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WIELDING THE PEN AS A SWORD: THE RADICAL JOURNALIST, I. F.  
STONE

*The University of Oklahoma*

PH.D. 1983

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

WIELDING THE PEN AS A SWORD:  
THE RADICAL JOURNALIST, I. F. STONE

A DISSERTATION

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ROBERT CHARLES COTTRELL

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WIELDING THE PEN AS A SWORD:  
THE RADICAL JOURNALIST, I. F. STONE

APPROVED BY

Paul H. Gledhill

Harvey M. Kaye

Robert S. Grossfeld

Samuel W. Lenz

David E. Ross

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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Finally, as always, most of all to Isa, because she means so much to me.

The only absolute value I would affirm  
is freedom of the mind; without it  
there cannot be social justice, which  
is our duty to others.

I. F. Stone

## PREFACE

Over the course of his lengthy journalistic career, I. F. Stone has remained a proponent of American radicalism, an advocate of democratic socialism. He has long believed that socialistic measures could help to modernize predominantly agricultural and economically underdeveloped societies such as Czarist Russia and Kuomintang China. Yet like Karl Marx, Stone has argued that genuine socialism could most easily develop in those nations that possessed a tradition of political freedom. Indeed, Stone has postulated that without its requisite corollary, democracy, socialism can never be fully implemented. Thus he, unlike a number of American and European leftists, has refused to dismiss civil liberties as "bourgeois" freedoms, declaring instead that they provide the foundation for a decent social order through their protection of unpopular groups and ideas. He has consistently maintained that only through the full incorporation of civil liberties and through the extension of civil rights to oppressed minority groups, can a truly humane society emerge. Such a society, Stone has repeatedly argued, also demands a degree of planning and economic democracy to prevent boom and bust cycles,



vast inequities, and the wielding of overwhelming economic and political power by a tiny sector of the populace. Describing himself as both a Marxist and a Jeffersonian, he has doggedly argued that a "synthesis of socialism and freedom" is the most urgent task of the modern era. And, along with insisting upon economic and political democracy, he has declared that if a nation does not base its foreign policy upon international cooperation, adventurism abroad and militarism at home will crush the democratic spirit.<sup>1</sup>

In addition to these concepts of democratic socialism and anti-imperialism, Stone has discussed other ideas and issues dear to the American left, while working for a series of liberal and left-wing newspapers and journals. Yet he was officially tied to a political organization, Norman Thomas' Socialist Party, for only a brief period, and has never approved of the sectarianism, dogmatism, and fratricidal conflicts so endemic on the left side of the American political spectrum. During the 1920s, a time considered an early nadir for the twentieth century left, Stone praised the Wilsonian concept of a League of Nations and supported such progressive candidates as Robert La Follette and Thomas. With the advent of the Great Depression, which reinvigorated reform and radical ranks, the journalist condemned the Hoover approach to the nation's economic woes, and served as a strong, although often

highly critical supporter of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. Like many leftists, Stone favored a Popular Front approach in both domestic and foreign affairs throughout most of the depression decade. But along with other non-authoritarian leftists, he pushed FDR for greater reforms and for a stronger, early response to the fascist threat abroad. Hoping for extensive social and economic change and a peaceful world order as the end of World War II approached, Stone was soon forced to condemn the anti-Communist phobia of the post-war years. In response to the red scare antics of Truman's America, Stone backed the Progressive Party candidacy of Henry Wallace, and passionately defended the civil liberties of all Americans, including such generally disliked groups as the Trotskyists and the Communists. He refused to adopt either the anti-Communist approach undertaken by such staunch leftists and liberals as socialist leader Thomas and Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union, or the blind genuflecting to external events characteristic of many tied to the American Communist Party. Stone also retained his focus upon U.S. activities overseas, castigating his nation's tendency to align with reactionary forces against the proliferating national liberation movements. The culminating development of American cold warriorism proved to be the bloody and brutal Vietnam War, and Stone attacked the

United States' involvement from the outset, arguing that it was the most horrific example of American imperialism. At the same time, he reaffirmed his call for domestic change, strongly supporting the cry for black equality and the exhortations of those who called for structural transformation of the American social and economic order. While the left appeared once again to weaken as the civil rights and antiwar movements dissipated during the 1970s, Stone continued to uphold the progressive banner, lambasting the efforts to right economic ills at the expense of the downtrodden, warning that another red scare might unfold as economic difficulties worsened, and bemoaning persistent U.S. support for dictatorial regimes.

While his perceptiveness about war and peace, civil liberties, civil rights, and economic deprivation has made him one of the most astute chroniclers of American foreign and domestic affairs during much of the twentieth century, I. F. Stone has also been an important historical figure in American journalistic and left-wing circles. His radical writings graced the pages of some of the most influential progressive publications of the 1930s and 1940s, including the then left-liberal New Republic and the Nation. A journalist for over half a century, Stone also served as chief editorialist for the country's oldest newspaper, the New York Post, which was possibly the country's leading liberal daily throughout the heyday of the New Deal, and as a reporter and columnist for the

experimental leftist papers PM, the New York Star, and the New York Daily Compass from 1940-1952. While working for PM in 1946, he became the first reporter to travel with the Jewish underground, the Haganah, to Palestine. But his later formation of I. F. Stone's Weekly brought him his greatest journalistic fame, as the newsletter provided a model of independent radical journalism during the McCarthy and Vietnam eras and served as a progenitor for the investigatory and underground publications which abounded during the latter period. In addition, Stone worked with left-wing and liberal groups to counter the red-baiters and to denounce the premises of the Cold War.<sup>2</sup>

A firm anti-anti-Communist, he joined other independent leftists at the zenith of McCarthyism to oppose the weakened civil libertarian stance of the A.C.L.U. and to establish the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. In the mid and late 1950s, Stone spoke in support of the anti-nuclear arms movement, and damned the seemingly blind anti-Communist foreign policy of the United States. As the Indochina War flared, he participated in the anti-war cause; in fact, a speech he gave at a national meeting of the Students for a Democratic Society is credited with helping to focus the attention of that leading New Left organization on the Vietnam War. Such involvement, along with the Weekly's insightful recording of American domestic failings and U.S. foreign policy disasters, eventually resulted in international acclaim for a man who was once

considered a pariah in respectable journalistic and political circles. Illness was to force Stone to stop publication of his journal in late 1971, but he soon became editor of the influential New York Review of Books, wrote editorials for a number of key newspapers and magazines, and began a study of Western freedom.

## FOOTNOTES

### PREFACE

<sup>1</sup>I. F. Stone, "Izzy on Izzy: I. F. Stone Interviews I. F. Stone at Seventy," The New York Times Magazine, 22 January 1978, sect. 6, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup>Stone, "Notes on Closing, but Not on Farewell," I. F. Stone's Weekly\* (hereinafter referred to as Bi-Weekly) 19 (December, 1971): 4.

\*I. F. Stone published his newsletter from 1953-1971. Generally printed weekly, Stone's journal was called I. F. Stone's Weekly from 1953-January 1963, and from January 1964-December 1969. The independent product was a bi-weekly from February 4, 1963-January 6, 1964, and from January 22, 1968-December 1971. It was named I. F. Stone's Bi-Weekly during that 1963-64 span, and throughout 1970 and 1971. For the sake of uniformity, the newsletter will be referred to as the Weekly throughout the text and in the footnotes.

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WIELDING THE PEN AS A SWORD:  
THE RADICAL JOURNALIST, I. F. STONE

CHAPTER I

THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN RADICAL, 1907-1933

We are communists. But our communism is not that of the authoritarian school: it is anarchist Communism, Communism without government, free Communism. It is a synthesis of the two chief aims pursued by humanity since the dawn of its history--economic freedom and political freedom.

Prince Petr Kropotkin

An oppressed class is the vital condition for every society founded on the antagonism of classes. The emancipation of the oppressed class thus implies necessarily the creation of a new society.

Karl Marx

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonism, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

Karl Marx

The radical journalist, I. F. Stone\*, was born

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\*For the sake of consistency, the name I. F. Stone will be used throughout this dissertation.



Isidor Feinstein in Philadelphia on 24 December 1907, the son of Russian Jewish immigrants Bernard and Katherine Feinstein. His father, a struggling middle-class businessman, was a dry goods merchant and realtor in Haddonfield, New Jersey. It was not easy for the small, bespectacled, gnome-like Jewish lad, who wandered into the woods to devour poetry and to dream about "willowy . . . six foot WASP beauties" who would not cast a glance at him, to grow up in an overwhelmingly gentile community. "Personally I felt I was Galahad, but I was Isidor."<sup>1</sup>

Although his parents were little concerned about politics and undoubtedly shared the Republican philosophy of most of their neighbors, young Izzy quickly displayed an interest in public and international affairs and early expressed a desire to become a reporter. In fact, Stone later asserted: "I always felt I was sort of born a radical," and approvingly quoted the old adage that "everyone is either a liberal or a conservative. What you are, you are born, your political attitudes are pretty much born with you." While a young boy, Izzy once had a dream involving the poor of Philadelphia's waterfront slums. He awoke from the dream deeply troubled, and his remembrance of the vision provided the beginning of his feeling

that a newspaperman ought to be a kind of cross between Galahad and William Randolph Hearst, because Hearst at his best, had a great capacity for . . . reaching a wide public, and not just talking to himself, and he was quite a populist and a radical in an earlier age.<sup>2</sup>

The radicalization of Izzy continued, abetted by the appeal of certain political figures, his own prolific reading, and an early attempt at journalism. The idealism of Woodrow Wilson excited him, particularly the president's call for an international body of countries, a League of Nations. Martin Eden, by the flamboyant socialist Jack London, furthered Izzy's passage down the progressive road by introducing him to Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. He then asked to borrow Spencer's First Principles from an artist, who spoke to Izzy's mother concerning the request, inquiring whether the youngster might be an "infidel." But Mrs. Feinstein misunderstood, thinking that the woman was querying if her son were an "invalid," and the loan was made. A study of Spencer and an awareness of vast suffering caused young Izzy to question what kind of a god would permit such impoverishment and sorrow, and he became a confirmed atheist.<sup>3</sup>

To impart his views to others, Izzy, at the age of fourteen, began publication of a newspaper, The Progress. An amazing precocity and the radical journalism for which Stone later became known, were prominently displayed in the little paper. In The Progress, Izzy supported the nullification of World War I debts provided that debtor nations agreed to a quarter century moratorium on the European arms race, and he praised the League of Nations. He condemned the yellow peril campaign of the former radical publisher William Randolph Hearst, and castigated the anti-evolutionary stance of William Jennings Bryan,

charging that the old reformer was a "modern Torquemada." The regressive ideas of Hearst and Bryan both seemed alien in a rationalist era and were antithetical to the "immutable law of progress." To Izzy, such thinking belonged to "the Middle Ages when free thinkers, philosophers, and Jews were considered the best fuel for bonfires (there was never lack of fuel)." The Progress enjoyed commercial success as the youthful entrepreneur solicited subscriptions and displayed advertisements for local merchants. But the paper closed after three monthly issues when Izzy's father, returning from an extended convalescence, saw that his son's schoolwork was suffering.<sup>4</sup>

Both Izzy's inadequate academic performance and his love for journalism remained constant despite the termination of his first independent venture. The youngster proceeded to work for the Haddonfield Gazette, a weekly paper, and covered sports for the Camden Post-Telegram, notwithstanding his ignorance of the subject. Then one day, the publisher J. David Stern stopped by the Feinstein store, told the aspiring young reporter, "I've heard about you," and offered him a job on the Camden Courier. Stern believed, as Izzy already did, that the fourth estate should "fight for cause" and strive to influence public opinion and governmental actions. Through diligence and the ability to create news, Izzy proved to be "a natural-born reporter. I really was a real bird dog

right from the beginning."<sup>5</sup>

As Izzy's journalistic experience increased, so too did his difficulties in school. Out of a high school class of fifty-two, he ranked forty-ninth. Unable to get into Harvard, Izzy enrolled at Pennsylvania, a university with an open enrollment policy. He continued the journalism trade, laboring for a variety of newspapers, but a heavy workload eventually forced him to leave the University. Toiling fulltime at the Philadelphia Inquirer, Izzy performed the tasks of rewriting, copy desk editing, and headline writing, all jobs normally undertaken by highly experienced newsmen. Undoubtedly another factor which induced him to withdraw from classes in his junior year was his distaste for structured studies. A philosophy major, Izzy considered the possibility of university teaching. But except for two esteemed philosophy professors, he despised "the smell of a college faculty." As he remembered, "the few islands of greatness seemed to be washed by seas of pettiness and mediocrity." The hard-boiled newsroom seemed infinitely more appealing.<sup>6</sup>

His disdain for cultural norms also encouraged him to bid farewell to the University. Later he noted that he had been "a New Lefty before there was a New Left. I didn't cut my hair, tie my ties or believe in college degrees." Rather, he had "believed you shouldn't do anything unless it was spontaneous and genuine." Such attraction for cultural distinctiveness undoubtedly influenced his short-lived performance, following his

withdrawal from the University, as drama critic for the Courier. After roasting a number of Philadelphia plays, Izzy was banned from entering the area's major theatres.<sup>7</sup>

Despite his departure from Penn, Izzy persisted with his self-education. An avid reader, he had long "devoured" literary works, philosophical studies, and historical writings. His favorite authors included Sappho, Heraclitus, Lucretius, Cervantes, Milton, Marlowe, Gibbon, Keats, Shelly, Wordsworth, Hardy, Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, Dickinson, Melville, Crane, Sandburg, and Beard. Radical treatises also appealed to the young journalist, and one of his early favorites was Prince Petr Kropotkin's anarchist classic, The Conquest of Bread. The "vision of a non-coercive, non-police state, voluntary free community society " enthralled Izzy, who early deemed himself a Communist-anarchist. Nearly a half century later, Stone continued to praise Kropotkin's Communist-anarchism as "the noblest human ideal."<sup>8</sup>

Marxist critiques also stirred Izzy, including Karl Marx's A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Friedrich Engels' Socialism: Scientific and Utopian, Vladimir Lenin's "Three Sources and Three Constituent Parts of Marxism," and Nicolas Bukharin's Historical Materialism. The attractiveness of Marxism helped to reinforce the radicalization of the budding reporter, who was determined not to accede to "those stale surrenders which are called the practical realities of the world." He joined the Socialist Party, serving as a New Jersey

State Executive Committee member before he was able to vote.<sup>8</sup>

Izzy's political consciousness quickly embroiled him in a pair of conflicts involving great issues of the period. Covering Camden for Stern's Courier, Stone saw that the large Italian population of the region supported fascism following Benito Mussolini's rise to power and his establishment of the first fascist state in the mid-1920s. The Camden Courier was a strongly anti-fascist paper, and Stone was an early Popular Fronter who called for an alliance of leftists and liberals to oppose the threat of fascism. In 1927, he attended a Rotary Club gathering in Camden and heard a Penn professor sing the virtues of fascist Italy, including the running of the trains on time. Izzy "got so goddamned mad" that he stood up at the press table and denounced the speaker. He asked the professor why there had been no mention of the ugly underside of fascism, including the murder of the socialist legislator Giacomo Matteotti; the emergence of Mussolini's shock troops, the squadristi; and the destruction of the labor unions.<sup>10</sup>

While that incident little affected his position on the Courier, another episode involving the Sacco and Vanzetti trial forced Stone's resignation. Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, a pair of Italian-born anarchists, had been arrested in 1920 during the height of the post-war red scare and charged with robbery and murder. With

neither their guilt nor innocence established at an unfair trial presided over by a prejudiced jurist, the two radical immigrants received large support from many liberal and radical elements. Others, however, believed that the issue revolved around radical efforts to uproot the base of law and order. They insisted that the accused posed such a threat to society that they must be sentenced to die. Eventually, to the dismay of many, Sacco and Vanzetti were executed. Quite upset about the case, Izzy wanted to venture to Boston to cover the denouement for the Courier. Although the paper was the only one in the Camden-Philadelphia area which supported the anarchists, the city editor refused to assign him to the story. An angered Stone stormed out of the Courier office, put an extra pair of socks in his pocket, and hitchhiked up north. Shortly after reaching the metropolis, he learned that a last minute stay had delayed the executions.<sup>11</sup>

Too embarrassed to return to the paper a suppliant for his old job, Izzy continued hitchhiking, ending up in Bellows Falls, Vermont, where a friend lived. Unable to find employment on a farm, he returned to Philadelphia and went to the Inquirer searching for work. Izzy asked the New Jersey editor if the newspaper could employ a good man. "I could use half a dozen," bristled the editor. Stone retorted, "Well, here's one," and he was hired.<sup>12</sup>

In the following year, Stone became directly involved in an effort to revive the generally moribund American

left. Differences over American entrance into World War I and concerning the applicability of the Bolshevik example in the United States, and the red scare antics of governmental entities had caused the once potent Socialist Party to splinter, weaken, and collapse. Heavy-handed practices by state and business forces had also devastated the radical labor union, the Industrial Workers of the World. For a brief period, Communism had seemed to be the wave of the future for the American left. But the Communists split into three branches, until orders from the new Russian-dominated International called for the formation of a single American Communist organization. Repression, schismatic developments, and the obeisance displayed toward the Soviet Union quickly negated the early potential of the American Communist Party. The next major movement on the left came when railway unions, socialists, farmer-labor groups, and insurgent Republicans formed the Conference for Progressive Political Action or the Progressive Party in 1922. Two years later, Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette ran for the presidency on the Progressive ticket and received over sixteen percent of the vote.<sup>13</sup>

Stone supported La Follette and the Progressive Party platform which called for public control of the railways and of waterpower, termination of the electoral college, a national initiative and a national referendum, and anti-monopoly measures. While many hoped that the



CPPA could eventually match the success of the new British Labor Party, La Follette opposed a permanent third party, and his death in June, 1925 left the movement without its greatest attraction. But as this reform effort disintegrated, and despite the apparent rightward drift of the nation during the period, the pacifist and former clergyman Norman Thomas determined to revive the Socialist Party in the 1928 presidential campaign. The socialist platform demanded public works projects to curb unemployment, with wages and hours to be determined by labor organizations; federal unemployment coverage and social security, to be financed through taxation of businesses; and an internationalist and pacifist foreign policy, including disarmament, American entrance into the League of Nations, independence for the Philippines, and recognition of the Soviet Union. Aligned with the socialist local in Camden, Izzy worked as a volunteer publicist for Thomas. Now considering himself basically a socialist, Stone greatly admired Thomas because of the native radicalism of the socialist leader. Sounding like neither a sectarian nor an academic "with a lot of gibberish," Thomas displayed "a very engaging . . . and outgoing, handsome personality." Disavowing abstractions and stereotypes, Thomas "had a wonderful way of putting socialism in American terms as a pragmatic answer to specific American problems."<sup>14</sup>

Despite the attractiveness of Thomas, the young "pre-Depression radical" shortly moved away from direct

party affiliation because of the prevalence of left-wing divisiveness. Izzy had also come to believe that an independent journalist should not be directly tied to any political party. He desired to aid the disadvantaged and the oppressed, and to support good causes without fear of leftist infighting. Although the Thomas effort seemed modestly to reinvigorate the American Socialist Party, Izzy redirected his talents toward the field of journalism. Returning to the Camden Courier, he was placed on rewrite, and "worked like hell." He could easily transform the morning headlines to produce the appearance of a new article for the evening edition. Because of his continued concern for public affairs, he dabbled in editorial writing on the side. The paper contained a one-man editorial page, but Stone managed to write a few columns, and even substituted for the vacationing editorialist at one point.<sup>15</sup>

In 1929, Izzy knew that he was going to marry Esther M. Roisman, whom he had met two years earlier "on a blind date and a borrowed dollar." Urging him to socialize more, Esther went dancing with the "terrible wallflower" during their courtship. On their moonlit strolls, however, Izzy would analyze holding companies. Believing that his upcoming marriage necessitated a salary hike, he went to the managing editor of the Courier and delivered an ultimatum of a five dollar raise. Already making forty dollars a week, not an insubstantial salary at the time, Stone received the increase and continued to push for

editorial work.<sup>16</sup>

He also maintained a running battle with the city editor and with publisher Stern over assignments. Wearying of the perpetual turmoil, Stern finally transferred Stone to the Philadelphia Record, another paper in his chain. Still desiring to write editorials, Izzy produced one and placed it on the publisher's desk one day in 1931. An irate Stern, furious at the bickering of Stone and at the young reporter's attempts to muscle in on his own editorial territory, proved to be "very nasty" about the piece. Izzy was quite shaken up, and thought, "You son-of-a-bitch, I'm going to keep pestering you until you make me editorial writer." But when Stone went to the newsroom on the following day, he found that his editorial career for a nationally known newspaper had already begun. It was customary for the Record staff to magnify one editorial and place it in the office window, and there Izzy saw his writing on display when he arrived for work.<sup>17</sup>

The ecstatic Stone received an advancement a couple of months later when Stern fired his chief editorialist. The Record was in economic straits because of the Great Depression, and Stern had been forced to reduce the staff and staff salaries. Thus at the age of twenty-three Izzy Stone became one of the youngest head editorial writers in the country working for a major paper. Within a short time, Stone's salary nearly doubled. "It was a

lot in those days," but "I did a lot of work." Many newspapermen during those hard times were not nearly as fortunate as Izzy. Because of reduced wages and "payless paydays," journalists urged formation of a union. Spearheaded by Heywood Broun, the famed columnist for the New Republic, disgruntled newsmen established the American Newspaper Guild. Included among the founding members were George Seldes, A. J. Liebling, and Stone.<sup>18</sup>

Stone's main concern during his stint on the Record, however, involved the massive depression and the increasing danger posed by fascism. The editorial pages of the Philadelphia Record condemned the response of Herbert Hoover to the depression, with Stone attacking the laissez-faire ideology of the president and his failure to recognize the need for planning. The Record berated the administration's acceptance of trickle-down economics which allowed for the granting of assistance to large business enterprises through such agencies as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the denial of direct relief to millions of suffering individuals. The paper warned that the downtrodden must be rehabilitated and treated as "economically incapacitated soldiers of our industrial system," not as bums. The Record's editorialists warned of the desperate straits of the American economy, and declared that the nation must "fight the depression as we fought the war."<sup>19</sup>

The Record, termed "that paper" by the conservative wealthy class, was the only pro-Democratic newspaper in

Philadelphia and became the first major metropolitan newspaper to support the presidential candidacy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The New York governor was praised as the sole major candidate who was concerned about the "forgotten man at the bottom of the economic pyramid," and as a proponent of the liberalism which the Record considered essential if national collapse were to be avoided. Although displeased with Roosevelt's apparent emphasis "on outmoded economics," including budget balancing, the paper lauded his acknowledgement of federal government responsibility for the people's welfare. The sweeping Democratic victory in November was viewed by Stone as "a peaceful revolution at the ballot box" that would bring to power a man able to buoy the spirits of the American people.<sup>20</sup>

Such hope and the structural transformations hinted at by Roosevelt both appeared essential as Hoover's term approached its final days. Stone later wrote that the United States seemed "closer to collapse and revolution than ever before." Fifteen million Americans were without work, placing the unemployment rate at anywhere from twenty-five to thirty-three per cent. National income had been halved since late 1929. Pervasive distress afflicted the nation, and gloom appeared everywhere. Bankruns were widespread, city and state governments ran out of relief funds, western farmers forcibly prevented foreclosure sales, the jobless went out on hunger marches, and "Hoovervilles, hobo jungles, soup kitchens" sprouted

throughout the land.<sup>21</sup>

The mass suffering caused by the depression provided the backdrop for Stone's initial article in a magazine of national import. In the May 1933 issue of H. L. Mencken's iconoclastic The American Mercury, Stone damned the pseudo-reform policies of the Pennsylvania governor and old Bull Moose, Giffort Pinchot. In his inaugural address to the state legislature, the former progressive had neatly avoided the issue of unemployment coverage with "a sweetly reasonable manner typical of a Great Liberal in a Tight Corner." Pinchot evoked the failed concept of voluntarism for dealing with the large jobless sector. Despite repeated calls for "social justice," the governor allocated sparse funds for relief and made even those contingent upon a swift economic upturn. Like Hoover, Pinchot resorted "to the doleophobia," while increasing funds for business interests, rather than augmenting the direct relief required by desperate individuals.<sup>22</sup>

Roosevelt, however, did move swiftly to restore faith in the nation and in its economic institutions. He acted to solidify the stock exchange, solvent banks, and large industrial concerns, and to stabilize agricultural production. Early enactments furthered the progress of collective bargaining, the establishment of minimum wage and maximum hour provisions in certain industries, and the diminution of child labor. Roosevelt's New Deal provided limited grants to the states for the poor, and instituted public works projects to reduce the ranks of the unemployed.

One of the most radical measures of the early Roosevelt administration called for formation of a public corporation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, to undertake planning and to provide cheap power for one of the nation's most destitute areas.<sup>23</sup>

Passage of such programs during the first hundred days of the Roosevelt presidency received mixed reviews from Stone. He charged that FDR was a fiscal reactionary who originally opposed such a vital piece of legislation as the Glass-Steagall Act, which established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and protected the first \$500 of all bank deposits. Pressured by the Philadelphia Record, Virginia Senator Carter Glass and others, Roosevelt finally signed the bill. Stone thought that except for the TVA, New Deal legislation did not require structural alteration of the American economic order and did not fully implement planning. Instead, Roosevelt only fitfully and sporadically adopted Keynesian policies, which even had they been completely utilized, would not have produced essential institutional transformation. The first New Deal also totally failed to address the problems faced by many of the nation's poorest individuals and groups, including tenant farmers and sharecroppers. The Agricultural Adjustment Act aided large farming interests and furthered the process of dispossession of small farmers.<sup>24</sup>

Still, Stone praised much of the early New Deal. Despite its inadequacies, the New Deal represented hope,

and Roosevelt "transmitted that hope." In Washington, D.C., after a dreadful period under Herbert Hoover, "a sense of concern and devotion" existed. Roosevelt seemed to truly care for the poor. His leadership even produced a feeling "of ebullience, of excitement." Significantly, because of his evident willingness to experiment, Roosevelt attracted a cadre of sincerely dedicated reformers to the nation's capital.<sup>25</sup>

While the depression produced massive suffering for millions and appeared to be interminable, it also helped to usher in a second great danger for those who desired peaceful change and social and economic betterment. In the mid-twenties, Stone had witnessed the rise of fascism in Italy, and as the new decade began, the spread of totalitarianism seemed ever more imminent. He very carefully watched the emergence of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist party in Weimar Germany. As the depression deepened, Hitler and the Nazis with their attacks on "decayed" liberal democracy, obtained increased popularity.<sup>26</sup>

Always opposed to sectarianism and petty squabbling on the left, Izzy and friends of like mind believed that if the absurd fighting among liberals and leftists were curtailed, then fascism could be stopped. The failure of Christian Democratic leaders and socialists to collaborate had resulted in a decimation of the anti-fascist ranks and the rise of Mussolini to power. Now Stone



watched as General Kurt von Schleicher became chancellor of Germany in December 1932, and attempted to create a national front which would incorporate leftists, trade unionists, patriotic anti-fascist military officers, various conservative groups, and the left-wing of the National Socialist party, in an effort to stave off civil war. But opposition by nationalistic organizations and the Nazis, and battling between the socialists and the Communists caused the Schleicher government to collapse in late January. Shortly thereafter, Adolf Hitler ascended to power in the state that prided itself on being the most advanced on the European continent.<sup>27</sup>

The Record, along with many other publications of a left-of-center slant, consistently worried that America might once again become entangled in an international conflagration. But the terroristic nature of the new Nazi regime so appalled the paper's editorialists that they supported both an economic boycott against Germany and an attempt to prevent Germany from rearming. One editorial even declared that formation of a united front by France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States provided "the last chance of bringing Hitler to book, and forestalling if not preventing a catastrophe."<sup>28</sup>

The spread of totalitarianism only reinforced Stone's conviction that broadbased, combinations of liberal and radical forces must be forthcoming inside of the democratic nations. His early experiences with left-wing

politics had revolved around such a Popular Front ideal. Because only a few radicals resided in small towns such as Camden, "you're all friends, whether you're an anarchist, a Communist, a socialist, or whatever, and you regard these other people all as comrades." But when he moved to Philadelphia, he discovered that the leftists were separated by the most vicious sectarian quarrels. The petty squabbling was repugnant to Izzy. The radicals fought among themselves, hated one another, and battled even within the individual parties "for lousy little \$50 a week jobs, and for prestige and for egoism." The Communists at the time supported "a fake united front," termed the United Front from Below, which Stone charged actually involved an attempt to submerge their rivals. In contrast, Stone and progressives such as Paul Douglas, then a left-wing socialist with an outlook very similar to Izzy's, believed in an authentic united popular front. Yet the general divisiveness on the left only affirmed Stone's belief that a newspaperman ought to participate in the great currents of his time, but should not directly affiliate with any particular party, or become a tool of any party, as that would stifle his search for truth and justice.<sup>29</sup>

When J. David Stern bought the New York Post\* in

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\*Until late April, 1934, the paper was named the New York Evening Post. Once again, for the sake of uniformity, the newspaper will be called the Post throughout this dissertation.

December 1933, he took Izzy with him to serve as editorial writer. In New York City, the splintering of the left was even starker than in Philadelphia. Stone aligned himself with no specific organization, and had "good friends who were Communists, Trotskyites, Lovestoneites, socialists, liberals." For him, the goal remained to aid "anybody who had a good issue, who had been treated unjustly, who had something to contribute in the way of ideals." But one had to avoid becoming a sectarian or a fanatic.<sup>30</sup>

Despite his misgivings over leftist splits, the move to the nation's intellectual center appealed greatly to Izzy, who was ecstatic to be in the giant metropolis. He would walk toward his job with the famed New York Post, and begin "to strut like a pregnant woman."<sup>31</sup>

Izzy was well served by the diligence he had long displayed. An early issue at the Post concerned a Tammany Hall politician, who was up for reappointment, one that would have to be approved by Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, formerly a liberal congressman and a hero for both Stone and Stern. The publisher called an editorial conference to discuss the case, which was attended by the top staff members, including Izzy. To prepare for the meeting, he ventured to the library and studied up on the Tammany politico. When Stern called on Izzy last as the junior member of the paper, the young editorialist became the first individual at the conference to discuss the man's

positions and to call for the ouster of "the son of a bitch."  
The performance of the Philadelphia novice delighted Stern.<sup>32</sup>

Serving as the Post's chief editorial writer as 1933 neared a close, Izzy remained determined to serve as a hardworking and crusading journalist. First awakened by a powerful dream, augmented by stirring literary works, and strengthened by a vigorous study of anarchist and Marxist classics, Stone's radicalism received continual sustenance from his reportorial work. The repeated viewing of American social and economic ills and inequities, and of right-wing authoritarianism abroad, provided firmer foundations for his radical orientation. The deterioration of the U.S. economy in the late 1920s and early 1930s, with resulting massive unemployment and widespread human suffering, heightened Stone's conviction that the American social and economic order required large structural changes. The emergence of a fascist state in Italy and a Nazi regime in Germany solidified his belief that progressive forces must not remain divided. The realities of the Great Depression and of fascist aggression were to pose great challenges for those such as Stone, who believed in the necessity of democratic social reform and despised what the new authoritarians represented. Solutions to these twin threats to peaceful change and stability were perceived neither as predetermined nor simplistic by independent leftists of Stone's ilk. Their recognition of a need to effect social change and to form anti-fascist coalitions of reformers and radicals grew out of their profoundest convictions.

## FOOTNOTES

### CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup>Leonard Downie, Jr., The New Muckrakers (New York: New American Library, Inc., 1976), p. 198; Karl E. Meyer, "The Rolling Stone," New Statesman 84 (December 22, 1972): 931; Derek Shearer, "Izzy Stone: From Outcast to Institution," In These Times, 7-13 June 1978, p. 13; Jerry Bruck, Jr., dir., I. F. Stone's Weekly, narrated by Tom Wicker, I. F. Stone Project, 1973; Susanna McBee, "Washington's Venerable Rebel," McCall's 98 (September, 1971): 43; Myra MacPherson, "Gathering No Moss," The Washington Post, 9 July 1979, p. B2; Interview with I. F. Stone, Washington, D. C., 15 October 1981 (hereinafter referred to as Interview, 15 October 1981).

<sup>2</sup>Andrew Kopkind, "The Importance of Being Izzy," Ramparts 12 (May, 1974): 42; Interview, 15 October 1981.

<sup>3</sup>Interview with I. F. Stone, Washington, D. C., 16 October 1981 (hereinafter referred to as Interview, 16 October 1981); Charles Fager, "With Atheists Like Him, Who Needs Believers?," The Christian Century 137 (November 4, 1970): 13-14; "Books That Changed Our Minds," The New Republic 95 (December 21, 1938): 205; Interview, 15 October 1981.

<sup>4</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981; Stone, "Notes on Closing," p. 1; Stone, "Bigotry Defeated Again," The Progress, April 1922, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981; J. David Stern, Memoirs of a Maverick Publisher (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1962), p. 10.

<sup>6</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981; Stone, "In Defense of Campus Rebels," Weekly 17 (May 19, 1969): 1; Stone, "Notes on Closing," p. 1.

<sup>7</sup>A. Kent MacDougall, "Gadfly on the Left: I. F. Stone Achieves Success, Respectability But Keeps Raking Muck," The Wall Street Journal, 14 July 1970, p. 22; Steve Neal, "Journalistic Radical Attains Folk-Hero Status," The Chicago Tribune, 2 September 1974, p. 8.

<sup>8</sup>"Books That Changed," pp. 205-206; Interview, 15 October 1981; Downie, The New Muckrakers, p. 198;

Stone, "Notes on Closing," p. 1; MacDougall, "Gadfly," p. 22.

<sup>9</sup>Interview, 15 October 1981; "Books That Changed," p. 206.

<sup>10</sup>Interview with Stone, 16 October 1981; Elizabeth Wiskemann, Fascism in Italy (New York: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 11-12, 15-17, 22-23, 59, 95.

<sup>11</sup>G. Louis Joughin and Edmund Morgan, The Legacy of Sacco and Vanzetti (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948); Francis Russell, Tragedy in Dedham: The Story of the Sacco-Vanzetti Case, quoted in Robert Justin Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present (New York: Schenkman Publishers Company, Inc., 1978), p. 169; Interview, 16 October 1981.

<sup>12</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981.

<sup>13</sup>Milton Cantor, The Divided Left: American Radicalism, 1900-1975 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), pp. 50-85; James Weinstein, Ambiguous Legacy: The Left in American Politics (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), pp. 19-39; John Diggins, The American Left in the Twentieth Century (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), pp. 81-105; Bernard K. Johnpoll with Lillian Johnpoll, The Impossible Dream: The Rise and Demise of the American Left (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 308-14; Weinstein, The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912-1925 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), pp. 125-38; David A. Shannon, The Socialist Party of America: A History (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), pp. 126-81; Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (New York: Quadrangle, 1969); Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, The American Communist Party: A Critical History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publisher, 1962), pp. 25-155; Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism (New York: Viking Press, 1957), pp. 101-395; Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, the Formative Period (New York: Viking Press, 1960), pp. 3-219; David P. Thelen, Robert M. La Follette and the Insurgent Spirit (Boston: Little, Brown and Company (Inc.), 1976), pp. 171, 181-83; Kenneth Campbell MacKay, The Progressive Movement of 1924 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947).

<sup>14</sup>Thelen, Robert M. La Follette, pp. 181, 192; MacKay, The Progressive Movement; W. A. Swanberg, Norman Thomas: The Last Idealist (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,

1976), pp. 109-11; Interview, 16 October 1981.

<sup>15</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981; Stone, "Introduction," The Haunted Fifties (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p. xvii.

<sup>16</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981; Henry Weinstein, "A Salute to the Elder Statesman of Radical Journalism," The Los Angeles Times, 6 October 1981, part VII, p. 29. The marriage of Izzy and Esther Stone has proven to be a highly successful one. Over four decades after their wedding date, Izzy wrote in the final issue of the Weekly, "Tu mihi curram requies, tu nocte vel atra lumen, et in solis tu mihi turba locis (Tibullus IV: 13, "You are the solace of my cares, light in the blackest night and company in lonely places.). He affirmed that Esther's "collaboration, her unfailing understanding, and her sheer genius as a wife and mother, have made the years together joyous and fruitful." Their three children chose the roads which Izzy seemingly had eschewed when he had followed the journalistic path. Jeremy is a leading spokesman for the American Federation of Scientists, Cecilia (Gilbert) is a published poetess, and Christopher is a law professor at the University of Southern California. Thus each became successful in fields which long interested Izzy--science, literature, and law.

<sup>17</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.; Shearer, "Izzy Stone," p. 13; James Aronson, Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenge to Press, TV and Radio (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), pp. 94-95; Daniel J. Leab, A Union of Individuals: The Formation of the American Newspaper Guild, 1933-1936 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

<sup>19</sup>Stern, Memoirs, pp. 191-92; Stone, "The Return of Mr. Hoover," PM, 7 September 1947, p. 3; "Senators Dress the Dole in a Flour Sack, and Call It Something Else," The Philadelphia Record (hereinafter called Record), 7 January 1932, p. 6; "Selfishness," Record, 27 February 1932, p. 6; "Three Years," Record, 6 March 1932, sect. 2, p. 6; "No One Thinks of Balancing Budgets in War Times," Record, 7 May 1932, p. 6.

<sup>20</sup>Norman Kaner, "I. F. Stone and the Korean War," in Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1971), p. 241; Stern,

Memoirs, pp. 189-90; Richard Anthony Nigro, "The Limits of Vision: I. F. Stone--Reluctant Progressive" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1980), p. 30; "Roosevelt Draws the Line Separating Him From Other Candidates," Record, 20 April 1932, p. 6; "Roosevelt-Hating Newspapers Display Their Fear of Liberalism," Record, 29 April 1932, p. 6; "Two Men," Record, 24 May 1932, p. 8; "Roosevelt's Liberalism," Record, 24 June 1932, p. 6; "A Platform Pointed Toward Liberalism," Record, 1 July 1932, p. 6; "Meet Our Next President: Franklin D. Roosevelt," Record, 3 July 1932, sect. 2, p. 4; "Liberalism vs. Reaction," Record, 4 July 1932, p. 6; "Governor Roosevelt Opens with Fine Restraint," Record, 1 August 1932, p. 6; "Roosevelt: Last Hope of American Capitalism," Record, 25 September 1932, sect. 2, p. 4; "A New Chapter Opens," Record, 8 November 1932, p. 8; "Victory for All of Us," Record, 9 November 1932, p. 8.

<sup>21</sup>Stone, "The Return," p. 3; William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1963), pp. 18-40; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), pp. 418, 459-61, 474-76, 484-85; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), pp. 123-24. See the Record's analysis of the need for immediate action: "The Story of a Man Who Hesitated Too Long," Record, 3 January 1933, pp. 1, 6.

<sup>22</sup>Stone, "A Gentleman in Politics," The American Mercury 29 (May, 1933): 82-85.

<sup>23</sup>Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 41-62; Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958), pp. 6-54, 87-112, 136-48, 263-68, 282-85, 319-37, 335-39.

<sup>24</sup>Nigro, "Limits," p. 35; Stern, Memoirs, p. 195.

<sup>25</sup>Nigro, "Limits," p. 35; Bernard Weintraub, "New Deal Veterans Gathered for Evening of Nostalgia, Commemorate Days of F.D.R.," The New York Times, 6 March 1977, p. 20.

<sup>26</sup>Interview, 15 October 1981; Wiskemann, Fascism; Ernest Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action Francaise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism, trans. Leila Vennewitz (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966),



pp. 145-475; Salvatore Saladino, "Italy," in The European Right: A Historical Profile, eds. Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 247-57; Nolte, "Germany," in The European Right, pp. 296-301; Erich Eyck, A History of the German Republic, trans. Harlan P. Hanam and Robert G. L. Waite (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963); "Hitler's Hour," Record, 12 August 1932, p. 6; "3000 Fascist Books," Record, 31 October 1932, p. 6.

<sup>27</sup> Interview, 15 October 1981; Eyck, A History, pp. 448-54, 459-87; Raymond J. Sontag, A Broken World, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), p. 163.

<sup>28</sup> "We Don't Want War," Record, 27 February 1932, p. 6; "The Twilight of Capitalism and Democracy in Germany," Record, 31 January 1933, p. 8; "Germany's Sickness," Record, 24 March 1933, p. 6; "Grim Joke," Record, 26 June 1933, p. 6; "Caveat Vendor," Record, 14 September 1933, p. 8; "Germany Must Not Rearm," Record, 8 October 1933, sect. 2, p. 6.

<sup>29</sup> Interview, 15 October 1981.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Interview, 16 October 1981.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER II

### NEW DEAL REFORM AND THE POPULAR FRONT, 1933-1939

I see one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished. It is not in despair that I paint you that picture. I paint it for you in hope--because the Nation, seeing and understanding the injustice in it, proposes to paint it out. We are determined to make every American citizen the subject of his country's interest and concern. . . . The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The landmarks and traditions which have marked the progress of civilization toward a civilization of law, order and justice are being wiped away. . . . Innocent peoples and nations are being cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy which is devoid of all sense of justice and human consideration. . . . The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of human instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Following his move to New York City to serve as the head editorialist for the Post, I. F. Stone began to achieve national eminence as a sympathetic, yet critical

observer of the Roosevelt domestic and foreign policies. At the height of the New Deal and the Popular Front, Stone also wrote for various journals, particularly the then left-liberal oriented New Republic and Nation. Throughout much of the thirties, the worst depression in the nation's history dominated the American mind. As the decade passed, and as the New Deal proved incapable of resolving the structural problems of the American economy, I. F. Stone's attention focused with increasing frequency on questions of economic democracy. He believed that the massive disorders engendered by the economic calamities of the era threatened the political freedoms of the Western world. Along with the economic dislocations and possibilities of the period, Stone's writings concentrated upon the threat of fascism in the world arena. The fascist peril posed by Mussolini, Hitler, and Japan's military government, loomed ever greater, and cemented his support for alliances of anti-fascist forces, both within the democratic countries and among the nations opposed to aggression.

During his early stint on the Post, Stone continued his practice of strongly championing the New Deal, while criticizing inadequate or conservative reforms. In the first editorial written under the paper's new ownership on 11 December 1933, Stone supported the Stern policy of journalistic independence, while affirming general support for Roosevelt's programs. He wrote that the Post possessed a long tradition of serving as "a fighting, liberal

newspaper," and would continue to display "vigilance, courage and human sympathy." He indicated that the Post of the present era would back Roosevelt for the same reasons that the paper had cheered President Andrew Jackson a century earlier. Both leaders confronted a system which enriched the affluent at the expense of the poor-- this was a system which allowed massive maldistribution of wealth, the harbinger of freedom's demise. Stone declared that the Post would applaud the Roosevelt enactments if they assisted in curtailing economic inequities, in revitalizing the national economy, and in promoting social justice. But the newspaper would look kindly at neither the veiling of "economic despotism" by Tories behind a false shield of fundamental liberties, nor at those who desired business collaboration but condemned labor organizations, nor at "the pullbacks" who failed to recognize the necessity for movement away from "the profiteering debauch" of the previous decade.<sup>1</sup>

By the end of Roosevelt's first year in office, Stone's analysis of the New Deal seemed even more favorable than before. Having previously called FDR "a liberal President" who was backed by all types of progressives, he now praised the New York Democrat for his contagious fearlessness, for his willingness to produce "legislation of unprecedented boldness," for his undertaking of "an orderly revolution." During this early New Deal period, Stone favored Roosevelt's attempt to transform peacefully American capitalism through various institutional changes

and the establishment of a welfare base. He lauded a signal from the president that the New Deal was to become a permanent entity in the national economic order, not simply a temporary device to be repudiated when recovery took effect. This, Stone believed, would help to create "an ORDERED LIBERAL NATIONAL ECONOMY FOR THE FUTURE." But he soon damned the reduction of welfare funds, and charged that a Minnesota riot demonstrated that the starving and desperate could challenge the public peace.<sup>2</sup>

At this time, as well as over the course of his career, Stone used the argument frequently adopted by both radicals and liberals in their call for economic, social, and political change. He insisted as Roosevelt frequently did, that the capitalists must bend, that they must accept reform, or they would lose all. He wrote in late 1933, that the Post generally did not call for "Government ownership or operation of industry, but when an industry proved incapable of conducting" itself decently, then the government must take it over. Stone frequently invoked the possibility of nationalization as a spur to what he perceived to be improved corporate behavior, particularly when discussing the utilities, shipping, and banking industries. He reported Roosevelt's threat of nationalization to the utility companies and stated that ineffective regulation would only ensure such a development; wrote that if "missdeeds of private capital" continued, then the merchant marine must be taken over by the government; and warned that the failure of bankers to allow

for governmental control of credit operations would result in federal ownership. Without hesitation or qualification, the journalist called for a government monopoly in the munitions industry in order to remove the profit motive from war, from "death in the jungle." He also declared that selective state ownership, as exemplified by the TVA, could provide a useful "yardstick" to measure the fairness of private rates. In addition, municipal control could help eliminate the problems of slums, dilapidated buildings, and housing for the poor.<sup>3</sup>

In March 1934, Stone wrote that "limited capitalism" would emerge if the capitalists were intelligent enough to adapt, and he told them to learn "from the dinosaur." He quoted from a Supreme Court decision which ruled that property rights must give way to public need. Only this would prevent democracy from being crushed by plutocracy. Only this would enable capitalism to survive. To buttress his argument concerning the reasonableness and the inevitability of New Deal-type reform, he argued that the Roosevelt revolution was radical only in comparison with the actions of earlier administrations, and simply involved an attempt to adopt progressive measures long popular in other nations.<sup>4</sup>

While advocating reform legislation, Stone believed that the formation of potent and aggressive labor unions was essential in the effort to reduce the vast income inequities which he blamed for America's economic misfortunes. He reasoned that strong labor organizations

were necessary to counterbalance the power of organized capital and could produce the increased wages essential for a resurgence of public purchasing power. But he berated racketeering and undemocratic developments within unions, and warned that the very reputation of the labor drive and the effectiveness of the worker's greatest protection required an attack on corruption.<sup>5</sup>

Stone also believed that vigorous trade unions could help to protect the political freedoms of laborers and of all Americans. He believed that class hostilities would only worsen if millions remained economically bereft, and repeatedly argued that America's liberal base, the Bill of Rights, would be endangered if class warfare developed. In a pair of reports in the New Republic in 1934 and 1935, Stone concentrated upon the relief and unemployment programs devised by the liberal administration of New York City's mayor, Fiorello LaGuardia. He condemned LaGuardia for failing to enact sufficient social welfare measures and for failing to protect the constitutional liberties of the downtrodden and the dispossessed. Following the reduction of relief funds, the United Action Committee, with some Communists at the forefront, had called for improved wages; union pay for emergency work; money for unemployment, cash, and rental assistance; and more relief administrators and bureaus. When a group of the unemployed congregated near relief headquarters, the police had attacked. Almost all of the city's newspapers, with the Post a notable exception,

declared that a "Red Riot" had taken place, but Stone charged that the police had rioted.<sup>6</sup>

The denigration of the unemployed demonstrators as "mere Red agitators," angered and worried Stone. He warned that unless civil libertarians stood guard, New York City might adopt tactics used in the deep south and in Southern California against laborers, radicals, and the jobless. He quoted from the New York Daily News which indicated that the protestors were members of a "Red minority" that was attempting "to force its will on the majority by violence," and must therefore, be met with necessary force from the police "mixed with their usual good judgment of course." Stone asked if the Daily News wanted to help validate the Communist theory that the government and its police power were only tools of the ruling class.<sup>7</sup>

This rhetoric of a "Red menace," Stone wrote, was fueling broader repression and was assisting the right. A public building, long used by various groups across the political spectrum, was now deemed off-limits. Remarkably, even anti-Nazi endeavors were confronting ever intensifying police and governmental hostility. A protest against heavy-handed practices in terminating an anti-Nazi gathering had resulted in interrogation of the individual filing the complaint. Stone stated that investigation had disclosed ties involving the police and a number of bankers who supported nascent fascist movements; the bankers were supplying the police with



"Red-menace and anti-Semitic literature." And amazingly, the "Who's Who in Radicalism" section in the recent Alien and Criminal Squad police handbook included such famed "Reds" as Henry Wallace, Harold Ickes, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Fiorello LaGuardia. Appalled by this revelation and by violations of civil liberties, Izzy headed a campaign to dump LaGuardia's police commissioner, John F. O'Ryan. Because of his willingness to work with different political groups, Izzy obtained support from all varieties of liberals and radicals in the successful bid to oust O'Ryan. But he continued to bemoan the "czarist methods" of the city administration, including the firing of several public employees who had appeared on a "Red list," and police "surveillance and espionage" practices directed at radicals.<sup>8</sup>

A strong and consistent civil libertarian approach, Stone believed, was necessary to protect the political freedoms that were essential in the fight for unionization and in the struggle to reform peacefully the American economic system. Thus he evenhandedly denounced Communist disruption of a rally held to condemn dictatorial moves in Austria as well as police maltreatment of anti-fascist demonstrators. While he reminded the police that "this is still free America," not a fascist state, he warned the Communists that disruptive actions had enabled Hitlerism to enslave Germany and that "only Nazi hoodlums" could have matched such an affair. Stone also defended freedom of speech and freedom of assembly for rightists,

including the American Nazis. He admitted that right-wing extremist groups were "irritating," but declared that violating their civil liberties would involve "a repudiation of our political philosophy," and would accord Hitler "the compliment of imitation" while demonstrating insufficient faith in the American system. In Stone's view, the German experience showed that full-scale repression began with the removal of the rights of one minority group, but soon extended to a denial of the rights of all.<sup>9</sup>

In discussing a 1934 May Day rally, Stone wrote that radical orations could not produce revolutions, but that repression and hunger could. The failure of the early New Deal to end the Great Depression did propel the emergence by 1934 and 1935 of several movements demanding deepseated change. Roosevelt watched warily as great popularity accrued to charismatic figures such as Louisiana Senator Huey Long with his "Share the Wealth" program calling for redistribution of wealth and income, Father Charles Coughlin with his National Union for Social Justice declaring that capitalism was through and that a new "social justice" system should replace it, Dr. Francis Townsend with his Townsend clubs demanding a monthly payment of \$200 to all Americans over sixty, and the novelist Upton Sinclair with his End Poverty in California campaign advocating a "production-for-use" economic system.<sup>10</sup>

In addition to suppression and impoverishment, rising

expectations helped to fire still another form of agitation. The limited success of the first New Deal in abetting collective bargaining encouraged an intensification of the union drive. Often guided by Socialists, Trotskyists, and Communists, a series of strikes swept the country in 1934, with a general strike enveloping San Francisco in the summer. During the following year, unionists dissatisfied with the conservatism of the American Federation of Labor established the Committee for Industrial Organization and determined to organize the leading mass-production industries.<sup>11</sup>

Pushed from the left, including the editorial page of the Post, and possessing an even greater liberal majority following the sweeping 1934 congressional election, President Roosevelt backed a second large series of reform measures. Various enactments, including many long advocated in the Post, provided increased encouragement of collective bargaining and declared "unfair labor practices" illegal; augmented public works projects; helped young Americans find employment; assisted artists, writers, and actors; established a system providing for unemployment compensation, aid for dependent mothers and children, disability payments, public health funding, and a pension plan for the elderly; furthered the electrification of rural America; attacked the large utility holding companies; and placed greater public control over the banking industry.<sup>12</sup>

Still, like many radicals, Stone believed that

Roosevelt's relief programs and those of liberal local administrations were fundamentally inadequate, and that the president's ingrained animus toward welfare crippled the recovery fight and hurt the poor. In two biting articles written for the Nation in late 1935 and early 1936, Stone again called for greater economic assistance to the disadvantaged and the destitute. He remarked that the New York Times often printed information about supposed "chiseling" by the unemployed. Yet he could not remember when the great paper had discussed the insufficient funding allocated for welfare, or the necessity of workmen's compensation for occupational injuries. Analyzing the Times' annual "Christmas campaign for New York's One Hundred Neediest Cases," Stone related what he perceived to be the results of the philosophy of "rugged individualism" which the newspaper seemed to favor, including low wages and extensive maternal and child illnesses. He stated that the Times' appeal would certainly move any American who knew how totally workers and their families could be ravaged by an outbreak of sickness or by financial collapse. But he chastised the Times and most of its counterparts for failing to talk "about the 100,000,000 Neediest, about social insurance, about the necessity for better relief, about the helplessness of the small investors, about the misery of the great masses of workers."<sup>13</sup>

The major failure to address the deep-seated inequities in the American order, Stone argued, rested with President

Roosevelt. In a report entitled "Starving on Relief," Stone charged that the President's rhetoric was much greater than his actions. While FDR condemned the Tories, "the poor Tories, though trounced, continue to be well fed." The same could not be said of the unemployed. When Roosevelt decried the fact that the average American citizen subsisted on "a third-class diet," Stone declared that severe dietary deficiencies occurred precisely because the nation's chief executive, despite "all his Tory-trouncing," demanded relief reductions. FDR eloquently asked whether the government could withdraw from the problem of welfare and thereby return the downtrodden to charity and to the "selfish" businessmen who insisted that only governmental interference caused the unemployment level to remain high. Yet again, the Roosevelt officials were reducing federal relief funds, and thus, leaving millions to face "coolie" wages, starvation, and untold misery.<sup>14</sup>

Despite such oftentimes harsh criticism levied at Roosevelt and the New Deal by the New York Post and Stone, the liberal paper and its number one editorialist closed ranks to defend the Roosevelt administration from attacks on the right. Throughout the 1936 presidential campaign, the Post sharply censured what it termed the Hoover-Landon policies of the Republican Party, and warmly praised FDR and the Democratic Party. The Post adjudged the Republicans as "basically reactionary," and declared that Roosevelt's conservative political foes,

including the antiquated ideologues of the American Liberty League, wanted to roll back New Deal reforms which aided the underprivileged and labor.

The American Liberty League, founded in 1934 by anti-New Deal forces, and funded by many in the nation's moneyed and corporate elite, had bitterly attacked Roosevelt since its inception. On January 25, 1936, the former Democratic presidential nominee and one of the initial organizers of the Liberty League, Alfred E. Smith, had torn into FDR and his reform program at a gathering reputedly attended by "the largest collection of millionaires ever assembled under the same roof." Smith argued that the New Deal brain-trusters were socialists, and exclaimed that only a single capital could exist, "Washington or Moscow. There can be only the clear, pure, fresh air of free America, or the foul breath of communistic Russia." Stone and the Post retorted that the Liberty Leaguers appeared to be aping the foolish actions of the aristocrats prior to the French Revolution. The French patricians had refused to make concessions to the masses, thus helping to usher in the convulsion which cost them their titles, properties, and heads. The English upper crust, by contrast, had acquiesced in needed changes and enabled peaceful reform to take place. Stone wrote that if the Liberty Leaguers possessed any intelligence, they would copy the English elite, accept the Rooseveltian reforms, and avoid the excesses which

always accompanied revolutions.<sup>15</sup>

The November 1936 balloting resulted in a massive reelection triumph for Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal. Following his landslide victory, the president appeared ready to shift even further to the left. In his inaugural speech in January, he deplored the fact that one-third of a nation remained "ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished." A short time later, he proposed an alteration of the Supreme Court, which was considered by many liberals and leftists, including Stone, to be the bastion of high finance, corporate interests, and private property. Throughout the first Roosevelt term, the Court had invalidated a number of early New Deal measures, including major pieces of legislation designed to improve industrial productivity, assist the depressed farming sector, and further collective bargaining. Fearing that the centerpieces of the second New Deal, the Wagner Act and the Social Security Act, might soon also be voided, Roosevelt proposed a plan to transform the Court. He requested presidential authority to appoint a Supreme Court justice for each jurist who reached the age of seventy and failed to retire. The court-packing plan, as opponents called it, would have enabled FDR to appoint six new justices, thus allowing for the creation of a liberal majority.<sup>16</sup>

While the Roosevelt attempt to remold the Supreme Court produced heated opposition in Congress and around the nation, I. F. Stone strongly supported the president.

In the Post, in the Nation, and in The Court Disposes, his first book, Stone described the Court as a reactionary institution. He wrote that the justices instinctively rejected novel economic or social legislation, citing the doctrine of laissez-faire. The Court did generally allow governmental involvement in economic matters to benefit big business, but not to assist workers, farmers, consumers, or small investors. To aid the great capitalists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court had gladly reworked the Constitution. Then, "our judicial Robespierres were ruthless, arbitrary, contemptuous of legal and constitutional precedents." The nation's highest court still supported only property in the economic struggle, thus remaining the citadel of "the money power," notwithstanding its defeat at the polls.<sup>17</sup>

Dismissing the assertion by some liberals that the Supreme Court protected personal freedoms, Stone also castigated its longtime reluctance to guard the Bill of Rights. The Court had previously failed to prevent the wartime suspension of habeas corpus by President Lincoln; had upheld discriminatory immigration laws; had supported Wilson's Espionage Act; and had repeatedly ruled that criminal syndicalism laws, which flourished during the post-World War I red scare, were valid. It had allowed the hanging of the Chicago anarchists; the imprisonment of the aged and saintly socialist leader, Eugene V.



Debs; the framing of labor organizer Tom Mooney; and the execution of the immigrant radicals, Sacco and Vanzetti. The high court would readily disregard precedents and procedural obstructions to grant utility company appeals, but it rigidly adhered to earlier rulings "when human lives and basic principles are at stake, especially those of radicals, that is, of those who most need protection."<sup>18</sup>

Rather than providing a foundation against fascism, Stone argued, the Supreme Court might actually assist in promoting it. If the judicial branch continued to overturn legislative enactments, that would in itself seem to lend credence to the charges of "the fascist demagogue" who condemned "the 'inefficiency' of democratic processes." And while the scent of "communism several centuries down wind" had induced the Court to throw out federal income taxation and minimum wages, Stone questioned whether it would be as alert to a fascist threat. Indeed, the American Liberty League had declared that only the Court provided a safeguard against dictatorship. Stone sardonically added that if the Supreme Court presented the only such protection, then "the Heil and the goose-step would have established themselves here long ago." The Court had persistently neglected to defend civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the right to indictment and trial by jury, from congressional limitation.<sup>19</sup>

For Stone, only increased political and economic

democracy would protect the cherished American freedoms enunciated in the Bill of Rights. Those liberties, he believed, would be secured not by court decisions, "but by the spirit which dominated our institutions and our people." If the love of liberty and the willingness "to compromise and conciliate that makes democracy and free government possible" should be replaced by a "mob spirit," or if moneyed interests should transform the nation "in the image of the company town," thereby changing the descendants of the revolutionary heroes into "hysterical helots," then the Supreme Court would be "the willing servant, not the opponent of reaction."<sup>20</sup>

To remove the judicial hindrance to a full flourishing of America's constitutional freedoms and to enable the republic to respond intelligently to social and economic crises, Stone echoed Roosevelt's call for a vast shakeup of the Court. To reduce the power of "the American House of Lords," he wrote that Congress should be granted increased power to transform the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and that the amendment process should be made easier, possibly through employment of a national referendum. If such changes were not forthcoming, if "Democracy" did not lessen judicial power, "the Supreme Court, instrument of our great concentrations of economic power," would cripple democracy. "This is," Stone asserted, "the choice before the American people."<sup>21</sup>

Following the 1937 publication of The Court Disposes,

Stone continued to attack what he perceived to be reactionary decisions. He warned that if the Court moved to weaken the Wagner Act, it would refute those like Roosevelt who believed that American economic and social difficulties could be "peacefully and democratically solved within the framework of capitalist democracy." The continued usurpation of congressional power only supported the claims of others who charged that the government was a ruling class instrument, and that all existing governmental entities, regardless of good intentions, must eventually become new devices for overtaxing and persecuting the less fortunate sectors of American society. Stone wondered if workers would soon regard the Supreme Court "as the greatest strike-breaker of them all."<sup>22</sup>

In spite of the exhortations of liberals and of leftists such as Stone, the Roosevelt Court plan failed. Yet Roosevelt later claimed he had accomplished his purpose, as voting shifts and resignations allowed for the appointment of such ardent New Dealers as Hugo Black, William Douglas, and Frank Murphy. The Roosevelt Court generally upheld governmental involvement in the economic arena and acclaimed the constitutionality of the major pieces of the New Deal which had not already been discarded or overturned.<sup>23</sup>

The Court fight did prove politically costly to the president and his supporters, however, as a seemingly solid conservative bloc of Republicans and right-wing

southern Democrats, who were also angered over labor unrest, determined to prevent furtherance of the New Deal. Despite a brief resurgence of reformism in 1938 when Congress agreed to aid farmers, passed a large public works bill, and adopted a federal minimum wage and maximum hour standard, the New Deal did appear to sputter and dissipate. Stone continued to back the president's attempts to produce needed reform, and by 1937 was comparing the struggle toward social democracy under FDR with the movement toward political democracy under Andrew Jackson. While the drive toward political democracy had received embodiment in various abstract ideas, such principles had required a personality to serve as their symbol. The earlier era necessarily elevated the old frontiersman; the more recent one utilized the Hyde Park aristocrat. Each contributed political astuteness, an idealistic vision, an empathy with democratic stirrings, and leadership qualities. The two movements and the two men, Stone declared, assisted in the democratization of American life.<sup>24</sup>

In the New Republic on 5 January 1938, Stone evaluated the results of the New Deal and discussed various obstacles in the push toward social democracy. He indicated that corporate and financial interests frequently condemned New Deal reforms, and unfortunately possessed an often staunch, although duped ally in the middle class. Despite being oppressed by big business interests, despite suffering from the boom-and-bust cycles of American capitalism,

despite the lack of true competition, despite the inefficiency of regulatory reform, the middle class "never harbors a grudge or develops a philosophy." Accepting the sacrosanct nature of supposed private enterprise, the middle class adjudged its real friends, the Brandeis-type liberals, "as little better than Reds," while terming its true "enemy, the concentrated money power, as its benefactor." Notwithstanding such lack of comprehension, the New Deal had produced vital changes in the American social, political, and economic order.<sup>25</sup>

Although he believed that the New Deal had brought about important reforms, Stone asserted during the mid and late 1930s, that the American economic system retained real weaknesses and dangers and required greater transformations. He wrote that in many industries, a basic lack of competition existed. The steel industry, for example, was dominated by United States Steel, which had long prevented "natural economic forces" from functioning. Its prices, workers, and investors were all "regimented." Stone declared that steel "prices have goosestepped since 1901," with certain products costing more than before the depression, and he called "steel-company towns . . . Third Reichs in miniature."

