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**TOWARD A SYNTHESIS OF THEORIES OF REVOLUTION: THE CASES
OF IRAN AND EGYPT**

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TOWARD A SYNTHESIS OF THEORIES OF REVOLUTION: THE CASES OF IRAN AND EGYPT

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degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By
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Norman, Oklahoma

1982

TOWARD A SYNTHESIS OF THEORIES OF REVOLUTION: THE CASES OF IRAN AND EGYPT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Certain social events take people by surprise, and revolutions are among the most surprising social phenomena. "Indeed, it has often been pointed out that vast social changes have taken place without even the clearest contemporary minds being conscious of what was happening, and [that] . . . the nature of the institutions involved in the process of change could not adequately have been understood till placed in the crucible of history" (Andreski, 1969:66-67). In this same regard, Robertson (1981:582) also emphasizes that, "Indeed, some social movements have occurred at times when virtually nobody, including sociologists, foresaw that they would."

These statements are substantiated with ample facts. To focus on the Iranian Revolution (1978-9), in which we have a special concern in this dissertation, some examples are mentioned. In 1971, Marvin Zonis, a professor at the University of Chicago, had concluded in The Political Elite of Iran that: "While monarchs and presidents throughout the Middle East and the developing world have been deposed or dismissed and political chaos has been rife, Iran does appear as an island of stability" (1971:338). Different writers and politicians

followed in the same view and spoke of Persia/Iran as "The Immortal Kingdom", "Oasis of Stability", or "Island of Stability" in the most troubled area of the world, the Middle East.

Further, "A CIA assessment in August 1978 claimed that 'Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a "prerevolutionary" situation' and a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Intelligence Appraisal dated September 28, 1978 announced that 'The Shah is expected to remain actively in power over the next 10 years'" (Ledeen and Lewis, 1980:11). A few months later, in February 1979, the "island of stability" sank, surprising observers worldwide.

On the other hand, ". . .even theories of revolution which attempt to identify more than a single variable, perhaps as many as two or three major ingredients, simply cannot provide an adequate explanation of this phenomenon. It seems that many factors are involved and, typically, not the same ones in each revolution" (Blackey and Payton, 1976:39). As a result, the factors that have caused previous revolutions have not been fully elaborated and, relatedly, the prediction of the would-be others has become a difficult task.

To overcome the problem--that is, to be able to explain the causes of historical revolutions sufficiently--and to "anticipate" the occurrence of similar phenomena as adequate as possible, a four-stage strategy is proposed and concentrated on throughout this dissertation. This strategy consists of both theory and empirical observation as sketched below.

(1) In the first stage, the prevalent theories of revolution, in the sense that they have many things in common to be integrated and

synthesized, are evaluated. Further, from the differences of these theories, more insight can be gained to supplement the proposed synthesis.

(2) In the second stage, the involved theories are applied to a case of mass revolution to aid in identifying the similarities and differences among the theories. In this practice, in fact, the validity of each theory can be assessed and, in accordance, a decision regarding a synthesizing enterprise can be made.

(3) In the third stage and based on the applicability of the addressed theories and their points of emergence and departure, a synthesis will be developed. Here, two issues must be emphasized. First, the intended application does not necessarily mean that each theory will (or should) be as applicable as the other. Nor does it imply that each revolution is a duplication of other revolutions to be explained by any given theory. One must remember that whatever its similarity to others, each social phenomenon, based on its sociocultural setting and circumstantial conditions, is unique and unparalleled.

Second, the intended synthesis does not (and should not) essentially handle any given revolution in exactly the same way as the other phenomena of the kind. The plausibility of this assertion can be sought in the very nature of the previous point, that is, each social fact is identified with its own peculiarity relative to others. To shed light on this problem and to assess its theoretical implications throughout this dissertation, the last stage will be considered.

(4) To determine if the proposed synthesis, derived from different theories of revolution, is valid, an attempt will be made to test the synthesis against another case of historical revolutions. If

such a test is successful to an acceptable degree, then the utility of the synthesis as a newly developed theory of revolution will be acknowledged.

As illustrated above, this four-stage enterprise is a departure from theorizing on the grounds of a case study or comparative investigation to building a theory on the basis of the already developed theories. Such a kind of theory construction, however, is also lodged on two cases of revolutions as mentioned earlier. This theorizing shift is, indeed, the underlying interest in this dissertation which may have some implication for Merton's observation that: "We may have many concepts but few theories; many points of view, but few theorems; many 'approaches' but few arrivals. Perhaps a shift in emphasis would be all to the good" (1968:52).

Chapter II, that is, the Study of Revolution, will embrace a review of the literature on revolution including definition, meaning, ideology, leadership, typology, a summary statement of theories of revolution, and other relevant concepts and categories. In this chapter, it will also be argued that the study of social revolutions is basically the task of sociology which is considered to be the "integrating science"--the science concerned with integrating the data of all other social sciences. However, this perception of sociology does not mean that the study of revolution is a "private property" of sociologists. Nor does it ignore the fact that almost every other social discipline (e.g., history, political science, social psychology) has a certain concern with the study of revolutions. What will be argued is that sociology can be defined as that kind of tradition that conjoins various routes of social

sciences. It regards ". . . itself as something like a universal science of social life embracing all aspects of social relations" (Dowes and Hughes, 1979:4).

Further, this chapter will emphasize how and why the study of revolution (within the sociological tradition) fits in the area of "social change," and that revolutions can be viewed as occasional radical changes in a social system. It also will be argued that revolutions have usually been studied with reference to their "causes," but without regard to their consequences. Such disregard can be understood as one of the major common flaws of many theories. Causal analysis of revolutions which does not account for their achieved goals--idealistically and ideologically crystalized in a new social order--may mean nothing more than investigating the process of shifts in the balance of power or the sudden circulation of the elite.

Chapter III is devoted to the category of Methodology, which covers (1) case study, (2) comparative method, and (3) theory construction technique. All these three procedures deal with either the applied theories, the test case revolutions, or the attempted synthesis. However, some points must be emphasized in advance. First, the criterion in terms of which theories of revolution are selected and applied is simply their prevalence in the literature. In order to examine these prevalent theories as such, both the original works and certain relevant interpretations will be considered.

Second, the test case revolutions are the Revolution of Egypt in 1952, and the Revolution of Iran in 1979. The latter revolution is employed as the event to which theories of revolution will be addressed

and thus from which the synthesis will be derived. The Egyptian Revolution will serve as the test case for the would-be synthesis. In each case, only the revolutionary causes and episodes up to the take-over stage will be considered and hence the institutionalization of the revolutionary ideals will not be addressed.

It should be noted that the two revolutions differ in some respects and the quality of mobilization for action, ideological emphasis, and the process of revolutionary "take-over" are examples. Such differences, however, will be useful in producing the synthesis from one revolution and testing it with the other. This can be regarded as one reason for the choice of the two revolutions. The other reason is the author's cultural acquaintance with these events. Under certain conditions, this type of familiarity is fruitful in the process of investigation. An investigator may have a better understanding if he knows the "native language" and the "historical background" of a given revolution (Bordewich, 1980:71).

The preceding claim, however, does not hold that unless one be Caesar one cannot understand Caesar. All it means is that, other things being equal, sociocultural affinity with social facts will provide unique insight into them. But, this kind of acquaintance could also be an academic disaster if "impersonalization" in the course of investigation is not secured. This is why one should be watchful to avoid any penetration of personalized bias and value judgment to his analysis. This commitment, which is surely stressed in this dissertation, touches the very heart of the research ethic and scientific neutrality.

Chapter IV deals with the theories of revolution that will be applied and synthesized. Herein, each theory will be summarized and characterized in the way that the original thought will be demonstrated. This chapter will be followed by chapter V in which the test case revolution, The Islamic Revolution of Iran, will be described in both historical terms and immediate origins. The historical incidents that contributed to the creation of this revolution will be pictured in the "Historical Background." "The Analysis of the Root Causes of the Revolution," will follow in the next section. In this context, the economic, political, ideological, ethnic, and legitimation sources and origins of the revolution will be singled out. The "Shah's modernization" also will be considered as another variable which, in turn, contributed to the emergence of the Revolution. The overall presentation of this revolution will be somewhat lengthy, for two reasons. First, since several theories will be applied to the addressed revolution, a sufficient account is required lest the explanatory capacity of the theories is distorted in the process. Next, the recency, of the Iranian Revolution also necessitates a thorough observation of its roots and antecedents.

Having thus approached the test case revolution, the theories will be applied in the next chapter, chapter VI. In this context, the implication of each theory for the revolution will be stressed. Accordingly, at least one "proposition" will be extracted and formulated. These propositions will all be integrated in an attempt to create the synthesis. The synthesis will eventually constitute the attempted "Integral Theory of Revolution" as an all-inclusive model within which revolutions are viewed and analyzed.

In Chapter VII, the new theory itself will be tested against the Egyptian Revolution, where the causes of this revolution, in turn, will be sketched simultaneously. Finally, an overall conclusion will follow in chapter VIII, which is the terminating chapter of this dissertation. In this chapter several issues relating to the proposed synthesis and the two test case revolutions will be emphasized, including the relationships between "social strain" and "resource mobilization" in the revolutionary process.

CHAPTER II

THE STUDY OF REVOLUTION

"More than ever before, revolution is seen as having played an integral part in the evolution of man. Its study cannot be neglected to the corners of academic responsibility" (Blackey, 1976:xvi). In line with such a view the phenomenon of revolution and its major categories are presently examined. This examination, aimed at shedding some light on what will follow throughout the dissertation, deals with the "identification," "description," and "explanation" of revolution as it is pictured in the relevant literature.

A. Definitional Appraisal

What revolution really is and how one can define it accurately is a problematic issue. This perplexity is evident, for example, in the fact that there is no agreed-upon definition of the phenomenon of revolution. Revolution usually means different things to those who attempt to define it. Hence, a complex of definitions is at hand, none of which is either completely valid or entirely irrelevant. It seems that this definitional disagreement results from the very nature of social facts, the quality of their manifestation in everyday life, and

the way in which they are reflected in our consciousness.

This dilemma can be traced in certain facts. First of all, the long-standing problem of "nominal" versus "operational" definition is at issue. That is, whether "words" have little or nothing to do with "concepts," and whether "operational definitions" operate on a "referential" level in addition to, or rather than, a symbolic or linguistic one (Bierstedt:1977). As long as such a problem is confronted, many of our social concepts cannot be defined thoroughly and easily.

Second, the intellectual roots out of which, and the political positions based on which, a definition of revolution is developed are usually different and sometimes contradictory. Students of revolution view revolution differently as a "political," "social," "reactionary," "radical," "religious," "secular," "ordeal," and finally "successful" or "abortive" phenomenon. Since what is seen by one observer is not what is observed by the other, common agreement on the definitions cannot be expected. In Tristram's words, "More generally, revolutions are studied by those who either support, made, opposed, or abhor them... therefore, the interests and values of theorists have had a considerable bearing on the name given to, and the definition offered of, the political phenomenon being studied" (1980:71-72). Furthermore, where the "materialistic" vision versus the "idealistic" perception of social reality is advocated, our understanding of and approach to social facts (including revolution) will vary substantially. Attacking the Hegelian "idealism," Marx and Engels (1970:47) argue that "...men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with their real existence, their real thinking and

product of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life" (emphasis added).

Third, and somewhat in connection with the latter point, social facts are not only "out there," "external" to, and exercising "constraint" and "coercion" over us (Durkheim, 1964:3-4); it is argued that they are also "'in here' part of our innermost being" (Berger 1963:121). Given the latter contention, one may be engulfed in the borderline of "objectivity" and its counterpart, "subjectivity", in his approach to social realities. When this happens, our identification of the observed phenomenon will be blurred and ambiguous. We are reminded that scientific misconception can result more from ambiguity than error.

Fourth, in many cases revolutions are confused with, or not accurately distinguished from, other somewhat analogous phenomena such as "revolt," "coup," "war of independence," "secessionist movement," and the like. As such, many definitions of revolution are either so broad that they encompass a wide range of nonrevolutions (and hence blur the concept of revolution), or they are so restrictive that the empirical and schematic utility of the definition remains at stake (Stone, 1966:159-162; Blackey, 1976:xvii).

Finally, when the study of revolution is attempted, "a paucity of data" is usually confronted. Additionally, as Salert indicates, "the type of data on revolutions that are available to us is often not reliable," and that "social scientists rarely witness a revolution" (1976:20).

With the foregoing considerations in mind, a sample of the definitions of revolution will be addressed, and an overall assessment

of the included definitions will follow. Needless to say, it is intended that this sample be representative of different intellectual-political positions, embracing the most prevalent definitions.

(1) According to Yoder, revolution is "the change in the social attitudes and values basic to the traditional institutional order" (1926:441).

(2) Marxism defines revolution in a broad sense as "class consciousness" which is "the locomotive of history." In a specific meaning revolution "is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets, and cannon--authoritarian means, if such there be at all..." (Engels, 1952:639).

(3) Amman notes that "revolution is a breakdown, momentary or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of power, usually accompanied by a lessening of the habit of obedience" (1962:36).

(4) Arendt claims that

only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government to bring about the formation of a new body politics, where the liberation from oppression aim at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution (1963:28).

(5) Eros defines revolution as a "sudden, radical change which takes place both in political and social conditions, that is, when an 'established' government (as well as a social and legal order) is suddenly, sometimes violently, replaced by a new one" (1964:602).

(6) Eckstein considers revolution as one type of "internal war" and defines the latter in a broad sense as "any resort to violence within a political order to change its conditions, rulers, or policies"

(1965:133).

(7) According to Brinton, revolution is a "drastic, sudden substitution of one group in charge of a territorial political entity by another group hitherto not running the government" (1965:4).

(8) For Johnson, "revolutions are social changes," and "revolutionary change is a special kind of social change, one that involves the intrusion of violence into civil social relations" (1966:1).

(9) In Huntington's view, "a revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, governmental activity and politics" (1973:264).

(10) Hagopian contends that

revolution is an active, prolonged crisis in one or more of the traditional systems of stratification, (class, status, power) of a political community which involves a purposive, elite-directed attempt to abolish or to reconstruct one or more of social systems by means of an intensification of political power and recourse to violence (1974:1).

(11) Finally, Blackey and Paynton observe that

revolution is a political and/or social and/or economic and/or cultural upheaval which calls for a fundamental change in the existing order; it is relatively rapid and generally employs the use of threat of force; it is directed against principles and institutions, not individuals (1976:18).

The definitions cited above illustrate some common characteristics of revolutions including "struggle for political freedom," "the overthrow of the existing order," "use of violence," and "fundamental social change." All these definitions tend to identify revolution with its "goals" and "causes," but overlook or even disregard

its actual consequences. This point seems to be evident at least in the concentration on the "sudden" downfall of the old regime through the "use of violence." As such, putting an abrupt end to the established order seems to be an end in itself but not a new beginning for the implementation and execution of the advocated ideology. Hence, de-emphasizing the institutionalization of the revolutionary ideology is a basic flaw in the study of revolution.

On the other hand, with the exception of the overall Marxist definition of revolution, the element of "ideology" and "collective consciousness," critical to the emergence and success of revolutionary actions, are absent in the involved definitions. Apparently, taken together, these definitions treat revolution as a "simple event" which takes place overnight, in one spot of time. Revolution is not a "spontaneous generation;" it is a relatively prolonged "movement" that antedates the very downfall of the established order, and will proceed after the latter is abolished. In LeBon's words "the true revolutions, those which transform the disciplines of people, are most frequently accomplished so slowly that historians can hardly point to their beginnings" (1913:25).

It seems that if revolution is viewed and defined as an "accomplished revolutionary movement," much insight would be given to its understanding. In such desired conceptualization, the "emergence" and "evolution" of the revolutionary episodes in the dimension of time and social context may be better realized and assessed. In such treatment, for example, "resource mobilization efforts" in the process of confrontation with social control and the operation of the latter

can be nicely pictured and examined. Based on such speculation, Garner's definition of social movement in general, and revolutionary movement in particular, is informative. According to Garner

... a social movement is a set of actions of a group of people. These actions have the following characteristics: They are self-consciously directed toward changing the social structure and/or ideology of society, and they either are carried on outside of ideologically legitimate channels of change or use these channels in innovative ways (1977:1).

Garner also distinguishes five types of social movements among which only "class-conscious" movement "that is aimed at seizing the state, the apparatus of coercion, in order to alter class structure" is considered as a revolutionary movement (Garner, 1977:6).

Garner's definition of (revolutionary) social movement is suggestive, but since he employs the concepts "consciousness" and "class" in the Marxist sense, that is, in the sense of economic-based action, his definition is of narrow scope and restrictive. According to Morris and Murphy (1966:298-313) class conscious political action is but one kind of political activism that is based on economic interests. The other types of such activism can stem from and be grounded in political, national, ethnic or religious causes, or a combination of these elements.

Based on the variety of definitions that are touched upon above, and their individual merits, the following definition, which is hoped to provide a better picture of the phenomenon under study, is elaborated and set forth. A revolution is a social movement which is relatively violent and massive, group-conscious and processual; such a movement gets organized gradually in a routinized way, and its

ideological goal is overthrowing the old order in favor of a new social system, chracterized by radical structural and/or valuational change.

B. Typology of Revolution

Constituting a typology of revaluation, like defining revolution, is not an easy task. The main objective of constructing a typology of revolution is (1) to single out revolutions from non-revolutions, (2) to shed light on the causes of revolution, (3) to generalize the findings on a revolution to other revolutions, and (4) to anticipate, to any possible extent, the occurrence of future revolutions. In a word, "classification is . . .a necessary prerequisite to analysis" (Wilson, 1973:14).

In order to construct typologies of revolutions, social scientists have focused on one or more traits as the criteria of classification. Such attempts, based mainly on (1) the revolutionary ideology, (2) the target of revolutionary activity (i.e., government, regime at large, or society as a whole), and (3) the scientist's own political values, have produced various categories of revolutions. They are: (1) communist, fascist, nationalist; (2) liberal, moderate, conservative; (3) radical, reactionary; (4) social, political, cultural, religious; (5) urban, rural; (6) Eastern, Western; and finally (7) successful versus abortive revolutions. It also should be noted that the typology of revolution involves a distinctive differentiation between revolutions proper and other sorts of socio-political activism. Examples of the latter are coups, revolts, and separatist movements which sometimes are confused with revolutions.

According to Edwards (1927:127-155), once a revolution erupts, three nearly distinct factions will emerge--the "radicals," the "moderates," and the "conservatives." The moderates do not aim to change the important features of the old regime--they have a minimal revolutionary program. In contrast, the radicals work to change the whole establishment. The conservatives, the counterrevolutionaries, wish to preserve as much from the old system as possible. Once each faction is in power, a certain kind of revolution--i.e., moderate, radical, or abortive--is at hand.

Some students of revolution (e.g., Dorso, 1955; Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950) make a distinction between "social" and "political" revolutions. Political revolution involves only power transition "within" the ruling class, that is, without changing the whole establishment. In this situation, then, only the reshuffling of the governing groups and the revitalizing of the existing government is involved. When the opposing groups destroy and replace the ruling class and create a new social order, social revolution will occur.

Viewed from the Marxist theory of revolution, the preceding distinction is not valid, for "an authentic social revolution . . . [has] to be political as well" (Hagopian, 1974:105). On the other hand, almost any political revolution produces some social consequences. Therefore, to avoid this terminological confusion, it is safer to drop the label "political" from any "revolution," and to use the terms coup and revolt wherever only the replacement of the governing individuals (and not the destruction of the whole order) is the case.

Huntington (1970:266-274) differentiates between Eastern and

Western revolutions, though he cautions that geographical labels do not reflect the real basis of this differentiation. He speculates that Western revolutions (e.g., French, British, and Russian revolutions) have occurred in traditionalist regimes ruled by landed aristocrats. Eastern style revolutions (e.g., Cuban, Chinese, and Egyptian revolutions) have taken place in societies in which some modernization has already occurred.

It seems that it is the birth date and not the birth place of revolutions that can serve as a useful criterion for an attempted differentiation. In other words, it is the dimension of time linked to the society's socioeconomic stage of development that, among other factors, can determine the style or the very character of revolutions. However, no Western society is immune from revolution, and all Eastern societies undergoing some modernization will not inevitably experience the eruption of revolution.

Concerning other labels of revolutions, some points should be made. First of all, it could be argued that it is not contradictory to have a "nationalist" revolution which is also "communist" or, in fact, "socialist" (e.g., Cuban Revolution of 1959). It seems that each revolution is nationalist unless by this attribute anticolonialist action, in a traditional sense of colonialism, is meant. Second, to label a revolution as "reactionary" (i.e., heading backward to a "golden age") is misleading, for even these revolutions base their objectives on a contemporary terrain and employ modern means to reach their ideals. Third, if a social event is considered as a successful revolution, then the distinction between "conservative", "moderate", and "radical"

revolutions is meaningless. A true, or successful, revolution is fundamental structural change, and where such a change is lacking, one should not speak of "revolution," be it conservative, abortive, or whatever. What is important then is how much and how rapid the drastic and institutionalized changes are, and to what extent a revolution is heading toward the left or otherwise.

From another viewpoint, many episodes of political violence have been regarded as revolutions and hence an ambiguity concerning what is and what is not revolution is confronted. While we are acquainted with only a small number of revolutions, Blackey (1976:xi-xiv) provides us with a list of all "revolutionary upheavals," events which took place between 1517 and 1974, out of which 87 have been termed revolutions. To overcome such confusion, many students of revolution have developed various criteria for differentiating among different kinds of sociopolitical action.

Johnson (1964:27-28) believes that, based on (1) the targets of revolutionary activity or the stake of revolution, (2) the identity of revolutionists or protagonists (i.e., masses or elites leading masses), (3) the revolutionary goals or ideologies, and (4) the spontaneity or calculation in revolution, six types of revolution are evident. They are the (1) Jacquirie, (2) milleniarism, (3) anarchist (nostalgic) rebellion, (4) Jacobin communist or nation-forming revolution, (5) conspiratorial coup d'etat, and (6) militarized mass insurrection. Some of Johnson's examples are communist, such as the Russian and Chinese revolutions, and others are Jacobin but not Communist, such as the French and the Turkish revolution of 1908-1922.

Since Johnson has based his typology on somewhat ambiguous or overlapping criteria (e.g., change in government, political regime, or society as a whole), his six types of revolution are ambiguous. Changing the political order includes the transformation of the government, and yet such a change is not revolution. In fact, not all of the revolutions mentioned by Johnson are revolutions per se but include revolts, coups and other similar upheavals (Hagopian, 1974:101).

Tanter and Midlarsky (1967:265-280) set forth four criteria to discriminate among different types of revolutionary movements. They are (1) the intensity of participation, (2) the duration of the movement, (3) the level of domestic violence, and (4) "the intentions of the insurgents." Based on these four factors, "mass revolution," "revolutionary coup," "reform coup," or "palace revolution" can occur. For example, the French Revolution (1789) and the Algerian Revolution (1962) are classified as mass revolutions, and the Nazi movement of 1933 and the Egyptian movement of 1952 are recognized as revolutionary coups.

The major flaw in this attempt is that it deals with the events in terms of the way in which the old regime is overthrown, and not the concomitant revolutionary outcome. As an example, the Egyptian revolutionary coup was acknowledged as revolution, and on the contrary, the Persian Revolution of 1906-1909 was called abortive revolution or merely a social movement, which somehow failed to achieve its ideal goals. In a word, it is the achievement of a social movement that will determine its nature in the sense that the movement is revolutionary or otherwise.

To better crystalize revolution as a distinct phenomenon,

Hagopian (1974:1-44) has deliberately concentrated on "what is not revolution." The latter category embraces three sub-categories: (1) coup d'etat, i.e., "a blow at the state" or "a sudden attack on the government," and can take on the label of (a) palace revolution, (b) executive coup, (c) military coup, and (d) paramilitary coup; (2) revolts which are identified with five forms (a) jacqueries and peasant revolts, (b) urban mobs, (c) nativism, (d) milleniarism-messianism, and (3) aristocratic revolts. Revolts have a clearly "conservative" or even "retrograde" character and, unlike revolution, "the short-run impact of revolt on the structure and function of social and political institutions is . . . indirect and marginal" (Hagopian, 1974:11); (3) secession, according to Hagopian, "involves the breaking off of one part of the state and the proclamation of its independence" (1974:31). Such separation can take on the label of a (a) regional, (b) colonial, (c) ethnic, or (d) religious movement. Finally, Hagopian concludes that

. . . when a movement repudiates a significant portion of the traditional values and institutions in the name of millenary vision, it is tempting indeed to call it revolutionary. Yet, such movements are characteristically limited to a single region or sector of society, whereas a true revolution affects the global society. . . . Revolution by definition is extraordinary (1974:39-40).

Hagopian's typology also suffers from certain problems. For example, it is safer to save the term "revolution" for only those "extraordinary" changes that are revolutions. As such, "palace revolution" should be called "palace revolt." Secondly, within the category of "what is not revolution," in which we are not so interested presently, some overlap exists. In this respect, it should be noted that a secessionist movement can be religious, ethnic and geographic

at the same time. Thirdly, Hagopian disregards the fact that some coups or revolts can, by virtue of their outcome, bring about revolutionary alterations and hence fit in the category of revolution. Fourth, although Hagopian distinguishes revolution from "what is not revolution," he fails to classify revolutions or to provide us with a set of criteria for such desired classification.

Finally, in closing this discussion of classification it should be noted that we may not typify what is called revolution only on the grounds of such factors as mass participation, duration of violence, level of violence, and the resulting destruction in lives and properties. The more important and determining criteria are indeed those revolutionary changes that are introduced to major social institutions and the dominant values. Accordingly, abortive revolutions are unsuccessful in that they have failed to introduce the attempted drastic changes to a society, though these revolutions may have originally come about via mass movement and violent action and have lasted for a relatively long period of time.

C. Ideology

When a political system is challenged, what should be established in its place becomes an urgent issue. In order to change the existing order, people need a promising ideal and a viable program of action. Kennan (1968) seems to suggest that rebels without a program should either put up or shut up. However, without a heartening program, people may rise to opposition, but they will not be able to make a revolution. In the process of revolutionary action, ideology functions

to inflame, and to convert the individualistic beliefs to collective ones. As Smelser suggests, "present in all collective behavior is some kind of belief that prepares the participants for action" (1962:79). If an ideology's sources are understood, its functional import in the creation of revolution will fairly be realized. According to Johnson (1968:79), ideology has its roots in (1) social strain, (2) vested interests and prospective gains, (3) bitterness about social change that has already occurred, (4) limited perspective due to social position, and (5) the persistence of outmoded traditions of thought. As such, ideology can be thought of as a certain principle based on which social movements can erupt, for the purpose of radical change (or even for maintaining the established order).

"Ideas" are defined as "weapons" (Lerner, 1939:3) under whose banner certain ideals can be achieved. These ideas, in fact, are those images that people have about how the world operates. In Feuer's words ideology is ". . . a world-system based on one's political and social feelings, an attempt, conscious or unconscious, to impose one's political will upon the nature of the universe" (1968:64). However, in the study of revolution the discussion of ideology and ideas for action revolves around the very nature of this same category and its operation in the process of revolutionary change.

In the Marxist theory of revolution, the "weapons" of ideas are materialist in origin--they are grounded in the people's materialist needs and the ownership of the means of production. Further, in this tradition, ideology is associated with "class consciousness," and is considered a central element in the Marxist theory of revolution.

Lenin argues that there can be no revolution without a revolutionary theory. The major problem with this identification of ideology is not the ample weight that is given to ideology, but the crucial import linked to (1) social class, and (2) the materialist base of ideology. (In the following chapter, this criticism will be elaborated and specified.)

In contrast to the Marxist materialist position of ideology, Hegel (1967) views ideology idealistically. He emphasizes the dialectical nature of the Spirit of Time where the individuals and nations become instruments of the Spirit. Hegel's Spirit represents the absolute and is the central principle of all existence. It is a process whose development proceeds by the dialectical course from the "in-itself" of the unconscious stage to the "for-itself" of the conscious stage (Lauer, 1978:183). Finally, Spirit comes into being in nature and history and is ". . . externalized and emptied into time" (Hegel, 1967:807). However, Hegelian perception of ideology is the other extreme from the Marxist materialist perspective in the sense that Hegel gives too much weight to the idealist base of ideas and ideologies. Concerning the ideas of revolution, it could be argued that what ideologically motivates people to revolt is of both material and spiritual nature.

Lauer (1978:184-5) recognizes two other ideological standpoints associated with social change, including revolution; the "interactionist," and that of "concomitant variation." The interactionist position compromises between ideas and material factors and gives more or less equal weight to each. In his study of changes that

have taken place in "human rights" in Jamaica, Bell (1965) presents this view. Defining and understanding human rights as "social," "political," "civil," and "economic" rights, Bell argues that

There has been a demonstrable interplay between ideas and institutions throughout the history of Jamaica. Institutions fostered certain ideas about what is right or wrong, what should or should not be; and ideas, often exogenous to Jamaica itself originally, have led to organized social action which often resulted in changing, eliminating, or creating institutions (1965:165-166).

Finally, with respect to the functioning of ideology in revolutions, Brinton (1965) advocates the fourth position. He argues that ideas and material factors change together, though not necessarily simultaneously, and that it is not possible to identify any causal relationship. Ideas are always a part of the set of variables involved in revolutions. This is so because of the fact that there is always a number of people discontented with social, political, and economic conditions, who more or less are unified by these common causes. However, it may be true that "no ideas, no revolutions," but "This does not mean that ideas cause revolutions, or that the best way to prevent revolutions is to censor ideas. It merely means that ideas form part of the mutually dependent variables we are studying" (Brinton, 1965:49).

So far, ideas and ideologies have been dealt with as one of the provoking, facilitating, and, to some extent, generating factors in a revolutionary process. Some scholars think of ideology as an impediment or barrier to change. Mannheim (1963) argues that ideologies are those systems of beliefs which result in behavior that maintains the "existing order." This is due to the fact that ideology

echoes the idea that "ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination" (Mannheim, 1936:40). An example of this contention is Confucian thought in China, which functioned as a barrier to change, "for it idealized the past" (Lauer, 1978:187). The outlawed caste system in the Indian society can be another example.

However, it should be appreciated that Mannheim differentiates between two kinds of ideologies: (1) the system of ideas that maintains the existing order which he calls "ideology;" and (2) the system of ideas that can also initiate change which he terms "utopia" (Remmling, 1975:52-56). According to Mannheim, utopian thinking is "incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs and tends "to burst the bonds of the existing order" (1958:192-3). It should be noted that such differentiation between revolutionary and conservative ideology can be found in the writings of some other scholars. For example, Edwards (1973) speculates that when a revolution finally erupts, "the rise of the radicals," and "the reign of terror" will follow. Then, "the return to normality" will ensue, which, because of developing a conservative position, will be facing "the next revolution." In a word, the next revolution comes about under the banner of a new revolutionary ideology, or utopian belief system in Mannheim's terminology.

Whether an ideology is preexisting for a revolutionary activity or develops throughout a sociopolitical insurrection is another question. In this context, the categories of "ad hoc ideology" (i.e., ideology that develops gradually during the course of the revolutionary

struggle), and "performed ideology" (i.e., ideology that has been articulated in advance of the eruption of revolution) are relevant (Hagopian, 1974:263-269). However, it should be understood that a revolutionary ad hoc ideology has at least some of its roots in the pre-revolutionary situation, but gets developed and articulated during the revolutionary process. In either way, such ingredients as "progress," "liberation," "equality," "democracy," "socialism," and "nationalism," individually or jointly, constitute the content of a given ideology. Nevertheless, the importance of and the priority that is given to each element differ from time to time and from one society to another. Some scholars speak about "the end of ideology;" others think of "the decline of ideology;" another group goes "beyond ideology" emphasizing that

A man without an ideology is today as rare as a man without a country, and certainly as unrespectable. Modern history is a history of warring creeds, of passionate faiths, and the man without an ideology is bannerless in an age when thinking is enlisted in battalions (Feuer, 1968:64).

But, the presence of ideology for revolutionary action does not necessarily mean that ideology will be implemented as it has been advocated nor does it indicate that revolutionary values will be institutionalized as desired. Rather, when ideology meets reality and the revolutionaries begin to fulfill their promises, many utopian dreams will not be realized. In Parsons' words "no revolutionary movement can reconstruct society according to the values formulated in its ideology without restriction" (1964:529).

D. Stages of Revolution

The foregoing sections have demonstrated that the phenomenon of revolution is of complex nature. For that reason, and for the purpose of a better understanding, many students of revolution have divided the revolutionary process into different stages and phases. They also have concentrated on one or the other stage as their subject matter of investigation. However, revolution can be thought of as a three-stage phenomenon: the causation (or the take-off, or the beginning) stage, the power transition (or the take-over) stage, the consequence (or the ending) stage. (This dissertation will be concerned with only one stage of revolution, namely, the causation stage.)

The first stage is identified with the issue of the causes of revolution and hence its other label, the causation stage. After certain elements are present in a society and the situation is ripe for a revolutionary movement, the take-off stage of revolutionary action may emerge. It is in this stage that the evolution of leadership, ideology, group-consciousness, and organization takes place. Resource mobilization and the adoption of certain strategies and tactics (i.e., the carrot and stick policies) in the process of the confrontation with the regime are other features of this period.

If a set of certain causes gives birth to a revolutionary movement, the circumstances that govern the second (take-over) stage will determine the success or failure of the opposition to tear down the old establishment. When the old regime is overthrown, the third stage emerges, during which the revolutionary values are institutionalized. This stage is also identified with the relative success or failure of the implementation of the revolutionary ideology. In fact,

we should not speak of "revolution" if the outcome of this stage is failure, for no more than an "abortive" revolution will have occurred. However, in order to gain comprehensive and comparative understanding of political actions, abortive events should also be studied and assessed as well as the successful ones.

Each of these three stages has been labeled differently by different scholars and also has been sub-divided into various phases. As noted elsewhere, Edwards (1973) identifies the first stage with "the slow development of revolutionary movements" within which both the "preliminary" and "advanced symptoms of revolution" get developed. He also characterizes the take-over stage by "the outbreak of revolution," which is followed by the third stage. Characteristics of the third stage are "the rise of radicals," "the reign of terror," and finally "the return to normality," which will pave the way for "the next revolution."

Following Edwards' distinct stages and phases, Brinton (1965) calls the first stage of revolution "the eternal figaro," which ends with "the honeymoon" of revolution--"the victory of the revolutionaries after what is rather dramatic than serious bloodshed" (Brinton, 1965:90). The "brief" honeymoon, however, will be over when the new leadership gets to work on the problems as the new government. The final stage in Brinton's scheme is characterized by the "reign of terror and virtue," and the "thermidor," that is, "a convalescence from the fever of revolution. . ." (Brinton, 1965:205). However, according to Brinton ". . .once the revolution has succeeded, once the new regime has got well established, the emotional overtones of the word 'revolution'

change for that society. The original revolution becomes part of history--oratorical history . . . --respectable and dead" (1965:266).

Timasheff (1946:330) argues that "every revolution is a series of dislocations and reconstructions, but the process of dislocation and reconstruction may assume different rhythms." He also claims that what Edwards and Brinton call "moderate" and "radical" phases (within the consequence stage) can be put into a single phase because the former is merely the prelude to the latter. In this same context, Hagopian suggests that

. . . each revolution gives birth to forces that tend to push it onward (hypertrophic forces) and forces that tend to wind it down (entropic forces). The interplay between these two kinds of forces could theoretically produce revolutions that run through three, four, five, six, or even more clear and distinct phases (1974:247).

It seems that what is really important in dividing the revolutionary process in different stages is not the periods themselves but why the would-be revolution succeeds or fails to take over and to fulfill its promises. According to Laqueur (1968:504), the most frequent causes of failure are (1) lack of support, (2) lack of active resistance (to the government) by the bulk of the population, and (3) disunity or lack of purpose on the part of the leaders. On the other hand, (1) the support of a militant minority and (2) the physical seizure of some vital points d'appui (such as the seat of government, the army and police commands, the means of mass communication--radio, press, etc.) are decisive for a revolution to succeed. Laqueur also emphasizes that "the timing of a revolutionary attempt is of crucial importance; so are the personalities of its leaders" (1968:504).

Evidently, Laqueur deals with a revolution's success or failure merely with regard to changing the government, and not with reference to the application of the revolutionary ideology after the new leadership has taken over. Like other students of revolution, he fails to address the issue of the abortion of some social movements, which could have become full-scale revolutions.

Why a revolution is successful in the course of implementing a new value system, or fails to do so, is the crucial issue. In fact, when one speaks of revolutions, he speaks of those revolutions that have, to a large degree, accomplished their ideals. Other movements which are still in process, or have achieved but the minimum, are not revolutions. However, sight should not be lost of the fact that it is both theoretically and empirically difficult to judge a revolutionary movement as a complete revolution. After almost two hundred years since its outbreak, the great French Revolution is charged as not having achieved some of its fundamental ideals, e.g., putting an end to the aristocratic tradition in the French society. In this context, Marx charges that "the French revolutionaries may have thought that they did battle for liberty, equality, and fraternity, but the real result of the revolution was the final victory of the capitalist mode of production" (Hagopian, 1974:70). Further, comparing two revolutions, Arendt notes that "the sad truth of the matter is that the French Revolution, which ended in disaster, has made world history, while the American Revolution, so triumphantly successful, has remained an event of little more than local significance" (1963:49).

Finally, in the process of investigating a revolution, each

Indeed, in one situation one or more variables may be more decisive than others. Such situational significance, one may assume, has led some theorists to define a revolution, for example, as economic (i.e., Marxist) or political (i.e., based on the struggle for power).

The remainder of this section is devoted to a summary statement of some dominant theories of the causes of revolution. (A detailed discussion and evaluation will follow in Chapters IV and VI.)

(1) The Marxists stress that a revolution's causes are economic in nature and manifestation. With the development of the capitalist mode of production, the masses become alienated, poor, and powerless. As Vanfosson (1979:242) suggests, Marx believes that "resistance to capitalist interests will develop only as the workers become increasingly destitute and miserable." Therefore, it is not only economic factors in general, but misery in particular, along with other factors, that gives rise to revolution.

(2) On the other hand, some students of revolution (e.g., Tocqueville, 1955; Davies, 1962) argue that it is during a lull in generally prosperous times that discontent increases and revolution will be more probable. After enjoying some economic well-being, people will be frustrated if a sudden economic stagnation comes about and further prosperity is not enjoyed. Hence, it is economic prosperity and not economic misery that is responsible for revolution.

(3) Without regard to a decisive role for the economic variable, other students of revolution seek and suggest structural-organizational causes for revolution. According to one sub-group exemplified by Dahrendorf (1957), it is the struggle for power, as a

of its three discussed stages is of crucial significance. If all these stages are not scrutinized as a whole, a comprehensive understanding of revolution will not be enjoyed. Unless analytical purposes are involved, this totality should not be dismembered. Since this dissertation is involved only with the genesis of revolution, and not the phenomenon of revolution as a whole, only the first stage, identified with the causes of revolution, will be emphasized in the next section.

E. Causes of Revolution

Whether revolution is good or evil, its generating factors do always fascinate the investigators. Understanding the causes of revolution is not only a prominent enterprise in its own right, it is also of significant importance with regard to its consequences. Such titles as "Why Men Rebel," "When Men Revolt and Why," and "Revolution: Why, How, When," emphasize the important weight that is given to the analysis of the origins of revolution. Probing a revolution's causes is as old as Aristotle and, at the same time, as fresh as if revolution were a newly introduced phenomenon. As a result, there is a plethora of theories of the causes of revolution, each of which is neither fully explanatory nor totally inadequate.

However, there is a common agreement on the very nature of those elements that motivate men to rebel, to make revolutions. These elements are social, political, economic, cultural (e.g., nationalist, religious), military, and psychological. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that in every given revolution all these independent variables are in operation. Nor does it imply that all of the functioning factors contribute to the creation of revolution equally.

scarce resource, that eventuates in revolution. In every sociopolitical organization, the powerless under certain circumstances are in ubiquitous conflict with the powerful for the possession of power. Thus, the desire for power motivates people to rigorously compete with and revolt against each other.

Another sub-group in this category argues that revolutionary change is an outcome of value disensus and a disfunctioning division of labor. Johnson (1966) emphasizes that inadequate socialization, for example, will cause the disfunctioning of the social system and its disequilibrium. This situation necessitates a new balance and provokes people to rebalance the disequilibrated system--to make revolution.

The third sub-group in this context, identified with the resource mobilization tradition, claims that even if certain socio-political and economic inequality does exist, people will not necessarily make revolution. In order to initiate a revolution, people must have certain organization, patterns for movement participation, and "strategy for social protest." Therefore, in the final analysis, it is a people's resource mobilization enterprise that paves the way for the creation of a drastic change, a revolution.

(4) Another standpoint, mainly identified with Gusfield (1976), maintains that when a people's way of life is changed unwillingly, or threatened by undesired change, they are more likely to rebel. This view gives priority to the cultural factor as the main cause of political unrest.

(5) The psychological tradition of revolution stresses that due to various conditions, people become aggressive and frustrated.

Such aggression and frustration will put individuals together to participate in political violence. This same participation, which may result in revolution, can be understood as a people's psychological response to certain motives and impositions. Gurr (1974) is one of the leading exponents of this tradition.

(6) War has also been regarded as a cause of revolution. In a specific sense, a severe military defeat which affects a nation's dignity and aspirations may motivate people to change their unfavorable situation through a revolution.

Understandably, revolution is a highly complex phenomenon and hence its explicit explanation and prediction is quite difficult. Additionally, if it is possible to comprehend which factors have caused a certain revolution, it is not an easy task to categorically analyze how these variables function together to produce a revolutionary change. Likewise, it is also difficult to single out the individual significance of each contributing variable to the creation of revolution. It should be emphasized, for example, that neither economic elements alone, nor struggle for power in particular is responsible for the eruption of revolution. In fact, "as a macro-event, revolution is produced by a multiplicity of independent causes. . ." (Gagopian, 1974:184-185).

Finally, it should be emphasized that such elements as ideology, leadership, group consciousness, collective commitment, organization, and communication are of vital significance in the development and success of a revolutionary movement. Likewise, some windfalls, factors which have variously been called accelerators or precipitating factors, are necessary to promote and inflame a revolutionary movement. The so-

called third party may also crucially determine the outburst of a revolution. The third party is identified with an exogeneous force which for various reasons may support the opposition to tear down the ruling class or helps the latter to liquidate the former. However, there can also be third "parties," some of which back the regime and others of which support the revolutionaries (Schumaker, 1978:168-184). Hence, when this same external party is in operation, a triadic relationship in a revolutionary situation is present. To be sure, all these categories do not cause a revolution but help to actualize the hidden strains and to translate them into open violent action.

Whatever its causes and consequences are, revolution as a social movement is a social phenomenon. Further, this same social entity is, for understandable reasons, of a sociological nature to be basically studied within the area of sociology. The following section is developed to shed some light on this contention.

F. The Study of Revolution is a Sociological Enterprise

Inspired by Leo Petrazhitsy, a Russo-Polish scholar, Sorokin once referred to sociology as the $(n+1)$ science, where (n) equals all other social sciences and the (1) equals sociology proper. In developing this idea

Sorokin says that to each of the many classes of social phenomena. . . a particular social science must correspond. But, in addition to these sciences, a science (sociology) is necessary to study the characteristics common to all the classes of social phenomena and the interrelation between these classes, because these two tasks cannot be satisfactorily achieved by the particular social sciences (Timasheff, 1955:8).

In this light, sociology is viewed as the "generalizing" or

"interrelating" science, that is, the science that concerns inter-relating data of all other social sciences. With this in mind, and since sociology basically deals with the "why's" and not the "what's" when the explanation of social phenomena is involved, the study of revolution fits into the discipline of sociology. Additionally, sociology, in a specific sense, involves itself with social groups and institutions and the interrelationships of each. This, too, is an indication of the fact that the study of revolution belongs to the sociological inquiry. Indeed, in each revolution three defined collectivities are involved--the government, its opposition, and the "third party," as touched upon in the previous section. Furthermore, revolution by definition is one kind of social change and hence it is a subject matter of the sociological perspective, for the study of social change is a sociological enterprise.

This perception of sociology and the acknowledgement of this location of the study of revolution, however, do not mean that the study of social movements is a private property of sociologists. Nor does it ignore the fact that almost every other social discipline (e.g., history, political science, social psychology) has its own concern with the study of revolution. Rather, what is meant and emphasized is that sociology incorporates different variables from various fields of social sciences into the study of such complex phenomena as revolutions. In this context, Timasheff indicates that

Neither the economist nor the student of the history of moral and religious ideas is competent to solve the scientific problem because he sees it from one side only; it falls within the province of a science which stands above the division of social phenomena into classes. This science is sociology (1955:8).

But, where does the study of revolution fit within the subdivisions of the science of sociology? The answer to this question was implied previously. In specific terms, revolution is a social movement which is sub-divided under the area of social change, whereas social change is a sociological subject. As Roucek and Warren (1976:253-255) note, the American Sociological Society acknowledges the branches of sociology as follows: social organization; social disorganization; interpersonal relations; intergroup relations; population; family; rural-urban; social psychology; public opinion; and communication; applied sociology; area studies; research methodology; theory; interdisciplinary specialities; and social change. In this classification, the branch of social change is identified with social control, social process, social mobility, technological changes, and social movements.

To emphasize, revolution is a social movement which resides in the category of social change though neither all social movements are revolutions nor all social changes are revolutionary. With this in mind, it might be of value to categorize different types of social changes in order to understand fully the category of the radical change, that is, the revolution. Based on the criteria of "duration" and "scope," and with reference to Moore (1963), Smelser (1968), and Lauer's (1978) identification of social alteration, all social changes can be divided into four categories: (1) revolutionary change, as one type of social movement, which is identified with great scope and short duration; (2) evolutionary change, which is a change of great scope and long duration; (3) pattern maintenance or homeostatic change,

which is characterized by small scope and long duration; and (4) fad and fashion, which are changes of small scope and short duration.

The study of revolution as outlined in the previous passages is both complicated and interesting. As such, how to approach revolutions and scrutinize theories of the causes of revolution is of crucial importance. The following chapter will address these issues as they constitute the major methodological concern in this dissertation.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

"It is commonly recognized today that science walks on two legs--theory and observation; that the logical phase of science (the phase of isolation and definition of basic categories, and of systematic building) is of equal importance with the activity of the fact-finder and verifier" (Morris, 1967:xi-xii). This dissertation concerns both theory and the empirical observation of some cases of revolution in order to obtain a better understanding of the causes of revolution. In this dissertation a four-stage process is proposed to develop an explanation and prediction of the occurrence of revolution. A brief sketch of the four stages is presented below.

(1) Discussion of the prevalent theories of revolution in terms of their basic characteristics.

(2) Application of the theories to at least one case of revolution to aid in identifying the similarities and differences among the theories. In this stage, the explanatory capacity of each theory can be assessed, and a decision regarding a synthesizing endeavor can be made.

(3) Synthesis of the theories, based on their application to the case study. Here, two reservations must be made. First, the in-

tended application does not necessarily mean that each theory should (or would) be as applicable to the same extent as the other. Nor does it imply that each revolution is a duplication of other revolutions. We must remember that whatever its similarity to others, each social phenomenon, based on its socio-cultural setting and time dimension, is unique and unparalleled. The second reservation is that the intended synthesis does not (and should not) essentially handle any given revolution in exactly the same way as the other phenomenon of the kind. The plausibility of this contention can be found in the very nature of the earlier point, that is, each social fact has its own uniqueness relative to others. To shed light on this point, two complementary steps will be taken. The first is to supplement the emerging synthesis with some subsidiary propositions, based on secondary findings about social movements including revolutions. The next step, which is the final stage in this synthesizing process, is the testing of the synthesis itself (with another revolution), as discussed below.

(4) Test of the synthesized theory with a second revolution. If such a test is successful, to an acceptable degree, then the utility of the synthesis as a newly developed theory of revolution can be acknowledged.

As outlined above, this four-stage enterprise is, in a sense, a departure from theorizing on the basis of a case study or comparative investigation to building a theory on the grounds of the already developed theories. It is, indeed, in this same shift that we are presently interested, and it is what we will concentrate on throughout this dissertation. However, in discussing each revolution, a case study

technique will be adopted; and in applying the synthesis, derived from a test case revolution, to another revolution, a comparative analysis concerning the two revolutions will be employed. Therefore, our methodological approach in this dissertation is identified with three techniques, that is, (1) comparative analysis, (2) case study, and (3) theory construction. Each of these will be discussed below.

A. Comparative Analysis

The comparative study of revolution is initially identified with some pioneer historians such as Edwards (1927), Pettee (1938), and Brinton (1965). The major attribute of this type of investigation, sometimes called "comparative history," is to single out the similarities of the compared phenomena. Whatever the criterion for the selection of revolutions and whatever the cultural contents, similarities among the compared events are the fundamental factors in this comparison. In a broad sense, this kind of procedure "is commonly used rather loosely to refer to any and all studies in which two or more historical trajectories of nation-states, institutional complexes, or civilizations are juxtaposed" (Skocpol, 1979:36).

In the comparative history technique certain deficiencies can be seen. First of all, it is utilized by historians who, depending on their specialty, usually do not attempt either to delineate the causes of or predict the occurrence of revolutions as do sociologists. "The sociologist picks up where the historian closes," and "he delves into assumptions with which the historian begins" (Gusfield, 1976:2-3). Secondly, since the compared cases are usually based on more [cases],

it ought to cover a number of cases large enough for certain rigorous testing procedures like statistical analysis to be used" (Skocpol, 1979: 33). Third, since the compared cases are usually chosen arbitrarily, a certain amount of bias can always be present. For example, according to Baechler (1975), Brinton's (1965) selection of the English, American, French, and Russian Revolutions, for the purpose of a comparative study, is problematic. Brinton's "entire work shows that the American Revolution, which was a national uprising against a foreign power, has nothing in common with the three others, which are endogenous" (Baechler, 1975:6).

So far, the comparative analysis has been viewed as a unified whole and as merely a historical method. Skocpol (1979) distinguishes three versions within this approach, each of which differs from the classic comparative tradition discussed above. The first is represented by the work of Charles, Louise, and Richard Tilly (1975) who attempt "to show that a particular general sociological model holds across different national contexts" (Skocpol, 1979:36). The next version is identified with Anderson (1974), and Bendix (1964), who "use comparisons primarily to bring out contrasts among nations or civilizations taken as systematic wholes" (Skocpol, 1979:36). The third version, which Skocpol labels "comparative historical analysis," is represented by such scholars as Tocqueville (1965), Moore (1966), and Bloch (1970). The overriding intent in this procedure, as Skocpol (1979:36) argues, "is to develop, test, and refine causal, explanatory hypotheses about events or structures integral to macro-units such as nation-states." This technique, according to Skocpol, is "distinctly appropriate" for historical analysis, because it is "in fact, the mode of multivariate

analysis to which one resorts when there are too many variables and not enough cases" (1979:39).

Comparative analysis, in general, either focuses on differences or similarities among the compared phenomena, and whether it is based on too many variables or too few cases, can produce genuine insight to the study of social units including revolutions. At the same time, it suffers from certain problems pertaining to contextual cultural differences when social revolutions are analyzed. Understanding this problem, Etzioni and Dubow (1970:14-15) emphasize that "we need instruments which will allow us to study different cultures without the results of measurements being affected by the culture in which the instruments are designed and tested."

B. Case Study Method

As Moore suggests, "that comparative analysis is no substitute for detailed investigation of specific cases is obvious" (1966:xiv). This statement emphasizes the very nature of the case study technique. If comparative studies search for differences and/or similarities for an overall explanation, case studies attempt to analyze specific individual cases in depth. According to Labovitz and Hagedorn (1976:61) the major purpose of the "one-shot" case study method "is to describe a unit, rather than to test hypotheses." Therefore, the case study method is almost synonymous with the descriptive type of research and "is the method of choice when you want to obtain a wealth of detail about your subject" (Simon, 1969:276).

However, the case study procedure suffers from certain defi-

ciencies. For, ". . . a single, cross-sectional constellation of empirical phenomena does not afford the possibility of establishing causal relations among these phenomena (Smelser, 1976:198). This proposed problem needs some clarification. First, when further statistical elaboration or situational manipulation is needed, a certain restriction is observed in the case study technique. Since this technique concentrates on but one unit of analysis, the findings cannot validly be attributed to other somewhat similar categories. This is so because each observed case is studied individually and uniquely. Secondly, since a case study "depends upon the mother wit, common sense, and imagination of the person doing the case study" (Simon, 1969:276), his own political values can affect the findings. In other words, what is really existing in the social world and what is seen by the observer may not match very closely.

Nevertheless, the case study method can provide a solid base for further comparative analysis. It could be argued that a variety of data that serve as a cornerstone for comparisons are derived from case studies. Durkheim's (1965) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Weber's (1958) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, and Gusfield's (1976) Symbolic Crusade, which are all case study enterprises, are some examples out of many that indicate how case studies can traverse their limits.

While recognizing the limitation in the case study procedure, we will characterize the revolutions of Iran (1979) and Egypt (1952), independently, as specific cases. By doing so, we do not attempt to develop either a specific causal explanation of a revolution or a general

theory of revolution based on the two addressed revolutions. Rather, we attempt to use these two cases as touchstones for an attempted synthesis on the grounds of some already existing theories of revolution. In this connection, and in order to characterize each revolution, a variety of historical data will be assessed and used. These data have been provided by different investigators, including some of the revolutionaries themselves, and can be classified as historical, political, sociological, and journalistic. To be sure, whatever the performance of each revolution has been, we are merely interested in those elements that caused the eruption of the revolution. In line with such interest, the causes and the revolutionary episodes resulting in the shift of power, which is "the basic sign of revolution" (Lenin:1917), will be illustrated.

C. Theory Construction Technique

Wagner (1964) suggests that all sociological theories demonstrate certain ideological and methodological differences among which that of "scope" is crucial. For, the scope of theory ". . . poses tasks which are much more complex than present-day theorists seem to realize" (Wagner, 1964:571). Blumer (1969:143) says that "theory is of value in empirical science only to the extent to which it connects fruitfully with the empirical world." In this line of argument it could also be argued that the way in which the theory is formulated and proposed can provide empirical fruitfulness. In Rosenberg's words "good data are important, but what is done with them is equally so. The data must be viewed within the framework of a certain logic" (1968:xi). Hence the very technical substance of theory and theory construction enterprise

can be realized.

When the procedure of theory building is dealt with, at least two issues must be emphasized and illuminated. The first concerns the very meaning of "theory" in a "technical" sense, and the second pertains to the "form" that a theory can take.

Concerning the first question, theory is defined as "a statement that is formulated to provide a testable answer to one kind of problem in interpreting experience. . ." (Boskoff, 1966:8). Statements are identified with "new ideas" aiming at a partial or a wholesale explanation of the target phenomenon. A statement, according to Reynolds (1975:67-82), can be an "existence" statement which relates one event to the other or a relational statement. A relational statement is either "associational," which describes what concepts occur or exist together, or "causal," which describes the relationship between two concepts in a causal fashion, i.e., one concept is the cause and the other is the effect. Finally, a causal statement can be either "deterministic" (i.e., under certain conditions, if A occurs, B will occur), or "probabilistic" (i.e., under certain conditions, if A occurs, B probably will occur). Evident as it is, each statement contains at least two concepts and concepts "comprise the building blocks and provide the content of theories" (Chafetz, 1978:45).


The very meaning of propositions leads us to the previously proposed question concerning the "form" that a theory can assume in a technical sense. This is so because of the fact that a proposition is a generic name for hypotheses, axioms, postulates, and theorems based on which different forms of theories can be developed. According to

Reynolds (1975:83-114), these forms are: (1) The set-of-laws form of theory, of which Michel's "iron law of oligarchy" is an example. However, this form of theory does not tell about what causes, say, a democratic organization to be oligarchical. For, it is developed in the form of an existence statement concerned with the "whats" and not the "whys." (2) The axiomatic form of theory, which is based on a set of relational statements consists of axioms (i.e., the basic propositions), from which all other statements in the theory may be derived. For this reason and because of this restriction, "it is extremely difficult to find examples of axiomatic theory relating to social or human phenomena, and it is even harder to find those that are simple enough for an introductory discussion" (Reynolds, 1975:93). (3) The causal process form of theory which consists of an interrelated set of theoretical and operational definitions, and existence and causal (deterministic or probabilistic) statements. Reynolds suggests that "almost all of the paradigms in social science appear amiable to. . .the causal process form" of the theory (1975:97), and the proposed synthesis in this dissertation will not be the exception. Thus, we will develop a synthesis of the causes of revolution in a causal process fashion, understanding that the search for causation in social sciences is a never-ending process. For, ". . .the analysis can go as far as the ingenuity of the theorist will carry him, without ever reaching the ultimate, or first cause" (Krech and Cruchfield, 1948:34).


Now we may turn to a crucial question of the types of relationships the variables can have in a causal situation. However, such complex relationships will concern us only as far as this dissertation necessi-

tates. With this in mind, the possible relationship, according to Baily (1978) and Rosenberg (1968), can be summarized as follows. One may consider a situation in which the relationship between the variables is asymmetrical and that more than two variables are at play. Here, we speak of prediction and not explanation or descriptive analysis (which pertains to symmetrical relation or asymmetrical relation in which two variables operate). Rosenberg (1968:xiv) concentrates on the introduction of a third variable into the analysis in terms of elaboration which "enables the analyst to test his reasoning, and at the same time serves as an instrument of discovery." On the whole, when a third variable is involved in the analysis, various kinds of relationships among the variables can be thought of.

First, spurious relationships can be identified in which the independent variable (A) and the dependent variable (B) are related to each other only because both are caused by a third variable (C), as depicted below:



Secondly, the third variable (i.e., C) can intervene in the relationship between A and B in the sense that A causes C and C, in turn, affects B. Here, C is




the intervening variable. Third, C may precede the independent variable A, by which B is affected. In this situation, C is considered as

antecedent (and not independent) variable (of A), as shown below:




Fourth, there is a situation in which C and A interact to produce an effect on B. Here the interaction effect is considered, and both A and C are regarded as independent variables of B, and B will not change if A and C do not change simultaneously:



What so far has been touched upon is merely a two-variable relationship to which a third variable is introduced. However, social phenomena at large, (and the phenomena of revolution in particular), are so complex that unless various variables with different relationships and functions are considered and elaborated, appropriate understanding of the causes and consequences of the events cannot be achieved. In Zetterberg's words "we have to consider it as normal that social events have multiple determinants and/or multiple consequences" (1965:65).

To hypothetically exemplify how the proposed synthesis in this dissertation will be elaborated, the following situation is considered. We may assume that a revolution, as a dependent variable (X_5), is caused by four variables such as class struggle (X_1), relative deprivation (X_2), resource mobilization (X_3), and war (X_4):



But, do all these variables affect revolution independently? In fact, they do not. Then, the relationships among them, with reference to revolution, must be determined.

Based on such elaboration the emergence of a revolution and its causal sequence will be approached in this dissertation. We will extract different elements from the applied theories for this purpose, and incorporate those elements into a new body of theory--a synthesis. In so doing, we will attempt to define sociologically the revolution as being an outcome of different (and not only one) social variables. Such variables cause the revolution in a complex fashion, that is, through diverse relationships that they have with each other, and their individual connection to revolution. In a sense, we will integrate various elements that each theory of revolution has concentrated on as the root cause of revolution. Such a practice seems to be fruitful. To mention a somewhat relevant example, Turner's attempt is addressed below.

In his "a strategy for reformulating the dialectical and functional theories of conflict," Turner (1978) attempts to combine Coser's (1956) functionalist approach to conflict and Dahrendorf's (1959) theory of dialectical conflict. The former sees conflict as occasional and when it occurs it is functional for, or a function of, consensus. The latter understands conflict as ubiquitous and is the rule and not the exception; hence social order is based on conflict and not consensus. In reformulating these two theories and putting aside "the excessive concern with the functions of conflict for system change or integration and global claims about the ubiquity of conflict in social system,"

Turner has reached the conclusion that:

By viewing conflict as only one of many processes in human affairs, then it is more likely that theory will be directed to understanding the conditions under which various types of conflicts are likely to occur. This is a more laudable goal than attempting to reveal, 'the ugly face of society' or lead sociology 'out of utopia' (1978:197).

