

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE DYNAMICS OF IDENTITY IN DETERMINING FRENCH BILATERAL  
AID: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF COLONIALISM AND FRANÇA-FRIQUE

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

By

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Norman, Oklahoma  
2017

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BY

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## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank my entire committee for their continuous support and patience throughout this project. I express gratitude to Dr. Robin Grier for her advice on the bigger picture of my research; Dr. Noah Theriault for his constant encouragement and exquisite grammar skills; and Dr. Dan Hicks for his expertise in econometric analysis.

Additionally, I thank the University of Oklahoma, and specifically the College of International Studies and the Department of International and Area Studies for the opportunity to pursue a graduate degree at a phenomenal institution. A special thank you to Katie Watkins and Rhonda Hill for all they do for the graduate students.

I would not have succeeded in this program or research project without the support and encouragement of my fellow graduate students. I would like to thank two students in particular. Thank you to Nela Mrchkovska for being constantly uplifting and always having ice cream when times get tough. Extra thanks to Stefanie Neumeier for being my friend and always proofreading my chapters and research papers. You are my academic role model, and your support has made me a better student and researcher.

I would like to thank my family and their support of me being a life-long student. I would never have made it this far without your love, encouragement, and support. Thank you, mom and dad, for always answering my calls and reminding me of the good things in life. I am eternally grateful for you!

Finally, a quick shout-out to my cat for consistently walking across my keyboard at the most inopportune times.

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## Abstract

In 2013, France sent more than \$3 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the African continent. The biggest aid recipients were Senegal and Morocco, both former members of the short-lived French Union. Senegal was fully colonized in nineteenth century, and Morocco was established as a protectorate in 1912. Although Senegal was an outlier in French West Africa because of the status of the *originaires* as French citizens in the Four Communes, it lacked full sovereignty until 1960. On the other hand, France was not the sovereign entity in Morocco due to the preexisting legitimacy of the sultan's rule. This discrimination continued during the French Union as colonies (both old and new), protectorates, and mandates had varying numbers of representation based on their assigned roles. Although official colonization ended over fifty years ago, the presence of the French, through *Françafrique*, has remained. *Françafrique* is the post-colonial French policy in Africa that included a mix of covert and official networks between French and African actors. Under the guise of *Françafrique*, France has frequently led military interventions and upheld specific monetary agreements with the CFA Zone. *Françafrique* has varied based on the acceptance of African heads of state. Because of this, variation in French identity can be observed through the channels of *Françafrique*. In this thesis, I argue that levels of “Frenchness,” an index composed from the remnants of identity from colonialism and *Françafrique*, determine French bilateral aid allocations to former colonies in Africa.



## Introduction

“Classic colonialism may be dead, but France continues to be the political and economic epicenter of its former colonies.”<sup>1</sup>

The official French website (*France Diplomatie*) for bilateral aid provides statistics and specific country information that allude to the generosity of the French government. With quotes like “France provides 10% of global ODA, [Official Development Assistance, OECD] despite its economy only accounting for 4% of the world’s GDP,” the French government attempts to portray a France that supports global development in lower income nations.<sup>2</sup> The largesse again appears: “the international target of ODA equivalent to 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) by 2015 has not been met by France, whose rate of 0.45% of GNI is nonetheless above the global average of 0.31%.”<sup>3</sup> In other words, the French government has yet to meet the target goal but still fares better than most other developed countries. Although the statistics and themes of French generosity are valid as France provides more bilateral aid than other developed countries, they do not provide a complete account of why Paris gives aid to developing countries. More than altruism, France distributes aid in order to further strategic interests, both maintaining their sphere of influence and increasing access to world markets. Because the role of French influence prompts aid allocation, scholars have argued and statistically illustrated that historical

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<sup>1</sup> Frank J. Priol, “France Seeking Closer African Ties,” *The New York Times*, September 23, 1981, accessed October 26, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1981/09/23/world/france-seeking-closer-african-ties.html>.

<sup>2</sup> “French bilateral aid,” *France Diplomatie*, December 23, 2013, accessed April 14, 2013, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/development-assistance/french-assistance-institutional/french-assistance-delivery/article/french-bilateral-aid>.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

relationships, like colonialism, are a key determinant of aid receipts.<sup>4</sup> Although most developing countries receive bilateral aid from France, those with colonial history receive a greater proportion, which is illustrated in Figure 1.<sup>5</sup>




Figure 1. French ODA in 2011, millions of USD

Previous scholarship fails to consider the variations within the French colonial empire, as well as post-independent relationships. This thesis contributes to

<sup>4</sup> Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5.1 (2000): 33-63; Jean-Claude Berthelemy, "Bilateral donors' interest vs. recipients' development motives in aid allocation: do all donors behave the same?" *Cahiers de Maison des Sciences Economiques* (2005): 1-36; Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein, "What determines foreign aid? The donors' perspective," *Journal of Development Economics* 87 (2008): 1-13; Paul Collier and David Dollar, "Aid allocation and poverty reduction," *European Economic Review* 46 (2002): 1475-1500; Alfred Maizels and Machiko K. Nissanke, "Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries," *World Development* 12.9 (1984): 879-900; R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, "The French Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model of the Distribution of French Bilateral Aid, 1964-70," *Development and Change* 3(1978): 459-78; Jakob Svensson, "Aid, Growth and Democracy," *Economics and Politics* (1985): 275-297; Javed Younas, "Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits," *European Journal of Political Economy* 24 (2008): 661-674.

<sup>5</sup> "Profiles and policies of bilateral donors: France," *OECD*, 2012, accessed April 21, 2017, [http://www.oecd.org/dac/France\\_DCR2012\\_21jan13\\_Part8.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/France_DCR2012_21jan13_Part8.pdf).

postcolonial studies and culture studies, as I provide additional understanding about the relationship between the West and the developing world and how the historical relations between them have shaped the present. In this thesis, I expand upon the existing literature by disaggregating the French colonial relationships and emphasizing the importance of *Françafrique* in present-day French-Africa relations. I argue that identity, primarily identity of belonging to the “in-group” of France, is the main driver of aid. Identity is more influential than altruism or the support of democratic norms, good governance, and human rights for French bilateral aid allocation, although these are also minor motivations. *Françafrique*, as will be presented in detail in Chapter 2, is the official yet covert policy of most French administrations, which is comprised of various networks among corporations, French politicians, and African heads of state. *Françafrique* is a form of neocolonialism, where French actors attempt to influence and manage African heads of state in exchange for access to natural resources and a solidified sphere of influence. By clarifying the colonial relationships that were dependent on identity, I show how regional and individual statuses shaped the French Empire. For example, the *originaires*—who were a privileged group of Africans that were granted voting rights in the nineteenth century—had a greater sense of political belonging within the French Empire and therefore had a more French “identity.”

In addition to presenting a detailed history of French colonization and the mechanisms of *Françafrique*, I create an index to measure the amount of “Frenchness” present in each African nation-state. “Frenchness” is the shared identity between France and former French colonies and is composed of political, economic, and social

factors. “Frenchness” varies according to relations with France and includes non-former French colonies. Although the French Empire did not colonize all of Africa, many countries have interacted with France, either during colonization or in the policies of *Françafrique*. “Frenchness” is created using principal component analysis, which constructs an index based on the colonial history and the presence of *Françafrique* in each country. This will be further explained in chapter 3.

The remainder of this introduction will provide a historical background of the aid relationship between France and Africa and establish the relevant identity theory necessary for evaluating its use in determining aid.

### **Franco-African Aid Relationship**

Prior to the end of colonialism, aid allocations were concentrated between Western nations. Empires were responsible for financing their colonial possessions, and other nations could not intervene financially or militarily. In the immediate postwar era, the discourse around colonial possessions shifted. Following the Atlantic Charter and the right for self-determination, colonial powers argued for the right to keep their territorial possessions in order to facilitate state building and development. In 1946, the French government created the *Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social* (Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development or FIDES) to finance development projects in colonial territories.<sup>6</sup> This

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<sup>6</sup> Great Britain created a similar development fund through the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 in response to criticism from the United States and the Atlantic Charter. Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 36.

fund altered the previous financing of territories by transferring responsibility from the colonies themselves to the metropole.<sup>7</sup>

In addition to financing development in its colonies, President de Gaulle proposed an increasing role for Africans in French institutions through the French Union. The French Assembly proposed the French Union, and later the French Community, as a compromise between colonial possession and full-fledged state. The French Union was the end of the French Empire and transferred power from French to African hands. Under the creation of the French Union, all Africans had a vote and direct representation in the French Assembly, and many soon-to-be African heads of states served as representatives. However, the French Union failed to appease the demands of African actors, and independence movements ensued in 1958 when Guinea declined to participate in the French Community. The implementation of the colonial development fund and the proposal of the French Union were in direct response to United Nations negotiations as “France and Britain feared pressures to apply the model of mandates to all colonies.”<sup>8</sup>

After former French colonies gained their independence, France signed bilateral treaties with the goal of state building and the maintenance of French influence. Not surprisingly given the historical, exploitative nature of colonialism, these treaties primarily benefited the donor country through high interest loans and unfair access to natural resources. These bilateral treaties make up one aspect of *Françafrique* and attempts for control through neocolonialist policies. The de Gaulle

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<sup>7</sup> Kevin Shillington, ed., *The Encyclopedia of African History: Volume 1, A-G*, (New York: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2005), 905.

<sup>8</sup> Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 39.

administration initially prioritized former possessions in terms of networks and trade negotiations because of the existing influence France had in former colonies, or the level of “Frenchness.” However, subsequent French administrations have expanded to other African states and attempted to facilitate a French influence in former Belgian, British, and Portuguese colonies. This expansion has occasionally resulted in closer ties and lower level of “Frenchness” when non-former colonies join French institutions, like *la Francophonie* and the CFA franc zone, as will be analyzed in Chapter 2.

### **Identity Theory**

In order to argue that identity matters for aid allocation, it is necessary to clarify what I mean by identity. In this section, I outline the relevant international relations theory, borrowed from constructivist literature, and I refer back to this theory to illustrate specific identity formation in the following chapters. Constructivism is a theoretical framework within international relations theory that emphasizes how international actors are socialized through norms, rules, and practices.<sup>9</sup> In opposition to realist theory, which advocates that power and material capabilities are the most important factors in understanding why states behave in certain ways, constructivism instead proposes how social constructs and understandings of such influence state behavior. Identity “references mutually

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<sup>9</sup> Constructivist theory states, “(a) human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; (b) the most important ideational factors are widely shared or ‘intersubjective’ beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and (c) these shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors.” Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 393.

constructed and evolving images of the self and other.”<sup>10</sup> The construct of identity is important as it clarifies how and to what extent France and former colonies engage with each other and perceive one another, both historically and contemporarily. Social identities are “cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine ‘who I am/we are’ in a situation and positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations.”<sup>11</sup> From this literature, we know that identity changes slowly and is based on historical interactions between states, as well as norms and behaviors. International relations theory also claims that identity is socially constructed and dependent upon the shared understanding between two states.

International relations theory, as well as economic theory on identity, is essential for understanding why France has consistently intervened in former colonies. The relationship between France and French West or Equatorial Africa is based on an identity where the other “is an extension of the self.”<sup>12</sup> According to the constructivist literature, identity is socially constructed and based on shared understandings between two individuals, or states in this instance.<sup>13</sup> Identity distinguishes between that of the self (the state) and the other, which can result in an in-group and out-group categorization, where those belonging to the in-group receive privileged treatment from various French actors, both political and economic. The French government has most often considered some African states, both during colonization and post-

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<sup>10</sup> Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 59.

<sup>11</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *The American Political Science Review* 88.2 (1994): 395.

<sup>12</sup> Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 386.

<sup>13</sup> In the constructivist literature, this is often referred to as intersubjective understanding.

independence, to be within the French sphere of influence or *pré carré*.<sup>14</sup> Those with collective identity—a group level identity that shares expectations and behavior—begin to consider each other’s welfare when making decisions. As President Giscard d’Estaing has famously said French policy is “help for friends first.”<sup>15</sup> African heads of state that align with French presidents belong to the in-group and receive special treatment, such as the special relationship between President Omar Bongo of Gabon and six different French administrations. However, when members of the in-group violate this collective identity, other members may reject said member.<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, identity is dependent upon history, as previous interactions with other states form the present relationship between two or more states.<sup>17</sup> The result of interactions in identity formation is evident in Chapters 1 and 2, which detail the colonial history and policy of Françafrique. Various French actors have interacted with African actors since the mid-fifteenth century. These interactions have not always been viewed positively, but the accumulated history has led to modern understandings of the relationship between French and African actors. This French-African relationship continued to form during the post-colonial period, as will be made clear in Chapter 2. Although not immune to change, identity changes slowly based on interactions and perceived interests.<sup>18</sup> One of the main conclusions from the constructivist literature is that identity shapes interests, and such interests can lead to

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<sup>14</sup> *pré carré* is often translated as the backyard of France but refers to the French sphere of influence.

<sup>15</sup> Flora Lewis, “France Seeking Wider Influence Among Africans,” *The New York Times*, August 1, 1977, accessed October 26, 2016, [http://www.nytimes.com/1977/08/01/archives/france-seeking-wider-influence-among-africans-6-france-focuses.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/1977/08/01/archives/france-seeking-wider-influence-among-africans-6-france-focuses.html?_r=0).

<sup>16</sup> George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, “Economics and Identity,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115.3 (2000): 725.

<sup>17</sup> Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 385.

<sup>18</sup> Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons, and Wayne Sandholtz, “After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 8.2 (2002): 267.



specific actions by individuals and states.<sup>19</sup> Because of this element of interaction, France, based on its historical role and identity as a dominant power in Africa, provides aid to its former colonies based on the identity facilitated throughout colonialism and neocolonialism.<sup>20</sup> Some argue that France has an obligation and moral responsibility, due to colonization, to continue investing in democracy and the economies of former colonies.<sup>21</sup> However, I argue that it is the notion of identity, rather than the promotion of democracy and economic growth, that determines foreign aid.

States seek ontological security or the security of the self, which guides states' behaviors and upholds specific identities in an attempt to avoid future uncertainty.<sup>22</sup> If states prioritize self-preservation and collective identity changes slowly, then this provides an explanation for why France has continued neocolonial practices despite international criticism. French administrations have internalized an interventionist norm in Africa, rooted in colonial history. In recent years, France has faced scandals for both supporting authoritarian regimes and harboring wealth of such authoritarian leaders. However, this has only slightly, if at all, shifted French policy in Africa. In addition to being motivated by these norms, France is influenced by domestic and

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<sup>19</sup> Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," 385; Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz, "After Empire," 270.

<sup>20</sup> Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz, "After Empire," 267.

<sup>21</sup> "The glory days are passing," *The Economist*, December 13, 2006, accessed October 23, 2016, <http://www.economist.com/node/8417979>.

<sup>22</sup> According to constructivist literature, "Ontological security refers to the need to experience oneself as whole, continuous person in time – as being rather than constantly changing – in order to realize the sense of agency... Individuals need to feel secure in who they are, as identities or selves. Some, deep forms of uncertainty threaten this identity security... Where an actor has no idea what to expect, she cannot systematically relate ends to means, and it becomes unclear how to pursue her ends. Since ends are constitutive of identity, in turn, deep uncertainty renders the actor's identity insecure. Individuals are therefore motivated to create cognitive and behavioral certainty, which they do by establishing routines." Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security," *European Journal of International Relations* 12.3 (2006): 342.

international expectations, rules, and cost-benefit analyses.<sup>23</sup> Together, these theoretical concepts explain why France continuously seeks world power status and why France gives a significant portion of French GDP as aid.<sup>24</sup> The international community expects France—based on historical relationships, the French level of development, their position on the UN Security Council, the use of conditionalities, etc.—to give aid as appropriate. Due to the persistence of history, the international community further expects France to initiate intervention when former colonies turn to violence.<sup>25</sup> Because France has internalized paternalistic actions as a norm or identity, the “aid relationship has persisted with little change despite the progressive normalization of underlying economic ties of trade and investment.”<sup>26</sup>

An evaluation of potential consequences does not fully explain why France favors specific former colonies with a similar identity over others amid criticism by the international community.<sup>27</sup> France has consistently showed favoritism towards African heads of state that belong to the in-group. In recent years, however, France has experienced reputational consequences for favoring influence and relationships

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<sup>23</sup> This section draws upon constructivist literature on logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences, as defined in this footnote. Both logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences guide policies concerning aid in its former colonies. Logic of appropriateness is choosing an action that is both rule-based and essential to a particular conception of the self. Logic of consequences is where actors “choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal and collective objectives.” Although logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences can be mutually exclusive, this is not the case for French policy towards Africa. French policy-makers are guided by both logics as the decision-making process includes the conservation of norms and a cost-benefit analysis of international and domestic expectations. James March and Johan Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of the International Political Orders,” *International Organization* 52.4 (1998): 949.

<sup>24</sup> March and Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of the International Political Orders,” 951.

<sup>25</sup> Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz, “After Empire,” 270.

<sup>26</sup> Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz, “After Empire,” 277.

<sup>27</sup> March and Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of the International Political Orders,” 949.

over democratic principles and human rights.<sup>28</sup> These reputational costs were prominent during the Elf scandal in the early 1990s, when the national oil company was accused of supporting authoritarian regimes that in turn funded French political campaigns.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, France has been accused of contributing to the lag in democratic development among French-speaking countries by propping up these authoritarian regimes that allow secret economic deals and an French interference in African domestic affairs.<sup>30</sup> The presence of such criticisms illustrate why France has slowly begun to shift towards “political conditionalities” amid pressure from the international community.<sup>31</sup>

Identity is not singularly composed, and there are hierarchies of identities within an individual, state, or region. For example, some of France’s identities are rooted in membership in institutions, like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union (EU), whereas other identities are constituted through values, such as the support of democracy and human rights. Although French identity incorporates French exceptionalism and *Françafrique*, these uniquely French identities may conflict with a European Union identity that advocates for an “ever closer union” and consistent multilateral aid approaches. The EU consistently practices aid contingency as a means for promoting democratic norms and good

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<sup>28</sup> Piet Benoit, “*Françafrique: The evolution of France’s interference in Africa*,” *Al Arabiya English*, August 26, 2015, accessed October 26, 2016, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2015/08/26/Fran-afrique-The-evolution-of-France-s-interference-in-Africa.html>.

<sup>29</sup> “The French African Connection,” *Al Jazeera*, April 7, 2014, accessed April 14, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2013/08/201387113131914906.html>.

<sup>30</sup> Craig R. Whitney, “France Snips at the Old Ties that Bind It to Africa,” *The New York Times*, July 25, 1997, accessed November 13, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/25/world/france-snips-at-the-old-ties-that-bind-it-to-africa.html>.

<sup>31</sup> Gordon Cumming, *Aid to Africa: French and British Policies from the Cold War to the New Millennium* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2011), 68.

governance, and French administrations have struggled to reconcile these differences with their policy of rewarding friends irrespective of democratic and human rights violations. However, French bilateral aid allocations are under the jurisdiction of the French government. Because of this structure, French aid institutions are influenced by EU multilateral agencies but not forced to alter their behavior. However, these repeated interactions may over time alter the current policies of the French aid. The primary lessons from identity theory that matter for aid receipts are as follows: (1) identity is formed through repeated interaction and changes slowly; (2) those with collective identity behave differently; and (3) identity also influences state behavior, in addition to material capabilities. For the purpose of this thesis, identity is the understanding of the self (the state), and therefore the approach towards appropriate actions in a given situation based on such perceived identity. France, as a state, perceives its identity as a world power and furthers this status by creating spheres of influence based on shared French identity in former colonies.

### **Chapter Summary**

French bilateral aid to former colonies is motivated by a variety of factors, including material gains, reputational hazard, and international norms. Despite these factors, identity is the most prominent determinant of French foreign aid to former colonies. By this, I mean a unique French identity that was established throughout colonization and facilitated through the channels of *Françafrique*, as will be presented in subsequent chapters.

In Chapter 1, I argue that a French “identity” was formed within the French colonial empire through the use of regional and individual statuses, which facilitated a closer relationship with French institutions, culture, and language. Regional statuses—department, colony, mandate, and protectorate—clarify the different approaches to French colonial rule in various territories. The French Colonial Empires granted individual, or person-level, statuses to Africans. These individual statuses are *sujets*, *tirailleurs*, *originaires*, *métis*, and *évolués*. In Chapter 2, I posit that the various channels of Françafrique, which were established post-independence, have continued to influence the “Frenchness” of African heads of states and other African actors. Finally, in Chapter 3, I present the economic analysis to test my overall hypothesis that identity of former colonies, formed throughout colonialism and influenced by Françafrique, is a key determinant in French bilateral aid allocation.

