INFORMATION TO USERS

Inamete, Ufot Bassey

THE CONCEPT OF NONALIGNMENT AND THE NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY
1960-1983

The University of Oklahoma   PH.D.   1985

University
Microfilms
International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE CONCEPT OF NONALIGNMENT AND THE

NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1960-1983

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

UFOT BASSEY INAMETE

Norman, Oklahoma

1985

THE CONCEPT OF NONALIGNMENT AND THE

NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1960-1983

A DISSERTATION

APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

By

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

THE CONCEPT OF NONALIGNMENT AND THE NIGERIAN

FOREIGN POLICY 1960 - 1983

By: Ufot Bassey Inamete

Major Professor: Donald E. Secrest, Ph.D.

This study examined the concept of nonalignment in relation to the Nigerian foreign policy. Specifically, it aimed at examining whether, and why, the Nigerian foreign policy manifested the phenomenon of nonalignment, or failed to do so, during the period spanning from 1960 - 1983.

The beginning of the study successfully handled the need to comprehensively rein in the conceptual profile of nonalignment; and, thus, this study developed a nonalignment conceptual scheme of an amalgam of perspectives and dimensions.

It is with this conceptual scheme of nonalignment, that this study developed, that the nonalignment content in the Nigerian foreign study also developed another novel way of studying the phenomenon of nonalignment; which is that of evaluating how, or whether, it is manifested, in terms of conceptualizing nonalignment as an amalgam of perspectives and dimensions.

On the main issue of the nonalignment content in the Nigerian foreign policy, this study found that, during different political eras in Nigeria, different mixes of factors were at work. Namely, during the First Republic, the factors of a government made up of a coalition of moderates,

and the significant role of assertive radical elements in the fringes of the governmental structure, and as pressure groups, resulted in Nigeria being able to be nonaligned. The succeeding Ironsi government, due to its very brief, and crisis-ridden, duration, was also found to manifest non-alignment phenomenon in the same way as did the First Republic. The Gowon government that followed, however, due to the realities of the Civil War, and the existence of a cautious government, was able to exhibit a nonaligned posture that, despite warm relations with the East, was still firmly adequate. The assertive national leadership during the Muhammed/Obasanjo government meant also an assertive nonaligned posture, while the Second Republic nonalignment phenomenon was, more or less, a replication of the First Republic dynamics and posture.

Additionally, although the nonaligned content of the Nigerian foreign policy varied with different political eras, all of the eras (especially the last three) were found to have manifested a mostly Afro-centric conceptual perspective, and foreign policy mechanism dimension of nonalignment.

THE CONCEPT OF NONALIGNMENT AND THE

NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1960-1983

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

General Objectives

About a hundred countries subscribe to nonalignment as their major foreign policy principle. Yet from 1961, when nonalignment was formally instituted as an international phenomenon till the present,[1] there has been no general agreement on its conceptualization. The seriousness of this general lack of consensus in its conceptualization is further deepened by the fact that the different ways of understanding nonalignment directly contradict each other.

This general lack of consensus about the concept of nonalignment has specifically necessitated this study. The abundance of different ways of understanding nonalignment has led to confusion over when, or where, nonalignment manifests itself. This is because the different ways of understanding nonalignment have led to situations

where other countries dispute the nonaligned status that some countries claim for themselves. The controversy that clouded the 1979 nonaligned summit clearly demonstrated this unsatisfactory state of the conceptualization of nonalignment. On that occasion many nonaligned countries strongly stated that Cuba was not nonaligned. Thus, these countries resisted the visible role Cuba was trying to create for itself within the nonaligned group. On the other hand, Cuba claimed that it was nonaligned. Using a curious understanding of nonalignment, it claimed that countries with its same foreign policy posture were those that were nonaligned. At the same time, Cuba also viewed many nonaligned movement member countries as not being nonaligned. This controversy was serious enough to weaken the nonaligned movement for a considerable period. Additionally, nonaligned meetings still do continue to be plagued with this sort of controversy. Thus, to both the academicians who study nonalignment, and the policy makers that are involved with this foreign policy phenomenon, the situation is not satisfactory.

A better conceptualization of nonalignment is the main key to the improvement of this situation. This study, therefore, develops a conceptual scheme that tries to understand nonalignment as a varied and complex concept or phenomenon. Thus this approach contrasts with the present tendency by many to understand nonalignment in a simple monolithic fashion. Additionally, this study seeks to understand how Nigeria's nonaligned policy can be viewed in terms of this complex view of nonalignment. This view of nonalignment entails it being seen as having various perspectives and dimensions.

Thus this study reins in the various perspectives of nonalignment, and also tries to find the commonalities among them. Additionally, efforts will be made to fit the various perspectives into major schools of thought in terms of grouping them into various dimensions of nonalignment.

This study also seeks to find out whether Nigerian foreign policy from 1960 to 1983 manifested a nonaligned content. Thus, this study aims at providing a novel way of studying the phenomenon of nonalignment by evaluating how or whether it is manifested in terms of conceptualizing it as an amalgam of perspectives.

As shown above, the word "nonalignment" does not have a universally accepted meaning.[2] However, nonalignment can be tentatively defined as an international policy that stresses an independent posture and the avoidance of routine alliance with any country, or bloc of countries, that is engaged in a mainly conflictual relationship with another country or bloc of countries. The phenomenon can additionally be understood as connoting an international policy of being actively, positively, and creatively participating in the international community with the purpose of promoting a more peaceful and prosperous relationship among the countries and peoples of the world.

Thus, nonalignment does not mean an attempt to show indifference in the face of global issues, withdrawal from the active interaction with other international actors, or refusal to positively contribute in the shaping of the events in the international community. In reality, it stands for the opposite of all these. However, it must be noted that since the nonaligned countries are presently relatively

less powerful, they shape events in the world less than do the more powerful countries. Nonalignment is also seen as not being against countries grouping themselves for broad or specific cooperative purposes. Instead, it is seen as objecting to groupings having conflictual relationships with another country, or group of countries, as their major driving force.

The notion of nonalignment as a policy of not generally favoring very strong routine alliance with one group, for the main purpose of being against another, also connotes that countries should subscribe to the idea of either commending, or condemning, any international actor, or actors, for their actions, based solely on how they perceive each particular action.

However, it should also be noted that nonalignment, as understood in the above paragraphs, may not describe the actual international behavior of any particular nonaligned country. As is the case with all ideal constructs, the aim of the above exposition of nonalignment phenomena is not an attempt to replicate any reality, but an attempt to construct a universally relevant conception of an idea by the process of abstracting from various realities, over time and space, the commonality of features, and then fitting them into a new harmonious whole--but in this case an ideal one. Thus, while the varieties of actual nonaligned international behavior may approximate the ideal construct, it is not necessary for any of them to fit exactly into the latter.

Various works on nonalignment often adopt a perspective that stresses either its politico-strategic or economic dimensions. The

politico-strategic perspective understands nonalignment mainly in terms of some countries trying to steer clear from issues of military strategic bloc rivalry, and from superpower political maneuvering to gain more influence in other countries.[3] Understanding nonalignment in terms of an economic perspective is exemplified by Clifford Edogun. According to him,

> the "glue" that has always united the movement even at its out-
> set, has been economic in nature: the shared economic depriva-
> tion of its members--the angry realization that this depriva-[4]
> tion exists, and the strident demand that it be ameliorated.

The above two perspectives reflect ideological underpinnings. The latter reflects the neo-Marxist view of social reality which stresses that the nature of global material production and distribution processes ultimately determines global political and broad cultural realities. Edogun seems even eager to make sure that any person reading his article clearly appreciates the ideological underpinnings of his analysis--thus his title, "The Non-aligned Movement Today: Towards an Ideological Perspective of World Order."[5] On the other hand, the former perspective (the politico-strategic) is the traditional social science view which contends that any attempt to understand every political and social reality as being determined by economic realities is both simplistic and misleading. In this case, while not denying the increasing role of economic realities as an important feature of nonalignment, this perspective does not hold that every feature of the phenomenon, especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s, was, and is, determined by economic factors. Thus, this perspective was not encased in a strong political economy approach. Additionally, this

perspective holds that nonalignment can in most cases, especially in its early years, be understood in terms of the behavior of less powerful countries that seek either to avoid being victims, or to maximize their roles, in an international system where more powerful countries compete for political and economic influence and military superiority. The above two views represent the extreme among the perspectives on nonalignment phenomena. Others fall along a spectrum between these two extremes, stressing either of the perspectives to a greater or lesser extent. The actual history of nonalignment phenomena shows that it displays political, military and economic features, with the first two being most significant in the 1950's and 1960's, while the last feature is becoming increasingly important since then. Since nonalignment lends itself to various conceptualizations, there is a need for understanding it as an idea-system; and this will be attempted in this study.

United Nations documents will serve as primary research sources. Additionally, this study will basically follow traditional chronological and analytic mode of research. In terms of the arrangement of chapters, it will include chapters on an overview of the historical development of nonalignment and a survey of related political themes, and on the conceptual profile of nonalignment. A major section of this study is that concerned with how the Nigerian foreign policy has been manifested, in relation to its being closer to, or distanced from, the phenomenon of nonalignment. This will be followed by a concluding section that presents the major findings of this study.

Literature Review

The literature relevant to this study is that which either pro-
vides a general understanding of the subject of nonalignment or of the
foreign policy of Nigeria within the context of nonalignment. An over-
view of the literature on nonalignment reveals that it can be grouped
into three major categories--those that focus on its historical devel-
opment as a movement, those that examine its conceptual profile, and
those that deal with the nonaligned foreign policy of particular coun-
tries.

Prasad's work (1981) tried to understand nonalignment in terms
of its general historical development as a movement.[6] His major
focus was on the historical foundations that led to the development
and the international viability of nonalignment. He essentially saw
the elements of colonialism and the independence struggles that re-
moved the latter (national experiences that most nonaligned countries
went through), as that that provided a shared world view that brought
the nonaligned countries together to promote the phenomenon of nona-
lignment in the international community. Additionally, Prasad saw the
desire by these countries to safeguard their national independence and
sovereignty as the factor that has made nonalignment a durable and via-
ble international phenomenon.

Mazrui (1980/1981), on the other hand, sought to comprehend
general historical development of nonalignment, as a movement, in
terms of changes (or possible future changes), in terms of the part of
the nonaligned world that assert much influence in the latter.[7]

Viewing the world through a cultural prism, he saw the increasing economic resources (petroleum) and military power in the Arab world as having indicated that the latter might likely occupy the position of influence in the nonaligned world that the Hindu world (India) had pioneered.

Bondarevsky and Sofinsky (1975, 1976) viewed the general development of nonalignment in terms of international class analysis, and advanced the view that the socialist world and the nonaligned world shared similar material conditions.[8] Charting a different course, Rothstein (1976) saw the nonaligned countries as having moved away from a prior major concern with steering clear of superpower bloc alignments to a major focus on binding together to try to effect changes in the nature of contemporary international economic relations.[9]

How the phenomenon of nonalignment has developed in regard to its relation to the United Nations and the superpowers is the subject treated by Jackson (1983);[10] and his work demonstrated that nonalignment had grown into a significant international reality. This view of nonalignment as a significant international reality was also conveyed in Willet's (1978) and Mortimer's (1980) works, and both imparted the view that nonalignment manifested itself as a Third World coalition framework.[11]

Misra (1981) and Mates (1983) sought to develop a conceptual profile of nonalignment, and both were of the general view that many scholars have approached the subject of nonalignment in a manner that indicated that they had a less than satisfactory understanding of the concept of nonalignment.[12]

There had also been many who had sought to comprehend the nonaligned foreign policy of particular countries. For example, Kashkett (1982),[13] in examining Iraqi nonaligned foreign policy, saw such factors as the central role of the Baathist ideology (especially in its present moderated form) in the Iraqi national life, the ability of the Baathist political elite group to be able to have control over and bring a measure of stability to the Iraqi political system, increasing economic power through oil revenue, and the Iraqi desire to play a more influential role in the Arab world and the nonaligned group, as having led to Iraq pursuing vigorously a nonaligned foreign policy.

For its size and material conditions, Tanzania was seen as manifesting a very assertive nonaligned foreign policy (Gupta, 1981),[14] while Nepal was seen as a small geographically constrained country which tried to pursue a foreign policy of nonalignment, but, at the same time, was saddled with a traditional feudalistic system at home (Baral, 1981).[15]

Some countries, like North Korea, were seen as using nonalignment to gain international recognition, as a platform for having an international audience for its position on issues relating to the precarious situation on the peninsula it is situated on, and as a forum for promoting links with nonaligned countries (Krishnan, 1981).[16] Phadnis and Patnaik (1981), on the other hand, saw a country like Sri Lanka as using nonalignment to maintain its stability and independence.[17]

Nigeria, whose nonaligned foreign policy is the subject of this study, has manifested foreign policy in various areas and

situations that relate to the phenomenon (and there have been studies on these areas and situations which provide much information for the understanding of the Nigerian nonaligned foreign policy).

Akinyemi (1974), in an effort to understand how the Nigerian federal polity related to Nigeria's foreign policy, provided much information on Nigerian foreign policy from 1960 to 1966.[18] Though the major outcome of this work was the thesis that the Nigerian foreign policy was much affected by the then nature of the Nigerian federal system, the detailed analyses of the various major foreign policy actions Nigeria was involved with, during this period, provided ample information with which Nigeria's policies relating to the Congo Crisis, the Middle East problem, the relationship with Nkrumah's Ghana, the apartheid problem in Southern Africa, and the decolonization issues could be examined in terms of nonalignment bearings.

Also concerned with the Nigerian foreign policy between 1960 and 1966 is the study done by Idang (1973) which posited that internal political realities had a significant impact on Nigeria's international behavior.[19] Like Akinyemi, Idang also provided an in-depth analysis of Nigerian foreign policy during the 1960's, but, unlike the former, instead of focusing on major issue areas he presented a comprehensive treatment of Nigerian international actions. In relation to this study, such a comprehensive analysis of the Nigerian foreign policy during the 1960's enables one to examine how such foreign policy related to the nonalignment principle.

Idang touched on the subject of nonalignment; but he approached this subject mainly in conceptual perspective. Thus, he saw

it mainly as one of "the ideological bases" on which Nigeria's foreign policy might have rested.[20] Therefore, to him, nonalignment was just one of the "body of ideas, doctrines, beliefs and values"[21] (which also included Pan-Africanism) which might have impacted on Nigeria's foreign policy. Through this perspective, nonalignment, in terms of its impact on the Nigerian foreign policy, was seen in terms of how it concerted with the other concepts. For example, he saw nonalignment as "an extension of African nationalism to the international level."[22]

How scholars look at the place of Nigeria in the international system was of interest to Shaw and Fasehun (1980).[23] Their main view was that two schools of thought dominate Nigerian foreign policy studies that relate to Nigeria's role in the international system--the traditional and the radical schools. They associate the traditional school with the realist/power politics perspective in that it concentrates its analysis on the societal superstructures and adopts a state-centric mode of analysis. Thus, this school assumed that Nigeria was an independent actor in the international system, and that it was a regional and continental leader. It was also seen as believing that Nigeria can achieve socioeconomic growth through capitalism. On the other hand, the radical school adopted a global political economy perspective and concentrates on the global societal infrastructures (which to this school are economic--mainly the nature of global economic activities) and the sort of global political and cultural relations that thrived on these. Thus, it saw Nigeria as belonging on the periphery, or semi-periphery, of a global capitalist system (which is

made up of a few powerful countries at the center, and numerous less powerful countries at its semiperiphery and periphery). Unlike the traditional school, this school held that a capitalist road would only lead Nigeria to underdevelopment. Additionally, since it saw Nigeria as being at the periphery, or the semiperiphery, of the global system, it held that it was not possible for Nigeria to be an independent actor in the international system. And this particular point showed how Shaw and Fasehun's work related to the subject of this study--nonalignment. Extending the above view on capability and noncapability for independent action in the international system on the part of Nigeria, the traditional school would have held that given the sovereign power inherent in the Nigerian state, the enormous economic and human resources it is endowed with, and its sheer physical size, it was possible for Nigeria to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy. On the other hand, the radical school held the view that given its place in the semiperiphery, or the periphery, of the global capitalist system, Nigeria was incapable of being an independent actor in the international system, and therefore, by extension, this school might have seen Nigeria as being incapable of pursuing a nonaligned policy during the period covered by this study.

Shaw and Fasehun saw the writings of Bolaji Akinyemi, Olajide Aluko, Ibrahim Gambari, and Mazi Ofoegbu as representing the traditional school of Nigerian foreign policy studies, while Ikenna Nzimiro, Claude Ake, and Segun Osoba, represented the radical school.

They also noted that while the traditional scholars were somehow more influential in the foreign policy process, the radical

scholars, though not as influential, did exert some influence also. The latter seemed to have had their influence more indirectly, through their high visibility in the academic world and through their impact on public opinion (which was often enhanced by the wide press coverage that their public comments seemed to draw). The authors even noted that a then Nigerian Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo, in some of his speeches, gave out views that were quite in consonant with the radical view of Nigeria's place in the international system (which is that of a country at the periphery of the global capitalist system).[24] However, in trying to gauge the influence of both schools of thought, one might have also considered what goes on in the professional bodies of those social science disciplines that relate to foreign policy studies. An example of this, which may be called the politics of political science in Nigeria, relates to the dynamics of the Nigerian Political Science Association. The radical scholars are increasingly making significant impact on this body. On the other hand, both the Nigerian Society of International Law and the Nigerian Society of International Affairs seem to be dominated by the traditional scholars. Delving into how these bodies function, and assessing their influence in the larger society, would have contributed to an evaluation of the influence of both the traditional and radical scholars on Nigerian foreign policy studies.

Though not primarily concerned with foreign policy, Nnoli (1981)[25] addressed the issue of finding an effective intellectual approach that would have allowed the problems of Nigeria's socioeconomic development (with due recognition of global socioeconomic factors) to

be resolved. Like Shaw and Fasehun, Nnoli saw two intellectual ap-
proaches on this subject--the traditional and radical approaches-- al-
though he saw only one as being useful. Basically, he did not view
Nigeria as being capable of controlling its economic destiny (and thus
to be able to achieve meaningful development) within its present posi-
tion in the periphery of the global capitalist system. By extensicn,
Nnoli's view of Nigeria's economic position in the world can be used,
especially by those who revere economic reality as the paramount so-
cial reality, to posit that for countries like Nigeria, a nonaligned
foreign policy is practically unattainable.

There are many particular foreign policy issues that have en-
gaged the attention of Nigeria, and the task of plowing through some
of these was undertaken by Aluko (1981).[26] His work specifically re-
lated to this study in two ways. Firstly, his detailed analyses of
major foreign policy issues during the First Republic and the first
era of military governments (for example, the effects of the Civil War
on foreign policy, relations with Britain, attitudes towards the Euro-
pean Economic Community, the Middle East problem, the Southern Africa
apartheid problem, the nationalization of the assets of the British Pe-
troleum Company, and relations with the superpowers) allows one to
gauge the relevance of the principle of nonalignment in relation to
how Nigeria dealt with these issues. Secondly, Aluko also directly ex-
amined the nonalignment content of the Nigerian foreign policy during
the Civil War and during the Mohammed/Obasanjo government. In connec-
tion with this second task, Aluko left the general impression that the
experience, and the lessons, of the Civil War helped move a nonaligned

foreign policy that was clearly leaning to the West during the prior First Republic to a nonaligned foreign policy that was more even in terms of the dealings with both the West and East;[27] and that the assertiveness of Nigerian foreign policy (which in some instances meant significant friction with some western countries) during the Mohammed/-Obasanjo government era, did not result in the abandonment of the nonalignment policy.[28]

However, though Aluko did pay direct attention to nonalignment in the above two instances, this subject was not treated in relation to most of the policy issues he dealt with since the central concern of his work was the general analyses of other foreign policy issues.

Nigeria's efforts to attain nuclear capability is a subject that strongly relates to the Nigerian foreign policy, particularly in terms of the desire to augment Nigeria's strategic and military position (though the domestic benefits of nuclear capability, in terms of more energy production for socioeconomic development, is publicly more often considered as being important). Henderson (1981) provides some information on the nature of Nigeria's nuclear policy.[29] By examining the issues of technical expertise, mineral resources, bureaucratic-intellectual constituencies, nuclear energy facilities, and technological milieu that related to the prospects of a viable nuclear industry, he held the view that, despite constraints, Nigeria would pursue the development of this energy source in some form that would be determined by the way the above variables are manifested. Additionally, apart from these issues concerning how the nuclear industry might develop, Henderson also considered how Nigeria's nuclear policy had

much to do with how the latter perceived its role in the African re-
gional context, particularly with reference to the festering situa-
tion in southern Africa, which is also accompanied by an acute violent
military situation--and the role Nigeria plays in this area. This sit-
uation has much to do with nonalignment since the tension in the area
sharpens the apprehensions of both the West and the East (and within
this context Henderson's work provided information for understanding
how, or whether, nonalignment was related to how Nigeria perceived its
role in Africa, and more specifically, in Southern Africa).

Another study of the Nigerian foreign policy by Aluko
(1977)[30] saw it in terms of three concentric policy areas--policy
toward neighbours in the West African region, African policy, and
extra-African policy. This approach allows a clearer understanding of
Nigerian foreign policy since Africa is being increasingly enunciated
as the foreign policy centerpiece. However, in terms of nonalignment,
Aluko gave the impression that this phenomenon will be mostly relevant
in the third concentric foreign policy area (the extra-African policy
area), with particular reference to relations with the superpowers. On
the other hand reality seems to indicate that, in terms of the rela-
tions with immediate neighbouring countries and other African coun-
tries, the phenomenon of nonalignment may also be relevant (more so,
since many regional issues often assume international dimensions that
engage the attention of the superpowers).

How Nigeria's political scene, economy, and external influ-
ences are related was explored by Gambari (1975).[31] He posited that
the growing political efficacy that accompanied the end of the Civil

War, and the significant improvement in the economy due mostly to petroleum resources, had generally been accompanied by a growing international influence. The African regional area was seen as the area in which the impact of Nigerian influence was most felt, and Gambari particularly pointed out Nigeria's role in trying to end the apartheid problem in Southern Africa as a case in point. Additionally, note was made of Nigeria's vigorous role in helping African, Caribbean and Pacific countries to negotiate better with the European Economic Community. Nigeria was seen as relying on the basic premise of strength through unity; and, Yakubu Gowon, a former head of state, was quoted as saying that "It is better for a United Africa to talk to a United Europe."[32]

Nigeria's premier role in the founding of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was seen by Gambari as the "most significant of all"[33] the manifestations of a growing international influence, which he saw as being linked to a growing political efficacy and a growing economy. Additionally, he observed that the ECOWAS might be used in "Undermining the pervasive influence of France"[34] in those African countries that were formerly the former's colonies.

Nigeria's growing influence was seen as also having an extra-African dimension in the general international community in the increasing attention being paid to Nigeria by the superpowers. For example, Gambari observed that in the mid-1970's the United States appointed a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs as its Ambassador to Nigeria.[35] The Soviet Union was also seen as having an increasing interest in Nigeria despite the fact that it was

unable to carve out a special privileged relationship with Nigeria after helping it during the civil war. The indications that the Soviet Union "has not given up hope"[36] were seen as its decision to help build an 800 million Naira iron and steel industry in Nigeria, and the fact that Vasily Solodovnikov, the then director of the African Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow, "announced that a special Nigerian section would be established" in his think-tank "both to demonstrate new hopes and prospects for Soviet-Nigerian cooperation and to underscore the place of Nigeria in Africa and the World."[37]

The dynamics of Nigerian foreign policy during the early phase of the Mohammed/Obasanjo government, which replaced the Gowon government in 1975, were analyzed by Aluko (1976).[38] He notes that the Mohammed/Obasanjo government adopted "a radical militant style in the conduct of external relations,"[39] and that this new approach, as expected, resulted in many confrontations in the international scene (and that this contrasted with the cautious foreign policy of previous governments). He also added that while Western countries were those Nigeria most often found cause to disagree with, "the bulk of the country's external economic, commercial and financial, and even military ties"[40] continued to remain with the former, as had been the case during the Gowon period. Thus, Aluko saw Nigeria's foreign policy during the Mohammed/Obasanjo government as still coming under the umbrella of nonalignment. He also observed that the various internal constraints, and external realities, would result in little change in the fundamentals of Nigeria's foreign policy that had guided the

country through previous governments. It was also observed that while the preceding Gowon government paid more attention to the formation of ECOWAS, for the Mohammed/Obasanjo government Africa was the center-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy.

Efforts to build a strong viable regional economic organization in West Africa (as crystallized in the form of the above mentioned ECOWAS), from the point of view of Nigeria's premier role, were analyzed by Ojo.[41] He traced Nigerian actions before the formation of ECOWAS that were related to the idea of an economic union in West Africa and analyzed the actions by both West African and extra-West African actors that led to the formation of the organization. His main interest was the examination of the factors that made Nigeria decide to shoulder the major responsibility of bringing ECOWAS to full fruition. Of particular interest to this study is Ojo's assertion that Nigeria desired to reduce France's influence in African countries that were formerly its colonies (and in terms of ECOWAS, it had decided to start with its immediate neighbours--the West African countries). France's leaning towards Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70), and influencing countries like the Ivory Coast to do the same, was seen as playing a major factor that made Nigeria determined to check France's influence in Africa starting with a device like the ECOWAS. Additionally, important economic reasons were also seen as motivating factors for Nigeria's desire for a framework like the ECOWAS. Nigeria was seen as needing an economic zone that would help its industrializing economy (due to its recognition of the fact that, contrary to the notion of global free trade, in practice there are a

lot of constraints in the international economic system with regards to the exportation of manufactured goods).[42] Ojo also showed that Nigeria was very realistic about the problems that regional economic integrations must experience and solve; thus, the clear pragmatism that is inherent in most Nigerian moves.

Both in terms of foreign and domestic policies, the Mohammed/ Obasanjo government is often seen as the one that was most innovative and dramatic in the Nigerian national existence in comparison with other governments that were in power during the 1960 to 1983 period (which is the period covered by this study). A comprehensive look at the Nigerian foreign policy during the era of this government has been carried out by Akinyemi (1979).[43] He was an active participant in the foreign policy process, and thus provided an inside view of it in his evaluation of Nigerian foreign policy during the Mohammed/ Obasanjo government era. He saw Nigerian foreign policy during this period as being very assertive, with Africa being the primary area of interest. Nigeria was seen as marshalling all of its resources to shape events, especially in Southern Africa (with special reference to the outcome of the Angolan independence struggle). In connection with this Angolan issue, Akinyemi went further to posit that Nigeria's role in helping the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the national liberation organization that succeeded in forming the government for the new independent country, was a just action. Thus, he declared that "there is no intrinsic relationship between success and justness of one's cause in politics," and therefore even "if the MPLA had been defeated. . . . we would still, however, have been convinced that Nigeria was right in recognizing the MPLA."[44]

The efforts to build a viable regional economic organization in West Africa (as evidenced by ECOWAS), and Nigerian technical and financial assistance to other African countries, were also seen as other important preoccupations on the international scene during this period.

Given Akinyemi's view of Nigerian foreign policy during the Mohammed/Obasanjo government era, one may postulate that during this period Pan-African conceptualization of foreign policy roles, being at the forefront of the Nigerian foreign policy formulations, might also have meant that nonalignment as a foreign policy principle was mainly relevant in terms of serving to reinforce the African-centered foreign policy.

While Akinyemi's article was concerned with Nigeria foreign policy during the Mohammed/Obasanjo government period, Nigerian foreign policy during the entire period of the first era of military governments (which lasted from 1966 to 1979) was the subject examined by Ofoegbu (1979).[45] He has been quoted as saying that

> existing works on Nigerian foreign policy contain lapses which I have endeavored to avoid . . . They devote a disproportionate amount of time and space to issues of domestic politics, constitutional development, and domestic economy, and are thus unable to provide adequate analysis of the substantive issues of foreign policy.[46]

Ofoegbu was not critical of the link between the domestic environment and foreign policy, but he asserted that more devotion to the former by some scholars tended to result in their not adequately evaluating how Nigerian foreign policy substantively manifested itself.

In this article he had tried to fill the gap in the latter area (with special attention to the first era of military governments) but without ignoring the domestic environment. He devoted his attention to the task of evaluating Nigerian foreign policy during the period of each of the three military governments (namely the Ironsi, Gowon, and Mohammed/Obasanjo governments).

Ofoegbu viewed the Ironsi government (January 1966 - July 1966) as one that witnessed not much significant initiatives in the foreign policy arena due to the crisis nature of the domestic political scene during that time (and it might also be added that the sheer short life period of this government also made significant foreign policy initiatives not practically attainable.)

The succeeding Gowon government was credited with moving Africa to the fore of Nigeria foreign policy preoccupation, while links with Britain (which were at the fore during the First Republic, 1960-1966) were relegated to the secondary level of consideration due to the Nigerian perception of Britain, and the West generally, as being hesitant in supporting it in maintaining its territorial integrity during the initial phase of the civil war. The Soviet Union, which allowed its military hardware and know-how to be at the disposal of the Nigerian military (especially the Nigerian Air Force) during the Civil War, was therefore seen as significantly improving its relations with Nigeria in comparison with the state of pre-war Nigerian-Soviet relations.

On the African scene, the ECOWAS formation was seen as an important interest to the Gowon government; and cautious and realistic moves on the part of Nigeria was seen as the hallmark of its moves in this policy area due to the many constraints it had to overcome.

Ofoegbu saw the succeeding government (the Mohammed/Obasanjo government) as that in which new initiatives were speedily and determinedly pursued; but he noted that this assertiveness was accompanied with many confrontations. In fact, one wonders whether Nigeria was giving a new meaning to nonalignment policy (which it often professes to follow) in the way it related to others, especially the big powers. According to Ofoegbu, Nigeria's "relations with the U.S.A., Britain, the U.S.S.R. . . . were all strained at one time or another . . ."[47]

An analysis of Nigerian foreign policy during the Second Republic (1979-1983) was provided by Ogunbadejo (1980).[48] The general thrust of his article is an examination of how the 1979 Constitution was related to the foreign policy process and orientation. Regarding the constitutional impact, he highlighted treaty provisions, war provisions, foreign policy institutions, general foreign policy guidelines, and the fact that the constitution specifically placed emphasis on the well-being of Africa by requiring Nigeria to do all to promote African unity, and the political, economic and social uplifting of the continent.

Ogunbadejo saw the Second Republic's foreign policy as being based mainly on two conceptual frameworks, namely the African-centered policy and nonalignment; and he held the view that the Nigerian foreign policy during this period was much in tune with those two foreign policy conceptual frameworks.

Unlike any of the literature reviewed above, an article by Mazrui (1982)[49] was devoted solely to the examination of Nigeria's relations with a global power (the United States). His aim was not

that of analyzing the nature of the relationship between these two countries but, as the title of his article implied, to comment on certain things that should, or should not, happen in the relations between both. He implied throughout his article that, though both could cooperate, Nigeria could not afford to be too close to a global power. In relation to the concept of nonalignment, one may observe that Mazrui's recognition of Nigeria not being able to afford intimate relations with a global power can also be taken to mean Nigeria not being able to be aligned with a global power.

Another view on Nigeria's relations with a global power was provided by Ogunbadejo (1978).[50] His article shows how, in its relations with Nigeria, the Soviet Union seemed not to be very unbending in terms of its ideological orientation. The Soviet decision to help Nigeria militarily solve the problem of secession, and its various multilevel economic and cultural contacts (both official and unofficial) with Nigeria, were elaborated on as key examples of its pragmatism. Additionally, Ogunbadejo also showed how, despite all these efforts, Nigeria had shown itself capable of not being locked into a close relationship with the former.

Endnotes

1. A later section on an historical outlook of nonalignment shows that it manifested itself first as a foreign policy principle of particular countries, then as an international movement, and since then, always in both ways.

2. Portions of this study will be devoted to more detailed examination of nonalignment as a concept.

3. An example of this perspective on nonalignment is given by Richard Rosecrance. See Richard Rosecrance, _International Relations: Peace or War?_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), pp. 91-92 and 275.

4. Clifford Edogun, "The Non-Aligned Movement Today: Towards an Ideological Perspective of World Order, " _Susquehanna University Studies_ (Volume XI, Number 3, 1981), pp. 131-148; emphasis that of Edogun.

5. _Ibid._

6. Bimal Prasad, "Historical Background of Nonalignment," _International Studies_ (Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981), pp. 13-21.

7. Ali Mazrui, "Changing of the Guards from Hindus to Muslims: Collective Third World Security in a Cultural Perspective," _International Affairs_, London (Vol. 57, No. 1, Winter 1980/1981), pp. 1-20.

8. See G. Bondarevsky and V. Sofinsky, "Bandung's Historic Lessons," _International Affairs_, Moscow (May 1975), pp. 45-53; and G. Bondarevsky and V. Sofinsky, "The Nonaligned Movement and International Relations," _International Affairs_, Moscow (July 1976), pp. 50-58.

9. Robert L. Rothstein, "Foreign Policy and Development Policy: From Nonalignment to International Class War," _International Affairs_, London (Vol. 52, No. 4, October 1976), pp. 598-616.

10. Richard L. Jackson, _The Non-aligned, The UN and the Superpowers_ (New York: Praeger, 1983).

11. See Peter Willetts, _The Non-aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance_ (New York: Nichols, 1978); and Robert A. Mortimer, _The Third World Coalition in International Politics_ (New York: Praeger, 1983).

12. See K. P. Misra, "Towards Understanding Non-alignment," _International Studies_ (Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January - June 1981), pp. 23-37; and Leo Mates, "The Concept of Non-alignment," _India Quarterly_ (Vol. 39, No. 1, January - March 1983), pp. 6-22.

13. Steven B. Kashkett, "Iraq and the Pursuit of Nonalignment," _Orbis_ (Vol. 26, Summer 1982), pp. 477-494.

14. Vijay Gupta, "Nature and Content of Tanzania Non-alignment," _International Studies_ (Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January - June 1981), pp. 379-399.

15. L. S. Baral, "Nepal and Non-alignment," International Studies (Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January - June 1981), pp. 257-272.

16. R. R. Krishnan, "North Korea and the Non-aligned Movement," International Studies (Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January - June 1981), pp. 299-313.

17. Urmila Phadnis and Sivananda Patnaik, "Non-alignment as a Foreign Policy Strategy: A Case Study of Sri Lanka," International Studies (Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January - June 1981), pp. 223-238.

18. A. B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1974).

19. Gordon J. Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 1960-1966 (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973).

20. Ibid., pp. 20-34.

21. Ibid., p. 20.

22. Ibid., p. 29.

23. Timothy Shaw and Orobola Fasehun, "Nigeria in the World System: Alternative Approaches, Explanations, and Projections," The Journal of Modern African Studies (Vol. 18, Number 4, December 1980), pp. 551-574.

24. Rather than just trying to placate the radical elements in the society, he seemed to have believed what he was saying since some of his policies seemed to have been aimed at enabling Nigeria to shape events for itself in the international system. Though some may argue that there were no comprehensive designs on which such policies were based, it must also be noted that Obasanjo, some of his views notwithstanding, did not see himself as a radical. In fact, Obasanjo seems to have been a person who shared some radical world view without accepting the radical notion of social reality and dynamics in its entirety.

25. Okwudiba Nnoli, "Introduction: The Intellectual Aspects of the Struggle for Nigerian Development," In Okwudiba Nnoli, ed., Path to Nigerian Development, (Dakar: Codesria, 1981), pp. 1-20.

26. Olajide Aluko, "Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981).

27. Ibid., pp. 122-124.

28. Ibid., pp. 237-240.

29. Robert D'A. Henderson, "Nigeria: Future Nuclear Power?" Orbis (Vol. 25, No. 2, Summer 1981), pp. 409-423.

30. Olajide Aluko, "Nigerian Foreign Policy," in Olajide Aluko, ed., The Foreign Policies of African States, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), pp. 163-195; Aluko also dwelled on the nature of foreign policy machinery, the role of the national economy, and the effects of the Civil War.

31. Ibrahim Agboola Gambari, "Nigeria and the World: A Growing Internal Stability, Wealth, and External Influence," Journal of International Affairs (Vol, 29, No. 2, Fall 1975), pp. 155-169.

32. Quoted in Ibid., p. 165.

33. Ibid., p. 165.

34. Ibid., p. 166.

35. Ibid., p. 167.

36. Ibid., p. 166.

37. Ibid.

38. Olajide Aluko, "The 'New' Nigerian Foreign Policy: Developments Since the Downfall of General Gowon," Round Table, (No. 264, October 1976), pp. 405-414.

39. Ibid., p. 411.

40. Ibid., p. 408.

41. Olatunde J. B. Ojo, "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS," International Organization (Vol. 34, No. 4, Autumn 1980), pp. 571-604.

42. Ibid., p. 584.

43. A. Bolaji Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy," in Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-79 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 150-168.

44. Ibid., p. 159.

45. Ray Ofoegbu, "Foreign Policy and Military Rule," in Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., op. cit., pp. 124-149.

46. Quoted in Shaw and Fasehun, op. cit., p. 555.

47. Ray Ofoegbu, op. cit., p. 144.

48. Oye Ogunbadejo, "Foreign Policy Under Nigeria's Presidential System," The Round Table (Issue 280, October 1980), pp. 401-408.

49. Ali Mazrui, "Nigeria and the United States: The Need for Civility, the Dangers of Intimacy," Orbis (Vol. 25, No. 4, Winter 1982), pp. 858-864.

50. Oye Ogunbadejo, "Ideology and Pragmatism: The Soviet Role in Nigeria, 1960-77," Orbis (Vol. 25, No. 4, Winter 1978), pp. 803-830.

CHAPTER II

NONALIGNMENT: AN HISTORICAL OUTLOOK AND A SURVEY

OF RELATED POLITICAL THEMES

An Historical Outlook

The Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Belgrade in September, 1961, marked the formal inauguration of the nonaligned movement, but the roots of nonalignment as a phenomenon had been sown in various places and occasions far earlier.

Before the Belgrade conference, nonalignment had already been identified as a phenomenon associated with the foreign policy of some countries. Thus, nonalignment manifested itself first as individual countries' foreign policy, then as an organized international movement (and subsequently nonalignment has continuously been manifested in both ways).

India, Egypt, Ghana, Sukarno's Indonesia, and Yugoslavia were some of the countries that helped develop the concept of nonalignment, adopted it as a major principle of their foreign policies, and also helped make it a collective international phenomenon.

29

India, in particular, has played a very important role in the history of the nonalignment phenomenon; and Jawaharlal Nehru was very crucial in determining how nonalignment developed, both as a concept and as an international phenomenon. It is also relevant to note that India's experience with colonialism, and its struggle to free itself formally from it, helped in molding India's nonaligned international behavior. India's sense of being an important international factor and a potentially great country (which Nehru well articulated), the Kashmir issue with Pakistan (and the resultant actions of other international actors) and the superpowers rivalry were also some of the factors that helped fashion nonalignment phenomenon in India.

In the case of Egypt, Nasser was anxious to sustain and assert the full sovereignty of his country in a region where the global powers were keenly interested in its affairs (as evidenced by the Israeli-Arab issue and the Suez Canal problem). Nasser was also highly conscious of the debilitating effect of close foreign contact and foreign domination that had been experienced by a weakened Egypt during the era of the traditional political regime which he removed from power. All these factors impacted on the way Nasser's Egypt pursued nonaligned foreign policy. Similarly, but under different circumstances, for Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Pan-African aspirations, and his unceasing concern over the phenomenon of neocolonialism, were crucial in shaping Ghana's nonaligned foreign policy.

For Indonesia, under Sukarno, the circumstances under which it attained its independence, its struggles to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, regional problems with Malaysia, and how it

perceived the actions of other international actors in relation to these issues, helped spark Sukarno's interest in nonalignment. On the other hand, for Yugoslavia, the precarious position of being located in Eastern Europe, and refusing to be part of the Eastern bloc in a cold war era, and the desire to build a socialist society outside the formal integral framework of the Soviet Union posed a serious problem to its ability to maintain its sovereignty. And it is within this context that Yugoslavia's interest in nonalignment, and the role it has played in fostering the latter's international importance, can be understood.

For the above countries and many others (mostly in Africa and Asia), nonalignment increasingly became a major foreign policy principle; and so also was their desire to have a collective appreciation, articulation, development, and utilization of this principle. (The latter phenomenon became manifested in the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in Indonesia in 1955.)[1] However, the formal inauguration of nonalignment as a collective international phenomenon occurred at the Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned Countries in 1961. Since then six similar conferences have been held in Cairo (1964), Lusaka (1970), Algiers (1973), Colombo (1976), Havana (1979), and New Delhi (1983).

Nonalignment as a movement has continued to grow in terms of conceptualization, goals, and institutionalization. For example, the earlier prominent concerns about avoiding strong military and political entanglements, in the face of East/West rivalry, have now shifted to more concern about global socioeconomic issues; its conferences and

meetings have become more regularized (though still managing to avoid full scale institutionalization). In terms of the institutional growth, structures such as coordinating bureaus, consultative meetings, working groups, a nonaligned news agency pool, etc., have proliferated.

In the area of concern for global socioeconomic issues, the New International Economic Order and the New International Information Order are the major anchors. It is interesting to note that the nonaligned countries pursue their goals in many and varied forms, most of them outside the formal forums of the nonaligned movement itself. Thus the United Nations, its special agencies, and other international trade and economic negotiation forums have been the prominent arenas of their activities; and their overlapping membership in these bodies further intensify their roles.

Likewise, the attitudes of the more powerful countries toward the phenomenon of nonalignment have also undergone various changes. For example, from earlier unenthusiasm towards it, the United States now has long concluded that nonalignment is not a serious threat to its interests.[2] The Soviet Union has also changed from hostility to the idea that it is somewhat normal for developing countries to not view the world primarily in terms of capitalism and communism. Moreover, the Soviets have tried to use close allies, like Cuba, to sell the idea that socialist countries are natural allies of the nonaligned countries (though this has not worked).

The nonaligned countries have a remarkable characteristic of exhibiting various social, political and economic outlooks, but having

the desire to be nonaligned in their international actions; and this seems to be a feature that has helped to make sure that the phenomenon does not metamorphise into something that is very rigid. This ensures its continued growth, viability and international significance.

A Survey of Related Political Themes

Spilling directly into the focus of this research (the non-alignment concept and the nonalignment content of Nigerian foreign policy) is the political thinking that is related to the phenomenon of colonialism in Africa, particularly in regard to the decolonization process. The decolonization process was sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent, and at times a mixture of both. The ideas expressed by Azikiwe are representative of the political thinking that tried to show that if a colonizing agent is capable of exhibiting political maturity it could disengage itself peacefully.[3] On the other hand, there is political thinking that sees decolonization as a violent process. Fanon is a key exponent of this line of thinking. Knowing the man himself is also as important as knowing his ideas: a person of African ancestry born in Martinique, who later traveled to France to study medicine, specializing in psychiatry, and afterwards to work for the French government as a psychiatric physician in Algeria (which was then a French colony). Incidentally, it was this sojourn in Algeria that was to provide him with the material conditions for his political writings. The fact of being in Algeria, which was then waging a national liberation war against France, forced him to take sides; and he

chose to put his material and intellectual resources at the disposal of the Algerian guerillas, mostly as a revolutionary theoretician and strategist. It was out of this experience that came his classic political treatise, The Wretched of the Earth.[4] In this book, with the theoretical clarity which his expertise in human behavior--both normal and pathological (through his training as a psychiatrist)--seems to have deepened, he raised the phenomenon of violence to a new theoretical level; but this time as an instrument of thorough decolonization. His opening statement on violence in this book goes thus:

> National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonization is always a violent phenomenon.[5]

Using his Algerian experience and those of other places that experienced or were experiencing a decolonization process, Fanon analyzed how violence is synonymous with this process. Another strand of his thoughts on violence shows him holding the view that it is the only thing that would enable the colonized to psychologically decolonize themselves.

Undoubtedly, there were many who were shocked and dismayed by such rigid views on violence. Nevertheless, people like Jean-Paul Sartre, who wrote the prefact to this book, challenged people to be courageous enough to read the man who gave the concept of "Fanonian Violence" to political theory.

> They would do well to read Fanon: for he shows clearly that this irrepressible violence is neither sound and fury, nor the resurrection of savage instincts, not even the effect of resentment; it is man re-creating himself.[6]

In another book Fanon ties the problem of decolonizing Africa with the greater issue of how an independent Africa can chart a more rewarding course in dealing with others. Thus, in this work he stressed the issue of African unity.[7]

Nkrumah is another person who wrote extensively on the subject of colonialism. In most of his works, he sought to analyze the colonial phenomenon and the way to end it. Unlike Fanon, he stressed a nonviolent decolonizing process called "Positive Action," which is seen essentially as involving mass social and political mobilization of the colonized that makes it quite clear that colonialism cannot simply continue.[8]

Nkrumah's writings were also concerned with contemporary Africa, and the most profound of these is Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism.[9] However, analysis is not restricted to Africa, but rather applies to any territory that is seen as having formal political independence while it is actually controlled, both economically and politically, by a power source that is foreign to the territory. According to him,

> The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent, and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.[10]

This book, which is a neo-Marxist-Leninist view of international relations, sees neocolonialism as an attempt by an assaulted imperialism to survive, and argues that through the unity of those under its yoke it will not survive for long. He also asserts that neocolonialism seeks to perpetuate itself through the balkanization of the neocolonized peoples.

This issue of unity among the developing countries logically leads to a major theme in African political thinking--which is the concept of Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism can·largely be seen as a loose concept that embodies ideas which articulate the unity of Africa. For some this means the unity of African people, wherever they may be, for their political, economic and cultural betterment; and, for others it is mainly the unification of the African continent into one political entity. Among the latter, some advocate immediate political unification, while others stress gradual functional cooperation in economic and social spheres that will later spill into political unification. There is also a group that emphasizes subregional integration that will eventually lead to continent-wide economic or suprastate political unification. Pan-Africanism also includes the idea of Africa existing without foreign interference and its ability to play a vital independent role in the international community. Idang, in examining the concept, sees its last focus as having much to do with the phenomenon of nonalignment, and even see the latter as a derivative of the former. Thus, as earlier shown, he asserts that,

> That there is a linkage between non-alignment and African nationalism admits of no debate. Not only is non-alignment a derivative of the idea of Pan-Africanism, but it is also an extension of African nationalism to the international level.[11]

He also posits the view that Pan-Africanism was actually generated, as a formal concept, by the people of African ancestry who were not even living on the continent. According to him,

> . . . the ideas of Pan-Africanism . . . were sown outside the African continent. Such American and West Indian Black intellectuals as W. E. B. Dubois, Marcus Garvey, Aime Cesaire, George Padmore and Jean Price-Mars made significant contributions to the growth of Pan-African consciousness.[12]

Idang also documents the historical fact that these men were those who organized the six Pan-African Congresses in the first half of the 20th Century. Cognizant of this, these men can also be credited with immensely contributing to the decolonization of Africa since some of those who were to be critical in the nationalist movements for the independence of African countries attended these meetings which were held outside Africa, and they undoubtedly benefited from the ideas of the organizers. Notable among such participants were Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta, both of whom led Ghana and Kenya, respectively, to independence, the former even more known for his contributions, both practically and intellectually, to the continent as a whole.[13] The indigenous Africans were also seen as later leading the Pan-African movement, since the "Western blacks were later joined and eventually swamped at the Pan-African congresses by the indigenous African intellectuals."[14] The formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) gave the idea of Pan-Africanism a more concrete indigenous African character, though Pan-Africanism Congresses (which are legally separate from, but cooperating with, the former) still continue to be held. The latter now function more as cultural bodies within which Africans and people of African ancestry in other continents meet to pursue common goals, while the OAU tries to give legal and political realities to the sort of ideas Pan-Africanism used to generate.

As already noted before, Nkrumah was at the forefront of Pan-Africanism, and many of his ideas on this subject are articulated in one of his works.[15] His main focus in this, and others of his works, is the idea that there should be suprastate political

unification in Africa, and he showed how this could be realized. In the practical world, he was bent on realizing this goal--as witnessed by the number of unions he formed with the other countries, and the fact that when he could not succeed in having suprastate political unification he readily compromised to allow unification to at least start from some lower level, in the form of the Organization of African Unity.[16] Apart from the strength through unity arguments, Nkrumah also seemed to have seen African political unification as such unification, in his statement above, is representative of the economic arguments for African unity.

Nyerere seems to have also perceived that mass African public support for African unity was a considerable check on the ambition of some African leaders who were loath to reduce their power through the surrendering of some sovereignty of their respective countries through unification. Thus, he asserts that:

> . . . psychologically we have been so successful that no African leader, even if he did not believe in such unity, would dare say so. What is needed, therefore, is not more preaching about unity, but more practicing of unity.[18]

The Balewa Government of Nigeria (1960-1966) was one of the countries that, though supporting African unity, was unenthusiastic about the idea of immediate suprastate political unification, and preferred to see this as a future ultimate goal. Thus, though seeing Pan-Africanism as "the only solution to our problems in Africa, no matter what kind of problems they are," and also believing that "no one in Africa doubts the idea of Pan-Africanism," it cautioned that the advocates of immediate suprastate political unification of Africa "must be

realistic," and noted that "at this moment the idea of a Union of Afri-
can States is premature" (while still, however, observing that it did
"not dispute the sincerity and indeed the good intentions of those
that advocate" this sort of unification).[19]   Nigeria not only
limited itself to the role of cautioning the view of others on this
issue of unification, it also had its ideas about how unification in
Africa would be realized. Thus, it reasoned that

>   The association of states is . . . more acceptable for it
> is yet premature to form a Union of States under one sover-
> eignty. We must first break all artificial barriers; build in-
> ternational roads, promote mutual exchanges--exchange of infor-
> mation, scientific and likewise, etc., lifting any ban on the
> movement of free trade and people between the various African
> countries . . . Yet one can hardly ignore the necessity for
> states, to be united under one sovereignty. Something of a
> loose federation at first having got the way clear may be a
> good beginning. Sooner or later unity will come by necessity
> or circumstantially. Africans are Africans. They are Africans
> by colour, they are Africans by soil, by culture, by ways of
> thinking, and indeed, Africans are inseparable. The unity of
> Africans comes as a natural course and there can exist no bar-
> rier against it.[20]

The above statement shows that Balewa's Government preferred a
gradual functional approach and/or subregional suprastate unification.
Also, it indicated that it would support the formation of a continen-
tal association which was something in the form of a regional interna-
tional organization--for example, the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) that was to come later in 1963.