Finally, it is hoped that the attempted synthesis will integrate different theories of revolution for a more reasonable understanding of this phenomenon. The following chapter in which the target theories will be demonstrated and discussed, might be regarded as the first step in this endeavor.

CHAPTER IV

THEORIES OF REVOLUTION: A DESCRIPTION

In this chapter, for an attempted synthesis, some of the prevalent theories of revolution are illustrated and characterized. All these theories will be tested with a revolution in the subsequent chapter. The order in which the theories are described is not intended to imply any priority or a given weight to each theory. However, the order is "temporal" and designed "to show repeatedly that a given idea has had the power to spawn other ideas, and that theoretical systems evolve as they are thought through again and again" (Skidmore, 1979:10). Finally, each theory is described on the basis of the original work(s) of the theorist. The critical accounts on each theory will be considered in a following chapter, when theories are assessed.

A. The Class Struggle Explanation of Revolution

Such explanation is identified with Marx and Engels and will be addressed with reference to Marx and Engels (1955) The Communist Manifesto, and (1970) The German Ideology; Marx (1959) The Critique of the Gotha Program, (1961) Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, (1961) and The Poverty of Philosophy (1961). At the very beginning of this

illustration, it should be noted that throughout Marx and Engels' works a theory of revolution in specific "technical" sense cannot be traced easily. What really can be pictured is a grand (broad) thought developed within the Marxist overall explanation of social reality at large. In other words, the Marxist theory of revolution should be approached with reference to historical materialism and economic determinism, the Marxist fundamental principles.

To Marx, history is characterized by class struggle associated with materialistic conditions and dialectical change. The central feature of "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" (1955:9), and the exploitation of the masses by the few. In this process, the ownership of the means of production, as social power, and the mode of production are determinant. At the very dawn of human life the mode of production was communistic, though in primitive form. In this stage, social differentiation was not tangible but a warrior band was distinguished. This long-term stage was followed by the slavery stage whose basic characteristic was the emergence of two recognizable classes--the master and the slave. The third stage is the feudal mode of production in which the lords as the dominant, and the serfs as the subjugated class, came about. The capitalist mode of production is the fourth stage in the human history which "has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society. . ." (1955:10). Capitalism is identified with different features among which the emergence of two conflicting classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the emphasis on the ownership of the means of production as private property, the

accumulation of wealth, and, in connection with all, the inevitable eruption of the social (communist) revolution are the most dominant.

In the capitalist society, the ownership of the means of production, as social force, is exclusively in the hands of the powerful class, the capitalist. In the eye of the capitalist, the labor of its counterpart--the workers, is a means of production or a commodity per se. However, under certain conditions, among which is class consciousness, the proletariat will overthrow the capitalist and make revolution. This revolutionary change demonstrates a new mode of production, socialism. (In the socialist society two classes are in order, i.e., the manager-bureaucratic, and the clerk-functionaries, whose perfect relationship of production will pave the way for and give birth to the ultimate mode of production, namely, true communism, a classless society.)

To better specify how the Marxist revolution occurs, further analysis of such categories as class, class consciousness, alienation, and the nature of the capitalist mode of production is needed. Class is an aggregate of human individuals who share common places in the mode of production. In the first stages of capitalism, the proletariat class is defined as class in itself demonstrating false consciousness. Class in itself is developed under certain undesired common historical economic conditions. False consciousness is an alienated thought from its real social being. Alienation in the Marxist theory basically means deep job dissatisfaction which climaxes in the capitalist mode of production where the worker at work "does not belong to himself but to another person", the capitalist (1961). However, alienation appears in different forms.

First, the worker becomes alienated from the product of his own labor. Specifically, when he produces a piece of work, the worker externalizes himself through this activity. Since what he produces belongs, unjustly, to the capitalist, he will be detached from his own products. Therefore, the worker becomes alienated from part and pieces of himself. Secondly, since the worker becomes alienated from his products he also becomes detached from his productive activity. In other words, he becomes repulsed by his work activity. As a result, such repulsiveness to work and production causes the decrease in his productive activity and his wage, which eventually will deteriorate his life conditions. Third, the worker gets alienated from his "species-life" which is due to the "forced" division of labor in a highly segmented industrial activity. Finally, the worker also becomes alienated from other men which is a direct consequence of other forms of alienations, especially the alienation from one's "species-life." For, "in general, the statement that man is alienated from his species-life means that each man is alienated from others, and that each of the others is likewise alienated from human life" (1961:105). As an overall result, the worker ". . .does not fulfill himself in his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery rather than well being, does not develop freely his mental and physical energies but is physically exhausted and mentally debased" (1961:5).

However, the alienated and oppressed workers who are recognized as a class in itself will, under certain conditions, recover and make revolution. This recovery takes place through a series of revolutionary activities such as (1) the creation of channels of communication (e.g.,

clubbing together), (2) the development of leadership, (3) the emergence of revolutionary ideology, (4) the formation of "combination" (i.e., trade unions). As a result, class consciousness will develop which is the prerequisite for social revolution. In this process, the workers become able to man the barricade and to relieve themselves from the capitalist suppression and exploitation. They are now in a position that makes them able to expose their ideas and actions. In this course of action, the proletariat transform themselves from class in itself to class for itself whose members are politicized and possess true class consciousness. This class is, in fact, a political party mobilized and armed for revolutionary action against the capitalist (whose strength at the time is somewhat, somehow declining).

With reference to the latter point, it must be noted that at the same time that the worker's revolutionary activity develops and matures, the ruling class is involved in external and internal "constant battle" and competition. It is engaged with (1) the aristocracy to which the escalating dominance of the capitalist has been a destructive danger; (2) with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself whose interests have become antagonistic to the progress of industry; and (3) with the bourgeoisie of other countries who always compete with each other, internationally. In the end, the weakened elements of bourgeoisie will seek refuge and side with the proletariat and drag it into the political arena. In doing so, the capitalist class "supplies the proletariat with its own elements of political and general education; in other words, it furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie" (1955:20).

As the revolutionary actions of the proletariat reach a peak, and the disintegration of the capitalist "nears the decisive hour," the proletarian revolution will erupt, and consequently a new mode of production in a classless society will be established. In a word, the bourgeois society is its own "gravedigger" and "its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable" (1955:20). Therefore, inherent in the capitalist mode of production are certain elements that cause its own dissolution and downfall.

While the Marxist theory treats revolution in terms of class structure and class struggle which is based on economic modes of production and privileges, Dahrendorf emphasizes that conflict, including revolution, stems from the competition over the possession of power among different social groups in different associations. The next section will address this revision of Marx's theory.

B. Authority Struggle as the Root Cause of Revolution

In his "toward a sociological theory of conflict in industrial society," Dahrendorf (1959) seems to explain social order at large and stands against the "consensus" explanation of social cohesion. As a neo-Marxist who attempts to update the Marxian thought, Dahrendorf concerns himself with "group" struggle based on power rather than economic conditions. However, his theory of conflict concerns us only to the extent that it explains the occurrence of revolution as a "sudden change."

For Dahrendorf, conflict among social groups is a stubborn and ubiquitous fact of social life. Such conflict emerges from authority

structure in every given social association. Authority in this sense is legitimized power as it is characterized by and manifested in certain social positions and roles in social organizations. It is this same scarce resource and valued reward over which groups struggle. In a specific sense, conflicts are identified with certain types such as war, revolution, and social movements, and can be of "exogeneous" and "endogenous" phenomena. Whereas exogenous conflicts are brought upon or into a given society from the outside, endogenous conflicts are generated within societies. In either case, conflicts are based on certain "structural arrangements." Hence, they should not be relegated to psychological explanation (e.g., aggressiveness), or to mere descriptive-historical analysis, or to "chance", but to the relationship between two categories, the rulers and the ruled.

Dahrendorf envisions society as a "combination" of "imperatively coordinated associations" (ICA's), such as state, church, party, labor union, and so on. In every ICA, authority, i.e., "imperative coordination," is distributed in such a way that there are positions identified with dominance and others with subjugation. As such, those who have the dominating positions command those who occupy the dominated positions. However, these two categories are mere aggregates and not organized units. They are regarded as "quasi-groups" in the sense that to them their "interests" are "latent" at the time. By latent interests it is meant that the opposition of outlook need not be conscious at this level; it is a "class in itself." Under certain conditions (to be specified later) the latent interests of these quasi-groups become "manifest." Now, "group consciousness" occurs and "class for itself" is established,

for the manifest interests are those formulated programs and ideologies under whose banner conflict will be initiated.

The conditions under which social conflict takes place are "social," "political," and "technical." They, as a whole, are those variables that give rise to group consciousness and transform latent interests to manifest ideals. Channels of communication among and effective recruitment into the quasi-groups are examples of the social organizational conditions. The presence of freedom for action and the extent to which this freedom is enjoyed represent examples of political conditions. Material means, a founder, a leader, and an ideology, are the best examples of the technical conditions. However, these three sets of conditions do not and may not be observed to the same extent, and they may not present themselves simultaneously. These variables in addition to and in connection with the quality of "social mobility" and "mechanisms for conflict regulation" (and not "conflict resolution"), will determine the "intensity" and "violence" in every conflict situation.

Intensity refers to "the energy expenditure and degree of involvement of conflicting parties." The violence of conflict "is a matter of the weapons that are chosen by conflict groups to express their hostilities." When the intensity is of limited scope and violence is not used, a "parliamentary debate," for example, may be the form of the conflict. On the other hand, when the challenging groups decide to fight to the end, that is, attach themselves to issues and substance to change the authority structure, and use militant means "such as strikes and civil wars," a "sudden change"--a revolution--is likely.

C. Collective Behavior Explanation of Revolution

Some students of social movements (including revolution) treat revolution on a general conceptual framework of collective behavior. In this light, revolution is seen as an important kind of collective behavior identified with values, norms, mobilization of individual motivation into organized action, and situational facilities. One of the leading exponents of this standpoint is Smelser, whose "theory of collective behavior," as far as revolution is concerned, will be addressed below.

Smelser (1962) considers revolution as a particular kind of "collective behavior" and defines the latter as "an uninstitutionalized mobilization for action in order to modify one or more kinds of strains on the basis of a generalized reconstruction of a component of action" (1962:71). Collective behavior takes on different types each of which "is oriented toward a distinct component of social action." Five types of these collective behaviors should be identified: (1) the value-oriented movement, (2) the norm-oriented movement, (3) the hostile outburst, (4) the craze, and (5) the panic. Revolution falls in the category of value-oriented movements, though not all revolutions are value-oriented collective behaviors. For, as an example, there are "norm-oriented revolutions" which are based on grievances about specific policies, laws or custome, which may be either revolutionary coups, or reformist revolutions. (What is addressed in this dissertation is Smelser's radical value-oriented revolution, which is quite distinct from the above-mentioned two.)

There are six determinants of the various forms of revolutions and all other collective behaviors. These determinants appear in a "value

added" process where each one is a necessary condition for the "actuation" of the next one. In other words, the value-added or accounting scheme holds that the earlier conditions must combine according to a certain pattern before the following conditions can constitute its particular value to final outcome. However, these variables can manifest themselves in any order, and collective behavior as revolution will not occur unless all of them are present.

These determinants, which cause revolution and other major collective behaviors, are as follows.

(1) Structural conduciveness, which means that a certain physical and social possibility must be present if collective behavior is to take place. In other words, structural conduciveness is a setting which is either permissive of hostility or prohibitive of other response or both. There are three factors or "aspects" that facilitate a conducive situation. They are: (a) a figure, class or agency to which responsibility can be assigned for the disturbing state of affairs; (b) the absence or failure of channels for expressing grievances; (c) the ecological and other situational factors.

(2) Structural strain, which indicates that within the context of structural conduciveness there must be some social or social-psychological disequilibrium, conflict, or inconsistency, necessary for the occurrence of collective behavior. In other words, structural strain means that impaired, traditional if not institutionalized social relations must be present in the pre-conflict situation.

(3) Growth and spread of generalized belief, that is, the

the strain must be articulated and its sources must be identified and labeled. Generalized belief is an ideological justification or loose ideology which is created on a ground of a value-added process. This process embraces five stages or elements. (a) The condition of ambiguity which pertains "to the adequacy of means for a given goal." In a word, "the situation may frustrate, harm, or destroy; but the kind and degree (if any) of the resulting frustration, harm, or destruction is unknown" (1962:92). (b) The condition of anxiety, which is the initial response to "ambiguity", and it "involves the creation of or appeal to a new view of causality by converting ambiguity into an absolute threat" (1962:92). (c) The assignment of responsibility to identified agents. (d) The condition of hostility in the sense that a generalized and focused aggression must be directed toward the responsible agent. Finally, (e) the condition of wish-fulfillment which endows the participants in a collective behavior with an immense power to destroy the agent of evil and thereby to "set the world right."

However, people do not proceed to re-specify, step by step, to reconstitute social action. Rather, they develop a belief which "short circuits" from the very generalized component directly to the focus of strain. Therefore, short-circuiting is a process in which beliefs move from extremely high levels of generality to specific concrete situation.

(4) Precipitating factors, which are events that set the collective behavior in motion and "may confirm or justify the fears or hatreds in a generalized belief" (1962:17). For example, under conditions of racial tension (as precipitating elements), conduciveness, strain

and a generalized belief can function to provide the prerequisites for collective behavior (where the remaining two conditions are present too). In a word, precipitating factors "provide a concrete setting toward which collective action can be directed" (1962:17).

(5) Mobilization of participants for action, in the sense that events and/or the leaders must develop and implement a course of action on the basis of the previously developed generalized belief. In this stage, the strain must be alleviated, and the leaders, on behalf of their followers, must dedicate their energies to the desired goal. However, two types of leadership can be distinguished: leadership in formulating beliefs, and leadership in mobilizing the participants for action. "In this process of mobilization the behaviors of leaders is extremely important" (1962:17).

(6) The operation of social control, that is, the counter determinants to the first five stages or variables. The functioning of social control determines the shape, form, direction, and the intensity of the collective behavior. Social control is identified with two types. One type exists prior to the emergence of a form of collective behavior, and mitigates conduciveness and strain. The other type is implemented only after the emergence of the collective behavior. Social control is identified with the operating government whose weak or strong responses affects the movement differently. In a word, social control and especially the second type of social control, can prevent, interrupt, deflect, or inhibit the accumulation of the five determinants just reviewed.

Thus, in Smelser's scheme, a revolution is likely (1) if it appears to be the only way to relieve serious strain, and (2) if this

same strain is translated into and gets developed through a specific organization and an organized succession of social actions, for "collective behavior is social, not psychological" (1962:12).

D. Frustration-Aggression/Cognitive Dissonance

Explanation of Revolution

Under the frustration-dissonance assumptions, different explanations of revolution with different points of emphasis can be identified. In this section, Davies "J-curve (or "rise and drop") pattern," Geschwender's "cognitive dissonance theory," and Gurr's "relative deprivation" model are addressed.

(1) Rising and Declining Satisfaction

Davies (1962) has initially presented the J-curve model in his "toward a theory of revolution," and then has explored this theory in his (1979) "the J-curve of rising and declining satisfaction as a cause of revolution and rebellion." The basic argument here is that "revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal" (1962:1). Therefore, "the actual state of socioeconomic development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future" (1962:6).

To specify, Davies suggests that when the rising expectations (in an improving situation) are suddenly dropped, frustration, dissatisfaction and, relatedly, lack of confidence in the existing system will follow. This will eventuate in political violence against the responsible system. Where frustration is widespread, intense and focused on the

government, revolution will be the case. Rebellion is contained in or overcome by the government. To better demonstrate the very nature of the ensuing frustration, Davies adopts Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of needs including (1) physical needs (water, food, sex, etc.); (2) safety needs (order, predictability, dependability); (3) need for love, affection, belongingness; (4) need for self-esteem; and (5) need for self-actualization. Based on these sets of needs, a potential for uprising will be present for, the affected individuals "individually sense the frustration of one or more basic needs and each is able to focus his frustration on the government" (1979:418).

Davies has grounded his assumptions in and validated them through some speculations about some historical cases of rebellions and revolutions (e.g., French, Nazi, Russian, and Egyptian revolutions, and the American Civil War, Dorr's rebellion of 1842, and the Black rebellion of the 1960's). In each case he finds a short period of sharp economic reversal that gave rise to the revolutionary action. However, he recognizes that the "intolerable gap" between "actual need satisfaction" and "expected need satisfaction" is rooted in a certain "state of mind," or the "mood of the people." But, in terms of prediction, it is "always difficult" even by techniques of systematic public opinion analysis to assess that same "mood." It is so because "we. . .are still not at the point of being able to predict revolution. . ." (1962:19).

(2) Cognitive Dissonance Explanation

Based on the Davies' proposed "rise and drop" hypothesis, Marx's speculation about the improvement in the worker's material

conditions, Durkheim's interpretation of suicide caused by economic disasters, and the literature on the "status inconsistency" issue, Geschwender (1968) has elaborated some hypotheses on revolution. They are, "rising expectations," "relative deprivation," "downward mobility" as three temporal hypotheses, and "status inconsistency" as a nontemporal other. He subsumes all these hypotheses, in addition to that of Davies, under the "theory of cognitive dissonance." According to Geschwender, "This provides a general social psychology theory of motivation which could account for individual predispositions toward participation in social movements and revolutions" (1968:127). With the exception of Davies hypothesis, which is discussed previously, each of Geschwender's hypotheses is summarized below.

(a) The rising expectation hypothesis indicates that in a given situation, the people's perception of an "intolerable gap" does not exclusively result from rising expectations followed by declining socioeconomic development. It also can emerge "from a simple decline in the rate of social and economic progress" (1968:12). For example, the Black Americans who have enjoyed some improvement in life conditions and come to believe that "progress is possible," now are frustrated and dissatisfied. They feel that the rate of their progress is rather slow. "As they become increasingly impatient with the rate of improvement in social conditions, they begin to resort more and more to direct action, to sit-ins, wade-ins, etc" (1968:129).

(b) The relative deprivation hypothesis maintains that people may revolt if they feel there is an increasing gap between what they sense they should get and what they actually receive. In this case, "the level

of expected need dissatisfaction derives from perception of the level of need satisfaction experienced by a reference group" (1968:129). An example of this can also be the Black Americans who feel that they are relatively deprived. For, although their objective position in the American society is improving, ". . .they are not gaining relative to Whites" (1968:129).

(c) The downward mobility hypothesis holds that an imbalance between what people desire, in economic or social terms, and what they achieve can also be brought about through downward social mobility, in either an absolute or a relative sense. Relative downward mobility refers to "the felt loss of status experienced by a group which observes a previously inferior group closing the gap between them" (1968:130). In such a situation, people experience "the intolerable gap" which is "likely to produce a social movement or revolution. . ." (1968:130).

(d) The status inconsistency hypothesis, which is unlike the above discussed hypotheses, deals with and is based on nontemporal elements as the cause of social movements. Status inconsistency is a situation in which the individual's upward mobility in some status hierarchies lags behind others indicating the existence of impediments to free mobility. "These impediments tend to create tensions which could produce protest activity" (1968:131). Hence, status inconsistent individuals may comprise the membership of a social movement. In a specific sense, people who have a low degree of "stratum consistency," i.e., having similar patterns of inconsistency, may particularly develop "ethnic" consciousness and initiate an ethnic movement. In fact, in the status inconsistency explanation of social movements, the propensity

toward revolutionary or protest activity does not reside in the development of the individual dissatisfaction. Rather, status inconsistency is envisioned with reference to a certain social stratum such as ethnic or religious minorities.

Finally, Geschwender integrates all these hypotheses, including that of Davies, into a theory of cognitive dissonance which, he believes, is capable of explaining the "state of mind" that causes revolutions and protests. He stresses and concludes that "the particular sequence of temporal changes described by Davies is only one of several sequences which produces in individuals the state of mind that tends to be expressed in revolutionary or other protest activity" (1968:135).

(3) Relative Deprivation Theory

Gurr (1974) has concentrated on relative deprivation as the very root cause of political violence, including revolutions. He argues that ". . . men are not likely to be mobilized by new, revolutionary hopes unless they feel sharply deprived by the circumstances in which they live" (1974:121). As such, relative deprivation (RD) is to be considered as the original element that causes revolutions. Relative deprivation "is defined as the actor's perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities" (1974:24). Value expectations are those valued rewards to which people believe they are rightfully entitled, and value capabilities are those valued rewards that individuals perceive themselves capable of obtaining and maintaining. The type of these two kinds of values must be analyzed with reference to two variables--intensity and scope. Intensity (i.e., the opportunities)

is of a psychological nature and its unit of analysis is the individual member. On the other hand, the scope of RD is a societal variable whose unit of analysis is the involved collectivity in a given violence. On the basis of its societal origins, RD is derived from three characteristics. They are exposure to new modes of life, new ideologies, and value disequilibria.

The quantity of goods, that is, their scarcity or plentitude, as well as the conditions of individuals in terms of having effective opportunities for sharing the benefits, is a decisive factor based on which a certain type of RD can emerge. First, decremental RD occurs when people experience RD "by reference to their own past condition." In such a case, and aside from futuristic hopes, "people lose what they have absolutely and this will eventuate in their anger whose end result would be discontent, and more so, open revolt" (1974:48). This kind of RD can be summarized in the proposition that "men are likely to be more intensely angered when they lose what they have than when they lose hope of attaining what they do not yet have" (1974:50). Decremental RD and the concomitant violence usually takes place in traditional societies and traditional units of transitional others.

Second, aspirational RD which comes about when people's value expectation is increased but no ensuing change in value position (or potential) is brought about. This type of RD reflects the increase in either desire for greater demands of values already held, or demand for new values never held before, or an intensified commitment to values that previously were "faintly" examined. Aspirational RD can be found in those societies in which the socioeconomic horizons are expanding.

Third, progressive RD, which is attributable to those societies that have already enjoyed some modernization and examined some aspirational RD where "their value capabilities stabilize or decline after such a period of improvement. . ." (1974:52-53). In fact, this kind of RD is a common theme in many old and some new theories that attribute revolutionary potential to general social change. Finally, "such a pattern is most common in societies undergoing simultaneous ideological and systematic change" (1974:53).

In sum, under certain conditions people become deprived and then frustrated and aggressive. Such aggression is very likely to be translated into political unrest. The root of psychological justification of violence can be found in both human culture and human nature and the disposition of the latter to either peace or aggression. If peace does not prevail, then "the primary source of the human capacity for violence... will be the frustration-aggression mechanism" (1974:36). In a word, "on earth, gravity can be assumed as contrast; among men, levels of frustration vary greatly" (1974:37).

E. The Functionalist Explanation of Revolution

Some students of revolution view radical social changes as functional for society in the sense that they are caused by a temporal discontinuity of social consensus on the existing order. This view is contradictory to the Marxists and the conflict theorists who see conflict and change as dialectical and ubiquitous. In this section, Johnson's (1966) explanation of "revolutionary change" which demonstrates a structural-functional standpoint is examined.

In his approach to revolution, Johnson envisions the social system in the light of the Parsonian tradition. In this tradition, the social system is conceptualized as a self-sufficient, self-regulatory, and homeostatic equilibrium whose vital functions consist of (1) pattern maintenance (e.g., socialization), (2) adaptation to the environment, (3) goal attainment, and (4) integration (e.g., social control). In such a system, "equilibrium" corresponds to "the healthy state of the social system" and "homeostasis" refers to the regulative and adaptive processes that "control and counteract variation which would destroy the system if they exceed more than a limited range" (p. 54). The presence of value and role consensus endows the social system with homeostatic capacity of adjustment, for society is seen as a "moral community" whose members share certain "definitions of a situation" called "values." Values "legitimize the inequalities of social organization and cause people to accept them as morally justified" (p. 19). However, "so long as the value structure remains synchronized with the demands of environmental adaptation" (p. 38), "society is immune from revolution" (p. 60); otherwise, revolution is likely.

To be sure, Johnson distinguishes between changes undertaken routinely to maintain an equilibrium and changes undertaken to recreate an equilibrium. The latter changes are revolutionary and the former do not necessitate revolution. One form of the nonrevolutionary change, that is, the evolutionary one, is "compatible" with homeostatic equilibrium. Some evolutionary changes can take on a revolutionary character though they are not intended to produce radical impacts. When the routine homeostatic processes of socialization, adaptation, goal attainment,

and integration fail to maintain systematic equilibrium (by making necessary evolutionary changes in the system), a revolutionary change is probable.

In specific terms, such a breakdown comes about because of the fact that the value structure (i.e., the symbolic interpretation of social action) and the structure of the division of labor (i.e., the pattern of adaptation to the environment) have become incongruent. Such incongruity is caused by some exogenous and endogenous forces. The endogenous forces are identified with such elements as "imperfect socialization," which occurs when the values of the system have been imperfectly imparted to new members; "role strain," which results from integrating the "human being" system with its own needs into another system, the society; and "normative dissensus," which develops out of conflicting norms or ambiguities within the value system itself (p. 36).

On the other hand, the exogenous forces are environmental and revolve around "scarce goods," which are sources of conflict between people occupying the same stratum and are involved in the processes of exchange (p. 37); "inequality," which is resulting from the possession of power and the subjection to it; and finally, "interstratum disputes" which often stem from "both the distribution of scarce goods and the allegedly excessive powers of the ruling stratum. . ." (p. 37-38). However, "if the authorities fail to recognize these situations or fail by their actions to correct them, other things being equal, a revolution will ensue" (p. 38).

Finally, Johnson stresses three "clusters of necessary causes" for revolution. The first is found in "a society which is changing

and which is in need of future change if it is to continue to exist" (p. 91). The second set of a revolution's causes "revolves around the quality of the purposeful change being undertaken while a system is disequilibrated" (p. 91). The third set serves as "wind-falls" which come about and either deprive the elite of its ability to maintain order or encourage the revolutionaries to make revolution. These factors are called "accelerators" and, when an insurrection takes place, will determine "whether or not the revolutionaries will succeed in establishing and occupying new statuses of authority" (pp. 91-92).

With respect to the time dimension, the above mentioned causes function on the basis of a five-stage process. In the first stage, the social system is integrated and has a "steady state" though some "deviant behaviors" do occur routinely. In the second stage, a source of change will disequilibrate the healthy system and consequently "anomie and disillusionment" become widespread. In the third stage, "cultural distortion" is in order and the tensions induced by disequilibrium become fully manifest. From this stage the period of "revitalization," or revolution, will emerge whose final task is the "routinization" of the revolution. In sum, Johnson roots his causal explanation of revolution in the structures of the social system and the system of the social values of a given society. When, in a social system, structural disintegration occurs and dissensus on the socially held values exists, a revolutionary change is likely.

F. Status Politics Explanation of Revolution

Weber (1947) distinguished three distinct "orders" in social

communities. The economic order, which is based on economic interests and represented by classes; social order, which is based on social prestige and yields status groups; political order which revolves around political power and is symbolized by political parties. Such differentiation is based on Weber's view that neither economic power nor political power par excellence is the sole base of social honor. "Indeed, social honor, or prestige, may even be the basis of political and economic power, and very frequently has been" (Weber, 1947:1).

Following Weber, some students of social movements have traced and stressed the noneconomic motives and ingredients in the creation of social actions. A leading example in this area is Gusfield (1976) whose theory is of interest at the present. However, as he acknowledges, Gusfield's "theory of status politics," which is based on the American Temperance Movement (nineteenth century) as a case study, is not a wholesale explanation of political unrest. It is only "a useful addition the the economic and the psychological modes of analysis current in the study of political and social movements" (p. 167). With respect to the underlying assumptions of this dissertation, the inclusion of status politics as a partial explanation of revolution is considered to be fruitful for it deals with "the structural and cultural roots" of social movements, the roots that can be identified in any given collective action.

Social status refers to the distribution of prestige in a given society; and prestige is the approval, respect, admiration, or deference a person or a group is able to command by virtue of his or its imputed qualities or performance. Among prestige groups, a status hierarchy tends

to develop within which some groups can claim greater prestige than others. Efforts to redistribute prestige will depend on the ability to control the giving of prestige against the reluctance of prestige-givers to grant it. Hence social status conflict over the allocation of prestige and the genesis of status movements can be understood. A status movement then is a collective action which seeks to maintain, restore, or raise the prestige of a group whose values and ideals are advocated by the movement. Such a movement is "symbolic in nature," and its goals are usually defined in idealistic terms. However, one must recognize that this does not mean that a "symbolic crusade" is less significant than others. In fact, almost any social movement is a blend of instrumental, symbolic, and expressive (i.e., a mere psychological catharsis) actions.

A status movement is to be understood as an "ethical position," and consequently "a sign of life style commitment and status group membership" (p. 30). Thus, "the position of a style of life in the status structure is an important clue to the significance of attempts to persuade, influence, or force others to emulate it" (p. 35). The target of a life style and moral crusade is usually directed toward the government, for "government is the only agency which claims to act for the entire society" (p. 168). The government, especially when society undergoes profound alterations, acts in such a way that one status group becomes degraded and the other is given deference. Consequently, "in seeking to affect their honor and prestige in the society, a group makes demands upon governing agents to act in ways which serve to symbolize deference or to degrade the opposition whose status they

challenge or who challenge theirs" (p. 167).

Status politics revolves around ethnic, religious, and other "cultural groups" who see their prestige and the traditional way of life as changed or threatened by change by others. Hence, "cultural issues" will polarize society along lines of status differences and pose conflict between divergent life styles. Status movements in this sense attempt to build and sustain moral orders which provide basic meaning to human life in the eyes of movers. In sum,

precisely because prestige is far from stable in a changing society, specific issues can become structured as tests of status when they are construed as symbols of group moralities and life styles. A civil liberties issue. . .takes much of its affect and meaning from the clashes between traditionalized and modernist groups. . . Elements of educational sophistication, religious secularism, or political liberalism may appear as alien, foreign, and indirect contradiction to the localist ways of life of the traditional oriented culture.

Thus , Issues of civil liberties become fields on which such cultural and educational groups fight to establish their claims to public recognition and prestige (p. 175).

G. Resource Mobilization Explanation of Revolution

Historically speaking, resource mobilization, as a determining factor in the final end of social movements, has been emphasized by different analysts of political unrest. However, as an explanatory model of social movements this viewpoint was not stressed until recently. Such students of social movements as Coleman (1969), Oberschall (1973), Tilly (1973, 1975), Gamson (1975), McCarthy and Zald (1977), and others have initiated and developed this perspective. As Oberschall notes "mobilization refers to the processes by which discontented group assembles and invests resources for the pursuit of the group goals" (1973:28). Resources to be managed include both material (e.g., jobs, income, savings,

and the right to material goods and services) and nonmaterial things (e.g., authority, moral commitment, time, trust, friendship, skills, mass media). However, all mobilizable resources have constraints which restrict their ability to be assembled. Such factors as the governing values, past experiences, reference groups, and relations with the target groups constrain the management of the available resources and the access to others (Freeman, 1979).

As such, resource mobilization should not be understood as a mere creation, discovery, preparation, organization of and devotion and commitment to the requirements of conflict situations. It also should be viewed in the sense that "groups locked in conflict are in competition for some of the same resources as each seeks to squeeze more resources from initially uncommitted parties. When one party to the conflict succeeds in obtaining some hitherto unallocated resources, these resources are no longer available to the opposition" (Obershall, 1973:28). Hence this perspective deals with social structures from the point of view of how resources are created, exchanged, reallocated, consumed, converted and even lost, constantly.

Whereas other explanations of social movements emphasize "structural strain," "generalized belief," and "deprivation," the resource mobilization model focuses on the "ongoing problems" and "strategic dilemmas" of social movements. In this context,

The resource management model views revolutionary violence as an extension or continuation, in a particular form, of everyday non-violent political activity. An event of political violence is conceptualized, not as a sudden and unpredictable outburst or eruption of heretofore latent tensions or frustrations which take their manifest form in an organizational vacuum, but rather as the outcome of a continuous process or organizational activity (Aminzade, 1973:5).

Tilly (1973:6) adds that whether violence takes place is largely contingent upon "whether members of one group decide to resist the claims being made by members of another group" (emphasis added).

The resource mobilization approach ". . . depends more upon political, sociological and economic theories than upon the social psychology of collective behavior" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1213). In this respect, social action in protest situations is considered as reasonable and calculated. It is not irrational as the psychological view of collective behavior suggests. This rationality can be justified by the fact that group action, as noted earlier, is viewed as being attached to the experience of everyday life. "Collective violence is one of the commonest forms of political participation" (Tilly, 1973:6). More specifically, "rebellion, in this view, is simply politics by other means. It is not some kind of irrational expression but is. . . instrumental in its nature. . ." (Gamson, 1975:139).

To better grasp the resource mobilization assumptions in a systematic fashion, McCarthy and Zald's (1977) hypotheses, as "a partial theory" of "resource mobilization and social movements", can be outlined as follows:

Hypothesis 1: As the amount of discretionary resources of mass and elite publics increases, the absolute and relative amount of resources available to the social movement sector increases. ("Social movement sector," SMS, refers to all "social movement industries", SMIs, in a society no matter to which social movement, SM, they are attached. SMI is "the organizational analogue of a social movement.")

Hypothesis 2: The greater the absolute amount of resources

available to the SMS, the greater the likelihood that new SMIs and "social movement organization," SMOs, will develop to compete for these resources. (A SMO is a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a counter movement and attempts to implement these goals.)

Hypothesis 3: Regardless of the resources available to the potential beneficiary adherents, the larger the amount of resources available to "conscience adherents" the more likely is the development of SMOs and SMIs that respond to preferences for change. ("Potential beneficiaries" are those groups or individuals who would benefit directly from SMO goal accomplishment. "Adherents" are those individuals or organizations that believe in the goals of the movement. "Conscience adherents" are individuals and groups who are part of the appropriate SM but do not stand to benefit directly from SMO goal accomplishment.)

Hypothesis 4: The more a SMO is dependent upon isolated constituents, the less stable will be the flow of resources to the SMO. ("Isolated constituents" are those groups or individuals who do not normally meet in face-to-face interaction with other constituents and hence cannot be bound to the SMO through solidary selective incentives.)

Hypothesis 5: A SMO which attempts to link both conscience and beneficiary constituents to the organization through federated chapter structures, and hence solidary incentives, is likely to have high levels of tension and conflict. (Federated chapters are those small but organized units that serve to put constituents together.)

Hypothesis 6: Older established SMOs are more likely than newer SMOs to persist throughout the cycle of SMI growth and decline.

Hypothesis 7: The more competitive a SMI (a function of the number and size of the existing SMOs), the more likely it is that new SMOs will offer narrow goals and strategies.

Hypothesis 8: The larger the income flow to a SMO, the more likely that cadre and staff are professional and the larger are these groups.

Hypothesis 9: The larger the SMS and the larger the specific SMIs, the more likely it is that SM careers will develop. (A "social movement career" is a sequence of professional staff and cadre positions held by adherents in a number of SMO and/or supportive institutions.)

Hypothesis 10: The more a social movement is funded by isolated constituents, the more likely that beneficiary constituent workers are recruited for strategic purposes rather than for organizational work.

Hypothesis 11: The more a SMO is made up of workers with discretionary time at their disposal, the more readily it can develop transitory teams. ("Transitory teams" are composed of workers assembled for a specific task, short in duration, and are typically led by cadre members.)

Finally, as it is outlined in this section, resource mobilization analysts anchor their explanation of social movements, revolutionary or otherwise, in the very nature of the available and predictable resources as both ends to be achieved and means whereby such achievement becomes possible. The resource mobilization idea can be traced to the fact that if, in a given situation, the oppressed people are not protesting, they should not be viewed as satisfied with the system. Rather, their situation demonstrates that to date they have not been able to activate their

potentials and set themselves in motion, that is, their overall resources are not mobilized.

In closing this discussion about the theories of revolution, the following points should be emphasized in conclusion. First, all these theories hold that under certain circumstances some strain and tension are produced in a society which, given other conditions, will revolutionize the masses or some segment of them. Second, concerning the origins of strain, some theorists (e.g., Marx, Dahrendorf, Smelser, Johnson, Gusfield), hold that strain is rooted in society's social structure and the system of cultural values. Other theorists (e.g., Davies, Gurr, Geschwender), maintain that strain results from an intolerable gap between what people want (or had in the past) and what they are receiving at the present. Third, whereas a group of theorists focus on the root of strain as sociological, economic, political, or cultural, the other group identifies it as predominately psychological. However, the psychological view can be pictured as either individualistic where the individual actor's aggressiveness is responsible for political violence, or collective where strain is accumulated in collectivity and manifested collectively. The latter standpoint identifies social action in social movements as calculated and rational while the former sees it as deviant and irrational.

However, our position is sociological in the sense that strain and dissatisfaction are caused by a web of interrelated social factors and not an individual variable, be it social or psychological. Such a position will be explored in the later application and evaluation chapter as it entails a characterization of the test case revolution.

CHAPTER V

THE REVOLUTION OF IRAN (1979)

A. A Prelude

In discussing the Iranian Revolution, an attempt will not be made to produce a theory of revolutions based on a single case or to vigorously explain this revolution. In fact, in this dissertation the target revolution is of interest only as a test case for theories of revolution based on which a synthesis will be concluded. However, in this process, the scientific commitment is twofold. On the one hand, justice must be given to the revolution under study, regardless of whether this revolution supports a particular theory or not. On the other, each addressed theory must be applied to the test case revolution regardless of the nature and character of this revolution. It should also be emphasized that since the underlying theme of this dissertation is why revolutions take place, our treatment of the Iranian Revolution revolves around only its causes proper without consideration of what the revolutionaries achieved after they took over.

As a complex social phenomenon, revolution has its roots in a society's social history; it is not an overnight creation. However,

the remoteness of the past events responsible for the creation of revolutions differs from one setting to the other. For instance, in his analysis of the Russian Revolution, Davies (1962:10) argues that "one can truly say that the real beginning [of this revolution] was the slow modernization process begun by Peter The Great over two hundred years before the revolution" (emphasis added). The very beginning of the Iranian Revolution has been variously attributed to (1) The Iranian nationalist movement of the early 1950's, (2) the religio-political uprising of the early 1960's, and (3) The "oil boom" which began in the early 1970's.

For reasons to be addressed later, we believe that the Iranian revolution must be traced to the religio-political episodes which occurred around the turn of the twentieth century. These events resulted in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1906), which from the very beginning was suppressed. With this in mind, the major events and their impacts that, in one way or another, gradually accumulated and ultimately surfaced to jointly contribute to the creation of the 1979 revolution will be addressed. This is approached in two interconnected sections. Taken together, the two accounts will produce a sufficient understanding of the test case revolution based on which a synthesis will be concluded.

B. Historical Background

Understanding that the Revolution of Iran is rooted in a fairly long past, the occurrence and cumulation of the events that are both responsible for and symptomatic of this revolution can be addressed in the following form.

(1) The Early Roots. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Iranians, led by the religious leaders, raised their guns against the imprudent Qajar dynasty (1796-1925), and the interference of Russia and Great Britain in their country (Shuster, 1912; Browne, 1966; Keddie, 1979:16; Johnson, 1980:36). Among the insurrections of the late nineteenth century, that of the Tobacco, or Regie (1981-2), had a crucial impact on the events to come (Paine, 1975:4; Keddie, 1980:66). In this movement, the opposition forced the government to revoke the concession it had already given to the British (1890) allowing England to monopolize the domestic tobacco production and industry. On the whole, all of the 1890s and early 1900s' uprisings resulted in a desired change - The Constitutional Revolution of 1906. As its fundamental ideal, the opposition succeeded in transforming the Qajars' autocratic rule to constitutional monarchy identified with the "rule of law" and symbolized by the parliament (e.g., Browne:1966).

But, at the very dawn of this achievement, two events took place. In 1907, Iran was divided into two spheres of influence, the Russian in the North and the British in the South (Pahlavi, 1980:47). Second, Mohammad Ali Shah, the new king, with the overt support of Russia, stormed the Parliament and challenged the "freedom-fighters" (1908). Thus for a thirteen-month period, he reimposed absolutism, or as better known in Iran, The "Istebdad-e Sagheer: (i.e., short depotism). Ultimately, the despotic Shah was expelled and the rule of the representative came again, to be continued chaotically until 1921.

(2) The Reza Shah Penonmenon. While Iran was suffering from serious internal problems as well as Russian - British impositions,

Colonel Reza Khan implemented a British-designed coup d'etat and took the saddle of power (1921). Four years later, he put an end to the Qajar dynasty to establish his own, the Pahlavi dynasty (1925). Significantly, following the enterprise of Kamal Atotork of Turkey, Reza Khan initially had the inclination to form a republic in Iran, but he somehow dropped the idea and perpetuated the imperial system.

Under dictatorial policies and practices and the deemphasis on the Constitution, Reza Shah attempted to create a modern unified Iran. Such an attempt continued until his grip of power was shattered by the Allies' occupation of the country (1941). Reza Shah's expanding multidimensional relationship with Germany under Hitler, as well as the "strategic spotlight location of Iran as the only route through which lend-lease material" could be delivered to Russia, led the Allies to replace Reza Shah with his twenty-two-year old son, the Crown Prince Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and to occupy the Iranian territories. This, however, took place in the guise of the so-called Tehran Treaty which partially reads that "The governments of the United States of American, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union" (Thomas and Frye, 1971:276).

(3) Iran Under the Shah. Up to the late 1940s, the new young king, hereafter the Shah, was not a real threat to the growing traditional opposition as he later became.

(a) The 1940s. During this period, the Iranians thought more of the fate of their occupied and embattled country than the nature of

the regime and its functioning. In noncompliance with the Tehran Treaty, the Russians continued their occupation of the North of Iran until they withdrew reluctantly in 1946, under the pressure of the United Nations Organization. In this year, the Turk and the Kurd minorities of Iran, who had Russian support, declared their independent republics. The Arabs, who had lost their traditional independence to Reza Khan in 1925, also rebelled against the regime (1946). However, no group achieved any objective in these rebellions. The Shah survived the first assassination attempt in 1947, but his Minister of Court, A. Hazhier, lost his life in another attempt in 1949. The attempt on the Shah's life was managed by the communist Tudeh Party, a result of which was the outlawing of the organization (Pahlavi, 1980:82); the attempt on the life of the Minister was planned by the Feda'ian-e Islam (i.e., the devotee to Islam). This organization was formed in 1945 and was roughly modeled on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. According to Keddie (1981:200),

. . .the Feda'ian-e Islam, [was] a group of young men of popular origin who published a fundamentalist program calling for a return to popular Islamic ways and laws and an end to Western influence, and who also assassinated their chief enemies.

(b) The Early 1950s. Even after their withdrawal from Iran, the British up to the early 1950s remained the principal target against which the politics of the country was directed. They had always been intervening in the internal affairs and entirely controlled the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Such a control began at the turn of the present century when they obtained the concession for the exploration of oil from the Qajars. Up to the 1950s, Iran was receiving only 25 percent of its oil revenue while the other 75 percent belonged to the British. This fact,

among many others, motivated the opposing and patriot Iranians to challenge the British and the Shah who allied himself with them. Such a challenge developed under and was politically justified through the banner of nationalism and nationalization of oil.

In response, the Shah sought more support from Great Britain and also took refuge in the United States as he made his first state visit to Washington (1949). Later, The Americans began to take an active role in the politics of Iran and to replace the British. Since the Iranian Parliament was operating with only the House of Representatives until 1949, the Shah, as he put it, "created" the Senate. He subsequently amended the Constitution to provide him with power to dissolve the Parliament and to order new elections (Pahlavi, 1980:83). At the time, the opposition consisted basically of right-wing Islamics represented by Ayatollah Kashani (the Speaker of the House), Fadaiyn-e Islam, nationalist parties led by Mossadegh (or Mossadeq) and the coalition of the National Front, and the pro-Russian Tudeh (mass) Party. All of these factions initially worked together and for a common cause - the nationalization of oil and the termination of the British political and economic dominance in Iran. With Mossadegh's leading role as the leader of the Front and a popular member of the Parliament, the opposition finally reached its goal. On April 19, 1951, the Parliament approved the nationalization and expropriation law which was endorsed by the Shah immediately.

On the other hand, before the nationalization of oil, the Premier General Razmara was assassinated by a religious devotee (March, 1951). He was succeeded by Ala's short-term Premiership (March - April,

1951). After Ala's resignation, "Mossadegh accepted and became Prime Minister on the day that nationalization was approved" by the Parliament (Roosevelt, 1979:85). As a new popular Prime Minister, Mossadegh, from the very beginning, attempted to minimize the Shah's role as an active ruler and obtained some concessions in this process. Yet, Mossadegh saw the Shah, the supreme power and commander-in-chief with foreign support, as the major roadblock in the course of managing the country.

However, (1) the consequent pressure on the Shah from the triumphant Premier, (2) the following, and even preceding, recession caused by the nationalization negotiations and measures, (3) the British counterpolicies, (4) the lack of a workable program to manage the country, and (5) in connection to the preceding points, the emerging rivalry and difference in political positions among the coalesced parties, produced an economically stagnant and politically militant situation in Iran. As a result, the opposition split (Cottam, 1979; Lenczowski, 1980:179; Abrahamian, 1978a:7) and the Shah denied more concessions to Mossadegh. Provoked by the British, the Americans understood that "events were moving rapidly, inexorably toward conflict between Mossadegh and the Shah and, by association between the U.S.S.R. behind Mossadegh, the major Western powers sympathetic to the Shah" (Roosevelt, 1979:91).

As a result, the Americans (and the British) counteracted with a "Counter coup" (Roosevelt:1979), aimed at two intertwined objectives: (1) putting an end to Mossadegh's movement, and (2) paving the way for the Shah to rule at will. Both ends were achieved successfully (August, 1953), though as a facilitation factor the Shah abdicated for a short

while. Consequently, a new era in the politics of Iran emerged which took shape through various sociopolitical episodes.

(c) After Mossadegh. In matters of foreign relations, the new era (1953-1979), became identified with the increasing presence of the United States in, and its overall dominance over, the Iranian scene. "Iran became part of what is called 'The Northern Tier', the line of pro-Western states along the southern borders of the Soviet Union, from Turkey through to Pakistan" (Halliday, 1979a:252). The Shah restored and accumulated power abruptly and denied the valued offices to the remaining opposition. His major challengers, including Mossadegh, were executed, jailed, detained or exiled, and the opposing political parties were outlawed or denied practical rivalry with the exception of the extreme right-wing Pan Iranist Party which was co-opted. In order to remain in control, the Shah, under the CIA supervision and Israeli collaboration, created his secret police - The SAVAK (1957), which harassed the Iranians, and functioned as an effective agent of social control until the very collapse of the regime.

However, as early as November 1953, inspired by now sporadic and subterranean opposition, the students of the University of Tehran demonstrated against the one-man regime. The demonstration was quelled by the Shah's troops and, among other casualties, three students lost their lives on campus. Until the downfall of the Shah, the incident served as a "generational event" to keep "generational consciousness most intense in the sense of generation martyrdom" (Feuer, 1969:27). Also it was invoked and exploited by different challenging parties.

In October 1955, the Shah signed the Baghdad Pact, which linked

Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq to Great Britain, in the guise of "defensive alliance" against Russian "expansionism" (e.g., Richards, 1975a: 9, 12). In the wake of their 1958 revolution, the Iraqis withdrew from the "imperialist-imposed" pact. However, the Shah remained an active ally of the treaty, now changed to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), to which the United States attached itself as a "Partner".

In 1957-8 the Shah ordered the formation of two political parties, the Mellion (the nationalists), as the majority party, and the Mardom (the people), as the opposition party. Both were continuously led by his devotees and functioned in one way or another until 1975. In January 1958, General Qarani attempted a coup against the regime but with the lack of foreign support he failed to achieve an end, though was courtmarshalled and jailed (Cottam, 1979:314-315, 362; Richards, 1975a:16). When the revolutionary regime took over, Qarani assumed the position of the Commander-in-Chief, to be assassinated by a counterrevolutionary clique. Also in 1958 the Shah created the Pahlavi Foundation ostensibly for charitable purposes, financed by Pahlavi Estates and the Crown Land. These properties had been confiscated by Reza Shah to become Pahlavi's private property (Zonis, 1972:48-49; Richards, 1975a:11, 14, 15; Hoveyda, 1980:92).

(d) The Early 1960s. In July 1960, the Shah, in a press meeting, confirmed that his regime had recognized the State of Israel de facto. This acknowledgement inflamed Jamal Abdul Nasser, the late President of Egypt, to attack the Shah and to cut off Egyptian relationships with Iran (Lenczowski, 1980:203-4). In consequence, Nasser became the major, if not the only, head of state to criticize the Shah as

being the puppet of the Colonialists and Israel as their satellite. Morally speaking, Nasser's standpoint against the Shah had an encouraging effect on the latter's opposition throughout the 1960s. This is why the Shah "detested Nasser, who had made speeches attacking him, and he tensed whenever the name of the Egyptian President was spoken in his presence" (Hoveyda, 1980:138).

Referring to the "black reactionaries" and the "destructive red elements", the Shah, in January 24, 1963, announced that ". . . they have chosen the Egyptian government as their leader and want Iran patterned on Egypt. . . .we shall pity these people if they do not mend their ways and do not make use of our generosity" (Pahlavi, 1963:1).

In fact, the early 1960s were a crucial point in the course of the Shah's administration. In late 1960 and early 1961, the Iranian teachers backed by the university students, went on strike and held frequent demonstrations. Their demands were salary increases and favorable employment regulations. However, the "invisible hand" of the traditional opposition was involved in the event. In a confrontation with the police, one of the Tehranian teachers, Dr. Khan-Ali, was shot to death. Hence, the situation tensed and consequently a new government in which the teachers' leader assumed the Ministry of Education came to power (Bill, 1972:139; Zonis, 1971:47-50; Fischer, 1980:187).

Throughout 1961-2, General Tiemur Bakhtiar, the tough director of the SAVAK, began to exercise power somewhat independently and to play politics with both the opposition and the incumbent Prime Minister, Amini. Further, the rumors circulated that he was about to engineer a coup against the regime. The Shah finally confronted Bakhtiar, and

the ambitious general went abroad to work later against the Shah from his self-exile in neighboring Iraq (Zonis, 1975:47-52; Richards, 1975: 16-17). Bakhtiar worked out and advocated a political program based on which he would substitute the Shah's regime with a "federative system." The proposed federation somewhat attracted the Iranian ethnic minorities, though this did not imply a confirmation of Bakhtiar's political career. However, Bakhtiar lost his life in Iraq at the hand of the SAVAK agents (1970).

In 1962, inspired and supported by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to do something about Iran's backwardness and hence to prevent the Russians' ideological provocation in the Iranian lower classes, the Shah declared a "six point" program - The White Revolution (Leeden and Lewis, 1980:4). Up to his dethronement, the Shah had raised the program to nineteen points. Some observers note that the introduction of this program was also influenced by Nasser's el-Mawad el-Sit (i.e., the six points) program (Bayne, 1965:267). The major point of this program was the land reform; the literacy corps, profit sharing for workers, and voting and political rights for women also attracted some attention. The land reform was opposed by some of the traditional landlords, many of whom were members of the Parliament or highly-ranked officials. Furthermore, it was rejected by the majority of the religious leaders who also disagreed with the political rights for women as proposed by the White Revolution (Zonis:1972; Cottam:1979). However, in 1963 another constitutional change took place, based on which the Iranian women achieved the franchise (Saikal, 1980:87).

Meanwhile, the religio-political opposition came to be more

identified with the enthusiastic Ayatollah Khomeini, who began to wage a battle against the regime. Ayatollah Khomeini first came to public attention after the death of Ayatollah Bouroajerdi (1961) who had overshadowed the whole religious sphere. On the eve of the election of the new Parliament, in October of 1962, Ayatollah Khomeini was detained for ordering his followers to boycott the vote. Shortly after, he was released. Later in this year, the Shah "in accord with the Vienna Convention", granted the so-called "extraterritorial rights," better known in Iran as the "capitulations", to the American servicemen. These rights indicated that if the Americans commit crime in Iran, they will be dealt with in their own country and according to the United State's laws. This concession motivated Ayatollah Khomeini to attack decisively the Shah, the pro-Western Prime Minister Masour, the "imperialist" Americans, and the "Zionist" Israelis as well (Bill:1971; Zonis:1972; Richards:1975a; Mottahedeh, 1980:25).

In the wake of these incidents, other events ensued and finally that of Panezdeh Khordad, or fourth of June, 1963, occurred. Inflamed by Ayatollah Khomeini's speeches and preachings, his followers demonstrated in Tehran and the holy city of Qam. In this event, "the blood of thousands of Iranians had been split" by the Shah's troops (Zonis, 1971: 63). Further, Ayatollah Khomeini was exiled to Turkey (November 1964), and then to Iraq where he took abode until October 1978. The Shah's behavior toward "the men of religion" was condemned by the Egyptian religious community. President Nasser also cited the disturbances (Richards, 1975a:18) and reproached the "puppet of Colonialism" who at the time persecuted the Iranian Arab activists. In connection, two

events must be mentioned. First, following the political unrest of Summer 1963,

. . . the Ayatollah [Khomeini] sent letters to leaders of Moslem and Arab countries, asking for help for the victims of what he described as the atrocities of the Shah. Of all the leaders the Ayatollah contacted, only one responded: Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian army colonel who, the years before, had overthrown King Farouk. The Egyptian leader sent \$150,000 by courier to the committee that was responsible for the relief of the victims. But the Savak arrested the courier at Mehrabad Airport as he was bringing in the money. The Shah seized upon the incident to rebuke the Ayatollah publicly, who even then was identified as a leader of the opposition. In a widely publicized speech, the Iranian monarch questioned both the source of the money and the use to which it was to be put. The next day, the Ayatollah replied: "Everybody knows I did not ask for the money for myself. I asked for it for the committee for the relief of the victims of what you have done--the children you have orphaned, the wives you have widowed." (Salinger, 1981:75-76).

Next, in 1963-4, the Shah was confronted by a separatist attempt by some Arab minority in Iran belonging to the "Arabestan (Khuzistan) Liberation Front". Although the attempt was aborted in December 1963, and the separatists were either executed or sentenced to imprisonment by the regime (June, 1964), the event outraged the Shah - it was designed, nurtured, and backed by the neighboring Arab Iraqis. Additionally,

By 1966 it would not be an exaggeration to say that in Iranian eyes Cairo had replaced Moscow as the major center of immediate danger. Radio Cairo broadcast increasing propaganda on behalf of the Kuzistan [Abarbestan] Liberation Committee (Burrell, 1972:23).

(e) The Late 1960s. In January 1965, the Prime Minister Mansour, also the leader of the Iran Navin Party - the substitute for the Mellion Party - was assassinated by a religious rightist from the Fedai'ian-e Islam. On the other hand, in April of the same year, the Shah survived another attempt on his life by an Imperial Guardsman. This event was directed by a leftist group whose leader, Parviz Nikkhuh,

was sentenced to imprisonment but later was pardoned by the Shah to collaborate with the regime and finally to be executed by the revolutionaries (Pahlavi, 1980:60). In October 1966, the Shah celebrated his Silver Jubilee. In September 1967, he, through superficial legal measures, altered the Constitution so that the Queen would be able to assume Constitutional Regency (Lenczowski, 1980:210). Such a right was not given to the female. This was followed by his and the Queen's coronation in October 1967. This occasion as the imperial values suggested, gave also the impression that the regime was in a steady state and that the Shah enjoyed total control over the country. As an indication of these attitudes, and as the foreign relations were concerned, the Shah also enjoyed a detente with the Soviet Union "an impressive manifestation of which was the construction of the Isfahan steel mill" begun in 1965 (Cottam, 1979:334).

Prior to the Shah's coronation, the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 had occurred, and he took advantage of its aftermath. For instance, his celebrated enemy, President Nasser of Egypt, lost the battle to Israel and had already begun to adopt and execute new policies, among which were the later resumption of diplomatic relationships with Iran. More importantly, Nasser's ideological principles, especially Arabism and Arab Socialism, were a serious threat to the Emperor (Burrell, 1972:22-23, 4; Burrell and Cottull, 1972:12; Bayne, 1965:267). To be sure, pan-Arabism conflicted with the Iranian nationalism and interests in the Gulf area and this was aggravated by the Shah's attitudes toward Israel. With reference to the socialist principle, the Shah was an advocate and executor of the capitalist system. Hence, the resumption of the political relationship with Egypt would reduce the existing tension in the Gulf area.

In 1967, the Shah's regime put into effect a Family Protection Law based on which ". . . men could no longer unilaterally divorce their wives but all divorce cases had to go to court and grounds for divorce by husband or wife were similar" (Keddie, 1980:180). This law, which was repealed and passed in stronger form in 1975, was criticized in the traditionalist religious circles as being based on Western mores and not being in agreement with religious values.

As another event, in early 1968, the regime tortured and poisoned to death the favorite Iranian world wrestling champion, Takhti, a member of the National Front. Apparently, he had refused to collaborate with the regime by becoming a member of the Parliament. However, the secret was disclosed immediately, and the claim of the regime that the champion committed suicide was proved false. Hence, tens of thousands of Tehranians demonstrated in the South of the Capital, where the champion was born and buried, to publicize the brutality of the regime. The event provoked the teachers as well as students to go on strikes and to demonstrate.

(f) The Early 1970s. "In March, 1970, university students [in Tehran] protested bus fare increases as a hardship on the poor; they attacked a hundred buses; five students were killed, five hundred injured, and a thousand arrested, of whom thirty to eighty were jailed for an extended period" (Fischer, 1980:188). On the other hand, beginning from the late 1960s at least two events occurred which, in turn, served as a prelude to the episodes of this decade and which had a direct impact on the approaching revolution

(1) After accomplishing his academic study in social sciences

in France, Dr. Ali Shariati, an Iranian religio-political scholar, initiated a symbolic awakening movement in the country. Through numerous lectures, papers, and books, he advocated and instilled enthusiasm, especially among the youth, and ideological revolution and liberation based on updated Islamic tradition (Farhang, 1979; Halliday, 1979a; Richard, 1980). His intellectual activity, which was mostly identified with Hussieniah Irshad, a mosque-like place, threatened the regime and resulted in his repeated imprisonment, detention and exile, the effect of which was to publicize further his teachings. Shariati's life finally, and mysteriously, came to an end in his exile in London (1977), but Sullivan (1981:112) reiterates, and does not verify, that he died of a heart attack. However, Shariati was not able to enjoy the revolutionary fervor to which he had already contributed.

In line with such an awakening movement, the Writer's Association of Iran with some fifty core members, came, however unofficially, into being. The Association called for the removal of censorship of the press, produced some anti-regime material, and held some poetry readings known as Shah-e Shear, i.e., poetry night (e.g., Baraheni:1976; Halliday:1979a). This occasional activism, though it was restricted by the regime, attracted the youth and especially the university students in the Capital.

(2) The more important event, in instrumental terms, was the emergence of guerrilla activism. In 1971, two separate underground partisan groups, the Fadayeen-e Khalgh (i.e., the devotees to the people), and the Mojahideen-e Khalgh (i.e., the peoples' fighters of holy war) came into existence. The first was Marxist-Leninist and the

second was, so to speak, Islamic-Marxist. Members of each group got some of their guerrilla training in the Palestinian Liberation Organization camps. The Fadayeen had the first armed confrontation with the regime in Siahkal in the North of Iran in 1969 . The two attempted many assassinations of army generals and other officials, including the American advisers, attacked many police posts, attempted to kidnap one of the Shah's nephews, Shahram, and the American Ambassador, Douglas McArthur, and were responsible for many explosions and bank raids (e.g., Fischer:1980; Abrahamian:1980a).

In 1970, the Shah, after "confidential diplomatic activity between Tehran and London" (Burrell, 1972:41-42), agreed that the issue of Bahrain should be settled by the will of its people. Bahrain was claimed by the Iranians as a part of their territories. Finally, the Bahraini people, who were under the British protection, voted for independence (March 1970). However,

. . .when the extreme right-wing Pan-Iranian Party attempted to censure the government for yielding Iranian soil, the party was quickly ordered to suspend its political activities and its leader was temporarily [sic] banned from speaking in parliament (Burrell, 1972:42).

As a related issue, on December 1, 1971, the British protection of the Gulf was formally terminated; and on November 30, (1971) the Shah's troops occupied the Islands of Abu Musa and the big and small Tumb on the Gulf. These three islands are considered by the Arabs as Arabian territories, belonging to the state of the United Arab Emirates. This action escalated tensions between the Shah and the radical Arabs, a result of which was the Arab's re-emphasis that the "Persian" Gulf

was "Arabian" Gulf proper.