## Chapter 1: Historical French-African Relations

French explorers arrived on the African continent in 1445 at the mouth of the river in present-day Senegal and eventually established the first settler community of Saint-Louis in 1659.<sup>32</sup> The French quickly began to export slaves as part of the transatlantic slave trade and have continued to exploit Africa's natural resources and fertile soil ever since. Much has changed in the last three hundred years, but French presence has stayed constant, despite the official end of French colonialism and the formation of independent African nation-states. France has frequently intervened in the economic and political affairs of various African nations, under the guise of foreign aid and international institutions, of not only its former African colonies but also colonies formerly under British, German, Belgian and Portuguese rule.

International relations theory, as was established in the introduction, asserts that identities are socially constructed, plastic, and shaped by the understanding of identity amongst states.<sup>33</sup> States can possess multiple identities, which depend on both historical relationships and the present-day day socio-political environment. Interactions between states and individuals create a shared, or collective, identity. Identity, defined in this manner, is essential to the relationships of Franco-Africa as the colonial institutions, which subsequently bind the economic and political spheres, shaped it. Regional identities—colony, department, protectorate, or mandate—are facilitated based on the level of autonomy within the region. Political rights and a

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<sup>32</sup> Parts of this chapter are forthcoming in the publication “The Original Exception: The *Originaires* In Senegal, 1848-1960” in the University of Oklahoma’s Journal of Global Affairs, Volume VI, 2017.

<sup>33</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *The American Political Science Review* 88.2 (1994): 385.

sense of belonging within the French Empire fostered a French “identity.” At the individual (or person) level, France discriminated based on citizenship status: *sujets*, *tirailleurs*, *originaires*, *méits*, or *assimilés*. Each status had rights or duties in the French Empire. Political rights were hinged upon voting rights, education, and legal courts, which contributed to a sense of “Frenchness” among individual persons.

This chapter will provide the historical background essential to understanding how French colonization is relevant to the Franco-African aid relationship in the present. Based on existing economic literature investigating the long-term impacts of historical institutions, like colonial history and the specific colonial ruler—Belgium, France, Great Britain, or Portugal—have significant consequences for economic growth in the present.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, these institutions and histories are “persistent,” meaning that they have long-term effects that spillover into the present.<sup>35</sup> This is observed in the variations between countries who provide substantial aid but lack colonial history and former colonizers, especially France, which gives “to former colonies tied by political alliances without much regard to other factors, including poverty levels or choice of politico-economic regimes.”<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” *American Economic Review* 91 (2001): 1369-1401; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of Modern World Income Distribution,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (2002): 1231-1294; Grazeilla Bertocchi and Fabio Canova, “Did colonization matter for growth? An empirical exploration into the historical causes of Africa’s underdevelopment,” *European Economic Review* 46 (2002): 1851-1871; Robert E. Hall and Charles I. Jones, “Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114.1 (1999): 83-116; Nathan Nunn, “Historical Legacies: A Model Linking Africa’s Past to its Current Underdevelopment,” *Journal of Development Economics* 83.1 (2007): 157-175; Nathan Nunn, “The Long Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades.”

<sup>35</sup> Melissa Dell, “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining *Mita*,” *Econometrica* 78.6 (2010): 1863-1903.

<sup>36</sup> Alesina Alberto and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” *Journal of Economic Growth* 5 (2000): 34.

In this chapter, I argue that discrimination of status resulted in a particular sense of political belonging within the French Empire. This sense of political belonging, based on participation and access to rights, created a French “identity” among those who belonged to the French Empire. First, I will provide a brief description of the policies of *assimilation*, *association* and other French colonial practices, as well as *mise en valeur* (development or improvement). Then, I will illustrate how the variation in such policies at the level of the individual person followed by differences at the regional level, represented by each colony. Lastly, I will detail the role of each territory in the formation of the French Union, as well as the beginnings of the relationships between newly independent nations and their former colonizer.

### ***Assimilation and Association***

Before we delve into the current Franco-African relations, it is essential to understand how the historical relationship between France and Africa could have lasting effects with the potential to impact contemporary identity. First, I analyze the historical context of the beginnings and end of colonization with specific attention to how colonists attempted to create Africans with a French identity through the policy of *assimilation* (assimilation). Although France had a grip on the African continent in the fifteenth century, the greater colonization effort took place following the Berlin Conference in 1895, which specified the rules for claiming African lands as an official colony. France, at this point in time, was competing for possessions in interior Africa with other European powers—Britain, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Belgium.



Unlike other European powers, who favored indirect rule or rule by corporation, France ruled its colonies directly, by using French administration rather than existing chiefs to administer its colonial objectives. This rule was furthered by the policies of *assimilation* and *la mission civilisatrice* (civilizing mission).

*Assimilation* was influenced by French rationalism and the thought that science could be the “key to regenerating humanity.”<sup>37</sup> French colonial possessions were sometimes viewed as “laboratories” for understanding how “savages” could become civilized. This was the policy of *la mission civilisatrice*, where Frenchmen argued that the spread of the principles of republicanism and rationalism could bring about civilized cultures. *Assimilation* defended the notion that the Declaration of the Rights of Man, an ideology heavily influential in the French Revolution, were “applicable everywhere, since it was thought that if men were given equal opportunity they would become civilized, rational, and free.”<sup>38</sup> Many thought the differences in development between cultures was not necessarily due to a biological difference but a lack of access to rational and republican principles. *La mission civilisatrice* was both a justification for colonialism and an obligation to civilize the African savages. The implementation of *assimilation* resulted in the initial formations of a French identity as “colonization was expected to produce Africans with French cultural values.”<sup>39</sup> It would be accomplished through education, labor participation, and *mise en valeur*, which was the rational development of natural and human

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<sup>37</sup> Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 8.

<sup>38</sup> G. Wesley Johnson Jr., *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle for Power in the Four Communes, 1900-1920* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 75.

<sup>39</sup> Michael C. Lambert, “From Citizenship to *Négritude*: ‘Making a Difference’ in Elite Ideologies of Colonized Francophone West Africa,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35.2 (1993): 241.

resources.<sup>40</sup> *Assimilation*, if successfully implemented, would result in French-like citizens, while *mise en valeur* led to subjects who were both loyal to the French Empire and productive members of society. Although this approach of *la mission civilisatrice* has been evaluated with modern conceptions of ‘race,’ it was the dominant theory at the time of colonization and will not be evaluated on its ethical integrity but rather its importance in establishing identity.

### *Mise en valeur*

At the beginning of French colonization, *mise en valeur* represented the development of the colonies particularly in terms of the construction of railroads and telecommunications network, but as French rule in Africa continued, *mise en valeur* shifted to include education, agriculture, health, and trade with the metropole. Despite the benevolent appearance in promoting education and health for Africans, behind the façade was French self-interest. Health improvements for Africans were implemented to protect colonial administrators living in close proximity to Africans and to protect settlers, especially in Algeria.<sup>41</sup> Additionally, education, in the French language, used *en faire des homes utiles* (the creation of useful men), meaning that Africans in French-like schools would be trained as an educated labor force to be manipulated by French officials for better production and resource extraction.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, “agricultural instruction was to be the main focus of the village school,” in order to

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<sup>40</sup> Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 6.

<sup>41</sup> Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 68.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 137.

make the most productive use of the African population.<sup>43</sup> Trade has clear economic implications, especially with the monopoly that France held over Africa. Additionally, *mise en valeur* argued that civilization needed to alleviate poverty alongside development of the colonies.<sup>44</sup> In order to accomplish the motives of *mise en valeur*, France frequently used military force to pacify its subjects. Although prone to adaptation, *mise en valeur* was practiced throughout French colonial rule in Africa, under the policies of both *assimilation* and *association*.

### Education

Education was a primary means for imposing a French identity upon both citizens and subjects in French West and Equatorial Africa. However, access to education was not evenly distributed throughout the colonies and often favored areas where colonial ministers and their families resided. Because of this variation in accessibility and the kinds of schooling, colonial residents interacted with the French in various ways and created different levels of “Frenchness.” Three levels of schools possessed separate curricula to fulfill a specific purpose.<sup>45</sup> The most basic level of education was for autochthonous Africans, who were able to attend village schools for 2-3 years of rudimentary instruction from African teachers. Village schools were both “of and for the masses.”<sup>46</sup> The purpose of village schools was to create loyal subjects or civilized peoples rather than patriotic citizens, which was the motivation

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>44</sup> Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 53.

<sup>45</sup> Kelly Duke Bryant, “‘The Color of the Pupils’: Schooling and Race in Senegal’s Cities, 1900-10,” *Journal of African History* 52 (2011): 299.

<sup>46</sup> Tony Chafer, “Teaching Africans to Be French?: France’s ‘Civilising Mission’ and the Establishment of a Public Education System in French West Africa, 1903-30,” *Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Istituto italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente* 56.2 (2001): 194.

behind education in the metropole.<sup>47</sup> A slightly improved version of the village school was the regional school. Students were selected to attend such schools in order to further *mise en valeur*, as these institutions trained Africans in practical skills, like agriculture and trade. Upon completion of the curricula and proof of some French fluency, students received certificates of their professional studies instead of degrees. In addition to supporting the constant need for African workers in the colonies, French administrators, especially the governor general, believed that education could also “engender support for French rule” and prevent rebellions.<sup>48</sup> The most prestigious school in colonial Africa was the urban school, which closely resembled schooling in mainland France and primarily concentrated in the *Quatre Communes* of Senegal. Urban schools were primarily available to children of French administrators, *métis* (mulattos), and *originaires* (a unique type of French citizenship for Africans living in the Four Communes). The curricula followed that of France, and students were taught primarily by Europeans in only the French language.<sup>49</sup> Unlike the British colonial education system, French schools were nonreligious and publicly funded.<sup>50</sup>

### *Association*

This *assimilationist* policy shifted over time to one of *association*, where Africans could, in theory, evolve within their own cultures and avoid a forced assimilation, which was viewed critically by the international community.

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<sup>47</sup> Kelly M. Duke Bryant, *Education as Politics: Colonial Schooling and Political Debate in Senegal, 1850s-1914* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), 9.

<sup>48</sup> Bryant, *Education as Politics*, 15.

<sup>49</sup> Bryant, “ ‘The Color of the Pupils,’ ” 304.

<sup>50</sup> Yannick Dupraz, “French and British Colonial Legacies in Education: A Natural Experiment in Cameroon,” *Paris School of Economics Working Paper* (2015): 2.

*Association*, implemented in the early twentieth century, advocated that African customs should be fostered as long as they did not conflict with the ideas of French civilization. The concept of *association* is built on two intertwined premises:

the first was that some form of sharing power with the old and new elite in West Africa was necessary to preserve French authority. The second was that power sharing, in the proper doses surrounded by the proper safeguards, was also in the best interests of its subjects and thus consistent with France's civilizing mission in West Africa.<sup>51</sup>

Despite its positive language, *association* policy was likely caused by the strain on French administrators and the French government to finance the implementation of *assimilation*. *Association* is present in the foreign policy approach of *Françafrique* as France constantly intervenes in the economic, political, and military situations in francophone Africa with the subtle notion of evolving African civilization within its own culture.

In the end, the outcomes of the policy of *assimilation* and *la mission civilisatrice* were different for each territory and the classification of such within the French Empire. *Assimilation* was a universal policy for all French colonies, but it was applied to varying degrees depending on the needs and purpose of each colony. The uneven effects of *assimilation* can be best observed in the number of Africans who achieved French citizenship. For example, in Algeria in 1944, less than one percent of the population had been granted citizenship, which was considered one of the more successful cases.<sup>52</sup> Some colonies, such as Senegal, had thousands of citizens in addition to the *originaires*, whereas others in central Africa were denied such status, as they were less “French” than others based on their limited interaction with French

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<sup>51</sup> Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 188.

<sup>52</sup> Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 29.

officials and the differing levels of education. However, it is clear that former French colonies perceived themselves as more “française” than their British counterparts felt they belonged to the Commonwealth.<sup>53</sup> With this basic understanding of the overarching themes and policies of French colonization, through the enforcement of *assimilation* and *association*, the next essential step is to complicate the story by looking at the individual and colony-level discrepancies in applying such policies, which further contributes to the “in-group” countries of francophone Africa.

### **Identity at the Individual Level**

Until the Lamine Guèye law in 1946—which on paper granted citizenship to every resident in a French territory, including women—individual categorization of colonial residents determined their access to resources such as education, health, and political representation or office. Africans were separated into two broad groups: (1) subjects and (2) citizens. However, this grouping would combine *originaires* and *métis* and Frenchmen into one classification, which obscures the diversity and privilege within each group and also disregards the special place of African soldiers, or *tirailleurs*, within the French Empire. Because Frenchmen are simply citizens from France residing in Africa, most likely as businessmen or working for colonial administration, it is not necessary to analyze their place of privilege or their access to education and welfare programs, as they represented the highest status by directly belonging to the French race. The status of individual classification portrays the variable levels of “Frenchness” that remain in former African colonies today, which

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<sup>53</sup> Chafer, “Teaching Africans to be French?,” 191.

is a remnant of these historical identities at the individual level. Because each individual status had particular interactions with French settlers and administrators as well as access to French services—education, legal rights, government positions, etc.—these person-level statuses yielded varying degrees of “Frenchness.” The identities will be discussed in the order of their level of “Frenchness,” with *originaires*, *evolués*, and *métis* possessing a similar level of “Frenchness” but in different ways, such as language or access to education.

### *Sujets*

*Sujets* were the most elemental members within the French territories, and they had little access to the resources that France theoretically provided. *Sujets* possessed duties to the French Republic rather than rights within it.<sup>54</sup> Access to education beyond primary school was scarce, as French facilities were not extended to many villages or rural areas. Most of the schools were near coastal cities or settler areas, except the village schools that focused on *mise en valeur*. Additionally, *sujets* were further distinguished under a separate court of law known as the *indigénat* (native courts). The *indigénat* was one of the most discriminatory institutions for the “lesser” members of a French territory. Although the French advocated that the *indigénat* was a way for Africans to remain under their cultural laws and traditions, the court instead

consisted of regulations that allowed colonial administrators to inflict punishment on African subjects without obtaining a court judgment or approval from the metropolis. It allowed the colonial officers to jail any African for up to two years without trial, to

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<sup>54</sup> Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 166.

impose heavy taxes and punitive fines, or to burn the villages of those who refused to pay.<sup>55</sup>

This court resulted in unfair and extreme punishment for minor crimes committed by *sujets*. Furthermore, *sujets* were completely excluded from the right to law in a French court, unless they had been naturalized. They also lacked any voting rights, including indirect voting through representation.

### *Tirailleurs*

*Tirailleurs* often existed in between the subject and the citizen because promised rights and statuses were not always granted. *Tirailleurs* were African soldiers responsible for protecting French colonies, both in Africa and Indochina and fighting for France in World War I and World War II.<sup>56</sup> These soldiers remained subjects but were no longer under the jurisdiction of the *indigénat*.<sup>57</sup> The *tirailleurs* originated in the favored colony of Senegal in 1857 and were originally used to diminish revolts and strikes in other French colonies, including Algeria and Indochina. At the advent of the World War I, soldiers were recruited from the remaining colonies in French West Africa and Central Africa, typically from a low social status or forced by the local chief as a bargaining tool with the French administration. Chiefs and *chefs de canton* could obtain special benefits, as well as limited power in their respective canton, based on the number of soldiers they provided for French-African

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<sup>55</sup> George B.N. Ayittey, *Africa Betrayed* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 83.

<sup>56</sup> *Tirailleurs* were originally called *tirailleurs Sénégalaise* because they were first recruited from Senegal. However, as the demand for soldiers increased, *tirailleurs* were recruited from all French territories.

<sup>57</sup> Gregory Mann, "What Was the *Indigénat*? The 'Empire of Law' in French West Africa," *Journal of African History* 50 (2009): 344.



troops. During World War I, over 200,000 men from the African colonies fought for France. As further evidence of the discriminatory policy and the importance of identities, *sujets* and *originaires* of *tirailleurs* statuses were split into separate regiments. *Originaires* fought alongside other French troops as citizens, whereas *sujet* soldiers fought in all black regiments or all Arab regiments known as *spahis*. *Originaires* belonging to the regular French army had access to goods and services equal to that of the French military, as Table 1.1.<sup>58</sup> clearly reveals.

Table 1.1. Service conditions for *originaires* and other Africans, 1915

Condition	<i>Originaires</i> in regular army	Colonial troops
Service liability	Initial three-year enlistment	Same
Pay	Same as French soldiers	One-half <i>originaires</i> ' pay
Quarters	Barracks, with bed	No provision for beds; sleep on ground or floor; blankets issued
Food	European food; food allowance 3.76 francs per ration	Traditional African food prepared by Senegalese women accompanying the troops; allowance 1.68 francs per ration
Promotion	Same as Frenchmen; can become officers in regular army	No promotion beyond noncommissioned rank; authority over African troops only
Pension (25 years service)	1,500 to 1,800 francs	437 to 572 francs

In addition to being distinguished based on their colonial residence, soldiers were further divided based on their position; *tirailleurs* were either *ancien combattants* (combat veterans) or *ancien militaires* (career soldiers). Combat veterans

<sup>58</sup> Reprinted from Johnson, *The Emergence of Black Politics*, 190.

and career soldiers had varying access to general benefits for their service to the French Empire. All *tirailleurs* were supposed to receive a pension and have better access to employment, especially within the colonial administration. However, the lack of the *état-civil* (civil registry)—which would continue to be the source of problems with citizenship in 1946—limited the ability of France to fulfill its promises as it struggled to rebuild mainland France after the destruction of World War II. Many veterans did not receive their pensions and honors due to the bureaucracy’s failure to keep track of them, which was made especially difficult since *tirailleurs* frequently changed their name before or after service, as they were forced to adopt the surname of their chief before the war and changed it back after service.<sup>59</sup> However, France still attempted to pay the “blood tax” to former soldiers and eventually extended various citizenship rights to family members of *tirailleurs*. France continued to pay military pensions after African colonies gained independence, perpetuating the link between the colonizer and colonized.

After fighting for the survival of the French republic, soldiers began to demand “reciprocity, entitlement, and state responsibility.”<sup>60</sup> They often used their military uniforms as a way to outwardly illustrate their power and status within the community. This increase in privilege within the French empire may have motivated soldiers to become politically active in advocating for rights as citizens under colonialism and pushing for independence during the formation of the French Union. However, historian Gregory Mann claims that the evidence for soldiers fighting for

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<sup>59</sup> Gregory Mann, *Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 100-101.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 65.

independence is “rarely substantiated,” and rather “political independence arose from the intersection of variety of factors most of which were beyond veterans’ control.”<sup>61</sup> Veterans did engage in obtaining the privileges from serving in the French military, mostly material benefits through soldier pensions. This political activism often led to increased access to services and other rights, even though *tirailleurs* were often grouped with the *sujets*. Regardless of their role in the independence movements, *tirailleurs* represented a unique part of French-African society, which allotted them certain privileges and prestige because of their service to maintaining greater France.

### *Originaires*

As briefly alluded above, *originaires* occupied a unique space within the French colonial system. *Originaires* belonged to the Four Communes of Senegal—Dakar, Saint Louis, Rufisque, and Gorée—and were granted French citizenship in 1848. At this same time, residents in the old colonies in the Caribbean and South America ended slavery and also gained citizenship in the French Empire, most of which are still overseas departments. Unlike later Africans granted French citizenship, who were required to renounce their personal status, *originaires* had “the rights of the citizen, including the rights to vote, while keeping their personal and family affairs under the jurisdiction of Islamic courts” and are sometimes referred to as *citoyenneté dans le statut* (citizenship status).<sup>62</sup> *Originaires* possessed citizenship status nearly 100 years prior to the rest of the French Empire, which allotted them special privileges. This status as a citizen of France combined with the ability to

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 22-23.

<sup>62</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 6.

remain Muslim was even more extraordinary within the French Empire. *Originaires* could continue to practice polygamy and abide by their inheritance laws but also be politically active in the Four Communes. They were not under the jurisdiction of the discriminatory *indigénat* but rather the French judicial system. *Originaires* “were French politically and economically,” but they maintained their personal status.<sup>63</sup> Personal status would later prove an issue for the *évolués* of Algeria and the remaining African *sujets* when citizenship was extended to the entire French Empire in 1946.

*Originaires* were unique in their ability to demand and gain political rights within the French Empire. Women living in the Four Communes also followed the activist model. African women did not have *originaires* status because women in France did not have the right to vote until 1945. Although women’s suffrage in France should have implied suffrage in the Four Communes, Senegalese women still had to protest against the Governor General for this specific status and gained citizenship privileges briefly after mainland France.<sup>64</sup> Female *originaires* demanded to have a specific status within the French colonial empire because it solidified their access to political rights and belonging.

The citizens of the Four Communes not only possessed unique rights compared to that of interior Senegal, but each city also had a distinct responsibility in the quotidian and long-term operations of the colony as well as those of greater French West Africa. For example, Saint-Louis was the colonial capital city until 1902

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<sup>63</sup> Mamadou Diouf, “The French Colonial Policy of Assimilation and the Civility of the Originaires of the Four Communes (Senegal): A Nineteenth Century Globalization Project,” *Development and Change* 29 (1998): 675.

