

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE LOVE OF PERSONS

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

by
EDWARD EVERETT ROUSAR III
Norman, Oklahoma

1984

THE LOVE OF PERSONS

A DISSERTATION

APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Tom W. Boyd

RSW

Kenneth R. Russell

J. N. Smith

© 1984

Edward E. Rousar III

All Rights Reserved

To Kenneth L. Shewmaker

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my parents for their unstinting support and to extend my gratitude to my committee for their patience and their helpful and constructive criticism.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	page
DEDICATION.iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.v
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. PLATO'S ACCOUNT OF LOVE.	10
III. SCHELER'S LOVE AS ACT.	75
IV. WHAT WE LOVE ABOUT WHO WE LOVE	147
V. LOVE ON ANY ACCOUNT.	223
FOOTNOTES	252
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	259

THE LOVE OF PERSONS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Any attempt to characterize, describe, or define love runs into difficulties. There are a bewildering variety of phenomena that can be--and have been--classified as love. The mother's doting attention to her child, the young couple's amorous interludes, the saint's fervent dedication to God are all considered examples of love. Given this diversity of experiences, it is not surprising that opinions about what love is vary. Love has been called a feeling, an emotion, an attraction, a desire, and even a judgment. And there is an equally diverse range of things that can lay claim to being the object of one love or another. God and the gods, man and animals, nature and the land, justice and freedom are among the things that have been claimed to be loved. Trying to find order among the phenomena, theories, and objects might well be a hopeless task, for there is no guarantee that all these have a common thread. There might not be a unifying theme to all loves, and even if some order were found, demonstrating the correctness of this order would be no small task. Hence, rather than take on the formidable job of describing any love whatsoever, I have chosen to examine one important area of love--adult

interpersonal love.

There are reasons for choosing to examine adult interpersonal love other than the practical requirement for a clearly circumscribed and limited focus to an inquiry. After all, being practical demands only that some well defined area or other be chosen. One very good reason for choosing adult interpersonal love is that, to my knowledge, adult interpersonal love is one of only two kinds of love consistently studied in philosophy. The other kind is the love of God. However troublesome studies of love in general or even just interpersonal love may be, an examination of man's love for God presents special difficulties. The first difficulty is that the object of the love may not exist. It is then rather difficult to inquire into the nature of the beloved and the justifications for loving Him. And even if He does exist, since there is no consensus on his attributes, an examination of the nature of the beloved would require taking some position or other with regard to his attributes. Since a justification of a love depends in part on the nature of the beloved, it follows that any justification of the love of God based on a specific set of attributes could be rejected out of hand by anyone who rejects that set of attributes. An examination of the love of God, then, would seem to require both a proof of God's existence and a demonstration of his attributes, two tasks that would range far afield of the examination of love.

Just as important as these two very practical reasons for not exploring the love of God, is the primacy of man's love for man. If I were to attempt a description of man's love for God, it would be in

very human terms. St. Theresa's descriptions of her loving experiences with God are excruciatingly human and sexual. In all likelihood she experienced her love for God within the bounds of human concepts and feelings, and even if she did not, she felt compelled to express that love in terms of human love. I am not here claiming that man's love of God is some sort of psycho-social derivation from a man's love for father or mother, the idolization of father (mother) writ large. It is just that any description of a man's experience of loving God I have heard has been in language that any romantic lover would understand. Man's love for God may not be a fantasy founded on man's love for man, but the language used to describe the love of God is the language of romantic love. Perhaps with a feeble effort, but the best one we can manage, we point to our love of God by pointing to our love of man and saying, "See, something like this." I believe that this is the case. Whether God exists, whatever attributes he may have, whether we can actually love him, and regardless of the genesis of the love for him, we speak of that love in the language of the romantic lover. If we are to understand the love of God, we must understand the love of man. We explain our love of God analogically. To understand the love of God at all requires first understanding the foundation of the analogy--the love of man. and hence, the love of man will be the focus of this study.

There are several questions anyone who was curious about interpersonal love in general would ask. The first and most obvious set of questions begins with "What is love?" Is it a feeling? Or a desire? What is the nature of love? The second set can be asked of a

love in general, but I will phrase them for an interpersonal love. What is it that we love about whom we love? Do I love you because you're witty? Or for your long blonde hair? What is it exactly about you that I love? Since I am concerned with interpersonal love, the object is loved is another person. But to say this is uninformative. What is it about the beloved that justifies my loving her? The question about who is loved becomes a question about what it is about the beloved that justifies loving her. Finally, we can ask about the relationship between the love and the desires and actions attending it. What kinds of desires are to be associated with love? What is their relationship to love? How are the lover's actions related to his desires and his love? If these various questions are adequately answered, then a reasonably clear picture of love should emerge. In fact, posing these questions and pursuing an answer to them will constitute the method of this inquiry. The questions must be answered if an adequate account of love is to be given. In addition, by pursuing various possible answers to the questions, the focus of the inquiry will remain on the phenomenon of love.

To answer these questions I will consider the positions of four philosophers, Plato, Scheler, Sartre, and Gabriel Taylor. Each has made a significant contribution to the philosophy of love. Plato's position on love will be used as the point of departure. His description of love is vivid and (I believe) accurate, for the most part, and his analysis is provocative. It is also well over two thousand years old. The fact that this ancient account accords well with modern descriptions means that an examination of it can provide

an initial look at most of the issues raised by the questions about love. His position, however, only hints at the nature of love. It also gives an unacceptable explanation of what it is about whom we love that prompts us to love him/her. For a more detailed exploration of the nature of love I will turn to Max Scheler. His account of love is sufficient for me to develop an answer to the question, "What is love?" Who is loved and why, is not so carefully examined by Scheler, and so I will use Jean-Paul Sartre's analysis of persons and love to develop an answer to the question what is it about the beloved that prompts us to love him. After adapting Sartre's account of persons to this purpose, I will use this modified account to provide answers to questions about the relationship of desire and action to love. Finally, I will examine Gabriel Taylor's account of love and test, against this late twentieth century account of love, the veracity and explanatory power of the theory I have developed

The earliest comprehensive view of love is Plato's. He gives slightly different descriptions in the Symposium and Phaedrus. I have chosen to review his position in the Phaedrus, since his description in the Symposium is more in the service of his metaphysics than of love. Even in the Phaedrus this very human phenomenon of love is used to support his metaphysics. Plato claims that true love is a love of the Beautiful as exemplified in individuals and describes the path a lover takes, through his love of a person, to philosophy--a love of truth and beauty. I do not wish to dispute the broad claim that interpersonal love can lead to a philosophical life, but, if we are to count as love romantic loves, love does not necessarily lead to a

philosophical life. To the extent that Plato believes that true love will lead to the philosophical life, he can be accused of wishful thinking. And opportunism. He deftly describes the lover in the first throes of love--a more accurate and poetic description probably cannot be had--but then goes on to claim that this love is the starting point in the style of life he endorses and recommends. We cannot condemn Plato for trying to convince us that earthly love is consistent with, indeed the beginnings of, a nobler end. And yet to the extent he makes his description of love fit his metaphysical view, he has abused the phenomenon. He is not satisfied with an analysis of love; he must make it the means to some greater end.

My point is to analyze the phenomena and give as accurate a description as possible without regard to what else might be (metaphysically) the case. Plato's basic description of love serves this purpose; his attempt to tie love to his metaphysical theory does not. Part of the project, then, will be to separate the description of the phenomenon from his metaphysics. Plato's primary goal is the defense of his metaphysics, and love is marshalled to this defense. Scheler, too, uses love to support his metaphysics. He claims that there is an objective hierarchy of values existing in the world independent of man and that we can perceive these values as we can see trees and hear symphonies. My position with regard to Scheler is much the same as with Plato. His metaphysical position about values may or may not be defensible, but the defensibility of his metaphysics is not important to my purpose. What is important are his ideas about love. Insofar as they can stand independent of his metaphysical ideas, I

will be able to use them to develop an answer to the question about the nature of love.

With regard to Sartre my position is slightly different. To answer the question about what it is about the beloved that we love, a theory of persons is necessary. Sartre's position does provide a theory of persons and the relationships among them, but he claims that all relationships are doomed to failure. Obviously, Sartre's theory, as he presents it, is antithetical to a theory of constructive, positive interpersonal interactions. Nonetheless, there seems to be more than a measure of truth in it. I will criticize his view and reformulate it so that it 1) conforms more to what I believe persons and the relationships between them are and 2) can provide some answers to questions about love. My reformulated Sartrean position will be able to answer the questions "What is it about the beloved that is loved," "What desires and actions are associated with love," and "What is the relation of these desires and actions to love and to one another."

I will treat Taylor as an adversary; she claims to give an account of love, an account that differs significantly from mine. The point will be to demonstrate that her theory does not adequately or coherently account for the phenomenon of love and that mine does. She attempts to analyze love as an emotion and in terms of the beliefs that justify emotions. When I address her article I will have already shown that love is not an emotion and that it is not justified on the kinds of beliefs that she claims it is. But rather than simply restating my arguments, I will address her on her own terms and show

some considerable flaws in her project.

Each of the philosophers I consider has philosophical commitments that interfere with his analysis of love. Plato claims that there is a metaphysical something called Beauty and that the praiseworthy life is in contemplation of that Beauty. Scheler claims that there is a objective heirarchy of values apart from man's recognition of them. Sartre is committed to a view of consciousness that makes interpersonal relationships invariably tragic. And Taylor is committed, not so much to a metaphysical position, as a method of analysis in terms of beliefs. I claim that an accurate account of love eludes each of them because of their other commitments. So, along with giving an accurate account of love, I should have, in the end, demonstrated that these various commitments are excess baggage and a hindrence to a clear understanding of love.

For the most part I will not consider the relationship of sex and love. The notable exception is the discussion of Plato. Plato's account explicitly considers the role of sex in love and so I will take up the subject briefly. Elsewhere I will consider sex as one of the possible desires a lover may have. Taylor, from what I can tell, puts sex under the rubric "wanting to be with the beloved." And indeed, sexual desires are wanting to be with the beloved in a very particular way. Since sexual desires can be placed under the more general category of "wanting to be with", I see no particular reason for giving them special treatment. There is no denying that sexual desires play an important role in our lives and in our loves. Yet sexual desires are clearly different from love. I may love--as a

brother perhaps--with no significant sexual desires. And I may sexually desire someone without the vaguest inclination to love her. Since sexual desires are distinct from love and since a category of desires under which sexual desires fall will be considered, there is no pressing reason to give special consideration to an additional topic in an already massive area of discussion.

There are two conventions I will observe that bear mentioning. First, I will routinely use "the beloved" as the object of the lover's love. At times this may seem stiff or archaic, but the phrase has the advantage of being brief, quite an advantage in a phrase that will be so often needed. Other phrases, of course, will be used for the beloved. They are the result of using a particular philosopher's vernacular. There should be no problem identifying synonyms for "the beloved." Also, except for the discussion of Plato, I will use "him" and "her" indifferently to refer to the lover and the beloved. Plato's love is always by a man of a man and so I will use masculine pronouns when discussing his theory. Otherwise, it is unimportant who is loving whom. A man may love a man or woman and a woman may love a woman or a man. Hence, I will use masculine and feminine pronouns as the mood strikes. Nothing more is intended than some person or another, but the pronouns for persons have gender and so will indicate the sex of this hypothetical person. Sex, and sexuality, and gender are not specifically at issue here. What is important is the development of an accurate theory of love with as few metaphysical commitments as possible.

CHAPTER II

PLATO'S ACCOUNT OF LOVE

2.1 Exposition

Not all of Plato's Phaedrus¹ is dedicated to a discussion of love, but the portion that is is fertile territory. Plato divides the discussion into three speeches. The first is given by Phaedrus but supposedly written by Lysias. The second is by Socrates and is an attempt to better Lysias at his own game. Both of these speeches counsel the prospective young lover that it is better not to bestow his favors on a suitor. In different respects both Lysias and Socrates, in his first speech, claim that the lover is a madman not to be trusted with anything as important as one's well-being. The third speech is again by Socrates but this time he recants his position that a young man ought not take a lover. A seemingly contrite Socrates now offers a paean to love to pacify the gods and ease his conscience. In his second speech, Socrates grants that the lover is mad but claims that this is a divinely inspired madness. To defend his claim that there are beneficial madnnesses and that not all forms of madness are evil and destructive Socrates cites examples. The first is the madness like that of the prophetesses at Delphi. The second is the type of madness that occurs in cursed families. This madness

presumably shows the way to relief from the curse. And third is the madness of the poets. These examples may not convince us that there are beneficial madnnesses, probably because we would not consider them true madnnesses, but they might well have convinced Socrates' contemporaries. However convincing the examples may be, Socrates then launches his demonstration that love is yet one more beneficial form of madnness.

To provide this demonstration he first proves that the soul is immortal and that the soul is the first principle of motion. He argues in a familiar vein: there are things which are moved; either they are moved by themselves or by something else; if they are moved by something else, that something is either self-moved or moved by another and so on until the causal chain is traced to that which moves itself--the first principle of motion. This first principle Socrates calls all soul. Since Socrates apparently excludes the creation of motion ex nihilo, the all soul, by its nature, must perpetually create itself without beginning or end. Socrates argues that individual souls are similar to the all soul since "the essence and definition of soul [is] self-motion." (245e) Clearly we move ourselves and are not moved by external causes hence that which animates us has the quality of being self-moved and therefore is immortal.

Whatever the strengths and weakness of this argument, Socrates uses this proof of the immortality of the soul as the starting point for his myth about the cycle of life of the soul. Socrates does not return to the argument and somewhat peremptorily ends the topic with "As to the immortality of the soul then we have said enough...." (246)

His interest in the immortality of the soul in the dialogue is merely to establish that the soul does have this quality so that he may place the soul in the midst of the epic of the immortal gods.

Retreating from argument to metaphor, Socrates describes the nature of the soul.

"Let it be likened to the union of powers in a team of winged steeds and their winged charioteer. Now all the gods' steeds and all their charioteers are good, and of good stock, but with the other beings it is not wholly so. With us men, in the first place, it is a pair of steeds that the charioteer controls; moreover one of them is noble and good, and of good stock, while the other has the opposite character, and his stock is opposite. Hence the task of our charioteer is difficult and troublesome." (246a,b)

When a soul loses its wings it falls to earth and fastens onto something solid. This composite of soul and matter is the mortal human being.

That the soul has wings is of special interest since Socrates says that "more than any other bodily part it shares in the divine nature, which is fair, wise and good, and possessed of all other such excellences." (246e) The gods' wings allow them to traverse their heavenly domains. At the times of feast and banquets their strong-winged and easily guided horses allow them to climb to the summit of the heavens. The climb is worth the effort; there is a great reward for "It is there that true being dwells, without color or shape, that cannot be touched; reason alone, the soul's pilot, can behold it, and all true knowledge is knowledge thereof." (247c) The culmination of the journey is a vision of true being in all its aspects: "justice, its very self, and likewise temperance, and

knowledge, not the knowledge that is neighbor to becoming and varies with the various objects to which we commonly ascribe being, but the veritable knowledge of being that veritably is." (247d,e) On true being the gods feast, it being their proper food. When they have feasted and had their fill they return home and tend their steeds. Such is the life of the gods. Their wings are strong as are their horses. On those wings they ascend to the pinnacle of heaven to feast on true being. With their wings strong they return home contented. Man's lot is not so easy.

The gods ride orderly to the summit, but human souls with their unmatched, hard-to-control, steeds travel riotously behind. Through the chaotic scramble, only those souls who have attended the gods closely catch glimpses of true being. Even these few are consigned only to brief glimpses since their steeds are so unruly. But worse, in the unbridled excitement of the human charioteers who emulate the gods less, some are "sucked down as they travel" and "trample and tread upon one another." (248) Fervor leads to disaster. "Thus confusion ensues, and conflict and grievous sweat. Whereupon, with their charioteers powerless, many are lamed, and many have their wings all broken, and for all their toiling they are balked, every one, of the full vision of being, and departing therefrom, they feed upon the food of semblance." (248b) Finally few human souls even taste the godly food of true being. Most make do with appearances of truth. Those souls who have seen something of true being are preserved and will ride again with the gods. But those hapless souls who, in the confusion, have seen only the appearance of true being are doomed to

forget even what little they have seen. Since it is true being that sustains their wings, these souls shed their wings and fall to earth to become humans.

The soul imprisoned on earth is not doomed without reprieve. After having lived an ordinary mortal life, it is judged. Those that are meretricious are borne aloft to heaven for one thousand years and those that are deemed wretched spend that time "in places of chastisement beneath the earth." (249) After the thousand years the souls are reborn to human form, if they deserve that lot, and the cycle continues. Most souls require no less than ten thousand years, that is, ten lives, to regain their wings, but the soul "who has sought after wisdom unfeignedly" (249), who has chosen the philosophical life three times regains its wings and speeds away to join the heavenly host. Socrates defends the privilege of the philosopher's soul. "Therefore it is meet and right that the soul of the philosopher alone should recover her wings, for she, so far as may be, is ever near in memory to those things a god's nearness whereunto makes him truly god." (249c)

One might fairly demand where in this epic tale of the soul is an account of love. To this point in his speech Socrates has given only a clue. For the soul wishing to return to the heavenly host he gives alternatives: the soul may regain his wings by diligently seeking after wisdom or he may also regain them by joining his passion with a loved one that is seeking also. On the face of it this seems like more work for the beleaguered soul, to love as well as pursue wisdom. But this is far from the truth. Loving is an aid to redemption.

Equally, Socrates seems to have left off his account of love as a madness. But it is just here in his narrative that he picks up the threads. The philosopher is attentive to the divine and isolates himself from the business of ordinary human life. Hence, being so possessed by the divine, he is called mad. This is the fourth and best form of divine possession. It is also this kind of madness that possesses the lover. The lover loves beauty. Not the beauty of this world so much as the beauty of that other world of which worldly beauty reminds him. In the presence of earthly beauty he remembers heavenly beauty and in the rapture of his remembrance is deemed mad.

Socrates explains that our organs for perceiving the aspects of true being are dull save for sight. Our perception of justice and temperance, for instance, is not nearly so keen. But "Beauty was ours to see in all its brightness in those days when, amidst that happy company, we beheld with our eyes that blessed vision...." (250b) It was beauty that "shone bright amidst these visions, and in this world below we apprehend it through the clearest of our senses, clear and resplendent. For sight is the keenest mode of perception vouchsafed us through the body...." (250d) Because beauty shone brightest and because we are best equipped to see it among the aspects of true being, it is that to which we most readily respond. "...for beauty alone this has been ordained, to be most manifest to sense and most lovely of them all." (250d)

Those who saw little of true being or who saw it long ago are not responsive to a beauty for what it represents--true beauty--but see a beauty as a means to satisfy their sexual desires and procreative

instincts. But those whose memory of true beauty is fresher, when in the presence of a beauty, are inspired to remember and envision true beauty. First, the lover shudders at the sight, at the reawakening of his memory. What happens next bears quoting in full for it is Socrates' description of the divine madness that overcomes the lover.

...a strange sweating and fever seizes him. For by reason of the stream of beauty entering in through his eyes there comes a warmth, whereby his soul's plumage is fostered, and with that warmth the roots of the wings are melted, which for long had been so hardened and closed up that nothing could grow; then as the nourishment is poured in, the stump of the wing swells and hastens to grow from the root over the whole substance of the soul, for aforetime the whole soul was furnished with wings. Meanwhile she throbs with ferment in every part, and even as a teething child feels an aching and pain in its gums when a tooth has just come through, so does the soul of him who is beginning to grow his wings feel a ferment and painful irritation. Wherefore as she gazes upon the boy's beauty, she admits a flood of particles streaming therefore--that is why we speak of a "flood of passion"--whereby she is warmed and fostered; then has she respite from her anguish, and is filled with joy. (251b-d)

But as soon as the beloved has departed the flood of passion stops and the nubs of the wings begin to dry up. The soul, given some respite from its earthly prison, now feels itself shrinking back into its shell. With the withdrawal of the beloved, the soul finds itself "stung and goaded into anguish." (251d) The thought or sight of the beloved once again makes the wings begin to swell. And so with advances and retreats of the beloved the soul flourishes and withers alternately. Driven to distraction, the soul searches out the beloved and follows him everywhere suffering insult and injury to be in the beloved's presence.

So goes Socrates' description of the madness of love and the

desire for the beloved. Next he speaks of the choice of the beloved and the action and attitude of the lover toward the beloved. The lover chooses a kindred soul, one who has followed in the train of the same god in the heavenly journey. A follower of Zeus picks another follower of Zeus, a follower of Hera another follower of Hera and so forth. Once the lover has found and come to love the beloved he sets out to achieve the attitude and disposition of his god. As the lover reaches out to the patron god in memory, he is possessed by that god and from this possession he partakes of the nature of this god. Yet he believes his growing kinship to his patron god is the result of his association with his beloved. The mistake prompts him to pour out into the soul of the beloved all beneficences he has received from his god and thereby also molds his beloved into a closer likeness to their patron god. The attitude and actions of the lover lead both him and his beloved to grow into a likeness of their god.

Every lover is fain that his beloved should be of a nature like to his own god, and when he has won him, he leads him on to walk in the ways of their god, and after his likeness, patterning himself thereupon and giving counsel and discipline to the boy. There is no jealousy nor petty spitefulness in his dealings, but his every act is aimed at bringing the beloved to be every whit like unto himself and unto the god of their worship. (253b,c)

Before these god-like changes can be wrought, the lover must capture the beloved. To do this the lover must tame his own black steed. His white horse is obedient to the charioteer's commands, but the black steed, "hot-blooded, consorting with wantonness and vainglory" (253e) must be forced to heed, not his own will, but that of the charioteer. The charioteer and the white steed struggle

against the black steed's passionate flight to the beloved but let the black steed have his way as he rushes to the beloved. Only when the beauty of the beloved strikes the charioteer with awe does he rein up his steeds. The black steed attempts to approach but the charioteer convinces him to delay. In a while the black steed once again attempts to approach the beloved. Finally the driver is forced to jerk "back the bit in the mouth of the wanton horse with an even stronger pull, bespatters his railing tongue and jaws with blood, and forcing him down on legs and haunches delivers him over to anguish." (254e) This battle of the lover's soul with itself occurs again and again until the black horse approaches the beloved with fear and "the soul of the lover follows after the beloved with reverence and awe." (254e)

The beloved now receives the services of the lover and accepts these with good will. As he grows older and as destiny has its sway, the beloved puts aside any qualms he may have and welcomes the lover's company. He begins to appreciate his lover's kindness. He absorbs it until he can hold no more and then begins reflecting it like a mirror. The love becomes reciprocal; each lover's wings grow with the nurturance. Even so the beloved has not yet come to understand the source and nature of his love. He comes to desire his lover and in that desire his own black horse is awakened. With the help of the tempered soul of his lover, he succeeds in subduing his black steed. "And so," Socrates says,

if the victory be won by the higher elements of mind
guiding them into the ordered rule of the philosophical
life, their days on earth will be blessed with happiness

and concord, for the power of evil in the soul has been subjected, and the power of goodness liberated; they have won self-mastery and inward peace. And when life is over, with burden shed and wings recovered they stand victorious in the first of the three rounds in that truly Olympic struggle; nor can any nobler prize be secured whether by the wisdom that is of man or by the madness that is of god. (256a,b)

2.2 Interpretation

2.2.1 Madness and Method

It is assumed in the Phaedrus that love creates some form of madness. Lysis' speech and Socrates' second speech take madness as a leitmotif. Even Socrates' first speech portrays the effects of the lover's madness. All the speeches in fact are in accord with folklore: the lover's madness prompts him to commit unusual, even bizarre acts. Lysis' speech views the lover's madness as foolishness. The lover has simply lost his senses. He makes promises he cannot keep. He acts irrationally with regard to others, the beloved and himself. Presumably his thinking has lurched from the calm and rational to the erratic, fevered and irrational. Perhaps the Lysisian lover could most aptly be described as having lost possession of his senses. He no longer has control over his own self. Yet nothing else takes control. Lysis' lover is a man in ruins. The very faculties that distinguish him as a human being have disintegrated and he is left a disheveled array of ineptly functioning human faculties.

The lover of Socrates' first speech is not so clearly gone mad. He is compelled by desire and perhaps that compulsion is his madness in the sense that he is no longer in possession; desire is. But being possessed by desire has its own logic. The Lysisian lover is simply lost. He is schizophrenic, a personality in shambles. The lover of Socrates' first speech is more nearly psychotic; there is not a disintegration of personality. There is a domination of personality by one of its facets. Desire may have taken possession, but the other faculties remain intact. Having the powers of reason still at its

command, desire becomes crafty. Socrates' first lover is a wily man bent on the satisfaction of his desires at all costs. Gone is the picture of the lover as a pathetic babbling madman. The lover now is virtually a demonic force. All the power, the protean energy of desire is set loose. With reason as its accomplice, desire with premeditated single-mindedness contrives its ends and its ends alone. Desire's satisfaction is desire's goal, and the lover's reason and arts are its means.

In severe schizophrenia the person is not only characterized by personality disintegration but by with a concomitant loss of contact with reality. There is no world that stands steadfast in the face of the schizophrenic's disintegration; the world is as fragmented and disordered as the man and little more than a mirror of the man--the ultimate solipsism. The psychotic's world, on the other hand, is not shattered; it is misinterpreted. The world seen through the eyes of the psychotic is interpreted consistently through the form of the psychosis. For example, the paranoid psychotic sees the world as apart from himself and sees what others see. But he sees more. The world is laden with danger. Innumerable aspects carry threats that no one else sees. The psychotic is surely possessed and this possession informs his world.

Socrates' first lover, possessed by his desire, is psychotic. The world is seen clearly but interpreted only through the eyes of desire. Desire is the lover's motivation and its satisfaction is his raison d'être. The psychotic may wreak havoc because he sees the world clearly and because he reasons. In fact, desire, like the fear

of the paranoid psychotic, is directed toward the world. The paranoid psychotic must accurately perceive what is threatening and then act coherently to avoid or abolish that threat. The lover, possessed by desire, must know what he desires and then act methodically to achieve satisfaction. Never mind that in some objective sense, what is feared is not threatening or what is desired is not finally desirable. However much the mind and world of the psychotic or the lover is skewed by the possession, reason and the world are largely left intact.

The lover possessed by desire, as Socrates describes him, is bereft of a moral sense. He is so because satisfaction of his desires is his morality. What is good is that which satisfies the desire, what is bad is that which frustrates that satisfaction. The desire-possessed lover virtually operates in the manner of the ethical egoist. There is some (at least tacit) concern with good and bad, but it is wholly involved with the satisfaction of the desire and totally unconcerned with others. If there is a rift in the world of the lover possessed by desire, it is a moral one. Otherwise, his world is our world.

If Lysis' lover has lost possession of himself and if Socrates' first lover is possessed by a part of himself--his desires, Socrates' second lover is divinely possessed. The second lover is mad by virtue of his soul's response to beauty. In the beauty of the beloved he has found something ultimately valuable--the remembrance of true beauty, that facet of true being which, like true being, is the food of the gods. Perhaps it can be said that what Socrates' second lover sees is

a beautiful person--a beauty--but that what he experiences is beauty itself. In this experience he has not lost possession of himself. He has not even been possessed by a part of himself gone berserk. He has been possessed by something of ultimate worth, something above and beyond himself. If we can accept this premise, then we can understand this lover's possession, his insanity, his relationship to the world and his actions as a lover.

The first two lovers are madmen in the ordinary sense. I think Socrates would suggest that they are mad precisely because their love bears no relationship to the divine. Their love is a response to a beauty, not true beauty. If we borrow from Socrates' myth for an explanation, we shall say that their souls, in the journey of the gods, never glimpsed true being and hence have nothing to which to relate the beauty standing before them. What they see in a beauty is a mortal and corruptible form. What is remarkable to them about the beauty is his being exceptional; the beauty stands out in contrast to the rest of humanity. And more importantly he stands out for no other reason. Perhaps the Lysisian lover is shattered and the first Socratic lover is overwhelmed by desire by the sheer remarkableness of the beauty. Perhaps the Lysisian lover is utterly crushed by the irony that such beauty should exist and yet be perishable. And perhaps the first Socratic lover is motivated by the same realization to have the beauty while it lasts.

However this may be, the second Socratic lover is possessed of no mortal madness. His soul is not shaken or overwhelmed by the ironies of this life. It is inspired by a vision of the eternal, immortal

realm beyond this earth's changeable one. He has not lost his senses but gained them. The Lysisian lover has no reason left. The first Socratic lover's reason is at the mercy of his desire. The second Socratic lover comes to think more clearly; his reason is the most lucid and the most at his disposal. While the second Socratic lover may reel at first glance of the beloved's beauty, he soon realizes the importance of that beauty and acts accordingly.

Neither does the second Socratic lover misconstrue the world. It is there for him precisely as it is for everyone else. But the world, aside from the beloved, is of little importance to him. Even the beloved is important only for the beauty that reflects true beauty and for his soul that might be developed into its natural (winged) form. In spite of his clear view of the world or rather precisely because of it, the lover is called mad. As seen by his peers he has left all sense behind. He follows his beloved not heeding the demands of life. He forsakes his commerce and forgets his family. He acts as one who has lost his bearings, hence he is mad. But Socrates contends that it is because he has found his bearings that he acts so oddly. It may seem rational for the ordinary man to tend to his business and see to his family, but the lover sees that duties, pleasures, and conventions of the mutable world are unimportant in relation to his soul's well being. He is not a madman unable to conduct his affairs; he is the picture of sanity using his energies to pursue what really counts--the development of his soul toward a commerce with true beauty.

As the source of his soul's growth the second Socratic lover treats the beloved with respect, even reverence. Though there is no

explicit moral theory expressed in the love speeches of the Phaedrus, there is at least an implicit utilitarianism. The first speeches counsel not to take a lover because he is not good for you. The third counsels taking one precisely because he is good for you. The Lysisian lover, bereft of his senses, is lacking in moral fiber. The first Socratic lover is clearly evil in attempting to ensure the degradation of the beloved. The second Socratic lover, though, is seen as beneficial both to the lover and the beloved because he promotes the growth of both their souls. After all, this madness is divinely inspired and must therefore produce morally praiseworthy results. The earthly madness of the first two lovers produces obnoxious, if not deleterious, results. Only the divinely inspired madness of love can produce beneficial results. The second Socratic lover achieves this result by treating the beloved as an ends and not just a means. He conceives both him and his lover as having souls that merit elevation. Just as he attends to his own soul, so does he his beloved's. But the morality of the lover is as much a function of his desires as his madness. It is these desires that complete the emotional characterization of the lover.

2.2.2 Desire And Will

The first two lovers may be said to be mad with desire. The Lysisian lover loses control of himself, loses his senses, is mad because he desires. He wishes to bask in his beloved's beauty which is to say that his will is his desire. He has no will distinct from his desire. The very profundity of his madness makes his will as an

effective agent apart from his desires impossible. The first Socratic lover, on the other hand, inclines his will only to the satisfaction of his desires. It is likely that herein lies his madness. He is not simply struck with a beauty only to stand in awe. He actively seeks to satisfy the desire that beauty inspires. There is no question that Plato sees beauty as a positive attribute or that he views the recognition of it as virtuous. It is equally clear that what the lover sees in the beauty is of importance and that the response to that beauty is, among other things, desire. All three lovers desire. The first desires, but that is all. The second desires and moreover attempts to see to it that that desire is satisfied. The first two lovers are both slaves to desire though they are distinguishable by virtue of the role of their will in relation to desire. The second Socratic lover, too, has a black horse of desire, but the lover's will is imposed on the black horse. In terms of Socrates' tripartite soul, the Lysisian lover has no charioteer or, at best, has one who stands idly by while the black horse races to the beloved. The first Socratic lover's charioteer is in the midst of the fray, not to rein in the black horse but to guide him swiftly to the goal. The second Socratic lover actively asserts his will against the black steed. Not only is his will clearly evident, it clearly restrains desire.

If we asked "Should we desire our beloved?" Plato could only respond "It's not a matter of should or shouldn't; you will." And if we rejoin "Well, then, what should our attitude and acts be with regard to the beloved?" Plato would respond "Carnal satisfaction of one's desires is ephemeral. Satisfy them if you must, but realize

that the satisfaction of desires is not the fulfillment of love." Plato is realist enough not to deny the existence of desires or their preeminent role in love. They are part and parcel of love. Madness could more easily be separated from love than desires. The madness comes at the recognition of the beloved and, at least for the second Socratic lover, abates with the pursuance of the love's goals with the beloved. Further, the divine madness of the second Socratic lover is insanity only if interpreted through the eyes of the non-lover. Desire, on the other hand, is a part of the lover on any account. It will hold its sway if not reckoned with. Without a doubt Plato holds that it is virtuous not to let desire have its way and to control it by an act of will. Why holding desire in check is virtuous is explainable only in terms of the object and objective of love.

2.2.3 To Whom And For What

The object of love seems obvious: the beloved. If we may trust our use of the word "love", we may love a man or woman, our land or the land, liberty, justice and other abstract concepts, animals and God. We may even love that dress or the way you do your hair. Even if we exclude this last, rather dubious group of objects, the objects of love are amazingly diverse, from the mortal to the immortal, from the concrete to the abstract. If love allows all these objects, it is quite possible that when we say we love a man or woman, we are not loving him or her at all. We may, for instance, be loving what he stand for or some concrete aspect of her.

Of the first two lovers Plato says nothing about what or who it

is they love. He is far more explicit about the second Socratic lover. Yet even when he is explicit Plato leaves many questions about who or what is loved.

The Lysisian lover has little to love. It must be either the beloved himself or the beauty of the beloved. There is little doubt that it is the second. Lysis argues that "Lovers, when their craving is at an end, repent of such benefits as they have conferred...." (231) and that "A lover more often than not wants to possess you before he has come to know your character or become familiar with your general personality, and that makes it uncertain whether he will still want to be your friend when his desires have waned...." (232e) The Lysisian lover cannot be loving the man for he doesn't even know him. Even if he did know him, he is at the mercy of his cravings. That sounds more like lust than love. But if we allow that the Lysisian lover does love, then we must conclude that he loves the beauty of the beloved. That is what makes him mad, that is what he desires--to revel in that beauty. When that beauty fades or his desires are satisfied or abate, he turns, he no longer loves.

Similarly the first Socratic lover loves the beloved's beauty if he loves at all. This lover cannot love the person for he commits with premeditated malice a variety of disservices to the person. All he can possibly love is the concrete beauty of the beloved.

The second Socratic lover is a far more complicated case. It is clear that he desires to indulge in the beauty of the beloved as is made clear by the insistence of his black steed. But this desire is not identified with his love. Quite the contrary; desire is virtually

a hindrance to the proper expression of love, as is made clear by the description of the charioteer's battle with the black steed. Socratic love cannot plausibly be a desire for the beloved as an object of sexual satisfaction nor even as an object of some sort of aesthetic gratification, although the latter is closer to the case.

What inspires the second Socratic lover to love is a "godlike face or bodily form that truly expresses beauty." (251) It is his presence to this expression of true beauty that makes the lover's wings grow. The joy that this presence brings makes the lover yearn for the beloved. Presumably at the outset the lover remembers little of his heavenly journey and the beauty he saw. All he knows is that in the presence of the beloved he is ecstatic, and, in the absence, the lover is in agony. Now what shall we say? Is the lover loving the beloved or the beauty of the beloved or true beauty? Is he deceived in believing that he loves the beloved? What's more, at least initially, the lover seems to be acting out of self-love; he is pursuing that which gives him pleasure, if so temperate a term may be used. Of course, this pleasure as Socrates characterizes it is no mere sensual indulgence; rather it is the joy at the soul's growth. Even so, this does not alter the fact that the lover's attraction to the beloved is self-serving. Few would be willing to condemn the lover's self-serving interest in the beloved. Though he desires the beloved for what the beloved can do for him, the lover desires to obtain spiritual growth from the beloved. Further, in part because the lover confuses the beloved's beauty with true beauty, the lover seems to have a misplaced reverence for the beloved. What ought to be

accorded to true beauty is accorded the beloved. With this reverence comes the chastity vouchsafed the devout lover. With it, too, comes the lover's unstinting attempts to foster the beloved's growth. This self-serving love, born of true beauty, is wholly benign. The reverence and devotion borrowed from true beauty insures that the lover acts not only in his ownbest interests but also in that of his beloved's. Without true beauty's inspiration the love is nothing more than a sordid affair.

Now he whose vision of the mystery is long past, or whose purity has been sullied, cannot pass swiftly hence to see beauty's self yonder, when he beholds that which is called beautiful here; wherefore he looks upon it with no reverence, and surrendering to pleasure he essays to go after the fashion of a four-footed beast, and to beget offspring of the flesh, or consorting with wantonness he has no fear nor shame in running after unnatural pleasure. (250e)

True beauty delivers the lover from mere lust and the satisfaction of hedonistic desires. Socrates seems to be saying that, when the lover desires the beloved as a man, then his desire can only be called lust, not love. But when the object of the lover's desire is true beauty, then the lover loves the beloved as the manifestation of true beauty. The object of love, then is not the beloved qua man but the beloved qua manifestation of true beauty.

If the object of love is the beloved as the manifestation of true beauty, what is the objective of love? Socrates tells us that our souls, in their heavenly sojourn, followed in the train of one god or another. It appears that Socrates accounts for our differences in personality by having our souls follow the appointed god literally in the heavenly journey and follow, figuratively, the nature of that god

on earth. Be this as it may, our patron god determines whom we come to love and how we comport ourselves toward everyone, but particularly the beloved. We choose a lover by finding someone who has the same patron god as we, who has the same disposition as we (these being the same for Socrates). Once followers of a certain god finds someone of similar disposition "and come to love him they do all in their power to foster that disposition." (252e) Socrates reiterates this point in the next paragraph.

Every lover is fain that his beloved should be of a nature like to his own god, and when he has won him, he leads him on to walk in the ways of their god, and after his likeness, patterning himself thereupon and giving counsel and discipline to the boy. There is no jealousy nor petty spitefulness in his dealings, but his every act is aimed at bringing the beloved to be every whit like unto himself and unto the god of their worship. (253b)

The objective of love is to fashion both lover and beloved into the mold of the god they worship insofar as that is humanly possible.

It is important to note that making the beloved into a more nearly perfect likeness of a god is not a simple didactic process. The lover, at least initially, is unaware of what he is really doing. He is not teaching from experience but is a fellow learner with the beloved. Speaking of the followers of a god, of the lovers who are attempting to foster a godly disposition in the beloved, Socrates says

And if they have not aforetime trodden this path, they now set out upon it, learning the way from any source that may offer or finding it for themselves, and as they follow up the trace within themselves of the nature of their own god their task is made easier, inasmuch as they are constrained to fix their gaze upon him, and reaching out after him in memory they are possessed by him, and from him they take their ways and manners of life, in so far as a man can partake of a god. (252e,253)

This is not a self-conscious task, as Socrates immediately notes that "...all this, mark you, they attribute to the beloved..." (253). The lover, inspired by the beautiful vestiges of the patron god in the beloved, is prompted to promote the growth of the vestiges. He does this by piecing together the traces of the god that reside in himself. By responding to the vestiges of the god in himself, he grows to be more like the god. What he draws from the god does not just enhance him; what he gains he pours out to the beloved and hence promotes the beloved's growth. The lover does "counsel and discipline" (253b), but this can hardly be an explicit counseling in the ways of the god since the lover attributes his own growth not to the god but to the beloved. The counseling must be what the lover knows consciously: such things as justice, moral responsibility and aesthetic appreciation. Presumably these teachings in turn would have (unbeknownst to the lover) their inspiration drawn from the god. As the process of mutual growth continues the beloved, as he is able, becomes an active part of this mutual growth contributing in much the same way as the lover.

