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EFFICACY OF INOCULATION STRATEGIES IN PROMOTING RESISTANCE
TO POLITICAL ATTACK MESSAGES: SOURCE CREDIBILITY PERSPECTIVE

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

Chasu An

Norman, Oklahoma

2003

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EFFICACY OF INOCULATION STRATEGIES IN PROMOTING RESISTANCE
TO POLITICAL ATTACK MESSAGES: SOURCE CREDIBILITY PERSPECTIVE

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is the product of the support, involvement, and sacrifice of many people. I wish to express my appreciation to my committee, colleagues, family, and students who participated in this experimental study.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Michael Pfau for his support and guidance. He helped me realize that academic research requires devotion, hard work, and persistence. Thank you, Dr. Pfau, for leading me in the right direction and pushing me toward this goal. Your encouragement and experience have been invaluable for the completion of the study. You are my role model of research and teaching.

I thank members of my advisory committee. Dr. Kelly Damphousse has been supportive since I took his social psychology class. Thank you for your encouragement and cheering me up. Dr. Keith Gaddie brought many valuable insights and ideas for the study. Thank you for your support and confidence in my pursuit of the goal. Dr. Ed Horowitz has provided important implications and suggestions. Thank you for your input. Dr. Amy Johnson has been a devoted reader. I appreciate your suggestions and commitment to this process. All of these wonderful scholars have my sincere gratitude. I also thank the Alumni Fellowship program and the staff for its' generous support for 4 years of research and schoolwork.

I would also like to thank my friends who helped in numerous ways throughout graduate school. Jane Garner, thank you for walking with me through many intellectual challenges as well

as personal hardships. I have been just fortunate to have such a wonderful officemate who has the most beautiful mind. I have been indebted to Sandy Larsen Moore. Thank you, Sandy, for reading my paper in such an intensive and careful manner. Your cheerful spirit and friendship always eased me throughout this progress. Karola Schwartz helped me so many times when I needed her reading. Thank you, Karola, for your congenial heart. I am so confident that your influence will be appreciated by many other people around you. Justin Walton has showed a true friendship since we met in 1998. The debate study could not have been completed without his last minute help.

Special thanks go to a group of my Korean friends. Kwang-Hoon Lee should have my deepest gratitude for the preparation of all experimental materials. Thank you, Kwang-Hoon, for your time with me throughout many sleepless nights and busy days. Also, I would like thank Jong-Chan Kim and Jae-Hoon Hur for their valuable time to help me out for the experiment. I want to thank you, Yangsoo, Sangwon, Sangho, Gyotae, Soonchul, and Heedong for their concern and support.

Thank you also to my professors at Kyungnam University who believed that I would be a scholar someday and guided me to that end. Dr. Nam-Seok Kim and his family, Ja-Eun and Sang-Jung, have stood beside my family throughout all the difficult days of the research. It is lucky that my family had such a supportive and accessible neighbor.

I can't adequately express my gratitude to my mom, sisters, and brother for their support and sacrifice. Their love,

commitment, and concern have made me strong and determined. To my mom, I would like to say that your self-sacrificing has led me to this end.

Finally, I dedicate this work to my wife and two sons. To my wife, Hye-Sun Um, I have to say that I am so blessed to have you in my life and I look forward to the rest of our lives together. I want to express my deepest love and respect to you. Your unselfish support and sacrifice can't be acknowledged enough. My two sons have been my joy and motivation. I thank them for being healthy and for bring laughter. Thank you and I love you.

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ABSTRACT

As one of the most pronounced changes in American political campaigns, the growth of attack messages has received extensive attention from scholars. Still, political attack messages remain one of the most virulent of election phenomena. Inoculation strategy has convincingly proved itself more viable than other options. This experimental study investigated the potential of inoculation strategy in conferring resistance to candidates' attack messages during the 2002 Oklahoma state election. The results of the current study clearly confirm that inoculation is effective in deflecting the impact of attack messages on receivers' attitudes toward candidates. In addition, the results indicate that inoculation strategy promotes behavioral resistance, reducing the likelihood of voters' participatory slippage from attack messages. Also, this investigation revisited source credibility, one of the most studied concepts in persuasion. With its growing importance in media politics (Iyengar & Valention, 2002; Lupia, 2000), source credibility was explored as to its role and impact in inoculation. The results indicated that a candidate's inoculation strategy can be more effective when receivers perceive his/her credibility more favorably. When treated by high candidate credibility, inoculated receivers were significantly less affected by opponent's attack messages than those treated by low credibility. The results revealed source credibility can mediate inoculation, enhancing or reducing the inoculation effect depending on how viewers evaluate candidates' credibility, particularly expertise and

trustworthiness.

Finally, the research investigated the potential of inoculation in another influential campaign communication venue, televised political debates. A separate set of data for the debate study was gathered and analyzed. The results also confirmed the efficacy of inoculation in that positive attitudes towards candidates were significantly greater for the inoculation group as opposed to the no-inoculation group. Importantly, this finding is a new addition to inoculation research in political campaign communication. The debate study also explored the potential of inoculation to strengthen receivers' normative values, mitigating against the destructive impact of debate messages on the democratic process.

Taken together, the results of this dissertation indicate that inoculation is an effective resistance option for candidates in deflecting the influence of political attack messages delivered in both political advertising and televised candidate debates.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Since William McGuire's (1961, 1964) inoculation theory set a framework for studies of resistance to persuasion, the importance of this approach is evident in the extension of its theoretical premises to many applied contexts. In spite of significant contributions to understanding resistance to attitude change, the theory is currently underutilized. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) argue, "in view of the apparent effectiveness of refutational defense, these issues deserve renewed study in the context of contemporary theory and methodology" (p. 568). Inoculation theory has offered one of the most important frameworks for examining resistance to persuasive messages, particularly with recent theoretical and methodological development.

The early roots of inoculation theory stem from the work of the Yale persuasion researchers on one-sided and two-sided communications (Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 1953; Lumsdaine & Janis, 1953). They found two-sided messages proved to be more successful in changing opinions. A two-sided presentation is one that involves representation of both sides of an argument, while a one-sided presentation merely represents the favored side of an issue. Overall, they discovered that after a two-sided presentation, "when a listener is then subsequently

exposed to the presentation of opposing arguments in the counterpropaganda, he is less likely to be influenced by them" (Lumsdain & Janis, p. 318). Lumsdaine and Janis posited that the following factors influence the effectiveness of two-sided presentations: number and cogency of opposing arguments, context of discussion, and extent of explicitness.

Considering why two-sided messages more effectively confer resistance to subsequent persuasion, McGuire (1964) focused on psychological processes in which attitudes and beliefs are vulnerable to attack especially those that are seldom challenged. He termed those special attitudes "*cultural truisms*." The political indoctrination of captive audiences during the Korean War motivated McGuire's research program regarding "the disconcerting vulnerability of people's convictions in forced exposure situations" (McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961, p.327). In addition, the "resistance" approach was new and intriguing to adherents of the dominant "persuasion" paradigm (Miller & Burgoon, 1973). The persuasion or attitude change paradigm had not conceived a need for protecting receivers from influence (Pfau & Kenski, 1990).

Elaborating the two-sided message insight, McGuire (1964) offered a biological analogy, in which the human body achieves immunization against viruses by pre-treating a weakened dose of the virus. McGuire (1964) explained, "this

mild dose stimulates his defenses so that he will be better able to overcome any massive viral attack to which he is later exposed, but is not so strong that this pre-exposure will itself cause the disease" (p. 200). Through this analogy, McGuire reasoned that, "a person's belief is more effectively immunized against a later massive dose of counterarguments by a resistance-stimulating pre-exposure to the counterarguments weakened by explicit refutation, than by prior familiarization with arguments supporting the belief" (Papageorgis & McGuire, 1961, p. 475). Based on Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory, McGuire (1961a) reasoned that, "people tend to defend their beliefs by avoiding exposure to counterarguments rather than by developing positive supports for the beliefs" (p. 184). Therefore, McGuire (1964) maintained that seldom-attacked attitudes such as cultural truisms, should be the most vulnerable to subsequent attack, just as people are most vulnerable to a virus to which they have been little exposed.

Hence, McGuire (1964) proposed that by inducing resistant cognitive states, an individual would be predisposed to resist persuasion. McGuire suggested that prior training facilitates an individual's ability to resist persuasive attempts. In other words, if a person has experience defending his or her beliefs, it will be easier for that individual to resist opposing persuasive messages. As a result of his early

work, McGuire (1961b) advocated a "healthy" training for resistance to persuasion, which would later be called inoculation theory. He posited that individuals could be inoculated by providing motivation to make the believer aware of personal beliefs and then, by providing defensive material to reinforce the belief.

It should be noted that inoculation is more than simply preemptive refutation (Pfau & Kenski, 1990), which merely consists of supportive material to rebut counterarguments. Instead, an inoculation pretreatment contains a "threat component," i.e., a warning of an impending and potentially persuasive attack. Pfau and Kenski (1990) argue, "It is threat that triggers the motivation to bolster attitudes, thus fostering resistance to counterpersuasion" (p. 75). That is, the threat component signals an alarm call to individuals about the potential weakness in their existing beliefs and, thus, motivates them to bolster the beliefs (McGuire, 1961b, 1962, 1970; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962; Pfau, 1997; Pfau and Kenski; 1990; Pfau, Tusing, Koerner, et al., 1997a). "The threat component of the pretreatment message is the integral element in inoculation, motivating receivers to defend against any potential attack, rather than rehearsing for specific arguments and rendering themselves defenseless against different arguments that might be encountered" (Pfau & Kenski, 1990, p.

75). In this way, inoculation treatments protect against the specific content preempted in the treatment and against a myriad of positions not covered in the treatment. Pfau (1997) reasons, "By motivating receivers, and then preemptively refuting one or more potential counterarguments, inoculation spreads a broad blanket of protection both against specific counterarguments raised in refutational preemption and against those counterarguments not raised" (pp. 137-138). Thus, the combination of threat and preemptive refutation implies tremendous potential for resistance to attack.

Early research on inoculation confirmed the superiority of refutational as opposed to supportive treatments in conferring resistance to influence (Anderson & McGuire, 1956; McGuire, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1970; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961, 1962; Papageorgis & McGuire, 1961; Tannenbaum, McCaulay, & Norris, 1966; Tannenbaum & Norris, 1965). Also, early studies indicated comparable effectiveness for refutational-same and refutational-different (novel) treatments (McGuire, 1961b, 1962, 1966; Papageorgis & McGuire, 1961).

Concerning the timing of inoculation pretreatments and persistence of the inoculation effect, several time points were tested. Overall, refutational-different inoculation treatments decayed less than refutational-same treatments (McGuire, 1961b, 1962, 1964, 1966; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961, 1962; Pryor &

Steinfatt, 1978; also see Insko, 1967), although inoculation messages in general, eventually deteriorated over time (McGuire, 1962, 1964, 1970; Pryor & Steinfatt, 1978). Finally, the potential of reinforcement was examined to see if an inoculation effect could be sustained longer (McGuire, 1961b, Tannenbaum et al., 1966). McGuire (1961a) found that while the single defense was effective with both same and novel counterarguments, the double defense was more effective against same than against novel counterarguments. Tannenbaum et al. (1966) reported that "concept-boost" treatment prior to attack induced a slight increase in belief.

While early inoculation research focused on strong prevailing attitudes and beliefs such as "cultural truisms," later studies have tested the applicability of the original construct to controversial issues (Adams & Beatty, 1977; Anatol & Mandel, 1972; Burgoon et al., 1976; Burgoon & Chase, 1973; Burgoon, Cohen, Miller, & Montgomery, 1978; Burgoon & King, 1974; Cronen & LeFleur, 1977; Hunt, 1973; McCroskey, 1970; McCroskey, Young, & Scott, 1972; Miller & Burgoon, 1979; Pryor & Steinfatt, 1978; Sawyer, 1973; Szybillo & Heslin, 1973; Ullman & Bodaken, 1975). For extensions of inoculation theory to more controversial issues, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) suggest, "perhaps beliefs do not have to be formed and maintained in a "germ-free" environment in order to be vulnerable to attack yet

protected from attacks by inoculations" (p. 566).

In addition, the inoculation approach in later research has been applied to various persuasion contexts. These include public relations/crisis communication (Burgoon, Pfau, & Birk, 1995; Wan & Pfau, 2001), health communication campaigns (Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Pfau, Van Bockern, & Kang, 1992; Pfau & Van Bockern, 1994; Szabo & Pfau, 2001), and commercial advertising/marketing (Bither, Dolich, & Nell, 1971; Gardner, Mitchell, & Staelin, 1977; Hunt, 1973; Pfau, 1992; Sawyer, 1973; Szybillo & Hslin, 1973;). Across the settings, research results demonstrate a consistent inoculation effect in conferring resistance to persuasive messages.

One domain of particular importance, especially in the U.S., is political campaign communication. Political attack messages incorporate "issues that are important enough to warrant an inoculation" (Pfau & Kenski, 1990, p. 82). Prior to the 1970s, political campaign communication focused largely on how to change individual attitudes and voting behavior (Kraus & Davis, 1976). One strategy considered effective in changing attitudes is an attack approach (Bowen, 1994; Finkel & Geer, 1998; Garramone, Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole, 1990; Kahn & Kenney, 2000; Lang, 1991; Lang & Lansfear, 1990; Pinkleton, 1997; Shapiro & Rieger, 1989), in which a candidate seeks to undermine the character or the position of an opponent. As the

attack approach has grown more prevalent in contemporary campaigns (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, & Valentino, 1994; Jamieson, 1996; Kaid & Johnston, 1991; Kern, 1989; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Taylor, 1986, West, 1997), "increasing attention has focused on a practical question, what can be done to combat attack messages?" (Pfau & Kenski, 1990, p. 84). Research confirms that the inoculation strategy is a useful and promising approach to combat the persuasive influence of political attack messages (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, Kenski, Nitz & Sorenson, 1990; Pfau, Park, Holbert, & Cho, 2001). In the following section, the extent and consequences of political attack messages and the viability of inoculation strategy will be discussed in detail.

Chapter 2

Attack Politics and Inoculation Strategy

The political attack message has grown popular in political campaign advertising. Research shows that candidates for public office are almost as likely to rely on attacking opponents as promoting themselves (Ansolabehere et al., 1994; Jamieson, 1996; Kaid & Johnstone, 1991; Kern, 1989; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Taylor, 1986; West, 1997). Although there is a continuing debate on the impact of attack politics on our election process, it is evident that there is a great deal of concern about negativity in recent election cycles (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Jamieson, 1992; Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1991; Kamber, 1997; West, 1997).

With the evolution of mass communication technology and the decline of party identification (Ansolabehere, Behr & Iyengar, 1993; Bennett & Entman, 2001; Edelman, 1988; Iyengar & Reeves, 1997; Kern, 1989; Lang & Lang, 1984; Patterson, 1993, 1980, Trent & Friedenberg, 2000), the media campaign emerged as the principal way that candidates, political parties, and interest groups transmit their messages through paid and free media outlets to the American people (Dulio, Nelson, & Thurber, 2000; Graber, 1997; Holbrook, 1996; Schwartz, 1972; Wattenberg, 1991). In particular, television advertising has become the dominant means of campaign communication. This is reflected in its

budget status as the single biggest expenditure in most major campaigns today (Jamieson; 1996; Kaid, 1996; West, 1997).

Voters are exposed to heavy doses of political spot messages during the election period. Campaign spending on spots has increased dramatically. A study reports that the 2000 presidential election advertising spree reached at least \$771 million in the broadcast television market, almost doubling in size from the 1996 election's \$436 million (Alliance for Better Campaign, 2001). Accordingly, as a result of its power to bombard airwaves, political advertising has been increasingly essential in election campaigns.

Types of Political Messages

Most contemporary campaigns rely on four types of message strategies; positive messages, attack messages, contrast messages, and refutation messages (Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Pfau et al., 1990; Salmore & Salmore, 1985).

Positive messages mainly focus on the candidate (Kaid & Johnston, 1991), promoting the candidate's positive attributes of character, positions, and performance in public office (Pfau & Kenski, 1990). Similarly, Benoit, Pier, and Blaney (1997) define "acclaim" as the use of positive strategies in which candidates are credited with desirable policy stands and attributed with positive character traits, such as honesty, compassion, and experience. Regarding the timing of message

airing, positive messages occur most frequently at the early stage of a campaign for the purpose of developing name recognition and issue positioning (Faber, 1992; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Young, 1987).

Critical messages are more negative in tone and focus on delineating the opponent's shortcomings. Pfau and Kenski (1990) distinguish these messages as two types, attack messages and comparative/contrast messages. While attack messages concentrate entirely on the opponent, comparative messages "move away from purely negative attacks on the opponent" (p. 2). Refining attack message categories, Jamieson, Waldman, and Sherr (2000) define comparison-contrast ads as those in which "the candidate makes claims both in favor of his or her own candidacy and in criticism of his or her opponent" (p. 49). Meanwhile, Pinkleton (1997) argues, "attack advertising and negative advertising often are used interchangeably, but attack advertising also represents the most malicious form of negative advertising" (p. 20). Attack messages, in general, have been employed at the later stage of a campaign in order to polarize the voters, solidify weak support, and impact voter turn-out (Faber, 1992; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Young, 1987).

Finally, rebuttal or response messages are designed to refute an opponent's attacks (Garrazone, 1985; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Roddy and Garrazone, 1988; Salmore & Salmore, 1985). In a

similar vein, Benoit et al. (1997) define "defense" themes in which messages explicitly respond to a prior attack on a candidate or the candidate's political party. Rebuttal message strategy could be crucial when a candidate fails to properly respond to the subsequent progress of attack messages. The 1988 presidential election constitutes a prime example. It is widely believed that Dukakis paid a high cost as he didn't rebut the malicious attack from Bush that he was "soft on crime" (Jamieson, 1996; West, 1997).

The type of message a candidate employs is "affected by the stage of the campaign, the status of the candidate, and the competitiveness of the race (Salmore & Salmore, 1985, p. 150). As Pfau et al (1990) maintains, most contemporary campaigns use various combinations of these four basic message strategies. In recent campaigns, political candidates have tended to rely more heavily on "the use of comparative political advertising as a means of communicating negative information about a candidate's opponent to voters while avoiding the stigma attached to purely negative attack advertising" (Pinkleton, 1997, p. 19). This doesn't mean fewer attacks. Instead, political parties and special interest political action committees stepped up use of pure attack messages. (Pfau et al., 2001). Attack message strategy has been criticized as "the least constructive development in politics" (West, 1997, p. 62) and a cause of

"disillusionment and distrust" (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995, p. 147). Nonetheless, the attack approach is an integral feature in the American political campaign landscape (Pfau et al., 1990).

The Growth of Attack Political Campaigns

Attack campaigns have become an accepted strategy among candidates and political consultants but a problem bemoaned by journalists and the public. Philip Friedman (1994), Democratic consultant, hints at the general viewpoint held by political practitioners: "Polls show there's nothing good about politicians that people will believe, and nothing bad they won't believe. The big question in most campaigns....is whose negative campaign is better. If it's negative, it works. If it's positive, save it for your tombstone" (as cited in Henneberger, 1994, p. 45). Corresponding with such aggressive perspectives, use of attack approach increased from the 1960s to the 1980s. Sabato (1981) estimated that negative ads consisted of one-third of all political commercials. After analyzing a convenience sample of 506 spot ads, Joslyn (1986) found that 23% of ads were negative in tone and that 30% or more of the average candidate's advertising budget was expended for negative advertising (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1991; Taylor, 1986). Young (1987) observes, "Experts estimate that today one of two political ads are negative; twenty years ago

only one in five were" (p. 60). Studies of the 1988 presidential campaign revealed an unprecedented amount of negative advertising (Jamieson, 1988; West, 1997). Clearly, by the end of 1980s, the use of the attack strategy had become widely accepted.

Since then, the trend has continued, but slowed. West (1997) found that "the 1992 [presidential] race featured sharp attacks from Clinton and Perot on Bush's economic performance and from Bush on Clinton's past record and trustworthiness" (p. 61). Based on content analysis of "prominent" ads, West reported that 66% of the campaign ads were negative during the 1992 election while 60% of the ads were negative during the 1996 election.

However, according to a new category system suggested by Jamieson et al. (2000), the portion of negative ads or "attack ads" is "conflated" (p. 49) due to the common practice of obscuring distinctive characteristics of "attack ads" and "contrast ads." In the most recent presidential election, Devlin (2001) observed that while "the Bush campaign ads were overwhelmingly positive, Gore's ads were overwhelmingly negative" (p. 2345). The pattern in 2000 was to shift the burden of attack to soft-money source, especially political parties. Devlin (2001) found that the majority of party-sponsored ads (RNC and DNC ads) were negative. More than two-

thirds of all ads produced by both parties were negative; out of 19 RNC ads, 13 were negative, while 35 out of 52 DNC ads were straight negative.

Similarly, West (2001) reports that although presidential candidates toned down the negativity of their ads in 2000 in the primaries, "prominent" spots during the general election period predominantly featured negative ads. The extensive use of attack messages indicates that candidates and political professionals believe the potential of attack messages. However, research findings on the effects of negative ads suggest the conclusion is less clear.

