates. The managers were then asked to report in writing what they would say in order to influence each of these three types of target employees. Through content analysis, a total of 370 tactics grouped into 14 categories were identified. In the second step, using a message selection procedure, Kipnis et al. rewrote the 370 influence tactics into a 58-item questionnaire. Respondents were then asked to indicate the extent to which
they would use each tactic to influence their superiors, co-workers, or subordinates. Factor analysis identified an eight-factor solution labeled as assertiveness (demanding, ordering), integration (making others feel important, humbling oneself), rationality (explaining reasons), sanctions (administrative punishment such as prevention of salary increases), exchange of benefits (offering an exchange of favors), upward appeal (invoking the influence of higher levels), blocking (threaten to stop working), and coalitions (obtain support of coworkers).

Kipnis et al. (1980) determined that the selection of these influence strategies was based on the following five factors: (a) relative power of the managers and their targets of influence (the higher the status of the target person, the more reliance on rationality tactics; the lower the status, the more reliance on assertive tactics and sanctions); (b) reasons for exercising influence (assertiveness for improving performance and assigning work, and ingratiations for seeking personal assistance); (c) organizational status of the managers (the higher the status, the more use of rationality, assertiveness, and sanctions); (d) organizational size (the larger, the more reliance on assertiveness, sanctions, and upward appeal); and (e) union of the organization (if unionized, more reliance on ingratiation with subordinates, less reliance on assertiveness with co-workers, and less reliance on rationality and more blocking with bosses).

Several of these findings are echoed by other researchers. Rim and Erez (1980) and Erez and Rim (1982), for example, reported a greater usage of rational strategies when influencing one's superior, and a greater usage of clandestine, exchange, or administrative sanction strategies when influencing one's subordinates (see also Erez, Rim, & Keider, 1986). Kipnis and Cohen (1980) also found that strategy selection was, at least to some extent, related to (a) dominance (the more dominant, the greater use of assertiveness and negative administrative sanctions); (b) right to persuade (the higher rights in assigning work, the greater use of assertiveness); (c) personal benefits (the higher desire of benefit from a superior, the greater use of exchange and ingratiation; the higher
desire of benefit from a coworker, the greater use of exchange, ingratiating, and blocking; the higher desire of benefit from a subordinate, the greater use of assertiveness and coalition; and (d) perceived resistance (the more resistance, the greater use of negative sanctions).

In another research study, Kipnis, Schmidt, Swaffin-Smith, and Wilkinson (1984) used similar techniques of written descriptions to examine managerial influence strategies in three different countries: the United States, England, and Australia. Factor analysis suggested seven factors labeled as assertiveness, friendliness, reason, sanctioning, bargaining, higher authority, and coalition. There was no significant variation reported in the use of strategies across managers. However, these researchers discovered that the selection of influence strategies was based, at least to some extent, on the following three factors: (a) the manager's power (the more powerful, the stronger strategies are used such as assertiveness); (b) the manager's objectives (in seeking benefits, friendliness is most often used; in persuading another to accept a new idea, reason is used); and (c) the manager's expectation of success (if success of influence seems unlikely, more assertiveness and sanctions are utilized).

Using a message selection procedure, Riccillo and Trenholm (1983) provided evidence of individual differences in the use of managerial influence strategies. These researchers predicted that "trust" of subordinates would influence managerial choice of three types of strategies: coercion, reward, and persuasion (rational reason). To test this prediction, a sample of managers was presented with two scenarios: one involving trusted (internally motivated) subordinates and a second involving distrusted (externally motivated) subordinates. Respondents were then asked to choose the type of strategy they would use in each scenario. As predicted, managers reported using persuasion strategy more often in the "trusted" workers' scenario and coercion strategy more often in the "distrusted" workers' scenario.

In their cross-cultural research, Hirokawa and Miyahara (1986) relied on a
message generation procedure to examine cultural differences in the use of managerial influence strategies in U.S. and Japanese companies. Positing no specific hypothesis, these researchers presented American and Japanese male managers with two hypothetical compliance-gaining situations. They then asked the managers to describe what they would say to their subordinate in order to alter his/her behavior in each situation. The first situation required the managers to persuade their subordinate to perform an obligatory work-related action (e.g., report to work on time). The second situation required the managers to persuade their subordinate to perform a non-obligatory work-related action (e.g., communicate ideas and suggestions to management).

Through content analysis, a total of 139 influence strategies were grouped into a "19-category mutually-exclusive coding system" (Hirokawa & Miyahara, 1986, p. 254). Different strategy usage was observed depending on whether the managers were American or Japanese and whether their goal was to influence subordinates' "obligatory work related actions" or "non-obligatory work-related actions." Under the obligatory condition, American managers relied more often on punishment-based strategies (e.g., threat, warning, or ultimatum), while Japanese managers relied more often on altruism or rationale-based strategies (e.g., duty or counsel). Under the non-obligatory condition, American managers were found to more often use rationale- or reward-based strategies (e.g., direct request, promise, ingratiation), while Japanese managers used more altruism-based strategies (duty or altruism).

Criticism

While many insights can be derived from research on compliance-gaining in the workplace, there is a significant criticism of compliance theory in the field of communication. This criticism involves the omission of the compliance-providers' or, more specifically, subordinates' perspectives presumably relevant to the explanation of compliance-gaining interactions.

Research interest in occupationally related compliance-gaining activity has been
one-sided, focusing exclusively on the potential persuader (manager) as an active element in the interpersonal persuasive attempt. Typically, most communication scholars and researchers use the term "compliance" in the workplace to mean a response of subordinates that would not have otherwise occurred without managers' strategy usage. A manager determines what he or she wants the subordinate to do, considers various influence strategies, selects the strategy with the fewest repercussions, and uses it to seek conformity from the subordinate. Thus, the focus is on the purposeful sought-after behaviors in various forms of compliance-gaining strategies. Compliance-gaining situations are calibrated exclusively from the point of view of the managers.

Consequently, the emphasis has been on superiors with hardly any theory and research regarding why and how subordinates reach a decision to comply. My search uncovered not a single study focusing on compliance-providers, that is, subordinates' decision-making process to comply or not to comply. Communication scholars and researchers have failed to seriously address the situation in which the recipient of a particular compliance-gaining message (the subordinate) may decide to resist compliance for some reasons (for exceptions, see instructional communication literature such as Burroughs, Kearney, & Plax, 1989; Kearney, Plax, & Burroughs, 1991; Lee, Levine, & Cambra, 1997; McQuillen, Higginbotham, & Cummings, 1984). This failure is ironic in light of the interactional view that both the compliance-seekers and compliance-providers (superiors and subordinates, respectively, as used in the present study), as active information processors, form compliance-gaining interactions. Both pursue competing agendas. Yet, a recent extensive review of research on compliance-gaining (Kellerman & Cole, 1994) does not even touch on the compliance-providers' perspectives.

The current research draws from this criticism to propose that compliance-provider's perspectives can be integrated into compliance theory by focusing on the concept of deterrence utilized in the rational choice decision-making theory of crime. This rational-choice perspective emphasizes offenders' (compliance-providers) strategic
thinking, the ways that they process information and evaluate opportunities and alternatives. It stresses calculated decision-making, arguing that offenders (compliance-providers) choose how to act after estimating the likely costs or sanctions from an illegal behavior (Conklin, 1995). Applying this perspective to a different theoretical context, the present research posits that conscience and significant other employees function as agents of social control in a manner similar to management. All three pose threats of costs that are more or less certain and severe which individuals take into account in deciding whether or not to violate organizational norms: (a) self-imposed shame, (b) socially imposed embarrassment, and (c) management imposed physical and material deprivation.

Thus, the present research begins with the basic compliance model as follows:

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SHAME ------► EMBARRASSMENT ------► COMPLIANCE
MANAGEMENT SANCTIONS
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In addition, this study extends rational choice decision-making theory by utilizing a data set of employees in Japanese and U.S. university hospitals. Extent literature suggests that there may be cultural differences in the extent to which each of the three sanction threats is perceived as significant by Japanese and American employees (e.g., Braithwaite, 1989). To delineate such differences, the present research integrates the theoretical variables of individualism-collectivism from Hofstede's (1980) cultural variability into the rational choice decision-making theory. The culturally differentiated compliance model is then structured as follows:

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SHAME ------► EMBARRASSMENT ------► COMPLIANCE
CULTURE ------► MANAGEMENT SANCTIONS
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Finally, this research proposes cultural differences in the extent to which employees are deterred by each of the three sanction threats. Culture may affect not only the perceived level of, but also the magnitude of the deterrent effect of, each of the three threats on subsequent organizational noncompliant behaviors. To rationalize this prediction, Hofstede's (1980) cultural variability of individualism-collectivity is intertwined with the rational choice decision-making theory.
Chapter 3:
Rational Choice Decision-Making Theory of Crime

The rational choice decision-making perspective, a branch of deterrence theory, is developed to advance our knowledge concerning "why some people do not violate the law while others do." Traditionally, deterrence research has focused on one type of potential cost, the threat of state-imposed formal legal sanctions in the form of physical and/or material deprivation. It views crime as a function of rational decision-making about penalties imposed by state legislation. People regulate their behavior by calculating the threat of various legal sanctions such as capital punishment, jail sentence, and fines. Consequently, "the moral crusades, while usually instrumental in the passage of legislation, directly appealed to a sense of conscience, or what Etzioni (1988) calls the 'moral dimension,'" tends to be neglected (Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993, p. 41).

Grasmick and his colleagues (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993) assert that there is a need to incorporate the moral dimension, along with legal sanctions, into a rational decision-making model of crime. In doing so, they propose that the moral dimensions may be conceptualized as informal sanction threats of shame and embarrassment that operate similarly to the threat of legal sanctions.

The present research examines this proposition. Given this attempt to extend the concept of deterrence to a different theoretical context, this chapter reviews Grasmick and his colleagues' rational choice decision-making theory which suggests that the perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions that originate from three different sources—conscience, significant others, and state legitimacy—affect criminality by decreasing the expected utility of crime.

This chapter begins by briefly describing the notion of deterrence, introducing historical views of deterrence by two classical theorists, Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy
Bentham. Second, the notion of perceptual deterrence is examined, discussing the issue of type of data to test deterrence theory. Next, the two relevant dimensions of perceived sanctions, certainty and severity, are described. Then, the potential deterrent effects of informal sanction threats are delineated. Finally, Grasmick and Bursik's integrated theory of rational choice decision-making is reviewed, with an emphasis on the three types of perceived sanction threats. Findings associated with their propositions are also summarized.

**Deterrence Theory**

The rational choice decision-making theory of crime, a sociological model of deterrence, is utilitarian, rationalist, and individualist. It assumes that an individual is a "profit maximizer, that is, a calculator of profit from estimates of gain and cost resulting from the projected act" (Geerken & Gove, 1975, p. 497). The individual is the decision-making unit; he or she renders his or her own decisions. The individual makes a rational decision, within the confines of his or her estimates of rewards and costs, about the projected act and, in consequence, behaves rationally. Thus, crime is a function of individual rational decision-making about pleasures and pains.

Deterrence theory focuses on punishment as a cost factor. Specifically, there appears to be a conclusion among criminologists that the threat of legal sanctions serves as the only punishment. Scholars offer the view that rational actors take into account the state-imposed sanction threat in their "rational" decision concerning whether or not to commit a crime. In this view, individual perceptions of the threat of legal sanctions operate as a sole deterrent or negative inducement to the utility of crime.

**Historical View of Deterrence**

Many of the theoretical developments within the sociological model of deterrence originate from works by Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. Their century-old assumptions established a solid basis for current deterrence theory and, as the theoretical stimulus, have sparked much of the empirical research. Their works reflect, to a great
degree, the philosophical arguments of the social contract thinkers of their day, including "Locke, Hobbes, Voltaire, and Rousseau, who emphasized hedonism, rationality, and free will as the underlying bases of human action" (Curran & Renzetti, 1994, p. 7).

Beccaria and Bentham's claim that the function of punishment is deterrence rather than revenge or retribution has yielded a profound influence on later theorizing about deterrence (Conklin, 1995). Beccaria (1764, 1963) rationalizes this claim as he argues that punishment is necessary because human beings are naturally self-serving. If left unrestrained, they would always attempt to maximize their personal pleasure even though this resulted in offending the rights and freedom of others. Punishment is needed, therefore, insomuch as it makes the negative consequences of crime greater than its rewards.

Bentham shares much in common with Beccaria (Geis, 1955). He reasons that all human action is a result of a single motivation—that is, the pursuit of pleasure and the simultaneous avoidance of pain. Naturally, humans would engage in rampant criminal acts to maximize their personal pleasure unless they were controlled by punishments. Punishments and sanctions should be established by law, therefore, so that they operate to make the choice to commit a crime more costly than not doing so. Thus, Bentham supports Beccaria's view that the purpose of punishment is deterrence rather than vengeance.

Beccaria (1764, 1963) further points out that if punishment is to successfully deter crime, it must have, at least, three characteristics: certainty, swiftness, and proportionateness. He argues that for a punishment to function as an effective deterrent, it should not inflict tremendous pain, but instead, be inescapable. To Beccaria, "the certainty of a punishment, even if it be moderate, will always make a stronger impression than the fear of another that is more terrible but combined with the hope of impunity" (1764, 1963, p. 58). Equally important, an offender should be tried as quickly as possible and, if judged guilty, receive the penalty promptly. Beccaria elaborates this prospect as he
asserts that "the promptness of punishment is more useful because when the length of time that passes between the punishment and the misdeed is less, so much the stronger and more lasting in the human mind is the association of these two ideas, crime and punishment" (1764, 1963, p. 56). Finally, proportionate punishment serves as an effective deterrent. With his concern over the extreme harshness and cruelty of the penalties imposed in his era, Beccaria states that any punishment should always be appropriate to the seriousness of the crime committed. Even the most serious and cruel crimes should be punished with a penalty that inflicts suffering "only to exceed the advantage derivable from the crime" (Beccaria, 1764, 1963, p. 44).

This proposition is supported by Bentham as he emphasizes the limits of severe punishment as an effective deterrent (Geis, 1955). He argues that to successfully inhibit crime, a punishment should only be so harsh as to produce enough pain to outweigh the pleasure derived from committing the forbidden act. To both Beccaria and Bentham, therefore, anything more severe is tyrannical.

Perceived Sanction Threats

A deterrence doctrine is basically a perceptual theory. As a perceptual theory, deterrence theorists assume that perceived risks of punishment and sanctions, rather than the actual risk, are the primary determinant of criminal behavior (Geerken & Gove, 1975; Waldo & Chiricos, 1972). By now, empirical tests of the perception of sanctions have become common, and evidence has been accumulating to support the assumption (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993; Grasmick & Green, 1981; Greeken & Gove, 1975; Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, & Chiricos, 1983; Tittle, 1977).

However, in the past, deterrence theory was tested by analyzing correlations at the aggregate level. Typically, researchers obtained the total rate for a crime classification within a specific aggregate, such as states or cities, and examined how it was correlated with measures of punishment for that same unit (e.g., Gibbs, 1968; Tittle, 1969). In a
study of the relationship between certainty and severity of punishment and criminal activity, Tittle (1969), for example, relied on published statistics about each state's prison sentencing and crimes reported by the police. To measure the certainty of punishment, he used the "number of admissions to state prisons for the years 1959-1963 divided by the number of crimes reported for the years 1958-1962" (1969, p. 412). To assess the severity of punishments, he utilized the mean duration of prison term for felony prisoners released from state prison in 1960. To scale the amount of deviance, he employed the rates for seven different types of offenses computed as, "the ration of the mean annual number of crimes in that category for the years 1959 and 1962 divided by the population in 1960" (1969, p. 413).

Tittle (1969) reported as evidence of a deterrent effect significant and consistent inverse relationships between certainty of punishment and crime rates for all seven illegal behaviors (sex offenses, assaults, larceny, robbery, burglary, homicide, and auto theft). However, a significant inverse relationship existed between severity of punishment and crime rate only for homicide. Based on these findings, he raised the possibility that severity of punishment might act "as a deterrent only when there is high certainty of punishment" (1969, p. 417). In his view, severe punishment has marginal deterrent effects on the commission of crime.

Despite these significant findings, Tittle's (1969) study has been criticized because of his use of available, aggregate rates of crime (see Waldo & Chiricos, 1972 for a summary of critique of aggregate data analysis). First, the use of published statistics causes Tittle to have such problems as unreliability of the statistics. The crime statistics include only those offenses that are reported by the police and, in consequence, he failed to consider criminal activity that went undetected. Second, the use of official statistics limits Tittle to seven "crime index" offenses. If a research focus of attention is on deterrence for other types of criminality (such as victimless crime or white collar crime), official statistics are of little use. Finally, and more critically, the use of aggregate data
inhibits Tittle from dealing with the issue of perceptions. He was unable to discern social-psychological processes by which the presumed effects of punishment were realized. His reported inverse relationship between severity and crime rates, in fact, reveals no information about how the penalties were perceived by potential offenders—or whether they were perceived at all.

Indeed, the issue of type of data is crucial when testing deterrence theory. While official aggregate data have been available for the study of deterrence, alternative modes of analysis must be tried if some of the remaining deterrence questions are to be answered. Specifically, to justify firm conclusions about the role of informal sanctions as potential sources of deterrence, individual level data are necessary. The notion of "cost" must be extended and captured in terms of individual perceptions of both formal and informal sanction threats.

To date, research on deterrence has shifted from a concern with relationships among aggregate properties (e.g., arrest rate and crime rate) to a concern with relationships between individuals' perceptions of sanctions and their involvement in illegal behavior (Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980). Jensen (1969), for example, offers evidence of a relationship between perceived risk of legal sanctions and self-reported delinquency in a sample of juveniles in grades seven through twelve. He paid special attention to beliefs regarding apprehension and punishment, which had been largely ignored in delinquency research, and predicted that such beliefs would be negatively related to both self-reported and official delinquency. To measure self-reported delinquency, Jensen asked respondents to indicate the number of delinquent acts committed within a year prior to his analysis. Beliefs were operationalized as "one's overall, general perception or belief regarding apprehension and punishment" (Jensen, 1969, p. 192). As such, belief was measured by responses to the following statement: "People who break the law are almost always caught and punished" (Jensen, 1969, p. 192). Findings supported his prediction that there is an inverse relationship between such belief and delinquency. The more strongly juveniles
believe in apprehension and punishment, the less likely they report to participate in delinquent acts.

A concentration on the relationship between individuals' perceptions of sanctions and their behavior is believed to provide a more direct test of deterrence theory. Even Gibbs (1968) and Tittle (1969), whose early research was on the relationship between properties of legal punishment and crime rates in aggregates, have advocated the necessity of research at the level of an individual's perception and behavior. Gibbs (1975, p. 208), for example, notes that: "If individuals commit crimes because they have not been deterred and if individuals refrain from crimes because they have been deterred, then those who commit crimes tend to perceive punishment as less certain and/or less severe than do those who conform to laws." Tittle (1980, p. 10) also argues that today it is "generally conceded that individual perceptions of sanction characteristics are probably more important than the actual characteristics of sanctions."

Perceived Certainty and Severity of Sanctions

Deterrence theory proposes that there are, at least, two relevant dimensions of an individual's perceptions: perceived certainty and severity of punishments (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993; Grasmick & Green, 1980). These reflect the subjective probability (certainty) of incurring a particular cost and the magnitude (severity) of that cost should it be incurred. The assumption is that rational actors, when deciding whether to commit an illegal act, estimate the probability of receiving a legally imposed penalty and the magnitude of that penalty.

Measures of Perceived Certainty and Severity

Researchers consistently measure perceived certainty with questions about probability of apprehension. Typically, they ask respondents to estimate their own chances of being arrested and nearly all of them report evidence of significant inverse relationships between measures of perceived certainty of legal sanctions and involvement

By contrast, as Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) observe, little effort has been devoted to developing a theoretically and empirically sound measure of perceived severity of punishment. Many extant measures are available, but they are all apt to ignore the premises of utilitarianism that "people's values differ—what is felt as extremely costly (or rewarding) by one individual may be considered insignificant by another" (Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980, p. 475). They presume that a particular penalty has the same meaning for all people (Grasmick & Appleton, 1977; Grasmick & Milligan, 1976; Tittle, 1969). This is not likely in reality, however. To illustrate, a fine of $100 for an illegal act would not be perceived as equally costly by all individuals. One individual might predict that a fine of $100 would be a probable penalty if apprehended, while another might predict a 30-day jail sentence. Due to differences in their personal values, however, the former might regard his or her expected penalty of the fine more costly or severe than the latter (see Grasmick, Jacobs, & McCollom, 1980, for this discussion). The seriousness of a particular penalty is relevant to that individual's values.

Congruent with traditional utility theory, Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) have developed one of the few valid indicators of perceived severity. They asked respondents to "imagine you had been arrested and found guilty and the court had decided what your punishment would be" (Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980, p. 480). They then asked the respondents to "think about what that punishment probably would be for you," and indicate "how big a problem that punishment would create for your life" (Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980, p. 480). This operationalization avoids the presumption that a particular punishment is experienced as equally severe by all individuals. Unlike others, this measure taps an individual's subjective judgment of how costly to him or her the penalty he or she expects would be, regardless of what penalty he or she expects.
Interaction Effects of Perceived Certainty and Severity

There is controversy regarding treatment of the two relevant dimensions. Grasmick and Bursik (1990) acknowledge that in social psychological literature on rational decision-making, scholars and researchers dispute whether the effects of certainty and severity of sanctions should be treated as additive or as multiplicative. In accord with traditional utility theory, however, the interaction hypothesis has been claimed as theoretically more important than the additive hypothesis to reduce the expected utility of crime (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993). If actors are rational, harsh punishments will have no deterrent effect when actors perceive no probability of being apprehended, but will have a greater deterrent effect when they are quite certain to be apprehended. Thus, in a rational choice perspective, individuals are assumed to "multiply the probability (certainty) of punishment times the expected magnitude (severity) of punishment to arrive at a projected cost" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 846).

Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) have reported evidence of a potential interaction effect of perceived certainty and severity on illegal behavior (see also Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993). They found that perceived severity, at relatively high levels of perceived certainty, had a significant deterrent effect on self-reports of involvement in illegal activities. Only among people who believed the certainty was relatively high, an inverse and significant relationship existed between perceived severity and involvement in illegal behavior. These findings support the interaction hypothesis that the magnitude of the perceived severity on involvement in illegal behavior is a function of the level of perceived certainty.

Informal Sanction Threats

By deterrence, Beccaria and Bentham meant, at least on the surface, the inhibition of criminal activity by state-imposed legal penalties or sanctions. In their view, when those penalties are perceived to be weakened, crime rates are expected to rise.
Consistent with this view, deterrence theory and research has drawn special attention to one type of potential cost, the threat of state-imposed legal sanctions in the form of physical and/or material deprivation. A majority of research efforts has focused on the relationship between individuals' perceptions of the state-imposed official penalties and their involvement in illegal behavior.

However, legal sanctions are not the only source of compliance with the law. A sole focus on formal legal sanctions is inadequate for examinations of deterrence theory. Grasmick and Bursik (1990) note that while some prefer to restrict the term "deterrence" to legal sanctions, there is no reason to do so. They point to Meier, Burkett, and Hickman's (1984) argument that in everyday usage, to be deterred is to refrain from wrongdoing out of fear of a variety of consequences. These adverse consequences need not be limited, therefore, to punishments emanating from state legislations.

This prospect is echoed by a number of sociologists. They advocate that deterrence theory should benefit from an extension to include informal and formal sanction threats (Andenaes, 1952, 1966; Gibbs, 1975; Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993; Tittle, 1980; Williams & Hawkins, 1986, 1989). In addition to the formal state legislation system, there should be a complex and highly efficient system of informal sanctions that deter noncompliant behaviors.

Specifically, some of these scholars speculate that criminals can experience social and personal losses from the publicity of the arrest which are equivalent to any potential punishment though court action. Andenaes (1952, 1966), for example, argues that legal sanctions might deter through the immediate threat of fines and incarceration, but in addition, law, "as a concrete expression of society's disapproval of an act helps to form and to strengthen the public's moral codes and thereby creates conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing crime" (1952, p. 179). The state-imposed legal sanctions are entwined with attempts to emphasize the definition of what is morally right and what
the community should consider to be acceptable behavior. Thus, Andenaes is able to assert that law has an "eye-opener effect" in that it directs attention to a punished conduct to guarantee moral condemnation of the conduct and a corresponding social support for certain values.

