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GENDER AND THE INHIBITORS OF CRIME: AN ISSUE OF  
TRADITIONALISM AND SOCIAL CONTROL

*The University of Oklahoma*

PH.D. 1982

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

GENDER AND THE INHIBITORS OF CRIME:

AN ISSUE OF TRADITIONALISM AND SOCIAL CONTROL

A DISSERTATION

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GENDER AND THE INHIBITORS OF CRIME:  
AN ISSUE OF TRADITIONALISM AND SOCIAL CONTROL

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## CHAPTER ONE

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Recently a highly documented relationship between gender and criminal activity has gained serious attention among scholars of deviance and social control. Over diverse measures of deviance, from official crime rates to self-reported survey data, females are found to conform more than males (Tittle, 1980; Tittle and Rowe, 1973; Sistrunk and McDavid, 1971; Williams and Gold, 1972). It has been suggested that specification of the processes involved in this relationship can provide additional insight into criminal behavior, as well as challenge traditional theories of conformity and deviance (Millman, 1975; Smart, 1977).

A specific concern of students of the gender difference in crime and deviance has been the controversy surrounding charges that the rates and patterns of female criminal activity have changed over the past two decades. Several theorists have argued that there has been a serious increase in female criminality and increased similarity of males' and females' patterns of crime (Adler, 1975). Others maintain that the "new female criminal is more of a social invention than an empirical reality" (Steffensmeier, 1978). However, most note that, at least for some types of crime, females' participation is increasing; the debate

concerns the extent and cause of that increase.

Those researchers who have considered the causes of a closing gap in female and male criminality generally focus on one of two types of explanations. The first contends that the structural position of males in some way produces greater criminality. As women enter positions which have generally been considered "masculine" (e.g., labor force positions), they will begin to resemble males in their criminality. Thus, location in the social structure helps explain criminal behavior. Following this argument, it is suspected that major increases in female crime will occur for economic types of crime.

The second argument is a cultural one. This explanation of the rising criminality among females posits that the gender role expectations of males and females are related to their rates of crime. The traits associated with masculinity, such as aggressiveness, bravery, and independence, are the types of traits consistent with nonconforming behavior. The socialized "feminine" traits such as passivity, conventionality, and dependence, are inconsistent with criminality. Thus, as females abandon the traditional feminine traits in exchange for masculine ones, similar behavior among males and females should result, including criminal behavior. Following this argument, the increases for females should occur for expressive types of crime.

Both these explanations of increasing criminality among women imply that changing roles and positions for women produce greater female criminality. Underlying these explanations of changing crime, is the assumption that it is these roles and positions that produce criminality.



Thus, following this logic, one should discover that those nontraditional women who currently occupy the roles and positions resembling males' should commit more crime than those women who do not. In fact, they should resemble males in criminality. Women who continue to occupy traditional female roles and positions should reveal lower levels of crime than do males or nontraditional females.

Previous analyses of these two arguments generally entailed examination of changes in women's roles that could produce a new climate for women's criminality. Aggregate analysis of women's positions in society and official crime rates are compared to speculate on the relation between the two. Researchers rarely examine individuals and compare conforming women to nonconforming women in terms of their positions in the social structure or gender roles expectations. Such research would use self-report data of individuals to help specify the causes of the female-male crime gap. One could expect that the relationship between gender and crime can be clarified when account is taken of subcategories of females (traditional versus nontraditional). The relationship between gender and deviance should hold only for traditional females. Nontraditional females should resemble males in their rates of criminality.

This research examines the self-reported illegal behavior of males, traditional females and nontraditional females. The distinction between traditionalism and nontraditionalism is made following both structural definition and cultural definition. The structural definition of traditionalism/nontraditionalism uses employment status. The cultural

definition uses attitudes toward traditional female gender role expectations. Following the arguments above, it was suspected that the women who were currently employed should report more illegal behavior than those women who were not employed. Similarly, women who hold nontraditional attitudes concerning the female role should commit more crime than those who hold traditional attitudes.

Thus, this research is concerned with the positions and roles of males and females which produce greater crime among males. Having suggested that male gender expectations and positions in the social structure present greater possibilities for crime, the next step is to determine "why." Several theoretically meaningful options have been suggested. One is that opportunities for criminal activity have been different for males and females. According to this perspective the change in opportunities for women, legitimate or illegitimate, produces a rise in females' criminal activity (cf. Adler, 1975; Simon, 1975). Others have suggested that motivations for deviant behavior have varied for females and males, and that these are beginning to approach on another (Hilbert and Hilbert, 1980; Bowker, 1981). Still others link the gap between females' and males' crime rates to differences in relations to agents or mechanisms of social control (Shover, et al., 1979; Steffensmeier, 1978).

This research follows a control theory perspective to specify further the conditions involved in social control which have relevance for the gender/conformity relationship. Although theorists have frequently searched for reasons why people break rules, control theorists have

asked "why do people obey rules?" Deviance is taken for granted, conformity must be explained (Hirschi, 1969). This perspective on deviance has led to a body of research concerned with the inhibitors that control members of society and produce conformity. It is a sociological continuation of the Hobbesian question of how order is possible.

For control theorists, the issue of gender and deviance becomes, "why are females more likely to conform to society's rules than are males?" It is, therefore, necessary to specify the relationships between gender and the inhibitors of deviance, and to clarify the meaning various inhibitors have for females and males as members of a particular social structure.

There are many mechanisms by which deviance may be inhibited. Generally three types of processes that work to restrain deviance and compel individuals to conform are analyzed, "guilt feelings," "fear of social stigma" and "fear of formal sanctions." "A large body of literature has developed to specify the nature of these factors, the conditions under which each is predictive of rule-breaking, and the extent to which these are independent inhibitors of deviance.

Noting the effect of these inhibitors on deviance and the effect of gender on deviance, detailed analysis of the possible relationships between the two is imperative. This research seeks to continue precise analysis of the relationship of gender and deviance by examining the inhibitory variables of guilt feelings, social stigma, and formal sanctions as possible intervening variables accounting for the gender-crime relationship. More importantly, the analysis will be conducted in terms of

subcategories of females. It is suspected that "traditional" females, defined in terms of either attitudes or location in the social structure, will perceive a higher threat of sanctions than either males or "nontraditional" females. Furthermore, it is expected that traditional females are more influenced, or deterred, by the sanctions they perceive than are either males or nontraditional females. As a result of these relationships, traditional females should be less involved in illegal behavior than males.

Nontraditional females, on the other hand, are expected to be similar to males in their perception of sanctions and in the influence these perceptions have on their behavior. Consequently, nontraditional females should not differ significantly from males in their involvement in crime. The implication of this argument is that the apparent gender-crime relationship occurs because traditional females commit fewer crimes than males and this happens because of differences between males and traditional females in perceptions of sanctions and the influence of sanction threats on their behavior.

The hypotheses which are stated in rudimentary form above will be developed in detail and then tested in the present research. Chapter Two reviews the literature on gender and crime, and considers explanations of the gender-crime relationship which have been presented by previous writers. Chapter Three begins by reviewing the literature on deterrence which leads to the development of an argument which attempts to account for the gender-crime relationship in terms of deterrence. In Chapter Four, the argument is refined into a set of specific hypotheses,

and these hypotheses are then translated into predictions about coefficients in multivariate analysis.

Chapter Five discusses the methods used to test the hypotheses. The data are from a survey of 353 adults in Oklahoma City in which self-reports of minor law violations were obtained. The tests of the hypotheses, which involve both multiple regression and logit analysis, are presented in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven reports the major conclusions and suggestions for future research.

## CHAPTER TWO

### GENDER AND CRIME

This chapter presents a review of the literature of the relationship between gender and crime. It discusses the analyses of increases of female criminality and presents explanations of the current crime gap. The details of the structural and cultural arguments are disclosed, which provide insight into the reasons for distinguishing between traditional and nontraditional females in analyses of female crime.

#### Increases in Female Criminal Behavior

A great deal of inconsistency and controversy has surrounded the debate over whether the relative gap between female and male criminality is decreasing. Some writers indicate that, due to the changing structural and cultural positions of women in society, women are beginning to resemble men in the amount and patterns of crime they commit (Adler, 1975; Oakley, 1972; Noblit and Burcart, 1976; Veder and Somerville, 1970). Others maintain that relative increases in female criminality are merely statistical illusions or social myths (Crites, 1976; Heidensohn, 1968; Steffensmeier, 1978).

Frequently, official arrest rates are utilized to acknowledge a

change in women's criminality, however, many of these studies suffer from misinterpretation of the official arrest rates (Steffensmeier, 1978). Gross arrest figures and percentage changes are reported to show that women are arrested more frequently than in the past. This type of analysis can be misleading in that variations in population size may produce absolute increases. Furthermore, only comparisons of relative increases between females and males can determine the extent to which the two sexes are converging in their patterns and rates.

Steffensmeier (1978, 1980) considers the population changes and relative increases for females as compared to males. He found that the relative gap in violent crime for females remained the same between 1960-1975, but that there were changes in property crime. The property crime rates for females have increased substantially, and there has been a gradual increase in the percent of total arrests for property crime contributed by females. Specifically, Steffensmeier indicates that most of the increase in serious crime can be attributed to increases in the larceny category, primarily to arrests in shoplifting. Although the absolute differences between males and females are large and females continue to lag far behind, he concludes there have been relative increases in the petty types of property crime for females.

Official arrest rates are frequently the only data available for analysis of changes in criminality over time. Yet changes in official statistics indicate social factors other than the actual amount of crime, such as reporting procedures (Smith and Visser, 1980; Henson, 1980; Simon, 1976). Efforts at self-report studies also reveal inconsistencies

in the type and patterns of changes in female criminality, however (Gior-dano and Cerndovich, 1979; Datesman, et al., 1975; Jensen and Eve, 1976). Smith and Visser (1980) have noted that the findings of various studies may be attributed to the characteristics of the subjects analyzed, the methodologies of the studies, and the types of offenses included in the study. After a review of forty-four studies of the relationship between gender and crime, Smith and Visser (1980) conclude that the relationship between gender and crime is decreasing. They state, however, that it is difficult to define precisely the gender-deviance relationship because it varies with the type of crime, the sample used, and the method of study. After the review of these studies, however, they do conclude that women are narrowing the gap in offenses of youth, personal, and property crime.

Given this controversy, it is not clear specifically how women's criminality is changing. There does seem to be evidence, that at least for certain types of criminality, women are approaching men in patterns and rates, although the absolute differences remain substantial. For some types of property crimes, there is agreement that the proportion of acts committed by women is increasing relative to men. The causes and consequences of the increase are not generally agreed upon, however (c.f. Steffensmeier, 1978, 1980).

#### Explanations of Gender Differences in Crime and Deviancy

No other variable has as great a statistical importance in differentiating criminals from non-criminals as does gender (Sutherland and Cressey, 1966). Scholars of deviance have recognized that, due to the



predictive power of the sex variable, further clarification is needed to fully understand its significance for conformity. Sociologists generally have rejected biological explanations of the gender-crime relationship and have focused on the dimensions of gender roles and their accompanying experiences. It is not the state of being male that is important in the causation of crime, but only insofar as it indicates social positions, expectations, and relations.

Two major theoretical links that provide insight into the relationship between gender roles and nonconformity have been acknowledged. These may be categorized as "structural" dimensions and "cultural" dimensions. The structural dimensions of the masculine gender role feature the social positions that generally are occupied by males. These positions usually are characterized by greater economic participation, independence, and authority than are the positions traditionally occupied by females. This school of thought suggests that the rates of crime for females are increasing relative to males' because of structural changes in females' social locations. To the extent women now are entering positions traditionally held by males (e.g., labor force positions) they are incurring the same opportunities and motivations for law-breaking. Frequently, theorists who relate the gender-crime relationship to structural factors focus on the opportunities that males have had to commit rule-breaking behavior. The males' traditional position in the labor force, for example, presents opportunities for job-related crime that are not available to women who remain outside the work force. Moreover, males' relatively external position to the home provides opportunities

to encounter illegitimate opportunities, such as gambling, alcoholism, etc. In these instances it is the social position of males that presents the opportunity for criminal behavior. Women also have a different relation to the positions of authority than do men. Therefore, the structural argument also suggests that social control mechanisms may affect women differently. Because of their lower autonomy, women may experience formal or informal controls differently than men.

The other school of thought focuses on the cultural meanings assigned to gender roles and the accompanying behavioral expectations. Cultural theorists stress the components of masculinity, such as aggression, achievement, and bravery, that are thought to be consistent with deviance. The feminine gender role, on the other hand, presents expectations of passivity, gentleness, and nurturance that would be inconsistent with criminal behavior.

Thus, the cultural perspective contends that attitudes and expectations associated with gender roles are the most likely cause of change. There are shifts in the self perceptions and expectations of women. As women's attachment to the traditional feminine gender role decreases, they will be more likely to resemble males in criminality.

These two perspectives have been analyzed and debated in relation to the explanations of the gender-crime correlation, and explanations of changing female criminality are based on these assumptions.

#### Cultural Explanations

Adler (1975) suggests that females are becoming more male-like in their expectations and behaviors, and that these changing expectations

account for the rising criminality among women. According to Adler, the motivations and attitudes associated with the traditional masculine role lead to the competitive and aggressive behavior that is associated with criminal activity. To the extent that males are socialized into this masculine role, they adopt the characteristics that would be most likely to lead to criminal behavior.

Oakley (1972:72) posits a cultural argument for the sex and crime relationship:

Criminality and masculinity are linked because the sort of acts associated with each have much in common. The demonstration of physical strength, a certain aggressiveness, visible and external "proof" of achievement, whether legal or illegal--these are the facets of the ideal male personality and also much of criminal behavior. Both male and criminal are valued by their peers for these qualities. Thus, the dividing line between what is masculine and what is criminal may at times be a thin one.

A small body of empirical research has analyzed the relationship between gender role expectations and criminal behavior. Norland et al. (1981), using attitude and personality traits, indicate little support for the "masculinity" hypothesis that masculine traits and deviant behavior are directly related. It had been suggested that the sex-deviance relationship could be accounted for by the relationship between masculine characteristics and criminal characteristics. Consequently, masculine males or masculine females would be more likely to commit certain types of crime than would feminine females or feminine males. Sex and deviance would be related only insofar as males tend to prescribe to masculine gender roles more than do females. The findings did not reveal a direct relationship between masculine characteristics and self-reported deviance for the adolescents used in this study.

Most frequently, the studies of the "masculinity hypothesis" have considered only the male role as important in the sex-deviance relationship. Very little has been done to examine the feminine role and its possible link to crime. It is assumed that masculine persons are not feminine because masculinity and femininity are opposite ends of the same continuum. This assumption is not acceptable (see Constantinople, 1973). It is possible for a person to score high on both masculinity and femininity or to have any combination of these traits. Any tests of the gender role relationship with deviance should not ignore the feminine role, therefore. In fact, since the conformity of females is the issue to be resolved, it may be more important to examine the expectations of the feminine role that have implications for low rates of rule-breaking.

Several studies have addressed females' expectations directly. Miller (1979) found girls who held nontraditional attitudes to be more involved in delinquent behavior. Eve and Edmonds (1979), however, found no relationship between law violations and nontraditional attitudes among college students. Giordano and Cernkovich (1979) note that the sex role is a multidimensional variable and that nontraditionality is more than the acceptance of masculine characteristics by females. Their findings indicate that some aspects of the gender role repertoire are not related to delinquent behavior but others are. They demonstrated that those girls who "are more delinquent have more liberated attitudes concerning what constitutes appropriate female behavior" (1979:479). They maintain that "more delinquent girls are more autonomous in their behavior generally than their less delinquent counterparts" (1979:479).

It is important to note that these studies of the importance of

gender role expectations and deviance have primarily relied on samples of youth and students. There is reason to suspect that adult criminality and its relation to gender role expectations may be different.

### Structural Explanations

In contrast to studies that emphasize the cultural components of the gender role, those who stress the structural components of the sex-deviance relationship emphasize socioeconomic and political factors (c.f.) Smart, 1977; Steffensmeier, 1978; Simon, 1981). Most of these studies examine aggregate data on the social positions of women over time and correlate them with an increasing crime rate. It is frequently noted that the major increases are in property crime (Simon, 1981). This is consistent with the argument that the structural social positions of females are the major reasons for more conformity among females. When opportunities change, as indicated by increasing labor force participation among women, women's criminality begins to approach men's. Simon (1981) notes that holding a full-time job and change in legal status contribute to opportunities and propensities that women have for committing crime.

In support of the opportunity hypotheses, Fox and Hartnagel (1979) found that the conviction rate for females increases with both the labor force participation rate and the post-secondary degree for women. They view this finding as an indicator of change in various aspects of women's structural positions in society. It is also important to note that several studies (c.f. Steffensmeier, 1978, 1979, 1980; Simon, 1976) have revealed increases in property crime without corresponding increases in violent crime. This is consistent with "structural" arguments. It is

inconsistent with "cultural" arguments which would contend that changes in sex role expectations would lead to increases in violent as well as property crimes.

Many of the studies of the structural tradition utilize aggregate data to indicate trends in females' opportunities and criminality. Most note the problems with using aggregate data to support explanations of individual behavior (Steffensmeier, 1978; Fox and Hartnagel, 1979). For example, Hill and Harris (1981:670) state:

. . . can one safely assume that the individuals committing this or that crime have actually been affected by changes in opportunities--even if, in the aggregate, rates of this or that crime are correlated with rates of employment? . . . or "can one safely assume that the individuals committing this or that crime have been affected by change in sex role attitudes--even if, in the aggregate, rates of this or that crime are correlated with innovations in beliefs about sex role identity and behavior?

Or as Fox and Hartnagel state (1979:102):

To conclude that the female theft rate tends to increase when the postsecondary degree rate increases is not to assert that university graduates are committing these thefts.

Caution should be used in interpretation of studies which use aggregate data. It cannot be assumed that the women who are entering positions in the social structure which resemble men's, are the ones contributing to the rising crime rates for women.

#### Research Studies of the Two Explanations of Gender

##### Differences in Crime

Hill and Harris (1981) categorize the two possible explanations of changing criminality among women as the "objectivist" explanation and the "subjectivist" explanation. In the objectivist explanation, stress

is given to the availability of opportunity to commit crime. The subjectivist explanation gives primacy to attitudes and motivations. Relying on official arrest data from the Uniform Crime Reports, they conclude that there are problems in assuming that the objectivist explanation can account fully for the changes in females' criminality. Following the opportunity argument, they maintain the greatest increases in women's criminality must occur for those dependent on a certain type of opportunity. This would mean that those females over 18, who are potentially affected by increased opportunities, would reveal the greatest increases in crime. Their analysis by age indicates, however, that there are greater changes in criminal activity for those under 18 than for those over 18 years of age. They maintain that the greater changes for the younger group indicate support for the subjectivist argument. Changing expectations in gender roles would occur more readily for those currently being socialized than for adults who would have to be resocialized into a nontraditional gender role. Their support for the subjectivist argument is simply residual support through evidence that there is greater movement toward rate parity by males and females under 18 years of age.

Smith and Visser (1980) also found the gap in criminality closing more for youth, which they maintain indicates "shifting sex role ideologies may be more salient for younger females" (p. 698). These findings seem to reveal support for the subjective or cultural explanations of the gap between female and male criminality and the changing rates of female criminality. A certain amount of evidence also exists, however, for the objective or structural explanations.

Shover, et al. (1979) compares the two theories concerning the

relationship between sex roles and delinquency; the "masculinity theory" and the "opportunities and controls theory." The masculinity theory suggests a direct link between traditional gender roles and criminality. The opportunity and controls theory suggests that gender roles and criminality are related indirectly through intervening variables. Sex roles are related to delinquency only insofar as they are related to 1) the opportunity to engage in criminal acts, 2) the attachment to conventional others, and 3) the belief in legitimacy of rules and laws.

Using a sample of adolescents, they discovered more support for the opportunity and social control theory than the masculinity theory. This indicates that masculinity is related indirectly to delinquency through the opportunity and social control variables. The masculine gender role allows greater opportunities for and fewer controls on deviant acts. The feminine gender role inhibits opportunities and restricts behavior through stronger conventional attachment to conformity. They further discovered that the traditional feminine role was a better predictor of involvement in delinquency than the masculine role. The effect is indirect, however, through the feminine role's relationship to opportunity and social control.

These studies indicate the importance of analyzing the dimensions of gender roles that lead to differences in criminality between females and males. The emphasis in this research diverts attention from the biological categories of female and male, and focuses on the social locations and expectations associated with gender roles in our society. There are, however, several major problems with the studies which analyze the two explanations of female/male crime differences. First, studies frequently



have tested their hypotheses through the use of aggregate data. The evidence that increases in females' labor force participation occur with increases in female crime, does not show causation. One cannot assume that those women who enter the labor force are the ones committing the crime. Aggregate data can result in misleading conclusions about individual behavior.

Second, studies of adolescents may not test accurately either the cultural or structural arguments. Adolescents do not present the best sample to examine changes in structural positions of women. Many have not yet entered an adult position in the social structure and are still preparing for future roles. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that young adolescent females have changed their attitudes toward gender roles more quickly than adult women.

Third, studies which analyze the dimensions of gender roles and their link to crime frequently constrain their analysis to a limited theory of crime. For example, studies of the structural explanations of crime may limit the analysis to an "opportunities" theory of crime. They assume that the structural location of males leads to greater opportunity for criminal activity. This may be true; however, several other explanations exist for the relations of structural positions to crime. Perhaps structural locations lead to different motivations for crime. Or perhaps males' structural location affects their relation to social control agents. The search for the dimensions of gender roles that help us explain the female/male crime gap should not be limited to particular sociological theories of crime. It should first be established which elements of the gender roles create the crime gap before the analysis of "why"

these elements produce crime differences.

The best way in which to address these questions is by analyzing individuals directly rather than through aggregate. Are the women who are committing crimes the same women who have increased their employment opportunities or who have changed their sex role expectations? This research will eliminate some of the previous problems associated with the explanations of the sex-deviance relationship. It will use an adult sample to determine if females who are more likely to report criminal activities are those who are employed or those who hold nontraditional attitudes towards gender roles. The first stage is a response to the question: "who are the females who are more likely to commit crime?" The second stage is to analyze, "why are these females committing more crime?"

## CHAPTER THREE

### DETERRENCE, GENDER AND CRIME

Before any assumptions are made concerning causes of changes in female criminality, the explanations of the current gap between females and males must be specified. To conclude that changing opportunities lead to convergence in female-male criminality assumes that the gap has been produced by differences in opportunities. Similarly, motivational changes for crime among women will not produce convergence in crime rates if differences in motivation did not produce the gap between females and males. For this reason, this research is concerned not only with differences in subcategories of women in rates of criminality, but also with why "feminine" positions and role expectations produce greater conformity.

This chapter examines the social control mechanisms which influence conformity and deviance. Having predicted that traditional females would be more conforming than either males or nontraditional females, it might be expected that traditional females have different relations to mechanisms of social control. Traditional females may perceive greater punishments associated with illegal behavior than nontraditional females or males, and, thus, are less likely to commit crime.

Social control theory is a theoretical perspective which considers social control mechanisms that channel persons into conformity. A large body of research, "deterrence research," has developed from this perspective which concerns the inhibitors of deviance. This perspective has been quite successful in accounting for variance in criminality, beyond the explanations of motivation and opportunity (Grasmick and Green, 1980). To a much lesser extent, this tradition of thought has been explored in the sex-deviance relationship (c.f. Richards and Tittle, 1981; Tittle, 1980; Glaser, 1982). There is evidence, however, that females and males may be affected differently by social control mechanisms (Tittle and Rowe, 1973; Sigelman and Sigelman, 1976; Richards and Tittle, 1981; Silberman, 1976). Although these ideas have been considered only briefly in the exploration of females' criminality, deterrence literature provides a concise theoretical body through which to elaborate the gender-deviance relationship.

#### Deterrence Literature

Since the 1960's there has been a revitalized interest in the deterrent effect of negative sanctions on conformity. Prior to this interest, assumptions made in theoretical debates de-emphasized the impact of sanctions as inhibitors of crime, and routed interest to the motivations of criminal behavior. Tittle (1969) using official crime statistics, revealed that a high certainty of imprisonment was associated with lower crime rates. Similarly, Gibbs (1968) discovered an inverse relationship between severity and certainty of punishment and the incident of criminal behavior. In response to a domination of motivational

theories in the literature on criminal activity, deterrence theorists focused on the inhibitors of criminal activity. Clear indications of inverse relationships between probability of apprehension and criminal behavior suggested that deterrent effects were significant enough to merit attention from students of conformity and deviance. The deterrence question is now one of the most popular issues in the study of deviance and social control (Tittle, 1980).

