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UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

AN ANALYSIS OF THE TERM "EXPERIENCE" IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE
AND IN THE MORE PRECISE ARENA OF ADULT EDUCATION LITERATURE

A Dissertation
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

By
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LANGUAGE AND IN THE MORE PRECISE ARENA OF
ADULT EDUCATION LITERATURE

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF LEADERSHIP &
POLICY STUDIES

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It is said that the journey from Kamakura to Kyoto takes twelve days. If you travel for eleven but stop on the twelfth, how can you admire the moon over the capital? Since all of one's efforts are wasted or lost if she gives up in the end, I am gratefully indebted to the following people who assisted me in my journey toward completing the doctoral program at The University of Oklahoma. Without their help, encouragement, and expertise this journey would not have been completed.

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IN MEMORY

In loving memory of my mother and father,
Yuki Deane and Harley Hanan.

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ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF THE TERM "EXPERIENCE" IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE
AND IN THE MORE PRECISE ARENA OF ADULT EDUCATION LITERATURE

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An analysis of the concept "experience" is conducted, both in ordinary language and in adult education literature, for the purpose of adding clarity to what is meant or intended by the use of the term "experience."

The study consists of three major divisions. First, analysis, following Soltis (1978), identifies six senses of the term as represented by the following typology: Noun (1) perception, (2) knowledge, (3) events; Verb (1) to be converted, (2) to undergo, and (3) to learn. Second, examples from adult education literature illustrate usages of the term. Five categories of usage are noted: Noun (1) perception, (2) knowledge, (3) events, Verb (2) to undergo, and (3) to learn. Third, an analysis of the term experience as used in adult education is conducted based on the techniques of differentiation-type and conditions-type analysis as suggested by Soltis (1978).

Conclusions are as follows: (1) the meaning of the term experience has expanded over time; (2) current ordinary language usage includes at least six kinds of meanings; (3) usage within adult education literature closely parallels ordinary language usage; (4) authors of adult education literature use the term experience to connote different meanings often in the same paragraph; (5) multiple meanings of experience when used in a single paragraph may result in confusion; (6) it is important for authors of adult education to agree on what they mean by experience; and (7) the outcome of this work may have confirmed the ambiguity and confusion surrounding the use of the term experience. Implications concerning the use of experience as a theoretical construct in adult education are discussed.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE TERM "EXPERIENCE" IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE
AND IN THE MORE PRECISE ARENA OF ADULT EDUCATION LITERATURE

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

'Experience', [sic] of all the words in the philosophic vocabulary, is the most difficult to manage; and it must be the ambition of every writer reckless enough to use the word to escape the ambiguities it contains (Oakeshott, 1978, p. 9).

Experience is a term used widely within adult education literature and is noted as being an important characteristic for the learning of adults (Long, 1983). Even though the term is widely used, the meaning of experience is not precisely explained. Authors appear quite ready to offer propositions concerning experience and its relationship to the learning of adults but, even in these propositions the connotation or operational definition of experience is lacking. Hanson's (1961) conceptual analysis of the concept "learning by experience" identifies four sources from which the term experience could derive, 1) everyday discourse, 2) the philosophic area of theory of knowledge, 3) from the

research and theoretical formulations of psychologists, and 4) the impact of James and Dewey on education (p. 13). Even though Hanson identifies sources of the term experience, he does not identify the most common ways in which the term is used in adult education. Researchers may look at the differing ranges of experience found in adults but do not specifically address the meaning of experience. Since the concept experience has not been conceptualized adequately in the literature, this work may contribute to a clarification of the problem.

Purpose

This study is designed to clarify the concept/term experience in adult education literature by systematically examining its use in ordinary language and in adult education literature in the most recent ten-year period. Selected adult education authors whose work prominently extols or emphasizes the significance of experience provide a corpus of work to be reviewed. Explanation of how the term is used, that is, what it connotes, will be accomplished by the use of philosophical analysis.

Significance of the Problem

Clarification of the term experience in adult education is both theoretically and practically significant.

1) Theoretical significance

Conceptually identifying the various connotations of the term experience in the field of adult education, should provide educators and students with a common base from which to improve theoretical formulations in important areas such as adult learning program development theory, training, and participation.

2) Practical significance

The practical significance of the problem lies in identifying the meaning(s) of the frequent and consistent usage of the term experience in adult education and learning. Vague use of a term leads to confusion. Thus by identifying the most commonly held or used meaning(s) for a term some of the confusion is dispelled and greater clarity is the result.

Chapter II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This literature review is divided into two major sections: 1) the method and 2) adult education literature. It is designed to determine what is known about the research method, why it is known, when it was known, who knows it and how it is known. Questions guiding this review of the literature on this research method include the following:

- 1) What is analytical philosophy, linguistic analysis or conceptual analysis?
 - a) What is the history of analytical philosophy?
 - b) What are some of the methods used by various analytical philosophers, particularly the methods to be followed in this study?
 - c) What are some examples of work focusing on conceptual analysis performed in the field of adult education?
- 2) Who are the authors writing about the importance or the significance of experience in the learning of adults?

Analytic Philosophy

What is analytic philosophy?

According to Ammerman (1965), Gross (1970), Gutek (1988), and Smith and Ennis (1961) analytic philosophy is concerned with the extraction(s) of the meaning(s) from concepts found in language. The extraction process is accomplished through examination, clarification, and analysis of the concepts and notions of philosophy, of language, and of science (Ammerman, 1965; Feinberg, 1983; Gross, 1970; Smith & Ennis, 1961; Strawson, 1992). By studying the interrelatedness of the structure of language, analytic philosophy attempts to understand ordinary talk or dialog about the world. Long (1983) describes analytic philosophy as concentrating "on the careful analysis of arguments, concepts, language, and policy statements in order to develop a philosophical foundation" (p. 302). The analytic philosopher's primary goal is to settle philosophical questions by conducting a study of language and to eliminate the confusion of meanings found in language by determining what meaning(s) concepts have (Ammerman, 1965; Charlton, 1991; Gowin, 1981; Gutek, 1988; Gross, 1970; Hanson, 1961; Long, 1983; Smith & Ennis, 1961).

Analytic philosophers use language as a means to discover or explore their world, to answer questions. There is no single method or set of problems that can be called analytic. Also, there is no single person's work upon which analytic philosophy can be or has been based (Charlton, 1991; Corrado, 1975; Sacks, 1990). In other words, "there is no single philosophy of analysis" (Ammerman, 1965, p. 2). It is, however, possible to identify general themes that allow one to recognize the purpose or existence of a general grouping of philosophers who share interests or procedures (Ammerman, 1965; Sacks, 1990). Gross (1970) identifies two common threads running among analytic thought:

- 1) Large numbers of if not all, philosophic problems can be understood, solved, or dissolved only through a close analysis or reform of the way language works.
- And 2), The questions of language and how it is to be construed are far more difficult than non-analytic philosophers realized (p. 19).

According to Charlton (1991, p. 2), "analytical philosophy is the variety of philosophy favored by the majority of philosophers working in English-speaking countries." He observes that there are some writers, however, who say analytic philosophy is coming to an end. Charlton (1991) does not agree with this; he believes that people will continue to use philosophic analysis as a resource for their own understanding. Feinberg (1983)

thinks that conceptual analysis may provide a meaning of a term, but not its significance or importance.

This section provides a description of analytic philosophy in the above discussion. The following section tracks the history and breakdown of these strands, themes, or threads of analytic philosophy as identified by Gross (1970) and Hart (1990).

History of Analytic Philosophy

This history of analytical philosophy focuses upon the development of the tradition and some of the pioneers of the analytical tradition. Gross (1970) divides the history of analytic philosophy into three general categories while Hart (1990) divides the history of analytic philosophy into four different categorical periods, which will be discussed later.

Accepting that analytic philosophy is concerned with the analysis and understanding of particular concepts and notions, Gross (1970) identifies three categories of analytic history:

1. Historically the earliest was the concern to use words precisely so as to formulate problems clearly and unambiguously.
2. The next was the construction of artificial or mathematical languages.

3. The last was the systematic analysis of 'ordinary' or natural language as philosophers usually speak it (pp. 9-10).

In addition to his three general divisions, Gross (1970) identifies five stages in the historical development of analytic philosophy. These stages emerge from the three general categories he identifies as well as from the work of Urmson (Gross 1970). The first stage identified by Gross (1970) is concerned with realism and analysis. The purpose of a philosophy at this stage is stating questions precisely and as clearly as possible. The second stage is logical atomism. The task of atomism is building a language mirroring the structure of the world. Logical positivism is the third stage in Gross' historical development. Positivism focuses on constructing a language containing no metaphysical sentences while simultaneously developing a language adequate for science. In the fourth stage, investigators are concerned with natural or ordinary language. The purpose of analysis is no longer to dissolve problems but to understand the ambiguities of the language itself (puzzle solving). Gross' fifth and final stage also deals with ordinary language. The task is to understand the subtle ways of understanding language. The concern of this stage is not with dissolving problems or puzzles, but with the language itself. Language is catalogued and laid out to

show not the difference or misleading aspects of saying the same thing, but rather ways of saying different things (Gross, 1970, pp. 13-14).

Differing from Gross, Hart (1990), divides the history of analytic philosophy into four major periods. The first period, the era of "logical atomism," dates from 1879-84 to about the end of World War I. Frege, Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein are the authors Hart identifies as representative for this era. Hart's second period, that of "Logical positivism," centers around the work of Schlick and Carnap. The time frame for this period lies between the world wars. Hart identifies Carnap as developing one of the most articulate and influential conceptions of clarity. Hart's final two periods are identified in the era from the end of the Second World War until 1987. The first half of this time period is referred to as the ordinary language philosophy, or concerned with Oxford philosophy, or linguistic philosophy. Quine and Wittgenstein's later works received attention during this period. The second half of this period might be called the American hegemony, but it is probably too near in time to actually identify its structure (Hart, 1990, pp. 197-198).

Modern analysts, credit the earlier philosophers with the style, method and outlook of today's analytic

philosophy. Gross (1970) and Hart (1990) agree that analytical methods have been used by philosophers since the time of Plato. Gross (1970) identifies and discusses the similarity of styles and methods of analytic philosophers dating back to the work of Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.

Commonly, the beginning of analytic philosophy is thought to be dated from the work of G. E. Moore (1873-1958) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), even though some begin with Frege (Gross, 1970; Gutek, 1988; Hart, 1990; Ozmon & Craver, 1990; Sacks, 1990). Analytic philosophy is sometimes identified with Moore's and Russell's departure from Idealism and movement toward common-sense Realism (Ammerman, 1965; Gross, 1970). Idealist commonly held the position that matter or objects were not real. Only ideas and impressions were real. It was Moore and Russell who challenged the view of idealism and took the first steps toward developing a new conception of philosophy (Ammerman, 1965; Gross, 1970).

Moore's writings were influential because of his insistence upon detailed analysis of the meaning of words, that these meanings were clear, that they adhered to common sense, and that language be looked at in its common or ordinary form. Through analysis Moore exerted an influence

upon the history of analytic philosophy as he was always trying to find what was real. Thus Moore, came to be known as an ordinary language philosopher who paid very close attention to detail. What he wanted to do was to find the way to analyze what was real. He turned his attention to the meanings of the questions and understood that by using alternative ways to form questions new and different questions were actually formed (Ammerman, 1965, pp. 3-5; Gross, 1970, pp. 14-15; Ozmon & Craver, 1990, pp. 272-273).

Bertrand Russell also rejected the Idealist's viewpoint. For Russell, the question of the nature of relations was settled in mathematical and logical terms. He believed that the only way to solve philosophical problems was to have philosophy become more like science in method. Thus he added to philosophy the discipline and precision found in the natural sciences (Ammerman, 1965; Ozmon & Craver, 1990).

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Russell's student, built upon the work of both Russell and Moore. Wittgenstein argued that metaphysical questions were by their very nature unanswerable. He attempted to show all meaningful discourse to be empirical in nature. Metaphysical questions were not empirical and, thus, were not meaningful. In fact, for Wittgenstein, metaphysical questions were not questions at

all, they were meaningless and should not be a part of philosophy. Wittgenstein understood the purpose of philosophy as the activity of clarifying language by developing a new language. This new language would clarify the former language by exchanging ambiguous grammar for logical grammar by the use of precise word meanings. The task of the philosopher was to show the person who was puzzled by metaphysical questions that the questions were meaningless and unanswerable (Ammerman, 1965; Gross 1970; Ozmon & Craver, 1990).

The Vienna Circle, formed in 1929, respected the achievements of science and was considered to be an outgrowth of Wittgenstein's earlier work. This group of Logical Positivists gained public recognition as they attempted to work out the logic of the sciences. Positivists held in common two main themes. The first theme was that metaphysical questions or statements were neither true nor false, but meaningless. They attempted to build a means of testing sentences, but it proved less than successful. The second theme, was the creation of an artificial language. It was thought a precise language that excluded metaphysical language problems could replace ambiguous ordinary language (Ammerman 1965; Gross, 1970; Ozmon & Craver, 1990).

Two common themes are central to Positivism. One is the idea that all metaphysical sentences are meaningless. If something cannot be perceived (known through sensory perception) by an individual, it cannot be known using meaningful language. The second theme is the identification of philosophy with analysis, especially with the analysis of the language of science. These two ideas were held by most if not all of the members of the Vienna Circle (Ammerman, 1965).

Logical positivism and linguistic analysis are two major directions analytic thought has taken with linguistic analysis being the methodological concern of this research. Linguistic analysis developed more slowly than Logical Positivism and does not have a formal organization, as the Vienna Circle to legitimize it. It is more of a general label for philosophers who share broad interests or general themes in philosophy. As there are no sharp distinctions between Logical Positivism and Linguistic Analysis, there are philosophers who write in both traditions (Ammerman, 1965; Gross, 1970).

Probably the most important person in the early development of linguistic analysis was Ludwig Wittgenstein (Ammerman, 1965). Wittgenstein's later work, as it has come to be known, was not published until after his death, and

dates roughly from 1930 until his death. It appears that Wittgenstein never accepted the basic tenets of Positivism even though he spoke of constructing a logically perfect language. His later writings which are filled with descriptions of language in its ordinary form, reject the construction of an artificial language as necessary for solving philosophical problems (Ammerman, 1965).

Wittgenstein maintained the idea that since metaphysical problems are not real problems they cannot be solved. His vision of the task of the philosopher is to clarify language and remove confusion. Wittgenstein accomplishes this task by demonstrating that metaphysical questions are meaningless and by describing the features of language giving rise to the question in the first place (Ammerman, 1965). He argues that the lack of precision in language is not a draw back, but is a characteristic of language itself. Thus problems are not solved, but are dissolved (Gross, 1970). Ozmon & Craver (1990), say

The role of philosophy, then, should not be to construct explanations about reality and so forth, but to solve the puzzles of linguistic confusion. Philosophy should be viewed as a method of investigation (although no specified, singular method) that results in pure description, and language should be seen as having no necessary or ideal form (p. 281).

Ammerman (1965) and Gross (1970) each identify additional philosophers, although not the same philosophers,

as being important to linguistic analysis. The following includes a brief discussion of the contributions made by Gilbert Ryle, John Wisdom, Peter Strawson, and John Austin as identified by Ammerman (1965) and Gross (1970).

Gilbert Ryle attempts to show the dichotomy between mental and physical terms in speech is a result of confusion about the use of such terms (Ammerman, 1965). By an analysis of mental concepts Ryle sought to demonstrate the old ways of thinking about the mind actually contained the means for its own destruction (Gross, 1970). His work helped to spread an interest in the methods of linguistic analysis (Ammerman, 1965).

John Wisdom, one of Wittgenstein's students, brought to linguistic analysis "an original and exciting new philosophical procedure" (Ammerman, 1960, p. 11).