Other researchers have offered perspectives that are compatible with Andenaes' extension of deterrence theory. In an attempt to link the formal sanctions with the awakened interest in informal sanctions, Williams and Hawkins (1986, 1989) raise the possibility that legal sanctions might trigger other mechanisms of social control. To illustrate, an arrest may be followed by a loss of self-esteem and adverse reactions from other people in a society. These researchers propose then that legal sanctions may have direct deterrent effects plus indirect deterrent effects through these informal control mechanisms. In congruence, Tittle (1980, p. 10) argues that "... negative reactions from significant others have greater relevance for one's self-esteem, total life circumstances, and interaction patterns; and... greater surveillance and probability of being discovered are involved in informal sanctions." Gibbs (1975, p. 209) also states that "individuals who appear to subscribe the most to the social condemnation of crime are the ones who tend to view punishment as the most certain, and they may commit fewer criminal acts because of social condemnation rather than fear of legal punishment."

Currently, many sociologists attempt to compare and potentially to integrate deterrence theory with those theories which focus on sources of compliance with the law other than the threat of legal sanctions. Broadly, these theories emphasize (a) moral beliefs about right and wrong and/or (b) attachment to peers, family, and various significant others (e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, & Chiricos, 1983; Tittle, 1977). Tittle (1977), for example, operationalizes moral beliefs and significant others as follows: moral commitment (moral wrongness of offenses), social integration (sense of belonging in residential area, personal pride in the U.S., etc.), and interpersonal/community fear (probability of discovery and perceived loss of respect).
Similarly, Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, and Chiricos (1983) draw on Hirschi's (1969) control theory to measure these variables as follows: moral belief (moral wrongness of offenses) and attachment to parents and peers (importance of approval and influence of disapproval by these people of respondents' acts, and affectionate identification with these people).

However, the most common approach to incorporating these variables into the study of deterrence has been to compare the direct effect on illegal conduct of perceived legal sanction threat to the direct effects of moral beliefs and attachment to significant others (e.g., Grasmick & Green, 1980; Paternoster et al., 1983; Tittle, 1977). "In nearly all survey research," Grasmick and Bursik (1990, p. 839) maintain, "the focus has been on differences between deterrence theory and other theories, rather than on commonalties and linkages" (for exceptions, Williams & Hawkins, 1986, 1989). Few attempts have been conducted to conceptualize moral beliefs and attachment as sources of compliance analogous to state sanctions and incorporate them in one study. Little effort has been devoted to developing parallel measures of the three types of perceived sanction threats emanating from the state, conscience, and attachment to others.

**Rational Choice Decision-Making Theory of Crime**

Grasmick and Bursik (1990) assert that the explicit emphasis in deterrence theory on rational decision-making, with actors considering the threat of punishment, offers a perspective for integrating theories which restrict the notion of deterrence to the consideration of legal sanctions. They propose that both conscience (internalized norms) and attachments to significant others, derived from other theories as potential sources of compliance, can be conceptualized in a manner similar to the state. These three sources pose three different types of possible threats or costs that are more or less certain and severe which actors take into account in deciding whether or not to violate the law: self-imposed threat of shame, socially imposed threat of embarrassment, and state-imposed threat of legal sanctions.
Integration of perceived threats of shame and embarrassment, along with the threat of legal sanctions, into a rational choice perspective, adds significantly to Grasmick and Bursik's (1990) model's ability to explain and predict subsequent illegal behaviors. These informal and formal sanction threats correspond to the mechanisms of social control outlined by Wrong (1961) and by Blake and Davis (1964). Subsequently and supposedly, Grasmick and Bursik are able to constitute an inclusive list of factors which deter criminal acts (Grasmick & Green, 1980; Grasmick, Jacobs, & McCollom, 1983).

Shame

The internalization of a norm poses a kind of potential cost or punishment for violating the law—the threat of guilt feelings or shame for doing something which the actor considers morally wrong. According to Grasmick and Bursik (1990), it is a self-imposed informal sanction that occurs when individuals violate norms they have internalized. It is experienced most immediately as the pain of feeling guilt or remorse, and can occur even if no one but the individual is aware of the transgression. The most immediate pain of such guilt-feelings, Grasmick and Bursik predict, probably is a physiological discomfort, such as self-remorse. However, more long-term consequences might be apparent in the form of "damaged self-concept, depression, anxiety, etc. which could impede normal functioning in one's social environment" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 840).

In accord with the traditional expected utility model (Becker, 1968), Grasmick and Bursik maintain that individuals are assumed to calculate the likelihood (certainty) of such sanctions and the magnitude (severity) of such sanctions should they be imposed. In deciding whether or not to engage in an illegal act, "individuals take into account whether they would feel ashamed and the effect that shame might have on their self-image or self-esteem" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 840). The resulting perceived threat of self-imposed sanctions, conceptualized as the product of certainty and severity, is a cost factor in the expected utility of crime. The prediction, then, is that the greater the perceived
threat of shame, the lower the expected utility of crime, and the less likelihood that crime will occur.

**Embarrassment**

The attachment to significant others (broadly defined to include friends, family, employer, etc.) poses another kind of potential cost or punishment for violating the law—the threat of embarrassment. It is defined by Grasmick and Bursik (1990) as a socially imposed informal sanction that occurs when individuals violate social norms endorsed by significant others whose opinions are of value to them (e.g., parents, teachers, friends, and employers). This kind of punishment occurs primarily in the form of embarrassment when such people might lose respect for an actor if he/she commits a crime.

Before further review of the literature, a distinction needs to be made between the two types of informal sanctions. Grasmick and Bursik (1990; see also Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993) suggest that their distinction between shame and embarrassment corresponds to the one made by Williams and Hawkins (1989) between "self-stigma" and "social stigma" (stigma emanating from the reactions of others). It also parallels the distinction by Braithwaite (1989, p. 75) between "consciences which internally deter criminal behavior" and the loss of "social approval of significant others," arguing that the former develops over time as a result of repeated incidents of the latter.

For the loss of respect, like guilt-feelings, the most immediate pain probably is a physiological discomfort. More long-term consequences, however, might be realized in "a loss of valued relationships and perhaps a restriction in opportunities to achieve other valued goals over which significant others have some control" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 841). Like the threat of self-imposed shame, the threat of socially imposed embarrassment can be viewed as more or less certain and more or less severe. When estimating the projected costs of an illegal act, individuals take into account whether they would lose respect from such significant others (certainty) and the effect that the loss of respect might have on their valued relationships with such significant others (severity).
The resulting perceived threat of socially imposed sanctions, conceptualized as the product of certainty and severity, is a cost factor in the expected utility of crime. The greater the perceived threat of embarrassment, the lower expected utility of crime, and the less the likelihood that crime will occur.

Legal Sanctions

Grasmick and Bursik (1990) argue that perceived threats of shame and embarrassment might be combined with the perceived threat of legal sanctions to generate a more inclusive list of cost factors for a rational-choice perspective on crimes. Legal sanctions are state-imposed formal punishments in the form of material and/or physical deprivation. Like shame and embarrassment, legal sanctions have the dimensions of certainty and severity. When calculating the projected costs of illegal behavior, individuals take into account the probability (certainty) that they will be caught and the severity of this sanction should it occur. The resulting perceived threat of legal sanctions, conceptualized as the product of certainty and severity, is a cost factor in the expected utility of crime. The greater the perceived threat of legal sanctions, the lower the expected utility of crime and the less the likelihood that crime will occur.

It should be noted that unlike other researchers (Andenaes, 1952, 1966; Gibbs, 1975; Tittle, 1977; Williams & Hawkins, 1986, 1989), Grasmick and Bursik (1990) take a stance that the threats of shame and embarrassment are not conditional upon legal sanctions. They suggest that it is not the reactions to arrest, but the reactions to the crime that potential offenders consider in their rational calculation. An individual can feel ashamed or embarrassed even if the police does not detect the illegal behavior. Thus, perceived threats of shame and embarrassment are conceived as separate entities.

Research

Integrating both formal and informal perceived sanction threats, Grasmick and his colleagues have begun to examine the concept of deterrence and its relationship with other analogous behaviors. Grasmick and Bursik (1990), for example, present evidence that all
three threats (shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions) operate as deterrents to the utility of crime. They report that perceived threat of shame, emanating from internalized normative constraints or internalized norms, is the best predictor of later commission of crime by adults (18 and older).

In Grasmick and Bursik's analysis, the dependent variable was respondents' present inclinations to commit three offenses: tax cheating, petty theft (less than $20), and drunken driving. To measure the variable, respondents were asked to simply indicate whether they thought they would commit each of the three offenses in the future. The response options were "yes" and "no."

Grasmick and Bursik achieved their objective to develop parallel measures of perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions that tapped both certainty and severity for each threat. To scale perceived certainty of shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions, respondents were asked for each of the three offenses to estimate the chances they would feel guilty, lose respect from significant others, and get caught by the police if they did the offense. The response options were "definitely would not," "probably would not," "probably would," and "definitely would." The measures of perceived severity was an application of the measures developed by Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) "which captures the subjective severity of the punishment—the meaning the actor attaches to the punishment" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 846). For each of the three offenses, respondents were asked to calculate how big a problem guilt-feelings, loss of respect, and arrest and subsequent legal punishments would create for their lives. The response options were "no problem at all," "hardly any problem," "a little problem," "a big problem," and "a very big problem." In accord with the principles of the traditional expected utility theory, Grasmick and Bursik then multiplied the certainty item times the severity item for each of the three punishment threats. These products were treated as the independent variables in their subsequent analysis.

As predicted, Grasmick and Bursik (1990) found that perceived threats of shame,
embarrassment, and legal sanctions inhibited the inclination to commit each of the three offenses. These three perceived sanction threats operated as deterrents to tax cheating, theft, and drunk driving. For all three offenses, perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions had significant inverse bivariate relationships. Further, the standardized coefficients for all three threats were inverse in sign, as predicted, except for the coefficient for embarrassment on theft; in fact, this direct effect was positive in sign. Specifically, strong evidence of a deterrent effect of shame was reported for all three offenses. For two of the three offenses (tax cheating and drunk driving), shame had the greatest direct effect. Based on these findings, Grasmick and Bursik stress the importance of internal control in generating compliance with the law. They speculate that "internal control might be conceptualized, at least to some extent, as a self-imposed punishment threat which can lower the expected utility of all illegal act" (1990, p. 854).

More recently, Grasmick, Bursik, and Arneklev (1993) report similar findings to support the theory's key propositions in a data set that merged cross-sectional survey of adults in Oklahoma City in 1982 and 1990. Using the same conceptualizations and operationalizations of perceived sanction threats developed in their previous research, Grasmick et al. predicted that an apparent reduction in drunk driving would be linked to increased perceived threats of legal sanctions, shame, and embarrassment over eight years.

Grasmick et al. (1993) offered evidence that a reduction in self-report drunk driving could be attributable to an increase in each of the three sanction threats. As predicted, respondents in their 1990 survey were less likely than those in 1982 survey to intend to drink and drive in the future. Further, the perceived certainty and severity of all the three threats for drunk driving were reported to have increased over the eight years. Specifically, the perceived certainty and severity of shame (and the product of certainty and severity) for the offense increased significantly. The perceived certainty of embarrassment (and the product of certainty and severity) also increased significantly, but the perceived severity did not. While the perceived severity of legal sanctions increased
significantly, the perceived certainty and the product of certainty and severity did not.

In isolating the independent contributions of the three threats to the reduction in drunk driving, Grasmick et al. discovered that the products of perceived certainty and severity of all the three threats had inverse direct effects. Particularly, shame and legal sanctions had significant deterrent effects on intention to drink and drive. Further, the bivariate Beta for year became clearly insignificant with inclusion of perceived threat of shame. Given these findings, the researchers concluded that the increased threat of shame would seem to be the primary source of reduction in drunk driving in their two surveys.

Criticism

Rational choice decision-making theory is a new perspective on criminology and tests of the model have led to several suggestions for refinement. Grasmick and Bursik (1990) point out continuous refinement of the notion of deterrence and more complete ascertainment of the full implications of informal and formal sanction threats as two such areas. The concept of deterrence should not be restricted to criminal control and illegal conduct in U.S. society. Unfortunately, however, the informal and formal sanction threats conceived by Grasmick and Bursik (1990; see also Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993) are restricted to projected criminal acts or "noncompliance with legal norms" among adults in the United States. Examination of their deterrent effects has been confined to a theoretical domain of criminality in a highly individualistic U.S. society. In the face of ubiquitous norms to be conformed with, however, there is no theoretical reason why these perceived sanction threats cannot be extended to noncompliant behaviors other than criminality and in societies other than the United States. The current research draws from this criticism to apply the concept of deterrence to a unique social setting, the workplace. In doing so, it compares the prevalence of noncompliance with organizational norms among employees in Japanese and U.S. organizations through three types of perceived sanction threats equivalent to those conceived by Grasmick and Bursik (1990).
Chapter 4:
Deterrence in the Workplace:
Extending Rational Choice Decision-Making Theory of Crime

The current research accepts the assumptions of Grasmick and Bursik's (1990) rational choice decision-making model and its causal structure as the foundation of theorizing about deterrence in the workplace. Their model is logically extended in order to build a comprehensive model of rational choice decision-making of noncompliance with organizational norms.

This chapter begins by conceptualizing three types of perceived punishment threats prevailing in the workplace, with an emphasis on conscience, significant other employees, and management as potential sources of compliance with organizational rules. Next, findings associated with the three sanctions are reviewed. Problems inherent in the findings are also summarized. This chapter concludes with a brief description of the propositions of the current research that link the role of perceived sanction threats to noncompliant workplace behaviors.

Perceived Threats of Sanctions

The present research draws on the conceptualization of Grasmick and Bursik (1990) to theorize deterrence in the workplace. It argues that both conscience and significant other employees can function as agents of social control in a manner similar to that of management. All three pose threats or costs that are more or less certain and severe which employees take into account in deciding whether or not to violate organizational rules: self-imposed threat of shame, socially imposed threat of embarrassment, and management-imposed threat of formal sanctions. Thus, conscience, significant other employees, and management potentially affect workplace deviance by decreasing behavioral intentions to engage in rule violation conduct.
Shame

The internalization of a norm poses a kind of potential cost or punishment for violating the organizational rule—the threat of guilt feeling or shame for doing something employees consider morally wrong. It is a self-imposed, reflective, informal cost that employees might experience immediately as "self-stigma" (Williams & Hawkins, 1989) when they violate their moral commitments or offend their own conscience by engaging in a particular act.

Current research recognizes that shame and guilt-feelings are not synonymous. "Whereas guilt is generated whenever a boundary (set by the Super-Ego) is touched or transgressed, shame occurs when a goal (presented by the Ego-Ideal) is not being reached" (Pier & Singer, 1953, p. 11). While guilt accompanies transgression, shame results in failure and one's lowered standing. But according to Grasmick and Bursik's (1990) rational decision-making model, these painful feelings are caused only through self-directed judgment. Shame and guilt-feelings occur even if no one else but the employee is aware of the transgression. To feel ashamed and guilty, one need not imagine other employees and/or people in authority inspecting and condemning the employees' transgression. Imagined presence and detection by other employees and managerial authorities are not required. The current study then treats the terms "shame" and "guilt feelings" in an interchangeable manner.

The current research predicts, drawing on Grasmick and Bursik's (1990, p. 840) conceptualization, that "the most immediate adverse consequence of such guilt feelings probably is a physiological discomfort," such as self-remorse. More long-term consequences might include "a damaged self-concept, depression, anxiety, etc.," which could destroy normal functioning in an employee's social environment (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 840). In accord with the traditional expected utility model (Becker, 1968), employees are assumed to formulate perceptions of the likelihood (certainty) of sanctions and the magnitude (severity) of sanctions should they be imposed. In calculating
the projected costs of deviant behavior, employees take into account whether they would feel ashamed and the effect that shame might have on their self-image or self-esteem. The resulting perceived threat of shame, conceptualized as the product of certainty and severity, is a self-imposed cost factor for the expected norm violation conduct. The product is conceived important here because, as Grasmick and Bursik (1990) emphasize, if an employee is rational, severe guilt-feelings will have a greater deterrent effect when he or she perceives probability of guilt-feelings to be high and will have no deterrent effect if the employee perceives probability of such painful emotions to be minimum or nonexist. Similarly, the certainty of guilt-feelings will have a greater deterrent effect when the painful emotions are perceived to be quite severe. The prediction, then, is that the greater the perceived threat of shame, the lower the behavioral intentions to engage in noncompliant conduct, and the less the likelihood that rule violation will occur in the workplace.

**Embarrassment**

The attachment to other employees poses another kind of potential cost or punishment for violating the organizational rule—the threat of embarrassment for breaking rules endorsed by those employees. While an employee's own conscience or internalized norms is a potential source of punishment, so are significant other employees—colleagues, supervisors, employers, etc. whose opinions about an employee are of great value to him or her. This kind of punishment is experienced immediately as "social-stigma" in the form of embarrassment when an employee might lose respect from such significant other employees. It is negative reactions from these significant employees to the deviant act that impose a punishment on the employee (Hollinger & Clark, 1982, 1983). In embarrassment, therefore, concern is always with an employee's own position vis-a-vis other employees.

While shame is a self-imposed punishment, embarrassment is a socially imposed punishment, though for both, the most immediate adverse consequence is a physiological
discomfort, such as self-remorse (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993). More long-term consequences of embarrassment might be apparent in a loss of valued relationships and, perhaps, a restriction of opportunities to attain occupationally valued goals over which significant other employees have some control (e.g., salary increase, promotion, collaboration, etc.).

Embarrassment, like shame, possesses the dimensions of certainty and severity. In deciding whether or not to participate in a deviant act, employees take into account the probability (certainty) that they will feel embarrassed and the severity of this sanction should it occur. The resulting perceived threat of embarrassment, conceptualized as the product of certainty and severity, is a socially imposed cost factor for expected norm violation behavior. The greater the perceived threat of embarrassment, the lower the behavioral inclination to be involved in noncompliant conduct, and the less the likelihood that occupational rule violation will occur.

Management Sanctions

The third possible punishment which decreases expected workplace noncompliant behavior is management sanctions, and this is an extension of the formal legal sanctions which are central to conventional deterrence theory. While the state is the source of the formal punishment threat for noncompliance with legal norms, the administration (or management) is the source of formal punishment threat for noncompliance with organizational norms. This kind of punishment occurs primarily in the form of material and/or physical deprivation when managerial authorities detect an employee's transgression.

The most immediate adverse consequence of such instituted penalties probably involve warning, fines, delay of promotion, salary decrease, discharge, and report to the police (Hollinger & Clark, 1982, 1983). More long-term consequences might be a loss of trust from supervisors, colleagues, and employers and, perhaps, like the threat of
embarrassment, a restriction in opportunities to achieve occupationally valued goals (e.g., prevention of salary increases, promotion, and collaboration). Like shame and embarrassment, management sanctions possess the dimensions of certainty and severity. In deciding whether or not to engage in a deviant act, employees take into account whether they might be caught and penalized by people in authority and the severity of this penalty should it be imposed. The resulting perceived threat of management sanctions, conceptualized as the product of certainty and severity, is an administratively imposed cost factor for the expected engagement in workplace noncompliant behavior. The greater the perceived threat of management sanctions, the lower the behavioral intention to engage in noncompliant conduct, and the less the likelihood that rule violation will occur in the workplace.

The present study suggests, therefore, that at least three kinds of potential costs which originate from three different sources—conscience, significant other employees, and the management—and possess the two dimensions of certainty and severity of the punishment, operate independently as deterrents to workplace noncompliant conduct. All of the three threats are taken into account separately by employees as cost factors in their "rational" decision about whether to comply with organizational norms: (a) self-imposed shame, (b) socially imposed embarrassment, and (c) administratively imposed physical and material deprivation.

For comparative purposes, the present study follows as closely as possible the analysis of Grasmick and Bursik (1990). Nevertheless, the current approach differs from, but is not incompatible with, their rational choice decision-making theory of crime in the following four ways: (a) sources of embarrassment; (b) sources of formal sanctions, (c) samples, and (d) types of deviant conduct. First, there exists a different degree of specification between the two in terms of sources of socially imposed punishment threat: for the present study, they are significant others in the workplace (e.g., employers, superiors, colleagues); for Grasmick and Bursik, they are significant others in society
generally (e.g., family, friends, employers, etc.). The deterrence doctrine nowhere declares, however, that the definition of significant others should not be specified. Thus, the current study expects to find significant other employees operating as an agent of social control at an interpersonal level.

Second, there are different sources of formal punishment threats between the two: for the present study, they are from the management; for Grasmick and Bursik (1990), they are from the state. However, as long as this study faithfully extends Grasmick and Bursik's research, this difference should not be problematic. The present research, therefore, proposes that management will serve as an agent of social control at an impersonal level in a manner similar to state legislation.

Third, there are sample differences between the two: for the present study, it is a group of business employees; for Grasmick and Bursik's (1990) research, it is a group of adults. The deterrence literature nowhere claims, however, that deterrence is a sociodemography-specific process. There is no reason, thus, why the current study cannot expect the deterrence process to operate across a sample of employees.

Finally, the types of deviant (or, noncompliant) conduct focused on in the present study are different from those in Grasmick and Bursik's research (1990): for the present study, it is productive deviance (e.g., tardiness); for Grasmick and Bursik's study, it is legal deviance (e.g., drunk driving). However, as Meier et al. (1984) and Grasmick and Bursik (1990) suggest, there is no theoretical reason why the notion of deterrence cannot be applied to other types of conduct than illegal ones. It is proposed, therefore, that the offenses in the present research should be as salient to the deterrence process as those in Grasmick and Bursik's research.

Research and Criticism

There is not a single study that has conceptualized conscience, significant other employees, and the management as sources of punishments, and incorporated all three into a rational choice perspective in the workplace. No research has focused attention on the
possibility that shame, embarrassment, and managerial sanctions, originating from these
three different sources and possessing the two dimensions of certainty and severity of the
sanctions, might be taken into account by employees in their "rational" decision as to
whether or not to comply with organizational rules. No effort has been devoted to
developing comparable measures of perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and
management sanctions for work-related deviant conduct.

While this is true, there exist a handful of studies in the field of sociology that are
relevant to assessing the deterrent effects of these three sanction threats prevailing in the
workplace. Three empirical studies (Hollinger & Clark, 1982, 1983; Tittle, 1977) to be
reviewed here clearly indicate that the theoretical boundaries of deterrence can be
extended to these three sanctions and occupational deviant conduct.

Tittle (1977) asserts that there is a blossoming interest in the possible deterrent
effects of sanctions or sanction threats on nonconformity. However, "evidence is too
weak to justify firm conclusions or to permit more than rudimentary understanding of the
place of sanctions in human affairs (Tittle, 1977, p. 580). Little has been revealed
regarding how much sanction fear contributes to conformity in relation to other factors
that are operative. Tittle's research is an initial attempt toward understanding this process.

Data were collected in 1972 in a sample survey of the population aged 15 and over
in New Jersey, Iowa, and Oregon. A sample of 1,993 was selected by area probability
techniques combined with random selection of respondents within each sampled
household. In Tittle's (1977) analysis, the dependent variable was respondents' present
inclinations to violate the following rules: (a) small theft (about $5), (b) large theft (about
$20), (c) smoking marijuana, (d) illegal gambling, (e) assault, (f) lie to spouse or
sweetheart, (g) tax cheating, (h) failure to stand for national anthem, and (i) role specific
deviance. Although he surveyed households, not work organizations, one of the role
deviance items focused on rule violation behavior in the workplace. Respondents
employed in a work organization were asked whether they would actually make personal
use of their employer's equipment if tomorrow they were in a situation where they had an extremely strong desire or need to do so. Five response options ranged from "excellent chance" to "almost no chance."

Independent variables included were as follows: (a) moral commitment, (b) social integration, (c) relative deprivation, (d) alienation, (e) differential association, (f) legitimacy, (g) utility, and (h) sanction fear. Of these eight independent variables, moral commitment and sanction fear were analogous to internalization of a norm, attachment to significant others, and the state—conceived by Grasmick and Bursik (1990) as potential sources of punishment. To assess moral commitment, Tittle asked respondents to indicate how morally wrong they considered each of the rule violations to be. Five response options were allowed, ranging from "not wrong at all" to "very wrong."

To measure sanction fear, the following seven indicators were adopted: (a) chances of discovery by somebody who does not approve of deviant acts, (b) chances of discovery by acquaintances, (c) chances of discovery by community, (d) amount of loss of respect by acquaintances, (e) amount of loss of respect in community, (f) chances of arrest, and (g) chances of jail. To assess chances, Tittle asked respondents to estimate the probability of each of the five (three excluding arrest and jail in the workplace deviance) consequences occurring. Response options were given on a five-point scale ranging from "almost no chance" to "excellent chance." To scale loss of respect, he asked respondents to estimate the amount of respect they would lose. Response options were allowed on a five-point scale ranging from "none" to "a great deal."

