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MULTIPOLARITY AND EAST ASIA

The University of Oklahoma

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MULTIPOLARITY AND EAST ASIA

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degree of

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BY

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Norman, Oklahoma

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MULTIPOLARITY AND EAST ASIA

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For Kay and Robert, after
eight long years.

PREFACE

This dissertation is concerned with systems theory as a method of analyzing international politics. Since World War II, many theories have been proposed for ~~analyzing international~~ politics. Of the various proposed theories, systems theory is believed to provide the best means of analysis because it is both interdisciplinary and all-inclusive. That is, it uses data from many disciplines and can include studies of all types of political phenomena such as national interests, power, decision-making, and linkages between domestic and international politics.

There are a number of contending theorists and analytical models within the area of systems theory itself. The particular model used in this dissertation will be based primarily upon that of Richard N. Rosecrance, but with some modifications. Rosecrance's model is believed to provide the best means of analysis of the global international system and its geographic subsystems for both the present and any historical time period. Further, Rosecrance's model is believed to provide the best basis for the prediction of the near-term future global international political system.

It has been evident, since the late 1960's, that a new international system is evolving from the old bipolar one, and it is now possible to identify the essential actors of this future system. The purpose of this dissertation is to define and describe the essential components, forces, and characteristics of the emerging future global system through an analysis of the Far Eastern subsystem. With the exception of a federated Western Europe, all of the essential actors of the new system currently

face each other in the Far East. Their past and future dealings with each other there will affect the functioning of the future global international system. Therefore it is believed that an analysis of the goals, capabilities, and problems of the essential actors within the Far East geographical subsystems, as well as an analysis of the methods which they devise to deal with each other, will provide clues concerning the makeup of the entire future international system. For the purposes of this dissertation, the Far Eastern subsystem will include the geographic portion of the Asian land mass from India's western border to the Pacific Ocean, as well as the island states of that ocean. Although India is technically located in South Asia, it cannot be oblivious to events in East Asia, and it is included for that reason.

Two of the criticisms of international systems theory is that it has not been found useful either in explaining system change or in predicting specific future systems. It is hoped that the information provided in this dissertation will answer those criticisms. Whatever merit this dissertation possesses is due largely to Professor Paul Tharp, the director of this dissertation, who gave unstintingly of his time over many years and two drafts. The author is also deeply grateful to Professor Donald Secrest for his clarification of controversial points of systems theory.

The author's appreciation extends also to Mr. Russell H. Gerbrick for his friendly cooperation and advice in the preparation of the first draft of this dissertation, and to Mrs. James O. Payne for her aid in the preparation of the final product.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	iv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	ix
LIST OF TABLES	ix
 Chapter	
I. A SYSTEM MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.	1
The East Asian Subsystem since 1945	1
The Tight Bipolar System, 1945-1955	1
The Loose Bipolar System, 1956-1962	4
The Emerging Multipolar System, 1963 to the Present . .	6
System Analysis	10
The Essential Actors and Their Information Variables. .	25
System Structure.	28
System Capacity	29
Actor Interaction	32
Outputs	34
System Change	35
A Theoretical Framework for Analysis.	35
II. INFORMATION VARIABLES OF THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R.	43
The U.S.	43
Elite Direction or Ethos.	43
Control Factors Operating on the Elite.	46
Quantity of Disposable Resources.	50
U.S. Foreign Policy Assumptions, Goals, and Tactics . .	52
The U.S.S.R.	55
Elite Direction or Ethos.	55
Control Factors Operating on the Elite.	61
Quantity of Disposable Resources.	65
Soviet Foreign Policy Assumptions, Goals, and Tactics .	67
III. THE ACTOR INFORMATION VARIABLES OF CHINA, JAPAN, AND INDIA.	76
China	76
Elite Direction or Ethos.	76
Control Factors Operating on the Elite.	89
Quantity of Disposable Resources.	96
Chinese Foreign Policy Assumptions, Goals, and Tactics.	100
Japan	103
Elite Direction or Ethos.	103
Control Factors Operating on the Elite.	110

Quantity of Disposable Resources.	116
Japanese Foreign Policy Assumptions, Goals, and Tactics.	120
India	123
Elite Direction or Ethos.	123
Control Factors Operating on the Elite.	130
Quantity of Disposable Resources.	137
Indian Foreign Policy Assumptions, Goals, and Tactics	142
IV. STRUCTURE AND CAPACITY OF THE EAST ASIAN SUBSYSTEM.	160
Subsystem Structure	160
Subsystem Stratification.	160
Subsystem Polarity.	163
Subsystem Distribution of Power	163
Subsystem Homogeneity	167
Subsystem Capacity and Change	169
Regulatory Forces	169
Environmental Constraints	171
V. ESSENTIAL ACTOR INTERACTION	176
Introduction.	176
The U.S. and the U.S.S.R.	177
The Stalinist Period and U.S. Containment Policy.	177
The Containment Policy in Operation Prior to the	
Vietnam War	180
The Vietnam War and the U.S. Guam Doctrine.	184
Sino-Soviet Relations	193
The Stalinist Period: 1945-1952.	194
The Period of Partnership: 1953-1963	197
The Period of Hostility: 1963 to the Present	203
Sino-U.S. Relations	209
The Period of U.S. Ambivalence: 1945-1950.	209
The Period of Hostility: 1950-1969	212
Moving Towards Normalization: 1969 to the Present.	216
U.S.-Japanese Relations	231
U.S. Occupation Policy in Japan: 1945-1952	231
The Patron-Protege Relationship: 1952-1968	234
The Period of U.S.-Japanese Stress: 1969 to	
the Present	238
Soviet-Japanese Relations	247
The Period of Official Hostility: 1945-1956.	248
The Period of Normalized Relations: 1957 to	
the Present	250
Sino-Japanese Relations	258
The Period of Hostility: 1945-1971	258
The Period of Normalized Relations: 1972 to	
the Present	261
Indo-U.S. Relations	271
The Nehru Years: 1947-1964	271
The Gandhi Years: 1964-1977.	277
The Janata Government and Mrs. Gandhi: 1977 to	
the Present	282

Indo-Soviet Relations	284
From Coldness to Cordiality: 1947-1962	285
Friendship and Alliance: 1963-1977	288
The Janata Government and Mrs. Gandhi: 1977 to the Present	296
Sino-Indian Relations	300
From Friendship to Hostility: 1949-1962.	301
From Hostility to Cordiality: 1963 to the Present. . .	306
Indo-Japanese Relations	311
Economic Relations.	312
Political Relations	314
VI. OUTPUTS, SYSTEM CHANGE, AND CONCLUSIONS	342
System Output	342
System Change	345
Conclusions	349
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	364
APPENDIX 1. Characteristics of Kaplan's Balance of Power System.	376
APPENDIX 2. Characteristics of Kaplan's Bipolar System	377
APPENDIX 3. Characteristics of Rosecrance's Nine Systems	379

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1. Rosecrance's Actor Information Variables.	27
2. Rosecrance's Constraints on Actor Disturbances.	30

LIST OF TABLES

Table	
I. Factors Related to the Economic and Military Capabilities of the Five Leading East Asian States, 1978	13
II. Factors Related to the Economic and Military Capabilities of the Middle and Minor East Asian States, 1978	14
III. Concrete Elements of Perceived Power: The East Asian Great Powers, 1978.	17
IV. Concrete Elements of Perceived Power: The Lesser East Asian States, 1978.	18
V. Value of Factors Affecting National Will.	20
VI. Final Power Assessment: The East Asian Great Powers, 1978.	21
VII. Final Power Assessment: The Lesser Asian States, 1978. . .	22

CHAPTER I

A SYSTEM MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The East Asian Subsystem Since 1945

This dissertation is concerned with the East Asian geographic subsystem of the global international political system. For the purposes of this dissertation the East Asian subsystem will include the geographic portion of the Asian land mass from India's western border to the Pacific Ocean, as well as the states of the Pacific Basin. Although India is technically located in South Asia, it is affected by events in East Asia and is included for that reason. Three regional international political systems have existed in East Asia since 1945; the first system evolved into the second, and the second evolved into the third. The third system is in the process of evolving into a fourth. In this dissertation the three systems are labelled: the tight bipolar system, 1945-1955; the loose bipolar system, 1956-1962; and the emerging multipolar system, 1963-The Present. Each East Asian system not only reflected the global international political system of the same name, but also preceded it. Thus, changes in the global international political system were usually preceded by changes in the East Asian subsystem.

The Tight Bipolar System, 1945-1955

A tight bipolar system is one in which the two opposing blocs are completely hierarchically organized. This type of system was already

operating in East Asia in 1945. After the fall of Japan in September of 1945 the two most important military and economic powers in East Asia were the U.S. and U.S.S.R. While the U.K. and France were still considered to be global great powers, their economies and armed forces had been seriously depleted by World War II. These two states relied on the U.S. for economic support and followed the U.S. lead politically. Japan had ceased to be a political factor in East Asia and was subject to the U.S. Occupation Government. An adversary relationship developed between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. even before the end of the war because President Truman did not want Stalin to declare war on Japan and expand Russia's holdings in East Asia. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union occupied North Korea and some of the minor Japanese islands, and acquired holdings in Manchuria. The U.S.S.R. also asked the U.S. for occupation rights in Japan itself, but this was refused. The U.S.S.R. was later thought to have been the instigator of various Communist revolts in East Asia, and was thought to have provided more support to the Chinese Communists in their final struggle against the Nationalists than it did. During early 1950, only a few months after the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in Peking in the fall of 1949, China and the U.S.S.R. signed a military alliance. This was perceived by the U.S. as significantly increasing Soviet power in East Asia, and as providing the U.S.S.R. with a surrogate through which to foment revolution. The U.S.S.R. was also believed to be the instigator of the Korean War.

During the early and mid-1950's the U.S. Containment Policy was extended to East Asia, and the U.S. entered into a series of formal security arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, the SEATO states, Taiwan and

Japan. The U.S. Occupation of Japan ended during 1952, but Japan remained tied to the U.S. economically and militarily.

The United Nations Organization was used by the U.S. as a tool to thwart Communist expansion in Korea, and the U.S. was successful in barring the Communist Chinese Government from that organization. The U.N. was ineffectual in reaching a settlement in Indochina, although it had been successful in ending Dutch rule in Indonesia in 1949.

India and Pakistan became independent states in 1947. Due to religious, political, and territorial differences, an almost pathological distrust and hatred grew between these two states. Because of the socialist and anti-colonialist orientation of India's leaders, India tended to take the Soviet side in the Cold War over that of the U.S., while at the same time seeking food and development aid from the U.S. The U.S. felt that, since India was a democracy and was accepting U.S. aid, India should also accept the U.S. view of the world. However, India refused to do this. U.S. military aid to Pakistan increased India's distrust of the U.S., while India's friendship with China increased U.S. irritation with India. Meanwhile, many former colonies became independent states and became members of the non-aligned bloc, of which India was the leading spokesman. This bloc tended to criticize the foreign policies and activities of the U.S. and the Western European states, while it tended to be sympathetic towards Soviet activities and views. In 1955 the Soviet Union began to provide economic aid to many of the developing states so as to hasten their development toward centralized state planning and eventual Communist revolution. India was one of the major recipients of this Soviet aid.

In 1954 Laos, Cambodia, and the two Vietnams obtained their independence from France at a conference in Geneva. The U.S. threw its support behind

the new entity in South Vietnam, thus sowing the seeds for its future involvement in war in Indochina.