. . . he attempts to understand why the metaphysician feels compelled to talk in his linguistically odd ways. By putting stress upon the imperfect similarities between various kinds of statements in our language, he hopes to discover what is and is not valuable in the various attempts to solve metaphysical questions (Ammerman, 1960, p. 11).

Peter Strawson's efforts were designed to show how Russell forced a logical framework upon language, which instead of clearing up puzzles left them as they were (Gross, 1970). According to Ammerman (1965), Strawson

distinguishes two kinds of metaphysics: that which only attempts to describe the conceptual boundaries of our

language (descriptive metaphysics) and that which attempts to revise them (revisionary metaphysics) (p. 12).

For Strawson, language was not something written down and understood in a rigid logical context, but in a living and spoken or ordinary way (Gross, 1970).

John Austin published little during his lifetime (Ammerman, 1965; Gross, 1970). Austin believed that the study of language is of a great value when dealing with philosophical questions (Ammerman, 1965). Agreeing with Wittgenstein and Wisdom, he believed that what has been written in philosophy is more misleading and confusing than false (Ammerman, 1965). His approach for dissipating this confusion was unique. With his attention on the grammatical complexities found in the English language, he was focused on cataloging and tracing the many nuances of meaning in order to show they represented different concepts (Ammerman, 1965; Gross, 1970). According to Gross (1970), it was important to Austin that the actual detail of this work be down on paper, with Austin believing that first a researcher must understand as clearly as possible how language operates before attempting to solve philosophical problems (Ammerman, 1965).

The previous section offered a brief over view of analytic philosophy, its history and development, and some of the pioneers of the field. The next section presents some of today's more commonly used techniques of analysis.

Analytic Method

Three standard works that explain some of the commonly used techniques of analysis employed by modern philosophers, are reviewed in this discussion of techniques or methods of philosophical analysis (1) Thinking with concepts (Wilson, 1963); (2) Philosophical analysis: An introduction to its language and techniques (Gorovitz & Williams, 1965); and (3) An introduction to the analysis of educational concepts (Soltis, 1978).

Wilson. John Wilson (1963) discusses several techniques of philosophical analysis, which he calls conceptual analysis. He is concerned with certain types of questions that can be analyzed best by using techniques of conceptual analysis. He calls the qualified questions "questions of concept" (Wilson, 1963, p. 3). He says,

Questions of concept, then are not questions of fact: nor are they questions of value: nor are they questions concerned with the meanings of words, or the definitions of words. . . . they are concerned with the uses of words, and with the criteria or principles by which those uses are determined (p. 11).

Wilson (1963, pp. 23-27) offers several techniques with which to analyze concepts. The first is one of "isolating questions of concept" (p. 23). He suggests that one begin with isolating the concept because many questions contain concerns of value, or of fact, as well as questions of concept. He calls these questions, mixed questions. In the case of mixed questions, Wilson suggests that the analyzer isolate the questions of concept and deal with them first. Only after the usage of the concept has been identified can values and facts be considered. For example, in the proposed research, according to Wilson, effort should be focused upon the concept of experience before values and facts about experience are considered.

The use of "model cases" is another technique described by Wilson (1963, p. 28). The analyzer picks an example or a case that provides absolute certainty of the instance of the concept. "Well, if that isn't an example of so-and-so, then nothing is" (Wilson, 1963, p. 28). Next, the analyzer looks at the features of the case and tries to identify the essential features of virtue of the case. The analyzer then selects another model case for examination to see if all the features identified in the first case are also present in the second. If they are not, it may look as if the absent features are not really essential. If they were essential,

they would likely be present in all cases. Narrowing the search for essential features is accomplished by eliminating unessential ones.

"Contrary cases" (Wilson, 1963, p. 29) offers an opposite technique to model cases. Here the analyzer selects a case that is in sharp contrast to the original concept, "Well, whatever so-and-so is, that certainly isn't an instance of it" (Wilson, 1963, p. 29). In the instance of analyzing experience, one would want to pick a case that failed to illustrate experience for the person. This may in fact be done more than once. Then the investigator would look for similar essential features in each case noting non-experience.

The need to understand "related cases" (Wilson, 1963, p. 30) appears to come naturally when one is analyzing a concept. It would be difficult to analyze a concept without considering other concepts related to, or similar to, the first concept. This broader understanding offers a clearer picture of the concept by showing how the different or related concepts relate to each other. This technique provides a way to be more precise about the criteria for applying not only the related concept but the original one as well.

Since words are not always used with clarity, and it is not always possible to give the exact/precise meaning of a word, the analyzer may be left with a situation where the extracted meaning is case related. Wilson (1963) offers the following example of what he calls "results in language" (p. 36): "Well, if you mean abc by so-and-so, then the answer is this: but if you mean xyz, then the answer is that" (pp. 35-36). The analyzer uses this technique when words are so vague that a definitive meaning is next to impossible to extract. According to Wilson (1963),

we have to look at the 'results in language' when choosing meanings for words or delimiting areas for concepts: we have to pick the most useful criteria for the concept. Thus, when (but only when) we have analysed the concept and noted the whole wealth of possible instances of it, we may often have to say at the end 'Amid all these possible meaning of the word so-and-so, it seems most sensible and useful to make it mean such-and-such: for in this way we shall be able to use the word to its fullest advantage' (p. 37).

Gorovitz & Williams. Definition and explication is the first technique or method discussed by Gorovitz and Williams (1965). Philosophical analysis attempts to do more than just provide a definition of terms or concepts. According to the authors "A major technique of analytic philosophy is to try to formulate precisely the meanings of terms which, for one reason or another, are of special interest" (p. 75).

A dictionary provides a definition of a term not necessarily its meaning (Gorovitz & Williams, 1965).

Although dictionaries provide definitions for terms of ordinary interest, dictionary definitions are not the interest of philosophy for two reasons: 1) they tell how words are used, not their meanings, and 2) the definition itself is circular. The authors clarify this limitation of dictionary definitions by stating that how a word is used is not the same as its meaning. The use and meaning of a word are, however, closely related even though they are not the same.

Consider the word 'angel'. We may use the word to describe an exceptional woman, but we don't intend to suggest that the woman literally is an angel. Rather, we are using the word metaphorically, in a way that depends on its literal meaning. We intend to suggest that the woman has certain angel-like qualities. It is just because the word 'angel' means what it does, that we can use it to describe something that is not really an angel (Gorovitz & Williams, 1965, p. 76).

According to the Gorovitz and Williams (1965), the second limitation has to do with the circular nature of the definitions themselves. A dictionary definition is circular because the word is defined in terms of the notion or concept being defined. They offer an example in finding the meaning of the term "beautiful." The dictionary explains "x is beautiful" meaning "x has beauty" (p. 77). Most people would agree with the above definition. The definition provided however, leads back to the word or concept started with, thus it is circular and has no meaning

or usefulness for philosophy. This example shows the confusion of defining a word in terms of the notion wished to be analyzed. For example, a definition might read that "x is beautiful" meaning that x consists of characteristics associated with being beautiful. An illustration of this circular confusion, applied to this research, would be to state that experience is the gaining of knowledge or skill, thus knowledge is experience.

There is yet another way in which definitions can be circular, although Gorovitz and Williams (1965) state that this circularity is less obvious than the previous example. In this instance the word is defined in terms of a concept not easily understood. A definition might read "x is beautiful" meaning "x enjoys the characteristic of positive aesthetic merit" (Gorovitz & Williams, 1965 p. 77). Once again we are led to the place we started by trying to understand the meaning of "beautiful" which is the term of interest.

Explication is offered as an alternative to definition within the field of analytic philosophy (Gorovitz & Williams, 1965). An explication is not circular nor are the concepts used easily misunderstood. The term being explained, called the explicandum is described by a substitute term or phrase, called the explicatum (Gorovitz &

Williams, 1965, p. 78). Thus, as much of the meaning of a term, as can be explained precisely, is captured by the explication. For example the concept "experience" can be explicated as "the mental, physical, or spiritual interaction with an event or phenomena."

Another technique offered by Gorovitz & Williams (1965) is one of counter-example (p. 79). "A counter-example is merely an example which illustrates that a given general assertion is false" (Gorovitz & Williams, 1965, p. 79). An experience might be considered to be the physical duration of an event or incident occurring in life. Yet a person might consider experience to be the mental recalculations occurring following the actual physical event.

Soltis. Soltis (1978) also describes techniques that are useful for analyzing educational concepts. He begins by "asking prior questions and making distinctions" (Soltis, 1978, p. 3). Next he outlines three basic analytical techniques or strategies. The first analytic strategy discussed is as follows:

generic-type analysis, a means of clarifying a concept by identifying its key characteristics. We also . . . demonstrate the technique of using counterexamples-- that is, sharpening up the meaning of an idea by pointing to examples that test and refine our conceptions by negative instances" (Soltis, 1978, p. 4).

The second strategy is differentiation-type analysis and the third is conditions-type analysis (Soltis, 1978, p. 4).

Table 1 on page 25 provides an outline of these strategies.

Soltis recommends his techniques for use as guides by beginners in conceptual analysis. He states ". . . analytic tools, techniques, and strategies, . . . need to be sensitively blended together to be effective in an intelligent

application to a conceptual problem" (Soltis, 1978, p. 69).

He further states

The use of any techniques need to be intelligently guided by one's own purposes and the relevant situational factors. Analysis should serve as an instrument for increasing understanding and for suggesting practical applications (p.78).

This section reviewed three standard works explaining the more commonly used techniques of analysis employed by modern philosophers. Techniques discussed included Wilson's (1963) isolating questions of concepts, model cases, contrary cases, and related cases; Gorovitz and Williams' (1965) definition and explication, counter-example; and Soltis' (1978) generic-type analysis, differentiation-type analysis and conditions-type analysis.

Table 1

Three Analytic Strategies

| | Generic Type | Differentiation Type | Conditions Type |
|----------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Nature of the Analytic Situation | Undisputed model case(s) of the concept X are readily available, but generic features shared by model species are not clearly spelled out. | The concept x seems to have more than one standard meaning and their identities and the basis for differentiating between them are not clear. | Undisputed model cases do not seem to be readily available and standard instances of the concept X can easily be made noninstances by changing a context condition. |
| Form of Prior Question | What features must x have to be an X? | What are the basic (different) meanings of X? | Under what context conditions would it be true to say that X is present or that S is Xing? |
| Moves | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Select standard of model cases and clear contrary cases of X. 2. Draw potentially necessary features from clear standard cases. 3. Test: Use examples and counterexamples (contrary cases) to test for necessity and sufficiency. 4. Keep, modify, or reject the feature(s) on the basis of the test(s) | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Search for dominant standard uses of the concept by means of examples. 2. Intuitively classify or categorize the uses into types. Any missing types? 3. Search for distinguishing marks of each type which can be used to clearly separate types. 4. Test the typology developed by means of examples and counterexamples; schematize relations if possible. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Identify a good candidate for being a necessary condition of x happening or X being present in a situation. 2. By altering the context, try to find an example where the condition holds, but X or Xing is not present. 3. Revise or modify the condition to meet the context problem or tease out from the altered context another condition and test it (as in no. 2). 4. Test the necessity and sufficiency of the conditions arrived at. |
| Intended Result | A clearer idea of what is essential to being an X. | A clearer idea of the logical terrain covered by different meanings of a concept. | A clearer idea of the contextual dimension of a concept's meaning. |

(Soltis, 1978, pp. 108-109)

Conceptual Analysis in Adult Education

Various contributors to adult education literature have used analytic techniques to clarify philosophical concepts found in the field. The following section outlines the work of some of those authors.

Crane. Terese Crane (1984) focuses on curriculum building from logical/conceptual assumptions concerning humanness or from a person centered orientation. She outlines the steps in her dissertation as follows:

1. Choose a logical assumption.
2. Review the literature for common usage of the concept in the assumption.
3. Specify the necessary conditions of the concept either:
 - a. from common usage
 - b. from stipulative definition
4. Choose an orientation for the curriculum.
 - a. subject matter base (e.g. Science, Math)
 - b. discipline base (e.g. Reading, Writing)
 - c. concept development
5. Develop a curriculum outline.
 - a. include instructional strategies for each necessary condition
 - b. include flexible instructional strategies
6. Present the curriculum to be experienced.
7. Evaluate the curriculum (p. 139).

The concern in this work is how Crane performs a conceptual analysis of the terms confluent and creative. She explains the task of the researcher as one of uncovering shared meanings of the concept. Beginning with a search for instances of use of the concept in the literature, then

looking to see if the concept is used in a way that is generally understood by the people. When or if the concept does not appear to have a common usage, then the researcher designates a usage for the curriculum being developed by looking for essential features of the concept. If no essential features are identified then the researcher must designate the necessary or essential features to be considered as the curriculum is developed. Crane further details her format for curriculum development, however this work is concerned with her procedures for conceptual analysis.

Hanson. John Hanson (1961) conducts an analysis of the concept "learning by experience" in a book edited by Smith and Ennis. Smith and Ennis (1961) suggest Hanson's analysis falls nearer the realm of Oxford analysts rather than a more conventional analytic style. Hanson (1961) validates his reason for analysis by stating:

We can readily recognize that we have here an expression which, through the multiplicity of its uses, is apt to present us with an immediate and present danger of slipping and sliding from meaning to meaning and generating thereby not knowledge but confusion (p. 4).

Five meanings of the concept "learning by experience" are identified within the field of education and at least four sources of the term experience. Experience derives from (1) everyday discourse, (2) the philosophic area of theory of

knowledge, (3) the researches and theoretical formulations of psychologists, and 4) the impact on education by James and Dewey (Hanson, 1961, p. 13). Hanson (1961) explains the learning process as being,

possible because of experience, that learning product occurs as a result of experience, that learning is part of experiencing, that experiencing is learning to learn (p. 16).

Later experiences are defined by Hanson (1961) as

those complex states of realization or appreciation in the individual which involve a range of connections (having both cognitive and affective dimensions and generally suggesting both prospective and retrospective references) (p. 21).

Kuchenmuller. Manfred Kuchenmuller (1984/1985) sets forth the primary objectives of his dissertation as follows:

first, to provide a conceptual analysis of the concepts of differentiation and enmeshment; second, to examine the fit between the theoretically expected and the empirically derived factor patterns; third, to test the theoretical relationship between differentiation and enmeshment within families of origin and procreation respectively; and fourth, to test Bowen's hypothesis that spouses show approximately equal levels of differentiation from their families of origin (p. ii).

Kuchenmuller states that the distinction between the terms differentiation and enmeshment is critical for the development of Q-sort statements and for proper theoretical appreciation of the often confused/interchanged terms. He identifies three distinctions between differentiation and enmeshment. The first distinction is based on the

experience of two developmental stages in the family of origin and procreation. The second distinction refers to different structural parameters of the concepts. And, the third distinction is functional distinction of different levels of influence within the subsystem of the families. He does not clearly explain how he arrived at these distinctions. Furthermore, the procedures used for the conceptual analysis are not clearly explained.

McDougald. Dana L. McDougald, in a doctoral dissertation completed in 1983, renders an analysis of the term "satisfaction". She states

The purpose of this study was to examine the use of the term "satisfaction" in an effort to extract ordinary and special meanings attached to the term. The use of the term in the literature of adult education, and the lack of clarity of the idea denoted by the term, provided the impetus for this investigation (McDougald, 1983/1984, p. 115).

First, she analyzes the various uses of the term "satisfaction" found in ordinary language and constructs a typology that illustrates and simplifies the categories of usages of the term. Second, a review of adult education literature provides examples of usage of the term by adult education writers. Third, an analytic analysis of the term "satisfaction" is conducted based on the guidelines set forth by Soltis (1978).