There has also always been the view that the Balewa Government
was not very supportive of the immediate political unification of
Africa, partly due to its speculation that Nkrumah's Ghana and its
ideas, would be the leader in such a union and the relative higher
national attributes of Nigeria (that most thought would make it play

such a role) notwithstanding. Thus, while it congratulated "those African leaders who" had "made such excellent contributions to the Pan-African movement," and also lauded them as "the pioneers that have set the ball rolling," it added that "if anybody makes the mistake of feeling that he is a Messiah who has got a mission to lead Africa, the whole purpose of Pan-Africanism will, I fear, be defeated."[21]

However, both Ghana and Nigeria, and other countries that held similarly disparate views on the issue of unification of Africa, were very prepared to compromise their views on how unification was to be achieved in Africa, and the OAU was the product of such an effort.[22]

African Personality is another concept that is important in contemporary African political thinking, and it is seen as being closely related "to other political ideas . . . [such] as Pan-Africanism, positive action, and nonalignment that it is difficult to distinguish one from another."[23] Nkrumah was the major contributor to the articulation and the development of this concept. He saw it essentially as the personality of the new African who, having rekindled his traditional African values, seeks to build a new, materially adequate, and morally sound society, and also tries to project this personality globally for the improvement of the international community. Thus, while he saw the African personality as being "defined by the cluster of humanist principles which underline the traditional African society," he said that this has to be utilized "to evolve new patterns, new social customs, new attitudes to life, so that while we seek the material, cultural, and economic advancement of our people, while we raise their standard of life, we shall not sacrifice their

fundamental happiness," and that another accompanying phenomenon is "the projection of the African personality in the international community."[24]

African personality is related to Pan-Africanism because it is one of the main ingredients upon which the latter's notion of a united, virile, and independent Africa is based; and it is also related to Positive Action because it is assertive and seeks to ensure that Africans do have a new wholesome reality for themselves. It is related to nonalignment in that its notion of Africans using their renewed value system to create a new society at home, and also using the same to enhance a more peaceful international community, connote a mostly independent contribution, and thus a mostly nonaligned international behavior. Actually, this concept was more often tied to an international context, and more specifically to a new peaceful, and ethically sensitive, international community; and, some see it as being capable of bringing "a new era of peace in which power may be measured not by quantities of armaments but by the quality of morality."[25]

A concept that is often mentioned when there is discussion on African Personality is that of Negritude. The latter is a concept that aims at the affirmation and the glorification of the black culture in a global sense, and is more closely identified with the writings of people of African ancestry in the Western world, and of Africans who were perceived to be assimilated into Western culture (specifically, as was applicable under the French colonial system). Thus, Aime Cesaire, a person of African ancestry from the Caribbean, and L. S. Senghor, the former Sengalese leader,[26] have come to be regarded as major contributors to the development of the concept of Negritude.

Though Negritude shared much in common with African Personality, they differed in some areas. In fact, some proponents of the latter were critical of some aspects of the former. Notably, African Personality proponents criticize the concept of Negritude for not being dynamic due to the fact that they view it as being characterized by the lack of the "tendency to issue into political action."[27] Thus, it was seen as being concerned only with the affirmation of blackness and tending more toward literary (specifically poetic) expositions.[28] Some of its critics also see it mostly as a myth-making exercise. African Personality, on the other hand, is mostly concerned with revitalizing a stock of value systems in order to be more able to build a more humane environment for man.

Another point of dissimilarity between Negritude and African Personality is that, while the former was concerned with black people wherever they may be found, the latter focused primarily on the African continental milieu.

The issue of acute racial consciousness was another area of difference. While for people of African ancestry living in the western world, Negritude was something to become highly emotionally related to, to Africans in Africa it did not make much sense. Not being in an environment where racial consciousness is an all-consuming national compulsive obsession, Africans were mostly amused and bewildered that there was any need to glorify oneself. Thus, while to those of African ancestry in the western world it is fashionable to exert that being black is beautiful and noble, Africans take this for granted and usually see such glorification as unnecessary. Soyinka,

the literary luminary, for example, noted that "Negritude is rather silly. After all, a tiger does not spend his time going around expressing his tigertude.[29] Additionally, generally, Negritude never had much impact on Africa, and Potholm also notes that:

> . . . for all its poignancy and shifting concepts, Negritude as a movement never caught on in Africa. Its strength and heart-wrenching power for black men in Europe and America was its weakness in Africa . . .The black writer living in Africa, embedded in his own society, did not need to claim his blackness, it was his to begin with. It was rather, the black intellectuals abroad, cut off from their spiritual and actual homeland whose alienation was the real source of the movement.[30]

Actually, a good number of literary minds and political thinkers in Africa were very critical of Negritude--for example, Nkrumah, Fanon, Soyinka, Quaison-Sackey and M. Towa. M. Towa even claims "that it has done much more harm than good for the cause of African liberation."[31] Nkrumah, who "was not simply a Ghanian or an African,"[32] but a person whom all that are African, or of African ancestry, saw "as a symbol of their own political, economic, and psychological emancipation,"[33] was also very critical of Negritude. As the major proponent of African Personality, he was more interested in showing how the main ingredients of his concept contrasted with that of Negritude:

> When I speak of the African genius, I mean something different from Negritude, something not apologetical, but dynamic. Negritude consists in a mere literary affectation and style which piles up word upon word and image upon image with occasional reference to Africa and things African. I do not mean a vague brotherhood based on a criterion of colour . . . By the African genius I mean something positive, our socialist conception of society, the efficiency and validity of our traditional statecraft, our highly developed code of morals, our hospitality and our purposeful energy.[34]

Quaison-Sackey also saw many things wrong with Negritude; but, while he did not see it as a concept that is of any significant use in

Africa, he tended to reason that it might be very relevant to people of African ancestry in the Western world. In some instances, he praised Negritude in things it is more suitable for. Thus, to him:

> . . . what Negritude does, it does brilliantly: the psycholog-
> ical gathering together of all black peoples in order to make
> a moral affirmation of themselves . . . whatever their condi-
> tions, whatever their homelands--from Martinique to Mali, from
> Chicago to Zanzibar.[35]

He evaluated Negritude in this way due to his empathy with the situation of its proponents, seeing them as "by and large, 'exiles'," in contrast with the proponents of the African Personality whom he saw as "conscious of their ancient roots, and from this sense of tradition they gain their strength, in action, in the struggle towards individual emancipation and national realization."[36] However, in other areas, Quaison-Sackey seems more interested in foisting African Personality as being more vital. In discussing the issue of the lack of political dynamism in Negritude, for an example, he prefers to see it as being incapable of meaningful growth (in the form of it later incorporating this phenomenon of political dynamism). Thus, he declares that "perhaps it cannot and should not: perhaps that is in the domain of African Personality."[37]

Generally, despite the above area of differences, Negritude and African Personality do share many things in common, the most basic of them being that they both seek to revitalize the African society and those that are linked to it ancestrally. In fact, most of the critics of Negritude are also the main exponents of this link. Quaison-Sackey, for example, asserts that African Personality in some ways aims at realizing some ideals for the former by categorically

declaring that "the African Personality . . . takes action, creative action, in trying to realize the dreams of Negritude, with which, of course, it has nothing but sympathy and understanding, to which it is closely related."[38] This consensus on the convergence of the major ideas in both concepts may mean that the proponents of Negritude, due to their experiencing a sort of cultural limbo syndrome, were overzealous in trying to conceptualize their ideas. Like someone discovering that he has been dropped into a deep hole and so anxious to get out, he becomes so overcharged that his behavior may be overreactions which trigger loss of control and an inability to calculatingly improvise objects around him in an attempt to climb out. The way both tried to conceptualize reality also might have contributed to some differences. Negritude, in the main, was more an attempt to explain the heritage it sprang from to other peoples and cultures, and comparing and contrasting this with those of others, while African Personality was mostly concerned with how to revitalize its value base and use this to launch Africa into a new era of progress. Thus, Quaison-Sackey views Negritude as seeking "to reconcile Negro culture with Western culture," while African personality was seeking "first to find itself."[39] Thus, he saw the latter as not being in the business of explaining, or reconciling, itself to anybody, but being in business to act and create for itself. Briefly, the African Personality has been seen as being more relevant than Negritude because the former was not out to sing praises for a particular color of mankind in a fetish way (which the critics of the latter will refer to as "myth-making"), but to regenerate a new individual for new national and global societies. The

proponents of the former also seemed to have reasoned that a preoccupation with racial consciousness was an enterprise that saps a society's productive energy, leaves it ethically debased, and enfeebles its social fabric. In all likelihood, the critics of Negritude did not mean that race was not a significant social reality, but that it was not a supreme social reality.

The concept of African Personality and Negritude figure, consciously or unconsciously, in African foreign policies. The former is roughly identified with some progressive (or radical) assertive countries, while the latter is linked with some very moderate countries. This may be due to the fact that some progressive countries have national ideologies that are of Marxist derivation, and thus place more emphasis on class, rather than racial or ethnic, understandings of social reality. Thus Angola, Tanzania, and Mozambique, for example, can be seen as societies where the social significance of Negritude type of ideas are most likely to be officially vigorously discouraged. Another reason seems to be that progressive countries are more assertive and usually seek continental influence and thus they do not want to see either the Sahara desert in the north or the Kalahari desert in the south of the continent as barriers to continental unity and resolve. They have practically broken this barrier, and the OAU is an example of such efforts.[40] The fact that most African countries do not actually feel comfortable with ideas of Negritude was also manifested in the name, and the participatory nature, of a cultural fair that was to highlight the African heritage in 1977. The progressive countries, and the host country (Nigeria), wanted the word "African"

to appear on the fair's name so that African countries that do not have predominantly black populations could attend. Thus this cultural fair was called the "Second Festival of Black and African Culture." While some countries associated with Negritude were viewed as wishing the fair to be an affair of black people, Nigeria, and most African countries, wanted an African cultural fair. The latter group prevailed, and North African countries were active participants. (Nigeria, which exercises an influential role in African affairs, was not enthusiastic in being associated with any significant African event, culturally or politically, that did not have a general continental appeal.)[41]

Another theme in political thinking in Africa that relates to international relations, and to nonaligned international policy, specifically, is that of African socialism. In addition to the fact that many of the countries in Africa that espouse some form of socialism are not strongly tied to either the Soviet Union or China, most of them tend to be more intensely nonaligned in their foreign policy behavior.

Socialism in Africa has tended to display variations, and one of them is the Tanzanian model based on the concept of <u>Ujamaa</u>.[42] The Ujamaa concept stresses the concept and the quality of the African family system upon which the society rests; and this is characterized by individuals creating wealth which in turn is seen mostly as community property.[43] Thus, there is a fine tuning of a value system that makes possible the individuals working to create wealth, and the existence of a societal consensus that such wealth will not be allowed

to create overwhelming social advantages for one man at the expense of another (and this has also been seen by some as a situation where the production process is privately oriented, while the distribution process tends to be social). Ujamaa also stresses taking care of the needy.

Nyerere is the chief proponent of the Tanzanian socialist model, and the major feature that represents an African character is the notion that a socialist society can come about without class struggle--his reasoning being that traditional African society, before and after Karl Marx, was based on a socialist model that was not created or sustained through class conflict. Socialism in Tanzania may be seen as the revitalization of this traditional model, and thus without a class struggle, and also without the society going through the dialectical process of moving through the different historical phases of primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism and communism (and thus socialism could occur in a society like Tanzania that has not fully experienced capitalism). Nyerere also stressed that socialism was a state of mind, thus a poor person could be a potential capitalist and a rich person could be a potential socialist (but this does not mean that he has stopped perceiving the existence of a few rich people, in the midst of many who are poor, as a destabilizing socioeconomic phenomenon, or that he condones or encourages gross social inequality).

Additionally, L. S. Senghor espoused a variant of African socialism which stressed that although economic reality is very important it is not absolute in any society.[44] He also noted that class struggle is not a must in order to have socialism in Africa.

Countries like Angola and Mozambique seem to follow scientific socialism, a variant that is more in tune with much that Marxism stands for.

Most Marxists criticize Nyerere's and Senghor's conceptualization of socialism, arguing that socialism, though adaptable to different situations, maintains its major tenets of social reality as being based mostly on economic reality and, specifically, on the nature of the production process; and thus the class oriented nature of society.[45] They also emphasize that the historical progress of society is still important. Nkrumah, who was to be more strongly associated with scientific socialism, especially in most of his later writings, believed that, "There is only one true socialism, the principles of which are abiding and universal."[46]

Apart from socialism, Nkrumah was also interested in conceptualizing how contemporary African societies should generally function and develop, and achieve more national integration; and it is in Conciencism that most of his ideas on such issues are found.[47] Conciencism is mostly theoretical and philosophical, mainly relating philosophy, society and ideology in a way that will illuminate his ideas.[48] Also, in it he stressed the need to channel and shape the Islamic and the Western cultural elements that are present in Africa, within the framework of traditional African culture, for the purpose of building a society where its value systems are more harmoniously arranged. He also presents a model of such a reorientation as being able to feed into the general scheme of making Africa more politically virile and economically buoyant.

Nkrumah's ideas seem to have been radicalizing with his age, especially when he was no longer the President of Ghana; thus his later works contain more emphasis on armed struggle, and scientific socialism, in order to rid the continent of neocolonialism and vestiges of apartheid.[49]

The nature of contemporary international economic relations is a subject that commands the attention of African countries and the rest of the developing world. Nyerere's views on this subject are often seen as being representative of those of most of these countries; and, since his country is economically very poor, he seems to have a sharpened perception of present global realities. To him the present global economic relations need many improvements if global peace is to be meaningful. Actually, he equates it to a Hobbesian and Social Darwinian state of nature:

> When only the law of the jungle reigns, the struggle for existence must naturally end up with survival of the fittest. This may be all right when it applies to beasts; as a method of contact between human beings it is intolerable.[50]

However, he seems to believe that if both the rich and poor countries realize the long term interests of mankind, this problem can be maturely solved. Additionally, this subject is very relevant to nonaligned foreign policy phenomena, since the subject of a new international economic order is presently much linked to the latter.

On the subject of global security and nonalignment, Armah attempts to relate it to contemporary global bloc politics. Arguing that contemporary global strategic reality is so sophisticated that it defies adequate evaluation, and that it is also very fluid and

unbalanced, he seemed to imply that it is unnecessary to see nonalignment as a part of a refined balance of power conception of the world.[51] He sees contemporary strategic thinking, which restricts itself to realist perspectives (since it is always coming up with conceptual schemes that are sophisticated adaptations of balance of power framework), as misleading. According to him,

> The world is not inertia-ridden. It is dynamic. It is always on the go. It is essentially unstable. In a world in which it takes a lot of effort to keep the same position, to suppose that by speaking of agonizing reprisals of massive retaliation balance can remain perfect is to reveal a touching naivete in surroundings of sophistication . . . nuclear balance is not an inability to strike. There remained only "the balance of terror" the triumph of which involves self-destruction and utter, horrific, universal defeat.[52]

He also deplores the tendency to "put force above reason and above justice."[53]

It is in the context of such a state of global affairs that Armah sees the relevance of nonalignment, which he sees as an "adventure of improving and civilizing the world's conduct of world affairs."[54] He further tries to distinguish nonalignment from classical neutralism by saying that it is a positive phenomenon, and that while nonaligned countries "refuse to engage in war-mongering and war-making, they are active in promoting peace."[55]

Another view on global security and nonalignment is provided by Quaison-Sackey. He tries to relate this concept to the needs of Africa and to show how, universally, nonalignment works and the sort of response it gets from the global powers.[56] In connection with United States efforts (beginning with the Kennedy Administration) to reduce previous pattern of American hostility toward nonalignment, and

become more understanding, Quaison-Sackey is suspicious. He sees such makeshift tolerance of nonalignment as a screen to shield client states from international ridicule and domestic upheaval.

The author also shows that the Soviet Union and China had been very suspicious of nonalignment at the beginning, especially the latter (though both now try to be less suspicious and even try to use it to their advantage). He saw both countries as being very rigid on their stand toward nonalignment, at first, by their trying to maintain the view that there "can be no neutrality on the issue of capitalism versus communism."[57] At present, both countries are pragmatic and try to utilize nonalignment phenomenon to further their divergent interests.[58] In presenting evaluations of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Chinese reactions to nonalignment, Quaison-Sackey provided a somewhat balanced perspective.

On the subject of the world economic situation and global security, Sekou Toure asserted that the pursuance of major changes in global economic relations have a lot to do with nonaligned foreign policy. Like Nyerere, he was also very unimpressed with the contemporary international economic order. According to him,

> In awareness of the specific problems resulting from our historic background and our material conditions, we may affirm that the gravest imbalance in the world, and the most dangerous, is the imbalance created by the division into rich nations and poor nations, the haves and the have-nots.[59]

He implied that if there is a genuine desire to have a more peaceful international system, the means are not through preoccupation with stockpiling military arsenals (with the concomitant need to continuously try to correct the persistent perceived military imbalance with

a given perceived hostile actor, or set of actors), but through the correcting of the imbalance of socio-economic conditions in the world. The best way to correct such an imbalance will be "to achieve harmony between the living conditions of all people on earth," although not by "leveling out the most advanced and the least developed societies."[60] Contrary to some prevailing views, Sekou Toure did not conceptualize the solution to the global economic balance in terms of economic aid from the rich to the poor, the transfer of technology, and other allied solutions. Instead he held the view that the imbalance would be corrected if international relations changed in such a way that all features associated with "imperialism, colonialism, and their by-product, neocolonialism," and global military adventurism, ceased to be the dominant features of how people, and countries, relate to each other.[61]

It is in the context of the poor countries being able to con-tribute to such a solution that the nonaligned foreign policy becomes relevant to Sekou Toure; and he pointedly noted that such an interna-tional policy is action oriented. He asserted that the nonaligned countries:

> Want to be actors in this evolution, which is the concern of all of us, and we shall make our contribution, promoted by our militant consciousness and by the noble ambition to work for the improvement of international relations and the advancement of social justice and democratic progress in the world.[62]

Toure also tied nonaligned foreign policy to regional economic and political integration, especially in Africa. He also seemed to have been very optimistic about the future of mankind, noting particu-larly, "the realities of the twentieth century; the tremendous

of future human achievement as well as the knowledge, experience, and discoveries accumulated in the course of past centuries."[63] He saw nonalignment also as

> . . . the expression of a lively faith in a happy future for mankind. It is something active, a participating force, an active agent in the struggle for the achievement of a world society--emancipated, fraternal, and united.[64]

Thus, nonalignment is seen as a concept that can be used to created a more prosperous and peaceful world.

On the whole, the major concepts that relate to the nonaligned foreign policy phenomenon display features that emphasize the need to overhaul international relations in such a way that the world will be more universally materially satisfying and peaceful. Additionally, they also stress the need for reason and justice, instead of force, to be the basis of foreign policy actions (reason and justice being seen as more likely to make the world more peaceful and materially prosperous, and also seen as enriching the quality of human interaction since they nourish the capacity of man to curb negative human excesses). Some of the conceptualizations also showed that the value of seeking knowledge in a way that significantly fosters the concern for solving pressing human problems (though this should be differentiated from a situation where almost all pursuit of knowledge is synonymous with deliberate searching for practical solutions to problems, in such a way that basic research and unstructured research for knowledge--which are often the springboards of enormous creative activity--are surely severely limited).[65]

Endnotes

1. Though the Bandung Conference is seen by some as the beginning
    of nonalignment as a collective international phenomenon, most
    of the nonaligned countries had long before then been conferring
    on this line of thought in small circles. In retrospect, also,
    it can even be said that nonalignment's later formal inaugura-
    tion, in Belgrade, was a triumph of moderate developing coun-
    tries over the more radical (and some will say confrontational)
    developing countries, which held the view that the nature of con-
    temporary international system needed an immediate overhaul in
    order to negate hegemonic and conflictual phenomena instituted
    by some few countries. Thus, nonalignment gaining more rele-
    vance in the developing world meant that the negotiating mode of
    changing the world, as championed by Nehru, was more acceptable
    to them than the immediate and total global relations overhaul
    approach, championed by Sukarno of Indonesia and Nkrumah of
    Ghana.

2. Donald E. Secrest, American Policy Toward Neutralism During the
    Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, Ph. D. Dissertation (Ann
    Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan, 1968).

3. Nnamdi Azikiwe, "Political Blueprint of Nigeria," in Mutiso and
    Rohio, in Gideon-Cyrus M. Mutiso and S. W. Rohio, eds., Read-
    ings in African Political Thought (London: Heinemann, 1975),
    pp. 100-102.

4. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove
    Press, 1963).

5. Ibid., p. 29.

6. Jean-Paul Sartre quoted in Ibid., p. 18.

7. Frantz Fanon, Toward the African Revolution (New York: Grove
    Press, 1967).

8. See the following: Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of
    Kwame Nkrumah (London: Heinemann, 1962). (Positive action can
    also be seen as playing the same role in a neocolonial
    situation.)

9. Kwame Nkrumah, Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism
    (London: Heinemann, 1965).

10. Ibid., p. ix.

11. Gordon J. Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 1960-1966 (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), p. 29. The concept of Pan-Africanism is usually linked to that of nonalignment since it is mainly concerned with Africans uniting to build a politically strong, and economically virile, continental system that is capable of playing a vital independent role in the international community. It is also synonymous with nationalistic tendencies, and the idea of any routine alliance with, or against, other international actors, or groups of actors, is unpopular. However, Pan-Africanism is still yet to be adequately practically realized.

12. Ibid., p. 27.

13. The political and personal friendships among these Africans, and those persons of African ancestry from the Americas, (who actually pioneered the phenomenon of Pan-African movement) were very strong and crucial. For example, W. E. D. Dubois, an American, when Ghana became independent, moved to that country and became naturalized there, and was seen as a close intellectual confidant of the then president Kwame Nkrumah. Also, George Padmore, who was from the Caribbean, became Nkrumah's adviser on African Affairs (see A. B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1974), p. 76.

14. Gordon J. Idang, op. cit., p. 22.

15. Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (London: Heinemann, 1963).

16. Some African leaders were seen as probably having the feeling that Nkrumah was aiming to lead the kind of suprastate he was championing (though he continually denied such speculation), and were less enthusiastic about such a suprastate, but preferring, instead, something in the form of a regional organization, at least initially.

17. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 189.

18. Ibid., p. 300.

19. "Extracts from the Statement by the Nigerian Delegation at the Second Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, June 1960," in Mutiso and Rohio, op. cit., pp. 399-400.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Nkrumah's Ghana's favoring of immediate suprastate political unification of Africa was in line with one of Nkrumah's other views that, due to the realities of colonialism, or neocolonialism, political power should be sought first, then thereafter, it should be used to have economic power, instead of wishing to have it the other way around. Thus, during Ghana's independence struggles he coined the famous phrase: "see ye first the political kingdom." He seemed to have transported this thinking to his conceptualization of African continental issues, also.

23. Alex Quaison-Sackey, "The African Personality" in Mutiso and Rohio, op. cit., pp. 75-82.

24. Kwame Nkrumah, Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah (London: Panaf Books, 1968), pp. 3-5. Nkrumah's ideas on African Personality are found in most of his books, especially in Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom (London: Heinemann, 1961).

25. Alex Quaison-Sackey, op. cit., p. 81.

26. L. S. Senghor, "What is Negritude," in Mutiso and Rohio, op. cit., pp. 83-84. See also Alex Quaison-Sackey, op. cit.

27. Alex Quaison-Sackey, op. cit., p. 78.

28. Actually the first mention of the word "Negritude" was in a poem by Aime Cesaire.

29. Wole Soyinka quoted in Christian P. Potholm, The Theory and Practice of African Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 87.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 88.

32. Ibid., p. 51.

33. Ibid.

34. Kwame Nkrumah, Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

35. Alex Quaison-Sackey, op. cit., p. 78.

36. Ibid., p. 79.

37. Ibid., p. 78.

38. Ibid., p. 79.

39. <u>Ibid.</u>

40. Kwame Nkrumah worked very hard in this wise, and some have speculated that his marriage to Fathia, an Egyptian lady, was to cement his enormous diplomatic forays in North Africa, and to strengthen the close links between Ghana and Nasser's Egypt.

41. Some critics of Negritude often go to the extent of positing that this concept does contain features that could be used to cause friction and divisions in Africa. This sort of perception might have also helped diminish its influence in the continent.

42. <u>Ujamaa</u> is a Kiswahili word that can be literally translated as "familyhood."

43. J. K. Nyerere, <u>Freedom and Unity</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>; J. K. Nyerere, <u>Freedom and Socialism</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); and J. K. Nyerere, <u>Freedom and Development</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

44. L. S. Senghor, "Senegalese Socialism" in Mutiso and Rohio, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 609-629.

45. Some proponents of African socialism who try to present traditional African society as one which was full of virtues, and as one where everybody was equal, can also be criticized for trying to recast the past in such a way as to justify contemporary national ideologies. While most traditional societies were based on humanistic principles, and wealth was not allowed to be a reckless, uncontained, source of power in the hands of individuals, common human excesses like greed were still manifested. Thus, though these societies had mechanisms to curb these excesses, they were not eliminated. (And more studies can show that Africa did not have a monopoly on virtues.) The efforts by these good-intentioned leaders to utilize the splendid features of African traditional social systems in building contemporary societies are noble and praiseworthy tasks, but the inability to recognize some shortcomings that were present in the past (it is hard to conceive of any human society that was free of shortcomings) is very inadvisable. Additionally, while social models need not be ahistorical, they should adequately express contemporary material conditions; thus there is need for national ideologies to rest on present realities.

46. Kwame Nkrumah, <u>Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 126; however, since many exponents of other forms of socialism in Africa tend to stress a variant that is different from Nkrumah's and that also disagrees on basic tenets like the inevitability of class struggle, and the inflexibility of historical progress (i.e., the argument that socialism only follows a mature capitalist historical phase), socialism in some countries in Africa may

also mean nonalignment (as in the case of Tanzania) since their national ideology does not mean their being strongly tied to one particular source of socialist inspiration.

47. Kwame Nkrumah, Conciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonisation (London: Panaf, 1970).

48. This approach also allowed Nkrumah to envision his novel model of social dynamics in Africa.

49. See, for example, Kwame Nkrumah, Class Struggle in Africa, (London: Panaf, 1970), and Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook for Revolutionary Warfare (London: Panaf, 1968).

50. J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, op. cit., pp. 247-248.

51. Armah, Kwesi, "Non-Alignment: Africa's Foreign Policy for Freedom and Progress," in Mutiso and Rohio, op. cit., pp. 655-658.

52. Ibid., p. 657.

53. Ibid., p. 656.

54. Ibid., p. 655.

55. Ibid., p. 656.

56. Alex Quaison-Sackey, "Positive Neutralism and Nonalignment," in Mutiso and Rohio, op. cit., pp. 659-662.

57. Ibid., p. 660.

58. The Sino-Soviet split has meant that each tries to court the developing world by presenting their application of Marxist theory as the authentic and genuine one, while that of the other is presented as a distorted application of it. China, in particular, often claims that its historical experiences are more relevant to the developing world, and also often insist that it shares the same world outlook with the former.

59. Toure, Sekou, "Policy on Foreign Affairs," in Mutiso and Rohio, op. cit., pp. 671-672.

60. Ibid., p. 671.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p. 672.

60

64. <u>Ibid.</u>

65. The need for significant concern for human problems when
     searching for knowledge, in a way, is also one of the things
     that post behavioralism emphasized. See G. J. Graham and G. W.
     Carey, eds., <u>The Post-Behavioral Era--Perspectives on
     Political Science</u> (New York: David McKay Co., 1972); and S. E.
     Toulmin, <u>An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics</u>
     (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

CHAPTER III

NONALIGNMENT AS A CONCEPT

Like most political ideas, nonalignment has generated contro-
versy over its meaning. Thus, though it is a foreign policy principle
associated with very many countries, it appears to mean many things to
many people. Unlike some other political ideas, nonalignment as a con-
cept is not a tightly documented system of ideas handed down by one
person (with the understanding that it is not to be much adapted or
liberally interpreted). Instead, it is a product of the various,
though like-minded, thoughts and aspirations of statesmen and scholars
from various countries that have been progressively forged into a gen-
erally convenient concept.

In this chapter, efforts are made to try to achieve a concep-
tual profile of the phenomenon of nonalignment. In connection with
this objective, efforts are also made to find out how and why it lends
lends itself to diverse conceptualizations. The points of similar-
ities and differences between, or among, the diverse conceptualiza-
tions are evaluated and grouped into different schools of thought.
Also, there is an evaluation of the pronouncements and declarations
emanating from the meetings and summits of the nonaligned countries.

Although the various conceptualizations of nonalignment can be grouped into different perspectives, it is important to note that these different conceptualizations, though distinct enough to be classified into different perspectives, also overlap.

The Equidistance from the Superpower Blocs
Policy Perspective

The essence of this conceptual perspective of nonalignment is that, to be nonaligned, a country has to maintain an international relationship that manifests an equidistance position from the two superpower blocs (headed by the United States and the Soviet Union in the contemporary international system). Thus, implicitly, this perspective rests on the assumption that the international system, from the 1950's when nonalignment gained momentum as an international phenomenon to the present, has always been primarily characterized by a bipolar configuration of power (and, generally, this assumption is correct, since during this period, even with due consideration given to the era of detente and the emergence of new power foci in places like China and Europe, the world has been more or less characterized primarily by bipolarity). However, it must also be noted that the assertion that the contemporary world is bipolar does not mean that this perspective, which is that nonalignment primarily involves the maintenance of an equidistance international position from the two superpower blocs, has been totally accepted without any controversy. As will be shown below, there are some who disagree with this view of nonalignment.

This notion of nonalignment, basically in terms of equidistant position, is forcefully posited by Nair (1980) who saw "the purity of the nonaligned philosophy" as the maintenance of "a truly nonaligned role in East-West relations." He further clarified these views by saying that such a role is played by the moderate nonaligned countries which, he asserts, prevents nonalignment from condoning any "sliding into" a superpower orbit.[1] Additionally, he is clearly concerned about the inability of the nonaligned countries to maintain the "middle-of-the-road posture."[2] Crabb (1965), though admitting to the complex nature of nonalignment, also held that "nonalignment refers to a country's position towards"[3] the superpowers, and thus also connoting that the nonaligned countries need to maintain an equidistance position from the two blocs.

In analyzing Nigeria's foreign policy during the era of Muhammed/Obasanjo government, Aluko (1981) states that Nigeria had been able "to keep its distance from both" blocs, and thus was non-aligned.[4] This view also connotes an understanding of nonalignment in terms of maintaining an equidistance position from the two blocs. Gambari (1975) and Ihonvbere (1983), in analyzing Nigeria's First Republic foreign policy, saw it as not being adequately nonaligned since they, respectively, viewed it as being "largely pro-West," and stated that "its economic, cultural and political relations were pro-West;"[5] and thus both also connoted nonalignment in terms of an equidistance position from the two blocs.

As already noted above, some do disagree with the equidistance perspective of nonalignment. Blazevic (1981), for example, sees the

nonaligned countries as being "pushed by alien interest into a false dilemma."[6]   Furthermore, he posits that the "alien interest . . . misinterprets and distorts basic principles"[7] in order to create this false dilemma. To him, nonalignment "imposed from the very beginning active involvement in defusing or overcoming world conflicts, global or local," and that it "was generally irrelevant to identify the rights and wrongs but to qualify the offense and try to reduce the consequences or further complications."[8]   Thus, he also sees nonalignment as always having the ability "to take the stand according to the merit of the case and not depending on the parties involved,"[9] Therefore, his argument connoted not paying much attention to maintaining equidistance between the positions of the two superpower blocs.

The Avoidance of Alignment with the Superpower Blocs Policy Perspective

This perspective is similar to the above equidistance perspective in that both seek to understand the essence of nonalignment mainly in terms of the nonaligned countries seeking to chart a course of actions that does not put them close to the poles of the two blocs. However, they differ in terms of the fact that the latter perspective is primarily concerned about the ability of the nonaligned countries to maintain an equidistant position on a policy spectrum that has the two superpowers at two extreme poles. On the other hand, the former is primarily concerned about the ability of the nonaligned to avoid formal alignment with either of the two blocs (thus, implicitly,

seeing nothing quite wrong with a nonaligned country fluctuating somehow to either side of the blocs' poles from the equidistant position on the spectrum as long as it does not get too close to either pole and become aligned).

Miller's (1967) views fit in with the avoidance of alignment perspective (which invariably is also more prepared to grant that the nonaligned can be somehow flexible, unlike the equidistance perspective), and thus he stated that a "Third world state will prefer to keep out of the quarrels of the major powers if it can."[10]

Rothstein (1976) even assumes this perspective to be self-evident, due to the nature of the international system, and that the essence of this perspective is what nonalignment is all about. Thus, to him "Nonalignment--literally, not taking sides--has almost always appealed to the weaker members of a bipolar international system."[11]

The Global Power Configuration Perspective

This perspective conceptualizes nonalignment in terms of the general configuration of power in the international system. Therefore, it seeks to comprehend nonalignment in terms of how it fits in within the general framework of the structure and dynamics of power in the international system.

The two perspectives described above are also concerned about the nature of power relations in the international system, but this third perspective, unlike the preceding two, views this global power

configuration in a very general sense and, most importantly, it is not primarily concerned with understanding nonalignment in terms of a phenomenon that negatively aims at steering clear of major global power poles. Additionally, this perspective does not stem from the assumption that nonalignment only makes sense in an international reality where there is a tight and neat configuration of global power only around two power poles.

Rosecrance (1973), for example, comprehends nonalignment as an international phenomenon that responds to the dynamic nature of the international system.[12] He sees the period starting from the end of World War II to the end of 1950's, as an era when nonalignment was a phenomenon that manifested itself as the refusal of the emerging countries of Asia and Africa "to be drawn into either the Western or the Eastern alliance systems."[13] Later on, nonalignment is seen by Rosecrance as manifesting itself as one of several "secondary factors" in the international system since the two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, could not win over the nonaligned countries and from "1963 to 1967 . . . looked on themselves as the fundamental determinants" of the international system.[14] However, from the beginning of the 1970's, the two superpowers were not seen as "the sole determinants of international relations" since "China and Japan had emerged as independent factors" in global politics and "Western Europe was taking a more self-reliant course;" and Rosecrance sees this as resulting in each of the two major powers again hoping to change the global configuration of power in their favor by trying to seek new allies among the nonaligned countries.[15]

Nonalignment is also seen by some, through the global power configuration perspective, as amounting to a global power bloc in itself. Udokang (1975), for example, notes

> . . . that the countries of the developing world, many of which are committed to nonaligned foreign policy, have come to be identified in the present period as the Third World, the third force in international relations.[16]

On the other hand, to Graham (1980), nonalignment, in terms of global power configuration, serves "as a protective buffer between pressures of East and West."[17] In fact, he sees this manner of conceptualizing nonalignment as a way of viewing it "in its traditional role;"[18] indicating that there are other perspectives from which this phenomenon can be conceptualized.

Rothstein (1968) understands nonalignment in terms of how power is distributed in a global balance of power system.[19] According to him, the viability of the phenomenon of some countries not joining any of the superpower group is "directly related to the power balance between" these powers. Furthermore, while it is "affected by that balance" it also "in turn exercises some influence over" the operation of such a balance.[20] Thus, he asserts that,

> Nonalignment is not only impossible in conditions of overt Great Power war or substantive cooperation; it is also nonviable for Small Powers in a balance of power system where the Great Powers primarily seek the support of their peers rather than their inferiors.[21]

Generally, as shown above, the global power configuration perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment assumes that this phenomenon can be understood in terms of some countries joining, or not joining, a power bloc, or forming a bloc of their own. Some scholars, like

Subrahmanyan (1981),[22] disagree with such an assumption. He notes
that while some "argued in favour of a third force as the basis of non-
alignment," the countries that are nonaligned "categorically refused
to play" such a role and thus are seen as rejecting the notion that
they became part and parcel of a bipolar politics.[23]

The reasoning for such positions by the nonaligned countries,
according to Subrahmanyan, is their desire to find out ways to fashion
a new global configuration of power that will result in more interna-
tional cooperation and democratization; thus, to him, nonalignment sym-
bolizes "progressively increasing integration of the international sys-
tem not for fractionation or hierarchical stratification."[24]

Strategic Rationality Perspective

Like the above global power configuration perspective, this
perspective is concerned with how power manifests itself in the inter-
national system, but differs in that it seeks to conceptualize non-
alignment mainly in terms of how it is keyed into the global military
strategic reality instead of in terms of general global power dynamics
and structure (which includes political, economic, cultural, as well
as the military/strategic aspects, of global power). Therefore, this
perspective understands nonalignment as a phenomenon that helps limit
conflict between the two superpower blocs (and it was seen as being es-
pecially very useful in this regard during the cold war era).

Using this perspective, Holbroad (1981), notes that the non-
aligned countries by "steering clear of alliances and opposing bloc

politics . . . secured a degree of looseness in the system" and thus prevented a situation where the conflicts, and outright brinkmanships, between the two superpowers would have had a more pervasive dimension throughout all nooks and corners of the globe.[25] He also adds that since the two "super powers were too preponderant and the polarizing tendencies too strong for any group of lesser power," the nonaligned group could not "set itself up as an effective third party."[26] Thus, "the function of the nonaligned middle powers in the cold war," which "was to help limit the conflict between the camps," was mostly performed through the "steering clear" approach mentioned above.[27]

While Holbroad's strategic conceptualization of nonalignment was concerned with the cold war era, Girling's (1981) focused on the era of detente.[28] Since the latter was essentially one of lessening tension between the superpowers, in a strategic sense the nonaligned countries, according to Girling, "were no longer 'indispensable,'" since the "function of the bridge between the rivals performed by the nonaligned states was increasingly taken over by the superpowers themselves."[30]

Alliance Against Alignment with Superpower
Blocs Policy Perspective

This perspective seeks to explain the nonalignment phenomenon as an alliance whose primary essence is the desire not to be aligned with any of the superpower blocs. While in some of the above perspectives there were notions of nonalignment as a bloc phenomenon in

relation to the general global configuration of power, this perspective specifically narrows the essence of nonalignment mainly to the desire to be a bloc that is not aligned with any of the superpowers.

For example, Liska (1968) asserts that "alliances among less developed countries cannot matter much as contributions to world order if they are mere extensions of great power policies."[31] Thus, to him, these countries can only play a "positive role" in the international system if they "can evolve into relatively separate subsystems regionally," and also have the "ability to evolve relatively specific foreign policies nationally."[32]

However, some disagree with these sorts of conceptualizations of nonalignment, which are hinged on their being manifested as a distinct international bloc, since the Declaration of the Belgrade Conference of the nonaligned countries had stated that the nonaligned countries" do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc."[33]

The Natural Ally Logic Perspective

This perspective conceptualizes nonalignment (which is seen by it as also being concerned with the assertion of national independence, the enhancement of socio-economic conditions, and the playing of a more viable international role by some developing countries) as naturally leading the nonaligned countries into allying with the group of countries, and international forces, that shares the above goals with them and that are also engaging in actions that will help in realizing these goals. In practical terms, the proponents of this

sort of concept of nonalignment posit that the socialist world is the group of countries that have this identity of interests and goals with the nonaligned countries; and that this reality inevitably makes these two groups of countries natural allies. However, it is important to note that the majority of the nonaligned countries do not agree to this concept of nonalignment. The main exponents of this concept are the political leaders and theoreticians of the Soviet Union, other members of the Warsaw Pact, and the nonaligned countries that have very close ties with the former two.

Another feature of this natural ally logic perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment is that it directly conflicts with the equidistance from the superpower blocs policy perspective, already described above. The latter conceptualizes nonalignment in terms of the maintenance of international relations which manifests an equidistant position from both the Western and the Eastern blocs, while the former conceptualizes it in terms of the nonaligned countries naturally allying with the Soviet bloc due to its assumption that both groups of countries share identical interests and goals. For example, Singham (1980) sees the equidistance perspective as having a "static quality," and also bringing "into the forefront a geo-political concept of the world rather than a more dynamic materialist concept of the world."[34] Additionally, this statement about a "materialist" concept of international reality also connotes that this perspective is wholly a neo-Marxist theoretical interpretation of nonalignment (the reasoning being that this perspective seems to assume the primacy of the material basis of relations among the countries and peoples of the world

and a concomitant manifestation of sort of an international class differentiation). A further extension of this sort of reasoning might be that the world is divided into only two classes, the owning class of countries that hold the monopoly on global economic relations, and the nonowning class of countries that are the victims of the former. Invariably, the natural ally logic perspective assumes that the capitalist world is composed of the owning class of countries, while the Soviet bloc and nonaligned countries are seen as composed of the nonowning class of countries. Therefore, since there are only two groups of countries (with the nonaligned countries assumed to share the same camp with the Soviet bloc), the natural ally logic perspective assumes that any reference to the nonaligned countries as being equidistant to both the Soviet and the Western blocs is irrelevant since this group of countries is already being assumed to be the natural ally of the Soviet bloc.

It is the above sort of reasoning that led Fidel Castro of Cuba to implore the nonaligned countries "to clearly appreciate what were the forces of progress and what were the forces of reaction in the world."[35] He also asserted that such an appreciation of reality led Cuba into choosing "a socialist path of development," an action which in turn also led to its aligning "with all those forces that oppose the ravages created by capitalism."[36] Thus, while many countries have vehemently disputed whether Cuba is qualified to belong to the nonaligned group of countries, Cuba itself has used this natural ally logic conceptualization of nonalignment to present the view that

it is nonaligned, and that other countries with the same ideology and international posture are, in fact, those that are truly nonaligned.

Cuba, along with other nonaligned countries exhibiting its same behavior, has tried to foist this natural ally logic perspective on the entire group of the nonaligned countries. In 1979, when it hosted the nonaligned summit conference, it vigorously tried, but without success, to achieve this objective; and its failure showed that the majority of the nonaligned countries is still far from embracing the natural ally logic perspective.

It is also important to note that this natural ally logic perspective is as old as the nonalignment phenomenon. For example, Sukarno of Indonesia, an important figure during the formative years of this phenomenon, held the view that "there can be no coexistence between independence and justice on one side and imperialism-colonialism on the other."[37] He thus implied that the nonaligned countries should not regard the Socialist and Western blocs as two blocs to be accorded equal dealings since one of the blocs was more on the side of the aspirations of the nonaligned countries than the other.

As noted above, the Soviet Union is a major exponent of this natural ally logic perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment, and Anatoly Gromyko, the Director of Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, reflected the view of the Soviet foreign policy studies community when he asserted that the "destiny of Africa is an embodiment of the ideas of the October Revolution in practice."[38] By alluding that the philosophical framework that laid the foundations for the establishment of the Soviet system in the Soviet Union is the same

that moves Africa, Gromyko implies that Africa, which is mostly made up of nonaligned countries, is a natural ally of the Soviet Union (though it might be interesting to speculate whether this kind of reasoning is based on the potentiality for such a reality in the future, or on contemporary reality).

The important role of class approach is an understanding of social reality in relation to the formulations of natural ally logic perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment; and this is very clearly elaborated by Kiva (1973).[39] Building on his understanding that

> Marxism-Leninism emphasizes that foreign policy is socially conditioned, and that relations among states, with all their contradictions, obvious and seeming, as well as unexpected turns, can be correctly understood only through a class approach, i.e., with due consideration of the relations and class character of the state,

he internationalizes the analysis of class reality by noting that

> . . . the correlation of socio-political forces on a worldwide scale, and the course of the struggle and competition between the two social systems are the major international factors.[40]

Therefore, Kiva, in simple terms, also views the world as divided between the Western world and the Socialist bloc (and also implying that the nonaligned countries are an actual, or potential, part of the latter, and thus its natural ally). This reasoning also becomes more obvious when he states that,

> When the foreign policy of the young states reflects their real national interests it inevitably runs counter to the course followed by the imperialist powers and objectively coincides with the anti-imperialist foreign policy of socialist countries.[41]

Furthermore, he also asserts that nonalignment is "a form of anti-imperialism;" and thus there is no wonder that he holds the view "that

the positions of socialists and developing countries are often identical."[42]

Kiva even builds an aura of inevitability, a sort of 'iron law' situation, into this aptly called 'natural' ally relationship between the socialist and nonaligned countries. Thus, to him,

> The people of the newly-free countries are becoming increasingly convinced, through their own experiences, that their friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is determined by history itself; that their successes in the struggle for strengthening political independence, and for economic and social progress are indissolubly linked with the successes of the forces of peace, progress and socialism in their global confrontation with the forces of war, reaction and imperialism.[43]

Bondarevsky and Sofinsky (1975) also echo this notion of the inevitability, or 'naturalness' of their so-claimed alliance between the nonaligned and socialist countries when they posit that the "uncompromising struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism" carried out by the nonaligned countries, "objectively solidified the alliance of the nonaligned and socialist countries."[44]

Bondarevsky and Sofinsky (1976) also try to refute the notion that the nonaligned countries should treat the Western bloc and the Socialist bloc in the same manner.[45] They assert that,

> The Soviet Union and other socialist countries reject the false conception of a world being divided according to wealth and industrial development, with no regard for the fundamental distinctions in their socio-economic systems and historical responsibility to the developing countries.[46]

To further attempt to show that both blocs should not be regarded as exhibiting the same domestic and international behavior, they also fashion their own sense of history; and according to them,

> The developing countries learn from their own experience that their very liberation and existence were determined by the growing role of the countries of the socialist community, and that the origin of the nonalignment policy and its implementation had been made possible only when the balance of power in the world radically changed in favour of socialism.

and therefore they deplore those who,

> Treat on a par those who are truly to blame for the current state of the economy in the former colonies, who have oppressed and exploited them for decades, on the one hand, and those who have always opposed colonialism, helping the peoples to throw off the colonial yoke and to take the path of independent development, on the other.[47]

Based on this sort of world view, it is also not surprising that Bondarevsky and Sofinsky come to the conclusion that the "theory and practice of nonalignment have invalidated the over-simplified approach to the idea of this movement as being mere nonparticipation in blocs,"[48] and thus they claim that "the socialist community"[49] is the "natural and most reliable ally"[50] of the nonaligned countries.

As already noted, this natural ally logic conceptualization of nonalignment does have many critics, and, ironically, the most notable criticisms of this perspective emanate from scholars who are also ardent followers of the Marxist philosophy. These are the theoreticians from nonaligned Yugoslavia (a country which, though very socialistic, does not belong to the Soviet bloc—and thus a member of a socialist community, but not a member of the Soviet camp). Blazevic (1981) views the idea that the nonaligned countries have a 'natural alliance' with the Soviet bloc as baseless reasoning, and asserts that the "Supporters of blocs are fighting each other over our heads and often succeed in confusing the issue."[51] He also argues that it "is very important to analyze the relevance of Power blocs," and questions

whether they are not "still objectively the biggest threat to peace or is it only the imperialism that should be fought back?"[52]

Blazevic also answers his question and posits that the non-aligned countries should not see themselves as allies of any of the superpower blocs. According to him,

> It is questionable also to suppose that only a specific bloc can be good and others bad. At least the course of events in the last thirty years has not proved this assumption and nonaligned policy on blocs has generally been sanctioned by history.[53]

The Global Morality Fountain Perspective

This perspective conceptualizes nonalignment as a phenomenon that serves as a global morality fountain that supplies ethical orientation to the conduct of relations among the peoples and the countries of the world. For example, Sukarno conceptualized Indonesian non-aligned foreign policy as being "congruent with the social conscience of man," and also asserted that it needed to be converted into "a coordinated accumulated moral force."[54]

This conceptualization of nonalignment as a moral force in the international community is also echoed in the statements made by Nasser of Egypt, Bourguiba of Tunisia, Makarios of Cyprus, Nehru of India and Tito of Yugoslavia, who saw nonalignment as "moral potentialities," "moral authority," "moral principles," "moral force" and "moral success," respectively.[55] Additionally, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia also conceptualized nonalignment as "the moral element in the conduct of human affairs."[56]

The Altruistic Policy Perspective

Like the preceding perspective, the altruistic policy perspective is also concerned with the proper ethical orientation in international relations; but the latter perspective, in addition, emphasizes the unselfish upliftment of humanity as a whole, instead of a mere concern for the benefits such an approach to international relations might bring to the nonaligned countries alone. For example, Haile Selassie saw nonalignment as a tendency,

> to judge . . . policies . . . as we see them either contributing to or detracting from the resolution of the world's problems, the presentation of peace and the improvement of the general level of man's living conditions.[57]

Tito also asserted this altruistic nature of nonalignment when he noted that the nonaligned "countries are fighting for the broadest interests of mankind as a whole, and not for some narrow goals of their own."[58]

International Peace Guarantor Perspective

The international peace guarantor perspective of nonalignment conceptualizes this phenomenon, primarily, as a framework for the enhancement and the guaranteeing of peace in the international community. For example, Narayanan's (1981) view--that world peace "is the highest national and international good . . . for the nonaligned countries"[59]--fits into this perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment.