Another example of American corporatism existed in the coal industry of Kentucky. Stone discussed efforts by the federal government to apply the Wagner Act to Harlan, Kentucky, where feudal practices still predominated.

He described past unionization drives in an area where lawlessness and violence reigned supreme; where "frontier customs and mores" were utilized by large mining interests which refused to deal with labor organizations; where witnesses against coal companies were bribed, intimidated, kidnapped, and murdered; where "espionage and the blacklist and the company-paid deputy" were everywhere; where the rugged, majority "Anglo-Saxon stock" was as totally dominated by mining concerns as were the Europeans residing under fascist governments. Yet even in Harlan, the drive to unionize, with federal support, seemed to be making progress.<sup>26</sup>

Such a development, Stone believed, remained vital because of perpetuation of massive economic inequities which blunted the attempts to end the depression and imperiled the democratic experience. In a review of Ferdinand Lundberg's study of the nation's elite, America's Sixty Families, the journalist warned that economic disparities threatened political democracy. Stone exclaimed that sharp and worrisome paradoxes existed in the individual who was a "free citizen at the ballot box" and an "anxious creature at the paymaster's window," and in the huge corporations which "overawe the State." These factors exemplified "the irreconcilable conflict of our age." Such a battle between political democracy and grave maldistribution of wealth had raged throughout American history, as indicated by repeated reform efforts. But great economic concentration continued despite the

recurrent protest movements, and was now more extreme than ever. Stone wrote that Lundberg had also documented that the nation's elite possessed great influence over both domestic and foreign policies, benefitted from imperial developments and from World War I, and possessed an "alley-cat moral code" which dated back to the early years of Standard Oil.<sup>27</sup>

Through this stage of the depression era, Stone had viewed economic affairs from a critical, although non-doctrinaire perspective, which incorporated both Marxist and liberal ideas. Unlike many leftists, he had refused to issue a blanket condemnation of the New Deal attempts to produce alterations in the economic order. Although favoring a more systematic approach to the plight of the economically bereft, industry, and agriculture, and despite urging increased social welfare measures, Stone reasoned that Roosevelt's program was an initial stage in the drive toward stability and economic democracy. Yet he continued to urge that greater steps be taken to ensure that plutocracy did not triumph, to make certain that millions did not remain economic victims of the American capitalist system. Still, again in contrast to many on the left, he never argued that the drive toward greater economic equality should override concern for political liberties. In fact, throughout this period as over the course of his entire career, Stone asserted that in America, political and economic democracy could not

be separated. He was unwilling to dismiss political rights, obtained through extensive struggles, as insignificant, as something which could be discarded in the drive toward a utopian society.

Not only his own imagined future good society, but the worthwhile qualities of the liberal tradition, appeared increasingly threatened as the 1930s unfolded. Western radicals who believed that socialism and expanded democracy were inevitable, now were confronted with the rise of ideologies and mass movements which challenged outright their cherished notion of inevitable progress. As right-wing authoritarianism deepened its hold on Germany and Italy, and threatened Austria, Stone wondered if the centuries' long movement toward individual liberty were being crushed by the chains of fascism. He considered the repressive actions undertaken by Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dolfuss toward laborers in 1934 as fascistic, and contended that because of developments in Germany, workers must fight back. The Nazis had reduced wages, destroyed labor organizations, and suppressed all freedom; rightists appeared desirous of carrying out such actions in the United States as well. Stone thus deemed the Austrian workers' struggle to be "Europe's battle against brown shirt barbarism," and declared that it was better to fall resisting than to be murdered in a Nazi concentration camp. Fundamentally, Stone adopted the Marxian interpretation that this terror



of fascism was veiled plutocracy, designed to enable the rich to exploit a nation's people. He warned that the fascist drive to reduce wages in payment for corporate financial backing, with the resulting weakening of domestic purchasing power, would inevitably require a push outward to attain other markets.

While Dolfuss attempted to tighten his dictatorial control, Stone feared that the German Nazis would become the real lords of Austria. The journalist declared that the other major European powers should immediately confront Hitler, regardless of the risk. The editorial pages of his paper repeatedly exhorted the European states, particularly France and England, to form an alliance against Hitler. The Nazi threat was perceived as so ominous that even Italy was encouraged to enter such a coalition.<sup>28</sup>

The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, however, ended any possibility that Mussolini might welcome an anti-Hitler union and was sharply denounced by Stone and his liberal employer. The newspaper condemned the "fascist canille" who had discovered "that poison gas, bullets and torture chambers are more than human flesh can bear." But the Post affirmed that "what human flesh cannot bear the human spirit can survive," and that "common men everywhere" desired to end mass murder.<sup>29</sup>

As fascist aggression intensified, many, including Stone, were pleased with the call by the Hungarian

secretary-general of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov, for the formation of a broad "People's Front" to be comprised of all anti-fascist elements. Such a combination, they reasoned, might induce the fascist dictators to curb their aggressive actions, and thus prevent another world war. As a longtime advocate of an anti-fascist grouping, Izzy strongly backed unity among progressives. Years later he stated: "I was a Popular Fronter. I was then and I am now. I'd be prepared to join with anyone on the left, including the Communists, in the struggle against fascism." He vigorously supported the left-wing coalition Spanish Republican government and the Popular Front administration of the French socialist Leon Blum.<sup>30</sup>

In America, a Popular Front thrived during the 1935-1939 period. Many writers and intellectuals, both in the United States and elsewhere, considered the Communist Party to be the foundation for this anti-fascist movement and for social transformation. The party's tie to the economically flourishing Soviet Union; its work supporting labor and minority groups; and its downplaying of the concept of class struggle, exalting of American democracy, and effort to depict Communism as "Twentieth Century Americanism," aided in the flourishing of the Popular Front in the United States, and helped to spur the popularity of the Communist organization.<sup>31</sup>

Because of his willingness to align with the Communists and because of a longstanding tendency on the part

of Stone and other non-Communist leftists and liberals to withhold many misgivings about the Soviet Union, he was later to be termed an apologist for Russia. Izzy dismissed the charge as unfair and proceeded to discuss the reasoning behind leftist support for the Popular Front during the 1930s. A second world war appeared inevitable, and a world coalition against Hitler was essential. Because of this, to a degree, one was indeed an apologist. Although many were cognizant of "a lot of these evils" in the Communist heartland, they thought that anti-fascist forces must not be divided. As portrayed by Simone de Beauvoir in The Mandarins, a number of liberals and leftists felt considerable anguish over developments in the Soviet Union. Stone declared: "We knew a lot of things were wrong, but we felt the overriding challenge and danger was the rise of Nazism, and it had to be defeated and we wanted a unity." Also, at the time, "nobody knew what the full horrors were behind the Soviet facade." Still, Izzy reasoned, "we were very far from taken in and yet to some degree you know we were busy saying that the real job is to defeat fascism and this may be a distortion of socialism, but it's still socialism." Stone indicated that even Leon Trotsky, despite Stalinist persecution and his expulsion from Russia, continued to defend his homeland. "So there were real anguished choices."<sup>32</sup>

One of those "anguished choices" involved the effort

to save the Spanish Republic from fascist troops guided by Francisco Franco and assisted by Mussolini and Hitler. Stone stated that many were aware that the anarchists and the PUOM, a dissident Marxist organization, were being sorely mistreated by the Communist Party during the Spanish Civil War. Nevertheless, Izzy admitted, discipline was needed in the conflict, and "we didn't know what to do." As so often occurs in human history, "your choices are not choices of good and evil, but choices of lesser evils and worse evils."<sup>33</sup>

Although acknowledging that in this case he "could look like an apologist," Izzy declared that he "certainly didn't do the kind of stuff that straight partyliners did." In fact, Stone had earlier sharply criticized the repression that was evident in Russia. In 1934, he had written that Stalin, like the fascist dictators, silenced all opposition, and had intimated that the Russians required "the light touch." He had condemned the Soviets for abetting the attack upon libertarian ideals. They had, for example, forced Lenin's widow to remove any mention of Trotsky from her study of the great Bolshevik chieftain. Now, unlike many party adherents, Izzy did not support the Moscow purge trials which resulted in the mass execution of thousands of old Bolshevik leaders, and helped to splinter the alliance of left-of-center elements. He read the official trial records and "thought it was a lot of hot air, not hot air, it was phony. I

could just feel the texture was a typical governmental frameup, taking a little bit of truth and building a lot of lies out of it."<sup>34</sup>

And although he remained a staunch advocate of the Popular Front, Izzy espied dangers within the organization that was the fulcrum of the anti-fascist movement, the Communist Party. Unlike a number of intellectuals of the era, Izzy never joined the Party and never even conceived of joining it. He maintained his hatred of organizations and attempted to work with groups of all political persuasions. He had friends across the liberal and left spectrum. "You know," he later recalled, "I was what they called a goddamned liberal in the sense that I was willing to be friends with Trotskyites, Lovestoneites, and defend them too." So the notion "of being subject to party discipline and told what to do, or what to think, or what to write, was absolutely repugnant to me." Indeed, Stone believed that the straight partyliners crippled the concept of a genuine coalition of leftists and liberals, and only reinforced the authoritarian structure of the Communist Party. Remembering the period, he railed at "the stuffiness of the Party, the thought control, the conformity, the yesmanship, the parrot-like obeisance, and the arrogance." He remarked that Stalin alone could not be blamed, for "there were a lot of little Stalins in the Party." In fact, "there were some pretty horrible people. And they acted like little Stalins, right in New York." Asked if he saw

these developments early, Izzy answered: "Yeah, you could smell it from outside," while for party members, "it was even worse."<sup>35</sup>

But critical of repentant party members, Stone warned: "Ex-Communists are often like ex-Catholics. They're so horrified by the evil of the church that they forget any good side, or any constructive side." If they mention positive factors about the party, then people declare that they are still Communists. Thus, they are pressured to be more anti-Communist than anyone else. Such remembrances were distorted, Izzy argued, because the American Communists, like the American socialists, performed a useful role during the Great Depression. They aided in the organization of the downtrodden and the dispossessed, including sharecroppers and tenant farmers, and they battled for social justice. Also, "you can't blame them for all evils of the Soviet Union."<sup>36</sup>

Still, the fact that the party was Stalinistic, caused independent leftists to undergo real anguish concerning collaboration with the Communists, but most decided--correctly so, Stone thought--"that the main job was the destruction of fascism, of Nazism." So he, like many American progressives of the pre-war years, continued to support openly the Communist mecca, the Soviet Union, as a bulwark against fascism.<sup>37</sup>

The right-wing totalitarian threat intensified as the 1930s waned, with Nazi entrenchment in Germany, fascist dominance in Italy, and challenges by extreme rightists

to democratic governments in France and Spain. The rising peril on the right caused I. F. Stone to focus increased attention upon foreign affairs. In an article in the Nation on 18 September 1937, he wrote that he hated fascism, and that his heart was with the Spanish Loyalists. But if insulation were possible, if one's children could remain untouched by overseas battles, if the United States would be unaffected by a fascist victory abroad, he would support the "isolationist neutrality legislation" that was so popular in the middle years of the decade. He conceded that "America was not born to set the universe aright," and that "war is nightmare." Unfortunately, such "insulated isolation" was not possible in the interconnected world of the twentieth century. He stated that neutrality provisions only bred delusions, that neutrality would collapse in the face of another international conflagration, and that "another world war is coming, that we shall ultimately be drawn into." It would be better for the United States boldly to support the League of Nations, another international organization, or some collective measure, to place the power of America "on the side of peace and against aggression." This seemed to offer the only hope for preventing war.<sup>38</sup>

The supporters of neutrality provisions also called for an economic separation from the European belligerents, but Stone deemed that unrealistic. The result would inevitably be economic calamity, a return to the worst phase of the depression. Only through general planning

could such chaos be avoided if a boycott were instituted. Stone affirmed that such planning would result in a massive construction work, slum clearance, and flood termination, thus producing "a new America, a richer, happier America, while the Old World, in a frenzy, spills its blood and treasure."<sup>39</sup>

Such a prospect, however, was unlikely to occur. Some Americans profitted from war, while to remain out of an upcoming world battle would demand extensive socialization to sustain a decent quality of life. Monopolies and vast profits would then not be allowed, as increased production and improved distribution would be essential. Asking whether his countrymen could relinquish "profit for peace," Stone quickly answered, "I doubt it." On the contrary, he thought that if isolation continued, the domestic result might well be establishment of an authoritarian corporate state instead of a democratic socialist one. Rather than restriction of private gain, isolation would bring total governmental domination over labor unions, including strike prohibitions, wage reductions, and reduced unemployment benefits. "A vigilant, a fascist America" might appear, "an America that would use neutrality as a demagogic cover-up for its attack on liberty and finally plunge the more eagerly into war as a way out of difficulties at home."<sup>40</sup>

America, Stone concluded, could not remain isolated. But he also warned that if the United States attempted to match the armed might of the fascist nations, "a



militaristic, regimented, goose-step influence hitherto absent from our national life would make its appearance." He again asserted that the best hope for preserving peace and of maintaining American democracy, rested with "the path of international cooperation." Only such collaboration could help to preserve vital international trade, aid in the easing of nationalistic hatreds, and begin to produce political security. Furthermore, without U.S. involvement in such an international body, fascist aggression could not be stifled.<sup>41</sup>

In a followup report which served as a strong retort to isolationists, Stone wrote that "1937 is not 1914," that the danger posed by Nazism and fascism was not the same as that presented by Kaiserism. In 1914, imperialistic designs of the European nations had disturbed the status quo. The disruptive ingredient in 1937 was

fascism, capitalism's misbegotten offspring, crushing individual freedom, gagging the press, extending the methods of a Pennsylvania coal-company town to whole nations, treating whites in European nations as imperialists have been accustomed to treat black, brown, red, and yellow men in 'backward countries,' destroying the labor union, bringing labor and capital both under the sway of a war machine run by demagogic adventurers who plunder the capitalism they protect as a gangster plunders the merchants he forces into a 'protective' association.

With greatly reduced consuming power resulting from economic oppression, with "the war machines" ever demanding more, the people of the fascist states "eat less and less." Stone repeated his admonition that "tightened belts at

home raise the pressure for war, the classic last resort of hard-press dictatorships."<sup>42</sup>

Thus Stone concluded that while imperialism had produced World War I, fascism was causing a second world war, and that "fascism makes war at home as well as abroad, on its own people as well as on the foreigner." He also declared that Hitler's Germany and Italy's Mussolini possessed new weapons, including virulent anti-Semitism and the red bogey, which divided people within a state. The fascists appealed to frightened wealthy classes in the democratic nations, using "the hobgoblin," and then offering "protection--at a price." Italian and German spies in Latin America and in the United States trained fascist groups and promised big business the destruction of labor organizations, a removal of democratic "annoyances," a diversion of attention away from actual problems to pretended ones. Stone warned that the wealthier classes in democratic societies now displayed a lack of patriotism. He wondered whether the England of 1914 would so easily have accepted such developments as were already occurring in Spain, and which he believed were likely to take place in Czechoslovakia in the future. The popular desire to crush labor unions in Spain appeared greater than the fear of German and Italian control.<sup>43</sup>

For Stone, as for many on the left, the greatest ally of those who wanted to stifle the fascist onrush remained the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Stone reasoned

that unlike the "decayed, semi-feudal, absolutist" and anti-Semitic monarchy of 1914, the Soviet state of 1937, "though in many respects absolutist," was "nevertheless the scene of the greatest social experiment of our time." Notwithstanding the most trying difficulties--insufficient capital, widespread illiteracy, and no international security--the Soviet Communist Party was attempting "to transform the most backward of the great European nations into the most advanced." While still impoverished as compared with Americans, the Russian workers and farmers were richer than their counterparts under czarist or Balkan rule. Despite the retention of party monopoly, the new Soviet constitution apparently offered protection against bureaucracy and inefficiency, and displayed at least formal movement in the direction of democratic practices. The purge trials which had developed after the murder of a leading government official, admittedly had bewildered the outside world. Nevertheless, Stone believed that the forces of change in the Soviet Union could not be stifled.<sup>44</sup>

All peoples, Stone declared, possessed an interest in the Soviet "experiment, in its failures as well as in its achievements, for we can learn lessons from it that may save many lives and much anguish in the West. There we can see the defects of socialism as here we can see the defects of capitalism." Only the emergence of fascism prevented development of a program that would attempt prudently and gradually to avoid the weaknesses of both

systems.<sup>45</sup>

Significantly, while "feudal-capitalist" Russia had contained an imperialistic potential, this new Russia, in Stone's view, was too involved with the development of its own society to seek foreign escapades. Instead, the Soviet military was "defensive." In addition, the urgent need for peace and rebuilding had caused the relinquishment of propaganda and of cries for world revolution. The Nazi ascendancy had forced Communist ideologues to discard previously intransigent positions, as typified by the strategy which had aided in the crushing of German freedom, and had propelled formation of the Popular Front to uphold international peace and Western democracy.<sup>46</sup>

Such an alliance Stone considered to be all the more necessary as the fascist challenge to liberty and progress in 1937 appeared infinitely greater than had been the challenge posed by imperialist strivings a generation earlier. The fascist states had "launched an international class war" which they hoped to use as "an instrument of conquest." The right-wing totalitarians threatened not only imperial concerns, but the very existence of democracy, "a possession that the rise of fascism has taught our sectarian radicals not to treat lightly." Fascism would produce far graver social disorders than those resulting from imperialism, for "the fascist preaches--and practices--the abandonment of the rationalism, the individual freedom, the free institutions that were capitalism's

accompaniment, and with increased productive capacity, its historic justification." Fascism therefore endangered both democracy and the first socialist experiment.<sup>47</sup>

The menace of fascism thus necessitated the continuance and strengthening of the Popular Front. Liberals and leftists could not let redbaiters divide their ranks at home or abroad. Fearing that the spectre of fascism could move from Europe to America, Stone wrote that as the Spanish Civil War had demonstrated, when such a time arrived, "there will be only one place to which anti-fascists can look for aid in the event that they must fight for their liberties and their lives. I shall not mention that bogeyman by name."<sup>48</sup>

As he continued to analyze international events, Izzy's grave fears of fascism affected his personal life and his career, and caused certain alterations in his thought. Alarmed that fascism might spread worldwide, the journalist changed his name from Isidor Feinstein to Geoffrey Stone, and then to I. F. Stone in 1937. Not concerned so much for himself as for his family, he determined that if virulent anti-Semitism arose in the United States, then at least one of his children, his youngest son Christopher, would be safe. But in recollecting this action from a distance of over forty years, Izzy admitted that he "still felt badly about it."<sup>49</sup>

The same dread and hatred of fascism, induced Stone to make certain changes in his own thought and to favor

changes in liberal and leftist thinking generally, as indicated by a pair of articles in the Southern Review in late 1938 and early 1939. Stone now refuted his own previous analysis that American war mobilization might well produce a "fascist or totalitarian" political state, and accepted the condemnation of appeasement as issued by the social critic, Max Lerner. Stone praised Lerner for stating that in a practical though unintended sense, pacifism had aided the fascists because fascism "must expand or perish." Stone also wrote that liberal supporters of the capitalist system believed that this mushrooming fascism was a temporary, perverse aberration from the standard workings of the liberal capitalist order. Like Lerner, however, he thought that a capitalist state provided the techniques for right-wing despotism. He agreed with Lerner's declaration that a capitalist system treated the individual worker solely as a labor market commodity. It thus so thoroughly splintered the Bill of Rights by separating political and economic freedoms "that finally both slip through." And although he lauded the liberal ethos of liberty, diversity, tolerance, and sanctity of the individual, Stone wrote that liberals themselves failed to accept the modern reality of vast flux, of "gigantic revolution and counterrevolution," and that they "are made for peaceful and stable periods and hate to choose." While some liberals favored the peaceful redistribution of property, he warned that

vast transformations in the past had not been gentle. Revolutions were not "pretty affairs." Yet Stone also declared revolution to be "a last resort, not a good in itself." He called for a way to effect the peaceful movement from capitalism to socialism, stating that the ugly head of fascism had vanquished "the complacency with which the Left once waited for revolution." With the present threat of fascist aggression, civil disturbance in the democratic nations would be suicidal, and responsible individuals must diligently work to prevent such disruption. Liberals and leftists must discover a way to merge the benefits of democracy with those offered by socialism. This would not be any easy chore, but the attempt must be made. Stone believed that the possibility of creating such a middle way was greatest in America.<sup>50</sup>

Izzy's radical stance and his increasingly open advocacy of democratic socialism, coupled with his habit of arguing with his employer, caused his departure from the New York Post in early 1939. Throughout much of the thirties, the Post had served as "a real fighting liberal paper." It had been the only New York City newspaper to defend the Spanish Republic, it had backed France's Popular Front government, it had called for an alliance of anti-fascist nations, and it had defended the rights of all unpopular groups. Izzy possessed great freedom on the Post, as he had in his earlier journalistic work, and had never been forced to write anything he did not believe. Nevertheless, his constant quarreling

with J. David Stern, even if he felt that the publisher was right, perhaps became a little tiresome. Unquestionably, ideological differences also caused problems between Stern and his star writer. While Stern began to consider his former protege too inflexible in his editorial approach, the latter was troubled by an evident change in the Post's attitude toward his vaunted Popular Front ideal. Although often highly critical of the dictatorial nature of the Soviet Union, the paper had long declared that the Communist state was truly desirous of peace and a leader in the fight against fascism. With the unfolding of the Moscow Trials, however, comparisons drawn between the U.S.S.R. and the fascist nations became more frequent and more embittered. Then in February 1938, a Post editorial denounced the continual linkage of liberals and leftists, arguing that "there can be no united front for democracy with the enemies of democracy." A companion cartoon depicted Stalin grinning maliciously at "World Labor," while gripping a bloody knife behind his back. Stone, who remained wedded to the idea of the Popular Front, and a number of the more liberal members of the Post, believed that Stern was beginning to indulge in red-baiting, and some questioned their future with the paper.<sup>51</sup>

In the following year, the Post confronted financial difficulties and a red smear campaign. Izzy later stated that Stern desired "to soften up the paper, be a little



less radical, and I was too radical for him." The publisher did not want to fire Stone, for that would necessitate severance payment. Instead, Stern's longtime fair-haired boy, who had served as the paper's chief editorial writer for over five years, was demoted to the position of reporter. What soon bothered Izzy most was the lack of forthcoming assignments from Stern's editor. Finally, the American Newspaper Guild instituted legal action on the journalist's behalf, arguing that as he was doing no real work, he had been effectively discharged and was therefore entitled to severance pay. When the case went to arbitration, Francis Biddle, later Roosevelt's Attorney General, ruled against Stone.<sup>52</sup>

Having lost his New York Post job, Izzy increased his output for the Nation, a publication for which he had long written and where he had become an associate editor in 1938. He was also offered a position as press officer for the National Housing Administration, but refused the appointment. Although he basically supported the New Deal, including Roosevelt's housing program, he thought that it would be inappropriate to serve as a public employee while continuing to write for the Nation on the side. Stone did begin to work for the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, which was affiliated with Columbia University. Created in 1937, the Institute was designed to analyze propaganda of all political perspectives, and to disseminate the information to schools

and to the general public. Representing the Institute Izzy toured the nation, particularly the Western region, and reported on the Associated Farmers, an organization created by agri-business interests to prevent the unionization of farm workers.<sup>53</sup>

The Associated Farmers, Stone found, engaged in anti-Semitic activities and adopted the red scare technique to denigrate unionization efforts. He acknowledged that Communists in the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union had actively pushed for the organization of farm laborers. But the reason for their being so heavily involved with migratory farm workers was the lack of concern displayed by the conservative labor leaders in the AFL. Stone reasoned that were it not for miserable wages and working conditions, no farm laborers would be willing to strike. The red agitation charge, he thought, was employed to besmirch anyone who attempted to organize the workers. Other anti-union devices used by the Associated Farmers included ordinances outlawing picketing, criminal syndicalism laws, blacklists, and violence. Leading agri-business concerns associated with the Associated Farmers supported the California Cavaliers, a para-military group formed "to stamp out all un-American activity among farm labor."<sup>54</sup>

Stone later identified the Associated Farmers as "really a fascist big-landowner movement." The trek across the country had been an eye-opener, and had taught him much about racism and prejudice. The Associated

Farmers denigrated the impoverished migrants from the Southwest, "our oldest American stock," and a type of pseudo-racial mythology developed concerning the migrants. The people in cities spoke of the farm laborers as many Americans talked about blacks or Chicanos: "We wouldn't want our children to go to school with Okies or Arkies, they're dirty, they smell bad, they steal." The migrants, residing in shacks outside the towns, "suddenly became aliens in their own homeland."<sup>55</sup>

A short time after the publication of his article on the Associated Farmers, the Nation printed Stone's review of Carey McWilliams's Factories in the Field, which also discussed the situation of farm workers. Stone wrote that the big farmers ruthlessly wanted only to exploit labor, and that they had early adopted the Hitlerian technique of fostering racial antagonisms among laborers. The land barons had long smashed unionization efforts, including that of "the heroic Wobblies" of the World War I era. Now only a comparable suppression of civil liberties, Stone believed, could prevent farm worker organization. But a further danger existed. A violation of basic freedoms might be employed "on a systematic, state-wide basis" against farm labor unionization, which could "provide storm troops" for the American nation. Stone also warned that because of unmitigated greed and the vast waste of resources, material and human, class confrontation appeared "endemic in California."

The only solution appeared to be replacement of monopolistic agri-business by "collective agriculture."<sup>56</sup>

By the summer of 1939, while he worried about a possible acceleration of reactionary influences at home, Stone agonized over the spreading fascist drive in Europe. In the previous year, German soldiers had marched into Vienna, cheered by Austrian sympathizers. A second French government headed by Leon Blum had collapsed. At Munich, British prime minister Neville Chamberlain and French premier Edouard Daladier had acceded to Hitler's demands for the seizure of the Sudetenland from democratic Czechoslovakia. Then in early 1939, the insatiable German dictator had moved his troops into Prague, demanding territory and concessions. Franco in the meantime, had declared that the Spanish Civil War was at an end.<sup>57</sup>

Stone still hoped that aid to England and France might enable the United States to remain out of the impending war. He continued to condemn "illusory isolation," and cautioned that Hitler was "out to dominate the world." Only collective action could prevent that, and any further appeasement would result in "war or worse." Yet Stone would not grant "a blank check" to the "pro-Fascist elements" dominant in the English and French governments. Rather, he believed that the wisest course involved granting flexible authority to Roosevelt, a man who despite all of his vacillations was a true democrat at the helm of the world's leading democratic state.<sup>58</sup>

The Popular Front remained the only viable anti-fascist

force for Stone and for a number of leading American intellectuals. But the Soviet purge trials of 1936-39 and Communist repression in Spain had caused many long-standing supporters of the Communist nation to question the Russian judicial system and the general practices of the Stalin-ruled government. Angered over the dictatorial practices of Joseph Stalin, a number of liberals and radicals including Sidney Hook and John Dewey formed the Committee for Cultural Freedom, called for an end of the Popular Front, and condemned those intellectuals who served as apologists for the Soviet dictatorship while attacking German totalitarianism.<sup>59</sup>

The intensified fascist aggression, which only the U.S.S.R. seemed directly to oppose, however, caused many American intellectuals to continue supporting a broad anti-fascist front. Thus, in a letter addressed to "all active supporters of democracy and peace," such American progressives as Roger Baldwin, Waldo Frank, Dashiell Hammett, Ernest Hemingway, Granville Hicks, Matthew Josephson, Corliss Lamont, Max Lerner, Clifford Odets, S. J. Perlman, James Thurber, William Carlos Williams, and I. F. Stone blasted the Committee for Cultural Freedom and like-minded organizations. They affirmed that anti-fascist solidarity was all important, that the fascists and their kind knew that democracy would triumph provided that unity on the left were maintained. The fascists and their allies therefore attempted to denigrate the Soviet Union and to divide the Popular

Front. To promote hostility toward Russia, they espoused "the fantastic falsehood that the U.S.S.R. and the totalitarian states are basically alike." The pro-Soviet petition stated that a number of sincere liberals had supported the foolish manifesto of the Committee for Cultural Freedom which denounced "in vague, undefined terms all forms of 'dictatorship' [while asserting] that the fascist states and Soviet Russia equally menace American institutions and the democratic way of life." Refuting such an analysis, the rebuttal praised the Soviet Union as a staunch opponent of war and aggression, and as the first socialist nation. Russia was saluted for the elimination of "racial and national prejudices," the emancipation of women and families, vast cultural and educational advances, the socialization of industry and agriculture, nation-wide planning, the incorporation of trade unions into Soviet society, sophisticated scientific experimental techniques, improved living standards, and a termination of unemployment. The letter cheered the movement within the U.S.S.R. toward "steadily expanding democracy in every sphere," called the Stalin dictatorship "a transitional form," and lauded the "epoch-making new constitution" which purportedly guaranteed all citizens political and economic freedoms.<sup>60</sup>

Unquestionably, a number of signatories to this manifesto sincerely believed that the Soviet Union remained the best hope to combat fascism. After all, the one country to support the Spanish Republic against

Franco's falangists and to back the democracy of Czechoslovakia, had been Russia. The supposed democracies of France and England on the other hand, had refused to defend the Spanish Republic and had accepted Hitler's demands to carve up the eastern European state. Some, like Stone, possessed longheld misgivings about the authoritarian nature of Stalinist Russia. But for such individuals, the immediate battle against fascism was of paramount importance, and that battle necessitated continuation of a broad anti-fascist front. And significantly, even at this date, many of these leftists still looked at the Soviet Union as the great socialist experiment, despite its flaws and inequities. Thus, they were convinced that Russia must be defended from attacks by either well-meaning progressives or rightists.

Still, only the increasing desperation of the times, incredible naivete, a measure of disingenuousness, or blind faith in a "socialist" ideal could enable men of such intelligence--and in the case of I. F. Stone, of such political independence and intellectual integrity--to give unconditional support to a regime whose oppressiveness was becoming ever more blatant. Undoubtedly, Stone's deepseated fear and hatred of fascism enabled him to approve the petition. Yet a disturbing question remains: how could this undogmatic writer, who truly believed in libertarian principles, approve of a letter extolling the increased democratization of the Communist nation, so shortly after the disturbing Moscow Trials?

The world of the Popular Fronters collapsed on 23 August 1939 when the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. The agreement stunned American leftists and liberals, who watched in disbelief as the world's only socialist state made common cause with the world's leading fascist one. Coupled with the increased information about the purge trials and about Stalinist terror in general, the declaration astonished and angered many in the left-leaning ranks. For numerous leftists, the dream of a rational and progressive Communist Russia vanished forever. "The masquerade is over" exclaimed radical journalist Heywood Broun. The American Communist Party, which rapidly shifted from a stalwart anti-fascist position to a condemnation of the allied states, was never again to possess the high standing that it had attained during the 1930s among many intellectuals and trade unionists. The dismay and disgust felt by many progressives was soon to evolve into a militant anti-Communist posture, one that never really dissipated despite wartime exigencies.<sup>61</sup>

The journalist Richard Rovere, who became a staunch critic of Stone, once remarked that he could "recall no one from the period who was more outraged by that outrageous document." Discussing the American Communists, many of whom seemed to be in a state of shell-shock, Stone wrote on September 23: "All of us who felt



that the Soviet Union was the core of the world front against fascism shared their indignation and contemptuous disbelief" that such an agreement could be in the making. Such a development would obviously "discredit the Soviet Union." Despite his evident dismay over the pact, however, Stone appeared to place the greater blame on the Allied statesmen, particularly damning Neville Chamberlain and his appeasement policy along with the British disinclination to form an alliance with the Russians. Stone stated that the Soviet desire to avoid war and to compel the surrender of Polish territory unquestionably had provided the Russian impetus behind the agreement. Stalin hoped that Hitler would drive westward, not eastward, but Stone declared that the Soviet dictator would be "as rudely surprised" as the English prime minister unless an Anglo-Russian alliance were forthcoming.<sup>62</sup>

A short time after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet accord, the German army invaded Poland, and Britain and France quickly responded with a declaration of war. World War II had officially begun. Stone condemned Russian and German aggression for the rape of Poland, but he also blamed British inaction. Had there existed an Anglo-Soviet tie, he argued, Hitler would never have dared such a move.<sup>63</sup>

The events of 1939 threw the American left into disarray. The demise of the Popular Front, which had been so strongly supported by the Communists, produced

a great vacuum on the left. Shortly after the bomb-shell reports of the Nazi-Soviet pact, a number of left-wing intellectuals met to discuss the possible formation of "a new non-Communist united front." Disillusioned leftists such as Max Lerner, Richard Rovere, Paul Sweezy, Matthew Josephson, Malcolm Cowley, Leo Huberman, James Wechsler, and I. F. Stone gathered to mull over the feasibility of establishing a new, basically educational political organization, to be comprised of "progressive elements on the left." They believed that the American left should be reconstituted, that the Communist Party "was finally exposed as a branch of the Soviet Foreign Office," and that sectarianism had crippled American radical groups in the past. Little came of the idea, however, and many of the early proponents of a "New Beginnings" entity soon became bitter ideological foes.<sup>64</sup>

The fragmentation on the left appeared to widen when the national board of the American Civil Liberties Union, including Roger Baldwin, Norman Thomas, and John Haynes Holmes, voted to expel activist Elizabeth Gurley Flynn from the organization in February 1940. Anger over the Nazi-Soviet agreement no doubt caused many staunch civil libertarians to urge the ouster of Flynn, a Communist with roots in the IWW. She was after all, they reasoned, affiliated with a totalitarian political organization. A group of seventeen liberals, including Franz Boas, Theodore Dreiser, Robert Lynd,

Carey McWilliams, Wechsler, and Stone unsuccessfully urged the rescinding of the purge.<sup>65</sup>

Continuing to uphold the progressive banner in 1940, Izzy for a short period edited a journal designed to assist small investors. In the summer and early fall, he wrote three complete issues of the American Investors Union monthly magazine, Your Investments. Formed in late 1939 with such directors as John T. Flynn, Robert Lynd, and George Seldes, the AIU carefully watched developments "in the investment, savings and insurance fields," and proposed legislation, particularly to protect small investors and depositors. To aid members, the AIU analyzed business accounts and merger and reorganization requests, and served as proxy at corporate gatherings. In the union periodical, Stone berated the attempt to reduce protection of investors, attacked the political power and the irresponsibility of investment trusts, and defended corporate minority interests. He challenged proposed regulatory changes which he declared were designed to gut such pieces of legislation as the Truth-In-Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act.

Although a real need existed for increased mobilization of American industrial and military power, Stone declared that authentic defense requirements must not provide an excuse for a return to the financial malpractices which had helped to usher in the Great Depression.

He also reasoned that American national interest ultimately demanded the confidence of investors and depositors, for individuals who had been financially devastated by corrupt promoters and speculating bankers provided "the sour soil in which the subversive thrives best."<sup>66</sup>

That fall, Izzy obtained the best paying job he had yet held, serving as a \$250 a week speech writer and publicist for Lawrence Tibbett of the American Guild of Musical Artists. Tibbett was battling James C. Petrillo, head of the American Federation of Musicians, who wanted to take over the music guild. Tibbett opposed the proposed union, considering Petrillo to be a tyrant and a crook.<sup>67</sup>

During his third week on the job, however, Stone received an offer from Freda Kirchwey to serve as Washington editor of the Nation. Izzy took the position, which offered a weekly stipend of only \$75, and moved with his wife and children to Washington, D. C. The new salary was inadequate to support the Stone family, and he began writing on space for the Washington Post.

He also started to work for the new, experimental newspaper PM, becoming a special correspondent in January 1941. PM attracted a cadre of left-wing and liberal reporters and editors, who attempted to present progressive news coverage to the public. Professing no ideology and adhering to no political party, PM

promised only to support the downtrodden, both at home and abroad. The left-leaning makeup of the staff soon resulted in condemnations of the paper as red-oriented. Publisher Ralph Ingersoll, nevertheless, favored a stolidly anti-isolationist position, directly contrary to that held by American Communist Party members after late August 1939.<sup>68</sup>

Thus unlike many on the American left, Stone retained both his radicalism and his critical independence as the 1930s closed. The period had witnessed the rise and the diminution of progressive ranks, as the Great Depression, the New Deal, and the threat of fascism abroad at first attracted many to the left side of the political spectrum, while Stalinist practices and the Nazi-Soviet agreement subsequently disrupted and weakened the left. Stone failed to follow the rightward passage of a number of liberals and former radicals, despite his acknowledgement that the Soviet Union no longer provided a socialist vision. Throughout the period, his support for both structural domestic transformations and anti-fascism remained constant.

From the first year of the Roosevelt administration to the outbreak of World War II, Stone's articles and editorials reflected his belief that in a time of great turmoil, FDR's New Deal offered the possibility of peaceful correction of large-scale economic and social inequities in America. He criticized the often

faltering nature of New Deal reformism, but supported the attempt to bring about changes in the American economic and social system. The mass support won by totalitarian leaders only reinforced his belief that an effort must be made to marry socialism and democracy. Socialism without democracy produced a system which failed to protect liberties; formal political freedom without a degree of economic equality could only result in a demise of true democracy.

All such freedoms, Stone feared, were threatened by the fascist upsurge of the 1920s and 1930s. To blunt the internal threat posed by the right-wing authoritarians, he had long favored anti-fascist alliances of leftists and liberals within the democracies. Increasingly, he viewed an international Popular Front as equally essential. With the isolationist movement remaining potent in the United States, with the major European powers apparently unwilling or unable to combat the increasing aggression of the fascist states, Stone, like many Americans left-of-center, early perceived the Soviet Union as the leading anti-fascist bulwark. The announcement of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact, however, destroyed the Popular Front in which Stone and many others had invested so much hope, and the American left splintered. Yet despite his dismay and disgust, Stone remained true to the radical course as the new decade began.

## FOOTNOTES

### CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup>Stone, "New York Loyal To Its Own," Post, 11 December 1933, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Stone, "The No-Man Says 'Yes,'" Post, 21 December 1933, p. 8; Stone, "A President Who Dared," Post, 5 March 1934, p. 10; Stone, "The President Goes to Bat for a Permanent New Deal," Post, 4 January 1934, p. 8; Stone, "Why They Riot," Post, 9 April 1934, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup>Stone, "Rocking the Repeal Boat," Post, 12 December 1933, p. 10; Stone, "How Smart Are Our Utility Companies?," Post, 19 February 1934, p. 6; Stone, "Scuttled," Post, 13 February 1934, p. 8; Stone, "Central Bank--or Government Banks?," Post, 17 February 1934, p. 6; Stone, "Take the Profit Out of War," Post, 14 April 1934, p. 6; Stone, "Stop the Blood Business," Post, 18 May 1934, p. 8; Stone, "The Yardstick Starts Measuring," Post, 28 December 1933, p. 8; Stone, "Attacking the Slum in Earnest," Post, 4 January 1934, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup>Stone, "Unlike the Dinosaur," Post, 7 March 1934, p. 8; Stone, "The 'Radical' New Deal," Post, 22 March 1934, p. 6.

<sup>5</sup>Stone, "Congress Must Save NRA," Post, 2 January 1934, p. 6; Stone, "Without Unionization There Can Be No New Deal," Post, 7 February 1934, p. 8; Stone, "Pass the Wagner Bill," Post, 25 May 1934, p. 8; Stone, "Racketeering in the A. F. of L.: I. The Poultry Racket," The Nation 141 (September 11, 1935): 288-89; Stone, "Racketeering in the A. F. of L.: II. Skulduggery in New York," The Nation 141 (September 18, 1935): 316-18.

<sup>6</sup>Stone, "How to Make a Riot," The New Republic 79 (June 27, 1934): 178-80.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.; Stone, "Spying on the Jobless," The New Republic 84 (October 30, 1935): 328-31.

<sup>9</sup>Stone, "The Nazi Way to Fight the Nazi Poison," Post, 26 April 1934, p. 6; Stone, "This Is Still Free America," Post, 15 February 1934, p. 6; Stone, "Disgraceful," Post, 19 February 1934, p. 6; Stone, "Hitlerism or Americanism?," Post, 31 March 1934, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup>Stone, "A May Day Notable--For Good Sense," Post, 3 May 1934, p. 6; Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 95-117; Donald R. McCoy, Angry Voices: Left-of-Center Politics in the New Deal Era (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1958), pp. 40-139; Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pp. 15-41, 96-124; Burns, The Lion, pp. 209-15, 220-26; T. Harry Williams, Huey Long (New York: Knopf, 1969), pp. 676-864; Sheldon Marcus, Father Coughlin: The Tumultuous Life of the Priest of the Little Flower (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 3-138; Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1982); Abraham Holtzman, The Townsend Movement: A Political Study (New York: Bookman Associates, 1963), pp. 17-189; Leon Harris, Upton Sinclair: American Rebel (New York: Crowell, 1975).

<sup>11</sup>James Green, The World of the Worker: Labor in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980), pp. 138-150; Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, pp. 406-19; Burns, The Lion, pp. 215-20.

<sup>12</sup>Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 124-66; Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, pp. 296-315; Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics, pp. 291-324, 343-84.

<sup>13</sup>Stone, "Unfit to Print," The Nation 141 (December 25, 1935): 740-41.

<sup>14</sup>Stone, "Starving on Relief," The Nation 142 (February 12, 1936): 186-87.

<sup>15</sup>"A Great President Leads a Great Nation," Post, 26 August 1935, p. 10; "England Had Our New Deal Years Ago," Post, 31 August 1935, p. 6; "There Is a New Deal," Post, 2 January 1936, p. 6; "The Balance Sheet of the New Deal," Post, 6 June 1936, p. 6; "Roosevelt at Little Rock," Post, 11 June 1936, p. 6; "Landon," in Press Time: A Book of Post Classics (New York: Books, Inc., 1936), pp. 221-23; "Political Miracle at Philadelphia," in Press Time, pp. 224-27; George Wolfskill, The Revolt of the Conservatives: A History of the American Liberty



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<sup>16</sup>Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 124-66; Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics, pp. 447-96; Burns, The Lion, pp. 229-34, 240, 291-94. The Post acclaimed that "Democracy Triumphs" in its November 4 issue (p. 18).

<sup>17</sup>Stone, The Court Disposes (New York: Covici, Friede, Publishers, 1937), pp. 12, 35, 70-71, 73-74, 76-79, 86-89, passim; "'Unpacking' the Supreme Court," Post, 8 February 1937, p. 6; "The Worst That Can Happen Is Democracy," Post, 9 February 1937, p. 6.

<sup>18</sup>Stone, "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties," The Nation 144 (February 6, 1937), pp. 151-53.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 153; Stone, The Court, pp. 99-100, 102-104.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp. 104-105.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 113-14, 127.

<sup>22</sup>Stone, "The Greatest Strike-Breaker of All," The Nation 149 (March 25, 1939): 346-48.

<sup>23</sup>Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 233-38; Burns, The Lion, pp. 303-304.

<sup>24</sup>Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 238-39, 252-74; Burns, The Lion, pp. 315, 337-49; Stone "Hyde Park, Tennessee Style," The New Republic 92 (October 20, 1937): 317-18.

<sup>25</sup>Stone, "Company in the Doghouse," The New Republic 93 (January 5, 1938): 251.

<sup>26</sup>Stone, "Corporate Tammany Hall," The Nation 141 (December 18, 1935): 710; Stone, "It Happened in Harlan," Current History 49 (September, 1938): 29-31.

<sup>27</sup>Stone, "Our Reigning Families," The New Republic 93 (December 29, 1937): 233.

<sup>28</sup> Stanley G. Payne, Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), pp. 65-67, 72-84, 88-95, 107-116, 342-48; Sontag, A Broken World, pp. 142-47, 164-65; Martin Kitchen, The Coming of Austrian Fascism (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980), p. 5; Stone, "Chains," Post, 11 May 1934, p. 8; Stone, "Barricades Against Brown Shirt Barbarism," Post, 13 February 1934, p. 8; Stone, "Murdering His Own Allies," Post, 14 February 1934, p. 8; Stone, "The Road Back," Post, 21 May 1934, p. 6; Stone, "Why Fascism Means War," Post, 27 April 1934, p. 10; Stone, "Better to Take the Bull by the Horns," Post, 19 February 1934, p. 6; Stone, "Peace Hangs Upon a Thread," Post, 26 July 1934, p. 8.

<sup>29</sup> "Haile Selassie Before the League," Post, 2 July 1936, p. 6.

<sup>30</sup> Cantor, The Divided Left, pp. 114-15; Interview, 15 October 1981; "The Old New Lefty," Time 97 (February 8, 1971): 47.

<sup>31</sup> Cantor, The Divided Left, pp. 115-18, 123-24, 129-42; Howe and Coser, The American Communist Party, pp. 319-86; Weinstein, Ambiguous Legacy, pp. 57-86; Diggins, The American Left, pp. 111-29; David Cate, The Fellow Travellers: A Postscript to the Enlightenment (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973), pp. 73-184. The finest study of the American Popular Front is Frank A. Warren's Liberals and Communism: The 'Red Decade' Revisited (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966).

<sup>32</sup> James Wechsler, The Age of Suspicion (New York: Random House, 1953), pp. 139-40; Louis Budenz, The Cry Is Peace (Chicago: Henry Regency Company, 1952), pp. 107-108; Interview, 15 October 1981; Simone de Beauvoir, The Mandarins, trans. Leonard M. Friedman (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1956).

<sup>33</sup> Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979); George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1952); Interview, 15 October 1981; Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977); Arthur H. Landis, The American Lincoln Brigade (New York: The Citadel Press, 1967); Vincent Brome, The International Brigade, Spain 1936-1939 (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1966); Robert A. Rosenstone, Crusade of the Left: The Lincoln Battalion in the Spanish Civil War (New York: Pegasus, 1969).

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.; Stone, "The Nazi Way to Fight the Nazi Poison," Post, 26 April 1934, p. 6; Stone, "Crooners for the Comrades," Post, 19 May 1934, p. 4; Stone, "Chains," Post, 11 May 1934, p. 8; Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968); Borys Levytsky, The Stalinist Terror in the Thirties: Documentation from the Soviet Press (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1974). Many students of the Stalin terror believe that the clearest depiction is presented in the novel by Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon, trans. Daphen Hardy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941).

<sup>35</sup>Interview, 15 October 1981.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Interview, 15 October 1981; Diggins, The American Left, pp. 129-35; Howe and Coser, The American Communist Party, pp. 15-16; Jessica Mitford, A Fine Old Conflict (New York: Vintage Books, 1978); Cantor, The Divided Left, pp. 142-44.

<sup>38</sup>Payne, Fascism, pp. 78-87, 89-96, 129-35, 151-54, 348-54; Stone, "Neutrality--A Dangerous Myth," The Nation 145 (September 18, 1937): 283-85.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Stone, "1937 Is Not 1914," The Nation 145 (November 6, 1937): 495-97.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981. See The Nation 145 (September 18, 1937): 283; The Nation 145 (October 2, 1937): 345.

<sup>50</sup>Stone, "Max Lerner's Capitalist Collectivism," The Southern Review 4 (Spring, 1939): 647, 654, 655, 656, 657, 662-63; Stone, "Jerome Frank's Dilemma," The Southern Review 4 (Autumn, 1938): 225-26.

<sup>51</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981; "Democracy Fights For Its Life In Spain," Post, 1 August 1936, p. 1; "Democracy Is at Stake in Spain," Post, 11 August 1936, p. 8; "The Lines Shift in Spain," Post, 21 May 1937, p. 10; "France Tries a New Deal," Post, 19 August 1936, p. 6; "Peace Hangs Upon a Thread," Post, 26 July 1934, p. 8; "Crisis at Geneva," Post, 14 September 1935, p. 6; Stern, Memoirs, pp. 245-45; The Reminiscences of J. David Stern, Columbia University Oral History Project, 1972, pp. 89-90; "The Two-Edged Sword of Terror," Post, 7 December 1934, p. 10; "Hobgoblins in Moscow," Post, 19 January 1935, p. 8; "The Case Against Dictatorship," Post, 24 June 1935, p. 10; "Brass Knuckles on a Dove of Peace," Post, 26 August 1936, p. 8; "Russia Refuses to Co-operate," Post, 19 January 1937, p. 6; "Jitters in the Kremlin," Post, 18 August 1936, p. 8; "'Borsch,'" Post, 1 December 1936, p. 8; "?????????", Post, 26 January 1937, p. 6; "Government by Purge," Post, 9 February 1937, p. 6; "Where Thought . . . Is Bowed Down," Post, 28 April 1937, p. 10; "The Real Question Behind the Russian Trials," Post, 14 June 1937, p. 6; "Freedom of the Press--a la Russe," Post, 22 July 1937, p. 8; "The Occupational Disease of Dictators," Post, 14 December 1937, p. 18; "Josef (He-Is-the-Law) Stalin," Post, 14 January 1938, p. 18; "Stalin Takes Off His Mask," Post, 15 February 1938, p. 1.

<sup>52</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981.

<sup>53</sup>Stone is first listed as an associate editor of the Nation in the September 24, 1938 issue; Interview, 16 October 1981; "Propaganda Probe," Time 30, Part 2 (October 11, 1937): 59; "The American Fascists," The New Republic 98 (March 8, 1939): 117-18; "Analysis of Propaganda: Institute Teaches How to Bare Influences on Public Opinion," Newsweek 13 (April 3, 1939): 32.

<sup>54</sup>Stone, "The Associate Farmers," Propaganda Analysis: A Bulletin to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and

and Analyze Propaganda II (August 1, 1939): 1-12.

<sup>55</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981.

<sup>56</sup>Stone, "The Class Conflict, Sunkist Style," The Nation 149 (August 5, 1939): 158-59.

<sup>57</sup>Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Anschluss (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963); Joel Colton, Leon Blum: Humanist in Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1966), pp. 292-306; Telford Taylor, Munich: The Price of Peace (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.), pp. 1-67, 378-1004; Fraser, Blood of Spain, p. 507.

<sup>58</sup>Stone, "America and the Next War: II," The New Republic 99 (June 21, 1939): 177-78.

<sup>59</sup>Diggins, The American Left, pp. 129-35; Cantor, The Divided Left, pp. 142-44.

<sup>60</sup>Matthew Josephson, Infidel in the Temple: A Memoir of the Nineteen-Thirties (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1967), p. 477; "To All Active Supporters of Democracy and Peace," The Nation 149 (August 26, 1939): 228.

<sup>61</sup>On the Nazi-Soviet connection, see Nicholas Fleming, August 1939: The Last Days of Peace (New York: Holmes & Meier, Publishers, Inc., 1979), pp. 124-32; James E. McSherry, Stalin, Hitler and Europe: The Origins of World War II, 1933-1939, Volume I (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 212-52; McSherry, Stalin, Hitler and Europe: The Imbalance of Power, 1939-1941 (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 242-49; Barry A. Leach, German Strategy Against Russia, 1939-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973); Robert Cecil, Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia, 1941 (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1975); Cantor, The Divided Left, pp. 144; Diggins, The American Left, pp. 135-36; Michael R. Belknap, Cold War Political Justice: The Smith Act, the Communist Party, and American Civil Liberties (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1977); Howe and Coser, The American Communist Party, pp. 387-91; Norman Holmes Pearson, "The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the End of a Dream," in America in Crisis: Fourteen Crucial Episodes in American History, ed. Daniel Aaron (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1952), pp. 327-48; Mary Sperling McAuliffe,

Crisis on the Left: Cold War Politics and American Liberals, 1947-54 (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978); Norman Markowitz, "A View From the Left: From the Popular Front to Cold War Liberalism," in The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism, eds. Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974): 98.

<sup>62</sup>Quoted in Meyer, "The Rolling Stone," p. 931; Stone, "Chamberlain's Russo-German Pact," The Nation 149 (September 23, 1939): 313-16.

<sup>63</sup>Fleming, August 1939, pp. 178-219; Stone, "The Chicken or the Egg?," The Nation 149 (November 4, 1939): 500-501.

<sup>64</sup>Daniel Aaron, Writers on the Left (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961), p. 388; Wechsler, The Age of Suspicion, p. 153.

<sup>65</sup>Lamson, Roger Baldwin, pp. 232-36; Swanberg, Norman Thomas, p. 238; Cedric Belfrage, The American Inquisition, 1945-1960 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), p. 37; Corliss Lamont, ed., The Trial of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn by the American Civil Liberties Union (New York: Horizon Press, 1968).

<sup>66</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981; "Investors Organize," The Nation 149 (December 23, 1939): 697; "The Objectives of AIU," Your Investments (hereinafter referred to as YI) 1 (August, 1940): 47; Stone, "Defense Hysteria and the Investor," YI (July, 1940): 3-9; Stone, "Less Truth in Securities?," YI (July, 1940): 10-23; Stone, "4,000,000 Ketterings Can Be Wrong," YI (July, 1940): 24-34; Stone, "A Bill of Rights for Corporate Minorities," YI (August, 1940): 3-13; Stone, "Banana Oil, Bingo and Barge Lines," YI 1 (July, 1940): 35-64; Stone, "When Logic Takes a Holiday," YI 1 (September, 1940): 3-7; Stone, "Heads You Lose, Tails I Win," YI 1 (September, 1940): 24-31.

<sup>67</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981; "The Worst Enemies of Labor Will Find . . .," The Nation 151 (September 7, 1940): 182.

<sup>68</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981; Richard H. Rovere, "Here Comes, 'PM,'" The Nation 150 (June 8, 1940): 700-703; Stone is listed as the Washington editor of the Nation in the January 18, 1941 issue.

### CHAPTER III

#### WORLD WAR II AND THE ANTI-FASCIST FIGHT, 1940-1945, AND BEYOND

In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms:

The first is freedom of speech and expression--everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way--everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want--which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants--everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear -- which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor--anywhere in the world.

That is no vision of a distant millenium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our time and generation. . . ."

Franklin D. Roosevelt

By 1940, the fascist peril loomed ever larger to Stone. With nation after nation falling before the fascist armies, he continued to advocate aid to the Allied Powers, the joining of anti-fascist forces, and the concept of collective security. Gradually, he moved toward support of American military mobilization. As the

war evolved, and after the German attack on Russia, Stone questioned the aims of those who failed to back wholeheartedly the nation which seemed to be bearing the greatest brunt of the fighting, the Soviet Union. When the end of the conflagration appeared in sight, he favored creation of an international body of nations to assist in the transition toward a peaceful and just world order. As an early anti-Cold Warrior, he sharply denounced those who seemed to equate Communism with fascism, and who began to compare the Soviet state with Nazi Germany. Stone also recognized that the rising discontent among the colonized peoples of the world posed yet another grave problem for international peace.

As Stone followed the course of the war, domestic shortcomings remained a vitally important concern, for he wanted to ensure that the fight against fascism did not lead to reaction at home. With an Allied victory appearing more and more certain, he increasingly focused upon the necessity of a just and efficient reconstruction process. As World War II approached its denouement, Stone called for an expansion of the reformism of the New Deal period and movement toward democratic socialism.

As late as March 1940, he had retained his hope that America could remain at peace. Like many antiwar activists and many isolationists, he charged that propaganda was being employed to drag the United States into the conflict. Despite his condemnation of fascism, he



refused to analyze the war as a struggle between total good and total evil. He castigated English and French imperialism, and declared that "the seeds of Kaiserism and Hitlerism" were evident in the political thought of many in the Allied nations. Reverting to an earlier analysis, he warned that nothing was so apt to cultivate the germs of fascism in the democratic nations "as another war to end war." Stone declared that he still saw no issue that justified American intervention, and indicated that he could foresee no solution to the European conflicts that "could possibly compensate us for the expenditure of lives and money, and for the bigotry, madness, and folly inevitably unchained by war." Still sensitive to the effects of the Nazi-Soviet pact, he now wrote that the European struggles appeared to be recurrences of Old World rivalries and imperialistic aspirations. Ideologies had been transformed but the old ingredients of "national interest, geographical position, and commercial rivalry" still dominated. He suspected that such seemingly interminable quarrels would only end as had the fratricidal Greek wars, "with mutual exhaustion."<sup>1</sup>

Warning his readers of a possible Anglo-French alliance with Germany against the Soviet Union, Stone also feared that military operations might be conducted "to make Russia safe for oil cartels and capitalism." He indicated that he would not champion the current Soviet government, and condemned its propaganda attack against

neighboring Finland. Regardless of the true character of the Russian regime, however, a crusade against it similar to the holy war Britain had waged against the French Revolution, would only provide justification for the severest type of repression in America. Stone believed that this potential for crushing social reform, and not empathy for the Russian people, appealed to many in the anti-Soviet camp. The journalist was to repeat those prescient analysis many times in the years ahead.<sup>2</sup>

In spite of his fear of U.S. intervention, the April German blitzkrieg against Denmark and Norway; the May attack on Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg; and the French collapse in June, seemed to convince Stone that it could no longer be avoided. Beginning in August and continuing for the duration of the war, he analyzed the American mobilization drive, discussing its slow pace, inefficiency, and resulting injustices. Stone carefully traced developments in industries considered integral to the mobilization process. He accused the aviation industry of engaging "in a sit-down strike against the national defense program" in order to force all possible governmental concessions, and berated corporate interests for their emphases on "business as usual." Accustomed to treat labor with a heavy hand, big business had little inclination to improve wages and working conditions for workers in defense-related industries. Used to monopolistic practices, big business

desired to keep small companies from obtaining government contracts. Antagonistic to the very notion of competition, big business wanted to ensure that pre-war cartels, even those connected with fascist states, would remain intact after the war had ended. Desirous of milking every possible penny, big business continued trading with the Axis powers during the early mobilization period and even during the war.<sup>3</sup>

Essential to the mobilization endeavor, Stone thought, were a contented labor force and a move to break monopolistic practices. Only full implementation of the Wagner Act and a general democratization of the industrial process would assuage America's workers. Stone praised labor, stating that the workers alone desired the full employment essential to American mobilization. In addition, labor supported efforts to curb industrial monopolization, which fostered low wages, high prices, and inadequate productivity. Possible solutions included greater governmental regulation, the development of TVA-type yardsticks in all major industries, or vastly increased production levels. Another alternative would resolve the problem of Roosevelt's one-third ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed. But large corporations feared the reduction of profit margins, preferring an economy of scarcity and an underutilization of productive capacity. Once again, only labor with its goal of total employment, favored full productivity.<sup>4</sup>

A major component of a successful mobilization venture required termination of business as usual practices involving international trade by large American corporations and actions by their ally, the U.S. State Department. Stone cited two examples concerning company dealings with Japan. He charged that American corporations were helping to arm the Japanese, members of the most dangerous alliance that the United States had ever faced, and he denounced "patriotic" oil companies and Secretary of State Cordell Hull for the continuation of commercial dealings with Japan, in spite of an oil embargo. While repeatedly documenting such trade, Stone wrote that commerce with the Axis powers must be prohibited.<sup>5</sup>

The reelection of Roosevelt to an unprecedented third term in November 1940 assured Stone and the nation that the mobilization effort would continue, albeit for many, at an often exasperating pace. In January, the House of Representatives acted to expedite mobilization, by granting broad executive powers to produce or purchase "any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States." An augmented lend-lease program, which aided a faltering Great Britain, evolved from this enactment. While isolationist publications such as Colonel Robert McCormick's Chicago Tribune condemned the bill, H. R. 1776, as dictatorial, Stone considered it essential to prevent bottlenecks in the

defense effort. On 25 January he wrote in the Nation that the United States might be approaching history's greatest war, and declared that Americans were striving "for imperial responsibilities and have become the focus of world-wide hopes and fears." Stone went so far as to state that "if 1776 stands as the symbol of our emergence from colonial status to independence, H.R. 1776 is the symbol of our determination a century and a half later to decide the destiny of the world." Increased American involvement in the international arena he considered essential to prevent a recurrence of diplomatic disasters. The Western nations had failed to aid the Spanish Republic and Czechoslovakia, but England's defeat had to be avoided and the convoying of ships to the island nation was therefore vital.<sup>6</sup>

Stone nevertheless continued to question the unfolding of the defense effort, and the direction of U.S. foreign policy. In early 1941, he exclaimed that a government which was incapable of ordering national production, could not mobilize the world for freedom. He thought that so long as big business interests dominated the defense program, the United States risked defeat and the disdain of the very states it encouraged to battle the Axis powers. He declared that a government that could not prevent oil interests, with their "rancid" practices, from aiding its enemies, was "too flabby" to wage a victorious fight. At one point, he asked whether the oil companies and FDR wanted "to save" Il Duce." An oil

embargo would have destroyed Mussolini during the Ethiopian war, "but the Foreign Office boys and the State Department boys" had feared that an Italian revolution would result. Stone contended that such a revolution should occur in Italy, and that in the meantime, the U.S. should help to establish "a democratic government-in-exile for the Italian people." America needed to indicate to the Italians that liberation was forthcoming.<sup>7</sup>

The very nature of the war, especially for those left-of-center, seemed to change in June 1941, when Germany attacked Russia. Stone had condemned the Nazi-Soviet agreement, the Russian incursions against Poland and "Pravda's belly-crawling assurances to Hitler." Now, however, the possibility of a reemergent anti-fascist alliance appeared. Just such a combination, Stone believed, was opposed by many people in the Allied nations. He charged that a number of big businessmen feared sacrifices, were never the strongest anti-fascists, and looked on America's new ally with disdain.<sup>8</sup>

Stone also blamed Roosevelt for inaction, claiming that greater leadership was essential. Instead, the President still approached "the war issue . . . obliquely and by subterfuge," still allowed trade with Vichy France, and still failed to oppose big business control of defense efforts. Stone warned that continued trade with the Japanese threatened the good will of the Chinese, something that would be of far greater import to later

generations than was the imperial wealth of the Western European countries. President Roosevelt had earlier proclaimed that political and religious liberties, freedom from want, and peace were essential for international stability. Yet Stone questioned how much faith the world's peoples could have in the American power to create this "better world" after the Nazis were crushed, if old imperialistic-style policies prevailed.<sup>9</sup>

In the summer of 1941, Izzy published his second book, Business as Usual, derived in part from many of his Nation and PM articles on the mobilization effort and American foreign policy. This work emphasized the need for a vast restructuring of the defense program and warned that irrational thinking about the war would result in disasters comparable to those which followed World War I. Stone called this "an anti-Fascist war," but declared that "Fascist tendencies" existed in the United States and again refused to depict the Germans as monsters. He also advised that the glib socialist belief about capitalism's decline resulting in a termination of all wars was unlikely to be proven accurate.<sup>10</sup>

Stone stated that the inevitable dissolution of property rights and the ensuing conflict between corporations and governments distinguished World War II from previous ones. This war, he reasoned, would be decisive in resolving the issue. Wartime requirements demonstrated the necessity of political control over internal "corporate

economic governments." He reminded his readers that the German condemnation of socialist trends in the democracies produced "a Fifth column" threat. But the more effective armies would come from those countries with public control over common resources, as "men fight best for that in which they have a stake."<sup>11</sup>

An anti-fascist victory, Stone reasoned, would undoubtedly produce massive social change. He wrote that the concept of freedom changed for every generation. The English, American, and French revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had attempted to achieve "security against arbitrary police power." The present revolution with "all its dreadful birth agonies," was a fight to attain "freedom and security against arbitrary economic powers." The peoples of the democratic states desired their political freedom and "freedom from want, unemployment, and insecurity." The United States was fortunate because of the experience of the New Deal reform programs and because of the control of power by President Roosevelt, who despite past falterings, was cognizant of these aspirations, and at least attempted to produce a measure of economic security. Yet the promise was far from fulfilled, and this reduced the strength of America.<sup>12</sup>

Further democratization of American life and the successful waging of the war could not take place in an atmosphere of business as usual. Stone wrote that an



anti-fascist fight could not be waged under the guidance of those who did despise fascists. Most dollar-a-year men he considered to be more desirous of restricting democracy in America, than in revitalizing it overseas. And he warned that a Soviet triumph would cause these same individuals to call for a crusade against the Communist state with enthusiasm far surpassing their desire to stop Hitler. Stone regarded it as fortunate that more and more conservatives and capitalists did support presidential movement against business-as-usual practices. It was also fortunate that the fight between the Nazis and the Soviets had brought greater unity among labor organizations and among leftists. He reasoned that the nations most able to resist fascism were those in which men of disparate political beliefs could create "a common front against the Hitler peril."<sup>13</sup>

Stone also believed economic reorganization to be essential for an effective anti-fascist effort both overseas and in the United States. Americans could not promise to free others from want and allow it to flourish at home, he warned, for only through reconstruction could America be saved. While a hostile and monopolized press would undoubtedly term any such effort Communistic or fascist, it was not. Rather, it signified the expansion of democracy into the economic sphere. If capitalists, laborers, and engineers could work together for defense purposes, they could also learn how to rebuild America.