McDougald found that ambiguity of the term "satisfaction" exists because "the use of the term is often restricted to a narrow usage which emphasizes only one use of the term while disregarding the others" (McDougald, 1983/1984, p. 121) and that many writers "seem to assume that the meaning intended by them will be the meaning received by the reader" (McDougald, 1983/1984, p. 121).

Three of the five uses of the term found in ordinary language were also found in adult education literature. McDougald identifies fulfillment as being the most frequently used sense of the term followed by favorable feeling or attitude and then enlightenment.

Monette. Maurice Leo Monette utilizes the techniques of philosophical analysis in a doctoral dissertation completed in 1977. He explores the concept of educational need in the literature of adult education. Monette (1977, p. 2) states, "Although the concept of need has been central to program planning both in the literature of adult education and of curriculum, the language of need remains rather ill-defined." He conducts his study first, by reviewing adult education literature pertaining to the term need, identifying basic meanings and dominant standard uses. Secondly, by developing a classification of the various uses from adult education literature. He further distinguishes

each type by discussing identifiable features of each type of use.

Pineda. Leopoldo Molina Pineda (1984) provides "a historical reflection on the uses of analytic methods in philosophy of education during the last twenty-five years in America" (p. 11). In his dissertation, he traces the roots of the analytic method in philosophy which follow closely the history outlined in the earlier literature review.

Sanchez. Karen Lou Van Til Sanchez clarifies the term "modeling" in a doctoral dissertation completed in 1993. Her conceptual analysis of the term "modeling" begins in the literature of teacher education. Four generic uses of the term are identified: demonstration, exemplification, imitation and role-modeling. Next, Sanchez presents hypothetical examples showing how each of the ordinary uses or meanings of the term can be recognized in teacher education settings. She determines that generic features of models and modeling are found to be consistent with case examples of modeling in teacher education. Next, the study uses hermeneutic theories to further understand the concept. And, finally, an alternative conceptualization of modeling along with suggestions for teacher education programs based on this work are presented.

Schwartz. Courtney Schwartz (1971) uses conceptual analysis to address the concept "program" in adult education. The techniques of conceptual analysis are employed "to discover the various interpretations that may be given to the term program" (p. 4). The concept is first examined in ordinary language and then in the literature of adult education. His analysis begins with the identification of grammatical differences, dictionary definitions, and word origin. Four senses of the term "program" are identified by utilizing ordinary language analysis, three senses emerge from the more specialized area of adult education. A typology is constructed from the identified senses and characteristics of the term. The typology is used for "analyzing guidelines that relate to program and for postulating relationships between variables associated with program" (p. 131).

Snyder. Robert Snyder (1969/1970) uses conceptual analysis in a doctoral dissertation to clarify the concept of involvement (to involve), a term commonly used by adult educators. His work is designed to explore the various uses of the concept in ordinary language and to elaborate more precisely on the meanings of the uses. He says,

The study's importance lies in providing added clarity to a central concept which may in turn increase the probability that it can more meaningfully be related to other concepts (Snyder, 1969/1970, p.2).

He analyzes the various uses of the term involvement found in ordinary language, using the techniques of Wilson and refined by Austin. His analysis provides a "fundamental range of uses of the term" (p. 105). He then reviews adult education literature for more technical or specialized uses of the concept. The third major area of Snyder's work is the investigation of the term or one of its equivalents in the area of empirical research within behavioral sciences. The purpose of this stage is "to determine the validity of the relationships utilizing the concept and the significance of the concept" (p. 1).

Snyder ascertains that ordinary language analysis "is a useful technique of exploring relevant concepts and for establishing a foundation for conducting an analysis of specific areas of usage" (p. 113).

Streib. James Thomas Streib (1992/1993) investigates the term "critical thinking" in a doctoral dissertation completed in 1992. He employs informal language analysis as the methodology of his work, however, he does not identify any specific techniques used. Streib (1992/1993, p. 3) defines informal language analysis as "the examination of words, terms or expressions to determine whether or not the standard meaning of a word, term or expression has changed

by its use in a different context." The analysis is a literature review including both primary and secondary sources limited to authors addressing the meaning of the term critical thinking and related terms.

Examples of applications of analytical techniques from adult education writers (Crane, 1984; Hanson, 1961; Kuchenmuller 1984/1985; McDougald, 1983/1984; Monette, 1977; Pineda; 1984; Sanchez, 1993/1994; Schwertz 1971; Snyder, 1969/1970; Streib 1992/1993) demonstrate how conceptual analysis may be used to clarify ambiguous educational concepts in adult education. The next section provides a brief overview of how the concept of experience has threaded a course through the history of adult education.

Experience in Adult Education

This section will provide an overview of how experience has been viewed by different authors in the recent history of adult education. Houle (1961/1988), Kidd (1959), and Knowles (1980) among others, recognized the importance of experience for adult learners. Authors have been selected because of their utilization of the concept experience as being important or significant to adult education.

As one of the purposes of an analytical philosophical inquiry is to identify the way in which a concept such as experience is being used, the procedure for selecting authors should provide an opportunity for a range of connotations (if they exist) to be found. It also follows that popular authors, e.g., those who frequently are cited in the literature, and who are perceived to believe that experience is an important concept, are likely to illustrate the convergence or divergence concerning the meaning of a concept. In other words, highly visible adult education authors who write about the role of experience in adult life and learning are assumed to reflect accepted usage of the concept. Therefore, the authors selected for review in this inquiry were chosen through a key word search that identified them as individuals who recently have written about experience. In addition, writers who were not identified by the above search procedure, but who are known to have addressed the topic were included. Some scholars, such as Csikszentmihalyi (1994), Dewey (1916), Kolb (1984), and Maslow (1968) who are not directly identified as adult educators were included because of their influence on adult education thought. It is likely that the authors discussed in the immediately following pages have influenced current main stream adult educators' work whose work is discussed in

chapter three. Therefore, the selected authors provide a reasonable universe for sampling purposes.

Archambault. In an analysis of the philosophic bases of the experience curriculum, Reginald Archambault (1956) defines "experience" as "a process of adjustment to a changing environment," and in the next paragraph states that the individual now "has an added store of personal experience to bring to bear upon new problems" (p. 264). The above statement suggests ambiguity or a lack of clarity with the term experience, as used by the author in a single paragraph.

Bergevin. Paul Bergevin (1967) speaks of "random experiential learning" (p. 60) as being a large part of adult learning. He identifies six components of random experiential adult learning. The fourth is the one of concern for this paper, "Taking place through every day experiences other than those usually thought of as organized school or classroom learning experience" (p. 60). Bergevin (1967) describes the adult learner as being the product of all his experiences, inclusive of the educational ones (p. 96). He is in agreement with other authors that the experiences of adults are different from that of children (Kidd, 1959). In general, adults have more experiences because they have lived longer than children, they have

different kinds of experiences, and they interpret their experiences differently (p. 121).

Csikszentmihalyi. Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi (1994) offers the following explanation of what he calls flow experience

because this was a metaphor several respondents gave for who it felt when their experience was most enjoyable--it was like being carried away by a current, everything moving smoothly without effort (p. xiii).

The first symptom of flow experience is a "narrowing of attention on a clearly defined goal. We feel involved, concentrated, absorbed" (p. xiii). The second symptom is a depth of concentration in which "we forget ourselves and become lost in the activity" (p. xiv). "The well-matched use of skills provides a sense of control over our actions...Often we feel a sense of transcendence, as if the boundaries of the self had been expanded" (p. xiv) is another symptom Csikszentmihalyi attributes to flow experience. He describes the characteristic dimensions of the flow experience as follows:

1. Clear goals: an objective is distinctly defined; immediate feedback: one knows instantly how well one is doing.
2. The opportunities for acting decisively are relatively high, and they are matched by ones perceived ability to act. In other words, personal skills are well suited to given challenges.
3. Action and awareness merge; one-pointedness of mind.

4. Concentration on the task at hand; irrelevant stimuli disappear from consciousness, worries and concerns are temporarily suspended.
5. A sense of potential control.
6. Loss of self-consciousness, transcendence of ego boundaries, a sense of growth and of being part of some greater entity.
7. Altered sense of time, which usually seems to pass faster.
8. Experience becomes autotelic: If several of the previous conditions are present, what one does becomes autotelic, or worth doing for its own sake (pp. 178-179).

According to Csikszentmihalyi (1994),

Flow can occur in almost any activity. . . . Flow appears to be a phenomenon everyone feels the same way, regardless of age or gender, cultural background or social class. One of the most often mentioned features of this experience is the sense of discovery, the excitement of finding out something new about oneself, or about the possibilities of interacting with the many opportunities for action that the environment offers (p. 177).

Dewey. In Essays in experimental logic, Dewey (1916), philosopher and educator, describes the word experience as an "immense and operative world of diverse and interacting elements" (p. 7). He further discusses the nature of the word experience as follows,

I am indebted to an unpublished manuscript of Mr. S. Klyce of Winchester, Massachusetts, for the significance of the fact that our words divide into terms . . . and into names which are not (strictly speaking) terms at all, but which serve to remind us of the vast and vague continuum, select portions of which are designated by words as terms. He calls such words infinity and zero words. The word experience is a typical instance of an infinity word. . . . the word "experience" is, I repeat, a notation of an

inexpressible as that which decides the ultimate status of all which is expressed; inexpressible not because it is so remote and transcendent, but because it is so immediately engrossing and matter of course (Dewey, 1916, pp. 8-10).

In Experience and education, Dewey (1938) provides some insightful observations about the educative influence of experience by offering a discourse on the "organic connection between education and personal experience" (1939, p. 12). He notes that some experiences can and are "mis-educative" (1938, p. 13). "Any experience is mis-educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience" (1938, p. 13). Dewey's continuity of experience can be viewed as central to the theory of learning (Kolb, 1984):

the principle of continuity of experience means that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after. . . . As an individual passes from one situation to another, his world, his environment, expands or contracts. He does not find himself living in another world but in a different part or aspect of one and the same world. What he has learned in the way of knowledge and skill in one situation becomes an instrument of understanding and dealing effectively with the situations which follow. The process goes on as long as life and learning continue (Dewey, 1938, pp. 35-45).

Thus experiences that educate lead to growth and further experiences, plus they have a meaningful connection with or to other continuing encounters.

Houle. Cyril Houle (1961/1988) speaks of an individual having an educational experience. He classifies learners into three sub-groups: goal-oriented, activity-oriented and learning oriented (pp. 16-24). It is in the third orientation which he speaks of learning experience, he states,

This subgroup differs from the other two much more markedly than either of them does from the other. Each particular educational experience of the learning-oriented is an activity with a goal, but the continuity and range of such experiences make the total patterns of participation far more than the sum of its parts (p. 24).

Houle also speaks of the teaching process as being important to the learning experience.

The deepening of the desire and capacity to learn involves the very quality of the teaching process itself. The master teacher makes every learning experience so inherently interesting and rewarding that curiosity is deepened, not dulled, and the desire to learn increases rather than diminishes (p. 72).

Houle speaks of the importance of the internal process involved when an external event is the catalyst for a changing life pattern. His thoughts are as follows:

Why did he listen now? Was it only that he was older and therefore had more perspective? If this were true, then all those in similar circumstances would start to learn in their mid-twenties, and it is clear that they do not. It is more likely that this young man was different from others because he had experienced a series of changes within himself, had observed what happened to other people, and had subconsciously revised his own values. The words of the foreman had meaning for him, whereas those same words uttered to

others who have not experienced such inner changes have no effect (p. 57).

Kidd. The importance of experience for the adult learner in the learning process is discussed by J. R. Kidd (1959, p. 15) "he (the learner) incorporates new experience, he relates it to his previous experience, he reorganizes this experiences . . .".

In a later discussion regarding adult experience, Kidd (1959) states a principal factor for adult learning as "the comparatively richer experience of the adult and what use is made of this in the learning transaction" (p. 45).

He then identifies three related notions,

"Adults have more experiences.

Adults have different kinds of experiences.

Adults experiences are organized differently" (p. 45).

Kidd discusses several important aspects about experience and learning (p. 45-46). One aspect is the range of experiences found from adult to adult is greater than that found among children. A second is past experience provides life examples for generalizing. The effect of experience upon perception is a third aspect. The fourth, and in his opinion the most important aspect about experience and learning, "is the way the learner perceives his own experience as unique and private" (p. 16).

Knowles. Malcolm Knowles (1980) identifies four assumptions upon which his andragogical theory for maturing adults is based. The second assumption refers to the importance of experience in adult education. Knowles states: "an adult accumulates a growing reservoir of experience that becomes an increasingly rich resource for learning. For an adult, personal experiences establish self-identity and so are highly valued" (p. 44). Knowles also explains that adults learn what is important to them at the time; the learning experience produces change or personal growth; and, an individual's learning is not taught by others but is enhanced or facilitated (1980).

Knox. According to Knox (1977), "An adult's approach to a learning activity reflects previous experience, including extent and type of formal education, recent use of learning procedures, and current circumstances that give rise to the need for increased competence" (p. 425). Agreeing with Dewey, Knox (1977) observes that educational experiences or prior experiences can both facilitate or inhibit learning or future learning experiences (p. 425). Furthermore, he says:

when an adult sets out to learn about something, it is related to a large amount of experience and information that the adult already possesses. The person's current understanding of the topic or problem is typically organized around his or her previous encounters with it (p. 428).

Kolb. David Kolb (1984) describes learning as a process of continuously testing knowledge against the experiences of the learner. Learning often then is relearning. It is a process by which the learner modifies old ideas and beliefs. Experiential learning "involves the integrated functioning of the total organism--thinking, feeling, perceiving, and behaving" (1984, p. 31). "Learning is the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience" (1984, p. 38).

Kolb (1984, p.35) explains experiential learning theory as,

the transactional relationship between the person and the environment is symbolized in the dual meanings of the term experience--one subjective and personal, referring to the person's internal state, as in "the experience of joy and happiness," and the other objective and environmental, as in, "He has 20 years of experience on this job." These two forms of experience interpenetrate and interrelate in very complex ways, as, for example in the old saw, "He doesn't have 20 years of experience, but one year repeated 20 times"(Kolb, 1984, p. 35).

Kolb quotes Dewey as describing the matter this way:

Experience does not go on simply inside a person. It does go on there, for it influences the formation of attitudes of desire and purpose. But this is not the whole story. Every genuine experience has an active side which changes in some degree the objective conditions under which experiences are had. The difference between civilization and savagery, to take an example on a large scale, is found in the degree in which previous experiences have changed the objective conditions under which subsequent experiences take place. The existence of roads, of means of rapid movement and transportation, tools, implements,

furniture, electric light and power, are illustrations. Destroy the external conditions of present civilized experience, and for a time our experience would relapse into that of barbaric peoples . . .

The word "interaction" assigns equal rights to both factors in experience--objective and internal conditions. Any normal experience is an interplay of these two sets of conditions. Taken together...they form what we call a situation.

The statement that individuals live in a world means, in the concrete, that they live in a series of situations. And when it is said that they live in these situations, the meaning of the word "in" is different from its meaning when it is said the pennies are "in" a pocket or paint is "in" a can. It means, once more, that interaction is in going on between an individual and objects and other persons. The conceptions of situation and of interaction are inseparable from each other. And experience is always what it is because of a transaction taking place between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment, whether the latter consists of persons with whom he is talking about some topic or event, the subject talked about being also a part of the situation; the book he is reading (in which his environing conditions at the time may be England or ancient Greece or an imaginary region); in other words, is whatever conditions interact with personal needs, desires, purposes, and capacities to create the experience which is had. Even when a person builds a castle in the air he is interacting with the objects which he constructs in fancy [Dewey, 1938, p. 39, 42-43] (Kolb, 1984, p. 35).