The Loose Bipolar System, 1956-1962

A loose bipolar system is characterized as one in which there are still two major blocs of states opposing one another, but the blocs are less hierarchically organized. During the 1957-1962 time period in East Asia this was more observable in the U.S. bloc, but was equally true for the Sino-Soviet bloc.

By 1956 France had practically withdrawn from East Asia and was only a member of SEATO on paper. The U.K.'s holdings in East Asia had been drastically reduced, and the U.K. was intending to withdraw from most of its commitments "east of Suez."

The U.S. had expected Japan to become its political and military ally in East Asia. Japan was a reliable political ally of the U.S., but it was not really interested in rearming. In 1956 a small Japanese military establishment with U.S. weapons existed, but only due to heavy U.S. pressure. Japan was interested in spending money on its economic development, not on a large military force. In 1960 a new U.S.-Japanese security treaty clarified Japan's position. Japan was only committed to defend its own territory with U.S. help; it was not expected to provide military support to the U.S. in the event of an attack on that state. Japan was not expected to aid the U.S. in policing East Asia. An agreement was also signed governing the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan. Meanwhile, Japan enjoyed its special economic relationship with the U.S.

Taiwan was tied to the U.S. militarily and economically, but sought to create a war between the U.S. and China which might result in a U.S.

invasion of the China mainland and the eventual restoration of a Chinese Nationalist government in Peking. Pakistan was an ardent supporter of SEATO, but was using U.S. military aid to increase the quality of its armed forces for an eventual confrontation with India. The other members of SEATO were concerned with economic development and were not major factors in East Asian international politics.

China was publicly supportive of the Soviet Union during this time period. China had achieved coequal status with the Soviet Union on paper in 1954, but deferred to the Soviet Union in public. China hoped, however, to have great influence over Soviet policy--and therefore bloc policy--in private. However, after the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, when Khrushchev condemned Stalin and sought to revise Communist doctrine, Sino-Soviet relations gradually worsened. China also lost whatever influence it possessed over the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's search for detente with the U.S. infuriated China's leaders. The Soviet support of India instead of China during the 1962 Sino-Indian War was indicative of the poor state of Sino-Soviet relations.

India and China were publicly friendly until 1962. Privately, however, India's leaders were concerned over China's seizure of Tibet and the possibility of further Chinese acquisition of territory from the other Himalayan states. Thus India felt that China was threatening India's defense perimeter. Chinese leaders believed that India and the U.S. were fomenting rebellion in Tibet. China also wanted a settlement of the Sino-Indian border question, but India refused to participate. Indian military moves along the border finally led to a short Sino-Indian war which resulted in Chinese control of 48,000 square miles of disputed territory. Sino-Indian relations have become relatively friendly again only in recent years.

Indo-U.S. relations were cool during the 1950's, but India continued to be a major recipient of U.S. economic and food aid. India was also a major recipient of Soviet economic aid and a major purchaser of Soviet weapons at bargain prices. India continued to lead the nonaligned states in criticizing U.S. foreign policy while it continued to be sympathetic to that of the Soviet Union. Indo-U.S. relations improved during the Kennedy Administration, especially because of U.S. support for India during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. However, India never did endorse U.S. policies and the improvement in Sino-Indian relations was short-lived.

Sino-U.S. relations during this period were characterized by hostility and confrontation.

The Emerging Multipolar System, 1963-The Present

This is a transitional system which is evolving into a five-power system. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have continued to be the economic and military super powers of East Asia, while China is a poor third militarily. Japan has become an economic super power, but is weak militarily. India has emerged as a military great power in the region.

The Sino-Soviet ideological break became final in 1963 when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed a limited nuclear test ban agreement. This ideological hatred has increased since that time. Meanwhile China has developed nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Until the late 1960's or early 1970's China feared an invasion by the U.S., Japan, and the Nationalists on Taiwan. When the U.S. became embroiled in a war in Indochina, China feared that this might lead to the defeat of the revolutionary struggle there, as well as to an invasion of China from the south.

Major U.S. military forces were engaged in Indochina from 1964 to 1974, but the U.S. failed to achieve its goals in the region. This led to a loss of U.S. popular and governmental support for the containment policy in East Asia, and resulted in the Nixon Doctrine. The doctrine stated that the U.S. would no longer be the world's policeman. The U.S. would continue to honor its treaty commitments and would continue to provide military and economic aid to deserving states, but U.S. troops would only be committed in a deteriorating situation when the U.S. felt that its vital interests might be adversely affected. The U.S. Asian allies became concerned over the future U.S. will to come to their defense, and they began to improve their relations with China. SEATO was dissolved in 1977.

The U.S. and Japan normalized relations with China in 1971, and friendship treaties were signed during 1978. U.S. and Japanese trade with China increased tremendously, especially in the area of technology.

The U.S.S.R. has sought to increase its influence in East Asia both because of the U.S. partial withdrawal from the region and because of the Soviet fear of China. The size and strength of the Soviet Pacific Fleet was significantly increased and a squadron was permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean. The U.S.S.R. also sought naval base rights in East Asia and the states bordering the Indian Ocean. The U.S.S.R. has been negotiating, for various reasons, a series of bilateral ententes in Asia. Some of these ententes might be of use in the event of a Sino-Soviet war. To date, the U.S.S.R. has concluded agreements with India, Vietnam, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. The U.S.S.R. has also supported Vietnam's efforts to control Indochina. However, the U.S.S.R. is concerned that a U.S.-Chinese-Japanese entente may exist in East Asia, and fears a future military alliance of these three states.

Whereas in the 1960's China desired U.S. withdrawal from East Asia, the Soviet moves to increase its influence in the region have necessitated a change in China's policy. China desires a strong U.S. presence in East Asia as a counterpoise to the U.S.S.R. China also favors continued Japanese conventional rearmament, and would favor the creation of a military alliance among the states of ASEAN. Thus the U.S.S.R. has become a major disturbing force in East Asia while China has come to favor the status quo.

Since the late 1960's Japan has been subject to growing U.S. pressure to assume greater political, military, and economic roles in East Asia. Japan has increased its economic role in the region, and has become the leading trading partner and source of foreign aid of these states. Japan has resisted increased political and military roles in the region. Japan's leaders do not want Japan to become involved in the domestic politics of the region's states, but they are beginning to realize that Japan's position as leading trading partner and source of foreign aid must inevitably force Japan to become more involved in these states' politics. Japan has also resisted increasing its armed forces because it would rather rely on the U.S. for defense and spend its money on economic development. However Japan is gradually increasing its defense spending because of increased U.S. pressure and Soviet moves in East Asia. With the exception of those states linked to Moscow, all of the East Asian states now favor an enlarged Japanese military establishment.

During the 1960's and 1970's India concerned itself primarily with its own national security and the threat from Pakistan and China. India became one of the major purchasers of Soviet sophisticated weapons and produces many of these under license. India has become self-sufficient in the production of conventional weapons. In 1971 India dismembered

Pakistan and became the preeminent military power on the continent. In 1974 India detonated an atomic device; some nuclear weapons may have been produced. Pakistan may have commenced a nuclear weapons development program. Considering their past record, India and Pakistan may eventually engage in a nuclear war.

The U.S. and India have had brief intervals of friendship during the final years of Nehru's premiership and during the years of the Janata Government. However, Indo-U.S. relations during Mrs. Gandhi's first premiership were generally cold, and sometimes frigid. India needed U.S. food aid, but it hurt India's pride to accept it. Indian leaders had an ideological affinity for the U.S.S.R. India was opposed to SEATO and feared both an arms race and U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Indian Ocean. India also disliked U.S. military sales to Pakistan and the growing Sino-U.S. rapprochement. Because of India's attitudes, the attitudes of U.S. leaders towards India have generally been hostile.

India has continued to be one of the leading recipients of Soviet development aid. India also signed an entente with the U.S.S.R. in 1971 which the Soviets probably viewed as being directed towards China. However, a case will be made later in this dissertation that Mrs. Gandhi used the treaty for her own ends against Pakistan and gave the Soviet Union very little in return. Mrs. Gandhi is also very concerned over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and possible U.S.-Soviet rivalries in or near the subcontinent.

In recent years India and China have begun to try to resolve their border dispute. An amicable settlement would soothe India's feelings and might nullify the Indo-Soviet treaty as far as China is concerned.

Indo-Japanese relations have been relatively minimal. However, there is a growing Indian interest in the commerce and international

politics of East Asia and ASEAN. India and Japanese interests may eventually clash in East Asia in the future.

System Analysis

A basic assumption of this dissertation, as the previous section indicates, is that international politics take place within a system. David Easton defines a political system as made up of a set of components which interact. By means of these interactions, values are authoritatively allocated for a society and these allocations are binding. The variables of the system, therefore, consist of the interactions or relationships between the system's actors.¹ Richard Rosecrance feels that an international system refers to, "relationships among states, to the way in which the objectives and techniques of states interact."² Morton A. Kaplan believes that an international system refers not only to relationships between states, but also to certain characteristics of the states.

If the number, type and behavior of nations differ over time, and if their military capabilities, their economic assets, and their information also vary over time, then there is some likely interconnection between these elements such that different structural and behavioral systems can be discerned to operate at different periods of history.³

Therefore, in an international political system one set of components consists of states. A state is defined as, "a political community occupying a definite territory, having an organized government, and possessing internal and external sovereignty."⁴ International organizations may also be system components. The system operates, to a large extent, according to "rules of the game" that are both formulated and accepted, either implicitly or explicitly, by the system's essential actors. An essential actor is a major power state within the system. The rules,

the essential actors, and the actors' characteristics may change over time, and a system at one point in time may differ from another system at a different point in time, but there is always a system present.

States may act as either disruptors or regulators within the international system. A state acting as a disruptor would seek either to disrupt the functioning of the system, to change the system, to change its rules, or to cause conflict. On the other hand, a state acting as a regulator would seek to either stop or mitigate the behavior of the disruptor.⁵ A state's ability to act either as a disruptor or a regulator is affected by its power. Ray Cline points out that:

The extent to which one country can pursue its international and domestic aims without regard to, or even against the interest of others, is based in the final analysis on its own national power as compared with that of other nations. Power in the international arena can thus be defined simply as the ability of the government of one state to cause the government of another state to do something which the latter otherwise would not choose to do--whether by persuasion, coercion, or outright military force.⁶

It would seem, then, that the more power that a state possesses, the greater is its ability to act as a system disruptor or regulator. The essential actors of the international system are a small group of states that clearly have power which is superior to that of the remaining states. However, power consists of both tangible factors such as the numbers of trained military personnel and deployed weapons systems, and intangible factors such as the beliefs and experiences of national leaders as well as the national will or purpose. Methods of calculating power since World War II have ranged from the simple power index proposed by A.F.K. Organski based upon population multiplied by per capita income to obtain national income and power, to a complex formula proposed by Ray Cline.⁷ The

relative power of the states of the East Asian subsystem will be shown through the use of Cline's formula. Table I shows some of the factors related to the economic and military capabilities of the leading East Asian states for 1978. Table II shows the same factors for the other East Asian states. These factors will be used in Cline's formula.