Several experimental studies in which hypothetical candidates were featured have shown that strong attack messages could be counterproductive, inducing a "boomerang" or "backlash" (Garrazone, 1984, 1985; Garrazone & Smith, 1984; Guskind & Hagstrom, 1988; Mann & Ornstein, 1983; Merritt, 1984; Stewart, 1975). Garrazone (1984) found 40% of voters form more negative attitudes toward the sponsor of attack messages when nothing else is know about that candidate, while only 15% develop more negative attitudes to the target of the ad. Hill's research (1989) obtained the similar results, supporting the backlash effect. However, in all of these studies, targeted receivers are not sufficiently familiar with the candidate making the attack. In addition, research indicate that negative

advertising, in general, has no significant effects on vote choice or feelings towards candidates (Faber, Tims, & Schmitt, 1990; Garramone, 1984).

On the other hand, negative advertising could achieve the intended effects if sponsors make strategic decisions about sponsorship, partisanship, and the nature of attack messages (Pfau et al., 1990). Attack messages sponsored by independent groups cause less boomerang effect (Garramone, 1985; Garramone & Smith, 1984), and the more intended effects of undermining the image of the targeted politician (Kaid & Boydston, 1987). Also, attack messages focusing on an opponent's issue standings elicit more intended effects and less backlash effects than attack messages on personal characteristics (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1991; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Roddy & Garramone, 1988; Shapiro & Rieger, 1989). Research has shown that partisanship and political involvement mediate the extent to which attack messages affect people's attitudes toward a sponsoring candidate and an opponent. Findings indicate that strong partisanship enhances the intended effects and diminishes the backlash effects (Boydston & Kaid, 1983; Faber et al., 1990; Garramone, 1985; Merritt, 1984; Pfau & Burgoon, 1989; Pfau et al., 1990).

Despite some controversies over the effect of attack ads, most political professionals and journalists tend to conclude

that attack ads can influence attitudes, that attack ads stir people's emotions, and that people remember negative information better than positive information (Perloff & Kinsey, 1992). Also some research findings support the traditional view held by consultants and pundits that attack messages do work (e.g., Johnson-Cartee & Copeland 1991; Garramone et al., 1990; Kaid & Boydston, 1987; Pinkleton, 1997; Shapiro & Rieger, 1992). Most survey research fails to confirm the depressing impact of negative advertising on voter turnout. This is not surprising considering that attack ads are often used in tight elections, which tends to increase the interest voters already have in close races (Finkel & Geer; 1998; Freedman & Goldstein, 1999; Lau & Pomper, 2002; Lau, Siegelman, Heldman, & Babitt, 1999). These studies find that more competitive races feature more total advertising, more negative advertising, and greater voter turnout (see Goldstein & Freedman, 2002). Correlational analyses, thus, suggest a positive association between negative advertising and turnout. By contrast, experimental studies suggest that attack ads suppress turnout. They find that negative ads turn off voters and demobilize the electorate (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, & Simon, 1999; Ansolabehere et al., 1994; Gerber & Green, 2000; Johnston-Cartee & Copeland, 1991).

In sum, attack advertisements seem to have some potential for intended effects against the target, but they

could induce counterproductive consequences such as backlash effects. In addition, negative advertising is regarded by some as "anathema" to the democratic process (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995) because of its demobilizing effects, even though others suggest that it may promote election interest, recognition of information, and the ability to distinguish between candidates (Brians & Wattenberg, 1995; Hill, 1989; Kahn & Kenny, 1999; Lang, 1991; Shapiro & Rieger, 1992; Wattenberg & Brians, 1999). Despite its potential effects on the election process, "the rise of poison politics has spawned a new cottage of industry of critics. More and more journalists, commentators, academics, and voters are publicly objecting to negative campaigns" (Kamber, 1997, p. xv).

Efficacy of Inoculation Strategy

American political campaigns have experienced revolutionary changes in strategies and technologies, including the growth of attack messages during the past 40 years (Pfau & Kenski, 1990). This makes the likelihood of political attack messages quite high; hence those engaged in a campaign must ask: "what can be done to deflect them?" (Pfau, 1997, p. 145).

Given the certainty of negative advertising especially in contested campaigns, how can candidates defend themselves against political attacks? Jamieson (1988) suggests that "vigilance" of the opposing candidate and party is necessary in

order to provide timely direct responses to an opponent's attack messages (p. C2). Jamieson advises that when attacked, candidates need to strategically exploit media news, political advertising, and televised political debates and to respond as quickly as possible.

Among several options, answering ads with ads is better than pinning hopes on media news' policing via adwatches. Relying on media news is problematic. First, news scrutinizes relatively few ads (Frantzich, 2002). Second, TV news adwatches can backfires. TV Adwatches in particular "actually have the effect of strengthening the impact of the scrutinized ad" (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1996a, p. 154; also see Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Cappella & Jamieson, 1994; Jamieson, 1992, Pfau & Loudon, 1994). Relying on televised debates is no solution since they occur only a few times during campaign period and, therefore, lack swift refutational maneuverability.

Accordingly, the best option is to use ads to combat ads. Richardson (2002) advises that, "responding to ads with ads, rather than restricting advertising, is perhaps the most appropriate redress to distorted charges" (p. 138). However, such refutation messages are post hoc (Pfau & Kenski, 1990). That is, they are implemented after an opponent's attack. Thus, Pfau and Kenski (1990) maintain that this inherently limits their effectiveness: "First, it is unclear whether refutation

or rebuttal messages can accomplish much more than to minimize the damage already done by an attack message" (p. 70). In addition, such messages are considered useless when an opponent launches a "last minute" attack, thus simply making an effective response impossible (Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Pfau, et al., 1990).

Inoculation research has demonstrated that utilizing an inoculation strategy promotes resistance to political attack messages. It is held that an inoculation strategy is more effective than a *post-hoc* rebuttal strategy for muting and minimizing the chance that political attacks may influence receivers (Pfau et al., 1990). Republican consultant Innocenzi (1985) recognizes the value of inoculation strategy when he says, "innoculation and pre-emption are what win campaigns" (as cited in Ehrenhalt, p. 2553). The inoculation strategy is a more generalized and viable defense option than use of preemptive message strategies that require candidates and their professionals to anticipate, prepare for, and implement responses to all potential attacks (Pfau & Kenski, 1990).

The inoculation approach has emerged as an alternative and promising option to deflect the influence of attack ads. (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990; Pfau, et al., 2001). In the first inoculation application to political campaign communication, Pfau and Burgoon (1988) investigated the use of

attack messages and the efficacy of the inoculation approach in a field experiment during a 1986 U.S. Senatorial election period. They concluded that inoculation deflects the effectiveness of subsequent political attack messages in several ways: "undermining the potential influence of the source of political attacks, deflecting the specific content of political attacks, and reducing the likelihood that political attacks will influence receiver voter intention" (p. 105-106). Other strategies do not seem to be as effective in accomplishing these goals.

Examining the potential of inoculation strategy in "direct mail" communication, Pfau et al. (1990) bolster the previous research findings of Pfau and Burgoon (1988). Pfau and colleagues (1990) found that the use of inoculation via direct mail communication, whether the inoculation treatments were same or different, confers resistance to the influence of political attack messages. The study also supported the prediction that inoculation is more effective than post-hoc refutation in protecting a candidate against attack.

Pfau and colleagues (2001) extended the applicability of inoculation to "soft-money-sponsored" issue ads, confirming the antidote effect of inoculation. In addition, the study extends the efficacy of inoculation to protecting the democratic system from the damaging effects of attack ads. The results revealed

that "inoculation treatments rendered the viewers of party-sponsored ads more interested in campaigns, more knowledgeable about the candidates and their positions, and more likely to go to the polls and vote" (p. 2395). Therefore, given the premises of inoculation theory and its recent successful application to political campaign communication, this study first posits the following hypothesis:

H1a: Compared to those who received no inoculation pretreatment, people who receive an inoculation pretreatment are more resistant to subsequent political attack messages.

Participatory Efficacy of the Inoculation Strategy

Previous research has demonstrated the efficacy of inoculation in deflecting the attitudinal influence of attack messages in political campaigns. Also, inoculation research has shown that inoculation messages foster resistance to the behavioral influence of political attacks (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988, Pfau et al., 1990, Pfau et al., 2001). Although political inoculation research has examined a single behavioral aspect such as the likelihood of voting, other active electoral behaviors need to be more explicated. This study seeks to extend the findings of Pfau et al. (2001) by arguing that inoculation can reduce the participatory effects of attack ads, thus affecting such behaviors as: putting up yard signs, posting bumper stickers, displaying a campaign button,

contributing money, working on behalf of a candidate, and proselytizing (speaking on behalf of a candidate).

Besides its theoretical importance in explaining the inoculation process, behavioral resistance has significant normative implications. Inoculation can protect democratic values, safeguarding people's political participation in the democratic electoral process. This is important since one of the most-feared consequences of attack messages is that they may undermine electoral participation; that attack messages undermine democratic values. Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) demonstrate that negative advertising is a cause for considerable concern in this respect. In order to examine the effect of negative advertising on participatory attitudes, Ansolabehere and Iyengar analyzed a data set pooled by a series of innovative controlled experimental studies in actual California election contexts—the 1990 California gubernatorial election, the 1992 California senate primary election, the 1992 California senate general election, the 1992 presidential election, and the 1993 Los Angeles mayoral election. The results show that the negative tone of political campaigning clearly lowers people's political participatory involvement. Compared to those who watched a positive advertisement, receivers who saw the negative version of the same spot expressed a lower intention to vote by 4.6%, reduced confidence

in government by 2.8%, and cut political self-confidence by 5.2%. The data suggest that the negative tone of political campaigning "contributes mightily to the public's dwindling participation and growing cynicism" (p. 105). Furthermore, the researchers' aggregate data from the 34 U.S. Senate elections confirmed the experimental findings: negative advertising keeps many people from the polls.

Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) contend that candidates' positive campaign advertisements tend to increase voting turnout whereas attack ads significantly depress the act of voting. Ansolabehere and Iyengar maintain that "attack advertisements resonate with the popular beliefs that government fails, that elected officials are out of touch and quite corrupt, and that voting is a hollow act" (p. 147). Therefore, Ansolabehere and Iyengar come to conclusion that the flood of negative campaigning tends to "erode the participatory ethos" (p. 147).

More recently, responding to some criticism of the external validity of the experimental studies and controversy over the effect of negative advertising (Finkel & Geer, 1998; Freedman & Goldstein, 1999; Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Lau, Sigelman, Heldman, & Babbitt, 1999; Wattenberg & Brians, 1999; also see, Lau & Sigelman, 2000), Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon (1999) offered the results based on more careful and robust analyses

of survey and aggregate data. Results of 1992 and 1996 National Election Study's surveys confirmed that exposure to negative advertising significantly depresses turnout. Also, the analysis of the aggregate data from the 1992 Federal Elections Commission (FEC) documented the demobilizing effect of negative advertising.

A study by Pfau et al. (2002) tested whether, compared to candidate-sponsored positive ads, soft-money-sponsored issue-advocacy advertising and candidate-sponsored contrast ads affect receivers' interest in campaigns or suppress their likelihood of voting. The results indicted that candidate-sponsored positive advertising was more likely to enhance the likelihood of voting, although the finding was only marginal. The results also revealed that attack ads exert the most debilitating effects on nonaffiliated voters. These results are consonant with the findings of Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995). They found that attack campaign advertising can increase alienation of nonpartisan voters. They conclude that, "attack ads produce the highest drop in political efficacy and in intentions to participate among nonpartisans" (p. 148). Regarding the likelihood of voting, the Pfau et al. (2002) findings also parallel Ansolabehere and Iyengar's argument that, while negative advertising turns voters away from participatory activities, positive advertising can "bring them back" (p. 105).

In addition to voting, the primary participatory mode of political behavior in elections, campaign activities such as working on behalf of a candidate or party, contributing money, proselytizing on behalf of candidates, putting up yard signs, and simply posting a bumper sticker also comprise important electoral activities (Kenny, 1992; Kessel, 1965; Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 1995; Verba, 1996; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978; Wielhouwer & Lockerbie, 1994). Verba & Nie (1972) hold that "voting and campaign activity are thus two of the major ways in which individuals can participate in politics" (p. 46). Thus, like voting, such campaign activities by nature are at the heart of the electoral process and the democratic political system.

Thus, beyond the scope of attitudinal resistance, this study will test whether inoculation deflects the draconian impact of attack messages; whether inoculation can militate the corrosive impact on citizenry's behavioral participation in the electoral process. This study predicts that:

H1b: Compared to those who received no inoculation pretreatment, people who receive an inoculation pretreatment are more behaviorally resistant to subsequent political attack messages, in that they are: a) more likely to go to the polls and vote; b) more likely to contribute money to preferred candidates; c) more likely to volunteer to work

for preferred candidates; d) more likely to proselytize on behalf of preferred candidates; e) more likely to display sticker or signs on behalf of preferred candidates.

Inoculation versus Post-hoc Refutation

As discussed earlier, the efficacy of the refutational strategy, which candidates employ in order to respond host-hoc to attack messages, is constrained by its somewhat "passive" nature. Because refutational messages constitute post-hoc strategy, the potential of rebuttal messages is limited to reversing damage already caused by an attack message. In addition, the refutation approach offers no protection against so-called "last minute" attacks (Pfau & Kenski, 1990).

Inoculation strategy has a relative advantage over post-hoc refutational approach as the result of its theoretical premises. Inoculation theory posits that because defense motivation is triggered by threat in combating subsequent attacks, "refutation is more effective if it precedes, rather than follows, exposure to a political attack message" (Pfau et al, 1990, p. 29). Early resistance research (Tannenbaum & Norris, 1965; Tannenbaum et al., 1966) tested the notion of the relative effectiveness of strategic optional sequencing of refutational messages, both before and after an attack. Tannenbaum et al. (1966) found that the refutation before the attack sequence is more effective than the reverse sequence.

Pfau et al's (1990) study renewed this idea of relative efficacy and made a direct comparison of both approaches in the political campaign context. The results of Pfau et al's study provided partial support for the prediction that inoculation is more effective than post-hoc refutation in promoting resistance to attitude change following exposure to political attack messages. The combined inoculation means on attitude toward candidate were lower than the post-hoc refutation means, indicating more resistance conferred in inoculation pretreatments. However, given the importance of this issue, these findings must be reaffirmed. The desirability of inoculation as a political campaign approach is contingent upon its superiority over post-hoc responses. Hence, this research will test the replicability of the previous research in a different election context, proposing that:

H2: Inoculation is superior to post-hoc refutation in deflecting political attack messages.

Chapter 3

Source Credibility and Inoculation

Source credibility revisited

This chapter examines the role of source credibility in conjunction with the inoculation approach to political communication. This investigation pursues three lines of inquiry pertaining to inoculation and source credibility in political campaign communication. First, the study tests the influence of source credibility in an inoculation context. Second, the study probes whether inoculation efficacy is more pronounced in less involved participants. And third, as peripheral and heuristic processing implies, the study addresses whether inoculation has more immediate effects in high source credibility compared to low credibility conditions.

Since Hovland, Janis, and Kelly's empirical inception of the construct (1953), source credibility has been one of the most researched concepts in persuasion. However, it has not received much attention in the context of resistance, despite the fact that early resistance studies (Tannenbaum, 1966; Tannenbaum et al., 1966; Tannenbaum & Norris, 1965) compared the potential of the source-based appeals to other defense options. Because contemporary elections rely on a heavy dose of media and candidate-centered campaigns, the construct needs to be

revisited in order to fully understand the resistance to persuasion mechanism in the context of contemporary election campaigns.

The importance of source factors including credibility is a product of broader changes in the election environment. At the presidential level, nominating reforms have led away from the conventional party-dependent selection system (Ceaser, 1979; Wattenberg, 1991; West, 1983). Consequently, candidates' dependence on media campaigning has increased as they seek to appeal directly to general public via media outlets (West, 1997). The heavy use of political spots on television (Graber, 1997; Kaid, 1999; West, 1997), also increases the use of candidate-centered campaigning, making source factors even more important.

Given that the aim of campaign is to win election through successful persuasion, source factors such as credibility better fit television's format (Iyengar & Valentino, 2000; Lupia, 2000). Television ads must be brief and must strike a "responsive chord" in audiences (Kosterman, 1991; Napolitan, 1972; Schwartz, 1972). Because of information overflow, most individuals cannot process every bit of incoming information from the mass media (Miller & Krosnick, 1996). Likewise, most voters "encounter information about the campaign not because they actively seek [it] out, but rather because it is sometimes

difficult to avoid" (Iyengar & Valentino, 2000).

Therefore, source credibility, rather than campaign issue content, is what many voters rely on in assessing candidates (Popkin, 1994). By implication, source credibility is important to the inoculation approach because credibility may mediate the effectiveness of inoculation. In campaign practice, candidates enhance their credibility on one hand, and they need to foster resistance to opponents' attacks on the other hand. This chapter investigates how source credibility impacts the efficacy of inoculation strategy, deflecting political attack messages as an additive factor.

Dimensions

Traced back to Aristotle's *ethos*, source credibility has been defined in terms of multiple dimensions. According to Aristotle, a speaker's *ethos*, is more important than *pathos* and *logos* in persuasion. Aristotlean *ethos* consisted of intelligence, character, and goodwill (Aristotle, 1954). Hovland et al. (1953) were the first to approach credibility empirically and reported that expertise and trustworthiness were the two basic components of source credibility. They operationalized expertise as "the extent to which a communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions" and trustworthiness as "the degree of confidence in the communicator's intent to communicate the assertions he

considered most valid" (p. 31). Kelman (1961), as part of a larger undertaking of the process of public opinion change, suggested three sources of persuasive sources: means control, attractiveness, and credibility. According to Kelman, a source "possesses credibility if his statements are considered truthful and valid, and hence worthy of serious consideration" (p. 68). Compared to means control and attractiveness, credibility is more autonomous, thus more likely to change receiver's attitudes and behaviors through internalization.

Employing a different approach to source credibility, McCroskey (1966) defines credibility as "the attitude toward a speaker held by the audience" (p. 63). More concerned with the dimensions of credibility drawn from recipients' perception than deductively driven credibility components, McCroskey measured the construct and offered "authoritativeness" and "character" as important factors of credibility (p. 66). Similarly, Berlo, Lemmert, and Davis (1969) found that credibility dimensions for audiences include such factors as safety, qualification, dynamism, and sociability. Hence, these factor analytic studies demonstrated that the construct of credibility is multifaceted.

Other studies emphasize the complexity of source credibility and the importance of "contextual" or "situational" variables. Cronkhite and Liska (1976) argue that researchers

should take into account the situational context in which a source and a receiver communicate. According to Cronkhite and Liska, source, timing, culture, and size of audience are factors that affect credibility. In a similar vein, Sternthal, Phillips, and Dholakia (1978) showed the joint effects of source credibility and several situational variables, such as persistence, timing, message variables (discrepancy, threat, incongruity, and evidence), and individual variables (locus of control and authoritarianism, involvement).

Despite the variations in dimensions and importance of contextual variables, the accumulated research findings confirm that expertise and trustworthiness are the two most important and salient components of the source credibility construct (Hovland et al, 1953; McGuire, 1985; Miller, 1987). Accordingly, the present research focused on these two dimensions and defined source credibility as a participant's perception toward a candidate's expertise and trustworthiness.

Impact of Source Credibility

Given the fact that the primary purpose of campaigning is political persuasion, source credibility may be one of the most important considerations in elections. Credibility impacts political persuasion in the way people respond to political candidates, changing public beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. (Iyengar & Valentino, 2000; Lupia, 2002; Sniderman, Brody, &

Tetlock, 1991) The influence of candidate's credibility on persuasion thus closely relates to the inoculation efforts to defend people from the upswing in political attack messages in recent election years. When deliberately incorporated in inoculation, people's perception of candidate's credibility may play an important role in their susceptibility and resistance to the attack messages.

Most of the early research (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; Lorge, 1936) indicates that "a high credibility source was more persuasive than a low credibility source if attitudes were measured immediately after the message" (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, p. 62). Hovland and Weiss suggest that communication recipients tend to conclude that a message from a low credibility source is less believable. Kelman and Hovland also found subjects are much more influenced by a message advocated by a court judge (high credibility source) than one by a criminal (low credibility source).

Hass (1981) suggests that more thinking occurs in response to messages concerning issues of high importance which are conveyed by a highly credible source than those presented by a source of low or moderate credibility. He concludes that people are more motivated to attend to an expert's position on an important issue, presumably because the more credible source has more valid information and trustworthiness than the less

credible source. Accordingly, Hass' study implies that high credibility sources will elicit greater agreement with the content of inoculation messages.

More recently, Chebat, Filiatrault, and Perrien (1990) examined whether source credibility increased the extent to which receivers accept political messages. Based on Kelman's (1961) cognitive and affective component of source credibility, Chebat et al. predicted that credibility enhance receivers' acceptance of political messages. The results confirmed that if receivers perceive the source as expert, trustworthy, attractive, and prestigious, they are more likely to agree with political statements. Chebat et al.'s findings imply that acceptability of inoculation messages may increase when individuals initially perceive the candidates they support to be more credible, subsequently resulting in greater inoculation efficacy against attacks. Likewise, when individuals rate the candidate credibility as low, the inoculation messages regarding the candidate may be less agreeable, resulting in less efficacy of inoculation against the subsequent attack.