Lindeman. Eduard Lindeman (1961/1989), describes adult education as being inclusive of the entirety of life. Thus learning is from living. Secondly, education is a continuous process with the purpose of putting meaning into the entirety of one's life. Third, the route to approaching adult education should be through situations not subjects (pp. 5-6). And fourth,

the resource of highest value in adult education is the learner's experience. If education is life, then life is also education. Too much of learning consists of vicarious substitution of some one else's experiences and knowledge. . . . Life becomes rational, meaningful, as we learn to be intelligent about the things we do and the things that happen to us. If we lived sensible, we should all discover that the attractions of experience increase as we grow older. Correspondingly, we should find cumulative joys in searching out the reasonable meaning of the events in which we play parts. In teaching children it may be necessary to anticipate objective experience by uses of imagination but adult experience is already there waiting to be appropriated. Experience is the adult learner's living textbook (pp. 6-7).

Maslow. Abraham Maslow (1968), considered by many to be the major contributor to the humanist psychology movement in America (Darkenwald & Merriam, 1982), speaks of peak experiences as providing the avenue through which insight and learning occur. Peak experiences occur in self-actualized people more frequently than in non self-actualized people. Maslow (1968) explains self-actualized people as "those who have come to a high level of maturation, health, and self-fulfillment, have so much to teach us that sometimes they seem almost like a different breed of human beings" (p. 71). In another text, Maslow discusses his belief that self-actualization is only possible in adulthood.

Self-actualization does not occur in young people. In our culture, at least, youngsters have not yet achieved identity, or autonomy, nor have they had time enough to experience an enduring, loyal, post-romantic love relationship. . . . Nor have they worked out their own

system of values; nor have they had experience enough (responsibility for others, tragedy, failure, achievement, success) to shed perfectionistic illusions and become realistic; nor have they generally made their peace with death;; nor have they learned to be patient; nor have they learned enough about evil in themselves and others to be compassionate; nor have they had time to become postambivalent about parents and elders, power and authority (1976, pp. 87-88).

Maslow is speaking of experience or the accumulation of experience as contributing to the defining of the individual and as a resource for learning for the individual, which is also noted by Knowles.

In Toward a psychology of being, Maslow (1968) asks individuals about their peak-experiences. His instructions are as follows:

I would like you to think of the most wonderful experience or experiences of your life; happiest moments, ecstatic moments, moments of rapture, perhaps from being in love, or from listening to music or suddenly "being hit" by a book or a painting, or from some great creative moment. First list these. And then try to tell me how you feel in such acute moments, how you feel differently from the way you feel at other times, how you are at the moment a different person in some ways. [With other subjects the questioning asked rather about the way in which the world looked different.] (p. 71).

He then identifies different types of experiences an individual might encounter:

This chapter is an attempt to generalize in a single description some of these basic cognitive happening in the B-love experience, the parental experience, the mystic, or oceanic, or nature experience, the aesthetic perception, the creative moment, the therapeutic or intellectual insight, the orgasmic experience, certain forms of athletic

fulfillment, etc. These and other moments of highest happiness and fulfillment I shall call the peak-experiences (Maslow, 1968, p. 73).

After gathering his data Maslow (1968) arrives at the following list of characteristics of the generalized peak-experience(s):

1. In B-cognition the experience or the object tends to be seen as a whole, as a complete unit, detached from relations, from possible usefulness, from expedience, and from purpose.
2. When there is a B-cognition, the percept is exclusively and fully attended to . . . fascination or complete absorption.
3. While it is true that all human perception is in part a product of the human being and is his creation to an extent, we can yet make some differentiation between the perception of external objects as relevant to human concerns and as irrelevant to human concerns. Self-actualizing people are more able to perceive the world as if it were independent not only of them but also of human beings in general. This also tends to be true of the average human being in his highest moments, i.e., in his peak experiences.
4. One difference between B-cognition and average cognition which is now emerging in my studies, but of which I am as yet uncertain, is that repeated B-cognizing seems to make the perception richer. The repeated, fascinated, experiencing of a face that we love or a painting that we admire makes us like it more, and permits us to see more and more of it in various senses. This we may call intra-object richness.
5. My findings indicate that in the normal perceptions of self-actualizing people and in the more occasional peak experiences of average people, perception can be relatively ego-transcending, self-forgetful, egoless. It can be unmotivated, impersonal, desireless, unselfish, not needing, detached. It can be object centered rather than ego-centered.
6. The peak-experience is felt as a self-validating, self-justifying moment which carries its own intrinsic value with it.

7. In all the common peak-experiences which I have studied, there is a very characteristic disorientation in time and space. It would be accurate to say that in these moments the person is outside of time and space subjectively.
8. The peak-experience is only good and desirable, and is never experienced as evil or undesirable. The experience is intrinsically valid; the experience is perfect, complete and needs nothing else. It is sufficient to itself.
9. Peak experiences . . . are also perceived and reacted to as if they were in themselves, "out there," as if they were perceptions of a reality independent of man and persisting beyond his life.
10. B-cognition is much more passive and receptive than active.
11. The emotional reaction in the peak experience has a special flavor of wonder, of awe, of reverence, of humility and surrender before the experience as before something great.
12. Perception is of unity.
13. I was led to this differentiation by my studies of self-actualizing people, finding in them simultaneously the ability to abstract without giving up concreteness and the ability to be concrete without giving up abstractness.
14. At the higher levels of human maturation, many dichotomies, polarities, and conflicts are fused, transcended or resolved.
15. The person at the peak is godlike not only in senses that I have touched upon already but in certain other ways as well, particularly in the complete, loving, uncondemning, compassionate and perhaps amused acceptance of the world and of the person, however bad he may look at more normal moments.
16. Perception in the peak moment tends strongly to be ideographic and non-classificatory.
17. One aspect of the peak-experience is a complete, though momentary, loss of fear, anxiety, inhibition, defense and control, a giving up of renunciation, delay and restraint.
18. There seems to be a kind of dynamic parallelism or isomorphism here between the inner and the outer. This is to say that as the essential Being of the world is perceived by the person, so also does he concurrently come closer to his own Being.

19. Now what I have been describing here may be seen as affusion of ego, id, super-ego and ego-ideal, of conscious, preconscious and unconscious, of primary and secondary processes, a synthesizing of pleasure principle with reality principle, a healthy regression without fear in the service of the greatest maturity, a true integration of the person at all levels (pp. 74-96).

In this section an attempt has been made to illustrate the usage of the concept of experience as it has been discussed and written about in adult education literature. Authors were selected because of their utilization of the term experience as being important to adult education as well as their own notoriety as contributors to the field.

Chapter Summary

The literature review is divided into two sections, method and adult education literature. The method of analytic philosophy is used to extract meanings from concepts found in language (Ammerman, 1965; Gross, 1970; Gutek 1988; Smith & Ennis, 1961). The extraction process is accomplished through examination, clarification, and analysis of the concepts (Ammerman, 1965; Feinberg, 1983; Gross, 1970; Long, 1983; Smith & Ennis, 1961; Strawson, 1992). The analyst's goal is to eliminate the confusion of meanings found in language by determining what meaning(s)

concepts are thought to have by studying the language in which the concept is used (Ammerman, 1965; Charlton, 1991; Gowin, 1981; Gutek, 1988; Gross, 1970; Hanson, 1961; Long, 1983; Smith & Ennis, 1961).

Analytic philosophy has a long history of use since the time of Plato (Gross, 1970; Hart, 1990). Gross (1970) identifies and discusses the similarity of styles and methods of analytic philosophers dating back to the work of Plato, Aristotle, and Locke. It is a common belief that analytic philosophy, as it is known today, can be dated from the work of Moore (1873-1958) and Russell (1872-1970) (Gross, 1970; Gutek, 1988; Hart, 1990; Ozmon & Craver, 1990; Sacks, 1990). Analytic philosophy can then be traced through, and is thought to be influenced by, the work of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Wisdom, Strawson and Austin (Ammerman, 1965; Gross 1970; Ozmon & Craver, 1990).

Though there is no single philosophy of analysis, there does appear to be groupings of philosophers who share interests or procedures (Ammerman, 1965; Sacks, 1990). Gross (1970) divides the history of analytic philosophy into three general time periods while Hart (1990) divides the history into four eras. Modern philosophers continue to use the techniques of analytic philosophy. This research reviews three standard works explaining the more commonly

used techniques of analysis employed by modern philosophers. Wilson's (1963) isolating questions of concepts, model cases, contrary cases, and related cases; Gorovitz and Williams' (1965) definition and explication, and counter-examples; and Soltis' (1978) generic-type analysis, differentiation-type analysis and conditions-type analysis, were discussed in this literature review.

Examples of application of analytical techniques used to clarify ambiguous education concepts in adult education literature were provided. Included were:

Crane (1984); Hanson (1961); Kuchenmuller (1984/1985); McDougald (1983/1984); Monette, (1977); Pineda, (1984); Sanchez (1993/1994); Schwertz (1971); Snyder (1969/1970); and Streib (1992/1993).

An overview of how experience has been discussed and written about by different authors through the history of adult education is the last section of this chapter. Authors were selected because of their utilization of the term experience as being important to adult education as well as their own reputation as contributors to the field. Authors included were: Archambault (1956); Bergevin (1967); Csikszentmihalyi (1994); Dewey (1916, 1938); Houle (1961/1988); Kidd (1959); Knowles (1980); Knox (1977); Kolb (1984); Lindeman (1961/1989); and Maslow (1968, 1976).

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section one discusses the theoretical framework. Section two identifies the limitations of the study. Section three supplies definitions of terms. Section four identifies the selection of authors whose work is included in the study. Section five provides the procedures for the research. Section six describes the techniques of analysis to be used. Section seven discusses the remaining chapters of the dissertation.

Conceptual Framework

The purpose of this study is to disentangle the concept/term experience in adult education literature by systematically examining its use in ordinary language and in the literature of adult education. As noted in the literature review in chapter two, experience has been used widely by adult education authors however, an operative definition or basic meaning has not been assigned to the term. The meaning of the term experience is left to be inferred in a fuzzy, vague or unclear context by the reader.

Given the purpose of this study, the methodology chosen is neither experimental, quasi-experimental nor historical in nature, hypothesis testing is not the focus of this study. Contrarily, it is a philosophical inquiry or a conceptual analysis into the meaning of a frequently used yet ambiguous concept. A major assumption of this work is that a philosophical method of inquiry will contribute to the clarification of a vague term/concept such as experience. The emphasis of this work will be on the clarification of the meaning(s) of the ambiguous and vaguely used term experience. The techniques of linguistic, conceptual or philosophical analysis are employed because of their assumed methodological usefulness in the elucidation of the meaning(s) of a concept(s) such as experience. A linguistic analysis based on the techniques of Soltis (1978), forms the bases of the process of this work.

Conceptual analysis or linguistic analysis may be less formal but it is no less stringent than forms of scientific inquiry. Smith and Ennis (1961) emphasize the use of conceptual analysis as a means for challenging ambiguity: "it is an indispensable means to achieve clarity in our thinking" (Preface). Soltis (1978) indicates the need for analysis when a concept, such as experience, "seems to have more than one standard meaning and their identities and the

basis for differentiating between them aren't clear" (p. 109). Therefore, the techniques of conceptual or linguistic analysis are utilized when the meaning of a term is confusing or unclear.

The motivation underlying an analysis of a concept generally arises when the meaning of a term is ambiguous or when the term connotes multiple interpretations by the reader. According to Hanson (1961), the characteristics of vagueness and ambiguousness can be attached to infinity words, such as experience. He explains

vagueness creeps in, of course, when continua exist and boundary lines become hard to set; this temporal dimension is, in Dewey, often referred to as the experience continuum or continuity in experience. Similarly, there is a vagueness implicit in the discussion of experience as to what is or is not to be considered experience (Hanson, 1961, p. 14).

When speaking of ambiguousness, an expression

becomes ambiguous only when it is used in various senses. It becomes dangerously ambiguous only when it is not possible for the listener or reader to determine readily in which sense it is being used, or when the person employing the expression slips unconsciously from one sense to another (Hanson, 1961, p. 15).

The following excerpts from Dewey (1958) and Archambault (1956), along with the four areas of probable origination of the term experience presented by Hanson earlier in this work, provide examples of the vagueness and ambiguousness found with the usage of the term experience.

Dewey describes the nature of the term experience in his Essays on experimental logic,

the word "experience" is, I repeat, a notation of an inexpressible as that which decides the ultimate status of all which is expressed; inexpressible not because it is so remote and transcendent, but because it is so immediately engrossing and matter of course (Dewey, 1958, pp. 8-10).

In an analysis of the philosophic bases of the experience curriculum Archambault (1956) defines "experience" as "a process of adjustment to a changing environment," and later describes the individual as having "an added store of personal experience to bring to bear upon new problems" (p. 264).

Three standard works explain some of the commonly used techniques of analysis (Wilson, 1963; Gorovitz & Williams, 1965; Soltis, 1978). Of the three, Soltis identifies and recommends his techniques for use by beginners in conceptual analysis, therefore Soltis' techniques have been selected for this inquiry.

Limitations

A limitation of this work is the selection of writers or authors included in the study. Selection is based upon those authors writing on the importance or the significance of experiences in the learning of adults in the most recent

ten year period as identified by this researcher. The authors are included based upon their reputation and because they were frequently cited in the literature. Authors who may have written about experience may not be included because of the selected time frame or to the search process. Thus, the possible usages, meanings, or connotations of the term will be determined by the sources selected.

A second limitation may be the methodology of conceptual analysis. According to Feinberg (1983, p. 114), "Conceptual analysis is limited because it can capture meaning and use but not significance. That is, it has not explained the role that a particular concept plays in practice and why some concepts take on importance at certain times and not others." Charlton (1991) states,

But there are writers who say that analytical philosophy is played out, that it is coming to an end and that those of us who still practice it are like the fabled Japanese soldiers in the Melanesian jungles who believed that the Second World War is still going on (p. 9).

He does not believe this to be a realistic forecast, because people will continue to use philosophy as a resource for their own understanding.

Definitions of Terms

The following terms have been identified as significant to the study and have been defined to facilitate clarity of understanding; analytic philosophy, concept, conceptual analysis, linguistic analysis, philosophical analysis, ordinary language analysis, typologies. Analytic philosophy, conceptual analysis, linguistic analysis and philosophical analysis are terms often used interchangeably, however they are listed and defined separately for this section.

Analytic philosophy is a methodology concerned with conducting a study of language by eliminating the confusion of meanings of terms or concepts found in language (Ammerman, 1965; Gorovitz & Williams, 1965; Gutek, 1988).

A concept is an idea of a class of phenomena. An abstract generalization based on perception (Dictionary of modern sociology, 1969).

Conceptual analysis is generally concerned with the achievement of clarity in the use of concepts (Gowin, 1981; Feinberg, 1983; Strawson, 1992).

Linguistic analysis is the name preferred by some researchers when recognizing the many uses of language

(Ozmon & Craver, 1990) and when analyzing ordinary language (Ammerman, 1965).

Philosophical analysis, by clarifying the meaning of terms basic to philosophical inquiry, is essentially the study of language (Ammerman, 1965; Gowin, 1981).

Ordinary language philosophy is the analysis of language in common or lay connotations or natural spoken language (Gross, 1970).

Typology is a classification system or scheme ordered on the basis of a set of organizing principles (Schwertz, 1971).