Although empirical evidence has provided support for the deterrent effect of sanctions, it has been acknowledged that these effects apply in a more complex way than simple popular thought espouses. Negative sanctions may be more or less effective in deterring deviance depending on the conditions under which they are employed. For example, the deterrent effect of formal punishments has been found to vary by the characteristics of the offenders, the circumstances surrounding the decision to commit an act, or the characteristics of the punishments themselves (Tittle, 1980). Much of the current research has been concerned with precise specification of the conditions of deterrence, the certainty and severity of sanctions, and the perceptions of sanctions by individuals.

A major contribution to the understanding of deterrent effects extends from the recognition that the perceptions of punishments are better predictors of behavior than actual amounts of punishments. Deterrence theory is rooted in utilitarianism with sanctions as potential costs compared to potential rewards (Grasmick and Bryjack, 1980). This school of thought has recognized that individuals calculate their rewards and costs according to their own perceptions and life circumstance. Therefore, for sanctions to be potential inhibitors, they must be viewed as certain and costly consequences of deviant behavior. Jensen (1969) has

pointed out that perceived probability of apprehension can vary from individual to individual and, thus, added the conception of beliefs and perceptions of sanctions as the significant factors in the deterrence of crime. Likewise, Tittle argues:

It is now generally conceded that individual perceptions of sanction characteristics are probably more important than the actual characteristics . . . . People act on what they perceive to be true regardless of the accuracy of their perceptions. (Tittle, 1980)

Consequently, most recent deterrence literature uses the perceived probability of penalty as the major independent variable. It is generally contended that the relationship between individuals' perceptions of sanctions and their participation in criminal behavior is a more valid test of deterrence than aggregate measures of objective chances of apprehension (Grasmick and Bryjack, 1980).

Just as degrees of certainty of punishment may be perceived by individuals differently, so can the perceived costs of applied sanctions. It is recognized that objective punishments may be viewed as more severe by some than others. "Therefore, even if objective knowledge about sanctions were uniform throughout society, people from different groups would still have different perceptions of the personal costs to them that would be entailed by different sanctions" (Tittle and Logan, 1973:387). Consequently, much research centers around the relationship of the perceived certainty and perceived severity of sanctions on deviant behavior. The recognition of the importance of perceptions of sanctions in deterrence indicates needed research pertaining to the explanations of variations in perceptions. This research seeks to answer the question, "What categories of persons are likely to view punishment as the outcome of criminal

behavior?"

A second recent contribution to the deterrence literature concerns the types and sources of sanctions that may be imposed. Although many scholars of deterrence have emphasized formal sanctions imposed by the law and agents of social control, there are negative sanctions imposed by other sources, such as family, peers, or oneself. Beyond the formal agents of the state, there are many informal mechanisms which also elicit conformity. Therefore, deterrence theorists have differentiated between the formal and informal sources of social control. Informal sanctions threatened or imposed by family, relatives or friends have been shown to have a deterrent effect on norm-violators. For example, Anderson et al. (1977) reveal the perceptions of informal sanctions are strongly related to use of marijuana among students. They discovered that the informal sanctions provide a deterrent effect independently of formal sanctions, and, in fact, have a slightly greater effect on deviance than do formal sanctions. Tittle (1980) has also suggested that informal punishments may be more effective than punishments imposed by the law or formal agents.

As with formal sanctions the perceived threat of punishments from informal sources may vary from individual to individual. "Depending on factors such as sociocultural backgrounds, personality, and intelligence, people in varying degrees understand that informal punishments (ridicule, gossip, criticism) are hints of possibly more unpleasant action" (Blake and Davis, 1964). It is as necessary, therefore, to search for explanations of variations in perceptions of threats of informal sanctions, as it is for formal sanctions.

It is also possible that the perceived sanctions associated with probable deviant acts may be imposed by oneself. The internalization of social norms creates the potential for violations of these rules to result in self-punishment in the form of guilt feelings. Thus, persons who ponder rule-violation may perceive a controlling mechanism in their own personal reactions to the act regardless of whether anyone else discovers the act.

Actually, the concept of internalization does not necessarily imply that the individual always, or typically, experiences no conscious desire for, or temptation to engage in, contra-normative activities. . . . we simply assume that in the face of temptation, one source of resistance to acting out deviant motivation in deviant behavior lies in the person's commitment to norms proscribing the behavior, and in his ability to symbolize significantly to himself the moral reasons for not succumbing. . . . Consequently, there is wide latitude for the investigation of sources of variation in the effectiveness of internalization as a control mechanism. (Blake and Davis, 1964:478)

This suggests that moral commitment to rules produces an internal sense of guilt associated with violations of those rules. The deterrence literature presents evidence that moral commitment, and the resulting guilt, provide a deterrent effect independent of other types of sanctions. For example, Silberman (1976) reveals a significant negative relationship between perceptions of how wrong it is to commit an offense and self-reports of illegal behavior.

Thus, three types of negative sanctions may be imposed in response to deviant acts: 1) formal punishments (enacted by law or courts), 2) informal sanctions (imposed through social stigma from peers, relatives, or acquaintances) or 3) guilt (self-imposed sanctions through moral commitment.) According to Grasmick and Green (1980:334), "three



independent variables - moral commitment, perceived legal punishment, and threat of social disapproval - appear to constitute a concise and probably exhaustive set of factors which inhibit illegal behavior." The effects of these variables are additive and each makes a significant, independent contribution to variance in deviance. They have been shown to account collectively for 40% of the variance in involvement in illegal behavior (Grasmick and Green, 1980). The three types add an important dimension to a comprehensive etiology of crime (Grasmick and Green, 1980). Moreover, they represent the three possible mechanisms suggested by Dennis Wrong's classic essay on social control, "The Oversocialization of Men in Modern Sociology" (1961).

The greater conformity of women, or at least some categories of women, suggests that these three inhibitors of deviance may be perceived by them differently or may affect them differently than males.

#### Deterrence and the Gender-Crime Relationship

Following the logic of deterrence theory, those groups who experience the greatest risk of sanctions should commit the least crime. It has been noted that women are given more lenient treatment by formal agents of social control than are men (Nagel and Weitzman, 1971; Simon, 1975). Since women's objective sanction risks are low<sup>1</sup>, their crime rates should be high. Women, however, appear to be more deterred, i.e. their rates of criminality are lower despite their shorter sentences and more lenient treatment. This appears to be a contradiction in the applica-

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<sup>1</sup>Females' formal sanctions, such as criminal sentencing, are low. The other types of sanctions, informal and self-imposed, have not been studied thoroughly.

tion of deterrence theory; however, two possible suggestions explain this paradox. First, this may be explained partially by the variation in perceptions of sanctions. As noted above, it is not objective sanction levels that deter but rather the subjective perceptions of those punishments. This would imply that women perceive sanction risks as greater regardless of the fact that they are less likely to receive formal punishment.

A second possible explanation is that women and men perceive equal levels of punishment risks, yet women are more deterred at any fixed level. This would imply that the threat of punishment has a greater impact on women than on men. Perhaps women view a particular level of punishment as more costly for their lives than do men.

Both these explanations suggest that the processes involved in deterrence vary for females and males. Very little research has dealt directly with this issue, yet there is evidence that this may be an important explanation in the gender-crime relationship. Several empirical studies indicate that processes involved in deterrence may vary for females and males. This implies that females may be more or less deterred by sanctions than are males. For example, Sigelman and Sigelman (1976) found in a field experiment that women were significantly more influenced against illegally turning right on a red light by the presence of a uniformed figure than were males. Tittle and Rowe (1973) found that females were more influenced by sanction threats than were males in classroom cheating. Other studies have suggested that the deterrent impact of sanctions is greater for males (c.f. Anderson, et al., 1977; Silberman, 1976). Still other studies have indicated that the processes of deter-

rence affect males and females similarly. Smith (1979), for example, indicates that the relationship between sanction fear and deviance is not sex-specific. In other words, females are affected by punishment risks to the same degree that males are.

These contradictory findings may be explained, in part, by the lack of any of these studies in taking into account subcategories of females. Perhaps nontraditional females are similar to males in their reaction to sanctions, while traditional females are more likely to be deterred. This research will address these possibilities.

The second explanation of the paradox of females' more lenient treatment and less deviance, is that females perceive greater risks associated with rule violation. Tittle (1980) suspects that with equal perceptions of sanction threats, males and females are equally deterred. However, females may perceive sanction threats to be greater, therefore, their actual curtailment of deviance also will be greater.

Because sanction threats or objective characteristics of sanctioning cannot induce fear directly unless there is individual perception, perceptions can vary independently of objective sanctions. One might expect, therefore, that females perceive sanctions as greater than do males and consequently commit less crime. Tittle (1980) finds evidence that the perceptions of females concerning the extent of sanctions is higher than the perceptions of males. For example, he found that females have greater perceived severities and certainties of formal sanctions than do males. Females also were more likely to believe they would be arrested and would lose respect among personal acquaintances if they committed a deviant act. Tittle further suggests that it is imperative that

future studies pursue information concerning the variance in perceptions of sanctions.

Although Tittle found differences in perceptions of sanctions between males and females, other studies have not. Silberman (1976) found no significant differences in females and males in certainty of punishment indexes or morality indexes. Once again, it appears that the evidence of differences in females and males in the deterrence process are contradictory. The contradictory findings may be explained by the failure of these studies to systematically analyze subcategories of females.

One study has attempted to focus on the dimensions of women's roles that may lead to differences in their deterrence of crime. Richards and Tittle (1981) examined gender differences in perceived chances of arrest. They contend that there are five lines of reasoning that suggest that women will perceive higher risk estimates than will males. 1) Greater stakes in conformity - Women have more to lose if sanctioned because the female role requires more conventional behavior. 2) Differential cognitive dissonance between gender role expectations and objective risks - The male role requires expectations of aggression, courage, and independence, and thus males experience pressure to act in these ways. Men may minimize the risks involved in criminal behavior because they are expected to behave in a manner consistent with masculine aggression, courage, and independence. 3) Differential perceived visibility - Women are more closely supervised and feel especially visible, so they are more sensitive to evaluations. 4) Differential conventionality - As primary socializing agents of children, women are expected to be more convention-

al. Thus, women perceive greater risk estimates in deviation. 5) Differential knowledge of crime and sanctions -Women's sheltered activity makes them less aware of criminal activity and resulting punishments.

Richards and Tittle's data indicate that women do give higher arrest estimates than do males. Although their zero-order relationships are small, women tended to overestimate their chances of getting caught and punished relative to males. In further examining the explanations of these differences, they discovered that gender differences in perceived risks can be explained to a large extent by differential stakes in conformity and differences in the extent to which people think themselves visible to public scrutiny. They suggest that the women's greater relative stakes in conformity may make deviance more threatening to them and lead to high sanction risk estimates. If risk perceptions are the deterrents of deviance, then women's low rates of rule-breaking can be understood in terms of high rates of perceived sanctions. They indicate that the perceptions of sanctions of women can be understood in structural terms. Their location in the social structure affects their stakes in conformity and visibility to public scrutiny; therefore, it affects their perceptions of sanctions. These points will be addressed further in the next chapter.

If, as Richards and Tittle suggest, differences in perceived risks are associated with women's positions in the social structure, one would not expect all women to have the same perceptions. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, "traditional" females and "nontraditional" females do not occupy the same positions in the social structure, nor do they have similar gender role expectations. It was proposed that those

females who are "emancipated" in terms of employment or subjective attitudes will resemble males more than traditional females in terms of criminal behavior. It follows that traditional and nontraditional females might also differ in perceptions of sanctions. This may explain why there have been contradictory findings in the deterrence literature concerning the effects of sanctions on males and females.

Following the cultural definitions of feminine gender roles, one would expect that differences in attitudes toward gender expectations would produce different risk estimates. Females have been traditionally identified with conventional traits, moral restraints, and more conservative life patterns (Broverman, et al., 1972). Social definitions of the feminine role dictate compliancy, obedience, dependency, and morality. Internalization of these definitions of femininity could cause one to assess risks associated with deviance as very high. Therefore, only those women who hold more traditional attitudes toward the feminine role would perceive sanctions as greater than would males.

Following the structural definitions of traditionalism, one would suspect some dimension of the traditional social position of women to influence risk estimates. For example, employment status and authority may affect the costs and rewards associated with sanctions. Greater attachment of females than males to families or children may produce greater stakes in conformity which lead to greater estimates of sanctions associated with rule-breaking.

Chapter Four presents hypotheses which integrate the structural and cultural explanations of the gender-crime relationship with the deterrence theory of deviance. The hypotheses address the differences between

traditional women, nontraditional women, and men in their perceptions of all three types of sanctions (formal, informal, and self-imposed), and the deterrent effects of each on criminal behavior.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### HYPOTHESES

The proposed research addresses two major issues concerning the gender-deviance relationship, both of which are relevant in explaining greater conformity among females. The first issue concerns the subcategories of females who are more likely to conform. Specifying the more conforming subcategories of females helps reveal the dimensions of the feminine role that create the gender-deviance relationship. The second issue concerns the mediating inhibitory variables which produce greater conformity among certain categories of females. This issue concerns the influences of social control mechanisms on subcategories of females.

This chapter presents the major hypotheses of this research. Part I presents each of the hypotheses and the rationales for the predicted relationships. Part II provides the statistical equations and predictions for each of the suggested relationships between gender, social control variables and criminal behavior.

#### Part I: Hypotheses and Rationales

##### Bivariate Relationships Between Gender Categories and Criminal Behavior

The first set of hypotheses concerns the types of females that



are less likely to engage in criminal activity. It is suspected that the lower crime rates of females relative to males reflect a depression of female criminality by certain subcategories of females. Therefore, analyses that compare all females to all males mask the variance among females that potentially could clarify the gender-deviance relationship. Those types of analyses relegate the sex-deviance relationship to issues of differences in biological sex rather than differences in gender role positions and expectations.

Tittle (1980) notes that differences in self-reported deviance are not constant among all categories of females and males. For example, he reports a smaller difference between the sexes where the female is equal to or greater in independence (measured by combining occupation, labor force status, and household status) than males. It is also reported that the mean figure for self-reported deviance is three times greater for part-time workers or students than it is for unemployed or retired females. He states (1980:86):

These variations demonstrate, among other things, that deviance is not simply a reflection of biological inheritance or genetic makeup. If that were so, all categories of men would show greater deviant tendencies than all categories of females, all categories of males would display relatively constant tendencies, and the mean percentage of all categories of females would be similar. Clearly that is not the case. Therefore, at least some of the variation between the sexes and between categories must be attributable to social variables such as role definitions and socialization patterns, or perhaps sanction fear.

One theoretically meaningful division of subcategories of females would include those women who occupy traditional feminine positions in society vs. those who do not. Following the "objective" or "structural" argument concerning females deviance, we would suspect that

if feminine structural positions in some way produce conformity, then only those females who occupy those positions would show greater conformity than males. In accord with Tittle's findings, one would expect females who are employed outside the home to be similar to males in level of criminal activity. Females who are not employed, on the other hand, should engage in less illegal behavior than both males and employed females.

Another theoretically meaningful division of subcategories of females would include those women who hold traditional attitudes on women's roles versus those women who hold nontraditional attitudes on women's roles. This division would indicate a "subjective" or "cultural" explanation of the sex-deviance relationship. To the extent that subjective factors explain the difference in male and female crime rates, those females who have nontraditional attitudes toward women's roles should have rates of criminality similar to men. Women with traditional attitudes, on the other hand, should have a lower rate of criminality than either males or nontraditional females.

Regardless of which definition of "traditionalism" is used, the expectation is that traditional women differ from males in rates of illegal behavior, while nontraditional women do not differ from males. It can be determined if traditional women are depressing the general rates of female criminality by subdividing females into two categories and comparing them to men. Hypotheses 1a and 1b describe the predicted relationships.

HYPOTHESIS 1a. Traditional females commit significantly fewer crimes than do males.

HYPOTHESIS 1b. Nontraditional females do not commit significantly fewer crimes than do males.

These hypotheses can be tested with both the structural and the cultural distinction between traditional and nontraditional females. A comparison of the two tests could indicate which of the two kinds of distinctions is most useful in understanding the gender-crime relationship.

The literature on criminality reveals a strong negative relationship between age and criminality (Rowe and Tittle, 1977). So it will be important to control for age in testing these hypotheses. The researcher expects to find that nontraditional females are younger than traditional females. Thus, any differences among males, traditional females, and nontraditional females might simply be a product of age differences.

When age is included in the analysis, it is likely that the differences in level of criminality between traditional females and males as a whole will decrease. This would indicate that part of the dissimilarity of traditional females and males in their criminality is due to a high proportion of older women in the traditional category. Since older women are more conforming, a large number of them in the traditional category would produce more conformity than that simply explained by traditionalism.

When age is included in the analysis, it is likely that the differences between nontraditional females and males will increase. A large proportion of younger women in the nontraditional category may be producing some of the similarity between nontraditional women and men as a whole. Because younger persons generally are less conforming, non-

traditional females would resemble males' levels of criminality because they are younger. When controlling for age, some of the similarity between nontraditional females and males should decrease.

After controlling for age, the similarity between nontraditional females and males would be due to the nontraditionalism and not age. The dissimilarity between traditional females and males would be due to traditionalism and not age. It is expected that the relationships between the gender categories and criminality will not disappear taking age into account, but they should be reduced. All the hypotheses presented throughout this chapter will, in a later chapter, be tested with a control for age.

#### Differences in Perceived Punishment Among Traditional Women, Nontraditional Women and Men

The second general issue addressed in this research concerns the intervening inhibitory variables that mediate the differences between gender and self-reported deviance. It is suspected that differences among traditional women, nontraditional women and men in perceived threats of formal sanctions, social stigma and guilt feelings can partially explain the sex-deviance relationship. Therefore, any similarity between nontraditional women and men in their levels of crime could be explained by their similarity in the perceptions of sanctions and guilt.

Formal Sanctions. The next set of hypotheses proposes differences in perceived formal punishments between the gender categories and the influence these differences might have on deviant behavior. Following the review of the literature in earlier chapters, it is suspected

that traditional females will experience formal sanctions differently than nontraditional females or males, and that these perceptions have a strong deterrent effect on rule-breaking behavior.

It has been noted that women receive preferential treatment from the criminal justice system. In other words, they are less likely to be convicted, sentenced, or harshly penalized by the formal processes, relative to men (Simon, 1975). Following the logic of deterrence theory, these relative lenient punishments should lead to higher crime rates among women; however, they do not. This paradox can be partially explained by the contention that although women receive less formal punishment, they may perceive their chances of being caught and punished as greater than men. The suggestion is that the perceived sanctions are the deterrents, and not the actual probability of punishment.

Tittle (1981) has noted that perceptions of formal punishments may vary from individual to individual, group to group. He reported that homemakers and retired, unemployed persons perceive probabilities of arrest much higher than do workers or students. The percentage of homemakers and unemployed persons who believe chance of arrest are high exceeds the percentage of students and employed who believe the chance is high (Tittle, 1980:309).

These findings suggest that certain categories of individuals perceive the certainty of punishment to be higher than other categories. This research is concerned with the gender categories and their differences in crime; therefore, the task here is to examine differences in perceived formal sanctions between traditional females, nontraditional females, and males. The first set of hypotheses concerning formal sanc-

tions suggest a simple bivariate relationship between the gender categories and the perceived certainty of formal punishments.

HYPOTHESIS 2a. Traditional females perceive a significantly higher certainty of formal punishments than do males.

HYPOTHESIS 2b. Nontraditional females do not perceive a significantly higher certainty of formal punishments than do males.

These hypotheses imply that there are structural and cultural features of traditional women's roles which impel them to perceive greater formal sanction threats associated with law-breaking. Differences in cultural expectations and structural positions between traditional and nontraditional women produce different risk estimates. Nontraditional women would be more likely to resemble males than would traditional women because their structural positions are more similar and their gender role expectations do not represent the traditional feminine conceptions. This recognition requires an examination of aspects of the traditional female role which would lead to higher perceived arrest probabilities. There are three possible reasons why traditional women may perceive greater risk estimates: 1) pluralistic ignorance, 2) gender role conflicts, and 3) greater visibility.

Burkett and Jensen (1975) revealed that perceptions of apprehension are related to involvement with non-deviant others. The more access to nonconventional others, the less likely one is to believe she or he would get caught. Becker (1960) states that the process of overcoming fear of apprehension is principally brought about through involvement with others who violate laws and a corresponding withdrawal from

conventional others. This suggests that women who occupy traditional positions in the social structure, such as family roles, etc., would be less likely to overcome fears of apprehension and more likely to estimate chances of formal punishments as high.

Tittle (1980:67) claims that this may be an example of pluralistic ignorance.

It seems that much conformity stems from perceptual ignorance of the real consequences of deviant acts. While growing up most people are taught that certain things are wrong, that the rules are of momentous importance, and that there is a legitimate basis for social condemnation of those things that are prohibited. They therefore build a perceptual system incorporating assumptions that terrible consequences will follow from violation of the rules. They are never sure exactly what those consequences are or might be, but they are constrained by the uncertainty and the belief that something of magnitude will happen. Each person, then, is surrounded by a shell of illusion about the likely consequences of deviance, and these shells of illusion are generally shared collectively, so social order rests on pluralistic ignorance of what will happen in case of rule violation.

It follows that those who are not in a position to overcome the misinformation concerning punishments following rule violation would be the most likely candidates for high perceptions of formal sanctions. Traditional females, generally isolated from criminal activities, would be likely to estimate chances and consequences of being caught as very high. Women who occupy positions similar to males, however, would be more likely to approach males' levels of awareness of low certainty of being caught. Richards and Tittle (1981) discovered that women do have less information about both crimes and sanctions than do males; however, the reported correlations were small. The division of females into categories of traditional and nontraditional may reveal that traditional women are the least likely to have realistic information concerning pos-

sibility of punishment. It is suspected that this lack of information would lead to overestimates of formal sanctions by traditional women relative to nontraditional women or men.

A second rationale for greater risk estimates for traditional women concerns their subjective definitions of expectations of the feminine role. Following the subjective definitions of the gender roles, one might suspect that women who hold traditional sex role attitudes may differ from nontraditional females in terms of perceptions of formal sanctions. The traditional feminine gender role is characterized by attributes of conformity, conventionality, maternalness, and purity. These attributes would be damaged by the experience of criminal procedures of sentencing and formal penalties. The application of formal punishments would threaten the role from which she draws identity.

A woman who commits a crime not only does something wrong, but also engages in status threatening or role contradictory behavior (i.e. she has failed to be passive, dependent, and fearful). (Richards and Tittle, 1981:1184)

If the possibility of sanctioning is more threatening, then it is likely that overestimates would be made concerning the risks involved. "Since the female roles are not as likely to encourage traits frequently associated with lawbreaking, they should feel less cognitive dissonance and less psychic drive to reduce it by underperceiving sanction risks" (Richards and Tittle, 1981:1184). Traditional women, who approve of the gender role expectations and identify with them, would be more threatened than nontraditional women, and consequently would perceive greater risks of formal sanctions.

A third rationale for the greater estimates of penalties by



traditional women concerns their perceptions of greater visibility.

It can be argued that women have been more closely supervised than men throughout their lives and have come to expect that their behavior will be monitored by others. To the extent that this is true, one would expect them to feel especially visible, under observation, and accountable to others. As a result they should be more sensitive to possible negative evaluations of others, and may perceive higher sanction risks than men. (Richards and Tittle, 1981:1184).

Empirical evidence suggests that women are more likely to feel they are in the public eye (Richards and Tittle, 1981), and that closeness of auditing of activities is positively related to perceived threat of legal sanctions (Glaser, 1982). We suspect that those women who are still in dependent position are more likely to feel monitored than those women who nontraditionally have acquired an independent status. Furthermore those women who accept the traditional expectations of female behavior would be more likely to retain feelings of being supervised and therefore more sensitive to evaluations.