Through a flexible framework of "co-operative industrial democracy," Americans "could have central planning without central despotism, a free play for initiative without a free sway for exploitation. The energies called forth to defend America could be used to rebuild America without poverty and without fear."<sup>14</sup>

Over the next several months, Stone continued to push Roosevelt for more decisive action. The journalist claimed that Soviet assistance in the war effort would be invaluable, thus requiring aid to Russia. He feared that should either England or the Soviet Union be defeated, the situation of the remaining foe of the Axis states would become even more precarious. Should both the British and the Russians fall, then America would be "outnumbered and encircled in a hostile world." While Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill seemed aware of the need for alignment with Stalin, the American president had failed to educate the public concerning such a necessity. But Stone warned that a Russian collapse could unleash "a tidal wave of appeasement in the West that might shake our own democratic system to its foundations."<sup>15</sup>

Stone also considered a vast intelligence and propaganda network essential to the Allied cause. He argued that Colonel William J. Donovan's propaganda division should generate democratic and social democratic opposition in Finland against the fascist collaborator and German sympathizer, Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil

Mannerheim. Stone believed that the type of "revolutionary, democratic fifth-column work" which America had used during World War I was now required to stir the Europeans against Hitler. Stone declared, however, that such propaganda efforts would be ineffective unless progressives directed policy, for the people of Europe would not fight for the decayed and undemocratic elements that had largely dominated their societies during the interwar years.<sup>16</sup>

Stone remained conscious of the dangers that mobilization and American entrance into the war entailed, particularly for reform programs, civil liberties, and progressive thought in general. He believed that along with vast economic inequities, a stifling of democratic freedoms would reduce the American people's willingness to fight. But most fundamentally, he argued in Business as Usual, "We cannot wage a war to reestablish democracy in Germany and disestablish it at home. We cannot talk of the four freedoms and gag those who disagree with us at home." In February 1941 he had indicated in PM that fascism threatened America at home as well as abroad. He had stated that the most dangerous ideology confronting the American people was the strange brand of Americanism displayed by the House Un-American Activities Committee. One could not criticize Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, or Stalin in Russia. According to HUAC, one could not criticize Chairman Martin Dies in the United States. The Dies method of stifling debate included the "smearing,

terrorizing and pilloring" of all opposition. Another example of American reaction appeared in a proposed House bill to allow high-ranking government officials to authorize wiretapping without court approval. The architect of this measure, Alabama's Samuel Hobbs, had previously distinguished himself by calling for establishment of concentration camps for non-deportable aliens. "The concentration camp is an institution highly praised in certain foreign countries," Stone had written. "So is wiretapping." Such "dirty-business" could only cripple personal liberties and moral standards.<sup>17</sup>

While Stone praised Roosevelt for refusing to get caught up in the growing anti-labor, anti-Communist feeling which sprouted prior to the Nazi invasion of Russia, the president failed to stop the attempted deportation of radical union official Harry Bridges, and as a political favor to Dan Tobin's corruption-ridden International Brotherhood of Teamsters, allowed the prosecution of Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party leaders. As the American Communist Party applauded governmental action against their sectarian rivals, Stone declared in July 1941: "You cannot kill an idea by putting its spokesmen in jail." He castigated the Smith Alien and Sedition Act, a measure used against the Trotskyists, as the first peacetime legislation since the Alien and Sedition Acts of the 1790s which made an expression of opinion a federal crime. Under the Smith Act, one could face ten

years in jail for circulating "such un-American documents" as Jefferson's Declaration of Independence and Lincoln's second inaugural address for "both 'advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government' by force." Stone agreed that a government possessed the right to defend itself "not only against overt acts but even against the expression of ideas when there is really, in the formula of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, 'a clear and present danger' that they will precipitate disorder or revolutionary action." But the American government had not accused the tiny radical sect of any specific actions, or even of threatening the general citizenry. The disavowal of the clear and present danger doctrine meant that the mere possession of certain ideas had resulted in the incarceration of the Trotskyists. The German and Russian governments used similar logic to persecute this small left-wing group, and such reasoning would have kept Thoreau in jail throughout his lifetime. Again, harassment for radical political ideas, as well as for militant labor organizing, seemed to explain the government's attempt to deport Harry Bridges, president of the International Longshoreman's Union. In October, Stone blamed the FBI and California businessmen for the prosecution. He wrote that New Dealers were embarrassed by the case, and warned that the finest propaganda would fail if a labor leader could be deported.<sup>18</sup>

As Stone continued to call for progressive domestic and foreign policies, the fascist challenge abroad intensified. In November 1941 the Germans approached Leningrad, Moscow, and the Don River. Early Soviet casualties proved to be enormous. Nevertheless, two key developments soon stunted the fascist drive. The Russians began to counterattack on the Eastern front, resulting in a slow and bloody withdrawal of German soldiers from the Soviet Union. Then on 7 December 1941, Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, producing an official declaration of war by the United States.<sup>19</sup>

For I. F. Stone, as for Franklin Roosevelt, the recognition of direct American involvement in the war seemed to come as a relief. Stone argued that the war "was unavoidable and is better fought now when we still have allies left." He hoped that overt U.S. participation would improve the mobilization effort, moving both capital and labor away from business-as-usual practices. He predicted that American belligerency would produce either reactionary developments such as an attack on workers and reformers, or greater collaboration between capital and labor in the defense area. Because of his deep faith in Roosevelt, Stone indicated confidence that the latter course would be taken.<sup>20</sup>

Democratic leftists such as Stone believed that World War II offered great opportunities as well as considerable hazards. Victory in a global struggle

could mean the annihilation of fascism and the spreading of democratic institutions and ideas in the international arena. Such developments could come about only if the Allied nations retained their anti-fascist focus, and only if they began to plan the transition to the postwar era. Other vital prerequisites were a willingness to liberate imperial possessions; a continuance of the Grand Alliance linking America, Russia, and England; and a dedication to an international body of nations. Should imperialistic designs supplant the promise of the Four Freedoms, should the Allied compact be replaced by an anti-Communist drive, should an international organization of nations serve only big power interests, then the promises offered by the smashing of Nazism and fascism would come to nought. At home, the mobilization effort demonstrated the necessity of heightened political and economic democracy. A real need existed to protect civil liberties and civil rights, to expand New Deal programs, to break monopolies, and to provide greater opportunities for the downtrodden, the consumer, the small farmer, and the small businessman. A real possibility existed for the expansion of democracy into the economic sphere.

Throughout the war years, Stone attacked what he perceived to be the seeds of fascism in America and condemned a number of infringements upon civil liberties. He praised Roosevelt's commutation of the prison sentence of American Communist leader Earl Browder, a move

which reflected the party's strong support for the administration's foreign policy after July 1941. At the same time, however, Stone charged that the government case against Harry Bridges suggested "absolutism in decay" and such "European style" practices as the employment of "the dregs of society" as informants. He deplored the readiness of a wealthy liberal Attorney General, Francis Biddle, to serve as an instrument for reactionary elements. He worried about prosecuting an anti-fascist trade unionist while a "pro-Catholic agitator," Father Charles Coughlin, was not arraigned. Yet while PM villified Coughlin, and while the Nation's editor, Freda Kirchwey, urged a curbing of "the Fascist press," Stone has stated that he did not call for a prosecution of the American far right or support the deprivation of their political freedoms during the war.<sup>21</sup>

Again, unlike other progressives, he continued to condemn the Smith Act and the prosecution of American Trotskyists, writing that Congress had violated the constitutional protections of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. He acknowledged the propriety of government action against those "accused of distributing Axis propaganda as enemy agents in time of war." In peacetime or in wartime, a government could defend itself "against insurrection or revolution." Yet Stone believed, as did the Founding Fathers, that liberty would disappear should the mere espousal of revolutionary ideas become illegal.



He wrote that under wartime circumstances, the government admittedly possessed greater authority to abridge freedom of speech and freedom of the press, but repeated his contention that words could not become punishable unless it were established that a clear and present danger existed. A man could not urge railroad laborers to destroy roads, for example, and could not incite soldiers to shoot their officers.<sup>22</sup>

Persecution of "the Ishmaelites of the Left," absent such charges, Stone feared, might establish precedents which could later haunt all Americans. The Trotskyists were being prosecuted for speeches given prior to U.S. entry into the war. Conviction would thus render peacetime utterances criminal. Stone wrote that no American war had been waged with fewer violations of civil liberties--a strange analysis from such an ardent defender of the bill of rights, in light of the mass internment of Japanese Americans and Japanese aliens. He deeply regretted that the American war record should be blemished by the "petty presecution" of the radical fringe group. The Trotskyist case, in Stone's opinion, involved the willingness of the Supreme Court to defend basic freedoms "when and where it hurts, not in peace, not in the case of some large, respected or powerful group, but in war and in the case of a most unpopular minority."<sup>23</sup>

Although Communists repeatedly cheered the legal action against their hated enemies, their celebration

was premature. Repressive measures, including the 1939 Hatch Act which denied federal jobs to any member of a political group that advocated the overthrow of the government by force and violence, were soon to be used against Communists and other leftists. Stone warned in late 1944 that anti-Communist progressives should not support red-baiting tactics, for they themselves could not remain unscathed if such tactics were used to crush despised political foes. "The right will set the standards," he predicted, "and the standards will be broad enough to encompass leftists of many varieties."<sup>24</sup>

Suppression and prosecution of radical groups and of individual progressives, and actions by the Dies Committee and the FBI, Stone feared, were providing the framework for a potent "post-war fascist movement in America." He condemned the anti-Communist and anti-Semitic orientation of HUAC, and quoted from a study of the committee which termed it "a denunciatory agency." Dies appeared to be striving to establish a system by which federal workers could lose their jobs without legal recourse. In its attempt "to police leftist and working-class opinions," the FBI posed another grave threat to American constitutional freedoms. The FBI arrested and maltreated Spanish Republican sympathizers; employed investigators who seemed to hold "the vague and fascistic idea that Jews and radicals are somehow synonymous;" and possessed "political police power,"

including authority to investigate the political beliefs of government workers. Stone wondered why, in the midst of an anti-fascist fight, anti-fascists should be so besmirched and mistrusted.<sup>25</sup>

The violations of civil liberties appeared to be coupled with a continued denigration of racial minorities and of labor. In April 1943, Stone invited Judge William A. Hastie, then dean of Howard University Law School and later governor of the Virgin Islands, to dine with him at the National Press Club. When they were ignored by the waiter, Izzy and his guest departed. Attempting to call a special meeting to discuss the segregation policies of the club, Izzy received little support. Believing that "elementary considerations of human decency" were being desecrated, he resigned from the National Press Club; almost four decades passed before Izzy again entered the reporters' habitat. In an August 1944 piece on union discriminatory practices, he had admitted that racism was a deep-seated problem in America. "We democrats still lie in the shadow of Rousseau," he wrote. "We are always yearning sentimentally over the Common Man." But white laborers sometimes just "don't want to give 'those damned niggers' a break" in obtaining employment. All peoples possessed some prejudices, all peoples represented differences. "We bolster our own little egos with hatred. We are as suspicious of the foreign, and unfamiliar."<sup>26</sup>

While he believed that racism blunted the nation's democratic aspirations and divided the American populace, Stone was also worried by the challenge to the gains labor had made under the New Deal. He discussed the growing call for a revocation of the forty-hour week, an attack that was guided by corporate interests. Anyone wishing to cripple national unity and damage morale could find no better method than to discredit labor. The tactic he charged, contained "ugly fascist overtones," and it carried on "the familiar suicidal tradition of those who preferred to fight 'communism' rather than to fight Hitler. This is the fifth column." Stone suggested that too many capitalists despised labor and the President more than they hated Hitler, "if it can be said that they hate Hitler at all." It was certainly clear that they wanted to crush the union movement and the New Deal.<sup>27</sup>

Believing that political democracy demanded protection of civil rights, civil liberties, and union rights, Stone continued to insist that a true democratic state required a measure of economic democracy. Fortunately, he believed, Roosevelt recognized this. Thus he praised the president's 1943 Post-War Plan and Program, which expanded the concept of an economic bill of rights, and called for "the right to work, usefully and creatively through the productive years" and "genuine social security." The plan did not envisage socialism, but a type of "mixed

state in which alone capitalism can hope to remain progressive," and necessary cooperation between government and business. Stone indicated once again that laissez-faire was withering away, and that the present generation must decide whether the new economic order would be democratic or oligarchical. Significantly, Roosevelt had begun, "the greatest battle of our time."<sup>28</sup>

Even a modicum of economic democracy called for planning, a breaking up of monopolies and cartels, and a guarantee of full employment. Unfortunately, the war period witnessed planning controlled by corporate interests, a strengthening of non-competitive practices, and an indication that many big businessmen favored a certain amount of unemployment to keep down wage demands and weaken unions. Stone wrote that one of the failings of capitalism was the absence of many small capitalists. Proliferating monopolies and cartels stunted or monopolized technological advances, and deliberately restricted production, which effectively limited employment. Stone warned in the Nation that a large pool of unemployed Americans would provide fertile ground for fascism following the war, a fascism which the same capitalists would undoubtedly encourage. Without planning and full employment, he predicted, the depression would reemerge. In late 1944 he wrote that in America, as in Europe, full employment demanded "some large measure of socialism." Americans needed "to get used to this terrible word

'Socialism.' We have to get used to saying it right out loud."<sup>29</sup>

In August, 1945, following the Labor party triumph in England, Stone wrote that the result provided large encouragement for those desirous of change and necessitated thinking and talking "in frankly socialist terms." The success of the British left caused him to wonder: "Will America Go Socialist?" This victory at the polls encouraged the hope of establishing

socialism without bloodshed and dictatorship, of developing a democratic socialism suited to the Western European and American peoples, of avoiding the creation of a monolithic state, of preserving elements of economic freedom and enterprise within the direction of social direction and planning.

After indicating that the sickness of Britain's economy required large measures of public ownership, Stone asserted that the future of American capitalism was similar to that of English capitalism. In both nations, full employment was possible only with broad government planning and direction. America must discard the inadequate New Deal with "its bootstrap economics and subsidies for planned scarcity." Leftists must begin to establish the framework for a new American social movement, to think in socialist terms, to start a program of public education. "What I am suggesting," Stone wrote, "is a Marxist approach, but one which will be non-sectarian, undogmatic, and rooted in a realistic appraisal of concrete problems." Most important, America required

a new approach, emanating from the left and concerned with the country's production and consumption capabilities, to spur productivity and to better the nation's standard of living. In certain areas, anti-trust action was ineffectual, and only governmental yardsticks could stimulate greater productivity. A mixed economy would be the ideal one for America, and demanded "socialist prodding and socialist understanding." Affirming that the socialist trend was inevitable, Stone declared that these steps were needed if the American economy were to evolve in a democratic fashion.<sup>30</sup>

While Stone thus believed that the war could help to usher in either reactionary or progressive developments, he believed that a similar dichotomy was also evident in U.S. foreign policy. Stone considered the ideal American foreign policy to be one that was truly anti-fascist, anti-imperialist, pro-Grand Alliance, and consistent with the concept of a world organization. The primary concern of I. F. Stone during the period of direct American involvement in World War II was the retention of an anti-fascist emphasis in Allied strategy. Only that could justify the devastation and horrors unleashed by war, only that could aid in the transition to peaceful and more democratized international relations.

The willingness of American corporations and the State Department to maintain relations with fascist and puppet states continued to exasperate him. In January

1942, he lambasted the State Department's readiness to deal with Petain and Vichy France and deplored its failure to recognize the Free French forces of Charles de Gaulle. Claiming that Secretary of State Hull should be removed for stupidity, Stone wrote that such policies made the State Department the final stronghold of appeasement, doomed the Western democracies, and undermined the trust of oppressed peoples around the globe. Stone believed that "some way should be found to let the world know in decisive fashion that the undemocratic little clique of decayed pseudo-aristocrats and backsliding liberals" who controlled the State Department, did not truly represent the American people. The people of the world, after all, would not join in a democratic crusade while American foreign policy was dominated by men whose actions belied democratic rhetoric. Later in the year, he accused the Office of Strategic Services and its head, William J. Donovan, of confusion in their attitude toward the European underground. The O.S.S. contained progressive thinkers, but also included a number of reactionary ex-diplomats who could only alienate the European Resistance. Stone declared that the fight for reconstruction of the continent was beginning and that it was no time for ambivalence. The leading view within the State Department favored creation of "new regimes far enough to the right" to enable corporations to regain their properties and to reaffirm previous cartel arrangements. While most big businessmen now recognized that Hitler



had to be deposed, they still desired "the trains to run on time." But the European resistance forces possessed "other visions of the future."<sup>31</sup>

Outraged over the American link with the Vichy French and the failure to repeal Nürnberg and anti-Semitic laws in French North Africa, Stone asked Secretary Hull at a press conference in January, 1943, if the State Department were moving to ensure that Nazi-inspired legislation in the French colonies be abrogated. An angry Hull refused to answer the query, but demanded the questioner's name. When the reporter replied "Stone," Hull retorted: "You have some other name, too, have you not?" Izzy's persistence also produced an outburst in the House of Representatives from Mississippi's John Rankin, one of the most reactionary political figures in the nation. In an anti-Semitic reference on 1 February, Rankin inquired of House members if they were aware that the "crackpots" who wanted to create "hatred and bitterness among the white and colored races," were "led by a man by the name of I. F. Stone of PM, I think his name is Feinstein," and were "now attacking and attempting to besmirch Cordell Hull." The following day, Rankin again condemned Stone, declaring that when "Hull asked him what his real name was I think it developed it was Bernstein or Feinstein. He is one of the pen pushers on this communistic publication known as PM."<sup>32</sup>

Unrepentant, Stone continued to blast U.S. policy

towards fascist states. He wrote that the reaction of both Hull and Roosevelt to the demise of the world's original fascist dictator in July 1943 appeared curiously subdued. The failure to push for social reform in Italy and throughout Europe, seemed to indicate a willingness to further Anglo-American imperialism through dealings "with any of the crooks at the top except the full-fledged, fully labeled Nazis and Fascists." For Stone, however, the most ominous development involved the move by Britain and America to exclude the Soviets from discussion concerning postwar Italy. The Russian response was the unilateral creation of a National Committee for a Free Germany. If such occurrences became established practice, Stone charged, the Soviet Union would be assisting democratic governments while Great Britain and the United States would be supporting "a revival of monarchy and reaction." That could only produce World War III.<sup>33</sup>

On 25 August 1943 in PM, Stone warned that various State Department employees were beginning to espouse the notion "that the choice in Europe is between reaction and communism," and thus, however unfortunately, America must favor reaction. Already some frightened liberals, he declared, were propounding this idea. Such alternatives had previously been heard in Italy, Germany, and Spain, and had been used to crush labor and freedom in those countries. Concerning the inevitability of this either/or proposition, Stone unveiled a parable. He discussed a very rich nation which had suddenly become quite impoverished, with millions

losing their jobs, large breadlines, and great marches on the nation's capital by ex-soldiers. But with a free choice, the people selected "neither reaction nor communism" and began to effect real social and economic reforms. The country "emerged stronger than ever, more stable than before." Stone concluded: "I can think of at least one man who ought to see the point."<sup>34</sup>

The following month in the Nation, Stone wrote that in adopting an equivocating attitude toward the resistance movements which called for sweeping changes in the European social and economic orders, the United States only encouraged Nazi and fascist collaborators to believe that they could remain in power. The shifting stance of pro-fascist elements demonstrated the eagerness of the Eastern European elites to obtain Allied protection against popular rebellions.<sup>35</sup>

Only a wholesale transformation of the fascist-afflicted states, Stone reasoned, could terminate the virus of right-wing authoritarianism and placate the European resistance. As reconstruction proceeded in Italy following Mussolini's final collapse, Stone in January 1945, discussed the fate of the newspaper, Il Messagero, a "Fascist and pro-Nazi" publication owned by the Perrone brothers. He described them as "the loyal supporters, servants and collaborators of our enemies," who had cost Americans dearly in human lives and material resources. The Italian resistance fighters who risked torture to oppose Il Duce while the

Perrones feasted, Stone wrote, would not look kindly at the continuance of Il Messagero. And if a German underground existed, the anti-Nazi forces would not debate about "'freedom of the press' or 'property rights' for those who supported the Hitler terror, shared its profits, and spread its propaganda poisons."<sup>36</sup>

While many Americans seemed to think "that Fascism was somehow less culpable than Nazism," Stone protested that those who murdered Matteotti were the same persons who had tortured the German anti-militarist editor, Carl von Ossietzky. Some Americans appeared to excuse big businessmen such as the Perrones, who claimed that they had assisted the fascists only for profit. They should not be blamed, ran the argument, like "those who supported it out of fanaticism." Stone termed such logic "treason to the future," for "the upper class canaille like the Perrones who egged Fascism and Nazism on to power, secretly subsidizing its leaders and then openly profiting from their success, will do it all over again if they get the chance." Therefore, not only the fascists and the Nazis, but the capitalists who aided Mussolini and Hitler, must be punished.<sup>37</sup>

In PM and in the Nation during February 1945, Stone declared that war criminality must be addressed following the end of the fighting. "The Hitler gang" should not be permitted to avoid punishment as had the Junker aggressors after the first world war. Beyond the ultimate

question of justice, he believed that the fate of several million people within German-occupied territory might be decided by apparent indecision on the part of the Allies concerning punishment. A determined stand could stifle "the most fanatical of the Nazis and the Japanese, the ones who may otherwise go underground to prepare for the next war," and could help to uphold international law. Stone charged that an "Anglo-American upper-class hostility" toward war crimes' trials was attributable to a desire to protect capitalist counterparts in the Axis nations.<sup>38</sup>

While he feared that an inconsistent anti-fascist attitude would mar the moral justification of the Allied effort, Stone also worried about the possibility that a growing anti-Sovietism was distorting U.S. foreign policy. The failure to provide greater support to Russia and the continued hostility of many American government leaders toward the Soviet Union, angered and frightened him. In late 1942 and early 1943, he condemned the failure to establish a second front in the eastern theatre. Stone declared that he was ashamed to write that while the Soviet soldiers fought "heroically in defense of our country as well as their own," the United States continued to refuse Russia essential oil processing and refining techniques. "While the Russians give lives, we haggle over oil patents." He berated those who still seemed to believe that perhaps the U.S.S.R. could be bled to death in the war on the eastern front.<sup>39</sup>

Stone warned against the possibility of an anti-Communist crusade. On 14 March 1943, he repeated Vice-President Henry Wallace's admonition that a number of State Department officials wanted the Soviet Union to relinquish claim to the Baltic nations and to Eastern Poland. Stalin, however, had already asserted that those regions were part of Russia and would not easily be surrendered. Stone declared that two factors were involved in considerations relating to Eastern Europe. One was plain "old-fashioned power politics," the wish to create buffer states next to a great nation. The other was ideological, the desire to establish "a new cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism, through restoration of the Hapsburg monarchy." He soon uncovered yet another element that guided American actions toward Eastern Europe. Corporations wanted an open door policy for American investments. This required antagonism "not merely to communism, but to more moderate socialist programs."<sup>40</sup>

As the European war neared its end, Stone wrote an editorial in PM on 1 February 1945, cheering the Red Army for its movement toward the final defeat of Adolf Hitler. He reasoned that many Europeans, including prisoners of war, concentration camp victims, "the haunted remnants of European Jewry," and others who had suffered from the Nazi onslaught, had to be overjoyed at the sight of the Russian military. He suggested that the early Soviet entrance into Berlin might well be fortunate, as the German city

was now "occupied by the armies of a people to whom Nazism is not a theoretical matter. . . ." Stone also declared that the Russian war effort demonstrated that the Communist system had achieved successful industrial mobilization and that the Soviets had "made Communism work."<sup>41</sup>

Only an international body of nations, Stone concluded, could prevent formation of an anti-Soviet campaign which would destroy the Grand Alliance. Only such an organization could block a resurgence of fascist or collaborationist elements, lead to a peaceful and more egalitarian world order, aid in the process of decolonization, and protect the dispossessed victims of World War II. The necessity of a world organization dedicated to peaceful reform, collective security, and international cooperation, seemed obvious to Stone. He believed that World War II had occurred in large part because of the American failure to accept the Wilsonian dream of a League of Nations, and exclaimed that World War III would take place should a comparable failure develop after the second world war. Stone acknowledged that peace would not occur without the power to enforce it. For the present and the near future, only the three major Allied powers possessed the requisite ability, thus necessitating continuation of the American-British-Russian tie. Stone feared that the greatest threat to the Allied triad and to a viable world organization appeared to be the animosity many felt toward the Soviet Union. He also warned that the German hope for a resurgence rested upon

"the same old line: fear of the Communist bogey in the West, fear of the capitalist bogey in the USSR." Such feelings remained strong in both America and Russia. Stone condemned those who attacked the Soviet Union and wrote that "all the bitter reactionary left-overs of Eastern Europe . . . are playing Paul Revere behind the scenes."<sup>42</sup>

Izzy attended the early gatherings of the United Nations and reported on the proceedings in a series of articles for the Nation and PM. He declared in late May that the recent death of FDR cast a pale over the UN meetings, for unlike the New Dealer, the new American president, Harry Truman seemed unable to hold a middle position between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Stone indicated that the world organization must cope with two sweeping developments which were mandatory in the postwar order. Without a vibrant world economy, which required economic stability and growth, political stability would not be established. A healthy world economy demanded full employment, particularly in the United States, and large economic alterations in Europe. Heavy dosages of socialism coupled with "a vigorous upper class purge" would allow for the needed changes in Europe. But the essential socialization of basic industry could only occur if England and America allowed a great amount of social reform in the western half of the continent. Should large levels of unemployment reappear, then fascism might return as well.<sup>43</sup>

While the Allies needed to accept structural change



within the European states, they also needed to accept the inevitability and the desirability of deep-seated transformations in the colonial world. A longtime anti-imperialist, Stone had condemned U.S. actions toward Latin America and European practices in the Far East during the 1930s. Throughout World War II, he urged American support for reform and self-determination around the globe. He lauded the Chinese Communist program as being similar to "a rural New Deal rather than Sovietism," termed the effort by Mao Tse-tung's cadres "a people's war," and compared the Chinese rebel leaders with the American revolutionaries. Stone noted that while thousands of Indians starved to death each week, while great diseases flourished, while staunch anti-fascist leaders such as Gandhi were jailed, "we Western progressives are being compromised in the eyes of the East by our uneasy reluctance to speak out." The maltreatment accorded the great pacifist, Stone indicated, constituted an insult to the Indian people for "he is their Lenin, their George Washington, and something more besides, something of an Indian Jesus." If Gandhi died, so would the ability to wed the Indian populace to non-violence. The "political stupidity" of the British and the Americans was driving the Indians to think that only the sword could produce liberation. And Stone reminded his readers, "the sword in the hands of 400,000,000 people will, indeed, be a problem."<sup>44</sup>

Writing in PM, Stone stated that aiding the people in

the Far East would endanger capitalist interests but would also save lives. "That's the difference between a war of liberation and a war of imperialist reconquest." An alliance between the colonized peoples and the Allies would not be possible if the latter promised only "to replace the new yellow Tuans with the old white ones." Only the pledge of self-government combined with deliberate and rapid steps toward implementing self-rule would produce needed support from the Asians. Such strides would indicate that the Allies did not intend to return to "the prewar status quo. The status quo ante wasn't good enough."<sup>45</sup>

Stone cautioned against the reinstitution of economic imperialism in America's dealings with other nations. Such a policy would neither aid the United States nor further "the prestige of capitalist democracy" among the poorer nations. Americans needed to recognize that "the undertow toward some form of socialism or communism in Europe, Asia, and Latin America" appeared inevitable, notwithstanding Soviet abstention from propaganda or moderate behavior by the Western Communist parties. Still, he foresaw that relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would naturally deteriorate "as the masses, notably in our hemisphere, turn left."<sup>46</sup>

Stone also warned about the failure of the Americans, the British, and the French to live up to the beneficent principle of self-determination which they invoked. In the Nation in May 1945, he reminded his readers: "It is

of just such inflated expectations and morning-after disillusionment that revolutionary movements have often been born." He wrote that should Truman, unlike Roosevelt, fail to appreciate the significance of worldwide ferment, the rift between Russia and the West would deepen. Permitting that to happen

would be to identify our own country with imperialism and reaction in the minds of the colonial and colored peoples and to orient them toward the U.S.S.R. This would be unworthy of what America has meant to the world in the past and should mean in the future.<sup>47</sup>

Ultimately, Stone believed that the United States and Western Europe possessed two alternatives concerning the Third World. The first involved using racial prejudices and hatreds "fascist style." The second called for a new relationship with colonial peoples, one of "full equality and partnership." Stone warned that "a few millions of European whites cannot forever dominate hundreds of millions of brown and yellow people," and that the response to this problem could well decide the viability of the world organization.<sup>48</sup>

The official ending of the war in August 1945, which led to the appearance of national liberation movements, induced Stone to reflect on the conflagration and on the upcoming postwar era. He wrote that the war had caused "terrible things" to be done to man's physical and mental nature, as indicated by the American airman who had

adjudged the results of the Nagasaki nuclear attack favorably. The war had produced untold suffering and deprivation, but had also given rise to great heroics and worthy goals. Despite the failure always to live up to the ideals of the Four Freedoms, the war's termination also closed the long fight against fascism, a battle begun long before the official outbreak of hostilities. Those who appreciated this fact, and the reality that the destruction of fascism was unleashing "the forces of freedom the world over," could not look lightly at the conclusion of the war. To prevent a recurrence of international battle would require a breaking away from old jingoistic beliefs--"the world has grown too small for them."<sup>49</sup>

In contrast to the attitude of Europeans, many Americans seemed to Stone to respond casually to the war's ending. For many Americans, the war was something distant, a type of "horrible accident," which had disrupted lives "for no good reason." A worried Stone warned that "one cannot understand what one has not suffered," and indicated that the United States had been spared the horrors wreaked upon much of the world. He wished that all Americans could see the amount of "suffering, the treachery, the sacrifice, and the courage of the past decade," for unless they felt deeply the pains and terrors suffered elsewhere, he wondered if "we will be unswervingly determined that it shall never happen again."<sup>50</sup>

Although World War II had resulted in a defeat of the

fascist states, the most obvious victims of fascism continued to suffer displacement as the war concluded. As a Jew, regardless of his profession of atheism, and as an individual always concerned about oppressed peoples, Stone was deeply worried about the plight of European Jewry. The unveiling of Hitler's "final solution" caused the journalist to consider emigration to the Middle East as necessary to save Europe's vanishing Jewish population, as a matter of "Life or Death." Stone condemned those who placed profits and the desire for Middle Eastern oil above the lives of the European Jews, and he blamed bureaucratic obstacles for abetting the murder of millions. An American tragedy, Stone wrote in the Nation on 10 June 1944, evolved from the failure of good men "to risk expediency, and defy prejudice, to be wholehearted, to care as deeply and fight as hard for the big words we use, for justice and for humanity, as the fanatic Nazi does for his master race or the fanatic Jap for his Emperor."<sup>51</sup>

When the war ended, Stone bemoaned the poor treatment accorded Jewish refugees in the displaced persons' camps. A PM article on 1 October 1945, quoted from a governmental report which asserted that the Allies were "treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them, except that we do not exterminate them." The homeless Jews, virtually the sole survivors from the once-thriving European Jewish community, received inadequate food, medical supplies, and clothing in the camps. In fact, some Jews were "forced to the

final ignominy of wearing the SS uniforms of their oppressors." Stone declared that the sad state of the DPs was "more than a Jewish problem," for as President Truman had acknowledged, the treatment accorded the holocaust survivors would demonstrate America's determination to destroy Nazism.<sup>52</sup>

The disease of anti-Semitism which had ignited the holocaust, Stone warned, was still prevalent throughout the occupied nations. Because of the virulence of anti-Semitism and the realities of the death camps, few German, Austrian, or Eastern European Jews desired to return to their former homes. These peoples had attempted to live as nationals in Europe, but had been persecuted as Jews. Now, most "wish to live as Jews, to hold their heads up as Jews." Consequently, "they look to the colonization of the Holy Land as their one hope of restored self-respect, their deepest need."<sup>53</sup>

In November 1945, Stone made his first trip to the Middle East and reported that both Jewish emigration and the creation of a binational Palestinian state were essential. He noted that good relations existed between the established Jewish colonies and Arab villages. But he prophesied that attempts to establish a Jewish Palestinian nation would be extremely difficult. Stone believed that the only possible way to effect understanding between Arabs and Jews was through formation of a binational state. Jews, he reasoned, should strive to coexist with the Arabs, should display a real willingness to live peacefully

together "on an equal basis." This, he argued, would be "nobler and politically sounder" than "any narrow Jewish nationalism."<sup>54</sup>

Upon returning from Palestine, Izzy movingly recorded his impression of his journey. While affirming his love for America and his strong affinity toward Western Europe, Izzy declared that he felt "a sense of homecoming" and a sparking of "filial memories" in Palestine. This very notion of "going home," the reporter noted, was attracting hundreds of thousands to the Middle East, particularly Central and Eastern European Jews who had never truly been assimilated into the lands of their birthplaces. In the Yishuv, the Jewish Palestinian community, on the other hand, Jews at last appeared to be totally unafraid. Stone asserted that only "in Palestine can a Jew be a Jew. Period. Without apologies, and without any lengthy arguments as to whether Jews are a race, a religion, a myth, or an accident." He happily asserted that no other group had accomplished more than had the Jewish settlers in Palestine, and that nothing, except perhaps nuclear weapons, seemed likely to stop them. Yet Stone again cautioned the Jews to improve relations with the Arabs, in order that "a secure homeland . . . among their Semitic brothers" might be attained. Stone believed that such security would be possible "if the Jews give one-tenth of the devotion to Arab relations that they have given to the land." Only such concern and only a binational Palestinian state could result in

"lasting and equitable peace."<sup>55</sup>

A short time afterwards, Stone wrote that the patience of the European Jews was wearing thin. The democratic states had failed to aid the six million who ultimately perished in the gas camps. Now, thousands more faced starvation unless they could leave the DP centers. In response, Palestinian Jews who had heroically assisted their brethren during the war, continued to rescue their fellows from liberated Europe, notwithstanding British opposition. The Jews in Palestine, Stone declared, were molding a nation, and they refused to consider the agony of the displaced persons as a insignificant matter. Rather, they deemed "illegal immigration . . . a Jewish Dunkirk across the Meditteranean, an urgent and inescapable duty."<sup>56</sup>

Stone condemned the efforts by the British Foreign Office to curb Jewish immigration. He castigated the English alliance with the most reactionary Arab forces, a connection which only stifled vital social reform and thus prevented real stability in the area. The Arab potentates feared the possibility of internal unrest even more than did the British, and these feudal-type rulers viewed continued British imperialism as a safeguard against their own masses. But only an international resolution of the Palestinian paradox, Stone exclaimed, would produce legitimate order; this could not be attained by "disingenuous power politics, nineteenth-century style."<sup>57</sup>

On 12 January 1946 in the Nation, Stone berated



British attempts to characterize the Haganah, the Palestinian Jews' self-defense organization, as terroristic. He maintained that the Haganah, in fact, was needed to protect the Jewish community from massacres and pogroms. Stone viewed the Haganah or "People's Army" as distinct from the Irgun and the Stern which he attacked as "the shameful terrorist minority." A May PM article declared that unwarranted violence would diminish only if greater assistance were granted the Jews.<sup>58</sup>

Earlier that spring, a friend and Haganah member had asked Izzy if he would care to travel with the Jewish underground to Palestine. The eager newsman was ready to take off immediately, but careful arrangements were necessary. Izzy, Washington editor of the Nation, told no one on the journal's staff about his prospective trip, not even the vacationing publisher Freda Kirchwey, because of fear that a pro-British staffer might "unveil the mission. The journey cost Stone his position on the Nation, but he became the first journalist to undertake the dangerous passage to the Middle East."<sup>59</sup>

Traversing legal and illegal routes through Europe, Stone passed through the "Germany of destruction, death, and dreadful memories," and the Poland where anti-Semitism still abounded. He heard frightful tales about the holocaust and listened to warnings that future pogroms could occur. He saw the devastation unleashed by World War II and witnessed the continued maltreatment of the surviving

European Jews. In Italy, Stone was temporarily detained by police officers who were heeding British requests to block the illegal migration process. Eventually, he boarded a ship which soon became loaded with Jews heading for their promised land. Jews from fifteen European states and Egypt made the trek, including many socialists who were looking forward to residing in Palestinian collective settlements. A fair number of socialists were Red Army veterans or Partisan fighters. The travellers faced many discomforts, including bedding difficulties, lack of ventilation, and illnesses. Near the borders of Palestine, they were forced to transfer to a small Turkish cargo boat. The heat on the new ship was unbearable, the smell was horrendous, and little air and light were available for the human cargo, densely packed like animals. One night on the Turkish vessel was the most frightening Izzy had yet spent on the voyage. "I was to learn that night, and to learn the hard and feverish way, what life in a concentration camp had been like." Although as the chronicler of the migration he was "a privileged character," he volunteered to take a turn under the deck, where conditions were abominable. After nearly two hours, Izzy could no longer stand the deadening heat and lack of breathing space, and he returned to the deck. The boat finally reached Palestine's shores, and Stone's underground passage came to an end. He was to write in his account of the journey: "These Jews were my own people and I had

come to love them on our long trip together."<sup>60</sup>

The story of Stone's travels through Europe and his adventures on the high seas appeared in the summer of 1946 in PM and in a full recollection of his voyage in Underground to Palestine. A New York Times Book Review critic termed the work "a notable journalistic achievement," and the Haganah awarded Izzy a medal. Yet the book received little publicity, and, he believed, suffered from a boycott. That developed following his meeting with some Zionist friends who indicated that a \$25,000 advertising effort for Underground to Palestine would be undertaken, provided "just one sentence or so" were deleted. The one crucial sentence involved Izzy's support for a binational state. He refused the request, and subsequently lost the proposed backing for the book. However when the 1948 Arab-Israeli War approached, a Hebrew translation of Stone's story was handed to the sabras--native-born Palestinian Jews--to enable them to comprehend the travails of the European Jews.<sup>61</sup>

Stone continued to lend active support to the Jewish cause. Attempting to enter Palestine in late February 1947, his papers were grabbed by British customs officials. He noted in PM: "I seem to have more difficulty reaching Palestine over than underground." Izzy's name was included "in a special letter file at the Airport Passport Control Office," he was soon informed, because of his "interest in illegal immigration." The following month, Izzy

accompanied European refugees who were being transported on a British prison boat from Palestine to Cyprus. Despite having obtained military clearance and a visa, he was not allowed to set foot on the island "on quarantine grounds," and was denied permission to wire his copy back to the PM home office because of security reasons. The eventual report indicated that the voyage, with refugees herded in cages "like zoo exhibits," demonstrated "the idiocy and . . . anguish of British Palestine policy."<sup>62</sup>

Later that year, Stone cheered UN approval of the establishment of a Jewish nation, despite having steadfastly championed formation of a binational Palestinian state. History, he declared, would acclaim "that the world did make recompense to the new Attila's foremost victims," and "that good will and Christian conscience did triumph after all." When war broke out between the Jews and the Arabs, Stone roundly decried the American arms embargo to Israel. In PM and the New Republic, he analyzed the fighting and stated that high morale enabled the outmanned and ill-equipped Jews to wage a successful campaign.<sup>63</sup>

Following the conclusion of the conflict, Stone saluted the outcome and discussed the future of the biblical land. In This Is Israel, he praised the democratic and socialist composition of the new government. He noted the tradition of "a cooperative and collectivist way of life," but acknowledged that Israel was "far from being a

socialist commonwealth." Fundamentally, he wrote, "it is still capitalist." However, "its distinctive character and pioneering forces spring largely from the labor movement and from socialist idealism." Like many others, Stone hoped that the nation of Israel might evolve into

a laboratory in the building of a new society. Its mixed economy, already indicated how socialist devices and democratic methods could be combined, social justice achieved, without sacrifice of individual freedom.

Indeed, Stone concluded, "there were some who hoped that again the law might go forth from Jerusalem, and light from Zion." This seemed possible because a few had battled the desert, fought the Arabs, and created a new nation. "The unbreakable spirit of these self-chosen few--This is Israel."<sup>64</sup>

Thus, with the cessation of the second world war and the formation of a permanent home for the survivors of Nazi tyranny, the long fight against fascism seemed to be at an end. For a period of about two decades, I. F. Stone had supported that quest. After early recognizing the gravity of the fascist threat during the 1920s, and after supporting formation of a broad-based anti-fascist alliance in the ensuing decade, Stone was convinced by mid-1940 that direct American involvement in a battle against the right-wing behemoths was inevitable. He urged a rapid mobilization effort, and attacked the monopolistic, anti-labor practices of big business which appeared to impede the defense buildup. He condemned the business-as-usual

practices of American corporations, including their willingness to continue trading with the Axis powers. Stone warned that only increased democratization of the American economic and political processes would produce a labor force and a people contented enough to wage the anti-fascist struggle. He chastised those who seemed more desirous of combating liberal and radical developments at home than they were of meeting the challenge posed by Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito.

Upholding an anti-fascist foreign policy and a progressive domestic program most concerned Stone following official U.S. entrance into the war. He denounced those right-wing elements, both in the United States and abroad, which he thought were more eager to wage a crusade against Red Russia than against the fascist nations. As the war neared its conclusion, Stone feared that if the anti-Soviet mentality prevailed, the Grand Alliance would crumble, the hopes for a peaceful postwar era would prove unavailing, and reaction would triumph in America. Only a potent world organization, he reasoned, could help to solidify the American-British-Soviet triumvirate, allow the great powers to respond intelligently to the demands of the colonial peoples, and peacefully produce the economic, social, and political changes essential to a prosperous and pacific world order. Very early, Stone declared that the American tendency to align with conservative and reactionary elements encouraged antagonisms

between the great states, and between these nations and the devastated countries and subjugated peoples around the globe. Such a development, Stone lamented, only diminished the image of America. Instead, the greatest democratic state should lead the effort to aid the world's oppressed and displaced persons. A reasoned foreign policy, Stone hoped, could help the cause of reform at home. There, he believed, New Deal reform was insufficient, for it was incapable of preventing the instabilities and inequities inherent in an unrestricted, capitalistic economy. Only socialistic measures could accomplish that, and also curb the growth of overweening corporate power which threatened to make a farce of American political democracy.

## FOOTNOTES

### CHAPTER III

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<sup>7</sup> Stone, "Does FDR Want to 'Save' Il Duce?," PM, 19 February 1941, p. 12; Stone, "Pipe Lines and Profit," The Nation 152 (April 26, 1941): 491-92.

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<sup>9</sup> Stone, "Heat Haze," pp. 28-29; Stone, "Memo on Japan," The Nation 153 (September 13, 1941): 217.

<sup>10</sup> Stone, Business as Usual: The First Year of Defense (New York: Modern Age Books, Inc., 1941), pp. 241-45.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp. 244-48.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp. 248, 255-57.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 261-63.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 265-66.

<sup>15</sup> Stone, "How to Overcome the Lag in Our Defense," PM (September 14, 1941): 10; Stone, "Washington Zigzag," The Nation 153 (October 25, 1941): 391-92.

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<sup>24</sup>Belknap, Cold War; McAuliffe, Crisis.

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<sup>28</sup>Stone, "Planning and Politics," The Nation 160 (March 20, 1943): 405-407.

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## CHAPTER IV

### THE HOT COLD WAR, 1945-1952

Some have spoken of the American Century. I say that the century upon which we are now entering, the century that will come out of this war, can and must be the century of the common man.

Henry Wallace

If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. I know, indeed, that some honest men fear that a republican government cannot be strong, that this government is not strong enough. But would the honest patriot, in the full tide of successful experiment, abandon a government which has so far kept us free and firm, on the theoretic and visionary fear that this government, the world's best hope, may by possibility want energy to preserve itself. I believe this, on the contrary, the strongest government on earth.

Thomas Jefferson

And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever kneew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?

John Milton

I fear yet this iron yoke of outward conformity hath left a slavish print upon our necks; the ghost of a linen decency yet haunts us. . . .  
We do not see that while we still affect by all means a rigid external formality we may as soon fall again into a gross conforming stupidity, a stark and dead congealment of wood and hay and stubble forced and frozen together. . . .

John Milton

Stone welcomed the end of World War II with his hopes paralleled by his fear of the future. His hopes for reform soon foundered in the chilly atmosphere of the postwar period, but his fear of a reactionary upsurge became a reality as bitter antagonisms destroyed the Grand Alliance and crippled efforts to augment New Deal measures.

The early Cold War years proved to be difficult ones for liberal and leftist forces in the United States. No longer encountering an often sympathetic Franklin D. Roosevelt, they now confronted a frequently hostile and generally ineffectual Harry S. Truman. Stone condemned the apparent rightward shift of Roosevelt's successor, particularly noting Truman's attempts to discredit leftist labor and political organizations. Stone believed that Truman's failure to uphold civil liberties only aided the right, warning once again that liberals could not attack the left and remain unscathed. Very early in the postwar period, Stone charged that police state methods were being employed to crush opposition and to



silence dissent. The whole thrust of Truman's policies seemed predicated upon blind anti-Communism. While apparent in the domestic arena, the anti-Communist crusading of Truman was even more evident in his conduct of American foreign policy. Very quickly, the new president helped to cripple any chance of creating a viable international organization which would help to produce world stability. Instead, he appeared obsessed with an anti-Soviet campaign. That, Stone believed, could only antagonize the Russians and cause them to clamp down on Eastern Europe. Furthermore, such intransigence would alienate the Third World and enable reactionaries to direct U.S. foreign policy. Stone worried that the inevitable results of such policies would be repression at home and widespread American interventionism abroad.

Following the Japanese surrender in the late summer of 1945, Stone had retained a certain degree of optimism that America could chart a progressive course in the post-war era. Such a development would be impossible without a stable economic order, or without protection of basic political freedoms at home. Leftists such as Stone therefore focused upon the issues of full employment, planning, socialism, and civil rights. The journalist reasoned that full employment and an economy immune to boom-and-bust patterns were unlikely under capitalism. Free enterprise still signified widespread monopolism, profitable scarcities, reduced initiative, and a pool of

unemployed workers. Capitalism still appeared to be "unplanned, irresponsible, and anarchistic."<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, as the war ended in August 1945, Stone in PM praised President Truman's support of the Full Employment Bill. He labeled the measure "historic," for it declared that the government should ensure that every American could obtain a job. This, even more than had any New Deal enactment, seemed to indicate a radical shift away from the concept of laissez-faire. For Stone, the bill signified that Americans had learned valuable lessons from their wartime experiences, including the necessity of economic planning. Such planning and not free enterprise had enabled the Allied powers to triumph in World War II. The massive output of war matériel was possible only because of the planning and compulsion utilized to move both capital and labor away from business as usual practices. Private corporations were able to increase output to unprecedented levels because of governmental guarantees of markets. Comparable and even greater levels of production during peacetime would be impossible, Stone wrote, without further planning and additional market guarantees. The 1920s model of rugged individualism and the 1930s example of the New Deal were both inadequate for the needs of the future. Neither had resulted in full employment, and while one led to the worst depression in American history, the other had failed to end that economic disaster.<sup>2</sup>

Producing effective reconversion, the journalist reasoned, required extensive investigation of demand, an overall plan for full employment, and enough education and imagination to realize that the peacetime challenge posed as grave a threat to American stability as had the war. Such a program would result in a mixed economy, but such a partly planned, partly free market economy already existed. Yet it was one organized by the heads of a few great industries to produce scarcity, not plenty. Stone favored economic planning with large-scale governmental involvement, even though such involvement was sure to antagonize business interests, because it would encourage enterprise among many other industrialists. The alternative to governmental action involved relinquishment of wartime controls and a return to the vague hope "that some magical thing called 'free enterprise' would eventually result in full employment." Declaring that "this is incantation, not reason," Stone warned that should economic woes again afflict Americans, the nation would soon adopt more drastic measures. Education concerning the necessity of governmental involvement in economic affairs was thus essential. An individualistic lot, Americans despised governmental interference and treated free enterprise as "the great American religion, our own Shintoism." But an effort to create full employment through democratic means, Stone believed, was "the great adventure of our generation, in America."<sup>3</sup>

In a later PM article, dated 5 October 1947, Stone discussed the average American capitalist's adhorrence of socialism. He admitted that capitalists had reason to be wary, as "ideas are more powerful even than atom bombs. And the idea of socialism, of social ownership and control of the means of production, an idea older than Marx, an idea at least as old as Jesus and his first followers . . . has become the most potent idea of modern times." Control by the state over private property had intensified since the 1930s, and behind it lay the need to mobilize for the war effort and to provide security for the general populace. Every interest group, including farmers, laborers, and capitalists, favored laws or combination to protect itself from the uncertainties of an uncontrolled market place. Capitalists must recognize that "socialism is coming everywhere," and that war against the red bogey would only destroy free enterprise. But American capitalists should also recognize that the pace and direction of socialism would be decided "by the character and traditions of its people and by the state of its industry and education." Communism, Soviet-style, was not the wave of the future unless actions by the United States were "so incredibly stupid" as to allow no middle approach for the world's masses. The intelligent capitalist would acquiesce in the development of a mixed economy, quasi-socialist and quasi-capitalist. Communism possessed great economic

weaknesses due to overcentralization and the growth of a massive bureaucracy, both deadening influences. Should America approach the future calmly, such evils could be avoided through a retention of "as much individual enterprise as possible within the framework of economic planning."<sup>4</sup>

While Stone believed that an aversion to planning could result in an economic downturn which would threaten the reforms of the past decade and a half, he also thought that the very real presence of reactionary forces posed yet another threat to internal harmony. The stink of racism, he argued, endangered fundamental American liberties and provided the basis for a fascist movement. Naturally then, the congressional move to filibuster against passage of a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission appalled him. On 3 February in PM, Stone termed the fight over the FEPC as important a battle as Americans would wage in the present era. He condemned the stench of bigotry on Capitol Hill, and warned that America "can no more survive half-free and half-fascist than it could half-slave and half-free." The bigots who refused to grant full rights to blacks appeared ready "to extend racial inferiority to others." The belief of the filibusterers that America was a land for white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxons, was potentially disruptive in a nation with such a diversity of peoples.<sup>5</sup>

Stone argued that a lesson loomed large in the

filibuster challenge. Racist concepts appeared to be more embedded in the American South "than anywhere else in the world except South Africa." The filibuster provided "a warning of the ugly forces that lie wait in our South, forces which can create as brutal, as violent and as black a fascism in this country as anything the world has seen, not excluding Germany." He declared that labor organizations, progressives, and all decent Americans should work to assist passage of the FEPC. The issue appeared clear. "Either democracy will be extended into the South or bigotry will be extended into the North. It's as simple, and as terrible, as that."<sup>6</sup>

Two days later, Stone wrote about the "subversive" nature of the filibuster. He noted that a small, unprincipled minority was preventing majority rule, the foundation of democratic government, and thus was destroying "faith in the possibility of gradual and peaceful change by democratic process." By implementing the filibuster, the Southern oligarchy was ruling the nation and disallowing even a slight movement toward increased opportunity for all. The battle over the FEPC seemed particularly ludicrous as the United States had just waged a successful "war against fascism and racism."<sup>7</sup>

The report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights received praise from Stone on 2 November 1947. To help further the cause of civil rights, he wrote, required executive and legislative action, as well as

organized work on the part of the American public. He called for Truman to use the Justice Department and the FBI to protect basic freedoms, and urged the president to create a permanent civil rights commission in the executive branch. Stone declared that Congress should pass toughened legislation against police terror, an improved Civil Rights Act, a permanent FEPC, and a bill outlawing the poll tax. But as he had indicated during the war, revolutionary changes in the hearts and minds of all Americans were essential to defend the rights of America's minority groups. Stone and PM supported creation of a new organization called Americans in Action to agitate for civil rights, and to "extend the promise of equality" enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. Only comparable grass roots action, he noted, had allowed for democratic gains under Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt. Americans in Action would exhort the nation to live up to its high ideals and would give America's finest youth "that opportunity for unselfish action and heroic struggle which youth requires." Such a quest would help to implement the two fundamental principles of the American creed.

One is the equality of man, treat  
men as equals and you raise them,  
treat them as inferiors and you  
push them down into the muck.  
The other is freedom of thought;  
there is no substitute for it if  
man is to grow to full stature.  
This is the essence of the American  
system, as affirmed in the Declara-  
tion. This is a creed for the

peaceful conquest of the world, if  
we are but true enough and brave  
enough to live up to it at home.<sup>8</sup>

A few months later, Stone derided as a sham the doctrine of separate but equal as proclaimed in Plessy v. Ferguson. "Separate but non-existent" better described the situation of public facilities for blacks in the south. The purpose of such maltreatment was to maintain America's blacks "in a twilight status somewhere between slavery and full freedom," to force them into menial work, and to keep them from cultivating "articulate and effective leadership." The entire Jim Crow system, Stone reasoned, possessed no constitutional basis, and he wrote that the Supreme Court should be courageous enough to void the Plessy decision.<sup>9</sup>

Stone believed that blacks must assist the civil rights cause. He stated that the American blacks must recognize that docility never cured tyranny. "Only those obtain freedom who want it badly enough to pay its price, and only those pay its price for whom death is preferable to bondage." Activist blacks could liberate their white fellows and make the nation "truly free."<sup>10</sup>

While Stone feared that the fight for democratic change and economic stability could be lost by a reactionary tide at home, he believed just as strongly that American foreign policy was degenerating during the early postwar period. He continued to warn that the hopes for a peaceful world order required a willingness



to allow for vast change in Europe, in China, and in the colonial world. An effective international body of nations, an American refusal to create an anti-Soviet bloc, and a readiness to relinquish monopoly control of atomic weaponry could also help to foster global peace.

The breakup of the great European empires and the shift in the balance of power on the European continent were two of the most portentous results of World War II. Nationalistic leaders, many of them attracted to the Allied cause by the promise of self-determination, retained their desire for independence and for large-scale social and economic change. Unrest appeared in areas previously dominated by imperial powers, and increasing attention was focused upon the great land mass of China. The growing strength of Mao Tse-tung's insurgent forces who were battling the feudalistic, American-support regime of Chiang Kai-shek, augured vast changes in China. Stone warned against granting a blank check to Chiang, now calling him "half fascist in his political views," and declared that the absence of democracy and the presence of vast corruption had weakened Kuomintang China. The Chinese Communists, in contrast, were reported to have waged many "heroic struggles" without Russian material assistance, and to have survived only because of their appeal to the peasants. The change that was also occurring in Eastern Europe, Stone thought, should not be opposed by the United States. Admittedly, the new

Bulgarian, Romanian, and Hungarian governments were "hardly democratic" as they had not been democratically chosen and failed to grant full political rights to their opponents. But the British Foreign Secretary's assertion that these governments "do not . . . represent the majority of the people" in their nations, Stone believed, could not be proven. Rather, the coalition governments seemed to represent worker parties, peasant organizations, and, in Hungary, small landowners. Such groups appeared to represent the great bulk of the people, and the promise of economic and land reforms did "certainly satisfy majority aspirations." Stone declared that it was "not only foolish to expect, but unwise to seek, democratic regimes of the standard variety" in Eastern Europe at the present time. For these were "enemy" states, Axis allies. The present governments were "provisional, born of defeat and revolution." Most important, they needed to destroy those forces which had collaborated with the Nazis. These nations possessed no democratic traditions and had generally experienced grave repression by governments which served only the wealthy few. The previous dictatorships had long prevented "the economic reforms which could along make possible settled democratic regimes in the future." Should democracy some day appear in Eastern Europe, transformations as great as were demanded for the Axis powers were mandatory.<sup>11</sup>

To be consistent, Stone thought, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin should pair his complaints concerning mistreatment of rightist minorities in Eastern Europe with condemnations of the suppression of Greek leftists. There, an unelected and unrepresentative government remained in power, jailing progressive opponents and employing terrorists. Stone wrote that tragically, while the Soviet Army was supporting the leftist governments in Eastern Europe, the British soldiers were propping up the Greek reactionary regime.<sup>12</sup>

Meanwhile, although the new Labor Party government continued to recognize the Franco regime in Spain, Great Britain and the United States refused to acknowledge the Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Romanian governments "which are at least anti-Axis and semi-democratic where his is totally fascist." Throughout the postwar period, Stone condemned interventionism and big power politics, believing that they were characteristic of the old, departed era. But he strongly believed that Franco Spain threatened world security, that it served "as a center of fascist infection and as a secret laboratory for new German war preparations." Thus, he indicated that in this one instance, the great states should direct an ultimatum at Franco by terminating all trade and diplomacy and by recognizing the Spanish Republican Government-in-Exile. To those who worried that such strong action would rekindle the civil war, Stone asserted

that for Franco's opponents a civil war already existed. They presently suffered incarceration, deliberate unemployment, forced labor, even murder. If no pressure were exerted against Franco, then Spain would remain "the last concentration camp in Europe, the one place from which men who fought against our enemies still look out with hungry longing from behind barbed wire."<sup>13</sup>

As the former Allied powers continued to disagree over European and Asian developments, Stone conjectured that the United Nations seemed only to have provided an international podium "for the war of nerves" being fought between the English and the Russians. He feared that unless the United States mediated between the two former allies, a third world war could emerge. For Stone, the current squabble between the British and the Soviets represented merely a continuation of a centuries old rivalry, which was predicated more on security than on ideological grounds. The leading European seapower, England, desired to prevent open access to the Mediterranean by the great Eurasian land power, Russia.<sup>14</sup>

By March of 1946, Stone was writing that the United States and the Soviet Union were now on a collision course. On 9 February Joseph Stalin had indicated that Communist and capitalist states could not coexist. William Douglas, the liberal Supreme Court justice, then manifested his fear that the Russian leaders' announcement signified "The Declaration of World War III." Winston Churchill

retorted on 5 March, when he exclaimed in Fulton, Missouri, that "a fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples" must direct the global order because of the dropping of "an iron curtain" over the European continent by the Soviets. Stone discussed three factors which seemed to be widening the rift between the world's most powerful nations. One involved the disruption of the European balance of power by World War II and the ensuing need for new stability to ensure peace among the victors. Another element arose from the massive suffering borne by the Russians during the war and their resulting demand for secure borders. A third problem evolved from American monopoly of atomic weaponry. The security interests of both the English and the Soviets must be met and that required transformations from the status quo ante, a particularly painful process for the British empire.<sup>15</sup>

American acceptance of the Churchill analysis, Stone reasoned, could only exacerbate tensions. Instead, both the United States and England needed to recognize that real change, and not an empty espousal of "democracy," was essential. Stone counseled that America must understand "that to talk in implicit terms of 'democracy' in Eastern Europe" and in the colonial world, would generally result in support of reactionary forces "against a mass of ignorant and miserable people." He warned that unless the United States assisted in the development of those regions, their peoples were "certain to

swing toward communism, and thus to poison relations between the West and the Soviet Union." American state-men needed to ascertain whether Russian demands were limitless, and where America should "draw the limit." The Churchill iron curtain speech seemed to preclude vitally essential negotiation. Beyond that, the apparent assumption concerning the inevitability of war with Russia was incredibly dangerous and had already resulted in a reduction of civil liberties at home. Actual war with nuclear weaponry "will mean Finis for all of us."<sup>16</sup>

While a number of the top American foreign policy-makers seemed to think that the atomic monopoly gave the nation a valuable bargaining chip in Cold War games, Stone favored international control of atomic energy. Any other alternative, he feared, would result in a nuclear arms race. He considered the eagerness of the American military to control the atom particularly perilous, and condemned "our military cave men."<sup>17</sup>

As the Grand Alliance collapsed during the early postwar period and an anti-Soviet crusade seemed to be in the offing, Stone's earlier concern that a parallel domestic reaction would replace Roosevelt reformism appeared prescient. The seeds of repression that many Americans later condemned during the ear of McCarthyism, sprouted very soon after the close of World War II. The hardening of Truman's stance toward the Soviet Union was coupled with a rightward drift in the American political

arena as reformers and radicals came under attack. Throughout the Truman presidency, Stone warned of the threat to civil liberties which he believed emanated from all branches of government and from reactionary private forces. On 6 October 1946, he castigated the "Red menace" speech made by FBI head J. Edgar Hoover to a convention of the American Legion. The Hoover tirade indicated a mindless far-right mentality. Stone termed "hysterical nonsense" Hoover's efforts to identify the American Communist Party as "Public Enemy No. 1," as it was so impotent that it could not even "elect a dog-catcher outside New York City." The Nazi-Soviet pact and the party's "intellectual antics" involving "Moscow-style" purges, had greatly reduced its support among the American public. Stone wondered if the Hoover talk indicated an attempt to silence all liberal and leftist preachments. He wondered why the FBI boss did not attack racism, anti-Semitism, or the threat of a reemergent Ku Klux Klan instead of the weak American Communist Party.<sup>18</sup>

Over the next several months, Stone berated the anti-civil libertarian stance emerging in the armed forces, the executive branch, and Congress. He condemned the army "witch hunt" which resulted in the ouster of several officials of the CIO United Rubber Workers from the Aberdeen, Maryland Proving Ground. Union activities and not subversion seemed to have angered the commanding officer. Stone criticized the smearing of the union leaders as Communists, and called for a public declaration

of charges at an impartial hearing, with the accused to be represented by counsel. Anonymous informants were sadly being allowed to ruin the careers and reputations of the dismissed workers. Such practices seemed only to encourage malicious or irresponsible individuals to air private resentments behind closed doors, and to establish "a self-righteous cloak for administrative injustices."<sup>19</sup>

On 2 July 1947 Stone discussed the dismissal of ten State Department employees. He stated that returning to the capital was like venturing "into a country under the shadow of a terror" for Washington seemed to be engulfed in hysteria. Governmental officials feared to speak freely because of "Congressional snarling about Reds." Admittedly, certain security problems did exist, but "the kernel of fact" was so hidden "in an uproar of insane suspicions and purges for opinions" that Americans risked losing sight of one vital consideration. Equitable treatment of governmental workers involved not just a sense of justice for specific individuals, but "protection for the Government itself against a mounting wave of panic" that was forcing all intellectuals out of government service. Already, it was hard to uncover able individuals who could live up to the congressional definition of what constituted a loyal citizen. Sadly, congressional tirades made government service dangerous for all but those ready deceitfully to switch their



opinions in response to any policy transformations or to each new reactionary move by Congress. The nation seemed destined to end up with "a Government of scared yesmen."<sup>20</sup>

Two days later, Stone declared that a useful exercise for many Americans would involve a rereading of the Declaration of Independence. A study of the document demonstrated to what extent the United States had moved from the precepts of the Founding Fathers. In the climate of the Cold War, the affirmation of a people's right to revolt against a tyrannical government would make Jefferson and his fellow writers of the Declaration ineligible for public employment. "This is embarrassing, and perhaps some day a different kind of America, the kind that seems to be developing around us, will discreetly edit the Declaration, keeping the original in the back room of the library, with other works fit only for mature minds above the ideological age of consent."<sup>21</sup>

Several months later, Stone noted that Truman's Attorney General, Thomas Clark, had opened a new stage in the development of the loyalty purge. Clark had drafted a list of "subversive organizations," thus branding legal groups as suspicious or disloyal without even a hearing. Stone wrote that this action tested whether America would defend free expression as the best method for reducing dissatisfactions and for encouraging the vital changes required to maintain a healthy society. He

condemned those who declared that the Communists repeatedly used constitutional protections "to infiltrate, disrupt and to destroy the democratic systems of which they are the avowed enemies." Communism, he pointed out, was least potent precisely in nations such as the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, where Communists were able to operate freely. They won few converts there because liberty and an effective social order had solidified the loyalty of the people. Thus the gravest threat to democracy came not from the Communists but from those who challenged longstanding freedoms and prevented the development of economic security. Stone declared that conspiracies and ideas did not overturn social systems "until they have [become] rotten from within." The real peril came from neither right-wing nor left-wing anti-democratic fringe groups, but from those who because of stupidity, fear, greed, and irresponsibility were feeding hysteria instead of attempting to resolve fundamental problems. Should emotional frenzy and suppression intensify, should the government continue to smear as "subversive" opposing political views, then such developments would serve to prove a major revolutionary theoretical point: faced with challenge, privileged elements would rather destroy liberty than accede to change. "The most subversive of current tendencies," Stone exclaimed, "is that which is destroying faith in freedom, faith in free discussion, faith in the power of truth

and the ability of ordinary folk to grasp it. This faith is the essence of the American creed; to give it up, the ultimate disloyalty."<sup>22</sup>

Abuse of congressional authority, he recorded, also gravely threatened American freedoms. Stone recognized that the most important power of Congress was its investigatory power, essential for the passage of intelligent legislation. But he condemned "the vague standards" employed by the House Un-American Activities Committee, which allowed for the persecution and smearing of those who opposed the committee and of those who challenged reactionary foreign policy. He attacked the congressional investigation of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, an organization designed to aid Spanish Republican exiles. Present or past condemnation of fascist Spain, dictatorial Argentina, or authoritarian China was causing many liberals and radicals to be branded as unpatriotic.<sup>23</sup>

The investigation of "un-American" activities in the Hollywood film industry received bitter damnation from Stone. He wrote that if a congressional committee could brand as un-American all ideas, speakers, and writers that displeased it, then freedom of speech and freedom of the press were being restricted. Stone declared that the past record of HUAC was an abysmal one. Under Chairmen Dies, J. Parnell, Thomas, and John Rankin, HUAC had terrorized any who attempted to employ their

constitutional freedoms in ways annoying to the committee. HUAC destroyed people's reputations and caused them to lose jobs. Stone cried that "no business will be immune from this unconstitutional inquisition, no reputation safe from the auto-da-fes of these new Torquemadas," should the courts not uphold the Bill of Rights and terminate the committee's "un-American activities." In the meantime, the committee was accomplishing its major design: the spreading of fear that Communists had "penetrated everywhere" and now threatened "the prize national possession, the atom bomb," thus justifying drastic action and even the infringement of constitutional rights. Stone feared

the state of mind being created is a kind of plot-and-persecution system akin to paranoid obsession and like paranoia impervious to correction by rational agreement. The creation of this state of mind is the necessary preliminary for the emergence of a full-scale fascist movement garbed as militant Americanism.

