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UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

IT'S MY PARTY...

EXAMINING WOMEN AS PARTISANS WITHIN THE U.S. CONGRESS

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

Jocelyn Michele Jones

Norman, Oklahoma

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IT'S MY PARTY . . .
EXAMINING WOMEN AS PARTISANS WITHIN THE U.S. CONGRESS

A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

This study suggests that women operate in a complex environment structured by partisanship. Their behavior is influenced by various cross-pressures, including party culture and electoral security. While Democratic women enjoy a party culture that facilitates constituency responsiveness and ideological diversity, Republican women operate within a culture that encourages party loyalty and ideological homogeneity. In the end, Republican women must make critical choices that influence their effectiveness within the party organization and thereby in the Congress. As long as the Republican Party holds the majority, this finding has significant implications for the effectiveness of women within the institution and the representation of women at large. This work also suggests that party culture structures Member behavior, and thus has implications both theoretically and methodologically for the future study of congressional behavior. Finally, this study encourages the pursuit of integrated theoretical frameworks and mixed methodologies in order to better understand the complex workings of the political environment in which women participate.

While the literature suggests stark differences between the sexes in terms of legislators' issue voting, committee behavior, and leadership styles, it offers little insight on possible ideological and behavioral differences among women in the Congress. Through an analysis of the ideological, partisan, and legislative behavior of women, this study provides a more thorough understanding of women's participation in the legislative arena. One of the nuances of the present analysis is its attention to the informal structures

of Congress. Little work has been done to assess the partisan dynamic of electoral politics. Likewise, little has been done to capture female Members' involvement with and attitudes toward the party in terms of organizational and issue support.

Consequently, this analysis provides a look at the informal contexts within which women participate as ideological and partisan actors.

The present work utilizes multiple data sources and methodological approaches to offer a more thorough analysis of the nuances of women's legislative behavior. In the first section, interview data is combined with Member- and district-level data to examine the partisan contours of electoral politics. To examine how the constituent factors translate into legislative behavior, the second section develops a predictive model of ideological voting behavior within the context of partisanship. While taking into account theoretically significant Member- and district-level characteristics, this section examines the cross-pressures presented by partisanship, sex, and electoral security. The next section takes a more qualitative approach to understand the effects of these cross-pressures on Member behavior within the party organization. This analysis addresses informal party organizational behavior by examining national media communications, fundraising activities, organizational records, and interview data. By combining qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches, this study more fully captures the ideological and partisan dynamic of the legislative behavior of female Members of Congress.

Chapter 1

It's My Party....

Examining Women as Partisans Within the U.S. Congress

"Research on women and politics has developed a narrow orthodoxy that has left the promise of the early gender-sensitive research of the 1970s stillborn, and an entire area of political science central to the political influence of women – political parties – has been both ignored and misunderstood" (Baer 1993 548)

Introduction

Contemporary gender theory suggests that there are significant differences in the behavior of male and female legislators in Congress. Female Members of Congress vote more liberally than their male co-partisans, particularly on social issues. Female Members also are more interested and active on traditional "women's issues" --- issues directly concerning women and children. While gender theory concerning legislative behavior has offered some insight on differences between male and female Members, it has done so largely to the neglect of the role of partisanship in shaping legislative behavior. This dissertation presents the cultural context provided by the two major political parties and argues that the legislative behavior of women is greatly influenced by the parties with which they are affiliated. At every level of congressional activity — the electoral level, the institutional level, and the party organizational level — women's legislative behavior is shaped in different ways by the distinctive cultures of the two parties.

The Present Contribution

Current gender theory describes women's behavior as if it occurs in a political vacuum. Political parties are notably absent from theoretical models of gendered

behavior. For the most part, the context of partisanship has been ignored. The contention of this dissertation is that this has formed a large hole in the literature on gender and legislative behavior in the Congress. Current gender theory tries to capture women's influence without taking into consideration the important function of partisanship in structuring Member behavior. Consequently, possible differences in women's behavior due to partisanship are left unexplored. Do Republican women behave the same way as Democratic women? Do they vote in the same way? Are their priorities the same? Do they have the same level of success within the institution? In other words, does sex alone determine legislative behavior, or does partisanship also influence the way in which women participate? These are the questions that drive this analysis.

This analysis is based on two primary assumptions. First, the two primary political parties are distinguished by unique cultures that permeate the electoral, institutional, and organizational elements of our political system. Female Members, like male Members, participate within the parameters of these two political parties and reflect their distinctive cultures. Secondly, Member behavior is predictive given that it is motivated by distinct, identifiable goals.

An assertion original to this work, however, is that pursuit of Member goals is structured by the party cultures. Women must conform to their partisan cultures in order to achieve their respective goals. From this theoretical foundation, we can develop models of Member behavior based on the interaction between party cultures and Member goals.

Party Culture and Member Behavior

While political science aims at making rational sense of the political world, it is nonetheless a social rather than hard science. Consequently, several of the concepts incorporated into analyses of political phenomena are hard to define and measure. Particularly vague are the theoretical concepts applied to the study of political parties. As Monroe (2001) states

The terms "party," "organization," and "party organization" produce many, and often vague, expectations about party activities and structures. The assumptions that stand behind these expectations often predetermine the scope of party existence – how it is structured, those who are counted among its membership, and the functions that it is allowed to perform. Each of the above terms also conveys a rich and elaborate set of ideas, images, and values about what political parties *were*, what they *are*, and what they *ought to be*. The absence of appropriate and applicable party concepts has further resulted in the inability to place the information that we do have in a coherent theory of the party. Therefore we are unable to generalize about the party as an institution, which differentiates itself from other institutions like interest groups or labor unions (2)

While the concept of a political party or party organization may be hard to concretely define, parties do have unique characteristics that set them apart from other organizations. Using a bureaucratic interpretation of political parties misses important aspects of party organizational behavior. According to Eldersveld (1964), political parties are different from other large bureaucratic institutions. They are characterized by informal activities as well as formal activities. As Monroe (2001) further elaborates:

A bureaucratic conceptualization of the party recognized those in formal party positions – party chairs, their professional staffs, and other workers "officially" linked with the apparatus. However, the party effort in the recruitment of candidates, in elections, and in the coordination of governmental activity is not confined (or even centered) in these formal party structures. In the end, a bureaucratic approach to the party may tell us little about how the party accomplishes a variety of critical tasks. Much of the party's activity occurs within an institution characterized by informal relationship between the party elite, yet this represents an important aspect of the party's structure. It is unlikely

that a bureaucratic model captures these activities that are important to the survival of the party. Without an ability to describe and explain this process, our understanding of the institutional basis of the party can only be a partial one (8)

The political party is a complex institution. It is responsible for internal and external congressional activities, such as recruitment of candidates, mobilization of voters, and concentration of power within the formal institutions of government (ibid 18). Consequently, the party literature has focused on two aspects of party behavior. First, party theory has focused on explaining the activity or role of parties in the electorate. Secondly, party theory has examined the institutional structures or organizational attributes of parties (ibid). The informal workings of the two parties, however, largely have been neglected. According to Monroe

The idea that the parties can be conceived as an informal institution departs from the traditional view that the parties are synonymous with their formal apparatus. However, this is a particularly useful, and possibly superior, approach to studying the party because it does not discard the party's formal structure; it simply demands that, to be considered a significant component of the party, it must engage in certain critical activities like candidate recruitment, electoral activity, or coordination of power within government. (2001: 30)

Not only does this analysis assume that the informal workings of the parties hold significant value for the understanding of women's participation in the Congress, it also assumes that the parties are fundamentally differentiated from one another. In short, they are characterized by unique cultures. As Schattschneider (1942) suggests:

The study of political parties has been remarkably confused by the power of the English language as far as the vocabulary of politics is concerned. Organizations called "parties" at various times in various places have in fact been fundamentally dissimilar, but all alike have been called parties for want of a sufficient variety of words corresponding to the diversity of realities. The label has therefore been attached to many different things (65).

Understanding the parties to be different, the present work utilizes the concept of party culture. While this concept is useful, it is not widely employed and brings with it all of the measurement problems associated with vague terminology.

The idea of political culture has been developed by political scientists and should be brought to bear on our conceptualization of party culture. According to Almond and Verba (1963)

The term "political culture" thus refers to the specifically political orientations - attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. We speak of a political culture just as we speak of an economic culture or a religious culture. It is a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes. When we speak of the political culture of a society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population. People are inducted into it just as they are socialized into nonpolitical roles and social systems. Thus the concept of political culture helps us to escape from the diffuseness of such general anthropological terms as cultural ethos and from the assumption of homogeneity that the concept implies. It enables us to formulate hypotheses about relationships among the different components of culture and to test these hypotheses empirically (12-13)

Some scholars have applied this notion of political culture to the structures, operations, and attitudes of the political parties (see Freeman 1986). The result is known as the party culture thesis. This analysis takes its point of departure from party culture theory, suggesting that the two parties demonstrate distinct patterns of behavior. Party culture theory challenges congressional scholars to take into consideration partisan differences when examining legislative behavior. Republican party culture is defined by ideological homogeneity, party loyalty, internal competition, hierarchical organization, and elite participation. Democratic party culture, on the other hand, is defined by ideological as well as descriptive diversity, constituent responsiveness, seniority rule, and

egalitarian organization and participation (ibid) Table 1.1 illustrates the party culture thesis

Table 1.1 about here

The present analysis is novel in that it combines both qualitative and quantitative data to assess the manifestations of party culture in political behavior, and particularly women's political behavior. Both district-level and Member-level variables demonstrate partisan differences in female Members' voting behavior. The interview data further substantiates these findings demonstrating that women do define themselves as partisans and do operate within the context and confines of their party organizations.

Partisanship structures the electoral circumstance of women, and thus influences their voting behavior, allocation of resources, prioritization of goals, and participation in partisan activities. Partisanship is further associated with male Members' attitudes toward and evaluations of their female copartisans within the institution. Interestingly, while gender differences are articulated by Democratic male and female Members, these differences are not apparent in voting behavior. Contrastingly, while gender differences are not articulated by Republican male and female Members, there are significant gendered differences in the voting behavior of Republican female Members.

Goal Motivations and Member Behavior

The second contribution of this study involves the combination of goal motivations or behavioral theory with party culture theory to understand women's political behavior. Members are driven by a number of identifiable goals. First, Members are driven by the reelection incentive (Mayhew 1974). Secondly, they are driven by policy, power, and prestige goals (Fenno 1973). Parker (1992) suggests that

Members try to expand their electoral security to attain the discretion necessary to pursue their institutional goals. Table 1.2 depicts the electoral security thesis.

Table 1.2 about here

Discretion is a concept developed by rational choice theorists to depict the underlying motivation of the reelection incentive. Members “seek to maximize reelection, or their margins of victory,” in order to “maximize their own discretion” (Parker 1992: 4). In other words, Members try to win elections by large margins in order to provide them with freedom to exercise their own preferences and pursue their own goals. Parker states:

Only when legislators feel free to pursue their personal agendas, without fear of voter reprisal or leadership interference, can they entertain the pursuit of more specific goals like power and ideological causes. Legislators, in short, want to give free rein to their own preferences and predilections. The pursuit of power, moral and ideological causes, money, leisure, and even altruism reflects the exercise of discretion by members of Congress. What might appear to be conceptual confusion in defining discretion only reflects the multiple and varied benefits that legislators derive from discretion. This is why discretion has such universal appeal to legislators (33).

Recent investigations employing the rational choice model of legislative politics have applied principal-agent theory to the relationship between congressional parties and legislators. Parties are described as “legislative cartels” facilitating Members’ individual and collective goals (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

A Matrix of Member Behavior

This analysis illustrates how partisanship structures the attainment of Member goals, including the basic goal of reelection. And reciprocally, this analysis demonstrates how goal motivations, for Republicans, can impinge upon participation in the party.

organization, thus limiting their institutional effectiveness. Table 1.3 illustrates how party culture combines with electoral security to create a matrix of Member behavior.

Table 1.3 about here

For Democratic Members electoral security provides them the freedom to pursue personal goals whether they involve power, policy or prestige. Electoral security is usually associated with seniority, and this seniority provides Democratic Members with institutional status and the partisan leadership positions that accompany it. Insecure Democratic Members, on the other hand, lack electoral discretion, and thus must focus their attention on district concerns. It is important to recognize that their partisan culture allows them the discretion to vote and participate in the interest of their districts. They are limited, however, within the institution because of their lack of seniority, but with time they can expect all the advantages that seniority brings.

Republican Members, on the other hand, face altogether different circumstances within this framework. Secure Republicans enjoy the freedom to pursue their personal goals, but they must pursue them within the parameters of the party platform in order to be effective within the organization. Seniority plays little of a role outside of these party parameters. Even the most senior Members can expect to be overlooked for leadership positions if they do not conform their pursuits to the party platform. Insecure Republican Members also operate within this system of ideological and participatory homogeneity, but lack the freedom to ignore district interests. In order to secure their reelection, they at times must stray from the partisan fold. Not only do they not adhere to the party platform, they also lack the personal or partisan resources to compete for leadership positions.

From this analysis, we develop a much richer understanding of Member behavior than that offered by the literature. We understand Members as operating in a complex, dynamic legislative arena, both structuring and structured by their participation in it. We see party organizations truly as mediating institutions that not only impact Members' voting behavior, but also impact their behavior both inside and outside of Congress. Further, we appreciate parties as the professional and central organizations that they are, inherently structuring Members' goals of power, policy, and prestige. Specifically, we develop a critical understanding of the role of parties and partisanship in structuring women's political participation within the Congress. The two party cultures serve to both advance and limit women's access to political power in the contemporary context.

Providing the Theoretical Context

In many ways, studies of congressional behavior derive their justification in representational theory. How and why do Members vote the way they do? In theory, Members of Congress go to Washington, D.C. with a two-fold responsibility: to represent the preferences of their district and to promote the national welfare.

As the number of women and minorities in Congress has grown, so has the attention paid to the representation offered by these groups. Members can be representative in many different ways. Pitkin (1957) suggests that there are passive and active modes of representation. First, a legislative body can be descriptively representative by simply accurately reflecting the descriptive characteristics of the populace. According to this school, "True representation... requires that the legislature be so selected that its composition corresponds accurately to that of the whole nation; only then is it really a representative body" (ibid: 60). Under this conception, Members'

actions are of little importance. They are representative simply by their presence in the legislative arena. As Pitkin (1957) explains:

This approach to the concept of representation is very different from the formalistic authorization and accountability views. For these writers, representing is not acting with authority, or acting before being held to account, or any kind of acting at all. Rather, it depends on the representative's characteristics, on what he *is* or is *like*, on being something rather than doing something. The representative does not act for others, he "stands for" them, by virtue of a correspondence or connection between them, a resemblance or reflection. In political terms, what seems important is less what the legislature does than how it is composed (61)

Secondly, a legislative body can be symbolically representative by evoking trust, belief, and acceptance by the populace as a legitimate governing institution. It is not an active form of representation, it does not depend on the agency of the representative. Although intangible, it is a very powerful concept. As Pitkin describes

Descriptive representation introduces the idea of correspondence or likeness and the importance of resembling one's constituents; symbolic representation suggests the role of irrational belief, which is neglected by the formalistic view, and the importance of pleasing one's constituents (1957: 111)

What Pitkin contributes to the ongoing theoretical discussion of political representation is the idea of representation as an activity. She calls our attention to "what goes on during representing, the substance or content of acting for others, as distinct from its external and formal trappings" (1957: 114). It is this notion of substantive representation that gives theoretical impetus to the work of political scientists studying the individual legislative behavior of Members of Congress.

In recent years, more and more women and racial and ethnic minorities have attained national elective office. The entrance of these Members into Congress is symbolically significant in that they stand for a symbol of national diversity, and is descriptively significant in that they are new faces at the political table. Gender theorists

continue to question whether women's increased numbers in Congress translates into increased representation of the substantive interests of women. This question assumes, however, that there are discrete interests held by women. Some of the more recent literature distinguishes among types of women's interests, acknowledging that there is an ideological dimension to gender consciousness. Yet, little work assesses the theoretical ramifications of this observation for women's representation.

These normative frameworks have substantially shaped the study of the Congress. The issues surrounding legislative behavior are issues of representation. In terms of the trustee-delegate debate, the responsible party debate, and the descriptive-substantive debate, Member behavior raises fundamental questions of representation. This dissertation takes a novel approach to understanding the behavior of women in Congress. Rather than focusing on the legislative activity of women as a homogenous group of legislators, this analysis focuses on the partisan activity of women. The argument of the text is that the legislative behavior of women, including gender differences and the unique legislative representation offered by women, is better understood within the context of partisanship. Through this lens, we develop a very different picture of the representation offered by women and expand our understanding of the role of gender in legislative behavior beyond the descriptive-substantive debate.

Women's Legislative Behavior

Gender theory spans the areas of political socialization, mass political behavior, campaigns and elections, and legislative behavior. When examining women's legislative behavior in the Congress, gender theorists focus on issues surrounding descriptive-substantive representation. In other words, they examine the extent to which women in

Congress represent women outside of Congress by championing women's issues.

Typically, gender theory is formulated from analyses of the legislative process, including women's participation in committee and on the House floor. Very rarely are women examined as partisans participating in the party organizations in Congress. More often, gender theory focuses on women's participation in the political activities of the parties at the state and local level.

In general, women are better able to steer feminist policy through the policy process than congressmen because of their interest and desire to affect change (Tamerius 1995, see also Thomas 1991). Social issues dealing with children, education, and welfare are thought to be rather soft issues appealing especially to female legislators (Thomas 1994, 1991). Some have even suggested that there is a uniquely gendered-dimension of voting behavior (Norton 1999). Consequently, female public officials gravitate towards committees dealing with social welfare as well as family and children's issues out of interest, expertise, choice, coercion or opportunity. Women choose committees that tend to focus on more "feminine issues" (Thomas 1994). It is possible, however, that this choice is due to processes of gendered socialization that shapes women and men's interest in different ways and reflects the power and prestige these issues have within the legislative body (Kathlene 1994).

One way to understand the participatory differences of men and women is through role orientations. "Role orientations are legislator's own expectations of the kind of behavior they ought to exhibit in the performance of their duties" (Walke et al. 1962: 246). Understanding the differences between the role orientations of men and women is important for understanding their differential impact on policy outcomes (Thompson

1980: 71) Whereas in the 1920s, congresswomen were given cursory appointments to minor committees, by the 1970s, they had gained status on all of the major congressional committees. Yet women's small numbers in the mid-70s led to a general feeling of duty among female members to represent not only their constituents but also women in general (Thompson 1980: 73)

Partisanship is an important key to understanding how women view their participatory roles. Not only is gender associated with participatory roles, party distinctions are also evident with regard to role perceptions (Fowlkes, Perkins, and Rinehart 1979). Gender differences, however, are stark with regard to political ambition and activities. Women are more likely to value activities such as "attending meetings and telephoning" than men, while men are more ambitious than women (ibid). In recent years, however, work in this area has illustrated that the ambition gap is closing (Constantini 1990)

Several variables are related to increased political ambition in women: community organization activity, religious affiliation, age, employment outside the home, feminist activity, and most importantly, the passage of time. From his work, Constantini (1990) concludes:

The closing of the ambition gender gap is most likely to occur where politically active women are highly integrated into their community and the larger society, where they may be described as 'modern' in social background terms, and where the feminist impulse is strongest (759)

Thus, we might expect the ambition gap to be most narrow within the class of political elites including the female Members of the U.S. Congress. But should we expect

partisan differences in the political ambition of women in Congress? Might we expect women's political involvement to be shaped by party context?

Party Difference and Women's Influence

Party structure is significantly related to the influence of women in the political process (Freeman 1986). While some have suggested that the Republican party is a poor imitation of the coalition-building Democratic party, the Republican party is a different type of political organization with a different type of political culture altogether (ibid). The Democratic Party illustrates a highly pluralistic structure, whereas the Republican Party illustrates a more elitist structure. Freeman notes that

Since the Democratic party is composed of groups, the success of individuals whose group identification is highly significant, such as blacks and women, is tied to that of the group as a whole. They succeed as the group succeeds. That is not the case within the Republican party. It officially ignores group characteristics. Generally, individuals succeed insofar as the leaders with whom they are connected succeed (336).

Consequently, the Republican party advocates a more unitary conception of representation. Meeting the needs of national interest, such as improving the economy, is the appropriate means for meeting the needs of individual groups. On the other hand, Democrats hold a conception of representation that emphasizes minority coalition-building (ibid). Freeman states,

Democrats do not have an integrated conception of a national interest, in part because they do not view themselves as the center of society. The party's components think of themselves as outsiders pounding on the door seeking programs that will facilitate entry into the mainstream. Thus, the party is very responsive to any groups... (1986: 338).

This ethos is further evidenced in the organizational style of the two parties. While Democratic party politics are often characterized as "open" and "confrontational,"

Republican party politics are characterized as "closed" and "consensual" (ibid). The organizational style of the Republican Party is best reflected by a corporation with discretion located at the top, whereas the organizational style of the Democratic party is best reflected by a social movement with discretion located among the different vocal groups. The representational ethos and the organizational style of the Democratic party work hand-in-hand to produce an environment of conflict and change (ibid).

One of the major consequences of these attitudinal and structural differences between the parties concerns the role of women within the parties. The Republican party emphasizes loyalty to the party first and foremost, whereas the Democratic party provides the vehicle whereby group loyalties may be articulated in the political arena. Freeman (1986) suggests that

Even in 1976, when Republican feminists were aligned with party leaders, one organizer commented that because the GOP is not "an interest group party" the RWTF (Republican Women's Task Force)¹ is viewed with skepticism. Party regulars have a hard time adjusting to the presence of an organized interest. The current leadership views feminist organizations as Democratic party front groups. Thus it is virtually impossible to be both an accepted Republican activist and an outspoken supporter of feminist goals. Since the party discourages people from identifying themselves as members of a group with a group agenda, it minimizes the possibility of multiple loyalties (348).

Another consequence of the Republican emphasis on party loyalty is widespread trust among rank-and-file members of the Republican party. An emphasis on social and ideological homogeneity fosters a trust of others within the group. Party leaders thus are

¹ According to Freeman (2000), "The year before the 1976 conventions, the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) organized a Republican Women's Task Force" of Ford supporters to promote the proposed ERA (Equal Rights Amendment). (Accessed from <http://www.seniorwomen.com/articles/FreemanGone.html> on June 6, 2002)

capable of maintaining discretion over the policy agenda because they benefit from a large degree of membership trust (ibid. 351).

The extent to which the Republican Party changed both ideologically and structurally during the 1994 election and the 104th Congress thereafter remains a question for future scholarship. In predicting the 1994 election, Connelly and Pitney (1994) suggested that the Republican Party would need to “appeal to disparate constituencies and yet [be] unified enough to present coherent alternatives” (578). In retrospect, it appears the Republican Party has managed to maintain a substantial amount of loyalty while integrating a number (small as it may be) of demographically-diverse legislators into its membership. This leads us to conclude that while conservative women have influenced the legislative debate, they have done so within the confines of partisan politics.

In sum, gender theory concerning women’s participation in Congress has focused on the influence of gender on political behavior within committees and within parties, including gender differences in legislators’ issue voting, participation as committee members, and behavior as party activists. While current theory suggests stark differences between the sexes, it offers no insight on possible ideological and behavioral differences among women. The normative assumption that representation of women’s interest parallels advocacy of feminist issues permeates gender theory. The consequence? For the most part, the context of partisanship has been ignored. Women’s legislative behavior is treated as operating in a political vacuum. The purpose of the present analysis is to reintroduce partisanship to the theoretical picture. Specifically, this study

focuses on the influence of partisanship on the participation of women in Congress. As Baer (1993) suggests

Research on women and politics has developed a narrow orthodoxy that has left the promise of the early gender-sensitive research of the 1970s stillborn, and an entire area of political science central to the political influence of women – political parties – has been both ignored and misunderstood (548)

Consequently, current theoretical frameworks are unable to address differentiated ideological behavior in political organizations such as the legislative arena

Parties and Legislative Behavior

“Legislative organization is party organization” (Oleszek 2000: 8). Never has this been more appropriate as a descriptive of congressional politics than the contemporary context. Recent investigations have highlighted the increased interparty polarization and intraparty cohesiveness of the current era (Smith 2000, Brewer, Mariani, and Stonecash 2002). One indicator of this trend is the gradual increase in party unity scores over the past thirty years (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1994). Several factors are responsible for this shift. First, an electoral realignment in the South has resulted in a partisan realignment in the Congress (Rohde 1991, Brewer, Mariani, and Stonecash 2002). Consequently, the Democratic Party has become more liberal. At the same time, Democratic representation in the North has increased, particularly in liberal-leaning areas that include urban, low-income, minority districts (Brewer, Mariani, and Stonecash 2002). The result is a more polarized, or consistently liberal, Democratic Party. In sum, Lowry (2002) suggests that party differentiation in Congress “can be explained as rational party responses to internal and external stimuli” (33).

In light of increased party polarization and the internal partisan cohesion particularly characteristic of the Republican Party, attention has once again turned to examination of the influence of parties on legislative behavior. Early research on party influence recognized the importance of the electoral connection. Party leadership was thought to be contingent upon constituency pressures surrounding legislation and the resulting electoral circumstances faced by representatives (Huitt 1961, Froman and Ripley 1965). The centralization of power in political parties reflected the distribution of Member preferences (Cooper and Brady 1981). Party leadership simply represented the collective expression of policy preferences (Sinclair 1983, 1995, Deering and Smith 1997, Rohde 1991, Aldrich and Rohde 1997). As Smith states

While most of these scholars make explicit their view that factors other than election outcomes (including leadership strategies) contribute to party cohesiveness, they appear to accept the view that election outcomes are the primary determinant of the policy alignments, which in turn determine the role of partisan institutions and policy outcomes (2000: 195).

In response to this literature, Krehbiel (1998) suggests that parties have little influence on legislative outcomes. Rather, he proposes a theory that revolves around the role of the median voter. In his spatial model of voting behavior, he posits that the median (or pivotal) voter determines the vote outcome. While the parties might counter-balance each other, the end result is votes reflecting the preferences of the median voter.

While Krehbiel's thesis may be convincing in a period of decentralized or atomistic parties, such as the previous era of congressional politics, it is hardly viable in an era of centralized and cohesive parties, such as the present era. In times of party polarization and internal cohesion, party leadership exerts a great deal of influence over

the policymaking process (Aldrich and Rohde 1997, Rohde 1991). Perhaps most difficult to reconcile is the sometimes conflicting influences of party and constituency. Several studies have examined the interaction of electoral goals and party support (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, Cox and McCubbins 1993).

These two goals are reconciled in the principle-agent theory of political parties as legislative cartels espoused by Cox and McCubbins (1993). Individual legislators have an electoral stake in the party label. The party leadership is tasked with reputation maintenance and enhancement through creating a favorable party record. In return, Members provide partisan support even if it conflicts with their preferences. In this account of party influence on legislative behavior, the majority party uses procedural control of the agenda to ensure favorable outcomes (ibid). The result is asymmetric outcomes, counter to Krehbiel's assertions. Vote outcomes more closely reflect majority party preferences than the preferences of the pivotal voter (Cox and McCubbins 1993, Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith (1999). Policy is the result of majority party mean preferences (Wilson 1999).

The extent of party influence on legislative voting behavior is not a constant. Rather, party influence varies in accordance with the legislative context. According to Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (1999), party influence is greater on close votes than lopsided votes. Party influence is also greater on procedural votes and passage votes than on amendment votes. In terms of issues, party influence is greater on social welfare and budgetary issues than on other issues such as abortion.

While this body of theory greatly extends our general understanding of party leadership and organizational influence over voting behavior, it does little to examine the

external influence of party on Member behavior. In other words, the political parties are mediating institutions that operate both inside and outside the halls of Congress. As Smith states: "Party is an external as well as an internal source of influence" (2000: 203). Secondly, while the literature illuminates the asymmetric influence of parties on voting behavior, it is not reflected in contemporary operationalization of party in models of legislative behavior. According to Smith

The use of a dummy variable is justified in many studies on the grounds that there are compound forms of party influence. But if legislative behavior or outcomes reflect asymmetric patterns of partisan advantage and influence, the dummy variable may underestimate party effects (212).

Surprisingly few studies examining party influence treat the parties distinctly.

Even in Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart's (2001) recent analysis of "the effects of party and preferences on congressional roll-call voting," the parties are not treated separately to ascertain asymmetrical effects. Nevertheless, the authors do draw the conclusion that majority and minority parties exhibit equal levels of discipline. The danger posed by measuring party as a dummy indicator in a single model of voting behavior is that possible interaction effects leading to asymmetric outcomes may be missed.

The Contemporary Congress

A substantial body of research on Congress and political parties addresses the causes and influences of the Republican takeover of the House of Representatives in 1994. The 1994 Republican Revolution represented a return to the party-dominated model of congressional behavior. The strength of the speakership, the blatant rejection of the seniority rule, and the log-rolling efforts involved in the "Contract with America"

legislation indicate a break with the traditional mold (Owens 1997). It is not yet clear, however, how the change in partisan control will affect the enduring character of the institution. What is clear is that the present period of congressional history is different from the previous era if not in rules and procedures, then in process and culture (Rae and Campbell 1999).

While some argue that the dramatic changes implemented by Republicans in the 104th Congress are not indicative of a new style of governance, but rather of a new majority party "learning to govern" (Fenno 1997, Connelly and Pitney 1997, Davidson 1999, Sinclair 1999, Deering 1999), this works assumes that the behavior of congressional leadership since 1994 speaks to the differences in culture between the Democratic and Republican parties (Peters 1999, Kolodny 1999). While uncertain of the enduring impact of the partisan shift on the institution, the Republican Revolution of 1994 changed the "internal structures and proceedings of the House of Representatives during the 104th Congress" (Rae and Campbell 1999). It is unclear how long the increased partisanship and centralized leadership defining this period will last. This behavior "might well be encouraged by the fact that, in historical terms, its margin of control has been very narrow" (ibid. 16).

The significance of recent party theory is two-fold. First, it represents a renewed focus on political parties and further development of party-dominated models of congressional behavior. Secondly, it raises questions concerning the assumptions of the work produced during a time of partisan stability within the Congress. It illustrates the importance of partisan context to patterns of legislative behavior.

The study examines the character of the two distinct party cultures in the House of Representatives and how these different party cultures influence the legislative behavior of women in Congress. Three different levels of analysis are employed to capture the extent of partisan influences on women's behavior, including the electoral level, the institutional level, and the organizational level. At all three levels, we see the significant ways in which partisanship shapes women's legislative behavior.

While the original research on parties and legislative behavior evolved around the important influence of constituent interests on Member voting behavior, contemporary work has neglected to systematically incorporate this factor in models of voting behavior (Smith 2000). Member behavior is the product of a number of factors, including party, constituency, institutional status, electoral circumstance, and personal preferences. The present analysis brings together multiple influences on Member behavior, incorporating institutional, personal, and constituent characteristics into a more fully specified model of voting behavior.

The Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. In Chapter 2, we examine the electoral connection -- or the electoral needs of female legislators and the ways in which partisanship helps or hinders women from meeting these needs. Combining data from interviews of Members and their staff as well as other political elites with district-level data, we develop an understanding of the electoral pressures faced by women in Congress. This chapter illustrates how partisanship structures the electoral circumstance of women in clear and significant ways.

In the third chapter, we turn to the institutional connection, examining the legislative behavior of female Members and the ways in which women differ ideologically from their co-partisan male colleagues. This chapter demonstrates that although women generally illustrate a more liberal ideological orientation than men, particularly on social issues, they by and large act like partisans. Democratic women's vote scores, for example, are much more liberal than Republican women's vote scores.

From the previous chapter, we find that electoral security is an important constraint on Members' behavior, but that this relationship is structured by partisanship. Once controlling for partisanship and electoral security, however, sex is sometimes a significant predictor of voting behavior. This significant association is more often present among Republicans than Democrats, further illustrating the ideological cross-pressures that exist in the Republican Party for women.

Ideological difference thus is most significant when understood within the context of partisanship. This chapter involves predictive modeling of Members' ideological voting behavior and party unity. Member- and district-level indicators for this chapter are taken from a variety of sources, including *CQ's Politics in America* (1994-2002) and *National Journal's The Almanac of American Politics* (1994-2002).

In Chapter 4, we turn to the organizational connection and examine the status and participation of women within the party organization. It is here that we develop the clearest picture of women as partisans and further understand the context within which they operate. In order to fully comprehend the operations of the legislative body it is important to capture both the formal and informal activities of Members (Hall 1996). This chapter more than any other captures the contours of Member' participation in the

party organizations. The data for this chapter also comes from a number of sources, including the aforementioned volumes as well as information from the official records of the House Republican Conference and the online publications of The Center for Responsive Government and *National Journal*. The quantitative data for this chapter is also supplemented by interview data from Members of Congress and their staff

Data and Methodology

The data for this project was collected during the first session of the 107th Congress. As an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow, I worked for a Member of the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington, D.C. from January to October of 2001. Not only did this experience offer me the unique opportunity to be a participant observer (Fenno 1990), I was also able to gain access to a number of congressional offices on both sides of the aisle for interviews of Members and their staff. This study incorporates the qualitative findings of these interviews with quantitative data concerning descriptive, district, and behavioral characteristics of Members of Congress. The qualitative and quantitative data is integrated to varying degrees throughout the text to appropriately develop the argument of the dissertation.

Chapter 2: Examining the Electoral Connection

Both quantitative and qualitative data are used in this chapter to explore the electoral circumstances of women in Congress given their partisanship. The quantitative data included descriptive Member indicators, such as the Member's sex and party affiliation, as well as district indicators, such as the vote return for the Member as well as the President in the last election (1992 or 1996). The sex of the Member was coded 1 for female and 0 for male. The party affiliation of the Member was coded 1 for Republican

and 0 for Democrat.² Both of these descriptive indicators were taken from *The National Journal's Almanac of American Politics* (1994-2002). Electoral insecurity of the Member is also taken from this source and is coded as the percent of the vote received by the Member multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation.³

The qualitative data for this chapter came from personal interviews of staff and Members in Washington, D.C. between June and December of the first session of the 107th Congress (2001).⁴ The research in this paper is based on interviews with political elites during the first session of the 107th Congress. Of the 81 interviews conducted for this research, 25 were with Members of Congress, 47 with congressional aides, and 9 with party elites. All of these respondents provided me with information under the condition that their identity would not be revealed. Consequently, none of the respondents are identified by name or office in this work.