What may have appeared at the outset as a beautiful, lyric myth has become, upon examination, quite complicated. The ecstatic sort of madness and the desire associated with love Socrates explains as the response to the beauty of the beloved. But neither the madness nor the desire is of the ordinary sort. The madness and desire are inspired not just by the beautiful body; this would be merely lust. They are inspired by the manifestation of true beauty in the beauty of the beloved. The lover, unaware of what has really inspired his madness and desires, attributes these emotions and emotional states to

the effect on him of the beloved pure and simple. The reverence he holds for the beloved by virtue of the beloved's manifesting true beauty prevents the lover from committing any untoward acts. The lover instead acts toward the beloved as if he were in the presence of a god. He must curb his carnal desires in order to pay homage to this "god." Without knowing it, the lover has chosen someone with the same disposition, who follows the same god as he. The image of this god and the beauty quicken his soul. His soul, reminded of its heavenly journey and of the god it followed, begins to grow. This growth provides growth to the beloved as well since the lover believes his growth is caused by his proximity to the beloved and therefore acts to return the gracious gift. The beloved, receiving these boons from the lover, responds in kind growing and giving as each increases in beauty and godliness.

2.3 Analysis I: Desire And Altruism

2.3.1 A Brief Analysis Of Desire

A primary non-cognitive reaction to the experience of value in the beloved by the lover is desire. All three of the lovers in the Phaedrus have this in common. That the lovers desire the beloved is not surprising; a fundamental characteristic of desire is that it is desire of something perceived as valuable and surely all of the lovers perceive the beloved as valuable. That desire is desire for something valuable can be most clearly seen in specific, circumscribed objects of desire and the desire attending them. I want (desire) this car because I perceive it as having some value--it is fast or luxurious or sleek. I have already placed value on speed, luxury or aesthetics and desire this car because I perceive it as having the quality I value. I want this tennis racket because it has good balance and I know the value of a well-balanced racket to my tennis game. I have always wanted a Van Gogh because I value (admire) his bold, dynamic use of color. Just as I may desire things, I may desire situations. In the summer heat I desire a cool, shady spot because I place value on my comfort. When I study, I want decent lighting because I know it is better for my eyes. Even more abstract situations may be desired. I want freedom of speech because I value self-expression. I want justice done because I value fair treatment of myself and my fellow man. I want understanding and tolerance for they are virtues without which society cannot endure.

From the simplest, most personal desires to the most abstract,

the desire is a desire for something valued. This, of course, does not mean that what is valued is of value to the person. I may rank a chocolate sundae as a top gustatory experience, but as a diabetic I must consider the sundae not only of no positive value but of negative value. What is valuable in some respect or another need not be what is valued. Desire is desire for what is valued and not necessarily for what is valuable. I may not even know what is best for me (what is valuable to my well-being), but I do have desires nonetheless and those desires are of something valued by me.

Perhaps the classic model for desire has been the personal appetitive desires. I want food or shelter or sex. When I say I want an ice cream cone or a new coat, I speak in two terms: me and the object desired. What is obscured in the two-term grammar of such declarations of desire is the distinction between who does the desiring and for whom the desiring is done. The elliptical forms "I want X" and "You desire Y" are convenient and efficient communicators in day to day interchanges. It is taken in such locutions that I desire X for me and that you want Y for you. And of course, this is often precisely what we mean. But there are a whole variety of cases in which the desirer and the person desired for are not the same. We are out shopping together. While looking over a rack of coats I exclaim "I want that one." Having noticed that I am looking at the size 44's and knowing that I wear a 40, you protest "But that's not your size." "Of course it isn't; I don't want it for me. I want it for my brother. His birthday's soon." The expanded form of the desire declaration here is "X wants Y for Z" where X is the desirer, Y

the object desired, and Z the person or thing for whom it is desired. When I want an ice cream cone, I want it for me. And you want a new dress for you. Yet I may want a dress for you (alternatively: I want you to have a dress) and you may want an ice cream cone for me (again: you want me to have an ice cream cone). Not only can we want something for someone, we can want something for something. I can want felicitous wording for the club constitution or an ornate facade for the opera house. Clearly there is no need for a desire to be reflexive; I do not have to want something for me. This possibility leaves the door open for altruistic desires, but it only opens the door. In determining an altruistic desire, why I desire X for Y is as important as the fact that I desire for Y.

The reasons for a desire can tell us as much about a desire as any aspect of the desire. Of course all desires have as their reason the object valued. I want an ice cream cone because I place some value on it. You want a new dress because you place value on your wardrobe. The "because" here simply functions to announce a category of objects valued by the desirer. Frequently we do give very minimal reasons for a desire. Why do I want a drink right now? I don't know I just do. All I can tell you about my urge for a drink is that I feel like one. The reason I give for my desire is nothing more than a restatement of it. I want because I want. I didn't think about wanting a drink. I just found myself wanting one.

But we give more interesting reasons for desiring than this. I want a new car because the old one is falling apart and gets lousy gas mileage, because I want to take my vacation in a comfortable vehicle,

because I promised the wife one this year if we could afford it.... The list could be endless. I do have reasons for some desires and those reasons can be complicated. I want to get my wife a new coat because she needs one and I want her to be well dressed and I love her and besides it may incline her favorably toward my buying the golf clubs I saw yesterday. Our reasons for a desire can range from the sophisticated to the virtually non-existent.

How sophisticated our reasons are is a measure of how rational our desires are. But the rationality of a desire is not an indication of its altruism. You see an elderly woman trying to mount some stairs with a package as you pass by in your car. You find yourself wanting to help her. Why? Because she needed it? Because you wanted to? But you probably did not want to because of some well thought out convictions about the role of the elderly in 20th Century American society. We may all want to help some charity or another because we think we ought to do our part, because of a rationally held belief. Yet all of our altruistic desires need not be of this sort. To desire altruistically requires that the desire is not reflexive but does not require a rational set of reasons for the desire.

2.3.2 Loving for oneself

Amidst the variables of desire where does Plato's love fall? Socrates tells us that the lover, upon meeting the beloved, is struck by the beloved's beauty, a beauty that makes the lover's soul's wings begin to grow. It is the pleasure of feeling his wings grow through the agency of the beauty of the beloved that the lover seeks.

At last she [the soul] does behold him, and lets the flood pour in upon her, releasing the imprisoned waters; then has she refreshment and respite from her stings and sufferings, and at that moment tastes a pleasure that is sweet beyond compare. Nor will she willingly give it up. (251e)

Socrates is realist enough to acknowledge that his lover, as much if not more than any other man, experiences sensual desires. His description of the soul as having both black and white, evil and good horses, attests to this. But while he admits that the lover has sensual desires, he does not consider these desires to be a beneficial part of love. They are to be fought and controlled. The Socratic lover, for all his sensual passion, is chaste.

It is not clear in Socrates' initial description (251) whether the lover at the outset of love is struck by just the spiritual desire to behold the beauty of the beloved or by a combination of sensual and spiritual desires. In his subsequent discussion of the charioteer and his horses, Socrates acknowledges the presence of both the black and white steeds from the first approach to the beloved as he must since both are permanent constituents of the soul. Yet his first description has the lover's soul struck by the beauty of the beloved in a wholly noble and pure beginning of love.

Presumably Plato's response to this ambiguity in the text would be to explain the differences as differences in emphasis. In his description of the onset of love Socrates wishes to distinguish the lover from the wanton man. Here Socrates compares the wanton man's purely sensual desire to the lover's spiritual desire. That is not to say that the lover does not have sensual desires, just that he has

more than sensual desires. When Socrates considers the lover alone he acknowledges both sensual and spiritual desires.

Since Socrates finds the wanton man's desire for sensual pleasures base and ignoble, he must condemn the lover's desire for sensual pleasure as well. And so he does. It is not that he finds having only sensual desires objectionable; having sensual desires, along with more noble ones, are no less objectionable. Sensual desires are, without qualification, of negative worth. Even if the lover is suffused with the light of true beauty, his nobler parts cannot transmute the sensual desire into anything praiseworthy. Not only are sensual desires totally and completely corrupt without redemption, even the lover who fosters his nobler parts is condemned to contend with his black steed for all eternity.

Socrates emphasizes the lover's struggle for nobler virtues, but even as the lover desires the beautiful so too does he desire the sensual. Though he is called upon to overcome the desire, the lover does have a sensual desire for the beloved. He wants the beloved for the express purpose of sensual gratification. Just as the wanton man wants the beloved so that he may enjoy the beauty for himself, so does the lover. One of the lover's desires, then, is the self-aggrandizing desire for pleasure. He wants the beloved's beauty for his own enjoyment, and he presumably wants because the beauty is pleasurable.

Socrates condemns this desire on the part of the lover. We might surmise that he condemns it because it 1) is self-serving and 2) is no more rational than any appetitive desire. I, the lover, want for me and I want for no better reason than it feels good. Socrates could

find this objectionable, first, because the desire is self-aggrandizing and does not have the altruistic character of X wanting Y for Z ($X \neq Z$), and second, because, as a proponent of rational discourse, Socrates would likely not find "I want X because it will give me pleasure" adequate justification for wanting X. It might well be that while X feels good to me, it is not good for me. The distinction between appearance and reality was hardly foreign to Socrates. Being a strong proponent, of it he could hardly be satisfied with a justification that left off at the level of appearances.

Socrates might argue in this vein, but I think not. If Socrates so argued, he would be in the uncomfortable position of criticizing his spiritual desires on the same grounds as the sensual desires. The lover has sensual desires of the form "I want the beloved for me because he will please me." His spiritual desires have the same form: "I want the beloved for me because he will please me." The lover finds that in the presence of the beloved he experiences something like pleasure but perhaps closer to ecstasy or rapture. In any case he finds the experience pleasurable notwithstanding the pain accompanying the sprouting of his wings. Whatever pain (in addition to the pleasure) the presence to the beloved causes, it is nothing compared to the anguish of the beloved's absence. And so the lover seeks out the beloved to assuage the anguish and to revel in the ecstasy. But note that what he desires is for himself. It is his anguish he wishes to relieve and his own ecstatic experience he wishes to have. This may be spiritual pleasure and pain, but it is his and

he seeks out one and attempts to avoid the other. Very much like the wanton man, the lover seeks out his own gratification, albeit spiritual. Socrates, then, could hardly condemn the wanton man of ego-centrism and praise the lover who is no more altruistic. The wanton man and the lover may want different things, but they both want them for themselves.

The lover's spiritual desires are for himself, but why? What reasons does he offer for this desire? Socrates gives only hints. The description of the lover in the first throes of love does not lead one to believe that the lover has any but the simplest reasons: he wants to be in the beloved's company because he finds it spiritually pleasurable. Yet, as the love grows the lover's reasons for desiring seem to become more complicated as will be seen later. But the initial stages of love seem marked with a lack of reason. The beloved, as he in turn begins to love, finds himself in much the same position as the lover originally did. Socrates describes the first pulses of love in the beloved in the following way. "So he loves, yet knows not what he loves; he does not understand, he cannot tell what has come upon him...." (255d) In all fairness to Plato, it must be acknowledged that this passage is followed by a description of the beloved's growing sensual desires for the lover, yet the word "love" is used and seems to apply to the total experience described in the passage. The conclusion I draw is that neither the lover nor beloved initially has any more reason for his spiritual desire than that the presence of the beloved pleases him. If this is true, then Socrates once again finds his lover in the same position as the wanton man.

Each wants for himself and for no more sophisticated reason than the beloved's beauty pleases him.

If the lover and the wanton man both want for themselves because it feels good, what then distinguishes them? The answer must be that what distinguishes them is the nature of what they desire and of their own character that prompts them to love one thing rather than another. Wanting sensual pleasure is the product of the base and ignoble elements of one's character. When these elements are all that comprise the character, the result is a wanton man who only desires sensual delights, the base and ignoble counterparts in the world to his depraved character.

The lover, of course, is of good character. His good character prompts him to desire good and noble things. Socrates deems the sensual bad and the spiritual good and hence it follows that his lover, being of good character, desires what is good--spiritual elevation and the pleasure gained therefrom.

Socrates' description of the first pulses of love compares well with standard descriptions of this phase. Not only is the lover struck and driven to distraction by his love, he finds himself desiring the beloved more than any thing in the world. He wants the beloved for himself because he is in ecstasy when the beloved is near. What the lover knows, what is most apparent to him, is that the beloved is an extraordinary source of pleasure, so great that nothing can compare to it. The superlatives of love are reserved for this stage when you make me happier than I ever knew was possible, and she is delirious with joy. The glowing metaphors of love bespeak the joy

the lover receives from beholding the beloved. It is the lover's own consummate pleasure that draws him to the beloved. "I cannot be happy without you." "You almost make the day begin." The lover is most aware of his own joy and is convinced that he has been graced. The lover, in the midst of his ecstasy, acts for his own benefit--or what he sees as his own benefit. And further, that the pleasures of love are truly a boon is self-evident to the lover; he sees no further reason for loving than the feelings he experiences. His experiences are palpably and thoroughly good. So overwhelming and complete is love that it is inconceivable that it could be other than it appears. Hence it needs no examination or justification; the experience is self-justifying or perhaps is above justification. It is clear and distinct, so pure and lucid that questioning it is as absurd as asking whether my hands are before me.

Socrates, then, has captured at least some important features of the onset of love. The delirium of love's first blush, the extraordinary value placed on the beloved, the desire for the beloved that knows only itself and knows no reason, all these bespeak the man rapt with himself, captured by the beginning of love, but this is surely not its end. There are times when love dies with the madness and so death and disillusionment are its end, but there are also loves that develop. Love, as Plato knows, may grow from madness' breathtaking flights. Though Socrates speaks only briefly of this state, I believe that Plato sees the development of love as more important than its onset. It is in the growth of love that the lover develops. He becomes wise and godlike. These are virtues that

Socrates can heartily endorse. The onset of love may give the lover experience beyond compare, but the development of love gives the lover character beyond value.

2.3 Analysis I: Desire And Altruism

2.3.1 A Brief Analysis Of Desire

A primary non-cognitive reaction to the experience of value in the beloved by the lover is desire. All three of the lovers in the Phaedrus have this in common. That the lovers desire the beloved is not surprising; a fundamental characteristic of desire is that it is desire of something perceived as valuable and surely all of the lovers perceive the beloved as valuable. That desire is desire for something valuable can be most clearly seen in specific, circumscribed objects of desire and the desire attending them. I want (desire) this car because I perceive it as having some value--it is fast or luxurious or sleek. I have already placed value on speed, luxury or aesthetics and desire this car because I perceive it as having the quality I value. I want this tennis racket because it has good balance and I know the value of a well-balanced racket to my tennis game. I have always wanted a Van Gogh because I value (admire) his bold, dynamic use of color. Just as I may desire things, I may desire situations. In the summer heat I desire a cool, shady spot because I place value on my comfort. When I study, I want decent lighting because I know it is better for my eyes. Even more abstract situations may be desired. I want freedom of speech because I value self-expression. I want justice done because I value fair treatment of myself and my fellow man. I want understanding and tolerance for they are virtues without which society cannot endure.

From the simplest, most personal desires to the most abstract,

the desire is a desire for something valued. This, of course, does not mean that what is valued is of value to the person. I may rank a chocolate sundae as a top gustatory experience, but as a diabetic I must consider the sundae not only of no positive value but of negative value. What is valuable in some respect or another need not be what is valued. Desire is desire for what is valued and not necessarily for what is valuable. I may not even know what is best for me (what is valuable to my well-being), but I do have desires nonetheless and those desires are of something valued by me.

Perhaps the classic model for desire has been the personal appetitive desires. I want food or shelter or sex. When I say I want an ice cream cone or a new coat, I speak in two terms: me and the object desired. What is obscured in the two-term grammar of such declarations of desire is the distinction between who does the desiring and for whom the desiring is done. The elliptical forms "I want X" and "You desire Y" are convenient and efficient communicators in day to day interchanges. It is taken in such locutions that I desire X for me and that you want Y for you. And of course, this is often precisely what we mean. But there are a whole variety of cases in which the desirer and the person desired for are not the same. We are out shopping together. While looking over a rack of coats I exclaim "I want that one." Having noticed that I am looking at the size 44's and knowing that I wear a 40, you protest "But that's not your size." "Of course it isn't; I don't want it for me. I want it for my brother. His birthday's soon." The expanded form of the desire declaration here is "X wants Y for Z" where X is the desirer, Y

the object desired, and Z the person or thing for whom it is desired. When I want an ice cream cone, I want it for me. And you want a new dress for you. Yet I may want a dress for you (alternatively: I want you to have a dress) and you may want an ice cream cone for me (again: you want me to have an ice cream cone). Not only can we want something for someone, we can want something for something. I can want felicitous wording for the club constitution or an ornate facade for the opera house. Clearly there is no need for a desire to be reflexive; I do not have to want something for me. This possibility leaves the door open for altruistic desires, but it only opens the door. In determining an altruistic desire, why I desire X for Y is as important as the fact that I desire for Y.

The reasons for a desire can tell us as much about a desire as any aspect of the desire. Of course all desires have as their reason the object valued. I want an ice cream cone because I place some value on it. You want a new dress because you place value on your wardrobe. The "because" here simply functions to announce a category of objects valued by the desirer. Frequently we do give very minimal reasons for a desire. Why do I want a drink right now? I don't know I just do. All I can tell you about my urge for a drink is that I feel like one. The reason I give for my desire is nothing more than a restatement of it. I want because I want. I didn't think about wanting a drink. I just found myself wanting one.

But we give more interesting reasons for desiring than this. I want a new car because the old one is falling apart and gets lousy gas mileage, because I want to take my vacation in a comfortable vehicle,

because I promised the wife one this year if we could afford it.... The list could be endless. I do have reasons for some desires and those reasons can be complicated. I want to get my wife a new coat because she needs one and I want her to be well dressed and I love her and besides it may incline her favorably toward my buying the golf clubs I saw yesterday. Our reasons for a desire can range from the sophisticated to the virtually non-existent.

How sophisticated our reasons are is a measure of how rational our desires are. But the rationality of a desire is not an indication of its altruism. You see an elderly woman trying to mount some stairs with a package as you pass by in your car. You find yourself wanting to help her. Why? Because she needed it? Because you wanted to? But you probably did not want to because of some well thought out convictions about the role of the elderly in 20th Century American society. We may all want to help some charity or another because we think we ought to do our part, because of a rationally held belief. Yet all of our altruistic desires need not be of this sort. To desire altruistically requires that the desire is not reflexive but does not require a rational set of reasons for the desire.

2.3.2 Loving for oneself

Amidst the variables of desire where does Plato's love fall? Socrates tells us that the lover, upon meeting the beloved, is struck by the beloved's beauty, a beauty that makes the lover's soul's wings begin to grow. It is the pleasure of feeling his wings grow through the agency of the beauty of the beloved that the lover seeks.

At last she [the soul] does behold him, and lets the flood pour in upon her, releasing the imprisoned waters; then has she refreshment and respite from her stings and sufferings, and at that moment tastes a pleasure that is sweet beyond compare. Nor will she willingly give it up. (251e)

Socrates is realist enough to acknowledge that his lover, as much if not more than any other man, experiences sensual desires. His description of the soul as having both black and white, evil and good horses, attests to this. But while he admits that the lover has sensual desires, he does not consider these desires to be a beneficial part of love. They are to be fought and controlled. The Socratic lover, for all his sensual passion, is chaste.

It is not clear in Socrates' initial description (251) whether the lover at the outset of love is struck by just the spiritual desire to behold the beauty of the beloved or by a combination of sensual and spiritual desires. In his subsequent discussion of the charioteer and his horses, Socrates acknowledges the presence of both the black and white steeds from the first approach to the beloved as he must since both are permanent constituents of the soul. Yet his first description has the lover's soul struck by the beauty of the beloved in a wholly noble and pure beginning of love.

Presumably Plato's response to this ambiguity in the text would be to explain the differences as differences in emphasis. In his description of the onset of love Socrates wishes to distinguish the lover from the wanton man. Here Socrates compares the wanton man's purely sensual desire to the lover's spiritual desire. That is not to say that the lover does not have sensual desires, just that he has

more than sensual desires. When Socrates considers the lover alone he acknowledges both sensual and spiritual desires.

Since Socrates finds the wanton man's desire for sensual pleasures base and ignoble, he must condemn the lover's desire for sensual pleasure as well. And so he does. It is not that he finds having only sensual desires objectionable; having sensual desires, along with more noble ones, are no less objectionable. Sensual desires are, without qualification, of negative worth. Even if the lover is suffused with the light of true beauty, his nobler parts cannot transmute the sensual desire into anything praiseworthy. Not only are sensual desires totally and completely corrupt without redemption, even the lover who fosters his nobler parts is condemned to contend with his black steed for all eternity.

Socrates emphasizes the lover's struggle for nobler virtues, but even as the lover desires the beautiful so too does he desire the sensual. Though he is called upon to overcome the desire, the lover does have a sensual desire for the beloved. He wants the beloved for the express purpose of sensual gratification. Just as the wanton man wants the beloved so that he may enjoy the beauty for himself, so does the lover. One of the lover's desires, then, is the self-aggrandizing desire for pleasure. He wants the beloved's beauty for his own enjoyment, and he presumably wants because the beauty is pleasurable.

Socrates condemns this desire on the part of the lover. We might surmise that he condemns it because it 1) is self-serving and 2) is no more rational than any appetitive desire. I, the lover, want for me and I want for no better reason than it feels good. Socrates could

find this objectionable, first, because the desire is self-aggrandizing and does not have the altruistic character of X wanting Y for Z ($X \neq Z$), and second, because, as a proponent of rational discourse, Socrates would likely not find "I want X because it will give me pleasure" adequate justification for wanting X. It might well be that while X feels good to me, it is not good for me. The distinction between appearance and reality was hardly foreign to Socrates. Being a strong proponent, of it he could hardly be satisfied with a justification that left off at the level of appearances.

Socrates might argue in this vein, but I think not. If Socrates so argued, he would be in the uncomfortable position of criticizing his spiritual desires on the same grounds as the sensual desires. The lover has sensual desires of the form "I want the beloved for me because he will please me." His spiritual desires have the same form: "I want the beloved for me because he will please me." The lover finds that in the presence of the beloved he experiences something like pleasure but perhaps closer to ecstasy or rapture. In any case he finds the experience pleasurable notwithstanding the pain accompanying the sprouting of his wings. Whatever pain (in addition to the pleasure) the presence to the beloved causes, it is nothing compared to the anguish of the beloved's absence. And so the lover seeks out the beloved to assuage the anguish and to revel in the ecstasy. But note that what he desires is for himself. It is his anguish he wishes to relieve and his own ecstatic experience he wishes to have. This may be spiritual pleasure and pain, but it is his and

he seeks out one and attempts to avoid the other. Very much like the wanton man, the lover seeks out his own gratification, albeit spiritual. Socrates, then, could hardly condemn the wanton man of ego-centrism and praise the lover who is no more altruistic. The wanton man and the lover may want different things, but they both want them for themselves.

The lover's spiritual desires are for himself, but why? What reasons does he offer for this desire? Socrates gives only hints. The description of the lover in the first throes of love does not lead one to believe that the lover has any but the simplest reasons: he wants to beloved's company because he finds it spiritually pleasurable. Yet, as the love grows the lover's reason's for desiring seem to become more complicated as will be seen later. But the initial stages of love seem marked with a lack of reason. The beloved, as he in turn begins to love, finds himself in much the same position as the lover originally did. Socrates describes the first pulses of love in the beloved in the following way. "So he loves, yet knows not what he loves; he does not understand, he cannot tell what has come upon him...." (255d) In all fairness to Plato, it must be acknowledged that this passage is followed by a description of the beloved's growing sensual desires for the lover, yet the word "love" is used and seems to apply to the total experience described in the passage. The conclusion I draw is that neither the lover nor beloved initially has any more reason for his spiritual desire than that the presence of the beloved pleases him. If this is true, then Socrates once again finds his lover in the same position as the wanton man.

Each wants for himself and for no more sophisticated reason than the beloved's beauty pleases him.

If the lover and the wanton man both want for themselves because it feels good, what then distinguishes them? The answer must be that what distinguishes them is the nature of what they desire and of their own character that prompts them to love one thing rather than another. Wanting sensual pleasure is the product of the base and ignoble elements of one's character. When these elements are all that comprise the character, the result is a wanton man who only desires sensual delights, the base and ignoble counterparts in the world to his depraved character.

The lover, of course, is of good character. His good character prompts him to desire good and noble things. Socrates deems the sensual bad and the spiritual good and hence it follows that his lover, being of good character, desires what is good--spiritual elevation and the pleasure gained therefrom.

Socrates' description of the first pulses of love compares well with standard descriptions of this phase. Not only is the lover struck and driven to distraction by his love, he finds himself desiring the beloved more than any thing in the world. He wants the beloved for himself because he is in ecstasy when the beloved is near. What the lover knows, what is most apparent to him, is that the beloved is an extraordinary source of pleasure, so great that nothing can compare to it. The superlatives of love are reserved for this stage when you make me happier than I ever knew was possible, and she is delirious with joy. The glowing metaphors of love bespeak the joy

the lover receives from beholding the beloved. It is the lover's own consummate pleasure that draws him to the beloved. "I cannot be happy without you." "You almost make the day begin." The lover is most aware of his own joy and is convinced that he has been graced. The lover, in the midst of his ecstasy, acts for his own benefit--or what he sees as his own benefit. And further, that the pleasures of love are truly a boon is self-evident to the lover; he sees no further reason for loving than the feelings he experiences. His experiences are palpably and thoroughly good. So overwhelming and complete is love that it is inconceivable that it could be other than it appears. Hence it needs no examination or justification; the experience is self-justifying or perhaps is above justification. It is clear and distinct, so pure and lucid that questioning it is as absurd as asking whether my hands are before me.

Socrates, then, has captured at least some important features of the onset of love. The delirium of love's first blush, the extraordinary value placed on the beloved, the desire for the beloved that knows only itself and knows no reason, all these bespeak the man rapt with himself, captured by the beginning of love, but this is surely not its end. There are times when love dies with the madness and so death and disillusionment are its end, but there are also loves that develop. Love, as Plato knows, may grow from madness' breathtaking flights. Though Socrates speaks only briefly of this state, I believe that Plato sees the development of love as more important than its onset. It is in the growth of love that the lover develops. He becomes wise and godlike. These are virtues that

Socrates can heartily endorse. The onset of love may give the lover experience beyond compare, but the development of love gives the lover character beyond value.

2.4 ANALYSIS II: THE SEARCH FOR ALTRUISM

2.4.1 Love unto Wisdom

Near the beginning of Socrates' first speech is a discussion of love and desire. After admitting that love is some sort of desire and that men do desire that which is fair without being lovers, the first Socratic lover asks how we are to distinguish the lover from the non-lover. To answer his own question the first lover draws a distinction:

...there are two sorts of ruling or guiding principles that we follow. One is an innate desire for pleasure, the other an acquired judgment that aims at what is best. (237d)"

He goes on to elaborate.

Sometimes these internal guides are in accord, sometimes at variance; now one gains the mastery, now the other. And when judgment guides us rationally toward what is best, and has the mastery, that mastery is called temperance, but when desire drags us irrationally toward pleasure, and has come to rule within us, the name given to that rule is wantonness. (237d-e, 238a)

He points out that there are many names for wantonness and that

When irrational desire, pursuing the enjoyment of beauty, has gained the mastery over judgment that prompts to right conduct, and has acquired from other desires, akin to it, fresh strength to strain toward bodily beauty, that very strength provides it with its name--it is the strong passion called love. (238b-c)

When Socrates recants his first speech and produces his second lover, he does not immediately appear to use the distinction drawn in his first speech. He argues that there are beneficial madnesses and that love is one of them. Yet he has not so much rejected the distinction as recast it. He is no more favorably disposed toward desire's

satisfaction for its own sake in the second speech than in the first. This he condemns fairly explicitly in both speeches. And in each he offers up reason as a guiding principle. What Socrates denies in the second speech is that great desire is incompatible with reason. In fact he claims reason reaches its apogee when it is propelled by the all consuming desire of love.

If we left our second Socratic lover with his madness and desire, we would have a case of little more than infatuation. The lover would be much like the child who is fascinated with the glittering lights of a Christmas tree. Socrates has more in mind for his lover than divinely inspired madness. The good character that leads the lover to want more than sexual gratification also leads him to perfect that character and that of his beloved's through the inspiration of divine, mad love.

Socrates explains the differences in human character by telling us that we followed different gods in our heavenly journey. This explanation serves, not only to explain why Paul is more bellicose than Bill and why Sally is more demure than Betty, but also how each of us is in some respect and degree like a god. It is important to see that this is a two pronged explanation. One prong allows for the foundation of a rudimentary theory of personality based on characterological differences. This part of the explanation is very much a part of the practice of modern science; there is an attempt to explain the facts as they are without recourse to evaluation. Things are as they are because of certain factors. Good, bad or indifferent these factors determine the facts. No value judgment is being made,

only an attempt to explain pure and simple.

But Socrates' explanation is not just an elementary scientific theory. It is also a philosophical theory of how humans evaluate themselves and how, whatever the differences in character explained by any scientific theory, humans through this evaluation improve themselves. Our characterological models in the Phaedrus are, after all, gods, and since we are built on a godly model, it is reasonable to expect us to approach that godly model more and more nearly through the course of our lives. Of course we don't all perfect ourselves as we age and Socrates acknowledges this by admitting that the wanton man exists. Socrates is more than aware that some men are more fallen than others. Nonetheless he maintains our ability to approach a god-like state. Fallen souls though we may be, we still retain a vestige of our god-like character.

There may be other ways to regain our godliness, but in the Phaedrus Socrates advocates love as a means to this end. I think it would be granted on all hands that being in love prompts us to put our best foot forward, but Socrates has something more than simple posturing in mind. The appearance of a "god-like face or bodily form that truly expresses beauty" (251a) brings the lover to "veneration and worship." (252d) For the sake of this godly beauty the lover draws upon his resources literally to make himself better. And the resource he has at his disposal is his own god-like character.

Perhaps it is well to pause a moment now to comment on Socrates' use of the words "veneration" and "worship." These are part of a group of words, including adoration and reverence, that describe an

attitude of honor and awe at the sacredness or the divine quality of the object. The group is particularly appropriate to Socrates' description of the lover. The lover has perceived the divine or sacred in the beloved and is properly in awe of it. He honors the divine and gives it respect. What other attitude can be conceived for a person who has seen beauty, who has seen a god? The lover has transcended the mundane to find something far above the ordinary routine of life. If you were to find beauty amidst squalor and banality, would you not treasure that discovery? Surely this is what the lover has found. Whether in French or English, he tells his beloved that he adores her. He says that he worships the very ground on which she walks. So it seems that Socrates is right; the lover has caught sight of the divine and is struck with awe and reverence for his discovery.

Yet in the Phaedrus these are but a few well placed words. Socrates does not pursue the topic. And since he does not, I will not at this point, but reserve it for a latter discussion.

What is important at the moment is to see that the lover, having been struck by beauty, venerates it and in his veneration is drawn to fulfill the divinity in his own character. This is not a case of one man making another what he is today. The beloved is not an agent in the ordinary sense; he does not consciously or unconsciously act to inform the character of the beloved. In fact he does not act at all. He simply is. He is beautiful and he is divine, and that is quite enough for the lover. In the presence of the divine and beautiful the lover takes it upon himself to fashion himself after that divinity.

(Remember that for Socrates the divinity of the lover is of the same type as that of the beloved; they are followers of the same god.) It is by being divine and beautiful that the beloved acts as a catalyst for the lover's improvement. In the beloved's catalytic role the lover can preserve his integrity. He has not been created by the beloved; he is not the product of the beloved's tutelage. He is the product of his own character. He improves and becomes more divine because he began with a good (godly) character. The beloved provides only the source of inspiration through which the betterment occurred. In some way all Plato is saying is that we improve when exposed to good circumstances with the proviso that we must be aware of the goodness to be influenced by its presence. Being provided with good circumstances does not cause us to improve; it allows us to improve. Perhaps there is no precise way to describe the relation of lover and beloved. Perhaps we would have to resort to a Heideggerian rejection of the subject-object split to talk of the relationship accurately. For present purposes, though, it is enough to recognize that the lover-beloved relationship falls into that vast expanse between a causal interaction between lover and the beloved and a merely gratuitous presence of the beloved to the lover. The beloved does not cause the lover to improve; neither is the beloved superfluous to the lover's improvement.

Yet where is the altruism in the lover's self-improvement? The beloved is certainly not acting altruistically. From the forgoing description he cannot be said to be acting at all. And even if the beloved's gift of inspiration to the lover could be considered an act

of giving to another, it does not fit the criteria for an altruistic act. For an act to be altruistic the actor must be consciously acting in another's behalf. The tree that provides nesting space for birds and squirrels is not acting altruistically. The earthworm whose castings nourish plants is not altruistic. Neither is the man who loses a dollar on the street only to be found by a starving man. Fortuitous circumstances yes, altruistic no. The act must be conscious to be altruistic. I must give to you or do for you because I think what I give or do is in your own best interest. This consciousness need not be self-consciousness, though. I do not have to think "I am going to do this for the other's welfare" for the act to be altruistic. The man who rushes out in the street to save a small child from an on-rushing auto can be said to be altruistic, yet he acts too quickly to be self-conscious. What he has done is act intentionally (which requires consciousness) for the other's welfare. On these conditions the beloved cannot be acting altruistically.

The flames of love may be fanned and the lover fast upon self-improvement and the beloved not even be aware the lover is alive. The beloved cannot be said to be acting altruistically because he lacks the intention to so act. Can the lover be acting altruistically for his part?

Neither in the inspiration he receives from the beloved nor in the self-improvement he fosters in himself is the lover altruistic. He is altruistic, however, in his actions that follow in the wake of the inspiration and the self-improvement. Socrates tells us that the lover is unaware that his self-improvement is the consequence of

drawing on his own resources and that he attributes his improvement to the beloved, albeit mistakenly. As a result the lover behaves toward the beloved as if the beloved was the source of the lover's improvement. "But all this, mark you, they attribute to the beloved, and the draughts which they draw from Zeus they pour out, like bacchants, into the soul of the beloved...." (253a) Here is the lover's altruism. He intentionally acts in the beloved's own best interests; he creates in the beloved "the closest possible likeness to the god they worship." (253a) The lover acts to promote the growth of the beloved. This is not the apparent good of pleasure, but the real good of personal growth. The lover does not pander to the beloved. He does not, like an obsequious servant, cater to the beloved's every whim. His love reaches beyond any apparent good to the actual good of self-improvement.

The lover has passed through the self-centeredness and self-indulgence of the beginnings of love to altruism. The lover, mistaking his own achievements in self-improvement as being caused by the beloved, acts to repay the non-existent debt to the beloved by giving the beloved the same growth the lover himself has experienced. The beloved presumably finally succumbs to the lover's attentions and begins to love. The beloved in turn becomes a lover and, with the same experiences and motivations the lover, comes to act in the lover's best interests. With this reciprocal love of self-improvement, Socrates' tale of love comes to an end. The lovers, if they both have conquered their dark horse, "have won self-mastery and inward peace. And when life is over, with burdens shed and wings

recovered they stand victorious in the first of the three rounds in that truly Olympic struggle...." (256b)

It has been argued by Gregory Vlastos² and Harry Neuman³, among others, that Platonic love is self-serving and not altruistic. To defend their claim they have appealed to the Symposium and in particular Diotima's speech. If the Symposium is kept in mind, then Vlastos and Neuman's position is defensible; the Symposium does concentrate on the lover's self-serving interests. Even the Phaedrus is not a paean to altruism, but I believe I have shown that there is at least a shred of altruistic concern in the Phaedrus. It is not so much a question of whether altruism plays a role in the story of love in the Phaedrus as a question of accuracy. However much we may wish altruism to be the central feature of love, however much we might condemn Plato for not emphasizing it, how much a part of love is altruism and how well has Plato characterized that part?

The first question is whether love can encompass other than altruistic desires. Using the schematic for desire mention earlier, there are at least four possibilities: 1) I love you and desire someone or something for myself (reflexive desire), 2) I love you and desire something for you (if that something is for your well being, then this is an altruistic desire), 3) I love you and desire something for us (combined altruistic and reflexive desires), 4) I love you and desire something for someone or something other than either of us (a desire unrelated to my love for you). The second and fourth cases are the least problematic. I don't believe anyone would question my love for you if I concomitantly desired the recovery of an ill friend or

the preservation of a national landmark, to mention only a couple possible desires falling into the fourth category. The second possibility seems an even more obvious combination of love and desire. Not only is the desire compatible with my love for you, altruistic desires for you seem to be a necessary part of my love for you; I could not properly claim to love you if I did not desire (something like) your health and personal growth. The common notion of love seems to require that I want some good things for you if I love you. If I do not want some good things for you, then I might well be told that I don't understand what love is or that I am a damn liar. Altruistic desires for the beloved appears to be an integral part of the notion of love.

My reflexive desires as a lover are more problematic. My wanting to further my career and my love for you, may be incompatible if, for instance, furthering my career interferes with my attempt to achieve my altruistic desires toward you. But it is possible that I can have altruistic desires for you and desire career advancement for myself. The practical course of things may find these desires incompatible, but not necessarily. And a possibility is all that is necessary: it is possible that I desire such things as career advancements for myself and love you. My love and my reflexive desires are not incompatible in the same way that my desire to hurt and to help you in the same respect at the same time are.

My desire for career advancement may concern the beloved directly in a variety of ways, but some of my reflexive desires concern the beloved far more intimately. I want to feast my eyes on you and have

sex with you. Now not only am I claiming to love you and to have reflexive desires, you are the object of those reflexive desires. Yet there does not seem to be anything necessarily incompatible with loving you and having reflexive (sexual) desires of which you are the object. I can have sexual desires for you and not love you--the most common term for this is "lust"--and if I have only sexual desires for you then we would not ordinarily classify my desire as love at all. But I can love you and desire you so long as my desire does not take a form that is detrimental to your well being. The only clearly incompatible desires are desires to hurt you and benefit you at the same time in the same respect. I may wish to satisfy my sexual desires and yours at the same time; here there is no incompatibility. But if satisfying my sexual desires means mortifying you then my sexual desires of that sort cannot be a part of my love for you.

Considerations of sex leads us to the third category, my wanting for us. If I want a beautiful home, a meaningful relationship, or passionate sex for us, I can still love you. Indeed we often take such desires as indicative of love. And again there seems to be no problem with both loving you and desiring for us so long as what I want for us does you no harm.