<sup>64</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 45.

and contained the largest population of *métis*, Gorée served as the headquarters for colonial naval operations, Rufisque was the commercial center for the southern markets especially for peanuts due to its proximity to the inland areas growing crops, and Dakar was the administrative powerhouse, containing the Governor General's palace and administration for all of French West Africa.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, in terms of geographic location, Saint-Louis was unique as it was a combination of both Islamic culture, influenced primarily by the nearby city of Médine, and the presence of French colonial administrators as well as *métis* traders.<sup>66</sup> Because the Communes underwent urbanization in the late nineteenth century, they maintained an advantage over other African cities and are better adjusted to living communities composed of diverse peoples and backgrounds.<sup>67</sup>

Because *originaires* possessed such a unique status, they demanded political representation from one of their own. Blaise Diagne won the deputy election to the French National Assembly in 1914 becoming the first African to hold such a prestigious position. Diagne was able to secure additional rights for both *originaires* and Africans. In 1916, he forced the French government to give permission to *originaires* access to jobs in mainland France.<sup>68</sup> He also fought to extend citizenship to *originaires'* descendants living outside of the Four Communes, adding more support for subsequent elections. Diagne had also contributed to the recruitment of

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<sup>65</sup> Diouf, "The French Colonial Policy of Assimilation," 674; Wesley, *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal*, 34.

<sup>66</sup> Mamadou Diouf, "Islam, the '*Originaires*,' and the Making of Public Space in a Colonial City: Saint-Louis of Senegal," in *Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal*, ed. Mamadou Diouf, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 183.

<sup>67</sup> Michael Crowder, *Senegal: A Study in French Assimilation Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 83.

<sup>68</sup> Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 155.

*tirailleurs* fighting for the French army, under the notions that they would be rewarded for their services with citizenship and social benefits.<sup>69</sup> His significance for individual identity is that he believed that “the Senegalese were first of all Frenchmen and only secondarily black men.”<sup>70</sup>

### *Évolués*

Differing from *originaires* status but still considered as a French citizen, was that of the *évolué* or the *assimilé*, who were originally Algerian Muslims that renounced their personal status in order to attain voting rights and trial under French courts. Although this form of citizenship was initially advocated as the most desirable and as a fulfillment of *la mission civilisatrice*, Algerians and other Africans who possessed such title were few and far between. *Évolués* were considered to be the educated African elite because they had frequently been educated in France and, additionally, could prove that they upheld the ideals of French republicanism. If granted such a distinct status, they were incorporated into French institutions in Africa. Such a status was not easily granted; during the period 1937-1943 only 73 Africans achieved French citizenship (out of 276 who applied) through one of two mechanisms, *plein droit* (full rights) or voluntary admission. *Plein droit* was “an entitlement stemming from having won a Legion of Honor or other award or marriage to a French women in certain circumstances,” whereas voluntary admission required proving the qualities that the French administration deemed as assimilated to French

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<sup>69</sup> Mann, *Native Sons*, 69.

<sup>70</sup> Lambert, “From Citizenship to *Négritude*,” 246

society.<sup>71</sup> *Évolués* status was based on proving one's identity as "French" and abiding by civil requirements consistently and throughout their life. Achieving this status was made increasingly difficult as applicants had to prove that their entire family members were also "French," meaning that they had registered their monogamous marriage and births of children with the *état-civil* and their children were receiving a French education as they happened.<sup>72</sup> Because of the tedious legal requirements prior to requesting such status, many Africans were denied such a privileged status due to minor infractions.

### *Métis*

The last distinct category among residents in French colonies was that of the *métis*, or a person of mixed parentage.<sup>73</sup> French colonial administrators, because of their need to be close to the African *sujets* in order to provide stability and enforce labor, were required to live in French West Africa for several yearlong periods. Oftentimes, these men would marry *signares* (elite African women). Because Frenchwomen were lacking in the colonies, France originally encouraged inter-racial marriages "to produce a more stable community."<sup>74</sup> However, these marriages were often not official in terms of Catholic rites and frequently dissolved when men returned to France. The *signares*, as well as their children, possessed certain

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<sup>71</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 28.

<sup>72</sup> Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 168.

<sup>73</sup> *Métis* refers to the mixed race population and is synonymous with creoles or mulattos and used interchangeably within the literature. *Métis* are also referred to as mulattos or Creoles with respect to the literature on French West Africa depending on the author and the time period in which it was written.

<sup>74</sup> John D. Hargreaves, "Assimilation in Eighteenth-Century Senegal," *The Journal of African History* 6.2 (1965): 178.

privileges in colonial French West Africa including inheritance of property and trade, which provided them with greater economic security and capacity.<sup>75</sup> Offspring of a Frenchman and a native woman resulted in children of mixed parentage, referred to as *métis* in French. The status of *métis* was unique because they were considered to be French—unlike the principle of hypodescent of mulattos in the Americas—and were granted French political rights and social benefits at birth.

Because of the presence of French blood, *métis* children were typically educated in the French system. These children, typically born out of wedlock, were a “symbolic threat” for the French Empire as they could demand certain rights based on their French ancestry but were not completely assimilated to the republican ideals of a French citizen and their appearance still resembled those of indigenous Africans.<sup>76</sup> *Métis* were granted full French citizenship, differing from the *originaires* and *évolués* citizenship status, meaning that social services of the French metropole were extended to these, often unclaimed, children. *Métis* did not inherit a unique identity but rather adopted their French citizenship as identity; they belonged to the “poor white” group or the elite natives of French colonies.<sup>77</sup> They were considered more French in some instances compared to the other colonial statuses because of the French blood in their veins. However, despite the negative association of the *métis* as a representation of unfaithful Frenchmen, they were also viewed as an intermediary

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<sup>75</sup> Hargreaves, “Assimilation in Eighteenth-Century Senegal,” 179.

<sup>76</sup> Emmanuelle Saada, *Empire’s Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 41.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 124.



between France and the colonies since they possessed qualities of “acclimatization, bilingualism, and the ability to command the natives.”<sup>78</sup>

*Métis* had a unique place within the French colonial system, which provided more privileges and opportunities if they were able to prove their French heritage. This intermediary position and dual identity resulted in an elite status that allowed and encouraged *métis* to serve in positions of power, such as lower administrative positions and eventually mayors of the Communes and deputies representing Senegal to the French National Assembly.<sup>79</sup> Although *métis* could be recognized as French *jus soli*, “colonial soil did not have the same power as metropolitan soil to confer nationality,” and they were still distinguished from colonial citizens and French nationals.<sup>80</sup>

Based on the citizenship status one possessed in the French colony, one had varying access to education, political representation, and overall social services. Those who were seen as “more French” possessed better access and more equality with French citizens. The people who were “most French” include: “*métis*, *originaires* of the Quatre Communes, civil servants in State Services, former soldiers, Malians who had renounced their personal status and chosen to come under the French civil code.”<sup>81</sup> Civil servants were often prestigious Africans, such as chiefs, who advanced through the French administration to concede to policies of *association* and the fulfillment of *assimilation*. This discrimination based on personal status furthered the unequal access of the benefits of French society, such as education and

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 213.

<sup>79</sup> Hillary Jones, “Rethinking Politics in the Colony: The *Métis* of Senegal and Urban Politics in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century,” *Journal of African History* 53 (2012): 330.

<sup>80</sup> Saada, *Empire’s Children*, 102.

<sup>81</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 377.

health care. Because this discrimination unequally favored the citizens of the Four Communes, Senegal illustrates how France has continued relations into the present with the Senegalese because a majority of its citizens are “most French” compared to other African nations.

### **Identity at the Regional Level**

At the “state” level, France categorized colonial regions in unique ways, ranging from department to League of Nations mandate (UN trust territory) to protectorate to a full-fledged colony. Regional level identity is important, primarily because territorial borders are similar to state borders today, which encompasses the individuals residing within each region. Each category received resources according to their “Frenchness,” with Algeria receiving more than others as it contained the largest number of French/European settlers. Based on the regional status, France had varying levels of authority, as will be made clear in the discussion of protectorates. This level of authority is significant because it help French settlers to establish a rule of law and French culture within respective regions.

#### *Department*

Officially colonized in 1832, Algeria became a part of France and was considered a department (although overseas) of the Empire in the same way that Paris and Rhône are departments within the territorial borders of European France. The *colons* or *pieds-noirs*, who were of French descent but immigrated to Algeria or were born in the department to French parents, living in Algeria furthered the unique status

of the department because local Algerians had frequent interactions with French citizens. *Colons* had French citizenship, although some had never stepped foot on French soil in continental Europe. This was not considered odd because Algeria was an overseas department and therefore a part of France. There were just over 1 million *colons* living in Algeria at the time of independence, compared to nearly 12 million Algerians.

On May 8, 1945, several Algerians erupted in protest in what became known as the Massacre de Sétif, where *pieds-noirs* (European settlers) were killed, and the French army retaliated by killing Muslim Algerians. The close integration and favoritism towards Algeria meant that President de Gaulle was unwilling to lose an integral part of France. Violence was manifested in war (1958-1962), which resulted in Algerians fighting and taking independence by force rather than declaration. This gruesome and bloody war has stained—especially due to the mass disappearances and torture of Algerians—French relations with Algeria since its resolve with the Evian accords in 1962.<sup>82</sup> Despite the special colonial status, Algeria has not succumbed to French influence in the present.

### *Protectorates*

Protectorates—Morocco and Tunisia—were autonomous under French rule as both countries were under the jurisdiction of legitimate authorities, the Sultan of Morocco and the Bey of Tunis. Tunisia was conquered in 1881, whereas Morocco maintained its de facto independence until 1912. In some instances, previous rulers

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<sup>82</sup> Christopher Hitchens, “A Chronology of Algerian War of Independence,” *The Atlantic*, November 2006, accessed January 10, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/11/a-chronology-of-the-algerian-war-of-independence/305277/>.

were allowed to maintain various levels of control and administration in exchange for taxes and labor to France.<sup>83</sup> Because of the protectorates' experience in limited self-rule, France quickly granted independence for Morocco and Tunisia. The positive experience of decolonization in the protectorates has contributed to good relations with France today.

### *Mandates*

Mandates from the League of Nations—Togo and Cameroon—were former German colonies that were allotted to France after the World War I. Because Germany was unfit to keep its colonies, and the international community did not believe that African nations should have independence, these two nations were given to France for administrative purposes and protection. Togo and Cameroon were not seen as colonies because the United Nations (League of Nations) oversaw many of French administrative and diplomatic actions in these two territories.<sup>84</sup> However, “the day-to-day administration of mandates was in most respects assimilated to that of colonies, but France neither assumed sovereignty over its mandates nor conferred its nationality on their people.”<sup>85</sup> Rule over mandates was similar to colonial rule as government officials and clerks were required to speak the French language. French remains the working language of Togo and the French parts of Cameroon. Although French control over mandates was limited and shorter than full-fledged colonial rule,

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<sup>83</sup> Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 111.

<sup>84</sup> Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

<sup>85</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 20.

France still facilitated the spread of French “identity” by implementing colonial institutions, such as education, language, and access to government services.

### *Colonies*

The last classification encompasses the majority of French possessions, and it is the status of colony. Colonies were subject to the strictest forms of direct rule and *assimilation*. Colonies were ruled by the Governor General and were separated into two distinct regions: French West Africa (AOF) and French Equatorial Africa (AEF). The French West African territory included Benin (Dahomey), Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali (French Soudan), Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. While the French Equatorial African territory included Central African Republic (Ubangui-Chari), Chad, Republic of Congo, and Gabon. Although Madagascar was also considered a colony, its geographic location separated it from the AOF and AEF colonies.

French possessions, where French officials had complete jurisdiction, were divided up and ruled at four levels: (1) territories, (2) colonies, (3) circles, and (4) provinces, cantons, or villages depending on the region. A Governor General presided over each territory—one in Dakar, Senegal (AOF) and one in Brazzaville, Congo (AEF)—and administrative duties and tax collections were further organized into *chefs de canton*, which were sometimes the existing African chiefs. The lower levels of administrative and official positions were eventually held by Africans since French officials would outsource less appealing jobs, such as collecting taxes from residents, to local African chiefs in order to avoid the negative association. The French viewed

these canton chiefs as symbolic and were hesitant to give power. However, in Guinea-Conakry and Senegal, the French could not maintain control or remove the canton chiefs without revolt. To avoid losing their legitimate rule in these colonies, France excluded the most powerful and traditional rulers from holding administrative positions but allowed those with similar ideals to rise within the administration.<sup>86</sup> Under *association*, elite Africans gained more French education and could be identified as more French due to education in the French language and culture. They were able to hold elite positions within the French colonies and territories; one such position was that of the Deputy of the Four Communes of Senegal, which was first held by Blaise Diagne. With an understanding of how different regions were ruled by France, we next look at the contributions that each region played in the formation of the French Union.

### **French Union and French Community**

Although many scholars argue that independence was motivated by the ideas of self-determination from the Atlantic Charter and pushed further by the French-African soldiers from the World Wars, a closer examination of history illustrates how political leaders in francophone Africa, especially Leopold Senghor and Felix Houphouët-Boigny, were instead advocating for equality and closeness with the rest of the French Empire rather than complete independence.<sup>87</sup> This advocacy for forming a union with France illustrates how states were aware of their levels of

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<sup>86</sup> Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 117.

<sup>87</sup> Richard Dowden, "Ivory Coast's Descent into Madness," *The Guardian*, January 1, 2011, accessed April 17, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/02/ivory-coast-richard-dowden-comment>.

“Frenchness” prior to independence. In 1946, due to the demands of the *originaires* and *évolués*, who were members of the *Assemblée Nationale* (National Assembly), every person living under French rule would be given citizenship, through the Lamine Guèye law. However, in the Four Communes and the exclusive African elite, citizenship was not applied homogenously throughout the empire. Prior to this “universal” citizenship law, French Muslims achieved full citizenship rights under the Ordinance of March 7, 1944, which

applied to former military officers, holders of certain diplomas, active or retired civil servants, current and former members of chambers of commerce or agriculture, certain councilors, holders of various civilian and military honors or medals, members of councils of indigenous cooperatives, and several categories of auxiliaries to the administration.<sup>88</sup>

Those who were eligible for citizenship participated more than others in French institutions. The emphasis on civil status and social involvement, plus the distinction of the category French Muslims perpetuated the inequality within the French Empire, soon to be the French Union. Algerian Muslims maintained a unique position in the quantity who were able to achieve citizenship, whereas the rest of French Africa were still obligated to their duties as *sujets* rather than French citizens.

Despite this move towards equality, actual implementation of citizenship proved more challenging and led to further distinction between statuses. This differentiation was rooted in the lack of an *état-civil* in the French territories—the alternate name for colonies post-World War II to illustrate a more inclusive French nation—and the absence of education among all citizens. Because France unevenly provided social services in the colonies, the *état-civil* was not present throughout the

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<sup>88</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 29.

French African territory. Some claim that this absence should not have limited civil participation, since the majority of the Frenchmen after the French Revolution “were illiterate... [and] technical difficulties were not invoked when it came to collecting taxes” from the colonies; however it limited citizenship.<sup>89</sup> Because of this difference in implementing the *état civil* two hundred years later and the focus on the *état-civil* only for African residents, African elites and modern day scholars have argued that this excuse was rooted in racism. The politicians of the French Union argued that the lack of the *état-civil* prevented Africans from voting in a legal manner; however, this was mainly a policy to prevent the large African population—that outnumbered the number of French citizens in European France—from controlling the legislative branch of the government.

Prior to breaking down the differential ways citizenship was applied in the French Union and French Community, it is imperative to understand how the regions of the former French Empire were distinguished from another, although certain areas remained more prestigious (and more “French) than others. The categories included:

1. 'Exterior provinces': Algeria, Réunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyana. They would be considered a 'prolongation of metropolitan territory' and be represented in Parliament as well as in a federal assembly, while retaining a 'large administrative liberty.'
2. 'Federal *pays*': Indochina, New Caledonia, Madagascar. These units, each with multiple components, were considered to have more 'maturity' than other overseas territories and would be allowed to develop a 'political personality' and elect deputies to a federal assembly.
3. 'Federal territories': AOF, AEF, Togo, Cameroon, Oceania, French Somalia. These territories would remain 'under supervision' ['sous tutuelle'], but as they matured, they would acquire more political 'personality' and eventually choose their representatives to the federal assembly.

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<sup>89</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 70.



4. 'International protectorates': Tunisia, Morocco, New Hebrides. Under international law, they possessed sovereignty and nationality, but the commission saw a 'spontaneous movement' among them toward 'the French community.' They too would have a place in the federal assembly.<sup>90</sup>

Depending on the categorization, each territory/province/protectorate/*pays* would have specific representation in the National Assembly. The overseas territories had 64 out of 586 seats in the ANC, which were broken down by region and the number of European French and African French living in the area. For example, AOF had six deputies for Africans and four for French citizens. Morocco and Tunisia's indigenous populations were not represented at the legislative level; only the European population could choose the five deputies for membership in the National Assembly.<sup>91</sup> Additionally, French and African legislators debated the idea of bicameral legislature and a double college of electorates. Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny, two African representatives in the National Assembly, argued that this would be an excluding and racist policy, whereas French politicians feared the sheer number of Africans influencing too much of the new French Republic.

In addition to the discussion of how to include African regions in the French Union, debates shifted to citizenship and if it would include both civil and political rights accompanied by French nationality. Those living in the Associated States, like Morocco and Tunisia, had only civil rights because these states had a different form of autonomy and self-rule than the rest of the French Union.<sup>92</sup> France did not have a legitimate, enforcing power in the Associated States and could merely suggest or

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 43-44.

<sup>91</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 61.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 76.

propose that Morocco and Tunisia adopt the rights provided by the French Constitution. However, citizens of Morocco and Tunisia were “not foreigners on French soil,” but rather had a unique option to exercise their rights as a citizen of the French Union.<sup>93</sup>

Residents could possess multiple nationalities. For example, one living in Soudan Français could be both Sudanese and French. These discrepancies of French Union citizenships “came out of a fundamentally imperial notion of governing people differently, with an evolutionary language betraying the notion of hierarchy rather than mutual acceptance”—meaning that the French Union attempted to portray an egalitarian society but in reality continued its practice of imperialism.<sup>94</sup> The French Assembly clarified the inequality between French citizenship and French Union citizenship; those in European France (or having ancestors from European France) would have French citizenship but those from the colonies would possess citizenship of the Union, where their passports would say “ ‘citoyen de l’Union’ (citizen of the French Union) as a badge of inferiority.”<sup>95</sup> This ambiguity in the “quality of citizen” allowed for continued discrimination.<sup>96</sup> The French Union was multinational with an imposed French nationality.

With the Lamine Guèye law—the law that gave citizenship to the territories—residents in African territories had citizenship but did not necessarily possess the right to vote directly for representation in the common assembly: “there was universal suffrage, but not necessarily direct. There would be legislative assemblies in each

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<sup>93</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 151.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 113.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 126.

territory, but they would have ‘delegated legislative power.’<sup>97</sup> This discrimination is twofold: (1) because the *état-civil* was not fully in place, France lacked the bureaucratic capabilities to register every citizen, and (2) France was fearful that the sheer number of Africans voting would change the basis of the republican principles currently upheld by the Constitution. The French Union was trying to advocate for equality by removing racist institutions, and “no more could the status of the ‘indigène’—or a religious or racial designation—figure in decrees or laws, nor could personal status be an obstacle to the exercise of any right, with the notable exception of the right to vote.”<sup>98</sup> Few citizens had the right to vote directly for their representatives. This discrimination of citizenship in French Union is illustrated in Figure 1.1.,<sup>99</sup> which demonstrates the difference between French and personal civil status, as well as voters and nonvoters in the overseas regions.

Citizens of the French Union				
Citizens of the French Republic				Citizens of Association States
French Civil Status		Personal Civil Status (overseas)		
Metropole	Overseas	Voters	Nonvoters	

Table 1.2.. Citizenship in the French Union

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>98</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 130.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 129.

In 1956, France compromised and granted some authority to African colonial possessions through the *loi cadre* (reform act). The *loi cadre* transferred some authoritative powers from French to African politicians. However, this compromise on equality was not enough to convince many Africans to stay in the French Union. Because of the existing tensions, the French Assembly proposed a vote from each colonial possession to join the French Community. Guinea-Conakry was the only colony to vote “non” and was subsequently the first French territory to leave the French Empire. The African territories that voted “oui” now sought to discern their place in the greater French Community.

The elites of the territories attempted to establish their significance within the French Union. Leopold Senghor and Modibo Keita—the future presidents of Senegal and Mali—organized their territories into the Mali Federation. Senghor, especially, advocated for the French Union to be organized into a confederation with federations between African nations.<sup>100</sup> Senghor attempted to persuade Houphouët-Boigny and the rest of French West Africa to join the federation, but Côte d’Ivoire refused because she wanted territorial autonomy and direct communication with France rather than a federation.<sup>101</sup> Confusingly, Côte d’Ivoire joined with Niger, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), and Dahomey (Benin) to create a coordinating body called the *Conseil de l’Entente* (Council of Entente).<sup>102</sup> This division between African elites and leaders resulted in “French West Africa split into two blocks” held together by their

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<sup>100</sup> Lambert, “From Citizenship to *Négritude*,” 240.