Cline suggests a formula of

$$P_p = (C+E+M) \times (S+W), \text{ where:}^8$$

P_p = perceived power

C = critical mass, or population and territory

E = economic capability

M = military capability

S = strategic purpose

W = will to pursue national strategy

In his discussion of critical mass Cline notes that the size, spirit and competence of a state's population can greatly affect a state's power. He also points out that states with large territories often have ample raw materials within their borders. He assigns a total of 50 points to the world's most populous states such as the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China, and India. Fewer points are given to less populous states; for example, Japan receives 40 points. He does the same for all states in terms of territory with an additional special weight of five points for those states that occupy crucial strategic locations on the globe, such as those states adjacent to the major sea lanes.¹¹

Cline is on firmer theoretical ground when he discusses states' economic capabilities. He uses the GNP's of the various states and observes that, "If qualified with appropriate caveats about other aspects of a nation's economic structure, particularly its natural resources, its

Table I. Factors Related To The Economic and Military Capabilities Of The Five
Leading East Asian States, 1978⁹

State	GNP (In \$U.S. Billions)	Military Expendi- tures (In \$U.S. Billions)	Military Expendi- tures as % of GNP	Total Military Manpower	Number of Active Major Combat Ships (Less SSBN's)
U.S.	2,106.6	105.1	5	2,022,000	260
Japan	930	8.6	0.9	241,000	60
U.S.S.R.	780 (1977)	133 (est. 1977)	11-14 (1977)	3,658,000	523
China	400 (est.)	40 (est.)	10	4,360,000	116
India	106.4	3.45	3.2	1,096,000	36

State	No. of ICBM's	No. of SLBM's	Number of IRBM's, MRBM's and Long-range Cruise Missiles	Number of Long Range and Medium Bombers	Total Combat Aircraft
U.S.	1,054	656	0	573	4,500
Japan	0	0	0	0	361
U.S.S.R.	1,398	1,028	710	659	7,800
China	2+	0	90 - 120	90	5,500
India	0	0	0	0	645

Table II. Factors Related To The Economic and Military Capabilities of the Middle and Minor East Asian States, 1978¹⁰

State	GNP (in %U.S. Millions)	Military Expenditures (in \$U.S. Millions)	Military Expenditures (As % of GNP)	Total Military Manpower	No. of Major Active Combat Ships	Total Combat Aircraft
Australia	108	2,968	2.7	70,261	16	138
South Korea	46	2,586	5.6	619,000	22	254
Taiwan	23.4	1,800	7.7	539,000	38	388
Philippines	23.2	793	3.4	103,000	18	85
Indonesia	22.6 (1977)	1,513 (1977)	3.4 (1977)	239,000	14	32
Thailand	21.7	806	3.7	216,000	4	168
New Zealand	16.3	312	1.9	12,739	13	256
Malaysia	14.7	693	4.7	64,500	2	32
North Korea	10.5	1,200	11.4	632,000-672,000	18	565
Vietnam	8.6	N/A	N/A	1,023,000	3	495
Bangladesh	8 (GDP)	115 (1979)	N/A	76,500	2	27
Singapore	7.54	411	5.5	36,000	0	131
Burma	3.9 (1977)	164 (1977-1978)	N/A	169,500	6	18
Mongolia	2.8 (1974)	113 (1979)	N/A	30,000	0	12
Laos	0.26	29 (1977-1978)	N/A	48,550	0	45
Cambodia *	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

* Note: Cambodia was invaded by Vietnamese forces during December 1978, and is occupied by 12-14 Vietnamese divisions.

technological skills, and its international trade, comparisons among nations which are based on GNP are extremely revealing." He also adds points for five special economic factors: energy, minerals, industry, food, and foreign trade.¹²

Cline believes that there are four aspects of a state's military capabilities: nuclear deterrence, conventional military forces, a state's strategic reach, and the percentage of its GNP spent for defense.

Nuclear deterrence includes the number of nuclear bombs and warheads, as well as the number of strategic missiles and long-range bomber aircraft available to a state. He assigns 100 points each to the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and 10 points to China, France, and the U.K. However, because of China's growing strategic missile and bomber force, including ICBM's, it is felt that China should at least have received 15 points in his formula. Cline assigns no points to India, even though India detonated a nuclear device in 1974. Since India might have secretly produced some nuclear bombs after 1974, it is felt India should receive five points.¹³

Cline calculates a state's conventional military capabilities using an average conversion factor which includes four elements: military manpower quality, weapons effectiveness, infrastructure and logistic support system, and military organizational quality. Military manpower quality refers to training, morale, and officer leadership. Weapons effectiveness includes types, quantity, and quality. However, in his methodology the effectiveness of a weapon depends upon its use and maintenance by a particular military force and not upon its factory performance specifications. Thus, the effectiveness of a weapon will vary according to the modernity of the military force possessing it. He defines infrastructure and logistic support as the amount of self-sufficiency a state possesses in the production of weapons, ammunition, and war materiel, as well as the adequacy

of the military logistical and technical support structure. Organizational quality refers to military managerial efficiency, planning, and readiness. These four factors are converted into an overall numerical value entitled "Equivalent Units of Combat Capability."¹⁴

Strategic reach, according to Cline, consists of three factors: geographic position, vehicles available for sealift and airlift, and the bases and forces which might be used in different conflict situations. Thus, Cline is referring to a state's ability to project its power far beyond the state's borders and even globally. He uses a numerical scale of 0.00 to 0.05 which is multiplied by the Equivalent Units of Combat Capability to arrive at a net total for conventional military forces.¹⁵ He then adds a bonus weight to the net conventional total of those states which spend more than the world average of defense spending as a percentage of GNP. Writing in 1977, he feels that the average state spends about five percent of the value of its GNP on defense. He adds five points for those states which spend beyond the average up to 25 percent, and 10 points for those states which spend above 25 percent. However, since no state spends above 25 percent, he adds five points to the U.S.S.R., Vietnam, China, North Korea, and Taiwan.¹⁶

Cline then totals up the assigned values of critical mass, economic capabilities, strategic weapons, and conventional military capabilities. The total number for each state consists of what he calls "the concrete elements of perceived power."¹⁷ The values of (C+E+M) for the great powers of East Asia, using Cline's formula, are shown in Table III. The values for the other East Asian states which are not great powers are shown in Table IV. The states are listed according to their totals.¹⁸

Table III. Concrete Elements of Perceived Power:
The East Asian Great Powers, 1978*

State	Critical Mass	Economic Capability	Strategic Weapons	Conventional Military	Total
U.S.	100	200	100	90	490
U.S.S.R.	100	100	100	100	400
China	100	40	15	40	195
Japan	60	90	0	5	155
India	90	10	5	10	115

*Note: The powers included in this table are those states with totals of 100 points or more. The responsibility for labelling these states as great powers of the East Asian subsystem rests with the author of this dissertation and not Professor Cline.

Table IV. Concrete Elements of Perceived Power:
The Lesser East Asian States, 1978

State	Critical Mass	Economic Capability	Strategic Weapons	Conventional Military	Total
Indonesia	80	5	0	1	85
Australia	50	20	0	0	70
Burma	50	0	0	0	50
Vietnam	40	0	0	8	48
Thailand	45	0	0	1	46
Philippines	40	2	0	0	42
Bangladesh	40	0	0	0	40
Malaysia	30	1	0	0	31
Mongolia	30	0	0	0	30
N. Korea	12	1	0	12	25
Taiwan	10	2	0	11	23
S. Korea	10	4	0	6	20
Laos	15	0	0	0	15
New Zealand	10	1	0	0	11
Singapore	1	0	0	0	1
Cambodia*					

*Note: Cambodia was invaded by Vietnamese forces during December 1978, and is occupied by 12-14 Vietnamese divisions. Therefore, no assessment has been made of its power.

Cline then turns his attention to the rest of the formula: (S+W). He mentions at the outset of his discussion on national strategy and will that any numerical values assigned to these two factors are done on the basis of subjective judgments. He observes that most states are usually preoccupied with regional affairs, but can normally obtain enough political and social cohesion to pursue a limited global international strategy if the need arises. Such states, he feels, are the norm, and he assigns them a value of 0.5. States with lesser national strategies are assigned ratings below 0.5, while states with well-conceived global strategies, such as the U.S.S.R., are assigned ratings above 0.5.¹⁹

Cline defines national will as, "the quality which enables a nation to bring its resources and capabilities effectively to bear for . . . the nation's strategy."²⁰ For purposes of analysis he divides the factors which make up the national will into three categories and four subcategories with a total numerical percentage value of 100 percent.²¹ These are shown in Table V. Again, Cline feels that the norm for the average state should be 0.5 while some states, such as the U.S.S.R. and Japan, exceed the norm and others, such as Bangladesh and Mongolia fall below the norm. Thus, the norm for both national strategy and will would have a total value of 1.0, while some states would exceed this and others would be below it.²²

Table VI shows the final power assessment for the East Asian great powers in 1978 using Cline's formula. Table VII shows the assessment for the rest of the East Asian states. Although Professor Cline's formula is used in this dissertation, the values used in the formula were provided by the author of this dissertation. Therefore the values shown in Tables VI and VII will not always agree with those shown in Professor Cline's book.²³

Table V. Value of Factors Affecting National Will

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Value (%)</u>
Level of National Integration	
Cultural Integration	25
Territorial Integration	8
Strength of National Leadership	
Governmental Policy Capability	17
Level of Social Discipline	17
Relevance of Strategy to the National Interest	<u>33</u>
TOTAL	100

Table VI. Final Power Assessment: The East
Asian Great Powers, 1978

State	Concrete Elements of Perceived Power	National Strategy	Will	Total Coefficient	Total
U.S.S.R.	400	0.8	0.5	1.3	520
U.S.	490	0.4	0.5	0.9	441
Japan	155	0.8	0.8	1.6	248
China	195	0.5	0.4	0.9	175.5
India	115	0.7	0.3	1.0	115

Table VII. Final Power Assessment: The Lesser Asian States, 1978

State	Concrete Elements of Perceived Power	National Strategy	Will	Total Coefficient	Total
Indonesia	85	0.5	0.5	1.0	85
Australia	70	0.4	0.7	1.1	77
Vietnam	48	0.8	0.5	1.3	62.4
Taiwan	23	0.7	0.9	1.6	37
Thailand	46	0.5	0.3	0.8	36.8
North Korea	25	0.8	0.6	1.4	35
Philippines	42	0.5	0.3	0.8	33.6
South Korea	20	0.7	0.7	1.4	28
Malaysia	31	0.5	0.3	0.8	24.8
Mongolia	30	0.4	0.4	0.8	24
Bangladesh	40	0.3	0.2	0.5	20
Burma	50	0.2	0.1	0.3	15
New Zealand	11	0.5	0.5	1.0	11
Laos	15	0.4	0.3	1.7	10.5
Singapore	1	0.5	0.5	1.0	1
Cambodia*					

*Note: Cambodia was invaded by Vietnamese forces during December 1978, and is occupied by 12-14 Vietnamese division. Therefore, no assessment has been made of its power.

Harry Gelber notes that, "It has become one of the truisms of international politics to observe that during the 1960's the international system moved away from the bipolarity achieved after World War II and towards more complex and multipolar patterns of relations."²⁴ It is now possible to identify the essential actors of this future system. With the exception of a federated Western Europe, all of the essential actors of the future system currently face each other in East Asia. Their past, present and future dealings with each other in that geographic subsystem will affect the rules of the global multipolar system which may come into being by the year 2000. The purpose of this dissertation is to define and describe the essential rules and characteristics of the future system through an analysis of the East Asian geographic subsystem.