Along with congressional staff, the respondents also include staff of the political and organizational arms of the national parties, including the National Republican Campaign Committee, the House Republican Conference, the Democratic Caucus, and

²Independents were excluded from the analysis.

³For further explanation of variables and coding, refer to the Appendix.

⁴During the data collection for this analysis, the nation underwent a serious terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, that dramatically shifted the policy agenda and partisan mood. Fortunately, most of the interviews had already been conducted. There were, however, notable differences in the responses during the weeks immediately following September 11, 2001. During this period of bipartisanship, Members of both parties were less likely to discuss differences between them and their colleagues across the aisle. Due to the semi-structured nature of the interviews, most of the interview data mirrors that gathered before this critical event. Certain direct references to the event are excluded from the analysis to provide a more consistent picture of Member behavior.

the National Federation of Republican Women. The interviews were semi-structured, involving a series of open-ended questions concerning legislative priorities, group membership, campaigning, evaluations of the party organizations and personal roles, and perceived gender and partisan differences among colleagues. In Chapter 2, the focus of the data is on the respondents' observations concerning women's electoral circumstances.

Chapter 3: Examining the Institutional Connection

In contrast to Chapter 2, the bulk of the data for this chapter is quantitative, with only minor interview data incorporated into the analysis. Several descriptive, district, and legislative indicators were coded to develop a predictive model of Members' ideological behavior. These variables are from a variety of sources.

Dependent Variables

Two dependent indicators are incorporated to fully capture Member ideology. First, DW-NOMINATE scores collapse Member ideological voting onto a single left-right continuum. The scale ranges from -1 to +2, with -1 representing the most liberal end of the spectrum, and +2 representing the most conservative end of the spectrum. This variable was taken from the website of Keith Poole and merged with the existing dataset.⁵

The second dependent variable is social liberalism ratings. This variable captures Member voting behavior on social issues, and is also measured on a left-right ideological

⁵ I employ the vote scaling techniques developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991, 1997). These DW-NOMINATE scores were downloaded from Keith Poole's data archive on the web at http://voteview.uh.edu/default_nomdata.htm and are recorded for the 103rd through 106th Congresses. DW-NOMINATE scores are useful in that they can be compared across congresses. DW-NOMINATE scores provide a single measure of ideology, bounded between +2 and -1 with conservatism increasing in a positive direction on a single left-right continuum.

continuum. The scale ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 representing the most conservative end of the spectrum, and 100 representing the most liberal end of the spectrum. This variable was taken from *National Journal's Almanac of American Politics* (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002).

In the literature, the first measures of ideology were the ratings or scores of Members of Congress produced by interest groups. Scores by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), the American Conservative Union (ACU), and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) became quite popular to use as proxies for Member ideology. For purposes of this analysis, ADA and ACU scores were recorded from *Congressional Quarterly's Politics in America* (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002). This data was supplemented by information from the websites of Americans for Democratic Action and The American Conservative Union. The scores produced by the ADA represent ratings of Members of Congress based on key votes (selected by the ADA). The rating system is between 1 and 100, with 100 representing the most liberal score possible. Similarly, the ACU rates members based on key votes using an equivalent scale, with 100 representing the most conservative score possible.

Most studies of Members' ideological voting patterns employ scores produced by various pressure groups, however these measures are now criticized for their inadequate sampling of issues across issue dimensions and their interest-based rather than ideologically-based construction. There is usually strong correlation among the various indices indicating an enduring liberal-conservative continuum dimension to voting behavior (Poole 1981, Brunell, Koetzle, Dinardo, Grofman, and Feld 1999).

One of the major weaknesses of this method is that voting is used to predict voting, or, as Carson and Oppenheimer explain, the dependent variable in the model is predicted by the same factors as the independent variable (ibid). They further explain that:

Theoretically, utilizing ADA as a direct measure of personal ideology double enters all the district characteristics (once indirectly, via ADA) and consequently makes all the other coefficients less significant than expected. Thus, such a measure poses a number of difficulties of interpretation for the researcher (165)

The second measures incorporated into predictive models of ideology are the ratings or scores of Members of Congress produced from roll-call data by *The National Journal*. These measures cross a wide range of votes and included scores for Members on economic, social, and foreign issues. The voting behavior of Members is compared to place them in liberal or conservative percentiles. For example, an economic conservatism score of 85 would indicate that a Member voted more conservatively on economic issues than 85% of the body. Although the benefit of the rating system is that it covers a wide range of issues and is based on ideology rather than special interests, its use of percentiles has become the subject of much debate. In comparing Members to each other rather than to a fixed scale, the measure inadequately captures the actual ideological orientations of Members. Rather, it captures only the ideological orientations of Members compared to other Members.

These measures have been criticized on a number of grounds for inaccurately reflecting the actual ideology of Members (Snyder 1992, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Rohde 1994, Brunell, Koetzle, Dinardo, Grofman, and Feld 1999). For example, according to Brunett et al. (1999), "interest groups are most interested in distinguishing

among their ideological friends and tend to group their ideological enemies near the bottom of the scale (87) ” One of the fundamental problems with interest group ratings is that they are not comparable across congresses

For this reason, recent studies have employed a new measure of Member ideology developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) DW-NOMINATE scores are based on all non-unanimous roll call votes They are adjusted for changes in the underlying scale over time, allowing for valid comparisons across Congresses at least within a particular party era (Poole 2000) For purposes of interpretation, it is important to recognize that the scale for this measure is different than for ADA, ACU, and National Journal scores Rather than a scale from “0” to “100,” DW-NOMINATE scores range from “-1” to “+2 ”

Independent Variables

The independent indicators can be divided into Member- and district-level variables Data on individual Members of Congress was taken from National Journal's *Almanac of American Politics* A number of variables are included in the analysis to measure the relative impact of individual, party, and constituency influences on ideological ratings The first set of variables involves the descriptive characteristics of Members The partisanship of the Member was coded in order to examine differences between the parties Other basic descriptive characteristics include the Member's sex, seniority, and electoral security Seniority was coded as the year the Member was elected to Congress minus the observation year For example, in predicting ideology scores in 1995, seniority was coded as 1995 minus the year the Member was originally elected to Congress Electoral security was coded as the district vote return for the Member in the last congressional election These records are systematically compiled after every session

and are available for the 103rd through the 106th Congresses from a number of sources, including *Congressional Quarterly's Politics in America* (1992-2002) and *National Journal's Almanac of American Politics* (1992-2002)

District-level variables are included in the model to capture constituency influence on Members' voting behavior. The district indicators for this chapter are the ideology of the district as well as the percent black and the socio-economic character of the district.⁶ While the black population of the district is coded as a direct percentage provided by the aforementioned sources, the socio-economic character of the district is computed as a factor score. This variable is measured by reducing three other district-level demographic variables into a single factor. The variables included in the factor analysis are the percent rural, the percent college-educated, and the average per capita income of the district. Initially, the black population of the district was also included as a socio-economic factor in the data reduction. This variable did not collapse into a single factor with the other measures, and is thus included separately in the predictive models.

While demographic indicators are considered to be significant predictors of ideological voting, they do not directly capture the ideological influences a constituency exerts on a Member. For this reason, the Member's district vote for President Clinton in 1992 and 1996 is included as an indicator of the ideological leaning of the Member's

⁶ The district indicators for this analysis are based on the analysis conducted by Swers (1998). Not only are these district characteristics generally used to reflect constituency characteristics in studies of this nature, but as Swers states "These factors have an added significance . . . because many scholars maintain that differences attributed to gender can be entirely explained by the tendency of women to be elected in districts that are more urban, have a higher percentage of African Americans, and have a lower median household income" (439-440). In this analysis, Swers also includes the district presidential vote return as a proxy for district ideology like the one incorporated in the present analysis.

constituency. If we expect Members to integrate a delegate role into their representative orientation, then constituency influences are important to understanding the ideological voting of Members. Also, to a certain degree, a Member can be expected to be the product of the socio-cultural dynamic of his or her home district. The district presidential vote thus helps explain the personal ideology of the Member.⁷

In order to adequately assess the extent to which a Member systematically diverges from constituent preferences we need not only use measures capturing district ideology, but also Member ideology (Bond, Campbell, Cottrill 2001: 13). Many measures previously have been used to assess Members' ideological orientations.⁸ Three

This measure has been incorporated into a number of predictive models of ideological voting. Some have suggested that, in order to capture the normal vote of the district, the presidential vote return should be averaged over two election cycles (Gaddie and Bullock 2000, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001). As Gaddie and Bullock (2000) note "Normal vote measures are often used to assess the equilibrium level of partisan competition in constituencies. The normal vote is typically calculated by averaging a party's share of the vote in several elections in a constituency" (20). Still others have relied on the presidential vote return in the most proximate election cycle as an adequate proxy for district ideology (Swers 1998). Since 1994, presidential partisanship has become a better indicator of district partisanship. While Republicans vying for open seats lagged behind the normal vote in the district prior to 1994, they actually ran ahead of it (Gaddie and Bullock 2000). This measure is therefore becoming more closely associated with district partisanship than it was before realignment. Further, recent investigations suggest that presidential partisanship is more-closely associated with female-male contests than with all-male contests (Hoffman, Palmer, and Gaddie forthcoming). Because of these findings as well as the strength of the association in the results of the present analysis, the measure used here is simply the most proximate district vote for president.

⁸Several different indicators were coded to capture the ideological and partisan voting behavior of Members of Congress, including interest group scores by the *Americans for Democratic Action* and the *American Conservative Union*, liberal and conservative ratings on economic, social, and foreign issues provided by *The National Journal*, ideology scores captured by the DW-NOMINATE measure created by Poole and Rosenthal (1997), and party unity scores calculated by *Congressional Quarterly*. While the model was tested across all of these measures, only the findings for predicting DW-NOMINATE scores and social liberalism ratings were presented in the analysis. It

different sets of variables to measure ideology were coded to test the model across all of the primary indicators suggested by current congressional research

Methodology

The methodology for this chapter combines simple cross tabulations and distributions with regression analysis to present a picture of the ideological contours of women's legislative behavior given their partisanship. Given the nature of the dependent variables, OLS regression was employed.⁹ This chapter is methodologically unique. In Chapter 3, the model is analyzed separately by partisanship. In other words, the data files are split, and the model predicting ideology scores is tested separately on Democrats and Republicans. This methodological approach allows us to examine possible differences in the predictive power of the model across partisanship, thus providing evidence of the perceived differences presented in the previous chapter.

This analysis employs a traditional ordinary least squares regression technique to estimate Member ideology with both individual and district-level indicators. Because the focus of the overall study is on the existence of distinct party cultures and the effect of partisan culture on women's political behavior, the models are estimated separately for Republicans and Democrats. If the model is equally robust for both parties and if the significant indicators for the most part evidence the same amount and same direction of influence on the slopes in the two populations, then we must accept the null hypothesis

should be noted, however, that the findings are systematic across the multiple measures of ideology.

⁹Although DW-NOMINATE scores are bounded by +2 and -1, they constitute an integral-level variable that meets all of the standard regression assumptions. Similarly, social liberalism ratings are integral-level ratings bounded between 0 and 100.

and reject the possible existence of party cultures as an influence on Member ideology. If, however, the model is not equally robust for both parties or if the indicators evidence different levels of significance, different directions, or different strengths, then we can reject the null hypothesis and consider the presence of partisan culture and the nature of its implications for ideology and voting behavior. The predictive model is based on the following equation:

$$Y = X_1 \beta_1 + X_2 \beta_2 + X_3 \beta_3 + X_4 \beta_4 + X_5 \beta_5 + X_6 \beta_6 + \varepsilon$$

Where

Y = DWNOMINATE (Model 1)
 Social Liberalism (Model 2)

X₁ = Female Member
 X₂ = Seniority of the Member
 X₃ = Electoral Insecurity
 X₄ = % Black Population in the District
 X₅ = Socio-Economic Character of the District
 X₆ = Presidential Vote Return in the District

ε = error term

Chapter 4: Examining the Organizational Connection

This chapter also employs a few novel measures of legislative behavior. The first measure accounts for Member' attendance at the organizational meetings of the House Republican Conference. Unfortunately, similar data was unattainable from the Democratic Caucus. This variable is coded as a percentage, calculated as the Member's

total attendances divided by the total number of meetings held during the first session of the 107th Congress

The second measure accounts for Members' associations with leadership PACs. This variable is coded dichotomously as 1 if the Member is associated with a leadership PAC and 0 if the Member is not associated with a leadership PAC. The third measure accounts for Members' appearances on nationally-televised political talk shows. This data is provided by *The National Journal*, and is accessible to members online at <http://nationaljournal.com/members/earlybird/tvguests.htm>. The variable was coded simply as the number of times Members appeared on a political talk show during 2000.¹⁰

At the end of Chapter 4, a predictive model is constructed to predict party unity scores with these other measures of partisan participation. Again this model is examined separately for Democrats and Republicans. As in Chapter 3, this analysis employs OLS regression analysis to predict party unity. The predictive model is based on the following equation

¹⁰ *National Journal* records guest appearances on nationally-televised political talk shows, including "Capital Report" (CNBC), "Inside Politics" (CNN), "Special Report" (FNC), "Hannity & Colmes" (FNC), "The News" (MSNBC), "Making Sense" (MSNBC), "On The Record" (FNC), "Hardball" (MSNBC), "Crossfire" (CNN), "O'Reilly Factor" (FNC), "Larry King Live" (CNN), "Nightline" (ABC), "NewsNight" (CNN), "Meet the Press" (NBC), "This Week" (ABC), "Face the Nation" (CBS), "Fox News Sunday" (FNC), "Late Edition" (CNN), "Wolf Blitzer Reports" (CNN), "The Point" (CNN), "The Edge" (FNC), "Rivera" (CNBC), "FOX News Sunday" (FNC), "Evans, Novak, Hunt & Shields" (CNN), "Capital Gang" (CNN), "Russert" (CNBC), "Beltway Boys" (FNC), "Barnicle" (MSNBC), and "Spin Room" (CNN).

$$Y = X_1 \beta_1 + X_2 \beta_2 + X_3 \beta_3 + X_4 \beta_4 + X_5 \beta_5 + X_6 \beta_6 + \varepsilon$$

Where

Y = Party Unity Scores

X₁ = Female Member

X₂ = Seniority of the Member

X₃ = Electoral Insecurity

X₄ = Party-Building Activities

ε = error term

The results of the analysis further explain the way in which partisanship shapes women's behavior. Republican women who participate in party-building activities are significantly more unified with the party in their voting behavior. These women have also had more access to positions of leadership within the Republican Party.

This chapter also heavily integrates interview data to further support the findings of the quantitative analysis. In particular, interviews with female Members and their staff supply the bulk of the data for this chapter. Member reflections on the party organization, their role(s) within the party organization, and the gendered or partisan differences among their colleagues offer a rich backdrop for understanding women's partisan participation.

In terms of data and methodology, this work makes a number of contributions to congressional theory. First, it quantitatively examines Member behavior through the lens of party culture. Models of Member behavior are examined separately for Democrats and Republicans. This analysis suggests that the parties are different and that models perform differently across parties. Future research should capture the unique influence of partisanship on Member behavior.

The present analysis incorporates a number of unique measures of Members' partisan participation that are also worth noting. First, in examining women's position within the parties, this study uses a novel measure of party leadership. Rather than understanding leadership to be limited to the top three or four elected positions, this analysis understands leadership to be a complex network of elected and appointed positions, including top leaders, whips, policy and steering committee members, and campaign committee members (Oleszek 2000). Secondly, in examining women's participation in party-building activities, this analysis incorporates three novel indicators of participation: organizational attendance, association with leadership PACs, and participation in national media.

Conclusion

In sum, the present analysis furthers both the study of gender and congressional behavior on theoretical and methodological grounds. In terms of theory, the contribution of the present study involves its integration of gender theory with party culture theory to frame a study of women as partisan actors in the legislative arena. In terms of methodology, this examination combines the statistical prediction power of quantitative methods with the contextual richness of qualitative data. It provides new conceptualizations of party leadership, organizations, and support that extend our understanding of the influences of partisanship on Member behavior.

This work examines the legislative behavior of women through the lens of partisanship. The analysis illustrates that differences between female Members' and male Members' legislative behavior are contingent on partisanship. The context of partisanship establishes important parameters for the discretion of female legislators, and thus must be

taken into consideration when examining the gendered contours of congressional behavior

The implications of this theory for future congressional research are three-fold. First, this analysis provides further evidence to support the party culture conception of parties. This model of governance therefore holds implications for the way in which we conceptualize models of representation and congressional behavior. Secondly, the argument of this study challenges the current paradigm of gender theory, suggesting that future examinations should account for the partisan context of legislative behavior. Finally, this study recognizes the utility of rational choice concepts such as “discretion,” but contends that these models cannot be constructed in a political vacuum. Rather, the partisan context contours the discretion of legislators in significant and meaningful ways that traditional formal theory neglects to capture.

The present analysis further serves as a contribution to congressional research on methodological grounds. By using the theoretical framework of party culture to drive the analysis of ideology in the second chapter, this work illuminates important differences in the constituency pressures felt by the two parties. Secondly, this analysis recognizes the significance of multiple measures of participation (Hall 1996). Analysis of Member partisan participation at both the institutional and organizational level more fully captures the relationship of party culture to legislative behavior. Finally, the integration of interview data into the analysis yields a rich descriptive picture of partisan roles and values that would otherwise be missing.

Table 1.1 The Party Culture Thesis

Party Culture	
Democrats	Republicans
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • minority coalition-building conception of representation • emphasizes individual group interest • highly pluralistic structure • emphasis on group loyalties leading to ideological diversity • open and confrontational party politics • organizational style best reflected by social movement with discretion spread among different vocal groups • rewards seniority 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • unitary conception of representation • emphasizes national interest • highly elitist structure • emphasis on party loyalty leading to social and ideological homogeneity • closed and consensual party politics • organizational style best reflected by corporation with discretion at the top • rewards party loyalty and party-building activities

Table 1.2 The Electoral Security Thesis

Electoral Security	
Secure Members	Insecure Members
<ul style="list-style-type: none">· can spend less time and effort on district issues· have more discretion to vote contrary to district preferences· enjoy time necessary to pursue leadership positions and get involved in the party organization· congruence of policy preferences with district and/or party organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">· must spend more time and effort on district issues· have less discretion to vote contrary to district preferences· lack time necessary to pursue leadership positions and get involved in the party organization· less congruence of policy preferences with district and/or party organization

Table 1.3 The Matrix of Member Behavior Based on Party Culture and Electoral Security

		Electoral Security	
		Secure Members	Insecure Members
Party Culture	Democrats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · enjoy electoral and partisan discretion · enjoy seniority and the leadership positions that accompany it 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · lack electoral discretion, but enjoy partisan discretion to vote in the interest of the district · lack seniority and the leadership positions that accompany it
	Republicans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · enjoy electoral discretion, but lack partisan discretion · enjoy seniority but still must compete for leadership positions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · lack both electoral and partisan discretion to vote in the interest of the district · lack seniority and must compete for leadership positions

Chapter 2

The Electoral Connection: Women as Partisans Within Their Districts

“She (Republican female Member) couldn’t ever run for leadership because she’s too busy securing her own race. But she would have been great (in leadership) because none of them are from vulnerable districts. She anticipates the train or the storm and would be a good spot check. If something is going to happen, she’s the first to hear the rumbling.”
-- senior staff for Republican female Member

Introduction

This project examines the partisan contours of women’s legislative behavior. Each section approaches the subject from a different perspective, including: the electoral circumstances of female Members within their district, the ideological nature of women’s voting behavior within the institution, and the character of women’s status and participation within the party organizations. In this section, we begin with the electoral connection to understand the different constituent pressures women face due to partisanship.

The legislative behavior of Members is first and foremost driven by reelection. While Members do have other motivations such as power, prestige, and policy development (Fenno 1973), they are fundamentally concerned with maintaining political office (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977; Fenno 1978). The cause of this electoral connection is the structure of the American political system. Legislators are elected to represent the interests of their constituencies. For this reason, we should first look to the electoral connection for insight on the partisan contours of women’s representation.

This analysis begins our quest from the vantage point of the district. We look to this arena for insight on motivations for Member behavior. What do women see when they look to their districts? How do district pressures influence women’s legislative

behavior? Are there district pressures specifically related to partisanship that shape women's participation in the legislative arena?

A number of interviews with both Members and staff provide the qualitative data for this examination.¹ From the vantage point of the campaign trail, respondents share their experiences and perspectives on the partisan arena in which female legislators must operate. This analysis provides a rich context from which to formulate more adequate conclusions and implications concerning women's partisan behavior.

Legislative Behavior and the Electoral Connection

During the first half of the twentieth century, congressional theory focused on the historical evolution of the institution. With the rise of behavioralism and the development of predictive modeling during the 1960's and 1970's, congressional theorists turned their attention to voting behavior and election returns. Some of the most influential theoretical works on the Congress were produced during this period. Works such as Richard Fenno's *Homestyle* (1977) and David Mayhew's *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (1974) point to the importance of the district and electoral politics to understanding a Member's legislative behavior. Members are well aware of the relationship between their voting behavior and their electoral safety. One incumbent interviewed by Fenno remarked: "if you get too far from your district, you'll lose it" (1978: 144). It is unlikely that one vote makes or breaks an incumbent's chance at reelection. A consistent divergence in a Member's general ideology from that of her district, however, can lead to incumbent vulnerability.

This analysis assumes that Members are concerned with reelection, and that they

¹ The research in this paper is based on interviews with political elites during the first session of the 107th Congress. Of the 81 interviews conducted for this research, 25 were with Members of Congress, 47 with congressional aides, and 9 with party elites. All of these respondents provided me with information under the condition that their identity would not be revealed. Consequently, none of the respondents are identified by name or office in this work.

thus reflect to some degree the preferences of their constituents. Although findings are mixed,² the electoral marginality of a Member is to some extent associated with the Member's attentiveness to district concerns (MacRae 1958; Miller and Stokes 1963).³

Consequently, the marginality thesis suggests that districts or Members representing more marginal districts are more moderate in their ideological voting behavior.⁴ Tests of this hypothesis also have produced mixed results. While some have found electoral marginality to be associated with party disloyalty (Froman 1963), others have found disloyalty associated with higher electoral margins. Particularly for Republicans, those with the most diverse districts display partisan disloyalty that leads to higher rather than lower election returns (Deckard 1976). Those candidates who most closely match constituency opinion are more likely to win (Sullivan and Uslaner 1978). It is important to note that much of the seminal work on marginality finds partisan-based differences in the relationship between marginality and voting behavior (Froman 1963; Shannon 1968; Deckard 1976).

For the purposes of this analysis, I examine the electoral security of Members as well as the general ideological climate of the district – another important influence on

² Kuklinski (1977) challenges the notion that constituency influence is greater in competitive districts as well as the notion that marginality leads to partisan disloyalty. He does not find complete support for these arguments when examining data across policy dimensions.

³ In this chapter, I do not focus on the determinants of constituent responsiveness or develop a predictive model of Member voting behavior controlling for district factors. This chapter is more qualitative and provides a broader theoretical overview concerning the role of partisanship in structuring the electoral circumstance of Members. This chapter provides an analysis of Member perceptions of their electoral circumstance and a general overview of their subsequent voting behavior. Predictive models are developed in the next chapter and a theoretical discussion of the relevant literature on constituency pressures and Member behavior is presented there.

⁴ Sullivan and Uslaner (1978) suggest Fiorina's (1973) review of the literature on the marginality hypothesis. In terms of the Congress, the short list includes: Huntington (1950), Froman (1963), Erikson (1971), and Deckard (1976).

Member behavior ((Bianco 1984; Bond, Covington, and Fleischer 1985; Canon 1990). Electoral security is measured as the percent of the vote received in the last election. The ideological character of the district is measured as the percent of the vote received by the winning presidential candidate in the last election. Why should we expect district variables to predict Member behavior? Because “those representatives who grossly misjudge the empirical situation do not survive long in the electoral arena” (Fiorina 1974: 40).

The presidential vote return of a district is frequently used as a proxy to capture general district ideology. While this measure is the subject of debate, it is the most consistent data source available that measures voter preferences at the district level. Because it is based on voting behavior, it provides a more accurate indicator of the political character of the district than those provided by demographic characteristics (Bond, Campbell, Cottrill 2001: 12). While some have used the mean presidential vote across multiple elections in order to limit the idiosyncratic effects of individual candidates (Bianco 1984), critics of this measure argue that doing so reduces the accuracy of the measure in capturing contemporary leanings (Bond, Campbell, Cottrill 2001: 11).

Party Culture and Electoral Politics

Party structure is significantly related to the influence of women in the political process (Freeman 1986). While some have suggested that the Republican Party is a poor imitation of the coalition-building Democratic Party, the Republican Party is a different type of political organization with a different type of political culture altogether (ibid). As presented in the previous chapter, Table 1.1 delineates the differences in party culture suggested by the literature (see Freeman 1986). The Democratic Party illustrates a highly pluralistic structure, whereas the Republican Party illustrates a more elitist structure. Freeman notes that:

Since the Democratic Party is composed of groups, the success of individuals whose group identification is highly significant, such as blacks and women, is tied to that of the group as a whole. They succeed as the group succeeds. That is not the case within the Republican Party. It officially ignores group characteristics... Generally, individuals succeed insofar as the leaders with whom they are connected succeed (336).

Consequently, the Republican Party advocates a more unitary conception of representation. Meeting the needs of national interest, such as improving the economy, is the appropriate means for meeting the needs of individual groups. On the other hand, Democrats hold a conception of representation that emphasizes minority coalition-building (ibid). Freeman states:

Democrats do not have an integrated conception of a national interest, in part because they do not view themselves as the center of society. The party's components think of themselves as outsiders pounding on the door seeking programs that will facilitate entry into the mainstream. Thus, the party is very responsive to any groups... (1986: 338).

This ethos is further evidenced in the organizational style of the two parties. While Democratic party politics are often characterized as "open" and "confrontational," Republican party politics are characterized as "closed" and "consensual" (ibid). The organizational style of the Republican Party is best reflected by a corporation with discretion located at the top, whereas the organizational style of the Democratic party is best reflected by a social movement with discretion located among the different vocal groups. The representational ethos and the organizational style of the Democratic Party work hand-in-hand to produce an environment of conflict and change (ibid).

One of the major consequences of these attitudinal and structural differences between the parties concerns the role of women within the parties. The Republican Party emphasizes loyalty to the party first and foremost, whereas the Democratic party provides the vehicle whereby group loyalties may be articulated in the political arena. Freeman (1986) suggests that:

Even in 1976, when Republican feminists were aligned with party leaders, one organizer commented that because the GOP is not "an interest group party... the RWTF (Republican Women's Task Force)⁵ is viewed with skepticism. Party regulars have a hard time adjusting to the presence of an organized interest." The current leadership views feminist organizations as Democratic party front groups. Thus it is virtually impossible to be both an accepted Republican activist and an outspoken supporter of feminist goals. Since the party discourages people from identifying themselves as members of a group with a group agenda, it minimizes the possibility of multiple loyalties (348).

Another consequence of the Republican emphasis on party loyalty is widespread trust among rank-and-file Members of the Republican Party. An emphasis on social and ideological homogeneity fosters a trust of others within the group. Party leaders thus are capable of maintaining discretion over the policy agenda because they benefit from a large degree of membership trust (ibid: 351).

The extent to which the Republican Party changed both ideologically and structurally during the 1994 election and the 104th Congress thereafter remains a question for future scholarship. In predicting the 1994 election, Connelly and Pitney (1994) suggested that the Republican Party would need to "appeal to disparate constituencies and yet [be] unified enough to present coherent alternatives" (578). In retrospect, it appears the Republican Party has managed to maintain a substantial amount of loyalty while integrating a number (small as it may be) of demographically-diverse legislators into its membership. This leads us to conclude that while conservative women have influenced the legislative debate, they have done so within the confines of partisan politics.

Women and the Electoral Connection

In order to explain the significant disparity between the number of male and

⁵According to Freeman (2000), "The year before the 1976 conventions, the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) organized a Republican Women's Task Force" of Ford supporters to promote the proposed ERA (Equal Rights Amendment). (Accessed from <http://www.seniorwomen.com/articles/freemanGone.html> on June 6, 2002).

female elected officials in national politics, gender theorists have devoted some attention to the electoral connection. Three different aspects of campaigns and elections have been thought to contribute to women's success as political candidates. First, research has focused on differences in the political ambition of men and women. Secondly, research examines differences in the way in which male and female candidates both perceive themselves and are perceived by the electorate. Finally, research measures how successful women are in terms of various campaign activities in vying for political office.

Early investigations on the subject of political ambition revealed significant differences between men and women (Bledsoe and Herring 1990; Constantini 1990; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Carroll 1994; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; NWPC 1994; Fox 1997). The implications for gender theory were that women have less political ambition and thus are less likely to participate in national electoral politics (Carroll 1994; NWPC 1994). In light of *The Year of the Woman* (1992) and the electoral gains women made during the 1990's both at the state and local levels and at the national level (Cook, Thomas, and Wilcox 1994; Thomas and Wilcox 1998), recent research has revealed that the ambition gap is closing. Fox, Lawless, and Feeley (2001), in their examination of the interaction between gender and the decision to run for office, for example, find equal levels of political ambition among men and women.

While men and women might demonstrate equal levels of ambition in the contemporary context, there is evidence to suggest that they face unequal campaign environments. Female candidates feel a greater need than male candidates to establish their credibility when presenting themselves to the public (Fowler and McClure 1989; Kahn 1996; Poole 1993). Perhaps, this perception is related to the finding that, given equal qualifications, men are much more likely to be encouraged to run for political office than women (Fox 1997). There is also evidence to suggest that women face additional pressures to prove their credibility in campaigns (Kahn 1993).

Beyond credibility, women also face gendered stereotypes in the electorate. Male and female candidates are treated differently both by the media and by voters. In covering campaigns, the press does differentiate between male and female candidates. The press pays less issue attention to women than men (Kahn 1994). In terms of voter evaluations, female candidates appeal to female voters. In evaluating both House and Senate races, female voters are more likely to support female candidates than male voters. When there is a female candidate, female voters are also more likely to vote based on gender-related issues (Dolan 1998). Women are viewed as more liberal on social issues. These stereotypes do not necessarily disadvantage women. Especially in gubernatorial campaigns, sex stereotypes produce positive evaluations of female candidates (Kahn 1994). Consequently, the strong female candidates can often attract cross-over votes or votes from the other party (Zipp and Plutzer 1985). In other words, these sex stereotypes can draw moderate voters from the opposition party.

In light of both positive and negative gendered stereotypes, women appear to be enjoying equal levels of electoral success. Particularly in open seat elections, women of both parties fair just as well as men (Gaddie and Bullock 2000). Recent research suggests that female candidates are not disadvantaged in terms of fundraising and vote totals (Wilhite and Theilmann 1986; Leeper 1991; Burrell 1994; 1998; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Cook 1998; Thompson and Steckenrider 1997; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). Low levels of female representation in the national political arena is due to gendered differences in the decision to run for political office rather than the success of female candidates in the electoral arena (Fox, Lawless, and Feeley 2001).

While it is true that females of both parties are more likely to vote for female candidates, Democratic female candidates are most advantaged by the female vote because of their clear feminist stance (Plutzer and Zipp 1996). Contrastingly, Republican female candidates give mixed voting cues. According to Plutzer and Zipp (ibid): "Gender identity competes with party affiliation as a cue for voting behavior" (21). Voters must deal with conflicting cues particularly concerning social issues when evaluating Republican female candidates. Consequently, the Democratic Party is both more likely to appeal to as well as actually recruit female candidates (Biersack and Herrnson 1994). According to Burrell (1994), women could be more likely to run as Democrats for several reasons. She suggests that women might run as Democrats because: they have a greater likelihood of winning; there are more Democratic female state legislators; there are more Democratic open seats; and Democratic party culture is more receptive to women as candidates than Republican party culture.

In the interview data for this analysis, Members and their staff discussed their personal decisions to run for congressional office, the nature of their districts, and the relative difficulty of their campaigns. Interviews with party elites echoed these themes and also shed light on the recruitment process. All of the respondents commented on the difficulty Republican women have in securing congressional seats. The following discussion highlights the findings from these interviews and illustrates the unique electoral circumstances faced by women in Congress.

The Decision to Run:

One of the clearest partisan patterns I observed while conducting interviews with Members and their staff concerned legislators' decisions to run for Congress. While Democratic Members largely came from backgrounds in social work or education, Republican Members largely came from political or business backgrounds or had politically-active families. Though gender theory suggests that women are more likely than men to be motivated run for office because of some specific issue (Fox 1997), the data for this research suggests that this finding is an artifact of partisanship rather than gender. The Democratic Party advocates the traditional "women's issues" that typically motivate and prioritize women's political involvement (Thomas 1994; Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern 1997). While Democrats were motivated to run for congressional office by issues or issue-relevant professional backgrounds, Republicans were motivated by previous political experience and a driving political philosophy. See Table 2.1 for a presentation of female Members' routes to congressional office.

*** Table 2.1 about here***

Democrats

For Democratic Members, issues or professional background was the driving force behind their decision to run. A few Democratic Members and staff noted issues as the impetus for the decision to run. Take, for example, Rep. Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY), motivated to run for Congress on the issue of gun control by the death of her husband and son due to a shooting. Interestingly, the Democratic Members who did mention issues were predominantly African-American. A staff for one such male Member reflected:

(Member X's) interest in running for office did not stem from a political family background. He was the first in his family to be elected to Congress in (state X), just as he was the first to be elected to the federal bench. What interested him was where he grew up. He was a civil rights leader. As an attorney, he was involved

in desegregation.

Similarly, a staff for another senior black Democratic male Member noted that it was the Member's involvement in the civil rights movement that motivated his political career. He was part of the historic march that was the catalyst of the Voting Rights Act.

Some Democratic women get involved in congressional politics because of their profession. One staff remarked that her Member "was a former substitute teacher that gained political experience before running for Congress." Still another noted that his boss was a former nurse who "has a heart for helping people." They work in professions directly associated with social issues traditionally considered women's issues, such as education and healthcare.