For the occupationally related rule violation behavior, Tittle (1977) found strong evidence of deterrent effects of moral commitment and sanction fear in general. Moral commitment ranked second only to the utility of the behavior as an independent predictor of future workplace deviance. Loss of respect by acquaintances and in community also had significant direct effects on work-related deviance in the expected negative direction. These findings emphasize the importance of internal and external controls in generating
compliance with the organizational rules. These controls might be conceptualized, at least, as self-imposed and socially imposed punishment threats, which can decrease expected engagement in occupational deviant conduct.

Despite these significant findings, Tittle's (1977) analysis is limited as a test of deterrence model of rational choice decision-making. There are three primary deficiencies. First, Tittle's conceptualization of moral commitments does not consider a component of rational choice decision-making that such commitments pose possible self-imposed threats. He does not use the notion of "moral wrongness" or "internalization of a norm" as conceived by Grasmick and Bursik. He does not extend the notion to propose that morality or internalized norms serve as a potential source of punishment in a manner similar to significant others and the state. Rather, his approach to incorporating moral commitments into the study of deterrence is simply to compare the direct effects on deviant behavior of socially imposed perceived threats of losing respect to the direct effect of moral wrongfulness. Consequently, he is unable to isolate and determine the deterrent effect of moral beliefs in the form of internally imposed sanction threat analogous to the deterrent effects of attachment to others in the form of socially imposed sanction threat.

Second, Tittle (1977) makes no predictions concerning a deterrent effect of formal sanctions on occupational deviance. Apparently, he leaves formal organizational sanctions out of consideration. He makes no efforts to conceptualize the formal organization as a potential source of punishment comparable to the criminal justice system. He includes no measures of such formal sanctions (probability of arrest and jail). As a result, he is unable to provide findings concerning potential deterrent effects of formal sanction threats.

Finally, Tittle (1977) incorporates no measures of the severity dimension that Grasmick and Bursik (1990) claim is crucial in determining the deterrent effects of sanction threats. In a rational choice perspective, individuals are assumed to formulate perceptions of the probability of sanctions and the harshness of such sanctions should they be imposed. And the resulting sanction threat, conceptualized as the product of certainty
and severity, is a cost factor for the expected noncompliant behavior. A lack of severity dimension, therefore, renders Tittle's research inadequate as a direct test of deterrence model of rational choice decision-making.

Hollinger and Clark (1982) acknowledge that there is accumulating evidence that informal sanctions by one's peers serve as a stronger deterrent to legal deviance than the threat of formal (i.e., criminal/legal) sanctions. However, little research focus has been directed to isolating and comparing the deterrent effects on employee deviance of informal sanctions (co-worker) and formalized sanctions promulgated by either the company or the criminal justice system. Hollinger and Clark accept this challenge.

Data were collected during 1979 and 1980 in a sample survey of employees working at all hierarchical levels of 47 formal organizations in Minneapolis–St. Paul, Dallas–Ft. Worth, and Cleveland. The sample consisted of 16 retail merchandise corporations, 10 electronics manufacturing firms, and 21 general hospitals, which represented the three largest employment segments of the three metropolitan areas. A sample of 9,175 was drawn by random selection of employees from corporate personnel lists and used in the analysis that followed.

In Hollinger and Clark's (1982) analysis, the dependent variable was respondents' tendency to be involved in two categories of workplace deviant behaviors: property and production deviance. Respondents were first presented with specific items describing property deviance (e.g., take store merchandise) and production deviance (e.g., come to work late and leave early). They were then asked to indicate how often they would engage in each deviance. The frequencies of self-reported involvement in the deviance was recorded via a Likert-type index.

Severity of perceived formal and informal sanctions were the independent variables in Hollinger and Clark's research. To measure perceived severity of formal management sanctions, respondents were asked the following question for each deviant item: "what would the most common reaction of persons in authority be" (Hollinger & Clark, 1982,
p. 339). The response options were "reward or promote," "do nothing," "reprimand or punish," "fire or dismiss," and "inform the police." To assess the severity of informal co-worker sanctions, respondents were asked to answer the following question for each deviance item, "What would the most common reaction of your fellow workers be?" (Hollinger & Clark, 1982, p. 339). Response options were provided on a five-point scale, ranging from "encourage," "do nothing," "discourage," "avoid the person," to "inform persons in authority."

Hollinger and Clark (1982) reported that perceived severity of formal and informal sanction threats had significant effects on employee deviance in the predicted negative direction. These findings highlight the crucial role of external control in constraining employee deviance. External control might be conceptualized, at least to some extent, as socially imposed and administratively imposed sanction threats which can decrease the behavioral intentions to become involved in a deviant act.

While Hollinger and Clark's (1982) findings lend support for the hypotheses derived from rational choice decision-making theory of crime, it is important to note that they do not constitute a direct test of the theory itself. There are three main weaknesses inherent in their research. First, the distinctive definitions of perceived severity of sanction threats are not included in their analysis. Their operationalization of sanction severity does not capture the "subjective severity of the punishment" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 846). Hollinger and Clark create five categories of possible reactions of fellow workers and management and rank order them along with the "presumed" harshness (severity) of the sanctions. However, in the rational choice decision-making model, what serves as severe punishment for some may not be considered as equally severe by others (see Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980). The meaning attached to the punishment varies from one person to another. For instance, a colleague reaction of avoidance may not be perceived as equally costly by all employees. Due to differences in their personal values, some employees may regard the reaction of avoidance more costly or severe than that of
informing people in authority.

Second, Hollinger and Clark (1982) fail to include measures of the certainty of socially and formally imposed sanction threats. This failure is crucial in determining the deterrent effects of sanction threats. In the rational choice perspective, sanction threats are viewed as more or less certain and more or less severe (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993). When estimating the projected costs of deviant behavior, individuals are assumed to formulate perceptions of both the likelihood of sanctions and the severity of the sanctions should they occur.

Finally, and more critically, Hollinger and Clark (1982) do not precisely determine the deterrent effects of perceived sanction threats on occupational deviance. They use reports of currently occurring deviance rather than estimates of future deviance as their dependent variables. They rely on present perceptions of sanctions to predict acts of deviance which have already occurred, thereby raising the possibility that it is the deviance that generates sanction threats, rather than the other way around.

In another research study, Hollinger and Clark (1983) point out that regardless of a renewed interest in studying white-collar crime, there has been little attention directed to occupationally related crimes against the business organization compared to corporate crimes committed by the organization itself. Their study is an attempt to correct this imbalance by examining the phenomenon of employee theft. To achieve this goal, these researchers propose that "employees who perceive the dual sanctions threats of apprehension and punishment to be minimal or nonexistent will be more involved in various types of property offenses against the work organization" (Hollinger & Clark, 1983, p. 400).

The sample for Hollinger and Clark's (1983) research is (presumably) identical with that for their 1982 research. Data were collected during 1979 and 1980 via self-administered, mailed questionnaires with a random sample of employees. A total of 9,175
employees randomly selected from corporate personnel lists responded to the questionnaire and served as respondents for the research.

In Hollinger and Clark's (1983) analysis, the dependent variable was respondents' past involvement in various theft activities within the employment setting. To measure the variable, respondents were asked to indicate how often they stole merchandise, supplies, tools, equipment, and other material assets belonging to their employers in the past year. Response options were given on a five-point scale ranging from "daily," "about once a week," "4 to 12 times per year," "1 to 3 times per year," to "never."

As independent variables, Hollinger and Clark (1983) included perceived organizational sanction threats similar to Grasmick and Bursik (1990), tapping both certainty and severity of punishments. To assess perceived certainty of punishment, respondents were first presented with the following item: "I believe I would be caught if I took something belonging to my employer" (Hollinger & Clark, 1983, p. 403). Respondents were then asked to report general perceptions of detection risk for thefts of company property—whether by management, co-workers, or any other resource. Four response options were given, ranging from "very true" to "not at all true." Subsequently, Hollinger and Clark divided their samples of respondents into those who reported "very true" or "somewhat true" (high perceived risk of apprehension) and those who indicated "not very true" or "not at all true" (low perceived risk) and treated them as a dichotomous independent variable in the analysis which followed.

To measure perceived severity, Hollinger and Clark instructed respondents to estimate possible informal and formal organizational sanctions that culminated in reporting to the police. Respondents were asked to indicate the most common reaction of persons in authority to their involvement in each theft activity. The response options were rank ordered, ranging from "positive sanctions (e.g., reward or promotion)," "do nothing," "reprimand or punish," "fire or dismiss," and to "inform the police." As with the certainty items, Hollinger and Clark created two groups of respondents: those who perceived
average or below average sanction severity and those who estimated above average sanction severity, and used them as a dichotomous independent variable in their subsequent analysis.

Controlling age and sex. Hollinger and Clark (1983) reported that both perceived certainty and perceived severity had deterrent effects on employee theft activities. Specifically, the employee perception of the certainty of being discovered for theft activity was, by far, the strongest independent variable of the four variables examined (age, sex, and perceived severity of sanctions). The respondents who perceived a low certainty of detection for acts of employee theft were over three and one-half times more inclined to steal from their employer than those who perceived a high certainty of apprehension. Similarly, the respondents' perception that theft would result in serious negative consequences operated as a significant deterrent. Respondents who perceived little severity in the management reactions to theft activities were almost twice as likely to report involvement in above average levels of theft activities. These findings demonstrate the importance of external control in generating obedience to the organizational rules. External control might be conceptualized, at least to some degree, as a management-imposed formalized punishment threat which can decrease the expected involvement in a workplace deviant act.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that Hollinger and Clark's (1983) research is limited as a direct test of deterrence model of rational choice decision-making itself. There exist four major flaws. First, Hollinger and Clark's deterrence model is limited because it is restricted to a consideration of formal sanctions. It does not take into account the degree to which employees are rational and calculating in their assessment of the personal costs (e.g., shame and embarrassment) of illegal behavior as well as the formal costs.

Second, like their previous study, the distinctive definitions of perceived severity of sanction threats are not incorporated. Operationalization of sanction severity does not
reflect the "subjective severity of the punishment—the meaning the actor attaches to the punishment" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 846).

Third, Hollinger and Clark make no attempt to assess the interaction effects of certainty and severity of punishment. They uncovered the additive effect of perceived certainty and severity on the theft activity—as the perceived certainty of detection and the perceived severity of the sanction increased, the level of theft involvement decreased. The highest degree of deterrent effect was observed when both certainty and severity were perceived to be high. In the sociological model of rational choice decision-making, however, the interaction hypothesis is claimed as theoretically more important than the additive hypothesis in influencing individual decision-making (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993). If rational, actors, in their decisionmaking, multiply the likelihood (certainty) of punishment times the magnitude (severity) of punishment to reach a projected cost—this requires interactive, rather than additive, treatment of the two dimensions.

Finally, consistent with their previous study, Hollinger and Clark's study (1983) fails to permit a clear conceptualization of causal ordering. These researchers rely on self-reports of past deviance rather than estimates of future deviance as their dependent variable. They use present perceptions of sanctions to predict acts of past deviance. This, in turn, raises the possibility that it is the deviance that induces employees to formulate perceptions of sanction threats, rather than the other way around.

The current research, grounded on the rational choice decision-making perspective (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993) and drawing from these three relevant studies and criticisms (Hollinger & Clark, 1982, 1983; Tittle, 1977), proposes that the concept of deterrence can be applied to informal and formal sanctions and deviant conduct in the workplace. It argues that conscience and significant other employees (e.g., employer, colleagues) serve as agents of social control in a manner similar to the management. All three pose possible
threats or costs that are more or less certain and severe which employees take into
account in deciding whether or not to violate organizational rules. The greater the
perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and managerial sanctions, the less behavioral
intentions to noncomply and the less the likelihood that rule violation will occur in the
workplace.
Chapter 5:
Cultural Differences in
Perceived Levels of Sanction Threats and Noncompliance Tendencies

Today, deterrence theorists acknowledge the need to examine the causes of variability of perceived sanction threats. Grasmick and Bursik (1990) indicate that researchers should consider why individuals vary in their perceived degrees of threats of shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions. They encourage others to incorporate this issue into research on deterrent effects of perceived sanction threats.

The current research accepts this challenge. It addresses the issue of individual variability in perceived levels of the three kinds of sanction threats: some categories of employees might perceive greater threats of shame and/or embarrassment, while others might perceive a greater threat of management sanctions.

Social learning or socialization plays an important role in the development of social behavior and has increasingly become the focus of study of deterrence for the criminal act. Social learning is a process of social interaction through which people acquire personality and learn values, norms, beliefs, skills, and thought and behavioral patterns (Robertson, 1987). Although some might prefer to restrict socialization to early childhood, it is actually "an ongoing process that continues throughout an individual's life" (Curran & Renzetti, 1994, p. 183). It continues to occur and influence individual employees over the course of their careers.

Sociologists assert that what is taught—that is, the content of socialization—varies across cultures, societies, communities, and social groups. This position is supported by Gudykunst and Kim's (1991) claim that culture is a "system of knowledge." Citing Keesing's (1974, p. 89) work, they argue that culture shapes and constrains, as part of our socialization, the way our "human brain acquires, organizes, and processes information and creates 'internal models of reality.'" Culture determines the content of socialization by
which individual employees' perceptions of sanction threats are culturally programmed. Culturally differentiated socialization experiences can make differences in perceived levels of sanction threats.

Focusing on employees in Japanese and U.S. organizations, the present research investigates how cultural differences in socialization practices affect the perceived levels of punishment threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions and, in consequence, the prevalence of noncompliance behaviors. In doing so, this study articulates a causal link from culture to perceived degrees of sanction threats and to noncompliance tendencies. It speculates that cultural values influence socialization experiences of employees in Japanese and U.S. organizations, thereby producing differences in perceived levels of punishment threats and prevalence of noncompliant acts.

The focus on the two dominant forces in the world market, Japan and the United States, is significant. Dertouzos, Lester, Solow, and the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity (1987) suggest that events happening inside individual organizations represent the ground truth of the national economy. While it is important to study such events at close range, views from a greater height are also revealing. The current cross-cultural study, therefore, presents a broad perspective on two successful economies.

The present research argues that when compared to employees in U.S. organizations, employees in Japanese organizations perceive greater levels of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions in their rational decision-making concerning whether or not to comply with organizational norms. Offering a rationale for this argument, this study begins by briefly describing Hofstede's (1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) cultural variability of individualism-collectivism, highlighting greater social controls and surveillance practiced in collectivistic societies. Then, the role of social controls are examined in determining the perceived levels of threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions. Finally, a causal chain is outlined from culture to these three punishment threats and to noncompliant behaviors.
Cultural Differences in Perceived Levels of Sanction Threats

There are numerous dimensions on which cultures in Japan and the United States differ. What they share, at least to some degree, is a basic assumption that Japanese are more controlled than Americans by collectivity. It is their strong ties, links, attachments, binds, or bonds to such conventional institutions as family and school that keep Japanese under control and, thus, refrains them from acting on deviant motivations. Especially notable is the theory by Geert Hofstede which has enjoyed great popularity and has had a powerful and widespread influence since its inception in 1980. Consequently, it is to this brand of cultural variability, individualism-collectivism, that the present study devotes its attention.

Individualism-Collectivism

In his book, *Culture's Consequences*, Hofstede (1980) presents four dimensions of cultural variability, along with an analysis of the empirical data he gathered from employees to test it. According to Hofstede, individualism refers to the relationship between the individual and the collectivity prevailing in a given society. Uncertainty avoidance represents the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. Power distance is described as the extent to which the members of a society accept power in institutions and organizations distributed unequally. Finally, masculinity is defined as a preference in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material success.

Hofstede (1980) proposes that these four dimensions represent elements of common structure in the cultural systems of countries. He does not assert that any one dimension is more predictive of a culture, viewing each of the dimensions as essentially fundamental issues in human societies to which every society must find its specific answers. He does not examine specific causal ordering of the different dimensions in his test of cultural variability.

However, the majority of research on cultural differences in Japan and the United
States has been directed at the dimension of individualism-collectivism. Traditionally, this dimension has been claimed as the most useful in understanding cultural differences, as well as similarities, of individual behaviors between the United States and Japan. It established a solid basis for intercultural and cross-cultural communication theory and, as the theoretical stimulus, sparked much of the empirical research on communication conduct between the two nations (e.g., Gudykunst & Nishida, 1984; Gudykunst, Nishida, & Chua, 1986, 1987; Nomura & Bamlund, 1983; Triandis, Brislin, & Hui, 1988). Thus, the present study focuses on the cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism (Hofstede, 1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) as a primary dimension that contributes to culturally differentiated perceived levels of punishment threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions for Japanese and American employees.

According to Hofstede (1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984), individualism stands for a loose knit social framework in which "people are supposed to look after themselves and their immediate family only" (Hofstede & Bond, 1984, p. 419). Conversely, collectivism is described as a tightly knit social framework wherein "people belong to ingroups or collectivities which are supposed to look after them in exchange for loyalty" (Hofstede & Bond, 1984, p. 419).

Hofstede (1984) asserts that the fundamental issue addressed by this dimension is the degree of interdependence, and this is closely related to people's self-concept. The "I" identity has precedence in individualistic cultures over the "we" identity, which takes precedence in collectivistic cultures. The emphasis in individualistic societies is on individuals' initiative and achievement, while the emphasis in collectivistic cultures is on belonging to groups. Hsu (1971) concurs with this distinction as he points out that a different self-concept is apparent in comparing individualistic western with collectivistic Asian thinking. He argues that the western concept of "personality" does not exist in Asian societies. In western societies, "personality" is considered a separate entity distinct from society and culture. Hsu views this as a reflection of western individualist thought.
or what Hofstede calls the "I" identity. By contrast, Japanese use the word *jin* (*jen* in Chinese) for "man" to describe a "human constant" which bonds the person him or herself to his or her intimate societal and cultural environment. If separated, an individual loses significance of his or her existence. Japanese people are, thus, more willing to modify their *jin* in accord with their environment. Hsu considers this a product of Asian collectivist thinking, or what Hofstede refers to as the "we" identity.

A more individualistic or more collectivistic self-concept carries different orientations toward social controls imposed by primary and secondary groups (e.g., Braithwaite, 1989; Hofstede, 1980, 1984). In collectivistic Asian societies, with their tightly knit and predetermined social framework, there is generally an extensive set of expectations about how people should behave toward each other. Behavior tends to be rigidly prescribed either by written rules or by unwritten social codes in ways to maximize coordination of the individual with his or her societal and cultural environments. Social controls in the form of informal sanctions applied by primary and secondary groups are, therefore, imposed more consistently and for more minor deviations from accepted standards. Violating these rules and standards threatens the so-important social framework. What or who is different is considered dangerous. Conforming to value systems shared by the majority (societal norms) is thus the best guarantee for the individual's "we" identity. Consequently, people are presumed to accept the controls and acquire very conventional orientations toward rules, norms, and law at an early age.

In individualistic western societies, there are also written and unwritten rules and standards, but they are considered more a matter of convenience and less sacrosanct (e.g., Braithwaite, 1989; Hofstede, 1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984). People are told to conform to existing rules and standards, yet are rewarded for flouting many conventional standards. They are not held to stringent standards. This is because such standards may destroy people's autonomous judgments. Rational calculation convinces individuals that their freedom and "I" identity are better assured through maintenance of
countervailing centers of group sanctioning. Therefore, the individual stands alone against all sanctions and controls by primary and secondary groups.

Prior to further discussion of individualism-collectivism, it should be noted that while cultures tend to be predominantly either individualistic or collectivistic, both exist in all cultures (e.g., Gudykunst & Kim, 1991; Parsons, 1951; Schwartz, 1990). Not all western societies are individualistic, of course, and not all Asian societies are collectivistic. Parsons (1951, p. 60), for example, indicates that a self-orientation and a collectivity orientation involve the "pursuit of private interests" and the "pursuit of the common interests of the collectivity," respectively. However, the same behavior can be simultaneously self- and collectivity-oriented. He elaborates this as he illustrates that a department head in an organization can act to pursue his or her own welfare, the department's welfare, the organization's welfare, and even society's welfare at the same time. In congruence, Schwartz (1990) states that individualistic and collectivistic values do not necessarily conflict. With respect to individualistic values, he argues that:

hedonism (enjoyment), achievement, self-direction, social power, and stimulation values all serve self interests of the individual, but not necessarily at the expense of any collectivity . . . . These same values might be promoted by leaders or members of collectivities as goals for their ingroup (Schwartz, 1990, p. 143).

Likewise, with respect to collectivistic tendencies, Schwartz suggests that:

prosocial, restrictive conformity, security, and tradition values all focus on promoting the interests of others. It is other people, constituting a collective, who benefit from the actor's [or actress'] concern for them, self-restraint, care for their security, and respect for shared traditions. But this does not necessarily occur at the expense of the actor [or actress] (Schwartz, 1990, p. 143).

Other researchers concur with this view as they argue that individuals and cultures can have both individualistic and collectivistic tendencies (Brittan, 1977; Gudykunst &
While this may be true, they also assert that either individualism or collectivism tends to predominate in one culture while both do exist. In the United States, for example, there are collective tendencies and some subcultures (e.g., religion) tend to be collectivistic, but individualism predominates. In Japan, there are individualistic tendencies and some subcultures (e.g., universities) tend to be individualistic, but collectivism predominates.

In his study of large multinational business enterprises, Hofstede (1980) verifies this position: culture in the United States is labeled as more individualistic rather than collectivistic, whereas the opposite is true for culture in Japan. Using a questionnaire survey, Hofstede gathered data from employees working for large multinational business subsidiaries in over 50 countries, including Japan and the United States. He utilized 32 value statements regarding organizational practices and compared the distribution of the answers from one country to another along four dimensions: individualism-collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity-femininity. On the individualism scale, the United States was reported as extremely individualistic (ranked 1). Conversely, Japan was observed to be nearer to the collectivism end of the individualism-collectivism scale (ranked 22). Consistent with much previous research, including Hofstede (1980), then, the present study argues that Japanese employees are more collectivistic rather than individualistic, whereas the opposite is true of American employees.

Culture and Perceived Sanction Threats

Unfortunately, no systematic attempts have been conducted to utilize Hofstede's (1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) cultural variability of individualism-collectivism to account for why individuals vary in their perceived levels of sanction threats prevailing in the workplace. Little is understood regarding the link between the two. Given the preceding discussion, however, this research speculates that the dimension contributes to differential perceived levels of punishment threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions. It argues that greater social control, reflected in a cultural
value orientation toward collectivity emphasized while Japanese are growing up, plays a crucial role in increasing the perceived levels of punishment threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions.

Culture and Shame. There appears to be a more or less straightforward connection between the individualism-collectivism dimension and the perceived threat of shame. As discussed earlier, early socialization and controls lead Japanese to be more accepting of given rules than Americans. Social control in the form of informal sanctions applied by primary and secondary groups is imposed more consistently and for more minor deviations from accepted standards. Japanese are taught to conform to more rigid standards and are rewarded for such behaviors whereas Americans are told to conform, but are rewarded for acting deviant. In other words, Japanese are held to more rigid standards of behavior at an early age and are admonished when they fail to adhere to such standards, while Americans are not held to such stringent standards and are often even praised when they deviate. Consequently, Japanese are presumed to have more conventional orientations toward the rules.

Braithwaite (1989) argues that this socialization process is important in developing children's moral standards, standards that are expected to endure into adulthood. He notes that "as children's morality develops, as socialization moves from building responsiveness to external controls to responsiveness to internal controls, direct forms of shaming become less important than induction" (Braithwaite, 1989, p. 72). Stated differently, direct forms of shaming become less effective as the external use of shaming becomes internalized and the child is internally controlled by shame. As children develop, they learn or have feelings for moral standards and develop a conscience. Even in the absence of external controls, children learn to draw on their internalized norms and refrain themselves from acting deviant. Japanese employees, who are more likely to be controlled at an early age in this manner, are thus more likely than American employees to internalize guilt and to feel ashamed when considering a norm violation act. Japanese employees are
expected to formulate estimates of greater probability (certainty) of guilt-feelings and magnitude (severity) of such painful emotions should they be experienced.

**Culture and Embarrassment.** While such internal controls as moral inhibition are linked to a threat of shame in the present research, such external controls as fear of social condemnation are linked to a threat of embarrassment, although both are the product of greater social controls in collectivistic cultures. According to Hofstede (1981), while Americans in a highly individualistic society are encouraged to be independent, Japanese in a collectivistic rather than individualistic society are socialized into a responsibility for the maintenance of social relationships. While socialization in the U.S. is built more on an "ethic of independence," socialization in Japan is predicated more on an "ethic of interconnectedness," an interconnectedness which can generate the repulsion of social stigmatization. The emphasis in Japanese socialization is to live up to wishes and expectations of other societal members. Thus, Japanese are trained to be more concerned with social approval and positive face of association with others. "Face"—a literal translation of the Japanese kao and mentsu—is something that the individual, through his or her conduct or that of people closely related to him or her, must maintain by meeting essential expectations or standards placed upon him or her by virtue of the social position he or she holds (Ho, 1976). Due to the controls and socialization experienced as children, therefore, Japanese employees are more likely than American employees to have affection or respect for others and to feel embarrassed in consideration of status and face threatening behavior. Japanese employees who noncomply with the value systems shared by other employees (occupational norms) not only do something wrong, but also participate in face and status threatening behavior.