There have been a number of theories and methods for analyzing the international system since 1945. One group of theorists, known as the Realists, analyzes international politics from the perspective of power and national interest.²⁵ A second group analyzes the process whereby national leaders made decisions relating to international politics.²⁶ A third group studies the nature of conflict between states. Conflict is defined by Lewis A. Coser as a, "struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals."²⁷ Conflict theories are interdisciplinary and can focus on many different issues such as arms control and disarmament, Communism versus Capitalism, or the industrial states versus the developing states.

The analytical approach used in this dissertation is system theory. System theory is both interdisciplinary and all-inclusive. That is, it uses data from many disciplines and can include studies of all types of

political phenomena such as power and national interests, decision-making, conflict, international organizations and integration, and linkages between domestic and international politics. Theorists of the international political system and its geographic subsystems include Morton A. Kaplan, Charles A. McClelland, Richard N. Rosecrance, Michael Brecher and Stanley Hoffman.²⁸

The particular system model used in this dissertation will be based primarily upon that of Richard Rosecrance, although there will be some inclusions from other theorists such as Kaplan. Rosecrance's model is believed to provide the best means of analysis of the global international system and its geographic subsystems during a historical period, as well as the best basis for the prediction of near-term future systems and subsystems.

Rosecrance's first major work was Action and Reaction In World Politics published in 1963 and reprinted in 1977. He then edited The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons and The Future of the International Strategic System, published respectively in 1964 and 1972. These contain articles by Rosecrance and other writers concerning nuclear weapons diffusion and the problem of stability in future multipolar international systems. His fourth work, International Relations: Peace or War, was published in 1973. It is concerned with those characteristics of the international system that either contribute to, or retard the outbreak of war.

Rosecrance's theoretical model for system analysis appears to consist of six elements:

- a) The essential actors and their information variables
- b) System structure
- c) System capacity

- d) Essential actor interaction
- e) System outputs
- f) System change

These elements will be discussed in the order listed above.

The Essential Actors and Their Information Variables

The essential actors of a system consist of the great powers. States make inputs into the system which may be in the form of either disturbances or regulatory measures. The greater a state's power, the greater its ability to disturb or regulate a system. International political organizations usually act as regulators.

The U.N. has acted as a regulator in numerous political disputes and wars since the end of World War II. However, it is given little consideration in this dissertation because its regulatory activity in East Asia since 1945 has been minimal. The U.S. used the U.N. as a tool to further its own strategic interests during the Korean War. The U.N. was effective in obtaining a cease-fire in Indonesia in 1946 which resulted in Indonesia's independence. The U.N. obtained a cease-fire in the first Indo-Pakistan war, primarily because of the Soviet Union's influence in the subcontinent. Conversely, the U.N. failed to obtain a cease-fire during the second Indo-Pakistan war due to the Soviet Union's obstructive tactics. The U.N. was ineffective in either halting or ameliorating the various wars in Indochina since 1945. In cases of great power indifference to human problems in East Asia, such as the Communist genocide in Cambodia, the U.N. has also been ineffective.

ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is also not considered to be an essential actor of the East Asian subsystem because its current

role is primarily economic. The leaders of the member states of ASEAN are beginning to consider the possibility of a collective defense role for the organization, but such a role may not come into existence for some years, if at all.

Each of Rosecrance's actor information variables consists of a number of constituent parts (Figure 1). States make inputs into the system by choosing objectives and by selecting and implementing techniques. The governing elites of these states, of course, actually make the decisions concerning objectives and techniques. Their decisions are affected by:

a. The "direction", or ethos, of the elite. This refers to the elite's ideas toward their own and other societies and consists of:

- (1) The attitude of a governing elite towards the internal organization of its own state.
- (2) The attitude of a governing elite towards the internal organization of other states.
- (3) The attitude of a governing elite towards the organization of the international system. In other words, the attitude of the elite towards the pattern of outcomes in the international system.²⁹

b. "Control" factors, or factors which can either limit or augment the elite's exercise of power.

- (1) The nature of the popular allegiance to a governing elite.
- (2) The amount of latitudinal discretion allowed a governing elite in its decision-making capacity.
- (3) The nature and security of a governing elite's tenure.
- (4) The personalities of the elite's leadership.³⁰




Figure 1. Rosecrance's Actor Information Variables

c. The "quantity of disposable resources" available to a state's governing elite. These include:

- (1) Persuasive skills.
- (2) Mobilizable resources
- (3) Speed of mobilization³¹

Here, what Rosecrance seems to be actually discussing is not merely the speed of resource mobilization, but the efficiency with which it is accomplished. That is, mobilizing the most effective amount of resources against a problem in the shortest possible time.

System Structure

Rosecrance discusses system structure in great detail, devoting an entire chapter to it in International Relations: Peace or War?³² System structure refers to the type of international stratification and polarity within the system, as well as its distribution of power and degree of homogeneity. He defines system stratification as the amount of influence and access to resources possessed by all the members of the international system. For example, he characterizes the present system as one in which five percent of its states possess seventy-five percent of the available influence and resources; these are the major powers. The middle powers, or fifteen percent of the states, possess twenty percent of the available influence and resources. The remaining minor powers, or eighty percent of the system's states, possess only five percent of the available influence and resources. System polarity refers to the number of major powers or blocs. He cites four examples:

- a. One major power or bloc.
- b. Two major powers or blocs.

- c. Five major powers or blocs
- d. A large number of states with roughly equivalent influence and status.

He feels that c. is the best position between the two extremes of a. and d. because one or even two of the five states or blocs would not be so preponderant in power as to be uncheckable by the remainder. Thus he argues for a balance of power system.

In contrast to system stratification which relates to all the members of the international system, the distribution of power refers to the way power and influence are divided among the system's essential actors. Thus, this is a method of further subdividing the system.

Rosecrance's last subdivision of system structure, system homogeneity, refers to the amount of ideological antagonism between the system's major states as well as their political and constitutional forms. Ideal homogeneity would occur when all the system's major states share similar ideological, political, and constitutional forms. This has not been the case since the end of the Eighteenth Century.

System Capacity

Rosecrance defines system capacity as the system's total ability to contain disruption (Figure 2). It is composed of:

- a. Regulative forces, or those that seek directly to reduce both the initiation and the variety of actor disturbances.
- b. Environmental forces, or those factors which go to make up the environment. While these do not directly affect the disturbance, they tend to mitigate or control its impact.³³




Figure 2. Rosecrance's Constraints on Actor Disturbances

One reason why Rosecrance makes a special point of a system's regulatory mechanisms may be because of Ross Ashby's influence upon his thinking. He cites Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety which states that, in order to maintain a system's stability, the variety of options open to the regulating force must at least be equal to the variety of options open to the disturbing force. If such is not the case, the disturbing force is apt to win over the regulating force and the system will fail.³⁴ Regulation can be by formal and/or informal means. Formal regulation refers to regulation by an international agency or organization. Informal regulation refers to regulation by various states or blocs. However, informal regulation can also occur as a result of ideologies, national capabilities, and the types of goods and resources in the environment. The following is an example of the interrelationship of these three variables:

It is impossible to make legitimate distinctions between the international relations of the eighteenth century and that of the modern period, unless ideological factors are brought into account . . . International disturbance and regulation are functions of the variety of moves available to each. And if variety is partly dependent upon material power, it is also a product of ideologies and values. Actor variety, or the range of moves available to an actor, for either regulative or disruptive purposes, is as dependent upon cognition as it is upon capability. One of the fundamental differences of the revolutionaries from the European dynasts of the old regime was in terms of intellectual conception. Louis XV would simply not have thought of using his capabilities for revolutionary ideological purposes. His intellectual horizons were limited by the prevailing aristocratic ideology of the period. The introduction in this instance of new ideological strands increased actor variety entirely independent of actor power capabilities.³⁵

In his first book, Rosecrance listed the environment as another major element of the international system, and as a part of system capacity. However, he was vague as to the definition of this term and gave the impression that it meant geographical or territorial space. In his fourth

book he changed the term to "environmental supply of goods and resources."

In the order of their present importance, these would include national security, ideological gratification, economic goods, and territory.³⁶

Thus the environment of the system contains certain goods and resources for which nations compete. However, the type of goods and resources for which nations have competed has changed over the centuries. Rosecrance regards the fact that there are not sufficient goods and resources to satisfy all states at all times as one of the major causes of war:

If states could get what they want without impinging upon the interests of objectives of others, there would be no war, even in the absence of regulation. Thus, if there is an abundant environmental supply of what states need, seek, or demand, conflict can be avoided. In the best of all possible international worlds, the environmental supply of resources would increase proportionally to an increase in national demands upon the system. In such a beneficent situation there would be a constantly expanding pie of environmental resources.³⁷

Rosecrance believes that, of the four types of environmental "supplies", ideological gratification can be especially critical. If the ideologies of two or more states fail to overlap, i.e., accommodate each other, there will never be a sufficient environmental supply of goods for all. If two or more states are ideologically opposed, any gain for one will be considered a loss for the others.

Actor Interaction

Rosecrance is interested in the types of interaction between a system's states, especially the major states. This interaction may be nonexistent, partial or full. An example of non-interaction was Japan's period of enforced isolation from the rest of the world between 1637 and 1854. Partial interaction, according to Rosecrance, can be economic or

spatial in nature. A state may have economic contacts with others, but may choose to have no political, military, or cultural contact with them. An example of this was China's relations with western Europe until the Opium War of 1839-1842. Rosecrance points out, however, that economic ties have usually given rise to political connections or conflicts. spatial interaction merely refers to the geographic areas of the world where a state chooses to participate. Full interaction between states, as noted above, usually develops out of partial interaction. Thus, full interaction would include the following relationships:³⁹

- a. Political
- b. Economic
- c. Military
- d. Social
- e. Cultural
- f. Dependent, independent or interdependent

Another system theorist, Morton A. Kaplan, has emphasized the existence of "rules of the game" for actor interaction. These rules are also believed to be a valid part of any analytical model.

Kaplan feels that these rules may be either implicit or explicit, and are generally obeyed by the essential actors of the system. The rules are also interdependent in that the violation of one may lead to the malfunctioning or violation of others. These rules may change gradually over time as the system seeks to maintain equilibrium, thus causing gradual system change. On the other hand, the system may be faced with a challenge with which it cannot cope under the existing rules, which will result in the scrapping of the rules by the essential actors and the formation of a new system. As Kaplan explains this:

The rules, in short, are equilibrium rules for the system. This does not, however, imply that the rules will be followed by the actors because they are equilibrium rules, unless an actor has an interest in maintaining the equilibrium of the system. The constraints on the actor must motivate it to behave consonantly with the rules; or, if one or more actors are not so motivated, the others must be motivated to act in a way which forces the deviant actors back to rule-consonant behavior. Thus the rules may be viewed normatively, that is, as describing the behavior which will maintain the equilibrium of the system or as predictive, that is, as predicting that actors will so behave if the other variables of the system and the environment are at their equilibrium settings. If the other variables of the system and the environment are not at their equilibrium settings, deviant behavior is expected.⁴⁰

Kaplan describes the characteristics and rules of the game for two international systems: the balance of power system, which began in the 17th Century and ended with World War II; and the loose bipolar system which began after the war (see Appendices 1 and 2).

Outputs

Rosecrance postulates that a system's actors create disturbances or inputs. These are subject to regulative forces and environmental constraints. System stability is achieved if the outputs are accepted by the system's essential actors. However, acceptance by the essential actors does not mean satisfaction, but merely acquiescence. System change occurs when the factors related to disturbance and regulation are significantly changed.⁴¹ This can mean changes in the numbers and types of actors, and/or changes in the variables of one or more essential actors. These in turn would be affected by changes in environmental constraints. These outputs might be considered authoritative allocations of value, but would generally be binding only in the short term for an international system.