<sup>101</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 256.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 340.

relationship with France rather than each other, meaning they lacked horizontal solidarity.<sup>103</sup>

As these African federations failed, based on differences between independent states and the lack of cooperation, the former French-African states shifted their focus towards independence from France through means of gaining “competences” in order to avoid the complete break between colonizer and colonized that happened in Guinea-Conakry in 1958. Not only was there a desire from Africa to gain independence at this point, but also President Charles de Gaulle began to realize that the former colonies were costing more than they were worth. However, France was so “eager to keep the [Mali Federation] in the French fold that it changed its own constitution to allow an independent, sovereign state to remain in the Community.”<sup>104</sup> When Guinea demanded independence, French administrators abandoned the colony by “empt[ying] their cash registers and shipp[ing] the weapons of the police, the library of the Ministry of Justice, and the furniture of the governor’s palace back to France.”<sup>105</sup> Not only had France become desperate to preserve the former empire, but it disproportionately favored colonies that were more like France.

As former colonies gained independence, de Gaulle left “the door open to its ex-citizens to reassert their French nationality if they established residence within the current boundaries of France, even if they had another nationality.”<sup>106</sup> The French government provided freedom of movement in the former French Community until the 1970s. The formerly colonized were able to travel throughout francophone Africa

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 372.

<sup>104</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 432.

<sup>105</sup> Ayittey, *Africa Betrayed*, 98.

<sup>106</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 416.

and France for both labor and leisure. Once again, there was discrimination based on geography and recognizing French nationality post-independence:

Africans born before independence could have their French nationality 'recognized' if and only if they established residency within the current boundaries of the French Republic... people who were descended from an 'originaire'...of the République française could retain their French nationality without the residency requirements...Algerians could retain French nationality without settling in France if they were of French civil status.<sup>107</sup>

Only those who had an adequate amount of 'Frenchness' were able to apply for French citizenship and nationality with the dissolution of the French Community, yet *originaires* did not have to be physically present in mainland France to preserve their French nationality.

### Conclusion

France lacked a unified doctrine for West and Equatorial Africa; instead of homogeneous policies, "actions had been undertaken piecemeal, often with the best of intentions."<sup>108</sup> Because of this piecemeal process of applying French rule on the African continent, the colonized often differed in their perceptions of identity and the legitimacy of French rule. Those with a "political belonging," in the French Republic, especially those who held political positions, fared better during and after colonization than those who remained *sujets* throughout the entire period.<sup>109</sup> By actively participating in the colonial empire, through voting and serving in minor administrative positions, some Africans began to adopt the French identity, as was the case for the group of *assimilés*. As will be analyzed in the following chapter, these

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<sup>107</sup> Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation*, 423.

<sup>108</sup> Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize*, 185.

<sup>109</sup> Mann, *Native Sons*, 8.

groups often facilitated and accepted a close relationship with their former colonizer in the post-independent years, furthering the relative “Frenchness.” These levels of “Frenchness” created during colonialism at both the individual and regional levels have repercussions for modern-day relations, as will be illustrated in the third chapter and the presentation of how identity drives aid allocation.

## Chapter 2: The Role of Françafrique in Post-Colonial Identity

### Formation

The failures of the French Union and Community influenced the new, neocolonial approach through covert networks, or what has been called Françafrique. French colonialism was the beginning of “Frenchness” in Africa, but de Gaulle made several attempts to maintain influence in former colonies, including the failed French Union followed by Françafrique interventions. Despite the collapse of the French Union in 1960, caused by the independence movements that encompassed much of Africa, France has continued to maintain its hold on former African territories through the policy of Françafrique. This unofficial policy arose under the de Gaulle administration with the appointment of Jacques Foccart as chief advisor of *cellule africaine* (African cell). Following the decolonization of French colonial possessions (excluding Guinea and Algeria) in 1960, de Gaulle advocated for “independence for France’s African colonies only in theory, while keeping them reliant on France in practice.”<sup>110</sup> Françafrique was implemented through bilateral treaties of cooperation with eighteen former French colonies. These bilateral treaties included the creation of the CFA franc zone, holding of African reserves in the French Treasury, budgets directly dependent on French aid, French officials running African schools, and a handful of defense agreements. The origins of Françafrique are rooted in these bilateral agreements in the immediate post-colonial world.

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<sup>110</sup> Martial K. Frindéhié, *From Lumumba to Gbagbo: Africa in the Eddy of the Euro-American Quest for Exceptionalism* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2016), 81.



So what does *Françafrique* really mean? *Françafrique* is a term that broadly denotes the relationship between France and former French colonies.<sup>111</sup> However, in recent years, it has been extended to include other African countries as well. The term itself is borrowed from the former Côte d’Ivoire President, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, who maintained a close relationship with various French administrations throughout his thirty-three yearlong rule. More specifically, *Françafrique* includes informal networks—such as the corrupt relationship between French corporation executives and African political leaders—as well as the official channels of French education and military assistance. The informal networks of *Françafrique* are not officially sponsored by the state but operate alongside the policies of the French government.

Further emphasizing the uniqueness of the relationship between France and former colonies through *Françafrique* is the absence of such in imperial counterparts, like the British or Portuguese. Although many former British colonies belong to the Commonwealth of Nations, this intergovernmental organization is based on consensus. French actors—specifically politicians and wealthy businessmen—mostly determine *Françafrique* with little consultation from their African correspondents. For the purposes of this thesis, I will use *Françafrique* as the combination of official and informal policies between the French government, French multinational corporations, and French actors, in their negotiations and often exploitation of African nations. Despite originating at the end of colonization, *Françafrique* has continued to drive French policies towards its former colonies and other African nations.

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<sup>111</sup> According to Maja Bovcon, the meaning of *Françafrique* as a “concept tends to oscillate between its narrower sense focusing on the corrupt informal Franco-African networks...and a broad description of the Franco-African relationship, in which these informal networks are only one, even if an important part.” Maja Bovcon, “*Françafrique* and Regime Theory,” *European Journal of International Relations* 19.1 (2011), 6.

Françafrique illustrates the interconnectedness between states, with France grabbing for power in African nations through social, political, and economic means. Françafrique and French interest in Africa is motivated by the desire for French influence and access to natural resources. The material benefits from petrodollars and secret economic negotiations cannot be completely disregarded as a part of the motivation behind Françafrique.<sup>112</sup> Some critics of Franco-African relations have dubbed Françafrique as “France à fric,” which translates as a source of cash.<sup>113</sup> Although there are material gains to be made from the policies of Françafrique, France enacts such policies based on identity and history. This analysis will become clearer in Chapter 3 when I control for economic benefits as a factor in determining aid allocation.

In this chapter, I argue that Françafrique is the mechanism through which France continues to influence the relative level of “Frenchness.” Although the initial identity was formed during the colonial period, continued interaction between French and African actors through neocolonialist policies increases the shared identity present in each former French colonial possession. The first section will reference the identity theory necessary for understanding how Françafrique can influence the identity of a particular state. The following section will illustrate how Françafrique is extensive, as the relationship affects many different aspects of African politics, economics, and culture. Françafrique often increases the “Frenchness” a certain state has because African actors play a more important role than in the colonial period.

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<sup>112</sup> *The Economist*, “No Winds of Change,” June 1, 2010, accessed Oct 23, 2016, <http://www.economist.com/node/16266978>.

<sup>113</sup> Christophe Boisbouvier, “50 Years Later, Françafrique Is Alive and Well,” *RFI*, February 20, 2010, accessed October 25, 2016, <http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20100216-50-years-later-francafrique-alive-and-well>.

Analyzing how Françafrique contributes to identity formation is vital for understanding how identity determines aid allocation.

### **Françafrique and Identity**

Following the embarrassment of the Vichy government during World War II, historians have observed, “that the building of French great power status was a constant preoccupation of French policy makers,” especially as the Atlantic Charter dismissed the claims for colonial possessions, as was discussed in Chapter 1.<sup>114</sup> In order to uphold this sphere of influence,<sup>115</sup> French exceptionalism, and the ideals of *liberté, égalité, et fraternité* (liberty, equality, and fraternity) enshrined in the French constitution, de Gaulle proposed the formation of a French Community that would incorporate French West and Equatorial Africa with more autonomy within the French Empire. When the Fourth Republic quickly crumbled with the independence movements of 1960, France attempted to maintain its perceived status as a world power by advocating for a “familial” relationship with former colonies.<sup>116</sup> African independence did not erase the ties of colonialism; rather these ties were reshaped into networks (*reseaux*) and families. This categorization as ‘family’ rather than a relationship based on material capabilities, led to the special treatment that is Françafrique. Françafrique, itself, has been categorized as a web of “highly personalized, family-like relations between the French and African political leaders

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<sup>114</sup> Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France’s Successful Decolonization?* (Berg: New York, 2002): 10.

<sup>115</sup> *pré carré*

<sup>116</sup> Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons, and Wayne Sandholtz, “After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 8.2 (2002): 267-8.

and the parallel networks of economic and political elites.”<sup>117</sup> This familial identity “explains why Europeans sustain special economic, political, institutional relationships with otherwise ordinary (even unappealing) partners.”<sup>118</sup> The notion of family creates a collective identity that results in special treatment for those who share such identity.

States identities can be hierarchical, meaning that they value or prioritize identities over one another. For example, Senegal can identify as a member of the African Union and a democracy in West Africa, in addition to its partnership with the French. Because identities can change, albeit slowly, *Françafrique* insured that the French identity established during colonization would not deteriorate. The repeated interactions between French and African actors—heads of state, government officials, corporations, citizens, etc.—lead to a collective French identity.

### **The Channels of *Françafrique***

*Françafrique* has historically been and continues to be the *de facto* policy of French governments following decolonization. Following the collapse of the French Union, de Gaulle wanted to maintain France’s power status by prioritizing its existing sphere of influence, in former African colonies and other French-speaking nations (Rwanda and Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire). Because France primarily saw itself as a “world power,” despite the contrary views held by most other states, and the policies of *Françafrique* and continuous intervention in Africa were an attempt to uphold such status.

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<sup>117</sup> Bovcon, “*Françafrique and Regime Theory*,” 11.

<sup>118</sup> Brysk, Parsons, and Sandholtz, “After Empire,” 268.

Françafrique is a form of neocolonialism because it is, by definition, the French attempt to influence African politics, culture, and economics. Neocolonialism, in this instance, differs from colonialism in the extent to which African actors possess agency. During colonization, African agency was present but more constrained due to the structure of direct rule in French territories. In the post-colonial period, African heads of state possess sovereignty and jurisdiction in their respective countries, and oftentimes they practice such authority in order to keep French influence at bay. However, some African heads of state choose to use French influence to their advantage and seek closer economic and political ties in order to promote economic growth and clout in the international community. Both French and African actors are aware of their agency and role. This shared understanding illustrates the influence of African leaders in the continuity of Françafrique.

A primary example of the difference in African agency is Guinea. Guinea-Conakry was the first French African colony to gain independence. When de Gaulle allowed colonies to vote on joining the French Union, Guinea simply said “non,” and as a result ended their favored relationship with France. African heads of state who disagreed with “French interests were simply frozen out, as in the case of Guinea’s President, Sekou Touré, who sought and gained independence in 1958, before Paris was ready to relinquish control.”<sup>119</sup> Rather than encouraging autonomy of an independent state, de Gaulle evacuated all French officials and all things associated with French assistance, even doorknobs from government buildings, from Guinea-Conakry. Unlike other French interventions in its former colonies, France has

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<sup>119</sup> Howard W. French, “How France Shaped New Africa,” *The New York Times*, February 28, 1995, accessed October 27, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/28/world/how-france-shaped-new-africa.html>.

primarily left Guinea-Conakry to its own devices, especially as Guinea followed a Marxist regime throughout the Cold War.<sup>120</sup> In the present, France is not privy to secret deals for Guinea's mineral reserves, but instead competes among other nations in the market place for potential investment opportunities.<sup>121</sup> France is treated like most other foreign nations in regards to economic and political relations.

Another example of exercising agency is Rwanda, which was a former Belgian colony that possessed relative levels of "Frenchness." Rwanda belonged to the French-speaking community, and France attempted to further this relationship through both aid and technical advice. France was deeply involved in Rwanda through language training and support of the government. However, Rwanda abandoned French as their official language in 2009, in an attempt to tarnish France's reputation for their suspected role in the 1994 genocide. Rwanda then joined the British Commonwealth, dealing another blow to French influence.

### Variations in Françafrique

Before providing analysis on the mechanisms of Françafrique in contributing to French African identity, it is essential to understand that the policies have not been homogenous since 1960. Despite its lengthy status as *de facto*—and sometimes *de jure*—French policy in Africa has wavered with each president; however, all presidents have attempted to preserve *exception française* (French exceptionalism), both domestically and internationally. Although much of the French leadership has

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<sup>120</sup> Angelique Chrisafis, "Guinea: War, Poverty, Dictatorship and Bauxite," *The Guardian*, September 29, 2009, accessed January 30, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/29/france-guinea-colonial-relationship>.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

followed in the footsteps of the Fifth Republic's first president (Charles de Gaulle), the policies have ranged from mutually beneficial to predominantly exploitative.

Different presidents, such as Pompidou (1969-1974) and Mitterand (1981-1995) approached the role of France from a perspective of cultural influence by emphasizing *la Francophonie* and hosting a large number of Franco-African summits. Others, like d'Estaing (1974-1981) and Sarkozy (2007-2012), sustained the military reach of Françafrique by increasing the number of military agreements, bases, soldiers, and interventions.<sup>122</sup> The current president, François Hollande, promised to “bring a moral dimension to French foreign policy” towards Africa.<sup>123</sup> Despite their continuous attempts for a more honest and equal relationship, the reach of Françafrique continued to dominate and exploit much of Africa.

### Mechanisms

The strength of the relationship between an African nation and France are based on the presence of the following categories: (1) the number of French citizens, (2) education, (3) language, (4) government institutions, (5) technical assistance, (6) military presence, (7) shared currencies, (8) multinational corporations, (9) economic relationships, and (10) similarities in voting patterns in the United Nations. These mechanisms of Françafrique influence different aspects of identity and lead to a greater level of “Frenchness” by permeating nearly all facets of the Franco-African relationship.

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<sup>122</sup> Gordon Cumming, *Aid to Africa: French and British Policies from the Cold War to the New Millennium*, (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2011), 62-66.

<sup>123</sup> *BBC News*, “What Will François Hollande Mean for Africa?” 9 May 2012, accessed 27 Oct 2016.

The following section will provide detail of the various mechanisms of Françafrique that strengthen the shared identity between France and former colonies. However, this list is not comprehensive, as other aspects—such as the number of Africans educated in France—construct an identity with French-like characteristics. These additional mechanisms are equally important but either exist at a small level or lack the data to evaluate the effects. Examples will be presented throughout this chapter to illustrate the pervasiveness of Françafrique. These mechanisms illustrate how frequent interactions, a key determinant in the constructivist literature, facilitate identity formation.

### French Residents

French citizens often migrate to former French colonies, for both economic and personal reasons. Figure 2.1. and Figure 2.2. illustrate the total French migrant stock residing in former colonies, split between West and Equatorial Africa, for the last 25 years.<sup>124</sup> French migrants are not present in all former colonies and are predominantly concentrated in Benin, Guinea, Mali, Senegal and Togo in West Africa and Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, and Gabon. However, the number of French residents has varied based on the political climate in both France and various African nations. There was a significant presence of French nationals living in Senegal in 1960, due to its capital being the headquarters of French West Africa, and nearly 14,000 French migrants lived in Senegal in 2015. There were more French residents living in Côte d’Ivoire in the 1990s than during the colonial

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<sup>124</sup> UN Global Migration Database, “International Migration Flows to and from Selected Countries: The 2015 Revision,” accessed April 16, 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/empirical2/migrationflows.shtml>.






Figure 2.1. Total French migrant stock in French West Africa




Figure 2.2. Total French migrant stock in French Equatorial Africa

period, and “at the shoulder of every minister was a French ‘adviser.’ ”<sup>125</sup> However, after the Ivoirian miracle subsided and conflict broke out in Côte d’Ivoire, most French migrants returned to France. Although at a personal level, the presence of French citizens residing in Africa increases shared understanding that facilitates a common identity.

### Education

As discussed in Chapter 1, education was one of the primary tools used during colonization through the policies of *assimilation* and *mise en valeur*. Unlike the colonial institutions, however, education in sub-Saharan Africa today is not distinguished between rural and urban schools, and variation does not exist in the same facet as the colonial period, where there were clear divides between education for individuals and states of a particular status. For example, *originaires* had access to French education, whereas *sujets* attended school with the specific intention of generating a healthy workforce or did not attend school at all. The African education system still resembles the French colonial education style, despite the high poverty levels and poor governance of many West African countries. This is partially due to France continuing to intervene in education, especially in regards to the French language. In 2014, France proposed an ambitious plan to train 100,000 African teachers in the French language, meaning that the French government is using

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<sup>125</sup> Richard Dowden, “Ivory Coast’s Descent into Madness,” *The Guardian*, January 1, 2011, accessed April 17, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/02/ivory-coast-richard-dowden-comment>.

education as a neocolonial tool to invest in the education of other nations' youth.<sup>126</sup> This emphasis on the French language is evident in the following section.

### Language

Language, because of its ability to disseminate cultural understanding, was one of the most effective colonial tools under the policies of *assimilation* and *la mission civilisatrice*. French was the working language of government officials and various African elites, and it is still used in many former French colonies. French is the official language of fourteen countries, including two former Belgian colonies. Additionally, in ten former French colonies, 25 percent of the population speaks French.<sup>127</sup> Language is one of the primary ways to facilitate cultural understanding, and therefore the French language increases “Frenchness.”

The *Organization Internationale de la Francophonie* (International Organization of la Francophonie, OIF) is an official institution created in 1970 and comprised of nation-states where either: (1) French is the official language, (2) a portion of the population speaks French, or (3) they possess an affiliation with the French culture. Under this broad definition, there are fifty-seven member states, including several in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia; however, the majority of members are former French colonies in Africa. According to the official website, the OIF “organises [sic] political activities and actions of multilateral cooperation that

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<sup>126</sup> RFI, “France to Train 100,000 African Teachers to Mark World Francophone Day,” March 20, 2014, accessed January 30, 2017, <http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20140320-france-train-100000-teachers-africa-international-francophone-day-abdou-diouf-laurent-fabius>.

<sup>127</sup> Britannica, *Britannica Book of the Year 2010*, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 2010), 766-770.

benefit French-speaking populations.”<sup>128</sup> This organization illustrates how France has institutionalized the use of language as soft power to increase the spread of economic and political ties with other nations. OIF member states constitute a significant portion of the global population. There are 274 million French speakers in the world, with 96.2 million currently residing in Africa.<sup>129</sup> In addition to the former French colonies as members of la *Francophonie*, other nations have joined the organization in order to cooperate with regional partners in West and Equatorial Africa. One such member of *la Francophonie* is Equatorial Guinea, who, although a former Spanish colony, has adopted French as a language in order to foster better relations with their West African neighbors and France.<sup>130</sup>

#### Government Institutions

The OIF only touches the surface of Franco-African institutions, which attempt to promote *exception française* abroad. Prior to decolonization, *Fonds d’Investissement Economique et Social* (Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development or FIDES), was implemented as a means to develop colonial areas overseas. Although not the first French program in the colonial empire, FIDES was significant in French attempts to build and sustain influence in Africa. In the years following independence, many government organizations, with similar capacity and purpose, have been created and modified under various French presidents. In 1959,

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<sup>128</sup> “Welcome to the International Organisation of La Francophonie’s Official Website, *Organisation Internaitonale de la Francophonie*, accessed April 14, 2017, <http://www.francophonie.org/Welcome-to-the-International.html>.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> James Brooke, “Africa Nation Opens Doors to French,” *The New York Times*, November 1 1987, accessed October 26 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/01/world/africa-nation-opens-doors-to-the-french.html>.

President de Gaulle replaced FIDES and created a new fund called the *Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération* (Fund for Aid and Cooperation, FAC), whose mission now included technical and military defense in addition to cultural and economic assistance.<sup>131</sup> Additional institutions were formed under FAC to provide development loans and supervise various projects. The Ministry for Cooperation and Development (MC) was formed to fulfill the official French aid policy outlined in the Jeanneney Report in 1964.<sup>132</sup> De Gaulle continued to create multiple institutions to pursue his Franco-African policy including separate cultural (*Missions de Coopération et d'Action Culturelle*) and military (*Mission Militaire de Coopération*) organizations throughout his presidency.<sup>133</sup> Perhaps most significant was his appointment of Jacques Foccart as *Monsieur Afrique* (Mr. Africa) as the head of the African cell, which was an advisory committee that created French policies for Africa. Foccart would greatly shape the Françafrique regime in years to come and advise multiple presidents.