Additive Multivariate Model. The above rationales suggest that not only will traditional women perceive greater formal sanction risks, these perceptions will lead to greater conformity. The deterrence literature suggests that high levels of perceived formal sanctions lead to less criminal behavior. The next set of hypotheses reveal the predicted relationship between the gender categories, perceived formal sanctions and deviant behavior. They suggest that differences in perceived formal sanctions act as an intervening variable between gender categories and criminal behavior. In other words, the predicted relationship between traditional females and low levels of criminal behavior can be explained by the differences in perceived certainty of formal punishment.

HYPOTHESIS 2c. Traditional females commit fewer offenses than males because they perceive a higher certainty of formal punishments.

HYPOTHESIS 2d. Nontraditional females do not commit fewer offenses than males because they do not perceive a higher certainty of formal punishments.

Interaction model. The next set of hypotheses suggests that certainty of punishment has different effects on deviant behavior for traditional females than for males or nontraditional females. They differ from the two suggested above in that they predict that the relationship between certainty of formal punishment and criminal behavior is greater for traditional females than for males or nontraditional females. In other words, these hypotheses contend that there is a conditional effect of gender category on the relationship between certainty of formal punishment and criminal behavior. It is predicted that at equal levels of certainty of punishment, traditional females will be more deterred.

HYPOTHESIS 2e. The inverse relationship between perceived certainty of formal punishments and deviance is greater for traditional females than for males.

HYPOTHESIS 2f. The inverse relationship between perceived certainty of formal punishments and deviance is not greater for nontraditional females and males.

Even at similar levels of perceived certainty of punishment, some individuals are more likely to be deterred than others. As Richards and Tittle note (1981:1194) "Individuals seem to consider their own risk estimates peculiarly in terms of the particular attributes of their roles,

statuses and life styles." One way in which particular life circumstances affect the influence of negative sanctions is in the calculation of the costs of a particular sanction on one's life. Grasmick and Bryjack (1980) have noted that a fine or a prison sentence is not equally costly for everyone. For some individuals a \$50 fine may be no problem for their life; for others it would be a big problem. It is the subjective severity of punishments that has a negative effect on deviance (Grasmick and Bryjack, 1980). One might expect, therefore, that similar levels of formal sanctions might have varying deterrent effects depending on the costs of the sanction versus the reward of the behavior.

There are two theoretical reasons for expecting that traditional women would be more deterred by formal sanctions than would nontraditional women or men which provide two rationales for the interaction model presented above. The first concerns the relative personal costs of formal sentencing and punishment for one's life. The second concerns the role conflict involved for traditional females in being formally punished for nonconformity.

Individuals who possess sufficient status or power could ignore most sanction threats (Tittle, 1980:21). They can simply pay fines easily or acquire expensive lawyers to assist them in obtaining less harsh sentences. Others are not capable of ignoring these sanctions; thus, the sanctions are very costly to their lives. It is logical to expect that a woman who is unemployed may have few opportunities to acquire economic resources and powerful positions; thus, the costs of formal sanctions may be greater for her than for employed women or men. Her objective position in the social structure, therefore, has consequences for the effect

of sanction threat on her behavior.

A second rationale for a stronger relationship between formal sanctions and conformity deals with the role conflict involved for a woman who violates laws. For women who hold traditional attitudes concerning femininity, the costs of sentencing and incarceration could be conceived as much higher. Richards and Tittle (1981) discovered that women tend to consider breaking laws very serious for someone like themselves, to a greater degree than do men. They also are more likely to report that they would be upset if they were arrested. When a woman strongly identifies with the traditional female role of conventionality, passivity, and purity, a formal sentencing involves not only the penalty prescribed by law but also the costs of exposure in not following traditional expectations. She experiences the role conflict as well as the formal penalty, thus creating a double impact of the punishments involved in being caught. As the major caretaker of children, she has violated the role of a model for morality for children, and, also, in the case of imprisonment, found herself in a position where she can no longer fulfill the role from which she gains her identity. It would not be surprising to find that these women would be more deterred by the threat of formal sanctions than would males or nontraditional females who would not experience as great a role conflict.

Informal Sanctions. Informal sanctions or social stigma have been shown to be strongly associated with the deterrence of criminal activity. The punishments imposed on those who violate society's rules may come from peers, relatives, acquaintances in the community, or friends. The importance of informal sanctions, as typically measured by

"loss of respect," has been noted in the deterrence literature (Tittle, 1980). There appears to be a controlling mechanism in the perception that others would lose respect for someone who is revealed as a law violator. Social stigma, or peer-imposed punishment, can be thought of as the punishment involved when one experiences social disapproval from significant others. There has been some evidence that the threat of informal sanctions may be even more effective in inhibiting deviance than threats of formal sanctions imposed by law (Tittle, 1980; Anderson, et al., 1977).

While loss of respect is an important variable in deterring crime, the threat of it may not be perceived the same by all individuals. Women may be more attuned to the expectations of others for conformity. The next set of hypotheses concerns the perception and impact on deviance of informal sanctions for the three gender categories. As with the formal sanctions, it is expected that traditional women experience these sanctions differently than do nontraditional women or men.

HYPOTHESIS 3a. Traditional females perceive a significantly higher threat of informal punishments than do males.

HYPOTHESIS 3b. Nontraditional females do not perceive a significantly higher threat of informal punishments than do males.

These hypotheses suggest a simple bivariate relationship between threat of informal punishments and the gender categories. It is suspected that women who occupy the traditional female positions in the social structure or who hold traditional feminine role attitudes would be more likely to perceive great loss of respect associated with criminal activ-

ity than would males or nontraditional females.

Tittle (1980) has noted that individuals who are in positions that make them dependent on the esteem of others would be more sensitive to the likelihood of negative sanctions. It follows that women who are dependent on their relationship to their husband for support would be the ones who would perceive greater social disapproval associated with deviance. Tittle (1980) found empirical support for the contention that dependent status would be associated with high perceptions of loss of respect associated with deviance. This suggests that women who occupy traditional positions in the social structure would perceive loss of respect as greater.

Another rationale for expecting women who occupy traditional positions to perceive a higher threat of loss of respect concerns variance in the knowledge of the informal sanctions imposed for deviance. Those women who no longer occupy traditional feminine positions in the social systems may have a more realistic conception of the consequences of violations of norms. They have already deviated from the traditional expectations of women in this society, and, therefore, do not suffer the perceptual ignorance concerning loss of respect.

Interestingly enough, it is usually the case that nothing much at all happens when rules are broken. Moral crises are usually avoided by rationalization and the triviality of most deviance is revealed when rule violation produces no great catastrophes . . . . Hence, those who for one reason or another actually break the rules usually discover that most of their fears were ungrounded. (Tittle, 1980:67)

Following this rationale, rule-breaking can be thought of as cumulative. Women who have violated traditional roles and come into contact with others who do, may not have high estimates of informal sanc-

tions. Individuals who reject the traditional gender role stereotypes are labeled "nonconformist," and they have discovered that the sanctions may not be life-threatening. Women who remain in well accepted traditional roles are more likely to overestimate the loss of respect that they would incur for breaking the rules of society.

It is also suspected that women who hold traditional attitudes, regardless of their location in the social structure, will also perceive greater loss of respect associated with deviance than will men or women who hold nontraditional attitudes. A large body of literature suggests that there are differences in females and males concerning affiliative motivations (Hoffman, 1972). Several studies indicate that females are more sensitive to social cues (Bardwick, 1971), more concerned about other people's impressions (Deaux, 1976; Ickes and Barnes, 1977; Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974), and more likely to rank interpersonal relationships as very important to their lives (Strommen, 1977). These studies generally indicate that females tend to show a greater interest in affiliation and social needs than do males (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974; Oetzel, 1966).

These differences generally are traced to socialization practices. Early independence in females is hampered by parental treatment as a child to be protected. Sex differences have been found in early independence training which could facilitate exploratory behavior and allow opportunities for further independence. Those women who have internalized these traditional gender role expectations may experience greater affiliative needs and would more likely fear loss of respect from those who supply the affectional ties. The internalized dependent

status can lead to sensitive awareness of the respect gained from others, and, thus, the threat of the loss of respect seems large.

Additive Multivariate Model. The inverse relationship between perceived loss of respect and criminal behavior has been well documented in the deterrence literature. Consequently, if it is discovered that traditional women perceive a higher threat of these informal sanctions, they should also commit less crime. The following two hypotheses suggest that perceived loss of respect should be the intervening variable between gender categories and criminal behavior. In other words, the relationship between gender and illegal behavior can be partially explained by differences in perceptions of informal sanctions.

HYPOTHESIS 3c. Traditional females commit fewer offenses than males because they perceive a higher threat of informal sanctions.

HYPOTHESIS 3d. Nontraditional females do not commit fewer offenses than males because they do not perceive a higher threat of informal sanctions.

These hypotheses present an additive model where members of gender categories are equally deterred by informal sanctions, yet traditional women perceive a higher threat of informal sanctions as a consequence of deviant action than do males or nontraditional females.

Interaction Model. Another possible model representing the relationship between gender, informal sanctions, and illegal behavior suggests that traditional women, at fixed levels of perceived threat of informal sanctions, are more deterred by the threat. In other words, fear of loss of respect has a greater impact on their behavior than it does



on the behavior of nontraditional females or males. This interaction model contends that gender categories may perceive equal threats of loss of respect, yet that threat will have a greater deterrent effect on traditional women.

HYPOTHESIS 3e. The inverse relationship between threat of informal sanctions and deviance is greater for traditional females than for males.

HYPOTHESIS 3f. The inverse relationship between threat of informal sanctions and deviance is not greater for nontraditional females than for males.

As with formal sanctions, individuals tend to view informal sanctions in terms of their significance for their own roles, statuses, and life circumstances. The costs of loss of respect may be greater for persons who derive their main role or status from affiliation from others. This would be the case for a woman who occupies a traditional location in the social structure. Her status is derived from affiliation with a male. Tittle (1977) states:

. . . it is conceivable that loss of interpersonal status, which proved to be exceptionally important in the general case, might be less influential among specific subgroups while being of greater importance to others.

Those persons who occupy positions in the social structure that require affiliation with others may be more likely to fear loss of respect. They develop statuses that are dependent on favorable relations from others, and they occupy roles that would be jeopardized by nonconformity (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). Tittle (1980) points out the significance of attachments to others in influencing one's behavior. The

more attached, the more benefits potentially derived from others. The more one is involved with others and derives one's personal identity from that association, the more one becomes dependent upon the social rewards of conformity.

It follows that women who are dependent on their relationship to others for support would be more deterred by the threat of loss of respect. Since they have fewer resources, the esteem gained from social affiliation takes on a greater significance (Richards and Tittle, 1981). Unless a woman has developed a status of her own by entry into the labor force or other role, she is likely to depend on her status through affiliation with her family. Thus, because her status depends mostly on approval from others, the costs of social disapproval would be great.

Women who possess traditional attitudes may also be more deterred by a threat of loss of respect than would women with nontraditional attitudes. Those women who have internalized the traditional gender role expectations define themselves in terms of their relationships to others. There is evidence that women have greater reliance on external social evaluations than do males (Deaux, 1976). It is suspected that traditional women would be more likely to do so. The respect gained from others is an important part of their gender role repertoire which they have internalized and maintained. Those women who have not retained this self-definition through affiliation with others would not be as influenced by a threatened loss of respect. Loss of respect, therefore, would have a weaker deterrent effect.

Guilt Feelings. The internalization of societal norms provides a potential inhibitor for deviance in that a violation might produce

guilt feelings or self-imposed punishment. Lynn (1979:105) states that a sense of guilt involves feelings directed towards oneself for having transgressed one's standards, whether or not others are aware of transgressions. Moral commitment, therefore, typically is included in deterrence theory as an indicator of possible guilt feelings, as self-imposed punishment, associated with rule-breaking. It can be thought of as sanctions imposed by oneself against oneself.

There is evidence that females experience a higher threat of guilt feelings than males. Hoffman (1975) finds moral transgressions are more likely to be associated with guilt in females than in males. Porteus and Johnson (1965) found more guilt in females than in males. Following the previous arguments, one would not expect that all females experience guilt equally. It is expected that traditional females would experience greater guilt associated with rule-breaking than would nontraditional females.

HYPOTHESIS 4a. Traditional females perceive a significantly higher threat of guilt associated with deviance than do males.

HYPOTHESIS 4b. Nontraditional females do not perceive a significantly higher threat of guilt associated with deviance than do males.

When traditionalism is defined in the structural sense of females occupying positions of less independence and authority, one would expect that they would be less able to overcome the constraints of commitment to norms. Tittle and Villemez (1977) maintain that the "higher one's status, the greater the likelihood that he will be self-directing

and able to overcome the constraints of normative obedience" (p. 485). They also suggest that the "more highly placed an individual is in a system, the more likely he is to have developed a hardened conscience, to be motivated to commit unacceptable acts to maintain his position, and to view himself as above the moral and legal constraints that affect others" (Tittle and Villemez, 1977:485). Tittle (1980:52) also notes that higher status groups generally seem to find the various acts less rather than more unacceptable. There is a negative association between status position and moral disapproval.

In terms of cultural definitions of traditionalism, one would also expect that females who hold traditional attitudes toward females' gender roles would experience a higher threat of guilt than nontraditional females or males. Norland, et al. (1981) discovered that "masculine" persons hold more relativistic beliefs about the law. The traditional feminine sex role has been comprised of expectations of conventionality, subservience, and submissiveness. To defy the norms of conventional behavior also is to defy the characteristics on which a traditional woman's primary role rests. As definitions of roles are internalized, women "are led to attempt, within the limits of opportunity and the resources allowed by the dominant group, to live up to the norms and roles of the dominant society" (Chafetz, 1976:48).

Once again, the issue of "pluralistic ignorance" is relevant. It could be expected that nontraditional women who have broken away from conventional expectations of the feminine role, could also subscribe less legitimacy to other conventional norms of society. Tittle notes (1980:67):

Once an act has been committed and successfully rationalized it no longer appears as morally reprehensible as before and once an act is seen by experience to be less serious than thought one accords it much less importance in the future. Such people have broken through the shell of illusion. Moreover, once the shell of illusion has been broken for some rules one is likely to have less reverence for other rules. Rule breaking, then, is cumulative and diffuse in its effect on attitudes toward rules and rule breaking. Furthermore, the net effect is to render social constraints more effective for a potential initial act of deviance than for subsequent potential acts.

Thus, women who have rejected the traditional expectations of the feminine gender role may have less attachment to other conventional norms of society. Their moral commitment and associated guilt feelings, therefore, would be less than for women who hold traditional gender role attitudes.

Additive Multivariate Model. As with the other types of sanctions, self-imposed sanctions have been found to deter deviance. If traditional women are more likely to experience guilt feelings associated with criminal behavior, then they should commit less crime. The additive model suggests that threat of guilt feelings is the intervening variable in the relationship between gender categories and deviance. Because traditional women perceive higher threat of guilt associated with illegal behavior, they commit less crime.

HYPOTHESIS 4c. Traditional females commit fewer offenses than males because they perceive a greater threat of guilt associated with deviance than do males.

HYPOTHESIS 4d. Nontraditional females do not commit fewer offenses than males because they do not perceive a greater threat of guilt associated with deviance than do males.

Interaction Model. An interaction model of gender, guilt feelings, and criminal behavior suggests that any particular level of threat of guilt feelings will have a greater impact on behavior for traditional women than for nontraditional women or men. Even if nontraditional women and men perceived equal threats of guilt as do traditional women, they are less likely to be deterred by it.

HYPOTHESIS 4e. The inverse relationship between threat of guilt and deviance is greater for traditional females than for males.

HYPOTHESIS 4f. The inverse relationship between threat of guilt and deviance is not greater for nontraditional females and males.

Hoffman (1975) has discovered that guilt more often prompts actions in females than in males. This can be interpreted as meaning that women are more likely to conform in response to the threat of guilt associated with deviance. There are two rationales for expecting that this would be a greater tendency for traditional females than for nontraditional females.

Although many people who have internalized the norms commit deviant acts, some are more able to neutralize the guilt surrounding that violation. It has been suggested that subcultural supports provide a means to overcome the guilt associated with deviance. Those who have been associated with others who violate laws can gain support through articulation of beliefs and attitudes which discount the importance of the violations. They can buttress each others' neutralizations of guilt and provide a context for release from conventional norms. Traditional

women are somewhat isolated from the world in which these offenses occur; therefore, they should be less able to neutralize the guilt that follows from contemplation of illegal behavior. Thus, threat of guilt would have more of an impact on their behavior.

The second rationale involves the women who maintain traditional gender role attitudes and the role conflict that stems from guilt linked with illegal behavior. Women with traditional attitudes have maintained their identity in conventional statuses, while nontraditional women have not. It is likely that traditional women will be less able to overcome their guilt because their role identity is linked to conventionality. They would receive double punishment: the guilt from the criminal behavior and the guilt from role conflict. Because of the double punishment, the guilt would be more difficult to overcome and would seem to them to be very costly for their lives. Thus, threat of guilt would more likely affect their behavioral intentions.

Nontraditional women have experienced deviance by violating conventional standards of feminine expectations and have learned to neutralize this guilt, or they would not possess the nontraditional attitudes that they hold. Neutralization of guilt for violating norms would be easier for them than for traditional women, because nontraditional women have neutralized guilt for other norm violations. Consequently, the self-imposed punishment imposed after deviance would have less of a deterrent effect on their behavior.

## Part II: Statistical Equations and Predictions of Hypotheses

This section presents the statistical equations and predictions for each of the suggested relationships between gender, social control

variables, and criminal behavior, and discusses procedures described in detail by Kerlinger and Pedhazur (1973).

### Bivariate Relationships

The bivariate relationships expressed in the hypotheses above suggest a simple relationship between the gender categories and a dependent variable (either criminal behavior, threat of formal sanctions, threat of loss of respect, or threat of guilt). Each of the hypotheses posits that the dependent variable will differ for traditional women and men but not for nontraditional women and men. These hypotheses will be tested following regression procedures for dummy variables. This procedure requires that categories of the gender variable be dichotomized and assigned codes of zero and one. Requirements for orthogonal comparisons of dichotomized variables dictate that the three gender categories (males, nontraditional females, and traditional females) produce two independent variables as follows:

	<u>N</u>	<u>T</u>
Males	0	0
Traditional females	0	1
Nontraditional females	1	0

The regression equation for predicting the dependent variable (V) as a function of dummy independent variables is:

$$Y = a + b_1N + b_2T$$

Where:

Y = The dependent variable of either a) self-reported criminal behavior, b) perceived threat of formal punishments, c) perceived threat of informal punishments, or d) perceived threat of guilt.



N = Dichotomized dummy variable where 1 equals nontraditional female  
0 equals all others

T = Dichotomized dummy variable where 1 equals nontraditional female  
0 equals all others

Following the procedures of dummy regression analysis, any terms in the equation with zero as the value of the dichotomy will drop out of the equation. Therefore:

For males, the regression equation becomes:

$Y = a$  ("a" represents the mean of the dependent variable for males)

For nontraditional females, the regression equations becomes:

$$Y = a + b_1N = a + b_1(1) = a + b_1$$

The value of  $b_1$  is the difference between males and nontraditional females in their average scores on the dependent variable. Hypotheses above predict that  $b_1$  will not be significant, indicating similar levels of criminality and perceptions of sanctions between nontraditional females and males.

For traditional females, the regression equation becomes:

$$Y = a + b_2T = a + b_2(1) = a + b_2$$

The value of  $b_2$  is the difference between males and traditional females in their average scores on the dependent variable. Following the hypotheses,  $b_2$  should be significant. If  $b_2$  is negative, then traditional females score lower on the average than males on the dependent variable. Thus, with criminality (C) as the dependent variable,  $b_2$  should be negative, indicating that traditional females tend to engage in less deviance than males. If  $b_2$  is positive, on the other hand, then traditional females score higher on the dependent variable than males. Since it is

predicted that traditional females, compared to males, perceive higher threats of punishment (P),  $b_2$  should be positive with each of the punishment threats as the dependent variable.

As mentioned above, it is suspected that part of the relationship between the gender categories and criminality may be explained by the age structures of traditional and nontraditional females. To test this assumption, the age variable will be considered in each equation. Thus, after age (A) is included, the equation is:

$$C = a + b_1N + b_2T + b_3A$$

Where:

C = the dependent variable

A = age

Therefore:

For males, the equation becomes:

$$C = a + b_3\bar{A}$$

For nontraditional females, the equation becomes:

$$C = (a + b_1) + b_3\bar{A}$$

It is suspected that the value of  $b_1$  will increase in a negative direction when controlling for age with deviance as the dependent variable. This would indicate that, when controlling for age, the average difference in amount of deviance between nontraditional females and males increases because nontraditional females, controlling for age, score lower on the scale than males. In other words, the similarity between nontraditional females is less when the effect of the high proportions of young people among nontraditional females is taken into account. Thus, some of the similarity of nontraditional females and males in deviance

is due to the nonconformity of young nontraditional females.

With one of the punishment threats as the dependent variable, it is likely to that  $b_1$  will increase in a positive direction when age is controlled. This would indicate that, controlling for age, nontraditional females perceive a higher punishment threat than males. In other words, some of the apparent similarity in perceived sanction threat between nontraditional females and males is due to age differences between these two gender categories.

For traditional females, the equation becomes:

$$C = (a + b_2) + b_3A.$$

It is suspected that the negative value of  $b_2$  will decrease when age is controlled, with deviance as the dependent variable. This would indicate that part of the difference between traditional females and males in deviance is due to the large numbers of older people among traditional females. When taking into account the age distribution, one should find that the differences between traditional females and males in amount of deviance decrease.

With punishment threat as the dependent variable,  $b_2$  should be a smaller positive number when age is included as a control. In other words, controlling for age will decrease the difference between males and traditional females in perceived threat of punishment.

The various bivariate hypotheses, in equation form, are summarized in Table 4.1. This table indicates the expectations for each equation, including the expectations when age is taken as control variable. In this table, "C" is criminal behavior, "N" is the first dummy variable (1 = nontraditional females), "T" is the second dummy variable (1 =

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TABLE 4.1  
SUMMARY OF BIVARIATE AND ADDITIVE HYPOTHESES

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DEVIANCE AS A FUNCTION OF GENDER CATEGORIES

No Control for Age

$$C = a + b_1N + b_2T \quad (\text{EQUATION 1})$$

$$\text{Hypothesis 1a : } b_2 < 0$$

$$\text{Hypothesis 1b : } b_1 = 0$$

These two hypotheses together predict that traditional females are significantly less involved in crime than males (1a), while nontraditional females do not differ significantly from males (1b).

Controlling for Age

$$C = a' + b_1'N + b_2'T + b_3A \quad (\text{EQUATION 2})$$

$$\text{Hypothesis 1a' : } 0 > b_2' > b_2$$

$$\text{Hypothesis 1b' : } 0 > b_1' < b_1$$

Hypothesis 1a' indicates that some of the difference in criminality between traditional females and males is due to age. When age is controlled, traditional females will not appear to differ as much from males. In other words,  $b_2'$  in EQUATION 2 will be a smaller negative number than  $b_2$  in EQUATION 1 (i.e.,  $b_2' > b_2$ ). On the other hand, 1b' indicates that when age is controlled nontraditional females will differ more from males. Some of the apparent similarity between males and nontraditional females, anticipated in 1b for EQUATION 1 is due to age. Thus,  $b_1'$  in EQUATION 2 will be a negative number (i.e.,  $b_1' < b_1$ ).

Even though controlling for age will make traditional females more similar to males and nontraditional females less similar

(continued on next page)

TABLE 4.1 (continued)

to males, it is still expected that traditional females will differ more than nontraditional females from males when age is controlled.

In other words,  $b_2'$  will be a larger negative number than  $b_1'$ .

#### PUNISHMENT THREAT AS A FUNCTION OF GENDER CATEGORY

##### No Control for Age

$$P = a + b_1N + b_2T \quad (\text{EQUATION 3})$$

Hypotheses 2-4a :  $b_2 > 0$

Hypotheses 2-4b :  $b_1 = 0$

These hypotheses predict that nontraditional females perceive a higher threat of punishment than males ( $b_2 > 0$ ), while nontraditional females do not differ from males in perceived threat of punishment ( $b_1 = 0$ ).