System Change

Rosecrance's analytical technique for studying system change emphasizes changes on the part of essential actors and regulatory methods:

. . . system-change may be said to occur when the internal constituents of disturbance and regulation are altered. All constituents of disturbance (goals or objectives, domestic security and stability, and resource potency) on the one hand and all constituents of regulation (institutional or informal mechanisms and the availability of goal-objects) on the other need not undergo transformation in order for system-change to occur. It is sufficient that many or most of them be altered.⁴²

By using this technique Rosecrance estimates that there have been nine international systems since 1740, eight of which fall into the time period of Kaplan's one balance of power system: the 18th Century-1945. Rosecrance thus believes that the changes that occurred during that time period were not just equilibrium changes, as Kaplan would postulate, but were instead major system changes (see Appendix 3).

In his introduction to The Future of the International Strategic System Rosecrance states his belief that, because of gradual nuclear weapons diffusion, the system is changing from bipolarity to multipolarity, and that this new system might be unstable.⁴³

A Theoretical Framework for Analysis

The theoretical framework of this dissertation is that a balanced and truly operable theoretical model for system analysis is provided by Rosecrance with the additions previously noted from Kaplan and Cline. Actor characteristics or variables, system structure and capacity, as well as environmental factors, all bear directly upon actor behavior patterns and the rules of the game. An operable theoretical model must

analyze all of these factors. One purpose of the model is to identify those factors causing system change. System change is assessed as occurring due to the rise and fall of different essential actors, changes in the ideologies and goals of leaders and governments of the essential actors, changes in the power of the essential actors, and consequent changes in the behavior of the essential actors and in the rules of the game.

One purpose of this dissertation is to put a theoretical model for system analysis into practice, with some modifications. For over twenty years political scientists have been concerned with finding methods of analyzing international politics. Models and methods have been revised, and new models and methods have been devised. The result has been a proliferation of methods and models for analyzing international politics, but no serious attempt to put a model into practice. This dissertation is an attempt to remedy that deficiency, by using Rosecrance's model, with minor additions, for the actual analysis of a geographic subsystem of the global international political system. Thus, a second purpose of this dissertation is to add to the academic community's actual knowledge of the functioning of this geographic subsystem so as to explain events and future changes in this subsystem.

The geographic subsystem chosen for analysis has been East Asia. This subsystem was chosen because it was assessed as being the most active of the world's political subsystems since 1945. The world's two economic and military superpowers have faced each other directly in East Asia, and each has striven for advantage in the region. Two other states, Japan and China, have achieved great power status within the region and are well on the way to achieving this status globally. India is only a great power

within East Asia, but it is a major factor and opinion leader in global international politics, and has the potential someday to become a great world power. The East Asian region was also chosen for analysis because, as was noted in the first section of this chapter, changes in the global international system may first be observed in the East Asian region. Therefore, an analysis of the activities of the great powers of the East Asian subsystem provides an outline of the type of global international system that will come into existence during the first half of the 21st Century. This will allow a postulation of the emerging system's rules of the game.

The first element for the analysis of an international system is its essential actors and their information variables. The great powers and essential actors of the East Asian subsystem are the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China, Japan, and India.

While emphasis should be placed upon the system's essential actors, the classificatory variables of any state involved in an international crisis should be examined at the time. The governing elites of these states provide inputs into the system, which are processed by various means, and the results consist of outputs. These outputs may either become new inputs into the system or cause new inputs to be formulated. States are ruled by governing elites which make decisions concerning national values and objectives, as well as techniques to be used to obtain these objectives. These techniques become inputs into the system. Thus it is necessary to make an analysis, as far as possible, of the values of a governing elite and of the decision-making process which leads to the elite making inputs into the system. This should include separate analyses of:

- (1) The ethics of a governing elite.
- (2) The controls on a governing elite.

(3) The disposable resources available to a governing elite.

(4) Foreign policy assumptions, goals and tactics.

Chapter II consists of an analysis of the governing elites of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The elites of China, Japan and India will be analyzed in Chapter III.

System structure and system capacity will be discussed in Chapter IV. The discussion of system structure will include an analysis of stratification, polarity, and homogeneity within the East Asian subsystem. The discussion of system capacity includes analyses of regulatory, integrative, and disintegrative forces, as well as the environmental factors. System capacity is defined as those forces and factors which influence the type and amount of inputs coming into the system from the member states. These forces and factors affect the stability of the system. Regulatory forces may be formal and informal. Formal forces (actually mechanisms) are institutions, such as the U.N., created by the essential actors to help them manage inputs, and especially crises, either before they occur or while they are occurring. An informal force is anything short of a formal institution which limits the amount or type of inputs into the system. The rules of the game may be considered an informal force. Integrative forces cause clusters of the essential actors to cooperate to reduce the amount and type of inputs coming into a system, or to overcome one particular input. Disintegrative forces are those which seek to cause the system to break down. Environmental constraints consist of goods and resources contained within the world environment, and the system's essential actors' goals vis-a-vis these environmental factors. The ability or inability on the part of the essential actors to possess these goods and resources affects the type and amount of their inputs into the system.

Chapter V will contain a discussion of the system's fifth major element: the interaction of the essential actors. This will consist of a survey of the relations between the system's five major powers for the purpose of showing system capacity in operation, and to show the operation of the forces and factors causing system change.

The system's sixth major element, outputs, will be discussed in Chapter VI. The chapter will also consist of a discussion of the conclusions reached from an analysis of the East Asian subsystem, and a postulated global international system for the year 2000 based upon those conclusions.

Footnotes

¹David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 21.

²Richard Rosecrance, International Relations: Peace or War? (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 73.

³Morton A. Kaplan, "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations," World Politics XX (October 1967): p. 8.

⁴Jack C. Plano and Milton Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary, 5th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p. 18.

⁵International Relations: Peace or War?, p. 75.

⁶Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment 1977: A Calculus of Strategic Drift (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p. 5.

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¹¹Cline, pp. 27-52.

¹²Ibid., p. 57.

¹³Ibid., pp. 83-110.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 111-125.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 126-127.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 128-219.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 131.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 131-140.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 142-144.

²⁰Ibid., p. 145.

²¹Ibid., p. 151.

- ²²Ibid., pp. 152-170.
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CHAPTER II

INFORMATION VARIABLES OF THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R.

The U.S.

Elite Direction or Ethos

Attitude Towards The Internal Organization of The State

The governmental elite in any state consists of the decision-makers and authors of policy, as well as their advisors and those responsible for the implementation of policy. In the U.S. this elite consists of the President and his assistants and advisors, the members and staff of the National Security Council, heads of Cabinet departments and senior officials of those departments, general officers of the armed services, and senior congressmen.

This elite is a product of the political socialization mechanism in the U.S. and has absorbed the basic views and values of their fellow countrymen concerning the purposes, processes, and internal organization of the state. In The Civic Culture, dated 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba were concerned with the political and social values and attitudes of the citizens of five states, including the U.S. Eighty-five percent of the U.S. sample stated that they were proud of the national government and political institutions.¹ Lewis B. Levering, writing in 1978, noted that the Vietnam War undermined the U.S. public's belief in

the inherent superiority of U.S. values and institutions.² However, he observed that, despite the war and Watergate, only a small but vocal minority of the U.S. public advocated revolution.³ Public opinion polls since 1973 have shown that the majority of the U.S. public supports U.S. governmental institutions, but may disagree with the government on foreign policy matters.⁴ This also holds true for members of the U.S. decision-making elite. If a member of that elite cannot agree with a major governmental policy, as was the case with Schlesinger over the SALT talks, he resigns.⁵

Attitude Towards The Internal Organization of Other States

One of the basic tenets of U.S. political ideology is that the best form of government is a democratic one. The corollary to this, in terms of national security, is the belief that democratic states will never be a threat to the U.S. Therefore the U.S. Government seeks to preserve democratic institutions and politics in those states that are already democracies. The means of doing this include providing military and economic aid to democratic states, such as those of Western Europe. They also include providing funds to democratic parties and candidates in democratic states that are becoming unstable, such as Italy.⁶ When dealing with client states under its protection, as in the cases of West Germany and Japan after World War II, the U.S. will use its power and influence to promote the spread of democratic institutions.

The U.S. favors political stability, peace, and a stable balance of power within a geographic region. Therefore, the U.S. has supported stable but conservative, and sometimes even repressive, regimes throughout the world.⁷ However, signs of instability and popular unrest, so

long as the unrest does not appear to be Communist-inspired, may cause the U.S. to withdraw its support for a regime. This was the case with the Sandanista revolt against Somoza in Nicaragua during 1979.

The U.S. is especially sensitive to Communist activity in its "backyard", i.e., Latin America. Since 1945 the U.S. has provided military and economic aid to such Latin American states as Guatemala, Columbia, and Venezuela to put down Communist guerrilla movements. The U.S. supported the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in an attempt to topple the Castro Regime. From 1963-1973 the U.S. spent \$13.4 million, first to block Allende's election in Chile, and then to have him overthrown.⁸

However, U.S. leaders recognize that there will be change in the world, and that the U.S. must be willing to accommodate that change. Since the end of the Vietnam War U.S. public opinion, as well as that of most of the U.S. decision-making elite, has been opposed to major military intervention in the internal affairs of other states.⁹

Attitude Towards The Organization Of The International System

U.S. Presidents and other members of the decision-making elite, since the latter years of Lyndon Johnson's Administration have recognized that the global international system was becoming multipolar. President Nixon was in favor of the changes because he, like Charles de Gaulle, believed in the primacy of states as actors in world affairs, and in a balance of power system, or a derivation of it, as the best form of international political system.¹⁰ Nixon foresaw the eventual emergence of three additional world economic and military power centers: China, Japan, and a federated Western Europe. Nixon sought to bring China into

the world community, and to push Japan into taking more political and economic responsibility in world affairs. Presidents Ford and Carter continued Nixon's policies and welcomed the changing system.¹¹ As noted previously, all U.S. administrations since 1945 have stressed that there should be regional balances of power in each of the geographic subsystems of the global international system.¹²

Control Factors Operating On The Elite

Nature of The Popular Allegiance To The Governing Elite

Kenneth Waltz noted that, from the commencement of the Cold War until major U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the U.S. public exhibited a high degree of national homogeneity on basic issues of foreign policy.¹³

However, Ralph Levering observed in 1978 that:

Public confidence in the federal government was shaken severely during the decade from 1964 to 1974; official credibility on foreign policy is being restored gradually, but many Americans continue to be wary of pronouncements from Washington. Until a greater degree of mutual trust is achieved, the government's effectiveness in convincing the public of the importance of particular foreign policy issues will be impaired.¹⁴

Lattitudinal Discretion Allowed Elite Decision-making

In 1975 pollster George Gallup stated that, "Americans believe that the public and Congress should have greater influence on U.S. foreign policy." At the same time, pollster Mervin Field voiced his belief that, "Americans no longer automatically assume that the President knows best" about shaping U.S. foreign policy.¹⁵

As a result of the public attitudes, measures have been taken by Congress to limit executive discretion in the creation and implementation

of U.S. foreign policy. In 1973 a War Powers Act was passed over President Nixon's veto. According to this law the President is required to receive the consent of Congress before committing troops into areas where hostilities either are occurring or are about to occur.¹⁵ This prevented President Ford from recommitting troops into Vietnam in 1975.¹⁶ Informal Congressional disapproval also prevented Ford from sending U.S. troops to Angola during the same year.¹⁷ In 1975 Congress passed a bill ending four previous national emergencies: Roosevelt's of 1933, Truman's of 1950, and two by Nixon. The law also gives Congress the power to end a national emergency at any time by a majority vote in both houses. Further, executive agreements, which previously did not require Senate ratification, were to be treated in the same manner as treaties. In addition, foreign arms sales were to be subject to Senate approval.¹⁸

Congress also has influence over the Executive Branch through the power of the purse. Congress can either slash or refuse to pass appropriations bills, or it can prescribe how monies will be spent.¹⁹ Congress has the power to either reject treaties and executive agreements or amend them. Even if the Senate accepts a treaty, Congress may refuse to pass implementing legislation, as was almost the case with the Panama Canal Treaty.

