

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

WORD OF GOD OR WORD OF HONOR? HONOR, RELIGION, AND  
RETALIATION

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

BY

AARON LEVI POMERANTZ

Norman, Oklahoma

2017

WORD OF GOD OR WORD OF HONOR? HONOR, RELIGION, AND  
RETALIATION

A THESIS APPROVED FOR THE  
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

BY

---

Dr. Mauricio Carvalho, Chair

---

Dr. Ryan Brown

---

Dr. Lara Mayeux



To my wife, Katherine, without whose love, encouragement, and support, I would not  
have come half as far, nor would have any idea where to go.

And to my parents, Dr. Jeffrey Pomerantz and Dr. Trudy Carswell-Pomerantz:

“All that is good in me began with you.”

*SDG*

## **Acknowledgements**

Special thanks to Drs. Carvalho, Mayeux, and most especially Dr. Ryan P. Brown for all their help and guidance.

Special thanks also to Stephen Foster and Kevin Green for their advice and support.

## Table of Contents

List of Tables .....	vi
List of Figures .....	vii
Abstract .....	vii
Introduction.....	1
Honor Ideology and the Culture of Honor.....	2
Multiple Facets of Honor Ideology.....	5
Honor and Religion.....	6
Multiple Conceptualizations of Religiosity .....	8
Study 1 .....	10
Introduction.....	10
Method .....	11
Participants.....	11
Measures .....	11
Results.....	13
Discussion .....	14
Study 2 .....	15
Introduction.....	15
Method .....	16
Participants.....	16
Measures .....	16
Results.....	18
Discussion .....	22
Study 3 .....	24
Introduction.....	24
Method .....	27
Participants.....	27
Measures .....	28
Results.....	30
Discussion .....	33
General Discussion .....	36
References.....	40
Appendix A.....	46
Appendix B.....	54
Appendix C.....	56
Appendix D.....	57
Appendix E.....	58
Appendix F.....	60
Appendix G.....	62
Appendix H.....	63
Appendix I .....	64

### **List of Tables**

Table 1. <i>Mean Scores on the HIW in Study 1</i> .....	46
Table 2. <i>Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for Study 2</i> .....	47
Table 3. <i>Study 2 Regression Analyses Results</i> .....	48
Table 4. <i>Results for t-test Comparisons of Participants' Religiosity Scores Across Condition in Study 3</i> .....	49
Table 5. <i>Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for Study 3</i> .....	50
Table 6. <i>Study 3 Regression Analyses Results</i> .....	51

## List of Figures

<i>Figure 1.</i> Simple Slopes for Intrinsic Religiosity X Condition Interaction in Study 3.....	52
<i>Figure 2.</i> Simple Slopes for Fundamentalism X Condition Interaction in Study 3.....	53



## **Abstract**

The psychology of religion has long attempted to clearly identify religion's effects on individuals' beliefs and attitudes. Many of these results have been contradictory, with some indicating religion to have prosocial effects while others indicating the opposite. The current studies were designed to explore a possible alternative explanation; that cultural variables, specifically honor ideology, might react differently with different religious orientations, producing the contradictory results seen within the psychology of religion. Across three studies, we identified if there was a relationship at all between measures of honor ideology and simple categorical religious identification, identified and classified specific relationships between measures of different honor facets and religious orientations, and finally experimentally induced a "faith/honor conflict" between honor ideology and religious orientation. Results of these studies indicated that religion's prosocial/antisocial effects may depend on the interplay between religious orientation and different facets of honor ideology. Implications of these findings are discussed.

*Keywords:* religion, honor, culture, retaliation

## Introduction

*“Ye have heard that it hath been said, ‘An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,’ but I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also... Ye have heard that it hath been said, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy.’ But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you.”*

-Matthew 5:38-39, 43-44, The King James Bible

Due to religion’s fundamental role in both human history and everyday experience, it is not surprising that psychology has attempted to better understand religion and its influence on human thought and behavior. However, much like its subject matter, the psychological study of religion has been marked by controversy and contradictions. On the one hand, there is a rich body of research indicating religion can have prosocial effects, including generosity and increased beneficence towards outgroups (Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007; Shen, Haggard, Strassburger, & Rowatt, 2013; Everett, Haque, & Rand, 2016) and lessening hostility after provocation (Schumann, McGregor, Nash, & Ross, 2014). However, an equally rich body of research indicates the opposite, demonstrating that religion predicts prejudice and hostility towards outgroups (Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010; LaBouff, Rowat, Johnson, & Finkle, 2012; Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009) as well as desensitizing its adherents to, and even encouraging aggression (Shaw, Quezada, & Zárata, 2011; Widman, 2011; Bushman et al, 2006). Thus, it would seem that there is a paradox

within the psychology of religion, indicating that religion is both prosocial and antisocial, producing diametrically opposed behaviors in its practitioners.

Burch-Brown and Baker (2016) comment that “[Religion’s] influence [on behavior] will depend upon the specific beliefs, attitudes, and practices of the community, and on their interaction with the broader society in which they are based” (p. 16). This suggests that the contradictory findings in the psychology of religion may be due in part to a sociocultural variable moderating the relationship between religion and the aforementioned prosocial and antisocial outcomes. I believe honor to be such a variable. The empirical study of honor ideology has linked honor to several of the same antisocial phenomena as religion, especially hostility/mistrust toward outgroups and aggression. Thus, it is possible that individuals’ levels of honor ideology might moderate the relationship between their religiosity and their tendency toward antisocial behavior. Alternately, the relationship between religiosity and antisocial behavior might be due to a potential overlap in honor ideology and religiosity, meaning that a mediation relationship might be present. I believe it profitable to examine both of these possibilities, moderation and mediation, in order to bring clarity to the paradox within the psychology of religion, and to elucidate the association between honor and religiosity.

### **Honor Ideology and the Culture of Honor**

The first social-psychological and sociological studies of honor culture originated as an attempt to explain the notably higher rates of homicide in the Southern U.S. (Gastil, 1971). This phenomenon was attributed to the South’s cultural norms, originally transplanted by its Scots-Irish immigrants to the new frontier (Fischer, 1991;

Nisbett, 1993). Over time, these norms came together to form a “culture of honor” in which one’s reputation in the eyes of one’s peers is valued as having supreme importance. Both the aggression and the politeness which are so strongly associated with the American South have been attributed to the fundamental role that honor ideology plays in Southern culture (Cohen and Nisbett, 1997; Cohen, Vandello, Puente, & Rantilla, 1999; Vandello, Cohen, & Ransom, 2008).

The focus of honor research in social psychology has since expanded beyond the American South to other countries and cultures including, but not limited to Spain, Turkey, Italy, South/Latin America, and Northern Europe (Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a; Vandello, Cohen, Grandon, & Franiuk, 2009; Cross, Uskul, Swing, Alozkan, & Ataca, 2012). As a part of broadening the geographic focus of studying cultures of honor, honor ideology is beginning to be examined as an evolutionary survival mechanism, rather than a culturally unique occurrence (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996; Shackelford, 2005; Nowak, Gelfland, Borkowski, Cohen, & Hernandez, 2015). This research has identified two key factors that play a fundamental role in the emergence of a culture of honor: a tough environment in which it is difficult to survive, and ineffective/non-present authorities (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996; Nowak et al., 2015).

When environments are extremely tough or hostile, one’s materials and goods, such as clothing and food, become fundamental to survival. In the early days of honor research, it was hypothesized that honor was especially linked to herding cultures, like that of the Scots-Irish who settled the early American South. Such herding cultures typify the economic vulnerability and weak law enforcement which are deemed necessary to the development of an honor culture. In a herding society, one’s livestock

are one's only source of income and survival. If they are stolen or killed, one suffers irreparable damage, as that animal might never be regained and can no longer be relied on to provide the milk/meat/money that one had assumed that it would. When no strong or effective government/law enforcement is present to ensure the protection of fundamental goods, individuals, especially men, must become their own source of protection via what is called "the rule of retaliation" (Shackelford, 2005; Brown, Carvallo, & Imura, 2014).

Shackelford (2005) explains the rule of retaliation as the necessity of individuals, especially men, to respond with "violence or the threat of violence to any affront," lest one leave people, especially the affront-giver, with the impression that one lacks the ability/willingness to protect one's property and self (p. 383). Nisbett and Cohen (1996) similarly identify the *lex talionis* as a man's "stance of willingness to commit mayhem and to risk wounds or death for himself" (p. 15) in defense of self, reputation, family, or property. It is important to note that it is not only direct threats against property that warrant hostile retaliatory action, but also threats against reputation. If one is thought of as strong, tough, and vengeful, one is less likely to be viewed as a potential victim. Thus an honorable individual is one possessed of these traits, and as long as one can be sure that one's peers are convinced of one's "honorable" status, one can rest easier regarding any potential threats to self or property.

While the conditions that produced many cultures of honor are gone, research indicates that "the rule of retaliation" is still in full effect; if one's honor is threatened, one must defend it via violent retribution, in a process often referred to as "reputation

management” (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Cohen, Vandello, Puente, & Rantilla, 1999). Varying explanations for this phenomenon have been put forward. Vandello, Cohen, & Ransom (2008) hypothesize that aggressive norms remain powerful in honor cultures because they are perceived as being demanded by the situation and society in which they occur. Shackelford (2005) hypothesizes that while actual thefts might be uncommon, individuals in a culture of honor may still view certain acts as non-physical theft, i.e., adultery may be seen as a man “stealing” another man’s wife, etc. Whatever the reason, cultures of honor remain prevalent across the globe, and the “rule of retaliation” remains primary in all of them: threaten someone’s honor and “you’ll have another thing coming.”

### **Multiple Facets of Honor Ideology**

Because much of social psychology’s research on honor ideology has focused on the American South, most conceptualizations of honor culture focus around retribution-based, masculine honor, described by Nisbett and Cohen (1996) as men’s “strength and ability to enforce [their] will on others” (p. 4). However, there are other facets of honor. One such facet is feminine honor, which deals with the concept of a “good woman,” and which often involves ideas like familial loyalty, spousal devotion, self-sacrifice, and sexual purity. Thus, an honorable woman is not one who takes part in the rule of retaliation, but instead, one who can be trusted by her father/brothers/husband to keep the family and the family’s reputation safe by being virtuous (especially regarding sexual purity) and ensuring a stable home life (Leyburn, 1962; Pitt-Rers, 1966; Schneider, 1971; Fischer, 1991; Wyatt-Brown, 1982; Vandello

and Cohen, 2003; Vandello et al., 2009; Brown, Carvallo, & Imura, 2014; Barnes et al., 2014).