##### Controlling for Age

$$P = a' + b_1'N + b_2'T + b_3A \quad (\text{EQUATION 4})$$

Hypotheses 2-4a' :  $0 < b_2' < b_2$

Hypotheses 2-4b' :  $0 < b_1' > b_1$


When age is controlled, traditional females will become more like males in their perceived threat of punishment. In other words, the  $b_2$  from EQUATION 3 will be reduced when age is controlled (i.e.,  $b_2' < b_2$ ). Nontraditional females, when age is controlled, will become more different from males than they appear in EQUATION 3 (i.e.,  $b_1' > b_1$ ).

Even though controlling for age will make traditional females more similar to males and nontraditional females less similar to males, it is expected that traditional females will differ more than nontraditional females from males in perceived punishment threat. In other words,  $b_2'$  will be a larger positive number than  $b_1'$ .

traditional females), "A" is age, and "P" is any one of the punishment threats.

### Additive Multivariate Models

The additive multivariate models predict that differences in perceived sanctions between gender categories can explain the relationship between gender categories and levels of crime. For these hypotheses it also will be necessary to control for age. The entire additive model is shown in the following diagram:



The regression equation for criminal behavior as a function of all antecedent variables:

$$C = a + b_1N + b_2T + b_3Z + b_4P \quad (\text{EQUATION 5})$$

If differences in perceived sanction threats account for the relationship between gender and criminality predicted in Hypotheses 1a' and 1b', then the significant  $b_2'$  predicted in 1a' (see EQUATION 2) should become nonsignificant when punishment threat (P) is included in the equation (i.e.,  $b_2$  in Equation 5 should not differ significantly from 0). In other words, traditional females commit less crime than males because they perceive a higher threat of punishment (as predicted in Hypotheses 2-4a'). If, on the other hand, nontraditional females do not differ from males in perceived punishment threat (as predicted in Hypotheses 2-4b'), then inclusion of P in the equation should not alter the value of  $b_1'$

from EQUATION 2. Thus,  $b_1'$  from EQUATION 2 should equal  $b_1$  from EQUATION 5 and both should equal 0.

The additive model, therefore, can be summarized as the following predictions:

Hypotheses 2-4c:  $b_2$  in EQUATION 5 is 0, making it less than the absolute value of  $b_2'$  in EQUATION 2.

Hypotheses 2-4d:  $b_1$  in EQUATION 5 is 0, making it less than the absolute value of  $b_1'$  in EQUATION 2.

### Interaction Models

The last set of hypotheses suggests that the threat of punishment has different effects on deviant behavior for traditional females than from the ones above in that they predict that the inverse relationship between threat of punishment and criminal behavior is greater for traditional females than for males or nontraditional females. In other words, they contend that there is a conditional effect of gender category on the relationship between threat of punishment and criminal behavior. It is predicted that at equal levels of threat, traditional females will be deterred.

The appropriate regression equation with the necessary control for age, is:

$$C = a + b_1N + b_2T + b_3A + b_4P + b_5NP + b_6TP \quad (\text{EQUATION 6})$$

where NP and TP are product terms for interaction effects.

The equation for the various categories of gender are:

$$\text{Males: } C = a + b_3A + b_4P$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Nontraditional females: } C = a + b_1 + b_3A + b_4P + b_5P = \\ (a + b_1) + b_3A + (b_4 + b_5)P \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Traditional females: } C &= a + b_2 + b_3A + b_4P + b_6P = \\ & (a + b_2) + b_3A + (b_4 + b_6)P \end{aligned}$$

Following Hypotheses 2-4f, it is predicted that the effect of threat of punishment on deviance should be the same for males and nontraditional females; therefore,  $b_5$  in EQUATION 6 should be nonsignificant. However, it is predicted that the deterrent (inverse) effect of threat of punishment on deviance will be greater for traditional females and males (Hypotheses 2-4e). Therefore,  $b_6$  in EQUATION 6 should be significant and negative. The negative sign will indicate that punishment threat has a greater inverse effect on criminality for traditional females than for males.

#### Logit Analysis of Single Offenses

The previous section discussed the effects of gender, sanctions, and interactions on criminality in general. For that section of the analysis, a composite index of several offenses, discussed in the next chapter, will be used. An examination of the literature on changes in female criminality, however, indicates that now all types of crimes are increasing for females. For example, Steffensmeier (1978, 1980) has found that females' rates have changed more for property crimes than violent crimes.

It is possible, therefore, that traditionalism and nontraditionalism among females would have different impacts on various types of crime. In terms of employment status, one might find that employed women commit job-related crimes at similar rates as males, but commit significantly fewer status or violent crimes. In order to examine these issues more closely, it is necessary to determine the effects of the independent



variables on different types of criminal offenses separately rather than in composite form.

The dependent variable, committing/not committing an offense, will be treated as a categorical variable. Gender (male, nontraditional female, and traditional female) and perceived threat of sanctions (high or low) will both be treated as categorical independent variables. A dichotomized measure of age will be included as a control for reasons discussed earlier. Logit analysis (ECTA) (Goodman, 1971, 1972a, 1972b) will be used to estimate logit effect parameters which predict the log of the odds (log-odds) of committing an offense given a linear combination of the three independent variables. This procedure permits comparisons of the independent effects of independent variables and interactions between them. Thus, it can be used for both the additive and interaction models. The ECTA program relies on a maximum likelihood estimation technique to estimate logit effect parameters for logit models once the best fitting model has been selected.

A forward selection process is used to determine the model which best fits the data in contingency table form. The selection of a model for each offense is based on two factors: 1) adequacy and 2) parsimony. A model is adequate if it generates expected frequencies that approximate the observed frequencies for the data. The model which always fits the data (i.e., expected frequencies equal observed frequencies) is the "saturated model". Here the number of parameters are the same as the number of cells in the table. However, the goal also is to find a parsimonious model, i.e., containing only parameters that are statistically significant. The model which best fits the data will have a low probability of

generating expected frequencies that approximate the observed frequencies by chance and will contain no terms which are not statistically significant in predicting the log-odds of committing an offense.

The first phase of the logit analysis will be to determine if gender category, controlling for age, influences the log-odds of a person committing an offense. This is analogous to Hypotheses 1a' and 1b' in the regression analysis. This will be accomplished by determining if the addition of gender category, with age (dichotomized) already included as a predictor of committing the offense, improves the "goodness of fit" between the expected and observed frequencies. An inspection of the changes in the likelihood ratio chi square statistic ( $G^2$ ) when gender category is included as a predictor is the procedure used to make this decision. It is expected that the addition of gender category, with age already included, will result in a statistically significant reduction in  $G^2$  for at least some offenses. For the offenses for which this occurs logit effect parameters can be estimated to determine in what direction and by what magnitude each of the gender categories, controlling for age, affects the log-odds of the person committing the offense.

The second phase of the logit analysis addresses the additive model. The additive model implies that the goodness of fit will not improve (i.e.,  $G^2$  will not be significantly reduced) when gender category is added as a predictor of whether the person commits the offense after punishment threat (and age) already have been controlled. Thus, it is expected that a model containing both gender category and perception of sanctions (and age) will not be an improvement over a model containing only perception of sanctions (and age). If this occurs, along with the

findings anticipated in the previous paragraph, one can infer that the effect of gender category apparent in the first phase of the logit analysis is due to the relationship between gender category and perceived sanction threat.

The third phase of the logit analysis addresses the interaction model for individual offenses. Here the relevant comparison (in terms of  $G^2$ ) will be between (a) a model including age, perceived sanction threat, and gender category, and (b) a model including age, perceived sanction threat, gender category, and the interaction of perceived sanction threat and gender category. The interaction hypothesis leads to the prediction that model b will be a significant improvement over model a in terms of goodness of fit for at least some offenses. If this occurs, it will then be possible to estimate the logit effect parameters for the gender-sanction threat interaction to determine the direction and magnitude of the interaction.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### METHODOLOGY

Analyses of the previous hypotheses were conducted through the use of self-report survey data collected on three hundred and fifty-three adults in the Oklahoma City area. The data were collected in conjunction with a larger survey project administered in 1981 by graduate students and faculty members in the Department of Sociology, University of Oklahoma, and funded by the National Institute of Mental Health (Center for Work and Mental Health) as part of a graduate training program.

#### Sample

The sample consisted of two hundred and six females (58.4%) and one hundred and forty-seven males (41.6%), over the age of eighteen. The names of individuals were drawn from the Oklahoma City Polk Directory using a table of random numbers. This method assured a simple random independent sample. Letters were sent to each person selected, introducing the project and informing them that a representative would be calling for an interview appointment. When letters were returned or appointments refused, replacements were selected from the Polk Directory. When alternates were exhausted, interviewers replaced the refusal with a same-

sexed person in a three-block radius of the original address. This procedure was followed until 353 interviews were obtained.

Interviews, averaging one hour and a half and covering various topics, were conducted by students and paid interviewers in the homes of respondents. Anonymity was assured in order to obtain responses to sensitive questions concerning involvement in illegal behavior.

A comparison of the distribution of gender and age in the survey sample to preliminary data from the 1980 U.S. Census of the Population for Oklahoma City<sup>1</sup> indicates similar distributions. The percent of the sample that was female was 58.4%; for the population, the percent female is 53.2%. For the sample, the mean age was 43.8%; the population mean age of those over 18 is 42.7.

#### Measurement of Concepts

Two measures of illegal involvement were included in this questionnaire, self-reported past involvement and self-reported estimates of future involvement. Past involvement was measured by simply asking respondents whether or not they had committed each of several offenses in the past. Future involvement estimates were gathered by asking respondents if they would commit the act in the future. For this research, the hypotheses will be analyzed using the estimates for future behavior. Because the current status of females is an important concept in the hypotheses, it is necessary to avoid behavior that was committed in the past, when employment status or sex role attitudes may have been differ-

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<sup>1</sup>These figures are based on a preliminary report of the 1980 U.S. Census of the Population available from the Oklahoma State Data Center, Oklahoma Department of Economic and Community Affairs.

ent. For example, illegal behavior committed as a juvenile can be of little help in analyzing the impact of adult employment or adult sex role attitudes on criminal activity. A further reason for the selection of future estimates comes from the suggestion of Tittle (1977) that future estimates provide a clearer conceptualization of deterrence theory.

The offenses included in this analysis were: 1) Taking something from someone or someplace worth \$20 or more that did not belong to you, 2) Gambling illegally on a sporting event or other situation, 3) Failing to report certain income or claiming deductions that were not deserved on income tax returns, 4) Taking something from someone or someplace worth less than \$20 that did not belong to you, 5) Physically hurting another person on purpose, 6) Illegally using fireworks, 7) Littering a highway, street, or public recreation area, and 8) Driving an automobile while under the influence of alcohol. A complete list of the questionnaire items is presented in Appendix A, along with the univariate distributions.

Respondents recorded their answers to these questions on a separate answer sheet so they did not have to expose their estimates of future behavior to the interviewer. It was suspected that this protection of privacy would lead to more accurate responses.

For one type of test of the major hypotheses, a composite scale of future illegal behavior was constructed. This composite scale was created by summing responses to the eight offense items. The use of this index of criminal activity provides a broader index of criminal behavior than any one single offense. It also creates a variable which approxi-

mates the interval level of measurement and can be analyzed with standard regression techniques.

In order to determine the validity of creating a single composite measure of future illegal behavior from the eight items, factor analysis was employed. If the eight items are tapping a single underlying concept, factor analysis should reveal a one-factor solution with fairly high loadings on that single factor.

Factor analysis was based on the correlation matrix for the eight items which is presented in Appendix B. The number of factors necessary to reproduce this matrix is determined by the "discontinuity test" or "scree test" for the pattern of eigenvalues. The eigenvalues, reported in Appendix B, clearly indicate a one-factor model. In the one-factor solution, all offenses have loadings above .30, the generally accepted level for retaining an item (Nunnally, 1967:357-358). The loadings are also reported in Appendix B. The composite scale, formed by summing the z-score transformations of the items, has a reliability of .71 as measured by Crombach's Alpha. Alpha was not increased by eliminating any of the items. The scale has a mean of 0 (because z-scores were summed) and a variance of 21.43. Thus, this composite scale of future illegal behavior will be used as the dependent variable to test the major hypotheses. Then, a comparable analysis will be conducted for individual offenses.

#### Perceived formal sanctions.

As mentioned previously, it is the individual's assessment of formal sanctions that provides the most accurate test of deterrence.

Survey analysis allows us to determine the respondents' perceptions of the certainty of formal punishments, rather than the objective certainty that would be likely to occur. A measure of "perceived certainty of formal punishment" was obtained by asking respondents to estimate their chances of being arrested if they were to commit each of the eight offenses. The response options were "definitely would be arrested, probably would be arrested, probably would not be arrested, or definitely would not be arrested." This measurement of perceived certainty of formal sanctions is similar to that used in other studies of deterrence theory (c.f. Tittle, 1980; Grasmick and Green, 1980). Appendix A presents the questionnaire format for this variable and the descriptive distributions.

A composite scale of perceived formal sanctions was created by summing the responses to the eight items. The correlation matrix of items, eigenvalues, and factor loadings are presented in Appendix B. The analysis revealed the items were tapping a single underlying concept, and factor loadings were all above .30. Thus, all items were included in the composite, after summing the z-score transformations. The Crombach's Alpha reliability coefficient was .83, and remains the highest with all items in the composite. This scale has a mean of 0 and a variance of 29.40.

#### Perceived Informal Sanctions

As with formal sanctions, the important element of informal sanctions in predicting conformity is the individual perceptions of the certainty of social disapproval if a criminal act was discovered. Perceived informal sanctions or social stigma was operationalized by asking respon-



dents to estimate how many of the five adults that they know best would lose respect for them if they were to commit each of the eight offenses. This operationalization follows the measures frequently used in deterrence research (c.f. Tittle, 1980; Grasmick and Green, 1980). Appendix A presents the questionnaire items and the frequency distributions for perceived loss of respect.

As with the other variables, the loss of respect items were summed to create a composite measure of perceived loss of respect. Justification for the creation of a single index comes from factor analysis which revealed the items tapped a single underlying dimension. The scree test of eigenvalue patterns indicates a one-factor solution. The factor loadings for the items were well above .30. Thus, all items were included in the computation of the composite variable of loss of respect. The z-score transformations were summed, resulting in a composite variable with a reliability coefficient of .87. The mean is 0 and the variance is 33.24. Correlation of items, the eigenvalues, and the factor loadings are presented in Appendix B.

#### Perceived Certainty of Guilt

To determine individual's perceptions of the certainty of guilt they would experience if they were to commit the offenses, a measure of moral commitment was used. Moral commitment was measured by asking respondents to indicate how wrong it would be to commit each of the offenses, "always wrong to do it, usually wrong to do it, sometimes wrong to do it, seldom wrong to do it, or never wrong to do it." It was suspected that those persons who feel an act is wrong to commit, will be more like-

ly to experience guilt feelings if they were to do it. These items can be considered measures of guilt feelings that would be attached to each offense, under the assumption that those who believe it is always wrong would be more likely to suffer guilt feelings if they committed the offense. This measure is similar to the indicator used in previous studies (c.f. Silberman, 1976; Tittle, 1980). Appendix A presents the questionnaire items and univariate statistics for this concept.

The composite variable of "perceived certainty of guilt" was created by transforming the items to z-scores and summing. Factor analysis revealed justification for including each of the eight items in a single index. The eight items are tapping a single underlying dimension and the factor loadings for each item is well above .30. The correlation matrix, eigenvalues, and factor loadings are presented in Appendix B. The resulting composite variable has a Crombach's Alpha of .70 and remained the highest when all eight items were included in the composite. The mean is 0 and the variance is 19.76.

### Traditionalism

Traditionalism will be operationalized following both the "structural" and "cultural" definitions. The "cultural" definitions of traditionalism should tap the attitudes concerning gender role expectations. Four items were used to create a composite measure of traditional gender role attitudes . 1) Although the wife might voice her opinion, the husband should have the final say in matters that affect the family. 2) In a family, the wife's most important role is to obey her husband. 3) It is somehow unnatural to place women in positions of authority over men.

4) Although some equality in marriage might be a good thing, the husband ought to have the main say in financial matters. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with these Likert items on a four-point scale, and an index of traditionalism was created by summing z-scores. The scale was then dichotomized and females who fell above the median were considered "traditional females," while those who fell below the median were considered "nontraditional females." The univariate distributions of these items are included in Appendix A.

Factor analysis revealed the four items were tapping a single underlying dimension. The factor loadings for each of the four items on a single factor are well above .30. The reliability coefficient for the resulting composite measure was .81, with a mean of 0 and a variance of 10.10.

The structural definition of traditionalism should reflect a woman's location in the social structure. For this analysis, employment status was used as an indicator of traditional or nontraditional location in the social structure. If a woman was not employed, she was categorized as a "traditional" female. If a woman was employed outside the home, either part-time or full-time, she was categorized as a "nontraditional" female because she occupies a position in the social structure typically considered a male's domain. In the sample, 45.6% of the females were not employed and 54.4% were employed. It should be noted that the structural definition is not distinguishing between women in occupations which are traditionally female and those in occupations which are not traditionally female. Rather, the structural definition rests on the premise that it is more "traditional" for a woman not to have a role outside the home than to have such a role.

## CHAPTER SIX

### RESULTS

This chapter is divided into two major sections. The first is an analysis of the hypotheses using the composite scale of self-reported future deviance and makes no distinction among types of offenses. In this section, multiple regression is the data analysis technique. The second section examines the hypotheses for each of the eight offenses and considers the possibility that a particular hypothesis might apply to some offenses but not to others. In the second section, logit analysis is used.

#### Regression Analysis of Composite Scales

This section uses composite scales of both deviance and of perceptions of each sanction threat to address the following questions:

- A. Are nontraditional females more similar to males in their level of involvement in crime than are traditional females?
- B. Are nontraditional females more similar to males in their perceptions of sanction threats than are traditional females?
- C. Do differences among the gender categories in perceptions

of sanction threats account for differences among gender categories in involvement in crime?

- D. Are males, traditional females, and nontraditional females equally deterred by the various sanction threats?

Each question is addressed using both the structural and the cultural operational definitions of traditionalism. Furthermore, analyses are conducted with a control for age since, as explained earlier, it is possible that any differences in deviance or perception of sanctions across gender categories (i.e., males, traditional females, and nontraditional females) might be artifacts of age differences among the gender categories. Questions dealing with sanction threats include each of the types of threats -- formal sanctions, loss of respect, and guilt feelings.

#### Bivariate Relationship Between Gender Categories and Illegal Behavior

As indicated in the earlier chapters, to consider the bivariate relationship between gender categories and deviance, it is necessary to decompose the gender variable into two dummy variables. In the tables which follow, D1 is coded 1 for nontraditional females and 0 for both males and traditional females. D2 is coded 1 for traditional females and 0 for both males and nontraditional females. Consequently, the scores of the three gender categories on each of the two dummy variables are:

	<u>D1</u>	<u>D2</u>
Males	0	0
Nontraditional females	1	0
Traditional females	0	1

The regression of deviance on the two dummy variables indicates the effect of the gender categories on deviance. The expectation, as noted in the hypothesis chapter, is that nontraditional females will be more similar to males than are traditional females. As indicated, this leads to the prediction that the regression coefficient associated with D1 will be smaller (and insignificant) than the regression coefficient associated with D2 which is expected to be statistically significant. The analysis is conducted without a control for age and again with a control for age to indicate how age influences the relationships. In both cases, results are presented for both structural and cultural definitions of traditionalism and nontraditionalism.

Before moving to the composite scales, however, it is worth noting the relationship between gender categories and each of the eight offenses. These are presented in Table 6.1 and are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. In Table 6.1, the mean score for each offense for each gender category is reported. Since the offenses are coded 0 (probably will not commit it in the future) and 1 (probably will commit it in the future), each mean is equal to the proportion of people in that particular gender category who said they probably will commit the offense in the future.

The left side of Table 6.1 is a comparison between males and all females; no distinction is made between traditional and nontraditional females. The t-tests for this comparison reveal that females are less likely to say they will commit any of the eight offenses in the future and each of these differences is statistically significant at the .05 level. For example, while 10.20 percent (or a proportion of .1020) of

TABLE 6.1  
MEANS AND T-TEST COMPARISONS OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES FOR EACH GENDER CATEGORY

OFFENSE	I Males	II Females	Comparison I-II (+)	Structural				Cultural			
				III Nontraditional Females	IV Traditional Females	Comparison I-III (+)	Comparison I-IV (+)	V Nontraditional Females	VI Traditional Females	Comparison I-V (+)	Comparison I-VI (+)
TAKE SOMETHING WORTH \$20 OR MORE	.1020	.0437	-2.02*	.0625	.0215	-1.16	-2.75**	.0769	.0098	- .69	-3.43***
GAMBLE ILLEGALLY	.5850	.4223	-3.05**	.5179	.3118	-1.07	-4.32***	.5577	.2843	- .43	-4.96***
CHEAT ON INCOME TAX	.3673	.2330	-2.71**	.3482	.0968	- .32	-5.37***	.3077	.1569	- .99	-3.91***
TAKE SOMETHING WORTH LESS THAN \$20	.1701	.1117	-1.53**	.1786	.0323	.18	-3.81***	.1442	.0784	- .56	-2.23*
PHYSICALLY HURT ANOTHER	.1769	.0777	-2.70**	.0804	.0753	-2.37**	-2.43*	.0865	.0686	-2.15*	-2.68**
LITTER	.4694	.3010	-3.22***	.3750	.2151	-1.53	-4.27***	.3269	.2745	-2.30*	-3.21***
SHOOT FIREWORKS	.4218	.2864	-2.62**	.3482	.2043	-1.21	-3.71***	.2885	.2843	-2.20*	-2.26***
DRIVING UNDER INFLUENCE	.3537	.2039	-3.09**	.3214	.0645	- .54	-6.14***	.2885	.1176	-1.09	-4.64***

\*p < .05

\*\*p < .01

\*\*\*p < .001

the males say they will take something worth \$20 or more in the future, only 4.37 percent of the females say they will do this. The value of  $t$  for this comparison is -2.02 and is significant at the .05 level.

In the middle of Table 6.1, a distinction is made between traditional and nontraditional females in terms of employment status (i.e., the structural distinction). Here it becomes apparent that the differences between males and females which appear on the left side of the table are due almost entirely to differences between males and traditional females. For all eight offenses, males are significantly more likely than nonemployed (i.e., traditional) females to say they will commit each offense in the future. For example, 10.20 percent of the males say they will take something worth \$20 or more in the future, while only 2.15 percent of the nonemployed women say they will do this, a difference which is significant at the .01 level. On the other hand, for seven of the eight offenses, there is not significant difference between the percent of males who say they will commit the offense in the future and the percent of employed (i.e., nontraditional) females who say they will do it. The only exception is for the offense of physically hurting another person where nontraditional females are less likely than males to say they will do it.

The far right side of Table 6.1 is comparable to the center section, except that the traditional/nontraditional distinction is made in terms of the attitudinal scale. Traditional females are those who scored above the median on the scale of traditional sex role attitudes, while nontraditional females scored below the median. The results for the cultural definition are similar to the results for the structural definition.



There is a significant difference between males and traditional females on all eight offenses, most beyond the .001 level. On the other hand, the differences between males and nontraditional females are considerably smaller. Only three of the eight differences are significant, and all three of these are just barely significant at the .05 level.

It is clear from Table 6.1, therefore, that the major component of the difference between males and females in self-reported future criminal behavior is a difference between males and traditional females, regardless of the definition of traditionalism. For the most part, differences between males and nontraditional females are small and not significant.

Without Control for Age. In Table 6.2, the eight offenses have been summed into a composite scale of self-reported future deviance for tests of Hypotheses 1a and 1b. The independent variables are the two dummy variables discussed earlier. At the top of the table, the structural definition of traditionalism is used, while the cultural definition is used in the bottom. Data from Table 6.1 above suggest that the regression coefficient associated with D1 (which separates nontraditional females from others) will be smaller in absolute terms than the coefficient associated with D2 (which separates traditional females from others) is significant. This pattern of results indicates that traditional females differ more from males in their score on the composite than do nontraditional females.