Despite such increases in Congressional power over foreign policy, the formulation and implementation of such policy is still primarily a function of the President and the Executive Branch. The President controls the most accurate sources of foreign information relating to foreign and national security policy: the Department of State and the intelligence services. Despite the increase in the size of Congressional staffs,

Congress still receives a great deal of its information from the news media and from the Executive Branch. The same also applies to the public at large. The news media itself relies heavily upon statements and releases from the Executive Branch.²⁰ The ability of the Executive Branch to obtain and disseminate information also gives it the ability, to some extent, to manipulate Congressional and public opinion. This was the charge levelled at the Johnson Administration after the publication of the Pentagon Papers.

Studies of Presidential actions during past crises have shown that Presidents tended to disregard Congressional and public opinion, and to act as they thought best. The opinions to which they did listen were usually those of a few trusted advisors.²¹ While Presidents since Nixon have been more mindful of Congressional and public opinion, they have still been expected to act decisively and to take the initiative in policy formulation and implementation. One of the criticisms leveled against President Carter by the U.S. public, the Congress, and U.S. allies, has been a lack of decisiveness and consistency.²² Thus it appears that the U.S. public and Congress expect the President to lead, while they reserve the right to be consulted and informed, as well as the right to make suggestions.

Nature and Security Of Elite Tenure

The term "nature and security of elite tenure" relates to the political leaders and decision-makers of a state. The meaning of the term varies according to the political makeup of the various states discussed in this dissertation. For example, the loss of tenure by the political leaders of the democratic states of the U.S., Japan and India

may simply mean that these leaders lose their elective or appointive offices. There may be no threat to the personal lives or properties of the democratic political leaders. However, the loss of tenure by the political leaders of the Soviet Union and China may result in a variety of penalties including loss of political power, loss of personal privileges, loss of personal wealth and possessions, exile, imprisonment, penal labor, and death. Further, any or all of these penalties may be applied to the friends and relatives of deposed Communist political leaders.

The President of the U.S. is not only the head of state, he is also the leader of his party. He himself is answerable to the electorate every four years, but he is also concerned with his party representation in Congress. Since his foreign policy activities can affect his re-election to office, or the popularity of his party, the President is sensitive to the popular mood. A prime example of this occurred in 1968 when President Johnson chose not to run for another term. He did so because of public disapproval of his conduct of the war in Vietnam.

The President's advisors and senior foreign policy officials are also concerned with public opinion as it affects the operation of their departments or offices. As a result, they maintain large staffs to deal with the public and the press. Since they hold office at the pleasure of the President, they must generally support his policies. However, they also act as spokesmen for the views and vested interests of the personnel of their departments. Honest disagreements may arise between the various departments, as well as the White House and Congress. An example of this is the debate that occurred during all of 1974 between Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, and Senator Jackson over the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the U.S. and

Soviet strategic posture, and Soviet sincerity towards detente.²³ In the end, Schlesinger was asked to resign because the President agreed with Kissinger.

Quantity of Disposable Resources

Persuasive Skills

The ability of the President, as well as that of his senior appointive officials, to influence Congressional and public opinion is quite high because, as was pointed out earlier, the Executive Branch controls most of the reliable resources of information on foreign affairs. The news media also relies heavily on press releases by the White House and the different executive departments. Thus, Congress and the public may be unaware of an impending crisis until they are informed by the Executive Branch.

Presidents use a variety of methods of obtaining Congressional approval. These include the transmittal of information by the White House and federal departments; executive branch speakers at Congressional committee hearings; briefings by the President and Cabinet officials; informal verbal pressure at White House-sponsored social activities; Presidential initiatives in foreign and defense matters; deliberately seeking the advice of Congressmen; offers of support or rejection of Congressional bills; and efforts to arouse public support for Presidential policies.²⁴

The President and his Executive Branch have the difficult job of influencing both the general public and the non-governmental foreign policy elite of the U.S. Plano and Greenberg define an elite as:

Persons who exercise a major influence on, or control the making of political, economic and social decisions. Elites achieve their power position through wealth, family status, caste systems, or intellectual superiority.²⁵

President Nixon once stated that the non-governmental foreign policy elite of the U.S. consisted of the leaders of the news media, senior business executives, college professors and ". . . those who have the background to understand the importance of great decisions."²⁶ Thus, this elite has great influence over public opinion as it relates to foreign policy and many domestic policies. Governmental persuasive techniques used upon this elite and upon the public at large include: the transmittal of press releases and documents; news interviews; speeches by the President, members of the Executive Branch and friendly Congressmen; White House luncheons and other functions; and "forums" by cabinet departments. For example, Terence Smith of the New York Times staff noted that Carter's campaign for public support of the SALT II treaty commenced during the spring of 1978, long before the treaty was signed in Vienna on June 18, 1979. Writing on June 10, 1979 Smith stated that:

In the months leading up to the signing of the treaty . . . the campaign has already involved 1,600 speeches by Administration officials around the country, 750 radio and television interviews, 17 state leadership conferences and symposiums and the publication and distribution of more than 50 brochures and documents explaining the treaty.²⁷

Mobilizable Resources

The military capabilities of the U.S. are provided in Table I of Chapter I. According to official U.S. Government pronouncements, U.S. military capabilities are still No. 1 in the world. Critics of U.S. defense policy maintain that the U.S. is No. 2 in comparison to the U.S.S.R. The U.S. has forces stationed at various points in the Pacific Ocean, in

Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, and in the Indian Ocean. President Carter and his defense planners developed a "swing strategy" which would allow the U.S. to quickly place naval, air, and mobile ground forces at any point on the globe where they might be needed. President Carter also called for the development of a rapid deployment force that could quickly be moved anywhere in the world. President Reagan is currently attempting to create such a Force.²⁸

U.S. Foreign Policy Assumptions, Goals, and Tactics

These assumptions, goals and tactics are derived from an analysis of U.S. foreign policy since 1968, i.e., from the end of the Johnson Administration.

Assumptions

- (1) The global bipolar international system is changing to a multipolar one.
- (2) A monolithic Communist Bloc no longer exists. Instead there is the spread of independence and nationalism in Communist states.
- (3) Communist states, as such, are not necessarily a threat to U.S. security. The threat depends upon the attitude of the Communist rulers. Therefore it is possible to coexist and to have friendly relations with Communist states.
- (4) The Soviet Union is the primary enemy and rival of the U.S. The Soviet Union seeks superiority over the U.S. in terms of military and economic capabilities, and global political influence.
- (5) Since both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have a nuclear overkill capability against each other, the limitation of future nuclear armaments

should be possible. In addition, the spread of nuclear weapons constitutes a destabilizing threat to the global international system.

(6) Complete detente between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. is desirable.

(7) The U.S. and U.S.S.R. should not be drawn into local conflicts in geographic subsystems because this might trigger World War III. The Third World is a potentially dangerous area where the U.S. and U.S.S.R. must seek to avoid confrontation.

(8) China needs the U.S. either as an ally or as a source of aid against the U.S.S.R. China can be developed as a counterweight to the U.S.S.R., and the U.S. can exploit the situation.

(9) Although Japan is an economic super power, and Western Europe may become one, these allies will continue to follow the U.S. lead in the management of their national security policies.

(10) The U.S. intervention in Vietnam was a result of the U.S. Containment Policy carried to its logical extreme. Despite its great industrial development, U.S. capabilities are finite. So is the will to use those capabilities. The U.S. will no longer police the world, although it will honor previous commitments. The U.S. is willing to provide economic and military aid, but not ground troops, to states threatened by aggression and seeking U.S. help.

Goals

(1) To achieve peace and stability throughout the world.

(2) To build up China economically and militarily as a counterweight to the U.S.S.R.

(3) To establish detente between the U.S. on one hand, and the U.S.S.R. and China on the other, through agreements and understandings that emphasize great power interdependency.

(4) To push Japan into exercising great power, political and economic responsibilities.

(5) To achieve national security without a costly arms race.

(6) To achieve recognition of the assumption that the great powers have interests throughout the world.

(7) To contain and moderate the behavior of the U.S.S.R.

(8) To obtain energy resources at a lower cost and to obtain alternative sources of supply of scarce resources.

Tactics

(1) The end of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Asian mainland.

(2) The guarantee to keep previous U.S. security commitments, including providing a "nuclear umbrella" over Western Europe and Japan.

(3) The promise of aid to states threatened with aggression by means of aid and economic assistance, coupled with the warning that these states must provide their own military manpower.

(4) The reduction in the size of the U.S. armed forces; the initiation and continuation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and the initiation, along with the European allies, of the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks.

(5) The resumption of full diplomatic relations with China, and support for economic aid to China from any source.

(6) The negotiation of the Agreement On The Basic Principles of Relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

(7) The sponsorship of international agreements seeking to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to those states not already possessing them.

(8) The application of pressure upon the governments of U.S. allies to induce them to spend more for their own defense.

(9) The reduction of the number of U.S. bases abroad.

(10) U.S. diplomatic efforts to persuade the U.S.S.R. of the desirability of detente in all areas, and not just a few.

The U.S.S.R

Elite Direction or Ethos

Attitude Towards The Internal Organization Of The State

The Soviet Union is a state which exists to serve the Soviet Communist Party. As Merle Fainsod described it:

Its ruling party is self-perpetuating, and it cannot be dislodged save by revolution. Its powers are all-embracing and without limit. So-called "constitutional" arrangements derive such force as they possess from the regime's sanctions; the whole apparatus of government and administration is subject to its dictates. The leadership enforces a standard of orthodoxy from which there can be no dissent. Opposition is outlawed and invested with the stamp of treason. Citizens have duties and obligations; such rights as they exercise depend upon the precarious beneficence of the ruling group. Freedom is equated with obedience. Individual values must conform to the system of values prescribed by the top leadership. Men seek fulfillment in serving a power which they dare not defy.²⁹

The Soviet national political decision-making elite consists of the members of the Politburo and Central Committee of the Communist Party (CPSU), senior members of the party Secretariat, and senior military officers. These people are a product of the Soviet mass educational system which emphasizes the primacy of the party above the state and its governmental organs, and which stresses the fact that the first loyalty of every individual is owed to the party. The Soviet political elite also consists of people who have attended the different party schools,

performed well in their occupations, and have risen through the party hierarchy to become its leaders. This also applies to the senior Soviet military officers since they do not rise high in the military hierarchy unless they are loyal and active party members. These people, then, have risen through the system to the highest leadership posts by proving their party loyalty and administrative ability. Their ability to exercise power depends upon the continuance of the system.³⁰

Attitude Towards The Internal Organization Of Other States

The CPSU, like other national Communist parties, is highly ideological. Based upon the theories of Marx and Lenin, Soviet political ideology highlights world revolution, subversion, and the class struggle. According to this view, the states of the world may be divided into three categories:

- (1) The Communist states, i.e., those states whose ruling Communist parties accede to direction by the CPSU.
- (2) The heretical Communist states, such as China, Albania, and Yugoslavia. These are states which no longer accept direction from Moscow.
- (3) The Capitalist states, i.e., those which are not ruled by a Communist party and which are not subservient to the Soviet Union.