The second president of the Fifth Republic, Georges Pompidou, institutionalized the French language as OIF, in order to promote the cooperation among French speakers. Additionally, he hosted the inaugural Franco-African summit in December 1973, which has had profound effects on the relationships between the former colonizer and African nation-states even today.<sup>134</sup> Similar to the OIF in extending culture but increasing the scope of such influence is the *Institut Français*—responsible for spreading French culture abroad—located in both Dakar and Saint

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<sup>131</sup> Cumming, *Aid to Africa*, 60.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

<sup>133</sup> Mission for Cooperation and Cultural Action; Mission for Military Cooperation.

<sup>134</sup> Cumming, *Aid to Africa*, 62.

Louis, which were two of the Four Communes.<sup>135</sup> Because of the historical status of these two cities, they engage in more cultural formation than other cities in the former French colonial empire.

Subsequent presidents enacted minor changes in French institutions operating in Africa. One of the most significant alterations occurred when President François Hollande (2012-2017) combined the cabinet positions for development and *Francophonie* in order to reduce the number of ministers and secretary-generals. This combination has faced criticism from international nongovernmental organizations, which argue that it confuses the separation between members of *la Francophonie* and the rest of the development community.<sup>136</sup> The international community did not support combining development with the furthering of French strategic influence into one position as this obscures the line between French and non-French policy. The alphabet soup of organizations pertaining to French-speaking Africa is not exhausted in this brief overview; however, it provides relevant information for understanding the pervasive aspects of *Françafrique* from a top-down perspective.

#### Technical Assistance

Because France had worked so diligently to establish the French Union just to see its demise two years later, they were unwilling to permanently abandon their former colonies without providing advice and assistance. This unwillingness was a trend among colonial powers, like Britain and Portugal, who felt that African nations

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<sup>135</sup> “France and Senegal,” *France Diplomatie*, April 7, 2016, accessed January 10, 2017, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/senegal/france-and-senegal/>.

<sup>136</sup> Cécile Barbière, “French Development Aid and Francophonie Make Unlikely Bedfellows,” *EurActiv*, January 8, 2015, accessed January 30, 2017, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/french-development-aid-and-francophonie-make-unlikely-bedfellows/>.

were not yet ready for full independence and needed continued administrative and technical support for an unforeseen period. However, British and Portuguese administrators did not intervene to the same extent as the French. Following independence, “the immediate entourage of most Francophone leaders included many Frenchmen in key positions—chief of cabinet, private secretary, bodyguards” who served as advisors to newly democratically elected leaders in African nation-states.<sup>137</sup> Oftentimes, former French secret servicemen served as part of the African presidential guard. For example, President Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire appointed several French citizens to government positions and other advisory roles. He maintained his strong relationship with France throughout his presidency. From 1970-1990, France provided \$8.2 billion (1990 prices)<sup>138</sup> in technical assistance expenditures by “revamping the justice and security sectors.”<sup>139</sup>

Furthermore, France has frequently held Franco-African summits to sustain channels of political and economic advice, fostering increased relationships between African states and France. These summits are vital to the notion of the French *pré carré* and in the recent past have included non-French speaking countries, like Zimbabwe’s Mugabe, who has a poor reputation in the international community.<sup>140</sup> The extension of an invitation to a non-francophone, former British colony illustrates France’s potential intentions to invest in Zimbabwe’s economy, which lacks the

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<sup>137</sup> Tamar Golan, “A Certain Mystery: How Can France Do Everything that It Does in Africa—And Get Away with It?” *African Affairs* 80.318 (1981), 6.

<sup>138</sup> Cumming, *Aid to Africa*, 68.

<sup>139</sup> Matt Wells, “François Hollande’s ‘Change’ Is More of the Same on Côte d’Ivoire,” *Human Rights Watch*, February 6, 2013, accessed April 17, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/06/francois-hollandes-change-more-same-cote-divoire>.

<sup>140</sup> Henri Astier, “Zimbabwe’s French Connection,” *BBC News*, January 24, 2003, accessed October 26, 2016, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2692343.stm>.

French historical relationship but may provide friendly relations and access to natural resources.

### Heads of State

Françafrique, through various French presidents and ministers, resulted in the formation of a French identity at the highest level of government. France attempted to control former colonies by helping to elect politicians that were allied with France.<sup>141</sup> Corporations provided campaign funds and French officials offered support during elections. However, empowered African heads of state often challenged France on French influence in domestic affairs. Countries with a relatively higher level of “Frenchness” often have leaders who are aligned with French policy, notably Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Gabon. When leaders were aligned with French interests, they often remained in power for several decades, despite the high number of coups d’état in Africa. By serving for long-term periods, African heads of state further solidified the French-African relationship.

### *Côte d’Ivoire*

The first president of Côte d’Ivoire, Felix Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993), set the precedent for the country’s relationship with France. Houphouët-Boigny was involved in the formation of the French Union, as well as setting the criteria for the policy of Françafrique. Houphouët-Boigny used French assistance in order to seize power over the country, as well as the military, following independence on August 7,

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<sup>141</sup> *Al Jazeera*, “The French African Connection,” April 7, 2014, accessed April 14, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2013/08/201387113131914906.html>, Part I, 23:50.



1960. Furthermore, Houphouët-Boigny modeled the political structure of Côte d'Ivoire after the system during colonization. For example, he maintained the same *sous-sections* (regions) and used something similar to direct rule.<sup>142</sup> Houphouët-Boigny held the presidency for thirty-four years and throughout his life, he upheld the advantageous relationship with the French. Under his rule, he allowed for neighboring country residents, such as those of Burkina Faso and Togo, to immigrate to Côte d'Ivoire; many of these immigrants obtained citizenship, which would yield consequences in future elections.

Côte d'Ivoire has recently had a tumultuous relationship with France, consequentially under the authority of Laurent Gbagbo. Gbagbo achieved power as Alassane Ouattara was prohibited from running since his parents originated from Burkina Faso.<sup>143</sup> In 2002, France intervened to protect French nationals during an attempted coup d'état and later received support from the UNSC for Operation Licorne.<sup>144</sup> France was against Gbagbo as he was "perceived to be a danger to French private interests in strategic Ivorian companies, and Gbagbo's policies "may have resulted in the end of secret deals for French firms."<sup>145</sup> In October 2010, France assisted Côte d'Ivoire when Gbagbo refused to transfer power to Ouattara. France also helped to open an investigation of Laurent Gbagbo at the International Criminal

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<sup>142</sup> Ryan Logan, "The Coming of Age in the Ivory Coast," *EDGE: Ethics of Development in a Global Environment*, July 26, 1999, accessed April 14, 2017, [http://web.stanford.edu/class/e297c/war\\_peace/africa/hage.html](http://web.stanford.edu/class/e297c/war_peace/africa/hage.html).

<sup>143</sup> Stephen W. Smith, "The Story of Laurent Gbagbo," *London Review of Books* 33.10 (2011), <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n10/stephen-w-smith/the-story-of-laurent-gbagbo>.

<sup>144</sup> "France and Côte d'Ivoire," *France Diplomatie*, January 13, 2017, accessed April 14, 2017, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/cote-d-ivoire/france-and-cote-d-ivoire/presentation/>.

<sup>145</sup> Frindéhié, *From Lumumba to Gbagbo*, 85.

Court—he denied all charges against him in January 2016.<sup>146</sup> French ministers supported Ouattara because of his relationship with Houphouët-Boigny and therefore had Ivoirian interests that aligned with French objectives. Since Ouattara obtained the presidency, French relations with the country have once again stabilized.

### *Senegal*

President Léopold Senghor was a frontrunner in the formation of the French Union. Senghor viewed himself as a Frenchman, as he had studied at the University of Paris and was well known for composing French poetry.<sup>147</sup> Senghor had advocated for a federation of French-African states and was politically active in maintaining Senegal's relationship with France following independence. Under Senghor's policies, Senegal aligned with French objectives in order to economically gain, in terms of trade and exchange of culture. For example, there are over 7,500 Senegalese students attending higher education in France. These students will likely become the next Senegalese leaders, and they have an understanding of the shared Franco-African relationship.

Senghor held the presidency for twenty years before peacefully transitioning power to Abdou Diouf. Unlike Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal has had fewer scandals and maintains a larger network through French corporations and cultural institutions. Subsequent Senegalese presidents have followed the Senghor's approach for

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<sup>146</sup> Oumar Ba, "Who is Laurent Gbagbo, and Why Is He on Trial at the ICC?" *The Washington Post*, February 3, 2016, accessed January 10, 2017, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/03/who-is-laurent-gbagbo-and-why-is-he-on-trial-at-the-icc/?utm\\_term=.b913192ac06c..](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/03/who-is-laurent-gbagbo-and-why-is-he-on-trial-at-the-icc/?utm_term=.b913192ac06c..)

<sup>147</sup> Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 343.

maintaining a healthy and beneficial relationship with France. By attending various French-African summits and building Françafrique networks, Senegalese heads of state have furthered the presence of “Frenchness” among government officials and the domestic population.

### *Gabon*

Omar Bongo served as president of Gabon for 42 years (1967-2009), and his son, Ali Bongo, took office shortly after his death. France was especially interested in forming a close relationship with Bongo because of his country’s oil reserves, as well as Gabon’s existing influence in neighboring countries due to its historical role as the capital of French Equatorial Africa. Not surprisingly, one of the largest companies in Gabon is Total, formerly known as Elf Aquitaine. The personal relationship between President Omar Bongo and France resulted in secret deals for French oil companies and the advice of hundreds of French civil servants in Gabonese ministries. Because of this resource wealth, Bongo was able to exploit his “bank reserves to cultivate ties in Paris.”<sup>148</sup> Bongo was so powerful that he had influence over French elections and helped put certain politicians in office.<sup>149</sup> Although unsubstantiated, there are rumors that Bongo specifically funded the campaigns for future French presidents Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy.<sup>150</sup> This unique relationship between Bongo and six French presidents illustrates the role of African leaders in furthering the French influence.

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<sup>148</sup> Robert Zaretsky, "France's Bongo-Bongo Party," *Foreign Policy*, September 7, 2016, accessed October 27, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/07/france-bongo-bongo-party-gabon-scandal-sarkozy-hollande-colonialism/>.

<sup>149</sup> “The French African Connection,” Part III, 42:49.

<sup>150</sup> Zaretsky, “France’s Bongo-Bongo Party.”

## Military Interventions

Likely the most controversial aspect of French presence in Africa, France currently maintains four permanent military bases in former African colonies—Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Djibouti. France is the only former colonizer to keep troops in its former African dependencies,<sup>151</sup> as illustrated in Figure 2.3.<sup>152</sup> In 1960, France encouraged newly independent nations to sign bilateral defense treaties



Figure 2.3. Military bases and operations in Sub-Saharan Africa

<sup>151</sup> Richard Bernstein, “In Africa, France is Still a Military Power,” *The New York Times*, April 19 1987, accessed October 26, 2016,

<sup>152</sup> *The Economist*, “They Came to Bury Him, Not to Praise Him,” June 18, 2009, accessed December 15, 2016, <http://www.economist.com/node/13875618>.

that have since contributed to modern Franco-African relations and a level of “Frenchness” based on continued interaction and military protection. France maintains military bases in other countries—besides the four on the African continent—but the bases in Senegal, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Djibouti are unique because they are *forces de presence* (military presence) rather than *forces de souveraineté* (sovereign military). The difference is that *forces de presence* defend *des intérêt français* (French interests) rather than protect French territories, like French Guyana and Antilles.<sup>153</sup>

Since independence, France has intervened nineteen times between 1962 and 1995 in both internal and external conflicts in former French possessions, in an attempt to prop up African leaders aligned with French interests and combat Islamic extremism.<sup>154</sup> Post-independence bilateral defense treaties often gave France the right to intervene to preserve presidencies but also gave French corporations access to natural resources. Abiding by the notion of helping friends first, France intervened in Côte d’Ivoire following the election of Alassane Ouattara when Laurent Gbagbo refused to leave office under Operation Licorne. Ouattara had served as prime minister under the favorable Houphouët-Boigny and had already advocated for a close relationship with France, but Gbagbo did not favor French interference or influence in Ivoirian domestic issues. French military presence has helped less democratic regimes to remain in power, amid domestic and international criticism.

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<sup>153</sup> “Les Forces Françaises Prépositionnées, Mai 2016.” *Ministère de la Défense*. January 31, 2017. Accessed April 14, 2017. <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces-prepositionnees/mission-des-forces-prepositionnees/missions-des-forces-prepositionnees>.

<sup>154</sup> Andrew Hansen, “The French Military in Africa,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, 8 Feb 2008, accessed 26 October 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/france/french-military-africa/p12578>; Jeremy Bender, “France’s Military Is All Over Africa,” January 22, 2015, accessed October 26 2016, Business Insider, <http://www.businessinsider.com/frances-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1>.

President Sarkozy renegotiated defense treaties with former colonies during his presidency to create mutual obligations and remove secret clauses, which permitted France to unnecessarily intervene in African domestic affairs and civil wars.<sup>155</sup> By offering protection to both African leaders and residents, France has strengthened their presence in the region and furthers the “Frenchness” of their supporters.

### CFA Franc Zone

The currency union of former French colonies may be the clearest example of *Françafrique*. Fourteen African nations—including non-former colonies, like Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea—use the CFA franc currency in two zones, the West African and Central African franc. The CFA has often been skewed as a voluntary membership with tangible economic benefits, but France attempted to force countries to participate in the currency union. For example, the French secret service printed fake Guinean francs to destroy the local economy in their attempt to destabilize Guinea.<sup>156</sup> However, in recent years, some non-French colonies have joined, which reduces the impact of the historical scandal. Table 2.1.<sup>157</sup> provides a comprehensive list of present and past members of either CFA franc zone. French bankers dictate African monetary policy for states that adopt the CFA franc, and the French treasury

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<sup>155</sup> Stephen Smith, “How France Maintains Its Grip on Africa,” *BBC Focus on Africa Magazine*, April 29, 2010, accessed October 24, 2016, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8639874.stm>.

<sup>156</sup> “The French African Connection,” *Al Jazeera*.

<sup>157</sup> Africa Recovery, United Nations, “The CFA Franc: New Peg for Common Currency,” April 1999, accessed April 20, 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/africarenewal/subjindx/124euro3.htm>.

holds reserves of nearly \$20 billion to guarantee the CFA franc.<sup>158</sup> The West African central bank is located in Dakar, influencing the collective identity between France

Table 2.1. Members of a CFA franc zone

Country	CFA zone	Years
Benin	XOF	1960-present
Burkina Faso	XOF	1960-present
Cameroon	XAF	1960-present
Central African Republic	XAF	1960-present
Chad	XAF	1960-present
Congo, Republic of	XAF	1960-present
Côte d'Ivoire	XOF	1960-present
Equatorial Guinea*	XAF	1985-present
Gabon	XAF	1960-present
Guinea	XOF	1960
Guinea-Bissau*	XOF	1997-present
Madagascar	XAF	1960-1973
Mali	XOF	1960-1962; 1984-present
Mauritania	XOF	1960-1973
Niger	XOF	1960-present
Senegal	XOF	1960-present
Togo	XOF	1960-present

XOF: CFA franc zone in West Africa

XAF: CFA franc zone in Central Africa

\*Not a former French colony

and Senegal. However, the African finance ministers and treasury departments are unable to adjust their monetary policy to combat various issues, like inflation or unemployment. This currency arrangement benefits France more than the African states, as the CFA franc does not favor African exports but rather promotes French exports to Africa.<sup>159</sup> France devalued the CFA franc by half in 1994 when “France

<sup>158</sup> Robert Neuwirth, “African Monetary Union Stirs Criticism of France,” *Bloomberg*, April 17, 2014, accessed October 28, 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-17/african-monetary-union-stirs-criticism-of-france>.

<sup>159</sup> Craig R. Whitney, “France Snips at the Old Ties that Bind It to Africa,” *The New York Times*, July 25, 1997, accessed October 27, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/25/world/france-snips-at-the-old-ties-that-bind-it-to-africa.html>.

bowed to Western pressure to end what amounted to a subsidy.”<sup>160</sup> Prior to this devaluation, the CFA franc benefited the West African nations who used it as the official currency, but this devaluation has reduced the purchasing power of the former colonies, which are some of the poorest nations in the world (not including oil-rich Gabon). Following the adoption of the euro in 1999, France pegged the CFA franc as 1 EUR = 655.957 XOF.

### Multinational Corporations

Under the guise of Françafrique, French companies were granted significant privileges in Africa, with additional favoritism towards French national companies, such as Elf Aquitaine. Many of these firms and organizations were established during colonization and remained in former colonies as a form of neocolonialism. For example, Gabon has nearly 120 French companies, including Elf, within its borders despite being a small nation of 1.6 million.<sup>161</sup> These multinational corporations are often accompanied by French businessmen, who increase the interpersonal interaction between French and African actors and therefore a common identity.

Elf Aquitaine, an oil and gas company, “paid secret ‘commissions’ to African officials with the blessing of French governments.”<sup>162</sup> Additionally, Elf expanded beyond former French colonies into Angola and Nigeria in order to increase oil

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<sup>160</sup> Kenneth B. Noble, “French Devaluation of African Currency Brings Wide Unrest,” *The New York Times*, February 23, 1994, accessed January 29, 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/23/world/french-devaluation-of-african-currency-brings-wide-unrest.html?pagewanted=all>.

<sup>161</sup> Peggy Hollinger, “Foreign Relations: Life Become More Competitive for the French,” *The Financial Times*, June 4, 2012, accessed January 30, 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/2b665aae-ae5b-11e1-b842-00144feabdc0>.

<sup>162</sup> Lucy Ash, “Breaking France’s Africa habit,” *BBC News*, April 1, 2007, accessed October 27, 2016, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6511963.stm>.



revenues. Under the Mitterrand administration, Elf was accused of funneling money back to France in order to sponsor politicians who could provide support for their corrupt practices throughout Africa. Elf also supported African government budgets and contributed 70 percent of Gabon's budget based on the oil royalties from the country's wells and offshore drilling sites.<sup>163</sup> In the early 2000s, 37 former Elf managers were charged with embezzlement; however, no politicians were charged and branches of the French government have been uncooperative by claiming Elf was subject to "secrecy laws."<sup>164</sup> Since this corruption scandal, Elf was acquired and privatized by another French company, Total. The privatization of the French national company meant that many of the charges were dropped and only a few executives were convicted. Total has since resumed Elf's activities among French and African politicians and maintains a strong influence in the oil-rich areas of West and Equatorial Africa. This official, yet covert, network created economic incentives for adopting "Frenchness," which France then rewarded with aid allocations and debt relief.

In addition to this extensive oil network, French corporations extend their market reach into goods and services, as well as a supply of what could be considered as state-sponsored services. The French provide water and electricity as well as the telecommunications networks in Senegal and other West African countries.<sup>165</sup> Orange Telecom, which belongs to the telecommunications industry, is a dominant French multinational corporation with deep roots in African markets. Orange typically has a

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<sup>163</sup> "The French African Connection," Part I, 37:15.

<sup>164</sup> Henri Astier, "Elf Was 'Secret Arms of French policy,'" *BBC News*, March 19, 2003, accessed January 30, 2017, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2862257.stm>.

<sup>165</sup> Smith, "The Story of Laurent Gbagbo."

third of the telecommunications sector in Africa nations, in which it operations. At the beginning of 2017, Orange “Money” implemented a program that allows those in France to transfer money using their mobile device to contacts in Africa, specifically Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal.<sup>166</sup> Money transfers, like M-PESA in Kenya, are popular in Africa as many lack access to typical banking services. Orange “Money” illustrates the number of African migrants in France.

Extracting much of Africa’s natural resource wealth, Areva conducts mining operations for nuclear power. The operations of Areva are vital to French foreign and domestic interests as France is dependent on nuclear power for nearly three-quarters of its electricity, much of which is found in Niger.<sup>167</sup> Despite the colonial relationship, in 2014, the Niger government attempted to diminish the special, yet disadvantageous, trade deals with France by proposing a cut in tax breaks and an increase in the royalty rate.<sup>168</sup> Areva revenues average around 10 billion euros each year, which would be a significant boost for Niger’s economy if royalty rates were to be increased. However, it is not clear if such rate has been implemented, yet its proposal contributes to an understanding of the power of African heads of state and corporate executives to alter the power balance of Françafrique.

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<sup>166</sup> “Press Release: Orange Launches Orange Money in France to Allow Money Transfers to Three Countries in Africa and Within Mainland France.” *Orange*. June 15, 2016. Accessed April 14, 2017. <https://www.orange.com/en/Press-Room/press-releases-2017/press-releases-2016/Orange-launches-Orange-Money-in-France-to-allow-money-transfers-to-three-countries-in-Africa-and-within-mainland-France>.