The top section of Table 6.2 supports this hypothesis. Because of dummy coding, the value of the "constant," 1.3419, is the average score for males on the deviance composite. The b associated with D2 is

TABLE 6.2  
BIVARIATE MODEL: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED DEVIANCE ON GENDER

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
D1	-1.0290	.5485	-.1036	3.519
D2	-3.8147	.5776	-.3647	43.626***
(constant)	1.3419			
Multiple R = .3358				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
D1	-1.1875	.6012	-.1108	3.901*
D2	-3.0884	.5494	-.3154	31.602***
(constant)	1.3419			
Multiple R = .2886				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.
  2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.
- \*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

the difference between males and traditional females in their average scores on the deviance composite, a difference which, unlike the difference between males and nontraditional females, is statistically significant ( $p .001$ ).

The b's from the top panel of Table 6.2 can be used to derive the mean of the deviance composite within each of the three gender categories as follows:

<u>Gender category</u>	<u>Mean score on deviance composite</u>
males	= +1.3419
employed females	$1.3419 + (-1.0290) = + .3129$
nonemployed females	$1.3419 + (-3.8147) = -2.4728$

The rank order of the mean is, as expected and as predicted, the difference between males and nonemployed females which is significant while the difference between males and employed females is not.

The bottom of Table 6.2 replicates the top half with the exception that in the lower section, the traditional/nontraditional female distinction is made in terms of the cultural or attitudinal definition. Here, as in the top, the b associated with D2 is large ( $-3.0884$ ) and significant beyond the .001 level. The b associated with D1 is  $-1.1875$ , much smaller than the b associated with D2, as expected from the hypotheses, indicating the nontraditional females do not differ from males as much as traditional females. The means on the deviance composite are 1.3419 for males, .1544 for nontraditional females, and  $-1.7465$  for traditional females. Contrary to the finding using the structural definition, however, the cultural definition suggests that the difference between males and nontraditional females is significant at the .05 level.

With Control for Age. It was noted in Hypotheses 1a' and 1b' that the gender categories most likely are confounded with the variable age. Traditional females, regardless of the definition used, are likely on the average to be older than both nontraditional females and males. In fact, using the cultural definition, the correlation between D2 and Age is  $+.1172$ ; for the structural definition, the correlation is  $+.3085$ . Similarly, nontraditional females, on the average, are likely to be younger than both males as a whole and traditional females. This age difference is illustrated by a correlation of  $-.2346$  from the structural perspective and  $-.0662$  from the cultural perspective. The mean age in this sample for males is 42, for traditional females it is 52 (structural definition of traditionalism) or 46 (cultural definition), and for non-traditional females it is 37 (structural) or 41 (cultural).

As noted, age is a variable strongly related to deviance. It is expected that in the present data older people will be significantly lower than younger people on the composite deviance scale. In fact, the correlation between age and the deviance composite is  $-.4541$ . Thus, it is essential to control for age in examining the relationship between gender category and deviance. Some of the difference between males and traditional females, which appear in Table 6.2, probably is due to the fact that traditional females, on the average, are older than males as a group. The inclusion of age as a control, therefore, should reduce the difference in deviance between males and traditional females. On the other hand, one source of the apparent similarity between males and nontraditional females probably is due to the fact that nontraditional females, on the average, are younger (and thus more inclined to deviance)

than males as a whole. Thus, inclusion of age as a control should increase the differences between males and nontraditional females in their average score on the deviance composite. When age is added to the analysis, the  $b$  for D1 (in Table 6.2) should become a larger negative number, while the  $b$  for D2 (in Table 6.2) should become a smaller negative number.

The regressions controlling for age are reported in Table 6.3. The top half uses the structural definition and the bottom half uses the cultural definition.

For the structural definition, the inclusion of age had the expected consequences. The  $b$  for D1 (nontraditional) is  $-1.4508$  with age as a control, compared to  $-1.0290$  with no control for age (see Table 6.2). Controlling for age, therefore, increases the differences between males and nontraditional females in their average scores on the deviance composite. Using the structural definition, the difference while controlling for age is significant at the .01 level, while the difference was not significant without the control for age. Furthermore, consistent with the logic behind controlling for age, the  $b$  for D2 became a smaller negative number when age was controlled. Controlling for age (Table 6.3), that  $b$  is  $-2.6882$ , compared to the  $b$  of  $-3.8147$  from Table 6.2 where age was not controlled. Thus, controlling for age reduces the difference between males and traditional females in their average scores on the deviance composite.

The same pattern occurs in the lower half of Table 6.3 where the cultural definition of traditionalism is used. The  $b$  for D1 is a larger negative number than in Table 6.2 ( $-1.2899$  compared to  $-1.1875$ ),

TABLE 6.3  
BIVARIATE MODEL: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED DEVIANCE ON GENDER AND AGE

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
AGE	- .1101	.0130	-.4119	71.241***
D1	-1.4508	.5049	-.1573	9.555**
D2	-2.6882	.5451	-.2564	24.320***
(constant)	6.0451			
Multiple R = .5117				
<hr/>				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
Age	- .1152	.0124	-.4306	86.654***
D1	-1.2899	.5389	-.1204	5.730*
D2	-2.6326	.4947	-.2688	28.316***
(constant)	6.2584			
Multiple R = .5158				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.
  2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.
- \*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

indicating that some of the apparent similarity between males and non-traditional females is due to the higher average age of males compared to nontraditional females. The  $b$  for D2 is  $-2.6326$  is a smaller negative number than the  $b$  of  $-3.0884$  from Table 6.2 when age was not controlled. This indicates some of the difference between males and traditional females in their scores on the deviance composite is due to the fact that males, on the average, are younger than traditional females.

In general, the adjustment for age differences among the three gender categories suggests that nontraditional females differ more from males than was suggested when age was not controlled. Furthermore, traditional females differ less from males than they seemed to when age was not controlled. The rank order of the  $b$ 's in Table 6.3, nevertheless, continues to support the central hypothesis. The  $b$  for D1 is smaller than the  $b$  for D2 for both distinctions between traditionalism and non-traditionalism. Even when an adjustment is made for age differences, nontraditional females are more similar to males in their level of deviance than are traditional females. If all females are "nontraditional," the overall relationship between gender (male vs female) would be reduced since it is the traditional females who differ most from males. This statement is true regardless of which definition of traditionalism is used.

Table 6.4 attempts to determine which of the two definitions, cultural or structural, is more useful in explaining differences in males' and females' deviance. It answers the question, which has the larger effect on females' criminal involvement: the distinction based on attitudes or that based on employment status? Some overlap is expected

TABLE 6.4  
REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED DEVIANCE ON FEMALE GENDER CATEGORIES

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Without Age in Equation</u>				
WOMENT	1.7690	.5238	.2175	11.405***
WOMENE	2.6754	.5201	.3313	26.467***
(constant)	-3.1522			
Multiple R = .4051				
-----				
<u>With Age in Equation</u>				
AGE	- .0880	.0150	-.3881	34.523***
WOMENT	1.4058	.4891	.1728	8.264**
WOMENE	1.3876	.5291	.1719	6.877**
(constant)	1.6303			
Multiple R = .5354				

1. WOMENT = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for females with traditional attitudes.

2. WOMENE = 1 for employed females; 0 for nonemployed females.

\*\*\*p  $\leq$  .001; \*\*p  $\leq$  .01; \*p  $\leq$  .05



if employed women, on the average, are less traditional than nonemployed women. These data indicated, however, that the correlation among females between employment status and traditional sex role attitudes is only .0489.

To compare the effects of the two distinctions on the criminality of females, males have been removed from the analysis in Table 6.4. Each of the remaining females has a score on employment status and a score on the sex role attitude scale. To assess the relative effects of these two variables, the deviance composite was regressed on both simultaneously for the females in the sample.

In the top half of the table, without a control for age, both the employment status and sex role attitudes variables have direct effects on criminality which are significant at the .001 level. In other words, each of the variables makes a significant independent contribution to understanding the variance among females in their level of criminal involvement. In the bottom panel of Table 6.4, when age is included as a control, the effect of both employment status and sex role attitude on female criminality are reduced. This is expected since employed women tend to be younger than unemployed women ( $r = .3420$ ), and women with nontraditional attitudes tend to be younger than women with traditional attitudes ( $r = .2337$ ). Nevertheless, even when age is controlled, both employment status and sex role attitudes have significant direct effects on the criminality of females. The effects are nearly the same in magnitude (Beta's of .1719 and .1728), and are significant at the .01 level. The appropriate conclusion, therefore, is that each of the two definitions of traditionalism is independently useful in accounting for vari-

ance among females in their involvement in crime. In a later section of this chapter, the possibility that different distinctions account for different types of crime will be considered.

#### Bivariate Relationships Between Gender Categories and the Inhibitors of Deviance

Having found support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b for both definitions of traditionalism, the possibility that the relationship between gender categories and deviance is due to differences among the gender categories in their perceptions of the threat of punishments is explored. In this section, the relationships for each of the three types of sanctions, formal, loss of respect, and guilt, is examined. As before, the results are reported for both the structural and cultural definitions, and with and without the controls for age. It is expected, in accord with both deterrence theory and the findings from the previous section, that traditional females differ more from males than do nontraditional females in their perceptions of sanctions.

Without Control for Age. Each sanction measure has been summed over the eight offenses to create composite measures. Regression analyses are presented for formal sanctions (Table 6.5), loss of respect (Table 6.6), and guilt (Table 6.7). The independent variables in each analysis are the two gender dummy variables discussed earlier. The structural definition of traditionalism is presented in the top of each table while the cultural definition is presented in the bottom.

The analysis provides support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b using the structural definition of traditionalism/nontraditionalism for formal

TABLE 6.5  
BIVARIATE MODELS: REGRESSIONS OF THREAT OF FORMAL SANCTIONS ON GENDER

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
D1	1.2353	.6566	.1062	3.540
D2	3.6308	.6914	.2964	27.581***
(constant)	-1.3587			
Multiple R = .2707				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
D1	1.4792	.7149	.1177	4.281*
D2	2.9492	.6517	.2575	20.478***
(constant)	-1.3587			
Multiple R = .2354				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

sanctions. The  $b$  (1.2353) associated with D1 is the difference in the average score of threat of formal sanctions between males and nontraditional females. As suspected, the difference is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the difference between traditional females and males is significant. The  $b$  (3.6308) is significant at the .001 level, indicating that the average score of threat of formal sanctions is significantly higher for traditional females than for males. The means indicate that, on the average, traditional females ( $\bar{X} = 2.2721$ ) perceive a greater chance of being caught and formally punished than do either males ( $\bar{X} = -1.3587$ ) or nontraditional females ( $\bar{X} = -.1234$ ).

The cultural definition of traditionalism/nontraditionalism is analyzed in the bottom section of Table 6.5. As in the top section, the  $b$  associated with D2 is large (2.9492) and significant beyond the .001 level. This indicates a large difference between traditional females and males in the perceptions of formal sanctions. The differences between nontraditional females and males is smaller; however, it is significant also, although only at the .05 level. The means for the composites are -1.3587 for males, .1205 for nontraditional females, and 1.5905 for traditional females. These means reflect the pattern predicted by the Hypotheses 2a and 2b; traditional females perceive the greatest threat of formal sanctions, while nontraditional females resemble males in their perceptions of formal sanctions to a greater extent than do traditional females.

Table 6.6 presents the findings of the regression of threat of loss of respect on gender category as a test of Hypotheses 3a and 3b. As in earlier tables, results for the structural definitions are in the

TABLE 6.6  
BIVARIATE MODELS: REGRESSIONS OF THREAT OF LOSS OF RESPECT ON GENDER

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural</u> <sup>1</sup>				
D1	- .7137	.7015	-.0577	1.035
D2	2.9278	.7386	.2248	15.714***
(constant)	- .5532			
Multiple R = .2540				
-----				
<u>Cultural</u> <sup>2</sup>				
D1	- .1734	.7732	-.0130	.050
D2	1.7677	.7049	.1451	6.290*
(constant)	- .5532			
Multiple R = .1509				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

top section, and the cultural in the lower section. Using the structural definition, the difference between males and nontraditional females (D1) in average scores on loss of respect is not significant. The b for D2 (representing the difference between traditional females and males) is 2.9278, significant at the .001 level. This indicates that traditional females perceive a significantly higher threat of loss of respect than do males.

The means for the composite variable loss of respect are -.5532 for males, -1.2669 for nontraditional females, and 2.3746 for traditional females. The values of these means indicate that traditional females perceive the greatest loss of respect associated with deviance, as was predicted. It is interesting to note, however, that nontraditional females have lower estimates of loss of respect than do males. This difference is not significant, however, and the hypothesis is that males and nontraditional females are similar in perceptions of loss of respect is supported.

Following the cultural definition of traditionalism, the findings are similar to those above. The lower portion of Table 6.6 indicates the b associated with D1 is not significant while the b associated with D2 is. This indicates that nontraditional females are not significantly different from males, while traditional females are significantly different from males in loss of respect. The means of this composite measure following the cultural definition of traditionalism parallel the pattern discovered for the structural definition of traditionalism. Nontraditional females perceived the lowest threat of loss of respect ( $\bar{X} = -.7266$ ), traditional females perceived the greatest levels ( $\bar{X} = 1.2145$ ),

and males are between the two ( $\bar{X} = -.5532$ ).

Table 6.7 indicates the results of the analysis for the composite measure of threat of guilt in a test of Hypotheses 4a and 4b. The top section of this table shows the  $b$  (.4291) associated with D1 is not significant when traditionalism is measured in structural terms. On the other hand, the  $b$  (2.1331) associated with D2 is significant beyond the .001 level. This indicates that nontraditional females are not significantly different from males in their perceptions of guilt; the opposite is true for traditional females. The means of each gender category on the composite measure of guilt indicate that traditional females show the greatest threat of guilt associated with deviance ( $\bar{X} = 1.4288$ ); nontraditional females show middle-range threats of guilt ( $\bar{X} = -.2752$ ); and males show the least threat of guilt ( $\bar{X} = -.7043$ ).

The analysis using the cultural definition of traditionalism, presented in the lower section of Table 6.7, indicates similar results. The  $b$  (.2075) associated with D1 is not significant. Thus, nontraditional females and males have similar perceptions of guilt. Traditional females, however, are significantly different from males in their perceptions of guilt. The  $b$  associated with D2 is 1.9371, and is significant beyond the .001 level. The means present the predicted pattern; males have the lowest perceptions of guilt ( $\bar{X} = -.7043$ ), traditional females have the greatest perceptions of guilt ( $\bar{X} = 1.2328$ ), with nontraditional females are in between ( $\bar{X} = -.4968$ ).

In general, for all three types of sanctions, the hypotheses are supported. Regardless of the definition of traditionalism used, traditional females are significantly different from males in their percep-

TABLE 6.7  
BIVARIATE MODELS: REGRESSION OF THREAT OF GUILT ON GENDER

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
D1	.4291	.5481	.0450	.613
D2	2.1331	.5771	.2124	13.662***
(constant)	- .7043			
Multiple R = .1982				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
D1	.2075	.5910	.0202	.123
D2	1.9371	.5388	.2063	12.926***
(constant)	- .7043			
Multiple R = .1989				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05



tions of the threat of formal sanctions, loss of respect and guilt. Non-traditional females typically do not differ from males in their perceptions of the threats of sanctions.

With Control for Age. As noted earlier, age not only is related to conformity, but it also might be related to the perceived risks of punishments. Data in this analysis reveal a correlation between age and perceived threat of formal sancitons of .2563; between age and loss of respect of .3269; and between age and guilt of .2838. Age, therefore, was added to the analysis to determine if the differences in perceptions of sanctions across gender categories were due to the age structures of the gender categories. Each of the sanctions, formal, loss of respect, and guilt are analyzed, following both the structural and cultural definitions of traditionalism, while controlling for age. If part of the differences between males and traditional females in their perceptions of sanctions is due to the large numbers of older females in the traditional category, the inclusion of age as a control should reduce the difference in perception of sanctions between traditional females and males. By the same token, if some of the similarity of nontraditional females with males is due to the average younger age of nontraditional females, then after controlling for age the differences in perceived sanctions should increase.

Table 6.8 presents the analysis for formal sanctions after controlling for age. Following the structural definition of traditionalism, the inclusion of age as a control has the expected consequences. The b for D1 is 1.5599 wiht age as a control, compared to 1.2353 with no control for age (see Table 6.5). Thus, the inclusion of age increased the

TABLE 6.8  
REGRESSIONS OF THREAT OF FORMAL SANCTIONS ON GENDER AND AGE

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
AGE	.0673	.0167	.2158	16.242***
D1	1.5599	.6456	.1349	5.839*
D2	2.8551	.6969	.2338	16.783***
(constant)	-4.2300			
Multiple R = .3333				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
AGE	.0742	.0159	.2381	21.820***
D1	1.5452	.6918	.1238	4.988*
D2	2.5687	.6352	.2232	16.355***
(constant)	-4.5262			
Multiple R = .3297				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

differenece between males and nontraditional females in their average scores on threat of formal punishments. In fact, with the structural definition this difference is now significant at the .05 level while the difference was not significant without the control for age. Similarly, the b for D2 was reduced when age was controlled. Without controlling for age (Table 6.5) the b for D2 was 3.6308, in Table 6.8 the b is 2.8551. Although traditional females are less different from males after controlling for age, they are still significantly different. Thus, the relationship between gender category and formal sanctions can be explained partially by age. The basic hypotheses remain supported, however, since even with the adjustment for age, traditional females differ more from males than do nontraditional females.

Similar results are revealed with the cultural definition of traditionalism. The differences between nontraditional females and males in their perceptions of formal sanctions are increased when controlling for age. The b for D1 is 1.4792 before controlling for age (see Table 6.5), and is 1.5452 after controlling for age (see Table 6.8). The differences between traditional females and males are reduced when controlling for age (2.9492 before controlling for age; 2.5687 after controlling for age). This indicates that part of the relationship between gender and threat of formal sanctions can be explained by age, although the central hypotheses still are supported. After controlling for age, nontraditional females are still more similar to males in perceptions of threats of sanctions than traditional females. Traditional females are significantly different from males.

Table 6.9 indicates the analysis of threats of loss of respect

TABLE 6.9  
REGRESSION OF THREAT OF LOSS OF RESPECT ON GENDER AND AGE

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural</u> <sup>1</sup>				
AGE	.0917	.0176	.2759	27.104***
D1	- .2709	.6814	-.0220	.158
D2	1.9315	.7356	.1486	6.930**
(constant)	-4.4682			
Multiple R = .3599				
-----				
<u>Cultural</u> <sup>2</sup>				
AGE	.1044	.0169	.3141	38.397***
D1	- .0805	.7339	-.0061	.012
D2	1.2864	.6738	.1057	3.645
(constant)	-5.0106			
Multiple R = .3441				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

after controlling for age. For the structural model, the  $b$  for D1 was reduced after controlling for age (from  $-.7137$  to  $-.2709$ ). This indicates the lower perceived threat of loss of respect among nontraditional females compared to males (an unexpected finding noted earlier), is due to a high proportion of younger females in this category. After controlling for age, however, males and nontraditional females still are not significantly different. The  $b$  associated with traditional females was reduced after controlling for age (from  $2.9278$  to  $1.9315$ ). This indicates that traditional females are more similar to males in their perceptions of loss of respect when controlling for age. The high proportion of older women in this category accounted for part of the dissimilarity with males. Nevertheless, the difference between traditional females and males remains significant after controlling for age, indicating that these two groups are different in perceptions of threat of loss of respect independent of age.

The results revealed in the lower section of Table 6.9 show similar findings when the cultural definition of traditionalism is used. The only exception is that, after controlling for age, the  $b$  for D2 becomes nonsignificant (from  $1.7677$  to  $1.2864$ ). This seems to indicate that the differences between traditional females and males is due in large part to the relative older average age of the traditional female category (the  $F$  of  $3.645$  is almost as large as the  $3.84$  required for significance). It should be noted, however, that traditional females still have the highest perceived threat of loss of respect.

Table 6.10 presents the results of the analysis of threat of guilt when controlling for age. The structural section reveals an in-

TABLE 6.10  
REGRESSION OF THREAT OF GUILT ON GENDER AND AGE

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
AGE	.0663	.0139	.2580	22.865***
D1	.7491	.5364	.0785	1.951
D2	1.4420	.5791	.1432	6.202*
(constant)	-3.5348			
Multiple R = .3120				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
AGE	.0681	.0131	.2650	27.006***
D1	.2681	.5708	.0260	.221
D2	1.6440	.5240	.1748	9.843**
(constant)	-3.6114			
Multiple R = .3282				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.  
 2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.  
 \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ ; \*\* $p \leq .01$ ; \* $p \leq .05$

crease in the  $b$  of D1 after controlling for age (from .4291 in Table 6.7 to .7491). This shows that part of the similarity of males and nontraditional females is due to the younger average age of females in the nontraditional category. Furthermore, as expected, the  $b$  for traditional females (D2) is decreased (from 2.1331 to 1.4420). Thus, part of the difference between traditional females and males is due to the confounding effects of age. It should be noted, however, that the  $b$  of D1 is still nonsignificant, while the  $b$  of D2 is significant after controlling for age. Thus, the relationship between gender category and perceived threat of guilt is reduced by age, but not eradicated.

The results are similar in the cultural section. The  $b$  for D1 is increased (from .2075 to .2681) and the  $b$  for D2 is decreased (from 1.9371 to 1.6440). The interpretation follows that above: age accounts for part of the dissimilarity between traditional females and males and for some of the similarity of nontraditional females and males. After account is taken of age, the average differences between males and traditional females in threat of guilt is significant. The average differences between nontraditional females and males are not significant.

In summary, for each of the threats of sanctions, formal, loss of respect, and guilt, the relationship with gender category is due partially to the age structure of the gender categories. After controlling for age, however, the central hypotheses are still supported. Independent of the effects of age, traditional females are significantly different from males in their perceptions of threats of formal sanctions, loss of respect and guilt for both the structural and cultural definitions (The only exception is loss of respect with the cultural definition; but

even this difference approaches significance in the expected direction). Nontraditional females are not significantly different from males in threats of loss of respect or guilt, regardless of the definition of non-traditionalism, after controlling for age. They do, however, perceive a significantly higher threat of formal sanctions (for both the structural and the cultural distinction) than males when age is controlled, although the differences are much smaller than those between males and traditional females. Generally, nontraditional females are much more likely to resemble males in their perceptions of sanctions than traditional females, even after controlling for age.

#### Additive Models: Gender, Perceptions of Sanctions, and Future Deviance

It has been shown that traditional females commit less crime than males. It has also been shown that traditional females perceive greater risks of formal punishments, loss of respect, and guilt than do males. The additive model Hypotheses (2-4c and 2-4d) are designed to determine if the differences in criminality between traditional females and males can be explained by their differences in perceptions of sanctions. "Perceptions of threat of sanctions" is the intervening variable between gender category and crime. Thus, it is proposed that traditional women commit less crime than males because they perceive greater sanctions resulting from criminal acts. Nontraditional females do not commit less crime than males because their risk estimates are similar to those of males.

In this section the additive models are examined for each type of sanction, formal, loss of respect, and guilt. The results are exam-



ined using both the structural and cultural definitions of traditionalism. The intent of this section is to explain the differences in criminality between traditional females and males; therefore, the focus on this section will be on D2 (traditional women versus all others). The results for D1 (nontraditional females) are presented in the tables, but are not the focus of the analysis. Also, having already established the importance of controlling for age in the analysis, this section will include age in each equation. Models without age are presented in Appendix C.

Table 6.11 presents the results of the analysis when threat of formal punishments is the sanction examined as an intervening variable. The top panel indicates results for the structural definition of traditionalism. The results here should be compared to those in Table 6.3 which reported the regression of future deviance on gender and age without the inclusion of sanctions. If perceptions of sanctions intervene in the relationship between gender and crime, the  $b$  for D2 should be reduced substantially when formal sanctions are included in the equation. In Table 6.3, the effect of D2 on future deviance controlling for age was -2.6882; in Table 6.11 inclusions of formal sanctions reduces the  $b$  to -2.2058, a reduction of 17.8%. In other words, 17.8% of the effect of D2 on future deviance is indirect through perceived formal sanctions. Thus, some of the differences between males and traditional females is due to differences in the perceived threat of formal sanctions. There is still a significant direct effect of D2 on future deviance, however, indicating that traditional females still are more conforming than males after removing the effects of age and perceptions of threats of formal

TABLE 6.11  
ADDITIVE MODELS: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED FUTURE DEVIANCE ON GENDER, THREAT OF FORMAL SANCTIONS,  
AND AGE

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
AGE	- .0988	.0131	-.3694	57.262***
FORMAL	- .1690	.0410	-.1969	16.987***
D1	-1.2972	.4978	-.1307	6.790**
D2	-2.2058	.5457	-.2104	16.339***
(constant)	5.3304			
Multiple R = .5444				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
AGE	- .1027	.0125	-.3839	67.795***
FORMAL	- .1683	.0408	-.1961	17.000***
D1	-1.0298	.5307	-.0961	3.766
D2	-2.2002	.4950	-.2247	19.760***
(constant)	5.4965			
Multiple R = .5480				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

sanctions.