Also, social judgment theory (Sherif & Sherif, 1967) posits that a "source with high status for the individual's reference groups will increase the range of assimilation" (p. 132) with discrepant communication. In other words, high source credibility enhances the width of the latitude of acceptance

and, at the same time, narrows the range of rejection.

Although source credibility has been one of earliest variables in studies of attitude change and persuasion, (Eagly & Chiken, 1993; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981), outside of some early attempts using the congruity approach, little research has investigated the importance of the construct within the framework of inoculation theory. Therefore, linking efficacy to source credibility, this study predicts that:

H3: Compared to pretreatments utilizing less credible sources, inoculation pretreatments featuring more credible sources confer greater resistance to political attack messages.

Issue Involvement and Source Credibility

According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986a), attitude changes occur via two basic routes. The *central route* to persuasion results from individuals' "thinking about the issue or arguments under consideration" (1981, p. 262). The ELM model posits that persuasion via the central route comes from effortful issue-relevant cognitive activity, and the changed attitudes tend to be relatively enduring. In contrast, the *peripheral route* occurs when persuasion results from non-issue-relevant concerns such as source attractiveness and promise of reward. Because it is a source cue, credibility would generally involve peripheral

processing. Persuasion via the peripheral route utilizes various superficial persuasion cues and contexts, and the consequent attitude changes tend to exist for relatively short periods of time. It is presumed that the peripheral route to persuasion is likely to occur when individuals are not motivated or not able to process the communication directly (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986a; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). Accordingly, peripheral cues could induce attitude changes without involving any active and cognitive thinking about arguments presented by the messages (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a; 1986b; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983; Petty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, & Cacioppo, 1987).

While most early research demonstrated the superiority of high source credibility compared to low source credibility, later research has shown that high source credibility is not always more effective than moderate or low source credibility in terms of persuasion (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1992; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Sternthal et al., 1978). The discrepancy in research findings stems from the different levels of issue outcome involvement. Petty and Cacioppo (1979) referred to issue involvement as "the extent to which the attitudinal issue under consideration is of personal importance" (p. 1915). According to ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979, 1981, 1984; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981), when an issue is highly involving

(high outcome involvement), it is likely that individuals employ the central route, and source credibility plays a less important role. In situations where the individual is highly involved in a certain issue, the motivation and ability to think about the content of the message rather than peripheral or heuristic cues such as source credibility increase as the personal relevance or importance of the issue increases. Meanwhile, people rely on the peripheral route when the issue is less involving (low outcome involvement); therefore, source credibility becomes a significant cue to process information. Fiske and Taylor (1991) maintain, "under low outcome involvement, then, source expertise can serve as a peripheral cue to persuasion, bypassing the need to process message arguments" (p. 481). In sum, the ELM suggests that the effect of source credibility depends on outcome involvement. Also, the model shows that source credibility exerts the strongest influence on the attitudes of those participants who are less involved in an issue, like many average voters.

For counter-attitudinal appeals on issues of low importance or prior knowledge, the previous research suggests that high credibility sources are more persuasive than low or moderate credibility sources (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Sternthal, Dholakia, & Leavitt, 1973). Research also found that fewer counterarguments were elicited by the highly credible source

than by either the low or unspecified source (Cook, 1969; Wu & Shaffer, 1987). With a low credibility source, receivers do more thinking, which results in more counterarguments being generated (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). Meanwhile, when subjects are exposed to proattitudinal advocacies, such as refutational preemption, the high credibility source has greater persuasion effect (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Sternthal et al., 1978). This is not surprising according to the basic premises of the ELM model. When an issue is not important or relevant, the receivers employ the peripheral route, relying on source credibility cues more than message-based cues. Therefore, in constructing inoculation messages, high source credibility will induce more intended pretreatment effects conferring resistance to attack persuasion.

Similar to the elaboration likelihood model, the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Eagly, 1983; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) posits that heuristic processing predominates when motivation for systematic processing is low, or when task importance is low. Chaiken (1980) argues that "source credibility significantly affects persuasion under conditions of low, but not high, issue involvement" (p. 754). When an issue is low involvement, heuristic cues such as source credibility exert a strong impact on receivers' attitudes. In contrast, if the issue is high involvement, only message

characteristics such as argument quality influence attitudes. For example, Chaiken (1980) found that high issue involvement tends to foster systematic information processing while low issue involvement seems to promote heuristic information processing. Chaiken (1980) reported that the attitudes of highly involved receivers are more strongly affected by argumentation factors than by the likability of the source. Meanwhile, the attitudes of low involved receivers are more strongly affected by the source factors than by the argumentation elements. Therefore, the current study provides a comparison of these different levels of involvement in political campaign messages, predicting that:

H4: Inoculation pretreatments featuring high source credibility appeals are more effective in conferring resistance to political attack messages among people who manifest low levels of issue involvement.

The Process of Resistance

In addition to issue involvement, the processing route utilized is related to whether the effect of an inoculation treatment is immediate or delayed. Also, the amount of the processing time is likely to depend on the type of information cue that is most salient (Chaiken, 1980; Perloff, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a). Previous research (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976) suggested that different modalities of persuasion took somewhat

distinctive routes of processing.

Examining the role and influence of print and video communication modalities in inoculation, Pfau et al. (2000) found that video inoculation treatments, compared to print treatments, employ an alternative route to resistance. Their results parallel previous research that video modality is more likely to rely on "source considerations" than print modality (Andreoli & Worchel, 1978; Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Chaiken & Eagley, 1983; Pfau, 1990), due to more intimate relational cues (Pfau, 1990; Pfau & Kang, 1991); the latter involve how people perceive their relationship with the source of a message. Pfau, Holbert et al. posited that video inoculation treatments elicit more positive relational perceptions of the source of such treatments, which subsequently promote resistance to the source of persuasive attacks. Pfau, Holbert et al. also found that, compared to print, video pretreatments immediately produced positive relational perceptions about the source of the treatments. The findings presented by Pfau, Holbert et al. imply that while inoculation treatments via more cognitive elements tend to take more time (or delay), inoculation treatments elicited by immediate source-related perceptions appear to promote resistance without any time delay.

As discussed earlier, the ELM posits that the central route to persuasion results from "thoughtful," "effortful," cognitive

consideration whereas persuasion via the peripheral route occurs as a result of some simple cues or inferences that require little cognitive scrutiny of information. The first tends to be more enduring and delayed, compared the latter persuasion type (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a). Similarly, the systematic information processing maximizes the message-based cognitions, which require more time to think about the validity of the argument. In contrast, the heuristic information processing maximizes the non-content cues, which has the "economic advantage of requiring a minimum of cognitive effort" (Chaiken, 1980, p. 753). Perceptions of source credibility as a peripheral factors are likely to require less cognitive processing effort and less time.

Meanwhile, the process of inoculation, in general, is more likely to require cognitive activity (Lee & Pfau, 1997; Pfau, 1997). The traditional inoculation model (e.g., McGuire, 1961b, 1964) treated resistance as a cognitive process, in which resistance was achieved via threat and counterarguing. The later research confirmed the essential role of counterarguing, which mostly involves cognitive preemptive refutation, in inoculation (Lee & Pfau, 1997; Pfau et al., 2001). Lee and Pfau and Pfau et al. posited that cognitive inoculation treatments would be superior to affective treatments since the inoculation process operates via an active, cognitive process, although

results revealed that cognitive and affective treatments were comparable in producing resistance. The current study assumed inoculation unleashed a largely cognitive process. This study posits that source-based inoculation appeals achieve resistance differently, since they rely less on counterarguing, which requires time to unfold (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a; 1986b; Pfau, 1997).

H5: Inoculation treatments featuring high source credibility appeals induce immediate resistance compared to a delayed effect for those featuring no-source credibility appeals.

Chapter 4

Study within a Study: Inoculation and Debate

Because of their ability to draw a large audience of voters and civic educational influence, televised political debates have been considered one of the most important campaign events. Although the viewership of televised debates has decreased since the 1992 presidential election—the third debate in 2000 had the lowest rating (25.9) of any televised presidential debate the 2000 presidential debates reached a total audience of more than 100-million people (Bierbaum, 2000; Nielsen, 2000a, 2000b). A *USA Today* survey in 1996 revealed that 36% of respondents viewed debates as the most valuable information source in their decision-making (in Carlin, 2000).

Debate Influence

In spite of the abundance of anecdotal evidence about the impact of the televised debates, the majority of empirical studies since the 1960s indicates that debates influence some viewers, but effects are small. Many studies report that debates exert influence on viewers' attitudes toward candidates and candidate preferences (Barnett, 1981; Becker, Pepper, Wenner, & Kim, 1979; Benoit et al., 1998; Benoit & Wells, 1996; Ben-Zeev & White, 1962; Brydon, 1985; Casey & Fitzgerald, 1977; Chaffee & Choe, 1980; D. Davis, 1979; M. Davis, 1982; Geer, 1988; Holbrook, 1996; Kelly, 1983; Krivonous, 1976; Ladd &

Ferree, 1981; Lanoue, 1992; Lanoue & Schrott, 1989a, 1989b; Lemert et al., 1991; Leuthold & Valentine, 1981; McKinnon & Tedesco, 1999; Middleton, 1962; Pfau, Cho, & Chong, 2001; Pfau & Eveland, 1994, 1996; Pfau & Kang, 1991; Robinson, 1979; E. Roper, 1960; B. W. Roper, 1977; Sears & Chaffee, 1979; Shaw, 1999; Swerdlow, 1984; Tannenbaum, Greenberg, & Silverman, 1962; Walker & Peterson, 1981). Meanwhile, other studies dispute that debates influence viewers' attitudes and especially vote choice. Instead, these studies maintain that the main impact of debates is confined in the reinforcement of viewers' political predispositions, rarely leading to attitudinal and behavioral changes (Abramowitz, 1978; Apker & Voss, 1994; Benoit et al., 2001; Bishop et al., 1980; Bowes & Strentz, 1979; Davis, 1979; Eadie, Krivonos, & Goodman, 1977; Feigert & Bowling, 1980; Hagner & Rieselbach, 1980; Katz & Feldman, 1962; Kennamer, 1987; Lemert, Elliott, Bernstein, Rosenberg, & Nestvold, 1991; Lubell, 1962; McLeod, Durall, Ziemke, & Bybee, 1979; Miller & Mackeun, 1979; Mulder, 1978; Payne, Golden, Marlier, & Ratzman, 1989; Rose, 1979; Rouner & Perloff, 1988; Sebald, 1962; Sigelman & Sigelman, 1984; Simons & Liebowitz, 1979; Smith, 1977; Vancil & Pendel, 1984; Wald & Lupfer, 1978).

Some studies offer contingent conditions in which the debate influence is potentially greatest (Becker & Kraus, 1978; Chaffee & Choe, 1980; Geer, 1988; Hellweg, Pfau, Brydon, 1992;

Pfau, 2002, The Racine Group, 2002). Becker & Kraus (1978) postulated that campaign communication could best influence voting decisions when "one of the candidates is not well known, many voters are undecided, the contest appears to be a close one, and party allegiances are weak" (p. 267). Further, Hellweg et al. (1992) suggested contextual circumstances in which the impact of debate is potentially greatest. One circumstance occurs when debates take place early in a political campaign such as primary and caucus (also see Chaffee & Choe, 1980). Hellweg et al. reason that during the nomination process, people's attitudes toward candidates are relatively volatile; mass media impact is potentially greatest; and party identification is less potent. The history shows that this circumstance favors the less-known candidates (Martel, 1983; Pfau, 1987). The second circumstance involves "elections featuring substantial undecided or conflicted voters" (Hellweg et al., 1992, p. 123). In this circumstance, as the number of undecided and conflicted voters increase, the effects of debates are maximized (Geer, 1987).

Despite the early findings that persuasive effects are modest, at best, recent studies with more sophisticated methods detect substantial debate influence on election outcome. After the extensive analysis of the 1960, 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1988 presidential debates, Hellweg, et al. (1992) came to a

conclusion that debates "often help to shape or even change [voters'] attitudes about candidates, often with sufficient force to alter voting intention" (p. 124).

Analyzing National Election Study data of 1984, 1988, and 1992 presidential elections, Holbrook (1995) found that presidential debates influence voting intention as well as candidate evaluations. The analysis clearly demonstrated that receivers' evaluations of candidate performance in TV debates significantly influence post-debate vote intention. Also, watching debates influences voters' candidate evaluations including their assessment of the candidate's caring about people, leadership qualities, and understanding of problems, as well as net candidate assessment. Thus, Holbrook concludes that while reinforcing candidate and party predispositions, televised debates often "play an important, persuasive role in the campaign process" (p. 121). In particular, the impact of televised debates is manifest more for low visibility elections than for high visibility elections.

A study by Shaw (1999) confirmed the previous research that debate effects were substantial. Testing both immediate and durable campaign effects in presidential elections from 1952 to 1992, Shaw found that debates are "highly correlated with changes in voters' preferences," supporting Holbrook's findings. (p. 417).

Because the debates are well publicized among people and feature dynamic contrasts and conflicts, they draw massive audiences. In particular, presidential debates attract larger audiences than any other single event during an election campaign (Trent & Friedenberg, 2000). It is observed that nearly 90% of Americans tuned in to at least one of the Kennedy-Nixon debates in 1960 (Stanton, 1962); 80% viewed at least one of the Carter-Ford debates in 1976 (Miller & MacKuen, 1979). Even though viewership may drop for some races, a typical presidential debate reaches between 60- and 80-million people, with a record high of more than 100 million in the Carter-Reagan debate in 1980 (Schroeder, 2000). The lower-level elections also tend to attract large audiences. For instance, a study reported that one of the 1998 Minnesota gubernatorial debates drew more than a third of television viewers (Alliance for Better Campaigns, 1998). A survey also revealed that about 70% of voters believe debates for major statewide offices such as governor or U.S. senator are important (Fox News, 2002). Therefore, debate is a key election event at all levels.

Combative Debates and Inoculation

Given the fact that debates attract such a high level of attention from the public, scholars are not hesitant in pointing out one of the unique characteristics of debate: it's combative. No other televised political event offers "such a

strong structural incentive to watch" (Schroeder, 2000, p. 202). Dye and Ziegler (1989) argued that debates provide the opportunity for viewers to watch a drama of confrontation. The potential for conflict imposes a great deal of pressure for candidates, which, in return, attracts viewership. Similarly, Pfau (2002) proposed that the debate is a unique communication venue that "facilitates clash, depth, and unfiltered access" (p. 251). Also, a debate is "human drama at its rawest" (Schroeder, 2000, p.201) because of its conflict. Schroeder maintains, "live debates teem with dramatic conflict: interpersonal conflict between candidates; intra personal conflict within a debater's psyche; the conflicts between expectation and performance, preparation and spontaneity" (p. 202). Accordingly, regarding the combativeness of the debate, as Walter Mondale once put it, " it's not giving a speech. This was real war, and people find it credible" (in Schroeder, p. 202).

Because debates are naturally combative, most candidates seem to find themselves feeling unsafe in the situation. Candidates may realize that a debate could actually be a "threat rather than a benefit because the stakes are so high" before the large size of the audience (Lemert, Elliott, Bernstein, Rosenberg, & Nestvold, 1991, p. 197). Numerous instances show that such threat matters in the course of an election, whether or not it determines the actual election

outcome (e.g., Reagan's "There you go again," and Bentsen's "You're no Jack Kennedy"). These high stakes in debates tend to make candidates more likely to "undermine or embarrass their opposition rather than explaining and debating substantive policy positions and differences" (Lemert et al., 1991, p. 197).

With the strong visuals and image-invoking characteristics of television (Diamond & Friery, 1987; Graber, 1997; McGinnis, 1969; Meyrowitz, 1985; Orin, 2000; Postman, 1988), televised debates may involve unwarranted persuasive influences on people's attitudes toward candidates and decision-making. As discussed earlier, the attractiveness of debates mainly stems from the fact that candidates contrast each other's ideas and clash over competing issues (Dye & Ziegler, 1989; Lemert et al., 1991; Pfau, 2002; Schroeder, 2000; Trent & Friedenberg, 2000). Considering the inherently combative nature of debate, we can raise a question: If attacks are delivered in debates just as they are in other settings such as political ads, how can we militate their influence? Hence, we should consider-in addition to the influence of debates-whether campaigns can protect against debate influence. Can campaigns inoculate against the influence of candidate attacks delivered in a debate setting?

Inoculation theory has been successfully applied to important political contexts such as political ads (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990; Pfau et al., 2001). It is

assumed that if debates' confrontational format is influential, then the potential of inoculation could be promising as it has been in other venues such as political ads. However, despite its enormous role in campaign communication, debate has never been analyzed using an inoculation approach. This study thus will explore the potential of inoculation treatments to enhance resistance to anti-attitudinal attack messages delivered in televised debates, predicting that:

H6: Compared to those who received no inoculation pretreatment, people who receive an inoculation pretreatment are more resistant to counter-attitudinal attacks delivered in televised political debates.

Normative Impact and Inoculation

Besides examining televised debates' influence on people's perceptions of candidates and voting dispositions, the most important question posed by scholars is, "do debates directly affect normative outcomes?" (Pfau, 2003). The question concerns the core values of the democratic process such as confidence in the political system, participation in politics, and trust in political leaders. Despite its importance, the normative effects of debates have not received much attention from the research community. A few studies, however, have documented that debates help strengthen the democratic process (Becker et. al., 1979; Chaffee, 1978; Pfau et al., 2001; Patterson, 2002).

Becker et al. (1979) found that debates provide viewers with heavy exposure to information about candidates, which "resulted in a certain degree of commitment to the election process and to the candidate selected through that process" (p. 396). Similarly, Chaffee (1978) maintained that televised debates enhance viewers' confidence in political institutions and induce political socialization. More recently, Pfau et al. (2001) found that traditional forms of communication such as candidate debates and newspaper articles "exerted the greatest impact on perceptions of democratic process" (p. 98). In particular, viewers' use of televised debate was positively associated with "respondents' engagement/participation, interest in the campaign, knowledge of the candidates and their positions, and lack of cynicism" (p. 98). In a tracking study of 2000 voters in the 2000 presidential election, Patterson (2002) found that debates significantly increased the proportion of Americans who regarded the election "exciting, informative, and encouraging" (p. 124).

Still, there are other findings on the impact of debates on normative outcomes that are discouraging. Contrary to our general belief that debates promote normative values, Spiker and McKinney (1999) found that watching the first 1996 presidential debate "had very little effect on malaise; in fact, "malaise increased significantly from the postdebate viewing

level" when viewers were involved in the focus group discussion (p. 333). Spiker and McKinney reasoned that participation in focus groups following the debate seemed to strengthen feelings of political malaise via the process of crystallization of the concept. In a similar approach, an extensive panel study of the 1992 presidential election analyzed the patterns of people's media consumption including debate viewing (Cavanaugh, 1995). Interestingly, the study found that debates failed to stimulate political interest and efficacy for people with less involvement. While most of the high political interest panelists who watched the first 1992 presidential debate continued to watch the vice presidential debate and the second presidential debate, the low-political interest groups who watched the first debate "lost interest and did not watch the final debate forums" (p. 143). This findings indicate that disaffected viewers may get more turned off after watching a debate.

With these not concurring findings, as Pfau (2002) argued, the search for debate influence, especially on the democratic process, is elusive. In this sense, the Racine Group (2002)'s call for further research on normative outcomes warrants diverse and broad approaches to debates. The current research argues that because debates are inherently combative, hence attractive and persuasive influencing our sense of democratic

process, inoculation strategy may contribute to the process either by bolstering democratic values enhanced via "sober" nature of debates (Hart, 2000) or by deflecting detrimental effects fostered via the intrinsic nature of "combative" formats. Thus, this research explores the potential of inoculation strategy in the context of debate, inquiring that:

Q1: Assuming that debate attacks undermine democratic norms, can inoculation militate against damage to democratic values produced by televised political debates?

Chapter 5

Method

The two studies featured in this dissertation will be integrated in the description of methods and results. To differentiate them, the "main study" refers to the broader investigation of inoculation against political attack messages whereas the "debate study" refers to the examination of inoculation against arguments launched in a televised debate. The two studies are distinct, although there is overlap in the measures used.

Participants

Participants in this study were recruited from undergraduate students enrolled at The University of Oklahoma who were eligible voters. In the main study, of the 668 students who began the study at phase 1, 508 completed all three phases (a 76% retention rate). For the debate study, an additional separate sample of 103 participants was recruited; after the three research phases, 86 participants remained in the study. No student was allowed to participate in both the main and debate studies to avoid possible threats to internal validity.

Design and Independent Variables

The main study employed a Multivariate Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA) design. Two independent variables were

manipulated in the initial analysis. The primary independent variable, treatment condition, was operationalized as inoculation, post-hoc refutation, and control condition. The detailed description of each condition's manipulation is presented below (see Attack/Inoculation/Refutation Message section).

As a part of the primary independent variable, candidate credibility message treatment was manipulated. To test the effect of candidate credibility within the inoculation conditions, the source credibility variable within the inoculation condition was additionally operationalized as high, low, and no manipulation. High source credibility was manipulated with written messages featuring positive credibility arguments and claims concerning candidates supported in the inoculation message. By contrast, low source credibility messages were constructed with negative information about candidates supported in the inoculation message. Finally, the no-manipulation control condition was operationalized as an inoculation treatment without either a positive or negative credibility message. No-manipulation control messages were produced with threat and refutational preemptive material only, with source credibility not present in this condition.