In October 1971, the Shah celebrated worldwide the controversial 2500th anniversary of the Persian Empire. Prior to and during the very occasion, the regime jailed or detained some of the political activists so as to prevent any opposition that might be voiced. In April 1972, impressed by this ambitious celebration, the Shah ordered the change of the Iranian-Islamic calendar, the Solar Heigra, to the Empire calendar which starts from the very dawn of the Persian Empire, 500 B.C.

In 1972, the Shah paradoxically obtained President Nixon's agreement that Iran and the United States instigate another rebellion of the Iraqi Kurds against the Iraqi government (Graham, 1980:64; Leeden and Lewis, 1980:8). The goal was the weakening of the Iraqis who (1) began to defend more than before Arab nationalism in the Gulf area, after the death of President Nasser, (2) did not (and have not) compromise on the Palestinian question, and (3) were about to settle the Iraqi Kurdish issue peacefully. At the same time, it was also attempted not to stimulate the Iranian Kurds who too had (and have) ethnic claims. The rebellion, finally, was triggered although ". . .by winter of 1974-75 Iraq was close to military victory, and Iranian forces were compelled to give military support to the Kurds, advancing as much as nine miles into Iraq (Cottam, 1979:340). However, the Iraqis counteracted by assisting the Iranian dissidents and Arab and Baluchi minorities in Iran. Later, in March 1975, the two governments signed an agreement based on which, among other terms, they agreed to cease assisting the other party's opposition (Khadduri, 1978:245-260).

However, the Shah's involvement in the problem as the Kurds were concerned served as a "defeat" and "setback" for the king who, according to Cottam, "had the decisional latitude to accept defeats and setbacks. . . but seemed to avoid publicizing even minor episodes in which casualties could result" (1979:362).

In October 1973, the fourth Arab-Israeli war occurred and, as a result, the Arabs partially embargoed their oil to the West, the supporter of Israel, thus making oil a weapon in the conflict. For this reason, and for reasons connected with the marketplace, the price of oil increased tremendously and Iran, as a major exporter of oil, became rich overnight. Thanks to the oil boom, a remarkable economic activity in the urban-industrial sectors developed. The army and its associates, however, in connection with the Shah's policies and ambitions, benefited tremendously. It became ". . .the world's fifth largest military force, equipped with the most ultra-modern weapons petrodollars could buy" (Abrahamian, 1980:21).

At this time, the Shah further attracted the Nixon administration in the United States. Based on his doctrine, Nixon believed that the United States interests in the so-called "troubled areas" should be secured from local opposition and Russian expansionism by her allies to whom the Americans' moral and instrumental support was offered. Such a policy was also to fulfill the Shah's regional ambitions. As a result, the U.S. military presence in the form of technical training, advising, and surveillance of Russia increased, and as other economic sectors were concerned, a wide-range of the American investment ensued. However, in line with Nixon's doctrine,

the Shah's aspirations traversed the Iranian territories. This doctrine was identified with "regional power", which in the case of Iran, ". . . considered the Iranian surrogates for Western military power in the Persian Gulf and Southwestern Asia" (Sullivan, 1981:149).

The Shah now came to dominate visibly the Gulf, to send his troops to Oman to oppress the Dofar nationalist movement, to provide support to Somalia in the Horn of Africa, to further attach his regime to Israel and South Africa, to somewhat instrumentally back the United States in Viet Nam, and to manage some dominance over the Indian Ocean (Richards, 1975a; Halliday, 1979a:249-384; Lenczowski, 1980:225; Pahlavi, 1980:131-143). This ambition and the guardianship of the Gulf was, however, simultaneous with the British withdrawal from the East of Suez in late 1969.

(g) The Mid-1970s. From the mid-1970s, the Shah came up with a new prophecy, the "Great Civilization", which ostensibly was synonymous with President Johnson's "great society." Based on such a prophecy, the Shah, with oil-dollars in hand, promised the Iranians that they would allegedly enjoy this utopia later this century. At that time, Iran would become the Asian Germany, a highly industrialized and prosperous homeland (Pahlavi, 1980:175-179). However, in March 1975, and to the surprise of even his intimates, the Shah dissolved the existing political parties, the two governmental and the one government-directed, to impose an "all-emcompassing" one party, the Rastakhiz (i.e., resurgence). Membership in the new phenomenon was obligatory, and the party's ideological principles, as determined by the Shah, were loyalty to the Imperial system, to the 1906 Constitution,

and to the White Revolution (e.g., Johnson, 1980:37; Hoveyda, 1980: 102-5). However, in this year (1975) Amnesty International declared that "no country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran."

In 1975, the Shah reached an agreement with the Iraqis based on which border disputes were settled and the rebellion of the Iraqi Kurds, fueled by the Shah, came to an end (Khaddouri, 1978:245-260). According to Helm,

. . .The agreements reached between Iraq and Iran in 1975 eventually opened the border between the two countries, permitting ten thousand Iranian pilgrims per year to cross over the Shi'a shrines in Iraq . This gave Komeini, then in exile in Iraq , contact with the pilgrims. What had been a trickle of Khomeini propaganda into Iran became a flood (1981:200, 202).

In 1976-77, the Shah celebrated his dynasty's Jubilee for a whole year and his mass media were ordered to emphasize the Pahlavis' achievements throughout their reign. In 1976, when the Democrats under President Carter's "human rights" slogan took over in the United States, the Shah was relatively pushed to democratize his political system (Fischer, 1980:192). However, in this year Iran was declared one of those countries in which human rights violations were prevalent, and tortures, executions, and imprisonments were common practices (e.g., Baraheni, 1976; Cottam, 1979; Johnson, 1980:37). In 1977, the international year of human rights, the well-respected and open-minded Ayatollah Taleghani, a religio-political leader from the 1950s' movement, was sentenced to ten years in prison (Cottam, 1979:331). During this time a number of the guerrilla activists had been shot on the streets, tortured to death or executed, in some cases even without superficial

trials. However, about the same time, and due to a showcase liberalizing measure, some of the opposing specialists and graduates were able to return to the country (Ledeen & Lewis, 1980:18) and to play a role in the future challenges.

"In August 1977, Tehran slum dwellers protested in large numbers against eviction notices and the leveling of their accommodations; a number of people were killed" (Fischer, 1980:189). Additionally, a series of arsons swept Tehran factories, and an assassination was attempted by some unknowns on the life of Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister. The attempt was made under the guise of a drug smuggling plot. At this same time, a Writer's Committee for the Defense of Prisoners was formed. In 1977, the regime declared that it would let the West European countries dump their atomic wastes in the Iranian deserts if they were interested in doing so. Although this dumping would be done in exchange for some million dollars, it aroused domestic criticism which prohibited this pro-Western policy from being carried out.

From the late Spring of 1977 and throughout the Summer of this year, a nationwide electric power failure occurred which caused much economic loss and produced a great deal of tension and unrest. At the time, the Ministry of Power was under one of the Shah's relatives. Further, this public inconvenience was added to the already existing strain and dissatisfaction caused by deficiencies in civil services, transportation, educational development (in terms of quality and quantity), skilled manpower, housing, inflation, skyrocketing prices, agricultural deterioration, urban exodus, international migration, multidimensional corruption (including irresponsibility and bad adminis-

tration in the bureaucratic organizations), and political strangulation (e.g., Richards, 1975a:3-18; Hurewitz, 1978:40; Burn and Dumont, 1978: 15-20; Halliday, 1978b:2-3; Cottam, 1979; 320-363; Nickle, 1979:95-106; Lenczowski, 1980:222-229; Hoveyda, 1980:31; Hooglund, 1980:3-6; Ledeen and Lewis, 198:9-11; Pahlavi, 1980:101-129; Armstrong, 1980:18A).

As face-saving measures, the Shah had already (1) ordered court investigation, (2) formed a group for investigating the problems of Iran to work allegedly under his auspices, and (3) declared a fight against corruption and profiteers, as the 14th and 19th points of the White Revolution (Pahlavi, 1980:126). However, as the later events would confirm, none resulted in anything other than further disappointing the people. Finally, in August 1977, he replaced his devoted Prime Minister, the thirteen year incumbent Amir Abbass Hoveyda, with Amouzgar who also was the leader of the Rastakhiz Party. On November 13 of this year, the Shah left for his "twelfth visit" to the United States. He was faced by some four thousand Iranian student demonstrators gathered around the White House chanting "death to the Shah." "Tear gas wafted across the White House lawn, causing Shah and President to wipe away tears during their speeches" (Fischer, 1980:193).

Amouzgar was not able to remedy the intensifying sociopolitical unrest. Moreover, the situation worsened, and the Shah later wrote, "By the Summer of 1979 I had a sense of the new troubles ahead" (Pahlavi, 1980:149). In an angry reaction to Ayatollah Khomeini's increasing agitation and activism the regime published a humiliating article, under a fake name, in the semi-official paper Ettellaat, January 7, 1978, (Fischer, 1980:194; Hoveyda, 1980:23). Later, it was disclosed

that the main theme of this article was dictated by the Shah himself (Ahrar, 1359/1979:4). However, the article, which labeled Khomeini as a "medieval reactionary", caused his followers to demonstrate angrily in the provincial city of Tabriz and other places. The demonstrators were confronted by the regime and in Qom, in addition to other casualties, two religious students were shot to death by the police in the house of the well-respected but moderate Ayatollah Shariat-Madari who also was present at the shooting in January 1978 (e.g., Fischer, 1980:196). In the wake of this event, "Shariat-Madari declared the Shah's government non-Islamic, called for a moratorium on communal prayers, and threatened a funeral march to carry the corpses to the Shah Niavaran Palace" in Tehran (Fischer, 1980:194).

However, on the eve of the new year (1978), President Carter, in return, made his state visit to Tehran and in his ceremonial speech in the Niavaran Palace acknowledged for the Shah that:

Iran because of the great leadership of the Shah is an island of stability in one of the most troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your leadership, and to the respect, admiration and love which your people give to you (Carter, 1977:1975).

(h) The Escalation of the Tension. In the summer of 1978, rumors circulated that the Shah was injured by one of his relatives and that he suffered from ill health (he had not appeared in public for some weeks). On August 19th, 1978, a "stunning tragedy" was perpetrated in the Rex Theater, during the show time, in the industrial city of Abadan. As a result, over 400 people were burned alive, including one of the arsonists. According to the Shah, the death toll was 477 people (Pahlavi, 1980:159). The regime reproached the extremist Muslims for the incident, but the people charged the SAVAK immediately (Fischer,

1980:197; Cottam, 1979:356). The city authorities failed and caused the firemen to fail to put out the fire. The regime also failed to confirm its accusation against the opposition or to single out any other. This "Fajeah" (i.e., disaster), served both as a turning point and as a precipitating factor in the course of the coming revolution. However, the hitherto unthinkable "down with the Shah" chanting began as the mournful Abadanians started their demonstrations and riots against the regime asking for punishment and revenge (Fischer, 1980:197).

Because of his now multiplied and concentrated declarations and prerecorded speeches, Khomeini was asked to desert neighboring Iraq. After he was denied refuge in Kuwait, he arrived in Paris (October 5, 1978) where, for the first time, he got access to and was favored by a worldwide mass media and press which never was available before. This helped much to shed light on the nature of the Shah's opposition, their determination, and their ideals, as well as the ongoing chaotic situation in the country. The regime's social control, and especially the censorship measures, had obscured the facts to the outside world. Later, it was observed that "The greatest error of judgment was that of the Shah himself, who told the French government it was all right to permit the Ayatollah Khomeini to take up residence in the Paris suburbs" (Ledeen and Lewis, 1980:12).

Interestingly, Khomeini's presence and symbolic activism in Paris were analogous to that of both Sayad Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, and his Egyptian disciple Shikh Mohammad Abduh, the religious enthusiastic scholars. They both, in the late nineteenth century, located in the city to make issue of the colonialist's aggression in the Muslim

countries as well as the reactionary leaders of the Muslim nations (Gabrieli:1961; Algar:1966; Keddie:1980).

In the wake of and inflamed by the Abadan disaster as well as by Khomeini's imposed departure from Iraq , the opposition began to multiply its voices. Various opposing groups with religious, nationalist, communist or social democratic ideological positions and intellectual principles poured into the streets and demanded independence, political freedom, fight against corruption, salary increases, the release of the political prisoners and the return of Khomeini as well. Members of the Shah's handpicked Parliament also were able to direct some charges against some officials and demanded a "real" investigation of the Abadan tragedy. Members of the royal family began to flee the country and to transfer their money and valuables. Many of the high-ranking authorities also took action to sent their money abroad.

In response to the challenging voices, the Shah named a new government (August 27, 1978) led by Sharif-Imami, the speaker of the Senate, the director of the Pahlavi Foundation, and once premier with ill reputation. He was given a mandate to make concessions to the opposition, especially the religious community. The closing of gambling casinos, the abolition of the Ministry of Women's Affairs, the creation of a Ministry of Religious Affairs, the approval of forming political parties within the limits of the Constitution, the lifting of the censorship on the printed media, the resumption of the Islamic calendar, salary increases, and the dismissal of some corrupt officials, including some Bahais (e.g., the Shah's personal physician) were the major concessions that the new government offered to the opposition throughout

its operation (Abrahamian:1978a; Cottam:1979; Fischer:1980). (Bahaism, as a religious belief, was born in Iran in the mid-nineteenth century and has always been considered by the practicing Muslims as a dangerous heresy to the religion of Islam. Some of the Bahais had dominated the political arena in the Shah's regime).

On September 4, 1978, the opposition celebrated a religious holiday, "Id-e Fitr," with a well-organized demonstration. This, for the first time, took place in the northern area of Tehran. By doing so, the opposition had intentionally shifted the geographical center of their activism from the traditional south, the Bazaar, which is identified with the lower strata, to the middle-and-upper class districts. During this feast, the demonstrators handed flowers to the soldiers and chanted: "isteghlal, azadi, hokoomat-e' Islami" (independence, freedom, Islamic government), and "marg bar Shah" (death to the Shah) (e.g., Fischer, 1980:198).

With reference to an Islamic government, it must be noted that until 1969 Khomeini had no open political program except the return to the 1906 Constitution as it had been abused by the Pahlavis. Thereafter, he began to advocate the Islamic sacred order which appeared in his book, The Islamic Government. "A composite Islamic order. . . provides for a state integrated with religion, a state self-avowedly Muslim, led by the Muslims in which the law of Islam enjoys a privileged position" (Kramer, 1979:13). The nationalist groups had always defended certain reformist principles which could be translated into "social democracy" (Halliday, 1978b:7), or the authentic implementation of the 1906 Constitution. The program of different communist groups had been clearer--

a communist order, with various approaches however. To be sure, at the time, the voice of Islam was overwhelmingly dominant (Fischer, 1980:190).

Sharif-Imami, from the very beginning, was not able to cool down the escalating oppositionist waves, hence he resorted to martial law, which was declared at 6:00 a.m. and included twelve major cities, among which was the capital. Under the guise of the martial law, but before it was adequately communicated, many Tehranian demonstrators, unaware of or uncertain about the new restrictions, were massacred by the Shah's troops, among which, according to rumors, were Israeli soldiers (Friday, September 8, 1978). The death toll of 86 was reported by the government (Pahlavi, 1980:160), but according to the opposition spokesman "at least forty-five hundred were killed and reports of seventeen thousand deaths were circulated" (Cottam, 1979:358). This "Black Friday" further highlighted the Abadan tragedy and ignited the masses; it helped the imminent revolution to erupt speedily. However, in the wake of the Black Friday, the Shah received a telephone call from President Carter confirming his support for the monarchy (Fischer, 1980:199). But the Shah later wrote that "President Carter has never called me--except once at Lackland Air Force Base in December 1979" (Pahlavi, 1980:161).

In spite of the martial law and the concomitant curfew, strikes, demonstrations, and riots continued. On October 18, oil workers began their strike; amnesties were announced; the celebration of the Shah's, the Crown Prince's, and the Queen's birthdays were cancelled; the SAVAK, as countermeasures to intimidate dissidents, attacked a mosque in Kerman and a girls' school in Hamadan, raping three girls (Fischer, 1980:201). Meanwhile, the previously dismissed head of SAVAK, General Nasseeri who

was appointed as the Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan, was recalled to face a military tribunal on charges of ordering tortures and illegal imprisonments.

Finally, the regime initiated political negotiations with the opposition in connection to which Karim Sanjabi, the leader of the National Front, flew to Paris to consult with Khomeini, as later did Mahdi Bazargan, the leader of the Iranian Liberation Movement (Cottam: 1979; Pahlavi: 1980). On his return to Tehran, Sanjabi announced that no compromise with the Shah was possible. Khomeini had previously refused to return to Iran, but he would do so only when the Shah was gone.

On November 4, 1978, the students pulled down the statue of the Shah at the University of Tehran, and on the following day the Bazaar, the traditional trade center, closed. The rioters now began to selectively attack banks, tourist hotels, liquor stores, cinemas, American and British Airlines and the Embassy of Britain as well (Abrahamian: 1978a; Fischer:1980). The removal of censorship helped the Iranians to communicate freely in collective terms and to exchange information. It was the first time since the early 1950s and a brief time during the early 1960s, that they had enjoyed a free press. However, such an opportunity came soon to an end: Sharif-Imani resigned and the new military government reimposed the ban.

The new government, nominated by the Shah on November 4, 1978, was led by General Azhari, the Commander-in-Chief. To pave the way for his "military card," the Shah, with a conciliatory tone, encouraged the Iranians to keep quiet and to await reforms to come. In this televised speech, which happened to be his last, the Shah acknowledged the twilight

of the Iranians' developing revolution as he said: ". . .your revolutionary message has been understood. . ." (Hoveyda, 1980:169). That was the first time that the movement was officially acknowledged as "revolution" by the regime (Iran Times, 1979:9). Under the military government, many journalists and printers boycotted the papers (Cottam, 1979:358) and, as a result, mass communication became restricted to the TV-radio networks which were in the hands of the government. At the time, the oil strike had reduced production from six million to 1.1 million barrels a day, and hence gasoline and kerosene were in short supply. Garbage collection and bus services in Tehran were suspended and public unrest was more widespread than ever before (e.g., Cottam, 1979; Fischer, 1980; Saikal, 1980).

In Tehran, on December 26, a professor participating in a sit-in at the Ministry of Sciences and Higher Education was shot to death by the police. The following day, at his burial ceremony, the participants were confronted by the troops which resulted in the killing of some people, including a colonel on duty. On November 11, Sanjabi was arrested on the charge of having arranged a prohibited press conference. On the following day, the radical religious leader, Taleghani, was released after four years of imprisonment, to play a very active and unifying role in the days to come. Ayatollah Montazeri was also released at the same time.

About this time, the Bazaar closed again and serious disturbances in the oil and commercial cities of Ahwaz, Abadan, and Khorramshahr occurred. The opposition demanded that foreign technicians leave the country, which they had already begun to do. On November 19, the Queen

flew to the holy city of Najaf in Iraq to seek support from the quiet Ayatollah Khoi, but she was denied support and was discredited (Fischer, 1980:203). On the same day as well as on November 23 and 26, other groups of political prisoners were released. On November 21 and 26, demonstrations and riots swept the holy city of Mashhad, as well as other cities including Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Gorgan in the following days.

On December 2, 1978, the holy mourning month of Mohrram began. For the Shia Muslims, this month has the special meaning of martyrdom. Shiism was officialized in Iran in 1501 and has become the country's official denomination ever since. On the tenth of Mohrram, known as Ashora, Imam Hussien, the third successor, according to Shiism, and the nephew of the Prophet Mohammad, was martyred with some seventy of his relatives and followers, in a defensive holy war, by the tyrant Yazid in Karbala, Iraq, A.D. 680 (e.g., Ayoob: 1979; Clinton, 1979; Deming, 1979:40). Hence, the implication of "Red Shism" in the Shia (or Shiite) doctrine as the anniversary of this martyrdom has always been held by the Shia Muslims with dramatic and tragic traditions and symbols as a function to produce religious-political zeal and consciousness. Based on the "karbala paradigm," and the value of martyrdom, the historical slogan, that is, "everywhere is Karbala and every day is Ashora," became prevailing in the month of Mohrram in revolutionary Iran (Fischer, 1980:204).

Throughout the first ten days of Mohrram and under military government and curfew measures many disturbances took place nationwide. Men in white shrouds, signifying their preparation and willingness to be martyred by the regime appeared here and there "in defiance of the

curfew" (Fischer, 1980:203). At nights, when gathering was prohibited, people went on rooftops to chant "Allaho Akbar" (God is greater), and, interestingly, to exchange messages and information which could not be communicated otherwise. Such a slogan as "although it is time to sleep, it is time to revolt," became the theme of the rooftop politics.

More importantly, during the 9th and 10th of Mohrram (December 11 and 12), in response to Khomeini and Shariat-Madari's statements and in line with the religious tradition as well as the willingness of all the opposing groups, millions of Iranians poured into the streets to mourn Imam Husien and to curse the Shah. Among these religious-based but politically motivated demonstrations, the one held in Tehran had certain determining revolutionary implications. This demonstration was led by the radical well-respected Ayatollah Taleghani, Ayatollah Montazeri, Sanjabi, who had been released recently, Bazergan, the leader of Iran Liberation Movement, and all other parties such as the Mojahideen Khalegh, Fedayee Khalegh, and the Tuden Party. Considering this event, Halliday indicates that ". . .in December, 1978, an estimated two million people poured into the streets of Tehran in one of the largest unofficial demonstrations in human history" (1978b:1). Further, this well-organized, well-attended, and militant but nonviolent demonstration, identified with Ashora, was acknowledged as a self-held referendum signifying the rejection of the Shah's regime and the approval of an Islamic order as the substitute.

In this month, clashes between some soldiers, who were inclined to join the people, and their commanders were reported. Serious attacks on the people occurred in at least two cities, Najaf-Abad and Esfahan.

Strikes, riots, sit-ins, boycotts in bureaucratic organizations, factories, and oil fields became the rule and paralyzed the system. As an example, the oil strike caused severe energy shortage and, as a general outcome, food supply problems emerged. Now, the opposition took some partial responsibility for distributing the scarce commodities, especially in the city of Tehran. Finally, the military government failed and collapsed, to be replaced by a civilian cabinet led by Shapour Bakhtiar (January 1, 1979).

(i) The Take-over. Bakhtiar, the leader of the Iran Party, an organ of the National Front, took some actions in line with the demands of the people. The imprisonment of some highly-ranked authorities, the dissolution of the SAVAK, the freeing of the majority of the remaining political prisoners, the embargo of oil of "zionist" Israel and "racist" South Africa, the easing of the curfew hours, and the cancellation of the bans on the papers were the best examples. However, from the very beginning, the Bakhtiar government was rejected and labelled as "illegal" by Ayatollah Khomeini, the National Front, and all other challenging parties, and he was also expelled from his party (Halliday, 1978b; Fischer, 1980). His acceptance of the premiership was considered by the opposition as a "split" from and "treason" against the united masses. Ayatollah Khomeini decreed that government employees should not collaborate with and must reject the new ministers.

On the other hand, the United States, which saw that the Shah's rule under the premiership of a challenging figure was on the verge of collapse, sent Air Force General Huyser to Tehran to back Bakhtiar's efforts. Huyser's mission has been differently understood as either

to persuade the army to foment a coup against the opposition or to prevent such an event (Ledeen and Lewis, 1980:35-36; Pahlavi, 1980:127). However, either way, staging a military coup was too late to serve any vital objective.

On January 13, a Regency Council was formed so that the Shah should "go on vacation." This, however, was immediately confronted with Ayatollah Khomeini's announcement that he had already formed an "Islamic Revolutionary Council" with ten anonymous members to assume power and to manage the country after the Shah is gone. The Shah, who totally failed to work out any self-sustaining device, fled the country with tears in his eyes on January 16, 1979. Soon after the Shah's forced abdication, "there was jubilation in the streets. Soldiers and civilians embraced. Anti-American slogans were in evidence--'After the Shah, now the Americans', and 'Yankees go home, the Shah is dead--but Americans on the streets were treated with friendliness" (Fischer, 1980:210).

After the Shah fled the country, Ayatollah Khomeini managed to return to Iran, but Bakhtiar closed the airports. This was reacted to by various demonstrations and slogans such as "Death to Bakhtiar." As a counter measure, Bakhtiar's troops clashed with the demonstrators. Among other casualties, twenty people were shot to death by the troops near the University of Tehran (Fischer, 1980:211). This took place on January 27, 1979. However, Ayatollah Khomeini, after more than fifteen years in exile, returned to Iran triumphantly to be welcomed by a "crowd of some two million people" (February 1, 1979). Soon after his arrival, he nominated Mahdi Bazargan, the Leader of the Iran Liberation

Movement, as the provisional Prime Minister.

Now, Iran had two governments. However, early in February 1979, the army split (Ledeen and Lewis, 1980:30, 35; Halliday, 1979b: 83) and the Shah's Prime Minister, Bakhtiar, vanished in the shadows. Consequently, the revolutionary masses in Tehran, backed by some military men, especially the Air Force Technicians, captured the National TV-radio Network, stormed the Zendan-e Qaser, the Bastille of Iran, occupied police stations and SAVAK offices, and finally took over on February 11, 1979. In the same fashion, all other cities and towns fell in the hands of the revolutionaries.

Thus, the Iranian people who later (on April 1979) voted for the "Islamic Republic of Iran," putting an end to the 2500-year-old Persian Empire and the last Emperor as well, came up with a revolution. The Shah (Pahlavi, 1974:14) was correct when he once said "nothing but the total destruction of human civilization could stop the Iranian people on their way," which happened to be toward his regime's extermination. The next section will deal with the root causes of this revolution.

C. Analysis of the Root Causes of the Revolution

The antecedents of the Iranian Revolution suggest and manifest understandable facts in whose light both the genesis and the eruption of this revolution can be grasped. The first evident fact is that, concerning its causes, the target revolution was not an overnight creation. It was rooted in a remote past and was nurtured by the ensuing and cumulating episodes. This, however, is endemic to all

social revolutions. As Wendell Phillips emphasizes, "Revolutions are not made. They come. A revolution is as natural a growth as an oak. It comes out of the past. Its foundations are laid back in history" (Fischer, 1980:181). In a word, the root causes of social revolutions are historical in substance. They are not causal or contemporary. Concerning the Iranian Revolution, the responsible variables and their accumulative impact can be seen and analyzed as a historical process that was in full development. In this attempt it will be shown how, throughout a long period, the Iranian's old sociocultural and political wishes remained unfulfilled, to burst finally into a revolution.

1. In Search of Political Freedom

To shed light on the roots of the Iranian Revolution, the desired changes that somehow brought undesired consequences and in the long run caused a new revolutionary change must be investigated. Beginning from the late nineteenth century and due to acquaintance with industrial Europe, the American, French, and Russian (1905) Revolutions, colonial hegemony, and governmental despotism and negligence, the Iranians were exposed to and developed a desire for distributive justice, territorial independence, and "progress." These ideals were raised and promoted under the banners of religious dignity and national integrity (Browne, 1966; Shuster, 1912).

In Islamic Iran, especially from the Safavid Reign (1501-1732), when Shiism was officialized, the political elites and the religious leaders developed an known reciprocal tie (Algar, 1966). In such an interaction, the political functionaries sought legitimizing support from the religious dignitaries and in return, the latter acquired more

influence and valued status. These mutual interests and functional relationships were, with some fluctuations, operational until the late nineteenth century when a number of factors disturbed the relationship.

Later in the Qajar's rule (1796-1925), the traditional Iran developed a disposition for new horizons. At the same time the Russian and the British competition over Iran began seriously. These countries had two interrelated objectives: political intervention and economic exploitation. This devastating situation caused a gradual conflict between the ruling class and the traditionally powerful religious leaders. The government was subjected to the overall hegemony of the foreign forces which it failed to oppose. On the other hand, the "Iranian traders [i.e., the Bazaaris] were hurt by foreign competition and Muslims in general were offended by the arrogance and manners of Western infidels. As a result, many people turned to 'mullahs' to voice their grievances" (Paine, 1975:3).

Backed by the people, the religious leaders were mobilized to curb the government. In reaction, the regime yielded towards the foreigners who could provide it with financial aid such as loans necessary for the maintenance of order. The major purpose of this support was an attempted dominance over and justification for intervention in domestic affairs. As a result, the traditional alliance between the religious leaders and the ruling class weakened and took a different direction. The regime understood that a compromise with the foreigners was more feasible and beneficial than one with the challenging religious leaders who were now backed by the newly emerging and active phenomenon, the nationalists. As Cottam (1976:6) observes, ". . .the wholesale

distribution of Iranian resources to foreigners were objectives closely related to the values of nationalism." It was for religio-patriotist values and objectives that the religious activists were politicized

In colonialized societies, as well as in societies subjected to neo-colonialism, nationalism evolved as both a reaction to and an ideological justification for a war of independence. However, in line with the underlying assumption of this analysis, and as the Iranian case is concerned, it is safer to speak of patriotism rather than nationalism for a number of reasons. First, in recent centuries Iran has never been a colony, in conventional terms, to nurse nationalistic values very fruitfully. However, she had been a sphere of neo-colonialism and imperialism until the dawn of the 1979 revolution. Second, ideologically, in the Islamic tradition, which is dominant in Iran, the Umma (i.e., the confluence of followers from whatever regions and origins) is more emphasized than the nation. In other words, in the Islamic ideology, "Taking the place of all similar concepts which in different languages and cultures designate a human agglomeration or society, such as 'society,' 'nation,' 'race' ' people,' 'tribe,' 'clan,' etc., is the single word umma, a word involved with progressive spirit and implying a dynamic, committed and ideological social vision" (Shariati, 1979:119).

Third, Iran has been identified with different ethnic minorities (e.g., Arabs, Baluchis, Kurds, Turkomans, Turks), tribes, and regional autonomists who, until "the prenational era. . .were able to enjoy a good deal of autonomy (Cottam, 1979:8). Such original and regional diversity cannot provide a solid base for pure and comprehensive

national values and ideals. The very meaning of the title "shahenshah" (i.e., king of kings) can be traced to this same fact (Graham, 1979:73f). In specific words, the Shahenshah ruled different territories with a variety of cultures and subcultures which often had nothing in common more significant than an over dominant sovereign. Therefore, as Hooglund notes, any application of the value of "national consciousness. . . to ethnic minorities would have to examine the effects of the interplay between ethnic consciousness and Persian chauvinism upon their concept and loyalty to Iran" (1980:5f).

Fourth, there have been different religious minorities (e.g., Assyrian, Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian) in the country, who, by definition, are neither included in the Islamic Umma nor, with exception of the Zoroastrians, have Persian origin. Fifth, in terms of political ideology, the Communist Iranian at least partially advocate international communism in which nationalism is either sacrificed or at best is at the peril of a slow-motion death. Finally, with all these considerations in mind, with their sharp traditional feudal, capitalist, and aristocratic differences, the Iranians also cannot demonstrate a commonly agreed-upon national sentiment. Since both their economic values and their social statuses are different and conflicting, their nationalist ideals may not be channeled toward one direction. Therefore, it can be argued that it was territorial identity in the sense of homeland and not ancestral affiliation crystalized in inclusive national values that has cemented the overall Iranians together. Interestingly, the semi-official slogan, Khuda, Shah, Meehan (i.e., God, king, homeland), of Iran's old regime, can be considered as an indication of this same

fact though some may see more nationalism in the slogan than in the shared territories.

Nevertheless, Islamic and nationalist ideologies can be regarded as the more prevailing current ideological thoughts in contemporary Iran. "They both reflect the same existential and national anxiety that grips Iranian society at all levels" (Boyat-Phillip, 1978:220). As Shiism is concerned, it is understood that "the history of Iran and the Shiite tradition are closely intertwined and have never ceased to develop in the course of the centuries" (Hoveyda, 1980: 44). Such a web, as Scarcia observes, is "a confluence between Shiism and the popular spirit, taking on the form of national consciousness" (1957:90). Finally, this confluence and the incurring consciousness, as noted earlier, came up with the Constitutional Revolution early in the twentieth century.

However, Iran's first "constitution" was more a valuational gain than a structural radical change. It did not propose a specific socioeconomic order categorically distinguished from the old one. The constitution more projected political freedom and religious dignity than distributive economic justice. The Iranian social structure would have remained intact substantially even if the constitution had been implemented. Yet, due to external pressures and internal aggression and conflict, the Constitutional Revolution was suffocated at birth, and the constitution was carried out at the will of the succeeding governments. Hence, from the very dawn of this revolution, a multi-dimensional deprivation and despair occurred from which different strata suffered. This situation was described by the contemporaries

Browne (1966) and Shuster (1912), and was best symbolized by Shuster's The Strangling of Persia. Such a situation heralded Reza Shah's coup de'etat in 1921.

2. The Intolerable Burden

Reza Shah's accession to power was possible through the support of the British who understood that a unified and stable Iran under a powerful central government would better secure their oil-based interests than other arrangements (e.g., Bayne, 1965:251-310; Graham, 1979:22-30; Forbis, 1980:41-62). In 1925, Reza Shah "forced" the Parliament to dissolve the "decadent" Qajar dynasty and to proclaim him the new Shah of Iran. However, ". . .reportedly he was anxious to establish a Kamalist style republic in Iran but the opposition to the abandonment of the traditional forms of legitimacy was so strong that he dropped the idea" (Huntington, 1980:270). In fact, Kamal Ataturk of Turkey was so disposed to modernization and the alteration of the Islamic tradition that the traditionalist Iranians refused the idea of the republican form of government, lest undesired changes would ensue. Finally, Reza Shah "established the Pahlavi dynasty and single-handed absolute rule" (Saikal, 1980:20).

In this process, Reza Shah came up with a new modern Iran, different substantially from the Qajar's period. As Keddie notes "Under Reza Shah, roads, telephones, automobiles, a railroad, and state-owned factories were introduced, as well as modern schools, a university, some education for girls, unveiling and new legal codes. Foreigner's power was reduced through the ending of capitulations, the gaining of tariff, autonomy and the use of protective tariffs" (1979:17).

However, such an achievement became possible through Reza Shah's attitudes disregarding the nature of the traditional political and religious values for which the pioneer Iranians sacrificed. Forbis notes, "Reza Shah believed that a king needed some harsh and unsavory qualities--suspicion of everyone, distrust of clemency, willingness to hit first" (1980:46). The Shah himself acknowledges for his father that "Proverbially, to get things done in Persia one must both reward and punish. My father relied more on punishment than he did on reward or encouragement. . .My father's method for getting things done showed no little realism in the light of our authoritarian tradition" (Pahlavi, 1961:49).

Focusing on Reza Shah's output, Hobson (1974:174) concludes that his ". . .rule brought about stability and prosperity for some, his increasing authoritarian approach created an oppressive burden for large sections of society. Many died in the process." Millspaugh, the economic adviser to the Secretary of State who served for some years as Director General of Iranian Finances under Reza Shah, had reached the same conclusion:"Altogether he thoroughly milked the country, grinding down the peasants, tribesmen and laborers, and taking heavy toll from the landlords. While his activities enriched a new class of 'capitalists'--merchants, monopolists, contractors, and political favorites--inflation, heavy taxation, and other measures, lowered the standard of living of the masses" (1946:34).

In a short word, the cost of Reza Shah's created stability, security, modernity, and centralism was despotism, a cult of personality, the growth of the bourgeoisie strata on the ruin of the proletariat and

peasantry, and a political burden against which the opposition had already fought. In Lambton's words, "if the movement of the constitutional reform and its antecedents are closely examined, it will be seen that what lay behind the movement was essentially a protest against tyranny. . .The constitutional revolution took place because it was felt that the weight of tyranny had become intolerable" (1972:176).

As such, the legacy of the Qajar's absolutism continued to interact with and be intensified by Reza Shah's forced reforms and to deprive the Iranians more than ever before. Such was the situation when the second Pahlavi came to power. Iran "was then weak and improverished, its commerce dependent upon foreign money, its resources owned by foreign investors, its political system penetrated by foreign agents, and its territory at the very moment occupied by thousands of uninvited British and Russian troops" (Paarberg et al., 1978:17).

3. The Shah's Modernization

With the above antecedents in mind, the Shah's order and its disintegration under the revolutionary forces of 1978-9, will be approached immediately. In this approach, the Shah's modernization enterprise, represented by his White Revolution, as the mechanisms for proposed social change is of interest. To be sure, this approach does not attempt to offer a "balance sheet" of the Shah's regime. As far as the causes of the Iranian Revolution are concerned, only the failures of the old regime which, in turn, caused and justified its disintegration will be investigated. Put differently, when a social revolution is at hand, the failure of the old regime in producing the desired changes can be taken a priori. Hence, what the Shah did not do rather than what he

did will be our analytical concern.

Such an analytical approach is appropriate in the light of the fact that "a modernizing revolution, a marked hastening of evolution, necessarily involves a conflict that has not yet been fully resolved in any society. . . . Yet, the ideological goal of Iranians, like that of other awkward [sic] people, must be assumed to be freedom within a modernized state" (Bayne, 1965:25203) (emphasis added).

Revolution From Above

The period of the 1950s may be considered as a span of time in which the Shah consolidated his power to introduce social change to the Iranian society through a program called the "White Revolution" (WR) or, as it was later called, the "Shah-and-People Revolution." According to the Shah, "the principles of this revolution form our political, social, and economic policies" (Pahlavi, 1967:1). Students of Iranian politics emphasize that the WR was initiated as a preventive device against the growing strength of the disenfranchised middle classes" (Bill, 1972:18) "who rejected the traditional socioeconomic arrangements" (Lauer, 1978:234). In a specific sense, the initiation of the WR was also a precautionary measure against the future spread of the Communist ideology among the poor and the peasantry in particular (Cottam, 1979: 139).

At the time of the downfall of the Shah, the original, six-point WR amounted to nineteen points. The Shah stresses that "everyone of the White Revolution's points is a small revolution in itself" (Forbis, 1980:74). But his critics commonly agree that the "essence"

of this revolution was the "land reform." They also seem to emphasize that "the other programs have done little more than exist" (Bill, 1972: 141). As Johnson indicates, "in practice, however, many of the reforms were ineptly administered; others were deeply resented" (1980:36). With emphasis on land reform, the rural aspect of the Shah's modernization can be pictured as follows.

The Land Reform

In the beginning it should be noted that feudalism in Iran "does not correspond to any of the various types of feudalism found in Western Europe. The element of mutual obligation inherent in the nexus of feudal tenure in Western Europe is notably absent" (Lambton, 1963:24). This fact is also emphasized by Richards (1975a:18) who says that ". . . social relations in the countryside of Iran were traditional but not feudal in any technical sense."

The program of the Land Reform was implemented in a three-phase period (1963-71), and at some 65,000 villages with about 16 million population which comprised about 70 percent of the total population at the time. The program's basic failures can be assessed in this form.

(a) About 40-50 percent of the village families were excluded from the land reform because the adult male heads did not have formal sharecropping agreements with the landlords. The result was "extreme poverty and indebtedness" of the landless laborers (Hooglund, 1980: 3; Keddie, 1979:23). This stratum, being unskilled, became farm laborers and "village proletariat" who in fact "accounted for the majority of the rural population" (Bill, 1972:146).

(b) The program left many loopholes from which the landholders benefitted and secured their properties. As Hooglund (1980:3) indicates, "roughly half of the land--and the best quality soil at hand--was never subjected to land distribution but remained under control of absentee landlords." Many of the major landlords were able to transfer their lands to their relatives before-hand. Others, capitalizing on "mechanization," "orchards," "Plantations of tea" or other crops as different but vague criteria for exclusion from Land Reform, escaped the device, and their properties remained intact (Richards, 1975:7; Keddie, 1979:22-3).

(c) For about 84 percent of the peasantry, the land gained was less than 10 hectares (Keddie, 1979:23). As a result, "the overwhelming majority of peasant owners farmed subsistence and not profit, were heavily indebted, and their poverty was only slightly less extreme than of the landless workers" (Hooglund 1980:3).

(d) Based on its subsidizing policies, the government imported such a staple commodity as wheat at twice the local cost to be sold at a subsidized price. On the other hand, it stabilized the price of local agricultural products, including wheat, rice, and barley, the major traditional crops. As a result, the livelihood of the subjected peasantry became a burden for they had to sell at cheap prices and to purchase at expensive prices (Halliday, 1979a:125-137; Keddie, 1979:25). This, however, was more troublesome in the 1970s when inflation reached a double-digit rate and the cost of services and non-subsidized goods escalated. The peasantry then sold their products cheaply and brought what they needed and could very expensively. As a related issue, ". . . subsidiaries concealed the wastage in local production: up to

\$2,000,000 worth of agricultural production was being lost each year through poor cropping, bad warehousing and inadequate distribution" (Graham, 1979:117).

(e) To improve agricultural production, to modernize peasant life, and to sew together bits and pieces of land that it had already distributed, the government took some initiatives, including the agri-business. These new devices were "farm corporations professionally managed and collectively owned." Until 1978 there were about 100 such corporations in the country. This, however, meant the submission of land to the government for collective cultivation and production, receiving "shares" in return. The device was confronted by a "wide-spread resistance," for the peasants would have to give back the land that they had hoped for throughout the centuries. In fact, "for people who had barely emerged from the medieval might of feudalism, land was a parable good, and shares were just paper. They were frustrated by the Shah ordered 'agribusiness' enterprises" (Hoveyda, 1980:89).

In addition to this psychological burden, at least two problems emerged (Hooglund, 1980:3). First, the differential shareholdings widened the gap among the shareholders--their number of shares was the major determinant of their earnings. Second, the landless agribusiness workers, due to wage increase and the profit sharing device, profited more than the shareholders proportionately. This became another source of frustration and even conflict between the two strata.

Another initiative was the techno-agriculture where four joint devices were formed in the Dez Dam area in the province of Khuzistan, the would-be bread basket of Iran. This included 58 villages

and was done with "prestigious" foreign partners. In order to prepose the land for large-scale farms, the government forcefully moved 6,530 families and relocated them in 13 places. As Graham observes, "This had been done in a clumsy way, and many were reluctant to work for others on land which they historically regard as theirs--especially as most of the work was casual" (1979:118). In this program, Khuzistan Water and Power Authority "took advantage of racial prejudices among the local peasantry and removed the Arab population first" (Richards, 1975a:14).

However, the program "was a financial and organizational disaster" (Graham, 1979:118). The peasantry were forced to abandon their traditional, privately owned places and cottages, to reside at a newly built small town called Shahrak, and to pay rent for the undesired quarters. They also worked as farm laborers and not as land owners; against their desire their lands were bought by the government. Finally, in addition to the joint authorities and foreigners' corruption, "The presence of the farm corporation and the agribusiness have done nothing to raise the welfare of the majority sector of Khuzistan's rural population" (Richards 1975a:15). Based on her 36 months participant observation in this same area, the anthropologist Goode11 concludes that the Shah's rural development program was but a program for destabilizing the Iranian society, for "To the Pahlavi regime tradition was Iran's first enemy; administrative decree, it's savior. In hindsight it is ironic that the dynasty sensed the dangers of tradition to be stronger in the countryside than in the cities" (1981:66).

(f) In line with its industrialization and modernization policies, the government held to the strategy of aiding large owners

in various economic sectors. As a result, many traditional but productive devices were neglected and even destroyed. The point in mind includes Boneh (i.e., the traditional peasant corporation of plowland owners formed around a draft animal team), and Qanat (i.e., the traditional subterranean irrigation channels). As a consequence of such strategy, the Qanats were left undredged and therefore dried out. The Boneh which were replaced with new corporative measures lacked their significance and even were dysfunctional. All of these factors contributed to the deterioration of rural economic conditions and traditional social relations as well (Bayne, 1965:278-9; Drun & Dumont, 1978:16-17; Halliday, 1979a:128). In addition, "in the rural areas traditional industries like carpet-weaving, which employed some 30,000 people, suffered" (Graham, 1979:122).

(g) Given the climatic situation of Iran, the peasant's parcels of land, if desirably planted, were very often destroyed by droughts or excessive water or pests. Before the Land Reform, the landlords were quick to respond to problems. Under the WR, the measures taken were not so adequate, and the affected peasantry either were left at the mercy of nature or were entangled by the bureaucratic monster.

(h) The absence of sufficient and adequate mechanization devices, technical training, and financial support caused extreme agricultural deterioration and peasant poverty. In this respect, Cottam observes that the peasants were "not prepared for their good fortune;" that they lacked an understanding of marketing, seed selection, animal husbandry, accessibility to capital; and that there was "nothing approaching an adequate staff technician to advise them" (1979:317).

Further, "as the peasants fall into financial difficulties, the regime will, almost inevitably, cease appearing to be the granter of land ownership and instead will seem to be aiding those who threaten that ownership" (Cottam, 1979:317).

As a related issue, since agricultural loans were based on the size of land and its productivity and types of product, the majority of loan recipients were able to get only small loans. Because of their impoverishment, they did not invest such small sums of money in cultivation but consumed it for basic necessities. Moreover, in many cases, in order to meet the requirements, the peasants paid a great portion of their loans to the professional guarantors without whom loans would not be obtained. Finally, when it was due, the loan was realized more as a liability than an asset.

(i) Because of agricultural deterioration as a major pushing factor, and urban plight as a pulling factor, urban influx at an official rate of 250,000 per year occurred in the 1970s. Such migratory waves included different ages and the youth in particular. This migration, aimed at the capital and a host of provincial cities, left the villages without the minimum manpower needed and also intensified urban problems. In Hoveyda's words, the peasantry, "unable to express their grievances freely, . . . voted with their feet against the intruder 'modernization' by leaving villages to look for work in the towns" (1980:89-90).

(j) There was evidence that some of the peasants from the very beginning, due to lifetime affiliation with the landlords and separation from the government, preferred to remain attached to the former and refused to be supervised by the latter (Bill, 1972:147). It was also

true that in certain cases a number of peasants made secret deals, however illegally, with the past landlords for agricultural guardianship, technological and financial provisions based on common or proportional ownership and utilization of the gained land.

(k) As a by-product of the Land reform, the big landlords received, as compensation, shares in state-owned factories and extended tax holdings for those founding new factories and industries. This policy was included in the third point of the WR, that is, "sale of state-owned enterprises to the public." However, this increased the influence of the former landlords in the urban sphere and encouraged alliance with the capitalist and powerful strata. Hence, the very implication of "Feudaliteh Shahri" (i.e., urban feudalism) as the Iranians labeled the new phenomenon. Relatedly, the Shah, for two reasons, did not attempt to destroy the landlord class completely (Paine, 1974:4). First, the upper classes, including the feudals, were the traditional and actual allies of the regime. Second, the majority of the Iranian feudals had traditional and/or tribal influence and urban as well as foreign connections whose transformation into other statuses was safer for the regime than their liquidation.

(l) Based on references herein, some statistical summaries pertaining to the 1970's can shed more light on the rural situation. While in 1976 about 55 percent of Iran's population was comprised of the peasantry, only 1,500 out of 10,000 doctors operated in the countryside; more than 60 percent of the villagers were illiterate and only 39 percent of the children were enrolled in primary education; about 95 percent of the houses were mud and/or mud brick; agriculture's share

of GDP fell back from 30 percent in 1959 to 13.6 percent in 1972 and it received only 8 percent from investment in comparison to industry's 22 percent; the percentage employed in agriculture decreased from 56 percent in 1956 to 33 percent in 1976. Finally, for ages, Iran had been largely all but self-sufficient in foodstuffs up to the early 1960s, but in the 1970s she suddenly had to import more than 60 percent of her food products at a price of over \$1.8 billion (Time, 1978:39; Graham, 1979:40, 85; Fischer, 1980:190-1). Interestingly, while the northern region of Iran had been the producer and exporter of citrus throughout the centuries, during the 1970s the California orange became the most available fruit to find in the country, including its north.

As sketched above, the Land Reform (and the rural side of the WR in general) was not a major structural change but rather a reformist measure with undesired consequences. In light of such outcomes, the Land Reform came to be considered as a "disaster" (Halliday, 1978:10), which "has begun to alienate many of the villagers who are told that they are to begin new lives but who in fact see themselves the victims of the government agents" (Bill, 1972:155). In line with such a conclusion, the peasant life under the old regime was seen as "a miserable life of sweat and toil, starvation and anxiety with an uncertain future" (Baraheni, 1976:36). Viewed from different angles, while the land reform was judged as a total failure in economic terms, ". . . it did produce substantial changes in the social and political structure in the countryside--changes running parallel to the population shift from country to town" (Halliday, 1978a:10).

In fact, the Land Reform program was not more than a partial

land division. Its economic gain in terms of agricultural rate of growth failed to parallel the rate of the increase in population. While the population growth was about 3.0 or 3.4 percent a year, a more reasonable rate of agricultural production was 2-2.5 or 3.0 percent per year (Keddie, 1979:25; Drun and Dumond, 1978:16). The program was treated by the government more as land give-away than as an economic program of production and structural social alteration. It lacked a revolutionary sense and even a planned reformist device. All these findings indicate that the countryside under the WR was "not some quaint reminder of the past, but a continuing and vivid example of the backwardness that exists behind the modernization of Iran" (Graham, 1979:29). Such was the rural side of the WR. The urban side, represented by the industrialization enterprise, will also be examined immediately.

The Illusion of Industrialization

Based on his WR, the Shah attempted to industrialize the country so that Iran would be on a par with the Western European countries and Japan by the end of this century. In this attempt industrialization, as was true with Land Reform, became an end proper regardless of the measures necessary to attain it. Democratic devices, social equality, and economic prosperity for the many were undermined. Growth, represented by figures and percentages, overrode the authentic socio-economic development identified with redistribution of wealth and political power.

Influenced by such an illusory vision and provided with the increasing petrodollar, the Shah's economic strategy favored the rich

over the poor, big over small, urban over rural, military and luxury expenditures over basic necessities, and assembly over production of expensive durables "that have a large foreign parts and/or investment component. . ." (Keddie, 1979:13, 20). It also was true that under the Shah's regime, Iranian industry grew an average of 15.2 percent per annum in the period of 1965-1975 (Halliday, 1978c:13). However, the industrialization efforts, which were paradoxically based on "super-rapid growth" but poor infrastructure, gave birth to a variety of devastating shortcomings, which are addressed below.

(1) The economic enterprise was basically financed by the oildollars which escalated from the early 1970s. As an example, about 80 percent of the country's income was oil-generated, and 90 percent of Iran's nearly \$70 billion Fifth Development Plan (1973-78) was financed by oil (Lenczowski, 1980:213; Keddie, 1979:18). As a result, on the one hand the quickly depleted oil stock suffered from exhaustion, and on the other Iran became more dependent on the international forces which were the ultimate determinant of the oil market. This is especially true when one remembers that Iran is a developing country which cannot compete with those same forces. Hence, it was the multi-national corporations that, in principle, determined the country's socioeconomic development, its rate, direction, and major preferences. As an example, even under the Shah's rule, the West did not supply Iran with a steel mill, as a heavy industry; this end was achieved by Russia in exchange for the country's natural gas (e.g., Graham, 1979:44).

(2) Although the regime, based on its capitalist nature, encouraged and supported private investments and enterprises, this was

confined to a few families who in 1974 numbered 45, and controlled 85 percent of the industry (Halliday, 1978c:13). Such a monopoly demonstrated at least two problems. First, it was enjoyed at the cost of the small and newly growing enterprises, in both traditional and modern realms, which needed more support for a secure operation. Second, industrialization, which in the developing nations is expected to act as equalizer, caused the widening of social gaps and differentials.

(3) In line with its industrialization strategy, the regime encouraged foreign investments. By 1974, there were 183 international firms operating in Iran (Halliday, 1978c:13) whose direct investment in 1975 was valued at \$1 billion ". . . making [the] U.S. the largest foreign investor in the country" (Paarlberg, et al., 1980:22). Since foreign investors, with few exceptions, were more concerned about their capital and profit in the short run, the well-being of the country in the long term did not matter. They produced more consumer than durable commodities, helped to exhaust the already poor infrastructure, and increased national dependence on foreign ventures.

(4) With few exceptions (e.g., oil and petrochemical industry), Iran's major industries were confined to assembly and light enterprises (e.g., Hoveyda, 1980:73). Concerning such an industry, there basically existed a consumer and dependent rather than producer and self-sufficient economy. Further, the efficiency of such an economy was also in question. According to Halliday (1978c:14) and Graham (1979:121), it took 45 hours in Iran to assemble a GM Chevrolet, a process needing only 25 hours in Western Germany. In 1972 it was estimated that Iranian manufactured goods were about 30 percent more expensive than the average price in the

world and the gap was widening (Looney, 1973:88). Consequently, Iran's industry could not compete world wide, and its dependence on foreign technology and expertise continued.

(5) With all its dependence and wastage, the industrial output fell short of the increasing demands caused by population increase and income growth. This shortage helped both the escalation of prices and the importation of the foreign commodities. Bazaar-e Siah (i.e., black market) became the rule and not the exception to which the affluent referred and from which the poor suffered.

(6) With reference to infrastructure, industrial growth was not based on a solid foundation. Some examples can shed light on this situation. The Shah admits that in the mid-1970s ". . . ships often waited six months or more to unload their cargoes" (Pahlavi, 1980:123). Further, due to lack of a highway system and adequate transportation devices (e.g., trucks, trailers, trains), it took weeks to transfer the offloaded materials to the consumer market. According to Graham, "at Khorramshahr 12,000 tons were being unloaded per day but only 9,000 tons were being removed per day. At the most congested point, in September/October 1975, there were over 1 million tons of goods piled upon the jetties and around the port" (1979:87). As a result, many goods decayed or corroded on the docks. Moreover, in 1975 alone Iran paid \$1.5 billion equaling almost 5 percent of its total foreign exchange earnings and more than 7 percent of its oil income, as demurrage (Halliday, 1978c:15; Graham, 1979:88).

The next example pertains to the skilled labor force which the government was unable to supply out of local manpower. Hence, in the

1970s "over one million foreigners," including truck drivers, were hired (Pahlavi, 1980:123). The regime's media acknowledged this as a sign of a flourishing economy. In fact, it was an indication of basic problems. First and foremost, such an imported labor force, basically at an intermediate level, could be supplied in the country through planned training devices. For example, instead of training the Iranian truckers, truck drivers were imported from Korea. This cost the government a "sizable commission on the deal owing to the labor recruiter and royal patron" (Fischer, 1980:191).

Second, the foreign presence in the labor market provoked the national sentiment, especially among the affected Iranians who saw that their country was being "ripped off" by some intruders. Such a feeling was more intensified by the fact that the foreigners, with few exceptions, earned much more than comparable local workers. Third, because of a housing shortage, this "imported" population led to the rise of rent, which tripled in 1975-6 (Halliday, 1978c:16). Interestingly, the foreign tenants were more welcomed than the Iranians, for the former offered and could afford higher rents, and the latter lagged behind and had a penchant for bargaining. In addition, many Iranian landlords would feel a sense of pride if they had a foreign tenant. Finally, in general, this imported labor was also an imported inflationary factor which contributed to the devastating situation.

Concerning the issue of manpower, it should be noted that according to Iran's Plan and Budget organization estimation, under the Fifth Development Plan (1973-78), 2.1 million skilled workers were needed, 40 percent of which in the industrial and mining sector. But,

only 1.4-1.3 million of them would be supplied in the process resulting in a shortage of about 800,000, 80 percent of whom were skilled and semi-skilled workers in industrial and construction sectors. Yet, all the old regime's critics agree that in the governmental organizations the level of skill was extremely deficient, and management was a bottleneck.

However, the Shah admits that "these weaknesses in our infrastructure played a role in the deterioration of our social and political climate. They contributed to our inflation problem, which we constantly sought to control" (Pahlavi, 1980:123). On the other hand, it seems that the Shah's critics agree with Cottam in the sense that "the government's efforts to construct a strong heavy industry infrastructure were hampered by the Shah's fascination with the most advanced and most expensive technology" (1979:345).

(7) Along with such operating industry, a supplementary industry, namely housing construction, grew rapidly and without a program. This rapid growth of housing projects was necessitated by urban growth and foreign immigration. However, it lacked appropriate devices and demand-supply measures. Hence, it turned out to be gross land speculations which absorbed many resources, including government credits (Cottam, 1979:345). Such speculations became so widespread and profitable that even big businesses and members of the "inner circle" took the initiative in the process. Many got rich overnight, and too many others were hurt badly.

Housing comprised 60 percent of the living cost, and 40 percent of housing expenditures were absorbed in land cost (Graham, 1979:89).

However, regardless of the outcome, the Shah later wrote that "controls were placed on the rapidly rising land prices, and various forms of land speculation were penalized. This was Principle 18 of our White Revolution, adopted in 1977" (Pahlavi, 1980:122). However, in 1972 the urban areas were at least 1.1 million residential units short, and "throughout the Fourth Plan (1968/9-1972/3) a total of 290,000 units were built. . ." (Graham, 1979:104). In addition, construction materials, especially cement, were in short supply and hence were rationed.

(8) To solve, however partially, the workers' economic and not political problems, the Shah devoted two points of the WR to the proletariat. The first (i.e., worker's profit-sharing) was adopted in 1963, and the second (i.e., employee and public ownership extension scheme) was adopted in 1975. The first point was, from the very beginning, "misunderstood and mismanaged" (Bill, 1972:141f). As a result, it came to be understood as a showcase rather than a fundamental device. Concerning the second initiative, the Shah argued that "at first, of course, we heared cries of 'sacrilge' from some factory owners" (Pahlavi, 1980: 108). Eventually, other problems surfaced. First, the purpose of this "law" was not fundamentally a direct support of the employees but a stopage to the undesired labor mobility in the country. This was caused by economic differences and fluctuations, especially wage differentials. Such a problem stemmed basically from the scarcity of the skilled manpower which led the management to offer higher wages and other privileges to the skillful and hence to destabilize the labor force.

Second, the addressed law discouraged foreign investors and some local ventures who naturally were not inclined to share their enterprises

with the employees. Hence, "private investment fell off, and up to \$2 billion of Iran private money. . .left the country in a few weeks" (Halliday, 1978c:13). To make up for such a loss, that is, to encourage the continuation of the foreign investment, the regime took certain steps in favor of the foreigners (Graham, 1979:95). Third, the "employee and public ownership" law intertwined with the anti-inflationary devices in 1977-78 and "led to widespread unemployment, especially in the construction industry" (Fischer, 1980:191). Fourth, since "an elaborate mechanism for implementation to avoid arbitrariness" was lacking, the groups that were to benefit from the program did not receive justice (Lenczowski, 1980:212). As an overall result, "the government timetable was impossibly ambitious," and "by July 1977, 72, 235 industrial workers and 125,745 farmers had benefitted from the scheme--a much smaller number than anticipated in 1975" (Graham, 1979:95).

(9) As expected, industrialization in such a developing society as that of Iran should lead to a new "class map." However, in the newly developed picture, gaps and social differences widened and were more sensed than ever before. As Lenczowski sees it "the stimulated economic activity, most of it government-sponsored, produced a class of 'nouveau riche' contractors, often men of elastic standards, whose multimillion-dollar deals involved corruption in the highest echelons of the government" (1980:224). Looked at differently, "the extraordinary speed of social change," produced "a new rootless, urban proletariat [and] a suddenly rich industrial elite with its brash Western habits and morals. . . ." (Borderwich, 1980:65). To emphasize, "this bourgeoisie as a whole relies for its survival on the state's provision of economic resources and

economic direction, and is not an independent agent" in the industrialization process (Halliday, 1978c:11).

Finally, Iran's industry and industrialization under the Shah's administration have been defined as "destructive but lucrative," "dependent" but growing at "full speed in the wrong direction." In this context, a 1974 Hudson Institute report stressed that "Iran, in the final decade of this century, could prove to be no more than a half-completed industrial edifice, with the trappings of power and international influence and none of substance." In addition to the Land Reform discussed earlier, this was Iran's industrialization and the proposed modernization under the Shah's WR.

In 1967, the Shah, quoting Leon Walras, the nineteenth century Swiss economist, had emphasized that "as long as wealth is not justly distributed amongst the people, its abundance is meaningless." In 1977-8, given the tremendous and increasing wealth of the country, it became evident that his emphasis bore no substance. According to official figures, Iran's per capita income rose from \$174 in 1963 to \$2,540 in 1978 (Pahlavi, 1980:176). However, "the effects of the new wealth were at first uneven and eventually disruptive. Hundreds became millionaires overnight as the web of corruption permeated Iran ever deeper, but the majority, particularly in the villages, saw little improvement in their life styles. . . .In 1976 only three percent of Iranians shared 90 percent of the national wealth (Thurgood, 1980:7). About this time, the Shah acknowledged an inflation rate at 20 percent (Pahlavi, 1980:126). However, others argue that such a rate was 30 percent (e.g., Brun and Dumont, 1978:15), or 30-50 percent (Lenczowski, 1980:224).