This discussion of the four categories of love and desire yields the following results. When we love, we must have some altruistic desires toward the beloved. We may have (and usually do) have desires for others and for ourselves, and these need not be incompatible with our love so long as they do not conflict with our basic altruistic desires toward the beloved. The lover may even have desires for both

himself and the beloved, but again the stipulation is that these cannot be incompatible with the altruistic desires for the beloved. Finally, sexual desires, as a special case of reflexive desires, can be compatible with love so long as they are compatible with basic altruistic desires for the well being of the beloved. There is, then, a wide range of desires possible when we love so far as the logical possibilities are concerned. Of course practical consideration may limit these desires and their compatibility radically, but to this point we have only considered the logical possibilities. Now the question of whether Plato's description of love is accurate with regard to desires and altruism can be evaluated with some precision.

One thing should be clear from the outset: Plato, like many romantic novelists, emphasizes the first throes of love. A romantic novel describes to us the trials lovers must overcome to be together and, if there is no tragic end, the novel ends in some version of "And they lived happily ever after." So too, Plato tells us of the initial stages of love, describing to us the battle that leads to love's success, only to leave us with an ellipse. The description of the living out of the tried love is sketched in only a few sentences. I suppose that Plato takes it that we all know what it is like, through mutual love, to grow in knowledge, wisdom, beauty, and truth or, if we don't, that we will by the time we pass through the initial stages of love as he prescribes. What we must get clear, it seems, is what it takes to get to that nourishing mutual love. This emphasis on the onset of love might well produce a lack of emphasis on the altruistic elements of love since we would expect the altruism to be most evident

in the day to day acts of an established mutual love. And indeed, such an emphasis is just what we find in the Phaedrus. Primarily Socrates addresses what the lover wants for himself.

Plato's position that the lover first wants for himself is not contradicted by the lore of love. Tales of love frequently tell of the lover's desire for the beloved. He wants the beloved as his own. To have the beloved is his goal, one which he will achieve at nearly any price. The desire for self-gratification may not characterize the onset of every love, but it does describe a sufficient number of cases that we would grant are love to conclude that reflexive desires can be, often are a part of the initial stages of love. Since the facts of the matter are that love does include self-serving desires, we can hardly fault Plato for acknowledging these and indeed for giving a vivid description of them. The reflexive desires, like all desires, are based on the perception of value in the thing desired. To ask that someone desire for another without at the same time desiring for himself requires that the lover be blind to the value of the beloved for himself. To ask that the lover only desire altruistically is to ask that he both value the other (so that he may want for the other) and not value the other (as in any way capable of gratifying the lover). This is not logically impossible because in both valuing and not valuing the same person the lover may be valuing in different respects. I somehow recognize your value as a person and desire what is good for you yet also recognize that what makes you valuable as a person is of no particular value (use?) to me.

This possibility is hard to conceive. If I come to value you as

a person, I am hard pressed to find circumstances under which I would not wish to enjoy this value at all, in any way, at any time. It is as simple as this: if I thought that you were a wonderful person, how could I help but want to be around you and enjoy you--for my own gratification? I admit that this psychological urge to want what I value is not logically necessary, but the connection between what I value and what I desire is frequent and compelling. Plato in describing the desire of the lover is no more than recognizing a common state of affairs between what I value and what I desire. If I love you, then I value you, and if I value you, then it is very likely that I will desire you for my own gratification.

Plato goes on to claim that, while perfectly natural and ordinary, my sexual desires for you are in conflict with my love for you. This conflict is grounded in his claim that the satisfaction of sexual desires are not beneficial for either the lover or the beloved. And sexual desires are not beneficial because they keep the lover's attention on the corruptible, corporeal world rather than on that which is intrinsically valuable--truth and beauty themselves. A person is loved in so far as he is a manifestation of these enduring spiritual values, and in so far as I am drawn to a person for other than these spiritual values, then I am being drawn away from what is intrinsically good. Hence, my desire for the sexual gratification your body can offer is incompatible with my desire for truth and beauty that association with your soul can offer.

In so far as we accept Plato's assumption that a person is composed of body and soul, then I think we are forced to accept the

conclusion that satisfaction of sexual desires is incompatible with the satisfaction of "spiritual" desires. But Plato's assumption that a soul plus a body equals a person need not be accepted. It is of course true that we can and regularly do distinguish between the mental and the corporeal. But that does not seem to require that we leap to the conclusion that there are physical things and spiritual things. I do not wish to argue against metaphysical dualism here, but I do want to assert that, given Plato's limited argumentation for a dualism, we need not accept the assumption that a person is a composite of soul and body. Rather, we may consider the person, not his alleged body and soul, as primitive. As we can distinguish between the color and brilliance of a diamond and yet not consider the color or brilliance as things of which the diamond is composed, so too can we consider the soul and body distinguishable aspects, but not parts, of a person. If we assume that the person and not his body and soul is primitive, then the incompatibility between sexual and spiritual desires disappears. Whether I want to revel in your beauty so that I might aspire to greater heights or want the sexual pleasure of your company, the criteria of the compatibility of these desires with my love for you is no longer based on the alleged intrinsic good of spiritual elevation but on the goodness of the person as a whole. When I consider you as a person, my reflexive desires, whether sexual or spiritual, can be compatible with my altruistic desires for you.

To the extent that Plato insists that sexual desires are incompatible with my love for you, we must consider Plato to have drawn an unjustified conclusion. At the very least, his account of

love and sex is based on unsubstantiated grounds, and we must part company with Plato. Sexual reflexive desires and altruistic desires can be compatible though they need not be.

We can for the moment ignore Plato's position with regard to sexual desires and reassert and reemphasize that even in loving the beloved his lover does have reflexive desires. That is, Plato's lover both has altruistic desires (of spiritual growth) for the beloved and reflexive desires (of spiritual growth) for himself. At least at the "spiritual plane" Plato sees no problem with both loving you and wanting for myself. Plato idealistically assumes that in every case my wanting my own spiritual growth is compatible with my wanting your spiritual growth. This is a pleasant thought but surely not the case. Even if we assume that the lover wants only spiritual goods for himself and his beloved (and hence, according to Plato, the lover only wants intrinsic goods), these desires need not be compatible. Again, we have established that reflexive desires can be compatible with altruistic desires, but we have not established that that they always will be. Plato tries to assure this by making the lovers followers of the same god. If we have the same sort of personality, then surely, Plato reasons, we will have the same goals, and if we have the same goals, then the reflexive and altruistic desires will not be in conflict. Plato's scheme seems to work if the lover's are something like philosophers. You and I, as philosophical lovers, work and share in the growth of our wisdom. The ideas and insight that constitute wisdom can be had by both of us. Any new insight I come upon for myself I can share with you. Then we both have gained and our

reflexive and altruistic desires are not in conflict. But should we be lovers whose personalities tend toward the acquisition of power, however benign and beneficent that power, we may find ourselves wanting the same position of power. In the case where both of us want to be president of the United States (presumably for the welfare of the country), our reflexive desires for ourselves and our altruistic desires for the beloved would conflict. Sometimes I would want to be president and want you to be president, clearly incompatible desires at a given time. Plato is concerned with personal growth, and he sees this growth as a growth of wisdom, but wisdom is not a limited commodity. All may have it. Whenever growth is toward a limited commodity, e.g. positions of power, one lover's having that commodity may prevent the other from having it. In such practical circumstances even the best of lovers would have his reflexive and altruistic desires in conflict. So here, too, we must differ with Plato and reassert that the reflexive and altruistic desires of the lover can be compatible, but practical circumstances may find these desires in conflict.

In so far as Plato acknowledges that both reflexive and altruistic desires are a part of love, we can grant that he has aptly characterized love, but he makes two important errors in his description of desire's place in love. First, under the influence of his metaphysical dualism, he claims that sexual desires are incompatible with "spiritual" desires. His claim can be rejected by denying the metaphysical dualism; by asserting the primacy of the person, not the soul, sexual reflexive desires can be compatible with

the basic altruistic desires of the lover. Second, by virtue of his idealism, Plato assumes that a lover's reflexive and altruistic desires are never incompatible. This claim mistakes what is possible for what is actual. That is, while it is certainly possible for reflexive and altruistic desires to be compatible, the particular circumstances of the lovers may make those desires practically incompatible.

2.4.2 In Summary

Plato has provided a fairly comprehensive description of love from its first throes to its fruition and many of his descriptions and explanations are on the mark. His accuracy is particularly notable since much of his account is given as an explanatory myth. He describes the "madness" that most of us would recognize as often accompanying the first throes of love. Metaphorically Plato ties this madness to the recognition of the godliness of the beloved. Stripped of the metaphor, the madness can be seen as a response to the perception by the lover of the extraordinary value of the beloved.

The same perception of value that prompts the lover's madness also fires his desire. Plato recognizes the place of desire in love although his symbolism carries the burden of the description. Nonetheless, Plato does explicitly acknowledge that the lover has both sexual and non-sexual reflexive desires for the beloved as well as altruistic desires for the beloved. His definition of love might read: Love is a human condition in which the one who loves experiences the true value of another as the manifestation of truth and beauty.

The experience of this value results in what is often considered a madness. In addition, the lover, because of the value he sees in the beloved, both reflexively desires the beloved for himself and altruistically desires the promotion of the beloved's welfare and growth. Sexual desires are one set of the lover's reflexive desires, but these should not be acted on since they conflict with both the lover's other reflexive desires for his own growth as well as his altruistic desires for the beloved's growth.

My criticism of Plato's account would alter the definition in the following ways: Love is a human condition in which the one who loves experiences the true value of another as a person. The experience of this value results in what is often considered a madness. In addition, the lover, because of the value he sees in the beloved, both reflexively desires the beloved for himself and altruistically desires the promotion of the beloved's welfare and growth. Sexual desires are one set of the lover's reflexive desires and may be compatible with his other reflexive desires and his altruistic desires for the beloved, depending on the circumstances.

As informative as this amended definition may be, it is not wholly satisfying. Partly because of his use of myth and partly because of his philosophical inclinations, Plato has left several questions unanswered. What is the nature of the value the lover experiences in the beloved? Who is this person that is the beloved? Can love be characterized as an emotion even though the primary reactions of the lover to the beloved is madness and desire?

I will take up each of these questions starting with the nature

of the value the lover experiences. It is Scheler who comments most explicitly on value and the lover and it is his work that I will look at next.

CHAPTER III

HOW DO I LOVE THEE? LET ME COUNT THE WAYS I DON'T:

SCHELER'S LOVE AS ACT

2.1 Love is not a feeling

At the heart of what I understand to be Plato's definition of love and of my revision of it is the experience of value. The lover, before he can desire or be deemed mad, must somehow recognize the value of the beloved, and he must do so in a way different than the non-lover. The non-lover may grant that the beloved is valuable as a musician, a member of the firm, a pasta maker, or as a sex partner. The non-lover may acknowledge the value of the beloved in innumerable ways and yet not love. The lover, on the other hand, "sees" the beloved in a special light and values the beloved in a special way--or so it seems. To some extent Plato addresses the issue of what the lover "sees" in the beloved. He claims the lover "sees" godliness and eternal beauty shining through the beloved. Yet while this does give us an indication of what is to be seen in the beloved, it does not really address the nature of the "seeing". This "seeing" seems to be like no other and seems to be at the heart of love. Even so Plato passes over it to speak about what is seen and what happens once the seeing has occurred. This special act of perception (if that is what

it is) that lies at the heart of love is glossed over. Plato takes the interplay of desires as the focus of love and yet he grants that something unusual has happened that is logically prior to and is the cause of those desires. Plato leaves us with the question "What is love?" if we consider that question not as about the acts specifically related to love but as about the original relation between the lover and beloved that provides the ground for the consequent acts.

It is the original relation established between the lover and beloved that I want to investigate now. The question to be answered is "What is the original relation between lover and beloved; how is the lover related to the beloved when the lover comes to love?"

Max Scheler in The Nature of Sympathy and "Ordo Amoris" attempts to analyze love. Since he believes love is an act and that acts are essentially indefinable, his analysis tends to be a via negativa, an analysis of what love is not. Even so, and in spite of himself, he seems to provide a definition. So with Scheler we have arguments for what love often is thought to be but is not and some argumentation for what love is. These arguments are not particularly well formed. Nor does Scheler provide a structural relationship between them. Hence it is helpful to have in mind what Scheler claims love is before examining his arguments.

Scheler provides the following definition of love.

...love is that movement wherein every concrete individual object that possesses value achieves the highest value compatible with its nature and ideal vocation; or wherein it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its nature.¹

Without some notion of Scheler's general position such a definition is

virtually meaningless. For the moment, a brief explanation of Scheler's view will be sufficient to orient the uninitiated. By claiming that love is a movement, Scheler is emphasizing its nature as act. If love is a movement, an act, then it can be distinguished from feelings and (Scheler thinks) emotions or anything else that can be called passive. Love is, however, a peculiar kind of act. The remainder of the definition indicates that love is that act through which something attains its most nearly perfect form. I have interpreted Scheler's definition as saying "love is that act through which something attains its most nearly perfect form" because for Scheler, while love is active in bringing forth the value inherent in a thing, love is not specifically directed to value enhancement as a goal. Love, by some means, does bring about the enhancement of value, but this enhancement is not a matter of pedagogy. By loving (though this is not love's goal), the beloved becomes more nearly perfect example of what it is.

Scheler defines love by way of its consequence--value enhancement. The value which a thing has and is enhanced through love seems to be a Platonic form. Scheler's position is that every thing has a value inherent in it and that there is a hierarchy of things by virtue of their value. A worm has less value than a man, a man less value than God. Love of any given thing, therefore, brings forth whatever value is appropriate to that thing. Values are objectively a part of a thing as much as its color or shape and are given objectively. It is up to us to discern the value appropriate to a thing and, when we love, bring forth the value a thing already has.

Depending on your frame of reference, the definition seems Platonic, Christian, idealistic, or humanistic. To the philosopher, it most likely seems vague and unsatisfying. For the moment, though, the definition, with my limited comments on it, will have to do as an introduction to Scheler's notion of love.

One of Scheler's concerns is to distinguish love from feelings and emotions. His arguments to this effect are fragmentary and I will fill in the details of these arguments with as much fidelity to Scheler's thought as is possible. Scheler rejects the possibility that love is a feeling or emotion (Scheler does not distinguish between the two in The Nature of Sympathy) before considering any other possibilities. His demonstration in The Nature of Sympathy, if it can be called such, that love is not a feeling is dispatched in no more than two brief paragraphs. Scheler first points out that our love for someone does not alter in spite of all the pain or pleasure the beloved may cause. From this brief comment, it appears that Scheler is assuming 1) that love endures over a reasonably long period of time and that at any rate love ordinarily endures longer than most of what we would consider feeling states, 2) that feeling states are relatively fleeting, and 3) that love can coexist with various feeling states.

Scheler then asks us to consider love as the cause of emotional states. That is, as a consequence of our pursuing our love we experience emotional states. Scheler evidently believes that by inspection of our experiences of love that we will be compelled to admit that love has caused some of our most dramatic emotional states

and that, this being the case, it is impossible that love itself be a feeling. No doubt Scheler would say that just because love so quickly, thoroughly and dramatically throws us into elation or despair, anxiety or euphoria, we tend to confuse the cause and effect conflating them into a unit. Nonetheless, seeing that love causes us to feel requires nothing more than a little careful reflection. Clearly, too, we would seem to have to admit that love is active insofar as it produces emotions and that emotions are (in some sense) the passive product of love.

Little else is said in The Nature of Sympathy to show that love is not a feeling. Scheler does allude to the distinction subsequently but produces nothing further by way of demonstration of the distinction. He does, however, consider the subject more fully in "Ordo Amoris."

Scheler takes very much the same position in "Ordo Amoris" as he does in The Nature of Sympathy stating that

Love and hate, therefore, can never be reduced, as people have so often tried to do, to the release of passive feelings in the presence of objects of representation and thought.²

His elaboration in "Ordo Amoris," however, involves his distinction between feelings, affects and passions. It also contains a criticism of a theory of feelings that claims that feelings are the result of volitions.

I will discuss his distinction between feelings, affects and passions first since the distinction will be central to an exposition of his arguments that claim that love is not a feeling or emotion.

Scheler does not provide us with a definition of feelings, but he does say that they have no value-intentions. This quality is clearly a result of his conception of them as passive. They are something that we just experience. We may attend to them and we may seek to have them again, but the feelings themselves are passive objects of consciousness, not a characterization of the intentional act of consciousness. And since feelings are not intentional they can hardly be intentions toward some value.

Scheler's claim that feelings are passive objects of consciousness seems reasonable. When we feel hungry or thirsty we are aware of certain bodily states. What we are aware of is not a characterization of consciousness. Rather the feelings of hunger or thirst are objects of consciousness. A certain set of sensations, I have learned, indicate that I need food and are to be called "hunger." These sensations are more intimate, perhaps, than my view of the Eiffel Tower, but nonetheless these sensations are every bit as much the object of my consciousness as the Eiffel Tower. As we go "out" from bodily sensations, Scheler's contention becomes clearer. For instance if, while walking barefoot on a lawn, I feel a sudden surge of pain in my right foot, I may well find that that searing pain is the sole object of my consciousness. I may glare at the offending piece of rusty tin and I may inspect my wounded foot; each of these are likely objects of my consciousness under the circumstances. But I may just as well be aware of the pain itself as it brings tears to my eyes. The pain is not a characterization of my mode of consciousness; it is the object of my consciousness. Similarly, the thrill of a

roller-coaster ride, the refreshing taste of a cold beer on a hot day, and the pleasantness of the sound of the band in the park on a summer's eve are all feelings and objects of my consciousness. Perhaps that I find all these things indicates their passivity. I find that I am hungry, that I am in pain, that the ride is thrilling, that the beer tastes good, and that the sounds of the band are pleasant. I happen upon these things and become aware of them as I happen upon them. They are no more modes of my consciousness than the vivid siren I hear or the vibrant sunset I happen to see. My feelings are objects of consciousness and as such are passive.

The affects Scheler defines as "the acute discharge of strong feelings of essentially sensuous and vital provenience."³ It sounds as if Scheler is treating affects as sub-category of feelings--those feelings with a particularly visceral quality. But is he? Like feelings, they are value blind and have "no characteristic intentional relation"⁴ to the objects which evoke them. Like feelings they are passive and fleeting. But unlike feelings they are "accompanied by strong driving impulses and organic sensations which pass into the expression."⁵ Scheler has previously mentioned pain presumably as an example of feelings. So, I take it, the "organic sensation" of pain is not quite what he has in mind with regard to affects. He also calls them "very complex."⁶ All this brings to mind violent emotions. Anger might be an example, better yet rage. Perhaps elation.

Scheler does not give us much to work from. Let us assume that by feelings he means relatively uncomplicated sensations of pain and pleasure. Surely then he must mean by affects those states we

ordinarily call emotions. My anger at you. My frustration with my child. My envy and my lust. My pity and empathy. Let us assume that these sorts of emotions are what he means by affects. Scheler calls them "acute and essentially passive."⁷ Are they?

There is no doubt that a particularly rude person may bring me to anger. Or that my child's willfulness in the grocery store may frustrate me in a moment. Certainly our emotions can have an acute onset. And just as similarly may have an acute termination. The rude lady in response to my angry words may say "I'm sorry. It's been a rough day; I'm just not myself today." And my anger is gone with her words and her pitiable expression. And a "Daddy, do you still love me?" will erase my frustration. Emotions may have acute onsets and terminations. But I've been angry at you for days and pity her whenever I see her or think of her. It seems that Scheler is thinking of the simplest cases of emotions when he calls them acute. Or perhaps it is that when these emotions involve our thoughts and volitions, when they occur in the context of the rest of our lives, they take on characteristics that they do not have in some sort of "pure" or "ideal" form. Yet what we call emotions do occur embedded in the totality of our lives, and therefore, even if there are "impure" emotions, they are still emotions and do not have the property of being acute.

Scheler also claims that emotions are passive. On the face of it this just doesn't seem true at all. Some people display their anger so violently that Mt. St. Helens would be humbled. Surely these violent emotions cannot be called passive. Scheler might claim that,

though the display of emotions might be violent and dramatic, they are in their essence just as passive as a violent pain; emotions are passive when considered as objects of consciousness. But emotions are not objects of consciousness. Emotions have the characteristic of conscious acts; they are directed and intentional. I am angry at you. She is envious of her. Clearly anger, envy, frustration, pity, and the like are modes of consciousness. I can think about my anger, but this is a second order intention dependent on the first order intention of my being angry at you. Scheler is wrong to call emotions (affects) passive. Emotions as intentional acts cannot be considered passive.

If Scheler's comments about emotions are brief, his comments about passion are even briefer. He says that "passion is a lasting capacity and by its nature is active and aggressive."⁸ Further, he says that "passion, although one-sided and isolating, has an eye for value and is a strong and perpetual movement of our drives in the direction specified by this value" and that "passion has its starting point in the deeper vital center of the 'soul.'"⁹ He says nothing more, other than to cite two aphorisms. His few comments are enough, however, to indicate that he is using "passion" as we usually do. We do ordinarily mean by "passion" a consuming drive toward some goal (say, the creation of art, succoring the needy, and probably a fervent dedication to a cause) that is deemed highly valuable. We do see passion as active and as aggressively prompting us to the achievement of the goal of that passion. And we do see passion as a virtual obsession that pursues its goal with little regard for other goals and

values.

How do Scheler's arguments that love is not a feeling or an emotion fair in light of his understanding of feelings, emotions, and passions? Scheler's first argument is that love endures even while the lover encounters various feelings occurring during the course of that love. He says that "Our love for someone does not alter, for all the pain and grief the loved one may cause us" and that "a beloved object offers more abundant possibilities of joy as well as sorrow."¹⁰ Surely this is true. From every source, personal experience, observation of friends and family, histories and romantic novels and stories, the tale is always the same. During the course of a love a person may suffer greatly and experience great joy. It is true of both feelings and emotions that they come to be and pass away during a love. Simple pleasures and pains may be mine when I love my wife: pleasure at nothing more than seeing her form, pain when she is angry and will not speak to me. Emotions, too, come and go: my anger at her willfulness, my pride at her achievements. The feelings and emotions come and go and all the while I love my wife. If it is true that, while I love, a variety of feelings and emotions related to my love come and go, then it is just as true that feelings and emotions come and go that are not related to my love. There is the pleasure at my baseball team's winning the pennant and the pain of the dentist's drill, my anger at that rude motorist and my pride in a big promotion. These are unrelated to my love for my wife, say, but are feelings and emotions all the same. Without a doubt Scheler is right; love does have an endurance that feelings and emotions do not ordinarily have.

But the fact that love has an endurance that feelings and emotions do not have allows for a variety of relationships between love and feelings and emotions. About all that my expansion of Scheler's argument demonstrates is that love is not one of the feelings or emotions mentioned. It is still possible that love is a feeling or emotion. Because feelings and emotions are fundamentally different, in spite of Scheler's comments to the contrary, demonstrations that love is not a feeling and is not an emotion have to be handled separately.

If love is a feeling, then it must have the properties of a feeling. Love does, as a matter of fact, fail to have one essential property that feelings do have. What is always the case when we have feelings is that we feel them. Feelings are precisely our experience of them. I have cut my foot and it hurts. That pain exists so long as I feel it. If my attention is distracted, if I use self-hypnosis, or if an anesthetic is applied I am no longer in pain, and that is the same as saying I no longer feel the pain. We do have expressions such as "That wound is painful," but here we are characterizing the wound, not the pain. When we say "That wound is painful" we are either saying that we are virtually continuously experiencing some pain or that without proper caution and care the wound is liable to produce more pain. The first possibility is that we are continuously feeling the pain and is, therefore, no argument against my assertion that feelings must be felt. The second possibility does not claim that there are unfelt feelings (pains). It simply asserts that more pain can be produced by inattention to the wound. Probably we are claiming

that the wound has the propensity to produce more of the same kind of pain. But we are not claiming that there is unfelt pain, only that the wound has certain characteristics (namely, the ability to produce pain). In no case do we claim or actually have feelings (pains) that are not felt. It is only by confusing the perseverance of the source of the feelings (e.g., the wound) and its ability to produce feelings with the feeling itself that we can arrive at the conclusion that there are unfelt feelings. The situation of feelings of pleasure is similar to the situation of feelings of pain. I view a beautiful sunset and feel a certain pleasure in its beauty. I feel the pleasure so long as I view or continue to think about the sunset and I stop feeling the pleasure and it ceases to exist when my view and my thoughts of the sunset cease. I may think about the beauty of the sunset again and recapture some of the pleasure I found in viewing it, but the pleasure is not stored away with my memory of that sunset. What the memory is capable of producing is a new feeling of pleasure that is very similar to the first though perhaps less vivid. Like the wound, my memory of the sunset is capable of producing a feeling though neither the wound or the memory of the sunset is (even in part) a feeling.

Love, on the other hand, can be distinguished from loving feelings. On a particularly romantic evening I may feel very loving toward my wife whom I love. I both love and feel loving toward my wife. But if she rejects my amorous advances, I will feel hurt. I now no longer feel loving only hurt, but I still love her. Perhaps I am not quite being honest with myself; maybe there is a residue of

loving feelings even while I feel hurt. Perhaps, but the next day at work I am totally engrossed in my work and have no thoughts of or feelings toward my wife. If someone, for some inexplicable reason, walked into my office and asked out of the blue "Do you love your wife?" I would respond "yes." Clearly love is not a feeling that persists for years on end. Those loving feelings do recur during those years, but I do not consistently feel them.

There is another possibility. Just as the wound and the memory of the sunset have the propensity to produce pain and pleasure, so too may my wife have the propensity to producing loving feelings in me. And so it seems she does; often she is capable of "making" me feel tenderly, lovingly toward her. Shall we then say that when I say I love my wife I am stating that she is the consistent source of loving feelings? Can it be that my love for my wife is nothing more than the set of loving feelings I "receive" from her and that saying "I love you" is nothing more than a report that I get these loving feelings from her? When I say "I love you," I do not appear to be making only a report of my awareness of the fact that my wife generate loving feelings in me. True enough, I will tell her that she delights me and tell you that she is a constant source of pleasure to me. These surely are reports of how my wife affects me and in such reports I am stating that my wife has the capability of producing certain positive feelings in me. But when I tell her I love her, I am doing something more than reporting my feelings or my awareness of the source of those feelings; I am making a claim that I am actively taking a particular attitude toward her. I say "actively taking a particular attitude

toward..." to be as general as possible and yet have some characterization of the force of "I love you." No matter how "I love you" is positively characterized, it is not a report of the feelings (sensations) my beloved generates in me or my awareness of my beloved as the source of them. "I love you" may be a report of my attitudes, but that is a report about me not about a propensity the beloved may have. It is conceivable that "I love you" reports the fact that I find the feelings you generate in me desirable and hence that I find you desirable as the source of positively valued feelings. This reading of "I love you" has the virtue of being a report about the lover's attitude about the beloved. If "I love you" is not about the lover but about the beloved, then the report "I love you" should be the same type of report as "She's witty," "She's charming," and "She's fun to be around." If the report is about the beloved, then like these other reports the report "I love you" ought to be open to inspection and verification. But the report "I love you" is not generally open to inspection and verification. It is quite possible that I love you and am willing to say so, but that no one else loves you and certainly would not say so. Both I, as the lover of you, and others who are non-lovers of you may even agree on your objective attributes, and yet it is still not the case that all of us would claim to love you. Unless we presuppose some highly idiosyncratic appreciation of the beloved by the lover that is simply not available to others, we are forced to conclude that "I love you " is not a report about the qualities of the beloved. And it seems that even if we do suppose some highly idiosyncratic appreciation of the beloved by

the lover, we are forced back to the admission that "I love you" is , at least in part , a report about the lover in some respect.

It is possible, I suppose, that what we take ourselves to be saying when we say "I love you" grossly misconstrues the actual event or experience of love. It could be the case that when I say "I love you" I think I am making some sort of report about me even though the love I have is something entirely different. When I say "I love you" do I think I am reporting about me when in truth I am reporting about your propensity to generate loving feelings in me? Besides the fact that this reading of "I love you" does not coincide with our introspections about love, there are three facts that seem to tell against the position that claims that the lover is saying (meaning) one thing and doing another. First, there does not seem to be any single loving feeling. There is no particular feeling that all lovers feel. I can have the same kind of pain as you and will get it from the same type of source. But some loves seem to generate ethereal feelings and others far more earthy feelings (without degenerating into mere lust). I personally cannot point to, cannot remember the loving feeling that I would be reporting about when I say "I love you." The only possible recourse for one who claims that I think I am reporting one thing although another is happening when I say "I love you" is for him to claim that there is a group of feelings bearing a family resemblance. When I say that "I love you," then I might be reporting that you are the source of any one of a number of feelings all of which could be considered loving. For this claim to be plausible and to keep it from degenerating into a babbling relativism,

the feelings in question must bear a resemblance to one another. Perhaps, as Scheler suggests, love has three forms: vital (sensual), mental (intellectual), and spiritual. Scheler did not mean for his forms of love to be forms of loving feelings, but let us borrow his categories to claim that a given set of loving feelings might be locatable on a three dimensional axis consisting of these qualities. Your love is strongly spiritual and intellectual and weakly sensual. My loving feelings are predominately sensual with moderate intellectuality and spirituality. A love that is only sensual might appear to have no resemblance to a love that is completely spiritual, nonetheless one resembles my loving feelings and the other yours. Other loving feelings would bear resemblance to ours and, in fact, all loving feelings would bear resemblance to many other loving feelings such that all loving feelings would fall within the three dimensional "space" of sensuality, intellectuality, and spirituality. Thus when I say "I love you," I am reporting that I have loving feelings falling somewhere within the "space" of loving feelings.

On the face of it such a position has some plausibility; after all, the beloved is the source of the lover's loving feelings, and it is quite possible that the lover is telling the beloved just this when he says "I love you." One could take the position that "I love you" reports the fact that the beloved has the propensity to produce loving feelings, but there is a problem; the position claims an objectivity for the loving feelings that does not seem to exist. Even allowing that the beloved has the propensity to produce, not a loving feeling, but a range of loving feelings, the claim is being made that, as the

rusty piece of tin has the propensity to produce pain in whoever might be cut by it, so the beloved has the propensity to produce loving feelings in whoever might come in contact with her. This is clearly not the case. I may have the propensity to produce loving feelings in you, but there is no one else who is similarly affected. I simply do not have the propensity to produce loving feelings in anyone who comes along or even those who know me well. Whatever qualities I have that might prompt loving feelings in you are, at least sometimes, experienced by others and yet, while they may recognize my virtues, they do not love me. And so it seems that "I love you" may be a report about the propensity I have to produce loving feelings in you, but that it is not a report about a propensity I have to produce loving feelings in anyone with reasonable contact with me.

The report "I love you", then, is not a report about my propensities at all, but about the lover's propensities toward the beloved. The lover is inclined to feel loving toward the beloved, not just anyone. The lover has a propensity to feel loving toward the beloved. It might be objected that the propensity of the beloved to produce loving feelings is not so much like the propensity of rusty tin to produce pain in those who step on it as like the propensity of a painting to produce positive aesthetic feelings in viewers. After all we are not talking about some simple physiological reaction such as pain; we are talking about feelings more akin to aesthetic appreciation. But still this will not do. Even though everyone may not respond with great enthusiasm to Monet or Corbet, there is a collection of people who do so respond. There are several, perhaps

many, people who agree that Monet is aesthetically elevating and who concur on why he is elevating. The same cannot be said of loves. There are few people who are loved by many and, in any case, even when several people do love the same person, they would rarely, if ever agree, on what qualities the beloved has that give her the propensity to produce loving feelings. Loving feelings produced by a given beloved are, for the most part, particular to the lover. There is little reason to assume that the propensity to produce loving feelings is an objective quality of the beloved. There is every reason to assume that the loving feelings are a subjective reaction to the beloved on the part of the lover.

Beside misportraying the objective quality of the propensity to producing loving feelings, the position that "I love you" only reports the ability of the beloved to produce loving feelings ignores the altruism of love. If you tell me that you love me and I am to understand by that that I have the propensity to produce loving feelings in you, I want to respond "That's nice but so what?" I do not exist to make you feel good and loving. I am glad that I do. I would certainly rather make you feel good than bad, but having acknowledged that, how am I to respond to your profession of love? Just because I make you feel good surely I am not obligated and probably not even inclined to devote myself to making sure that you continue to have loving feelings. What is missing from the report that I have a propensity to produce loving feelings in you is any indication that the lover will act in any particular way toward me. Yet, since love has an altruistic element, surely the profession that

I love you should have the force of indicating the lover's altruistic intent. When I say "I love you," I am, among other things, telling you that I treasure you and that since I do that I will treat you well. But the mere report that you have a propensity to produce loving feelings in me does not indicate, hint or imply an attitude on my part as lover. The position that "I love you" is a report of a propensity to produce loving feelings, whether considered objectively or subjectively, is simply too weak. When I say "I love you," I am saying that you make me feel good, but I am saying more. I am saying that I have altruistic inclinations toward you. Any account of love that reduces love to a report of what makes the lover feel good cannot account for a distinction between the lover's preferences with regard to pleasure and his love. Saying "I love you" becomes little more than a report that this object gives more pleasure than others or gives a particular kind of pleasure that other objects cannot foster. Hence, the position that "I love you" is a report of the beloved's propensity to produce loving feelings is inadequate because it does not take into account the altruistic element in love and hence it does not distinguish reports of love from reports of pleasures.

Loving feelings are, of course, an important part of love. Plato's account of love depends on the lover's experiencing the "flood of passion." Without that flood of passion the lover would never be goaded into approaching the beloved or acting on his love. Loving feelings must, at the very least, act as a report to the lover that something special and important is afoot. The transparent goodness, the overwhelming positive quality of loving feelings, tells the lover

that he is in the presence of something he should pursue. Without recourse to reason and cognitive processes the lover is presented with evidence that what he is about is good and beneficial. There is no denying that literature has repeatedly told us that love can end in tragedy, but the tragedy arises from impossible circumstances or flaws in the lover's character. The love itself is not tragic and the loving feelings hold out the promise and possibilities of the love, however limited by character and circumstance these possibilities may be.

Loving feelings are an important part of love and yet are not love. It is possible that love is an emotion and that loving feelings attend love as angry feelings attend anger and fearful feelings attend fear. If love is not a feeling, then can it reasonably be considered an emotion?

2.2 Emotions and love

The relationship of emotions and love pose entirely different consideration than the relationship of feelings and love. Being active and a mode of consciousness, they need not be felt to be the mode of consciousness we are in. When I pity you or am proud of you or am angry at you, you are the object of my intentional act. The anger, pity, or pride characterize how I intend you; the emotions characterize the act. When I feel, I must be aware of the feeling since it is (at least the momentary) object of my awareness. When I have an emotional disposition toward you, I must be aware of you since you are the object of my intentional act. My awareness, however, need not be of the emotion, since it characterizes the awareness itself rather than the object of awareness. I may, of course, be aware of my anger in at least one, and perhaps two, ways. First and most clearly, I can have a second order intention. I may be angry at you, but I may also be aware that I am angry at you. But being aware that I am angry at you is a second order intention founded on the first order intention of my being angry at you. And if I am aware that I am angry at you, then I may be aware in two distinct ways. I may be aware of my acts (e.g., "My God, I must be angry at him; I just punched him in the gut."), or I may be aware of the feeling of anger (e.g., the knot in the pit of my stomach, the pounding in my chest, the flushed, heated feeling in my entire body). Second, I may be aware of my anger non-thetically, as Sartre calls it. That is, along with my awareness of you as the object of my anger, I am also aware of my angeriness but not as a specific intentional act. In essence non-thetic awareness is the awareness of angeriness that I have when I am positionally taking you as the object of my anger. This is a rather dim

and amorphous sort of awareness that might best be characterized as the experience of the act of anger.

To put it mildly, the emotions are more complex than feelings. The complexities I have pointed out make it impossible to use the same argument against love being an emotion that I developed to show that love is not a feeling. The simple attribute of feelings, that they must be felt to be feelings, is not at all an attribute of emotions. I may have emotions and not know that I have them. I may not even feel angry when I am angry. Each of us surely have had the experience of friend approaching us and saying, "Gee, you sure were anxious (or nervous) the way you kept squirming in your chair," or "Heavens, the way you wadded up that paper and threw it in the waste basket you must have been angry," and only after your friend's comment were you aware that you were anxious or angry.

Just because emotions are a mode of consciousness, a characterization of the intentional act, love appears to be much more like emotions than feelings. Neither emotions or love have to be felt to be. On occasion I have seen people confuse the feeling of anger with anger and the feeling of love with love. If not you, then someone you know has denied their anger by claiming that they did not feel angry or they denied their love because they did not feel loving. I can think of one case vivid in my mind in which a mother was angry at her son. The mother and son were arguing bitterly. Finally, in the hope of aborting the argument, I asked the mother "I know you're angry at him, but do you love him?" She hesitated and then replied no. But the next day, when her anger has passed, she was once again able to say she loved her son.

In my mind at the moment of her hesitation, I could see her searching her mind for a loving feeling and when she found none she concluded that she did not love. Nothing was further from the truth; she simply had no loving feelings (and had angry ones instead), but she did have love. But this confusion need not occur between the feelings of love or anger, say and the love or anger. I am on a coffee break at work and am complaining to a friend about my wife. "She made me so angry last night I could have strangled her. I just don't see how she can do things like that. How can she be so thoughtless?" Then my friend rejoins "I know you're angry at her; do you still love her?" And I say "Yes, of course, but boy does she make me angry." We may confuse the feelings of love or anger with the love or anger, but we are also quite capable of distinguishing between the two. Finally, because emotions and love do not have to be felt to be, we must qualify our assent to Scheler's first argument. Scheler is right with regard to feelings and love; love can not be a feeling because feelings as passive objects of consciousness must be felt to be and this is not true of love. Love can be and not be felt. But also Scheler is wrong with regard to emotions and love for neither one needs to be consistently felt to be.

In his second argument, Scheler suggests that love cannot be a feeling or emotion because love causes feelings and emotions. Scheler's comments are as follows.

Quite a different set of facts is involved once the love and hate-relationships are regarded as causes of emotional states (and not as their effects). It now becomes plain that the pursuance of these acts is itself the deepest of all sources of joy and sorrow, bliss and despair.¹¹

Here Scheler is arguing for the causal primacy of love and hate, for he assumes that his first argument established that love is neither a

feeling or an emotion. But we have already seen that his first argument only establishes that love is not a feeling. Whether love is an emotion is still an open question. Hence, I will take the argument in a slightly different light than Scheler intends. On the face of it, it would appear that, if Scheler can demonstrate that love causes feelings and emotions (or, for that matter, that feelings and emotions cause love), then he has established that they are different things. If love causes emotions, then surely it cannot be one. We would finally like the argument to do two things: first, to show love and feelings or emotions have a causal relationship and as such cannot be the same sort of thing and, second, love is the cause of feelings and emotions (rather than the other way around).

A few general comments are in order. First, it is obvious that love does not cause all our feelings and emotions. Scheler says as much when he comments that "a beloved object offers more abundant possibilities of joy as well as sorrow."¹² (my emphasis) When we come into the world, we have feelings and express emotions long before we are sufficiently developed to love. Also there are those who happen not to be in love at the moment and yet are perfectly capable of feelings and emotions. Further, as I pointed out earlier, even while I love, I have feelings and emotions that are not directly related to that love. It follows that love does not cause all of our feelings and emotions, but at best it causes some subset of them.