The bottom section of Table 6.11 reveals similar findings. When the cultural definition of traditionalism is used, the effect of D2 on future deviance while controlling for age and formal sanctions is -2.2002. Compare this to the effect of D2 when formal sanctions are not included in the equation ( $b = -2.6236$ ). Thus, after controlling for threat of formal sanctions, the effect of D2 on future deviance is reduced by 16.4%. Part of the greater conformity of traditional females is due to their perceptions of greater formal sanctions. This only partially explains the differences between traditional females and males, however, because the direct effect remains significant even after controlling for formal sanctions.

Table 6.12 contains the results when threat of loss of respect is the sanction included in the equation. The top section presents the structural definition of traditionalism. A substantial reduction in the effect of D2 is disclosed when loss of respect is controlled. The  $b$  was -2.6882 before loss of respect was included in the analysis (see Table 6.3); after controlling for loss of respect it is -2.2081. Thus, loss of respect explains 17.9% of the difference between traditional females and males, after controlling for age. Although 17.9% of the effect of D2 on future deviance is indirect through perceptions of loss of respect, a significant direct effect remains. This indicates there is a significant difference between traditional females and males in future deviance which loss of respect does not explain.

The cultural section of Table 6.12 yields similar findings. The effect of D2 on future deviance while controlling for age is reduced

TABLE 6.12  
ADDITIVE MODELS: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED FUTURE DEVIANCE ON GENDER, THREAT OF LOSS OF RESPECT, AND AGE

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
AGE	- .0874	.0128	-.3269	46.740***
LOSS	- .2479	.0375	-.3081	43.746***
D1	-1.6280	.4766	-.1640	11.667***
D2	-2.2081	.5195	-.2106	18.064***
(constant)	4.9373			
Multiple R = .5870				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
AGE	- .0894	.0123	-.3342	52.851***
LOSS	- .2470	.0371	-.3069	44.272***
D1	-1.3098	.5082	-.1222	6.643**
D2	-2.3148	.4690	-.2364	24.361***
(constant)	5.0209			
Multiple R = .5909				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. d2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

by 12.1% when taking into account differences in loss of respect (from -2.6326 to -2.3148). Part of the difference between traditional females and males in their rates of criminality is explained by differences in perceptions of the threat of loss of respect. The effect of D2, however, remains significant after controlling for age and loss of respect.

The results in Table 6.13 indicate that perceived threat of guilt has a similar effect on the relationship between D2 and future deviance while controlling for age. In the structural section, the effect of D2 on future deviance while controlling for age is reduced from -2.6882 (see Table 6.3) to -2.0290 when threat of guilt is included in the analysis. This is a reduction of 24.5%. In the cultural section, the effect is reduced from -2.6326 to -1.8872, a reduction of 28.3%. Thus, a substantial percentage of the effect of D2 on future deviance is indirect through perceptions of guilt, although the direct effect remains significant.

It can be stated generally that the differences in perceptions of sanctions partially explains the differences in crime for traditional females and males. When each of the three types of sanctions is included in the model separately, the effect of D2 on future deviance after controlling for age is reduced. Since the reduction is greatest for guilt feelings this sanction threat appears to account for more of the relationship between gender and criminality than the other two.

It is important to note that in the case of each sanction threat the direct effect of D2 remains significant, indicating that differences between traditional females and males remain after taking into account

TABLE 6.13  
ADDITIVE MODELS: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED DEVIANCE ON GENDER, THREAT OF GUILT, AND AGE

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
AGE	- .0796	.0118	-.2986	45.834***
GUILT	- .4371	.0442	-.4391	107.062***
D1	-1.2184	.4433	-.1228	7.555**
D2	-2.0290	.4814	-.1935	17.762***
(constant)	4.4293			
Multiple R = .6602				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
AGE	- .0843	.0113	-.3151	55.829***
GUILT	- .4534	.0445	-.4355	103.999***
D1	-1.1684	.4735	-.1090	6.089*
D2	-1.8872	.4407	-.1927	18.341***
(constant)	4.6211			
Multiple R = .6598				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

their differences in age and perceptions of sanctions.

Table 6.14 contains results when all three sanction threats are included simultaneously. These findings allow a determination of how much of the effect of D2 on future deviance can be accounted for by all the sanction threat collectively. Although all the sanction threats are related ( $r = .3316$  between formal sanctions and loss of respect;  $r = .3112$  between formal sanctions and guilt; and  $r = .3810$  between loss of respect and guilt), it is likely that collectively they explain a greater part of the relationship between gender and deviance than any explains individually.

In the top panel (structural), the  $b$  for D2 is  $-1.7000$ , with controls for age and all three sanctions. In Table 6.3, with only age as a control the corresponding  $b$  was  $-2.6882$ . The three sanction threats, therefore, taken together and controlling for age account for 37% of the difference between males and traditional females in their level of criminality.

In the lower panel (cultural), the  $b$  for D2 is  $-1.6781$ , with controls for age and all three sanctions. The corresponding  $b$  without controls for sanctions was  $-2.6882$ . Thus, the effect of D2 on deviance when controlling for age was reduced by 38% when taking into account differences in all three sanctions.

After controls for all types of sanctions, the direct effect of D2 on deviance remains significant. Thus, differences in the perceptions of sanctions do not completely account for differences between traditional females and males in criminality. Other factors, such as motivation or opportunity, therefore, are needed to explain the remaining dissim-

TABLE 6.14  
ADDITIVE MODEL: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED FUTURE DEVIANCE ON FORMAL SANCTIONS, LOSS OF RESPECT,  
GUILT, AGE AND GENDER

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
FORMAL	-.0556	.0376	-.06475	2.191
LOSS	-.1407	.0364	-.1749	14.991***
GUILT	-.3862	.0459	-.3710	70.669***
DEMP1	-1.2229	.4360	-.1232	7.868**
DEMP2	-1.7000	.4789	-.1622	12.602***
AGE	-.0679	.0118	-.2539	33.065***
(constant)	3.8161			
Multiple R = .6835				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
FORMAL	-.0559	.0375	-.0651	2.221
LOSS	-.1427	.0361	-.1773	15.627***
GUILT	-.3816	.0461	-.3666	68.520***
DEMP1	-1.1128	.4645	-.1038	5.740*
DEMP2	-1.6781	.4360	-.1714	14.816***
AGE	-.0701	.0114	-.2622	37.725***
(constant)	3.9124			
Multiple R = .6840				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05



ilarity between traditional females and males in rates of criminality. These possibilities for future research are considered in the Conclusion. The hypotheses, however, are supported in that differences in the perceptions of threat of sanctions between traditional females and males can account for a substantial amount of their difference in crime.

#### Interaction Model: Gender, Perceptions of Sanctions, and Crime

The additive model presented above predicted that traditional females and males differed in their reports of criminality because they perceived different levels of sanctions associated with rule-breaking. In that model, it is assumed that equal levels of threats of sanctions equally deter males and females. Traditional women deviated less simply because they perceived greater threats of sanctions. The interaction model, on the other hand, predicts that sanctions have a different impact on traditional females and males. Thus, at equal levels of perceptions of threats, traditional females would be more deterred than would males or nontraditional females.

Having already established the importance of controlling for age in the analysis, this section continues to include age in the equation. The results for the interaction models without age are presented in Appendix C, while the more comprehensive models with age will be discussed throughout this section. Tables 6.15 (formal sanctions), 6.16 (loss of respect), and 6.17 (guilt) present the results of regression analysis with inclusion of interaction terms. The structural definition of traditionalism is used in the top section of each table; in the bottom section, the cultural definition is used as before.

Examination of these tables clearly indicates a lack of support

TABLE 6.15  
INTERACTION MODEL: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED FUTURE DEVIANCE ON GENDER, FORMAL SANCTIONS,  
INTERACTION TERMS AND AGE

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
AGE	-.1016	.0133	-.3799	58.588***
FORMAL	-.2451	.0602	-.2960	17.813***
D1	-1.1904	.5005	-.1199	5.658*
D2	-2.3060	.5554	-.2199	17.242***
D1FORMAL	.1235	.0942	.0765	1.721
D2FORMAL	.1977	.1009	.1184	3.836
(constant)	5.3353			
Multiple R = .55215				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
AGE	-.1061	.0125	-.3965	71.963***
FORMAL	-.2518	.0599	-.2934	17.675***
D1	-.9174	.5309	-.0856	2.986
D2	-2.2614	.4965	-.2309	20.744***
D1FORMAL	.0672	.1031	.0357	.425
D2FORMAL	.2085	.0905	.1420	5.313*
(constant)	5.5278			
Multiple R = .5577				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

TABLE 6.16  
INTERACTION MODEL: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED FUTURE DEVIANCE ON GENDER, LOSS OF RESPECT, INTERACTION  
TERMS AND AGE

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
AGE	-.0876	.0128	-.3276	46.836***
LOSS	-.3121	.0568	-.3879	30.203***
D1	-1.5597	.4844	-.1572	10.365**
D2	-2.3237	.5318	-.2216	19.097***
D1LOSS	.0909	.0867	.0607	1.097
D2LOSS	.1308	.0876	.0890	2.228
(constant)	4.9106			
Multiple R = .5905				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
AGE	-.0891	.0122	-.3331	53.059***
LOSS	-.3109	.0562	-.3864	30.625***
D1	-1.3387	.5087	-.1249	6.925
D2	-2.4089	.4676	-.2460	26.544***
D1LOSS	-.0248	.0947	-.0140	.069
D2LOSS	.1759	.0787	.1368	4.998*
(constant)	4.9735			
Multiple R = .6012				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

TABLE 6.17  
INTERACTION MODEL: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED DEVIANCE ON GENDER, GUILT, INTERACTION TERMS AND AGE

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
AGE	-.0779	.0116	-.2913	44.900***
GUILT	-.6403	.0676	-.6150	89.847***
D1	-1.0422	.4393	-.1050	5.629*
D2	-2.0134	.4941	-.1920	16.603***
D1GUILT	.3206	.0910	.2048	12.415***
D2GUILT	.2503	.1318	.0934	3.607
(constant)	4.2177			
Multiple R = .6754				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
AGE	-.0824	.0111	-.3079	55.095***
GUILT	-.6353	.0672	-.6103	89.302***
D1	-.9462	.4680	-.0883	4.088*
D2	-1.7426	.4427	-.1780	15.496***
D1GUILT	-.3677	.0934	.2212	15.483***
D2GUILT	.1620	.1170	.0694	1.918
(constant)	4.4105			
Multiple R = .6780				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

for the interaction hypotheses. The predictions from these hypotheses (2-4e and 2-4f) were that traditional women would be more inhibited by a fixed level of sanctions than would males.

As noted in the methods chapter, this implies a significant negative  $b$  associated with the product of D2 and sanction threat. Regardless of the type of sanction, it is not the case, as revealed in Tables 6.15-6.17, that traditional females are more deterred than males. For example, in the structural and cultural models containing the interaction terms of formal sanctions and D2 a significant interaction effect exists. The positive sign of the  $b$  (.1977 for structural and .2085 for cultural), however, indicates that traditional females are less deterred by threat of formal sanctions than are males. This is contrary to the hypothesis which predicted traditional females would be more deterred than males by equal amounts of threats of sanctions.

The interaction terms of D1FORMAL (nontraditional women) are not significant in either the structural or cultural section. As predicted, there is no significant difference in the deterrent effect of formal sanctions for nontraditional females and males. At equal levels of threats of formal sanctions, they would be equally deterred.

When examining the interaction effects for loss of respect (Table 6.16) only one interaction is significant. In the bottom panel the interaction of D2 and loss of respect is .1759 and significant at the .05 level. This indicates that there is a significant difference between traditional females and males in the deterrent effect of loss of respect. Once again, however, this is contrary to the hypothesis because of the positive sign of this term. Traditional females are deterred less than

males by threats of loss of respect after controlling for age. This interaction is significant only in the cultural section, since no significant interaction terms appear when the structural definitions of traditionalism is used.

The table including the guilt interaction terms (Table 6.17) discloses findings which also are not consistent with the hypotheses presented above. In this table, there are no significant interaction terms for traditional women. This indicates that traditional females and males are equally deterred by threats of guilt. There are, however, significant interaction terms for nontraditional females. For both the structural and cultural sections, DIGUILT is significant at the .001 level. The *b* in the structural section, (.3206) and the *b* in the cultural section (.3677) are both positive. This indicates that nontraditional females, controlling for age, are less deterred by threats of guilt than are males. This is contrary to the hypotheses which predicted that the deterrent effect of guilt would be similar for nontraditional females and males.

In general, the predictions from the interaction hypotheses were not supported. None of the significant interaction terms revealed greater deterrent effects for traditional females. In fact, the interaction terms which were significant revealed:

- Traditional females (structural and cultural definitions) are less influenced by formal sanctions than males.
- Traditional females (cultural definition) are less influenced by loss of respect than males.
- Nontraditional females (structural and cultural definitions) are less influenced by guilt than males.

Seven of the twelve interaction terms were not significant. The ones which were certainly did not indicate that traditional females were more deterred than males.

Having discovered that traditional females are less likely to be deterred by some of the sanction threats than are males, we would expect, in general, that the threats should explain less of the variance in crime for traditional females than males. Table 6.18 presents the regressions of self-reported future deviance on all the sanction threats for each gender category. This table indicates for each gender category the proportion of variance in deviance explained by all the sanction threats simultaneously while controlling for age. Due to the findings of the interactions above, the sanction threats should explain more of the variance in criminality for males than for either traditional or nontraditional females. This is revealed in Table 6.18. The increment of variance in deviance explained by the sanction threats after controlling for age is .2785 for males. Thus, 27.85% of the variance in males' criminality is explained by sanction threats beyond that explained by age. The percentage of variance explained by sanction threats after controlling for age for nontraditional females is 18.99% (structural) and 27.09% (cultural). Thus, for structurally defined nontraditional females, the sanction threats have less of effect on deviance than they do for males. For the culturally defined nontraditional females, the proportion of variance is similar to that of males.

For traditional females, the percentage of variance explained by sanction threats after controlling for age is 21.73% (structural) and 17.85% (cultural). This indicates that after controlling for age, the

TABLE 6.18      MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR FUTURE DEVIANCE ON AGE AND THREAT OF SANCTIONS  
FOR EACH GENDER CATEGORY

MALES

Multiple  $R^2$  including only age = .1876

Multiple  $R^2$  including age, formal, loss, and guilt = .4661

Increment in  $R^2$  when including sanctions = .2785

-----  
FEMALES (NONTRADITIONAL)

Structural

Multiple  $R^2$  including only age = .1109

Multiple  $R^2$  including age, formal, loss, and guilt = .3008

Increment in  $R^2$  when including sanctions = .1899

Cultural

Multiple  $R^2$  including only age = .1269

Multiple  $R^2$  including age, formal, loss, and guilt = .3978

Increment in  $R^2$  when including sanctions = .2709

-----  
FEMALES (TRADITIONAL)

Structural

Multiple  $R^2$  including only age = .2646

Multiple  $R^2$  including age, formal, loss, and guilt = .4819

Increment in  $R^2$  when including sanctions = .2173

Cultural

Multiple  $R^2$  including only age = .3092

Multiple  $R^2$  including age, formal, loss and guilt = .4819

Increment in  $R^2$  when including sanctions = .2173



proportion of variance in deviance explained by sanction threats is less than it is for males. The overall impact of sanction threats in deciding whether to commit deviant acts, therefore, is greater for males than for traditional females.

Once again, it should be noted that these findings do not support the hypotheses which predicted a greater impact of sanction threats on traditional females. In fact, it appears that sanction threats explain more of the variance in deviance for males than for either female category. Perhaps other factors are more important among females in explaining their criminality. The differences within female categories may better be explained by differences in motivations or opportunities, rather than differences in sanction threats. On the other hand, as indicated in the additive model, the differences between the gender categories can be explained to a great extent by differences in perceptions of sanctions. Thus, differences in sanction threats between the gender categories are important in explaining their differences in crime. Differences in sanction threats, however, are less important in explaining differences in criminality among females than they are in explaining differences among males.

#### Logit Analysis of Single Offenses

As noted earlier, in the Hypotheses Chapter, there is reason to suspect that traditionalism among females would have different impacts on various types of crime. This section continues multivariate analysis of the hypotheses, but uses single offense items. The procedures of logit analysis used in this chapter are described in detail in the Hypotheses Chapter. The present chapter presents the results of the selection

process used in determining the models which provide significant contributions in predicting crime. Then, the estimates of logit effect parameters for appropriate models are presented for each offense.

One possibility to be explored is that the structural definition of traditionalism-nontraditionalism is appropriate for certain offenses, while the cultural definition is appropriate for others. In particular, proponents of the structural position have emphasized economic crimes, while proponents of the cultural view have focused on crimes which are "expressive" rather than instrumental. According to the former argument, women who have roles outside the home are exposed to greater possibilities of engaging in economic, or property crime. In the present data, four of the offenses (theft > \$20, gambling, tax cheating, and theft < \$20) are the types of crimes most compatible with the structural explanation. Thus, it might be expected that the distinction between women who work and those who do not has greater predictive ability for these offenses than for the others.

The advocates of the cultural perspective, on the other hand, emphasize crimes which presumably reflect the acting out of traditionally male traits. Four of the offenses in the present research (physically hurting someone, littering, illegal use of fireworks, driving while under the influence of alcohol) seem compatible with the emphasis in the cultural perspective. The expectation is that the distinction between traditional and nontraditional women based on attitudes contributes more toward predicting these offenses than toward the other four.

#### Bivariate Model: Gender and Crime

The first set of logit analyses deal with the effect of gender

on each offense after controlling for age. To assess the contribution of the gender variable in predicting each of the eight offenses, conditional  $G^2$ 's are used. Table 6.19 presents these conditional test statistics. The top section presents results following the structural definition of traditionalism, the lower section follows the cultural definition. A significant conditional  $G^2$  indicates that the model provides a significant contribution beyond the preceding one in predicting crime. Model I presents the effect of age on crime. Model II presents the effect of gender and age in predicting crime.

Model II, which adds gender to age, is of interest in testing Hypotheses 1a and 1b. A significant conditional  $G^2$  would indicate that the gender variable (male, nontraditional female, and traditional female) contributes significantly to the ability to predict whether a person commits an offense after controlling for age. (The importance of controlling for age has been noted repeatedly throughout the text.) For example, in the structural section, the conditional  $G^2$  for Model II (15.36) with "Gambling" is significant. This means that after controlling for age, gender has a significant effect on predictions of committing the offense of gambling. An examination of the other offenses reveals that for seven of the eight offenses, gender has a significant effect. The conditional  $G^2$ 's are significant at the .05 level or lower. The only offense for which gender does not add a significant contribution after controlling for age, is "theft > \$20." Gender does not add to predicting whether persons commit acts of theft greater than \$20, after age has been controlled. The inclusion of gender in the model for seven offenses provides a significant contribution in predicting whether a person commits

TABLE 6.19  
CONDITIONAL TEST STATISTICS FOR LOGIT ANALYSIS FOR AGE, GENDER, AND CRIME

Model	conditional		Conditional G <sup>2</sup>							
	df	df	THEFT > \$20	GAMBLE	TAXES	THEFT < \$20	HURT	LITTER	FIREWORKS	ALCOHOL
<u>STRUCTURAL</u>										
I. CRIME WITH AGE	4	1	15.01***	11.92***	19.32***	16.62***	3.33	13.45***	36.66***	25.76***
II. CRIME WITH AGE AND GENDER	2	2	5.45	15.36***	21.77***	10.87**	7.98*	14.43***	8.91*	26.81***
<u>CULTURAL</u>										
I. CRIME WITH AGE	4	1	15.01***	12.12***	19.31***	16.62***	3.32	13.45***	36.66***	25.76***
II. CRIME WITH AGE AND GENDER	2	2	6.26	24.11***	14.72***	3.93	8.23*	10.91**	7.86*	19.09***

\* p < .05  
 \*\* p < .01  
 \*\*\* p < .001

the offense; for only one offense (theft > \$20) it does not.

The lower section, using the cultural definition, indicates that the model with gender is significant for all but two of the offenses, theft > \$20 and theft < \$20. Gender does not have a significant effect after controlling for age for these two crimes, It does have a significant impact after controlling for age, however, for the other six offenses.

Although Table 6.19 presents evidence that gender has a significant effect on predicting whether a person commits most of the offenses, it does not reveal the direction of the relationship. Table 6.20 presents the logit effect parameters of the model with gender and age when Model II is significant. The parameters from Model I are presented for those cases where II is not an improvement over I (see Table 6.19). These parameters indicate the log of the odds of committing each offense for each category of the independent variables. The top section (structural) indicates that, controlling for age, the log-odds of a male committing the offense "gambling" is greater (.4812) than for nontraditional females (.1192) and traditional females (-.6004). Each of the estimated logit effect parameters may be interpreted similarly by comparing the value associated with one category relative to the other categories of the independent variable.

An examination of the top section of this table reveals, as suspected, that males are more likely to commit each of the offenses related to gender category than are either category of females. For all but one of these (hurting someone), traditional females are least likely to commit the offense. Thus, after controlling for age, nontraditional

TABLE 6.20  
ESTIMATED LOGIT EFFECT PARAMETERS PREDICTING EACH OF THE COMMITTED OFFENSES BY AGE AND GENDER

VARIABLES	COMMITTED OFFENSE							
	THEFT > \$20	GAMBLING	TAXES	THEFT < \$20	PHYSICALLY HURT ANOTHER	LITTER	FIREWORKS	ALCOHOL
<u>STRUCTURAL</u>	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>
<u>AGE</u>								
YOUNG	.8820	.3374	.4678	.5834	.3132	.3852	.6938	.5750
OLD	-.8820	-.3374	-.4678	-.5834	-.3132	-.3852	-.6938	-.5750
<u>GENDER</u>								
MALES		.4812	.6056	.5828	.6226	.5352	.4678	.7642
N.T. FEMALES		.1192	.4018	.5046	-.3550	.0380	-.0584	.4644
TRAD. FEMALES		-.6004	-1.0074	-1.0874	-.2676	-.5724	-.4092	-1.2284
<u>CULTURAL</u>	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>
<u>AGE</u>								
YOUNG	.8820	.3656	.5204	.6492	.3022	.4220	.7184	.6296
OLD	-.8820	-.3656	-.5204	-.6492	-.3022	-.4220	-.7184	-.6296
<u>GENDER</u>								
MALES		.4084	.4512		.6196	.4972	.4512	.5548
N.T. FEMALES		.3628	.2192		-.1736	-.2094	-.2554	.2516
TRAD. FEMALES		-.7712	-.6704		-.4460	-.2878	-.1958	-.8066

females are more similar to males than are traditional females. There is some evidence in the top half of Table 6.20 that the structural explanation is more appropriate for economic crimes than for expressive crimes. As noted in Table 6.19, gender category from the structural perspective was a significant predictor of crime, controlling for age, for three of the four economic crimes--gambling, tax cheating and theft < \$20. For these three offenses the effect parameters for nontraditional females and males are more similar to one another than are the nontraditional female and male parameters for the expressive offenses. For example, note the two extremes. For theft < \$20, controlling for age, the log-odds for nontraditional females is .5046, very similar to the .5828 for males. Both of these are higher than the log-odds of -1.0874 for traditional females. On the other hand, for the expressive crime "physically hurting another," the log-odds for males and nontraditional females are not similar. In fact, for this offense, the log-odds for nontraditional females is more similar to traditional females. In this extreme example, nontraditional women (structurally defined) are slightly less likely than traditional females, controlling for age, to say they will hurt another person. The only exception to this general pattern of greater support for the structural explanation for economic crimes is the offenses of driving while under the influence of alcohol. For that particular expressive crime, the structural distinction has as much predictive ability as it does for the economic offenses.