From Expected Political Participation to Political Strangulation

For a society to be democratic, a tendency towards both economic equality and political liberty must exist. In this respect, some researchers (e.g., Lenski, 1966; Cutright, 1967; Stack, 1978) argue that democracy has an independent negative effect on sectoral income inequality. In other words, economic growth causes more political democracy in the process of industrialization and modernization. On the other hand, other researchers "view political democracy as a luxury that can be ill-afforded by Less Developed Countries. . . facing the more pressing problems of socioeconomic development, income inequality, and rapid population growth" (Bollen, 1980:370). Although under the Shah's rule Iran was undergoing a remarkable economic growth and increase in income, economic inequality, as addressed before, did not decrease and political democracy, as will be sketched immediately, did not emerge.

Bollen understands that since the political power of the elite, in comparison to the nonelite, varies from one society to the other, political democracy can be defined "as the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the nonelite is maximized" (1980:372). Based on such a definition as well as the above mentioned considerations about the relationship between economic equality and political liberty, the case of Iran under the Shah's regime can be assessed in the following way. In the first place, it should be noted that the Iranians have always fought for the principle of "Azadi" (i.e., freedom, political freedom). As stated earlier, the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the nationalist movement of the early 1950s, and the

religiously motivated uprising of the early 1960s can best represent such a desire. Although the Revolution of 1978-9 advocated a new socioeconomic order, "political freedom" was at the very fundamental ferment of the revolutionary voices.

However, the value of liberty in the Iranian social movements has always been interlinked with the ideal of "isteqlal" (i.e., independence). As Ross suggests, "Iranians, even in normal times, have a strong tendency toward xenophobia after almost a century of what they feel has been foreign domination, first by the Soviet Union, then the British, and finally the Americans" (1980:A16). Indeed, what the Iranians had fought for first and foremost was most denied to them.

Some of the Shah's critics argue that he adhered to the theory that economic growth and social development would, or should, lead to political democratization. Even if this allegation, as well as the theory itself, were true, the nature of the Shah's absolutist rule was decisively preventive in this process. "Few of the Shah's internal policies worked because the imperial vision was always made subservient to political expedience" (Thurgood, 1980:7). In his dictatorial exercise of power, socioeconomic growth and development could not, and did not, democratize the society. "Even with the United States behind him, the Shah lacked the confidence and charisma to carry out his reforms in a democratic setting. . .he was never quite able to trust his own people to run his new society" (Shah, Diana K., 1980:4). Consequently, he "ruled with progressively repressive absolutism" and suppressed all the possible outlets of freedom such as "the press, political parties, student organizations, and any forum for free speech. . ." (Zabih,

1979:2, 20). Such an oppressive rule can be described very specifically.

The Peasantry. Due to their traditional conservatism, remoteness from urban and cultural centers, dispersion in the rural areas, the regime's control, and widespread illiteracy, the peasantry were neither politically aware nor had the motivation for politicization. However, through the WR policies and practices (e.g., Land Reform, Corps of Illiteracy, Houses of Equity) the government penetrated into the rural life more than before. This penetration held a governmental control over the countryside and, as a latent function, helped the villagers to interact with the government agents directly. When agricultural deterioration occurred and the ensuing difficulties were sensed, the peasants, disunited and disorganized, were not able to channel and voice their grievances. Even if on some occasions this was possible, a satisfactory reaction from the regime was improbable. The regime had already shifted its attention to the urban areas and industrialization enterprises.

In this process, the regime exploited the "natural purity" and "politeness" of the farmers who came to realize that they lacked the minimum political freedom necessary for the promulgation of their problems. In fact, the Shah not only deprived the peasantry of some kind of political freedom and participation in the political processes, he also failed to promote, and even to maintain, their enthusiastic support which was elicited in the first stage of the Land Reform. Consequently, in the late 1970's, the so-called "unbroken alliance between the Shah and peasants" became nothing but a hollow official slogan.

Hobson (1980:178) observes that although there were no demon-

strations and riots, ". . .there was disillusion at the failure of the government to help the rural areas" (1980:178). Realistically, the slum dwellers who participated in the revolutionary processes were mostly the peasantry who, after agricultural failures, had already taken refuge in the urban outskirts in pursuit of a minimum level of subsistence. With regard to a certain group of these immigrants, Hooglund observes that the young peasantry who left their villages for the cities ". . . succeeded in organizing political support for the anti-Shah demonstrations which occurred daily throughout the country. . ." (1980:6).

The Proletariat. In the industrial process, unionization epitomizes the rights of the working classes. Beginning from the early twentieth century, trade unions came into being in Iran. This, however, took place under (1) the influence of a great number of Iranians who had already worked in Tsarist Russia, across the border, and (2) the Iranian Communist Party which was formed in the early 1920's. Under Reza Shah's rule such an experience was suppressed and unions were dissolved in 1936 (Ramazani, 1966) to be resumed in the 1940's and early 1950's. From 1953 on, labor unions were discouraged or their formation and operation were supervised and controlled by the regime. The Labor Law of 1959 allowed unionization only after the approval of the Ministry of Labor, and supposedly any such approval was conditioned on continued compliance with the government.

By 1978, there were some 1,023 labor unions, all of which were prevented ". . .from playing an independent political role" (Halliday, 1979a:197-210; 1978c:7). This kind of unionization can be understood as "paternalism but not participation" in the political process and

labor right arrangements (Fischer, 1980:191). Zonis understands that these ". . .officially syndicated unions [were] created as a challenge to communist dominance of organized labor or even a non-communist but independent body of organized labor" (1971:293).

So as to minimize the working class unrest, the Shah adopted two programs as two points of the WR: profit-sharing, and share participation in firms and factories. Each of these two devices had some economic benefits for the workers. The share-participation device was intended to "integrate the classes and head off the clashes." "But reality was quite different from this kind of euphoria. With Iranian cynicism, workers thought the plan was some kind of trap. If the Shah had wanted to appeal to them, he could have freed their unions and called off his secret police, who swarmed through factories in search of 'communists'" (Forbis, 1980:247). In fact, government-directed labor unions served two governmental objectives. On the one hand they were stressed as labor representation in the political process. On the other, they were used whenever officially orchestrated parades and rallies were necessary, to show the workers' prosupposed alliance with the regime. Hence, the proletariat were not only prevented from exercising their genuine labor rights but were also forced to rally for the regime against their own will and belief.

Yet, the workers were required to make more sacrifices to satisfy the regime. In 1976, the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, at the Third Iranian Labor Congress, emphasized that the Iranian "workers should strive to work harder, improve their skills, and raise productivity in an effort to repay their debts to the Shah"

(Halliday, 1979a:206). While the workers seek any possible route to political participation and free expression, "the SAVAK has the task of ensuring that labor does not become politicized or does not exploit industrial action for political ends" (Graham, 1979:148). Finally, among such deprived strata two groups could be found who, although having different economic situations, were both politically frustrated. The first was the group that succeeded economically and now needed some valued political rewards or at least a sense of free expression. The other, which lagged behind the first group in economic terms, sought political means for economic ends. Neither achieved any political freedom.

While the regime concentrated on industrialization, it failed to accompany this strategy with some democratization measures necessary for furthering industry and productivity, save the labor right proper. This alienating situation led to strikes, riots, and demonstrations, even before the episodes of the 1978-9 Revolution (e.g., Fischer, 1980:181-244). With the middle classes, the proletariat promoted the Revolution.

The Middle Classes: From Evolution to Revolution. As noted elsewhere, the WR was basically introduced to diffuse the growing unrest of the expanding middle classes. In 1978-9 it became evident that the middle social strata, whose political strength and desire for power were underestimated by the Shah, instigated the Revolution. To emphasize, "the Iranian Revolution was urban in composition. Its cadres came from the urban-based middle and working-classes--the bazaaris, Muslim clerics, workers, intellectuals and students. It was swelled

by rural migrants driven to the cities by the Shah's modernization of agriculture" (Ahmad, 1979:6).

As an indication of the Shah's ignorance of these strata, he "blocked movements within the government toward any radical land reform and even inhibited any appeal to the educated middle class for support of land reform" (Paine, 1975:18). The hostile and politically deprived middle classes grew very rapidly in terms of number, educational attainment, and expectations. They then sought new horizons commensurate with their new situation. However, such a growth and desire was not met with an appropriate response from the regime. ". . .the Shah imposed stringent limitations on independent political action, [and] this was a severe provocation to those students, intellectuals, and members of the middle classes who had enthusiastically participated in party activities" (Ledeen and Lewis, 1980:10).

To reiterate, the Iranian middle classes consisted of three categories: (1) the traditional bourgeoisie, best known as the Bazaaris (i.e., the traditional merchants, traders, contractors, and professionals), (2) the clerics, and (3) the intellectuals including the white collar workers, basically the government employees, and university students. However, all these classes, as will be seen shortly, shared somewhat common political situations, caused more by the old regime's policies and practices than their own unified ideals and interests. The political situation of each class may be assessed as follows:

The Traditional Bourgeoisie. Historically, this tratum has

always been involved in politics. This condition, however, was not caused by this stratum's desire for political power but by the way in which the regime interfered in the traditional commercial arrangements as well as the religious tradition. In fact, the Bazaaris' acquaintance with politics and their deprivation of political freedom stemmed from certain factors. First, they are traditionally religious and conservative. Regardless of its nature and direction, forced modernization can affect or threaten their traditional professional practices.

Second, the development of the new capitalist stratum in the country, which was by all means supported by the regime, jeopardized their own economic situation. However, a number of Iran's dominant capitalists grew out of the corner of the Bazaar (Graham, 1979:47-8). Interestingly, such individuals became a threat to the lagging Bazaaris and at the same time served as a reference point for the ambitious traders. Third, historically, as was mentioned before, the Bazaaris had the desire to be united with the religious dignitaries as they had always been. In time of crisis, the religious leaders set the Bazaar in motion, and the Bazaaris financed and/or staged violence with their own money, time, and energy. This is the major reason for the Shah's constant and direct control over the Bazaar.

Zabih (1979:27) observes that ". . .the group which more significantly broadened the basis of anti-regime opposition was the bazaaris." Concerning the "susceptibility" of the Bazaaris to mobilization efforts of the clergy, Zabih (1979:27-32) emphasizes certain reasons. First, there has been a mutual dependence between the two in that the economically powerful Bazaaris finance the religious leaders

and the religious institutions. In exchange, in addition to moral support, the clergy educate the children of the Bazaaris. This was, however, more true in the past when the educational agencies were almost restricted to the clergy and their circles. At that time, the clergy were agents of education and, with the high-ranking authorities, were also the educated stratum.

Second, traditionally, the Bazaaris, by means of the purchase of the agricultural surplus and the sale of consumer goods, had maintained close ties with the peasantry and at times were able to mobilize them for demonstrations. Third, due to the regime's strategies and practices, the Bazaaris themselves were alienated and hence had a built-in potential for violence. "In the last 20 years their economic power has plummeted, with the state taking over more than 80 percent of the GNP. Their nouveau riche bureaucratic successors were westernized and newcomers to the political scene. Even though the bazaari benefitted from the oil boom after 1973, once their status declined, their hostility toward the regime was revived" (Zabih, 1979:28).

Bill (1972:13) notes that "The traditional middle classes fled the scene once they saw their goals satisfied and their upper class detractors shackled." However, the actual political deprivation of these strata can be traced to the regime's failure in realizing the attitude of the Bazaaris. It seems that these attitudes were harmonious with gradual modernization but discordant with forced social change from whatever direction. This is because of the fact that the traditional merchants and businessmen have both money to enjoy their life and the desire to improve their ways and means in the economic processes. In-

stead of articulating and exploiting these tendencies and dispositions, the Shah's regime functioned as an uprooting force or as an evil agent of social change.

To better understand the preceding claim, two examples will be discussed. First, in his course of modernization, the Shah recommended ". . .that at least part of the old bazaar area [in Tehran] . . .be torn down, and a new commercial and shopping area be constructed. . .". (Ledeen and Lewis, 1980:11). This was intended under the guise of city planning and traffic measures, but it was confronted with great despair and strong symbolic resistance by the Bazaaris. The Bazaari Tehranians were quick to understand that this intended reconstruction had two interlinked objectives, neither of which was desirable for them. Physically, it would partition the traditional businesses centered around a historical Mosque in a multi-purpose area: the Bazaar. Socially, it also would affect the ties that had become more possible, durable, and politically functional by means of togetherness at jammed shops and benches. However, because of the growing grievances, the regime dropped the idea, but the hostility of the Bazaaris did not decrease.

The next example, of almost the same nature, pertains to the provincial holy city of Mashhad. The precinct of the Shrine of Imam Reza, the Shiite's Eight Iman, was so jammed with tiny and overloaded shops located in narrow alleys that, at least for safety, security and public hygiene reasons, some sort of reconstruction was essential. The Shah's regime finally succeeded in relocating the Bazaaris, centered around the Shrine and the annexed Mosque, at a newly built

marketplace located some blocks from the Shrine. The regime came up with a splendid precinct in an open area planted with trees, lawns, and flowers very appropriate to the status of Imam.

However, this plan was resented by the Bazaaris and the religious community for several reasons. First, it took the "heart" of the Bazaar far from the everyday pilgrims, based on whose purchases the Bazaar had come into being. Secondly, there were alleged losses by the shop owners in terms of compensation for the old places and the renting of new shops in the new Bazaar from the government. Third, this relocation separated the Bazaari community from the Shrine, as well as from the major religious dignitaries centered at the Shrine and at the annexed Mosque for teaching, preaching, and practical religious purposes. On behalf of the Shah's regime, this alteration, as was intended in the case of Tehran, achieved an underlying objective too. It helped to diffuse the mixed religious-political unrest which usually took place around the Shrine. In fact, this alteration would reduce the joint clergymen-Bazaaris' action and mobilization capability in time of crisis.

Finally, Hobson observes that "In the 60s and 70s many of the middle class merchants moved out of the bazaar [sic] into a new prosperity; and when imports dominated trade in other parts of the cities, it seemed the bazaar was losing its role as a nerve-center" (1979:177). However, during the revolutionary upheaval economic interests and religious values motivated the Bazaaris to play their traditional political role in Iranian politics. They at least regained both their traditional status in the religio-political arrangements and the

symbolic centrality of the Bazaar.

The Religious Stratum. In the Iranian social hierarchy the clerics with their different theological ranks, can be considered as a social stratum whose religio-social status was more definable than their occupational roles. They were involved in the processes of teaching, preaching, and the regulating of religious affairs. These activities were basically financed by the Islamic tithe and other religious donations as well as such revenues as endowments. All this money was given to the religious leaders and their representatives directly and was out of governmental control and taxation. In this sense, the religious dignitaries operated as neither government employees nor as private investors handling free enterprises. Hence, they mostly functioned out of the mainstream of the economic arrangements of the country.

For this reason, as well as their traditional positions, the religious dignitaries can be defined as a "status group" rather than a "social class" in the Marxist sense. By this definition, they may be seen as being independent from, and deprived of, both the governmental arrangements and the officialization of their religious-educational attainment. To wit, neither religious ranks nor educational certificates were recognized by the old regime. The only exception was the top religious figures, the Ayatollahs, who were traditionally and symbolically recognized by the government.

This situation can be explained on the basis of a certain historical background discussed earlier. In short, the religious stratum which once was represented in the ruling class through the

jurisdictional branch began, from the late nineteenth century, to lose its traditional strength and influence. Such a positional loss, among other factors discussed before, pushed the religious leaders to stand against the government and the intruding foreigners and hence to be further immersed in politics. A close examination of Iran's 1906-7 Constitution would confirm the valuational achievement that the religious leaders accomplished constitutionally. As a concrete example, article 2 of "the supplementary fundamental laws of October 7, 1907" reads:

At no time must any legal enactment of the Sacred National Consultative Assembly, established by the favor and assistance of His Holiness Imam of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!), the favor of his Majesty the Shahinshah of Islam (may God immortalize his reign!), the care of the Proofs of Islam (may God multiply the like of them!), and the whole people of the Persian nation, be at variance with the sacred principles of Islam or the laws established by His Holiness the Best of Mankind (on whom and on whose household be the Blessings of God and His Peace!).

It is hereby declared that it is for the learned doctors of theology (the ulama)--may God prolong the blessing of their existence!--to determine whether such laws as may be proposed are or are not conformable to the principles of Islam; and it is therefore officially enacted that there shall at all times exist a Committee composed of not less than five mujtahids or other devout theologians, cognizant also of the requirements of the age, [which committee shall be elected] in this manner. The ulama and Proofs of Islam shall present to the National Consultative Assembly the names of twenty of the ulama possessing the attributes mentioned above; and the Members of the National Consultative Assembly shall, either by unanimous acclamation, or by vote, designate five or more of these, according to the exigencies of the time, and recognize these as Members, so that they may carefully discuss and consider all matters proposed in the Assembly, and reject and repudiate, wholly or in part, any such proposal which is at variance with the Sacred Laws of Islam, so that it shall not obtain the title of legality. In such matters the decision of this Ecclesiastical Committee shall be followed and obeyed, and this article shall continue unchanged until the appearance of His Holiness the Proof of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!) (Browne, 1966:372-3).

However, in practice, such a constitutional right was denied to the "Ulama and Proofs of Islam," the highly ranked religious leaders, from the very beginning. Further, so as to justify such a denial, the Pahlavis took steps to separate, in one way or another, the religious community from politics. Hence, whenever a religious leader was able to play a role in the political process, he was either moderate or subordinate. Otherwise, such a figure was liquidated. Sayyad Hassan Modarress, a radical congressman in Reza Shah's reign, was the best example (Cottam, 1979:146; Ramazani, 1966), and Ayatollah Khomeini in the Shah's rule is the other. In fact, "under the two Pahlavi shahs, the balance of tension has tilted sharply against the Mojtahids. . . . An imbalance of this degree has not existed since the last years of the Safavid dynasty (Bill, 1972:24).

In recent times, namely the sixties and seventies, the religious leaders were in danger more than ever before. Such a situation became more threatening under the Shah's initiation of the WR. With full intention, this initiative headed toward secularism and the abolition of traditionalism. Such a planned change and emphasized shift hurt the religious community who, in a secular society as proposed by the Shah and his Western connections, would lose even their traditional and symbolic influence. Secondly, in reality, the Shah's Land Reform took out of the hands of the religious leaders the "Awghaf" (i.e., endowment) based on which these dignitaries had been able to finance, at least partially, their religious institutions throughout history (Zabih, 1979:21; Halliday, 1978b:3). This practice, the supervision of Awqaf, can also be understood as a source of traditional power on behalf of

the clerics. In addition, the Land Reform Law was observed as contradictory to some religious principles.

Third, in the process of modernizing family relationships, the regime sanctioned the officialization of marriage and divorce very strictly. This enterprise minimized the clergy's traditional religious role in this area, which they considered as one of the cornerstones of the Islamic arrangements. They saw such a transformation as another example of the constitutional violation by the government. As Article 2 mentioned before indicates, they had the right to supervise the legislations, and to veto whatever was contradictory to the Islamic tenents. Fourth, the regime even speculated about a "Religious Corps," as another "point" of the WR. This, however, meant the governmentalization of the Islamic tradition and the expropriation of the traditional religious dignitaries and their historical functioning.

In connection with these official speculations and other governmental programs (e.g., reducing the religious holidays) the regime also took different steps to achieve the collaboration of some religious leaders who either were allured by the regime or were co-opted for personal interests. As Cottam observes ". . .there were a great many Shiite religious leaders who were not only willing but anxious to sanctify the regime. This included, of course, all those with official appointments. . . . But the prominence of those in opposition was so substantial that the Shah was effectively denied the ability to use, in his own and his dynasty's behalf, the sanction of Shiite Islam" (1979: 331-2). Finally, the American's presence in Iran which amounted to "more than 40,000 military and civilian personnel" (Time, 1978:39),

as well as the operation of the Israelis in different projects, undermined and antagonized the religious community. Advocating both national independence and the rights of the "Muslim Palestinians," the clergy saw such a presence as contemptuous and humiliating. As a result, "serious pressures began to be applied against the Shah and his regime, and also against his reforms, which had hurt the status of the religion" (Shmuelewitz, 1979:36).

In order to fulfill their traditional religious commitments and to regain some of their privileges and statuses, the religious leaders had to resist the regime's uprooting measures. Otherwise, not only would their advocacy of Islam be meaningless, they also would be seen as dysfunctional in the eyes of their followers. In such a frustrating situation, their nothingness and powerlessness, even in a traditional sense, would cause their increasing decay. In order to avoid such a "killing edge," the religious dignitaries began to make sensitive political issues in their year-round religious preachings and sermons. Whenever this was possible, it attracted a variety of social strata, in addition to the traditional audience, who were not able to hear of militant and open political criticism against the regime elsewhere.

Consequently, mosques, which were considered as places for religious practices for the practical followers, were frequented by a new audience from different social backgrounds and political stands. This new audience, although Muslim by culture and/or ideology, was more interested in the political tone of the mosque than in Heaven and Hell. Thus, "religion provided a common reference point and a fulcrum of

protest" (Graham, 1979:24). In this respect, Bazargan, the leader of Iran's Liberation Movement, acknowledges that "in spite of the power of the security forces, the mosques and religious centers were sanctuaries where we met, talked, prepared, organized, and grew" (1979:20).

Instead of opening some outlets for political expression favorable to his regime, the Shah continued to "keep the lid on"--to liquidate the preachers and speakers and to shut down the active religious centers. The exile or imprisonment of such activists as Khomeini, Talequani, Montazeri, Zanjani, and Dr. Ali Shariati as well as the shut down of Hussienieh Irshad, are among the best examples. To be sure, the regime would tolerate the religious leaders' preaching if they would not make mention of three issues: the denouncing of the Shah, the attacks on Israel, and the cry that Islam was in danger (Hakeimi, 135/1979:111). Incidentally, these three "taboos" were the very backbone around which the preachers could rally if they were to take a militant political tone. These issues were, in fact, what the religious leaders had to offer for the newly emerging audience. Based on these and related topics, they were able to politicize the followers and to give meaning to their own religious operation. This was a struggle of survival in the sense of status maintenance and meaningfulness on behalf of the clerics. It was in this respect that they could make sense of themselves as religious dignitaries and the religion of Islam as well.

The regime failed to understand the "latent function" of its own counter measures. It also failed to understand that the new groups recruited to the religious centers and participating in certain religious rituals had more political values in their heads than strict

religious attitudes. Hence, by suppressing the religious community and shutting down some religious places, the regime both angered and unified different social strata with different age structures and even opposing ideologies. In addition, through its suppressive measures, the regime staged the marriage between those who were interested in and exposed to modernity based on political liberty, and those who were traditionalist with a desire for a free political expression and not necessarily practical participation in the political process. However, as Leeden and Lewis note, the regime ". . .failed to comprehend the organizational capabilities and crisis-management skills of the leaders of the Shiite religious community, and did not recognize that the mullahs were capable of distributing political tracts and organizing street actions" (1980:12). This capability would be better recognized if one understood that the religious leaders were favored by a network of some 180,000 clerics operating in about 80,000 mosques all around the country (Hoveyda, 1979:44; Zabih, 1979:20). In addition, the functioning of "Hayats" (i.e., religious ritualist groups mostly identified with their place of birth and/or a member of the House of the Prophet), must also be considered in this process.

Thus, in many cases the religious leaders and preachers came not only to represent their traditional followers but also to symbolize certain groupings of the political dissidents. On the other hand, in such a situation, the religious community saw itself as actually powerful but legitimately powerless. Such frustrating circumstances did not cause the ambitious to despair. On the contrary, frustration set the religious stratum in motion and helped it to develop some legitimizing

measures for confronting the regime. Fischer observes that

All of these issues provided the clergy with a receptive audience and fertile moral platforms. Their own material interests--the systematic removal from their control of education, administration of justice, notary responsibility, administration of religious endowment--were less important than their role as spokesmen for the interests of more important sectors of society, and than their articulation of the general protest against the secret police tyranny and massive corruption (1980: 191-2).

In addition, ideologically speaking, the Shiite Muslims have the belief that "Al-Molk wa Addin Twoamam" (i.e., state and religion are twins). Hence, in the process of opposing the regime, such a belief both inflamed and justified the confrontation. To specify, such an ideological value is rooted in the Shiite definition and recognition of "Imamat" (i.e., the succession of the Prophet; the spiritual leadership of the Muslim community). Shiism holds that the Prophet Mohammad, as he had openly announced, was succeeded by his immediate kin, the Twelve Imams, the first of which was Imam Ali, Mohammad's cousin and son-in-law. The last Imam, the Hidden Imam who went into occultation in 940 A.D., is the Muslims' Messiah who will reappear before the Resurrection Day to establish the legitimate rule (Keddie:1980).

In this theological scheme, the institution of Imamat functions in terms of social integration and social control on the basis of the Quranic rules and the "tradition" of the Prophet as it has been "reported." Therefore, Imamat will spread justice and sweep off the seed of corruption from the earth. However, until the Advent of the Hidden Imam, the most qualified religious leaders (i.e., the Mojtahids, the Aya-tollahs) should rule or supervise the Islamic community, the Umma, as surrogates.

Interestingly, in connection with such a belief system, all the Shiite's Imams, except the Hidden Imam, were martyred, either assassinated or poisoned to death, by their non-Shiite rivals: the Sunni Muslims (Pooya, 1972:179-181). Hence, the concept of "Red Shiism," of which the Shiites are proud. More interestingly, the Shiite clergy consisted of two groups: the group that claims its descendancy from the Prophet and his House, the Sayyids with black turbans, and the other, with white turbans, who do not. Historically, the Sayyids' religious commitment and their claimed ancestral attachment to the Prophet together have intensified and justified their involvement in politics. Bill (1972:28) observes that "The members of this family have often had a charismatic power and thus almost all of the violent political movements that have arisen in Islamic areas have occurred in the name and under the leadership of a person claiming direct descent from the Prophet."

It may be illuminating to note that until recently, Shiism, as a school of thought, was not recognized by the Sunni Theology. This theology is identified with the Hanafi, Hanbali, Maleki, and Shafiay schools of thought and holds that the succession of the Prophet was (and should be) settled by the "Ijmaa" (i.e., consensus) of the followers. According to Shiism, the founders of the Sunni schools were students under Imam Jaafar Al-Sadigh, the Shia's six Imam, and hence their doctrines are secondary or partial to his thought. "In 1929 the head of Egypt's Al Azhar University, the main [Shafiay] Sunni religious establishment, pronounced a Sunni-Shia concordat, declaring that Shiism was a legitimate version of Islam" (The Economist, 1982:47). This recognition was also endorsed in the early 1960's by Shiekh Mahmoud Shaltoot, the Chief of

Al-Azhar at the time. However, the issue of the succession of the Prophet remains as the fundamental theological difference between the two Islamic traditions.

The radical religious leaders led by Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Taleqani saw political power as the logical and essential extension of the Islamic tradition. Moderates led by Ayatollah Shariat-Madari just wanted "clear and honest political leaders" (1978:136). Neither achieved anything under the Shah's regime. Worse, the Shah assigned to some of the Bahais, members of a heretical sect, highly ranked positions which added insult to the injury. Further, ignoring the religious grievances, moderate or otherwise, he ridiculed the religious community and labeled the clergy as "black reactionaries" who "made unholy alliance" with the "red forces" (Pahlavi, 1980:145-174). Among other things, he disregarded the fact that, as the official Iranian textbooks read, the 1906 Constitutional Revolution was basically managed under the leadership of two influential religious leaders: Sayyad Mohammad Tabatabai and Sayyid Abdollah Behbahani (Browne, 1966).

Finally, although the exigencies of time entailed certain alterations in the traditional social life in favor of secular arrangements, the regime was not able (or did not prefer) to coordinate its policies in the process. Hence, even on certain occasions some fruitful measures were resented because the religious leaders were not "consulted." The authorities did not pave at least a psychological way for the accommodation to and the acceptance of socially desired changes. The Shah, in fact, was engulfed in a certain "role conflict." On the one hand, as a leader of a leading Islamic country, he had the

desire to assume a sense of Islamic leadership for political dominance. As an indication, he assumed the guardianship of the major holy places in the country though this meant the governmentalization of the religion by his critics. Within the Islamic world, in 1966 with King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, he took the initiative in founding an Islamic Conference. However, this was sterilized by their rival, President Nasser, who charged that the "invisible hand" of the imperialists was behind the initiative.

On the other hand, as a practical secular ruler, the Shah pushed his country toward secularism regardless of the consequences. Once he informed his ministers: "I am going to go faster than the left" (Johnson, 1980:36). In all, it can be argued that part of the Shah's failure in dealing with the religious stratum was attributed to his superficial guardianship of Islam and at the same time his drastic secular conduct and Western attitudes aimed at the destruction of the traditional establishment in favor of a modern order. Unable to abandon their traditional values, and dismayed by a sweeping Western life-style, the clergy found themselves powerless and alienated from the regime. Such an alienating situation antagonized and mobilized them for action. This situation also helped to ally them with the educated and intellectual groups, the supposed "forerunners" in the process of modernization.

The Intellectuals. To better understand the identity of the Iranian intelligentsia, it is necessary to single out their occupational statuses. The occupations of these strata in the developing nations typically are teaching, journalism, law, medicine, and civil services. Shils (1960:331) emphasizes that ". . .these are the professions in which

intellectuals are to be found and which require either intellectual certification or intellectual skills. . . ." Therefore, the intellectuals can be considered as ". . .all persons with an advanced modern education and the intellectual concerns and skills ordinarily associated with it" (Shils, 1960:332). In line with this definition, in this study the Iranian intellectuals are identified as those strata of society which were (1) government employees, instructors and bureaucrats, (2) university students, and (3) the free-lance individuals involved in private or free enterprises. However, in this categorization, which includes both secular and religious persons, some overlapping existed. For instance, many of the Iranian university students were white-collar workers, especially school teachers, and in certain cases, the intellectuals occupied different occupational statuses simultaneously--an indication of the "drifting intellectuals."

On the whole, "the greatest concentration of the professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia is found in the governmental apparatus. . . ." (Bill, 1972:62). It is also indicated that "Numerically the Iranian intelligentsia is one of the largest in the Middle East" (Zabih, 1979:17). At the present, those intellectual individuals are considered who, because of unsatisfactory government services and/or political ideals, were in conflict with the old regime and the regime constantly controlled and curtailed their activism in the process. They may be labeled as either the "nonelite" or the "counterelite." They saw the Shah's elite, even with comparable qualifications, as more privileged, and this was understood as a syndrome of socioeconomic inequality.

Interestingly, these strata were, in fact, involved in a two-

fold conflict with different directions. They rejected the existing power structure but adhered to modernity and modernization compatible with the essence of the national and cultural values. Hence, they shared with the other politically deprived strata common values concerned with the alienating nature of the regime. Simultaneously, they had, however in principle, one thing in common with the regime itself, that is, socioeconomic reforms with the reservation about the magnitude and the ensuing foreign dominance.

The Shah's regime failed to understand and exploit these somewhat supportive attitudes. As a result, the main body of the intellectuals were kept out of the political process in terms of both decision making and social policies. Moreover, certain groups of the intelligentsia also shared some nationalist values with the regime, although they viewed the regime as either chauvinistic, imperial, or Westernized. The regime again failed to explore and orient these favorable nationalist attitudes. Such a failure, in turn, facilitated and activated the the growing alliance among (1) certain religious intellectuals who emphasized Islamic universalism, (2) leftists who advocated international communism, and (3) the nationalist intellectuals who argued that "Iran" and the "Iranians" were "out there" even before the dawn of Islam and the rise of Marxism-Leninism.

To be sure, until the late 1950s the label "intellectual" was not prevalent in Iranian circles. Instead, the "Tahseel-kardeh" (i.e., the educated) was most popular. (This fact can also justify the inclusion of all the white-collar employees under the category of the intelligentsia.) From the late 1950's, the concept "Roushan-fekr" (i.e.,

clear-or-bright-minded: the intellectual) came more to public attention. This seemed to be caused by the charge from some leading intellectuals that groups of the "educated" were either apolitical or had been co-opted. Thus, only the "motaahid" (i.e., the committed) intellectual, who cared about people and dared to voice somewhat his grievances, came to be appraised as an intellectual proper. Other intellectuals, who chose a lavish Western life-style and became "Gharb-zedegi" (i.e., Westernized), were rejected and denied by the self-defined "responsible" intellectuals.

The well-known Iranian writer, Jalal Al-Ahmad (1343/1963) most publicized the phenomenon Gharb-zedegi (i.e., Westomania) by his book of the same title. However, the majority of the Iranian intellectuals, who were not co-opted or were political, shared a common political situation. They were alienated from the mainstream of the political process and prohibited from scholarly production as they desired. Bill (1972:57-61) recognizes five characteristics of this intelligentsia, which one may think of as an indication of the noted alienation: (1) rejection of the traditional power structure that dominated society; (2) the possession of modern education or accessibility to it; (3) the possession of talent and skill that made them able to achieve or seek that kind of education; (4) the exposure "outside" philosophies, thoughts, and ideas; (5) the nonexistence of rigid religious dogmatism and blind worship of history. However, it seems that, in certain cases, the Iranian intellectuals' inclination to modern education was not only encouraged by their "talent" and "skill," but it was also facilitated by their financial background.

Members of the intelligentsia had both "wealth" and "property" which enabled their talents and skills to flourish. Elsewhere it will be argued that layers of the Shah's opposition, at the leadership level, did not raise their heads for economic rewards but for political power.

From Zonis' (1971) The Political Elite of Iran, one can also realize the alienation of the counter-elite. He observes that

Inasmuch as the structure of the elite is predicated on the notion of inclusivity, opposition to the elite is equated, by the regime, with opposition to the regime itself. And the regime, to the present, has refused to tolerate persons who, by its own definition, are in opposition to it. The result is that the active unassimilated or unassimilable are subjected to continued pressure from the regime (1971:39).

Such a "continued pressure," which finally exploded, can be better pictured if it is approached by examining the individual layers of the continuum of the intelligentsia.

Government Employees. This stratum, traditionally, had been one of the most prestigious layers in the Iranian society. Generally, it was identified as the governing class, regardless of the internal distribution of authority and the possession of power and wealth. The Iranian parents more than hoped to get their children employed in the government apparatus. There, they would achieve some sort of state power, social prestige, and economic rewards materialized in the present salary and the future pension. Roughly, until the 1950's, the major occupational sector was the public sector. Up to this time, Iran's development took place basically in the areas of education and administration (Banani, 1961). Education was at the service of government through which it was able to nurture, maintain, and develop its administrative arrangements.

In feudalist-capitalist Iran, the government was not only the unique source of power but also the major investor, employer, and entrepreneur. The governmental role in the economy was actually based on a total control, not laissez faire. This, however, has been a peculiarity of many underdeveloped and developing nations wherein the private sector has been in the process of development and has relied more on government credits than on its own initiatives. From the late 1950's, due to (1) population increase, (2) the gradual dissemination of college education, (3) the general urbanization trends, and (4) the twilight of industrialization, many certified youths sought jobs basically in the governmental agencies. Since the private sector was in the primary stage of its development, the government was pushed to employ the maximum of the applicants, including the untrained and the illiterate. According to the Iranian official statistics, from 1969 on the population of the governmental employees increased rapidly. In 1977 this increase was 102 percent relative to the year 1975.

This, of course, caused under-employment and mal-employment. Because of this fact and many others discussed earlier, government salaries and wages, though increasing constantly, failed to meet the rising costs of living. The consumer price index, according to the state bank, Bank Mardezi (Central) of Iran, rose from 0.2 percent in 1965 (relative to year 1964) to 25.2 percent in 1977. The criteria based on which one could get promoted were educational attainment, occupational career, and "relations." However, the overemphasis on college certificates in the employment process affected the quality of education decisively for what mattered was simply college "sheep

skin" and not the academic values. Hence, the Iranian implication of "madrek-Garai" (i.e., the lavish tendency toward diplomaticization) prevailed. Indicative of this was also widespread favoritism and the marketing of grades and diplomas, at least in the private colleges.

Rumors even circulated and printed in the press about some Iranians who obtained college degrees from some European schools illegally. Hence, the metaphor "Doctor-hya Qaleechei va Pistai" (i.e., doctors who were given doctorates by means of Persian carpet and pistachio as bribes). However, with the passage of time, the government employees came to realize that even with their college diplomas in hand, they were not able to keep up with the escalating expenditures and the booming inflation. These salaried groups suffered in this situation (Fischer, 1980:190).

In addition, because of declining significance of college diplomas as the major determinant of economic gains, the traditional certificate-based social prestige and self-esteem began to decline. This decline was surely caused by "diploma inflation," especially in the less demanded academic fields. It was also caused by the inefficiency of occupational performance as well as job productivity relative to educational attainment. To be sure, the root cause of this problem must be traced to the government's inadequate educational planning in relation to the labor market. Iran's educational system was operating irrespective of the demand of the occupational sectors, both private and public. Further, many college graduates worked in fields that were unrelated to their major subjects. The full-time operation of some physicians and veterinarians in such occupations as accounting and

business are examples.

Nevertheless, in terms of educational achievement, only "doctors," and "engineers," preferably educated abroad, were in demand and hence ranked highly. Interestingly, the bureaucratic distinction and the public attraction of the highly educated individuals was such that the government in the early 1970's prohibited the formal use of such titles as "Doctor" and "Engineer" in state correspondence. This step was taken to somewhat normalize the escalating inclination toward diplomatization. However, the majority of the Iranian government employees found themselves caught in a situation in which their salaries were inadequate and their corresponding social statuses were not rewarding. Such a dilemma was further complicated by the regime's counter-measures and the constant pressure on the already affected strata.

In this process, the Karmandan (i.e., the white-collar workers), became able to relate their occupational claims to political ideals. They developed a consciousness of kind based on a common and worsening situation. Beginning from the early 1970's, the regime created the so-called "Security Division" in each bureaucratic organization to carry out "confidential affairs" and to check on the Karmandan directly. Such a task was carried out by the SAVAK from outside government offices and eventually the "inside" presence of the SAVAK agents was sensed. By doing so, the regime in fact antagonized and alienated different layers of its own apparatus, who if satisfied, at least economically, could have helped the ongoing of the system. Worse, the regime, in one way or another, required the salaried strata to celebrate, advocate, and demonstrate the Pahlavi's self-proclaimed achievements, year round.

This, in fact, was the "rite of passage" in the Shah's bureaucratic organizations.

Alfred Sauvey, the contemporary French social scientist, once said the while-collar government employees have the upper-classes' desires, wishes, and tastes, and the lower-classes' bread and butter problems. The Iranian government employees found themselves in such a frustrating situation. Due to their educational attainment, occupational career, and world view, they developed new values concerning modernity, life-styles, economic prosperity, and political liberty. At the same time, because of the regime's political suppression and inadequate occupational rewards, they were unable to realize those ideals. Although the government, during the very episodes of the revolutionary upheaval, made some concessions, such a salary increase (e.g., Fischer, 1980; Halliday, 1978d), this was too little too late to diffuse the accumulating strain that it had already created.

Students. "No consideration of the intellectual class in underdeveloped countries can disregard the university students" (Shils, 1960:337), and the Iranian university students are no exception. However, a higher education system in its modern sense is not a very historical and widespread phenomenon in Iran. The first Iranian college, Dar Al-Funoon (i.e., polytechnic), was established in 1849. It operated as, roughly the only higher educational institution until the creation of the University of Tehran, the country's first, in 1934. The first group of Iranian high school graduates were sent by the government to Europe (1928) to pursue a higher education and to function finally as the core faculty of Iran's first university.

Following the aftermath of WWII, the Iranian students became more involved in politics than ever before. At the time, the political situation of Iran, as discussed previously, motivated them to participate in the issues of the day. Although it is argued that "Student movements are born of vague, undefined emotions which seek for some issue, some cause, to which to attach themselves" (Feuer, 1969 :53), the Iranian students' activism against the regime stemmed from identifiable objectives. Until the early 1960's, they had primarily political values concerned with political freedom and national independence. Later more material causes emerged. Because of (1) population increase, (2) gradual migration to the cities and urbanization, (3) the expansion of high school education, and (4) the crucial significance of a college education in the process of employment, an increasing desire for higher education followed. This intensified desire was not satisfied sufficiently and adequately, for the enrollment capacity of the higher educational system was limited. Along with the later expansion of this capacity, the regime also applied the "entrance examination," better known in Iran by its French equivalent, that is "Concours." Based on this selective examination, the most academically qualified individuals were admitted to colleges and universities.

Since the quality of the pre-college education was not comparable in different high schools and since the actual length of the academic year for climatic reasons was not consistent nationwide, the participants did not enjoy an equal opportunity for competition. This handicap as well as the limited enrollment frustrated the prospective students and led to the development of anti-regime attitudes. (Such attitudes,

however, interacted with the already existing political differences and later were shaped ideologically). According to the Ministry of Sciences and Higher Education (MSHE) of Iran (1335/1976:10-15), in 1963, out of 13,600 candidates only 2,000 (14.7 percent) were accepted to higher education institutions. In the following years the number of applicants rose constantly to reach about 295,952 in 1976. However, in this year only 25 percent of the students were admitted in all the country's colleges and universities.

The majority of the admitted students had to pursue their studies even in their last, namely tenth, choice of preference. Otherwise, they would fail to enter the higher educational system. In 1976, 81 percent of the applicants were eager to pursue their studies even to the point of their tenth and last choice of majors. However, even in such a choice the demand was 7.4 times higher than the demand (MSHE, 1335/1976:8). In addition, in this same year, there were 21 universities and 209 two-year and four-year colleges with 400 majors and some 150,000 students in the country. In 1946 the higher educational institutions numbered but five. But such a tremendous increase had two major flaws. First, it failed to embrace all or the majority of those who somehow desired a higher education. The process left a yearly increasing "reserve army " of almost 4/5 of the total candidates. The MSHE (1335/1976:10-15) also predicted that, given both the current trends of supply and demand, such a reserve army would amount to 1,327,952 persons in 1981-2. For such a huge group, mostly under 25, occupational training was not available to facilitate their employment and significant jobs were not provided.

Second, this expansion in the higher educational system, though it was not all-encompassing, took place at the cost of the quality of education (Halliday, 1979a:218). As an indication of this, in 1976, according to MSHE (1355/1976:86-91), the 73 students who took the entrance examination for the master degree in the Faculty of Cartography failed to obtain a minimum average of 50 percent of the grade in each subject--mathematics, physics, and foreign language. Interestingly, according to the same report, the participating students represented, in their undergraduate career Iran's seven leading universities and three colleges. The tests were evaluated by an impartial group of experts and judged to be fair and standardized. Such a failure in itself can be considered as a symptom of the on-going nepotism and embezzlement in at least private schools as mentioned previously. The overall inadequacy and inefficiency of the Iranian higher education system, among other facts pertaining to economic growth, led many, even those of lower-middle class families, to send their children abroad. In 1978, there were 100,000 Iranians studying in other countries, about 40,000 of whom were in the United States, "because there is no room for them at their own universities. . ." (Time, 1978:36).

This situation--that is, the imbalance between supply and demand as well as the low quality of the higher education--antagonized the students and encouraged them to join their already antagonized and politicized comrades. These tendencies and exposure to politics can be better seen in a processual framework. In Scott's words, "this proclivity for politics is passed from one student generation to another by a specialized student sub-culture" (1969:410). The lack of political

as well as academic freedom on campuses further encouraged the students to communicate with the subterranean traditional opposition and to be oriented by it.

Throughout the 1970s, there had always been disruption in the higher educational system caused by both students' unrest and arrest. Such tactics as sit-ins, strikes, boycotts of examinations, and campus demonstrations ". . . were the only means of expression since student magazines were censored, normal political meetings were government infiltrated, and there was no forum outside the university" (Graham, 1979:214). Surprisingly, the regime even planted pine trees along the south side of the main campus of the University of Tehran, dominating a main street. This was done to obscure the student disturbances, and to block any interaction between the demonstrators and passers-by. In fact, as Graham observes, "Education was at the service of the regime. This meant that students were constantly spied upon by SAVAK, courses doctored, and controversial lectures dismissed" (1979:214).

As an example of such a control, the regime even attempted to invade students' privacy and violate their individual rights and personal life-styles. Very often, SAVAK agents sneaked into the dormitories in search of radical literature. Moreover, the regime managed to prevent the co-eds from wearing "veil" and "chador." The two together may be congruent with the Islamic "hijab" (i.e., modesty) though chador is a traditional Iranian clothing and not necessarily religious, even in the Islamic Iran. The usage of both was paradoxically increased in the 1970's. This can be explained as both a reaction to the regime which has already officially imposed the

unveiling in 1935 and the increasing representation of the lower and traditional strata in universities and colleges. Such strata, roughly speaking, until the mid-1960s were far from the mainstream of higher educational attainment. Identification with university education was basically confined to and characteristic of the middle and upper classes.

According to the MSHE (1335/1976:81-82), the tendency toward modesty was not caused simply by religio-political factors but also by economic factors. Specifically, since the lower class females were not able to compete with their stylish and "in-fashion" counterparts, they resorted to the traditional, inexpensive and humble clothing. Interestingly, a study conducted in Egypt in 1981 concerning a similar case arrived at the same conclusions (Abdullah and Mostafa, 1981:13).

However, the MSHE suggested, though confidentially, several practices to the authorities so that the use of "hijab" was either discouraged or passively resisted by the regime. The appearances of females with "modern" modesty on campuses, TV networks, in newspapers and magazines as well as at work were examples of the passive resistance. Among the ten advocated "solutions" to discouraging the traditional dress were the compulsory unveiling at the university gates and the unacceptance of the outmoded veiled females in classes, at examination sessions, and in employment interviews. In this respect, Fischer reports that:

In 1977, women who attempted to register for classes at the University of Tehran wearing a chador were refused; the issue of the right of hijab (modesty) became rekindled, with many women who otherwise would not wear chadors, turning up in them. The right to choose was at issue, so during 1978 the chador at universities became a symbol of protest against dictatorship in general. Women at the University of Isfahan were even reported to put the chador on to demonstrate at the University but to take it off when going out onto the streets to champion women's liberation (1980:186).

However, the traditional lower-class students, for religious or traditional motives, were eager to maintain their own way of life. To many of them Tehran campuses appeared strange and alienating. According to the MSHE (13355/1976:1-9), in 1976, 45 percent of all the country's 230 higher educational institutions were operating in Tehran, but the capital comprised only 12.4 percent of Iran's total population. In light of the overall geographic distribution of colleges and universities, two facts might be emphasized. First was the accumulation of youths for educational (and occupational) purpose in limited urban centers and the capital in particular. This concentration, at least partially, caused some housing, transportation, and sex-related difficulties. Next, in this situation, many youths were also confronted by a new way of life for which they were not prepared financially and psychologically. Such a mode of living was based on urbanization-modernization measures which were different from, if not contradictory to, the traditional standards of the affected youths. Thus, for groups of students, the problem was first adaptation to the environment and not necessarily involvement in politics.

The textbooks in Iran were censored, and the instructors were either apolitical, indoctrinated, or harrassed by the SAVAK. Political materials, even in the political science courses, did not touch upon domestic issues but only the conservative foreign examples. Further, social matters discussed in social science courses revolved generally around historical cases and antecedents. These policies all were implemented to keep students isolated from current radical social thoughts, philosophies, and ideologies. In his "informal" but govern-

ment supervised "Observations About Higher Education in Iran," Millett (1976:7) reported to the then Minister of Sciences and Higher Education of Iran that

One common criticism of university performance was voiced in private conversation. It was said that there were a good many dissatisfied students within the universities. This dissatisfaction arises, so it was said, from the failure of faculty members to give adequate attention to their subject matter, and to provide poor instruction to students.

For students in such a developing country as Iran who, like all other students in comparable nations consider themselves "as part of the intellectual class" (Shils, 1969:337), this situation was surely alienating. Such an alienation can be traced to the Shah's 13-years incumbent Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda, who once said "The Iranian student must be courageous and willing to sacrifice. He should and can form student unions and organizations. He should not, however, build these into anything political. This is not his business" (Bill, 1972:88) (emphasis added).

In fact, what the Iranian students were able to "form" were Student Libraries on campuses. These libraries, identified with Islamic and Communist students, contained some alleged "ideological" materials none of which was "hot" even by the regime's standards. On the part of the regime, these libraries had a twofold function. They were exploited, elaborated, and emphasized by the authorities as a manifestation of the regime's academic freedom and political tolerance. They also functioned as a granted means through which the opposition network could be checked and detected, and through which the most activist students could be identified and trapped. On the part of the

students, the libraries symbolized a sense of student identity and a desired independence from the government-controlled educational process.

Ideologically, it is observed that "Within this young bloc, the role of the left faction is very prominent, both in actions and in slogans" (Shmuelewitz, 1979:35). If what is meant by "the left" is communist ideologies, Atkins' (1981-54) contention should also be taken into the consideration: "The Tudeh. . . lamented the weakness of Marxism-Leninism among the students, many of whom were hostile to the regime but remained bogged down in the 'petty-bourgeoise' ideologies." Realistically, it was from the totality of the Iranian students abroad and at home that at least two major guerrilla groups, the Majahedeen and the Fedayeen, emerged to play a significant role, both in symbolic and in instrumental terms, in the confrontation with the old regime. It should also be noted that the Iranian students in Europe and in the United States were first identified with the Confederation of Iranian Students and later also with the Muslim Students Association, and Muslim Students Society.

As a result of the regime's escalating pressure on the student community and the continuing student violence, many students were dismissed, imprisoned, tortured or shot to death, and executed throughout the 1970's. Nevertheless, "we can observe that in the end of 1978 and the beginning of 1979, the most active faction is the young people, who are very frustrated, because they have not benefitted from the quality of education which they had anticipated. The Shah did not succeed in carrying out all of his educational reforms" (Shmuelewitz, 1979:35). The Iranian students abroad were also harrassed. An indication

of this intimidation occurred in the United States, Anderson and Witten (1967:7) indicate that

The Savak [sic] agents devote most of their time, apparently, to spying on the students who oppose the Shah's imperial rule. Savak informants have infiltrated students groups so completely that no one knows whom to trust. When the students demonstrate, Savak agents, posing as newsmen, snap their photographs. This is why most Iranian demonstrators wear masks. And that Savak agents hound and harrass Iranians in the United States, with full knowledge and sometimes the assistance of CIA.

According to Paarlberg (1978:25), "The Shah has admitted that Iranian intelligence agents do keep close watch on Iranian students activism within the U.S." Troubled by the Iranian students' anti-regime activism abroad, one of the Shah's highly-ranked authorities once said "we have to accompany each Iranian student heading for America and Europe with a SAVAK agent." Although the Shah continued his intimidation and inattention to his students, President Nixon advised him that "I envy the way you deal with your students. . . Pay no attention to our liberal gripings" (Hoveyda, 1980:77).

On the other hand, the Iranian students abroad continued to publicize the regime's suppression, to socialize politically the newcomers, and to function as a reference point for their fellow students at home. Interestingly, owing to the available academic and political freedom in the host countries, the Iranian students abroad were more able to discuss political issues and to demonstrate the nature of the Shah's oppressive rule than their comrades inside the country.

Instead of working out certain devices for students' academic dissatisfaction and ideological claims, the regime intensified its uprooting measures. In reaction, the Iranian university campuses

became a barricade from which the whole establishment came under attack. The University of Tehran mostly fueled other campuses nationwide and symbolized the intensifying political violence against the regime. In 1969, Feuer predicted that "the students of the Tehran University, 'a beehive of political ferment,' could, according to qualified observers, bring down the government at any time. . ." (1969:179). Later it became evident that "in the period of repressed stability from 1963 onwards, the rapidly expanding student population was the most active political group in Iran" (Graham, 1979:213). Further, it was also emphasized that "By and large the opposition to the Shah was believed to be led by students and intellectuals, with additional technocratic and religious components, along with bazaaris and the usual fringe groups" (Leeden and Lewis, 1980:19).

The Professional Intellectuals. In a specialized sense, one may single out a group from all the Iranian intellectuals which was more involved in scholarly production and symbolic intellectual opposition to the regime than other intellectuals. These individuals can be seen as intellectuals by "profession," irrespective of the scope and the effectiveness of their activities. In this respect, Feuer's definition of the intellectual is suggestive: "The intellectual is what he reads, and in all societies his world of books, with its moral imperatives, has seemed more real to him than the world of men" (1969:66). So, he is "a person whose consciousness determines his existence" (Feuer, 1963:ix), and the "creator" of "culture" in Lipset's (1963:333) terms.

These intellectuals were a cluster of writers, poets, artists, and instructors. They were identified with their poems, articles,

scripts, scenarios, translations, poetry nights, open letters and "Shah-Namehs" (i.e., secret letters), and the publication of some periodicals though irregularly, all with some anti-regime flavor which often was implicit. In fact, they were more men of their "pens," "words," and "theatrical roles" than men of bullets and guns. Hence, they might be defined as the creators of counter-culture though in political terms. The majority of these individuals were identified with the Writer's Association of Iran which operated, irregularly and unofficially, from the 1960's.

In terms of their intellectual standpoints and not necessarily political ideologies, they might be considered in the forefront within the intelligentsia. Their political ideologies, in general, ranged from the sacred to the profane, the New Left to the classic Marxism-Leninism, and from social democratic to liberal and national tendencies. However, in certain cases, ethnicity opposed nationalism and religiosity stood against communism in the advocated political ideals. Hence, the professional intellectuals were of different categories with various shades of opinions. As a result, they could not introduce a specific program for action against the regime, nor did they produce a concrete "ideal type" society that would replace, for example, the Shah's professed "Great Civilization." They were more critics of the existing arrangements than initiators of a promising establishment. However, in general terms, such ideologists, nationalists, leaders, and revolutionaries as Imam Ali, Imam Hossien, Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Mao Tse-tung, Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre, Joseph Titto, Jamal Abdul Nasser, Patris Lumumba, Herbert Marcuse, Frantz Fanon, Che

Guevara, Regis Debray, Fidel Castro, and the like were their reference points.

In the meantime, like the Shah's elite, these counter-elites, in a sense, were relatively detached from the masses though for different reasons. First, the regime's constant check and censorship affected the magnitude of their intellectual maneuvering, prevented them from addressing issues explicitly, and weakened their ability to lead influentially. Second, the potential beneficiaries of their intellectual products--that is, the masses--were generally illiterate or not sufficiently educated to digest and comprehend. This caused poor intellectual communication between the men of pens and the rank and file. Consequently, the intellectuals, who by their own definition and intention, were expected to be at the service of the many, became able to communicate with but the few--groups of university students.

Third, in connection with the last point, in the Iranian society the "educated" traditionally were assumed to be a category of the "Az Ma Behtiran" (i.e., the better-off). This stereotype image persisted. As a result, the intellectuals' political standpoint was not precisely comprehended as it might have been. Such an image of the intellectuals was also aggravated by some allegations that members of them had their own covert SAVAK connections; that their ostensible anti-regime challenge was managed and used by the regime. To further obscure the intellectuals' image, the SAVAK itself in one way or another advanced and exploited these allegations. It is to such a situation that the alienation of the intellectuals can be ascribed and blamed.

In fact, the regime did not tolerate any appeal of these

intellectuals. They were denied even the basic right to form their authorized professional associations. Further, some of them were detained, imprisoned, tortured, beaten, exiled, dismissed from or denied governmental jobs, and intimidated, and others were executed or liquidated by the regime (Zonis, 1971; 39-79; Bill, 1972:73-101; Graham, 1979; Halliday, 1979a:325f; Fischer, 1980:192-194). The political strangulation that engulfed this stratum also did affect the very content, direction, and magnitude of their scholarly productivity. Their poems, writings, and lectures took on a different style and were shaped and colored by the regime's intimidation and imposition (Bill, 1972:73-79; Doctorow:1976; Halliday, 1979a:217-221). Hence, "it is no wonder that the whole of contemporary Iranian fiction, poetry, and criticism revolves around a central theme: repression" (Baraheni, 1976:116). Indicative of this is the following verse by the Iranian poet, Medhi Akhavan-Saless (1978:90) from his poem, "Inscription:"

The stone lay there like a mountain
and we sat here a weary bunch
Women, men, young, old
all linked together
at the ankles, by a chain.

Finally, referring to the Shah's autocratic rule, Hurewitz notes that "He's given no freedom to the Iranian intellectuals. The result is that Iran suffers from a political vacuum: the people feel out of things" (1978:40).

* * *

In closing this argument about the Shah's unrealistic approach to the necessity of political liberty, it must be emphasized that such a feeling of nothingness as discussed above engulfed different strata

of the Iranian society. In the Shah's regime, in fact, the whole nation was playing a passive role in the political process. By alienating a nation at large, the Shah, unconsciously and unintentionally, coordinated and unified a people from different regions and roots with conflicting ideological, religious, and cultural interests. Many students of Iranian politics seem to adhere to the conclusion that ". . . repression was the major reason for the fall of the Shah" (U.S. News and World Reports, 1980:31).

What was worse, while some sort of political liberalization was vital to accompany the ongoing economic growth, population transformation, educational development, and bureaucratic proliferation, the Shah, in 1975, terminated all the people's hopes for political "tranquility." He dissolved all the existing governmental and government-supervised parties and imposed the Rastakhiz (i.e., Resurgence) Party to which all the Iranians should be recruited. The non-conformists were allowed to "leave" the country or else they would be denied the regime's mercy. Although from the very initiation of this party, built-in ideological and practical problems were revealed, the Shah only in his exile came to realize that ". . . experience was to show that the creation of this party was an error. . . . The Resurgence Party did not succeed in achieving its objectives--it did not become the conduit of ideas, needs, and wishes between the nation and the government" (Pahlavi, 1980:124). Interestingly, by acknowledging this, he ". . . admits to only one failure during his 37-year reign-- . . . The one-party political system--and apports blame like summer rain" (Thurgood, 1980:7).

Thus, in addition to his socioeconomic failures concerning the appropriate redistribution of wealth and income, which was pouring affluently into the country, and the elimination of the widening gaps among social classes, the Shah failed to create independent political institutions or at least to liberalize the already existing ones. It is emphasized that "one of the prime causes of his disaster, in fact, was that he. . .did not adapt his political institutions sufficiently to the economic and social changes he had brought about" (Kissinger, 1979:1259). To be sure, political freedom was in short supply even within the Shah's inner circle where members either developed some kind of popularity, attempted some significant changes, or criticized loyally. In addition to the reshuffling of the elite, such members of them as Ali Amini, Hassan Arsanjani, Tiemur Bakhtiar, Ahmad Aramesh, Abol-Hassan Ibtahaj, Ali Kani, Nasser Ameri, and Ferydoon Mahdavi represented the best examples of those who were dismissed, jailed, exiled, or even liquidated (Zonis, 1971:80-117; Bill, 1972; Cottam, 1979:312-363; Graham, 1979). "Thus," as Hoveyda put it, "he destroyed all valid representation of other viewpoints. He removed all possible rivals at every level, and muzzled intellectuals, politicians, the press, Parliament--the whole people, in fact" (1980:132).

So far the major emphasis has been put on the Shah's economic and political failures as two structural causes for his downfall. A closer analysis of such a collapse would also reveal other structural problems which in turn contributed to The Fall of the Shah. They are (1) the Shah's lack of a unifying ideology, (2) the phenomenon of ethnic strain, and (3) the problem of the legitimacy of his regime, each

of which will be sketched below.

5. Ideological Illusion

In the review of literature we have already observed the crucial significance of the weapons of ideas. In this section ideology is treated in the Manheimian tradition, that is, in the sense that it functions either to preserve an ongoing system or to challenge, idealistically, its operation. While the Shah was confronted by different challenging "utopian" ideals, he failed to falsify them in theory or in practice. This contention is based on certain facts.

First, as the traditional controversy between socialism and capitalism is concerned, the Shah adhered to and laid the foundation for the capitalist mode of production. Although the state, in one way or another, controlled the entirety of the economic processes, the result was a swelling bourgeoisie stratum and a widening of the socioeconomic gaps. However, it might be argued that in the developing nations what really matters in the first place is not the simple adoption of socialist or capitalist policies but the nature of the achieved structural changes. Such a pragmatic position was not advocated in the Shah's Iran. Equal life chances were not enjoyed, for the rich got richer and the poor continued to lag behind. The regime's proposed quasi-socialist policies such as "profit-sharing in factories," "employee and public ownership," and some subsidizing devices were in reality showcases yet based on the Shah's imperial ambivalence and not genuine socialist practices. In fact, ". . . strutting in anachronistic, imperial splendour, he declined to follow the example of other third-

world leaders in paying even lip-service to the misty socialism that helps to keep middle-class intellectuals happy" (The Economist, 1980:12). The absence of socialist measures during the Shah's regime was more sensed by the opposition groups who were already acquainted with the socialist ideologies of Nasser's Arab Socialist Union, the socialist tradition in Algeria and the Arab Bath Socialist Party.