Without a doubt love does (perhaps indirectly at times) cause feelings and emotions. I am in anguish because I love you and you have rejected my overtures. I am delighted if I love you and you get recognition that you have worked long and hard for. If I did not love

you, your rejection of me could not have hurt nearly as much and perhaps not at all. By the same token, if you are an acquaintance in whom I am not interested, then your just recognition would be of little concern to me; it certainly would not elicit my delight. There is a subset of feelings and emotions caused by love and that subset is those that are experienced in my relationship to you as my beloved.

It is important to note that love causes emotions in the experience of you as my beloved. It is not the case that all my feelings and emotions concerning you, my beloved, are caused by my love. I may take gratification in your promotion because I feel that women have been dealt with unfairly in the past and therefore your promotion represents a partial righting of a social wrong. My gratification is not of you as my beloved; it is for seeing social justice being executed. And then you may have the annoying habit of squeezing the tube of toothpaste from the middle. It annoys me no end. It annoyed me when my roommate in college did it. It will always annoy me. My love for you did not cause my annoyance nor has it changed it one wit. These examples indicate that those feelings and emotions that love causes are limited not only to those arising from the love object but are further limited to those concerning the love object as the love object.

Even though we allow that love causes a subset of our feelings and emotions, does this fact demonstrate that love is not an emotion? The answer, I think, must be no. For the argument to work, it must be the case that emotions cannot cause other emotions, that feelings cannot cause feelings, that emotions cannot cause feelings, and that feelings cannot cause emotions. Scheler does not demonstrate this and cannot because feelings and emotions do cause one another. I will give

examples of each possibility to show that Scheler's argument does not work as he thinks it does.

Emotion causing emotion. You tell me about your sad lot in life and your story elicits pity in me. Then I find out that you are an inveterate liar and that not one shred of your story was true. As a consequence I am utterly angry at you for attempting to elicit pity and getting it. I may even be angry at myself for being duped. However you wish to explain my anger, had I not pitied you I might well not have been angry subsequently. Feeling causing feeling. I have been out working and now feel cold, wet, tired, and hungry, and I feel miserable because I am cold, wet, tired, and hungry. Although I have agreed with Scheler that feelings are passive, some feelings may be a causal factor in having other feelings. This can be the case insofar as we understand causal as "contributing to." My feelings of coldness, wetness and so forth, as a matter of fact, do contribute to my feeling of misery, a feeling that I would probably not have if I did not feel cold, wet, tired, and hungry. Emotion causing feeling. Emotions by their nature cause feelings. My anger causes me to feel angry. My pity causes me to have feelings of pity. Some may object here that the emotion and the feeling of it are too closely related to call the relationship causal and that, in any case, this is not the sense of causal that Scheler intends. Very well, but an emotion may cause feelings not directly related to the emotion. I may be angry at you, a perfect stranger, for some rudeness on your part. As a result I may find your person very unpleasant--the way you stand, or the way your nose turns up--features that others under other circumstances I have found pleasing. Surely, if I had not gotten angry, I would not feel the unpleasantness, perhaps revulsion, that I do

feel in your presence. Feelings causing emotions. Perhaps the most common cases of this sort concern our sexual feelings. I am sexually aroused and find you a willing partner. Because of the pleasure you have given me, all sorts of extravagant emotions may occur. I might be grateful toward you or I might despise you, but no such emotions could occur without my having had the pleasure of your company.

To these examples the general objection might be made that, for the examples to work, we must suppose some attitudes and values to the people involved. No doubt, but these attitudes and values are only a part of the causal explanation as well. No claim is being made that feelings and emotions alone can cause themselves and one another. Furthermore, in the case of love the same objection can be raised. I love you and also hold the belief or attitude that lovers ought to be considerate and thoughtful. Simple courtesy will do for other relationships, but loving ought to include consideration and thoughtfulness. You, as my beloved, have frequent lapses of consideration and thoughtfulness. This always irritates me and often brings me to the point of anger. In this case both my love and my attitudes are causal factors in my irritation and anger just as the feeling or emotion along with attitudes were the causal factors in the above cases. It does not appear that love is special in this way. Feelings, emotions, and love can all be causal factors in the determination of other feelings and emotions.

What makes matters worse is that not only is love not unique in the ability to cause feelings and emotions--even a subset of feelings and emotions--, but it is also likely that feelings and emotions can cause love. If I do not fall in love with you at first sight, that is, if I

do not fall in love without your eliciting in me any definit feelings or emotions, then in all likelihood you have made me feel certain feelings and have certain emotions. Partly on the basis of these, I form my love for you. Perhaps this is nothing more than admitting that love does not occur in a vacuum. It would be very difficult for most of us to fall in love with someone whom we found disgusting, revolting and obnoxious. A pleasant visage, a comely form, a bright wit, and so forth make it easier to fall in love. These and a thousand other pleasing and emotionally rewarding attributes entice us and in so doing may provide the ground for love. Hence, to some degree, feelings and emotions may cause love. Surely they are not the only cause, but they may contribute to our coming to love someone.

Scheler's argument that love is not a feeling or emotion because it causes them doesn't hold water. In the sense that Scheler uses "cause," love, feelings and emotions are all capable of causing one another. Love is not unique because it causes feelings or emotions nor can love be distinguished from feelings or emotions on the grounds that it causes them. Scheler, however, must be allowed this: a love, because it routinely endures longer than either feelings or emotions, has the capacity to cause more feelings and emotions than any single feeling or emotion and as a matter of fact does cause more. But here we are talking in terms of quantity, not quality. Scheler's argument hinges on a difference in quality between love and feelings and emotions.

3.3 Another look at emotions and love

Perhaps Scheler has overlooked the possible range of types of emotions. There are relatively simple emotions. The angry growl when someone steps on your foot or the experience of fear at a strange and unidentifiable noise in the dark seem to be examples of brief, spontaneous emotions. On the other hand, the envy she feels everytime she sees her acquaintance in that new fur coat or the anger he feels every time he hears that political hack speak are examples of emotions that have some endurance and therefore lack spontaneity. It is almost as if in the latter cases the individuals choose to continue to be envious or angry. The character of choosing in these enduring emotions points to an essential feature of choosing. When I choose, I choose on the basis of some values. And in the case of these more enduring emotions not only does there seem to be a choice involved but a judgement as well. When she envies her acquaintance, the envy seems to be based on a judgement: she doesn't deserve a fur coat anymore than I. And even this judgment is based on a valuation: fur coats are desirable, valuable because they signify the social standing of the wearer. Presumably the lady in question could have placed value on something besides social standing or on some other status symbol and yet she persists in that valuation and thereby to some degree judges her acquaintance and chooses to envy her. Had she chosen to value otherwise she would not have been envious of the fur coat, and presumably she has the choice to value otherwise at any time. Her envy, then, is a choice based on a value judgement; she values something someone else owns and wishes ill to the person as a means of

establishing her valuableness within her heirarchy of values. The same considerations extend to the case of enduring anger. The political observer seems to choose to be repeatedly angered by the politician, and there is surely a value judgement being made. The observer has criteria of relevance and consistency; he values political words and actions that divine the heart of the issues and give the issues a logically consistent interpretation. The politician, he judges, either utters empty banalities or endorses logically inconsistent lines of action. On the basis of his value judgements he becomes angry whenever he hears the politician speak. Yet he could choose not to be angry and rather coldly analyze the politician as a foe to be defeated. In this case as well, there are value judgements being made on which the choice to be angry is founded.

It could be objected that these choices to have emotions are hardly on the same level as a choice about which flavor of ice cream to have. And indeed there are some differences. Little hinges on my choice of flavors of ice cream and my choice may be based on nothing more than choosing whatever I had last time. What my friends are having may sway my choice, and I am willing to rescind my choice without much ado. On the other hand, my emotional choices carry a great deal of importance to me. I do not quickly change my mind. In fact, I almost seem impelled to have certain emotional reactions in given circumstances. "I can't help it; that hack always irks me." The political observer pleads compulsion and a lack of choice. He is at the mercy of forces beyond his control. Or so he would have us

believe. Perhaps a better account of the differences between choices of ice cream and emotional choices would explain the differences as differences in the centrality of values involved. Choices of ice cream would ordinarily be considered matters of preferences. I simply prefer chocolate right now. I am making a decision on the basis of personal taste. And while I can have good reason for choice based on personal taste, just as often nothing more is at stake than how feel at the moment. But in matters of politics and social standing, some of my most deeply held values are at issue. To change my emotional reaction to a political figure often seems to require a change in my value system that I am unwilling to make. Choosing ice cream does not involve an abiding value; choosing my emotional reaction does. Hence, the compulsion so often felt in an emotional reaction is the result of a resistance to change values and value systems. It is not at issue whether, in a given case, one ought to alter one's values. I am merely claiming that the choice of values affects emotional reactions.

In enduring emotional reactions are, in part, propensities to react to actions that in some way comment on (attack, praise, etc.) held values. The brief, spontaneous emotional reactions are not so clearly related to held values. When I growl in anger at someone's stepping on my foot or am fearful when I hear strange, unidentifiable noise in the dark, it is not obvious that I hold as a value others' keeping off my feet or silence in the night. In the case of anger, I can be angry without having any rational beliefs about the source of the anger. I can account for my growl as a simple knee jerk reaction that calls into play no particular values. Perhaps I do believe that

one shouldn't step on other's feet. Perhaps I have beliefs about respecting other's persons and territory. I could concoct an explanation that starts with the rationally held value that person's territories ought to be respected and account for my anger at the person who steps on my toes as a reaction to an infringement of that value. But the fact of the matter is that I don't knowingly have such a value and my reaction was just that--a reaction to the insult to my foot. Something hurt my foot and I will try to remove the cause. Equally the fear of the noise in the dark does not seem to entail a choice or a judgement; I just react. Perhaps there is a value involved. I may believe that strange noises in the dark pose a threat to my well-being, something I value dearly. But I have never particularly thought about the value I place on my well-being and certainly have given no thought to noisy nocturnal threats to that well-being. It appears that, in the case of brief, spontaneous emotions, choice, judgement, and value play at best an attenuated role.

There are some observations that can be made about these two types of emotions. There seems to be no reason to assume that they are anything more than conceptually distinct. In people's lives emotions range from the brief and spontaneous to the enduring and calculated. Every emotional reaction does not appear to fall neatly into one or the other of the categories. Indeed, the same emotional reaction could be of either type. The angry growl could have a rational basis with concomitant values, or it could be spontaneous. Then too, it might be argued that even most brief and spontaneous

emotions imply choice, judgement and value. After all, even the most primitive and simplistic emotions have as their "aim" the preservation of life or some status of life. The value is being placed on life in the simplest expressions of anger or fear, and there must be some judgement that the object of the fear or anger are life, or life-status threatening. Further, there is some choice being made for life or some life status and against some real or imagined threat. And yet while such objections hold a measure of truth, it is also true that the briefer, more spontaneous emotional expressions do not carry the same degree of rational choice and judgement and value placement. It is simply true that some of our emotional reactions are based on more conscious and rational grounds than others and that, not surprizingly, the more rational and conscious the grounds for an emotion, the more likely it is to be an enduring emotion.

Scheler's definition of affects does not seem to take into account the scope and complexity of emotions. He claims that the affects are

...the acute discharges of strong feelings of essentially sensuous and vital provenience. These affects are combined in typically different ways on each occasion and are exhibited in typical expressions, accompanied by strong driving impulses and organic sensations which pass into the expression. Accordingly, they possess a characteristic value-blindness in regard to the objects which evoke them and have no characteristic intentional relation to these objects.¹³

The claims that emotions are essentially of "sensuous and vital provenience" and that they are "accompanied by strong driving impulses" are surely true of the briefer, more spontaneous emotions and at least often true of the more enduring emotions. It seems,

then, that Scheler has the briefer emotions in mind. If he does, then it is easy to see why he does not consider them intentional. The expression of anger when someone steps on my foot has as its object whoever inflicts the pain, and I know not who nor care in the moment of anger; whoever it is, is going to hear about it. Similarly with the moment of fear: I am afraid of whatever caused the noise in the dark. The fear pounds in my heart while there is still yet no specific object of my fear. Primitive fears and angers seem to function as preparation for action. Something is amiss in the organism's environment and the organism is going to ready itself for whatever may come. This readying for action quality of brief, spontaneous emotions inclines one to think of emotions not so much as intentional acts as physiological reactions. Nonetheless, while Scheler's rejection of brief emotions as intentional is understandable, it is wrong. Even the more enduring and complex emotions may have ambiguous, minimally defined objects. I am angry at whoever fowled up my billing. I was angry yesterday when I received the bill, and I will still be angry when I find out who it was.

Emotions are intentional as has already been argued, but are they value-blind as Scheler claims? The briefer, more spontaneous emotions seem to imply only the most rudimentary values, those of the general well-being of the organism and of its current homeostasis, but the more enduring and complex emotions frequently and clearly require values for their very existence. It is true that the envious lady might not be able to clearly elaborate the value she places on fur coats and social standing, but such valuations are necessary to make

sense of the envy. The briefer, more spontaneous emotions may only require that the individual judge that something is amiss in the environment (simple perceptual judgements that like the emotion verge on being more reaction than judgement), but the more enduring, complex emotions require a variety of value judgements to be in effect. So it seems that even with regard to his claim that emotions are value-blind, Scheler is thinking of the briefer, more spontaneous emotions. If Scheler is allowed to reformulate his claim to read that love is not one of the briefer spontaneous emotions, is his claim more sound? Further, given the distinction between brief and enduring emotions, is love more like one than the other?

While love often, if not always, has a spontaneous quality and hence similar to brief and spontaneous emotions, it is nothing if not enduring and so like the enduring emotions. And yet love does not have the features of an enduring emotion. Enduring emotions are based on judgements about value hierarchies. The choice in an enduring emotion comes from the possibility of choosing other values and hence being able to judge and then react with different emotions to the same object, objects, or kind of objects. But there is something very peculiar about the kind of value involved in love. In the most rational cases of enduring emotions, the individual can defend his emotion by reference to his value system. I can explain my anger at the politician by appealing to my values: I value straightforward, insightful, coherent political action and only those actions which fulfill those (among other) criteria can properly be called political. The politician harbors none of those values yet claims to be a

competent politician. No wonder he makes me angry. I can even defend my criteria of political action further by, perhaps, prudential appeals to what must be the case for political action to be for the common weal. In the case of the envious lady, she may claim a rational basis to her emotion on the grounds of who has the right to which expressions of social status. The fur-coated lady is in no better a social situation than the lady who envies her, and yet she wears the emblem of a higher social standing. The envious lady may go on to claim that not only is her social position comparable to the other lady but she has performed many social services to the community that ought to be honored far more than the simple monetary worth of the fur-coated lady. Clearly multiple reasons can be given, and these reasons are based on appeals to a value system. Furthermore, not only can the enduring emotions be defended on rational appeal to a value system, these emotions have a universal quality. Not only does this politician, embodying the negative values that he does, anger me, but every politician who does not meet my criteria will anger me and each politician will anger me more or less depending on how well or poorly he meets my criteria for a politician. By the same token the envious lady will be more or less envious of another depending on how much or little the other is judged to deserve the social standing she is accorded. The enduring emotions can and often do make a rational appeal to a value system and all such emotional reactions are governed by the same criteria. Love, on the other hand, is not often justified at all. The claim is often made that love is its own justification. Furthermore, if love were an enduring emotion, then one ought to love

anyone that meets the criteria of love. Not only do we not actually love people who have similar traits and qualities that we might value, we often love different kinds of people, and if we attempt to defend or explain our various loves, we use different criteria for each person. The rational appeal to a value system does not seem to be a part of love nor does the universality of such appeals. Scheler makes this point in the following way.

There may be emotional acts which presuppose the passing of a judgement (or rather, an evaluation). Respect, for instance, seems to me to be one of these. It presupposes that initial detachment from the object, which alone makes it possible for a value-judgement to precede the onset of the emotional act; and it also requires a specific awareness of the presence of the value by which it is evoked. But this detachment is just what is lacking in love and hatred. They are entirely primitive and immediate modes of emotional response to the value-content itself....¹⁴

Scheler goes on specifically to comment on the lack of rational justification in love.

Nothing shows this better than the extraordinary perplexity which can be seen to ensue when people are asked to give 'reasons' for their love or hatred. It is then that one sees how these 'reasons' are invariably looked for after the event, and how the whole inventory of them is never sufficient to account for the nature and intensity of the acts they are alleged to justify. It is also noticeable that though other objects may have value-qualities identical to those alleged as reasons for love or hatred, no such emotions are addressed to them.¹⁵

Scheler addresses the issue again latter in The Nature of Sympathy in the Chapter "Love and Personality." His positive thesis, which I have avoided mentioning so far and which I will address properly later, is that "Love and hatred necessarily fasten upon the individual core in things, the core of value..."¹⁶ That is, as an

individual I have an essence, and it is that indefinable essence apart from my definable, observable traits and actions that is what is loved. Since my essence is indefinable, unlike my personality traits and my actions, it is not susceptible to rational judgement.

Hence the utterly misguided 'rationalism' of seeking to account for one's love for an individual person in any such terms as those relating to his qualities, acts, achievements or dispositions. Indeed the very attempt to do so has the effect of bringing the phenomenon of individual personal love sharply home to us. For we always find out in the process, that we can imagine every single one of these details to be altered or absent, without being a whit more able, on that account, to leave off loving the person concerned. We also realize that if we consider these qualities and activities separately, and add up our liking for each of them, their total value for us is nothing like enough to justify our love of the person. There is always a surplus we cannot account for. Moreover, the curious inconstancy of the reasons we are accustomed to offer ourselves in justification of our love for somebody, is a further indication that all such reasons are merely trumped-up after the event, and that none of them provides the real explanation.¹⁷

All of the arguments Scheler presents are variations on a theme, but I count five distinct lines of argument, two of which occur in both passages. Scheler's one sentence arguments leave a lot to be desired, but I think his intent and general direction are clear. Love cannot be what I have called an enduring emotion since it does not have the quality of being the reaction to a judgement of a value system. Whatever reasons we give for our love are not really reasons at all but excuses. That is, we do not first rationally judge (at any level--conscious or unconscious) and then love; we love and then try to make our love plausible to others by offering "reasons", reasons that more plausibly could be called excuses. Perhaps the weakest of the arguments Scheler offers in defense of this position is what I

would call the eidetic variation argument. Scheler claims that a lover could imagine the beloved without any one of the qualities the lover gives as a reason for loving and yet would love. We do not need to quibble with Scheler's claim. For the most part we would not like to think and not want to claim that the loss of our beloved's sparkling wit or flaxen hair or any other single attribute would be sufficient for us to stop loving. I think it is plausible to argue that the husband who leaves his wife after a mastectomy either didn't really love his wife but her body instead or that he was such a weak person that his love was overcome by aesthetic or social (what will the guys at the office say?) considerations. The alternative is to say that all he loved was a pair of breasts, and when there was no longer a matched set, he no longer loved. With such cases in mind I think we can agree with Scheler that love is not based on a given quality of the beloved. And this does seem to be at variance with the enduring emotions. If I discover that the politician I took to be mealy-mouthed is really wiley, that his bland and fatuous public persona was merely a ruse to maintain power while he conscientiously affected positive political change, then my anger vanishes along with the reason for it. Of course there are unreasonable fears that are not easily conquered. Even when I know that bull snakes are not dangerous, I still cannot help being a little alarmed when I approach one. Only diligent effort to desensitize myself could free me from my unwarranted fear. But such emotions are not so much the problem with Scheler's argument as the assumption that the reasons for love stand independent of one another. Perhaps the loss of any one reason is not

enough to make the lover stop loving, but there might be a combination of reasons the loss of which would be sufficient. Not only might there be a simple additive calculus at work--the more reasons lost, the less the love, it is possible that the reasons function as a network. When one or two key reasons for loving are lost, then the network of reasons collapses and the lover stops loving. I know of no demonstration that would show that the loss of reasons in combination or configuration would not destroy a love. Nonetheless, Scheler's suggestion that we add and subtract reasons for love to show that no one reason is sufficient for love does indicate an artificiality about the reasons given for loving. The reasons for love seem to be a way to make our love plausible to others, a way to get a handle on an experience that does not have ordinary reasons.

Somewhat more convincing is his claim that the reasons for loving someone aren't enough to justify the love. No, I would not risk my life for a keen wit or flaxen hair, but neither would I risk my life for someone who had a keen wit and flaxen hair and a bright smile and the compassion of a saint and.... I wouldn't, that is, unless it is my practice to risk my life for anyone whosoever. Yet lovers have risked lives and fortunes, sacrificed aspirations and jobs--just about anything a lover values is included--for the sake of a love. Let us assume that these lovers have sacrificed not merely for fear of being alone and lonely, for the sake of maintain financial security or social standing, or for the assurance of a good meal on the table every night. Let us assume that these lovers risked and sacrificed not for some utilitarian gain, but for beloved. Is there anything about

the beloved so irreplaceable that that quality is reason for risk and sacrifice. There are a lot of beautiful women, witty women, rich women, women of every description. The lover does not have such a rare commodity that he has reason for his extravagant feelings and actions. The qualities of the beloved might justify admiration, respect, approbation, affection, but they hardly seem sufficient to justify love. Perhaps there are a handful of people in the world at any given time that are such superb examples of humanity that their qualities are sufficient to justify the extravagances of love, but I have not met them and they cannot account for the other loves in the world. It just does not seem plausible to claim that what is done for the sake of love is justified by the qualities of the beloved. There may be reasons for a love, but they are not adequate to justify it.

The inadequacy of reasons argument suggests and leads to the universality argument offered earlier. The inadequacy of reasons argument points out that the reasons we give for loving are not adequate to explain our emotions and actions toward the beloved. The universality argument points out that the lover does not even act in accordance with his reasons. That is, if I as a lover give as a set of reasons a group of qualities the beloved has and claim that the beloved's having those qualities are the reasons I love, then given another person with those same qualities I should love the second person as well. Such a prediction works with the enduring emotions. The envious lady will be envious of any woman wearing a fur coat in similar circumstances to the original lady wearing the fur coat. And I will be angry at any politician that utters banalities and pap. But

though I tell you I love you for your intelligence and well proportioned body, I will not love (I may desire, but I will not love) just any woman with those qualities. Scheler suggests respect as a contrast to love. I respect anyone who is courageous. Being courageous is sufficient reason for my respect, yet having a keen intellect my is reason for loving you, just you. Love's reasons are most often specific to the person loved and hence do not obtain the universality that is common in enduring emotions. It begins to look as if Scheler is right; the reasons given for loving are fabricated after the fact and have little to do with the loving.

The universalizability of the reasons for enduring emotions suggests Scheler's fourth argument that the reasons for enduring emotions require a pre-existing value system that is not present in love. All other things being equal, another object with the same qualities as the ones I give as reasons for having an enduring emotion toward that object should elicit the same emotion. That this is so implies that I have a value system to which I appeal (in some sense) when I react to a given object. I place value on courage, I find merit in those who are courageous, and I deem those who are courageous deserving of my respect. The value I place on courage underpins my respect. Without such a valuation I would have no grounds for my respect. But just as my reasons for loving are not universalizable, neither are they founded on my value system. Of course, I would not name as reasons for my loving, qualities I deplore; I will choose my reasons from those qualities that I positively value. But almost any qualities that I positively value will do as reasons for my loving.

There is no consistent appeal to a quality or set of qualities as my grounds for loving various people. The only constraint is that the qualities come from the large pool of qualities that I positively value. And even this constraint is sometimes breached. Not only will I endure qualities in the beloved that I either hold no value for at all or negatively value, some qualities that I have found unattractive I may come to treasure in the beloved and even give as reasons for my love. I have never thought highly of a sharp tongue, but my beloved is so charming when she gets her feathers ruffled that I find I can't help myself loving her for it. The case of the inordinate fear of snakes may have escaped the other arguments, but it does plausibly fall into the pre-existing value system argument. However irrational my reasons for fearing snakes may be, the grounds on which I fear them imply a pre-existing value system. I fear anything that is cold, ugly, slimy and venomous. Never mind that all snakes are not venomous; I can't tell the difference between snakes. And even when I can tell a bull snake from others and have been assured that they are not venomous, it is because I can't quite get it out of my head that it could be venomous that makes me fear it. I disvalue being bitten by a poisonous animal so much that, even when I am cognitively aware that this animal is not venomous, the mere suspicion that it is is sufficient to arouse my fear. Unlike such fears, love often perversely sets our value systems on their ears. It might be claimed that the kind of person an individual claims he would like to love and the kind he will love can be two entirely different kinds of people. I might rationally, consciously hold a set of values that I say I

would like to see in my beloved, but what I "really" want is someone entirely different. Hence, since the qualities I allege are the ones I value are not the ones I actually value, my actual value system has not been undermined despite my protestations. I suspect such objections are based on a psychological view of love. My ego and superego lay claim to a respectable and socially acceptable set of values, but deep down my id wants a girl just like the girl that married dear old dad. My response is that this sort of situation does, no doubt, occur, but that to the extent I love my wife because she is like my mother (in contrast to my consciously held values) I do not love my wife as herself at all but as a surrogate for my mother. I would discount such cases simply because the one who is supposedly loved is not loved at all. Hence, since this is not a case of love, it is not an exception to the argument that loves are not based on pre-existing value systems. I do not wish to deny that preferences, tastes, even my value system is learned or that a beloved's attributes often coincide fairly well with preferences, tastes, and value systems. The claim is simply that an individual need not have any particular set of qualities that the lover's value system positively values for that individual to be loved. If the beloved does not necessarily "fit" into the lover's value system, then love need not have a rational basis and cannot be an enduring emotion that is grounded in reasons based on the individual's value system.

Scheler's last argument is less satisfying than the others because it based on less substantial evidence. Scheler claims that a lover, when asked why he loves, will respond either with perplexity

or, if the question is asked over a period of time, will respond with inconsistent answers. If these are the cases, then Scheler has some grounds for claiming that love does not have rational basis. Now it seems true that those who have loved often have a hard time coming up with reasons for their love. The frequency with which this is the case indicates that there is not a rational foundation to the love. Yet this need not be so; not everyone is articulate enough to give reasons for his emotions and so the perplexity may not be at the lack of reasons but at an adequate way to express them. I am not sure what Scheler has in mind when he refers to inconsistent reasons for love. Certainly I will give different reasons on different occasions for my love. But this does not constitute inconsistency; it merely indicates that I have more than one reason for loving. And I cannot think of an instance, although I am sure there must be some, in which a lover gives one reason on one occasion and a logically incompatible reason on another occasion. In any case such inconsistencies could easily be chalked up to the pressure to provide acceptable reasons to a given audience (I give my parents one set of reasons and my friends another), among other possibilities. Scheler's fifth argument, while providing some evidence for his claim that love does not have a rational basis, is not conclusive.

Considered collectively, Scheler's five arguments are persuasive. Love is not an enduring emotion because it does not have the rational basis in value systems that enduring emotions have. Having said this, I must admit two things. First, I have augmented Scheler's arguments. I believe my additions to his arguments are entirely in line with

Scheler's intent. Hence, my augmentations do not fundamentally alter or misrepresent Scheler's intent. Second, I have put the arguments to a slightly different purpose than Scheler intended and hence, while Scheler's general intent to deny that love is a feeling, an emotions or a judgement is preserved, the intent of the specific arguments against the rationality of love is not. Scheler's arguments against a rational basis for love are just that--arguments to show that love is not a matter of reason and judgement. My expansions of Scheler's arguments have shown that it is highly implausible to consider love as a judgement--entirely in accord with his intent, but I have also put these arguments to further use. I have used them to defend Scheler's general contention that love is not an emotion. Scheler's own arguments that love is not an emotion are inadequate as I showed earlier. By refining the notion of emotion Scheler uses and adding the distinction between the simple, brief and reactive emotions and the more enduring and complex emotions, I have demonstrated that love is like no other emotion. Hence, love should not be considered an emotion. Reason, judgement and value come into play in enduring emotions, but these three elements of enduring emotions need not be a part of love. Since love need not have these elements and enduring emotions do, either love is an exceptional and extraordinary emotion like no other or it is not an emotion at all. Perhaps because love is laden with so much emotion, one would still like to call it an emotion in spite of evidence to the contrary, but care needs to be taken to keep from being disingenuous. If love is to be called an emotion, it should also quickly be noted that love does not conform to the way the

other emotions act. This is such an extraordinary proviso that I would prefer to say that love is not an emotion so as not to confuse it with what we might expect of other emotions.

2.4 Scheler's definition of love

Scheler claims that love is not a feeling, an emotion, or a judgement. He is correct; love is none of these things. Either his arguments or arguments developed from his arguments have demonstrated that love does not fit well into these categories. Few would be troubled by the claim that love was not a judgement, that it was not a matter of reason. More, I think, would be disturbed by the claim that love is not an emotion. The many strong feelings and emotions, both negative and positive, experienced during love tend to make us think of it as the emotion that supports the rest. Yet, even if grudgingly, we concede with Scheler that love is not an emotion, we are left with the question, what then is love? The candidate that comes to mind most readily is desire. Plato uses desire extensively in his explanation of love. But desires, it was argued, require a logically antecedent valuation. Value is placed on the object of desire before the object can be seen as desirable. I cannot simply desire another. I must first perceive the value of the other to desire him. This formulation of desire suggests that love is some form of perception.

Three of the four traditional categories of human faculties have been eliminated. Love is not cognition; we do come to love as we would come to the conclusion of an argument. Love is not affection; for all the emotional quality of a love, love itself is not an emotion. Love is not volition. By volition we can mean desire (wanting) or choosing. We often if not always desire the beloved but the desire is based on antecedent valuations, hence desire is the

consequence of love, not the source of love or its definition. But neither is love a choosing. None of us can walk down the street, pick out a person, and choose to love him. I can decide to learn to appreciate a person's qualities, but all the appreciation, admiration, or respect I can come to muster as a result of my decision will never amount to love. Love, then is neither kind of volition. All that is left is perception.

In spite of appearing to be forced to conclude that love is some kind of perception, Scheler does not. Rather, he conceives of love as an act and gives no faculty to which love acts might belong. He does not attribute love to any faculty in part because he claims love is an act and as an act (he also claims) it is essentially indefinable.

The ultimate essences of love and hatred, as inherent in acts, can only be exhibited; they cannot be defined.¹⁸

It does not seem to strike him as important that other acts have corresponding faculties. But if worst came to worst Scheler could always claim that love acts are not characterizable as pertaining to any of the ordinary faculties but are subsumable under the as yet unnamed faculty of love. So perhaps it is merely odd that Scheler has no problem accepting other categories of acts and arguing against love falling into any of those categories. What is more disturbing is his apparent vacillation about his own definition (perhaps description is a better word, although he looks for all the world as if he is giving a definition). The following seems to be the description or definition he settles on.

...love is that movement wherein every concrete individual object that possesses value achieves the highest value

compatible with its nature and ideal vocation; or wherein it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its nature.¹⁹

Here love is considered an act which brings to fruition the value qualities possible to a thing. Perhaps this characterization is not as revealing as it could be, but it is clear from it that Scheler does not consider love as falling under any of the traditional categories. In other passages, though, Scheler either contradicts or confuses the above characterization. In one passage he refers to love and hatred as "these emotions"²⁰ and in another he calls them "...entirely primitive and immediate modes of emotional response to the value content itself."²¹ So it seems that Scheler is at the very least modifying his denial that love is an emotion. But he does not only characterize love as emotional; he also calls it "a unique attitude towards objects of value..."²² and "the most personal of attitudes."²³ If by attitude he means something like "taking a position toward", then this characterization would seem to be compatible with the emotional characterization; love might be considered as an emotion insofar as an emotion is an active taking up of a position toward. Yet characterizing love as an attitude hardly seems compatible with characterizing it as a movement. Attitudes tend to be rather stationary and static while movements are surely dynamic. Similarly we do not ordinarily think of attitudes as acts although Scheler calls love both. Scheler may be giving a clue as to how love can both be an attitude and a movement in a passage in which he claims that love (and hatred) "necessarily fasten upon the individual core in things, the core of value..."²⁴ Here love is a fastening onto--surely an act--and

yet there is a sense in which an attitude fastens onto a thing. By taking a position toward a thing we have "hooked" into a particular view of it. Our attitude considers a thing from a particular aspect for the most part to the exclusion of other aspects and by this homing in on a thing through a particular aspect we make contact or come into contact with it in a way that is not possible when the object is considered through no particular respect (aspect). Still, this isn't very helpful; the fastening onto an aspect of an object is an act but once achieved the fastening becomes an attitude which does not seem to require a particular act to maintain.

Scheler uses another cluster of concepts to characterize love in the following passage.

For love is that movement of intention whereby, from a given value A in an object, its higher value is visualized. Moreover, it is just this vision of a higher value that is of the essence of love.²⁵

Here love is characterized as both a movement and a visualization. There is no problem insofar as both are acts, but a visualization hardly seems the same kind of act that a movement is. A movement suggests, at least in Scheler's work, a complex interaction. How else would a thing's higher value be realized? A vision of thing, even of its "core of value," is an activity for the viewer, but not for the viewed. What is viewed is most often totally unaffected by the viewing. (Here I am not talking about perceptual theories that consider how a thing or at least the appearance of it is changed by the perception of it.) As unrelated as viewing and movement seem, Scheler does relate them in the paragraph following the above quote.

Love only occurs when, upon the values already acknowledged as 'real' there supervenes a movement, an intention, towards potential values still 'higher' than those already given and presented. These additional values are not yet manifested as positive qualities, being merely envisaged concurrently as potential ingredients of a corporate structural pattern. In so doing, love invariably sets up, as it were, an 'idealized paradigm of value' for the person actually present, albeit conceiving this at the same time as an embodiment of his 'true' nature and 'real' value, which only awaits confirmation in feeling. To be sure, this 'paradigm' is implicit in the values already disclosed empirically in feeling--and only the fact that it is so implicit keeps it free from interpolation, empathic projection, etc., and hence from delusion. But, for all that, it is not empirically 'latent' in them, save as an appointed goal, an objective ideal challenge to a better and more beautiful fulfillment of the whole.²⁶

In this account of love, the lover first sees the beloved much as anyone else would. The lover, for example, could presumably give the same report of the physical characteristics of the beloved as any acquaintance of the beloved might. But in addition to seeing what everyone else can see, the lover presumably "sees" in a movement (or in an intentional act, which here amounts to the same thing) the beloved as he might appear "in the best of all possible worlds." The seeing and the movement, then, are generally (Scheler hedges on the movement always being from lower to higher elsewhere) from the actually given complex of qualities of the beloved to what that complex could ideally become. Scheler believes that the values that a thing has are objectively present in the thing and hence are not relative, are not conferred by the viewer, and are observable just as much as the thing's physical properties are observable. Hence he can claim that this idealization of the beloved is not fantasy of the lover, but an actual vision of the fulfillment of the qualities of the

beloved. This last description of love characterizes love as a mental act of visualizing the beloved as the best the beloved could possibly be. Mental here is opposed to ordinary physical vision and is not to be taken as rational or cognitive. In fact this is where Scheler's characterization of love as emotional fits in. This visualization, this movement is felt, not thought. I think Scheler would not mind calling it an intuition of the heart for he subscribes to Pascal's claim that the heart has reasons that reason does not know.

This last formulation of love has some plausibility and makes some sense, but, juxtaposed to what I take to be Scheler's most specific and succinct characterization of love, the formulation leaves some uncomfortable ambiguities. Scheler's most formal characterization of love read:

...love is that movement wherein every concrete individual object that possesses value achieves the highest value compatible with its nature and ideal vocation; or wherein it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its nature.²⁷

The key words are "achieves" and "attains." The characterization makes it sound as if something has happened and the implication is that a movement is not love until the object of love has achieved its ideal state or highest value or ideal vocation. Perhaps it is quibbling, but Scheler needs to introduce a sense of on-going achievements toward that ideal state. No one I know of has achieved his ideal state and hence, according to the characterization, no one has been loved. This is surely not the case; some people have loved and been loved. It is clear, then, that Scheler needs to amend the characterization to imply a going towards the ideal state. But even

with this amendment the characterization clashes with Scheler's description of love as some sort of felt perception of the beloved's true value. It is one thing to visualize the value of something. It is quite another to take the necessary steps (however unpremeditated, however unpedagogical as Scheler would have it, those steps may be) to make this visualization an actuality. What Scheler seems to have overlooked is the distinction between the love act and loving acts, that is, those acts that follow as a consequence of love. The "natural", unpremeditated perfecting of the beloved may come fast in the footsteps of love, but as sure as there is unrequited love this need not be so. I am inclined to agree with Scheler that loving someone tends to improve, to perfect, to make them more who they ideally are. Something of this sort does often happen in a loving relationship. And I would agree with Scheler that the blossoming forth of a person in a love relationship is a natural consequence of loving the person and not a pedagogical exercise. But this movement of the beloved toward perfection is not the same as the lover's movement, as the lover's felt vision of the beloved's ideal self. Both the lover and the beloved are necessary for the first movement, but only the lover is necessary for the latter. In fact the lover's movement or felt vision of the beloved's ideal self seems to be sufficient for love whereas the beloved's movement toward his ideal self is not sufficient unto itself and requires the lover's felt vision for the beloved's movement to be a movement of love. Presumably I could work toward perfecting myself without the aid of a lover, but insofar as the movement toward perfection is love it

requires the lover's felt vision.

Scheler cannot have it both ways. Either love is the lover's felt vision of the ideal state of the beloved or it is the movement of the beloved toward perfection. Since Scheler is not here to choose, I shall choose for him: love is the lover's felt vision of the ideal state of the beloved. And I so choose because this makes the most sense of Scheler's position. For the reasons mentioned above, the lover's felt vision requires no specific antecedent act, but the beloved's movement toward perfection does. It seems clear that the loving acts of the lover are a consequence of his felt vision of the idealized beloved, that is, of his love act. But choosing to characterize love as a felt vision of the beloved in his most ideal state creates other problems for Scheler. Such a felt vision even if understood metaphorically is a perception if only a metaphorical perception and Scheler seems to deny that love is a perception since he expressly denies love is an apprehension.

...preference and rejection belong to the sphere of value-apprehension..., whereas love and hatred cannot be reckoned as acts of apprehension at all. ... They may indeed serve as a basis for the apprehension of value (as we shall see), but they are not themselves apprehensions of this kind.²⁸

Scheler claims that preference is an act of emotional cognition and that "preference always assumes the existence of two values A and B, of which one is then preferred to the other."²⁹ Presumably Scheler sees preference as a comparison test. Having tasted two wines, I find that I prefer one because it is smoother and more full bodied. The pleasantness of the wine is the emotional aspect of preference; this

wine pleases me. I find that this wine pleases me more than another and hence I prefer it. This comparison of the tastes of the wines is the cognitive element of preference. This seems to be a reasonably good characterization of preference and also seems to distinguish love from preference. Love does not have the cognitive element that preference does. We do not weigh the qualities of one individual against another and at the end of our comparison declare that we love one rather than the other (although, we might declare we prefer one to the other). In so far as Scheler takes apprehension to mean this cognitive, rational weighing and comparing the goodness of the qualities of two object, then I must agree; love is not an apprehension. But we need not consider apprehension as an act with an explicitly cognitive element. We may instead consider apprehension in its root meaning of grasping ahold of or seizing something. Further, it is just this grasping ahold of that precedes the cognitive element of preference, just as Scheler suggests. It is only when I firmly have ahold of the tastes in my mind that I can compare them. If I just swallow the wines without attending to their taste, then I will not be able to compare them and hence not be able to prefer one. When I have fully gotten ahold of, when I have apprehended the flavors of the wines, I have attended to them and am capable commenting this one's particularly fruity bouquet.