Yet some in Democratic leadership are concerned about the effects of women running on issues for reaching out to women nationally. A senior staffer in a Democratic leadership office noted:

When a woman Democrat says anything about guns, the public perceives her to be extreme. As Democrats, we have not done a good enough job at the local level to identify, nurture, and support female candidates in order for them to prove credible. The Republicans have done a better job at that. Take this scenario for example. A small business person at a chamber of commerce meeting considers herself a Republican. She considers herself pro-choice and for equal pay. Her social circle and networking however is Republican. This identification becomes how she gets along, but she doesn't realize that Republicans don't support the programs she believes in. We count on women candidates figuring that out on their own...

Because women make up 50% of the voting population, female candidates are better able to appeal to all districts than minority candidates and thus have enjoyed quicker advancement to higher levels of politics. Consequently, this senior staff person reiterated the importance of reaching out to more women by:

having our female Members articulate other messages. We need new African-American women like Juanita Millender-McDonald. We need Carolyn McCarthy on mainstream issues rather than guns. We need women to take credit for their

non-traditional stances, like Jane Harman who is pro-defense. Ellen Fauscher, a fiscal conservative, needs to be out there.

Republicans

For Republicans, the pattern was very different. Republican women by and large seemed motivated to run for Congress by political backgrounds -- and importantly, their own political backgrounds. A senior staffer in a Republican leadership office noted that just twenty years ago,

very few (Republican) women were elected on their own. All of them were widows. They left service in the 80's, and a new breed started in the 90's. The others worked hard, but they were brought here by their husbands.

In an examination of the congressional careers of sixty-six women elected to the House between 1917 and 1970, Bullock and Heys (1972) found that nearly a majority of them (47%) were widows who filled their late-husbands' seats. According to the leadership of the National Federation of Republican Women, several convergent factors have been at work to encourage female Republicans to independently run:

In the early 90's, at the national level, we began looking to women who had been elected before at other levels of government. First and foremost, these women know the demands of holding elective office; they are well versed in issues; they have proven they can win, and that they can raise money. Women weren't stepping up as much. Then 1992, the "Year of the Woman," and we didn't do that well. This is when women in the party realized that it took more than just being a woman. People want more than a "woman's perspective." All issues are issues for all of us. More became willing to step up and run, and realized that voters want more than women's issues. We gained the majority in 1994, and for the first time had women in leadership positions in the House. We put the spotlight on them; they were good role models. Then we started providing campaign management schools, and there was also the natural progression of the increase in local women office-holders. We are on the executive committee of the RNC. There has been a real effort at the national level with Anne Wagner (Vice Chair of the RNC).

Nearly 85% (11 out of 13) of the congressional aides to female Republican Members interviewed commented on the Representative's political or legislative

qualifications for elective office. Some noted the political family background of the Member. One staff for a Republican female Member explained that she “came from a political family. Her father was a congressman and governor. Given that her district is a swing district, the party definitely had interest in her long before the election.” Another staff for a female Republican Member noted that, “her Dad was the executive director of the RNC. She felt the need to carry on the family name. There is a 16-year history of holding the seat. There was a whole host of party recruiters convincing her to run.”

Others talked about the political experience of the Member that qualified her to run for Congress. One staff for a Republican female Member, when asked what interested her Member in running for Congress, noted: “She was the (X) state party chair for 12 years. She worked on Goldwater’s campaign. She is a huge Reaganite and a fiscal conservative. She believes we ought to get government out of personal issues, we ought to make government smaller.” Another stated that her Republican female Member “had previous political experience and likes public service. When (Member X) retired, the local GOP knew her.” One of the most interesting stories concerning the decision to run involved a more senior female Republican Member. Her staff recounted the early days of the Member’s political career:

She had previous political experience. She was on school board, and ran her area for (Candidate X’s) gubernatorial campaign. There were a number of party activists and leadership at the local and regional level that urged her to take on the incumbent for her congressional district. She attended the NRCC’s campaign school on how to run and win in the mid 1980’s – they called it “charm school.” In fact, G. W. (Bush) named her “Charm-School (first-name of Member X).”

While the vast majority of women elected to represent Republican districts come from political families or backgrounds, some do not. Some expressed the hardships they faced getting the endorsement of the party given their background outside of political life. One staff for a Republican female Member noted that she responded to a “grassroots

public outcry. She was number 1 in real estate. The party came on late once they realized she was going to win.” Still others who had political experience recounted difficulty in gaining the party endorsement. One staff remarked:

(Member X) had previous political experience... She was recruited, but not everyone in the party agreed on who the candidate should be. It was a split endorsement. The key issue was abortion. In the primary, she ran against a very conservative Republican. She walked the fence enough to get elected... She comes from an urban area with suburbs and a college and some rural areas that are Midwest moderate. She’s a good balance. She receives 70% of the vote now. Guns and abortion are two issues in which she’s out of sync with conservative Republicans.

For some, the marginality of the district combined with previous political experience worked to their advantage in gaining the party endorsement. One staff for a Republican female Member said:

She’s a grassroots campaigner. She had no political connections or family money. She was the only Republican in the area down the board. But she understands the legislative process; she has a legal background. She has 10 years experience as a state legislator, and that definitely impacts business here.

One staff for an electorally-focused Republican female Member offered rich insight into the problem Republican women face in gaining the party’s endorsement. She suggested that it is not necessarily the lack of qualified female candidates, but rather the lack of consideration given to them by male party elites. She stated:

Men (in the local party organization) will sit around and talk about candidates. Whenever talking about civic or community service positions they will ask women to serve, but when talking about political office, they don’t. Women are used to being asked. When they aren’t asked, they tend to not feel qualified or adequate. We (women) have to shift the paradigm and just run.

For many, the contours of the district determine the electoral fate of the Member. When asked how the party generally handles recruitment, a high-ranking Republican leadership staffer noted:

The party actively recruits challengers. It is a function of the RNC and NRCC...We work with the representatives already in the state for recommendations. Then we look at the make-up of districts for racial diversity, democratic registration, and union membership. We go district by district and try to find candidates early so that we can get grassroots mobilization and fundraising early on. Then we send in the leadership team to raise the profile of the candidate and raise money. It's hard to recruit candidates unless there is lots of money to back them. It's even hard with money because of all the media scrutiny and family scrutiny.

A director at the NRCC contended that the party's handling of recruitment depends on the seat. He observed: "If the seat is one we can hold, then we're pretty much hands off. If it's competitive, we then try to promote the candidate. We try to stay neutral, but at times we help to find a strong candidate if one has not already been identified."

In discussing the criteria involved in the recruitment of female candidates, he remarked:

The most important category is 'electability'. If the candidate is a state representative from the corner of a district and is up against a state senator, then the candidate has low electability. This criteria includes things like ideological orientation and compatibility with the district.

When asked what characteristics the party looks for in female recruits, a director in a Republican leadership office stated: "Being a woman - that's what they look for." She elaborated that "it's always tricky; it depends on the district." When pushed on specific criteria such as confidence, ambition, attractiveness, and education, she noted: "They like ambition the least. Male party leaders are the ones doing the recruiting. What they think is appealing to the public is a woman who's not too aggressive." Similarly, the director from the NRCC noted that "women can be too aggressive," but he also noted that "they can also be too soft." He elaborated:

It's hard to just check off a box. If everybody says 'she's a bitch,' but she's majority leader, they'll say 'she gets stuff done.' If they have a record of getting stuff done, they can be hard core and it not work against them. Some might even

view it as a good quality. We look to the candidate and tell her to use it to her advantage – use her qualities to her advantage.

A majority of the Republican party elites I interviewed (5 of 8) noted that the family background of female candidates is becoming increasingly important in the recruitment process. The NRCC director stated:

A woman's family background allows her credibility on issues, such as: family issues, education issues, social issues, and abortion... Female candidates discuss family background more than men because when females have children and aren't in the workforce, they have to use that time to their advantage and integrate it into their qualifications as work experience or a positive quality. You wouldn't buy it if a man used it as experience, but it is bought from women. They are thought of as care givers. There's no question that women are still breaking barriers. The first thing that jumps out with female recruits is what they've done to qualify them for office. Men can just say, 'I believe in... and that's why I'm running.'

In fact, 6 (33%) of the Republican women in office in the 106th Congress came from political families, according to the Center for American Women in Politics.⁶ Family background along with the ability to raise campaign funds seem to be the most important criteria involved in the party's perception of female candidates. As another Republican leadership staffer commented: "The party looks for money. If a challenger is individually wealthy, she is automatically a candidate. The ability to raise money is highly attractive."

District Marginality

Several district-level factors combine to form electoral pressures on a Member. Marginality is a concept that is often used to describe the extent to which a congressional seat is competitive. It refers to a number of contexts. First, a seat is considered marginal

⁶ Political family background as well as the other routes to office was coded from the biographical sketches provided by the Center for American Women in Politics (2002). If the sketch mentioned the political associations of the female Member's family in any way, that Member was coded as having a political family background. In terms of the interview data, the definition of family background was left to the discretion of the party elites.

if the general ideology of the district is more moderate than the party holding the seat. Secondly, a seat is considered marginal if the vote returns for the Member are barely a majority. According to Mayhew (1974), a Member represents a marginal seat if she captures less than 55% of the vote. This standard is not sufficient for measuring marginality in the present context (Jacobson 1987). According to Jacobson (1987):

Electoral data show that House incumbents are no safer now than they were in the 1950s, the marginals properly defined have not vanished; the swing ration has diminished little, if at all, and competition for House seats held by incumbents has not declined. Vote margins increased without adding to incumbent security, diminishing competition, or dampening swings (126).

This research suggests that marginality still influences Member behavior, but that the standard for marginality has changed. Elections are more volatile, so Members are unsafe at wider margins than in decades past. Consequently, the measure used for this analysis is 60%. Members who receive 60% of the vote or more are defined as safe; Members who receive less than 60% of the vote are defined as insecure.⁷

It is important for us to consider district marginality when examining women's political participation because marginality can have a significant impact on legislative behavior. Recent rational choice theory suggests that Members in safe seats with wide electoral margins enjoy more "discretion" than Members in competitive districts (Parker 1992). In other words, they have more freedom to pursue their own policy goals or higher inter- or intra-institutional office.

Several factors are thought to lead to electoral competition or marginality. In particular, district heterogeneity or diversity is thought to be associated with marginality

⁷ Multiple measures of marginality were tested in developing the analysis for this chapter as well as the sections of the project that follow. Marginality defined as 55%, 60%, and 65% produced generally the same results. For the purpose of this project, the 60% measure was incorporated because not only is it supported by the literature, but it also provided enough cases in the insecure category as well as the secure category to provide meaningful interpretation.

(Froman 1963; Fiorina 1974; Koetzle 1999). The district diversity thesis suggests that “members from diverse districts are likely to experience more electoral competition than other members from relatively less diverse districts” (Koetzle 1999: 562). Analyses examining this association, however, have produced mixed results (see Bond 1983; 1985).

Proponents of the diversity thesis point to the disparate constituencies to which the American political parties appeal. Republicans typically represent whites, higher income populations, white-collar workers, Protestants, and suburban voters. Democrats, on the other hand, typically represent blacks and other minority populations, lower income populations, blue-collar workers, and urban voters (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Miller, Converse, and Stokes 1960; Froman 1963; Levy and Kramer 1976; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt 1989; Mayer 1996; Aistrup 1996; Miller and Stokes 1996). In diverse districts, or districts that are a mix of these two conglomerations, Koetzle suggests:

we might expect the “distribution of opinion to be more centered than in homogeneous districts. In this situation, each party is better able to field candidates ideologically attractive to a significant portion of the constituency. This, in turn, leads to relatively higher levels of electoral competition (562).

In my interviews, clear patterns developed regarding the electoral constraints female Members face due to marginality. There are marginal seats on both sides of the aisle. A staff for a Democratic female Member noted the electoral constraints faced by the Member.

She’s in a Republican district, so she doesn’t vote along party lines all the time. Take for example the tax cut: she personally disagreed, but it was in the district’s interest. She would follow the party line more if she was in a Democratic district. She often doesn’t have a choice on what or how to vote if she wants to retain her seat.

Female Republican Members and their staff, however, provided the majority of the comments regarding marginality. A few female Republican Members specifically drew my attention to their electoral situation, noting that they had additional constraints on their participation than their co-partisan male colleagues.

These Members and staff pointed to the ideological marginality of the district as a constraint on legislative behavior. More specifically, social issues seemed to pose problems for Members' vote decisions. Out of the 13 female Republican offices in which I interviewed, 10 were characterized as representing marginal or socially moderate districts by the staff and/or Member. A staff for one Republican female Member noted that she:

struggles more with social issues because of her district. It is fiscally conservative. Thankfully, on her committee, she doesn't have to deal with the 'prickly issues,' like abortion and gun control, because the district is divided. It has both rural and urban areas. Both her (the Member) and Gore took the district by 65%.

Another staff for a Republican female Member noted that she comes from a "very depressed state." Consequently, her top three legislative priorities are: "economic development, prescription drug coverage, and infrastructure." He later commented that "all her legislative priorities are district driven."

Some noted that these constraints posed personal ideological problems for the Member. One staff for a Republican female Member noted that she comes from a "Democratic district," elaborating that:

She's socially conservative (pro-life and pro-gun), but she has to toe the line on unions for example. She sees tax cuts as a route to job creation to address the needs of her district which is economically-depressed.

These electoral constraints do not just condition the Member's vote; they also structure their time and attention. A staff for a female Republican Member noted that

she:

brings back more money than we ever thought possible to the district. She has an intonation for what people want to hear. She wants to be involved in everything because it's her neck that's on the line. She is involved in the direct mail, the franked mail. She rewrote the entire franked mail education piece last year. She's incredibly hands on; she's very in touch with what's going on in the office. She emphasizes her soft side. It's two-to-one registered Democrats in the district. She emphasizes education, seniors, healthcare; she doesn't talk about tax cuts in the district. She's not putting out legislative proposals right now. It was no legislation, just appropriations pieces up until ergonomics - that was the first substantive policy issue that we worked on. She's very election-focused. She had three ads against her last election cycle by June.

Not only do female Republican Members see their districts as requiring more attention because of issues, they also understand their personal ambition constrained by electoral demands. One staff for a female Republican Member noted:

She couldn't ever run for leadership because she's too busy securing her own race. But she would have been great (in leadership) because none of them are from vulnerable districts. She anticipates the train or the storm and would be a good spot check. If something is going to happen, she's the first to hear the rumbling.

The additional attention necessary for the district also poses time constraints in Washington. Several Members noted that because they were from marginal districts they were required to participate in more political activities sponsored by the National Republican Campaign Committee. In return for political support, they were expected to participate in party meetings and events. The NRCC director explained that:

Twenty percent of the organizational meetings involve the full conference; forty percent of meetings include active folks in politics who want to be involved in the team; and the other forty percent of meetings are attended by people who have to be involved and active because they need to be reelected and they're trying to score points.

One staff for a Republican female Member noted that his Member is a "targeted Member" meaning that she is in a marginal district and receives great attention by the

NRCC. For this reason, she regularly attends the NRCC meetings and fundraisers (averaging twice a month). Another staff for a Republican female Member explained that her district is a “swing district.” She is also considered a “targeted member.” He further explained that:

She is on the ‘ROMP list’ or the ‘Retain Our Majority Party’ list. This list is composed of 7-10 of the most vulnerable Members. The NRCC has events with this group. They are given the very best treatment. She is a very valuable Member in a competitive district, so she is top on the list.

He further suggested that the marginality of her district has consequences for her party activity, stating: “It’s a tough position to be in. She is a freshman in a vulnerable seat. She is going to be given some leeway, but we have to dissent at the right time.”

Nevertheless, these Republican women do serve a vital function in the party. As one staff remarked:

Ninety percent of the time, she votes Republican. She’s a great fundraiser, and she’s a great communicator when properly focused. And she holds a seat that would never hold a man. She appeals to soccer moms. She comes from a large family and talks about policy in the context of her family.

In this short bit of dialogue, this staffer articulates the function of women within the party. These women add a new face to the Republican Party. They communicate the message in a distinctive way that appeals to a different, more liberal audience. They do not always vote with the party, but can be counted on most of the time. And most importantly, they secure seats that otherwise would be unattainable by Republicans. The ability of Republican women to communicate to a different, more feminine audience is valued not just by the female legislators themselves, but also by the party leadership. As one senior Republican leadership staff noted:

Their contribution is that they understand better than men family concerns and the challenges of raising a family. That’s why they’re biased towards those types of issues (e.g. education and healthcare). Men don’t own the problem. The women

understand what 50% of voters go through in trying to raise a family. Even Democratic men are biased towards numbers (e.g. taxes and defense). The women bring a sense of community, even the conservative women like Barbara Cubin understand that. The conservative men just don't get it.

It appears that the evaluations expressed by staff and Members of electoral constraints are not too far fetched. Either way we define marginality, female Republican Members generally represent more marginal districts than their co-partisan male colleagues (See Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 about here

Overall, female Republican Members win their elections by narrower margins than male Republican Members. Both before and after the Republican take-over of Congress, Republican women represented more marginal districts than men. The only exception to this generalization is in the 105th Congress, or the election of 1996. In this year, Republican men held a slightly lower average rate of electoral return than Republican women. Perhaps this is attributable to the public backlash to the excesses of Gingrich control. It is also possible that this anomaly reflects the marginality of the large freshmen class of 1994 who had not yet established an incumbency advantage. The years surrounding the Republican Revolution are considered to be unstable years, and thus we should be careful to draw conclusions based on data from these years.

It is important to note, however, that during years of partisan stability the pattern is even more pronounced. In 1992, Republican women had the lowest average vote return of any category of Members. At 58.92%, they were lower than Republican men (62.65%), Democratic men (64.28%), and Democratic women (64.11%). Similarly, in 1998, Republican women repeated the pattern. With 64.59%, they enjoyed markedly higher average returns, but still were lower than Republican men (70.25%), Democratic men (71.42%), and Democratic women (70.15%). Also of note is the fact that Democratic women as a group enjoy larger electoral margins than Republican women in

every congress in the sample.

Figure 2.1 about here

Dichotomizing the electoral vote return variable provides us with a basic measure of security. To construct this variable, I coded safe Members as those Members receiving 60% or more of the vote, and unsafe Members as those Members receiving less than 60% of the vote. Table 2.3 provides the percentages of Members defined as safe and unsafe by party and sex. Similarly, Figure 2.1 provides a visual depiction of Member marginality across congresses by party and sex. This figure clearly demonstrates that Republican women have the largest percentage of insecure Members of any group. Except for the 104th Congress when a slightly larger percentage of Democratic men than Republican women were electorally insecure, this figure provides further evidence to suggest that Republican women suffer from greater electoral insecurity than any other group. Further, on average the largest partisan gap in electoral security is between Republican men and Republican women. In other words, since the change of partisan control in the 104th Congress, Republican men as a group are the most electorally secure Members of Congress and Republican women are generally the least electorally secure Members of Congress.

Table 2.3 about here

Drawing from the interview data, it would seem that one of the primary differences between the districts represented by Republican men and Republican women is general ideology. Members and their staff suggested that female Republican Members represent districts that are on average more moderate than those represented by male Republican Members. Table 2.3 presents the average district presidential returns broken down by sex and partisanship of the Member. Districts represented by female Republican Members yielded higher returns for President Clinton in both 1992 and 1996 than districts represented by male Republican Members. This measure of district ideology

supports the notion that female Republicans do represent more marginal or moderate districts than male Republicans. In 1992, the average vote return for Clinton was 37.67% in districts represented by Republican women; it was 35.92% in districts represented by Republican men. Similarly, in 1996, the average presidential return was 45.12% in female Republican districts, and 42.55% in male Republican districts.

Conversely, Democratic women represent districts with much higher average presidential vote returns than Democratic men. In 1992, the average vote return for Clinton was 55% in districts represented by Democratic women; it was 48.17% in districts represented by Democratic men. In 1996, the pattern was the same. The average presidential return was 61.68% in female Democratic districts, and 58.04% in male Democratic districts.

Connecting the Dots – From Electoral Behavior to Voting Behavior

Although voting behavior is given a much more thorough treatment in the next chapter of the analysis, for the purposes of this presentation, it is helpful to briefly “connect the dots” between Members’ electoral behavior and their general voting behavior.

Figure 2.2 about here

Figure 2.2 illustrates mean differences between male and female voting behavior from the 103rd Congress to the 106th Congress given partisanship. While this is simply a graph of average DW-NOMINATE scores, it serves to illustrate the ever-growing partisan polarization among Members of Congress.⁸ Women are more liberal than their

⁸ I employ the vote scaling techniques developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991, 1997). These DW-NOMINATE scores were downloaded from Keith Poole’s data archive on the web at: http://voteview.uh.edu/default_nomdata.htm and are recorded for the 103rd through 106th Congresses. DW-NOMINATE scores are useful in that they can be compared across congresses. DW-NOMINATE scores provide a single measure of ideology, bounded between +2 and -1 with conservatism increasing in a positive direction on a single left-right continuum.

male partisan colleagues, however, there is a clearly delineated pattern of partisan voting among both men and women. Female Republicans are much more conservative than male or female Democrats. Conversely, female Democrats are much more liberal than male or female Republicans.⁹

Since the Republican takeover of Congress, male and female Republicans have become more conservative in their voting behavior. It is important to note that the gap between Republican male and female ideological voting has narrowed since the 103rd Congress. In other words, Republican women have disproportionately become more conservative in their voting behavior. This is further significant given that the number of Republican women has increased by a third since the 103rd Congress (from 12 to 18). Democratic women, on the other hand, have stayed relatively ideologically stable across congresses. While Democratic men have become a little more conservative overall, this difference is minimal.

The argument of this analysis is that partisanship structures women's behavior in the Congress. In this study, we examined how the electoral circumstance of female Members is shaped by their partisanship. We found that Republican women represent more moderate districts, and must devote additional resources to electoral concerns in order to secure their seats. This finding raises an important question concerning women's voting behavior given their electoral security. How does electoral security influence women's voting behavior? Are electorally-insecure women more likely to vote with their district than their party? Should we expect Republican women to illustrate more liberal

⁹ To test whether the differences in means between the independent populations (Democratic males and Democratic females, and Republican males and Republican females) were significant, I conducted Levene's test for equality of variances and independent sample t tests assuming normal distributions as well as Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests assuming nonparametric distributions. (see Tables 2.4 and 2.5 for a presentation of the results). Since the 104th Congress, the differences in means have been more pronounced between Democratic males and females than between Republican males and females.

voting behavior when they are electorally insecure?

Figure 2.3 about here

Figure 2.3 illustrates average Member DW-NOMINATE scores by party, sex, and electoral security. This figure demonstrates a clear difference in voting behavior based on electoral security. There is a consistent, discernable difference in the voting behavior of insecure versus secure Members. For Democrats, this difference is in the expected direction. We would expect more marginal Democratic Members to represent more moderate districts and thus vote more conservatively than their colleagues. Insecure Democratic women voted an average of .1075 points more conservatively than secure Democratic women. Similarly, there was a .725 difference in the voting behavior of secure and insecure Democratic men, with insecure men voting more conservatively than secure men.

Interestingly, the pattern is in the opposite direction for Republicans. While we would expect marginal Republican Members to represent more moderate districts and thus vote more liberally than their colleagues, this is not the case. Although the mean difference is slight, insecure Republican men voted on average .002 points more conservatively than secure Republican men. Similarly, but more significantly, insecure Republican women voted on average .12 points more conservatively than secure Republican women.¹⁰

¹⁰ To test whether the differences in means between the independent populations (insecure and secure Democratic males; insecure and secure Democratic females; insecure and secure Republican males; and insecure and secure Republican females) were significant, I conducted Levene's test for equality of variances and independent sample t tests assuming normal distributions as well as Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests assuming nonparametric distributions. The results indicated significant differences in means for Democrats, and significant differences in distributions for Republicans (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7 for a presentation of the results). Since the 104th Congress, the differences in means have been more pronounced between secure and insecure Democrats, but the differences in distribution have been more pronounced between secure and insecure Republicans. This suggests that Democratic mean ideology scores

What can we conclude from these findings? This pattern further illustrates differences in the cultures of the Republican and Democratic parties. Republican Members respond to electoral insecurity by securing their partisan base through more conservative voting. They act like Republicans. This also ensures them further support from the national party organization. Democratic Members, on the other hand, attempt to expand their base through more moderate voting. They respond to diverse constituent pressures. Doing so does not affect their support from the national party organization that fosters constituent responsiveness and ideological diversity.

It appears that, in general, women are more attuned to electoral insecurities than men. Also, based on average ideological voting behavior, Democratic Members seem more attuned than Republican Members to electoral vulnerabilities. They seem more responsive to constituent pressures.

Conclusion and Implications

Partisanship is perpetually the strongest predictor of legislative behavior. Nevertheless, in recent decades, rational choice theory has refocused attention on the electoral and political goals of individual Members as explanations of voting behavior. Members are treated as "single-minded seekers of reelection" (Mayhew 1974). Consequently, since the initial work of Mayhew (1974), Fiorina (1977), and Fenno (1978), congressional theory has addressed the electoral incentive by including district-level indicators in models of legislative behavior. Recent rational choice theory further suggests the importance of electoral margins in predicting Members' voting behavior. Members in safe seats with wide electoral margins enjoy more "discretion" than

are significantly associated with electoral security (insecure Members voting more moderately than secure Members). While Republican mean ideology scores are not significantly associated with electoral security, the distributions between secure and insecure Members are significantly different. In other words, the range for electorally-secure Republican Members is much more limited than it is for electorally-insecure Republican Members.

Members in competitive districts (Parker 1992).

The female Members and staff interviewed for this analysis suggest that women do face unique electoral pressures, and that these pressures are contingent upon partisanship. While Democratic women on average represent more liberal districts than their male colleagues, Republican women represent more moderate districts than their male colleagues. In addition, they represent more electorally-marginal seats than any of their other colleagues.

This unique district context shapes Republican women's participation within the institution in important ways. First, they must spend more of their time and effort on district issues. Secondly, their electoral situation contours their involvement in the national party apparatus. Republican women do not enjoy the time necessary to pursue leadership positions. They also do not have the luxury of disregarding political fundraising activities. They, nonetheless, are valued by the party. Republican women secure congressional seats that might not otherwise be included in the Republican camp. They do, however, find themselves operating in a party culture that values ideological homogeneity and partisan loyalty. While the party does grant them some discretion to vote on behalf of their districts, they must break rank strategically in order to avoid losing favor with party leadership.

Democratic women, on the other hand, enjoy substantial discretion due to their electoral security. It should be noted, however, that the ideological homogeneity and issue-driven political careers of senior female Democratic Members hold national consequences for the party. A senior staff person in Democratic leadership noted that in the contemporary context "while female candidates are viewed as more trustworthy and more honest," they are also seen as "more liberal."

This public stereotype is reinforced by the seniority system that dominates the culture of the Democratic Party. According to this same staff person:

People assume that they (female Democratic Members) are militantly pro-choice and anti-defense. That's just not true. Women represent districts that hold those views. In particular, senior women from more liberal districts keep our new moderate women from getting more exposure. Women in the party should be used more and a little differently. We should send a counter-intuitive message. We shouldn't have women articulate our most liberal positions. Female Democrats support the more liberal, more urban positions, but it's less who they are than who they represent. We have women minority members in the Democratic Party; they're aren't any on the Republican side. It's impressive that female Members are elected by minorities in minority districts. Their extreme liberal positions, however, are less reflective of male and female differences than they are of minority constituency interests. And those are the constituencies who are almost always going to vote for them.

From this discussion, it appears that the electoral connection is important to women's legislative behavior. Because electoral politics are structured by political parties, we might expect partisanship to influence the electoral pressures faced by Members. In fact, it does influence women's political participation in significant and meaningful ways. For Democratic women, the general demographics and ideology of the district grant the discretion to positively participate in party politics. For Republican women, district characteristics and pressures inhibit certain forms of partisan involvement and demand others. In the next section of my analysis, I more thoroughly examine the institutional connection. How do electoral pressures translate into the voting behavior of women within the context of partisanship? What district factors or Member characteristics are associated with ideological voting?

This analysis has important implications for women's participation in Congress. Partisanship plays a very real and significant role in contouring the legislative behavior of women. The first arena where this relationship is evident is the electoral arena. Party culture operates even at the electoral level. From recruitment to electoral outcomes, parties shape congressional campaigns.

In terms of participation, Democratic women are relatively free to pursue electoral

security through constituent responsiveness. Republican women, on the other hand, must balance partisan loyalty with district interests in order to ensure future electoral success. Republican women express frustration because of limitations created by electoral marginality. They are limited in the resources they can devote to partisan activities. They are restricted in the time and effort they can give to institutional pursuits.

Even if these findings were based on merely perceptual evidence, they still would hold significant implications for the participation of Republican women. Not only do women already face many obstacles to political participation that men do not face, but, as Bledsoe and Herring (1990) suggest, political circumstance also influences their pursuit of higher office. They state:

Compared to men, women are more likely to be influenced in making a bid for higher office by the strength of their current political position and their perception of their political vulnerability. Women who see themselves as electorally vulnerable are unlikely to try for higher office (1990: 221).

In the end, we find discernable differences in the behavior of male and female Members, even when considering partisanship. Yet evaluating women's behavior outside the context of partisanship grossly misrepresents their participation. We also find discernable differences in Member behavior associated with electoral security. These findings, however, must be interpreted within the context of partisanship. Women are aware of their electoral vulnerability. Their voting behavior reflects their electoral circumstance. In the end, however, their voting behavior reflects the patterns of their respective parties. Electorally-insecure Republican women vote like electorally-insecure Republican men, and electorally-insecure Democratic women vote like electorally-insecure Democratic men.

Table 2.1 Routes to Office of Women Serving in the House During the 107th Congress¹¹

	Democratic Women	Republican Women
State Representative or Senator	25 (56.82%)	9 (50%)
City Council Member	10 (22.73%)	1 (5.56%)
County Commissioner or Supervisor	6 (13.64%)	1 (5.56%)
Mayor	2 (4.55%)	2 (11.11%)
Party Activist	4 (9.09%)	1 (5.56%)
School/University Board Member	4 (9.09%)	2 (11.11%)
Educator	16 (36.36%)	7 (38.89%)
Nurse/Physician	4 (9.09%)	0 (0.00%)
Businesswoman	4 (9.09%)	7 (38.89%)
Attorney/Judge	6 (13.64%)	3 (16.67%)
Advocate/Lobbyist	3 (6.82%)	2 (11.11%)
Congressional Staff	4 (9.09%)	0 (0.00%)
White House Staff	3 (6.82%)	0 (0.00%)
Administrator	2 (4.55%)	2 (11.11%)
Civil Servant	2 (4.55%)	1 (5.56%)
Widow	1 (2.27%)	2 (11.11%)
Political Family Background	5 (11.36%)	6 (33.33%)

¹¹Data provided by the Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP), National Information Bank on Women in Public Office, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University (2002).

Table 2.2 Electoral Returns By Party and Sex¹²

		103 rd	104th	105th	106th
Republican Men	Mean	62.65%	67.57%	64.02%	70.25%
	St. Dev.	(.1180)	(.1464)	(.1100)	(.1478)
	N	164	214	211	205
	% Secure	55.5%	67.8%	63.5%	75.1%
	N	91	145	134	154
Republican Women	% Insecure	44.5%	32.2%	36.5%	24.9%
	N	73	69	77	51
	Mean	58.92%	65.82%	64.59%	64.59%
	St. Dev.	(.0976)	(.1582)	(.1602)	(.1422)
	N	12	17	17	17
Democratic Men	% Secure	41.7%	58.8%	47.1%	70.6%
	N	5	10	8	12
	% Insecure	58.3%	41.2%	52.9%	29.4%
	N	7	7	9	5
	Mean	64.28%	63.75%	64.15%	71.42%
Democratic Women	St. Dev.	(.1150)	(.1272)	(.1237)	(.1486)
	N	223	173	168	173
	% Secure	59.6%	54.3%	58.9%	71.7%
	N	133	94	99	124
	% Insecure	40.4%	45.7%	41.1%	28.3%
	N	90	79	69	49
Democratic Women	Mean	64.11%	66.80%	65.84%	70.15%
	St. Dev.	(.1229)	(.1291)	(.1255)	(.1303)
	N	35	30	38	39
	% Secure	54.3%	63.3%	63.2%	71.8%
	N	19	19	24	28
	% Insecure	45.7%	36.7%	36.8%	28.2%
	N	16	11	14	11

¹² Standard deviations are presented in parentheses and represented by St. Dev. The valid N represents the number in the category. The figure indicating % secure represents the percent of Members in that category receiving at least 60% of the vote. Conversely, the figure indicating % insecure represents the percent of Members in that category receiving less than 60% of the vote.

**Figure 2.1 Percent of Insecure Members by Party and Sex:
103rd – 106th Congresses**

Percent of Insecure Members by Party and Sex




Table 2.3 Average District Presidential Return By Party and Sex

	103rd	104th	105th	106th
Republican Men	35.92% (.0635) 164	36.76% (.0613) 214	42.55% (.0657) 211	42.36% (.0649) 205
Republican Women	37.67% (.0585) 12	36.71% (.0572) 17	45.12% (.0625) 17	44.41% (.0602) 17
Democratic Men	48.17% (.1241) 223	50.85% (.1267) 173	58.04% (.1279) 167	57.64% (.1258) 173
Democratic Women	55.00% (.1290) 35	57.47% (.1214) 30	61.68% (.1230) 38	62.49% (.1223) 39

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses with valid N present below.