The credibility messages were designed to reflect the two domains of source credibility defined previously: expertise and

trustworthiness (Hovland et al., 1953; McGuire, 1985; Miller, 1987). Based on publicly available information about candidates, the researcher prepared positive and negative credibility messages for each candidate. Positive messages featured positive expertise properties such as candidate's achievements and experiences in public service, various awards, honors, and recognitions from independent organizations for his/her excellence and devotion. Positive messages also utilized materials designed to evoke positive perceptions of candidate trustworthiness. Complimentary remarks, excerpts, and citations from highly visible and objective sources on a candidate's character were incorporated. Reports on a candidate's non-political activities, such as family and community activities, were also included to enhance trustworthiness. Meanwhile, negative messages were assembled with various materials that indicated a candidate's shortcomings in expertise, such as inexperience in public service, the lack of policy vision, and an ill-informed approach to issues. Also, negative messages contained negative trustworthy elements such as personal troubles, character problems, records of being indicted, and moral and normative loopholes.

Special attention was given to the form and style of the messages when constructing credibility messages. The messages were formatted as if they were objective news articles rather

than messages prepared by candidates. Also, identifiable news sources were presented when credibility arguments and claims were drawn from news articles. The results of a pilot study insured the utility of manipulation and overall equivalence between messagesⁱ.

Initial attitudes and political involvement were treated as covariates in this study. Receiver initial attitude was assessed with six bipolar adjective pairs developed by Burgoon, Cohen, Miller, and Montgomery (1978) and employed by recent inoculation studies (Pfau et al., 1990; Pfau et al., 2000; Pfau et al., 2001). These semantic differential items were: unacceptable/acceptable, foolish/wise, negative/positive, unfavorable/favorable, wrong/right, and bad/good. The previous research reports that the reliability of the scale is high ($\alpha = .96$ and $.97$ for Pfau et al., 2000 and Pfau et al., 2001, respectively). The reliability of the initial attitude measures for this study was $.97$.

Political involvement was operationalized as the importance or salience of the 2002 senatorial or gubernatorial election in Oklahoma depending on which race each participant was assigned to. Political involvement was assessed using an abbreviated version of the Personal Involvement Inventory (PII) developed by Zaichkowski (1985). Six bipolar adjective pairs were presented: unimportant/important; of no concern/of much

concern; irrelevant/relevant; means nothing/means a lot; doesn't matter/matters; insignificant/significant. The reliability of the issue involvement measures for this study was .97.

In the debate study, one independent variable (treatment condition) was manipulated. Treatment condition was operationalized as inoculation and control condition. All the covariates used in the main study were employed with the same operationalizations and instruments for the purpose of the debate study.

Procedure

Both the main and debate study used actual candidates running for public office in the state of Oklahoma during the 2002 mid-term election. In particular, the study utilized the state gubernatorial election and U.S. Senate race, anticipating these two campaigns would be more visible than other lower-level elections.

Attack/Inoculation/Refutation Messages

Multiple messages were prepared for administration in the study. After identifying the most salient issue concerns on the basis of polling data and candidates' campaign messages such as position papers, political commercials and candidate speeches, the researcher constructed printed attack messages mostly relying on actual candidate arguments on the selected issues.

Two attack messages were prepared for each candidate except the independent candidate in the gubernatorial election, who as a long-shot, thus less attacked than other candidates. The independent candidate, therefore, had only one attack message. For the gubernatorial race, Republican Steve Largent, the favored candidate, was attacked for his insolvent education plan in one message and a lack of integrity for accepting money from disreputable (e.g., Enron) donors in the other message. Democratic candidate Brad Henry was attacked in one message for his "radical" economic plans imposing obstacles to business. In the second attack message, Henry was criticized for his idea of legalizing gambling for educational funding. Gary Richardson, the independent candidate, also proposed a state-run lottery, and he was attacked for his support for the gambling idea.

For the senatorial race, each candidate had two attack messages. The frontrunner James Inhofe, the incumbent Republican, attacked David Walters, Democrat, for his dubious stance in national security and endorsement from an anti-military interest group. In the other message, Inhofe attacked Walters' character problem, the violation of election laws in a previous election. The Walters messages attacked Inhofe for his support for medical malpractice bill that would restrict the rights of medical victims to justice, and his stance against banning cockfighting. Sponsorship of all attack messages was

attributed to the interest group, Citizens for Informed Elections.

Based on the premises of inoculation theory, inoculation messages were constructed based on the corresponding attack messages. As discussed earlier, inoculation pretreatment consists of two essential components, threat and refutational preemption. Hence, inoculation messages incorporated these two components. For the threat element, the inoculation messages were designed to warn receivers that in the coming election they would receive impending threatening attacks against a candidate/issue position supported by receivers. Also, receivers were informed that the attack messages would be potentially persuasive and dangerous. The warning was specific to the content of the subsequent attacks. On the other hand, in the refutational preemption component, the messages were designed to refute, point-by-point, the argument of political attack messages with supporting materials to bolster the existing attitudes.

Post-hoc refutation messages resembled inoculation messages, except that they contained only the refutational preemption components, removing the threat message component. The post-hoc refutation messages did not offer forewarning of the impending attacks. Persuasive attack arguments followed by the warning were modified into simple straightforward sentences that

encapsulated the main point of the attack. The abbreviated argument, thus, was devoid of the specifics, implications, and consequences of the initial attack arguments (threat component). Lastly, the post-hoc refutation messages did not reiterate the forewarning of the attack at the concluding section of the messages. Except for the threat component, all other sections including the refutational preemption section were kept in the same fashion as in the inoculation messages.

To manipulate two variables (inoculation and source credibility), this study borrowed the message manipulation design employed by Chaiken and Eagly's (1983) study on source perception and communication modality. In their study, the source factor was manipulated in a separate form of "background interview," which elicit the perceptions of a source. After watching this somewhat separate message about source, participants were then exposed to the main persuasive message from the speaker for the modality manipulation. In a similar manner, the present study separated the manipulation of source credibility from the inoculation treatment manipulation. Each source credibility message was collated with one of the treatment messages. For example, participants in a high source credibility/inoculation condition began reading the first page of the description of high source credibility about a candidate, and then they proceeded to the inoculation message on the next

page. In doing so, each condition differed only based on the combination of the two variables without interfering with each other's message formation. Thus, it is expected that the study achieved better control of potential confounding caused by the mix of various elements of the two variables in a single message.

Finally, for the debate experiment, the attack messages were the senatorial candidates' arguments against each other during the televised debate. The inoculation messages used in the main study were administered for the debate study. As in the main study, two inoculation messages were applied to each candidate. Because it was assumed that multiple issues and topics would be discussed in the televised debate, difficulties arose with inoculation treatment. The researcher reasoned that the candidates would clash in the debate attacking each other's salient weaknesses on issues or character, which were already featured in the inoculation messages in the main study. Thus, the two issues chosen in the main study for each candidate were employed for the debate inoculation. Post-hoc review of the debate contents provided reasonable support for the projection: The two candidates made harsh exchanges over campaign violations and national defense, which were featured in the main study, as well as other issues (*Tulsa World*, 2002). In addition, some contents of the inoculation messages were

indirectly (inoculation different) relevant to the debate exchange. Further, inoculation theory hints that inoculation-different treatments provide a generic protection, an "umbrella effect," which protects an attitude from attacks featuring unrelated issues and topics (McGuire, 1961b, 1962, 1966, also see Pfau, 1997).

Message Equivalence

Each attack message and its corresponding inoculation message were constructed in order to be as equivalent as possible in terms of the style of writing and the degree of comprehensibility. The attack and inoculation messages ranged in length from 300 to 303 words. To achieve this message equivalence, the study employed the Index of Contingency developed by Becker, Bavelas, and Braden (1961). The Index of Contingency is designed to appraise the readability of sentences. The Index indicates the degree of readability by calculating the frequency of the concept words based on numbers of total words, nouns, and repeated nouns. Lower scores indicate greater diversity in word use, suggesting more difficult readability. Higher scores imply recurrence in word use, suggesting more ease in comprehension (Becker et al., 1961). As Table 1 shows, the similarity of the index ratings across different messages indicates that the messages employed in this study were relatively equivalent in readability.

Ratings for attack messages and inoculations messages ranged from 9.32 to 11.85, thus suggesting equivalence.

Administration

The study was conducted in three phases during approximately one month of the 2002 congressional and state election period. Phase 1 began administration of pretreatment instruments including a brief demographic questionnaire, and measures of attitude toward candidates, political party identification, and political involvement. After Phase 1, the researcher analyzed the preliminary data in order to know participants' attitudes toward candidates, party affiliation, and issue agendas under consideration. On the basis of the results of the attitude indicators of the scale, the researcher assigned participants to treatment conditions. Assignment to condition was random and stratified. Equal numbers of people with different initial attitudes were placed in each condition randomly.

Phase 2 involved the primary experimental treatments. Participants were asked to read a political message on behalf of candidates they supported. Inoculation treatment participants were given an inoculation message consistent with their candidate preference. Those who were assigned to the post-hoc refutation condition received an attack message produced by the researcher. The strategy of post-hoc refutation

assumes that refutational defense follows an attack message. Therefore, the participants in the post-hoc refutation condition were exposed to an attack message first, and then received refutational messages to defend their attitudes. Control participants received no message. All participants were asked to complete a questionnaire containing assessment of threat, counterarguing, attitude toward the candidate, and behavioral intentions.

Phase 3 involved three simultaneous steps. First, the researcher administered attack messages to those who had received inoculation pretreatments and to control group participants. Second, the researcher administered post-hoc refutation messages to those in the post-hoc refutation condition. Finally, all participants were asked to complete posttreatment instruments.

For the debate study, the researcher administered pretest questionnaires two weeks before the televised debate experiment was scheduled. After determining their preexisting candidate preferences, the researcher randomly assigned participants to either the inoculation or control condition. A week later, the inoculation group was treated with inoculation messages while the control group received no messages. For the third phase, all participants, upon arrival at the research site, were asked to answer predebate questionnaires, which used

the same measures of the political attack message experiment. The inoculation group and control group then watched a 30-minute long televised debate between the two Oklahoma senatorial candidates in a separate viewing room. After the debate viewing, all participants were asked to complete postdebate questionnaires, which had the same measures used in the political attack message experiment. Finally, the researcher debriefed the participants as to the purpose of the study and concluded the experiments.

Instruments

Manipulation Check

Threat was operationalized as a warning of impending, and potentially persuasive, attacks against the candidate supported by the receiver. In order to ensure that threat was elicited by the inoculation pretreatments, a manipulation check was conducted using five bipolar adjective pairs employed in previous research (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990; Pfau et al., 1992; Pfau et al., 1997a; Pfau, Szabo et al., 2001). Items include not threatening/threatening, not harmful/harmful, unintimidating/intimidating, not risky/risky, and safe/dangerous. Pfau, Szabo et al.'s study reported that the reliability of the scale is high (Cronbach's $\alpha = .91$). The reliability of the threat measures in this study was .94.

As another manipulation check, source credibility was

measured in order to ensure that each condition of credibility elicits the corresponding amount of perceptions toward candidates. Source credibility, defined as a set of perceptions about sources held by receivers, was operationalized as the following two dimensions: expertise and trustworthiness. As McGuire (1985) suggests, the dimensions are the two most important and salient components of the source credibility construct. Source credibility of candidates was assessed using six semantic differential items based on previous factor-analytic work of Berlo et al.(1969), McCroskey (1966), and Tuppen (1974). The items for expertise were: trustworthy/untrustworthy, honest/dishonest, and just/unjust. The item for trustworthiness were: experience/inexperience, informed/uninformed, and intelligent/unintelligent. The reliability of the overall credibility scale for this study was .95, with expertise, .95 and trustworthiness, .94, respectively.

Dependent Measures

Both the main study and debate study employed six dependent measures. Three measures assess participant's attitudes toward the candidates: global attitude toward the candidate attacked in the attack message, perceptions of the candidate's competence, and perceptions of the candidate's character. Two measures were used to assess participant's behavioral

disposition: voting likelihood and participatory intention.

Threat was assessed for a manipulation check after administration of phase 2.

Global attitudes toward each candidate attacked in the attack message were measured using six semantic differential items developed by Burgoon et al. (1978). This scale was previously used by Pfau and his colleagues and has proved highly reliable (Cronbach's efficient alpha = .97 on average of all candidates measured, Pfau et al., 2001). The items include wise/foolish, good/bad, positive/negative, favorable/unfavorable, right/wrong, and acceptable/unacceptable. The reliability of the attitude toward candidate measures for this study was .98.

Participants' perception of candidate competence and character were assessed using semantic differential items developed by McCroskey and colleagues (McCroskey, Holdridge, & Toomb, 1974; McCroskey & Jenson, 1973). The items for competence measurement are: unintelligent/intelligent, incompetent/competent, and unqualified/qualified. The character items are: dishonest/honest, bad/good, and selfish/unselfish. Previous research demonstrated the scale is highly reliable (Cronbach's alpha = .91 and .93 for Pfau & Burgoon, 1988 and Pfau et al., 2001, respectively). The reliability of the competent and character measures for this study was .95 and .94,

respectively.

Voting likelihood for the candidate attacked in the attack message was employed to assess voting disposition. A 0-100 scale measured participants' voting probability for the candidate attacked in the attack message (Pfau & Burgoon, 1998; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Pfau, et al. 1990; Pfau, Cho, & Chong, 2001).

Participatory intention was measured employing a 6-item Likert-type scale. Items were borrowed from a previous study (Pfau et al., 2001), which was based on a scale ranging from 0 (no chance) to 100 (near certain probability). In the current study, the items were measured on a 7-point scale in order to increase the reliability of the scale. Responses were elicited by asking participants how likely they would be to: "attempt to persuade others to support the candidate"; "display a poster, bumper sticker, or campaign button on behalf of the candidate"; "contribute money to the candidate's campaign"; "volunteer your time to work on behalf of the candidate"; "go to the polls and vote for the candidate on election day." The reliability of the previous study and current study were .68 and .86, respectively.

Chapter 6

Results

668 undergraduate students initially participated in the first phase of the study. After the first phase, participants were categorized based on their candidate preference and party identification. They were then randomly assigned to each of the experiment conditions. Those with no candidate preference and party identification were eliminated, and so were those who irresponsibly answered the questionnaires. The final sample yielded the total 508 participants (24% of attrition rate) who completed all three phases of the research. Based on the final data, a manipulation check was performed on threat and candidate credibility. Subsequently, data were analyzed to test the hypotheses using a Multivariate Analysis of Covariance technique. The independent variables were treatment condition (inoculation, post-hoc refutation, and control), candidate credibility (high and low credibility). Participants' initial attitudes toward candidates, political party strength, and involvement with the election served as covariates. Participants' phase 3 attitudes, voting likelihood, and behavioral intentions were treated as dependent variables.

The omnibus MANCOVA was examined for the test of the overall findings. Planned comparisons were conducted to analyze all predicted relationship and Scheffe post hoc tests for

unpredicted relationships. Finally, correlational and structural equation analyses were employed to assess Hypothesis 5, which explicated the process of inoculation.

Omnibus Findings of Inoculation in the Main Study

The manipulation check and Hypothesis 1-3 addressed the overall effectiveness of inoculation in the main study. An omnibus MANCOVA was computed for all relevant dependent variables in the initial step in these analyses. The omnibus MANOVA revealed significance for the covariate of initial attitude, $F(6,495)=9.57$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.10$, with univariate tests revealing significant effects on the dependent measures of: attitude toward candidates, $F(1,500)=32.20$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.07$; perceived threat, $F(1,500)=4.5$, $p<.05$, $\eta^2=.01$; perception of candidate credibility, both competence, $F(1,500)=31.41$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.06$, and character, $F(1,500)=29.29$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.06$; participation dimensions $F(1,500)=27.90$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.05$, voting likelihood, $F(1,500)=47.84$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.09$; and involvement, $F(6,495)=6.34$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.07$, with univariate test revealing significant effects on the dependent measures of participation dimensions, $F(1,500)=16.97$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.03$, and voting likelihood, $F(1,500)=2.52$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.02$. The omnibus MANCOVA also revealed a main effect for experimental condition, $F(30,1982)=3.84$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.04$, with univariate tests indicating significant effects on attitude toward candidates,

$F(5,502)=8.97$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.08$, perceived threat, $F(5,502)=5.15$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.05$, perceived candidate competence, $F(5,502)=12.31$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.11$, character, $F(5,502)=9.43$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.09$, participation dimensions $F(5,502)=9.17$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.08$, and voting likelihood, $F(5,502)=4.66$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.04$.

Manipulation Check

Threat is the integral element in inoculation process by motivating receivers to defend against attacks. Therefore, it is needed to ensure whether inoculation pretreatments elicit threat. Five bipolar adjective pairs were used to measure threat on a 7-point scale indicating the more threat for the higher score. A planned comparison, employing Dunn's multiple comparison procedure, was computed to compare threat levels between inoculation groups and the control group. The results showed that participants in inoculation treatments experienced greater threat than those in the control group. As Table 2 indicates, the combined inoculation group mean was higher than the control group mean, $F(1,435)=11.12$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.02$. Therefore, the results revealed that inoculated participants experienced greater elicited threat than control group participants.

As another manipulation check, candidate credibility was measured in order to ensure that each credibility manipulation elicited the corresponding perceptions toward candidates. The

previous research suggests that expertise and trustworthiness are the two most important and salient components of source credibility. Six bipolar semantic differential items was used to measure candidate credibility on a 7-point scale indicating the greater credibility for the higher score. A planned comparison, employing Dunn's multiple comparison procedure, was computed to compare credibility perception levels between positive credibility group, negative credibility group, and control group. As Table 3 indicates, the positive credibility group mean was higher than the negative credibility group mean, $F(1,155)=9.88$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.05$. Also, the positive credibility group mean was higher than the control group mean, $F(1,148)=4.07$, $p<.05$, $\eta^2=.02$. The negative credibility group mean was lower than the control group mean, $F(1,165)=6.23$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.04$. Therefore, the results confirmed that participants in positive treatments perceived candidates as more credible than those in negative and control conditions.

Hypotheses 1-3: Overall Effectiveness

Hypothesis 1a posited that compared to those who received no inoculation pretreatment, people who receive an inoculation pretreatment are more resistant to subsequent political attack messages. The hypothesis was fully supported. A planned comparison examining the inoculation means versus the no inoculation means on the three dependent variables revealed

that the combined inoculation means were significantly higher than the control means on attitude toward candidate, $F(1,346)=28.57$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.06$; perceived candidate competence, $F(1,346)=41.42$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.09$; and candidate character perception, $F(1,346)=23.9$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.05$. The results indicated that the political attack messages exerted significantly less influence on the inoculated participants than those in the control group as manifested by: more favorable overall attitude, greater perceived candidate competence, and higher source credibility ratings. The treatment condition means are displayed in Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c.

Hypothesis 1b predicted that compared to those who received no inoculation pretreatment, participants who received an inoculation pretreatment are more behaviorally resistant to political attack messages. A planned comparison indicated strong support for the prediction. As Tables 5a and 5b show, the combined inoculation means were higher than the no inoculation means on behavioral disposition toward candidate, $F(1,346)=35.0$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.07$, as well as voting likelihood $F(1,346)=6.85$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.02$. Therefore, the results indicated that compared to people received no inoculation pretreatment, inoculated participants are more likely to go the polls and vote; more likely to contribute money to preferred

candidates; more likely to volunteer to work for preferred candidates; more likely to proselytize on behalf of preferred candidates; and more likely to display sticker or signs on behalf of preferred candidates.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the inoculation strategy is superior to post-hoc refutation in deflecting political attack messages. The planned comparison indicated support for this prediction on the dependent measures of both attitudinal and behavioral aspects. As shown in Tables 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, and 6e, the combined inoculation means were higher than post-hoc refutation means on attitude toward candidate, $F(1,415)=5.79$, $p<.05$, $\eta^2=.01$; competence perception toward candidate, $F(1,415)=8.68$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.02$; character perception toward candidate, $F(1,415)=7.16$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.01$; and behavioral disposition toward candidate. $F(1,415)=4.89$, $p<.05$, $\eta^2=.01$. However, the difference in voting likelihood between the inoculation group and post-hoc group was not statistically significant, $F(1,415)=1.40$, $p>.10$.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that compared to pretreatments utilizing negative credibility messages, inoculation pretreatments featuring positive credibility messages confer greater resistance to subsequent political attack messages. The planned comparison indicated support for this prediction on all dependent measures of attitudinal and behavioral aspects (see

Table 7). Positive inoculation means were higher than negative inoculation means on the measures of: attitude toward candidate, $F(1,176)=10.62$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.05$; competence perception toward candidate, $F(1,176)=11.53$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.06$; character perception toward candidate, $F(1,176)=14.85$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.07$; behavioral disposition toward candidate, $F(1,175)=4.92$, $p<.05$, $\eta^2=.02$; and voting likelihood, $F(1,175)=7.45$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.03$.