Nehru even categorically stated that, for the nonaligned coun-
tries, the goal of procuring and maintaining world peace is their fore-
most priority; and thus, according to him,

> Everything we have contended against and that we are con-
> tinuing to struggle against--imperialism, colonialism, racial-
> ism, and the rest--all these are somewhat overshadowed. . . .
> For if war comes all else for the moment goes.[60]

He even believed that it is the duty of the nonaligned countries to
shoulder the primary responsibility for the procurement and the
guaranteeing of world peace:

> When there is a crisis involving the possibility of war,
> the very fact that we are nonaligned should stir us to action,
> should stir us to thought, should stir us to feel that now
> more than ever it is up to us to do whatever we can to prevent
> such a calamity coming down upon us.[61]

Kwame Nkrumah also shared this view of nonalignment as the
guarantor of world peace, and thus he asserted that the "policy of non-
alignment" had the capability of having the "most powerful effect for
world peace."[62]

The nonaligned countries' role as the guarantors of world
peace is even seen by Singh (1981) to involve the duty of liberating
certain sections of the world population, which he sees as being condi-
tioned in a way that does not suit the pursuit of world peace.[63]
After asserting that,

> The doctrines of nuclear war have over the years sought to
> condition the populations of the industrialized nations into
> accepting mass terrorism and mass killings as legitimate,

and also claiming that the

> present rise in international terrorism is by no means unre-
> lated to the legitimization of terrorism through the doctrines
> of nuclear war, the NPT, nuclear-weapon-free zones, etc.,

he posits that nuclear weapons should be "stripped of their glamour and prestige," and that nonalignment "has to . . . liberate the populations of the industrialized nations from this conditioning."[64]

However, the above views of Singh seem to assume that the only threat to world peace are nuclear weapons and global wars, and thus seem to ignore the fact that conventional and regional wars can also threaten world peace.

Sarajcic (1981) also asserts the "role of the nonaligned movement in the preservation of world peace . . . ."[65] He observes that, by supporting

> the basic rights of countries and nations throughout the world, the non-aligned movement is objectively the only historical force at the present moment that can influence the solution of the different interests by not being undertaken by force and threats, which could eventually jeopardize peace in the whole world.[66]

While most people usually focus on nonalignment as a phenomenon belonging to the developing world, Sarajcic asserts the universal reality of this phenomenon (which has often been stressed by those in the nonaligned countries) by noting that, in fact, the best and most glaring demonstration of nonalignment as a force for world peace has been in Europe. Thus, he notes that the "mobilization of neutral and nonaligned European countries in the struggle for European peace and security is the best proof"[67] of this role. He also adds "that the nonaligned and neutral European countries are the only subject capable of starting initiatives and preserving the elementary confidence necessary for agreement between European countries facing great dangers," and furthermore, that all "this is happening in circumstances of

strained relations between the big powers in Europe, which is at the moment the greatest military arsenal ever."[68]

The world peace essence of nonalignment is also noted by Hameed (1983)[69] who, while observing that the nonaligned group "is a coalition of differing political, economic and social systems--a coalition of different democracies--direct and indirect," adds that its "greatest success is that it has prevented the world being divided into two cheering or firing squads."[70]

Hameed also attempts to weave an analysis of the relationship existing among peace, nonalignment and power:

> It could be said that if nonalignment has failed to defuse tension it has at least avoided adding to it. Peace becomes a chimera if sought on the basis of parity of military strength. It has to be sought on the parity of confidence and understanding. Peace flourishes in a climate devoid of tension. Any contribution to defuse tension is a contribution towards peace. This is what non-alignment seeks to do.[71]

International Relations Positive Innovator Perspective

This way of conceptualizing nonalignment sees the essence of this phenomenon as the framework for the positive innovation of the way countries and peoples of the world relate among themselves (be it in political, economic or cultural contexts).

This perspective, for example, is revealed in Singham's (1980) view of nonalignment as a "struggle for creating a more humane and just world."[72] Additionally, John Kotelawala, a former Sri Lankan leader, even sees this duty of creating a new world order, or reality, as the responsibility which the less powerful countries can best carry

out than the more powerful countries, and thus he contends that "the salvation of the world depends not on the great powers but on the lesser countries of the world."[73]

To Nehru, with a strong faith in the phenomenon of nonalignment, the possibility of a future world, where the relations among the nations and peoples is marked primarily by the spirit of cooperation, appeared to be inevitable. Thus, he observed that,

> The world, in spite of its rivalries and hatreds and inner conflicts, moves inevitably towards closer co-operation and the building up of a world commonwealth.[74]

Additionally, he also saw this phenomenon of global cooperation as not being divorced from a united world that is built on a just world order. Thus, he asserted that

> It is for this One World that Free India will work, a world in which there is the free cooperation of free people and no class or group exploits another.[75]

To Remington (1980), the positive innovation of the nature of international relations as the essence of nonalignment is seen as,

> a demand for new rules of the game based on equality and democratization of international decisionmaking; rules which would mean the elimination of spheres of influence, power politics, and superpower hegemony.[76]

Furthermore, Remington also believes in the attainability of this sort of international system. For example, he notes that Yugoslavia, by utilizing its role as a nonaligned country, played a very important role in the

> two important European negotiations of the 1970's: the 1975 Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation and the 1976 Berlin Conference of European Communist and Worker's Parties.[77]

Thus, he saw "the direction of European politics in the 1970's as in-
dicative of both the vitality and the diversity of the nonaligned move-
ment."[78]

Lebedev (1976) is another exponent of this international rela-
tions positive innovation perspective of nonalignment, but he seems to
base his ideas primarily on Marxism-Leninism.[79] He sees the task of
improving the way nations and peoples of the world relate among them-
selves as one which, based on an adequate understanding of interna-
tional reality, can be designed, planned, implemented and controlled.
While asserting "the class content of international relations,"[80]
and also observing that, despite "all their complexity, diversity and
checkered character, international relations are not an unordered
congeries of fortuitous links between states and people,"[81] he
posits that the "international relations . . . restructuring can never
be spontaneous or automatic."[82] Furthermore, to him,
"MarxistLeninists cannot rely on spontaneous development in
international affairs, or in political affairs in general." and he
advocates that any "fundamental restructuring of international
relations must be planned, controlled and corrected."[83] He also
adds that,

> Such restructuring consists not in passive adaptation to
> changing international relations but in the adoption by states
> and peoples of active measures aimed at accelerating the demo-
> cratic transformation of international life and at consolida-
> ting incipient positive changes within it.[84]

And in relating the place of nonalignment to the above exposition, he
noted that

The newly independent countries, which have become an influential international force, have an ever growing role to play in the development of world relations and the positive changes going on in this sphere.[85]

Also echoing this positive innovation of international relation by nonalignment, Labh (1982) asserted that Nehru "endeavoured to keep this part of the world free from big power politics."[86]

To Armah (1975), the innovation of international relations by nonalignment was seen mostly in terms of its civilizing influence; thus, as already noted in a preceding section, while viewing the state of international relations, associated with big power bloc politics, as one that "put force above reason and above justice,"[87] he observed that the "begetters of Non-alignment"[88] are leading "in the adventure of improving and civilizing the world's conduct of world affairs."[89]

A better future world for mankind, as a result of the international relations innovation, was seen by Toure (1975) as a possible product of nonalignment. He saw nonalignment, as noted above, as an,

> expression of a lively faith in a happy future for mankind . . . something active, a participating force, an active agent in the struggle for the achievement of a world society--emancipated, fraternal, and united.[90]

However, Toure seemed to have believed that this sort of a better world for man would be more possible if the whole world realized, and supported, the innovating role of nonalignment; and thus he hoped "that the highly developed nations and peoples can understand this historical movement in its universal significance and that they will take full part in it,"[91] implying that the world will be better if the whole world embraced the nonalignment philosophy.

Also, some see the innovating task of nonalignment primarily in terms of a more just international order. For example, Misra (1981) sees the goal of nonalignment as that of establishing "an international order based on justice, whether in the field of the economy, information or science and technology."[92]

Rajan (1981) is another person that attempted to comprehend nonalignment as a phenomenon that aims to positively innovate the way nations and peoples of the world relate; and he attempts to do this by comparing and contrasting it with other theoretical framework that have influenced international relations. Thus, he notes that,

> The traditional bases of the functioning of the system of sovereign nation states . . . were: isolationism, alliances, neutrality, balance of power, imperialism, and universalism (Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, and so on)

and that one "feature common to all these choices is the division of the international community into opposing groups."[93] In contrast, he sees nonalignment as being "clearly and stridently opposed to ideological or power blocs and bloc politics in international relations."[94] Additionally, he notes that the dislike for bloc politics has not allowed the nonaligned group to be much institutionalized in a sense that makes it look like a bloc.[95] (Thus, presently the nonaligned group has no permanent secretariat but coordinating bureaus.) Unlike the other international concepts, Rajan also sees nonalignment as having the qualities of "novelty and distinctiveness," and these are attributed to its desire to seek "to be cohesive, not divisive, of the international community."[96] Therefore, to him, a "nonaligned state has by definition no enemies: other states are either present or potential friends."[97]

The Total Social Reality Perspective

The essence of this perspective is that nonalignment seeks to tackle problems in the international system in a total reality perspective (that is, in its global political, economic and cultural ramifications). Another strand of this perspective is that all of the contexts in which international activities occur--political, economic and cultural--are seen as being interconnected. For example, the solving of a problem, or understanding of the reality, in one context is seen as being connected with those of other contexts.

Thus, the total social reality perspective of nonalignment takes on the task of comprehending and solving global problems in a total social reality sense with an emphasis on the interrelatedness of all issues in all contexts.

Rao (1981), for example, saw the nonaligned countries as being "led by a new generation of leaders who, though steeped in their respective national and political traditions, are tempered by the real-politik of international relations of the 1960's and the 1970's."[98] Additionally, he also stated that

> The search for development and for natural and energy re-
> sources, the inner tensions of the newly developing societies,
> the very real danger of thermonuclear destruction, and the new
> and indirect forms of political and economic domination

are all "part of the subconscious motivations of the new leadership in the nonaligned movement."[99]

Also, Akindele (1976) expresses a total social reality conceptualization of nonalignment when he notes that the members of the

Organization of African Unity, who are part and parcel of the nona-

ligned group, work in conjunction with the latter to deal with

> the necessity for the democratization of international rela-
> tions, the ever-widening gap between the more- and less-devel-
> oped countries, as well as the forces of racism and reaction
> which continue to bedevil world peace.[100]

Gromyko (1977), in an analysis of the international conduct of

African countries (which are a part of the nonaligned group), also un-

derlines the interconnectedness of domestic and international real-

ities, and the political and socio-economic realities, when he ob-

serves that

> changes in domestic life and international affairs have taken
> place in most African countries which have carried out deep-
> going progressive transformations in the course of the mount-
> ing fight against imperialism, for political equality, eco-
> nomic independence and social progress.[101]

Nehru also reflected the total social reality conceptualiza-

tion of nonalignment when he asserted that

> disarmament ultimately depends on far-reaching changes in the
> political and economic structure of the world, leading to a re-
> moval of the basic causes of war. So long as this is not
> done, the conflicts continue and lead to wars.[102]

This interconnectedness of all realities, in all contexts, is also em-

phasized by Chari (1983), who observes that "Proceeding towards the

New International Economic Order, and establishing socially just soci-

eties, could alone remove these fundamental causes of conflict," and

that "No contradiction, therefore, obtains between the non-aligned

struggle for peace and the larger struggles for egalitarianism in the

international system."[103]

The Cultural Autonomy Assertion Perspective

This perspective conceptualizes nonalignment in a somewhat narrower sense in that it sees it as a form of cultural assertion in societies that historically had been, or are now being, blanketed by outside cultural influences. Dinh (1977), in particular, expresses this sort of conceptualization of nonalignment when he asserts that, though "the roots of non-alignment can be traced back to the 1955 Asian-African conference in Bandung, Indonesia," its foundations "however, 'are found in the first stirrings of national sentiments among Asians and Africans . . .'" which "led to a reexamination of indigenous values and cultures."[104] Furthermore, he also sees "the present state of non-aligned countries' anti-cultural imperialist struggle" as being manifested by "their demands for a New Information Order."[105]

Indira Gandhi of India also reflects on the need for the non-aligned countries to be culturally assertive, while advising some sense of logic in the course of such assertiveness. She echoed the advice of Mazi Mbonu Ojike, a late Nigerian nationalist: 'boycott the boycottables and leave the unboycottables unboycotted.' Thus, she also advised that "it is necessary for the older cultures to make conscious efforts to safeguard their personalities," while also discriminating

> between what in western legacy is beneficial and what is unsuitable for us and similarly in our own heritage and ways of life how much that is obsolete needs to be discarded and what should be preserved because of its continuing relevance, utility and beauty. . . . We must strive to create new international institutions and reform existing ones.[106]

The Anti-Imperialism Worldview Perspective

Like the preceding cultural autonomy assertion perspective, this perspective also conceptualizes nonalignment in a somewhat narrower sense in that it views it simply as an anti-imperialism phenomenon.

Farer's (1975) conceptualization, for example, fits into this perspective in that he views the nonaligned countries as being "linked by a single world view, a kind of ideology, which imparts to them an intense emotional coherence" and which in turn is shaped "by a special historical experience to produce a distinct amalgam" of ideas, "which can most usefully be described as the developing states in fact describe it: 'anticolonialism.'"[107]

However, it must also be noted that Farer appears to understand the word "colonization," for the purpose of his study, not in a de jure sense. His understanding of a colonial phenomenon is not limited to formal/legal control of a society by a foreign power, but rather in its de facto sense in that such a reality does exist though not being legally instituted. Therefore, Farer's understanding of this phenomenon seems very close to how Kwame Nkrumah, a major theoretician on the phenomenon of neo-colonialism, understood this phenomenon. For example, to Nkrumah a "Colony is an economic-political term, not a legal one."[108]

The International Collective Bargaining

Framework Perspective

This perspective views the essence of nonalignment as being a framework for international collective bargaining by a group of countries. It is through this perspective that Graham (1981) sees nonalignment "as a focus of Third World pressure on key political and economic issues," and "as a coordinating and lobbying tool in the United Nations system."[109] Also, to Howe (1975), nonalignment is the "idea of poor-country solidarity," which has moved from that of steering clear of bloc politics to that of focusing "on the objective of obtaining a better share in the material benefits from man's economic activity."[110]

Jones (1980) even more forcefully asserted the essence of nonalignment as being a framework for international bargaining by positing that some nonaligned countries that have acquired sophisticated technical know-how, for example, in the area of nuclear science and technology, actually press such knowledge into use for helping the nonaligned group in their task of bargaining with the developed world. Thus, he notes that the

> nuclear-capable LDCs are better equipped to challenge the technical arguments and policy positions of developed states on equal terms, and to organize coalitions of less expert LDCs on matters of common interest in international negotiating fora.[111]

To some like Singham (1976), the idea of nonalignment as an international collective bargaining framework is so real that he sees the nonaligned countries as having even succeeded in globalizing a trade union mentality.[112] Thus, he asserts that

> The Non-aligned Movement has developed what can be broadly
> described as a trade union strategy in dealing with capitalist
> nations of the world,

and has, therefore, "essentially advanced a trade union bargaining process onto a global level."[113]

The Global Political Economy Perspective

Through this perspective, the essence of nonalignment is that of a phenomenon that interfaces the global economic and political realities with the assumption that the perception of such interfacing provides a more adequate way of dealing with global realities. However, it is important to differentiate this perspective from the total social reality and the international collective bargaining framework perspectives. The former, primarily, conceptualizes nonalignment as a phenomenon that deals with international reality as a matrix of interconnectedness of all global realities in all contexts (and thus unlike this perspective, it does not restrict itself to the interconnectedness of global political and economic realities). Also the latter see the essence of nonalignment, primarily, as an international collective bargaining framework.

Nworah (1977), in trying to analyze how African countries deal with international issues in their region seems to reflect this perspective since he views their actions in economic and political areas as interfacing to make one whole action approach.[114] Thus, he saw these countries as focusing on the "serious needs of regional economic co-operation and national welfare, and the more urgent problems of

colonialism on the continent," and therefore, saw their approach as "strategically more rewarding."[115]

The Global Economy Reordering Policy Perspective

Through this perspective nonalignment is seen as a framework for the reordering of the existing international economic reality system. The nonalignment concept is thus seen as guiding and inspiring the whole gamut of fore, facilities, and platforms created or utilized by the members of the nonaligned countries to work for a new international economic order that will be more equitable than the present global economic status quo, which they perceive as particularly unfair and unjust to them.

However, it also seems necessary to differentiate this perspective from the total social reality, international collective bargaining, and global political economy perspectives. The first is concerned with dealing with international reality as a matrix of relatedness of all realities in all contexts, the second with international collective bargaining process, and the third with dealing with international reality as an interface of economic and political realities. This perspective sees the essence of nonalignment, specifically, as the reordering of the international economic reality. Thus, in regard to the activities of the nonaligned countries, Mortimer (1980) notes that "Not only was the rhetoric regarding the international economic system becoming more militant but a strategy for implementing economic change was more fully spelled out."[116]

To Mphaisa (1983), the "Collective economic deprivation vis-a-vis former colonial powers seems to be the"[117] glue that binds the nonaligned countries of Asia and Africa in their pursuit of the reordering of international economic institutions and processes, and it was in this sense that Indira Gandhi implored these countries to

> influence the world economic forces in such a way that developing nations, especially those in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Caribbean can overcome their poverty. . . .[118]

There is also the view which asserts that the focus on the need to reorder the international economic reality was mostly due to the desire by the nonaligned countries to have something they can use as a rallying issue. Jayaramu (1982) feels that these countries' giving priority to the issue of change in the international economic relations "was a natural corollary to the fact that by the seventies, decolonization as a political objective was nearing complete achievement."[119] However, people like Nyerere hold the view that the nonaligned countries' desire to change global economic realities is more due to the desire to be truly sovereign: thus, he asserts that "Dependence, whether it be economic or military, reduces the reality of our freedom," and, therefore, "The purpose of non-alignment is to increase that reality."[120] More specifically, he asserts that

> The ultimate incompatibility of extreme poverty and economic dependence on the one side, and equal freedom for all sovereign nations on the other, lies behind the demand for a New International Economic Order, a demand which was first articulated in an organized form (although not under that title) at a nonaligned conference.[121]

Volkov (1970) sees the demand for a new international economic order as involving the "restructuring of the whole system of exploitative relations within the world capitalist economy,"[122] while

Sobhanlal Mookerjea believes that "the viability of the non-aligned countries, individually as well as collectively, mainly depends on how far and how best can they foster a new international economic order."[123]

To Edogun (1981), the very existence of a phenomenon like non-alignment is the reality of contemporary international economic relations since he sees the former's "major raison d'etre" as being "the gross inequities in international economic relationships."[124]

There are also views that indicate that the change desired by the nonaligned countries, in order to correct the aforesaid inequities, are not merely the pursuit of reforms, but the pursuit of a fundamental reordering of the nature of the entire international economic relations. For example, to Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the Algerian Foreign Minister, the goal of those countries pursuing the creation of a new international economic order

> is not . . . just a matter of providing access to markets and correcting price formation mechanisms in order to reduce the size of fluctuations in the prices of products exported by the developing countries but, rather, of transforming all the workings of international trade,

and that this sort of goal

> presupposes a new type of relationship in which concerted action and some degree of planning on the international scale are substituted for the so-called laws of supply and demand, which, in reality, merely reflect an imposed relationship based on the respective strengths of the seller and buyer.[125]

There are numerous international fora and bodies through which efforts are made at restructuring the international economic relations; and many perceive most of them as being formally, or informally

part of the nonaligned group. The fact that the members of the latter mostly constitute these fora and bodies even make some to accept the existence of such relationships among these bodies as given. To some, like Gupta (1981), these bodies are even seen as the nonaligned group in an economic context. To him, "the Group of 77, which has come up in recent years, is the economic counterpart of the non-aligned group," and the two groups largely overlap; and the spirit with which they function is very much the same.[126]

Another angle to this pursuit of a new international economic order is the assumption that the nature of the contemporary order is not immortal, and also that it is inherently unsound. To Kerim (1977), for example,

> The ever deeper crisis of the existing international economic order and the disintegration of certain of its parts (for example, the international monetary system), while confirming the historical obsoleteness of the conception upon which the system was founded, has greatly contributed to strengthening awareness among the progressive ranks of mankind that the problem of bridging the gap between developed and developing countries can only be lastingly resolved through a radical revision of the existing, and establishment of a new international economic order.[127]

Kerim also does express some optimism that the restructuring of the existing world economic order has somehow, though slowly, started due "primarily to the persevering activities of the . . . nonaligned"[128] countries. Essentially, he sees these activities as having spurred the international community to take "decisive steps in identifying the insurmountable problems inherent in the existing system," and that the world "has started out along the road to the construction of a new international order."[129]

The Foreign Policy Strategy Perspective

Through this perspective, nonalignment is conceptualized primarily as a foreign policy orientation which encases a particular manner of designing and planning actions in order to achieve some stated goals. Vasudevan (1983), for example, sees nonalignment as "a foreign policy approach, a means to an end."[130] Also, it seems that Kwame Nkrumah was conceptualizing it in the same way when he called for "a new and vigorous approach to the problem of peace and war."[131]

Rana (1980) seems to accept this conceptualization of nonalignment as the most adequate way of perceiving the phenomenon; thus, to him it is more sensible to carry out "a careful analytical review of nonalignment as a foreign policy strategy."[132] Some, like Kumar (1980), even imply that nonalignment is just one of the strategies available to the developing world, and thus he asserts that "They have tried various diplomatic strategies to safeguard their security," and that "Non-alignment has been one of them."[133]

The nature of the international system is also seen by some as influencing the adoption of nonalignment as a foreign policy strategy. For example, Rothstein (1976) sees such an approach to foreign policy as a "response to a particular distribution of power between the great powers."[134]

The Opportunistic Foreign Policy Perspective

Like the above foreign policy strategy perspective, this perspective sees nonalignment as a type of foreign policy approach, but it sees it as primarily a foreign policy of opportunism.

Through this perspective, nonalignment is seen as the foreign policy of some developing countries which aim, primarily, at serving their own immediate interests. Additionally, another major strand of this perspective is the perception that the upholding of the integrity of some declared principles, in the course of foreign policy conduct, does not augur as a priority obligation to those subscribing to this policy, since the essence of the policy is the ability to be flexible enough in order to achieve its function of maximizing the self-interests of the countries concerned. Therefore, as a corollary, this conceptualization of nonalignment assumes that the nonaligned countries' major foreign policy goals do not include those goals that aim at providing or promoting contributions to the improvement of international community as a whole, or some aspects or parts of it (of course, unless such actions mean the promotion of their self-interests too).[135]

In a practical sense, and within the context of contemporary superpowers bloc politics, this perspective sees nonaligned countries as out to play the game of playing the blocs against each other, and always looking to seek out ways to maximize their benefits from the international system, through the gray and muddy areas of conflicts and stiff competition between the blocs.

Crabb (1965), for example, observed that the

Nonaligned countries have been accused of "straddling the fence" diplomatically, of opportunistically seeking the "best of both worlds," or of merely endeavoring to "play off Washington against Moscow (or Peking)."[136]

However, he was of the opinion that the above view of the nonaligned countries was less than adequate in understanding what nonalignment was all about.[137]

Liska (1968), on the other hand, held the view that the nonaligned countries actually "engaged in active policy of play-off and unsolicited mediation between the great powers."[138] Stremlau (1980) also suggested that, even while trying to take advantage of blocs competition, the nonaligned countries avoided strong links to any of the superpower blocs; thus, he notes that behind the minds of the founders of nonalignment was the notion of opening "up greater opportunities to take advantage of the Soviet-American competition while avoiding an identity with either side."[139]

However, Idang (1973), though acknowledging that some "regard non-alignment merely as a profitable short-term Machiavellian strategy employed by the new African states to enjoy the best of both sides in the current East-West conflict," asserts that,

> Non-alignment as a technique or a basis for the conduct of foreign relations (particularly with the great power blocs) implies more lofty ideals than mere selfish, diplomatic maneuvering of playing one major power against another.[140]

The Global Input of a Regional Ideology
(Pan-Africanism) Perspective

In this perspective, nonalignment is conceptualized as the global manifestation, or even equivalent, of a regional ideology (which in this case is Pan-Africanism). Therefore, through this perspective, the augmenting and safeguarding of sovereignty and political

viability, the developing of better socio-economic conditions, the fostering of continental unity, and the ensuring and safeguarding of social justice in Africa (which are the goals of Pan-Africanism) are represented at the global level by the phenomenon of nonalignment, which is assumed by the proponents of this view to share the same goals with the former.

Nkrumah (1975), for example, when noting that

> . . . the three basic aims of Ghana's foreign policy are African independence, African unity, and the maintenance of world peace through a policy of positive neutralism and nonalignment,

also added that "The third aim is closely associated with the other two."[141]

An Organization of African Unity (OAU) statement is also quoted as positing that the nonalignment phenomenon "offers an adequate framework for the effective mobilization of the countries of the Third World, and for the concrete affirmation of their solidarity in favor of Africa cause."[142] Thus, this view sees nonalignment mainly in terms of how it reinforces Pan-Africanism.

For some like Idang (1973), the notion "that there is a linkage between non-alignment and African nationalism admits of no debate . . .,"[143] and this view logically flows from his assumption that for the nonaligned countries "the primary concern is not neutralism but nationalism."[144] Therefore, to him, nonalignment is "an extension of African nationalism to the international level."[145]

However, it must be noted that if Pan-Africanism is interpreted as a concept that serves the interest of one continent, first and foremost, this perspective appears to contradict some of the above

perspectives that tend to emphasize the universal purpose and goals of nonalignment. On the other hand, if Pan-Africanism is interpreted as a concept that emphasizes that political, economic and cultural progress in Africa also mean progress for mankind as a whole (in the sense that, through increased development, stability and cooperation in Africa, this progress is also assured for all mankind), then Pan-Africanism and nonalignment do appear to have much in common.

The Position of Strength Policy Perspective

This perspective sees the essence of nonalignment in a specific procedural manner in the sense that it emphasizes a specific approach to the attainment of certain goals. Basically, this perspective views nonalignment as a phenomenon that, through a position of strength, can bring a more sane and rational international reality. The nonaligned countries are seen as being more able to bring about a more socio-economically progressive, and a politically stable and peaceful world, through their ability to maintain visible and credible strength with which they can be able to create new global realities.

Elaigwu (1983) is a vivid exponent of this way of conceptualizing nonalignment.[146] Being concerned with a more peaceful and a less militarized international society, he sees nonalignment as being capable of achieving its visions when the nonaligned countries, through a strong military position of their own, are able to make the world realize that the present sophisticated state of military technology is not something to be used by some countries to massage their

national egos, and play old-time militaristic competition and domination games, to the detriment of mankind. Additionally, he implied that nonalignment, as a philosophy, by being able to create a more peaceful and stable world, will also be able to create more improved socio-economic conditions in the whole world. Thus, he views the present escalating global arms race as a perplexing reality. Specifically, he sees this reality as creating a global situation in which "the choice is difficult" and "cruel" since "it creates a dilemma for leaders to choose between buying guns for survival or bread for survival." While noting that the "arms race detracts from development programmes," he believes that the nonaligned countries' advocation of "disarmament is unrealistic."[147] He even sees such a view on the part of the nonaligned countries as not being in consonance with the reality of their actions, by observing "that even some non-aligned countries who started out calling for disarmament were investing heavily on arms themselves and others had gone nuclear."[148]

Elaigwu's position that the nonaligned countries should arm themselves more in order to create a situation where the whole world is brought around to the rationality that weaponry should be scaled down, seems to be based on the assumption that "The United States and the Soviet Union . . . will not disarm."[149] Furthermore, he bases this assumption on the view that, "Despite its dangers, advantages of arms race for the superpowers are still great" since he sees such concentrations "of the technology of destruction" as enabling them to "have an effect on the present economic, military and social order. . ."[150]

In direct bearing to the phenomenon of nonalignment, he sees "the interest" of the nonaligned countries--the "restructuring of the political, economic and social order . . ."--as "being undermined by excessive funds invested in arms race to keep the old order."[151] Therefore, he posits that "Only by democratizing nuclear technology will the dangers of everybody owning dangerous weapons dawn on the superpowers."[152] Furthermore, he also advocated that nonalignment should mean shunning international frameworks like the nuclear nonproliferation treaty since such a treaty "is only a mortgage of liberty to nuclear imperialism of a few suzerains who cow others to inevitable subservience."[153]

However, it seems that Elaigwu's view of nonalignment was influenced by his view of international reality as much as by his desire to provide a rational basis on which Nigeria's aspirations and activities in the area of nuclear energy resources can be compatible with one of the country's major foreign policy principles--nonalignment. Thus, according to him, "For Nigeria, as well as other countries, unless the technological nuclear monopoly of the old is broken, there will be no disarmament--only cosmetic attempts."[154]

On the whole, conceptualizing nonalignment as a position of strength policy again presents a perspective that runs directly counter to some other perspectives. Specifically, it tends to counter some of the main thrusts of the international relations positive innovator perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment in that a major thrust of the latter perspective is the view that nonalignment is an international phenomenon that tries to improve the the ways nations

and people relate among themselves by helping to get rid of international actions embedded in power politics notions and other similar realist concepts.

The Linking of National Goals with International
Goals Tool Perspective

This perspective sees the essence of nonalignment as a phenomenon that provides a bridge for national interests to be projected in such a way that they make the international goals of a group of countries to be compatible, and thus providing a basis for a more peaceful, progressive and cooperative world.

Kumar (1983), for example, holds the view that, as a concept, nonalignment does represent a framework for such national interests linkage; however, he also contends that in actual manifestations, the foreign policy of some nonaligned countries does allow their national interests to be projected in such a way that they are not adequately tuned in with the wave length of the collective international goals of the nonaligned group.[155] Thus, he holds the position that

> If nonalignment is to play successfully its historic role
> in reconstructing the international political and economic sys-
> tem, its well-conceived international goals must dominate and
> override the short-term national interests of its members.[156]

Based on the above main thrusts of this perspective, it can be interpreted that nonalignment will have a positive impact on the international system only when the actual actions of the countries that subscribe to and support it are in conformity with the way this

perspective conceptualizes it. And, in practice, this will mean the national interests of the nonaligned countries not being allowed to be incompatible with the collective international goals of the nonaligned group (which is that of creating new and better global political, economic and social realities) through national interests being made to be superseded by the collective international goals.

The Independent International Initiatives and
Actions Capability Perspective

This perspective conceptualizes nonalignment as a capability phenomenon--the capability of the countries, that subscribe to this concept as their foreign policy principle, to be able to independently carry out their own international initiatives and actions.

Some views of Haile Selassie particularly fit into this perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment. According to him, to be nonaligned is to be able "to judge actions and policies objectively . . .," thus the nonaligned may find themselves "now opposing, now supporting, now voting with, now voting against, first the East, next the West." The ultimate determinant of the course of action taken will then be "the worth of the policies themselves, and not the source of sponsor."[157]

Some aspects of Narayanan's (1981) conceptualization of nonalignment fit even more into this perspective. He simply asserts that "Nonalignment has often been defined as an independent foreign

policy."[158]   Furthermore, he also sees it as "an expression in the international field of the independent spirit and the independent judgment of a nation."[158]   Nehru, in some of his views, also sees nonalignment through this perspective. Thus, when he asked "what does independence consist of?" he gave the following answer:

> It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. All else is local autonomy. Once foreign relations go out of your hand, into the charge of somebody else, to that extent and in that measure you are not independent . . . Our sole purpose is to be left in peace ourselves to solve our problems and, where possible, to help and cooperate with other people.[159]

The National Sovereignty Guarantor Perspective

While the above independent international initiatives and actions capability perspective views the essence of nonalignment in terms of the ability to exercise independence mainly, though not exclusively, in the narrow area of foreign policy, this perspective views nonalignment in a broader sense--as the guarantor of national sovereignty in a general sense.

Misra (1981), for example, holds the view that

> Non-alignment was chosen to be an instrument or a means of foreign policy by its founders like India in order to give fuller meaning and content to their newly achieved political independence, . . .

since he saw these countries as not being

> . . . content with just formal transfer of political power: they wanted to go beyond and shape their destiny autonomously and in a manner which protected and promoted their national interest which lay essentially in accelerated socio-economic development of their weak and backward societies.[160]

Josip Broz Tito, the late Yugoslav leader, also paid much attention to the socio-economic dimension of a country being able to guard its national sovereignty. He tended to see the socio-economic aspect as being fundamental in nature, and reasoned that

> As long as there are undeveloped countries, the aggressive forces will endeavour to subordinate and exploit them. The more developed a country becomes, the lesser will be the possibilities of its subjection. Accordingly, there are two tendencies in the world today: one directed toward the subjection of undeveloped countries, and the other directed towards a useful understanding among the nations and prevention of hostilities. For this reason I consider it to be most rational for progressive forces to join in defense and development of the most underdeveloped countries. I can see no other possibilities.

However, to him, meaningful development meant that which was carried out mainly by each country, with cooperation with other countries considered a useful but not an indispensable phenomenon. In the case of Yugoslavia, Tito said that such an approach was steadfastly held; therefore, to him, Yugoslavia "will prefer to be naked if necessary . . . until we are capable of creating with our own capacities whatever we need."[162]

To Sarajcic (1981), the phenomenon of national sovereignty is seen not only as having a strong relationship with economic reality, but the latter is seen as the paramount reality impacting on the former. Thus, while being "Conscious that there can be no absolute independence," and that "nations are struggling for real interdependence," he added that

> The main issue of this national struggle is political, economic, and cultural freedom, with economic emancipation as their central concern. Being the essential condition for a factual and effective independence, economic emancipation is

the most pronounced issue of the struggle. From the require-
ments for economic and real political liberation have devel-
oped the fundamental determinations rejecting the doctrines of
"relative sovereignty," and limited national independence
through "global interdependence," "natural alliances,"
etc.[163]

As a Yugoslav scholar, the reality of his country's national
experience might have helped to sharpen his views on national sover-
eignty. An adequate understanding of the historical experience of the
smaller national groups in Central and Eastern Europe, over the centu-
ries, makes one appreciate how this sort of concern dominates the at-
tention of Yugoslavs (even more so in view of their contemporary ef-
forts to sustain their national sovereignty and maintain an autonomous
identity within a geopolitical area dominated by the Warsaw Pact alli-
ance). It is no surprise that Yugoslavs, like Sarajcic, see "The pro-
tection of national independence, sovereignty and the right of each
country to opt for their own socio-economic, political and cultural de-
velopment without interference"[164], as "representing the central com-
mitment and platform of the non-aligned countries . . .,"[165] of
which Yugoslavia, itself, is a pioneer and a leading member.

Interestingly, an overall evaluation of the effectiveness of
the nonalignment policy which Yugoslavia has steadfastly adhered to,
according to Mazrui (1980), has been demonstrated to be very positive.
According to him, "Tito's effort to prevent or avoid Soviet domination
without falling into the arms of the Western embrace was a classic
dramatization of sustained non-alignment."[166]

This way of conceptualizing nonalignment (as a guarantor of na-
tional sovereignty) is also evident in Willet's (1978) work. He sees

nonalignment as being synonymous with the phenomenon of national sovereignty in the developing world. To him, "Non-alignment is," simply, "the assertion of state sovereignty in Afro-Asia."[167]

In connection with the manifestation of nonalignment in Guinea, Ademolekun (1977) also supports this view. He noted that

A most fascinating illustration of the complex pattern that Guinean foreign policy sometimes assumed was the interaction between developments in the domestic and international political scenes that made possible the dramatic demonstrations of positive neutrality (based on the doctrine of national independence) . . .[168]

Belisaro Betancur, the President of Colombia, even gave the reason of sovereignty protection as the fuel that drove its desire to become a nonaligned country. In early 1983, just before his country's formal admission into the nonaligned group, he noted that its

. . . proposal to join the non-aligned group is an affirmation of sovereignty and a search for new forums, for new partnerships with those who have problems similar to Colombia's. It's a question of not being a satellite of any one power center and of maintaining our own power of decision.[169]

Another head of state, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, echoed similar views. While noting that, "Every great power that is given the opportunity to turn its relations of friendship into another kind of relationship will do so," and hoping "that in the Arab world there will be no satellites for the Americans or the Soviets . . .," he sees nonalignment as "a definite guarantee of independence."[170]

For the relatively less powerful countries, nonalignment was seen by Nehru as an appropriate policy; thus, according to Appadorai (1981), some of his statements implied that "a non-aligned and militarily weak country can hope to maintain its territorial integrity."[171]

However, according to Appodorai, the Indo-China conflict led Nehru to augment military power as a complementary, and more realistic, means of protecting India's sovereignty.[172]

Nevertheless, many scholars still hold the view that nonalignment was seen by Nehru as a paramount guarantor of India's sovereignty. According to Damodaran (1983), "There was no doubt from the very beginning in Nehru's mind that the essence of independence lay in the ability of the . . . Indian state to take decisions free of any external influence,"[173] and also that in his "thinking, non-alignment was intimately related to the safeguarding of India's own honour and interests."[174] To Sukarno, the former Indonesian leader, the conceptualization of nonalignment as a guarantor of national sovereignty was even having a contagious effect:

> The experiences of one country in discovering that a policy of non-alignment is the best guarantee for safeguarding our national international position have undoubtedly helped others to come to a similar conclusion.[175]

Some, like Narayanan (1981), add some novel features to the national sovereignty guarantor perspective of nonalignment.[176] While agreeing that

> The core of the policy of nonalignment consists in a country's urge to safeguard its independence, national integrity, and national interests and in its freedom to choose its own path in internal development and external policies,

and that,

> The nonaligned countries together may identify colonialism, imperialism, hegemonism, etc., as threats to their independence.

he further posits that,

Each country has to deal with its specific threat percep-
tions and orient its policies accordingly within the general
framework of non-alignment.[177]

Thus, he defends some nonaligned countries which develop close rela-

tionships with a superpower:

To deny the right of such differing orientation in poli-
cies to different non-aligned countries would be to deny them
the right of independent appraisal of their interests and to
reduce non-alignment to an abstract generalized concept.[178]

However, it must be noted that Narayanan's conceptualization of non-

alignment again presents a case where a perspective of nonalignment

conflicts with other perspectives. His view, in particular, conflicts

with some of the views of the proponents of the equidistance from the

superpower blocs, and the avoidance of alignment with the superpower

blocs policy, perspectives (presented above).

An Overview

The variance and differences among the above various concep-

tual perspectives of nonalignment shows its conceptual difficulty.

The unsettling conceptual profile of nonalignment is further empha-

sized by the fact that a lot of individuals, in a single study or

statement, or in various studies or on various occasions, have concep-

tualized nonalignment in many various perspectives (as can be noticed

in the above analyses of each of the above perspectives), and that in

some cases the various perspectives through which an individual con-

ceptualized the phenomenon may significantly differ among themselves.

Nonalignment, obviously, is not a clear and concise concept, nor an idea handed down by one person. Instead it is one that developed as a result of the shared aspirations and goals of most of the countries in Africa, Asia, and to a lesser extent, Latin America. An important feature of the development of the concept is the fact that the world leaders who laid its foundation did not see any need for a single, iron-clad definition of this phenomenon. Possibly they felt that their aspirations and goals were close enough and clearly understood by all the nonaligned countries, and thus did not feel the need for a formal definition of nonalignment. Another possibility is that it might have been more expedient for the various nonaligned countries not to be concerned about the need for a rigid definition, thus allowing themselves more flexibility to interpret nonalignment in ways more convenient to them. However, the manifestations of the nonalignment phenomenon tend to indicate that the above two explanations combine to explain the absence of its formal definition since, as a phenomenon, it continues to have significant relevance in rallying all the nonaligned countries to achieve common international goals, and it also has exhibited significant variations and changes in how the nonaligned countries, in multilateral and unilateral international initiatives and actions, conceptualize it. Thus, it is in this sense that the efforts by some to deduce the concept of nonalignment solely from the declarations and statements issued by the various nonaligned conferences and summits may be inadequate because such declarations and statements are more often a result of significant efforts to arrive at positions that are acceptable to most members of an organization made

up of about a hundred countries by 1983. Expectedly, such positions that are found to be acceptable to most members in a very large group are often not synonymous to the true ideals on which the existence of the group rests. Furthermore, this sort of reasoning may be buttressed by the fact that a concept is often significantly different from the actual course of action that is carried out in an effort to translate the concept into reality, though they are often close enough to be seen as being a manifestation in reality of the concept (and reality, as already noted above, is not expected to replicate theoretical construction, but only to adequately approximate it, in order to be considered as a manifestation in reality of a said theoretical construction).

Therefore, the major trends of the positions of the various nonaligned summits, analyzed below, may be seen as only providing part of the knowledge needed to understand the concept of nonalignment.

To further illustrate the difficulty of defining nonalignment, as late as 1983, Nyerere, a leading statesman in the nonaligned group since the pioneering days, declared that "The concept of non-alignment has never been officially defined."[179]

The "efforts to define non-alignment . . . based on the analysis of the term itself" also results in misleading notions, according to Mates (1983).[180] He notes that those who try to understand nonalignment through such an approach assume

> . . . even, unwittingly, the notion that the name of the movement was chosen after it was conceptually defined and with the greatest care taken to find the right word to describe it as completely as possible

but that such "did not happen, nor does it happen in most cases of a similar nature."[181] To further buttress his view he also notes that

>   International movements, organizations and other events or
>   developments are given the name, which they thereafter carry
>   and by which they are recognized from outside, like human be-
>   ings who also receive their names before anybody could know
>   how they would develop and without their being asked.[182]

Therefore, "The Atlantic Alliance and its organization NATO includes Greece and Turkey, although they are much more remote from the Atlantic than, for instance, Czechoslovakia," and that "The Warsaw Pact is not centered around Warsaw, but Moscow."[183]

Mates notes that the word nonalignment might have been used at the 1961 Belgrade Conference due to the tense cold war atmosphere that was prevalent during the conferences. But, the fact that the participants in the conference might have rightly paid attention to the prevalent international situation, at the time, did not necessarily make such concern the very essence of the aspirations and goals that brought the various countries together.[184]

This point that Mates makes means that the essence of nonalignment, like with other concepts, cannot be found only in "the term itself."[185] Therefore, it may be misleading to primarily try to understand nonalignment simply as nonalignment.

While in the above sections there have been attempts to rein in the broad spectrum of the various conceptualizations of nonalignment, this does not mean there have not been significant conceptual controversies. Notably, some have viewed nonalignment as being a negative concept in terms of both its substance and terminology, the main argument being that nonalignment was merely a reaction to the global

power configuration presented by the Cold War; and also that nonalign-
ment, in terms of its terminology, connotes negativism since it is a
negative noun. However, others hold the view that, on the contrary,
nonalignment both in terms of substance and terminology is a positive
and active concept. K. P. Misra's view, for example, is that most of
those who hold the opposite view from him concentrated almost entirely
on understanding nonalignment in terms of global systemic factors. He
believed, instead, that internal dynamics were also very significant
in how the concept developed; and he sees this mainly in terms of the
sensitivity of most nonaligned countries to their past formal control
by other foreign countries and their contemporary relative socio-
economic underdevelopment. Thus, he noted that:

> Nonalignment was chosen to be an instrument or a means of
> foreign policy by its founders like India in order to give
> fuller meaning and content to their newly achieved political
> independence. They were not content with just formal transfer
> of political power: they wanted to go beyond and shape their
> destiny autonomously and in a manner which protected and pro-
> moted their national interests, which lay essentially in accel-
> erated socio-economic development . . .[186]

Misra thus asserts that "the Cold War was not the sole reference point
of nonalignment," and also not "even a critical one."[187] To further
buttress his point, he noted "the fact that the genesis of nonalign-
ment preceded the Cold War"[188] since, as Subimal Dutt observed, "The
principle of nonalignment . . . was accepted by the Congress at the
Haripura session (1939)."[189]

Another important observation of Misra is that, like other con-
cepts, nonalignment in actual application cannot ignore the environ-
ment within which it unfolds; thus, "when the Cold War between the two

Super Powers was in its intensest, it was logical that the movement should give high priority to this item on its agenda of work."[190] However, according to his reasoning, nonalignment addressing itself to an important global reality, at one particular time, should not be mistaken to mean that that reality was the essence, the cause, and the beginning of the latter.[191]

In terms of his view that nonalignment is also, terminologically, a positive concept, he implores that "it is relevant to consider the ways of thinking of the Indian people" since according to him the concept "owes its origin to India . . . ."[192] He does this by delving into the linguistic relevances in Indian society:

> Even a cursory look at the philosophical and civilizational tradition indicates that the Indians have been fond of nouns with negatives. It is through negative terms that they have expressed positive and affirmative ideas of profound significance in their social evolution. The point can be illustrated by giving some examples. Instead of saying "victory and defeat," what is said is "victory and non-victory" (jayaajayau). Instead of "many" there is "non-one" (aneka). At the more popular level we are familiar with non-violence (abimsaa) as against peace, non-idleness (apramaada) as against exertion, and non-grudge (avaira) as against tolerance. These examples can be multiplied, particularly from the literature on Buddhism and Jainism. What is evident is that these negative words have positive meanings of great significance.[193]

In a nutshell, while "to other nations . . . showing the moral precepts in the negative form seemed somewhat powerless and unsatisfactory," to the Indian people, "who lay stress on the negative phase and pursue the non-determinant, the negative form of expression has more positive and powerful meaning."[194]

In summary then, Misra believes that "neither from the substantive point of view, which is very important, nor from the terminological point of view, is nonalignment a negative concept."[195]

Another conceptual controversy involving nonalignment has been
the way it has been linked to neutrality, the main argument being on
whether both are similar to or different from each other. Misra holds
the view that neutrality is a legal concept while nonalignment is dif-
ferent in that it is mainly a political one. According to him, the
former is "founded on either municipal or international law" and that
such a "legal status cannot be transformed without violating the legal
provisions relevant to them," while the latter "is based on political
considerations and can be changed without recourse to legalities."[196]
Thus, he posits that

> . . . neutrality is an integral part of the international law
> of warfare, the legal basis of which is mostly to be found in
> the Hague Conventions of 1907. The conventions vest certain
> duties obligatory for them. Under them, a neutral state is ob-
> liged to abstain from participation in an armed conflict and
> also from assistance to any of the parties to such a conflict.
> Participants in a conflict are on their part required to re-
> spect the territory of neutral countries, which includes ab-
> stention from use of such territory for movement of troops and
> munitions of war. This is what is called the classical notion
> of neutrality, which is simple and limited in scope in terms
> of the area and the time (period) of its operation. It is evi-
> dent that this fragment of neutrality is a different concept
> and has little in common with non-alignment.[197]

The above comments on the nature of neutrality, to Misra,
throw more light on its differences with nonalignment. For example,
"The main concern of all . . . neutrals is war, i.e., to stay neutral
in that eventuality," and that "their peace-time neutrality is really
a prerequisite to their main war-time objective," while nonalignment
"is basically and almost entirely a peacetime policy."[198] Another
point of difference he sees is that, while the neutral states are
legally disabled in taking sides in wars, the nonaligned states, "on

the merits of each case as they see it,"[199] are free to take sides if they so wish.

While neutrality generally denotes passivity and negativism in international conduct, nonalignment is more of an active positive concept as is demonstrated by the relentless activism by the nonaligned countries in the international arena through various forums that deal with global political, economic and social issues. This is easily attested to by the demand for a new international economic order and a new international information order, the intensity of the attention they devote to a new law of the sea, attempts to shape global trade relations through instruments like the OPEC, tendencies to extend, to the most possible limits, the scope of their influence in the political and the socio-economic forums of the United Nations system, etc. The issue is not their relative success or failure in these endeavors, but the active and positive nature of their roles. Even on a country by country basis, nonaligned countries do not exhibit behavior that can be likened to neutral states. One of the chief architects of nonalignment, Jawaharlal Nehru, declared that India has "an army and a navy and an air force and if danger threatens us we shall use them,"[200] which does not sound like a statement from the statesman of a country whose cardinal foreign policy principle has anything to do with the legalistic concept of neutrality. The eagerness of India to acquire nuclear capability as soon as it became independent also was not an action that is associated with a neutral state. Egypt, under Nasser (one of the moving forces of nonalignment), also did not portray a neutral state; note the Suez Crisis, the Middle East wars,

the Yemen involvement, military pacts with the Soviet Union, and the quest for the leadership of the Arab world. Ghana, under Kwame Nkrumah (another major pioneer of nonalignment), was also without the tendency of a neutral state. Apart from his preoccupation with shaping events on the continent of Africa, Nkrumah was very much interested in backing his diplomatic efforts with a formidable and visible power. Thus, for example,

> In February 1961 . . . Ghana signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for a research reactor, fuel rods, construction of a research facility at Kwabenya (near Accra), and the training of Ghanaian personnel. The facility began operating in 1964 . . .[201]

In summary, the above behavior of these major nonaligned countries had nothing in common with legalistic neutrality; and even in contemporary times most nonaligned countries are more active and positive in their eagerness to be included in, and to shape, events around them despite all the odds.

Another broad conceptual difference between neutrality and non-alignment is that while the former is a by-product of the various manifestations of power politics (which connotes an international regime imbued with realist tendencies, and thus portraying phenomena as balance of power, etc.), nonalignment aims at introducing new ways that people and countries should relate to each other. It holds that the basis of such relationships should be the concern for peace, cooperative existence, socio-economic progress, justice, and the elevation of the quality of human rationality, rather than the exaltation of brute force and survival of the fittest mentality. Thus, instead of operating on the notion that international reality can only make sense if

there are opposing conflicting camps, nonalignment operates on the notion that human goals are the same (more abundant and rewarding human life), and that in pursuing these goals with different means, mankind can resolve its problems without institutionalizing conflict. It is through this way that it can be seen that, though nonalignment does appreciate the existence and utility of power (in the various forms it can be manifested), it does not seek to mobilize and distribute it in such a way that makes conflict chronic, as does power politics.