**Culture and Management Sanctions.** Given the preceding review of literature, the present research proposes that collectivism and perceived threat of management sanctions vary jointly—that is, the more collectivistic the tendency, the greater the perceived levels of formal sanction threat. The general foundation for this claim is found in the assertion
that Japanese are more controlled than Americans in early childhood. Japanese are trained to believe that they are subject to greater control and surveillance than are American employees. Recall Hofstede's (1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) argument that in collectivist cultures with a tightly knit and predetermined social framework, behavior tends to be more rigidly prescribed either by written rules or by unwritten social codes. Social control applied by primary and secondary groups is imposed more consistently and for more minor deviations from accepted standards. Children in collectivistic cultures are more closely supervised throughout their lives and, thus, targets of more intense social control than those in individualistic cultures. They are so closely observed in terms of violation of rules, standards, and expectations, that they conclude they cannot avoid detection and ignore the threat of punishment should it be imposed by such institutions as family and school. Thus, due to these controls and socialization practices at an early age, it is predicted that Japanese employees encounter more agents of social control, or at least think they do, and are more likely to believe they are closely scrutinized for minor deviations from accepted standards of performance. Japanese employees are expected more likely than American employees to think they will be caught if they commit an offense and, thus, according to the rational choice decision-making theory (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993), perceive greater levels of managerial sanction threat.

In summary, the current research postulates that collectivism has positive effects on the perceived levels of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions. That is, the more collectivistic the tendency, the greater the social control or surveillance, and the greater the perceived levels of punishment threats.

**Cultural Differences in Noncompliance Tendencies**

The foregoing discussion provides a rationale for the hypothesis that there is a cultural difference in the overall likelihood of noncompliance in a specific direction suggesting that Japanese employees are less noncompliant than American employees. The
theoretical reason to expect less noncompliance tendencies among Japanese employees are
summarized as follows: (a) noncompliance is a function of three perceived threats of
shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions; (b) greater levels of punishment
threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions are perceived among
employees who are in more collectivistic nature of societies; and (c) Japanese society is
categorized as more collectivistic than is U.S. society.

To elaborate this contention, three patterns of relationships between
noncompliance and being Japanese (or American) including three perceived threats are
briefly delineated. First, the expected sign (+ or −) of the relationship between being
Japanese and noncompliance tendency is inverse because Japanese employees tend to
perceive a greater threat of shame, or guilt-feelings, than American employees. It is
argued that Japanese employees, who would be held to more rigid standards of behavior at
an early age, are more likely to internalize moral standards and, therefore, according to the
rational choice perspective (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick &
Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993), perceive a greater threat of shame,
making them less noncompliant. In other words, the perceived sanction threat of shame is
expected to serve as an intervening variable between culture and deviant behavior. Shame
should account for the cultural difference in workplace noncompliant behaviors.

Second, the expected sign of the relationship between being Japanese and
noncompliance tendency is inverse because Japanese employees are likely to perceive a
greater threat of loss of respect than American employees. Japanese employees, who
would be more concerned about social approval and positive face of association with
others, are expected to perceive a greater threat of embarrassment or a loss of respect and,
thus, be less noncompliant with status and face threatening character of organizational
rules. That is, the perceived sanction threat of embarrassment should operate as an
intervening variable between culture and noncompliant tendencies.

Third, the expected sign of the relationship between being Japanese and
noncompliance tendency is inverse because Japanese employees are apt to perceive a
greater threat of management sanctions. Japanese employees, who would be more closely
supervised throughout their lives and, thus, targets of more intense social control at an
early age, are expected more likely than American employees to believe that they cannot
avoid detection and ignore the threat of punishment should it be imposed by people in
authority. Stated differently, Japanese employees are predicted to encounter more agents
of social control, or at least they think they do, and perceive a greater threat of
management sanctions, making them less noncompliant. The more frequent monitoring
attaches a greater threat of management sanctions to deviant behaviors, dissuading
Japanese employees from acting on their deviant motivations. Thus, the perceived
management sanction threat serves as an intervening variable between culture and
noncompliant tendencies.

In conclusion, these three patterns of relationships involving three types of
sanction threats are the source of the specified inverse sign of the relationship between
being Japanese and employee involvement in rule violation behaviors. The more
collectivistic the tendency, the greater the social control and the perceived levels of
punishment threats. This, in turn, leads to the lower behavioral inclination to noncomply
with organizational rules and, in consequence, less likelihood that rule violation behavior
will occur. That is, the three perceived punishment threats are considered in the
conceptualization here as three independent mediators that link culture with noncompliant
tendencies.
Chapter 6:

Cultural Differences in Deterrent Effects of Sanction Threats

Culture and Deterrent Effects of Sanction Threats

Literature on criminality regularly draws attention to gender differences in the deterrent effects on deviance (Hagen, Gillis, & Simpson, 1979, 1985; Hagan, Simpson, & Gillis, 1987), but the role of culture has been neglected. To date, there have been no empirical tests to determine if deterrent effects of shame, embarrassment, and legal sanction threats differ across cultures.

Hofstede's (1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) cultural variability of individualism-collectivism enables the present research to address this prospect. It is argued that collectivity and individuality—cultural values emphasized, developed, and maintained throughout adulthood—contribute to culturally differentiated deterrent effects of the formal and informal sanction threats. Values on responsibility for maintenance of social relationships in collectivistic cultures and a sense of individuality in individualistic cultures are presumably major factors accounting for the cultural gap. Secondarily, thus, the present research posits, drawing from Hofstede's cultural variability of individualism-collectivism, that the deterrent effects of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions are different for employees in Japanese and U.S. organizations.

Culture and Deterrent Effects of Shame

In Grasmick and Bursik's (1990) formulation, shame functions as a powerful deterrent. It is defined as a self-imposed informal cost when individuals "offend their own conscience by engaging in behavior they consider morally wrong" (1990, p. 837). It is experienced immediately as an injury to self-respect or a blow to self-esteem, and it can occur even if no one else is aware of the transgression.

The prediction derived from this conceptualization is that the threat of shame is a greater deterrent for Japanese than for American employees. Japanese employees are
expected to be more influenced than American employees by guilt feelings or self-stigma. Howard Kaplan's (1975) argument of self-esteem provides a beginning of the rationale for this prediction. According to Kaplan, we develop our sense of self through social interaction with others in the groups to which we belong (e.g., families, peers). We learn to place a particular value on ourselves as a person and on our behavior through others' reactions to us. Being a member of the group entails being held in esteem by the group. A loss of self worth or status as an individual thus leads to a loss of status as a member. A loss of self worth is total extinction of the individual that has existed as a member of the group. In short, it is a total loss of identity.

The principles of individualism-collectivism (Hofstede, 1980, 1983, 1984, Hofstede & Bond, 1984) complete the rationale for the prediction—that the threat of shame is a stronger deterrent for Japanese employees than for American employees. A loss of self worth or self-esteem is expected to be more influential in collectivistic Japanese than in individualistic U.S. work environments. According to Hofstede, while the emphasis in individualistic cultures is on being independent, the emphasis in collectivistic cultures is on the maintenance of social relationships. Insofar as the collectivistic nature of Japanese employees are more likely than the highly individualistic nature of American employees to function in a tightly knit social framework, they are more likely to have a sense of self anchored in valuable relationships with other employees. This, in turn, leads Japanese employees to be more concerned with self-esteem or concepts in which they are held by in such relationships (see also Braithwaite, 1989). Once damaged, it is more difficult for Japanese employees to re-establish self-esteem or concepts in their heavily enmeshed fabric of social relationships with others. Conversely, since it is generally easier for American employees operating in a loosely knit social framework to obtain comparable replacement self-concepts or esteem, they are expected to have much less to lose than do Japanese employees if they have a guilt-feeling or self-stigma. Thus, the current study postulates that compared to American employees, Japanese employees are more deterred
from expressing deviant impulses by their calculation of a self-imposed punishment threat of shame.

**Culture and Deterrent Effects of Embarrassment**

Another informal cost which operates as a strong deterrent is embarrassment. According to Grasmick and Bursik (1990, p. 839), it is defined as a socially imposed cost that individuals experience when they "violate norms which significant others support." It is experienced immediately as the pain of stigma or a loss of respect from such people, and occurs when such people become aware of the actors' transgression. While the self potentially is a source of punishment threat, so are significant other employees (broadly defined to include colleagues and supervisors) whose opinion about an employee are considered important and valuable by that employee.

The prediction derived from this conceptualization is that the threat of embarrassment is a stronger deterrent for employees in Japanese than in U.S. work environments. Japanese employees are expected to be more influenced than American employees by a loss of respect or social stigma from reactions of significant other employees. The principles of labeling theory offer the beginning of a rationale for this prediction. According to Curran and Renzetti (1994), what is crucial is that others respond to an individual's rule violation behavior, labeling him or her a deviant. "This may be done informally," Curran and Renzetti maintain, "but of greater significance to labeling theorists is when this process takes place in what they refer to as 'public status degradation ceremonies'" (1994, p. 230). The label "deviant" makes up a "master status"—a status that has the precedence over all other statuses or characteristics of the employee. Other employees, who have deeply ingrained and preconceived ideas of what a deviant is like—untrustworthy and unpredictable—starts organizing their interactions with the labeled employee in accord with these stereotypes. They may not only lose respect for the labeled employee, but also stop socializing and exclude him or her from social environments.
This contention is extended to propose that a loss of respect from significant others or social stigma is experienced as more costly by Japanese employees than by American employees—implying that the former would be more deterred by the threat of embarrassment. It is predicted that Japanese employees are more dissuaded from acting on deviant motivations by the fear of repulsion of social stigmatization by those employees. Recall Hofstede’s (1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) argument that while social development in individualistic cultures is predicated on a sense of individuality, socialization in collectivistic cultures stresses the responsibility for maintaining social relationships. Insofar as Japanese employees are more likely to operate in a dense network of social relationships with other employees, they are more likely to have accumulated valuable relationships with those employees. The loss of respect or negative self-image in collectivistic Japanese work environments is the worst thing that can happen to any employee (e.g., Hirokawa & Miyahara, 1986; Ting-Toomey, 1989). It is generally more difficult to obtain comparable replacement relationships with other employees and regain social respectability once they are derogated. Losses for Japanese employees are greater than for American employees in the arena of social relationships and reputation. The current study predicts, therefore, that compared to American employees, Japanese employees are more deterred from carrying out deviant impulses by the socially imposed punishment threat of embarrassment.

Culture and Deterrent Effects of Management Sanctions

According to Grasmick and Bursik (1990), the third possible punishment which decreases expected noncompliant behavior is state-imposed formal sanctions that individuals experience in the form of physical and/or material deprivation (e.g., fines and incarceration). Applying this conceptualization to work environments, administratively imposed management sanctions are a comparable replacement. These formal sanctions operate as deterrents via the regularized bureaucratic rules and corresponding sanctions established by people in authority within the work organization. They are experienced in
the form of instituted material and/or physical deprivation (such as fines, suspensions, and discharges), and occur immediately upon the presence of detection by managerial authorities.

The prediction derived from this conceptualization is that the threat of management sanctions is a stronger deterrent for Japanese employees than for American employees. Japanese employees are expected to be more influenced than American employees by instituted material and/or physical deprivation. The principles of cultural variability of individualism-collectivism provide a rationale for this prediction. Recall Hofstede's (1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) argument that while people in individualistic cultures such as the United States are socialized to break away from dependency and assert dominance, people in collectivistic cultures such as Japan are trained to accept an ongoing status of dependency on their primary and secondary groups (e.g., parents, school, employers). For Americans, the relationship between employees and people in authority is based on the premise of mutual advantage; for Japanese, it carries a moral component based on mutual obligations. In U.S. work environments, "either party can terminate it if it can exchange it for a more advantageous deal elsewhere" (Hofstede, 1984, p. 87). In Japanese employment practices, however, receiving instituted penalties such as fines and suspensions, not to mention discharges, is a socially disapproved event. It is a reflection of disloyalty of the employee toward the employer and invites social stigmatization for the employee. It is more difficult for Japanese employees, who operate in a tightly knit social framework, to reestablish comparable social respectability and regain trust once they are penalized. Losses would be experienced as more costly by Japanese employees than American employees, particularly in the arena of social respectability. To sum up, Japanese employees are predicted to be more deterred than American employees not only by their rational calculation of informal punishment threats of shame and embarrassment, but also by formal management sanction threats.
Chapter 7:
Models and Hypotheses

The present research examines cultural differences in noncompliant tendencies between Japanese and American employees. Specifically, two patterns of multivariate relationships involving three types of sanction threat variables from rational choice perspective are proposed as potential sources of an inverse relationship between being Japanese and involvement in noncompliant behavior. First, Japanese employees are less likely to engage in deviant acts because they perceive higher risks of punishment threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions than American employees. The foundation for this claim is located in the premises of cultural variability of individualism-collectivism (Hofstede, 1980, 1983, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984) and rational choice decision-making theory (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993): collectivistic Japanese employees are more controlled than highly individualistic American employees in early childhood, leading them to perceive greater sanctions and, thus, be less noncompliant. Thus, the current research postulates the following five hypotheses.

H1: Japanese employees will perceive a greater threat of shame than will American employees.

H2: Japanese employees will perceive a greater threat of embarrassment than will American employees.

H3: Japanese employees will perceive a greater threat of management sanctions than will American employees.

H4: The perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions will lower the likelihood of noncompliance with organizational norms.

H5: Japanese employees will be less likely than American employees to noncomply with organizational norms as a result of their greater threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions.
Alternatively, the present research proposes that Japanese employees are less inclined to participate in deviant acts because, compared to American employees, they are more deterred by the threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions they perceive. In other words, for workplace noncompliant behaviors, Japanese employees are more strongly influenced by sanction threats than American employees, proposing a possibility of interaction effects between cultural difference (Japanese and American) and each of the three punishment threats on noncompliant tendencies. Thus, this research posits the following three hypotheses.

H6: The perceived threat of shame will have more of a deterrent effect for Japanese employees than for American employees.

H7: The perceived threat of embarrassment will have more of a deterrent effect for Japanese employees than for American employees.

H8: The perceived threat of management sanctions will have more of a deterrent effect for Japanese than for American employees.
Chapter 8:
Methods

Data

To test the hypotheses, data were collected in summer 1997 in two surveys of employees working at all hierarchical levels (excluding doctors) of university hospitals in Japan and in the United States. For each survey, a target size of 200 employees was set and self-administered questionnaires were distributed. The self-administered questionnaires were adopted because they afforded subjects greater privacy while answering the questions. Since most of the questions concerned rule violations, this procedure helped to minimize socially desirable responses.

The survey of Japanese university hospital employees contained questions written in Japanese measuring current behavioral intentions to noncomply with three categories of organizational rules and three types of perceived punishment threats (shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions) for the noncompliant behaviors (see Appendix A). The same questionnaire items written in English were used in the survey of U.S. university hospital employees (see Appendix B).

The steps involved in the data collection were as follows. For the survey of Japanese employees, an administrative officer in a university hospital with a total number of about 850 employees (excluding doctors), located in a northeastern part of Japan, gave permission for her employees to serve as voluntary participants. Initial contact was in a letter briefly describing the nature of the survey and indicating that the researcher would soon try to schedule an appointment with the officer. Attempts to schedule the appointment were made in person by the researcher and her two native Japanese assistants. Given the target sample size of 200 employees, this negotiation was arranged in a way that a supervisor in each of five medical divisions would be responsible for randomly selecting a total of 275 employees and distributing questionnaires to them. Each
employee filled out the questionnaire at his or her convenience and returned it to his or her supervisor. The returned questionnaires were then collected by the administrative officer and given to one of the two assistants in person. The proportion of employees who responded to the survey was 93.1 percent. A total of 256 Japanese employees responded to the anonymous, self-administered questionnaires.

For the survey of American employees, an administrative officer in a university hospital with a total number of about 1,000 employees (excluding doctors), located in a southwestern part of the United States, gave permission for her employees to be participants. Like the survey of Japanese employees, initial contact was in the form of a letter briefly describing the nature of the survey and suggesting that the researcher would soon try to schedule an appointment with the officer. Attempts to schedule the appointment were made in person by the researcher and her instructor. This negotiation was arranged in a manner that the officer's assistant would be in charge of distributing questionnaires to all employees (excluding doctors). Each employee answered the questionnaire at his or her convenience and mailed it to the researcher. The return rate was 29.2 percent. A total of 340 employees responded to the anonymous, self-administered, mailed survey questionnaires.

To control for the possible effect of different cultural backgrounds among respondents in the U.S. university hospital, 68 respondents were eliminated as they reported being non-white. This restriction, plus missing cases on any of the variables described below, resulted in an N of 238 for American sample and 231 for Japanese sample.

Comparisons of the two samples indicate that the Japanese sample differed significantly from the U.S. sample in percentage male (16.0 percent in the Japanese sample, 27.3 percent in the American sample), mean age (36.0 years old in the Japanese sample, 41.0 years old in the American sample), and mean education of employees (14.6 years of education in the Japanese sample, 15.5 years of education in the American sample).
To avoid confounding findings, these three demographic variables were included as controls in the analyses.

**Measures**

This section describes the instruments used to measure the dependent and independent variables of the study. Given financial and time constraints, the structure of questions was close-ended in order to make data analysis manageable. All question items were designed to maximize clarity and brevity, along with mutually exclusive response categories. Prior to the actual distribution of the questionnaire, these items were pre-tested on five native English speakers. Feedback from the pre-test was used to improve instructions and clarity of items in the questionnaire.

To develop the Japanese version of the questionnaire, every effort was made to insure literal compatibility with the English one. Initially, the questionnaires were translated into Japanese by two bilingual Japanese graduate students. Their translations were subsequently verified by two other Japanese natives.

**Noncompliance with Organizational Norms**

The dependent variable proposed in Hypotheses 4-8 is respondents' noncompliance with organizational norms, operationalized as the behavioral inclination to commit each of three offenses in the future (see Appendix A, questions 45-47; and Appendix B, questions 46-48). As Grasmick and Bursik (1990) point out, behavioral intentions and subsequent behaviors are not synonymous. An employee's current intention to commit an offense may not be apparent in actual behavior in the future. However, the present research takes the stance, consistent with the rational choice decision-making model, that "any discrepancy between present intention and future behavior is expected to result from changes over time in the expected utility of crime, including changes in perceived costs" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, pp. 844-845). This stance enables the researcher to assess the effects of present perceptions of each punishment threat on present estimates of whether or not to commit an offense in the future.
The two surveys included three product deviance questions used in Hollinger and Clark's (1982) research on deterrence in the workplace: (a) take a long lunch or break without approval, (b) come to work late or leave early without approval, and (c) use sick leave when not really sick. The decision to focus on these three forms of counterproductive deviance was pragmatic because these three are inherently believable organizational rule violation behaviors (Harper & Hirokawa, 1988; Hirokawa & Miyahara, 1986; Hollinger & Clark, 1982). These are behaviors that both Japanese and American employees can see themselves engaging in, or have previously engaged in, within their respective work environments. In support of this decision, Hollinger and Clark (1988) report that these three are the most frequently occurring forms of productive deviance—at least in the U.S. work environments.

To measure involvement in the deviant behaviors, respondents were simply asked whether they thought they would commit each of the three offenses in the future. For each offense, a code of 0 was assigned if the respondents thought they would not commit it and a code of 1 was assigned if the respondents thought they would commit it. In the combined samples (N=469), 34.1 percent reported that they would "take a long lunch or break without approval"; 27.1 percent reported they would "come to work late or leave early without approval"; 25.4 percent reported they would "use sick leave when they are not really sick."

**Shame, Embarrassment, and Management Sanctions**

The dependent variables in Hypotheses 1-3 are perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions, operationalized as the product of current estimates of certainty and severity of punishments for the organizational offenses. The questions included parallel the original perceived threat measures used in Grasmick and Bursik's (1990) research on noncompliance with laws. Unlike Grasmick and Bursik, however, the current research focuses on deterrence to noncompliance with organizational rules for business employees, and the perceived threat measures are thus modified in form.
Consistent with the rational choice perspective (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik, & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993), three steps were taken to create reliable and valid measures of punishment threats. As a first step, the perceived certainty of each of the three punishment threats was assessed. For perceived certainty of shame, respondents were asked if they "would feel guilty" if they committed each of the three offenses (see Appendix A, questions 09, 11, and 13; and Appendix B, questions 10, 12, and 14). For perceived certainty of embarrassment, respondents were asked if most of the employees whose opinions they value would lose respect for them if they committed each of the three offenses (see Appendix A, questions 21, 23, and 25; and Appendix B, questions 22, 24, and 26). For perceived certainty of management sanctions, respondents were asked if they thought they "would get caught" by people in authority if they committed each of the three offenses (see Appendix A, questions 33, 35, and 37; and Appendix B, questions 34, 36, and 38). Response options for each certainty scale were "definitely would not" (coded 1), "probably would not" (coded 2), "probably would" (coded 3), and "definitely would" (coded 4).

The means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are presented in Table 1 in the columns labeled "C.", The means for the certainty of shame tend to be higher than for the other two types of punishment threats. The largest certainty mean in the table is 3.63 for certainty of shame for coming to work late or leaving early without approval. The lowest is 2.68 for the certainty of management sanctions for using sick leave when not really sick.

As a second step, perceived severity for each of the three punishment threats was scaled. For perceived severity of shame, respondents were asked if they did feel guilty for committing each of the three offenses, how big a problem this would create for them (see Appendix A, questions 10, 12, and 14; and Appendix B, questions 11, 13, and 15).
Table I

Means (and Standard Deviations) of Certainty (C), Severity (S), and the Product of C and S (C*S) of Shame, Embarrassment, and Management Sanctions (N=469)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>C*S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shame</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking a long lunch or break</td>
<td>3.354</td>
<td>3.104</td>
<td>10.945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.808)</td>
<td>(1.066)</td>
<td>(5.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coming to work late or leaving early</td>
<td>3.627</td>
<td>3.452</td>
<td>12.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.673)</td>
<td>(1.086)</td>
<td>(5.184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using sick leave</td>
<td>3.522</td>
<td>3.429</td>
<td>12.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.655)</td>
<td>(1.005)</td>
<td>(4.890)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Embarrassment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking a long lunch or break</td>
<td>2.731</td>
<td>3.503</td>
<td>9.908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.845)</td>
<td>(.991)</td>
<td>(4.791)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coming to work late or leaving early</td>
<td>2.945</td>
<td>3.631</td>
<td>11.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.807)</td>
<td>(.969)</td>
<td>(4.946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using sick leave</td>
<td>2.979</td>
<td>3.586</td>
<td>11.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.814)</td>
<td>(1.010)</td>
<td>(5.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management Sanctions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long break or lunch</td>
<td>2.868</td>
<td>3.463</td>
<td>10.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.847)</td>
<td>(.990)</td>
<td>(4.732)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come to work late or leave early</td>
<td>3.307</td>
<td>3.625</td>
<td>12.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.768)</td>
<td>(.976)</td>
<td>(4.861)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use sick leave</td>
<td>2.682</td>
<td>3.614</td>
<td>9.985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.947)</td>
<td>(.995)</td>
<td>(5.022)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For perceived severity of embarrassment, respondents were asked if most of the employees whose opinions they value within their hospital did lose respect for them, how big a problem this would create for them (see Appendix A, questions 22, 24, and 26; and Appendix B, questions 23, 25, and 27). For perceived severity of management sanctions, respondents were asked if persons in authority caught and decided what their punishment would be, how big a problem it would create for them (see Appendix A, questions 34, 36, and 38; and Appendix B, questions 35, 37, and 39). Response options for each severity item were "no problem at all" (coded 1), "hardly any problem" (coded 2), "a little problem" (coded 3), "a big problem" (coded 4), and "a very big problem" (coded 5).

The means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported in Table 1 in the columns labeled "S." By contrast to the certainty means which tend to be highest for shame, the severity means tend to be lower for shame than for the other two punishment threats. The highest severity mean is 3.63 for embarrassment for coming to work late or leaving early without approval. The lowest is 3.10 for shame for taking a long lunch or break without approval.

A final step in the development of the punishment threat measures was to multiply certainty items by severity items. For each of the three types of punishment threats (shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions) for each of the three offenses, the certainty item was multiplied by the severity item. These products are then treated as variables in the subsequent analyses.