Selection of Authors

The work of frequently cited authors in adult education literature are the source of data for this project. Authors whose writings discuss the importance or significance of experience for the adult learner are included, see pages 34-36 for related information. A time frame for accepted work was the most recent ten year period. Selection was made by computer search and manual examination of indexes. One resource was then used as an informant to identify and lead to another, some researchers refer to this as chaining, linking or snowball sampling (Babbie, 1989; Cohen, 1980;

Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Sommer & Sommer, 1991). The following is a list of selected authors separated into two divisions;

A. Historical and modern adult education authors, and B. Individuals whose work has influenced adult education.

Historical and Modern Authors

Archambault, Reginald D. (Summer, 1956). The Philosophic Bases of the Experience Curriculum. Harvard Educational Review, XXVI, No. 3, 263-75.

Bergevin, P. (1967). A philosophy for adult education. New York: Seabury Press.

Boud, D., Cohen, R., & Walker, D. (Eds.). (1993). Using experience for learning. Buckingham: The Society for Research into Higher Education & Open University Press.

Boud, D., Keogh, R. & Walker, D. (Eds.). (1985). Reflection: Turning experience into learning. London: Kogan Page.

Brookfield, S. D. (1987). Developing critical thinkers: Challenging adults to explore alternative ways of thinking and acting. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Brookfield, S. D. (1991). Expanding knowledge about how we learn. In Smith, R. M. & Associates (Eds.), Learning to learn across the lifespan (pp. 327-345). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Candy, P. C. (1990). How people learn. In Smith, R. M. & Associates (Eds.), Learning to learn across the lifespan (pp. 30-63). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Daloz, L.A. (1986). Effective teaching and mentoring. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Dewey, J. (1916). Essays in experimental logic. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Dewey, J. (1938). Experience and education. New York: Macmillian.

Houle, C. O. (1961/1988). The inquiring mind. (Sec. Ed.) Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma.

Jarvis, P. (1987a). Adult learning in the social context. London: Croom Helm.

Jarvis, P. (1987b). Meaningful and meaningless experience: towards an analysis of learning from life. Adult Education Quarterly, 37 (3) 164-172.

Kidd, J. R. (1959). How adults learn. New York: Associated Press.

Knowles, M. (1980). The modern practice of adult education: From pedagogy to andragogy (Rev. ed.). Chicago: Follett.

Knox, A. B. (1977). Adult development and learning. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Lindeman, E. (1926). To discover the meaning of experience, survey, vol 55, pp. 545-545. In Marsick & Watkins (1990). Informal and incidental learning in the work place. London: Routledge.

Lindeman, E. C. (1961/1989). The meaning of adult education. Norman OK: University of Oklahoma.

Lovell, R. B. (1980). Adult learning. London: Croom Helm.

Maslow, A. (1968). Toward a psychology of being. New York: Von Nostrand Reinhold.

Maslow, A. (1976). In J. A. B. McLeish, The Ulyssean adult: Creativity in the middle and later years. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Marsick, V. J. & Watkins, K.E. (1990). Informal in incidental learning in the work place. London: Routledge.

Merriam, S.B. & Caffarella, R.S. (1991). Learning in adulthood: A comprehensive guide. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Merriam, S.B. & Clark M.C. (1991a). Learning from life experiences: what makes it significant? In Proceedings of the 32nd Annual American Education Research Conference (pp. 179-184). Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma.

Merriam, S. B. & Clark M.C. (1991b). Lifelines: Patterns of work, love and learning in adult life. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Merriam, S. B. & Yang, B. (1996). A longitudinal study of adult life experiences and developmental outcomes. Adult Education Quarterly, 46, 62-81.

Mezirow, J. & Associates. (1990). Fostering critical reflections in adulthood: A guide to transformative and emancipatory learning. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Mezirow. J. & Associates. (1991). Transformative Dimensions of adult learning. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Peters, J. M., Jarvis, P., & Associates. (1991). Adult education: Evolution and achievements in a developing field of study. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Usher, R. (1989). Locating experience in language: Towards a poststructuralist theory of experience. Adult Education Quarterly, 40, 23-32.

Usher, R. (1993). Experiential learning or learning form experience: Does it make a difference? In D. Boud, R. Cohen & D. Walker (Eds.). Using experience for learning. Buckingham: Society for Research into Higher Education & Open University Press.

Wacks, V. Q., Jr. (1987). A case for self-transcendence as a purpose of adult education. Adult Education Quarterly, 38, 46-55.

Other Influential Authors

Cell, E. (1984). Learning to learn from experience. Albany: State University of New York.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1994). The evolving self: A psychology for the third millennium. New York: Harper Perennial.

Kolb, D. A. (1984). Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

The above list, generated by the search procedures noted earlier confirm the frequent use of experience in the writing of adult educators and related scholars. Examples of how some of the above authors write about experience follow in this chapter.

Procedures

In the remainder of this document, an analytical study of the concept experience, as found in selected sources, is conducted to clarify the meaning of the concept as it is used in ordinary language and in adult education literature. For the purposes of this analysis it is necessary to attempt to demonstrate that the uses identified are the only ones in the literature. It is more important to determine if consensus prevails, and if not, what range of uses may be identified in the effort to clarify the problem.

The following section describes the procedures of how the data was collected and treated. Details are given for ordinary language analysis and for the area of adult education.

1. Experience was examined in the realm of ordinary language, by
 - a) determining basic meanings of the term, through dictionary definitions and word origins;
 - b) developing categories of the meanings of the concept or typologies; and
 - c) noting distinguishing features of each type of usage of the concept.
2. The researcher then reviewed the literature in adult education seeking those authors identifying experience as important or significant to adult education.
 - a) Examples of the use of the term experience were placed into categories illustrating a range of meaning associated with the use of the term in the area of adult education. The number of categories extracted from within adult education may differ from the number found in ordinary language analysis.
3. An analysis of the term experience as used in adult education was performed based on the techniques of differentiation-type and conditions-type analysis, as suggested by Soltis (1978).

- a) The basic meanings of experience as used in adult education were identified.
- b) Categories of usages of the term were developed or extracted.
- c) Distinguishing features of each category were discussed.
- d) Necessary conditions for experience were noted in order to examine under what context conditions it would be true to say that experience is present, or that an activity is an experience.
- e) The context was then altered in an effort to find an example where the condition holds, but experience was not present.
- f) The condition could then be revised meeting the context problem thus obtaining a clearer idea of the conceptual dimensions of experience.

Description of Analytic Methods

This section describes the techniques of analysis used in this study. Differentiation-type analysis and

conditions-type analysis are discussed as suggested by Soltis (1978).

A differentiation-type analysis attempts to discriminate and clarify among the various meanings for the same concept. According to Soltis (1978), in order to get a clearer idea of the different meanings of the concept, one must

1. Give examples of some of the standard uses of the concept.
2. Compare and contrast the identified examples in order to get a grouping or a preliminary category system for them.
3. Test the range and adequacy of that system.
4. Look for and identify key marks or characteristics which separate and distinguish each category from the other (p. 102).

This technique offers a way of "mapping the logical terrain of a general concept" (Soltis, 1978, p. 102), which offers more in terms of clarification than making distinctions of meaning.

Conditions-type analysis is used when there is a question of the appropriate context of the use of the concept, in other words, when the meaning of the concept is ambiguous. Conditions-type analysis attempts to answer the question "What are the contextual conditions governing the proper use of the term X?" (Soltis, 1978, p. 97). Soltis (1978) provides the following guides for this type of analysis

1. Begin with a fully formulated condition for X being present in a particular situation or for the condition of X happening.
2. Test for sufficiency by seeking an example in which the condition holds, but X does not occur.
3. Formulate additional necessary condition(s) and revise.
4. Test the revisions
5. Imagine other examples until no change in context seems possible (p. 105).

Chapter IV, Presentation of Findings, applies Soltis' (1978) techniques to the analysis of the term "experience." His technique of differentiation-type analysis was used in Part A in the context of ordinary language. This type of analysis was conducted to achieve a clearer understanding of the uses of the concept in ordinary language. Dictionary definitions and word origins were examined to determine the basic meanings of the term, and to discover the most common standard uses of the concept. A typology was developed from the most common uses. A discussion of distinguishing features follows in the Appendix to more clearly separate the types of uses of the concept "experience" as found in ordinary language.

In Part B of Chapter IV, a review of the adult education literature identifies potential examples illustrating the various uses of the concept "experience" in the more specialized language of adult education. Work noting the significance or importance of experience for the

learning of adults is included. Selection was based on the reputation of the authors and upon the frequency of their work being cited. Material for inclusion was limited to the most recent ten-year period and to some historically influential authors. The use of the concept "experience" as it is used in adult education was related to some of the senses of the concept as found in ordinary language.

An analysis of the term "experience" as used in adult education was conducted as the third section of Chapter IV. Strategies for analysis includes Soltis' (1978) differentiation-type and conditions-type analysis. A differentiation-type analysis answers the question "What are the basic meanings of X (experience)?" A conditions-type analysis answers the question "Under what context conditions would it be true to say that X (experience) is present, or that S (an activity) is Xing (experiencing)?"

Finally, Chapter V includes a summary of the study along with conclusions, implications emerging from the work, and recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER IV

PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

Chapter IV presents the results of the linguistic analysis of experience. In order to simplify the discussion of the findings, the chapter is divided into three major divisions as noted below. The chapter divisions are further divided into subsections where necessary.

The first major chapter division includes the list of typologies generated by the analysis, followed by a brief discussion. Ordinary language analysis examines the word origin and definitions of the term experience. Definitions are presented in tabular form for easier reading and comprehension. A more extensive discussion of the tables is found in the Appendix. Distinguishing characteristics of the typologies are discussed in the second chapter subsection. The final subsection of this chapter division summarizes the preceding discussion of typologies.

The second major division in this chapter explicates the adult education language analysis. A blending of differentiation-type and conditions-type analysis as described by Soltis (1978) is used for this analysis. Examples of instances in which experience is used in adult education literature are presented, examined and typed. A

brief discussion of how the assignments were made is included also. Counter-examples are provided in an attempt to clarify the term experience further by testing the emerging typologies. Conditions-type analysis follows in the third subsection of this chapter division as a final step in the analysis.

The summary and conclusions of the chapter comprise the third and final major division of Chapter IV.

Typologies

Examination of the different definitions of the term experience as found in ordinary language generated a typology of six categories. A discussion of word origin, history, definitions, and synonyms of the term experience provides insight into how the term has been and is still used in ordinary language. For convenience of identification and understanding, an abbreviated label, based upon the definition, was assigned to each type. A typology of three noun usages and three verb usages was identified as follows:

Noun 1 or N-1: Perception

(1) apprehension or perception of an object, thought, or emotion, including the religious.

Noun 2 or N-2: Knowledge

(2) accumulation of knowledge or skill.

Noun 3 or N-3: Event

(3) participation in events, activities, or occurrences.

The activity or event itself.

Verb 1 or V-1: To be converted

(1) to be converted (experience religion).

Verb 2 or V-2: To live through

(2) to undergo or to live through.

Verb 3 or V-3: To learn

(3) to learn by experience.

The above typology emerged from the following ordinary language analysis. The following analysis begins with word origin.

Ordinary Language Analysis

Word Origin

According to Shipley (1984) and the American heritage dictionary of the English language, the word experience comes from the root word per meaning through or ahead. It is the suffixed form peri-yo-, in Latin experiri, meaning to try, to test, or to learn by trying.

Experience was first used about 1378, according to Barnhart (1995), it was borrowed from the Old French word experience, meaning learned and from the Latin word experientia, meaning knowledge gained by repeated trials. Experience also is believed to be from the Latin word experientim, the nominative form of experiens and the present participle of experiri meaning to try, test. The verb form of experience, meaning to test or try, is from the noun and was first recorded in 1533. The verb form of experience meaning to feel, suffer, or undergo, was first recorded in 1588. It was not until the early part of the 20th century that the use of experience as a verb was accepted generally even though it had been used on occasion in this sense as far back as the 16th century (Webster's dictionary of English usage, 1989). Thus the history of usage reveals a trend toward expansion and multiple meanings of the word by applying it to connote ideas from to learn, to try or test, to feel, and to suffer or undergo.

Definitions

Experience is the term used as the entry word for this dictionary search in ordinary language. The definition, or number of definitions assigned a word, depends on the word's

number of uses. Many dictionaries refer to the definition of a term, or to the multiple definitions, as senses (meaning experience, in the sense of the actual observation of events). In those dictionaries, usually Arabic numbers are assigned to the different senses of a word along with lowercase letters that identify/differentiate the sub-senses of a word. For clarity and to reduce confusion, a definition, in this study, refers to either the single meaning (i.e., single sense) of a word, or the first sense level where multiple senses are listed by Arabic numbers: 1., 2., or 3. etc. Connotes, is used to refer to the second level sense division identified by lowercase letters as given in the dictionary: 1a., 1b., or 1c. etc. The following tables provide definitions and connotations as found in The Oxford English dictionary in Table 2, The American heritage dictionary in Table 3, Webster's new collegiate dictionary in Table 3, and the Oxford Thesaurus, in Table 3. Typology assignment is also noted on the tables (N-1, N-2, N-3, V-1, V-2, and V-3). A narration on the definitions including typology assignments can be found in the Appendix.

Table 2

Dictionary Definitions Displayed According to Types

The Oxford English Dictionary (1989, v.5, p. 563).

| Obsolete Definitions & Connotations | | Current Definitions & Connotations | |
|--|---|---|---|
| Noun | Verb | Noun | Verb |
| N-1 or 3: **1.a. The action of putting to the test; trial. to make experience of: to make trial of. N-1, 2, or 3: b. A tentative procedure; an operation performed in order to ascertain or illustrate some truth; an experiment. | V-3: **1.a. To make trial or experiment of; to put to the test; to test, try. V-3: b. To ascertain or prove by experiment or observation; chiefly with sentence as obj. Also rarely, to prove or reveal (a thing) to (a person) by experience. | N-1: *3. The actual observation of facts or events, considered as a source of knowledge. N-1 or 3: **4.a. The fact of being consciously the subject of a state or condition, or of being consciously affected by an event. Also an instance of this; a state or condition viewed subjectively; an event by which one is affected. N-1R: b. In religious use: A state of mind or feeling forming part of the inner religious life; the mental history (of a person) with regard to religious emotion. | V-2: **2.a. To have experience of; to meet with; to feel, suffer, undergo. V-3: b. To learn (a fact) by experience; to find. With direct object and compl. Infl., or with sentence as obj. Now rare. V-2: c. Of a thing: To meet with, undergo. V-1: d. To experience religion: to be converted. |
| N-1, or 3: *2. Proof by actual trial; practical demonstration. to put in experience: to fulfil in practice. passing into. | V-3: **3.a. To give experience to; to make experienced; to train (soldiers). Also, in passive; To be informed or taught by experience (const. of, or with subord. clause). V-3: b. To gain experience in, practise the use of (arms). | N-1, 2, or 3: *5. In usages 3, 4 often personified; esp. in various proverbial phrases. N-3: *6. What has been experienced; the events that have taken place within the knowledge of an individual, a community, mankind at large, either during a particular period or generally. N-2: **7.a. Knowledge resulting from actual observation or from what one has undergone. N-3: *8. The state of having been occupied in any department of study or practice, in affairs generally, or in the intercourse of life; the extent to which, or the length of time during which, one has been so occupied; the aptitudes, skill, judgement, etc. thereby acquired. *9. attrib., as experience philosophy, experiential philosophy; experience school, the school of empiricism, experience table, a table of mortality computed from the experience of one or more life-assurance companies. | |

* indicates a definition with one connotation
** indicates a definition with more than one connotation

Table 3

Dictionary Definitions According to Types

| <u>The American heritage dictionary, (1971)</u> | | <u>Webster's new collegiate dictionary, (1989)</u> | | <u>Oxford Thesaurus, (1991)</u> | |
|---|---|--|--|---|---|
| Noun | Verb | Noun | Verb | Noun | Verb |
| N-1: *1. The apprehension of an object, thought, or emotion through the senses or mind. | V-2: *1. To participate in or partake of personally; undergo. | N-1: **1.a. The usual conscious perception or apprehension of reality or of an external, bodily, or psychic event. | V-2: *1. To have experience of: undergo. V-3: *2. To learn by experience. | N-2 or 3: *1. Knowledge, contact, involvement, practice, familiarity, acquaintance, exposure; participation, observation. | V-2 *4. Undergo, live or go through, suffer, endure, sustain, face, encounter, meet (with), feel, sense, taste, sample, be familiar with, know. |
| N-3: *2. Active participation in events or activities, leading to the accumulation of knowledge or skill. | | N-1: b. Facts or events or the totality of facts or events observed. | V-1: Run-on entry --experience religion: to undergo religious conversion. | N-3: *2. Incident, event, happening, affair, episode, occurrence, circumstance, adventure, encounter; trial, test, ordeal. | |
| N-2: *3. The knowledge or skill so derived. | | N-3: **2.a. Direct participation in events. N-3: b. The state or result of being engaged in an activity or in affairs. | | N-2: *3. Common sense, wisdom, sagacity, knowledge, know-how, savior faire, savior vivre, sophistication, skill, judgement. | |
| N-3: *4. An event or series of events participated in or lived through. | | N-2: c. Knowledge, skill, or practice derived from direct observation of or participation in events. | | | |
| N-3: *5. The totality of such events in the past of an individual or group. | | N-1 or 3: **3.a. The conscious events that make up an individual life. N-1 or 3: b. The events that make up the conscious past of a community or nation or mankind generally. | | | |
| * Indicates a definition with one connotation. ** Indicates a definition with more than one connotation. | | N-3: *4. Something personally encountered, undergone, or lived through. | | | |

Distinguishing Characteristics of the Typologies

According to Soltis (1978), there must be some distinguishing feature(s) of each usage category that clearly separates it from other categories. The following discussion of noun and verb types addresses some distinguishing features of each usage category for experience as identified in the above typology.