Neutrality and nonalignment also differ in the sense that, while the former seems to resign itself to the global status quo, the latter seeks to change the global status quo and it does this mainly in a way that will bring more political efficacy, and economic and social progress, to all countries of the world.[202]

The fact that, as noted earlier, nonalignment is not a concept that is a product of a tightly documented system of ideas devised by one individual (with an understanding that not much of its conceptual formulations is to be tampered with), but that it is a product of the various, but like-minded, views of many statesmen and scholars in many countries, has led to nonalignment often being given a variety of meanings by different proponents at various times. But all these meanings do appear to have some common major ingredients. Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, conceptualized nonalignment as containing three basic ingredients, one of which is the need for each country having "an independent approach to foreign policy" and "not being tied down to any particular line of action" due to a particular commitment to one or a group of actors.[203] Another basic ingredient was the need to avoid

being a member of alliances (whose sole aims are military, and thus re-
quire routine support for one actor, or group of actors, against
another actor, or group of actors), while the other ingredient was the
need to "attempt to maintain friendly relations with all coun-
tries."[204] However, these views do not imply a naive view of a
world with no conflict but, instead, that countries and peoples should
aim more to increase the cooperative aspects of international rela-
tions and avoid the conflictual relationship wherever and whenever it
can be avoided.

The preparatory meeting in Cairo, for the first Nonaligned Con-
ference in Belgrade, saw nonalignment mainly in terms of countries hav-
ing independent policies, fostering international peace, supporting
movements of national independence, and avoiding entanglement in mili-
tary bloc alliances. The Belgrade conference itself showed that the
members conceptualized nonalignment as a less structured arrangement
for international cooperation, rather than as a bloc; thus they de-
clared that they "do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a
bloc."[205]

Beginning with the Lusaka summit of 1970, the nonaligned coun-
tries seemed to become more active in trying to shape international re-
lations in such a way that would allow them to achieve more national
progress, especially in the economic sphere; thus, at this summit they
"set the tone and drew a blueprint for an assertive action by the non-
aligned countries for the establishment of a NIEO."[206] However,
even before this the nonalignment phenomenon was concerned about the
New International Economic Order (NIEO). The first conference in

Belgrade in 1961, for example, talked of the need for "a new order based on . . . social justice for the promotion of prosperity,"[207] and the second conference in Cairo in 1964 urged

> . . . all the countries to contribute to the rapid evolution of a new and just economic order under which all nations can live without fear or want or despair and rise to their full stature in the Family of Nations, [because] the structure of the world economy and the existing international institutions of international trade and development have failed either to reduce disparity . . . or . . . to rectify serious and growing imbalances between developed and developing countries.[208]

The Havana Conference of 1979 saw the economic and social components of nonalignment as being one of its crucial concerns. Thus, it declared that

> . . . the establishment of the New International Economic Order is one of the most important and most urgent tasks facing the Non-aligned Movement and that democratization of international economic relations constitutes its political substance.

The New Delhi Conference of 1983, like all the conferences after the Lusaka conference, also paid attention to global economic and social issues.[210]

In order to pursue their global economic and social concerns, the nonaligned countries have been adept both in utilizing existing global institutions and in devising new ones--thus the United Nations systems (especially its specialized bodies), Group of 77, OPEC, ACP (African-Caribbean and Pacific) group, etc., have all been involved in these efforts.

Running all through the various meanings and concerns of nonalignment, right from the days of Nehru, Tito, Nkrumah and Nasser to the present, as shown above, has been a steadfast conceptualization of

nonalignment as a phenomenon which seeks to ensure that different peoples with differing social philosophies can politically, economically, and socially enhance themselves, act independently in the international system and, according to their best judgments, relate to others in a cooperative and peaceful manner, and generally promote peace and social justice in all parts of the world.

At this juncture, it may be relevant to note that a conceptual feature of nonalignment is the need not to allow itself to be reduced to a short, tightly held idea-system, but rather to exist as an encompassing idea-system that adapts to various circumstances while maintaining its essential tenets. Thus, K. R. Narayanan, like other scholars of nonalignment, has often noted that nonalignment is not a dogma "to be interpreted by a Coordinating Bureau or a Secretariat or even a Summit."[211] Also, it must be noted that theoretical constructions, in order to be valid, do not need to replicate any reality but mainly to approximate it, (in fact, a theoretical construction is the product of the abstractions from an adequate sample of the various manifestations of reality, and need not fit exactly into any of the manifestations, since the essence of a theoretical construction is the ability to have universal applicability). Thus, while it would be interesting to see how much of Hungarian society does not conform to Marxist theory, that society is still seen as operating under Marxist theoretical formulations; and, while it would be interesting to note how much of Dutch society does not conform to capitalist theory, that society is still seen as operating under capitalist theoretical formulations (and, actually, it is hard to find any single human society that fits

exactly into either Marxist or Capitalist theoretical formulations).
Likewise, though it would be hard to find any country that has a for-
eign policy that fits exactly into the conceptual formulations of non-
alignment, as examined above, a lot of countries are considered as be-
ing nonaligned.

On the whole, many of the above various perspectives of the
concept of nonalignment do share some common themes. One of these is
the maximization and the utilization of the potential for independent
actions in the international system. The avoidance of routine attach-
ment to a country or bloc of countries, engaged in an institutional-
ized conflictual relationship with another country or bloc of coun-
tries, and the promotion of more progressive and rational economic,
social, and political relationships among countries and peoples, are
also other major themes. Additionally, many of the perspectives also
emphasize the themes of strengthening cooperative relationships (and
thus the avoiding of conflictual relationships wherever and whenever
possible), and the general pursuit of actions that promote peace and
social justice in all parts of the world.

Endnotes

1. V. M. Nair, "Havana Summit Shows Non-aligned Divisions: Moder-
   ates Unhappy Over Drift into Radicalism." The Round Table
   (Issue 277, January 1980), pp. 100-101.

2. Ibid., p. 101.

3. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of
   Nonalignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 209.

4. Olajide Aluko, <u>Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy</u> (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 239.

5. Ibrahim Agboola Gambari, "Nigeria and the World: A Growing Internal Stability, Wealth, and External Influence," <u>Journal of International Affairs</u> (Vol. 29, No.2, Fall 1975), p. 163; and Julius O. Ihonvbere, "Resource Availability and Foreign Policy Change in Nigeria: The Impact of Oil," <u>India Quarterly</u> (Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, April-June 1983), p. 121.

6. Andjelko Blazevic, "Resolving Dilemmas of Non-alignment," in K. P. Misra and K. R. Narayanan, eds., <u>Non-alignment in Contemporary International Relations</u> (New Delhi: Vikas, 1871), p. 23.

7. <u>Ibid.</u>

8. <u>Ibid.</u>

9. <u>Ibid.</u>

10. J. D. B. Miller, <u>The Politics of the Third World</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 104.

11. Robert L. Rothstein, "Foreign Policy and Development Policy: From Nonalignment to International Class War," <u>International Affairs</u>, London (Vol. 52, No. 4, October 1976), p. 603; the emphasis included.

12. Richard Rosecrance, <u>International Relations: Peace or War?</u> (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), pp. 91-92.

13. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 91.

14. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 92.

15. <u>Ibid.</u>

16. Okon Udokang, "The Third World as a Political Force," <u>Black Scholar</u> (May 1975), p. 11.

17. John A. Graham, "The Non-aligned Movement After the Havana Summit," <u>The Journal of International Affairs</u> (Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring/Summer, 1980), p. 153.

18. <u>Ibid.</u>

19. Robert L. Rothstein, <u>Alliances and Small Powers</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 246-247.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 246.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 246-247. Emphasis included.

22. K. Subrahmanyan, "Non-alignment and the Struggle for Peace and Security," in Misra and Narayanan, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-124.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

25. Carsten Holbroad, "The Role of Non-aligned Middle Powers," in M. S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly, eds., *Great Power Relations, World Order and the Third World* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), p. 15.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. J. L. S. Girling, "International Hierarchy of Power," in Rajan and Ganguly, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. George Liska, *Alliances and the Third World* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 44.

32. *Ibid.*

33. Quoted in M. S. Rajan, "Institutionalization of Non-alignment: Widening Gulf Between the Belief and the Prospect," *International Studies* (Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June, 1981), p. 41.

34. Archie Singham, "Havana Summit: Currents and Cross-Currents," *The Black Scholar* (Vol. 11, No. 6, July/August 1980), p. 25.

35. A. W. Singham, "The Fifth Summit Conference of the Non-aligned Movement," *The Black Scholar* (Vol. 8, No. 3, December 1976), p. 2.

36. *Ibid.*

37. Sukarno quoted in Kapileshwar Labh, "Intra-Non-Aligned Discords and India," *India Quarterly* (Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1, January - March 1982), p. 66.

38. Anatoly Gromyko, "The October Revolution and Africa Destiny," International Affairs, Moscow (September 1977), p. 102.

39. A. Kiva, "The Role of the Young National States in International Relations," International Affairs (Moscow, March 1973), pp. 69-75.

40. Ibid., p. 69.

41. Ibid., p. 71.

42. Ibid., p. 70.

43. Ibid., p. 75.

44. G. Bondarevsky and V. Sofinsky, "Bandung's Historic Lessons," International Affairs (Moscow, May 1975), p. 49.

45. G. Bondarevsky and V. Sofinsky, "The Non-aligned Movement and International Relations," International Affairs (Moscow, July 1976), p. 56.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., pp. 55-56.

48. Ibid., p. 51.

49. Ibid., p. 50.

50. Ibid.

51. Blazevic, op. cit., p. 23.

52. Ibid., p. 24.

53. Ibid.

54. Sukarno quoted in Dike Nworah, "Nationalism Versus Coexistence: Neo-African Attitudes to Classical Neutralism," Journal of Modern African Studies (Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1977), p. 214.

55. Nasser, Bourguiba, Makarios, Nehru and Tito quoted in Ibid. (footnote)

56. Haile Selassie, quoted in Ibid., p. 214.

57. Haile Selassie, quoted in Ayele, Negussay, "The Foreign Policy of Ethiopia," in Olajide Aluko, ed., The Foreign Policies of African States (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p. 55.

58. Tito quoted in K. R. Narayanan, "Relevance of Non-alignment," in Misra and Narayanan, op. cit., p. 19.

59. K. R. Narayanan, "Non-alignment, Independence, and National Interests," in Misra and Narayanan, op. cit., p. 96.

60. Nehru quoted in Ibid.

61. Nehru quoted in Ibid., p. 67.

62. Kwame Nkrumah, "Africa in World Affairs," in Gideon-Cyrus M. Mutiso and S. W. Rohio, eds., Readings in African Political Thought (London: Heineman, 1975), p. 652.

63. Dinesh Singh, "The Role of Non-alignment Today," in Misra and Narayanan, op. cit., p. 103.

64. Ibid.

65. Ivo Sarajcic, "Non-alignment, Independence, and National Interests," in Misra and Narayanan, op. cit., p. 88.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid. The nonaligned country referred to here seems to be Yugoslavia, since it has been very active, in conjunction with some neutralist-tending Scandinavian countries, in helping to lessen East-West tensions.

68. Ibid.

69. A. C. Shahul Hameed, In Pursuit of Peace: On Non-alignment and Regional Cooperation (New Dehli: Vikas, 1983), pp. xviii-xix.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., p. xix.

72. Archie Singham, "Havana Summit: Currents and Cross-Currents," op. cit., p. 28.

73. John Kotelawala, quoted in Fouad Ajami, "The Fate of Non-alignment," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 59, Winter 1980/1981), p. 367.

74. Nehru quoted in Subrahmanyam, op. cit., p. 123.

75. Nehru quoted in Ibid.

76. Robin Alison Remington, "Nonalignment as Ideological Transfer: The South-North Dialogue," _Indian Journal of Political Science_ (Vol. 41, No. 3, September 1980), p. 473.

77. _Ibid._, p. 497.

78. _Ibid._

79. N. Lebedev, "The System of World Relations: Problems of Development," _International Affairs_, Moscow (December 1976), pp. 79-88.

80. _Ibid._, p. 82.

81. _Ibid._, p. 79.

82. _Ibid._, p. 83.

83. _Ibid._

84. _Ibid._

85. _Ibid._, p. 81.

86. Labh, _op. cit._, p. 65.

87. Kwesi Armah, "Non-alignment: Africa's Foreign Policy for Freedom and Progress," in Mutiso and Rohio, _op. cit._, p. 656.

88. _Ibid._, p. 655.

89. _Ibid._

90. Sekou Toure, "Policy on Foreign Affairs," in Mutiso and Rohio, _op.cit._, p. 672.

91. _Ibid._

92. K. P. Misra, "Towards Understanding Non-alignment," _International Studies_ (Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June, 1981), p. 31.

93. Rajan, _op. cit._, p. 39.

94. _Ibid._

95. _Ibid._, pp. 39-41.

96. _Ibid._, p. 39.

97. _Ibid._

98. P. V. Narasimha Rao, "Non-alignment Today and Tomorrow," in Misra and Narayanan, op. cit., p. 3.

99. Ibid.

100. R. A. Akindele, "Reflections on the Preoccupation and Conduct of African Diplomacy," The Journal of Modern African Studies, (Vol. 14, No. 4, 1976), p. 571.

101. Gromyko, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

102. Nehru quoted in P. R. Chari, "Non-alignment and the Nuclear Threat," India Quarterly (Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, April-June 1983), p. 159.

103. Ibid.

104. Tran Van Dinh, "Non-alignment and Cultural Imperialism," in A. W. Singham, ed., The Nonaligned Movement in World Politics (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1977), p. 73.

105. Ibid., p. 82.

106. Ghandi quoted in Ibid., pp. 82-83.

107. Tom J. Farer, "The United States and the Third World: A Basis for Accommodation," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 54, No. 1, October 1975), p. 79.

108. Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-colonization (London: Panaf, 1974), p. 108.

109. Graham, op. cit., p. 153.

110. James W. Howe, "Power in the Third World," Journal of International Affairs (Vol. 29, No. 2, Fall 1975), p. 113.

111. Rodney W. Jones, "Atomic Diplomacy in Developing Countries," Journal of International Affairs (Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring/Summer 1980), p. 107.

112. A. W. Singham, "The Fifth Summit Conference of the Non-aligned Movement," op. cit., p. 6.

113. Ibid.

114. Nworah, op. cit., p. 237.

115. Ibid.

116. Robert A. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 31-32.

117. Chisepo J. J. Mphaisa, "Diplomacy by Conference: Principles, Goals and Problems of NAM," India Quarterly (Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January-March 1983), p. 23.

118. Indira Ghandi, quoted in Labh, op. cit., 68.

119. P. S. Jayaramu, "Super Powers and the Changing International System: A Third World Perspective," India Quarterly (Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, April-June 1982), p. 151.

120. Julius K. Nyerere, "Non-alignment and Its Future Prospects," India Quarterly (Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January-March 1983), p. 4.

121. Ibid.,p.3.

122. N. Volkov, "The Developing Countries and International Economic Relations," International Affairs, Moscow (September 1976), p. 58.

123. Sobhanlal Mookerjea, quoted in Madan Mohan Puri, "International Round Table on Non-alignment: Editor's Report" Indian Journal of Political Science (Vol. 41, No.1, March 1980), p. 129.

124. Clifford Edogun, "The Non-aligned Movement Today: Towards an Ideological Perspective of World Order," Susquehanna University Studies (Vol. XI, No. 3, 1981), p. 138.

125. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, quoted in Ibid., p. 144.

126. A. K. Das Gupta, "Non-alignment and the International Economic Order," International Studies (Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January - June, 1981), p. 134.

127. Srdjan Kerim, "Activities of the Non-aligned in Building a New Economic Order," in A. W. Singham, The Non-aligned Movement in World Politics, op. cit., p. 186.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Parvathi Vasudevan, "Propsects for Non-alignment India's Role," India Quarterly, (Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January-March 1983), p. 52.

131. Kwame Nkrumah, "Africa in World Affairs," op. cit., p. 651.

132. A. P. Rana, "Nonalignment as a Developmental Foreign Policy Stra-
tegy: A Conceptual Enquiry Into Its Systematic Capabilities,"
Indian Journal of Political Science (Vol. 41, No. 4, December
1980), p. 588.

133. Satish Kumar, "Non-alignment as a Diplomatic Strategy," Interna-
tional Studies (Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981), p. 103.

134. Robert L. Rothstein, "Foreign Policy and Development Policy:
From Nonalignment to International Class War," op. cit.,
p. 603.

135. Thus, in this sense this perspective is seen as directly oppos-
ing the above nonalignment conceptualization perspectives of
global morality fountain and altruistic policy which view this
phenomenon as a major source of global supply of moral values
and orientations, and of selfless policy for the good of all man-
kind, respectively. Additionally, similarly, these tenets of
the nonalignment conceptualization as an opportunistic foreign
policy also conflict with the above international peace
guarantor perspective of conceptualization of this phenomenon.

136. Crabb, op. cit., p. 4.

137. Ibid.

138. George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdepen-
dence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 204.

139. John J. Stremlau, "The Foreign Policies of Developing Countries
in the 1980's," Journal of International Affairs (Vol. 34, No.
1, Spring/Summer 1980), p. 166.

140. Gordon J. Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy
1960-1966 (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), p. 29.

141. Nkrumah, "Africa in World Affairs," op. cit., p. 652.

142. Quoted in Akindele, op. cit., pp. 570-571.

143. Idang, op. cit., p. 29.

144. Ibid., p. 30.

145. Ibid., p. 29.

146. J. Isawa Elaigwu, "Non-Alignment and Disarmament: The Survival
of the Weak in an Insecure Global System," The Indian Political
Science Review (Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1983), p. 91.

147. <u>Ibid.</u>

148. <u>Ibid.</u>

149. <u>Ibid.</u>

150. <u>Ibid.</u>

151. <u>Ibid.</u>

152. <u>Ibid.</u>

153. <u>Ibid.</u>

154. <u>Ibid.</u>

155. Satish Kumar, "Nonalignment: International Goals and National Interests," <u>Asian Survey</u> (Vol. XXIII, No. 4, April 1983), pp. 445-463.

156. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 461.

157. Haile Selassie, quoted in Ayele, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 55.

158. K. R. Narayanan, <u>Non-Alignment, Independence, and National Interests,</u>" <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 94.

158. <u>Ibid.</u>

159. Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in Sarvepalli Gopal, ed., <u>Jawaharlal Nehru: An Anthology</u> (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 367-370.

160. K. P. Misra, "Towards Understanding Non-Alignment," <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 23.

161. Josip Broz Tito, quoted in Sarajcic, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 77-78 (footnote).

162. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 78.

163. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 77-78.

164. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 82.

165. <u>Ibid.</u>

166. Ali A. Mazrui, "Changing the Guards from Hindus to Muslims: Collective Third World Security in A Cultural Perspective," <u>International Affairs,</u> London (Vol. 57, No. 1, Winter 1980/81), p. 5.

133

167. Peter Willets, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance (New York: Nichols Publishing Co.), p. 29.

168. 'Ladipo Adamolekun, "The Foreign Policy of Guinea," in Olajide Aluko, ed., The Foreign Policy of African States, op. cit., p. iii.

169. Belisaro Betancur, quoted in Richard L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned the UN and the Superpowers (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 8.

170. Saddam Hussien, quoted in Steven B. Kashkett, "Iraq and the Pursuit of Nonalignment," Orbis (Vol. 26, Summer 1982), p. 479.

171. A. Appadorai, "Non-Alignment: Some Important Issues," International Studies (Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981), p. 8.

172. Ibid.

173. A. K. Damodaran, "Jawaharlal Nehru and Non-alignment," India Quarterly (Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January-March 1983), p. 43.

174. Bimal Prasad, "India's Foreign Policy: The Nehru Legacy" in M. S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly, eds., op. cit., p. 375.

175. Sukarno quoted in Bimal Prasad, "Historical Background of Non-alignment," International Studies (Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981), p. 20.

176. K. R. Narayanan, "Non-alignment, Independent and National Interests," op. cit., pp. 44-98.

177. Ibid., p. 95.

178. Ibid.

179. Nyerere, op. cit., p. 1.

180. Leo Mates, "The Concept of Non-Alignment," India Quarterly (Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January-March 1983), p. 6.

181. Ibid.

182. Ibid.

183. Ibid.

184. Ibid., pp. 6-12.

185. Ibid. However, this reasoning does not mean that the term used for a concept cannot in some cases be wholly, or partially, used to understand a concept.

186. K. P. Misra, "Towards Understanding Non-alignment," op. cit., p. 23.

187. Ibid.

188. Ibid.

189. Sublimal Dutt, quoted in Ibid., p. 25 (footnote).

190. Ibid., p. 25.

191. The fact that the lessening of the "coldness" of the Cold War during detente, did not seem to lead to the lessening of nonalignment phenomenon in the international sphere, but that, rather, it seemed to have increased the impact of nonalignment in the economic and social spheres of international relations (areas of activities that have much to do with the context within which nonalignment was founded—the need to achieve real and meaningful independence for poorer countries), somehow seem to reinforce K. P. Misra's line of reasoning.

192. K. P. Misra, "Towards Understanding Non-alignment," op. cit., p. 26.

193. Ibid.

194. H. Nakamura, quoted in Ibid.

195. Ibid., p. 26.

196. Ibid., p. 31.

197. Ibid., p. 29.

198. Ibid., p. 31.

199. Ibid.

200. Nehru quoted in Gopal, op. cit., p. 370.

201. Robert D'A. Henderson, "Nigeria: Future Nuclear Power?" Orbis (Vol. 25, No. 2, Summer 1981), pp. 409-423. The program ended with Nkrumah's presidency.

202. K. P. Misra, "Towards Understanding Non-alignment," op. cit., p. 31.

203. Appadorai, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

204. Ibid., p. 4.

205. Quoted in M. S. Rajan., "Institutionalization of Nonalignment: Widening Gulf Between the Belief and the Prospect," op. cit., p. 41. Such a desire not to form a new bloc was in keeping with their intention to revolutionize the practice of international relations through nonalignment which also, conceptually, connotes the need not to divide the world into camps. However, some observers, like M. S. Rajan, think that, consciously or unconsciously, the nonaligned countries are tending towards a bloc, particularly due to economic issues.

206. K. B. Lall and S. D. Muni, "Non-alignment and the New International Economic Order," in Misra, and Narayanan, eds., op. cit., p. 44.

207. Quoted in Ibid., p. 136.

208. Ibid., pp. 141-142.

209. Ibid., p. 144.

210. Summit Conferences of the nonaligned countries have been held in Belgrade (1961), Cairo (1964), Lusaka (1970), Algiers (1973), Colombo (1976), Havana (1979) and New Delhi (1983).

211. K. R. Narayanan, "Relevance of Non-alignment," in K. P. Misra and K. R. Narayanan, eds., op. cit., p. 19.

CHAPTER IV

NONALIGNMENT AND NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

In order to evaluate the nonaligned component of Nigerian for-
eign policy, separate attention will be given to Nigerian foreign pol-
icy during the various governmental regimes since each of the govern-
ments from 1960 to 1983 manifested distinctive foreign policy styles
and substances.

This examination of the Nigerian foreign policy will be done
through the examination of the main foreign policy issue areas that
were manifested during each of the periods, so as to portray the non-
alignment component in full perspective. From 1960 to 1983, there
were five governmental periods in Nigeria, the First Republic, the
Ironsi Government, the Gowon Government, the Mohammed/Obasanjo Govern-
ment, and the Second Republic. The nonaligned foreign policy content
in the Nigerian foreign policy will be evaluated for each of these gov-
ernmental periods, starting with the first one.

The First Republic

The First Republic covers the period from 1960 to 1966, during which Nigeria was under a parliamentary system with Tafawa Balewa serving as the Prime Minister. Notably, the First Republic was the maiden period of modern Nigeria existing as an independent and a sovereign nation. Thus, the First Republic foreign policy manifestation was also modern Nigeria's maiden foreign policy manifestation; and, therefore, it is fitting that the nature of the Balewa Government relations with Britain (the country that had colonized Nigeria) should first be examined.

The Balewa Government and Britain

An understanding of the nature of the First Republic relations with Britain is very important to the understanding of the nonaligned foreign policy adopted by the First Republic for two reasons. One is that the ability to exercise independent actions, both in foreign and domestic affairs, and to demonstrate one's de facto possession of sovereignty (apart from the de jure possession of such a status), constitute major features of nonalignment (although these features have to be complemented by others, which have been analyzed in a preceding chapter on the subject of the conceptual profile of nonalignment). The nature of the First Republic's relations with Britain (the country that had colonized Nigeria) is one of the important ways of assessing the nature of these features of independence and sovereignty as manifested by Nigeria during this era.

Another reason an assessment of the First Republic's relations
with Britain is important is the fact that the nature of relations
with Britain is also one of the important ways of assessing the nature
of Nigeria's relations with one of the twosuperpower blocs in the
contemporary international system--the Western bloc. The nature of a
nation's relations with the superpower blocs (in terms of demonstra-
ting that there is no routine link with any of the bloc against the
other) is another major feature of the phenomenon of nonalignment.
More specifically, the nature of Nigeria's relations with Britain re-
flects the nature of Nigeria's relation with the West since Britain is
a very important country in the Western bloc (and Britain's position
in this bloc is determined largely by the existence of the Common-
wealth of Nations, the nature of Britain's relations with the United
States, and Britain's role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization).
The Commowealth of Nations is an international organization composed
of most of the countries that were formerly under British colonial con-
trol;[1] and, Britain's position in this body, as its nerve center,
gives the former much avenue for international influence even though
all member states are legally deemedas having equal status within the
body. After the grandiose British global colonial empire was disman-
tled, except for some few insignificant territories, the phenomenon of
Commonwealth afforded Britain something to remind it of its past
global stature (though, practically, a poor reflection of that past),
and an international platform to show that it has not been reduced to
standing on the global sideline. During this period, when Britain was
not an official member of the European Economic Community, the

Commonwealth was particularly very important to it in order to have something to cling to and remain internationally significant. Since Britain is an important Western country, its ability to claim to have some close relationships with many countries in Africa and Asia, through the Commonwealth links, was important in helping it remain significant in the Western world.

Additionally, Britain is often perceived as having a very special relationship with the United States (the leader of the West), and as being its closest European ally although the United States has an excellent relationship with all Western European countries. This is further demonstrated by the fact that though some countries like the Federal Republic of Germany can be seen as having relations with the United States that is close to that which Britain enjoys, France, though also having good relations with the United States, may not be perceived as having as close a relationship with the latter as does Britain. And the important significance of Britain's special relations with the United States is the fact that it can contribute to Britain's being seen as a very influential Western country. One particular example of such an influential role in the West is Britain's role in NATO, which is that of a highly regarded member-state which has the confidence and respect of the United States (the leader of this military alliance).

Therefore, the Nigerian First Republic's closeness to, or distance from, Britain also meant its closeness to, or distance from, the West, and thus, is an indicator of the nonalignment content in the First Republic's foreign policy.

One main feature of Nigeria's relations with Britain was that the coalition government, formed by the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), with the former serving as the senior coalition party, pursued a very cooperative relationship with Britain as a priority foreign policy. This was reflected in the manner which the Federal Government of Nigeria was often prepared to reach accommodation with Britain in many foreign policy areas, although Britain's position conflicted with the general position of most Nigerians. For example, when there was "widespread and bitter" criticism in Nigeria of British policies, in connection with the unilateral declaration of independence in Zimbabwe (then called Rhodesia), the Nigerian Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, was of the opinion that Britain was not being very insensitive to the position of African countries that belonged to the Commonwealth.[2] Additionally, when some Nigerian legislators were criticizing the British government for supporting Portugal in the United Nations Security Council debates over the situation in Angola, the then Minister for External Affairs, Jaja Wachuku, was of the simple opinion that Britain was a sovereign state, and that it was not the duty of another country to interfere in its affairs.[3]

The nature of the First Republic's power elite seems to be the reason such for this sort of leanings. In particular, the NPC, the senior coalition party, was thoroughly controlled by the traditional political system that then had the grip on the northern areas of Nigeria.[4] Many NPC members also were traditional elites; and, therefore, the NPC injected a large dose of conservatism into Nigeria's

domestic and foreign policies. Thus, Ihonvbere (1983), relating the nature of the First Republic's power elite to Nigeria's foreign policy, noted "the capture of political power by a conservative and aristocratic power elite which interpreted international politics in moralistic and legitimist terms."[5]

Though the other coalition government party, the NCNC, grew out of a mass movement, and also had a progressive outlook, its desire to be a part of the government meant that they had to mostly give in to the conservative position of the coalition government's senior party, the NPC, and thus avoid "sticking to their radicalism and militant assertiveness."[6] Thus, in foreign affairs the NCNC mostly gave in to the NPC favoring of pro-British, and generally pro-West, policies. This sort of foreign policy posture was also reinforced by the placating, and avoidance of provocation, personal characteristics of Tafawa Balewa,[7] which meant that he had a "naive and unrealistic"[8] view of international politics; and, in particular, in relation to relations with Britain, this meant that the latter was able to have a lot of room to maneuver in.

Another important means of assessing the First Republic relations with Britain is through an assessment of its regard for the Commonwealth, since the latter is, by and large, an organization that is perceived as projecting British international influence.

In addition to a minister in charge of foreign affairs, there were two junior ministers—a Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations and a Minister of State for International Affairs.[9] That the Balewa Government thought it necessary to accord Commonwealth

relations a ministerial position that would be only concerned with its affairs, while no other specific foreign policy issue area, whether a geographical or a functional issue area, was accorded such a position, amounted to a deployment of diplomatic resources, both in terms of human and material resources, in the area of Commonwealth relations that was glaringly far higher than the deployment of resources in other areas of Nigerian foreign relations. Thus, this dramatically demonstrated that the Balewa Government had high regard for the Commonwealth and considered it a major diplomatic arena. However, it is important to note that this ministerial position for Commonwealth relations ended with the First Republic.

Apart from this sort of structural arrangement, that showed the importance of Commonwealth relations, the Prime Minister and other leading political figures, by devoting a significant portion of their personal attention to Commonwealth affairs, also demonstrated the importance the government accorded the latter. For example, important Cabinet ministers often attended Commonwealth events, and the Prime Minister always valued his attendance at Commonwealth conferences. In the case of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, his attachment to Commonwealth affairs was actually a devotion to its affairs. For example, even when Nigeria was in great turmoil, due to political crisis in the then Western Region, he found it necessary to host a Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in Lagos, in January, 1966, in order to discuss the problem of decolonizing Zimbabwe (then called Rhodesia).[10] This was also his last public activity, for the First Republic was brought to a conclusion on January 15, 1966 by the advent of a military government.

The Commonwealth economic agencies also played a great role in the First Republic's external economic relations. For example, they made available to Nigeria 7.7 million Naira and 20 million Naira loans, in 1960 and 1962, respectively.[11] Therefore, in the area of foreign economic relations, the First Republic also utilized the Commonwealth framework as a very important avenue for foreign economic contacts.

In addition to these Commonwealth economic links, there were Nigerian economic links with Britain, which was clearly more important than the Commonwealth economic ties per se. The economy of First Republic Nigeria was actually still a reflection of a colonial legacy (an economy hinged on the periphery of the Western economic structure), and, having a conservative government like the Balewa Government (which was not ready for much fundamental restructuring of the economy of an independent Nigeria), meant that Britain continued to play a very important role in the Nigerian economy. Thus, in 1960, Britain was still the major Nigerian foreign trade partner by accounting for 42.3 and 47.6 percent of the latter's imports and exports, respectively.[12] However, this major British role was gradually decreasing, though not significantly since, at the end of the First Republic, it was still the major foreign trade partner in 1965 by accounting for 30.9 and 37.8 percent of Nigeria's imports and exports, respectively.[13]

As expected, this dominant British role in Nigeria's foreign trade relations was also followed by the West being Nigeria's main trade partner, generally. The West in 1960 accounted for about 85 and

90 percent of Nigeria's imports and exports, respectively; and in 1965, about 80 and 85 percent of Nigeria's imports and exports.[14]

Western economic interests were also very prevalent in the Nigerian domestic economy with the manufacturing sector, the mining industry, the huge marketing conglomerates, and the banking industry, virtually controlled by them.

Thus, during the First Republic, Nigeria's foreign economic relations were mostly with the West; and in terms of the relevance of the concept of nonalignment in connection with this area of Nigeria's foreign relations, it can be said that Nigeria was aligned with Britain, specifically, and with the West, generally.

Another major area of Nigeria's relation with Britain is the nature of cultural links between both; and for the First Republic era an examination of this area of their relations is very important since that period in Nigeria's national life was the maiden era of modern Nigeria existing as an independent country after just gaining independence from Britain.

Clearly the new independent Nigeria had to exist with a considerable amount of cultural legacy that was the direct result of the British colonial contact; and the most visible manifestation of this was the use of English as the official language of Nigeria (the English language still serves this function in Nigeria). Being an important cultural dynamic, the English language has served to help maintain a considerable amount of cultural ties between both countries and between Nigeria and West. Specifically, the use of this language in Nigeria has helped printed and broadcasted forms of communication

(with either scholarly or popular appeal emphasis), and communication through visual and performing arts, from English-speaking countries, to be available in Nigeria. Also, the use of English in Nigeria has allowed the above forms of communication, originating from the latter, to be available in many English-speaking countries. Additionally, many Nigerians visit or live in Britain, and vice versa; which also helps in maintaining cultural links between the two countries.

The colonial era in Nigeria also meant the introduction of British political and legal values, through the introduction of British political and legal frameworks into Nigeria. At independence, though there were many political and legal structural changes, due to the desire to ensure that an independent Nigeria also reflected new Nigerian political and legal values, this was not done by discarding the British political and legal frameworks. It was accomplished by retaining those of them that had come to be perceived as part of the Nigerian social reality, and by also bringing new political and legal frameworks that were Nigerian social products. For example, the Federal and Regional Constitutions adopted in 1960 and 1963, while reflecting a lot of the British political framework, was also geared toward the creation, sustenance and growth of an independent and sovereign Nigeria. Also, the legal system frameworks, while still containing a lot of the British legal frameworks, inculcated legal frameworks from the various legal traditions that are indigenous to Nigeria.

On the whole, the cultural links with Britain, as shown above, through the use of common official languages, frequent human contacts, and the sharing of some similar political and legal frameworks, meant

that Nigeria and Britain had tremendous cultural links. In terms of the relevance of this reality to the nonalignment concept, it can be said that the West was much closer to Nigeria, culturally, than the East, since the British cultural tradition is prominent in the West (though other cultural traditions, like the French and the broader Latin cultural traditions, at other historical epochs, dominated the West), and at present, many countries in the West, share fairly common cultural traditions. More specifically, the fact that the United States, the leader in the West, does share the language, has frequent human contacts, and has similar political and legal traditions, with Britain also means that Nigeria has many cultural links with the dynamic center of the West.

However, it must also be noted that Britain, in spite of its colonial presence in Nigeria, did not have a wholesale cultural impact on Nigeria, ironically, partly because of some aspects of British colonial policy. The most significant of these was the Indirect Rule policy whereby in most parts of Nigeria the British colonial authorities almost left intact the political systems they came to find in Nigeria. This policy was due to the sheer logistical problems they envisaged in any attempt to directly administer a country the size and complexity of Nigeria, the lessons they learned in India (in terms of realizing that it is far more prudent not to tamper much with the political structures they come into contact with), and their admiration of the strong political and administrative systems that they found in places like the Oyo and Benin Empires and the Emirates in the northern parts of Nigeria. Thus, with the Obas and Emirs, continuing to rule their

domains[15] to such an extent, the British cultural values did not per-
meate the Nigerian society in such a pervasive amount that the French
and Portugese cultural values were able to more considerably permeate
the countries that came under their colonial tentacles. The net prod-
uct was that Nigeria became independent not only with some British cul-
tural legacy, but also, with Nigerian traditional cultural values
still having much impact in many spheres of life. For example, while
some Nigerians living in urban areas could speak English (though most
of these continue to use a Nigerian language as a primary medium of
communication), most Nigerians could only speak, or understand, a Nige-
rian language. Additionally, while those living in urban areas came
under political and legal frameworks that inculcated a lot of British
political and legal frameworks, many Nigerians had primary contacts
with political and legal frameworks that contained more traditional
Nigerian political and legal values.

Thus in an overall assessment, the nature of Nigeria's cul-
tural links with Britain has not been as strong (as should have been
expected from the former's colonial control), especially when compared
with the French, Portuguese, or Spanish cultural impacts in countries
that are their former colonies.[16]

The nature of military links between the First Republic and
Britain is another important area to consider. Most Nigerian military
personnel had undergone officers' training courses in British military
institutions since, during the First Republic, such facilities were
limited in Nigeria. Additionally, British military officers also
served under contract in Nigeria to help in further training and

military development programs. Nigeria military hardware also mostly came from Britain.

Thus, in the area of military relations, the First Republic had most of such links with Britain, and thus with the West. However, as will be shown below, close military relations with Britain was widely unpopular in Nigeria, due to the latter's colonial past and the tense Cold War situation between the Western and Eastern blocs.

On the whole, a general assessment of the First Republic's relations with Britain in the political, economic, cultural and military spheres has demonstrated a situation of close relations; and in the context of nonalignment it can be said that First Republic Nigeria was much closer to the West than to the East, since Britain is an important Western country. However, due to tremendous pressures from various interest groups and many radical individuals and forums (that were part of the First Republic's federal coalition government), the First Republic was not able to be routinely linked to Britain or the West in general.[17] This phenomenon was forcefully demonstrated by the controversy surrounding, and the dismal fate of, the effort to institute a pact to cover Nigeria's relations with Britain in the military area.

The Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact

This pact, which took effect in 1960, was a legal compact aimed at promoting cooperation in military affairs between Nigeria and Britain in a way that many Nigerians felt was very involving. Essentially, it provided for the British ability to use military facilities in Nigeria.

However, the pact sparked much public resentment, and within a year after its existence it was politically immobilized due to the intense public agitation for its abrogation. This massive public outrage was very catalytic, and led to a very brief and ineffective life span for the pact since it resulted in the former's abrogation in 1962.

The pact was favored by the important political circles of the First Republic federal coalition government. These consisted of the upper echelon of the NPC and NCNC, which were the coalition government parties. However, the same coalition government establishment harbored a significant number of radical and assertive political circles, though mostly at the level of the political parties' organizational framework (and then also mostly as the radical wings or affiliates of the parties--especially the NCNC), or at the regional governmental levels. For example, the Zikist National Vanguard (ZNV) was the radical wing of the NCNC and was much opposed to the pact. The Nigerian Youth Congress and the Nigerian Socialist Group were some of the very vocal pressure groups against the pact, and many of their members belonged to the NCNC.

Being part of the governing establishment, the individuals in these radical groups who held government positions were very effective in destroying the pact from within the government itself. For example, Adewale Fashanu, the President-General of ZNV was one of the directors of the Nigerian National Press, which was owned by the Federal Government.[18] His was a significant position regarding national communications. Also, the ZNV Vice-Chairman, R. B. K. Okafor, was a

federal legislator who later held the post of Parliamentary Secretary in the Ministry of Justice; and it was he who tabled a motion in the House of Representatives that disapproved of Nigeria entering into any external arrangement, such as the one provided for in the pact. A. Abangwu, the Chairman of the Nigerian Socialist Group, who was also the Deputy Speaker of the NCNC-controlled Eastern House of Assembly, also asserted that it was his organization's pressure which made the Federal Government decide not to include the provision for military bases in the final draft of the pact.[19]

With such prominent opposition the pact's fate was doomed. However, the most critical blow was the accelerating of public awareness about the negative implications of the pact (in terms of compromising Nigeria's ability to be independent and sovereign), that was fueled by vocal denunciation by nonestablishment groups. For example, the students' group that led a march to the Parliament, in protest of the pact,[20] and thereby focused national attention on the pact as a menace to Nigeria's independence (thus hastening its abrogation which came in 1962).

On the whole, the significance of the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact episode, in terms of nonalignment, was the fact that it demonstrated that, though the First Republic governing group was a conservative lot that was prepared to have a very close relationship with the West, especially Britain; however, there were also in existence, within the political system, certain political forces and dynamics with enough momentum to counter-balance, or, as in the case of this

pact, to nullify the tendencies within the governing elite that would have resulted in Nigeria being routinely aligned to a superpower bloc.

Thus, the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact episode demonstrated that the First Republic had enough political dynamics to ensure that Nigeria was not routinely aligned to any superpower bloc.

However, the successful abrogation of the pact did not mean that the First Republic coalition government became very assertive in the foreign policy area. Nevertheless, it did actually have a significant impact for the Balewa Government, which had very close relations with Britain at the early phase of the First Republic and tried to show that it could exhibit some assertiveness, especially in the area of African affairs. Still, even such an effort at assertiveness was at a very mild level (especially if the Balewa foreign policy is compared to that of Nkrumah's Ghana); and although throughout the First Republic era Nigeria had very good relations with Britain and the West in general, such relationships were not characterized by any routine Nigerian link to the latter.

The First Republic and Pan-African Ideals and Goals

The First Republic era coincided with the first half of the 1960's, a period when many countries under colonial regimes gained their independence; and in Africa this dramatic decolonization process resulted in almost all African countries (except countries mostly under the Portuguese colonial regimes, and those under minority regimes in Southern Africa) being able to regain their independence.

A very important international issue that engaged the attention of these African countries was the search for frameworks through which they could cooperate with each other in order to create better political, social, and economic situations in the continent. Also fueling the interest in this issue area was the fact that the clamor for such an African framework had a rich historical legacy due to the Pan-Africanism concepts and movements that had developed in the Western countries among both people of African Ancestry within those countries and students from Africa that sojourned to those countries for education (led by people like W.E.B. Dubois, Marcus Garvey and George Padmore. However, it must also be noted that, while the Pan-African ideals and goals of the leaders of African countries emphasize more the reality on the continent, the Pan-Africanism identified with the above initiatives, or actions, of people of African ancestry in the Western world is more of a movement that seeks closer ties among people from, or of, Africa, wherever they may be, in order to foster the betterment of their political, social and economic situations. However these two tendencies shared the same ideals and goals.

To the Balewa Government of the First Republic of Nigeria, the pursuit of African unity, in order to uplift Africa politically, socially and economically, was also an important policy. Thus, it saw the "future strength" of Africa as lying in its "closer integration."[21] This view was based on Nigeria's conviction that "the havoc wrought by imperialists and colonists had been the carving up of the continent" and "that the road to future strength and prosperity lay in coming together once more in closer integration."[22]

However, Nigeria differed significantly from some other Afri-
can countries on how such integration could be achieved, and on what
the nature of such an integration should be. It conceived the best
means of achieving African integration as being through gradual and
functional cooperation in social and economic spheres, which would
later spill over into cooperation in political spheres.[23] Addition-
ally, it favored cooperation starting at the level of sub-regions in
the various parts of Africa, for example, West, East and Central Afri-
can regions, though it also believed that some form of political coop-
eration was necessary (but it only viewed such political cooperation
in terms of "a loose federation," in order to ensure "a good begin-
ning"[24]). Therefore, to Nigeria, the establishment of an immediate
suprastate unification of Africa was not a good idea, and it thus as-
serted it would be "premature to form a Union of States under one sov-
ereignty."[25]

This sort of Nigerian policy on Pan-African affairs was much
in direct contradiction with the policies of countries like Ghana. Es-
sentially, to Ghana, African unity was understood only in terms of an
immediate suprastate unification of Africa. In fact, in Ghana this
idea of African unity was "no longer a matter for public political de-
bate" because that country's constitution "specifically states that
Ghana is prepared, at any time, to surrender her sovereignty in whole
or in part, in the interest of a Union of African States."[26]

In actuality, these differing views on African unity were of
much significance in the African political scene due to the fact that
those that had the same view as Nigeria formed a bloc called the

Monrovia bloc, while those who had the same view as Ghana's formed the Casablanca bloc.[27]

The Monrovia bloc consisted mainly of moderate, and mostly pro-West, African countries,[28] while the Casablanca bloc was made up of the radical countries which generally sought to drastically reduce links to the West. Herein lies the basis for evaluating the First Republic's policy in the area of Pan-African affairs in terms of the concept of nonalignment. To the extent that Nigeria was identified with the Monrovia bloc, which favored a gradual and functional integration of Africa and which had pro-West tendencies, Nigeria's policy also reflected some pro-West tendencies.

However, the Nigerian Pan-African policy was not static throughout the First Republic era; thus, it increasingly added some assertiveness, partly to calm domestic critics[29] and partly to adjust its position in order not to appear to other African states as not being strongly committed to a strong united Africa. Indeed, Nigeria played an active role in building the bridges that helped in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (and thus it helped in creating a framework which embraced the whole continent, and which also led to the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs ceasing to exist).

Thus, toward the end of the First Republic, Nigeria had become more assertive in Pan-African affairs. For example, in 1965 it could forcefully declare that "Africa cannot be subverted unless African states aid such subversion," and that no foreign power "can get a foothold on the African continent save with the aid and abettment of

Africa."[30] However, Nigerian assertiveness did not reach a level in which it saw itself, or was seen by others, as a radical either in terms of domestic or foreign policy. Therefore, it is not surprising that when the First Republic was brought to an end, and the Prime Minister during that era, Tafawa Balewa, was assassinated, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana described the latter as

> . . . a victim of forces he did not understand and a martyr to a neo-colonialist system of which he was merely a figurehead. . . . Striving valiantly to master a situation which was beyond his capacity, he has fallen in a struggle whose nature he never understood.[31]

Nigeria and the Congo Crisis

The early 1960's, that heralded the regaining of independence by many African countries, also witnessed the debacle that was made out of Zaire's (then called the Congo) effort to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity after regaining its independence from Belgium. This global unnerving spectacle was appropriately referred to as the Congo Crisis in many circles. It manifested itself in terms of leadership tussles that resulted in long periods of confusion over where, or whether, adequately recognizable political authority existed, and was also accompanied by general political immobilism, a paralyzed state apparatus, and threats of secession. There was also a galore of allegations of undue interference in the internal affairs of the Congo by Belgium, the two superpowers, and even the United Nations (whose civilian and military operations in that country were conceived by the global body as a means of providing the environment for the restoration of a viable polity).

Nigeria expectedly was closely involved in the Congo Crisis since it, like other African countries, was eager to ensure that the Congo should not be subjected to forces that were only out to enfeeble it. Notably, Nigeria's policy in the Congo was that of supporting the United Nations' role in the Congo; and thus,as it regained its own independence in 1960 and became a member of the United Nations, it provided military personnel to aid in the latter's military operations in the Congo.[32] Additionally, Nigeria was also very anxious to support the UN civilian operations, and forwarded two of its senior civil servants, T. A. R. Oki and Francis Nwokedi, to serve with that body,[33] with the latter being the third person to hold the position of head of United Nations operations in the Congo, after Rajeshwar Dayal (Indian) and Robert Gardiner (Ghanaian).[34]

On the purely political plane, Nigeria also sought to foster the UN role. JaJa Wachuku, a Nigerian, as the Chairman of the UN Conciliation Commission, helped the UN to play a credible role in helping to deal with the political issues Congo faced.[35]

Significantly, this Nigerian policy of overwhelming support for UN role seems to have stemmed from the Nigerian foreign elite conceiving the Congo Crisis in terms of a situation of a breakdown of law and order in the Congo due to the existence of a weak political, social and economic infrastructure at the time it regained its independence. For example, to Jaja Wachuku of Nigeria, the "lesson to be learned from the Congo" was that the "failure to ensure the education of indigenous people" before independence leads to "chaos and the risk of a world conflict."[36]

Having diagnosed the cause of the Congo Crisis as above, Nigeria saw the solution as the provision of political, social and economic infrastructures that can support a sovereign state and thus bring political viability to the Congo. Therefore, Nigeria's Congo policy reflected a mostly "nonpolitical, administrative"[37] character.

Interestingly, the Balewa Government of First Republic Nigeria diagnosis of, and solution to, the Congo Crisis was much in consonance with those of the UN and major Western powers (and, at that period, the latter had much influence on the former).

However, the Nigerian policy had many critics both at home and abroad. The NCNC, the other party in the coalition government, was strongly in support of Lumumba and what he stood for, and was also very critical of the United Nations.[38] This put it at odds with the Balewa Government's full support of the UN and the former's efforts not to appear to support any of the political groups in the Congo. The Action Group, the Opportunity Party, was also strongly against the official Nigerian role and according to its leader, Obafemi Awolowo, the forces against Lumumba represented forces that did not stand for the genuine independence of the Congo.[39] This implied that Nigeria had to take sides in the Congo Crisis--and that it should support the Lumumba forces. Additionally, much of the press,[40] the pressure groups,[41] and the mass public opinion[42] were also in support of the Lumumba forces, and saw them as representing the genuine interest of Congo and all of Africa, and thus opposed the government's policy.

Nigeria's role in the Congo was also very displeasing to some African countries. The role that Jaja Wachuku played, in his leadership role in the UN forums concerned with the Congo Crisis, earned him the following epithets from African ambassadors that reflected how those countries felt about Nigeria's role in the crisis: "lackey of imperialism and neo-colonialism," "frolicking," "this ridiculously self-satisfied and dangerously irresponsible despot," "human wreck," and "a traitor and an enemy of Africa."[43]

The Balewa Government, which strongly believed that it was playing a sane and level-headed role in the Congo Crisis, was appalled by these domestic and international criticisms (but convinced of the soundness of its role, it nevertheless continued this role, at least in terms of substance).