Source Credibility and Receiver Issue Involvement

Hypothesis 4 posited that inoculation pretreatments featuring high source credibility appeals are more effective in conferring resistance to political attack messages among people who manifest low levels of issue involvement. An omnibus MANCOVA was conducted comparing high credibility inoculation appeals versus control across relevant dependent variables. The results indicated significance for the covariates of initial attitudes and issue involvementⁱⁱ; and for experimental condition, $F(6,155)=9.98$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.275$. Subsequent univariate tests were significant on all dependent variablesⁱⁱⁱ, thus, supporting differences between high credibility group and the control group. However, because the covariate of issue involvement manifested a positive beta, Hypothesis 4 was not supported. A positive beta indicates that high credibility appeals are more effective as issue involvement levels increase.

Process of Resistance

Hypothesis 5 predicted that inoculation treatments featuring high source credibility appeals induce immediate resistance compared to a delayed effect for credibility-control inoculation appeals. Hypothesis 5 addresses the internal process of resistance involving the relationship of initial attitude, involvement, and credibility treatments, and attitude and threat in the second phase, and attitude in the final phase. This investigation assumed that the process of resistance varies according to credibility treatments which involve different routes to information processing. It was assumed that high source credibility plus inoculation appeals, because they tend to occur via peripheral/heuristic route, produce immediate resistance. Meanwhile, it was predicted that inoculation-only appeals take more enduring and delayed process because they occur via central/systematic route, which requires more cognitive efforts to process information.

Two approaches were used to evaluate this prediction. First, correlational analyses were computed to assess high-and no-credibility conditions versus controls at Phase 2 and Phase 3. Second, structural equation modeling was used to provide a nuanced view of the process of resistance. The correlational analyses provided some support for Hypothesis 6. As shown in Table 8, the high credibility inoculation treatment is

significantly associated with attitude at Phase 2 and attitude at Phase 3 whereas no-credibility inoculation treatment is related to only Phase 3 attitude. This indicates that while no-credibility inoculation had a delayed effect at Phase 3, high credibility inoculation exerted both an immediate (Phase 2) and delayed effect (Phase 3). In order to determine whether the two conditions differed in terms of cognitive process, threat and counterarguing were further analyzed. Interestingly, the results showed that the no-credibility inoculation treatment was associated with threat and counterarguing whereas high credibility inoculation was only related to threat. Hence, the results indicated that although the two conditions elicited threat, such elicited threat subsequently led to participant's counterarguing, a cognitive process, only in no-credibility inoculation condition. This is consistent with the underlying logic behind hypothesis 5.

In addition to correlation analysis, the study employed two structural equation analyses, featuring credibility condition (high-credibility inoculation versus control) and no-credibility condition (no-credibility inoculation versus control). The predicted models of each approach were depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Six variables were featured in the predicted and final models: high-credibility condition (Figure 1) and no-credibility condition (Figure 2); Phase 1 issue

involvement; Phase 2 threat and attitude toward candidate; and Phase 3 attitude toward candidate 3.

The initial high credibility inoculation model didn't fit the data, significant $\chi^2(df=8, N=178)=77.22$, $p=.00$, comparative fit index of .682. Hoyle and Panter (1995) suggest that a model fits the data should manifest both a nonsignificant chi-square and a goodness fit index above .90. The modification indices indicated that the model's fit could be improved with the addition of paths from credibility treatment to threat; involvement to threat; and threat to Phase 2 attitude. In addition, the results indicated that the model could be improved with removal of the path from involvement to Phase 3 attitude. The final model was improved, but not sufficient to fit the data, significant $\chi^2(df=6, N=178)=57.16$, $p=.00$, comparative fit index of .765

The initial no-credibility inoculation model didn't fit the data, significant $\chi^2(df=7, N=157)=57.571$, $p=.00$, comparative fit index of .635. Modification indices indicate that the model's fit could be improved with the addition of paths from involvement to Phase 2 attitude and credibility treatment to Phase 3 attitude, and with the removal of paths from involvement to Phase 3 attitude, Phase 1 attitude to Phase 3 attitude, and threat to Phase 3 attitude. The final model fit was not noticeably improved, significant $\chi^2(df=8, N=157)=35.509$,

$p=.00$, comparative fit index of .801.

Structural equation analyses revealed that the two approaches don't fit the data, thus failing to support Hypothesis 5.

Debate Study Findings

As a study within a study, Hypothesis 6 predicted that compared to those who received no inoculation pretreatment, people who receive an inoculation pretreatment are more resistant to televised counter-attitudinal political debate messages. A separate set of data for the debate study was analyzed to test the hypothesis using Multiple Analysis of Covariance technique. One independent variable was manipulated. Treatment condition was operationalized as inoculation and control condition. Initial attitudes and political involvement were employed as covariates. The omnibus MANOVA was conducted to test this prediction. As the Table 9 indicates, the results indicated significant differences in the treatment means, $F(6,77)=2.40$, $p<.05$, $\eta^2=.16$; with subsequent univariate tests indicating significance on the dependent variables of: attitude toward candidate, $F(1,82)=6.47$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.073$; perceived candidate competence, $F(1,82)=6.27$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.071$; and candidate character perception, $F(1,82)=4.9497$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.057$. In addition, univariate results were significant for the threat manipulation, $F(1,82)=3.78$, $p<.05$, $\eta^2=.044$.

However, differences fell short of statistical significance for participatory dispositions, $F(1,82)=1.00$, $p<.30$, $\eta^2=.012$ and voting likelihood, $F(1,82)=1.51$, $p<.30$, $\eta^2=.018$.

Thus, Hypothesis 6 was supported for the attitudinal measures, but fell short with behavioral measures^{iv}. The observed power of these insignificant tests were participatory disposition, .25; and voting likelihood, .39.

Chapter 7

Discussion

Inoculation Effect

This investigation examined the efficacy of inoculation strategy in the 2002 mid-term election campaigns. The study attempted to determine whether candidates can inoculate their supporters against an opponent's attacks, whether those attacks are initiated via advertising or in the context of televised debate. The investigation builds on the previous findings of Pfau and Burgoon (1988) and Pfau et al. (1990) that inoculation can insulate attacks toward candidates from slippage in the face of attacks. In addition, the study extends the claim by Pfau, Park et al. (2001) that inoculation can protect against the erosion of a variety of active participatory behaviors, such as putting up yard signs, posting bumper stickers, displaying campaign buttons, contributing money, working on behalf of a candidate, and proselytizing.

Hypothesis 1a predicted that people have greater resistance to political attack messages if they have received inoculation treatments than if they have not. The results of planned comparison tests provide support for this prediction. The results indicated that an opponent's attack message exerted significantly less impact on inoculation participants' attitudes toward candidates they supported than on no-

inoculation participants' attitudes. Also, compared to no-inoculation participants, participants treated by inoculation were significantly less affected by attack messages in terms of perceptions of candidate competence and character. The results of this investigation offer strong support for inoculation's efficacy, documenting that the inoculation strategy is effective in deflecting the influence of political attack messages.

The use of inoculation in political communication is both viable and important, given the fact that political attack messages are a staple in recent election cycles (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Jamieson, 1996; Kaid & Johnson, 1991; Kern, 1989; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Taylor, 1986; West, 1997). Although the pattern and degree of attack messages have changed (Devlin, 2001; Jamieson, Waldman, & Sherr, 2000; Pfau, Park, et al., 2001; West, 1997, 2001), the incidence of attack messages has held relatively constant and is perceived by practitioners as an essential strategic option (Estrich, 1993; Kamber, 1997). Because other options of restricting attack messages such as adwatches, legislative actions, and voluntary agreements between candidates are neither effective nor realistic, inoculation offers a viable defense option to combat attack messages.

While Hypothesis 1a addressed the efficacy of

inoculation on people's attitudinal resistance on behalf of candidates, Hypothesis 1b focused on the potential of inoculation to bolster the democratic process through behavioral political participation. Hypothesis 1b predicted that inoculation treatments would confer behavioral resistance to an opponent's attack messages. The results from a planned comparison supported this prediction, indicating that compared to those who received no inoculation treatment, people who received an inoculation treatment are more likely to go to the polls and vote; more likely to contribute money to their preferred candidates; more likely to volunteer to work for the candidates; and more likely to proselytize on behalf of the candidates. This finding extends the efficacy of inoculation to more active tendons of resistance, voter participatory dispositions in particular. It suggests that inoculation strategy had the promising potential in preventing voters' behavioral slippage from political attack messages.

The previous research (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1997; Ansolabehere, Iyengar, & Simon, 1999; Pfau et al., 2002) documented that attack messages may undermine the democratic process by reducing voter political participation. Given the findings of the research that attack politics can discourage voters, reducing voter turnout and confidence in the political system, it is important to protect voters from the destructive

consequences of attack messages, which can corrode normative outcomes such as democratic values and participatory activities. The results of the current study indicate that inoculation treatments soften the consequences of attack messages, buffering the downturn in participatory dispositions. Overall, the results suggest that inoculation is not only a viable defense option for candidates, but it also is a promising buttress for democratic behaviors.

The present study attempted to reaffirm that inoculation is a better strategy in deflecting an opponent's attack messages than post-hoc refutation strategy. The study predicted in Hypothesis 2 that inoculation strategy is superior to post-hoc refutation in promoting resistance to subsequent attack messages. The results from a planned comparison test largely support this prediction; inoculation was more effective than post-hoc refutation on all dependent measures, except voting likelihood. Participants treated by inoculation messages, as opposed to post-hoc refutation, showed greater attitudinal and behavioral resistance to an opponent's attack messages. The inoculation group rated candidates supported in inoculation messages more favorably than the post-hoc refutation group. Participants in inoculation conditions also perceived the candidates' competence and character more highly.

Plus, the results support that inoculation is superior

to post-hoc in conferring "participatory" resistance to subsequent attack messages. The inoculation group was more active in participatory dispositions, suggesting greater efficacy of behavioral inoculation effects. Hence, the study suggests the superiority of inoculation strategy both on attitudinal and behavioral resistance, which is an important addition to inoculation research. However, the study failed to support the finding of Pfau et al.'s study (1990) about the superiority of inoculation on voting likelihood. The combined inoculation mean (62.15) of voting likelihood was higher than the post-hoc mean (59.68), but the difference was not statistically significant.

The results of this study, hence, confirm the previous findings (Pfau et al., 1990; Tannenbaum & Noris, 1965; Tannenbaum et al., 1966) of the relative advantage of inoculation over post-hoc refutation, primarily because of perceived threat in inoculation messages. Thus, the results are congruent with the premise of inoculation theory that threat is the integral part of inoculation process, acting as the motivational trigger for resistance in the inoculation process (Anderson & McGuire, 1965; McGuire, 1962, 1964, 1970; Papageorgis & McGuire, 1961; Pfau, 1997; Pfau & Kenski, 1990; Pfau et al., 1997a). As inoculation theory posits, inoculation treatments are designed to generate more threat than post-hoc

refutation through the implementation of forewarning of impending attack.

Source Credibility Effect

This study attempted to explore the role and impact of candidate credibility in inoculation. In spite of the importance and legacy in persuasion studies, source credibility has been virtually ignored in inoculation research. The current study tested whether, in combination with an inoculation treatment, a candidate's positive credibility treatment enhances the efficacy of inoculation against the opponent's attack messages. Hypothesis 3 posited that, compared to an inoculation treatment on behalf of a low-credibility candidate, inoculation treatments on behalf of a high-credibility candidate are more effective in fostering resistance to an opponent's attack messages. The results of the current study provided support for the prediction that high credibility sources confer greater resistance to attack messages than low credibility sources. The planned comparisons indicated that participants in the high credibility inoculation condition were less influenced by the attack messages than those in the low credibility inoculation group in terms of all dependent measures: more favorable attitudes toward candidates, greater perceived candidate competence and character, higher participatory dispositions toward candidates, and higher

likelihood of vote for the candidates.

These findings are consistent with the results of Chebat et al.'s experimental study (1990) that political message acceptance is increased by the enhanced perception of source credibility. The pattern of the results of this study thus indicates that receivers who perceive candidates as expert and trustworthy are more likely to accept the subsequent inoculation messages than those who do not, hence exerting greater resistance to later attack messages.

This finding is important both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, this finding suggests that source credibility can mediate the process of inoculation. The pattern of the results revealed that the inoculation effect increased when high source credibility is induced and decreased when source credibility is low (See Tables 3a through 4b). Thus, this study suggests that inoculation efficacy can be enhanced or diminished as a function of the mediating role of source credibility.

The increased efficacy of inoculation by candidate credibility treatments, however, needs further investigation. For example, which component of the resistance process is activated by a receiver's perception of source credibility? Research needs to examine further the relationship between credibility, threat, and counterargument. The roles the two

credibility dimensions (expertise and trustworthiness) play in inoculation are far from clear, calling for subsequent development. Each credibility dimension may distinctively involve the process of inoculation as the topic of inoculation/attack varies. For instance, expertise influence may be more profound in "issue" inoculation messages whereas the impact of trustworthiness may be more salient in candidate "character" inoculation messages.

In a practical sense, this finding also carries an important implication for candidates and the election process. The results confirm that candidates' efforts to promote their positive credibility may well pay off when they later adapt inoculation as a defense strategy. Thus, credibility appeals can be constructive in formulating an effective inoculation strategy. Since the purpose of inoculation strategy for candidates is to deflect the influence of opponents' persuasive messages on potential voters' political preferences, this finding may provide candidates with ways of envisioning more effective strategies in election campaigns. For example, when expecting an opponent's persuasive attacks, a candidate could benefit from building a strong base of credibility prior to launching inoculation messages. In this sense, it is not surprising that candidates running ahead of the polls (usually incumbents) are more likely to engage in positive credibility

establishment at the early stage of an election anticipating attacks from the trailing opponents (usually challengers), who are more aligned to the attacker's position (Garrazone, 1984; Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1991; Kaid & Davidson, 1986; Pfau & Kenski, 1990).

Hypothesis 4 predicted that people who have low levels of issue involvement are more likely to gain resistance from inoculation treatments containing appeals with strong source credibility. This study failed to support this prediction. The results of this study did not provide evidence supporting the ELM's premise that source credibility exerts greater influence on receivers' attitudes when they are less involved in an issue. An omnibus test and subsequent univariate tests, instead, indicated that the outcome was actually the opposite: high credibility appeals were more effective in promoting resistance to attack messages as issue involvement levels increased. Thus, this finding contradicts the hypothesis derived from the premises of ELM. ELM posits that source credibility increases persuasion effects when involvement is low (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Petty et al., 1983). Thus, results indicate that the effect of credibility in inoculation can be enhanced by efforts to increase issue-involvement levels.

One plausible explanation for this finding may stem from the boundary condition of involvement in inoculation theory.

Inoculation theory posits that involvement is a prerequisite to inoculation (see Pfau, 1992) because involvement is needed to generate sufficient threat so as to motivate receivers to bolster their attitudes. In addition, inoculation theory suggests that involvement functions as a boundary condition (Pfau, 1997; Pfau et al, 1997a), in which there are both minimum and maximum involvement thresholds. It implies that too little or too much involvement will fail to generate sufficient threat which, in turn, undermines the ability to confer resistance. In this research, the distribution of involvement was highly skewed to the left^v, suggesting the limits of inoculation effectiveness for those manifesting the low involvement. Previous research suggests that inoculation was more effective in conferring resistance with high as opposed to low involvement (Pfau, 1992; Pfau et al., 1990, 1997a, 1997b). Thus, the finding of this study is consistent with the dual-processing models, which suggest a greater credibility effect with low involvement.

Process of Resistance

The present study tested the notion that the route of information processing impacts the timing of inoculation. Hypothesis 5 predicted that inoculation with high credibility appeals produces more immediate resistance whereas inoculation-only treatment causes delayed effects. The ELM posits that

information processing via the peripheral route occurs as a result of simple cues such as source credibility, requiring less time to unfold. Meanwhile, the central route to persuasion results from more enduring cognitive efforts (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b). Past research indicates that inoculation is more likely to involve cognitive process in which resistance is achieved by cognitive components such as counterarguing elicited by threat. (Lee & Pfau, 1997; Pfau et al., 2001).

Correlation analysis mainly supported the prediction. The result indicated that the high credibility treatment immediately impacted Phase 2 attitude and threat, and Phase 3 attitude, whereas the no-credibility condition initially affects Phase 2 threat and counterarguing, and subsequently impacts Phase 3 attitude. The finding is consistent with previous research that standard inoculation treatments achieve resistance via threat and counterarguing, requiring time to confer resistance. The high credibility inoculation appeals, by contrast, exerted an immediate impact on attitudes, but also a delayed effect. Because the high credibility inoculation condition consists of credibility messages and inoculation treatment, it is assumed that both immediate and delayed effects occur.

The results from structural equation analyses, however, failed to support the prediction that high credibility appeals

induce an immediate inoculation effect compared to a delayed effect for no-credibility appeals. Neither high credibility nor no-credibility models fit the data. Even though correlational analyses intimated support for the prediction, SEM results failed to provide additional support. In most plausible explanation is that the SEM test suffered from insufficient power. In addition, counterarguing, the vital cognitive apparatus, was excluded from the models because of a significant number of missing cases, which the SEM program excludes from analyses.

Related to this finding, the role of involvement also needs to be explicated in future research. Because the different routes leading to persuasion operate under different involvement levels (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979), participants' involvement in election campaign is the important consideration to gauge the route utilized. Even though it is held that election campaign communication is relatively less involving to most receivers (Iyengar & Valentino, 2000; Popkin, 1994), there could be an idiosyncratic importance to each election issue for which attack messages are constructed. For example, intrinsically some issues are more involving than others-like cockfighting and lottery plans in this study probably were. Thus, future research needs to address issue involvement in the more explicit manner utilized in other inoculation studies

(Pfau et al., 1997a, 1997b).

Inoculation and Televised Debates

As a study within a study, the research investigated the potential of inoculation in promoting resistance to attack messages delivered in the televised candidate debate context. Because debates are influential, and intrinsically combative, inoculation may be a viable option to militate the influence of anti-attitudinal attacks delivered in a debate setting. Hypothesis 6 predicted that viewers who receive inoculation prior to a televised debate have greater resistance to the counter-attitudinal attacks they see. The results provide qualified support for the prediction that the inoculation treatment, compared to the no-inoculation treatment, confers more resistance to televised counter-attitudinal political debate messages. The omnibus MANCOVA test, using a separate set of data, revealed that participants who received inoculation treatments evaluated the candidate they supported more favorably: higher attitudes toward the candidate and greater perceived candidate competence and character. The results extend the scope of inoculation to a different form of campaign communication, suggesting the viability of inoculation strategy against counter-attitudinal attack arguments in political debates, the single most watched campaign events during the election period (Dye & Ziegler, 1989).

In addition, the study examined the efficacy of inoculation in terms of normative outcomes. If, like with ads, the confrontational nature of debates undermines democratic values, inoculation against such corrosive influence should be possible. Because of inconclusive research findings on the impact of debates on normative outcomes, the current investigation raised the research question of whether inoculation can mitigate the damage to democratic values that televised political debates may cause. However, the results failed to support behavioral efficacy of inoculation in the debate milieu. Unlike the results of the main study, the inoculation treatment exerted no significant effect on people's participatory dispositions and voting likelihood toward candidates supported in inoculation.

This disjuncture in inoculation's effects between attitudinal and behavioral outcomes may derive from the characteristics of televised debates as a communication venue. The present study assumed that attacks produce similar normative consequences regardless of the nature of the communication venue. Political ads are known to affect participation (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1997; Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, & Valentino, 1993; Gerber & Green, 2000; Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1991) Debates, by contrast, may be a superior venue, in which candidates can attack but their

attacks are not disparaged by viewers. Televised debates, compared to other traditional communication venues, feature "clash, depth, and unfiltered access" (Pfau, 2002, p. 251), involving more reasoning, clearer statements, and greater specificity in issues (Ellsworth, 1965; Kelly 1962; Mortensen, 1968). Debates produce more precise, accurate discourse; less embellishment and bombast; and more give-and-take exchange, because candidates must comprehend and respond to each other's arguments (Hart, 2000). In addition to such superior characteristics of political communication, debates contribute to normative outcomes (Kraus, 1988; Patterson, 2002; Pfau et al., 2001). Patterson concluded that the debates significantly enhanced the perception of the 2000 campaign as "exciting, informative, and encouraging" (p. 124). Therefore, although the candidates clash, attacking each other and affecting viewers' attitudes toward them, the overall format of debate does enhance people's normative outcomes.

Limitations

Two caveats should be addressed concerning the results of this study. First, the investigation used college undergraduate students as participants. Their age range is constricted and so are their other characteristics. Sears (1986) argued that undergraduates tend to have "more unstable, changeable, weak, and inconsistent attitudes" than older

cohorts (p. 522). Political attitudes are especially vulnerable: young adults tend to "change attitudes more than older persons in response to political events" (Sears, 1986, p. 522). To many participants in this study, the 2002 mid-term election was the first eligible voting event, leaving an additional susceptibility to material influence. Compared to older voters, undergraduates may not possess predispositions about candidates. The effect of the experiment might be inflated if these politically less experienced participants intake experimental messages absent developed schemas. Accordingly, the current study is subject to the caveat that undergraduates' uncrystallized attitudes may distort the nature of experimental outcomes.

The second limitation of the study concerns the control candidate credibility manipulation. Because the research took place during the last 4 weeks of the election, the experimental credibility messages might interfere with the actual candidate messages. Since attacks messages were common during the election period, negative credibility messages could be perceived as the opponent's attacks rather than objective, credible information formatted in this study as if it's news report. Professional-quality production could enhance the believability of the credibility article, minimizing threats to internal validity of the study.