Each threat scale potentially ranges from 1 to 20, and the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported in the columns labeled "C X S" in Table 1. For all three categories of deviant behavior, the mean product is the greatest for shame: 10.95 for taking a long lunch or break without approval; 12.98 for coming to work late or leaving early without approval; and 12.45 for using sick leave when not really sick.
Culture

In the current research, culture is a key independent variable. It is classified into two categories in the analyses: Japanese and Americans. Employees who responded to the Japanese version of the questionnaire are categorized as Japanese: in fact, the Japanese university hospital practices a rule that all employees must be Japanese. The second category is derived from employees who answered the English version of the questionnaire and reported their race to be Caucasian (see Appendix B, question 02). In the analyses that follow, these two categories are treated as a dummy variable (coded 1 for Japanese and 0 for Americans), with Japanese comprising 49.3 percent of the merged samples. The regressions to be reported are thus comparisons of Japanese with American respondents.

Control Variables

Assuming that differences among respondents in the relationship of each of the three sanction threats and engagement in deviant behaviors are, in part, a function of possible sources of spuriousness outside of the present research, three sociodemographic variables were included as controls: gender, age, and years of formal education.

In the analyses, gender is a dummy variable coded 1 for males and 0 for females and having a mean (i.e., proportion male) of .22 (see Appendix A and B, question 01). Age and years of formal education are interval level variables with means of 38.5 and 15.0 and standard deviations of 9.9 and 1.9, respectively (see Appendix A, questions 02 and 04; and Appendix B, questions 03 and 05). Post high school education but no college is treated equivalent to one year of college, while 3-year nursing school education is treated equivalent to three years of college.

Finally, the analyses control past involvement in counterproductive behaviors. Grasmick and Bursik (1990) suggests that past offending influences current perceived threats of informal and formal sanctions and, in consequence, intention to engage in the deviant behaviors. They argue that current perceived threats and behavioral inclinations to
commit an offense are dependent, at least to some extent, on past involvement in the offense. There is a possibility that previous norm violation experiences may function as a potential source of spuriousness. For each of the three offenses, respondents were asked whether they had committed each offense at least once in their entire lives (see Appendix A, questions 48-50; and Appendix B, questions 49-51). In the combined samples (N=469), 30.9 percent said they had taken a long lunch or break without approval; 30.7 percent said they had come to work late or left early without approval; and 15.6 percent said they had used sick leave when they were not really sick. These items, coded 1 for respondents who reported they had committed the offense and 0 for those who reported they had not, allow this study to assess the effects of current perceived sanction threats on current behavioral intentions to commit the offense while controlling for prior offending.
Chapter 9:

Analysis

Plan of Analysis

The current research proposes that cultural differences in the variable of future involvement in deviant behavior may stem from cultural differences in perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions. To test the proposal, the analysis is performed in three steps. First, t-tests comparing the Japanese sample to the American sample for offense measures and measures of perceived threats are conducted. Then, bivariate correlations among all variables are computed. Finally, a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions are applied as direct tests of the specific eight hypotheses. Since direction is predicted, one-tailed tests are appropriate, and the conventional .05 level is used for judgments concerning significance.

Cultural Differences in Perceived Levels of Sanction Threats

As direct tests of the first three hypotheses, the theoretical variables of perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions are regressed on culture and control variables of gender, age, education, and prior offending. Two equations are presented for each of the three perceived punishment threats for each of the three categories of deviant acts. The first equation reports the regression of each of the three punishment variables on culture. The standardized coefficient, or Beta, for Japanese represents a simple bivariate effect of being Japanese (coded 1 for Japanese and 0 for whites), compared to Americans, on the punishment variable. This coefficient suggests whether there is a significant difference in the perceived degree of each threat. The present research predicts that for the theoretical variables of perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions, the coefficient for Japanese should be positive and significant. In other words, Japanese are expected to perceive a significantly higher threat of each of the three sanction threats.
Equation 2 adds the control variables of gender (coded 1 for male), age, education, and prior offending (coded 1 for respondents who reported they had committed the offense) to determine whether the effect of Japanese on perceived punishment threat is spurious due to some combination of the effects of these control variables. The current research proposes that the standardized coefficient for Japanese may decrease, but should continue to be significant with the addition of these control variables.

**Cultural Differences in Future Intention to Participate in Noncompliant Behavior**

A series of OLS regressions are performed to examine Hypothesis 4 which proposes inverse direct effects of perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions on intended future offenses, and Hypothesis 5 concerning the inverse direct effect of culture on the future offending mediated by these three threats. To test these hypotheses, intended future offense is regressed on culture, three perceived threats, and control variables.

A total of nine equations are presented for each of the three future offenses. The first equation reports the regression of a theoretical variable of future offense on culture. The standardized coefficient, or Beta, for Japanese represents a simple bivariate effect of being Japanese (coded 1 for Japanese) on the theoretical variable. This coefficient suggests whether Japanese employees are less inclined than American employees to participate in future offenses. The present research predicts that for the theoretical variable of future offenses, the coefficient for Japanese should be inverse and significant without controlling for the three types of punishment threats.

Equation 2 adds the control variables of gender (coded 1 for male), age, education, prior offending (coded 1 for yes) to determine whether the anticipated inverse effect of Japanese is the result of spuriousness due to these four variables. The current research proposes that with the inclusion of these sociodemographic variables to the analysis, the coefficient for Japanese may decrease, but remain significant.
Equation 3-5 add, one at a time, the threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions to the previous equation containing Japanese and the control variables. These equations enable the research to assess the extent to which each threat, by itself and without controls for the others, accounts for the inverse effect of Japanese on future offending. The current research postulates that the significant inverse effect of being Japanese on future offenses is mediated by greater levels of sanction threats perceived by Japanese employees compared to American employees. Specifically, Japanese employees are expected to perceive greater threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions than do American employees, leading to significantly less likelihood of future offenses. Thus, the intervening effects of sanction threats should be inverse in sign and statistically significant. Also, the effects of sanction threats should render the effect of being Japanese on future offenses insignificant.

Equation 6-8 contain the various combinations of two threats, along with culture and control variables. These equations permit examination of which combinations of the two threats are effective in accounting for the cultural differences in the likelihood of noncompliant behavior. With the addition of two types of punishment threats, the standardized coefficient, or Beta, for each threat should be inverse, making the standardized coefficient for Japanese insignificant.

Equation 9 includes all three threats, along with culture and control variables. Threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions in the equation enable the research to compare the direct effects of intervening variables of these threats. The current research predicts that the standardized coefficient, or Beta, for each threat is inverse in sign and statistically significant. Further, with the inclusion of all three sanction threats, the standardized coefficient for Japanese is expected to become insignificant.

Cultural Differences in Deterrent Effects of Sanction Threats

To test the last three hypotheses, OLS regressions are performed. It is hypothesized that the expected deterrent effect of each of the three sanction threats is
different for Japanese and for American employees. Thus, these hypotheses propose a model of statistical interaction which can be tested by creating product terms of culture (coded 1 for Japanese) and each of the three sanction threats.

One equation is presented for each of the three future offending types. In the equation, intended future offense is regressed on perceived sanction threat, Japanese, and Japanese X Threat. This regression is formulated in the following equation:

\[ \text{Offense} = a + b_1 \text{Threat} + b_2 \text{Japanese} + b_3 (\text{Japanese X Threat}) + e \]

For American respondents who are coded 0 on the dummy variable, the interaction term involving Japanese is zero, and the equation is reduced to \( \text{Offense} = a + b_1 \text{Threat} + e \). Thus, \( b_1 \) is the effect of perceived threat on intended future involvement in the offense for Americans. For Japanese, the equation becomes \( \text{Offense} = (a + b_2) + (b_1 + b_3) \text{Threat} + e \). Therefore, the effect of perceived threat on future offense is \( (b_1 + b_3) \) for Japanese, and a significance test for \( b_3 \) is a test of the difference in the effect of threat on future offending between the two samples.

For three categories of future offense and threat of shame, the b's associated with the three product terms are expected to be inverse and significant, indicating that the deterrent effect of shame on future offending should be significantly higher for Japanese than for American respondents. In other words, the threat of shame is not as strong a deterrent for American respondents as for Japanese respondents. Likewise, for future offending and threat of embarrassment, the b's associated with the three product terms are predicted to be inverse and significant, suggesting greater deterrent effect of embarrassment for Japanese respondents than for American respondents. Finally, with three categories of future offending, the b's for three product terms for management sanctions are expected to be inverse and significant. This indicates that management sanctions in the form of material and/or physical deprivation are more of a stronger deterrent for Japanese respondents than for American respondents.
Analysis

Comparisons of Japanese and American Samples

As a first step toward hypothesis testing, a series of t-tests are reported. Tables 2-4 report simple comparisons of the Japanese and American samples for three rule violation measures, and measures of perceived certainty and severity, as well as the product of certainty and severity, for each of the three threats.

**Taking a Long Lunch or Break without Approval.** The comparison of the two samples concerning a future offense of taking a long lunch or break without approval and perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions for the offense is presented in Table 2.

Insert Table 2 about here

Comparing the Japanese sample to the American sample, the percentage who report they had taken a long lunch or break without approval during their whole lives is significantly lower for the Japanese sample. Likewise, the percentage of Japanese respondents who report they will do so in the future is significantly lower than that of American respondents. These findings are consistent with the expectation of the current research that Japanese employees are more inclined than American employees to avoid noncompliant acts.

Table 2 also reveals significant differences in perceived levels of all three sanction threats in the predicted direction. For each of the three threats, the difference between the two samples is significant for certainty, severity, and the product of the two. Clearly, Japanese respondents, compared with American respondents, perceive greater probability that they will feel ashamed, lose respect from significant other employees, and be caught by management authorities when considering whether or not to take a long lunch or break
### Table 2

**One-tailed t-tests Comparing Japanese and American Samples in Taking a Long Lunch or Break without Approval**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Japanese (N = 231)</th>
<th>American (N = 238)</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Who Have Taken a Long Lunch or Break without Approval in Whole Life</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>52.10</td>
<td>-11.36</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Who Intend to Take Long Lunch or Break without Approval in the Future</td>
<td>13.42</td>
<td>54.20</td>
<td>-10.29</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty of Shame</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>12.24</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Severity of Shame</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>11.83</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty X Severity of Shame (Threat of Shame)</td>
<td>13.81</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>13.90</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty of Embarrassment</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>10.59</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Severity of Embarrassment</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty X Severity of Embarrassment (Threat of Embarrassment)</td>
<td>11.91</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>9.79</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty of Management Sanctions</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>12.53</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Severity of Management Sanctions</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty X Severity of Management Sanctions (Threat of Management Sanctions)</td>
<td>12.38</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>10.85</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
without approval. For severity, Japanese respondents estimate more severe effect of the
guilt-feelings, the loss of respect, and the formal management sanctions. These differences
in certainty and severity for each of the three threats are large enough that the product of
certainty and severity of each threat is significantly greater for Japanese than for American
respondents.

Coming to Work Late or Leaving Early without Approval. The comparison of
Japanese and American respondents for coming to work late or leaving early without
approval and perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions for
the offense is reported in Table 3.

Insert Table 3 about here

The results are similar to the previous rule violation conduct. As expected, a
significant difference exists between the two samples in the percentage who indicate they
had committed the offense during their whole lives. Similarly, for Japanese respondents
compared with American respondents, the percentage who report they will do so in the
future is significantly lower.

Table 3 also shows significant differences in perceived levels of all three
punishment threats. For each of the three threats, the difference between the two samples
is significant for certainty, severity, and the product in the expected direction. Japanese
respondents, compared with American respondents, report a greater likelihood that they
will feel guilty, lose respect from significant other employees, and be caught by people in
authority when considering whether or not to come to work late or leave early without
approval. Similarly, Japanese respondents perceive more severity for guilt-feelings, loss of
respect, and formal sanctions should they occur. These differences in certainty and
severity for each of the three sanction threats are so large that the product of certainty and
severity of each threat is significantly greater for Japanese than for American respondents.
### Table 3

**One-tailed t-tests Comparing Japanese and Whites Samples in Coming to Work Late or Leaving Early without Approval**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Japanese (N = 231)</th>
<th>American (N = 238)</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Who Have Come to Work Late or Leave Early without Approval in Whole Life</td>
<td>19.91</td>
<td>41.18</td>
<td>-5.12</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Who Intend to Come to Work Late or Leave Early without Approval in the Future</td>
<td>12.55</td>
<td>41.18</td>
<td>-7.35</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty of Shame</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>9.11</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Severity of Shame</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty X Severity of Shame (Threat of Shame)</td>
<td>15.48</td>
<td>10.55</td>
<td>11.68</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty of Embarrassment</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Severity of Embarrassment</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty X Severity of Embarrassment (Threat of Embarrassment)</td>
<td>12.77</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty of Management Sanctions</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Severity of Management Sanctions</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty X Severity of Management Sanctions (Threat of Management Sanctions)</td>
<td>13.56</td>
<td>10.97</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

92
Using Sick Leave When Not Really Sick. The comparison of the two samples for an offense of using sick leave when not really sick and perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions for the offense is presented in Table 4.

The results are somewhat different from those for the previous two offenses. Contrary to the expectation, no significant difference is observed between the two samples in the percentage who indicate they had engaged in this rule violation behavior during their whole lives. Neither is there a significant difference in the percentage who report they will do so in the future.

However, the table demonstrates significant differences in perceived levels of all three punishment threats in the predicted direction. For each of the three threats, the difference between the two samples is significant for certainty, severity, and the product. These findings indicate that in considering the projected costs of using sick leave when not really sick, Japanese respondents, compared with American respondents, estimate a higher probability of feeling guilty, losing respect from significant other employees, and being caught by management authority. Japanese respondents also perceive greater severity of the guilt-feelings, the loss of respect, and the management sanctions should they be imposed. These differences in certainty and severity for each sanction threat are large enough then that the product of certainty and severity of each threat is significantly greater for Japanese than for American respondents.

Bivariate Correlations

Before estimating direct effects on future offending of culture and three perceived threats in an OLS regression model, the current study examined, as a second step, all bivariate relationships among the variables used as predictors. In these analyses, data for Japanese and American respondents were merged with Japanese as a dummy variable for
### Table 4

**One-tailed t-tests Comparing Japanese and Whites Samples in Using Sick Leave When Not Really Sick**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Japanese (N = 231)</th>
<th>American (N = 238)</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Who Have Used Sick Leave When Not Really Sick in Whole Life</td>
<td>15.58</td>
<td>15.55</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Who Intend to Use Sick Leave When Not Really Sick in the Future</td>
<td>22.94</td>
<td>22.73</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty of Shame</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Severity of Shame</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty X Severity of Shame (Threat of Shame)</td>
<td>13.57</td>
<td>11.37</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty of Embarrassment</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Severity of Embarrassment</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty X Severity of Embarrassment (Threat of Embarrassment)</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td>10.09</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty of Management Sanctions</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>15.70</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Severity of Management Sanctions</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Certainty X Severity of Management Sanctions (Threat of Management Sanctions)</td>
<td>12.41</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>11.71</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
culture, coded 1 for Japanese. The threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions were the products of the certainty and severity measures. Male was a dummy variable for gender, coded 1 for males. Age and years of education were interval variables measured in years. Finally, prior offending was a dummy variable for past involvement in the offense, coded 1 for respondents who said they had committed the offense during their lives.

Tables 5-7 report the bivariate correlations involving the dependent variables (i.e., the inclinations to commit each of the three offenses in the future). It is found that prior offending is more strongly correlated with the dependent variables than are culture (coded 1 for Japanese and 0 for Americans), perceived threats, and sociodemographic variables. These correlations range from a low of +.547 to a high of +.735. However, all three bivariate correlations involving Japanese and behavioral intentions are inverse, as predicted. This indicates that Japanese respondents are less likely than white respondents to commit the offenses in the future. For intended future offense of taking a long lunch or break without approval, the bivariate correlation with Japanese is -.430; for intended future involvement in coming to work late or leaving early without approval, -.322; and for intended future involvement in using sick leave when not really sick, -.055. The first two correlations achieve significance beyond the .001 level, but the last one fails to do so (p=.117).

Strong significant correlations in the predicted direction exist between future offending and the intervening variables of perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions. All nine correlations involving future offense and perceived threats (i.e., products of certainty and severity) are inverse and statistically significant beyond the .001 level. This suggests that the threats of shame, embarrassment, and
Table 5

Correlations of Behavioral Intention to Take a Long Lunch or Break without Approval with Perceived Threats and Control Variables (N=469, one-tailed tests)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Long lunch or break</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Japanese</td>
<td>-.430</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(3) Shame</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) Embarrassment</td>
<td>-.295</td>
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<td>.556</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Management sanctions</td>
<td>-.345</td>
<td>.449</td>
<td>.583</td>
<td>.564</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(6) Male</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>-.137</td>
<td>-.164</td>
<td>-.136</td>
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<tr>
<td>(7) Age</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>-.254</td>
<td>-.110</td>
<td>-.154</td>
<td>-.117</td>
<td>.185</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>(.093)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Education</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>-.245</td>
<td>-.170</td>
<td>-.068</td>
<td>-.227</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.072)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.101)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(9) Prior offense</td>
<td>.735</td>
<td>-.465</td>
<td>-.475</td>
<td>-.306</td>
<td>-.331</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.101)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Come to work late or leave early</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Japanese</td>
<td>-.322</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Shame</td>
<td>-.435</td>
<td>.476</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) Embarrassment</td>
<td>-.239</td>
<td>.345</td>
<td>.544</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Management sanctions</td>
<td>-.285</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>.572</td>
<td>.536</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Male</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>-.137</td>
<td>-.202</td>
<td>-.101</td>
<td>-.201</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Age</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>-.254</td>
<td>-.178</td>
<td>-.139</td>
<td>.185</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>(8) Education</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>-.245</td>
<td>-.181</td>
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<td>-.200</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>(9) Prior offense</td>
<td>.728</td>
<td>-.230</td>
<td>-.322</td>
<td>-.184</td>
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<td>.064</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>-.081</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
<td>(.183)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7

Correlations of Behavioral Intention to Use Sick Leave When Not Really Sick with Perceived Threats and Control Variables (N=469, one-tailed tests)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Use sick leave</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Japanese</td>
<td>-.055</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Shame</td>
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<td>.225</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Embarrassment</td>
<td>-.263</td>
<td>.202</td>
<td>.524</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Management sanctions</td>
<td>-.219</td>
<td>.476</td>
<td>.466</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Male</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>-.137</td>
<td>-.212</td>
<td>-.112</td>
<td>-.204</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Age</td>
<td>-.058</td>
<td>-.254</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>-.128</td>
<td>-.188</td>
<td>.185</td>
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<tr>
<td>(8) Education</td>
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<td>-.245</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.172</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>.042</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Prior offense</td>
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<td>.001</td>
<td>-.297</td>
<td>-.249</td>
<td>-.149</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.077</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: p-values are shown in parentheses.*
management sanctions operate as deterrents, as expected, to intended future involvement in the three offenses. The correlations are in the range of a low of -.219 for the correlation between management sanctions and using sick leave when not really sick to a high of -.479 between shame and taking a long lunch or break without approval.

Consistent with the expectation, being Japanese is positively correlated with all three perceived threats for each three future offending. All nine correlations containing perceived threats and Japanese reach the significance beyond the .001 level. This suggests that Japanese respondents, compared to American respondents, perceive significantly higher threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions when considering each offense. The correlations range from a low of +.202 for the correlation between Japanese and embarrassment for using sick leave when not really sick to a high of +.541 between Japanese and shame for taking a long lunch or break without approval.

The sociodemographic control variables tend to be related to the perceived threats. For all three threats for all three offenses, men score significantly (p<.05) lower on all three punishment threats than do women, with correlations in the range of -.101 to -.212. Age also has an inverse correlation with each of the threat-offense combinations. With the exception of the correlation between age and shame for using sick leave when not really sick (p=.380), all significance levels achieve significance beyond the .01 level. Education is less consistently related to perceived sanction threats. For two types of future offending (taking a long lunch or break without approval and coming to work late or leave early without approval), education produces significant (p<.001) inverse correlations with shame (-.170 and -.181) and management sanctions (-.227 and -.200), but no correlation with embarrassment. For the offense of using sick leave when not really sick, education has a significant (p<.001) inverse correlation (-.172) with management sanctions, but not with the other two threats.

Prior offending is significantly correlated with all three perceived threats ranging from a low of -.149 for the correlation between management sanctions and using sick
leave when not really sick to a high of -.475 between shame and taking a long lunch or break without approval. All nine correlations involving prior offending and sanction threats achieve significance beyond the .001 level.

Regression Analysis of Determinants of Perceived Sanction Threats

As direct tests of the seven hypotheses, a series of OLS regressions are performed. Although some variables are dichotomous (e.g., intended future involvement in the offense), an OLS regression model is consistently adopted because the OLS regression, unlike logistic regression, facilitates a comparison of direct effects of intervening variables for three perceived threats. The current research, however, replicates the analyses using a logistic regression model and reaches the same conclusion.

To assess the first three hypotheses, an OLS regression is used to first regress each of the three sanction threats for each of the three future offenses. In the second equation, the control variables are added to determine whether any effect of being Japanese in the first equation is merely a function of the sociodemographic composition of the two samples.

Culture and Shame. Table 8 reports the direct tests of Hypothesis 1 regarding the cultural differences in perceived levels of punishment threat of shame for future offending.

Insert Table 8 about here

Equation 1 reveals that three standardized coefficients, or Beta, for Japanese are positive as expected and statistically significant (p<.001). This indicates that Japanese respondents perceive a greater threat of shame than do American respondents when considering each of the three future offending types. For taking a long lunch or break without approval, the coefficient is +.541; for coming to work late or leaving early without approval, +.476, and for using sick leave when not really sick, +.225.
Table 8

OLS Regression of Shame on Culture and Control Variables (N=469, one-tailed tests)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Long Lunch or Break</th>
<th>Come to Work Late or Leave Early</th>
<th>Use Sick Leave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eq. 1</td>
<td>Eq. 2</td>
<td>Eq. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>.541</td>
<td>.397</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>&lt;.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
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<td>-.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior offense</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-3.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.397</td>
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<td></td>
<td>p</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td></td>
<td>.293</td>
<td>.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Equation 2 adds the control variables of gender, age, education, and prior offending. The coefficients associated with being Japanese are not substantially altered with the addition of these control variables. For taking a long lunch or break without approval, the coefficient is +.397; for coming to work late or leaving early, +.383; and for using sick leave when not really sick, +.247. All three coefficients are significant beyond the .001 level. These findings are consistent with the first hypothesis of the current research that Japanese perceive a higher threat of shame than do Americans when considering future deviant acts.

Equation 2 also shows that some of the control variables have significant direct effects on perceived threats of shame. Males perceive a significantly lower threat of shame than females. For taking a long lunch or break, the coefficient is -.075 (p=.025); for coming to work late or leaving early, -.118 (p=.002); and for using sick leave when not really sick, -.178 (<.001). Age (Beta=.079, p=.037) and education (Beta=.106, p=.008) also have significant direct positive effects on threat of shame for using sick leave when not really sick. These findings indicate that the older and the educated perceive a greater threat of shame when considering future offenses. Prior offending has a statistically significant inverse effect on shame. For taking a long lunch or break without approval, the coefficient is -.397; for coming to work late or leaving early without approval, -.223; and for using sick leave when not really sick, -.269. This suggests that people who say they had committed the offense tend to formulate perceptions of a lower threat of shame.

Culture and Embarrassment. Table 9 reports the multivariate analysis examining Hypothesis 2 regarding the cultural differences in perceived degrees of punishment threat of embarrassment, using an OLS regression model.

Insert Table 9 about here
Table 9

OLS Regression of Embarrassment on Culture and Control Variables (N=469, one-tailed tests)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Long Lunch or Break</th>
<th>Come to Work Late or Leave Early</th>
<th>Use Sick Leave</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eq. 1</td>
<td>Eq. 2</td>
<td>Eq. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>3.951</td>
<td>3.216</td>
<td>3.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>.413</td>
<td>.336</td>
<td>.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.826</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>p</td>
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<td>.050</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
<td>.092</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
<td>.036</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td></td>
<td>.204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior offense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.445</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td></td>
<td>.002</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

103
The results are similar for the perceived threat of embarrassment. The standardized coefficients, or Beta, for Japanese employees in Table 9 are positive as predicted and statistically significant beyond the .001 level. This indicates that Japanese respondents perceive a greater threat of embarrassment for the three offenses than do American respondents. For taking a long lunch or break without approval, the coefficient is +.413; for coming to work late or leaving early without approval, +.345, and for using sick leave when not really sick, +.202.

Addition of the control variables in the second equations does not substantially alter these findings. The coefficients for Japanese employees remain positive and significant beyond the .001 level with controls of the sociodemographic variables of gender, age, education, and prior offending. For taking a long lunch or break without approval, the coefficient is +.336, for coming to work late or leaving early without approval, +.293; for using sick leave when not really sick, +.190. These findings clearly support the second hypothesis of the current research.