The felt quality of love is only one of the perceptual metaphors. In addition to the tactile quality is a visual quality. Scheler speaks of the higher value being visualized and of "this vision of a higher value that is of the essence of love."³⁰ He also says that

"love is a movement, passing from a lower value to a higher one, in which the higher value of the object or person suddenly flashes upon us...."³¹ Of course no one who has ever loved has ever seen in the strict and literal perceptual sense anything about the beloved other than what an impartial observer might. What the lover "sees" that others do not is the value the beloved carries. Assuming that the lover and the non-lover are in the same position to see in the strict and literal sense, their perceptions of the beloved should not differ significantly. Both would agree that the beloved is 5'10" with brunette hair and so forth. And assuming that the lover and non-lover were equally astute observers of human behavior, they would both agree that the beloved is intelligent, keen witted and so on. As we have seen the lover cannot explain his love on the basis of the qualities he has seen in the beloved for the simple reason that the non-lover may see them too and yet not love. Hence there are three possibilities: the lover sees in a different way than the non-lover or the lover actually sees more than the non-lover or the lover is delude, fantazing or idealizing. The first possibility is either uninteresting or a restatement of the claim that the lover sees in a different way. If the lover sees more than the non-lover and if seeing more is merely a matter of fact, then the possibility is uninteresting because all that is needed for the non-lover to see this "more" is further contact and proximity to the beloved. Given this further contact, the case is reduced to the original case in which the lover and the non-lover see the same person and yet the lover loves and the non-lover does not. The second interpretation of the claim

that the lover does not see differently but simply more is first patently true since the lover has to be seeing something that the non-lover isn't if the lover isn't merely fantasizing. Second, the seeing more than must come from a way of seeing unavailable to the non-lover. This, then, is just another way of saying the lover sees differently than the non-lover. The other possibility is that the lover is deluded, fantasizing, or idealizing the beloved. Some have taken this position, notably Stendal. Such theories are based on the claim that the lover makes a misattribution of qualities to the beloved. Lovers are human and surely do make mistakes, but there are cases of lovers who have no delusions about the beloved's qualities and yet love. Shakespeares 130th sonnet makes this point.

My mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun;
 Coral is far more red than her lips' red;
 If snow be white, why then her breasts are dun;
 If hairs be wires, black wires grow on her head.
 I have seen roses damask'd red and white,
 But no such roses see I in her cheeks;
 And in some perfumes is there more delight
 Than in the breath that from my mistress reeks.
 I love to here her speak, yet well I know
 That music hath a far more pleasing sound:
 I grant I never saw a goddess go,
 My mistress, when she walks, treads on the ground:
 And yet, by heaven, I think my love as rare
 As any she belied with false compare.

The lover can be under no delusions and yet love, thus the second possibility is at least sometimes false. Besides, accepting this second possibility that love is nothing more than a fantasy or a delusion would make short shrift of this investigation. The task still remains then to describe this different sort of seeing that is love.

3.5 Singer: Appraisal and bestowal

The lover sees the beloved in a different way than the non-lover. And this different way is intimately related to the value the lover places on the beloved. There is no doubt that the lover values the beloved. The sacrifices the lover makes and the risks he takes make it apparent that the lover highly values the beloved, often above all else. It is just as clear that the disagreement between the lover and the non-lover is a disagreement about the value of the beloved.³² They agree on the various attributes of the beloved and may even agree on a ranking of the relative value of the attributes and on the total relative worth of the aggregate valuableness of the traits in comparison to others with other combinations of traits. In spite of their accord, the lover loves, and the non-lover does not. For the moment we can avoid the issue of the justifiability of love and the question of whether it is an a-rational, perhaps phantasmagoric, placement of value by the lover. Instead we may ask, however justifiable or fantastic the lover's placement of value, what is the experience like?

A description of the loving, of the experience that is love, is perhaps better suited to the full-bodied, suggestive and evocative language of literature. The feelings that love's throes prompt are not so easily captured by philosophical discourse and need not be. What philosophical discourse can do, that literature most often does not, is capture the connections and relationships of the love act. When the philosopher speaks of love he may not quicken the pulse, but he should provide a better view of the phenomena.

Scheler claims that love "represents a unique attitude towards objects of value"³³ and expands this claim with the following comments.

They [love and hatred] may indeed serve as a basis for the apprehension of value (as we shall see), but they are not themselves apprehensions of this kind. Moreover, these attitudes are not directed intentionally towards value, let alone 'higher' value, as when we prefer one value to another; they refer to objects inasmuch and insofar as these possess value. It is never values we love, but always something that possesses value.³⁴

Scheler is contrasting the initial placement of value on a thing and value considerations about a thing with the relationship to a thing as valuable. Value apprehension for Scheler implies the act of emotional cognition present in preferring. In the act of value apprehension as in the act of preferring, the value of an object is consciously considered and, as consciously considered, is cognitive albeit a cognition about emotive responses. It is of course true that we can consciously consider the value of one or more things. It also must be true that the objects must be presented to us, often by perceiving them. (We need not perceive the object. Given sufficient familiarity with that kind of object, we can be told that an object did, does, could, or will exist and consider its value in terms of its kind.) If the object has been perceived, then what value it may have may be considered. Such evaluations may be considered appraisals after Irving Singer's distinction in The Nature of Love Plato to Luther.

Singer distinguishes between objective and individual appraisal. He describes objective appraisal as follows.

But what is it to value or evaluate? Think of what a man does when he sets a price upon a house. He

establishes various facts--the size of the building, its physical condition, the cost of repairs, the proximity to schools. He then weights these facts in accordance with their importance to a hypothetical society of likely buyers. Experts in this activity are called appraiser; the activity itself is appraisal or appraising. It seeks to find an objective value that things have in relation to one or another community of human interests. I call this value "objective" because, although it exists only insofar as there are people who want the house, the estimate is open to public verification. In other words, appraising is a branch of empirical science, specifically directed toward the determining of value.

But now imagine that the man setting the price is not an appraiser, but a prospective buyer. The price that he sets need not agree with the appraiser's. For he does more than estimate objective value: he decides what the house is worth to him. To the extent that his preferences differ from other people's, the house will have a different value for him. By introducing such considerations, we relate the object to the particular and possibly idiosyncratic interests of a single person, his likings, his needs, his wants, his desires. Deciding what something is worth to oneself we may call an "individual appraisal." It differs from what the appraiser does; it determines a purely individual value, as opposed to any objective value.³⁵

Whether an objective or an individual appraisal is being made, conscious, presumably rational, consideration goes into the appraisal. Since an evaluation, an appraisal (of which Scheler's preference is a species) is calculated, conscious and rational and since love clearly is not, Scheler and Singer agree that love itself cannot involve this sort of valuing, although both would also agree that love is one basis for such appraisals.³⁶ The rejection of appraisals by both Scheler and Singer, however, do not lead them to the same conclusion. Singer's tactic is to claim that there is another type of valuing.

This further type of valuing I call bestowal. Individual and objective value depend upon an object's ability to satisfy prior interests--the needs, the desires, the wants, or whatever it is that motivates us toward one object and not another. Bestowed value is different. It

is created by the affirmative relationship itself, by the very act of responding favorably, giving an object emotional a pervasive importance regardless of its capacity to satisfy interests. Here it makes no sense to speak of verifiability; and though bestowing may often be injurious, unwise, even immoral, it cannot be erroneous in the way that an appraisal might be. For now it is the valuing alone that makes the value.

Think of what happens when a man comes to love the house he has bought. In addition to being something of use, something that gratifies antecedent desires, it takes on special value for him. It is now his house, not merely as a possession or a means of shelter but also as something he cares about, a part of his affective life. Of course, we also care about objects of mere utility. We need them for the benefits they provide. But in the process of loving, the man establishes another kind of relationship. He gives the house an importance beyond its individual or objective value. It becomes a focus of attention and possibly an object of personal commitment. Merely by engaging himself in this manner, the man bestows a value the house could not have had otherwise.³⁷

Bestowal, Singer claims, is much the same in interpersonal love, the only obvious difference being that the object of love is a person. The lover gratuitously places value on the beloved without consideration for how much the beloved might "deserve" or merit that valuation. By claiming that love is freely placed valuation, Singer has circumvented problems concerning the justification of love. For Singer, love isn't justified; it has no reason. In addition we have the heartening notion the the lover graciously grants, as a sovereign might grant dispensation to his subjects, his valuation. There are no conditions. The young beauty need not worry about getting old and haggard; her husband didn't marry her for her beauty. He loves her "just because." His love is not contingent on her unblemished complexion and finely chiseled features.

Singer's notion of bestowal seems attractive, given the

difficulty in describing the love act. But bestowal is problematic just because it is freely given. Love becomes a capricious act. Surprise! Today I love you; tomorrow I may not. Perhaps sheer force of habit perpetuates the bestowal, but this is hardly reassuring. Furthermore, it is hard to see the value of loving if it is mere caprice. We do not find someone who freely (without reference to his own needs or desires) confers value upon chocolate almond mocha ice cream particularly admirable or praiseworthy. I am not a better man for having conferred value upon it. In fact I would be considered eccentric for conferring value on it on whim. And yet we do feel that love is praiseworthy, if sometimes unwise, and we usually grant that the lover is the better for having loved. Why is love praiseworthy if it confers value willy-nilly? There is some virtue in placing objective value as other appraisers would. The skillful appraiser has learned discernment, surely of some value. But it is insulting to be told that value has been conferred upon me, that you have bestowed value on me when you have found no outstanding reason for conferring it. Shall I respond "You insulgent twit! How dare you confer value on me. I am already valuable. I do not need your bestowal like alms for the poor." Not only is there nothing praiseworthy in bestowing value as one might throw rice at a wedding, it is an insult and a condescension. No, if you love me, I want you to appreciate me for who I am, I want you to recognize how valuable I am. Yes, I want you to bestow value on me, but not capriciously. I want you bestow the value on me that you see I am due.

At this point the demand of the beloved, that she be recognized

for the valuable being that she, is suggests a perceptual theory of the love act rather than a gratuitous bestowing of value. Nonetheless Singer's claim that love is a bestowal is not without merit. If love is a perception of some kind, it is not just a perception. The perception must be followed by an act of valuation. The non-lover perceives the beloved and places some value by virtue of the beloved's attributes. If there is any consistency to valuations, the lover must go through the same two steps: perception and valuation. In the non-lover these two steps can and often are temporally separated. The judges of a beauty contest size up each contestant making note of the attributes that he has seen. Once he has seen all contestants, he compares how they appeared to him, and on the basis of his perceptions he judges their relative beauty (presumably beauty is considered valuable and hence he is making a value judgement). Singer claims that such valuations are not love but objective appraisals. Scheler makes the same claim a bit more clearly; there is a rational, judgemental element in such valuations that is not present in love. In love the valuation falls so closely on the heels of the perception that there is no time for value judgements. The lover sees the beloved and in the seeing values the beloved. The intimacy of the perceiving and the valuing is what is captured in Singer's bestowal. The time consuming act of making a value judgement helps distinguish the perception from the evaluation in an act of appraisal. Since no such rational act is involved in love the perception and the valuation virtually collapse into an unit. The indistinguishability (from a practical standpoint) of the perception and valuation of love makes

love look like an act of bestowal. Without a clear act of evaluation separate from the perception, the overwhelmingly positive valuation of love stands out and overshadows the perception involved. The impression is then of a valuation without a judgement or the antecedent perception needed for judgement. The impression is that the love act is a bestowal of value.

Singer resorts to the description of love as bestowal because he sees no distinguishable acts of perception and valuation in love. Scheler would agree insofar as Singer claims there is no rational act of evaluation as a component of the love act. But Scheler's view that there is an objective hierarchy of values means that he would deny that love is a gratuitous act. Yet, since this hierarchy is not directly perceivable to the senses and since it is not immediately evident to cognition, Scheler is forced to claim, as Pascal does, that the heart has its reasons that reason does not know. It is true that Scheler tries to clarify what he means by "heart" as he does in the following passage.

The figurative expression "heart" does not designate, as both philistines and romantics think, the seat of confused states, of unclear and indefinite agitations or some other strong forces tossing man hither and thither in accord with causal laws (or not). Nor is it some static matter of fact silently tacked on to the human ego. It is the totality of well-regulated acts, of functions having an intrinsic lawfulness which is autonomous and rigorous and does not depend on the psychological organization of man; a lawfulness that operates with precision and exactness. Its functions bring before our eyes a strictly objective sphere of facts which is the most objective, the most fundamental of all possible spheres of fact; one which remains in the universe even if Homo sapiens is destroyed, just as does the truth of the proposition $2 \times 2 = 4$. Indeed, it is more independent of men than the validity of that proposition.³⁸

Yet this passage still contains the perceptual metaphor "bring before our eyes." Scheler has not escaped metaphor, only explained one in terms of another. Even his clarifications do not clarify; I have no idea what he means by "the totality of well-regulated acts" and so forth. I understand what he wants. He wants a being that has the capabilities, the functions to reflect the order of the universe much as Kant's description of man's ability to perceive space and time were an attempt to reflect these dimensions in man. But criticize Kant as you might, no one would contend that man does not have the faculties to perceive space and time. Scheler does not have that much ground to stand on. He must not only argue for the structure of the phenomena but for the existence of it as well.

The above brief passage is not, of course, Scheler's only attempt to defend his position. A little later in "Ordo Amoris" he makes these comments.

People no longer understand the whole of emotional life as a meaningful symbolic language. They no longer see that objective connections are unveiled in the language that, in their changing relationship to us, govern the sense and meaning of our life. Rather, they take our emotional life to consist in a series of totally blind happenings which run their course in us like any natural processes; happenings which eventually one must have a technique for managing in order to get some use from them and avoid harm. However, they do not think that we have to learn to listen to these happenings when we are considering what they "mean," what they wish to say to us, what they advise against what their goals are, or to what they point.³⁹

Here Scheler sounds like an existentialist bemoaning modern man's plight and railing against his stupidity. Still we can agree with him to some extent that our emotional lives has been reduced to conditioned response to be behaviorally modified when they are no

longer useful and that the meaning of our emotions is lost to the extent we treat ourselves like lab animals to be conditioned. Never mind that there are severe problems with Scheler denying that love is an emotion on one passage and implying in the other that love is an emotion. In the end he resorts to a metaphysical structure that may be defensible but unnecessary. Love can be described without reference to an Ordo Amoris or to some extraordinary faculties for the perception of value. What is worse is that his theories add little more to our understanding of the nature of love than has already been gleaned.

The lover perceives the beloved in some special way. Intimately tied to the act of perception is the act of valuation in the love act. From an examination of Singer's distinctions we have seen that a valuation requires a logically prior perception if the valuation is to be grounded and not utterly capricious. We can, of course, perceive and not value, as I do when I drive down the road with no thought to what passes by and only a little to staying on the road. We can perceive and then value. Having thought over the play I saw tonight, I have decided that there was more to it than met my eye. But there are a variety of circumstances in which the perception and valuation are virtually indistinguishable. I have walked into a gallery of a museum and been immediately struck by one painting. Its beauty was immediately evident to me. Every other painting in the gallery I had to inspect and apply my critical faculties to appreciate. Yes, I could see the value in them, but I had to work to see it. The painting that struck me with its beauty constitutes the combined

perceiving-valuing act and the other paintings the perceived then valued act. But what virtually does not make sense is a valuation without a logically antecedent perception, however cotemporaneous the perception and the valuation may actually be.

If we disallow the possibility of valuation without logically antecedent perception, then we have three possible primary combinations of perceiving and valuing. First, there are simple acts of perception without any valuation. (These are only of interest to us insofar as they lead to the second possibility.) Second, there are acts of perception followed by temporally distinct acts of valuation. Third there are perceiving-valuing acts in which the perceiving and the valuing are logically but not temporally distinct. Secondary acts of valuing may follow on the tail of either the perceiving then valuing acts or the perceiving-valuing acts. For instance, the paintings in the gallery which did not immediately strike with their beauty but which I subsequently came to appreciate can be the subject of further valuations such as an art appraiser's evaluation of their monetary worth. But the painting that did strike me with its beauty can be the object of further valuing as well. Having been struck with its beauty, I begin to formulate reasons why the features of the painting combined in such a way that I found it beautiful. In either case the secondary valuations are founded on more primary ones. Singer's appraisals and Scheler's value apprehensions are either of the primary perceiving then valuing acts type or of either of the secondary valuations type. Notice in the secondary valuations type it is possible to consider the value (of the object) rather than the

object itself. But in the primary perceiving then valuing acts or the perceiving-valuing acts it is the object which is the object of consciousness after or during which value is conferred. But even in the perceiving then valuing acts reason can intervene in the schism between the act of perceiving and the act of valuing. Only the perceiving-valuing act leaves no room for reasoning. And it is this act that Singer attempts to capture (unfaithfully as it turns out) in his notion of bestowal. It is also this a-rational perceiving-valuing act that Scheler claims is love and tries valiantly to describe metaphorically.

Lest there be any doubt, I want to make it clear that I am not talking metaphorically in speaking of the perceiving-valuing act. We do perceive without any particularly noticable valuing. A huge portion of philosophy deals with such perceptions. But we also have more complex acts of perception. The perceiving-valuing act is one class of them. The complex act of perception that is perceiving-valuing is rarer than ordinary perceptions that are not value laden, but even so most (all?) of us can claim to have had some. Being transfixed by a particularly awesome sunset is one example. Being struck by the power of a symphony is another. Perhaps you have overwhelmed at the sight of a particularly magnanimous act. Or at the truth that rings out in a play or a poem.⁴⁰ There are even more mundane examples. In the first bite of a particularly good cantelope I am delighted with its full flavored succulence. Perception-valuations are part of everyday life, if not part of its routine.

In the examples it is obvious that there is an emotional component. The delight or awe is surely an emotional reaction. But they are not reactions to the mere taste or sight of something. They are reactions to the perceiving-valuing act. These acts may even form the even more complex perceiving-valuing-affecting act. But even if they do, the logical order is perception, valuation and then affection. This complex act reveals why Scheler both asserted and denied that love was an emotion. Simple reflex emotions such as fear and anger are almost too simple to contain a valuative element. They are more like psycho-physiological reactions than emotions. There is a chain reaction--perception then emotion. But while my awe at the sunset is a reaction to the sunset, it is not a knee-jerk reaction. There is a spontaneous quality to perceiving-valuing-affecting acts, but this is distinct from a physiological reflex. Simply put, simple emotions have no more than two logically distinct acts--perceiving and feeling. The complex act that love must be has the additional logically distinct act of valuing. Furthermore, the emotions attached to the perceiving-feeling act can range. This is particularly evident in love where the first blush may contain an extraordinarily positive, glowing feeling and a rejection may contain utter dejection and despair. And of course there are a multitude of other emotions that may be attached to the basic perceiving-valuing act depending on the circumstances. Hence, love has an emotional element, but it is not a single emotion. Much like an unstable molecule will tend to stabilize itself with an element or molecule of the proper valence, so too love tends to complete itself with an emotion that fits the circumstances,

for example, joy at the acceptance of one's love by the beloved and despair at rejection. A calculus of love and emotions could be worked out, although I will not do that here. With the description I have just given Scheler's apparent contradiction can be resolved. Love is not an emotion insofar as the emotion is a simple one requiring only a perception and a reaction or is complex one with intervening rational judgements. (This second type of emotion has been rejected in a previous section and is even more clearly not love given the current discussion of the unitary perceiving-valuing acts.) But love is emotional; it takes various emotions depending on circumstances.

If we both go into the art gallery, you might be struck with the beauty of one painting and I another. The difference can be accounted for in terms of tastes that have been educated and cultivated over the years as well as by other variables, for instance, our differing constitutions. This is important; we are individuals with unique personalities that have developed through the course of our lives. Part of differences in selecting the love object can be accounted for just because our different personalities give us different views of the world. But more important at the moment is the possibility that a third person might enter the gallery and find the whole collection an abysmal pile of garbage. I have a friend who has no use for impressionist paintings although many affect me profoundly. But I have some training in art and know some of the history that led to the transformation from realism to impressionism. Someone might object that my apparent perceiving-valuing acts at being confronted with one of Monet's waterlily panels is really a perceiving then valuing act or

even a secondary consideration of the value. There is no denying that I approach the paintings with a different, tutored point of view. But I would deny that in those special cases in which I am struck by a painting's beauty I am "having" anything other than a perceiving-valuing act. I may argue phenomenologically that my experience is of a perceiving-valuing act; I can distinguish this experience from those I have with paintings that do not forcefully strike me. The distinction needs to be drawn. My experiences are different, and hence the description of them also needs to be. But I can also point out to the objector that no person is an empty slate after the moment of birth and probably not since conception. Whether I explain it genetically or environmentally or both, I now have a personality, a foundation on which I experience the things about me. To philosophize about some pristine creature without such a foundation is sheer folly when the matter at hand is a particularly human function. When I talk about the perceiving-valuing acts, I am talking about acts that people as they are perform. The psychologist may describe how people accrue value complexes that allow them to respond to certain stimuli and not others, but that is a matter for the social sciences. What the philosopher needs to know is that people are capable of such acts for at the moment they occur, they occur in a given, individual background. The perceiving-valuing acts can be examined and described whatever the geneology of the ground on which they occur.

We are now in a position to give a definition or, perhaps more aptly, a description of the love act. Since we are concerned only

with interpersonal love, the object of the love act will be designated as "a person." This designation of the object is also provisional but will suffice for the moment. The love act is an act of perceiving-valuing toward a person. Such acts take a wide range of possible attendant emotions depending on the circumstance. The complex perceiving-valuing act is the only possibility here considered that plausibly fits the phenomena. The description logically orders the elements of the love act in a way that definitions of the love act as a desire, or emotion, or judgement cannot, because each of those kinds of definitions oversimplifies the phenomena.

But there is one serious omission in the definition. To get the description we left aside the issue of justification. As it stands, the description still leaves open the possibility that love is merely a matter of taste. You happen to be struck by the beauty of David's paintings, I by those of Monet. Merely a matter of taste. You love Sally, and I love Jane. Merely a matter of taste. But while we each can, depending on our artistic critical sophistication, defend our preference for David or Monet, we are speechless in any attempt we might make to defend our love. But the justification of my pechant for Monet comes, not from a description of my perceiving-valuing act toward his paintings, for presumably your taste for David is a structurally similar perceiving-valuing act, but from the nature of the object of my perceiving-valuing act. Hence, to give a full description of the love act and to explore its justification, we will have to examine the objects of interpersonal love--persons.

CHAPTER III

WHAT WE LOVE ABOUT WHO WE LOVE

4.1 Introduction

She [the beloved] is not static: she is fluid, changing, indefinable--alive. The lover is attending to a person. And who can say what that is?¹

The concept of a person gives Singer pause, as well it might. But although his reluctance to explore what a person is is understandable, it is absolutely essential to an understanding of interpersonal love. After all, a person is the object of such loves. To say that, when we love another, we love a person is not merely redundant and uninformative, it leaves the nature of our love ambiguous. Without further comment, the perceiving-valuing act that is the love act could be directed at any object indifferently with comparable results and consequences. Yet we do not find people falling head over heels in love with rocks or trees. It is only when love is directed at persons that love exhibits itself most fully. But just when love exhibits itself most fully, we find its object most puzzling. What is it that constitutes the love of a person? How is this love unique? What is it (presumably there is something) about the person that is loved? An understanding of interpersonal love cannot be had without a clear view of what it is about a person that

makes him lovable.

An examination of the enduring emotions has shown that love is unlike them insofar as explicit reasons can be given for the emotions and cannot be given for love. What this amounts to is that no particular trait of the beloved can be given as the reason for love, and hence no particular trait is the reason for love. What happens to my love when you become arthritic if I love you for your mastery of the piano? Or when your body ages if I love you for your delicate skin and subtle curves? If I love you for your sharp wit does my love end when you are comatose, never to regain consciousness? Surely I may hold these and a myriad of other traits dear, but they are not the reasons I love you. In part we find these physical and characterological traits a feeble foundation for love because they come and go while the person endures. But just as much they seem insufficient. While seeing, appreciating and enjoying the same group of traits in the beloved, the lover and non-lover do not have the same response to them. We might fault the non-lover for not appreciating them enough, but more likely we will see the lover as over-valuing the beloved's traits. The non-lover is not wanting; he is not somehow deficient, a particularly dull witted fellow without proper emotional responses. The non-lover may love someone else and find himself on the other end of the stick, demonstrating his capability to love but also finding himself responding "unreasonably" to another. Neither is the lover demented; while often in the beginnings of love the lover acts strange, not all lovers do and most in due course can both love and carry on perfectly ordinary life otherwise. No, we do not love a

person's traits.

We might say that what is loved is the goodness of the person. Surely the virtues of the man or woman deserve our love and justify it. But in truth goodness of a person is nothing more than another word for his lovableness. Both point to the positive qualities and traits of the person. And so the arguments that demonstrate that we do not love traits apply to the claim that we love the goodness of a person. In addition, as Scheler points out, loving a person for his goodness puts us in a peculiar moral position. If someone, after genuine and honest effort, fails to attain some virtue and if we love them only for their goodness, their failure to attain the virtue would prompt us to halt our love and shun them. Not only does halting our love at this point go against how we think the course of love ought to run, it puts us in the position of not loving just when the person needs it the most and when (it would seem) it is most virtuous to love. In other words, part of our notion of love is that, if we love, we love whether the person deserves it or not. I am glad of her strengths and regret her weaknesses, but I love her all the same. Love is not a reward for being good boys and girls. But if I do not love you because you deserve it, because you are good, then all justification for my love seems to vanish.

We are left it seems in an impossible situation. If I love you for no reason at all, then my love is a ridiculous condescension having no more worth than a particular roll of the dice. But whatever reasons I might have are inadequate to justify my love, at least reasons of the ordinary sort--the kind we give for our other emotions

and valuations. But perhaps this is just as well: we really don't want a reason of the sort that hinges on commonly granted qualities of a thing. We want a reason better, more profound than "She's pretty" or "He's intelligent." We feel that our love is profound: shouldn't it have profound reasons? The only problem is coming up with those profound reasons.

Scheler advocates one possibility: we love a person for the unique person that he is. Since we are all unique individuals, loving a person in (for?) his uniqueness seems to explain why I love this person and not another. But why this uniqueness rather than that? Singer puts the objection this way.

For what then does a man love a woman? For being the person she is, for being herself? But that is to say that he loves her for nothing at all. Everyone is himself. Having a beloved who is what she is does not reveal the nature of love.²

While it is true that we love unique individuals, the uniqueness seems no reason or justification for loving. On the other hand, the justification for love, as I have suggested and to which we are virtually forced, is a justification of a peculiar sort. The sort of justification that would provide reason for anyone loving anyone else. For, after all, we have no reason to believe that a person couldn't love any other person. In fact, this is what Christianity enjoins us to do. With this need for an unusual justification in mind, uniqueness has some plausibility as a possible justification. Uniqueness is something everyone has, but no two people are unique in the same way, else they would not be unique. Before I descend into paradox and word play, I want to object that uniqueness simply does

not seem profound enough to be a justification. Put another way, everything is unique. Persons surely are, but so are rocks and trees. Uniqueness doesn't give us reason for a purely human love. Nonetheless it suggests the kind of reason we may be forced to if we are to justify love at all; a justification that can provide reason for loving any person, but specifically persons.

To find such a justification, though, requires an examination of persons. I will not investigate complete theories of persons nor will I provide one of my own. Such a task is another project entirely. I will examine the part of Sartre's Being and Nothingness that considers the initial, primary relationship between people. While he also gives a theory of love, I will not examine it in detail since it relies on assumptions I dispute. Nonetheless, Sartre's exploration of the Look and the Other will provide direction in finding the missing justification for love.

4.2 Sartre's Look And The Awareness Of Others

To begin an examination of Being and Nothingness³ with Sartre's exposition of the Look and the Other is to begin after his development of the for-itself, that is, consciousness. To understand the Look and the Other requires a rudimentary understanding of Sartre's conception of being-for-itself and so a few prefatory comments are in order. Sartre develops his concept of consciousness from Hegel, Heidegger, and Husserl. It can be argued that his notion of consciousness more closely resembles Husserl's, but whatever the genesis of his ideas, Sartre's understanding of consciousness diverges significantly from his predecessors. Sartre's consciousness is a nothingness which takes being as its object.

As curious as it sounds to call consciousness a nothingness, Sartre has good reason for doing so. Sartre is well aware of the difficulties of any Cartesian type system which claims that there are two kinds of substance (two kinds of being), mind and matter; there always arises the apparently insoluble problem of how two radically different kinds of being can influence one another as mind and matter so obviously do. Sartre's solution to the Cartesian dilemma is to acknowledge that there are thoughts and matter but to claim that only matter is. Matter or, in Sartre's terminology, Being just is and as such is completely identical with itself. As such, it cannot be related to itself and can make no reference to itself. It is massive, opaque and undifferentiated. Consciousness (which is our thoughts in the broadest possible sense of "thoughts") is what matter is not. Since matter is being, consciousness is non-being or nothing. Perhaps

the best way to express plainly what Sartre is driving at is to say that consciousness is a nothing aware of being. Taking over from Husserl the notion that consciousness takes an object, Sartre points out that consciousness in taking an object is still not ever that object. I may think about you or perceive the tree, but my consciousness of you or of the tree is not you or the tree. In fact, consciousness can be viewed as negation. It not only is not its object (whatever that may happen to be at the moment), it also "haunts" being with negation. By isolating the tree from the ground, consciousness has actually distinguished the tree from what the tree is not (i.e., the remainder of being). Furthermore, if consciousness is not to collapse into being, it must retrieve itself in its awareness of being by being aware of its not being what it is aware of. Sartre defines consciousness as that which is what it is not and which is not what it is. This may sound paradoxical, but it is Sartre's attempt (an attempt which he makes at great length) to capture the nature of pre-reflective consciousness. Sartre imbues the pre-reflective consciousness with almost human characteristics. Presumably this is justifiable since it is human consciousness that Sartre is describing. In any case consciousness, even at the pre-reflective level, strives to be its own foundation. That is, consciousness attempts in its being consciousness of itself as not being itself as aware of being in-itself to be a being identical with itself and yet aware of itself. This is impossible since only being in-itself can be identical with itself and since this identity does not allow an awareness (which is not, cannot be, the in-itself) of the

being in-itself. In its striving to be a for-itself-in-itself (a being conscious of itself and yet identical with itself) the for-itself dooms itself to failure. All of the foregoing description of prereflective consciousness, it should be noted, is not a relationship of knowing but of being. The prereflective consciousness does not know its object, rather it is in relationship to its object. Even when consciousness reflects on itself the most primary relationship is one of being. The reflective consciousness is a mode, a modification of the prereflective consciousness. Reflective consciousness is, for Sartre, the sort of awareness one has when one is aware that one is typing or playing tennis or whatever. This sort of reflective consciousness is in the present; it is a consciousness of on-going consciousness. There is also reflective consciousness as knowledge that is of the past, as when I consider what I did yesterday. My past, of course, is no longer a consciousness and has become a being in-itself. My past Sartre calls a facticity which, along with my body as my other facticity, I must acknowledge as mine and yet I must always go beyond or transcend these facts of my existence since I am a consciousness, a for-itself, and my body and past are being, in-themselves.

There are four aspects of prereflective consciousness that require closer examination in view of this discussion of love: lack, value, possibility, and freedom. A being in-itself has to be, cannot be other than it is, and is lawfully, causally determined. The for-itself, on the other hand, being what the in-itself is not, is not determined but

free. Consciousness is only bound by its dependence on being in-itself as consciousness' object. The lack of freedom we ordinarily experience is based on this dependence. Our feeling that we are not free to argue with the boss or free to climb a mountain is based, not on consciousness' lack of freedom, but on the fact that consciousness is situational, that it is always in relationship to some in-itself or another. I am free to argue with the boss or climb a mountain to get to the valley on the other side. I just am not free to alter the fact that the boss will fire me if I argue with him or the fact that the mountain's height is such that I will freeze to death before I can reach the other side. The freedom of consciousness is probably the most criticized aspect of Sartre's philosophy; however, I will not take issue with Sartre's analysis since the analysis of the object of love will not hinge on it.

The for-itself as nihilation determines itself as lack. Quite simply consciousness lacks being. A being, an in-itself, cannot lack anything. A broken chair may be said to lack an arm, but the broken chair itself lacks nothing. Only through consciousness can the chair be seen as lacking anything. Consciousness not only intends, but perceives the chair as it is in its fullness as being in-itself. It transcends the broken chair toward the complete chair and supplies the missing part. A lack, then has three parts: that which is lacking (e.g., the chair), that which is lacked (e.g., the missing arm), and the totality which would be were there not a lack (e.g., the "complete", whole chair). Any time we see something as missing or complete a whole of which only a part is given, we are manifesting

lack. Most often we think of lack as applied to some object, but Sartre claims that lack is the very "nature" of Consciousness. Consciousness, after all, strives for a whole which it is not. So the totality toward which consciousness strives as lack is identity with itself. That which is given is consciousness itself considered as awareness and what is lacked is the identity of the in-itself that consciousness is not. Thus, by its very nature consciousness is lack and perpetually so, constantly throwing out before itself the totality which it can never be. This totality (the for-itself-in-itself) is the self that consciousness attempts to be. It is also value. Value has the peculiar characteristic of both being and not being. It is not, since it is the unattainable attempt of consciousness. It is however for consciousness as that totality toward which consciousness aims. Here, as throughout his discussion of prereflective consciousness, Sartre is not speaking of knowing and value is not held out to consciousness as an object and a specific goal. Rather value is contained within the act of consciousness as that which the act of consciousness transcends itself toward. Sartre is claiming in his discussion of lack and value that consciousness is lack and value and that lack and value are not merely modifications of consciousness which consciousness may or may not choose to take.

Sartre immediately follows his discussion of lack and value with a discussion of possibilities. I will not try to reproduce the course of the analysis of possibility, but rather note its relationship to freedom, lack, and value. It should be clear that nothing can be free unless there are options (possibilities) open. This is generally

accepted and uncontentious. Equally, insofar as there is lack there is possibility for in lack there is always the totality toward which lack aims as a possibility even if this possibility is, in the end, impossible. Since value is the totality toward which lack aims, value too is intimately related to possibility. And, of course, all these relationships are ones of being, not knowing. A prereflective consciousness does not consider possibilities; it is its possibilities in the same sense that it is lack and it is the value toward which it strives.

After he develops these aspects of consciousness that consciousness is (freedom, lack, value, and possibility), Sartre shows that consciousness in its very nature temporalizes and spatializes. Consciousness is not just in time and space, in its being it makes time to be by temporalizing and makes space to be by spatializing. With the addition of space and time to the character--the being--of consciousness we have a characterization of consciousness sufficient for an examination of the Look and the Other.

The review of Sartre to this point is not comprehensive nor was it intended to be. For present purposes it is enough to get a general idea of Sartre's position. Consciousness is in contrast with Being as nothingness is in contrast to complete, opaque, self-identical being. But consciousness is not a simple awareness of being. It is an awareness of itself as being aware of being. In its both being aware of being and of itself, consciousness is also a freedom, a lack, value, and possibility. From this core of attributes which it is, consciousness temporalizes and spatializes. It is this extensively

developed notion of consciousness that Sartre brings to his discussion of the Look and the Other.

Sartre introduces the Look and the Other by way of the traditional problem of others variously stated as the questions "How do I know this other being is a person like myself?" or "How do I know this other being has a mind?" or, more appropriately for Sartre, "How do I know this other being has/is a consciousness?" Sartre, of course, rejects prior attempts to answer these questions and claims that the being of the Other (another conscious being) is given to me in a relationship of being. It is this relationship of being to the Other that Sartre describes in "The Look."

Sartre first considers the Other-as-object and begins with this description.

This woman whom I see coming toward me, this man who is passing by in the street, this beggar whom I hear calling before my window, all are for me objects--of that there is no doubt. Thus it is true that at least one of the modalities of the Other's presence to me is object-ness.⁴

But a person is not like other objects in the world to which I might attend. Sartre points out that if the man I view in the park were only one object among many that "I could have him disappear without the relations of the other objects around him being perceptibly changed." and "In short, no new relation would appear through him between those things in my universe."⁵ This, of course, is not the case; his being a man makes all the difference in the world.

Perceiving him as a man, on the other hand, is not to apprehend an additive relation between the chair and him; it is to register an organization without distance of the things in my universe around that privileged object. To

be sure, the lawn remains two yards and twenty inches away from him, but it is also as a lawn bound to him in a relation which at once both transcends distance and contains it. Instead of the two terms of the distance being indifferent, interchangeable, and in a reciprocal relation, the distance is unfolded starting from the man.... We are dealing with a relation which is without parts, given at one stroke, inside of which there unfolds a spatiality which is not my spatiality; for instead of a grouping toward me of the objects, there is now an orientation which flees from me.⁶

Yet the man is an object for me and he belongs to my distances. It is just that because I perceive him as a man

...the world has a kind of drain hole in the middle of its being and ... it is perpetually flowing off through this hole.⁷

Nonetheless,

The universe, the flow, and the drain hole are all once again recovered, reapprehended, and fixed as an object. All this is there for me as a partial structure of the world, even though the total disintegration of the universe is involved.⁸

The disintegration may be contained as when the man is absorbed in the book he is reading. In such instances, he is not perceiving all that I am perceiving but merely a small part. But even such contained cases of the Other as object indicate a new aspect of a world that was heretofore completely for me.

The quality "man-reading" as the relation of the man to the book is simply a little particular crack in my universe. At the heart of this solid, visible form he makes himself a particular emptying. The form is massive only in appearance; its peculiar meaning to be--in the midst of my universe, at ten paces from me, at the heart of that massivity--a closely consolidated and localized flight.⁹

Even though this "drain hole", this "localized flight" in my world is the Other as object, it is not the original relation of the Other to

me. Sartre claims this is so because 1) such events in my world concern only the person (I view) and the things in the world, 2) the person is still only an object of knowledge (e.g., I can report, "The man is walking on the lawn.", and 3) that the man is purely probable in two ways. First, it is only probable that he is a man and not a cunningly contrived robot and, second, even if it is granted that he is a man, it is only probable that he is reading or looking--he may be daydreaming and only look as if he is reading. On these grounds Sartre says we can discount the Other as object as the original relation of the Other to me and hence we must look further for this original relation of the Other to me. Sartre initially points to the permanent possibility that "...if the Other-as-object is defined in connection with the world as the object which sees what I see,"¹⁰ then I may be seen by the Other as subject.