Noun Types

The three noun types identified in the analysis are based on the noun form of experience, that is, experience is used as a name for something. Each of the noun types is discussed below. This subsection provides descriptions and distinguishing characteristics of the term experience when it is used as a noun in one of the following three ways: in the sense of perception, in the sense of knowledge, or in the sense of events/occurrences.

N-1 Experience in the sense of perception. When used in the sense of perception, experience refers to viewing, seeing, or witnessing an occurrence of an object, emotion or thought in one's life. This is more than just seeing it;

perception can come through any sense organ and through the mind. An individual's perception is an impression of an object obtained by use of the senses. A distinguishing characteristic of this category is the idea of a general view about various phenomena or of an individual's world view.

N-2 Experience in the sense of knowledge. In this category experience refers to the knowledge, skill or wisdom gained by the individual by living through his/her experiences. An example of experience in the sense of knowledge is a new skill acquired or through training or practice by an individual. This type of experience could, also, refer to wisdom or understanding gained or acquired by an individual. A distinguishing characteristic of this category is that the individual has acquired new information.

N-3 Experience in the sense of events/occurrences. Experience as a single event or multiple events refers to specific incidents, occurrences, or happenings in a person's life such as marriage, death, or job change. Accordingly, experience refers to an incident in which an individual has participated or has been involved in personally. An example

of this case would be "I understand this is a difficult time for you, I also experienced the death of my father last year." In this category the distinguishing characteristic is that experience refers to an event or occurrence in an individual's life.

Verb Types

Experience is also used in the verb form. The typology includes the verb form of experience when used to denote action such as in a sense of religious conversion, a sense of living through something, or a sense of learning something. Experience when used as a verb as identified in the typology listed is discussed in the following subsection.

V-1 Experience in the sense of to be converted. When used in a religious sense, experience refers to under going a religious conversion, a state of mind forming an inner religious life. An individual, when changing from one belief to another, or when deciding to adopt a particular religion, are additional examples of religious conversion. The religious sense of the term has the distinguishing feature of being about God or the Church, in the Judeo-

Christian religions, but it could be broadened to include other deities and religions.

V-2 Experience in the sense to live through.

Living through an event, incident or occurrence in life, is the sense of this category. This is not the perception or cognition of the occurrence of an event but the actual living of, or living through, the life event itself. The sense to live through is illustrated by individuals engaging in or personally walking through a life event such as getting married or starting a new job. An example of this sense would be "That person experienced hunger and homelessness as a child." The fact that experience is referring to individuals progressing through an event or occurrence is the distinguishing characteristic of this category. Experience is not something being thought about or watched, but it is a part of the individual's life.

V-3 Experience in the sense to learn. To learn by experience, or personally to find information on one's own and not from a formal learning situation, is the meaning of this typology. "She has learned from experience or from the school of hard knocks." The distinguishing characteristic of this category is that the individual learns by herself.

Summary of Typologies

The previous section has provided an ordinary language analysis of the concept experience, using techniques described by Soltis (1978). Mainly the technique of differentiation-type analysis was used for this examination/exploration. The word's origin was researched, dictionary meanings and historical uses were examined while answering Soltis' question of "What are the different basic meanings of experience?" Examples of uses of experience from adult education literature were provided.

Through this examination, a typology of six categories emerged: perception, knowledge, event, to be converted, to under go, and to learn. Finally, as suggested by Soltis (1978), the distinguishing features of each type of usage of the concept were identified and discussed. The ordinary language analysis resulted in a clearer understanding of the different types of uses of the term experience in everyday discourse. The next section discusses the adult education language analysis by first reviewing/examining/exploring the concept experience as it is used in adult education literature primarily within the most recent ten-year period. Categories emerging from adult education literature will be

identified followed by an analysis of the term experience as used in adult education.

Adult Education Language Analysis

Differentiation-type Analysis

The authors of adult education literature quoted in the following pages use experience in a variety of ways. Most if not all of the connotations in adult education literature, however, can be placed in one of the types included in the typology discussed above. Few of the authors used experience consistently in a single connotation. As illustrated below, several authors used experience in more than one way in a single paragraph. This practice raises important issues since adult educators have identified experience as a critical element in adult learning. For example, theory development concerning the role and importance of experience will be hindered without precise use of the term. Furthermore, if adult educators insist in applying experience to a variety of phenomena without clarification confusion is the result. Further comments concerning the problems of multiple and

inconsistent use of experience are provided in the concluding observations.

Soltis' (1978) strategies for analysis were used for the adult education language analysis. A blending of the strategies of differentiation-type and conditions-type analysis was used in the analysis. Differentiation-type analysis answers the question "What are the basic meanings of X (experience)?" Conditions-type analysis answers the question "What are the logical conditions for properly using the term experience?"

Authors whose work emphasizes the significance of experience to adult education were selected for inclusion. Selection was made through an ERIC search and by manual examination of adult education literature. The examples are placed in categories of usage in order to display the range of meanings associated with the use of the term experience in the more specialized language of adult education. The examples assigned to any given category do not limit that usage or example to only that specific meaning or category. Category assignment listed in this research was determined by the apparent sense of the term in the particular context used. The example also might be appropriately assigned to another category, however. For simplicity and clarity only one assignment per quoted

context is made in this work. Some of the other interpretations are part of the discussion that follows. Possible examples of usage in adult education are not limited to those displayed in this work. The examples noted below were selected to illustrate the way the term might be used for a particular meaning. The following examples illustrate the different ways experience is used in adult education literature.

Senses of Experience in Adult Education Literature

Two types of examples of experience are noted. One illustrates the usage of experience as a noun in the senses of perception, knowledge and events. The other uses experience as a verb in the senses of to be converted, to live through and to learn.

Experience in the sense of perception N-1. Examples from adult education literature in which the concept of experience appears to be used either as a perception of, or as the witnessing of an event in an individual's life, are provided in the following paragraphs. The mechanism by which an individual witnesses or perceives an event can be

received through any of the five sense organs and through the mind.

Experience as a way of perceiving or apprehending an occurrence or an event in one's personal life is found in Jarvis (1987a, p.77):

*It is necessary to note that **experience** is used here in relation to the manner by which persons apprehend or comprehend the social situation. The memories of all of these **experiences** form their biography and the way that Knowles (1980) and Usher (1985, 1986) employ the term is much closer to the way in which biography is used here. Hence to use people's **experience** as a learning resource is to recognise that they bring their own biography to every situation that they **experience**.*

It seems that Jarvis is using experience in more than one way in the cited quotation. The first usage of experience seems to connote the way a person may perceive an event, that is, the way in which the event is contextualized. The second usage seems to refer to the event itself. Experience as used the third time appears to mean the overall composite of perception, knowledge, and events. A fourth usage of experience connotes living through an event. In the above quotation, Jarvis, illustrates the multiple usage of experience in the literature. He used the term four times with apparently four different insinuations.

Boud, Keogh, and Walker (1985, p. 18-19) provide another example of experience used as perception in the following quotation:

In the sense in which we are using the term, **experience** consists of the total response of a person to a situation or event: what he or she thinks, feels, does and concludes at the time and immediately thereafter.

Experience as used here refers to the total response of the person or to the biography as implied by Jarvis in the third use in the previously cited quotation.

Knox's (1977) use of experience may be interpreted in at least two ways. Knox (1977, p. 428) seems to use experience as connoting knowledge of, or the memories of experience as mentioned in Jarvis, when he explains how an adult begins to learn. When these two sentences are taken together, it appears that Knox is using experience to mean the perception or overall view of the individual, thus the placement in this typology. If, however, the first sentence is read alone, it makes sense that Knox is speaking of the memories of events in a person's life.

When an adult sets out to learn about something, it is related to a large amount of **experience** and information that the adult already possesses. The person's current understanding of the topic or problem is typically organized around his or her previous encounters with it.

Marsick and Watkins (1990, p. 15) describe experience as "the way in which people make sense of situations they encounter in their daily lives." It seems that the way people make sense of situations they encounter would mean

the way they mentally perceive or cognitively structure their situations.

Other authors including Wacks (1987) use experience in the sense of perception. Wacks discusses what he calls the transcendental experience in the following quotation.

The **experience** of the transcendental or the expression of the transpersonal self is difficult to understand and comprehend without having known its existence personally. Many people have had such an **experience** at some point in their lives, perhaps during childbirth, in nature, with a lover, or during a religious or near-death experience. Ordinarily it is an unforgettable **experience**, and one that transforms their perspective and life (1987, p.51).

Wacks also uses experience with apparently more than one meaning. First Wacks seems to use experience as a particular type of occurrence in one's life. Secondly experience is used in reference to the perception an individual has regarding such an event. When used in the last sentence, Wacks seems to connote a special kind of mental event occurrence taking or having taken place in a person's life.

Experience in the sense of knowledge N-2. Adult education writers use experience in the sense of knowledge, skill or wisdom gained by the individual living through life. Examples include, but are not limited to, the following.

Archambault (1956, p. 264) defines experience as "a process of adjustment to a changing environment" and in the next paragraph states that the individual now "has an added store of personal **experience** to bring to bear upon new problems." Experience in Archambault's first quotation seems to mean the verb to change as inferred from the idea of a process. The second example appears to mean the knowledge gained by an individual, thus the placement in this category. This usage is similar to one Jarvis used and to one connotation found in Knox as discussed above.

Cell (1984) speaks of organizing experience into groupings that are of interest to the individual. This alludes to the storing and categorizing of knowledge acquired by the individual.

Our language functions as a system of organization for our **experience** by grouping things according to certain similarities that are of interest to us and connecting these groups in various ways (p.74).

If accepted, that language is a way of accessing that which we know, then experience as it is used here would mean knowledge.

Jarvis (1987a) speaks directly of a person gaining knowledge or skill as being experienced. That is, to paraphrase Jarvis, knowledge or skill results in an experienced person. Specifically, he says

It will also be noted that one of the outcomes of learning is a more **experienced** person, who might have a new knowledge, a new skill, a different attitude, a changed self-concept, or any combination of these . . . (p. 24).

Experience as used in this quotation appears to mean knowledge. As the experience of the individual increases, so does the knowledge of the individual.

Other authors who infer that experience results in accumulation of knowledge include Boud, Cohen and Walker (1993, p. 7).

For the sake of simplicity in discussing learning from **experience**, experience is sometimes referred to as if it were singular and unlimited by time or place. Much **experience**, however, is multifaceted, multi-layered and inextricably connected with other **experience**, that it is impossible to locate temporally or spatially.

Experience as used in the first sentence appears to mean an event occurring in a person's life. In the second sentence, Boud, Cohen and Walker indicate their interpretation of experience means cognitive interpretation, and thus knowledge. A test for this would be to substitute knowledge for experience in this sentence.

Experience in the sense of events/occurrences N-3. The meaning of this sense connotes the actual incident, occurrence or happening within an individual life such as marriage, death of a loved one, or a job change. Several examples of this usage as found within adult education

literature are available. It appears that Usher's usage, among other things (1993), is describing an event in the following discourse on experience and what it is.

Understanding my **experience** means 'giving' it meaning, but the means to do this arise from a source outside of me, a bank of pre-existing yet changing significations and cultural meanings. **Experience** is personal because there is an 'other' to the personal, a social 'other' which works through the constitutive power of language. **Experience** is the site where the personal and the social intersect and intertwine through which each gives a constantly changing meaning to the other. Usher (1993, p. 174).

In Usher's first sentence experience seems to refer to an event in one's life. If experience is the site where the personal and the social intersect, however, experience seems to mean understanding or abstract knowledge.

Boud, Cohen and Walker (1993, p. 6) imply experience is more than an event when they say

We consider meaning to be an essential part of **experience**. This suggests that **experience** is a meaningful encounter. It is not just an observation, a passive undergoing of something, but an active engagement with the environment, of which the learner is an important part.

In the first sentence they indicate the event connotation is too limited. In the second sentence, experience is a meaningful encounter. That is, the encounter is not sufficient alone. Experience, according to that position, combines the event with the interpretation of it, or with the meaning attributed to it. However, they, also appear to

limit experience to that which is meaningful, thus buying a coke under ordinary circumstances, according to Boud, Cohen and Walker, is not an experience. They later explain the assumption of their book as

every **experience** is potentially an opportunity for learning. While we often choose not to focus on the learning possibilities of events in daily life, any one of them could lead us into many different domains of humanist enquiry personal or interpersonal, formal or informal, systematic or unstructured. The initiation of learning in this view is the act of framing some aspect of **experience** as something from which we can learn (1993, p. 8).

Experience seems to mean an event in the above quotation.

Jarvis (1987a) describes experience

as something that happens to a person, in which the person is involved usually as a result of conscious living and the reaction to such may result in learning (pp. 16-17).

Later he suggests,

Traumatic and stressful **experiences** may be easily memorised because they are so meaningful. However, for some people such experiences are debilitating, while for others they are challenges to be overcome (p. 129).

Jarvis seems to mean event when he describes experience as something that happens to a person. Traumatic and stressful experiences seem to refer to the psychological impact of events occurring in an individual's life.

Merriam and Yang (1996, p. 68) identify seven independent variables as a means of operationalizing life experiences: "marriage, parenting, unemployment, type of

employer, work with people educational attainment, and location." Merriam and Clark (1991a p. 180) classify life experiences as "a birth of a child, job change or taking a class." Merriam and Caffarella (1991 p. 171-173) explain life experiences to mean both everyday experiences and ordinary or expected life experiences such as: "marriage, parenting, work activities, retirement, adult education and counseling." Once again marriage, jobs and etc. are often considered to be events. The life experiences identified above are often operationalized as life events.

Mezirow, J. (1990, p. xiv) discusses the influence of the way people perceive as they act upon their experiences.