The equation also reveals that being male has a barely significant inverse direct effect on embarrassment for taking a long lunch or break without approval (Beta=-.071, p=.050). Age has a significant inverse direct effect on embarrassment for coming to work late or leaving early without approval (Beta=-.100, p=.014). Prior offending has significant inverse direct effects on embarrassment for all three offenses. For taking a long lunch or break without approval, the coefficient is -.140; for coming to work late or leaving early, -.117; and for using sick leave when not really sick, -.238. All these three coefficients are statistically significant beyond the .01 level.

Culture and Management Sanctions. Tests of Hypothesis 3 concerning the cultural differences in perceived levels of punishment threat of management sanctions are reported in Table 10 in the form of OLS regression equations.
The results are similar to those for the perceived informal sanction threats. In the first equation, the standardized coefficients, or Beta, for Japanese employees is positive as expected and statistically significant beyond the .001 level. This indicates that compared to American respondents, Japanese respondents perceive a significantly greater threat of management sanctions when considering the three future offenses. For taking a long lunch or break without approval, the coefficient is +.449; for coming to work late or leaving early without approval, +.266; and for using sick leave when not really sick, +.476.

The addition of the control variables of gender, age, education, and prior offending in Equation 2 does not substantially change these findings. The direct effects of being Japanese on the formal sanction threat continue to be positive and statistically significant beyond the .001 level. For taking a long lunch or break without approval, the coefficient is +.340; for coming to work late or leaving early without approval, +.161; and for using sick leave when not really sick, +.434. These findings clearly support the third hypothesis of the current research.

The equation also demonstrates that gender has significant direct effects on the formal sanction threat for all three offenses. The significant inverse coefficients for males suggest that compared to women, men perceive a significantly lower threat of management sanctions. For taking a long lunch or break without approval, the coefficient is -.094 (p=.012); for coming to work late or leaving early without approval, -.136 (p=.001); and for using sick leave when not really sick, -.110 (p=.004). Education also has significant inverse direct effect on management sanction threat for taking a long lunch or break without approval (Beta=-.121, p=.002) and for coming to work late or leaving early without approval (Beta=-.122, p=.003). Prior offending has significant inverse effects on the formal sanction threat for all three offenses. For taking a long lunch or
Table 10

OLS Regression of Management Sanctions on Culture and Control Variables (N=469, one-tailed tests)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Long Lunch or Break</th>
<th>Come to Work Late or Leave Early</th>
<th>Use Sick Leave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eq. 1</td>
<td>Eq. 2</td>
<td>Eq. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
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<td>2.584</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.340</td>
<td>.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.081</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Beta</td>
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<td>-.094</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beta</td>
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<td>.006</td>
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<tr>
<td>p</td>
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<td>.495</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
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<td>.246</td>
<td>.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
break without approval, the coefficient is \(-0.158\), for coming to work late or leaving early without approval, \(-0.167\), and for using sick leave when not really sick, \(-0.140\). All these coefficients are significant beyond the .001 level.

**Regression Analysis of Determinants of Noncompliance Tendencies**

The analyses examining hypotheses 4 and 5 regarding the cultural differences in likelihood to participate in future offenses are presented in Tables 11-13. It is important to emphasize that the intervening effect of any one threat on the relationship between being Japanese and future offenses should be interpreted as a function of the following two magnitudes: (a) the magnitude of cultural differences in the perceived levels of sanction threat and (b) the magnitude of the effect of that threat on intention to become involved in the three offenses.

Isolation of the independent contributions of the three threats to the cultural differences in intended future offenses is not a simple task because, as Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev (1993) assert, there exist strong correlations among these threats. Tables 5-7 demonstrate that all of these correlations are positive and significant beyond the .001 level. The correlations range from a low of \(+0.466\) for the threats of shame and management sanctions for using sick leave when not really sick to a high of \(+0.583\) for the threats of shame and management sanctions for taking a long lunch or break without approval. The current research examined the multicollinearity diagnostics from SPSS outputs in the various regressions, but they suggested no harmful multicollinearity problem.

**Taking a Long Lunch or Break Without Approval.** The effects of culture, control variables, and three perceived threats on the behavioral intention to take a long lunch or break without approval in the future are presented in Table 11.

\[\text{Insert Table 11 about here}\]
Table 11
OLS of Behavioral Intention to Take a Long Break or Lunch without Approval on Independent Variables
(N=469; one-tailed tests in parentheses)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eq. 1</th>
<th>Eq. 2</th>
<th>Eq. 3</th>
<th>Eq. 4</th>
<th>Eq. 5</th>
<th>Eq. 6</th>
<th>Eq. 7</th>
<th>Eq. 8</th>
<th>Eq. 9</th>
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<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
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<td>-.036</td>
<td>-.071</td>
<td>-.065</td>
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<td>-.060</td>
<td>-.032</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.075</td>
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<td>-.034</td>
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<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.177)</td>
<td>(.199)</td>
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<td>b</td>
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<td>-.013</td>
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<td>-.122</td>
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<td>Beta</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.141</td>
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<td>-.129</td>
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<td>p</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(&lt;.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Embarrassment</td>
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<td>Beta</td>
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<tr>
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Equation 1 in Table 11 reports the bivariate standardized effect of culture on the intended future offense. The significant inverse effect (Beta=-.430, p<.001) simply indicates that compared to American respondents, Japanese respondents report they are significantly less likely to take a long lunch or break without approval in the future.

The control variables are added to the regression in Equation 2. The effect of being Japanese remains positive and statistically significant (Beta=-.093, p=.006), with controls of the sociodemographic variables of gender, age, education, and prior offenses. The equation also reveals that education has a significant positive effect (Beta=+.104, p=.001), while prior offense has a positive direct effect (Beta=+.690, p<.001) on the dependent variable of future offense.

Equations 3-5 add, one at a time, the threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions to the previous equation to evaluate a function of each threat, by itself and without controls for the other threats, as an intervening variable in the relationship between culture and the intended future offense. Clearly, addition of these variables does reduce the magnitude of the coefficient for Japanese, supporting Hypothesis 5. The variable that by itself is most effective in accounting for the effect of being Japanese is threat of shame. The coefficient of -.093 for Japanese in equation 2 is reduced by 59% to -.038 and becomes no longer significant with the addition of threat of shame in equation 3. In equations 4 and 5, when only threat of embarrassment and threat of management sanctions are included separately, the reduction in the effect of Japanese is less than in equation 3. In fact, the coefficient for Japanese remains significant (p<.05).

Equations 6-8 contain the various combinations of two threats. Equation 8, which involves embarrassment and management sanctions, is least effective in accounting for the effect of Japanese. In this equation, the coefficient for Japanese is -.063, compared with -.037 for the combination of shame and embarrassment and -.034 for the combination of shame and management sanctions. The coefficients for Japanese in equation 6 and 7 are not much smaller than the -.038 in equation 3, which includes shame and control variables.
These comparisons, therefore, suggest that the greater perceived threat of shame for Japanese employees is the primary source of their lower future intention to take a long lunch or break without approval.

Equation 9 offers additional evidence for this conclusion. When all three perceived threats are included, the coefficient of -.034 for Japanese is only slightly smaller than the coefficient of -.038 from equation 3, which contains shame and control variables. The greater threats of embarrassment and management sanctions that Japanese perceive contribute very little, beyond the greater threat of shame, to the lower inclination of Japanese than American respondents to commit the offense.

While the difference in the perceived levels of shame between the two samples is primarily responsible for the difference in future involvement in taking a long lunch or break without approval, shame is the only threat variable that has a significant deterrent effect (p=.002) on the offense in the merged data set. The coefficient for shame (Beta=-.130) is more than four and half times as great as that for management sanctions (Beta=-.028). Although the direct effect of the formal sanctions is inverse as predicted in Hypothesis 4, it fails to achieve significance (p=.251). The direct effect of embarrassment is not significant (p=.460), as well; in fact, it is positive (Beta=+.004), contrary to the expected "deterrent" effect. These findings suggest that the cultural difference in the perceived levels of shame and its strong deterrent effect are the primary source of less inclination of Japanese respondents to commit the future offense.

The addition of perceived threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions to the equation does not create any changes in the direction nor the statistical significance of all demographic variables. Although the bivariate correlation between male and intention to take a long lunch or break without approval (r=+.089) is significant (p=.026), male does not make a direct contribution to intention to take a long lunch or break without approval and to the cultural difference in the intended involvement in the offense between Japanese and American respondents. The analyses reported in Tables 8-
10 reveal that the direct effect of male is insignificant in equation 9 because men perceive significantly lower threats of shame (Beta=-.075, p=.025), embarrassment (Beta=-.071, p=.050) and management sanctions (Beta=-.094, p=.012) for the offense.

Education makes a direct contribution to future intention to take a long lunch or break without approval. The bivariate correlation between education and the intended future offense is positive (r=+.164) and significant beyond the .001 level, and education has a significant inverse direct effect on the perceived threat of management sanctions (Beta=-.121, p=.002). Nevertheless, even when the formal sanction threat is controlled in equation 9, as well as 5, 7, and 8, education continues to have a significant positive effect of .095 on the future offending (p=.002). Thus, while some of the positive correlation between education and the intended future offense occurs because the more educated people perceive a higher threat of management sanctions, education continues to have a significant effect independent of the formal sanction threat variable.

Equation 9 also reveals that prior offense makes a direct contribution to intention to take a long lunch or break without approval. The bivariate correlation between prior offense and the intended future offense is positive (r=+.735) and significant beyond the .001 level, and prior offense has inverse direct effects on the perceived threats of shame (Beta=-.397, p<.001), embarrassment (Beta=-.140, p=.002), and management sanctions (Beta=-.158, p<.001) for the offense. Nevertheless, even when the three threats are controlled in equation 9, prior offense has a significant positive direct effect of .650 on the future offense. Thus, while some of the positive correlation between prior offense and the intended future offense occurs because people who had committed the offense perceived lower threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions, prior offending has a direct effect independent of these punishment variables.

**Coming to Work Late or Leaving Early Without Approval.** The results are somewhat different for the intended future offense of coming to work late or leaving early without approval. Equation 1 in the Table 12 reports the bivariate standardized effect of
culture on the intended future offense. The significant inverse effect (Beta=-.322, p<.001) simply indicates that Japanese respondents are significantly less likely than American respondents to indicate they intend to come to work late or leave early without approval in the future.

The control variables are added to the regression in Equation 2. None of the four sociodemographic variables have significant effects except prior offending. With the addition of these control variables to the analysis, the effect of being Japanese remains significant (Beta=-.154, p<.001).

Equations 3-5 add the threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions separately to the previous equation which contains culture and control variables. Addition of these variables does reduce the magnitude of the coefficient for Japanese. The coefficient is reduced to -.084 when shame is added (Equation 3), to -.135 when embarrassment is added (Equation 4), and to -.140 when management sanctions is added (Equation 5). However, unlike the results in Table 11, the coefficients for Japanese remain significant beyond the .01 level even with the addition of any one of the threats. These findings are in sharp contrast to Hypothesis 5.

Equations 6-8 contain the various combinations of two threats. Equation 8 which includes embarrassment and management sanctions is least effective in accounting for the effect of culture. In this equation, the coefficient for Japanese is -.134, compared with -.085 the two combinations of shame and embarrassment and shame and management sanctions. However, all these three coefficients remain significant beyond the .01 level. This suggests that any one of the greater punishment threats perceived by Japanese respondents is not the source of their lower intention to come to work late or leave early without approval.
### Table 12

**OLS of Behavioral Intention to Come to Work Late or Leave Early without Approval on Independent Variables (N=469; one-tailed tests in parentheses)**

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Equation 9 (all three perceived threats) provides additional evidence for this conclusion. Addition of these variables does reduce the magnitude of the coefficient for Japanese. However, the effect observed for being Japanese on the future offending remains significant with controls for the three perceived threats (Beta=-.087, p=.008). The greater threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions perceived by Japanese respondents contribute very little to their lower likelihood to come to work late or leave early without approval in the future. In other words, the difference in the future intention cannot be attributed to the difference in the perceived threats of these three sanctions between Japanese and American respondents.

While the differences in the perceived levels of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions are not responsible for the difference between the two samples in future involvement in this offense, shame has a significant deterrent effect (p=.002) on the offense in the combined data set. The coefficient for shame (Beta=-.181) is more than eleven times as great as that for management sanctions (Beta=-.019). The direct effect of the formal sanctions is inverse as predicted in Hypothesis 4, but it fails to achieve significance (p=.314). The direct effect of embarrassment is also insignificant (p=.338); again, it is positive (Beta=+.016), in sign, contrary to the expected "deterrent" effect.

Equation 9 also shows that none of the three sociodemographic variables have significant effects, while the effect of prior offending is significant beyond the .001 level. Although the bivariate correlation between male and intention to come to work late or leave early without approval (r=+.109) is significant (p=.009), male does not have a significant direct effect in the equation (Beta=+.019, p=.054). The analyses reported in Tables 8 and 10 reveal that the direct effect of male is insignificant because males are apt to perceive significantly lower threats of shame (Beta=-.118, p=.002) and management sanctions (Beta=-.136, p=.001). The bivariate correlation between education and future offending is also significant (r=+.142, p=.001), but the direct effect is insignificant (Beta=+.031, p=.162). The insignificance of the direct effect appears to result from the
tendency (as reported in Table 10) that the less educated respondents perceive a higher threat of management sanctions ($\beta = -1.22$, $p = .003$).

Prior offense also contributes directly to the future offending with a control for three punishment threats. The bivariate correlation between prior offense and the intended future offense is positive ($r = +.728$) and significant beyond the .001 level, and prior offense has significant inverse effects on the perceived threats of shame ($\beta = -.223$, $p < .001$), embarrassment ($\beta = -.117$, $p = .004$), and management sanctions ($\beta = -.167$, $p = .004$). Nevertheless, even when the three threats are controlled, prior offense has a significant positive direct effect of .619 on the future offense. This indicates that while prior offending might affect future intentions indirectly through the three perceived threats, prior offending also has a direct effect independent of all three punishment threats.

**Using Sick Leave When Not Really Sick.** The results for the future offense of using sick leave when not really sick are somewhat different from those for the previous two offenses. The bivariate $\beta$ for Japanese in Equation 1 in Table 13 is -0.055, indicating that Japanese respondents are less likely than white respondents to commit the offense in the future. However, the coefficient for Japanese is not statistically significant ($p = .117$).

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The control variables are added in Equation 2. With the inclusion of sociodemographic variables of gender, age, education, and prior offense, the coefficient for Japanese becomes significant ($\beta = -.072$, $p = .040$). Specifically, age ($\beta = -.084$, $p = .020$) and prior offending ($\beta = +.547$, $p < .001$) are significantly associated with the future offense, suggesting that these two control variables serve to suppress the inverse relationship between being Japanese and the future offending.
Table 13

OLS of Behavioral Intention to Use Sick Leave When Not Really Sick on Independent Variables (N=469; one-tailed tests in parentheses)

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Equations 3-5 add, one at a time, the threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions to the previous equation. Clearly, the Beta for Japanese in Equation 2 is reduced and becomes insignificant with the addition of each of the three threat variables. The variable that by itself is most effective in accounting for the effect of Japanese is threat of management sanctions. Shame also contributes as much to the effect. In fact, the Beta of -.004 for Japanese in Equation 5, which includes management sanctions, is not much different from Beta of -.018 in Equation 3, which includes shame. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 5 concerning the direct effect of culture being mediated by perceived threat variables.

Equations 6-8 provide support for this conclusion. Equation 7, which contains shame and management sanctions, accounts for all inverse effect of being Japanese on the future offense. With the addition of the two threats, the coefficient for Japanese becomes positive in sign and statistically insignificant (Beta=+.009, p=.425). In Equation 6, which contains shame and embarrassment, the Beta for Japanese is -.014. The corresponding Beta in Equation 8 (embarrassment and management sanctions) is -.004. These comparisons, therefore, also suggest that Japanese employees score significantly higher on future involvement in using sick leave when not really sick primarily because they score significantly higher on the perceived threats of shame and management sanctions.

The conclusions are not altered when all three perceived threats are in Equation 9, along with culture and control variables. The Beta of .007 for Japanese is positive in sign and not much different from the Beta of .009 in Equation 7 (shame and management sanctions). This indicates that the greater threat of embarrassment perceived by Japanese respondents contributes very little, beyond the greater threats of shame and management sanctions, to their lower inclination to use sick leave when not really sick.

While the differences in shame and management sanctions appear to account for all inverse effect of being Japanese on the future offense, shame is the only punishment variable that has a significant inverse effect on intention to use sick leave when not really
sick in the merged data set in Equation 9. The coefficient for shame (Beta=-.184, p<.001) is more than two and a half times as large as the coefficient for management sanctions (Beta=-.066, p=.094). These findings indicate that greater threats of both shame and management sanctions perceived by Japanese respondents contribute directly to their lower intention to be involved in the offense; the greater threat of shame is a primary source of their less intended future offense. The coefficient for the threat of embarrassment is inverse (Beta=-.029), consistent with the expected "deterrent" effect, but it is not statistically significant when shame and management sanctions are controlled.

Equation 9 also shows that the addition of the three perceived threats does not create any changes in the direction nor the statistical significance of all demographic variables. Age continues to make a direct contribution to intention to use sick leave when not really sick (Beta=-.075, p=.030). The results reported in Table 8 demonstrate that age has a significant positive direct effect on the threat of shame for the offense (Beta=+.079, p=.037). Nevertheless, even when the threat of shame is controlled, the direct effect of age remains significant. Thus, while some of the inverse association between age and future offending occurs because older people perceive a higher threat of shame, age continues to have a significant effect independent of the self-imposed punishment variable.

Prior offense also makes a direct contribution to intention to use sick leave when not really sick. The bivariate correlation between prior offense and the intended future offense is positive (r=+.543) and significant beyond the .001 level; and prior offense has inverse direct effects on the perceived threats of shame (Beta=-.269, p<.001), embarrassment (Beta=-.238, p<.001), and management sanctions (Beta=-.140, p<.001). Nevertheless, even when the three threats are controlled, prior offense continues to have a significant positive direct effect of .482 on intention to use sick leave when not really sick. This indicates that prior offending might affect the future intentions indirectly through the three perceived threats; prior offending also has a direct effect independent of the three punishment variables.
Interaction Effects

To test the last three hypotheses, OLS regressions are performed. Results in Table 14 assess the possibility of interaction effects between culture and perceived threats on intended future offenses.

Insert Table 14 about here

Taking a Long Lunch or Break without Approval. For future involvement in taking a long lunch or break without approval and threat of shame, the \( b \) associated with the product term in Table 14 is positive and statistically significant (\( b=+.025, p=.002 \)). This indicates a significant difference between Japanese and American respondents in the deterrent effect of perceived threat of shame on the future offense. The effect (\( b \)) is -.043 for American respondents but only -.018 (i.e., -.043 + .025) for Japanese respondents. Additional analysis reveals that the effect of shame among Japanese is significant (\( p=.002 \)). In contrast to Hypothesis 6, the nature of this interaction suggests that despite their lower likelihood to commit this future offense, Japanese employees are less influenced than American employees by the threat of shame. With this offense as the dependent variable, moral sentiments have more of a deterrent effect for American employees than for Japanese employees.

The significant difference found in the effect of perceived threat of shame on this future involvement between Japanese and American respondents warrants that the product term be left in another equation where the control variables are added to the regression. The analysis, not reported here, indicates that the product term becomes clearly insignificant with the addition of the control variables of gender, age, education, and prior offense (\( p=.355 \)).
Table 14

OLS Regression of Behavioral Intention to Commit the Offense on Culture, Perceived Threats and Interaction Terms (N=469, one-tailed tests)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Long Break or Lunch</th>
<th>Come to Work Late or Leave Early</th>
<th>Use Sick Leave</th>
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<td>p</td>
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For this future offense, the b for the product term in the equation for embarrassment (b=+.013, p=.074) or for management sanctions (b=+.086, p=.262) is not significant. With this measure of the dependent variable, therefore, the magnitude of the deterrent effects of these two perceived threats does not differ significantly between Japanese and American respondents. Specifically, for the threat of embarrassment, regardless of which indicator of the dependent variable is used, the b's for the product terms are not significant. Inconsistent with Hypothesis 7, these findings suggest that the magnitude of the effect of embarrassment on involvement is not a function of culture.

**Coming to Work Late or Leaving Early without Approval.** The significant interaction term for threat of shame using the future involvement reported earlier is replicated with intended future involvement in coming to work late or leaving early without approval as the dependent variable. The signs and magnitudes of the b associated with the product term in Table 14 indicates that the inverse effect of perceived threat of shame on this intended future offense is greater for American respondents (b=-.041) than for Japanese respondents [(-.041)+.026], or -.015, and the b for the product term is significant at the .001 level. Additional analysis reveals that the effect of shame for Japanese is statistically significant (p=.013). Again, these findings are in direct contrast to Hypothesis 6. Regardless of their lower intention to participate in this offense, Japanese employees are less deterred than American employees by their moral beliefs.

Another regression, not reported here, indicates that the interaction effect remains significant even with the control variables in the equation. The inverse effect of the perceived threat of shame is greater for American respondents (-.021) than for Japanese respondents [(-.021)+.013], or -.008, and the difference is statistically significant at the .01 level.

With this intended future involvement, the interaction of culture and threat of management sanctions is significant in a direction which suggests that Japanese respondents are less deterred than white respondents by the formal sanction threat. The
effect is -.031 for American respondents and \((-0.031) + 0.027\) or -.004 for Japanese respondents; the difference in the effect of management sanctions for Japanese and American respondents is .027. Additional analysis demonstrates that the effect of management sanctions for Japanese is not significant \((p=.230)\). These findings are in contrast to Hypothesis 8 that the threat of management sanctions is more of a deterrent for Japanese than for American employees. In spite of less likelihood to be involved in this future offense, Japanese employees are less influenced than American employees by the threat of instituted penalties.

Additional analysis, not reported here, reveals that the interaction effect remains significant even with the controls in the equation. For American respondents, the effect of management is -.015 and significant \((p<.001)\). The effect of management sanctions for Japanese respondents is -.015 plus the coefficient of .014 for the product term, or -.001. Thus, the effect of management sanctions on the future involvement in coming to work late or leaving early is greater for American respondents than for Japanese respondents, and the difference (i.e., the \(b\) for the product term) achieves significance beyond the .01 level.

**Using Sick Leave When Not Really Sick.** The significant interaction terms for threats of shame and management sanctions using the future involvement reported earlier are not observed with intended future involvement in using sick leave when not really sick as the dependent variable. While the signs and magnitudes of the appropriate \(b\)'s in Table 14 reveal that the inverse effects of shame and management sanctions are greater for American respondents than for Japanese respondents, neither of the \(b\)'s for the product terms achieves significance beyond the .05 level.
Chapter 10:
Summary and Discussion

Cultural Differences in
Perceived Levels of Sanction Threats and Noncompliance Tendencies

Summary

The objective of the current research has been to account for cultural differences in noncompliance tendencies through cultural differences in perceived levels of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions between employees in Japanese and U.S. organizations. To do so, this study has proposed that Japanese employees perceive a greater threat of each punishment threat than do American employees. Subsequently, it is argued, Japanese employees are less likely than American employees to commit future offenses.

Hypotheses 1-3 are clearly supported as the analyses offer evidence of significant cultural differences between Japanese and American respondents in the perceived levels of sanction threats in the predicted direction. However, the findings relevant to Hypotheses 4 and 5 are less consistent. For two of the three offenses (i.e., taking a long lunch or break without approval and using sick leave when not really sick), the direct inverse effect of being Japanese is not rendered insignificant with the inclusion of the perceived threats of embarrassment and management sanctions. For the offense to come to work late or leave early without approval, the effect remains significant with the addition of any one of the three threats. Besides, while the differences between the two samples in perceived levels of embarrassment and management sanction threats seem to contribute little beyond the effect of shame to lower noncompliance tendencies of Japanese respondents, neither of these two threats has a significant deterrent effect on any future offense. It is concluded, thus, that these data do not yield clear support for the Hypotheses 4 and 5.
Shame

Grasmick and Bursik (1990) point to the importance of internal control in generating conformity to extant rules, suggesting that internal control might be conceptualized, at least to some extent, as a self-imposed punishment threat of shame which can lower the expected noncompliant behavior. This argument is upheld in the current research. Shame, a variable with a long and recently revitalized tradition in sociology, not only appears in the present analyses as the only significant deterrent to future offending, it also accounts for the lower likelihood of Japanese employees to commit offenses in the future. The inverse relationships between being Japanese and two of the three future offenses (i.e., taking a long lunch or break without approval and using sick leave when not really sick) exist because, compared to American respondents, Japanese respondents perceive significantly higher threats of shame. The significant inverse relationships between Japanese and the two offenses became clearly insignificant with the inclusion of the self-imposed punishment threat. In conclusion, the lower likelihood of Japanese respondents to commit these two offenses is attributable to cultural differences in the perceived threat levels, with Japanese perceiving a higher threat of shame than white respondents.