Figure 2.2: Mean DW-Nominate Scores for the 103rd - 106th Congresses by Sex and Partisanship

Mean DW-NOMINATE Scores




Table 2.4 Significance Testing Between Independent Populations By Party and Sex

		Valid N	Mean	Std Dev.	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		Independent-Samples t Test			Mean Difference
					F	Sig.	t	df	Sig.	
103 rd Congress	Democratic Male	223	-3297	1821	1.369		3.812	256	***	1243
	Democratic Female	35	-4540	1595						
	Republican Male	164	-4333	1459	.092		3.317	174	***	1442
	Republican Female	12	-2891	1379						
104 th Congress	Democratic Male	173	-3654	1778	3.490		2.535	201	**	0865
	Democratic Female	30	-4519	1373						
	Republican Male	214	-4716	1558	.796		1.687	229		0674
	Republican Female	17	-4042	1914						
105 th Congress	Democratic Male	168	-3708	1761	3.219		2.485	204	**	0753
	Democratic Female	38	-4461	1294						
	Republican Male	211	-4830	1596	.017		2.072	226	*	0840
	Republican Female	17	-3991	1745						
106 th Congress	Democratic Male	173	-3742	1678	3.014		2.777	210	**	0795
	Democratic Female	39	-4536	1283						
	Republican Males	205	-4951	1548	.146		2.369	220	*	0932
	Republican Females	17	-4019	1679						

Table 2.5 Nonparametric Significance Testing Between Independent Populations By Party and Sex

		Valid N	Mann-Whitney Mean Rank	Mann-Whitney Sum of Ranks		DW- NOMINATE		DW- NOMINATE
103 rd Congress	Dem. Male	223	136.15	30361.00	Mann-Whitney U	2420.000	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	-3.612***
	Dem. Female	35	87.14	3050.00	Wilcoxon W	3050.000		
	Rep. Male	164	91.62	15025.50	Z	-3.612***		
	Rep. Female	12	45.88	550.50	Mann-Whitney U	472.500		
104 th Congress	Dem. Male	173	173	196.21	Wilcoxon W	550.500	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	-3.002**
	Dem. Female	30	30	77.72	Z	-3.002**		
	Rep. Male	214	214	117.93	Mann-Whitney U	1866.500		
	Rep. Female	17	17	91.71	Wilcoxon W	2331.500		
105 th Congress	Dem. Male	168	108.31	18196.00	Z	-2.453**	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	-2.453**
	Dem. Female	38	82.24	3125.00	Mann-Whitney U	1406.000		
	Rep. Male	211	117.49	24789.50	Wilcoxon W	1559.000		
	Rep. Female	17	77.44	1316.50	Z	-1.557		
106 th Congress	Dem. Male	173	112.04	19383.00	Mann-Whitney U	2384.000	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	-1.557
	Dem. Female	39	81.92	3195.00	Wilcoxon W	3125.000		
	Rep. Males	205	114.74	23522.50	Z	-2.435*		
	Rep. Female	17	72.38	1230.50	Mann-Whitney U	1163.500		
	Dem. Male	173	112.04	19383.00	Wilcoxon W	1316.500	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	1.386 *
	Dem. Female	39	81.92	3195.00	Z	-2.408*		
	Rep. Males	205	114.74	23522.50	Mann-Whitney U	2415.000		
	Rep. Female	17	72.38	1230.50	Wilcoxon W	3195.000		
	Dem. Male	173	112.04	19383.00	Z	-2.770**	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	1.593**
	Dem. Female	39	81.92	3195.00	Mann-Whitney U	1077.500		
	Rep. Males	205	114.74	23522.50	Wilcoxon W	1230.500		
	Rep. Female	17	72.38	1230.50	Z	-2.613**		
	Dem. Male	173	112.04	19383.00	Mann-Whitney U	2415.000	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	1.599**
	Dem. Female	39	81.92	3195.00	Wilcoxon W	3195.000		
	Rep. Males	205	114.74	23522.50	Z	-2.770**		
	Rep. Female	17	72.38	1230.50	Mann-Whitney U	1077.500		
	Dem. Male	173	112.04	19383.00	Wilcoxon W	1230.500	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	1.696**
	Dem. Female	39	81.92	3195.00	Z	-2.613**		
	Rep. Males	205	114.74	23522.50	Mann-Whitney U	2415.000		
	Rep. Female	17	72.38	1230.50	Wilcoxon W	3195.000		

Figure 2.3 Mean DW-NOMINATE Scores for the 103rd – 106th Congresses by Party, Sex, and Electoral Security




Table 2.6 Significance Testing Between Independent Populations

		Valid N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		Independent-Samples t Test			
							F	Sig.	t	df	Sig.	Mean Difference
103 rd Congress	Insecure Dem. Male	90	-68	15	-3027	1617	5.661	*	1.833	221		0453
	Secure Dem. Male	133	-73	09	-3480	1932						
	Insecure Dem. Female	16	-55	-17	-3711	1221	.021		3.174	33	**	1527
	Secure Dem. Female	19	-84	-16	-5248	1562						
	Insecure Rep. Male	73	21	80	4498	1315	2.398		1.298	162		0297
	Secure Rep. Male	91	08	84	4201	1560						
	Insecure Rep. Female	7	14	47	3353	1071	.586		1.438	10		1109
	Secure Rep. Female	5	02	45	2214	1617						
104 th Congress	Insecure Dem. Male	79	-68	14	-3122	1487	4.468	*	3.742	171	***	0979
	Secure Dem. Male	94	-73	10	-4101	1883						
	Insecure Dem. Female	11	-56	-16	-3966	1261	.009		1.734	28		0873
	Secure Dem. Female	19	-74	-17	-4839	1364						
	Insecure Rep. Males	69	19	96	4869	1780	6.370	**	.989	212		0225
	Secure Rep. Male	145	12	85	4644	1141						
	Insecure Rep. Female	2	27	84	5017	2000	.262		1.894	15		1657
	Secure Rep. Female	10	04	60	3360	1608						

Table 2.6 Significance Testing Between Independent Populations (cont.)

		Valid N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		Independent-Samples t Test			Mean Difference
							F	Sig.	F	df	Sig.	
105 th Congress	Secure Dem. Male	99	-76	15	-4048	1776	891		3.049	166	**	.0822
	Insecure Dem. Male	69	-60	12	-3224	1632						
	Secure Dem. Female	24	-76	-17	-4715	1316	.044		1.622	36		.0691
	Insecure Dem. Female	14	-61	-23	-4024	1172						
	Secure Rep. Male	134	16	85	4816	1345	7.101	**	1.68	209		.0384
	Insecure Rep. Male	77	-22	115	4855	1968						
	Secure Rep. Female	8	07	60	3451	1584	.006		1.219	15		.1019
	Insecure Rep. Female	9	20	84	4470	1830						
106 th Congress	Secure Dem. Male	124	-82	15	-3928	1715	1.195		2.360	171	*	.0660
	Insecure Dem. Male	49	-61	13	-3269	1496						
	Secure Dem. Female	28	-78	-17	-4893	1213	.066		3.055	37	**	.1263
	Insecure Dem. Female	11	-57	-27	-3629	1013						
	Secure Rep. Male	154	18	85	4855	1371	7.023	**	1.550	203		.0386
	Insecure Rep. Male	51	15	127	5242	1978						
	Secure Rep. Female	12	09	60	3715	1232	4.715	*	1.171	15		.1035
	Insecure Rep. Female	5	21	84	4750	2483						

Table 2.7 Nonparametric Significance Testing Between Independent Populations By Party, Sex, and Electoral Security

		Valid N	Mann-Whitney Mean Rank	Mann-Whitney Sum of Ranks		DW- NOMINATE		DW- NOMINATE
103 rd Congress	Secure Dem. Male	133	105.03	13968.50	Mann-Whitney U	5057.500	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	1.528*
	Insecure Dem. Male	90	122.31	11007.50	Wilcoxon W Z	13968.500 -1.962*		
	Secure Dem. Female	19	13.47	256.00	Mann-Whitney U	66.000	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	1.648**
	Insecure Dem. Female	16	23.38	374.00	Wilcoxon W Z	256.000 -2.848**		
	Secure Rep. Male	91	78.29	7124.50	Mann-Whitney U	2938.500	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	.932
	Insecure Rep. Male	73	87.75	6405.50	Wilcoxon W Z	7124.500 -1.267		
	Secure Rep. Female	5	5.00	25.00	Mann-Whitney U	10.000	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	.878
	Insecure Rep. Female	7	7.57	53.00	Wilcoxon W Z	25.000 -1.218		
104 th Congress	Secure Dem. Male	94	72.77	6840.50	Mann-Whitney U	2375.500	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	2.403***
	Insecure Dem. Male	79	103.93	8210.50	Wilcoxon W Z	6840.500 -4.076***		
	Secure Dem. Female	19	13.58	258.00	Mann-Whitney U	68.000	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	.821
	Insecure Dem. Female	11	18.82	207.00	Wilcoxon Z	258.000 -1.571		
	Secure Rep. Male	145	105.63	15316.50	Mann-Whitney U	4731.500	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	1.058
	Insecure Rep. Male	69	111.43	7688.50	Wilcoxon W Z	15316.500 -.640		
	Secure Rep. Female	10	7.50	75.00	Mann-Whitney U	20.000	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z	.957
	Insecure Rep. Female	7	11.14	78.00	Wilcoxon W Z	75.000 -1.465		

Table 2.7 Nonparametric Significance Testing Between Independent Populations By Party, Sex, and Electoral Security (cont.)

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		Valid N	Mann- Whitney Mean Rank	Mann- Whitney Sum of Ranks		DW- NOMINATE		DW- NOMINATE
105 th Congress	Secure Dem. Male	99	74.52	7377.50	Mann-Whitney U	2427.500	Kolmogorov-	1.616**
	Insecure Dem. Male	69	98.82	6818.50	Wilcoxon W	7377.500	Smirnov Z	
					Z	-.3185***		
	Secure Dem. Female	24	17.42	418.00	Mann-Whitney U	118.000	Kolmogorov-	1.080
	Insecure Dem. Female	14	23.07	323.00	Wilcoxon W	418.000	Smirnov Z	
					Z	-.1513		
	Secure Rep. Male	134	105.18	14093.50	Mann-Whitney U	5048.500	Kolmogorov-	.674
	Insecure Rep. Male	77	107.44	8272.50	Wilcoxon W	14093.500	Smirnov Z	
106 th Congress					Z	-.259		
	Secure Rep. Female	8	7.50	60.00	Mann-Whitney U	24.000	Kolmogorov-	.857
	Insecure Rep. Female	9	10.33	93.00	Wilcoxon W	60.000	Smirnov Z	
					Z	-.1155		
	Secure Dem. Male	124	81.04	10049.50	Mann-Whitney U	2299.500	Kolmogorov-	1.509*
	Insecure Dem. Male	49	102.07	5001.50	Wilcoxon W	10049.500	Smirnov Z	
					Z	-.2488**		
	Secure Dem. Female	28	16.75	469.00	Mann-Whitney U	63.000	Kolmogorov-	1.642**
	Insecure Dem. Female	11	28.27	311.00	Wilcoxon W	469.000	Smirnov Z	
					Z	-.2840**		
	Secure Rep. Male	154	100.89	15536.50	Mann-Whitney U	3601.500	Kolmogorov-	.817
	Insecure Rep. Male	51	109.38	5578.50	Wilcoxon W	15536.500	Smirnov Z	
					Z	-.886		
	Secure Rep. Female	12	8.75	105.00	Mann-Whitney U	27.000	Kolmogorov-	.595
	Insecure Rep. Female	5	9.60	48.00	Wilcoxon W	105.000	Smirnov Z	
					Z	-.316		

Chapter 3

The Institutional Connection: Women's Formal Participation Within the Institution

"I'm afraid you have come to the wrong place. I'm not going to be of much help to your study. You see, Jocelyn, I am an elected congresswoman. I was elected to represent all the views of my district. I don't ever look at issues as gender-oriented." — Female Republican Member

Introduction

Gender theory suggests that women evidence much more liberal voting patterns than men. Although a few early studies of women's voting scores suggested this norm (Leader 1977, Welch 1985), the pattern has varied over time (see Vega and Firestone 1995). In the end, gender is only one factor in the complex matrix of Members' voting behavior. Partisanship, ideology, constituency factors, and ethnicity are much stronger predictors of vote scores (Welch 1985, Vega and Firestone 1995, Schwindt 2000). As Swers (2000) states, "The influence of gender on a member's legislative behavior is highly dependent on his/her overall political ideology" (20).

In the previous chapter, we explored Members' electoral connections, examining the unique constituency pressures that women face. The partisan context is largely responsible for women's electoral circumstance. Democratic women represent some of the most liberal congressional districts in the country. District ideology and issue concerns mirror those of the Democratic Party. Consequently, female Democratic Members enjoy electoral security and the additional discretion that accompanies it. Republican women, on the other hand, occupy congressional seats representing some of the most liberal districts

within the fold of the Republican Party. They represent some of the most electorally-marginal seats held by the Republican Party. District ideology and issue concerns do not reflect the ideology and priorities of the national party. Consequently, female Republican Members face more electoral insecurity and less discretion than their male copartisan colleagues. In other words, female Republican Members have less freedom to pursue their personal goals and preferences.

Understanding the electoral circumstances of female legislators, we turn to the institutional connection. This chapter explores the voting behavior of women within the context of partisanship. An analysis of ideology scores provides a traditional glance at the voting behavior of women in the contemporary Congress. Gender theory suggests that women are more ideologically stable and more liberal as a group than men. We might expect this given the nature of the districts they represent. The present analysis, however, demonstrates that women illustrate diversity in their ideological leanings. In particular, Republican women illustrate more conservative voting patterns than Democratic women. While it is true that women are more liberal in their voting behavior than men, this generalization is only accurate given the context of partisanship.

The following pages present the relevant literature on ideology and partisanship as well as the current understanding of women's legislative behavior. This discussion grounds our examination in relevant theory and frames our analysis of women's voting behavior. After a brief discussion of data and methodology, the ideological behavior of men and women is examined within the context of partisanship and electoral security.

Several questions drive this analysis. First and foremost, does partisanship shape

the voting behavior of female legislators in the House of Representatives? Secondly, if so, then is sex significantly associated with ideological voting behavior given the context of partisanship? In other words, do women vote differently than men of their same party? Is this relationship more significant when examining social issue voting?

In the previous chapter, we discovered that women face different electoral circumstances than men. They face a matrix of cross-pressures that are significantly structured by partisanship. A second set of questions thus involves the more general partisan contours of voting behavior. Are there identifiable differences between the two parties in terms of the factors associated with ideological voting behavior? In other words, do Members respond differently to institutional and constituency pressures? And are these differences structured by partisanship?

Several theoretical questions bear on this discussion. If there are differences between the ideological voting of the two parties, how do these differences affect representation? Do the different party cultures need different models of representation to explain their legislative behavior? And finally, what are the significant implications of different party cultures for the ideological behavior of female legislators?

Ideology as a Motivation for Political Behavior

Political ideology, according to Van Dyke (1995) is a guide to, an explanation of, and a justification for political action. He understands ideology to “consist of a set of ideas and principles relating to the purpose to pursue in political life and the methods to employ” (1). Similarly, Miller and Shanks (1996) “use the term ‘ideology’ as a symbol for the systems of political belief” (121). Ideology provides structure, organization, and

coherence of political thought. They suggest that both “cognitive matters — beliefs and patterns of attitudes — as well as affective matters — values and preferences... play a central role in facilitating understanding of the nature of one’s world” (ibid)

In order to mirror the diverse beliefs and values of voters, parties distinguish themselves from each other on ideological grounds. Eldersveld (1964) argues that “the party... is what it believes — its attitudes and perspectives, at all echelons” (180). The party acts as a vital organ for developing stable issue preferences and positions by which members of Congress can orient themselves politically. It does so through the maintenance of a series of partisan-based committees such as the party caucus, policy committees, steering committees, and informal groups (Eldersveld 1964). Party elites are not necessarily steered by the party leadership, but are personally ideologically distinctive. In other words, leaders tend “if liberal, to be more liberal, if conservative, to be more conservative” (Kirkpatrick 1976: 297). Ippolito and Walker (1980) suggest that

There are ... major policy controversies that find many, if not all, congressional Democrats on one side and many, if not all, congressional Republicans on the other. A concurrence of views characterizes each of the parties in Congress, and it is this concurrence rather than sanctions or leadership control, that explains party voting among members of the House and Senate (146)

Party elites are perhaps more ideologically intense than the general public because of higher levels of political information and involvement (Eldersveld 1964: 153)

Ippolito and Walker (1980) draw our attention to the relatively stable policy platforms of the Republican and Democratic Parties. They suggest that “in some policy areas, such as social welfare, government regulation, economic management, and

agricultural assistance, there have been significant and fairly stable interparty differences over the years” (146). For this reason, it is possible to track the extent to which Members of Congress articulate the preferences of their party when voting on domestic issues. A popular measure of party support is provided through the legislative voting record of Members. *Congressional Quarterly* records a number of “key votes” each congressional session to compare the voting records of Members with their espoused political party. Key votes are defined as issues which represent “a matter of major controversy, a test of presidential or political power, [and/or] a decision of potentially great impact on the nation and the lives of Americans” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, v33: 1B).

Several studies have assessed the relationship between party membership and roll-call voting.¹ Certain factors are thought to influence party unity. Cantor and Herrnson (1997) suggest that party unity is enhanced by national party assistance in congressional campaigns. In 1984 and 1992, the DCCC’s assistance with campaign communication of key issues fostered increased party unity in the ensuing congressional sessions. Similarly, in 1994, “The dramatic increase in Republican party unity during the early days of the 104th Congress was undoubtedly tied to the GOP’s unified campaign message” (Cantor and Herrnson 1997: 411, see also Gimpel 1996). Majority status may also lead Members to feel collective responsibility for legislative gridlock and parties to emphasize a unified

¹Several groups have created indexes by which to measure legislators’ ideological leanings as expressed through their roll-call voting behavior. Among the most popular are *National Journal’s* vote ratings of Members across economic, social, and foreign issue dimensions; indexes created by interest groups such as *Americans for Democratic Action* and *The American Conservative Union*; and most recently, Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores.

platform in campaign message creation (Cantor and Herrnson 1997).

Women as Ideological

Focus on the influence of women in legislatures grew out of the feminist movement of the 1970's and women's ascension to political office. Gender theory developed around the ideological and participatory differences between men and women in the legislative arena. The primary argument of gender theory is that female Members are more interested in promoting women's issue legislation than their male counterparts. Issues concerning the family, child-welfare, women's health and reproductive rights, and sex discrimination are all of more interest to women legislators (Carroll 1985, Saint-Germain 1989, Thomas and Welch 1991, Thomas 1994, Dodson 1998).

Consequently, gender theory suggests that female legislators have more liberal ideological orientations and vote scores than male legislators (Leader 1977, Welch 1985). Critics of gender theory point to vacillations in this trend over time. Although women did demonstrate more liberal voting behavior than men during the 1970's, women evidenced similar voting scores to men during the 1980's (Vega and Firestone (1995)). In the early 1990's, and with the Year of the Woman in 1992, however, women once again began to have more liberal voting records than men (ibid). It is possible, nonetheless, that the pattern is due to constituency factors, partisanship, and ethnicity rather than ideological difference due to gender (Welch 1985, Vega and Firestone 1995). In fact, partisanship explains 91% of the variance between men and women's vote scores (Schwindt 2000). Proportionately speaking, female Members are more Democratic (i.e. liberal) than male

Members. Gender, on the other hand, explains only 5% of the variance (ibid)

While the role of gender cannot be dismissed, Schwindt (2000) suggests that

it is important to keep in mind that the U S political system is based on representation by political parties, not gender, and those political parties will continue to play the most important role in determining the way a representative votes (11)

Gender theory has largely neglected the role of partisanship in conditioning a female legislator's vote. It appears, however, that women are more likely to show bipartisan support on issues directly concerning women, such as abortion and women's health (Dolan 1997, Swers 1998)

It is important to note that women's issues encompass a broad gamut of issue areas. Anything affecting a woman can be (and often is) classified as a woman's issue. Consequently, there is need for conceptual clarity in gender studies of legislative behavior. Swers (2000) suggests that we distinguish between "traditional women's issues" such as childcare and women's health, and "feminist issues," which specifically concern women's rights. Because feminist issues are often highly controversial (Norton 1997), it may be important to consider women's support of these issues separately

It is possible that these issues, especially since the 104th Congress, do not garner the bipartisan support of all congresswomen. For example, the number of amendments concerning reproductive policy increased after 1995 (Norton 2000). This increase, however, was due to "a smaller group of highly motivated (Democratic) women activists on key subcommittees (who) offered a majority of all reproductive-policy amendments" (ibid: 18)

Although the number of women in committees has increased and consequently the support garnered for women's issue policy, the majority of women actively concerned with these issues subsequent to 1994 have held minority status. This observation is crucial to understanding Norton's finding that leadership may have counteracted the positive force of increased female membership in conference committees concerning reproductive rights.

The presence of highly motivated pro-life policy activists like Hyde and Smith, who both held committee and subcommittee leadership positions, may have worked as a counter force to the increased number of women conferees (ibid. 21).

Ideological Difference

Although gender theory has consistently suggested that women's inclusion in legislative bodies is important because women support feminist issues, undertones are evident in more recent work on gender and legislative behavior yielding these findings suspect. Critics suggest that present gender theory fails to distinguish among gender, feminism, and women's interests (Duerst-Lahti 2000). In a discussion of ideological frameworks, Duerst-Lahti (2000) contends that gender constitutes a separate ideological spectrum from the traditional liberal/conservative framework. It is a "protoideology" — "a parent or source ideology from which other governing ideologies emanate" (ibid. 7). Under the umbrella of gender ideology, therefore, lies both socialism and social conservatism. Both hold a distinctly gendered understanding of the state, one feminal² the other masculine. By distinguishing between feminism and feminalism, we are able to

²Duerst-Lahti introduces the term "feminalism" to refer to that which is female without

capture the broad ideological spectrum of women's interests. It is important to clarify that

feminism is not located on the left-right continuum, rather, like its counterpart, masculinism, it subsumes and compounds with all governing ideologies. Importantly, feminalism allows the full spectrum of political ideologies by women to be seen. Gender ideology is more than feminism and feminism is more than one unified political ideology. To recognize this fact is to break free of the notion that gender is only feminism. More to the larger point of women and gender in congress, it also is to recognize that women's views run the gamut of political ideologies without exactly corresponding with their male colleagues despite many shared views. This recognition, in turn, confirms that gender ideology is not exclusively feminist ideology and therefore that feminalism operates at a level that is higher or more encompassing than conventional governing ideologies (ibid. 7)

Gender theory only recently has begun to address the ideological orientations of female party elites. Female party elites appear to come from similar political orientations as male party elites ("social background, political status, political careers, and perceptions of the political process") and demonstrate diverse issue orientations (Jennings and Farah 1981: 462). "Issue orientations continue to be a matter of party rather than gender" (ibid. 472). Even in the 1960s and 1970s, at the height of the feminist movement, party and general ideology were better predictors of preferences with respect to feminist issues than sex. Democratic women more often identified with a feminist position than Republican women, and likewise, Democratic men more often identified with a feminist position than Republican men (ibid. 478).

Similar Perspectives...Different Attitudes

Male and female Members of Congress demonstrate different perspectives

referring to the loaded term "feminism." For a detailed discussion, refer to pp. 6-7

concerning social policy. Particularly in the case of welfare reform and "partial birth abortion" there are systematic differences between the personal experience testimonies of men and women. In the case of welfare reform, men emphasized tax relief and women emphasized the effect of the legislation on children. "Women do bring unique perspectives to the floor of the House in both subtle and unmistakable ways" (Walsh 2000: 11).

There are, however, significant partisan differences in the testimony content of women. Republican women were less than half as likely as Democratic women to frame the welfare debate in terms of children (ibid.: 12). Similarly, women were significantly more likely to frame the debate over "partial-birth abortion" in terms of motherhood and parenting, whereas men framed the debate in terms of the welfare of the unborn child (ibid.: 13). Interestingly, however, women used the frame of children in the case of welfare reform and motherhood in the case of "partial-birth abortion" to both support and oppose the legislation based on personal partisanship (15-16).

It is reasonable for us to conclude that 1) women do use similar perspectives or frames to discuss policy, but 2) women do not necessarily agree on the policy outcomes they prefer. The importance, therefore, of understanding issue framing in terms of representation resides not in the similarity of issue preference but in the similarity of personal experience. Walsh concludes that

Even though men and women frame their statements in similar ways to make overlapping claims about what is at stake, it matters that women more often mention the effect of the legislation on underrepresented constituencies and that they bring to the floor first-hand experience with the difficulties mother face. This ability to act as empathetic delegates of underrepresented concerns makes

Congress an institution that more closely resembles the thoughts and fears of the population and more likely incorporates such concerns in the process of legislating (2000 18)

Similarly, when examining gender differences in women's issue bill sponsorship, "the influence of gender on a member's legislative behavior is highly dependent on his/her overall political ideology" (Swers 2000 20). While moderate Republican women are much more likely to sponsor women's issue legislation than their male colleagues, conservative Republican women are not. In 1994, a number of conservative Republican women were elected to Congress. Conservative women can be expected to either ignore women's issues altogether or actively support anti-feminist legislation. Although these women appear to be concerned with electoral security rather than women's issues, this behavior could be a result of conscious political choice on the part of conservative Republican congresswomen (ibid). Citing Miller (1995), Swers suggests that

given their small numbers in Congress, the conservative women knew that their gender and their position on women's issues would gain media attention. Therefore, these women made a point of stating that they did not "claim sisterhood with the so-called 'women's agenda'" and that they viewed themselves as 'citizens' rather than as women (22).

It is possible that in the not-so-distant future (when these women gain leadership positions associated with seniority) conservative women might actually inhibit women's issue legislation (ibid).³

Differences in Voting Behavior

³ Note that Swers assumes that women in the Republican Party enjoy the same advantages as women in the Democratic Party due to seniority. This work suggests that party loyalty

Much of gender theory focuses on women's activity on feminist and traditional women's issues -- those issues directly targeting the status of women and children. Women support these issues both through their formal and informal legislative activities. In terms of a general philosophical ethos, women espouse a more liberal ideological orientation towards the role of government with regard to social welfare and equal rights. Consequently, female representatives as a collective whole illustrate more liberal voting patterns than their male colleagues. Simply looking at women's legislative voting behavior in one year across multiple measures demonstrates this finding.

Table 3.1 about here

Looking at the mean ideological differences between male and female Members across multiple measures in 2000 illustrates that women vote more liberally than men (see Table 3.1). Using Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) measure of ideology, bounded between -1 and +2 with conservatism increasing in a positive direction, we see that women's average vote score (-1.939) is more liberal than men's average vote score (-0.979). Similarly, the average female legislator's ADA score (61.43) is more liberal than the average male legislator's ADA score (38.9415). Even across issue dimensions, we see that women have more liberal voting tendencies on the whole than men. In terms of economic policy, social policy, and foreign policy, women illustrate more liberal vote patterns than men. The difference, however, is most pronounced in vote averages on social issues. The average female legislator's social liberalism score (69.27) is much more liberal than the average male legislator's social liberalism score (43.58). It is not

is a more important determinant of party leadership than seniority in the Republican Party

surprising, therefore, that gender theorists have highlighted this important difference between the ideological leanings of men and women

Figure 3 1 about here

If we look at the distribution of Members' vote scores by sex, however, we see that the distribution does not fit a normal curve, but rather mirrors a bimodal distribution. Figure 3 1 illustrates that male legislators either received DW-NOMINATE scores of - .06 or below or .10 or above approximately in the 106th Congress. This is the logical product of ideologically-differentiated political parties. The pattern is also the same for female legislators.

Figure 3 2 about here

Although more female Members are on the liberal end of the spectrum than on the conservative end, the cases are still quite skewed to fit a bimodal distribution (see Figure 3 2). Female legislators either received DW-NOMINATE scores of - .13 or below or .13 or above approximately in the 106th Congress. The uneven numbers of Democratic and Republican women explains much of the difference between this distribution and the previous distribution. It should be noted, however, that just as men cross the gamut of ideological difference, so do women. There are female legislators who received DW-NOMINATE scores of - .78 in the 106th Congress, there are female legislators who received DW-NOMINATE scores of .84 in the 106th Congress. The important point to be made is that male and female legislators both illustrate partisan patterns of ideological voting behavior. Party is a more obvious determinant of ideology than sex.

Figure 3 3 and 3 4 about here

The literature suggests that female Members are more liberal on social issues than male Members. Figure 3.3 illustrates that male Members received social ratings across the board in the 106th Congress just as they did DW-NOMINATE scores. Although the ratings ranged from 10 to 87%, the average male social rating was 45.6% with a standard deviation of 28.41. It is also evident that the distribution of male ratings is fairly even across the spectrum. Contrastingly, female Members' ratings were by and large on the liberal end of the spectrum (see Figure 3.4). Although the ratings did range from 9 to 87%, the mean female rating was 70.8 with a standard deviation of 20.13. This mean is 25 percentage points higher than the mean score for male Members indicating that in general women are more liberal than men on social issues.

Partisanship and Women's Ideological Voting Behavior

While on the whole women are more liberal than men in terms of their voting behavior, simple distributions reveal that both men and women evidence bimodal or partisan patterns of ideological voting. In order to examine the partisan contours of women's voting behavior more thoroughly, the data is split to examine Democratic ideological voting and Republican ideological voting separately. The theoretical importance of this section is to examine how women participate (one measure being voting behavior) in the legislative arena as compared to their male copartisans.

In the previous chapter, we discovered that while Members operate in a partisan climate, they also operate in a climate conditioned by their electoral security. We also discovered that electoral security for women varies substantially by party. Republican women perceive themselves as representing competitive districts, and this marginality

shapes their legislative activity. Democratic women, on the other hand, do not perceive themselves in very competitive districts by and large, and thus enjoy more electoral discretion in their legislative pursuits. Consequently, in this analysis, we will examine the ideological voting behavior of Democratic and Republican women separately, and also examine the impact of marginality on women's ideological behavior.⁴

Democratic Ideological Voting

Figure 3.5 and 3.6 about here

Examining the distributions of Democratic male and female DW-NOMINATE scores illustrates the findings of the previous chapter. Figure 3.5 illustrates that Democratic men are rather ideologically diverse – their scores ranging from - .82 to + .15. The average DW-NOMINATE score among Democratic men is - .37, and the standard deviation is .17. By contrast, Democratic women are rather ideologically homogenous as a group. Figure 3.6 illustrates that Democratic women's scores range from - .78 to - .17. At - .45, the mean score among Democratic women is also more liberal than that of Democratic men, and the standard deviation is only .13.

Figure 3.7 and 3.8 about here

Examining the distribution of Democratic Members' social liberalism scores

⁴ Before separating the pooled data for this analysis, Chow tests were run on the regression equations to determine whether or not there are significant differences in the coefficients attributable to party. This statistical procedure uses the F-statistic to compare differences in the pooled regression and separated regressions. The results indicate that the coefficients for Democrats and Republicans are not equal, and thus the data should not be pooled. While theoretically we might assume that the same variables predict ideological voting behavior, the relative impact of those variables is not the same for Democrats and Republicans.

illustrates the more liberal voting tendencies of Democratic women suggested by the literature. As illustrated in Figure 3.5, Democratic men have social liberalism ratings ranging from 10 to 87%. With the majority of men receiving ratings above 50%, the mean rating of this group is 68.5%, with a standard deviation of 18.09. Contrastingly, Democratic women have scores ranging from 64 to 87% (see Figure 3.8). With a mean of 81.6%, the standard deviation of this group is only 6.72.

Developing a Model of Voting Behavior

Several factors are understood to be associated with Member voting behavior and should be incorporated into any predictive model. The three variables of theoretical interest to the analysis at hand are Member partisanship, Member sex, and Member electoral security. Beyond these, we know that seniority is significantly associated with voting behavior (Brewer, Mariani, and Stonecash 2002). Also, several district characteristics are suggested by the literature as important influences on voting behavior. In this analysis, we examine the percent black population of the district as well as the general socio-economic character of the district.⁷ Finally, the presidential vote is included to capture the influence of the general ideological orientation of the district on Member behavior.

⁷ Factor Analysis was conducted for purposes of data reduction. The correlation matrix (Table 3.2) presents the association among the included variables. Given the significant associations, a series of variables were examined using factor analysis to test the stability of the component created from the three variables of interest. Employing an Eigenvalue cut-point of 1.0, a single component was drawn from the three variables. This single component was included in the regression models to measure the socio-economic character of the district. The total variance explained by the principal component analysis is presented in (Table 3.3).

The presidential vote return of a district is also frequently used as a proxy to capture general district ideology — another important influence on a Member's behavior (Bianco 1984, Bond, Covington, and Fleischer 1985, Canon 1990). While this measure is the subject of debate, it is the most consistent data source available that measures voter preferences at the district level. Because it is based on voting behavior, it provides a more accurate indicator of the political character of the district than those provided by demographic characteristics (Bond, Campbell, Cottrill 2001: 12). While some have used the mean presidential vote across multiple elections in order to limit the idiosyncratic effects of individual candidates (Bianco 1984), critics of this measure argue that doing so reduces the accuracy of the measure in capturing contemporary leanings (Bond, Campbell, Cottrill 2001: 11).

The present analysis examines both population as well as political indicators of district preferences. Why should we expect district variables to predict Member behavior? "Those representatives who grossly misjudge the empirical situation do not survive long in the electoral arena" (Fiorina 1974: 40).

Table 3.4 about here

The first model predicts the DW-NOMINATE scores of Democratic Members given the electoral security of the Member as well as other Member- and district-level factors (see Table 3.4).⁶ The model explains nearly half of the variance in Member voting

⁶ The models predicting Democratic and Republican ideological voting are based on the following equation: $Y = X_1\beta_1 + X_2\beta_2 + X_3\beta_3 + X_4\beta_4 + X_5\beta_5 + X_6\beta_6 + \varepsilon$. Where Y = DWNOMINATE (Model 1), Social Liberalism (Model 2), X_1 = Female Member, X_2 = Seniority of the Member, X_3 = Electorally-Insecure Member, X_4 =

behavior across congresses (adj. R^2 ranging from .425 in the 105th Congress to .506 in the 103rd Congress). While the seniority of the Member is a significant predictor of voting behavior in the 105th and 106th Congresses (significant at the .01 level), in general the Member-level indicators are rather insignificant.⁷ Member marginality, for example, is not significant after the 103rd Congress, and is only significant then at the $p < .05$ level.

Contrastingly, the district-level variables are generally significant predictors of Member voting behavior. While the size of the black population in the district is not a significant predictor after the 103rd Congress, the socio-economic character as well as the district presidential vote return are both consistently significant predictors of Member voting behavior (significant for the most part at least at the $p < .01$ level). The most important observation to be made regarding the results of this estimation is that sex is not a significant predictor of voting behavior in any congress. While the slope is in the predicted direction, when controlling for other factors sex is not significantly associated with ideological voting.