As noted above, states ruled by indigenous Communist parties which do not accept dictation by the CPSU are regarded as heretics. The leaders of the Soviet Union would probably prefer to bring these erring states back into the Soviet fold through quick military occupation. The non-bloc European Communist states of Yugoslavia and Albania are believed not to have been occupied because of Soviet fear of world public opinion, and because these states have not been directly necessary to Soviet economic

and military security. In the case of China, the U.S.S.R. is believed to fear nuclear retaliation and the possibility of becoming involved in a tedious and drawn-out ground war.

The eastern European Communist states located around the periphery of the U.S.S.R. are deemed essential to its security for two primary reasons:

(1) The states act as a buffer zone in case of invasion, and their military forces supplement those of the Soviet Union.

(2) The economies of these states supplement that of the Soviet Union, and they are economically dependent upon the Soviet Union.³¹ Complete heresy among these states is not permitted, as the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia amply demonstrate.³² President and CPSU First Secretary Brezhnev justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in a speech delivered on 26 September 1968:

. . . when external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given Socialist country in the direction of a restoration of the Capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of Socialism in that country-- a threat to the security of the Socialist Commonwealth as a whole--this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem--the concern of all Socialist countries.³³

Alexander Dallin suggested in 1971 that the Soviet leaders were willing to ignore a multitude of sins on the part of Communist parties in other states, including those in Eastern Europe, so long as they formally acknowledged the leadership of the CPSU, but that the Soviet leaders found a non-Leninist Communist party totally abhorrent. A Leninist party consists of a highly disciplined and centralized elite which controls all the other institutions with the state. Dallin postulated that the

proposed Dubcek reforms in Czechoslovakia were anathema to the Soviet leaders, and that they felt themselves to be in a position to do something about the situation.³⁴

The June 1976 conference of European Communist leaders in East Berlin showed that there were still special links among the European Communist parties, and therefore ties with Moscow. However, the Soviet claim to dominance and sole guardianship of ideological purity was unacceptable to many European party leaders.³⁵ Nevertheless, as events in Poland during 1981 have shown, the Soviet Union appears to still be willing to invade a Communist state on its periphery to halt reforms which might cause the Communist ruling party in that state to be less Leninist. The reasons for this are probably partly concerned with ideology and partly concerned with Soviet national security.

The Capitalist states include both economically developed and developing states. They are fair game for internal subversion and/or revolution. If the world political situation allows it, they may also be directly occupied by Soviet troops, as was the case with Eastern Europe after World War II. Because of the election of the Marxist Allende in Chile, and the increasing strength of the Communist parties in Western Europe, Soviet doctrine during the 1970's has stated that Communist parties can achieve state power by peaceful means and not solely by revolution. This doctrine has its antecedents in previous Soviet doctrine concerning the developing, or Third World, states.³⁶

Prior to 1952 Stalin regarded the Third World states as still being tied to the old Capitalist and colonial powers. Therefore he did not seek friendly diplomatic relations with them. He also gave his approval

to revolutionary struggles by local Communist parties in a number of Third World states. By 1952 most of these struggles had failed. Soviet expansion had been checked in Europe and stalemated in Korea. Stalin began to consider a policy of expanding Soviet influence in the Third World. However, nothing was done due to his death in 1953.

After his death Stalin's successors began to formulate a new global foreign policy. Khrushchev is reputed to have been the prime mover in the formulation of this policy, especially with regard to the Third World. The new policy appears to have been an expansion of the ideas held by Stalin in 1952. Khrushchev recognized that the emerging Third World states tended to be socialist, anticolonial, and sympathetic to Marxism. Although blocked in Europe, the emerging Third World was an area where the Soviet Union might make some gains against Capitalism with relatively low economic, political, and ideological risks. Khrushchev described the leaders of the Third World states as "national bourgeoisie", who could be used to help build socialism in their states in collaboration with native Communists. Eventually the Communist leaders would replace the national bourgeois leaders and the Third World states would join the Communist camp. Khrushchev courted the national bourgeois leaders with economic and military aid.³⁷

In 1964 Khrushchev was replaced by a coup, and Brezhnev came to power. Khrushchev's policies and goals towards the Third World were not dropped, but were altered as was their ideological basis. Whereas Khrushchev had expected the Third World states would move rapidly along the path towards Communism, Brezhnev felt that a long transition period was required. This period might last many decades, even as much as a century and a half. Therefore Soviet economic aid to these states should be designed to

genuinely advance their economies and help them along the path to Communism. Flashy development projects with little tangible benefits to overall economic development were to be discouraged in the future. Further, Soviet economic and military aid should support pragmatic foreign policy and strategic objectives that would directly benefit the Soviet Union. In the case of East Asia these policies and objectives would be related to isolating and containing China, to reducing U.S. influence, and to increasing that of the Soviet Union in the region.³⁸

Attitude Towards The Organization Of The International System

Based upon the preceding discussion, it is obvious that the Soviet Union's attitude toward the organization of the present international system is unfavorable. The Soviet leaders see the world divided into three hostile camps. The Capitalist states must be converted, by economic and political means, to Communism. The heretical Communist states must be brought back into the Soviet fold. The states within the Soviet Bloc must be constantly watched for signs of stirring nationalism. Further, the Soviets see new centers emerging of economic and military power, such as China and Japan. Clearly, the Soviet leaders view the present international system as a hostile environment in which to conduct their foreign policy. Their ideology indicates that they will adhere to the implicit or explicit rules of the system only so long as it serves their purpose. The same applies to international law. Treaties can be broken if they are no longer useful. One Soviet diplomatic handbook quotes Machiavelli approvingly on this point:

A sensible prince cannot keep his word when this is harmful to him, and when the reasons compelling him to do so no longer exist.³⁹

Soviet ideology, as well as national interests, presuppose hostility to any international system which it does not control.

Control Factors Operating On The Elite

Nature Of The Popular Allegiance To the Governing Elite

Popular allegiance to the Soviet regime is affected by three primary factors: political socialization techniques, the secret police, and the mass information media. These factors are controlled by the CPSU through the organs of government and the party bureaucracy. Political socialization techniques affect the individual first; these include the educational system, the youth organizations, and the family. The Soviet educational system is designed to imbue the state's youth with Communist ethical and political values, as well as to train them for future job occupations. From the time that Soviet children enter grammar school at the age of seven until they graduate at the age of fifteen, they are taught the CPSU moral code. This includes the importance of the collective, social discipline, respect for labor, patriotism, veneration of the CPSU, and other virtues. All school subjects are taught from the Marxist viewpoint. Formal political training begins during the latter part of secondary school education and continues into the higher educational institutions.

Party and non-party students who do not progress past the grammar schools, or who fail to graduate from the secondary schools, are encouraged to join Marxist study circles and/or to attend political schools. Subsequently, they are encouraged to undertake supervised individual research.⁴⁰ Party and non-party students who have graduated from either

secondary schools or higher educational institutions, are encouraged to attend a local Evening University of Marxism-Leninism and study Communist history, philosophy, and political economy. The CPSU maintains special schools for party cadres and executives. Thus, an individual in the Soviet Union may receive indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist principles from the age of seven until he is middle-aged.⁴¹

The Communist youth organizations also play a great part in political socialization. Virtually all Soviet youth belong to the Little Octobrists during ages seven to nine, and to the Young Pioneers during ages ten to fourteen. About one-third of Soviet youth belong to the KOMSOMOL, or Young Communist League, during the ages of fifteen to twenty-six. The first two youth groups emphasize CPSU ethics and values. KOMSOMOL members are taught Marxist-Leninist philosophy and party history, and are expected to perform actual services for the party.⁴²

While not necessarily opposing the political socialization values put forth by state and party organs, the family tends to impede their acceptance. Religious parents will attempt to communicate their views to the children. In the areas beyond Great Russia, the parents may also communicate local customs and loyalties. Family solidarity may also be stressed. There is also evidence that parents seek to use whatever wealth or influence they possess in order to help their children advance educationally, occupationally, and politically.⁴³ This is particularly true of the CPSU executives, as Milovan Djilas pointed out as early as 1957 in The New Class, and later in The Unperfect Society.⁴⁴

Thus it seems that even the Soviet leaders do not totally subscribe to the Marxist-Leninist ethic. The Soviet Union also faces the problem of a certain amount of public political apathy. As a matter of fact,

Jeremy Azrael suggests that if the Soviet population had been more highly politicized than it apparently is, the regime would not have survived Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign.⁴⁵ Joseph Nogee has summed up the results of Soviet political socialization as follows:

To the extent that the regime seeks to reform the human personality along Communist lines, Soviet political socialization has not been successful. However, the Party has by means of the instruments of socialization succeeded in creating a general uniformity of outlook and conformity of behavior among the overwhelming majority of its citizens, and that is enough to ensure the regime's continuation.⁴⁶

The public information media, which includes radio, television, magazines, newspapers, and books, is directed and controlled by the Party through the state. This will be discussed in a later section. The secret police, or KGB, exists because of the party and is therefore its most loyal supporter. Its domestic function is to identify dissent, gauge public opinion on issues of the day and, if requested by the party leaders, make arrests. Periodic reports on public opinion are sent to the Central Committee and Politburo. Although the secret police is no longer being used as an instrument of overt domestic terror, it pervades every area and activity in the U.S.S.R. including the party itself.⁴⁷

Latitudinal Discretion Allowed Elite Decision-making

Since the CPSU rules the U.S.S.R., the party has complete decision-making power over state organs and activities. Within the party generally, decisions are made by higher officials after a bargaining process involving both the higher officials and lower echelon officials. National decision-making is done by the Politburo and the Central Committee. Each member of these two party organs has usually specialized in an area of economic or political activity, and tends to represent the interests

and attitudes of the lower party members engaged in his sphere of activity. Decisions within the Politburo and the Central Committee are made by a simple majority vote.⁴⁸ Thus a policy proposal is accepted if its proponent can obtain enough votes in its favor. Since the early 1970's the Soviet Defense Minister has been included in the Politburo. This is probably done in recognition of the military's role in party affairs as an interest group. The Defense Minister can also give technical advice to the rest of the Politburo on military matters.⁴⁹

Thus, policymaking in the Politburo appears to be the result of a bargaining process whereby each member attempts to influence the others in order to obtain favorable votes.

Nature and Security of Elite Tenure

The elite of the CPSU, as noted above, are the members of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the senior officials of the Central Committee Secretariat. The Secretariat, controlled by the General Secretary, nominates members for the two other party organs as well as the party congress. The Central Committee then accepts them. The Secretariat may also recommend that members be dropped from the two party organs, and the Central Committee then confirms the recommendation. Thus the Secretariat and the Central Committee select and reject the party leadership. Members are selected or rejected on the basis of their past records, their power bases, and the opinions of the Secretariat and General Secretary. If the power bases of the members of the Politburo and Central Committee either stand firm or, as in the case of the military, are neutral, the Central Committee may be able to vote the General Secretary out of office.⁵⁰ For instance, Khrushchev was removed from office because

his policies had alienated the vested interests of almost every sector of the party including the military. Thus, when the Central Committee voted Khrushchev out of office, he is not believed to have received support from any sector of the party.⁵¹ To summarize, the party leadership selects its own successors on the basis of similar attitudes and proven abilities. When the views or behavior of a member of the leadership becomes offensive to the General Secretary and a majority of the Central Committee, he may be dismissed. When the policies of a General Secretary offend a majority of the party sectors, the Central Committee may also vote his dismissal. Thus the party leadership must be sensitive to party sector opinions.