Because of this very real danger, "all men of good-will" had to condemn the congressional witchhunt. Fundamental and true American ideals were being tested. If freedom of speech were presently threatened in the cinema, freedom of the press could be next. The ultimate desire of the Thomases was "to terrorize all leftists, liberals, and intellectuals; to make them fearful in the film, the theatre, the press, and any school of advanced ideas the Thomas Committee can stigmatize as 'red.'"<sup>24</sup>

The congressional attempt to require registration of the Communist Party and front groups, indicated to Stone that "leading American democrats have too little faith in the free discussion which is the essence of the democratic system." While political freedom would not be officially denied to American Communists, the bill would surely make "the exercise of that freedom so hazardous as to force them underground." Stone admitted that the Communists did pose "special problems." But so had the earlier anarchists, abolitionists, and francophiles. The paramount issue of liberty confronted each generation "in strange and alarming guises, testing anew faith in freedom." And a calm look at the facts of present day America did not justify "the panic-stricken adoption of methods which smack of the totalitarianism for which we criticize Moscow." The American Communist Party, functioning since the late 1910s, remained basically a tiny sect, not able directly to elect one congressional representative. The history of the party in America proved what history had repeatedly shown: "that revolutions are not made by conspiracies, and that societies are rendered not less but more stable by free dissemination of ideas, however repugnant." Furthermore, regardless of its tenets, the American Communist Party had not been a revolutionary party for quite some time. Its continual obeisance to the Soviet Union and the sharp alterations of party policy "have left the comrades as

confused as the FBI." Stone warned that fascist movements obtained power by overestimating Communist potency, by expanding it "to bogey proportions." HUAC's propagandistic activities remarkably paralleled those which had preceded the emergence of European fascism.<sup>25</sup>

A PM article in early 1947 acknowledged that the American Communist Party propensity for secrecy and the tendency of a few party members toward "conspiratorial habits," only played into the hands of reactionary forces such as HUAC. Stone argued that the Communists should fight to participate as an open political party, and should terminate "all the penny dreadful hole-in-the-wall, playing-at-revolution" antics. He wrote that he could "hear the screams from Union Square already," but he advised the Communists to reflect. "They can't make a revolution, but they can certainly set off a counter-revolution that will smash civil liberty and the whole progressive movement in America and end hope of world peace." Stone declared that continued Comintern activities were also counter-productive. "The Russians cannot have the cake of conspiracy and the penny of cooperation at the same time. That is an issue the Kremlin must face."<sup>26</sup>

While Stone diligently defended the civil liberties of all types of leftists, even those with whom he disagreed ideologically, he did support the continued prosecution of a motley group of right-wingers who had been charged by the government with conspiring to cripple

American military morale during the second world war. Among the defendants were "fascist philosopher Lawrence Dennis . . . anti-Semitic prophet Gerald L. K. Smith . . . red-baiter Elizabeth Dilling . . . German-American Bund Leader William Kunze . . . James True . . . inventor of a billyclub he called the 'kike killer' (U.S. Patent 2026077) which reportedly came in a special size for women." After dismissal of a first trial following the death of the presiding judge, the government had reindicted the native fascists, but an appellate court soon determined that the entire case had been a travesty of justice. Stone argued in October 1946 that the accused seditionists should be retried. He wondered why Truman refused to grant executive clemency to those who had refused military service because of moral or religious reasons, while allowing those charged with sedition to avoid even a day in court. Stone declared that the Supreme Court had declined to review the sedition convictions and jailings suffered by the Minneapolis Trotskyists but freed "rightists and Bundists . . . on traditional civil libertarian grounds."<sup>27</sup>

Consistently a staunch defender of the Bill of Rights, including freedom of expression for the far right, Stone evidently did not think that the case called for the classical civil libertarian defense because sedition had taken place. However, as it began, the American Civil Liberties Union condemned the prosecution, and historians have determined that the entire case

rested upon a "notably weak" foundation. The government proved unable to demonstrate that a conspiracy had occurred or that the defendants possessed any intention of disrupting the military. While almost all liberals and leftists approved of the sedition prosecution at the time, it resulted in an attack upon a despised minority through employment of sweeping conspiracy charges and guilt by association, and censured the accused "for views that paralleled Nazi propaganda before the outbreak of the war." Precisely because such developments threatened American freedoms, Stone, in almost every other case involving ostracized political minorities, adopted a more libertarian stance.<sup>28</sup>

And on 27 June 1947, Stone demonstrated that his support for prosecution of the American fascists was not predicated upon ideological grounds. He defended the right of the Christian Front, a right-wing, anti-Semitic organization, to meet publicly in New York City. While terming the Christian Front a fascist movement, Stone declared that American law restricted neither the free assemblage nor the free speech of any group, no matter how untrustworthy others believed it to be. While some observers believed such reasoning to be typical "bankrupt liberalism" or "ostrich tactics," and while they noted that a similar mistake had been made under the Weimar Republic, Stone wrote that "this business of free assembly and free speech is terribly



important."

It's as easy as rolling off a log to uphold basic rights when our own side is involved. The test of the quality of our thinking and the quality of our faith comes when it's the other fellow's right to speak that's at stake. Especially when the other fellow is selling ideas as repellant as the Christian Front.

To uphold the principle of free speech required faith in the populace, and a confidence that eventually truth would triumph. Stone asserted that such a belief was the noblest one, and that "in this sense, I am a liberal as well as a socialist." He also indicated that, ultimately, the "revolutionary socialist states" must adopt the Lockean and Jeffersonian precepts or deteriorate "into the facile falsehoods of the 'national' socialism we saw in the Third Reich." Those who truly believed in democracy must support the premise "that freedom of thought has about as close to absolute value as anything in this finite world," and must understand that this fundamental principle had to be safeguarded from the government. Real protection for this tenet could only emanate from wide acceptance of the free expression of ideas. Without such support, law courts and written constitutions would be worthless. Finally, for Stone, the Christian Front case involved the key question: was the faith of Americans in their fellow citizens so fragile, so tenuous, "that a little bunch of loudmouth Hitler hailers and Jew-baiters in Queens" could frighten

them into relinquishing Jeffersonian beliefs. The most effective answer to the fascist menace resided in a robust economic order and a pacific world order, not in a system for the suppression of "screwballs."<sup>29</sup>

This editorial and another Stone article a short time later defending the freedom of speech of a right-wing, "Jew-baiting suspended priest," Arthur W. Terminiello, undoubtedly alienated a number of liberals and radicals. In the latter piece, Stone wrote that the world had witnessed many "closed systems, from the ancient Roman Catholic to the modern Communist" which attempted to cast out "risk by relying on revelation of one kind or another," and thus, "justified injustice and purge." But history had proven that suppression abetted only "an illusory security." Stone admitted that he was unquestionably what Terminiello decried in his invectives-- "an 'atheistic, communistic, zionistic Jew!'" Yet Stone would demean neither himself nor his fellow Jews by denying free speech to Terminiello. Stone stated that he did not so lightly regard American freedoms that he would discard them "like a rabbit" because somebody utilized them "to say what I suppose ought to disturb me deeply." But Terminiello's invective did not so concern him, for he believed that the hazard posed by "fascist ideas on the Right" could no more be silenced by incarceration than could the threat of leftist revolutionary doctrines.<sup>30</sup>

While Stone defended the political rights of individuals and organizations across the political spectrum, he considered protection of the rights of yet another group essential to uphold libertarian ideals and human decency. Under the 1948 conscription act, which allowed for declaration of conscientious objection only on religious grounds, "a Thoreau, a Tolstoy, or a Gandhi" might well not qualify. The failure to recognize the philosophical or humanitarian objector directly contradicted the Nuremberg declaration that "men had a moral obligation to refuse to carry out criminal orders." That doctrine placed personal conscience ahead of the state. Stone asked if Americans accepted at home the creed they favored as international law at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. Conscientious objectors considered it as heinous "to plunge a bayonet into another man's belly as to hurl him into a furnace." They thought that "murder is murder, however committed," and believed that the government possessed no authority to force one man to kill another. Stone proceeded to attack the policies which permitted the granting of blanket amnesties to millions of fascists, and the treatment of American conscientious objectors as second-class citizens without the opportunity to vote, to hold governmental jobs, or to work as professionals. "We give absolution to Nazis because we want their aid in a new war. We deny it to those closest in spirit to Jesus because we fear their and His example."<sup>31</sup>

Although Stone thus generally defended civil liberties for all, many Americans, including a sizeable number of former leftists and several liberals, backed the drive to restrict the political freedoms of radicals at home while praising the increasingly anti-Communist orientation of U.S. foreign policy. During the early postwar years, Stone sharply denounced the anti-Soviet emphasis of American policymakers, the resulting alignment with reactionary forces, and the increasing tendency to favor military solutions for deep-seated social and economic problems. In the late summer of 1947, Stone compared the conflicting viewpoints of the U.S.S.R. and its former allies. The Russians now desired friendly or puppet nations along their borders to form a shield against the capitalist West. Since the end of World War II, the Soviets had attempted to appeal to European peasants and laborers. To assist this process, the Soviet Union possessed "a new force: an international Communist movement, with all the fervor and fanaticism of a new religion, Jesuitical in its tactics and disciplined in its maneuvers." This movement believed that the continuance of Communism in Russia, as compared with the collapse of social democracy before fascism, sustained the Leninist tenet that only a ruthless dictatorship could result in socialism, and that the attempt to reach socialism democratically and peacefully was destined to fail. The Communist movement, added to the instabilities

inherent in a reshuffling of the balance of power following a major war, greatly worried many. The Catholic Church feared a stolid foe in the battle for the hearts and minds of man. The democratic socialist movements feared extinction through Bolshevik-style revolutions. The Western nations feared Soviet and Communist control of Western Europe and China, and the possibility of "a Communist One World." The Western capitalist classes feared that a Communist surge would obliterate them. All of these elements looked for assistance from the United States, although not for identical purposes. Only America possessed the capital and products needed to rebuild and stabilize the war-damaged western nations. Only America contained reactionary forces wealthy and potent enough to aid an anti-Communist drive. And only America enjoyed both the democratic tradition and the residue of good feelings among the world's peoples, which could possibly prevent a Communist advance.<sup>32</sup>

Yet Stone recognized that instability existed over much of the globe, including Europe, precisely because of popular discontent against the old order which many thought was represented by the U.S. Throughout a good portion of Western Europe, the choices were not between "'free enterprise' American style" and Communism, but between democratic socialism and Communism. Indeed, much of "the non-Communist world is socialist in its aspirations and thinking." Unfortunately, Americans

had difficulty comprehending this inevitable movement toward socialism. They viewed it as a "queer mental quirk" of the Europeans, as "an eccentricity to be cured." They failed to see that the movement toward socialism resulted from many developments: the unpatriotic collaboration of many wealthy individuals with the fascists, the deliberate impoverishment of large sectors in Europe because of "a closed cartelized capitalism," a new and growing inability to obtain vital raw materials essential for inherently wasteful capitalist systems.<sup>33</sup>

An intelligent response to changed world-wide circumstances and a recognition of the need for large-scale reform, were impeded by the resurgence of conservative and even reactionary elements in America, "intent on untrammelled exploitation." For his part, President Truman appeared totally incapable of coping with the fundamental problems of the era. Roosevelt had known instinctively how to compete with Communism. Avoiding both belligerence and threats, he secured the adoption of reforms which appeased popular demands to a degree, and which magnified the worth of democratic, nonviolent means. Under Truman, unfortunately, although "we preach democracy, we practice plutocracy." Consequently, Truman's policies and actions, which involved mouthing idealistic incantations while aiding reactionary forces and "imperialist exploitation," were making America appear as

"hypocritical and untrustworthy." Tragically, America was enabling the Soviet Union to pose as the champion of democracy and freedom, despite the fact that the Communist state was neither democratic nor free. The United States marred its own often legitimate condemnations of repressive Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe because it tolerated comparable or even harsher actions in the American zone of influence.<sup>34</sup>

His newspaper PM, Stone declared, believed in the efficacy of democracy, and in the chance of resolving even the gravest social ills through democratic processes. The paper's position was that America could display "world leadership in the 'struggle against Communism,'" through a demonstration of the inherent virtues of free government. But such leadership was not presently forthcoming from the United States. Instead, American practices were aiding "Communist planning by leaving people little choice between reactionary American-supported regimes and Communist leadership."<sup>35</sup>

Such an occurrence could clearly be seen in Greece and in China. For Stone, American policies appeared most evident in Greece, where they devolved "into [a] harsh and cynical collaboration with a corrupt and unrepresentative government in the task of crushing Greek liberties." The granting of \$55,000,000 in military aid to assist the right-wing Greek government in "an anti-bandit campaign," appeared strikingly suggestive of the

hokum employed by the Coolidge administration to justify the sending of Marines to uphold dollar diplomacy in Nicaragua against Augusto Cesar Sandino. Stone wondered if the Truman officials really believed that the American populace would "swallow that sort of guff again." American tactics were forcing Greek liberals either to align themselves with "Fascist and collaborationist elements," or to light out for "the hills with the 'bandits.'"<sup>36</sup>

All around the globe, similar developments seemed to be occurring because of wrongheaded American foreign policy. America appeared to have created "a military shopping service for dictators, guns for the asking to anti-democratic regimes from Iran and Turkey to Brazil and Argentina, guns for use against their own peoples, guns marked U.S.A., not the best kind of advertising." America continued to assist World War II foes at the expense of wartime allies, thereby antagonizing the latter. Stone warned that the divisions that America was encouraging were as deadly as those caused by the Soviet Union. The Russians had divided Europe and demanded that the Eastern countries "support Moscow or else." The United States was repeating this action in each nation within the American sphere of influence, thus thwarting the hopes of those who wanted the great Western power to promote moderate solutions in order to end civil altercations and hatred. America seemed to be demanding that these people back "reaction--or



else. And that 'or else,' as Greece and China demonstrate, is an 'or else' that breeds civil war."<sup>37</sup>

The emphasis upon force as the key to resolving large economic and social ills struck Stone as foolish and dangerous. He wrote that U.S. policymakers should heed the advice of Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who before departing from China had noted the inefficacy of military action in eliminating Communism. Stone admonished: "You cannot kill an idea. You cannot substitute bullets for bread. You cannot make misery more palatable by putting it under guard. You cannot build a stable society on exploitation and corruption." He thought that if Truman could begin to approach Roosevelt's understanding, then the foreign policy of the United States could start to appear as something other than a hopeless effort to create fortifications against Soviet aggression "on the quicksands of bankrupt ruling classes." He warned that American military involvement in places such as Greece would prove to be "long-drawn out, costly, painful and bloody. . . ." Only internal reform could produce real peace in such areas as Greece and China, and only large changes could "save" these nations from communism.<sup>38</sup>

The sending of American funds to reactionary forces around the world, Stone argued, would also divert moneys required for the vitally needed reconstruction of Europe. Without a rebuilding of the European economies, the possibility of a fascist reemergence would always be

present, and peace would always remain precarious. Consequently, Stone supported the Marshall Plan and cautioned against refusal to finance it. If Western Europe were forced to undertake drastic economic measures and revolutionary political alterations, he declared, the repercussions would shake the globe. Such turmoil would leave neither American capitalism nor the American political system unaffected, and could be avoided only if United States lived up to its responsibilities as the most productive nation in a badly troubled world. To adopt a hard-line policy instead of the Marshall Plan would only increase European divisions at a time when peace and prosperity required commercial and cultural intercourse.<sup>39</sup>

Stone wrote that a severe shortage of capital impeded the reconstruction effort. That shortfall had developed because of a weakening of the European empires, a direct result of World War II, and augured a vast reshaping of dealings between Western Europe and other regions. The capital essential for Europe's rebirth could be obtained by theft, by loan, or through self-abnegation. The European capitalists had previously adopted the first approach, that of imperialism, but the United States now needed to assist Europe through the second method. The third possibility had been employed in Russia for an entire generation, and would loom larger if European reconstruction faltered. The Soviet Communist leaders

had obtained capital not through outside aid, but through the suffering of the Russian population. Stalin's five-year plans indicated how capital could be accumulated through "a system harsh, ruthless and single-minded enough to underfeed and underclothe a whole generation for the sake of the future." Should external assistance be withheld, Western Europe would either decay or would employ "a system, like Communism, draconian enough to marshall all national resources and to harness all national energies under a system of virtual forced labor." And if Western Europe were to turn Communist, an American-Soviet war would be almost unavoidable. Stone's reasoning thus led him to conclude that all concerned individuals must support aid for the crippled European states. Not surprisingly, he chastised the American Communists for opposing the Marshall Plan, for establishing "politically impossible conditions" for a European aid package. "They demanded an unattainable type of perfectionism," he declared, adding that "hunger cannot wait on Utopian conditions."<sup>40</sup>

But within a short time following passage of the Marshall Plan bill, Stone argued that the program was being administered in an undiplomatic fashion. This occurred, he believed, because of continued reluctance within key American circles to aid socialism, and because of accompanying affinity for undemocratic European interests. Stone soon charged that the economic emphasis of the Marshall Plan was being superseded by a military one,

that America was preparing its Western allies not for reconstruction, but for war.<sup>41</sup>

Stone feared that a militaristic U.S. foreign policy would be disastrous not only for world peace, but also for American society. In January and February 1948, he used PM as a sounding board to warn against the increasing militarization of the Truman administration, and called for reduced military spending. Massive military outlays, he reasoned, only increased inflation and reduced the nation's ability to cure domestic problems. He argued that "war machines" possess insatiable appetites, "devour a nation's substance," and create vested interests favoring large military budgets. He reminded his readers that armaments suppliers did not appreciate attempts to reduce worldwide tensions or efforts to produce a stable world order. And with the mounting cries for greatly increased military expenditures, Stone wondered if the military chieftains might "not be tempted to whip up war fever and war hysteria further." He condemned the call for Universal Military Training, stating that "the services are as hungry for men as for machines," with military leaders even talking about a labor draft. To Stone, increased military spending and a beefed up military force assured neither peace nor "a livable victory," and he cited the Nye Committee recommendations supporting government ownership of war industries.<sup>42</sup>

By the summer of 1948, Stone's disdain for the

direction of American foreign policy and for highhanded Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, as demonstrated by the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, caused him to argue that the smaller nations of the world now appeared little disposed to follow blindly either the U.S. or Russia. Around the globe, there seemed to be considerable resentment against the arrogant supposition that all must decide between the two great powers. Stone remarked that to the less powerful states, America and the Soviet Union sometimes appeared to be peopled "by hysterical idiots." Consequently, Yugoslavia desired autonomy, as undoubtedly would Poland and Czechoslovakia if their peoples were able to speak out openly.<sup>43</sup>

By late 1947 or early 1948, the rightward direction of the Truman administration's foreign and domestic policies had convinced Stone and many other independent leftists and liberals that the almost certain renominations of the president offered no real political alternative to the drift toward war and reaction. In March 1948 Izzy declared his support of Progressive Party candidate Henry Wallace, indicating that the differences between the major political parties were indecipherable. Stone believed that only a large Wallace vote could return the Democratic Party "to the path of Franklin D. Roosevelt." The Progressive Party platform adopted at the July convention urged disarmament; international control of troubled areas; a sizeable pension for the elderly;

national health insurance, federal funding for public education; strong price controls; TVA-type developments; congressional enactments to terminate the poll tax, lynching, and racial discrimination; the elimination of tax breaks for the wealthy and for corporations; women's rights; and public control over large banks, the railroads, and energy.<sup>44</sup>

Shortly thereafter, Izzy acknowledged various reservations concerning Henry Wallace and the Progressive Party.

I don't like yogis and I don't like commissars. I condemn the way Stalin combs his hair and I disapprove the way Molotov blows his nose. I can't help cheering for Tito, and when socialism comes I'll fight for the right to spit in the nearest bureaucrat's eye. I own a house in Washington and I don't want proletarians trampling petunias on their way downtown to overthrow the government by force and violence. I wouldn't want my sister to marry a Communist, and force me to maldigest my Sunday morning bagel arguing dialectics with a sectarian brother-in-law.

Izzy admitted: "I know I'm a dupe or worse, and ought to have my ideological tires checked at the nearest FBI service station." Furthermore, "if the Communists came to town I'd soon find myself eating cold kasha in a concentration camp in Kansas gubernya." But he did not consider himself "quite as big a dupe" as those about to cast ballots for the president and his bipartisan foreign policy, who thought that such votes would bring peace, reform, and prosperity. He also did not adjudge himself

as great a fool as those who preferred not to go to the polls, and would "suck their politically pasteurized thumbs" in November.<sup>45</sup>

The red-baiting of the Progressive Party and its candidate by Truman, the deterioration of the American left, the fear of liberals that a Democratic defeat would usher in a new era of Republicanism, the apparent move leftward by the president in the latter stages of the campaign, and repeated political blunderings by Wallace combined to produce an embarrassingly small vote for the third party. But the surprising victory and the recapturing of Congress by the Democratic Party caused many liberal and left-wing journals to rejoice. Ever the optimist, Stone wrote that Truman's win "has transformed the atmosphere left-of-center in Washington," and that the Democratic congressional gains promised a return of Rooseveltian reformism. Stone credited the Wallace campaign with forcing Truman to adopt Roosevelt-like calls for social reform and peace. Soon, however, harsh criticism of Truman's domestic and foreign policies replaced the kind words.<sup>46</sup>

Despite the election results, the nationwide rightward tilt seemed only to intensify over the next several years. The diminution of left-of-center ranks by mid-1948 had caused Stone's longtime employer, PM, to cease publication. Izzy proudly discussed the operation of PM, a paper that had offered its highly opinionated staff an

opportunity "to do the kind of newspaper job small boys dream about, mixing it all up with windmills and knights errant." While the paper was frequently "sloppy, screwy and exasperating," it always exuded excitement. Despite their constant complaints, the staff members were proud participants in the experiment in independent radical journalism. Writing in January, 1949, as a second radical paper for which he worked followed PM into bankruptcy, Izzy wrote that PM had collapsed because of increasing printing costs, inadequate capital, and its own mixed quality. But he declared in the New York Star that the New York Times had accurately disclosed the principal reason why America's most radical independent daily faltered: "the people whose causes it promoted with such vigor did not buy it." Still, the old PMers possessed satisfaction from their endeavors. "We know the names they called us but these never penetrated the pride that made us feel in a great tradition, walking however humbly where Jefferson and Thoreau and Whitman had walked before us."<sup>47</sup>

That democratic tradition, Stone firmly believed, was becoming more and more threatened as the 1940s neared an end. He remained vitally concerned with the need to protect the civil liberties and political freedoms of all groups. Stone sharply condemned the potential emergence of "a thought police" in America, a development seemingly favored by right-wing groups. But he



also warned that the disregard for political democracy and civil liberties, long exemplified by certain sectors on the left, only abetted the drive to crush freedom in the United States. With his strong civil libertarian support of unpopular groups, Stone offended groups of varied political persuasions: rightists who considered anyone left-of-center as traitorous or at least suspect, liberals who continued down the hardline anti-Communist road, and left-wing sectarians who wanted to crush their impotent radical opposition.

Starting in late 1948, Stone began championing James Kutcher, a legless World War II veteran who had lost a \$42 a week clerical position with the Veterans Administration because of the governmental loyalty program. Stone wrote that if Trotskyists like Kutcher could lose public employment, so could socialists, or even New Deal proponents. He stated that "the Case of the Legless Veteran" indicated the real purpose of the loyalty purge. The political views and the job involved showed that the real design was to penalize a man for his ideas, irrespective of his conduct or record. Izzy continued to press for the reinstatement of Kutcher, and spoke at several gatherings defending the veteran. One meeting attracted such speakers as Thomas Emerson of Yale Law School, Roger Baldwin, and Norman Thomas. Thomas denounced the maltreatment accorded Kutcher but argued that the government required loyalty provisions to protect

itself from Stalinists. Izzy disagreed with the socialist leader's premise, and declared that the purge was intended to keep liberals and radicals out of governmental posts. He did not deny that there were real problems connected with the Communist Party. But he affirmed that "you have a Bill of Rights for all, or you have no Bill of Rights."<sup>48</sup>

After attending a Conference to Defend the Bill of Rights held in New York City in June 1949, Izzy more strongly berated the American Communists. Three days prior to the opening of the gathering, the Daily Worker argued that any attempt to protect the civil liberties of the Trotskyists would receive no support from the Communist Party. The Communist paper declaimed as "disruptive" men such as Stone, Emerson, and New York Star writer Albert Deutsch, who defended the rights of Communists but refused to parrot the Communist Party position concerning civil liberties. At the conference, the Communist stance toward constitutional rights was exemplified by Paul Robeson's denunciation of the Trotskyists: "Would you ask the Negroes to give freedom of speech to the KKK? Would you give civil rights to Jefferson Davis?" Non-Stalinist individuals and groups were so disgusted with the sectarian fighting that they left the assemblage, and the attempt to form a new organization protective of civil liberties thus collapsed.<sup>49</sup>

In the New York Daily Compass, his new employer,

Stone cuttingly attacked Communist behavior at the congress. He discussed the "hisses, boos and catcalls" which greeted an attempt by a Trotskyist to introduce an amendment to a resolution condemning the governmental prosecution of Communist Party leaders under the Smith Act. Then Stone declared that the foundation for civil liberties was "based on something more fundamental than constitutions. It is based on an attitude of mind." The Communists' actions at a conference for free speech, however, only indicated "they have no real conception of what they are talking about." The Communists had refused to allow an open platform "because they are as hysterical about Trots as Red-baiters are about Communists." Stone wrote that "the spectacle of a hounded faction in turn hounding its own heretical sub-faction is by no means unfamiliar in history, but this is a poor time to be complacent about it." Just as they had during the wartime trial of the Trotskyists, the Communists subordinated "principle to party fanaticism." The Communists only damaged the fight for civil liberties with such behavior.<sup>50</sup>

Izzy admitted that sometimes vital structural transformations could be produced "only by single-minded fanatics," and that "people like myself--the much despised 'liberals' are useless for such tasks." He recognized that when peaceful reform was impossible--although he refused to admit that such was the case in the Western nations--cataclysmic social strife was likely, and that

"revolution or chaos" would occur. For such upheavals, "mentalities like mine are unsuited. I hate cruelty and injustice too much to accept it without protest even in a 'good' cause." But history demanded both liberals and fanatics. Some must affirm the worth of freedom. The Communists, however, "tend to forget that even in Marxist doctrine the excesses and repressiveness of a revolutionary period are deplorable and passing necessities, not methods to be erected into a new way of life." The left needed to be reminded of this continually, for new concepts had always encountered resistance and persecution. Men in power, whether state or church-based, always "grow too big for their britches," and thus, "the determination of truth" could be granted neither to commissars nor cardinals. Despite the frightful needs of a period of great change, "in the long run there can be no substitute for freedom of thought." Only freedom of expression "can breed the kind of men who stand on their own legs unafraid."<sup>51</sup>

Despite his misgivings about Communist Party practices and tactics, Izzy consistently defended the civil liberties of American Communists, who tended to be the most notable victims of postwar reaction. Government prosecutions of first and second-rank Communist leaders and the flourishing red-baiting of the era, combined with the disastrous decision of the American Communist Party to continue aping the Soviet line, effectively

destroyed the largest organization on the left. Stone warned that the Smith Act indictments were designed precisely "to make second class citizens of everyone on the Left," were causing Jefferson to be consigned "to the museum of forgotten pieties," and were "changing the face of America." Stone declared that the Communists were accused of no illegal actions, but were being persecuted solely because of their political beliefs. He warned that American intellectuals had better organize immediately or would awaken one day to discover their minds enslaved. With the insidious spread of thought control, he cried, a man could be punished for ideas, and eventually everyone would become wary of expressing certain ideas, of possessing certain books, of making certain statements. The successful prosecution of Communists would give the right "a fulcrum for frightening America, into an ideological goosetep, for heightening the hysteria with which to mobilize public sentiment for war abroad and reaction at home."<sup>52</sup>

Stone issued a severe condemnation of the loyalty mania which seemed to be afflicting America, declaring that the nation was becoming used "to star chamber methods." He wrote that three centuries of American history indicated that freedom was a better risk. He warned that a democratic state could not police so-called subversive ideas. Should members of revolutionary groups organize private military forces to march against the nation's

capital, should they plan to set off explosives in a courthouse, should they obtain secrets for another nation, should they induce soldiers to refuse orders, then illegal actions would have been undertaken for which they could be prosecuted and punished. The government possessed sufficient power to defend itself against such authentic threats. But the question of subversive activity was a different matter. Who would determine what was subversive? Was exhortation of the right of revolution, subversive? If so, Stone reminded his readers, then many sacred Christian and American creeds must be barred from educational institutions. In the Bible, in the Declaration of Independence, and in Lincoln's wartime addresses, "the right to resist tyranny by force" was deemed fundamental. Karl Marx had not unveiled the concept of the right of revolution. Since the Glorious Revolution in England during the late seventeenth century, it had been a major component of Anglo-American laws and tradition. And the policing of thought only resulted in a morass, whether conducted by the church or by the Kremlin. To grant an elite the authority "to establish dogmas and hunt heretics" created a real potential for stifling new thought and for allowing bureaucracy to fester. Then, "either stagnation or revolution results."<sup>53</sup>

The postwar red scare which Stone challenged from its outset, entered a second, more strident stage in early 1950 when the right-wing demagogue, Wisconsin Senator

Joseph McCarthy brandished Communist spy accusation. Stone immediately proclaimed that McCarthy's attack on the State Department copied "Nazi techniques," and stated that the senator should be investigated for his apparent close ties with German militarists and industrialists and the Kuomintang Chinese. Stone exclaimed that America was now experiencing the proliferation of "a mass mental illness." He warned that "once this gets beyond a certain point, the task of combating it is hopeless." And he believed that the inanities of the present political atmosphere would not terminate until well-respected men firmly called "for a sane, sober and adult view of politics in a period of change." In May, Stone wrote that "the moral corruption" of the age, exemplified by the employment of informers to police ideas, paralleled the depravity characteristic of the most sordid period of the Roman Empire. Only there could one see the same "miasmatic panic and degeneration" which was flourishing in the capital of America. By August, Stone worried that his warnings would be futile. He sensed that he was attempting "to shout into a hurricane," and recognized that few would hear and even fewer would heed his admonitions. For "the panic is on, and everyone pushes up to make a self-serving declaration to ward off suspicion from himself."<sup>54</sup>

Stone also thought his was a voice crying in the wilderness as he condemned the direction of U.S. foreign policy. By 1949, the tendencies of American policymakers

to employ military solutions for social and economic woes and to display a blindness concerning the birth pangs emanating from revolutionary movements, appeared more striking than ever to Stone. He bemoaned the Truman administration's push for a military alliance with the Western European states, arguing that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization declaration of regional security could only damage the United Nations. He feared that the pact could be used to crush "a majority popular front government," and that it hinted at the possible formation "of a new Holy Alliance to police the internal systems of Western Europe against popular discontent and change." Greece again appeared to be an American laboratory, serving as an experiment for controlling European affairs. But Stone declared that economic reform and not military oppression was still necessary to stabilize Greece. The small contingent of Greeks who ruled the economic and political order of their nation, he wrote, would have been forced to accept reform measures if they had feared the left but that threat had been weakened by British and American weapons. Now, the new Atlantic Pact only extended to all of Western Europe the Truman doctrine that had allowed for the arming of Greek rightists. Stone suggested the possibility that administration spokesmen were becoming prisoners of their own simplistic anti-Communism.<sup>55</sup>

The militaristic and generally simpleminded thrust



of American foreign policy, Stone believed, would only result in a strengthening of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe. He wrote that discouragement of trade between Western and Eastern Europe had already slowed down recovery in the West and made the Eastern states even more dependent upon the Soviet Union. This was occurring despite the Russians' increasing unpopularity in their sphere of influence, which all too naturally resulted from an unwillingness to allow nationalism to flower and a typical lack of "tact, flexibility and the light touch." Stone chided the U.S.-dominated World Bank for its failure to provide financial aid to Tito's Yugoslavia. He prophesied that if leftists in the Eastern European nations believed that the price of their independence from Russia involved abandonment of socialism and homage to the United States, then Titoism would not be duplicated. In the failure to assist the renegade Communist state, as on so many other occasions, American political and financial leaders "provide Moscow's best arguments." In underdeveloped peasant countries such as Yugoslavia and China, exalting Western political concepts would only appear "like the nauseating rubbish that it is." In actual practice, such rubbish would still signify the circumstances whereby foreign nations exploited Eastern Europe's natural resources. Cognizant of this, Eastern European leftists therefore believed that their nations required the type of "planning of popular enthusiasm and compulsory service,

possible only under Socialist or Communist dictatorship." Western-style political democracy could develop only later, after the creation of viable economic orders, and could appear sooner should Western aid be forthcoming.<sup>56</sup>

A more intelligent American policy, Stone argued, would involve the attempt to win friends; the encouragement of national identity within the Soviet bloc; a willingness to allow self-determination for smaller nations; and the acceptance of different social systems which could lead to improved living standards and increased world trade. Unfortunately, Washington, D. C. now seemed to be "the capital of world reaction," as it sustained and bankrolled "the exiled men and bankrupt movements which seek a new holy alliance to destroy the hope of backward millions for an end to poverty." America battled overseas the same elements that caused its own comparatively affluent populace to seek increased security through restrictions on free enterprise. This practice of backing the right would certainly not change until leading American diplomats discarded "the bogeyman theory of history." Men such as Secretary of State Dean Acheson accepted "the paranoid delusion that has always served as the pseudopolitics of stupid rulers and ruling classes," the concept that only conspiracies cause revolutions. If Americans recognized that revolutions resulted from vast social inequities, and if they worked to correct the abuses of decaying societies, then dread of subversive ideas would disintegrate. If however, Americans believed that revolutionary concepts "are a kind of bacillus" and that societal

upheavals occurred only because of conspiracies guided by the Moscow Bogeyman, then the U.S. must expend its wealth on preparations for conflict with that ogre. Should the first concept be valid, then American political leaders must convince the wealthy of the need for social reform. Should the second theory be true, then political leaders must continue the armaments race. The notion of conspiratorially-directed revolution could engender a cataclysm, Stone pointed out, "but it certainly is comfortable."<sup>57</sup>

The inability to respond intelligently to worldwide revolutionary developments, he feared, promised disaster both at present and in the near future. Just as American policymakers had refused to comprehend the need for sweeping change in Russia three decades earlier, their successors now failed to appreciate the vital necessity of transforming the old and corrupt feudal order in China. If the United States again responded to a major revolution with a trade embargo and with military assistance to all anti-red elements, Stone asserted, the Chinese affinity for America would disintegrate and Mao Tse-tung would become aligned with Moscow. Stone reasoned that America should recognize that in China, as in Russia, Communism could aid in the process of industrializing an underdeveloped peasant state, which would result in higher living standards. The inability to understand this, he warned, would cost America dearly

both economically and morally. Americans should comprehend that the Communist conquest was as valid as a referendum, and should adhere to the principle of self-determination. He wrote that trade and American friendship might prevent a Chinese-Soviet alliance, while indicating that border disputes might cause such a tie to be precarious. Engaging "in intervention, economic blockade, and hostility," however, would only harden "the solid bloc we fear, and set in motion a course that may ruin America in the next fifty years."<sup>58</sup>

On 24 February 1950, in discussing a little-known corner of Asia, Stone warned against yet another possible tragedy which could result from failure to uphold the principle of autonomy. Referring to the uproar within the State Department following Tito's recognition of the Indochinese government of Ho Chi Minh, he declared that the loyalty purge and McCarthyite charges had crippled American foreign policy. The United States appeared to have embarked upon a "costly failure" by placing considerable prestige and aid at the behest of the puppet Emperor Bao Dai in Vietnam. Bao Dai possessed no public support in Vietnam, and many Asians regarded the French fight against Ho Chi Minh as a return of old-time imperialism. Even the composition of the competing Vietnamese groups made mockery of America's claims to be the protector of liberty in Southeast Asia. The emperor had served during World War II as a puppet for Japan, while the Communist leader had battled the Vichy French

and the Japanese. Once again, Stone wrote that a sophisticated American foreign policy would encourage the desires for autonomy and thus prevent development of solid blocs which would disturb the balance of power. He regretted that the foolish policies of the United States government were only forcing emerging revolutionary movements to become ever dependent upon the Soviet Union.<sup>59</sup>

Stone believed that regardless of American actions, the inexorable movement toward socialism would continue. Force could only temporarily impede the socialist drive, but would only cause it to later explode "in a more extreme form than ever." The gradual transformation to a parliamentary democracy, he analyzed, had occurred with the lightest eruption in England, a nation now slowly evolving toward socialism. The greatest violence, in contrast, had accompanied change in Russia, where a feudal, decayed regime maintained power for so long that revolutionary developments eventually propelled the most underdeveloped European state to the most extreme variety of socialism. In the Russian Revolution, as in all overwhelming societal metamorphoses, "brutalities, fanaticisms, cruelties and stupidities" had occurred. But to counter the threat of Communism through force would only usher in its emergence "in the most nightmarish form."<sup>60</sup>

Ultimately, the capitalist and Communist nations must accept the necessity of coexistence, Stone averred, for unless they did, humankind would be unable to fulfill

the major social duty of the present era--the merger of freedom and security. The democratic nations should recognize that Communism did indeed help to industrialize underdeveloped agrarian states. Yet it did so only "at a price." That price was the formation of a state so potent as to threaten efficiency and progressive advancement, as both required an atmosphere where people did not fear to speak out. The wealthier nations happily were not compelled to employ "such Draconian means," and possessed greater knowledge of compromise and toleration. Only such affluent societies provided the stability to allow freedom without internal turmoil. The peoples of those countries could possibly mitigate the movement toward statism by developing processes for reconciling centralization and personal liberties while retaining "that wonderful quality 'enterprise,' the yeast of any society, from the dead hand of bureaucracy." But to effect such a development required freedom of expression at home and real diplomacy in foreign affairs, each necessary for needed adaptation and conciliation. Suppression and war, on the other hand, Stone believed, were inevitably joined together and could result only in "statist extremes, Fascist and Communist." Engaged in struggles for their very existence, neither reactionary nor revolutionary societies could permit freedom and moderates would be pushed toward one extreme or another. If the

vital synthesis of the best qualities of Communism and "capitalism" were to produce the good society, coexistence was therefore essential.<sup>61</sup>

In the early summer of 1950, Stone's hopes for a lessening of world tensions collapsed as the warm embers of the Cold War ignited following the North Korean invasion of South Korea. The United Nations Security Council condemned the Communist state as the aggressor, and a UN force was sent to Southeast Asia. Liberals almost uniformly supported sending American troops to South Korea, and even a number of leftists determined that North Korea had initiated the hostilities. Stone's first response of 27 June was to place equivocal blame on the North Koreans, as the sweep of the attack appeared to be too well coordinated to be a counter-attack. At the same time he declared that "politically bankrupt elements" such as South Korea's Syngman Rhee and Taiwan's Chiang Kai-shek desperately needed another world war to remain in power. The following day, Stone urged the Soviet Union to demand a cease-fire from its ally, and indicated his fear that a world war might be in the offing. In a bitter denunciation of the Russians, he wrote on 29 June that the Moscow "peace policy" had been replaced by another strategy, one intended to entrap America and Western supporting allies in a chain of aggressive actions by satellite governments. He angrily charged that the Soviets had granted American right-wing and military

elements the excuse they needed to increase repression and the militarization of American society. But as President Truman announced that American ground forces would be sent to Korea, Stone warned on 30 June that the United States was supporting colonialism in Southeast Asia. He called for negotiations, noting that "the power of a few guerrillas to pin down, harass and bleed armed forces many times their size" could enable the Russians to make a successful drive elsewhere.<sup>62</sup>

Stone's immediate responses to the early fighting thus involved a strange admixture of his usual perceptiveness and a very atypical sensationalistic analysis. He condemned the possibility of American military intervention; discussed the inability of military force to overcome rebel insurgency; attacked the right-wing, dictatorial regime of Syngman Rhee; and feared the domestic repercussions of U.S. involvement in Asia. But he uncharacteristically responded with stridency to the first fighting in Korea, and early analyzed the development of civil conflict as a possible strategem of Soviet policy. For perhaps the only time during the entire postwar era, albeit for a shortlived time, Stone spouted ideas which he had debunked for years.

Very quickly, however, he regained his usual sharp perceptiveness about the turmoil which seemed endemic in the world's poorest regions. By 6 August he wrote that both Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung of North Korea had long been mobilizing for war, and that an assault by



one side had been inevitable. Stone continued to berate the Truman decision to prop up the repressive South Korean regime, and declared that the pervasive incompetence, corruption, and dictatorial character of the Rhee government was well known throughout the Far East. He stated that American support for the South Korean autocracy appeared all too symptomatic of Truman's foreign policy. The president was accused of recklessly committing the United States to rightist forces around the globe, of employing the Truman Doctrine to turn America into "the policeman of the world," a burden beyond even its riches and antithetical to its national image. Such a "pax Romana" necessitated an overblown military establishment and a populace indoctrinated to consider the military life as the greatest ideal.<sup>63</sup>

In August, after repeated discussions at editorial meetings, New York Daily Compass editor Ted Thackery sent Stone overseas to assess the possibility that a "neutral bloc or 'Third Force'" might help to resolve the Korean situation and prevent the world's great nations from confronting one another. During the next several months, Izzy, who had long backed the idea of a Third Force, traveled to Southern Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. India, the birthplace of the great pacifist Gandhi, and Yugoslavia, the Communist state which had broken away from Soviet domination, seemed particularly to fit the mold of independent neutral states. Stone

spent two weeks in India in early September, but the brief stay there dampened his hopes that Jawaharlal Nehru could help to guide the formation of a neutral bloc. Stone wrote of large opposition to Gandhi's heir, the continued existence of privileged classes, and the maltreatment of the poor. The poverty and exploitation seemed to overwhelm Izzy, and he charged that "nowhere is there a people more callous about the suffering of the poor than in the Orient." The "natural brutality" of the elite classes, he declared, long antedated the appearance of fascism and helped to explain the worsening "police-state mentality" emerging in India.<sup>64</sup>

The following month, Izzy ventured to Yugoslavia, where he remained for about a month. In India, he had interviewed Nehru. Now allowed to meet Marshall Josip Broz Tito, he felt honored to speak with the Resistance hero, "a legendary figure." Stone wrote that change had occurred in the Balkan state since the rift with Moscow, and that now the Yugoslavs were not afraid to speak out. Those eager to converse included Yugoslav Communists desirous of seriously analyzing critical issues. Stone declared that this was the first instance where he had encountered Communists "really willing to discuss, and to listen to criticism of basic 'Marxist-Leninist dogma.'" The Soviet condemnation of Tito had "shaken faith in much that Yugoslav Communists once took for granted." But Stone recognized that had the Soviet-Yugoslav split not occurred, Stalinism would have remained intact under

Tito. And despite the fresh air in Yugoslav society, he encountered "the same mindless mendacity in dealing with political opponents or 'deviators.'" Still, Stone approved the Yugoslav attempts to combat bureaucracy and to increase popular participation in government and industry. Tito also seemed to be attempting to prevent the appearance of a "new privileged class" which was emerging throughout the Russian sphere. The Yugoslav experiment thus seemed to be challenging the Leninist notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Despite numerous criticisms which appeared in his articles on Yugoslavia, Stone concluded his reports with accolades for the Tito effort. He stated that while "force, fraud, and terror" existed in Yugoslavia, these were historical factors in Eastern Europe, and that attempts to correct such abuses might well succeed if Yugoslavia received Western support. Possibly then, Yugoslavia could combine the best qualities of socialism and of the West, including intellectual freedom and individual rights. For now, notwithstanding the drabness and the poverty of life in Yugoslavia, there existed "an electric spirit in the air, a sense of direction, a faith in the future to be found nowhere in Western Europe." Stone exclaimed: "I salute the Yugoslavs and wish them well."<sup>65</sup>

In spite of the mixed but hopeful signs within Yugoslavia, the move to create a Third Force of independent nations seemed to gain little ground as the Korean conflict kept heating up the Cold War. Late in

1950, as Chinese forces entered the fray, Stone began to focus once again on the Asian war. Now, he read accounts of the conflict by French and English reporters, and discovered sharp discrepancies between the European stories and the American ones based upon U.S. military communiques. By 7 December, Stone was more directly questioning the authenticity of American reports concerning the Korean intervention and subsequent events. He wrote that the Chinese had entered the war to protect their borders, and warned that Douglas MacArthur had deliberately provoked the great Communist state. The ensuing day, Stone queried if MacArthur were acting in an aggressive fashion to protect Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorial hold on Formosa and to undercut diplomatic efforts to end the war.<sup>66</sup>

American practices in Korea were sharply condemned by Stone. He warned against attempts to induce "terror from the skies," stating that the poorly-equipped Chinese soldiers were equalling their American counterparts despite the latter's sophisticated weaponry. In February, Stone charged that the American commander was ravaging Korea "with methodical destruction." He asserted that the Air Force inclination to bomb at will was perverse. "To 'devastate' seems to be synonymous with American political argot 'to liberate.' This is terror and total warfare and moral degeneration." Stone declared that the American people had "blood on their hands," and he urged

the peoples of the world to "look . . . and see the reality of 'liberation' as packaged by the U.S.A." Stone asked: "What right do we as Americans have to treat another people's country and countryside so wantonly?" He castigated indiscriminate bombings of suspect villages by "rockets, napalm and machine guns." Thus, Stone was posing questions during the Korean War which were to become far more commonplace a generation later.<sup>67</sup>

By February Stone had become so thoroughly disgusted with American behavior in the war that he began to analyze its outbreak more closely. His doubts about the beginnings of the Korean affair first appeared in L'Observateur, a liberal weekly edited by Claude Bourdet, a French Resistance hero. This article and a second one which Stone first attempted unsuccessfully to have printed in England, caused "a great stir in Paris diplomatic circles" and induced Bourdet to wonder if "the greatest swindle in military history" were occurring. Stone began to ask if the war were "Stalin's blunder--or MacArthur's," and he expressed a new suspicion that Russia had been surprised by the early fighting. He wondered, on the other hand, if the fighting had evoked similar surprise in the Pentagon. In the New York Daily Compass that March, Stone questioned why John Foster Dulles had not warned the United States about the explosive Korean situation, and why he had predicted punitive moves just prior to the war's outbreak. Stone wrote that American entrance

into the conflict extended Truman's containment policy to the Far East and abetted everything that "the China Lobby, the rebuild Germany and Japan crowd and the advocates of preventive war wanted." Within a very short period, after all, the Korean War had resulted in American mobilization, had provided the possibility of U.S. assistance to Chiang Kai-shek for his return to the mainland, and had encouraged proponents of a preventive war against the major Communist nations.<sup>68</sup>

While continuing his reportorial coverage of the war, Stone began writing a book on its origins. Using mainly official papers from the United Nations and the United States government, he challenged the accepted version of the outbreak and conduct of the war. Stone now argued that fighting had raged across the 39th parallel prior to June, 1950. He indicated that Syngman Rhee had incited the North Korean attack, had been actively supported by Chiang Kai-shek, and had received covert aid from General MacArthur and President Truman. A recent legislative election had resulted in a smashing defeat for Rhee, and calls for reunification were intensifying in Korea prior to the start of the war. Chiang Kai-shek had departed to the island of Formosa in January 1950, and he feared a Chinese Communist attack. Both thus urgently required American assistance. President Truman, for his part, needed a crisis to scare Congress into supporting NATO. MacArthur's Pacific office and

the Pentagon were aware that an attack was forthcoming and did nothing to prevent it, for combat would prevent the withdrawal of American forces from Japan and the return of military bases there. The final version of the completed book, The Hidden History of the Korean War, sustained Stone's argument that by deliberately stifling peace moves, MacArthur and his successors were prolonging the war in order to battle the Chinese and possibly even the Soviets.<sup>69</sup>

Having arrived at this analysis of Cold War America, Izzy attempted to obtain a British publisher for his work. When that effort proved fruitless, Stone sent his product to twenty-eight American publishing firms. They all refused to print it, although many admitted that The Hidden History was an excellent and important study. At the same time, some affirmed off the record that the Korean story was "too hot to handle." Finally, in the fall of 1951, Izzy met Monthly Review editors Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy at a restaurant in New York City's Central Park, and told them about his manuscript. The independent socialist journalists readily determined to publish it. At last, in April 1952, the Monthly Review Press printed I. F. Stone's The Hidden History of the Korean War.<sup>70</sup>

Although Stone had returned to the United States in June 1951, he had been determined for some time not to do so. The previous October he had written a series of biting articles attacking the plague of McCarthyism.

Passage of the McCarran Internal Security Act thoroughly frightened him, for it required "communist-action" and "communist-front" groups to register with the Subversive Activities Control Board. These organizations were obligated to label any publications or broadcasts, "Disseminated by \_\_\_\_\_, a Communist organization." Members of such groups would no longer possess the right to travel overseas, to obtain employment in military-related industries, or to hold government jobs. A small contingent of Democratic liberals had attempted to substitute their own proposal to circumvent due process, which would allow the Attorney General to place accused subversives in concentration camps during periods of national emergency. The Democratic alternative was added to the original bill, thus increasing its repressiveness. Residing in Paris, Stone reacted sharply. From a distance, he wrote, "America seems a kind of bad dream" dominated by a "Mad Hatter quality." It appeared that his country was moving toward "fascism and folly." Staying in Europe made the similarities between the Soviets and the Americans appear starker than ever. While the Russians extolled collectivity, and the Americans praised individualism, "both are devotees of mass-production methods not only in manufactures but in mentalities." Tolerance, Stone declared, had never been a leading American trait, and was becoming even less so. Thus within five years, he believed, the two nations would



become more alike in their suppression of dissent.<sup>71</sup>

Stone perceived the Subversive Activities Control Board as "the first thought police in American history," and called it the culmination of post-New Deal efforts by right-wing elements to cripple American social reform movements through legislation. "It is the beginning of an American fascism and it represents a tide which must some day run its course but which cannot be turned off and on like a spigot." Sadly, "all the precious faith in freedom, all the fundamental affirmations of the great American and British revolutions of the Eighteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, all the Pilgrim Fathers learned in the Dutch Republic, all that made America a proud name in the eyes of the world is being dirtied and destroyed and degraded." The worst thing, Stone lamented, was "I don't know that anything can be done about it."<sup>72</sup>

A man who truly revered America and American libertarian principles, Izzy told an acquaintance in Europe that he could not "stand America any longer--it's impossible to be a journalist and to keep sane and honest," and therefore, he was "becoming a political refugee." Serving as the European correspondent for the Daily Compass, Izzy planned to establish permanent residence in England. With editor Thackery he even discussed the formation of an overseas Daily Compass branch, so that he might continue the fight for freedom and peace abroad, should political repression intensify.<sup>73</sup>

Nevertheless, despite his ever constant dread about American political developments, Stone returned to the United States the following June. Upon passing through customs, he encountered an immigration official who looked at the journalist's passport and asked: "Hey, is you the Stone that used to write for PM?" Izzy feared the loss of his passport, but answered, "Yep, that's me." The immigration worker stamped the passport, returned it, and said "Sei gesund."<sup>74</sup>

In spite of the gratifying welcome, the atmosphere in America remained stultifying. Stone reminisced that "everybody was scared to death," with progressives scrambling to form ad hoc committees to protest violations of civil liberties. One such group in Syracuse asked Stone to give a talk defending the Communist leaders indicted under the Smith Act. A large university hall was reserved for the gathering, but the local American Legion chapter protested the meeting. Committee members worriedly asked their prospective guest what to do, and he told them to invite the veterans to participate in the discussion. After Izzy gave a strong civil libertarian address, one Legionaire declared that his organization also believed in the First Amendment, but asked why its protections should be granted to individuals and groups that attacked those very principles. Izzy responded that many distinguished attorneys adhered to such a philosophy, including Andrei Vysinsky of the

Soviet Union. Vysinsky, prosecutor in a number of the leading Moscow purge trials, had declared that Russia possessed constitutional rights like America, but that these freedoms were not going to be granted to those who opposed the foundations of Soviet society. Stone stated that it could be very difficult to distinguish between those who criticized a government and those who challenged its basic precepts. Because of this, the Founding Fathers had refused to "draw a line." They had realized that "if you draw a line, you end up by shutting off all kinds of criticism."<sup>75</sup>

Stone later came to believe that few leftists would have publicly enunciated such sentiments during the McCarthy era. But during that period, he carefully analyzed the U.S. Constitution, Madison's Notes, the Federalist Papers, and the Supreme Court, for ammunition against the witchhunt. Stone reasoned that leftists should not relinquish the national heritage to the rightists, who "were really the un-Americans, not us."<sup>76</sup>

Listening to the lonely appeals of a small cadre of independent leftists and steadfast liberals who were fighting to uphold the Bill of Rights, however, Stone could only conclude that "freedom was not ringing very loudly" in America. "Everywhere," he wrote, "in government employment, in the press, on the radio, in the movie business, in the labor movement, among professional people, one finds fear." It seemed perilous to air

unconventional thought, or to engage in political activity. The simplest assurance for avoiding trouble was to utter only "the safest and the most conventional opinions." One could avoid charges of guilt by association by not associating, and already many hesitated to join any type of committee or organization. Thus a pervasive and "humiliating subservience" suffocated America.<sup>77</sup>

America, Stone wrote, now appeared to be "a country scared into submission. The land of the brave and the home of the free" seemed "to have become the land of the belly-crawler and the home of the fearful." Right-wingers had inculcated fears "among the intelligent and the forward-looking," the very individuals who had provided the foundation for the widespread progressive movements of the 1930s. Stone warned that the German Nazis and the Italian fascists had needed only "to beat, torture and imprison relatively few people in order to frighten the rest into silence." The same pattern he declared, was occurring in the United States. The prosecution of a smattering of Communists, the purging of a few individuals from governmental service, the holding of a few spy trials, had stilled most intellectuals who feared loss of "livelihood, reputation and safety." In this manner, "a Terror operates." The longer people failed to contest the infringements of civil liberties, Stone warned, the sharper the attacks would become. If people would resist and fight back, then a chance existed to

blunt "this terror before it clamps down completely and brings into being a police state America." Thus he refused to condemn four Communists who jumped bail during their trial for purported violations of the Smith Act. He wrote that a fundamental western tenet taught "the duty of disobeying constituted authority when constituted authority demands what is morally wrong." When a government declared a political party illegal, than party members must behave as outlaws. The American Communists must necessarily regard "this government as they would any repressive government which denies their fundamental rights," rights they retained in all other democratic nations.