Table 3.5 about here

The pattern is basically the same when examining Member voting behavior on

Electoral-Insecure Female Member, X_1 = % Black Population in the District, X_2 = Socio-Economic Character of the District, X_3 = Presidential Vote Return in the District, ϵ = error term

⁷A separate model included the race of the Member as a predictor of ideology. Given that there is only a nominal number of black Republican Members in Congress during this time period, this indicator was dropped from the analysis for the sake of consistency and comparability across models. It should be noted, however, that race is significantly associated with ideology scores. African-American Members of Congress are generally significantly more liberal than non-black Members (significant at least at the $p < .05$ level across all congresses).

social issues (see Table 3.5). The explanatory power of the model is slightly less overall than that of the model explaining general ideological voting behavior, but the adj. R^2 still ranges from .370 to .497. The Member-level variables are generally insignificant. Neither seniority nor electoral marginality are significantly associated with Democratic social ratings. While the size of the black population in the district is not significant, once again both the socio-economic character and the presidential vote return are significantly associated with social ratings (significant across congresses at the $p < .001$ level). One difference between the models, however, is that while sex is not a significant predictor of social ratings in predicting DW-NOMINATE scores, it is sometimes a significant predictor of social ratings. In the 105th and 106th Congresses, Democratic females received significantly higher social liberalism ratings than Democratic men (significant at least at the $p < .05$ level). When we examine the interaction effects between sex and electoral security in predicting DW-NOMINATE scores and social ratings among Democratic Members, we find that electoral marginality is not a significant influence on female Members' behavior (see Tables 3.6 and 3.7).

Table 3.6 and 3.7 about here

Republican Ideological Voting

Figure 3.9 and 3.10 about here

Among Republicans, the pattern is very similar between men and women except it is an overall more conservative distribution. Figure 3.9 illustrates that Republican men have DW-NOMINATE scores ranging from .18 to .129, with the average Member having a vote score of .50. The standard deviation among Republican men is .15. Republican

women have similar scores ranging from 07 to 93 (see Figure 3 10). At 40, the average score among Republican women is 10 points more liberal than that among Republican men. The standard deviation in this group is actually larger than the standard deviation among Republican men (17). This pattern is the reverse of that between Democratic men and women. Democratic women are more ideologically homogenous as a group than Democratic men, while here we find that Republican women are less homogenous than Republican men.

Figure 3 11 and 3 12

In examining Republican Members' social liberalism ratings, we see the differences between male and female Members in the expected direction. With liberal scores ranging between 33 and 70%, Figure 3 11 illustrates that Republican men are socially conservative. Even within the range of ratings, the distribution is skewed to the left, towards the conservative end of the scale. The average Republican male Member received a social liberalism rating of 24.6% in the 106th Congress. The standard deviation in this group was 17.93.

Republican women, on the other hand, demonstrate a much different pattern (see Figure 3 12). With ratings ranging from 6.3 to 81.3%, Republican women demonstrate more liberal social ratings than Republican men. The distribution is skewed more to the right than that of Republican men. The mean rating among Republican women is 44.2% -- 20 points higher than that of Republican men. At 17.16, the standard deviation is reflective of the standard deviation for men, but interestingly it is much larger than that among Democratic women. Although overall more liberal than Republican men, this

pattern indicates that Republican women are more heterogeneous in their voting behavior on social issues than Democratic women.

Table 3.8 about here

In estimating the model to predict Republican Members' DW-NOMINATE scores, several differences between the two models are evident (see Table 3.8). First, the explanatory power of the Republican model is much weaker than that of the Democratic model. The model explains roughly a quarter of the variance in Member behavior, with the adj. R^2 ranging from .246 in the 105th Congress to .281 in the 103rd Congress. Another important difference concerns the significance of Member-level indicators. While Member-level variables were not generally significant predictors of Democratic scores, they are significant predictors of Republican scores. Women are at times significantly more liberal than their male copartisans. More senior Members are significantly more liberal than more junior Members (significant at least at the $p < .01$ level). In most congresses, electoral security is also significantly associated with voting behavior. Marginal Members are significantly more conservative than secure Members (significant in most congresses at least at the $p < .01$ level). In contrast to the Democratic model, district-level variables are not generally significant predictors of Republican ideological voting. Only the presidential vote return of the district is consistently significant in predicting vote scores (significant at the $p < .001$ level).

Table 3.9 about here

Predicting Republican social ratings produces somewhat different findings. While female Members' social ratings reflect female Members' DW-NOMINATE scores,

seniority is not significant in predicting social ratings (see Table 3 9). Electoral security is sometimes significant, with more marginal Members voting more conservatively on social issues

What is different between this model and the model predicting DW-NOMINATE scores involves the association between district-level variables and Republican Member voting behavior. The socio-economic character of the district as well as the presidential vote return of the district are both consistently and significantly associated with social ratings (significant at least at the $p < .05$ level). Overall, the model is weaker than previous models, only explaining between .169 and .368 across congresses

Table 3 10 about here

In examining the interaction effects between sex and electoral security, we find that marginal Republican females do not illustrate significantly different ideological voting patterns than marginal Republican males (see Table 3 10). Both sex and electoral security, however, are independently significant. This finding suggests that when controlling for the significant influence of seniority, more secure females are significantly more liberal than their copartisan colleagues (significant across most congresses at the $p < .05$ level). Contrastingly, insecure males are significantly more conservative than their copartisan colleagues (significant across most congresses at the $p < .05$ level). Insecure Republican females are not significantly more liberal or conservative than we might expect given both their sex and their electoral security. In other words, these women act both like Republican women, and like insecure Republican Members.

Table 3 11 about here

In estimating the model to predict social ratings among Republican Members, we find a few significant differences from the previous model. First, sex is significant in different congresses than in the model predicting DW-NOMINATE scores. In the previous model (see Table 3.10), the sex of the Members was significant in the 103rd through the 105th Congresses. In this model (see Table 3.11), the sex of the Member is significant in the 103rd, 105th, and 106th Congresses, but not in the 104th Congress. Similarly, electoral insecurity is significantly associated with DW-NOMINATE scores in the 103rd, 104th, and 106th Congresses, but is only significantly associated with social liberalism ratings in the 103rd and 104th Congresses. While seniority is significant across all congresses in the previous model, in this model it is insignificant in any congress. Finally, while in the previous model there were no significant interaction effects between sex and electoral insecurity, in predicting social ratings in the 105th Congress, insecure females are significantly more liberal than we would expect given their sex and security independently (significant at the $p < .05$ level).

It should also be noted that the district variables also perform differently between the two models. While the size of the black population in the district is never significantly associated with DW-NOMINATE scores, it is very significant in predicting social ratings in the 106th Congress (significant at the $p < .01$ level). Interestingly, the slope is not in the direction we might expect. As the black population in the district increases, the social rating of the Member decreases. In other words, a larger minority population is associated with a more conservative social rating. We also find discrepancies between the models regarding the control variable for the socio-economic character of the district. While the

socio-economic character of the district is only slightly significant in predicting DW-NOMINATE scores in the 104th Congress, this variable is highly significant in predicting social ratings in both the 104th and 106th Congresses (significant at the $p < .001$ level)

Women's Partisan Voting Behavior

This pattern is mirrored when looking at formal measures of party support. On average, party unity scores for the full House have been between 83.53 to 88.55 (see Table 3.12). Interestingly, the parties were most unified in 1999 and 2000, the last two years of the sample. Party unity scores in these two years on average surpassed party unity scores in 1995. It is not completely accurate to conclude that the present atmosphere is more partisan than that of the Republican Revolution. A more accurate understanding would compare the severe unity of Republicans and the limited unity of Democrats in 1995 with the relatively equal and high levels of unity characteristic of the current period.

*** Table 3.12 about here***

Prior to the Republican takeover of the House in 1994, Democrats were on average more unified than Republicans. After 1994, however, the pattern reversed with Republicans consistently having higher average party unity scores than Democrats from 1995-2000. Party unity declined among Democrats between 1993 and 1996, but between 1997 and 2000 it steadily increased and reached an all-time high (for the sample years) in 2000 of 86.97. Republican party unity surged in 1995, reaching an all-time high of 91.10, paralleled pre-majority scores in 1998 at 84.82 (1993 was 84.80), but increased again into the 90's in 2000 (90.05).

Female party unity scores are on average higher in all years except 1998 (33 less) by 1 to 2 points than male scores. This difference was greatest in 1993 with men unified with the party 84.78% of the time and women 87.32% of the time. Republican men have been on average 5 points higher than Republican women except in 1998 when they were nearly even (men = 84.89, women = 84.06) since gaining the majority. In 1993 and 1994, however, this difference was nearly double, averaging 10 percentage points. Democratic women have been on average at least 6 points higher than Democratic men, except in 1998 when they were nearly even (men = 84.89, women = 83.37).

Party unity on average was at an all-time low in 1996 for Democratic males (79.09) and in 1998 for Democratic females (83.37), and was at an all-time high in 2000 for both groups (men = 85.90, women = 91.74). Party unity on average was at an all-time low in 1994 for Republican males (83.99) and Republican females (74.42), and was at an all-time high in 1995 for both groups (males = 91.46, females = 86.53). Finally, Democratic women are between 4 to 16 points on average more unified with their party than Republican women. The two notable exceptions are 1995 (Republican women = 86.53, Democratic women = 87.93) and 1998 (Republican women = 84.06, Democratic women = 83.65). In all years except 1998, Democratic women are more unified than Republican women.

Conclusions

In addressing women's general ideological voting behavior, this analysis indicates that, for the most part, women act like partisans. Democratic women illustrate the same voting patterns as Democratic men, and Republican women illustrate the same voting

patterns as Republican men. The exception to this generalization arises in predicting social liberalism scores.

Women, both Republican and Democratic, appear to vote more liberally than men on social issues while generally adhering ideologically to the party line. While this finding is nothing new, it is significant in light of the attention granted by this analysis to both Member- and district-level characteristics. Particular attention has been paid in this analysis to the behavior of female legislators given their partisanship. While this preliminary analysis does not advance our understanding of women's actual status and participation within the party organization, it does illuminate the general ideological differences between men and women in terms of voting behavior.

The second general finding of this chapter is that parties matter. Partisanship shapes ideological voting in discernable ways. First, Democratic party culture provides Members with the discretion or freedom to respond to constituency pressures.⁸ We see from the analysis in this chapter that Democrats do respond to these pressures. Constituency factors as well as personal factors explain half of the variance in Democratic Member's vote decisions. On the other hand, Republican party culture promotes loyalty and ideological homogeneity and does not provide Members with the discretion to respond to constituency pressures. In other words, Republican party culture restricts the

⁸ When applied to legislative behavior, principal-agent theory suggests that Members of Congress are the agents of several principals, including: political parties, constituencies, and interest groups (Parker 1992). In this analysis, the concept of "discretion" is used to describe the amount of freedom Members enjoy from their various principles to pursue their legislative goals. Sometimes the constraints of one principal negatively impact the desires of another principal. In other words, sometimes districts (as principals) restrain

amount of freedom Members have to pursue goals, whether those be personal or constituent-driven. Consequently, Republicans do not respond to district pressures to the same extent as Democrats. In fact, constituency factors as well as personal factors only account for about a quarter of the variance in Republican Members' vote decisions.

Secondly, this chapter further provides support for party culture theory in that Democrats and Republicans respond to different constituency pressures. In the models, the only common significant predictor between the two parties was the general ideology of the district. Beyond that, the slopes of the indicators predicting Democratic Members' behavior were different in direction and significance from the slopes of the indicators predicting Republican Members' behavior.

These findings yield support for the idea that constituency constraints faced by Members vary by party. These constraints also vary by issue. While the percent black in the district was a significant predictor of general ideological voting behavior among Democrats, it was not a significant predictor of ideological voting on social issues for Democrats. Similarly, while the seniority of Republican Members was significantly associated with their general ideological voting behavior, it was not significantly associated with their voting behavior on social issues. If true, the implications of this finding are theoretically significant for the study of representation. It is useful to once again consider the words of Miller and Stokes:

Especially critical is the question whether different models of representation apply to different public issues. Is the saliency of legislative action to the public so different in quality and degree on different issues that the legislator have a single

Members from responding to party pressures (another principal).

generalized mode of response to his constituency that is rooted in a normative belief about the representative's role or does the same legislator respond to his constituency differently on different issues? More evidence is needed on matters so fundamental to our system (1999: 88)

These implications are also significant for modeling of Member legislative behavior. The scaling technique developed by Poole and Rosenthal has been widely used in the literature because it is highly collinear with other measures of ideology. It is touted as a general measure that not only encompasses a variety of issue dimensions, but also allows for comparisons across congresses. The present analysis calls into question the generalizability of this measure. Differences between the associations in the models predicting DW-NOMINATE scores and social liberalism ratings suggest that certain questions require multiple measures of ideology. We must recognize the limited utility of this measure, and verify results by comparing measures of ideological voting behavior.

In the end, although gender theory has assumed a cohesive women's voice concerning women's issues, there is reason to believe that women represent diverse constituencies that frame their preferences and behavior in different ways. Republican women are not the same in ideological orientation as Democratic women, however Republican women are most likely to agree with Democrats on social issues, particularly women's issues (Swers 1998). One Republican woman made these remarks in discussing her Democratic female colleagues:

I am totally different in philosophy. I am against big government. We agree that we need a degree of a safety net, but people prefer to empower themselves. Republicans are for cutting taxes and regulation. Theirs is such a different philosophy.

It does not follow, however, that women's participation in the legislative arena is inconsequential. Women's inclusion in public debate is important because they bring different experiences, attitudes, and resources to the political table (Tamerius 1995)

Some female members I interviewed expressed that although women differ in terms of ideology, they are more similar in terms of priorities. One Democratic female Member stated:

I see them (female Republican Members) as very different (ideologically) because most of them are pro-life. We are ideologically very different, although they (like us) are probably inclusive in the sense that they go to things. They probably start out and remain a part of their community. Women members pay more attention to what's going on in the office. Women are more likely to look at a broader range of budget issues. They may have different priorities, such as education, housing, and healthcare. Women approach legislating from a different perspective.

Similarly, one Democratic African-American female Member remarked

In some ways, there is no difference. As a human being, there is no difference. We just differ in what we give priority to. They don't have less ideals about service to constituents. I may be considered far more liberal (for example pro-choice), but some of them are too. We are ideologically different on wealth, income, social programs, and the role of government.

While the simple conclusion to be drawn is that women are more liberal than their male copartisans, the more critical point stems from our examination of party unity scores. Democratic women are much more formally unified with their party than Republican women. On average, women in the Democratic Party support the party position at much higher rates than Democratic men. Conversely, women in the Republican Party support the party position at much lower rates than Republican men. From the previous chapter, it is clear that Republican women face electoral pressures very different from those faced by

Democratic women. We would expect that Republican women would evidence lower party support scores than Republican men. The critical question is this: If women do face difference pressures and evidence different patterns of voting behavior when taking into consideration partisanship, then what are the implications for their status and participation within the legislative arena? In Chapter 4 we examine the positional and participatory differences between men and women within the party organizations of Congress.


Table 3.1 Mean Ideological Differences Between Male and Female Members Across Multiple Measures in 2000

		DW-NOMINATE ^o	ADA	Economic Liberalism	Social Liberalism	Foreign Liberalism
Male	Mean	0979	38 9415	46 3670	43 5806	45 3040
	N	378	376	376	372	375
	Std Deviation	4618	36 7247	29 3987	31 1897	30 1429
Female	Mean	- 1939	61 4286	62 8393	69 2679	63 7857
	N	56	56	56	56	56
	Std Deviation	4209	34 7682	26 9463	24 3956	27 0486
Total	Mean	0604	41 8565	48 5023	46 9416	47 7053
	N	434	432	432	428	431
	Std Deviation	4667	37 2143	29 5860	31 5767	30 3735

^oThe data for this analysis was taken from a number of sources. I employ the vote scaling techniques developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991, 1997). These DW-NOMINATE scores were downloaded from Keith Poole's data archive on the web at http://voteview.uh.edu/default_nomdata.htm and are recorded for the 103rd through 106th Congresses. DW-NOMINATE scores are useful in that they can be compared across congresses. DW-NOMINATE scores provide a single measure of ideology, bounded between +2 and -1 with conservatism increasing in a positive direction on a single left-right continuum. ADA scores were taken from the website of the Americans for Democratic Action at <http://adaction.org/voting.html>. The three liberalism measures were compiled from the website of *National Journal* at <http://nationaljournal.com/> and required membership to access. Refer to the section in the introduction for a more thorough presentation of data sources.


**Figure 3.1 Distribution of Male Members' DW-NOMINATE Scores
in the 106th Congress**

Male Members




**Figure 3.2 Distribution of Female Members' DW-NOMINATE Scores
in the 106th Congress**

Female Members



DW-NOMINATE Scores

**Figure 3.3 Distribution of Male Members' Social Liberalism Scores
in the 106th Congress**



**Figure 3.4 Distribution of Female Members' Social Liberalism Scores
in the 106th Congress**




Figure 3.5 Distribution of Democratic Male Members' DW-NOMINATE Scores in the 106th Congress





Figure 3.6 Distribution of Democratic Female Members' DW-NOMINATE Scores in the 106th Congress



**Figure 3.7 Distribution of Democratic Male Members' Social Liberalism Scores
in the 106th Congress**




Figure 3.8 Distribution of Democratic Female Members' Social Liberalism Scores in the 106th Congress




Figure 3.9 Distribution of Republican Male Members' DW-NOMINATE Scores in the 106th Congress




Figure 3.10 Distribution of Republican Female Members' DW-NOMINATE Scores in the 106th Congress




Figure 3.11 Distribution of Republican Male Members' Social Liberalism Scores in the 106th Congress




Figure 3.12 Distribution of Republican Female Members' Social Liberalism Scores in the 106th Congress




Table 3.2 Correlations Among and Principal Components Analysis of Indicators of District Socio-Economic Character

	Correlations			Component
	1.	2	3	
1 % Rural	---			- 740
2 % College Educated	- 505***	---		909
3 Per Capita Income	- 454***	771***	---	890

***p< .001 level

Table 3.3 Total Variance Explained Through Data Reduction by Party

	Initial Eigenvalues		
Component	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2 166	72 204	72 204
2	608	20 256	92 460
3	226	7 540	100 000

Extraction Method Principal Component Analysis

Table 3.4 Predicting DWNOMINATE Scores of Democratic Members Given Electoral Insecurity

	103 rd Congress	104 th Congress	105 th Congress	106 th Congress
	b (se)	b (se)	b (se)	b (se)
Constant	220 (.049) ¹⁰	153 (.058)	100 (.059)	154 (.058)
Sex	-.027 (.026)	-.022 (.028)	-.045 (.026)	-.040 (.024)
Seniority	-.002 (.001)	-.002 (.001)	-.003 (.001)**	-.003 (.001)**
Electoral Insecurity	-.045 (.019)*	-.022 (.021)	.009 (.021)	-.035 (.022)
% Black	.135 (.064)*	.089 (.067)	-.006 (.064)	.027 (.060)
Socio-Economic Factor	-.025 (.009)**	-.030 (.010)**	-.026 (.010)**	-.023 (.010)*
Presidential Vote Return	-.1125 (.101)***	-.995 (.113)***	-.763 (.103)***	-.858 (.101)***
Adj R ²	.506 (.1280)	.484 (.1260)	.425 (.1310)	.440 (.1237)
Valid N	245	193	196	203
Durbin-Watson	1.803	1.810	2.013	1.967

* p< .05 level

** p< .01 level

*** p< .001 level

¹⁰ Throughout the analysis, the standard error is reported in parentheses

Table 3.5 Predicting Social Liberalism Scores of Democratic Members Given Electoral Insecurity

	103 rd Congress	104 th Congress	105 th Congress	106 th Congress
	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)
Constant	29 264 (5 827)	31 189 (7 069)	35 487 (5 123)	23 969 (6 161)
Sex	5 006 (3 058)	5 486 (3 185)	6 224 (2 302)**	6 056 (2 497)*
Seniority	.016 (.123)	-.024 (.138)	.055 (.108)	-.054 (.120)
Electoral Insecurity	1 499 (2 329)	4 771 (2 556)	859 (1 800)	1 253 (2 349)
% Black	3 416 (7 088)	-1 515 (7 837)	-1 004 (5 436)	-5 520 (6 199)
Socio-Economic Factor	6 765 (1 072)***	4 213 (1 156)***	3 527 (.877)***	5 212 (.985)***
Presidential Vote Return	71 159 (11 723)***	73 465 (13 568)***	58 993 (8 930)***	79 874 (10 627)***
Adj. R ²	.497 (13 1750)	.370 (13 0903)	.412 (10 7528)	.480 (12 5448)
Valid N	183	153	175	188
Durbin-Watson	1 879	2 047	2 104	1 961

* p< .05 level

** p< .01 level

*** p< .001 level

Table 3.6 Predicting DW-NOMINATE Scores of Democratic Members Given Female Electoral Insecurity

	103 rd Congress	104 th Congress	105 th Congress	106 th Congress
	b (s e)	b (s e)	b (s e)	b (s e)
Constant	214 (049)	153 (058)	100 (059)	23.823 (6.169)
Sex	-.054 (035)	-.029 (034)	-.041 (031)	4.786 (2.933)
Seniority	-.001 (001)	-.002 (001)	-.003 (001)**	-.053 (0.121)
Electoral Insecurity	-.051 (020)**	-.024 (022)	.011 (022)	.502 (2.520)
Insecure Females	.058 (050)	.021 (055)	-.012 (052)	4.347 (5.256)
% Black	.130 (064)*	.087 (067)	-.006 (065)	-.5895 (6.221)
Socio-Economic Factor	-.027 (009)**	-.030 (010)**	-.025 (010)*	5.178 (9.87)***
Presidential Vote Return	-1.109 (0.102)***	-.993 (0.114)***	-.764 (0.103)***	80.569 (10.669)***
Adj R ²	.507 (0.1279)	.482 (0.1263)	.422 (0.1313)	.479 (0.125558)
Valid N	245	193	196	188
Durbin-Watson	1.825	1.811	2.011	1.973

- * p < .05 level
- ** p < .01 level
- *** p < .001 level

Table 3.7 Predicting Social Liberalism Scores of Democratic Members Given Female Electoral Insecurity

	103 rd Congress	104 th Congress	105 th Congress	106 th Congress
	b (s e)	b (s e)	b (s e)	B (s e)
Constant	30.076 (5.849)	31.241 (7.091)	35.512 (5.146)	32.325 (13.041)
Sex	7.791 (3.736)*	4.560 (3.988)	6.099 (2.739)*	1.429 (6.201)
Seniority	.002 (.123)	-.023 (.139)	.055 (.108)	-.197 (.255)
Electoral Insecurity	2.425 (2.432)	4.388 (2.747)	.799 (1.942)	-.3.731 (5.327)
Insecure Females	-7.982 (6.176)	2.406 (6.207)	3.98 (4.710)	6.867 (11.111)
% Black	4.147 (7.097)	-1.995 (7.957)	-1.001 (5.452)	-9.610 (13.151)
Socio-Economic Factor	7.090 (1.099)***	4.136 (1.177)***	3.526 (.879)***	6.112 (2.087)**
Presidential Vote Return	69.147 (11.804)***	73.818 (13.638)***	58.981 (8.958)***	74.913 (22.556)***
Adj R ²	.499 (13.1499)	.366 (13.1285)	.409 (10.7847)	.153 (26.5433)
Valid N	183	153	175	188
Durbin-Watson	1.916	2.037	2.104	2.023

* p< .05 level

** p< .01 level

*** p< .001 level

Table 3.8 Predicting DW-NOMINATE Scores of Republicans Given Electoral Insecurity

	103 rd Congress	104 th Congress	105 th Congress	106 th Congress
	b (s e)	b (s e)	b (s e)	b (s e)
Constant	833 (063)	966 (064)	1 005 (069)	1 009 (068)
Sex	- 135 (038)***	- 059 (035)	- 066 (037)	- 071 (036)*
Seniority	- 004 (001)**	- 005 (001)***	- 006 (001)***	- 004 (001)**
Electoral Insecurity	064 (021)**	062 (023)**	021 (021)	076 (023)***
% Black	- 277 (198)	151 (169)	- 071 (149)	121 (158)
Socio-Economic Factor	- 007 (010)	- 024 (010)**	- 006 (010)	- 008 (010)
Presidential Vote Return	-1 081 (171)***	-1 333 (175)***	-1 141 (159)***	-1 203 (161)***
Adj R ²	281 (1253)	260 (1355)	246 (1427)	266 (1371)
Valid N	165	217	213	207
Durbin-Watson	1 682	1 643	2 026	1 952

* p< .05 level

** p< .01 level

*** p< .001 level

Table 3.9 Predicting Social Liberalism Scores of Republicans Given Electoral Insecurity

	103 rd Congress	104 th Congress	105 th Congress	106 th Congress
	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)
Constant	-30.701 (8.028)	-16.598 (10.219)	-20.012 (8.679)	-23.787 (8.085)
Sex	18.430 (5.023)***	11.355 (5.938)	6.889 (4.814)	10.146 (4.159)*
Seniority	212 (187)	161 (252)	189 (197)	121 (171)
Electoral Insecurity	-8.230 (2.701)**	-10.600 (3.870)**	-1.226 (2.775)	-3.627 (2.699)
% Black	-1.952 (25.495)	-42.021 (27.599)	-16.224 (19.792)	-57.564 (18.830)**
Socio-Economic Factor	2.138 (1.277)	5.489 (1.575)***	2.855 (1.321)*	5.944 (1.206)***
Presidential Vote Return	143.971 (22.139)***	125.844 (28.011)***	105.249 (20.434)***	126.324 (19.090)***
Adj R ²	.303 (14.9193)	.183 (20.1243)	.169 (16.9892)	.368 (14.7709)
Valid N	143	179	186	176
Durbin-Watson	1.906	1.845	2.201	1.987

* p < .05 level

** p < .01 level

*** p < .001 level

Table 3.10 Predicting DW-NOMINATE Scores of Republicans Given Female Electoral Insecurity

	103 rd Congress	104 th Congress	105 th Congress	106 th Congress
	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)	b (s.e.)
Constant	833 (.063)	960 (.065)	1 007 (.069)	1 009 (.068)
Sex	- .136 (.060)*	- .090 (.045)*	- .105 (.053)*	- .079 (.043)
Seniority	- .004 (.001)**	- .005 (.001)***	- .006 (.001)***	- .004 (.001)**
Electoral Insecurity	.064 (.022)**	.055 (.024)*	.015 (.022)	.074 (.024)**
Insecure Females	.002 (.078)	.075 (.070)	.075 (.073)	.027 (.077)
% Black	- .277 (.199)	.155 (.169)	- .064 (.149)	.122 (.159)
Socio-Economic Factor	- .007 (.010)	- .023 (.010)*	- .005 (.010)	- .007 (.010)
Presidential Vote Return	-1 080 (.173)***	-1 310 (.176)***	-1 141 (.159)***	-1 199 (.161)***
Adj R ²	.276 (.1257)	.260 (.1355)	.246 (.1427)	.263 (.1374)
Valid N	165	217	213	207
Durbin-Watson	1.682	1.355	2.027	1.947

* p< .05 level

** p< .01 level

*** p< .001 level

Table 3.11 Predicting Social Liberalism Scores of Republicans Given Female Electoral Insecurity

	103 rd Congress	104 th Congress	105 th Congress	106 th Congress
	b (s e)	b (s e)	b (s e)	b (s e)
Constant	-31 049 (8 129)	-16 380 (10 282)	-20 013 (8 601)	-23 777 (8 108)
Sex	16 784 (7 248)*	12 378 (7 164)	15 504 (6 344)*	9 675 (4 858)*
Seniority	211 (187)	162 (252)	200 (195)	119 (171)
Electoral Insecurity	-8 508 (2 849)**	-10 324 (4 027)**	252 (2 842)	-3 787 (2 837)
Insecure Females	3 185 (10 078)	-3 277 (12 764)	-19 734 (9 576)*	1 718 (9 690)
% Black	-2 298 (25 603)	-42 392 (27 712)	-16 610 (19 616)	-57 514 (18 886)**
Socio-Economic Factor	2 189 (1 291)	5 451 (1 586)***	2 497 (1 321)	5 955 (1 211)***
Presidential Vote Return	145 356 (22 640)***	125 084 (28 243)***	103 781 (20 264)***	126 432 (19 153)***
Adj R ²	298 (14 9689)	178 (20 1791)	183 (16 8372)	364 (14 8132)
Valid N	143	179	186	176
Durbin-Watson	1 896	1 846	2 270	1 985

*p< .05 level

** p< .01 level

*** p< .001 level

Table 3.12 Mean Party Unity Based on Partisanship and Sex of Member: 1993-2000

		1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Republican	Mean	84.86	83.34	91.10	86.72	87.82	84.82	88.10	90.05
	N	176	178	230	230	227	226	222	222
	s.d.	9.95	12.41	5.96	8.84	9.05	10.77	8.25	7.62
Democrat	Mean	85.23	83.67	80.69	80.12	81.78	83.42	85.49	86.97
	N	256	255	203	203	205	206	212	212
	s.d.	10.45	12.60	14.99	14.36	12.39	12.26	13.38	11.79
Male	Mean	84.78	83.30	86.07	83.50	84.76	84.21	86.55	88.36
	N	385	386	386	386	378	378	378	378
	s.d.	10.19	12.62	12.55	12.22	11.42	11.60	11.31	10.14
Female	Mean	87.32	85.43	87.43	84.66	86.31	83.78	88.64	89.79
	N	47	47	47	47	54	54	56	56
	s.d.	10.45	11.51	9.86	12.08	9.17	11.01	9.71	8.89
Republican Male	Mean	85.49	83.99	91.46	87.09	88.12	84.89	88.58	90.44
	N	164	166	213	213	211	209	205	205
	s.d.	9.45	12.12	5.45	8.51	8.79	10.83	7.75	7.11
Republican Female	Mean	75.33	74.42	86.53	82.12	83.88	84.06	82.35	85.29
	N	12	12	17	17	16	17	17	17
	s.d.	12.16	13.49	9.49	11.56	11.58	10.25	11.76	11.42
Democratic Male	Mean	84.25	82.79	79.43	79.09	80.49	83.37	84.16	85.90
	N	221	220	173	173	168	169	173	173
	s.d.	10.70	12.99	15.35	14.46	12.85	12.46	14.09	12.41
Democratic Female	Mean	91.43	89.20	87.93	86.10	87.62	83.65	91.38	91.74
	N	35	35	30	30	37	37	39	39
	s.d.	5.64	7.93	10.19	12.32	7.82	11.47	7.26	6.81
Total	Mean	85.06	83.53	86.22	83.63	84.95	84.16	86.82	88.55
	N	432	433	433	433	432	432	434	434
	s.d.	10.24	12.51	12.28	12.19	11.17	11.51	11.13	9.99

Chapter 4

The Organizational Connection: Women's Participation Within the Party Organizations

"I am gravely disappointed at the decision of the Steering Committee," Roukema (R-NJ)¹ said "However, I will be gracious and a good sport as a member of the Republican Team. I pledge to continue my services on the Committee and assure with my knowledge and experience that we protect the safety and soundness of financial services and assure that we continue supplementing the good economy with sound monetary policy " – Roukema Statement on Banking Committee Chairmanship (January 4, 2001)

Introduction

In the preceding chapters, we explored the extent to which partisanship shapes the unique pressures women face at the electoral level. These electoral pressures in turn translate into voting behavior within the institution that uniquely positions women within their respective parties. For Democratic women, electoral pressures fall in line with partisan pressures. In turn, they mirror their male colleagues ideologically and are even more unified in their voting behavior with the party than Democratic men. For Republican women, on the other hand, electoral pressures can conflict with partisan pressures. Consequently, they are sometimes significantly more liberal and significantly less unified with the party in terms of their voting behavior than Republican men.

In this chapter, we examine the organizational connection, including the status and participation of women within the party organizations. We might expect Democratic women to be equally incorporated within the party organization because of their electoral

¹ Rep. Marge Roukema (R-NJ) was the most senior Member on the Banking Committee and was passed over for the chairmanship. She was one of the most senior female Republican Members in the House before she retired at the end of the 107th Congress in 2002.

discretion and ideological consonance with the party. We might expect Republican women conversely to be unequally incorporated within the party organization because of their lack of electoral discretion and ideological dissonance with the party. This chapter is critical to the argument of this dissertation as well as to gender theory because it provides a novel understanding of women's legislative behavior as shaped by partisan participation within the Congress.

In the following pages, we examine the theoretical basis for such an analysis, exploring factors contributing to Member participation and support within party organizations and our present understanding of women's participation within political institutions. From this review, we develop a certain expectation of women's incorporation within the party organizations and so turn to examine the current status of women within the parties. Next, women's participation in party-building activities is presented to measure actual organizational behavior. Finally, we explore the less formal or tangible contours of women's participation within the party organization, such as Member evaluations of the party organizations, perceived roles within the parties, and reflections on gender differences within the context of partisanship.

Party Organizations and Member Support

Too little attention has been given to the advantages held by the majority party in "structuring the committee system -- setting up jurisdictions, allocating resources, assigning members, and so forth" (Cox and McCubbins 1993: 8). Just as Members have individual goals that motivate their legislative behavior, so parties have collective goals that motivate leadership behavior. Party leaders use their resources to "promote committee accountability," to "advance or delay legislative initiatives," to "structure the

choice context,” to protect prefloor logrolling,” and to “reduce uncertainty” (Evans and Oleszek 1999: 120-121). Parties are allowed to pursue these goals because they prove mutually beneficial to Members

These simple facts — that majority status can be made preferable to minority status, that leading can be made preferable to following — suggest a rather different view of the motivation of rational legislators. . . . Reelection remains important, even dominant, but its importance can be modified significantly by the desire for *internal advancement* — defined both in terms of a party’s advancement to majority status and in terms of the individual MC’s advancement in the hierarchy of (committee and leadership) posts within her party (Cox and McCubbins 1993: 126)

In sum, deference to the party leadership helps Members solve the collective-action problems inherent in the organization (Cox and McCubbins 1993)

Members are motivated to support the party by a number of both external and internal factors. Some have even related the strength of party government in the House to a “legislative cartel” (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Parties have a number of electoral and institutional resources at their disposal to influence Member support. Since the formal and informal reforms implemented by the Republicans in the 104th Congress, the party has taken on a new importance in setting the legislative agenda and influencing legislative behavior. Through a combination of electoral, structural, and political incentives, the contemporary party (particularly the majority party) influences the support of its Members. We see differences in the partisan behavior of Members based on both the status of the Member and the party organizational context.