While the possibility of seeing the other points to the possibility of being seen by him, the "being seen" cannot be derived from the "seeing." It is not as if "the Other's look after having wandered over the lawn and the surrounding objects came following a definite path to place itself on me,"¹¹ but rather a radical conversion of the Other is necessary if he is to escape objectification. For the Other to be a subject, I cannot objectify him as just one more object in my world. Furthermore, if I am to be an object to his subject then my objectivity cannot be derived for me from the (objective) world since I am the one by whom there is a world. Hence this possibility of being-seen-by-another cannot be derived from the Other-as-object (for here he must be a subject) nor

can it be derived from my being-as-subject (since I cannot be an object to myself, reflective consciousness notwithstanding). The Other as object is, then, a reference to the Other as subject and, Sartre claims, "being-seen-by-the-Other" is the truth of "seeing-the-othular set of eyes, for I may feel the look of another on me when I hear a rustle in the bushes as I attempt to sneak by enemy lines or when I hide myself from the house on the hill that might be enemy occupied. Even when I do encounter another's eyes, Sartre claims, I can either look at them or I can experience the look, but I can not do both. But whether the Other is actually present or not, whether I actually see his eyes or feel them boring through my back, the experience is of the look and the other as subject. In the experience of the look I may feel shame as one of the primitive reactions to the Other as subject. It is this shame that Sartre uses to develop the details of my experience of the Other.

Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice I have just glued my ear to the door and looked through a keyhole. I am alone and on the level of a non-thetic self-consciousness. This means first of all that there is no self to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can refer my acts in order to qualify them. They are in no way known; I am my acts....¹²

The scene behind the door is "to be seen" and the conversation going on "to be heard." "The door and keyhole are at once both instruments and obstacles..."¹³ This world before me is in relation to my free possibilities. I am my jealousy. My jealousy is the objective fact that there is something to be seen behind the door and is called situation. The situation reflects the facticity of the objective

structure of the world surrounding me and my freedom, as well, since I have tasks freely to be done. Yet, I cannot define myself as in a situation since I am not a positional consciousness of myself.

There is nothing there but a pure nothingness encircling a certain objective ensemble and throwing it into relief outlined upon the world, but this ensemble is a real system, a disposition of means in view of an end.¹⁴

But just as I am so engaged, I hear footsteps in the hall. I have been seen. I have been looked at. Now I exist as myself for my pre-reflective consciousness. Before the entrance of the Other I could only consider myself in a reflective mode of consciousness. But now, Sartre says, the self comes to haunt the pre-reflective consciousness. Since pre-reflective consciousness is consciousness of the world, its consciousness of the self exists on the level of things in the world. This consciousness of the self is not consciousness of the self as an object, however, since only reflective consciousness can take the self as a positional object. Rather, my self is present to me only insofar as I am an object for the Other. I am conscious of myself as escaping myself; I am conscious of myself as having a foundation outside myself (in the Other). As such consciousness, I am for myself only as a pure reference to the Other. Just as this self is not the object of my consciousness neither is the Other. If he were the object of my consciousness, he would be reduced to an object and my self would vanish in my objectification. Neither do I empty myself intend this self as something to be filled in later. This self entirely escapes me. I cannot know it since it does not exist for me; it exists for the Other. Even so, I am a self which another knows.

When I apprehended the Other as object in my world, I experienced him as a drain in the middle of it. Nonetheless, my world contained this draining out of it. With the look, the world flows out of itself and I flow outside of myself. In speaking of my flowing outside of myself Sartre is pointing to this self as something that I am and yet something that I do not directly make to be. There is an indeterminacy and unpredictability to this self that stem not so much from my inability to know the Other as from his freedom, for this self reveals his freedom to me. The revelation of his freedom does not come from an image he might produce of me but from a dimension of my being that is separated from me by nothingness--his nothingness as freedom. I can never be for myself this being seated in a chair--my consciousness transcends this "being" as what I am not--but the Other can see me as seated on the chair just as he can see the cane resting against the table. I recognize the Other's ability to make of me a thing and in this recognition, I have an outside and this outside is my nature.

To speak of my nature is to speak of my possibilities becoming probabilities. My free possibilities become before the Other's look possibilities in his world. He objectifies me and so may construe my actions as having patterns. These patterns are probabilities derived from my acting on my possibilities. My possibilities become probabilities when viewed by the Other and yet the possibilities remain such for me; I just experience them as probabilities for the Other. For instance, my possibility of hiding in a corner is cut short by the probability that the Other might find me there.

Furthermore, as I am the Other's possibles so I am an instrumentality in his world.

Just as my nature can be characterized as my possibilities becoming probabilities, it can also be characterized as my spatializing becoming spatialized and my temporalizing becoming temporalized. The world was for me as I spatialized it, but in the experience of the look I experience myself as being spatialized in the Other's world. In the same fashion my temporalization is temporalized. The Other temporalizes himself and, as he views me, he temporalizes me. As a spatio-temporal object in the world, I offer myself to the Other's appraisal. In becoming an object before the Other, I subject myself to the appraisals and value judgements he might make. I am there for him to assess. And to the extent I am available to his appraisal, I can be considered a slave before him. I am a defenseless being before his freedom.

With his comments on the appraisal of the Other in the look, Sartre claims that he has finished his description of the look. He points out that his description has taken place on the level of pre-reflective consciousness and hence that his description of the look in no way involves knowing. The Other is particular, concrete condition of my being-unrevealed, that is, of the self that I am but do not know. Since I am related to the Other in my being, Sartre claims that his description has avoided solipsism. His arguments have the following general form. I do experience the look and the self that escapes me. I am a consciousness that (as has been shown previously) cannot make an object of itself. If I cannot make an

object of myself and yet there is a self, then this self must be the product of some other, i.e., the Other.¹⁵ Any attempt to make the Other merely a construction of my consciousness is in error since it has failed to appreciate the relation of being between me and the Other. It is true that I can know the Other as object and that this knowledge of him is merely probable, but the Other as object is a degraded experience of the Other. The Other as subject as experienced in the look is a factual necessity of my being. He is factual insofar as he is not derivable from me as consciousness, and he is necessary since I do experience the look.

Sartre considers the possible objection that I might experience the look and yet find that there was no one there to produce it. In light of this objection Sartre introduces the notions of presence and absence. Even if an Other was not there when I deduced from an experience of a look that he was, I demonstrate my capability for experiencing the Other through the look. In fact I may alter my behavior because I have experienced the look. After hearing the bushes rustle and thinking that it was someone, I may decide that my hiding place is not safe enough and go elsewhere. In such an event the absence of the Other indicates his presence to me. In fact it makes no sense to speak of absence at all except insofar as there is a presence. A halltree that never occupied a space in my house is not absent. Only if it had been present at one time could it now be present. Similarly, my friend Paul is now absent because he has been present to me. Even now he is present to me in his absence when I think of going to see him or of a conversation we had. Hence even in

the experience of the absence of an Other, the look reveals to me my presence to the Other.

Sartre makes the point that the look is prenumerical. That is, the experience of the look does not distinguish whether there is one or a thousand people looking at me. I am simply looked at. Only when I look do countable Others appear. But then, the look disappears, and I am left with the Other as object. By the time Sartre talks about the prenumerical look it is clear that the Other as subject cannot be considered any single other consciousness or group of consciousnesses. The look demonstrates that a) I am capable of experiencing another consciousness and b) other consciousness exists since the look could only be experienced in an interaction with a consciousness that is not mine.

That the look is prenumerical makes it evident that the Other as subject, as a consciousness, can only exist for me as a refused self. The Other cannot be discerned as this or that particular consciousness and hence cannot be specified as this or that other person. All that there is of him is this self that I am. But this self I refuse to be since as consciousness I transcend myself at every moment. But of course, in the same way that I refuse the Other, as another consciousness, he refuses me. This relationship to the Other in the refused self (and through the experience of the look) is a double negation. "Not only do I make myself not-be this other being by denying that he is me, I make myself not-be a being who is making himself not-be me."¹⁶ But this double negation is in a sense self-destructive. If I make myself not-be this other being, then I

loose my objecthood in making an object of him. If he makes an object of me, then he loses his objectivity. Of these two states of the double negation the more fundamental is that in which I am objectified inasmuch as in the other negation I deny his being. But since in the negation in which I am objectified I do not apprehend the Other directly, my experience of him is as my refused self. This refused self I transcend and so I alienate myself from the Other. At the same time this refused self is my bond to the Other. It is that which differentiates us; two consciousnesses can be distinguishably two only if they negate and objectify one another. It is this double negation that provides the basis for all my relations with others. I am always either experiencing myself as an object for the Other or transcending this objectification. The objectification leads to the transcendence, and the transcendence collapses back into the objectification.

There are affective consequences of this interplay of consciousnesses. Emotions are generated out of the particular stages of my interaction with another. Sartre comments that I might remain fascinated with this Unrevealed, this Other, if I did not realize him specifically in fear, shame, and pride. It is interesting that Sartre mentions fascination first, but he makes nothing of the possibility of fascination. He is more concerned with some fundamental emotional reactions, not only fear, shame and pride, but arrogance and vanity as well. Each of these is developed from some particular moment in the experience of the Other. In fear, for instance, I appear to myself as threatened. It is not, of course, the for-itself that is threatened directly but the self. But then, I am this self and so the ruin of

the self implies the ruin of the for-itself.

Fear is therefore the discovery of my being-as-object on the occasion of the appearance of another object in my perceptive field. It refers to the origin of all fear, which is the fearful discovery of my pure and simple object-state in so far as it is surpassed and transcended by possibles which are not my possibles.¹⁷

I may escape my fear by thrusting myself toward my possibles thereby transcending my object state and at the same time objectifying the Other such that his possibilities become dead possibilities.

Shame, too, hinges on the realization of my object state. And pure shame, Sartre says, "...is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object but in general of being an object; that is, of recognizing myself in this degraded, fixed, and dependent being which I am for the Other."¹⁸ In shame I have "fallen" into the world and realize that I need the mediation of the Other to be what I am. And again, the way out of shame, the escape from it lies in objectifying the Other. When I objectify the Other he has a subjectivity as a hollow box has an inside, and since this subjectivity is there, at a distance, contained, it loses its efficacy. Then his knowledge of me appears as nothing more than an image he has of me and takes on the character of "subjective" (in the sense of relative) knowledge. I am in turn non-thematically aware of being capable of being an object for the Other. It is this awareness that is imperfectly referred to in the "I" of "I am ashamed of myself before the Other."

In pride I am aware of my objectness before the Other but in addition I am aware that I am responsible for this objectness.

I emphasize my responsibility and I assume it. In one sense therefore pride is at first resignation; in order to

be proud of being that, I must of necessity first resign myself to being only that.¹⁹

Pride is built on shame since it builds on my original awareness of my objectness before the Other that is shame. Sartre also comments that pride is a reaction of flight and bad faith since "I try to apprehend myself as affecting the Other by my object state"²⁰ at the same time I hold the Other as a subject. Hence, Sartre claims, there are only two authentic attitudes: shame and arrogance--the shame of apprehending Other as the subject through whom I get my objectness and the arrogance of affirming my freedom as I confront the Other as object.

In vanity, as in pride, I accept my objectness before the Other. But whereas in pride I accept responsibility for that objectness, in vanity I attempt to use my objectness to manipulate the Other. I attempt to affect him passively with admiration or love. He, as he objectifies me, confers qualities on me--beauty, intelligence, wit--and I in turn try to have him respond freely as a subject to return these qualities to me so that I might know my self. But in principle my self is unknowable to me and in the process of attempting to know it I objectify the Other as the object of this project. I play a role for the Other, a self I would know, so that he will return it to me. But in the process of playing this role, I look to the Other for this self and thereby turn him "into stone", into an object. At this point I have lost the self I would know in the depths of the Other and I am faced with my own freedom objectifying the Other.

Sartre continues his discussion of the Other, and only when he is done, does he turn to the body. Even so, at the point at which he

finishes discussing the basic affective reactions to the Other, he has provided enough of the essential relationship of self to the Other for a discussion of the Other as the beloved. The tools he provides for an exploration of the Other as the beloved do not seem promising. Given his description of the Other, it appears that there is no relationship that is not doomed to failure. I am either objectifying the Other or being objectified by him and no matter how elaborate my attempts at a union with the Other, my attempts are always reduced to those two possibilities. If love is not a project doomed to failure and if all claims to love are not shams, then a reevaluation of Sartre's development of the Other is necessary. It is that project to which I turn next.

4.3 Another Look At Objectification

What makes Sartre's description of the for-itself's basic relationship with others so dismal is that he claims that there are only two--equally futile--possibilities. Shall I objectify you or shall I feel objectified by you? Even the most complex relationships are derived from these two possibilities. The more complex relationships simply have layers of objectifying and objectification intertwined with dissimulation. Dissimulation is necessary since the only way to derive more complex emotions from the two basic attitudes is through deceit. Sartre's analysis of love bears witness to what happens when two attitudes are required to explain emotions and human interactions with a significant emotional component. To love, Sartre claims, is to want to be loved. In this love that is a wanting-to-be-loved

...I want to assimilate the Other as the Other-looking-at-me, and this project of assimilation includes an augmented recognition of my being-looked-at. In short, in order to maintain before me the Other's freedom which is looking at me, I identify myself totally with my being-looked-at.²¹

But to get the Other to love me requires more than having him look at me; after all, he looks at me already, and at other things as well, without loving me or them. For the Other to love me, he must treat me as the center of his world. I must be all that counts and that through which all else is understood. I am an object for the Other, but this very special central object.

In one sense if I am to be loved, I am the object through whose procurement the world will exist for the Other; in another sense I am the world. Instead of being a "this" detaching itself on the ground of the world, I am

the ground-as-object on which the world detaches itself.²²

And how do I convince the Other to give me this status? Through fascination. By being fascinating I attempt to seduce the Other into putting me in this privileged place in his world.

For the moment it is not important to understand why I, as a lover, have these goals or exactly how I pursue them; it is only important to see that I, as Sartre's lover, knowingly attempt to use the fact of my objectification (through the Other's look) to ensnare the Other as a free consciousness. Sartre claims that, at heart, the lover attempts to convince the Other through fascination to treat the lover as the ultimate object in the Other's universe in spite of the fact that the Other knows full well that the lover is not just an object. Love is consciousness playing at being only object and deceiving the Other into believing that this ersatz object is the only object worth looking at. Such a description of his love makes it clear that Sartre's account is relying both upon the two basic attitudes toward the other--objectifying and objectification--and upon deception.

Upon reading Sartre's account of relationships, probably all but the most misanthropic and depressed have wanted to deny his distinctions or at least claim that there was some third alternative to objectifying and objectification. A recent attempt at showing a third attitude has been made by Robert C. Good who claims that Sartre himself suggests such a third attitude toward others. Good points to Sartre's discussion in the section on bad faith of the possibilities open to the guilty homosexual. One possibility is for the homosexual

to deny his "nature", deny the facticity thrust upon him by the Other and thus be in bad faith by denying what is him.

The homosexual acknowledges that he has engaged in acts of homosexuality in the past, but he refuses to agree that he is in any sense a homosexual. He insists that what defines him are his intentions and expectations for the future, which include not being a homosexual.²³

This denial of one's past corresponds to refusing to acknowledge the Other's objectification and asserting freedom as a consciousness. But the Other's objectification has occurred, and the denial of it is in bad faith. It would be bad faith as well for the homosexual to completely identify with the objectification of the Other and confess that he was nothing more than a homosexual. He is still a consciousness. Good suggests that an alternative to the homosexual's complete identification with either his own objectifying glance or his objectification by the Other is a compromise which is an acknowledgement of the circumstances.

He [the homosexual] could acknowledge that he is a homosexual, in so far as he has engaged in homosexual activities in the past, but also maintain that the existence of his future possibilities shows that he is not a homosexual by nature. Given that he could change and that his possibilities have to be taken into account in developing an adequate conception of what he is at the moment, his sexual preference cannot be said to be an inherent characteristic of his being.²⁴

Good then cites Sartre's description of the circumstance.

He would be right...if he declared to himself, 'To the extent that a pattern of conduct is defined as the conduct of a paederast and to the extent that I have adopted this conduct, I am a paederast. But to the extent that human reality cannot be finally defined by patterns of conduct, I am not one.'²⁵

This example Good generalizes as the third attitude.

In this third attitude, whenever one is objectified by another on the basis of certain behavior, one acknowledges that he is the object the other person takes him to be. That is, one agrees that he is the object he is thought to be, in so far as what one is is always partially determined by how one has behaved. However, one simultaneously insists that one is not completely defined by the object another takes him to be. One is always more than the object another has taken him to be on the basis of certain behavior. One's future possibilities have to be taken into account in any adequate account of what one is.²⁶

There is no doubt that this is a reasonable solution to the dilemma that Sartre puts all of us in. It is all the more satisfying a solution since Sartre himself recognizes it as a possible solution. The solution seems to state the obvious: my past and body are things that may properly be considered as such and my consciousness is not such a thing and need not be bound by the properties of those things that are mine, i.e., my past and body. And yet this simple, obvious solution that Sartre suggests early in Being and Nothingness he ignores, when he later considers relations with others. A mere oversight? I think not. Sartre has more in mind. He sees consciousness' attempt to found itself as its fundamental project. I, as a consciousness, try to create for myself the foundation of myself. In this project I attempt to provide a being of which I am conscious as my being. It is only by making this attempt at self-founding the fundamental project of consciousness that Sartre can carry out his project as he does. As Sartre himself might say, this theme infects all of Being and Nothingness even his description of love.

...if the beloved can love us, he is wholly ready to be assimilated by our freedom.... Our objective essence implies the existence of the Other, and conversely it is the Other's freedom which founds our essence. If we could

manage to interiorize the whole system, we should be our own foundation.

Such then is the real goal of the lover in so far as his love is an enterprise--i.e., a project of himself.²⁷

This need to found oneself colors even the most basic relations to others. When Sartre describes the other as object, he describes my experience (as an objectifying consciousness) as a draining way. This man I see in the park is an object and yet one which orients the world away from me. The foundation of myself which I seek and which I cannot have, even when aware of simple objects, is all the more in jeopardy with the presence of this other that drains away the world, takes away what meager pretense of foundation I have. And yet, as Sartre points out, in such situations the Other is an object for me and I may recover my composure in that realization. I may arrogantly remind myself that the Other's being is the being I give him, and one that is forever beyond his grasp. The Other's objectification in my eyes, his loss to me of any hope of his own foundation, is the source of the authentic emotion of arrogance.

Sartre's discussion of the Look also reveals the turmoil of the soul in search of its own foundation. Now, in my search for a foundation, it is not the world that is taken from me (as is the case in my experience with the Other as object) but I myself. I find that the object that I want to be for myself so badly is an object that I cannot claim. Here is the promise of the for-itself-in-itself, the consciousness that founds itself, and that promise is cruelly wrenched from me just at the moment it comes into being. The for-itself that I am, finally gains the being that it wishes to be, but that being, that

objecthood, only exists for another consciousness, not mine. And I am in shame. I have been slapped in the face with the missing part of me. It is dangled in front of me, and like Tantalus, I can never grasp it. My being is always beyond my reach in the consciousness of the Other. And so it must be that I am always in conflict with the Other for he has the key to what I most fervently and fundamentally want--to be a being conscious of itself.

Sartre claims shame is my authentic reaction to the Other's look.

Pure shame is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object but in general of being an object; that is, of recognizing myself in this degraded, fixed, and dependent being which I am for the Other.²⁸

Clearly, it is in the face of the failure of my project to be my own foundation that I am ashamed of the foundation the Other provides for me but will not let me have. I have failed and the Other's every glance demonstrates my failure. In a prideful response, I may attempt to turn this failure to my advantage; I may react with pride to the object the Other makes of me. I attempt to preempt the Other and claim whatever he makes me to be as my own. But, as Sartre points out, this attempt to found myself through the Other's objectification of me, while an original reaction, is not an authentic one; pride is founded on the shame I feel before the Other's glance. (Footnote: Fear is the other "original reaction" to the Other and will be discussed later. For now it is enough to say that it based on the awareness that through damaging or destroying my objectification (e.g., my body) the Other may effect, even destroy my consciousness. Perhaps this is the ultimate slap in the face since I must be afraid of the very

objectification I desire.} And so whether I respond to the Other with arrogance, shame or pride, I am responding out of my desire to found myself.

One might accuse Sartre of being an egomaniacal pessimist. He strives for complete dominion over himself and in his failure to achieve that goal rants about, among other things, the failure of all relationships. He does, after all, perpetually torment himself with an impossible project. How then can he possibly have a calm and cooperative relationship with Others? Perhaps he is an Icarus who aspires to too much and falls but lives to tell us of the futility of all striving. This might be the case, but first we must grant that to some degree Sartre was not so far off the mark. Psychological research has shown that there is some virtue to Sartre's interpretation of the look.

George Stack and Robert Plant have collected an impressive array of experimental data that indicates the role being-looked-at plays not only in the lives of men but of animals as well. Tonic immobility "characterized by a waxy flexibility of the limbs, freezing in place and rapid eye fluttering"²⁹ is a defense technique used by small animals. Their lack of movement allows them to fade into the background while the predator is distracted with some movement elsewhere in the environment. Experimenters found that tonic immobility can be prolonged by eye contact with the animal, that even glass eyes suspended from dowels prolonged tonic immobility, and that larger pupils in the staring "eyes" also prolonged the immobility. But if a stare prompts some animals to defensive behavior, then what

better defense than to stare back? This appears to be precisely the tactic of those insects, fish, birds, and snakes that have eye spot patterns. The eye spot pattern on a cobra is particularly evident when it is about to attack. Apparently the eye spot pattern protects it from attack from the rear. Yet while these defense tactics are provocative, experiments closer to home are desirable. For instance, "It has been found that gazing or staring is often a prelude to attack or a substitute for it in primates."³⁰ Humans, too, show a reaction to being stared at.

Experiments confirm that eye contact provokes emotional arousal as measured by Galvanic skin response activity. What is to be noted ... is that eye contact per se was shown to have produced a nonspecific "emotional arousal" or emotional response in the experimental subjects.³¹

In another experiment, "observers found that the motorists who were stared at crossed the intersection at significantly faster rates than did those who were not stared at."³² Even before the motorists could clear the intersection they exhibited gaze aversion behavior. Stack and Plant conclude from such experiments that "Staring or gazing in itself seems to be a salient stimulus that arouses tension, produces emotional arousal, and induces avoidance responses."³³

Stack and Plant claim that such experiments support Sartre's description of the reaction to the look. It is clear, as they claim, that pervasive reactions to the look among animals as well as man makes it difficult to consider such reactions as nothing more than pathological responses. Man and animal seem to have inborn reactions to the look just as one would predict given Sartre's phenomenology.

But Stack and Plant also point to a variety of circumstances in which Sartre's description of the response to the look does not seem to fit.

In situations in which an individual is offering a presentation, performing, giving a speech or lecturing it would be unusual for the object of visual attention to interpret staring as hostile, aggressive, or menacing.³⁴

There are also those situations in which one person is interested in another and in such situations Stack and Plant observe that the eye contact involved may simply indicate fascination or interest. Common sense and personal experience tell us that in public speaking and personal interest situations that the look does not convey a threat but interest. Furthermore some experiments have discovered that "pupil size is an indication of emotional arousal and attraction."³⁵ The larger the pupil the greater the interest. These various observations lead Stack and Plant to conclude that

Prolonged eye contact, intense staring and large pupil size are, under certain conditions and in certain social contexts, experienced as signs of attraction, interest, or desire. A conscientious phenomenology of "the look" must accommodate these polarities of response to being the object of the gaze of another.³⁶

Surely it is appropriate for Stack and Plant to call for a phenomenology of the look that takes into account these more positive responses as well as the negative ones. And just as surely Sartre's account of the look is inadequate as it stands. There is even good reason to believe that his account cannot be patched up to account for the diversity of responses to the look. And even if it could be, it probably shouldn't be, for while accurate in some respects, the account seems too obsessive to be accurate. A closer look at fear, shame and arousal will make this obvious.

Sartre is correct to count fear among the authentic responses to the look. It is fear that is evidenced by the physiological arousal as measured by Galvanic skin response in the experiments. In the angry stare there is the threat of bodily damage, however removed that damage may be from probability by social custom. And even in Sartre's most favored instance--being caught in the act of eavesdropping--there is the fear of punishment. The fear produced by the angry look or by being caught in the act of eavesdropping is a rational fear. It is a fear stemming from an appropriate source. Whether I deserve the angry look or not, having received it I had best beware; someone intends me harm. Having been caught eavesdropping, I had better be careful; I could yet get the worst of it yet. The look in these situations produces fear because there is reason to be afraid. Perhaps it not physical harm that I am afraid of in this instance, but a loss of social standing or of privilege. Even so, these too count as things about which I might reasonably be afraid. Not being afraid in such situations would be maladaptive. If I do not treat the look seriously in such situations, I may well loose anything from respect or privilege to life or limb. Fear is a very practical response to the look--when the look is threatening--and in so far as fear is an uncontrived and unpremeditated response to a look, it is also authentic.

Fear can be an authentic response, because there are hostile looks and deeds. But not all looks are hostile. What would be the authentic response for a puzzled look, a rapt attentive look, or a sexually desirous look? Surely fear is not the appropriate response.

Is shame? What possible connection can there be between a puzzled look and shame? Sartre says I am in shame because I experience myself as an object. But why should I be ashamed of being an object? True, I do not have the freedom that I would have had had I not been seen. But my response to the curtailment of my freedom should either be fear that it be curtailed in a respect important to me or anger that someone should dare to curtail my freedom. Perhaps what Sartre does not spell out as clearly as he should is that I am ashamed in the face of the evaluative look. In the various looks Sartre thinks I have been evaluated and found wanting. And I am ashamed. Of course, in most people's lives even this is not enough to feel ashamed. There is the further condition that I feel the evaluator worthy of evaluating me. Someone might feel that anyone is worthy to evaluate him or no one or only a specified few, but the shame can only come when someone feels himself having been found wanting by those worthy of evaluating him. For Sartre, I am ashamed in the look because the Other finds me wanting: I have failed in my project to found myself. Any Other is worthy of finding me wanting in this respect since any Other has objectified me and thereby possesses the part of me I have striven for. The Other possesses the evidence of my failure.

Even if we grant to Sartre the claim that consciousness fundamental project is to found itself and that the look reveals in shame to consciousness the failure of its project, we are left with those other looks. Not all looks are specifically judgmental of my fundamental project. The look of hatred does not necessarily judge me a failure but an annoyance or obstacle to the Other's project. My

response to that look had better be fear--that visceral response of arousal--not shame. If I am not aroused to ready myself to fight for my projects or flee in the face of the Other's, then I will not last long. I will be crushed as just one more obstacle to be removed on the Other's way to his goals. If I respond with shame to the Other's attentive gaze, I will entirely miss the fact that he is not judging me as wanting but as (possibly) valuable. The sexually desirous gaze, too, will be lost on me if I react unswervingly with shame. Even the puzzled look will be beyond me if I insist on being ashamed instead of explaining myself.

The look is a call to arousal. What I should be aroused to must be determined by the situation. If I respond univocally to all types of looks, I am doomed for I shall falter and die in a world that calls for a variety of responses. But I do have this variety of response. I am capable of discerning various kinds of looks. So it seems that shame is equiprimordial with responses to other types of looks. Sartre might argue that that arousal experienced when looked at just is shame. I suppose that he could call it such, but first calling arousal shame would blur the distinction between arousal-shame and shame-interpreted-being-found-wanting. Further, the claim that the response to being looked at is arousal conveys the important point that the person has become ready to interpret his environment, namely, the source of the look. It is this readiness that is most fundamental for without it no interpretation of the look can be made; first, I must be oriented to the look so that then I may react appropriately.

I have argued 1) that arousal, not shame, is the fundamental

response to the look, 2) that this must be so since the reaction of shame alone and even the reactions of shame and fear cannot give proper flexibility to respond to all circumstances that consciousness is called upon to respond to, and 3) that as a matter of fact shame is not the only response to the look. Conclusion 1 is unavoidable, for even Sartre allows that we may respond to the look with either fear or shame. To be able to respond to the look with one or the other, to be able to choose the most appropriate response requires that consciousness be aware of and directed toward that choice. Physiological arousal performs just that task. To anthropomorphize, arousal tells us that we need to make a choice. More strictly, arousal is a focusing activity that eliminates to a large extent superfluous and redundant input. Assuming for the moment that there are only two possible responses, fear and shame, arousal brings us to the point of choosing the most appropriate one. Hence the arousal is prior to either the shame or the fear. This means that neither shame or fear is a simple, knee-jerk response. They are both responses which have required some, perhaps very limited and historically quite archaic, interpretation of the environment. Even if they were considered built-in responses, they would require association with selected, pertinent features of the environment. But however you interpret the nature of fear and shame, it is clear that not they but arousal is the primitive response to the look.

Since arousal is a necessary prerequisite to either fear or shame, it would be, among other things, uneconomical for all other responses to be built upon just these two. For example, arousal is

sufficient starting point for a sexual response to the look. And in this case at least it is clear that the look of sexual desire is incompatible with the look of negative judgment. To desire someone sexually, and hence when looking with sexual desire at someone, I have found them to have some positive attributes, if only the attribute of a b l e - t o - s a t i s f y - m y - d e s i r e s or, perhaps, well-suited-to-satisfy-my-desires. And this positive judgment is incompatible with the negative been-found-wanting look-judgment that prompts shame. Arousal is a-judgmental and logically prior to the judgments of "This is a look of hatred" or "This is a look of being-found-wanting" or "This is a look of desire." Arousal can orient me to the look of desire just as well as it can to the look of hatred or the look of being-found-wanting. Hence, from the present choices, I must conclude that the reaction of shame cannot found the reaction of sexual arousal. These two reactions depend on different types of judgment. Further, since arousal is essential to fear, shame, and sexual arousal, arousal is the most fundamental response to the look. Only arousal is flexible (and non-judgmental) enough to be the ground for our responses to the look. Since we do have these as well as other (I have not mentioned anger which surely is as primitive a response to the Other and the look as any) basic responses to the look, shame cannot be the reaction to the look. It is only in the freedom of arousal that we can choose our response to the look.

Sartre plainly and repeatedly asserts freedom as a fundamental trait of consciousness, and yet he denies consciousness this very freedom by claiming that consciousness can only respond to the look

with shame. He cannot have it both ways: either consciousness responds to the look with shame and thereby is determined, or consciousness responds to the look with arousal, and is thereby free.³⁷ I will assume that, Sartre being forced to the choice, would reaffirm his claim that consciousness is free and grudgingly reject the claim that shame is the response to the look. Freedom is a fundamental characteristic of consciousness without which Sartre's whole ontology would crumble. Shame as the response to the look, on the other hand, is not imperative. Sartre can maintain that the Other is made obvious to us by shame even though shame might not be the only way the Other is presented to us in the look. Sartre's most important use of shame is to demonstrate that we have an immediate awareness of the Other in our response to the look. The experience of shame is this demonstration, but the demonstration stands even if shame is not the only experience of the look. Even if shame is not the only experience that makes the Other immediately obvious to us, it is still one experience (among others) that makes the Other's quality as objectifying consciousness apparent to us. And that is Sartre's point, after all: we are not alone; we have immediate and unassailable experiences of a consciousness other than our own.

There is an interesting consequence to the claim that arousal, not shame, is the fundamental response to the look and this consequence might well make Sartre blanch. Shame as an interpreted response to the look requires an objectifying glance at the Other for that interpretation. Sartre's shame is an immediate and forced response to the look. But we have seen first, that arousal is a much

more plausible candidate for this immediate and force response to the look and second, that Sartre cannot maintain his claim that consciousness is free if shame is a forced response. Arousal, on the other hand, is immediate and forced--just as much as what I see when I open my eyes in the morning. The arousal has the character of a givenness, and this givenness is just as much a givenness as the givenness of the objects before my eyes. This arousal is the presentation to me of a consciousness other than my own just as the objects are presented to me as other-than-me. And just as I freely choose my projects and reactions to the objects in the world so, too, do I choose my reaction to the look. If my choice of reactions and projects to the Other are not to be a matter of pure whimsy and caprice, then I must discern what kind of look, in what manner the other, is being presented. Discernment requires looking at the other and hence any response to the look, other than the most basic arousal, requires an objectification of the Other. Even shame, as immediate an intimation of the Other (as objectifying glance) as it is, is also an objectification of the Other. Insofar as this fact is a reaffirmation of constant the play of objectifying and objectification that is consciousness' relation to the Other Sartre would agree, but insofar as shame, under the present description, cannot be considered a simple unadulterated reaction to the look Sartre would oppose this reinterpretation of shame.

While arousal may present us with the most intimate demonstration of the Other's existence, and while the evidence of the Other's existence that arousal may present us with is logically prior to the

objectification of the Other, any relationship to the Other more sophisticated than mere arousal requires both the experience of being objectified and the act of objectification. Looking and being looked at become so inextricable in any relationship that, while their interplay may be traced, it is perhaps better to consider them on par. Any undue emphasis on the look and my objectification under it would misrepresent the nature of the relationship. Sartre, of course, treats relationships as just such an interplay, yet he places the emphasis on consciousness' attempt to deal with its objectification in the look and treats consciousness' objectification of the Other most generally as a retaliatory strategy.

Sartre's emphasis on consciousness' objectification in the look is a direct consequence of his claim that consciousness' fundamental project is to found itself. Consciousness' awareness of its failure is most pronounced when consciousness experiences the look and feels the shame of its objecthood being lost to the Other. Hence, Sartre sees consciousness as not only trying to found itself but as trying to avoid the shame which a direct and unabashed look produces. Yet, if shame is not a mindless reflex, it must be a responsible reaction to the look. As such, it contains the seed of an escape from the tyranny of the futile, self-founding project. Responding with shame to the look requires that first I objectify the Other and second that I determine from my objectification that his look is a look of judgment that finds me wanting. It is not, however, required that I realize these steps to my reaction of shame. If I do realize these intermediates between the arousal and the shame, then I have the key

to abandoning my futile project. If I realize that, even in shame, even in my most poignant awareness of my estranged objecthood, I have objectified the Other, then I realize that I have already done to him what he has done to me. And I may realize that just as he looks at me as wanting so may I look at him; he is no better or worse judge than I. Each of us can demonstrate through the look that we are consciousnesses in search of a foundation. If the project is futile for me, then it is futile for him; we are no different in this respect. Whether in my shame I consider the Other as objectified by me or as the judge of me, I am forced to grant that the Other is no better off than I. If he objectifies me in the look, then to be ashamed before that look I must objectify him. I, as consciousness, have already escaped him and he has, just as surely, already escaped me. If he judges me in his look, then to be ashamed before that look I must judge him. But I grant him the power to judge me and his power to inflict a judgment of shame is only so great as I allow it. It comes down to this: just at this point I need no longer be deluded that my project of self-founding through the Other is possible. I recognize that we are separate consciousnesses and cannot in principle be captured one by the other. And I realize that he presents no threat to or promise for a project of self-foundation. He can never directly steal away my consciousness by objectifying it; in my perpetual flight I am safe.³⁸ And he cannot give back to me the object he has made of my flight; my flight as consciousness prohibits me from being that object. I may only contemplate what he chooses to give to me of the object he has made of me as I might contemplate a

remembrance of things past. There is no alternative to objectification and being objectified, but neither is there harm or promise in these acts. They are merely fact. In the realization that these attitudes are my lot--and the Other's--I may accept my fate. If I take objectification and objectifying as primitives for me, then I need not confuse objectification with foundation. I will objectify as I must, but I need not seek pointlessly for a foundation I cannot have. Of course, I may also, as Sartre suggests, pursue hopeless relationships in search of self-foundation, but I need not. In the realization of the elements of shame I have the choice of pursuing futilely or accepting with honor my destiny.

With these last conclusions we have what we need to determine who it is that is loved. Sartre's Other still has its basic attributes. It is still another consciousness freely objectifying and capable of being objectified by an Other. But I have shown that relationships with the Other need not be doomed to failure. Sartre concludes relationships are doomed to failure because he conflates the project of self-foundation with objectification. But it has become quite clear that, while objectification and being objectified are inescapable attributes of consciousness, the project of self-foundation can be a freely chosen goal and is distinct from the act of objectification. Sartre, of course, is right the attempt to find one's foundation in another is quite hopeless. But relationships with the Other need not be the attempt to find one's foundation, and hence there is the possibility that the relationship of love is not a doomed relationship. All that is needed is that the love act, which is

a valuing, have its proper object, one that will not a priori doom the love to failure. The reworked Other of Sartre has the proper attributes to be that object.

3.4 The look of love

The object of love is the Other. This Other is an other consciousness that may be characterized as a freedom and one of the sources of my facticity. As we have seen, Sartre claims that my facticity is established by the Other and this fact forever troubles my consciousness. I am never in possession of myself. Ideally I would like myself to encompass the Other so that I could reclaim my facticity and found myself. But of course, this is impossible, and so Sartre claims that we try the next best thing--the seduction of the Other. In seduction I make my self a fascinating object so that the Other freely orients his world around this fascinating object that is me. I then become the limits of his transcendence and the origin of his world. In other words, I attempt through fascination to get the Other to love me. Sartre calls this project love. His explanation of why the lover makes being loved his project and his description of how the lover, by becoming a fascinating object, attempts to seduce the Other into loving is interesting, but his equation of love with wanting to be loved is deeply flawed. Equating loving with wanting to be loved means that the lover only loves if he has previously chosen the futile project of self-foundation. It is the ideal of being and in-itself-for-itself that prompts the lover to want to be loved and to be seductive in an attempt to capture the consciousness of the Other. Sartre's explanation of love works only if the lover has taken up the futile ideal as a necessary project. This futile ideal, I have argued, is not a necessary project for consciousness, only a possible one. Thus, while the futile project is

not a necessary project for consciousness in general, it is necessary for the lover if Sartre's account is true. Furthermore, the futile project of self-foundation must be assumed by the prospective lover prior to "Falling in love," since the prospective lover, to value the beloved for the beloved's ability to love the lover, must have previously determined to be engaged in the futile project. Only if the lover already has as his project the project of self-foundation, can he value the Other as an instrument in the attainment of that project.

Did I say instrument? Insofar as I conceive the beloved as a means to my self-foundation and not as an end in himself, I view the beloved as a tool. But Sartre would have it that love is wanting to be loved. Wanting to be loved is wanting to be an object before the Other's consciousness, a very special object it is true, but an object nonetheless. There seems to be a problem. Is love wanting to use the Other as a tool in the project of my self-foundation? Or is love wanting to be a special object before the Other? Both: love is wanting to use the Other's consciousness as a tool to my project of self-foundation. The problem is that at one and the same time I want to treat the Other as object (tool) and as subject. Now I can't treat him as a tool, but he is not one. He is a consciousness. To treat him as a tool, then is to mistreat him. But I want to treat him as a subject only insofar as he can be a tool. In other words, to want to be loved by the Other I must objectify him first. Love as wanting-to-be-loved requires that I first appraise the Other as a satisfactory means to my goal of self-foundation. But this means that

from the outset the description of love as wanting-to-be-loved as means-to-self-foundation is based on a contradiction. As lover I must value the beloved as object and want him as subject.

Sartre might respond "Well, that's the way it goes. Relationships are rife with conflict." There is something perversely appealing about such a response. Nonetheless, if I value the Other as an object or tool to my ends, I have appraised her. If I have appraised her, I have not loved her in that capacity. Appraisal is a kind of valuation as is love, but it is a different kind. I am grateful for the money my wife has made to support us while I finish my schooling, but if all I value her for is her ability to earn a living, I may throw her out when I am able to make my own or when she wants to become a housewife and mother. She has, after all, served her usefulness. The reason I appraised her as valuable is now gone. She has lost her utility as tool toward my goal of the good life as a dentist. But love does not have this judgemental quality, and we cannot give reasons of the sort we would for an appraisal. Love is not an appraisal and the beloved cannot be, as beloved, an object-tool toward my end of self-foundation. Even when I conceive of this tool, the beloved, as a consciousness to be used toward my end, I am yet appraising and not loving. Whatever love I may have for her is distinct from any appraisal I may have of her. It follows that, however much the lover values and hence wants the beloved as a means in the project of self-foundation, this valuation is an appraisal and is not love. Love is not wanting to be loved. Wanting to be loved is a consequence of loving (as we shall see later), but cannot be

equated with love.