Feminine honor's focus on the family touches on another facet of honor: collectivism. Even in the highly individualistic culture of the Southern U.S., honor maintains a collectivist facet because of the related concepts of family and clan (Brown, Carvallo, & Imura, 2014). This makes sense when considering honor as a survival mechanism; there is safety in numbers. Barnes, Brown, Lenes, Bosson, and Carvallo (2014) elaborate on the collectivistic facet of honor:

[A group identity] could represent a modern manifestation or extension of the tribe mentality and clannishness that was so critical to subsistence in the tumultuous conditions that gave rise to honor cultures originally. Thus...honor endorsers may be pursuing a long- standing strategy for relying on group memberships to protect hearth and home from harm. (p. 641)

This research found that honor-oriented individuals' whose group identity, in this case their national identity, was threatened would respond according to the "rule of retaliation," just as they would to an affront that threatened their personal identity. Even though these individuals' personal reputations and goods were not being threatened, any affront to the honor of the collective was seen as an affront to the honor of the individual and thus seen as deserving an aggressive response.

### **Honor and Religion**

Religion has not been an area of primary interest in honor research, though it has been brought up in certain studies (Barnes, Brown, & Osterman, 2012). Outside of psychology, however, the relationship between honor and religion has been considered,

albeit non-empirically. In his 2006 book *Honor: A History*, political scientist James Bowman traces the relationship between honor and faith in Christian, Jewish, and Islamic doctrines and cultures. Bowman believes the norms of an honor culture to be especially incompatible with Christianity, the dominant religion in America, due to Christ's numerous commands to refrain from taking vengeance or engaging in violence, such as in the Sermon on the Mount, as quoted at the beginning of this paper (p. 48-49). Thus, in Bowman's perspective, honor and religion (at least in the Christian tradition) are inherently opposed because each "demands" supremacy in the practitioner's life. Each belief system promises dire consequences if not held supreme. In an honor culture, if one's honor is neglected, one becomes vulnerable to both physical assault and the potential loss of one's property, while to the religious individual, not valuing the teachings of one's faith as supreme has eternal consequences, such as damnation. The problem comes in that, while both belief systems demand to be supreme in their practitioner's lives, each has opposing values; honor, valuing survival, holds the "rule of retaliation" as supreme, while Christianity (and, I believe, Judaism and Islam) forbid the taking of personal vengeance as a part of one's submission to God. Thus, one cannot hold both honor and religion as supreme at the same moment, but each will have to "win" on different issues, such as the rule of retaliation, in what will henceforth be referred to as faith/honor conflicts, the resolution of which might, in part, depend upon the way in which religion is conceptualized and practiced by the individual in question, as well as the momentary salience of both religion and honor.

Although honor and religion have not been empirically examined together, research suggests several superficial similarities, such as finding violence more



acceptable when done in the name of the respective belief system (Cohen and Nisbett, 1997; Widman, 2011), a preference for members of faith or honor-based ingroups, as well as dislike for outgroup members (Fitzgerald and Wickwire, 2012; Brewer and Yuki, 2013), and even certain teachings regarding the ideal behaviors of men and women (Bowman, 2006; Brown, Carvallo, & Imura, 2014). It is also interesting to note that all of the most-studied honor cultures are also highly religious, including the Protestant “Bible belt” of the Southern U.S., Roman Catholic Spain and Latin/South America, and Islamic Turkey (Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a). However, while these superficial similarities might seem to indicate a relationship between religion and honor, little research has been conducted to determine whether that relationship actually exists

### **Multiple Conceptualizations of Religiosity**

Just as there are multiple facets of honor ideology, so too are there multiple ways of being religious. Most research involving religion has conceptualized it according to the Intrinsic/Extrinsic (I/E) model of Allport and Ross (1967). However, the I/E model is not the only way in which religiosity can be conceptualized. Other ways to do this include conceptualizing religion categorically (basic demographic identity), by intensity of belief (e.g., fundamentalism and orthodoxy), and according to the teachings of religion itself (e.g., authoritarian vs. benevolent “God concepts” [Johnson, Li, Cohen, & Okun, 2012]). However, while each of these has its own uses, the I/E model remains the most researched and, arguably, the most relevant conceptualization due to its unique compatibility with honor research.

The I/E model categorizes religiosity as either “intrinsic” or “extrinsic,” based on the underlying motives of the belief. Religiosity is categorized as intrinsic when it is the practitioner’s “master motive,” with all other needs being viewed as subordinate to religious beliefs and prescriptions. In contrast, extrinsic religiosity is categorized by being “lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit more primary needs,” including the needs of “security and solace,” as well as “status and self-justification” (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 434).

It is this extrinsic orientation which makes the I/E model so uniquely suited to honor research. Extrinsic religiosity is motivated by the benefits one can gain, especially “security and solace” (Allport and Ross, 1967, p. 434); like honor, it is essentially a psychological survival mechanism. Indeed, this motive to pursue “security and solace” echoes the “desire to mitigate threats to hearth and home” (Barnes et al., 2014, p. 656) that underlies the collectivist and masculine facets of honor ideology. Thus, it is possible that an extrinsically religious honor endorser would not experience a faith/honor conflict in a social retaliatory context, due to “selective shaping” of that person’s religious beliefs to conform to the more primary need of maintaining their honor (Allport and Ross, 1967, p. 434), allowing them to easily ignore the tenets of Christianity that oppose honor norms such as retaliation.

The series of three studies described herein investigates the relationship between religion and honor and their joint connections to retaliatory motives in conflict situations. Study 1 examines the relationship between a categorical conceptualization of religion (i.e., religion measured at its simplest and broadest level) with three different facets of honor. Study 2 uses more nuanced measures of religiosity to test the

relationships between different facets of honor and different conceptualizations of religiosity. Finally, having examined the connection between religious orientation and multiple facets of honor ideology, Study 3 examines how the relationship between religion and honor might play out in an experimental setting involving social conflict and retribution.

### **Study 1**

Study 1 was designed to determine whether or not a relationship between religiosity and honor ideology exists when measuring religiosity at the categorical level as simple religious identification. We predicted that a modest relationship would exist between categorical religiosity and honor, but that this would be most pronounced for honor's feminine facet. This was due to the feminine facet of honor sharing religion's focus on sexual purity and the domestic sphere. It must be acknowledged that measuring religiosity at the categorical level does come with certain limitations, as merely identifying oneself by affiliation with a sect or faith gives no detailed information regarding one's beliefs, practices, or the depth of one's faith (Gorsuch, 1984). For example, one person might identify as a Christian because he or she endeavors to live according to the tenets of this faith, including Christ's command to love and forgive enemies, while another might identify as Christian because he or she is American, a culture that has been primarily shaped by Christianity, but this person might never attend church or use Christian tenets to guide their behavior. While both of these individuals might identify as Christian, their behaviors would potentially be very different in conflict situations, and cannot be differentiated by categorical measures.

## Method

### Participants

Though our initial data included representatives of multiple faiths and beliefs, the religious identity with the largest sample size was Christians ( $N = 3,786$ ). The second-largest religious identity represented, Buddhism, had a sample size of only 51, and thus all religious faiths besides Christianity were excluded from subsequent analysis due to insufficient sample size. We compared our Christian sample to our sample of atheists/agnostics ( $N = 803$ ). Our final sample consisted of 4589 participants (1634 male, 2955 female;  $M$  age = 21,  $SD$  age = 2.27; 76.3% Caucasian, 4.9% African-American, 5.4% Native American/Pacific Islander, 6 % Latino, and 1.2% “other”). All participants were gathered from nine semesters’ worth of prescreening data.

Prescreening consists of participants completing a large number of scales at the beginning of the semester, in order for them to take part in studies later in the semester for class credit.

### Measures

**Religious Identification:** Categorical religious identification was assessed via a question asking participants to select the option which best represented their primary religious affiliation: “Christian-Catholic, Christian-Protestant, Muslim, None/Atheist/Agnostic, etc.”

**Honor Ideology for Manhood (or HIM).** The HIM (Barnes et al., 2012) was used to assess participants’ endorsement of masculine honor norms. The HIM consists of 16 items ( $\alpha = .93$ ) that test participants’ beliefs about how an honorable man will behave, including explicit references to justified retaliation norms (e.g., “A man has the

right to act with physical aggression toward another man who calls him an insulting name,” “A real man never leaves a score unsettled”) which are assessed on a scale, ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 9 (“strongly agree”).

**Honor Ideology for Womanhood (or HIW).** The HIW (Barnes, et al., 2014) was used to assess participants’ endorsement of feminine honor norms. The HIW consists of 12 items ( $\alpha = .91$ ), rated on a scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 9 (“strongly agree”) which tests participants’ beliefs about how an honorable woman will behave (e.g., “A good woman avoids any behavior that might bring shame to her family,” “A respectable woman never wants to be known as being sexually permissive”). Because one of the primary traits of feminine honor is sexual purity (Barnes, et al., 2014, p. 644; Vandello & Cohen, 2003), several questions on the HIW deal with this issue, implying that a “good” woman is a chaste one. Feminine honor’s focus on sexual purity is a value shared by Christianity, which is interpreted by many to proscribe any sexual behavior outside of marriage. Due to this shared perspective between honor and Christianity, we expected religious individuals to score higher on the HIW than would atheists. It is also worth noting that the HIW does not share the HIM’s focus on retributive behavior, as personally taking revenge is not normally associated specifically with honorable women in honor cultures.

**Honor Concerns Scale.** The HC scale (Ijzerman et al., 2007) was used to assess participants’ self-reflective, personal perspectives on honor. The HC scale consists of nine statements ( $\alpha = .86$ ) designed to measure participants’ beliefs about their own honor. Like the HIM, the HC scale is designed, in part, to measure the retributive facet of honor ideology, and contains questions to this effect (“It is my duty to constantly

prepared to defend the honor of my family”) as well as broader questions about how personally concerned participants are with their own honor (“My honor is the basis for my self-respect”). Unlike the HIM and the HIW, the HC scale’s items make almost no reference to gender-specific expectations of honor and are instead written from a personal perspective, rather than the abstractly ideological HIM and HIW. These statements are assessed on a scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 9 (“strongly agree”).