Because of the increasingly repressive atmosphere, Stone declared, those who adhered to the old democratic principles were not respectable anymore. That, he indicated, should not bother them, as the American revolutionists and the abolitionists were also not viewed as respectable at the beginning of their struggles. Indeed, those defending America's basic freedoms should feel proud as they were upholding the noble proclamations of the Declaration of Independence. Those very American concepts were "ours in a special sense, for we--however poorly, and inadequately and faltering--are fighting to keep them realities."<sup>79</sup>

Maintaining his attack on McCarthyism, Stone charged in March 1952, that big business interests were heavily involved in the movement toward repression. Following

release of a report on Communism by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Stone caustically termed it "a carefully worked master plan for the extension of thought control in America." The study called for the barring of all "Communists, fellow travelers, and 'dupes' from all agencies and professions affecting public opinion," including the press, the media, the entertainment industry, the educational profession, and many industrial plants. The Chamber, Stone charged, desired "a Big Business iron curtain" to envelop American thought. A reading of the annual Chamber reports on Communism since 1946 indicated that "responsible businessmen" had been operating "in an intelligent and organized fashion" to back redbaiting. So the Chamber had endorsed, before any governmental action, a loyalty purge, a congressional inquiry into Communist influence in the cinema, a Justice Department list of Communist-dominated front groups and labor unions, modification of the Wagner Act, and the barring of Communists from many occupations. The most recent Chamber report asked if a mere coincidence caused many "so-called liberals" to defend civil liberties. Stone declared that the Chamber and its compatriots wanted to eclipse the Big Business success after the first world war, when a red scare had produced a weakening of the labor movement and a general suppression of dissident elements. Now the Chamber, representing the bulk of the nation's wealthiest banks and companies, possessed vast power

on Capitol Hill and was attempting to establish grass-roots anti-Communist organizations. It called for members to watch out for "Communist sympathizers" in their communities, and to condemn public officials who demonstrated "softness toward Communism." Stone termed this "a clear invitation to terrorize radicals," and stated that the Chamber was attempting to prevent the emergence of any reform movement, "even if it has to create an American variety of fascism to do it."<sup>80</sup>

At the core of America's domestic repression and cold warrior-influenced foreign policy, Stone believed, were simplistic, erroneous, and unjust views of Communism, socialism, and revolution. Throughout 1951 and 1952, he attacked the growing belief in American diplomatic and military circles that "liberation" of Eastern Europe and Russia could destroy Communist rule. He condemned a series of articles in Collier's which previewed World War III and displayed the Soviet Union as "one vast slave labor camp where we need only shoot the guards and wreck the gates to be hailed as liberators." The theory that the Russian dictatorial regime was "simply a rule of terror," Stone thought, had proved futile before and had resulted in the deaths of millions. Undoubtedly, hatred of the Soviet secret police, distaste for Bolshevik harshness, and ethnic dissatisfaction existed in the Soviet Union. But one could also wrongly believe that an uprising in America was imminent if one read of the horrors inflicted upon blacks and workers. And an attack on the Russian

government would naturally involve war against the Russian populace and their Chinese and Eastern European allies.<sup>81</sup>

Stone denounced the 1951 Mutual Security Act for its inclusion of \$100 million to finance counterrevolutionary activities within the Soviet bloc. The funding was allocated to encourage discontented individuals residing either in Eastern Europe or in exile to form military groups which supported NATO. Thus terrorism was to be employed, and "Terrorism is terrorism, whether used for good or bad purposes." This action refuted the long-held belief that Americans considered means and ends to be inextricably intertwined. And the notion that Communism was a terrorist movement, Stone argued, was absurd. Rather, "Communism is a political movement susceptible to ordinary political attack. It dies on the vine where good economic and social conditions create stability." Terror was more apt to be the tool of anti-Communist forces, with fascism involving terrorism on a massive scale.<sup>82</sup>

Developments since the end of the second world war, Stone warned, had demonstrated "an instinctive popular resistance to 'liberation.'" Three billion dollars had been poured down a rathole in the attempt to keep China "liberated." Intervention had been more successful in Greece, but the military dictatorship that ruled there was "no prize exhibit." The people of Indochina and Korea seemed little attracted to "liberation." Despite



grave difficulties, Ho Chi Minh was able "to keep his forces going . . . good, very good." Stone reasoned that "men do not fight this way for enslavement." Admittedly, revolutionary movements might produce "distress, suffering and individual injustice." Yet they also provided hope to many, and stimulated "new creative energies." Furthermore, what appeared as slavery from one vantage point, often seemed like emancipation from another. "Slaves who fight as the rebel Indo-Chinese, the North Koreans, and the Chinese have been fighting are not men who can easily be 'liberated.'" <sup>83</sup>

Ultimately, Stone declared, America must come to terms with the most potent ideologies of the era--socialism and Communism. He warned that Americans must begin to comprehend the phenomenon of Marxism if their nation were to avoid a cycle of wars which would only destroy American capitalism, the only major variety that still functioned well and retained the fidelity of the masses. Stone admitted that the abrupt disappearance of capitalism in America would be matched by the demise of political and intellectual liberties. To help guide the nation toward a more reasonable foreign policy, intellectuals and writers must assist in educating the general populace about political and economic realities. An entire generation was being inculcated with the notion "that Karl Marx was some kind of a malignant magician whose Communist Manifesto in 1848 opened a Pandora's box of

subversive ideas." Yet the tenets of Marx kindled a flame because of their very familiarity and because of their general veracity. The principles of socialism and Communism emanated from early Christianity, and appeared whenever the downtrodden searched the Bible for guidance. It was a Catholic saint, Thomas More, who had employed the phrase "utopia" to describe an existence without exploitation and private property. The majority of ideas associated with Marxism, including "the labor theory of value, materialism, and concept of class interest as fundamental in society," were in fact enunciated well before 1848. Indeed, the father of the American constitution, James Madison, had argued that "the most common and durable source of factions" involved maldistribution of property.<sup>84</sup>

Stone argued that no literate European would approach Marxism in the simplistic fashion prevalent in post-war America. He indicated that previously, key non-Marxist thinkers had looked at Marxism intelligently. The great historian, Charles Beard, for example, had praised the "wide and deep knowledge" of Marx, and "his fearless and sacrificial life." A leading non-Marxian economist had remarked at the staid American Economic Association national convention some time earlier, that the major economic prognostications of Marx--"increasing concentration of wealth, rapid elimination of small and medium-size enterprises, progressive limitation of competition

. . . the undiminishing amplitude of recurrent cycles"-- displayed unmatched foresight which far surpassed the supposed refinements of modern economic thought. Stone stated that philosophers such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels should not "be equated with racist screwballs and obscurantist demagogues." Their influence on human thought had been as pervasive as that of Charles Darwin, Sigmund Freud, or Albert Einstein. To a certain degree, all today were Marxist in their thinking. Individuals as disparate as Joseph Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, Nehru, and England's Ernest Bevin were all products of various Marxist schools. Significantly, "a third of the world is Communist. Another third is Socialist. A movement of this kind cannot be treated as some kind of aberration."<sup>85</sup>

By late 1951, I. F. Stone's independent, radical critiques of a militant anti-Communist foreign policy and domestic McCarthyism had caused him to alienate groups across the American political spectrum. As early as 1948, the previously well-respected journalist had possibly lost respectability and burned bridges behind him when he had backed the Progressive Party candidacy of Henry Wallace. While the Cold War intensified, and as he retained his support for reformism at home and conciliation abroad, Stone and others like him seemed to be more and more isolated, more and more alone. In late 1949, Izzy had written an editorial attacking the policies of the Meet the Press radio and television show, on which he frequently served as a panelist. Izzy declared that he

seemed to be the "Hot radical" of the program. "Whenever some poor Red or near-Red is to be barbecued," he was included as a participant because the show's producers wished to provide a semblance of equity, and possibly because no other Washington reporter was "still willing to stick his neck out in this capital of the land of the free and the home of the brave." Angered over the recent grilling of John Gates, Daily Worker editor, Izzy proceeded to deride the usefulness of the show in clarifying controversial subjects, and he adjudged the moderator, Lawrence Spivak, to "have been a Torquemada or a Vysinsky in some other incarnation." Stone recognized that because he was a man who relished only his own dogmas "in an age of warring dogmas," his appearances on the program antagonized many listeners. He enjoyed asking embarrassing questions "even of my friends and allies." This made him appear either as "a stooge or an enemy." Frosty Washington viewed him as "a dirty red," while Union Square deemed him "a dirty counter-revolutionary." After this essay, almost two decades were to pass before Stone was again invited to appear on national radio or television.<sup>86</sup>

Izzy's outspokenness alienated a motley lot: witch-hunting rightists, cowering liberals, and authoritarian leftists. Ogden R. Reid attacked Izzy in his weekly column, "the Red Underground," which appeared in the New York Herald Tribune. One Reid column discussed

Stone's speeches against the Smith Act. Izzy conceded that his condemnation of the Smith Act was well known, and that he had made several public addresses damning the measure. At the same time, he pointed out that relating the meetings in a column entitled "The Red Underground" resulted in the smearing of all participants and an inference that they had engaged "in something furtive, undercover, and sinister." Furthermore, the column had misquoted him, alleging that he had stated that more freedom existed in Russia than in America. Izzy responded sharply: "I consider a statement of that kind untrue and politically idiotic. The very fact that I can speak and write as I do rebuts the statement attributed to me." He proclaimed that the printing of such nonsense helped to establish an atmosphere of "hysteria and McCarthyism." He warned that those who questioned "these witchcraft manias" would likely be slandered themselves. A former editor of the Daily Worker and a professional witness before congressional investigating committees, Louis Budenz, also directed invectives at Stone. He blamed Stone and others like him for propagating favorable information about the Soviet Union. Budenz charged that writers such as Stone aided "the Communist conspiracy" and sought "to forward the Stalinist game" in various ways.<sup>87</sup>

Reviewers, mainly in liberal magazines, termed Stone's The Hidden History of the Korean War "tendentious" and unreasoned dissent. The most biting attack came

from the liberal ex-Communist, Richard Rovere in Izzy's old newspaper, the New York Post. Rovere admitted that Stone had once displayed "every promise of becoming one of the most accomplished journalists in this country," and had been "an adroit stylist, a shrewd and thoughtful analyst and a man with an incredible capacity for gathering and storing information." In fact, "Stone was as good as the best and perhaps was the best." His writings were radical, but not Communistic. But now "'something unpleasant to contemplate' has happened to Stone." Since focusing upon the Korean War, he "has no longer been a promising journalist or even a moderately good one." "Zest, style and humor have departed from his work, leaving it merely querulous." Rovere continued: "Stone's contribution to American journalism today is that of a man who thinks up good arguments for poor Communist positions." Rovere indicated that Stone was still no Communist, but termed The Hidden History "preposterous," and "bland and heavily documented rubbish." One favorable review, written by a Trotskyist, declared that Stone was "being read out of the world of 'decent'--that is subservient journalism--that he, or anybody like him, is going to be cut off from further employment opportunities in bourgeois journalism and that every attempt is now going to be made to ruin his professional career."<sup>88</sup>

But many leftists berated Stone during this period. He antagonized a number on the left by refusing to support

the Progressive Party in the 1952 Presidential campaign. He called for Progressives to maintain their peace party, but urged his readers to vote for Adlai Stevenson. Stone considered 1952 to be a dangerous year because of the drift toward war and reaction. He wrote that the Republican Party "harbors the seeds of American Fascism," and that the Democratic Party remained "by and large the party of the American 'common people,'" "the better of the parties" with "the better people." Stone acclaimed creation of another Popular Front as essential, one that "must extend right as well as left," and cried that he did not want a repetition of "the same mistakes in miniature" that had occurred in Germany. Stone asked the Daily Compass audience to "imagine Red raids by a McCarthyite Attorney General." He conceded that despite his criticisms of the liberals, he certainly could not equate their stance on civil liberties with that of the right-wing Republicans. Stone affirmed his confidence in the Illinois governor, and indicated that while Stevenson was not a progressive such as FDR, he could be a force for peace and liberty and would eventually "prove himself a great American and a great statesman."<sup>89</sup>

In September and October Izzy and the former radical congressman Vito Marcantonio wrote columns in the Daily Compass calling for support of the Democratic Party and the Progressive Party respectively. Izzy acknowledged

misgivings about Stevenson and the Democrats, but declared that a defeat of the McCarthy-influenced Republican Party was essential.<sup>90</sup>

Alan Max of the Daily Worker penned a series of articles dissecting Stone's support for Stevenson. Max wrote that Stone's announcement of his upcoming vote for the Democrat was "the subject of much discussion in progressive circles." Regardless of Stone's motivation or rationale, "his own record as a peace advocate and fighter for civil liberties requires that his views be examined thoroughly." Max thought that a large vote for the sole peace candidate could impede the movement toward war, and urged that progressives begin to fight for political freedoms now.<sup>91</sup>

Izzy answered that "the possessors of the One True Faith always look down on erring heathen like me." But too frequently, he stated, the Communists had committed very significant mistakes in analyzing popular movements, having opposed "Debs in 1920, La Follette in 1924, and Roosevelt in 1932." Then, the Communists had totally failed to understand broad-based people's movements, and had refused to support America's most significant progressive figures. The 1952 election promised to be vitally important, and Stone considered radical support for the Democratic candidate essential. Once again he asked: "Will it be easier to fight for peace and freedom in the America of 1953 if the McCarthys are in power?"<sup>92</sup>



Further antagonizing the American Communists and others on the left, Stone refused to dismiss the Rosenberg case as nothing but a red herring. He declared on 15 October 1952 that previous instances had demonstrated that the Soviets had "utilized ideological sympathies to recruit for scientific espionage." While all nations engaged in spy activities, each government naturally and correctly attempted to prevent such practices. Stone stated that he had remained silent concerning the case as he was not assured of the innocence of the accused. After reading through the court records with Ted Thackery, he was still not convinced that a frameup had occurred, and thought that some damaging testimony and evidence existed. But he condemned the death sentences, terming them "barbaric, savage and way out of line with justice." Because a degree of doubt would persist about the case, because of a need for "human decency and humanity," and because he wished to protect the nation's reputation, Stone called for a commutation of the sentence. Thackery and Stone both thought the trial itself unfair, and urged that the Rosenbergs receive a new one.<sup>93</sup>

Two and a half weeks later, on the day before Dwight Eisenhower trounced Adlai Stevenson in the presidential race, publisher Thackery called Izzy and told him that the New York Daily Compass would close down the following day. Izzy phoned Freda Kirchwey at the Nation and

requested his old job back as Washington editor. But she believed that her former colleague was "too much of a loner, too independent, and that at any moment he might [again] disappear to the mideast or far east on a story." Newspapers expressed no interest in the radical writer, the "ideological typhoid Mary" who seemed to be facing a type of journalistic blacklist. Thus I. F. Stone, after thirty years at the trade of journalism, was without employment.<sup>94</sup>

Sitting in his New York Daily Compass office, Izzy began to cull through his writings for a book of essays, later titled The Truman Era, and in so doing, retraced his professional career. Stone wrote that he had long been a part of the "series of experiments in independent liberal journalism which now have come to an end," serving on PM, the New York Star, and the Daily Compass. He thanked his editors, publishers, and readers for the type of "freedom and opportunity for service" enjoyed by few contemporary American journalists or intellectuals. "I had the greatest privilege any human being can have," Stone reminisced. "I was able to earn my bread doing exactly what I liked to do. I wrote as I pleased." Although the period was a turbulent one, the turmoil did not affect him personally. He possessed inner peace, suffered from no ulcers, and required no psychiatrist. "I was and am a happy man."<sup>95</sup>

Stone declared that the present era appeared bleak,

but urged leftists to avoid despair. "This is the age of birth, and birth is always painful and bloody." He advised them to look toward the future: "the independent intellectuals of the Left represent ideas whose value is attested and survival assured by all we know of men and history. The socialism in which we believe is coming everywhere." And although menaced by all varieties of authoritarianism, from both the left and the right, by Communists and Catholics, the libertarian ideal was one "of which we need not despair." All must constantly strive for and aspire to intellectual freedom, as only in an atmosphere of political liberty could socialism erect "the good society." Always, "new truth" must battle against the old order, and must continue to sprout "despite monarchs, priests, bureaucrats, or commissars, or that often most intolerant of despotisms, the majority itself."<sup>96</sup>

I. F. Stone's brand of independent leftism had been sorely tested during the early post-World War II period. His hopes and the hopes of many leftists for a rebirth of reform and an era of international cooperation foundered with the advent of the Cold War. Rather than extending Roosevelt's New Deal and moving toward increased economic democracy, America witnessed the outpouring of reaction and hysteria. Confrontation replaced the cooperation of the Grand Alliance, the United Nations served mainly as a tool for Great Power clashes, and virulent anti-Communism

directed U.S. activities abroad.

Anti-radicalism, not progressivism, served as the dominant theme in post-war America. The red scare antics of the period effectively decimated the left, silenced liberals or induced them to join in the witchhunts, and allowed the right to appear dominant. Such practices, Stone warned, also signalled the failure to address deep-seated problems involving race and the economy. In addition, the often desperate cries for change throughout much of the world required a more sensitive and imaginative response than an alignment with right-wing authoritarian forces.

In certain ways, the proudest hour of like-minded individuals, as few as they were, came during this time when the Truman-McCarthy red scare was at its height and rational discourse seemed to have become frozen by fear. Despite dangers to careers and to reputations, and notwithstanding cutting attacks from political opponents, Stone and a saving remnant never succumbed to emotional inanity. Believing that the American beacon derived its power only from genuine democracy, they defended the Bill of Rights and warned that the world's greatest democratic state should not be supporting feudal, rightist, dictatorial, and unpopular regimes around the globe.

## FOOTNOTES

### CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup>Stone, "Capitalism and Full Employment," The Nation 161 (September 7, 1946): 198-99.

<sup>2</sup>Stone, "How to Do in Peace What We Did in War," PM, 17 August 1945, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.; Stone, "Looking Forward--From the Truman Message," PM, 9 September 1945, p. 2.

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## CHAPTER V

### I. F. STONE AND THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE ERA OF EISENHOWER AND KENNEDY, 1953-1963

The problem with which the intellectuals of this country are confronted is very serious. Reactionary politicians have managed to instill suspicion of all intellectual efforts into the public by dangling before their eyes a danger from without. . . . What ought the minority of intellectuals to do against this evil? Frankly, I can only see the revolutionary way of noncooperation in the sense of Gandhi's. Every intellectual who is called before one of the committees ought to refuse to testify, i.e., he must be prepared for jail and economic ruin, in short, for the sacrifice of his personal welfare in the interest of the cultural welfare of his country. However, this refusal to testify must not be based on the well-known subterfuge of invoking the Fifth Amendment against possible self-incrimination, but on the assertion that it is shameful for a blameless citizen to submit to such an inquisition and that this kind of inquisition violates the spirit of the Constitution. If enough people are ready to take this grave step they will be successful. If not, then the intellectuals of this country deserve nothing better than the slavery which is intended for them.

Albert Einstein

I do not know of any country where a man who has a genuine love for his neighbor can long avoid obloquy.

Bertrand Russell

Decree, dictatorial force of the factory overseer, Draconic penalties, rule by terror--all these things are but palliatives. The only way to a rebirth is the school of public life itself, the most unlimited, the broadest democracy and public opinion. It is rule by terror which demoralizes.

Rosa Luxembourg

Unemployed near the climax of the Cold War, Izzy Stone seemed to be a victim of the times. A life-long rebel who was not able even to receive emotional or financial sustenance from a political party, a man who had dedicated himself to both independent journalism and independent thought, Stone appeared to be facing a mid-life crisis in a nation undergoing a psychic trauma. Soon however, he turned his misfortunes completely around by starting a small, four page newsletter. Within a short time, the editor of I. F. Stone's Weekly had once again attained respectability for his diligent research and principled stands. The early period of the Weekly saw Stone maintain his focus upon the Cold War, as he raged against McCarthyism in America and Stalinism in Eastern Europe, and against the hardline foreign policies of the great world powers. Despite repeated disappointments during the early postwar era, he continued to argue that only full democracy at home and an opening up of the Soviet-bloc societies, joined with international cooperation abroad, could result in the good American society, the fulfillment of the promises of socialism, and a



decent world order. Such developments would also allow for a more generous attitude by the superpowers toward the smaller, now explosive states.

As 1953 began, Stone became involved with a series of endeavors designed to uphold American political freedoms and the fight for world peace. Believing that the American Civil Liberties Union had failed to protect adequately the constitutional rights of individuals attacked during the post-World War II red scare, Corliss Lamont, Paul Lehmann, H. H. Wilson, Clark Foreman, Thomas Emerson, Carey McWilliams, and Stone among others, had earlier decided to form a new organization, the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, which would effectively defend the political liberties of all Americans. The ECLC founders were "non-Communist libertarians" who dauntlessly attacked McCarthyism and refused to deflect possible criticism by asserting their opposition to Communism, reasoning that such a declaration would only be self-serving. Not surprisingly, red charges from such organizations as the bitterly anti-Communist American Committee for Cultural Freedom, were soon forthcoming. Prior to an upcoming ECLC gathering, ACCF member Irving Kristol slandered the new civil liberties' organization as "a Communist front with no sincere interest in liberty in the United States or elsewhere." Kristol wrote to Reinhold Niebuhr, requesting that the famed theologian persuade Lehman to resign from the conference, and citing McWilliams, Emerson, and Stone as "suspect." Undismayed by such charges,

Stone wrote that the ECLC battle was the same one fought by the adherents of Jefferson 150 years earlier. He praised the appearance of a thousand individuals at an early ECLC gathering, which seemed to indicate that the libertarian spirit was alive in America, notwithstanding the current political climate. In addition to supporting the new civil liberties organization, Izzy ventured around the nation attacking infringements upon political freedoms, as he had during the Truman and the early McCarthy witch-hunts.<sup>1</sup>

Izzy's major contribution to the fight for peace and justice, however, revolved around the launching of his small newsletter. Unable to find a position with a journal or newspaper and hoping to aid the causes he believed in, Izzy began in late 1952 to obtain funding for his project. The initiator of personal journalism, George Seldes warned Stone to retain financial independence and to avoid the mistakes experienced by his own paper, In Fact. Seldes' newsletter had flourished during the 1940s, gathering a sizable following through a connection with leftist labor unions and political groups. But Seldes' support of Tito and his condemnation of Stalinism had alienated the sectarian left. Combined with right-wing attacks and the spread of the red scare, In Fact's subscriptions dropped sharply and Seldes shut down the paper in 1950. Determined to avoid Seldes' errors, Izzy decided to produce a publication which required only a limited audience to become self-supporting. Still possessing no

illusions that his endeavor would succeed, Izzy used his \$3500 severance pay from the New York Daily Compass; a \$3000 loan from one individual, a small amount of money from others; the old PM, New York Star, and Daily Compass mailing lists; and a record of the individuals who had purchased his books. Finding a small group of left-of-center individuals willing to brave the fervent McCarthyism of the era to back a radical work of journalism seemed "like looking for a needle in a haystack." Yet Izzy garnered 5300 initial subscribers, including Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, and Eleanor Roosevelt.<sup>2</sup>

Despite a reputation as a "Red," and although only the Daily Worker seemed to be to the left of Stone, he received no harassment from the postal service and was granted a vital, second class mailing permit. The cheaper rate, or government subsidy, allowed him to draw a \$125 weekly salary, with an additional \$75 for a secretary. His wife soon took over the business chores, while Izzy served as publisher, editor, reporter, and proofreader.<sup>3</sup>

From the outset, Izzy determined to produce a paper that would be radical in content, but conservative in format. He avoided lurid headlines, claimed no inside information as a radical reporter in Cold War Washington, and worked carefully to document his writing from official hearings, public transcripts, and government records. Izzy culled through such materials for "the significant trifle" little acknowledged by the standard press, and

sprinkled the pages of the Weekly with boxes which illuminated some important development, quotation, or analysis. Great diligence--"I just sweated blood over the writing"--was employed in the research and writing of the paper, as Izzy endeavored to "make it like a soufflé, urbane, erudite, and witty, and a pleasure to read." Stone never thought that it measured up to his high standards, but he was comforted that the effort had been made.<sup>4</sup>

Desperation, determination, and defiance propelled Stone in the early period of the Weekly. He later admitted that only a desperate man would undertake such an enterprise. But he needed to work to support his family, and he hoped to lend sustenance to some of the persecuted and lonely individuals in Cold War America. The first issue of I. F. Stone's Weekly was dated 17 January 1953, and included a letter to his readers. Izzy wrote that the newsletter served as an effort to keep alive during a troubled time the type of independent journalism earlier provided by PM, the Star, and the Daily Compass. He declared that the Compass had failed for the same reason that the earlier two radical newspapers had folded: not enough people were willing to support it. Izzy indicated that he began indebted to no one, and affirmed his belief that "a solid substratum of good sense and good will" remained in America, that a dissenting view, "fairly, accurately and soberly presented" would be accorded an audience. He asserted his intention "to fight for peace and for

civil liberties," which he considered inseparable. Interestingly, Izzy told his subscribers to keep the various issues, as they would later be valuable. Later in the year, he stated that in many small towns, the Weekly provided "the only breath of dissent from the cold war and the witch hunt."<sup>5</sup>

The first few years of the Weekly proved to be both trying and rewarding ones. A "naturally gregarious" individual, Izzy often felt lonely and ostracized. In the formative period of the Weekly, which coincided with the zenith of McCarthyism and the Cold War, he "felt like a guerilla warrior, swooping down in surprise attack on a stuffy bureaucracy where it least expected inquiry." When he attempted to talk with governmental officials, they tried to prevent guilt by association. But he received substantial encouragement from both family and readership, and from his own ingrained sense of Americanism. Passing across the grounds of the capitol one day, for example, Izzy reflected on the domestic Cold Warriors and reasoned, "you may just think I am a red Jew son-of-a-bitch, but I'm keeping Thomas Jefferson alive and you bastards are killing (him)." On another occasion, a dejected Stone sauntered into a public library and picked up Bertrand Russell's pacifist tract, Why Men Fight. Written in 1915 as World War I rolled along, this work caused Izzy to feel a real bond with the old English philosopher, who also had been an outcast in his own land. As Russell had noted, while it was terrible to feel out of touch with

the prevailing atmosphere, one must not lose sympathy, even for one's opponents. This was an inspirational message for the journalist.<sup>6</sup>

Above all, Izzy received emotional succor from his family, his subscribers, and his work. His wife and three children always supported his endeavors, and the Weekly subscribers rekindled his optimism. Indeed, although a pariah in Washington, his resolve was strengthened by "an intense love" from his readers. He thanked his followers for allowing him to challenge their "pet preconceptions" and to contest the dogmas of the left. Ultimately, Stone was basically happy with the decision to form his own paper. He experienced freedom to speak out, contentment in "being true" to himself, and pleasure in battling for what he believed.<sup>7</sup>

In the early period of the Weekly, Stone determined to attack McCarthyism, Stalinism, and the aggressive foreign policies of the world's great superpowers. In the process, he again managed to annoy, exasperate, and anger individuals and groups on both the right and the left. The initial Weekly issues lambasted the man whose reign as arbiter of American domestic and foreign policies seemed to have been assured by the landslide defeat of Adlai Stevenson in the 1952 presidential election and the Republican capture of Congress. Now possessing a Senate chairmanship, Joseph McCarthy appeared free to slander any government figure who failed to show proper obeisance.

Stone declared that an inevitable clash between respectable Eisenhower Republicans and "crypto-Fascist" McCarthy adherents would undoubtedly pose the major problem for the new administration. He believed that this confrontation would develop because McCarthy desired to become an American dictator. McCarthy was no fool, and was plotting "a series of little 'Reichstag fires'" to guide his path to power. McCarthy was creating a circus atmosphere to convey the impression of widespread Communist infiltration of the government and the corresponding notion that only one man could be trusted. The Wisconsin legislator was attempting to become like Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels, the "master of the Big Lie." Stone wrote that the American rightists led by McCarthy were destroying faith in the democratic processes by increasing "distrust, panic and insecurity," even questioning the loyalty of such men as General George Marshall. Still, Stone thought that regardless of their personal designs, the Joseph McCarthys and the Pat McCarrans were "tools" of business interests which desired to transform the nation "into a corporate state." He indicated that repressive legislation recently passed by Congress was producing "a new America, remodeled for conformity, unsafe for dissent, a chrome-plated version of George Orwell's 1984."<sup>8</sup>

Repeatedly the Weekly warned that only a direct challenge to McCarthyism could weaken and destroy it. Stone urged journalists and others to refuse to answer any

congressional questions concerning political views. He praised what he termed the Einstein pledge which called for American intellectuals to adopt the Gandhian revolutionary method of noncooperation in dealing with witch-hunting committees. When Harvey O'Connor and Leo Huberman refused to take the Fifth Amendment, Stone was elated, for one had to return to the Hollywood Ten to find a comparable defiance by America's writers.<sup>9</sup>

In spite of the exhortations by Stone and a very few others, the master witchhunter appeared to reign supreme until he escalated his attacks against the Eisenhower administration and the military. Such a tactical mistake coupled with Protestant fears of church-baiting, Democratic recognition of a frontal assault on their party, and the anger aroused among besmirched governmental workers and minority groups, proved to be McCarthy's undoing and helped to bring about a slow thaw in the domestic Cold War. In the spring of 1954, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson dismissed McCarthy's accusation of subversion in the military as "tommyrot." Vermont Republican Ralph Flanders chastised McCarthy on the Senate floor, and Edward R. Murrow delivered his famous "See It Now" documentary on the American demagogue. McCarthy's failed theatrics during the televised Army-McCarthy hearings seemed to break the power of the nation's number one red-baiter.<sup>10</sup>

While the demise of America's "would-be Fuhrer" cheered Stone, he warned that the vestiges of McCarthyism



had not been destroyed. Many Americans still refused to discuss intelligently and soberly "the real problems which arise in a real world where national rivalries, national aspirations and ideas clash as naturally as the wave of the sea." McCarthyism would not be completely vanquished until someone refuted its fundamental premises of diabolical subversion and worldwide conspiracies. Also necessary were acknowledgements that peace and reform were essential for American liberties, that peace was impossible without coexistence with rival ideologies, and that socialism was still on the march. Further, Stone reminded his readers that McCarthyism could not be crushed until Americans remembered that freedom entailed risk, that stability demanded faith, that no sensible society would exist while Communists were portrayed as superhuman characters able secretly to subvert the nation. "There is no way to keep the United States permanently just a little crazy. . . . Either sanity will be restored or the Fascist mentality will take power. . . . Freedom as we know it and 'security' as the paranoids preach it are incompatible. . . . This is what needs to be driven home."<sup>11</sup>

As Congress continued to enact repressive measures, Stone feared that the nation was heading "closer toward Fascism." He argued in September 1954 that a re-education concerning the concept of freedom, and a bold fight for political liberties were needed. He affirmed that those who strove to defend libertarian ideals during this perilous period, would later be acclaimed as honorable figures.

"It is in this spirit that we must all carry on."<sup>12</sup>

Thus encouraged that he and others like him were truly upholding America's finest traditions, Stone maintained his defense of those attacked during the red scare. In one of his most chilling essays, written in August 1955, Stone described McCarthyite practices in America's armed forces. As Norman Thomas had indicated in a report to Congress, a number of young soldiers had been termed disloyal because of their mothers' political affiliations or beliefs. One individual was berated for closely associating with his mother, a reputed Communist, and for maintaining a correspondence with her. Stone warned that "soldier boys should check on Mama before writing home." In addition, he added, they might well examine the family histories of their girlfriends. One soldier's mother-in-law was accused of "lying low as a Communist for a long time," before becoming involved in peace agitation once again. But Stone wrote that inasmuch as she had died many years earlier when the soldier was a child, she could only participate in a "Second Coming" peace movement. Other cases showed that relatives, childhood acquaintances, chance comments, and reading materials could cause a person difficulty. Books seemed to be "a special American bugaboo," making the practice of reading as hazardous "as the accident of birth." Stone averred that such practices demonstrated that a "mindless machinery" was moving "to grind a nation's youth into conformity."<sup>13</sup>

McCarthy-type repression also continued to be directed against the press. The government waged a long battle to deport editor Cedric Belfrage of the National Guardian. Early in the Weekly, Stone had written that the Guardian was one of a handful of voices which challenged the official Cold War line. The attack against Belfrage and the radical press seemed to involve an effort to frighten and quiet even those few dissidents. Stone repeatedly spoke and wrote about the Guardian case. At one gathering, he described the governmental actions as "lawless, unconstitutional, disgraceful," and criticized the establishment press which pretended to oppose McCarthyism, but failed to defend "any McCarthy victim below the rank of general."<sup>14</sup>

Then in late 1955, Mississippi's James Eastland and the Senate Internal Security Committee began to investigate the presence of "subversives" in the newspaper field. On 1 December, Eastland's Senate subcommittee requested a subscription to the Weekly. Izzy was little troubled, but decided to attempt to wring some publicity from the case. He had summons served upon Eastland and his fellow committee members, and wrote the Senator, turning down the subscription on the grounds that it would entail illegal expenditures of public monies for press surveillance. Izzy declared that freedom of the press must be protected. But after studying the history of injunctions and of congressional rights, Stone determined that the invaluable authority to investigate must not be injured or impeded by court action.<sup>15</sup>

As the red scare began to abate more fully, Stone, who had feared that fascism was approaching in America, reflected on the failure of totalitarianism to dig deeper roots in this country. He thought that culture and tradition were important in the development of a nation, and that the anti-fascist Germans possessed no longstanding strain of liberty to use as a bulwark against the Nazis. But in the United States, those who fought McCarthyism could really believe as Stone did, that they "were in the American tradition."<sup>16</sup>

A series of libertarian Supreme Court decisions in mid-1957 caused Stone to acclaim the apparent end of McCarthyism. He stated that 17 June 1957 would be recorded as the actual day on which the nation's highest court finally blunted the witch hunt. In the Service, California Smith Act, Sweezy, and Watkins cases, the Supreme Court weakened the free license previously accorded congressional inquisitions. An early chairman had demonstrated a plan to utilize HUAC as a type of meandering grand jury, which disregarded normal practices of secrecy and worked to slander radicals accused of nothing illegal. The Supreme Court now affirmed that Congress was no "law enforcement or trial agency," that it could not "expose for the sake of exposure in the area of ideas protected by the First Amendment." In Sweezy, the justices declared that state legislative investigations should also be limited, and defended both academic freedom and general

political liberty. Stone happily wrote that these landmark cases "promise a new birth of freedom. They make the First Amendment a reality again," and demonstrated the mushrooming public disdain "for the weird collection of opportunists, clowns, ex-Communist crackpots, and poor sick souls who have made America look foolish and even sinister during the last ten years with their perpetual searching under the national bed for little men who weren't there."<sup>17</sup>

Still, Stone believed that the residue of McCarthyism had poisoned the atmosphere of America for some time to come. In late 1958, he discussed the plaudits directed at Boris Pasternak's Dr. Zhivago by major American publications. Stone charged that the Pasternak devotees had done little to protect the reputations of Howard Fast, Charlie Chaplin, and Paul Robeson. He admitted that an opponent of capitalism could live more easily in this country than could a foe of Communism in the Soviet Union. Yet an unofficial blacklist still barred some of the country's finest writers, actors, and directors from working in the entertainment field. And "all of us who are more or less heretical in our society" were required "to live on its margin, grateful that we are able to speak (at the cost of abnormal exertions) to a small audience." The universal worth of Pasternak resided in his embodiment of the perpetual struggle that the artist and the intellectual must undertake "against official dogma and conformist pressures."<sup>18</sup>

For his long-time support of civil liberties and for his ceaseless fight against Trumanism and McCarthyism, Izzy was granted the Tom Paine Award from the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee in late 1959. Heartfelt congratulations poured forth from many admirers including Eleanor Roosevelt, Bertrand Russell, and Clarence E. Pickett.<sup>19</sup>

As the Weekly focused upon the McCarthyite danger at home during its first years, it also called for a less belligerent American foreign policy. Too frequently, Stone wrote, American policies brought hostility and not cooperation, an emphasis upon nuclear buildup and not disarmament. He condemned Truman's final State of the Union address which failed to recognize that the alternatives were coexistence between the superpowers or their mutual devastation, and that "men must learn to live together on the same planet in mutual forbearance." But sadly, Truman still demanded "total diplomacy," which meant no negotiation, hoping that Cold War pressures could eventually cause the Russian government to collapse. In the interim, Stone declared, a massive arms race would unfold. The more horrible the weapons of destruction became, the more intense would be fears of insufficient strength, thus provoking a frantic attempt to retain superiority, which would only ensure ever increasing insecurity. In addition, Stone warned that the very pressures imposed against the Russian system were being felt in America, and could produce internal decay here as well as in the USSR. Stone remarked that the Farewell Address of the first American

president seemed far wiser, particularly the admonitions not to hold "permanent inveterate antipathies against particular nations" and to discard the "habitual hatred" toward another state which would only enslave one's own country. Stone proclaimed that only talk, detente, and peace could free America "from the campaign of hate and its hateful consequences."<sup>20</sup>

The new president, Dwight Eisenhower, a professional soldier, soon appeared to Stone to be a man much less given to stridency than Harry Truman. At the beginning of the new administration, Eisenhower moved to control military spending, while a deputy Defense Secretary attacked the Pentagon's "incompetence and extravagance." In praising Eisenhower's efforts to end the Korean War despite great opposition from the Republican rightists and the military, Stone on 13 June 1953 called for the left to "Back Ike for Peace." Eisenhower seemed to be the fulcrum of big business forces which opposed war. Stone believed that with their policy of total diplomacy, Truman and Dean Acheson had attempted to turn peace into "a subversive word," and as a result had badly crippled the antiwar movement. Eisenhower, on the other hand, provided an opportunity to remove "the repressive strangle" and once again to increase peace agitation. Despite his sharp disdain for the messianic preachments of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Stone continued to declare that "this is an Administration of conservatives, not

adventurers."<sup>21</sup>

Although believing that Eisenhower's desires for peace were sincere, Stone feared that right-wing extremists, belligerent military men, and political, economic, and labor pressures could prevent moves toward an easing of the Cold War. He remarked that the Democrat Party and the unions favored massive military spending, for armament had turned into a type of pork barrel. Pathetically, he added, the anti-Communist phobia had imprisoned liberal Democrats and intellectuals who did not dare to risk being charged with "subversive sympathy" by challenging military expenditures.<sup>22</sup>

In a burning editorial discussing developments in Korea, on 1 August 1953, the Weekly described the results of the Cold War mentality. The essay declared that the fate of the Asian nation should serve as "a terrible object lesson" for all nations and regions which became puppets in the American-Soviet clash. The Korean affair indicated that the American populace could "easily be doped and duped by military leadership" into allowing the type "of unnecessary havoc" caused by the United States. In addition, the war demonstrated that the U.S. Air Force was "infested with publicity men who are among the world's biggest liars; their inflated figures and inflammatory reporting are a menace." The conflagration showed once again "the delusion of victory by airpower and firepower, the ability of colonial coloured peoples to handle jet



planes and anti-aircraft radar effectively, the tremendous military power of the new Chinamen, and the willingness of the Chinese and the Russians to swallow one provocation after another in their desire for peace."<sup>23</sup>

To Stone, the seemingly mindless anti-Communism which helped to entrap America in Korea, and included the notion of a diabolical worldwide conspiracy orchestrated by Moscow, prevented development of a rational American foreign policy. When the reputed architect of that conspiracy, Joseph Stalin died in March 1953, Stone wondered why "a sudden chill" had enveloped the capital. If Stalin were truly "the aggressive monster" so often condemned by official Washington, his death should have been cheered. Stone argued that American policymakers, however, actually recognized that the Soviet dictator had so desired peace that he would act only if Russian territory were transgressed. Now, a fear existed that the new Kremlin leadership might be more adventurous.<sup>24</sup>

The lack of magnanimity displayed by the U.S. government following Stalin's demise worried Stone. The American people, he declared, needed to recognize that the Soviet regime had helped to stop Hitler. Besides, Stalin had been "one of the giant figures" of the modern era, and a monumental force in Russian history. But Stone was most troubled because he considered the American response to follow naturally from the popular analysis of the Soviet state. Still, Americans so long told that Russia was one

great slave labor camp must ask why the Soviet people did not react to the death of their "oppressor." The truth was that the Communist Party had established a base that was sturdy enough to keep the Soviet nation together. To continue to condemn this movement as just a body of conspirators could be disastrous. It, like the major religious orders, had been able to instill fervent devotion. In addition, the movement was strengthened by constructive economic achievements. In a relatively brief time, it had industrialized feudal Russia and had provided "new vistas to its masses," which broadened its appeal in many areas in Asia. Such a challenge, Stone reasoned, could only be met through peaceful competition, for the greatest Western heritage of personal freedom and free thought could thrive only in peacetime.<sup>25</sup>

While he constantly urged the necessity of coexistence, Stone did become increasingly and more openly embittered with Communist development in Eastern Europe. He likened Stalinist practices in the Soviet bloc to McCarthyism in America, although frequently stating that the repression in Eastern Europe far surpassed the worst horrors experienced in America. When nine doctors, including six Jews, were accused in early 1953 of seeking to poison Communist leaders at the behest of U.S. imperialists and bourgeois Zionists, Stone wrote that the charges were "too hideous to be credible," and indicated that the trial possessed obvious anti-Semitic overtones. Stone

declared that he and other friends of the Communist state had the right to call for the presence of disinterested medical and legal experts at the proceedings. Russia owed this much "to itself and to the world socialist movement."<sup>26</sup>

Stone admitted that no one really knew what was taking place in Eastern Europe. Significantly, the Soviet rulers possessed a "way of erecting possibilities into actualities and then staging trials to 'prove' what they fear. Their trials were political morality plays which cynically assume an audience too unintelligent to be impressed by anything less than melodrama. It is not enough to prove a man mistaken; he must be displayed as a monster." Thus, for over two decades, the Russian people had "been fed on a heavy diet of conspiracy, treason, poisoning and murder in this political dramaturgy." From this perspective, one could view the recent Slansky case in Czechoslovakia and the prosecution of the Moscow physicians.<sup>27</sup>

The party acknowledgement following Stalin's death that false accusations had been levied at the doctors and that confessions had been obtained through "impermissible means," pleased Stone and caused him to wonder once again if other trials had also been only fabricated shows. The admission that the Russian secret police had engaged in "a deliberate wrong" undoubtedly appeared as a near revolutionary development to the Eastern Europeans, who considered the power of the secret police to be without

parallel. Now that fresh air had blown into the Soviet sphere, Stone believed that the system could never again be as closed as before. Most significantly, some highly "explosive" questions had been raised. What embedded sickness within the Stalin regime produced such vast injustices? How many additional railroaded political prisoners remained in the Soviet labor camps?<sup>28</sup>

Passionately, Stone declared that Soviet policy had too long been predicated on the half-truth that Russia was encircled by foes. The USSR was also surrounded by friends, even in conservative Western circles, who were anxious that peace be obtained. Those more attracted to socialism, who deeply respected the Soviet people, had been embarrassed and alienated by many developments since the Bolshevik takeover. Along with great accomplishments hidden by a veil of invidious propaganda, there had existed "an indifference to mass suffering and individual injustice, a sycophancy and an iron-clad conformity, that has disgraced the socialist ideal." In addition, a needless rudeness and crassness in Russia foreign policy had developed. Stone thought that should the new Soviet leaders begin to open up their society, "it would awe the world" and cripple reactionary forces which hated socialism and feared peace. But the Soviet Union required "habeas corpus, the right to counsel and the doctrine of overt act as the test of guilt if it is to dissipate the mark of conspiracy on which its secret police has grown great."

Internal transformations would certainly help to alleviate the fears which aided "warmongers." And perhaps the Russian officialdom would recognize that a measure of real freedom and authentic safeguards against arbitrary police action were vital for the healthy running of Russian society, and would help to prevent "bureaucratic arteriosclerosis."<sup>29</sup>

The large necessity for liberal reforms in the Communist states could be seen throughout Eastern Europe. In July 1953, Stone discussed the festering discontent which had produced riots in East Germany, and he indicated that dissatisfactions were also evident in other Communist states. The following year, he analyzed developments in Yugoslavia, the nation that he had earlier praised as a progressive force in Eastern Europe. There, he wrote, the deviationist Tito now attacked and imprisoned his own deviationist and former Vice-Premier, Milovan Djilas. The Djilas case again demonstrated some basic ills of socialism. "How to get the State to wither away? How prevent the bureaucracy from establishing itself as a new ruling class? How adopt the great juristic achievements of the capitalist-liberal era to Socialist society?" Stone condemned such "a monstrosity" as the Kirov law which was used to destroy the man who had cleared the Moscow doctors, and which allowed for treason charges to be prosecuted in secret, absent the defendant. This only affirmed the necessity for Marxists to analyze the

writings of the American Founding Fathers.<sup>30</sup>

For Stone, the Yugoslav Vladimir Dedijer, a defender of Djilas, had produced two statements which had to strike a chord with those who believed in both socialism and democracy. In supporting Djilas, Dedijer had affirmed that "a Communist should be first of all, a human being, and every political movement which puts aside ethics and morals carries within it the seeds of its own destruction." This, Stone reported in early 1955, could prove to be the epitaph for the Soviet-directed Communist movement. Dedijer also had insisted that socialist development required freedom of opinion. Stone affirmed that no society could remain healthy without free discussion, including criticism directed at its very foundation.<sup>31</sup>

Djilas, for his part, had argued that Yugoslavia could not experience freedom without competing political parties, and had excoriated Leninism. Upon resigning his Communist Party membership, he had asked why one should remain in a political organization that silenced one's speech. Stone reasoned that these words would deliver a message to all Communist parties. They were "dangerous words because they are free words." And the writings of one of the martyrs of revolutionary socialism, he indicated, could be used to defend Djilas. In the first stages of the Russian Revolution, Rosa Luxembourgh, a friendly critic of the Bolsheviks, had written: "Freedom

for supporters of the government only, for the members of one party only--no matter how big its membership may be--is no freedom at all. Freedom is always freedom for the man who thinks differently." She had proceeded to warn her Bolshevik friends that political suppression would eventually destroy the virility of the Soviets. Minus free elections, a free press, and civil liberties, all public institutions would decay. Eventually discussion would disappear, and a small group of dedicated party officials would hold power through a dictatorship of politicians.<sup>32</sup>

Although Stone took a dim view of developments in Eastern Europe by late 1955, he continued to believe that the movement toward socialism remained "universal and irresistible." He still thought that if peace emerged, efforts might be made to curb the unanticipated and distasteful qualities of the socialist advance: draconian-type Communist thought control, the continued difficulty in upholding personal freedoms as governmental economic dominance increased, bureaucratic solidification which occurred in centralized nations as well as in large companies. Most important, "absolute freedom of opinion" had to be protected against state interference.<sup>33</sup>

Stone took satisfaction in the easing of Stalinist practices by Nikita Krushchev, the new Soviet premier's acknowledgment that the nuclear peril and the need for detente superseded the previous Marxist-Leninist call

for world revolution, and his apparent implication that a democratic path to socialism might be possible. Stone believed that the change in Russian policy might allow for the formation of another Popular Front. He hoped that an alliance on the left might prevent the resurgence of fascism in Italy and its burgeoning in France. On the other hand, he warned that a new Popular Front must not serve as "a Trojan horse" to once again enable the Communists to destroy their liberal and left-wing comrades. Stone also declared that if the Soviets truly desired peace, they should alter the strategy of the Communist parties around the globe, which considered "Moscow as the new Rome," for violent revolution in nearly any major nation could precipitate a world war.<sup>34</sup>

Stone's momentary vision of new left-wing unity soon collapsed following Khurshev's condemnation of Stalinism at the Soviet Communist Party's Twentieth Congress in early 1956. While many progressives such as Stone had long been dismayed by developments in Eastern Europe, they, along with much of the American left and Communist parties around the globe, appeared thunderstruck by the revelation of Stalinist terrors. The Khrushchev address depicted the recently deceased Russian ruler as a paranoid, a butcher, a torturer of countless innocent victims, the inventor of plots which had resulted in mass purges, and a proponent of Siberian slave labor camps. The repression inflicted during the Truman-McCarthy



red scare and mounting doubts about party practices had already weakened the hold of the Communist movement. Now the Khrushchev report, like the earlier Nazi-Soviet pact, served as the Kronstadt\* for many long-time Communists. As one former party member later told Vivian Gornick, feminist activist and also a former CP member: "we could not believe these things were true in the USSR, and when we discovered they were we realized we had built our world on mud and shit, there was no foundation in our lives." The young Gornick herself had responded vehemently to the announcement.

Lies! Lies and treachery and murder.  
A maniac has been sitting there in  
Moscow! A maniac has been sitting  
there in the name of socialism. In  
the name of socialism! And all of you  
--all these years--have undone your-  
selves over and over again in the  
service of this maniac. Millions of  
Russians have been destroyed! Millions  
of Communists have betrayed themselves  
and each other!<sup>35</sup>

Having long understood that repression existed in the Soviet Union and having never been affiliated with the Communist Party, Izzy possessed neither blind allegiance to Mother Russia nor the vision that Communism represented the one true faith. Yet he too reacted sharply to the unveiling of Stalinist horrors, and he

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\*In The God That Failed, Louis Fischer declared that a Kronstadt developed when an event or practices repulsed one's revolutionary sensibility, and caused one to leave the Communist Party. For an analysis of this concept of Kronstadts, see Victor S. Navasky's Naming Names, pp. 287-93.

quickly attacked Communism even more harshly than before. Stone wrote that the Khrushchev speech dealt a fatal blow to Communist parties worldwide and served as "Communism's self-exposure." The disclosures indicated that the Soviet Union was "too backward" a nation to provide guidance for other states. It also demonstrated that the sycophancy of the Communist parties toward Russia had weakened an entire generation of left-wing leaders, and that the left needed to discard all Communist influence and begin a new independent course, determined in every nation by indigenous circumstances and histories. The termination of the Western Communist movement would happily demolish "a tattered scarecrow which reaction exploits everywhere." Generally, Stone believed that the Communists had been revealed "as prize idiots abroad and prize cowards within Russia"; the Soviet hierarchy understood the ugly reality of Stalinism but feared to contest it. He declared that intellectuals should retain critical sympathy for "the great revolution of our time," but must maintain their independence. The Communists themselves appeared incapable of learning these lessons, having lost the capacity for autonomous thought.<sup>36</sup>

In May of 1956, Izzy traveled to the former mecca of world socialism. In his initial report, he wrote that even now Russia seemed to be a peasant nation, with the people only a few stages removed from serfdom.

Moscovites were "friendly and eager to talk but still afraid." Yet Izzy felt drawn to the Russian people, whom he characterized as "still half-barbaric, deeply religious whether as Christians or Communists, capable of much senseless cruelty, and of the deepest devotion." The Soviet Union, "Holy Russia in a new sense to the world's left intellectuals," was unquestionably "backward, no model for the future, Byzantine, slavish and submissive, still enmired in the past, but a giant from whom, given peace, there will be giant accomplishments."<sup>37</sup>

After completing his stay in the U.S.S.R., and following a brief sojourn in Poland, Stone delivered a more stinging attack. He wrote that friends had advised him that one's misgivings about the Communist state must be subordinated to the battle for international peace. But Stone declared that he despised the morass one fell into when one became disingenuous because of possible consequences. It was in such a morass that the Soviet Communist structure had been established. He exclaimed that he must speak the truth about the Soviet Union. "This is not a good society and it is not led by honest men. No society is good in which men fear to think--much less speak--freely." Stone insisted that the worth of a society was established by the quality of its people, not through the quantity of industrial production. The Russian people were forced to be overly cautious, were ever ready to change positions, were

oblivious to suffering, and were ready to survive regardless of the cost to others. Such a society was a dream "only for a rather stupid type of Communist party member, good but sharply limited." Yet for the independent thinker, the intellectual, or those deeply concerned about humane values, Russia was "a hermetically sealed prison, stifling in its atmosphere of completely rigid and low-level thought control." In such an atmosphere, "a whole generation of sycophants, and yes-men, and writer-politicians" had been bred.<sup>38</sup>

Stalinism, Stone argued, still suffused Soviet society. The condemnation of the deceased Russian leader did not diminish the crassness of Stalinist attacks. To attribute the Stalinist ills to one man was certainly inadequate. Most significantly, Stalinism naturally flowed from the basic nature of the Communist movement. The countless murders, fabricated trials, and exiles were justified by "a movement whose members had been taught not only to obey unquestionably but to hate."<sup>39</sup>

Stalinism itself evolved naturally from Leninism, Stone thought, although Lenin personally was more humane and civilized than his successor. In all great institutions, "the first generation of saints and zealots" was followed by a new group adopting the new faith largely as a means to grab power. The symbols the truly committed had believed in were cynically employed by the calculating and devious, thus crushing the original revolutionary

élan. Stalinism also unfolded inevitably from the great Bolshevik leader's own strange version of Marxism. Lenin believed that revolution was to be forced upon the laborers and farmers by a small, well organized, conspiratorial group. He feared any challenges of any sort and attempted to devise a totally "monistic view of the universe" to uphold the power of the all-mighty monolithic party, which in turn was to be controlled by a central committee. The legacies of this type of movement, with its merciless treatment of deviation and opposition, unavoidably led to Stalinism. To terminate such abuses would require transformation of basic practices and tenets, and an alteration of the state.<sup>40</sup>

Should coexistence develop, Stone believed that Russia would slowly be transformed. But such a process would not be abetted by retaining delusions, by utilizing convenient excuses, or by overlooking Stalinism in the false hope that the Soviet Union had now been sharply remade. Alignment "with the poor deluded house-broken Communist parties of the West" which were still only "Soviet puppets," would not further such change. Stone now stated that nothing had occurred within the Soviet Union which called for an alliance between independent progressives and the Communists. Following publication of this essay, around four hundred angry readers cancelled their subscriptions to the Weekly.<sup>41</sup>

As yet another report in the Weekly evidenced,

Stone found Poland remarkably open in comparison to Russia. Warsaw seemed astonishing with its freedom of speech and its far greater affluence. Western Communist publications and even Western European newspapers were available in the Polish capital. A totally different ambiance prevailed with Communists speaking freely, and with the national assembly permitting real discussion and criticism of the government. Stone wrote that the Polish rulers believed that an alliance with the U.S.S.R. was essential but were determined to move toward a more liberalized state. They desired no return to capitalism, but rather a union of socialism and political liberty.<sup>42</sup>

Despite the hopeful signs in Poland, the trip to Eastern Europe had proven an unsettling one for I. F. Stone. Though long critical of developments in the Soviet bloc and concerning Communism, Stone still was obviously taken aback by the reality of life in Eastern Europe. His journey only furthered the disillusion of a once firm notion that the demise of private property "was the answer." Yet ever the independent rebel and socialist, Stone immediately increased his already caustic attacks upon heavy-handed Russian treatment of other Communist states and upon Stalinistic Communism.<sup>43</sup>

Further developments in the Soviet sphere of influence were to heighten the dismay already felt by Stone and by many other leftists. When worker discontent erupted in Poland in the summer of 1956, he declared that support

should be accorded the demonstrators and that the upheaval served as the test of the Communist government. Stone recognized that the iron grip of the Soviet Union remained constant, and that the Communist hierarchy feared that the Polish uprising in Poznan could kindle similar disturbances throughout Eastern Europe, particularly in discontented Czechoslovakia and Hungary. He thought that Western leftists must defend the rebellious laborers so that socialism could endure in Eastern Europe.<sup>44</sup>

The apprehension of the Soviets over the possible contagious effect of Polish ferment seemed to be borne out when a revolution broke out in Hungary. Stone admitted that it was extremely unsettling "for those of us who have all our lives regarded socialism as our ideal" to realize that the same groups which had been most attracted to the socialist ideal in the time of Marx were now leading the Eastern European revolts. Industrial laborers, concerned students, and socially conscious intellectuals were reacting against Marxism-Leninism. Workers, for example, could thus become as enraged against socialist bureaucrats as against bourgeois oppressors. Stone indicated that this should not surprise anyone who had entered the Soviet sphere and had witnessed the "ruling class complacency" of the Communist parties. The long-stored anger festering amongst the Eastern European masses was directed against bureaucrats and their perquisites, including Cadillacs, luxurious living

quarters, servants, and protection from the secret police and censors. Stone argued that only defense of political freedoms, establishment of a free press, and formation of opposition parties could protect the worker. "Otherwise he has merely changed bosses." Stone also warned that because of job security and no real criticism, the bureaucrats could damage the economy and then veil their incompetence. Not surprisingly, the resulting economic decay and corresponding discontent were proliferating so rapidly that "a Gomulka in Poland and a Nagy in Hungary" were needed to preserve existing states. These individuals symbolized real transformation, having suffered abuse from both the Soviets and their cronies.<sup>45</sup>

The Hungarian revolt, Stone believed, threatened to become "the 1848 of communism," a kindle for a chain reaction of revolutionary attacks against a seemingly "ubiquitous secret police enforcing a new sacred dogma and maintaining a new lay priesthood in power under communism." He considered a hopeful sign that "in the boasted age of atomic bomb and jet plane, the urban mob, the student rally, even the barricade made their reappearance and exert their power."<sup>46</sup>

Fearing demands for free elections which undoubtedly would have turned the Communists out of power, and perturbed by Nagy's calls for removal of Russian troops and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the Russians invaded Hungary. Stone had earlier charged that "socialism's



good name has been blackened by Communism's rigid and arbitrary rule," and he now adjudged the Hungarian revolution to be "the biggest" happening of the present era. He wrote that the Hungarian rebels had lowered the Soviet empire "in the minds" of all men. "An era is dying, the era in which many of us intellectuals grew up, the era of the Russian Revolution, the era in which--for all its faults and evils--defence (sic) of that revolution was somehow the moral duty of all progressive-minded men." That idea had disintegrated as had the related one, particularly potent in the East, that the Soviet Union was not imperialistic. Instead, rising from the wreckage of Hungary was "the old Ivan, the bewildered peasant soldier of a bureaucratic despotism, heavy-handed, cruel in a slovenly way, and not too sure of itself, weakly reforming and brutally repressing in fits and starts." The Hungarian revolution was therefore even more damaging than Khrushchev's revelations. One could now see the Stalinist bureaucracy's unwillingness to effect real transformation either in Russia or in the satellite states. Stone warned: "What happened in Budapest will some day happen in Russia."<sup>47</sup>

Stone was appalled by the thinking of the Soviet leaders who had crushed the Hungarian uprising and had moved to solidify control within Russia. He considered their thought alien to the socialism once foreseen by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The Marxist masters

had believed that socialism would result in "a more perfect democracy, not rule from the top by a self-chosen few." They never would have envisioned "a Marxism that purported to be a self-contained system embracing the totality of truth," to be handed down by a bureaucratic hierarchy. "This rigid, naive, dogmatic view" was totally contrary to "that rich, complex and dynamic" notion of social flux which the Marxist founding fathers had developed.<sup>48</sup>

Stone continued to attack the suppression of ideas and persons so evident in Communist societies, and continued to praise the fight for freedom there. He thought that the association of socialism with police state terrors was truly tragic. It might enable reaction to occur, thus setting back an entire generation. When Tito proceeded to imprison Djilas after the Hungarian revolt, Stone wrote that even the Titoist variant of Communism had been smashed. He termed "'popular democracy' . . . a fraud if the people are free to discuss only one point of view, the Party's, with a capital P, like the G in God." Tito's treatment of his former vice-premier again demonstrated that "the one party system is the evil." "If the Revolution after all these years is still afraid of the popular will," Stone concluded, "it is time something better were constructed." In early 1957 he discussed the case of Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who had been imprisoned in the infamous Lubianka prison in

the Soviet Union, despite his valiant work to save thousands of Jews from the Nazi death camps. Stone wrote that only the Soviet Union could have accorded this "angel of mercy" such barbarous treatment, and that a nation that enabled its secret police to so abuse a neutral diplomat "is a disgrace to world socialism." When Nagy was executed by the Russians in 1958, Stone stated that the entire affair was "sickening," and that "the brutal faithlessness" of the Soviet Union would ever be remembered in Eastern Europe. Stone feared that the Nagy murder seemed to auger a termination of internal change in the Soviet-dominated nations, and warned that Khrushchev must continue reform policies to retain power.<sup>49</sup>

Although Stone thought that the repressive attitude of the Communist elite toward Russia's malcontent satellites and dissidents would only further damage the image of socialism and increase world tensions, he also believed that the ever-present subservience of the Western Communist parties hindered the drive for freedom and peace. Even before the Hungarian invasion, Stone had discussed the undemocratic nature of the American Communist Party and its lack of touch with reality. In the fall of 1956, he wrote that the Communists refused to analyze the major weakness of the Party: its failure to defend the political freedom of non-Communist leftists. The American Communists displayed a Stalinist approach toward left-wing criticism, and even denied free speech to party members. In leftist and labor organizations, the Communists tried to rule

through minority factions, mindless of the feelings of the rank and file. Thus it was impossible to imagine a new leftist party while the Communist Party still remained exant, for its adherents would once again move to join the new movement, not as true progressives, but as party members following sectarian commands.<sup>50</sup>

As the 1957 Communist national convention was about to open, the Weekly indicated that the best contribution which insurgent Communists could make to American progressive movements would be to call for the termination of the party. The Soviets, unfortunately, would always favor "a hard core of submissive and obsequious fanatics" rather than honest individuals striving to overcome home-grown problems. Stone declared:

There are good, devoted and heroic people in the American Communist party but they will never be effective until freed from the intellectual bondage of the movement. The real crime of the CP is that it taught a whole segment of youth and intellectuals to believe blindly, to obey without question, to shut their eyes to thought control and political persecution in the Soviet Union immeasurably worse than anything we fight at home, and to slander and destroy by any means those who tried to tell the truth.<sup>51</sup>

The would-be American revolutionaries continued to be lambasted by Stone. Challenging the Popular Front approach of A. J. Muste's new American Forum for Socialist Education, he posed the question: How could true democrats link hands with those who only cynically viewed civil liberties as something to be discarded when they obtained power?