Even if Sartre is interpreted as claiming that the project of love is to be loved, there are problems. First, this implies that love, at least logically, precedes the project of love. Thus, love must be defined or described apart from any description of the project of love. Second, even if a project of love is to be loved, this is not love's only project. We need not hold that love is wholly altruistic to point out that at least sometimes a lover acts without thought to return. In Sartre's case that translates: lovers sometimes act without thought of being loved in return. Such altruistic acts can be as simple as those times we present a loved one with a trinket and say "I saw this and thought of you." The lover acted on impulse out of love and without thought to being loved in return. Of course, it is true that, if the trinket is contemptuously rejected, the lover is hurt, and Sartre might say "You see the lover did expect something in return after all." But this need not be the case; the loving act need not have been a barter--"I'll give you this if you'll love me" or even "I'll give you this in the hope that you will feel obligated to love me." In fact the pain of rejection in such cases does not rest on the disappointment of failing to be loved in return for goods proffered. The lover is hurt that his love has not been accepted. Acknowledgement is different from reciprocation. IN any instance in which I wish the beloved's welfare without regard for my own (including my being loved in return), I have a project borne of love that is not a project of being loved.

On these various grounds we can reject Sartre's claims about the

nature of love. Love is not wanting to be loved. Neither is wanting to be loved love's sole project. Yet, this brief examination of Sartre's concept of love highlights something troubling. Love is a perception, in Sartre's terms, a look. As such, it is an objectification of the beloved. But this objectification cannot be the objectification of the Other when I determine the Other as a tool toward my projects. An objectification of the Other that determines the Other as a tool is an appraisal of the Other--just the sort of valuation that love cannot be. It would seem that if this sort of objectification is the only sort, then love is impossible. The kind of perception-valuation that I have described love as having to be is not the valuation of appraisal (which is to say not the kind of objectification of the Other that Sartre routinely seems to mean).

Sartre's dichotomy of objectification and objectified, look and looked at, is too simple. Love is not an experience of being looked at; it is a perception after all, not a being-perceived. Neither is it an objectification or looking-at that appraises the Other's worthiness in the service of the lover's goals. Love has an altruistic element that Sartre does not allow in his distinction between for-myself/for-others, but he polarizes the distinction completely into the objectification for-myself and the objectified for- (or before) Others. This polarization is unacceptable partly because Sartre seems to be able to allow no other valuation between consciousnesses than appraisal. Sartre's mutually exclusive choices are either I use him or he uses me. However above board this use and the accompanying appraisal is, it is still utilitarian. We have just

seen how Sartre by trying to force some notion of altruism into his utilitarian scheme has described love in contradictory terms. The altruism of wanting to be loved, that is, wanting to have the Other's appraisals, not my own, determine the situation, can only be described in terms that finally reduce to my using the Other. Sartre's own description indicates as much, since it describes my desire to experience the Other's valuation in terms of my own project of self-foundation. The altruism that is an essential element (though not the whole of) love cannot be accounted for in terms of utilitarian evaluations on either the lover or the beloved's part. Altruism--the thought of another with no thought for oneself--cannot be accounted for in terms of self-serving appraisals. Any such account contains a manifest contradiction in terms.

If altruism is possible and if love is not merely wishful thinking, then the objectifications of the Other that I make cannot only be appraisals made in my own interest. The choices are not just either he appraises me or I appraise him, but either he appraises me or I appraise him or I love him.³⁹ The loving of him is an objectification of him just as surely as my appraisal of him; my love is my love for him, not his for me. But this objectification that is love is an objectification of the Other, not as a means, but as an end. He is, true enough, a possible threat to me. I may respond to him in fear that he may destroy me or something dear to me. I may respond to him in shame that I am nothing more than an object of utility to him. I may grant these possibilities (or perhaps in naive loves, ignore or be ignorant of these threats), but I need not respond

with calculated plans for the utilization of the Other before he utilizes me. I may respond with the recognition of the Other's potential to destroy and humiliate. It is an awful potentiality the Other has. And I have the potential to respond to this potential with awe. This awe in the face of the Other's potential is love.

Awe is not fear or shame, although they are hidden in it. Awe is the recognition of the potential to inflict fear or shame. Fear and shame are reactions to specific attempts to inflict destruction or utilization. As has been pointed out, to feel fear or shame the Other must be assessed (accurately or inaccurately) to have intentions to destroy me (or part of me or something of worth to me) or to make me a tool for his utilization. These are specific reactions to specific situations. Awe precedes them as an appreciation of the Other's ability to inflict. Awe is, in part, an appreciation of the Other's ability to disvalue me (in my destruction which I fear) or to appraise me (and thereby put me to shame as an object of utility for him). As an objectification of the Other, awe is the awareness of perception of the Other as a disvaluing being. More, it is a perception-valuation of this other disvaluing being. Here I am not objectifying the Other to utilize him as a tool to my ends. I am no more than recognizing and valuing him for what he is. It is as if I saw his pure potentiality. Never mind for the moment that that potentiality might, as actuality, turn to my disadvantage. Just now in awe I see and value the power of valuing that is the Other. And it is not just his ability to disvalue that places me in awe. His very ability to disvalue indicates his ability to value. Disvaluing is a

characterization or mode of valuing. And so it is that this awe is not just a look that values the Other's potential to destroy and utilize, to disvalue, but also a look that values the Other's potential to value, a valuing that need carry no negative qualification. In love I need not be responding to the beloved's power to negatively value; it is the power to value itself that is important. The Other may prize and even love for he is a being that values. He, just as I, is capable of awe. He is just as capable of positive valuations as negative since in his being he is valuation. My perception and valuation of the Other, which is my love for him, is my awe of his potential as a valuing being. This is the who of love. This is my beloved. A being capable of valuing unto love.

Love of the Other is value valuing value or more properly valuing being valuing valuing being. This valuing is not a valuing for. It is not an appraisal. It is a sheer awe at the fact of the Other's valuing. As such it does nothing and is not directed toward some goal either mine or the beloved's. To have such a goal would be to place one or the other or the both of us as a tool appraised as useful. The valuation simply is. In the midst of my projects in which I, among other things, evaluate--appraise--and use Others I am struck by love. I find that amongst amongst these Others an Other that I see differently. No matter how highly I appraise these Other's, they are always evaluated and objectified with regard to their usefulness to me. They may be tools or impediments, but they are always seen in relation to my projects. The beloved shatters my complacent appraisal and objectification of the Other. Now there is at least one Other who

is not objectified as tool and regarded with concern to his utility. For whatever reasons peculiar to my personality and situation, I have been struck. And while it is true that I objectify the beloved, I do not objectify him in light of my projects. Simply: here stands before me someone amazing. If I look at myself and then look at the beloved, I may note that he is just like me, an orientation point in the world. But in any case I see that the world centers around him. It is evaluated purely from his perspective. That others are just like him does not matter; all I know is that this one is the center of the world from which all valuations emanate. I "see" his valuing core, a core that is the axis of the universe. If I am not experienced and have not loved before, I will forget myself. I will forget that I am a center to the world as much as he. In my awe, I will be dazzled and only see the universe revolving around him. I will be captivated. I will be in awe. I will love.

Now we can see why Scheler would speak of love in the following terms.

For the primary orientation of love is towards values, and towards the objects discernible, through those values, as sustaining them....⁴⁰

And again:

But the fact of the matter is that love relates, in the first instance, to what has value, and to man only to the extent that he is endowed with value and capable of advancement in this respect.⁴¹

The Other certainly does "sustain" values, because he is a source of them, and love does relate to what has value particularly when that "what" is an Other who is a value conferring being. It is my

impression that Scheler's commitment to an objectively existing hierarchy of values prevented him from seeing the uniqueness of the love act directed toward the Other. The Other is not just a link in the great chain of values. He is a source of values, of valuing. Whether these values objectively exist is beside the point; it is not important that the Other confers values correctly or incorrectly or even, for that matter, whether there is even the question or possibility of correctly or incorrectly conferred values. It is a fact that the Other values. There may be an objective value to the things he values, and then again there may not. Insofar as love is a valuing of the valuing itself, then there need be no guarantee that what is valued is indeed valuable. It would be entirely pointless for there to be objective values "in" things, if there were no being to recognize those values. We must be, therefore, at least capable of recognizing values for there to be love at all. If we could not at least perceive values, we would be with regard to values in the same position that we are with regard to ultra-high frequencies of sound. Until the advent of modern science, those sounds that a dog can hear but we cannot might as well have not existed. We were thoroughly unaware of them. And as unperceived, they could not effect our hearing. No symphonies were written with notes above the audible range for the simple reason that we could not hear those sounds and were unaware they existed. So, too, would values go unperceived, if we could not perceive them, or alternatively, create them. It is, then, a minimal criterion that man be able to perceive value to be able to love. It may be the case that man creates value instead of,

or in addition to, perceiving value. Whether we perceive or create values need not be decided here. It is sufficient that man be that through which value is realized (in the broad sense of realize). Love is a valuing perceiving act. And in as much as the object of interpersonal love is a valuing being itself there is no need for this being to be intrinsically valuable. Man's value comes from valuing whether that valuing being perceptive or creative or a combination of both. It is that value as a valuing being that is the object of love.

I am not sure that there is any possible proof that what the lover loves is the valuational aspect of the beloved, but loving the valuing conferring center that is man makes more sense than any other explanation. In examining Scheler's view of love we saw that love could not have an ordinary reason. My love for you could not be justified on the basis of your golden hair, your girlish laugh, or your brilliant insights. These were insufficient for a variety of reasons, but most important, such reasons did not seem to capture the who of love. You are not just your golden hair or girlish laugh or brilliant insights. You are more. But since none of what are ordinarily considered your attributes or any collection of them were sufficient to justify love, there seemed nothing on which to found my love of you. All that was left was Singer's bestowal which claimed there was no reason for my love. Yet, love understood as pure gratuity made love unadulterated whimsy and therefore ridiculous. There needed to be some reason for love and yet not a reason of the ordinary sort. There needed to be a reason that would not dissolve

with changes in circumstance or time. The reason for love needed to have a persistency and universality. Since love itself is a perception-valuation, its reason must correspond to the nature of the act: when you see, you see objects; when you hear, you hear sounds. Similarly when you perceive and value there surely must be a corresponding "object" to be perceived that is valuable. And what may be perceived that is valuable about the Other is his capacity to value. This valuation-potential that is the Other cannot be dismissed as just some other thing to be valued in my world and used according to its value to me. All else in the world passively awaits my appraisal. The Other, though, steadfastly refuses to passively submit to my evaluations. Sartre's point, which holds in many if not most circumstances, is that I try to treat the Other as an object of appraisal and constantly fail to the extent that the Other is a consciousness that appraises me even as I appraise him. No, we do not ordinarily treat the Other merely as an object, not just as another tree or chair. We do recognize that he is a force in our world. But we treat the Other much like we would a small volcano or whirlwind. A force to be reckoned with, and if possible, even used. The positive thinking literature counsels us to harness the abilities of those around us to succeed at our goals. Such works even acknowledge that you must work within the constraints of your "helpers" so that you do not cross their grain and lose their cooperation. But such advice is much like saying you must learn the sea and the winds to sail; sheer force of will does not make good sailing. Know the forces you wish to harness and use them to your advantage or die. Such an

attitude is entombed in every aspect of our lives. We are told that you can catch more flies with honey than vinegar. We are taught to conform so that we may get what we want. Whether any such attitude is praiseworthy or blameworthy is beside the point. What is clear is that in such attitudes the Other is treated as the object of appraisal and that in so treating the Other we underestimate him. But in love there is no such underestimation. The Other stands out as what he is. There across the room from me is not a force to be reckoned with or used but valuation in process. In love I am aware of a source of on-going valuations. In love I am most directly aware of the Other as what he is. It is no wonder that in love we respond as we do. For in love the ebb and flow of forces that ordinarily rule our lives is parted, and the beloved stands forth luminescent in his value that is valuing. Here we have reason enough for love. I can think of no better.

What may seem odd about love is that it happens so rarely and is so particular. I love her but not you. I may never love you, but I can and do love. Yet, surely I ought to love you; you are just as much a valuing center as she is. Why love this person rather than that? The reason for love is a universal reason. It justifies loving anyone. Part of an answer to such an objection may run something like this: the justification for love does justify loving anyone, but it does not demand loving everyone or even anyone. This is not a particularly satisfying response, but the reason I love this person and not that one is in large part the concern of psychology. The lover and the beloved are not disembodied consciousnesses. They are persons

with a history and in a situation. That history and situation are specifics that a theory of what love is cannot address. In all likelihood the reason I only have eyes for you is that you are very much like my mother, and I loved my mother, or you are very much unlike my mother and, and I hated her. It might be, then, that my preferences determine to whom I open myself to love. I am attracted to this woman because she reminds me of mother. This attraction can be translated as my preference for women of a certain sort. My tastes and preferences are appraisals that direct me to certain kinds of women. I have found (via my mother) that women with a sense of humor are particularly pleasant to be around. Perhaps, when enough of these preferred traits occur in one person, I can no longer treat the person as a utility, e.g., someone with whom to have a good time. I then make something like a leap from an overwhelmingly positive appraisal to love. Her valuableness (to me) allows me to see her as valuing (as a center of valuing). (We will see in a moment how Plato reverses this shift. Instead of being led to see the valuing beings from valuableness, he claims that we move from the perception of valuing beings to ultimate valuableness, i.e., true beauty.) More sociological and less psychological forces may be at work. A generation who valued full figured girls may be succeeded by a generation who revolts and chooses lithesome wenches. But all such considerations are a search for why you love this one special girl. I have offered an explanation of why you can and do love at all (this special girl included). Your neighborhood psychologist must provide an explanation of your specific case. In general all that needs to be

said is that each of us is an individual and will respond uniquely to people and circumstances. Our limitations as human beings will limit who we love and even our ability to love.

Just as important is that no theory of love that I am aware of takes into account the particularity of individual loves. Plato tells us that the lover sees the beauty of the beloved, but he does not tell us why this lover sees beauty in this beloved and not another. Scheler claims that the lover sees the value of the beloved, but gives no indication of what this value might be in individual cases. So too Sartre gives a general account of the project of love, but does not tell us why someone might choose this project rather than another. Only Singer talks about the particularity of love. Yet even he says little more than that when we love we love the particulars of the person. Then he admits that love is gratuitous and that any set of particulars that strikes our fancy will do. When addressing the issue of why we love one person rather than another, the best any theory of love can do, it seems, is describe the quality of being struck with the beloved that so often accompanies the onset of love. It happens. We fall in love. With just this person.

Perhaps it is just as well that classic theories of love, and this one in particular, leave it to the psychologist to explain why you are the only girl in the world for me. At stake in these theories is the generality and universality of love. At first a theory that explains why I love you intems that could explain my loving anyone whosoever seems to miss its mark. I want to know why I love you. To be told that I love you for reasons that would explain my love of

anyone is disappointing and unsatisfying. Yet if a theory of love leaves to science the job of explaining my specific reaction to you, it can, and mine does, explain phenomena traditionally associated with love. The very generality embodied in the theory explains such diverse phenomena as Diotima's ladder and Christian love.

In the Symposium Plato, through the character of Diotima, describes the lover's ascent from the love of a single man to all men and then on through progressively more abstract entities until the lover loves beauty itself. Of course, Plato's cause is the advocacy of the philosophical life, but there is more to the ladder of loves than Plato lets on. What could possibly justify or explain the development of a lover's love from one man to many? Plato says beauty itself. For whatever reasons (to be explained by the psychologist and perhaps in Plato's case by the aesthetician as well) the lover falls in love with the beauty of the beloved. This beauty is not particular to the beloved; it is Beauty as exemplified in the beloved. All that is required for the lover to love all men is for him to see the Beauty exemplified in each. Since this cannot be a physical beauty--all men are not equally physically beautiful--the beauty must be something that all men share equally. Presumably there is something that is objectively valuable that all men share in--beauty. Plato, by assuming what is valuable in the beloved is objectively real beauty, can then call upon his lover to love whatever exemplifies that beauty. Plato rests his explanation of love on what he sees as most valuable--Beauty (as one aspect of true being). And of course, since he rests the explanation of what is valuable instead of the valuing,

he can have his lover rise from the love of an individual to, in the end, love of beauty--what is supremely valuable--itself. In the Symposium the lover loves what is valuable. But in the Phaedrus the lover loves and finds value in the beloved. This value, however, is not the absolute objective value of Beauty. It is the ability of the beloved to inquire and seek after knowledge. That is, the lover loves the beloved's ability to love. And this loving and seeking that is love is a search after what is valuable. Between the two dialogues we can see Plato attempting to describe love as a perception-valuation that is directed, first if not last, toward another center of perception-valuation. All that is needed to get from loving a man or men to loving beauty itself is to substitute (presumably unwittingly) love of the valuing for love of the valuable. Since, as I have argued, valuing is valuable, deriving Diotima's ladder requires nothing more than subsuming valuing (or valuing beings) under the category of valuable things. The arguable point in Plato's position, then, is whether there is an objective hierarchy of value in which man is only one tier or whether man is that through which any hierarchy of value comes into existence. In either case, Plato's love hinges on the lover's ability to respond to the beloved's ability to the beloved's ability to love. If we explain love as a perception-valuation of the Other as a valuing center, then we have given the sort of reason for loving necessary to explain Plato's position. The reason for loving this one is reason for loving anyone. Universality is mistaken for objectivity, and the result is Diotima's ladder.

When Plato suggests that we can develop our love from encompassing one man to many, he indicates the universality of love's reason. In turn ethical systems have taken up the universality as their theme. The Christian tenet of "Love thy neighbor as thy self" can be taken as saying "Perceive and value valuing centers since, as valuing centers, others are as valuable as you--no more, no less so." It is when we perceive others, not in the valuation of appraisal, but in the non-utilitarian valuation of love that they become our equals. It is in so far as we see others in their universality that we can love mankind. The particulars of this or that person are useful and can be the object of appraisal, but the universal quality of being a valuing being is useless and cannot be the object of appraisal. In the awe that is the experience of love, others can be treated as ends and not merely as means. Kant's insights into Christian ethics can best be explained by the universality of the justification of love. It is not important here to examine Kant's ethics in detail. It is enough to see that the universality of the justification of love is the source of altruism and that the love perception-valuation is that through which altruism can be realized.

But concern with the universal aspect of the justification of love can overshadow the psychological facts. It is individuals that love and for the most part it is individuals that they love. The universal love of mankind is not the antithesis of individual loves but its logical extension. Nonetheless individuals do not routinely logically extend their love. The utter awesomeness of just one love is sufficient to hold a person's attention. A person most often

understands his love as a reaction to a specific person; he does not routinely draw an inference from his love of an individual to the whole of humanity. After all, that is what the (individual's) love is: a reaction to an individual. The reason a person loves does not seem important in the face of the experience and so the love remains a love of a person. Add to the basic experience of love the general circumstances of life and any inference from the particular to the general is improbable. We all must appraise others (even the beloved), and they must inevitably become treated as utilities. There are groceries to be bought, checks to be cashed, classes to be taught. There will be, therefore, grocery clerks, bank tellers, and teachers. No one is the worse for it, but each is utilized. Insofar as others are clerks and tellers and teachers, they will be objects of my appraisal and not of my love. Furthermore, the simple fact is that many people are threats. Since they are, it is extraordinarily difficult to transcend our spontaneous defensive reactions toward a universal response of love. The limits of being human and the constraints of the world test even the saint's ability to love universally.

By placing love in situation, the tension between its particularity and its universality can be explained. Any one person's love is, as a matter of fact, routinely directed toward a very limited number of people even though being a valuing being is a trait of all people. A person's love is justified by the universal trait of being a valuing being, and hence all loves are justified and in principle one can justify loving any and everyone. Nonetheless, while loving

everyone can in principle be justified, that justification cannot be equated with causation. Circumstance and personality direct whom I love. The particulars of my situation cause my love for this person rather than that. But the quality that justifies my love is perfectly universal. With this said about what the love act is, who it is that is loved, and on what grounds he is loved, two closely related topics can be addressed.

4.5 Acts Of Love

Love is in itself sterile and impotent. The love act is nothing more than a perception valuation of a valuing being. It does nothing. Yet, we are told that love makes the world go round, that it changes everything. We are regaled with countless tales of how love turns the misanthropic miser into a a kind and generous soul. If one were selling love, no doubt the marketing manager would remind you to emphasize to the prospective customer how much love can do for them. It's a great bargain: you have all these wonderful feelings and not only that but every day in every way you and whoever you love get better and better. Surely all these promises are not illusory. Love is promising. The great romantic tragedies are tragedies because the promise of a great love has been snuffed out. The love was good, and it would have created good things if only....

It is not only popular misconception that supports the notion that love is effective. Plato describes how, in the course of love, not only the lover but the beloved is perfected. And Scheler is in agreement:

But love is a movement, passing from a lower value to a higher one, in which the higher value of the object or person suddenly flashes upon us....⁴²

He claims even more explicitly that "love... looks to the establishment of higher possibilities of value..., and to the maintenance of these, besides seeking to remove the possibility of lower value...."⁴³ Scheler also insists that this movement from lower to higher value is not pedagogical but somehow just happens in the course of love. But whether love is considered as pedagogical or as

corrective of the beloved in some more mysterious sense, it is clear that Scheler sees love as an act in which there is a movement from lower to higher values. But this movement is also a "sudden flashing upon," and so it seems that two kinds of metaphors have been confused: those of activity with those of sight. In the process of confusing the metaphors an important distinction has been overlooked. Loving someone and acting on that love are distinct kinds of acts. Even though these two kinds of act may occur simultaneously, they are not the same. By calling love both a movement and a flashing upon, Scheler has conflated the love act with loving acts. Even though Scheler can only be faulted for not seeing through the popular myth that tells us that love both strikes us with blinding light and makes everything better, the fact remains that loving and acting lovingly are distinguishable acts.

The love act is a perception valuation. There is nothing in perception or valuation in themselves that affects things beyond themselves. When I see a tree, I do not alter it. And when I relish the brush strokes of the Van Gogh, I do not change them. It is, of course, possible that I misperceive the tree, and if I misperceive, then my valuation may go astray. But if there is an object in the world to perceive and value, then however accurate or inaccurate my perception, however appropriate or inappropriate my valuation, the thing remains unscathed. Without throwing into question a world external to and independent of me (which I do not wish to do here), we are forced to admit that love, since it is an act of perception valuation, cannot in itself change the beloved.

The love act does not change the beloved, but I, when I love, am not just a love act. When considering myself as a lover, the most important of my other attributes is that I am an agent, with desires, capable of effecting change. Since when I love I see the beloved as a valuing center, I may desire for him instead of or in addition to myself. If the beloved is no longer just an object to be appraised and used but valuable because he is valuing, then there is nothing preventing me from wanting for him just as I would for myself. The experience of wanting for the beloved, wanting the very best for the beloved is familiar to every lover. And while that wanting is not the love act, it is an act that is directly dependent on the love act. For only in so far as I see the Other just like me, can I desire for him just as I would for myself. Since I want for myself what I please me, what furthers my goals, and what enriches me, and since I see the Other as a valuing being just like me, I will have no trouble desiring for him these kinds of things. There is no denying that my desires for myself and my desires for him may come in conflict (let alone the possibility of his desires conflicting with my various desires), but in principle I may desire for either one of us with equal fervor since we are indistinguishable and identical as valuing beings. The very nature of the love act as a perception valuation of a valuing center allows the lover to desire for the beloved as he might for himself.

This is not to say that the lover reasons analogically. He does not say to himself "I value things and desire them because I value them. I perceive and value this other as a being just like me--a

being that values--and thus I will desire for him as I desire for myself." The lover loves. That loving focuses his attention on the beloved. The force of the insight and valuation that is love may well distract the lover from his own desires, and he may, in his distraction, desire for the beloved. Certainly there is the possibility that he can desire for himself and for the other, and he can have desires for both himself and the beloved just because they are indistinguishable as valuing beings. The awesomeness of love may drive the lover to the extreme of completely denying or forgetting his own desires for the sake of the desires of the beloved. What allows him to substitute the beloved's desires for his own is the beloved's character as valuing being. Past the first rushes of love, lovers ordinarily have to come to some sort of accommodation among the various desires: his desires that have nothing to do with the beloved, his desires to have the beloved, his desires for the beloved (for the beloved's pleasure and welfare) and the analogous desires on the part of the beloved. But what makes the accommodation necessary and what allows his dedication to the beloved at love's first blush is the very essence of love as valuing being valuing valuing being. The love act by its very nature, then, allows for this plurality of desires. The most important of these for the moment is the altruistic desires for the beloved. These altruistic desires spring forth from love as much as any others, but unlike other desires, they are the source of loving acts.

Desire comes a step closer to altering its object than the perception valuation which is love. Desire holds out some goal toward

which one may work. Now not only has something or someone been valued, there is also a project for that something or someone. Whether I desire to enjoy or to have or to be, I have valued something and projected obtaining it. I value strawberry ice cream, and in the summer's heat I want to enjoy it. I value dependable transportation and so I want a new car. I value a good grasp of matters and so I desire knowledge. For me to desire something, I must have logically antecedently valued what I desire. And in so far as my desire is a desire and not merely wishful thinking I will have some notion of how to obtain what I want. Failing that, I will be able to tell you why any project to obtain my desire is liable to fail. In desire, as opposed to wishful thinking, there is at least an attempt at a plan of action to obtain the goal of the desire. A desire may be impossible to satisfy and it may be thwarted, but the nature of desire is such that desire impels me to act in a manner that promotes its satisfaction. Simply put, I am an agent who can, and often does, act to satisfy his desires. I may reject my desires as immoral and refuse to carry out my plans to satisfy them. I may give up on a desire should I become convinced that I have no means to satisfy it. But my initial impulse is to act to satisfy my desires.

When I act to satisfy an altruistic desire borne of love I have acted lovingly. The source of such an act is the love act which perceives and values the beloved. Having perceived and valued the beloved, I may and often do desire the welfare of the beloved. In so far as I have not considered my desires, such desires for the other's welfare are altruistic desires. When I act to fulfill these

altruistic desires, I have acted out of my love for the other. Acting out of love for the other may fairly be called acting lovingly or, alternately, loving acts. The loving acts, however, are not the love act. Between them comes the intermediary of altruistic desire. The sacrifices we hear of in the name of love presumably are loving acts. Giving the only vacant seat on the lifeboat to your wife as the "Titanic" goes down is a loving act (presuming it wasn't done out of pure sense of duty). I loved my wife before I gave her the seat and the actual giving of the seat was an expression of that love. It was, in fact, a loving act. It was not a love act.

In the course of a life and a love the distinction between the love act and loving acts may seem moot. And in many instances it is a distinction of little importance. When my wife gives up her job and comes with me to a new city so that I may pursue my career, we say that she did it out of love (again, I assume she did not act out of a sense of duty). The distinction between the love act and acting lovingly is only obliquely referred to. Even so, it seems enough was said. But the phrase is "she did it out of love" and it gives the impression that what was done issued forth from love. It seems appropriate to substitute the "she acted lovingly" for "she did it out of love" since the loving act, as I have described it, does issue forth from the love act through altruistic desire. The distinction between the love act and loving acts may seem relatively unimportant, but to a degree they are reflected in the way we speak. Furthermore, the distinction does seem to apply to lovers and the way they act, whether their descriptions of their love and loving acts reflect the

distinction or not.

Perhaps the reason love acts and loving acts are confused is that the love act is, like any act of perception or valuation, invisible. We never see a person seeing; we only see how well he maneuvers in the world. We see his acts. It may be that, when a person first views a painting that strikes him, we can see his reaction: the gasp of appreciation, the rigid immobility. We may even in due course observe his buying or working to buy the painting. We can view his reactions and his actions, but we cannot view his valuing. So too, with love we can view the consequences of love, those loving acts, but we cannot view the love act itself. And just as we do not confuse the perceiving or the valuing with the way we ascertain that someone is perceiving or valuing, so should we not confuse the love act with loving acts.

The love act and loving acts are distinguishable but so are other acts associated with love. The lover's reactions in the first throes of love so accurately chronicled by Plato in the Phaedrus are part of the way we determine if a person is in love and an example of acts inextricably related to love. But more important than the reactions of the lover are his acts toward the beloved that are not loving acts. In the strict sense I have defined, loving acts must be supported by altruistic desires. It would be folly, however, to imply that all desires about the beloved are altruistic desires. Some are clearly self-serving desires. The desire to bask in the beloved's presence as Plato describes it is surely self-serving. The lover wishes to enjoy the beauty of the beloved. There is no desire for the beloved's

welfare. There is only a desire to enjoy. Under most circumstances such a desire is harmless, and the beloved might find the excessive attention at most annoying. More problematic for everyone involved is the desire to be loved in return. In most, if not all, cases the lover not only wants to enjoy the beloved and wants to benefit the beloved but also wants to be loved by the beloved.

It is important to distinguish between wanting to be loved simpliciter and wanting to be loved while one is loving. The former is reducible to a self-serving desire. A person who just wants to be loved is not particularly concerned to love in return and if he does "love" in return it is merely part of a barter: "If you'll love me, I'll love you." Such a wanting to be loved is merely wanting to have the benefits that accrue to a beloved. Without love, a wanting to be loved is nothing more than a wanting to be idolized. Graces are then dispensed to the worshippers according to their dedication. But the lover wants to be loved as a consequence of his loving. For the lover the distinction between himself and the beloved as valuing centers is blurred. It is this blurring of the distinction between self and other that allows the lover to desire altruistically and to act lovingly. Only in so far as the lover sees no practical difference between himself and the beloved, can he want for both of them indiscriminately. He is of course correct if the only consideration is of the lover and beloved as valuing centers, but perceiving, and valuing the other as just like me is not the same as being the other. There are practical limits to the "as if" quality of altruistic desire. At some point the lover becomes aware that, while he and his

beloved are equals, they are separate. In the lover's awareness of separate and equal comes an awareness that the beloved may love too. With the awareness of the beloved's ability to love can come the desire to be loved by the beloved. As lover, I can be so enthralled with the beloved that I can forget myself and become the obsessed aesthete wanting only revel in the beloved. I can be so taken with the beloved that I forget that I am the one that perceives the value of the beloved and instead only see the valuing center that is the beloved. But when I gain possession of my senses, when the world intrudes, I see myself and the beloved. I am not shaken in my awareness of the beloved as a valuing center, but I become aware that I, too, am one. And I want the beloved to see me for what I am as much as I see her for what she is.

My wanting to be loved depends heavily on two factors. If the beloved does love me and shows it, then either the want will not arise, or it will subside when she manifests her love. My wanting to be loved, then, is contingent on how much I am loved. It is also dependent on my self-esteem. The less I think of myself, the less I think myself deserving of love, the less I will want to be loved and the more I will invest most of my wants in the other categories. With a low self-esteem, I will feel grateful when the beloved allows me to bask in her presence, and I will desire altruistically and act lovingly, but I will barely hope that my love will be returned.

I have previously shown that Sartre's claim that the project of love is to be loved by the beloved is flawed in two ways. First, Sartre does not account for the other possible projects the lover

might have with regard to the beloved. Second, and more fundamentally, love is distinct from any project love might have. Only when I do love, can I then set as a project getting the beloved to love me. These two objections are problematic for Sartre's account, but that is not all. Sartre has not taken into account the fact that the desire to be loved is contingent on self-esteem. Sartre's paradigm of love is the idealized love of two consciousnesses. Each has set before it the doomed goal of becoming an in-itself-for-itself. And in love, each sets out to achieve this goal by seducing the beloved. What is presupposed on such an account is that the lover has a clear notion of his worth; he must know that he is a consciousness equal to the consciousness he is trying to seduce. And, given that in Sartre's account the beloved is utilized in the lover's project of self-foundation, the lover actually values himself more than the beloved. Of course, this is possible, but it need not be. It is as foolish or wise for the lover to under-value himself as it is to overvalue himself. The fact is that the lover and beloved are equal as consciousnesses, as valuing beings. It makes no more sense for me, as lover, to under-value myself and not want to be loved than it does to over-value myself and only want to be loved. That people do under- and over-value themselves is an undisputable fact, and hence it surely is the case that they do not routinely see the parity between lover and beloved. Sartre's claim that to love is to want to be loved, then, must be qualified. Love allows the lover to want to be loved. But love itself does not determine whether a lover wants to be loved. The external fact of whether the beloved

actually shows her love is a partial determinant. More importantly the worth the lover places on himself may determine whether and how much the lover wants to be loved. The lover in an act of sheer egoism may say that his consciousness is the only one that matters and thereby want to be loved above all else. Such a position is undercut by the fact that what he wants to love him must be something of intrinsic worth--a valuing something just like himself--and thereby his equal. In conceit, he can willfully maintain his superiority over the other, but in fact the other is his equal. The lover in utter self-depreciation may go to the opposite extreme and deny his own worth and only exalt the worth of the beloved. But such a position is as untenable as the other extreme for two reasons. First, as a matter of fact, the beloved is the lover's equal--in so far as they are conscious, valuing beings. Second, the lover's valuation, his love, is worthless, if he is not worthwhile and his love is an empty, pathetic gesture. Between the extremes is the possibility of striking a position closer to the truth. The lover can love the beloved unashamedly as his equal, and as the beloved's equal he can want the love the beloved has to give.

At this point we can say the following. Love is a perceiving valuing act that is in-itself inert. It is (here, by fiat) directed toward another person and is justified by the fact that the beloved is a valuing being just as the lover is. Further, the desires of love are a consequence of the love act. These desires, in turn, are the source of the various activities surrounding love. Among the most prominent of the desires associated with love is the desire to enjoy

the beloved's presence, the (altruistic) desire to promote the beloved's welfare and the desire to be loved by the beloved. Each of these kinds of desires may have acts associated with them. Those acts, borne of altruistic desires, are "loving acts", are most frequently associated with "pure" love and are the result of the lover's inability to discern any real difference between himself as a valuing being and the beloved as a valuing being. The desire to be loved hinges on the lover's self-esteem. An over- or under-valuation of himself in relation to the beloved as a valuing being will lead to an extremely intense or an extremely limited desire to be loved. The lover who values himself as he values the beloved (since they are equally valuing beings) will have a moderate desire to be loved just as he loves. Finally, we can conclude that the desire to be loved will result in acts that could well be called seductive.

Such a brief summary of love can hardly account for all the possibilities. Nonetheless, the theory is sufficiently developed to be tested. The theory should be as coherent, and if possible, more coherent than competing theories and predict more often more correctly than competing theories. A test of the coherency and explanatory power of the proposed theory of love is the next task.

CHAPTER IV

LOVE ON ANY ACCOUNT

5.1 Gabriel Taylor's Description Of Love

The foregoing account of love, while being a detailed examination in some respects, is meant to be a schematic to get us around in the terrain where we find ourselves when in love. Gabriel Taylor in her article "Love" also makes an attempt to describe the terrain of love. She keeps a sharp eye for what we ordinarily consider to be the facts about love and tries to find a structure in the phenomena. As in my analysis, she is concerned with the reasons and justifications of love. Her suppositions and tack, however, are radically different. Since she agrees with my account, for the most part, on the factual description of love but explains the phenomena differently, her article provides an excellent opportunity to test the theories for internal consistency and explanatory power.

Taylor first considers emotions and distinguishes between those that are intentional and those that are not. Examples of the first sort are anger, fear, jealousy and envy. Examples of the second sort are "feeling happy", "feeling depressed", and "experiencing nameless fears." Emotions of the first sort not only take an object, but the person who experiences them has certain beliefs about the object.

If x feels the emotion, and if y is the object, then

x will believe y to have a specific property or set of properties. Depending on which emotion he feels he will believe, for example, that y is dangerous, that y has done him an injury or a good turn. Put more formally, this requirement reads: for any member of this class of the emotions there is a quality or set of qualities phi that for all x and all y, if x feels the emotion towards y then x believes y to be phi....¹

These qualities Taylor calls determinable qualities. Because these determinable qualities are so general, they give us little information about the emotion. It is unexceptional to say, for instance, that if I feel fear I believe the object of that fear to be dangerous. We can be more informative and specific.

x will therefore also believe, and normally be able to articulate, that y has certain determinate qualities psi, and further he will believe that it has the determinable quality phi because it has the determinate quality psi: the thing is dangerous, say, because it is aggressive and has sharp claws, or again because it is malicious and powerful. So we have the further requirement, that if x feels the emotion in question towards some object y then x believes y to have some determinate quality, which normally but not necessarily he will be able to specify....²

Exactly what is found to be dangerous and why, can and will vary widely from person to person, but there are limits placed on what I can reasonably be afraid of. If I fear x, then I must believe (even if I cannot state) that the object of my fear has certain determinate qualities. I can be afraid of x because it is powerful and malicious but not because it is good and kind. Of course, while having certain emotions entails believing certain things about the object of the emotion, it need not be the case that, because an object has particular determinate qualities, anyone should experience an emotion toward it. You may be afraid of our boss because he is powerful and

malicious, but, even though I grant he is, I am not afraid, perhaps because I have dealt with his kind before. The relationship is not symmetrical: if I have a certain emotion, I must believe that the object of the emotion has determinate qualities and that, because it has those determinate qualities, I believe it has the appropriate determinable one(s), but if an object has certain determinate qualities, I may not believe it has some determinable ones and therefore do not experience a given emotion toward the object.

Taylor then claims that there are further conditions for feeling one of the emotions which takes an object. A person feeling such an emotion will, in addition, have certain wants and therefore tendencies to behave in certain ways toward the object of the emotion. Again, not all wants and tendencies to act are reasonable, given a certain emotion. There are some restrictions on what I can want if I fear. I can want to run away from the bear that I fear because it is dangerous (and I believe it is dangerous because I believe it is powerful and has long claws). But if I fear it, I cannot want give it a tender embrace.

But even if the beliefs about the determinate and determinable qualities are justified, is that sufficient to justify the emotion? If the beliefs aren't justified, then the emotion isn't. Of that much we can feel confident. But there are cases in which the beliefs are justified and the emotion isn't. "So for instance it could be argued that however rational the beliefs involved in a man's envy, jealousy or hatred, such emotions are highly undesirable, and if so it would be odd to regard their occurrence as ever justified."³ Taylor points out

that what is being overlooked in such cases is norms of various kinds and previously formed moral views. We can claim that one is never justified in feeling envy because envy is not morally justifiable. Justifying my envy, then, would include not only justifying my beliefs about the object of envy but also a defense of my beliefs about my own role in life as opposed to that of my neighbor.

Fully justifying the feeling of this or other emotions on some occasion will therefore often be a difficult and troublesome undertaking as it is likely to include a defence of one's moral views.⁴

Further, whether a man experiences a given emotion may well depend not only on his beliefs about the object but his moral beliefs as well.