## Results

We predicted that categorical religiosity would be only modestly related to honor ideology, particularly the feminine dimension of honor, as measured by our three honor scales. To this end, three ANOVAs were conducted, with each of the three styles of honor endorsement as the dependent variable in a 2x2 (Religious/Non-religious X Gender) design. We opted to include gender as an exploratory variable, in order to ensure that any associations we found were not simply the results of gender differences in honor endorsement and religious identity. For the HIM, the main effect of categorical religious identification was significant,  $F(1, 4585) = 135.01, p < .000, d = 0.14$ , with Christians scoring higher ( $M = 5.09, SD = 1.50$ ) than non-religious people ( $M = 4.53, SD = 1.67$ ). A main effect of gender was also present,  $F(1, 4585) = 175.83, p < .000, d = 0.41$ , with males scoring higher ( $M = 5.42, SD = 1.50$ ) than females ( $M = 4.75, SD = 1.52$ ). No significant interaction was observed.

For the HIW, the only significant main effect was of religion,  $F(1, 4581) = 652.57, p < .000, d = 0.99$ , with Christians scoring higher ( $M = 7.03, SD = 1.34$ ) than non-religious people ( $M = 5.61, SD = 1.59$ ). A significant interaction was also seen

between religion and gender,  $F(1, 4581) = 15.90, p < .000$ . Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni correction revealed all mean differences to be significant, save for that between non-religious men and non-religious women (see Table 1). Non-religious males scored non-significantly higher on the HIW than did non-religious females, but religious females scored significantly higher than religious males did.

For the HC scale, the main effect of categorical religious affiliation was also significant,  $F(1, 4543) = 250.48, p < .000, d = 0.62$ , with Christians scoring higher ( $M = 5.60, SD = 1.36$ ) than non-religious individuals ( $M = 4.77, SD = 1.55$ ). A main effect was also seen for gender,  $F(1, 4543) = 15.32, p < .000, d = .12$ , with males scoring higher ( $M = 5.52, SD = 1.47$ ) than females ( $M = 5.42, SD = 1.40$ ). No significant interaction was observed.

## Discussion

Our hypothesis that a modest relationship would exist between categorical religiosity and facets of honor ideology was confirmed; categorical religiosity was significantly related to all of our honor scales, each measuring a different facet of honor ideology (masculine, feminine, and personal). The largest association, as we expected, was between feminine honor beliefs and religious identification, consistent with the overlap in both belief systems' norms regarding ideal feminine behavior. Thus, our results indicate that a relationship exists between religion and honor. However, our conceptualizing religion categorically, without accommodation for specific beliefs, led us to believe that further research was necessary. For example, it is possible that an intrinsically religious individual will have a very different perspective on honor than an extrinsically religious individual, but these differences are not accounted for in Study 1;

the two individuals would both have been designated as “religious.” Thus, we elected to perform another study in order to determine what different relationships might be observed between the same facets of honor and more specific conceptualizations of religiosity.

## **Study 2**

Study 2 assessed different religious orientations, and also observed how each predicted honor endorsement, in order to determine which conceptualizations of religion might be more or less compatible with different facets of honor. Though our primary interest was in Allport and Ross’s (1967) Intrinsic/Extrinsic Model, due to its widespread use and theoretical compatibility with the honor culture literature, we also measured fundamentalism, a religious orientation that has previously been used to predict both prosocial and antisocial behavior (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2002, 2005; Blogowska & Saroglou, 2013). Fundamentalism is a religious orientation categorized by the belief that one’s religious beliefs are the only true beliefs, that these beliefs are under assault and must be defended, and that there will be eternal consequences for doing/not doing so (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005). Because of previous findings regarding fundamentalism, we included a measure of it to explore its relationship to different facets of honor.

We predicted that extrinsic religiosity would be positively associated with retributive facets of honor (the HIM and the HC Scale) due to their theoretical compatibility, whereas intrinsic religiosity would be negatively associated due to a faith/honor conflict, i.e., a situation where religion and honor both “demand” supremacy but compel people to obey inherently opposed behavioral mandates. We also predicted



a strong positive relationship to exist between all forms of religiosity and the HIW. The feminine facet of honor conceptualizes a “good woman” in much the same way as many religions do, including Christianity, so a positive relationship was expected to exist between feminine honor and religiosity, consistent with the categorical results of Study 1.

## **Method**

### **Participants**

Participants were gathered via an online research participation system. As compensation for their time, participants were credited an hour’s worth of participation credit for their introductory psychology classes. Our final sample size was 247 (71 male, 176 female; *M* age = 20, *SD* age = 1.1; 74.1% Caucasian, 1.6% African American, 5.7% Native American/Pacific Islander, 12.6% Asian, 5.3% Hispanic, .4% “other”). Only participants who identified as Christian were included in this study. Study measures were administered via the Qualtrics online survey program.

### **Measures**

**Demographics.** As part of the standard demographic questionnaire, participants were asked about age, gender, ethnicity, parents’ education, family income, and political affiliation.

**Honor.** Honor endorsement was measured with the HIM, HIW, and HC scale, as in Study 1.

**Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religiosity.** Participants’ levels of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation were assessed via the I/E-Revised Scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1983). This scale is an updated version of Allport and Ross’s original 1967 measure.

We elected to use this measure instead of the 1967 original because of its shorter length and higher reliability, as well as its attribution of specific motives for extrinsic religiosity.

The I/E-revised scale is broken down into subscales, each of which highlight different motives for religiosity. The intrinsic subscale consists of six items ( $\alpha = .88$ ), consisting of statements such as “I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs,” and “My whole approach to life is based on my religion.” The extrinsic scale is made up of two subscales, extrinsic-personal, and extrinsic-social, reflecting two different motivations behind extrinsic religiosity. The scale can be assessed as a whole, using all six items ( $\alpha = .62$ ), or by each subscale. The personal subscale consists of three items ( $\alpha = .78$ ), such as “What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow,” and “Prayer is for peace and happiness.” The social subscale consists of three items ( $\alpha = .62$ ), such as “I go to church because it helps me make friends,” and “I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there.” All subscales in the I/E scale are measured on a five-point Likert scale where 1 is rated as “strongly disagree” and 5 is rated as “strongly agree.” The personal subscale is the measure that is theoretically most compatible with honor ideology. As has been previously remarked upon (Barnes et al., 2012; 2014), honor endorsing individuals will often focus on the collective facet of honor when they feel that they gain safety and security – i.e., when they receive a salient personal benefit. Thus, we believe that honor endorsers might have a motivation to be extrinsically religious for the personal benefits they receive.

**Fundamentalism.** Participants’ religious fundamentalism was measured using Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (2004) Religious Fundamentalism scale. This scale

consists of twelve items ( $\alpha = .86$ ), such as “To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion,” and “When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God, and the rest, who will not,” which are rated on a 9-point Likert scale, from -4 (“strongly disagree”) to +4 (“strongly agree”).

**Self-esteem.** Previous research has indicated a relationship to exist between self-esteem and religiosity. Benson and Spilka (1973) found evidence indicating that higher self-esteem is related to prosocial, non-aggressive religiosity, while lower self-esteem is related to a more vindictive style of religiosity. More recently, Gebauer, Sedikides, and Niberich (2011) found that, in cultures that value religion (like the United States), religious individuals are more likely to have high self-esteem than are non-religious individuals. Self-esteem has also been used as a covariate in previous honor research. Thus, we opted to measure self-esteem as an exploratory measure, to see if higher self-esteem was associated in any way with the different styles of religiosity and honor mentioned above, and to control for it as a potential confound if it was. Participants’ self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE) (Rosenberg, 1965). The RSE is a 10-item scale ( $\alpha = .88$ ) in which participants rate their agreement with statements such as “I feel that I have a number of good qualities,” and “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself,” on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree), with higher scores representing higher self-esteem.

## **Results**

We predicted that extrinsic religiosity would be positively associated with the retributive aspects of honor due to their theoretical compatibility, while intrinsic

religiosity would be negatively associated with the retributive facets of honor, due to the conflicting norms of each system of thought producing a faith honor conflict.

Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to assess the associations between study variables (for a full list of correlations, see Table 2). The results of correlational analysis provided mixed but generally positive support for our hypotheses. The HC scale was not significantly related to the intrinsic religiosity scale, but was significantly related to the extrinsic scale ( $r = .22, p < .01$ ), especially to its personal subscale ( $r = .27, p < .01$ ). The HC scale was similarly related to fundamentalism ( $r = .28, p < .01$ ). The HIM was significantly related to all religiosity measures, but with varying degrees of strength. The strongest association was with fundamentalism ( $r = .29, p < .00$ ), followed by the extrinsic religiosity scale's personal subscale ( $r = .23, p < .01$ ). The association between the HIM and the intrinsic religiosity scale was significant, but small ( $r = .14, p = .03$ ). The HIW was also significantly (and more strongly) related to all measures of religiosity, the strongest associations being with the fundamentalism scale ( $r = .57, p < .01$ ) and the intrinsic religiosity scale ( $r = .45, p < .01$ ), while the association with the extrinsic religiosity scale was smaller ( $r = .21, p < .01$ ).

These results provide moderate support for our predictions. Both the HC and the HIM contain retributive content, which is incompatible with Christian doctrine. Thus, the lack of association between intrinsic religiosity and the HC scale, as well as the weak relationship between intrinsic religiosity and the HIM, can be interpreted as partially supporting this incompatibility. Similarly, our predictions were supported by the findings regarding the feminine facet of honor, as measured by the HIW. The HIW was positively associated with all measures of religious orientation, as we had

predicted, most likely due to the overlap in how each system of thought conceptualizes “good womanhood.”

On the whole, the associations among the various measures of religious orientation, while all significant, did not raise concerns regarding multi-collinearity. While each religious orientation is distinct, they are unlikely to be completely independent, as they will have similarities, however small, to other religious orientations. However, the strength of the relationship between fundamentalism and intrinsic religiosity ( $r = .83, p < .01$ ) was concerning. Fundamentalism is the belief that one’s beliefs are the only true ones, and worthy of defense. Intrinsic religiosity is defined by its serving as a “master motive,” with religious teachings and beliefs being regarded as supreme. Theoretically, it makes sense that these two religious orientations would possess similarities. However, in the literature, they have been observed to behave dissimilarly. Intrinsic religiosity has been associated with lessened hostility and prejudice, as well as numerous other prosocial behaviors (Allport & Ross, 1967; Donahue, 1985; Hunsberger, 1991; Pargament, 2002). In contrast, while fundamentalism has been seen to predict prosocial behaviors in certain contexts (Blogowska & Saraglou, 2013; Saraglou, 2016), much of the literature still indicates it to be primarily associated with prejudice and antisocial behavior towards outgroup members (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Mavor & Gallois, 2008). Therefore, the high degree of correlation between the measures of these two religious orientations is somewhat surprising. However, it is worth noting that, even though they themselves were highly correlated with each other, fundamentalism’s correlations with both the HC scale and the HIM were significantly higher than intrinsic religiosity’s, indicating that,

even if fundamentalism and intrinsic religiosity are related concepts, they behave somewhat differently with respect to honor.