Conclusion

As one of the most pronounced changes in American political campaigns, the growth of attack messages has received extensive attention from scholars. Attack messages, political spots in particular, have been analyzed in various ways: their effectiveness for the target; their counter-effectiveness against the sponsor; their compelling nature for campaign practitioners; and their potential to be anathema to the democratic process. Attack messages have evolved new patterns and directions over the years, such as the increase of negative issue advocacy ads; thus, political attack messages remain one of the most virulent of election phenomena.

Several defense options have been suggested to combat political attacks, but inoculation strategy has convincingly proved itself more viable than other options such as simple preemption, post-hoc refutation, adwatches, and legal remedies. Unique to the inoculation approach is the "threat" component that triggers receivers to bolster their attitudes and provides them with an umbrella of protection against a wide range of attacks. Previous research (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990; Pfau et al., 2001) has demonstrated that inoculation is a viable strategy for promoting resistance to the influence of attack messages.

This study investigated the potential of inoculation

strategy in conferring resistance to candidates' attack messages during the 2002 Oklahoma state election. The results of the current study clearly confirm the findings of the previous research that inoculation is effective in deflecting the impact of attack messages on receivers' attitudes toward candidates. In addition, the results indicate that inoculation strategy promotes behavioral resistance, reducing the likelihood of voters' participatory slippage from attack messages. The investigation underscores the promising role of inoculation in upholding democratic norms and participatory activities by diminishing the destructive influence of attack messages on the democratic process. The study reaffirms that inoculation is a more effective strategy than post-hoc refutation in promoting attitudinal and behavioral resistance to attack messages. This finding of the superiority of inoculation to post-hoc refutation sheds light on the importance of the threat component in inoculation process, which is the key element of inoculation.

As a second asset, this investigation revisited source credibility, one of the most studied concepts in persuasion. With its growing importance in media politics (Iyengar & Valention, 2002; Lupia, 2000), source credibility was explored as to its role and impact in inoculation. The results indicated that a candidate's inoculation strategy can be more effective

when receivers perceive his/her credibility more favorably. When treated by high candidate credibility, inoculated receivers were significantly less affected by opponent's attack messages than those treated by low credibility. The results revealed source credibility can mediate inoculation, enhancing or reducing the inoculation effect depending on how viewers evaluate candidates' credibility, particularly expertise and trustworthiness.

Even though this research failed to support the predictions regarding the relationship between involvement and source credibility in inoculation, the results hinted that research on involvement could be fruitful. Inoculation research suggests that involvement offers a boundary condition (Pfau, 1992; Pfau et al., 1990, 1997a, 1997b), within which there is a positive relationship between inoculation and involvement. Meanwhile, ELM maintains that for the less involved, persuasion occurs via peripheral routes such as source-based cues (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). The current study found that inoculation was more pronounced among the highly involved, suggesting that involvement is an important factor to account for inoculation. The study also suggests that source credibility appeals elicit immediate effect whereas inoculation-only appeals result in delayed effect on viewers' attitudes toward candidates, consonant to both ELM and inoculation premises.

Finally, the research investigated the potential of inoculation in another influential campaign communication venue, televised political debates. The study reasoned that because debates attract large audiences and are inherently combative, inoculation could confer widespread resistance to televised counter-attitudinal debate messages. A separate set of data for the debate study was gathered and analyzed. The results also confirmed the efficacy of inoculation in that positive attitudes towards candidates were significantly greater for the inoculation group as opposed to the no-inoculation group. Importantly, this finding is a new addition to inoculation research in political campaign communication.

The debate study also explored the potential of inoculation to strengthen receivers' normative values, mitigating against the destructive impact of debate messages on the democratic process. Receivers' participatory dispositions were measured. However, the significant differences between inoculation and no-inoculation groups were not observed. Not totally unexpected, this result implies that attacks in debates are less likely to be perceived as unwarranted, which may mean that inoculation does not relate to the decrease of confidence in the democratic process thought to be associated with debates.

Taken together, the results of this dissertation indicate that inoculation is an effective resistance option for

candidates in deflecting the influence of political attack messages. Several valuable insights were obtained from this endeavor. These insights are important considering the influence of political attack messages is neither negligent nor one-dimensional. Rather, attack messages tend to become more ubiquitous and multi-layered in recent years in that it is elusive to fully comprehend their influence. Thus, it is hoped that the findings of this investigation contribute to understanding of the potential of inoculation in the changing environment of political campaign communication.

A GLM factorial design test (credibility treatment x candidate) was conducted. The results showed main effect for credibility treatment, $F(1,89)=30.83$, $p<.01$; no main effect for candidate, $F(4,85)=.38$, $p=.82$; no interaction effect, $F(4,85)=1.12$, $p=.88$. Therefore, only the difference was significant between high and low credibility conditions.

ⁱ The results of omnibus test indicated significance for issue involvement, $F(6,155)=3.13$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.11$ and initial attitude, $F(6,155)=4.54$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.15$.

ⁱⁱⁱ The univariate tests for issue involvement on the dependent measures indicated only significance for the voting likelihood, $F(1,160)=5.39$, $p<.05$, $\eta^2=.033$; no significant impact on other dependent measures; attitude toward candidate, $F(1,160)=.52$, $p=.47$, $\eta^2=.003$; candidate competence, $F(1,160)=.56$, $p=.45$, $\eta^2=.004$; candidate character, $F(1,160)=.55$, $p=.46$, $\eta^2=.003$; and behavioral disposition, $F(1,160)=3.08$, $p<.10$, $\eta^2=.02$. The univariate tests for initial attitudes indicated significance for all the dependent measures: voting likelihood, $F(1,160)=20.08$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.111$; attitude toward candidate, $F(1,160)=19.63$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.109$; candidate competence, $F(1,160)=17.70$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.100$; candidate character, $F(1,160)=12.13$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.070$; and behavioral dispositions, $F(1,160)=10.84$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.063$. The univariate tests for treatment conditions indicated

significance for all dependent measures: voting likelihood, $F(1,160)=11.46$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.067$; attitude toward candidate, $F(1,160)=26.55$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.142$; candidate competence, $F(1,160)=40.95$, $p<.1$, $\eta^2=.204$; candidate character, $F(1,160)=24.68$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.134$ and behavioral dispositions, $F(1,160)=26.64$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.143$.

^{iv} The omnibus test indicated significant covariate effect for initial attitude, $F(6,77)=6.05$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2=.073$.

^v The mean score is 4.81 out of 7-point scale and skewed to left (more than two third of participants rated their involvement higher than 4.00, the midpoint of the scale), the variance of involvement is receptive to the positive direction.

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Table 1
Message Evaluation: Inoculation and Attack Messages

Messages	<u>Total Words</u>	<u>Nouns</u>	<u>Repeated Nouns</u>	<i>O%</i>	<i>C%</i>	<i>Ip</i>
Steve Largent						
Inoculation 1	301	50	32	.640	.0598	10.70
Inoculation 2	301	48	30	.625	.0598	10.45
Attack 1	303	53	34	.641	.0627	10.22
Attack 2	302	54	35	.648	.0629	10.30
Brad Henry						
Inoculation 1	300	49	31.5	.643	.0583	11.03
Inoculation 2	301	44	26.5	.602	.0581	10.36
Attack 1	303	52	34	.654	.0594	11.01
Attack 2	302	51	34	.667	.0563	11.85
Gary Richardson						
Inoculation 1	301	51	32	.627	.0631	9.94
Attack 1	302	51	33	.647	.0596	10.86

(Cont'd)						
Messages	<u>Total Words</u>	<u>Nouns</u>	<u>Repeated Nouns</u>	<i>O%</i>	<i>C%</i>	<i>Ip</i>
Jim Inhofe						
Inoculation 1	300	50	31.5	.630	.0617	10.21
Inoculation 2	301	48	30	.625	.0598	10.45
Attack 1	302	49	29.5	.602	.0646	9.32
Attack 2	303	53	34	.641	.0627	10.22
David Walters						
Inoculation 1	302	45	28	.622	.0563	11.05
Inoculation 2	302	48	30	.625	.0596	10.49
Attack 1	302	49	30.5	.622	.0612	10.16
Attack 2	302	51	32	.627	.0629	9.97

Note: *O%* = number of repeated nouns/total number of nouns.

C% = (total number of nouns-number of repeated nouns)/total number of words.

Ip% = *O%*/*C%*

Table 2
Means of Threat as a Function of Message Treatments

Message Treatments	Threat		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Inoculation-Positive	3.09 ^a	1.20	86
Inoculation-Negative	3.35 ^a	1.30	91
Inoculation-Control	2.93 ^a	1.31	77
Inoculation Combined	3.14 ^a	1.28	254
Control	2.60	1.02	92

Note: Threat was measured using a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate more elicited threat.

^a Significant compared to control group at $p < .05$.

Table 3
Means of Candidate Credibility as a Function of Message Treatments

Message Treatments	M	SD	N
Expertise			
Inoculation-Positive	5.65 ^{ab}	1.08	86
Inoculation-Negative	3.64 ^a	1.45	91
Control	4.84	1.19	77
Trustworthiness			
Inoculation Positive	5.94 ^{ab}	1.04	86
Inoculation-Negative	4.58 ^a	1.44	91
Control	5.21	1.18	77
Overall Credibility			
Inoculation-Positive	5.79 ^{ab}	0.94	86
Inoculation-Negative	4.11 ^a	1.33	91
Control	5.01	1.14	77

Note: Credibility was measured using a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater credibility.

^a Significant compared to control group at $p < .05$.

^b Significant compared to inoculation-negative at $p < .05$

Table 4a**Means of Attitude toward Candidate as a Function of Inoculation Message Treatments**

Message Treatments	Attitude		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Inoculation-Positive	4.96 ^a	1.39	86
Inoculation-Negative	4.27 ^a	1.38	91
Inoculation-Control	4.52 ^a	1.50	77
Inoculation Combined	4.57 ^a	1.45	254
Control	3.74	1.49	92

Note: Attitude was measured using a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater attitude toward candidate.

^a Significant compared to control group at $p < .05$.

Table 4b
Means of Competence Perception as a Function of Inoculation Message Treatments

Message Treatments	Competence		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Inoculation-Positive	5.33 ^a	1.30	86
Inoculation-Negative	4.60 ^a	1.49	91
Inoculation-Control	4.87 ^a	1.39	77
Inoculation Combined	4.93 ^a	1.43	254
Control	3.88	1.55	92

Note: Competence was measured using a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater competence perceptions of the candidate.

^a Significant compared to control group at $p < .05$.

Table 4c
Means of Candidate Character Perception as a Function of Inoculation Message
Treatments

Message Treatments	Character		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Inoculation-Positive	4.99 ^a	1.47	86
Inoculation-Negative	4.17 ^a	1.43	91
Inoculation-Control	4.41 ^a	1.46	77
Inoculation Combined	4.52 ^a	1.48	254
Control	3.76	1.47	92

Note: Character was measured using a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater character perception toward candidate.

^a Significant compared to control group at $p < .05$.

Table 5a
Means of Behavioral Intention toward Candidate as a Function of Inoculation
Message Treatments

Message Treatments	Behavioral Intention		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Inoculation-Positive	2.57 ^a	1.42	86
Inoculation-Negative	2.20 ^a	1.35	91
Inoculation-Control	2.30 ^a	1.05	77
Inoculation Combined	2.36 ^a	1.30	254
Control	1.64	.77	92

Note: Behavioral Intention was measured using a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater behavioral intention toward candidate.

^a Significant compared to control group at $p < .05$.

Table 5b
Means of Voting Likelihood toward Candidate as a Function of Inoculation Message Treatments

Message Treatments	Voting Likelihood		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Inoculation-Positive	68.43 ^a	28.40	86
Inoculation-Negative	58.05 ^a	30.12	91
Inoculation-Control	59.96 ^a	26.26	77
Inoculation Combined	62.15 ^a	29.36	254
Control	54.76	26.23	92

Note: Voting likelihood was measured using a 100-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater likelihood to vote toward candidate.

^a Significant compared to control group at $p < .05$.

Table 6a**Means of Attitude toward Candidate as a Function of Inoculation Message Treatments**

Message Treatments	Attitude		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Inoculation-Positive	4.96 ^a	1.39	86
Inoculation-Negative	4.27 ^a	1.38	91
Inoculation-Control	4.52 ^a	1.50	77
Inoculation Combined	4.57 ^a	1.45	254
Post hoc Refutation	4.17	1.71	76

Note: Attitude was measured using a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater attitude toward candidate.

^a Significant compared to post hoc refutation group at $p < .05$.

Table 6b
Means of Candidate Competence Perception as a Function of Inoculation Message Treatments

Message Treatments	Competence		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Inoculation-Positive	5.33 ^a	1.30	86
Inoculation-Negative	4.60 ^a	1.49	91
Inoculation-Control	4.87 ^a	1.39	77
Inoculation Combined	4.93 ^a	1.43	254
Post hoc Refutation	4.32	1.80	76

Note: Competence was measured using a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater competence perceptions toward candidate.

^a Significant compared to post hoc refutation group at $p < .05$.

Table 6c
Means of Candidate Character Perception as a Function of Inoculation Message Treatments

Message Treatments	Character		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Inoculation-Positive	4.99 ^a	1.47	86
Inoculation-Negative	4.17 ^a	1.43	91
Inoculation-Control	4.41 ^a	1.46	77
Inoculation Combined	4.52 ^a	1.48	254
Post hoc Refutation	4.09	1.70	76

Note: Character was measured using a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater character perception toward candidate.

^a Significant compared to post hoc refutation group at $p < .05$.

Table 6d

Means of Behavioral Intention toward Candidate as a Function of Inoculation Message Treatments

Message Treatments	Behavioral Intention		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Inoculation-Positive	2.57 ^a	1.42	86
Inoculation-Negative	2.20 ^a	1.35	91
Inoculation-Control	2.30 ^a	1.05	77
Inoculation Combined	2.36 ^a	1.30	254
Post hoc Refutation	2.11	1.08	76

Note: Behavioral Intention was measured using a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater behavioral intention toward candidate.

^a Significant compared to post hoc refutation group at $p < .05$.

Table 6e
Means of Voting Likelihood toward Candidate as a Function of Inoculation Message Treatments

Message Treatments	Voting Likelihood		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Inoculation-Positive	68.43 ^a	28.40	86
Inoculation-Negative	58.05	30.12	91
Inoculation-Control	59.96	26.26	77
Inoculation Combined	62.15	29.36	254
Post hoc Refutation	59.68	26.26	76

Note: Voting likelihood was measured using a 100-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater likelihood to vote toward candidate.

^a Significant compared to post hoc refutation group at $p < .05$.

Table 7
Means of Dependent Measures as a Function of Credibility Message Treatments

Message Treatments	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Attitude			
Inoculation-Positive	4.96^a	1.39	86
Inoculation-Negative	4.27	1.38	91
Competence			
Inoculation-Positive	5.33^a	1.30	86
Inoculation-Negative	4.60	1.49	91
Character			
Inoculation-Positive	4.99^a	1.47	86
Inoculation-Negative	4.17	1.43	91
Behavioral Intention			
Inoculation-Positive	2.57	1.42	86
Inoculation-Negative	2.20	1.35	91
Voting Likelihood			
Inoculation-Positive	68.43^a	28.40	86
Inoculation-Negative	58.05	30.12	91

(Cont'd)

Note: Attitude, confidence, character, and behavioral intention were measured using a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater attitudinal and behavioral resistance to attacks.

Voting likelihood was measured using a 100-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater likelihood to vote toward candidate.

^a Significant compared to Inoculation-Negative at $p < .05$.

Table 8

Correlations among High Credibility Inoculation Condition, No-credibility Inoculation Condition, Phase 2 Threat, Phase2 Counterarguing, Phase 2 Attitude, and Phase 3 Attitude

	Hi- Credibility Inoculation	No- Credibility Inoculation	Phase 2 Threat	Phase 2 Counterarguing	Phase 2 Attitude	Phase 3 Attitude
Hi-Credibility Inoculation	——	——	.217 ^a (n=178)	.115 (n=178)	.271 ^a (n=178)	.388 ^a (n=178)
No- Credibility Inoculation	——	——	.260 ^a (n=169)	.155 ^b (n=169)	.112 (n=169)	.251 ^a (n=169)
Phase 2 Threat	.217 ^a (n=178)	.260 ^a (n=169)	——	.115 ^a (n=255)	-.128 ^a (n=255)	-.153 ^a (n=255)
Phase 2 Counterarguing	.115 (n=178)	.155 ^b (n=169)	.115 ^a (n=255)	——	.304 ^a (n=255)	.276 ^a (n=255)
Phase 2 Attitude	.271 ^a (n=178)	.112 (n=169)	-.128 ^a (n=255)	.304 ^a (n=255)	——	.446 ^a (n=255)
Phase 3 Attitude	.388 ^a (n=178)	.251 ^a (n=169)	-.153 ^a (n=255)	.276 ^a (n=255)	.446 ^a (n=255)	——

Note: Phase 2 threat was measured using multiple item 7-point scales. Higher scores indicate greater elicited threat. Phase 2 counterarguing was measured using average rating of counter-responses, which is calculated by total ratings of responses divided by total numbers of responses. Higher ratings mean greater counter-responses to attack messages. Phase 2 and Phase 3 attitudes were measured using multiple items 7-point scales. Higher scores indicate greater attitude toward candidates. High credibility inoculation treatment was operationalized as high credibility inoculation condition and control condition with the higher score reflecting the presence of positive credibility messages. No-credibility inoculation treatment was operationalized as inoculation-only condition and control condition with the higher score indicate the presence of inoculation messages.

(Cont'd)

^a significant at $p < .01$

^b significant at $p < .05$

Table 9
Means of Dependent Measures as a Function of Inoculation Message Treatments

Message Treatments	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Attitude			
Inoculation	4.64 ^a	1.08	46
Control	4.10	1.41	40
Competence			
Inoculation	4.98 ^a	1.07	46
Control	4.42	1.49	40
Character			
Inoculation	4.65 ^a	1.01	46
Control	4.18	1.39	40
Behavioral Intension			
Inoculation	2.13	1.25	46
Control	1.91	0.94	40
Voting Likelihood			
Inoculation	66.78	24.38	46
Control	61.10	25.19	40

(Cont'd)

Note: Attitude, confidence, character, and behavioral intention were measured using a 7-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater attitudinal and behavioral resistance to attacks.

Voting likelihood was measured using a 100-point scale. Higher scores indicate greater likelihood to vote toward candidate.

* Significant compared to Inoculation-Negative at $p < .05$.

Figure 1

The Predicted model of high credibility inoculation: Process of resistance





Figure 2

The Predicted model of no-credibility inoculation: Process of resistance



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Appendix A

HENRY SUPPORTS BUSINESS AND NEW JOBS

Brad Henry has worked hard for Oklahoma's economic prosperity and our working families. Now, however, as the election day draws nearer, you can bet that Henry's opponents will step up their campaign, attacking Brad Henry for his stance on Oklahoma economy. Henry's opponents continue to attack his economic plan as radical and hostile to business.

We would like to set the record straight about Henry's plan for the Oklahoma economy. Henry has worked hard eliminate waste and balance the state budget. He fights to create tax credits and incentives to attract new business and assist existing businesses. Further, contrary to his opponent's attacks, Henry has a track record of commitment to our business. He believes the workers' compensation system has been abused by unwarranted lawsuits impacting our businesses with unreasonably high costs. Henry's plan will save Oklahoma businesses more than \$1 billion by reforming the workers' compensation system. By lowering the cost of doing business in Oklahoma, he will assist existing businesses and attract new, good-paying jobs to the state.

Henry's opponents are wrong when they claim that he opposed Right-to-work legislation. In fact, Henry was one of the majority statesmen who voted for Right-to-work in the state senate legislation last year so that Oklahoma could create more manufacturing jobs and get better wages for workers. Simply put, Henry is a strong supporter for expansion of economic development to support Oklahoma's hard working family. Also, Henry is a champion of our rural economic development. He supports tax incentives to enrich businesses locating in a rural area. He argues that Oklahoma needs a rural economy plan that includes a quality jobs bill for small businesses.

So when Brad Henry's opponents attack, remember that Henry's record speaks for itself. Henry's plan will move Oklahoma toward prosperity.

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Appendix A

HENRY'S PLAN IS THE BEST FOR OKLAHOMA EDUCATION

No one has worked harder in support of public education in the Oklahoma Legislation than Brad Henry. Yet, despite Senator Brad Henry's efforts, as the election draws nearer, you can expect Henry's opponents will step up their attacks on his state lottery proposal. Henry's opponents continue to attack his idea as dangerous and unreliable to our education.