The old Popular Fronter asked how leftists could create a new movement which would meet American necessities if joined with those who would jump in an instant upon orders from Moscow? He wrote that independent leftists must uphold the rights of Communists "100 percent," but must remain wary of any effort to rekindle Communist influence. Howard Fast's The Naked God, a disillusioned depiction of the American Communist Party by one who had been its leading writer, received large praise from Stone. The work served as an important reminder to leftists that, despite its past accomplishments, the Communist Party was now "a prison for man's best and boldest dreams." But the future "belongs to those who break down the prison walls that enclose the minds of men, not to those who support such walls.". Stone also revealed that his favorite epigram from the new Nobel laureate, Albert Camus, was the following: "Every revolutionary ends by becoming either an oppressor and or a heretic."<sup>52</sup>

Stone had long believed that the struggle for freedom, the noblest quest for humankind, whether at home or in the Communist states, could not be separated from the fight for peace. A peaceful world order, in turn, required two developments: movement of the superpowers toward detente, which demanded termination of the nuclear arms race, and the willingness of the major nations to allow self-determination for the world's smaller states. Cold warriorism and interventionism, by contrast, only nourished the seeds of a police mentality and threatened

global annihilation, and Stone worried that the McCarthy terror had seemingly rendered a rational foreign policy impossible. He had written in early 1954 that as international crises arose, few voices acclaimed the need for coexistence, while many called for increased military spending and for new instruments of destruction. Stone feared that "not hydrogen, but hatred . . . threatens the future of mankind," that detente would be impossible in a world divided between the musclebound, mutually suspicious nations. He reasoned that detente could occur only if rational thinking evolved, and this required an intelligent approach to the new revolutionary countries, a willingness to see both favorable and unfavorable developments. In short, people needed to "take a pragmatic, adult, humane and compassionate view of our fellow travellers on this tiny and perhaps already fated planet," and most important, to recognize the existence of problems within the so-called "free world."<sup>53</sup>

The warning of leading intellectuals that man needed to think in a new manner was applauded by Stone. He identified the real enemies as hate and fear, and stated that only their demise could "make homo sapiens secure again." In striking contrast to the critical intellectuals, the military appeared desirous of fostering the notion that a nuclear fight could be made humane. Stone called this idea a menace to humankind. He wrote that "belief in force and violence" appeared to be the sole tenet that

all peoples accepted, and that the "universal complacency about killing" posed the major problem for peace advocates. "Ultimate weapons in the hands of a species so badly conditioned" made peace imperative.<sup>54</sup>

By the late 1950s, an antinuclear movement was emerging which attacked nuclear testing and the arms race, and propounded the necessity of coexistence. Izzy traveled around the nation in support of the new movement, and in the Weekly, repeatedly condemned a nuclear-based, militaristic foreign policy. He declared in late 1957 that the newsletter would now focus upon the indispensability of peace. Soon, he further aided the antinuclear cause. In the fall of 1957, the United States undertook its first underground nuclear tests, which experts claimed could not be detected beyond a range of two hundred miles. Stone read in the New York Times, however, that reports from Tokyo, Rome, and Toronto indicated that seismologists in those cities had been able to follow a recent test. Despite the marked discrepancy between the Times' article and the protestations of those who denounced a possible prohibition of the tests, Izzy lacked the funds to verify the stories and filed away the clippings. A short time afterwards, the Soviet Union agreed to establish listening posts approximately 600 miles apart so as to uphold a test ban. Again wondering about the different analyses, Izzy retrieved the newspaper accounts, phoned the Atomic Energy Commission, and asked about the discrepancies. He visited

the seismology branch of the Coast and Geodestic Survey, was informed that a recent test had been detected as far away as Fairbanks, Alaska, a distance of over two thousand miles. Izzy published his findings, and the AEC subsequently admitted publicly that an earlier report which had denied that such detection was possible, was false.<sup>55</sup>

As the decade of the fifties closed and the new one opened, Stone cautioned that the general failure to question the arms race was posing potential dangers for world peace and for American freedoms. He condemned the tendency of government figures to delay disarmament discussions until the U.S. possessed a "new Wonder-Monster." This could only result in "a perpetual electronic arms race with all its crushing cost," included "creeping inflation" and eventual disaster. Stone also considered dangerous the blind acceptance of military demands for increasingly sophisticated weapons. He reminded the followers of the Weekly that no principle had appeared more vital to the American Founding Fathers than the concept of civilian control of the military. Now, however, nuclear arms were among "the Pentagon's sacred cows," and opposing them would put one beyond the bounds of respectability. The lack of dissent in Congress over the spread of nuclear weapons demonstrated "that we too, like the Germans before 1914 and 1939 are falling under military domination." By early 1960, Stone feared that the notion of preventive war was becoming more and more potent. To



make such an idea acceptable, he charged, required indoctrinating the general populace with a combination of "ferocity, and fanaticism." In late October 1960, he wrote that a free state's future required termination of the arms race. The Garrison State loomed ahead if it were to continue, with political and economic freedom ultimately to be stifled. Stone warned against the increasing tie in American society between scientists and the military. He declared that the military lobby was already the most potent one in the nation's capital, able to crush a disarmament measure. He stated that Americans should be smug about neither civilian control of the country nor the nation's "immunity to a man-on-horseback." These perils, he felt, would only worsen should the nuclear race continue.<sup>56</sup>

As the maverick journalist assessed the situation, the armaments race and the failure to reach detente could only strengthen the tendency of both the United States and the Soviet Union to view the Third World as yet another arena for confrontation. The predilection of the major powers to deal cynically and harshly with the smaller nations of the world, particularly those within their respective spheres of influence, exasperated Stone. While Soviet actions in Eastern Europe appalled him, American practices in the Middle East, in Latin America, and in Southeast Asia angered him. In those regions, the United States backed right-wing governments and reactionary groups against forces calling for social

and economic transformation, and demeaned reformers and radicals as Communist-inspired. When the U.S. landed Marines in Lebanon in 1958, Stone berated "gunboat diplomacy in the H-bomb age." Without consulting Congress, NATO allies, or the United Nations, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles sent troops to prop up a Western-backed regime against popular unrest. Four years earlier, Dulles had spoken about "forced labor on a vast scale" in supporting an overthrow of the democratic government of Guatemala's Arbenz. Stone wrote that Latin Americans well knew about such forced labor, about Guatemala's history of slavery, and about the great bulk of the populace having long been exploited by latifundios and foreign corporations. Pathetically, a long period of American witchhunting had so intimidated its intellectuals that no governmental officials, and few others would back a state that had been castigated as "communistic." Stone warned that the Arbenz reform government might be deposed, but that such action would damage America the most. Throughout Latin America, the United States would be associated with reaction. And while force might stifle change for a period, that would only usher in the very transformations America feared. After the U.S. instigated a Guatemalan coup, Stone declared that his nation was moving to erect "a hemispheric police state" as it supported intervention against both homegrown subversion and foreign aggression. This would allow America to quash anyone who fought against U.S. corporate interests. When the new Guatemalan head

of state, Castillo Armas was greeted with open arms in Washington, Stone commented wryly that the American government favored free elections, but not when it disliked the results. In November 1956, he wrote that while Russia opposed anti-Soviet and anti-Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the United States attempted to prevent anti-American and anti-capitalist governments from appearing in the West. "How we honor brave fighters for freedom," he lamented, "until they shot down our tyrant friends as recently in Nicaragua."<sup>57</sup>

The growing revolutionary ferment in Cuba caught Stone's attention. He wondered why the State Department displayed great interest over the governance of Syria, but very little concern for Cuban freedom fighters. He supported the Cuban revolution of 1959, condemned the possibility of U.S. intervention, and hailed Fidel Castro as a modern-day hero who had thrilled the Latin American young more than had any figure since Simon Bolivar. Stone berated the early condemnation of the Cuban revolution as a Communist-led conspiracy. He discussed the economic colonialism which provided the base for political tyranny, social retardation, and vast inequities. Tragically, the American government and the standard press supported South American dictators, "no matter how bloody, so long as they play ball with U.S. oil, sugar, banana and other private interests." Stone argued that Castro was "exactly the kind of human being we would applaud if we still held truly to American ideals, indeed if he had turned up in

Hungary instead of Cuba, we would have gone wild over him, he could have had anything from us he wanted." And he praised the revelation "that a handful of patriots loving liberty more than life could overthrow a powerfully armed dictator in the days of jet planes and atom bombs." The rebels had thus "reaffirmed the human spirit's primacy." Stone warned that Latin America would declaim American pronouncements of liberty as hot air if aid to Castro were not forthcoming. Above all, he believed, the Caribbean island must not be turned into "our Latin American Hungary."<sup>58</sup>

Nevertheless, as antagonisms abounded between the United States and Cuba, Stone increasingly feared an invasion of the island nation or an overthrow of Castro. American corporations desired a return of their expropriated properties, and the U.S. wanted to overturn the Cuban agrarian revolution. Stone reminded his readers that once peasants obtained land, it was virtually impossible to take it back from them. While a lengthy battle of near civil-war dimensions had resulted in the ruthless Stalinist collectivization process, he could not recall a single case where redistributed land had been returned to its previous feudal or capitalist owners. Indeed, a new American-backed Cuban government would have sufficient difficulty negating other reforms involving rents, electrical rates, education, and labor unionization. The mere attempt to remove land from the peasantry would demand such repressive actions as "to shame forever our

pretensions to being a champion of freedom."<sup>59</sup>

In July 1960, Izzy traveled to Cuba and was greatly impressed with the young revolutionaries, whom he found to be "as unusual and gifted" as the American Founding Fathers. He later wrote that "men become revolutionaries for diverse, often surprising and sometimes unworthy motives--rancour, dislike of themselves, need for power, or a hatred of stupidity which easily becomes contempt for humanity itself." But a man such as Che Gueverra, who had greeted Izzy "as a fellow rebel against Yanqui imperialism," was an individual who wanted "to heal" and who pitied the downtrodden. "It was out of love, like the perpetual knight of medieval romance, that he had set out to combat with the powers of the world. This was Galahad, not Robespierre." Leaders such as Guevara seemed to have deep and widespread popular support, and did not appear to be imposing the revolution upon defiant peasants and fearful intellectuals.<sup>60</sup>

Returning to the United States, Stone predicted that the longer the fight continued between the great North American power and the small revolutionary state, the more expensive would be its conclusion. By late October 1960, he declared that the U.S. was apparently edging toward interventionism. He feared that a possible blockade of Cuba would pose international problems and might result in "a hemispheric chain reaction." As the most reactionary regimes in Latin America backed aggressive U.S. moves, Stone thought that America could not have chosen "less

attractive recruits" to wage "a crusade against a popular hero like Castro." He warned that only improved relations with Cuba could help to divert the explosive force of anger toward a drive for ordered and non-violent transformation.<sup>61</sup>

Revisiting Cuba in February 1961, Stone believed that the Fidelistas were now residing "in a dream world," centered around Cuba, "that big weakling to the north . . . and that distant but doting foster parent, the Soviet Union," which at a moment's notice from Fidel, was prepared to threaten global annihilation if America misbehaved. While terming Cuba "the Don Quixote of the world family of nations today," Izzy admitted that his own mission had been quixotic. He had hoped to indicate how a rapprochement could be reached. He had thought that the Cuban revolutionary heads would understand that it was unfeasible to mold a totally socialistic country so near American borders, that the lesson of Nagy would have been learned. Stone had believed that Castro could retain the agrarian reform and socialized industrial transformation if Cuba would move toward a mixed economy and negotiation with American interests. Stone had foreseen an announcement of forthcoming elections and protection of political freedoms. He had envisioned no chance of a peaceful resolution of the Cuban-American quarrel should the island permit only Communists to function freely outside the confines of the revolutionary movement.<sup>62</sup>

Yet Stone had discovered that the Cubans and the Americans possessed highly mistaken impressions of one another. There, prevailed "a heady, youthful recklessness" which could lead the Castro government "very easily to overplay its hand." A simplistic view, a type of "naive . . . infantile leftism" was displayed toward the Soviet-dominated nations. The Cubans also possessed an image of their state heading a hemispheric revolutionary elimination of "Yanqui imperialisms," and retention of that ideal could only result in poor relations with both America and the more conservative Latin American governments. Thus "your wistful pilgrim" discovered in Cuba "a full-fledged revolution, in all its creative folly and self-deceptive enthusiasms."<sup>63</sup>

Stone recognized that American policy had not allowed for a "moderate, mixed-society" solution, and had forced Cuba to become totally dependent upon Russia. But sadly, after conversing with Cuban intellectuals, he now believed that Cuba was "becoming a Soviet-style popular democracy." Even more dangerously, he thought that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could be forced to take sides concerning Cuba over which they could not compromise.<sup>64</sup>

American lack of foresight seemed to equal that of the Cubans. The Weekly warned that the United States would be bested in Latin America should America once again tie "that word Freedom with United Fruit, Chase Manhattan and I.T.&T." After the collapse of military dictatorships

over the past decade, the United States was again seeking military solutions, albeit in the new guise of counter-insurgency. Stone warned that guerrillas who promised to protect the rural poor against despised latifundios or usurers would be far more popular than American counter-guerrillas who requested assistance from the peasants while demanding a return of land. Cuba presented the largest challenge America had yet confronted in Latin America, a challenge which could not be met with military might. Only a perceptive, protracted, and extensive reform program could uphold America's good name and maintain hemispheric amity. Such a development would be impossible as long as individuals like Che Guevara were regarded "as sinister puppets in some occult conspiracy."<sup>65</sup>

The seemingly inevitable attack of Cuban soil in the Bay of Pigs episode, Stone wrote, was morally crippling America. Along with Erich Fromm, Maxwell Geismar, H. Stuart Hughes, Robert Heilbroner, C. Wright Mills, A. J. Muste, John Nevin Sayres, and Norman Thomas, Izzy signed the initial public declaration condemning the C.I.A.-sponsored coup attempt.<sup>66</sup>

As hostilities continued to rise concerning Cuba, Stone feared that the island "could set off the conflagration." In September 1962, he condemned the Republican attempt to profit politically from the Cuban situation, and wrote that American leaders feared everything but the possibility of war. When the Senate granted President



Kennedy the authority to employ any means to prevent the Cuban regime "from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere," Stone asked what would be the American response to "the spreading of the Cuban inspiration?" He declared that if Cuba were truly allowed to complete its own destiny, it might prove disillusioning to many. But destroyed by the United States, the Cuban example would remain etched "in the most idealized form among the Latin hungry and oppressed, the legend of Castro the Latin American David who defied the Yankee Goliath, who took the sugar lands to give his people bread and dared sieze the oil refineries when the foreign masters refused to obey Castro's law."<sup>67</sup>

Following the Cuban missile crisis, Stone wrote that only "a fundamental change of behaviour among nations" could prevent nuclear holocaust. He stated that while America emerged from the confrontation as the most potent country on the globe, Kennedy must begin to push for reconciliation and peace, and must strive to educate the American populace "to a saner view of the world, to a more sophisticated view, to a less self-righteous view."<sup>68</sup>

While the American hatred of Castro had resulted in interventionism and had helped to bring the world to the edge of annihilation, it also fed the power of reactionary forces, particularly the military, in Latin America. As the newsletter noted, right-wing elements were using the

specter of Castroism to overturn tenuous democratic institutions. Thus, the hispanic states were facing a polarization process which would weaken moderate groups that provided the sole backing for the Alliance for Progress. For a short period, the 1963 democratic election of Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic seemed to offer to Stone, the possibility of "a peaceful challenge to Castroism." The Dominican Republic appeared to be uniquely blessed as the government already owned a large portion of production facilities previously controlled by the brutal dictator Trujillo and his family. Stone believed that no other Latin American state possessed such an advantage, that economic planning and land reform could occur without the initial necessity of taking over private lands. The Dominican Republic thus enjoyed a great opportunity to engage in "democratic socialist development, without terror, class war or dictatorship." There, if anywhere, Kennedy's Alliance for Progress "may provide a democratic answer to Castroism. If Cuba is to a showcase of Communism, the Dominican Republic can be a showcase of democratic socialism." Yet past and present activities of America in the Caribbean provided Stone with little confidence in the possibility of such a development. Efforts were already being undertaken to depict Bosch as tied to the Communists, despite the fact that he and his followers were, like most socialists, strongly opposed to Communism and to Castro.<sup>69</sup>

By 1963, Stone dreaded that along with the Caribbean, one other region could pull the United States into a diplomatic and even a military quagmire. He had long castigated American policies in Southeast Asia, damning the failure of the U.S. to back open elections in Vietnam or in Laos. In the mid-1950s, America had feared that Ho Chi Minh, leader of popular resistance forces against the Japanese and the French, would triumph in a fair contest. Stone had declared that if the Vietnamese people actually considered the Communist leader an aggressor or an oppressor, they would vote against him. But as Stone recognized, Ho Chi Minh possessed large support, which caused administration officials such as John Foster Dulles to argue that the Vietnamese were not ready for an honest vote. Stone wrote that Asians must deem as strange the free world which opposed the ballot box and independence. After the United States refused to accept election results in Laos in 1959, Stone warned that if America did not adhere to democratic processes, that Southeast Asian nation would become further engulfed in dictatorship and war. He believed that in a land such as Laos, containing great jungle areas, small guerrilla contingents could wage battles for a long time. The key to the regional turmoil remained, as it had for so long, political, not military. Without a political settlement, civil war would be forthcoming. Stone charged that almost \$250,000,000 had been expended upon the Laotian military, and that America was now starting "to pour more millions in aid

down this same rathole." Inasmuch as there were apparently no more than 5000 rebels, "there must be something rotten in the state of Laos" if it could not cope with such insurgency.<sup>70</sup>

In a pair of insightful articles in the spring of 1961, Stone challenged the heightened fascination, particularly strong in the new Kennedy administration, with counterinsurgency as a tool to crush rising Third World liberation movements in such areas as Southeast Asia. He wrote that the aborted military coup in French Algeria seemed to have been little noticed by American reporters. But significantly, the revolt was guided by "a strange group of offbeat colonels," the same ones who had begun "the fad for reading Mao Tse-tung" and had initiated the stress in Washington on "'para-military,' 'guerrilla' and 'revolutionary war' tactics against the communists." These generals had helped to place Charles de Gaulle in power in 1958, but were soon removed from Algeria by the French president. What de Gaulle understood, but Kennedy seemingly did not, was that when such men read guerrilla theoreticians and attempted to apply guerrilla strategy for counter-revolutionary designs, they were transformed, often unknowingly, "into communists-in-reverse, i.e., to put it bluntly, into fascists." Eventually, they would "be tempted to use at home, against their own people and government, the psychological warfare, the brainwashing, the cloak-and dagger methods and the 'dirty tricks' they

are allowed to utilize in colonial areas." If you employ "cloak-and-dagger forces abroad on the assumption that you are dealing with a vast Communist conspiracy," Stone wondered, how could you stop such practices from being directed against domestic dissidents? Thus, to destroy the division between politicians and the military would be to invite a dissolution of the Republic.<sup>71</sup>

An English writer and intelligence officer with Allied forces during World War II argued that these French military thinkers possessed "a 'comic strip concept of history,'" tending to detect Communist conspiracy in each colonial independence drive. Stone warned that "the Steve Canyon comic strip mentality is even stronger at the Pentagon." The men studying guerrilla warfare could "see the notions but they can't hear the music." They failed to appreciate

the injured racial feelings, the misery, the rankling slights, the hatred, the devotion, the inspiration and the desperation. So they do not really understand what leads men to abandon wife, children, home, career and friends; to take to the bush and live gun in hand like a hunted animal; to challenge overwhelming military odds rather than acquiesce any longer in humiliation, injustice or poverty.

The American military was used to victory in the public relations arena, which ensured ever greater military expenditures. They were required to appeal to "a gimmick-minded public, which is used to mechanical devices and looks for some new pushbutton solutions whenever confronted by a new problem. So the dazzling latest military toothpaste for social decay is this idea of using guerrilla

methods, too." No one seemed to understand that similar strategy and the same architects of the new counterinsurgency programs, had recently failed so totally in Cuba. "It is time we realized that the brutal surgery of military and para-military methods cannot cure complex social and economic problems," Stone warned. The CIA had helped to depose popular leaders in Iran and Guatemala: Now, in both nations, new ferment was occurring. As he had several years before, Stone declared that "these counter-conspiracies only postpone crises which burst forth again with redoubled force."<sup>72</sup>

Another Weekly essay declared that Americans repeatedly talked as if wars of national liberation "could be turned off at some Kremlin spigot." In reality, they were unavoidable, and to offset possible Soviet influence, the U.S. should support them. But pathetically, America seemed to be replicating the blunders committed by France in its colonial enterprises. In South Vietnam, the United States was employing similar practices "of 'regroupment center' (concentration camps would be a more realistic term) for the peasantry which failed in Algeria."<sup>73</sup>

Stone repeatedly castigated American policies throughout Southeast Asia. Attacking U.S. actions in Laos, he asked: "To win the people by fair treatment--is this so difficult a principle to understand" in a democratic state? Stone argued against the landing of American forces in the region. "This is a first step into a vast

march where swarming gnats can devour a giant." He condemned American backing for Southeast Asian dictators, whom he termed several "of the queerest figures ever smuggled under the Jeffersonian mantle." He declared: "Never did a rich concern acquire so many sure tax losses." Not support for unpopular rightists, but only neutralization, Stone wrote, could contain Communism in the area. Only Cambodia, with Prince Sihanouk's neutralist orientation and his willingness to produce reform, possessed stability. But American policymakers seemed to despise Cambodia, and worked to overthrow Sihanouk.<sup>74</sup>

Developments in Vietnam greatly troubled Stone. In early 1961, he stated once again that small guerrilla groups could control an entire countryside only if the regime were "weak, corrupt and unpopular." Later in the year, he reported that Diem, despite years of American assistance, was unable to attain popular support or to construct a viable government. The introduction of land forces to prop up the Diem regime, would not only invite a repetition of the French fiasco, Stone feared, but would threaten a battle with China. As Kennedy continued to send fact-finding missions to Vietnam, he exclaimed in the fall of 1963, that they were designed only to evade reality. One reality was that dealing with China was required to effect regional stability. Another reality was that a small group of wealthy Catholic mandarins could not continue dominating a Buddhist state. Yet another

reality was "that you can't go on pouring napalm on villages and poisons on crops, uprooting people and putting them in prison-like compounds, and expect to be liked."<sup>75</sup>

In the Weekly on 28 October 1963, Stone charged:

The inhumanity which has made a world scandal of South Vietnam has its origin as much in Washington as in Saigon. The uprooting of the rural population, its incarceration in stockaded villages, the spraying of poisons from the air on crops and cattle in violation of the Geneva conventions, the use of napalm for attack on villages suspected of harboring rebels--these policies were all formulated and directed out of Washington. The familiar belief that the end justifies the means in any conflict with communism was enough to wipe out qualms, if any, about the mistreatment of the Vietnamese.

He wrote that as the major orientation of the American policymakers was militaristic, they depended upon the Pentagon and counterinsurgent practices. But "the government becomes a prisoner of the ends and the means it chooses. The type of men, mentality and institutions brought into play determines the course of events and constricts the choice of alternatives." Sadly, as the Eisenhower memoirs indicated, Americans had long funded this war to force upon the Vietnamese people an unpopular autocracy.<sup>76</sup>

Stone warned that American strategists were making other blunders. They refused to heed signals that National Liberation Front forces were calling for a nonaligned South Vietnamese government to be selected through fair elections. And ominously, American officials were moving to rewrite history in an effort to enforce "a party line myth on the press and public." Without a drive to inform



the American people about the realities of Vietnam, "the war will drag on, poisoning the air of freedom at home, imposing misery on the bewildered people of South Vietnam and risking a wider conflagration."<sup>77</sup>

The November assassination of the architect of U.S. policy in Vietnam, John Kennedy, saddened Stone, but appeared to symbolize the readiness of all peoples to "reach for the dagger, or the gun, in our thinking when it suits our political view to do so." He wrote that "we all believe that the end justifies the means." Stone repeated his admonition that if violence were to be curbed, man must discard "the idea of murder on the violent scale as the arbiter of controversy between nations." For when an entire nation was ready to chance annihilation to further its demands, "the readiness for murder has become a way of life and a world menace."<sup>78</sup>

As 1963 approached its finale, I. F. Stone's Weekly still seemed to be a lonely voice crying out against the ready resort to violence, whether directed at people, nations, or ideas. But with a break from the McCarthy fever, and with a growing realization among at least a committed few that reform at home and formulation of a rational foreign policy were essential, the possibility of change once again seemed to be in the offing. At the beginning of 1953, I. F. Stone had been an out-of-work, forty-five year old reporter, ostracized because of his radicalism and his critical perspective of Cold War America. By late 1963, Stone was still an outsider,

but one whose independent journalistic venture had weathered the frigid climate of the 1950s and had attained a respectable audience of 20,000 subscribers. The Haunted Fifties, a collection of Weekly pieces, was well received by reviewers, with one declaring that Stone "is controversial in a day when controversy is equated with sin. He is bold, when courage is next door to treason. He is non-mercenary, when indifference to money is close akin to forgetting God." Another reviewer reasoned that the Weekly was one reason why McCarthy had not been more successful, why McCarthyism had been weakened. Still, as James Neuwman recognized in the preface to the book, Stone possessed foes, including public officials, "who would enjoy turning him inside out." So, not surprisingly, "his writings are on many an index and his name on many a dossier."<sup>79</sup>

During the next several years, the Vietnam era, Izzy's popularity mushroomed. His perceptiveness about the Southeast Asian disaster lent greater authority to both Stone and his newsletter. The ravaging effects of the Vietnam conflict, both in that distant land and at home, only seemed to confirm his longstanding admonitions against imperialism and militarism.

## FOOTNOTES

### CHAPTER V

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## CHAPTER VI

### THE MOVEMENT, THE VIETNAM YEARS, AND THE WEEKLY: 1954-1973

The world needs a revolution in feeling,  
in sensitivity, in orientation, in the  
spirit of man.

A. J. Muste

I have at times been paralyzed by  
skepticism, at times I have been  
cynical, at other times indifferent,  
but when the time came I felt as if  
I heard the voice of God. I knew that  
it was my business to protest, however  
futile protest might be.

Bertrand Russell

The appearance and growth of I. F. Stone's Weekly virtually paralleled the emergence of the third great American radical movement of this century, an amorphous upsurge that included groups demanding change in the status of blacks, women, and various minority groups; in human relationships; in the corporate dominance of the economic, social, and political orders; and in the militaristic, reactionary, interventionist orientation of U.S. foreign policy. The Weekly and "the movement" both started slowly during the "haunted fifties," but both reached great prominence by the end of the sixties, a period that proved to be as Stone exclaimed, "a time

of torment." As the thawing of America from the Truman-McCarthy iceberg continued, he chronicled the early drives for civil rights and nuclear disarmament, and the beginnings of a New Left. He proceeded to trace the escalation of American involvement in Southeast Asia, and the corresponding mushrooming of the antiwar movement.

Stone shared the movement's condemnation of domestic injustices and of America's imperialistic activities, but remained a critical observer of the newly resurgent left. While an early influence on the New Left and although a consistent participant in the antiwar fight, he condemned what he perceived to be disturbing tendencies in the movement. He chastised the demand of some militants for instant revolution, a tendency to glorify violence, and the verbal dehumanization of foes. The aging crusader sometimes shared the anger and the frustration of those who adopted "infantile left" tactics. But he felt that the movement must try to create a better example for humankind.

Near the final phases of the antiwar movement and the Vietnam War, Izzy closed the Weekly. By that time, the former leftist pariah was being praised in the establishment media as a paragon of individualism, critical intelligence, and humaneness. Later serving as a contributing editor of the New York Review of Books, this "Godfather of the New Left" kept up his attack on

the war and on American imperialism.<sup>1</sup>

Stone had been greatly pleased when the seeds of a new progressive movement sprouted as the worst phase of McCarthyism appeared to dissipate. The historic 1954 Supreme Court decision, Brown v. the Board of Education, deeply moved him and seemed to auger a revolution. While Stone believed that the case demonstrated the efficacy of American democracy, he declared in the following year that blacks must aggressively assert themselves to bring about changes in Southern society and in the halls of Congress. Also, America's blacks required "a Gandhi" to guide them, just as the American public needed the blacks to lead the nation. Upon hearing an eloquent address by Martin Luther King, Jr. at the 1957 Prayer Pilgrimage in Washington, D. C., Stone wrote that the young minister should become one of the greatest living Americans. King's interracial ideals appealed to the journalist, who no longer called for creation of a separate black nation, but now warned that a fervent black nationalism, "a racism in reaction against ours," might impede assimilation.<sup>2</sup>

Along with the civil rights movement, an antinuclear drive developed in the late 1950s. It promised to challenge the McCarthyite-Cold War assumptions of the day and to rekindle the now virtually non-existent American left. Speaking in churches, universities, community centers, and other public establishments around the

country, Izzy extolled the antinuclear cause. In September 1958, he participated in an open forum held in New York City by the Student Council for a Sane Nuclear Policy. Izzy indicated his satisfaction at seeing young college students once again becoming involved with the major issues of the era.<sup>3</sup>

As 1960 opened, observers began speaking about the emergence of a New Left in America. Along with churchmen and committed leftists, young Americans, both black and white, were demanding change. In the South, they engaged in a series of sit-ins and freedom rides, thereby directly challenging the Jim Crow system. After a long quiescence, liberal, leftist, and peace groups were again astir on college campuses, confronting such issues as the death penalty, the practices of the House Un-American Activities Committee, and nuclear war. To further their causes and to attain a sense of solidarity, young people formed new progressive organizations, including the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).<sup>4</sup>

Stone praised the student activists who were battling for civil rights in the American South. He acclaimed the freedom riders for applying Gandhian non-violent methods in their attack on Jim Crow. While reasoning that white Southerners could continue segregation practices in education and at the polls for a long time, he believed that courageous individuals could use direct

action techniques to demand immediate desegregation of other public facilities. These "secular saints," as Norman Thomas had termed them, along with a few white counterparts, had initiated " a social revolution in the South." When James Meredith enrolled at the University of Mississippi in the fall of 1962, Stone deemed him a modern hero who was singly facing a "howling mob of racist imbeciles."<sup>5</sup>

The Weekly urged increased federal assistance for the civil rights movement, and in May 1963 warned that tragedy might be in the offing because of the "savagery" characteristic of certain Southern whites and the "murderous resentment" boiling among America's blacks. Isolated events, Stone believed, could result in racial earthquakes throughout the nation. As the Kennedy Civil Rights bill appeared certain to confront a congressional filibuster, Stone stated that stalling actions would only deepen racial tensions, and that the inadequate response to peaceful demonstrations was increasing acrimony in black communities nationwide. When Kennedy exhorted supporters of his civil rights legislation to leave the streets and enter the courts, Stone reminded his audience that the president had not acted until blacks had entered the streets. When they had waged merely a judicial battle, progress had been "unbearably slow." Only nonviolent, dignified agitation would result in noteworthy civil rights legislation.<sup>6</sup>



The 200,000 person march on Washington in August 1963, termed the highlight of the nonviolent phase of the civil rights movement, exhilarated Izzy. As a long-isolated member of the American left, he felt great personal satisfaction in the outpouring of progressive sentiment. He was pleased that a number of faithful radicals, many long driven from chosen professions, now seemed reborn, believing themselves to be participants in a mass movement. In a union hall in Washington, Izzy listened as A. Philip Randolph, architect of the march, reminded black nationalists that whites and blacks together had started the civil rights movement, that political equality was insufficient, and that jobs and freedom were both necessary. Stone heard Randolph's assistant, Bayard Rustin, declare that civil rights advocates must combine with other progressive groups to demand social change. In its report on the day's proceedings, the newsletter argued that America's impoverished still required socialistic solutions.<sup>7</sup>

In December 1963, Stone again extolled the virtues of the civil rights activists. He declared that the appearance of such an organization as SNCC demonstrated the vitality of America's younger generation, and he praised its members for their devotion, their

purity, their absence of self-seeking or of vanity. They are the stuff of saints. They are determined to change our country, and for them the most fundamental change of all is to win by non-violent means, to answer hate with love. They stand in a

line that runs back from Gandhi to Thoreau to St. Francis to Jesus. I regard them with reverence.

Against these "consecrated few," Stone declared, greater forces than the Southern segregationists had withered.<sup>8</sup>

The individuals and groups comprising the new peace movement were also applauded by the journalist. He believed that such a movement and a revised left were needed to impede militarism and interventionism and to provide an impetus toward reform. In January 1962, Stone participated in a Washington demonstration headed by the Women's Strike for Peace. "A new stirring in the land" was taking place, with peace activism flourishing once again. Stone warned that the president remained entrapped by the "granite interests and habits" of the "nightmarish" Pentagon and its corporate partners, by a complacent and an archaic Congress, by mankind's perpetual distrusts and antagonisms, and most important, by the widespread sense of impotence over the nuclear issue. It seemed that only a grass roots peace movement could help to weaken the dominance of "these frightful institutions."<sup>9</sup>

The following month's student peace march on the nation's capital was lauded by Stone. He praised the new young activists in such organizations as Turn Toward Peace, for they were vanquishing the terror of non-conformity which had reigned supreme during the McCarthy era. And happily, these marchers seemed different from

both the beatniks of the fifties and the sectarians of the forties. Rather than party-line dogmas, the crowd exuded "fresh spontaneity" and comprised "a Third Camp demonstration" which condemned the militarism and the "nation state lawlessness" of both East and West. The humane phrases of heretical intellectuals were popular among this antiwar force, which borrowed from Camus's "Neither Victims Nor Executioners" and Thoreau's "Unjust Law Exists."<sup>10</sup>

In mid-1962, Stone called for the budding peace movement to focus upon Vietnam, a place where American soldiers were actually engaged in combat. His early emphasis on Southeast Asia, coupled with the Weekly's general analyses of American domestic and foreign policies, brought Izzy a degree of influence over the early New Left and its leading organization, SDS. SDS publications repeatedly quoted from the newsletter and urged members to read "the best source of material which doesn't seem to be fit to print in major newspapers," I. F. Stone's Weekly. Todd Gitlin, the third SDS president, has indicated that many of the first leaders of the New Left group "devotedly read" the Weekly. To many in the early New Left, its editor "was always an exemplar of intellectual and political integrity, one of the few of his generation [who] . . . had not been fatally compromised by either Stalinism or inflexible anti-Communism." As Gitlin remembers, "Izzy was . . . a

spiritual eminence on early SDS, the only others of his generation who played a similar part--respectful, admirable, and critical at the same time--were A. J. Muste and perhaps David Dellinger."<sup>11</sup>

Izzy participated in affairs affiliated with SDS, and publicly supported the new organization. Along with Norman Thomas and SDS Vice-President Paul Booth, he addressed a Washington rally in November 1963, where he condemned South Vietnam's repressive government and its American backers. Izzy charged that U.S. actions in Southeast Asia were destroying "our reputation as a government of the free." In June of the following year, Izzy, A. J. Muste, and W. H. Ferry of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, mailed a note to several progressive publications urging "moral, intellectual, and financial support" for SDS's community action program, ERAP. The letter welcomed the appearance of young people who denounced vested interests, proposed a new vision of society rather than "the corrupting status quo", favored grass roots mobilization, and called for creation of a new American Left. The three elder progressives praised SDS for appealing to many "of the best and angriest young minds now functioning" and for encouraging them to engage in socially relevant work.<sup>12</sup>

These critical young activists, coupled with other left-leaning elements, Stone believed, could help to

redirect America's internal and external policies. The twin threats of racial turmoil at home and involvement in a guerrilla war abroad, he argued, required left-wing opposition to the new president, Lyndon Johnson. Stone reasoned that only an authentic leftist opposition and an infusion of progressive ideas would force the right to accept certain reform measures and enable Johnson to truly wage a war on poverty. America needed to return not merely to the deficit spending of John Maynard Keynes, but also to the ideas of Norman Thomas and the American socialists so that a real battle against poverty could be undertaken. "Americans must learn to hear the word socialism without blanching if they are to solve the problems of structural national growth and endemic poverty." Stone wrote that the American fear of socialism prevented development of the mixed economy which had already benefitted European states, but indicated that Americans would soon discover how faltering economic growth resulted from inadequate thought. In March, he declared that Johnson's simplistic extolling of "free enterprise" only compounded prevailing difficulties. In reality, the emphasis upon "so-called free enterprise" had proven ineffectual both in America and overseas. As he had a generation earlier, Stone called for independent progressives to devise an economic program and to begin educating the public.<sup>13</sup>

The Weekly adjudged the Johnson program as America's third effort to terminate poverty. The unwillingness of

New Dealers to use Social Security to redistribute wealth and the diluted nature of the 1946 Employment Act --originally designed to incorporate the concept of economic planning for full employment--had rendered the earlier anti-poverty endeavors incomplete. The Johnson plan would only succeed, Stone stated, if it increased the minimum wage and utilized economic planning to aid the "Other Americans." A federal government inventory of the actual needs of specific industries would greatly aid the process and help to stave off potentially grave social strife. Sadly, Stone admitted that American politics were so imbalanced toward the right, that even he, in attempting to popularize certain basic socialist ideas, was only desperately urging the modernization of American capitalism. He later wrote that a proposed economic planning measure for full employment should become the fulcrum of a left-wing challenge to the White House's antipoverty drive.<sup>14</sup>

A true war on poverty, Stone believed, must be combined with an attack against racism and segregation. He continued to laud civil rights activists, but warned that the movement's crisis would occur in Mississippi when the Freedom Summer project began. He praised the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which attacked Jim Crow and discriminatory practices, and acclaimed Lyndon Johnson as the nation's chief lobbyist for civil rights. At the same time, he applauded the American people for supporting change and claimed that few nations had acted so strongly to curb

"racism, a disease that poisons human relations everywhere on this planet." Nevertheless, he warned that the fight for freedom was "still a long, rocky and probably bloody one," and that black rights would not be complete until educational deficiencies and poverty entrapment were curbed.<sup>15</sup>

That quest, Stone feared, could be thwarted by the wasting of American material resources and lives in distant lands. He repeatedly urged the peace movement to concentrate upon U.S. imperialistic activities in the Third World, and called for a dissolution of the C.I.A., an organization which he believed had often fomented trouble around the globe. In early 1964, he wrote that the United States possessed "the sinister distinction of being" the sole nation with a so-called intelligence network which deposed and even murdered foreign leaders. Stone declared the American utilization of assassins, indicated in Senator Eugene McCarthy's report, "morally monstrous." He insisted that only by terminating all spy actions and by transforming the C.I.A. into a true intelligence agency, could "this cancerous growth be excised from a free society." He also damned American support for the Brazilian military coup which overturned Goulart's reform government, and warned that a world afflicted with nuclear arms required peace and non-violent change. U.S. approval of such a military takeover, however, would lead the downtrodden to believe that only arms could terminate their misery.<sup>16</sup>

Increasingly, Izzy's attention and that of the peace

movement riveted upon Vietnam. He spoke at various points around the nation, condemning American policies in Southeast Asia. In the Weekly, he stated that the Vietnam conflict was "a blind alley" which was dampening faith in the American government both overseas and at home. He indicated that the peace movement should be wary of allowing America to become too involved in another Asian war. He quoted from Hanson Baldwin, the military writer, who had affirmed that the stakes were large in Vietnam. There, for the first time, America was employing counter-insurgency practices. And there too, U.S. officials believed that failure would damage American prestige and cause global repercussions. Thus, they had begun to consider the possibility of land forces.<sup>17</sup>

Consistently, Stone denounced American strategists and deplored the results of the American-backed war. He considered the greatest hindrance to resolving the conflict to be the falsehood that the uprising against the South Vietnamese government was directed by the invading North Vietnamese, not by indigenous guerrillas. A related fallacy involved the notion that the war could be terminated if North Vietnam were bombed. Such an action, Stone believed, could result in "a new Korea or worse." By March 1964, he was charging that the Pentagon was using the Vietnam War as "a testing ground for new weapons and a training ground for new tactics." In the same month, he related how the Associated Press had refused to sell the Weekly a graphic photograph of a napalmed child.



Stone obtained the picture elsewhere, printed it, and reported how Vietnamese and Cambodian peasants were affected by American practices. He believed that the child had been injured during the bombing of a Cambodian village. The South Vietnamese regime had long desired to invade neutral Cambodia and thus continue their practice of decimating all villages suspected of harboring guerrillas.<sup>18</sup>

Almost singly among the nation's reporters, Izzy questioned the veracity of the official account involving the purported North Vietnamese shelling of American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin on 3 August 1964. The administration report of the incident enabled President Johnson to obtain congressional passage of a resolution which effectively granted him a blank check to wage the Vietnam War. But always doubtful of government versions of developments in Vietnam, Stone immediately wrote that South Vietnam, backed by the United States, "has been carrying the war to the north," thus "carrying on war behind our back." He continued his efforts to uncover the full story of the Tonkin attacks, charging that both government officials and newsmen had hidden the complete truth from the American people. He condemned the bombing reprisal against North Vietnam, noting that such actions had been declared illegal by international accords. "Between nations, as between men, reprisals are lynch law." He then questioned if the North Vietnamese action had been provoked, indicating that an American attack had long

been planned.<sup>19</sup>

Despite his fears of wider American involvement in Southeast Asia, his belief that the War on Poverty had been inadequately funded, and his general analysis of Lyndon Johnson as a "moderate conservative Democrat," Stone believed that the 1964 election was a crucial one. The Republican nomination of Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater thoroughly frightened him. Stone declared that the rightward shift of the nation was so severe that groups which would be perceived "as hopeless reactionaries or crypto-fascists" in other countries were only viewed as conservatives in America. But he warned that the Goldwater crusade involved civilian and military extremists, "a merger of the worst Southern reactionaries, the right-wing military and the obsessed inveterate anti-Communists, with those elements which have never reconciled themselves to the New Deal." Thus the election might determine "the peace of the country and the world," with the Goldwater candidacy testing the nation's sanity.<sup>20</sup>

The landslide triumph of Lyndon Johnson and the Democratic Party gladdened Izzy, who rejoiced that America had "voted overwhelmingly for racial justice, for patience in foreign policy and for continuation of the welfare state." The Weekly asserted that the entire world, other than fascist forces, had feared a Goldwater win.<sup>21</sup>

Despite his belief that Johnson's great victory provided the president with a unique opportunity to lessen world tensions, Stone feared that American policies,

particularly in Vietnam, would continue down the same road of interventionism and failure to heed the wishes of Third World peoples. Deeply troubled about events in Vietnam, Izzy went to the December national convention of SDS, now the major New Left group. Paul Booth and Todd Gitlin thought that a Stone address on Vietnam to the SDS National Council might focus the organization's attention upon the war and upon American foreign policy in general. Izzy gave an "eloquent," "stirring," and deeply moving talk, analyzing American entrance into Southeast Asia and explaining why the U.S. should leave the region. To a number within SDS, the Vietnam conflict now suddenly attained an importance which it had previously lacked. The following day, SDS began to plan for a spring march on the nation's capital.<sup>22</sup>

While at the time SDS hoped for a small gathering, subsequent events were to turn the April rally into the largest peace demonstration that had yet occurred. In February 1965, supposedly in response to a North Vietnamese attack on American installations, U.S. bombers began the Rolling Thunder air war against North Vietnam. Stone and the peace movement reacted immediately. He wrote that the American and the South Vietnamese military brass had long wanted to expand the fighting by bombing the north. But the guerrilla successes, Stone declared, should have informed the nation that despite the world's greatest technology and undoubtedly the finest press agents, the American military "don't do well in the test

that matters." The discernment of military leaders, particularly involving guerrilla fighting--"where the human factor counts more than the technological"--was defective. Yet they did possess a striking ability to veil their mistakes and the truth from the American people. This had caused calamities for other major empires. Stone indicated that the American public also needed to be aware of the unpopularity, cowardice, and incompetence of the South Vietnamese forces, whose collapse could be prevented only by increasing American participation in the war.<sup>23</sup>

To defend the official U.S. position on Vietnam, the State Department put out a White Paper intended to demonstrate that guerrilla weaponry had been received from North Vietnam and from other Communist states. In a careful and highly influential analysis, Izzy totally dissected the State Department paper, indicating that perhaps over 97% of the guerrilla weapons had actually been obtained from American or South Vietnamese troops.<sup>24</sup>

In March as Lyndon Johnson began to introduce American land forces, Stone charged that this president "rushed in where Ike and Kennedy feared to tread." Stone predicted that more and more American soldiers would be dragged into Vietnam, despite their obvious unpopularity. War weariness was growing and the number of South Vietnamese desertions was rapidly increasing. If the conflict were to continue, then Americans would have to fight it. Less than five months after hailing Johnson's election victory,

Stone thus declared that the president's triumph might turn out to be "one of the greatest frauds in American history." Daily, "Johnson's policy in Vietnam becomes more indistinguishable from Goldwater's."<sup>25</sup>

As pressures mounted for journalists to accept the administration's version of the war, Stone cited a military expert who had reasoned that such individuals possessed "an inescapable duty to speak out. . . . The most insidious crimes of our time have been those of indifferences and silence." Izzy wondered when his fellow countrymen would "awaken to bring an end to the crimes against humanity we are committing in Vietnam."<sup>26</sup>

Consequently, he acclaimed the Supreme Court decision, *U.S. v. Seeger*, which expanded the field of deferred conscientious objection, and he backed the SDS call for a mass march on Washington. In the Seeger case, the Court ruled that conscientious objector status could be attained by those who possessed non-conventional religious views. To Stone, this signified that in a time of bellicosity, the Court had elected "to affirm as the highest moral principle in our constitutional system that a man has a right to refuse to kill for his country." The outpouring of some 25,000 demonstrators at the antiwar rally also warmed Stone, who was an active participant. At one point, sectarian rivalries threatened the success of the gathering, with an attack directed at liberals such as Ernest Gruening, the Alaska Senator whom Izzy had persuaded

to talk to the crowd. Angered by the condemnation of his old friend, Izzy placed himself in the liberal camp and went on to berate "the previous generation of snotty Marxist-Leninists." He proceeded to declare that the left's major concern was an ending of the war, and he attacked the administration's arguments for American involvement. In the Weekly, Izzy urged that before "we slip over the brink," all peace groups should "bury their sometimes petty and personal differences and awaken our fellow countrymen to the dangers."<sup>27</sup>

While the April march attracted considerable national attention, the proliferation of teach-ins on the nation's campuses demonstrated growing grass roots support for the antiwar movement. Three of the most popular works carried by students to the meetings were Robert Scheer's How the U.S. Got Involved in Vietnam, Bernard Fall's The Two Vietnams, and Stone's "Reply to the White Paper." After serving as a panelist at the Washington teach-in in May, Izzy termed it inspiring, for "those intense and dedicated young faces, eager to learn filled one with new hope. The teach-in movement is making democracy meaningful on the one issue where it has counted least and is needed most. The intellectuals are beginning to do their duty." In the same month, the largest crowd, estimated at some 12,000, congregated in Berkeley to hear such speakers as author Norman Mailer, Free Speech movement leader Mario Savio, famed pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock, Bertrand

Russell, comedian Dick Gregory, SNCC activist Bob Parris, SDS's Paul Potter, Staughton Lynd of Yale, Norman Thomas, Senator Gruening, and Izzy. The journalist urged his listeners to pay more attention to developments in Latin America, particularly the recent landing of American marines to prop up the tottering, right-wing Dominican Republic regime. He stated that Johnson's treatment of Latin America belied U.S. assertions of support for "democratic social reform" and indicated a failure to understand that the Third World needed "socialistic measures," heavy infusions of "economic planning and public ownership." America was "destroying democracy," Izzy exclaimed. It had helped to overthrow the Bosch government, and was forcing the world's youth to choose "between communism and a kind of military strong-arm dictatorship." The United States was now replicating its Southeast Asian practices in Latin America, "and this is a crime against humanity, a crime against our country." But Izzy warned the audience that the mere espousing of revolution would not transform American foreign policy and that "it's one hell of a hard road, and it means so much destruction."<sup>28</sup>

Notwithstanding increasing protest by an ever expanding peace movement, the number of American soldiers in combat overseas increased sharply over the next three years. During that period, Stone escalated his own attack on American foreign policy, particularly in Southeast Asia. Intransigence, simple-mindedness, even stupidity seemed

to guide U.S. actions in Vietnam. The repeated refusals of the American government to negotiate with the National Liberation Front, and the U.S. insistence that rebel forces were just puppets led by Vietnam, appeared ludicrous. Stone declared that "this is a war of national liberation" which had been waged against three major colonial powers, and that this was the most important political reality of the war. He was also appalled by the attempt to apply methods that had failed in Korea. Air Force commander Curtis LeMay, for example, wanted to issue an ultimatum to the North Vietnamese: either they end their belligerence, or America would "bomb them back into the Stone Age." Such an attempt, Stone wrote, had been made to no avail during the inconclusive Korean conflict, despite "our crushing aerial superiority and savagery." And "the delusions that failed in Korea are not going to win in Vietnam."<sup>29</sup>

Paralleling the inane stubbornness, incompetence, and lack of vision, Stone believed, were ethnocentricity, racism, and a seemingly wanton disregard for life. Such factors frequently led to massive destructiveness and war criminality. In late 1965, he charged that American strategy was oriented toward depicting the Vietnamese rebels not as humans, "but as a kind of vermin to be exterminated." This led to the practice of body-counts, as if "a rat-killing campaign" were taking place. When Stone visited Southeast Asia in May 1966, he observed



that the American officials acted as though an "extermination mission" were occurring. He warned that the evident U.S. demand for unconditional surrender, backed by the threat of total devastation, and the escalation of the war, imperiled the entire nation, "North and South, including the innocent and the friendly." Pathetically, "a once flaming faith has become a faith in napalm." He declared that the America tactics horrified almost every nation that witnessed the world's premier military force "burn and bomb at will a country too small and weak to retaliate." Stone deemed the vast bombing "not pacification," but "genocide." He referred to the New York Times' Neil Sheehan who had asked if America or any country possessed the right to produce razed villages, begging orphans, napalmed individuals. Stone stated that "this is the abomination against which the world's conscience must be mobilized. This is the horror we must not let any phony olive branches elsewhere hide from view. This is the crime our country is committing. And this is what we must condemn, lest a later generation ask of us, as they ask of the Germans, who spoke up." Such actions caused Stone to support the 1967 Bertrand Russell-chaired trial on war criminality in Vietnam. He wrote that American conduct demanded an investigation involving Nuremberg principles.<sup>30</sup>

A pair of developments during the vital Tet offensive in January 1968 particularly struck Stone as symptomatic of the American war effort. Despite the inflicting of

civilian casualties, Bentic was fired upon to reach rebel soldiers. An American officer explained: "It became necessary to destroy the town to save it." Stone called such an operation cowardly if carried out in a foreign land, and indicated that such reasoning would later be recorded as characteristic of the entire conflict. The entire nation was being destroyed "to save it." At Khesanh, Americans had refused to admit civilian refugees or South Vietnamese forces, even taking weapons away from the latter. Stone wrote: "The truth is that when the chips are down we feel that the 'gooks' are expendable."<sup>31</sup>

Stone believed that American practices in Vietnam and in many other regions, were designed to threaten insurgent movements around the globe, and justified condemnation of U.S. foreign policy as imperialistic. He warned in 1966,

if our military machine crushes the Vietnamese rebellion, it will mete out similar punishment wherever subject peoples seek their freedom from corrupt oligarchies linked with American interests. Vietnam is intended to be a lesson to the poor of Brazil and to the disaffected everywhere, a training ground for the League of the Pax Americana. If our military wins in Vietnam there will be no holding them elsewhere or at home.

He wrote that only one country possessed "military bases on every inhabited continent and a fleet in every open sea." Only one state "keeps nuclear armed bombers flying on alert thousands of miles from its own skies." This

nation, its guns cocked to visit instant death on any other country of which it disapproves, presents a world problem. Were its destructive power to fall into irresponsible hands, it would render much of the earth uninhabitable. We can imagine no nation to which the doctrine of containment more aptly applies. The No. 1 problem of humanity is to contain the United States.<sup>32</sup>

Diverse instruments enabled America to perform the role of "world gendarme," as enunciated by the Truman Doctrine in 1947. While Truman had stated that the United States would back "free peoples . . . resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," the C.I.A. had become "the undercover instrument of this Pax Americana." American military forces were another means to enforce U.S. hegemony. And "our military, like Trotskyites in reverse, dream of permanent revolution requiring permanent agencies of suppression." American technological devices, including chemical-biological warfare, provided still more implements to crush Third World aspirations. Stone traced the expansion of this program to the Kennedy administration, whose top officials had desired relatively inexpensive means to wage limited warfare. The Kennedy-backed CB materials and Green Berets were both intended to threaten smaller countries. Stone declared that "our CB laboratories are preparing to enforce a Pax Americana with a Pox Americana, our politics by our man-made plagues." Lastly, he wrote that the Kennedy-McNamara military programs which had adopted the

Rockefeller-Kissinger proposals for development of "'options'--from tactical nuclear weapons to Green Bereted counter-guerrillas . . . made Vietnam possible." Because of militaristic devices and because of the policy of Pax Americana, "a 'Vietnam' was bound sooner or later to happen."<sup>33</sup>

Besides the great destruction produced by the American military in Southeast Asia, Stone feared that the Vietnam War would also wreak political and economic havoc at home. As early as 1965 he worried that the Democrats would suffer sizable losses at the polls, that a new conservative coalition in Congress would stifle additional efforts to resolve peacefully social and economic ills. He warned that the war would worsen inflation, divert needed funds to the Pentagon, and dampen hopes that a Great Society could truly emerge. Stone feared that the poor, the blacks, and the committed young would become more and more alienated if the desperate problems of American society were not attended to.<sup>34</sup>

Like many in the black and white organizations of the New Left, Stone urged a type of participatory democracy in the poverty programs of the Johnson administration. Rather than top-down, heavy-handed, paternalistic, business-subsidizing, and bureaucratic monoliths, he favored a congressional proposal enabling the poor to select their own representatives to anti-poverty panels.

Without such an input from the local communities, militant leaders would have little chance of serving on the boards. Elections would also allow the poor to establish independent power bases and to fashion "a more articulate, class-conscious organization."<sup>35</sup>

The actual anti-poverty efforts, however, too often appeared to be undemocratic and were inadequately financed, in large part because of the Vietnam War. As the federal government seemed little disposed to aid voter registration and school desegregation, Stone wrote in late 1965 that "a volcanic bitterness" was increasing. Failed expectations did fuel rising anger in the black communities during the latter years of the 1960s, as racial disturbances flickered across the nation and as more and more black radicals advocated separatism. Stone strongly praised the martyred Malcolm X as a man who had attempted to urge the American black to discard the feeling of being "a nigger." Still, he continued to believe that the "racism and nationalism" early espoused by Malcolm X and adopted by many young militants, were "poisons." But Stone also believed that white Americans should be sympathetic to the demands and the agonies of blacks. As riots spread through urban centers again in the summer of 1966, he suggested that only the fear of extremists and of racial turmoil might well compel America finally to work toward the "rehabilitation and reconstruction" of her black citizens.

He recognized a bright side to the explosions, for they demonstrated "that the poor are no longer poor in spirit." Still, he indicated that America might soon lament the wealth expended in Southeast Asia and might soon regret the training of black soldiers in guerrilla tactics.<sup>36</sup>

With the riots worsening in 1967 and 1968, and with black militancy sharpening, Stone worried that unless real and positive attempts were made in response to the uprisings, "we may find it necessary one day to call out troops to deal with this rumbling Africa at home." He feared that the urban explosions were approaching the point, "if not of revolution, then at least of a racial revolt," and that the cry of the blacks must become America's most important concern. Following the eruption in Detroit in 1967, Izzy wrote that if he were religious in an orthodox fashion, he would recognize God's wrath in the heightening urban demolition, divine handiwork meting justice "for the mindless cruelty" produced daily by American planes in Southeast Asia. Now the guerrilla tumult America sought to thwart "by mass destruction abroad," was emerging at home. Finally, "the bill for racial humiliation has come due." The summer of 1967, "the seventh of our successive hot summers, is the black spiral cloud of an oncoming tornado that is beginning to tear our country apart." Sadly and ominously, America's public officials still propounded "the same comforting self-delusions that have blinded

other societies and ruling strata on the eve of upheavals." But Stone also criticized the declarations at a Black Power conference of "partition, violence and race hatred," which could only alienate all moderates and prevent any reconciliation. Black and white Americans had to learn to coexist.<sup>37</sup>

In the spring of 1968, following the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr., praised by Stone as "in that line of saints which goes back from Gandhi to Jesus," the nation's cities again glowed. Stone warned that only a massive program would uplift the hopeless and embittered generation of ghetto blacks. He declared that the 55,000 soldiers in the nation's urban areas equalled the number in Vietnam just a short time earlier. Should guerrilla war develop, not even the present Vietnam ceiling of over 500,000 troops would suffice. Yet administration spokesmen were already announcing that a cessation of the present war would not result in any large diminution of military spending because of the great need to replenish matériel. The Treasury Under-Secretary had stated that the war had been waged "on a very, very lean budget (only \$80 billion!)." Stone remarked: "How dare the poor be so obstreperous when the Pentagon is so hungry."<sup>38</sup>

While the Vietnam War prevented any genuine effort to wage the promised War on Poverty, thus deepening racial conflict, it also alienated the young white

radicals whom Izzy had continuously supported. He paralleled his critical yet highly sympathetic depiction of the civil rights movement with his analyses of the antiwar movement. In a June 1965 Weekly piece, he divided the peace forces into three groups: the revolutionaries, the religious "witnesses," and the democratic elements. He chastised the would-be revolutionaries who attempted to demonstrate their support of rebel forces in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic by hindering the war machine in America. Because of the realities of the domestic situation, Izzy was concerned that the revolutionaries could serve as "agents provocateurs," handing government officials justification for suppression. Revolutionary strategy would have been applicable, he wrote, only if a revolutionary atmosphere had emerged. But in affluent America, with its conservative labor movement, the revolutionaries would not obtain sufficient allies to conduct a putsch. And if global peace demanded the destruction of U.S. capitalism, then the world possessed little hope. Revolutionary actions bespoke "a recipe for holocaust, an apocalyptic Marxist-Leninist version of the old belief in the Second Coming." Izzy hoped that student activists would not follow "stunt-mongers" and adopt self-defeating tactics. In contrast, he felt sympathy for those who desired to "testify" by challenging the law as a way of demonstrating moral disdain for the law. Yet he did not think they



could be effective, as they would not be able to achieve in a very short time "what Isaiah, Buddha, Jesus, St. Francis, Tolstoy and Gandhi could not do in 2500 years." Finally, Izzy enthusiastically praised those who were attempting to educate the nation, including "the wonderful students" who had participated in the teach-ins. Peace activists must "persuade, not provoke," and "must appeal to kindness and to reason." The Guardian blasted Stone's report as "simplistic" and "tendentious."<sup>39</sup>

In the period ahead, Stone was to both defend and criticize all branches of the peace movement. Because of efforts to slander and cow it, he devoted the complete issue of 25 October 1965 to an antiwar movement. In a satirical story, he indicated that draft resistance and peace agitation would be dampened "if we could only get rid of Christ and Constitution." In another article, he wrote that regardless of the herd-like cries of the respectable, they could not silence "the still small voice of conscience." The Vietnam conflict "is a cruel, a barbarous, an immoral and an illegal war." If America were invaded, Izzy wrote, then few would fail to defend her. The antiwar protestors condemned U.S. involvement in Vietnam not because of insufficient patriotism, but rather because of solicitude for their nation's reputation and finest traditions. He commended the upcoming November march on Washington, indicating that it must be successful. Solid support for the demonstration would "help save

human life and perhaps our own freedom." When war frenzy increased, "the fools and the cowards" were always viewed as patriots, and those who called for thought were castigated as subversives. Identifying the actual march as the greatest peace outpouring in the nation's history and as an example of America's best side, Izzy lauded the devoted student activists who were involved in both the antiwar and civil rights movements.<sup>40</sup>

In November, Stone defended the SDS suggestion that those who opposed the Vietnam War could serve their country in its "slums, in the South, in the Peace Corps." He warned that these "idealistic" young people

are the seed corn of a better future. They embody that strain of idealism which in every generation has written the brightest chapters in our American history. They are the spiritual sons of the Jeffersonians and the abolitionists. They have already proven their mettle, besieged as they are by the ignorant rich of Birchism on one side and the ignorant poor of the KKK on the other. There could be no greater folly than for the government to be drawn into a frontal conflict with the best youngsters of our time. Instead of alienating them further, we ought to take up their offer to enlist in their own way.<sup>41</sup>

By the fall of 1966 and the spring of 1967, the antiwar and student movements had burgeoned and shifted in more radical directions. In October, 1966, Izzy remarked that the war was deepening the alienation felt by many young people and by many intellectuals. But he charged that a good portion of New Left politics involved an

effort "in disillusion to secede from the American political system." After attending a meeting of the 1967 Spring Mobilization, Izzy discussed his concerns about the course of the movement. He praised radical groups for having led the massive New York and San Francisco spring rallies. However, the great size of the crowds seemed to have given some of them "delusions of grandeur," and had caused them to believe that the many thousands were marching for their individual causes. In Washington, they battled one another in efforts to dominate the peace movement through "Lilliputian all-night caucuses of far-out Leftists and far-out Black Nationalists" who were unable to reach any accord. Izzy considered the striking inability to devise a political program as the major result of the conference. The most dangerous development was the disdain and loathing directed by many blacks toward their white fellow radicals. He declared that such divisiveness could destroy the antiwar movement and was made to order for agents provocateurs. The antiwar movement had to decide, Izzy asserted, whether it wanted to reach the widest possible audience or to alienate the broader public. Those desirous of utilizing the antiwar drive to espouse hatred, racial conflict, and revolution, he exclaimed, should leave the movement and return to their individual "war movements." Antiwar proponents would not "sell peace by spreading hate and hysteria." He stated that people were comparing the situation in American in the sixties

with Germany in the thirties, but in doing so they failed to recognize the most significant point. Hitler had ascended to the top of German society because of the embittered confrontation between forces on the left. The easiest way to produce "Fascist-style repression" in America was to antagonize the moderates and the middle class, and then to charge the air with extremism and riots.<sup>42</sup>

Still, Izzy recognized that if the American public truly appreciated the dangers of nuclear holocaust, great demonstrations would abound. Regardless of their weaknesses, the activist few remained "the prescient, the handful who sense what's coming, and try in time to raise the alarm." Yet he thought that the effort must be made to have them and the antiwar movement behave more sensibly.<sup>43</sup>

A short time afterwards, Stone required an eye operation and suffered from angina pectoris, which resulted in a massive heart attack. For several months, he was unable to put out the Weekly. During the following year, he transformed the newsletter into a bi-weekly publication. In November 1967, after a European convalescence, Izzy began anew and wrote a letter to his readers. "It is a deeper satisfaction to be back here, at the center of the storm, and to feel the exhilaration of taking some small part, even though it may often seem to be again as always on the losing side." He returned convinced that the young radicals, "to our country's honor," comprised the group most committed to an end of the "inhuman" Vietnam affair.

A small number always maintained the best traditions of any nation. This "seeing and anguished handful" needed to attempt to shake humankind "from the wheel of hate, racism and war." He concluded his note with a query: "What could be more wonderful than to live and do one's duty at such a time?"<sup>44</sup>

As the radical sectors of the antiwar and student movements began to call for revolution, others preferred using the electoral process to unseat the president who was waging the Vietnam War. If that were successful, they believed it would then be possible to elect an individual willing to redirect American policy. Izzy continued to back the major antiwar demonstrations, but like many others, thought that the ensuing battle for the presidency would be terribly important. He feared in late 1967 that the upcoming campaign would be disillusioning to those who desired an end to the war and an augmenting of domestic reform. It could worsen the despondency which was moving increasing numbers of America's finest young people and blacks "to fantasy and hysteria, wild talk of guerrilla war and the partition of our country into two nations, one white one black." Thus he declared support for the dump Johnson campaign and indicated that he would back Eugene McCarthy. Concerned individuals, Stone wrote, must work to reinvigorate political processes and to restore faith in the possibility of peaceful change. Still, he admitted that such transformation had never

appeared less likely.<sup>45</sup>

By early 1968, the credibility of the antiwar movement and of I. F. Stone was rising. The January Tet offensive in Vietnam, which indicated that the war was not going well despite affirmations by President Johnson, General William Westmoreland, and others, seemed only to fuel sentiment that American involvement in Southeast Asia must be terminated. The more its analyses concerning the mendacity, irrationality, inhumanity, and destructiveness of American policies in Vietnam seemed to be borne out by events both abroad and at home, the more the popularity of the Weekly increased. Both the underground papers, which flourished during this period and whose writers sometimes looked to Izzy as a model of journalistic integrity, and the establishment press, a number of whose key reporters began to more closely adopt Stone's rationale, were heavily influenced by the newsletter. And no longer was its editor referred to as "poor Izzy" and identified as a man attracted to hopeless causes. No longer did the Weekly remain a cult item, appealing only to a small contingent of progressives. By the end of the year, the subscription numbers reached 45,000, and Stone served as the subject of extensive and favorable articles in periodicals as diverse as Newsweek, the New York Times, Ramparts, and The Listener. His new collection of writings, In a Time of Torment, which included works from the Weekly, The New Republic, and the New York Review of Books,

received generous plaudits from critics. Reviewers termed him "an indoubtable radical," a "cross between Tom Paine, the young William Randolph Hearst and the worried citizen's Ralph Nader . . . the master debunker of the ponderous platitude and the gilded lie"; "virtually indispensable"; "an American Diogenes" who was never fooled by "conventional wisdom, never intimidated"; "a razor-edged commentator"; "the main, some would say the only, specimen of the truly fearless commentator on the American scene"; "a prophet who dared to be a Jeremiah." Perhaps the most striking analysis of Stone was produced by Henry Steele Commager, an influential American historian. Commager called the radical journalist "a modern Tom Paine, celebrating Common Sense and the Rights of Man, hammering away at tyranny, injustice, exploitation, deception, and chicanery with an eloquence that appeals even to the sophisticated who are most suspicious of eloquence."