Second, although nationalism in itself is not considered a workable ideology in a socioeconomic sense (Lauer, 1978:200), but an ingredient of some political ideologies, the Shah's nationalism and patriotism were in question. (1) As stated before, with the imposition of the Rastakhiz Party, the Shah emphasized his political standpoint in the sense of loyalty to "three principles"--the institution of kingdom, the Constitution of 1906, and the White Revolution. Some might argue that given the nature of the combination of the Iranian people, the geographic characteristics of the country, and the 2500-year monarchical tradition in Iran, the imperial regime may better function than other systems to unify the people. Even if this allegation is taken a priori, in practice, the alleged royal patronage turned out to be a cult of personality, dynastic hegemony, and humiliation of a people whom the institution of monarchy was expected to cherish and to patronize.

Instead of emphasizing Iran's nationalist values, the values of the Persian kings, and the Pahlavis in particular, were stressed and appreciated. This policy was consistent with Marx and Engles' observation that, in a polarized society, "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual

force" (1970:64). To revive the ancient imperial tradition, and, in fact, to stress and justify his proposed dynastic excellence, the Shah celebrated the 2,500-year anniversary of the Persian Empire for which, according to the official claims, "only" \$100 million was spent (e.g., Shah, 1980:42; Harper's, 1980:10). He also replaced the traditional Iranian calendar, adopted by his father in the 1925, with a monarchical one, which, according to some Iranian historians, does not match exactly the founding of the Empire. In fact, it was formulated in such a way that the beginning of the twenty-sixth century of the imperial rule in Iran corresponds to the Shah's accession to power in 1941.

Further examples of these kinds of aspirations can also be observed easily. The Shah was entitled to a variety of imperial titles some of which have divine coloration. "Aala Hadhrat Homayounee" (i.e., His Imperial Majesty,) "Shahinshah" (i.e., King of Kings), "Dhel-Allah Fel Ardh" (i.e., the shadow of God on Earth), and "Arya-Mehr" (i.e., the light of Aryans). Interestingly, the last title, it is said, was a last name of an Iranian army officer which was "confiscated" by the Royal Court to be used and monopolized by the King. In addition to his earthly hegemony, the Shah, in one way or another, attached himself to Almighty and Divine rule. The Persian concept of "Farr-e Ezadee" (i.e., the Awe of Providence), with which the Iranian Great Shahs had been identified, indicates the same fact. The Shah argued that "I believe in God, and that I have been chosen by God to perform a task. My visions were miracles that saved the country. My reign has saved the country, and it has done so because God was on my side" (Pahlavi, 1973:7). It is based on such claims that he once told the ABC television network

that there is a "rule" that the King should not be insulted or "even criticized." Such a self-designated supremacy was surely presented and overemphasized by the Shah's media. As Hoveyda (1980:55) observes, ". . . the radio news bulletins always angered the listeners. They invariably started with a detailed account of doings of the royal family, even when important news was pouring out of the teletype machines." In accordance with this observation, Leeden and Lewis also note that "(all the resources of the mass media have been exploited to stress the idea that loyalty to the monarchy and national patriotism are identical" (1980:5).

The Iranian national anthem was in name and content identified with the Pahlavi Shahs and not the nation and the country. It was labeled "The Imperial Anthem" and started, after the British tradition, with "long live the Shah." Further, even Iran's ambassadors to foreign countries were officially designated and identified as ambassadors of Shahinshah Aryamehr. The Shah once defined himself as "super modern," and one must wonder how really such a royal modernity and overemphasized divinity can be lodged on the Shah's collection of titles, his cult of personality, dynastic hegemony and shallow base of social support. This example, in fact, is socialization into the family values and not identification with nationalism whatsoever.

(2) While the nationalist leaders in the Third-World countries had either waged a battle of independence against the foreign forces and/or chosen a non-aligned position, the Shah restored power through the CIA and "after this restoration of 1953, . . . [he] never really freed himself from his dependence on the U.S." (Godsell, 1980:12). In

addition to the Shah's membership in the Central Treaty Organization, he also signed military pacts and agreements with the United States in 1947 and 1963. In the last one he even gave the so-called extraterritorial rights to the Americans. However, similar rights which had been given to the British and the Russians were abolished by his father in 1928 (Mottahedeh, 1980:19-34). Based on different policies and practices, he identified himself as "the American's Shah" (Richards, 1975: 3-22), "the American Middle Eastern surrogate," and the "Gendarme of the Region," In Cottam's words, "the epithets 'traitor,' 'American agent,' and 'puppet' are used by every opposition group regardless of ideological complexion. But so are 'corrupt,' 'tyrannical,' 'murderer'" (1979:361). It is no wonder then that President Carter, as late as November 30, 1978, sixteen days before the Shah's abdication, in a press conference, emphasized that "we trust the Shah to maintain stability in Iran. . . .We have confidence in the Shah. We support him. . . ." (1978:2101).

(3) In foreign relations the Shah adopted and stressed what he called a "national independent policy," or "positive nationalism." In his words, "our policy is based on the maintenance and the preservation of peace. We in Iran have adopted a policy which we call a policy of independent nationalism. Its essential principles are non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and peaceful co-existence" (Pahlavi, 1967:173). In this connection, Lenczowski (1980:201) indicates that this phrase "positive nationalism" was coined in reply to two concepts which the Shah's government was trying to combat: one was the 'negative' nationalism [in fact, the "negative balance"] of the Mossadegh

era which brought Iran to the verge of ruin; the other was Nasser's 'positive neutralism,' which the Iranians thought tended to facilitate Soviet infiltration in the area." However, while in the course of time Nasser and Mosadegh rose to prominent nationalist leadership, the Shah was dethroned by his nation to wander ultimately as a "man-without-a-country."

Contrary to his proposed policy of "non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries," the Shah, as noted before, involved his regime in the Iraqis and Omanis' internal affairs, backed the Israelis in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and allowed the Americans to surveil on the Russians from the Iranian soil. Thus, in the eyes of the nationalist, religious, and communist Iranians, the Shah's foreign policies were "dictated," "imported," and "imposed" by the Americans. They also saw the Shah's establishing of the diplomatic relationship with Mao's China in 1974, as a U.S. directive since America's recognition of the Republic of China was in the process. Therefore, such foreign-enhanced and foreign-oriented policies could not be rooted in Iran's national interest.

(4) While the nationalist leaders, in one way or another, backed the nationalist-radical movements, the Shah played an active role to offset such insurrections or to destabilize certain arrangements. For instance, he deprived the Palestine Liberation Organization of any sort of support; in addition, he helped the fragmentation of Lebanon by supplying the separatist right-wing militia with arms and by provoking the "traditional and ultra-conservative elements of the Shiite community of Lebanon" (Cottam, 1979:341)--Harakit Al-Mahroumeen, i.e.,

the Deprivds' Movement; further, as indicated before, the Shah sent his troops to Oman to crack down on what he called the "savage" people's radical movement of Dhofar (New York Times, 1975:47); and finally after the 1967 war between Israel and the Arabs, he cheered and backed the Israelis militarily. To cite one example related to the last case, in ". . . the 1968-79 'war of attrition,' during which the Israelis ran short of bombs for their air force . . . the Shah. . . provided Israel with 23,000 tons of bombs, all of which were dropped on Egyptian targets" (Newsweek, 1980:17). According to Helms (1981:188) the Shah ". . . had been heard to say that neither Israel nor Iran wanted to be surrounded and alone in a sea of Arabs."

(5) Where the committed nationalist leaders sacrificed for the cause of their people and took pains to preserve their riches and resources, the Shah, his family, and his elites milked the wealth of the Iranian nation. As early as the rise of Reza Shah, the Pahlavi family, through a variety of devices and excuses (e.g., pretended charity organizations, confiscations, commissions, royalties, tax loopholds, court-sheltered investments) exploited the country. To mention but one example, Newsweek (1979:44) reports that

After the Shah's successful campaign to quadruple OPEC's oil price in 1974, Iran's petroleum revenues ran between \$20 billion and \$30 billion a year. About \$1 billion of the gusher went into the royal coffers annually. For years, anyone wanting to do business in Iran routinely sought to include one or another royal relative in the profits, and the numerous family foundations had part or full interests in scores of banks, hotels, shipping companies and other enterprises. It was nearly impossible to say where Iran's wealth ended and the Pahlavi family's began (emphasis added).

Such an "imperial" intervention and orientation brought about

a new culture whose values were those of corruption, bribery, usury, embezzlement, scandal, favoritism, and nepotism all of which were better represented in the Iranians' habitual phrases--Parti Bazi (i.e., relations), Pool (i.e., money which implied bribery), and "Chapeedin" (i.e., "ripping-off"). Hence, the Court was "a rat race" and a "hive of corruption." In Hoveyda's words, ". . . the people were concerned that the roots of corruption grew out of court itself" (1980:60). Interestingly, the Iranian proverb, "Ab Az Sar Cheshmeh Gel-Aloud Ast" (i.e., the spring muddy at its origins), can best characterize the corrupt court.

More interestingly, the Shah's creation of a variety of military and civil "inspection" organizations, committees, and groups as well as their ineffectiveness was in itself the most ringing indication of the corrupt order. However, in that kind of "inspection" it was the powerless and the impoverished who were scapegoated so that the masses' tension would be diffused and challenged elsewhere. Thus, "the 'two-cultures' phenomenon in Iran (that is, different cultures for the elite and the masses) is largely a phenomenon of the Pahlavi period, before which there was a gradation but no sharp break between elite and popular cultures" (Richard, 1981:183). The non-popular but dominant culture was generally identified with "Hizar Family" (i.e., one thousand families) who constituted the inner circle and exploited the wealth of the nation. From the late 1950s, these families were target to a proposed law known as "Az Koja Avardai" (i.e., how you have obtained "it", the wealth). This recommended law, symbolizing the regime's ostensible desire for action against corruption, was never taken

seriously, because its actual target was the regime itself.

(6) Shifting propaganda emphasis from the White Revolution, to the National Independent Policy, and then to the Rastakhiz Party, the Shah finally, from 1976 on, stressed his utopian society--Tamaddon-e Bozorg (i.e., Great Civilization). But, "what then is this Great Civilization that I wanted for Iran?" The Shah's answer to this self-addressed question is this: "To me, it is an effort toward understanding and peace which creates the perfect environment in which everyone can work" (1980:176). According to the Shah, the Iranians would reap the fruit of such an ideal civilization by the mid 1980's, or as he later emphasized, by the turn of this century. Given the structural shortcomings that were discussed before, the Iranians were quick to realize the emptiness of the Shah's dream. They understood that his Great Civilization "was time wasted" and "his hobby-horse, his very own little invention, an imaginary world which was more real to him than reality" (Hoveyda, 1980:29). Belatedly, after his downfall, the Shah too came to realize that "Today, our Great Civilization may appear to have died for all time" (Pahlavi, 1980:190).

(7) While "the opposition ideology grew from the native values of Iran" (Dorman, 1979:65), the Shah's ideological values were lodged on imperial and dynastic aspirations which were generally shaped by and inclined toward the West and Westernization (e.g., Richards, 1975; Paarberg, 1978; Rouleau, 1980). Thus, while "middle Eastern ideology is . . . highly nationalistic" (Bill and Leiden, 1979:285), the Shah's ideological tendencies were oriented toward dynastic values and Western traditions. In fact, the Shah failed to create a viable ideological

base in his society. "His only defense is the loyalty of the armed forces and the efficacy of the security services" (Graham, 1979:211). He relied on a clique of the political and military elite of his own attitudinal nature who failed to circulate but were quick to disappear and split even before the Shah's forced abdication. Both the Shah's military tradition and powerful army, for whose build-up much resources were exhausted and national development plans were distorted (e.g., Time, 1978:40; Nickel, 1979:95-106; Cottam, 1979:333; Newsweek, 1980: 41-42), failed to operate properly and to secure the monarchy. In fact, the Shah and his military-political men were involved in a process of "self interest" but not in the interest of the people. Such a group of individuals is most likely to lose the game (Coser, 1956), and they did.

Finally, although "Nationalism per se demands no particular political orientation other than the unification of a people" (Lauer, 1978:200), the Shah's proposed nationalist values as well as his other ideological stands antagonized the people but unified them against the regime. "Indeed, the surprising feature is that. . . [the Shah's] policy has generated so little nationalistic excitement with Iran" (Cottam, 1979:337). Stated differently, ". . . the former Shah was remembered more generously by foreigners than by his own people" (Johnson, 1980:36).

In fact, the Shah's nationalistic failure was twofold. He failed (1) to truly identify himself with and (2) to accommodate Iran's non-Persian nationalities to Persian nationalism. This last failure

must be envisioned in the light of the ethnic strain that had been in the process of accumulation and eruption throughout the Pahlavi regime.

6. Ethnic Strain

Historically, Iran has been identified as a potpourri of tribes, ethnic and racial minorities who, in one way or another, had enjoyed "autonomous rule," "semi-dependent authority," "regional autonomy," or, in some cases and times, full independence. Such a circumstantial authority was also chrystalized in two Iranian official emblems: (a) the title Shahinshah," i.e., the King of (the other Iranian) Kings, as touched upon before, and (b) "Mimalik-e Mahrouseh Iran," i.e., the fortified states of Iran. The peoples of these states are either from different races (e.g., the Arabs, the Turkomans, the Turks) or are branches from the dominant Arayan race (e.g., the Kurds). They also have their defined languages or dialects (e.g., the Arabic, the Baluchi, the Kurdish, the Azari). To be sure, both the Baluchi and the Kurdish have a common root with the Persian language. These are branches of the Indo-Iranian family of languages. As a result, all of the concerned Iranian minorities must be defined as ethnic-linguistic minorities.

All of these minorities are Muslims and either belong to the official denomination of Shiism (e.g., the Arabs, the Turks, and the Kurds of Kirmanshah and Elaam) or are identified with Sunnism (e.g., the Baluchis, and the Kurds of Kurdistan and West Azarbijan). However, ninety percent of the Iranians are Shiite. Geographically, the target minorities are, in historical terms, settled in the following order. The Arabs reside in the Southwestern province of Khuzistan, the oil

rich area of Iran. There are, in fact, other Arab people, the Baseris, who reside in the Southern province of Fars and, with four Iranian tribes, constitute the tribal federation of Khamseh (i.e., the Five) (Frye, 1953:9). The Baluchis reside in the Southeast where, across the Iranian-Pakistani border, the Pakistani Baluchis live. The Kurds are settled in the west, the Turks in the northwest, and finally the Turkomans reside in the north of the country.

Although because of the regime's policies no statistics about the population size of ethnic minorities are available, these groups allegedly constitute one half of the total Iranian population. Beck (1980:14) states that "less than half of the total Iranian population of 35 million speaks Persian as a first language." Halliday (1978b:10) also emphasizes that "It is often forgotten that at least half of Iran's population is not Persian speaking."

According to the Iranian historian Ahmad Kasravi (1956/1977: 53), even the pure Persian "Eils" (i.e., tribes) under the Safavid's (1502-1747) central rule exercised some self-rule agreed-upon by the central government. Before the Safavids, Iran was a country of several independent states, and after the Safavid's era, the country also continued its segmentations though under semi-centralized authority. Indeed, the Iranians as a whole are more identified with their Eyalats (i.e., local states), provinces, counties, hometowns, and tribal origins than other kinds of identifications. An indication of this is the Iranians' last names which usually are derived from either their tribal/ethnic ancestors or place of birth or both.

To clarify, the extent of the authority exercised by minorities was usually determined by the strength of the central government and its ability at "conflict resolution." However, the conscription for the central army in times of crisis and, more importantly, the leveling of tax symbolized the general power pattern exercised over ethnic minorities. To be sure, tax was collected from the tribes' members and paid to the central government by the local governor, the tribal chief (i.e., Wali, Amir, or Khan). This procedure in itself indicated the sphere of influence of the tribal chiefs and the quality of governmental dominance over localities and ethnic communities. However, from the late nineteenth century, when the central government began to assume a "nation-state" pattern of governance, ethnic minorities came to realize that ". . . the policy of Theran [was] directed towards the gradual suppression of all semi-dependent authority in non-Persian hands, and the centralization of executive power" (Curzon, 1966:326). This policy later was incorporated in Iran's first Constitution of 1906-7. However, in terms of representation in the Parliament, the Constitution preserved minimum ethnic, local, or tribal rights for some minorities though within a unified and centralized Iran.

With Reza Shah's take-over, the ethnic minorities' traditional authority came under systematic challenge and finally was terminated. Frye (1953:8) notes that "Reza Shah (1925-1941) tried unsuccessfully to break their organization and settle them on the land, but the result was not only a near disaster for the tribes but a disrupted economy between townsmen and their source of meat, hides, and the like." In this respect two points must be made. First, in the classic literature,

ethnic minorities were mostly defined and categorized as scatter tribes with simple social organization. The evident flaw with this definition is that it overlooked both their ethnic-based political rights and their local authorities. Next, in fact, even prior to Reza Shah's era, all of the target minorities, or "tribal people," had already enjoyed a sedentary life. However, such a life was based on a pastoral, agricultural, and commercial mode of production in which feudalism and not industrialism was the prevailing pattern.

Throughout Reza Shah's rule none of these ethnic minorities ceased ethnic claims either in symbolic terms or in some kind of armed resistance. But, none of them obtained its traditional authority. Besides, all of them were subjected to systematic Persianization and at the same time were forced to abolish their ethnic traditions, especially the study of the native language (Afshar, 1927; Sykes, 1930; Lockhart, 1948).

After the fall of Reza Shah and in the wake of World War II, the Turks were somehow able to establish their Republic of Azirbijan in 1945. The Kurds also formed their Republic of Mehabad in 1945-6. Each of these, however, was torn down by the regime (e.g., Sykes, 1927; Roosevelt, 1947; William, 1963). With respect to the Arabs, "Khuzistan remained mostly Arab in population and Arabic language. . . .and after Reza Shah's abdication the Arab tribesmen there returned to their old dress and nomadic customs" (Forbis, 1980:251-2). In turn, they revolted against the central government, in 1945-6, and called for "incorporation" into the neighboring Arabian Iraq (e.g., Elwell-Sutton, 1955; Lenczowski,

1980). This rebellion too was crushed by the regime's authorities who used some rival Arab chieftains to suppress the movement. Consequently, many Arab leaders took refuge in Iraq, were killed in the confrontation, imprisoned, or exiled with their families to the north of Iran. Referring to this event Firzli notes that the Shah ". . . gave the order for sixteen of their chiefs to be buried alive to set an example so as to dissuade the population from other revolts" (1981:96).

As was the case under his father, under the Shah's government all these minorities were subjected to a two-fold policy--denial of any ethnic rights and Persianization. They were forcibly persuaded to get their education in the Persian language, to be recruited into the Army, and to be ruled by Persians or heterogeneous ethnic authorities. Meanwhile, they were prohibited from studying their own languages. Their traditional areas of residence were dismembered or incorporated into other areas and their populations were transformed and relocated. In this respect, some examples are worth mentioning. Instead of a unified traditional domain, the Kurds have been divided and relocated in different areas though within the historical part of their dominance. This new residency embraces four provinces in which the Kurds either mixed with others or separated from their own union.

They were settled in this way: (1) the Shiite Kurds were assigned to (2) Elam province with aggregates of the Shiite Lurs, and (b) to the Kirmanshah Province where they embrace the majority of the inhabitants. (2) The Sunni Kurds were settled in (2) Kurdistan province when they are a majority, and (b) in the Western Azirbian province with the Shiite Turks. The Turks, in turn, either were mixed with the

Sunni Kurds as said before, or settled in the Eastern Azarbijan province as the dominant majority. However, in the eyes of the Turks and the Kurds, Azirbijan and Kurdistan are unified Turkish and Kurdish areas respectively. The Baluchis, who are Sunni, were identified with their Baluchistan as a traditional realm of residence and influence, but in the recent governmental divisions they were annexed to other Persians from Sistan to form, together, the Sistan-Baluchistan province.

The case of the Arabs is also interesting. The Arabs had been in the very southwest of Iran adjacent to Iraq. They came to this area "in successive waves from the Arabian Peninsula well before Islam" (Firzli, 1981:49). However, before the Islamic era there were ancient Persians who lived in the very northeast of the area. With the Islamization of Iran in 600's, the Arabs designated the name Al-Ahwaz (i.e., "appropriation) to their region. In the ancient texts and maps this name as well as the designation "the Arabs" were used interchangeably in referring to this territory and its people (e.g., Curzon, 1966). According to Kasrawi (1356/1977:46-47), with the emergence of the powerful Safavid dynasty (1502-1737), the Arabian area was officially given the Arabic-Persian designation of Arabistan (i.e., the land of the Arabs) by the Safavid kings in reference to its inhabitants. Kasravi (156/1977:257F) also argues that although this designation meant but the western part of the region in which the Arabian Moucha'chi state was in order, it finally covered all territories of the region including the Persian-dominated places. The Arab dominance continued until the early 1920's. In 1923, the would-be Reza Shah modified the name of Arabistan to Khuzistan (i.e., the land of the Khuz). The Khuz, pre-

sumably, were a Persian people who once lived somewhere in the very northwestern frontier of the area long before the dawn of Islam. In 1925, Reza Shah somehow was able to overthrow the ruler of Arabistan, Shiekh Khazal, and began Persianization devices. These events had severe consequences and the following are examples.

First, the Arab's overwhelming population came under gradual challenge by Persians whose immigration has always been encouraged by the rapid development of the oil industry in the area (e.g., Curzon, 1966; Cottam, 1979:110-111). However, until now the Arabs have not been outnumbered by the Iranians. Second, the Arab's cities and towns such as A'bbadan, Al-Ahwaz, Al-Hwaizeh, Al-Dawraq/Al-Falaheiah, Khour-Mousa, Al-Khafajeiah, M'ashure, and Al-Mohammareh were given Persian names (e.g., the Iranian Academy of Language, 1353/1974), or "Persianized" names based on Persian phonetics. Such a phonetic shade of difference between the Arabic and Persian languages caused the affected names a loss of etymological meaning and pure Arabic identity. Third, the Arabs were denied the right to study their Arabic language and at the same time were compelled to study the Persian language systematically (e.g., Afshar, 1927). Fourth, the Arabs were conscripted into the army. Finally, the Arabs were constantly subjected to disarmament even though they were not approved to be armed.

Economically, ethnic minorities, especially in the rural areas, suffered under the Pahlavi's centralized rule. The Baluchis reside in the most arid and the least developed region of Iran. As a result, they ". . . have the lowest standard of living and per capita income of any part of the economy" (Halliday, 1979a:224). In the early 1970's, after

years of negligence and downplay, the regime somehow implemented some short-term local development projects to improve their deteriorating economic conditions. Yet, in Summer of 1979, the Provisional Prime Minister Madhi Bazirgan (1979:8), after a short visit to the region, declared that, short of "bread," the Baluchi (and Sistani) people "fed on grass." Concerning the Turkomans' situation Tymaz (1358/1979:15-25) stresses the miserable life of this people who also experienced "forced labor" under the authorities "whipping." As Algar indicates, "A particularly glaring example was in Khuzistan, which was the source of the major wealth of the country through the oil industry. One finds that the oil workers in Abadan, most of whom are Arab, ethnically speaking, lived in the most miserable conditions" (1981:109). Due to such impoverishment, many of the ethnic minorities, especially from rural backgrounds, migrated to different areas within and beyond the Iranian territories, including Iraq, Kuwait, and the Persian Gulf Emirates.

Politically, ethnic minorities lived also under suppressive measures. Beck (1980:15) notes that "those of tribal affiliation were not usually represented in government, except for some tribal elites, most of which did not represent tribal concerns but, rather their own class and personal interests." In fact, those "tribal elites" who rose to power were, especially from the early 1960's on, backed by and identified with the Court and SAVAK connections, but not ethnic affiliations. They were feudals and on the whole did not work for ethnic causes and ideals. Nevertheless, beginning from the early 1940's, the Kurds formed their Kurdish Nationalist Society, Kumelh, in 1943, and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran in 1945 (Roosevelt, 1947). The Turks

also created their Azirbijan Democratic Party in 1944 (Lenczowski, 1980) which merged with the Tudeh Party of Iran in 1960 (Halliday, 1979a:225).

As early as 1924, the Arabs created the Saadeh (i.e., happiness) Insurrection Committee (Kasravi, 1356/1977:236), or the Saadeh Coalition "created by Sheikh Khazaal with neighboring tribes in order to resist Reza Shah" (Firzli 1981:97F). In 1958, they formed the Front of the Liberation of Ahwaz (Halliday, 1979a:223) or the Front of the Liberation of Arabistan which was followed by, merged with, and remerged from other political fronts all of which claimed ethnic ideals and worked for liberation (e.g., Al-Heloo, 1966; Firzli, 1981:95-98). The Baluchis, in turn, came up with their Baluchistan People's League which claimed ethnic rights and also the union of the Baluchi people across the Pakistani-Iranian border (Halliday, 1979a:224-5).

All of these ethnic-organizations worked underground but somehow did not achieve their ideals in practical terms. In fact, the regime's pressures and its anti-ethnic devices such as land dismemberment and annexation, systematic Persianization and constant prohibition against studying native languages, functioned to (a) loosen ethnic bonds within ethnicities, and (b) at the same time caused conflicts both within and between ethnic minorities and the dominant majority as well. Indeed, this was what the regime meant by such a "divide-and-rule" policy. However, in symbolic terms, ethnic political organizations served several ends such as awakening, energizing, and mobilizing ethnic groups for days to come. In sum, ethnic activism, though mostly subterranean, helped the prolongation of ethnic claims in the absence of ethnic-based authority.

Thus, in terms of political liberty, economic equality, and cultural plurality, all the Iranian ethnic minorities were deprived under the Shah's regime. However, they would not be discriminated against if they did not claim ethnic rights or seek political privileges through ethnic channels. The Pahlavis failed to assimilate ethnic minorities into the dominant Persian culture and to overcome the problem in the sense of Persian-conformity. They also failed to manage for a "melting pot" solution in which all the involved cultures together would evolve into a new blend (Gordon, 1964:34-51). Interestingly, even the religion of Islam could not help the creation of such a blend among ethnic minorities and the Persian society, all of which were Muslim.

The regime also prevented the evolution of a pluralist solution, for none of the ethnic languages were allowed to be studied systematically and to be used intellectually. This, however, was the major reason for the fact that all Iran's ethnic minorities, with the exception of some Turkish elements, added nothing significant to the wholesale Iranian literature and written culture--neither in their own nor in the Persian languages. In fact, by studying the Persian language, either by force or by persuasion, ethnic minorities sought more job careers than academic/intellectual expressiveness.

On the other hand, among all Iran's minorities, ethnic minorities were the least privileged. Indicative of this is the fact that the Iranian religious minorities (i.e., the Christians, the Jews, the Zoroastrians) had constitutional rights of political representation. The first two religious groups were also allowed to study their cultural

heritage and historical background in their own languages and in their own private schools. This, however, was enjoyed up to the high school level and was practiced along with the Iranian official curriculum. To be sure, the Zoroastrians did not need such a privilege for they are ancient Persians. Thus, "Tribal populations, as well as ethnic nationalities in Iran, were denied many national rights under the Pahlavis and were victims of Persian Chauvinism" (Beck, 1980:16). A member from the Turkish ethnicity, Baraheni, emphasizes that "The people of the country are being alienated from their cultural and ethnic roots and thus from their identity" (1976:5).

Finally, such a systematic alienation and persisting frustration had always accumulated tension and strain. In the revolutionary episodes of 1978-9 it might be observed that at least half of the participants demonstrated for a two-fold purpose: the downfall of the Shah's regime and at the same time the acquisition of their ethnic ideals under a new political order. The depth of their strain and the breadth of their hope can be better realized if one observes their militant ethnic demands which burst right after the eruption of the Iranian Revolution and are still ablaze.

In addition to (1) the imposition of such ethnically strainful conditions, (2) the absence of a defined ideology, (3) the monopolization of power and valued offices, and (4) the escalation of economic inequality, the Shah's regime was also identified with and suffered from a legitimation problem to be discussed below.

7. The Problem of Legitimacy

"Many of the concepts used in theories of revolution--such as

. . . 'legitimacy'. . .--refer to complex and multifaceted phenomena that elude precise definitions" (Salert, 1976:19-20). The essence of this problem is the two intertwined questions of "power" and "authority." In tradition, sociologists owe the distinction between power and authority to Weber (1947) who defined authority (Herrschaft) as legitimate power and power (Macht) as the ability to exercise one's will over others in spite of their resistance. What then legitimizes power, or how does power get legitimated, to be exerted as authority by elites is, indeed, the problematic issue.

Thomas Hobbes (1980), whose major interest was "the problem of order" at large and the emergence of the "state," argued that in order to get rid of their chaotic "state of nature" people made a "contract" based on which their state of affairs should be regulated by Leviathan or an authorized body. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1981) claimed that such a contract was made on the assumption that people would be able to return to their original normative and pacific "state of nature" after it has been disturbed by the practice of private property. This practice began with the ownership of "a piece of ground" and resulted in severe competition and finally "crime, wars, and murders." John Locke, in turn, stated that "If a government violated this trust, the contract was broken, and the people had the right to rebel in order to restore their freedom" (Robertson, 1981:501).

In the modern sociological explanation of authorized power and the whole problem of legitimacy, the functionalists (e.g., Parsons, 1964:1968; Davis and Moore, 1945; Blau, 1964) observe that what actually legitimates the exercise of power is the common consensus among people

who assign power to a group of individuals, the elites, to manage society. This consensus is based on the shared values and norms which are internalized, through the process of socialization, into the individual Consciousness and are objectified in certain institutions, agencies, and arrangements. However, if "the rules of the game" are violated by the elites, power deflates and legitimacy is challenged. Hence, a "revolutionary change" for order restoration and reintegration is likely (Johnson, 1966). In this sense, conflict is seen as "functional" in that it reproduces social cohesion and legitimizes the use of power anew (Coser, 1956). However, conflict and class struggle are not the rules of social life but the exception.

On the other hand, the radical conflict theorists (e.g., Marx and Engels) view social life as historically immersed in conflict and overwhelmed by the practice of power in the hands of the few. Therefore, power is not legitimate by the prevailing values for they pertain to the dominant class. Power will be authorized only after a sweeping socialist revolution erupts. Such a drastic change will put power in the hands of the many, the whole society in fact. Hence, in the ultimate, conflict will have no place in the true communist society. Dahrendorf (1959) understands that conflict is an ever-lasting phenomenon and is based on several interests, including economic concerns. Under certain conditions, discussed before, a politically deprived group overthrows the powerful suppressive group and, in turn, is itself ultimately challenged. Therefore, those who rise to power in conflictual situations are taken for granted as legitimate rulers. In this context, Wrong (1980:89) charges that conflict theorists "neglect the interaction and mutual

influence between legitimacy and coercion in stable power relations." More specific criticism is developed in the sense that, if in a given conflict situation that subordinates view the authority relationship as legitimate, why then would they ever want to rebel? (Turner, 1973).

However, the nature, the limits, and the manifestations of the exercised power as authority, as well as the question of legitimation/de-legitimation, remain paradoxical in ethical, philosophical, and sociological terms, both in theory and in practice. Nevertheless, in the final analysis of this problem two questions must be advanced. First, are power wielders agreed-upon through a socially defined measures (e.g., free election)? Second, if such arrangements are initially lacking, do those who assume power (e.g., through a military coup) justify and legalize their accession to power by means of, say, honest sacrifice for the cause of the people? With all these considerations in mind, the legitimacy of the Shah's rule is approached and assessed. To be sure, this assessment is attempted in the realization that "A lack of nationalistic legitimacy had not proved important enough to bring down the regime, but it had denied it depth of support" (Cottam, 1979:338).

The Shah's critics, cited throughout, have, in one way or another, pointed out "the Unconstitutionality Side" of his regime, characterized by abuse of authority. Kissinger notes that "In Iran, whatever the dynasty, the authority of governance ultimately resided in the remoteness of the emperor: it was his historical strength, as well as his weakness. Without doubt the Shah was an authoritarian ruler. . . . This was for a time the source of his strength just as it became later a cause of his downfall" (1979:1259). The "emperor," in fact,

traversed the defined limits of his authority and used forceful means to reach his ends. However, "Force is a source of power, but it can have longer range effectiveness only when it is linked to a principle of legitimacy" (Huntington, 1968:269). To scrutinize the Shah's misuse of power, it is also necessary to go back to the promulgation of Iran's first Constitution of 1906-7, which envisaged a "constitutional monarchy" modeled on the Belgium tradition.

In 1921, the Shah's father, through a British-designed coup, took over and later, in 1925, overthrew the constitutional dynasty and founded his own. This attempt may be considered the first constitutional violation on behalf of the Pahlavis. Yet, it might be argued that, given the incompetency of the Qajar's regime, this violation was "functional" for the people and hence tolerable. But this can be contrasted with the fact that (1) Reza Shah's coup was backed by foreigners and therefore caused foreign intervention in national destiny; (2) the coup was also based on personal ambitions and speculations and not necessarily the interests of the people, as it later became evident.

One may also counter-argue that Reza Shah initially proposed a republic system for Iran, but the Iranians ". . . preferred to maintain the traditional institution of the Shah, and felt that it would protect their interests" (Shmuelewitz, 1979:37). Therefore, even after his coup, had Reza Shah kept in line with the Constitutional principles, his regime would not have been judged as dictatorial and suppressive and hence illegitimate. But he did not. This saga, however, might be considered as a historical base of the questionable legality of Reza Shah's successor, his son, the Shah.

As the Allies overthrew Reza Shah and appointed his son as his substitute, the second constitutional violation occurred. Specifically, although this power transformation in favor of the "Crown Prince" was consistent with the Constitution, in the process, the will of the Iranian people was not incorporated at all. Hence, in principle, the Shah's accession to power might be considered as imposed and finally unconstitutional. However, from the late 1940's, the Shah began to exercise power beyond the limits, and this is why he was forcefully persuaded to rule constitutionally. But, as was the case with his father, the Shah too executed a coup, this time designed by the Americans, and cast down the legal and popular government of Mossadeq. Further, as also stated in the historical narrative, the Shah altered the Constitution three times, two of which had nothing to do with the cause of the people but rather were in the interest of the Pahlavi family.

Practically, the Shah denied the constitutional rights of the people in the sense of freedom of speech, press, and assembly. These rights were assumed and emphasized in the 1906-7 Constitution (Articles 8-25). He accumulated and monopolized all the executive, legislative, and judicial powers and deprived his opposition, indeed his people, of these scarce but valued resources. By Zonis' analogy, "If government in the United States is in theory 'of the people, by the people and for the people,' and in practice, 'of the people, by a political elite, for the people,' as all governments to some degree must be, then the government of Iran historically has been and continues to be 'of, by, and for the elite'" (1971:133). In fact, in addition to their deprivation of constitutional rights, the Iranians were also required

to comply to what was not Constitutional, the best example of which was the compulsory membership in the Shah's Resurgence Party.

Ideologically, the Iranians, including the overwhelming majority of the religious leaders and scholars, did not reject the institution of the constitutional monarchy, and the promulgation of Iran's first Constitution is the evidence to cite. This institution, of course, must recognize the right of the religious leaders to supervise legislation and to accommodate them to the Islamic principles as discussed earlier. However, the radical Shiite religious leaders and scholars hold that monarchy and the royal power are neither divine nor inherent. If he is in order, the monarch, as an authorized individual and not a paramount sovereign, functions only on trust on behalf of the Hidden Imam. Still, since in the absence of the Hidden Imam the most qualified religious leaders are in charge of the well-being of the Islamic community, the monarch should operate under the guidance of these leaders, as surrogates (Algar, 1966; 1981; 6-23). Therefore, in this theological scheme, the Shah may be legitimate as an individual ruler, and this legitimacy does not descend automatically.

From another viewpoint, Della Fave (1980:956) specifies that legitimacy can apply to at least four system levels: (1) the particular status occupied by a particular individual or group, (2) a particular regime in power, (3) a particular system of political economy, and (4) a particular system of stratification. In Shah's Iran, as discussed previously, the problem of legitimation is relevant at each system level. This contention may also be specified by these concluding remarks. First, the Shah, egotistically, like Charles I of England, Louis XVI of France, Nicholas II of the Czarist Russia,

and the Manchu rulers of China, idealized himself and identified his legitimacy with a self-proclaimed "divine mission" or the "mandate of heaven." In effect, he emphasized what had caused the collapse of Louis XVI more than two hundred years ago: L'Etat, C'est Moi.

Second, as indicated before, "In theory, the Shah observed the 1906 Constitution. . . . In practice, the Constitution only served as a point of reference when convenient" (Graham, 1979:131). In this respect, "Historically, the Pahlavi regime had come to power and maintained its position by coups, thereby crushing the democratic opposition and violating the Constitution" (Halliday, 1979b:85). Third, as Revel (1981:22) observes ". . . when it's a question of the Third World, the notion of responsibility disappears completely. This is even more unjustified in that the large majority of Third World leaders took power through coups or administer totalitarian systems. Their sole legitimacy, if one can call it that, is derived from results obtained after the fact" (emphasis added). In the Shah's case, the "results," as discussed earlier, were not promising. Hence, on the ground of the above reasoning, the Shah failed to take action to legitimize his own take-over and the ensuing totalitarian tradition.

Fourth, the Iranians as a whole did not break the constitutional "contract" based on which Iran's nation-state could operate. This was evident in the nationalist movement of the early 1950's, the uprising of the early 1960's, and the early claims during the episodes of 1978-9 in which what was demanded at first was the return to the 1906 Constitution. Indeed, it was the monarch who violated the so-to-speak "consensus." Fifth, by power abuse and economic mismanagement

the regime widened the gaps between social classes and favored the upper over the lower strata. In such a stratification system, both equal opportunity and political liberty were in short supply, but economic inequality was prevailing.

Finally, as Time (1978:40) indicates, the Shah ". . . ruled as an absolute monarch--no matter how worthy his goals--and depended on repressive measures to keep the disparate forces in line. . .," and it is said that "Power corrupts, but absolute power corrupts absolutely" (Lord Acton). Thus, one is justified in concluding that the Revolution of Iran was ". . . preceded by an erosion of the legitimacy of the existing system" (Robertson, 1981:480), and as Lipste (1959:78) notes, "a crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of change" (emphasis added).

In the following section, this discussion of the causes of the Iranian Revolution, as demonstrated in the narrative and analytical accounts, will be concluded.

D. Conclusion

In the preceding accounts, it was argued that the Shah's regime was identified with five fundamental failures (i.e., economic injustice, political oppression, ideological illusion, ethnic strain, and legitimacy crisis) all of which must be considered as independent variables that jointly brought about the Revolution. The current concern is threefold. First, what, in a narrow but inclusive scheme, put an end to the Shah's era? Here, the Shah's modernization will be assessed and emphasized as the sixth and last variable that also contributed to his downfall. Second, how did the Shah's seemingly healthy and actually wealthy state fail finally to resist or curb the challenge? Here,

two factors will be considered--the Shah's alienation, and the strength of his opposition. It is hypothesized that each of these factors facilitated but, unlike the other variables, did not cause the Revolution. Finally, where, after all, does the "Islamic Revolution of Iran" fit in the sociological theory of social movements in the current time?

1.The All-encompassing Cause of the Revolution

In this context, some relevant speculations about the overall cause of the Shah's collapse can be arrayed as follows.

(1) Bordewich (1980:66) holds that, "The Shah tried to telescope hundreds of years of Western social, economic, political, and (implicitly) psychological change into a forced march of twenty-five years. . . . But by so doing he put in motion the same forces that generated fascist reaction in Europe, dynamic capitalism corroding a passive, traditional economy; the individualism inspired by industrialization competing with a constricting web of medieval relationships; indigenous values versus half-understood foreign ones."

(2) Rejecting charges that his human rights emphasis contributed to the Shah's departure, President Carter (1981:A10) notes that "I don't believe that the point out of the need to honor the rights of his people caused his downfall. If there was a cause, it was because he failed to honor the demands of his own people."

(3) Cottam (1979:354) understands that "Mass receptivity for protest, even violent protest, against the regime was a consequence of the deep economic distress most Iranians were experiencing because of the uncontrolled inflation."

(4) Fischer (1980:190) indicates that "The causes of the

revolution, and its timing, were economic and political; the form of the revolution, and its pacing, owed much to the tradition of religious protest."

(5) Graham (1980:229) observes that "There are at least six main reasons why this dramatic end came with such bewildering speed: (1) The Shah underestimated the strength of the opposition. (2) The concessions made to the opposition were always too late and inadequate. (3) All his actions suffered from a lack of credibility. (4) His close ties with the U.S. allowed nationalist sentiment to brand him as an American puppet. (5) His personalized system of government prevented him from distancing himself from any errors committed. (6) He became too dependent upon the military for his survival and was subject to their hardline pressure."

(6) Halliday (1979b:88) notes that ". . . the major causes of the revolution were (a) the denial of the basic political rights of the population and (b) the socially unequal and increasingly inefficient manner in which the state was managing the economy."

(7) Abrahamian (1980:23) contends that ". . . the structural tensions were aggravated not by modernization per se, but by the way the modernization was implemented and by the fact that the capitalist method of modernization invariably benefits the rich more than the rest of society."

(8) Godsell (1980:12) argues that "By the second half of the decade, the polity of Iran proved unable to digest what was being forced on it. Boom turned into bust."

(9) Kissinger (1979:1259) emphasizes that "One of the prime

causes of his [the Shah's] disaster, in fact, was that he modernized too rapidly. . . ."

(10) Ledeen and Lewis (1980:9-11) speculate these "symptoms of crisis" which "Iran had long demonstrated:" demographic dislocation, lack of adequate social services, the growth of a hostile middle class, growing vacillation of the Shah, concentration of strength in the hands of the religious leaders, and the hostility of the Bazaaris.

(11) Summarizing a one-thousand-page report by the State Department on the revolutionary crisis of Iran, Armstrong (1980:A18) draws this conclusion: "Affluence resulting from the 1973-74 quadrupling of the price of oil had led to double-digit inflation, caused mass migration from the countryside to the cities, served to break up the traditional Islamic family and cultural patterns of the society, and had raised expectations throughout the populace. Furthermore, widespread corruption in high places was universally recognized and despised. While such corruption 'unfortunately permeated the traditional Iranian social system,' it nevertheless made many in the society 'cynical,' according to the report."

(12) Lenoczowski (1980:224) notes that "The Iranian political system was subjected to serious strains that could briefly be called 'the King's dilemma,' namely how to reconcile modernization in the social and economic sectors with a lack of corresponding progress in the political sector."

(13) Robertson (1981:614) notes that ". . . a sudden influx of oil wealth, combined with an autocratic Shah's attempt to transform a backward nation into an industrial and military power, provoked a

violent revolution, a return to more fundamentalist religious principles, a new feeling of Iranian nationalism and continuing political disagreement between traditionalists and those favoring renewed modernization."

(14) In her Roots of Revolution, Keddie (1981:276), approaches the Iranian Revolution historically and reaches this conclusion:

Iranians see foreign powers, which recently meant mainly the Americans, as using them for their own purposes; always for Iran's strategic role, with the hope of scoring gains and stopping gains by others, chiefly the Russians; in the twentieth century for oil; and by the Americans also as a gendarme of the region against Soviet or Communist advance. Foreign governments have also promoted exports, investments, construction of infrastructure, and banking by their nationals or governments in Iran. As noted, huge American sales of arms, agricultural equipment, high technology, and consumer goods inadvertently helped destabilize Iran's economy and contributed to the Iranian Revolution. However wrong and self-defeating have many of the methods and policies used in Iran since that Revolution, one may understand the Iranians' widespread desire to demonstrate their release from foreign control and foreign ways and to build up an economy, society, and culture that are independent or freely interdependent, rather than subordinate to Western powers.

As the above speculations about the root cause of the Iranian Revolution suggest, the Shah's "disaster" (which in fact means the explosion of the Revolution) was caused by the Shah's modernization enterprise. This endeavor was associated with both foreign dominance and internal displacement. Therefore, the Shah's modernization must be assessed in regard to its nature, scope, direction, and more importantly its cost for the Iranians. But first it is useful to understand the meaning of modernization as it is linked to industrialization. Lauer (1978:19) notes that ". . . industrialization may be viewed as an essential economic pattern of development, while modernization refers to the social and political changes that are often, though not necessarily, associated with industrialization."

However, at both scholarship and leadership levels the two

phenomena have mostly been blurred by ideological viewpoints or practical perplexities. It is then not surprising to contend that "Rare were those who suggested that modernity is not necessarily synonymous with progress or well-being, or that the concepts of economic development current in the West--where quick material gain is often the only valid criterion--does not necessarily correspond to the true needs and interests of developing nations" (Rouleau, 1980:1). In this line of debate, the Shah was not only among the leading rulers of the Third World who were overwhelmed by the ideal of industrialization-modernization, but he also was the ruler who took the leading role in this process. In his approach to progress, growth, development, territorial dominance, and regional influence, industrialization was a preoccupation per se. Meanwhile, what industrialization signified to him was modernization par excellence.

The Shah's industrialization was (1) identified with poor infrastructure and hesitant planning, (2) characterized by assembly and not manufacturing enterprises, (3) dependent on imported know-how and technology, and (4) developing at the cost of the country's agriculture, widening social gaps, and cultural disarrangement. If modernization in the political sphere, as Huntington (1966:378-414) holds, is characterized by (a) rational authority, (b) increased participation in the political process, and (c) differentiated political structure, under the Shah's rule, none of these were met. National authority was, in fact, a centralized and monopolized power; mass participation was not allowed; and the political structure symbolizing differentiation in the national structure was confined to a class of elites who, in turn, were dominated by a single family--the Pahlavis.

What was worse, the Shah equated modernization with Westernization. Thus, his downfall must be attributed to the Westernization of a pre-industrial society which was (and still is) bound to religious, ethnic, tribal, nationalistic and historical values from which it was traumatic to detach. These values, however, are not necessarily contradictory to, or in conflict with, those of the Western societies, though from the late 19th century on they have been severely challenged by the West. With respect to European colonialism, all the Muslim societies were colonized directly or otherwise. After achieving their independence, these societies were encompassed by neo-colonialism and imperialism, with increasing economic, political, military, technological and cultural influence over and interference in domestic arrangements. Imperialism imposed itself on the developing nations as a successor to colonialism with a legacy of the same tastes and interests but with different means and devices. In this course, the United States of America has played the dominant role. Hence, the Iranians' pun "Miras-Khwar-e Isteamar"(i.e., the heir of colonialism) which appeared as a title of the Iranian writer Mehdi Bahar (1344/1965).

While the circumstances were not conducive, the Shah, with "full speed" but in the "wrong direction," pushed his society toward a Western-style of life, mode of production, and even psychological coloration. As an example, ". . .in his relentless pursuit of Western-style modernization, the Shah imported fleetloads of western technology and technocrats, but he was never able to trust his own people to run his new society" (Newsweek, 1980:41). The Shah's motive for Westernization was deeply rooted in his own personality. It is observed that "Though

his Swiss schooling helped to rid him of his father's provincialism, it created a cultural schizophrenia--an admiration for and fascination with Western culture, technology and institutions. . . (Graham, 1979:58).

Moreover, while the Shah had a Western-type society in mind, in reality his Westernization was the ". . . Americanization of Iranian military and political elites" (Paarberg, 1978:24), and, in the end the Americanization of the Iranian society at large. The Shah's modernization, as Ahmad (1979:7) observes, went through two stages "both under American tutelage." In the first stage (1949-1968), "with the brief interregnum of Mossadegh's government," the modernization of the police forces, gendarmerie, bureaucracy, and the armed forces took place and the SAVAK was created. In the second stage, which began in 1970, Iran's modernization witnessed a transformation into a "regional power."

By his accelerating move toward a Western and especially an American way of life, the Shah undermined the traditional attitudes and ideological interests of the nationalist, religious, and communist who for several reasons could not afford Americanization. The religious community saw the American symbolic and practical influence on Iran, as well as the American secularism, as uprooting and intolerable. This was justified and reinforced by two factors. First was the Americans' persistent support of Israel at the cost of the "oppressed Palestinians" whose dilemma has become more a humanitarian problem than ethnic, religious, or ideological. Second, the prevailing feature of the American culture that deliberately was imported to Iran was ethically corrupt and lacked substance even by American standards. Asked "How was Western culture perceived in Iran during the Shah's rule," Clinton, a specialist

on Iran, replied that "It was almost a caricature of our civilization as we know it. When I was there, it was embarrassing to see Peyton Place in Persian. Movies and TV gave the impression that the West was totally materialistic, selfish, and consumer-oriented. Conservative Iranian Muslims saw their sons and daughters corrupted by these influences from the West. They felt powerless" (1979:70-71).

The nationalist Iranians, especially those who were associated with Mossadeq's nationalist movement and the National Front, had already suffered from the CIA's liquidation of the movement and their resultant political captivity at the hands of the regime. Needless to say, the Leftist groupings, from whatever ideological origins, could not adhere to and did not accept the Iranian society to be modeled on a capitalist system in which the ownership of the means of production was in the hands of the exploitative bourgeoisie class, and at the cost of the proletariat labor and toil--as the Marxist premises go. Thus, the Shah's version of modernization intensified the resentment and the unification of different forces who, in spite of their parallels, had also their own ideological contrasts (which surfaced immediately after the take-over). In other words, ". . . the association of the Shah's regime with Western culture, commodities, and vices brought on a traditionalist reaction even among many former Westernizers, which often took an Islamic form" (Keddie, 1980:182).

Interestingly, as early as 1961 the Shah himself professed and stressed the problems endemic to a blind Westernization. He wrote

Especially in a country with such venerable traditions as ours, rapid change naturally brings its strains and stress. These are the prices we must pay for Westernization and modernization. But I do not propose that we abandon our great heri-

tage. On the contrary, I have every confidence that we can enrich it. Religion and philosophy, art and literature, science and craftsmanship--all will prosper more as we develop our economy so that the common people of this ancient land can enjoy all the essentials of life. Instead of the few flourishing at the expense of the many, they will do so with the many. Selective and judicious Westernization can help us towards the goal of democracy and shared prosperity; that is why I refer to it as our welcome ordeal (Pahlavi, 1961:160).

But, in the course of action, he came to think of Iran as an "extrapolation" of the contemporary Western society and attempted to shape it that way. He ignored certain facts in the progress. First, the path to social change is neither unidirectional nor is Western society the ultimate alternative to social evolution (e.g., Moore, 1967; Hoffer, 1952; Lerner, 1958; Rander, 1967; Etzioni and Etzioni, 1973; Lauer, 1978; Vago, 1980). Second, "Where the West has had some four centuries to adjust to the far-reaching tradition from an agrarian to an industrial society, the non-Western world has had a bare century in which to absorb an intruding and dynamic civilization" (Benda, 1971:39). With the increasing petrodollars, the Shah thought that such a time gap would be bridged easily and abruptly. Third, "The momentum of change which in the West had largely stemmed from within, has been imposed on the non-Western world from without" (Benda, 1971:38). Even if managed acutely, such an imposed change would cause psychological displacement and material discrepancies.

Fourth, even if the Western society is taken for granted as a prototype, it cannot be traced and copied without regard to domestic situational arrangements. Otherwise, the pre-industrial society cannot receive, assimilate, and digest whatever is injected to it. Realizing this problem, even some of the Shah's intellectuals repeated and printed

in his press: "Danish-e Garb Ne Rah-e Hal hay-e Gharbi" (i.e., Iran must adapt the West's science and technology but not the Western solutions). By his individualistic ambitions, ideological illusion, and the erroneous definition of the situation, the Shah, consciously or otherwise, attempted to destroy, and to an extent destroyed, a socio-economic structure and a religious, cultural, and political system that required adjustment to the reality of today but not displacement. In this illusory approach, he, in fact, overexploited the tendencies of many Iranian strata who looked for and were exposed to modernization. Meanwhile, he overlooked the attitudes of other strata who could not trade their own way of life for that of others--The Westerners. The Shah's enterprise then exemplified the contention that "Destruction of the traditional structure is far easier than the long reconstruction of the new, a period in which few rulers have survived for long" (Bayne, 1965: 256)--but the Shah has not.

Therefore, it was disruption and not consistency that shocked the Iranian society to break down its political system. Such a destructive shock was, in fact, the cost of the Shah's modernization. It is argued that, in the developing nations, the cost of modernization is characterized by ". . .the disrupted traditions, the breakup of families and villages, the impact of vast economic and social forces that can neither be understood nor adapted to in terms of inherited wisdom and ways of living" (Bella, 1976:337). Iran's Shah was no exception.

Nevertheless, whatever the substance, the magnitude, the direction, and the cost of the Shah's modernization, it actually contributed to the awakening of Iranians and finally the breakdown of the

regime itself. Although, the Shah's modernization strained the Iranian people, it furthered their political consciousness and raised their expectations for a better life or a different path to the existing realities, including the reality of modernization.

With their riches, historical backgrounds, growing middle-classes, expanding education, and spreading communication at both national and international levels, the Iranians came to realize further that Iran would be better-off under a new political system. It is observed that the "revolution of rising expectations" has become possible by means of "The spread of communication system throughout the world. . . . And so the economic achievements, primarily those in the consumer sector, which once had been a distant dream or not even thought of, are now passionately demanded" (Brigitte Berger, 1979:50-51).

Peter Berger and associates view the introduction of modernization into the traditional societies and the reaction to it as a "Collision of Consciousness." They note, "The new images of modernity inevitably collide with the symbols, values, and beliefs of traditional society" (1973:141). However, in the 1970s, the Urban Iranian society, which constituted some 50 percent of the total population, was not a traditional society strictly attached to the past and shocked by the future. Nor was it at the gates of industrialization as the Shah and his elites exaggerated. Realistically, it was in a transitional phase from traditionalism to industrialism, though not in a Western sense.

It might be adduced and argued that radical social changes are less likely to occur in two types of societies, industrialized and traditional. In the industrial societies rapid economic and technolo-

logical changes are occurring and the democratic tradition is in progress. As a result, ". . . aggressive movements in a democracy seldom reach revolutionary proportions partly because there are so many of them" (May, 1943:191). In traditional societies, similarities are prevalent, class structure is mostly intact, stratum consciousness, in active political terms, is absent, and, in a word, structural conduciveness for radical action is not present. Hence, it is in the process of take-off from traditionalism to industrialization/modernization that the probability of revolutionary changes might be sought. This likelihood is substantiated by the fact that, in the transitional phase, societies undergo, with a differentiated preference, a three-fold process simultaneously: (a) the maintenance of the old, (b) the adoption of the new, and (c) the accommodation and coordination of the two. In this course, a government's strategic failure may cause a drastic reaction by the involved society.

Finally, the Shah's modernization, for reasons discussed above, is considered as the sixth and last variable which interacted with the other five variables (i.e., economic injustice, political repression, nonexistence of unifying ideology, ethnic strain, and legitimation crisis) to cause jointly the Revolution. This interaction, however, was twofold. On the one hand, the Shah's modernization caused cultural alienation and, on the other, it helped the culturally alienated groupings to advance political awareness, to further claim valued offices and resources, and to intensify their struggle in the process. Still, two more factors facilitated (though were not an origin of) the Revolution. They are discussed below.

2.Strength versus Decay

To shed more light on the Shah's collapse and the occurrence of the Revolution, further speculations are necessary. To be sure, these are not associated with the root of the Iranian Revolution but are connected with (a) the regime's failure to realize the progressing dissidence (and to diffuse it deliberately), and (b) the growing strength of the opposition. Both of these factors facilitated but did not cause the Revolution.

a.The Shah's Alienation. In this context, it might be asked why the Shah failed to realize and resist a sweeping change while (1) he defined himself as "supermodern" ruler, (2) he ruled a rich and wealthy country, (3) he identified with a society that had been associated (and some may argue adapted to) a monarchical tradition for 2500 years, (4) he enjoyed the support of a strong well-equipped army, (5) he was backed by well-educated, experienced, and sophisticated political elites and technocrats, (6) he had adequate access to domestic and foreign channels of information, conventional and intelligence, and (7) he was favored by an international official support symbolic and/or instrumental?

The answer might be sought in two realities--the growing strength of his opposition, to be discussed later, and his own increasing alienation to be discussed immediately. The Shah's alienation must be considered as a self-created and, at the same time, an imposed phenomenon. With the passage of time, and in the guise of developing a charismatic personality, he isolated the masses from himself and was ultimately segregated from them. Based on his egoistic attitudes and dynastic tendencies, he also differentiated his own elites from the masses and from himself as well--and was finally deprived of their own loyal criticism. In the

Shah's Iran, "Higher officials did not give a damn about the impact of their statements on the people, only about the reaction of the Shah" (Hoveyda, 1980:26).

Immersed in and impressed by his absolutism and unrealism, the Shah's elites followed his lead sightlessly. Otherwise, their own personal and collective interests would not be realized. In this alienation-proven situation, the Shah may be seen enthroned in the "Peacock Throne" as an "irony tower," overwhelmed by imperial dreams and guarded by domestic and foreign secret services. The Throne was not guarded by the masses, the invincible power and the viable source of support and legitimation. In Bill's words, "He ruled as a lion and a fox, but in the process he forgot the needs of his people. He insulated and isolated himself from them, and in the end he failed to build the political institutions and social trust they needed" (1980:37).

The Shah saw the "surface calm" that was maintained by his secret services as a consistent stability and tranquility for which he ought to be acknowledged by foreign friends and allies, and the Iranians as well. Without evident hesitation, the Americans from President Roosevelt to President Carter (ca. 1953-1978), praised the Shah's alleged solid leadership in Iran and his leading role as an ally in the region. The Russians, from the early 1960s, though for different reasons, held detente with the pro-Western Shah's regime. From the early 1970s, the Chinese joined forces to acknowledge the Shah and to welcome warmly his sisters, his Prime Minister Hoveyda, and the Queen in Peking. In September 1978, when the Shah was on the verge of Collapse, China's Hua Kuo-feng toasted the Shah in his Nivaran Palace in Tehran. Throughout

his reign, many Arab leaders, as is said, "from Morocco to Bahrain," enjoyed a political honeymoon with the Shah even at the cost of their claimed territorial and national rights in the "Arabian Gulf" and in "Arabistan" (Khuzistan). Very frequently, the Arab Kings, Sultans, Presidents, and Shiekhs, consorted at the Shah's court and praised "His Imperial Majesty." Altogether, these external worldwide supports, recognitions, and admirations, in turn, caused and intensified the Shah's ignorance of and alienation from Iran's ongoing internal realities.

It must be considered that some of his advisors were aware of the nature of the regime's steadiness, but "No one dared to tell the truth to the Shah. . . .As his image of himself grew, he stopped consulting even his closest advisers. . . .Even in June 1978, when there was rioting in Tehran, the Shah still had no inkling of the bloody revolution to come" (Diane K. Shah, 1980:41). Further, in the same time, he commented that "Nobody can overthrow me. I have the support of 700,000 troops, all the workers and most of the people. . . .I have the power, and the opposition cannot be compared in strength with the government in any way" (Pahlavi, 1978:37). However, in December 1978, in response to a foreign reporter about where his supports were, the Shah simply said "Search me" (Abrahamian, 1980:26).

Yet, it seems that his alienation prevented even his belated awakening to reality. Pointing to the Iranian people, in December 1979, the Shah wished that ". . .if only I had had three more years. . . . Then they would have known what it was I wanted to do" (Pahlavi, 1979:47). However, interviewed by ABC Television Network and speculating about the cause of his collapse, he prophesied that "It might be an end of

era"--the monarchical tradition. With Nickle (1979:102) one may draw the conclusion that, "Having progressively cut himself off from reality by his own autocratic style, his world or gaudy visions quickly collapsed." Thus, the Shah's alienation from reality may be seen as a definite kind of "false consciousness" caused by unrealistic "definition of the situation."

b. The Shah's Army. Since the role of the armed forces in the revolutionary process is of special concern in the literature, some light must be cast on the case of the Iranian army. In general terms, some writers and revolutionaries stress the disloyalty of the army as a decisive factor for successful revolutions, and others claim that the masses can win a revolution in spite of the loyalty of the armed forces (Russell, 1974:80). According to Russell, the view of the first group has been proved correct and the contention of the second group "has to be rejected" (1974:80). However, the situation of the Iranian armed forces demonstrates an interesting example.