In addition to these correlational analyses, we performed a series of regression models in which we regressed different facets of honor onto a single religiosity index, with self-esteem, gender, and an interaction term between religiosity and gender included as well.<sup>1</sup> This regression series supported our hypotheses, while also providing a somewhat clearer picture of how each facet of honor related to different religious orientations.

The HC scale, our measure of personal honor, which contains mild retribution-related content, was only significantly predicted by the extrinsic religiosity scale, especially the personal subscale, which assesses the specific religiosity motive of personal benefit. The HIM was predicted by both the extrinsic and intrinsic scales, being positively predicted by the former and *negatively* by the latter. Finally, the HIW was positively associated with both fundamentalism and intrinsic religiosity. For details of regression results, see Table 3.

Though we observed some of our anticipated results regarding the HC Scale and the HIM, results regarding the HIW were less conclusive. Due to a high correlation between the intrinsic and fundamentalism scales, we analyzed a combined model containing both predictors, which accounted for approximately 24% of the variance in

---

<sup>1</sup> We also created a latent honor factor for use in regression analysis by submitting total scores on the honor scales to an exploratory factor analysis, with principal axis factoring as the extraction method. Our latent factor accounted for 58.69% of the total variance in participants' scores on the honor measures. Factor loadings were strongest for the HC scale (.65), followed by the HIM (.63), and then the HIW (.57). The use of factor analysis has become common in honor research (Barnes et al., 2014), and we used it to comply with the common practice. This latent honor factor was positively associated with the extrinsic religiosity scale, but was not significantly associated with the intrinsic or fundamentalism scales.

HIW scores,  $R^2 = .24$ , Adj-  $R^2 = .21$ ,  $F(7, 164) = 7.57$ ,  $p < .01$ . In this model, fundamentalism was the only significant predictor of the HIW ( $\beta = .50$ ,  $p < .01$ ).

No meaningful, statistically significant results were found with the exploratory variable of self-esteem, as measured by the RSE. Thus, the associations we observed between religious orientations and facets of honor are not due simply to their correlation with self-esteem. Gender, in contrast, was a frequently significant covariate in these models, which underscores the importance of controlling for gender when examining the association between facets of honor and forms of religiosity.

### **Discussion**

We had hypothesized that honor endorsement would be negatively related to intrinsic religiosity and positively related to extrinsic religiosity. Our hypothesis received only moderate support. The HIM was, indeed, positively related to a measure of extrinsic religiosity and negatively related to a measure of intrinsic religiosity when potential confounds were controlled for. However, while the HC was also predicted by the extrinsic scale, it had no relationship with the intrinsic scale. Similarly, the HIW had no relationship with either extrinsic scale, and its relationship with the intrinsic religiosity scale disappeared in a model which also included a measure of fundamentalism. However, even though fundamentalism seemed to “swallow” intrinsic religiosity’s significance in this model, it remains to be seen if they are, indeed, merely different ways of measuring the same construct, or if something else is at play. It is possible that the unexpected covariation between these two measures is simply an issue of our sample’s coming from the “Bible belt.” In either case, more research will be

needed. However, it is worth noting that neither intrinsic religiosity nor fundamentalism predicted endorsement of the retributive facets of honor.

Overall, a clearer, more nuanced picture of the relationship between religion and honor has emerged in this study. The positive relationship between extrinsic religiosity and both the HIM and HC scale does support our hypothesis that extrinsic religiosity is compatible with honor ideology, due to extrinsic religiosity's promise of security and solace (Allport and Ross, 1967, p. 434), which is compatible with the protective motives of honor. Thus, even though Christianity's teachings prohibit taking revenge, it is possible that extrinsically religious honor endorsers "selectively shape" these teachings of their faith (Allport and Ross, 1967), thereby allowing them to circumvent or ignore this prohibition and continue to respond aggressively in defense of their personal and collective self and reputation.

It is also worth noting that the HIW was not associated with the extrinsic religiosity scale or its subscales, but was only significantly associated with intrinsic religiosity and fundamentalism. The former relationship disappeared when a model including *both* religious orientations was analyzed. This may be due to a combination of factors. The first is that the intrinsic religiosity scale and the fundamentalism scale are very highly correlated. Though previous research, as well as their differing predictive power in our own study, indicate that they are not the same construct, there is still a great deal of overlap between the two. While they predict different behaviors, both intrinsic religiosity and fundamentalism share a deep regard for the primacy and authority of religious teaching, as well as a deep belief in the truth of one's religious convictions. These similarities make it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish



between the two orientations on a matter like feminine honor, due to feminine honor's focus on sexual purity, which is still shared by a majority of religious faiths, including Christianity as practiced in the American South.

One of the primary distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity is how each treats religious doctrine. Extrinsic religiosity views religious doctrine as malleable, altering it via "selective shaping" to meet the needs of security and solace, while intrinsic religiosity views doctrine as being of prime importance, above all other wants and needs (Allport and Ross, 1967). We had predicted that honor would be positively related to extrinsic religiosity because we had conceptualized honor as focused around retribution norms, which are proscribed by Christian teachings. However, the HIW does not contain this retributive content and, in fact, upholds Christian norms and teachings, and so is unlikely to trigger a faith/honor conflict the way the other two facets of honor are. Thus, the primary takeaway from our findings regarding the HIW are that the relationship between honor and religious orientations depend on the specific ways one conceptualizes each. For faith/honor conflicts to occur, it is important that the facets of honor being measured are ones which contain norms that are condemned by the religious teachings of the sample. Therefore, in Study 3, we investigated specific ways to trigger faith/honor conflicts in an experimental setting.

### **Study 3**

Study 2 provided moderate support for our hypotheses by revealing a significant positive association between extrinsic religiosity and the retributive facets of honor ideology, but a *negative* association between *intrinsic* religiosity and the same. However, the low effect sizes of Study 2's regression analyses indicated that there was

more to the story. It is unlikely that a clearer understanding of the relationship between different facets of honor and different religious orientations can be gained via survey alone. By observing how they relate to one another in an experimental setting, we hoped to be able to gain a deeper understanding of these constructs.

Intrinsic religiosity is theoretically incompatible with the masculine facet of honor ideology due to intrinsic religiosity holding as supreme religious teachings proscribing retribution. Thus, an intrinsically religious honor endorser is more likely to feel a faith/honor conflict because he or she will recognize the incongruity between the norms of each system, while the extrinsically religious honor endorser will either not recognize the incongruity or will not care about it, due to selective shaping of his or her faith.

We predicted that individuals higher in intrinsic religiosity would experience a faith/honor conflict after being presented with a religious prime which forbids revenge, due to the theoretical incompatibility of the presented doctrine and honor ideology's rule of retaliation. We predicted that this faith/honor conflict would be less intense, if it occurred at all, after exposing participants to a religious prime seeming to indicate Divine approval of retaliation. We did not expect differences between conditions for individuals high in extrinsic religiosity, due to the lack of conflict between the norms of extrinsic religiosity and honor ideology.

Due to the high correlation between fundamentalism and intrinsic religiosity in Study 2, we included the same measure of fundamentalism in Study 3. We had no strong expectations for results regarding the fundamentalism scale. In the literature, fundamentalism has been seen to predict both prosocial and antisocial behavior

(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2002, 2005; Blogowska & Saroglou, 2013), and though our results in Study 2 showed fundamentalism to behave similarly to intrinsic religiosity, we were unsure how fundamentalism would relate to honor ideology, due to the history of this concept's use in religious psychological literature.

Fundamentalism, as defined by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2002), has three components to it: the belief that one's religious beliefs are the only true ones, that they are under assault and must be defended, and that there will be eternal consequences for not believing in and defending them. Thus, fundamentalism shares intrinsic religiosity's valuing of religious teachings as supreme, but adds the components regarding those teachings' being under assault and needing defense. Our correlational analysis in Study 2 supports this interpretation ( $r = .83, p < .01$ ). However, these aspects of assault and defense present a problem for defining and identifying what different levels of fundamentalism look like.

The fundamentalism scale does not have subscales, and measures all three components of fundamentalism throughout. This leads to a conceptual difficulty when it comes to discussing individuals low in fundamentalism. On the one hand, someone with a low score on the fundamentalism scale may be intrinsically religious, meaning that they do believe their religious beliefs to be the only true ones, but not believe that their faith is constantly under assault, or that they need to defend it by silencing other competing beliefs. On the other hand, someone with a similarly low score may simply consider themselves a "cultural Christian," and have little regard for the specific teachings of their religion. The scale, however, would not differentiate between the two.

This in turn leads to potential difficulty in determining if fundamentalism may be used to set up a faith/honor conflict. Someone low in fundamentalism may experience a faith/honor conflict because they still value religious teachings and must reconcile their honor and faith-related norms. On the other hand, if someone simply scored low in fundamentalism because they do not have strong religious beliefs but simply identify with a particular faith, they may not be as likely to suffer a faith/honor conflict.

Finally, we did not predict any experimental effect to be observed for scores on the HIW, due to it measuring a different facet of honor than that of the HIM, and thus theoretically unrelated to the concepts primed by our experimental manipulation.

## **Method**

### **Participants**

Participants were gathered via the University of Oklahoma's SONA system and Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) system. SONA participants were given class credit for research participation, while MTurk workers were financially compensated, receiving \$2 upon completion of the survey. Our final sample size was 157 (54 male, 102 female; 88 from SONA, 69 from MTurk;  $M$  age = 32.36,  $SD$  age = 14.08; 72% white, 11.5% African American, 7% Hispanic, 5.1% Asian, 3.2% Native American/Pacific Islander/Alaska Native, 1.3% "other"). While other participants were gathered, only individuals who identified as Christian were included in this study, consistent with Study 2.

## Measures

**Demographics.** Participants' demographic information was assessed by a questionnaire asking about their age, gender, and ethnicity.

**Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religiosity.** Religious orientation was measured by the I/E-Revised Scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1983), as in Study 2.

**Honor.** Honor was assessed with the HIM and the HIW, as in Study 2 (Barnes et al., 2012, 2014). The HIM was created based on a range of previous literature in which vignettes had been used to measure honor-related outcomes (Barnes et al., 2012), and so we opted to use the HIM as our outcome variable. We predicted that scores on the HIM would vary as a function of exposure to the religious prime and as a function of religiosity style. We did not expect scores on the HIW to vary based on the prime, but rather expected the results to mirror Study 2's, with intrinsically religious individuals scoring higher than extrinsically religious individuals on the HIW.