On the other hand, at least in terms of style, the Balewa Government tried to assuage domestic criticism and international ridicule by later on occasionally taking some actions that fell in line with progressive positions. For example, "Nigeria began to canvass for some kind of rapprochement with the Casablanca powers,"[44] which consisted of the radical African countries that were pro-Lumumba. Additionally, toward the end of the First Republic, Nigeria would be heard saying that it was "ready to work with all fellow African countries within the OAU in a renewed search for a plan of assistance for the Congo,"[45] thus indicating that Nigeria believed that, apart from the UN, the solution to the Congo Crisis also can be found in purely African forums. This was a significant change from an earlier view that

such African initiative should be within the UN framework.[46] However, it must also be noted that Nigeria had always stressed a strong African role,[47] no matter what forum it was to be manifested. Also, it must be noted that Nigeria, right from the beginning supported the sanctity of the Congolese territorial integrity. For example, Jaja Wachuku warned that,

> . . . any country that dares to suggest that Katanga will by any means be taken out of the Congo is an enemy of Africa so far as we are concerned.[48]

However, Nigeria's support for the UN role in the Congo Crisis remained constant; thus, even towards the end of the First Republic such support was reiterated.[49]

On the whole, supporting the UN role in the Congo Crisis can be interpreted to also mean a Nigerian policy towards the Congo crisis that was closer to the Western position (since the UN then was much influenced by it and such influence was apparent in UN Congo initiatives, though some of such UN initiatives did differ with the positions of some Western countries sometimes). Also, some scholars like Akinyemi hold the view that, "the fact that the Western states, especially the United States, opposed Lumumba," and Nigeria, did not support Lumumba, but instead tried to show that it did not favor any of the political groups in the Congo, made "the Nigerian policy . . . even more suspect."[50] Therefore, assessing Nigeria's policy towards the Congo Crisis, in terms of nonalignment, shows that its policy was closer to that of the West.

The First Republic and Southern Africa

While the process of decolonization was sweeping Africa in the 1960s, in most countries in Southern Africa such winds of change had insignificant momentum. Coupled with this was the lack of any progress in moves to dismantle the offensive and explosive racial situation of suppression and exploitation in Zimbabwe (then called Southern Rhodesia) and South Africa.

In principle, the Balewa Government fully supported the effort to solve the problem of colonization and/or racial oppression in Southern Africa, which during that period persisted in Angola, Sao Tome, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia), Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia), Botswana (then Bechuanaland), Lesotho (then Basutoland), and Swaziland. Some, like the last four, were not serious problem areas and did easily regain their independence. However, the Balewa Government policy towards the solution of the problems in these areas was loaded with concern for constitutionality and adequate preparation for independence;[51] and this underlying emphasis of its policy made many, inside and outside of Nigeria, dissatisfied with Nigeria's role in the Southern Africa problem area. Although the Balewa Government wanted colonization and racial oppression to be wiped out in Southern Africa, it had almost no sympathy for any group that wanted to use armed struggle to achieve this. Thus, during the First Republic, while supporting the effort to solve the Southern African problem, Nigeria was, generally, not very close to many nationalist groups from this area (though it gave moral and material help to them, through the OAU Liberation Committee, as African countries were,

and are still, required to do). For example, the Balewa Government did not make these nationalist groups feel that Lagos was a very understanding place to them, even though these groups made extra efforts to create such a climate.[52] Additionally, Balewa mostly avoided personal contacts with the leaders of these groups.[53]

Another important aspect of Nigeria's policy towards the Southern African problem was its lack of significant resentment towards the colonial and apartheid authorities in this area. For example, despite a general outcry inside and outside of Nigeria over the Sharpeville Massacre of March, 1960, and the fact that all the Nigerian political parties demanded the banning of trade with, and the Commonwealth terminating the membership of, South Africa, the Balewa Government invited South Africa to the Nigerian independence ceremonies and did not break trade relations with that country until April, 1961.[54] Also,

> On the eve of the March 1961 Commonwealth Conference, Balewa still said he had not made up his mind whether to oppose South African membership or not, despite the rare unanimity among Nigerian political parties and the press in demanding the expulsion of South Africa.[55]

And this particular episode shows that, in some cases, Nigeria's foreign policy was strongly dependent on the whims and caprices of Balewa (as a person).

The Balewa Government, by recognizing diplomatically the short-lived Central African Federation (which would be perceived mostly as an effort to thwart the efforts to regain genuine independence in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi through the dilution of the nationalist strengths in these countries by bringing them under a federal umbrella that could be effectively controlled from Harare, then Salisbury), also showed how far it went in fraternizing with authorities that were

seen as representing the impediments to the solution of Southern African problems. And for the record it should be noted that, "until the dissolution of the Federation, Balewa allowed the Federation to keep its diplomatic mission in Lagos."[56] This was another situation in which Balewa stuck to such a policy despite considerable criticism from inside and outside Nigeria. For example, both the government and the opposition party legislators in the House of Representatives were against the course of action followed by Balewa.[57] Also, such an insensitivity on the part of Balewa drew the following retort from a Zimbabwean nationalist group:

> Your lack of understanding of the African plight from Welensky's oppression is shocking, disturbing and unbefitting an African Prime Minister. Your friendship with Roy Welensky has warped your sense of justice.[58]

Another strand of the Balewa Government's policy towards the Southern African problem areas was an underlying overdose of flexibility which, in some instances, bordered on policy actions that many considered to be policies that could perpetuate the problems in these areas. For example, Jaja Wachuku proposed "a federation of 'black' and 'white' states in South Africa"[59] as a solution to the South African problem. It should also be noted that, in this instance, Wachuku's proposal did not only appear capable of perpetuating the South African problem but it was also identical to a solution the South African authorities (which at present are trying to implement such a policy, despite domestic and international opposition) had conceived as 'Bantustanism', and which at present translates into carving South Africa into 'black' and 'white' states. In reality this

represents the wish that the black population can vanish from the mainstream of South African political life and the illusion that they can achieve their full political participation in the so-called 'homeland' states. In a nutshell, the 'Bantustan' policy basically rests on the notion that blacks and whites can best live in separate societies (which the South African authorities also purports to mean two societies with equal opportunities, but which the majority of South Africans and the international community sees as an arrangement which perpetuates very limited political, social and economic opportunities for blacks). Additionally, this notion of racial separation is the bedrock of the apartheid policy, and the fact that the 'Bantustan' policy also rests on such a notion means that the idea of separate 'black' and 'white' states is an effort to create new structures to perpetuate the apartheid phenomenon.

Thus, Wachuku, by proposing the creation of 'black' and 'white' states in a federated South Africa as a solution to the South African problem, far from being seen as a form of flexible policy, was perceived as a Balewa Government policy that bordered on support for the apartheid policy of 'Bantustanism'. Though the Balewa Government did drop this proposal, it appears that such a perception of the proposal, due to its shocking value, stuck in the minds of many as a statement that reflected an endemic pattern of thought in the Balewa Government foreign policy circles.

Expectedly, this Wachuku proposal triggered an avalanche of outrage from the press, the mass public and pressure groups. Some called for Wachuku's dismissal from the government, while others saw

his actions as demoralizing and shocking and also "accused him of sub-
scribing to the idea of Bantustanism.[60]

However, there is a need to reiterate that the First Repub-
lic's foreign policy was not static and, in the case of its policy
towards the Southern African problem, there was some change over time
(though such changes were gradual and often were changes involving
style rather than the substance of its policy). In connection with
the struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe, which occurred during
the early phase of the First Republic, Nigeria seemed to have shown
much faith in the British authorities' having the political will to
help bring genuine independence to that country[61] (on the basis that
the British Government, being the de jure colonial authority in the
country then, had the legal and moral responsibility to ensure that
the latter was able to have nothing less than genuine independence).
Additionally, Nigeria, along with several other African countries, en-
dorsed the position championed by Ghana that the situation then in Zim-
babwe "represented colonialism in its worst form."[62] The Balewa Gov-
ernment appeared to have been much impressed with the chances of con-
stitutional reforms being able to make all the segments of the Zimbab-
wean population willing "to work together."[63] It also made state-
ments which implied that it strongly preferred the process of bringing
independence to that country to be marked with gradualism and adequate
preparation for independence, even though it saw the conditions in
that country as being grave. Thus, while in one breath it recognized
the question of independence for that country as being "very explo-
sive," in the same breath it was advocating that the people of

that country should "learn to govern by governing" during an implied preparation for independence period.[64]

Nevertheless, towards the end of the First Republic, the Balewa Government did become a little bit more assertive in its position on the situation in Zimbabwe. For example, it was becoming more forceful in demanding economic sanctions against the illegal regime then in power in that country.[65] Also, it even began to publicly doubt the sincerity of those big powers that it regarded as its friends, and thus it posited that the question of independence for Zimbabwe "was going to be a test of the sincerity of the big powers which claimed to be friends of Africa."[66] The threat of African countries using "all forces at their disposal" to bring independence to that country was not even ruled out by Nigeria.[67]

The above positions represented an increasing level of assertiveness over the question of Zimbabwean independence; but, even then, the change was mostly in terms of style (while the substance of policy basically remained moderate). Such assertiveness was still very mild relative to the positions identified with many radical African countries.

Nigeria, on the whole, still trusted the British "to spare no effort"[68] in initiating some 'constitutional' arrangements to solve the problems in that country. Thus, while countries like Mali were of the view that the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) carried out by the regime then in power in Zimbabwe "had occurred with the encouragement and even complicity of the United Kingdom,"[69] and Tanzania also saw the role by the latter as dismal enough to warrant its

termination of diplomatic relations with that country,[70] Nigeria ". . . accepted the British view that 'limited economic sanctions' and not force of arms would be adequate to bring"[71] the regime then in Zimbabwe to submission, "and hence were the more appropriate reaction to UDI . . ."[72] The First Republic's policy towards the Zimbabwe issue, therefore, showed that its earlier hope for "a peaceful and orderly manner"[73] of bringing independence to that country prevailed throughout that era of Nigerian government.

With regards to the situation in South Africa, Nigeria also endorsed the idea of hoping for "a peaceful change"[74] in that country's policies, though it was also aware of the gravity of the festering situation. For example, it noted that the three most serious concerns it saw facing the United Nations then, namely, disarmament, colonialism and slavery, as all existing in South Africa.[75] This Nigerian policy of helping to look for peaceful solutions to the South African problem thus led it to constantly advocate economic sanctions against that country.[76] Additionally, it also worked towards utilizing the United Nations facilities and resources to expose and disseminate information about the evils of the apartheid system, and about those outside elements that help to keep it alive.[77] Thus, implicitly by emphasizing these two methods of solving the apartheid problem, Nigeria appeared to have held the view that South Africa, and the countries Nigeria considered to be economically, militarily and politically, helping the latter, were capable of being rational and willing to respond to international public opinion in favor of an immediate termination of the apartheid system, either through the concern for

global moral indignation or through the physical hardship that sanctions might bring. But the history of the past decades seems to indicate that the Balewa Government overestimated South Africa's moral capacity and political will, while underestimating their capacity to be obsessed with and impressed by the power that can be sustained through the possession of coercive forces.

With regard to the situation in Namibia, Nigeria was also hopeful that international forums like the United Nations "would fulfill its obligations to the inhabitants of the territory by rescuing them from the "monster of Apartheid."[78] And here again recent history testifies to the fact that Nigeria overestimated the capacity of international organizations like the United Nations, and the ability of the world's more powerful countries to help solve this issue.

However, it seems that Nigeria did sometimes doubt the goodwill and sincerity of some countries. For example, in connection with its surprise at the level of foreign military support that Portugal got, and often used, to maintain its colonial regimes in Africa and elsewhere, Shettima Ali Monguno of Nigeria asserted that the "NATO powers were responsible for the arms build-up . . . in Portugal," and that he could not understand their "pleading the necessities of western defence."[79] Additionally,

> Nigeria failed to see that South Africa could properly be regarded as part of the free world in view of its racial policies, denials of fundamental human rights, repression and oppression of individuals and the aggressive tendencies.[80]

Nevertheless, despite some of this doubt, the First Republic, as shown above, was mainly in support of peaceful solutions to the

problems of Southern Africa, and was not advocating armed struggle. This sort of policy position was mostly parallel to the policy position of Western countries, and was far from the policies of the East which was actively supporting the armed struggle in these areas. Therefore, in terms of nonalignment during the First Republic, the latter's policy position toward Southern African problems was much closer to the policy position of the West than that of the East.

The General Decolonization Process and the First Republic

Apart from the problems in the Congo and Southern Africa, the 1960's also witnessed the struggle for independence and social justice in other parts of Africa and throughout the world, generally.

Nigeria's attitude toward the decolonization process in these places, as was applicable to the Congo and Southern African situations as already shown above, was marked by the concern for constitutionality, gradualism, and prospects for stability (though it undoubtedly wanted all territories to be free from colonial yoke and social oppression). For example, the radical Algerian Provisional Government was not recognized by the Balewa Government, and it refused "to invite it to the Lagos Conference of African Heads of States and Government."[81] The Balewa Government also reasoned that independence should only be granted to countries after adequate preparation; and in 1961, it proposed 1970 as the date for all the colonial territories to be independent.[82] This action was also another one that was highly criticized both within and outside of Nigeria, and many African countries were

particularly shocked by this proposal.[83] The level of the unpopularity of this proposal was demonstrated by the strong dismay expressed even by an important member of the party controlling the government, the NPC, who complained that Nigerians "have completely neglected nonindependent African nations," and that he would "like the Ministry of Foreign affairs for goodness sake, to avoid giving the impression that" Nigerians were "British stooges because circumstances" showed that Nigeria was "still a satellite of the United Kingdom."[84]

However, the Balewa Government's policy also had some assertive aspects toward the general decolonization process, though these were relatively mild. For example, "since 1963 Nigeria has been a member and the biggest contributor to the funds of the OAU Liberation Committee which assists freedom fighters in the areas of Africa"[85] still under colonial or racial oppression.

On the whole, in terms of to nonalignment, Nigeria's role in the decolonization process, as shown above, was much in tune with Western positions since it, like the latter, emphasized the elements of constitutionality, nonradicalism, and gradual changes based on adequate national political and administrative preparations for independence. Additionally, it should also be noted that some observers like Akinyemi state that while admirers may term Balewa's actions as those of a "moderate," his critics term his actions as those of a "neo-colonial agent."[86]

The Middle East Problem and the First Republic

The First Republic of Nigeria maintained diplomatic relations with both the Arab countries and Israel in such a way that there was a somewhat balanced perspective to its relations with both. Thus, even in relation to the conflictual relations between both, Nigeria mostly avoided actions that portrayed it as favoring one side. This was often done by refusing to take any committed position, and also by urging both sides to compromise.[87]

This sort of even-handed relationship with Israel and the Arab world had much to do with the Nigerian domestic reality. With an almost equal population of Nigerians adhering to the Christian and Muslim religious faiths, and with the members of the two faiths residing mostly in the southern and northern parts of Nigeria, respectively, there were also tendencies which showed that the mostly Christian South was pro-Israel, while the mostly Muslim North was pro-Arab. The fact that the political forces in the two areas reinforced these tendencies also reinforced the latters' significance, in terms of their impact on the Nigerian policy towards the Israeli/Arab conflict.

The fact that neither of the two religious groups was overwhelmingly more populous, in addition to the nature of Federal Government during the First Republic, meant that not only were the political forces within the country more or less balanced, but that they were also mostly incorporated into broad-based coalition governmental frameworks. The Federal Government consisted of a coalition government formed by the Northern-based NPC and the Eastern-based NCNC, during

the early and middle period of the First Republic, and by a more broad based compromise coalition government of the NPC, NCNC, and the Western-based Nigerian National Democratic Party--NNDP--during the later period of the First Republic). This resulted in considerable compromising and balancing acts (more so since most of the coalition parties were incompatible with others and only joined the coalition to share power).

In relation to Israeli/Arab issues, this compromising and balancing act was very significant in that the compromising and balancing between the political forces of both the mostly Christian pro-Israel South, and the mostly Muslim pro-Arab North, produced the Nigerian Middle East policy that showed an even-handed dealing with the Israelis and the Arabs. However, it must be noted that the compromising and the balancing of views also might have been made more possible by the very accommodating, and placating, personality of the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa.[88]

Additionally, it is also important to note that the ability to compromise views on the Israel/ Arab issue, for the sake of national interests, did not actually mean that the partisan tendencies, which had strong specific regional anchors, also disappeared. Instead, they were waxing strong at the regional level. For example, the Premier of the then Northern Region, Ahmadu Bello, over-involved himself with the efforts to rally the Islamic world against Israel, while the governments of the then Western and Eastern Regions were also very intense in their links with Israel, especially in the economic areas.[89]

On the whole, the Federal Government, which has the full responsibility for foreign policy (though this did not mean a curb on individual or regional initiatives, as shown above) made sure that Nigeria did not favor either side in the Israeli/Arab issue.[90] Therefore, in terms of nonalignment, Nigeria's policy towards the Israeli/Arab issue was nonaligned, since it did not favor either Israel, which was backed by the West, or the Arab world, then led by Nasser's Egypt, which was backed by by the Soviet Union.[91] In fact, the First Republic's policy towards the Israeli/Arab issue appears to be the one that most manifested nonaligned content in foreign policy.

Foreign Economic Relations

The nature of Nigeria's foreign economic relations will be evaluated by examining the volume and the direction of its trade relations with other countries, the sources of foreign investment and assistance, and the magnitude and direction of scientific and technical cooperation with other countries.

The First Republic of Nigeria, having an economy that was still much a reflection its colonial legacy (an economy hinged on the periphery of the Western economic structure) and a conservative government like the Balewa Government (which had no inclination for drastic changes in the economic structure of an independent Nigeria), meant that Nigeria, in 1960 and 1965, had about 85 percent and 80 percent of its imports, respectively, from the West, while only 1.2 and 2.7 percent of its imports, in 1960 and 1965, respectively, came from the

whole of Eastern Europe, and 0.8 and 1.8 percent of imports, in 1960 and 1965, came from the People's Republic of China.[92] In terms of the direction of export trade, the same pattern was applicable, with about 95 and 90 percents of the exports, in 1960 and 1965, going to the West, while only 0.4 and 2.5 percents of the exports, in 1960 and 1965, went to Eastern Europe, and 0.3 percent in 1965 (and virtually no recordable amount in 1960), of the exports went to the People's Republic of China.[93] Thus, in terms of the pattern of trade partners, Nigeria's links during the First Republic were overwhelmingly with the West.

Britain was clearly the most favorite Western trade partner as demonstrated by the fact that Nigeria got 42.3 and 30.9 percent of its imports, in 1960 and 1965, from the former, which also received 47.6 percent (in 1960) and 37.8 percent (in 1965) of Nigeria's exports.[94]

It is also important to note that though Nigeria's trade links were overwhelmingly with the West, there were some efforts to diversify external trade relations (though this was clearly very negligible). For example, trade relations with Eastern Europe and China were gradually rising (from a total of about 2.0 and 0.4 percent of imports and exports in 1960, to about 4.5 and 2.8 percent of imports and exports, in 1965).[95] However, as the figures show, the percentage of trade relations with Eastern Europe and China, was still very small, while Nigeria trade links continued to be overwhelmingly with the West.[96]

During the First Republic most manufacturing firms, large marketing conglomerates, and some banks were also owned, wholly or

TABLE 1

PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S IMPORT TRADE RELATIONS, 1960-1965

Countries	1960 Million Naira	%	1965 Million Naira	%
Britain	182.8	42.3	170.1	30.9
U. S. A.	23.2	5.4	66.2	12.0
Japan	55.6	12.9	51.2	9.3
Federal Republic of Germany	30.4	7.0	59.1	10.7
Italy	14.4	3.3	25.4	4.6
France	9.8	2.3	24.2	4.4
Netherlands	23.2	5.4	20.9	3.8
Belgium and Luxemburg	6.5	1.5	6.9	1.2
Norway	14.4	3.3	11.4	2.1
People's Republic of China	3.6	0.8	9.7	1.8
Eastern Europe	5.1	1.2	14.6	2.7
Africa	4.6	1.1	7.8	1.4
Other Countries	58.2	13.5	83.8	15.1
TOTALS	431.8	100.0	550.8	100.0

Source: Culled from Olufemi Fagana, "International Trade and Balance of Payments," in F. A. Olaloku, et al., eds., Structure of the Nigerian Economy, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, pp. 235-236 (which based its data on data collected from the Federal Office of Statistics, Trade Report and The Review of External Trade, and Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report).

TABLE 2

PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S EXPORT TRADE RELATIONS, 1960-1965

Countries	1960 Million Naira	%	1965 Million Naira	%
Britain	161.4	47.6	202.9	37.8
U. S. A.	31.8	9.4	52.4	9.8
Japan	5.1	1.5	6.3	1.2
Federal Republic of Germany	25.8	7.6	55.7	10.4
Italy	14.4	4.2	21.9	4.1
France	12.9	3.8	36.5	6.8
Netherlands	43.1	2.7	63.1	11.8
Belgium and Luxemburg	6.6	1.9	15.4	2.8
Norway	2.1	0.6	1.5	0.3
People's Republic of China			1.4	0.3
Eastern Europe	1.3	0.4	13.6	2.5
Africa	8.7	2.6	7.8	1.4
Other Countries	26.2	7.7	58.0	10.8
TOTALS	339.4	100.0	536.5	100.0

Source: Same as TABLE 1.

partially, by Western investors, while investments by organizations from Eastern Europe or the People's Republic of China were virtually absent in all sectors of the economy. In the area of foreign assistance, the West was also in a clear lead, with the United States and Britain providing most of the direct bilateral assistance (in addition to their contributions to international financial institutions, which also accounted for much of the external assistance to Nigeria).[97] Also, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Israel, and Switzerland (all of which belong to the Western camp) were the other major aid donors.[98] On the other hand, the Balewa Government rejected the "Soviet Union's interest-free loan" of about 40 million Naira offered to Nigeria soon after it became independent.[99] However, due to increasing elite and mass public opinion clamoring for a more independent foreign policy, and the pressures of the vocal and visible organized groups, the First Republic, in its middle and later phases, became more open to Eastern bloc assistance. Thus, in June 1962 and September 1965, it got a 30 million Naira Polish loan and 10 million Naira Czechoslovakian loan, respectively, and in March 1962 it also received "credit for an unspecified amount" from the Soviet Union.[100] Thus, though the West contributed more economic assistance to First Republic Nigeria, the East was not totally left out.

In the areas of international scientific and technical cooperation, Nigeria also had most of its links with Western countries. This was a result of its having most of its foreign trade, investments and assistance with those countries (which meant that most scientific and

technical components, processes and systems, existent then in Nigeria were overwhelmingly from the West, particularly Britain).

Thus, on the whole, the First Republic Nigeria foreign economic relations was mostly with the West, and in terms of evaluating the relevance of nonalignment on this aspect of Nigeria's foreign relations it can be asserted that Nigeria leaned clearly towards the West. However, the nature of Nigeria's foreign economic relations with the West did not mean that the former thought everything was normal, or was unconscious of the implication of such relations, in terms of its ability, or inability, to be in adequate control of its domestic economy, or to be able to pursue an independent foreign policy. For instance, the Balewa Government refused to accept an associate membership in the EEC on the grounds that such an action would compromise its foreign policy principle of nonalignment.[101]

The First Republic and the East

When Nigeria regained its independence, in 1960, it was very hesitant to establish relations with the East. For example, it was only in 1961 that the Balewa Government allowed the Soviet Union to open an embassy in Lagos, and even after deciding not to further delay the Soviets in opening their foreign mission it "placed an unprecedented restriction on the number of Soviet diplomats in Nigeria."[102] Additionally, by 1965, Nigeria had only one foreign mission in the East, and that was at Moscow.[103]

However, in response to the pressures from radical domestic groups, and the Casablanca group of African states, the First Republic, in the middle and last phase was more forthcoming in its relations with the East.[104] By 1965 Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Soviet Union had established foreign missions in Nigeria; and each of these countries had also concluded trade agreements with Nigeria (Poland in 1961, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in 1962, Hungary and the Soviet Union in 1963, and Yugoslavia in 1964.[105] In November 1961, Nigeria took actions that expanded relations with the East, such as the lifting of the ban on important Communist literature, the modification of travel restrictions to Eastern countries and the approval of Soviet-bloc scholarships for Nigerian students.[106] The last was to become very important to the East for it was then a maiden effort to foster direct cultural contacts; and it appears they have found these educational links to be a very important link for direct cultural contacts (since they have continually asked the Nigerian Government to send more students and the program is now in a very expanded form).

'Cultural multipliers' from these educational links have been some marriages that have accompanied it; and to the East, which before the 1960s had very little cultural contact with Nigeria, the impact of this cultural multiplier has actually has been the multiplication of relations, since it often means the contact of two people from two different countries resulting in the contacts of two families, and even communities, in two different countries. Another cultural multiplier has been language, since apart from serving as a communication link it

also represents an energizer of the culture it springs from. The fact that former Nigerian students in Eastern European countries are now administrators, teachers, doctors, businessmen, engineers and public officials who are fluent in Polish, Russian, Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Yugoslavian or Romanian languages also means a significant impact of the culture of the societies those languages belong to (and the significance of such an impact also increases when consideration is given to the fact that before the 1960's such cultures, unlike the cultures of Western nationalities, had very little impact in Nigeria).

There was also some economic link with the East, although this was very negligible in comparison to the overwhelming link with the West (as shown in the preceding section). Additionally, economic assistance from the East totaled only about 40 million Naira.

Thus, on the whole, the First Republic's links with the East were weak, in comparison with its Western links. As a clear demonstration of this during the First Republic, the highest Soviet official to visit Nigeria was Deputy Foreign Minister Malik."[107] Additionally, one incident served to cool relations, and this was an alleged Soviet involvement in a plan to overthrow the Balewa Government by providing military training and weapons to Nigerians in Ghana,[108] This incident resulted in a well-publicized trial in which many prominent Nigerian politicians were tried, convicted, and imprisoned.

Thus, in terms of nonalignment, the First Republic's relations with the East were considerably diminutive, in comparison to closer and more extensive relations with the West.

An Overview

On the whole, Nigerian policies in the various policy issue areas discussed above show that the First Republic had very warm relations with the West, while its relations with the East were significantly diminutive. It can, therefore, be posited that if the First Republic's foreign policy is evaluated in terms of the "equidistance from the superpower blocs" policy perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment,[109] it can be said that it was not nonaligned.

However, it must also be noted that the Balewa Government was aware that Nigerian foreign policy did not reflect its potential as an independent country, especially at the early phase of the First Republic. Thus, its convening of the All-Nigerian People's Conference in 1961 was an effort to collate "ideas and proposals"[110] from a wide spectrum of the Nigerian society in order to be able to fashion a more assertive foreign policy (and therefore also assuage the mounting criticism of Nigerian foreign policy by various Nigerian pressure groups, in addition to efforts to modify the image the radical Casablanca group of African countries[111] portrayed of Nigeria as a client-state of the West).

Though the All-Nigerian People's Conference did not actually result in the Balewa Government pursuing a more assertive foreign policy, during the middle and later phase of the First Republic, Nigeria was displaying some actions that showed that it was not actually routinely linked to the West. One of these was the abrogation of the defense pact with Britain[112] not long after it was signed (and even when it was in force it did not translate to much in reality due to considerable domestic pressure against it).

The refusal to become an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC), "on the grounds that acceptance of associate status in the organization would not only be inconsistent with Nigeria's nonalignment policy but would perpetuate Africa's economic dependence on the West,"[113] was also another instance where the Balewa Government demonstrated it could carry out an action that posited an independent Nigerian posture and showed that the latter was not routinely linked to the West. Additionally, the fact that Nigeria, in 1961, broke off all diplomatic and commercial links with France as a protest over the latter's testing of atomic bombs in the Sahara, and the additional fact that Nigeria was the only African country to take such an action,[114] further demonstrate that although the First Republic had very good relations with the West on the whole, it was not routinely linked to the latter. This independent element in Nigerian foreign policy was also demonstrated by the fact that the Balewa Government lifted the ban on the shipment of columbite to Eastern bloc countries in spite of the fact that the United States had a law allowing it to end economic assistance to countries that allowed the shipment of strategic materials to the Eastern bloc.[115] As early as 1961, Nigeria also called for the admission of the People's Republic of China into the UN.[116]

On the whole, the above actions show that First Republic Nigeria was not routinely linked to the West (though it had very good relations with the latter), and that it could carry out independent foreign policy actions. Thus, in evaluating the First Republic's foreign policy in terms of the avoidance of alignment with the superpower bloc

policy, and the independent initiative and capability perspectives of conceptualizing nonalignment,[117] it can be said that the First Republic was nonaligned.

Other foreign policy positions adopted by Nigeria also show that it subscribed to other perspectives of nonalignment. Nigeria was one of the five countries that recommended the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (others were Burma, Ghana, Indonesia and Syria),[118] and together with Egypt and Yugoslavia it also advocated that international loans on longer terms and at lower interest be made available to developing countries, and that the latter should also to have access to an increased amount of capital.[119] These actions showed that Nigeria shared the perspective that nonalignment should also mean the reordering of the global economy.[120] (Also note that these countries that Nigeria consorted with to push these initiatives belong to the nonaligned group.) Nigeria also reflected this perspective of nonalignment when it asserted that "trade as a means of fastening the economic development of the developing countries," was "the key issue of the decade."[121]

Nigeria sometimes behaved in such a way which implied that it shared the view that nonalignment is an opportunistic foreign policy.[122] For example, when there were problems over the choice of a new UN Secretary-General as the successor to Dag Hammarskjold, Nigeria was of the view that "if neither the East or West could produce a suitable man . . . the smaller states will produce one . . ."[123] Thus, it appears that Nigeria was comfortable with the idea of exploiting stalemates between the superpowers as an opportunity for advancing

the interest of the nonaligned countries. However, it is not easy to determine whether such an opportunistic behavior played an important part in the appointment of U Thant of Burma as the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Other views of Nigeria also indicated that the latter also subscribed to the view of nonalignment as an alliance against alignment with the superpower blocs.[124] For example, Wachukwu of Nigeria, after refuting the argument that greatness means the possession of "weapons of (mass) destruction" and positing that Africa will not be "dragged into this human suicide," he added that

> the time has come when we have to abandon the great powers
> . . .give them some distance and let them feel that they are
> now gradually being confined in a cold chamber . . . let them
> feel the coldness of the attitude of the smaller powers, and
> let us withdraw to the warmer environments within our own cir-
> cle . . . and let us see whether we cannot formulate some
> ideas that will make them amenable to reason![125]

Nigeria also took actions that conformed to the view of nonalignment as an international relations peace guarantor.[126] For example, it did not share the view that having nuclear weapons, in order to deter the hostile actions of others, was a rational and sane way of conducting relations among countries and peoples of the world, and it was at the forefront of demanding the reduction of the level of armaments, especially nuclear weapons.[127] Nigeria also was optimistic that, even in Europe, where the West and East are physically close, both blocs could live together peacefully; thus, it declared that the "division of Europe into East and West was "unreal"[128] That it shared this conception of nonalignment as an international peace guarantor was further demonstrated by its belief that "it was the duty of . . .

nonaligned countries"[129] to help the great powers to avoid the further hampering of world peace through their accelerated arms race and confrontation.

The Ironsi Government

The Ironsi Government was very brief[130] (lasting from January to July 1966) and focused more on the domestic policy arena, apparently due to the fragile state of this government and political system during this period. Thus, during the Ironsi Government era the career diplomats appeared to have been allowed to handle most of the routine diplomatic links since the political leaders were less inclined to initiate, or get much involved with, major foreign policy issues.

The only significant action the Ironsi Government took was to assure the world that it honored all the international commitments and obligations of the previous government and to drastically reduce the visible international activities which the then Regional Governments carried out abroad.[131]

Thus, in terms of the nonaligned content of the Nigerian foreign policy during the era of this government the situation was not significantly different from that which existed during the First Republic.

The Gowon Government

The Gowon Government lasted from 1966 to 1975, and due to the major dramatic events which Nigeria experienced during this period it is necessary that this era also be viewed in different phases. These phases also connoted significant changes in the Nigerian body polity which were also accompanied by significant shifts in the approach of handling domestic and international realities.

The Gowon Government, therefore, can be viewed as consisting of four phases: the first phase, corresponding to the immediate Pre-Civil War period (which was marked by deep societal cleavages, and serious threats to the survival of Nigeria as one whole entity); the second phase, corresponding to the Civil War period (which was marked by efforts at the fragmentation of Nigeria, as the then Eastern Region of Nigeria made a secessionist attempt through the declaration of the latter as the Republic of Biafra, and also by the successful effort of the Nigerian Government to stop such secessionist attempts and maintain its territorial integrity); the third phase, corresponding to the immediate post-Civil War years (which was marked by national reconstruction, reconciliation, and consolidation efforts after the successful countering of the secessionist effort and by greater economic prosperity due to increasing oil revenue and political stability); and the fourth and final phase, corresponding to the period in which Nigeria seemed to be searching for a more permanent political future (which was still marked by economic prosperity but with increasing demand for a firm and purposeful political direction and for the formulation of a more permanent political framework, whether civilian or military).

Yakubu Gowon was the Head of State during this period, and under his leadership Nigeria tackled various domestic and international issues. For purposes of this study, attention will only be focused on the latter issue area. Thus, in order to examine the nonaligned foreign policy content of the Gowon Government, attention will be focused on the nature of Nigerian relations with the West, the Civil War and how it related to relations with the East, the nature of foreign economic relations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the posture in African Affairs, and the policy toward the Southern African and Middle East problems.

Relations With the West

During the first phase of the Gowon Government, which as noted above corresponded to an era of great domestic upheaval, Nigeria was occupied with domestic problems and thus was not much involved in significant new initiatives in the foreign policy arena (just like the preceding Ironsi Government). Therefore, during the first phase of the Gowon Government there were not many significant new initiatives in the area of Nigeria's relation with the West.

However, the second phase of the Gowon Government, in terms of general foreign policy orientation and relations with the West witnessed many changes. The second phase was the Civil War period, and the Gowon Government was very much in need of military hardware and international support in its efforts to end the secession of the then Eastern Region (which had declared itself the Republic of Biafra). However Britain did not appear very forthcoming in assuring Nigeria that

the former could be firmly counted on to extend support in the areas that the latter required.[132] Thus although Britain did provide some small arms to Nigeria, the latter perceived the types and amounts of arms the former was willing to sell as inadequate for its war needs.[133] Moreover, Nigeria perceived Britain as not staunchly committed to the idea of bringing the secession to a speedy end at all costs. British criticism of Nigeria's economic blockade of the seceding area as against international law, and the fact that some British oil firms paid royalties to the authorities in the seceding area[134] (creating Nigeria's suspicion that such efforts might later amount to Britain according to the seceding area international respectability and recognition), were very critical to this perception of the British position, in relation to the Civil War, by Nigeria. However, Britain saw itself as being neutral between the two sides involved in the war; but to Nigeria, which had considered the former to be a friend, such efforts at portraying its actions as neutral were seen as a form of betrayal.[135]

Most Western countries followed the British position, and portrayed themselves as being neutral. Some, like France, openly supported the secession, supplied arms to the seceding side, and provided diplomatic support for it (by trying to get some African countries, that were its former colonies, to recognize the seceding area as an independent and sovereign state).[136]

On the whole, Nigeria perceived the West as not understanding of its position; and it even perceived some Western countries, like France, as actively campaigning to violate its territorial integrity

and sovereignty. Thus, compared to the First Republic's relations with the West, Nigeria's relations with the latter during the second phase of the Gowon Government was in decline. The extent of such a decline was shown by the fact that efforts by some Western organizations to provide humanitarian services to civilians in Biafra, who were suffering severely from the ravages of the war, were met with much suspicion on the part of the Nigerian Government. Thus, Nigeria questioned those it termed as

> neo-colonialist circles why these so-called humanitarian feelings are not so readily expressed with respect to South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), Southern Rhodesia and Namibia.[137]

Furthermore, Nigeria even perceived these same circles as urging "the rebels to hold out despite the realities"[138] of Nigeria being in a position to easily militarily end their efforts at seceding.

At one point during the war, Nigeria even had cause to warn against the translation of "humanitarian considerations into political concepts," and converting "them into an acceptance or recognition of a rebel regime;" and also added that such actions would be "a blatant and crude violation of all standards of civilized international conduct and practice."[139] Thus, Nigeria's relations with the West had deteriorated to the point that Nigeria was accusing the latter of trying to use humanitarian services as a cover to aid the secession and accord it international recognition. Such an accusation was even more direct when Nigeria noted that the secession would have ended by the end of 1969 if not "for the intransigence of the secessionist leadership, which is financed and sustained by neo-colonialist Powers

outside Africa."[140]   Therefore, Nigeria, in addition to its assert-
ing that there was "no longer any secret" who was supporting and sus-
taining Biafra, also noted that personnel "from Sweden, France,
Canada, Portugal, Belgium, South Africa, Rhodesia, the United States
and other Western countries" were also helping the seceding area.[141]

Thus, throughout the Civil War years Nigeria's relations with
the West was in a much poorer condition, especially when compared with
the very good relations that existed between both during the First Re-
public. However, the successful ending of the secession resulted in a
post Civil War Gowon Government that repaired some of its relations
with the West. One of the reasons for the augmentation of the Western
links was a desire to ensure that Nigeria was locked into a very tight
relationship with the East, upon whom the former heavily depended,
militarily, in order to end the secession. For an example, the Nige-
rian Air Force being "largely equipped with Soviet MiG 17 and 21 and
Iluyshin-28 war planes" occasioned "the need for close ties with the
Soviet Union."[142]   Thus, it was observed

> that in order not to be entirely dependent on Moscow for the
> development and expansion of the country's air force, the fed-
> eral military government has taken steps, since the end of the
> war, to buy some planes from the United States.[143]

Diplomatic links with the West were also improved in comparison to the
Civil War years, especially with Britain (which was one of the three
prominent countries Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of State, paid state
visits to, the others being the Soviet Union and China).[144]   How-
ever, though the post-Civil War period of the Gowon Government did wit-
ness much improvement in Nigeria's relations with the West,[145] the

relations between both could not be said to have returned to the very warm and close relations that existed during the First Republic.

On the whole, in terms of the nonalignment content of Nigeria's relations with the West during the Gowon Government era, it can be posited that while the first phase of the Gowon Government (the immediate pre-Civil War period) did not witness any change in the good relations with the West, the Civil War years meant a period in which Nigeria moved away from very close Western links. Finally, the post-Civil War Gowon Government did witness improved relations between both (but the state of their relations did not return to First Republic level of very close ties).

The Civil War and the East

During the first phase of the Gowon Government (the immediate pre-Civil War period) Nigeria's relations with the East did not experience any dramatic changes; but as soon as the Civil War ensued, the Soviet Union's readiness to supply Nigeria with the huge amount of military hardware it needed in its efforts to end the secession (while, as already noted above, the latter unsuccessfully tried to get such military hardware from the Western countries) resulted in relations between Nigeria and the East changing from a diminutive low-key one to a very expanded and close relationship. However, Nigeria's improved relations with the East did not result in a situation in which the former was tightly locked into the latter's orbit, and this was shown by the fact that even during the war years (during which Nigeria needed Soviet military support the most) Nigeria did not show any indication of interest in participating in any Eastern multilateral

military and economic frameworks like the Warsaw Pact or the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and there was no attempt to transform the Nigerian social reality into one which fitted a Marxist-Leninist perspective. Thus, it seems Nigeria's improved relations with the East were more centered on the military support it was getting from the latter to prosecute the Civil War than on any yearning to fundamentally share much with the latter in terms of broad political, social and economic perspectives. Surprisingly, this lack of deep political or ideological commitment, beyond the cooperation in the military area, on the part of Nigeria did not result in the Soviet Union withholding or dragging its military support to the former's war against the secession.

However, the fact that the Soviet Union decided to aid Nigeria, instead of Biafra, is puzzling since the latter represented an area that was more progressive in its social and political outlook in comparison with the former, and also since some of the African countries that had socio-political outlooks which were closer to those of the Soviet Union supported the Biafran cause, for example, Tanzania and Zambia. Thus, Soviet support for Nigeria did not seem consonant with its ideological heritage (which is supposed to be the critical factor guiding its actions).[146] The Soviet Union also seemed to have perceived this seemingly ideological contradiction, and thus saw the need for more theoretical explanation and clarification, which people like Vladimir Kudryavtsev, a Soviet expert on African affairs, appeared to have embarked upon.

Kudryavtsev reasoned that the Soviet action was in line with the task of class struggle, and universal social liberation.

He quoted from Lenin to the effect that each case must be considered in the light of "social development as a whole" and that for the benefit of the workers one must strive "to form as large a state as possible" in the interest of "merging" its nations.[147]

Put starkly, Kudyravtsev appeared to have meant that the Soviet Union supported Nigeria in order to make sure that no part of its territory permanently seceded, due to its view that the existence of a big country in Africa, whether with a progressive government or not, would be a great asset in removing colonialism, neo-colonialism and racial injustice on the continent. This perception also connotes a Soviet belief that in Nigeria there will always be an adequate domestic progressive force which will always ensure that, no matter how conservative any government may be, on the issues of decolonization, combating the phenomenon of neo-colonization, the need for the genuine resolution of the problem of racial injustice in South Africa, and the fostering of more unity in Africa, Nigeria will always be in support of them. This would also mean a big country's support for long-term Soviet objectives since the latter often believes that the support for these issues will enhance its role in Africa; even though Nigeria and other African countries often champion these issues for a different reason—the total political, economic and social emancipation of Africa.

When some socialist-oriented countries like Tanzania, which supported Biafra, characterized those who opposed the secession as oppressors and imperialists, Kudryavtsev observed that it was naive for these countries to equate Soviet support to Nigeria with that which Britain also provided.[148] He posited that the Soviet and British supporting for the same side was merely a matter of "external

coincidence," and that it did not mean that both supported Nigerian unity "on the same premise."[149] According to him

> Britain supported the unity of Nigeria, just as France, West Germany, and Portugal supported the secessionists, because of rivalry over oil, over assets, and influence in Nigeria.[150]

On the other hand, he said that the Soviet Union supported Nigerian unity due to its consideration for

> the African peoples' anti-imperialist struggle both for strengthening the independence of the liberated countries and for the complete liberation of the continent from the remains of colonialism.[151]

However, though the Soviets did think in terms of total African liberation (and the benefits it will bring to its role in Africa), it was also interested in changing the Nigerian socio-political system, though in a restrained way (but still, this effort was totally unsuccessful).

In connection with the Soviets' attempt to try to change Nigeria's socio-political orientation during this period, they tried to accomplish this through the organization of "'progressive' elements in the country,"[153] Essentially this meant trying to have influence on the labor unions, the general working class, and critical radical elements, informally, by bypassing the Government. However, since the Gowon Government saw these as informal links that might be used by the Soviet Union to later topple the government (and replace it with one which might have been willing to be used to create a new society along Marxist-Leninist lines), it effectively countered any Soviet move to organize 'progressive' elements, either openly or clandestinely. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was also restrained in its moves; and

once it realized that the Government was determined to ensure that it did not unduly meddle in Nigeria's internal affairs, it relaxed its efforts and appeared to have been prepared to limit itself to helping in the war efforts. However, this did not mean that it had totally shelved its interest in Nigeria, or it was not willing to try other means, since "in April 1969 the Soviet Union asked if she could be allowed to set up consular posts in"[153] all of the states in Nigeria except one that was still then effectively under Biafran control. The Gowon Government turned down this request, which would have meant a sprawling network of Soviet bureaucracies all over Nigeria posing a possible threat to the Government.

Additionally, in external actions even during the Civil War, Nigeria was independent since, apart from still maintaining some relations with the West, as mentioned above, it was also not tied down to play the Soviet tune on international issues. Thus

in August 1968 when Soviet military aid was still crucial there was an outcry of condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. Although the government did not issue an official statement about the invasion, all the country's newspapers saw it as evil.[154]

However, even though the Nigerian Government "did not condemn the Warsaw Pact in August 1968, it has criticized it on some other occasions."[155] Therefore, the Gowon Government was adequately nonaligned, even during the Civil War.

However, even though Nigeria was not locked into very close ties with the Soviet Union, relations with the latter were clearly warm. For example, articles by Soviet writers appeared frequently in

Nigerian newspapers, and many of these articles were aimed at illustra-
ting the dysfunctional role of the private sector in the Nigerian eco-
nomy.[156] It has also been noted that from 1967 onward the Soviet
Union had been secretly urging the Nigerian Government to nationalize
Western oil firms; and though it is not easy to precisely ascertain
the effect of such pressures, "it was no accident that the Government
had to announce a 55 per cent takeover of the equity shares of all
these firms in April 1974, less than a month after General Gowon's
state visit to the Soviet Union.[157]

Additionally, the extent of the warm relations between Nigeria
and the Soviet Union can also be illustrated by the fact that the lat-
ter's ambassador to Nigeria, A. I. Romanov, was given the opportunity
to explain his country's policy in Nigeria through a Nigerian radio
broadcasting system.[158] At the end of the Civil War, Romanov also

> had conferred upon him one of the highest titles in Nigeria,
> Commander of the Order of the Niger (CON), by General Gowon in
> appreciation of his 'constructive' role during the Civil
> War.[159]

Nigerian-Soviet military relations were also strong. For exam-
ple, as noted above, the Nigerian Air Force was largely supplied with
Soviet MiG 17 and 21 and Iluyshin-28 military planes and "Moscow sup-
plied the heavy 122 mm artillery guns which were decisive in ending
the secessionist rebellion . . ."[160] To further more emphasize the
strong military component of Nigeria-Soviet relations during this
period, the Soviet Embassy in Lagos had "Colonel Mikhail Medvedev
armored warfare expert, late of Kiev, Peking, Cairo, and Khartoum'" as
its military attache.[161]

The warm relations with the Soviet Union also meant warm relations with other Warsaw Pact countries, as shown by increased contacts with those countries.[162]

However, the post-Civil War years of the Gowon Government meant improved relations with the West (which were strained during the Civil War) Britain, in particular, fostered very good relations with Nigeria as shown by the fact that Gowon paid a very fruitful state visit to Britain and a British oil firm seemed to have even managed a preferential treatment.[163]

Nevertheless, the improved Western relations did not mean that Nigeria did not continue to have good relations with the East. However, to the extent that the West was also enjoying very good relations with Nigeria, particularly through a strong British link, the East, unlike during the Civil War period, did not have relations that were more favorable than those with the West.[164] Thus, in terms of the nonalignment, the Gowon Government could be seen as being very close with the East (though, as shown above, this did not mean routine closely locked ties), and that during the post-Civil War years it moved toward having good relations with both the West and the East.

Foreign Economic Relations

Nigeria's foreign economic relations during the era of the Gowon Government, viewed from the angle of the direction and magnitude of international trade, showed that Western countries were the biggest trade partners. For example, in 1970, Britain, the U.S.A., and the Federal Republic of Germany accounted for 30.7, 14.5, and 13.0 percent

of Nigeria's imports, respectively (while also, respectively, receiv-

ing 28.2, 11.4, and 6.7 percent of Nigeria's exports in 1970.)[165]

In 1974, the three biggest trade partners were Britain, the U. S. A.,

and the Netherlands, which accounted for 23.2, 12.3, and 4.7 percent,

respectively, of Nigeria's imports, in addition to 16.9, 27.3, and

13.7 percent, respectively, of Nigeria's exports.[166] Also, during

this period, Nigeria's other major trade partners were Japan, Italy,

France, Belgium and Norway [167]

On the other hand, during the same period, Eastern European

countries (including the Soviet Union) accounted for only 5.1 and 4.2

percent of Nigeria's imports in 1970 and 1974, respectively; while in

terms of Nigeria's exports they received in 1970 and 1974, only 3.6

and 1.6 percent respectively.[168]

Thus, though the Gowon Government did witness improving rela-

tions with the East generally, the West was still Nigeria's leading

trading partner. However, though still sharing a smaller percentage

of Nigeria's foreign trade, the East did experience an increase in

their trade relations during this period. East bloc exports to Nige-

ria increased almost fivefold from 1960 to 1970 (from 1.2 percent in

1960 to 5.1 percent in 1970).[169] The amount of Nigeria's exports

they received also increased from 0.4 percent in 1960 to 3.6 percent

in 1970.[170]

This change in the economic links with the East was even more

noticeable in the kinds of goods available in the Nigerian market

since a significant number of "trucks and passenger cars, motor scoot-

ers, welding machines, cement, fabrics, sugar, and many other consumer

goods"[171] were made in the Soviet Union, with similar and other arrays of products also coming from other East European countries. While during the First Republic Soviet-made vehicles were rare in Nigeria, during the Gowon Government era, Moskvitch, Volga, and Lada cars were familiar and popular brand names in Nigeria (with some of these being even assembled in Nigeria). On the other hand, agricultural products like cocoa, groundnuts, palm products and timber went to the Soviet Union.[172]

However, it was through cooperation in the area of heavy industries development that the East made an impact that has turned out to have a long-term fundamental significance in the Nigerian economy; and the most important of these was the agreement of the Soviet Union to cooperate in the development of the iron and steel industry in Nigeria. Thus, during the Gowon Government era, the ground work for the development of this industry was intensified with Soviet help in "aeromagnetic and ground surveys of Nigeria's potential iron and coal resources,"[173] and other kinds of feasibility studies. The construction industry was also another area where the Eastern European countries' presence was felt; for example, a Bulgarian firm got itself a not insignificant opportunity of building a national theater in Nigeria.

Another feature of Eastern economic links with Nigeria was a tendency by the smaller Eastern European countries to choose some industries, and some states, with which to concentrate their economic interests. Romania, for example, intensified its efforts in the wood processing and manufacturing industries, and in some states like the

TABLE 3

PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S IMPORT TRADE RELATIONS, 1970-1974

Countries	1970 Million Naira	%	1974 Million Naira	%
Britain	232.0	30.7	402.2	23.2
U. S. A.	109.6	14.5	213.1	12.3
Japan	47.4	6.3	160.2	9.2
Federal Republic of Germany	98.6	13.0	264.7	15.3
Italy	36.2	4.8	94.0	5.4
France	25.2	3.3	114.6	6.6
Netherlands	26.8	3.6	81.0	4.7
Belgium and Luxemburg	16.2	2.1	35.0	2.0
Norway	5.0	0.7	11.3	0.6
People's Republic of China	14.0	1.8	30.4	1.7
Eastern Europe	38.9	5.1	73.1	4.2
Africa	9.3	1.2	20.1	1.1
Other Countries	97.4	12.9	237.6	13.7
TOTALS	756.4	100.0	1737.3	100.0

Source: Same as TABLE 1.