The Shah's army did not deny loyalty to the Shah until his abdication was inevitable, nor did it side with the opposition from the early stage of challenge to weaken the regime's position. Although this army finally defected and split, this occurred only after the Shah's forced abdication. This defection or "neutrality" can be explained by (1) constant mass pressure on the army and (2) the army's ideological illusion after the Shah's absence. Specifically, the ideological base of the Iranian armed forces was simply the official slogan of loyalty to God, Shah, and homeland. After the Shah's humiliating departure, which was caused by some six months of street demonstrations, the army

lost its personalized ideological stand. In the absence of the "Bozorg Farmandeh" (i.e., the higher commander, the Shah), the army felt no urgent and justifiable commitment to defend a kingless Crown.

Further, "God" and "homeland," the other two ideological principles, were still there, and, of course, were more than ever before advocated and expressed with revolutionary fervor throughout the long-lasting demonstrations. This situation is comprehensible in that the Iranian revolutionary movement developed itself as a nationalist-partiotist (i.e., anti-imperialist), humanitarian, and religious movement with which the Shah's regime was not identified and by which it was charged and challenged. In this process, the army was not only affected by a leadership vacuum and an ideological bewilderment but was also emotionalized by popular humanitarian, religious, and nationalist values, which awakened and invited its military spirit to side with God, society, and the homeland.

Hence, the armed forces received what was actually denied to them under the Shah's rule: a popular but independent character. Under the Shah, the army, like any other institution, was emphasized as "the Shah's army" and an achievement of the Pahlavi dynasty. It was also supervised by the American "advisers." Further, from 1945-6 onward, the army was not involved in any national or international conflict to demonstrate patriotism and develop popularity. Finally, after the Shah's supreme commandment, the armed forces were controlled by military elites who were widely separated from the people, the original source for support and popularity.

In fact, it was this mutual process of demoralization-emotion-

alization that functioned for the people but against the Shah and at last disarmed the army or neutralized it. However, a closer observation reveals a three-fold erosion in the armed forces. In this context, a group of the Shah's Generals, represented by Azhari and Ovissee, were quick to flee the country even when the Shah was still there. The next group, represented by Fardoust and Gharabaghi, were coopted simply to save their lives. The last group, represented by Badrai, Rabyi, Khosru-Dad, and Naji, lost control of the situation while remaining somewhat loyal to the regime but not necessarily to the Shah. All the generals of this category were killed or executed throughout the process of massive take-over. Concerning the "neutrality" or "disloyalty," "defection" or "cooption" of the army, some confusion still exists most of which relates to the so-called Huyser's mission (pp. 115-6). However, Sullivan, the then U.S. Ambassador to Tehran, emphasizes that:

. . . Washington directed a series of tactical actions which succeeded in placing the religious and the military in antagonism to each other. This resulted in the consequences we consistently warned about--the disintegration of the military and the spewing of perhaps one hundred thousand weapons into the hands of the street gangs (1981:273-274).

It should also be noted that in terms of the social composition of the middle-rank officers and the conscripts, the Iranian armed forces belonged to the middle and lower classes which constituted the backbone of the opposition. This observation can be substantiated by the fact that the army was not dissolved or massively purged at the level of the mentioned categories which comprise the military establishment of post-revolutionary Iran. Needless to say, the middle and lower classes representation in the Shah's army was a result of the on-going social mobility in society which actually did not exclude the institution

of the Shah's armed forces.

Finally, it must be concluded that the way in which the revolutionary masses throughout months of street demonstrations approached the army had a determining effect. This approach was a suitable empirical example of Russell's suggestion that: "Revolutionaries should try to make it more likely that the armed forces personnel can identify with them. This might be facilitated by fraternizing as much as possible with them, infiltrating the armed forces, playing down the differences between themselves and members of the armed forces instead of maximizing these differences. . ." (1974:87). (As will be seen in Chapter VII, The Egyptian Army, demonstrated a totally different picture in the process of political challenge and radical social change.)

In the context of the sociological theory of revolution, the Shah's decay and departure, on his own part and not necessarily on behalf of his opposition, can be explained by the classic theories of Aristotle (1980), Ibn Khaldun (1967), Pareto (1963), and Michels (1967). Altogether, these theories suggest that after their accession to power and the congruent satiety, the elites become apathetic, indifferent, selfish, and corrupt. The ultimate end of this gradual "dysfunctioning" is their decay and failure to circulate. This kind of explanation--that is, alienation from the masses and erosion from within--however, is only one way of approaching the collapse of Iran's old regime. Different explanations should be traced to the strength of the regime's challengers.

c. The Strength of the Opposition. It is not attempted here to characterize the organization, the leadership, or the strategy of the

counterelites in their confrontation with the old regime. Rather, this section intends to demonstrate why religion in Iran functioned both as a system of cultural values held by 98 percent of the population and as political principles on behalf of certain categories within this population. Present concentration on religion should be justified by the fact that (1) the Iranian Revolution has, officially, been defined Islamic, and (2) its religious substance is also acknowledged in the relevant literature. In this approach, however, two points must be considered. First, our emphasis on the Islamic culture, and not necessarily the Islamic political ideology, is based on the assumption that "Most who participated in the Revolution were fighting, not for a clerical rule, but for an ideological vision of Islam that embodied ideals of a just society that the secularists voiced in other terms" (Keddie, 1981:272). Second, herein, culture is viewed in the Parsonian sense, that is, as a congerie of moral values, beliefs, and symbols which shape the socially permissible manifestation of the actors' "drives or needs" (1964:326-383).

To better understand the ideological lines of the participants in the Revolution, a sketch of these lines is necessary. According to Abrahamian (1979:7-8), there were five categories involved--the religious conservatives, the religious reactionaries, the religious radicals, the secular reformers, and the secular radicals. If by the last category--that is, the secular radicals--the communist left is meant,

It includes a variety of small groups espousing loyalty to China (The Tufan, or Typhoon, group), Albania, or others, and even a Socialist Workers' Party of Trotskyist orientation. It includes underground organizations professing adherence to Marxism and demanding autonomy for the people's of the Kurdish,

Arab, and Baluchi areas, where these organizations are active. It even includes secular socialist groupings, such as The National Democratic Front (an offshoot of the Centrist National Front, a secular grouping that opposed the Shah in the late 1950's and early 1960's). Perhaps the most interesting groups on the left, however, are the Tudeh, the Fedaiyin-e Khalq, and the Mojahedin-e Khalq (Chubin, 1980:2-3).

However, in line with the current underlying assumption, the opposition is approached in terms of three broad categories--the religious, the nationalists, and the Left. Since radical principles are also found in the religious and nationalist categories, the Left here would mean the communist line, stemming from all the intellectual roots together. As Muslims by tradition, all these religious-secular categories identify with the Islamic culture as a culture of movements, revolutions, radicalism, justice, equality, Mahdism (i.e., Islamic Messianism), Jihad (i.e., holy war), and Shahadât (i.e., martyrdom). The Shiite tradition, whose followers constitute the majority in Iran (and Iraq) but are the minority worldwide, identified itself with a historical subjugation by the Sunni rulers. Such a tradition had been taught officially for centuries in Iran, and was symbolized and reinforced by religious rituals year round. Thus, Shiism, as its followers would argue, provides the revolutionary tradition of Islam with more militancy and radicalism.

To be sure, the present approach to Islam as both cultural values for the many and political ideals for certain categories, does not overlook the roles of the nationalists and the Leftists in the anti-Shah struggle. However, for reasons to be discussed immediately, neither nationalism nor communism were strong and popular enough to bring down the regime.

In the case of nationalism it should be emphasized that nationalist values are not a defined socio-economic ideology based on which a specific political system and a concrete mode of production and distribution can be created, implemented, and maintained. The significance and functioning of nationalism should be traced to the reality of other situations. For example, in times of crises (e.g., wars, international aggression, secessionist movements), nationalist sentiment couples with patriotic tradition to accomplish offensive, defensive, or preemptive measures. Iranian nationalism is no exception. The Iranian nationalist values, individually, were not only incapable of providing and promising a new social order but also were inept at mobilizing the Iranian masses for political challenge against the Shah. The recent history of Iran provides solid evidence for this contention.

First, the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of the 1900s was not nationalist per se as some would argue, but a religious-nationalist movement. At least, at the leadership level, the movement was predominantly religious. Second, the Mossadeq's nationalist movement of the early 1950s failed to challenge the Shah and his foreign support because it was denied support from the religious and communist groupings. Third, the National Front, the legacy of the nationalist Mossadeq, even until the eve of the Revolution, identified itself with the return to the 1906-7 Constitution--the constitutional monarchy. Yet, if executed perfectly, this constitution would very likely be in the hands of the religious leaders, especially in the legislative sphere. This, ultimately, downplays Iranian nationalism in favor of Muslim universalism. (The new regime of Iran has approved of this prediction--irrespective

of what has been achieved in the process.)

Fourth, the leadership of Iran's nationalist movement, from Mossadeq on, has emerged from traditional feudality, chieftainhood, or aristocracy which, ideologically, does not represent the interest of the masses but rather its own. In nationalism, in addition to patriotism, the masses seek distributive justice in both economic and political terms. It might be of value to support this claim with a regional experience. After achieving their independence, the leading Arab nationalists came to realize that (a) communism was flourishing in their societies and (b) bare nationalism could not persist to function to promote further ideals and nationalistic interests and to restore order. Hence, other ideological principles (i.e., political democracy and socialism) were advocated and coordinated with the sentiment of nationalism. Regardless of what has been gained in the course of action, these three fundamental principles formed President Nasser's ideological standpoint (e.g., Nutting, 1972; Dekmejian, 1971), and have been the pillars of the Arab Socialist Party (e.g., A'Ysami, 1977; Farah, 1978).

Fifth, with its diversity of nationalities, tribes, and localities, Iran's nationalism could not (and cannot) develop countrywide representation and support. As an indication, many Iranian ethnic and tribal groups took refuge in the communist and Islamic ideologies prior to and in the wake of the Revolution. Sixth, while the Shah's nationalism-patriotism was in question, some politically confused, or economically privileged, or chauvinist (e.g., the Pan-Iranists) Persians understood him as the reviver of the Golden Age of Persia. They seemed

to maintain that, although the Shah had overstepped his authority, his "mission" was worthwhile. This understanding weakened the nationalists' action against the Shah. As an example, while the National Front, from 1953 on, was not allowed to participate in the political process, the Pan-Iranist Party and its offshoot, the Iranian Party, were represented in the Shah's regime.

Finally, in a critical time, while the fate of the (1978-9) movement dependent on continuing joint action and strategic coordination, the nationalists split. Shapour Bakhtiar, the leader of the Iran Party, a lifetime affiliate of the National Front, was co-opted and inaugurated as the Shah's new, and coincidently last, Prime Minister. As Sullivan, the then U. S. Ambassador to Tehran, narrates, Bakhtiar had acknowledged to him that he had intended "to 'steal the revolution' from the ayatollah. . . , to confront the revolution and to disperse its challenge by the minimal use of military force" (1981:235-234). This split shook the revolutionaries' struggle at the time and loosened the nationalists' position ever since. In short, for a variety of cirss-crossing reasons as well as the rivalry of the Islamic culture and the communist inclinations, Iran's nationalism alone was incapable of bringing about the Revolution.

Concerning the communist ideology, it should be noted that many Iranians owe a prominent orgainzational experience to Iran's communist and the Tudeh (mass) Parties, formed in 1920, and 1941, respectively. But, in Iran, communism had not been represented by only the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party, for there had been independent and pro-Peking Leftist inclinations. All the Iranian communist groupings were identified with self-

created and imposed situational difficulties which enabled them to provide a strong ideological base in the country. First, in 1953, while the situation was critical, the Tudeh Party ceased collaboration and denied its vital support to the Shah's celebrated challenger, Mossadeq. This denial, in turn, helped the Shah to restore order. "According to Moscow, the Tudeh had erred through insufficient understanding of the progressive character of the Mossadeq movement and left wing of the national bourgeoisie" (Atkin, 1981:55). Such an error antagonized the nationalist Iranians and other supporters of Massadeq, including some radical religious leaders and secular figures with religious affiliations.

Second, Moscow's healthy relations with the Shah, which developed from the early 1960s on, discredited the Russians and the now outlawed Tudeh Party on behalf of the progressive forces. That is why Russia took a number of tactical steps to improve and strengthen the base of its affiliates in Iran. The Russians reshuffled the leadership of their client Tudeh Party, created new political groups, including the Iranian People's Democratic Union (founded in 1978), began to side with the movement after the collapse of the Shah was imminent, and, in some ways, encouraged their affiliates to put up with the religious categories. Atkin observes that in the episodic revolutionary activism, "Iranian communists staged public demonstrations in which they carried pictures of Khomeini, and the female participants wore chadors while shouting slogans critical of the Shah and the United States" (1981:64).

With regard to the other communist groupings, which were either independent from Moscow or Peking or belonged to one or the other, further facts were observed, all of which indicated the inability

of communism. First, all these groups emerged from the 1960s on, and hence they had a history of experience, struggle, and mobilization efforts too short to make them able to achieve a popular and effective support. Second, they all evolved out of student circles; their leaderships, though based on radicalism, were overridden by the traditional, often moderate, religious and nationalist leaders. Third, since these groups attempted armed struggle, they went underground where, in fact, they were born. This situation, in turn, caused them unpopularity with the masses who were unprepared for armed confrontation with the regime. Through the state media, some bloody events, in which innocent people got hurt, were also used against and blamed on the activists. Fourth, the SAVAK, from the very beginning, was able to infiltrate into the guerrilla's networks and this, among other setbacks, caused them internal conflict, segmentation, or liquidation at the level of leadership.

Fifth, on occasion, members of these groups recanted, and at other times even collaborated with the Shah's regime. Needless to say, this conduct shook the infant base of radical activism, which was essentially true in the Left's case. Sixth, the Shah's media directed two moral-ideological charges against these activists both of which hurt their reputation. One was the permissive sexual attitudes and conduct among activist males and females. The other was their ideological fallacy of Islamic-Marxist, signifying an unhappy marriage between the spiritualistic Islam and the materialistic Marxism. Finally, while some communist groups had shifted attention from the "opportunistic" Moscow to the "uncompromising" Peking, from the early 1970s, Mao and the Shah's developing diplomatic relationship, as discussed previously,

took them by surprise.

Thus, "The Marxist Left has been hurt in the last ten years by the fact that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have openly supported the Shah" (Abrahamian, 1979:8). Yet, as discussed above, another problem weakened the Left's position in the country. As Chubin (1980:2) observes "The Left in Iran is split into a dozen splinter groups without any one dominant force around which others can coalesce." It is not surprising then to see the disunity of the Iranian leftist forces and their inability to originate and lead a massive action--a revolution.

In such a devastating situation where (a) national independence was undermined by foreign influence, (b) ethnic rights and local rules were abolished in favor of centralism and the rule of the Persian "solid majority," (c) rising expectations were frustrated by constant political suppression and widening socioeconomic gaps, and finally an all-embracing challenging ideology was lacking, religion came to meet a "functional necessity" and to play a reviving role. In general terms, such a functioning of religion is crystallized in social solidarity, desired social change, social control, the provision of meaning to life, and psychological support (e.g., Durkheim, 1965; Weber, 1958; Parsons, 1964; Glock and Bella, 1976; Berger, 1969). An Iranian historical heroic story holds that "The toiled afflicted people always look forward to a heavenly relief." From the Shah's regime and its excessive repression, neither the earthly communism nor the territorial nationalism, whose scope of mass attractiveness was discussed independently, could provide such a relief. Religion did. In this respect, Bella (1964:356-374)

indicates that traditional societies tend to be identified with prescriptive value systems; that these systems embrace almost every situation in life and are always integrated with ultimate religious values; that any political movement in these societies, where the political does not have independent legitimacy, "must" take on a religious coloration.

To be sure, a functionalist approach to religion as applied here does restrict the conflict theorists' definition of religion--a force that is utilized and monopolized by a group to govern or by a governing class. However, taken together the two approaches would provide a sufficient explanation of the values and functions of religions in different social situations.

With this in mind, in the case of Iran not only did religion function as both cultural values for the many and also political principles for certain categories, the leadership of the Revolution was too dominated and shaped religiously. This leadership was mostly identified with Ayatollah Khomeini whose leading spiritual role must be sought in two realities--a leadership vacuum and his own overall characteristics. "He was perceived as a traditional religious leader, a man of poverty, honesty, learning--everything that the Shah was not" (Clinton, 1979:71). The lack of an effective generally agreed-upon political leadership as well as his objective political stand, humanitarian claims, and state of exile helped Ayatollah Khomeini to develop a spiritual and charismatic sense of leadership and legitimacy--to lead the Revolution.

Viewed as a system of cultural values and norms, the Islamic religion was generally acknowledged by and manifested in all the involved strata in the anti-Shah struggle. In political (ideological) terms such

a consensus was not in order. There were certain ideological differences between the revolutionaries. These discrepancies were not related solely to the nature and the operation of the future system, but they also concerned the opposition strategies and tactics as well as the approaching transition of power. As early as May 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized to a reporter from Le Monde that, "No, we will not collaborate with the Marxists, not even to overthrow the Shah. . . .We are opposed to their ideas; we know they want to stab us in the back; and if they achieved power, they would establish a dictatorial regime contrary to the spirit of Islam" (1978:20). On the other hand, in January 1978, prior to the revolutionary take-over (February 11, 1979), the Marxist Organization of the People's Fedayin, in an "open letter" to Ayatollah Khomeini, emphasized that

We announce with utmost frankness that this revolution and what has brought people uniform and united into the streets . . . is their increasing economic, political and national oppression. The struggle that is taking place is for freedom and liberation. It is an anti-dictatorial, anti-imperialist and patriotic struggle. . . . Real freedom and democracy-- which will be gained only after the overthrow of imperialism and reaction--is the most revered aspiration that has united all social strata and classes of the people from workers and students to office workers, the clergy and farmers and has brought them to struggle to death against the regime.

If your understanding of the Islamic Shari'a and the Islamic movement means persistence in the anti-imperialist and anti-dictatorial struggle, we admire such an understanding by you because this struggle and sacrifice has been the highest aspiration and hope of all Fedayi martyrs and comrades and has always been a part of their skin, flesh and blood. But if, on the contrary, the purpose of appealing to Islam and its teachings is the repressing of every opposing thought, form and opinion, the chaining of thought and revival of an inquisition and instruments of repression, the revival of the slogan of "only one party" and the muffling of every freedom-seeking voice under the pretext of defending the Koran and the Shari'a, we are certain every liberationist patriot will condemn it and we believe that the people also will rise to expose and destroy it because they see it as a ploy in the hands of imperialism and reaction.

The nationalist categories first were satisfied with the Shah's concessions which presumably would culminate in the effective execution of the 1906-7 Constitution and implied a constitutional monarchy. Finally, the majority of these factions, led by Karim Sanjabi, accepted the fight to the end, but the minority, led by Shapour Bakhtiar, were co-opted. However, it is also observed that the ". . . pro-nationalist sentiment, is wider than the pro-Khomeini sentiment, but the religious segment really has an unquestionable hegemony over the movement, by even those who are not altogether comfortable with it" (Falk, 1979:9). In this line of argument it is also claimed that "The ayatollah, after all, received very little support from his religious colleagues during his long struggle against the Shah. The majority of them, so many Vicars of Bray, jumped on the revolutionary bandwagon only four or five months before it rallied to victory" (The Economist, 1981:29). Yet, Abrahamian comes to the conclusion that among all the involved categories in the anti-regime struggle, ". . . The religious ones have so far achieved most success in mobilizing a mass following, especially among the bazaar population, the Shanty-town poor, and even the industrial proletariat" (1979:8).

3. Why Religious Uprising?

In terms of scientific curiosity, one may set forth the following question: Why, in this modern time where secularism is prevailing, does religious morality assert itself in different forms? Some (e.g., Glock and Bella, 1976; Berger, 1969, 1981) indicate that there is a "new religious consciousness" and a "religious revival" worldwide including the modern industrialized United States. In the

Iranian case which is linked to the Muslim world as a whole, some facts are observable.

First, in the last two centuries, the Muslims have been overridden by the God-fearing Western colonialist-imperialist forces. This dominance has taken different shapes and at the present it is at least held technologically. However, Islam shares certain principles with the Christian West such as monotheism and the right of private ownership though with definite differences and not in the sense of the American capitalist tradition. These similarities might be a major reason and justification for the idea that "Islamic civilization and Western civilization can and should merge in order to create a better civilization for all" (Hejazi, 1979:13).

Second, from the early 1920s, the Muslims have also been, ideologically speaking, challenged and in some cases crushed by "Godless" communism. Again there are some theoretical agreements between the two ideologies. Hodgkin (1981:233-236) summarizes these parallels as (1) the idea of the individual's responsibility for everything he/she does and believes, (2) the idea of activism, (3) the idea of austerity (or the Islamic "Zuhd"), (4) the egalitarian-democratic tradition, (5) the idea of universality, and finally (6) the idea of history. Hence, ". . . There is a sufficient common theoretical ground between revolutionary Muslims and Marxists for them to be able to work together effectively in many kinds of political situations" (Hodgkin, 1981:235).

Third, in its own right, Islam considers itself not only a religion in the conventional sense and a flexible way of life but also an eternal universal system. This system is considered revolutionary

However, sociologically, it is understood that this characteristic of social realities does not (and should not) invalidate the fact that each category of social facts is identified with class similarities and qualifications. Hence, no social phenomenon is unique to the extent that it overshadows the similar phenomenon and places itself in a social vacuum. This is why, for instance, what, two centuries ago, put an end to the French old regime, has been identified with what, two centuries later, put an end to the Persian Empire, that is, "revolution" and not "revolt" (as Louis XVI and the Shah would have desired.)

To better comprehend the Iranian Revolution, it might be noted that this revolution, as Heikal (Salinger, 1981:137) would argue, should not be wrongfully understood by Iranians or others as (a) a sectarian (i.e., Shiite) revolution, (b) an Islamic revolution in Iran, or (c) an Islamic revolution alien from the similar phenomena in the Islamic world or human society at large. This revolution is, in fact, a humanitarian-millenarian movement which, regardless of its direction and performance to date, exemplifies man's belief in and struggle for equality, dignity, and identity in rapidly changing circumstances. This is what the Muslims may like to identify with the Islamic tradition for, "Islam was established on the basis of universal laws and human nature" (Richard, 1981:288). Therefore, the Iranian Islamic Revolution can be defined as an existential movement where such movements, as Turner (1964:390-405) observes, characterize the necessity of our time and are concerned with the problems of (1) man's alienation, (2) existence, and (3) search for a viable sense of self.

by its advocates, and it is identified with and works for equity, equality, and justice in the name of God, Allah, and by tradition of His Prophet Mohammad. The holy Qoran emphasizes that "God does not change the state/situation of a people until they change themselves inwardly" (XIII:II). However, with the exception of the very dawn of Islam (seventh century, A.D.), the Qoranic rules, except in small communities, have not been practiced as an economic/political system. In the current time, it is also observed that:

The various books and pamphlets on Islamic politics and economics written in the past twenty years do not, even had been followed in detail, provide an adequate basis for setting up a policy that could meet the widely recognized needs for social justice, mass participation in political and economic life, rights of minorities and women, a truly functioning economy, and so forth (Richard, 1981:229).

In a word, an authentic Islamic practical order responsive to both the Qoranic principles and the complex world-system of today remained to be seen in the future.

Fourth, in the present century, though with certain ideological differences, neither the pro-Western nor the pro-Eastern Islamic states have been able to overcome their socioeconomic problems, technological lag, and general underdevelopment. Each group is lagging behind the industrial world and dependent on Western-Eastern technology and industry. Further, from 1917 on, the Muslims have also been immersed in the question of Palestine and the Palestinians as a humanitarian, a religious, and for the Arabs, also a national question. In this year, the British recognized the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine which, at the time, was under their mandate. The Muslims would argue that both the West and the East together might have been able to settle the

question peacefully if they had enthusiastically and jointly approached the problem.

Fifth, within the Muslim states such ideologies as nationalist, Marxist, social democratic and capitalist, individually or jointly, have not been able to lay down a solid base for a promising future characterized by true independence from foreign influence and sound distributive justice. In such a situation, the religious Muslims came to further realize, as the saying goes, that "East and West, home is best." In the Militant Islam, Jansen (1981:198-90) comes to the same conclusion about the Muslim nations

In these nations, as in many others of the Third World, all other alternative forms of governance have been tried and failed, especially in the all important economic sector. One-man rule, both monarchical and republican, has not produced the desired results; and it has been the same with one-party regimes; so too with multi-party systems, both democratic and parliamentary and undemocratic and non-parliamentary; the military men have tried their hand with little success, and in some cases have ordered themselves back to their barracks; equally unsuccessful have been the non-political technocrats. Since all these alternatives have been used, and used up, what else is left? In a way the Muslim countries may count themselves lucky that they still have left the alternative of militant Islam, an alternative not available to the non-Muslim Third World countries.

4. Identifying the Iranian Revolution

Some argue that ". . .despite any parallels or analogies which might legitimately be established, the Iranian revolution is like no other. It is sui generis (Rouleau, 1980:2). But, in a sociological perspective, where sociology integrates or interrelates similar social phenomena to each other so that a valid explanation of reality is gained, any given social fact might be considered an event of its own kind.

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In sum, the causes of the Iranian Revolution had been generated, accumulated, and complicated throughout a historical process that persisted for decades. The diversity of the roots of this revolution is crystallized in a blend of cultural, religious, national, ethnic, political, economic, legitimation, and identity-based values and variables which together contributed to the creation of a widespread, profound tension and unrest. Such a strain, at the time that the Iranian wealthy society was undergoing a transitional process from traditionalism to modernization, burst abruptly. The nature of the Shah's modernization further awakened the Iranians, as did the method of its introduction to the country. It shocked the people and intensified the already amassed pressure. The alien regime failed to realize the breadth and the depth of this strainful situation so that it could take preemptive and corrective action to diffuse or rechanneled the crisis. This failure can be seen as an erosion from within and a decirculation of the elites. Such an erosion facilitated and legitimated the massive political action of the opposition to exploit the regime's wearing away, to activate the tension militantly, and to give birth to a revolution.


The timing of the Revolutionary take-over was caused by several factors, some of which, it is argued, are still concealed to the observer and hence go beyond an objective sociological analysis. As an example, it is argued that the timing of the Iranian Revolution had something to do with the fact that, in the Middle-East, oil and politics explode together. However, there had been identifiable

factors, or pitfalls, that accelerated the explosion of the Revolution, as was discussed in the chronology of the pre-takeover events. Finally, our overall discussion on the causes of the Iranian Revolution can be summarized diagrammatically (and not theorized) as follows (p. 254). This will be followed by chapter VI in which theories of revolution are applied to this test case revolution. In that chapter, further light will also be cast on the causes of the target Revolution.

A DIAGRAMMATIC SUMMARY OF THE CAUSES OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

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CAUSES



CHAPTER VI

TOWARD AN INTEGRAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION

A. Prelude

Before applying theories of revolution to the test case revolution, some reservations must be considered.

First, in the proposed application neither the addressed theories nor the test case revolution will be outlined and justified. This task has already been performed in the preceding chapters. With this in hand, each theory will be taken a priori and so will be the Revolution.

Second, by testing each theory against the test case revolution, a proposition will be derived accordingly. In this practice, in fact, the applied theory is translated into a concise and rigorous thread of explanatory thought that provides but a partial explanation for the cause of revolution. This conceptualization, however, should not be understood as reductionism for it is the underlying deductive logic in this dissertation.

Third, since based on this deduction each theory solely contributes to the explanation of but does not totally explain the revolution, an inclusive theory consisting of a set of propositions is entailed.

This comprehensive explanation is indeed what is offered in this dissertation.

Fourth, theorists of revolution have usually conceptualized both the "causes" of revolution and the "developmental aspects" of such categories as "ideology," "leadership," and "organization" of the "opposition" as a mixture or continuum. This schematic commission or omission obscures and complicates the identity of the root cause of revolution (e.g., the economic element) with the very reason for a successful revolutionary take-over (e.g., appropriate tactics). In the current approach, the above mentioned categories will simply be treated as a root cause for a fruitful revolutionary action and not the root cause of a strainful situation which might lead to revolution. In a word, we will differentiate between and will not be confused with the cause of revolution and the reason for a successful transition of power, which is a prerequisite for the institutionalization of the revolutionary ideals.

This is why in the course of application and synthesis four accumulative steps will be taken. In the first step attention will be focused on those theories that emphasize and relate the structural cause of revolution to the "economic," "political," and "cultural" factors directly. In the second step "value-dissensus" will be approached through Johnson's "Revolutionary change." In the third step, all theories that, in one way or another, emphasize "social strain," from whatever source, as the cause of revolution, will be considered. In the last step those theories will be considered that emphasize effort management and resource mobilization as either the cause of revolution or as pre-

requisite for a successful revolutionary take-over (after the root cause was already identified).

To be sure, in dealing with the majority of the theories throughout the first three steps, some of their implications for the test case revolution will be reserved for the last step. The last step addresses issues of "resource mobilization." Examples of these implications, which are shared by different theories, are such categories as ideology, organization, leadership, and stratum consciousness. Hence, by focusing on the addressed theories in the first steps, only the fundamental thought will be pinpointed and reformulated. Further, throughout the synthesis, only the implications and not the total explanation of the theory for the test case revolution will be considered.

Fifth, as it was emphasized elsewhere, theories of revolution have many things in common to be integrated and elaborated. This characteristic implies, among other things, that the theories can also be sorted and classified. Saltman (1978:3-8) observes that there are three defined approaches to the causes of social movements--(1) the psychological, (2) the collective-behavioral, and (3) the sociological approach. The first category ascribes the cause of social movements to the "individual's" frustration, discontent, and strain. The next category holds that a social movement is simply one type of collective behavior which is generated by collective strains and grievances. The last category attributes the cause of social movements to societal arrangements and processes (such as class struggle, organizational dysfunctioning, and value dissensus).

According to Robertson (1981:581:584), theories of social

movements can be subsumed under three classes. (a) The psychological theories which consider social movements ". . . as simply one more form of irrational collective behavior." (b) The "strain" theories which claim that the main factor that lies behind the emergence of social movements is some form of "social strain." In this context, some sociologists also observe "that people's feelings of deprivation are the source of social movements." (c) The resource-mobilization theory which maintains that ". . . dissatisfaction may well exist in society--whether because of psychological frustration, social strain, feelings of deprivation, or for any other reason--but a social movement will not emerge until people organize and take action using the resources at their command" (Robertson, 1981:583).

Useem (1981:357-369) notes that all theories of social movements can be put in two major categories. The first category is identified with the "Breakdown theorists" who claim that actors who are weakly integrated into their community and experience discontent are likely to join a protest movement. The second category is identified with the "Solidarity theorists" who argue that isolated individuals are less likely to protest than others and that discontent is unrelated to protest. These theorists, in fact, point to the dissolution of traditional social formations and communal solidarities as a result of rapid change.

The position taken here is integrative in that revolution is a social (or societal) phenomenon; that the social is a complex of several factors such as economic, political, cultural, psychological, historical, ethnic/racial, local, international, epistemological, biographical, existential, and the like; that the causes of revolution are generated,

accumulated, and complicated historically and identified with life-cycle; that revolutionary action occurs under relatively unique conditions which vary, though not necessarily, from one place and space to the other.

In the application and synthesizing initiative which follows immediately, this position will be illuminated.

B. Applying and Synthesizing the Theories

In line with the four steps that were proposed above, the addressed theories will be applied and accordingly classified in the following form.

The First Step: The Structural Causes of Revolution

1. The Marxist Theory Applied

Although the Iranian Revolution, as both characterized earlier and defined officially, is not a "communist" revolution, the "Marxist" theory of revolution provides some causal explanation for its occurrence. This proposed partial explanation is associated with general category of economic-based class struggle and conflict. As it is adopted in this synthesis, class struggle, on behalf of the opposition to the ruling class, is identified with several strata, including the proletariat.

First, for a certain stratum of the Iranians--that is, the workers--the opposition to the regime had, basically, economic motivation and material interests. These workers were either economically "deprived" or economically "frustrated." In the first case, the workers' material gain failed to keep pace with the mounting consumer expenditures and hence resulted in relative deprivation. This kind of deprivation can be defined as ". . . a situation in which people may be able to afford

basic necessities but are unable to maintain the standard of living considered normal in society" (Robertson, 1981:269). In the next case, relative deprivation did not occur. But, due to (1) the country's flowing wealth and (2) relatedly, their own rising materialistic expectations, which were not met adequately, the workers were thwarted and frustrated.

However, the blue-collar workers alone were--in terms of number, organization, leadership and political ideology--not powerful enough to make a revolution, proletariat or otherwise. Further, given the overall characteristics of the country's economic development and industrial transformation, the Iranian workers were simply "lumpen-proletariat." Hence, historically speaking, they were far away from developing the revolutionary "class consciousness" seen as a prerequisite for revolutionary class struggle and proletariat revolution. This qualification does not simplify but in fact stresses the workers' economic-based disposition to and actual participation in the massive political action that eventually toppled the Shah's regime.

Second, for other Iranian social strata such as the middle-classes (i.e., the government employees, the intellectuals, the Bazaaris, the religious community) and the farmers, economic incentives were, though with certain between and within differences, a base for challenge. The majority of the farmers, though they did not noticeably participate in the revolution, were economically deprived in relative or absolute terms. "Absolute deprivation" may be defined as a situation in which people cannot afford the basic standards of health care, education, nourishment, housing and clothing (Kolka, 1962). Relative deprivation also existed

among the lower layers of the middle-classes whose net economic gains failed to meet the rising cost of living. Further, the upper layers of the middle-classes were affected by an intensifying frustration which was caused by increasing material expectation (along with other, non-economic, desires to be discussed elsewhere) and the paucity of social services.

By and large, it was not only the low economic situation that, in part, revolutionized people for political action but in fact the realization of the existing economic discrimination symbolized by the well-being of the upper classes. All the economically affected strata came to further realize that the country was getting rich abruptly but its riches were not distributed appropriately. Therefore, the inferior economic state of affairs as compared to the economic prosperity of the wealthy provided a deeper sense of discontent and strain. People more likely raise their heads in opposition if they find themselves overwhelmed by prosperous (and powerful) groups. Otherwise, as the Arabic proverb says "Equal Oppression is Justice," a significant opposition is less probable. It is actually this sensed economic discrimination and not essentially the existing poor economic situation that contributed to the Iranians' frustration and their inclination to political action.

All these strata could have different economic-based political interests if they had not shared a common economic strain for political action. Indeed, there was a between-class economic difference among the opposition itself. But, sharp economic inequality which was caused by the governing class and from which all the governed classes, in one way or another, suffered, provided a common objective for mobilization and revolution. Such a reality is congruent with two related facts. First,

the economically poor people are so involved in butter and bread problems that they cannot give preference to political action. Next, in order to emerge, revolutions need a base of physical needs and motivations.

Thus, as it is perceived here, class struggle should not be understood as a struggle between only two classes--the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as the Marxists theoretically perceive. Rather, should be viewed in terms of economic values and objectives that are shared by different strata, all of which form the opposition of a society whose class structure is not dyadic but multidimensional. In this light, and in the case of Iran, the economic factor put different strata together, including the proletariat, but excluding the bourgeoisie class, to challenge the dominant categories. In other words, unlike the Marxist sharp class polarization, the economic element, as an objective for and a source of political action, set in motion several Iranian strata for class conflict even though their overall class interests were not alike or could not be. Interestingly, these strata included certain categories with which the "superstructure" was identified--the religious categories.

Hence, a non-communist revolution can be made possible with the contribution of the economic factor, as a major cause, and the participation of the proletariat as one element of the opposition. It is also true that a Marxist revolution can emerge even if the involved society is not industrialized and the proletariat are not the only generating force of the revolution. ". . . Russia and China were overwhelmingly agrarian countries when the communists established themselves" (Moore, 1968:xi). What is meant by this overall emphasis is that the Marxist theory of revolution has several implications for various revolutions, including

the Iranian "Islamic" Revolution, though not necessarily in the Marxist terms and qualifications.

Based on such a grasp of the quality of the Marxist theory and its testability against the test case revolution, the first, and not necessarily and abstractly the most explanatory, cause of revolution can be traced to the economic variable and can be translated into the following proposition.

Proposition 1: Given other conditions, sharp economic differences will likely result in conflict and revolution.

To be sure, what is meant by "other conditions," here and throughout this synthesis, is all other variables that together are theorized as causes of or contributory to the creation of revolution. In this line of theorizing it should be understood that, in the traumatic creation of the complex phenomenon of revolution, the economic variable alone cannot cause the revolution. Several variables are involved in this process, each of which, as hypothesized here, will be discussed and derived as the remainder of the addressed theories are applied respectively.

2. The Dahrendorf Theory Applied

In terms of the structure of political power, the Iranian society under the Shah's regime was polarized to the powerful few and the powerless many. While in economic terms the upper layers of the opposition were privileged, all the opposing groups were deprived politically. Analytically, under the Shah's authoritarian rule, political power and free political expression were two different aspects of the same reality. Where the leadership of the opposition

camp had a desire for political office and governance, the masses simply felt the need of political freedom to express their increasing grievances. In the process, the regime denied the opposition, leaders and followers, its overall political objectives. Such a denial helped, among other things, the opposition to ignore its individualistic interest in the "political" and to confront the regime as a unified whole.

Given this situation, it seems resonable to concentrate on Dahrendorf's Theory in terms of power relation between two broad categories, the powerful and the powerless, and not necessarily within the "Imperatively Coordinated Associations." After all, this theory is ". . .a sociological theory of conflict in industrial society" in which "social groups" are identified with structural complexity and the intensification of the division of labor. In a preindustrial society like that of Iran, these arrangements were much less complicated and cannot be approached by the addressed theory appropriately. However, in line with the fundamental principles of this theory, it must be emphasized that the conditions of political conflict existed in the Shah's Iran. An indication of this was the fact that the social stratification system was not rigid, openness existed, and social mobility was possible. In this context, the major problem was the non-existence of equal opportunity for social mobility in all spheres and in the area of political power in particular. This gave sense to and made the struggle for political power possible. Such struggle can be traced to each of the opposing parties, all of which acted against those in power.

a. The Religious Community. Traditionally, the religious community in Iran was one of the most powerful strata whose traditional

power stemmed from certain facts. First, the clergy are identified with the "sacred" and considered by their followers as a link between God and people. Second, the clergy are usually born out of the lower and traditional layers of society and hence are associated with the masses structurally. Third, until recent times the clergy were among the few educated categories who had a desire for both learning and teaching. This desire revolved around two objectives--economic gains and religious mission. This fact deepened the clergy's social and intellectual position in society and provided them with self-esteem and intellectual power. Finally, the religious leaders identify themselves with a divine mission committed to the spread of justice and equality in society. Such an identification required, and traditionally was endowed with political power, especially in the judicial branch of government. All these qualities and necessities point to the Islamic idea that "Al-Molk Wa Al-Din Towaman" (i.e., state and religion are twins).

Because of the recent waves of modernization, such as the emergence of the nation-state and the secularist tendencies in society, the clergy's traditional strength decreased officially and, in connection, traditionally. With the passage of time, the clergy came to further realize their circumstantial powerlessness and even nothingness. In the eyes of some of their traditional followers they were also seen as dysfunctioning categories. Such a perception of self and evaluation by others caused co-option, indifference, or political action in the religious circles. The majority of the clergy chose to act against the regime, in symbolic terms, to achieve two objectives--

prevention of the deteriorating state of affairs and restoration of the traditional strength and status. With other opposing categories, the religious community overthrew the governing class and, to date, became the governing class themselves. They achieved political power in both state and traditional terms incomparable to any period of time.

b. The Traditional Political Leadership. This stratum had been somewhat active under the Shah's autocratic rule. From the early 1950's, after the Shah restored power, members of this leadership were exiled and imprisoned and others were prohibited political participation. For those individuals, who had already enjoyed political power in the past, powerlessness was difficult to live with. They were experienced political leaders who were also economically privileged and academically well-educated. They felt a social vacuum and a sense of nothingness which could be filled in and reimbursed only by accession to and exercise of political power. Their traditional sociopolitical position in society, as well as the political struggle of other opposing groups, strengthened and enforced their action against the regime. Finally, with their unsatisfied taste for power, solid economic base, and supportive masses, the traditional leaders contributed to the dethronement of the Shah and the creation of a new structure of power.

c. The Bazaaris (Petty Bourgeoisie and Craftsmen). This stratum which was traditionally involved in or somehow used for political objectives, had a dual situation under the Shah's regime. It was economically threatened by the rapidly growing capitalist class, big businesses and modern marketing enterprises. At the same time, it also saw the capitalist arrangements as a desirable reflection of its

own future. However, unable to compete with their reference group and not willing to give up, the Bazaaris were engulfed in an undesirable economic situation. These circumstances were in fact created or facilitated by the government which encouraged the modern and worked for the abandonment of the old in different terms. The Bazaaris' conservatism, traditional alliance with the religious and nationalist categories, and the threat of what may be called governmental capitalism, increased their inclination to politics. They sought in the political either expressive measures or channels whereby the traditional arrangements could be secured or changed desirably. With their money, physical energy, and traditional religio-political supportive base, the Bazaaris fueled the ongoing anti-regime action and hence helped to define the political situation anew.

d. The Intellectuals. Analytically, the Iranian intellectuals worked for a "fair share" of political power, the demonstration of their theoretical social policies, or both. Hence, their practical and symbolic activism was oriented toward execution of political power or participation in the decision-making processes. The majority of this stratum was also deprived economically and, in accordance, sought political means for economic ends. In a word, the intellectuals were convinced that their wish-fulfillment in political, intellectual, and economic terms would not be realized unless a grain of political power and a sense of free expression were enjoyed. This, indeed, was denied to the intellectuals. Higher and effective political offices were held by the regime's loyalists who were selectively chosen and ratified by secret services. In addition, on behalf of the intellectuals, any

significant professional promotion in all official organizations was checked or blocked by authorities.

This governmental ongoing control of the situation resulted in the alienation of the intellectuals and their political deprivation. They further sensed a feeling of both powerlessness and, as intellectual production was concerned, nothingness. Powerlessness was particularly decisive among government employees who were the backbone of the official bureaucratic machine but were directly and constantly controlled in the process of operation. Eventually, all the intellectual categories got involved in conflict with the power wielders to express grievances, to accomplish economic goals, and to participate in the political processes. Since democratic and symbolic means alone did not accomplish the desired ends, groups of intellectuals, namely university students, resorted to guerrilla activity and militancy. It was out of this camp that guerrilla organizations were born to play a constructive role in the confrontation. In a word, symbolic and practical anti-regime measures, which ranged from covert dispute to overt conflict, signified a drastic competition with those in power. In response, the regime continued its monopolization of political power and intensified its pressure on the intelligentsia. In the end, the powerful lost the battle to the officially powerless, including the intellectuals.

e. The Blue-Collar Workers. This stratum of the opposition, in both public and private sectors, was engaged in dispute and conflict with three categories. The first category was the management which usually sought economic returns at the least possible cost, including the cost of labor. The second category consisted of the white-collar

workers who, in comparison to the blue-collar workers, were more privileged in economic and political terms. The white-collar workers exercised bureaucratic and managerial authority and force over their inferiors--the blue-collar workers. The third category was the government itself, represented by the SAVAK agents and retired military men who, in several ways, checked on and controlled collective action in work places. Moreover, at the higher official levels (e.g., the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs), labor issues were not taken seriously, for the challenging party, the management, was either the government itself or the private sector which had the upper hand in the process of conflict resolution.

In short, economic affairs as well as the lack of free political expressions frustrated the Iranian blue-collar workers. It was in the factories, workshops, oil and petro-chemical industries that labor dispute and conflict were translated into sit-downs, strikes, demonstrations, passive resistance, and open action. It was the workers who paralyzed the system economically, and, in turn, paved the way for a new mode of power distribution.

(f) The Peasantry. Although the Revolution of Iran is defined as an "urban" revolution, the receptive attitudes and the supportive role of the peasants in the religious Iran should not be ignored in the analysis. This reaction, however, was more sensed in the late stages of the anti-regime action where political violence became the prevailing order. From the early 1960's, amazed by the Shah's Land Reform, a great portion of the peasantry enjoyed a sense of dignity materialized in the allocation of land and independence from the traditional landlords. But, with the passing of time, the farmers

observed that they were left with merely bits and pieces of land and were not backed by an effective technical and financial support from the government.

With their traditional conservatism, poverty, and illiteracy, the peasantry could not get ahead without the support of the landlords or their substitute, the government. The former, due to the Land Reform policies, were absent from the scene and the latter concentrated attention on industrial enterprises and urbanization. The regime also adopted new policies pertaining to agribusiness and agricultural corporations. None of the government's devices could prevent the deteriorating agricultural productivity and the increasing poverty in the countryside. The regime, which was first considered by the farmers as their savior, now was thought of as the major cause of their poverty and social disruption. In such a situation, a hostile body of peasantry was developed against the regime. However, the peasants did not have a will for political power but a need for expressing their economic-based grievances. In their villages and foothills, they did not confront the regime directly but backed the revolutionary urban masses morally. Interestingly, the regime had, for a long time, taken this moral support for granted, though in its own favor.

* * *

As sketched above, political power and free political expression were denied to a nation at large and were monopolized by a class of society. In the process of difference, dispute, and conflict, the opposition jointly became able to deny political power and legitimacy to the class that had exploited this scarce resource historically--

it rebalanced power relations. Based on such an approach to both the addressed theory and the revolution, the following proposition is deduced.

Proposition II. In a given situation, the more political power as a scarce resource is unequally distributed and unjustly exercised over and denied to those who have will to power, the more likely conflict and revolution will emerge. However, unless other conditions are met, open conflict and revolution will not arise.

* * *

Finally, neither the desire for political power, nor the economic inequality, alone or jointly, are the only source for conflict in society. There are also occasions on which people rise in action for cultural reasons. The cultural then may interact with or even overshadow other causes of social conflict. This argument, however, leads to Gusfield's "Status politics" and Geschwender's "Status inconsistency" hypotheses which are applied to the test case revolution immediately.

3. Status Politics and Status Inconsistency Explanations Applied

The causes of social movements, including the prototype revolution, are a mixture of such variables as political, cultural (i.e., national, religious, moral, racial etc.), economic, and psychological which somehow set people in motion and involve them in political action. Economic interests and political offices alone are not necessarily the sole causes of political violence. In certain situations people may rebel even if they are economically prosperous and politically privi-

leged. Or a rebellion may also take place when people give reference to cultural values and national sentiments over other interests. In several anti-colonialist movements, the colonialized people rose against the colonializers more under the banners of moral sentiments and traditional ethics than economic or political issues.

In the process of status-based political action, and in social movements in general, the cultural interests and issues related to prestige and self-esteem can function in different ways. They may symbolize the movement as a whole, inflame the existing economic and political inequalities with cultural sentiments, or operate as the major cause in the process. In other words, cultural sentiments and values may speak for themselves and function independently or interact with other pressing realities to cause or pre-empt a change, to shape that change valuationally, or to maintain the existing moral order.

On the other hand, in recent times political conflict that is fueled culturally may have taken place in two stages of social development. The first stage is identified with the importation of industrialism into the pre-industrial society, as a new way of life and mode of production challenging the traditional arrangements. The next stage is identified with intensified and too rapid industrialization in the already industrialized society. Segments of this society cannot absorb excessive change very smoothly and see such a change as a kind of demoralization of the already transformed traditional morality. However, the nature, direction, intensity, and strategy of status politics in each stage are not the same, though the incentives are.

In the case of Iran, status politics is characterized by the

first case, namely, the situation in which rapid and inharmonious but imported industrialization challenged the normative moral order and the traditional way of a people's life. The Shah's industrialization, modernization, or Westernization affected variously certain strata at least in the urban centers. These processes began with Reza Shah's era (1921-1941) and aimed at modernizing a traditional society forcefully and without qualifications. These policies were opposed by different categories of the Iranians. The first category was the conservative traditionalists who viewed modernization as disruptive Westernization aimed at the destruction of the conventional way of life and social statuses. In addition, it paved the way for further interference in favor of the alien and foreign forces. The next category was exposed to and accepted modernity but rejected the way in which modernization was introduced to society and the undesired cultural transformation that it caused.

Although the two categories were different in their perception of modernity, affiliation with the past, and visions about the future, in the course of action they came to common terms. Indications of this were the practical alliance between secular intellectuals and the upper-middle classes on the one hand, and the religious community and the lower strata on the other. These two categories understood that they had moral values in common and that their traditional life-style were either undergoing undesired transformation or were not attainable under the Shah's regime. However, their ethical position and life-style commitment were paradoxically enforced by a third category--ethnic minorities.

This category saw that the government's policies in the cultural, political, economic, and centralization areas, by intention and otherwise, were targeted toward the breakdown of the traditional ethnic way of life and ethnic liberties. In fact, these ethnic minorities understood the Shah's modernization as a double alienating force. It changed the traditional structure in which they were included and it attempted to totally liquidate their particular ethnic relations and customs. Although they had ethnic-based status and moral differences with the wholesale anti-Shah activists, the cultural interests in general unified the two parties, at least momentarily. This, again, reemphasizes the point that the Shah's administration put different strata together with conflicting interests against the regime.

As stated earlier, the actual threat to the traditional establishment began with Reza Shah's reign. He ". . . abolished titles, forbade the wearing of veils, turbans and national costumes (. . .), reduced religious holidays, and decreed the use of surnames" (Paine, 1975:15). In fact, "Part of Reza Shah's modernizing nationalism was a secularist attack on traditional dress. . ." (Fischer, 1980:186), and the imposition of the conventional European costumes, hair-style, and the like. This social policy continued, extended, and exacerbated in the Shah's era in which "tradition" was his "first enemy." In this era many social conditions, cultural values, and moral attitudes underwent undesired changes by the traditional moral standards.

These changes, however, were not endemic to modernization, but mostly were caused by fascination with Western life-style, mismanagement, and inadequate provision for a viable adjustment. Impressed

by Western music, movies, pornography, dresses (e.g., the controversial mini-skirt), the pet (especially the "impure" dog) raising habits, night clubs, gambling centers, boy friend-girl friend habits, and dancing parties, many Iranians gave up the traditional practices in favor of a new mode of living. Since these practices were not primarily lodged on adaptive measures but simple imitation, they were seen by the traditionalists as bare Westomania, loss of identity, and absurdity. Interestingly, these attitudes and behavior also pervaded the lower middle-classes who attempted to catch up with the upper-classes, at least symbolically, and, of course, superficially. In these circumstances, cultural lag, moral inconsistency, and generational gaps surfaced and increased.

This situation resulted in a kind of cultural deprivation, status loss, and humiliation on which ground a moral crusade was launched. Such a crusade, however, was initiated on behalf of its own self, interacted with the economic and political objectives, and to a great extent symbolized the Iranian Revolution as in totality. This reality can be traced to, among other indications, the official identification of the Iranian Revolution as "Islamic," that is, a religious revolution. It is also observed that, "The bulk of the movements' rank and file is drawn from lower-middle class property owners, shopkeepers, traditional merchants, and craftsmen--the groups that have been most threatened by industrialization and modern mass marketing" (Bordewich, 1980:69).

On the other hand, cultural values, intellectual issues, and status-related interests had a particular implication for three categories

of the Iranian opposition: religious leaders, ethnic minorities, and the professional intellectuals. In each case, this particularity is explainable by "status inconsistency" and non-temporal "downward mobility," as proposed by Geschwender.

The religious leaders, who traditionally and officially were one of the most highly ranked strata in society, saw themselves as inferior relative to the past and lower in the social hierarchy than the comparable pro-regime individuals. Their prestige and mobility were restricted or blocked by means of secularistic attitudes, isolation from the mainstream of politics, and the concomitant circumstantial powerlessness. As a result, even in their traditional theological spheres of influence, such as Mosque and Madreseh (i.e., traditional religious college), they failed to maintain their traditional prestigious positions and self-esteem. The clergy and those people who advocated traditional and not necessarily reactionary or conservative values were called by the newcomer secularists "Omol" (i.e., foggyish). This status distortion was also true with regard to "modern" intellectuals and ethnic minorities.

Ethnic minorities did not gain privileges on the ground of ethnic affiliation, ethnic rights, and ethnic authority throughout the Pahlavi regime. What was worse, with the course of time they were forced to give up certain ethnic ties, sentiments, customs and ambitions. They eventually suffered from identification loss in a society in which the Arabs, the Baluchis, the Kurds, the Turks, and the Turkomans were not identified as such or even as "hyphenated" Iranians, but as pure Iranians overwhelmed by the dominant culture.

When certain members of these ethnicities, usually the Turks, rose to higher positions this was achieved through absolute loyalty to the regime and total withdrawal from ethnic claim and identification. In fact, when it came to ethnic-based position and career promotion in association with ethnic rights, the Iranian ethnicities had two incompatible choices--to submit to and be assimilated into the dominant system or to withdraw from ethnic-based social honor. Eventually, in either way, ethnic objectives were defeated and the pertaining privileges were not achieved.

In sum, while religiosity and ethnicity were actually considered two viable sources of self-esteem, prestige, and social mobility in the past, in the Shah's era they turned out to be barriers to upward mobility in non-economic terms.

In the case of the professional intellectuals, both status inconsistency and downward mobility were experienced under the Shah's rule. The only criterion based on which an individual could develop and promote his intellectual and occupational careers was loyalty to the regime. The critic intellectuals lagged behind comparable individuals in comparable governmental occupations. This cleavage was manifested in different forms. For example, members of the politically active intelligentsia were expelled from or denied public jobs or were assigned to occupations inferior and irrelevant to their specialization. The occupational promotion of other intellectuals either were belated, suspended, or stalemated without occupational justification, but rather for political reasons. In each case, the individual's social mobility was blocked and restricted, and hence his social status was affected

constantly. It is worthwhile to note that this discussed case of the Iranian intellectuals (and similar instances) can be suitably explained by status inconsistency theory which traditionally covers only ethnic and religious categories.

Along with status politics and status inconsistency approaches to social conflict, the Revolution of Iran was, to a great extent, provoked by a search for normative morality, viable ethical and ethnic statuses, functional identity, and a meaningful situation in a rapidly changing society and crisis time. Responding to Newsweek's question that "What are the successes and failures of your revolution?", the Iranian President Ali Khamenei (1982:42), replied that "... We have freed our culture to a great extent from the dependence which our enemies, especially the Americans, imposed on us. We have been born again" (Emphasis added).

Thus, in considering the implication of status politics and inconsistency for social action, in fact, the significance of the "super-structure," unlike what the Marxist Theory holds, is at issue. However, based on the underlying theme of this synthesis, the functioning of ethical, moral, national, racial, and ethnic values as well as issues of life-style blockage or a combination of them, is considered to provide a wider base for economic and political causes of revolutions. Moreover, to avoid semantic confusion and to provide further implication of political action based on issues of morality, dignity, identity and life-style, from now on we will identify this kind of militant politics with Cultural Alienation. Therefore, the cultural variable will be considered the third original source of social revolutions.

With these qualifications and considerations, the following proposition is derived.

Proposition III. If a people's conventional way of life, traditional identity, and social status consistency undergo a sweeping change, these people will likely rise in culturally pre-emptive, sustaining, or promotional opposition in symbolic, expressive, and/or practical terms. Cultural opposition will not invoke conflict and revolution unless other conditions exist.

* * *

So far, in this first step, the structural causes of a potential and abstract revolution stemming from economic, political, and cultural sources have been discussed and formulated. This formulation, however, is in line with Weber's (1946) multidimensional analysis of social differentiation. In this analysis, people are considered to be stratified on the ground of (1) "wealth," to which economic status is connected, (2) "political power" which relates to political status, and (3) "prestige" which is associated with social status. Thus, valued temporal and non-temporal resources on which stratum inequality is based and in which conflict is rooted, are economic, political, and social. However, since the "social," by definition, also includes both the "economic" and the "political," we have already deviated from Weber's terminology in this particular case by substituting the "cultural" for what is related to social status-based politics.

Along with this formulation, it is also theorized that these fundamental' origins of revolution will, with a leading role of one over the other, eventually lead to three processes which are "value-dissensus,"

"strain-build up," and "resource-mobilization" on behalf of the opposition. In the subsequent steps each of these processes is explained by the corresponding theory out of which further propositions will be developed.

The Second Step: The Emergence of Value-Dissensus

1. Johnson's Revolutionary Change Applied

Based on the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-7 which in fact was a new definition of the undesirable situation, the Iranian people came to terms with the institution of monarchy. This agreement was substantiated with the implementation of constitutional rules and democratic measures. In the course of time, the monarch's authority, which was constitutionally defined as symbolic, turned out to be instrumental and absolute. The regime accumulated and monopolized political power and denied valued authoritative resources and democratic practices to the people. The Pahlavi regime ignored, overlooked, or altered the Constitution, that is, the encoded values based on which consensus was initiated.

In fact, as was emphasized in chapter five, the Pahlavi regime suffered from a legitimation crisis throughout its era. Such a crisis should be interpreted as a constant dissensus or at least a doubtful consensus between the elites and the masses. The most open crisis prior to the 1978-9 Revolution was the 1953 coup through which a constitutional monarch with external support overthrew the legal government and restored power forcefully. (This case, and similar ones, proposes a definitional problem in the sense that any given political regime should not be considered as legitimate simply because it is

"in power".)

For the Pahlavi regime, power gradually diminished, but contrary to that, the masses gained a progressive legitimation for confrontation with the regime. In this dysnchronized value structure, a new definition of the situation was inevitable. The regime failed to inject new blood into the disintegrating system, to enforce the agreed-upon values, and to avoid a practical dissensus. Thus, the instigation of a new division of labor, a new value structure, and a new equilibrium became the task of the opposition. This task was indeed the source of the opposition's strength and legitimation for open conflict and revolutionary change.

This implication of the theory for revolution can be generalized to abstract cases as the following proposition holds.

Proposition IV. Structural causes of conflict will somehow produce value dissensus which, in turn, will precipitate social tension, legitimize anti-regime action, and, with other factors, pave the way for open conflict and revolution.

To be sure, the assumed shared values among society do not necessarily mean a functionalist explanation of social reality. Rather, what is really meant here is that, in the pre-revolutionary crisis, the status quo may be seen as de facto, which, for the time being, is immune from or has the potential for conflict and revolution. In this modern time and civilized society, a "war of all against all" is incredible. A factual contract of kind (e.g., a constitution), or some unwritten accords, must be put into effect if a constant chaotic situation is to be avoided. However, people will be justified to act

against the status quo if the ad hoc or existing accords, constitutional laws, and the like fail to fulfill their wishes. Such a failure as well as the politics of the opposition are together associated with the process of strain build-up as discussed immediately.

The Third Step: The Build-up of Strain

Some theories of revolution concentrate on the phenomenon of "strain" as the cause of social conflict and revolution. In this perspective, the actual economic, political, and existential causes of political unrest are overlooked or are not specified in the interest of a strainful situation that gives rise to revolution. Such theories as those of Davies, Smelser, Gurr, and Geschwender are examples to be applied and utilized in this third step of the synthesis. Since the quality of strain build-up is approached differently in these theories, each theory will primarily be considered independently. The only exception is Geschwender's hypotheses, two of which have already been covered in the first step and each of the remaining will be used in the rising expectation and relative deprivation explanations of revolution.

1. Rise-Drop Model. This model, as formulated by Davies and supplemented by Geschwender, has some implications though with some consideration for the Revolution of Iran. The first implication is associated with the idea of "rising expectation" per se, that is, without regard to an essential comparison between a favorable past and an intolerable future viewed from the pessimistic perspective of the present. Although Iran's GNP began to increase tremendously with the oil boom in 1973, it did not decrease noticeably even until the very

eruption of the Revolution. No "sharp reversal" occurred in the process, as Davies' model holds abstractly. In economic gains, the majority of the urban population continued to earn more relative to the past.