**Religious Prime.** Previous research (Bushman et al., 2006; (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2013) has successfully used religious scripture as a prime to induce various behaviors and attitudes. We used two primes, one designated "forgiving" and one "vengeful." The "vengeful" prime consisted of a passage taken from the book of I Samuel, in which the prophet Samuel calls for the utter annihilation of the Amalekites, as per Divine command. The "forgiving" prime consisted of a passage taken from Matthew 5, Christ's famous "Sermon on the Mount," a selection of which is presented before the introduction of this paper. Participants were randomly assigned to read either the forgiving or vengeful prime (see Appendix for the full text of the primes).

**Fundamentalism.** Fundamentalism was assessed as an exploratory variable via the Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) Religious Fundamentalism scale, as in Study 2.

**God-Concept.** Research has indicated that one's mental image or representation of God, specifically of God's character as either more benevolent or authoritative (called a "God-concept"), can predict both prosocial and antisocial behavior (Benson and Spilka, 1979; Johnson, Li, Cohen, & Okun, 2013). Thus, for exploratory purposes, we examined what types of God-concepts might be associated with different religious orientations and facets of honor. The Authoritarian/Benevolent God scale (Johnson, Okun, and Cohen, 2015), specifically categorizes individuals' God concept as either benevolent ("B-God") or authoritarian ("A-God"). B-God is defined by such terms as "forgiving" and "gracious," while A-God is defined by such terms as "punishing" and "wrathful" (Johnson, Okun, & Cohen, 2014, p. 229). This scale provided the opportunity to examine the content of participants' religious beliefs, as well as their religious orientation. It is possible that an A-God concept is congruent with honor ideology, due to this concept's similarity to the rule of retaliation, and thus may help provide a more detailed picture of how religion and honor relate and interact. While Bowman conceptualizes Christianity as incompatible with honor, essentially a B-God concept, it is possible that intrinsically religious individuals with A-God concepts may also be high in honor, as there is little or no conflict between their faith's teachings and their personal beliefs. Thus, this scale was included for exploratory purposes. This scale consists of 10 adjectives ( $\alpha = .71$ ), which are used to construct two subscales with 5 adjectives each, authoritarian ( $\alpha = .84$ ) and benevolent ( $\alpha = .77$ ), which are rated by participants as either accurately or inaccurately measuring their concept of God's

character on a 7 point Likert scale, with ratings ranging from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”).

### **Procedure**

Participants were recruited from SONA and MTurk, with the study being described as a test of the behavioral effects of literature. The study was administered via the Qualtrics program. Participants were randomly assigned into the forgiving and vengeful conditions. Participants took a short survey about their reading habits, after which they read their Scriptural prime corresponding to their assigned condition. They then responded to this passage, via questions like “how engaging did you find this passage?” and “did you enjoy reading this passage?” on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 being “not at all” and 7 being “very much.” After this, they filled out the HIM and the HIW in counterbalanced order. After this, participants read two other literary texts, followed by an attention check in which they were asked to pick the “one that did not belong” from a series of quotes taken from their condition-corresponding scriptural passage. They then read two more literary passages and filled out more response items. After this, they filled out the religiosity scales, demographic information, and were granted credit for their participation.

### **Results**

We predicted that participants high in intrinsic religiosity would experience a faith/honor conflict when presented with an anti-revenge prime, and would either experience a lessened conflict, or no conflict at all when presented with a prime indicating Divine approval of vengeance. We did not expect to find these differences for

those high in extrinsic religiosity, due to its lack of conflict with the norms of honor ideology. We did not predict any experimental effect to be observed for the HIW.

Before further statistical analyses were conducted, we performed a series of t-tests to ensure that there were no conditional differences for our participants' scores on any measures of religious orientation. All t-tests were shown to be insignificant, indicating that our experimental manipulation did not have any effect on participants' responses to these measures (see Table 4).

Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to assess the associations between study variables (for a full list of correlations, see Table 5). The results of these correlational analyses followed a similar pattern to those obtained in Study 2.

Specifically, the HIM was significantly predicted by the extrinsic-personal scale ( $r = .26, p < .01$ ), while being unassociated with the measure of intrinsic religiosity. Our measure of fundamentalism had a modest correlation with the HIM ( $r = .19, p < .05$ ), but was highly correlated with our measure of intrinsic religiosity ( $r = .72, p < .01$ ).

Of special interest were the observed relationships between the measures of authoritarian and benevolent God-concept and our measures of honor ideology. The association between A-God concept and the HIM was modest but significant ( $r = .25, p < .01$ ), while there was no association between the HIM and the measure of B-God concept ( $r = -.13, p > .05$ ). The HIW was also significantly related to both God-concept measures. This association was approximately the same for the benevolent ( $r = .22, p < .01$ ) and the authoritarian scales ( $r = .19, p < .05$ ). The two scales were not significantly correlated with each other.



In addition to confirming Study 2's findings regarding the zero-order relationships between our variables, including the modesty of associations between honor and religiosity, we also performed a series of regression models in which we regressed the HIM and the HIW onto different measures of religious orientation along with priming condition and a condition X religiosity interaction (see Table 6). Participant gender, as well as all potential interactions therewith, were included as covariates. These regression models provided mixed support for our hypotheses.

Our experimental manipulation had a significant effect on HIM scores across regression models, save for that regressing the HIM onto the benevolent God-concept scale. Our experimental manipulation was not seen to have an effect on participants' endorsement of the HIW, save for the measures of extrinsic religiosity. Two interactions between religiosity and condition were seen for the HIM, potentially indicating the successful inducement of faith/honor conflicts (.).

We had predicted a religiosity X condition interaction for intrinsic religiosity, where those higher in intrinsic religiosity would score lower in the forgiving condition than in the vengeful condition. We observed precisely the opposite. In the forgiving condition, lower levels on intrinsic religiosity were associated with lower levels of endorsement of the HIM, while higher levels of intrinsic religiosity were associated with higher levels of HIM endorsement ( $\beta = .49, p < .01$ ). Levels of intrinsic religiosity did not predict differing levels of support for the HIM in the vengeful condition ( $\beta = -.13, p > .05$ ) (see Fig. 1). A similar pattern was seen for fundamentalism. In the forgiving condition, lower levels of fundamentalism were associated with lower levels of HIM endorsement ( $\beta = .63, p < .01$ ), while levels of fundamentalism were not

associated with differing support for the HIM in the vengeful condition ( $\beta = -.05, p > .05$ ) (See Fig. 2).

Our hypotheses regarding the HIW were upheld for every religious orientation save extrinsic religiosity and its personal subscale, both of which predicted support for the HIW. This relationship was marginally stronger for the personal subscale ( $\beta = .36, p < .05$ ) than for the scale as a whole ( $\beta = .33, p < .05$ ). No significant interaction terms were observed.

Results from regressing honor measures onto the A/B God-concept scales mirrored those found in correlational analysis. The authoritarian scale predicted support for both the HIM ( $\beta = .38, p < .01$ ) and the HIW ( $\beta = .41, p < .01$ ), while the benevolent scale only predicted support for the HIW ( $\beta = .72, p < .05$ ).

### **Discussion**

Our predictions received mixed support from the results of Study 3. We induced what seemed to be a faith/honor conflict for both intrinsic religiosity and fundamentalism. However, the faith/honor conflict for intrinsic religiosity was contrary to our predictions. We expected to see lower levels of endorsement for the HIM for highly intrinsic participants in the forgiving condition. We found precisely the opposite: those lower in intrinsic religiosity, when primed with a scriptural passage highlighting the incompatibility of Christian beliefs with retaliatory honor norms, our participants' endorsement of those norms was weaker than when primed with a scriptural passage that indicated the opposite.

Before attempting to guess why these results were found, it is important to discuss our findings regarding fundamentalism. We included a measure of

fundamentalism in Study 3 to see if fundamentalism would behave any differently to intrinsic religiosity in an experimental context. We found it to behave similarly; the faith/honor conflict was seen in those low in fundamentalism. The lack of clarity regarding what it means to be low in fundamentalism (as mentioned in the introduction to Study 3) makes it difficult to interpret precisely why it was that individuals low in this construct experienced what appeared to be a faith/honor conflict.

One explanation for the results for both fundamentalism and intrinsic religiosity might involve our vengeful prime. Even for those high in these religious orientations, the predicted HIM scores were only around the mid-point of the 9-point scale. The story of Samuel and the Amalekites is not well-known, nor is it considered relevant for everyday life for most Christians. By contrast, Christ's Sermon on the Mount is much more well-known, even in non-Christian circles. It is possible that our choice of vengeful prime may not have had a strong effect in our audience, and that what we observed was less the result of the vengeful prime than it was more akin to participants' base level of endorsement of masculine honor norms. Choosing a more relevant or better-known passage might have successfully induced the expected faith/honor conflicts. One such passage might be Christ's cleansing of the Temple, an event depicted in all four Gospels of the Christian New Testament. While not as strongly related to honor themes as our selected Old Testament passage, it is still an example of a central Christian figure responding aggressively to a transgression against himself, and thus might produce results more in line with our original predictions.

Another explanation for the lack of difference between fundamentalism and intrinsic religiosity's results may be the result of our choice in scale. We elected to use a

revised version of Altemeyer and Hunsberger's scale, which has been shortened for ease of use. However, it reduces the amount of content focusing on the dynamic of assault and defense which is central to the concept of fundamentalism. While the overall "flavor" of the scale still contains this, it is possible that the revised scale simply is not suitable to pick up on the finer differences from intrinsic religiosity, as discussed in the introduction to Study 3. Including the full scale might have produced results which differentiated the religious orientations more fully, and future research might benefit from its use.

Our hypotheses regarding the HIW were upheld, save for extrinsic religiosity. One potential explanation for this could again have to do with our choice of prime. The Old Testament, unlike the New, has a number of specific rules and regulations regarding moral behavior, especially for chastity, as seen in the Pentateuch. Indeed, many of these passages regarding chastity are found near passages which could be interpreted as supporting retaliatory honor norms, such as "an eye for an eye," (Exodus 21:24). Priming the idea of this "Old Testament God" may have primed related constructs in our extrinsic participants that they not otherwise have endorsed so strongly, such as chastity. Future research might attempt to see if this pattern of endorsement occurs if both primes involve Jesus Christ, rather than the "Old Testament God."

Exploratory analysis regarding the A/B God-concept scale proved fruitful, with the two scales both predicting support for the HIW, but only the authoritarian predicting support for the HIM. This, taken with the lack of correlation between the two scales, indicates that the A/B God-concept scale might be useful to future research on the

relationship between honor and religiosity, as it might provide a clearer picture than the I/E scale.

### **General Discussion**

Overall, the relationship between honor and religiosity seems to depend on what facet of honor and what type of religious orientation is being considered. Orientations that hold divine teaching as supreme seem more weakly linked with honor facets that contradict those teachings, while being strongly linked with the facets of honor that complement their religious beliefs. Conversely, religious orientations that are less faith-based and more goal-oriented, such as extrinsic religiosity, seems to have a strong link with honor facets that might help fulfill those goals, such as “security and solace.”

Our research produced some potential evidence of a faith/honor conflict being experimentally induced, but future research should continue to attempt to induce such conflicts in other religious orientations and in other experimental settings. Such research might benefit from using pre-test/post-test methodology, establishing whether or not participants’ honor levels have deviated from a baseline after exposure to a religious prime, rather than simply using the HIM as a state measure of honor. Alternatively, a vignette-based approach could be used, as in previous honor-related research (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997). This could potentially serve as a more concrete response variable, and could perhaps be crafted to more clearly be forbidden or permitted by the scripture passages in each condition. These passages should also both be drawn from the New Testament, if future research intends to make use of an exclusively Christian sample, in order to make sure that both passages are of equal salience to participants across conditions.

One potential direction future studies could take regarding faith/honor conflicts would be to tap further into the collective nature of honor, as has already been done with political ideology (Barnes et al., 2014, 2015). Presenting subjects with a threat to their Christian identity, gauging their willingness to respond via retaliatory honor norms, and seeing if this willingness varies as a function of religious orientation and the presentation of scriptural primes might be especially useful. It is possible that in such an instance, extrinsically religious honor endorsers (due to the needs of “security and solace”) or those high in fundamentalism would respond with greater support for retaliatory aggression to an offense against their religious identity, while those higher in intrinsic religiosity or a benevolent God-concept might not.

For most of the history of the psychology of religion, there has been a quest to categorize religious orientations as either “good” or “bad,” depending on their behavioral effects. The I/E scale does this, as its authors use value-laden language when discussing potential behavioral elements and consequences of each religious orientation. In the I/E conceptualization of religiosity, those who truly believe in their religion for their religion’s own sake (intrinsic) will be less prejudiced and more prosocial, while those who only subscribe to a religious belief for the potential benefit (extrinsic) will be more prejudiced and antisocial (Allport & Ross, 1967). Other research has indicated that religion may generally make its participants more prone to aggression, violence, and other antisocial behaviors (Bushman et al., 2006). The A/B God scale provides a new way of looking at religious orientation without the same value-laden content as previous conceptualizations.

The advantage of the A/B God scale is that it allows for a clearly-defined religious orientation to be deeply held and believed, while still allowing for potential antisocial outcomes. In this way, it is superior to the Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) measure of fundamentalism, in that it differentiates between what might be called “fundamentalists” and “evangelicals,” both of whom may have similar teachings but different beliefs about God and what behaviors and attitudes He expects of them. The A/B God scale also has a conceptual benefit over the I/E scale, in that it does not attempt to force the idea of bipolarity onto a concept that cannot conform to it. While Allport referred to intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity as if they were inherently opposed constructs, research in our and other studies showed that there is in fact a mild and significant correlation between the two scales, indicating that they are not as incompatible as Allport assumed (Allport & Ross, 1967). In contrast, the A/B God-Concept Scale was designed for both concepts to be used together, even being able to serve in the same analysis, should the researcher want it (Johnson, Okun, & Cohen, 2015). It is also worth noting that both in Johnson, Okun, and Cohen’s original work with the scale (2015) and our own research, the authoritarian and benevolent subscales were not significantly correlated with each other, unlike intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Thus, future research into the relationship between religiosity and honor, as well as the general psychological study of religion, might benefit from using the A/B God-Concept scale.

Religion is incredibly complex and diverse, with numerous orientations and ideologies. Given this, it is not surprising that religion should relate differently to unique cultural and behavioral phenomena. However, previous research has often failed

to account for this, leading to numerous contradictory findings. Investigating cultural phenomena like honor ideology brings some clarity to the confusion by showing that behavior is not simply a result of one variable, but the relationships between different religious orientations and honor facets. It is imperative that research in this area should continue to investigate these relationships in order to more fully understand religion's effect on human behaviors and beliefs.



## References

- Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). *Multiple Regression: Testing and Interpreting Interactions*. Milton Keynes: SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Allport, G. W., & Ross, J. M. (1967). Personal religious orientation and prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 5(4), 432.
- Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B. (1992). Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and prejudice. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 2, 113–133.
- Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B. (2004). A revised religious fundamentalism scale: The short and sweet of it. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 14(1), 47–54.
- Anderson, C.A, Deuser, W.E., DeNeve, K. (1995). Hot temperatures, hostile affect, hostile cognition, and arousal: Tests of a general model of affective aggression. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21, 434-448.
- Anderson, C. A., & Carnagey, N. L. (2009). Causal effects of violent sports video games on aggression: Is it competitiveness or violent content? *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 45, 731-739.
- Atkins, S. (2004). *Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Barnes, C. D., Brown, R. P., Lenes, J., Bosson, J., & Carvalho, M. (2014). My Country, My Self: Honor, Identity, and Defensive Responses to National Threats. *Self and Identity*, 13(6), 638–662. <http://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2014.892529>
- Barnes, C. D., Brown, R. P., & Osterman, L. L. (2012). Don't Tread on Me Masculine Honor Ideology in the US and Militant Responses to Terrorism. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 38(8), 1018–1029.
- Barnes, C. D., Brown, R. P., & Tamborski, M. (2012). Living Dangerously: Culture of Honor, Risk-Taking, and the Nonrandomness of “Accidental” Deaths. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 3(1), 100–107. <http://doi.org/10.1177/1948550611410440>
- Barnes, C. D., Pomerantz, A., & Yashko, L. (2015). Children Cover Your Eyes: Masculine Honor and the Role of Blind Patriotism in Teaching National Allegiance to Posterity: Honor and Teaching National Allegiance. *Political Psychology*, n/a–n/a. <http://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12291>

- Benson, P., & Spilka, B. (1973). God Image as a Function of Self-Esteem and Locus of Control. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 12(3), 297.  
<http://doi.org/10.2307/1384430>
- Blogowska, J., Lambert, C., & Saroglou, V. (2013). Religious prosociality and aggression: It's real. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 52(3), 524–536.
- Blogowska, J., & Saroglou, V. (2013). For Better or Worse: Fundamentalists' Attitudes Toward Outgroups as a Function of Exposure to Authoritative Religious Texts. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 23(2), 103–125.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/87567555.2012.687991>
- Bowman, J. (2006). *Honor: A History*. New York, New York: Encounter Books.
- Brewer, M. B., & Yuki, M. (2013). *Culture and Group Processes*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Brown, R. P. (2003). Measuring individual differences in the tendency to forgive: Construct validity and links with depression. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29(6), 759–771.
- Brown, R. P., Barnes, C. D., & Campbell, N. J. (2007). Fundamentalism and forgiveness. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 43(6), 1437–1447.  
<http://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2007.04.025>
- Brown, R. P., Carvallo, M., & Imura, M. (2014). Naming Patterns Reveal Cultural Values Patronyms, Matronyms, and the US Culture of Honor. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 40(2), 250–262.
- Burch-Brown, J. M., & Baker, W. (2016). Religion and reducing prejudice. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 1–24.
- Bushman, B. J., Ridge, R., Das, E., Key, C., & Busath, G. M. (2006). When God sanctions killing: Effect of scriptural violence on aggression. *Psychology Science*, 18(3), 204–207.
- Cauvin, J., & Watkins, T. (2000). *The Birth of the Gods and the Origins of Agriculture*. Cambridge University Press.
- Cohen, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1997). Field experiments examining the culture of honor: The role of institutions in perpetuating norms about violence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23(11), 1188–1199.
- Cohen, D., Nisbett, R. E., Bowdle, B. F., & Schwarz, N. (1996). Insult, aggression, and the southern culture of honor: An“ experimental ethnography.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(5), 945.

- Cohen, D., Vandello, J., Puente, S., & Rantilla, A. (1999). "When You Call Me That, Smile!" How Norms for Politeness, Interaction Styles, and Aggression Work Together in Southern Culture. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 62(3), 257.  
<http://doi.org/10.2307/2695863>
- Donahue, M. J. (1985). Intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness: Review and meta-analysis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 48(2), 400.
- Everett, J. A. C., Haque, O. S., & Rand, D. G. (2016). How Good Is the Samaritan, and Why?: An Experimental Investigation of the Extent and Nature of Religious Prosociality Using Economic Games. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 7(3), 248–255. <http://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616632577>
- Fischer, D. H. (1991). *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America*. Oxford University Press.
- Fischer, P., Haslam, S. A., & Smith, L. (2010). "If you wrong us, shall we not revenge?" Social identity salience moderates support for retaliation in response to collective threat. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, 14(2), 143–150.  
<http://doi.org/10.1037/a0017970>
- Fitzgerald, C. J., & Wickwire, J. H. (2012). Religion and political affiliation's influence on trust and reciprocity among strangers. *Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology*, 6(2), 158.
- Galen, L. W. (2012). The complex and elusive nature of religious prosociality: Reply to Myers (2012) and Saroglou (2012). *Psychological Bulletin*, 138(5), 918–923.  
<https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029278>
- Gastil, R. D. (1971). Homicide and a Regional Culture of Violence. *American Sociological Review*, 36(3), 412. <http://doi.org/10.2307/2093082>
- Gebauer, J. E., Sedikides, C., & Neberich, W. (2012). Religiosity, Social Self-Esteem, and Psychological Adjustment: On the Cross-Cultural Specificity of the Psychological Benefits of Religiosity. *Psychological Science*, 23(2), 158–160.  
<http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611427045>
- Gorsuch, R. L., & McPherson, S. E. (1989). Intrinsic/Extrinsic Measurement: I/E-Revised and Single-Item Scales. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 28(3), 348.  
<http://doi.org/10.2307/1386745>
- Harrison, J. M. D., & McKay, R. T. (2013). Do religious and moral concepts influence the ability to delay gratification? A priming study. *Journal of Articles in Support of the Null Hypothesis*, 10(1), 25–40.