Embarrassment

The findings for the threat of socially imposed embarrassment are less compatible with the prediction of the current research. Although the inverse relationships between Japanese and future offenses were somewhat attenuated with inclusion of embarrassment, the relationship was not rendered insignificant. For none of the three offenses did the difference in the perceived levels of embarrassment between the two samples make significant contribution to the tendency of Japanese employees to be less noncompliant. Regardless of the significantly higher threat of embarrassment perceived by Japanese than by American respondents, this difference was not responsible for the inverse relationships between being Japanese and future offending. Additional evidence for this conclusion was
offered as the analyses revealed that for none of the three offenses did the threat of embarrassment have a significant deterrent effect, beyond the threat of shame or management sanctions.

These findings are problematic since past research suggests that significant others play an important role in producing conformity with norms (e.g., Andenaes, 1952, 1966; Paternoster et al., 1983; Tittle, 1977; Williams & Hawkins, 1986, 1989). The current research examined the patterns of correlations among the independent variables (i.e., the threat variables and the control variables) to determine if the insignificant direct effect of embarrassment could be due to especially strong correlations with other variables. The correlations between embarrassment and the sociodemographic control variables were not as strong in magnitude as the correlations between shame and these variables, as well as management sanction and these variables. Besides, for all three offenses, the magnitudes of the correlations among the three threat variables were about the same. The collinearity problems surrounding the measure of embarrassment should be no more severe than those surrounding shame and management sanctions.

As Grasmick and Bursik (1990) suggest, one possibility concerns the certainty dimension of embarrassment. In the current research, respondents were asked if most of the employees whose opinions they value would lose respect for them if they committed the offenses. It can be that "among some or all respondents an affirmative response meant they think they would suffer a loss of respect if significant others knew about the transgression" (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990, p. 855). However, they did not necessarily believe that those other employees would discover the transgression. If the perceived chance of detection by significant other employees were zero, then even if the perceived certainty times the severity of embarrassment were high, the employee would be experiencing no threat of embarrassment. A better scale might be developed by multiplying the perceived probability that significant other employees would find out about the offense, times the perceived probability that detection would result in a loss of respect,
times the perceived severity of such a sanction. A more refined measure of threat of embarrassment such as this might have yielded results more consistent with the prediction of the current research, as well as the extant deterrent literature.

Notwithstanding, the effectiveness of embarrassment as a deterrent has been questioned in recent research (e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993; Williams & Hawkins, 1989). Grasmick and Bursik (1990), for example, suggest the possibility that the threat of such a sanction has become a less effective deterrent over time. Perceptions of punishment threat of embarrassment wield less impact on decisions to engage in deviant conduct now than in the past. This position is supported as Grasmick and Bursik reported that embarrassment operated as the weakest deterrent of the three. The direct effect of embarrassment on each of three types of illegal conduct (e.g., tax cheating, petty theft, and drunk driving) was not significant. Williams and Hawkins (1989) also uncovered no significant direct deterrent effect on wife assault of perceived risk of social-stigma resulting from an arrest (see also Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993). Consequently, the findings in the present research that the significant cultural difference in the perceived threat of embarrassment might be offset by the possibility that the effectiveness of embarrassment as a deterrent declined at the same time.

Management Sanctions

The analyses indicate that inclusion of the perceived management sanction threat did substantially account for the cultural difference in the likelihood of one of the three future offenses (i.e., using sick leave when not really sick). The inverse relationship between Japanese and the offense was rendered insignificant with the addition of the formal sanction threat. Cultural differences in the perceived levels of management sanction threat in the predicted direction, along with the effect of shame, accounted for the entire inverse relationship between being Japanese and the offense; in fact, the effect of Japanese became positive in sign when management sanctions and shame were controlled.
Nevertheless, for none of the three offenses did the formal sanctions have a significant deterrent effect beyond the effect of shame and embarrassment. One possibility is that formal sanctions might have an indirect, not direct, effect on noncompliance (e.g., Andenaes, 1952, 1966; Williams & Hawkins, 1989). Andenaes asserts that law, "as a concrete expression of society’s disapproval of an act helps to form and to strengthen the public’s moral codes and thereby conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing crime" (1952, p. 179). Furthermore, Williams and Hawkins argue that legal sanctions may yield indirect deterrent impacts through a loss of self-esteem. Apparently, these views were supported in the current research. The analyses revealed that once the threat of shame was controlled, the direct effect of management sanctions became no longer significant. This indicates that formal sanctions might be a prerequisite for the moralizing impact as a deterrent.

Another possibility concerns the nature of the dependent variable used in the analyses. The present research chose as the dependent variable minor offenses for which the management sanctions for employees would be trivial. On the other hand, for many of the offenses in the workplace (e.g., theft, drug use), the strictly formalized penalties, independent of any informal punishments contingent upon them (i.e., "stigma" of discharges or unemployment) are more severe. In their research on work-related deterrence, Hollinger and Clark (1982, 1983) included serious offenses such as employee theft with presumably the most serious organizational sanctions that culminated in reporting to the police. For all settings, these researchers found that perceived risk of formal sanctions had significant deterrent effects. It is possible, therefore, that in the current study, with the offenses selected, the perceived threat of management sanctions did not reach the threshold necessary for deterrence, while it did in Hollinger and Clark’s research.
Cultural Differences in Deterrent Effects of Sanction Threats

Summary

The current study has also suggested that the deterrent effects of perceived sanction threats are conditioned by culture. It has been proposed that the punishment threats of self-imposed shame and socially imposed embarrassment, as well as formal management sanctions, are more of a deterrent for Japanese employees than for American employees.

The evidence of deterrent effects of these three sanction threats in this study is in sharp contrast to Hypotheses 6-8. Threats of shame, embarrassment, and management sanctions operated as greater deterrents for American than for Japanese respondents. Specifically, the difference in the deterrent effects of shame and management sanctions reached significance, indicating that American employees were more deterred than Japanese employees by these sanction threats.

Interaction Effects of Culture and Shame

The findings for cultural differences in the deterrent effect of shame were inconsistent with Hypothesis 6. For all three offenses, the threat of shame functioned as a greater deterrent for American respondents than for Japanese respondents. Especially for two offenses (i.e., taking a long lunch or break without approval and coming to work late or leaving early without approval), the difference in the deterrent effect of shame was significant in the direction that Japanese respondents were less deterred than American respondents by the threat of shame. Despite their lower intention to commit these offenses, Japanese employees were less influenced than American employees by their moral sentiments.

One possibility for these contradictory findings is a greater tendency for Japanese respondents to choose the extremes for the certainty of shame for the two offenses. The high skewness, with the majority of Japanese respondents reporting that they would surely feel ashamed, creates a pattern yielding substantially smaller standard errors for the
Japanese coefficient for the theoretical variable of shame. This suggests smaller variance around the unstandardized coefficient for Japanese compared to that for American respondents. Consequently, the interaction test for significance may be also influenced, generating contradictory results. On the other hand, however, shame was the threat treated as a product of the certainty and severity of the punishment in the present study. Thus, while the skewness problems surrounding the measure of certainty of shame cannot be underestimated, they cannot fully account for why the deterrent effect of shame (the product of certainty and severity) was greater for American than for Japanese.

Another possibility is that the treatment of morality might be producing different results. The conceptualization of internalized norms is an extension of the conceptualization proposed by Grasmick and his colleagues (Grasmick, Blackwell, Bursik & Mitchell, 1993; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993) which captures internalization of norms as a source of punishment analogous to the state and significant others. The internalization of norms stimulates guilt-feelings in consideration of norm violation conduct; and to avoid the painful feelings employees keep themselves from being noncompliant. However, it might be that Japanese respondents conform to norms simply because they believe in and internalize normative bases. It is possible that they do what is right because it is right, not because they are avoiding costs or punishments (see Etzioni, 1988 for this discussion). If this speculation is correct, it is concluded then that Japanese respondents are more apt to have a "hardened conscience," allowing them to behave contrary to their moral sentiments.

Interaction Effects of Culture and Embarrassment

Hypothesis 7 that the deterrent effect of embarrassment should be significantly stronger for Japanese than for American employees was not supported. The interaction analyses revealed that the deterrent effect of embarrassment was smaller for Japanese than for American respondents, while for none of the three offenses did the difference approach significance. A possibility is that recent movements toward increased "individuation and
separation" characterize Japanese culture. In a highly individualistic society, the opinions of others matter little in shaping one's behavior. In a collectivistic Japanese society with a strong sense of community, the threat of socially imposed embarrassment should serve as a stronger deterrent. Nevertheless, the data indicate that Japanese respondents were less deterred than American respondents by a loss of respect or social stigma. These findings imply, therefore, that the collectivity in a Japanese society has been transforming into individuality in a manner that would substantially reduce the deterrent effects of the socially imposed sanction threat of embarrassment. Cultural patterning of deterrent effects of informal sanctions might be changing over time.

Interaction Effects of Culture and Management Sanctions

The findings for cultural differences in the deterrent effect of management sanctions were not consistent with Hypothesis 8. The hypothesis and rationale suggest that the deterrent effect of formal sanctions would be relevant to the extent that the sanctions (e.g., dismissal, suspension, discharges) associated with the offense impede social relationships. The effect would be dependent on the extent to which instituted penalties accompany a loss of social respectability and distrust. Once derogated, it would be generally more difficult for Japanese employees, who function in a tightly knit social framework, to regain social respect. Losses would be experienced as more costly for Japanese than for American employees. For all three offenses, however, the threat of formal sanctions functioned as a greater deterrent for American respondents than for Japanese respondents. For the offense of coming to work late or leaving early without approval, the difference in the deterrent effect of management sanctions reached significance. These findings, therefore, illustrate that the strategies for linking management sanctions to morality can be a useful heuristic for management in U.S. organizations.
Conclusion

While the current research does not offer clear support for all hypotheses advanced, it does have both pragmatic and theoretical implications. Practically, findings associated with the cultural variabilities in the perceived levels of and in the magnitudes of deterrent of three sanction threats should offer vital information to management practitioners. To secure employee compliance and maximize corporate profits, managers ought to consider the decision-making process of their subordinates. The rationales behind their decisions to comply or not to comply with organizational rules must be integrated into the development of effective persuasive strategies. Without understanding of the culturally differentiated rational calculation of subordinates, the blossoming interests of practitioners in competing with foreign forces and of specialists in expanding their markets on multinational and international levels will be in vain.

Theoretically, the present research should serve as an impetus for future research concerning the role of perceived threat variables in the rational choice decision-making model. The caveats of external validity is acknowledged. Due to the use of university hospital employees as a sample, the conclusions from the current research may be limited to white-collar employees in non-profit seeking organizations. The results may not be generalizable to blue-collar employees in profit seeking business organizations. The impact of this sampling should be realized, therefore, in interpretation of all findings reported here.

More importantly, the present research recognizes the need for advances in measurement, particularly of embarrassment. It used a measure of embarrassment which captured the probability of suffering a loss of respect and the severity of the loss, while others (e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, 1990) have suggested that the perceived probability of detection by significant others might be a prerequisite for the probability of loss of respect. A more refined measure of embarrassment, taking into the perceived risk of detection by other employees, must be tried in the future.
Furthermore, the researcher is aware of the necessity of a greater variety of offenses to ascertain the deterrent effect of management sanction threat. This research has restricted the analyses to only three categories of minor offenses with presumably minor management consequences, and has not considered more serious offenses (such as drug use and theft) with more serious management consequences that may culminate in reporting to the police. A greater variety of offenses should be included in the future to determine the deterrent effect of formal sanction threat.

In addition, the present research realizes that future research will benefit from an extension to include both cost and reward factors. This study has considered only the cost factor in employees' calculations of expected rule violation conduct. However, as the original concept of utility emphasizes, "All actions are directed toward the gain of pleasure or the avoidance of pain" (Dyke, 1981, p. 31). We are purposeful animals and the purpose is to maximize benefits and minimize costs. In support of this view, Scheff (1988, p. 396) argues that the "emotion of pride and shame make up a subtle and pervasive system of social sanctions . . . . We experience the system as so compelling because of emotions—the pleasure of pride and fellow feeling on the one hand, and the punishment of embarrassment, shame, or humiliation on the other." This view must be tested in future research to determine the moral and normative bases of compliance with organizational rules.

Equally important, the current research acknowledges that the treatment of morality as a source of compliance needs to be refined in a manner that can enrich a rational choice perspective across cultures. It has assumed that the perceived threat of shame, originating from internalized norms (or conscience), serves to deter noncompliant behaviors. The theoretical variable has been aimed at respondents' calculation of the self-imposed cost. However, this stance might not be applicable to all nationalities (see Etzioni, 1988 for this discussion). Some employees may comply simply because it is right
to do so, not because they are avoiding costs or punishments. Some employees may not seek causality at all.

Finally, the current research realizes the caveats of simple distinction between Japanese and American employees. The individualistic-collectivistic distinction may be too broad. Differentiating Japanese employees from American employees on the basis of cultural variability on individualism-collectivism dimension may be too simplistic, and ignores the fact that people within cultures vary in their individualistic or collectivistic orientation. In fact, the young generation in Japan increasingly have been changing into individuality. This trend would predict a reduction over time in cultural differences in deterrent effects of perceived sanctions associated with noncompliant behaviors. Change over time in the cultural patterning of perceived risks should be explored in the future.

In conclusion, I would encourage others to incorporate these kinds of issues and other advances in decision-making theory into cross-cultural research on the deterrent effects of self-imposed, socially imposed, and formal sanction threats. Perhaps it is time to move beyond the question of whether the threats of shame, embarrassment, and formal sanctions deter noncompliance with laws to the questions on whether these threats operate as social control, in general, across cultures. The current research has provided a step in that direction.
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Appendix A: Questionnaire in Japanese
大学病院に勤務の皆様へ

オクラホマ大学コミュニケーション学部大学院生として、私は日本とアメリカの医療機関に携わる人々に対象に社会調査をさせております。
「組織内行動の比較文化研究（Cross-Cultural Study of Organizational Behavior）」と題され、大学の研究機関（Institutional Review Board）により審査され、承認を受けているこの博士論文は、職場において日本とアメリカにある大学病院勤務の方々が、様々な事例に関することを意味して知覚しているかを調査する事を目的としております。
あなたにとってこの調査に参加して頂ける事は、2つの国における組織行動の類似、相違に関する知識、理解を深める事に大変役立つものと存じます。

このアンケート用紙にある60の質問事項に回答して頂くに際し、あなたの貴重な時間および15分を割いて頂く事になると思いますが、日本の大学病院における行動様式に関するより正確な理解を得るため、ご協力の程何卒よろしくお願い申し上げます。なお、アンケート用紙記入の際は、60項目すべての質問事項にお答え頂けますと大変有り難く存じます。
それぞれの項目には正しい答え、又は間違った答えなど一切ありません。あなた個人の意見、信条がそのまま各項目に対する答えとなり、貴重な情報として扱われます。
このアンケートには幾つかのプライベートな質問事項が含まれております。しかし、この調査で得られた全てのデータは極秘事項として取り扱わせて頂きます。あなた個人の名前がアンケート用紙に記入される事は一切ありませんし、事実、アンケート用紙記入者は全て匿名でお願いしております。又、コンピュータにデータを入力後、このアンケート用紙は全て破棄されます。
あなたが個人の意見や信条を表現するこの機会を楽しみ、そして有意義なものと感じて頂けましたら大変光栄に存じます。
もし、この調査を通じて得られた結果の概略をご希望でしたら、お手数ですがどうぞ私に連絡をして下さい。博士論文完成次第、喜んでその概略を送って頂きます。
このアンケート調査について何か質問等がありましたら、速やかに下記の住所まで連絡をして下さい。

お忙しいところ恐縮ではございますが、何卒ご協力の程、重ねましてよろしくお願い申し上げます。
調査に先立ちまして、先ずは御礼を申し上げます。ありがとうございました。

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146
I.
まず始めに、あなた自身についてお答え下さい。

01. 性別（1又は2選び、丸で囲んで下さい。）
   1. 男性
   2. 女性

02. お歳をお聞かせください。

03. 少しプライベートな質問をさせて下さい。（適切な数字を1つ選び丸で囲んでください。）
   1. 結婚している（既婚）
   2. 死別した
   3. 離婚した
   4. 別居中である
   5. 結婚していない（未婚）

04. 最高学歴をお聞かせ下さい。

05. 当大学病院に勤務なさってどれ位経ちますか。

06. 現在のあなたの勤務状態を表現するとしたらどれですか。
    （適切な数字を1つ選び丸で囲んで下さい。）
    1. 他の従業員の監視をする立場ではない。
    2. 他の従業員の監視をする立場である。
    3. その他（具体的に____________________）

07. 私の病院で、現在の特定の仕事（職場での履歴）をもってどのくらい経ちますか。

07. 1年
08. 過去5年間に、仕事を見つける事ができなかったという理由で、職に就かなかった事がありますか。（1又は2を選び、丸で囲んで下さい。）

1. はい  2. いいえ

II. 次に、病院組織における3種類の規則違反に関するご意見をお聞かせ下さい。これらは多くの従業者が日常陥りがちな行為であり、病院組織の理想や方針に反するものであります。

この質問事項の中にある行為は、病院組織の方針や規則に反するかもしれませんが、あなた自身、個人的にそういうことをすることが、悪いことだと思わないかもしれません。
それは何か良くても、何が悪いかというあなたの個人的性格によって左右されます。そこでもし仮に、あなたがこれらのことをした際、あなた自身が罪の意識を感じるかどうかをお答え下さい。更にその罪の意識や自覚の念が、あなたにとってどの程度大きな支障、問題をきたすであろうかお答え下さい。以下それぞれの質問に対し、あなたのご意見を最も良く表している数字を1つ選び、丸で囲んで下さい。

09. もしま、あなたが許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休憩をとったとしたら、罪の意識を感じると思いますか。

1. きっと、罪の意識を感じるだろう。
2. 多分、罪の意識を感じるであろう。
3. 多分、罪の意識を感じないであろう。
4. 決して、罪の意識を感じないであろう。

10. もしも、あなたが許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休憩をとる事に対して罪の意識を感じたとしたら、その気持ちはあなたにとってどの程度大きな問題をきたすと思いますか。

1. 全く問題なし
2. ほとんど問題なし
3. 少し問題をきたす
4. 大きな問題をきたす
5. とても大きな問題をきたす

11. もしも、あなたが許可なしに遅刻、又は早退したとしたら、罪の意識を感じると思いますか。

1. きっと、罪の意識を感じるであろう。
2. 多分、罪の意識を感じるであろう。
3. 多分、罪の意識を感じないであろう。
4. 決して、罪の意識を感じないであろう。
12. もしも、あなたが許可なしに遅刻、又は早退する事に対して罪の意識を感じたとしたら、その気持ちはあなたにとってどの程度大きな問題をきたすと思いますか。

1. 全く問題なし
2. ほとんど問題なし
3. 少し問題をきたす
4. 大きな問題をきたす
5. とても大きな問題をきたす

13. もしも、あなたが本当は病気でないのに病気を理由に休暇をとったとしたら、罪の意識を感じると思いますか。

1. きっと、罪の意識を感じるであろう。
2. 多分、罪の意識を感じるであろう。
3. 多分、罪の意識を感じないであろう。
4. 決して、罪の意識を感じないであろう。

14. もしも、あなたが本当は病気でないのに病気を理由に休暇をとる事に対して罪の意識を感じたとしたら、その気持ちはあなたにとってどの程度大きな問題をきたすと思いますか。

1. 全く問題なし
2. ほとんど問題なし
3. 少し問題をきたす
4. 大きな問題をきたす
5. とても大きな問題をきたす

続いて、もし仮にあなたがこれらのことをしなかったならば、あなたの自尊心が増すであろうかどうか、誇りに思うであろうかどうかをお答え下さい。 更にその事が、あなたにとってどの程度価値のあるものであるかお答えください。

15. もしも、あなたが許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休憩をとるという行為をしなかったならば、あなたの自尊心は増すと思いますか。

1. きっと、自尊心が増すであろう。
2. 多分、自尊心が増すであろう。
3. 多分、自尊心は増さないであろう。
4. 決して、罪の意識を感じないであろう。
16. もしも、あなたが許可なしに長時間の昼寝、又は休憩をするという行為をしなかった事に対し、自分を誇りに思ったとした時、その自尊心はあなたにとってどの程度価値があるものですか。

1. 全く価値がない
2. ほんの少し価値がある
3. いくらか価値がある
4. とても価値がある
5. このうえもしくは価値がある

17. もしも、あなたが許可なしに遅刻、又は早退をするという行為をしなかったならば、あなたの自尊心は増すと思いますか。

1. きっと、増すであろう
2. 多分、増すであろう
3. 多分、増さないであろう
4. 決して、増さないであろう

18. もしも、あなたが許可なしに遅刻、又は早退する事をしなかった事に対して、自分を誇りに思ったとした時に、その自尊心はあなたにとってどの程度価値のあるものですか。

1. 全く価値がない
2. ほんの少し価値がある
3. いくらか価値がある
4. とても価値がある
5. このうえもしくは価値がある

19. もしも、あなたが本当は病気でないのに病気を理由に休暇をとるという行為をしなかったならば、あなたの自尊心は増すと思いますか。

1. きっと、増すであろう
2. 多分、増すであろう
3. 多分、増さないであろう
4. 決して、増さないであろう
20. もしも、あなたが本当は病気でないのに病気を理由に休職をとるという事をしなかった事に対し、自分を持ちに行ったとしたら、その自尊心はあなたにとってどの程度価値のあるものですか。

1. 全く価値がない
2. ほんの少し価値がある
3. いくらか価値がある
4. とても価値がある
5. このうえもなく価値がある

次に、病院内において、あなたが信頼する職員の方々を具体的に思い浮かべてください。そしてもしだけに、あなたがこれらのことをしたら、その方々はあなたに対する尊敬の念を失うであろうと思うかどうかお答えください。更には、これらの方々のあなたに対する尊敬の念の喪失が、あなたにとってどの程度大きな支障、問題をきたすであろうかお答えください。

21. もしも、あなたが許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休憩をとったとしたら、病院内において信頼をおくる職員のほとんどは、あなたへの尊敬の念を失うでしょうか。

1. きっと失うであろう
2. 多分失うであろう
3. 多分失わないであろう
4. 決して失わないであろう

22. もしも、あなたが許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休憩をとることに対し病院内で信頼をおくる職員のほとんどが、あなたへの尊敬の念を失ったとしたら、その尊敬の念喪失はあなたにとって、どの程度大きな問題をきたすと思いますか。

1. 全く問題なし
2. ほとんど問題なし
3. 少し問題をきたす
4. 大きな問題をきたす
5. とても大きな問題をきたす
23. もしも、あなたが許可なしに遅刻、又は早退したとしたら、病院内において信頼をおく職員のほとんどは、あなたの尊敬の念を失うでしょうか。

1. きっと失うであろう
2. 多分失うであろう
3. 多分失わないであろう
4. 決して失わないであろう

24. もしも、あなたが許可なしに遅刻、又は早退した事に対し、病院内において信頼をおく職員のほとんどが、あなたの尊敬の念を失ったとしたら、その尊敬の念喪失はあなたにとって、どの程度大きな問題をきたすと思いますか。

1. 全く問題なし
2. ほとんど問題なし
3. 少し問題をきたす
4. 大きな問題をきたす
5. とても大きな問題をきたす

25. もしも、あなたが本当は病気でないのに病気を理由に休暇をとったとしたら、病院内において信頼をおく職員のほとんどは、あなたの尊敬の念を失うでしょうか。

1. きっと失うであろう
2. 多分失うであろう
3. 多分失わないであろう
4. 決して失わないであろう

26. もしも、あなたが本当は病気でないのに病気を理由に休暇をとった事に対し、病院内において信頼をおく職員のほとんどが、あなたの尊敬の念を失ったとしたら、その尊敬の念喪失はあなたにとってどの程度大きな問題をきたすと思いますか。

1. 全く問題なし
2. ほとんど問題なし
3. 少し問題をきたす
4. 大きな問題をきたす
5. とても大きな問題をきたす
引き続き、病院内においてあなたが信頼をおく職員の方々を具体的に思い浮かべて下さい。
もし仮に、あなたがこれらのことをしなかったなら、その方々があなたへの称賛の念を示すであろうと思うかどうかお答えください。更に、その称賛があなたにとってどの程度価値のあるものであると思うかお答えください。

27. もしも、あなたが許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休憩をとる事をしなかったなら、病院内において信頼をおく職員のほとんどはあなたへの称賛の念を示すでしょうか。