The cultural section of Table 6.20 indicates, as in the structural section, that males are more likely to commit each of the offenses related to gender category than either of the female categories. The only offense in which nontraditional females scored the lowest was shoot-

ing off fireworks (-.2664 for nontraditional females, -.1958 for traditional females). Traditional females were less likely to intend to commit the other offenses (including "physically hurting another") than were nontraditional females or males. Generally, support is discovered for the hypothesis which predicted nontraditional females were more similar to males than traditional females after controlling for age. The only offenses which provided exceptions were "physically hurting another" (structural) and "shooting fireworks" (cultural), where nontraditional females scored the lowest relative to the other two categories.

The cultural section of Table 6.20, however, fails to support the hypothesis that the cultural distinction is more appropriate for expressive crimes than for economic crimes, a hypothesis which predicts that the log-odds for nontraditional females would most resemble the log-odds for males for the expressive crimes. Instead, it is for the two economic crimes which are significantly influenced by gender category (gambling and tax cheating) that the log-odds for traditional females and males are most similar. The difference is much greater for the expressive crimes, especially illegal fireworks where the log-odds for nontraditional females is even lower than for traditional females.

In general, therefore, this stage of the logit analysis does provide some support for the argument that the structural distinction between traditionalism and nontraditionalism is most useful in predicting economic crimes. The corollary, that the cultural distinction is more appropriate for expressive crimes than for economic crimes receives no support. The implications of this finding are discussed in the concluding chapter.



### Additive Models: Gender, Sanctions, and Crime

After having revealed the relationship between gender and each of the offenses after controlling for age, the next step is to determine if these differences can be explained by differences in perceptions of sanctions. Hypotheses presented above predicted that the differences in criminality between traditional females and males might be due to the difference in perceptions of the punishments that would be incurred. Logit analysis permits examination of this prediction for each of the offenses separately.

Tables 6.21 and 6.22 present the conditional test statistics for the structural and cultural definitions respectively. The analysis was performed for each of the three types of sanction threats. As indicated earlier in Table 6.19, however, structural gender category, controlling for age, did not have a significant effect on theft > \$20. Cultural gender category did not have an effect on theft > \$20 or theft < \$20. There is no effect of gender category to explain by sanction threat for these offenses; and in these instances in Tables 6.21 and 6.23, Model III is irrelevant and will not be discussed.

As stated before, the conditional  $G^2$  associated with each model determines if the inclusion of a variable in the model contributes to the predictions of crime. For example, a significant conditional  $G^2$  for Model II would indicate that the inclusion of formal sanctions significantly improves predictions in crime after controlling for age. Model III indicates the improvement of predictions in crime made by adding gender to a model already containing age and sanction threat. It would make no sense, however, for present purposes to interpret Model III if

TABLE 6.2)  
CONDITIONAL TEST STATISTICS FOR "LOGIT" ANALYSIS OF AGE, GENDER, THREAT OF SANCTIONS AND CRIME (STRUCTURAL DEFINITION OF TRADITIONAL ISM)

Model	df	conditional df	Conditional G <sup>2</sup>							
			THEFT > \$20	GAMBLE	TAXES	THEFT < \$20	HURT	LITTER	FIREWORKS	ALCOHOL
<u>FORMAL SANCTIONS</u>										
I. CRIME WITH AGE	10	1	14.89***	11.30***	19.28***	16.57***	3.33	13.44***	36.44***	25.72***
II. CRIME WITH AGE AND FORMAL SANCTIONS	9	1	8.20**	20.73***	17.54***	8.37**	12.62***	22.44***	10.70**	38.83***
III. CRIME WITH AGE, FORMAL SANCTIONS AND GENDER	7	2	3.27 (a)	10.21**	18.99***	8.90*	7.44	11.21**	5.62	20.78***
IV. CRIME WITH AGE, FORMAL SANCTIONS, GENDER AND INTER- ACTION OF FORMAL SANCTIONS AND GENDER	5	2	1.44	5.58	.41	.77	.90	10.08**	2.24	.11
<hr/>										
<u>LOSS OF RESPECT</u>										
I. CRIME WITH AGE	10	1	14.89***	11.91***	19.28	16.56***	3.33	13.43***	32.84***	25.71***
II. CRIME WITH AGE AND LOSS OF RESPECT	9	1	7.36**	75.12***	32.78***	20.39***	14.17***	27.19***	26.83***	49.71***
III. CRIME WITH AGE, LOSS OF RESPECT, AND GENDER	7	2	5.57 (a)	17.06***	13.22**	7.70	6.14	12.98**	6.68	18.39***
IV. CRIME WITH AGE, LOSS OF RESPECT, GENDER, AND INTER- ACTION OF LOSS OF RESPECT AND GENDER	5	2	1.31	.77	.27	.23	1.41	8.68*	5.19	2.09
<hr/>										
<u>GUILT</u>										
I. CRIME WITH AGE	10	1	14.89***	11.90***	19.28***	16.57***	3.32	13.44***	36.53***	25.71***
II. CRIME WITH AGE AND GUILT	9	1	14.19***	108.35***	62.99***	11.95***	37.60***	38.00***	86.00***	59.49***
III. CRIME WITH AGE, GUILT AND GENDER	7	2	5.51 (a)	7.44	13.16**	9.60**	4.92	11.70***	4.23	21.77***
IV. CRIME WITH AGE, GUILT, GENDER, AND INTERACTION OF GUILT AND GENDER	5	2	5.65	6.56	.77	2.08	.52	1.16	.89	1.65

\*  $p \leq .05$

\*\*  $p \leq .01$

\*\*\*  $p \leq .001$

(a) The conditional G<sup>2</sup> is not appropriate to indicate if sanction explains the relationship between gender and the offense, since for this offense there was no significant effect of gender.

TABLE 6.22  
CONDITIONAL TEST STATISTICS FOR "LOGIT" ANALYSIS OF AGE, GENDER, THREAT OF SANCTIONS AND CRIME (CULTURAL DEFINITION OF TRADITIONALISM)

Model	conditional		Conditional G <sup>2</sup>							
	df	df	THEFT > \$20	GAMBLE	TAXES	THEFT < \$20	HURT	LITTER	FIREWORKS	ALCOHOL
<b>FORMAL SANCTIONS</b>										
I. CRIME WITH AGE	10	1	14.89***	11.90***	19.28***	16.57***	3.33	13.44***	36.60***	25.72***
II. CRIME WITH AGE AND FORMAL SANCTIONS	9	1	8.20**	20.73***	17.54***	8.36**	12.62***	22.44***	10.70**	38.34***
III. CRIME WITH AGE, FORMAL SANCTIONS, AND GENDER	7	2	4.99 (a)	17.06***	14.44***	2.29 (a)	7.59	8.71*	4.98	10.65**
IV. CRIME WITH AGE, FORMAL SANCTIONS, GENDER, AND INTERACTION OF FORMAL SANCTIONS AND GENDER	5	2	1.37	3.94	2.26	.73	.80	.08	.12	2.53
<b>LOSS OF RESPECT</b>										
I. CRIME WITH AGE	10	1	14.89***	11.90***	19.28***	16.57***	3.33	13.43***	36.60***	25.72***
II. CRIME WITH AGE AND LOSS OF RESPECT	9	1	7.36**	75.13***	32.78***	20.39***	14.17***	27.19***	25.88***	49.71***
III. CRIME WITH AGE, LOSS OF RESPECT, AND GENDER	7	2	6.83 (a)	22.43***	11.44**	4.13 (a)	6.34	11.29**	5.58	11.31**
IV. CRIME WITH AGE, LOSS OF RESPECT, GENDER AND INTERACTION OF LOSS OF RESPECT AND GENDER	5	2	1.59	1.83	.06	.14	1.78	7.27	.38	1.85
<b>GUILT</b>										
I. CRIME WITH AGE	10	1	14.89***	11.90***	19.67***	16.57***	3.33	13.44***	36.60***	25.72***
II. CRIME WITH AGE AND GUILT	9	1	14.19***	108.35	62.33***	11.95***	37.59***	38.00***	86.01***	59.48***
III. CRIME WITH AGE, GUILT AND GENDER	7	2	6.03 (a)	12.27**	5.90	2.94 (a)	4.95	9.66**	4.17	8.17*
IV. CRIME WITH AGE, GUILT, GENDER AND INTERACTION OF GUILT AND GENDER	5	2	4.81	.81	.23	2.04	.53	1.32	1.57	.54

\*  $p \leq .05$

\*\*  $p \leq .01$

\*\*\*  $p \leq .001$

(a) The conditional G<sup>2</sup> is not appropriate to indicate if sanction explains the relationship between gender and the offense, since for this offense there was no significant effect of gender.

Model II is not an improvement over Model I. If II is not an improvement over I, sanction threat controlling for age, is not a significant predictor of crime and it would be pointless to ask if the effect of sanction threat on crime accounts for the effect of gender category or crime, thereby producing an insignificant  $G^2$  for Model III. An inspection of Tables 6.21 and 6.22 indicates this is not a problem since II is always a significant improvement.

Following the additive hypotheses presented above, it is suspected that conditional  $G^2$ 's for Model III would not be significant. This would mean that adding gender to a prediction equation already containing sanction threats and age would not improve predictions of crime. In other words, any differences in the gender categories in their rates of crime could be explained by their difference in sanction estimations.

As noted in Table 6.19, all offenses except theft > \$20 are influenced by structural gender category. In the top section of Table 6.21, it is apparent that the relationship can be explained by gender category differences in perceived threat of legal punishment for two of the offenses--physically hurting another and illegal fireworks. For both of these Model III (which contains age, threat of formal sanctions, and structural gender category) is not a significant improvement over Model II (which contains only age and formal sanction increases the predictability of crime. Thus, for two of the seven offenses related to structural gender category, sanction threat appears to account for the effect of structural gender category on whether a person commits the offense.

A similar finding is revealed when the sanction threat included is loss of respect. The inclusion of gender does not significantly in-

crease predictions of the offenses theft > \$20, hurting another, and fireworks, after loss of respect and age are controlled. The differences between structural gender categories are explained thus by their perceptions of loss of respect associated with these offenses. On the other hand, for the offenses gambling, tax cheating, and driving under the influence, the gender variable does have a significant effect. This indicates that for these offenses there are differences in the structural gender groups unexplained by differences in loss of respect.

The analysis including guilt as the sanction threat reveals that for three offenses (gambling, hurting another, and fireworks), the significant differences between structural gender categories are explained by threat of guilt. For the other four (tax cheating, theft < \$20, littering, and alcohol) gender differences remain. Gender still contributes to predictions of crime after controlling for threats of guilt for these latter four offenses. Differences between the structural gender categories in these offenses cannot be explained totally by guilt differences.

Table 6.22 reveals the conditional test statistics using the cultural definitions of traditionalism. Two offenses, theft > \$20 and theft < \$20, are not considered because, as revealed in Table 6.19, cultural gender category, controlling for age, does not significantly influence the log-odds that a person will commit these offenses. It is meaningless, therefore, to ask if sanction threat accounts for the effect of gender category for these offenses.

Table 6.22 reveals that differences in criminality between the gender categories are explained by differences in sanction threat for

the offenses of physically hurting another person, and shooting fireworks illegally, regardless of the type of sanction. Additionally, when guilt is the sanction, tax cheating also is included. For these offenses, the inclusion of gender in a model already containing sanction threat and age does not contribute to predictions of crime.

These findings indicate that for some of the offenses for at least one of the two distinctions between traditional and nontraditional women (particularly physically hurting another and fireworks), the three gender categories tax cheating, theft < \$20 and gambling would have similar rates of crime if they were to perceive similar risks of sanctions. Any differences in crime rates between traditional females and males are simply due to their different perceptions of sanctions. Thus, the relations of traditional women to these social control mechanisms explains their lower rates of crime.

Generally, for the other two offenses (littering and alcohol), differences between traditional females and males cannot totally be explained by formal sanctions, loss of respect, or guilt. Traditional women commit less crime even after controlling for sanction threats. Perhaps motivation or opportunity play a greater role for these types of sanctions.

Tables 6.23 (structural) and 6.24 (cultural) present the summary of the estimated logit effect parameters for Model III's for those offense/punishment combinations in which, contrary to the hypotheses, gender category did add significantly to age and threat of punishment in predicting crime. For those offense/punishment combinations in which gender was not significant, the effect parameters are presented for Model

TABLE 6.23  
ESTIMATED LOGIT EFFECT PARAMETERS PREDICTING EACH OF THE COMMITTED OFFENSES BY AGE, GENDER, AND THREAT OF SANCTION (STRUCTURAL  
DEFINITION OF TRADITIONALISM)

VARIABLES	COMMITTED OFFENSE							
	THEFT > \$20	GAMBLING	TAXES	THEFT < \$20	PHYSICALLY HURT ANOTHER	LITTER	FIREWORKS	ALCOHOL
<u>FORMAL SANCTIONS</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>
<u>AGE</u>								
YOUNG	.9030	.3190	.4518	.6064	.2966	.3298	.6566	.5944
OLD	-.9030	-.3190	-.4518	-.6064	-.2966	-.3298	-.6566	-.5944
<u>FORMAL SANCTIONS</u>								
LOW	.6284	.5111	.5140	.4420	.5968	.6414	.4270	.7772
HIGH	-.6284	-.5111	-.5140	-.4420	-.5968	-.6414	-.4270	-.7772
<u>GENDER</u>								
MALES		.4066	.5692	.4762		.4948		.6636
N.T. FEMALES		.1040	.4002	.5298		.0142		.5186
TRAD. FEMALES		-.5104	-.9748	-1.0060		-.5090		-1.1822
<u>LOSS OF RESPECT</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>
<u>AGE</u>								
YOUNG	.8486	.2882	.3590	.5054	.2550	.3270	.5742	.5050
OLD	-.8486	-.2882	-.3590	-.5054	-.2550	-.3270	-.5742	-.5050
<u>LOSS OF RESPECT</u>								
LOW	.6018	1.1604	.7104	.7340	.6570	.6202	.7694	.8820
HIGH	-.6018	-1.1604	-.7104	-.7340	-.6570	-.6202	-.7694	-.8820
<u>GENDER</u>								
MALES		.6194	.3814			.5302		.5100
N.T. FEMALES		.1354	.2536			-.2476		.1226
TRAD. FEMALES		-.7548	-.6350			-.2826		-.6324
<u>GUILT</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>
<u>AGE</u>								
YOUNG	.8054	.1160	.3638	.6292	.2324	.4720	.4728	.4704
OLD	-.8054	-.1160	-.3638	-.6292	-.2324	-.4720	-.4728	-.4704
<u>GUILT</u>								
LOW	1.0482	1.3574	.9676	.7022	1.0702	.9200	1.2100	1.0524
HIGH	-1.0482	-1.3574	-.9676	-.7022	-1.0702	-.9200	-1.2100	-1.0524
<u>GENDER</u>								
MALE			.3246	.3314		.4628		.4012
N.T. FEMALE			.1446	.0158		-.0738		.1830
TRAD. FEMALE			-.4708	-.3472		-.3890		-.5842

TABLE 6.24  
ESTIMATED LOGIT EFFECT PARAMETERS PREDICTING EACH OF THE COMMITTED OFFENSES BY AGE, GENDER, AND THREAT OF SANCTION (CULTURAL DEFINITION OF TRADITIONALISM)

VARIABLES	COMMITTED OFFENSE							
	THEFT > \$20	GAMBLING	TAXES	THEFT < \$20	PHYSICALLY HURT ANOTHER	LITTER	FIREWORKS	ALCOHOL
<u>FORMAL SANCTIONS</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>
<u>AGE</u>								
YOUNG	.9030	.3428	.4924	.6498	.2906	.3566	.6566	.6094
OLD	-.9030	-.3428	-.4924	-.6498	-.2906	-.3566	-.6566	-.6094
<u>FORMAL SANCTIONS</u>								
LOW	.6284	.4830	.5520	.4830	.4968	.6550	.4270	.7418
HIGH	-.6284	-.4830	-.5520	-.4830	-.4968	-.6550	-.4270	-.7418
<u>GENDER</u>								
MALES		.3472	.4086			.4626		.4504
N.T. FEMALES		.3268	.2934			-.2468		.1948
TRAD. FEMALES		-.6738	-.7020			-.2156		-.6452
<u>LOSS OF RESPECT</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>
<u>AGE</u>								
YOUNG	.0486	.3050	.4220	.5954	.2550	.3534	.6098	.5550
OLD	-.0486	-.3050	-.4220	-.5954	-.2550	-.3534	-.6098	-.5550
<u>LOSS OF RESPECT</u>								
LOW	.6018	1.1450	.7696	.7340	.6570	.6362	.7598	.8850
HIGH	-.6018	-1.1450	-.7696	-.7340	-.6570	-.6362	-.7598	-.8850
<u>GENDER</u>								
MALES		.6732	.5262			.5568		.6928
N.T. FEMALES		-.0952	.3010			-.0588		.3928
TRAD. FEMALES		-.3778	-.8272			-.4980		-1.0256
<u>GUILT</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>
<u>AGE</u>								
YOUNG	.8054	.0538	.3624	.6270	.2324	.4436	.4728	.3850
OLD	-.8054	-.0538	-.3624	-.6270	-.2324	-.4436	-.4728	-.3850
<u>GUILT</u>								
LOW	1.0482	1.3432	1.0162	.7204	1.0702	.8968	1.2100	1.1480
HIGH	-1.0482	-1.3432	-1.0162	-.7284	-1.0702	-.8968	-1.2100	-1.1480
<u>GENDER</u>								
MALES		.4712				.5100		.6152
N.T. FEMALES		-.0956				.0380		.6446
TRAD. FEMALES		-.3756				-.5480		-1.2598



II's (with only age and sanction threat in the equation). The purpose of these tables is to determine if, for these remaining gender differences, the log-odds for the gender categories, controlling for age and sanction threat are consistent with the general hypothesis that traditional females differ more from males than do nontraditional females in their likelihood of committing the offense.

The findings generally support the hypotheses. For each combination of offense and sanction, males are more likely to commit the offense than are nontraditional or traditional females, with one exception. For the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, nontraditional female (cultural) are more likely to commit the offense (.6446) after controlling for guilt, than are males (.6152). Thus, in general, males are more likely to commit the offenses than either of the gender categories even after controlling for age and sanction threat.

Traditional females generally are more conforming than nontraditional females on each of the offenses. One exception is that nontraditional females are less likely to litter after controlling for formal sanctions (cultural section). This difference is small, but indicates that for some offenses nontraditional females may surpass the conformity of traditional females. In general, nontraditional females resemble males in criminality more than do traditional females. There are, however, certain offenses where nontraditional females resemble traditional females more than they do males. For example, in the structural section, for the offenses of littering (controlling for loss of respect, formal sancitons, or guilt) nontraditional females are more similar to tradiitonal females than they are to males. In the cultural section for

the offense of gambling (controlling for guilt) and for littering (controlling for formal sanctions or loss of respect) nontraditional females are more similar to traditional females than to males. But the general hypothesis that nontraditional females resemble males in levels of criminality more than they do traditional females is supported with these few exceptions. For these few exceptions nontraditional females resemble traditional females in conformity, but traditional females are the most conforming group for every offense with the exception of littering.

#### Interaction Models: Gender, Sanction Threats, and Crime

As indicated in Table 6.21 and 6.22, by the  $G^2$  for Model IV, the interaction effects of gender and sanction threats were generally not significant. This indicates that for most offenses, males and females are similarly affected by the threat of social sanctions. There were only two interaction terms out of 48 possible which were significant: 1) the structural gender category with formal sanctions for littering, and 2) the structural gender category with loss of respect for littering. These two significant interaction terms indicate that the interaction of gender and sanction contributes to the prediction of littering, above the additive effects of the variables.

Table 6.25 indicates the estimated effect parameters for the model including those two significant interactions of gender and sanctions. Since only the two presented above are significant, only these will be included in the table. The top section presents the parameters when loss of respect is the sanction included; the bottom section includes formal sanctions. This table also contains the computations necessary to calculate the odds and probabilities of committing the offense

TABLE 6.25  
ESTIMATED EFFECT PARAMETERS, ODDS, AND PROBABILITIES FOR MODELS WITH INTERACTIONS OF GENDER AND SANCTION THREATS

Structural/Loss of Respect/Littering

	Main Effect		Sanction Effect		Gender Effect		Interaction Effect		Log Odds	Odds	P	Difference in P's
Males with low loss of respect	-.8500	+	.8122	+	.7298	+	-.4800	=	.212	1.236	.55	.16
Males with high loss of respect	-.8500	+	-.8122	+	.7298	+	.4800	=	-.452	.636	.39	
Nontrad. females with low loss of respect	-.8500	+	.8122	+	.0270	+	-.1338	=	-.145	.865	.46	.28
Nontrad. females with high loss of respect	-.8500	+	-.8122	+	.0270	+	.1338	=	-1.501	.223	.18	
Trad. females with low loss of respect	-.8500	+	.8122	+	-.7570	+	.6138	=	-.181	.834	.46	.41
Trad. females with high loss of respect	-.8500	+	-.8122	+	-.7570	+	-.6138	=	-3.033	.048	.05	

Structural/Formal Sanctions/Littering

Males with low formal sanctions	-1.4184	+	1.1402	+	.9294	+	-.4568	=	.194	1.214	.55	.31
Males with high for- mal sanctions	-1.4184	+	-1.1402	+	.9294	+	.4568	=	-1.172	.310	.24	
Nontrad. females with low formal sanctions	-1.4184	+	1.1402	+	.7768	+	-.9602	=	-.452	.630	.39	.08
Nontrad. females with high formal sanctions	-1.4184	+	-1.1402	+	.7768	+	.9602	=	-.822	.440	.31	
Trad. females with low formal sanctions	-1.4184	+	1.1402	+	-1.7064	+	1.4170	=	-.568	.567	.36	.36
Trad. females with high formal sanctions	-1.4184	+	-1.1402	+	-1.7064	+	-1.4170	=	-5.682	.003	.003	

of littering. These statistics provide a clearer means of interpreting the directions of interaction effects than the log-odds statistics. The probabilities (P) reveal the probability of committing the offense of littering given the category of the independent variables. For example, for males with low estimates of loss of respect, the probability of littering is .55. For males with high perceptions of threats of loss of respect, the p is .39. Note that for both loss of respect and formal sanctions, traditional females with perceptions of high threats have a probability of littering which is almost zero (.05 for loss of respect and .003 for formal sanctions). Thus, traditional females with perceptions of high threats of loss of respect or formal sanctions have almost no probability of littering. For nontraditional females with perceptions of high sanctions, the probability of littering is .18 (loss of respect) or .31 (formal sanctions). For males the probabilities of littering with perceptions of high sanctions are .39 (loss or respect) and .14 (formal sanctions). Thus, among persons with high estimates of threats of sanctions, traditional females have the lowest probability of littering.

The important comparison to be made, for tests of the interaction hypotheses presented in Chapter Six, are those which compare the difference between males, nontraditional females, and traditional females in the difference in probabilities between high and low sanctions. For example, the difference between the probabilities of littering for males with high estimates of loss of respect and males with low estimates of loss of respect is .16. The comparable difference is .41 for traditional females, and .28 for nontraditional females. This indicates that the

differences in threats of loss of respect have a greater effect on traditional females' littering than males' or nontraditional females'. Thus, the relationship between sanction threats and littering is stronger for traditional females than males. For nontraditional females, the impact of sanction threats is less than traditional females, but greater than for males.

Similarly, a comparison of the probabilities in the bottom section shows the effects of perceptions of high and low formal sanction threats for males, nontraditional females, and traditional females. Once again, differences in sanction threats explain more of the difference in littering for traditional females (difference in p's = .36) than for males (difference in p's = .31) or nontraditional females (difference in p's = .08), but the difference is small. In this table, the major source of the interaction is the small effect of formal sanctions on littering among traditional females. The probability of a nontraditional female committing the offense if she perceives a high threat of formal sanctions (.31) is not much less than if she perceives a low threat of formal sanctions (.39). Furthermore, her probability of committing the offense is greater than the probability for a male who perceives a high sanction threat (.24).