Additionally, because of the appointment of the new government in August 1977, some kind of relief was felt by the masses who were undergoing certain pressures caused by inadequate services and increased socioeconomic gaps. This relief was enforced by new promises, policies, and reshuffling, all of which served two objectives. This change confirmed, though implicitly, the regime's failure in different areas of planning and administration. It also encouraged the opposition to realize further that change was possible and the stability of the regime was in peril. To be sure, the preceeding 13-year old government, headed by a veteran politician loyal to the Shah, was considered and recognized by the Shah as the most fit and winning card in Iranian politics and conflicts.

The second implication of the rise-drop model is that the rising expectations, which were not appropriately met in the 1970's, strained the Iranians. However, these expectations aimed at two objectives, neither of which is explainable by the rise-drop model. One was the unjust distribution of wealth and income caused by capitalistic measures, and the other was concerned with political freedom. With reference to the last objective, the Iranians saw political freedom essential for two reasons. (1) The economic development necessitated the accompaniment of political democratization of some kind, and (2) democratic measures were considered as vital channels through which increasing economic gaps could be balanced and narrowed. Hence,

rising expectations in the case of Iran, as understood here, were not based on economic interests alone but political privileges as well. It is also emphasized that this rise did not stem from a comparison between two phases of development but was based on the constant escalation of differentiation in economic rewards and political privileges.

The third implication of the Davies' model, which may be considered in line with the model itself, was associated with the lower stratum of the white-collar workers and a majority of the peasantry. The lower white-collars, who based their life on government salaries, failed to meet the rising cost of the oil boom years, relative to the early 1970's and the preceeding years. In this situation, this category saw its current state of affairs as inferior to the past conditions and its future was uncertain if the present trends continued. However, because of their powerlessness, economic dependence on the government, and the overwhelming operation of social control, these categories alone were by no means capable of creating or representing a revolution.

The peasantry did not raise expectations for a better future relative to the past, but compared their present with the past. In the early 1960's, the regime appealed to the peasants and raised their morale through the program of Land Reform. With the passage of time, and especially in the 1970's, their economic gains and social privileges decreased decisively. Hence, in the process they advanced value capabilities in different areas. The regime failed to respond appropriately to the expectations that it had already elevated. But, the peasants did not make nor did they participate directly in the making of the

Revolution.

In a word, in the case of Iran and in line with Geschwender's hypothesis, but unlike Davies' argument, "The actual state of socio-economic development" must be considered as more and not "less significant than the expectation that progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future." People more likely get involved in violent politics for objective reasons related to their current situation, rather than because of an ambiguous perception of an uncertain future. Finally, Davies-Geschwender's strain can also be seen in the light of Smelser's theory, though from a different view.

2. Smelser's Theory. This theory may be better considered as a comprehensive frame of analysis of social movements and revolutions than as a novel explanation of their causes. However, as the origins of revolution are concerned, one "determinant" (i.e., structural strain) of this "value-added" approach will be considered in this step of the synthesis. To be sure, the other four determinants (i.e., generalized belief, precipitating factors, mobilization for action, and the operation of social control) will be taken advantage of in the fourth step, that is, the category of resource mobilization.

On the other hand, Smelser's "structural conduciveness," which is associated with (1) an identifiable enemy, (2) the absence of channels of expressing grievances, and (3) favorable ecology for political action, has already been covered in the first step of this synthesis. There we showed that structural socioeconomic inequality and cultural alienation were born under the Shah's regime and produced national circumstance conducive to militant political action

or a "hostile outburst." Thus, what is left of interest of the theory for the present is the determinant of structural strain.

In line with Smelser's approach, it should be emphasized that there, indeed, was a "structural" strain in the Iranian society under the Shah's rule. This strain was caused by "impaired social relations" in both "traditional" and "institutional" areas and in "social" and "social psychological" terms. Traditional arrangements underwent undesirable change in national, religious, ethnic, and ethical aspects or, as we labeled previously, in cultural terms. The institutionalized values, which were assumed to substitute, challenge, or coexist with the historical establishment, were mostly carbon copies of the West in the guise of Western-style modernization. In addition, the Shah's newly created institutions were not managed appropriately but were used and promoted for group interests, individualistic ambitions, familial hegemony, and class dominance.

In those "institutions," in fact, "relations" governed the situation, and not standards or institutionalized collective values. As a result, social gaps and economic differences were widened and increased in the Shah's institutions, though absolute economic gains were multiplied. Political power was monopolized by the elites, and any political appeal of the opposition was oppressed by the secret services. Although social mobility was noticeably in practice, higher and strategic offices were blocked to the many.

Finally, where Davies and Smelser attribute the strainful situation that eventuates in revolution to "sharp economic reversal" and "impaired social relations" respectively, Gurr's theory of "aggres-

sion" and "frustration" is lodged on "relative deprivation."

3. Relative Deprivation Model. This explanation of "political violence," which is based on relative deprivation, as formulated by Gurr and explored by Geschwender, also has some implications for the causes of the Iranian Revolution. However, some considerations must be highlighted. First, as it will be sketched immediately, all the "decremental," "aspirational," and "progressive" deprivations, prevailed in the Iranian society, though among different categories. In other words, it is not necessarily relevant to attribute one type of deprivation to one stage of socioeconomic development as Gurr maintains. This qualification is, however, connected to the second consideration. That is, the source of deprivation should not necessarily be identical for all society's classes as the theory holds. To specify the implication of this theory for the Revolution of Iran in association with the above mentioned considerations, the following application practice is advanced for the transitional society of Iran under the Shah's regime.

The traditionalist and lower categories of the Iranian society lost some of their accustomed way of life, mode of production and transaction, and traditional authority and prestige. This loss was caused in the interest of a new mode of economic exchanges and political relations, and a system of value-orientation into which they had not been assimilated at the time. The upper middle classes developed some aspirations in political and economic terms and in patterns of life. However, because of unfair distribution of economic rewards and the monopolization of political privileges by the elites, they failed to fulfill their wishes. The upper layers of this category were also

affected by progressive deprivation stemming from desire for higher political offices, intellectual production, ideological maneuvering, and self-styled but not imported style of life.

However, these clues and instances do not imply a total explanation for the target revolution for several reasons. First, relative deprivation in fact is not a cause for revolution but rather it is an aspect or a manifestation of structural causes that had already produced, among other things, deprivation. Second, people may not be deprived of only one particular source such as value, sentiment, commodity and the like, but rather of all, or a combination of, these values and interests. Third, they may also be deprived at different levels and in variable stages of a potentially revolutionary process. Finally, based on their particular socialization into the norms of society and stratum, people may also perceive of deprivation differently and define the situation in different ways. Thus, the assumed deprivation in a given situation can bring about different, cut-crossing, or even conflicting states of affairs.

In the case of Iran, there was in fact relative deprivation though with differing origins, regions, manifestations, explanations, and remedial reactions on behalf of the affected. For instance, while the communist categories viewed deprivation in structural economic values, the religious groupings perceived of it in moral and ethical terms or even in an ascetical sense. It can also be argued that the professional intellectuals defined their depriving situation existentially and primarily sought meaning for life rather than conventional prosperity. Ethnic minorities might have envisioned their

situation from an all-encompassing perspective which also covered a colonialist reference point for their subjugation. Finally, the nationalists adhered to a new political definition of the situation within the existing value system and the monarchical tradition. Thus, what really matters in this synthesis is the reality that deprivation, in one way or another, prevailed under the Shah's rule, and, in turn, caused aggression, frustration, and strain, which somehow ultimately burst out into revolution.

Finally, on the ground of both the inclusion of strain in the discussed theories of revolution and the implication of strain for the test case revolution, the following proposition is set forth.

Proposition VI. If enduring sharp economic and political inequalities are not reduced appropriately, and the impulsive cultural alienation are not managed appropriately, they will likely produce a socially strainful situation leading to conflict and revolution. This radical change will not occur unless strain is activated collectively and militantly.

The collective and militant activation of the strainful situation as well as the manipulation of the situational value-dissensus are the subject matter of the next steps in this synthesis which cover the resource mobilization explanation of revolution.

The Fourth Step.Resource Mobilization Explanation Applied

As discussed previously in chapter five, the Revolution of Iran was characterized by religious values and sentiments as a culture

for the many and as political ideals for certain categories of people. The Quran commands the followers to man the barricade against their enemies with different means and by different alternatives. As an example the Quran says "Do manage against them whatever strength you afford. . . ." (IX:54). A. N. Jassem (1979) describes a variety of strategies, tactics, and resource management that the early Muslims adopted to expand Islam forcefully or peacefully in the era of the Prophet.

However, resource mobilization in the case of the Iranian Revolution was not restricted to religious practices and traditions. It was also based on communist and nationalist experiences in both symbolic and practical terms.

A brief review of the Iranian politics from the late 19th century, as was discussed in the "Narrative Account," reveals that there had always been dispute and conflict of a kind between the regime and the opposition. But, prior to 1978-9, the regime had gradually been able to take hold of the situation, to overwhelm the opposition, and to crush it decisively at least on two occasions, in 1953 and in 1963. On these two occasions, the opposing groups failed to accomplish their fundamental ends. This failure was basically caused by the growing strength of the elites on the one hand, and the poor effort management of their counterparts on the other.

For instance, although the Shah was able, though through external support, to put an end to the popular government of Mossadeq in 1953, a close observation of the events reveals another cause for the opposition's failure. According to Roosevelt (1978:166f), the CIA

agent in charge of the operation, "less than \$100,000. . ." was invested "during the operation" to mobilize the Iranians against Mossadeq's movement and to reinstall the Shah in power. In a sense, this means among other things that the opposition was short in counter-balancing the situation by some \$100,000. Interestingly, because of nationalistic fervor enhanced by the nationalization of oil, the anti-British sentiment, and the growing local, regional, and international popularity of Mossadeq, the overall situation was much more favorable for the opposition than for the regime.

In 1963, the Bazaaris' anti-regime action and massive demonstration, which was basically identified with the religious community, was denied sufficient support from different challengers and especially the communist categories and the nationalist leadership. This rebellion, which the new regime acknowledged as the beginning of the Iranian 1978-9 Revolution, was severely crushed by the Shah's troops. Again, the situation was more favorable for the opposition than for the regime. The regime was suffering both internal pressure from the inner circle and external pressure and provocation from the rival President Nasser and even from the Kennedy administration which pushed the Shah to adopt some reforms. The opposition was so immobilized and disunited that it failed to exploit the permissive and supportive circumstances for its own good.

In the 1978-9 episodes, which brought about the Revolution, the situation differed remarkably. This is, in fact, attributed to two reciprocal processes: the growing popular strength of the opposition as a unified whole, and the decaying of the regime. Such a decay was

caused by the regime's own disintegration from within and the opposition's pressure from without. The strength of the opposition stemmed from the management of its effort, unity, adoption of different means for challenge, and the determination to fight to the end. These determining efforts and strategies for a successful anti-regime action are sketched in the following passages.

The traditional opposition usually provoked and encouraged the university students to demonstrate or riot on every possible occasion. This was particularly true in the event of the annual Shanizdeh Azar (December 17), the "generational event" in which three Tehran University students were killed on campus by the Shah's troops (1953). This demonstration served at least two ends: the enduring politicization of different generations of students, and the continuous, though covert, parade of the old opposition. In a word, the event served as a constant revitalization of student politics and sacrifice.

From the early 1970's, the university students were able to identify themselves with "student libraries" on major campuses. These entities, which were associated with the Marxist and Muslim students, unified the activists, eased their recruitment, and their efforts of politicization. The collective prayers of the Muslim students, who were functionaries and beneficiaries of the Muslim students library, signified the emergence of a new religio-political and revolutionary generation.

The Iranian student organizations abroad, in Western Europe and in the United States, were among the most effective means through which the regime's oppression was publicized and denounced. In the

process, the students with some help of the international groups on human rights were able to gain a minimal international support at an intellectual level for their cause. Moreover, after their return to the country, many of the activist students continued their challenge though with different tactics, including armed struggle. The Iranian student organizations abroad, which were favored by "Western democracy," politically socialized different student generations and served as reference points for their fellow activists inside the country. Some of these students abroad finally became members of the "Revolutionary Council" and one of them became Iran's first President (to be later denounced by the Parliament).

From the early 1970s, two active Islamic and Marxist guerrilla organizations emerged to initiate, encourage, and symbolize armed struggle against the regime. The "Siahkal" Confrontation with the regime's gendarmes, though of a limited scope, served as a turning point in anti-regime action. The bravery of the guerrilla Fadaeyeen in this challenge was also developed metaphorically in some songs and gained noticeable popularity.

The vitality of Mosques and other religious places as well as of the religious sermons and preachings should also be acknowledged as an effective but traditional kind of preparation for challenge. Since the regime could not prohibit Mosque attendance nationwide, Mosques operated as almost the only places in which unofficial mass gatherings were possible. In such congregations, the desirable marriage between two Islamic mates (i.e., religion and politics) was in practice. The regime failed to understand the fact that Mosque attendants were not

necessarily all practicing Muslims but people who had political purposes which could not be advanced elsewhere and by other means. Some preachers criticized the regime overtly, others did so by implication, and hence the Mosque became the only available place in which militant politics were touched upon or at least were expected to be exchanged and communicated.

Another means which was exploited easily for political anti-regime communication was the Iranian tradition of "Dawrah." Dawrah literally means course of time or action, but in tradition it means a "confluence of personal and group relations" (Bill, 1972:44). The Iranians are used to gathering at certain periods of time, weekly, biweekly, or monthly. The purpose of this gathering is the maintenance and reinforcement of family ties, friendly relationships, and leisure time. Dawrah is usually staged at night and characterized by hospitality and entertainment. It takes place in every participant's home alternately and this is another rationale for the term. Under the Shah's rule where open political discussions and criticisms were a total risk, this "confluence" automatically functioned for the opposition as covert overnight media for political discussion, mobilization, and future action. This traditional form of interaction was generally immune to SAVAK penetration, for, traditionally, it includes only close relatives and intimate friends. It was on such occasions as the Dawrah gatherings that the "what is to be done" and "how should it be carried out" issues were discussed and determined.

The mountainous location of the capital city of Tehran was also exploited by the inhabitants, especially the youth, to involve themselves

in politics and ideological dialogue at the "summits." This prevalent practice usually took place, and was easily justified, in the guise of leisure time activity and camping which occasionally lasted for days. To repeat, such a recourse to mother nature for political purposes was caused by the SAVAK's intensifying check over the conventional places of gathering in the jammed city of Tehran.

"Shab-nameh" can be thought of as another tactical means in the process of resource mobilization endeavors. Shab-nameh is a secret letter which is distributed anonymously overnight. Since under the Shah's regime the press and other public means of communication were under constant censorship, Shab-nameh served as a nightly secret paper through which the opposition communicated to the citizens through this kind of paper, the opposition sent also its militant and revealing messages to the authorities. By adopting this means of communication, the Iranians, in fact, revived a traditional practice to which they had always resorted historically.

Poetry nights, though not held very often, were among other means the intellectuals adopted to speak out whenever possible. Persian poetry was historically used, either directly or by implication, as a channel for political criticism and psychological catharsis. Interestingly, one of the characteristics of the Iranian post-Islamic poetry is the "Sanat-e Eham" (i.e., the poetic device of metaphor), which was developed at least partially because of the nonexistence of free political expression under different regimes. At a poetry night, which was held in Tehran in 1975, Hamid Mossadegh, a participating poet addressed his audience of some fifteen thousand by the provocative

question:

If I do not rise,
And you do not rise
Who else then will rise?

Furthermore, Dr. Ali Shariati, who advocated a modern humanitarian but militant Islamic ideology, held countrywide lectures which were attended by different groups and served to orient the participants in religio-political terms. Shariati helped orient youth toward defined political and ethical ideals and in turn sowed the seed of a revolutionary action in their receptive minds.

Cassette tapes were also used to convey the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini's messages and to bridge the geographical gap between him and his followers. In this practice, the so-called "transistor revolution" contributed to the creation of the Iranian Revolution through politicization and mobilization of different categories of the people for militant action. These tapes, along with the Ayatollah's leaflets, were smuggled into Iran from Iraq by pilgrims and were easily but covertly duplicated, multiplied, and circulated nationwide.

In terms of financial support and other preparatory measures, the Bazaaris invested a great deal of money, time, and energy. They had the money to offer and the will to continue this sacrifice. In addition to their traditional and religious inclination to politics, the Bazaaris considered their sacrifice of money as religious tithes. This practice was both encouraged and legalized by the religious leaders. Thus, the interlink between religious duties and practical political necessities can be observed as both legitimizing and reinforcing

prophecies for whose purpose time, money, and energy were sacrificed and appreciated.

In the revolutionary episodes, the opposition adopted slogans, tactics, and strategies consistent with the course of events. While the initial slogans and demands revolved around such issues as "political freedom," "salary increase," and the return of Ayatollah Khomeini, with the passage of time, the slogan "down with the Shah" became the focal point. In a gradual manner the opposition approached the Shah's army and the quiet religious minorities; offered flowers to soldiers and the riot troops, and diverted their attention by patriotic, religious, and humanitarian slogans and Quranic decrees. In this context, the now massive revolutionized opposition emotionalized or neutralized its enemy and in the end caused the split in the army.

So far the endogenous resource mobilization practices and policies have been discussed. With reference to exogenous resource management, and in addition to student activism abroad, the Organization for Liberation of Palestine was also taken advantage of by the Iranians. From the late 1960's, different groups of the young activists resorted to the PLO training camps in Jordan and Lebanon. In addition to partisan training, the trainees also furthered and enriched their theoretical and ideological education and also participated in some guerrilla activities on the spot. The core of the two Iranian guerrilla organizations, Mojahideen and Fedayin, may be considered a training produce of the PLO. It is also indicated that the backbone of the "Revolutionary Guard Army," the pride of the new regime of Iran, was trained by the Palestinians.

Finally, certain points must be concluded and emphasized in the case of the Iranians resource mobilization. First, what was discussed in the above passages must be considered and analyzed as an integrated whole: a network of interaction, communication, collaboration, and even constructive competition among the revolutionary factions. In fact, there were two regimes acting against each other: the regime in power, and the rival regime that had a desire for power. Second, the regime of the opposition was mobilized for two ultimate alternatives: to share political power within the existing system or to bring about a new system in spite of the will of power wielders. Since, as time went on the opposition gained more strength and determination, the second alternative became the only ideal, and it was achieved with success.

Third, in the process of resource mobilization, conflict resolution among the opposing camps, with some exceptions, was adopted either as de jure or de facto. This kind of consensus was a contributing, if not a determining, factor for a revolutionary take-over. Whatever their ideological and tactical differences, the religious, communist, nationalist, and ethnic factions actually worked together to topple the regime. Such a constant unity, though it suffered from occasional breaches and cleavages, was at the very heart of the opposition's resource mobilization. Fourth, in mobilizing their resources, politicizing the intolerable value-dissensus and revolutionizing the strainful situation imposed on them, the Iranians were favored by a religio-political revolutionary tradition which goes far back in their Islamic history. Fifth, such a national tradition was also reinforced by regional and international wars of independence, revolutionary movements, and ongoing

worldwide conflict. This, in turn, raised the Iranians' situational consciousness, elevated their "spirit of time," and mobilized them for constructive political action. Thus, the Iranian activists were able not only to assemble their national resources to challenge the Shah but also to exploit, to all possible extent, the international experiences in extending their situational consciousness, building up their strength, and enforcing their determination.

* * *

But, the position taken here is not that effective resource mobilization is revolution, as the theory assumes. Rather it is argued that there should primarily be objective socioeconomic injustice and substantive existential issues leading to social strain and strangulation around which resource mobilization efforts could or would revolve. People are rational. They could not be mobilized for militant action if there were not structural causes for mobilization and revolution. If such potentialities are existing, their actualization as well as the recruitment and politicization of adherents, constituents, transitory teams, and beneficiaries would be the task of resource mobilization strategies.

If resource mobilization theory does not emphasize the fact that the structural cause of revolution exists situationally but should be worked out in militant political terms to eventuate in revolution, it would be considered a "truncated" theory. Realistically, resource mobilization theory can better provide an explanation for the failure-success dichotomy of a revolutionary "take-over" than a sufficient explanation for a revolutionary "cause." With these considerations one

can better understand why the Iranians were able to overthrow a visibly powerful and internationally supported regime in 1979, but failed to do so in 1953 or 1963 when the regime was weaker than ever before or since. Based on the testability of the theory and the proposed considerations, the following proposition is developed.

Proposition V. Given the intolerable (1) economic inequality, (2) political oppression, and (3) cultural alienation, the concomitant (a) valuational disagreement, and (b) strainful situation, will not result in severe conflict and succesful revolutionary take-over unless people mobilize their resources.

* * *

However, a successful resource mobilization itself is conditioned on another set of variables which are explored in the following step.

The Fifth Step. Ideology, Leadership, and Organization

Resource mobilization strategy and its inevitability for a successful revolutionary action is, indeed, based on and justified by two sets of variables. One set is identified with the intolerable structural shortcomings caused by the dysfunctioning of the regime in power against which people rise in opposition. This reality was considered previously. The other set is identified with the opposition's own ideology, leadership, and organization under whose banner and within whose context the people challenge the regime in power. Therefore, when they rise in action, people do not merely question the existing establishment but also propose their own alternative.

(1) By terms like "ideology," "belief system," "generalized

belief," "revolutionary ideals," "Political program", "world view" (weltanschauung) or "manifesto", what is meant is simply that people must formulate and advocate their own political values and ideals once collective value disagreement is the case. Based on these proposed values and alternatives, the regime is humiliated and a new system, however vague, is promised. Ideology as such is emphasized in several theories of revolution. In practice, too, ideology is seen as vitally functioning in different revolutions. In the case of the Iranian Revolution, the significance of ideology was crucial in the process. Although they adhered to different political ideals, the Iranians were put together under the banner of Islamic values. Accordingly, they advocated an "Islamic Government," which had not been examined elsewhere. However, the Muslim Iranians traditionally understood that Islamic rule will demonstrate equity, equality, and justice. These are the values that Islam advocates and the Shah's regime failed to institutionalize. In a word, "we speak of an ideology when a certain idea serves a vested interest in society" (Berger, 1963:111).

(2) There must also be a leader or leaders who develop or emphasize these alternative ideals and/or lead the movement. They must be aware of time and situational circumstances and must have the personal, intellectual, political, and educational capacities for leading, functioning, and maneuvering. Again, the significance of leadership in the revolutionary process has been emphasized theoretically and observed empirically. Were it not for situational consensus on Ayatollah Khomeini's spiritual leadership, the Iranians would not have been able to act as a unified whole. They adhered

to different political, religious, national, communist, and ethnic lines which, in different ways, cut-cross each other. It was the charismatic leadership that, to a great extent, created a confluence of interests out of conflicting interests, at least momentarily, to challenge the regime. When need is felt, ". . .each society produces the men it needs" (Berger, 1963:111). In crisis situations, such a need intensifies and hence the presence of leadership for viable action is sensed decisively.

(3) Ideology and leadership must operate within a certain frame of action, reaction, and interaction, namely an organization. In such a framework, processes of disputes, conflict, exchanges, and redefinitions of the situations within the opposite camps and between it and the regime, as well as with the "Third Party" of conflict, must occur and advance. Whatever its resources, the opposition cannot overcome the regime if it acts in a disorderly manner. From military wars to social revolutions, and from bargaining tables to open confrontations, organization is a determinant in goal attainment. One characteristic of the Revolution of Iran was its militancy which coupled with non-violence. This condition helped the revolutionaries to shape their action desirably. Through their political groups, guerrilla organizations, well-organized and popular demonstrations, and planned activism, they actually waged a systematic "war of attrition" against the Shah who lost it ultimately. In fact, the organization of the Iranian revolutionary movement in terms of political coalition, internal conflict resolution, pull and push politics with the elites, and tactical devices, demonstrated a great deal of situational consistency, fruitful political maneuvering, and

responsive organizational flexibility.

These three prerequisites of resource mobilization, that is, ideology, leadership, and organization, are born historically and get developed with the course of action or with the intensity of the structural causes of revolution. They also get shaped with the accumulation of strain and the intolerable value-disagreement in society. With all these considerations in mind, this proposition is developed.

Proposition VII. Resource mobilization strategies and tactics will not produce a desirable radical change unless they are adopted and exploited under appropriate ideals, sophisticated leadership, and through a responsive organization.

However, the functioning of leadership, ideology, and organization in the twofold process of (1) resource mobilization and (2) the actual confrontation with the regime must produce sufficient stratum politicization and consciousness. (Stratum politicization and stratum consciousness mean group politics, stemming from economic, political, cultural, religious, ethnic, or national sources.) In fact, it is this gradual revolutionary politicization and consciousness that inflame and motivate people for political action, sacrifice, and confrontation. Active stratum political consciousness also justifies people's commitment to the interest of self and the ideal of the stratum. This situational and sequential collective consciousness may revolve around such perplexities as (1) what situation "we" are already engulfed in, (2) how it is possible to redefine the situation favorably, and (3) how it is functional for the group and imperative to us to get involved in action.

In the case of the Iranian Revolution, collective consciousness enhanced and complicated the politics of the opposition. The Iranians were able to relate to different religious/secular ideals in political terms and defined their situation accordingly. They understood that they would be better-off under a new social system whose realization required conscious political sacrifice. In the process, active collective consciousness developed and anti-regime action was promoted. If simply political consciousness, as the Marxist theory holds, is not identical with revolution, a revolution of political consciousness is inevitable for the emergence and success of revolutionary action. That is what happened in the revolutionary Iran as well as any other mass revolution. In connection, the following proposition is concluded and proposed.

Proposition VIII. For ideology, leadership and organization to succeed in resource mobilization processes, active political stratum consciousness must be present among the revolutionaries.

The Sixth Step. Windfalls as the Precipitating Factors of a Revolutionary Take-Over

Some theorists (e.g., Smelser and Johnson) point out the role of some "precipitating factors" or "accelerators" that somehow promote revolutions. Whatever their impact on the process, these factors must be considered as Godsend or windfalls. These accelerators may operate as latent functions of either some anti-regime action or of the operation of social control itself. For example, the execution of a revolutionary figure by the regime may, contrary to the regime's expectation, further revolutionize the masses and hence advance the occurrence of revolution.

It is also true, for instance, that the untimed assassination of a top official by the opposition can cause a setback for the opposition itself. In this situation, the regime may take severe revenge and hence minimize the probability of open conflict at least momentarily. Or, the revolutionary action may recede automatically under the pretext that it has already caused a loss to the regime and hence has achieved an end in the course of confrontation. In such a case, "wait and see" may become the opposition's new approach to the changing situations. As a recent example, it seems that the assassination of President Anwar Al-Sadat by his opposition has tranquilized the anti-regime militant action in Egypt and minimized the probability of a revolutionary movement against Sadat's regime and his moderate successor.

In the case of the Iranian Revolution, some factors were hypothesized as contributing to the emotionalization of the people and the explosion of revolution beforehand. However, it should be emphasized that, as they are defined here and elsewhere, the precipitating factors do not cause a revolution but contribute to the timing of a revolutionary transition of power. As such, these windfalls can be viewed in the light of the overall strategies and tactics of resource mobilization enterprise. Historically, the contribution of the accelerating factors in revolutionary action has more or less been observed and emphasized in revolutions, including the test case revolution, and in several theories of social movements. In this regard, it is plausible to supplement the proposed synthesis with the following proposition.

Proposition IX. As far as the timing of revolution is concerned,

some unprecedented factors may precipitate conflict and accelerate the explosion of revolution. This is true only if the revolutionaries manipulate, manage, and exploit the windfall events deliberately.

* * *

In the preceding steps the economic, political, cultural, psychological, organizational, ideological, situational sources, and leadership enterprises as well as conditions of conflict leading to probable revolutions were outlined, synthesized, and formulated. This overall enterprise is diagrammed in page 307 .

In terms of specification, the diagram (p. 307) must be read as follows. First, economic inequality, political oppression, and cultural alienation, jointly or separately, constitute the basic source of political transformation and drastic social change. However, in dissimilar circumstances one variable may dominate the others.


Second, once these pre-revolutionary conditions are existing, value dissensus and social strain will emerge in the process.

Third, the eventuation of strain and dissensus in revolution is conditioned on the opposition's resource mobilization efforts (relative to the regime's).

Fourth, the resource mobilization enterprise is materialized in and characterized by the operation of leadership, ideology, and organization, which actually produce, among other things, stratum consciousness.

Fifth, the timing and the acceleration of revolution is also dependent upon some windfalls to be approached and manipulated by the opposition in the course of action.

AN INTEGRAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION:
ILLUSTRATION



Obviously, the revolutionary cause is a complex phenomenon which develops historically, booms circumstantially, and bursts suddenly. Various factors, in one way or another and anticipated or not, are involved in the creation of the causes of revolution as well as its timing. The popular state of mind that somehow breaks out into a revolution is empirically difficult to scrutinize, characterize, and measure rigorously and abstractly. However, it is observed here that the magnitude and the nature of social strain in relation with resource mobilization efforts can provide different types of revolutionary (or political) action. This point would be specified after the next test case revolution was addressed and the final conclusion was drawn.

Finally, although revolutions are identified with their places of birth--that is, a nation, a country, or a nation-state--they are, in fact, universal phenomena with evident international implications. This is especially true in the complex world system of today. Evidence of this can be traced, for instance, to the fact that some revolutions are promoted by international, regional, or bilateral conflicts, and other revolutions contribute to similar encounters. The Revolution of Iran surely has contributed to the ongoing war between Iraq and Iran, and the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1940's also played a part in the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. This last revolution is sketched in the next chapter to serve as a test case for the proposed synthesis.

CHAPTER VII

TESTING THE SYNTHESIS AGAINST THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION (1952)

In performing the task of this chapter, two steps will be taken successively. First, the historical background of the Revolution will be highlighted. Second, the synthesis will be applied to the Revolution while the causes are analyzed simultaneously.

A. The Egyptian Revolution: A Historical Background

As Issawi (1963:48-9) observes, "Of course the Egyptian, like other revolutions, was not just an accident. On the one hand it can be fairly easily placed in its context of contemporary events and on the other its roots run deep in the previous Egyptian society." Thus, a statement of history is necessary if this revolution is to be understood thoroughly.

Egypt, which came into being about 3000 B.C., is considered the first nation-state in history. From 525 B.C. until 1952, she was ruled by Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantine, Muslim Arabs, Crusaders, Mongols (Tatars), Turkish Mamluks, Frenchmen, Turkish Albanian, and the British. From the 19th century until after WWII, the Arabian Egypt, in one way or another, was a visible scene for the rivalries of and alliances between the French, the British, the Germans, the Italians

and the Ottoman Turks. From the early 1830s, the Egyptian nationalist and patriotist sentiments were advocated and provoked against the foreign forces and the ruling class which was not pure Egyptian originally but Egyptianized Albanian with Turkish connections. These sentiments were colored with and inflamed by pure Egyptianism, pan-Arabism, or pan-Islamism, or a blend of these ideals. Socialist ideas also emerged in the country from the 1920s on.

From 1805 until 1953, Egypt was ruled by Muhammad Ali (1769-1849) and his descendants. Muhammad Ali, who is generally considered the founder of modern Egypt, rose to power in the wake of the expulsion of the Frenchmen from Egypt by the joint British and Turkish forces. In this event, he, as a Muslim Albanian officer under the command of the Ottoman Sultan, participated valiantly. The rulers of this dynasty operated in Egypt as Governor General or Pasha (1805-1867), Viceroy or Khedive (1867-1914), Sultan (1914-1922), and King (1922-1953). In this era Egypt underwent three forms of sovereignty, namely, Autonomy (1805-1882), British Rule (1882-1922), and the Kingdom of Egypt (1922-1953) (e.g., Platt and Hefny, 1958:31-48).

In 1882, Ahmad Urabi (1841-1911), the pioneer Egyptian nationalist officer, rebelled against the British forces, the Ottoman Sultan who actually was represented by the Khedive of Egypt, and indeed the Egyptian ruling class as a whole. The British dominance over Egypt began in 1839, though indirectly (Baker, 1978:1). This rebellion was finally crushed by the British in the guise of supporting the allied Ottoman Sultan and securing their own vital interests in the Suez Canal which was mainly controlled by them under a contract with the Egyptian

government and the French party. The Canal was constructed in 1859-1869 to join the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. In 1882, Bismark said "Egypt is of the utmost importance to England on account of the Suez Canal, the shortest line of communication between the eastern and western halves of the Empire. This is like the spinal cord which connects the backbone with the brain" (Ziad, 1965:33). However, in the wake of Urabi rebellion, the British Army began an occupation that lasted some seventy five years (1882-1956).

Beginning from the last quarter of the 19th century, the religious based political opposition to the colonialist forces and their domestic circles, as well as the ineffectiveness of the local rulers, emerged in Egypt. This intellectual/religious ideological development had already been initiated by Al-Afghani (1839-1897), and later by his contemporaries and disciples the Egyptian Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Muhammad Rashid Rida (?-1935). This Islamic intellectual movement helped the awakening of the Muslims to the reality of their backwardness and the associated subjugation by the colonializers. It also paved the way for, encouraged, coupled with, and in cases counteracted the ongoing nationalist currents and upheavals (e.g., Safran, 1961:62-84).

In 1899, the British declared their partnership in the Condominium of the Sudan. This territory had been recognized as Egyptian since the era of Mohammad Ali (1805-1848). About this time, the Egyptian nationalist movement was revived by Mustapha Kamil (1874-1980), ". . . the first prophet of Egypt modern nationalism. . ." (Nutting, 1972:15). Kamil, with a "license" in law from France (1894), founded the first political party (i.e., the National Party) in Egypt, made the first

call for an Egyptian university and the freedom of women, published the Al-Liwa (The Standard) paper, and protested the British dominance over both the Egyptian and the Sudanese territories (e.g., Gabrieli, 1961: 56-58; Safran, 1961:85-90). It was from this era that the Egyptian youth provided the main recruiting field for nationalists and the politics of nationalism. According to legend, Kamil was finally "poisoned" by the British in 1908 (Sadat, 1978:5).

In 1908, the British forced the Egyptian government to extend the concession of the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company for 40 years beyond its termination in 1968. In 1914, with the inception of WWI, the British officially declared Egypt their own Protactorate under the pretext of confronting both Germany and Turkey, The Axis. In 1913, right after the War, Saad Zaghloul (1857-1927), the leading Egyptian politician and nationalist of the time, challenged the British for the independence of Egypt. In 1922, the Egyptians, under Zaghloul and his Wafd (delegation) Party achieved a "nominal independence," revoked the martial law which had been enforced by the British since 1914, and finally drafted their first Constitution (1923). But, in return, the British continued to station their troops in the country and began to control the legislations through British "advisers" (Vatikiotis, 1969:314-373).

Furthermore, they continued their "punitive" demands, including the whole control of the "Anglo-Egyptian" Sudan, as they had already labeled it, which inevitably was granted to them in 1924. About this time, Fuad took over as the new king of Egypt with the right of appointing ministers and dissolving the Parliament (Vatikiotis, 1969:265-291).

This was contrary to the Constitution which stipulated the King's right to reign but not to govern. However, this attainment was enhanced and backed by the British to gain the King's alliance, even at the expense of national independence and political democracy. In 1935 King Fuad died and his 16 year old son, Farouk, rose to power.

In 1936, the British persuaded the Egyptian government to sign a "Treaty of Alliance" by means of which they obtained the right to station some 10,000 troops in the Canal Zone for another 20 years with an option of renewal. However, in contrast to this Treaty, the British would have 80,000 troops in the Canal Zone in 1949 (Nutting, 1972:23). In return, some kind of sovereignty was recognized for the Egyptian government over the Sudanese territory. The uncompromising nationalists were quick to denounce this "shameful" treaty which only furthered national humiliation but secured the British military presence in and political dominance over the country (Richmond, 1977:196-202).

About this time, the Egyptian nationalist movement split into "spinal groups" which were more interested in political offices than a radical politics for national ideals (Nutting, 1972:10-11). This situation with other conditions promoted Islamic politics and religious political organizations. In pursuit of the Al-Afghani's ideological movement, in 1927, Abdul-Hamid Said founded the Young Men's Muslim Association. In 1928, too, Hassan Al-Banna, a prominent religious leader, created the Ikhwan Al-Muslimin (Muslim Brethern) Organization. The initial ideological goal of this organization was the purification of Egypt and the Nile Valley from materialism, corruption, and the political-military occupation the West had brought. In the course of

time, this organization gained extensive power and claimed the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate with Cairo as its center (e.g., Harris, 1964:111-211).

In 1936, Egypt once again became a battle-ground for WWII, a conflict in which the Egyptians took neither a part nor had an interest. About this time, "apart from a handful of Communists," the Muslim Brotherhood was ". . .The only active and vocal nationalist resistance" in the country (Nutting, 1972:11). During the War period, the Egyptians suffered decisively in different ways but were looking forward to the "Day of Evacuation and Unity of the Nile Valley" in recognition of their strategic cooperation with the Allies. But, this hope turned to despair even though the Allied victory was already granted. The British simply promised a partial evacuation in 1947, to be followed by a complete withdrawal in 1949 (Richmond, 1977:210-216; Mansfield, 1972:290-301). The postwar Egyptian government placed before the Security Council of the United Nations a complaint against the British and claimed the right of repudiating the Treaty of 1936 (Platt and Hefny, 1958:47). However, the British finally gave the right to the Sudanese to determine their own fate under a common crown of Egypt.

About this time, the question of Arab unity and the form that this unity should take was at issue. "The major differences were between the views of Egyptians and Iraqis" (Richmond, 1977:208). While the Iraqis suggested a definite scheme for unity centered around Arab Fertile Crescent, the Egyptians favored a "loose union" of the existing Arab states and eventually succeeded in getting agreement on an Arab League (7 October, 1945) which was also favored by the British. The

League was formally inaugurated in Cairo on 22nd March, 1945. Since the Arab League was ". . . created with the support of Britain. . . (Gabrieli, 1961:110), and was in accord to the Egyptian approach to Arab unity, it was understood as "a loose confederation" (Mansfield, 1972:291). Nevertheless, through this League the Egyptians began to assume formal political leadership and national commitment in the Arab World and their participation in the first Arab-Zionist conflict was a historical example.

In 1948, while still suffering from the aftermath of WWII, the Egyptians took part in the first Arab-Zionist war in Palestine. In 1917, the British, who were the Protectorate of Palestine, recognized the right for the Jews to found a nation-state in Palestine. This recognition is identified with the "Balfour Declaration" after the name of the then British Prime Minister. At the time, the Jews comprised only eight percent of the Palestinians while 92 percent of the population was Arab (Nutting, 1972:25). In 1947, the U.N., declared the partition of Palestine into two Arab and Jewish states, a division that took place with the "powerful American pressures" (Richmond, 1977:213), and which was rejected by the Arabs. In reaction, and in the face of the expanding Jewish immigration, dominance, and presence in Palestine, which was facilitated by terrorist activity, the Arabs engaged in their first war with the Jews. They lost the war ultimately.

Concerning the Revolution of Egypt, this war served as a precipitating factor. The concomitant defeat was a drastic humiliation for the many Arabs by the few but well-organized and well-supported Jews. It also revealed certain problems concerned with corruption.

negligence, treason, and self-interest on behalf of the Arab governments and the Egyptian government in particular (e.g., Neguib, 1955:11-33; Nasser, 1955:79-114). In connection with this "lost war," some points must be specified. First, the war deteriorated Egypt's economic and financial situation which had not yet recovered from the aftermath of WWII. Second, the Egyptian nationalist officers, the nascent revolutionaries, who were in combat in the war, closely observed that the major cause of their military defeat was rooted in their corrupt political order. For example, they realized that their armaments were inadequate and defective, and the military budget was embezzled by the authorities (e.g., Lieden and Schmitt, 1968:165; Sadat, 1957:87-97).

Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, the "natural" leader of the Revolution who participated in the war and was wounded on two occasions, later wrote that: "When I now try to recall the details of our experience in Palestine, I find a curious thing: we were fighting in Palestine, but our dreams were centered in Egypt. Our bullets were aimed at the enemy in his trenches before us, but our hearts hovered over our distant country, which we had left to the care of the wolves" (1955:21).

Third, within the Arab world, the Egyptian nationalists and religious activists felt further humiliation because, in recent times, they had assumed the Arab's leadership which achieved no end in this conflict. From the mid-thirteenth century, when Baghdad fell to the hands of the Mongol, Cairo became the Arabs' cultural center (Nasser, 1955:86-87). Thus, the 1948 defeat, as will be emphasized later, nurtured and promoted the revolutionary seed that had already been sown in the heart of the "Free Officers." According to Baker (1975:48),

"These young men had first been drawn together in 1938 and 1939 when they graduated from the Egyptian military academy." Interestingly, the training in this Military Academy was until 1936 a privilege for the sons of the upper classes. But, "following the signature of the 1936 Treaty with Britain, the Egyptian army was being expanded. More officers were needed quickly and. . .they were being recruited from a broader social base," which included the would-be military revolutionaries (Stephens, 1971:38-39).

On October 1951, the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was abrogated unilaterally since constant negotiations with the British were not productive. After this event, the Egyptian pin-pricks became visible guerrilla activities against the British personnel and installations (e.g., Berque, 1972:668-670; Mansfield, 1972:295-301). As a reaction, "On January [25th] 1952, British forces surrounded the barracks of a unit of Egyptian auxiliary police at Ismailia. It was believed that this unit had been cooperating with the guerrillas. . .; some forty Egyptians were killed and seventy wounded. . ." (Richmond, 1977:216). The Egyptians reacted very quickly and militantly. The climax of this militancy was reached in Cairo on Black Saturday (January 26, 1952) "when seven hundred hotels, bars, restaurants, cinemas, cabarets, department stores, fancy shops, auto showrooms, banks, and modern commercial offices were systematically looted, destroyed, and burned within a few hours" (Safran, 1961:187). Another account describes the event of Black Saturday in this way:

A National Liberation Army then came into being and went into action against the British troops in the Canal Zone early in 1952, while, almost at the same time, Cairo fell into the hands of a maddened, murdering, looting mob whose destructive violence, directed by trained specialists, followed a course and reached dimensions that proved it to be a revolutionary outbreak deliberately planned and organized by foreign Communists. The world-famous Shepheard's Hotel was one of the many landmarks that went up in flames; the British Turf Club was attacked and burnt to the ground; a number of its members were murdered and their bodies, dead or alive, were thrown into the flames. A pall of smoke hung over the city; and when order was at last restored by Egyptian troops, a large part of the European Quarter lay a wilderness of ruins (Jarvis, 1955:285).

In the wake of the "Cairo Fire," other incidents followed and the revolutionary environment matured rapidly. It is observed that, "Early in the summer of 1952 Egypt was oozing revolution from every pore" (J. and S. Lacouture, 1958:125). As such, "The situation was ripe to the point of rottenness; somebody had to take action. . ." (Berque, 1972:664). On July 23, 1952, the Free Officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Jamal Abdul Nasser, took over and dethroned King Farouk in favor of his one-year old son Ahmad Fuad II. On July 18, 1953, Nasser declared Egypt a Republic and hence put an end to the old order. Nasser (1918-1970), the son of a post-office worker, was elected in June 1956 as Egypt's second President after the Presidency of the "figure-head" of the Revolution, namely, General Mohammad Neguib. Since Neguib was born in Sudan and was a half-blood Sudanese (Richmond, 1977:221; Neguib, 1955:37), therefore, "Nasser was the first native ruler of an independent Egypt since the Persian invaders destroyed the twenty-sixth and last Pharonic dynasty in 525 B.C." (Stephens, 1971:11). In his childhood whenever he had seen an airplane in the sky, Nasser often shouted that "O, Almighty God, may

disaster take the English!" (Nasser, 1955:65). After the take-over he heartened his fellow citizen by emphasizing: "O, my brother! raise your head for, indeed, the ["English"] colonialization era is over." Further, "He and his followers. . .established a new government that evolved into the first Arab Socialist state" (Goode, 1973:5).

In the next section, the causes of this revolution will be specified and the synthesis will be tested accordingly.

B. Causes of The Egyptian Revolution

In this section, the causes of the Egyptian Revolution will be outlined in accordance with the eleven propositions of the synthesis. As was sketched previously, the causes of this revolution too stem from the early history of Egypt. However, for the present purpose, these origins will be traced to the British occupation of the country, which began in 1882. "This foreign oppression of Egypt's national classes, national heritage, national language and values was the basis for the economic subjugation of the nation" (Hussien, 1973:17). Yet, the causes which will be concentrated on are related to the 1940s onward when the structural historical difficulties were aggravated and surfaced. Because of the aftermaths of the Second World War and the First Arab-Israeli conflict, both of which intensified the chronic national problems, the whole Egyptian system was plunged into a manifold state of crisis. As Berque (1972:583) notes, during this ". . .dark period, . . .Egypt experienced disappointment as great as her hopes. . . ."

(1) The first proposition revolves around "Economic Inequality"

in a revolution-stricken society, from which the Egyptian masses were actually suffering. According to the Egyptian writer Salama Musa, who wrote in the beginning of the current century, "The Egyptian question is an economic one" (Ibrahim, 1979:354). On the other hand, according to Issawi, "In 1951 Egypt was an overwhelmingly agrarian country, in which industry accounted for under 10 per cent of GNP" (1963:46). The overwhelming majority of the Egyptian population consisted of the peasantry, who, historically speaking, utilized traditional means of agricultural production and a primary system of irrigation. Interestingly, while Herodotus understands that "Egypt is an acquired country, a gift of the river," the "capricious" Nile now and then disturbed the peasantry life with the "vagaries" of its flow. The world of the Egyptian Fellaheen (farmers) was understood as the world of poverty, illiteracy, diseases, rapid population growth (three percent), malnutrition, and suffering. Taha Hussien (1948:27), the well-known Egyptian writer, defines his fellow citizens, namely the Fellaheen, as al-Muadhdhabun fil-Ard (i.e., the sufferers on earth) whose community suffered historically.

In the late 19th century, "Because of their need to develop revenue quickly for the service and repayment of the debt, the British had favored agricultural development. . ." in Egypt (Richmond, 1977:199). Even with such a given priority and the concomitant aid, the Egyptian farmer did not benefit in the process, though the landlord did. In Egypt, about 70 percent of the total population was directly engaged in working the land, and agriculture produced nearly 40 percent of the national income and supplied 94 percent of all exports (Platt and Henfy, 1958:155). On the other hand, about 97 percent of Egypt's 386,000

square miles was still desert in 1951 (Harris, 1964:105). The unjust partition of cultivated land was a prevailing feature of the countryside. About one third of the land belonged to the big absentee landlords who comprised only 0.4 percent of the Egyptian population; the next third belonged to small and middle size farmers who owned 5-50 "feddan" (each feddan equals 1.038 acres); the last third belonged to some two million farmers each of which owned less than 5 feddans (Issawi, 1954:125; Berque, 1972:618). Yet, "There was also some million and a half, of peasants owning tiny plots of less than 0.5 feddans, for whom land was no longer a concrete means of production" (Berque, 1972:618). Put differently, "In 1951 more than sixty percent of the land under cultivation was owned by about six percent of the population. About ten percent of the land was owned by 270 persons" (Heaphey, 1966:177). This condition, encouraged ". . . the speculative nature of Egyptian agriculture to develop still further" (Vatikiotis, 1969:9).

Moreover, a great portion of peasantry also was landless. These peasants were ". . . totally deprived of the possibility of working themselves and . . . [had] no other means of subsistence than the sale of their labor power. They became agricultural workers or migrant rural laborers (tarabil) and work[ed] very irregularly. They constitute[d] three-fourths of the rural population" (Hussien, 1973:37). In 1948, there were about 9.2 million feddans of arable land (Safran, 1961:196), which somehow decreased to less than six million feddans in 1952. In this time, more than 65 percent of Egyptians derived their living directly from agriculture and 70 percent of the industrial labor manpower worked in factories that depended on raw agricultural crops

(Harris, 1956:362). As a related problem, in the late 1940s, there were ". . .400,000 more Egyptians annually [who] had to be fed from less than 6 million feddans" (Wheelock, 1960:75). In other words, a 21 million population with a 3 percent rate of increase, eked out a subsistence below the one-half feddan per person required for a modest existence.

On the other hand, Egypt's agriculture was basically dependent on a single product, namely, cotton. According to Brown (1953:8-9), "It is impossible to minimize the extent to which everything in Egypt depends on cotton. One can see no other crop which would support the present population." The price of cotton boomed because of the Korean War (Baker, 1978:9), but this was immediately followed by a "catastrophic drop." According to Hussien (1973:61), "Since cotton export revenue was such a decisive factor in the economy, this situation resulted in a general economic imbalance which was seriously aggravated by frantic speculation--the parasitic character of investments was exacerbated by the anxiety of a class which viewed itself as doomed." It was also true that "During the war, fertilizer imports had been sharply curtailed, with the subsequent result that yields per feddan declined substantially" (Wheelock, 1960:74).

Not only did the production of cotton decrease noticeably but also "The value of a ton of cotton fell from 67 Egyptian pounds to 45 and then to 33.5" (Hussien, 1973:61). What was worse, "The government repeatedly intervened in the futures market to buy cotton after the Korean War boom in 1951" (Dekmejian, 1971:121). Not only was the crop of cotton affected as such, but the whole agricultural production

decreased in the 1940s, and even prior to this decade. "Between 1914 and 1947, the growth rate of agricultural production showed a sharp decline; it fell to an [sic] 0.4 percent average" (Hussien, 1973:46).

On the whole, the overall situation of the Egyptian peasantry can be better seen in the light of some concrete conclusions. According to Leiden and Schmitt (1968:164), "In the past, it was land not his own on which the Egyptian peasant, the fellah, labored. . . and the rent he paid was often exorbitant. His crops were ravaged by insects as he himself was by a myriad of diseases. He was constantly in debt, uniformly exploited, debilitated by disease and a subsistence diet. His only luxury was sex, his only hope was the surcease of an early death." Harris also reaches the same conclusion: "The peasants in addition suffered chronically from all the afflictions associated with malnutrition and insanitary living conditions. . . About 85 percent of the rural population has become the victim of a serious health problem" (1964:107, 109). According to Hussien, this situation was caused by ". . . the class interests of the big landlords and the general interests of the British as transmitted by these big landlords" (1973:20).

Thus, it is no wonder that Nasser (1959:ix), the leader of the Egyptian Revolution, would emphasize that "feudalism" was one of the people's "triple enemy" (the other two being "imperialism" and "monarchy"). To be sure, the Egyptian peasants did not make nor participate in the revolution but ". . . when the revolution did come, it was made in their name" (Leiden and Schmitt, 1968:164). However, the fellaheen, the overwhelming majority of the people, were not the only "sufferers on earth;" the urban workers too suffered from a miserable life, exploi-

tation, and unstable economic conditions.

It is observed that the unskilled Egyptian urban worker who fled the hopelessness of the countryside brought with him to the squalor of the city, "All too often. . . turned to crime and hashish. In company with others he formed a part of the Cairo (or Alexandria) 'street', that amorphous mass of humanity that lends substance to every riot or demonstration" (Lieden and Schmitt, 1968:164). Further, as Berque notes, the working strata in the Egyptian society ". . . had for a long time been considered by political parties only as a subsidiary resource which could be used or discarded at will" (1972:624).

These strata emerged from the early 19th century when industrialization made its first move under "Mohammad Ali's regime (1805-1849). Mohammad Ali, whose dynasty ruled Egypt until 1953, was considered the "Founder of Modern Egypt" for his industrializing efforts in the country (Barbour, 1972:27-35). But, as early as the 1840s, Egypt's industrial development was ". . . arrested by the competition of European imported manufactured goods" (Richmond, 1972:199). As an example, the British ". . . saw no need to encourage industrial growth in Egypt; its products would compete with British manufacturers" (Richmond, 1972:199). It is with regard to this policy that Musa, the Egyptian writer, notes that,

Had not the development of Egypt been interrupted in 1882 by the British occupation, she would have jumped to the fore of the civilized world: she would have had complete literacy, and a high scale of wages for the workers; indeed we would have become a powerful nation in the Eastern corner of the Mediterranean and Britain could have no say in the affairs of the Suez Canal (1958:207).

Nevertheless, WWI spurred the Egyptian industrial movement and opened new horizons for different categories of the society. But,

in the process, "The moderately wealthy got immoderately so in commodity market speculation, finance, and manufacture, and the uprooted peasants who were now employed, or at any rate living in cities were relieved of at least the notion that poverty must be the will of Allah" (Davies, 1962:13-14).

The Second World War too gave impetus to Egyptian industrialization. This was caused by ". . .the restriction of shipping space available for imports from Europe, while the demands of the armies for more sophisticated labor than they had needed in 1914-18 encouraged the training of Egyptians in engineering skills" (Richmond, 1972:200). This factor as well as the concomitant increasing migration from the countryside to Cairo, the Canal Zone, and the Mediterranean coast, enlarged the size of the labor force and eventually swelled labor-related issues. During the War period, ". . .the Allies were employing 200,000 Egyptians as clerks or skilled and unskilled laborers" (Mansfield, 1971:280).

However, the influx of cheap labor from the rural areas as well as the War-time conditions in general, strained decisively the Egyptian socioeconomic structure. According to Issawi (1954:262), "Perhaps the most important single factor was the imposition of a twentieth century inflation on a social structure in many ways reminiscent of the eighteenth century."

In 1945, the aftermath of the War demonstrated itself very visibly. As a concrete example, about 250,000 workers, one-third of the total workers, became jobless when the War activity ceased (e.g., Issawi, 1954:262). In 1951 alone, some 40,000 Egyptian employees of the British

forces were forced to give up their jobs. They were added to the already overcrowded civil services and yet were paid from the national and not the Ally's resources (Neguib, 1955:94). About this time, the cost of living rose to three times the index of 1937 (Davis, 1962:13), and this steep rise aggravated the material conditions of the employed as well as the unemployed, in different ways. However, in 1947, there were about 1,700,000 workers involved in some branch of industry (Platt and Hefny, 1958:155).

On the other hand, the War was all good for businessmen and the capitalist groups. According to J. and S. Lacouture (1958:99), the number of millionaires in pounds sterling increased eight fold during the War. Altogether, these "exploiters" constituted a very small group in the country but took hold of all spheres of economic activity. Stated differently, about this time "Monopolies, or monopolist conditions,. . . [were] found in most branches of Egyptian industry" (Issawi, 1954:160). Issawi also observes that wages did not catch up with the cost of living because of ". . . low productivity, due to the malnutrition, lack of training, and poor equipment" (1954:171). Finally, it can be concluded that

In brief, the proletariat and the dispossessed masses in the countryside and in cities share a similar relationship to the existing system of servitude and transition: they are directly oppressed and exploited by the system, and their class interests clash absolutely with its existence" (Hussien, 1973:43).

The economic conditions of the middle classes may also be remembered. According to Safran, "Economic development, the expansion of the functions of the government, the spread of education, and the

increased social mobility that resulted, led to an enormous expansion of the white collar, professional, and student groups" (1971:184). In 1913 the number of university students was "negligible", but by 1951, there were 41,000 Egyptian students at home and 1,400 studying abroad (Issawi, 1954:67). In fact, it was in the early 1930's that a new urban class, "seeking upward mobility," entered the political stage. However, "the frustration that soon beset this nebulous class proceeded directly from the existing social, political, and economic conditions in society" (Dekmijian, 1971:18).

On the other hand, the Egyptian middle bourgeoisie consisted of urban and rural groups which derived their economic gains from the exploitation of others but who ". . . had no dominant political or economic position" in society (Hussien, 1973:25). It is also true that, "As a whole, the petty bourgeoisie suffered national oppression and indirect forms of economic exploitation at the hands of the foreign monopolies, the local ruling classes, and, to a lesser extent, the middle bourgeoisie" (Hussien, 1973:28).

Taha Hussien (1948) portrays such a group of the white collar workers, identified with the "humble officials" as "a walking tomb," indeed, a "whited sepulchre"; and he also sketches the "post office" employees as "half-starved," yet supporting a large family (Berque, 1972:617). In the 1940s, there also was a ". . . large number of unemployed 'intellectuals' who were foremost in their resentment of the system for its apparent lack of determination, and most active in the revolt against it" (Safran, 1961:207). However, economically, according to Davies (1962:13), white collar workers and professionals probably

were hurt more by inflation than unemployment.

Finally, as a result of national and international wars, rapid population increase and dislocation, economic imbalances, and the increasing gap between population growth and growth in resources, ". . . The annual per capita income of the entire population declined from \$109.50 in 1907 to \$63.50 in 1950" (Safran, 1961:196). Evidently, in this situation that lower classes suffered overwhelmingly. Further, the steep rise in the cost of living deteriorates their conditions decisively. "The gap between rich and poor, already great, was further enlarged; the unskilled rural and urban labourers suffered severe privations; and the salaried middle and lower middle classes, whose money income rose very little, were relentlessly pressed down" (Issawi, 1954:262).

Interestingly, to improve the economic situation caused by the Palestine War, the government proposed new income taxes affecting capital gains and investment dividends. But, this was rejected by the Parliament as this ". . . institution consisted mainly of wealthy Deputies and Senators. . ." (Vatikiotis, 1969:367). While the masses were suffering constantly, the "King and politicians had discredited themselves by personal luxury and administrative corruption. . ." (Richmond, 1977:210). In fact, the Egyptian masses were caught in a depriving situation which was caused by the common interests of the local forces, the court entourage, the landlords, the bourgeoisie, the aristocrats, and the colonializing British. In these frustrating circumstances,

Idleness, precarious livelihood, rootlessness, crowding, desires in excess of reach, inadequate restraints--all contributed, in turn, to turning these people into responsive and easily accessible material for the political agitator and the social troublemaker, who were not lacking throughout this period (Safran, 1961:182).

Finally, the gap between the rich and the poor was so grave that ". . .there seemed no way to redress this difference short of revolution" (Leiden and Schmitt, 1968:165).

(2) The second proposition reflects upon "Political Oppression" as a precondition for a nascent political action. This, indeed, prevailed yet with a double feature in prerevolutionary Egypt. Politically, the Egyptians were dominated by both indigenous forces represented by the King and his entourage, and external forces represented by the British who also supervised and controlled the power of the Egyptian ruling class. Although Egypt was able to obtain her independence from the protectorate of the British (1922), this liberation was "nominal," simply "formal," or "semi" independence. It ". . .had been stripped of all meaning and was merely tangential in relation to any real power" (Berque, 1972:324).

Even if on occasion the Egyptian King, for either dynastic ambitions or mild national interest, attempted to reflect the voice of the people, the British rechanneled these attitudes in favor of their own colonialist interests (Mansfield, 1972:264-289). The King, however, had no choice but to comply. Otherwise, ". . .His majesty King Farouk must accept the consequences" (Vatikiotis, 1969:348).

Although the Egyptians drafted their first Constitution in 1923, the institution of monarchy under the British force overlooked the Constitution and operated mostly at will. The Parliament was fundamentally constituted of members from the upper classes and hence was actually concerned with class interest at the cost of the interest of the masses. Yet, on more than one occasion, both the Constitution and

the Parliament were suspended or dissolved in the interest of the governing class and its British tutelage (e.g., Berque, 1972:393; Nutting, 1972:22; Gabrieli, 1961:99).

According to Baker (1978:103), ". . .one of the four major political forces in the country until the Nasserist revolution was the British--along with the Egyptian King, the aristocracy, and the nationalist party known as the Wafd." In line with this observation, Issawi (1954:269-1) also suggests that, in the period of 1923-1952), the political power structure was identified with four categories. The first category included the King and a party of "King's Friends," that is, the "Ittihad" (Unionist) Party. The second category comprised the Wafd Party which, in the course of time especially from the 1940's on, began to lose its militant nationalism and uncompromising stand. The third category consisted of the Moderates, which were liberal constitutionalists, Shaabists (Popular Party), and Saadists (dissident Wafdists). Finally, there was the British Residency, "which often had the last word."

Sadat (1978:103) observes that these ". . . political parties were themselves a tool at the hands of the king and the British, allying themselves alternately with one or the other to secure the greatest possible personal gains at the expense of the people." From the 1920s on at least three political organizations (i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood, the Socialist Party, and the Communist Party) emerged, but, as the opposition parties, they could not practice political freedom. However, these organizations, in proportion, contributed to the intensification of the politics of the opposition and the provision of a social setting

regime. This opposition was translated into the creation of several political, religious, and military organizations, guerrilla activities, strikes, demonstrations, political assassinations, and eventually the emergence of the 1952 Revolution. Finally, this value-dissensus is accurately described and expressed for the King in the "ultimatum" that the Free Officers delivered to him and he was required to sign as a legal measure in the process of power transmission. This ultimatum reads as follows (Sadat, 1957:125-126):

Whereas the total anarchy in which the country has of recent months been thrown, and which has spread to all domains, is a result of your bad administration, your violations of the Constitution, and your disregard of the will of the people to a point where no citizen could feel secure in his life, dignity and property.