This book is meant to be a resource for educators, counselors, advisers, psychologists, and trainers who are interested in helping adults identify the frames of reference and structures of assumptions that influence the way they perceive, think, decide, feel, and act on their **experience**.

Experience as it is used here appears to mean the occurrences, happenings, or events a person encounters in life. In Mezirow's quote experience becomes the fodder for mental operations.

Experience in the sense of to be converted V-1. No examples of religious conversion were found in this research. It was found that a strong relationship once

existed between religion and education during the formative era of adult education, 1607-1789 (Long, 1991, p. x).

Mezirow's concept of perspective transformation, however, may serve as a secular parallel to this sense of being converted. Mezirow (1991, p. 91) addresses the concept when discussing Bateson's third category of learning:

learning involves transformations of the sort that occur in religious conversion, Zen experience, and psychotherapy. These are perspective transformations, through which we can become aware that our whole way of perceiving the world has been based on questionable premises.

Mezirow (1991, p. 193) explains perspective transformation as involving

a sequence of learning activities that begins with a disorienting dilemma and concludes with a changed self-concept that enables a reintegration into one's life context on the basis of conditions dictated by a new perspective.

He later reveals that transformative learning is about transforming "beliefs, attitudes, opinions, and emotional reactions" (p. 223) that are apart of or make up our meaning perspectives. It is the process involved with perspective transformations that can be said to be a parallel to the sense of to be converted.

Experience in the sense to undergo V-2. The meaning of this sense of experience is when an individual engages in or

walks through an activity or a life event such as getting married or starting a new job. Authors in adult education offer few examples of this usage.

Mezirow, J. and Associates (1991, p. 21) state,

It becomes clear that **experience** is an act rather than a thought. We **experience** symbolic qualities and, by acting upon them, constitute the world.

Paraphrasing Mezirow, it seems that he is saying that we psychologically grasp and process (experience) symbols that affect our interpretation and understanding of the world. Thus, he illustrates an abstract connotation of experience as living through the event.

Experience in the sense of to learn V-3. The sense of the meaning of experience in this category connotes learning from a situation in one's life that is not considered a formal learning activity. Candy (1990) illustrates this sense when he speaks of experience of life as teaching an individual. He says,

But people's [sic] **experience** of life rapidly teaches them not just about the content but also about the process of learning (p. 89).

The above discourse provides examples of how the term experience is currently used in adult education literature reviewed. Table 4 summarizes the range of uses, by authors, identified in the analysis. The typology emerging from

adult education literature is N-1, experience in the sense of perception; N-2, experience in the sense of knowledge; and N-3, experience in the sense of events/occurrences. As shown in Table 4, limited examples of experience used as a verb were found in this search. The examples provided constitute all that were found in this search. Thus, the use of experience as a verb exists, but appears to be limited in contrast to the verb types as noted in ordinary language. Table 4 also reveals that the authors selected for this analysis appear to use experience more often as a noun to connote an event or occurrence. Of the authors reviewed, Jarvis appears to employ experience in the greatest number of senses. Following suggestions by Soltis (1978), the next section will test the typology by attempting to identify counter-examples.

Table 4

Senses of Experience as Revealed in Selected
Adult Education Literature, by Author

| Authors | Perception N-1 | Knowledge N-2 | Event/ Occurrence N-3 | To be Converted V-1 | To Undergo V-2 | To Learn V-3 |
|-------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| Archambault | | X | | | | |
| Boud et al. (1985) | X | | | | | |
| Boud et al. (1993) | | X | | | | |
| Candy | | | | | | X |
| Cell | | X | | | | |
| Jarvis | X | * X | * X | | X | |
| Knox | * X | * X | | | | |
| Marsick & Watkins | X | | | | | |
| Merriam & Caffarella | | | X | | | |
| Merriam & Clark | | | X | | | |
| Merriam & Yang | | | X | | | |
| Mezirow | | | X | * | X | |
| Usher | | | X | | | |
| Wacks | X | | | | | |

An X indicates use

A * indicates possible use, based on interpretation

Counter-Examples

Counter-examples provide a way of testing the accuracy of the typology applied to adult education. If a counter-example is found then the typology needs refinement. Few counter-examples are expected if the typology covers most or all uses of the word.

Counter-examples are used to test the individual usage in the typology developed from adult education literature. Accordingly, if X is an experience, then Y is not, as Y is the counter-example of X. This reasoning is consistent with Leibniz's law or masked man fallacy (Dictionary of Philosophy, 1979). Therefore, using the typology structure, if experience is assigned one of the meanings in the typology in a sentence, it cannot be used in another way. The following section includes a matrix of the typologies and discussion.

Refer to Table 5, for an illustration of the procedures; if experience is perception, then Y, the counter example, is not perceiving; it must have another meaning or use. According to the logic illustrated in the table, if experience is perception, then an event or knowledge would not be experience and would need to be addressed as something else in written work. The fantastical refers to

the unreal or illusionary, according to the American heritage dictionary (AHD). Accordingly, if experience is an event it cannot be fantasy or vice-versa.

Table 5

Counter Example Matrix

| If X is experience, | then Y is not. |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Noun Types | |
| 1. Perception | Event Knowledge Fantastical |
| 2. Knowledge | Event Philosophical Innate knowledge not from experience |
| 3. Event | Perception Knowledge Fantastical/imagination |
| Verb Types | |
| 4. To undergo or to live through | To learn |
| 5. To learn | To undergo |

If experience is knowledge, then Y is not knowledge. Y could then be an event, or it could fall into the philosophical realm of rationalism. According to rationalistic theory, some human knowledge comes from reason and is unaided by the senses (Wolff, 1987). Rationalism stresses the involvement of the mind before knowledge can be

obtained (Hergenhahn, 1988). Plato believed objects of sense experience were not objects of knowledge. Descartes assumed that certain universal self evident truths or pieces of knowledge were innate in the individual, and not derived from sense experience. Others, such as Kant and Locke also argued that the human, by virtue of being human, possesses innate concepts or ideas. Thus, some philosophers have identified knowledge as being sense free, therefore not directly dependent on experience.

If experience is an event in an individual's life, therefore, the counter example must reflect the use of Y as something other than an event in an individual's life. Y could be the individual's perception of something. In this case knowledge would not be experience if event has been assigned that operational definition. Once again the area of the illusional would not be experience.

If experience means to undergo, then Y means something else. In the example Y is used to refer to some life event person A did not undergo. In contrast, X would refer to something Person B underwent. Person A might learn of what person B underwent, but in this case A does not have the undergoing experience.

If experience, as X, is to learn, then Y is not learning. Therefore, in X, person B encounters something in

her life from which she learned. A counter example, as y, would be person A who has not had that encounter in her life and has not learned, or possibly person A has had the same happening or event in her life but did not learn. In the above example, experience means to learn, therefore a happening or event is excluded as a meaning for experience.

Would symbolic representation of an event or occurrence, such as reading about it, but not actually living it provide a counter-example to experience? No, as stated above, the person could still perceive or apprehend the event without having to live through the event itself. To apprehend means to grasp mentally or to understand (AHD). Imagination according to AHD, means the process or power of forming a mental image of something that is not or has not been seen or experienced. For example, Jules Verne wrote of life in an underwater sea world without having seen such a world. Thus, if a person is able to form an image of the occurrence or to understand mentally what another is explaining, it can be said that there is an experience taking place, according to one type of meaning.

Conditions-type Analysis

According to Soltis (1978) a conditions-type analysis answers the question "What are the logical conditions for properly using the term experience?" This form of analysis approaches the problem of finding conditions that can be met by any case in which the term is used, thus identifying standard case usages of the term. The proper use of the term within a context is defined by the conditions identified, consequently answering the conceptual question stated above.

The first logical condition for something being an experience is to identify it as an event, occurrence, or happening present in an individual's life such as getting married, going to school, getting or changing a job, etc. Calling this the "event condition" makes the conceptual point that to have an experience logically requires an event occurring in an individual's life or the individual living through that event, see counter examples page 93.

According to Soltis (1978), the next step in this analysis is to find an example in which the necessary condition(s) holds, but the context is such that the phenomena does not occur. This step tests the necessity and sufficiency of the condition(s) identified. The conditions

are then revised or added to so that no other conditions emerge for the term to be properly used. This process is repeated until no other necessary conditions emerge. The sufficiency of the identified conditions has then been met.

To test the first condition, can an example be found when there is an event but there is not an experience? The event could be, for example, the Oklahoma City bombing or any disaster. There is no question that this occurrence was an event. Was it an experience? What of a person who was totally isolated and was unaware of this event happening. The condition holds of this being an event, however the context is such that it is not an experience for the unaware or unformed individual. The next logical condition then would be one of awareness. The event or occurrence must be perceived or apprehended by the individual. If the person is unaware of the event it does not seem logical to say it was an experience. The individual must perceive or apprehend the occurrence of the event in his life. This will be called the "apprehension condition."

Are these two conditions, event and apprehension, sufficient for properly identifying something as an experience? What if a person obtained a new job and recognized the difference in this job and the last. Would this then be an experience for him? The first condition was

met with the event of a new job. An individual recognizing the new job as a different job than the last meets the apprehension condition. But if changing jobs does not impact the individual, or if changing jobs holds no meaning for him, does this job event meet the experience conditions? No. Most events if retold to another individual appear to have meaning or have impacted the individual telling the story in some way. What seems to be necessary is a third condition, an "impacting condition." If an individual lives through an event and can recognize having done so, but it seems unimportant or insignificant, is this an experience? If a person was insensitive to an occurrence in his life, though it was a life event, it may make little sense for the person to say it was an experience, even though it qualifies according to the "event" condition. An awareness seems to be necessary for the proper application of the term experience, according to the "apprehension condition."

Discrimination among events appears to affect the impact, or meaning, the event has on the individual, the "impacting condition." According to Dale's (1969, p. 109) "Cone of Experience," the ability to differentiate or to discriminate between or among events is abstraction and the further one is removed from what he calls a "direct concrete sensory

level experience" the more abstract the experience encounter becomes.

The Oklahoma City bombing can be used as an example to test the sufficiency of these three conditions, event, apprehension, and impact. For the first condition to be met there must be an event, the bombing. The second condition states that the event must be apprehended by an individual. The individual in question was neither a victim of the bomb nor eye witness to it; however, the individual became aware of the bombing, either via television or newspaper. The first two conditions have been met. The third is one of impact. Was the individual impacted by the event or by apprehending the event? Lets say the individual lived in Israel. One response might be for this person to identify with the victims of the bombing and with the community concern in general, or the person may wonder what is the "big deal," his city or country undergoes these occurrences on a frequent basis. With either scenario there appears to be some impact or meaning associated with the event.

It appears that these three conditions, event, apprehension, and impact provide sufficiency for properly identifying something as an experience, according to this analysis.

Chapter Summary

The presentation of findings is divided into three major divisions, ordinary language analysis, adult education language analysis, and the chapter summary. The ordinary language analysis began with a list of the typologies generated by the analysis: perception, knowledge, event, to be converted, to under go, and to learn. The ordinary language analysis examined the word's origin, historical uses, dictionary meanings and synonyms while answering Soltis' question of "What are the different basic meanings of experience?" Definitions and synonyms were presented in tabular form for easier reading comprehension. A more extensive discussion of the tables can be found in the Appendix. Following Soltis' suggestion (1978), distinguishing features of each type of usage of the concept were identified and discussed.

A blending of differentiation-type and conditions-type analysis, as described by Soltis (1978), was used for the adult education language analysis. Examples of instances in which experience was used in adult education literature were presented, examined and typed. A brief discussion of how the assignments were made was also included. Counter-examples were used to test the accuracy of the typology

developed from adult education literature. Conditions-type analysis, according to Soltis (1978), answers the question "What are the logical conditions for properly using the term experience?" This form of analysis approaches the problem of finding conditions that can be met by any case in which the term is used, thus identifying standard case usages of the term. This work identified three conditions for properly using the term experience: the event condition, the apprehension condition, and the impacting condition.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS,
AND IMPLICATIONS

This study was designed to clarify the concept\term experience in adult education literature by systematically examining its use in ordinary language and in adult education literature in the most recent ten-year period. Selected adult education authors whose work prominently extols or emphasizes the significance of experience provided a corpus of the work reviewed.

In an attempt to more precisely clarify the term experience, three stages of investigation were employed in this study. First, a typology was developed from the various uses of the concept as found in ordinary language. Second, examples were provided of how the term experience is used within adult education literature. Third, an analysis of the term experience as used in adult education was completed. As suggested by Soltis (1978), the combined strategies of differentiation-type and conditions-type analysis formed the bases of this analysis.

Results

Dictionary definitions and the study of word origins, comprised the ordinary language analysis that yielded six senses of the term experience: perception, knowledge, events, to be converted, to undergo and to learn. As the noun sense of perception, experience refers to viewing, seeing, or witnessing an occurrence of an object, emotion or thought in one's life. The individual can perceive the occurrence of an event through any sense organ or through the mind. In the noun sense of knowledge, experience means the knowledge, skill or wisdom gained by the individual because of living through his/her encounter in life. In the noun sense of event, experience means those incidents, occurrences or happenings in a person's life. The first verb sense is to be converted as in a religious conversion. The meaning of this sense is to undergo a changing inner state, or to choose to follow a different religion. To live through is the second verb sense of experience. The sense to live through is illustrated by an individual engaging in or personally walking through a life event. The final sense of experience is to learn, meaning when an individual finds information on one's own and not from a formal learning situation.

Following techniques suggested by Soltis (1978), distinguishing features of each sense of the term experience were identified providing for a clearer understanding of the meanings within ordinary language.

Examples of statements by authors in the literature of adult education were selected and analyzed for use of the term experience. Five of the six senses found in the ordinary language analysis were identified in the context of statements by authors. No unequivocal example of the use of experience in the sense of to be converted was found in this search. A possible parallel was identified with Mezirow's perspective transformations, however. The following five senses of the term experience emerged from the adult education analysis: perception, knowledge, events, to undergo, and to learn.

Techniques suggested by Soltis (1978), were utilized in developing the typology in ordinary language and in identifying the distinguishing features of each type of usage. The typology was then used in this study as a tool for investigating the uses of the term within adult education literature. A blend of Soltis' (1978) techniques of differentiation-type and conditions-type analysis was used.

Conclusions

Seven conclusions based on the analysis are discussed below with comments. A list of the conclusions is presented first, followed by a discussion of the individual conclusions. The conclusions are as follows: (1) the meaning of the term experience has expanded since its early use; (2) current ordinary language usage includes at least six kinds of meanings; (3) usage within adult education literature closely parallels ordinary language usage; (4) authors of adult education literature use the term experience to connote different meanings often in the same paragraph; (5) multiple meanings of experience when used in a single paragraph may leave the reader confused as to the intent of the author; (6) it is important for authors of adult education to agree on what they mean by experience; and (7) the outcome of this work may have confirmed the ambiguity and confusion surrounding the use of the term experience.

Conclusion 1. The meaning of the term experience has broadened and expanded since its early use in 1378 where experience meant knowledge gained by repeated trials or something learned.

The history of the usage of the term experience reveals a trend toward expansion and multiple meanings of the word (Barnhart 1995). Experience has been used as both a noun and a verb. The word has been applied to connote ideas from meaning knowledge gained by repeated trials, to meaning to try, test, to feel, to suffer, or to undergo.

Conclusion 2. Current usage of experience in ordinary language includes at least six kinds of meanings in noun and verb forms.

Six senses of the term experience were found in ordinary language: the perception of an object, thought, or emotion; the accumulation of knowledge by an individual; the participation in events, activities, or occurrences by an individual; to be converted as in religion; to undergo or to live through an event; and to learn by experience and not from formal situations.

Conclusion 3. The meaning of experience in adult education literature closely parallels ordinary language usage.