These findings for the offense of littering tend to support the hypothesis that traditional females are more affected by sanction threats than are nontraditional females or males. However, the other 46 possible interactions were not significant. The two are, furthermore, different in nature from the interactions discovered in the composite section of this chapter. Using a composite measure of illegal behavior, the only

only interactions which were significant revealed a greater impact of sanction threats for males than for traditional females. Conversely, the only significant interaction effects for single offenses disclose a greater impact of sanction threats for traditional females. These inconsistent findings may possibly be explained by insignificant interactions at the individual offense level summing to a significant interaction in a composite. In general, the data from both the composite and the offense level analysis provide no clear pattern of a consistent interaction effect of gender category and sanction threat on crime.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CONCLUSIONS

This research has addressed issues surrounding differences in criminality between females and males. Those researchers who have concluded that crime rates of women are approaching those of males have specified two types of processes that may be causing this convergence. One is a structural argument suggesting that females' structural positions are beginning to resemble those of males and that these positions present motivations, opportunities, or relations to social control mechanisms which lead to greater illegal behavior by these females. The second is a cultural argument postulating that females' attitudes or expectations of appropriate gender role behavior are changing, giving them a normative outlook that is more similar to that of males. Thus, their behavior resembles males' behavior. Both contentions assume that women who currently resemble males on these two factors will have rates of criminality similar to males. Those women who occupy traditionally "feminine" positions or hold traditional attitudes concerning the feminine gender role will be quite different from males (and from nontraditional females) in rates of illegal behavior. This research addressed these

assumptions directly.

Consistent with the structural argument, it was discovered that women who were employed were similar to males in their self reports of future deviance. On the other hand, women in this sample who were not employed were significantly different from males in self-reported criminality. Thus, occupying a structural position considered "masculine" (i.e., labor force employment) appears to affect rates of criminality. This suggests that an increase in numbers of employed women would result in an increase in at least some types of criminality among females.

It also was discovered, consistent with the cultural argument, that women who held nontraditional attitudes towards the feminine gender role were less conforming than those who held traditional attitudes.. These nontraditional women had rates of self-reported criminality that approached those of males. Women with traditional attitudes towards gender roles were significantly different from males in criminality.

In general, this research disclosed that certain categories of females (i.e., traditional females) are depressing the total female crime rate. Both the cultural and structural distinction between traditionalism and nontraditionalism provided subdivisions of females which independently predicted crime. Although the structural distinction was a slightly better predictor of crime, both were found to present independent, significant effects of future criminality. Nontraditional women, regardless of the definition of traditionalism, were more similar to males in illegal behavior than were traditional women.

As suspected, these relationships were confounded by the age structures of the gender categories. Specifically, the higher conformi-



ty of traditional females was explained partially by the preponderance of older persons in this category. The similarity of nontraditional females and males was due partially to the average young age of the nontraditional females. Although age partially accounted for these relationships, it was discovered that the hypotheses were still supported after controlling for age. Nontraditional females were more similar to males in criminality than were traditional females.

It should be noted that although nontraditional females were more similar to males than traditional females on most crimes, they still were slightly less likely to commit these crimes than were males. Although most of these differences were small and generally not significant, for certain offenses these differences were significant. For the one violent crime measure in this study ("physically hurting another person on purpose"), nontraditional females were significantly different from males. Thus, women who are entering structural positions similar to males, or who have nontraditional attitudes are not resembling men in this violent crime. In fact, under some conditions, these nontraditional females reported less involvement in the violent crime than traditional females. This points out the need to distinguish between types of crime when predicting a convergence of male and female crime rates. Further research is needed to explore these differences in violent behavior between genders. In addition, research is needed to determine the causes and conditions of higher violence among traditional women than nontraditional women.

Those women who are nontraditional have not completely adopted males' criminality patterns for property crime either. For some of

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these types of offenses, nontraditional females were slightly less involved than males. The differences between these two categories found in this study may be explicable by the measures of "nontraditionalism." Employment in the labor force does not imply women are entering the same occupations as men. In fact, occupational segregation is well-documented. Perhaps a more pure test of nontraditional roles for women would take into account those women who are entering typical "male" occupations versus those who are employed in typical "female" occupations. Those women in nontraditional occupations would be expected to resemble males more closely than all other employed females. Future analysis of the gender differences in crime should create divisions of nontraditional females which most approximate positions similar to those of males.

In the future, a different cultural measure of traditionalism, tapping the extent to which females are adopting some of the "masculine" personality traits, might be used. The measure in this research actually only examined the extent to which women have abandoned traditional expectations of the feminine role. A measure more consistent with the cultural explanation of rising female crime rates probably would include the extent to which females are adopting the "masculine" traits thought to be consistent with crime.

Logit analysis allowed analysis of the effect of the distinctions of traditionalisms on certain types of crimes. As suspected, the types of crimes explained by the structural distinction were generally, but not completely, of an economic nature rather than of an expressive nature. This was consistent with the logic of the structural explanation of rising female crime. On the other hand, the cultural distinction

was not a better predictor of expressive crimes than of economic crimes. For many of the economic crimes the cultural distinction was a significant predictor; for some of the expressive crimes it was not.

The failure to disclose the expected patterns for the structural versus the cultural distinction may, in part, be a consequence of the measurement problems discussed above. Another possible explanation, however, is that the arguments generally presented with these two distinctions rely on specific theories of crime. For example, those who advocate a structural argument for increasing female crime rates generally imply that the "cause" of crime is the opportunity to commit it. Participating in the labor force provides new opportunities to commit economic crimes, so women who enter the labor force increase their opportunities to engage in economic crimes. Following the structural argument, female crime rate increases occur only for economic crime.

Those who advocate a cultural argument suggest that rising female crime is due to the adoption of "masculine" traits by females. In some way these traits motivate persons to crime, as crime is viewed as the "acting out" of personality traits. The expressive types of crime are the ones which presumably will increase for females.

Both these explanations, therefore, limit their explanations of rising female crime rates to specific theories of crime. Perhaps a clearer explanation of female crime would emerge if analysis were grounded in a theory in which the distinction between the cultural and the structural definitions of traditionalism versus nontraditionalism was irrelevant. In the present research, each of these distinctions made a significant contribution to explaining gender differences in crime.

Furthermore, the results were basically the same regardless of which distinction was being used.

Although these findings could be explained by several theories of crime, (i.e., anomie or opportunity), this research considered a social control perspective in addressing the gender-crime relationship. It was suspected that the traditional women are more conforming because they perceive greater risks of punishment associated with deviance. The tests of hypotheses revealed that traditional females perceived greater loss of respect, guilt and formal sanctions associated with rule-breaking than did either males or nontraditional females. Traditional females continued to report greater risk estimates even after controlling for age. This was true regardless of whether the structural or cultural distinction was used, and, in the analysis of composite scales, over a third of the relationship between gender category and crime was accounted for by differences in perceived threat of sanctions across gender categories. Whether measured in terms of attitudes or in terms of position in the social structure, traditional females perceive a higher threat of all three sanctions (legal punishment, loss of respect, and guilt feelings) than either males or nontraditional females. In terms of perceived sanction threats, nontraditional women are not very different from males.

An unexpected finding revealed that nontraditional females estimated the lowest chances of loss of respect of all gender categories. Although not significantly different, they reported slightly lower perceived threats of loss of respect than males. It had been expected that males would perceive the lowest threats of all types of sanction, yet this was not the case for loss of respect. Perhaps these low estimates

are due to the experience of nontraditional females in deviating from the traditional female role. The concept of "pluralistic ignorance" suggests that persons who have deviated will have more realistic notions of levels of sanctions that follow deviance. The concept of "pluralistic ignorance" would not apply as well for nontraditional females vis a vis males for all types of sanctions. Most deviations from traditional sex roles are not illegal; thus, nontraditional women would not necessarily have greater encounters with formal sanctions than males.

Having discovered higher estimates of sanctions among traditional females, tests of additive hypotheses revealed that these greater estimates of sanctions among traditional females partially accounted for their greater conformity. Thus, part of the differences in criminality among traditional females and males can be explained by traditional females' higher estimates of threats of punishments.

The analysis generally has revealed the importance of differences in sanction threat perceptions in explaining differences in crime rates among the gender categories. For many of the offenses considered in the logit analysis, the difference between males and traditional females was due simply to their differences in estimates of the sanctions perceived to be associated with crime. These sanctions may be imposed by the state, informally, or by oneself. In fact, the sanction threat of guilt appeared to be the best predictor of crime differences. Differences in the threat of guilt explained the lower crime among traditional females for some offenses.

On the other hand, these differences in perceptions of sanctions do not account totally for gender differences in some crimes.

Further research should incorporate deterrence theory with other theories of deviance to explain gender crime rates. Opportunity and motivation theories present starting places from which to examine the unexplained variance in crime by gender.

The tests for interactions revealed that, in general, traditional females were not more deterred by sanction threats than males or non-traditional females. For the most part, the impact of sanctions had a similar deterrent effect for both males and females. The interactions that were uncovered (exceptions for the offense of littering), indicated that males were affected more by sanction threats than were females. The differences in criminality between genders due to sanction threat simply reflects the perceptions of greater sanctions by traditional females, not a greater deterability.

Furthermore, this analysis indicates that, while perceptions of sanction threats were important in explaining differences between genders in crime, they were less helpful in explaining variation in criminality among females. In fact, the relationship between sanctions and criminality was somewhat stronger for males than for females. This suggests that the processes by which decisions to commit an illegal act are made may be somewhat different for females. This finding calls into question those researchers who maintain that the popular sociological theories of deviance apply equally well to males and females (c.f. Smith, 1979). It is possible, for example, that among females variation in motivation and opportunity to commit crime accounts for more of the variance in criminality than these variables account for among males.

Finally, this research has revealed the importance of sociolog-

ical explanations of gender differences in crime as opposed to biological ones. It indicates that one's positions in the social structure and roles expectations affect levels of deviance. As women and men begin to share similar roles and positions, it is likely that they will experience similar criminal patterns. This is not to say that women will become criminal as traditional sex roles change, but only that similar positions provide similar possibilities for crime. One also might expect that if men were to adopt more "feminine" role expectations their rates of criminality might decline.

It should be noted that the lack of conformity that is sometimes labeled "criminal" can also be valued in the social system. The ability to disregard sanction threats and guilt imposed for nonconformity also allows for innovation and creativity that are frequently rewarded. The discovery that the traditional female's positions and role expectations produce greater conformity because the persons who occupy them fear social sanctions, indicates that they are more constrained in their behavior than are those who do not occupy these roles and positions. This fear of sanctions imposes limited options in behavior and makes these people unwilling to challenge conventional social standards. Sociologists have long recognized the importance of nonconformity in social change and challenges to legitimate social orders. Fear of nonconformity due to fear of sanctions impedes these challenges.

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APPENDIX A  
QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS AND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS

TABLE 1  
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF SELF-REPORTS OF FUTURE ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR

INSTRUCTIONS:

As you know, many people do the things we have been discussing. Previous studies like this one suggest that as many as half the people do. I would like you to use this answer sheet to indicate if you think you ever would do these things in the future. Because some people might be embarrassed to answer honestly, I don't want you to give me your answer out loud. Instead, use the sheet of paper and circle either YES or NO for each activity as I read them. Then, when we are finished, you can put the sheet of paper back into the envelope. In the future will you ever...

OFFENSE ITEMS AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS:

	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
Take something from someone or someplace worth \$20 or more that does not belong to you	6.8	93.2
Gamble illegally on a sporting event or other situation	49.0	51.0
Fail to report certain income or claim a deduction you do not deserve on your income tax return	28.9	71.1
Take something from someone or someplace worth less than \$20 that does not belong to you	13.6	86.4
Physically hurt another person on purpose	11.9	88.9
Litter a highway, street, or public recreation area	37.1	62.9
Shoot off fireworks withing the city limits	34.3	65.7
Drive an automobile while under the influence of alcohol	26.6	73.4

TABLE 2  
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF PERCEIVED CERTAINTY OF FORMAL PUNISHMENTS

INSTRUCTIONS:

Indicate your rough estimate of the chances you would be arrested by the police if you did each of these things. Choose your answer from the list on the card.

1. definitely would be arrested
2. probably would be arrested
3. probably would not be arrested
4. definitely would not be arrested

"What are the chances you would be arrested if you .....

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS:

	<u>DEFINITELY OR PROBABLY WOULD BE ARRESTED</u>	<u>DEFINITELY OR PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE ARRESTED</u>
Took something from someone or someplace worth \$20 or more that did not belong to you	71.4	28.6
Gambled illegally on a sporting event or other situation	27.8	72.2
Failed to report certain income or claimed an undeserved deduction on you income tax return	41.9	58.1
Took something from someone or someplace worth less than \$20 that did not belong to you	46.5	53.5
Physically hurt another person on purpose	69.9	30.1
Littered highways, streets, or public recreations areas	26.9	73.1
Shot off fireworks within the city limits	35.4	64.6
Drove an automobile while under the influence of alcohol	69.9	30.1



TABLE 3  
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF PERCEIVED CERTAINTY OF LOSS OF RESPECT

INSTRUCTIONS:

Think of the five adults you know best. For each of the activities, indicate how many of the five probably would lose respect for you if they found out you did each of these things. Your answer will be some number between 0 and 5. "How many of the five probably would lose respect for you if they found out you...."

OFFENSE ITEMS AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS:

	<u>0 through 2</u>	<u>3 through 5</u>
Took something from someone or someplace worth \$20 or more that did not belong to you	24.0	76.0
Gambled illegally on a sporting event or other situation	65.8	34.2
Failed to report certain income or claimed an undeserved deduction on your income tax return	59.3	40.7
Took something from someone or someplace worth less than \$20 that did not belong to you	31.1	68.9
Physically hurt another person on purpose	22.6	77.4
Littered highways, streets, or public recreation areas	56.7	43.3
Shot off fireworks within the city limits	69.5	30.5
Drove an automobile while under the influence of alcohol	43.6	56.4

TABLE 4  
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF PERCEIVED CERTAINTY OF GUILT

INSTRUCTIONS:

I will read you a list of eight illegal activities. Although a particular activity is illegal, you personally might not consider it always wrong to do it. That depends on your own personal beliefs about what is right and wrong. For each of the activities I read, please indicate if you think it is always wrong to do it, usually wrong, sometimes wrong, seldom wrong, or never wrong to do it.

OFFENSE ITEMS AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS:

	<u>ALWAYS WRONG TO DO IT</u>	<u>NOT ALWAYS WRONG TO DO IT</u>
Take something from someone or someplace worth \$20 or more that does not belong to you	93.2	6.8
Gamble illegally on a sporting event or other situation	37.4	62.6
Fail to report certain income or claim an undeserved deduction on you income tax return	62.8	37.2
Take something from someone or someplace worth less than \$20 that does not belong to you	89.8	10.2
Physically hurt another person on purpose	79.0	21.0
Litter highways, streets, or public recreation areas	82.4	17.6
Shoot off fireworks within the city limits	55.8	44.2
Drive an automobile while under the influence of alcohol	79.8	20.2

TABLE 5  
 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES

---

1. Although the wife might voice her opinion, the husband should have the final say in matters that affect the family.

strongly agree	76
agree somewhat	76
disagree somewhat	78
strongly disagree	123

2. In a family, the wife's most important role is to obey her husband.

strongly agree	42
agree somewhat	68
disagree somewhat	78
strongly disagree	165

3. It is somehow unnatural to place women in positions of authority over men.

strongly agree	42
agree somewhat	69
disagree somewhat	96
strongly disagree	144

4. Although some equality in marriage might be a good thing, the husband ought to have the main say in financial matters.

strongly agree	64
agree somewhat	92
disagree somewhat	96
strongly disagree	101

---

APPENDIX B  
FACTOR ANALYSIS AND SCALE CONSTRUCTION

CODES FOR OFFENSES IN APPENDIX B:

- A THEFT GREATER THAN \$20
- B GAMBLING
- C TAX CHEATING
- D THEFT LESS THAN \$20
- E PHYSICALLY HURTING ANOTHER
- F LITTERING
- G FIREWORKS
- H DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE

TABLE 1  
 FACTOR ANALYSIS: SELF-REPORTED FUTURE DEVIANCE EIGHT-ITEM SCALE

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
A	--	--						
B	.1629	--						
C	.2499	.2877	--	--				
D	.5823	.2063	.2030	--				
E	.2136	.1998	.2290	.1095	--			
F	.1420	.1971	.2477	.2256	.1705	--		
G	.2554	.2830	.3165	.2707	.1955	.2483	--	
H	.2192	.2812	.3229	.2472	.1547	.2271	.2671	--

<u>Factor Number</u>	<u>Eigenvalue</u>	<u>Item Label</u>	<u>Loading</u>
1	2.701	A	.556
2	1.117	B	.460
3	.879	C	.538
4	.817	D	.565
5	.732	E	.353
6	.713	F	.411
7	.650	G	.538
8	.390	H	.550

TABLE 2  
 FACTOR ANALYSIS: PERCEIVED THREAT OF FORMAL SANCTIONS EIGHT-ITEM SCALE

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
A	--							
B	.4123	--						
C	.2667	.3397	--					
D	.6173	.3864	.3192	--				
E	.3038	.2503	.2895	.3988	--			
F	.3730	.4802	.2791	.4771	.2935	--		
G	.3485	.3620	.3477	.4647	.3477	.6138	--	
H	.3963	.3930	.3634	.3922	.3593	.3899	.4355	--

<u>Factor Number</u>	<u>Eigenvalue</u>	<u>Item Label</u>	<u>Loading</u>
1	3.704	A	.635
2	.833	B	.602
3	.818	C	.490
4	.749	D	.723
5	.614	E	.503
6	.586	F	.689
7	.358	G	.686
8	.338	H	.622

TABLE 3  
 FACTOR ANALYSIS: PERCEIVED THREAT OF LOSS OF RESPECT EIGHT-ITEM SCALE

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
A	--							
B	.3332	--						
C	.4253	.6008	--					
D	.7280	.3918	.5085	--				
E	.6084	.2911	.3834	.5836	--			
F	.3253	.4738	.4673	.3997	.3306	--		
G	.2458	.5420	.4727	.3100	.2267	.6295	--	
H	.3942	.5110	.5836	.4706	.4650	.4529	.4769	--

<u>Factor Number</u>	<u>Eigenvalue</u>	<u>Item Label</u>	<u>Loading</u>
1	4.167	A	.650
2	1.280	B	.667
3	.6507	C	.745
4	.5303	D	.727
5	.412	E	.610
6	.376	F	.645
7	.326	G	.610
8	.258	H	.720

TABLE 4  
 FACTOR ANALYSIS: PERCEIVED THREAT OF GUILT EIGHT-ITEM SCALE

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
A	--							
B	.0771	--						
C	.1309	.3102	--					
D	.5626	.1542	.2007	--				
E	.2582	.1184	.1110	.2329	--			
F	.2606	.1873	.1607	.3155	.2092	--		
G	.1117	.3652	.2977	.2057	.2260	.2570	--	
H	.2526	.2019	.3383	.2977	.1996	.1758	.2519	--

<u>Factor Number</u>	<u>Eigenvalue</u>	<u>Item Label</u>	<u>Loading</u>
1	2.636	A	.524
2	1.278	B	.398
3	.905	C	.445
4	.824	D	.624
5	.705	E	.396
6	.626	F	.464
7	.601	G	.485
8	.424	H	.511



TABLE 5  
 FACTOR ANALYSIS: TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES FOUR-ITEM SCALE

	A	B	C	D
A	--			
B	.6209	--		
C	.4066	.4207	--	
D	.6594	.5347	.4155	--

<u>Factor Number</u>	<u>Eigenvalue</u>	<u>Item Label</u>	<u>Loading</u>
1	2.544	A	.835
2	.670	B	.735
3	.468	C	.530
4	.318	D	.766

APPENDIX C  
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MODELS WITHOUT AGE

TABLE 1  
ADDITIVE MODELS: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED FUTURE DEVIANCE ON GENDER CATEGORIES AND THREAT OF FORMAL SANCTIONS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error B	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
FORMAL	- .2345	.0429	-.2747	29.852***
D1	- .7393	.5299	-.0744	1.947
D2	-2.9633	.5766	-.2833	26.414***
(constant)	1.0233			
Multiple R = .4274				
<hr/>				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
FORMAL	- .2504	.0429	-.2933	34.006***
D1	- .8171	.5778	-.0762	2.000
D2	-2.3751	.5386	-.2429	19.442***
(constant)	1.0017			
Multiple R = .4076				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

TABLE 2  
ADDITIVE MODELS: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED FUTURE DEVIANCE ON GENDER CATEGORIES AND THREAT OF LOSS OF RESPECT

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error B	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
LOSS	- .3169	.0383	-.3947	68.571***
D1	-1.2551	.5029	-.1264	6.228*
D2	-2.8869	.5405	-.2760	28.529***
(constant)	1.1666			
Multiple R = .50836				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
LOSS	- .3323	.0371	-.4138	78.093***
D1	-1.2451	.5439	-.1161	5.241*
D2	-2.5262	.5002	-.2583	25.241***
(constant)	1.1581			
Multiple R = .5022				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

TABLE 3  
ADDITIVE MODEL: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED FUTURE DEVIANCE ON GENDER AND THREAT OF GUILT

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
GUILT	- .5317	.0454	-.5106	137.272***
D1	- .8008	.4658	-.0806	2.956
D2	-2.6805	.4995	-.2563	28.803***
(constant)	.9674			
Multiple R = .6027				
<hr/>				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
GUILT	- .5431	.0460	-.5216	139.440***
D1	-1.0748	.5086	-.1002	4.465*
D2	-2.0615	.4721	-.2108	19.069***
(constant)	.9594			
Multiple R = .5883				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

TABLE 4  
INTERACTION MODEL: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED FUTURE DEVIANCE ON GENDER, FORMAL SANCTIONS, AND  
INTERACTION TERMS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
FORMAL	-.3065	.0645	-.3590	22.574
D1	-.6294	.5339	-.0633	1.390
D2	-2.8861	.5933	-.2760	23.666
D1FORMAL	.1699	.1013	.1051	2.810
D2FORMAL	.0811	.1063	.0496	.582
(constant)	.9255			
Multiple R = .4350				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
FORMAL	-.3065	.0653	-.3590	22.043***
D1	-.7422	.5816	-.0692	1.629
D2	-2.3985	.5438	-.2453	19.454***
D1FORMAL	.0671	.1130	.0356	.352
D2FORMAL	.1188	.0977	.0822	1.478
(constant)	.9255			
Multiple R = .4120				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

TABLE 5  
INTERACTION MODEL: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED FUTURE DEVIANCE ON GENDER, LOSS OF RESPECT AND  
INTERACTION TERMS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
LOSS	- .3832	.0593	-.4772	41.703***
D1	-1.1577	.5110	-.1166	5.133*
D2	-2.9605	.5560	-.2831	28.355***
D1LOSS	.1142	.0921	.0761	1.537
D2LOSS	.1127	.0926	.0773	1.479
(constant)	1.1299			
Multiple R = .5128				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
LOSS	- .3831	.0592	-.4772	41.834***
D1	-1.3000	.5449	-.1212	5.693*
D2	-2.6332	.4992	-.2693	27.825***
D1LOSS	- .0635	.1013	-.0358	.393
D2LOSS	.1622	.0839	.1271	3.732
(constant)	1.1299			
Multiple R = .5151				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05

TABLE 6  
INTERACTION MODEL: REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED FUTURE DEVIANCE ON GENDER, GUILT, AND INTERACTION TERMS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	b	Std. Error b	B	F
<u>Structural<sup>1</sup></u>				
GUILT	- .7279	.0703	-.6990	107.335***
D1	- .6204	.4609	-.0625	1.812
D2	-2.6338	.5142	-.2518	26.235***
D1GUILT	.3498	.0964	.2231	13.176***
D2GUILT	.2602	.1393	.0976	3.487
(constant)	.8293			
Multiple R = .6221				
-----				
<u>Cultural<sup>2</sup></u>				
GUILT	- .7279	.0710	-.6990	105.259***
D1	- .8396	.5024	-.0783	2.793
D2	-1.8600	.4747	-.1902	15.354***
D1GUILT	.3463	.1003	.2381	15.622
D2GUILT	.1268	.1253	.0545	1.025
(constant)	.8293			
Multiple R = .5883				

1. D1 = 1 for employed females; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for nonemployed females; 0 for all others.

2. D1 = 1 for females with nontraditional sex role attitudes; 0 for all others. D2 = 1 for females with traditional attitudes; 0 for all others.

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05