<sup>167</sup> Daniel Flynn and Geert de Clercq, “Special Report: Areva and Niger’s Uranium Fight,” *Reuters*, February 5, 2014, accessed January 30, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-areva-specialreport-idUSBREA140AA20140205>.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*

## Economic relationship

In addition to the aforementioned policies and organizations, France also favors economic resources and “gives priority to African countries that sell oil (Angola, Nigeria, etc.) or uranium (Niger) and those that can buy hitech [sic] (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, South Africa)” goods from France.<sup>169</sup> Table 2.2.<sup>170</sup> illustrates the extensive economic relations between France and much of Africa through the imports and exports of 2015. Relations with Côte d’Ivoire are advantageous as the country is an exporter of coffee and cocoa, as well as petroleum. In 2015, French exports to Côte d’Ivoire totaled at €1.02billion with imports at €772million, which was a 10.8% increase from a year prior.<sup>171</sup>

Economic prioritization differs from French development assistance, which is based off of the identity of the African state rather than the potential resources that could be extracted. Additionally, African states respond to Françafrique in various ways based on their relationship with France; those who agree with the foreign aid assistance view it as “an irreplaceable instrument for holding on to power: a guarantee against democratic change, a sign of presidency for life, indeed, a promise of inheriting power.”<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Boisbouvier, “50 years later.”

<sup>170</sup> “France” *Observatory of Economic Complexity*, accessed April 14, 2017, <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/fra/>.

<sup>171</sup> “France and Côte d’Ivoire.”

<sup>172</sup> Boisbouvier, “50 years later.”

In an attempt to fulfill the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals, France has listed sixteen priority countries, most of which are former colonies, and will extensively promote development in these countries.<sup>173</sup>

Table 2.2. Exports and imports with France

Country	Exports to France	Percent of total exports	Imports from France	Percent of total imports
Algeria	\$6.7B	10%	\$7.5B	12%
Benin	\$26.4M	1.2%	\$1.91B	5.2%
Burkina Faso	\$69.1M	2%	\$387M	11%
Cameroon	\$317M	5.4%	\$789M	9.8%
Central African Republic	\$3.71M	5.1%	\$64.7**	16%
Chad	\$7.08M	0.3%	\$162M	13%
Congo, Democratic Republic of***	\$14.8M	0.2%	\$205M	3.2%
Congo, Republic of	\$310M	2.8%	\$759M	15%
Côte d'Ivoire	\$1.01B	7.1%	\$1.4B	12%
Djibouti	\$1M	0.3%	\$89.8M	3%
Equatorial Guinea***	\$900M	7.7%	\$134M	6.1%
Gabon	\$150M	2%	\$885**	22%
Guinea-Conakry	\$108M	3.5%	\$171M	5%
Guinea-Bissau***	\$549k	0.2%	\$11.9M	3%
Madagascar	\$534M*	21%	\$252M	7.8%
Mali	\$11.7M	1.4%	\$452M**	15%
Mauritania	\$85.1M	2.2%	\$320M	6%
Mauritius***	\$379M*	13%	\$433M	7.4%
Morocco	\$5.05B	18%	\$5.84B	13%
Niger	\$542M*	44%	\$308M	13%
Rwanda***	\$10.4M	1.2%	\$37.8M	1.9%
Senegal	\$132M	4.5%	\$1.07B**	14%
Togo	\$11.2M	0.6%	\$966M	7.7%
Tunisia	\$5.3B*	33%	\$4.41B**	19%

\*France holds the largest share of country's exports

\*\*France holds the largest share of country's imports

\*\*\*Not a former French colony, but belongs to *la Francophonie* or uses the CFA franc

<sup>173</sup> RFI, "France to Target 16 African Countries for Aid," July 31, 2013, accessed October 25, 2016, <http://en.rfi.fr/economy/20130731-france-target-16-african-countries-aid>.

Senegal is one of the sixteen priority countries that France has targeted for additional official development assistance (ODA). France had a trade surplus with Senegal of €681 million in 2015, meaning that the economic relationship greater benefit to France.<sup>174</sup> Most extraordinary in the economic relationship between France and Senegal is holdings of French companies in a variety of industries—mining, telecommunications, and clubs/restaurants—amounting to nearly 25 percent of Senegal’s GDP.<sup>175</sup>

Although the trade relationships appear to take away from the importance of identity in terms of its aid relationship, this is not the case. There are material benefits to *Françafrique*, but French administrations are more interested in advancing the sphere of influence. Trade negotiations often involve interpersonal connections, established through years of interaction with other nations’ counterparts, and the shared identity can ease the tensions and miscommunications behind difficult trade negotiations. At a regional level, countries that are tied economically are less likely to face conflict and prefer a relationship that is advantageous to both parties.

### Voting in the United Nations

In addition to contributing to *pré carré*, Africa matters to France because “Sub-Saharan countries represent one of the largest geographical voting blocs in the United Nations, and their support carries useful moral clout—if fewer votes—in other international organisations [*sic*].”<sup>176</sup> France offers protection in exchange for votes at

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<sup>174</sup> “France and Senegal.”

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>176</sup> Paul Melly, “The Cosy Relations Between France and Africa,” *BBC News*, September 13, 2011, accessed November 6, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14898197>.

the UN and economic ties with French firms.<sup>177</sup> For example, France colluded with the US on intervention in Iraq and cooperated with Angola, Cameroon, and Guinea, as they were among the rotating members of the UNSC.<sup>178</sup> Furthermore, support from African heads of state supported the intervention in Libya under Gaddafi and the election of Christine Lagarde as the head of the International Monetary Fund.<sup>179</sup>

However, France also advocates for interventions in sub-Saharan Africa as Sarkozy chaired a UN Security Council meeting focused on Sudan and Somalia in 2007. This was an attempt to convince the international community that France cares about more than simply French-speaking Africa.<sup>180</sup> Because African nations represent a significant voting bloc of the United Nations, the maintenance of the French-African relationship and the “Frenchness” identity leads to African support for French policies. Repeatedly French officials make an effort to convince the international community that they care about more than Francophone Africa.

### Scandals of Françafrique

The various channels of Françafrique have most often fostered a shared understanding of identity between French and African actors. However, scandals have damaged the relative level of “Frenchness” in several countries, especially Rwanda and more recently, Gabon. Due to these scandals, governments and nongovernmental

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<sup>177</sup> Henri Astier, “Sarkozy’s Africa policy shift,” *BBC News*, September 26, 2007, accessed November 6, 2016, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7014776.stm>.

<sup>178</sup> *BBC News*, “Franco-African Summit Contrasts,” February 21, 2003, accessed October 25, 2016, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2787155.stm>.

<sup>179</sup> Melly, “The Cosy Relations Between France and Africa”

<sup>180</sup> Astier, “Sarkozy’s Africa Policy Shift.”

organizations in Africa have criticized the role of the French and, in extreme cases, expelled any assistance in terms of technical, military, and economic.

Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, France was accused of assisting President Habyarimana and the Hutu rebels in their heinous crimes. Although not directly involved in the mass killings, France provided arms to rebels and helped to evacuate the assassinated president's wife, Hutu politicians, and other war criminals.<sup>181</sup> Despite French troops being among the first UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda, the current Kagame administration still harbors anger for their possible contributions in the genocide.<sup>182</sup> In 2006, Rwanda kicked out all French diplomats. In 2009, Kagame changed the official language from French to English overnight and joined the British Commonwealth. President Kagame never learned to speak French as he grew up in Uganda in English-speaking schools and claimed that his intentions are to increase trade and relations with the rest of East Africa, who speak English.<sup>183</sup> France has vastly decreased foreign aid to Rwanda after being kicked out of the country and embarrassed on an international stage.

Tensions arose between Gabon and its former colonizer in 2009, when France supported the election of the former president's son, Ali Bongo, among protests from Gabonese citizens. In addition to this, Transparency International has investigated claims that the Bongo family and other African leaders have maintained vast amounts

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<sup>181</sup> Chris McGreal, "France's shame?" *The Guardian*, January 11, 2007, accessed January 29, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/11/rwanda.insideafrica>; "French Peace Drive in Central Africa," *BBC News*, August, 14 2001, accessed October 26, 2016, <http://www.bbclinksmachine.appspot.com/2/hi/africa/1488112.stm>

<sup>182</sup> Alissa J. Rubin and Maïa de la Baume, "Claims of French Complicity in Rwanda's Genocide Rekindle Mutual Resentment," *The New York Times*, April 8, 2014, accessed January 30, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/world/africa/claims-of-french-complicity-in-rwandas-genocide-rekindle-mutual-resentment.html>.

<sup>183</sup> Chris McGreal, "Why Rwanda Said Adieu to French." *The Guardian*, January 16, 2009, accessed January 29, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2009/jan/16/rwanda-english-genocide>.

of wealth within France.<sup>184</sup> Despite such close economic ties with France, Gabon changed its official language from French to English in October 2012, claiming that it is in response to French injustices that failed to remove Ali Bongo and allowed for the Bongo family to accumulate wealth reserves and luxury acquisitions in France.<sup>185</sup> Furthermore Ali Bongo claims that “he does not enjoy the close personal relationships with French politicians that his father cultivated” and may continue to lessen these ties in the future.<sup>186</sup>

France has been criticized for supporting undemocratic regimes, especially decade-long presidents or human rights violations. Despite criticism of France as “tepid” and impartial to justice, French ministers have failed to change their efforts to further “Frenchness” via the channels of *Françafrique*.<sup>187</sup> However, Nicolas Sarkozy made some efforts to reform the *Françafrique* network and closed the African cell as an official part of the French government.<sup>188</sup> But under the administration of François Hollande, the usual networks and secrecy of *Françafrique* resumed.

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<sup>184</sup> Transparency International France, “TI-France Re-Files Complaint Targeting Assets Held in France by Five African Heads of State,” *Transparency International France*, July 9, 2008, accessed January 15, 2017, [http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20080709\\_ti\\_france\\_re\\_files\\_complaint\\_targeting\\_assets\\_held\\_in\\_france](http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20080709_ti_france_re_files_complaint_targeting_assets_held_in_france)

<sup>185</sup> Agnès Poirier, “Gabon’s French Rejection Hits Us Where It Hurts,” *The Guardian*, October 12, 2012, accessed January 27, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/12/gabon-french-rejection-hurts>.

<sup>186</sup> *The Economist*, “A French-African Quarrel with the Former Coloniser,” January 26, 2016, accessed January 20, 2017, <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21689216-former-colony-and-coloniser-grouse-cling-tight>

<sup>187</sup> Matt Wells, “François Hollande’s ‘Change’ Is More of the Same on Côte d’Ivoire,” *Human Rights Watch*, February 6, 2013, accessed April 17, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/06/francois-hollandes-change-more-same-cote-divoire>.

<sup>188</sup> Brian Eads, “France Is Slowly Reclaiming Its Old African Empire,” *Newsweek*, October 30, 2014, accessed April 20, 2017, <http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/07/france-slowly-reclaiming-its-old-african-empire-280635.html>.



## Conclusion

Although subject to scandal and international criticism in recent years, Françafrique is not dead and still permeates the political, economic, and social lives of Africans. Françafrique, as a covert network and official French policy in Africa, has led to the continuation of shared identity where “Frenchness” was established during the colonial period. However, this neocolonialist approach differs from *la mission civilisatrice* because African heads of state possess more sovereignty and agency to accept or reject French intervention and foreign aid contributions. In most instances of rejection of French-imposed identity, African heads of states and domestic populations expel French presence and France retaliates by pulling its foreign aid. However, France rewards former colonies that accept French presence based on a shared understanding of identity and role in the neo-French Empire.

In recent years, French officials and corporations have expanded the reach of Françafrique in an attempt to extend their existing sphere of influence in to non-former French colonies. This is evident in various channels including the CFA franc zone, membership in *la Francophonie*, and the participants at the Franco-African summits. Although not extensively analyzed in this chapter, the extension of Françafrique is included in the “Frenchness” index, which will be presented in Chapter 3.

### **Chapter 3: Identity as a Determinant in Aid Allocation**

The previous two chapters illustrated how “Frenchness” was first created in the colonies and how this identity has been perpetuated through the policy of *Françafrique*. In this chapter, I will test the hypothesis that France gives aid based on the level of “Frenchness” present in an African country, both historically and contemporarily.<sup>189</sup> While a substantial literature review was provided on French colonial history and the establishment of a French identity, I will now detail the important economic theories about why countries provide aid. Most economists debate whether aid is based on altruism or strategic interests, with the overwhelming majority leaning towards strategic interests. An additional component of this literature asks to whom does each donor provide aid. I will contribute to the existing research by addressing how France uniquely allocates aid. I will argue that “Frenchness” does predict how France disproportionately favors nation-states based on their shared identity. This chapter is along the same lines as the paper “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?”, in which Alesina and Dollar (2000) establish that past colonial powers favor their former colonies in providing bilateral aid. However, my analysis is unique in that I primarily investigate how France specifically allocates aid rather than donor countries as a whole.

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<sup>189</sup> Note: Much of the existing literature fails to distinguish between regional statuses of the French colonial empire (colony, protectorate, mandate, and department). Because of this, prior authors have used colony in exchange for possession, and I am in accordance with the use of colony in many instances in this chapter. However, this is not to diminish the importance of the variations in French possessions, as this is a key part in my composition of the “Frenchness” index and my overall argument that regional and individual identity matters for bilateral aid flows. It is mostly for convenience that I use possession and colony interchangeably. When applicable, however, I will distinguish between various regional statuses in order to clarify my analysis of identity.

As I have established in the previous two chapters and will continue to expand upon in the subsequent analysis, this research is important because it also contributes to the existing literature on the salience and persistence of history.<sup>190</sup> However, the specific relationship between variations in French colonial rule has not yet been analyzed. Because of this persistence of history, we expect the colonial relationship to have ramifications for “Frenchness” and current French aid policies towards former colonies. The existing literature on the prominence of the French colonial empire instead identifies other economic relationships, such as investment and trade. More specifically, French colonial public investments—education, health, and infrastructure—can “explain about 30 percent of the corresponding current performance” in regions where France most heavily invested.<sup>191</sup> In addition to public investment, which is possibly correlated with the number of European settlers, the trade relationship between France and Africa is stronger as the number of settlers increases.<sup>192</sup> However, the relationship is often one of exploitation as the imports of raw material are more affected than manufactured goods.<sup>193</sup> Because I expand on this literature, I expect for the colonial relationship and the formation of identity to be a

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<sup>190</sup> Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” *American Economic Review* 91 (2001): 1369-1401; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of Modern World Income Distribution,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (2002): 1231-1294; Grazeilla Bertocchi and Fabio Canova, “Did colonization matter for growth? An empirical exploration into the historical causes of Africa’s underdevelopment,” *European Economic Review* 46 (2002): 1851-1871; Melissa Dell, “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining *Mita*,” *Econometrica* 78.6 (2010): 1863-1903; Robert E. Hall and Charles I. Jones, “Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114.1 (1999): 83-116; Nathan Nunn, “Historical Legacies: A Model Linking Africa’s Past to its Current Underdevelopment,” *Journal of Development Economics* 83.1 (2007): 157-175; Nathan Nunn, “The Long Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades.”

<sup>191</sup> Elise Huillery, “History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa,” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 1.2 (2009): 176-215.

<sup>192</sup> Cristina Terra and Tania El Kallab, “French Colonial Trade Patterns: European Settlement” *Thema Working Paper n 2014-27*: 1-40.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

key factor in determining aid, especially if aid is distributed based on the strategic interests of the donor country. It is important to note that the relationship between colonial history and investment trade does not detract from my overall argument that a common French identity is the main determinant of bilateral aid committed because prior studies fail to consider identity as a potential explanation. Additionally, I control for such factors and elaborate on the robustness of “Frenchness” in the results section of this chapter.

Following the section on background literature, the second section will outline the data used for regression analysis. Then I will present my results and hypothesis tests in which I argue that France gives aid to former and non-former colonies based on their level of Frenchness. Finally, I will offer conclusions on my research.

### **Background Literature**

Critics of aid claim that donor countries often fail to evaluate the needs of recipient countries and frequently overlook the opportunity to support good governance through aid. France has been especially accused of such behavior, as was illustrated with Gabonese examples in the previous chapter, where France allowed the ruling Bongo family to hide their wealth in France—wealth that was possibly the result of large foreign aid receipts. Even with the rise in popularity of aid conditionalities that encourage good governance, France has instead favored allies, often former colonies or governments with a reputation of corruption. Previous economic scholarship finds that donor countries prioritize strategic interests—including sphere of influence, trade benefits, and UN voting affinity—over recipient

needs.<sup>194</sup> Rather than using aid as a tool to address poverty, increase economic growth, and promote good governance, donor countries use bilateral aid to further their own interests. These interests can be both political and economic.

Politically, donor countries use aid to show allegiances and may expect reciprocation in the form of UN voting or other agreements at the international level.<sup>195</sup> This strategic motivation for providing aid applies to many, if not the majority of, donor countries, as the United States gives aid to Israel, with whom they have an extensive, interventionist history. The two major colonial empires—Great Britain and France—provide more aid to countries where they have a “relatively long colonial past.”<sup>196</sup> Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that France disproportionately favors former colonies, even more so than its counterparts in other parts of Europe. Because of this favoritism, I expect there to be variation among former French colonies that receive aid based on their relationship with the former metropole. There is some debate on whether or not the end of the Cold War has altered the importance of strategic interests in aid allocation, as the competition for alignment with the First

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<sup>194</sup> Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5.1 (2000): 33-63; Jean-Claude Berthelemy, "Bilateral donors' interest vs. recipients' development motives in aid allocation: do all donors behave the same?" *Cahiers de Maison des Sciences Economiques* (2005): 1-36; Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein, "What determines foreign aid? The donors' perspective," *Journal of Development Economics* 87 (2008): 1-13; Paul Collier and David Dollar, "Aid allocation and poverty reduction," *European Economic Review* 46 (2002): 1475-1500; Alfred Maizels and Machiko K. Nissanke, "Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries," *World Development* 12.9 (1984): 879-900; R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, "The French Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model of the Distribution of French Bilateral Aid, 1964-70," *Development and Change* 3(1978): 459-78; Jakob Svensson, "Aid, Growth and Democracy," *Economics and Politics* (1985): 275-297; Javed Younas, "Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits," *European Journal of Political Economy* 24 (2008): 661-674.

<sup>195</sup> Alesina and Dollar, 46; Eliana Balla and Gina Yannitell Reinhardt, "Giving and Receiving Foreign Aid: Does Conflict Count?" *World Development* 36.12 (2008), 2568.

<sup>196</sup> Specifically, "a country that has a relatively long colonial past (1 standard deviation above the mean) receives 87 percent more aid." Alesina and Dollar, 40.

and Second Worlds has lessened.<sup>197</sup> However, historically, political interests have provided a motivation for aid, and therefore, political factors, like measurements of democracy and autocracy using Polity IV data, are included in the analysis of French aid allocation.

Aside from the benefits that donors receive from aid allocation, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies claim that recipient countries share in the potential gains, in addition to receiving monetary assistance. Some of these potential benefits include economic growth, poverty alleviation, expansion of human rights protections, a decrease in corruption, and the promotion of democratic norms. However, the existing scholarship does not illustrate that bilateral donors take these recipient benefits into account when determining who gets what amount of aid or if aid actually yields these various improvements.<sup>198</sup> Furthermore, these potential benefits are frequently missed opportunities as aid is fungible and typically allocated to governments, which often fail to distribute aid dollars among its citizens that are often in need of aid relief. These problems of distribution and accountability help provide an explanation for why bilateral donors frequently disregard benefits to recipients, especially at the subnational level.

Former French colonies are especially unique in their economic relationship with France, as many of them belong to the CFA franc zone – either in French West

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<sup>197</sup> Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder, "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?" *The American Economic Review* 92.4 (2002): 1131; Per Lundborg, "Foreign Aid and International Support as Gift Exchange," *Economics and Politics* 10.2 (1998): 140; Svensson, "Aid Growth and Democracy," 294.

<sup>198</sup> Alesina and Weder, "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?"; David Dollar and Victoria Levin, "The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984-2003," *World Development* 32.12 (2006): 2034-2046; Stephen Knack, "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?" *International Studies Quarterly* 48.1 (2004): 251-266; Maizels and Nissanke (1984); Eric Neumayer, "Is Respect for Human Rights Rewarded? An Analysis of Total Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Flows" *Human Rights Quarterly* 25.2 (2003): 510-527; Svensson, "Aid, Growth, and Democracy."

Africa or French Equatorial Africa. Burnside and Dollar (2000) established that this currency zone receives “special treatment from France” in terms of aid allocations.<sup>199</sup> Additionally, closer proximity in terms of geography is also an important factor in aid allocation.<sup>200</sup> Furthermore, population density and income play a role, although the level of income (low, middle, high) necessary for aid is up for debate.<sup>201</sup> Although these demographics partially determine aid allocation, the primary focus of this chapter will be to use the strategic interests of donor countries, namely France. The relationship between the political formation of identity and aid will be highlighted in the analysis below.