TABLE 4

PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S EXPORT TRADE RELATIONS, 1970-1974

Countries	1970 Million Naira	%	1974 Million Naira	%
Britain	249.6	28.2	978.3	16.9
U. S. A.	100.8	11.4	1583.5	27.3
Japan	6.8	0.8	238.3	4.1
Federal Republic of Germany	59.2	6.7	413.8	7.1
Italy	38.0	4.3	91.1	1.6
France	74.6	8.4	581.8	10.0
Netherlands	149.0	16.8	794.1	13.7
Belgium and Luxemburg	6.8	0.8	37.1	0.6
Norway	9.4	1.0	32.2	0.6
People's Republic of China	0.8	0.1	3.6	0.1
Eastern Europe	32.0	3.6	91.9	1.6
Africa	6.0	0.7	106.2	1.8
Other Countries	152.4	17.2	842.9	14.6
TOTALS	885.4	100.0	5794.8	100.0

Source: Same as TABLE 1.

Cross River. Thus, it is not surprising that it is a major partner in Seromwood Industries (a wood processing and manufacturing firm) in the Cross River State, in addition to the fact that Romania also rendered a significant amount of its technical cooperation in that state; and that the Romanian leader, Nicolae Ceucescau, while visiting Nigeria, spent a very sizeable proportion of his time in the same state. Poland, on the other hand, had a program which involved the exchange of engineering and architectural professors with some Nigerian universities (an interest which still continues), in addition to the provision of technical cooperation for the modernization of the coal industry.

The Gowon Government era's most innovative contributions to the nature of Nigerian foreign economic relations were in the areas of global economy restructuring, and African regional and subregional economic integration. In terms of global economic order restructuring, Nigeria was very crucial in the formation of a unified front by the developing countries (the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group) to negotiate with the EEC for more equitable economic links between both.[174] The basic logic behind the Nigerian action was the idea that a united developing world would lead to its being able to improve its negotiating capacity (due to the sheer impact of their number and unity), and that this would eventually lead to a better and a more equitable link between the contemporary developed world and the ACP. Furthermore, the Gowon Government goal was not only limited to bargaining for better economic links between the EEC and ACP, but extended to an ultimate goal of a fundamental overhauling of the contemporary

international economic order. Thus, Gowon asserted that he wanted the developing countries to "reverse the present system of trade and aid," which amounts to the developing countries becoming "an exporter of capital so desperately required for local development, to the development of industrialized countries that often falsely claim to be aiding us."[175] Thus, to Nigeria, the contemporary international order, in reality, functions in such a way that the developing countries were giving economic aid to the developed countries to continue to develop or sustain their economies, and not vice-versa. This kind of reasoning also led to Nigeria playing an active role in other global economic forums, like those under the United Nations agencies, in order to help in fostering conditions that lead towards the restructuring of the contemporary international economic order.

Nigeria was even more involved in efforts at improving economic conditions in Africa. For example, regarding relations with the EEC, it stressed the subject of unity (though mainly at the continental African level). Thus, in Gowon's view, "it is better for a United Africa to talk to a United Europe."[176]

In the arena of the general African economy, Nigeria was also wary of the role of non-African financial institutions and facilities, and thus was always opposed to the opening of the Abidjan-based African Development Bank (ADB) equity to non-African states, as a way of its mobilizing resources, with the argument "that there were other ways to getting additional resources."[177] To further demonstrate Nigeria's commitment to the reduction of African countries' dependence on non-African capital sources, the other ways of ADB mobilizing for

resources (that Nigeria suggested) turned out to mean Nigeria giving the ADB a sizeable amount to establish the Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF) within the ADB framework. However, Nigeria agreed to the establishment of the NTF only after receiving the assurance that "the question of opening the Bank's equity to non-Africans, would not be raised again."[178]

The Gowon Government also shared the conception that, though changing the nature of economic relations between the developing and the developed countries is an important means for creating a new international economic order, the capacity of the developing countries to increase economic links among themselves (often tagged the South-South initiatives) is seen as being even more important in creating this new order. The main reasoning behind this view appeared to be that those benefiting from the present global economic status quo will likely be reluctant to dismantle such a status quo, and thus the task of catalyzing such a change will be carried out mostly by and among the developing countries, with or without the cooperation of the developed countries. Thus, the Gowon Government championed African economic integration, and actively devoted efforts to lead in initiating the nurturing of such an integration first in the subregion of West Africa (through the formation of the Economic Commission of West African States, ECOWAS).[179]

On the whole, in terms of nonalignment and the nature of Nigeria foreign economic relations during the Gowon Government era, it can be said that Nigeria, by maintaining good economic links with the Western and Eastern blocs as shown above, was able to maintain a policy

that fitted with the avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs' perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment.[180] Also, by stressing the unity of the developing countries, in not only negotiating but also in building new economic structures with the developed countries, some facets of Nigeria's foreign economic relations mirrored the international collective bargaining framework and the global economy reordering policy perspectives of conceptualizing nonalignment.[181] In the arena of regional and subregional economic integration, Nigeria's enthusiasm and leadership showed that Nigeria in some circumstances harbored a global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of understanding nonalignment.[182]

The Economic Commission of West African States

The formation and the strengthening of ECOWAS, already mentioned above, was a foreign policy area that enjoyed much prominence in the post-Civil War era of the Gowon Government and thus merits separate attention in this study.

A major motivation for the creation of ECOWAS was the desire to create better economic conditions in member states and, through the integration of their economies, to assert their economic and political independence from non-African sources.[183]

Another major factor that fueled Nigeria in championing ECOWAS formation was the desire to set in motion the dynamics which would reduce France's influence in the West African region due to the perception that France was a very subtle threat to Nigeria, and to the whole of Africa, due to its "more formally and elaborately structured"[184]

links with African countries that are its former colonies.This perception that the Gowon Government developed toward France was mainly due to the latter's support to Biafra during the Civil War period and its ability to pressure some African countries that were its former colonies to also do so.[185] This created a situation that made Nigeria perceive France as having an antiquated imperialistic instinct of hoping to balkanise Africa's most populous country in order to strengthen French influence over its former colonies. Thus, a major but less publiicized factor for Nigeria just emerging from a Civil War to champion a regional economic integration was this desire to create a structural framework that would result in the reduction of France's role in Africa.[186]

Therefore, since Nigeria's actions, in relation to the formation of ECOWAS, were aimed at providing conditions that augmented the sovereignty of West African countries, its actions fitted into the national sovereignty (guarantor) perspective of nonalignment.

On the whole, in the sense that Nigeria's role, in the formation of ECOWAS, mostly comes under the umbrella of Pan-Africanist ideals, its actions in terms of nonalignment fits into the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment.[187]

The Gowon Government and Pan-African Ideals and Goals

As the above assessment shows,[188] the Gowon Government was assertive in promoting the Pan-African ideals and goals of fostering unity, promoting better socioeconomic conditions, and strengthening

national sovereignty in Africa, especially when compared with the First Republic. The Gowon Government was also very active in championing the decolonization of Guinea Bissau and Southern Africa, and the removal of racial oppression in South Africa.[189] Nigeria also played a strong role in helping strengthen the OAU.[190]

In some instances, Nigeria acted in a way that showed that it subscribed to a Pan-Africanism that had a diasporadic flavor. This was demonstrated by the fact that in 1975 Nigeria "assisted in paying the salaries of civil servants of Grenada,"[191] a country in the Caribbean with a population that is made up predominantly of people of African ancestry. Thus, Yakubu Gowon, the then Nigerian Head of State, was seen as "a strong Pan-Africanist" who was "a defender of the rights of" people of African ancestry "in different parts of the world."[192] Additionally, Nigeria provided a law enforcement training program in Grenada.

Thus, in the sense that the Gowon Government pursued Pan-African ideals and goals, its foreign policy in this broad sense can be seen as also fitting into the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment[193] in that its actions fostered political, economic and social progress and a peaceful atmosphere, in Africa and among people of African ancestry; and thus also helping in universalizing these phenomena.

The Southern African Problem

During the Gowon Government era, the festering problems of colonialism and racial oppression in Southern Africa covered Angola,

Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa;[194] and, while Nigeria (in concert with the OAU) did set in motion actions that sought to resolve these problems, it also developed some specific positions on the problems in some of these countries.

On the problem in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, cognizant of the fact that the Ian Smith regime tried to use the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) to retard the effort to solve the problems of colonialism and racial oppression in that country, stressed that there should be "no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe."[195] Thus, apart from joining the effort to make sure that the Ian Smith regime UDI did not amount to anything more than a piece of paper, Nigeria held the position that Britain had a legal and moral responsibility in ensuring that a country that it had chosen to colonize was genuinely decolonized. Therefore, to Nigeria, "Britain must bear the primary responsibility for the events in Zimbabwe," and Nigeria continued to see Britain as "the administering Power over Zimbabwe". Also, Nigeria held the position that it must be ensured that Britain "discharged its obligation towards all the people" in that country.[196]

The reasoning behind the above Nigerian position seems to have been a perception that Britain was either lacking the moral and political will to treat the Ian Smith UDI as a gross rebellion against the former's colonial authority (which it was), or that it was implicitly colluding to perpetuate racial oppression by a minority regime by feigning inability to put down such a rebellion.[197] In fact this perception was very overt in some other African countries, some of which had no doubt that Britain was condoning or encouraging

such a rebellion. For example, Tanzania, by breaking diplomatic relations with Britain over the UDI issue,[198] demonstrated that it strongly held such a view.

Another aspect of Nigeria's policy was advocacy of the establishment of "more effective enforcement of sanctions, complete with the preparedness to act swiftly against any country guilty of breaking sanctions" against the Ian Smith regime.[199]

In general, Nigeria appeared to have been less than satisfied with Britain's policy towards the situation in Zimbabwe. Thus it warned that if Britain was not eager to correct a problem which it had moral and legal responsibility for, "it should not put obstacles in the way of the people of Zimbabwe by aiding and abetting the illegal regime of Ian Smith."[200]

Nigeria, convinced that Britain was not prepared to genuinely decolonize Zimbabwe, saw the liberation movements of the latter as the only force capable of doing that; thus it urged that encouragement should be given to the "authentic representatives of the people of Zimbabwe" so that they can to "maintain the struggle against oppression and exploitation."[201]

On the problem of decolonization in Angola and Mozambique, Nigeria strongly supported self-determination and independence of these countries. It even appeared to believe that these goals would soon be realizable, and thus noted that the Portuguese policy in these countries "had run its course."[202]

With regard to the Namibian situation, Nigeria was of the view that South Africa's continued presence in that country had "no

legitimate or legal" backing, and noted that the International Court of Justice had restated that fact.[203] Nigeria was thus of the view that it was the responsibility of the international community to ensure that South Africa be made to conform to international norms and conduct. The liberation movement in Namibia also enjoyed the support of Nigeria; and this support appeared to be more important due to the continued inability of the international institutions and frameworks to resolve this problem.

The apartheid problem in South Africa also consumed the foreign policy attention of Nigeria. While the removal of this unjust system was a cardinal foreign policy goal of Nigeria, it particularly championed the offensive to dilute any effort by South Africa to gain international respect or to buy time by pretending to be interested in having a dialogue with African countries. Thus Nigeria noted that many viewed such interest by South Africa "with skepticism" and added that:

> Unless the whole effort is a ruse to deflect African and world attention from the cruel inhumanities which characterize the rule of the Government of South Africa, it is difficult to understand why such dialogues should not begin within South Africa.[204]

Therefore, Nigeria was of the view that if South Africa is interested in having a dialogue with African states, as a condition, it should start a dialogue first with its oppressed population. Additionally, African countries were of the view that such a dialogue can only occur after South Africa at least denounces apartheid policy as an official state policy and sets in motion forces to dismantle the system created by such a state policy.

As in the case of Zimbabwe, sanctions have also been seen as a way of bringing down apartheid (but only as one possible way). Thus, for South Africa and the countries still plagued with the problems of colonialism and racial oppression, Nigeria also supported the concept of armed struggle. In this connection, Nigeria noted that the oppressed peoples in these countries were "beginning to lose faith in the ability of the international community to assist them in their peaceful struggle," and thus had turned to "arms struggle".[205] Nigeria was thus of the view that armed struggle only followed the failure of the 'peace struggle.' At one point Nigeria even posited that the international community had no choice but to support this arms struggle. It reasoned that since the international community, broadly, is on the side of oppressed people in these countries, it "had tacitly agreed to whatever methods the liberation movement might choose," and thus "could not disavow these methods."[206] However, it appears that Nigeria might have been seeking to impose such a view rather than believing that there was a basis for such a link between the sympathy shown by the international community and their being committed to 'any method' of resolving these problems.

In terms of nonalignment, the Gowon Government's Southern African policy cannot be said to fit into the equidistance from the superpower bloc policy perspective,[207] since it was closer to one of these blocs than the other. This is buttressed by the fact that while Nigeria was of the view that the "Western Powers which persist in political, economic and military collusion, especially with Portugal and South Africa, sow the seeds of strife in Africa against

themselves," in the same breath it noted that the "moral and material help of other countries, notably the socialist countries, is greatly appreciated;"[208] This view of the role of the two blocs did not connote an equidistance from the two blocs, in so far as the Southern African issue was concerned.

However, the nonaligned countries mostly do not view nonalignment in terms of equidistance policy per se, and, Nigeria saw itself as following the policy of the African and the nonaligned groups, (the two of which it saw as waging a "war against colonialism and racialism)."[209] Thus, to such an extent, Nigeria perceived itself as being very nonaligned; and its conceptualization of nonalignment fit more into the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective.[210] Nigeria's position on the Southern African problem, therefore, rests on the basic premise that the main issue underlying this problem is the struggle to guarantee basic human rights and civilized standards of human decency, rather than concern for maintaining an equidistance between the two superpower blocs, per se, in relation to the resolution of this problem. To Nigeria and other African countries those which according to their perception do not appear to genuinely share the urgency of resolving this problem, and those that, to them, diplomatically and materially support the genuine and speedy resolution of this problem, are not to be equidistantly placed by Nigeria and the OAU, in their initiatives and actions which set in motion the dynamics that aim at resolving the Southern African problem. Furthermore, insofar as the resolution of this problem is seen as the removal of the source of conflict that can trigger a global conflictual

situation, Nigeria's and the OAU's roles in this issue can be seen as being in the interest of all mankind, rather than their pursuit of a narrow regional interest, while playing down the relevance of bipolar realities in relation to the resolution of this problem.[211]

The Middle East Problem

One major feature of Nigeria's policy toward the Middle East problem during the Gowon Government era was the advocacy of a comprehensive approach to the resolution of the problem; and this emphasis seemed to have been triggered by Nigeria's dissatisfaction with the tendency of some to pay attention to the problem mainly when there were incidents and reprisals. Thus, to Nigeria, the road to "stable peace" in the Middle East is through the tackling of the problem "as a whole and not piece-meal on the basis of incidents and reprisals."[212] Additionally, it was not only content with the advocacy of a comprehensive peace plan, but actually championed the formulation of such a plan; and, on behalf of a group of countries, it presented three principles as the cornerstones for peace in the Middle East. These were "the peaceful settlement of disputes, nonacquisition of territory by war and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of"[213] all of the countries in the area. It also noted that these three principles, apart from being in consonance with the United Nations resolution 242, did not add or remove anything from that resolution.[214]

Another angle to Nigeria's initiative was a new emphasis on pushing initiatives through the OAU, and as "a member of the 10-nation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on the Middle

ast"[215] it helped push an African initiative on the resolution of the Middle East problem.

However, though it emphasized that the OAU effort was "a complement, not an alternative to the efforts of"[216] other international forums, it turned out that this OAU effort amounted mostly to an end-product that made OAU countries take a stand that put them on the side of the Arab position, instead of a position that did not favor either the Arab world or Israel. For example, OAU resolutions became more direct in holding only one party, instead of all the parties involved, as being responsible for the problem in the Middle East. One of these resolutions called for "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied African and Arab territories,"[217] and even implied that the OAU Charter itself left African countries no option but to support the Arab world since Egypt apart from being an Arab country is also an African country. The OAU reaffirmed

> in the name of African solidarity and by virtue of Article 11, paragraph 1(c) of the OAU Charter its active and total support for the Arab Republic of Egypt in their legitimate struggle to recover entirely by all means her territorial integrity.[218]

Thus, the basic premise for the OAU position was that an African country was occupied and, therefore, the need to invoke the OAU Charter. This OAU position eventually led to African countries breaking relations with Israel which Nigeria did in 1973.[219] However, it seems that, apart from the issue of an occupation of an African country, the Nigerian and OAU actions were more the result of a stepped-up tendency by African and Arab countries to support each other on international

issues,[220] and the fact that many African countries (the North African countries) are also Arab countries, and thus have the ability to act as catalysts in bringing African and Arab countries position closer in international issues. In Nigeria, the fact that it has a large Muslim population was also a factor that influenced its actions. The appeasement of "the Islamic susceptibilities"[221] was also seen as influencing the actions of Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of State, who is himself a Christian.

However, it appears that Nigeria's action was more a desire not to be seen as not following OAU requirements, rather than any special desire to take sides in the Middle East problem, and this is buttressed by fact that, even after breaking relations with Israel, it still reiterated the latter's rights. Thus it warned that

> there should be no illusions about any solution which does not take into account the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Arab people and the recognition that Israel is a reality.[222]

In terms of the relevance of nonalignment to the Nigerian policy on the Middle East problem during the Gowon Government era, Nigeria's actions fitted more with the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective,[223] since it viewed its actions through an OAU perspective. This perspective of nonalignment can also be said to fit Nigeria's policy due to the fact that it stressed that the Middle East problem should be solved "outside the context of the cold war",[224] This implied that the problem should be viewed from a local and regional perspective, instead of it being viewed as a problem whose solution had to depend more on the need to balance the superpower blocs' role and influence in the area. It was seen as a

problem whose solution had to depend on the desires of all directly affected parties to live in peace, harmony, and mutual trust and respect.

An Overview

On the whole, Nigerian foreign policy during the Gowon Government era witnessed expanded relations with the East. However, this did not lead to Nigeria having routine close relations with the latter since Nigeria did not join the multilateral military and economic framework of the East (the Warsaw Pact or Comecon), or adopt its socioeconomic system. During this period, Nigeria also had adequate relations with the West, especially after the Civil War. For example, there were conscious efforts to increase air force military hardware from the West in order to avoid being over-dependent on the East in this area. Thus, in terms of relations with West and the East, Nigeria's relations fitted the avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs perspective of nonalignment. The analysis of Nigeria's foreign economic relations with both blocs also reflect this perspective of nonalignment.

Additionally, Nigerian foreign economic relations also fitted into the global economy reordering policy perspective (in that it pursued actions aimed at fundamentally overhauling the present international economic order), and the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective (in that it emphasized regional, and subregional, economic integration in Africa as a means of augmenting the political and economic viability of the continent.) This latter

perspective of nonalignment was also reflected in the analyses of Nigeria's role in Africa, and its policies towards the Southern African and Middle East problems.

On occasions, Nigeria's view of the world also emphasized the international relations positive innovator perspective of nonalignment in that it advocated the democratization of global power and influence. This view was reflected when Nigeria condemned the "impression that . . . conflict can be resolved at Geneva by the big powers, and that small countries need play no role beyond that of cheerleaders in the power game . . ."[225] Additionally, in some other circumstances, Nigeria, while appreciating the benefits of detente also complained of the

> problems which may be created by detente such as the increasing tendency of a few to see themselves as the sole arbiters of international peace and security seeking solutions outside the United Nations to world problems.[226]

This sort of view may be interpreted by some as reflecting the opportunistic foreign policy perspective of nonalignment since it connotes that closer relations between the two superpowers leave the nonaligned countries not enough room to maneuver in and maximize their benefits (possibly by exploiting the differences between the two superpowers), as would have been possible if an intense level of tension existed between both blocs (and thus the apparent inadequate enthusiasm about detente.) On the other hand, some may view the above Nigerian view of detente as fitting into the international relations positive innovator perspective of nonalignment in that, instead of being unenthusiastic about detente per se, Nigeria supported detente unless detente meant

powerful countries beginning to cooperate on entrenching a very hierar-chical international system. Thus, some might postulate that Nige-ria's view supports detente if it also means that the less powerful countries benefit from detente through a move to democratize the inter-national system. This view may also be supported by the added Nige-rian position that the "small, medium-sized and developing countries must seek active participation in the development of world order."[227]

The clamour for a new world order is not only limited to the international political order. In fact, the clamour for a new interna-tional economic order by the nonaligned countries has been even more intense than the former (and the overwhelming interest of the non-aligned countries in this issue has even led some to conceptualize the phenomenon of nonalignment as a global economy reordering phenomenon). Nigeria, in some of its particular actions and views, also stresses this perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment. For example, it saw the workings of contemporary international economic relations as "the realities of the unjust world economic system,"[228] while it also talked of the "unwillingness of the industrialized countries to disa-vow the existing imperial patterns of trade . . ."[229]

Nigeria also shared the conceptualization of nonalignment through the international peace guarantor perspective; hence, while de-ploring the lack of achievement of much progress in the area of disar-mament, and attributing this situation to "the lack of confidence be-tween the great powers,"[230] it was of the opinion that the non-aligned countries has the duty of making the world more peaceful.

Thus, it advocated "a bolder approach on the part of the smaller coun-
tries . . ."[231]

The Muhammed/Obasanjo Government

The Muhammed/Obasanjo Government lasted from 1975 to 1979, and
covered the period that Murtala Mohammed and later, Olusegun Obasanjo,
were Heads of State. This government, as will be shown below, paid
much attention to African affairs, especially the issues in Southern
Africa; and, in this arena of its diplomatic activities, Nigeria's ac-
tions will be examined within the context of their relation to the con-
cept of nonalignment. Additionally, the nonalignment content in Nige-
rian foreign policy will be examined in the areas of its foreign eco-
nomic relations, its policy on the Middle East problem, and its rela-
tions with the West and East.

Relations with the West and East

During the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era, Nigeria's rela-
tions with the West and East were dynamic in that, on different
issues, different postures were adopted. For example, in its relations
with the West, there was considerable strain on the relations with
Britain over the issue of the latter's insistence on not giving in to
the Nigerian demand for the return of Yakubu Gowon, a former Head of
State, in connection with the investigations over an abortive attempt

to topple the government. The level of differences between the two countries on this issue was high enough to lead to Nigeria's demand for the recall of the British envoy in Nigeria.[232] Additionally, "Nigeria decided to diversify its foreign reserve formerly held in sterling," and this action helped start "a run on sterling which prompted industrialized states to rush to the pound's rescue."[233]

However, Nigeria's relations with Britain during the Muhammed/ Obasanjo Government era were not very warm even before this issue about Gowon's presence in Britain since that Government, in its early phase, had "abruptly postponed indefinitely"[234] the visit of the British Queen to Nigeria, and had cause to refuse BBC correspondents, who had arrived at a Nigerian airport, entry into Nigeria.[235]

Despite these strains and stresses, Nigeria still had adequate relations with Britain since it did not decide to break relations with the former. In fact, the ability of Nigeria to continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Britain, despite these problems in their relations, led a foreign policy scholar to observe that "Many students of foreign policy were perplexed that Nigeria and Britain still maintained diplomatic relations . . . ."[236]

On the issue of Zimbabwean independence, Nigeria and Britain found cause to differ on many occasions (while also being able to share some views on some other occasions). For example, while in October 1976 Nigeria rejected proposals made by Britain and the United States for the settlement of the Zimbabwean crisis, it found the proposals the latter two presented in 1977 as being reasonable.[237]

Additionally, it is important to note that the problem over Gowon's refuge in Britain had been quieted down, and Nigeria and Britain again enjoyed relations that "were not only warm but characterized by mutual understanding,"[238] However, true to the fluctuating nature of the relations between both, during the last months of the Muhammed/ Obasanjo Government, there was again a very serious crisis in their relations over the Zimbabwean issue. Nigeria strongly suspected that Britain might recognize what the former considered a puppet regime, (which had been installed through a sham election). This led to "British firms being barred from tendering for contracts in Nigeria"[239] in 1979, and, in that same year, the Nigerian Government nationalized the assets of a British firm, British Petroleum (BP), [240] as part of its campaign to ensure that the kind of independence Zimbabwe would have would be a genuine one (through putting pressure on Britain to refrain from helping install a puppet regime.) Therefore, through these actions Nigeria helped the Patriotic Front (PF) to have a fair chance of contesting for election (which it won, and thus formed the first government in an independent Zimbabwe).

In terms of relations with the United States, the early phase of the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government was characterized by poor relations between Nigeria and the United States, due to sharp differences over the Angolan struggle for independence, specifically, and the Southern African problems, generally. While Nigeria was pushing for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)[241] being recognized, and supported, as the sole nationalist force to form a government in an independent Angola, due to its perception that other

nationalist groups were being backed by South Africa, the United States preferred a union government in Angola that involved all the liberation forces. Nigeria's decision seemed to have been based mostly on the desire to have a government in Angola that would aid in the solution of the remaining problems in Namibia and South Africa (with the ideological orientation of the government that Angola would have not appearing to be of much concern to Nigeria as long as such a government would serve to further the above Pan-African goals in Southern Africa). On the other hand, the United States was much concerned about a strong Soviet/Cuban influence in Angola (through the MPLA) having significant impact on Western strategic and economic interests in this region, and thus also affecting the nature of global powers factors.

The deep differences between Nigeria and the United States over the general situation in Southern Africa was indicated by the fact that Henry Kissinger, American Secretary of State, was on two occasions, in 1976, not allowed to visit Nigeria.[242] Further straining relations between the two countries was the furor over personal letters President Ford sent to African Heads of State seeking to negate the MPLA from having the sole role in Angola (and thus also seeking to negate the Soviet and Cuban role in the Southern African region). Nigeria's response to this letter was that it "replied in anger to President Ford's letter and made public its angry reply."[243] The net result of this tussle over Angola was that Nigeria was able to persuade the majority of OAU member states to support the MPLA as the sole liberation force in Angola and thus help facilitate its

forming the government of the independent Angola (though the other lib-
eration forces are still contesting with it for power in that coun-
try).

However, the state of Nigeria's relations with the United
States improved very greatly with the advent of the Carter Administra-
tion due to Nigeria's perception that that administration did not per-
ceive the Southern African problem only in terms of bipolar politics
and the power game.[244] Thus, throughout the remaining period of the
Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era, Nigeria's relations with the United
States were continuously improving. This was shown by the fact that,
in 1977, Olusegun Obasanjo, the then Nigerian Head of State, paid the
first State visit by a Nigerian Head of State to the United States,
and this was reciprocated in 1978 by Jimmy Carter, the then President
of the United States (which also made it the first State visit to Nige-
ria by an American President).[245]

Nigeria's relations with the East, like those with the West,
were a mixture of some frictional areas and eras and some that were co-
operative. However, it is important to note that although there were
some crises with the West, especially over Southern African issues,
the Soviet Union was not "the power behind"[246] these crises. In
fact, "Moscow's failure to consult with Nigeria or the OAU over Soviet
involvement in Angola and in the Ethiopia-Somalia war"[247] was a
cause for some friction with Nigeria. Nevertheless, Nigeria chose to
champion the case for the support of the MPLA (which were backed by
the Soviet Union and Cuba) among other OAU countries, due to its per-
ception that the MPLA best represented African interests. In

connection with the Soviet's strong influence in Ethiopia and the Ethiopia-Somalia war, the OAU, probably due to its loathing of issues that it may not be able to easily resolve, has not made sustained initiatives in this direction.

It has also been noted that the Soviet Union "avoided contact and collaboration with Nigeria in spite of Nigeria's efforts to effect some link-up . . ."[248] and influence, over the Angolan issue and the Ethiopian-Somalia war. Thus, the nature of Nigeria's relations with the Soviet Union "was one of real crisis in relations, and both countries knew it."[249] This, situation underscored the fact that the Soviet Union had not been able to carve a "special position"[250] for itself in Nigeria, despite its help to the latter during the Civil War, and thus its "ambition in Nigeria remains unfulfilled."[251] (It must also be noted that, after the Civil War ended, and the Soviet Union did not succeed in carving up a special position for itself in Nigeria, the Soviets still expressed "new hopes . . . for Soviet-Nigerian cooperation,"[252] due to its appreciation of "Nigeria's place in Africa and the world."[253] Because of this, the African Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, according to its director, Vasily Solodovnikov, decided to establish "a special Nigerian section".[254]

However, Nigeria and the Soviet Union, despite their differences still maintained some good links. For example, Nigeria, "partly to clear up any misunderstanding between Moscow and Lagos,"[255] found it necessary to brief the Soviet leaders on its support for the Anglo-American proposals for the settlement of the Zimbabwean issue.

That Nigeria found it very necessary to do this meant that it was eager to maintain adequate relations with the Soviet Union.

Nigeria, during this period, was also intensifying its relations with Romania and Poland.[256] It has been noted that this intensification of relations with these countries was an effort to "compensate"[257] for the friction it had been having with the Soviet Union, and to ensure that it had adequate relations with the East and thus maintain its "nonaligned status."[258]

Therefore, as the above analysis of Nigeria's foreign policy during the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era shows, Nigeria's foreign policy fitted into the avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs' policy perspective of nonalignment,[259] since Nigeria did not have routine close ties to either the West or the East. This fact can be further buttressed by the observation that, in 1978, both the United States Chief of Army Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Force visited Nigeria.[260] It is also important to note that, as shown above, Nigeria's "relations with the USA, Britain and the USSR . . . were all strained at one time or another."[261]

The Middle East Problem

On the problem of the Middle East during the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era, Nigeria "welcomed all initiatives in the direction of peace,"[262] and this seemed to have been an obvious reference to the United States' initiatives through the Camp David accord. However, in the same breath, Nigeria saw the Camp David accords only as "a framework,"[263] and added "that the road to final peace was still long and

arduous."[264] Additionally, by noting that "the United Nations over the years had established broad principles for the resolution of the Middle East problem,"[265] Nigeria connoted that the United Nations framework, and initiatives, were still the most appropriate for the resolution of the Middle East problem. However, it must be noted that the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government still continued an approach to this problem which had been initiated during the preceding Gowon Government and which was not within the United Nations framework. It was, instead, an OAU approach to the Middle East problem, and one which was more favorable to one party to the issue (the Arab world) since it involved African countries breaking diplomatic relations with Israel on the grounds that the latter occupied territories that do not belong to it. In fact, the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government appeared to be even strengthening this approach on this issue. Instead of perceiving all parties involved in the Middle East problem as having to compromise some of their positions, it appeared to perceive one party as being responsible for the impasse in efforts to bring peace to the region since it observed that "there were . . . uncertain prospects for Middle East peace where the State of Israel had doggedly held on to Arab lands conquered by force of arms.[266] However, it is important to note that Nigeria also recognized that Israel is a reality that all mankind has to accept, thus it referred to Israel in the above immediate statement as the "State of Israel". Additionally, Nigeria recognized the right of the people of Israel to a state of their own within protected and respected boundaries. Thus it saw the means to a "durable and lasting solution of the Middle East problems"[267] as not

only the recognition of "the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians to a homeland of their own,"[268] but as well the recognition of "all States in the region to exist in peace within secure and recognized borders"[269] This was an obvious reference to Nigeria's support to the right of the people of Israel to a homeland within secure borders which is recognized, and respected, by all neighboring countries and the general international community.

Nevertheless, since Nigeria still continued to insist on not having even diplomatic relations with Israel[270] (a party in the Middle East issue more favored by the West), the Nigerian policy on the Middle East problem can be said not to have fitted into the equidistance from the superpower blocs policy perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment.[271] However, since Nigeria, as indicated in a preceding section, tends to perceive the Middle East problem as a regional issue instead as problem that can be understood mainly in terms of bipolar politics, Nigeria's Middle East policy may also be seen as fitting into the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of conceptualizing nonalignment[272] since it saw its role as that of trying to bring stability and peace to the parties involved (many of which are also OAU member states), and thus also bring peace to the Middle Eastern region and the whole world. Moreover, it should also be noted that Nigeria's position accorded with that of most countries in the nonaligned group and that most nonaligned countries appear to favor the Arab position, due also to the simple reality that the Arab countries and countries with dominant or significant Islamic populations constitute a large number of the nonaligned countries.

Foreign Economic Relations

As TABLES 5, 6 and 7 show, during the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era, Nigeria continued to have a very large percentage of its trading link with the West, both in terms of its imports and exports; while the East, as those same tables also show, had a very negligible share of Nigeria's foreign trade links.

An important feature of the Nigerian economy, during the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, was a coordinated effort to provide a very viable economic platform that could fuel more industrialization and encourage heavy industries in the manufacturing sector of the economy. Thus the development of adequate energy resources, chemical, steel and machine tool industries to provide the required inputs for the manufacturing sector (in terms of providing it with cheap energy, primary and intermediate raw materials, capital, goods, and related technological industrial inputs). The iron and steel industry was seen as a very critical area in this economic scheme; and it was this area that, particularly, has afforded the Soviet Union an opportunity to have a significant economic link with Nigeria. As already noted in an earlier section, during the Gowon Government era the Soviet Union had agreed to provide technical cooperation for the iron and steel industry and, though there had been considerable delay in implementation, the Soviet Union was eventually designated to provide assistance for the centerpiece of the Nigerian steel industry, the Ajaokuta Steel Complex. For the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, speedy progress in the steel industry was a top priority program and that meant increasing economic contacts with the Soviet Union in this area. For example, in

TABLE 5

PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S IMPORT TRADE RELATIONS 1976-1979

Country	1976 %	1977 %	1978 %	1979 %
Britain	23.3	21.9	22.0	22.1
Belgium-Luxembourg	2.8	2.4	2.1	2.2
Denmark	1.1	1.2	0.8	0.8
France	7.2	6.9	7.2	7.3
Federal Republic of Germany	16.2	15.6	15.8	15.8
Ireland	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2
Italy	7.2	7.0	6.6	6.4
Netherlands	4.5	4.2	4.1	4.0
United States	10.7	11.1	10.9	10.9
Eastern Europe	1.8	2.5	2.0	1.8
Africa	0.9	1.2	1.0	1.2
Japan	9.3	10.8	10.9	11.0
Other Countries	14.8	14.9	16.3	16.3
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Notes: The above import figures do not include petroleum.

Source: Culled from Nelson, op. cit., which based its data on information collected from Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December, 1976; and Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the Year Ended 31st December, 1979.

TABLE 6

PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S PETROLEUM EXPORT TRADE RELATIONS 1976-1979

Country	1976 %	1977 %	1978 %	1979 %
Britain	9.1	6.3	2.6	2.1
Belgium-Luxembourg	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.2
Denmark	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1
France	9.1	7.8	11.3	10.1
Federal Republic of Germany	6.3	5.2	7.5	6.8
Ireland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Italy	0.8	1.2	3.4	3.6
Netherlands	9.7	10.2	13.6	12.7
United States	36.1	41.8	44.1	46.8
Eastern Europe	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Africa	1.8	2.3	3.1	3.4
Japan	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Countries	26.0	25.0	14.3	14.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Same as Table 5.

TABLE 7

PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S NON-PETROLEUM EXPORT TRADE RELATIONS 1976-1979

Country	1976 %	1977 %	1978 %	1979 %
Britain	29.8	30.7	28.0	27.8
Belgium-Luxembourg	1.9	1.7	1.2	1.1
Denmark	0.7	0.8	0.3	0.3
France	2.0	2.9	9.3	9.6
Federal Republic of Germany	10.8	16.0	17.4	17.4
Ireland	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.3
Italy	2.7	2.5	4.3	4.0
Netherlands	18.4	24.1	15.0	13.7
United States	17.7	10.9	11.9	12.2
Eastern Europe	7.3	3.3	4.2	4.1
Africa	5.7	3.1	3.5	3.7
Japan	1.6	1.4	0.6	0.6
Other Countries	0.9	2.6	3.9	5.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Same as Table 5.

977, "the permanent secretary of the Federal Ministry of Industries, Mallam Ahmed Joda, led a delegation to Moscow . . . which included the project manager of the Nigerian Steel Development Authority, Dr. Adegboye" to familiarize themselves "with the design of the iron and steel complex and with the method and organization of production in the USSR's own iron and steel plants . . ."[273] Due to the fact that Nigerian Governments have devoted much resources to the iron and steel industry and have also accorded it a vital role in its economic schemes, the cooperation with the USSR in this area has afforded the latter a significant link to an important part of the Nigerian economy.

However, there have also been efforts to diversify external cooperative links in the iron and steel industry, which appears to be an effort to avoid over-dependence on one source. For example, the Aladja Steel Complex, which uses the direct reduction process, was built with the technical cooperation of a German-Austrian consortium. Thus, in reality, the iron and steel industry is evolving in such a way that external cooperation links with both the West and the East have become possible.

These sorts of efforts to utilize external cooperative links (in economic undertakings where such links are needed), in such a way that both the West and East are involved, was even more glaring in the nation-wide oil product distribution system construction contract awards. While Tsvemepormexport, a Soviet firm, was awarded 180 million Naira to construct two oil pipelines, two oil pipeline contracts were also given to Western firms (Williams International from the United States, and Montubi Montaggi Material Tubolari from Italy.)[274]

Thus, on the whole, during the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era, Nigeria's foreign economic relations fitted into the avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs policy perspective of nonalignment.[275]

The Southern African Problem

Nigeria, during the period of Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, was very much involved with the problems in Southern Africa. As shown in a section above, Angola was one area in which its involvement was very strong. At the eve of Angolan independence, Nigeria made up its mind to support the MPLA as the only nationalist group to form the government in Angola,[276] and thus thwarting others' efforts to help form a government involving all the Angolan nationalist groups. The Nigerian position was that the MPLA was "the truly nationalist group",[277] and that the other groups, apart from being "ethnically based movements",[278] were being supported by South Africa[279] (and thus seen as undesirable to be part of the government of an independent Angola since they might retard the solution of the remaining problems in the Southern African region). Thus, although Nigeria's motivation was a desire to have a government in Angola that would help the people achieve meaningful independence and also help in the efforts to resolve the remaining problems in Namibia and South Africa, on balance, Nigeria helped install a government in Angola which was supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba. However, the other Angolan nationalist groups that were not able to be part of the Angolan government process have been contesting for power with the MPLA with arms.

Nigeria's effort to help the MPLA gain power involved "a diplomatic blitzkrieg among African states on behalf of the MPLA"[280] for the latter's international recognition as the sole political force in Angola, and this "resulted in victory for the Nigerian position at the 1976 Extraordinary Summit of the Organization of African Unity held in Addis Ababa to discuss the Angolan crisis."[281]

Nigeria's commitment to help sustain the MPLA in Angola and to help it to build a viable and stable polity was not limited to diplomatic support. Nigeria gave Angola 13 million Naira "as a cash grant" and 52 million Naira "in military and economic aid;"[282] and for the Nigerian resources level, this amount of assistance was a large amount of money to give out and showed the high level of Nigeria's commitment to the MPLA.

On the Zimbabwe issue, Nigeria worked towards an arrangement that ensured that the liberation forces that waged the armed struggle had a fair chance of contesting for election (which they won); and this effort, as shown in an earlier section, involved pressures on Britain not to help install a puppet regime (the nationalization of BP, also discussed in an earlier section, was one of these pressures.)[283] In the final analysis, Nigeria's opposition to the internal settlement was successful since the Patriotic Front was able to form the government for the independent Zimbabwe.

The Namibian problem was seen by Nigeria as being caused by South African intransigence,[284] since the latter continues to control Namibia contrary to the decision of the International Court of Justice. This tended to push Nigeria to support the South West

African People's Organization (SWAPO), an organization which tries to gain independence through negotiations where possible, and through armed struggle. Nigeria's strong support for this group can be borne out by out by the fact that the former "saluted the leaders of SWAPO and paid tribute to the devotion of the organization and its determination to free Namibia from illegal occupation."[285]

On the South African apartheid problem, Nigeria continued to push for the former to be "isolated in all areas of international endeavor"[286] through the demand for more sanctions against it. Nigeria also posited it would continue to press for such isolation of South Africa's "allies and friends in international forums."[287]

Nigeria also continued to favor armed struggle and asserted that it "would continue to give diplomatic, political, financial and material assistance to the national liberation movement."[288] Unsurprisingly, it also reasserted the position that it rejected any dialogue with South Africa without the latter "renouncing its policy of apartheid."[289] On the efforts by South Africa to create bantustans, Nigeria saw such action simply as "the quintessence of apartheid."[290]

The fact that Nigeria's position is more on the side of liberation groups, most of which are supported by Eastern sources, makes Nigeria's actions not fit into the equidistance from the superpower bloc's policy perspective of nonalignment.[291] However, as the above analysis shows, Nigeria's position appeared to be based more on its desire to support what, to its best judgment, represents true African

interests (with much less concern with the question whether such support happen to also tally with or differ from the position of the West or the East), with the understanding that independence, justice, peace, and prosperity in Africa will also mean the universalization of this phenomena. Thus, Nigeria's policy on the Southern African problem can be seen as fitting more into the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment.[292]

The Muhammed/Obasanjo Government and African Affairs

During the era of the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, the strengthening of Africa was "the cornerstone of Nigeria's foreign policy"[293] Apart from the Southern African problems, Nigeria was interested in other African issues such as the efforts to develop viable intra-African economic cooperation and economic integration in the West African sub-region. In the area of continental economic links, Nigeria, for example, extended one million Naira in financial assistance to Somalia, and also revitalized the Chad Basin Commission.[294] Additionally, apart from the already mentioned 20 million Naira assistance to Angola, Nigeria also extended 2.5 million Naira in assistance to Mozambique to enable the latter to cope with the economic hardships arising from the closure of its border with Zimbabwe, in March 1976,[295] in an effort to help bring a speedy and acceptable settlement of the independence problem of the latter.

On the subject of ECOWAS, the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, like the preceding Gowon Government, championed and helped build this regional economic community, and was very interested in seeing it grow

into a viable framework for regional cooperation. Thus, at the Dakar Summit of April 1979, an agreement that visa requirements should be abolished for nationals of ECOWAS countries, who are visiting other member states for ninety days, was reached.[296] There was also an agreement on the progressive reduction in tariff barriers against goods originating from other ECOWAS states for the following two years.[297] Also, significantly, a nonaggression pact, signed in 1978, was to be supplemented by some form of military alliance among the member countries.[298]

Nigeria continued to strengthen the OAU in African affairs; but there also developed a new element, with Nigeria being impatient with, or intolerant of, OAU member states (which to it were not 'progressive' enough in outlook) without much concern for consensus building within the OAU.[299]

Another major African issue that Nigeria was involved with was the invasion of the Shaba province of Zaire in 1978 by Zairean dissidents based in Angola (which were said to be backed by Cuban troops). Nigeria mainly concentrated on helping to arrange a mediation between Zaire and Angola due to its belief that continued extra-African intervention (that came from Western sources who encouraged some African states to do the same, on behalf of Zaire; from Eastern sources, through the use of Cubans as conduits, on behalf of the Angolan-based Zairean dissidents)[300] could have been detrimental to both Zaire and Angola. Thus, Nigeria strongly condemned those extra-African forces that intervened for the two sides in the conflict. Regarding those that intervened for Zaire, Nigeria saw their role as "a most naked and

unashamed attempt to determine (by external force) what Africa's true collective interests should be,"[301] while, about those in Angola, he told "the Soviets and their friends . . . that having been invited to Africa to assist in the liberation struggle and the consolidation of national independence, they should not overstay their welcome."[302] Since Nigeria's position was a balanced rebuke of both the West and the East, Nigeria's role in the Shaba issue fitted into the equidistance from the superpower bloc's policy perspective of nonalignment.[303] However, from the Nigerian perspective, its role of concentrating on encouraging the resolution of the issue through a mediation process between Angola and Zaire, thus helping to stem continued extra-African intervention in this issue, stemmed more from its desire to pursue the genuine interest of Africa and thus further peace and stability in Africa and the world, rather than from a sheer desire to be equidistant from superpower blocs. Thus, from the Nigerian viewpoint, its role in the Shaba issue tallies more with the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment, rather than with the equidistance from the superpower bloc's perspective of nonalignment[304] (even though its position on this Shaba issue was very balanced, in terms of its equal resentment of Western and Eastern roles in that issue). Additionally, the rebuke of Soviet excesses on the Shaba issue shows that Nigeria's continued support for the MPLA government in Angola was based on what Nigeria considered to be the genuine interests of Africa (genuine independence for Angola and a desire to have a government in Angola that will help in the resolution of the remaining problems in Angola and South Africa), and not on an

attempt to routinely link to the East. Therefore, at this juncture, it

can also be said that the Nigerian policy on Angola, and on the whole

of Southern Africa, tallies with the global input of a regional ideol-

ogy (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment,[305] since Nigeria

mainly views its role in this area as that of promoting independence,

peace, and justice, stability and prosperity in Africa, and on univer-

salizing these phenomena.

An Overview

An overall view of Nigerian foreign policy during the era of

Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, through the above analyses of Nigeria's

relations with the West and the East, foreign economic relations, Mid-

dle East policy, and role in Southern African and general African af-

fairs shows that though some of its actions did fit into the avoidance

of alignment with the superpower bloc's policy perspective of nonalign-

ment, most of its actions fitted more into the global input of a re-

gional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment.[306]

Nigerian foreign policy during this period also reveals some

features of fascination with a 'just cause' mentality. For example, a

scholar who was much involved in the foreign policy process[307] dur-

ing the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era enunciated views that indi-

cated that this sort of mentality guided Nigerian Angolan policy. Ac-

cording to him

> there is no intrinsic relationship between success and the
> justness of one's cause in politics--definitely not in interna-
> tional politics. Therefore, that in recognizing the MPLA
> government in Angola we backed the winning horse does not mean
> that we will always be successful in our policies--success be-
> ing measured in terms of achievement of our objectives. A lot
> of us would have been disappointed if the MPLA had been

defeated . . . in Angola. But we would still, however, have been convinced that Nigeria was right in recognizing the MPLA.[308]

This view, coming from somebody who was closely involved in the foreign policy process, means that in some policy formulation processes scoring political victories at home and abroad, through the pursuit of policies that are more bound to be successful, mattered less, while the pursuit of policies that passed the test of "justness of one's cause,"[309] whether they had the prospects of succeeding or not, mattered more. Thus, since most of the foreign policy issues that Nigeria was involved in concerned the issue of oppression and exploitation in Southern Africa, Nigeria's role in this area also fitted into the altruistic policy perspective of nonalignment. It was concerned less with the victories at home and the extension of influence abroad through the pursuit of successful policies, while being concerned more with justness of its policies in terms of their being able to bring independence, peace, justice, stability and prosperity to the Southern African region, and thus also universalizing these phenomena.

On the nature of contemporary international economic relations, Nigeria observed that, while

> there was at hand the economic and technological means to end the progressive and definitely controllable drift to chaos in international economic relations.[310]

there were "vicissitudes experienced in efforts to establish a new international economic order."[311] To Nigeria, the concept of new international economics has nothing to do with the concept of international aid. Thus, it observed that

> Mere palliatives, along the traditional lines of donor and recipient not only were peripheral to the structural economic problems of developing countries, but also inhibited self-reliance and sustained growth.[312]

Therefore, Nigeria saw the new international economic order as involving the demand for "a clear voice in the decisions that affected the management of the world economy."[313] It also supported the demand for the "reform of the international monetary system."[314] Additionally, it was also of the view that it was "the responsibility and obligation of the developed countries to make concessions and adjustments in their approach to international economic relations."[315]

Nigeria also seemed to have been of the view that, with or without the cooperation of the developed world, the developing world will have to bear the responsibility of creating the new international economic order. Thus, it talked of the developing countries seeking "ways to articulate programmes for collective self-reliance in protection of their legitimate interests,"[316] and of their stepping up intra-developing world cooperation[317] as very viable means of creating this new order. It is in this sense that one can also appreciate Nigeria championing the creation and the development of ECOWAS as a viable regional economic framework.

Therefore, on the whole the above positions and actions of Nigeria fit into the global economy reordering policy perspective of nonalignment,[318] since all those positions and actions are in support of overhauling the nature of contemporary global economy.

On the issue of the hope for Africa steering clear of nuclear capability, Nigeria wished that such a "hope was not rendered naive by

the merchants of horror and the enemies of humanity."[319] Put
starkly, Nigeria's view seems to imply that if such a view of Africa,
in terms of African and global realities, turns out to be that which
threatens the security of the people of the continent, then it will be
naive for Africa to still hope for its not having the need to have a
nuclear capability. Thus, if this interpretation of the above Nige-
rian view is correct, Nigeria's position on this issue fits into the
position of strength policy perspective of nonalignment.[320] It con-
notes a desire to have an adequate possession of visible and credible
power through which to have the strength to create new and better
global realities which will results in a democratized manifestation of
the global power configuration. Thus, Nigeria viewed lack of progress
in disarmament as a "super-Power collusion",[321] and resented the
situation where "the attitude of the nuclear Powers had served to con-
firm the inequity of a world dominated by super-Power hegemony."[322]
Further, it preferred a democratized global power structure which it
yearns to bring about by contributing to the demise of the present
order by augmenting its national power capability (thereby subscribing
to the position of strength perspective of nonalignment).

The Second Republic

The Second Republic lasted from late 1979 to 1983, and was the
first civilian government after thirteen years of various military gov-
ernments. Shehu Shagari was the President during the Second Republic.

Nigerian nonaligned foreign policy during this period will be examined in the areas of foreign economic relations, Middle East policy, Southern African, general African policy, and relations with the West and the East, starting with the last.