1. きっと示すであろう
2. 多分示すであろう
3. 多分示さないであろう
4. 決して示さないであろう

28. もしも、あなたが許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休憩をとる行為をしなかった事に対し、病院内において信頼をおく職員のほとんどが、あなたへの称賛の念を示したとしたら、その称賛はあなたにとってどの程度価値のあるものですか。

1. 全く価値がない
2. ほんの少し価値がある
3. いくらか価値がある
4. とても価値がある
5. このうえもなく価値がある

29. もしも、あなたが許可なく遅刻、又は早退するという行為をしなかったなら、病院内において信頼をおく職員のほとんどはあなたへの称賛の念を示すでしょうか。

1. きっと示すであろう
2. 多分示すであろう
3. 多分示さないであろう
4. 決して示さないであろう
30. もしだ、あなたが許可なしに薬剤、又は早退するという行為をしなかった事に対し、病院内において信頼をおく職員のほとんどが、あなたへの称賛の念を示したとしたら、その称賛はあなたにとってどの程度価値のあるものですか。

1. 全く価値がない
2. ほんの少し価値がある
3. いくらか価値がある
4. とても価値がある
5. このうえもしくは価値がある

31. もしだ、あなたが本当は病気でないのにも拘らず、休暇をとるという行為をしなかったたら、病院内において信頼をおく職員のほとんどがあなたへの称賛の念を示すでしょうか。

1. きっと示すであろう
2. 多分示すであろう
3. 多分示さないであろう
4. 決して示さないであろう

32. もしだ、あなたが本当は病気でないのにも拘らず、休暇をとるという行為をしなかった事に対し、病院内において信頼をおく職員のほとんどがあなたへの称賛の念を示したとしたら、その称賛はあなたにとってどの程度価値のあるものですか。

1. 全く価値がない
2. ほんの少し価値がある
3. いくらか価値がある
4. とても価値がある
5. このうえもしくは価値がある

次に、もし仮に、あなたがこれらのことをした際、あなた自身、上司に見咎められると思うかどうかお答えください。更に、もし見咎められ、処罰されるとしたら、その処罰があなたにとってどの程度大きな支障、問題をきたすであろうかお答えください。

33. もしだ、あなたが許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休憩をとったとしたら見咎められると思いますか。

1. きっと、見咎められるであろう。
2. 多分、見咎められるであろう。
3. 多分、見咎められないであろう。
4. 決して、見咎められないであろう。
34. もしご、あなたが許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休暇をとるという行為を見咎められ、処罰されるとしたら、その処罰はあなたにとってどの程度大きな問題をきたすと思いますか。

1. 全く問題なし
2. ほとんど問題なし
3. 少し問題をきたす
4. 大きな問題をきたす
5. とても大きな問題をきたす

35. もしご、あなたが許可なく遅刻、又は早退したとしたら、見咎められると思いますか。

1. きっと、見咎められるであろう。
2. 多分、見咎められるであろう。
3. 多分、見咎められないであろう。
4. 決して、見咎められないであろう。

36. もしご、あなたが許可なしに遅刻、又は早退するという行為を見咎められ、処罰されるとしたら、その処罰はあなたにとってどの程度大きな問題をきたすと思いますか。

1. 全く問題なし
2. ほとんど問題なし
3. 少し問題をきたす
4. 大きな問題をきたす
5. とても大きな問題をきたす

37. もしご、あなたが本当は病気でないので病気理由に休暇をとったとしたら、見咎められると思いますか。

1. きっと、見咎められるであろう。
2. 多分、見咎められるであろう。
3. 多分、見咎められないであろう。
4. 決して、見咎められないであろう。
38. もしご、あなたが本当は病気でないのに病気を理由に休暇をとるという行為を見咎められ、処罰されるとしたら、その処罰はあなたにとってどの程度大きな問題をきたすと思いますか。

1. 全く問題なし
2. ほとんど問題なし
3. 少し問題をきたす
4. 大きな問題をきたす
5. とても大きな問題をきたす

次に、もし仮に、あなたがこれらのことをしなかったならば、あなた自身、上司に報酬（金品、昇進など）を与えられであろうと思うかどうかお答えください。更に、その報酬があなたにとって、どの程度重要のあるものであるかお答えください。

39. もしご、あなたが許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休憩をとるという行為をしなかったならば、報酬を与えられると思いますか。

1. きっと、与えられるであろう。
2. 多分、与えられるであろう。
3. 多分、与えられないであろう。
4. 決して、与えられないであろう。

40. もしご、あなたが許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休憩をとるという行為をしなかった事に対し、報酬を与えられるとしたら、その報酬はあなたにとってどの程度価値のあるものですか。

1. 全く価値がない
2. ほんの少し価値がある
3. いくらか価値がある
4. とても価値がある
5. このうえもなく価値がある

41. もしご、あなたが許可なく遰刻、又は早退をするという行為をしなかったならば、報酬を与えられると思いますか。

1. きっと、与えられるであろう。
2. 多分、与えられるであろう。
3. 多分、与えられないであろう。
4. 決して、与えられないであろう。
42. もしあなたが、許可なしに遅刻、又は早退する事をしなかった事に対し、報酬を与えられるとして、その報酬はあなたにとってどの程度価値のあるものですか。

1. 全く価値がない
2. ほんの少し価値がある
3. いくらか価値がある
4. とても価値がある
5. このうえもなく価値がある

43. もしあなたが、本当は病気でないのに病気を理由に休暇をとるという行為をしなかったならば、報酬を与えられると思いますか。

1. きっと、与えられるであろう。
2. 多分、与えられるであろう。
3. 多分、与えられないであろう。
4. 決して、与えられないであろう。

44. もしあなたが、本当は病気でないのに病気を理由に休暇をとるという行為をしなかった事に対し、報酬を与えられたとして、その報酬はあなたにとってどの程度価値があるものですか。

1. 全く価値がない
2. ほんの少し価値がある
3. いくらか価値がある
4. とても価値がある
5. このうえもなく価値がある

今後将来、あなた自身がこれらのことをするかと思うかどうかお答えください。以下3つの質問項目に対して、「はい」または「いいえ」の選択肢いずれかを選ぶ。丸で囲んでください。どうか、率直な意見をお聞かせください。

45. 将来あなた自身、許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休暇をとることがあると思いますか。

1. はい
2. いいえ

46. 将来あなた自身、許可なしに遅刻、早退することがあると思いますか。

1. はい
2. いいえ
47. 将来あなた自身、本当は病気でないのに、病気を理由に休暇をとる事があると思いますか。

1. はい
2. いいえ

次に、過去において、あなたがこれらのことをしたことがあるかどうかお答えください。

48. 過去において、許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休憩をとったことがありますか。

1. はい
2. いいえ

49. 過去において、許可なしに遅刻、又は早退をしたことがありますか。

1. はい
2. いいえ

50. 過去において、本当は病気でないのに、病気を理由に休暇をとったことがありますか。

1. はい
2. いいえ

次に、過去5年間に、あなたがこれらのことをしたことがあるかどうかお答えください。

51. 過去5年間において、許可なしに長時間の昼食、又は休憩をとったことがありますか。

1. はい
2. いいえ

52. 過去5年間において、許可なしに遅刻、又は早退をしたことがありますか。

1. はい
2. いいえ

158
53. 過去5年間において、本当は病気でないのに、病気を理由に休暇をとった事がありますか。

1. はい
2. いいえ

IV.
次の項目は、あなたの直属の上司に対する見解を尋ねたものです。以下の質問に対し、5つの選択肢の中から適切な数字を1つ選び、丸で囲んでください。

54. あなたの直属の上司を、職業上、かつ、一人の個人として模範的だと思うですか。

1. 全くそう思わない
2. ほんの少しの面においてそう思う
3. いくらかの面においてそう思う
4. ほとんどどの面においてそう思う
5. あらゆる面でそう思う

55. 経営管理に携わる人は、私を困らせようと、又は手間をかけさせようとしている。

1. 全くそう思わない
2. どちらかというと、そう思えない
3. どちらかというと、そう思う
4. 非常にそう思う

56. 経営管理に携わる人は、常に私を監視している。

1. 全くそう思わない
2. どちらかというと、そう思えない
3. どちらかというと、そう思う
4. 非常にそう思う
57. 経営管理に携わる人が私の職場にやって来るとき、誰かを困らせようと、
又は手間をかけさせようとしているように見える。

1. 全くそう思わない
2. どちらかというと、そう思わない
3. どちらかというと、そう思う
4. 非常にそう思う

V.
最後に、あなたが理想とする職業について伺います。まず、今現在の職業に関係なく、
あなたが理想とする職業を思い浮かべてください。その理想的職業を選ぶに際し、以下
に示された特徴のそれぞれは、あなたにとってどの程度大切なものですか。次の3つの
質問に対し、適切な数字を1つ選び、丸で囲んでください。

58. あなた個人、又はあなたの家族との生活に、十分な時間を割くことを可能
にしてくれる職を持つ事は、あなたにとってどの程度大切ですか。

1. この上もなく大切である
2. とても大切である
3. どちらかというと大切である
4. ほとんど大切ではない
5. 全く大切ではない

59. あなた個人の方針、手順を採り入れながら仕事をこなすだけの自由を持
つ事は、あなたにとってどの程度大切ですか。

1. この上もなく大切である
2. とても大切である
3. どちらかというと大切である
4. ほとんど大切ではない
5. 全く大切ではない

60. 大変な仕事を持ちながらも、その仕事を通じて個人的に何かを学ぶと感じたといった実感を得られる事は、あなたにとってどの程度大切ですか。

1. この上もなく大切である
2. とても大切である
3. どちらかというと大切である
4. ほとんど大切ではない
5. 全く大切ではない

ご協力、どうもありがとうございました。
Appendix B: Questionnaire in English
May 19, 1997

Dear University Hospitals' Employee:

As an OU Ph.D. student in the Department of Communication, my dissertation involves conducting a survey of medical workers in both the US and Japan. My research project, entitled "Cross-Cultural Study of Organizational Behavior" and reviewed and approved by OU's Institutional Review Board (325-4757), seeks to learn how workers in the US and Japan feel about a variety of issues in their workplace: organizational rules, organizational behaviors, quality of relationships with others, etc. My hope is that my dissertation will advance knowledge and understanding of both similarities and differences in the organizational behaviors of the two nations.

You have been selected as part of my US sample which includes 1,000 individuals. To obtain meaningful data, I need, and will greatly appreciate, your help.

It will take about 15 minutes of your time to answer the 61 questions on my questionnaire. I hope that you will respond to all questions so that I can obtain a more accurate picture of US organizational behavior.

There are several sensitive questions on my questionnaire and I assure you that all data obtained from my survey will be treated as confidential. Your name will not be recorded anywhere on the questionnaire and, after I enter the data from the questionnaire into a computer file, I will destroy the original questionnaires.

I hope you will find the opportunity to share your beliefs and opinions enjoyable. If you would like a summary of the findings from the survey, please send me a note and I will send you that summary upon the completion of my dissertation.

If you would like to know more about this project, you may call either me or the two chairs of my committee: Drs. Friedrich and Chen in OU's Department of Communication (325-3111).

I would appreciate it if you would mail the questionnaire to me by May 31. I am enclosing a return envelope for your use. Please place in CAMPUS MAIL and I will receive it on the OU Norman Campus.

In advance, I would like to thank you very much for helping me complete what I hope will be a worthwhile dissertation project.

Sincerely,

Emiko Kobayashi
1. Please provide the following information about yourself.

01. Gender (please circle either 1 or 2)
   1. male
   2. female

02. Race: (please circle an appropriate number)
   1. Black
   2. American Indian
   3. Hispanic
   4. Asian
   5. Caucasian
   6. other (please SPECIFY: ______________________)

03. How old were you on your last birthday?
   __________ years old

04. What is your current marital status? Are you currently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married? (please circle an appropriate number)
   1. married
   2. widowed
   3. divorced
   4. separated
   5. never married

05. What is the highest level or grade of education you completed in school? (please circle an appropriate number)
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
   (12 = completed high school)
   13 14 15 16 (16 = completed college)
   17 18 (18 = completed Master's degree)
   19 20 (20 = completed Ph.D., law degree, medical degree)
   21 (21 = post high school training such as trade school, secretarial school, etc., but no college)
06. How long have you been working for the current hospital?

__________ years

07. Which of the following best describes your current occupation?
(please circle an appropriate number)

1. work for someone and do not supervise the work of anyone else
2. work for someone and do supervise the work of other employees
3. other (PLEASE SPECIFY: _________________________________)

08. How long have you held your current specific job (in other words, job title) at the current hospital?

__________ years

09. At any time during the past five years have you ever been out of work because you could not find a job? (please circle an appropriate number)

1. yes
2. no

II.
The next group of items concerns your views about three types of organizational rule violations. These are things which many employees do, but which are contrary to organizational ideals and expectations. I would like to know your opinions about these things.

Although a particular activity may be against your hospital's policies and norms, you personally might not consider it wrong to do it. That depends on your own personal beliefs about what is right and wrong. So doing these things may cause you to feel guilty or remorseful, or it may not. Again, that depends on how wrong you think the activity is. So now I will ask you whether you think you would feel guilty if you engaged in these behaviors. I will also ask you how big a problem any guilt-feelings or self-reproach would create for you if you did this. Please respond to each question by choosing a number that best represents your opinions.

10. Generally, in most situations I would feel guilty if I took a long lunch or break without approval.

1. definitely would
2. probably would
3. probably would not
4. definitely would not
11. If you did feel guilty for taking a long lunch or break without approval, how big a problem would it create for you?

1. no problem at all
2. hardly any problem
3. a little problem
4. a big problem
5. a very big problem

12. Generally, in most situations I would feel guilty if I came to work late or left early without approval.

1. definitely would
2. probably would
3. probably would not
4. definitely would not

13. If you did feel guilty for coming to work late or leaving early without approval, how big a problem would it create for you?

1. no problem at all
2. hardly any problem
3. a little problem
4. a big problem
5. a very big problem

14. Generally, in most situations I would feel guilty if I used sick leave when I was not really sick.

1. definitely would
2. probably would
3. probably would not
4. definitely would not

15. If you did feel guilty for using sick leave when you were not really sick, how big a problem would it create for you?

1. no problem at all
2. hardly any problem
3. a little problem
4. a big problem
5. a very big problem
Now, I would like to know whether you would have increased feelings of pride in yourself if you did not engage in these behaviors. So now for each activity, indicate whether you think you would feel proud of yourself if you kept yourself from doing this. I will also ask you how rewarding you think any feelings of pride in yourself would be if you refrained from doing this. Please use the choices listed below each question.

16. Generally, in most situations my feelings of pride in myself would be increased if I refrained from taking a long lunch or break without approval.
   1. definitely would
   2. probably would
   3. probably would not
   4. definitely would not

17. If you did feel proud for refraining from taking a long lunch or break without approval, how rewarding would this feeling be for you?
   1. not rewarding at all
   2. just a little rewarding
   3. somewhat rewarding
   4. very rewarding
   5. extremely rewarding

18. Generally, in most situations my feelings of pride in myself would be increased if I refrained from coming to work late or leaving early without approval.
   1. definitely would
   2. probably would
   3. probably would not
   4. definitely would not

19. If you did feel proud for refraining from coming to work late or leaving early without approval, how rewarding would this feeling be for you?
   1. not rewarding at all
   2. just a little rewarding
   3. somewhat rewarding
   4. very rewarding
   5. extremely rewarding
20. Generally, in most situations my feelings of pride in myself would be increased if I refrained from using sick leave when I was not really sick.

   1. definitely would
   2. probably would
   3. probably would not
   4. definitely would not

21. If you did feel proud for refraining from using sick leave when you were not really sick, how rewarding would this feeling be for you?

   1. not rewarding at all
   2. just a little rewarding
   3. somewhat rewarding
   4. very rewarding
   5. extremely rewarding

Now, I would like you to think of the workers you know within your hospital whose opinions about you matter the most to you. Think about how they would feel about you if you engaged in each of the three behaviors. Please indicate whether you think that most of those employees whose opinions you value would lose respect for you if you engaged in each behavior. I also want to know how big a problem any loss of respect for you from other employees would create for you if you did this. Please continue to choose your answer from the options listed below each question.

22. Would most of the employees whose opinions you value lose respect for you if you took a long lunch or break without approval?

   1. definitely would
   2. probably would
   3. probably would not
   4. definitely would not

23. If most of the people whose opinions you value within your hospital did lose respect for you taking a long lunch or break without approval, how big a problem would it create for you?

   1. no problem at all
   2. hardly any problem
   3. a little problem
   4. a big problem
   5. a very big problem
24. Would most of the employees whose opinions you value lose respect for you if you came to work late or left early without approval?
   1. definitely would
   2. probably would
   3. probably would not
   4. definitely would not

25. If most of the people whose opinions you value within your hospital did lose respect for you coming to work late or leaving early without approval, how big a problem would it create for you?
   1. no problem at all
   2. hardly any problem
   3. a little problem
   4. a big problem
   5. a very big problem

26. Would most of the employees whose opinions you value lose respect for you if you used sick leave when you were not really sick?
   1. definitely would
   2. probably would
   3. probably would not
   4. definitely would not

27. If most of the people whose opinions you value within your hospital did lose respect for you using sick leave when you were not really sick, how big a problem would it create for you?
   1. no problem at all
   2. hardly any problem
   3. a little problem
   4. a big problem
   5. a very big problem
Again, think about the workers at your workplace whose opinions about you matter most to you. Think about how they would feel about you if you did not engage in these behaviors. So now I will ask you whether you think that most of those employees whose opinions you value would express admiration or praise for you if you did not do these things. I will also ask you how rewarding you think any expression of admiration or praise for you from other employees would be if you refrained from doing these things. Please use the choices listed below each question.

28. Would most of the employees whose opinions you value express praise for you if you refrained from taking a long lunch or break without approval?
   1. definitely would
   2. probably would
   3. probably would not
   4. definitely would not

29. If most of the employees whose opinions you value expressed praise for you refraining from taking a long lunch or break without approval, how rewarding would this praise be for you?
   1. not rewarding at all
   2. just a little rewarding
   3. somewhat rewarding
   4. very rewarding
   5. extremely rewarding

30. Would most of the employees whose opinions you value express praise for you if you refrained from coming late or leaving early without approval?
   1. definitely would
   2. probably would
   3. probably would not
   4. definitely would not

31. If most of the employees whose opinions you value expressed praise for you refraining from coming to work late and leaving early without approval, how rewarding would this praise be for you?
   1. not rewarding at all
   2. just a little rewarding
   3. somewhat rewarding
   4. very rewarding
   5. extremely rewarding
32. Would most of the employees whose opinions you value express praise for you if you refrained from using sick leave when you were not really sick?

1. definitely would
2. probably would
3. probably would not
4. definitely would not

33. If most of the employees whose opinions you value expressed praise for you refraining from using sick leave when you were not really sick, how rewarding would this praise be for you?

1. not rewarding at all
2. just a little rewarding
3. somewhat rewarding
4. very rewarding
5. extremely rewarding

Since these behaviors are against organizational ideals and expectations, there is a chance that you would get caught and punished by people in authority if you did these things. Some employees, however, might think they could get away with it, while others might think they would get caught. I want to know if you think you would get caught by people in authority if you violated each of these rules. I would also like to know how big a problem any punishment by people in authority would be for you if you did this. Imagine you had been caught and think about what the punishment probably would be. How big a problem would this punishment create for you? Please choose your answer from one of the options listed below each question.

34. Do you think you would get caught if you took a long lunch or break without approval?

1. definitely would
2. probably would
3. probably would not
4. definitely would not

35. If you were caught and the people in authority had decided what your punishment would be for taking a long lunch or break without approval, how big a problem would it create for you?

1. no problem at all
2. hardly any problem
3. a little problem
4. a big problem
5. a very big problem
36. Do you think you would get caught if you came to work late or left early without approval?
   1. definitely would
   2. probably would
   3. probably would not
   4. definitely would not

37. If you were caught and the people in authority had decided what your punishment would be for coming to work late or leaving early without approval, how big a problem would it create for you?
   1. no problem at all
   2. hardly any problem
   3. a little problem
   4. a big problem
   5. a very big problem

38. Do you think you would get caught if you used sick leave when you were not really sick?
   1. definitely would
   2. probably would
   3. probably would not
   4. definitely would not

39. If you were caught and the people in authority had decided what your punishment would be for using sick leave when you were not really sick, how big a problem would it create for you?
   1. no problem at all
   2. hardly any problem
   3. a little problem
   4. a big problem
   5. a very big problem
There is a chance you would get rewarded by people in authority over you if you refrained from engaging in these acts. I want to know if you think you would get rewarded by people with authority over you if you refrained from doing these things. I would also like to know how rewarding you think any rewards from people in authority would be for you, if you kept yourself from engaging in these acts. Please choose your answer from the list below each question.

40. Do you think you would get rewarded by people in authority if you refrained from taking a long lunch or break without approval?
   1. definitely would
   2. probably would
   3. probably would not
   4. definitely would not

41. If you were rewarded by the people in authority for refraining from taking a long lunch or break without approval, how rewarding would this be for you?
   1. not rewarding at all
   2. just a little rewarding
   3. somewhat rewarding
   4. very rewarding
   5. extremely rewarding

42. Do you think you would get rewarded by people in authority if you refrained from coming late or leaving early without approval?
   1. definitely would
   2. probably would
   3. probably would not
   4. definitely would not

43. If you were rewarded by the people in authority for refraining from coming to work late or leaving early without approval, how rewarding would this be for you?
   1. not rewarding at all
   2. just a little rewarding
   3. somewhat rewarding
   4. very rewarding
   5. extremely rewarding
44. Do you think you would get rewarded if you refrained from using sick leave when you were not really sick?

1. definitely would
2. probably would
3. probably would not
4. definitely would not

45. If you were rewarded by the people in authority for refraining from using sick leave when you were not really sick, how rewarding would this be for you?

1. not rewarding at all
2. just a little rewarding
3. somewhat rewarding
4. very rewarding
5. extremely rewarding

As you know, many people violate the kinds of organizational rules about which we have been asking your opinions. Now, I would like you to indicate, first, whether you think you ever would do these things in the future. Please circle either YES or NO for each of the three activities. No one will ever know your answers since your name is not recorded anywhere.

46. In the future will you ever take a long lunch or break without approval?

1. YES
2. NO

47. In the future will you ever come to work late or leave early without approval?

1. YES
2. NO

48. In the future will you ever use sick leave when you are not really sick?

1. YES
2. NO
Next, I would like to know if you have done these things within the past year. Again, please circle YES or NO to answer each of the following three questions.

49. In the past year, have you ever taken a long lunch or break without approval?
   1. YES
   2. NO

50. In the past year, have you ever come to work late or left early without approval?
   1. YES
   2. NO

51. In the past year, have you ever used sick leave when you were not really sick?
   1. YES
   2. NO

Now, I would like to know if you have done these things within the past five years. Please circle YES or NO to answer each of the following three questions.

52. In the past five years, have you ever taken a long lunch or break without approval?
   1. YES
   2. NO

53. In the past five years, have you ever come to work late or left early without approval?
   1. YES
   2. NO

54. In the past five years, have you ever used sick leave when you were not really sick?
   1. YES
   2. NO
III.
The next item concerns your views about your direct superiors. Please respond to the following question by choosing one of the five options.

55. Do you perceive your direct superior (or, superiors) as a role model both professionally and personally?
   1. not at all
   2. only in a few ways
   3. in some ways
   4. in most ways
   5. in every way

IV.
The next three items concern some of your views about management activity. Please respond to each question by choosing one of the four options listed below.

56. Whenever I see people in authority, I feel like they are just waiting for me to do something so they can bother me.
   1. strongly disagree
   2. somewhat disagree
   3. somewhat agree
   4. strongly agree

57. People in authority keep their eye on me.
   1. strongly disagree
   2. somewhat disagree
   3. somewhat agree
   4. strongly agree

58. When people in authority come into my work area, they usually are just looking for someone to bother.
   1. strongly disagree
   2. somewhat disagree
   3. somewhat agree
   4. strongly agree
V. Finally, I would like to know your views about an ideal job. Please think of an ideal job - disregarding your present job. In choosing an ideal job, how important would each of the following characteristics be to you? Please respond to each of the three questions by choosing one of the five options listed below.

59. How important would it be to you to have a job that leaves you sufficient time for your personal or family life?
   1. extremely important
   2. very important
   3. of moderate importance
   4. of little importance
   5. of no importance at all

60. How important would it be to you to have considerable freedom to adopt your own approach to the job?
   1. extremely important
   2. very important
   3. of moderate importance
   4. of little importance
   5. of no importance at all

61. How important would it be to you to have challenging work to do, from which you could get a sense of personal accomplishment?
   1. extremely important
   2. very important
   3. of moderate importance
   4. of little importance
   5. of no importance at all

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION