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JOHN DEWEY AND LAWRENCE KOHLBERG: CONTRASTING CONCEPTS  
OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

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JOHN DEWEY AND LAWRENCE KOHLBERG: CONTRASTING  
CONCEPTS OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY  
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BY

MICHAEL SHANNON LAWSON

Norman, Oklahoma

1983

JOHN DEWEY AND LAWRENCE KOHLBERG: CONTRASTING  
CONCEPTS OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

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DEDICATION:

To Luticia, a companion whose mere presence  
has enriched my life and whose confidence encouraged  
this attempt at academic achievement.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My mother, Virginia Dent Lawson, loved to tell me the story of a little train that "could". He climbed a mountain with an extra heavy load repeating the phrase "I think I can." That story reflected her philosophy of life. She always believed that I could do more than I thought possible. "Can't" was not in her vocabulary and "failure" was only an opportunity to try again. I wish she were here to share this occasion. She deserves a great deal of credit.

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been patient with my absentmindedness during my graduate studies. All of them have been a help to me.

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This dissertation was typed as a labor of love by my lovely wife, Luticia. She has worked from poorly handwritten copies under tremendous time pressure. Simultaneously, she has cared for our children, kept up our home, worked part-time, watched after my father, entertained our friends, directed Vacation Bible School, supervised Pioneer Ministries, sang in the Ladies Ensemble and Choir,

been a source of encouragement to me, and still found time to bowl a respectable average. Her expertise and patience are beyond value. I owe her more than this life will enable me to repay.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

". . . For education, Dewey has become an American institution."<sup>1</sup>

"He wrote the philosophy of the continent."<sup>2</sup>

"Nor has any other exercised so profound an influence on the schools,<sup>3</sup> not only of America, but other lands as well."<sup>3</sup>

These words were written by three different authors, over a twenty-five year span of time. Their description expresses clearly the impact of John Dewey on American education. Even though the most recent quote is now thirty years old, many educators would still agree with the evaluation of John Dewey's influence made by these authors. Dewey attempted to integrate into his educational philosophy every phase of life. In fact, he makes a strong case in Democracy and Education for the theory that education is life.

Within his comprehensive philosophy, John Dewey addressed the moral issue many times throughout his professional career. In dealing with morals, he describes both what he thinks they are and where they originate. He began as early as 1893 in his article "Teaching Ethics in

the High School." He devoted a whole chapter to morals in the 1916 classic work Democracy and Education. Before his death, he wrote three books dealing exclusively with the problem of morals and how they are acquired. These books are entitled, Moral Principles in Education (1909), Human Nature in Conduct (1922), and Theory of Valuation (1939). Dewey also authored several journal articles which contribute different dimensions to his understanding of how morality fits within both education and life.

Dewey's voluminous writing and enormous impact on education has provided a philosophical framework for the research of many modern educators. Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg, currently a professor at Harvard University, claims to be one of those. Kohlberg traces his ideas back to John Dewey. He says his ideas are at best "... warmed over John Dewey ..."<sup>4</sup> Lawrence Kohlberg also asserts that John Dewey is the only modern thinker about education worth taking seriously.<sup>5</sup> Kohlberg's link to Dewey is more than incidental since he specifically traces his fundamental notion about moral development to John Dewey.<sup>6</sup>

Although Kohlberg does not depend exclusively on Dewey, it is obvious from his many references that he wishes to draw on Dewey's reputation and align himself favorably with the "American institution in education." To some degree, Kohlberg has been successful since some scholars have taken Kohlberg's not so subtle hint and made a philosophical connection between Kohlberg and Dewey. For instance,

R. Freeman Butts, the noted education historian, picks up on Kohlberg's claim. In his book, Public Education in the United States, Butts describes the search for a moral base in education. In that description he traces Rawls' formalist philosophical approach, and, coincidentally, the link between Kohlberg and Dewey as follows:

The total position elaborated in great detail by Rawls cannot even be hinted at here, . . . however, Rawls has not elaborated a full-scale philosophy of education based upon his underlying political and moral philosophy, as Dewey did. This remains for the philosophers of education to do if they decide to turn once again to restore a profound political and moral base for public education. It was already clear by 1976 that there was some affinity between Rawls' view and that of Kohlberg, and Kohlberg claimed to be in the tradition of Dewey.<sup>7</sup>

While Butts has simply stated Kohlberg's claim, others have taken the claim seriously and affirmed Kohlberg's attachment to Dewey. Carole Findlay in an article entitled "Humanistic Education: The Basis in Developmental Theory" says,

Dewey laid the groundwork for developmental education. However, he did not yet have the work of those that were to follow him and further expand and clarify his ideas. Dewey was not able to give us the specifics for stimulating development as his philosophy proposed. . . . Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Erik Erikson, and Jane Loevinger are among those who have attempted to clarify the stages of cognitive and affective development that individuals pass through during the life cycle.<sup>8</sup>

The real significance of the supposed connection

between Kohlberg and Dewey is formulated by James Rest in his article "Development Psychology as a Guide to Value Education: A Review of 'Kohlbergian' Programs."

Dewey laid out an educational program in broad philosophical terms. It was not, however, until Piaget's work that a psychology was begun which "developed the general premises of Dewey . . . into a science of great richness and logical and empirical rigor." Following Piaget, Kohlberg has worked "to make Dewey's ideas concrete," and Kohlberg's associates, in turn, have worked on "an application of Kohlberg to a high school curriculum (Sprinthall, 1971b)." Educational programs with such a venerable lineage (Dewey-Piaget-Kohlberg, and so forth), have created interest because of the intellectual heft behind them and the promise of initiating something more than a superficial, piecemeal, short-lived fad.<sup>9</sup>

Obviously, teachers or administrators sorely pressed for time and increasingly encouraged to offer "values" programs can be easily persuaded by "intellectual heft." After all, choosing programs supposedly based on Dewey-Piaget-Kohlberg is prestigious. Does Kohlberg really have a legitimate claim to being "warmed over Dewey?"

Certainly, the casual reader of Dewey and Kohlberg will notice some very general ways in which Dewey and Kohlberg are similar. For instance, they agree on the basic dignity of human beings. They share a hopeful confidence in democratic processes. They concur that moral education ought to be a part of schooling. These similarities seem strong enough but they are deceptively superficial. Kohlberg, however, claims that his relationship to Dewey is

more than superficial. Could a practitioner by following these two thinkers develop two completely different models for moral education? Kohlberg would say "no" since he believes his ideas are subsumed under Dewey's comprehensive philosophy. There are educators who would disagree.<sup>10</sup>

### PROBLEM STATEMENT

Certainly a more careful look at the concept of moral development in both Dewey and Kohlberg seems warranted since two alternate approaches to moral education may emerge. Therefore, this study contrasted the concepts of moral development as found in selected works of John Dewey and Lawrence Kohlberg.

### METHODOLOGY

The basic approach of this dissertation was to examine directly the writings of Dewey and Kohlberg and contrast their concepts of moral development. Specifically, Dewey's Democracy and Education, Moral Principles in Education, Human Nature in Conduct, Theory of Valuation and "Teaching Ethics in the High School" were used to provide the essence of Dewey's ideas about moral development. Other works by Dewey were referred to when they provided an additional idea or stated a similar idea with more precision.

Lawrence Kohlberg has written over one hundred articles, but only some focus clearly on the problem identified in this paper. The attached bibliography lists twenty-one



articles which were chosen because they appear to represent the central and relevant ideas of Kohlberg on moral development.

In addition to the writings of these two authors, a few critics of Kohlberg, as well as other writers on moral development, were used when they helped to clarify issues related to moral development or the unique perspectives of John Dewey or Lawrence Kohlberg. However, it should be remembered that this study was not primarily intended to criticize either Lawrence Kohlberg or John Dewey. Instead, the supposed connection between Kohlberg and Dewey was isolated and analyzed.

Specific mention should be made about two works which address the same problem as this paper but from different perspectives. Dr. Jeannie Pietig wrote a doctoral dissertation for the University of Minnesota entitled A Critique of Lawrence Kohlberg's Interpretation of John Dewey and Progressivism (1978). In that work, she questions Kohlberg's interpretation of Dewey and concludes that Kohlberg's developmental psychology does not have its roots in Dewey's thinking. Her argument is briefly sketched here because her work is so well organized and documented. In the opinion of this author, Pietig's dissertation should be required reading for any serious student of Kohlberg.

Essentially, Pietig notes that Kohlberg traces developmental psychology back to John Dewey. However, his argument almost exclusively is built on a single citation

from Psychology of Number. Pietig questions the validity of this citation since it was co-authored and some scholars doubt Dewey contributed very much. She then shows that even if Dewey held a technically developmental notion early, he later abandoned the idea and cites numerous quotes from his later works to show Dewey's differences with developmental psychology. She further concludes that Kohlberg's and Dewey's educational philosophies are fundamentally different. She says,

The two major conclusions to be drawn from this study are the following. First, Kohlberg's discussions about Dewey and progressivism tell us a great deal about Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach to education but very little about Dewey or progressivism. And second, Kohlberg's theory of moral development and moral education is not a restatement of Dewey, as he claims.<sup>11</sup>

The second work which addresses Kohlberg's claim to being connected to Dewey was written by Dr. Israela Aron. Her article entitled "Moral Philosophy and Moral Education II. The Formalist Tradition and the Deweyan Alternative" really assumes rather than argues that significant differences exist between Kohlberg and Dewey.<sup>12</sup> Curiously enough in an article of this nature, she never once refers to Kohlberg's claim to be a follower of Dewey. However, the article proceeds very nicely to outline formalist philosophy and its proposals for moral education. Then, she briefly sets forth Dewey's philosophy in contrast. Her conclusion is to recommend an eclectic approach to moral education. In

the process, Aron demonstrates that formalist philosophy is fundamentally different from Dewey because it separates morality from the rest of life and discusses morality abstractly. Aron points out that for Dewey everything impinged on morality and nothing could be isolated from morality. Further, Dewey was continually insisting on connecting the abstract with the concrete. Dewey wanted students to grapple with real life.

If Lawrence Kohlberg does not depend on John Dewey for his developmental psychology as Pietig argues or his formalist philosophy as Aron demonstrates, are there any parts of Kohlberg's moral development that could be traced to Dewey? This study looked at four elements of both Kohlberg and Dewey's thought. The definition of morality, the origin of morality, moral behavior, and moral education were examined and contrasted in summary form at the end of each chapter. The conclusion briefly recaps the differences, suggests some reasons why the differences exist, and critiques the significance of the differences.

CHAPTER II  
DEFINITIONS OF MORALITY

Introduction

A clear understanding of how John Dewey and Lawrence Kohlberg use the term "moral" is fundamental to determining whether their ideas are similar or divergent. If they proceed from different definitions, then their respective theories will be built upon different foundations and as a result can be expected to lead to different conclusions.

Both Dewey and Kohlberg proceed to discuss morality without giving the reader a concise definition. Instead, they both assume definitions which often leaves the reader guessing about their ideas. Only occasionally do they give glimpses of the precise nature of the term they use so often in their writing.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine carefully the use of the terms "moral" or "morality" as found in selected writings of John Dewey and Lawrence Kohlberg. From these usages, definitions will be constructed. Once these definitions are constructed, any contrasts will become evident and the significance of the differences consequently explored.

While a dictionary definition of morality is inadequate to express comprehensively the concepts of either man, nevertheless, it may provide an initial framework for examining the different components of their definitions. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary lists the following components as part of the definition of "moral":

1. Characterized by excellence in what pertains to practice or conduct;
2. Dealing or concerned with establishing principles of right and wrong in behavior; . . .
3. Pertaining to character, conduct, intentions, social relations...
4. Conforming to a standard of what is good and right; . . .<sup>13</sup>

From a dictionary point of view, "behavior", "social relations", and "standards" emerge as important elements to the definition of morality. Summarizing these elements suggests that morality is "behavior" in "social relations" measured against some "standard of what is good." These elements will be used initially to compare Dewey's and Kohlberg's definitions.

#### Dewey's Definition

Looking first at Dewey's definition, one may best begin by describing what Dewey believes morals are not. For John Dewey, morals are the same as ethics and certainly neither are fixed.<sup>14</sup> Very clearly in his article "Teaching Ethics in the High School," he declares, "In any right study of ethics, then, the pupil is not studying hard and fixed rules for conduct; . . ."<sup>15</sup> Nor is this an isolated theme

in Dewey's writing. He repeats the idea in his article entitled "Moral Theory and Practice." Here, he says essentially the same thing but uses different words when he explains, "But, I am very certain that moral science is not a collection of abstract laws, . . . "16 (emphasis his) Both of these statements are clear denials of fixed moral certainty.

This denial of moral certainty is not surprising since naturalism is a commonly known and fundamental part of Dewey's overall philosophy. Naturalism is the doctrine that scientific facts account for all phenomena. Dewey argues rigorously for this naturalistic assumption. Nevertheless, naturalism must remain an assumption since it cannot be objectively verified. All of his reasoning about morality rests on this assumption. Comparing him to our dictionary definition, Dewey's "standards" are relative and not fixed.

This notion of relative standards leads nicely to the element of social relations within the dictionary definition. For Dewey, morality is determined exclusively by custom, culture, or folkway.<sup>17</sup> There are no fixed rigid principles or laws which transcend culture. Instead, morality is determined by society, and people accept a particular moral code because it is acceptable within their particular society. In Dewey's own words, " . . . morals are social."<sup>18</sup>

Dewey explains how morals develop within society

from individual human nature since societies are really no more than collections of individual humans. (This theme will be discussed at length in Chapter Three.) Dewey notes the interesting phenomenon that all societies everywhere possess moral codes. Although the moral codes differ, the notion of morality is universal to mankind.

So far then, Dewey assumes that standards are flexible codes determined by the social relations within each culture. This position has often been described as cultural relativism.

Extending Dewey into behavior, the third element of the dictionary definition, we find a comprehensive view of moral behavior. No activity is exempt from moral implication. Dewey makes this clear in Democracy and Education when he asserts, "As a matter of fact, morals are as broad as acts which concern our relationships with others."<sup>19</sup> In his earlier work, Human Nature and Conduct, he had defined moral acts as all activities or relationships in which choices are involved. In Dewey's own words:

The foremost conclusion is that morals has to do with all activity into which alternative possibilities enter. For wherever they enter a difference between better and worse arises. Reflection upon action means uncertainty and consequent need of decision as to which course is better. The better is the good; the best is not better than the good but is simply the discovered good.<sup>20</sup>

According to Dewey, each person is faced with an incredible number of moral choices each day because each social encounter is pregnant with choices. The acceptable

moral behavior on each occasion is governed by the culture and subject to change as the culture changes. Again, morality is not governed by anything abstract or external to the culture. From this point on, we must depart from our dictionary definition if we are to grasp a more complete picture of Dewey's notion of morality.

Dewey observes that few, if any, people stop to consider the moral impact of their numerous social-moral encounters. Instead, most people rely on habits developed in themselves throughout their lifetime and derived through observation of others. Although this is the nature of the case, Dewey would change it if he could. Behavior based on habit normally precludes behavior based upon an intelligent thoughtful rationale. For Dewey, a thoughtful intelligent approach to decisions about relationships would enable people to make better moral choices instead of merely habitual choices.<sup>21</sup> The only exception would be if the habit were based upon thoughtful choices. Intelligent and thoughtful decisions are an important element in Dewey's ideal definition of morality.

If people are to abandon unthoughtful habitual choices in favor of thoughtful choices, two things will be necessary. First, sufficient information must be gathered. Although there are no fixed rules as to how much time and effort must be expended in order to secure "sufficient" data, Dewey presupposes the good will (intentions) of the



decision maker. This presupposition may be gratuitous based on the history of human nature and activity. However, if a person fails here, the moral choice quite possibly will be misguided.

When sufficient information has been gathered, the second thing necessary for a thoughtful choice is some basis upon which to choose. The basis, if it is to be effective, must be simple, workable, and implementable by almost everyone. In his book Reconstruction in Philosophy, Dewey proposes just such a basis. Dewey suggests that the ultimate test for any moral choice is whether the choice promotes growth. In fact he says, "Growth itself is the only moral 'end'".<sup>22</sup> In this way, Dewey hopes to relieve the tension between the polarities of good and evil. Without some resolution, Dewey is faced with a dilemma. In other words, a decision which was morally good at one point in time may very well prove to be morally evil at another point in time. If people adopt Dewey's thinking, they will no longer face the potential of exhilaration or remorse depending on their choice of good or evil deeds. Instead, if they use intelligence and their decision promotes growth, they simply anticipate and experience the exhilaration of the decision making (moral) process. By learning from their mistakes and using intelligence to cope with the challenges of life, they are growing and acting morally. According to Dewey, they never need to experience "the agony of defeat" or guilt.

Dewey's definition of morality thus far suggests that the basic ingredients of morality are concerned with all behavior in any social relationship measured against the standard of growth. Dewey would argue that moral behavior changes from culture to culture being relative as opposed to fixed or transcendent. Moreover, true moral decisions require sufficient information and when enough data has been gathered, the correct decision will be apparent.

Another dimension to Dewey's definition is that Dewey defines morality in highly individualistic terms. Although he wrestles with the consequences of this notion, he nevertheless is insistent. In "Moral Theory and Practice," he constructs his argument as follows:

Shall I be told, then, that there can be no such thing as moral theory at all? . . . Every man, before he acts, always has such a theory unless his act is one of mere impulse. It is true enough that he may not exhaust, all the real concreteness of the act; but nonetheless his idea of the act is individualized as far as it goes; it may be a smaller individual than the real act, but this does not make it an abstract universal. What he sees, in a word, is this act, although the "this" he sees may not be the true complete "this".

. . . . .

But I am very certain that moral science is not a collection of abstract laws, and that it is only in the mind of an agent as an agent.

. . . . .

Moral theory, so far as it can exist outside of the particular agent concerned with a special act, exists in the mind of him who can reproduce the condition of that agent. Just because moral practice is so individual or concrete, you can theorize for another only as you "put yourself in his place."<sup>23</sup>

Three important ideas should be noted from Dewey's discussion which add dimension to his definition. First, each individual functions on the basis of his own individualistic moral theory. Each person is a bundle of individual components: individual heredity, experiences, and relationships. Therefore, each individual faces moral choices from his or her own personal perspective. Second, each choice is unique because no two people face the identical set of circumstances. While generally the circumstances may be similar, the details will always be unique. Nor can the same person face the same situation twice because each individual changes as time passes. Third, evaluating moral choices becomes incredibly difficult if not impossible because who can ultimately put themselves completely in the place of another? Enough differences occur between individuals to make this impossible for all practical purposes.

Dewey does not set aside his idea of culture when asserting this intense individualism, but rather defines morality in terms of both the culture and the individual. However, American culture compounds the difficulty of making moral choices because of its pluralistic nature. Although Dewey sees this as a hopeful opportunity, many people will probably feel frustration in light of so many choices. Dewey's own description of this unique occasion is found in Human Nature and Conduct as follows:

But always and everywhere customs supply the standards for personal activities. They are the pattern into which individual activity must weave itself. This is as true today as it ever was. But because of present mobility and interminglings of customs, an individual is now offered an enormous range of custom-patterns, and can exercise personal ingenuity in selecting and rearranging their elements.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to individualism, another dimension to Dewey's definition of morality can be seen in his discussion of the naturalistic dilemma. Dewey must face this problem because his definition of morality focuses upon actual problems solved without reference to transcendent rules. This dilemma is frequently defined as the "is" and "ought" problem. Basically, the charge against naturalism asserts that a mere observation of what "is" can never describe what "ought" to be. For instance, to describe a rape (what "is") will not be sufficient to determine whether rape is right or wrong (what "ought" to be). In defending his definition of morality from this charge and attempting to resolve the apparent conflict, Dewey exposes an important assumption which adds to and undergirds his definition of morality. Dewey suggests his resolution of the naturalistic dilemma in "Moral Theory and Practice" in the following words:

But limiting the question as best I can, I should say (first) that the "ought" always rises from and falls back into the "is", and (secondly) that the "ought" is itself an "is", - the "is" of action.<sup>25</sup>

In this as well as the argument that Dewey goes on to develop in the remainder of his article, he is suggesting that "ought" does not look only at what "is" but also what

"could be" as a result of intelligent choices. In other words, a person must examine what actually exists along with what actually could be. Unfortunately, Dewey does not make clear how a person chooses among those alternatives. Instead, he appears to simply assume that the correct choice will be apparent if enough data is gathered about the consequences of the alternative courses of action. This assumption is fundamental to Dewey's definition. If in contrast to his assumption, the correct choice is not apparent, some objective criterion for choosing would be necessary.

Dewey's definition of morality as discussed thus far in this chapter can be summarized into the following six statements.

First, morality is naturalistic and not transcendent; therefore, facts are the only guides to moral choices. Second, the moral choice is always apparent from sufficient information since "is" and "ought" are connected and not polarities. Third, morals are merely social customs which are subject to change as cultures change. Fourth, the only goal of morality is growth and the notions good and evil are excluded. Fifth, moral behavior is all inclusive behavior; there can be no categories such as "amoral" behavior. Sixth, morality resides only within the person making the choices which means that evaluation of the moral choice of another is impractical if not impossible.

While not everyone will agree with Dewey, he at least seems to deal with the major ingredients of a comprehensive definition of morality.

### Kohlberg's Definition

Let us turn now to examine Lawrence Kohlberg's definition of moral. Dr. Kohlberg has developed a definition of morality based upon both developmental psychology and formalist philosophy. Initially, let us compare his definition to the dictionary definition which says essentially that "morality" in "behavior" is "social relations" measured against some "standard of what is good."

Kohlberg's definition emerges from his theoretical model of moral development, which is structured in a manner similar to Jean Piaget's cognitive developmental model. In fact, Kohlberg traces the beginning of his definition and his connection to Piaget in an article entitled "Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development." In that paper, he speaks of himself in the third person and says,

As an enthusiastic reader of PIAGET'S, however, he knew that the development of autonomous morality was not completed until the advanced age of 12 or 13. To allow for the laggards, he decided to include children as old as 16 in a study of the development of moral autonomy. When he actually looked at his interviews, it dawned on him that children had a long way to go beyond PIAGET'S autonomous stage to reach moral maturity. Accordingly, he constructed a six stage-schema of moral development. A schema in which super ego morality was only stage one and what PIAGET termed autonomous morality was only Stage 2. His thesis data left him uncertain as to when Stage 6, the

stage of mature morality was finally reached; but at least he knew that it was fully reached by age 25 his age at the time of the study.<sup>26</sup>

Basically, Kohlberg proposes that children progress through a predictable and highly structured sequence in their ability to think about moral issues. He explains,

Our psychological theory of morality derives largely from Piaget, who claims that both logic and morality develop through stages and that each stage is a structure which, formally considered, is in better equilibrium than its predecessor.<sup>27</sup>

Children thus have a developing but predictable moral value system. Kohlberg suggests that this development progresses through three levels or six stages (two stages per level). As individuals grow from childhood through adolescence to adulthood, they progress systematically through each of these levels and stages. It is possible to fixate at a particular level. Concern over fixation precipitated Kohlberg's educational curriculum, which will be dealt with in a later chapter. It is easy to see the relationship between Kohlberg and Piaget when the stages of Piaget and Kohlberg are laid side by side. Steve Owen does a good job of summarizing the connection between Piaget and Kohlberg in the chart in Appendix A.

In Kohlberg's definition of morals, each stage refines the definition of morality but stage six reflects the optimum definition. Unlike John Dewey who seems to scatter his ideas about morality throughout his writings, Lawrence Kohlberg discusses his ideas in two basic articles.

He frequently repeats his ideas in the articles that focus on his "stage six."

Kohlberg says in his article entitled, "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgement":

The present paper elaborates a claim made in the previous paper: the claim that a higher or later stage of moral judgement is "objectively" preferable to or more adequate than an earlier stage of judgement according to certain moral criteria. Since these criteria of adequacy are those central to judgement at our most advanced stage, "stage 6," the problem becomes one of justifying the structure of moral judgement at stage 6.<sup>28</sup>

In order to gain a clear understanding of Kohlberg's definition of morality, a clear understanding of his definition of stage six is necessary. Although in other articles, Kohlberg elaborates on the implications of stage six, nevertheless, he defends the "morality" of stage six in his article, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development." His definition for each of the six stages is reproduced in Appendix B. Since his stage six is fundamental to his ultimate definition of morality, his summary is repeated here from the article entitled "From Is to Ought." He says,

Stage 6. The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of



human rights, and of respect for the dignity of  
human beings as individual persons. . . .<sup>29</sup>  
(emphasis his)

As with Dewey, knowing what Kohlberg wants to avoid saying may be as important as knowing what he is saying. In the definition just cited, Kohlberg has stressed the "universal" notion. He does this primarily because he wishes to avoid the charge of cultural relativism in his definition and because he believes he has found universals in morality. In the same article, he clarifies and reaffirms the universal aspect of his definition of morality. He asserts that morality transcends both individuals and cultures. He says,

In sum, our evidence supports the following conclusions: There is a universal set of moral principles held by men in various cultures, our stage 6. (These principles, we shall argue, could logically and consistently be held by all men in all societies; they would in fact be universal to all mankind if the conditions for socio-moral development were optimal for all individuals in all cultures.) At lower levels than stages 5 or 6, morality is not held in a fully principled form. Accordingly, it is more subject to specific content influence by group definition of the situation than is principled morality. Nevertheless, the more generalized and consistently held content principles of conventional morality are also universal.<sup>30</sup>

Furthermore, having described his position positively, he turns and states his argument against cultural relativism negatively when he says,

Our first step in this article is to show that the common assumption of the cultural relativity of ethics, on which almost all contemporary social scientific theorizing about morality is based, is in error.

. . . . .

In the next section we shall go on to consider the evidence for a non-relativist "cognitive-developmental" theory of the developmental process. Our account will be based on a rejection of the relativity assumption and an acceptance of the contrasting view that 'ethical principles' are the end point of sequential 'natural' development in social functioning and thinking; correspondingly, the stimulation of their development is a different matter from the inculcation of arbitrary cultural beliefs.<sup>31</sup> (emphasis his)

He reiterates this idea when he says,

Both cultural values and religion are important factors in selectively elaborating certain themes in the moral life, but they are not unique causes of the development of basic moral values.<sup>32</sup>

Kohlberg apparently rejects cultural relativity in favor of fixed principles as a fundamental assumption of his definition. For Kohlberg, the standard of what is good is found in stage six.

A second part of Kohlberg's definition of morality that needs further exploration is the idea that although individuals make moral choices, if they are at stage six, they always decide on the basis of these fixed principles. In other words, the first step in moral choosing is to gather adequate information; then the second step is to apply the fixed principles to the information so that a moral choice can be made. These principles are universalizability and reversability. If these two principles are not utilized, the best moral choice has not been made. Kohlberg explains:

Since Kant, formalists have argued that rational moral judgements must be reversible,

consistent, and universalizable, and that this implies the prescriptivity of such judgements. We claim that only the substantive moral judgements made at stage 6 fully meet these conditions, and that each higher stage meets these conditions better than each lower stage. In fully meeting these conditions, stage 6 moral structures are ultimately equilibrated.<sup>33</sup>

This two-step process is an assumption that undergirds all of Kohlberg's definition and discussion of morality. Since Kohlberg does not want to be classified as a cultural or moral relativist, he must isolate some absolute around which his theory can be constructed. In fairness to Kohlberg, he argues that this absolute has been scientifically discovered in humans through his research rather than arbitrarily assigned.

Kohlberg asserts that the universal absolute is justice. In his own words:

. . .virture is ultimately one, not many, and is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture. Second, the name of this ideal form is justice.<sup>34</sup>

Justice at once becomes the standard for moral decisions and the goal for moral development. Obviously, justice is a key ingredient in Kohlberg's definition of morality. Since morality is defined in terms of justice, morality does not change from culture to culture. According to Kohlberg, justice ultimately exists in equilibrium only in stage six, the final product of the developmental process. Kohlberg states his own rationale for this decision as follows:

My argument for justice as the basic moral principle is then as follows:

1. Psychologically, both welfare concerns (role taking, empathy) and justice concerns, are present at the birth of morality and at every succeeding stage, and take on more differentiated, integrated, and universalized forms at each step of development.

2. Of the two, however, only justice takes on the character of a principle at the highest stage of development, that is, as something that is obligatory, categorical, and takes precedence over law and other considerations, including welfare.

3. 'Principles' other than justice may be tried out by those seeking to transcend either conventional or contractual-consensual (stage 5) morality, but they do not work either, because they do not resolve moral conflicts, or because they resolve them in ways that seem intuitively wrong.

4. The intuitive feeling of many philosophers that justice is the only satisfactory principle corresponds to the fact that it is the only one that 'does justice to' the viable core of lower stages of morality.

5. This becomes most evident in situations of civil disobedience for which justice, but not other moral principle, provides a rationale which can cope with the stage 5 contractual-legalistic argument that civil disobedience is always wrong.

6. The reason that philosophers have doubted the claims of justice as 'the' moral principle is usually that they have looked for a principle broader in scope than the sphere of moral or principled individual choice in the formal sense.<sup>35</sup>

Although Kohlberg admits that there is little proof that justice is the ultimate form of morality, he defends himself with an argument from silence, one of the weakest forms of argumentation. Kohlberg says,

In this article, we cannot show that the moral form of universality, tied to the notion that obligations are to persons, logically implies

the principle of justice, . . . We simply point to the fact that no principle other than justice has been shown to meet the formal conception of a universal prescriptive principle.

. . . . .

Alston is correct in saying that I have not proved that justice is the only possibility, but he neglects to point out that no one has successfully argued for an alternative.<sup>36</sup>

This description of moral standards in terms of justice by Kohlberg is not as clear as it initially appears. What Kohlberg is describing about morality is very confusing. Apparently a person can be more moral or less moral but not immoral because Kohlberg is simply attempting to describe what is occurring within the individual not proposing a foundation upon which individuals draw value judgments for moral decisions about behavior. In his discussion of "differentiation" and "integration", Kohlberg says,

In the moral domain, these criteria are parallel to formalistic moral philosophy's criteria of prescriptivity and universality. These two criteria combined represent a formalistic definition of the moral, with each stage representing a successive differentiation of the moral from the non-moral and a more full realization of the moral form.

Our developmental definition of morality is not a system for directly generating judgements of moral worth, . . . A developmental definition seeks to isolate a function, like moral judgement or intelligence, and to define it by a progressive developmental clarification of the function.

. . . . .

But we . . . do not think a stage 6 normative ethic can justifiably generate a theory of the good, a theory of virtue, or rules for praise, blame, and punishment.<sup>37</sup>

Although the moral justice Kohlberg describes, is a

universal standard, it will not help solve the problem of whether a behavior is good or evil. Kohlberg is not actually evaluating behavior per se although he does not want to be classified as a relativist. He resolves this apparent paradox through his philosophical position which is commonly identified as formalist philosophy.

Kohlberg subscribes to the formalist position which divides morality into "normative" ethics and "meta-ethics". Consequently, his definition of morality is based not on "normative" ethics which examines moral behavior and issues of good and evil but rather on "metaethics" which essentially analyzes conversations about ethical discussion. Kohlberg is defining how people discuss morality rather than morality itself. Therefore, his definition of morality is completely different from the commonly accepted definition or our previously mentioned dictionary definition. Rather, his definition reflects the highly refined notions of formalist philosophy. A very helpful summary of this position is given by Israella Aron in her critique of Kohlberg. She points out three assumptions which characterize formalist philosophy. First, she suggests that, ". . . morality can be defined in terms of form alone, without entering into a discussion of its content."<sup>38</sup> Second, she notices that,

. . . the domain of morality is unique, set apart from other domains . . . Divorced from science, politics, art, law, and economics, morality becomes insular and rarefied.<sup>39</sup>

Third, she suggests that,

A final problem with the formalist approach lies in preoccupation with justification of moral decisions as opposed to the process of decision making itself. . . In real life, the reasons for our decisions are certainly important, but so are the decisions themselves.<sup>40</sup>

Kohlberg's definition of morality as described in this chapter can be summarized into the following seven statements.

First, morals are transcendent principles, not relative or socially determined customs. Second, moral choices require both information gathering and the application of appropriate principles and are not always apparent from facts. Third, the ultimate principle which transcends culture is justice. Fourth, the goal of moral development is justice and all growth will be measured against movement toward this objective. Fifth, morality can be divided into two categories: normative ethics and metaethics. Sixth, moral development primarily refers to metaethics which avoids discussion of behavior and focuses on moral discussions. Seventh, moral choices are predictable along a developmental scale and therefore subject to analysis and evaluation.

#### Summary of Differences

The definitions of John Dewey and Lawrence Kohlberg employed in discussing morality seem worlds apart. Laying their concepts side by side may help crystalize how radically different their ideas really are.

First, Dewey categorically rejects any transcendent principles for morality, while Kohlberg's whole system is built upon them, especially justice. Second, Kohlberg categorically rejects cultural relativism, whereas Dewey's morals are exclusively cultural customs. Third, Dewey expects moral choices to be apparent after sufficient information has been gathered, while Kohlberg requires both information gathering and the application of appropriate principles of universalizability and reversability. Fourth, Dewey describes the only goal for morality in the very broad notion of growth, while Kohlberg describes a very restricted form of justice as the goal of morality. Fifth, Dewey's whole philosophy, including his ideas about morality, was devoted to reconciling the theoretical and the practical, while Kohlberg divides morality into metaethics and normative ethics or theoretical ethics and practical ethics. Sixth, Dewey focuses on moral behavior, whereas Kohlberg focuses on moral discussion. Seventh, Dewey describes moral choices as highly individualistic not easily predicted or evaluated while Kohlberg describes moral choices as predictable along a developmental scale and subject to analysis and evaluation.

These fundamental differences in defining morality seem to indicate that these two men are describing entirely different concepts. Lawrence Kohlberg certainly does not appear to draw his definition of morality from John Dewey.



CHAPTER III  
EXPLANATIONS OF MORAL ORIGINS

Introduction

One of the age old controversies in the discussion of human morality is the nature of human nature. Essentially, two polarities exist. Frequently, this controversy is referred to as "nature" versus "nurture". On one end of the continuum are those thinkers who believe that human nature is basically inherited. According to them, people bring with them into life the innate elements which determine human nature. They assert that very little if anything is contributed to human nature by the environment. These individuals are identified as those who hold to "nature".

On the other end of the continuum are those thinkers who believe that human nature is determined exclusively by the environment. According to them, people bring a blank slate into life and the environment literally conditions them to the extent that their human nature is fixed by their surroundings. These individuals are identified as those who hold to "nurture".

The purpose of this chapter is to examine selected writings of Dewey and Kohlberg to see if they adhere strongly to either of these ideas. If their views can be

identified clearly, then we can determine if their views are basically divergent.

### Dewey's Explanation

John Dewey does not give a concise analysis of the origin of morals in his writings on the subject. Therefore a number of quotations must be brought together to capture the essence of his thinking. From these, two basic ideas will be drawn which are also consistent with his definition as outlined in the previous chapter. Dewey brings together in his notion about the origin of morals both the individual and the society or culture.

Beginning with the individual, Dewey rejects Locke's notion of a "tabula rasa." Instead, according to Dewey, individuals begin life with a bundle of instincts and impulses. These are apparently the products of evolution though never so clearly specified by Dewey. In his article entitled "Ethical Principles Underlying Education," Dewey identifies this portion of the origin of human morality. He says,

In the first place, all conduct springs ultimately and radically out of native instincts and impulses.<sup>41</sup>

At first blush, Dewey appears to be proposing some form of innate moral qualities. Other evidence seems to indicate this is not so. In Human Nature and Conduct, he clarifies his position. Even though he admits to basic impulses as innate sources of initial activity, he argues

that the meaning for those activities (morality) comes from external sources. He states,

But an individual begins life as a baby, and babies are dependent beings. Their activities could continue at most for only a few hours were it not for the presence and aid of adults with their formed habits. And babies owe to adults more than procreation, more than the continued food and protection which preserve life. They owe to adults the opportunity to express their native activities in ways which have meaning. Even if by some miracle original activity could continue without assistance from the organized skill and art of adults, it would not amount to anything. It would be mere sound and fury.

In short, the meaning of native activities is not native; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction with a matured social medium.<sup>42</sup> (emphasis his)

Dewey is therefore consistent with his own definition of morals as customs. While granting basic impulses, he clearly believes these cannot continue without a social medium nor will they take on any meaning. This point must be remembered if we wish to gain a clear idea of Dewey's notion of child "development". For example, Dewey reflects upon the importance of child development to the origin of morals when he says,

We must know what these instincts and impulses are, and what they are at each particular stage of the child's development, in order to know what to appeal to and what to build upon.<sup>43</sup>

We must understand that Dewey is describing a child's moral development which is dependent upon and contained within a social context. For Dewey, there is no moral development apart from that context. He says,

And so we need to know about the social conditions which have educated original activities into definite and significant dispositions. . .<sup>44</sup>

Nowhere does Dewey concede a natural development apart from the social context. Interestingly enough, although the individual is enculturated by the society, morality remains individualistic. Dewey describes his position:

The moral life is lived only as the individual appreciates for himself the ends for which he is working, and does his work in a personal spirit of interest and devotion to these ends.<sup>45</sup>

Dewey sees the individual and his society so highly interwoven in the origin and development of morals within the individual. A brief tracing of his ideas may be helpful especially since humans are not born with morals according to Dewey.

There are three ingredients in emerging morality for Dewey. Instincts or impulses, habits, and customs are the key words Dewey uses to identify these ingredients. The individual begins with instincts or impulses alone but is acted upon by a society with existing customs forming habits in the person. We noted previously the place of impulse and instinct in Dewey's thought about morality. Before moving to his description of habits, a final note from Dewey clarifying his meaning of the terms instincts and impulse may be helpful. He says,

The use of the words instinct and impulse as practical equivalents is intentional, even

though it may grieve critical readers. The word instinct taken alone is still too laden with the older notion that an instinct is always definitely organized and adapted - which for the most part is just what it is not in human beings. The word impulse suggests something primitive, yet loose, undirected, initial. Man can progress as beasts cannot, precisely because he has so many 'instincts' that they cut across one another, so that most servicable actions must be learned. In learning habits it is possible for man to learn the habit of learning. Then betterment becomes a conscious principle of life.<sup>46</sup>

A person brings extremely primitive impulses into life which are transformed into habits only by learning. These habits are useful only if they are conceived through intelligence. On the other hand, it would appear that impulses are rather impotent. Dewey disagrees. Although impulses are not highly organized or defined, Dewey describes their crucial role when he says,

Impulses are the pivots upon which the reorganization of activities turn, they are agencies of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality. Consequently whenever we are concerned with understanding social transition and flux or with projects for reform, personal and collective, our study must go to analysis of native tendencies.<sup>47</sup>

According to Dewey, these impulses are so strong in children, adult society views them as undesirable. Adults, therefore, very quickly begin to train the impulses of a child by instilling moral habits. The dynamics of this process are described by Dewey as follows:

Adults distrust the intelligence which a child has while making upon him demands for a kind of conduct that requires a high order of intelligence, if it is to be intelligent at all. The

inconsistency is reconciled by instilling in him 'moral' habits which have a maximum of emotional impressment and adamantine hold with a minimum of understanding. These habitudes, deeply engrained before thought is awake and even before the day of experiences which can later be recalled, govern conscious later thought.<sup>48</sup>

Initial impulses are thus quickly subjected to training in "moral" habits. These habits are then influenced by and interact with the customs of the culture to which one belongs. But where do customs come from? Dewey explains:

We often fancy that institutions, social custom, collective habit, have been formed by the consolidation of individual habits. In the main this supposition is false to fact. To a considerable extent customs, or widespread uniformities of habit, exist because individuals face the same situation and react in like fashion. But to a larger extent customs persist because individuals form their personal habits under conditions set by prior customs. An individual usually acquires the morality as he inherits the speech of his social group.<sup>49</sup>

And again:

For practical purposes morals mean customs, folkways, established collective habits. But, always and everywhere customs<sup>50</sup> supply the standards for personal activities.

Not only do morals originate in customs of cultures but they also originate from within the culture through sub-cultural groupings. Dewey says,

For segregated classes develop their own customs,<sup>51</sup> which is to say their own working morals.

This state of affairs proves to be a hopeful one for Dewey because, although difficult, changes for the better in

morality can occur. In his own words,

Stated in psychological terms, it means that there must be a training of the primary impulses and instincts, which organizes them into habits which are reliable means of action. But, know practically that the kind of character we hope to build up through our education is one which not only has good intentions, but which insists upon carrying them out.<sup>52</sup>

The detailed description of Dewey's ideas about the origin of morals is given to demonstrate that Dewey envisions a complex system of natural impulses interacting with environment. How then can he be classified into a "nature" or "nurture" proponent? He weaves his way back and forth between inherited impulses and enculturated habits; therefore, a clear cut classification may be difficult. The following reasons however, provide persuasive evidence that Dewey is much closer to those who hold to "nurture" than those who suggest "nature" as the source of morality. First, the impulses/instincts which are inherited are extremely primitive and void of meaning apart from enculturation. Second, Dewey defines morals as customs. Third, Dewey clearly maintains that changes in moral character can be achieved through crucial changes to the environment. He exposes his strongest argument for nurture while discussing these changes in "Character Training for Youth".

The two changes Dewey proposes for improving morality in children are really rather surprising. One might expect Dewey to suggest the school as a premier candi-

date for changing the character or morals of young people because he had such a deep concern for education. Instead, in his article "Character Training for Youth", Dewey says,

Compared with other influences that shape desire and purpose, the influence of the school is neither constant nor intense. Moral education of our children is in fact going on all the time, every waking hour of the day and three hundred and sixty-five days a year. Every influence that modifies the disposition and habits, the depths and the thought of the child is a part of the development of his character.<sup>53</sup>

Interestingly enough, as Dewey examines the problems of the changing morality of a nation, he determines that the one thing that will bring about moral improvement is economic change. In conclusion to his article entitled "Character Training for Youth" he says,

So I should put general economic change as the first and most important factor in producing a better kind of education for formation of character.<sup>54</sup>

Since this is such an unexpected suggestion, further explanation is necessary as well as appropriate to allow Dewey to clarify why he believes an economic change will effect a moral change. Dewey elaborates on the importance of economic change in the same article when he says,

As long as society does not guarantee security of useful work, security for old age, and security of a decent home and of opportunity for education of all children by other means than acquisition of money, that long the very affection of parents for their children, their desire that children may have a better opportunity than their parents had, will compel parents to put great emphasis upon getting ahead in material ways, and their example will be a dominant factor in educating children.<sup>55</sup>



Dewey's second proposal for changing morals of youth requires the education of parents. In "Character Training for Youth" he continues his prescription for moral change in young people:

I would put parental education second among the factors demanded in the improvement of character education.<sup>56</sup>

In "Character Training for Youth" he goes on to list recreational activities and the school as third and fourth in importance in changing moral character. These four environmental factors are working upon the child or young person. While these four appear to be the most important, Dewey does not explain what proportionate role each one has.

Summarizing then, Dewey tends to put much more emphasis on "nurture" than "nature". Although he recognizes the existence of instincts or impulses, his explanation for the source of moral origins is certainly environmental enculturation or nurture! As we shall see in the next section, this explanation conflicts with Lawrence Kohlberg's.

#### Kohlberg's Explanation

Following the thoughts of Lawrence Kohlberg on the origins of morality is like following a man on a journey. In his article "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development", he describes his original notions and how his research in moral development confirmed these ideas.

He says,

It has already been noted that we started our studies of moral development fifteen years ago with the notion (a) that there were universal ontogenetic trends toward the development of morality as it has been conceived by Western moral philosophers, and (b) that the development of such 'rational' or 'mature morality' is a process different from the learning of various 'irrational' or 'arbitrary' cultural rules and values. While these notions were mere assumptions fifteen years ago, we believe our longitudinal and cross-cultural research has now turned these assumptions into well-verified factual conclusions.<sup>57</sup>

Kohlberg's research crystallized his original assumptions and presuppositions into his present conclusions. What are his conclusions, and what are the findings that are so persuasive, and how does he detect the origin of morality? Remembering that Kohlberg draws heavily upon both developmental psychology and formalist philosophy, we can trace Kohlberg's thoughts and see where he fits on the nature-nurture continuum.

Kohlberg's initial research centered on subjects here in the United States. He describes his work:

For 12 years, my colleagues and I studied the same group of 75 boys, following their development at three-year intervals from early adolescence through young manhood. At the start of the study, the boys were aged 10 to 16. We have now followed them through to ages 22 to 28.<sup>58</sup>

Studying only seventy-five American youth would hardly provide a sufficient basis for conclusions about morality that are universal. So, he broadened his research. He continues:

In addition, I have explored moral development in other cultures - Great Britain, Canada, Taiwan, Mexico and Turkey.<sup>59</sup>

Moreover, in his article "From Is to Ought: . . .," he details some of the research which supports his universal conclusions about moral development.<sup>60</sup> In that article he compares the results of his research among middle-class urban boys in the United States, Taiwan, and Mexico, although more of the research was presented in the paper entitled "The Child as a Moral Philosopher." The conclusion about moral development is virtually the same in both articles. Kohlberg summarizes in "The Child as a Moral Philosopher":

In summary, the nature of our sequence is not significantly affected by widely varying social, cultural or religious conditions. The only thing that is affected is the rate at which individuals progress through this sequence.<sup>61</sup> (emphasis his)

Kohlberg concludes in "From is to Ought":

. . . a stage concept implies universality of sequence under varying cultural conditions. It implies that moral development is not merely a matter of learning the verbal values or rules of the child's culture, but reflects something more universal in development, something which would occur in any culture.<sup>62</sup>

Kohlberg begins by looking for "universal trends" in moral development and after looking briefly at six different cultural settings (three of which are primarily Anglo-Saxon and English speaking), he finds these universals. He does admit that both his assumptions and his findings contradict almost all modern research and thinking

in both sociology and anthropology. Kohlberg is willing to challenge all of this research and counsel. He says,

Our first step in this article is to show that the common assumption of the cultural relativity of ethics, on which almost all contemporary social scientific theorizing about morality is based, is in error.<sup>63</sup>

And,

When I first decided to explore development in other cultures by this method, some of my anthropologist friends predicted that I would have to throw away my culture-bound moral concepts and stories, and start from scratch learning the values of that culture. In fact, something quite different happened.<sup>64</sup>

Kohlberg feels that he has found universal moral principles. These discoveries led Kohlberg to some unusual conclusions. He states:

Yet as I have tried to trace the stages of development of morality and to use these stages as the basis of a moral education program, I have realized more and more that its implication was the reassertion of the Platonic faith in the power of the rational good.<sup>65</sup>

So as not to become lost, the sequence of Kohlberg's journey thus far proceeds as follows. He began by assuming there were universals in moral development. Next, he examines small samples from six cultures and concludes he has found these universals. Finally, upon examining these universals, he is led to reaffirm Platonic notions about universals. He describes how clearly he identifies with Plato and in the process discloses where he believes morals originate. He summarizes some of the elements of Plato's view of the nature of virtue as follows:

First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture.

Second, the name of this ideal form is justice.\*

Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the good. He who knows the good chooses the good.

Fourth, the kind of knowledge of the good which is virtue is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs.

Fifth, the good can then be taught, but its teachers must in a certain sense be philosopher-kings.

Sixth, the reason the good can be taught is because we know it all along dimly or at a low level and its teaching is more a calling out than an instruction.

Seventh, the reason we think the good cannot be taught is because the same good is known differently at different levels and direct instruction cannot take place across levels.

Eighth, then the teaching of virtue is the asking of questions and the pointing of the way, not the giving of answers. Moral education is the leading of men upward, not the putting into the mind of knowledge that was not there before.<sup>66</sup>

This series of statements by Kohlberg are so strongly opposed to everything Dewey taught that even Kohlberg senses the tension between what he has just said and his previously affirmed allegiance to John Dewey. He attempts to defend himself by commenting,

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\*Kohlberg feels free to redefine justice as equality rather than Plato's own hierarchy.

In speaking of a Platonic view, I am not discarding my basic Deweyism, but I am challenging a brand of common sense first enunciated by Aristotle with which Dewey partly agrees.<sup>67</sup>

Unfortunately, neither here nor in any other article does Kohlberg explain what "basic Deweyism" really means.<sup>68</sup> Instead of clarifying the matter, the issue between himself and Dewey becomes even more clouded in the same article when he really ignores quoting Dewey and instead challenges what he terms "Deweyite thinking".

He argues:

Nevertheless, Deweyite thinking has lent itself to the Boy Scout approach to moral education which has dominated American practices in this field and which has its most direct affinities with Aristotle's views.<sup>69</sup>

No documentation is offered for this accusation. Kohlberg appears confused at this point. First, if Kohlberg follows Plato, and Dewey follows Aristotle (a charge which is hardly defensible), how is it that Kohlberg can hold to Plato and not reject "basic Deweyism?" Second, how is it that Dewey becomes responsible for "Deweyite thinking," assuming of course that "Deweyite" refers to some alleged follower of Dewey? No names or specifics are given.

Let us return to the questions raised initially in this chapter. What is the origin of morality as defined by Kohlberg? By following Plato, Kohlberg has set forth a position on the origin of morality which is in dramatic contrast to Dewey. Basically, Kohlberg asserts that "we

know it all along dimly or at a low level." This certainly appears to be describing the origin of morality as innate. Kohlberg becomes even more definitive when later in the same article he says,

The Platonic view implies that, in a sense, knowledge of the good is always within but needs to be drawn out like geometric knowledge in Meno's slave . . . . Returning to the teaching of virtue as a drawing out, the child's preference for the next level of thought shows that it is greeted as already familiar, that it is felt to be a more adequate expression of that already within, of that latent in the child's own thought.<sup>70</sup>

As if this were not strong enough, he reaffirms this notion in his article "From is to Ought:". He says, in summarizing the implications of his studies:

Fourth, the kind of knowledge of the good which is virtue is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion, or acceptance of conventional beliefs.<sup>71</sup>

On the basis of these statements, one is extremely persuaded and sorely tempted to categorize Kohlberg clearly in the "nature" camp along with all of those who hold to innate morality; however, Kohlberg is elusive. He acknowledges at least a marginal influence of social or cultural context. In one sense, his acknowledgement is rather back handed since he speculates what would happen to his developmental stages in children who were handicapped by the total absence of social context, a non-existent set of circumstances. Nevertheless, he does admit:

A child deprived of all moral social stimulation until adolescence might perhaps develop

'principled' or formal operational, logical thought in adolescence, but would still have to go through all the stages of morality before developing moral principles rather than automatically reflecting his cognitive principles in a morally principled form of thought.<sup>72</sup>

There is therefore a small place for social context but it does not alter his moral stages.

In spite of these extreme statements, Kohlberg is not yet willing to proclaim his intuitive moral justice an "inborn conscience". While he does not explain the difference between "intuitive justice" and "inborn conscience," he does say,

Again, the existence of six qualitatively different systems of moral apprehension and judgement arising in invariant order is clear evidence that moral principles are not the intuitions of an inborn conscience or faculty of reason of the sort conceived by Butler or Kant.<sup>73</sup>

Moreover, in his article entitled, "The Adolescent as a Philosopher" he says,

While the stage of concrete operations is culturally universal and in a sense natural, this does not mean it is either innate or that it is inevitable and will develop regardless of environmental stimulation.<sup>74</sup>

Kohlberg appears to be somewhere short of innate morality. He definitely cuts himself off from any important influence of culture with categorical denials. One such denial is found in "The Child as Moral Philosopher" where he comments:

Actually, as soon as we talk with children about morality, we find that they have many ways of making judgements which are not 'internalized' from the outside, and which do not come from in any direct and obvious way from



parents, teachers or even peers.<sup>75</sup>

Perhaps the clearest description of Kohlberg's position is found in his explanation of developmental stages found in his article "The Adolescent as a Philosopher". Here he says,

Stages are rather the products of interactional experience between the child and the world, experience which leads to a restructuring of the child's own organization rather than to the direct imposition of the culture's pattern upon the child.<sup>76</sup>

In this explanation, three key elements are brought together by Kohlberg in one sentence. First, notice that the child possesses innately an organizing pattern. If this is Kohlberg's intuitive moral justice (equality), he does not explain. Second, the child is neither enculturated nor does he have the imposition of the culture's pattern upon him. Third, the culture merely provides experiences which lead the child through the stages of moral development.

Kohlberg's conclusions are rather paradoxical. A review of the findings of this chapter may help to identify precisely where a paradox exists. The following statements are offered as summary:

First, Kohlberg begins by looking for universals in the field of cognitive-moral development. Second, he concludes he has found universals after sample studies of small single groups in six cultures. (Three of the cultures are basically Anglo-Saxon and English speaking.) Third, these universals lead him to reaffirm Platonic justice as ultimate

morality as well as intuitive knowledge of justice. Fourth, Kohlberg is not ready to concede an inborn conscience. Fifth, he does deny that moral development is enculturated. And, sixth Kohlberg does affirm that culture is necessary for moral development to take place.

Kohlberg is really vague about the origin of morals. Morality is "intuitive" but not "inborn". Morality is not enculturated but requires culture as an agent. Why doesn't Kohlberg believe morals are enculturated? Perhaps he senses the critical dangers of cultural relativism. Ultimately, if all values are relative, even the value of human life is relative. One suspects that preserving the ultimate value of human life is part of a hidden agenda for Kohlberg. In fact, preserving human life may be the premier value for Kohlberg. He hints at this in his evaluation of a Stage Six response of one of his subjects. He states:

This young man is at Stage 6 in seeing the value of human life as absolute in representing a universal and equal respect for the human as an individual. He has moved step by step through a sequence culminating in a definition of human life as centrally valuable rather than derived from or dependent on social or divine authority.<sup>77</sup>

Notice that the value of human life is "absolute" and "universal" and not derived.

If the suspicion that human life is the ultimate value is accurate, Kohlberg is to be commended for his noble though essentially unsubstantiated efforts to defend it. No amount of mental or philosophical gymnastics however will

allow Kohlberg to "scientifically" demonstrate that human life is the premier value. Either one must assume it is valuable or one must be told (by divine authority?) that it is valuable. Otherwise, Alston's cryptic comment that Kohlberg is trying to pull a moral philosophy out of a hat is essentially true.<sup>78</sup>

#### Summary of Differences

Lawrence Kohlberg, denials notwithstanding, is hardly similar to John Dewey in his description of the origin of morals. Dewey clearly is a cultural relativist and Kohlberg claims he clearly is not! These two men are distinctively different on this decisive issue, and they both take different routes in establishing the link between moral thinking and moral behaving as well as proposing different systems for accomplishing moral education. These two differences will be explored and documented in the next two chapters.

## CHAPTER IV

### DESCRIPTION OF MOTIVES FOR MORAL BEHAVIOR

#### Introduction

Any complete philosophy of morality must explain how moral thinking and moral behavior are linked together. No moral philosophy is complete without addressing this difficult but essential issue. A scholar may set forth an explanation for how people think about morals which does not explain the behavior of people. If in fact it does not explain behavior, a serious question arises about whether such a theory has completely explored the essential ways people think about morals. Otherwise, a theory of morals could simply divide moral thinking and moral behavior into separate and unrelated categories. In such a theory a dichotomy exists whereby thinking may be extremely rational and understandable while behavior may be completely irrational and unpredictable. If the behavior were rational it would be disconnected from the rational thinking. The purpose of this chapter is to see if John Dewey and Lawrence Kohlberg explain the connection between thinking and behavior in similar ways, or if they find a similar motive

for moral behavior. John Dewey's thoughts will be explored first.

### Dewey's Description

In his book, Democracy and Education, John Dewey addresses the critical link between moral thinking and moral behavior in the chapter entitled "Theories of Morals". Throughout the book, Dewey is attempting to resolve dichotomies which exist in philosophy and particularly as it relates to education. The problem in explaining moral behavior revolves around motive. In other words, "why do people do what they do?" Typically, two answers have been proposed. First, some suggest that moral behavior can only be explained in terms of informed self-interest. Regardless of appearance, people are motivated by personal needs, drives, and concerns. On the other hand, others suggest that true moral behavior must be prompted by pure motives. They insist that only selfless behavior that is fundamentally altruistic and not self-seeking has any real moral value to it. Dewey addresses the issue of motive in an extremely insightful way.

Dewey suggests that the true solution to the question about motive will be resolved when two dichotomies are resolved. Using Dewey's terms, these two dichotomies exist between "intention" and "conduct" and between "principle" and "interest." Understanding Dewey's resolution of these dichotomies is essential to a clear perception of his notion

about the link between moral thinking and moral behavior. This chapter will proceed by examining Dewey's definition of the four previously mentioned terms and then his proposed resolution of the tension.

According to Dewey, men began to focus on "intention" because of the disparity between the real world in which they lived and the ideal world they longed for. Although not specifically mentioned, I believe that Dewey is probably tracing his notion of the history of Platonic thought. Men can visualize a world in which present conflicts are eliminated; therefore, they basically condemn the real world in which they live. Dewey explains:

They seek refuge and consolation within their own states of mind, their own imaginings and wishes, which they compliment by calling both more real and more ideal than the despised outer world. Such periods have recurred in history. In the early centuries of the Christian era, the influential moral systems of Stoicism, of Monastic and popular Christianity and other religious movements of the day, took shape under the influence of such conditions . . . The external world in which activity belongs was thought of as morally indifferent. Everything lay in having the right motive, even though that motive was not a moving force in the world.<sup>79</sup>

Dewey also believes that men became preoccupied with the invisible, internal, ideal of intent. In essence, moral behavior was not the focus at all. If a person's motives were pure, their behavior could be excused in spite of horrible consequences. Dewey perceptively notices that remnants of this notion are present in modern society and cites the school as an example. He explains the rationale:

On one hand, certain states of feeling are made much of; the individual must 'mean well,' and if his intentions are good, if he had the right sort of emotional consciousness, he may be relieved of responsibility for full results in conduct.<sup>80</sup>

Beginning somewhere in history and continuing to the present, moral behavior is often, at least to some degree, measured by a person's intention. Even modern American law, recognizes intention in criminal cases. Premeditated murder ordinarily calls forth more severe consequences than accidental manslaughter. Insanity, if it can be proved, calls forth acquittal since modern psychology has discovered that people with severe mental illness frequently are irrational in their behavior. Even though these intentions (built on false perceptions of reality) may be basically good or justifiable, the actions (or reactions) are bizarre. For Dewey, intention alone, as we shall see later, is not a sufficient rationale for moral behavior.

Intention reflects one end of a tension drawn on the other end by "conduct". Dewey again appeals to history in tracing the reason for the inclusion of "conduct" as one evaluator of human moral behavior. Those who made this philosophical shift began to evaluate morality as completely external and measured exclusively by what conduct actually occurred. He recounts his version of the occasion which precipitated a turn of moral theorists' attention away from intent and toward conduct. He says,

The purely internal morality of 'meaning well,'

of having a good disposition regardless of what comes of it, naturally led to a reaction. This is generally known as either hedonism or utilitarianism. It was said in effect that the important thing morally is not what a man is inside of his own consciousness, but what he does - the consequences which issue, the charges he actually effects. Inner morality was attacked as sentimental, arbitrary, dogmatic, subjective - as giving men leave to dignify and shield any dogma congenial to their self-interest or any caprice occurring to imagination by calling it an intuition or an ideal of conscience. Results, conduct, are what counts; they afford the sole measure of morality.<sup>81</sup>

Dewey also returns to the illustration of the school classroom as an example of the vestiges of this principle in modern society. He comments:

But since, on the other hand, certain things have to be done to meet the convenience and the requirements of others, and of social order in general, there is great insistence upon the doing of certain things, irrespective of whether the individual has any concern or intelligence in their doing. He must toe the mark; he must have his nose held to the grindstone; he must obey; he must form useful habits; he must learn self-control, - all of these precepts being understood in a way which emphasizes simply the immediate thing tangibly done, irrespective of the spirit of thought and desire in which it is done, . . .<sup>82</sup>

As with intent alone, conduct alone forms an imperfect measure of human moral behavior for Dewey. Intent and conduct themselves do not provide adequate measures of moral behavior. Dewey considers both of them as evils to be avoided.<sup>83</sup> He reasons that these extremes are the products of frustration and reaction. As such, they fail to provide for positive moral behavior which rests on what he describes as, " . . . progressively cumulative undertaking under



conditions which engage their interest and require their reflection."<sup>84</sup> When these conditions exist, moral behavior is inevitable. If Dewey's moral theory is followed and intent or conduct are not examined, how can the problem of motive be solved?

Without a successful solution to the dichotomy which explains moral behavior, the argument shifts for Dewey and another dichotomous school of thought arises. Dewey describes the problem:

Probably there is no antithesis more often set up in moral discussion than that between acting from 'principle' and from 'interest.'<sup>85</sup>

By "principle", Dewey means some universal rule or law that supersedes humanity or culture. He clarifies his definition of "principle" by stating:

To act on principle is to act disinterestedly, according to a personal law which is above personal considerations.<sup>86</sup>

The proponents of "principled" morality argue

. . . that since man is capable of generous self-forgetting and even self-sacrificing action, he is capable of acting without interest.<sup>87</sup>

Dewey rejects this rationale for moral behavior. His rebuttle to this argument is ". . . the premise is sound, and the conclusion false."<sup>88</sup> He agrees that man is capable of generous self-forgetting, but this does not lead him to the conclusion that man is capable of acting without interest. As a keen observer of the human experience, Dewey explains,

Yet to an unbiased judgement it would appear plain that a man must be interested in what he is doing or he would not do it.<sup>89</sup>

This seemingly obvious point is often overlooked.

Dewey will not permit those on the other side of the dichotomy to use his keen point to establish their view. If men do not behave morally simply out of "principle", neither do they act solely out of "interest." Dewey says, "To act according to interest is, so the allegation runs, to act selfishly, with one's own personal profit in view."<sup>90</sup> All moral behavior, therefore, emerges from personal needs, concerns, or interest. According to these philosophers, natural human behavior is selfish. They are not necessarily condemning selfish behavior, they are simply describing what they believe to be the case. When Dewey explains the rationale for this position, he points out a glaring weakness:

A clew (sic) to the matter may be found in the fact that the supporters of the "interest" side of the controversy habitually use the term "self-interest." Starting from the premises that unless there is interest in an object or idea, there is no motive force, they end with the conclusion that even when a person claims to be acting from principle or from a sense of duty, he really acts as he does because there "is something in it" for himself.<sup>91</sup>

Dewey disagrees with those who argue that regardless of noble claims, a person always chooses and behaves on the basis of his own best interests. Dewey concludes that "The premise is true but the conclusion is false."<sup>92</sup> He agrees that apart from interest, people do not

choose a particular course of action. However, just because there is "interest" does not preclude altruistic behavior choices.

If people do not behave morally simply from "principle" or solely from "interest", what is the motivation for moral behavior? How are moral thoughts and behavior connected? Here Dewey's genius is at its best. His insight is penetrating. First, he analyzes a common term misunderstood by both sides. Dewey explains:

Both sides assume that the self is a fixed and hence isolated quantity. As a consequence, there is a rigid dilemma between acting for an interest of the self and without interest. . . Then the reaction from this view as a cynical depreciation of human nature leads to the view that men who act nobly act with no interest at all. . . . The moment we recognize that the self is not something ready-made, but something in continuous formation through choice of action, the whole situation clears up.<sup>93</sup>

Dewey is suggesting two thoughts to solve the problem and answer the questions about the true motive for moral behavior. First, he suggests that "self" and "interest" be separated. Second, he recommends that "self" be defined as a dynamic rather than a static concept which is affected by and reflected in behavior. He says,

A man's interest in keeping at his work in spite of danger to life means that his self is found in that work; if he finally gave up, and preferred his personal safety or comfort, it would mean that he preferred to be that kind of a self. . . . In fact, self and interest are two names for the same fact; the kind and amount of interest actively taken in a thing reveals and measures the quality of selfhood which exists.

. . . . .

Unselfishness, for example, signifies neither lack of interest in what is done (that would mean only machine-like indifference) nor selflessness - which would mean absence of virility and character.<sup>94</sup>

While Dewey rejects the principle of "self-interest," he proposes dynamic self-projection as the true motive for and connection between moral thoughts and behavior. What we observe in action is a direct self-projection. People behave consistent with their self-image. This view is consistent in all branches of modern psychology. What people actually believe is reflected in their behavior. The only point of difference among the branches of psychology is how the self is acquired or changed. Dewey's concept of how the self is acquired was reflected in the previous chapter. He believed fundamentally in enculturation.

For all practical purposes, Dewey has established the link between thinking and behaving and solved the problem of motive. Before he develops other aspects of his theory, he rejects two more extremes in moral thinking.

First, he rejects a morality which is based on abstract reason detached from experience. Dewey rejects this proposition because it divides conscience from consciousness and makes morality something separate and detached from other human experiences. He argues:

. . .there is an identification of the moral with the rational. Reason is set up as a

faculty from which proceed ultimate moral intuitions, and sometimes, as in the Kantian theory, it is said to supply the only proper moral motive. On the other hand, the value of concrete, everyday intelligence is constantly underestimated, and even deliberately depreciated. Morals is often thought to be an affair with which ordinary knowledge has nothing to do."<sup>95</sup>

Second, Dewey rejects a morality which is based on the assumption that moral knowledge will automatically promote virtue. He explains:

At the other end of the scale stands the Socratic-Platonic teaching which identifies knowledge and virtue - which holds that no man does evil knowingly but only because of ignorance of the good. This doctrine is commonly attacked on the ground that nothing is more common than for a man to know the good and yet do the bad: not knowledge, but habituation or practice, and motive are what is required."<sup>96</sup>

Dewey does note an exception which would change his categorical rejection of this notion. If people correctly understood what Plato meant by knowledge, Dewey would modify his position. He says,

. . .Plato's teaching to the effect that man could not attain a theoretical insight into the good except as he had passed through years of practical habituation and strenuous discipline. Knowledge of the good was not a thing to be got either from books or from others, but was achieved through a prolonged education."<sup>97</sup>

This knowledge of the good gained from experience in life fits with Dewey's own definition of knowledge and its relation to conduct which he describes as ". . .knowledge gained at firsthand through the exigencies of experience which affects conduct in significant ways."<sup>98</sup> Significantly, Dewey rejects both Kantian and Platonic thought about the

motive for moral behavior.

In summary, let us review both what Dewey rejects and what he accepts.

First, Dewey rejects "intent" alone as an adequate measure of morality. Second, Dewey rejects "conduct" as an exclusively sufficient explanation for moral behavior, although he admits "conduct" is important. Third, Dewey rejects "principle" as an adequate motive for moral behavior. Fourth, Dewey rejects "self-interest" as a sufficient explanation for moral behavior. Fifth, Dewey rejects Kantian rationality as the only proper moral motive. Sixth, Dewey rejects the misunderstood Platonic assumption of knowledge promoting virtue. Seventh, Dewey is suggesting that moral behavior is a reflection of the self which has dynamic interest in the project. People make moral choices based on knowledge gained from life experiences, not egotistic but certainly egocentric.

#### Kohlberg's Description

Several problems immediately appear when a study of Lawrence Kohlberg's view of moral behavior is undertaken. The first problem revolves around his philosophy, the second problem focuses on his research, and the third problem reflects on his journalistic practices. Since each of these will to some degree limit the precision of this chapter, each will be briefly considered before proceeding to the actual question of the chapter.

As has been noted earlier, Kohlberg subscribes to formalist philosophy. This particular school of thought maintains that there are two kinds of ethics. Normative ethics essentially refers to what people in general mean by moral or discussions of good and evil. Metaethics refers to conversations about moral discussion.<sup>99</sup> Kohlberg is concerned with metaethics more than normative ethics therefore, he is one step removed from any analysis of actual moral behavior.

Kohlberg's philosophy has focused his research on conversations about moral discussions. All of his studies are based on verbal responses of subjects to moral dilemmas. The responses are then rated and translated into his moral developmental stages. Kohlberg has spent most of his time analyzing these conversations and very little time examining and describing the link between these conversations and actual behavior. Alston comments on this deficiency:

Perhaps one thing that is responsible for Kohlberg's unwarranted slighting of these other aspects of morality is his concentration on moral dilemmas in his research. Kohlberg's special subject is moral reasoning, and if you want to find out what sort of moral reasoning a subject does, you have to get him to do some, which means that you have to present him with a problem (real or imaginary) that calls for reasoning. It has to be a situation that has no obvious solution in terms of dominant cultural standards; otherwise it will not evoke hard thinking. Now there is no doubt that it is just situations of this kind in which reasoning looms largest, as over against affect and habitual response, both in terms of relative contributions to the determination of behavior, and in terms of phenomenological prominence.<sup>100</sup>

Finally, Kohlberg's view of moral behavior is clouded by his confusing journalism. His writing suffers from a general lack of clarity and precision considering he is supposed to be describing "scientific" facts. Dr. Paul Wagner comments:

Even though his studies are dependent upon linguistic matters, Kohlberg makes little effort to sort out the difficulties involved in attempting such an investigation.<sup>101</sup>

And again,

. . . it is because Kohlberg does not attempt to justify his position in the careful and rigorous manner of either a philosopher or a scientist, that it seems unfair on Kohlberg's part to present his work as though it is simply the product of scientific study.<sup>102</sup>

In spite of these limitations, however, Kohlberg does discuss moral behavior. His arguments and conclusions are based on his developmental stages. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, Kohlberg's research in moral development has led him to the view that universal stages of moral development exist. These stages are not affected by culture and are not relativistic in nature. The existence of these universal stages consequently led Kohlberg to affirm a uniformity of "the good" which he defines as justice. He explains:

Why do I say existence of culturally universal stages means that knowledge of the good is one? First, because it implies that concepts of the good are culturally universal. Second, because an individual at a given level is pretty much the same in his thinking regardless of the situation he is presented with and regardless of the particular aspect of morality being



tapped. There is a general factor of maturity of moral judgement much like the general factor of intelligence in cognitive tasks.<sup>103</sup>

This knowledge of the good is identified by Kohlberg as Platonic in origin and innate as we observed in chapter three. In addition, this knowledge of the good is the motive for moral behavior. Kohlberg connects these ideas when he explains:

We have claimed that knowledge of the moral good is one. We now will try to show that virtue in action is knowledge of the good, as Plato claimed. We have already said that knowledge of the good in terms of what Plato calls opinion or conventional belief is not virtue. . . however, true knowledge, knowledge of principles of justice, does predict virtuous action.<sup>104</sup>

The link between Kohlberg's developmental stages and moral behavior can be traced and is summarized as follows. Kohlberg's research in moral development led him to the conclusion that his developmental stages were universal. The existence of universal stages led him to the position that knowledge of the good is one which is basically taken from Plato. He who knows the good will choose to do the good because knowledge of the good is one. Kohlberg asserts this in both "Education for Justice" and "From Is to Ought. . ." Essentially, Kohlberg is assuming that correct knowledge will precipitate correct action. He states,

Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the good. He who knows the good chooses the good.<sup>105</sup>

For Kohlberg, the key to correct action appears to lie in correct knowledge. It must be remembered that Kohlberg is

not speaking of facts about the circumstances or moral dilemma in question. He is staying within his formalist philosophy by describing knowledge of principles. Ultimately the most important principle is the principle of justice. Moral behavior is therefore predicated on knowledge of justice. Kohlberg asserts:

Because morally mature men are governed by the principle of justice rather than by a set of rules, there are not many moral virtues but one. Let us restate the argument in Plato's terms. Plato's argument is that what makes a virtuous action virtuous is that it is guided by knowledge of the good. A courageous action based on ignorance of danger is not courageous; a just, act based on ignorance of justice is not just etc. If virtuous action is action based on knowledge of the good, then virtue is one, because knowledge of the good is one. We have already claimed that knowledge of the good is one because the good is justice.<sup>106</sup>

Previously, we noted that this knowledge of the good is fundamentally intuitive or "known all along or at a low level." The knowledge of principles will guide behavior. Kohlberg makes a clear distinction between rules which govern action and his principles which are supposed to govern choices. He explains:

We now turn to the defense of our substantive definition of stage 6 in terms of principles of justice. . . . the whole notion that there is a distinctively moral form of judgement demands that moral judgement be principled, that is, that it rely on moral principle, on a mode of choosing which is universal, which we want all people to adopt in all situations. . . . By 'moral principle,' all thoughtful men have meant a general guide to choice rather than a rule of action.<sup>107</sup>

Applying the universal principle of justice in moral

choices so that moral behavior will result is not as easy as it may appear on the surface. According to Kohlberg, one must understand justice in order for virtuous behavior to result. Kohlberg says, "The man who understands justice is more likely to practice it."<sup>108</sup> The kind of knowledge of justice that Kohlberg expects a person to understand and which is supposed to be "known all along or at a low level" is sophisticated indeed. Justice, redefined as equality by Kohlberg, must meet three different tests in order to be true to his stage six requirements. He says,

Since Kant, formalists have argued that rational moral judgements must be reversible, consistent, and universalizable, and that this implies the prescriptivity of such judgements. We claim that only the substantive moral judgements made at stage 6 fully meet these conditions, and that each higher stage meets these conditions better than each lower stage.<sup>109</sup>

It would appear that knowing the good requires a substantial amount of ability to grasp the "reversible", "consistent", and "universalizable" criterion, not to mention thinking one's way carefully through each, holding them in tension, and finally making a moral choice. If moral behavior is dependant upon this kind of process, can anyone truly qualify for stage six under real life conditions? Would not the demands of time and the volume of decisions make justice an impractical guide for individual moral decisions?

Kohlberg is therefore saying that in addition to a

knowledge of the good, true moral behavior is also dependent on extensive logic and rational thought processes. Kohlberg states it clearly:

To act in a morally mature way requires a high stage of moral reasoning. One cannot follow moral principles if one does not understand or believe in moral principles. However, one can reason in terms of principles and not live up to these principles.<sup>110</sup>

If morally mature action presupposes this high degree of moral reasoning, then understanding how one acquires this moral reasoning is important. However, moral reasoning is not actually acquired, rather it is part of the developmental process of the individual. Kohlberg says,

Our psychological theory of morality derives largely from Piaget, who claims that both logic and morality develop through stages and that each stage is a structure which, formally considered, is in better equilibrium than its predecessor. It assumes, that is, each new (logical or moral) stage is a new structure which includes elements of earlier structures but transforms them in such a way as to represent a more stable and extensive equilibrium. Our theory assumes that new moral structures presuppose new logical structures, i. e., that a new logical stage (or substage) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a new moral stage.<sup>111</sup>

This logic or rational thought must be added to knowledge of the good. Fortunately, both are a part of human development according to Kohlberg. One wonders however, whether Kohlberg is describing or proposing moral behavior.

In introducing his article entitled "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View" he says,

Yet as I have tried to trace the stages of development of morality and to use these stages

as the basis of a moral education program, I have realized more and more that its implication was the reassertion of the Platonic faith in the power of the rational good.<sup>112</sup>

Not only is "faith" in the power of the rational good required, Kohlberg is willing to give up all kinds of rational thought in order to propose rational thought as the foundation for moral behavior. He goes on to say,

In this essay, I shall throw away my graduate school wisdom about the distinction of fact and value and elaborate a view of the nature of virtue like that of Socrates and Plato.<sup>113</sup>

Discarding the distinction between fact and value is extremely curious to say the least. How can moral behavior depend on knowledge of the good and logical developmental stages yet require faith in the power of the rational good and the irrational abandonment of the distinction between fact and value? To make matters worse, disagreement with this proposition means one has not matured to Kohlberg's stage six. Kohlberg argues:

Most psychologists have never believed any of these ideas of Socrates. Is it so surprising that psychologists have never understood Socrates? It is hard to understand if you are not stage 6.<sup>114</sup>

Kohlberg is asserting that failure to believe means you simply have not developed morally to the optimum stage. This appears to be an obvious elitist argument.

Being able to unravel Kohlberg's notion of the motives for moral behavior may not be possible. Certainly "knowledge of the good" and "logical development" are necessary for the ultimate application of justice.

Defining it more precisely than that may not be possible. Alston comments on the ambiguous nature of Kohlberg's position:

More especially, I would like to raise the question as to the place of an account of moral thought in a complete psychology of morals, which amounts, I suppose, to the same thing as raising the questions as to the place of moral thought in moral life.

. . . . .

Kohlberg opposes irrational emotive theories of moral development such as those of Durkheim and Freud, but draws a contrast between 'cognitive' and 'emotive' theories with such a broad brush, that I do not know exactly what his views are on the role of affect. From what he says about the dynamics of moral development, I would suppose that he is opposed to the idea that anything like a Freudian superego plays a crucial role.<sup>115</sup>

Kohlberg ultimately admits that behavior is affected by more than principles or logical development. He says,

A variety of factors determine whether a particular person will live up to his highest stages of moral reasoning in a particular situation. Partly it depends on the pressures and ambiguities of the situation; partly it depends upon the extent of the subject's tendency to slip into the egocentrism of immediate interest. . .<sup>116</sup>

Whatever else Kohlberg truly believes about moral behavior, this quote makes it clear it should not depend on "egocentrism", an idea fundamental to Dewey.

What does Kohlberg really believe about the motives for moral behavior or the real link between moral thinking and moral behavior? Alston is not sure but suggests that the superego is out. Ultimately Kohlberg does not have any

place for egocentrism among proper motives for moral behavior. He is concerned about people following moral principles particularly justice as he defines it. Moral behavior is also dependent upon rational thinking to some degree. If a person reasons at a particular stage and fails to live up to that stage, he has conceded to pressure or egocentrism. Both of these are undesirable.

#### Summary of Differences

What is the motive for moral behavior? How is behavior linked to thinking?

First, Dewey rejects mere intent as a proper measure of moral behavior while Kohlberg feels that intent must play a definite part. Second, Dewey rejects mere conduct as a measure of morality although admitting behavior is important while Kohlberg largely avoids the issue. Third, Dewey rejects principle as a proper motive while Kohlberg clearly lands on principle as fundamental. Fourth, Dewey rejects self-interest in favor of egocentrism while Kohlberg clearly rejects egocentrism. Fifth, Dewey rejects reason as the link between thinking and behavior while Kohlberg's system presupposes a rational link between thinking and behavior. It would seem that these men are again really discussing morality from clearly different perspectives.

## CHAPTER V

### PROPOSALS FOR MORAL EDUCATION

#### Introduction

The previous three chapters provide an excellent backdrop for the question addressed in this chapter. Without the previous chapters, this one would lack dimension, depth, and adequate explanation. The concern of modern education is often with the details of the program and how it works in the classroom rather than the philosophical underpinnings of the moral education program being taught.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the recommendations of Dewey and Kohlberg for moral education. One would expect that certainly here Kohlberg would be very close to Dewey, especially since as we have previously noted he acknowledges Dewey as "the only modern thinker about education worth taking seriously."

Dewey's educational philosophy has received so much attention and is so universally discussed that a chapter which basically sets it forth in summary form hardly seems necessary. Chapter one pointed out, however, that many people who should know John Dewey are able to take Lawrence Kohlberg's claim and writings without observing any conflict. In order for the contrast between Dewey and Kohlberg



to be clearly established, Dewey's philosophy of education as it relates to his proposals for moral training will be reviewed.

### Dewey's Proposals

Dewey's educational philosophy is consistent with our findings in chapters two, three, and four. To understand, we must remember that Dewey defines morals as social customs, traces the origin of morals to enculturation and finds the link between moral thinking and behavior to be an egocentric projecting of the self into action within the social context. When he then discusses moral education, it is not surprising that he addresses the entire context that children and young people inhabit. Dewey will not be satisfied with any moral education program which falls short of changing behavior in the social context. In his article entitled "Ethical Principles Underlying Education" he says,

But we know practically that the kind of character we hope to build up through our education is one which not only has good intentions, but which insists upon carrying them out. Any other character is wishy-washy; it is goody, not good. The individual must have the power to stand up and count for something in the actual conflicts of life. He must have initiative, insistence, persistence, courage and industry. He must, in a word, have all that goes under a term, 'force of character.'<sup>117</sup>

Without question, character training is an ambitious goal. Dewey does not, however, expect the school to bear the whole burden of responsibility. As noted in chapter three, Dewey has a fourfold recommendation which he be-

lieves is essential before any major improvements in morality can be expected. His suggestion is so unexpected and yet penetrating that it bears repeating.

First, as noted earlier, Dewey recommends a general change in our economic system if morality is to be changed. Our present economy is fraught with so many uncertainties that parents will be inclined to push their children toward more materialistic objectives which will secure for them a more predictable and less precarious life style. This focus on materialism will continue to dominate the values of youth until a fundamental change in the economy occurs.

Second, Dewey is absolutely convinced that parental education is essential to a better moral education of children. In his article "The Chaos in Moral Training", he reaffirms his convictions. He says,

Yet I do not see how any successful training of children as to their conduct is possible unless the parents are first educated themselves as to what right conduct is, and what methods are fit for bringing it about.<sup>118</sup>

The education of parents is basic because parents have such a powerful influence and yet are often ignorant of the actual impact of their words and actions on children. Dewey explains:

. . . the increase of knowledge of human nature, and of how it develops and is modified, has grown enormously in the last generation. It has grown especially with respect to how relations between persons - between parents with respect to each other and with respect to their offspring - affect character. The important movement for parental education has developed out of this increase of knowledge.

But there are still multitudes of parents who have not had the most rudimentary contact with the new knowledge and who are totally unaware of the influences that are most powerfully affecting the moral fibre of their children.<sup>119</sup>

The recommendation of parental education by Dewey is rather paradoxical in light of the current mood in American education which seems to place more responsibility for moral education on the school.

Third, Dewey suggests recreation as a fundamental ingredient to good moral education. This proposal addresses the two dominant impulses of youth. Dewey may be arguing that a good offense is the best defense. Rather than allowing children to acquire bad habits through unsupervised activities and associations, perhaps these needs could be met in a positive way. Dewey says,

The two dominant impulses of youth are toward activity and toward some kind of collective association. Our failure to provide for these two impulses, . . . is at least a partial measure of why we are getting unsatisfactory results in character development.<sup>120</sup>

Finally, Dewey sees the school as having its place of influence on moral education within the context of the other three. The school cannot carry the burden for moral education alone. Dewey says,

If I put the school fourth and last it is not because I regard it as the least important of factors in moral training but because its success is so much bound up with the operation of the three others.<sup>121</sup>

The school is important but it only occupies one portion of the child's time. For Dewey, all of life bears

on the moral education of youth. He explains:

In short, formation of character is going on all the time; it cannot be confined to special occasions. Every experience a child has, especially if his emotions are enlisted, leaves an impress upon character. The friends and associates of the growing boy and girl, what goes on upon the playground and in the street, the newspapers, magazines, and books they read, the parties and movies they attend, the presence or absence of regular responsibilities in the home, the attitude of parents to each other, the general atmosphere of the household - all of these things are operating pretty constantly. And their effect is all the greater because they work unconsciously when the young are not thinking of morals at all. Even the best conscious instruction is effective in the degree in which it harmonizes with the cumulative result of all these unconscious forces.<sup>122</sup>

It is important to note here that Dewey views the majority of moral education going on outside the school to be unconscious. Any conscious moral education within the school will be effective only to the extent it "harmonizes" with these unconscious forces.

When Dewey speaks of moral education, therefore, he is not speaking primarily of the school but the myriad of forces affecting youth. The school does have a place and Dewey does have some specific notions about how moral education should be conducted in the school. First, the school must assume its rightful place. For Dewey, this means that schools must be a miniature of society because the school primarily exists to prepare children to live in the social context. Dewey asserts:

The fundamental conclusion is that the school must be itself made into a vital social institution to a very much greater extent than obtains at present.

. . . . .

Apart from the thought of participation in social life the school has no end nor aim.<sup>123</sup>

In a very practical way, the school is a social medium, but also part of a larger social medium that actually conducts the business of moral education. Notice the continuing emphasis on the social context in Dewey's summary as follows:

I sum up, then, this part of the discussion by asking your attention to the moral trinity of the school. The demand is for social intelligence, social power, and social interests. Our resources are (1) the life of the school as a social institution in itself; (2) methods of learning and of doing work; and (3) the school studies or curriculum.<sup>124</sup>

Even when Dewey describes the school's role in moral education, specific cognitive curriculum is really only one small part and the morals derived are from the social context.

Dewey explains:

We get no moral ideals, no moral standards for school life excepting as we so interpret in social terms.<sup>125</sup>

Overemphasizing Dewey's concept of the role of social pressure in moral education is very difficult. It is one of his constant themes. Having established this overriding concern of Dewey's, let us look at the place of the teacher, the place of curriculum, and the place of process in Dewey's notion of moral education.

Dewey is not naive in his understanding of the needs of the classroom. One of those needs is a competent teacher and no where is that more evident than in the teaching of morals. A competent teacher, however, is assumed for Dewey. Dewey spends little time describing any practical training for teachers called upon to give moral education. In one of his illustrations of how young people can be trained in moral habits of benevolence he puts us on notice that a competent teacher is basic to moral education in the school. He says,

Any teacher who is even moderately acquainted with the literature of charity organizations will have no difficulty in showing the necessity of not giving way to the feelings of the moment. He can show that to do so is not to act for any moral or practical reason, but simply to gratify one's own feelings - and that this is the definition of all selfishness; he can show that, by encouraging idleness and beggary, it does an injustice to society as a whole, while it wrongs the person supposedly helped, by robbing him of his independence and freedom. Now all this, I submit, is valuable in itself; treated by a teacher who knows his business (or who is even interested in it, if he does not know it), . . .<sup>126</sup>

If a good teacher is a vital part of moral education in the school, so is a curriculum which helps bridge the gap between what children will face in the larger society and what they do face in the classroom. For Dewey, history has the special quality necessary to meet this need. He is not describing history in the conventional sense. History is unique in Dewey's moral education proposals. Dewey explains,

The ethical value of history teaching will be measured by the extent to which it is treated

as a matter of analysis of existing social relations - that is to say as affording insight into what makes up the structure and working of society.

.....

History is equally available as teaching the methods of social progress.

.....

. . . when history is taught as a mode of understanding social life it has positive ethical import. . . . In relation to this highly complicated social environment, training for citizenship is formal and nominal unless it develops the power of observation, analysis, and inference with respect to what makes up a social situation and the agencies through which it is modified. Because history rightly taught is the chief instrumentality for accomplishing this, it has an ultimate ethical value.<sup>127</sup> (emphasis his)

Dewey thus assumes the necessity of a good teacher and emphasizes the unique role history can play in the curriculum of moral education. Dewey is also interested in the actual process of learning. Proper application of any moral theory to a classroom setting is crucial. Dewey writes prolifically on this process. Even summarizing his thoughts on the process of learning would be sufficient material for a study all by itself. Dewey himself provides a helpful correlation between moral theory and moral learning in his article entitled "The Chaos in Moral Training." He summarizes:

To give a reason to a child, to suggest to him a motive - I care not what - for doing the right thing, is to have and use a moral theory. To point out its consequences to himself in the ways of pains and pleasures; to point out its reaction into his own habits and character; to

show him how it affects the welfare of others; to point out what strained and abnormal relations it sets up between him and others, and the reaction of these relations upon his own happiness and future actions - to point to any of these things with a view to instilling moral judgement and disposition, is to appeal to a theory of the moral life.<sup>128</sup>

As the student interacts with life, the teacher supplies thought-provoking interjections about consequences. This is the outworking of Dewey's theory in its simplest terms. Before leaving Dewey's notion of moral education, however, it may be well to heed two of his warnings.

First, Dewey warns that young people are notorious for avoiding the conflicts and paradoxes of real moral problems. Their tendency is to intellectualize rather than struggle with the issue. He warns of this danger and reemphasizes the need for solving real problems to help avoid this pitfall when he says,

Although ethics is the most practical of the philosophic studies, none lends itself more readily to merely technical statement and formal discussion. . . . It seems to me especially advisable to get in some contact with the practical, and accordingly largely unconscious, theory of moral ends and motives which actually controls thinking upon moral subjects. . . . As anyone knows who has had much to do with the young, their conscious thoughts in these matters, or at least their statements, are not fresher, but more conventional, than those of their elders. They are apt to desire to say the edifying thing, and the thing which they feel is expected of them, rather than express their own inner feelings.<sup>129</sup>

One of Dewey's continuing concerns in moral education is the tendency to intellectualize and fail to cope



with the real problems at hand. The second warning, is related but instead of focusing on the problems of the student, focuses on the problem of the teacher. Dewey reemphasizes the necessity to avoid the abstract and deal with reality as much as possible. Dewey elaborates:

The object is to get them into the habit of mentally constructing some actual scene of human interaction, and of consulting that for instruction as to what to do. All the teacher's questions and suggestions, therefore, must be directed toward aiding the pupil in building up in his imagination such a scene. . . The whole point, in a word, is to keep the mental eye constantly upon some actual situation or interaction.<sup>130</sup>

Summarizing then, Dewey's basic notions on moral education as outlined in this chapter are reflected in the following statements.

First, moral education is going on all the time and this is a function of the social context. Second, the ultimate goal of moral education is mature moral behavior. Third, the school can effect general moral change only in cooperation with general economic change, parental education and provision of recreation. Fourth, although the school plays a secondary and dependant role, the teacher, the curriculum (uniquely history) and a process saturated with life are crucial to moral education. Fifth, intellectualizing is to be avoided in moral education. Sixth, dealing with real moral problems may help avoid the danger of intellectuatzing.

### Kohlberg's Proposals

Lawrence Kohlberg conceives of himself as working out the moral and educational philosophy of John Dewey. Since Kohlberg makes so many references to Dewey on the subject of moral education, some attention needs to be given to his specific claims. Once these claims are addressed, the chapter will proceed to look at Kohlberg's actual proposals for moral education.

The specific purpose of this paper is to deal with Kohlberg's actual proposals instead of his claims. Only one such claim, therefore, will be used as an example. This limitation may not be significant since, as Dr. Jeanne Pietig\* points out, Kohlberg's citation of Dewey tends to be repetitive.<sup>131</sup> Furthermore, the passage cited from Dewey by Kohlberg in this paper is by far the one most frequently referred to by Kohlberg.<sup>132</sup>

In order to adequately deal with Kohlberg's claim to implementing Dewey's philosophy, a citation from Kohlberg about Dewey with introductory and concluding comments are repeated as follows:

When stage development is taken seriously by educators as an aim, real developmental change can occur through education.

In saying this, we return to the thought of John Dewey which is at the heart of a democratic educational philosophy. According to Dewey, education was the stimulation of development through stages by providing

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\*Pietig's work is addressed to the specific claims of Kohlberg and is summarized in chapter one.

opportunities for active thought and active organization of experience.

'The only solid ground of assurance that the educator is not setting up impossible artificial aims, that he is not using ineffective and perverting methods, is a clear and definite knowledge of the normal end and focus of mental action. Only knowledge of the order and connection of the stages in the development of the physical functions can, negatively, guard against those evils, or positively, insure the full maturation and free, yet, orderly, exercises of the physical powers. Education is precisely the work of supplying the conditions which will enable the psychical functions, as they successively arise, to mature and pass into higher functions in the freest and fullest manner. This result can be secured only by a knowledge of the process of development, that is only by a knowledge of 'psychology.'

Besides a clear focus on development, an aspect of Dewey's educational thought which needs revival is that school experience must be and represent real life experience in stimulating development.<sup>133</sup>

Kohlberg is trying to establish three thoughts as emerging from Dewey with which he concurs. First, he is asserting that Dewey holds to developmental psychology. Second, he is asserting that Dewey recommended that the educational context be so contrived as to stimulate stage development. Third, he is asserting that Dewey felt that the school experience should represent real life. The remaining discussion will attempt to demonstrate that the first two assertions do not really reflect Dewey's ideas and that the third assertion, while reflecting Dewey's thought, conflicts with Kohlberg's own suggestions about moral education.

In determining whether or not Dewey actually held to developmental psychology and an educational context which encouraged it, the following arguments emerge against the idea.\* First, Kohlberg misquotes Dewey and strategically inserts the words "of development" in the last sentence. Second, the quotation which appears to be a single paragraph is actually taken from several different pages and pieced together in collage form without the usual elipses. Third, the quotation is ascribed to Dewey's article in On Education: Selected Writing when it actually comes from a work entitled The Psychology of Number written by McLellan and Dewey. Fourth, serious questions exist about Dewey's contribution to The Psychology of Number. Fifth, other works by Dewey virtually negate any connection between Dewey and developmental psychology.

These reasons raise serious if not insurmountable questions about Dewey's adherence to developmental psychology. Certainly, if he did not hold to it, he did not recommend an educational context which encouraged it. The first two assertions of Kohlberg appear to lack credible support.

Kohlberg's third assertion that Dewey felt school experience should represent real life is genuine without question to anyone who has studied Dewey. Kohlberg's specific recommendations about moral education however, conflict

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\*Special acknowledgement is given to Jeannie Pietig who documents these arguments in her paper.

with this well-known concept of Dewey. The remainder of the chapter will be dedicated to examining Kohlberg's recommendations.

The goal of moral education for Kohlberg must be kept in mind. That goal is stage six on Kohlberg's scale which reflects his notion of Platonic justice defined as equality. Consistently, Kohlberg urges an educational program toward this goal. He declares:

In the present section, we have clarified our claim that stage 6 is the most adequate exemplification of the moral, supporting it with a few of the many arguments advanced by formalist (deontological) theories.<sup>134</sup>

Moral development to stage six is ultimately dependent upon cognitive development; therefore, the context for moral education must be a highly cognitive setting. Kohlberg even says, "We are claiming instead that the moral force in personality is cognitive."<sup>135</sup> For this reason, Kohlberg is not nearly so interested in sweeping social change to bring about moral education and development. Kohlberg has focused his attention on cognition and its relationship to morality. As was pointed out in chapter four, cognitive development must precede moral development. Kohlberg is very specific when he says:

The psychological assumption that moral judgment development centrally involves cognitive development is not the assumption that this is an increased 'knowledge' of rules found outside the child, in his culture and its socialization agents. . . . By insisting on the cognitive core of moral development, we mean rather that

the distinctive characteristic of the moral is that it involves active judgement.<sup>136</sup> . . . emphasis his)

As Kohlberg pointed out, the school must promote both the cognitive and moral development of the student. The context of the school and moral education must nurture the cognitive processes.

Looking briefly at three major components of the school may also clarify Kohlberg's proposal for moral education. Some general comments about the teacher, the curriculum, and the actual process of education proposed will be examined.

Kohlberg faces the very real problem of finding teachers adequate to administer his fairly sophisticated dilemmas in a group context. Although Thomas Sobol raises the practical question of how teachers will be certified to engage in formal moral education under Kohlberg's proposal, Kohlberg virtually ignores the problem when he answers:

In a democratic school there are no moral 'experts' whose advice on moral issues should be taken by students as authoritative.

While I believe we cannot and should not train or license moral experts, I also believe all teachers should think about issues of moral education and be aware of some of the answers which have been given about these issues by educational philosophers and psychologists.<sup>137</sup>

In another article, however, Kohlberg emphasizes how critical sophisticated teachers are to his proposal when he says,

In the context of the school, the foolishness of assuming that any teacher is qualified to be a moral educator becomes evident if we ask (sic) 'Would this assumption make sense if we

were to think of moral education as something carried on between one adult and another.<sup>138</sup>

In a fairly extreme comment in the same article he asserts, "Fifth, the good can then be taught, but its teachers must in a certain sense be philosopher-kings."<sup>139</sup> For Kohlberg's system to work, by his own admission and on the face of the matter, teachers will require considerable training in group processes and the handling of moral dilemmas.

Kohlberg mentions two items around which the curriculum for moral development can and should be built. Returning to the essence of stage six, he suggests first that the curriculum must focus on the teaching of justice. Kohlberg elaborates his rationale:

Rather, I am arguing that the only constitutionally legitimate form of moral education in the schools is the teaching of justice and that the teaching of justice in the schools requires just schools.

.....

The problems as to the legitimacy of moral education in the public schools disappear, however, if the proper content of moral education is recognized to be the values of justice which themselves prohibit the imposition of beliefs of one group upon another.

.....

The school is no more committed to value neutrality than is the government or the law. The school, like the government, is an institution with a basic function of maintaining and transmitting some, but not all, of the consensual values of society. The most fundamental values of a society are termed moral, and the major moral values in our society are the values of justice.<sup>140</sup>

Once justice is determined as the central value to be

taught, Kohlberg recommends that teachers use English and Social Studies to focus the attention of students on this value. In his response to Thomas Sobol as well as other places he makes this assertion. He says,

Basically, however, the projects mentioned at the beginning of this response have integrated discussion of moral dilemmas with the subjects of regular study, especially social studies and English. Indeed, moral and civic education is a key to integrating experiences in social studies with English.<sup>141</sup>

In addition to a trained teacher focusing students attention on justice, through English and Social Studies, the process of moral education emphasizes cognitive development. Kohlberg emphasizes the cognitive side of learning because he believes this is the most potent agent for change in moral behavior. He says, "We are claiming instead that the moral force in personality is cognitive."<sup>142</sup> Growing out of this belief are his suggestions about how to proceed with moral education. He describes this process in "Education for Justice" when he says,

The first step in teaching virtue, then, is the Socratic step of creating dissatisfaction in the student about his present knowledge of the good. This we do experimentally by exposing the student to moral conflict situations for which his principles have no ready solution. Second, we expose him to disagreement and argument about these situations with his peers. Our Platonic view holds that if we inspire cognitive conflict in the student and point the way to the next step up the divided line, he will tend to see things previously invisible to him.<sup>143</sup>

Finally, we should take note of two important



features of Kohlberg's notion of moral education. First, moral education proposed by Kohlberg promotes the development of moral reasoning.<sup>144</sup> While he talks about just schools and democratic processes, any system which fails to enable children to develop moral reasoning will fail to bring them to the ultimate in moral development, stage six. Second, the process of moral education leads students to acceptance of and commitment to principles at stage six. These principles will enable people to make moral choices without regard to actual circumstances. Kohlberg says,

To count as past conventional, such ideas or terms must be used in such a way that it is clear that they have a foundation for a rational or moral individual whose commitment to a group, or society is based on prior principles.<sup>145</sup>

These prior principles which influence moral reasoning are actually an outgrowth of formalist philosophy. William K. Frankenna comments on this unique feature of stage six development:

[The formalist] maintains that there is something which may be called the moral point of view. This point of view can be described in purely formal terms - readiness to think and make practical decisions by reference to principles which one is willing to take as supreme even in light of the best available knowledge.<sup>146</sup>

In summary, the following statements review the proposals from Kohlberg on moral education discussed in this chapter.

First, the context for moral education is essentially cognitive and must nurture cognitive develop-

ment. Second, the ultimate goal of moral education is stage six acceptance of the moral principle of justice. Third, the teacher in Kohlberg's plan probably needs extensive training. Fourth, the school must transmit the value of justice, and English and Social Studies are recommended as the medium. Fifth, the process of moral education must include discussing moral dilemmas emphasizing cognitive conflict. Sixth, moral education focuses on moral reasoning with an ultimate acceptance of principles which enable one to make choices without specific references to the actual problem.

#### Summary of Differences

Lawrence Kohlberg's distinctive contributions to moral education are fundamentally different from that of John Dewey. Kohlberg focuses on cognition; Dewey focuses on social context. For Kohlberg, the school must transmit the ultimate value of justice; Dewey's school acknowledges the validity of relative values. Dewey emphasizes dealing with real problems; Kohlberg builds on hypothetical dilemmas. Dewey insists on actual facts determining moral choices; Kohlberg requires adherence to principles which function regardless of facts. The moral education proposals of these two men appear to have fundamentally different and irreconcilable differences.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Summary

This paper began by questioning the claim of Lawrence Kohlberg to be the implementer of John Dewey's philosophy. Along the way, we noted two others who have also seriously challenged this claim. Jeanne Pietig argued that contrary to Kohlberg's claim, John Dewey was not an early proponent of developmental psychology. Israela Aron persuasively contrasted the formalist philosophy of Kohlberg with Dewey's philosophy described in some quarters as functionalism and others as pragmatism. These two challenges to Kohlberg's connection to Dewey are extremely serious since Kohlberg's whole system is based on developmental psychology and formalist philosophy.

This study purposed to take a different approach to Kohlberg's claim and look at the actual concepts of Dewey and Kohlberg on moral development as reflected in their writing. Four elements within their concepts were examined. The definition and origin of morality were the focus of chapters two and three while moral behavior and moral education were the focus of chapters four and five. The con-

trasts in Dewey's and Kohlberg's concepts detailed in those chapters could hardly have been greater. Each of these contrasts would lead educational practitioners in different directions. In review, let us look briefly at each of the elements in Dewey's and Kohlberg's concepts of moral development as discussed in chapters two through five and notice the real dilemma presented to educators who would choose to follow either Dewey or Kohlberg.

If an educator chooses to discuss morality from Dewey's perspective, children will be talking about social customs and folkways which have been established within the child's social context. These values have only relative worth since Dewey rejects absolutes. The discussions, however, will focus on real activities within the social context. An educator cannot discuss morality in Dewey's terms, however, and include Kohlberg's definition. Since Kohlberg rejects cultural relativism, the educator will need to define morality for children with different terms. Following Kohlberg, children will be involved with transcendent principles and especially the principle of justice as uniquely defined by Kohlberg. Instead of focusing on real life, children will be involved with metaethics or the analysis of moral discussion. Morals can be either culturally relative or universal and transcendent, but they cannot be both at the same time. Children can be taught that morals are one or the other, but they should not be confused by being told these are the same concept or that

one concept is an outworking of the other.

Not only are these definitions of morality different, they pose different problems. If an educator follows Dewey's relativism, not only will he or she face significant resistance from parents, but they also will find it impossible to approve or disapprove of the behavior of children. Dewey is weakest at the most critical point. Even if we grant that morals are social customs, which ones should be preserved? Which ones should be discouraged? Who makes those determinations? These are the tough questions which as yet have inadequate answers in relativistic philosophies.

On the other hand, if an educator follows Kohlberg, the morality of justice is clearly in focus. While the catch word "justice" may be popular with parents, the rationale for justice in Kohlberg is weak. The educator will know "what" but will struggle to find a sufficient "why". Kohlberg argues that justice is developmental. If justice is developmental, it is also metaethical, abstract, and detached from normative ethics. Children and young people may be able to discuss moral dilemmas and still be deficient in solving real moral problems. Educators will therefore be talking about different definitions of morality and will face significantly different problems.

If educators are persuaded that morals are derived from the social context as Dewey argues rather than known

all along at a low level, as Kohlberg argues, the attention of the teacher will be directed to different concerns. If morals are derived from the social context, the teacher should give considerable attention to the social context of the school. At the same time, the teacher should realize that morals are acquired through the greater economic context and more particularly the context of the home. The teacher can contribute to moral education but not compensate for a defective society. Teachers should experience some consolation for this.

In contrast, if morality is somewhat innate and must be brought to the surface through cognitive exercises, the teacher and the school certainly should take the lead in moral development. What other place in our society is so devoted to cognitive exercises? The school and the teacher are uniquely suited to this task, unlike other forces which tend to be largely unconscious or appeal to obedience and duty rather than logic and reason. These contrasts in educator concerns exist because fundamental differences in Dewey's and Kohlberg's description of moral origins exist.

If the educator turns to influencing moral behavior, the same discrepancy between Dewey and Kohlberg reappears. The educator who follows Dewey will surely give considerable attention to self-image since moral behavior is an outworking of the interest possessed by the individual. Moreover, the educator must abandon all plans to develop individuals who function on the basis of some universal principle. Nor

will the follower of Dewey be allowed to depreciate human behavior as purely motivated by self-interest. Instead, attention must be given to the essentially egocentric nature of moral motives so wholesome egos will develop and produce wholesome behavior.

The educator under Kohlberg's system will be leading children toward more principled ways of thinking about morality in hopes that moral behavior will emerge. It is true that Kohlberg is supposed to be describing a natural developmental process within man. If Kohlberg is correct, Dewey clearly missed the point and Kohlberg's principle of justice is the supreme and ultimate test of moral thinking. Educators who follow Kohlberg should appraise parents of the fact that, as of the present, a great deal of uncertainty remains about the link between moral thinking and moral behavior. However, if Kohlberg and Plato are right about those who know the good doing the good, the educator's task will focus on this knowledge aim.

Finally, the educator who follows Dewey must again and again bring the discussions of moral issues to bear on the actual problems of life being faced by the student or the society. While the teacher under Dewey's plan must develop intelligence in the student, everywhere a student should turn from the pursuit of purely abstract reason to the application of mental powers by addressing real problems.

The educator who implements Kohlberg's proposals must deal with hypothetical situations. Actual problems are not Kohlberg's concern because the student will be led to an ultimate commitment to the principle of justice. Since abstract rational powers are necessary to move to stage six, dealing with real problems is secondary.

Interestingly, Dewey warns against the very thing Kohlberg's system of necessity focuses on. Dewey is very concerned about the tendency of youth to intellectualize, dealing only with the hypothetical, making decisions without having to think about or cope with the consequences. Intellectualizing is the focal point of Kohlberg's concern with metaethics. What real moral value exists for students who know how to conduct moral discussions? Kohlberg's system never really helps young people deal with the actual problems they face day to day. Young people's attention is distracted to the abstract and hypothetical. Kohlberg's plan for moral development seems to accentuate the tendency of youth to intellectualize about moral issues rather than solve them.

Dewey's and Kohlberg's differences appear in their approaches to psychology and philosophy as well as in their actual concepts of moral development. Why are these men so different in their concepts? Both men are concerned about morality, both men are concerned about education, and both men are concerned about democratic processes. While a direct answer to the question of "why" is probably not



possible, the following speculation is offered as a possible and probably partial explanation.

John Dewey and Lawrence Kohlberg have approached their studies from totally different perspectives. John Dewey begins with a philosophy of life. Although his philosophy has inadequacies and weaknesses, Dewey attempted to explain life in general as best he could. Within that life view, Dewey explained education and morality. Kohlberg on the other hand, begins with some very specialized and highly technical data about one part of the life of man, his moral development. After examining this very thin slice of life, he extrapolates a philosophy which he sometimes calls Kantian, sometimes Piagetian, sometimes Deweyan, and sometimes Platonic. Even Kohlberg strains at blending the views of this quartet into a single unified philosophy. The striking contrast between Dewey and Kohlberg is their starting place. Dewey begins with an overview of life from which he extracts some details like morality. Kohlberg seems to begin with some details about morality from which he tries to build a philosophy of life.

If this conjecture is true, perhaps there is a lesson for educators of today and tomorrow. Much of modern graduate school education is focused on research into the myriad of details that make up the education process. Much attention is being given to smaller and smaller pieces of information. Less and less time is being spent on helping

educators forge a life philosophy from which to draw their educational practice. Teachers receive precious little training in the foundations department of colleges of education. Consequently, educators can naively adopt some Skinnerian practice without questioning the ethics of manipulation. They may also adopt a Rogerian approach without struggling with relativism. They could also adopt Kohlberg's moral development without knowing where it fits into their philosophy of life and education. If educational research continues to focus on the many details of educational process, then more emphasis should also be placed on philosophical foundations so teachers will not lack the philosophical expertise to put the many pieces together into a comprehensive world and life view.

Two specific recommendations are suggested on the basis of this paper. First, claims about philosophical, psychological, or conceptual alignment of ideas need to be scrutinized much more carefully. Otherwise, educators who think they are being faithful to Dewey or some other educational leader may actually be guiding students in opposite directions unwittingly.

Second, Kohlberg's moral education programs should be put on hold unless better explanations accompany them. Parents should be informed that Kohlberg's program is really aimed at improving moral thinking which hopefully will influence moral behavior in the young or assist the young in solving the problems they face. Kohlberg proposes a

basically abstract approach to moral discussions. Even high sounding words like justice and stage six principles may not really help these young people deal more effectively with life. They really need some operational values that will enable them to make good choices.

Educators should not be persuaded by "intellectual heft" if it does not exist. If Kohlberg's plan is adopted, it should not be because administrators and educators are led to believe it is "warmed over Dewey." Kohlberg should and must take either the credit or the criticism for his own research and proposals.

One final thought, perhaps education should take Dewey's counsel for moral education seriously and remind the nation that moral education is essentially done by parents in the greater context of our economy. In the field of moral education, the school may simply not be able to compensate for an inadequate job of moral training in the home or a defective society. Furthermore, our moral education efforts might be better directed toward parents. This proposal not only would fit nicely with the recent emphasis on life-long learning and community education but would truly be "warmed over Dewey."

## APPENDIX A\*

## PIAGET'S 2 STAGES OF MORALITY

STAGE 1: (up to age 7) Morality  
imposed from without

STAGE 2: (age 7 on) Morality  
develops from within  
as a result of social  
contact

## KOHLBERG'S 6 STAGES OF MORALITY

## PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL

STAGE 1: "Good" results in  
praise, agreement  
with authority.

STAGE 2: "Good" is what  
satisfies a need.

## CONVENTIONAL LEVEL

STAGE 3: "Good" results in  
being liked.

STAGE 4: "Good" is doing  
one's duty.

## POSTCONVENTIONAL LEVEL

STAGE 5: "Good" is arrived at  
by consensus.

STAGE 6: "Good" is deter-  
mined by individual  
ethical principles

\*Steven Owen et.al., Educational Psychology: An Introduction,  
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1979) p. 119.

## APPENDIX B\*

## DEFINITION OF MORAL STAGES

## I. Preconventional level

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right and in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you

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\*Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought:" in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, T. Mischel, Ed. (New York: Academic Press, Inc. New York, 1971), p. 164-165.

scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

## II. Conventional level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy - nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention - "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice".

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

## III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and applica-

tion apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience to accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal

principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.



## END NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Robert L. Cooke, Philosophy, Education and Certainty(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1940), p. 237.

<sup>2</sup>Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy(New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1926), p. 566.

<sup>3</sup>Frederick Ely and C. F. Arrowood, Development of Modern Education (New York: Prentice Hall, 1934), pp. 855-6.

<sup>4</sup>Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Concepts of Developmental Psychology as the Central Guide to Education" in M. Reynolds (Ed.). Psychology and the Process of Schooling in the Next Decade. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Audio Visual Extension, 1971), p.13.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View". In T Sizer (Ed.), Moral Education: Five Lectures.(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 59.

<sup>7</sup>R. Freeman Butts, Public Education in the United States (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1978), p.394-5.

<sup>8</sup>Carole Findlay, "Humanistic Education: The Basis in Developmental Theory" Colorado Journal of Educational Research 17.2 (1978), p. 23.

<sup>9</sup>James Rest, "Developmental Psychology As a Guide To Value Education: A Review of 'Kohlbergian' Programs" Review of Educational Research 44, 2 (1974) p. 241.

<sup>10</sup>Both Jeanne Pietig and Israla Aron question the approach to education proposed by Kohlberg. They doubt that Kohlberg's proposal is based on Dewey's philosophy or psychology.

<sup>11</sup>Jeanne Pietig, "A Critique of Lawrence Kohlberg's Interpretation of John Dewey and Progressivism", Ph. D. dissertation for University of Minnesota (1978) p. 125.

<sup>12</sup>Israela Ettenberg Aron, "Moral Philosophy and Moral Education II. The Formalist Tradition and the Deweyan Alternative" School Review Vol. 85 No. 4, pp. 513-34.

<sup>13</sup>Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Fifth ed. (1942), s.v. "Moral".

<sup>14</sup>John Dewey uses 'moral' and 'ethical' interchangeably. The citations that follow in the paper document this usage.

<sup>15</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Teaching Ethics in the High School", in "The Early Works of John Dewey: 1882-1898, Vol. 4, 1893-1894: Early Essays and "The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus", Ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971, p. 56.

<sup>16</sup>John Dewey, "Moral Theory and Practice", In The Early Works of John Dewey: 1882-1898, Vol. 3, 1889-1892: Early Essays and "Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics", Ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971, p. 99.

<sup>17</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922, p. 75.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 319.

<sup>19</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, New York: Free Press of Macmillan Co., 1944, p. 357.

<sup>20</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 278.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 172-180.

<sup>22</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, Reconstruction in Philosophy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1948, p. 177.

<sup>23</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Moral Theory and Practice", p. 98-99.

<sup>24</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 75.

<sup>25</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Moral Theory and Practice", p. 105.

<sup>26</sup>Lawrence Kohlberg and R. Kramer, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development", Human Development 12 (1969) p. 93.

<sup>27</sup>Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Claim To Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgement", The Journal of Philosophy, 70;18 (October, 1973) p. 632.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p.360.

<sup>29</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "From Is To Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development", Cognitive Development and Epistemology. T. Mischel, ed. (New York: Academic Press, Inc. 1971) p. 165.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 178.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 174.

33 \_\_\_\_\_, "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgement", p. 641.

34 \_\_\_\_\_, "From Is to Ought:", p. 232.

35 Ibid., p. 220.

36 Ibid., p. 221-222.

37 Ibid., p. 216-217.

38 Aron, "Moral Philosophy and Moral Education II.", p. 517.

39 Ibid., p. 519-520.

40 Ibid., p. 521-522.

41 John Dewey, "Ethical Principles Underlying Education" In The Early Works of John Dewey: 1882-1898. Vol. 5 Jo Ann Baydston ed. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972) p. 77.

42 \_\_\_\_\_, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 89.

43 \_\_\_\_\_, "Ethical Principles Underlying Education", p. 77.

44 \_\_\_\_\_, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 91.

45 \_\_\_\_\_, "Ethical Principles Underlying Education", p. 77.

46 \_\_\_\_\_, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 105.

47 Ibid., p. 93.

48 Ibid., p. 98.

49 Ibid., p. 58.

50 Ibid., p. 75.

51 Ibid., p. 82.

- <sup>52</sup>Dewey, "Ethical Principles Underlying Education",  
p. 78.
- <sup>53</sup>John Dewey, "Character Training for Youth" Recreation  
29:, p. 139.
- <sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 142.
- <sup>55</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>56</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>57</sup>Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought", p. 155.
- <sup>58</sup>Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral  
Philosopher". Psychology Today, 7 (1968) p. 25.
- <sup>59</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>60</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "From Is to Ought:", p. 173.
- <sup>61</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "The Child as a Moral Philosopher",  
p. 30.
- <sup>62</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "From Is to Ought:", p. 171.
- <sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 155.
- <sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 163.
- <sup>65</sup>Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice:", p. 57.
- <sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 58.
- <sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 59.
- <sup>68</sup>Jeanne Pietig challenges Kohlberg on this very issue  
in chapter one of her work.
- <sup>69</sup>Kohlberg, "Education for Justice:", p. 59.
- <sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 80.
- <sup>71</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "From Is To Ought:", p. 232.
- <sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 187.
- <sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 184.

<sup>74</sup>Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan, "The Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Post-conventional World", Daedalus 100:4 (1971) p. 1058.

<sup>75</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "The Child as a Moral Philosopher", p. 26.

<sup>76</sup>Kohlberg and Gilligan, "The Adolescent as a Philosopher", p. 1059.

<sup>77</sup>Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral Philosopher", p. 29.

<sup>78</sup>William P. Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is to Ought'", available in reprint form from Harvard attached to Lawrence Kohlberg's article "From Is to Ought". p. 277.

<sup>79</sup>John Dewey, Democracy and Education, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 1916) p. 349.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., p. 350.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 349.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 350.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 351.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 350.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 351.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., p. 352.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., p. 354.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., p. 355.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., p. 356.

<sup>99</sup>Aron, "Moral Philosophy and Moral Education II.",  
p.519

<sup>100</sup>Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is To Ought'",  
p. 284.

<sup>101</sup>Paul A. Wagner, "Kohlberg, Science and  
Indoctrination", A Paper presented to A. E. S. A. in Nashville,  
Tennessee in November 1982.p. 9.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p.11.

<sup>103</sup>Kohlberg, "Education for Justice:", p. 72.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>107</sup>Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought:" p. 218.

<sup>108</sup>Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral Philosopher", p. 30.

<sup>109</sup>Kohlberg, "The Claim To Moral Adequacy of a Highest  
Stage of Moral Judgement." p. 641.

<sup>110</sup>John Gibbs, Lawrence Kohlberg, Anne Colby, Betsy  
Speicher-Dubin, "The Domain and Development of Moral  
Judgement: A Theory and a Method of Assessment", Available  
in reprint form from Harvard University (1976) p. 40.

<sup>111</sup>Kohlberg, "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgement", p. 632.

<sup>112</sup>Kohlberg, "Education for Justice:" p. 57.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>114</sup>Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought:", p. 232.

<sup>115</sup>Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is to Ought'", p. 278.

<sup>116</sup>Gibbs, Kohlberg, Colby and Speicher-Dubin, "The Domain and Development of Moral Judgement:", p. 40.

<sup>117</sup>Dewey, "Ethical Principles Underlying Education", p. 78.

<sup>118</sup>Dewey, "The Chaos in Moral Training", p. 114.

<sup>119</sup>Dewey, "Character Training For Youth", p. 142.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid., pp. 139-140.

<sup>123</sup>Dewey, "Ethical Principles Underlying Education", pp. 60-61.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>126</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Teaching Ethics in the High School", p. 59.

<sup>127</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Ethical Principles Underlying Education", pp. 70-73.

<sup>128</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "The Chaos in Moral Training", p. 117.



<sup>129</sup>Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>130</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Teaching Ethics in the High School",  
p. 57.

<sup>131</sup>Pietig, "A Critique of Lawrence Kohlberg's  
Interpretation of John Dewey and Progressivism", p. 26.

<sup>132</sup>Ibid.

<sup>133</sup>Kohlberg, "The Adolescent as a Philosopher", p.  
1083.

<sup>134</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "From Is to Ought", p. 218.

<sup>135</sup>Ibid., p. 230.

<sup>136</sup>Ibid., p. 185.

<sup>137</sup>Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Education: A Response to  
Thomas Sobol", Educational Leadership (October, 1980), p. 22.

<sup>138</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Education for Justice:", p. 65.

<sup>139</sup>Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>140</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>141</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Moral Education: A Response",  
p. 21.

<sup>142</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "From Is to Ought:" p. 230.

<sup>143</sup>\_\_\_\_\_, "Education For Justice:" p. 82.

<sup>144</sup>Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is to Ought'",  
p. 284.

<sup>145</sup>Kohlberg, "The Domain and Development of Moral  
Judgement", p. 24.

<sup>146</sup>William K. Frankena, "Recent Conceptions of Morality" in Morality and the Language of Conduct Eds. Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Naknikian (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963), p. 8.

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