Commager continued:

He is the last of that long succession of radical pamphleteers which includes Paine and Garrison and Theodore Parker, Henry George and E. A. Ross and Henry Demarest Lloyd, Upton Sinclair and Lincoln Steffens, the Rev. A. J. Muste--crusaders all, champions of lost causes, never happier than when they had a fight on their hands, never more effective than when the causes they championed were desperate.<sup>46</sup>

Increasingly, that cause involved the Vietnam War and the peace movement. In early 1968, Stone again warned that the very fabric of American society was being

endangered by the Vietnam conflict. He worried that the prosecution of Dr. Benjamin Spock, Yale Chaplain William Sloane Coffin, writer Mitchell Goodman, Institute for Policy Studies co-director Marcus Raskin, and Harvard student Michael Ferber for abetting draft evasion, demonstrated the threat of increased repression. Stone now declared that while Spock and his co-defendants and like-minded individuals might be imprisoned, their moral example would eventually influence the nation. Such anti-war activists and the peace movement in general were said to be discharging "a sacred duty" to America and to the world. If Spock had committed a crime, the Weekly reported, then the nation did not possess enough prisons for "all those who ought to be there with him." Stone admitted that during a period when the nation had been inculcated with the belief that its defense resided in the ability to mete out "instant immolation . . . what could be more incendiary than to attack institutionalized arson?"<sup>47</sup>

As the Democratic convention approached, the antiwar movement helped to force Lyndon Johnson out of the presidential race. But the murder of Senator Robert Kennedy, who had been competing with McCarthy for the peace vote, seemed to assure the nomination of Johnson's faithful vice-president, Hubert Humphrey. Izzy urged Kennedy's supporters to back McCarthy, for "the nihilistic anger" would deepen should the two major candidates be Humphrey and the Republican's Richard Nixon. He warned that



developments in other lands had demonstrated that small revolutionary groups could polarize entire campuses and nations when malaise heightened. Only a McCarthy victory could allow for the revitalization of democratic processes, and provide domestic tranquility and an end to the war. Only a Democratic attempt to rebuild a new coalition which included blacks, antiwar advocates, and the angry youth, could prevent a Nixon triumph.<sup>48</sup>

The disastrous Democratic outing in Chicago in August seemed to assure the election of hardliner Nixon. The brutal televised police riot directed against antiwar demonstrators, journalists, photographers, and the general citizenry in the streets of a major American city, and the ensuing nomination of Humphrey, appeared to indicate that the two-party system had become "a one-party rubber stamp." Stone reported that the nation was offered no real choice on the most vital issue of the era, the Southeast Asian War. "The Establishment and the military have locked the ballot box," he cried. The two major political parties and their nominees "have been drafted. The Pentagon has won the election even before the votes are cast." He thought that this might well produce increased youth alienation, draft resistance, and street turmoil.<sup>49</sup>

Stone declared that the nation was indebted "to the tatterdemalion army of Yippies, hippies and peaceniks" who had scared the establishment into adopting extensive

security measures at the convention site. The protestors had demonstrated against the war and had allowed all to discover the inherently undemocratic nature of the Democratic Party proceedings. But his passage through Lincoln and Grant parks and the New Left headquarters compelled Izzy to fear that the hatred of the war was causing "the best of a generation" to be "lost--some among the hippies to drugs, some among the radicals to an almost hysterical frenzy of alienation."<sup>50</sup>

Admittedly, Izzy wrote, he did not know what political actions should be taken at this point. Three alternatives appeared in Allard Lowenstein's call to capture the Democratic Party, Marcus Raskin's plea for a fourth party, and the New Left's cry to enter the streets. Stone still believed that patience and persuasion were necessary to confront the challenges of race and war. Yet he wondered how such behavior could be preached to the young who might be drafted. Nevertheless, "hate and frenzy" he adjudged as inadequate replacements for rational political thought. Guerrilla-oriented youth cadres might set the atmosphere for the nation, and a few could incite government overreaction which might split the American people between extreme factions. But if law and order really disintegrated and democratic means were discarded, "we of the Left," the peace movement and its intellectual allies, would "be the first to suffer." Stone warned as he had previously: "To play with revolutionary talk

and tactics as the New Left is doing, when there is no revolutionary situation, is to act as the provocateurs for an American fascism." He thought that a major calamity had occurred with the relinquishment of nonviolent and rational means by many black and white activists. To cast aside suasion for direct action, to direct abusive language rather than reasoned arguments, to scream at and to dehumanize one's political foes with calls "of 'pigs' and worse," would involve the left in "a game the rightists are better equipped to play," and would provide a precedent "which American Storm Troopers may some day apply to us." Once again, Stone wrote that humankind's greatest enemy was hate, which was "the fuel that heats the furnaces of genocide." He wondered how a finer world could be created by adopting "primitive and sanguinary habits."<sup>51</sup>

Very quickly, Stone determined that leftists and peace proponents should form a progressive new party. America stood "at the beginnings of two revolutions, one by the blacks, the other by our youth." A new political party could help to challenge the concept of America as world policeman. It could help to redirect attention toward domestic concerns, including the emergence of Big Brother Daleyism which threatened to turn a group of dissenters "into an army of the disaffected."<sup>52</sup>

No strong progressive political movement developed after Richard Nixon garnered sufficient votes to take the election. His conquest, Stone feared, augured an increasingly militaristic, imperialistic, and repressive America.

Even before the votes had been cast, Stone stated that a permanent organization was required to shield America from the escalating expenses of militarism and the military-industrial complex. He believed that these ills would shatter the American economy and weaken democratic institutions. Operating in secrecy, they had already produced such disasters as the Vietnam War. Following the Nixon win, Stone reminded his readers that huge military outlays prevented a resolution of racial problems. But they did provide "the upper class welfare system" of the military-corporate combine, including the aerospace industry. "This is the gravy train of the suburbs, the technicians and the new millionaires of Texas and California whose guilt-edged old age pensions depend on militarism and the space race." The capturing of the White House by Nixon promised "Happy days ahead for the Pentagon." Stone declared, however, that other great states had collapsed as a result of militarism. The great power of the military-industrial complex could help to transform presidents into "Caesars," and like them, into "the masters and the pawns of the imperial legions."<sup>53</sup>

In a biting essay in mid-1969 which further lambasted the military, Stone charged that during the postwar era, Americans had expended a trillion dollars "on a gigantic hoax." The United States prospered mightily following World War II, as it became the greatest power on the globe. The idea that America was threatened by a decimated Russia,

still industrially underdeveloped and suffering from the annihilation of twenty-five million people, "was a wicked fantasy." Yet this illusion had supported the designs of American militarists and of large business interests, both of which benefitted mightily from massive "defense" expenditures. And until the red bogey was quashed, politicians, militarists, and industrialists would always call for a new super weapon to protect the nation. Indeed, the sharpest opponent of the Pentagon was "a world without an arms race, a world freed from the fear of war." Stone also warned that the most dangerous individuals were those who would cover "the military in the shining armor of another crusade for liberty."<sup>54</sup>

Stone thought that possibly the most significant lesson to be learned from the recent American crusade was "that the bigger and more diverse a nation's military establishment the bigger and more diverse the troubles it will get that nation into." Thus, the nation should begin to focus not only upon the direction of U.S. foreign policy, but also on the size of the American military-industrial complex. "As long as we have navies on every sea, bases on every continent, Green Berets for intervention and C-5A's for swift intercontinental transport, the chances of stumbling into new Vietnams and Cambodias-- will remain high."<sup>55</sup>

Militarism and imperialism, he believed, fed upon

one another and endangered both world peace and American democracy. He wrote in 1971 that postwar America had evolved into the greatest empire in world history, and that the massive military and intelligence establishments necessary to uphold the Pax Americana seemed like cancerous growths. He argued that the new administration's adoption of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine involved the same old imperialistic practices of waging war with native forces and of dominating other states through puppet rulers.<sup>56</sup>

Most pathetically, American imperialistic policies had resulted in such disasters as Vietnam, which in turn had produced such horrors as My Lai. Long-held imperialistic, ethnocentric, and racist attitudes seemed to have culminated in Pinksville, where frustrated U.S. soldiers had massacred a village of unarmed women and children. Stone wrote that unwittingly, "ours has become an 'Anti-People's war.'" When Mao Tse-tung observed "that the guerrilla survives among the people as a fish does in the sea," an American officer had "said we would 'dry up the sea.'" Following such a strategy, American troops attempted to destroy villages, crops, and people, wherever guerrilla forces were thought to be. America thus strove "to create a desert where no 'fish' could live," causing My Lais inevitably to occur. Stone exclaimed that "the biggest and dirtiest booby trap of all is the filthy pit of this war itself, from

which we emerge stinking in the nostrils of mankind.<sup>57</sup>

As the war threatened to turn into a holocaust for the Vietnamese, the Cambodians, and the Laotians, it continued to intensify tensions and divisions at home. During the late 1960s and the early 1970s, American society itself seemed at times to be unravelling. Stone shared the anger, desperation, and futility that so many felt during the era. While American practices abroad repeatedly appalled and infuriated him, developments on the home front, including much that involved the antiwar movement, sometimes heartened, sometimes dismayed him. The antics at the National Mobilization Committee's counter-inaugural in January 1969 annoyed him. He declared that the carrying of great portraits of such non-violent prophets as Martin Luther King, Jr., A. J. Muste, and Gandhi, seemed inappropriate in a parade which included a number of hate-filled "escaped lunatics." On another occasion, while addressing a crowd at New York University, Izzy was faced with antagonists who shouted that a Cuban-type society should replace the present American one. He retorted that despite his large admiration for Fidel, Communism provided a means for removing needed capital from "the bellies of the working class." Hissing began. Then Izzy stated that in capitalist America, he was allowed to speak freely. One listener cried: "But you can't make any changes!" A fatigued Stone answered: "Listen, if you brought about change you'd have to put three quarters of the population in

concentration camps to reconcile them to that change." The crowd was silenced for a time.<sup>58</sup>

In May 1969, Stone wrote an editorial both criticizing and defending the student rebels, who he believed were trying to warn that America must either meet the aspirations of the downtrodden or attempt to crush them. The first alternative would be expensive, while the latter would be calamitous. Stone conceded that he did not appreciate a good portion of the rhetoric and actions of the radical young. "I hate hate, intolerance and violence." Yet like Erasmus, who had helped to inspire and then was repelled by Luther, he could not condemn the country's youthful radicals, who were performing "God's work too, in refusing any longer to submit to evil, and challenging society to reform or crush them." As a life-long dissenter, Stone admitted that he had become accustomed to accept setbacks genially and had become distrustful of victory. Indeed, the very concept of a movement troubled him. "I see every insight degenerating into a dogma, and fresh thoughts freezing into lifeless partylines." Those admirably desirous of becoming "their brother's keeper sometimes end up by becoming his jailer. Every emancipation has in it the seeds of a new slavery, and every truth easily becomes a lie." Stone recognized that such analyses, which seemed so lucid from a distance, little affected those involved in an ongoing quest. They seemed "no better



than mystical nonsense to the humane student who has to fight the draft board, the dissident soldier who is determined not to fight, the black who sees his people doomed by shackles stronger than slavery to racial humiliation and decay." For all their tumult, the refusal of her finest young people to accede to the injustices of the Southeast Asian conflict, militarism, and racial oppression, provided America's one hope. But he reminded the radicals that the ills they contested--"war, racism and bureaucracy--are universal," and that the Marxism-Leninism some were adopting had produced the most "suffocating" form of officiousness. Still, during the ensuing month, Steon saluted the spring college graduating class which included many of the activist young, as the "finest" in U.S. history.<sup>59</sup>

By the fall, the antiwar cause seemed never to have shone brighter. In October, the Moratorium committee called for a one-day strike against the war, which proved to be highly successful. In November, orchestrated by the National Mobilization Committee, peace rallies in Washington, D. C. and San Francisco, involved several hundred thousand demonstrators. Stone supported the efforts of both organizations, declaring that public protest must continue as no change was occurring in the capital. He wrote that the war would never be ended unless the antiwar movement maintained pressure, and that peace advocates needed to engage in a grass-roots campaign to educate

the nation about Vietnam.<sup>60</sup>

The following spring, the antiwar movement and the American left experienced a brief surge, but also suffered serious setbacks. During the previous year, the most powerful New Left organization, S.D.S., had replicated the history of earlier American left-wing groups. It splintered over ideological differences, and a small number of its activist leaders had determined to move from resistance to revolution. While Popular Front-type coalitions had molded the massive fall outpourings, in the future, no single peace organization proved capable of holding together the diffuse antiwar factions. The demise of S.D.S. also meant that the left possessed no group capable of unifying disparate radical and reform elements. In addition, a number of liberals and leftists were to become politically disillusioned because of the adoption of terrorist tactics by various groups, including the S.D.S. splinter, the Weathermen. An explosion in a Greenwich Village townhouse in March 1970, which resulted in the deaths of three Weathermen who had been attempting to produce bombs, troubled many on the left. Stone wrote that America might be approaching the initial steps "of an urban guerrilla movement." He cautioned that such a movement, regardless of its activities, was a political and not a criminal development, and that such guerrilla cadres could be stifled only through political action. The Weathermen could be condemned as "spoiled brats" who were striking out at a world that refused to transform instantaneously. Yet

these were "the most sensitive of a generation." They intimately felt what older Americans could only view as a fanciful abstraction, that the planet was drifting toward holocaust, and that some attempt must be undertaken to prevent such a calamity. Stone also reasoned that a movement lacking faith in the people reached for "the desperate few idealists" who were ready to give up their lives in possibly futile gestures. Some of America's youthful revolutionaries were "chillingly sober and disconcertingly sensible." Their censure "of conventional dissenters like myself and our futility" was difficult to combat. Other revolutionaries had lately demonstrated an unwholesome readiness to exalt violence. But "these wild and wonderful--yes, wonderful! kids" performed a very rational political role. They helped to maintain pressure on the Establishment to reform.<sup>61</sup>

Many hoped that the U.S.-backed invasion of Cambodia, and the resulting explosion of campus protest which followed the murder of four students at Kent State, would reinvigorate the movement calling for an end to the Vietnam War, American imperialism in general, and militarism. The Weekly, however, feared that "the race is on between protest and disaster." Stone worried that the United States was entering yet another phase of an expanded war, and argued that the sole deterrent would be the creation by students of "a Plague for Peace." He urged striking students to adopt the slogan, "Suspend Classes and Educate the Country." With the gunning down of two more students

at Jackson State, and with cries of revolution and fascism in the air, Stone called for rational discourse. Giving the commencement address at Amherst University, a ceremony which David Eisenhower, grandson of the late President, boycotted because of his talk, Stone declared: "You don't mobilize the country by telling them it has been a monolithic monster in the world. There's no use in making things worse by slipshod analysis and metaphors." He stated that the nation had not turned to fascism, and exhorted the graduating seniors, whom he had heartily praised, not to follow Vice President Spiro Agnew's lead in polarizing the people.<sup>62</sup>

The campus killings and the continued wave of revolutionary activity, including the bombing of the Army Mathematics Center at the University of Wisconsin which resulted in the death of a researcher, left Stone personally dismayed. He indicated in September 1970, that even as a young journalist during the Great Depression, he had not experienced the anguish which he was starting to feel concerning America's future. Even the depression era revolutionaries had espoused rational designs, "not just a blind frustrated urge to destroy." Stone warned that "the panic, hysteria and hate" which might soon be unleashed, would hardly allow for the creation of "that New Man of whom Mao and Che dreamed." But he stated that the revolutionaries would not be turned back until an "inner sense of righteousness" were stifled, which would only occur if the nation

willingly examined "the morality of its own behavior" and began to correct the abuses which stirred the ferment.<sup>63</sup>

Soon, however, the revolutionary fervor dissipated, and the antiwar movement itself began to crumble, abetted by governmental repression, agents provocateurs, and further divisions within the movement. In addition, replacement of the draft by a lottery system, the beginnings of American troop withdrawal while a secret air war mushroomed, signs of the termination of the sixties' economic boom, frustration, hopelessness, spent energy, and inertia all helped to weaken the broad-based "movement." Stone continued to participate at antiwar gatherings, and kept tracing the evolution of the peace movement in the Weekly. The spring 1971 antiwar demonstrations in Washington, D. C., were lauded by him. To him, the Vietnam Vets Against the War, were the heroes of the new protests. He compared the VVAW with the small number of French Resistance fighters who had preserved their nation's honor, and he predicted that at a future date these individuals would be viewed "as men who saved the honor of America."<sup>64</sup>

When the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice called for closing down the U.S. government unless it ended the war, Stone remarked that no one cognizant of the unreceptivity of the administration could fail to muster a certain sympathy for the effort of this radical group. The May Day protestors also desired to bring the war home and caused Stone to wonder if Washingtonians

should not encounter some small traffic disorders to awaken "the sluggish conscience" of America to "the misery and murder we continue to rain down on Indochina."<sup>65</sup>

Stone's views on the antiwar movement and his fervent condemnation of American foreign policy resulted in praise from liberals and the left, but also produced sharp criticism and governmental surveillance. By early 1971, Senator Edmund Muskie reported that Izzy and several other Washington residents had been spied upon by the FBI during the previous year's Earth Day proceedings. A later Jack Anderson column revealed that the journalist had been "kept under regular surveillance" by the FBI. After the burst of campus protest following the Cambodian invasion, Vice-President Agnew had charged that the unrest was fueled by editorialists in the East and elsewhere. Among others, he named the New York Times's James Reston, Tom Wicker, and Anthony Lewis; Life's Hugh Sidey; and I. F. Stone's Weekly, which Agnew termed "another strident voice of illiberalism." Joseph Kraft in the Washington Post charged that Stone had not deviated from the Soviet position on U.S. policies for the past two decades, which demonstrated that the columnist had followed carefully neither Russian strategy nor the Weekly. Izzy considered the charge ridiculous and declared: "If you live long enough the venerability factor creeps in: You get accused of things you never did and praised for virtues you never had. As respectability darkens my door, it's sort of comforting

to know that someone still thinks I'm a dangerous man."<sup>66</sup>

Writers on opposite ends of the political spectrum so considered Stone. One underground paper indicated that "I. F. Stone, for as good-hearted and just a man as he is," is "a hot-shot eastern liberal." While such criticism from the left sometimes induced Izzy jokingly to refer to himself as "a counter-revolutionary," he continued to declare that he was a radical--"not the bomb-throwing stereotype but a real radical: one who gets to the roots of problems." Michael M. Uhlmann in the right-wing National Review wrote that Stone had condemned the American government for all types of savage crimes, including "deceit, avarice, racism, genocide." But inexplicably, Stone had refused to acknowledge rebellion as the inevitable conclusion of such analyses. A government which performed such misdeeds, Uhlmann declared, simply could not retain the loyalty of honorable men, and failure to admit such a conclusion demonstrated "either ignorance or disingenuousness. And since Stone is anything but ignorant, one can only conclude that the latter must be the case." Such disingenuousness, Uhlmann thought, had developed in large part because Stone was a Marxist who resided in a society that had attained material plentitude far surpassing the most extreme visions of Marx, and which had until recently left radicals isolated. Uhlmann termed Stone "an armchair revolutionary," who became popular with the liberals because he indicated "how to play at

revolution, at the same time absolving them (and himself) from any responsibility for their words and deeds, because after all, they are merely playing at it." He wrote that the honesty of the Black Panthers appeared striking by contrast. "They, at least, know that revolution is not a game, and for better or for worse, are prepared to lay their lives on the line." But to accuse Stone of revolutionary aspirations bespoke the very ignorance of which Uhlmann had absolved the journalist. Alongside his radical calls for structural transformation of American domestic and foreign policies, Stone remained first and foremost an advocate of democracy and of peaceful change.<sup>67</sup>

Despite the occasional attack, Stone had by the end of the 1960s seemingly completed the evolution from "a pariah to a character" to "a national institution," a process he had long ago prophesied to his wife. In late 1969, two reviewers wrote that his 1952 analysis of the Korean conflict, The Hidden History, was a prescient warning of the present Southeast Asian disaster. After a two decade absence, Who's Who in America, again included a section on Stone. In mid-1970, the Wall Street Journal, of all publications, printed a long and sympathetic article on this "gadfly on the left." The Christian Century, Time, Newsweek, and McCalls in 1970 or 1971, included glowing perspectives on the Weekly editor. His newest books, Polemics and Prophecies and The Killings at Kent State, generally received warm accolades.<sup>68</sup>



By late 1971, Izzy was a regular guest on such programs as "Dick Cavett," and the Weekly had over 71,000 subscribers, including several congressmen and the White House. But the work load of the one-man editorial operation became too heavy, and Izzy feared that he might collapse. He became so weak that a short walk from his house made him feel that he was going to drop. So in early December, Izzy printed the final issue of the Weekly. He thanked his readers for their long support, declaring that no individual could have been more contented than he had been with the newsletter. It had enabled him to provide some sustenance for the persecuted, to write what he believed was true, to accept only the compromises produced by his own inadequacies, to freely heed no other master, to strive to become his idealized conception of a journalist, and to provide for his family--"what more could a man ask?" Stone terminated the Weekly with the following message:

I have been able to live in accordance with my beliefs. Politically I believe there cannot be a good society without freedom of criticism; the greatest task of our time is to find a synthesis of socialism and freedom. Philosophically I believe that a man's life reduces itself ultimately to a faith--the fundamental is beyond proof--and that faith is a matter of aesthetics, a sense of beauty and harmony. I think every man is his own Pygmalion, and spends his life fashioning himself. And in fashioning himself, for good or ill, he fashions the human race and its future.<sup>69</sup>

Praise for the Weekly and its editor poured forth from the establishment press. Time declared that "the irrepressible godfather of New Left journalism" had called

an end to "the Stone Age." A Washington Post editorial remarked that Stone was possibly the only Marxist who had succeeded "as a capitalist in the fiercely competitive jungle of American free enterprise journalism." The Post stated that Stone had condemned "cant and pretentiousness in public life," and had possessed "qualities of thoroughness, fairness and insightfulness that made his work almost solid, illuminating and a goad to all his competitors." The columnist Nicholas von Hoffman indicated that Stone had "reached a unique prominence, as perhaps the most respected reporter, especially investigative reporter" of the present era.<sup>70</sup>

The fact that the Weekly had succeeded on both the editorial level and the financial level immensely pleased Izzy. In an interview with the New York Times, Izzy affirmed that he was "a man of the left--absolutely." But he also displayed great satisfaction that he had been "a prosperous free-enterpriser, 'a solid bourgeois.'" In fact, the Weekly had proven to be so lucrative that Izzy had been able to establish a trust fund for his family. In addition, he now sold the Weekly subscription list to the New York Review of Books, which he joined as a contributing editor. "What a wonderful thing to quit when you're on top," his wife Esther exclaimed, and she indicated that they both sensed that "a new life and a new career" were beginning.<sup>71</sup>

As that new career began, Izzy received a major

journalistic award at the first A. J. Leibling Counter-Convention. During the proceedings attended by such luminaries as Tom Wolfe, Jack Anderson, David Broder, Joe McGinnis, David Halberstam, J. Anthony Lukas, Nat Hentoff, Studs Terkel, Jimmy Breslin, Murray Kempton, Peter Hamill, Jack Newfield, and Dan Rather, Izzy was given the initial A. J. Liebling award, named after the maverick New Yorker columnist. The presenter declared that Stone was being honored for his single-handed commitment to independence, for his never-ending examination of government and corporate power, and for his advocacy of personal freedoms. Izzy told the audience that institutions, not individuals, created the ills of modern man. At the same time he found the Establishment so full of "crap that it really deserved to be treated disrespectfully."<sup>72</sup>

Throughout 1972 and early 1973, in the New York Review of Books, Stone continued to direct such analyses against the administration's handling of the Vietnam War. He thought that the Nixon decisions to mine the ports of North Vietnam and to blockade the Communist state, were "potentially the gravest" ones ever made by a president of the United States, which might well ignite another world war. Stone wondered how many lives would be lost in smaller states, how many peoples must be imperiled, because of the inferiority complex of a superpower. He condemned the architect of Nixon's foreign policy, Henry Kissinger, whose Metternichian approach had

long characterized America's Vietnam strategy. Kissinger belonged to a generation of intellectuals who justified the armaments race and diverted attention from the necessary task of establishing a new world order. Stone asked: "How many wars on this planet before men are cured of the old delusions Nixon and Kissinger propagate?"<sup>73</sup>

The candidacy of South Dakota Senator George McGovern, Stone believed, offered a real chance to end the war, to rein in the military establishment, and to redirect American priorities. The nomination of McGovern by the Democratic Party greatly encouraged him. Izzy thought that he had witnessed a miracle, with activists who had been outside the convention in 1968 now serving as delegates. The many dark-skinned faces and the numerous women present indicated that a political eruption had occurred which had finally collapsed "barriers of race, sex, age, and class on a substantial scale in a major party gathering." Izzy believed that regardless of the outcome of the general election, the committed activists were "the future." He was also heartened to see so many veterans of lost causes, including a number of individuals who had been connected with the 1912 Bull Moose Party, the 1924 La Follette effort, and the 1948 Henry Wallace movement. Delegates included "a scattering of these foolish old indomitables who never have sense enough to know when they are licked."<sup>74</sup>

Despite fears that a move was underway to shift McGovern to a more moderate stance, Stone thought that

the Democratic nominee provided the nation with the first real choice and the first possibility of real change for some time. The prizes were high, for they included the direction of the Supreme Court, the modification of the military-industrial complex, and the chance to exchange imperialism for a transformation of America.<sup>75</sup>

Nevertheless, the 1972 election concluded with an overwhelming repudiation of the liberal Senator, whose effort seemed in many ways to serve as the last gasp of the antiwar movement. Shortly after the November vote, accords were reached which officially ended U.S. participation in the Vietnam War. The domestic fury and disruption caused by the conflict, coupled with the inability of American firepower to overcome the Vietnamese insurgents, had brought the war to a close.<sup>76</sup>

One of the earliest foes of American practices in Vietnam, I. F. Stone had long directed a sustained attack on U.S. interventionism, imperialism, and militarism, while urging sweeping changes in the ordering of the nation's foreign and domestic affairs. He had frequently argued that broad-based political movements supporting such alterations were essential. And during the nearly two decades from the announcement of the Brown decision to the end of the longest American war, the country did experience a series of reform and radical movements which challenged racial, social, economic, and foreign policies. During the 1950s, Stone chronicled the early civil rights and antinuclear movements. As he continued to record

the events of his time, the following decade witnessed the flourishing of progressive movements, as increased anger fired civil rights activists and the opponents of U.S. interventionism, and helped to rebuild the American left. While highly supportive of these movements and although invigorated by the radical upsurge, Stone warned against apocalyptic tendencies on the left and declared that violence, hate, and hysteria in all their guises remained the true enemies of humankind. By 1971, his prescient analyses enabled Stone to become something of an independent left-wing icon, but an inability to maintain his heavy workload caused him to abandon his now renowned newsletter. Moving on to the New York Review of Books, he upheld the antiwar banner and continued his attack on American practices in Southeast Asia.

## FOOTNOTES

### CHAPTER VI

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## CHAPTER VII

### SEMI-RETIREMENT AND A STONE REBIRTH, 1973-1982

And he shall judge among the nations,  
and shall rebuke many people; and they  
shall beat their swords into plowshares,  
their spears into pruning hoods: nation  
shall not lift up sword against nation,  
neither shall they learn war any more.

Isaiah

Zion shall be redeemed with judgement,  
and her converts with righteousness.

Isaiah

Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element. Public life gradually falls asleep, a few dozen party leaders of inexhaustible energy and boundless experience direct and rule. Among them, in reality only a dozen outstanding heads do the leading, and an entire elite of the working class is invited from time to time to meetings where they are to applaud the speeches of the leaders and to approve proposed resolutions unanimously--at bottom, then, a clique affair--a dictatorship, to be sure, not the dictatorship of the proletariat, however, but only the dictatorship of a handful of politicians, that is a dictatorship in the bourgeois sense... .

Rosa Luxembour

Throughout the remainder of the 1970s and into the early 1980s, I. F. Stone hammered away at many of the themes long prominent in his writings. He again condemned the domestic repercussions of imperialism, the militarization of American foreign policy, Cold War antagonisms, and big power misadventures in Eastern Europe and the Third World. He also continued to decry tribal antipathies of any sort, thus deepening an already bitter controversy with his fellow American Jews. But Stone thought that such animosities only hindered the quest for freedom, the most vital journey for humankind. Believing so strongly in that fight, he initiated an extensive study of freedom of thought.

As the period of his semi-retirement began, the tale of Watergate began to unravel in 1973 and 1974. Stone reasoned that the Watergate disaster stemmed directly from the emergence of the Imperial Presidency during the era of the Cold War and that Richard Nixon's impeachment might provide the sole remedy against "Caesarism in the White House." Only impeachment proceedings might uncover the extent of the president's guilt and thus perhaps prevent a repeat of such abuses. As the actual revelation of executive misconduct unfolded, Stone declared that the sitting president seemed ready to transform the nation "into a presidential dictatorship." By late 1973, the case had evolved from a purportedly minor burglary into a conspiracy to obstruct justice.

Stone cried that it "now threatens a presidential revolution." Nixon and his attorneys were making revolutionary claims of executive power including total presidential immunity from judicial process and unrestricted power of executive privilege. This, the journalist argued, would make Nixon the country's chief prosecutor, with the ability to withhold information and to prevent any unwanted indictments.

At an ACLU awards banquet, guest speaker Stone indicated that the Watergate affair posed two trials for the nation. One revolved around the prosecution of Richard Nixon, while the other involved "the trial of the American people." Stone recalled the warning in the Federalist Papers that if the spirit of a people deteriorated, then a written constitution would protect no fundamental freedoms. Now, the presidency itself appeared to be imperiling such civil liberties, with Nixon engaging in a major counterrevolution and poisoning the democratic process. Stone argued that the most damaging charge that could be leveled at Nixon involved the poor example which he had set during turbulent times. Inasmuch as Nixon had subverted esteem for law and order, the longtime hounder of "subversives" had himself proven to be "the biggest subversive we have ever had."<sup>2</sup>

The immediate pardoning of Nixon by his successor, Gerald Ford, was bitterly attacked by Stone. After Spiro Agnew had been forced to resign following revelations

of income tax evasion and accepted kickbacks, the Michigan congressman replaced him. As the confirmation hearings took place in Washington, D. C., Stone had urged that Ford be questioned. If legal action against Nixon were not taken, Stone wrote, then the president's involvement in the Watergate affair, the Ellsberg case, and the ITT scandal would possibly never be discovered. When Ford proceeded to exempt Nixon from criminal prosecution, Stone cried foul. To him, Ford's actions were "Nixonism, pure and undefiled," and demonstrated that "Tricky Dicky" had been supplanted by "Foxy Ford."<sup>3</sup>

As Stone condemned the misuses of power which emanated from the Imperial Presidency, he damned comparable practices in the sphere of foreign policy. Following the Mayaguez affair in which Ford ordered an attack against Cambodia because of the seizure of an American vessel, Izzy wondered if Richard Nixon were still presiding in the White House. He wrote that American policy had not been intended to save the captured Mayaguez crewmen, but rather to prevent the U.S. from looking like "a 'pitiful helpless giant.'" Congress in turn, despite the 1973 War Powers Act which was designed to curb interventionism, "raped as easily" as it had during August 1964. And now there were no Senate mavericks to stand up and condemn American actions. Condemning the ideological orientation of the new administration, Stone believed that the truest display of national

resolution was evidenced by "the awakened humanity and good sense" that had propelled the anti-Vietnam movement.<sup>4</sup>

Throughout the Middle East and Central America, Stone espied more dangers to America's real interests, as many influential Americans urged support of unpopular dictators. Following the deposing of the Shah by the Iranian revolution of 1979, Stone wrote that this "billionarie refugee" promised trouble. He noted that the American government possessed a long and disastrous history of backing the wrong forces. Years had passed before the U.S. had acknowledged the Russian and Chinese revolutions, and after two decades, the American government still failed to recognize Castro. Countless billions had been lost because of "Canute-like operations" intended to sweep back revolutionary developments. The absurdity of such practices gradually became apparent, Stone declared, for every revolutionary government eventually desired commercial dealings and improved relations. Following the upheaval in Iran, one could hear "hysterical metaphors" concerning "crumbling crescents, arcs, and northern tiers." Such unwillingness to accept reality had repeatedly polluted America's domestic atmosphere, causing anyone who questioned "the existence of the latest bogey" to be tagged as disloyal.<sup>5</sup>

By 1980, the possibility of another Vietnam loomed greatest in Central America. American aid to the right-wing government of El Salvador, dominated by reactionary

military commanders and a landowning elite, increased despite widespread discontent with the regime and its program of repression and murder. In the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Nation, Stone attacked U.S. policy in that troubled land. He joined over two hundred others, including Kurt Vonnegut, Carl Sagan, Allen Ginsberg, Kris Kristofferson, Harry Belafonte, Mary Travers, Jesse Jackson, Ed Asner, Coretta King, Andrew Young, Bella Abzug, Julian Bond, Linus Pauling, and George Wald in urging that self-determination be allowed for the Central American state, and in condemning military assistance that promised to engulf America "in the endless morass of another Vietnam." Stone ridiculed the election of March 1982 which solidified right-wing dominance in El Salvador. He stated that the left's exclusion from the ballot box had blocked a possible peaceful road to change. He attacked the attempt to transform Roberto d'Aubisson, "El Salvador's No. 1 Terrorist" and soon to become president of the Constituent Assembly, into his nation's "No. 1. Statesman."<sup>6</sup>

The U.S. government's simplistic analysis of Central American turmoil caused Stone to repeat admonitions that he had made thirty years earlier. He wrote that someone should remind the "fevered" Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, that Marx did not originate class conflict and that revolution was "not a recent gadget manufactured for export in Moscow." Stone charged that Haig and

other officials in the Reagan administration were simplifying the long-boiling Central American unrest "to a spy thriller." They seemed to believe that the turmoil evolved from a Russian "hit list." The first target involved the Sandinista toppling of "the benevolent Somozas in Nicaragua." Now "the sylvan elysiums of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras" were being endangered, as otherwise contented peasants had only become opposed to massive abuse because of agitation "by misguided nuns and dialectical materialism."<sup>7</sup>

The aggressive bent of the new Reagan administration which was evinced in Central America and elsewhere, produced an assertion from Stone that he had never been more fearful, not even during the Vietnam era. He thought that the Reagan aides were "just itching for a war." He also worried about "spooky talk" concerning "a super Mayaguez," and over surmises that a foreign policy confrontation and mobilization might save the American economy from the disastrous effects of Reaganomics. Stone argued that Reagan's projected massive military buildup was "reckless," and that "too many are silent."<sup>8</sup>

While Stone thus once again decried the direction of American foreign policy, he also continued to criticize Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. Soviet oppressiveness, along with the mendacity of Communist rule in the Russian sphere, had repeatedly exasperated and infuriated this one-time critical defender of the Soviet Union. For

years he had denounced the Russian willingness to employ force against the Eastern bloc nations, and the unwillingness to accept needed change. The 1968 smashing of the Prague spring, the attempt to democratize Czechoslovakia, again demonstrated to Stone that Russia, like America, was ready to crush "rebellious nationalisms." The destruction of the drive to transform Czechoslovakia into a democratic socialist state, he wrote, deepened "the moral decline of the world communist movement" and heightened the acrimony that would eventually produce even more tumultuous change. To Stone, "the ideal of socialism" was being razed by its connection with intellectual oppression; Marx's successors were destroying his legacy. Not surprisingly then, the Polish Solidarity movement which flowered in 1980, received effusive praise from him. He again wrote that Rosa Luxembourg's prophetic warning against one party dictatorship could readily be applied to Eastern Europe. The Poles, as Solidarity demanded, required not only independent trade unions, but also an independent press and "a cleansing revolution" within the Communist Party. But pathetically, the Soviet denigration of the Polish movement as the handiwork of "imperialist intrigue," seemed strikingly like America's condemnation of the El Salvadoran uprising as a Communist conspiracy. By late 1981, Stone was extremely fearful of a Soviet move to demolish Poland's dissident movement.<sup>9</sup>



Russian and American attitudes toward nationalistic aspirations in their regions of influence, Stone believed, reflected imperialism and ethnocentricity. He sadly found that the state of Israel also displayed chauvinism. An uproar had developed in the intellectual community and among American Jewry over Stone's concern for the Palestinian refugees, and over his disapproval of developments within Israel. Despite his early high hopes that the Jewish nation would become a model democratic socialist state, Izzy admitted that he had quickly become disillusioned with Israel. Soon after its formation he had begun to sense that more idealism existed in America than in the new country. The American concept of "a nation of nations" provided a model for all, while Israel quickly became "narrow-minded." "Nationalism in the biblical dream of the light out of Zion and the law of Jerusalem" had been the ideal, he lamented. "It just hasn't turned out that way."<sup>10</sup>

Stone had long indicated that the 1948 Arab-Israeli war "was tragic" as "it was a struggle of right against right" and because a people became displaced by the fighting. The Jews had battled to prevent annihilation and to preserve the state of Israel, while the Arabs had attempted to prevent loss of their homeland and reduction to a "subordinate status." The resulting Arab refugees, Stone wrote in 1956, were "a moral millstone around our necks as a people." Resolution of this problem, he wrote, would "determine our future as a

people and Israel's future as a nation." He exclaimed that it would be inexcusable if the long-suffering Jews could not pity their Arab brethren. He eloquently warned that Jews were at a turning point in their history. In one direction were "greater militarization and chauvinism; greater hatred and fear of the Arabs," which would damage relations with Arabs and dark-skinned Jews even within Israel. Izzy cried: "We dare not treat the Arab as human dirt swept out of the land without dirtying ourselves." In 1957, he pointed out that "the refugee camps eat away the moral foundations of Zionism," and asserted that "as a military force, Israel must always be Lilliputian, only as a moral force, can it be great." By 1964, Stone believed that his fear of possible maltreatment of Arabs inside Israel's border had tragically been borne out, and that the attitude of the Jews had become one "of contemptuous superiority, even racism." Such a development was deeply disheartening. "For if Jews, after all their experience of suffering, prove no better once in the majority than the rest of mankind, what hope for a world as torn apart as ours is by tribalism and hate." Following the smashing Israeli victory in the 1967 war, Stone insisted that improved relations with the Arabs were imperative. He again charged that the alternative could well be a chauvinistic and militaristic Israel, the creation of a fearful nation which viewed every Arab within its borders "as a potential

Fifth Columnist." Thus, "the Arab problem was the No. 1 Jewish problem." He reiterated his belief that the way the Jews treated the Arabs would decide "what kind of people we become: either oppressors and racists in our turn like those from whom we have suffered, or a nobler race able to transcend the tribal xenophobia that afflicts mankind."<sup>11</sup>

Undoubtedly, his increased prominence as editor of the famed radical newsletter and as a frequent contributor to the highly influential New York Review of Books, partially explains the vehemence with which he now was denounced. And significantly, opposition to Israel's annexation of vast expanses of territory following the 1967 war was greater than any which had previously confronted the Jewish state and the Jewish community. Unquestionably, forthcoming attacks upon Stone for his criticism of Israeli policy and practices were embittered. No longer was he perceived as a faithful and important friend of Israel, nor as the former friend of the Haganah. In the Review of Books, which had printed an impassioned article by Stone on the Middle East, one letter questioned the journalist's fairness and truthfulness, while condemning his purported confusion and lack of thought. Commentary contained a pair of articles which accused Stone of "pseudo-history" and bemoaned the fact that he and other leftist critics demanded perfection from Israel. Midstream devoted three full essays to damning him and his supposed "disgraceful accusations" and refusal

to accept the right "of Israel to exist as a Jewish State." The most striking feature of the hostile comments was the evident ignorance of the fact that in the articles which induced the invectives, Stone was basically only repeating old warnings and chastisements.<sup>12</sup>

The feuding between Stone and a good number of his fellow Jews continued unabated throughout the late sixties and into the seventies as he repeatedly spoke of the tragedy of the Arab refugees and began to call for a separate Palestinian state. He undoubtedly antagonized many when he remarked that one must recognize that Palestinian guerrillas were duplicating actions undertaken by Jewish "terrorists and saboteurs" against the British. Stone proceeded to write that both major American political parties had effectively granted "a blank check for a hawkish Israeli policy," and had helped to rule out the refugee problem as a viable topic for public debate. And if an American author declared this to be so, Stone exhorted, he would be dismissed as an anti-Semite. In late 1974, while addressing a crowd at Temple Sinai in Washington, D. C., Izzy noted that he had not spoken in a synagogue for quite some time. When he had championed the Jewish refugees, Izzy bristled, he had been welcomed, but his support of the Arab homeless had dampened his popularity. He reminded his listeners: "Isaiah says, 'Israel shall be redeemed by justice!'" Izzy believed that this required justice for both Arabs and Jews.

A 1975 article by Stone in the New York Review of Books warned that "the lesson of the holocaust is that to treat other human beings as less than human can lead to the furnaces." The way to honor the dead is to see the Palestinian Arab as a displaced brother, not as an expendable." A number of letters again blasted Stone's assertions, which were said to kindle "anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic" elements in America and overseas.<sup>13</sup>

In 1978, Izzy reissued Underground to Palestine, adding two articles which discussed the disparagement of critical Jews and the adherents of "the other Zionism" who had called for protection of Arab rights in a binational Palestinian state. Yet another torrent of abuse was directed against Izzy. In a truly strident fashion, Marvin Maurer, a Dartmouth political scientist, assailed him in Midstream. Maurer surmised that Stone's celebration as "a voice of conscience and morality" was unfortunate because of the journalist's unsteady advocacy of humanitarian issues. Maurer declared that Stone was "a militant in the Marxist camp," whose analysis of the Middle East meshed with his long-time backing of Marxism-Leninism. Prior to the Khrushchev exposure of Stalinism in 1956, Maurer reported, Stone had considered Russia "in the forefront of world progress, a model for those aspiring to socialism." He further accused Stone of being "an open PLO-spokesman" who worked hard to vindicate "one of the world's most vicious murder machines" by

falsifying past Zionist history. This Midstream article ended with the observation that Stone wanted "Jews to find a place in the new socialist order. But until that millenium, and until the Zionist lust for power is wiped out, Stone remains the comrade of those who call openly for the massacre of all Jews in Israel."<sup>14</sup>

Clearly the professor had not done his homework. To term Stone a proponent of Leninism bespoke an inadequate understanding of both radical ideology and the journalist. To argue that Stone deemed the Soviet Union a socialist ideal as late as 1956 required an ignorance of Stone's writings since the late thirties. The signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact had immediately caused Stone to declare that the Russian state was discredited. He had long criticized Russia precisely because of its authoritarian nature, and had specifically stated that Stalinist and imperialist practices made the Soviet Union no fit socialist example. And to damn Stone as a proponent of the destruction of Israel and its Jewish citizenry also required blinders. Despite his repeated condemnations of Israeli behavior and his constant concern for the refugees, Stone had backed the Jewish state in all of its wars and had affirmed that Israel's right to exist was fundamental.

In spite of such an invective as the Maurer piece, Stone continued to urge reconciliation in the Middle East. He praised the Camp David accords, which called

for the return of Egyptian territory taken by Israel during the 1967 war, as the first step toward peace in the region, and as "a prime event of history." He lauded Menachem Begin, the deeply conservative Israeli prime minister for admitting that a Palestinian people existed, something "a Labor Socialist Zionist" like Golda Meir had refused to concede. Stone argued that the explosive issue of Palestinian terrorism would dissipate if the Palestinians were provided with their own state. All liberation movements employed terrorism, after all, but eventually moderated after obtaining their goals. As new Israeli settlements on the West Bank were constructed, however, Stone, writing in the Nation, sounded less hopeful. He asserted that "impossible conditions for peace" were being created. He again attacked Israel's policy on the West Bank which included dismissal of Arab mayors. He also remarked that turmoil was now occurring within Israel, and because it was not always easy to distinguish Middle Eastern Jews from Arabs, possibly the latter should don "special badges--perhaps--a yellow crescent. Just for identification, of course." Appalled by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, Stone signed a letter published in the Washington Post which condemned the "death and destruction" and "the inhuman assault upon the civilian population." In a New York Times editorial, Stone once again asked: "Can we Jews not recognize the image in our mirrors? Can we not respond to a kindred

people being made homeless once again, first in Palestine, now in Lebanon?"<sup>15</sup>

While such analyses would surely prolong his festering feud with many American Jews, Stone did not retreat. Earlier, he had analyzed his difficulties with his brethren. "I believe that any human being who tries to be a good human being will sooner or later get into trouble with his own tribe. Because you're a hero to them when you defend them against injury, but when you defend the others . . . then you're a bastard and everything else." However, Stone believed that unless Isaiah's message that "Zion . . . be redeemed by justice" were heeded, the crisis and tragedy of the Middle East would never be resolved.<sup>16</sup>

The xenophobia which Stone spotted in Israel's dealings with the Palestinians, in America's relations with the Third World, and in Russia's approach toward Eastern Europe, seemed to be matched by a world-wide upsurge of fundamentalism. Stone condemned the emergence of the Moral Majority in America, a right-wing religiously-oriented group that desired to order the nation's politics, and he damned the appearance of fundamentalist movements abroad. He charged that around the globe, many desired to return "to the security of religious dogma, to the womb of a faith" which provided all the answers for its unthinking followers. All the advances humankind had made because of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and



the Enlightenment were imperiled by this scourge of fundamentalism which fed "human ethnic bigotry and inter-human struggle."<sup>17</sup>

Holding bigots in contempt and repressive societies in disdain, Stone had always considered the fight for freedom of the mind and more democratized nations to be the fundamental goal of the modern era. Upon closing down the Weekly, he had determined to produce an extensive work on freedom of thought and freedom of expression. He particularly desired to elaborate on the major chore of the present era: the melding of socialism and personal freedom, for "socialism without freedom is monstrous." While continuing his journalistic craft into his seventh decade, therefore, Izzy embarked upon a second career. In fact, he took up the role of academic, a position he had rejected almost half a century earlier.<sup>18</sup>

Izzy began by researching the major English revolutions of the seventeenth century, which involved attacks against absolute monarchical power, greatly influenced developments in America, and produced Milton's Areopagitica, "the most eloquent defense of freedom of the press ever written." After a year of such study, he decided that it was necessary to trace the Reformation, the Renaissance, and the medieval antecedents of both. Then he concluded that he could not truly comprehend the middle ages without analyzing the classical era, particularly ancient Greece, where he believed, freedom of speech and expression

had originated. Izzy originally intended to make a brief search of secondary sources. But upon learning that no adequate standard works existed and that precise political and philosophical inferences could not be obtained from translations, he began to relearn Greek and Latin so that he might read the classics in the original languages.<sup>19</sup>

A good portion of his research was done at nearby American University in Washington, D. C., where he daily made a five mile excursion to and from the library on foot. Discovered while studying in the library, this "recycled freshman" was named a distinguished scholar in residence and given an office in the Department of Literature. Soon, Izzy was translating a number of poems for the New York Review of Books and writing essays on Socrates and Plato for the New York Times Magazine and Harper's.<sup>20</sup>

In a 1978 self-interview in the New York Times Magazine, Stone provided some insight into the staunch commitment to freedom demonstrated by his editorials of the past sixty years and by his recent exploration of classical libertarian roots. He reiterated earlier affirmations that a society which did not allow for freedom of speech was not a good one, regardless of material benefits. Not surprisingly, he termed himself "an old-fashioned liberal," whose heroes were John Milton and Thomas Jefferson. "The only absolute value" he would uphold involved freedom of the mind, which he considered essential for social justice.

Such freedom, however, was now endangered by "the enormous power that new technologies of surveillance, indoctrination and mobilization have given the state in our time," and by the failure to achieve a union of Marx and Jefferson. The technological advances provided the means for the almost instantaneous appearance of a fascist state. The absence of a Marx-Jefferson linkage allowed the transformation of Communism into "the greatest prison of the mind the world has ever seen, far more oppressive than the so-called Dark Ages of medieval Europe." Still, Stone wrote that in his more optimistic moments he felt that man, especially creative man, possessed an innate "desire to speak truly, to create freshly, to explore the human condition honestly." This was a universal quality, which even appeared in undemocratic states which had never experienced widespread intellectual liberty, as was evidenced by the emergence of Eurocommunism.<sup>21</sup>

Notwithstanding his own difficulties and the nation's recurrent witchhunts, Stone praised the United States for sharing with Athens the longest tradition of freedom of thought. In America, he wrote, dissenters possessed the greatest protections. In America, freedom of the press, naturally so dear to Stone, was most "fundamentally . . . a part of a secular national ideology." The Bill of Rights granted journalists a status in this land unequalled in England or continental Europe.<sup>22</sup>

As the Reagan era began, however, he began to fear

a resurgence of repression, and warned that even America did not allow sufficient freedom of the press and that popular discourse was too frequently limited to the "center and center-right." Anything suggesting "socialism or government ownership or public planning or social planning" received "short shrift." Journalists who called for major transformations in the economic order were forced to write for "peripheral" magazines such as the Nation or the Progressive, or for even smaller publications. The United States remained the sole major industrialized nation without a strong socialist movement, and America still exuded that "secular religion about free enterprise" which blinded its people.<sup>23</sup>

Stone's related concerns for personal freedom and socialism continued to dominate his thinking as the eighties began. In 1981, he affirmed that he had always been a radical and a Marxist, and that the anarchist-Communist Kropotkin and the socialist master Marx remained idols. Admittedly, the unfolding of events in the so-called socialist states had helped to dampen a once ardent faith that abolition of private property would usher in better societies. Thus Stone now stated that he was "half a Jeffersonian" and "half a socialist," and that he was not as sure about socialism as before, although more certain of his Jeffersonian ties than ever. Yet such a declaration only confirmed the journalist's longtime belief that individual liberty was the most important ingredient of

any decent society, and that its absence would result in the degeneration of a party, a people, a nation. And he retained his conviction that greater planning was necessary in the Western societies and that mixed economies were the wave of the future. Thus, the merger of Jefferson and Marx remained the most vital quest of the era.<sup>24</sup>

Stone's continued condemnation of repression, ethnocentricity, and imperialism in all guises caused his stature as a "journalistic patriarch" to grow throughout the period of his semi-retirement. His increased respectability resulted in large praise of a documentary film about him, further applause from the establishment media, the receipt of several honorary degrees, appointment as a visiting professor at a number of universities, more journalistic awards, and his readmission to the fold of the "respectable" press. In discussing a collection of Weekly articles, one reviewer termed the journal "increasingly legendary." A young Canadian filmmaker, Jerry Bruck, Jr., shot footage for that documentary on Stone, from 1970-1973. I. F. Stone's Weekly received critical acclaim and was presented at the Cannes Film Festival in 1974, where Izzy became "the great star" of the gathering. The Chicago Tribune, in the same year, indicated that Izzy was "America's latest folk hero." The December 1978 issue of the Saturday Review contained a special segment on contemporary heroes, including pieces on former Chief Justice Earl Warren, broadcaster Walter Cronkite,

heavyweight boxing champion Muhammed Ali, sex researchers William Masters and Virginia Johnson, architect-philosopher R. Buckminster Fuller, and the iconoclastic journalist. In its "Style" section, the Washington Post ran a lengthy article on the celebration of Izzy and Esther Stone's fiftieth wedding anniversary. In June 1981 the National Press Club readmitted its maverick son and selected him as guest speaker at an awards luncheon. As irascible as ever, Izzy recalled the Hastie incident which had prompted his resignation. "This town was full of such cowards," he told a sometimes squirming crowd. Later in the year, he appeared as a featured guest on the Tom Snyder and Dick Cavett shows, and Sixty Minutes included a story on him. The one-time blacklisted journalist, now began to syndicate his own column damning the new administration's domestic and foreign policies in such papers as the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Chicago Tribune. In 1982, regular "Izzy" columns condemning chauvinism, militarism, and economic greed began appearing in the Nation, for which he had worked so many years before. Thus, the "retired" journalist remained committed to attacking injustices of all sorts.<sup>25</sup>

## FOOTNOTES

### CHAPTER VII

<sup>1</sup>Elizabeth Drew, Washington Journal: The Events of 1973-1974 (New York: Random House, Inc., 1975); See J. Anthony Lukas, Nightmare: The Underside of the Nixon Years (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1976) for a general study of the repressive aspects of the Nixon administration; Stone, "Impeachment," Review 20 (June 28, 1973): 12, 17, 19; Stone, "Why Nixon Fears to Resign," Review 20 (November 29, 1973): 16.

<sup>2</sup>Stone, "America's Greatest Subversive."

<sup>3</sup>Stone, "Agnew's Successor: What Nixon Fears," Review 20 (November 1, 1973): 37; Stone, "The Fix," Review 21 (October 3, 1974): 7; Leo Rangell, The Mind of Watergate: An Explanation of the Compromise of Integrity (New York: W. W. Morrow & Company, 1980).

<sup>4</sup>Stone, "Conned in Cambodia," Review 22 (June 12, 1975): 16-18.

<sup>5</sup>Michael Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Stone, "A Shah Lobby Next?," Review 26 (February 22, 1979): 29.

<sup>6</sup>The finest collection of articles on the El Salvadorean civil war is El Salvador: Central America in the New Cold War, ed. Marvin E. Gettleman, et al. (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1981); "Echoes of Vietnam: Celebrities Want U.S. Out of El Salvador," The Los Angeles Times, 15 March 1981, Part I, p. 4; Stone, "Celebrating Too Soon," The Nation 234 (April 10, 1982).

<sup>7</sup>Stone, "A Compress for Al Haig's Brow," The Chicago Tribune, 2 April 1981, sect. 3, p. 4.

<sup>8</sup>Bryce Nelson, "Former Pariah of Journalism Now Viewed as Patriarch," The Los Angeles Times, 25 June 1981, Part I-B, p. 4; Stone, "Won't Listen, Can't Hear," The Nation (April 10, 1982): 419; Stone, "U.S. Budget Suffers from Arms Race Shellshock," The Chicago Tribune, 15 March 1981, Sect. 2, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup>Ivan Svitak, The Czechoslovak Experiment, 1968-1969 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton:

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<sup>10</sup> Interview, 16 October 1981.

<sup>11</sup> Stone, "The Road to Peace Lies Through the Arab Refugee Camps . . . ," Weekly 4 (April 30, 1956): 2-3; Stone, "The Really Urgent Task for Israel's Tenth Anniversary Year," Weekly 5 (October 7, 1957): 4; Stone, "An Affluent Society But Living Beyond Its Means," Weekly 12 (June 1, 1964): 2-3; Stone, "Holy War," Review 9 (August 3, 1967): 6, 8-14.

<sup>12</sup> Robert Alter and Amos Perlmutter, letter, Review 9 (September 28, 1967): 37; Alter, "Israel and the Intellectuals," Commentary 44 (October, 1967): 49-51; Martin Peretz, "The American Left and Israel," Commentary 44 (November, 1967): 30-33; Maïe Syrkin, "I. F. Stone Reconsiders Israel," Midstream 13 (October, 1967): 3-13; Joel Carmichael, "I. F. Stone Reconsiders," pp. 13-15; Lionel Abel, "I. F. Stone Reconsiders," pp. 15-17.

<sup>13</sup> Jay Mathews, "Jews Hear Argument for Palestinian State," The Washington Post, 11 November 1974, pp. 1, 4; Stone, "The Need for Double Vision in the Middle East," Weekly 17 (January 13, 1969): 2; Stone, "Where Was Nixon When Sadat Gave the Russians the Boot?," Review 19 (August 31, 1972): 11; Stone, "On Justice for the Palestinians," Temple Sinai, Washington, D. C., printed in The Progressive 39 (January 1975): 20-21; Stone, "War for Oil?," Review 22 (February 6, 1975): 10; Otto Nathan, letter, Review 22 (March 6, 1975): 31-32; Fred M. Gottheil, letter, Review 22 (March 6, 1975): 32; Michael Blankfort, letter, Review 22 (March 6, 1975): 32-33.

<sup>14</sup> Stone, Underground; Stone, "Confessions of a Jewish Dissident: Attitudes on the Middle East," Review 25 (March 9, 1978): 11-12; Stone, "The Other Zionism: Accommodating Jew and Arab in Palestine," Harper's 257 (September, 1978): 65-72; Marvin Maurer, "I. F. Stone--Universalist," Midstream 25 (February, 1979): 3-12.

<sup>15</sup> Stone, "The Hope," Review 25 (October 26, 1978): 11; Larry van Dyne, "The Adventures of I. F. Stone: An Iconoclastic Journalist's Progress from the Jewish Underground to the Joys of Greek," The Chronicle Review, 5 February 1979, pp. 4-6; Stone, "the Darkness Out of Begin's Zion,"



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<sup>16</sup>Interview, 16 October 1981.

<sup>17</sup>Sarah Cardin, "The Many-Faceted Stone," In These Times, 25 February-3 March 1981, p. 8.

<sup>18</sup>Stone, "Izzy on Izzy," p. 12; Stone, "Notes on Closing;" Meyer, "The Rolling Stone," p. 930; Interview, 15 October 1981.

<sup>19</sup>Interview, 15 October 1981; Stewart McBride, "I. F. Stone: Rumpled Revolutionary in Ancient Greece," The Christian Science Monitor, 21 May 1981, p. B3.

<sup>20</sup>Interview, 15 October 1981; Interview, 16 October 1981; Stone, "Izzy on Izzy," p. 15; McBride, "I. F. Stone," p. 24; Stone, "I. F. Stone Breaks the Socrates Story," The New York Times Magazine, 8 April 1979, Sect. 6, pp. 22-23, 26, 34, 37, 67-68; Stone, "Plato's Ideal Bedlam," Harper's 262 (January, 1981): 66-71; Stone, trans., "From the Greek," Review 26 (February 22, 1979): 10.

<sup>21</sup>Stone, "Izzy on Izzy," pp. 13, 15, 55; Uncloaking the CIA, pp. 145-265; Morton H. Halperin, et al., The Lawless State: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies (New York: Penguin Books, 1976, pp. 61-236; Communism in Eastern Europe, eds. Teresa Rakowska and Andrew Gregory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979); Wolfgang Leonhard, Eurocommunism: Challenge for East and West (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978); The Politics of Eurocommunism: Socialism in Transition, eds. Carl Boggs and David Plotke (Boston: South End Press, 1980); Carl Marzani, The Promise of Eurocommunism (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1980); In search of Eurocommunism, The Ideological and Political-Theoretical Foundations, ed. George Schwab (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981).

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Cardin, "The Many-Faceted," p. 8.

<sup>24</sup>Telephone interview with Stone, May 1981; Nelson, "Former Pariah," p. 4.

<sup>25</sup>Nelson, "Former Pariah," p. 4; Albert H. Johnston, "I. F. Stone Reader," Publisher's Weekly 204 (July 2, 1973): 75; Bruck, "I. F. Stone's Weekly;" Robert Mazzocco, "Dancing on the Titanic," Review 21 (February 7, 1974): 18-19; Bernard Weiner, n.t., Film Quarterly 27 (Winter 1973-74): 61; Penelope Gilliatt, "The Current Cinema: Record of a Rascal Hunter," The New Yorker 50 (April 22, 1974): 135-36; Michael Kernan, "Rare, Sparkling 'Stone,'" The Washington Post, 3 October 1973, p. B1, B6; Vincent Canby, "'I. F. Stone's Weekly' Is a Film Delight," The New York Times, 9 October 1973, p. 52; Gene Siskel, "Watching Izzy Watching Washington," The Chicago Tribune, 12 April 1974, Section 2, p. 6; Eliot Fremont-Smith, "I. F. Stone: His Own Pygmalion," Columbia Journalism Review 12 (January-February 1974): 21, 23; David A. Sohn, "The Film," Media and Methods 13 (December 1976): 45; Canby, "New Cannes Film Festival Star: I. F. Stone," The New York Times, 23 May 1974, p. 58; Neal, "Journalistic Radical," p. 8; "A Special Section," The Saturday Review 61 (December, 1978): 29; Sigma Delta Chi annual dinner, The National Press Club, Washington, D. C., June 6, 1975; Thomas W. Lippmann, "Journalists Hail Stone: The Master Muckraker Rejoins the Press Club," The Washington Post, 19 June 1981, p. C1; Francis X. Clines, "About Washington: The Press Club Re-admits an Angry Young Man, 73," The New York Times, 20 June 1981, p. 9; Nelson, "Former Pariah," p. 4.

## CHAPTER VIII

### I. F. STONE AND THE AMERICAN LEFT

I'm a lifelong radical and a Marxist.

I. F. Stone

To be whole a man has to serve a greater cause. A man is like a horse. A horse has to draw a wagon to really grow to his whole potential. He cannot live for himself alone. He has to serve others and society and his conception of the good and just. But he has to be free to do it in his own way. To think and to speak.