Obvious and extreme examples would be a man who does not feel pity because he never spends enough thought on others to realize that they may find themselves in a painful situation, or one who does not feel remorse because he cannot conceive of himself as ever doing wrong.⁵

Having given this analysis of emotions that take objects, Taylor looks at love to see if it fits the characterization of such emotions. Love does satisfy the first condition: love takes an object. That much is clear. But when the object of love is another person are there identifiable determinate and determinable qualities of the person? Taylor considers the possibility that being lovable is the determinable quality. Who is considered lovable may vary from person to person as what is considered dangerous may vary. If being lovable is taken as meaning someone who is "outgoing, friendly, and open to affection,"⁶ a lover might find the beloved lovable when no one else would be willing to attribute that quality to the beloved.

But there is no reason to suppose that this must always be the case; there seems to be no contradiction in saying

that x loves y although he does not believe y to be lovable in the accepted sense, as there is a contradiction in saying that x fears y and yet does not believe y to be dangerous in some respect.⁷

Being lovable cannot be the determinable quality of love since, unlike other emotions and the determinable qualities of them, the person may love but not find the beloved lovable. There is the possibility that there is some, yet undiscovered, determinable quality of the object of love, but Taylor cannot find one that does not fall heir to the same difficulty and neither can I. This suggests that the most that can be said is that x finds y lovable. But this reduces the issue to a matter of taste and tells us nothing about the (determinate) qualities of the beloved. There seems to be a striking dissimilarity between love and emotions that take objects.

That there does not appear to be determinable qualities for love as there are for emotions which take objects would suggest that Taylor is barking up the wrong analogy. Certainly my examination of emotions and love led me to reject love as an emotion because love lacked important features that emotions had. But Taylor is concerned with the justification of love and does not forsake the possibility that love is an emotion. After all, both love and emotions may often have elaborate justifications. It is all well and good to say that "Love and emotions (often) have elaborate justifications; they're alike in this way" and quite another to base an account of love on such a flimsy basis--especially when pertinent disanalogies are known. Nonetheless Taylor does. And since she cannot find the determinable let alone the determinant qualities of the object of love, she uses

the fact that emotions have attendant wants or desires as a foundation for assessing the justifiability of love. Her tack now is to claim that because the wants attending an emotion are justified only within certain constraints and since love has attendant wants, love's justifiability can be gleaned from the justification of the wants attendant to love.

If therefore we can find a set of wants which are typically involved in the case where x loves y then this will put a constraint upon the beliefs concerning particular qualities in virtue of which x can love y, and allow us to dismiss those which can in no way be seen as explanatory of the wants in question.⁸

In its most general formulation this ploy seems plausible. Look at the wants attendant to love. Find the constraints on the wants and then apply them to the object of love. In other words, the front door slammed shut when Taylor attempted to find the determinate qualities of the beloved so she then tries the back door. There is nothing wrong with a back door--if it's the right back door. Unfortunately, wants are not necessarily the right back door to love or emotions. It's true that wants or desires may be the consequence of love or emotions. I may want to benefit you because I love you and I may want to injure you because you made me angry. But I may also want peace in the world because of moral beliefs or general good will. Wants need not be the consequence of love or emotions. Since they need not be, an analysis of the wants of love need not indicate any similarity between love and emotions. Just because wants may have justifications is no reason to assume that all such wants spring from a common kind of source (here emotions). Yet Taylor assumes just this: that,

because wants may have justifications and wants attend both emotions and love, love is an emotion. Such an assumption is unwarranted given the prima facie evidence that love and emotions are not the same kind of thing. The objects of emotions have determinate qualities and love does not (apparently). Exhibiting the constraints on the justification of wants whether they be the result of emotions, love, or some other thing, is not sufficient to make up for the gaping difference in love and emotions.

Taylor is forced to the strategy of examining love through its wants because the objects of love do not have the determinate qualities that emotions do and because she rejects as possible determinate qualities universal human traits.

...it seems true and even trivial that very often at least if x loves y then he does so in virtue of certain determinate qualities which he believes y to have, even though such qualities may vary greatly for different persons, and even though the lover may find it difficult to be articulate about them. But though choice and variety may be great, not just any description will do if x is to love y. Some constraints upon them can perhaps be derived from the original restriction, that the love in question be of a particular person; this allows us to rule out such features as are universally possessed by any normal person.⁹

As Taylor sees the it, the question boils down to "Why do I love this person rather than that?" She takes it that the beloved has certain properties in virtue of which he is loved as just the person he is. But by making that assumption she misses the difference between asking "Why do I love (at all)?" and "Why do I love this person?" The difference is of the utmost importance. I have answered the first question by claiming that I love because I perceive and value the

beloved as a valuing being. I love at all because of a perfectly general trait "possessed by any normal person." And I have answered the second by saying that there are certain psychological and physical features of the person that I love to which I am responsive and which have allowed me to view and value the universal characteristic of the beloved. Taylor has conflated the two questions and is therefore prompted, first, to consider love an emotion and, second, when that approach fails, to consider the wants arising from love in a search for the qualities that justifies the beloved being loved. With these criticisms in mind, we can examine how Taylor treats the justification of the wants concerned with love.

Taylor first gives a general characterization of the wants associated with love.

We view love as a give-and-take relationship, so the essential wants will have to reflect this feature. If x loves y we have on the one hand x's wants to benefit and cherish y, on the other his wants to be with y, to communicate with y, to have y take an interest in him, to be benefited and cherished by y. Such wants allow us to impose constraints on x's beliefs in that only those are now relevant which can explain his wants. This, quite properly, leaves a wide choice of psi properties at x's disposal in virtue of which he may have these wants.¹⁰

The wants Taylor mentions seem very much to be the wants associated with love, but I would take exception on two points. First, she claims these are essential. From her account so far there seems no reason to call them essential. Observation will allow us to agree that these wants often accompany love, but such an inductive generalization will hardly do as justification for the claim that they are essential. But even if we admit that they so often accompany love

that we can consider them as essential there is still one small difficulty. Taylor says the lover wants to cherish the beloved. This does not strike me as routinely true. What is routinely true is that the lover does cherish. It is because he cherishes that the lover wants to benefit the beloved. Even on Taylor's account (as we shall see) the lover values the beloved and wants because he values. Does it make any sense to say that the lover wants to value the beloved, for after all cherishing is a kind of valuing. Perhaps the lover wants to cherish the beloved more. This could be the case, but it is hardly essential. Descriptions of the first throes of love are replete with accounts of how much the lover does value--and presumably cherishes--the beloved. Cherishing--or something like it--may be essential to love, but wanting to cherish need not occur at all if the lover cherishes enough in the first place.

Aside from these two relatively minor objections we can agree with Taylor's characterization of the wants of love. She claims, however, that this gives only a rough-and-ready description that is in need of qualifications and refinements. The refinement she suggests is the distinction between infatuation and love. She grants that an infatuated person and a person in love may want the same thing or person. Since infatuation and love cannot be distinguished by their object, she claims they are distinguishable by how reasonable the attendant wants are. She describes infatuation as "a state which we do not even attempt to link with anything that is accessible to rational, or for that matter, moral evaluation"¹¹ and says that love "has traditionally been regarded as capable of being rational and as

admitting of degrees of moral excellence."¹² She then suggests that love and infatuation can be so characterized with the theoretical backing of the distinction between (at least) two very different kinds of want. "The crucial difference between these is that wants of one kind do and of the other do not involve some form of evaluation of what is wanted."¹³ In the case of wants that involve evaluation a man believes that what is wanted is worthwhile, although he need not believe it is the most worth while thing to want. He cannot, however, view what he wants as having no value whatsoever. In the case of the man who simply wants several situations are possible: "he may not evaluate a [the object desired] at all; or he may think that no value or even that a disvalue attaches to doing or having a; and finally he may think it worth while to do or have a, but if so then not because a as such is worth doing or having, but because he thinks it worth while to satisfy his desires, either on this occasion or as a general policy."¹⁴

That love and infatuation are hard to distinguish in practice and that love may become infatuation and infatuation love, Taylor grants. Practical determinations aside, she suggests that love and infatuation can be distinguished on the basis of the kinds of wants associated with each.

If x loves y then at least some of his wants will be based on the thought that it is worth while e.g., to be with and cherish y, while the wants of his infatuation have no such base.¹⁵

And again, the same point.

...infatuation, being thought of as a blind passion, is very suitably linked with a type of desire which may lead

a man to act against his better judgement, while the type of want ascribed to love accounts for the view that the lover tends to value what he loves. Such an assessment of the lover's part would hardly be possible if he did not believe that y had certain characteristics in virtue of which it would be worth while to have his wants satisfied, indeed he will think this if what he values is being with y, cherishing y etc., and not just the satisfaction of his desires.¹⁶

The association of blind desire with infatuation and reasoned wants with love again suggests that the lover believes the beloved to have certain properties and these properties provide the reasons for his wants. Further, the infatuated man will want someone as a means to the end of, say, the satisfaction of his desires, while the lover will want the beloved for herself and not just a means to some other end. The infatuated man may see someone merely as a means to slake his sexual appetite. The lover, on the other hand, could not see the beloved merely as a means to slake sexual appetites or gain social standing or obtain wealth.

Taylor summarizes her findings thus far in the following words.

...if x loves y then x wants to benefit and be with y etc., and he has these wants (or at least some of them) because he believes y has some determinate characteristics psi in virtue of which he thinks it worth while to benefit and be with y. He regards satisfaction of these wants as an end and not as a means toward some other end.¹⁷

At this juncture a few comments on Taylor's exposition are in order. She speaks of "simply desiring" and claims there are three possible characterizations of such desiring. A man who has such a desire may not evaluate the object of desire at all. Or he may evaluate the object but judge it as having no value or negative value. Or he may see the object not as worth while in itself but merely

valuable as a means to satisfy his desires. I take it by her characterization of simple desires that Taylor is thinking of something like appetitive desires. Why do I want some of those freshly baked cookies? Because the smell of them makes my mouth water and they're my favorite kind. Presumably in such cases I do not evaluate the worth-whileness of the object, I simply want it. Yet in such simple cases do I have no beliefs that might or might not be justified? It could be claimed that, even in these minimal cases, the desirer may be said to believe that the object of desire tastes, smells, looks, or feels good and that he might justify his desire with the belief. In fact I do believe and justify in simple cases. I believe the cookie tastes good or I won't bite into it and I bite into it because I believe it tastes good. These are simple justifications and evaluations, but they are justifications and evaluations. Taylor has mischaracterized simple wants. But to allow Taylor to pursue her case, let us grant that when she says simple wants are without belief, justification, and evaluation she means there are few beliefs, justifications, and evaluations involved in simple wants. Given this, I take it that when Taylor claims that the objects of simple desires may be seen by the desirer as having no or negative value she is claiming that, after the desire emerges, a judgement is passed. Yes, I want the cookies, but I really shouldn't have them; I'm watching my figure, you know. The last possibility is that, when I find myself wanting those cookies, my only consideration is an appeal to a hedonistic principle. On principle I believe I ought to have anything that makes me feel good. I know these cookies taste good. Therefore

I should satisfy my desire if possible. It is important to note that these last two characterizations of a simple desire contain evaluation of the desire. The evaluation occurs as the result of the desire rather than the desire occurring because of an evaluation, nonetheless evaluation does occur. But Taylor claims that "The crucial difference between these [infatuation and love] is that wants of one kind do and of the other do not involve some form of evaluation."¹⁸ Clearly Taylor has contradicted herself; she has described simple desires as being associated with some form of evaluation and then claimed that they involve no evaluation.

The contradiction must be transparent even to Taylor and so it is safe to assume that she has something more in mind. She claims that "If x loves y then at least some of his wants will be based on the thought that it is worth while e.g., to be with and cherish y, while the wants of his infatuation have no such base."¹⁹ Now it appears that the distinction between desires of infatuation and desires of love is between feeling and being good. I have a simple desire for the cookies because they taste (seem, feel) good. I may, subsequent to desiring, judge the good taste only an apparent good. The cookies may seem good, but they really aren't good for me. Or I may judge that any apparent good is good; if I enjoy the cookies then that's good enough reason for eating them. But when I love, I judge that the beloved will provide a real (rather than apparent) good. Not only does she seem good, she's good for me, too! So now the difference between desires of infatuation and love seems to be the difference between unevaluated or negatively evaluated apparent goods and

evaluated real goods for me. But even this won't do. Taylor now adds the stipulation that the desires I have in love must be in part altruistic. I must treat the beloved as an end and not just a means. But how are the desires of love to be characterized? Are only those that the lover evaluates as being both in his and the beloved's best interest desires of love? Are the lover's desires for himself, however rational, to be considered simple desires because the desires are for himself and treat the beloved as a means. And what about rational desires that the lover has for the beloved because the end is the beloved's good but (unfortunately) are not in the lover's best interest? It's not clear how Taylor would respond to these variations. What is clear is that she has confused two continuums that characterize desires. A desire may be more or less rational. It may also be more or less altruistic. Being more rational does not guarantee being more altruistic. And being more altruistic does not imply being more rational. I may without any particular thought (let alone justification) want something for myself. That ice cream cone you're eating sure does look good to me. I may also have very rational self-serving desires. I want a word processor because it would eliminate my dependence on secretaries, it would facilitate corrections and editing and so forth. I may also rationally want for you. I want you to get the promotion because you worked for it, you deserve it, because you're the best man for the job. And I may want this whether or not your promotion affects me directly. And finally I may want for you impulsively. That diamond dinner ring in the jeweler's window that I see as I pass by--I just know you'd love it

and I wish I could get it for you. Taylor has sorely underestimated the complexity of desires and her account of love suffers for it. Her mischaracterization of desires makes some revision of her theory necessary to make it coherent.

Taylor's definition (description? characterization?) of love reads as follows:

...if x loves y then x wants to benefit and be with y etc., and he has these wants (or at least some of them) because he believes y has some determinate characteristics psi in virtue of which he thinks it worth while to benefit and be with y. He regards satisfaction of these wants as an end and not as a means toward some other end.²⁰

The definition does not distinguish between the lover's rational wants for himself and for the beloved. Presumably the lover has both kinds of wants because he believes the beloved has certain characteristics. In addition he believes that these characteristics justify his desire for the beloved and his desire to be good to the beloved. Then Taylor claims that the lover regards the wants as ends in themselves. This is a curious turn of phrase since what is ordinarily thought of as an end in itself in a love relationship is the beloved, not the desires for the beloved. Shall we then say that the beloved is merely the means to the end of satisfying our altruistic desires? Do we have these altruistic desires and then find someone to love as a vehicle for the expression and satisfaction of these desires? I believe Taylor's intent is that the beloved's welfare is the object of altruistic desires and we have such desires because we believe the beloved worthy of such desires. On the other hand there are the lover's self-serving desires. These, too, are founded on a belief

that the beloved is worthwhile. But here neither the beloved or the beloved's welfare is the object of desire. In my self-serving desires as a lover to be with and enjoy the beloved I treat the beloved as a means to my ends. Taylor tries to distinguish between using the beloved to obtain social status and using the beloved for my enjoyment. But on her own terms the former should be love and the latter infatuation. After all love was characterized by rational, evaluative desires. How rational--even conniving--is wanting someone for the purpose of improving social standing or wealth. And just wanting someone for the pleasure she can give me seems very much like the simple desires that Taylor claims are characteristic of infatuation. What Taylor should say is that the lover both wants for himself and for the beloved (and sometimes even for the both of them together). That both these can be more or less rational is beside the point. Therefore the lover wants, rationally or not, both for himself and the beloved because, in part, he believes the beloved to have certain characteristics that make her 1) worthy of wanting for and 2) being wanted. There seems to be no reason why the characteristics for one and two need be the same although they probably often are. Taylor is firmly convinced that the lover believes that the beloved has certain characteristics and that the lover justifies his love on the basis of those characteristics. My revision of her definition seems to capture the essential aspects of her analysis.

Taylor claims, on the basis of her analysis of love in terms of wants and beliefs, that it is possible to assess a man's love favorably or unfavorably. She cites three areas of evaluation.

First, since the lover believes the beloved to have certain qualities, the lover's beliefs may be well- or ill-founded. Second, since the lover has wants and in so far as these can be distinguished from mere wishful thinking, he has some grounds for believing that he can satisfy these wants with the beloved and these grounds can be more or less good. Third, he may be mistaken in attaching the value he does to what he wants. In other words, the value he places on the beloved and what he wants as a result of placing value may contravene other values important to him. Taylor admits there is difficulty in establishing a hierarchy of values such that we can say the lover has placed undue value on the beloved. She also claims that it is at least possible for the lover, if not the observer, to determine that something has gone wrong with his evaluations when the values placed as a result of his love conflict with his other values.

All three of Taylor's areas of evaluation seem well taken. The lover has not become infallible by becoming a lover and so he may well have mistaken as well as accurate beliefs about the beloved. Just as surely he may have inadequately appraised the possibility of satisfying the wants he has as a lover. He may think that he can benefit the beloved--even have plans how to--and in reality be unable to. Just as likely he may have beliefs that the beloved can please him and want to be pleased when, in fact, the beloved is incapable of pleasing him. So the lover's beliefs that his wants can be satisfied by the beloved may have good or poor grounds. Finally, it is clear that the value placed on the beloved may conflict with other values, though it may not be clear which values are more highly regarded.

Taylor cites as an example Lord Randal's telling his mother that he has just been with his true love and then promptly dying of the poison his true love administered to him. Presumably Lord Randal valued his life and his true love. The two values came into fatal conflict. Should I have had the chance I might have counseled Lord Randal that his values were in conflict and asked him to assess if his life weren't more important than his love. Nonetheless, there are many cases in which the conflict of values does not so obviously tilt against love. Given the chance, should I have advised Romeo or Juliet that the stability of family and state were more important than their love? Should I have warned them that choosing love would precipitate their death? In many cases, as Taylor admits, weighing the values is difficult. But her general claim seems true: the value the lover places on the satisfaction of his wants as a lover often conflict with the value of other wants.

To this point Taylor has stipulated the conditions for love and given three classes of beliefs associated with love. Beliefs falling into each of these classes may go awry. Presumably without any further amendment one could point out a lover's poorly grounded belief (in any or all of the classes) and thereby claim that the love was unjustified. But Taylor is very much aware that we are unwilling to say that any love is unjustified. There seems to be something inherently virtuous about loving no matter how poorly founded the beliefs of that love are. To account for the fact that love may be defective but not unjustified Taylor introduces three more aspects to love.

5.2 Complications Set In

There are a variety of seemingly insurmountable difficulties in finding grounds for justifying love. Finding a determinable quality of the beloved is one Taylor wrestles with. Now she points out another that I (and Scheler before me) have already mentioned: unlike emotions, love is not occasional. We can speak of the occasion on which we were angry or afraid or grateful, but such talk of occasions doesn't seem to apply to love. Taylor suggests that "the beliefs and wants involved are too varied to be tied to one particular occasion."²¹ She echoes Scheler when she says that love more than any other emotion "may be responsible for his [the lover] finding himself in almost any emotional state we can think of, covering the whole range from bliss to despair, or hope to jealousy."²² And she concludes that "if there are no particular occasions for feeling love then of course we cannot ask whether a man is justified or not in feeling love on this or that occasion."²³ Scheler's conclusion on the basis of the same observations was that love was not an emotion and I have argued that Scheler was right. Nonetheless I must grant that Taylor, whatever she claims love is, has correctly perceived that love endures and that questions about justification on a particular occasion are not applicable to love.

More interesting than her observations about loving not being occasional are Taylor's comments about the "nature of love". The nature of a man's love "consists of the form taken by the individual beliefs and various wants, and their relation to each other."²⁴ Taylor gives three parameters within which this nature varies.

What x sees as satisfying his want for y 's company will of course vary in different cases, as will what he understands by 'benefiting y ', which may range from the simple and mundane to such a complex one as making y aware of being valued as the person he is. Again, the wants in the two groups may vary very much in intensity, so x 's want to have y take an interest in him may be much stronger than his want to benefit y , or the other way about. He may also put a higher value on the satisfaction of one set of wants than on the other, irrespective of their intensity. The sorts of beliefs he holds here as well as the focus and intensity of his wants will indicate the kind of love he feels, whether it is relatively disinterested or possessive, sentimental or passionate.²⁵

Taylor is characterizing the lover's personality in terms of the focus (altruistic or self-serving) of his wants, the relative intensity of those wants, and the values he holds independent of these wants. Clearly if the lover is a very selfish person his focus will be on the self-serving wants. However he may find that in principle he values benefiting others highly. This conflict in values and wants may be, in turn, steeped with a ferocious passion or relative languor. Taylor claims that if these beliefs concerning the nature of love are irrational, then the lover's belief that the beloved has certain characteristics as well as his evaluation of these and his estimation of his likelihood of satisfying his wants will likely be flawed. Taylor's claim here seems to amount to the claim that characterological differences in lovers will produce differences in their loves. Moreover, insofar as these characterological differences can be evaluated as better or worse, the love will likely be more or less reasonable.

Where x 's view of what constitutes a benefit to y is so entirely coloured by considerations of his own interests, his wants concerning y will be correspondingly 'unbalanced' in that he is more concerned with taking than

giving, and the demands he makes on y will tend to be unreasonable.²⁶

Taylor later points out that the nature of a man's love is not necessarily related to his beliefs about the beloved. It is entirely possible that I have sorely mistaken beliefs about the beloved and yet have a generous attitude toward the beloved that results in benefiting the beloved. So, to the complexity of evaluating a love, we must add the dimension called the nature of love. This dimension often affects the lover's beliefs about the beloved, his evaluation of these and his projections of success at fulfilling the wants of love, but it need not. Taylor's claims seems to be that the lover's character colors his love and may make it defective but that this need not be so; a lover with characterological defects may surmount them and have a relatively unassailable love. I take it that Taylor would claim that, so long as there is a spark of altruism in a reaction to another and although self-serving interests far out-weigh the altruistic impulses, we may properly consider the reaction love. Taylor is of course right to point out that the character of the lover will effect the quality of the love. Love does not occur in a vacuum but is a very human activity. The qualities of the lover therefore will effect the love he bears. Furthermore, the qualities of the lover that, in general, give him insights and blind spots will carry over into his love and effect his beliefs about his love. To all of these claims we surely must assent, so long as we do not deify love but acknowledge it as a human activity.

But Taylor is not quite done characterizing love, the beliefs

surrounding love, and the justifiability of those beliefs. To this point she has acknowledged that I, as lover, may have inaccurate beliefs about the beloved and yet, because of the generous or noble character of my love, my love may still be worthy of approbation. In fact, loving and the ability to love seem commendable in themselves regardless of the character of the lover or his love.

Love is thought of as somehow enriching to the lover as well as the person loved, and there seems something sad or even sinister about the man who never loves at all.²⁷

Taylor then describes five possible attitudes a man might possess that might deter him from loving. And she claims that "Selfishness, avarice, arrogance, sloth and cowardice are at any rate among the major failings a man may possess if he lacks this or that belief or want essential to the lover."²⁸ But having these failings does not prevent a man from being a lover and neither does the lack of these failings ensure that a man is a lover. There is nothing inconsistent about a man being avaricious and loving. All that follows is that his love may be defective because of his avarice. The same can be said of any failing; it does not prevent love, it may merely make love defective. It is just as true that a man may be of good character and yet not love. He may, like a Kantian man of duty, perform all manner of good works and be judged commendable without ever having loved. Yet being of good character does seem to imply that a man would be a "good" lover, one "whose beliefs are well-based and whose wants are well-balanced."²⁹

In light of these complexities Taylor comments on love and on determinations of love as well-balanced, defective or unjustified.

What we value about love is no doubt the spontaneous appreciation of another person, and maybe it can be said that even in its most defective form it involves a trust in another which is spontaneous in that it is not backed by any rights or conventions. From that point of view x's wants to be with y etc., are as important as his wants to benefit etc. y; not because such wants indicate any kind of virtue in him, but because they express appreciation of the other person, for whatever reason.³⁰

Given that love does contain an element of spontaneous appreciation of another, we are unwilling to say that someone would have been better off not loving at all. It is only in these last observations that Taylor indicates what love is and why it might be valuable regardless of other considerations. Having admitted that love is, at least in part, a spontaneous appreciation of another, Taylor comments on her initial project of comparing love to emotions and of finding grounds for the justification of love.

...love is not so unlike paradigmatic emotions that the question of justification does not arise: in the form of questions of deficiency and of propriety it does.³¹

In her concluding comments Taylor makes the claim, not that love can be justified straightforwardly as can emotions, but that it can be evaluated as deficient or not and as proper or not.

This seems a far cry from what I took to be her initial claim that love was very much like those emotions that took objects. In fact Taylor's analysis of love as an emotion seems to have disintegrated in the face of various observations she has made about love, observations that make love appear very different from emotions. First, Taylor points out that the relevant kind of emotions have objects with both determinable and determinate qualities in light of which the emotion may be judged justified or not. Yet she cannot find

any determinable quality for love. And since she cannot, she resorts to an analysis of wants in an attempt to find the determinate qualities of the beloved. Her analysis of love in terms of wants is flawed because her analysis of wants is. But even if we grant her analysis of love in terms of wants and the beliefs concerning those wants, there is still her ad hoc qualification that the beloved must be treated as an end in himself. This altruistic stipulation is not developed from her analysis of emotions, wants, and beliefs but from observation about our general view that love contains an altruistic element. She describes love in terms of wants and the beliefs concerning those wants and includes a stipulation about the beloved being treated as an end in herself. This description works to some extent, but it works because it is a restatement of our beliefs about love and not because of any virtues intrinsic to her theory of love.

In addition to admitting that love does not have an object with determinable qualities (as do emotions), she also observes that love, unlike emotions, is not occasional. Between these two observations Taylor should have concluded that love is a very uncharacteristic emotion, if it is an emotion at all. Further, to give an adequate account of love, she finds it necessary to speak about "the nature of love" and the character of the lover. These additional considerations of the character of the lover and his inclination toward a selfish or altruistic love or a moderation between these extremes, while giving some explanation of the lover's beliefs and expectations about love, further blur any relation between the lover's beliefs and a justification of love. Finally, Taylor mentions that love may be

laudable even when defective because it involves an appreciation of another person. In the end Taylor no longer talks about justifying love. She can only talk about the deficiencies and proprieties of a love and claim that these are related to the justifications of emotions.

It is interesting that Taylor is willing to grant that virtually any love is "justified" in the sense that the lover, however corrupt and despicable, by loving has spontaneously appreciated the beloved. There is a clear implication that the particular qualities of the beloved are no longer at issue. Even if the beloved is a less than an admirable person, the love is worthwhile insofar as it spontaneously appreciates another person. Here is Taylor's limited distinction between the justification of love and the wisdom of a particular love. My analysis started with a search for a definition of love. Once that definition was in hand, I looked for the justification of love in the object of love. I assumed that particular loves might be doomed, defective, or tragic, but that any love had some intrinsic worth. It is that intrinsic worthiness of love that Taylor only belatedly acknowledges and which forces her to reject talk about the justification of love in the straightforward sense. Her belated acknowledgement of the intrinsic worthiness of loving and her insistence on considering love an emotion when so much data tells against such an interpretation makes Taylor's analysis of love a very shaky one indeed.

However much her analysis lacks cohesion, Taylor's account pays close attention to one aspect of love to which I have yet to give much

consideration. She of course notes that a love is a love of a particular person. Because loves are of individuals, she concludes (wrongly, I would suggest) that the lover must perceive certain qualities in the beloved that are the foundation of the lover's love. Backhandedly, and only at the end, Taylor seems to admit that love is justified because the lover spontaneously appreciates the beloved. But even in her admission she is concerned with the particulars of the lover and the beloved and how these particulars affect the quality of the love. In fact her paper would probably had been better titled "Beliefs, Wants, and Attitudes that Effect the Quality of Love." That loves can be of better or worse quality is a fact too often overlooked. That loves can be defective, as Taylor puts it, bears on how we understand the love act in relation to loving acts.

Having been concerned among other things with the justification of any love, of love in general, I have, for the most part, ignored love as it occurs in particular instances. That has, perhaps, given an idealistic cast to my discussion that needs rectification. Clearly no love occurs in a vacuum. Humans are the lover and the beloved. However noble the insight of love, it is the insight of humans who often do have grievous flaws. It is unreasonable to expect this perception valuation that is love (so inert as perceptions are) to routinely and radically change the lover. In some circumstances surely love can be so striking, so forceful that the lover is all but compelled to change. More often the lover loves without stretching the confines of his character very much. The miser will still be a miser even though he loves. The jealous man will still be jealous,

perhaps more so, when he loves. And so on. The miser might just give a little to the beloved on the side. He might deem the love worth a few pennies. But the jealous man will be, in all probability, more protective and will only grudgingly give up his jealousy, if at all, when he finds that holding the beloved too close makes her run away. The character of the lover does affect the quality of the love. His character affects his attitudes, beliefs, desires, and acts. And however pure and pristine his love in itself, a man's love will evidence itself through the filter of his personality. He may believe in general that his wants should always be considered first and be satisfied when possible. As a consequence, when this man falls in love he will tend to consider the beloved's wants as secondary to his own. And though he appreciates the beloved as being able to satisfy his wants, he will be unlikely to appreciate how important the beloved's wants are (at least to the beloved). It is likely that he will often assume that what he wants is what the beloved wants and, by so assuming, have some thoroughly mistaken beliefs about the beloved and the beloved's wants. Here we have the spontaneous appreciation of another, as Taylor calls the love act, and the consequent "loving" acts. The character of the lover may thoroughly color his love, so much so that we may judge it defective. But what is important to note is that the love act is not defective, only the acts that result from the love act--those acts that are, in part, determined by the belief system of the lover.

Taylor's examination does, then, point out the importance of the lover's character in determining the quality of his love. Her

analysis fails, however, insofar as it draws on inadequate and often faulty theoretical underpinnings. Had she seen more clearly the distinction between the love act and the acts (logically) consequent on the love act, she could have distinguished between what is justifiable in love and what makes it defective. The common belief is that loving is without qualification virtuous. This belief seems to point to the love act that perceives and values another valuing center. Whatever else is the case, there seems to be no occasion under which this perceiving valuing is not justified. Hence the very love act is either self-justifying or in need of no justification. But the love act is not the acts consequent on love. These are very much dependent on the person who loves and may involve faulty (unjustifiable) beliefs and wants. These faulty beliefs and wants may then give us good cause to judge a love defective. Since my theory is better able to make sense of the variables of love and do so without (I hope) serious conceptual misstep, since my theory can correct and clarify Taylor's, and even though her theory makes some astute observations, I conclude that, on the whole, my theory is better able to provide a framework in which to talk about love.

What I have provided is a schematic of love. Every aspect of love has not been covered, only the most central and important features. But with these features in hand, I can give a succinct and useful characterization of love. Love is a valuing perceiving act by a valuing center of a valuing center. This act of itself is inert. Only when the valuing center is considered as a complete person, who desires and has the ability to act and change, can love alter

anything. The desires that occur as a result of the love act may be categorized into three types: 1) loving desires which are altruistic desires toward the beloved, 2) hedonistic desires which are a desire to enjoy the beloved, and 3) seductive desires which is the desire to be loved by the beloved. The mix of these desires and the acts that follow as a result of them are highly dependent on the character of the lover. The love act itself guarantees no balance between the various types; it is only the source of all three. Hence, on the whole, a good man will have a good love and a flawed man will have a defective love. Since the love act is justified whenever it occurs in response to a valuing center and since only persons (all of which are valuing centers) are being considered as objects of love, love is always justified. This does not mean, however, that love is always perfect. Insofar as the lover's character is defective, then the love may be also. But however defective his acts consequent on his love, the lover's love is always justified. With this summary of love, I will let the reader take his leave and draw what morals he can.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

¹I am using R Hackforth's translation of Phaedrus as it appears in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton University Press, 1961. All references to the Phaedrus use standard pagination.

²Vlastos, G. "The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato," (Platonic Studies, Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1973.

³Neumann, Harry. "Diotima's Concept of Love," (American Journal of Philosophy, vol. 86, 1965, pp 33-59).

Chapter III

¹Scheler, Max. The Nature of Sympathy. (trans. Peter Heath. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1954), p.161.

²Scheler, Max. "Ordo Amoris," (Selected Philosophical Essays, trans. David R. Lachterman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 128.

³"Ordo Amoris," p. 131.

⁴"Ordo Amoris," p. 131.

⁵"Ordo Amoris," p. 131.

⁶"Ordo Amoris," p. 131.

⁷"Ordo Amoris," p. 131.

⁸"Ordo Amoris," p. 131.

- ⁹"Ordo Amoris," p. 131.
- ¹⁰The Nature of Sympathy, p.147.
- ¹¹The Nature of Sympathy, p.147-148.
- ¹²The Nature of Sympathy, p.147.
- ¹³"Ordo Amoris," p. 131.
- ¹⁴The Nature of Sympathy, p.149.
- ¹⁵The Nature of Sympathy, p.149.
- ¹⁶The Nature of Sympathy, p.149.
- ¹⁷The Nature of Sympathy, p.167.
- ¹⁸The Nature of Sympathy, p.152.
- ¹⁹The Nature of Sympathy, p.161.
- ²⁰The Nature of Sympathy, p.154.
- ²¹The Nature of Sympathy, p.149.
- ²²The Nature of Sympathy, p.148.
- ²³The Nature of Sympathy, p.167.
- ²⁴The Nature of Sympathy, p.149.
- ²⁵The Nature of Sympathy, p.153.
- ²⁶The Nature of Sympathy, p.153-154.
- ²⁷The Nature of Sympathy, p.161.
- ²⁸The Nature of Sympathy, p.148.
- ²⁹The Nature of Sympathy, p.153.
- ³⁰The Nature of Sympathy, p.153.
- ³¹The Nature of Sympathy, p.152.

³²This is not to say that the disagreement about the value of the beloved is not based on a difference of perception. The disagreement is based on a difference of perception of the beloved, as we shall

see, but the non-lover would claim that the lover has over-valued the beloved and the lover would maintain he has not.

³³The Nature of Sympathy, p.148.

³⁴The Nature of Sympathy, p.148.

³⁵Singer, Irving. The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 4.

³⁶Since love so often involves an intimate knowledge of the beloved, it is easier to make appraisals about the beloved than about some mere acquaintance.

³⁷Singer, p. 5.

³⁸"Ordo Amoris," p. 117-118.

³⁹"Ordo Amoris," p. 119-120.

⁴⁰It is harder to come up with examples that are not responses to beauty. Plato was no fool: we are far more responsive to beauty than to the other virtues.

Chapter IV

¹Singer, p. 9.

²Singer, p. 14.

³My synopsis of Being and Nothing is derived from the introduction and first three parts of that book. I also used Joseph Catalano's A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness, Harper and Row, New York, 1974.

⁴Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, (trans. Hazel E. Barnes. Washington Square Press: New York, 1966), p. 340.

⁵Sartre, p. 341.

⁶Sartre, pp. 341-342.

⁷Sartre, p. 343.

⁸Sartre, pp. 343-344.

⁹Sartre, p. 344.

¹⁰Sartre, p. 344.

¹¹Sartre, p. 345.

¹²Sartre, p. 347.

¹³Sartre, p. 348.

¹⁴Sartre, p. 349.

¹⁵My synopsis of Sartre's argument closely resembles Phyllis Sutton Morris' in Sartre's Concept of Person, p. 137.

¹⁶Sartre, p. 379.

¹⁷Sartre, p. 383.

¹⁸Sartre, p. 384.

¹⁹Sartre, p. 386.

²⁰Sartre, p. 386.

²¹Sartre, p. 476.

²²Sartre, p. 482.

²³Robert C. Good, "A Third Attitude Toward Others", (Man and World, vol. 15, 1982, pp. 259-263), p. 260.

²⁴Good, p. 260.

²⁵Sartre, p. 106.

²⁶Good, pp. 260-261.

²⁷Sartre, p. 484.

²⁸Sartre, p. 384.

²⁹George J. Stack and Robert W. Plant, "The Phenomenon of 'The

Look'", (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 42, 1982, pp. 359-373), p. 360.

³⁰Stack and Plant, p. 362.

³¹Stack and Plant, p. 363.

³²Stack and Plant, p. 364.

³³Stack and Plant, p. 364.

³⁴Stack and Plant, p. 371.

³⁵Stack and Plant, p. 372.

³⁶Stack and Plant, p. 372.

³⁷Good argues that Sartre cannot object to Good's proposed third attitude to the Other because consciousness is free to adapt any attitude it chooses. Good is, of course, correct, but he fails to appreciate just how fundamental consciousness' freedom is.

³⁸The Other may, of course, threaten my bodily existence and thence my consciousness, but he may not directly threaten my consciousness.

³⁹The act of appraisal is such that it assesses utility. Once that assessment has been made, one may proceed to love the person that has been perviously appraised. Similarly, the love act does not assess utility and hence is not an appraisal. Even so, once the love act has occurred, it is possible--and ordinarily quite frequent--to appraise the beloved.

⁴⁰The Nature of Love, p. 151.

⁴¹The Nature of Love, p. 155.

⁴²The Nature of Sympathy, p. 152.

⁴³The Nature of Sympathy, p. 153.

Chapter V

- ¹Taylor, Gabriel. "Love", (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 76, 1975-1976, pp. 147-164), p. 147.
- ²Taylor, 148.
- ³Taylor, 149.
- ⁴Taylor, 150.
- ⁵Taylor, 150-151.
- ⁶Taylor, 152
- ⁷Taylor, 152.
- ⁸Taylor, 153.
- ⁹Taylor, 153.
- ¹⁰Taylor, 153-154.
- ¹¹Taylor, 154.
- ¹²Taylor, 154.
- ¹³Taylor, 155.
- ¹⁴Taylor, 155.
- ¹⁵Taylor, 155.
- ¹⁶Taylor, 156.
- ¹⁷Taylor, 157.
- ¹⁸Taylor, 155.
- ¹⁹Taylor, 155.
- ²⁰Taylor, 157.
- ²¹Taylor, 161.
- ²²Taylor, 162.
- ²³Taylor, 162.
- ²⁴Taylor, 159.

²⁵Taylor, 160.

²⁶Taylor, 160.

²⁷Taylor, 162.

²⁸Taylor, 163.

²⁹Taylor, 163.

³⁰Taylor, 164.

³¹Taylor, 164.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Catalano, Joseph. A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness. New York: Harper and Row, 1974.
- Good, Robert C. "A Third Attitude Toward Others," Man and World, vol. 15, 1982, pp 259-263.
- Morris, Phyllis Sutton. Sartres Concept of Man. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1975.
- Neumann, Harry. "Diotima's Concept of Love," American Journal of Philosophy, vol. 86, 1965, pp. 33-59.
- Plato. The Collected Dialogues of Plato. ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. trans. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press, 1966.
- Scheler, Max. The Nature of Sympathy. trans. Peter Heath. Hamden Connecticut: Archon Books, 1954.
- Scheler, Max. Selected Philosophical Essays. trans. David R. Lachterman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
- Singer, Irving. The Nature of Love: Plato to Luther. New York: Random House, 1966.
- Stack, George J. and Plant, Robert W. "The Phenomenon of 'The Look,'" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 42, 1982. pp. 359-373.
- Taylor, Gabriel. "Love," Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 76, 1975-1976, pp. 147-164.
- Valstos, Gregory. Platonic Studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.