### **Data and Methodology**

I will use regression analysis to examine aid allocation between (1) France and all countries in Africa and (2) France and former French colonies in Africa. My dependent variable is the log of bilateral aid committed from the donor to recipient country, and my independent variable is an index of “Frenchness.” I use bilateral aid flows from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) database for the years 1973-2010.<sup>202</sup> Although OECD collects data on most donor and recipient country pairs, my analysis is restricted to a single donor (France) and recipients in Africa, as this is the relationship of interest based on the historical ties presented in

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<sup>199</sup> Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid Policies, and Growth,” *The American Economic Review* 90.4 (2000): 850.

<sup>200</sup> Neumayer, “Is Respect for Human Rights Rewarded?” 101.

<sup>201</sup> J.M. Dowling and Ulrich Hiemenz, “Biases in the Allocation of Foreign Aid: Some New Evidence,” *World Development* 13.4 (1985): 535-541; Paul Isenman, “Biases in Aid Allocations Against Poorer and Larger Countries,” *World Development* 4.8 (1976): 631-641.

<sup>202</sup> Although aid flows are available prior to 1973, the data is somewhat sporadic in terms of missing data. Additionally, the time variant variables are of primary interest in the 1970s. In order to maintain the highest level of observations, the data begins in 1973.

the previous two chapters.<sup>203</sup> My overall objective is to explain how France behaves towards African aid recipients—both former colonies and non-colonies—based on the level of Frenchness calculated for each country. Frenchness is calculated using the principal component analysis from the following variables:

- number of years as a French colonial possession
- type of possession – colony, department, mandate, or protectorate
- presence of unique colonial status at the individual level – originaires, métis, or tirailleurs
- if the president was a member of the French Assembly prior to independence
- membership in either CFA franc zone
- percentage of the population that speaks French (lingua franca)
- membership in La Francophonie
- if the legal origins are French
- if France has militarily intervened within the country's borders
- if France maintains a permanent military base if the legal origins are French in nature.<sup>204</sup>

The principal component analysis creates an index that is a linear combination of the uncorrelated variables that contains most of the variance. More information on the source of the data is detailed in the Appendix. In addition to constructing Frenchness

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<sup>203</sup> For more detailed information on how DAC measures bilateral aid flows, see the Appendix

<sup>204</sup> Although additional channels of Françafrique were presented in the previous chapter, data constraints have limited my ability to use regression analysis for such channels. When I include these additional channels, my sample size is significantly restricted. Moreover, data for things like the number of students attended higher education institutions in France is not consistent overtime. Because of these constraints, I instead use the channels presented in this list.



Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.
<b>Frenchness Variables</b>		
Years under French rule	41.8	(60.3)
Colony	0.35	(0.48)
Department	0.02	(0.15)
Protectorate	0.04	(0.2)
Mandate	0.05	(0.21)
Originaires	0.02	(0.15)
Metis	0.32	(0.59)
Tirailleurs	0.49	(0.69)
If a president was a member of the French Assembly prior to independence	0.14	(0.35)
CFA franc zone	0.299	(0.46)
Percentage of the population who speaks French (2010)	15.83	(22.18)
Membership in La Francophonie	0.56	(0.49)
Presence of a military base	0.098	(0.298)
If France has ever militarily intervened in the country	0.13	(0.34)
<b>Economic variables</b>		
Total bilateral aid committed, in millions of USD	70.7	(14.9)
Total multilateral aid committed to recipient country, in millions of USD	314	(416)
Real GDP, in billions USD (constant at 2010 prices)	25.03	(56.32)
<b>Political variables</b>		
External war indicator	0.008	(0.09)
Civil war indicator	0.048	(0.215)
Number of years in current regime	17.72	(12.9)
Polity IV score	-1.96	(5.83)
Democracy (dummy)	0.18	(0.39)
Presence of natural disaster	2.09	(3.66)
Population, in millions	13.16	(19.84)
<b>Dyadic variables</b>		
Distance between countries	5551	(1939)
Trade flows, in millions of USD	250	(647)
UN voting affinity	0.62	(0.07)

as an independent variable, I use each of the above listed variables independently in order to examine the magnitude or uniqueness of each variable in aid allocation.

Furthermore, I relate bilateral aid flows to other numerous indicators, including economic variables (trade flows and gross domestic product (GDP)), political variables (polity score, a dummy for democracy, and the presence of civil war), and demographic variables (population density in 1950). I present the summary statistics for the Frenchness and other variables in Table 3.1. These variables provide alternate explanations for French aid allocation, while also testing the robustness of “Frenchness.”

Figure 3.1. and Figure 3.2. illustrate the amount of “Frenchness” in each African country, both former French colonies and non-colonies. In order to simply present the information, Figure 3.1. and Figure 3.2. show the mean for each country, and therefore the time variance of “Frenchness” is not visually illustrated. Additionally, “Frenchness” can be negative or positive. Although it is possible to standardize the principal component analysis between 0 and 1, the analysis is still the same. A negative “Frenchness” simply means the absence of the composition variables. For example, Zimbabwe and Kenya lack “Frenchness” because they also lack a colonial relationship with the French colonial empire and are not yet included in the policy of *Françafrique*. However, Equatorial Guinea is less negative than other non-colonies because it has adopted the CFA franc as its official currency and is also a member of the *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie*. On the other hand, Senegal has the strongest level of “Frenchness,” primarily due to their unique colonial and post-colonial relationship with France.




Figure 3.1. "Frenchness" index in former colonies




Figure 3.2. "Frenchness" index in non-former colonies

## Results

In this section, I will present several regressions that explain the variation in French bilateral aid flows, including the individual components of the “Frenchness” index as well as the “Frenchness” index.<sup>205</sup> Overall, my regressions confirm my hypothesis that France favors former colonies over non-colonies, especially former colonies with an identity more aligned with the French, in terms of culture, language, education, etc.

In Table 3.2., Column (1) reports the raw correlation of “Frenchness” and the natural log of bilateral aid committed. The coefficient is positive and significant, which implies that the amount of aid received is increasing as “Frenchness” increases. In subsequent columns, I implement controls in groups (political, economic, and other) with respect to the existing literature. The last column implements all of the control variables. From the regression tables, we see that “Frenchness” is robust in determining bilateral aid allocation. This confirms my hypothesis that France gives aid based on the amount of French identity present. Moreover, the amount of aid increases on average by 30 percent with each unit increase of “Frenchness,” created using the principal component analysis.

This table is in agreement with the existing economics literature that gross domestic product (GDP), trade, and the presence of democratic norms are important factors in determining aid receipts. GDP is both positive and significant, meaning that the level of economic development also influences the amount of aid a country

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<sup>205</sup> Although detailed, this section does not present an exhaustive list of results from regression analysis, and additional regression tables are listed in the Appendix, including a brief section investigating how UN voting affinity (or UN friend according to Alesina and Dollar) relates to “Frenchness” and bilateral aid committed.

receives. This is both intuitive and in agreement with the economics literature and policy makers. However, these results do not significantly lessen the effect of “Frenchness.” Although trade is significant, it has a minimal effect on bilateral aid committed, which will be further emphasized on in the next section.

Various political measurements—democracy, Polity IV score, and the age of the current regime—have similar effects on bilateral aid flows. The democracy variable, which is a dummy variable, is both positive and significant, but again does not alter the significance of “Frenchness.” In order to gain a more complete understanding of the importance of regime type, I use Polity IV, which ranges from -10 (authoritarian) to 10 (democracy). Most African states lean towards the negative end of the spectrum, which is reported in the summary statistics in Table 3.1. Polity IV is in accordance with the democracy dummy as a negative Polity IV score has a negative impact on bilateral aid flows. Again, this does not necessarily mean that “Frenchness” is not a key determinant in aid allocation but rather than donor countries can consider a variety of influences in addition to strategic interests.

Finally, the age in years of current regime is positive and significant. This measure, however, could be slightly related to “Frenchness” because of the length in the regimes of former French possessions. Some of these long-term politicians include President Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal (20 years), President Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire (33 years), and President Omar Bongo of Gabon (41 years). As presented in previous chapter, these presidents had special or privileged relationships with various French administrations through the channels of *Françafrique*. Because of the nature and scope of these special relationships, the

Table 3.2. Bilateral aid committed (ln), full sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Frenchness	0.375*** (0.022)	0.365*** (0.019)	0.351*** (0.020)	0.343*** (0.022)	0.373*** (0.023)	0.323*** (0.022)	0.348*** (0.020)	0.324*** (0.022)
Real GDP (ln)		0.481*** (0.031)	0.416*** (0.036)			0.452*** (0.046)	0.422*** (0.045)	0.466*** (0.045)
Trade flows			0.001*** (0.000)			0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Recipient Civil War				0.083 (0.190)			-0.007 (0.186)	0.034 (0.188)
Recipient External War				0.389 (0.445)			0.452 (0.475)	0.485 (0.479)
Democracy (Dummy)				0.997*** (0.210)			0.619*** (0.198)	0.615*** (0.197)
Polity IV				-0.057*** (0.012)			-0.040*** (0.012)	-0.033*** (0.012)

Age in years of current regime	0.044*** (0.005)			0.009* (0.005)	0.010* (0.005)
If recipient had any type of disaster		0.186* (0.103)	0.084 (0.097)		0.113 (0.098)
Population (in thousands)		0.000*** (0.000)	0 (0.000)		-0.000* (0.000)
Distance between capitals (capitals, km)		-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.000** (0.000)
Constant	16.720*** (0.050)	12.569*** (0.278)	13.038*** (0.309)	15.729*** (0.120)	13.222*** (0.387)
No. of observations	1,018	952	945	964	922
R2	0.229	0.381	0.393	0.3	0.399

note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

significance of the age of the regime for bilateral aid allocation is not surprising.

Because the level of “Frenchness” and historical relationship varies between former colony and non-colony, Table 3.3. investigates the relationship between “Frenchness” and bilateral aid committed to former colonies only. The exclusion of non-colonies is important because I expect “Frenchness” to be strongest within the countries that have had repeated interactions with French administrators during both colonization and throughout the policy of *Françafrique*. In this table, we observe, again, that “Frenchness” is positive and significant in determining aid allocation. Similarly to the previous table, which included all African countries, Table 3.3. is robust as additional controls are implemented. Of particular note are the political variables—democracy, Polity IV, and the age in years of current regime, which are significant determinants of French aid allocation. This is not surprising considering the lengthy regimes of several African presidents that maintained a very close relationship with France, including Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, and Omar Bongo of Gabon. Furthermore, this regression analysis also supports the finding that GDP influences the amount of bilateral aid.

In order to more fully understand the implications of “Frenchness,” Table 3.4. breaks down the channels of *Françafrique* and the colonial identities and their relationship with bilateral aid. From this regression analysis, I observe that the variable for years under French rule is significant throughout. This finding is intuitive based on identity theory, which stresses that repeated interaction fosters identity formation—interactions would be longer and most likely more frequent the longer France occupied a specific place. Other variables of significance include the



Table 3.3. Bilateral aid committed (ln), former French colonies only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Frenchness	0.527*** (0.126)	1.331*** (0.139)	1.367*** (0.142)	0.827*** (0.151)	1.103*** (0.148)	1.369*** (0.144)	1.387*** (0.152)	1.410*** (0.155)
Real GDP (ln)		0.494*** (0.043)	0.533*** (0.051)			0.514*** (0.067)	0.610*** (0.071)	0.640*** (0.092)
Trade flows			-0.001 (0.001)			-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Recipient Civil War				0.331 (0.237)			0.132 (0.232)	0.076 (0.239)
Recipient External War				0.742 (0.585)			0.616 (0.666)	0.724 (0.689)
Democracy (Dummy)				0.846*** (0.294)			0.282 (0.279)	0.249 (0.283)
Polity IV				-0.048*** (0.017)			-0.012 (0.017)	-0.018 (0.018)

Age in years of current regime	0.048*** (0.007)		0.004 (0.008)	0.001 (0.009)
If recipient had any type of disaster	0.078 (0.171)	-0.134 (0.164)		-0.067 (0.168)
Population (in thousands)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)
Distance between capitals (km)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)
Constant	16.765*** (0.247)	14.124*** (0.407)	13.906*** (0.435)	16.362*** (0.360)
No. of observations	509	464	463	461
R2	0.033	0.277	0.280	0.157
			13.828*** (0.505)	13.075*** (0.519)
			463	440
			0.282	0.303
				12.675*** (0.636)

note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 3.4. Bilateral aid committed (ln), individual components of Françafrique, full sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	0.010***				0.011***	0.011***	-0.001	0.003
Years under French rule	(0.001)				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.008)
If president served on French Assembly	0.283*				0.201	0.201	0.550***	0.126
	(0.145)				(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.171)	(0.191)
CFA franc	0.657***				0.215*	0.215*	0.346**	0.248
	(0.108)				(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.157)	(0.164)
Percent of population that speaks French		0.007***			0.002	0.002	-0.005*	-0.010***
		(0.002)			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
La Francophonie		1.484***			1.035***	1.035***	0.356**	0.482***
		(0.099)			(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.143)	(0.142)
Interventions			0.320**		0.057	0.057	-0.043	0.386**
			(0.143)		(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.166)	(0.187)
Presence of military base			1.243***		-0.868***	-0.868***	0.451	0.467
			(0.164)		(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.284)	(0.412)

Colony	1.836*** (0.086)	0.827*** (0.216)	-0.565 (0.732)
Department	2.179*** (0.263)	1.604*** (0.449)	-1.301 (1.393)
Protectorate	3.168*** (0.197)	2.619*** (0.265)	1.196 (0.752)
Mandate	2.049*** (0.191)	1.288*** (0.277)	1.322*** (0.419)
<i>Originaires</i>			-1.465
			(1.455)
<i>Métis</i>			0.428***
			(0.156)
<i>Tirailleurs</i>			0.773***
			(0.217)
Legal Origin: French		0.779*** (0.151)	0.819*** (0.150)

Constant	16.146***	15.846***	16.637***	15.876***	15.984***	15.724***	15.267***	15.215***
	(0.054)	(0.065)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.098)	(0.097)
No. of observations	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,018	1,018
R2	0.201	0.192	0.049	0.298	0.268	0.266	0.344	0.371

note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

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percentage of the population that speaks French (according to the lingua franca), membership in *la Francophonie* or the CFA franc zone, and the presence of a military base. Although I would expect French possessions to be significant as a whole, it is somewhat surprising that the regional status changes depending on the controls used. However, the individual statuses—*originaires*, *métis*, and *tirailleurs*—support the notion that proximity with the French identity is important for aid allocation. I suspect that regional statuses change based on the other variables present, which may dwarf the effects of a specific status. When I pare down the sample to include only former colonies, there are issues of collinearity, and many variables are dropped. Because of this, I report the regression analysis for only former French possessions in the Appendix.<sup>206</sup>

### Other Explanations

The literature review briefly alludes to other explanations for aid receipts, and this section will further elaborate on why trade, specifically, does not provide a complete explanation for bilateral aid flows. In addition to being motivated by economic growth, poverty, and democracy, donors also consider economic benefits. Economic incentives between donors and recipients can be observed in the flow of imports and exports, as well as the nature and scope of trade agreements. The direction and type of flow is important for understanding the relationship between

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<sup>206</sup> Collinearity, in this instance, is likely due to the number of dummy variables in classifying regional statuses—colony, mandate, protectorate, or department. As I pare down my analysis to only colonies, these regional statuses are correlated because a former French possession can only have one specific status. While this is unfortunate for understanding, which individual components of “Frenchness” are significant in determining French bilateral aid commitments, collinearity does not weaken the overall argument but rather strengthens the need for using principal component analysis to create an index.

donor and recipient, often the former colonizer and colony. Donors benefit from importing raw materials and exporting manufactured goods to recipients. Distinct from other similar donors, France “directs aid preferentially to developing countries in which French private investment is concentrated, whether or not they are former colonies.”<sup>207</sup> This finding, however, does not consider the level of “Frenchness,” as is presented throughout this paper. By taking another look at the regression tables presented in the previous section, dyadic trade flows between France and aid recipients do not have a significant impact on bilateral aid flows. Additionally, the coefficient is negative and not distinguishable from zero. Although previous scholars have observed that France attempts to facilitate trade with other countries through the façade of aid receipts, these analyses do not consider the explanation that France is instead rewarding countries for similarities in culture and colonial history.

### **Conclusion**

I find that “Frenchness” is a significant indicator of bilateral aid allocations from France, which also prioritizes former colonies over non-colonies. Additionally, an increase in “Frenchness” is manifested through colonial identities and the various channels of *Françafrique*. Overall, this confirms that France prioritizes strategic interests or its sphere of influence when allocating aid to recipient countries. My results are in agreement with much of the literature that donor countries also consider the facilitation of democratic norms and poverty alleviation when disbursing aid. This is not to say that these additional considerations are more important than “Frenchness,”

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<sup>207</sup> Maizels and Nissanke, *Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries*,” 887.

but rather that the similarities in identity, as observed through the French language, military bases, colonial history, etc. are robust even when we consider alternate explanations. As will be further elaborated in the overall conclusion to this thesis, policy makers should give proper attention to strategic interests of donors, in addition to focusing on conditional aid and the discourse around facilitating democratic norms.



## Conclusion

France has historically and contemporarily attempted to maintain its influence in African nations through a variety of political tools, including the initial colonial policies of *assimilation* or *association* and the current expansion of the channels of Françafrique. France provides aid based on the shared identity formed through such political tools as a reward for cooperation and participation in the French sphere of influence.

This shared identity is rooted in centuries of interaction between French and African actors. Variation in statuses, both at the individual person and regional level, contributed to a sense of belonging and “Frenchness.” For example, *originaires* and *métis* possessed unique statuses in the French colonial empire and were able to participate in particular aspects of political life, including access to education, voting rights, lower level administrative positions, and the like. This participation in the political sphere contributed to an understanding of their respective role in the greater French Empire. At the regional level, Senegal was the center of administrative life for French West Africa, as well as an economic powerhouse for the region. This unique status as an administrative colony, in addition to being one of the first places colonized, resulted in a close relationship between Senegal and France. The extent of this relationship was evident in Senegal’s role in the creation of the French Union. Although the French Union failed soon after its inception, several African members—primarily Leopold Senghor and Felix Houphouët-Boigny—argued for a privileged relationship with the former colonial power at the time of independence. These

variations make up a significant portion of “Frenchness” and contribute to the greater argument that historical identity is a key factor for aid allocation.

By analyzing the specific channels of *Françafrique*—the neocolonial, covert French policy for network building in Africa—I present further evidence of continued interaction between French and African actors post independence. Military bases, the CFA franc zone, language, and technical assistance are some of the more important channels of *Françafrique* that were implemented shortly after independence and have continued to influence Franco-African relationships today. *Françafrique* explains some of the variation in “Frenchness” because African heads of state often choose to abide by such policy and therefore willingly increase interaction with French administrators and businessmen. Not all African heads of state have desired a closer relationship with France through *Françafrique*, and these countries possess lower levels of “Frenchness” than their cooperative counterparts.

“Frenchness,” constructed using historical statuses and channels of *Françafrique*, is a significant and positive predictor of French bilateral aid given to recipient countries in Africa. “Frenchness” is robust even after implementing the controls—economic development, trade, regime type, etc.—that explain variation in overall aid receipts in previous economic literature. The difference in findings is attributable to the inclusion of identity as a unique indicator. Although previous studies consider colonial relationships and UN voting affinity, they fail to provide a comprehensive account of historical interactions that, according to my research, have a significant effect on aid allocations.

## Future Research

Histories of interaction and therefore identity formation are the dominant theme of colonial and world powers. France was not unique in its colonization of other countries, but French policy was exceptional due to *la mission civilisatrice* and the continued presence of French advisers after the official end of colonization in the 1960s. Other colonial powers, notably Great Britain, Belgium, and Portugal, varied in their approaches to governance in Africa. Great Britain utilized indirect rule, where Africans—often from the minority population—were given power to rule over specific areas in British territories. The British Empire rivaled the French Empire in terms of sheer number of colonies in Africa. Because the interaction between British and African actors was not as systemic as Franco-African interactions, analyzing the presence of British identity in former colonies presents a challenge. However, membership in the British Commonwealth may provide a starting point in order to generalize that shared identity determines aid allocation.

Closer to French rule, the Belgians ruled the native population via Belgian administrators. However, Belgians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire) predominantly intended to extract natural resources, like rubber, and failed to cultivate a relationship with the Congolese. After Françafrique was more fully developed, French administrations expanded their reach into both the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, as former Belgian colonies share the French language. The “Frenchness” index measures the relationship between former Belgian colonies and France, but it would be interesting to analyze the “Belgianness” in order to better understand the lasting effects of the vastly exploitive history.