Member Status

A principal tenet of legislative behavior theory is that Members of Congress are driven by a desire to win reelection (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977). Any list

of factors contributing to party support through legislative behavior must include, if not begin with, the “electoral connection.” Members who represent marginal districts have a greater need for the monetary as well as political support available through the national party organizations. Nonetheless, they suffer from additional electoral pressures that guide their voting behavior. For this reason, marginality of districts has been shown to be associated with lower party support scores (Shannon 1968, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001). Even in an era of interparty competition, such as the modern era, district marginality is associated with lower party support scores (Brady 1973: 155). Members who represent relatively safe districts, on the other hand, do not have this pressing need and can enjoy the additional discretion that electoral security provides (Parker 1992).

There is historical evidence to suggest that party leadership through the Committee on Committees seeks to achieve a number of goals through the committee assignment process such as: management, constituent interest, party maintenance, and party support (Rohde and Shepsle 1973: 905). “It is useful to view the assignment process as an institutionalized allocation process involving goal-seeking actors, scarce but valued commodities, and behavioral constraints” (ibid). A central goal in the assignment process is to facilitate the reelection of Members (Masters 1961, Clapp 1964). In particular, freshmen from marginal districts benefit from the reelection goal, receiving assignments that benefit their chances of reelection. Even when freshmen do not immediately receive their preferred committee assignment, most all Members secure preferred positions by their third term (Gertzog 1976).

While there are a number of factors that figure into committee assignments, such as: the Member’s expertise, stances on committee-relevant issues, and age, the

demographic and factional balance of the committee, and the preferences of the chairman, "being in good graces of the party leader is certainly important in getting on major committees" [(Masters 1961 345), see (Masters 1961) as well as (Clapp 1964 207-240) and (Goodwin 1959) for a discussion of factors relevant to committee assignment]. Particularly regarding the major committees, assignment is restricted to more senior Members "who are 'responsible' legislators, and who represent districts which do not require them to take inflexible positions on controversial issues" (Masters 1961 357). In contrast, "unfavorable assignments, of little political value to the recipients, are sometimes deliberately given by the powers that be as a mark of disapproval, or for reasons that might be described as 'for the good of the order'" (ibid 356). Interestingly, prior to the realignment of Southern Democratic seats, these conservative members were "less successful in obtaining desired assignments" than their colleagues from other regions (Bullock 1973 115). They were also required to serve longer than others before being promoted to exclusive committees (ibid).

The assignment of committee seats further illustrates differences in the two party cultures. Republicans since taking over the Congress have used the committee system as a means for reward and punishment. Contrastingly, Democrats have traditionally based committee assignments strictly on seniority. These differences hold implications not only for party unity but also for the fate of women within the respective organizations.

A group of Members we might expect to illustrate heightened party unity is committee chairmen. Since the congressional reforms of the 1970's, committee chairs have illustrated significantly higher levels of party support. In the pre-reform House, it was quite typical for committee chairs to vote with the party less than half of the time.

According to Brandes Crook and Hibbing (1985).

Committee chairmen often registered party support scores of 40, 30 and sometimes even 20 per cent. After William Colmer of Mississippi became chairman of the Rules Committee in 1967 he proceeded to record party support scores of 19 per cent, 25 per cent and 19 per cent in the next three congresses (225)

Since the reforms, however, chairs seem more cooperative and willing to follow party leadership (ibid; Waldman 1980). This behavior is a direct result of changes in the seniority system brought about by congressional reform. Now that there is an incentive structure, committee chairs are much more likely to respond to party pressures. Brandes Crook and Hibbing (1985) suggest

The heightened party support of these individuals is not due to their sudden concern with the health of political parties in our system, but rather is due to a sanction that recently returned after a lengthy hiatus — the ability of the party caucus to take away a committee chairmanship. If one of the goals of the reformers was to improve the degree of party cohesion in government — the weakening of the seniority system was a successful reform. Congressional reform has had an effect, and in this one instance it has moved the US legislative process closer to one in which the political parties are not lying prostrate before the thrones of committee chairmen (225-226)

Members appointed or elected to positions of leadership within the party help to realize the party goals of developing and focusing the legislative agenda, promoting committee accountability, and structuring legislative success. They are the heavy hand of the party. Based on the responsibilities of the leadership team, Members holding positions of party leadership display higher levels of party unity than their colleagues. Even in the less centralized, less-unified Democratically-controlled Congress, party leaders evidenced higher levels of party support than their colleagues (Ripley 1967, Peabody 1976; Sinclair 1983). As Loomis (1984) states

leaders' party unity scores, as of 1980, ran a bit higher than those of nonleaders. For the most part, leaders appear as slightly party-conscious 'middle-men' (193)

Organizational Context

A further factor influencing Members' behavior within the party organization is the organizational context. There are important administrative, purposive, and behavioral differences between the two parties in the contemporary Congress. In terms of structure, they are seemingly quite similar, however, administrative and purposive characteristics of the organization illuminate the severe differences between the Democratic and Republican Party on the Hill. In terms of administration, the Democratic Caucus has one-quarter the staff and one-tenth of the budget of the Republican Conference. In terms of purpose, the Democratic Caucus serves as an arm of the leadership team to develop responses to Republican legislation, while the Republican Conference operates as a sophisticated public relations firm (Peters 2002). In describing the Conference, Peters notes:

The Republican Conference operates like a large public relations firm, sponsoring a sophisticated web page (GOP GOV), organizes large issue conferences, has a major outreach program to talk radio and television shows and other media outlets, has monitored campaign contributions by lobbyists, and has been responsible for specific policy portfolios within the GOP leadership group. The Democratic Caucus functions mostly through a series of issues task forces designed to forge Democratic alternatives to Republican legislation, but has no specific policy portfolio, has a less well developed web site, is not responsible for communications strategy, and is generally subordinate to the floor leader and whip organizations (2002: 2)

These differences are not only due to majority/minority status, but also are directly associated with party culture. The Republicans' long-standing status as the minority party in Congress prior to 1994 limited their access to positions of power within the

institution and resulted in the proliferation of positions within the leadership organization "through which leadership ambition was channeled" (ibid: 17)

The purposes of the two organizations are also different in critical ways. In recent years the Conference has not only streamlined weekly briefings with Member press secretaries, it has also streamlined communication with committees and leadership, and is attempting to streamline communication with the electorate (Peters 2002). Particularly since losing the majority, the Democratic Caucus has become a forum for debate, a patchwork of diversity, and an umbrella for policy-focused task forces. In sum, Peters suggests:

The Democratic Caucus is coalitional, it works with and through external interest groups, it is subordinated to the committees, and its focus has been more internal than external. The Republican Conference is ideological, it runs on money, it functions more autonomously from the committee system, and its focus is more external than internal (2002: 33)

At the end of the day, however, an important party-building activity for both parties is internal and external communications. "Party communications services have become a growing activity for building party cohesion" (Forgette 2002: 37). At every level within the organization, communication activities increasingly serve the function of creating a unified message. From the message articulated by the party leaders, to the issue briefs circulated by the caucuses, to the order of bill introduction (Forgette 2002), Members are provided with information by the party concerning its priorities and are encouraged to participate in party-building by "staying on message."

Party theory has only recently begun to reflect the diverse party-building activities that contribute to Member legislative behavior. Partisan activities, such as attending

party organizational meetings, promoting the party agenda through internal and external communications and building political capital by assisting with colleagues' campaigns, are important facets of the modern party organization. In the next section, I examine three distinct forms of party-building activity: organizational attendance, national fundraising, and national media appearances to build a more adequate model of women's partisan participation.

Party-Building Activities

There is a hidden element of legislative behavior – that of party building. Members participate in party-building activities to curry favor with colleagues or build “social capital,” to use a term now popular in the social sciences (Forgette 2002, for further explication of social capital as a concept, see Loury 1987, 1977, Coleman 1990, Ostrom 1992, and Putnam 1993). Forgette (2002) suggests that

Party building activities may not directly affect specific committee action or floor votes, however, these activities may generate greater party identity, informal networks, friendships, and a shared sense of party expectations and destinies among legislative copartisans. Party building activities, in short, maintain and strengthen long-term party success (5).

This form of activity makes cognitive sense within a number of theoretical frameworks, not only social network theory but also rational choice theory. “Party-building, from (the) rational choice perspective, operates as a means of building reciprocity and information relationships among goal-directed politicians to solve their collective dilemmas” (ibid. 6). Members can have a number of institutional identities, such as an “institutionalist” identity (focused on the committee culture or policy development of the Congress) or a “partisan” identity (focused on the team loyalty or ideological unity of the

party) (Connelly and Pitney 1994). We should expect party building activity to differ according to institutional identities (Forgette 2002: 9)

Some have suggested that parties are more election than policy oriented (Cantor and Hermanson 1997). Party unity scores do not influence the distribution of party monies and campaign assistance, and conversely party spending or recruitment does not lead to greater party unity (Cantor Hermanson 1997, Clucas 1997). Little research, however, has examined the relationship between party spending and party unity scores since the Republicans have held the majority in the House. This analysis suggests that party culture is an important factor in examining party unity. While campaign spending might not be related to party unity scores, party-building activities including party fundraising should be related to party unity scores or greater ideological loyalty.

As was discussed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, the Democratic Party illustrates a highly pluralistic structure, whereas the Republican Party illustrates a more elitist structure. Freeman notes that

Since the Democratic party is composed of groups, the success of individuals whose group identification is highly significant, such as blacks and women, is tied to that of the group as a whole. They succeed as the group succeeds. That is not the case within the Republican party. It officially ignores group characteristics. Generally, individuals succeed insofar as the leaders with whom they are connected succeed (336).²

For this reason, sponsorship is important in the Republican Party. Incoming freshmen are

² Although Freeman (1986) focuses on the national party organizations rather than specifically on the congressional party organizations, her observations of national party culture are applicable to the congressional organizations as well, and are pertinent to our discussion of party organizational behavior here.

often "sponsored" by more senior Members within the organization. Sponsors take freshmen Members "under their wings" and "show them the ropes." This practice serves to orient Members to the ethos, protocol, and practices of the party. A number of the prominent women in the Republican Party are sponsored by Republican men (ibid)

The Republican Party advocates a more unitary conception of representation. Meeting the needs of national interest, such as improving the economy, is the appropriate means for meeting the needs of individual groups. On the other hand, Democrats hold a conception of representation that emphasizes minority coalition-building (ibid). Freeman states:

Democrats do not have an integrated conception of a national interest, in part because they do not view themselves as the center of society. The party's components think of themselves as outsiders pounding on the door seeking programs that will facilitate entry into the mainstream. Thus, the party is very responsive to any groups. (ibid. 338)

This ethos is further evidenced in the organizational style of the two parties. While Democratic party politics are often characterized as "open" and "confrontational," Republican party politics are characterized as "closed" and "consensual" (ibid). The organizational style of the Republican Party is best reflected by a corporation with discretion located at the top, whereas the organizational style of the Democratic Party is best reflected by a social movement with discretion located among the different vocal groups. The representational ethos and the organizational style of the Democratic Party work hand-in-hand to produce an environment of conflict and change.

One of the major consequences of these attitudinal and structural differences between the parties concerns the role of women within the parties. The Republican Party

emphasizes loyalty to the party first and foremost, whereas the Democratic Party provides the vehicle whereby group loyalties may be articulated in the political arena Freeman (1986) suggests that

Even in 1976, when Republican feminists were aligned with party leaders, one organizer commented that because the GOP is not "an interest group party" the RWTF is viewed with skepticism. Party regulars have a hard time adjusting to the presence of an organized interest." The current leadership views feminist organizations as Democratic party front groups. Thus it is virtually impossible to be both an accepted Republican activist and an outspoken supporter of feminist goals. Since the party discourages people from identifying themselves as members of a group with a group agenda, it minimizes the possibility of multiple loyalties (348)

Another consequence of the Republican emphasis on party loyalty is widespread trust among rank-and-file members of the Republican Party. An emphasis on social and ideological homogeneity fosters a trust of others within the group. Party leaders thus are capable of maintaining discretion over the policy agenda because they benefit from a large degree of membership trust (ibid. 351)

In sum, high levels of party unity in the contemporary context could be due to the relative ideological homogeneity of the parties combined with the increased control of party leadership over committees, policy development, and voting cues. Evidence from the McKinley era suggests that "higher levels of party support... were related to the centralized leadership structure and the homogeneity of the constituencies represented by each party" (Brady 1972: 439). In fact, several studies of American legislatures point to these two variables (centralized leadership and constituent homogeneity) as significant predictors of party support (see Jewell and Patterson 1966: 425; MacRae, Jr. 1952; Jewell 1955; Dye 1961; Flinn 1964; Polsby et al. 1969; Rohde 1991).

What implications does this have for women's legislative behavior? Given the

elitist structure of the Republican Party as well as the emphasis on party homogeneity and ideological loyalty, we might expect Republican women, who are more liberal on average than their colleagues on social issues, to have lower party unity scores, and to consequently be underrepresented in formal positions of power. These women might be underrepresented on exclusive committees, among committee and subcommittee chairs, and in the leadership team. In contrast, given the coalitional structure of the Democratic Party, with its emphasis on seniority and diversity, we might expect Democratic women, who are also more liberal on average than their colleagues, to have higher party unity scores but regardless enjoy at least equal representation in the same formal positions of power.

Nonetheless, academics, journalists, and politicians alike have noted the inability of all women to reach the highest levels of party leadership. Women are often elected to positions of service within the party structure. Since the 104th Congress, the vast majority of Republican Conference Secretaries and Democratic Caucus Secretaries have been women. Some have described it as a token position of power (Peters 2002). Women have not been elected, however, to the most prestigious positions of leadership within the party -- until recently. Although her accomplishment is not captured by the data included in this analysis, Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) was elected to the position of minority whip during the second session of the 107th Congress and to the position of minority leader following the 2002 election. Her victory marks the highest office held by any woman in the House of Representatives. Gender theory sheds light on possible reasons for this discrepancy between men and women's status within the party organizations.

Women's Participation

Concerned about the quality of political representation, gender theory in the legislative context focuses on women's participation in the political discourse of state and national legislatures. Women's inclusion in public debate is important because women bring different *experiences, attitudes, and resources* to the political table (Tamerius 1995, Schlozman et al. 1995). Congresswomen are better able to steer feminist policy through the policy process than congressmen because of their interest and desire to affect change for women (Tamerius 1995, see also Thomas 1991). It is possible, however, that women may not be fully effective at promoting feminist policy because of certain gendered power dynamics present in legislative discourse and because of the highly masculinized nature of political talk (Kathlene 1995).

In sex-differentiated group interaction, men and women participate differently. Men are more interested in accomplishing the task at hand, while women are more attentive to maintaining group solidarity (Bales 1950). Men are more likely to offer opinions and guidance and to talk in general (Smith-Lovin and Robinson 1992, see also Eakins and Eakins 1978, Leet-Pellegrini 1980, Crawford and MacLeod 1990, Sadker and Sadker 1994). Conversely, women are more likely to facilitate group discussion, to support the expression of opinions, and to agree with the suggestions of others within the group (Eakins & Eakins 1978; Ridgeway and Johnson 1990).

The gendered nature of political institutions and processes also shapes women's participation (Kenney 1997). Political institutions "produce, reproduce and subvert" gender in their processes and arrangements of power (ibid: 456). As such, political settings may reward behavior typically regarded as "male" or "aggressive" and thus

magnify insignificant differences in knowledge, interest, and participation

Across political organizational contexts, gender theorists find that women are limited in their access and effectiveness by gendered discourse regardless of the social composition of the group. "Women, whether they be 10, 20, or 60 percent of an organization, work within the larger confines of gendered institutions and socially prescribed roles" (Kathlene 1995: 167). Female committee chairs use their leadership posts to facilitate dialogue and include more voices at the table while male chairs interject more of their own personal opinions and assert dominant verbal behavior such as cutting off speakers (Kathlene's 1994: 572). Female chairs create a more inclusive or facilitating speaking environment while male chairs present a more assertive or challenging speaking environment. In confirmation hearings, women are not given equal access to political debate. Female witnesses before the U S Senate Judiciary Committee are given less time to speak, and their testimonies are given less credence. Even those female witnesses who adopt a more masculine linguistic style are treated with less respect than male witnesses (Mattei 1998).

A major concern in this line of research is the impact of the social composition of groups on the "token" individual's behavior (Kanter 1977). Indeed, women hold a minority of leadership roles in most American political institutions. Yet we should be careful to assume that a more "balanced" institutional setting would lead to equal participation. Balanced numbers may not lead to balanced participation. As women's numbers increase, does women's participation in the political debate increase as well? In examining committee behavior, Kathlene (1994) finds support for Yoder's (1991) intrusiveness theory in that "men rather than women became significantly more vocal

when women comprised greater proportions of the committee” (179). Whether the gendered contours of political discourse are due to institutional norms rather than gendered norms of behavior *per se* is the subject of some debate

Women’s Status Within the Party Organizations

The number of women in Congress has increased over the last decade for both parties. Table 4.1 illustrates the gender composition of the parties in the House for the 103rd through 106th Congresses. The female composition of the Democratic Party increased from 13.6% (35) in the 103rd Congress to 18.4% (39) in the 106th Congress

Table 4.1 about here

The dramatic seat gains of the Republican Party throughout the last decade mask the gender compositional change that took place over the same time period. While the female composition of the Republican Party only increased from 6.8% in the 103rd Congress to 7.7% in the 106th Congress, the actual number of women increased by 42%, from 12 to 17.

Table 4.2 about here

In the Democratic Party, women also made gains in terms of their representation in committees and in leadership (see Table 4.2). In the committee structure, they enjoyed increased representation on exclusive committees, changing the composition from 11.4% female to 19.1% female over the respective congresses. They also enjoyed increases as ranking members on subcommittees, doubling their numbers from 6 in 1993 to 12 in 1999 and changing the composition of the group from 5.5% to 14.8% female. The number of women who were full committee chairs between those years, however, remained the same -- only one woman was a committee chair in the 103rd, 104th, and

106th Congresses, and no women were chairs in the 105th Congress

In the leadership structure, women made great gains in the Democratic Party. The female composition of the overall leadership team³ increased from 14.5% (17) to 21.0% (21). Women made their greatest and enduring gains on the policy and steering committees, doubling their representation and increasing the composition from 11.8% to 20.5% between 1993 and 2000. Women also infiltrated the highest ranks of leadership during the 104th Congress, claiming 1 of 6 leadership positions. The composition of the whip team and the campaign committee also seem to have changed to reflect women's increased numbers in Congress, although the data is not complete for all years.

Table 4.3 about here

In the Republican Party, women more than tripled their numbers on exclusive committees, increasing the female composition of these committees from 4.9% to 11.1%. They also increased in number as subcommittee chairs. They did not enjoy, however, increases as full committee chairs. In the 105th and 106th Congresses, no Republican

³ When referring to the "leadership team," this analysis incorporates a novel measure of party leadership. Not only has the leadership structure in the House become increasingly institutionalized over the last century, power has become increasingly centralized in the party apparatus since the committee reforms of the 1970's and the institutional reforms of the Republican Revolution. For these two reasons, it is important to treat party leadership as a group of elected and appointed Members collectively responsible for the electoral and legislative success of the party. The power and prestige that party leadership offers comes at the price of party loyalty and service. Consequently, we should expect that Members inside party leadership should demonstrate higher party unity scores than Members outside of party leadership. The data for this measure was taken from Congressional Quarterly's *Politics in America*, from their list of "Partisan House Committees." This dichotomous variable accounts for being a member of the leadership team, defined as: the Speaker and floor leaders; the whip team, including chief deputy whips, deputy whips, assistant whips, at-large whips, and regional whips; membership on the national campaign committees, membership on the policy committees, and membership on the steering committees.

women chaired a full committee. They did not make significant gains overall in the leadership structure either. Their representation within the highest ranks of leadership did increase from 0 in the 103rd Congress to 2 in the 106th Congress (making the composition of formal leadership 25% female). And their representation within the whip team did increase from 4 to 5, but the overall size of the whip structure also dramatically increased, resulting in a decrease of the female composition of the structure from 22.2% to 8.5%. They made no advances on the policy and steering committees, decreasing in number from 8 in 1993 to 2 in 2000. Similarly, their numbers shrank on the campaign committee, going from 7 in 1993 to 3 in 2000. Overall, the female composition of the leadership team dropped from 12.0% in the 103rd Congress to 7.7% in the 106th Congress.

Table 4.4 about here

To end here, however, would not paint an adequate picture of women's partisan status in Congress during these years. Although they may not have made tremendous gains in terms of numbers in either the committee structure or the leadership structure during these Congresses, they are proportionately represented in almost every group. Table 4.4 illustrates that the tables have turned in terms of the percentage of men and women holding exclusive committee assignments. In the 103rd Congress, 5% fewer women enjoyed prestigious committee assignments than men (27.8% of men versus 22.9% of women). In the 106th Congress, however, a greater percentage of women than men held prestigious assignments (22.0% of men versus 23.1% of women). Both in terms of full committee and subcommittee ranking positions, nonetheless, men have held more than "their fair share" of assignments. While women have not had any more success gaining full committee ranking positions, they have made progress at the

subcommittee level. In the 106th Congress, 39.9% of Democratic men and 30.8% of Democratic women held ranking positions on subcommittees, whereas, in the 103rd Congress, 46.2% of Democratic men and 17.1% of Democratic women held ranking positions on subcommittees.

In the leadership structure as well, Democratic women have enjoyed proportionate assignments with men. A greater percentage of women than men have been appointed to the whip team in every Congress included in the analysis. A greater percentage of women than men have served on the policy and steering committees in every Congress since the 104th Congress. A greater percentage of women than men have served on the campaign committee in every Congress (except in the 105th where there is insufficient data to make observations). Overall, for most Congresses, over half of the women in the Democratic Party served in some sort of leadership capacity, and less than half of the men in the Democratic Party served in similar capacities.

Table 4.5 about here

The trend is similar in the Republican Party. Table 4.5 illustrates that for most Congresses a greater percentage of Republican women than men held seats on exclusive committees. Similarly, a greater percentage of women than men held ranking positions on subcommittees. In every Congress, however, a lower percentage of women than men held ranking positions on full committees.

In terms of the leadership structure, after the 103rd Congress a greater percentage of Republican women than men were elected to the highest levels of leadership. A cursory glance also leads us to conclude the Republican women have also had better chances at being elected to the whip team than men. It is important to recognize,

however, that the whip team in the Republican party organization grew dramatically in the 104th Congress, while women's numbers on the team remained virtually the same. Women's successes at holding positions on the policy and steering committees have been mixed. Until the 106th Congress, a greater percentage of Republican women than men held positions on these committees. In the 106th Congress, however, the size of the committees grew and the relative representation of women did not. While their numbers decreased on the campaign committee, a greater number of women than men held positions on the committee for every Congress in the sample. Even though the percentage of women on the leadership team as a whole decreased by 28% from the 103rd to the 106th Congress, a greater percentage of women than men held positions on the team during every Congress.

Since the 103rd Congress, the number of Republican women in Congress has increased by 42%, but the general number of Republican women in positions of leadership has remained virtually the same. While it appears that Republican women have not been successful within the party organization, they have enjoyed greater odds than their male colleagues at holding every partisan position except full committee chair. In other words, a greater proportion of Republican women hold positions of party leadership (other than committee chairmanships) than Republican men.

Table 4.6 about here

While the gains made by women between the 103rd and 106th Congresses seem modest, a historical look at the leadership positions and committee positions held by women indicate that the 1990's have reached a high point for women in party leadership. The number of women holding positions within party leadership has increased.

dramatically since the 104th Congress (see Table 4 6) In contrast to the 81st through 98th Congresses where women in the Democratic Party only held the position of Secretary of the House Democratic Caucus, women in the 107th Congress held an array of positions, including Assistant to the House Democratic Leader, Chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, House Democratic Whip, Democratic Chief Deputy Whip, House Republican Conference Secretary, and Vice Chair of the House Republican Conference. In both parties, women have made great strides in securing leadership positions.

Table 4 7 about here

Gains have been less pronounced in the committee leadership structure While two female Members served as committee chairs in the 75th through the 77th Congresses, hardly any women have held chairmanships since the 83rd Congress (see Table 4 7) Since the 83rd Congress, only three women have served as committee chairs Rep Edith Nourse Rogers (R-MA, 83rd Congress, Chair of Committee on Veterans' Affairs), Rep Leonor Sullivan (D-MO, 93rd and 94th Congresses, Chair of Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries), and Rep Jan Meyers (R-KS, 104th Congress, Chair of Committee on Small Business) While women have had some recent success in attaining party leadership positions, they have had very little success in attaining committee chairmanships. Now that we have examined women's general representation in the committee structure and the party structure, we are ready to examine women's actual participation in and evaluations of the party organizations.

Women's Support of the Party Organizations

The previous chapter illustrated that Democratic women illustrate significantly

higher party unity scores than Democratic men. Contrastingly, Republican women have significantly lower party unity scores than their male colleagues. It is important to realize, however, that this is only one form of party support. It is the most basic measure of party support. There are other ways in which Members demonstrate support for their party organization. In particular, two venues in the modern congressional era have become popular outlets for Members to participate in party-building activities: the establishment of leadership PACs and participation in national political media.

Women's Participation in Party-Building Activities

Analyzing party support scores does little to tell us about the active support given by Members to both the official and political wings of the two parties. While measuring support scores might reveal whether there are discrepancies between male and female partisan voting patterns, it does not reveal the extent to which men and women are partisan actors on the political scene. Do women attend organizational meetings to the same degree that men do? Do women participate in the same kind of fundraising activities as men? Are they as successful in raising funds as men? Do they act as public spokespersons for the party through the venue of national media? Do they view their role(s) in the party in the same way that men do, or are there critical differences that might illuminate the way that sex and partisanship interact to mold congressional behavior? These are the kinds of questions explored in this analysis of women's participation in party-building activities. This level of analysis yields profitable findings that take us further than previous studies built on party support scores.

In the previous chapter, we established that Republican women do not support the party through their voting behavior to the same degree as their male colleagues. We

might expect then that Republican women would not participate in other party-building activities to the same degree as men either. The main question driving this analysis is whether or not women illustrate different patterns of party support than men through their organizational behavior. Three forms of party-building activities are examined: organizational attendance, national fundraising, and media participation.

Organizational Attendance

Do women attend organizational meetings more or less on average than men? Or are there other factors that predict Member organizational support independent of sex? Data from the organizational records of the Republican Party sheds light on this type of party-building activity.⁴

Figure 4.1 about here

Even though there were a few critical events that possibly affected turnout to the conference meetings, for the most part attendance was rather stable across the first session of the 107th Congress (see Figure 4.1).⁵ Members were never in total attendance (there were 222 Republican Members in the House during the first session of the 107th Congress). On a few occasions, however, attendance reached 85%.

⁴Unfortunately, attendance records could not be obtained from the Democratic Caucus. It should be noted, however, that the party-building activities of Republican women are more crucial to the argument of this study given the electoral cross-pressures these women face, their more liberal ideology scores, and their lower party unity scores.

⁵The data set is based on attendance records from 39 Republican Conference meetings. For the most part, these conference meetings were part of the routine weekly meeting schedule. The House Republican Conference, under the leadership of Chairman J. C. Watts, Jr., holds its meetings on Wednesdays at 10:00a.m. when the House is in legislative session. On occasion, special conferences are called to discuss legislative strategy or to provide necessary emergency information to the membership.

Table 4 8 about here

It appears that there is no significant difference between the participation rates of men and women in the Republican Party (see Table 4 8) Republican men, on average, attended conference meetings 64% of the time. Surprisingly, Republican women attended conference meetings 68% of the time. At the highest level of official party organizational activity, men and women appear to attend meetings at equal rates

It should be noted, however, that the standard deviation for men's attendance rates is 6% larger than the standard deviation for women's attendance rates (see Table 4 8) This is noteworthy because it is contrary to what we might expect. We would expect that the standard deviation for the women would be larger than for the men because the size of the group is so much smaller. There were only 18 women as opposed to 208 men in the Republican Conference during the first session of the 107th Congress. What this suggests is that while men and women on average attend conference at fairly equal rates, the distributions are different in these two groups. The distribution is wider among men than it is among women suggesting that the average for women more accurately describes the attendance pattern of the group than the average for men. In other words, there is more variance in male attendance rates than there is in female attendance rates.

Fundraising and Media

Recent developments in gender theory within the context of campaigns and elections suggest that gender is not a significant factor in predicting a Member's ability to raise campaign funds. Until women increase their numbers in Congress, however, the majority of female candidates will run as challengers and will lack the institutional resources (such as incumbency, ranking positions, and credit-claiming) available to most

male candidates. It is important to note the implications of the pervasive myth that women are inferior fundraisers. Uhlaner and Schlozman (1986) suggest that we should recognize the "potential potency of that belief" (46). They suggest

If political influentials believe that women cannot raise money, they will be reluctant to encourage women to become candidates. If potential women contenders believe that they will have trouble filling their campaign coffers, they will hesitate to run. Therefore, the assumption that women candidates are disadvantaged with respect to campaign finance has potential political consequences regardless of its veracity (ibid).

It is true that this myth is held even among the political elite. In my interviews, however, only Democratic female Members mentioned the trouble women have raising campaign funds during interviews. In evaluating the strengths of a female colleague, one Democratic female Member stated

Pelosi (D-CA) can raise lots of money which is a huge issue for women. Traditionally, they (female candidates) are seen as not as strong. I'm not sure if this is true person to person. But because of their socialization, it's harder for them to ask for help.

Republican women in general painted a different picture of their ability to raise campaign funds. One female Republican Member noted

Do you know that (Member X) and I were first and second in fundraising in our class. There's a myth that women can't raise money. That's not true anymore. I used to be a (Profession X) and discussed money all the time... so it doesn't bother me. (Member X) is very well organized as well.

Similarly, when asked how she personally viewed her role in the party, another female Republican Member commented: "I could help a whole lot more than I do. I am very good at campaigns. I have a lot of discipline." From this comment, it appears that not only do some more junior women not feel disadvantaged in raising campaign funds, they

actually feel skilled at raising money and think they have something to offer the party in that area.

In recent years, the establishment of leadership PACs has become a popular party-building activity. These political action committees represent a distinct form of party-building activity (that of fundraising) that has become crucial to understanding legislative behavior in the modern Congress. Leadership PACs are technically created to provide fundraising money to colleagues' campaigns, but in reality they serve as political favors and help the Member achieve clout in the party. For example, Members with leadership PACs have better odds at securing ranking positions on committees than other Members (Center for Responsive Government). For this reason, it is important for us to understand who has leadership PACs.

In the 106th Congress, 30 Democratic Members were affiliated with leadership PACs, while only 7 Democratic Members held the highest-ranking partisan leadership posts. Nearly twice as many Republican Members (55) were affiliated with leadership PACs in 2000, while only 8 Republican Members held the highest-ranking partisan leadership posts. Granted, 71.4% of Democratic party leaders and 87.5% of Republican party leaders had leadership PACs, but 70 leadership PACs were affiliated with Members outside of the inner circle of party leadership.

Table 4.9 about here

Overall, women in both parties are just as likely to be associated with a leadership PAC as their male colleagues. If we examine the distribution of leadership PACs by party and sex, however, we discover clear differences between Republicans and Democrats (see Table 4.9). A smaller percentage of Democratic Members have

established leadership PACs than Republicans Members. Proportionately speaking, female Democrats have the fewest leadership PACs. Only 10.36% of female Democratic Members are affiliated with leadership PACs. In stark contrast (proportionately speaking), female Republicans Members have the most leadership PACs. Nearly 36% of Republican women are affiliated with leadership PACs.

A third form of party-building activity that has become increasingly popular in the modern Congress is media participation. Communications both inside and outside the party organization have become important venues for the collection, articulation, and dissemination of partisan information. One way in which Members act as spokespersons for the party or communicate the party message is through participation on nationally-televised political talk shows.

Table 4.10 about here

While party leadership theory to date has only suggested that party leaders participate in media, in reality a large number of Members take part in this activity. In 2000 during the second session of the 106th Congress, 66 Democratic Members and 71 Republican Members made at least one appearance on the political talk shows included in this analysis. In fact, some of the most frequent television guests held no position of formal leadership within the party (see Table 4.10). Just as women equal men in the establishment of leadership PACs, so women of both parties participate at equal levels in this form of party-building activity (see Table 4.11).

Table 4.11 about here

On average, both Republicans and Democrats participate at equal levels in media. Approximately 31.5% of Members appeared at least once on a nationally-televised

political talk show in 2000 (31.1% of Democrats and 32% of Republicans) Perhaps this is due to the tendency of media outlets to interview both sides of the aisle in the spirit of objective journalism In general, however, Republican Members participate in media more often than Democratic Members In terms of women's participation, a larger percentage of women (in both parties) participate in media than men Surprisingly, a higher percentage of Republican women (52.9%) than Democratic women (41%) appeared on nationally-televised political talk shows in 2000 Female Democrats averaged the fewest number of appearances (1.62), whereas female Republicans averaged the most number of appearances (2.65)

Table 4.12 about here

After considering popular forms of party-building activity in the modern Congress, we are left to ask how these forms of partisan support correspond with party support through legislative voting behavior Among Democratic Members, electoral insecurity is significantly associated with affiliation with a leadership PAC (See Table 4.12) Insecure Democratic Members are significantly less likely to be affiliated with a leadership PAC than secure Democratic Members This relationship is what we might expect We would expect that insecure Members would have less time to devote to party-building activities, particularly those involving extra fundraising Also significantly associated with leadership PACs is party leadership Those Members who are part of the Democratic leadership team are also more likely to be affiliated with a leadership PAC Finally, Members affiliated with a leadership PAC are also more likely to participate in media

Table 4.13 about here

Among Republican Members, we see both similar and different patterns (see Table 4.13). Members who are a part of the leadership team are also likely to be affiliated with a leadership PAC. Members who participate in media are also more likely to be affiliated with a leadership PAC. In contrast to the pattern among Democrats, however, electoral insecurity is not significantly associated with affiliation with a leadership PAC. In other words, electorally insecure Members are just as likely to have leadership PACs as electorally secure Members.