I. F. Stone

I. F. Stone's place as a preeminent figure in American radical ranks appears secure. Arguably the greatest journalist of his era, Stone has employed his pen and voice to support many of the nation's great left-oriented movements during the post-World War I era. Indeed, in certain ways, his career provides a microcosm of the American left during that span. As a young man and budding journalist, he participated in efforts to revive reformism and radicalism during the 1920s, backing the Progressive Party candidacy of Robert La Follette and the Socialist Party bid of Norman Thomas. Thomas, in Stone's eyes, fortunately spoke in a nonsectarian,

non-dogmatic fashion, and was therefore able to produce a mild socialist resurgence. Throughout the 1930s, in the leading liberal newspaper, the New York Post, and in the top left-liberal journals, the New Republic and the Nation, Stone backed the major reform and radical movements of the day, the New Deal and the Popular Front. The New Deal, which he believed was aided by "a wonderful assortment of liberals, radicals, and idealists," was evidently viewed by Stone as a Popular-front type of government, which worked to aid the impoverished, prevent corporate dominance, and assist labor in its battle with capital. Still, he repeatedly challenged Rooseveltian policies from the left, urging deeper changes in the socio-economic structure of the nation and calling for movement toward democratic socialism. He also believed that an alliance of liberals and leftists was necessary to brake the tide of right-wing totalitarianism. As for many left-of-center, Stone's Popular Front vision crumbled and his favorable image of Russia disintegrated following the Nazi-Soviet pact. Never again would Stone and many of his contemporaries declare that the Soviet Union, notwithstanding its absolutism, was "the scene of the greatest social experiment of our time." But the Popular Front ideal remained strong, and Stone was somewhat relieved by German incursions into Soviet soil which allowed for eventual formation of the Grand Alliance.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of that wartime U.S.-U.S.S.R. tie, an anti-Russian and anti-Communist strain remained potent. In the Nation, and in the experimental left-wing dailies, PM, the New York Star, and the New York Daily Compass, Stone argued that a crusade against "red fascism" must not prevail, or efforts to liberalize the international order and the American nation would prove futile. Thus he supported Henry Wallace's Progressive Party drive, the final attempt to sustain the old Popular Front. The poor performance of the Wallace campaign and the demise of the independent radical newspapers demonstrated the increasing impotency of the left. In the early fifties, Stone's role as a founder of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee and his establishment of a four-page newsletter as the McCarthy fire raged, placed him in the camp of a small group of dedicated leftists and civil libertarians who remained true to both radical and liberal ideals, despite prevailing political winds. The plight of an already famous newsman reduced to putting out a tiny newsletter for a sparse audience, further indicated the shattered state of the left during the decade. Even during this nadir for the left, Stone retained his critical perspective, recognizing that the wounds of many American radicals were in part self-inflicted, owing to the narrow-minded, authoritarian, and sectarian practices of the Communist Party and its link with Stalinism. He further warned that the good

name of socialism was being dirtied by the heavy paw of the Russian bear in Eastern Europe.

While serving in many ways as a conscience for the left and for America, Stone evolved from the lonely figure of the Eisenhower era to status as a respectable elder by the end of the following decade. Early attuned to the new political ferment, he had reported on the civil rights and anti-nuclear campaigns of the fifties. As those stirrings evolved into the mass movements of the sixties, Stone chronicled the resurgent dissidence, and his increased popularity and respectability paralleled that of the left during the Vietnam years. A participant in the fifties' anti-nuclear gatherings, he now backed the leading New Left organization, SDS, and traveled around the country attacking American practices in South America and Southeast Asia. Consequently, Stone, unlike most members of the Old Left, successfully bridged the gap with the young rebels of a later generation. Indeed, his committed journalism provided a model for the underground papers which so proliferated during the 1960s. But despite sharing the outrage of the New Leftists over racism, economic exploitation, militarism, and imperialism, he early cautioned about infantile left tendencies toward vanguardism and revolutionary posturing. Holding firm to his radical critiques as the New Left national movements dissipated, Stone a decade later was once

again extolling an antiwar drive against American interventionism.

While Stone's career serves as a lens through which to view the recent American left, his ideological development more specifically parallels the passage undertaken by democratic socialists, both at home and in Western Europe, at least until the period of his quasi-retirement. After an atypical youthful flirtation with anarcho-communism, he found attractive the brand of democratic socialism offered by Thomas and the American socialists, who called for social welfare measures and the eventual public ownership of the means of production and distribution. Economic collapse and fascist aggression caused Stone and many other non-sectarian radicals to undergo changes in their thinking. Because of the enormity of these challenges, Stone supported the efforts by social democrats overseas and by New Dealers at home to reform and restructure capitalist economies. The failure of the German Social Democrats to bring about needed changes in the direction of socialism and their unwillingness to fight diligently for democracy, had appalled him. The movement by Scandinavian social democrats to create welfare states, on the other hand, he applauded. He also backed Roosevelt's actions to transform the American economy, but favored a more systematic approach comparable to that taken by the Swedes, urging Keynesian ideas earlier than did the famed British economist, a degree of planning, and

greater state intervention concerning general financial and monetary practices. The need for wartime mobilization resulted in exhortations by Stone and other democratic socialists for more comprehensive planning. When World War II ended, they considered extensive planning essential to produce full employment and consistent growth, and to lead their states toward eventual transformation of capitalist economic orders. During the postwar era, the earlier socialist emphasis upon the need for nationalization and the abolition of private property lessened. Some began to consider the reforms made by the prosperous Western countries to be sufficient; others such as Stone lost their once firm convictions, because of developments within the Soviet bloc nations, that "socialization" of property would necessarily result in human betterment. Yet they continued to perceive socialism as an ideal that would bring greater equality and liberation.<sup>2</sup>

Because of such a non-doctrinaire approach, Stone was able to attain a position as a fixture on the American democratic left, one paralleled by only a few, including pacifist idol A. J. Muste, Nation editor Carey McWilliams, the ACLU's Roger Baldwin, and Socialist Party leader Norman Thomas. All shared a commitment to both radical and liberal ideals, despite occasional wanderings to disillusioned or sectarian paths. Generally they eschewed sectarianism, dogmatism, and rigid adherence to Marxism as a new religion or moral opiate, factors which caused



so many to depart the left spectrum. They refused to damn liberal political traditions and often desired to combine the finest qualities of liberalism and socialism to produce the good society. Particularly after the Nazi-Soviet agreement, they recognized that no blue print, not even those purportedly etched by the socialist masters, could guide humankind toward the promised land.

Because he disavowed doctrinal hair-splitting and ideological millennialism, Stone suffered nothing approaching a non-Communist Kronstadt which caused him to renounce socialism and radicalism, and begin a sharp drift to the right. Additionally, he avoided the paradoxes which have afflicted so many on the left. For Stone, there never existed any choice--at least for the Western nations--between socialism and democracy, Marxism and Leninism, peaceful evolution and revolution. Socialism without democracy never seemed to him to provide a reasonable alternative to the old liberal order. On the contrary, Stone has consistently argued that the good society demands freedom, and not just freedom for a self-appointed elite. Consequently, he has declared that radicals must strive to preserve the best of liberalism, especially its invocation of civil liberties and political opposition. He has recognized that such political freedom in turn, is threatened by massive economic inequities which can only debase the impoverished, reduce the efficacy of formal political rights, and induce class antagonisms. Inevitably

then, he believes, a merger of Marx and Jefferson remains the fundamental task for modern man. But until such a coalescence is possible, valued political rights are not to be lightly discarded in the quest for a distant utopia. And a conspiratorial design to overturn existing Western institutions will not help to bring about the good society promised by both Kropotkin and Marx. Furthermore, means and ends are inextricably intertwined, and erection of the good society will not likely occur through authoritarian practices. Rather as Marx recognized so long ago, gradual movement toward the good society can best take place in a land such as America with its liberal base.

The attempt by Western progressives such as Stone to encourage radical change in democratic capitalist nations has been hindered by these paradoxes and by numerous other factors long noted by scholars and activists. Repression emanating from governmental and private sources, ethnic and racial divisions, the attraction of bourgeois amenities, cultural hegemony, development of the welfare state, sectarianism and dogmatism in radical ranks, Communist Party obeisance to the Soviet Union, and the failure of the state apparatus in the so-called socialist nations to "wither away," have all helped to weaken the appeal of both the revolutionary and the radical, but non-revolutionary left in America. Two additional elements, directly tied to the left, have crippled its advancement. For too long, the distorted version of "socialism"

existing in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and various Third World countries, has provided an albatross for the left. While the Russian experiment as the world's first socialist state early thrilled both liberals and radicals, most progressives soon recognized that the socialist millenium was not emerging in the Soviet Union. Yet despite rapid disillusionment with developments in that far away tragic land, particularly following Stalin's ascendancy to power, many leftists continued to believe that the U.S.S.R. must be supported as it seemed to promise economic democracy, a necessary ingredient in the drive toward heightened freedom. Owing to this desire to "protect" the lone socialist state and because of the need for an anti-fascist alliance, too many on the left, including many generally astute individuals, remained uncritical, at least openly, of Communist practices for far too long. Even today, excuses are made concerning the absence of political democracy in the "socialist" states by many who would never justify such dictatorial practices in right-wing, capitalistically-inclined societies. Such a double standard only feeds accusations that leftists condemn absolutism only on the right, that their adherence to civil liberties is incomplete or even insincere. This is tragic indeed, for the most potent attractions of socialism remain its promises of increased freedom, equality, and brotherhood.

Additionally, the failure of certain radical groups

to insist upon the retention and expansion of political liberty as an inseparable aspect of socialism has not surprisingly diluted the appeal of radicalism in the West. The attraction of Leninism for certain sectors on the left has resulted in the invoking of revolution as a panacea for all, the exhorting of revolution in non-revolutionary situations, and a wider gap between the general populaces and the would-be revolutionaries. To expect the holders of political liberties to discard those rights to a vanguard party in return for a promised, but undated millenium, is both absurd and antagonistic to the critical spirit of the Marxist progenitors.

By the early 1980s, however, most Western progressives seem more desirous than ever of avoiding the ills which have plagued the left in the past as they affirm that socialism and democracy must be linked. In Western Europe, democratic socialists argue that movement beyond the welfare state must be made, while declaring that democracy in both the economic and political arenas is essential. Eurocommunists in several European nations have discarded the Leninist orientation of Stalinist Communist parties, and appear to be aping social democratic models. American progressives through such new publications as Democracy, In These Times, Working Papers for a New Society, and Democratic Left, and such old standbys as the Nation and the Progressive, and in various bodies including the New American Movement and

the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee (now merged as the Democratic Socialists of America), have also reaffirmed the need to expand democracy in all spheres. Possibly the most striking legacy from the New Left of the 1960s has been the extolling of participatory democracy in groups ranging from the west coast-based Campaign for Economic Democracy to the national Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN).

Still, questions remain for the democractic socialists. Are socialism and democracy mutually antagonistic? That is, can Stone's hoped for merger of Marx and Jefferson really take place? Can a peaceful road to socialism, beyond the welfare state variety, unfold? Will the Communist behemoth or the capitalist powerhouse allow such a society to evolve, and not repeat the tales of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Chile, and Jamaica?\* How can a socialist state avoid the dangers of overbearing governmental control which results in bureaucratization, ossification, loss of initiative, and most tragically, diminution of political freedom?

Possibly as I. F. Stone indicated in a recent interview, the quests of Western radicals, whether in favor of democratic socialism or in opposition to militarism, stunted economic growth, and the dehumanization of humankind that has occurred in the name of "socialism" or "democracy," will ultimately prove futile. Yet he for one continues to feel that such endeavors have been

\* Frequently of course, even attempts to enact welfare states as in the cases of Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, are quashed.

inherently valuable, that in one sense, the only battles worth waging are those one is destined to lose. Furthermore, he asserts that the left has achieved considerable accomplishments during his lifetime. American radicals have helped to unionize oppressed laborers; to provide social welfare protection against capitalistically-bred injustices; to curb discriminatory practices; to challenge hardline Cold War policies, including the Vietnam War; and to uncover the excesses of the nation's intelligence agencies, an unprecedented feat. Perhaps the story of the American left, which nevertheless still so often appears futile, was most aptly summed up by a friend of the radical journalist who once told him: "Izzy, what you do is like pissing against a boulder. It doesn't seem to make a difference, but eventually, the rock begins to wear away."<sup>3</sup>

## FOOTNOTES

### CHAPTER VIII

<sup>1</sup>Stone, "In Memoriam," Weekly 5 (May 13, 1957): 4.

<sup>2</sup>For an exceptional analysis of the changes discussed here, see Richard Lowenthal, "The Postwar Transformation of European Social Democracy," in Democratic Socialism: The Mass Left in Advance Industrial Societies, ed. Bodgan Denitch (Montclair: Allanheld, Osmund Co., Publishers Inc., 1981): 20-35. Also helpful were Leslie Derfler's Socialism Since Marx: A Century of the European Left (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), pp. 135-200; Michael Harrington's "Eurosocialism: An Overview," in Eurosocialism and America: Political Economy for the 1980s, ed. Nancy Lieber (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982): 5-21; and Denitch's "Prospects and Dilemmas of the Socialist Left in Europe," in Democratic Socialism, pp. 1-19.

<sup>3</sup>Interview with Stone, 15 October 1981.

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The most valuable resource materials for this study were I. F. Stone's voluminous writings and a series of interviews with the journalist during 1981. The interviews, two conducted with Stone in Washington, D. C. and two conducted over the telephone, provided invaluable information about his formative years, his lengthy career, and his intellectual perspectives. Especially helpful were Stone's reminiscences concerning his early attraction to radicalism, the appeal of the Popular Front for a stalwart democratic socialist, and the anti-anti-Communist fervor of a few leftists during the early Cold War years. His careful documenting of his journalistic passage unveiled new biographical data.

Unfortunately, there is no public repository containing an archival collection on Stone. Thus private correspondence concerning him was generally unavailable. Also, an attempt to obtain the F.B.I. files on Stone through the Freedom of Information Act proved unsuccessful.

Nevertheless, the interviews and his published works, which span a sixty year period, formed a solid base for an analysis of his ideas and actions. Only a smattering of signed articles, in addition to the three issues of



his own publication, The Progress (1922), appeared in the several newspapers for which Stone worked prior to his move to New York City in late 1933. A reading of the editorial page of the Philadelphia Record, where Izzy served as chief editorial writer from 1931-1933, remained fruitful in attempting to understand the young journalist's reaction to the onset of the Great Depression. A single American Mercury (1934) piece damned inadequate liberal responses to the economic ailments of the nation. To uncover his views on the economic woes of depression-era America, the New Deal, the threat of fascism, and the Popular Front, Stone's editorials for the New York Post (1933-1939), the New Republic (1934-1938), and the Nation (1935-1939) were valuable. Of the Post writings, the most useful were those which spanned December 1933-May 1934, a period in which Stone essayed the entire editorial page. A study of the Post over the course of his tenure on the paper remained illuminating, as did a reading of Press Time: A Book of Post Classics (New York: Books, Inc., 1936) which contained a series of editorials written by Stone and Samuel Grafton. A pair of lengthy critiques in the Southern Review in late 1938 and early 1939 unveiled certain changes in Stone's thought and contained thoroughful avowals that a merger of democracy and socialism was essential, and that revolutionary exhortations might only result in the dislocations on which fascism thrived. An extensive article produced

in August 1939 for the Institute of Propaganda Analysis which covered the anti-labor Associated Farmers, displayed his fear of native reaction. Stone's prolific work on the Nation (1940-1945) and the independent, left-wing newspaper PM (1940-1945), demonstrated his growing support for mobilization and his firm desire that World War II be successfully waged, both abroad and at home, as an anti-fascist effort.

Early Cold War fears of domestic red-baiting and an expansive anti-Communist crusade were clearly evident in Stone's post-war work for the Nation (1945-1949), the New Republic (1949), PM (1945-1948), the New York Star (1948-1949), and the Post (1949). His column in the New York Daily Compass (1949-1952) displayed his analysis of the Cold War antagonisms of the period following the crucial election of 1948. The premier receptacle of later Stone writings is of course I. F. Stone's Weekly (1953-1971), which covered the era of flourishing McCarthysim and belligerent Cold Warriorism, a decimated left, Third World encounters including the Vietnam War, and the resurgent movements of the 1960s.

During the time of the Southeast Asian conflict, Stone also began his long relationship with the New York Review of Books (1964-1979), where he published lengthy articles on politics, the military machine, the arms race, and the Soviet Union. As the seventies unfolded, he wrote essays for many leading liberal and

"establishment" publications, including the Progressive, the Washington Post, Harper's, the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, and once again, the Nation. These recent writings repeated his condemnation of big power mendacity, ethnocentrism, and Hoover-styled economics. The 1978 New York Times Magazine article, "Izzy on Izzy: I. F. Stone Interviews I. F. Stone," best allowed for an understanding of the journalist's current thinking.

There are several excellent collections of Stone's writings, culled mainly from the Nation, PM, the Star, the Daily Compass, the Weekly, and the New York Review of Books. These include The Truman Era (New York: Random House, Inc., 1952), The Haunted Fifties (New York: Random House, Inc., 1963), In A Time of Torment (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967), Polemics and Prophecies (New York: Random House, Inc., 1971), and The I. F. Stone's Weekly Reader (New York: Random House, Inc., 1973). Yet only a careful reading of all of Stone's articles and editorials allows for a full understanding of his ideas.

Stone's monographs, The Court Never Disposes (New York: Covici, Friede, Publishers, 1937), Business as Usual (New York: Modern Age Books, Inc., 1941), Underground to Palestine (New York: Boni & Gaer, 1946; New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), This Is Israel (New York: Boni & Gaer, Inc., 1948), The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952), and

The Killings at Kent State (New York: Random House, Inc., 1971) are detailed analyses of problems which deeply concerned him: corporate dominance of the legal system; big business control of the World War II mobilization effort; the plight of the remnants of Hitler's Jewish victims; the establishment of a state to protect those refugees from fascism; American support for an unpopular, reactionary regime; and the cover-up of repression undertaken against student dissidents.

Printed copies of Stone addresses also provided insights into his analyses of controversial subjects. His talk on the American invasion of the Dominican Republic at the massive Berkeley teach-in during the spring of 1965 was published in We Accuse (Berkeley: Diablo Press, 1965), a collection of the major speeches at the gathering. A small segment of Stone's attack on "the Establishment" at the 1972 journalism counter-convention was recorded in MORE (1972). A rare oration at a synagogue which urged greater sympathy for Arab refugees was printed in part in the Progressive (1975).

Audiovisual materials were particularly illuminating. The Library of Congress contains a series of interviews with leading personalities of the 1940s, conducted by the "Meet the Press" radio and television programs on which Stone served as a panelist. These tapes provided fascinating glimpses of Cold War America. After listening to the grillings of Robert Kenny, former California

Attorney General and a lawyer for the Hollywood Ten; Senator Glen Taylor, Progressive Party vice-presidential candidate; and Yugoslav Ambassador Sava N. Kosanovitch, one understands more fully why Stone felt that his was a voice crying into the wilderness. The inanity of the questions posed by the other press members remains truly astonishing and frightening. Excellent, and quite useful for those unfamiliar with Stone's work and career, was the Jerry Bruck Jr. documentary, I. F. Stone's Weekly (1973). A series of tape-recorded speeches and interviews on such subjects as Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, the Vietnam War, corporate malpractices, and government secrecy, demonstrated the intellectual depth, the moral vision, and the passion of Stone. Equally helpful in this regard were Stone appearances on such programs as "Over Easy," Dick Cavett, "Tomorrow," and "Sixty Minutes."

Other primary materials which aided this study included Stone's remembrance in "Books That Changed Our Mind" (New Republic, 1938); the pro-Soviet letter signed by Stone and some 400 other individuals, "To All Active Supporters of Democracy and Peace" (Nation, 1939), which was absolutely crucial for an understanding of the depth of Popular Frontism and anti-fascism, and perhaps, as an example of blinders on the eyes of the left--it sadly appeared in print just as the Germans and Russians inked their infamous non-aggression pact; the anti-Semitic

attacks on Izzy by John Rankin (Congressional Record, 1943); Ogden Reid Jr.'s "Red Underground" column which abounded in the absurdities which afflicted the American right during the zenith of the Cold War (New York Herald Tribune, 1951-1952); the Daily Worker (1946-1956), especially the attacks on non-Stalinist leftists and the three part critique by Alan Max of the Daily Compass's support for Adlai Stevenson in the 1952 presidential campaign; the National Guardian, particularly the advertisements for the Weekly in late 1952 and the 1965 condemnation of the newsletter's analysis of the budding anti-Vietnam War movement; the Socialist Party papers which included letters written to Stone over a two-decade period (1945-1967); the Earl Browder papers which contained correspondence to the defrocked Communist Party chief by Stone who befriended the aging radical, thereby demonstrating his willingness to challenge Cold War norms; the SDS papers which abounded in references to Izzy and the Weekly; and a letter by former SDS president Todd Gitlin, which analyzed Stone's influence on the New Left.

Memoirs by former associates and by participants on the left provided information on Stone. "The Reminiscence of J. David Stern" (Columbia University Oral History Project, 1972) recorded the precocity of young Izzy and the later rift between the publisher and his protege. National Guardian editor James Aronson in Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenge to Press, TV and Radio (Indianapolis:

Bobbs-Merrill, 1972) discussed Stone's advocacy of the American Newspaper Guild, and briefly related the circumstances surrounding the drive to unionize the pressroom. Stern's Memoirs of a Maverick Publisher (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1962) related both the liberal tilt of the New York Post following his purchase of the paper in late 1933, and the shift away from the Popular Front ideal by the late 1930s. Iconoclastic journalist George Seldes in Lords of the Press (New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1938) examined the early Popular Front approach of the Post and the anger felt by many staff members as the newspaper began to air an anti-Soviet line toward the end of the decade. Former leader of the Communist party youth branch and later New York Post editor James Wechsler in The Age of Suspicion (New York: Random House, Inc., 1953), and ex-Daily Worker editor Louis Budenz in The Cry Is Peace (Chicago: Henry Regency Company, 1952), derided Stone's acceptance of the Popular Front and respectively denounced him as an apologist for the party and a Stalinsit. The American Inquisition, 1945-1960 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973) by Aronson's cohort on the Guardian, Cedric Belfrage noted Stone's opposition to the ACLU ouster of CP member Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. James Kutcher's The Case of the Legless Veteran (New York: Monad Press, 1973), with its title borrowed from a Stone editorial, charted the reporter's readiness during the early Cold War to defend the civil liberties of small, ostracized groups from both

a witch-hunting government and a heresy-seeking Communist Party. Aronson and Belfrage's Something to Guard: The Stormy Life of the National Guardian, 1948-1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978) indicated that Stone's increasing disgust with domestic red-baiting induced him to set up shop in Europe. One-time Communist Party leader George Charney, in A Long Journey (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), praised Stone as an individual who "stood alone in the welter of politics, without organizational ties, and persisted in his individual endeavor to fight for sanity in a world obsessed with the Cold War." Charney also remembered one sharp and significant confrontation between Izzy and V. J. Jerome, the "cultural commissar" of American Communism. Jerome approached Izzy about the possibility of garnering liberal backing for the Smith Act defendants. Quietly but emphatically Stone responded by reminding Jerome of the Communists' "arrogant, derogatory attitudes over the years toward liberals, even those of Marxist sympathies." For Charney, this "was a brief encounter, but devastating. The episode suddenly revealed the awful disarray we had caused in liberal and radical circles and the rankling bitterness and suspicion that now existed." Charney continued: "and this came from Stone, a man who continued to speak at every opportunity in our defense." The Autobiography of Carey McWilliams (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979) recalled Stone's anti-anti-Communist stance and his participation in the formation of



the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.

Of the numerous secondary works which aided this study, particularly useful for uncovering various stages in Stone's career were Daniel Aaron's Writers on the Left (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961) which briefly discussed the attempt by outraged leftists to form an independent, non-Stalinist organization after the announcement of the shattering Nazi-Soviet agreement; Curtis D. MacDougall's three volume Gideon's Army (New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1965) which stated that the Progressive party favored usage of articles by PM's Stone and Jennings Perry and the Post's Ted Thackery, in its attempts to elicit support for the Wallace cause; Einstein on Peace (New York: Schocken Books, 1968) which contained a notation that the great scientist, Thomas Mann, Thomas Emerson, Robert S. Lynd, Carey McWilliams, Linus Pauling, and Stone were among those who protested moves to punish the attorneys for the Smith Act defendants; and Victor S. Navasky's Naming Names (New York: Viking Press, 1980) which quoted Stone's answer to a solicitation by Dashiel Hammett for the journalist to speak at a rally for V. J. Jerome.

VJ is a hell of a nice guy personally but politically he has tried to ride herd of the intellectuals in a way most offensive to anyone who believes in intellectual and cultural freedom, as has New Masses, often in most humiliating ways--as in the belly-crawl forced some years ago on Albert Maltz. I'd feel like a stultified ass to speak at a meeting for Jerome without making my own sharp differences with the desultory, dogmatic, talmudic, and dictatorial

mentality he represents. I intend to go on defending him as a Smith Act victim but I can't pretend he's a libertarian, so I'd better get away.

Eric Bentley in Thirty Years of Treason: Excerpts From Hearings Before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1938-1968 (New York: Viking Press, 1971) credited Stone with terming the exhortation to intellectuals to battle inquisitional congressional committees, "the Einstein Pledge." Several books acknowledged Stone's role in influencing and aiding the New Left. James Weinstein's Ambiguous Legacy: The Left in American Politics (New York: New View Points, 1975), Kirkpatrick Sale's SDS (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), and Fred Halstead's Out Now: A Participant's Account of the American Movement Against the Vietnam War (New York: Monad Press, 1978) all stated that Izzy helped to focus SDS's attention upon the Southeast Asian war. These works also discussed Stone's participation at the first great rally in April 1965, protesting the Vietnam conflict. Thomas Powers' The War at Home: Vietnam and the American People, 1964-1968 (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973) indicated that the Weekly and especially Stone's "A Reply to the White Paper" provided an intellectual base for antiwar activities.

Richard Nigro's dissertation "The Limits of Vision: I. F. Stone--Reluctant Progressive" (University of

Minnesota, 1980) is the first full-length study of Stone, and was helpful in providing useful biographical information on the early thirties. Significantly, however, Nigro's analysis appeared to me to be interesting, but wrong-headed. His thesis is that Stone is at best "a reluctant progressive," definitely not an authentic radical. Certainly Stone has never been a revolutionary, but the Nigro premise that he also is no radical is refuted by Izzy's own professions and by a thorough examination of his writings and actions. Furthermore, one need not fly to the barricades, undertake putsches, or back Leninist parties to possess a radical perspective. Western radicals, at least those of the democratic socialist variety, analyze structural problems, and are supportive of efforts to correct resulting inequities and to work toward establishment of a more just and equitable, social, economic, and political order. One must recognize that the determination of Stone and like-minded individuals to retain the fruits of political liberalism while urging movement toward democratization of the economic sphere, does not diminish their claim to be radicals in the West.

Also, Nigro's argument that Stone suffered ideological fissures which threatened even his purported "progressive" stance, is, I believe, simply incorrect. Despite certain alterations, Stone has remained remarkably consistent in his thinking, and has never really questioned the appropriateness of democratic socialism for the Western nations.

While Stone, like so many of his compatriots on the left has been shaken, angered, exasperated, and even disillusioned by so many of the developments that have afflicted twentieth century Western radicals, his non-sectarian, non-dogmatic approach has enabled him to retain a life-long vision of a joining to Marx and Jefferson.

Shorter pieces on Stone are numerous. The most complete articles which cover the broadest expanse of Stone's career are the following: Kent MacDougall's "Gadfly on the Left" (Wall Street Journal, 1970), Karl E. Meyer's "The Rolling Stone" (New Statesman, 1972), Andrew Kopkind's "The Importance of Being Izzy" (Ramparts, 1974), Derek Shearer's "Izzy Stone" (In These Times, 1978), Stuart McBride's "I. F. Stone" (Christian Science Monitor, 1981), and Henry Weinstein's "A Salute to the Elder Statesman of Radical Journalism" (Los Angeles Times, 1981). Other good general analyses are the introductions to his books written by Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman (The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1952), Robert Alter (The Truman Era, 1972 edition), James Neuman (The Haunted Fifties, 1963), Murray Kempton (In a Time of Torment, 1967), and Neil Middleton (The I. F. Stone's Weekly Reader, 1973). Two fine essays focused upon crucial phases of Stone's career. Norman Kaner's "I. F. Stone and the Korean War" (Cold War Critics, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971) was a careful study of Izzy's analysis of that Asian fight. Donald Murphy's "I. F. Stone's Weekly" (The American

Radical Press, 1880-1960 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974) provided a solid overview of the newsletter. Vital biographical data was provided by Christopher Lydon's "I. F. Stone to Suspend 19-Year-Old Leftist Biweekly," (New York Times, 1971), Steve Neal's "Journalistic Radical Attains Folk-Hero Status" (Chicago Tribune, 1974), and Myra MacPherson's "Gathering No Moss: The I. F. Stones Marking 50, Still Going Like Sixty" (Washington Post, 1979).

Of the numerous interviews conducted with Stone, in addition to those already mentioned, the following were most fruitful: Israel Shenker's "I. F. Stone: Gadfly Likes People and Sometimes Angers Readers" (New York Times, 1968), "One-Man Newspaper: The American Journalist I. F. Stone: A Conversation with Joan Bakewell" (The Listener, 1968), Charles Fager's "With Atheists Like Him, Who Needs Believers: An Interview with I. F. Stone" (The Christian Century, 1970), "The Old New Lefty" (Time, 1971), Susanna McBee's "Washington's Venerable Rebel" (McCall's, 1971), "Izzy Slows Down" (Newsweek, 1971), "End of the Stone Age" (Time, 1971), John Neary's "I. F. Stone Retires to a Tough New Job" (Life, 1972), Larry van Dyne's "The Adventures of I. F. Stone: An Iconoclastic Journalist's Progress from the Jewish Underground to the Joys of Greek" (The Chronicle Review, 1979), and Sarah Cardin's "The Many-Faceted Stone: I. F. Stone Talks About the Coming Reagan Years" (In These Times, 1981).

Also helpful were the many and generally highly favorable reviews of Stone's books. The most eloquent was Henry Steele Commager's essay, "Common Sense" (New York Review of Books, 1968), which placed Stone the polemicist in the company of William Lloyd Garrison, Theodore Parker, Upton Sinclair, and A. J. Muste. Among the other laudatory reviews, the most thoughtful or provocative included Lewis Corey's "Monopoly and Defense" (Nation, 1941), Bartley C. Crum's "Escape From Europe" (Nation, 1947), Meyer Berger's "Living Nightmare" (New York Times Book Review, 1947), Philip S. Bernstein's "Birth of a Nation" (Nation, 1949), Art Preis's "A Trotskyist Defends New I. F. Stone Book: In Defense of I. F. Stone and His Korean War Book" (Daily Compass, 1952), reevaluations of The Hidden History by Bernhardt J. Hurwood and Stephen E. Ambrose (Saturday Review and Baltimore Sun respectively, 1969), Gerald W. Johnson's "Gadflying with I. F. Stone" (New Republic, 1963), Emile Capoya's "The Move Toward Immobility" (Saturday Review, 1963), Stuart W. Little's "One Man in Time" (Saturday Review, 1968), Robert H. Zieger's analysis of In a Time of Torment (The Social Studies, 1968), Alex Campbell's "Stone's Throw" (New Republic, 1968), Patrick MacFadden's "More Than Stone Can Bear" (Nation, 1968), Christopher Serpell's "Stone's Moss" (The Listener, 1968), a pair of critiques in the Times Literary Supplement (1968), Kenneth Alsop's "America, America!" (Punch, 1968),

Robert Sherrill's "Washington's Exquisitely Unforgiving Reporter" (Commonwealth, 1968), Ronald Steel's "Eternal Hostility to Bunk" (Book World, 1968) and his "American Crusade" (Imperialists and Other Heroes (New York: Random House, 1971)); Little's "Heavyweight Stone" (Saturday Review, 1971), Jean M. Halloran's study of Polemics and Prophecies (Harper's, 1971), Laurence Stern's "Advocates and Patsies" (Washington Post, 1971), Johnson's "Hard-working Gadfly" (New Republic, 1971), Donald G. Shockley's "Fact Finder and Truth Seeker" (The Christian Century, 1971), Stephen S. Rosenfeld's "If Only the Pen Were Mightier Than the Sword" (Book World, 1971), Elizabeth Drew's report on Polemics and The Killings at Kent State (New York Times Book Review, 1971), Alan Rudrum's "Burning and Killing" (The Listener, 1971), a Times Literary Supplement article on The Best of I. F. Stone's Weekly (1973), Corinne Browne's "Song Sung by a Pro" (New Republic, 1973), Benjamin DeMott's "Alone in Cover-Up Country" (Atlantic, 1973), Christopher Hitchens' "Promised Land" (New Statesman, 1979), and Fawaz Turki's "Retrieving the Other Zionism" (Nation, 1979).

An opposite interpretation of Stone's work was evidenced in the following reviews: Michael Straight's "A Fictive Report" (New Republic, 1952), which condemned the Hidden History as "tendentious, unreasoned dissent"; Richard Rovere's "History in the Stone Age: Hidden 'Facts' and Fiction of the War in Korea" (New York Post, 1952),

which damned Stone as an apologist for the Communist line; Quincy Howe's "Do-It-Yourself Journalism" (Book Week, 1963), which argued that the journalist invariably contradicted himself; and Michael Useem's "Armchair Revolutionary" (National Review, 1971), which deemed him disingenuous, hypocritical, and dangerous.

Anger over Stone's recent articles on the Middle East has resulted in a near publishing explosion. Following his challenge to Israeli policies in the aftermath of the 1967 war, the triad of Marie Syrkin, Joel Carmichael, and Lionel Abel authored "I. F. Stone Reconsiders Israel" (Midstream, 1967), which blasted its subject's reported dishonesty, fabrications, "disgraceful" accusations, and unbalanced reports. Robert Alter's "Israel and the Intellectuals" and Martin Peretz's "The American Left and Israel" (Commentary, 1967) continued the attack, challenging Stone's "pseudo-history" and "discriminating" studies. Several of these writers argued that the left demands an unrealistic perfectionism from the state of Israel, a charge also made by James A. Michener and Amos Perlmutter (New York Review of Books, 1967). After Stone once again questioned Israeli actions after the 1973 conflict, Otto Nathan and Fred M. Gottheil blasted his analyses. Only his old friend, the writer Michael Blankfort seemed able to present a reasoned critique (New York Review of Books, 1975). Following the inclusion of "Confessions of a Jewish Dissident" (1978) and "The



Other Zionism" (1978) in a reprinted edition of Underground to Palestine, Syrkin again wondered about Stone's comparison of the plight of Jewish and Arab refugees (New Republic, 1979), and Marvin Mauer presented a truly astonishing invective, "I. F. Stone: Universalist" (Midstream, 1979). Absolutely worthless as a guide to Stone's ideas, Maurer's analysis of the journalist as an advocate of "Marxist-Leninism," "a militant in the Marxist camp," "an open PLO spokesman," and "the comrade of those who call openly for the massacre of all Jews in Israel," is illuminating as an example of the ire which Izzy has managed to stir up in his opponents.

To understand the radical zeitgeist of the Stone years demands a familiarity, however incomplete, with the extensive literature on the left. The three finest general histories of the twentieth-century American left are John Diggins's The American Left in the Twentieth Century (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), James Weinstein's Ambiguous Legacy (1975), and Milton Cantor's The Divided Left: American Radicalism, 1900-1975 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978). Diggins' stylistically molded work is strongest on "the lyrical left," the cultural radicals of the pre-World War I period, the radical split following the war and the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Old Left of the 1930s, including the attraction of Communism for depression-era intellectuals, and the disintegrating effects on left-wing unity of the

Spanish Civil War, the Moscow Trials, and the Nazi-Soviet pact. Weinstein's study, written by the present editor of the independent socialist weekly In These Times, provided a systematic analysis of the ebb and flow of the American left. He argued that the left, after the demise of the Debsian Socialist Party, failed to emphasize openly the issue of socialism. Cantor's book analyzed the perceived no-win situation of American radicals. If they merged with reformers, they diluted the socialist appeal and veiled the socialist message. If they opted for revolution, they emerged as futile vanguardists in a non-revolutionary situation. Bernard K. Johnpoll's The Impossible Dream: The Rise and Demise of the American Left (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981) provided an even broader overview of American radical and reform movements, covering a period of a century and a half. Johnpoll concluded that true socialism is unattainable, and is yet another myth "that 'Thy will could' be done on earth as it is in heaven." Still, he credited radicals with helping to reform and humanize the American social and economic order. Lawrence Lader's excellent Power on the Left: American Radical Movements Since 1946 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1979), focused upon post-World War II reform and radical drives. Written by a former Progressive Party congressional candidate and a one-time aide for Representative Vito Marcantonio, Power on the Left offered the best general study covering a limited

period, and is especially strong on the Wallace candidacy, the anti-Communist crusade, the collapse of the Communist Party, and the various strains of the insurgencies of the sixties. Lader discussed the necessity of leftist-liberal collaboration, while examining what he perceived to be the failings of the American left. Above all else, he remarked, the left must recognize the need "to fuse democratic values and a socialist vision of society into a uniquely American unity."

Even for a work that focuses upon a later period, one necessarily must have a foundation in the development of early twentieth century American radicalism. Still the best study of the major leftist group of the pre-World War I period is David Shannon's The Socialist Party of America: A History (New York: Macmillan Company, 1955). Shannon discussed the splits between the Haywood and Hillquit-Berger wings in 1912, the "right-wing" and "left-wing" Socialists during the war, and the adherents and antagonists of a Bolshevik road to power in the U.S. Shannon obviously favored the Milwaukee-type socialists, as did Sally Miller in Victor Berger and the Promise of Constructive Socialism (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973). Ira Kipnis in The American Socialist Movement, 1897-1913 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952) and James Weinstein in The Decline of American Socialism, 1912-1925 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967) were more appreciative of the more radical party members,

particularly the Haywood-guided Wobbly types. Kipnis damned the party's more conservative faction, blaming it for the 1912 ouster of Haywood and the radicals, while Weinstein challenged the longheld assumption that the Socialist Party peaked in that year with the Debs presidential campaign and the electoral triumph of hundreds of party officials. Weinstein reported that the antiwar stance of the Socialist Party during World War I broadened its appeal, and that government and business-led repression and divisions concerning the applicability of the Bolshevik experiment for American radicals, weakened the first great twentieth century left-wing movement. The idea that repression crushed the radical movement was shared by Melvyn Dubofsky, in his eloquent study, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World (New York: Quadrangle, 1969). Dubofsky argued that the Wobblies' ability to garner increasing support among the American subproletariat, similar to the Socialist Party's augmented popularity at the ballot box, caused the Wilson administration and anti-radical and anti-union businessmen to foment repression against the left. Dubofsky wrote that the Wobblies, like the subjects of Lawrence Goodwyn's Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976) and James Green's Grass Roots Socialism: Radical Movements in the Southwest, 1895-1943 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), were practioniers of rank-and-file or participatory

democracy and community action who formulated the idealized notion of a cooperative society in response to the growing terrors brought about by modernization.

The idea that repression played a major role in crushing this first large-scale twentieth century American left-wing movement was a dominant theme in William Preston's Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) and Paul L. Murphy's World War I and the Origins of Civil Liberties in the United States (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1979). The excellent Aliens and Dissenters, like Dubofsky's work, discussed the I.W.W. challenge to the capitalist order and ensuing measures taken to crush this radical lumpenproletariat force. Murphy's study, and the earlier Opponents of War, 1917-1918 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957) by H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, documented countless cases of legal and illegal moves against dissidents.

The drive to suppress radicals was also a topic of many illuminating biographies of leading pre-1920 rebels. These included Ray Ginger's praiseworthy The Bending Cross, A Biography of Eugene Victor Debs (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1949) which discussed the incarceration of the Socialist martyr for antiwar activity and his eloquent response on behalf of the downtrodden everywhere, Robert Rosenstone's beautifully written

Romantic Revolutionary: A Biography of John Reed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1975) which related the movement into the Communist ranks by one of the lyrical leftists and his harassment by the U.S. government, William O'Neill's The Last Romantic: A Life of Max Eastman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) which traced the strong antiwar stand of one of Reed's colleagues on the ill-fated Masses, Sally Miller's Victor Berger which discussed the Wisconsin Congressman who was twice prevented from rightfully taking his seat in Washington, D. C., Richard Drinnon's Rebel in Paradise: A Biography of Emma Goldman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961) which uncovered the drive to deport America's leading anarchist, and Joseph Conlin's Big Bill Haywood and the Radical Union Movement (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1969) which reported on the leading Wobbly, who fled an American jail to wind up as an unhappy guest in the new Bolshevik state.

War and repression thus crippled the left, and also caused many former reformers to shift leftward, to take stands against militarism which coupled with their support for social change, would place them at the forefront of American radicalism for decades to come. As Roland Marchand's The Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), Charles Chatfield's For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1973), and Charles DeBenedetti's Origins of the

Modern American Peace Movement, 1915-1929 (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO Press, 1978) and The Peace Reform in American History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980) indicated, the war divided the peace movement, resulting in one branch becoming more cognizant of societal ills and more desirous of effectuating large transformations in the existing order. Among those participating in this leftward peace shift were three figures who would serve as dominant figures in American radical and reform ranks. Their stories are best recounted in W. A. Swanberg's Norman Thomas: The Last Idealist (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), Jo Ann Ooiman Robinson's Abraham Went Out: A Biography of A. J. Muste (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981) and Peggy Lamson's Roger Baldwin: Founder of the American Civil Liberties Union (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976). Thomas soon headed the Socialist Party, Muste became the nation's leading peace activist, and Baldwin helped to establish the American Civil Liberties Union.

While the Thomas-Muste-Baldwin radical-reformers helped to keep alive domestic dissent through the dormant twenties, the Communist revolution in Russia both strengthened and weakened the attraction of the left for many Americans. The Bolshevik success furthered divisions among the socialists, who battled over the appropriateness of Leninism and revolutionary tactics for the United States. The early story of American Communism is recorded in Irving Howe and Lewis Coser's The American Communist Party:

A Critical History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publisher, 1962), and in Theodore Draper's The Roots of American Communism (New York: Viking Press, 1957) and American Communism and Soviet Russia, the Formative Period (New York: Viking Press, 1960). These works related the evolution of American Communism from left-wing socialism and syndicalism, the early divisions of the would-be revolutionaries, the Bolshevik vision and influence, the establishment of the Comintern, and the Russian dominance which resulted in infantile-leftism, united front tactics, and the eventual Stalinization of the American party. The Howe-Coser and Draper studies analyzed the devolution from the independence stance of such early American Communists as John Reed, Louis Fraina, and Max Eastman, to the sycophancy demonstrated by later party leaders.

The already prevalent obeisance and vacillations of the Communist Party and the sharp reduction of Socialist Party adherents resulted in a vacuum on the American left. As noted in the text, non-sectarian liberals and radicals combined to form the Conference for Progressive Political Action in 1922 and later backed the presidential bid of Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette. A too-frequently neglected study, Kenneth Campbell McKay's The Progressive Movement of 1924 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), provided a thoughtful analysis of the La Follette effort, which it deemed the initial



formal tie between organized labor, the socialists, and farmers.

The failure to form a permanent national farmer-labor party and the death of La Follette, once again seemed to close off political alternatives for the American voters. Consequently, as Swanberg noted, intellectuals, radicals, and reformers responded with some enthusiasm to the 1928 presidential challenge of Norman Thomas. Thomas managed to produce a minor, and short-lived resurgence in the fortunes of the Socialist party.

The true catalysts for the rebirth of the American left, however, were the Great Depression which afflicted capitalist economies worldwide and the upsurge of fascist aggression. With the plummeting of the western economic orders, the sole socialist state appeared more and more attractive for many. Lee Elihu Lowenfish's "American Radicals and Soviet Russia, 1917-1940" (University of Wisconsin dissertation, 1968) related the image of the Communist experiment "as a model for planning, socialism and industrialization." Richard H. Pells' Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the Depression Years (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973) also discussed the idealization of Russia as a model progressive state which served as an alternative to "democratic capitalism" and "the dying American Dream."

Furthermore, Pells related the attractiveness of socialism and its emphasis upon community and cooperation,

to intellectuals whose own land was suffering the seemingly inevitable effects of destructive individualism and competition. The ultimate purpose of the critical intelligentsia was to help to usher in "a genuine political and cultural revolution that would transform the lives of every American." Concerned about both the economic and psychological costs resulting from depressed capitalism and the failed American Dream, many proposed movement from the capitalist system to one emphasizing planning and production-for-use. Finally, they desired to construct a new order as just an initial stage in the formation of "a new man."

In America, the major recipients of this ideological shift and the revitalization of reformism and radicalism proved to be FDR's New Deal administration, the Communist Party, and Popular Front organizations. Many on the left, including an oftentimes critical I. F. Stone, backed Roosevelt, while other attacked the New Deal as a reformist facade for the corporatizing of America. Perspectives on leftward critiques of the Roosevelt programs appeared in William E. Leuchtenburg's Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1963), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s series The Age of Roosevelt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957, 1958, 1960), James MacGregor Burns' Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), Donald R. McCoy's Angry Voices: Left-of-Center Politics in the New

Deal Era (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1958), and George Wolfskill and John Hudson's All But the People: Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Critics, 1933-1939 (Toronto: Macmillan Company, 1969). Leuchtenburg declared that the New Deal comprised a "revolution" through its establishment of a social welfare base and its expansion of government intervention in the economy. Schlesinger suggested that the first New Deal in particular challenged the concept of laissez-faire and moved in the direction of planning, developments long advocated by the left.

Several chroniclers of the thirties argued that the rise of popular insurgency caused a Roosevelt shift leftward in the middle of his first term. Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward's Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977) traced the unemployed workers' and industrial workers' movements which induced jobs programs, unemployment insurance, and measures designed to further collective bargaining. Three mass movement leaders who challenged New Deal tenets and heightened concern for the plight of destitute, were discussed in Alan Brinkley's Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982) and Abraham Holtzman's The Townsend Movement: A Political Study (New York: Bookman Associates, 1963). A local movement with national import, the End Poverty in California campaign, was discussed in Leon Harris's Upton Sinclair: American Rebel

(New York: Crowell, 1975).

The major American radical organization during these hard times was of course the Communist Party. The party's role in fighting for civil rights and unionization, its shift to an alliance with liberal forces during the Popular Front phase, and its link with the one socialist nation, resulted in a large increase in membership and considerable influence in intellectual and labor circles. The Howe and Coser work provided a caustic analysis of Communist Party actions throughout this period, one that was challenged by Roger Keeran's The Communist Party and the Auto Workers Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980) and Harvey A. Levenstein's Communism, Anticommunism, and the CIO (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981). Unlike Hower and Coser, Keeran emphasized the constructive nature of Communist actions in organizing the mass production industries, arguing that the party union activists did not blindly follow Soviet policy. Additionally, Keeran believes that the CP maintained a revolutionary thrust throughout the 1935-1939 period. Levenstein also refused to condemn Communist practices, while Bert Cochran in Labor and Communism: The Conflict That Shaped American Unions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977) presented a more critical appraisal of the party's union activities.

The attractions of the Communist Party during the thirties were related in Jessica Mitford's A Fine Old

Conflict (New York: Vintage Boosk, 1978), Vivian Gornick's The Romance of American Communism (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), Nell Irwin Painter's The Narrative of Hosea Hudson: His Life as a Negro Communist in the South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), Al Richmond's A Long View From the Left: Memoirs of an American Revolutionary (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1972), Charney's A Long Journey, Bruce Cook's Dalton Trumbo (New York: Charles A. Scribner's Sons, 1977), David King Dunaway's How Can I Keep From Singing: Pete Seeger (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981), Joe Klein's Woody Guthrie: A Life (1980), John Gates's The Story of an American Communist (New York: Thomas Nelson, 1958), Steve Nelson's Steve Nelson: American Radical (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), and Len De Caux's Labor Radical: From the Wobblies to the CIO (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970). These accounts explained the Communist appeal for native Americans and immigrants, Jews and gentiles, the rich and the poor, urban and rural folk, laborers and professionals, intellectuals and folk artists, red diaper babies and the children of conservative households. One study, Daniel Aaron's graceful Writers on the Left, focused upon the attraction of Communism to certain radical literary figures.

These radicals, their comrades, and many others left-of-center gladly participated in the Popular Front which broadened the appeal of Communism and helped to

revive the American left. A number of works have criticized the Popular Front and its adherents. Eugene Lyons damningly titled the period in The Red Decade: The Classic Work on Communism in America During the Thirties (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1941). Notwithstanding his obvious and often strident biases, Lyons' work remains useful in charting various actions by American reformers and radicals. James Williams Crowl's Angels in Stalin's Paradise: Western Reporters in Soviet Russia, 1917 to 1937, a Case Study of Louis Fischer and Walter Duranty (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1982) questioned the professionalism of two Popular Front journalists. Crowl argued that Fischer and Duranty, in order to remain in good graces with Soviet authorities, purposefully falsified their Soviet chronicles. Paul Hollander's Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba 1928-1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1981) declared that Russian officials veiled the true horrors of their oppressive state, but also indicated that the millennial search for political religion blinded the visitors to the Communist "utopia." David Caute's The Fellow-Travellers: A Postscript to the Enlightenment (New York: Macmillan Company, 1973) charged that Western intellectuals overlooked or made light of repression which would have horrified them had it occurred elsewhere.

Caute wrote that the fellow-travellers glorified the Soviet state because of disillusionment with their own nations which had failed to live up to the professed ideals of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." Instead, poverty, unemployment, grave maldistribution of wealth, unequal opportunity, exploitation, and imperialism continued unabated. Thus, the concept of "progress-by-evolution" was shattered. Consequently, the fellow-travellers searched desperately for a new road to change. Particularly after 1928, with the establishment of the Five-Year Plans, that path seemed to be hewn by the Soviets. Richard Pells's Radical Visions stated that the threat of fascism and war propelled formation of the Popular Front. The result however, Pells believed, was not "a fulfillment of but a retreat from the creative ferment and radical possibilities of the early 1930s," an argument also made by Staughton Lynd in "The United Front in America: A Note" (1974). Pells charged that "the passionate anti-fascism of the Popular Front only succeeded in paralyzing the Left long before the real guns shattered what remained of the decade's radical dreams." Pell's study and Frank A. Warren's Liberals and Communism: The 'Red Decade' Revisited (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966) provided the most comprehensive analyses of the Popular Front. As Warren recorded, the onset of the Great Depression in the capitalist nations which contrasted so sharply with the economic advances of the Soviet Union, and the fear of both domestic and

international fascism caused many left-of-center to consider Communists as potential progressive allies, to view Russia in a favorable light, and to urge formation of a united anti-fascist front. Yet Warren indicated that the Popular Front "liberals" too frequently adopted a double standard in regard to civil liberties in the Soviet Union, and frequently failed to retain their critical perspective. These developments occurred as "the Popular Front mind could not tolerate ambiguity; it did not understand 'critical support.'" Still, Warren acknowledged the complexity of the Popular Front, declaring that on all major issues of the period "there were at least two and usually three differing attitudes." Warren also related the cataclysmic events which weakened and then broke the Popular Front: Communist Party actions in the Spanish Civil War, the Moscow trials, and the Nazi-Soviet pact.

Matthew Josephson's Infidel in the Temple: A Memoir of the Nineteen-Thirties (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967) and Malcolm Cowley's The Dream of the Golden Mountains: Remembering the 1930s (New York: Viking Press, 1980) provided insights concerning the lure that the Popular Front held for radical, non-Communist intellectuals.

The disillusionment, disdain, and disgust which followed declaration of the German-Russian accord and the collapse of the Popular Front, were discussed in Norman Holmes Pearson's "The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the



End of a Dream" (1952), Norman Markowitz's "A View From the Left: From the Popular Front to Cold War Liberalism" (1974), Pells' Radical Visions, Caute's Fellow-Travellers, and Warren's Liberals and Communism. These studies noted the shattering effects of the agreement on leftist-liberal unity and on the American Communist Party. Eric Hobsbawm in The Revolutionaries (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973) attempted to explain the Communist response to the pact through a far different appraisal than the one usually presented by scholars.

There is something heroic about the British and French Communist Parties in September 1939. Nationalism, political calculation, even common sense, pulled one way, yet they unhesitatingly chose to put the interests of the international movement first. As it happens, they were tragically and absurdly wrong. But their error, or rather that of the Soviet line of the moment, and the politically absurd assumption in Moscow that a given international situation implied the same reactions by very differently situated parties, should not lead us to ridicule the spirit of their action. This is how the socialists of Europe should have acted in 1914 and did not in carrying out the decisions of their International. This is how the Communists did act when another world war broke out. It was not their fault that the International should have told them to do something else.

Unlike the Communist Party, other American radical organizations experienced disappointing growth prior to August 1939. Warren's An Alternative Vision: The Socialist Party of the 1930s (Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 1974) chronicled the failure of Norman Thomas's compatriots to attract broader support during a time of capitalistic failing. While most historians have condemned the party for failing to adapt to the exigencies of the period and for refusing to join the Popular Front, Warren argued that the socialists behaved correctly. He stated that the Socialist Party retained its radical stance, thereby presenting an alternative to New Deal reform and Stalinist Communism. Constance Ashton Myers' The Prophet's Army: Trotskyists in America, 1928-1941 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977) discussed a small, militant organization whose members believed that a centralized, Bolshevik structure was required to produce revolutionary transformation in America. Despite certain successes in union work, the Trotskyists possessed little appeal for the American public.

The German attack on the Soviet Union and subsequent formation of the Grand Alliance allowed the American Communist Party to temporarily recoup some of the ground lost by the left following the Nazi-Soviet agreement. In Which Side Were You On?: The American Communist Party During the Second World War (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1982), Maurice Isserman wrote that the Browder-guided organization appeared "to be moving toward a more realistic appraisal of their position in American life." He continued: "Their failure to do so had an immense impact on the future of American radicalism

and much can be learned from their experience."

Isserman's comment was appropos as the CP shift leftward in response to a new Moscow line and the emergence of the Cold War, caused visions of a postwar leftist u surge to dissipate. Both developments only quickened the movement of many prewar liberals and radicals into an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist camp. For a good number of these progressives or former progressives, the wartime tie with the Russians had been fragile at best, or even an evil to be discarded once the Nazi threat was quashed. Markowitz's "A View From the Left" and Robert Clayton Pierce's "Liberals and the Cold War: Union for Democratic Action and Americans for Democratic Action, 1940-1949" (University of Wisconsin dissertation, 1979) related the growing hostility, one which abetted the Cold War atmosphere, destroyed the remaining vestiges of Popular Frontism, and severely damaged the American left. The Moscow trials, left-wing strife within the labor unions, and the Nazi-Soviet accord had already disposed more and more Americans to view the Soviet system as "red fascism." (See Leslie Kirby Adler's "The Red Image: American Attitudes Towards Communism in the Cold War Era" (University of California at Berkeley dissertation, 1970).)

The increasing tendency to view all left-of-center criticism of U.S. domestic and foreign policies as "red-inspired" helped to crush Henry Wallace's 1948

presidential bid, the leading left-oriented organizational effort of the immediate postwar period. The tale of the Progressive party drive was lucidly charted by Curtis MacDougall in Gideon's Army (New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1965) and by Markowitz in The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry R. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941-1948 (New York: The Free Press, 1973). Both asserted that public association of the Wallace candidacy with the Communists doomed the former vice-president to a shattering defeat.

Many historians have agreed that the weak Wallace showing both reflected and exacerbated the demise of the left. The deepening Cold War, the disappearance of the Rooseveltian atmosphere, and Communist Party mistakes resulted in a diminution of progressive strength to a shell of the Popular Front era. Several excellent studies emphasized the anti-radical crusade which prevailed during this period. The broadest work, David Caute's near encyclopedic The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), recorded a litany of actions undertaken against leftists and even liberals in public employment, the military, the state department, the United Nations, unions, education, journalism, libraries, the sciences, the media, and the arts. The devastating attack against the leading radical organization was documented by Caute and was fully examined in Michael R. Belknap's

Cold War Political Justice: The Smith Act, the Communist Party, and American Civil Liberties (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977). As the title of the Cate book indicated, he agreed with the thesis propounded by Athan Theoharis' Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1977), that the anti-Communist phobia did not suddenly sprout with the demagoguery of Joseph McCarthy. The current editor of the Nation, Victor S. Navasky in Naming Names, carefully studied the effects of the red scare in one highly publicized arena, the Hollywood film community. Navasky vividly recorded the remembrances of those who did and of those who did not acquiesce to legislative interrogation. The autobiographical The Education of Carey McWilliams included equally penetrating glimpses of the human costs of the postwar witch hunt. Robert Griffith's The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970) wove the tale of the nation's number one red-hunter. Mary Sperling McAuliffe's Crisis on the Left: Cold War Politics and American Liberals, 1947-1954 (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978) discussed the role of purported progressives in the worsening domestic Cold War.

The post-World War II red scare effectively decimated the American Communist Party. As noted before, the party contributed to its own demise. After benefitting so

greatly from the Grand Alliance and the revised Popular Front of the wartime years, the American Communists faced the shock of another Moscow-directed leftward tilt as the Cold War evolved. The tale of the party's deterioration was recorded by Joseph R. Starobin in American Communism in Crisis, 1943-1957 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) and by David A. Shannon in The Decline of American Communism: A History of the Communist Party of the United States Since 1945 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959).

Starobin challenged the notion that the American party followed direct orders from the Soviet Union. Rather, he indicated that a "mental Comintern" influenced Communist practices. Shannon charged that obeisance to the U.S.S.R. was surely the single most important factor leading to the dissolution of the American Communist Party: "The revolution does indeed devour the children it has borne and nursed and never weaned."

The remaining vestiges of the Old Left suffered additional, and ultimately fatal blows with the Khrushchev revelation of Stalinist terrors and Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt. These two developments produced the Kronstadts which caused many to leave the Communist Party and denounce the socialist homeland. Vivian Gornick's The Romance of American Communism and Irving Howe and Lewis Coser's The American Communist Party quite possibly provided the most illuminating reminiscences of the catalysmic effects of the two events.

Believing that the Communist Party was effectively destroyed, Howe and Coser acknowledged that the movement had attracted sincere idealists and authentic anti-fascists. However, they also argued that in their uncritical stance toward Russia during the fight against Hitler, "an atrophy of moral sensibility among many American liberals" had occurred. Furthermore, the authors reasoned that

for nearly four decades the Communist Party exerted a profoundly destructive and corrupting influence upon American radicalism. In looking back upon its history . . . one is struck most of all by the enormous waste of potentially valuable human beings, men who had dreamed of a better world and had been ready to give their lives in order to realize it. Before this stark and tragic fact nothing that could happen in the party during the mid-fifties meant very much.

Despite such an analysis, the evaporation of the Communist Party did result in a large vacuum in the American political spectrum as the left appeared to disappear. However, reform and radical ferment continued even during the generally quiescent fifties, and the seeds of a progressive rebirth were already being planted by civil rights and peace activists. Thomas R. Brooks' The Walls Come Tumbling Down (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974) and Harvard Sitkoff's The Struggle for Black Equality (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981) related the breaking of racial shackles by blacks and their white supporters, and by Supreme Court decisions. The

effect of judicial renderings in tearing down academic Jim Crow was related by J. Harvie Wilkinson III in From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration: 1954-1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). Several excellent studies, particularly Lawrence S. Wittner's Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), DeBenedetti's The Peace Reform in American History, Milton S. Katz's "Peace, Politics, and Protest: SANE and the American Peace Movement, 1957-1972" (St. Louis University disseration, 1973), and Neil H. Katz's "Radical Pacifism and the Contemporary American Peace Movement: The Committee for Nonviolent Action, 1957-1967" (University of Maryland dissertation, 1974), discussed the appearance of an anti-nuclear drive as the fifties neared an end.

These studies also focused upon the massive civil rights and peace movements of the 1960s. William Chafee's Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina and the Struggle for Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) provided a brilliant case study of the fight to end segregation, discrimination, and inequality. Howell Raines's My Soul Is Rested, Movement Days in the Deep South Remembered (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1977), like the Chafee book, relied upon oral history to present a moving account of the early sixties' civil rights struggle. The two finest analyses of seminal



civil rights organizations were Clayborne Carson's In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981) and August Meier and Elliott Rudwick's CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). The Chafee, Carson, and Meier works traced the gradual radicalization of participants in the freedom fight, as both stunted hopes and initial successes fueled the desire for more rapid and more radical change.

The peace movement of the sixties was briefly discussed by Wittner and more fully by DeBenedetti. They noted, as do numerous other writings, the coalescing of the antiwar push with an emerging New Left movement. The most careful and thoughtful presentation of the leading New Left organization was Kirkpatrick Sale's SDS (1973). Sale's book was indispensable for understanding the hopes and fears, the early optimism and the later jaded pessimism of the New Left. Sale argued that SDS began as a reform organization, but soon moved into radical and revolutionary stages, a pattern also followed by many black militants. The leftward shift was greatly encouraged by preoccupation with the Vietnam War, and developed within certain segments of the peace movement, as noted by Michael Ferber and Staughton Lynd in The Resistance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971). The ideological thrust of SDS was analyzed in James L. Wood's

New Left Ideology: Its Dimensions and Development

(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975) a useful counterpoise to the often heard argument that the New Left was untheoretical and unthinking. Peter Clecack's Radical Paradoxes: Dilemmas of the American Left 1945-1970

(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1973) focused upon four intellectual progenitors of the New Left--C. Wright Mills, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, and Herbert Marcuse--and again argued that the young radicals somewhat simplistically adopted the "myth of revolution."

Nigel Young's An Infantile Disorder?: The Crisis and Decline of the New Left (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977) and Irwin Unger's The Movement: A History of the American New Left, 1959-1972 (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1974) presented highly critical general accounts of the sixties' radicals. Young wrote that the change in SDS policy proved disastrous as the young radicals entered an infantile left stage. Unger damned both the white and black radicals of the period for adopting militant stances.

Milton Viorst's Fire in the Streets: America in the 1960s (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979) used biographical sketches to provide a highly readable overview of the antiwar, student, civil rights, and counter cultural movements of the 1956-1970 era.

As the "movement" spawned in the sixties collapsed due to revolutionary posturing and the withdrawal of

land forces from Vietnam, the left once again splintered and rightist reaction ensued. Additionally, as several studies have indicated, repression played a major part in the evident crippling of American reformism and radicalism. As David J. Garrow uncovered in The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: From 'Solo' to Memphis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), an intensive effort was undertaken to besmirch and destroy the reputation of the leading civil rights activist. Frank J. Donner's The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System (New York: Vintage Books, 1981) and Robert Justin Goldstein's Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present (New York: Schenkman Publishers Company, Inc., 1978) served as a detailed and convincing critique of government malpractices over half a century against domestic dissidents.

While the broad-based movement of the sixties obviously divided and appeared to lose national focus, grass roots drives continued to proliferate throughout the following decade. Harry Boyte's The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizen Movement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980) and John Case and Rosemary C. R. Taylor's Co-ops, Communes and Collectives: Experiments in Social Change in the 1960s and 1970s (New York: Random House, Inc., 1979) indicated that numerous locally-based groups adopted one of the major theoretical premises of the New Left, participatory

democracy, in their fight to produce transformations at the community level, in the work force, and in a series of alternative organizations.