Relations with the West and the East

Nigeria, during the early phase of the Second Republic, had to deal with the controversy over the United States-led campaign for the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games (due to charges of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan). Nigeria's response to such a campaign took two perspectives of dealing with the Moscow Olympic Games boycott issue—an Afro-centric and a global perspective. Through the Afro-centric perspective, Nigeria mainly looked at the boycott issue through the prism of African politics and issues. Africa itself has a reputation for boycotting sporting events in order to score political points; and one would have assumed that African countries would not have found the idea of mixing sports and politics as a novel or repugnant one. And in reality, African countries did not feel that the United States was wrong in mixing sports and politics. But Nigeria and many African countries were unhappy that the United States in the past had been opposing them for conceptualizing international sporting and political relations as part and parcel of one whole social reality. Thus, Nigeria responded to the United States campaign for the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games was to remind the latter that it "had failed to respect Africa's similar call for the boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympics"[323] (which the African countries had campaigned

for due to their resentment of the fact that New Zealand, which had had sporting links with South Africa and thus falls into the category of countries which the African countries usually try to ostracize for having such links with the latter, was allowed to participate in the 1976 Montreal Olympics). By pointing out past United States noncooperation with African sports boycott efforts, Nigeria was advancing the rationale for its noncooperation with the United States campaign for the 1980 Moscow Olympics as being based on the simple logic of reciprocity. Therefore, Nigeria declared that it "had already made up its mind to go to Moscow."[324]

However, apart from the above Afro-centric perspective of looking at the Moscow Olympics issue, Nigeria also looked at this issue through a global perspective. According to a prominent politician, Nigeria considered itself as being "friendly with both the U. S. and the Soviet Union," and thus "it could not join one against the other."[325] Nigeria, therefore, also "invoked the nonaligned principle to rationalize its decision to go ahead with its plans to attend the Moscow Olympics."[326] The fact that Nigeria, in 1984, (after the Second Republic) also ignored the Soviet Union's campaign for the boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, also served to underscore the fact that the 1980 Nigerian refusal to join the 1980 Moscow Olympics boycott, on the grounds of its major foreign policy principle of non-alignment, was a case of a genuine enunciation of such a principle.

On the issue of the Afghanistan invasion by the Soviet Union, per se, "Nigeria expressed disappointment at the Soviet action since it felt no country had assisted the third world more,"[327] and thus

Nigeria joined most nonaligned countries to vote in favor of a United Nations General Assembly Resolution condemning the Soviet action in Afghanistan.[328]

The United States action in Grenada in 1983 also drew a negative response from Nigeria. It "condemned the invasion of Grenada by U.S. forces together with some six Caribbean countries,"[329] saw such an action as deplorable and unjustified, and specifically denounced the use of force by superpowers to change governments they were uncomfortable with.[330] Additionally, Nigeria also voted in favor of a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning the United States actions in Grenada.[331]

The fact that Nigeria condemned the actions of both the Soviet Union and the United States in regard to their actions in connection with forceful change of political realities in smaller neighboring countries (Afghanistan and Grenada, respectively), shows that it displayed an equidistance from the superpower bloc's policy perspective of nonalignment.

In 1983, Nigeria decided to improve the capability of the Nigerian Air Force with the acquisition of Anglo-French Jaguar ground attack fighter aircrafts.[332] This was significant in that it signaled that the Second Republic Nigeria was about to break the dominance of Soviet aircrafts in the Nigerian Air Force (which had been the reality for about the past sixteen years); and the significance was further deepened by the fact that the source for the new aircraft was in the West.

Additionally, the Second Republic's political and diplomatic links with the Soviet Union were not very cozy, even though there was no specific major crisis in such links. The 'average' situation in such links was particularly indicated by the fact that the Nigerian ambassador to the Soviet Union, Tunde Oyeleke, had his first opportunity to meet the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, when he accompanied Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, then the Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), who was on a working visit to Moscow, to see Gromyko.[333]

Nigeria seems to have sensed that its relations with the Soviet Union in the political and diplomatic areas, per se, were not very cozy. It seems to have tried to compensate for the slack in these areas by stepping up their relations in the economic areas since the Second Republic witnessed a tremendous expansion of Nigerian cooperation with the Soviet Union in the development of the steel industry in Nigeria. Also, the slack in the political and diplomatic areas with the Soviet Union was compensated for with increased links with other East European countries, for example, through increased links with the German Democratic Republic (GDR)[334] and Czechoslovakia.[335] (However, it should also be noted that this technique of stepping up relations with other East European countries, in order to compensate for slack in the relations with the Soviet Union, also was in place during the preceding Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era;[336] and its sole aim has always been to ensure that its relations with the West and East were not lopsided.)

Thus, on the whole, it can be said that Nigeria's relations with the West and East conformed to the avoidance of alignment with the superpower bloc's policy perspective of nonalignment.[337] This was further underscored by the fact that, in 1980, Nigeria "decided to reverse . . . the neglect of the Republic of Korea"[338] by establishing diplomatic relations with the former at the ambassadorial level and thus ensuring that it not only had such diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (it had such links with the latter since 1975).[339] Nigeria even posited that it decided to have diplomatic relations with the two Koreas because of its foreign policy principle of nonalignment.[340]

Foreign Economic Relations

A prominent feature of the Nigerian economy during the Second Republic was its creeping weakness due to falling oil prices, since about 85 percent of its foreign revenue came from oil. An outgrowth from that situation was that Nigeria was increasingly finding it difficult to meet the repayments of loans it got from Western banks, and that Nigeria's economic relations with the West amounted to its being in a weaker position in relation to the latter. (However, from late 1983 there had been efforts to tune up the economy through the review of expenditures and attempts to increase the productivity and the diversity of the sources of revenue; thus there was the contention that the economy was still potentially strong.)[341]

Generally, the West and the East had adequate links with Nigeria. For example, in the industrial sector of the economy (in which

there was much activity) both of the blocs' participation and coopera-
tion were existent. Technical cooperation with Western firms was very
strong in the automotive industry with most of the car and truck
plants having technical partnerships with them. For example, an Aus-
trian firm that provided the technical assistance to a truck plant in
Bauchi was also to provide such assistance to a new plant for the pro-
duction of "military type vehicles."[342] However, Eastern contacts
in the industrial sector were also significant, especially in the
machine tool industry. Czechoslovakia gave a 55 million Naira loan
for the establishment of a metallurgical and engineering plant that
would produce tools and automobile spare parts and machines,[343]
while the German Democratic Republic (GDR) offered to give Nigeria a
200 million Naira line of credit, part of which could be used to fur-
ther develop the machine tools industry.[344]

One important feature of Eastern economic contacts with Nige-
ria was that most of those contacts were in the area of heavy indus-
tries, as shown above, while most Western economic contacts were in
the area of consumer goods. Thus, it is not surprising that the
Soviet Union, during the Second Republic, also expanded its role in
the Nigerian economy, mainly through its longstanding technical coop-
eration in the steel industry, since it provided technical cooperation
to the Ajaokutu Steel Complex, the centerpiece of the Nigerian steel
industry, which at that period witnessed much activity in its develop-
ment. However, as shown earlier, Western firms were also encouraged
to participate in other steel projects[345] in order to avoid a situa-
tion where Nigeria's external cooperation in the steel industry were

mostly with the East. Thus, it was "categorically stated that Nigeria's doors would continue to remain open for technological cooperation and transfer from both the East and West,"[346] and that such a position demonstrated Nigeria's nonalignment.[347]

Thus, Nigeria's economic relations with the West and East conformed to the avoidance of alignment with the superpower bloc's policy of nonalignment,[348] since it had economic relations with both blocs.

The Second Republic continued to support the increasing viability of ECOWAS as a regional economic organization that would help West African countries realize their full economic potential and thus enhance their economic and political independence. Surprisingly, the unfortunate Nigerian expulsion of undocumented nationals of ECOWAS member states did not have much negative impact on the ECOWAS as a body.[349]

Nigeria also emphasized the need for cooperation among the less developed countries as a way of improving their economies and augmenting their role in international economic relations. This is the sort of rationale that made Nigeria emphasize its need to belong to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and thus view the world outside the umbrella of the latter as lethal and hostile.[350] The need for the less developed countries to change the contemporary international economic order was even more emphasized by Nigeria, in its relations with the European Economic Community (EEC), through its lead in helping the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group to unite in changing the nature of its relations with the EEC.[351] Specifically, Peter Afolabi, then the Nigerian Ambassador

to the EEC, was in the forefront in such a position, his main theme being that the EEC countries should be made to trade rather than aid since he saw aid as palliative and not curative.[352] He also posited that the EEC would rather prefer to emphasize aid since it "uses its aid programme to promote its own trade."[353] and to protect its industries from the goods from the less developed countries.[354] Thus, Afolabi also urged the ACP countries to emphasize that, if the EEC wants to help them, they should help in the area of industrialization.[355] Perhaps drawing from Nigeria's determined effort to build a strong and viable economy through emphasis on heavy industries and capital goods production, he also deplored the situation where the EEC found it more attractive to give ACP countries assistance mainly in small-scale industries and thus urged the EEC to concentrate on helping in large-scale industrial schemes.[356] Afolabi also urged the ACP countries to change the situation by emphasizing intra-ACP cooperation, and noted that "the scope for such cooperation remains enormous."[357] Thus, on the whole, it can be said that in some ways Nigeria's actions in the area of international economic relations also promoted the global economy reordering policy perspective of nonalignment,[358] since most of the above Nigerian actions and positions in relation to regional economic organizations, and its relations with the developed and developing countries, emphasized the need to change the nature of contemporary international economic relations.

The Middle East Problem

Like governments in the other eras, the Second Republic also paid attention to the Middle East problem. The Second Republic did

nothing to change the position of relations with Israel with which Nigeria had had its diplomatic relations severed during the Gowon Government era. Also, the Second Republic continued to echo the rationale given by previous governments, which is that as long as Arab lands are occupied "Israel could not expect normalization of relations with Nigeria and Africa."[359] Furthermore, it saw the inability of the Palestinians to enjoy the "right of nationhood" as "the greatest obstacle to any lasting peace in the Middle East."[360]

Nigeria's actions were more unfavorable to the party in the Middle East conflict closest to the West (Israel). It tended to see the latter as the only party that had concessions to make without also requiring concessions from the other parties, and without emphasizing the rights of the people of Israel to have a state that has secure and protected borders. Thus, Nigeria's action could not fit into the equidistance from the superpower bloc's policy perspective of nonalignment.[361]

However, Nigeria had based its position more on regional considerations. Thus, by not having a global perspective of the Middle East problem, it played down the relevance of the equidistance from the superpower bloc's policy perspective in its actions and positions. Nevertheless, the changing realities of the situation in the Middle East had made obsolete the rationale it used to break diplomatic relations with Israel, which is that the latter had infringed on the territorial integrity of an OAU member state (Egypt). After the Camp David accord improved the relations between Egypt and Israel up to the point that both resolved most of their bilateral problems and decided

to have diplomatic relations, Nigeria's regionally-based rationale for not resuming diplomatic relations with Israel was shattered. However, Nigeria quickly fashioned another regionally-based rationale, which was the view "that the only condition for resuming relations is for Israel to reassess its stand on South Africa,"[362] thus giving the impression that it was in search of a reason to maintain the status quo in the nature of its relations with Israel.

A possible reason for Nigeria's position appeared to be a desire by the OAU and the Arab World to maintain their mutually-supporting diplomatic arrangement, whereby they each support each other's international positions and causes; the Arab World counting on OAU support for the Arab position on the Middle East problem, while the OAU counts on the Arab World to support the OAU position on Southern African problems.

Therefore, the only way nonalignment may be relevant to Nigeria's position may be through the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment, through which Nigeria might have seen its role as that of helping to bring peace, independence, stability, justice and prosperity to all parts of Africa and thus universalizing these phenomena.

The Southern African Problem

On Angola, Nigeria refused to see the Cuban presence in Angola as having anything to do with the solution to the problem there, and thus rejected the Western position that there should be a linkage of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to the solution of the

security problems the latter has,[363] stemming from South African

incursion into its territory and its support for Angolan dissident

forces still fighting to topple the regime now in power in Angola.

Withdrawals of Cuban troops from Angola, apart from being linked to

the solution of the security problem in the latter, is also linked to

the question of Namibian independence. Nigeria, however

> saw no such links and unreservedly repudiated the claims of
> extra-continental Powers to dictate to any African country who
> their friends should be when their national survival was
> threatened.[364]

Thus, Nigeria was of the opinion that Angola had the right, as a sover-

eign state, to have Cuban troops, or troops from any other country, as

long as the host country wanted them to be there; and that nobody else

could determine for Angola who it could invite to assist in its secu-

rity problem.

On the South African problem of apartheid, Nigeria still main-

tained that dialogue is only possible with South Africa when the lat-

ter replaces "the apartheid system with genuine democratic majority

rule."[365]   Additionally,   while   still   advocating   more   sanctions

against South Africa, Nigeria noted that the "sanctions alone will not

destroy apartheid,"[366] and thus added that continued South African

refusal to change such a system would also mean Nigeria's continued ef-

forts "to assist, encourage and support the struggle of South African

nationalists with all the might and resources at its disposal."[367]

Nigeria's belief might have been that, sooner or later, the armed

struggle concept of war of attrition would sap the political will of

South Africa and its allies, and also make redundant their superior

military hardware just as the armed struggles in Guinea Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, through wars of attrition, crumbled the political will of Portugal from within and paved the way for independence in those countries.

On the situation in Namibia, Nigeria noted the continued illegal occupation of the former by South Africa,[368] and saw Namibian independence as "a cardinal objective of Nigerian foreign policy"[369] in addition to reiterating Nigeria's "unflinching support for SWAPO."[370] Also, to Nigeria, "the people of Namibia were denied their inalienable rights"[371] due to "the collusion between South Africa and its Western allies."[372]

From the Western perspective, Nigeria by supporting armed struggles (which the former saw as also being supported by the East), and also by singling out the West as being responsible for the persistence of the problem in Southern Africa (by accusing it of colluding with South Africa in order to try to preserve the status quo in that region) did not maintain a position that fit into the equidistance from the superpower bloc's policy perspective of nonalignment.[373] Instead its position was seen as conflicting with that of the West, while at the time it was friendly to nationalist forces that were armed and supported by the East. Additionally, the West considered as false the accusation of its collusion to perpetuate the problems in Southern Africa; and actually saw its role as that of helping to bring peace in a very precarious situation.

On the other hand, Nigeria saw its position as being dictated by the realities and its perception of genuine African interests, and

it also saw its destiny as being "intricately linked with the fortunes of all the countries of Africa and all the peoples of African descent abroad."[374] Therefore, Nigeria saw its position as fitting into the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment,[375] since it saw its position as fostering peace, justice, independence, stability, and prosperity in Southern Africa, and thus also universalizing these phenomena.

The Second Republic and African Affairs

Nigeria stating that its destiny is "intricately linked with the fortunes of all the countries in Africa and all the peoples of African descent abroad,"[376] as shown above, meant that in terms of foreign policy the Second Republic continued to view Africa as the centerpiece of its foreign policy.[377]

Thus, on the situation in Chad, Nigeria was against the intervention of extra-African forces there, while it thought that negotiations among the different groups in Chad were the most viable means of ensuring enduring peace in that country.[378] Nigeria had also played a major role in an OAU peace-keeping operation in Chad,[379] (and in some circles there was still support for Nigeria playing a future direct role in that country[380]).

Nigeria was also helping in the efforts to foster efficient gathering and dissemination of news and information in Africa, and it supported the Pan-African News Agency (PANA) and also urged the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) to cooperate with the former.[381] Furthermore, by perceiving PANA's role as that of helping to stop the

situation where non-African news sources were only "too ready to distort news about Africa to suit the taste of their home readers,"[382] Nigeria's position fitted into the cultural autonomy assertion perspective of nonalignment[383] in that it sought to help assert the cultural autonomy of African countries through helping them play significant roles in international communication.

However, the Second Republic was perceived by many as not being able to vigorously pursue Pan-African goals, and some even had nostalgic feelings about the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era, which was much identified with such vigorous Pan-African goals.[384] The Second Republic was seen as not having a clear and positive position on major African problems like the Western Sahara issue, the Chadian conflict, and the Libyan question; and that when these issues did not enable the OAU to form quorums for its Summit meetings, Nigeria, instead of leading in resolving the impasse on these issues, preferred to engage in less decisive compromising roles.[385]

Some also criticized Nigeria's continued membership in the Commonwealth of Nations, and saw this as being inconsistent with Africa being the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy.[386] Additionally, Nigeria's continued membership in that body was seen as an example of Nigeria not leading by example since it had often urged African countries to lessen their extra-African relations[387] for the sake of ensuring greater attention to African issues and insuring their inde pendence.

Nevertheless, on the whole, Nigeria did play a major role in African affairs during the Second Republic, though this was not as

vigorous as had been the case during the preceding governmental era. For example, Nigeria was active in Southern African issues and the ECOWAS, as shown above; and its actions in general African issues did fit into the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment[388] since it sought to ensure independence, peace, stability, justice, independence and prosperity in Africa and thus also universalizing this phenomena.

An Overview

On the whole, the Second Republic's relations with the West and East, foreign economic relations, Middle East policy, and its role in African affairs shows that Nigeria was nonaligned. Specifically, in terms of its relations with the West and East and foreign economic relations, Nigeria displayed the avoidance of alignment with the super-power bloc perspective of nonalignment,[389] while its Middle East policy and role in African affairs mostly reflected the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment.[390]

In the area of international economic relations, Nigeria also displayed the global economy reordering policy perspective since it sought to change the contemporary international economic system.[391] For example, it called for changes in the global areas of "money and finance, resource flow, industrialization, and trade and protectionism",[392] and also noted that these changes were very critical "to the realization of the aspirations of the developing countries."[393]

Additionally, the Second Republic Nigeria, in campaigning for disarmament, also fitted its actions into the international peace

guarantor perspective of nonalignment.[394] For example, it posited that there "must be disarmament" in order "to save mankind from untoward anxiety and holocaust."[395]

Endnotes

1. Additionally, there are also a small number of territories that come under Britain's direct governance.

2. Olajide Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 43.

3. Ibid.

4. Ironically, the NPC grew out of Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa (which in Hausa literarily means the association of peoples of the North), a cultural organization formed by the modern intellectual community in the Northern part of Nigeria. However, in order to survive, politically, these pioneers had to ingrain their activities with the powerful traditional political system in these areas.

5. Julius O. Ihonvbere, "Resource Availability and Foreign Policy Change in Nigeria: The Impact of Oil," India Quarterly (Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, April-June 1983), p. 122.

6. Gordon J. Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 1960-1966 (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), p. 48.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 108.

10. Alexander A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1980), p. 8.

11. Idang, op. cit., p. 140.

12. Olufemi Fajana, "International Trade and Balance of Payments" in F. A. Olaloku et al., eds., Structure of the Nigerian Economy, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 235-236; (this text based its figures on data collected from Federal Office of

Statistics, <u>Trade Report</u> and <u>The Review of External Trade</u>, and Central Bank of Nigeria, <u>Annual Report</u>.)

13. <u>Ibid</u>.

14. <u>Ibid</u>.

15. As a testimony to such a reality, the Nigerian nationalist leaders had to first succeed in having these powerful Nigerian traditional authorities on their side before seeking to dislodge Britain from Nigeria.

16. However, it must also be noted that the British colonial presence in Nigeria was comparatively brief, lasting roughly from 1860 to 1960 (and with a significant portion of that period--the post-World War Two years--guaranteeing significant self-government in many parts of Nigeria).

17. Idang, <u>op. cit</u>., pp. 77-96.

18. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 82.

19. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 84.

20. The students viewed the pact as a "neocolonial arrangement". See Billy Dudley, <u>An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics</u>, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982) pp. 278-279.

21. <u>United Nations Review</u>, (Vol. 9, No. 3, March 1962), p. 48.

22. <u>Ibid</u>.

23. <u>Extracts from the Statement by the Nigerian Delegation at the Second Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, June 1960</u>, in Gideon-Cyrus M. Mutiso and S. W. Rohio, eds., <u>Reading in African Political Thought</u> (London: Heinemann, 1975), pp. 399-400.

24. <u>Ibid</u>.

25. <u>Ibid</u>.

26. <u>Extracts from the Statement by the Ghana Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon Ako Adjei, at the Second Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, June 1960</u> in Mutiso and Rohio, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 398.

27. It is interesting to note here that King Hassan of Morocco, who is presently seen as a very moderate leader, belonged to this radical bloc. Also, Sekou Toure of Guinea, who was to mellow a lot during his later years, was one of the firebrand of this bloc.

28. A. B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1974), p. 168-169.

29. Ibid., pp. 173-177.

30. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1965), p. 78.

31. Kwame Nkrumah quoted in Akinyemi, op. cit., p. 98.

32. United Nations Review (Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1961), p. 31.

33. Akinyemi, op. cit., p. 45.

34. Ibid., pp. 48 and 54.

35. Ibid., pp. 55, 56, 58, 63, 68, 70.

36. United Nations Review (Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1961), p. 19.

37. Akinyemi, op. cit., p. 43.

38. Ibid., p. 42.

39. Ibid., p. 44.

40. Ibid., p. 65.

41. Ibid., pp. 72-73.

42. Ibid., p. 73; and Idang, op. cit., pp. 126-127.

43. Akinyemi, op. cit., p. 67 (footnote).

44. Idang, op. cit., p. 127.

45. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1965), p. 16.

46. United Nations Review (Vol. 9, No. 11, November 1962), p. 25.

47. Ibid.

48. United Nations Review (Vol. 8, No. 11, November 1961), p. 19.

49. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1965), p. 77.

50. Akinyemi, op. cit., p. 71.

51. Ibid., p. 106.

52. Ibid.

53. <u>Ibid.</u>

54. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 107-108.

55. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 108.

56. <u>Ibid.</u>

57. <u>Ibid.</u>

58. <u>Ibid.</u> Roy Welensky was the Prime Minister of the short-lived <u>Central African Federation.</u>

59. <u>Ibid.</u>

60. <u>Ibid.</u>

61. <u>United Nations Review</u> (Vol. 9, No. 7, July 1962), p. 11.

62. <u>United Nations Review</u> (Vol. 9, No. 3, March 1962), p. 16.

63. <u>United Nations Review</u> (Vol. 9, No. 7, July 1962), p. 11.

64. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 10-11.

65. <u>UN Monthly Chronicle</u> (Vol. 11, No. 11, December 1965), pp. <u>18-19.</u>

66. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 19.

67. <u>UN Monthly Chronicle</u> (Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1965), pp. <u>77-78.</u>

68. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 78.

69. <u>UN Monthly Chronicle</u> (Vol. 11, No. 11, December 1965), p. 18.

70. Dudley, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 280.

71. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 280-281.

72. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 281.

73. <u>United Nations Review</u> (Vol. 9, No. 7, July 1962), p. 11.

74. <u>United Nations Review</u> (Vol. 10, No. 12, December 1963), p. 28.

75. <u>United Nations Review</u> (Vol. 10, No. 5, May 1963), p. 35.

76. See <u>UN Monthly Chronicle</u> (Vol. 1, No. 6, November 1964), p. 7 and, <u>UN Monthly Chronicle</u> (Vol. 11, No. 7, July 1965), p. 45.

77. See <u>UN Monthly Chronicle</u> (Vol. 11, No. 6, June 1965), p. 54 and <u>UN Monthly Chronicle</u> (Vol. 11, No. 5, May 1965), p. 33.

78. <u>United Nations Review</u> (Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1963), p. 36.

79. <u>Ibid.</u>

80. <u>Ibid.</u>

81. Idang, <u>op. cit.</u> p. 128.

82. Akinyemi, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 106.

83. Idang, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 128.

84. Ibrahim Gusau, quoted in Akinyemi, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 107.

85. Akinyemi, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 105. Akinyemi also notes that a Nigerian diplomat (whose identity he did not fully disclose) asserted that, on the Nigerian Government's instructions, financial assistance was given to African national liberation groups by at least one Nigerian foreign mission, even before 1963 (but it appears that these actions were not made to be matters for public knowledge). See <u>Ibid.</u> (footnote).

86. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 109.

87. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 104.

88. On the personality profile of Balewa, see Idang, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 48.

89. Akinyemi, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 101-104.

90. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 102-104.

91. However, it must be noted that nonalignment on this issue was more due to the domestic reality, as already shown in preceding paragraphs, than to the desire to avoid alignment with either the West or the East.

92. See Table 1.

93. See Table 2.

94. See Tables 1 and 2.

95. See Tables 1 and 2.

96. See Tables 1 and 2.

97. Idang, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

98. *Ibid.*

99. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

100. *Ibid.* Interestingly, the combined amount of aid later received from both Poland and Czechoslovakia was 40 million Naira, which corresponded to the amount Nigeria earlier rejected from the Soviet Union.

101. *Ibid.*, pp. 137 and 139. However, the succeeding government did face up to the realities of contemporary economic relations, and initiated formal links with the EEC.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 136. It was a succeeding government that finally removed such a restriction.

103. *Ibid.*

104. *Ibid.*

105. *Ibid.*, pp. 136 and 137.

106. *Ibid.*, pp. 136 and 137.

107. Oye Ogunbadejo "Ideology and Pragmatism: The Soviet Role in Nigeria, 1960-1977," *Orbis* (Vol. 25, No. 4, Winter 1978), p. 808.

108. *Ibid.*

109. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment above.

110. Akinyemi, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

111. Idang, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 76n.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

114. Akinyemi, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

115. Idang, *op. cit.*, p. 76n.

116. *United Nations Review* (Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1962), p. 20. This sentiment was repeated in 1965 to make clear Nigeria's stand on this issue (see *UN Monthly Chronicle* (Vol. 11, No. 10, November 1965), p. 80).

117. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment above.

118. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. 1, No. 1, May 1964), p. 57.

119. Ibid., p. 56.

120. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment above.

121. United Nations Review (Vol. 10, No. 12, December 1963), p. 38.

122. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment above.

123. United Nations Review (Vol. 8, No. 11, November 1961), p. 16.

124. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment above.

125. United Nations Review (Vol. 8, No. 11, November 1961), p. 23.

126. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment above.

127. United Nations Review (Vol. 8, No. 12, December 1961), p. 12.

128. United Nations Review (Vol. 10, No. 11, November 1963), p. 18.

129. United Nations Review (Vol. 9, No. 12, December 1962), p. 8.

130. The Ironsi Government marked the advent of the first era of military governments which also included the Gowon, and the Mohammed/Obasanjo Governments. Aguiyi-Ironsi was the Head of State during the Ironsi Government period.

131. Ray Ofoegbu, "Foreign Policy and Military Rule," in Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule 1966-79 (New York: St. Martin Press, 1979), p. 263.

132. Aluko, op. cit. p. 45.

133. Ofoegbu, op, cit., p. 126.

134. Aluko, op. cit., p. 45.

135. Ibid.

136. Dudley, op. cit., p. 286.

137. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. 5, No. 10, November 1968), p. 122.

138. Ibid.

139. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. VI, No. 10, November 1969), p. 105.

140. <u>Ibid</u>.

141. <u>Ibid</u>.

142. Aluko, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 103.

143. <u>Ibid</u>.

144. Aluko, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 261.

145. It is important to note that even the improvement of relations with the West, generally, did not involve a very warm relation with the leader of the West, the United States (though Nigeria's relations with the latter were adequate); for example, a planned meeting between Nixon and Gowon did not occur (see <u>Ibid</u>., p. 109).

146. Up to the beginning of the Civil War, the Soviet Union did, however, appear to be evenhanded in its relationship with the Federal Government and the region that wanted to secede; but after the declaration of the Republic of Biafra, and the ensuing Civil War, the Soviet Union was firmly on the side of the Federal Government. See Ogunbadejo, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 812.

147. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 814.

148. <u>Ibid</u>.

149. <u>Ibid</u>. In fact, the Nigerian Civil War was a rare case where the East and the West were generally on one side; and this might have indicated the perception by both that, no matter the orientation of any government, Nigeria, due to existing domestic forces that champion the latter being nonaligned, it will not be totally committed to any one particular bloc. (Thus, to both blocs, no matter which of them supported Nigeria, both sides will still have meaningful relations with Nigeria.)

150. <u>Ibid</u>.

151. Vladimir Kudryavtsev, quoted in <u>Ibid</u>.

152. Ogunbadejo, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 815. To the Gowon Government, the Soviet Union's efforts to organize the progressives was not perceived as an imaginary problem since "Dr. Otegbeye, who had gone to the Soviet Union to attend the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties," was hopeful that this could happen; and as a leader of a defunct party with formal links with the Soviet Communist Party (the Nigerian Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party) he told his Moscow audience that the Nigerian progressives were considering "the possibility of a united front of all anti-imperialist forces . . . and the leading role of the

Party of a new type--the party of Communists who can guide with the instrument of Marxist-Leninism the development of the national-democratic revolution, and its transformation into a socialist revolution."

153. Aluko, op. cit., p. 123.

154. Ibid. Ironically, at the initial stages of the Nigerian conflict, the Soviet Union used Czechoslovakia as the source for military aid to Nigeria. According to S. E. Orobator, it was Czechoslovakia's decision to stop serving as the Soviet surrogate for Nigeria's military aid that helped signal to Moscow that there was a very serious doubt about Prague's role in the Warsaw Pact, and prompted the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. (See S. E. Orobator, "The Nigerian Civil War and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia," African Affairs (Vol. 82, No. 329, April 1983), pp. 201-214.) However, Orobator has also emphasized that the Czechoslovakian decision not to support Nigeria with military supplies any longer only served as a final straw for, and not the main cause of, the occurance of the invasion. Czechoslovakia no more serving Nigeria, meant that the Soviet Union openly and directly gave this assistance (and also used Egypt as a conduit.)

155. Aluko, op. cit., p. 106.

156. Ibid., pp. 101 and 112.

157. Ibid., p. 101.

158. Ibid., p. 105.

159. Ibid., p. 107.

160. Ibid., p. 103.

161. Ogunbadejo, op. cit., p. 818.

162. Aluko, op. cit., p. 124.

163. Dudley, op. cit., pp. 290-291.

164. Nigeria's ability to avoid being hooked into a very close routine relationship with the Soviets during, or after, the war, seems to have been facilitated by Nigeria having the resources to pay "hard cash," or barter, for the arms it bought from the Soviet Union. See Ogunbadejo, op. cit., pp. 817-818. Additionally, as already noted, the Gowon Government's ability to contain Soviet efforts to organiz the Nigerian progressives was also critical in ensuring that Nigeria was adequately independent from the Soviet Union.

165. See Tables 3 and 4.

166. See Tables 3 and 4.

167. See Tables 3 and 4.

168. See Tables 3 and 4; however, there is a note of caution over the reliability of the figures, since some have posited that the Soviets have a history of engaging in barter trade (most of which might not be publicized), in order to circumvent currency problems (in addition to a desire to avoid other economic and political problems.) (See Ogunbadejo, op. cit., pp. 817-818.) Therefore, it is possible that the volume of Nigeria's trade link with the East might have been bigger than the above figures.

169. See Tables 1 and 3.

170. See Tables 2 and 4.

171. Ogunbadejo, op. cit., p. 816.

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid., p. 822.

174. Aluko, op. cit., pp. 73-81.

175. Yakubu Gowon, quoted in Ibid., p. 73.

176. Yakubu Gowon, noted in Ibrahim Agboola Gambari, "Nigeria and the World: A Growing Internal Stability, Wealth, and External Influence," Journal of International Affairs (Vol. 29, No. 2, Fall 1975), p. 165.

177. Douglas Ngwube, "How Nigeria came to the ADB's Aid," West Africa (10 September 1984), pp. 1851-1852.

178. Ibid. However, in the early 1980's Nigeria appeared to have been more flexible on the issue of non-Africans particpating in the ADB equity.

179. Separate attention is paid to ECOWAS in a section below.

180. See chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.

181. Ibid.

182. Ibid.

183. However, some West African countries do sometimes feel that Nigeria (due to its very large size and resources relative to other West African countries) may be attempting to replace non-African economic and political influence with its own economic and political influence; but Nigeria, instead, often stresses that the main goal of frameworks, like the ECOWAS is the freeing of African countries from undue non-African influence.

184. Olatunde J. B. Ojo, "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS," International Organization (Vol. 34, No. 4, Autumn 1980), p. 602.

185. Ibid., pp. 571-604.

186. Some Nigerians often feel that France's role in Africa is more problematic than those of more visible global powers that are often more easily identified with imperialistic tendencies. France's tentacles appear in subtle fashions; and, its major client states (mostly its former colonies), due to its "licking and soothing the wounds" mode of operation, do not develop much significant anti-French sentiments (a sort of sentiment that often helps alert societies under such influence from other more visible powers, due to the latter's still crude methods, to try to remove such an influence).

187. See the chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.

188. However, some Nigerian critics often hold the view that, given the resources at its disposal, Nigeria should have been more assertive in ensuring a more self-reliant economy for itself, in addition to helping restructure the international economic system.

189. A separate section below is devoted to Nigeria's role in the Southern Africa problem.

190. Aluko, op. cit., p. 201.

191. Particularly, Nigeria stressed good relations with other African countries, and it was also through the OAU forums that it garnered African support for a united front, (which also included the Carribean and Pacific States) to deal with the EEC.

192. Ibid.

193. See the chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.

194. At present, the last two are the only countries where these problems have not been resolved.

195. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. IX, No. 3, March 1972), p. 26.

196. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. IX, No. 9, October 1972), p. 19.

197. Showing displeasure over Britain's dealings with Ian Smith's regime over a settlement plan, without including all segments of the population in such negotiations, Nigeria alluded that Britain was guilty of such an action. (See UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1972), p. 77.)

198. Dudley, op. cit., p. 280.

199. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. IX, No. 9, October 1972), p. 19.

200. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. IX, No. 1, January 1972), p. 78.

201. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. IX, No. 9, October 1972), p. 20. Nigeria held that majority rule should not be anything less than absolute equal rights for all citizens (thus no special rights reserved for any segment of the population.)

202. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. IX, No. 11, December 1972), p. 15. Other countries, ouside Southern Africa, then under the Portuguese colonial rule were Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde.

203. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. VIII, No. 10, November 1971), p. 126.

204 Ibid.

205. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. VI, No. 10, November 1969), p. 105.

206. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. VI, No. 6, June 1969), p. 25. Noting its own unilateral commitment, Nigeria also reaffirmed "its readiness to extend assistance to the freedom fighters in those territories." (See UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. V, No. 10, November 1968), p. 123.) During the Gowon Government era, Nigeria's assistance to the libration movements was mostly through the OAU Liberation Committee (which acts as the official OAU organ for the mobilization of support for these movements, and as the clearing house for the support they receive from African and non-African sources).

207. See the chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.

208. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. VII, No. 10, November 1970), p. 18.

209. Ibid.; furthermore, Nigeria's view of the situation is that it conceives the Southern African problem as one in which the issue of fundamental human rights, and not that of geopolitics or superpower rivalry, should be the primary concern (thus it views this problem as that which warrants all civilized societies being mobilized to restore basic civilized standards).

210 See the chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.

211. However, it is important to note that while this view of the problem might fit the global input of a regional (Pan-African-ism) perspective of nonalignment, it is also, diametrically opposed by the equidistance from the superpower blocs policy perspecitve of nonalignment. (See the chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.)

212. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. III, No. 11, December 1966), p. 20.

213. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. VII, No. 10, November 1970), p. 135.

214. Ibid.

215. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol.VIII, No. 10, November 1971), p. 126.

216. Ibid.

217. OAU Resolution noted in UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. X, No. 7, July 1973), p. 16.

218. Ibid.

219. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. X, No. 10, November 1973), p. 53.

220. This view is supported by the fact that even after Egypt improved relations with Israel, Nigeria has continued to dodge the issue of improving its relations with that country (by always being ready to search for new reasons for the status quo in their relations) due to the desire not to break ranks with the majority African and Arab countries.

221. Dudley, op. cit., p. 290.

222. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XI, No. 11, November 1974), p. 99.

223. See the chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.

224. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. 111, No. 10, November 1966), p. 17.

225. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XI, No. 11, November 1974), p. 99.

226. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. IX, No. 10, November 1972), p. 43.

227. Ibid.

228. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. VII, No. 10, November 1970), p. 18.

229. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. V, No. 10, November 1968), p. 123.

230. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. III, No. 9, October 1966), O. 86.

231 UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. III, No. 9, October 1966, p. 86.

232. Ofoegbu, op. cit., p. 137.

233. Ibid.

234. Aluko, op. cit, p. 56.

235. Ibid.

236. Ofoegbu, op. cit., p. 136.

237. Aluko, op. cit., p. 249-250.

238. Ibid., p. 217.

239. Ibid. p. 225.

240. Ibid., pp. 226-227. The BP nationalization decision was made just before the Commonwealth meeting of 1979 at Lusaka, Zambia, so as to maximize its impact and make Britain reconsider its desire to recognize the government that Ian Smith was trying to install in Zimbabwe.

241. This group was backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

242. Aluko, op. cit., p. 249.

243. Ofoegbu, op. cit., p. 136.

244. Aluko, op. cit., p. 250.

245. Ibid., p. 249.

246. Ofoegbu, op. cit., pp. 137-138.

247. Nelson, Harold D., ed., Nigeria: A Country Study (Area Handbook Series) (Washington, D. C.: The Department of the Army, 1982), p. 232.

248. Ofoegbu, op. cit., p. 139.

249. Ibid., p. 138.

250. Ibid., p. 140.

251. Ibid., p. 139.

252. Gambari, op. cit., p. 166.

253. Ibid.

254. Ibid.

255. Aluko, op. cit, p. 255.

256. Ofoegbu, op. cit., p. 146.

257. Nelson, op. cit., p. 232.

258. Ibid.

259. See the chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.

260. A. Bolaji Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy," in Oyeleye Oyediran, op. cit., p. 168.

261. Ofoegbu, p. 144.

262. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XV, No. 10, November 1978), p. 124.

263. Ibid.

264. Ibid.

265. Ibid.

266. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XIV, No. 10, November 1977), pp. 94-95.

267. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XIII, No. 10, November 1976), p. 83.

268. Ibid.

269. Ibid.

270. In spite of this, Nigeria has still maintained economic relations with Israel, especially in terms of the latter's presence in the construction industry (see Aluko, op. cit., pp. 84 and 90.).

271. See the chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.

272. Ibid.

273. Ogunbadejo, op. cit., p. 825.

274. Ibid., p. 825 and p. 825n.

275. See the chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.

276. Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy," op. cit., p. 155.

277. Ibid., p. 156.

278. Ibid.

279. Ofoegbu, op. cit., p. 135.

280. Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy," op. cit, p. 155.

281. Ibid., p. 156. As already noted in an earlier section, Nigeria championing this cause for the MPLA put the former in a direct confrontation with the United States (which favored the participation of all the nationalist groups) and this brought the relation between the two countries down "to the zero mark." See Ibid.

282. Ogunbadejo, op. cit., p. 823.

283. Aluko, op. cit., pp. 212-230.

284. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XV, No. 10, November 1978), p. 124.

285. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XIV, No. 10, November 1977), p. 94.

286. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XV, No. 10, November 1978), p. 124.

287. Ibid.

288. Ibid.

289. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XIII, No. 10, November 1976), p. 83.

290. Ibid.

291. See the chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.

292. Ibid.

293. H. Idowu, quoted in Ofoegbu, Op. cit., p. 142.

294. Aluko, op. cit., p. 236.

295. Ibid., pp. 236-237.

296. Ibid., p. 19.

297. Ibid.

298. Ibid.

299. Ibid., p. 237.   Aluko also viewed Nigeria's actions in this regard as being similar to that of Nkrumah's Ghana.

300. Dudley, op. cit., pp. 299-300.

301. Ibid., p. 300. Nigeria's opposition to extra-African intervention also explains its opposition to the presence of French troops in Chad due to the Civil War in the latter. Therefore, Nigeria demanded French withdrawal and spearheaded the move for an African peacekeeping force in Chad (see Ibid., p. 301).

302. Ibid.

303. See the chapter above on the subject of the concept of nonalignment.

304. Ibid.

305. Ibid.

306. Ibid.

307. Bolaji Akinyemi who has a rare dual background in the discipline of international relations (since he has educational backgrounds in both the purely academic discipline of international relations and in the professional and practical discipline of diplomacy) was the then Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

308. A. Bolaji Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy," op. cit., p. 159.

309. Ibid.

310. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XV, No. 10, November 1978), p. 123.

311. Ibid.

312. Ibid. From this time onward Nigeria has been emphasizing the theme of fair trading links, while viewing aid as being dysfunctional to the recipient and also as being tokens from wealth accumulated by donors through unequal international economic relations.

313. Ibid.

314. UN Monthly Chronicle, (Vol. XII, No. 10, November 1975), p. 79.

315. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XIII, No. 10, November 1976), p. 83.

316. Ibid.

317. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XII, No. 11, November 1975), p. 79.

318. See the chapter above on the subject of the concept of nonalignment.

319. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XIV, No. 10, November 1977), p. 94.

320. See the chapter on the subject of the concept of nonalignment.

321. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XII, No. 10, November 1975), p. 79.

322. Ibid.

323. Oye Ogunbadejo, "Foreign Policy Under Nigeria's Presidential System," The Round Table (Issue 280, October 1980), p. 405.

324. Ibid.

325. Ibid., p. 406.

326. Ibid.

327. Yearbook of the United Nations 1980 (Vol. 34, 1983), pp. 308-309.

328. Ibid., p. 301.

329. West Africa (7 November 1983), p. 2593.

330. Ibid.

331. West Africa (14 November 1983), p. 2605.

332. West Africa (8 August 1983), p. 1834.

333. Clem Baiye, "Change of Baton at NIIA," West Africa (31 October 1983), p. 2507. Even the Akinyemi meeting with Gromyko was said to be only possible when the former demanded it on the basis of reciprocity, since Professor Anatoly Gromyko, a Soviet African studies expert and the son of Andrei Gromyko, when he led a Soviet delegation to Nigeria earlier for a comprehensive dialogue session on the state of Nigeria-Soviet relations, was able

to pay a courtesy call on the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs. Akinyemi was leading a Nigerian delegation for a similar dialogue session in Moscow and thus had to pay such a courtesy call on the Soviet Foreign Minister also.

334. _West Africa_ (1 August 1983), p. 1777.

335. _West Africa_ (4 April 1983), p. 851.

336. See Ofoegbu, _op. cit._, p. 146; and, Nelson, _op. cit._, p. 232.

337. See the chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.

338. Oye Ogunbadejo, "Foreign Policy Under Nigeria's Presidential System," _op. cit._ p. 407.

339. _Ibid._

340. _Ibid._

341. _West Africa_ (28 November 1983), p. 2771.

342. _West Africa_ (8 August 1983), p. 1835.

343. _West Africa_ (4 April 1983), p. 851.

344. _West Africa_ (1 August 1983), p. 1777.

345 Oye Ogunbadejo, "Foreign Policy Under Nigeria's Presidential System," _op. cit._, p. 406.

346. _Ibid_, pp. 406-407.

347. _Ibid._, p. 406.

348. See the chapter above on the concept of nonalignment.

349. _West Africa_ (10 October 1983), p. 2353.

350. _West Africa_ (12 December 1983), p. 2909.

351. _West Africa_ (27 August 1984), p. 1744.

352. _Ibid._

353. _Ibid._

354. _Ibid._

355. Ibid.

356. Ibid.

357. Ibid.

358. See the above chapter on the concept of nonalignment.

359. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XVII, No. 10, December 1980), p. 100.

360. Ibid.

361. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment.

362. Oye Ogunbadejo, "Foreign Policy Under Nigeria's Presidential System," op. cit., p. 406.

363. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XVIII, No. 11, December 1981), p. 83.

364. Ibid.

365. Ibid.

366. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XVII, No. 10, December 1980), p. 100.

367. Ibid.

368. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XVIII, No. 11, December 1981), p. 82.

369. Ibid., p. 83.

370. Ibid.

371. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XVII, No. 10, December 1980), p. 100.

372. Ibid.

373. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment.

374. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XVII, No. 10, December 1980), p. 100.

375. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment.

376. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XVII, No. 10, December 1980), p. 100.

377. West Africa (10 October 1983), p. 2350.

378. West Africa (22 August 1983), p. 1976.

379. Oye Ogunbodejo, "Foreign Policy Under Nigeria's Presidential System," op. cit., p. 406.

380. West Africa (7 November 1983), p. 259.

381. West Africa (11 April 1983), p. 918.

382. Ibid.

383. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment. Note that it is this perspective of nonalignment that provides the theoretical platform for the new international information order demands. The West particularly sees the clamor for such a new order as an attempt to advance state censorship of information to a global level, and thus opposes it.

384. West Africa (10 October 1983), p. 2350.

385. Ibid., pp. 2350-2353.

386. West Africa (10 October 1983), p. 2376.

387. Ibid.

388. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment.

389. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment.

390. Ibid.

391. Ibid.

392. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XVII, No. 10, December 1980), p. 100.

393. Ibid

394. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment.

395. UN Monthly Chronicle (Vol. XVII, No. 10, December 1980), p. 100.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The nonaligned foreign policy that was manifested by Nigeria had dynamic features; and that reality underscored the fact that a mix of factors, at various times, shaped the nonaligned content of Nigeria's foreign policy.

As shown above, a moderate government (which at the same time lacked cohesiveness due to its being a coalition government made up of not very compatible elements)[1] translated into the Nigerian First Republic exhibiting a very mild form of nonalignment. The fact that the First Republic did not actually slide into a position that would have made it to be routinely aligned to one particular bloc was also testimony to the fact that the moderate governing group was significantly checked by adequately mobilized domestic progressive political circles and forces.[2]

The Ironsi Government that succeeded the First Republic amounted to little change in Nigerian nonalignment policy due ·to the very brief nature of this political era and also to the fact that severe domestic political problems focused the government's attention

on the domestic political arena[3] (and not much focus on the foreign policy arena).

On the other hand, the Civil War, which occurred during the Gowon Government era, led to Nigeria receiving moral support and substantial military hardware from the Soviet Union.[4] This, expectedly, led to improvements in Nigeria's relations with the East.

The very assertive nature of the political leaders (and thus the government itself),[5] coupled with a robust economy, made the succeeding Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era go down in Nigerian history as one of the most aggressive in terms of foreign policy (which also meant that during this period Nigeria was assertively non-aligned.)

The Second Republic contrasted greatly with the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era in that the governing group of the former was moderate,[6] which accounted for its mild nonalignment posture. During this period, just as was the case during the First Republic era, the presence of domestic progressive circles and forces was critical in ensuring that the Second Republic did not slide into an international position that significantly compromised Nigeria's nonaligned posture.[7]

Thus, an overall view of Nigerian foreign policy shows that its nonalignment content fluctuated with time. The First Republic in its early phase manifested a foreign policy that made Nigeria to be very close to the West, and to Britain specifically. Thus the First Republic, while expanding diplomatic relations with Western countries in its early phase, was very unenthusiastic about developing such links with the East. Additionally, Nigeria's foreign economic

relations were mainly with the West, and there was not much intention of significantly diversifying such relations in the future. Nigeria's role in African affairs also manifested a Western leaning orientation. For example, its emphasis on gradualism, constitutional process, adequate preparation for independence, and general lack of open support for nationalist groups engaging in armed struggles, in relation to the decolonizing process, set it apart from many African countries and at times invited criticism from these countries. Thus, though Nigeria in principle supported the decolonization process and the end to minority regimes, it differed from many African countries over the issue of the best methods through which to attain these goals. It did not generally favor sudden changes (unaccompanied by adequate preparation for independence) and armed struggles, while many other African countries perceived that emphasis on this issue was used by the colonizing authorities, or minority regimes, to delay independence or to stage-manage the independence movement in such a way that by the time independence comes about it is only in the form of a caricature of independence, and thus the status quo persists under the facade of subtle neo-colonial arrangements.[8]

Specifically, the fact that the phenomena of gradualism, constitutional process, adequate preparation for independence, and general nonviolent means in the decolonization process as stressed by Nigeria were also the phenomena that Western countries stressed in the decolonization process, meant that on this issue, either by accident or design, Nigeria's position was close to that of the West. This was evident in the Nigerian role in the Congo in that, though it genuinely

desired Zaire (then the Congo) to be independent, Nigeria's position leaned more towards those Congolese groups that were more identified with nonradical and nonrevolutionary tendencies; and thus Nigeria's position was close to those of Western countries. Nigeria's role in the United Nations Conciliation Commission, on which the Nigerian Minister of External Affairs served as the Chairman, particularly showed this orientation.

In the First Republic, Nigeria's preoccupation with Commonwealth affairs also revealed a pro-Western orientation and very warm relations with Britain. Additionally, the purely bilateral relations with Britain magnified the pro-Western orientation. If the short-lived Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact had been fully implemented and was not short-lived, it could have been a factor that would have had the First Republic routinely aligned, militarily, with a superpower bloc.

Ironically, the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact episode, in the way it manifested itself, was also to act as a catalyst that made the First Republic of Nigeria reaffirm and reassert nonalignment as a cardinal foreign policy principle. The pact, apart from triggering a massive and successful demand for its abrogation, also galvanized the forces that had long criticized Nigeria for not being able to assert an independent posture in international affairs. Thus, the general criticism of the First Republic's foreign policy, in a fully mobilized form, was to help the First Republic in its later phases to be more assertive internationally. Thus, an earlier lukewarm attitude toward the East gradually led to more diplomatic ties with it. Additionally, its lukewarm attitude towards Eastern economic cooperation was

replaced by Nigeria receiving financial assistance from some Eastern countries. These actions helped to reaffirm Nigeria's nonaligned credentials.

The nonalignment content of Nigerian foreign policy was to be further expanded by Nigeria's refusal to be formally linked to the European Economic Community (EEC) on the grounds that such an action will be inconsistent with its policy of nonalignment (though a succeeding political era in Nigeria was to later forge such a link). Additionally, the First Republic, lifting the ban on the shipment of columbite to Eastern countries (while being aware that the United States had a legal provision for the ending of economic assistance to countries that sent such strategic materials to Eastern countries), also showed that nonalignment was clearly taking a cardinal position in Nigeria's foreign policy.

The First Republic, which was very nonassertive in its early phase, was to crown its nonaligned posture in a latter phase by being the only African country to break diplomatic relations with France over the issue of the latter's atomic bomb tests in the Sahara desert.