Tables 4.14 and 4.15 about here

When we examine these correlations by partisanship and sex, we find generally the same patterns (see Tables 4.14 and 4.15). Among Democratic men, association with a leadership PAC is associated with media participation and being part of the leadership team. Similarly, among Democratic women, media participation is also associated with affiliation with a leadership PAC. Interestingly, electoral insecurity is significantly and negatively correlated with membership on the leadership team. This indicates that women who are part of the leadership structure are also significantly more electorally-secure than those women who are not part of the leadership structure.

Tables 4.16 and 4.17 about here

Among Republican males, affiliation with a leadership PAC is significantly and positively associated with both media participation and membership on the party leadership team (see Tables 4.16 and 4.17). Among Republican females, however, none of the partisan activities are significantly associated. It is possible that these associations do not reach statistical significance because of the limited number of observable cases.

The above analysis indicates that there are significant associations among the

party-building activities measured for this study. Due to high correlation among the party-building activities, a factor was created to account for the level of Member involvement.⁶ The factor constructed collapses these activities onto a single dimension and allows for less biased estimates. The model predicting party unity scores is represented by the following equation:

$$Y = X_1 \beta_1 + X_2 \beta_2 + X_3 \beta_3 + X_4 \beta_4 + X_5 \beta_5 + \varepsilon$$

Where:

Y = Party Unity

X_1 = Female

X_2 = Seniority

X_3 = Electoral Security

X_4 = Party-Building Activities

X_5 = Female Party-Building Activities

ε = Error

Table 4.20 about here

While generally the model does not explain much variance in party support, estimation of the predictive model yields significant differences between the two parties (see Table 4.20). Among Democrats, female Members are significantly more unified with the party than male Members (significant at the $p < .01$ level). Electorally secure Members are also more unified with the party than insecure Members (significant at the $p < .05$ level). Finally, those Members who are involved in party-building activities are

⁶ Factor Analysis was conducted for purposes of data reduction. The correlation matrix (Table 4.18) presents the association among the included variables. Given the significant associations, a series of variables were examined using factor analysis to test the stability of the component created from the three variables of interest. Employing an Eigenvalue cut-point of 1.0, a single component was drawn from the three variables. This single component was included in the regression models to measure the intensity of Member party-building activity. The total variance explained by the principal component analysis is presented in (Table 4.19).

also significantly more unified with the party than Members who are not involved in these activities (significant at the $p < .05$ level)

Among Republicans, we see a different pattern. The relationship between female Republican Members and party unity scores is also significant, but the relationship is in the opposite direction. Republican women, as we might expect from the previous chapters, are significantly less unified with the party than their male colleagues (significant at the $p < .001$ level). In contrast to the Democratic model, seniority is also associated with party unity, with more senior Members demonstrating lower party unity scores than less senior Members (significant at the $p < .01$ level). While electoral insecurity is significantly associated with Democratic Members' party unity scores, it is not significantly associated with Republican Members' party unity scores when taking into consideration party-building activities. In other words, insecure Republicans demonstrate similar patterns of party unity as secure Republican Members.

Party-building activities are significantly and positively associated with party unity scores. Republican Members who participate in party-building activities also illustrate more party unity in their voting behavior (significant at the $p < .05$ level). The most important relationship for purposes of the present analysis, however, involved the significant association between female Members participating in party-building activities and party unity scores. Female Republicans who participate in partisan activities are significantly more unified in their voting behavior with the party than either their female copartisan colleagues who do not participate or their male copartisan colleagues who do participate in the same activities (significant at the $p < .05$ level).

Two conclusions can be deduced from these findings. First, it appears that Members of Congress participate as partisans to varying degrees. Secondly, there appear to be no gendered patterns in party-building activities. Both men and women attend party organizational meetings, participate in party fundraising, and participate in national media. When looking at the connection between party-building activities and party-line voting, it appears that for both parties there is a significant connection. Particularly among Republican women, those women who participate in some forms of party-building activities are also more likely to offer party support through their voting behavior. It makes sense that Republican women who are electorally secure enough to invest time in national fundraising activities are also more able to vote with the party. From here we turn to the Members themselves for an understanding of women's perceptions of the party organizations. By looking at the parties through the eyes of the Members, we develop a much clearer picture of the unique and gendered organizational environment in which women participate as partisans.

Women's Evaluations of the Party Organizations

In evaluating the contribution of the parties on the Hill, most every Member I interviewed noted the camaraderie facilitated by the party organizations. The parties offer Members the opportunity to interact with those who share their philosophy and interests. A Republican female Member noted that the party offered her the

opportunity to get to know colleagues. It offers a base idea from which to move an idea. I've always liked to think of them as a 'committees without an issue'. It's an opportunity to find those of like mind.

Similarly, a Democratic female Member stated:

I value the ability to network... to develop relationships where you learn more

about the needs and interests of the people in your state. I value the chance to talk to someone with a shared agenda or views. The Caucus does believe that government has a role. I value working with people who have a shared basic philosophy.

Yet the observations made by Members regarding what they value about the party organizations also clearly reflected the distinct party ethos described throughout the party culture literature. Several of the observations offered to me by female Members reflected the findings of the party culture literature concerning the Republican and Democratic party organizations. Republican women, when asked what they valued about the party organization pointed to the party unity promoted by the Conference, and the ability to get things done. One female Republican Member noted:

You have to have organization to get things done. I am very proud of the party. We have stood together on rules and process. We have to stand together to be effective. I've also been impressed with leadership. Hastert is a very caring person. J.C. Watts is very sincere. You don't see partisanship like that very often — caring about people.

Similarly, another female Member commented, "I like (the Conference) being able to drive priorities such as health care." Yet another stated, "The party offers leadership on these (priority) issues. It provides a basic philosophy." Another remarked:

The camaraderie and support. The party makes it possible for us to get a lot done. I also appreciate the information provided by the party. I appreciate the opportunity for briefings. It's a chance for educating myself and taking it back home to my constituents. It also gives me the opportunity to become close to people in leadership who are the changers.

Still another female Member expressed that she valued the party for:

the information on issues. The Conference serves to rally the troops... to provide unity. The meetings emphasize where we are alike and that's useful. We can air both sides of issues without it becoming a public issue. It gives us a chance to

hear from the Speaker who most specifically gives us a sense of where the other branches are going. It gives us a feel for the executive branch

One junior Republican female Member noted that this characteristic of the Republican party culture was useful in the contemporary context given the narrow seat margin of partisan control in the House, stating, "They (party leadership) help keep the majority."

Just as Republican women reflected through their comments the ethos of the Republican Party, several of the observations offered to me by female Democratic Members reiterated the ethos of the Democratic Party as promoting diversity, coalition-building, and equality. For some, it was exactly this ethos that led to their identification with the Democratic Party. One particular female Member commented,

I had a Republican mother and a Democratic father. I come from a moderate gypsy-moth background. I valued the diversity of the Democratic Party at a young age. I felt like I would hear from a larger cross-section of society.

Several female Members noted that they valued not only the ability to express their point of view, but also the ability to hear the opinions of their colleagues. One female Democratic Member stated, "We get an opportunity to put our point of view out there. Being that there are so many Members from all across the country, it is valuable to hear other points of view." Still another expressed that she valued the camaraderie offered by the party organization, elaborating:

I value the ability to hear what my colleagues feel about certain issues. In a positive way, I'm amazed at the diversity in color, gender, and opinions. The Democratic Party truly reflects the American people. It's a wonderful microcosm of the great American dream.

While all of the Democrats I interviewed agreed with the party ethos of open dialogue,

some articulated the consequences of this ethos for party unity. One female Member explained

It (the party organization) provides the opportunity to hear a diversity of views. It is frustrating, however, that we don't vote lock step. But on diversity, I value the ability to stand up and speak my mind. I'm really proud to be a member of a disorganized party. With more organization, we could possibly get more done, but I'm more for individuality.

Women's Perceived Roles in the Party Organizations

During my interviews, I asked Members to evaluate their personal role in the party organizations on the Hill. The responses to this question provide valuable insight into both the participation of women and the status of women within the party organizations.

Three specific roles were clearly defined by female Republican Members. Some Members thought that what they had to offer the party was expertise at the electoral level. One Member, though limited in her participation, suggested "I could help a whole lot more than I do. I am very good at campaigns. I have a lot of discipline." Another Member articulated a similar role, stating, "I see my role as that of a motivator more than anything else. I try to get people involved at grassroots level. I'm good at getting out the message, getting out the vote."

Others in evaluating their role within the party pointed to their position within the state delegation as trailblazers. One such female Republican Member noted

I'm somewhat of a pioneer. I'm the only Republican woman in the (State X) delegation. I'm one of too few women.

Another expressed that she saw herself not only as a pioneer in her state delegation, but

also as a pioneer on her committee. She stated:

I am the first Republican female ever elected to Congress in the state of (X). I see myself primarily as a role model for my district. I don't do national things so much. I am the only Republican female with a (issue X) voice. I sit on the (X) Committee and am out front on those issues.

Some female Republican Members acknowledged the ideological difference between them and their male colleagues. They felt that their role in the party was to facilitate ideological compromise. One female Member said, "I see my role as building consensus as a moderate." Another reflected:

How many Republican women are there? Only 18? Geez that's not very many. I see myself as a more flexible, more moderate Member on some issues. I'm a "floating kind of Member." My identification doesn't necessarily determine my vote. I see women in general as a broadening aspect to the party. I campaigned as a "new face at the table."

Still another remarked:

I don't think about party politics as such. I don't think about my role in the party. I think it hurts on a national level to think that way. We don't work together like we should.

A few female Republican Members suggested that they don't view themselves as having a particular role in the party. One simply stated, "I never thought of myself as having a role specifically as a Republican." More often, however, female Republican Members viewed their role within the party organization as limited. A junior Member reflected:

I'm probably not as successful as I would like to be. I'm not as much a part of things as I used to be in other things. I have wonderful committee assignments. I appreciate being able to take on a position on the Speaker's (Issue X) Task Force... I was actually blocked from leadership because (omitted to protect the identity of the Member).

While some did not blatantly suggest that their roles were limited, they did allude to it in their comments. One noted "I see myself as a supporting player. It's hard to be, but you have to do your time." A freshman female Republican Member, while recognizing her limited role, suggested the importance of the representation of women within party leadership, stating: "My role is to really learn as a freshman. I don't see myself as a leader. Women have a different perspective, and need to get to leadership." Only one female Member that I interviewed, however, saw herself having a leadership role. She stated

I see myself as a spokesman for the party among women for Republican principles. I feel a great responsibility for doing media. There are not enough women who do it. It's hard work. I'm a leader on some issues such as the (Issue X).

In this brief description, she illuminated a number of informal modes of leadership unaccounted for by formal measures. First, she suggested that an important leadership function she served involved communications, particularly through media outlets. Secondly, she suggested that her role included leadership on specific issues.

In contrast, Democratic women communicated not only definite roles within the party organization, but also inclusion within leadership. A few of these women noted the importance of their gender to their partisan role(s). One remarked

I speak up though my role as the Democratic Women's Caucus liaison to leadership which is separate from the Women's Caucus. But my focus continues to be with my district.

Gender not only affects these women's roles at the national level, but also within their state delegations and within their districts. Another Democratic female Member noted

I was in leadership in the (State X) House. I was the only woman some of the

time. Right now, I am the second woman to be elected to the House. There hasn't been another since 1958. My role is very different than I had previously envisioned. I'm a congressional leader and a leader for women. I'm the highest elected woman in the state. So it's important that I be there for political Caucus events, as a party leader in the 4th congressional district. I take my role working on campaigns very seriously as did my predecessor for me. I have a role here, attending more Task Forces built on issues with a broad cross-section of coalitions.

As this Member suggested, some women described their role in the party as being an issue expert. They participate as liaisons, on task forces, and in committee rooms.

One Member stated

As a physician, they (leadership) think I'm kind of an expert (on health issues). I've always tried to be active. Compared to others, they've found me to be very supportive. They see me as a leader in healthcare as someone they can depend on.

Another expressed

It varies on the issues. I'm perceived by the elective leadership as a resource on technological issues. They are my constituents' issues. I get along with all of the elements of the party, the Blue Dogs and the Progressives.

None of the women I interviewed indicated that they felt excluded from leadership. A number even described their role as being a team player and a leader among their colleagues. An African-American female Member explained

I see my role as being the "stellar ideal... but most respectful." I see myself as loyal but slightly independent... not quite a party activist. I'm fortunate enough to sit at the leadership table. I was elected the leader of my class. I vote majority Democrat. I'm a team player. I'm probably not as partisan as some, but certainly one they (leadership) can come to.

Another female Member reiterated

In Congress, I aspire to be a good team player and a leader among my classmates. I am the president of the sophomore class. At home, I'm a leader in the party.

Perceived Gender Differences Within the Party Organization

In evaluating their similarities and differences with their male copartisans, female Members also illuminated party-based gender differences. Republican women, by and large, noted the similarities between them and their male colleagues. Any differences were noted as a side-note to the general reflection of sameness. Democratic women, on the other hand, commented on the gender differences between them and their male colleagues.

The majority of female Republican Members I interviewed noted the similarities between them and their male colleagues. One Member simply stated, "I really don't see them as any different." A few noted ideological differences, but interestingly these differences were in both directions. A conservative female commented

I don't see myself as different from my Republican male colleagues. Some see themselves as moderate, so we may not vote the same but in general I think we're all the same.

A more liberal female Member, on the other hand, noted, "I don't really see that much difference. I'm different from some, but not overall. Some are much more partisan, but not all."

Another group of female Republican Members, while noting the overriding philosophical similarities, suggested the emphasis they personally place on family and their children. For instance, one freshman female Member expressed,

I think fundamentally there is no difference at all. I know best my fellow freshman. We're all excited about being here and charged up. We haven't developed any cynicism. At heart, I share similarities with men who are very family-oriented, I gravitate towards men who will share about their kids and are very grounded in their homes. Philosophically we are the same. We both believe

in less government, more local control, lower taxes, and strong fiscal restraint and the military. Everything gets so personal with me that I forget the big issues

Similarly, a more junior female Member noted the added familial responsibilities faced by women:

We are similar in our ideology, our philosophy . . . in almost all ways. The only difference is the amount of juggling that women have to do. Men have it fairly easy. We are the nurturers and the caretakers.

A few women more clearly articulated the ways in which they differ from their male colleagues. For some, their gender contours the way in which they approach their job. One Member stated:

Sue Kelly, Sue Myrick, Kay Granger . . . we take a systems approach to legislating. We are concerned with other points of view. We are in the business of policy-making. The men get more involved in lines of right and wrong.

Another Member similarly expressed:

We are quite similar. Dave Camp said, "(Member X), you vote policy rather than politics." I never wanted the job. I only ran to keep the seat in Republican hands. I have no urgent need. The job doesn't give me a big ego boost. I just like trying to solve problems. I mean there are the normal male/female differences. I am pro-life, but I don't like when men get on a high-horse with no clue about what it feels like. Men look at issues from a numbers perspective. Females have a people perspective. Women do react to things in a much more emotional or immediate way than do men.

Another stated:

Most women are conscientious and they like to complete jobs. Women don't make promises, claim victories, or give facts that are incorrect. Men posture a lot. J.C. is different. He is low key . . . high quality. We are very similar in our set of beliefs, however. We believe in the power of the individual to help the person next door. If you create a reliance on government that the Democrats want to do, we won't move forward.

Still another framed it this way:

I'm similar to them on a lot of positions I take. I'm a standard Republican who believes in free market. We're different in terms of issues at top of my list. I'm also more likely to look at other less clean cut issues. I think outside the traditional Republican box.

The differences noted by female Republican Members extended beyond the way in which they approach the job of policymaking. One female Member shared with me her personal experience in the more informal network of the party organization. She reflected:

It seems that my male colleagues live with a sense of entitlement. Informal relationships are just as important (as formal relationships). They have a camaraderie. They also have the support of a wife. When we as Members go on trips or CODELS, the men get briefed and the women go shopping. If my husband goes with me, what can he do? The women always want to surround me and show me pictures of their grandchildren. The men gather and talk about defense. I want to be over there talking about defense!

A real emphasis on diversity pervaded all of the comments given to me by

Democratic female Members. For example, one Member reflected:

They are all so different. Men who have been here for 40 years behave a certain way. The youngsters coming along behave a different way. On both sides, you have hard working people. Members show up every week, have long days and long hours, and then go home and do the same thing in the district.

Similarly, another female Democratic Member stated:

Especially in (State X), I'm different in the fact that I'm the congresswoman from (State X), not from the 4th district. People from the state always come over to see me. The guys tease me about being "the little sister in the delegation." Of course, it's with a lot of respect. Otherwise I see us as similar. . . whether male or female, we are all different — and yet we are all the same.

Compared to Republican women, however, Democratic women by and large focused on

the differences between them and their male copartisan colleagues rather than the similarities. These gender differences were also largely reflective of the differences previously noted in the congressional literature.

Some Democratic women noted the important differences in the way men and women approach problems. One stated:

They are the guys I hang out with... There is a difference in the way women and men see things. We see things totally... we look at the whole sphere. We see things holistically... round. Men see an object and go straight to it and forget about all those affected. It's not at all an issue of politics.

These differences involve not only women's approach to problems, but also the issues important to women as opposed to men. A black female Member observed:

Some of them aren't as sensitive to issues important to minorities as I would like for them to be... seeing how that connects to the nation's healthcare as a whole. They get tired of me talking about the same issue, and don't see it as important.

Other women focused on the more behavioral differences between them and their male copartisan colleagues. Some noted differences in the organizational behavior of men and women. One Democratic female Member, when asked about the similarities and differences between male and female Democratic Members, remarked, "It's hard to know... I've never been a man. Men aren't necessarily more ambitious people, just different in their interest in leadership."

A few women actually noted differences in the way in which they and their male colleagues communicate or interact in the organizational setting. One black female Democratic Member stated:

Gender is a factor that allows me to have the advantage of heightened sensitivity

to certain things. I don't have the burden of trying to prove my strength by yelling. I can listen. Being a woman allows me to feel and act without embarrassment of being perceived as weak. and that's a strength. I have certain liberties that gender and age give me. I'm not intimidated by certain things. As a mother and a grandmother, I know how dependent men can be, and yet how stern they can be. These men are no different. Any women can use her gender to her advantage. Laws should have a sense of feeling. Depth can be used to your advantage. We can communicate.

Similarly, another female Member remarked

They are also a diverse group. Some of them are conservative, and some are wild-eyed liberals. You can't tell outside looking in who's faking it and who knows what they're talking about. My testosterone level is certainly lower! (Laughs) ... I don't think I get my ego so involved. I'm more focused on substantive outcomes. Men on both sides of the aisle are like that.

Conclusion

There are several ways to measure women's representation within the party organization. In terms of sheer numbers, women are sorely underrepresented as a group. While women comprise 50% of the population, they comprise only 16% of the Congress. In terms of status within the Congress, however, women are generally advantaged. More women than men have the opportunity to hold the prestigious positions of the committee and leadership structures. Nonetheless, women are not even proportionately represented in the highest levels of leadership. They are noticeably absent among full committee chairs and formal elected leadership. This had been the case for both parties until recently.

Within the party organizations, women perceive the party apparatus, their role within the party, and their relative behavior differently. Republican women applaud the ethos of the Republican party organization for its emphasis on unity and leadership.

Democratic women, on the other and, applaud the ethos of the Democratic party organization for its emphasis on diversity and open dialogue.

Republican women see their role within the party organization as underdeveloped and limited to a supportive role. Democratic women, conversely, see their role within the party as clearly defined and instrumental. Democratic women see their voice as affecting leadership, whereas Republican women see their role as following leadership.

Republican women also view their personal behavior as quite similar to that of their male colleagues. Contrastingly, Democratic women see their behavior as quite different from that of their male copartisans. Interestingly, however, both Republican and Democratic women note distinct differences between male and female Members in the way in which they understand problems and work to find a solution. By and large, all of the female Members emphasize that they are more interested in policy development than partisanship and see themselves as consensus-builders.

This chapter illustrates, nonetheless, that partisanship is critical to understanding the position as well as the participation of women within the legislative arena. Women understand themselves as part of the party apparatus. To some extent, positions within the institution are granted or taken away based on party support. For Democratic women, this dynamic is not problematic. Their electoral pressures fall in line with the partisan pressures they face within the institution. Republican women, on the other hand, face unique cross-pressures from their district and their party organization. Though we might expect them to pay less attention to party-building activities than Republican men due to their electoral constraints and lower average party support scores, Republican women actually participate equally in all three activities examined in this study. In fact, in the

Republican Party, women attend more organizational meetings on average than men, more women have leadership PACs than men, and more women participate in media than men. It seems that women try to compensate for their lack of party-line voting by participating in party-building activities. Yet, women have not seen their efforts pay off in terms of greater representation at the highest levels of leadership.

Female Members have clear sentiments about their participation. Some of these sentiments involve their participation within the party organization, including: their evaluation of the party leadership and culture, their respective role within the organization, and their behavior relative to their male colleagues. This facet of women's political participation cannot be discovered or understood outside of an examination of partisanship. While this study is by no means comprehensive, it is a first step in understanding the ways in which women's participation is contoured by their involvement in the party organization.

The present analysis holds several implications for women's political participation. First, party culture does influence the ways in which women participate. The Republican Party, with its emphasis on homogeneity, loyalty, elitism, and centralization, is not likely to incorporate women from marginal districts or with liberal ideological leanings into full positions of leadership. Examining the 103rd through 105th Congresses, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001) suggest that party members may be especially loyal (on procedural) votes because:

They understand that to be disloyal on such votes risks long-range trouble within the party. The *pattern* of votes cast by a representative is likely to be the critical factor that party leaders use when they judge the rank-and-file, just as voters use patterns of votes to judge their representatives (Fenno 1978: 151) (559).

The result of this pressure is that moderate members are conflicted. They must either sacrifice constituent responsiveness or career aspirations. Ansolabehere et al (2001) summarize

Our results reveal a fundamental tension between party politics and electoral responsiveness. Parties consistently pull the moderate legislators away from the middle, away from the median voter in the nation as a whole. Parties provide greater collective responsibility, but at the cost of policies that deviate from the preference of the median voter (560)

These findings yield critical implications for the representation of women and the fate of women's issue legislation. Prior to the Republican takeover, Swers (1998) found that Republican women were situated to have the most influence over women's issue legislation. She states

Gender plays a most significant role in the voting of Republican representatives. While many women's issues are supported by all Democrats, Republican women are defecting from their party's traditional position to vote in favor of these issues (445)

She warns, however, that the shift in partisan control of the House might influence this trend, stating,

Given the pivotal role of these legislators, the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 makes the position of Republican women even more significant in determining outcomes on women's issue voting. Yet the newly elected Republican women of the 104th Congress were ideologically more conservative than were the Republican congresswomen of the 103rd Congress (444)

It should be noted that Republican women were positioned in leadership roles during the politics surrounding the Republican Revolution and the Republican Convention of 1996. As women's numbers have grown in the party in recent years, however, their numbers in leadership have decreased. We are left to wonder if the early

success of women was due to tokenism rather than full incorporation within the Republican Party

The Democratic Party, on the other hand, with its emphasis on diversity, dialogue, equality, and decentralization, would seem to be more likely to incorporate women into positions of leadership within the committee and party structures. After all, these women represent some of the most Democratic districts in the country. Nonetheless, women's ascension within the party organization has been quite gradual and limited to positions of supportive rather than full leadership. While women are perhaps more likely to be given leadership positions within the Democratic Party, these positions are also more likely to involve their gender. For example, a few female Democratic Members did mention leadership roles, but these leadership roles involved them as liaisons to leadership from the Women's Caucus. Republican women might not be as readily incorporated into leadership, but their inclusion (as more than just tokens) would be based on criteria other than their gender.

Table 4.1 Gender Composition of the U.S. House: 103rd - 106th Congresses

	103 rd Congress	104 th Congress	105 th Congress	106 th Congress
Democratic Men	86.4% 223	85.2% 173	81.6% 168	81.6% 173
Democratic Women	13.6% 35	14.8% 30	18.4% 38	18.4% 39
Republican Men	93.2% 164	92.6% 214	92.5% 211	92.3% 205
Republican Women	6.8% 12	7.4% 17	7.5% 17	7.7% 17

Table 4.2 Distribution of Select Positions Within Democratic Party By Sex

	103rd		104th		105th		106th	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
On Exclusive Committee	62 88.6%	8 11.4%	39 90.7%	4 9.3%	38 80.9%	9 19.1%	38 80.9%	9 19.1%
Committee Chair	23 95.8%	1 4.2%	19 95.0%	1 5.0%	19 100%	0 0.0%	19 95.0%	1 5.0%
Subcommittee Chair	103 94.5%	6 5.5%	75 90.4%	8 9.6%	74 89.2%	9 10.8%	69 85.2%	12 14.8%
Leadership	5 100.0%	0 0.0%	5 83.3%	1 16.7%	5 83.3%	1 16.7%	6 85.7%	1 14.3%
Whip Team	79 84.9%	14 15.1%	71 84.5%	13 15.5%	62 77.5%	18 22.5%	58 79.5%	15 20.5%
Policy and Steering Committees	30 88.2%	4 11.8%	37 86.0%	6 14.0%	30 78.9%	8 21.1%	35 79.5%	9 20.5%
Campaign Committees	29 87.9%	4 12.1%	34 79.1%	9 20.9%	1 100.0%	0 0.0%	3 75.0%	1 25.0%
Leadership Team	100 85.5%	17 14.5%	98 83.1%	20 16.9%	78 78.8%	21 21.2%	79 79.0%	21 21.0%

Table 4.3 Distribution of Select Positions Within Republican Party By Sex

	103rd		104th		105th		106th	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
On Exclusive Committee	39 95.1%	2 4.9%	57 91.9%	5 8.1%	61 92.4%	5 7.6%	56 88.9%	7 11.1%
Committee Chair	22 95.7%	1 4.3%	18 90.0%	2 10.0%	20 100%	0 0.0%	20 100.0%	0 0.0%
Subcommittee Chair	78 92.9%	6 7.1%	77 91.7%	7 8.3%	76 90.5%	8 9.5%	77 90.6%	8 9.4%
Leadership	8 100.0%	0 0.0%	6 75.0%	2 25.0%	6 75.0%	2 25.0%	6 75.0%	2 25.0%
Whip Team	14 77.8%	4 22.2%	48 90.6%	5 9.4%	61 92.4%	5 7.6%	54 91.5%	5 8.5%
Policy and Steering Committees	51 86.4%	8 13.6%	31 91.2%	3 8.8%	35 92.1%	3 7.9%	45 95.7%	2 4.3%
Campaign Committees	31 81.6%	7 18.4%	31 81.6%	7 18.4%	32 84.2%	6 15.8%	28 90.3%	3 9.7%
Leadership Team	66 88.0%	9 12.0%	83 89.2%	10 10.8%	98 90.7%	10 9.3%	96 92.3%	8 7.7%

Table 4.4 Percent of Democratic Women Holding Select Positions

	103rd		104th		105th		106th	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
On Exclusive Committee	62 27.8%	8 22.9%	39 22.5%	4 13.3%	38 22.6%	9 23.7%	38 22.0%	9 23.1%
Committee Chair	23 10.3%	1 2.9%	19 11%	1 3.3%	19 11.3%	0 0.0%	19 11.0%	1 2.6%
Subcommittee Chair	103 46.2%	6 17.1%	75 43.4%	8 26.7%	74 44.0%	9 23.7%	69 39.9%	12 30.8%
Leadership	5 2.2%	0 0.0%	5 2.9%	1 3.3%	5 3.0%	1 2.6%	6 3.5%	1 2.6%
Whip Team	79 35.4%	14 40.0%	71 41.0%	13 43.3%	62 36.9%	18 47.4%	58 33.5%	15 38.5%
Policy and Steering Committees	30 13.5%	4 11.4%	37 21.4%	6 20%	30 17.9%	8 21.1%	35 20.2%	9 23.1%
Campaign Committees	29 13.0%	4 11.4%	34 19.7%	9 30.0%	1 6%	0 0.0%	3 1.7%	1 2.6%
Leadership Team	100 44.8%	17 48.6%	98 56.6%	20 66.7%	78 46.4%	21 55.3%	79 45.7%	21 53.8%

Table 4.5 Percent of Republican Women Holding Select Positions

	103rd		104th		105th		106th	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
On Exclusive Committee	39 23.8%	2 16.7%	57 26.6%	5 29.4%	61 28.9%	5 29.4%	56 27.3%	7 41.2%
Committee Chair	22 13.4%	1 8.3%	18 8.4%	2 11.8%	20 9.5%	0 0.0%	20 9.8%	0 0.0%
Subcommittee Chair	78 47.6%	6 50.0%	77 36.0%	7 41.2%	76 36.0%	8 47.1%	77 37.6%	8 47.1%
Leadership	8 4.9%	0 0.0%	6 2.8%	2 11.8%	6 2.8%	2 11.8%	6 2.9%	2 11.8%
Whip Team	14 8.5%	4 33.3%	48 22.4%	5 29.4%	61 28.9%	5 29.4%	54 26.3%	5 29.4%
Policy and Steering Committees	51 31.1%	8 66.7%	31 14.5%	3 17.6%	35 16.6%	3 17.6%	45 22.0%	2 11.8%
Campaign Committees	31 18.9%	7 58.3%	31 14.5%	7 41.2%	32 15.2%	6 35.3%	28 13.7%	3 17.6%
Leadership Team	66 40.2%	9 75.0%	83 38.8%	10 58.8%	98 46.4%	10 58.8%	96 46.8%	8 47.1%

Table 4.6 House Leadership Positions Held by Women⁷

House Leadership Positions Held by Women				
	Democrats		Republicans	
107 th Congress	Rep. Rosa DeLauro (CT)	Assistant to the House Democratic Leader	Rep. Barbara Cubin (WY)	House Republican Conference Secretary
	Rep. Nita Lowey (CT)	Chair, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee	Rep. Deborah Pryce (OH)	Vice Chair, House Republican Conference
	Rep. Nancy Pelosi (CA)	House Democratic Whip		
	Rep. Maxine Waters (CA)	Chief Deputy Whip		
106 th Congress	Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO)	House Deputy Minority Whip	Rep. Barbara Cubin (WY)	House Deputy Majority Whip
	Rep. Rosa DeLauro (CT)	Assistant to the House Democratic Leader	Rep. Tillie Fowler (FL)	Vice Chairman, House Republican Conference
	Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson (TX)	House Democratic Deputy Whip	Rep. Kay Granger (TX)	House Assistant Majority Whip
	Rep. Nita Lowey (NY)	House Minority Whip At-Large	Rep. Deborah Pryce (OH)	House Republican Conference Secretary
	Rep. Louise Slaughter (NY)	House Minority Whip At-Large		
	Rep. Lynn Woolsey (CA)	House Deputy Minority Whip		
105 th Congress	Rep. Eva Clayton (NC)	Co-chair, House Democratic Policy Committee	Rep. Barbara Cubin (WY)	House Deputy Majority Whip
	Rep. Rosa DeLauro (CT)	House Chief Deputy Minority Whip	Rep. Jennifer Dunn (WA)	Vice Chair, House Republican Conference
	Rep. Barbara Kennelly (CT)	Vice Chair, House Democratic Caucus	Rep. Tillie Fowler (FL)	House Deputy Majority Whip

⁷ Data obtained from the Center for American Women and Politics (2002) "Women in Congress Leadership Roles and Committee Chairs "

Table 4.6 (cont.) House Leadership Positions Held by Women

105 th	Rep. Nita Lowey (NY)	House Minority Whip At-Large	Rep. Kay Granger (TX)	House Assistant Majority Whip
			Rep. Susan Molinari (NY)	Vice Chair, House Republican Conference
104 th	Rep. Eva Clayton (NC)	Co-chair, House Democratic Policy Committee	Rep. Barbara Cubin (WY)	House Deputy Majority Whip
	Rep. Rosa DeLauro (CT)	House Chief Deputy Minority Whip	Rep. Tillie Fowler (FL)	House Deputy Majority Whip
	Rep. Barbara Kennelly (CT)	Vice Chair, House Democratic Caucus	Rep. Susan Molinari (NY)	Vice Chair, House Republican Conference
	Rep. Nita Lowey (NY)	House Minority Whip At-Large	Rep. Barbara Vucanovich (NV)	Secretary, House Republican Conference
103 rd	Rep. Barbara Kennelly (CT)	House Democratic Chief Deputy Whip	Rep. Nancy L. Johnson (CT)	Secretary, House Republican Conference
102 nd	Rep. Barbara Kennelly (CT)	House Democratic Chief Deputy Whip		
100 th	Rep. Mary Rose Oakar (OH)	Vice Chair, House Democratic Caucus	Rep. Lynn Martin (IL)	Vice Chairman, House Republican Conference
99 th	Rep. Mary Rose Oakar (OH)	Vice Chairman, House Democratic Caucus	Rep. Lynn Martin (IL)	Vice Chairman, House Republican Conference
98 th	Rep. Geraldine Ferraro (NY)	Secretary, House Democratic Caucus		
97 th	Rep. Shirley Chisholm (NY)	Secretary, House Democratic Caucus		
86 th to 97 th	Rep. Leonor K. Sullivan (MO)	Secretary, House Democratic Caucus		

Table 4.6 (cont.) House Leadership Positions Held by Women

83 rd , 84 th , and 88 th	Rep Edna F. Kelly (NY)	Secretary, House Democratic Caucus		
81 st	Rep Chase G. Woodhouse (CT)	Secretary, House Democratic Caucus		

Table 4.7 House Committee Chairmanships Held by Women

Congress	Democrats		Republicans	
104 th			Rep. Jan Mevers (KS)	Committee on Small Business
93 rd and 94 th	Rep. Leonor Sullivan (MO)	Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries		
83 rd			Rep. Edith Nourse Rogers (MA)	Committee on Veterans' Affairs
81 st	Rep. Mary Teresa Norton (NJ)	Committee on House Administration		
80 th			Rep. Edith Nourse Rogers (MA)	Committee on Veterans' Affairs
78 th and 79 th	Rep. Mary Teresa Norton (NJ)	Committee on Labor		
77 th	Rep. Mary Teresa Norton (NJ)	Committee on Memorials and Committee on Labor		
	Rep. Caroline O'Day (NY)	Committee on Election of President, Vice President, and Representatives		
76 th	Rep. Mary Teresa Norton (NJ)	Committee on Labor		
	Rep. Caroline O'Day (NY)	Committee on Election of President, Vice President, and Representatives		
75 th	Rep. Mary Teresa Norton (NJ)	Committee on Labor		
	Rep. Caroline O'Day (NY)	Committee on Election of President, Vice President, and Representatives		

Table 4.7 (cont.) House Committee Chairmanships Held by Women

72 nd to 74 th	Rep. Mary Teresa Norton (NJ)	Committee on District of Columbia		
68 th			Rep. Mae Ella Nolan (CA)	Committee on Expenditures in the Post Office Department

Figure 4.1 Conference Attendance Levels Across the First Session of the 107th Congress




Table 4.8 Conference Attendance by Sex

Sex	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Men	6355	208	2656
Women	6895	18	2096
Total	6398	226 ^a	261

^aNote that the number of cases is greater than the total number of Republican Members in the House during the first session of the 107th Congress. During this session, a small number of Members either died in office or retired before the fulfilment of their term. In order to fully capture the participation rates of every Member of Conference, the records of both these Members and the Members elected to replace them are included in the analysis. Their attendance rates were individually adjusted to reflect the proportion of meetings they attended out of the total possible meetings they could have attended. The only other included case not explained by simple replacement is the addition of Rep. Randy Forbes (VA-4) to the Republican Conference after the death of Rep. Norman Sisisky, the Democrat previously representing this district.