Whereas your persistence in this course has compromised the name of Egypt among the nations, and treacherous and corrupt persons have, under your protection, continued to amass shameful fortunes and to squander public funds while the people remained a prey to hunger and poverty.

Whereas these facts have been brought to light by the war in Palestine, the traffic in defective arms and ammunition to which it gave rise, and the judgments pronounced by the Courts on those responsible revealed your intervention--intervention which distorted truth, shook confidence in Justice, encouraged traitors in their crimes, enriched some and corrupted others.

Therefore the Army, representing the power of the People, has authorized me to demand that your Majesty abdicate the Throne in favour of the Heir Apparent, His Highness Prince Ahmed Fouad, on this day, Saturday, July 26th, 1952, and that you leave the country before 6 p.m. of this same day.

The Army holds Your Majesty responsible for any consequences which may result from your refusal to conform to the will of the people.

Commander-in-Chief of the armed Forces,
(signed) Mohamed Neguib.

(5) Proposition V is concerned with "Social Strain" which prevails in a prerevolutionary society. This strain, however, is not a primary cause for revolution but is a product of different structural

shortcomings and discrimination that develops historically and manifests itself eventually. Such a social strain characterized the Egyptian masses, especially in the era of 1940s and the early 1950s. According to Richmond,

It was a period of intense frustration for the Egyptian people, and was marked by cynical corruption on the part of the King and the ruling class. Financial and sexual scandal touching the King became the staple of Cairo gossip. Stories of faulty weapons supplied to the army in Palestine under contracts which had been profitable to the King and his creatures were widely circulated. So were stories of the rigging of the Alexandria cotton market for the profit of Wafdist Ministers. Against a background of rising cost of living and a shortage of basic foodstuffs, these stories brought steadily nearer the end of the regime (1977:215).

Indeed, in this era too much pressure from different directions was imposed on a people who could no longer comply with, be indifferent to, withstand, or diffuse this chronic imposition.

This strainful situation wherein the Egyptians were considered by a dominant class of some 250,000 foreigners second-rate in their homeland, ". . . pointed to an unprecedented intensification of the crisis leading to the military takeover" (Dekmejian, 1972:36). Such an accumulative strain was crystalized in and expressed by several Egyptian writers who employed a vocabulary of "frustration," "repression," "violence," "deprivation," "suffering," "hopelessness," "moral disintegration," and "futility." These characteristics, as Berque (1972:647) observes, ". . . inaugurate a new period in Egyptian and Arab sensitivity." As an example, the Egyptian writer, Al-Ahwani (1951), identified this situation in his Asrar Al-Nafs (i.e., the secrets of psyche) with "qalaq" (i.e., anguish), which penetrated the Egyptian society.

Indicative of and manifesting these conditions were the ongoing

riots, demonstration, strikes, guerrilla activity, assassinations, and a variety of deviant conducts which all precipitated the Black Saturday or Cairo Fire on 26, January, 1952, -- a turning point in opposing the regime and the British dominance as well. -In Sadat's words, "Black Saturday was an orgy of uncontrolled mob violence, motivated by hunger and despair" (1957:105). Stated differently, "Egypt in 1952 was a land of misery with an old regime that offered no hope and an army that suffered humiliation" (Leiden and Schmitt, 1968:166). Finally, this overall strain, which was created and accumulated throughout a long period of economic inequality, political strangulation and existential bewilderment, was activated by different revolutionary categories and was finalized in a revolutionary transformation led by the Free Officers.

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As it is approached in this work, the Resource Mobilization category covers different propositions (VI-X), including the justification of political action stemming from "Value Dissensus," the emotionalization of the emerging social strain, the organization of an ideological action led by a determined leadership, the politicization and awakening of social strata, and finally the favorable exploitation of some accidental events, the "windfalls." Without these measures, a revolution will not occur even if the potential for its occurrence is already there. All these categories relating to the happening of the Egyptian Revolution will be considered as a composite of variables to be approached jointly.

In the process of mobilizing their resources for anti-regime and anti-British challenges, the Egyptian counterelites consolidated their political powers, specified their demands, developed and defined their

framework, broadened their social base, and functioned decisively throughout an eventful period of ten years (1942-1952). Although throughout this period the situation was ripe for a radical change through a massive action, this did not happen until July, 1953, and then in the form of a military coup. Paradoxically, such a reality, as will be seen later, demonstrated the quality of resource mobilization and the situational consciousness on behalf of the Free Officers.

From the late 1940s on, the leadership of the Nationalist Wafd Party lost its traditional base of support owing to its conciliatory position, financial scandals, and moral corruption. This further encouraged the Egyptians to shift to and develop more hope around the Muslim Brotherhood, the Socialist parties, and the sporadic nationalist forces that functioned openly and covertly out of the organization and the leadership of the Wafd Party. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to create a wide social base, to attract traditionalist and patriotist groups, to initiate partisan activities against both the Zionist in Palestine and the Colonialist British on the Egyptian soil. At the time, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to mobilize some 500,000 members for action (e.g., Vatikiotis, 1978: 92).

However, with their massive forces, popular attraction, and Islamic ideals they still did not make the 1952 Revolution nor was this revolution made in their name. Further, they came to be considered as counterrevolutionaries and became involved in counterrevolutionary actions. Part of this failure is attributed to (1) the assassination of their prominent leader, Hassan Al-Banna in March, 1949, by the Secret Police, (2) their assassination tactics, (3) the imposition of martial

law in 1952, and (4) the dissolution of their organization (e.g., Baker, 1978:22; Vatikiotis, 1978:39). The other aspect of the failure is related to the severity of social control and the lack of a defined program for action that would go into effect after the regime was already toppled. Finally, there was another determinant factor which was identified with the well-organized Free Officers, the would-be revolutionaries.

The socialist forces were not powerful enough to originate a revolution. At that time, religious and nationalist forces dominated the political arena of the country. Yet, they both were at ideological odds with communism. The capitalist regime and the British, too, especially in the era of the Cold War, exercised too much pressure over the socialist categories. On the other hand, as Berque suggests, ". . . Marxism in Egypt was found only among small groups, still imbued with romantic fervour and with a bitterness justified by persecution" (1972: 643). It is also observed that "Not a single Egyptian Communist organization became an integral part of the proletariat, and certainly not of the dispossessed masses" (Hussien, 1973:90). Nevertheless, it could be argued that the communist groups helped to an extent to create a supportive base for anti-regime action from whatever side.

In this situation, when religious, socialist, and civil nationalist parties were powerless, disillusioned, suppressed, or disorganized, the institution of the army and its enthusiastic nationalist officers became the only source for national hope, political change, and militant but nonviolent challenge. Thus, "The army emerged as the only national force which had not been hit. . ." (Mohy Ed-Din, 1966:35), but was able to hit first on behalf of the nation. It was from such a circumstantial

army that the "Society" (or "Association" or "Organization") of the Free Officers emerged in 1942 to materialize the ideals of the people in the 1952 Revolution.

Nasser, the president of the Free Officers and the leader of their Revolution, observed that:

This situation demanded the existence of a force set in one cohesive framework, for removal from the conflict between individuals and classes, and drawn from the heart of the people: a force composed of men able to trust each other; a force with enough material strength at its disposal to guarantee a swift and decisive action. The conditions could be met only by the Army (1955:42).

The core of the Free Officers number 9 or 10 or 11 or 13 in the early 1940s, but ten years later, on the eve of the Revolution, hundreds of the officers were recruited in the process. Sadat (1978:78) claims that, "When I was imprisoned in 1942, Nasser took over command of the Free Officers' Organization. . ."; but Naguib acknowledges that ". . . Nasser invited me to join the Zabat el Ahrar, or Free Officers, the secret organization of which he was the founder and the president" (1955:30). Nevertheless, all the constituent Free Officers were in their early thirties and had middle ranks in the army. Since these military men did not only overthrow the old regime, but also, at least until Nasser's era, took the saddle of power, the enterprise of their resource mobilization is of special concern.

The essence of this enterprise can be found in Nasser's (1955: 105) suggestion that "It is not strength to shout at the top of the lungs; real strength lies in acting positively with all the effective means at our command." (Emphasis added.) In line with such a strategy and from the very beginning, Nasser ". . . resorted to the creation of

secret cells within the army, each quite unknown to the other, which proliferated day after day until the organization was represented in every corps, and particularly in such crucial departments as army administration, and so on" (Sadat, 1978:100). In a letter to a friend which he wrote at the age of 17, Nasser summarized his ideological resource mobilization efforts in what "Allah" decrees: "Oppose them with whatever forces you can muster" (Nasser, 1955: 26-27). Interestingly, some 44 years later, this verdict became one of the themes of the Iranians' revolutionary movement.

The Free Officers were not only able to implant the seed of a revolutionary action in their military divisions but also to approach popular figures, to collaborate and take advantage of similar organizations, to exploit the accidental events, and to do all these secretly and anonymously. The following cases are indications of these strategies. In addition to the conventional preparation for action, these Officers had participated in the War of Palestine which caused a humiliation for the army but persistent determination for anti-regime action on behalf of the Free Officers. "In Palestine, Free Officer cells found opportunity to study and investigate and to meet in their trenches and command posts We sat there in our besieged positions, not knowing what the outcome could be, but our conversation dwelt only upon our country, which it was our soldier's duty to defend" (Nasser, 1955: 22).

In 1944, Nasser approached Hassan al-Banna, the influential leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, to seek support and consolidate power. While Nasser had already constituted his organization of the Free Officers,

al-Banna encouragingly advised him: "Begin to organize in the army groups which have faith in what we believe so that when the time comes, we will be organized in one rank, making it impossible for our enemies to crush us" (Baker, 1978:26). This faithful advice, however, implied many things to Nasser including the success of the "secrecy" of his conspiracy which was crucial in the process of goal attainment. According to Haikal, the secrecy in the revolutionary cells established by Nasser created "veils" that screened individual abuses of authority and petty tyrannies by the nationalist officers (Baker, 1978:28). In late 1951, The Voice of the Free Officers was established (Lacouture, 1954:134). In addition, "Inexpensive pamphlets, published irregularly, increasingly became commonplace in the officers' messes" (Wheelock, 1960:7).

When the Cairo Fire or Black Saturday broke out in January 26, 1952, the Free Officers observed how the peoples' tension was increasing and that the situation was ripe for action; on the other hand, they also understood that a violent anti-regime action could be easily oppressed and sterilized by the regime and the present British forces. Historically, they learned that open massive action or terrorist activity would be less likely to achieve any defined objective for the people. This was especially confirmed when on July 18, 1952, days before the overthrow, the King ordered the cancellation of the election's results of the Officers Club Board. In this election the Free Officers had won most of the seats, "thus defeating the Loyalists" (Sadat, 1978:104). The Free Officers were somehow able to overcome at least two rival groups within the opposition camp. According to Dekmijian (1971:22),

One of these--Capt. Mustafa Kamal Sidqi's band of twenty-three officers--because of their continuous terroristic involvement had come under constant surveillance and harassment by the authorities that resulted in the group's partial breakup. On the other hand, the Brotherhood had dissipated its energies in the guerrilla campaign against the British in the Canal Zone. Government action against the Brethren was especially harsh, since of all the conspiratorial groups this was the largest and most powerful outside and inside the army. In addition, the Brethren in the army were left leaderless after the death of Muhammad Labib in 1951.

As another example of the Free Officers' tactical resource management and realistic approach to the situation, prior to the take-over, they sought a "front man" to symbolize their movement and to compensate for their relative youth and unpopularity. Three candidates (i.e., Generals el-Massri, Sadeq, and Mehanna) declined, but General Naguib, 51, who was popular and at odds with the King, assumed the "figurehead" position (Naguib, 1955:30; Sadat, 1955:107-108; Baker, 1978:23). According to Sadat, "until July 21st, 1952, Naguib knew nothing of the role which we had planned for him, and which he was to continue to play until October, 1954" (1955:111). The insistence of the Free Officers to be unknown even after the take-over can be traced to Nasser's strategy as he notes, "I ordered that no name be given any publicity except that of Naguib's. I wanted all the light cast on him. I gave this order principally to avoid a split in the Free Officers. . . . I knew how the British and our internal enemies would try to pit us one against the other, if we gave them a chance" (Baker, 1978:32).

In the content of the issue of leadership, Al-Alayili (1941) the Egyptian writer, believes that the Arab people needed a leader "powerful and violent" to mold them together. Later, in the course of

future action, Nasser was labeled a "reluctant dictator," a label which ". . . has gained wide credence" (Baker, 1978:31). In fact, "the charismatic leader that Al-Alayili had prescribed as a cure for Arab backwardness appeared in Colonel Nasser of Egypt, who made an indelible imprint on Arab socialism in that country" (Goode, 1975:46). Referring to Nasser's leading role in the initiative of the Free Officers, Sadat (1955:15) acknowledges:

It need scarcely be stated that our organization was illegal. We worked in darkness, awaiting the dawn. It was a long-term plan, and Gamal Abdul Nasser was to be the architect and the strategist. His energy, his clear thinking, his balanced judgment equipped him, more than anyone else, for this task. Gamal's wisdom preserved us from premature action and from many dangerous adventures. Revolutionary tactics demand patience and lucid thought. We proceeded cautiously. It was useless and dangerous to make ambitious claims if we had not the means to translate them into reality.

We swore an oath to remain faithful to our country and to work with all our strength for its regeneration. The Army had a right to intervene, since both the government and the opposition parties were incapable of ending oppression.

In terms of specification, it is observed that "the ideological persuasion of the young men who coalesced around Gamal Abdul Nasser covered the full range of political thought from right to left, from Muslim fundamentalism to Marxism. The exigencies of conspiracy impelled Nasser to minimize these differences" (Baker, 1978:23). However, Sadat notes that "Our object was to have a healthy political life in the country, to get rid of the King, the various political factions, and the British" (1978:110).

Beyond these objectives Nasser spoke of "a number of circles within which our activities inescapably must be confined and in which we must try to move" (1955:85). The first circle was the "Arab World"

to which the overwhelming majority of the Muslim Arab Egyptians were linked for some thirteen centuries. Based on this commitment, Nasser later came up with the United Arab Republic, a union between Egypt and Syria, which was the Arabs' first of the kind, though short-lived (1958-1961). Throughout his reign (1954-1970), Nasser advocated, nurtured, and to a great extent materialized Arab Nationalism. Harris also (1964:165) observes that ". . . it was not until after the Revolution of 1952 in Egypt that Egyptians recognized the full dimensions of Arabism and the potentiality of leadership in the Arab world."

The second circle was that of Africa in which a ". . . terrible struggle exists for its future -- a struggle whose results will be either for us or against us. . ." (Nasser, 1955:86). In reaction to this historical-geographical attachment to the Black Continent and its people, Nasser later became one of the founding fathers of the Organization of African Unity and a celebrated backer of the nationalist movements all over the continent.

The third circle was that of the ". . . Islamic world with which we are united by bonds created not only by religious belief, but also reinforced by historical realities. . ." (Nasser, 1955:86). Nasser was not only a humble, practical Muslim but had also a humanitarian and progressive approach to the Islamic ideology. He advocated Islamic values within a secular state and a socialist tradition. In a word, Nasser's humanitarian Islam can be sought in his response to an interviewer: "You mentioned what [the] Prophet Muhammed owned and what King Faysal [of Saudia Arabia] now owns, and you will find the answer to his allegations that he represents Islam. Islam calls for sharing

the loaf of bread with your borthers, which, in the modern age, means socialism" (Kramer, 1980:10).

Finally, as a new sociopolitical order, Nasser and his associates came up with a system that was first identified with "state capitalism" and later with Islamic or "Arabic socialism" which has been acknowledged as the Arab's first socialist order in the modern time.

So far, the enterprise of resource mobilization has been considered and discussed in conjunction with the organization, ideology, and the leadership of the Egyptian Revolution. Next, the issues of Stratum Consciousness and the Windfalls will be sketched successively.

Stratum Consciousness in the Egyptian society was present, though not widely dispersed. This consciousness was mostly experienced at both leadership and intellectual levels of the religious, nationalist, and socialist circles, but not necessarily in the circles of their followers. This situation was caused by at least three variables. First, illiteracy was prevalent in the society and the mass media was in the hands of the government. According to Platt and Henfy (1958:118), in 1947, 77 percent of the people were "completely illiterate" and, of those reported as able to read and write, about 90 percent had attended only elementary school, and only 9 percent had certificates from schools above the elementary level. In addition, as discussed earlier, the majority of the Egyptians were also impoverished and hence developed little involvement in politics. They actually were preoccupied with problems of bread and butter.

Nevertheless, as early as the 1820s, some Egyptian nationals having received their education in Europe, became exposed to the nationalist and patriotic ideals of the European tradition. The leading

example was Al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) who spent the years 1826-1831 in France and later described his experience in his book in Arabic, Al-Talkhis. . . (i.e., distillation), published in 1905. This leading intellectual reformer proposed, among other things, that "If Egypt took care and the tools of civilization were applied copiously there, then it would be the sultan of cities and the chief country in the world" (Dawen, 1973:125). In a word, in the time of the Revolution there was a great body of intelligentsia in Egypt, including writers, professors, and university students who wrote, taught, learned, and nurtured nationalist, religious, patriot, and, to some extent, socialist ideas (e.g., Harris:1964; Safaran:1961).

Second, the Egyptian intellectual spheres as well as the Egyptian politics have somehow been mild and nonviolent (e.g., Leiden and Schmitt, 1968:160-162). This fact can also be substantiated by the Free Officers' nonviolent take-over in 1952 and their precautionary and preparatory but conspiratory measures throughout a ten-year period. While almost all of the Third World's military take-over, including those of the Arab countries, had been severe and bloody, in the Egyptian case no blood was shed, though through a "coup" a "revolution" was brought about. When they heard about the news of the take-over, the Egyptians ". . . old and young, women and children, were kissing each other, shaking hands, coming together in small clusters or large circles -- but all the time in total silence" (Sadat, 1978:107). However, if massive and popular political consciousness did not characterize the Egyptian public, the counter-elites, the leading forces of these masses, were aware of the ongoing situation of which the Free Officer's long-planned action was the best

responsive to and supportive of social and political changes. This is also true when the Young Egypt Party, student committees and labor unions are considered. It should be added that in terms of mass mobilization the role of the Muslim Brotherhood was prominent. At the time, this organization had a social base which mostly was represented by the lower classes and layers of the middle classes.

Finally, "The state apparatus was totally controlled from the palace: the Egyptian police, the administrative organs of repression, the instruments of local repression in the countryside--the omdebs (based largely on the lower traditionalist stratum of the wealthy peasantry)" (Hussien, 1973:67). Interestingly, the "Palace" as such was controlled by the British Royal Palace represented by 80,000 troops stationed in the Canal Zone and at the British Embassy in Cairo. Thus, there was a power elite structure in the country in which the colonialist forces and their adherent indigenous ruling class were represented, but not the Egyptian masses. More interestingly, while the regime was on the verge of collapse, less than three months before the take-over, ". . . King Faruq made what was to be his last attempt at self-legitimation when he proudly announced on May 1952, the tracing of his ancestry to the Prophet Mohammad" (Dekmejian, 1972:36).

This crisis situation led Nasser to the observation and conclusion that

The country was under autocracy. That yoke had to be thrown off to open the way to our renaissance. A long history of negligence, error and frustrated projects showed that a reform of the state was to accomplish it. Jobbery and corruption sullied the regime. That center of infection had to be eradicated (1957:ix).

The Egyptians' economic deprivation, as discussed earlier, increased and complicated their political frustration, as it is sketched presently. These two historical dilemmas together caused, interacted with, and precipitated the people's cultural perplexity--a feeling of meaninglessness, a state of alienation, and a dubious perception of national identity.

(3) As hinted above, "Cultural Alienation," the subject matter of proposition III, characterized the state of affairs in Egyptian society. For centuries, the Egyptians were submerged in several religious, national, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, dynastic, and sovereignty-based questions that, in different times, caused them increasing existential pressures. In recent time, the rivalry of the Turks, Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, and the British must be remembered. This rivalry occurred in a society that had been primarily identified with the Arabic-Islamic traditions from the mid-seventh century; a society which also included a minority of Christian Copt nationals. Accordingly, there also was a mixture of, a conflict among, and a confusion about life styles, historical affiliations, national ideals, valuational preferences, and attitudinal orientations in this society.

Such titles, headings, and phrases as "in search of identity," "Egypt's destiny," "Lost dignity," "where is nationalism," "where is dignity," "uncertainty," "city of wrong," "useless awareness," "what is Egyptianness," "Interrupted country," "how are things going to hold together in Egypt," and the like, connote a tacit aspect of the Egyptians' historical bewilderment. Attached to this situation and the imprecise perception of the Egyptian "spirit of time," there also was an

ambiguity or dissensus about such ideals as "pure Egyptianism," "pan-Arabism," "pan-Islamism," or a combination of the kind. Further, there was an inclination to perceive of Egypt as an European piece of land and culture which happened to be on the other side of the Mediterranean.

These issues together were examples of an identificational crisis which is pointed in Nasser's (1955:69-70) observation:

I consider all this, and feel a deep understanding of confusion that besets our national life and of the disorder from which we plan escape. Then I reflect: this society will develop form, consolidate and become a strong, homogeneous and unified whole.

These are the origins of our present conditions. These are the sources from which our difficulties flow. . . our position is blown upon by the wind from all directions We are on a field roaring with hurricanes, dazzled by lightening and shaken by thunder.

Another observation specifies further details in the context of the Egyptians' existential perplexity. According to Wynn (1959:10-11),

If you had walked through downtown Cairo a few years ago, you would have seen little to indicate you were in an Arab-Muslim country. The street-signs and advertisements were in French or other European languages but rarely in Arabic, the language of the country. When shopping, you would speak French, Italian, English, or Greek, but almost never Arabic. The architecture was European. The business district closed on Sunday instead of the Muslim prayer-day of Friday. In the universities the lectures and textbooks were in English, French, or German. Arabic was the language only of the servants, the uncouth, and the fanatically religious Muslims.

It is also interesting to understand that Kamil, the founder of the modern nationalist movement in Egypt, "Through education, travel, and personal friendship lived with part of his mind in Europe; and he gives the impression of having always played to European audiences even when he was addressing his own people" (Safran, 1961:86). The Muslim King

Faud (1868-1936) "had been brought up in Italy" (Richmond, 1977:203); further he was not a national Egyptian but of Albanian-Turkish origin. Because of this dynastic affiliation with and the traditional political influence of the Turks on Egypt, the Egyptians were required to pay an annual "subsistence" to the Turkish army until this was abolished in 1952 by the Free Officers (Radwan, 1976:164).

Some "pure" Egyptians, usually Christian Copts, set forth certain ethnic, cultural, and historical claims of which Salama Musa is an example. According to Musa, there is no difference between Egyptians and Europeans in ethical and cultural terms; the Arabization of Egypt did not wipe out the Egyptian Pharonic culture; Arabic culture is not only parochial and unable to meet modern conditions, but also is foreign to the Egyptian mind; and "Although the sun rises in the East, the light, however, comes from the West" (Ibrahim, 1979:347-357).

In sharp contrast to this standpoint, there was an emphasis on the Arabic, and especially Islamic-Arabic, culture and traditions which were advocated by the Egyptian Arab nationals or Egyptian pan-Islamic Arabs. Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, emphasized the authenticity of Islam and the moral deterioration that was brought into Egypt by the "cultural imperialism" of the West. He says:

After the last war and during this period which I spent in Cairo, there was an increase in spiritual and ideological disintegration, in the name of intellectual freedom. There was also a deterioration of behavior, morals, and deeds, in the name of individual freedom. . . . Books, newspapers, and magazines appeared whose only aim was to weaken or to destroy the influence of any religion of the masses. . . . Young men were lost, and the educated were in a state of doubt and confusion. . . . I saw that the social life of the beloved Egyptian

nation was oscillating between her dear and precious Islamism which she had inherited, defended, lived with and become accustomed to, and made powerful during thirteen centuries, and this severe Western invasion which is armed and equipped with all the destructive and degenerative influences of money, wealth, prestige, ostentation, material enjoyment, power, and means of propaganda. . . . I remember that I was so disturbed about the threat to Islam posed by the West that I spent about half the month of Ramadan of that year in a state of great anxiety and sleeplessness. And I therefore decided upon positive action and I asked myself: Why do I not place this responsibility upon the shoulders of Muslim leaders and urge them strongly to co-operate in resisting this invasion? (1949: 56-59, 65).

As briefly pictured above, there existed a crisis of mortality, dignity, and identity in the Egyptian society which coupled with and complicated the already prevailing economic inequality and political suppression. This was reflected in the commitment of Nasser (1955:44) as the initiator of the Revolution where he declared that ". . .we [must] restore lost dignity to our moral values by not forgetting the past." Such a feeling of lost dignity and self-commitment to its appropriate treatment was deeply rooted in the personality of the leader of the Egyptian Revolution. According to Wynn (1959:19-20):

. . .Nasser suffered the humiliation that brought home to him a maddening fact--his family was looked down on as inferior simply because they were Egyptians, because they spoke Arabic instead of French, because they were baladi [inferior citizens]. It was there that the emotional groundwork was laid for the tremendous psychological drive in Nasser--the drive to make himself and his people proud, and not ashamed, to be Egyptians.

However, ". . .the problem of [the Egyptian's] alienation could not be solved by a fatal compromise with foreigners; it permeated the very act of liberation" (Berque, 1972:649). Such a task of liberation was eventually performed and gave a new identity to the Muslim-Arab-African-Egyptians, and the minority of the Christian Copt nationals.

In Baker's words, ". . .through their efforts to destroy Egypt's colonial dependency, the military conspirators [i.e., the "Free Officers"] did give new meaning to a history that for the mass of Egyptians had become meaningless" (1978:11).

(4) Proposition IV centers around "Value Dissensus" which manifests itself after the "rules of the game" are played down by, or withheld on behalf of the regime in power. In fact, in such a situation, the morality, legality, and the functioning of the regime came into question. In general, such a manifest disagreement develops with the emergence of economic inequality, political conflict, and identificational crisis. These conditions surfaced under the Egyptian old regime and thus justified its abrogation by the people.

Paradoxically, there was a twofold disagreement concerning two political orders in the Egyptian society. One was directed toward the occupying British forces and the other dealt with the Egyptian political regime proper. However, these two disagreements had a common source and hence were intertwined. Since colonialization is illegitimate in the absolute, at least by the judgment of the affected people, no kind of "agreement" can be comprehended in the process. Yet, for some theoretical purposes, it must be argued that even within the context of their imposed colonialist policies and treaties, the British did not fulfill their own promises. As was mentioned in the Historical Background, the British occupation of Egypt, the partnership in the Condominium of the Sudan, the Control of the Canal Company, the stationing of the troops in the Canal Zone, the timing of the "Evacuation" from Egypt, and the like, went far beyond the codes and accords that they had already

promulgated to serve their own colonialist interests. Thus, the Egyptian Revolution (and the following events such as the nationalization of the Canal Company and the expulsion of the British troops) was a natural and legitimate reaction to the illegitimate operation of the British.

On the other hand, dissensus between the Egyptian people and their own state can be traced to the suspension of the Constitution, the dissolution of the Parliament, the abuse of authority, even under the operation of both the Parliament and the Constitution, and the ineffectiveness in managing the country. According to Musa (1958:166-167), the government ". . . dissolved the Parliament on [sic] 1925 on the very first day of its assembly, suspended the Constitution and thus destroyed the young Egyptian democracy by putting back the nation to an autocratic rule. . . . The same was done. . . in 1929 and . . . in 1930." Hence, independence was meaningless ". . . if reactionaries and despots govern the nation" (Musa, 1960:41).

It was not only in the beginning of the Parliamentary rule that the democratic tradition was oppressed by the regime; this suppression actually lasted until the dawn of the Revolution. Throughout this period, King Farouk and his "Party of Friends" mostly operated at will. For example, in reaction to the people's constant appeal for free political expression but in the guise of the Palestinian War, the regime enforced martial law which continued until 1950, that is two years after the War. Further, four months before the Revolution, "It dissolved Parliament on 24 March and announced fresh elections for 18 May; but later it postponed holding them indefinitely" (Vatikiotis, 1969:372).

Throughout the 1940s and in the early 1950s, it became evident

more than ever before that the regime was affected by "power deflation," political scandals, financial misdoings, moral corruption, and a state of dysfunctioning. "With political power in hand, the king did not, and could not, resolve a single problem. His resumption of power was in fact unconstitutional [sic]. Inoperative power can hardly be regarded as effective" (Hussien, 1973:85). While the reigning King assumed a governing role in the process, his ". . .scandalous behavior. . . discredited both the monarch and the existing order" (Issawi, 1957:264). In the course of time, the inoperation of the regime intensified and the political crisis deepened. Indicative of this was the fact that, in the first half of 1952, five governments were appointed, none of which was able to control the situation (e.g., Sadat, 1957:113, Baker, 1978:11).

As for the morality of the King, in a land that had long known kings, Farouk's ". . .private life, however, soon became entangled in alcohol and women; he grew enormously obese. . ." (Lieden and Schmitt, 1968:165). The decay, ineffectiveness, and the crisis of legitimacy of the regime is also reflected in Sadat's (1957:130-131) words: "The old regime had crumbled to the ground, the King had fallen without majesty, the leaders without virtue or dignity. There was nothing left but the ruins they had created."

Thus, people lost their faith, if any, in their political regime and withdrew their loyalty as this was defined by a value system reflected in the 1923 Constitution. This dissensus must also be traced to the Egyptians' lifetime opposition to the government, which actually indicated the ongoing crisis of legitimacy of the old

example.

Yet, there was a third factor which impeded mass consciousness, liberal political socialization, and violent and widespread demonstration. This situation is attributed to the severity, popularity, and the three-fold nature of social control. According to Sadat (1978:100):

At that time five secret bodies were operating in Egypt: the Political Police; the Criminal Investigation Department; the Army Military Intelligence; the British Intelligence Service; and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which began to operate in Egypt immediately after World War II. Apart from these there was a further body that worked for the King and was directly responsible to the royal court--the Royal Intelligence Service.

Interestingly, one of the Free Officers' preoccupations was to assure promptly the British and the American embassies in Cairo that the power transition that had already occurred on July 23, 1952, was an internal event whereby the foreigners would not be affected. Finally, whatever the scope of stratum consciousness in the Egyptian society and however it was exploited by the revolutionaries, the case demonstrates a certain example of The Politics of Mass Society (Kornhauser: 1953). In this approach, in fact, the Egyptian "elites" (indeed "counter-elites") were accessible to the masses and the masses were potentially available to the counterelites. This also can be substantiated by some interrelated facts, namely that the military counterelites operated on behalf of the masses; the masses cheered the Revolution; and furthermore, ". . . no Egyptian rose up to defend the monarchy. . ." (Sadat, 1955:128).

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The eleventh and last proposition of the synthesis revolves

around certain unpredictable but exploitable factors which somehow come about in the revolutionary process. These Windfalls precipitate the revolution and affect the time of the revolutionary take-over. In the case of the Egyptian Revolution, a variety of these accelerators can be singled out. Mansfield (1971:266) claims that "one side effect of the [1936] treaty ultimately paved the way for the 1952 Revolution and the end of the British influence in Egypt." On the other hand, students of the Egyptian Revolution as well as the initiators of this revolution seem to acknowledge the observation that, "Undoubtedly, the Palestine War [of 1948] constituted a major conditioning factor for the revolution of 1952" (Leiden and Schmitt, 1968:165). This acknowledgement might be substantiated by the fact that, for several national, religious, economic, military, and political values, "The army's morale was shaken by the Palestine War. . ." (Issawi, 1957:264).

Further, the two events of January 25 and 26, 1952, accelerated the occurrence of the Revolution. In the first event, "On January 25th, 1952, a battalion of the Egyptian Auxiliary Police was surrounded at Ismailia, and called upon to surrender [to the British forces]. The battalion refused, and resisted heroically when attacked by tanks and light artillery. There were more than seventy dead. Public opinion was outraged by the news" (Sadat, 1957:104-105). This event caused the Cairo Fire or Black Saturday on the following day, as a reaction to the British and the Egyptian demoralized regime (which was discussed previously). From the eventful Black Saturday, the Free Officers as eye-witnesses learned two things: the situation was ripe for revolution and the regime was ineffective in the face of a serious challenge.

Indicative of this was the "inaction" of the police forces during the riots (Issawi, 1954:264).

Thus, the Executive Committee (or the Constituent Council) of the Free Officers decided to advance the take-over. "The revolution was fixed for March, 1952" (Sadat, 1957:107). But, because of the unexpected desertion of the would-be "front man" of the Revolution, General Mehanna, the execution of the plan was postponed to November, 1952 (Sadat, 1978: 104), or August 5, 1952 (Neguib, 1955:112). Unexpectedly, Nasser learned that the King was about to appoint a new Cabinet whose Minister of War would be Major-General Hussien Sirry Amer. This General, ". . .knew a great deal about the Free Officers, and. . . once in power, he would eliminate them all and frustrate their plans to show the King how powerful and loyal he was" (Sadat, 1978:105). Accordingly, ". . .we advanced the date of the coup to 22 July. In the end, though, we found it impossible to make all the necessary arrangements in time to act before the morning of Wednesday, 23 July" (Neguib, 1955:112).

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In sum, the Free Officers' overall resource mobilization initiatives or their "distinguishing qualities" in the process of revolutionary take-over, can be traced to the following capacities stressed by Dekmijian (1971:21-22): (1) the unity among the inner core of eleven officers; (2) the effectiveness of leadership characterized by Nasser and the utilization of the cell system; (3) the ability to gather intelligence from and about different groups and circles within both the opposition and the regime; and finally, the ability to move quickly and boldly to preempt the actions of competing groups and the Palace.

* * *

Finally, in the concluding chapter which follows, certain theoretical and observational issues, including the relevancy of the synthesis for the test case revolution and the generating forces of the Egyptian and Iranian Revolutions as compared together, will be considered, and the relationships between social strain and resource mobilization will be emphasized.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Through the preceding theoretical and observational accounts, certain issues relating to both revolution and the theory of revolution were proposed. A concluding sketch, concentrating on the developed synthesis, in link with a comparative glance at the two test-case revolutions, may be drawn as follows:

A. The Phenomenon of revolution as a sudden, drastic social change is complex and multi-dimensional. Partially because of this characteristic, different theories of revolution have failed to provide a sufficient explanation of the phenomenon. Such a failure also stems from the rooting of the cause of revolution in a single variable of social milieu. It was attempted here to attribute different causal and contributory variables to the creation of revolution. This approach relates to and is substantiated by the economic, political, and cultural orders. This Weberian scheme about social structures and processes not only aids in an accurate explanation of revolution, but also lodges the causal analysis of this phenomenon in the sociological discipline. The interests of sociology are broad. "Sociology examines aspects of social life that might otherwise be overlooked or taken for granted. Its

large and challenging agenda includes efforts to discover the basic structure of human society, to identify the forces that strengthen or weaken groups, and to search out the conditions that lead to social change" (Broom et al., 1981:5).

However, the study of revolution falls in the area of middle-range theories (Dowse and Houghes, 1972:3), but the complexity of revolution requires a comprehensive cross-cultural sociological investigation. If adopted, a narrow approach to revolution especially in the current stage of sociological development and the fragmentation of sociology, might not be productive. One may remember Hughes' assertion in 1958 that

"...by sociology I do not mean the highly specialized and fragmented discipline with which we are currently familiar in the United States, I mean a more universal social theorizing in the tradition of Montesquieu and Marx. This was the notion of sociology held by Weber or Durkheim or Pareto" (1977:22).

B. The relevant literature suffers from a definitional problem concerned with what actually is a revolution. As a reaction to this problem, a comprehensive definition of revolution was suggested (see pp. 13-14), which covers the whole revolutionary process. Such a process is identified with Hopper's (1950:270-779) observation in that revolutionary development undergoes four distinguishable stages: the preliminary stage of mass (individual) excitement and unrest; the formal stage of formulation of issues and formation of policies; the popular stage of crowd (collective) excitement and unrest; and finally the institutionalization stage of legalization and societal organization. In a short word, one should not speak of a "successful" revolution unless visible structural and/or valuational changes are

introduced to a social system, and that in the desired direction.

C. Revolutions, however infrequent, occur in varying social circumstances and are deeply rooted in human societies. Stated differently, "Each revolution is shaped by the history of the people involved and by their distinctive genius that gives shared meaning to the formative events of their past" (Baker, 1978:1). Therefore, students of the sociology of revolution must always be conscious of and explore the social setting in which their investigations take place. "But to stress this does not entail acceptance of a wholly relativistic position, according to which the 'validity' of a given conception is only limited to the circumstances which gave rise to it" (Giddens, 1977:x).

D. Revolution is but one type of social change, though a sudden and drastic one. Yet, many fundamental changes can take place without revolutions. Revolution is not necessarily a "bad" or "good" phenomenon. If a revolutionary take-over is justified by socio-historical imperatives, the privilege of the new regime should be judged by its post-revolutionary performance. However, a sound evaluation or a readable "balance-sheet" of revolutionary performance may go beyond a scientific, and particularly sociological, observation. For instance, how can one justify the sacrifice which is made by the present generations in order to secure the proposed well-being of the future generations? Questions and evaluations like this are ethical, philosophical, and surely complicated. On the other hand, it is also true that ". . . revolution cannot be made with rosewater and the tree of liberty must be lavishly watered with blood. . ." (Brogan, 1966:11). Revolution

is neither inevitable nor impossible and when it occurs, it occurs at a cost. In Brinton's words "Revolution may be as 'inevitable' as thunderstorms--and often as useful as a storm in a parched countryside" (1965:6).

E. Both the Egyptian and the Iranian old regimes were suffering from a legitimacy crisis prior to their downfall. This crisis was crystalized in their systematic and constant violation of the "social contract" symbolized by the constitutions. This crisis was also evidenced by the masses' enduring, narrow or broad, easy or intense, and symbolic and/or instrumental opposition to these regimes. Yet, until the moment of the take-over, the two regimes were, by definition, considered legitimate and the masses' opposition was not. This is a paradoxical approach to the category of "legitimation" and "authority" (i.e., legitimized power) in the tradition of social sciences. Along with these two regimes' crises of legitimacy, social theory also suffers from a definitional crisis in defining "legitimate." It is a serious flaw in social theory to take the legitimation quality of a government for granted simply because this government is somehow in power.

Even if consensus (or value-agreement) between government and people is taken for granted, such a "Consensus is always under stress, even in systems with a long tradition of legitimacy" (Macridis and Brown, 1972:102). This reversible concentration on consensus-dissensus signals the fact that the challenged regime is not undoubtedly legitimate nor are its challengers illegitimate in the absolute. The legality for anti-regime action can be sought in (1) value-dissensus, as was approached in the synthesis, and (2) the "emergent-norms" explanation as it is proposed by Turner (1964). To specify, the "popular"

(or collective) opposition to the regime must be considered legitimate on two bases: the regime's violation of the agreed-upon terms, and the developed values and norms on behalf of the opposition. These measures gain both rationality and legality for challenge. In sum, the current approach to the legitimacy of regimes in power tends to be a merely "diplomatic" and not "scientific"--that is, "realistic"--definition.

F. Neither "social strain," caused by economic, political and cultural difficulties, not "resource mobilization," identified with leadership, ideology, and "organization," and substantiated by "dissensus," alone is sufficient for the materialization of revolutions. These originating and activating factors can jointly bring about a revolution. More importantly, the "intensity" and the "nature" of strain, and the "scope" of resource mobilization can affect the magnitude of a revolutionary change and the quality of the revolutionary take-over.

Structural strain involves the imposition of tension to the affected people. Such a tension generally arises out of the internal contradiction, discrimination, deprivation, disruption, and alienation within a given social system. In such a strainful situation, different people may also experience different strains or different levels of strain. People's level of education and political socialization as well as their economic interests and cultural norms are not necessarily alike and even may be conflictual. The opposition to the regime may have only one common objective, the overthrow of the regime. Beyond such an end they may have or will develop different interests or different approaches to the concerning realities. It is also true that

"leaders" and "followers" do not necessarily adhere to or digest the same ideals and the latter may be used by the former. Thus, what is important is not simply the accumulation of strain and its intensity but the channeling of strain and the quality of its actualization. In other words, resource mobilization, as understood in this work, is as crucial as the accumulation of strain in the revolutionary process. This contention can be supported by a partial comparative observation of the two test-case revolutions.

Although the pre-revolutionary conditions (e.g., economic inequality, political suppression, and cultural alienation) seemed alike in Egypt and Iran, the Egyptian event demonstrated itself in the form of a military coup in the capital city of Cairo, but the Iranian event came about as massive movement and massive take-over, country-wide. Further, while the Iranian Army impeded revolutionary change (or revolutionary take-over), the Egyptian Army originated such a change. Moreover, while the two societies enjoyed a common Islamic religion and even systematic religious action existed for some twenty-five years (1927-1952), in Egypt, the Egyptian Revolution turned out to be nationalist (with a visible conflict with the religious fundamentalists), but the Iranian Revolution sprang up as religious (with a substantial conflict with the "nationalists" and ethnic activists).

It is understood here that these differentials are caused, in principle, by the nature and quality of both strain and resource mobilization, and their interaction in the two situations, as specified below.

- (1) Egypt was an economically poor country, which lacked ample

national resources but had too many mouths to feed. This implies two things: first, that a part of the economic deprivation was not blamed on the system, but on "mother nature;" second, that when people are improverished, they are less likely to involve themselves in political action for, "They are endured in the extreme case because the physical and mental energies of people are totally employed in the process of merely staying alive" (Davies, 1962:7). On the other hand, in Iran petro-dollars were pouring into the country, economic growth was increasing, and economic expectations were rising. What, economically, strained the Iranians was not widespread poverty but the prevalent unequal distribution of economic privileges and social services. The Iranians could not (and did not) blame this situation on mother nature but on their unrealistic regime which, on several occasions produced "evil" even if it meant "good." In a short word, as the economic impulses of social strain are concerned, the nature of strain was not alike in the two social situations.

(2) The overwhelming majority of the Egyptians were illiterate at the time and hence they could not develop a massive political consciousness necessary for ideological mass action. This widespread illiteracy interacted with their improverishment and blocked the possibility of a visible consistent and militant massive action. Contrary to this assumption, the Egyptian writer Mahmoud Hussien (1973:83) claims that "The demonstration [of January 26, 1952] revealed an unprecedented level of unanimous mass consciousness and strength. This force merely needed a direct call to be transformed into a people's army ready for struggle." Hussien also concludes that "These masses. . . were more

conscious than the other popular classes of the need of acting outside the normal, legal framework--and particularly the need for violence" (1973:83). However, in reality, none of the political organizations, including the popular Muslim Brotherhood, was able to mobilize the masses for a mass take-over. Nor did the masses embrace the Nasser's coup to move it toward a mass revolution.

In this respect, Nasser (1952:32-34, 39-40) writes that

Before July 23rd, I had imagined that the whole nation was ready and prepared, waiting for nothing but a vanguard to lead the charge against the battlements, where upon it would fall in behind in serried ranks, ready for the sacred advance towards the great objective. And I had imagined that our role was to be this commando vanguard. . . the vanguard performed its task. . .[but] the masses that came were disunited, divided groups of strangers. . . . At this moment I felt, with sorrow and bitterness, that the task of vanguard, far from being completed, had only begun. . . .It was from these facts, and no others, that the revolution coined its slogans.

I can now state that we are going through two revolutions, not one revolution. Every people on earth goes through two revolutions: a political revolution by which it wrests the right to govern itself from the hand of tyranny, or from the army stationed upon its soil against its will; and a social revolution, involving the conflict of classes, which settles down when justice is secured for the citizens of the united nation.

Nasser's observations illuminate the quality of the revolutionary process in Egypt, provide some insight into the definition of revolution, and support Lenin's consideration that "The transfer of state power from one class to another class is the first, the principal, the basic sign of a revolution, both in the strictly scientific and in the practical political meaning of the term" (1917:?). It may be of value to indicate here that the nonviolent military take-over in Egypt (and in similar cases) should not undermine the possibility of subsequent radical changes, for as Lauer notes, "It is the collective action

rather than violence that is critical to historical process" (1978:223). Sadat also emphasizes that, "In 1952, the Egyptians did only what the English had done under Cromwell three hundred years before; what the Americans did in 1776; and the French in 1789. But our revolution was less bloody then [sic] these" (1955:114). To summarize, the Egyptian masses either did not sense the presupposed strain decisively, or the strain itself was not decisive enough to set them in motion, or the leadership of the opposition in different camps failed to activate the existing strain by means of collective revolutionary action, significantly.

(3) Because of the stage of social development and economic growth, the Egyptian middle classes were not extensive and effective at the time. Although, for example, there was a visible body of the creators of culture, there were few users and distributors. This fact implies, among other things, that in the absense of the powerful middle classes, the impoverished, strained, and illiterate Egyptian peasants--that is, the overwhelming majority of the people--could not (and did not) make a revolution, agrarian or otherwise. Nor were they used by the leadership of the middle classes for a revolution, urban or otherwise. It could also be argued that layers of the middle classes as such impeded radical change lest their current overall interests be curtailed and the future ones blocked. An example of this was the right wing of the nationalist Wafd Party whose members had more things in common with the regime in power than with the demanding people. Therefore, it can be claimed that factions of the Egyptian middle classes not only detested the Revolution but, through their represen-

tation in the government, eased the tension of the masses and, in turn, overturned the possibility of massive action.

Contrary to the Egyptian Case, the Revolution of Iran has been acknowledged as middle class (or urban) revolution. It was the expanding and constantly demanding middle classes who, for different and differing collective objectives, challenged the Shah's regime. They all were strained and available for mass action even without intensified emotionalization efforts and strong organization. (This point will also be reemphasized in the following passages.)

(4) It was a fact that the Egyptians were governed by dictatorial forces represented by the King as well as the colonialist British; but it was also true that they normally had their political parties which, however powerless, provided some psychological relief within a pseudo-democracy. What is meant here is that political organizations as such actually functioned in terms of mitigating political strain and its intensification. In addition, as was hinted above, on occasions the leadership of these political parties offset the voice of the opposition through justifying the suitable operation of the regime. Iran demonstrated a totally different picture. Not only were all the political parties dissolved in 1975, but also people were openly obliged to join the Shah's self-designed and imposed Resurgence Party. In such a situation, political pressure on people was doubled and super-imposed. Not only were people forced to give up what they did want, (i.e., political freedom) but also they were forced to give in to what they did not (i.e., political participation, beneficial to the regime). This situation, in turn, turned the Iranians to inflammable masses who could

explode eventually, and they did.

(5) In the Revolutionary take-over of Iran, for a variety of reasons and conditions, religious sentiment became the dominant force in the process. In the Egyptian case, although the Muslim Brotherhood had already provided a social base for action and were the dominant force in the country, the corresponding sentiment was nationalism. Not only could Egyptian nationalism soundly speak for all the Egyptians, but it was also able to symbolize Arab nationalism. This was what occurred in Nasser's era (1954-1970). As an indication, Nasser came up with the "United Arab Republic," a merger between Egypt and Syria, which was the Arab's first, and to-date last, United State in the modern time. In Egypt (and any other Arab country) nationalism does not necessarily conflict with Islam universalism, for what is actually stressed in Arabism is the Arabic language, the Arabic culture, and the Arabic heritage. All these are basically identified with and crystallized in the Islamic Arabia, the Prophet Mohammad who was Arab, and the holy book, Quran, which is in Arabic. In a short word, at least in theory and in the Arabs subjectively, Arab nationalism is synonymous with Islamic sentiment and the history of Islam. As Richmond observes "In the minds of the religious reformers Afghani and Abduh, and of the nationalists of the Arabist movement, there was not conflict between the interests of country and religion, between nationalism and Islam" (1977:197).

On the other hand, although the Muslim Brotherhood emerged in Egypt and gained a popular support among the masses, they were not able to make a revolution, or to initiate a military take-over, or to embrace

(or to seize) the military coup that had already been initiated by the Free Officers. Part of this inability can be attributed to what has been concluded previously, that is, Arab nationalism can symbolize Islamic sentiment, at least among the Muslim Arab masses. In other words, the military-nationalist take-over by the Free Officers, who also included at least two Officers from the Brethern, was able to satisfy the religious conscience of the Muslim masses. The other part of this failure might also be traced to the Brethern's assassination tactics, the assassination of their leader and founder, Al-Banna in 1949, the death of their military leader in the Army, Mohammad Labib in 1951, the dissolution of their organization, and the lack of a clear and practical program for governance and the maintenance of order.

Contrary to the Egyptian case, nationalism in Iran could barely represent a half of the population. The other half of the population is identified with several ethnic minorities who had been suppressed under the Pahlavi regime. It should also be remembered that the communist left of Iran was divided and not powerful enough to lead or to symbolize massive political action. Thus, it was a functional necessity for religion to lead or symbolize the anti-Shah struggle. Interestingly, religious zeal and religious emphasis in Iran could supply the Iranians with more ideological enthusiasm than the Egyptians for two reasons. First, the Iranians' version of Islam is characterized by Shiism, to which the majority of the Iranians belong. Shiism has not been officialized anywhere else but in Iran. By emphasizing Islam, the Iranians actually emphasize, by intention or not, Shiism, and especially "red" Shiism. The Shiite followers are willing to see Shiite Islam prevailing

politically and reviving historically.

Second, it seems that neither Islam in general or Shiite Islam in particular is emphasized in Iran, the emphasis bearing its "Persian" coloration. In other words, it is the "Iranian" or Persian Islam (with its dominant Shiite tradition) that is stressed and advocated. This religio-ideological concentration can also satisfy the patriot and/or nationalist Iranians who, through "religious means," can achieve or emphasize "nationalist ends." Such an attitude may be found among some religious figures as well. (The rule of the Arab dynasties in Iran, with some exceptions, demonstrated that this fact transcends nationality indeed.) Further, the Iranians' emphasis on religion can also satisfy some ethnic minorities who, ideally or short of achieving political ends through ethnic claims, seek refuge in religion. In this context, the case of the Arab Iranians, all of whom are Shiite, is interesting. It seems that the Iranian emphasis on Shiism provides, at least in theory, some meaning to their presence in the international territory of the "non-Arab" Iran, and out of the Arab community at large which does not recognize Shiism as its followers desire or believe they deserve. (However, diverse they are, the attitudes of the Arab states toward the "Islamic" Revolution, or the "Islamic" Republic of "Iran," can also be analyzed within the above proposed perspective.)

In sum, while in the "Arabian" Egypt Arab nationalism symbolized or catalyzed the Islamic religious sentiment, in the "Persian" Iran religious sentiment symbolized or catalyzed Iranian nationalism in the revolutionary take-overs (and the following episodes). Further, the dichotomy of nationalism - Islamic universalism created more pressure in the Muslim Iran in comparison to the Muslim Egypt. This, in turn,

helped the massive character of the Iranian Revolution.

(6) While the military forces in Iran impeded the revolutionary process, their Egyptian counterparts initiated power shifts and revolutionary social changes that followed. Further, historically, while the substantial political actions in Egypt were initiated by elements from the Army, the Iranian Army was always loyal to the Pahlavis. These qualifications mean two things. First, when it is deemed necessary, social forces from whatever walks of life and with whatever ideologies can initiate drastic change and create revolution. Next, being loyal to the regime and suppressive of the opposition, the Iranian Army intensified the strainful situation in which the people were already engulfed. These circumstances also helped the organized opposition to have visible access to the masses, and with ease. Probably the Shah had understood, though belatedly, the latent function of further military operation against the revolutionary demonstrators, and he discouraged it. In Egypt, the Army, which was understandably defeated in 1948, and which was identified with its nationalist and religious anti-regime elements, were not a source of strain for the masses. Further, the military men were a hope, or the only hope, for the people in confronting the regime.

(7) Compared to current time, national and international consciousness was not widespread and could not be expanded promptly and effectively in Egypt of 1952 relative to Iran of 1978-79. This differential was partially caused by the nonexistence of extensive local, regional, and international communication network. Contrary to the Egyptian situation in the early 1950's, the Iranian situation of the late 1970's was much more awakening and conducive for political action and confrontation. As a result, the Iranians were both favored

by and able to exploit international events such as wars of independence, aggressions, conflicts, and revolutions, including Nasser's Revolution and his anti-Shah position. To be sure, this kind of awareness and exposure was lodged on Iran's extending international relations, increasing urbanization, expanding education, and the like. This assertion may also justify the proposed claim that the Shah's modernization, irrespective of its direction, magnitude, and nature, was also responsible for the rising of the Iranians. In sum, situationally speaking, the Iranian people were more able than the Egyptian to feel tension and strain, and to be more accessible for mass action and militant confrontation.

(8) The Egyptian society was, in general, a homogeneous society. All the people considered themselves "Egyptian," the overwhelming majority of whom were Muslims. The minority Copt Christians could not be considered an oppressed minority, for religious freedom actually existed and the "Arab Muslim" Egyptians did not deny their pre-Islamic (i.e., Coptic) history and heritage. Further, at least in terms of economic privileges, the Copts were actually represented in the upper layers of society. Ethnic strain and substantial religious strain did not exist to give birth to internal tension and conflict. In fact, all the Egyptian masses were unanimously undermined, in economic, political, and cultural terms, by the governing class. In this situation, the "super-imposed" strained failed to burst into a massive revolution. This failure, in addition to what was discussed previously, could also be attributed to the addressed "homogeneity" itself, which could function more in sense of order and mild politics

than violence and disorder.

In Iran not only did "heterogeneity" exist in society, but in different classes and nationalities social strain was superimposed or cross-cutting. The Iranian society is identified with a plethora of ethnicities, tribes, and localities. The majority of these categories, especially at the middle and lower levels, were economically deprived, politically oppressed, and culturally alienated. In religious terms also some kind of difference existed. While the dominant and official religion was Shiism, there was also a great number of Sunnis identified with three different ethnicities (i.e., the Kurds, the Baluchis, and the Turkomans). In addition, there also existed such religious minorities as the Jews, the Christians, the Zoroastrains, and the Bahais, who, with whatever religious freedom could enjoy, were surrounded by a "sea" of Muslims, and Shiite Muslim in particular.

Viewed from a class perspective, Iranian society was also heterogenous with internal conflict or difference of interests. For example, it is not that all the Iranian workers were politically oppressed or economically deprived equally. In fact, the oil workers, in general, had a better situation than the others; the skilled workers in different sectors enjoyed a better economic conditions than the others. The Bazaari businessmen were economically prosperous, though politically powerless. The intellectuals, regardless of their economic gains, were ideologically undermined by and politically alienated from the system. The government employees, the rollers of the Shah's bureaucratic machine, enjoy neither political power nor sufficient economic rewards. The politically active religious community was undermined by the regime and without power. These differences and differentials

produced and imposed different pressures on the people, and for variable reasons. Although in cases these pressures could cross-cut each other, in the process they joined the mainstream of the tenseful situation in which strain was accumulating, even in a super-imposed fashion. The Shah failed to exploit this difference of interests among different groupings, but the opposition was able to create a confluence of interests, at least until the Shah's regime was gone. The "gist" of this argument is that the intensive strain in the case of Iran created more accessible and inflammable masses than in the case of Egypt. Further, heterogeneity in the social situation of Iran, which could be functional for the regime, was remarkably beneficial to the revolutionaries.

G. Based on the comparative analysis offered in the above passages, four types of relationships between social strain and resource mobilization, leading to four types of political action can be observed. They are shown below and will be specified immediately:

		Resource Mobilization	
		High	Moderate
Social Strain	High	(1)	(3)
	Moderate	(2)	(4)

(1) If intense strain couples with a high level of resource mobilization, a successful revolutionary change is very likely. In this strainful situation people are readily available to the counter-elites and the latter are already well-organized, alert, and committed to exploiting this mass availability. When the revolutionaries are in power, they do not face a drastic counter-revolutionary or administrative

problem. In this situation, the "reign of terror" will be absent or very lightly visible. Through their preceding systematic resource mobilization and constant definition of the situation, they have already taken the role of the government. In a sense, they were a "government in exile" whose time came to govern. A proper example of this type of political action might be the Cuban Revolution of 1959.

(2) If social strain is somehow moderate, a great deal of resource mobilization effort is required for the creation of revolution. Because of the easing of social strain, and hence the diminished availability of the masses, the counterelites may also deepen but not extend the strategy of their enduring resource mobilization. Anyway, they will probably succeed in the take-over, confronting no decisive resistance; however, relative to case (1), it will take them more time to institutionalize their values. An example of this type of revolutionary action is the Egyptian Revolution. For ten whole years the Free Officers were engaged in mobilization of the available resources, secretly but systematically.

(3) Without intensive and long-planned resource mobilization, a highly strainful situation can also lead to revolution. In this case a revolution may undergo its conventional life-cycle, including the "reign of terror," shaky order maintenance, and gradual reconstruction. In this type of revolutionary process, people are so inflammable that in a short period of time, or with a low degree of mobilization, they can burst into revolution. The Revolution of Iran provides a sound example for this type of strain--resource mobilization relationships. What took the Iranians some six months to produce in

1979--that is, the overthrow of the regime--had taken the Free Officers ten "bitter years" to initiate. Needless to emphasize, the generating factors of the two revolutions were historical.

(4) When both strain and resource mobilization are only moderate, revolution will be less likely or abortive. The Revolution of Iran in 1906, and the Revolution of Egypt in 1919, and a rainbow of coups and palace revolts are good examples. It seems that other types of social action, collective behavior, political violence, and the like--that is, revolt, rebellion, palace revolution etc.--can be identified with and analyzed within this fourth category of revolutionary or militant action.

In a word, the gravity of strain and its nature, in interaction with the magnitude of resource mobilization, as it is approached in this work, have a determining, if not the determining, impact on shaping, accelerating, and conditioning the revolutionary process.

H. The integrated theory of revolution--that is, the "synthesis"--developed in this dissertation must be considered "probablistic" and not "deterministic" in causally approaching revolutions. However, since "One of the problems of comparing various theorists is that they do not take the same variables as the focus of analysis. . ." (Lauer, 1978:58), this theory has to an extent minimized the problem. It provides a comprehensive and multi-dimensional framework for the definition and the causation of revolution. The synthesis roots the causes of revolutions in the economic and/or political, and/or cultural arrangements, or a combination of them, where the problem is really structured. In this synthesis, "value-dissensus" and "social strain" are viewed successively

as "justification" and "motivation" for anti-regime action. In this scheme, neither strain nor dissensus is understood as the cause or a cause for revolutions, but manifestations of a troubled system, in economic, political, and cultural terms.

Further, in the synthesis, "resource mobilization" is not approached as a comprehensive explanation of revolution. This explanation can only provide more thought into and sheds more light on the "quality" of a successful (or abortive) action, after the prerequisite for such an action (i.e., the economic, political, and cultural difficulties) are present, leading to the mutually reinforcing value - dissensus and social strain. It is only with the existence of such qualifications that resource mobilization efforts, identified with leadership, ideology, and organization, will be justified, precipitated, and probably productive. "People" are rational and they would not respond with enthusiasm to the counterelites' call for action if there were not some visible causes and sensed burdens for struggle. Yet, whatever resource mobilization strategies and tactics achieve in the course of action, this achievement will be relative to the regime's counter-efforts, or, stated differently, to the operation of social control.

Nevertheless, the synthesis suffers from a serious problem the solution of which calls for further intellectual curiosity, sophisticated theorizing, and sociological data. The problem is identified with the sequence of events--that is, "when," "what" takes place in the revolutionary process. For example, does value-dissensus precede social strain, or is it antedated by it, or do the two occur

simultaneously? One may also think of another problem which is the predictive capacity of the synthesis. However, given the complexity of social phenomenon in general and revolutions in particular, and given the current stage of sociological development, vigorous prediction is not possible in our discipline and the proposed synthesis does not purport to make such predictions. In one simple word,----the synthesis can serve as a comprehensive model within which historical events can be sufficiently analyzed. Where the future events are concerned, this model can be approached in terms of "anticipation" and not "prediction." The future, though rooted in the past and the present, belongs to other social structures for which we do not now have (and cannot) have relevant data. Prediction in sociology is an area still obscure and a problem to be solved.

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