The Ironsi Government that succeeded the First Republic, due to its very short life-span, and its preoccupation with serious domestic instability, did not engage in any significant international initiatives that made Nigeria's international posture to be significantly different from that of the First Republic.

On the other hand, the Gowon Government, which followed the Ironsi Government, did effect changes in Nigeria's international posture. Nigeria, during this period, received much military assistance

from the Soviet Union in order to grapple with a very serious problem of ending a movement toward secession; and the reality of this Soviet role in the Civil War, which ensued, was the latter's closer relations with Nigeria. However, this relationship did not lead to Nigeria changing its political orientation to fit with that of the East. Additionally, Nigeria's relations with the Soviet Union did not reach a point where the former considered having any formal link with either the Warsaw Pact or the COMECON. The fact that Britain also extended some military help to Nigeria, though at a lesser level, meant that Nigeria still had adequate links with the West. The post-Civil War Gowon Government was even further to expand Nigeria's Western links in such a way that the expanded links with the East did not put the latter in a position that it had a dominant position in Nigeria's external links. Thus Nigeria was able to demonstrate the avoidance of alignment from the superpower bloc perspective of nonalignment.

The Gowon Government, unlike the First Republic, was also very assertive in championing the cause of unity, decolonization and socio-economic progress in Africa. Its championing role in the establishment of ECOWAS, a regional economic organization in West Africa, to help member states assert their economic independence, particularly showed that the Gowon Government desired to help fashion Africa in such a way that it could be adequately distanced from superpower bloc competition for influence. This role was even more emphasized in Nigeria's help in creating a strong ACP[9] framework that could effectively deal with issues of economic relations with the EEC. Thus, by helping the less developed countries to create new global economic

realities that would allow them to assume more independent and non-aligned roles in the world, Nigeria during the Gowon Government era also demonstrated its strong commitment to the global economy reordering perspective of nonalignment.

The Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, which followed the Gowon Government, was even more identified with a very assertive foreign policy. This government had fundamental differences with the United States over the Angolan independence issue and with Britain over the Zimbabwe independence issue; but at the same time it was able to repair the damages in relations with the two countries to a level where Nigeria was again able to enjoy warm relations with both. At the same time, while Nigeria was supporting the MPLA forces in Angola, which were backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, Nigeria's bilateral relations with the Soviet Union in the political and diplomatic areas were not particularly warm. Additionally, Nigeria tried to compensate for the slack in political and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union by stepping up economic links with the latter, and by also increasing its relations with other East European countries. Thus, in terms of relations with the West and East, Nigeria was able to maintain good relations with both; and, therefore, also making Nigeria, during the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era, manifest the avoidance of alignment with superpower bloc policy perspective of nonalignment.

However, it was in the area of African affairs that the assertiveness of the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government was most profound. Apart from strongly stating, and demonstrating, that Africa was the center-piece of its foreign policy, the Angolan independence issue was to

particularly show its commitment to an Afro-centric worldview. Thus, while its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union were not particularly warm, Nigeria, due to its arriving at the conclusion that the MPLA was the only nationalist group in Angola that will best pursue genuine African interest of ensuring genuine independence for Angola and also helping in the solution to the remaining problems in Namibia and South Africa, decided to champion the successful move to help give the MPLA sole political control in Angola. Also, by taking action that might have hampered its foreign economic relations (the nationalization of BP) in the course of its effort to pressure Britain to help ensure that Zimbabwe was able to achieve genuine independence, Nigeria also shows that it was able to make selfless sacrifices for African interests.

Thus, in terms of its role in African issues, Nigeria, during the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era, manifested the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment in that by advancing the cause of independence, justice and the resolution of conflicting issues in Africa, it also helped advance these causes in a global sense.

However, the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government was able to act on another African issue in such a way that Nigeria showed another perspective of nonalignment. By strongly condemning the Soviet Union and Cuba for supporting Angolan-based Zairean dissidents in connection with the invasion of the Shaba province of Zaire, and by condemning the Western countries that intervened on behalf of Zaire, Nigeria demonstrated an equidistance from the superpower blocs policy

perspective of nonalignment in that both the East and West got an equal weight of criticism of their role in the Shaba issue. Nevertheless, Nigeria's action on this African issue appeared to reflect a global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment in that Nigeria's action was less a concern for adopting an equidistant position in relation to the West and East (though its action actually manifested such a position) and more a conscious concern about extra-African intervention in African affairs (a concern that was also reflected in Nigeria's constant condemnation of extra-African interventions in the Chadian issue, while emphasizing an African solution to this problem.)

The Second Republic, which followed the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, also displayed the nonalignment content of the Nigerian foreign policy in a different way. The Second Republic vastly improved its relations with the West, and this led to the Nigerian Air Force, which for about the preceding twelve years had been equipped mostly with Soviet-made aircrafts, being equipped mostly with Western-made aircrafts. During this period Nigeria's relations with the Soviet Union were not particularly warm, but at the same time it was not in a cold state either. Nigeria continued the method of compensating for slack in political and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union with increased economic relations with the latter and also with the Eastern European countries. Thus, on the whole, during the Second Republic, Nigerian relations with the West and East fitted into the avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs policy perspective of nonalignment. This perspective of nonalignment was even demonstrated when

Nigeria refused to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games,[10] and when it established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea in order to assure that it not only had such relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (which had existed for a long time).

However, the Second Republic was not very assertive in African affairs. Its indecisive role in the OAU Summit problems in Libya, the Western Sahara issue, and the Chadian issue meant its not exerting a leading role in African affairs. It was also less assertive in the Southern African issue, but it continued to support majority African positions. Thus, despite the dissidents in Angola significantly contesting for power with the MPLA with arms, Nigeria continued its support for the government formed by the latter. Also, Nigeria rejected others' efforts to link the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to the solution of the problem of the South African incursion into the Angolan territories and to the question of Namibian independence. Nigeria was also very supportive of the ECOWAS and thus helped West African countries to build the foundations for a future ability to be more economically independent.

Thus, on the whole, during the Second Republic, Nigeria manifested a global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment in that it helped foster the cause of independence, justice and socio-economic prosperity in Africa, and thus also helped universalize this phenomena.

In ranking all the perspectives of nonalignment (identified through the conceptual scheme developed by this study--see TABLE 9), TABLE 8 shows how they were manifested in the Nigerian foreign policy

in terms of importance. Some of these perspectives prominently relate to the Nigerian foreign policy, while others relate moderately, and still others do not seem to relate at all.

Specifically, perspectives that are ranked 8th (see TABLE 8), which are those numbered 15 to 23, failed to be manifested in Nigeria's foreign policy. Finding adequate explanations for the nonmanifestation of these perspectives actually demand further investigation. Nevertheless, this study does provide explanation for the nonmanifestation of some of these perspectives. For example, this study has shown that, even though Nigeria's relation with the East was, on the whole, normal, at no particular time was it locked into a tight embrace with the latter. The natural ally logic perspective of nonalignment is a conceptual outlook that is specifically identified with the East and its very close allies in the nonaligned world. Therefore, it is not surprising that natural ally logic perspective was completely absent in Nigeria's nonaligned policy. Additionally, this study also showed that in many foreign policy issue areas, for example, the Southern African and Middle East issues, Nigeria mostly stressed that injecting much global power politics and geopolitics into them often distort the diagnoses of the problems, and thus produce inaccurate formulae for cures. Therefore, expectedly, the global power configuration and strategic rationality perspectives failed to be manifested.

Perspectives numbered from 8 to 14 (see TABLE 8) are ranked 7th, and are those that only negligibly manifested in the Nigerian nonaligned policy. As in the case of the perspectives that were not manifested at all, an adequate understanding of why these perspectives

TABLE 8

RANK-ORDER OF PERSPECTIVES

Perspective	Rank-Order	The Number of Times a Perspective Manifested in All Issue Areas in All the Political Eras
1. Global Input of a Regional Ideology (Pan-Africanism) Perspective	1	14
2. Avoidance of Alignment With the Superpower Blocs Policy Perspective	2	10
3. Global Economy Reordering Policy Perspective	3	6
4. International Peace Guarantor Perspective	4	4
5. Opportunistic Foreign Policy Perspective	5	3
6. Alliance Against Alignment With Superpower Blocs Policy Perspective	6	2
7. Independent International Initiatives and Actions Capability Perspective	6	2
8. Equidistance from Superpower Blocs Policy Perspective	7	1
9. Altruistic Policy Perspective	7	1

TABLE 8   (Continued)

RANK-ORDER OF PERSPECTIVES

Perspective	Rank-Order	The Number of Times a Perspective Manifested in All Issue Areas in All the Political Eras
10. International Relations Positive Innovator Perspective	7	1
11. Cultural Autonomy Assertion Perspective	7	1
12. International Collective Bargaining Framework Perspective	7	1
13. Position of Strength Policy Perspective	7	1
14. National Sovereignty Guarantor Perspective	7	1
15. Global Power Configuration Perspective	8	0
16. Strategic Rationality Perspective	8	0
17. Natural Ally Logic Perspective	8	0
18. Global Morality Fountain Perspective	8	0
19. Total Social Reality Perspective	8	0

TABLE 8   (Continued)

RANK-ORDER OF PERSPECTIVES

Perspective	Rank-Order	The Number of Times a Perspective Manifested in All Issue Areas in All the Political Eras
20. Anti-Imperialism Worldview Perspective	8	0
21. Global Political Economy Perspective	8	0
22. Foreign Policy Strategy Perspective	8	0
23. Linking of National Goals With International Goals Tools Perspective	8	0

NOTE: See TABLE 10 on how many times each perspective manifested in the various issue areas in the various political eras. The scores in this table are based on TABLE 10 data.

TABLE 9

THE DIMENSIONS OF NONALIGNMENT

Dimensions	Perspectives
The Power Politics Dimension	Equidistance from Superpower Blocs Policy Perspective
	Avoidance of Alignment With the Superpower Blocs Policy Perspective
	Global Power Configuration Perspective
	Strategic Rationality Perspective
	Alliance Against Alignment With Superpower Blocs Policy Perspective
	Natural Ally Logic Perspective
The Ethical Dimension	Global Morality Fountain Perspective
	Altruistic Policy Perspective
	International Peace Guarantor Perspective
	International Relations Positive Innovator Perspective

TABLE 9 (Continued)

THE DIMENSIONS OF NONALIGNMENT

Dimensions	Perspectives
The Socio-Economic Dimension	Total Social Reality Perspective
	Cultural Autonomy Assertion Perspective
	Anti-Imperialism Worldview Perspective
	International Collective Bargaining Framework Perspective
	Global Economy Reordering Policy Perspective
Foreign Policy Mechanism Dimension	Foreign Policy Strategy Perspective
	Opportunistic Foreign Policy Perspective
	Global Input of a Regional Ideology (Pan-Africanism) Perspective
	Position of Strength Policy Perspective
	Linking of National Goals With International Goals Tool Perspective
	Independent International Initiatives and Actions Capability Perspective
	National Sovereignty Guarantor Perspective

only were negligibly manifested provides areas for further research. However, also, this particular study does provide some understanding of the negligible manifestation of some of these perspectives. For example, Nigeria, as shown above, did not favor the efforts of others to view many foreign policy issues, that strongly engaged its attention, mainly through power politics and geopolitical prisms. Instead, it often saw these issues mainly as regional issues, which could best be resolved through regional sensibilities and initiatives being allowed to be supreme. This accounts for the negligible occurrence of the equidistance from the superpower blocs perspective, since nonglobalized issue areas (from the Nigerian viewpoint) meant the unnecessity of its manifesting a conceptual perspective of nonalignment that is strongly shackled to a conception of the international system that sees it as a rigidly bipolar international order.

The negligible occurrence of the altruistic policy perspective of nonalignment, on the other hand, can be attributed to the fact that, as this study shows, Nigeria's nonaligned foreign policy was often not manifested in a way that did not take into consideration its national interests.

In terms of moderate manifestation in the nonaligned content of the Nigerian foreign policy, the perspectives ranked 5th and 6th and numbering from 5th to 7th (see TABLE 8), fall into this category. The moderate showing of the alliance against alignment with superpower blocs policy perspective might have been an indication that Nigeria was not much concerned about the nonaligned group existing as a bloc or not, as long as the vitality and mission of the phenomenon

continued to be adequately manifested. In the case of the moderate showing of the opportunistic foreign policy perspective, this can be accounted for by the fact that, as this study shows, on some occasions, Nigeria's manifestation of nonaligned foreign policy had a connotation of expediency. The independent international initiatives and actions capability perspective moderate showing, on the other hand, indicate that Nigeria, on the average, was not obsessed with the narrow perception of nonalignment as a means of exercising independent international initiatives and actions, per se.

International peace guarantor perspective (ranked 4th) is shown by TABLE 8 to be strongly manifested in the nonaligned foreign policy of Nigeria, since, except for one governmental era, it was consistently present in Nigeria's nonaligned foreign policy from 1960 to 1983. This strong showing can be easily attributed to the fact that Nigeria has consistently championed efforts to curb activities and preoccupations that threaten world peace. The fact that TABLE 10 does show the international peace guarantor perspective as not showing during the Muhammed/Obasanjo government era does not mean that, during that period, Nigeria abandoned the support for world peace. Rather, it points to the fact that the assertiveness of that government, both in foreign and domestic foreign policy areas, resulted in its not allowing its concern for a more peaceful, safer and happier world to be accompanied by a naivete about contemporary international reality.

Avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs policy, global economy reordering policy, and the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspectives, as shown by TABLE 8, are the

TABLE 10

DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF NONALIGNMENT ACCORDING TO ISSUE AREAS

	First Republic					Ironsi Government					Gowon Government					Muhammed/ Obasanjo Government					Second Republic				
Issue Areas:	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
The Power Politics Dimension																									
Equidistance																	X								
Avoidance	X		X			X		X			X		X			X		X			X				X
Global Power																									
Strategic																									
Alliance	X					X																			
Natural																									
The Ethical Dimension																									
Global Morality																									
Altruistic																	X								
Inter-Peace	X					X					X										X				
Inter-Relations											X														

TABLE 10 (Continued)

DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF NONALIGNMENT ACCORDING TO ISSUE AREAS

	First Republic					Ironsi Government					Gowon Government					Muhammed/Obasanjo Government					Second Republic				
Issue Areas:	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
The Socio-Economic Dimension																									
Total																									
Cultural																				X					
Anti-Imperialism																									
Inter-Collective													X												
Global-Political																									
Global-Economy			X				X						X			X			X				X		
The Foreign Policy Mechanism Dimension																									
Foreign Policy																									
Opportunistic	X					X					X														
Global-Input		X					X					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X						
Position											X														
Linking																									
Independent	X					X																			
National													X												

297

TABLE 10 (Continued)

DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF NONALIGNMENT ACCORDING TO ISSUE AREAS

Notes:

A. The numbers in the table stand for the various foreign policy issue areas, which are as follows:

1. Relations with West and East

2. General African Affairs

3. Southern Africa

4. Middle East

5. International Economic Relations

B. The perspectives are identified in the table by one of their first words, or by an abbreviated form of one or two of those words. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment for the full names of these perspectives.

perspectives that this study showed to be most prominently manifested; and in order of importance are ranked 3rd, 2nd and 1st, respectively. The avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs policy perspective of nonalignment being ranked third is a clear indication that Nigeria is one of the nonaligned countries that believe that nonalignment actually means nonalignment (in terms of not forming routine formal close ties with a superpower bloc), though not in a rigid sense. Thus, as an extension, it is no surprise that TABLES 8 and 10 also showed that this study indicated that Nigeria at no time subscribed to the natural ally logic perspective (a perspective that directly contradicts perspectives like the avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs policy perspective). The second ranking of the global economy reordering policy perspective, on the other hand, attests to the fact that this study showed that Nigeria was assertive in the area of articulating, and engaging in, actions that aimed at creating a new international economic order. However, this perspective was overwhelmingly being manifested in the international economics relations issue area only. This perspective being manifested overwhelmingly in only one issue area, appears to have meant that the great intensity of this perspective, in the nonaligned content of Nigerian foreign policy has not been portrayed adequately.

TABLE 8 shows that the Afro-centric perspective is ranked first. This study also showed that Nigeria conceptualized many of the foreign policy issues that confronted it in a mostly regional perspective. This perspective was prominent in all the political eras (see TABLE 10), and it blanketed almost all issue areas during the Gowon

Government the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, and the Second Republic eras. Thus, it is proper to conclude that such an intense manifestation of the Afro centric perspective in the nonaligned content of the Nigerian foreign policy accounted for Nigeria being seen as adopting Africa as the centerpiece of its overall foreign policy.

It is important to note that, though the avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs policy, the global economy reordering policy, and the global input of regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspectives were all prominent throughout all political eras (see TABLE 10), this study also showed that the last was more manifested in clearly more issue areas both in terms of magnitude and intensity (see TABLES 8 and 10). Therefore, it is very important to also note that though the other two perspectives were also consistently prominent, in comparison with the Afro-centric perspective, the latter was more important.

The Afro-centric emphasis of Nigerian foreign policy, apart from being accompanied by the persistent reiterations by various Nigerian Governments that Africa is the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy, had also actually resulted in most Nigerian diplomatic resources being involved in African issues or African-related issues. Bolaji Akinyemi stressed this reality when he posited that Africa as "the cornerstone of Nigeria's foreign policy has been an article of faith since 1960, [11] and that, therefore

> Seventy-five percent of the time and energy of the foreign Office staff is consumed by African affairs. Ninety-five percent of the technical and financial assistance during this period was directed at the continent. Over 75 percent of the

policy differences between Nigeria and other industrialized
countries revolve around African issues, especially Southern
African issues.[12]

The fact that the above data on the percentages of foreign
policy resources devoted to African issues, and on the percentage of
African related issues in terms of all policy differences Nigeria had
with industrialized countries, also goes to buttress the fact that
Nigerian foreign policy has been very Afro-centric.

This Afro-centric emphasis in Nigerian foreign policy also ac-
counts for Nigeria's nonalignment often manifesting the global input
of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalign-
ment,[13] in that most of its actions advances the cause of indepen-
dence, justice, peaceful coexistence and socioeconomic prosperity in
Africa, thus also helping to universalize this phenomena.

However, as noted earlier, a preoccupation with a regional out-
look (in this case an Afro-centric outlook) of international relations
sometimes connotes an inconsistency with the universalistic view of
nonalignment. A regional worldview may mean that a country is only in-
terested in fostering the interests of only one particular region of
the world, while nonalignment is mainly concerned with fostering more
wholesome human existence all over the world. An understanding of the
Afro-centric worldview and nonalignment, however, does dispel the no-
tion of such incompatibility between these two concepts. The Afro-
centric worldview is the product of the Pan-Africanism concept which
gave birth to Pan-African movements in the early 20th Century, and
later crystallized into a very institutionalized political reality in
the form of the OAU. However, it must be noted that though the

Pan-Africanism concept, the Pan-African movement, and the OAU do not mean exactly the same thing, they all share the same major tenets. Some of these tenets are the fostering of independence, self-determination, justice, peace, unity, and socioeconomic progress in Africa;[14] and these tenets are almost synonymous with the major themes that most perspectives of the nonalignment concept share.[15]

Specifically, one area of similarity between the Afro-centric worldview and nonalignment is that, just as nonalignment, the Afro-centric worldview, in terms of its main driving force, is the expression of a desire by relatively less powerful countries to be able to assert themselves independently in an international system dominated by superpowers, by being able to safeguard their sovereignty, protect their territorial integrity, and develop relatively self-reliant and adequate socioeconomic conditions for their citizens. Both concepts also operate on the assumptions that the contemporary operational mode of the international system needs to function better by being able to institute a more globally sensitive and fair mode of political, economic and cultural contacts among countries and peoples, and also be able to focus more on cooperative aspects of relations, while deemphasizing conflictual relations. Although this last phenomena can only be reduced to acceptable levels, and not eliminated, the ability to increasingly reduce institutionalized conflictual relations is often seen as being very encouraging. Also, the Afro-centric worldview, by emphasizing African political, economic and cultural integration (with some exponents of this worldview positing that such aspirations should be achieved immediately, while others prefer gradual realization of

such aspirations), seeks to build an Africa that is strong enough to stand by itself without any need to be aligned to any superpower bloc. This also means that, like nonalignment, the Afro-centric worldview seeks to mold a world which has a democratized configuration of global power, and is also more peaceful. This sort of reasoning led people like Kwame Nkrumah to posit that "The emancipation of the African continent is the emancipation of man;"[16] and thus clearly showing that the Afro-centric worldview, like nonalignment, seeks to liberate mankind from global conceptions and modes of interactions, among the countries and peoples of the world, that are dysfunctional to human progress.

The shared conceptual outlook of both the Afro-centric worldview and nonalignment have led some, like Idang, to posit that "there is a linkage between nonalignment and African nationalism [that] admits of no debate,"[17] and also that "not only is nonalignment a derivative of the idea of Pan-Africanism,"[18] but that "it is also an extension of African nationalism to the to the international level."[19]

Thus, since Nigeria, from 1960 to 1983, manifested a foreign policy that mostly exhibited the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment,[20] it can be concluded that such an exhibition of this perspective of nonalignment meant that the Nigerian foreign policy, during the period covered by this study, embraced the principle of nonalignment.

Focusing jointly on the three perspectives TABLE 8 shows as being the most prominent in the nonaligned content of the Nigerian

foreign policy, the nonalignment phenomenon in Nigeria can also be understood in another way. The three perspectives are the global economy reordering policy, the avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs policy, and the Afro-centric perspective. The prominence of these perspectives can be interpreted to mean that Nigeria's nonaligned policy was mostly conceptualized in terms of steering clear of formal links with superpowers, the changing of global economic realities and as being synonymous with political, economic and social reconstructions and revitalizations in Africa. TABLE 10 also shows that Nigeria stressed the avoidance of alignment with superblocs policy perspective mostly in the issue areas of its relations with the West and East and international economic relations. Additionally, the same perspective manifested in the Middle East issue area in the earlier political eras. On the other hand, the global economy reordering policy perspective was virtually restricted to the area of international economic relations. The Afro-centric perspective, which is most manifested in terms of issues across all political eras, reveal a pattern (see TABLE 10) that shows actually that Nigeria was significantly consumed in conceptualizing its nonaligned policy at sub-systemic levels. However, such an overwhelming view of the world through a subsystemic prism can create situations of misunderstanding in an international system where many countries, especially the superpowers and those belonging to their bloc, conceptualize the world at systemic levels. This, in particular, explains why Nigeria, on some occasions, had misunderstandings with some of these countries.

Some of these perspectives of nonalignment, which have been identified through the conceptual scheme developed by this study appear also to have conceptual profiles that are closer to those of some particular perspectives. Therefore, all the perspectives can be grouped in terms of schools of thought, which will here be referred to as the dimensions of nonalignment. Such an exercise results in the development of four dimensions of nonalignment as shown in TABLE 9. These dimensions are the power politics, the ethical, the socioeconomic, and the foreign policy mechanism dimensions of nonalignment. However, these dimensions are not water-tight, since some of the perspectives, expectedly, are borderline cases and could be classified into more than one dimension.

Thus, this study, apart from finding out that the concept of nonalignment has twenty-three perspectives (see TABLE 8), also develops nonalignment as a concept with four major conceptual dimensions, when the various perspectives are grouped according to their similarities (as shown in TABLE 9).

The power politics dimension relates nonalignment to the shaping of global power by countries or group of countries, in terms of how the structure, the configuration, the mobilization and the dynamics of power in the international system are manifested. The perspectives that belong to this dimension are equidistance from superpower blocs policy, avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs policy, global power configuration, strategic rationality, alliance against alignment with superpower blocs policy and natural ally logic perspectives (see TABLE 9). The ethical dimension of nonalignment

refers to the dimension that conceptualize nonalignment as injecting ethical considerations into the conduct or relations among peoples and countries. The perspectives of nonalignment that come under this dimension are global morality fountain, altruistic policy, international peace guarantor, international relations positive innovator perspectives (see TABLE 9). On the other hand, the socioeconomic dimension sees nonalignment as a phenomenon that is associated with the dynamics of evolving new global social and economic realities. Total social reality, cultural autonomy assertion, anti-imperialism worldview, international collective bargaining framework, global political economy and global economy reordering policy perspectives belong to this dimension of nonalignment (see TABLE 9). In the case of foreign policy mechanism dimension, nonalignment is seen as a tool, an approach or a strategy of foreign policy. The perspectives that come under this dimension are foreign policy strategy, opportunistic foreign policy, global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism), position of strength policy, linking of national goals with international initiatives and actions capability, and national sovereignty guarantor perspectives (see TABLE 9). The foreign policy mechanisms dimension also, in reference to its above conceptual profile and perspectives, is related more to a nonaligned country unilateral initiatives and actions than to the nonaligned group phenomenon, per se.

In relating these various dimensions of nonalignment to the various foreign policy issue areas, that Nigeria was involved in, more interpretations of Nigeria"s nonaligned policy emerge. TABLE 11 shows that, in the issue area of relations with the West and East, the power

TABLE 11

DIMENSIONS OF NONALIGNMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

	West/East Relations	General African Affairs	Southern African	Middle East	International Economic Relations
The Power Politics Dimension	7	1	0	2	3
The Ethical Dimension	5	0	1		
The Socio-Economic Dimension	0	2	0	0	6
The Foreign Policy Mechanism Dimension	5	5	3	3	4

Note:

The numbers indicate the number of times perspective in each dimension manifested in each issue area in all the political eras. See also TABLE 10.

politics dimension was very prominent, with the perspectives in this dimension being manifested seven times in all this issue area in all the political eras. The ethical and foreign policy mechanism dimensions were also well manifested, with both featuring five times each. This can be interpreted to mean that, in the area of relations with the West and the East, Nigeria manifested a nonaligned policy that paid attention to global power shaping, structure and dynamics, injected some dose of ethical concerns to its actions and viewed nonalignment as a vehicle for the accomplishment of certain goals.

TABLE 11 also shows that in the area of general African affairs, Nigeria's policy mostly incorporated socioeconomic and foreign policy mechanism dimensions, with the latter being more manifested. Additionally, the power politics dimensions was only negligibly manifested. This can also be interpreted to mean that, in the area of general African affairs, Nigeria conceptualized nonalignnment mainly in terms of the evolution of new social and economic realities on the continent, and as a vehicle for the attainment of certain goals. In relation to the Southern African issue, specifically, Nigeria's policy mostly manifested ethical and foreign policy mechanism dimensions, and this can be extended to mean that in this issue area Nigeria's nonalignment policy paid attention to ethical considerations and conceptualized nonalignment in terms of means of solving a particular problem. Nigeria's Middle East policy also saw nonalignment as a means phenomenon since it mainly reflected a foreign policy mechanism dimension. Also, this issue area was also viewed through global power dynamics, since the power politics dimension also related to it. In the area of

international economic relations, Nigeria's nonaligned policy had the power politics, the socioeconomic and the foreign policy mechanism dimensions. This can also be interpreted to mean that, in this issue area, it associated nonalignment with the global power dynamics, and the evolution of new social and economic realities, and also saw it as a vehicle for the accomplishment of certain goals.

In terms of relation the dimensions of Nigeria's nonaligned policy to foreign policy issue, there also emerges another way of interpreting Nigeria's nonaligned policy. By examining the issues that related to each particular dimension, it is found that while some dimensions related to only few issues, others related to many issues. For example, the power politics dimension was significant in the area of Nigeria's relation with the West and East, international economic relations, general African affairs, and Middle East (see TABLE 11). Many conclusions can be drawn from this sort of manifestation. One is that, in terms of the dimension of nonalignment, Nigeria's nonaligned policy significantly reflected the power politics dimension. This also can be interpreted to mean that Nigeria was not actually wary in associating nonalignment with the structure, the mobilization and the dynamics of global power. A further interpretation of this is a conclusion that Nigeria tended to see nonalignment also at global political systemic level, in addition to the more prominent focus at the regional level (as shown above, through much association with Afrocentric perspective). However, TABLE 11 also shows that the power politics dimension was most manifested in the issue area of relations with the West and the East. Thus, this also leads to the conclusion that

Nigeria viewed nonalignment through this dimension mainly in that issue area.

The ethical dimension was related to two issues--West/East relations and Southern Africa--and this means Nigeria nonaligned policy actually reflected ethical considerations in very few issue areas, with more of such manifestation in the former issue area (see TABLE 11). The socioeconomic dimension was also reflected in very few issue areas since it manifested also in only two issue areas--general African affairs and international economic relations.

On the other hand, the foreign policy mechanism dimension thoroughly accompanied Nigeria's nonaligned policy, since it was reflected in all the issues. This also led to the conclusion that Nigeria's overall nonaligned foreign policy was mostly seen as the vehicle for accomplishment of certain goals. The tendency of Nigeria's nonaligned policy to be tinged with some dose of expediency on significant number of occasions, as this study revealed, can thus best be explained by this fact that all issue areas reflected this foreign policy mechanism dimension (a dimension to which belongs the opportunistic foreign policy perspective).

The fact that the foreign policy mechanism dimension appeared in all issue areas, however, is most explained by the fact that the Afro-centric perspective, which this study shows to manifest in all issue areas, and to be most prominently manifested in the overall Nigerian nonaligned policy, belongs to this dimension of nonalignment. (The Afro-centric perspective is grouped into this dimension due to the fact that it is mostly conceptualized as a foreign policy approach

or a vehicle for the evolution of new political, social and economic realities in Africa).

The various dimensions of nonalignment can also be related to the manifestation of nonalignment during the various political eras manifested the power politics and foreign policy mechanism dimensions more, with the latter being more prominent. The First Republic and Ironsi Government in terms of the intensity of the manifestation of all the dimension were lower, in comparison to the Gowon Government, Muhammed/Obasanjo Government and the Second Republic. The last three by far exhibited all the dimensions more. For example, the Gowon Government adequately manifested all the dimensions, with the foreign policy mechanism dimension trebling the other dimensions in intensity (see TABLE 12). This leads to the view that the Gowon Government strongly conceptualized nonalignment as a foreign policy means, strategy or approach phenomenon. In fact, of all the political eras considered, the Gowon Government most manifested this dimension of nonalignment (see TABLE 12).

The Muhammed/Obasanjo Government and the Second Republic also manifested much intensity in all the dimensions of nonalignment except the ethical dimension. It is important to note that the ethical dimension was the least prominent dimension throughout all the political eras (see TABLe 12), and this further confirms the conclusion that Nigeria's nonaligned policy often was not fashioned without much consideration given to Nigeria's national interests and the realities of contemporary international relations. As in the case of the other dimensions, the foreign policy mechanism dimensions were very

TABLE 12

DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF NONALIGNMENT AND NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

	First Republic	Ironsi Government	Gowon Government	Muhammed/ Obasanjo Government	Second Republic
The Power Politics Dimension	3	3	2	3	2
The Ethical Dimension	1	1	2	1	1
The Socio-Economic Dimension	1	1	2	2	2
The Foreign Policy Mechanism Dimension	3	3	6	5	4

Note:

    The numbers in the table indicate the number of times perspectives in each dimension were manifested in each corresponding political era. See also TABLE 10.

prominent during the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government and the Second Republic eras.

However, it is important to note that the foreign policy mechanism, during the First Republic and the Ironsi Government eras, manifested the same intensity as the power politics dimension, and that both were also manifested in a moderate manner (see Table 12). This is explained by the fact that the Afro-centric perspective, which belongs to the foreign policy mechanism dimension, was not much prominent during these two political eras. This also led to the conclusion that these two political eras, unlike the latter three political eras, did not strongly view nonalignment as foreign policy means, strategy or approach phenomenon. The fact that the moderate First Republic coalition government, in particular, as shown in earlier chapters, did not pursue foreign policy in a very active manner further buttresses this view.

On the other hand, TABLES 10 and 12 show the last three political eras as more manifesting all the dimensions of nonalignment, and this is much buttressed by the fact that this study showed Nigeria as being more assertive during those eras. Additionally, these three political eras also most prominently manifested the foreign policy mechanism dimension, and thus were the political eras that mostly associate nonalignment to foreign policy means, strategy or approach.

Also, when the conclusion that the foreign policy mechanism dimension, unlike any other dimension, was related to all issue areas (see TABLE 11) is linked with the conclusion that this same dimension displayed more in intensity, in all the political eras, than any other

dimension (see TABLE 12), there arises another conclusion that, more than any other dimension, the foreign policy mechanism dimension, both in terms of magnitude and intensity, was most manifested in the Nigerian foreign policy.

When note is taken of the fact that the Afro-centric perspective belongs to this dimension of nonalignment (and is also the most prominent of the perspectives in this dimension), the foremost position of this perspective in the Nigerian nonaligned policy, as this study shows, is further established. Therefore, this study shows that Nigeria, from 1960 to 1983, manifested a nonaligned foreign policy that mostly had an Afro-centric perspective while also manifesting a mostly foreign policy mechanism dimension.

Endnotes

1. Gordon Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 1960-1966, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), pp. 35-76.

2. Ibid.,pp. 77-104.

3. Ray Ofoegbu, "Foreign Policy and Military Rule," in Oyeley Oyed iran, ed.,Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-79, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, pp. 124-149.

4. Olajide Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 117.

5. Ibid., pp. 212-248.

6. Oye Ogunbadejo, "Foreign Policy Under Nigeria's Presidential System," The Round Table (Issue 280, October 1980), pp. 401-408; see especially Ibid., p. 408.

7. Ibid., p. 505.

8. See Kwame Nkrumah, Neocolonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Heinemann), 1965.

9.   ACP stands for the African Caribbean Pacific group of countries.

10. In a post-Second Republic era, Nigeria also demonstrated its non-aligned policy by participating in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics.

11. A. Bolaji Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy" in Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., Op. City., pp. 162-163. However, it seems that Akinyemi's view should have taken into consideration the fact that the Afro-centric emphasis in the Nigerian foreign policy has not been uniform (for example, the First Republic did not pay enough attention to Africa, while the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government did so very vigorously).

12. Ibid.

13. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment.

14. These goals are also usually pursued for the people of African descent elsewhere.

15. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment.

16. Kwame Nkrumah, Conciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization (London: Panaf, 1974), p. 78.

17. Idang, op. cit.,p. 29.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. See the chapter on the concept of nonalignment.

BIBLIOGRAHY

Books

Akinyemi, A. B. Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experi-
ence. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1974.

Aluko, Olajide. Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy. London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1981.

Aluko, Olajide, ed. The Foreign Policy of African States. London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1977.

Crabb, Cecil V., Jr. The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nona-
lignment. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.

Dudley, Billy. An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

East, Maurice A., Salmore, Stephen A. and Herman, Charles F., eds.
Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspective for Comparative
Foreign Policy Studies. Beverly Hills, California: Sage,
1978.

Ekundare, R. Olufemi. An Economic History of Nigeria 1860-1960.
New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1973.

Fanon, Frantz. Toward the African Revolution. New York: Grove
Press, 1967.

_____. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, 1963.

Gopal, Sarvepalli, ed. Jawaharlal Nehru: An Anthology. New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1980.

Graham, G. J. and Carey, G. W., eds. The Post-Behavioral Era -- Per-
spectives on Political Science. New York: David McKay Co.,
1972.

316

Hameed, A. C. Shahul. In Pursuit of Peace: On Non-alignment and Regional Cooperation. New Delhi: Vikas, 1983.

Idang, Gordon J. Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 1960-1966. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973.

Jackson, Richard L. The Non-Aligned the UN and the Superpowers. New York: Praegen, 1983.

Liska, George. Alliances and the Third World. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.

_____. Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.

Madiebo, Alexander A. The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War. Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1980.

Miller, J. D. B. The Politics of the Third World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Misra, K. P., and Narayanan, K. R., eds. Non-alignment in Contemporary International Relations. New Delhi: Vikas, 1981.

Mortimer, Robert A. The Third World Coalition in International Politics. New York: Praeger, 1980.

Mutiso, Gideon-Cyrus M., and Rohio, S. W. eds. Readings in African Political Thought. London: Heinemann, 1975.

Nelson, Harold D., ed. Nigeria: A Country Study (Area Handbook Series). Washington, D. C.: The Department of the Army, 1982.

Nkrumah, Kwame. Africa Must Unite. London: Heinemann, 1963.

_____. Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah. London: Panaf, 1968.

_____. Class Struggle in Africa. London: Panaf, 1970.

_____. Conciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonisation. London: Panaf, 1970.

_____. Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah. London: Heinemann, 1962.

_____. Handbook for Revolutionary Warfare. London: Panaf, 1968.

_____. I Speak of Freedom. London: Heinemann, 1961.

_____. Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. London: Heinemann, 1965.

Nnoli, Okwudiba, ed. Path to Nigerian Development. Dakar: Codesria, 1981.

Nyerere, J. K. Freedom and Development. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

_____. Freedom and Socialism. London: Oxford University Press, 1968.

_____. Freedom and Unity. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Olaloku, F. S., et al., eds. Structure of the Nigerian Economy. New York: St. Martin Press, 1979.

Oyediran, Oyeleye, ed. Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-79. New York: St. Martin Press, 1979.

Potholm, Christian P. The Theory and Practice of African Politics. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1979.

Rajan, M. S. and Ganguly, Shivaji, eds. Great Power Relations, World Order and the Third World. New Delhi: Vikas, 1981..

Rosecrance, Richard. International Relations: Peace or War? New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973.

Rothstein, Robert L. Alliances and Small Powers. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.

Secrest, Donald E. American Policy Toward Neutralism During the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1968.

Singham, A. W., ed. The Nonaligned Movement in World Politics. Wesport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1977.

Toulmin, S. E. An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Willets, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance. New York: Nichols, 1978.

Articles

Ajami, Fouad. "The Fate of Nonalignment," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, Winter 1980/1981, pp. 366-385.

Akeredolu-Ale, E. O. "The 'Competitive Threshold' Hypothesis and Nigeria's Industrialization Process--A Review Article," The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 1972, PP. 109-120.

Akindele, R. A. "Reflections on the Preoccupation and Conduct of African Diplomacy," The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1976, pp. 557-576.

Akintola, J. O. "Direct Public Industrial Investment and the Goal of Even Development: The South-Western Nigerian Experience (1956-1971)," The Nigerian Geographical Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2, December 1978, pp. 133-151.

Aluko, Olajide. "The 'New' Nigerian Foreign Policy: Developments Since the Downfall of General Gowon," The Round Table, No. 264, October 1976, pp. 405-414.

Anglin, Douglas G. "Nigeria: Political Non-Alignment and Economic Alignment," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1964, pp. 247-263.

Appadorai, A. "Non-Alignment: Some Important Issues," International Studies, Vol. 10, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981, pp. 3-11.

Baral, L. S. "Nepal and Non-alignment," International Studies, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981, pp. 257-272.

Bondarevsky, G. and Sofinky, V. "Bandung's Historic Lessons," International Affairs, Moscow, May 1975, pp. 45-53.

_____. "The Non-aligned Movement and International Relations," International Affairs, Moscow, July 1976, pp. 50-58.

Chari, P. R. "Non-alignment and the Nuclear Threat," India Quarterly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, April-June 1983, pp. 159-172.

Damodaran, A. K. "Jawaharlal Nehru and Non-alignment," India Quarterly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January-March 1983, pp. 41-49.

Edogun, Clifford. "The Non-aligned Movement Today: Towards an Ideological Perspective of World Order," Susquehanna University Studies, Vol. XI, No. 3, 1981, pp. 131-148.

Elaigwu, J. Isawa. "Non-alignment and Disarmament: The Survival of the Weak in an Insecure Global System," The Indian Political Science Review, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1983, pp. 80-91.

Ezenwa, Uka. "Reflections on the Economic Community of West African States," The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, July 1981, pp. 187-208.

Farer, Tom J. "The United States and the Third World: A Basis for Accommodation, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, October 1975, pp. 79-97.

Gambari, Ibrahim Agboola. "Nigeria and the World: A Growing Internal Stability, Wealth and External Influence," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2, Fall 1975, pp. 155-169.

Graham, John A. "The Non-aligned Movement After the Havana Summit," The Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring/Summer 1980, pp. 153-160.

Gromyko, Anatoly. "The October Revolution and Africa's Destiny," International Affairs, Moscow, Septmber 1977, pp. 95-103.

Gupta, Vijay. "Nature and Content of Tanzanian Non-alignment," International Studies, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January—June 1981, pp. 379-399.

Gupta, A. K. Das. "Non-alignment and the International Economic Order," International Studies, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981, pp. 133-142.

Henderson, Robert D'A. "Nigeria: Future Nuclear Power?" Orbis, Vol. 25, No. 2, Summer 1981, pp. 409-423.

Howe, James W. "Power in the Third World," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2, Fall 1975, pp. 113-127.

Ihonvbere, Juius O. "Resource Availability and Foreign Policy Change in Nigeria: The Impact of Oil," India Quarterly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, April—June 1983, pp. 109-136.

Ikpeze, Nnaemeke. "The Role of Government in Aggregate Planning," The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, July 1978, pp. 243-252.

Jayaramu, P.S. "Super Powers and the Changing International System: A Third World Perspective," India Quarterly, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, April—June 1982, pp. 147-160.

Jones, Rodney W. "Atomic Diplomacy in Developing Countries, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring/Summer 1980, pp. 89-117.

Kashkett, Steven B. "Iraq and the Pursuit of Nonalignment," Orbis, Vol. 26, No. 2, Summer 1982, pp. 477-494.

Kiva, A. "The Role of the Young National States in International Relations," International Affairs, Moscow, March 1973, pp. 69-75.

Krishnan, R. R. "North Korea and the Non-aligned Movement," International Studies, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981, pp. 299-313.

Kumar, Satish. "Non-alignment as a Diplomatic Strategy," International Studies, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981, pp. 103-118.

_____. "Nonalignment: International Goals and National Interests," Asian Survey, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, April 1983, pp. 445-463.

Labh, Kapileshwar. "Intra-Nonaligned Discords and India," India Quarterly, Vol XXXVIII, No. 1, January-March 1982, pp. 64, 77.

Lebedev, N. "The System of World Relations: Problems of Development," International Affairs, Moscow, December 1976, pp. 79-88.

Mates,Leo. "The Concept of Non-alignment," India Quarterly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January-March 1983, pp. 6-22.

Mazrui, Ali A. "Changing the Guards fom Hindus to Muslims: Collective Third World Security in A Cultural Perspective," International Affairs, London, Vol. 57, No. 1, Winter 1980/81, pp. 1-20.

_____. "Nigeria and the United States: The Need for Civility, the Dangers of Intimacy," Orbis, Vol. 25, No. 4, Winter 1982, pp. 858-864.

Misra, K. P. "Towards Understanding Non-alignment," International Studies, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981, pp. 12-37.

Mphaisa, Chisepo J. U. "Diplomacy by Conference: Principles, Goals and Problems of NAM," India Quarterly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January-March 1983, pp. 23-40.

Nair, V. M. "Havana Summit Shows Non-aligned Divisions: Moderates Unhappy Over Drift into Radicalism," The Round Table, Issue 177, January 1980, pp. 99-101.

Nworah, Dike. "Nationalism Versus Coexistence: Neo-African Attitudes to Classical Neutralism," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1977, pp. 213-237.

Nyerere, Julius K. "Non-alignment and Its Future Prospects," India Quarterly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January-March 1983, pp. 1-5.

Obi, Anyaegbunam W. "The Growth and Structure of Nigeria's Export Manufactures, 1971-75," The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, July 1978, pp. 225-242.

Ojo, Olatunde J. B. "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS," International Organization, Vol. 34, No. 4, Autumn 1980, pp. 571-604.

Ogunbadejo, Oye. "Africa's Nuclear Capability," The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, March 1984, pp. 19-43.

_____. "Foreign Policy Under Nigeria's Presidential System," The Round Table, Issue 280, October 1980, pp. 401-408.

_____. "Ideology and Pragmatism: The Soviet Role in Nigeria 1960-1977," Orbis, Vol. 21, No. 4, Winter 1978, pp. 803-830.

Orobator, S. E. "The Nigerian Civil War and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia," African Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 329, April 1983, pp. 201-214.

Oyaide, W. J. "A Framework for Data Collection and Utilization in the Distributive Sector of the Nigerian Economy," The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, July 1978, pp. 295-307.

Oyovbaire, Sam E. "The Nigerian Political System and Political Science," The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3, November 1981, pp. 355-377.

Phadnis, Urmila and Patnaik, Sivananda. "Non-alignment as a Foreign Policy Strategy: A Case Study of Sri Lanka," International Studies, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981, pp. 223-238.

Prasad, Bimal. "Historical Background of Non-alignment," International Studies, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981, pp. 13-21.

Puri, Madan Mohan. "International Round Table on Non-alignment: Editor's Report," Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 1, March 1980, pp. 122-131.

Rajan, M. S. "Institutionalization of Non-alignment: Widening Gulf Between the Belief and the Prospect," International Studies, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981, pp. 39-55.

Rana, A. P. "Nonalignment as a Developmental Foreign Policy Strategy: A Conceptual Enquiry Into Its Systematic Capabilities," Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 4, December 1980, pp. 587-637.

Remington, Robin Alison. "Nonalignment as Ideological Transfer: The South-North Dialogue," Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 3, September 1980, pp. 471-497.

Rothstein, Robert L. "Foreign Policy and Development Policy: From Nonalignment to International Class War," International Affairs, London, Vol. 52, No. 4, October 1976, pp. 598-616.

Shaw, Timothy M. and Fasehun, Orobola. "Nigeria in the World System: Alternative Approaches, Explanations, and Projections," The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 1980, pp. 551-573.

Singham, A. W. "The Fifth Summit Conference of the Non-aligned Movement," The Black Scholar, Vol. 8, No. 3, December 1976, pp. 1-9.

Singham, Archie. "Havana Summit: Currents and Cross-Currents," The Black Scholar, Vol. 11, No. 6, July/August 1980, pp. 19-28.

Sonaike, S. Adefemi. "Exploring Indicators of Public Opinion in Nigeria With Special Reference to the Letter to the Editor Column, The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 1978, pp. 37-53.

Stremlau, John J. "The Foreign Policies of Developing Countries in the 1980's, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring/Summer 1980, pp. 161-178.

Udokang, Okon. "The Third World as a Political Force," The Black Scholar, May 1975, pp. 11-22.

Vasudevan, Parvathi. "Prospects for Non-alignment: India's Role," India Quarterly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, January-March 1983, pp. 50-62.

Volkov, N. "The Developing Countries and International Ecoomic Relations," International Affairs, Moscow, September 1976, pp. 57-67.

Magazines and Dailies

National Concord, Vol. 4, No. 1153, Saturday, November 5, 1983.

New Nigerian, No. 5452, Monday, 26 September, 1983.

West Africa, 4 April, 1983.

_____. 11 April 1983.

_____. 1 August 1983.

_____. 8 August 1983.

_____. 22 August 1983.

_____. 10 October 1983.

_____. 31 October 1983.

_____. 7 November 1983.

_____. 14 November 1983.

_____. 28 November 1983.

_____. 12 December 1983.

_____. 27 August 1984.

_____. 10 September 1984.

Official Publications

United Nations Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1961.

_____. Vol. 8, No. 5, May 1961.

_____. Vol. 8, No. 7, July 1961.

_____. Vol. 8, No. 10, October 1961.

_____. Vol. 8, No. 11, November 1961.

_____. Vol. 8, No. 23, December 1961.

_____. Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1962.

_____. Vol. 9, No. 3, March 1962.

_____. Vol. 9, No. 4, April 1962.

_____. Vol. 9, No. 7, July 1962.

_____. Vol. 9, No. 11, November 1962.

_____. Vol. 9, No. 12, December 1962.

_____. Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1963.

_____. Vol. 10, No. 2, February 1963.

_____. Vol. 10, No. 5, May 1963.

_____. Vol. 10, No. 7, July 1963.

_____. Vol. 10, No. 11, November 1963.

_____. Vol. 10, No. 12, December 1963.

_____. Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1964.

UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. I, No. 1, May 1964.

_____. Vol. I, No. 5, October 1964.

_____. Vol. I, No. 6, November 1964.

_____. Vol. I, No. 7, December 1964.

_____. Vol. II, No. 1, January 1965.

_____. Vol. II, No. 5, May 1965.

_____. Vol. II, No. 6, June 1965.

_____. Vol. II, No. 7, July 1965.

_____. Vol. II, No. 10, November 1965.

_____. Vol. II, No. 11, December 1965.

_____. Vol. III, No. 1, January 1966.

_____. Vol. III, No. 9, October 1966.

_____. Vol. III, No. 10, November 1966.

_____. Vol. III, No. 11, December 1966.

_____. Vol. V, No. 2, February 1968.

_____. Vol. V, No. 4, April 1968.

_____. Vol. V, No. 6, June 1968.

_____. Vol. V, No 10, November 1968.

_____. Vol. VI, No. 1, January 1969.

_____. Vol. VI, No. 6, June 1969.

_____. Vol. VI, No. 10, November 1969.

_____. Vol. VI, No. 11, December 1969.

_____. Vol. VII, No. 10, November 1970.

_____. Vol. VII, No. 11, December 1970.

_____. Vol. VIII, No. 10, November 1971.

_____. Vol. IX, No. 1, January 1972.

_____. Vol. IX, No. 3, March 1972.

_____. Vol. IX, No. 6, June 1972.

_____. Vol. IX, No. 8, August-September 1972.

_____. Vol. IX, No. 9, October 1972.

_____. Vol. IX, No. 10, November 1972.

_____. Vol. IX, No. 11, December 1972.

_____. Vol. X, No. 1, January 1973.

_____. Vol. X, No. 7, July 1973.

_____. Vol. X, No. 10, November 1973.

_____. Vol. XI, No. 11, November 1974.

_____. Vol. XII, No. 10, November 1975.

_____. Vol. XIII, No. 10, November 1976.

_____. Vol. XIV, No. 10, November 1977

_____. Vol. XV, No. 10, November 1978.

_____. Vol. XVII, No. 10, December 1980.

_____. Vol. XVIII, No. 11, December 1981.

Yearbook of the United Nations 1980, Vol. 34, 1983.