Five of the six senses found in ordinary language were identified in adult education literature. They are perception, knowledge, events, to undergo, and to learn.

Experience used to connote the noun sense events, activities or occurrences, seems to be the most frequently used sense of the term; experience in the sense of perception also is used frequently; experience in the sense of knowledge, to undergo, and to learn, while present in the literature, were found less frequently.

Conclusion 4. Authors of adult education literature often use experience to connote different meanings in the same paragraph.

The typology of uses from ordinary language was useful as a tool for investigating uses of experience in adult education literature in this study. Placement of excerpts from adult education within the typological structure proved to be difficult, however. The difficulty was caused by many, if not most, of the excerpts containing experience in multiple senses.

Conclusion 5. Where the multiple meanings of experience are connoted in a single paragraph or in the same item, such as an article, chapter, or book readers may have difficulty in understanding the intent of the author.

It was found that when the term was repeated or used more than once within a paragraph in the adult education excerpts, experience often had more than one meaning. It also was found that the term could be used in singular contexts with the sets or contexts having multiple or different meanings.

Conclusion 6. Given the emphasis adult education authors give to the importance of experience in adult learning theory and philosophy it is important to understand what authors mean when they employ the term.

Frequently it is assumed the reader will infer the meaning intended by the author. Wilson (1963. p. 36), called situations where the reader is left to extract the meaning of the word, as being case related. Wilson (1963) expressed the idea that when authors select the meaning for words they may have to do the sensible thing, that is, make it mean such-and-such and inform the reader of the inference.

Conclusion 7. The outcome of this work may not have provided a clearer definition of the term, but it may have confirmed the ambiguity and

confusion surrounding the use of the term experience.

Experience as used in adult education is an ambiguous concept. Ambiguity results from either a too narrow or too broad a usage of the term. When used precisely the range of meaning is restricted or limited. Ambiguity also exists when the term is used with a specific meaning, but the author fails to inform the reader of the senses in which it is being used.

Implications

The above conclusions suggest at least seven implications concerning the use of experience as a theoretical construct in adult education. Implications derived from this study are listed and discussed below.

Implication 1. It is unlikely that a useful theory of adult learning based on experience will be developed without greater precision in the meaning of experience.

Theory development using experience as a key construct will remain confusing, and further theory development will

be retarded until greater precision in the use of the term occurs.

Implication 2. Precision in the use of experience in theory development will require consensus on one of the multiple meanings identified in this analysis.

Using experience in multiple ways in a paragraph, article, or chapter contributes, to confusion in both theory and practice. By selecting a meaning for experience and using other terms rather than repeating the term experience when referring to other concepts clarity can be achieved. For example, if experience means an event, etc. perception, knowledge or some other term should be used to connote the mental/cognitive consequence of the event (experience). If experience means a change in cognitive structure then the events associated with those changes should be defined accordingly.

Implication 3. Adult education authors appear to prefer to use experience as a noun.

The authors examined in this study seem to have used experience most frequently in its noun form. Furthermore, most authors used experience to connote an event or

occurrence. Thus, it appears that the event or occurrence sense of experience may be the most widely understood.

Implication 4. Due to the equivocal meaning of the term experience, it often complicates understanding. Therefore, authors should avoid use of the term without specification of meaning as indicated by Wilson on page 20 of this work.

Misunderstanding of the meaning of a term may occur when it is left to the reader to infer the author's intent. If the author states that in their work the term means such-and-such, as suggested by Wilson, then the reader does not have to assume the term means event, knowledge or any other of the possible meanings of the term experience.

Implication 5. If authors would operationalize their definitions it would allow for the formulation of theory around teaching adults, program development for adults, and training and development programs for adults.

By operationalizing their definitions authors would be able to build upon one another's work. This allows for

consistency and a solid bases from which to formulate theory development in fields of adult education.

Implication 6. Without specification as suggested in items three and four, above, theory and practice are highly susceptible to the influence of subjective interpretation of the meaning of experience.

Since there appear to be as many meanings of the term as there are authors using the term experience, readers are left to interpret the meaning. This creates compounded confusion of the term. Specification as suggested would allow for singular meanings and not subjective interpretations.

Implication 7. Theories of instruction based on the importance of experience are weakened by equivocal meanings of the term.

Development of solid theories of instruction are not possible when a single term is interpreted in so many different ways. In order to strengthen theories of instruction, a consistent usage of the term needs to be developed and agreed upon by adult education authors.

Suggestions for Further Research

Future research concerning experience as a theoretical construct may be informative. Some research projects that may be useful are as follows:

1. Survey a selected sample of adult educators such as those cited in this research to determine the meaning they generally attribute to experience. Then compare their answers with this analysis.

2. Survey a random sample of adult educators and request them to interpret and analyze the excerpts used in this study to compare their impressions with this analysis.

3. Survey a random sample of adult educators to determine the meaning(s) they attribute to experience.

4. Rewrite some of the excerpts used in this study by substituting suggested meanings to determine if the meanings of the excerpts change.

5. Exhaustively search the adult education literature in an effort to identify (a) an author who consistently used

experience in one sense; (b) or in other meanings not identified in this study.

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AppendixText for Second Table

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (1989, v. 5, p. 563) lists nine major definitions of the term experience when used as a noun, with sub-layers or multiple connotations for some if not all definitions listed (see table 2). The first two definitions of the term are considered obsolete. These two definitions along with other obsolete connotations are listed and assigned within the typologies developed. Although it might be possible to do so, a separate typology for obsolete uses of the term experience does not seem to be practical. Therefore, an assignment to a typology is made based on the nearest appropriate current usage.

The first obsolete definition and connotation of the term experience is "the action of putting to the test...to make trial of." Typology assignment is N-1, perception or N-3, the event. A second connotation of this definition is "a tentative procedure; an operation performed in order to ascertain or illustrate some truth; an experiment." It is possible to assign this connotation of the term to all three categories of noun typologies perception, knowledge or event.

Second, is the obsolete definition of "proof by actual trial; practical demonstration. To put in experience: to fulfill in practice. Passing into." This definition is assigned to N-1, perception or N-3, event.

A third definition of experience is "the actual observation of facts or events, considered as a source of knowledge." The use of this definition was first noted in 1377, "Throw [through] experience..[sic] I hope pei [I] shall be saved [saved]." Other examples of this definition include: (1577) "To poure into his mouth wine and oyle..[sic] we finde by experience, is very good"; (1736) "It is not so much a Deduction of Reason, as a Matter of Experience"; (1785) "Experience informs us only of what has been, but never of what must be"; (1830) "The..[sic] only ultimate source of our knowledge of nature and its laws, experience; by which we mean..[sic] the accumulated experience of all mankind in all ages, registered in books or recorded by tradition"; (1862) "Daily experience informs us of the consequences." This definition is assigned as N-1 because the observation of an event provides for the perception or apprehension of that event.

Fourth, is a major definition of the term experience consisting of two connotations. Connotation number one in OED, is first noted in 1382, and is assigned N-1, perception

or N-3, event. It is defined as "the fact of being consciously the subject of a state or condition, or of being consciously affected by an event. Also an instance of this; a state or condition viewed subjectively; an event by which one is affected." An example provided is "(1848) Both..sic had learned by experience how soon James forgot obligations."

Connotation number two of the fourth definition is "In religious use: A state of mind or feeling forming part of the inner religious life; the mental history (of a person) with regard to religious emotion." Examples provided include: "(1674) Testified unto by the Experience of them that truly believe" and "(1857) [At these meetings] there was praying, and exhorting, and telling experience, and singing..sic sentimental religious hymns." Since this connotation refers to a state of mind it is given the assignment of N-1*. A separate typology for religion was not set up for noun definitions. Thus, this typology is the closest match.

A fifth major definition of the term experience is "often personified; esp. in various proverbial phrases." Examples of this definition include "(1578) Experience is the mother of Science" and "(1650) If experience be the mistresse of fools, I am sure it is the mother of wisdom."

Here the term is used as a metaphor or simile and is assigned to any of the three typologies, N-1 perception, N-2 knowledge or N-3 event.

The sixth definition of the term experience as given in OED is "What has been experienced; the events that have taken place within the knowledge of an individual, a community, mankind at large, either during a particular period or generally." An example listed for this definition is "(1607) I can finde nothing in mine experience to contradict your speech." This definition is assigned to N-3 since the definition speaks of events and participation in those events by an individual.

Seventh, is a definition of experience consisting of two connotations one current and the second obsolete. The first is "Knowledge resulting from actual observation or from what one has undergone." Examples of this connotation include "(1607) I have no further experience of you then the bare report of my Tenant" and "(1860) I had had but little experience of alpine phenomena." Since this connotation is speaking of knowledge gained by an individual it is given the assignment of N-2.

An obsolete connotation of the seventh definition of experience is "A piece of experimental knowledge; a fact,

maxim, rule, or device drawn from or approved by experience." This connotation is assigned as N-2 knowledge.

An eighth definition of experience listed in OED is "The state of having been occupied in any department of study or practice, in affairs generally, or in the intercourse of life; the extent to which, or the length of time during which, one has been so occupied; the aptitudes, skill, judgement, etc. thereby acquired." Examples provided include "(1709) You are stricken in Years, and have had great Experience in the World" and "(1770) His experience in the world is but moderate." This definition is assigned as N-3 event.

The ninth and final definition listed for experience when used in noun form is "as experience philosophy, experiential philosophy; experience school, the school of empiricism; experience table, a table of mortality computed from the experience of one or more life-assurance companies." Examples provided include "(1859) The experience philosophy and the association psychology are getting up again" and "(1882) Mr. Ward has continued to uphold his peculiar tenets against the Experience-school." This definition seems to be related to a name noting an observation or a recording of events. The highly specialized use of the term experience in these two part

names does not fit the general typologies developed from the ordinary language analysis. Forcing this definition to fit a typology does not seem appropriate, neither does creating and including it as a separate typology, thus this definition is given no typology assignment.

The OED (1989, v. 5, pp. 563-564) lists three definitions of the term experience along with multiple connotations when the term is used as a verb. An obsolete definition and connotation are the first listed in OED. "To make trial or experiment of; to put to the test; to test, try" is the empirical definition provided. It is assigned to a V-3 to lean typology.

A second obsolete connotation of the first definition is "To ascertain or prove by experiment or observation; chiefly with sentences as obj. Also rarely, to prove or reveal (a thing) to (a person) by experience" is assigned to a V-3 to learn typology.

Second is a current definition of the term experience, "To have experience of; to meet with; to feel, suffer, undergo." An example of this meaning is "(1736) The whole passage is...[sic] applicable to what we experience in the present world." This connotation is assigned as V-2 to under go.

"To learn (a fact) by experience; to find" is another connotation of the second definition of the word experience. Examples of this are "(1580) Pamela..[sic] had now experienced how much care doth sollicit a lovers heart" and "(1858) I have experienced that a landscape and the sky unfold the deepest beauty." V-3 to learn is the typology assigned this connotation.

Listed as the third connotation is "transformation of a thing: to meet with, undergo." "(1786) The treaties..[sic] have experienced greater delay than was expected" and "(1794) Holland often experiences a degree of cold greater than countries placed under higher latitudes." This connotation is assigned to the V-2 to undergo typology.

A final connotation of this definition of experience is "to experience religion: to be converted." "(1837) I have 'experienced religion' as well as thousands of others, and in the same way" and "(1868) some went so far as to doubt if she had ever experienced religion, for all she was a professor" are examples provided for this connotation. This connotation is an example of the V-1 to be converted typology.

The third and final definition of the word experience listed in OED is "To give experience to; to make experienced; to train (soldiers). Also, in passive: to be

informed or taught by experience." Connotation number two of the third definition is "To gain experience in, practise the use of (arms)." This definition and its connotations are considered obsolete and are assigned to typology V-3 to learn.

Text for Third Table

According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (AHD) (1971, p. 462) the term experience has five major definitions as a noun and one as a verb (see Table 3). The first definition is "The apprehension of an object, thought, or emotion through the senses or mind." "The experience of art has always been taken to be 'recreation'" is an example of this definition and it is assigned to typology N-1 as it refers to apprehension.

A second definition of the term is "Active participation in events or activities, leading to the accumulation of knowledge or skill." This definition is assigned as N-3, the participation in events.

"The knowledge or skill so derived" is the third definition of the term experience in AHD with the assignment of this definition falling into typology N-2, the accumulation of knowledge or skill.

Fourth is the definition "An event or series of events participated in or lived through." This definition is classified as N-3 or the participation in events.

A fifth and final definition is "The totality of such events in the past of an individual or group." This definition is typed as N-3, the participation of events.

AHD provides the following definition of experience used as a verb, "To participate in or partake of personally; undergo." An example of this is "everyone experiences this feeling of loneliness, of not belonging;" and this definition is assigned to the category of V-2, to undergo or to live through an event.

Webster's new collegiate dictionary (WNCD) (1976) provides six definitions of the term experience including multiple connotations and a run-on phrase (see Chart 3). The first definition and connotation is "the usual conscious perception or apprehension of reality or of an external, bodily, or psychic event." This connotation is speaking of perception or apprehension and is assigned as N-1.

A second connotation of the first definition is "facts or events or the totality of facts or events observed." Because the events are being observed, this connotation is also assigned as N-1.

"Direct participation in events" is the second definition of experience in WNCD and is typed as N-3 the event. A second connotation of this definition is "the state or result of being engaged in an activity or in affairs" also is assigned as N-3 the event. The final connotation for this definition is "knowledge, skill, or practice derived from direct observation of or participation in events." This connotation is assigned as N-2 due to accumulation of knowledge.

A third definition of experience is "the conscious events that make up an individual life." Another connotation of this meaning is "the events that make up the conscious past of a community or nation or mankind generally." Both connotations are typed as either N-1 or N-3 because they may be used to refer to perception and to participation in the event.

"Something personally encountered, undergone, or lived through" is the fourth and final definition of experience found in WNCD when used as a noun. This definition is assigned as N-3 because it infers participation in an event.

Definitions five and six found in WNCD are verb forms of the term experience. "To have experience of: undergo" is the fifth listed definition. "She experienced severe hardships as a child." is given as an example of this

definition. V-2 to undergo is the assigned typology for this definition.

The sixth and final definition of experience is "to learn by experience." An example of this is "I have experienced that a landscape and the sky unfold the deepest beauty." This definition is typed as V-3 to learn.

WNCD includes the run-on-entry "experience religion: to undergo religious conversion." A run-on entry is explained as a phrase or phrases containing the entry word. The run-on entry has "no functional label. They are, however defined since their meanings are more than the sum of the meanings of their elements." This entry is assigned the typology V-1, to be converted.

The Oxford Thesaurus: An A-Z Dictionary of Synonyms (OT) (1991), lists four categories of synonyms for the term experience (see Table 3):

(1) knowledge, contact, involvement, practice, familiarity, acquaintance, exposure, participation, observation. An example provided for this category is "Her book on nursing is based on personal experience." This category of synonyms, referring to the accumulation of knowledge and to the participation in events, is assigned the typologies of N-2 or N-3.

(2) incident, event, happening, affair, episode, occurrence, circumstance, adventure, encounter, trial, test, ordeal. "He has lived through some harrowing experiences" is an example of this QT category and is assigned a N-3 typology, the participation in events.

(3) common sense, wisdom, sagacity, knowledge, know-how, savoir faire, savoir vivre, sophistication, skill, judgement. An example of this category is, "She is a woman of experience." These synonyms are assigned as N-2 or knowledge.

(4) undergo, live or go through, suffer, endure, sustain, face, encounter, meet (with), feel, sense, taste, sample, be familiar with, know. An example of the usage as a verb is "Your problem is that you have never experienced genuine hunger." The typology assigned this category of synonyms is V-2, to undergo or to live through an event.