- Henry, P. J. (2009). Low-status compensation: A theory for understanding the role of status in cultures of honor. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 97(3), 451–466. <http://doi.org/10.1037/a0015476>
- Hunsberger, B. (1991). Empirical work in the psychology of religion. *Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne*, 32(3), 497.
- Hunsberger, B. and Jackson, L. M. (2005), Religion, Meaning, and Prejudice. *Journal of Social Issues*, 61: 807–826.
- Ijzerman, H., van Dijk, W. W., & Gallucci, M. (2007). A bumpy train ride: A field experiment on insult, honor, and emotional reactions. *Emotion*, 7(4), 869–875. <http://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.7.4.869>
- James, W. (1988). *William James: Writings 1902-1910: The Varieties of Religious Experience/Pragmatism/A Pluralistic Universe/The Meaning of Truth/Some Problems of Philosophy/Essays* (1st ed., Vol. 38). New York, New York: Library of America.
- Johnson, K. A., Li, Y. J., Cohen, A. B., & Okun, M. A. (2013). Friends in high places: The influence of authoritarian and benevolent god-concepts on social attitudes and behaviors. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, 5(1), 15–22. <http://doi.org/10.1037/a0030138>
- Johnson, K. A., Okun, M. A., & Cohen, A. B. (2015). The mind of the Lord: Measuring authoritarian and benevolent God representations. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, 7(3), 227–238. <http://doi.org/10.1037/rel0000011>
- Johnson, M. K., Rowatt, W. C., & LaBouff, J. (2010). Priming Christian religious concepts increases racial prejudice. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 1(2), 119–126.
- Kashima, Y. (2016). Culture and Psychology in the 21st Century Conceptions of Culture and Person for Psychology Revisited. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 47(1), 4–20.
- LaBouff, J. P., Rowatt, W. C., Johnson, M. K., & Finkle, C. (2012). Differences in Attitudes Toward Outgroups in Religious and Nonreligious Contexts in a Multinational Sample: A Situational Context Priming Study. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 22(1), 1–9. <http://doi.org/10.1080/10508619.2012.634778>
- Lieberman, P. (1991). *Uniquely Human: The Evolution of Speech, Thought, and Selfless Behavior*. Harvard, Connecticut: Harvard University Press.
- Lindsay, J.J., & Anderson, C.A. (2000). From Antecedent Conditions to Violent Actions: A General Affective Aggression Model. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26, 533-547.

- Mavor, K. I., & Gallois, C. (2008). Social Group and Moral Orientation Factors as Mediators of Religiosity and Multiple Attitude Targets. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 47(3), 361–377. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2008.00415.x>
- Nisbett, R. E. (1993). Violence and US regional culture. *American Psychologist*, 48(4), 441.
- Nisbett, R. E., & Cohen, D. (1996). *Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South*. Westview Press.
- Nowak, A., Gelfand, M. J., Borkowski, W., Cohen, D., & Hernandez, I. (2015). The evolutionary basis of honor cultures. *Psychological Science*, 0956797615602860.
- Pargament, K. I. (2002). The Bitter and the Sweet: An Evaluation of the Costs and Benefits of Religiousness. *Psychological Inquiry*, 13(3), 168–181.
- Rosenberg, M. (1965). *Society and the adolescent self-image*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rounding, K., Lee, A., Jacobson, J. A., & Ji, L.-J. (2012). Religion Replenishes Self-Control. *Psychological Science*, 23(6), 635–642. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611431987>
- Rowatt, W. C., LaBouff, J., Johnson, M., Froese, P., & Tsang, J.-A. (2009). Associations among religiousness, social attitudes, and prejudice in a national random sample of American adults. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, 1(1), 14–24. <http://doi.org/10.1037/a0014989>
- Saroglou, V. (2016). Intergroup conflict, religious fundamentalism, and culture. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 47(1), 33–41.
- Schumann, K., McGregor, I., Nash, K. A., & Ross, M. (2014). Religious magnanimity: Reminding people of their religious belief system reduces hostility after threat. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 107(3), 432–453. <http://doi.org/10.1037/a0036739>
- Shackelford, T. K. (2005). An evolutionary psychological perspective on cultures of honor. *Evolutionary Psychology*, 3(1), 147470490500300126.
- Shariff, A. F., & Norenzayan, A. (2007). God is watching you priming God concepts increases prosocial behavior in an anonymous economic game. *Psychological Science*, 18(9), 803–809.
- Shaw, M., Quezada, S. A., & Zárate, M. A. (2011). Violence with a conscience: Religiosity and moral certainty as predictors of support for violent warfare. *Psychology of Violence*, 1(4), 275–286. <http://doi.org/10.1037/a0025346>

- Shenberger, J. M., Smith, B. A., & Zárate, M. A. (2014). The effect of religious imagery in a risk-taking paradigm. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 20*(2), 150–158. <http://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000022>
- Shen, M. J., Haggard, M. C., Strassburger, D. C., & Rowatt, W. C. (2013). Testing the love thy neighbor hypothesis: Religiosity's association with positive attitudes toward ethnic/racial and value-violating out-groups. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 5*(4), 294–303. <http://doi.org/10.1037/a0033648>
- Van Cappellen, P., Saroglou, V., & Toth-Gauthier, M. (2016). Religiosity and Prosocial Behavior Among Churchgoers: Exploring Underlying Mechanisms. *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 26*(1), 19–30. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10508619.2014.958004>
- Vandello, J. A., Cohen, D., Grandon, R., & Franiuk, R. (2009). Stand by Your Man: Indirect Prescriptions for Honorable Violence and Feminine Loyalty in Canada, Chile, and the United States. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 40*(1), 81–104. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0022022108326194>
- Vandello, J. A., Cohen, D., & Ransom, S. (2008). U.S. Southern and Northern Differences in Perceptions of Norms About Aggression: Mechanisms for the Perpetuation of a Culture of Honor. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 39*(2), 162–177. <http://doi.org/10.1177/0022022107313862>
- Widman, D. R. (2011). Variation in the ascription of violence to violent and nonviolent religious words by believers. *Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology, 5*(4), 248.
- Worthington, E. L., Jr., Wade, N. G., Hight, T. L., Ripley, J. S., McCullough, M. E., Berry, J. W., ... O'Connor, L. (2003). The Religious Commitment Inventory--10: Development, refinement, and validation of a brief scale for research and counseling. *Journal of Counseling Psychology, 50*(1), 84–96. <http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0167.50.1.84>
- Ysseldyk, R., Matheson, K., & Anisman, H. (2011). Coping with identity threat: The role of religious orientation and implications for emotions and action intentions. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 3*(2), 132–148. <http://doi.org/10.1037/a0021599>
- Zakrisson, I. (2005). Construction of a short version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale. *Personality and Individual Differences, 39*, 863–872.

**Appendix A**  
Tables and Figures

Table 1.  
*Mean Scores on the HIW in Study 1*

	Males	Females
Christians	6.90 (1.26)	7.10 (1.37)
<i>N</i>	1222	2561
Atheists	5.73 (1.51)	5.49 (1.65)
<i>N</i>	403	399

Note: The Bonferroni procedure revealed all mean differences to be significant, save that between atheist males and atheist females

Table 2.  
*Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for Study 2*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. HC Scale	—								
2. HIM	.46**	—							
3. HIW	.49**	.52**	—						
4. Fundamentalism scale	.28**	.29**	.47**	—					
5. Extrinsic Religiosity (total)	.22**	.19**	.21**	.37**	—				
6. Extrinsic (social subscale)	.08	.09	.03	.18**	.81**	—			
7. Extrinsic (personal subscale)	.27**	.23**	.29**	.42**	.848**	.38**	—		
8. Intrinsic Religiosity	.01	.14*	.45**	.83**	.39**	.22**	.43**	—	
9. RSE	-.01	.03	.14*	.09	.08	.04	.08	.15*	—
Mean	5.40	4.63	6.24	4.91	2.72	2.19	3.27	3.18	3.05
Standard Deviation	1.21	1.44	1.42	1.81	.74	.84	.93	.91	.047

$N = 246$ . \*.05  $\geq p \geq$  .01; \*\* $p <$  .01.



Table 3.  
*Study 2 Regression Analyses Results*

	HC Scale	HIM	HIW
	$\beta, t$	$\beta, t$	$\beta, t$
Extrinsic (total)	.29, 3.4**	.17, 1.37	-.01, -.05
Gender	.20, 2.26*	.38, 3.18**	-.04, -.04
Extrinsic (social)	.16, 1.67	.01, 0.10	-.12, -1.0
Gender	.14, 1.50	.36, 2.86**	-.03, -.24
Extrinsic (personal)	.39, 3.66**	.31, 2.06*	.15, 1.13
Gender	.28, 3.13**	.39, 3.20**	.04, 0.32
Intrinsic	-.04, -0.36	-.26, 2.03*	.32, 2.85**
Gender	.16, 2.13*	.24, 3.17**	-.03, -0.39
Fundamentalism	.10, 1.03	-.06, -0.46	.51, 5.02**
Gender	.19, 2.08*	.39, 3.25**	-.07, -0.74

\*.05  $\geq p \geq$  .01; \*\* $p <$  .01.

*Note.* All regressions held both self-esteem, measured by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1965), and a religious orientation x gender interaction term as constants. Neither proved significant in any model. Full models are available upon request. Condition and Gender variables were coded as -1/+1 for the vengeful/forgiving primes and for men/women, respectively.

Table 4.  
*Results for t-test Comparisons of Participants' Religiosity Scores Across Condition in Study 3*

	<i>N</i>	Mean	SD	<i>t</i>	df	<i>p</i> -value
<b>Intrinsic</b>						
Vengeful	87	3.48	.99	-.10	145.40	.923
Forgiving	70	3.50	1.03			
<b>Extrinsic (total)</b>						
Vengeful	87	2.54	.67	.29	139.23	.77
Forgiving	70	2.51	.76			
<b>Extrinsic (personal)</b>						
Vengeful	87	3.21	.87	.23	139.16	.82
Forgiving	70	3.18	1.00			
<b>Fundamentalism</b>						
Vengeful	87	.32	1.48	.97	140.65	.332
Forgiving	70	.06	1.64			
<b>Authoritarian God-Concept</b>						
Vengeful	87	4.16	1.24	.01	149.00	.99
Forgiving	70	4.16	1.38			
<b>Benevolent God-Concept</b>						
Vengeful	87	6.15	.72	.18	126.74	.86
Forgiving	70	6.13	.948			

Table 5.  
*Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for Study 3*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. HIM	—								
2. HIW	.36**	—							
3. Fundamentalism	.17**	.54**	—						
4. Extrinsic Religiosity	.19*	.23**	.20*	—					
5. Extrinsic (social subscale)	.04	.04	.14	.77**	—				
6. Extrinsic (personal subscale)	.26**	.32**	.17*	.81**	.25**	—			
7. Intrinsic	-.01	.50**	.72**	.25**	.17*	.22*	—		
8. Authoritarian God Concept	.25**	.19*	.25**	-.02	-.06	.03	.17*	—	
9. Benevolent God Concept	-.13	.22**	.13	.10	-.01	.16	.30**	-.07	—
Mean	4.31	6.22	.20	2.52	1.85	3.20	3.49	4.16	6.14
Standard Deviation	1.68	1.86	1.56	0.71	0.87	.94	1.01	1.30	0.82

$N = 157$ ,  $.05 \geq p \geq .01$ ;  $**p < .01$ .