We would like to set the record straight. Henry's family is full of public school teachers. His grandmother and mother are retired teachers, and his wife is a teacher. Unlike other candidates, he attended Oklahoma's public schools and has confidence in our public education. In the state congress, Henry has fought to reduce class sizes and raise teacher salaries to keep the best teachers, who play a pivotal role in bringing discipline and citizenship back to the Oklahoma classroom. Henry supports a state lottery, with generated funds going solely to improving education by modernizing classrooms and increasing teachers' wages. In this time of economic downturn, a lottery is the only realistic plan for compensating the massive \$350 million education budget shortfall. Contrary to his opponent's claim, Henry is adamant that proceeds from a lottery will go only for education and that safeguards should be established to ensure that lawmakers can't reduce current education funding levels. The profits will be absolutely earmarked for education and untouchable by the legislature. By organizing and implementing a state lottery, we finally can improve our educational revenue and use it to fund teacher salaries, early childhood programs, and classrooms. We point to Georgia's success story, where the lottery generates more than \$700 million for education programs each year.

So when Henry's opponents attack, remember that his championship of Oklahoma education is rock solid. He is a friend of Oklahoma's public education.

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Appendix A

WALTERS TOOK RESPONSIBILITY

David Walters has worked hard for Oklahoma and our working families during his time as governor. Walters' term was marked by bold programs in education, job creation, infrastructure funding, and government reorganization. Now, however, as the election day draws nearer, you can bet that Jim Inhofe and his supporters will step up their campaign, attacking Walters for campaign finance violations in the 1990 gubernatorial election. Jim Inhofe and his supporters continue to charge that Walters should "tell the truths" regarding the controversy.

While this charge may bother some voters who are not familiar with Walters and his record, most voters are tired of hearing this decade-old, dead issue resurrected by vicious political intentions. How many times should a candidate apologize for a single misdemeanor count of violating the state's campaign finance regulations? Over and over, Walters has stood up and accepted responsibility. As the investigation showed, even though he was not aware of the excessive contributions. Nevertheless, he remains deeply sorry, saying "It was my campaign and my responsibility." Indeed, the man who made the illegal contributions told the Daily Oklahoman that Walters had no prior knowledge of what happened. We believe Walters already paid the price for this mistake and should not have to continue paying. As a man of integrity, Walters vows to avoid these kinds of embarrassment in the future.

It is very disappointing that Jim Inhofe makes hypercritical attacks on Walter's mistakes even though he is guilty of the same problem. In 1989, the Federal Election Commission found Inhofe guilty of accepting a \$20,000 loan from his campaign treasurer, though he called it a personal loan. A guilty man should not throw stones. When David Walters' opponents attacks, remember that Walters is a man of integrity who is taking responsibility for running an honest campaign.

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Appendix A

WALTERS SUPPORTS STRONG MILITARY

David Walters has been a firm believer that America must maintain its military strength to defend us from all potential threats. Yet, as the election draws nearer, you can bet Jim Inhofe and his supporters will step up attacks on Walters' military stance, charging that Walters and liberals have been working together to disarm America and hurt Oklahoma.

While this charge may influence some voters who are not familiar with David Walters and his record, most voters will recognize the attack as misleading. We would like to set the record straight. David Walters is a lifelong supporter of a strong, flexible, and modern military force as essential to the protection of America's interests and values. He proclaims that America's military is the best trained, best equipped, most capable, and most ready fighting force in the world. Walters is proud that Oklahoma has played a critical role in our nation's military preparedness. As Governor, David Walters was involved in defending the military installations during the last round of base closures. His administration helped fund the consultants necessary to prepare our defense of these installations. He flew to a hearing in Texas to address the Base Closure and Realignment Committee in order to defend Oklahoma's best interests. He worked hard with Tinker officials to develop a fixed and variable cost estimate for the Tinker operation to show how competitive the base could be if it continued operations. Oklahomans were pleased that Governor Walters teamed up with Republicans, Democrats, and city, state, and county workers to protect the Oklahoma's critical base from the closings. Walters knows how to defend Oklahoma's military bases successfully.

So, when David Walters' opponents attack, remember that Walters' record in support of our strong military speaks for itself. David Walters will support and strengthen our military installations.

INHOFE STANDS UP FOR OKLAHOMA'S RIGHTS

Senator Jim Inhofe has worked hard for Oklahoma and for our working families in battle after battle in the U.S. Congress. Now, however, as the election day draws nearer, you can bet that Senator Inhofe's opponents will step up their campaign, attacking his stance on Oklahoma's cockfighting. Inhofe's opponents continue to attack his vote against a senate amendment would make it illegal to transport fighting birds through states that have outlawed cockfighting.

While this charge may affect some voters who are not familiar with Jim Inhofe and this issue, Oklahomans will recognize this attack not only misses the point but also is misleading. First, it is true that Senator Inhofe voted against the bill. However, the underlying agenda is not cockfighting. It is our state's right to decide what is important to our land, our people, and our future. It is truly unacceptable when the federal government tries to infringe on states' rights.

Second, the amendment died along with the Democrats' attached farm bill, which causes even bigger risks about violating our principles of federalism. The bill, co-sponsored by liberal Democrat Hillary Clinton, doesn't recognize that the traditions of each state deserve equal respect and observation. Also, supporters of the legislation don't acknowledge how intrusive the federal government can be when it overshadows a state's current decisions. Inhofe raised legitimate concerns by questioning, "What is the proper role of the federal government?" The supporters of the entire bill do not comprehend how much the bill affects our rural economy, including thousands of small businesses and families who will be deprived of their ability to make a living.

So, when Jim Inhofe's opponents attack, remember that the senator is fighting for our state. It is not a cockfighting issue. Rather, it's states' rights at stake.

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INHOFE SUPPORTS HEALTHCARE BETTER THAN YOU THINK

No one has worked harder in support of healthcare issues in the U.S. Senate than Jim Inhofe. Yet, despite Senator Inhofe's efforts, as the election draws nearer, you can expect David Walters and his supporters both to step up their attacks on Medical Malpractice Reform as dangerously extreme measures and to depict Senator Inhofe as misdirected in his strong sponsorship of the reform legislation. Inhofe's opponents continue to attack the reform that is designed to protect drug and medical-equipment manufacturers, doctors, hospitals, and other healthcare providers by simply limiting patients' requests for redress to a reasonable period of time.

We would like to set the record straight. It is true that Senator Inhofe voted for the Medical Malpractice Reform Bill last August. However, the senator worked hard to make it better by addressing citizen's growing concerns about the impact of expensive and unwarranted medical malpractice lawsuits. Senator Inhofe called for an increased awareness that unnecessary malpractice lawsuits are increasing costs to patients and threatening the healthcare system throughout the country. Inhofe supported the bill because frivolous lawsuits and outrageously expensive settlements impose enormous and unfair costs on both doctors and patients. As a result, malpractice insurance rates skyrocket, and patients suffer from higher medical expenses as well as reduced access to quality care.

Further, Senator Inhofe's record as a champion of the healthcare system is beyond question. For instance, Inhofe recently sponsored a "Prescription Drug Bill," which provides an immediate, fiscally-responsible prescription drug benefit to those seniors most in need. He also supports medical savings accounts, a Patients Bill of Rights which protects patients from bad HMOs, and prescription drug coverage for seniors.

So when Senator Inhofe's opponents attack, remember that the Senator's record in support of our healthcare system speaks for itself.

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Appendix A

RICHARDSON'S PLAN IS THE BEST FOR OKLAHOMA EDUCATION

Gary Richardson is a determined and honest candidate who offers solutions for Oklahoma education. Yet, despite Independent Gary Richardson's efforts, as the election draws to a close, you can expect Richardson's opponents will step up their attacks on his "state-run" lottery plan. Richardson's opponents continue to attack his idea as irresponsible and unreliable to our education.

We would like to set the record straight. First, Richardson's state-run lottery is a "voluntary tax" that will benefit all Oklahomans whether they play it or not. When education is helped in our state, every citizen of Oklahoma is helped. Second, a recent poll reveals that 73% of Oklahomans want a state lottery if the funds are solely used for education. Richardson's plan proposes that every penny generated by a lottery will be used for education. Lastly, we would like to point out the success story of the state of Oregon, which adopted the lottery 16 years ago. Oregon is almost identical to our state with its population of 3.42 million. Since 1986, they have put \$2.6 billion into their education out of the lottery proceeds. Oregon today ranks 11th in their educational level of their work force. Oklahoma ranks 32nd.

We believe that as governor, Richardson's strong position against corruption and crime based on his previous achievement as former U.S. Attorney will never let this lottery proceed without a rigorous state supervision system. By organizing a lottery, we finally can increase our educational proceeds to fund teacher salaries, early childhood programs, and classrooms. If we want to achieve such educational programs in Oklahoma, we need the income from a state-run lottery.

So when Richardson's opponents attack, remember that his plan is rock solid. He is the champion of Oklahoma education with his integrity and independent voice.

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Appendix A

LARGENT WORKS HARD TO SUPPORT OUR CORE VALUES

Steve Largent has worked hard for Oklahoman and American core values in battle after battle in the U.S. Congress. Now, however, as election day draws nearer, you can bet that Largent's opponents will step up their campaign, attacking Steve Largent for accepting money from questionable donors such as the gambling industry, a tobacco company, Enron, and WorldCom. Also, Largent's opponents continue to attack his votes that favor powerful donors such as corporations, interest groups, wealthy individuals, and labor unions, allowing them to wield their tremendous influence over our political process.

While this charge may affect some voters who are not familiar with Steve Largent and this issue, most Oklahoman voters will recognize the weakness of this attack. First, attempting to charge candidates as responsible for accepting money from party-sponsoring donors is misleading. Most political contributions have been spread between the two national parties, benefiting most candidates of both parties. For example, the scandalous WorldCom has split contributions equally between Democrats and Republicans.

Second, attempts to attack Largent's vote against campaign financial reform are senseless. Largent opposed the bill because he and 249 other congressmen believe this bill is blatantly unconstitutional and is hostile to free speech. The right to free speech is one of our most deeply held American core values and is carefully guarded. Imposing restrictions on issue advocacy groups and their activities is completely unacceptable. Largent believes the bill will gag our citizen groups' advocacy rights. Thus, we agree with Largent that the bill has been misrepresented as the campaign finance reform.

So when Steve Largent's opponents attack, remember that Steve Largent has stood up for the rights the founding fathers claimed for the people of America. Largent has been proven that he is an ardent supporter of the principle of freedom.

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LARGENT'S "BOLD NEW PLAN" FOR EDUCATION

Steve Largent has worked hard for Oklahoma and American core values in battle after battle in the U.S. Congress. Now, however, as election day draws nearer, you can bet that Largent's opponents will step up their campaign, attacking Steve Largent's plan for Oklahoma education. Largent's opponents continue to attack the plan as unrealistic and even wrong.

We would like to set the record straight about Largent's "Bold New Plan." Largent is deeply committed to public education not only because of its vital role in society, but also because of the indelible mark public education made on his own life. As his father abandoned his family when Largent was a young boy, it was his teachers and coaches in Putnam City schools who helped fill that void. No one appreciates the impact of teachers and schools in the development of our young people more than Steve Largent.

His new plan envisions the future of Oklahoma education: Increase teacher pay beyond the regional average; Reward outstanding teacher performance with merit pay; and give parents, teachers, and local administrators more control over educational decisions. To raise teacher salaries, Largent plans to introduce a reallocation of funds from current \$2.24 billion education budget. By shifting education priorities from inefficient administrative bureaucracy toward classroom education, the plan is just right and very promising for Oklahoma education.

His opponents argue that only by creating new funds for education, such as a lottery can we solve the budget deficit problem. However, this is an extremely dangerous idea at the expense of educational principles. How can we teach students moral values when we promote gambling?

So when Steve Largent's opponents attack, remember that Largent's Bold New Plan stands up for what Oklahomans believe is the moral solution, rather than gambling with our future.

OKLAHOMA ECONOMY IN CRISIS

This year's gubernatorial election involves much more than a struggle involving candidates who differ in approaches and style. If this was all that was at stake in this election, your decision would be easy, as you would simply vote for your preference among Brad Henry, Gary Richardson, and Steve Largent. However, there is more to it than that. This election is also a vote toward success or failure of our economy future. Simply put, Oklahoma's economic future depends on the next governor's vision. As the CEO of Oklahoma, the governor should attract more business for new jobs and support existing businesses to overcome the impact of the nation's economic downturn. The governor should work to eliminate various obstacles to business.

Unfortunately, while Oklahomans have sent a clear, positive message that "Business is welcome; We are eager for new jobs and better wages," Brad Henry's position on this issue concerns most of Oklahomans. As the chair of the Senate Judiciary committee in 1999, Henry refused to discuss the workers compensation issue, which was the greatest obstacle to business. Workers' compensation in Oklahoma has been regarded as "one of the biggest messes in the nation." The compensation system is costly and is often abused by fraud, making Oklahoma 6th highest in costs and 47th in benefits in the nation.

Further, we are very concerned about Henry's opposition to Right-to-Work, which was passed by the popular vote last year. Most Oklahomans believe that Right-to-work will pave the way to success for the state's economic future. Henry should note that right-to-work states have created 800,000 manufacturing jobs since 1977, while states where union membership is compulsory have lost 2 million jobs.

Oklahomans can't accept the radical idea of Brad Henry's economy. Brad Henry's record speaks for itself. His plan is a losing plan.

DON'T GAMBLE WITH OKLAHOMA'S FUTURE

This year's gubernatorial election involves much more than a hard-fighting candidates who differ in approaches and styles. This election is a test of our morals and our values regarding what and how to teach our children. A good governor is someone who has a good moral character. The candidate with the best character can lead our children to their highest potential. However, it is very disappointing that Brad Henry, Democratic gubernatorial candidate, is going backward regarding education when he proposes legalized gambling for educational budget.

Oklahomans have sent a clear message on gambling: The idea of a state lottery was easily defeated in a statewide vote in 1994; in 1998, more than two-thirds of Oklahomans rejected the casino gambling initiation. Oklahoman's "no-gambling" message demonstrates the concerns most Oklahomans have about gambling's disastrous consequences for our future, especially for our children. The University of Chicago National Gambling Impact Study Commission found that 2.5 million Americans are suffering from "pathological" gambling. The fastest growing "addiction" among high school and college-age young Americans is gambling, with 1.3 million teens considered addicted. Howard Schaffer, director of the Harvard Medical School Center for Addiction Studies, predicted, "We will face in the next decade or so more problems with youth gambling than we'll face with drug use."

Brad Henry's lottery idea to generate educational fund is just baloney. When state lottery money is spent on education, legislatures cut back other money for schools. Experts believe using a lottery to raise money for public education is an unstable method of educational funding. To try to achieve the good end of education through the bad means of gambling could hurt other support for education and lead to gambling addictions in Oklahoma children. Oklahomans know Henry's idea risks the future of Oklahoma education.

OKLAHOMA NEEDS A SENATOR OF CHARACTER

This year's Senate election involves more than just a simple contest between two candidates who differ on issues. It also concerns a fundamental choice between two distinct political characters. When you go to the polls on election day, remember you are selecting someone to represent Oklahoma's morals in the U.S. Senate for the next six years. A candidate's character is an important barometer by which we can predict how he or she will perform as a political crusader for Oklahomans. We believe that a candidate's character is established by previous behaviors rather than by promises. A candidate with character should be responsible for what he or she has done before. As bad behaviors in elections give our state a poor image, a politician's violation of election law represents an essential denial of democracy. Elections should be controlled by rules and ethics.

In 1993, David Walters was indicted by a grand jury for eight felonies, including two counts of conspiracy and six counts of perjury. Walters pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor for accepting money over the legal limit in his 1990 race for governor. The criminal investigation revealed Walters had accepted a contribution above the \$5,000 legal maximum. He received a one-year deferred sentence. He also was fined \$1,000 and ordered to pay \$135,000 from his campaign funds to the state Ethics Commission. While admitting his mistakes, Walters still hasn't been completely aboveboard in explaining the events surrounding his 1993 allegations. Oklahomans will never let this violation slip away without a full accounting.

This year's Senate election makes it clear who deserves the public's confidence and who misrepresents Oklahoman's morals. With indicted felonies, plea-bargains, and perjuries, and conspiracy, Walters' records speak for themselves. Walters can't be the voice of Heartland Oklahoma. Oklahomans deserve better than Walter's disgraced character.

NATIONAL SECURITY BY MILITARY STRENGTH

There is no higher priority of government than to provide national defense. The lessons from 9/11 show that, more than ever, we need to work in a bipartisan manner to strengthen and defend our nation. We are alerted that we are in a more threatened position than we have been in our entire history. We must overcome the threats from terrorism. We believe that America is the strongest nation in the world with the power to bring peace through strength. We feel that we must maintain our homeland security by any means, including military strength. We should send a strong message that America will protect herself and her allies against all threats. We support our nation's military efforts to protect American lives against threats from weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

There is no doubt that military strength is important to Oklahoma and the life of Oklahomans. Our military installations, such as Tinker, Vance, Altus, Ft. Still, and McAlester, have played a critical role in our nation's security Oklahoma's economic strength as well. Unfortunately, while our bipartisan congressmen work together diligently to protect our military activities, such as the Crusader project, David Walters and his anti-military friends in Council for a Livable World (CLW), an ultra-liberal, anti-military Washington interest group, are working to disarm America and hurt Oklahoma. We are very disappointed that the ex-governor of Oklahoma has embraced the support of an organization whose sole purpose is hollowing-out America's military strength. Walters received the endorsement of CLW in exchange for the interests of Oklahoma and our local economy. We are concerned with David Walters' stance on our military strength and his acceptance of endorsement from an anti-military interest group. Simply put, we can't afford to let Walters endanger our nation's top priority.

DON'T GAMBLE WITH OKLAHOMA'S FUTURE

This year's gubernatorial election involves much more than a hard-fighting candidates who differ in approaches and styles. This election is a test of our morals and our values regarding what and how to teach our children. A good governor is someone who has a good moral character. The candidate with the best character can lead our children to their highest potential. However, it is very disappointing that Gary Richardson, Independent gubernatorial candidate, is going backward regarding education when he proposes legalized gambling for educational fund.

Oklahomans have sent a clear message on gambling: The idea of a state lottery was easily defeated in a statewide vote in 1994; in 1998, more than two-thirds of Oklahomans rejected the casino gambling initiation. Oklahoman's "no-gambling" message demonstrates the concerns most Oklahomans have about gambling's disastrous consequences for our future, especially for our children. The University of Chicago National Gambling Impact Study Commission found that 2.5 million Americans are suffering from "pathological" gambling. The fastest growing "addiction" among high school and college-age young Americans is gambling, with 1.3 million teens considered addicted. Howard Schaffer, the director of the Harvard Medical School Center for Addiction Studies, predicted, "We will face in the next decade or so more problems with youth gambling than we'll face with drug use."

Gary Richardson's lottery idea to generate educational fund is just baloney. When state lottery money is spent on education, legislatures cut back other money for schools. Experts believe using a lottery to raise money for public education is an unstable method of educational funding. To try to achieve the good end of education through the bad means of gambling could hurt other support for education and lead to gambling addictions in Oklahoma children. Oklahomans know Richardson's idea risks the future of Oklahoma education.

EMBARRASING FOR OKLAHOMA

This year, Oklahomans will have the opportunity to vote on State Question 687, which proposes to ban cockfighting in Oklahoma. Gov. Frank Keating has endorsed the bill, saying cockfighting is "embarrassing to Oklahoma." Only Oklahoma, Louisiana, and New Mexico allow this barbaric practice. Strongly endorsing the proposed bill, the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), the nation's largest animal protection organization, stated, "Cockfighting is inhumane and barbaric, and has no place in a society committed to basic anti-cruelty principles." HSUS claimed, "Cockfighters frequently drug birds to heighten their aggression, affix knives and gaffs to their legs to fight to injury or death." Also, these spectacles expose our youth to violence, gambling, and even narcotics.

While the Senate passed the cockfighting ban amendment, Senator Inhofe vowed he would work to ensure the cockfighting ban died in Senate conference. Inhofe also voted against the farm bill that would make it illegal to transport fighting birds through states that have outlawed cockfighting. It is very disappointing that Inhofe is against a federal law that would stop illegal shipment of fighting roosters. Roosters have been transported across state lines to make money by dying for the cockfighting crowd. It is no secret that cockfighting is deeply associated with gambling, which is also connected to politics. Simply, cockfighting is neither a sport nor a leisure activity. If dogfighting is prohibited, surely cockfighting should be prohibited too. There is something wrong with watching two animals fight to the death simply for amusement or gambling. Jim Inhofe should explain why our border states have long banned such a cruel practice while he helped the amendment die.

Oklahomans will not ignore what Inhofe has contributed to the state's embarrassment of cockfighting, permitted by a legal loophole. Oklahoma can no longer tolerate his stance on this shameful issue.

HEALTHCARE CRISIS

The Institute of Medicine's 1998 study estimates that the annual rate of serious medical errors across the nation exceeds 98,000 cases. It has been no secret that medical negligence incidents have been consistently unreported. Even so, there is now a push in 17 states and Washington, D. C. for enacting medical malpractice reform to restrict the rights of medical victims to justice. It's the latest in extreme measures used to protect drug and medical-equipment manufactures, doctors, hospitals and other health care providers by closing off avenues of recourse for those who have suffered a loss from another's mistake. Under this measure, if more than a year goes by before evidence of bad care or harmful drugs shows up, we can't hold anyone responsible. Juries and judges aren't allowed to impose damages to punish and deter even the worst incidents of medical negligence. The financial recovery that a victim can obtain would be severely limited, especially in the loss of children, low-wage earners, and stay-at-home mothers. We know that restricting victims' rights is just the wrong answer to this practice.