Unlike other colonial powers, Portugal's reign in Africa lasted until the mid-1970s. The Portuguese colonized Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Equatorial Guinea in addition to the islands of Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. Portugal, as an additional case study for shared identity, is the most interesting in terms of other colonial powers, as the concept of empire was contested because Portugal and Portuguese territories were considered to be one state with a shared language and culture. Again, an index that combined this shared language, culture, and history with the modern relationship between Portugal and former Portuguese colonies would further test my hypothesis that aid is determined by a collective identity.

The French style of colonialism and neocolonialism is the ideal case study for analyzing the relationship between identity and aid, yet more extensive research in other colonial histories may uncover a similar story of shared identity based on interaction between Europeans and Africans. This potential theory could likely be applied to the United States and its soft power efforts in the postwar era. Furthermore, the former Soviet Union had a unique relationship with Eastern European and Central Asian states in the Cold War. Although not technically colonial history, the former USSR diffused ideologies and possibly identity to satellite states. By analyzing the effects of identity on aid in a more global sense, I can draw additional policy implications for future development and aid relationships.

In addition to this expansion on identity-aid relationships, I would like to further investigate *Françafrique*. The Franco-African summit of 2003 included the Zimbabwean dictator, Robert Mugabe, and this invitation was harshly criticized.

Additionally, French influence has gained traction in neighboring West African countries, like Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea, which have joined the CFA franc zone. These are the beginning signs of Françafrique expansion into Anglophone Africa, which lacks the common colonial history and shared language. How has and will the policy of Françafrique adapt to this new environment? And what is the possibility of a stronger “Frenchness” in the future?

Under the current political climate of rising nationalism and fear of immigration, how will the policy of Françafrique, which is often criticized as an object of the past, remain or change under future French presidents? If elected, Marine Le Pen has declared an end to Françafrique and the CFA franc zone, but prior presidential candidates have made similar claims and failed to end the neocolonial approach to influence in Africa. Other presidential candidates have either failed to state their stance on Françafrique or come from similar political backgrounds as previous presidents, meaning they are unlikely to alter the current policy. If Françafrique comes to an end, what will this mean for future relationships between France and African countries, especially in terms of aid allocation?

### **Policy Implications**

If donor countries provide aid based on strategic interests and more specifically a shared identity, how does this alter the current discourse on aid allocation? State behavior is driven by identity, and this behavior facilitates the emergence of international norms. International norms and identity are mutually constitutive. If this is true, then it is possible for prioritization of strategic interests

over all other donor factors to lead to future norms. If the French norm for giving based on identity becomes an international norm, then the discourse around facilitating democratic norms and support of human rights could fade away.

Instead of supporting the increase of human rights, democratic norms, and overall well-being, donor countries, notably France, are instead acting in self-interest and preservation of influence. Although other scholars have identified the importance of strategic interests, few have evaluated the potential implications for future policy.<sup>208</sup> It is important to compile a list of all donor motivations in order to better analyze why aid has been so ineffective in contributing to economic development. If a donor country disregards the importance of economic growth or human rights and only prioritizes strategic influence, then it is no surprise that low-income countries are only slightly better off. If the global consensus is to improve development conditions in low-income countries, then it is crucial to understand why aid is ineffective, especially if this inefficiency resides in donor motivations.

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<sup>208</sup> Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5.1 (2000): 33-63; Jean-Claude Berthelemy, "Bilateral donors' interest vs. recipients' development motives in aid allocation: do all donors behave the same?" *Cahiers de Maison des Sciences Economiques* (2005): 1-36; Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein, "What determines foreign aid? The donors' perspective," *Journal of Development Economics* 87 (2008): 1-13; Paul Collier and David Dollar, "Aid allocation and poverty reduction," *European Economic Review* 46 (2002): 1475-1500; Alfred Maizels and Machiko K. Nissanke, "Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries," *World Development* 12.9 (1984): 879-900; R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, "The French Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model of the Distribution of French Bilateral Aid, 1964-70," *Development and Change* 3(1978): 459-78; Jakob Svensson, "Aid, Growth and Democracy," *Economics and Politics* (1985): 275-297; Javed Younas, "Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits," *European Journal of Political Economy* 24 (2008): 661-674.

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## Appendix A Glossary

*ancien combattants*: combat veterans in the *tirailleurs*

*ancien militaires*: career soldiers in the *tirailleurs*

*Assemblée National*: National Assembly

*assimilés*: assimilated; Africans who had denounced their native culture and adopted the French language, culture, and institutions

*assimilation*: assimilation; the French colonial policy that forced Africans to speak the French language and abide by French laws and institutions

*association*: association; the French colonial policy following *assimilation* that argued for development within African culture

*cellule africaine*: African cell; office in the French government that enacted the policy of *Françafrique*

*chefs de canton*: African district chiefs who reported to French colonial officials

*citoyenneté dans le statut*: citizenship status

*colons*: French settlers, see *pieds-noirs*

*Conseil de l'Entente*: Council of Entente; a French West African regional cooperation formed near the end of colonialism in 1959

*des intérêt français*: French interests

*état-civil*: civil registry; government records for citizenship and various certificates (birth, death, marriage, etc.)

*évolués*: evolved, Africans who were educated in French schools yet did not have the political rights of *assimilés*

*exception française*: French exceptionalism

*Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération*: Fund for Aid and Cooperation, development fund that replaced FIDES and included military assistance

*Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social*: Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development, FIDES; the French development fund

that financed projects in the colonies in the immediate postwar years. FIDES altered the financial structure as colonies were not longer financially responsible for themselves.

*forces de presence*: military presence in former French colonial possessions

*forces de souveraineté*: sovereign military in French territories, such as French Guyana and Antilles

*indigénat*: native courts under French colonialism, African *sujets* were subject to these courts and often faced harsh punishments for minor crimes

*Institut Français*: French Institute, a center for cultural understanding located in Dakar, Senegal

*jus soli*: citizenship by soil; metropolitan and colonial soil did not confer the same kind of nationality

*liberté, égalité, et fraternité*: the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity enshrined in the French Constitution

*loi cadre*: Reform Act; transfer of powers from France to African colonies

*la mission civilisatrice*: the civilizing mission; French approach to colonization in Africa was to educate the natives and turn them into civilized, rational men.

*métis*: mixed, mulatto; a status granted to mixed Africans (one French and one African parent) who had political rights during colonization because they possessed French blood

*mise en valeur*: development or improvement of both natural and human resources

*Missions de Coopération et d'Action Culturelle*: Mission for Cooperation and Cultural Action; aid through technical assistance and advisors

*Mission Militaire de Coopération*: Mission for Military Cooperation; aid given through military assistance and equipment

*Organization Internationale de la Francophonie*: International Organization of la Francophonie; institution for states whose population speaks French

*originaires*: originals, a unique citizenship status granted to Africans residing in the Four Communes

*pieds-noirs*: black feet, referring to Frenchmen who were born in Algeria when it was a French department

*plein droit*: full rights; a mechanism for Africans to obtain French citizenship

*pré carré*: backyard, France's sphere of influence

*Quatre Communes*: Four Communes—Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque, and Dakar—that had special privileges in the colonial empire

*reseaux*: network, referring to the networks of Françafrique

*signares*: elite African women, often had relations with French colonial administrators

*spahis*: all Arab regiments who fought in the French army

*sujets*: subjects, the most basic level of status in the French colonial empire; subjects had duties rather than rights

*tirailleurs (Sénégalaise)*: French African soldiers; originally from Senegal but later recruited from all French colonies during the world wars

## Abbreviations

AEF	<i>Afrique Équatoriale Française</i> , French Equatorial Africa
AOF	<i>Afrique Occidentale Française</i> , French West Africa
DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
EU	European Union
FAC	<i>Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération</i>
FIDES	<i>Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social</i>
GDP	gross domestic product
GNI	gross national income
MC	Ministry of Cooperation and Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIF	<i>Organization Internationale de la Francophonie</i>
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
XAF	Central African CFA franc
XOF	West African CFA franc

## **Appendix B**

### **Dependent Variable Measurement: ODA Bilateral Aid Committed**

The DAC database lists Official Development Assistance (ODA) from donor countries to recipient countries. Specifically this includes assistance “(i) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and (ii) each transaction of which: (a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and (b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).”<sup>209</sup> However, ODA does not include bilateral or multilateral spending in the form of military, peacekeeping, social/cultural programs (museums, sport training facilities, etc.), anti-terrorism activities, and some forms of nuclear energy and research activities. ODA flows are measured in the form of cash or commodities and services; however, loans for less than a year are not counted in aid flows.

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<sup>209</sup> OECD, “Is It ODA: Factsheet – November 2008,” accessed April 12, 2017, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf>, 1.

## Appendix C Sources of Data

Table C.1. Summary of data

Variable	Description	Source
age of regime	Number of years a current regime has been in place.	Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. "Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) Data." <i>Public Choice</i> 142.2 (2010): 67-101.
aid committed	Amount of aid committed to recipient, 2009 USD	OECD. "Technical guide to DAC statistics database." OECD aid statistics 2014. Accessed July 2014, <a href="http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dacguide.htm">http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dacguide.htm</a> ; Tierney, Michael J., Daniel L. Nielson, and Darren G. Hawkins. "More dollars than sense: refining our knowledge of development finance using AidData." <i>World Development</i> 39 (2011): 1891-906.
CFA franc	Dummy variable by year; 1 if country was a member of the CFA franc zone	Hadjimichael, Michael T. and Michel Galy. "The CFA Franc Zone and the EMU." <i>IMF Working Paper WP/97/156</i> (1997).
colony	Dummy variable; 1 if regional status was French colony, 0 otherwise	Cooper, Frederick. <i>Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960</i> . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
democracy	Dummy variable: 1 if country is a democracy, 0 otherwise	Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. "Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) Data." <i>Public Choice</i> 142.2 (2010): 67-101.
department	Dummy variable; 1 if regional status was French department, 0 otherwise	Cooper, Frederick. <i>Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960</i> . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

distance between capitals	Simple distance between capitals (capitals, km)	Mayer, Theirry and Soledad Zignago. "Notes on CEPII's Distances Measures: the Geodist Database." <i>CEPII Working Paper</i> 25. (2011). Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales, Paris.
external war	Recipient External War	Barbieri, Katherine and Omar Keshk. <i>Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0</i> . 2012. Accessed August 18, 2014. <a href="http://correlatesofwar.org">http://correlatesofwar.org</a> .
French Assembly	If a head of state served on the French Assembly prior to independence	Cooper, Frederick. <i>Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960</i> . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
internal war	Recipient Internal War	Barbieri, Katherine and Omar Keshk. <i>Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0</i> . 2012. Accessed August 18, 2014. <a href="http://correlatesofwar.org">http://correlatesofwar.org</a> .
interventions	Dummy variable by year; 1 if French troops were present in country, 0 otherwise	Bender, Jeremy. "France's Military is All Over Africa." <i>Business Insider</i> . January 22, 2015, accessed April 1, 2017. <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/france-s-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1">http://www.businessinsider.com/france-s-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1</a>
la Francophonie	Dummy variable by year; 1 if country was a member of <i>Organization Internationale de la Francophonie</i> (OIF), 0 otherwise	"Welcome to the International Organisation of La Francophonie's Official Website." <i>Organisation Internaitonale de la Francophonie</i> . Accessed April 14, 2017. <a href="http://www.francophonie.org/Welcome-to-the-International.html">http://www.francophonie.org/Welcome-to-the-International.html</a> .
legal origins	If the legal origins: French civil law	LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origines." <i>Journal of Economic Literature</i> 46.2 (2008): 285-332.

mandate	Dummy variable; 1 if regional status was French mandate, 0 otherwise	Cooper, Frederick. <i>Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960</i> . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
<i>métis</i>	Variable between 0 and 2 based on the number of <i>métis</i> throughout the colonial period	Saada, Emmanuelle. <i>Empire's Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies</i> . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
military base	Dummy variable; 1 if military base is <i>les forces de présence</i> or occupied by French troops, 0 otherwise	“Les Forces Françaises Prépositionnées, Mai 2016.” <i>Ministère de la Défense</i> . January 31, 2017. Accessed April 14, 2017. <a href="http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces-prepositionnees/mission-des-forces-prepositionnees/missions-des-forces-prepositionnees">http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces-prepositionnees/mission-des-forces-prepositionnees/missions-des-forces-prepositionnees</a> .
natural disasters	Indicator for if recipient had any type of disaster	Guha-Sapir, D. R. Below, Ph. Hoyois. EM-DAT. “The OFDA/CRED international disaster database.” Université catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. 2012. Accessed June 2013. <a href="http://www.emdat.be">http://www.emdat.be</a> .
<i>originaires</i>	Dummy variable as <i>originaire</i> was only a status in Senegal, 0 otherwise	Crowder, Michael. <i>Senegal: A Study in French Assimilation Policy</i> . New York: Oxford University Press, 1962.
percentage French	Using the <i>lingua franca</i> data, I calculated the population speaking French in each country	Britannica. <i>Britannica Book of the Year 2010</i> . Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 2010.
Polity IV	Measurement of most autocratic (-10) to most democratic (10)	Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers. <i>Polity IV Project: Data Users' Manual</i> , Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2012.
population		Feenstra, R.C., Inklaar, R., and Timmer, M.P. “The Next Generation of the Penn World Table.” 2013. Accessed July 2013.



		<a href="http://www.ggdcd.net/pwt">http://www.ggdcd.net/pwt</a> .
protectorate	Dummy variable; 1 if regional status was French protectorate, 0 otherwise	Cooper, Frederick. <i>Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960</i> . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
real GDP	Gross domestic product in terms of 2010 USD	Feenstra, R.C., Inklaar, R., and Timmer, M.P. "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table." 2013. Accessed July 2013. <a href="http://www.ggdcd.net/pwt">http://www.ggdcd.net/pwt</a> .
<i>tirailleurs</i>	Variable between 0 and 2 based on the number of <i>tirailleurs</i> throughout the colonial period	Echenberg, Myron J. <i>Colonial Conscripts: the Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960</i> . Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1991.
trade flows	Trade flows between countries (dyadic)	Barbieri, Katherine and Omar Keshk. <i>Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0</i> (2012). Accessed August 18, 2014. <a href="http://correlatesofwar.org">http://correlatesofwar.org</a> .
UN voting affinity	Voting similarity index (0-1) using three category vote data (yes, abstain, no) (dyadic)	Bailey, Michael, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten. "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from UN Voting Data." Forthcoming <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i> .
years of possession	The number of years a possession was occupied by France	Cooper, Frederick. <i>Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960</i> . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.

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## **Appendix D**

### **Regression Tables**

#### UN Voting

The following section presents regression analysis to address the argument for UN voting affinity presented in “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Alesina and Dollar argue that UN votes are a “reliable indication of the political alliances between countries and that these political alliances in part determine aid flow.”<sup>210</sup> However, other scholars—notably Kuziemko and Werker (2006)—argue that members of the UN Security Council, especially the US, give aid to rotating members on the Security Council in exchange for votes. The following analysis addresses this debate, and I find that UN voting affinity, which is a dyadic variable, has a positive and significant effect on bilateral aid committed. This can be seen in Table D.1., column (4). Table D.2. shows the regression analysis for former French colonies only. Additionally, I ran regressions with UN voting affinity as the dependent variable with similar controls from previous analyses. The results are presented in Tables D.3. and D.4.

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<sup>210</sup> Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5.1 (2000): 46.

Table D.1. Bilateral aid committed (ln) with UN voting affinity, full sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Frenchness	0.375*** (0.022)	0.365*** (0.019)	0.351*** (0.020)	0.337*** (0.022)	0.373*** (0.023)	0.323*** (0.022)	0.342*** (0.020)	0.316*** (0.022)
Real GDP (ln)		0.481*** (0.031)	0.416*** (0.036)			0.452*** (0.046)	0.415*** (0.045)	0.449*** (0.057)
Trade Flows			0.001*** (0.000)			0.000*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Recipient Civil War				0.100 (0.195)			-0.072 (0.186)	-0.030 (0.188)
Recipient External War				0.428 (0.442)			0.483 (0.468)	0.487 (0.471)
Democracy (Dummy)				0.921*** (0.214)			0.568*** (0.199)	0.563*** (0.198)
Polity IV				-0.040*** (0.013)			-0.020* (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)

Age in years of current regimes	0.046*** (0.005)	0.013** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.005)
UN voting affinity	-3.100*** (0.824)	-4.127*** (0.771)	-4.360*** (0.772)
If recipient had any type of disaster	0.186* (0.103)	0.084 (0.097)	0.184* (0.098)
Population (in thousands)	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Distance between capitals (capitals, km)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Constant	16.720*** (0.050)	12.569*** (0.278)	13.038*** (0.309)
No. of observations	1,018	952	945
R2	0.229	0.381	0.393
		0.300	0.305
		938	952
		945	945
		902	902
		0.406	0.415
		15.222***	15.557***
		(0.583)	(0.665)

note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table D.2. Bilateral aid committed (ln) with UN voting affinity, former colonies only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Frenchness	0.527*** (0.126)	1.331*** (0.139)	1.367*** (0.142)	0.776*** (0.154)	1.103*** (0.148)	1.369*** (0.144)	1.296*** (0.154)	1.321*** (0.157)
Real GDP (ln)		0.494*** (0.043)	0.533*** (0.051)			0.514*** (0.067)	0.584*** (0.071)	0.596*** (0.091)
Trade Flows			-0.001 (0.001)			-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Recipient Civil War				0.266 (0.241)			-0.010 (0.230)	-0.060 (0.238)
Recipient External War				0.866 (0.572)			0.706 (0.648)	0.775 (0.671)
Democracy (Dummy)				0.743** (0.293)			0.273 (0.274)	0.251 (0.278)
Polity IV				-0.022 (0.018)			0.008 (0.017)	0.004 (0.018)



Table D.3. UN Voting Affinity, full sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Frenchness	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
		0.000***	0.000***			0.000***	0.000	0.000
Real GDP (ln)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Trade Flows			0.000**			0.000***	0.000**	0.000*
			(0.000)			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Recipient Civil War				-0.026***			-0.024***	-0.024***
				(0.008)			(0.008)	(0.008)
Recipient External War				0.026			0.009	0.004
				(0.018)			(0.020)	(0.021)
Democracy (dummy)				0.002			0.001	0.001
				(0.009)			(0.009)	(0.009)
Polity IV				0.004***			0.004***	0.004***
				(0.000)			(0.001)	(0.001)

Age in years of current regime	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
If recipient had any type of disaster	0.019*** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)
Population (in thousands)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Distance between capitals (capitals, km)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.610*** (0.002)	0.604*** (0.002)	0.611*** (0.005)
No. of observations	973	917	902
R2	0.000	0.023	0.179

note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



Table D.4. UN Voting Affinity, former colonies only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Frenchness	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.016*** (0.006)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.012* (0.006)
Real GDP (ln)		0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)			0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Trade Flows			0.000* (0.000)			0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Recipient Civil War				-0.028*** (0.009)			-0.025*** (0.010)	-0.028*** (0.010)
Recipient External War				0.029 (0.022)			0.009 (0.027)	0.008 (0.028)
Democracy (dummy)				0.006 (0.011)			0.006 (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)
Polity IV				0.003*** (0.001)			0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)

Age in years of current regime	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
If recipient had any type of disaster	0.021*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.007)
Population (in thousands)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Distance between capitals (capitals, km)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.586*** (0.011)	0.576*** (0.013)	0.574*** (0.013)	0.579*** (0.014)
No. of observations	478	443	443	443
R2	0.013	0.043	0.049	0.163
			0.086	0.173
			0.428	0.428
			0.058	0.190

note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

### Individual Components of “Frenchness,” Former Colony Only

The following section was mentioned in Chapter 3 but not included due to issues of collinearity. However, I wanted to illustrate that many variables were dropped—most likely due to the coding of regional statuses—and therefore not included in the overall analysis. See the results in Table D.5. below.

Table D.5. Bilateral aid committed, individual components of Françafrique, former French colonies only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Years under French rule	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)
If president served on French Assembly	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)
CFA franc			-0.403 (0.301)			-1.326*** (0.302)	-1.215*** (0.408)	-1.215*** (0.408)
Percent of population that speaks French				-0.016*** (0.004)		-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.004)
La Francophonie				1.214*** (0.145)		1.394*** (0.152)	0.840*** (0.225)	0.841*** (0.225)
Interventions					-0.965*** (0.350)	-0.687** (0.337)	-0.394 (0.487)	-0.373 (0.487)
Presence of military base					(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)	(dropped)

Colony	(dropped)	(dropped)
Department	(dropped)	(dropped)
Protectorate	(dropped)	(dropped)
Mandate	(dropped)	(dropped)
<i>Originaires</i>		(dropped)
<i>Métis</i>		(dropped)
<i>Tirailleurs</i>	0.595	(0.585)
Legal Origin: French	0.742***	0.766***
	(0.190)	(0.192)

Constant	15.876***	15.876***	15.895***	15.587***	15.909***	15.630***	15.284***	15.259***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.116)	(0.119)
No. of observations	862	862	862	862	862	862	509	509
R2	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.076	0.009	0.101	0.114	0.115

note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

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