Table 6.  
*Study 3 Regression Analyses Results*

	HIM	HIW
	$\beta, t$	$\beta, t$
Intrinsic Religiosity	.49, 2.31** (forgiving) -.13, -.612 (vengeful)	.98, 6.38**
Condition	.44, 3.13**	.27, 1.86
Gender	.59, 4.16**	.18, 1.25
Interaction	-.31, -2.09*	
Extrinsic (total)	.40, 2.57**	.55, 3.01**
Condition	.39, 2.73**	.33, 2.01*
Gender	.53, 3.79**	-.21, -1.27
Extrinsic (personal)	.59, 3.76**	.76, 4.12**
Condition	.41, 2.87**	.36, 2.18*
Gender	.54, 3.81**	-.2, -1.24
Fundamentalism	.63, 3.21** (forgiving) -.05, 0.24 (vengeful)	.97, 6.52**
Condition	.48, 3.47**	.17, 1.15
Gender	.71, 5.15**	.11, .725
Interaction	-.68, -2.42*	
Authoritarian God Concept	.38, 2.67**	.41, 2.47**
Condition	.35, 2.59**	.20, 1.29
Gender	.51, 3.78**	-.21, -1.34
Benevolent God Concept	-.29, -1.18	.72, 2.52*
Condition	.27, 1.62	.06, .33
Gender	.48, 2.85**	.10, .54

\*.05  $\geq p \geq$  .01; \*\* $p <$  .01.

*Note.* Condition and Gender variables were coded as -1/+1 for the vengeful/forgiving primes and for men/women, respectively.

Figure 1.  
*Simple Slopes Test for Intrinsic Religiosity X Condition Interaction in Study 3*





Figure 2.  
*Simple Slopes Test for Fundamentalism X Condition Interaction in Study 3*



## Appendix B

### Honor Ideology for Manhood Scale (HIM) (Barnes et al., 2012)

Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements using the provided

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 ----- 8 ----- 9

Strongly  
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly  
Agree

1. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who calls him an insulting name.
2. A real man doesn't let other people push him around.
3. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who slanders his family.
4. A real man can always take care of himself.
5. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who openly flirts with his wife.
6. A real man never lets himself be a "door mat" to other people.
7. A real man doesn't take any crap from anybody.
8. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who trespasses on his personal property.
9. A real man can "pull himself up by his bootstraps" when the going gets tough.
10. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who mistreats his children.
11. A real man will never back down from a fight.

12. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who steals from him.
13. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who vandalizes his home.
14. A real man is seen as tough in the eyes of his peers.
15. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who insults his mother.
16. A real man never leaves a score unsettled



## Appendix C

### Honor Ideology for Womanhood Scale (HIW) (Barnes et al., 2014)

Rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements using the provided scale.

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 ----- 8 ----- 9

Strongly  
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly  
Agree

1. A respectable woman knows that what she does reflects on her family name.
2. A good woman is loyal to her family members, even when they have behaved badly.
3. A good woman stands by her man at all times.
4. A respectable woman avoids any behavior that might bring shame on her family.
5. A good woman never flirts with a man who is not her husband or boyfriend.
6. A good woman teaches her children the importance of family traditions.
7. A good woman never tolerates disrespect.
8. A good woman is always truthful, even when it hurts her.
9. A respectable woman never wants to be known as being sexually permissive.
10. A respectable woman never betrays her husband.
11. A good woman always puts her family first.
12. A good woman is willing to die for her family.

## Appendix D

### Honor Concerns Scale (HC Scale) (Ijzerman et al., 2007)

Rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement below, using the

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 ----- 8 ----- 9

Strongly  
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly  
Agree

1. My honor depends on the appreciation and respect that others have for me.
2. I could not have respect for myself if I did not have any honor.
3. I think that a public humiliation would be one of the situations that would violate my honor the most.
4. To maintain my honor, I have to be loyal to my family, regardless of the circumstances.
5. I think that honor is one of the most important things that I have as a human being.
6. I think that the honor of a man would be violated if he were humiliated publicly by others.
7. It is my duty to be constantly prepared to defend the honor of my family.
8. A family member would violate my honor if he/she were to do something disgraceful.
9. My honor is the basis for my self-respect.

## Appendix E

### Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religiosity Scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989)

Use the scale provided to rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement below.

1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5

Strongly  
Disagree

Neutral

Strongly  
Agree

1. I enjoy reading about my religion. (Intrinsic)
2. I go to church because it helps me to make friends. (Extrinsic-social)
3. It doesn't much matter what I believe so long as I am good. (Intrinsic)\*
4. It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer. (Intrinsic)
5. I have often had a strong sense of God's presence. (Intrinsic)
6. I pray mainly to gain relief and protection. (Extrinsic-personal)
7. I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs. (Intrinsic)
8. What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow.  
(Extrinsic-personal)
9. Prayer is for peace and happiness. (Extrinsic-personal)
10. Although I am religious, I don't let it affect my daily life. (Intrinsic)\*
11. I go to church mostly to spend time with my friends. (Extrinsic-social)
12. My whole approach to life is based on my religion. (Intrinsic)
13. I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there. (Extrinsic-social)

14. Although I believe in my religion, many other things are more important in life.

(Intrinsic)\*

*Note.* Items marked with an asterisk are reverse coded

## Appendix F

### Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005)

Please indicate your reaction to each statement according to the following scale:

-4 = You very strongly disagree with the statement.

-3 = You strongly disagree with the statement.

-2 = You moderately disagree with the statement.

-1 = You slightly disagree with the statement.

0 = You feel exactly and precisely neutral about the statement.

1 = You slightly agree with the statement.

2 = You moderately agree with the statement.

3 = You strongly agree with the statement.

4 = You very strongly agree with the statement.

1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed.

2. No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths about life.\*

3. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God.

4. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion.\*

5. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can't go any "deeper" because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity.

6. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God, and the rest, who will not.

7. Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered completely, literally true from beginning to end.\*

8. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion.

9. “Satan” is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is no such thing as a diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who tempts us.\*

10. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right.

11. The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or compromised with others’ beliefs.

12. All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings. There is no perfectly true, right religion.\*

*Note.* Items marked with an asterisk are reverse coded

## Appendix G

Authoritarian/Benevolent God Scale (A/B God-Concept Scale) (Johnson, Okun, & Cohen, 2015)

Instructions: There are many ways of thinking about God, a Higher Power, or a divine Life Force, but some of God's traits may seem more relevant to us than others. Using a WIDE RANGE OF THE SCALE below, please rate how well each word describes God--BASED UPON YOUR OWN, PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND BELIEFS (as opposed to what you 'should' believe or what is theologically or philosophically correct): (Items are randomized on the page).

1 = Strongly disagree

2 = Disagree

3 = Somewhat disagree

4 = Neither agree nor disagree

5 = Somewhat agree

6 = Agree

7 = Strongly agree

### **Authoritarian factor items:**

Wrathful      Punishing      Strict      Stern      Commanding

### **Benevolent factor items**

Forgiving      Compassionate      Gracious      Tolerant      Merciful

## Appendix H

### Vengeful Prime (Study 3)

1 Samuel 15: 1-5, 7-9, 17-19, 32-33

Samuel also said to Saul, “The Lord sent me to anoint you king over His people, over Israel. Now therefore, heed the voice of the words of the Lord. Thus says the Lord of Hosts; ‘I will punish Amalek for what he did to Israel, how he ambushed him on the way when he came up from Egypt. Now go and attack Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and do not spare them. But kill both man and woman, infant and nursing child, ox and sheep, camel and donkey.’” So Saul gathered the people together and numbered them in Telaim, two hundred thousand foot soldiers and ten thousand men of Judah. And Saul came to a city of Amalek, and lay in wait in the valley. And Saul attacked the Amalekites, from Havilah all the way to Shur, which is east of Egypt. He also took Agag, king of the Amalekites, alive and utterly destroyed all the people with the edge of the sword. But Saul and the people spared Agag and the best of the sheep, the oxen, the fatlings, the lambs, and all that was good, and were unwilling to utterly destroy them. But everything despised and worthless, that they utterly destroyed... So Samuel said, “When you were little in your own eyes, were you not head of the tribes of Israel? And did not the Lord anoint you king over Israel? Now the Lord sent you on a mission, and said, ‘Go, and utterly destroy the sinners, the Amalekites, and fight against them until they are consumed.’ Why then did you not obey the voice of the Lord? Why did you swoop down on the spoil, and do evil in the sight of the Lord?”... Then Samuel said, “Bring Agag, king of the Amalekites, here to me.” So Agag came to him cautiously. And Agag said, “Surely the bitterness of death is past.” But Samuel said, “As your sword has made women childless, so shall your mother be childless among women.” And Samuel hacked Agag in pieces before the Lord in Gilgal.



## Appendix I

### Forgiving Prime (Study 3)

Matthew 5, 1-11, 21-22, 38-48, New King James Version

And seeing the multitudes, Jesus went up on a mountain, and when He was seated His disciples came to Him. Then He opened His mouth and taught them, saying: “Blessed *are* the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed *are* those who mourn, for they shall be comforted. Blessed *are* the meek, for they shall inherit the earth. Blessed *are* those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be filled. Blessed *are* the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy. Blessed *are* the pure in heart, for they shall see God. Blessed *are* the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God. Blessed *are* those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are you when they revile and persecute you, and say all kinds of evil against you falsely for My sake... You have heard that it was said to those of old, ‘You shall not murder, and whoever murders will be in danger of the judgment.’ But I say to you that whoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment. And whoever says to his brother, ‘Raca!’ shall be in danger of the council. But whoever says, ‘You fool!’ shall be in danger of hell fire... You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I tell you not to resist an evil person. But whoever slaps you on your right cheek, turn the other to him also. If anyone wants to sue you and take away your tunic, let him have *your* cloak also. And whoever compels you to go one mile, go with him two. Give to him who asks you, and from him who wants to borrow from you do not turn away. You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to you, love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who spitefully use you and persecute you, that you may be sons of your Father in Heaven.