Unfortunately, Republican senatorial candidate Jim Inhofe voted for this wrongful reform that would restrict victims' rights. Indeed, Inhofe has been a strong sponsor of the bill, turning his back on the victims and supporting wealthy people in the medical industry. Last August, while angry seniors were picketing outside against Inhofe's opposition to medical reform, Inhofe was inside St. Anthony Hospital with his Senate colleague Bill Frist (R-TN), meeting with doctors and promising to protect them from big medical malpractice damages. It is very disappointing that Inhofe has consistently opposed the better measures that offer to expand access to medical care and prescription drugs for the people of Oklahoma, while at the same time, he has promoted the flawed medical malpractice bill.

OKLAHOMA NEEDS A GOVERNOR OF INTEGRITY

It is no secret that the cost of running for office is rising. The total price of the 2000 congressional and presidential elections was almost \$3 billion, up from \$2.2 billion in 1996. Critics of the current campaign finance system fear the corrupting influence of the amount of money pouring into elections. There is no doubt: the more money involved in running for office, critics say, the more influence donors—wealthy individuals, companies, labor unions, interest groups—have over elected officials and, thus, public policy. In response to these concerns, the House and Senate passed a landmark “campaign finance reform,” named, the “McCain-Feingold bill.” The bill is designed to reform the campaign finance system and seeks to reduce money’s influence in politics. Finally, in March, President George Bush signed the legislation, saying the bill “will improve the current financing system for federal campaigns.”

It is very disappointing that our house representative, Steve Largent has opposed bi-partisan support for this reform bill. While other Republicans and President Bush agreed to reform the current system, Largent, who insists he has integrity, opposed them. Further, in an interview, Largent said, “I don’t take any money from tobacco companies. I don’t take gambling money.” However, it was revealed he took money from a gambling company, Circus Circus, and from the tobacco company, RJR Reynolds. Also, Largent received over \$5,000 from scandalous Enron over the last eight years, tops among the state’s six House members. In 1998, Largent took his campaign high of \$10,000 from WorldCom, another of the biggest scandals. No one believes companies generously contribute such amounts just for the democratic process. We believe these donors make such investments to achieve tremendous influence over the political process. They want a pay-off. Oklahomans can’t afford politicians who accept these practices.

OKLAHOMA EDUCATION IN CRISIS

Education is the most critical issue in this election. We believe the future prominence and economic viability of Oklahoma depends more than anything else on our children's education. Unfortunately, the future of Oklahoma education is dismal. Oklahoma has slipped backwards to 48th in teacher salaries and 46th in per pupil expenditures. Teachers spend nearly \$600 of their own money buying supplies for needy children. The latest poll shows that education is top priority with the public, and the majority of Oklahomans want teacher salaries raised to the regional average.

With education a high priority, Steve Largent's plan for education looks useless. It is easy to say that education is important. However, Largent's so-called Bold New Plan is deceptive because it lacks substance. His proposal offers adding \$2,500 per teacher to bring them to the regional average at a cost of \$125 million. He claims it can be financed by shifting 5% from administration to teacher wages. This plan is simply wrong. The total education budget is \$2.24 billion. Of this, \$1.72 billion already pays teacher salaries. That leaves only \$517 million from which the schools must pay overhead, supplies, and administrative expenses. Unless the politician expects teachers to take a 5% pay cut to pay for their own increases, 5% of what is left will only pay for an average raise of about \$520.00 per teacher.

Even before this unrealistic approach to education, Largent is not a friend of our public education. For example, his children attend an elite private school. He has consistently voted for school voucher program in congress, which could divert our tax money into private and parochial schools. Simply put, he may not have confidence in our public education. Largent's idea of public education raises profound doubts among Oklahoma working families about his education plan.

PHASE ONE QUESTIONNAIRE

Questions in Part 1 are designed to provide necessary information about you. All of your responses in this study will be treated confidentially. However, we need some information so we can match up the questionnaires you complete during each of the three sessions and so that we can inform your instructor about your participation in the study. For items on department, course number, and instructor, we want to know which course/instructor we should inform about your participation in this study. PLEASE PRINT LEGIBLY.

1. Your name: _____, _____, _____.
(last name) (first name) (middle name)
 2. Department: _____.
 3. Course Number: _____; Course Name: _____.
 4. Instructor: _____.
 5. Your Gender: female _____ male _____
-

The next items concern your political preferences. Which of the following best represents your political beliefs? **Check one and circle a number between 7 (strong) and 1 (weak) in response to the strength of your affiliation.**

6. Would you describe your political party affiliation as:

_____ Democrat

Strong 7 :: 6 :: 5 :: 4 :: 3 :: 2 :: 1 *Weak*

_____ Republican

Strong 7 :: 6 :: 5 :: 4 :: 3 :: 2 :: 1 *Weak*

_____ Independent

Strong 7 :: 6 :: 5 :: 4 :: 3 :: 2 :: 1 *Weak*

_____ Third Party

Strong 7 :: 6 :: 5 :: 4 :: 3 :: 2 :: 1 *Weak*

_____ Others: _____.

The next series of questions are designed to assess your overall opinions about the 2002 senatorial election campaigns between **JIM INHOFE** (Republican) and **DAVID WALTERS** (Democrat). Circle a number between 1 and 7 in response to the following questions.


7.	How much interest do you have in the INHOFE/WALTERS campaign for Senator?	Very little	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Great deal
8.	How much awareness do you have of the INHOFE/WALTERS campaign for Senator?	Very little	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Great deal
9.	How much knowledge do you have about the candidates in the INHOFE/WALTERS campaign?	Very little	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Great deal

These items are designed to measure your sense of the overall importance of the election.

How do you feel about the meaning of this election?

10.	unimportant	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	important
11.	of no concern	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	of much concern
12.	irrelevant	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	relevant
13.	means nothing	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	means a lot
14.	doesn't matter	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	matters
15.	insignificant	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	significant

16. Please give us your feelings toward **JIM INHOFE**, Republican senatorial candidate, on this feeling thermometer. Ratings between 51 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward **INHOFE**. Ratings between 0 degrees and 49 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward him and that you don't care too much for him. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold, you would rate **INHOFE** at the 50 degree.



The next questions seek to assess your attitudes about **JIM INHOFE**. Specific items involve pairs of adjective opposites. For each item, circle a number that best captures your attitude.

MY ATTITUDE TOWARD JIM INHOFE

17. Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive
18. Unfavorable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Favorable

JIM INHOFE IS:

19. Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Good
20. Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Acceptable
21. Foolish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Wise
22. Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Right

The next series of questions are designed to assess your behavioral intention for **JIM INHOFE** during the 2002 senatorial election campaigns. Circle a number between 1 and 7 that best represents your intention in response to the following statements.

23. I will attempt to persuade others to support the candidate.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
24. I will display a poster, bumper sticker, or campaign button on behalf of the candidate.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
25. I will contribute money to the candidate's campaign.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
26. I will volunteer my time to work on behalf of the candidate.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
27. I will go to the polls and vote for the candidate on election day.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely

28. Please give us your feelings toward **DAVID WALTERS**, Democratic senatorial candidate, on this feeling thermometer. Ratings between 51 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward **WALTERS**. Ratings between 0 degrees and 49 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward him and that you don't care too much for him. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold, you would rate **WALTERS** at the 50 degree.

0-----50-----100
DAVID WALTERS _____ degrees

The next questions seek to assess your attitudes about **DAVID WALTERS**. Specific items involve pairs of adjective opposites. For each item, circle a number that best captures your attitude.

MY ATTITUDE TOWARD DAVID WALTERS

29. Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive
30. Unfavorable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Favorable

DAVID WALTERS IS:

31. Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Good
32. Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Acceptable
33. Foolish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Wise
34. Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Right

The next series of questions are designed to assess your behavioral intention for **DAVID WALTERS** during the 2002 senatorial election campaigns. Circle a number between 1 and 7 that best represents your intention in response to the following statements.

35. I will attempt to persuade others to support the candidate.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
36. I will display a poster, bumper sticker, or campaign button on behalf of the candidate.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
37. I will contribute money to the candidate's campaign.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
38. I will volunteer my time to work on behalf of the candidate	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
39. I will go to the polls and vote for the candidate on election day	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely

The next series of questions are designed to assess your overall opinions about the 2002 gubernatorial election campaigns between **STEVE LARGENT**, **BRAD HENRY** and **GARY RICHARDSON**. Circle a number between 1 and 7 in response to the following questions.

40.	How much interest do you have in the HENRY/LARGENT/RICHARDSON campaign for governor?	Very little	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Great deal
41.	How much awareness do you have of the HENRY/LARGENT/RICHARDSON campaign for governor?	Very little	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Great deal
42.	How much knowledge do you have about the candidates in the LARGENT/HENRY/RICHARDSON campaign?	Very little	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Great deal

These items are designed to measure your senses of the overall importance of the election.

How important is this election to you?

These items are designed to measure your senses of the overall importance of the election.

How important is this election to you?

43.	unimportant	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	important
44.	of no concern	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	of much concern
45.	irrelevant	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	relevant
46.	means nothing	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	means a lot
47.	doesn't matter	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	matters
48.	insignificant	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	significant

49. Please give us your feelings toward **STEVE LARGENT**, Republican gubernatorial candidate, on this feeling thermometer. Ratings between 51 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward **LARGENT**. Ratings between 0 degrees and 49 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward him and that you don't care too much for him. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold, you would rate **LARGENT** at the 50 degree.

0-----50-----100
STEVE LARGENT _____ degrees

The next questions seek to assess your attitudes about **STEVE LARGENT**. Specific items involve pairs of adjective opposites. For each item, circle a number that best captures your attitude.

MY ATTITUDE TOWARD STEVE LARGENT

50.	Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive
51.	Unfavorable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Favorable

STEVE LARGENT IS:

52.	Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Good
53.	Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Acceptable
54.	Foolish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Wise
55.	Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Right

The next series of questions are designed to assess your behavioral intention for **STEVE LARGENT** during the 2002 gubernatorial election campaigns. Circle a number between 1 and 7 that best represents your intention in response to the following statements.

56.	I will attempt to persuade others to support the candidate.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
57.	I will display a poster, bumper sticker, or campaign button on behalf of the candidate.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
58.	I will contribute money to the candidate's campaign.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
59.	I will volunteer my time to work on behalf of the candidate	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
60.	I will go to the polls and vote for the candidate on election day	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely

61. Please give us your feelings toward **BRAD HENRY**, Democratic gubernatorial candidate, on this feeling thermometer. Ratings between 51 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward **HENRY**. Ratings between 0 degrees and 49 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward him and that you don't care too much for him. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold, you would rate **HENRY** at the 50 degree.

0-----50-----100
BRAD HENRY _____ degrees

The next questions seek to assess your attitudes about **BRAD HENRY**. Specific items involve pairs of adjective opposites. For each item, circle a number that best captures your attitude.

MY ATTITUDE TOWARD BRAD HENRY

62. Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive
63. Unfavorable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Favorable

BRAD HENRY IS:

64. Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Good
65. Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Acceptable
66. Foolish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Wise
67. Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Right

The next series of questions are designed to assess your behavioral intention for **BRAD HENRY** during the 2002 gubernatorial election campaigns. Circle a number between 1 and 7 that best represents your intention in response to the following statements.

68.	I will attempt to persuade others to support the candidate.	Very <u>unlikely</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
69.	I will display a poster, bumper sticker, or campaign button on behalf of the candidate.	Very <u>unlikely</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
70.	I will contribute money to the candidate's campaign.	Very <u>unlikely</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
71.	I will volunteer my time to work on behalf of the candidate	Very <u>unlikely</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
72.	I will go to the polls and vote for the candidate on election day	Very <u>unlikely</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely

73. Please give us your feelings toward **GARY RICHARDSON**, Independent gubernatorial candidate, on this feeling thermometer. Ratings between 51 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward **RICHARDSON**. Ratings between 0 degrees and 49 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward him and that you don't care too much for him. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold, you would rate **RICHARDSON** at the 50 degree.

0-----50-----100

GARY RICHARDSON _____ degrees

The next questions seek to assess your attitudes about **GARY RICHARDSON**. Specific items involve pairs of adjective opposites. For each item, circle a number that best captures your attitude.

MY ATTITUDE TOWARD GARY RICHARDSON

74. Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive
75. Unfavorable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Favorable

GARY RICHARDSON IS:

76. Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Good
77. Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Acceptable
78. Foolish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Wise
79. Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Right

The next series of questions are designed to assess your behavioral intention for **GARY RICHARDSON** during the 2002 gubernatorial election campaigns. Circle a number between 1 and 7 that best represents in response to the following statements.

80.	I will attempt to persuade others to support the candidate.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
81.	I will display a poster, bumper sticker, or campaign button on behalf of the candidate.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
82.	I will contribute money to the candidate's campaign.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
83.	I will volunteer my time to work on behalf of the candidate	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
84.	I will go to the polls and vote for the candidate on election day	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely

PHASE TWO QUESTIONNAIRE

We appreciate your continuing participation in this study of how people process messages. Please read the instructions at the start of each section of this booklet, do what is asked, and complete the survey items in each section as accurately as possible.

Part 1

Questions in Part 1 are designed to provide necessary information about you. All of your responses in this study will be treated confidentially. However, we need some information so we can match up the questions you complete during each of the three sessions and so that we can inform your instructor of your participation in this study.

1. Your name: _____, _____
_____.
(last name) (first name) (middle name)
2. Day and Date: _____, _____.
3. Department: _____.
4. Course Number: _____.
5. Instructor: _____.
- 5-a. Email Address: _____.

The following part contains messages about a political candidate and his/her campaign issue position. Please read the messages on the next pages carefully.

BRAD HENRY

Source Credibility Claim(s): Expertise/Trustworthiness Manipulation

Here

Items on the next section concern your perceptions regarding **BRAD HENRY**. Circle

the number that most accurately describes your perceptions regarding **BRAD HENRY**.

I THINK BRAD HENRY IS:

6.	untrustworthy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	trustworthy
7.	dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	honest
8.	unjust	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	just
9.	inexperienced	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	experienced
10.	uninformed	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	informed
11.	unintelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	intelligent

BRAD HENRY
Inoculation Message
Here

The next section is designed to help us understand how you feel about the idea

expressed at the **beginning of the message** you just read that, despite your preference for candidate, **BRAD HENRY**, there is a possibility you may come into contact with arguments contrary to your opinion that are so persuasive, they may cause you to rethink your preference. You find this possibility:

12.	not dangerous	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	dangerous
13.	nonthreatening	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	threatening
14.	Calm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	anxious
15.	not scary	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	scary
16.	not harmful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	harmful
17.	not risky	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	risky

18. You indicated that your preference for governor is **BRAD HENRY**. Please indicate your feelings toward **BRAD HENRY**, Democratic gubernatorial candidate, on this feeling thermometer with a mark at the appropriate point. Ratings between 51 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward **HENRY**. Ratings between 0 degree and 49 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward him and that you don't care too much for him. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold, you would rate **HENRY** at the 50 degrees.

0-----50-----100
BRAD HENRY _____ degrees

The next questions seek to assess your attitudes about **BRAD HENRY**. Specific items involve pairs of adjective opposites, and ask you to circle a number that best captures your attitude.

MY ATTITUDE TOWARD BRAD HENRY

19.	Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive
20.	Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Good
21.	Unfavorable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Favorable
22.	Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Acceptable
23.	Foolish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Wise
24.	Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Right

Think about your preference between **BRAD HENRY** and his opponents, **STEVE**

LARGENT and **GARY RICHARDSON** in the gubernatorial race. On the left side below, write down any arguments you can think of against your preference (why your candidate might not be the best choice for governor) and, then, to the right of each argument you note, tell us your thoughts and/or feelings about the argument against your preference (as many responses as you can think of). Write concisely.

25. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MY PREFERENCE	26. MY RESPONSE TO THIS ARGUMENT
Write argument here:	Write response here:
1.	1.
2.	2.
3.	3.
4.	4.
5.	5.

Please go back to each argument against your candidate above and rate it from 1 (weak) to 7 (strong). Then, go back to each of your responses and rate them from 1 (weak) to 7 (strong).

	ARGUMENTS AGAINST MY PREFERENCE	MY RESPONSE TO THIS ARGUMENT
27.	1. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong	1. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong
28.	2. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong	2. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong
29.	3. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong	3. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong
30.	4. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong	4. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong
31.	5. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong	5. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong

The next questions seek to assess your attitudes about political candidates. Specific

items involve pairs of adjective opposites. You are asked to circle a number that best captures your attitude.

MY OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD BRAD HENRY

32. Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive
33. Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Good
34. Unfavorable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Favorable
35. Foolish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Wise
36. Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Right
37. Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Acceptable
38. Incompetent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Competent
39. Unintelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Intelligent
40. Unqualified	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Qualified
41. Dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Honest
42. Selfish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unselfish
43. Unsympathetic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Sympathetic

44. Assuming that you are registered to vote in Oklahoma, on a scale from 0-100 (where 0 represents "no probability" and 100 represents "certainty"), please indicate the likelihood that you would vote for **BRAD HENRY** for governor in 2002.

0-----100

(no probability)

(certainty)

YOUR PROBABILITY: _____.

The next series of questions are designed to assess your behavioral intentions for **BRAD HENRY** during the 2002 gubernatorial election campaigns. Circle a number between 1 and 7 in response to the following statements.

45. I will attempt to persuade others to support the candidate.	Very <u>unlikely</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
46. I will display a poster, bumper sticker, or campaign button on behalf of the candidate.	Very <u>unlikely</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
47. I will contribute money to the candidate's campaign.	Very <u>unlikely</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
48. I will volunteer my time to work on behalf of the candidate	Very <u>unlikely</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
49. I will go to the polls and vote for the candidate on election day	Very <u>unlikely</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely

PHASE THREE QUESTIONNAIRE

We appreciate your continuing participation in this study of how people process messages. Please read the instructions at the start of each section of this booklet, do what is asked, and complete the survey items in each section as accurately as possible.

Part 1

Questions in Part 1 are designed to provide necessary information about you. All of your responses in this study will be treated confidentially. However, we need some information so we can match up the questions you complete during each of the three sessions and so that we can inform your instructor of your participation in this study.

1. Your name: _____, _____, _____.
(last name) (first name) (middle name)
2. Day and Date: _____, _____.
3. Department: _____.
4. Course Number: _____.
5. Instructor: _____.
- 5-a. Your Email Address: _____.

The following part contains messages about a political candidate and his/her campaign issue position. Please read the messages on the next pages carefully.

BRAD HENRY

Attack Message

Here

Think about your preference between **BRAD HENRY** (Democrat) and his opponents, **STEVE LARGENT** (Republican) and **GARY RICHARDSON** (Independent) in the gubernatorial race. On the left side below, write down any arguments you can think of against your preference (why your candidate might not be the best choice for governor) and, then, to the right of each argument you note, tell us your thoughts and/or feelings about the argument against your preference (as many responses as you can think of). Write concisely.

6. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MY PREFERENCE	7. MY RESPONSE TO THIS ARGUMENT
Write argument here:	Write response here:
1.	1.
2.	2.
3.	3.
4.	4.
5.	5.

Please go back to each argument against your candidate above and rate it from 1 (weak) to 7 (strong). Then, go back to each of your responses and rate them from 1 (weak) to 7 (strong).

ARGUMENTS AGAINST MY PREFERENCE	MY RESPONSE TO THIS ARGUMENT
1. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong	1. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong
2. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong	2. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong
3. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong	3. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong
4. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong	4. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong
5. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong	5. weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strong

The next questions seek to assess your attitudes toward the candidate who was attacked in the message. Specific items involve pairs of adjective opposites. For each item, circle a number that best captures your attitude.

MY OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD BRAD HENRY

13. Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Positive
14. Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Good
15. Unfavorable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Favorable
16. Foolish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Wise
17. Wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Right
18. Unacceptable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Acceptable
19. Incompetent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Competent
20. Unintelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Intelligent
21. Unqualified	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Qualified
22. Dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Honest
23. Selfish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unselfish
24. Unsympathetic	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Sympathetic

25. Assuming that you are registered to vote in Oklahoma, on a scale from 0-100 (where 0 represents "no probability" and 100 represents "certainty"), please indicate the likelihood that you would vote for **BRAD HENRY** for governor in 2002.

0-----100
(no probability) (certainty)

YOUR PROBABILITY:_____.

The next series of questions are designed to assess your behavioral intentions for **BRAD HENRY** during the 2002 gubernatorial election campaigns. Circle a number between 1 and 7 in response to the following statements.

26. I will attempt to persuade others to support the candidate.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
27. I will display a poster, bumper sticker, or campaign button on behalf of the candidate.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
28. I will contribute money to the candidate's campaign.	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
29. I will volunteer my time to work on behalf of the candidate	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
30. I will go to the polls and vote for the candidate on election day	Very unlikely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely

31. You indicated that your preference for governor is **BRAD HENRY**. Please indicate your feelings toward **BRAD HENRY**, Democratic gubernatorial candidate, on this feeling thermometer with a mark at the appropriate point. Ratings between 51 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward **HENRY**. Ratings between 0 degree and 49 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward him and that you don't care too much for him. If you don't feel particularly warm or cold, you would rate **HENRY** at the 50 degrees.

0-----50-----100
BRAD HENRY _____ degrees