Table 4.9 Leadership PACs by Sex in 2000

	Valid N	Number With Leadership PACs	Percent With Leadership PACs	s d
Male Democrats	173	26	15.03%	3584
Female Democrats	39	4	10.36%	3074
Male Republicans	205	49	23.90%	4275
Female Republicans	17	6	35.29%	4926

Table 4.10 Top Ten Most Frequent Guests on Nationally-Televised Political Talk Shows

Democrats		N		Republicans		N
1	Rangel (D-NY)	45		1	Dreier (R-CA)	47
2	Wexler (D-FL)	30		2	Watts (R-OK)	36
3	Meeks (D-NY)	24		3	King (R-NY)	32
4	Hastings (D-FL)	21		4	Kasich (R-OH)	31
5	Bonior (D-MI)	21		5	Hayworth (R-AZ)	31
6	Deutsch (D-FL)	19		6	Burton (R-IN)	28
7	Nadler (D-NY)	18		7	Scarborough (R-FL)	27
8	Waters (D-CA)	14		8	Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)	24
9	Markey (D-MA)	14		9	Diaz-Balart (R-FL)	23
10	Traficant (D-OH)	13		10	Graham (R-SC)	19

N = Member's number of appearances on political talk shows

Table 4.11 Media Appearances by Sex in 2000

	Valid N	Percent Participating in Media	Maximum Number of Appearances	Mean Number of Appearances	s d
Male Democrats	173	28.90%	45	2.0405	5.8183
Female Democrats	39	41.0%	14	1.6154	2.9165
Male Republicans	205	30.2%	47	2.5659	6.9382
Female Republicans	17	52.9%	24	2.6471	6.4220

Table 4.12 Correlation of Party-Building Activities Among Democratic Members

	Electoral Insecurity	Association with Leadership PAC	Media Participation	Part of Leadership Team
Electoral Insecurity	---	---	---	---
Association with Leadership PAC	- .135*	---	---	---
Media Participation	- .128	.392***	---	---
Part of Leadership Team	- .111	.186**	.010	---

N=212

* p< .05 level

** p< .01 level

*** p< .001 level

Table 4.13 Correlation of Party-Building Activities Among Republican Members

	Electoral Insecurity	Association with Leadership PAC	Media Participation	Part of Leadership Team
Electoral Insecurity	---	---	---	---
Association with Leadership PAC	- 069	---	---	---
Media Participation	- 018	238***	---	---
Part of Leadership Team	- 005	151*	077	---

N=222

* p< .05 level

** p< .01 level

*** p< .001 level

Table 4.14 Correlations Among Democratic Males

	Electoral Insecurity	Association with Leadership PAC	Media Participation	Part of Leadership Team
Electoral Insecurity	---	---	---	---
Association with Leadership PAC	- .121	---	---	---
Media Participation	- .135	.385***	---	---
Part of Leadership Team	- .035	.231**	- .008	---

N=173

* p< .05 level

** p< .01 level

*** p< .001 level

Table 4.15 Correlations Among Democratic Females

	Electoral Insecurity	Association with Leadership PAC	Media Participation	Part of Leadership Team
Electoral Insecurity	---	---	---	---
Association with Leadership PAC	- .212	---	---	---
Media Participation	- .094	.515***	---	---
Part of Leadership Team	-.448**	-.026	.198	---

N=39

* p< .05 level

** p< .01 level

*** p< .001 level

Table 4.16 Correlations Among Republican Males

	Electoral Insecurity	Association with Leadership PAC	Media Participation	Part of Leadership Team
Electoral Insecurity	---	---	---	---
Association with Leadership PAC	- .084	---	---	---
Media Participation	- .001	.258***	---	---
Part of Leadership Team	- .020	.139*	.107	---

N= 205

* p< .05 level

** p< .01 level

*** p< .001 level

Table 4.17 Correlations Among Republican Females

	Electoral Insecurity	Association with Leadership PAC	Media Participation	Part of Leadership Team
Electoral Insecurity	---	---	---	---
Association with Leadership PAC	.064	---	---	---
Media Participation	-.233	.002	---	---
Part of Leadership Team	.167	.290	-.325	---

N=17

* $p < .05$ level

** $p < .01$ level

*** $p < .001$ level

Table 4.18 Correlations Among and Principal Components Analysis of Indicators of Party-Building Activity by Party

		Correlations			Component
		1	2	3	
Democrats	1 Affiliated with a Leadership PAC	---			844
	2 Media Participation	.392***	---		765
	3 Part of the Leadership Team	.186**	.010	---	376
Republicans	1 Affiliated with a Leadership PAC	---			758
	2 Media Participation	.238***	---		688
	3 Part of the Leadership Team	.151**	.077	---	523

**p< .01 level

***p< .001 level

Table 4.19 Total Variance Explained Through Data Reduction by Party

	Component	Initial Eigenvalues	% of Variance	Cumulative %
		Total		
Democrats	1	1.438	47.932	47.932
	2	.992	33.072	81.004
	3	.570	18.996	100.000
Republicans	1	1.320	44.008	44.008
	2	.931	31.047	75.055
	3	.748	24.945	100.000

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

Table 4.20 Predicting Party Unity by Party

	Democrats	Republicans
	b (s e)	b (s e)
Constant	86.632 (1.602)	92.907 (.983)
Female	6.042 (2.084)**	-6.456 (1.852)***
Seniority	.021 (.105)	-.220 (.074)**
Electoral Insecurity	-3.538 (1.795)*	-1.042 (1.146)
Party-Building Activities	1.780 (.854)*	1.112 (.506)*
Female Party-Building Activities	-.634 (2.553)	4.478(2.022)*
Adj. R2	.063 (11.4180)	.101 (7.2241)
Durbin Watson	1.907	1.564

* p< .05 level

**p< .01 level

***p< .001 level

Chapter 5

The Matrix:

Partisan Context and Political Goals as Parameters for Women's Political Behavior

The 106th Congress was a pivotal period for women in both party organizations. In the Republican Party, Rep. Marge Roukema (R-NJ), the most senior Member on the Banking Committee, was passed over for the chairmanship. She retired at the end of the 107th Congress. During the same Congress, Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) ran for the leadership post of Minority Whip and won. After the 2002 election, she also ran to replace Rep. Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and won. She is now the highest-ranking woman in the history of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Introduction

The present analysis has examined the participation of women in the U.S. House of Representatives within the context of political parties. At the electoral level, women face unique electoral circumstances due to their partisanship. Female Democratic Members represent some of the most liberal districts in the country. For this reason, these women enjoy wide electoral margins and all the discretion to pursue legislative, partisan, and personal goals that accompany them. Contrastingly, Republican Members often represent marginal districts and must be responsive to moderate constituencies.

In the institution, women demonstrate partisan patterns of ideological voting behavior. Democratic women vote like Democrats, and Republican women vote like Republicans. Partisanship shapes ideological voting in discernable ways. Republican women are not the same in ideological orientation as Democratic women, however. Republican women are most likely to agree with Democrats on social issues, particularly women's issues (Swers 1998). The electoral pressures faced by Republican women

significantly affect their voting behavior. More secure Republican women enjoy the electoral discretion to pursue their personal ideological preferences. They are significantly more liberal than both their male colleagues and their electorally-insecure colleagues. Insecure Republican women do not enjoy this electoral discretion. They vote as we might expect based on both their gender and their electoral circumstance.

Examining the organizational behavior of women, we find that women participate in party-building activities to the same extent as men. While Democratic women illustrate higher party unity scores than their male colleagues, Republican women illustrate lower party unity scores than their male colleagues. Nonetheless, Republican women attend organizational meetings, are affiliated with leadership PACs, and participate in media to the same extent as Republican men. Yet women in both parties lack proportionate representation at the highest levels of party and committee leadership. While the Democratic Party rewards seniority and thus women must serve the requisite time to reach these positions of power, the Republican Party rewards party homogeneity and ideological loyalty and thus women must demonstrate more conservative voting behavior to gain these positions.

In the end, women participate in a legislative institution defined by parties. These political parties structure their behavior at the electoral, institutional, and organizational levels. In order to understand the implications of women's behavior within our Congress, we must account for the parameters created by partisanship and electoral circumstance. In the end, these party cultures determine the "playing field" on which women succeed or fail.

Contribution to the Literature

According to contemporary gender theory, there are significant gender-based differences in the participation of male and female Members of Congress. Female Members display more liberal voting records than male Members. Female Members are more concerned with "women's issues" than male Members. And female Members have a different style of participation within the institution than male Members.

In general, women are better able to steer feminist policy through the policy process than congressmen because of their interest and desire to affect change (Tamerius 1995, see also Thomas 1991). Social issues dealing with children, education, and welfare are thought to be rather soft issues appealing especially to female legislators (Thomas 1994, 1991). Consequently, female public officials gravitate towards committees dealing with social welfare as well as family and children's issues out of interest, expertise, choice, coercion or opportunity. Women choose committees that tend to focus on more "feminine issues" (Thomas 1994). It is possible, however, that this choice is due to processes of gendered socialization that shapes women's and men's interest in different ways and reflects the power and prestige these issues have within the legislative body (Kathlene 1994).

These observations lead theorists to the conclusion that women's increased inclusion in the Congress would lead to a more liberal voice on legislation, particularly on issues directly affecting women and children. Increased numbers of women in Congress would also change the political dynamic of the institution, increasing collaborative behavior among legislators and female leadership.

The present work challenges these implications on a number of grounds

Current gender theory describes women's behavior as if it occurs in a political vacuum. Political parties are notably absent from theoretical models of gendered behavior. Gender theory has focused on the influence of gender on legislators' issue voting, participation as committee members, and behavior as party activists to the neglect of possible ideological and behavioral differences among women. The consequence? For the most part, the context of partisanship has been ignored. The purpose of the present analysis is to reintroduce partisanship to the theoretical picture. Specifically, this study focuses on the influence of partisanship on the participation of women in Congress. As Baer (1993) suggests:

Research on women and politics has developed a narrow orthodoxy that has left the promise of the early gender-sensitive research of the 1970s stillborn, and an entire area of political science central to the political influence of women – political parties – has been both ignored and misunderstood (548)

Consequently, current theoretical frameworks are unable to address differentiated ideological behavior in political organizations such as the legislative arena.

Similarly to Baer (1993), the contention of this dissertation is that this has formed a large hole in the literature on gender and legislative behavior in the Congress. Political parties have always structured American politics. In the contemporary context, partisan competition is evident in every branch of our government. The need for a vote recount after the presidential election of 2000, the shift in partisan control of the Senate at the beginning of the 107th Congress, and the slim seat margins defining the House since the midterm elections of 1996 all point to intense partisan competition in the contemporary era.

Current gender theory tries to capture women's influence within the institution without taking into consideration the important function of partisanship in structuring Member behavior. Consequently, possible differences in women's behavior due to partisanship are left unexplored. Do Republican women behave the same way as Democratic women? Do they vote in the same way? Are their priorities the same? Do they have the same level of success within the institution? In other words, does sex alone determine legislative behavior, or does partisanship also influence the way in which women participate?

Not only is partisanship an important factor of political context. Other factors such as Member goal motivations also are involved in determining behavior. A substantial body of congressional theory suggests that Members are motivated by goals. First and foremost, Members are driven by the reelection incentive (Mayhew 1974). Members are also motivated by more intra-institutional goals, such as policy, power, and prestige (Fenno 1973).

These goals are an important part of Member behavior that at present are neglected by gender theory. Consequently, differences in women's political behavior due to electoral, policy, power and prestige incentives also are left unexplored. How does electoral insecurity influence women's behavior? Do electorally insecure women act differently than electorally secure women? Do women motivated by institutional ambition act differently than women with less ambition? Are these goals associated in any way with partisanship? If so, then not only must we understand the role of partisanship in women's political behavior, but also the role of goals in women's participation within the institution.

Theoretical Contribution

This analysis has explored the behavior of women in the U S House of Representatives given the political context created by political parties and Member goal-orientations. There are two primary assumptions of this work. First, the two primary political parties are distinguished by unique cultures that permeate the electoral, institutional, and organizational elements of our political system. Female Members, like male Members, participate within the parameters of these two political parties and reflect their distinctive cultures. Secondly, Member behavior is predictive given that it is motivated by distinct, identifiable goals.

An assertion original to this work, however, is that pursuit of Member goals is structured by the party cultures. Women must conform to their partisan cultures in order to achieve their respective goals. From this theoretical foundation, we can develop models of Member behavior based on the interaction between party cultures and Member goals.

Party Culture and Member Behavior

This analysis takes its point of departure from party culture theory, suggesting that the two parties demonstrate distinct patterns of behavior. Party culture theory challenges congressional scholars to take into consideration partisan differences when examining legislative behavior. Republican party culture is defined by ideological homogeneity, party loyalty, internal competition, hierarchical organization, and elite participation. Democratic party culture, on the other hand, is defined by ideological as well as descriptive diversity, constituent responsiveness, seniority rule, and egalitarian organization and participation.

(see Freeman 1986) As presented in the first chapter, Table 1.1 illustrates the party culture thesis.

The present analysis is novel in that it combines both qualitative and quantitative data to assess the manifestations of party culture in political behavior, and particularly women's political behavior. Both district-level and Member-level variables demonstrate partisan differences in Member women's voting behavior. The interview data further substantiates these findings demonstrating that women do define themselves as partisans and do operate within the context and confines of their party organizations.

Partisanship structures the electoral circumstance of women, and thus influences their voting behavior, allocation of resources, prioritization of goals, and participation in partisan activities. Partisanship is further associated with male Members' attitudes toward and evaluations of their female copartisans within the institution. Interestingly, while gender differences are articulated by Democratic male and female Members, these differences are not apparent in voting behavior. Contrastingly, while gender differences are not articulated by Republican male and female Members, there are significant gendered differences in the voting behavior of Republican female Members.

Goal Motivations and Member Behavior

The second contribution of this study involves the combination of goal motivations or behavioral theory with party culture theory to understand women's political behavior. Members are driven by a number of identifiable goals. First, Members are driven by the reelection incentive (Mayhew 1974). Secondly, they are driven by policy, power, and prestige goals (Fenno 1973). Parker (1992) suggests that Members try to expand their

electoral security to attain the discretion necessary to pursue their institutional goals. As discussed in the first chapter, Table 1.2 illustrates the electoral incentive thesis.

A Matrix of Member Behavior

This analysis illustrates how partisanship structures the attainment of Member goals, including the basic goal of reelection. And reciprocally, this analysis demonstrates how goal motivations, for Republicans, can impinge upon participation in the party organization, thus limiting their institutional effectiveness. As presented in the first chapter, Table 1.3 illustrates how party culture combines with electoral security to create a matrix of Member behavior.

For Democratic Members electoral security provides them the freedom to pursue personal goals whether they involve power, policy or prestige. Electoral security is usually associated with seniority, and this seniority provides Democratic Members with institutional status and the partisan leadership positions that accompany it. Insecure Democratic Members, on the other hand lack electoral discretion, and thus must focus their attention on district concerns. It is important to recognize that their partisan culture allows them the discretion to vote and participate in the interest of their districts. They are limited, however, within the institution because of their lack of seniority, but with time they can expect all the advantages that seniority brings.

Republican Members, on the other hand, face altogether different circumstances within this framework. Secure Republicans enjoy the freedom to pursue their personal goals, but they must pursue them within the parameters of the party platform in order to be effective within the organization. Seniority plays little of a role outside of these party

parameters. Even the most senior Members can expect to be overlooked for leadership positions if they do not conform their pursuits to the party platform. Insecure Republican Members also operate within this system of ideological and participatory homogeneity, but lack the freedom to ignore district interests. In order to secure their reelection, they at times must stray from the partisan fold. Not only do they not adhere to the party platform, they also lack the personal or partisan resources to compete for leadership positions.

From this analysis, we develop a much richer understanding of Member behavior than that offered by the literature. We understand Members as operating in a complex, dynamic legislative arena, both structuring and structured by their participation in it. We see party organizations truly as mediating institutions that not only impact Members' voting behavior, but also impact their behavior both inside and outside of Congress. Further, we appreciate parties as the professional and central organizations that they are, inherently structuring Members' goals of power, policy, and prestige. Specifically, we develop a critical understanding of the role of parties and partisanship in structuring women's political participation within the Congress. The two party cultures serve to both advance and limit women's access to political power in the contemporary context.

Methodological Contribution

One of the greatest contributions of the present analysis is its combination of quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data for this project spans eight years and four congresses (103rd - 106th Congresses). It integrates district-level census data and electoral vote returns with Member-level data in order to control for situational factors in

predicting ideological voting behavior. The qualitative data incorporates interview data with organizational records to more fully capture the complex partisan environment in which Members operate. The interview data includes 25 Member interviews, 47 congressional staff interviews, and 9 party elite interviews – a total of 81 interviews.

Secondly, this analysis recognizes the significance of multiple measures of participation (Hall 1996). Analysis of Member partisan participation at both the institutional and organizational level more fully captures the relationship of party culture and legislative behavior. By examining women's legislative behavior at the electoral, institutional, and organizational level, we develop a more holistic understanding of female Members' political circumstance. Future studies of congressional behavior should attempt to bring together the disparate worlds where Members operate. As Fenno (1990) states

My own view begins with the idea that politicians are both goal-seeking and situation-interpreting individuals. It proceeds to the idea that politicians act on the basis of what they want to accomplish in their world, and on the basis of how they interpret what they see in that world. It moves from there to the idea that we can gain valuable knowledge of their actions, perceptions, and interpretations by trying to see their world as they see it (114).

Findings

The legislative behavior of female Members is structured by political parties. Female legislators participate within the context of their respective party culture. From this simple argument, we embarked upon a rich study of women's legislative behavior within the context of partisanship. This analysis revealed important differences in women's behavior at multiple levels of participation: in the electoral arena, in the institution, and in the party organization.

Participation in the Electorate

Within the electorate, female congressional candidates' partisanship structures their political circumstance in distinct and significant ways. Female Republican candidates come from particular backgrounds, typically including political families or previous legislative or business experience. Republican women typically represent moderate districts that are fiscally conservative and socially more liberal than the party mean. One reason for this is that they may suffer from gendered stereotypes that inhibit their ability to succeed in more conservative districts (McDermott 1997). Female politicians are often viewed as being liberal on social issues regardless of their record or personal platform simply based on their gender identity (Plutzer and Zipp 1996, McDermott 1997). For this reason, they often face difficult primary elections against more conservative challengers and difficult general elections against more liberal opponents. Consequently, they must devote substantial resources to constituent service and electoral concerns throughout the legislative cycle.

On average, Republican women represent more marginal districts than any other Members of Congress. Not only are their districts more ideologically liberal than the districts represented by Republican men, their electoral safety is also more marginal than that of their male colleagues. Not only do female Republican Members see their districts as requiring more attention because of these ideological disparities, they also understand their personal ambition constrained by electoral demands.

Democratic women, on the other hand, face altogether different circumstances. They run on social issues and come from backgrounds in social work, local government,

and civil service. They typically represent very liberal districts that value diversity and expect liberal voting records. Often winning by large margins, they have more time and resources to spend on things besides electoral concerns

Participation in the Institution

Partisanship combines with electoral needs to structure women's political circumstance within the institution as well. Republican women enter into their legislative career with little electoral security. They face the constant threat of a tough primary as well as general race. They lack the time, resources, or discretion to pursue goals within the institution. Their male Republican colleagues, while appreciating their role in maintaining swing districts, expect them nonetheless to vote in lockstep, and hold their moderate voting records against them when electing or appointing partisan officers.

Democratic women, on the other hand, often enter their legislative career with wide electoral margins. They enjoy the bloc vote of minority populations and rarely face difficult electoral competition. This circumstance provides them with ample time, resources, and discretion to pursue their personal goals whether they involve policy development or career advancement. Their partisan colleagues value their diversity, appreciate their outspokenness on social issues, and expect them to reflect the interests and concerns of their districts. These women operate within a partisan system that rewards seniority regardless of ideological orientation, voting record, or partisan activity.

Differences between Republican party culture and Democratic party culture within the institution is further illustrated by the explanatory power of the models predicting ideological voting behavior. The model predicting ideological voting behavior performed

differently for Democrats and Republicans. The only common significant predictor between the two parties was the general ideology of the district. In terms of strength, significance, and direction, all of the other indicators in the model performed differently for the two parties. This suggests that the constituency constraints faced by Members vary by party, and the responsiveness of Members to these pressures also varies by party.

Further, when controlling for district- and Member-level variables, the model predicts nearly half the variance in Democratic voting behavior across congresses. Contrastingly, the model generally predicts less than a quarter of the variance in Republican voting behavior across congresses. This observation illuminates one of the primary cultural differences between these two parties. The Republican Party encourages ideological homogeneity and does not encourage or reward constituent services. Contrastingly, the Democratic Party encourages diversity, coalition-building, and equal representation. One way in which to conceptualize these different party cultures is to understand the Republican Party as conforming more to a responsible-party model of representation and the Democratic Party as conforming more to a constituency-centered model of representation.

Participation in the Party Organization

Finally, within the party organizations themselves, women's participation is structured by their respective party cultures. Republican women must join Republican men in competing for positions of party leadership. In these races, they must articulate and emphasize credentials other than their gender when bidding for their colleagues' vote or the approval of the Committee on Committees. They must further rely on a solid

voting record demonstrating strong Republican-ism. They must participate in party-building activities, such as generating party money through fundraising and communicating the party message through media.

On the other hand, Democratic women operate within a party culture that values seniority over competition and diversity over ideology. Democratic women are valued as political pioneers. They have a place at the leadership table simply because of the demographic they represent. While at the highest levels of leadership they must be competitive in order to win, once senior, they are generally granted full access to positions of leadership within the institution and organization.

While women of both parties have enjoyed access to positions both in the extended leadership structure and in the committee structure, they have not had much enduring success in securing positions at the highest levels of these structures. Until very recently, women had only sporadically held full committee chairmanships and had never been part of the formal leadership team. During the first session of the 107th Congress, however, the Democratic Caucus elected Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) to the position of Minority Whip. This represents the highest congressional office ever held by a woman.

Based on the different cultures of the Democratic and Republican Parties, it is not surprising that a Democratic woman would make this historical achievement. The implications of this analysis, nonetheless, suggest that there are multiple forces at work to limit the effectiveness of women within the Republican Party besides general party ethos. Republican women, unlike Democratic women, face electoral constraints that limit their organizational ambition. Another consequence of their electoral circumstance is that

Republican women lack the legislative discretion to vote with the party and thus do not prove themselves ideologically loyal enough to hold positions of power

It does appear that Republican women are disadvantaged within the party organization. Using multiple measures of partisan support, Republican women participate equally with their male colleagues in party-building activities. Perhaps their participation is an attempt to compensate for their divergent voting behavior. Nonetheless, female Republican Members enjoy only limited positional status within the party. The voting discretion they need to ensure their reelection has consequences for them within the hierarchy of the party organization. It is important to realize that

Voters, constituents, groups, and party leaders are the ultimate principals in the legislative process, and members of Congress are their agents. A major problem inherent in, and disruptive of, the principal-agent relationship is the exercise of discretion. Discretion occurs when agents pursue their own interests while ignoring the preferences of their principals. A natural remedy for this problem is to invest resources into monitoring the agent's actions, especially since issues such as moral hazard create a divergence between the principal's interest and agent's actions. It is costly, however, for principals to monitor the actions of their agents since the full observation of actions is either impossible or prohibitively costly (Parker 1992: 10-11)

The costs of monitoring Republican women's legislative behavior outweigh the benefits of their descriptive representation among leadership. Given this dynamic, it is surprising that Republican women have had as much success as they have had in securing other positions including seats on exclusive committees, subcommittee chairmanships, and seats on partisan committees and leadership teams.

Figure 5.1 about here

Two Models of Member Participation

From these findings, we develop two distinct systems of Member participation. For Democrats, the system is what we would consider traditional. Figure 5.1 illustrates the typical path of participation of Democratic Members of Congress. While the cultural characteristics of the party, the characteristics of the district, and the characteristics of the Member all interact during the election, they ultimately result in a vote return for the Member that communicates his or her electoral safety in the district. This factor along with district and Member preferences lead to the Member's general voting behavior. In terms of partisan activities, however, voting is not a prominent criterion. The Member's personal political background might influence his or her involvement in partisan activities. The Member's electoral security might also figure into his or her decision to allocate resources in party-building activities. In the end, however, the seniority of the Member is a large determinant of the Member's supportive activities in the party organization. Seniority in turn is also largely associated with success within the organization. Party leaders are senior Members, regardless of their voting behavior.

Figure 5.2 about here

Figure 5.2 illustrates differences in the Republican system of participation. Just as in the Democratic model, party culture, district, and candidate characteristics all interact to produce election outcomes. In turn, these electoral outcomes shape Member voting behavior and partisan activity. What is noticeably different in the Republican system is the lack of seniority as a determinant of both partisan activity and success within the party organization. Candidate characteristics are important to partisan activity. Members who

were involved with their state and local party organizations are likely to participate in party-building activities in the national organization. Members who are electorally secure are also more likely to invest resources in party-building activities than electorally-insecure Members. In the competitive climate of Republican party culture, these activities lead to success within the organization. Similarly, given the value of ideological homogeneity in the Republican party culture, voting behavior also is associated with success in the organization. These two factors figure much more prominently than seniority in the Republican organizational system.

Discussion and Implications

The present analysis holds several theoretical implications for the future study of women's legislative behavior as well as practical implications for women's participation in the legislative arena. That the models predicting Member voting behavior performed differently for the two parties bears significant implications for future models of representation. Not only does the party culture of the Democratic Party provide more discretion to its Members to respond to electoral pressures, Democratic Members in turn respond more to district voting cues than Republican Members. Future models of voting behavior should take into account differences in party culture and the ensuing differences in the strength and significance of indicators of ideological voting. From this analysis, it appears that the Democratic Party adheres to a more constituency-centered model of representation while the Republican Party reflects a more responsible-party model of representation. Perhaps Miller and Stokes (1963) were right in asserting that

No single tradition of representation fully accords with the realities of American legislative politics. The American system *is* a mixture, to which the Burkean,

instructed-delegate, and responsible-party models all can be said to have contributed elements (56)

The Republican Party, in contrast to the culture of the Democratic Party, does not value diversity and coalition-building. Republican Members do not respond to constituency pressures to the same extent as Democratic Members. This poses particular problems for female Republican Members who represent the most liberal Republican districts. Republican women face unique electoral pressures that must shape their legislative behavior. Because they operate within a party culture that values homogeneity and party loyalty, however, their divergent voting behavior poorly positions them within the party organization.

The second implication of this analysis more broadly involves future work in congressional behavior. The argument of this dissertation crosses prominent theoretical frameworks such as gender theory, party culture theory, and rational choice theory to provide a more comprehensive and more accurate theory of women's legislative behavior. Concepts such as discretion and the reelection incentive hold important ramifications for women's legislative behavior that current gender theory overlooks. Future theoretical work should not be constrained to one framework or set of frameworks, but should aim to accurately reflect the political world by bringing to bear relevant theory.

While gender theory has largely neglected the unique role of Republican women in the Congress, it is precisely these women who are demonstrating noticeably gendered voting behavior. This analysis builds on the work of Swers (1998), who suggests that, "much of the impact of gender is due to the influence of Republican women" (1998: 435).

Given the district and institutional circumstance of Democratic women in Congress, there are no significant differences between their behavior and that of their male colleagues. Their voting records are generally identical with those of Democratic men. Granted this analysis does not explore the substance of women's legislative activities, and thus perhaps overlooks the impact Democratic women have in both developing and championing "women's issue" legislation. Nonetheless, in terms of general ideological voting behavior, Democratic women do not demonstrate unique behavior.

The gendered voting behavior demonstrated by Republican women leads us to some significant implications. It is important to recognize that, in light of their political circumstance, Republican women are choosing to pursue policy success over partisan success and are thus stifling their congressional careers. This observation raises critical questions concerning women's political behavior. Do these Republican women know that they are limiting their potential for success within the party organization by voting with a gender consciousness? Could it be that these women have so very few role models to emulate, and have until recently been unaware of any repercussions of gendered behavior, that they are making the same mistakes as those who have gone before them? Now that Marge Roukema (R-NJ), the most senior Member to vie for the chairmanship position on the Banking Committee during the reorganization of the 106th Congress, was denied a chairmanship at the end of her career, will other Republican women take note and begin to pattern themselves even more like their male colleagues in order to be effective? Or will they still choose to pursue policy that targets women's issues?

In the end, there also are several practical implications of this analysis. First, the

finding that women operate within two separate party organizations with distinct cultures leads to several implications concerning women's participation within the institution. Democratic women enjoy a partisan climate that fosters ideological diversity and equitable participation. The organizational structure is reflected best by spokes on a wheel, with the different coalitions such as the Congressional Black Caucus, the Women's Caucus, the Progressive Caucus, the New Democrats, and the Blue Dogs all equally represented. Democratic women, for the most part, represent districts ideologically compatible with the party's liberal stance on issues. Republican women, on the other hand, operate within a partisan climate that fosters ideological homogeneity and organizational competition. The organizational structure is reflected best by a hierarchical structure, with no specific representation of coalitions such as the Tuesday Group or the Value Action Team.

How do these partisan climates impact the participation of women within the institution? For Democratic women, this organizational dynamic fosters their equitable participation. Although we might expect these women to be advantaged because of the party's promotion of descriptive diversity, it is also important to remember the premium Democrats place on seniority. While women will ultimately enjoy full access to positions of leadership within the Democratic Party, they must gain the seniority necessary to be granted these positions. Republican women face a very different organizational dynamic. The Republican Party traditionally has not valued ideological diversity, but rather has emphasized and rewarded ideological homogeneity. Republicans also place little value on descriptive diversity or seniority. Rather, the party seems to reward organizational and ideological support. While women are not limited by their lack of seniority, they are

limited by their electoral circumstances and ideological preferences

The implications of this analysis, however, stretch beyond the current participation of women in Congress. According to Bernick (2001), "legislative career orientation (is) associated with attainment of a leadership position, political ambition, and acceptance of legislative norms" (123). If women are not effective as participants, they will become disenchanted with the institution and choose to focus their efforts elsewhere. Recent works suggests that institutional ineffectiveness is directly correlated with Member retirement (Theriault 1998). As Moore and Hibbing (1998) state, "members who are not achieving their goals are more likely than others to depart voluntarily from the U S House" (1088).

This is perhaps most disturbing given the current partisan control of the House of Representatives. At the time of this analysis, Republicans hold the majority in the House, thus Republican women enjoy the most political opportunity to influence the workings of the Congress. Nonetheless, Republican women lack the time, resources, or partisan influence necessary to affect change. They lack the electoral discretion to be effective participants within the party organization. Based on this scenario, we might expect Republican women to become disenchanted with the institution and seek early retirement.

Conversely, we should expect Democratic women to enjoy full participation within the party structure. They not only enjoy the partisan discretion to develop policy and influence group behavior, they also enjoy the electoral discretion to fully participate within the party organization. Based on this alternative scenario, we should expect Democratic women to remain in Congress. It is important to recognize, however, that another factor

leading to early retirement is persistent minority status with the institution (Gilmour and Rothstein 1993). If Democrats do not regain the majority, we might expect Democratic women to become frustrated by their inability to affect change given their minority partisan status, and seek early retirement as well

At present, the political climate for women is intensely structured by partisanship. Women's fate within the institution largely depends on the status and cultures of the two major parties. These cultures permeate the electoral, institutional, and organizational aspects of the American Congress. In the electorate, party culture structures every aspect of campaigns and elections, determining both who runs and who wins. In the institution, party culture structures the committee system and the policy agenda, determining who has power and how they exercise it. Finally, party culture structures the party organizations in Congress, resulting in distinct leadership structures, roads to power, and modes of participation. We must understand the specific ways in which partisanship structures women's participation in order to begin to truly understand how women are making a difference within the American Congress.

Figure 5.1 Model of Democratic System





Figure 5.2 Model of Republican System



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Appendix: Variable Descriptions and Coding

Dependent Variables	
DW-NOMINATE Scores	Range between -1 and +2 on one liberal-conservative dimension, with -1 being the most liberal and +2 being the most conservative
Social Liberalism Ratings	Range between 0 and 100 on one liberal-conservative dimension, with 0 being the most conservative and 100 being the most liberal
Independent Variables	
Sex	Dichotomous variable accounting for Members' biological sex, coded 0 = male, 1 = female
Seniority	Variable accounting for Members' seniority, coded as years in office
Electoral Insecurity	Dichotomous variable accounting for Members' electoral insecurity, coded 0 = secure, or receiving at least 60% of the district vote in the last election, 1 = insecure, or receiving less than 60% of the district vote in the last election
Female Electoral Insecurity	Interaction term combining Member sex with Member electoral insecurity, coded dichotomously with 0 = secure male, secure female, or insecure male, 1 = insecure female
% Black	Variable measuring the percent of the district population that is African American, taken from the 1990 Census
Socio-Economic Character of the District	Factor score measuring the socio-economic makeup of the district. Data reduction of the % rural, the % college-educated, and the average per capita income of the district.
Presidential Vote Return of the District	Variable measuring the percent of the district vote taken by the winning presidential candidate in 1992 or 1996 (in both cases a Democrat)