The Quantity of Disposable Resources

Persuasive Skills

As was noted earlier, all the means of public communication are controlled by the CPSU through state agencies. Freedom of the press was abolished in 1917. With the exception of radio broadcasts from outside the U.S.S.R., such as those emanating from Radio Liberty and the Voice of America, the Soviet citizen is told what the party thinks he should know. Of course, the U.S.S.R. attempts to jam all foreign broadcasts beamed to it. Thus, according to Avtorkhanov,

. . . militant propaganda provides the basic content of Soviet intellectual life. Now it captures, not by enthusiasm or quality, but by an organized and massive encirclement of the Soviet citizen by a gigantic army of propagandists, beginning literally in the cradle and lasting to his death.⁵²

Suppression of underground newspapers is a function of the KGB. Nothing can be broadcast or published without the prior approval of the party

censors. The latest technique of suppression of intellectual discontent is to either send them to mental institutions or to banish them from the state for life. While the Soviet citizen may not always believe the information he receives from the media, there may be much domestic and foreign news of which he is unaware because he is not told of it.

Mobilizable Resources

Table I in Chapter I shows the ground, naval, and air forces of the U.S.S.R., as well as its strategic missile force. Besides maintaining an extremely powerful and mobile army, as well as the world's largest strategic missile force, the U.S.S.R. has modernized and greatly expanded its navy. Soviet fleets now cruise the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas. A Soviet squadron is also in the Indian Ocean. David R. Cox postulates that the Cuban missile crisis convinced the Soviet leaders that they could not rely primarily upon the threat of strategic nuclear weapons as a means of achieving their foreign policy goals, and that large and flexible general purpose forces would also be necessary. The Cuban missile crisis also graphically pointed out to them the value of a large and powerful navy for the purposes of blockade, interdiction, and invasion.⁵³ In other words, they learned the value of "gunboat diplomacy". Thus, besides maintaining large ground and missile forces in a high state of readiness, the Soviet intent appears to be to use its fleet as a means of influence in support of its global foreign policy objectives. Although the Soviet Union became a European super power in the late 1940's, it did not become a global super power until the 1970's.

The Soviet economy emphasizes heavy industry and munitions at the expense of light industry and consumer goods. Although the GNP of the U.S.S.R. is less than half of that of the U.S., its estimated military expenditures exceed those of the U.S. This estimate still does not take into account those expenditures in other industrial sectors whose products are not military-related per se but which do, in fact, support the military. Examples might include small electronic components, as well as construction materials. Thus the evidence indicates that the Soviet economy operates primarily in support of the military machine.

Since the fall of Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership has concentrated upon improving the flexibility, quality, and especially the reaction time of the armed forces. While the U.S.S.R. has powerful forces in Europe and in Eastern Siberia, and naval forces in all of the world's seas, it lacks the capability to quickly transport naval air and ground forces to any point on the globe. However, the U.S.S.R. may eventually develop this capability.

Soviet Foreign Policy Assumptions, Goals, and Tactics

Assumptions

The primary intellectual basis for the foreign policy views and assumptions of the Soviet leadership has been hotly debated over the years by Western scholars. Some, such as R. N. Carew Hunt⁵⁴ and Barrington Moore,⁵⁵ have said that these views are based primarily upon Marxist ideology. Others, such as Samuel Sharp, have suggested that these views are based primarily upon the leaders' perceptions of the national interest and expediency.⁵⁶ The truth probably lies somewhere

in between. The view expressed in this dissertation is that Soviet foreign policy assumptions are probably based upon a mixture of ideology and pragmatic perceptions of the national interest, and that it is difficult during any given situation to say which is dominant over the other. The following list of these views and assumptions is based upon an assessment of past Soviet foreign policy activities and writings since 1945, and especially since the fall of Khrushchev during 1964:

(1) Due to their Marxist ideology, the Soviet leaders must regard non-Communist states as being potentially hostile or at least unsympathetic to their world-view. This also would apply to Communist states which either have (in the Soviet view) non-Leninist Communist parties, or are tending in that direction. The Soviet leaders would regard the existence of these parties as a form of heresy.

(2) Since Soviet perceptions of Marxist-Leninist doctrine are (in their eyes) the most correct, and since the U.S.S.R. is economically and militarily the most powerful Communist state in the world, the U.S.S.R. has the right to lead the world Communist movement.

(3) The two primary antagonists of the Soviet Union at the present time are the U.S. and China. The U.S. is a primary Soviet antagonist because it is the most powerful Capitalistic state, and is the Soviet Union's most active competitor in world affairs. China is the other primary Soviet antagonist because of its heretical views on Marxist-Leninism, its active propaganda war against Soviet aims and ideology, and its growing economic and military power.

(4) The destructiveness of modern nuclear warfare has made the initiation of total war against the U.S. unthinkable unless the Soviets

achieve a major technological breakthrough that will nullify the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Thus, direct competition among the two states must be political and economic in nature. The U. S. nuclear umbrella over the NATO states must also be respected. Because of China's growing nuclear power, the initiation of total war against her is also unfeasible. Therefore direct Soviet competition against China must also be economic and political in nature. However, military forces of other non-nuclear Communist states, such as Cuba and Vietnam, may be used to further Soviet aims against the Capitalist states and erring Communist states.

(5) Detente with the U.S. is useful because of the limitations on armaments, thereby allowing some Soviet armament funds to be spent on other sectors of the economy. Detente is also useful because it allows for U.S. technology transfer to the lagging Soviet economy.

(6) While the Soviet fear of Capitalist encirclement seems to have lessened, the Eastern European states are necessary to Soviet national security both as a military buffer zone against the NATO states and as an adjunct to the Soviet economy. As such, these states must remain under Soviet hegemony.

(7) The U.S.S.R., as a military and economic super power, has a right to global influence. Thus, means must be found, such as the increase in the size and flexibility of the Soviet navy, to exercise this influence.

(8) The U.S.S.R. must be capable of defending itself against U.S., NATO, and Chinese forces if all of these states were to attack the U.S.S.R. at the same time.

Goals

The goals of the Soviet leaders appear to be:

(1) To continue to increase the economic and military power of the U.S.S.R. so as to be able to project its influence worldwide.⁵⁷

(2) To achieve universal recognition of Soviet global interests. This was accepted by the U.S. in the Basic Principles signed on May 29, 1972.⁵⁸

(3) To weaken the U.S. economically and militarily. It should be remembered, for example, that during the Yom Kippur War the Soviets urged the Arabs to use oil as a weapon against the U.S.⁵⁹ Later, when the Arabs were considering lifting the oil embargo, the Soviets urged them not to do so.⁶⁰

(4) To bring the heretical Communist states back into the Soviet orbit.

(5) To acquire influence, bases, raw materials and markets throughout the Third World.

(6) To eventually cause the dissolution, or at least the nullification of NATO. To also oppose any Western European federal union.

(7) To counter the spread of Chinese influence throughout the world, and especially in East Asia. To surround China with a group of Asian allies.

(8) To prevent a possible Asian axis of the U.S., Japan, and China.

Tactics

The tactics of the current Soviet leadership may be summarized as follows:

(1) The furtherance of detente with the U.S. and its allies through the negotiation of political, cultural, economic, and military agreements which are beneficial to the U.S.S.R. and which do not compromise Soviet national security.

(2) Continued increases in the quality of weapons systems, and continued increases in the quantity and flexibility of general purpose forces, including the fleet.

(3) Activities designed to consolidate U.S. and Western European recognition of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and to obtain recognition of Soviet hegemony in that area. During the Nixon Administration the U.S. and its allies recognized that the U.S.S.R. had special interests and a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, but they did not recognize sole Soviet hegemony over the region.⁶¹ This position has not changed since then.

(4) Willingness to use military force to crush signs of political nationalism in Eastern Europe.

(5) Attempts to create an Asian collective security system, through a series of alliances with the U.S.S.R., aimed at China. The current members of this system include Mongolia, Afghanistan, India, Vietnam, the Vietnam-sponsored Government of Cambodia and, unofficially, Laos.

(6) The use of economic aid to Third World states and the sale of weapons at bargain prices.

(7) Attempts to increase the number of Soviet military-related facilities abroad, and attempts to lease the use of port facilities.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER III

THE ACTOR INFORMATION VARIABLES OF CHINA, JAPAN, AND INDIA

China

Elite Direction or Ethos

Attitude Towards the Internal Organization of the State

The Chinese state, like that of the Soviet Union, exists side-by-side with the Communist Party. The organs of both parallel each other from the national level down to the county and municipal levels. Party representatives can also be found at the street, block, and residential levels. As is also the case in the Soviet Union, the Party rules and leads the civilian government and the military. The decision-making elite of China consists of the senior party leaders who may also hold high civilian governmental or military posts. For example, Minister of Defense Geng Biao is also Secretary General of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.¹ However, ever since Deng Xiaoping and a number of other Party leaders resigned their governmental positions in 1980, the trend has been to separate Party and governmental posts.²

The 1977 CCP Constitution vests the supreme governing power over the Party in its legislative organ, the Central Committee, which is elected by the Party Congress (Article 10).³ However, the Central Committee usually consists of 300 or more members and alternates which only meets an average of once or twice a year. The Central Committee selects a smaller

Politburo, and an even smaller Politburo Standing Committee which makes policy and see to the day-to-day conduct of affairs. China's highest leaders are members of the Politburo and its Standing Committee.⁴ Politburo members are also in charge of Party agencies which supervise the activities of the Party, civilian government, and the armed forces. The party decision-making body for military policy is the Military Commission of the Central Committee.⁵ Decisions of the Commission probably must be approved by either the Politburo or its Standing Committee before a policy is initiated. A Party commission for regular foreign affairs is not known to exist. Therefore, it is likely that foreign policy matters are primarily debated in the Politburo and its Standing Committee. On occasions when foreign policy relates to military policy, it is probably also debated in the Military Commission.⁶ Major foreign and military policy moves may be put on the agenda for discussion by the entire Central Committee. This was the case with China's decision in 1970 to improve relations with the U.S.⁷ Such an enlarged debate would provide wider support and increased publicity for a policy decision.

Party leadership over the state is clearly shown by the 1978 State Constitution. Leadership of the on-going Chinese revolution is vested in the Party Chairman and Central Committee. The thought of Mao is enshrined as the theoretical basis of the state and its activities. China's armed forces, the PLA, are led by the Party and the Chairman of the Central Committee commands PLA.⁸

The legislative branch of the government is the National People's Congress (NPC), which is supposed to hold at least one session every year. However, it met infrequently from 1959 through 1976 due to various domestic political crises such as the Cultural Revolution. Since the fall of the

Gang of Four in 1976 and the assumption of power by a new leadership determined to restore regularity and normality to Chinese political affairs, the NPC has met more than once a year. The NPC theoretically supervises the activities of the State Council and even determines the number and types of ministries. In actual fact, it has usually met only to ratify the acts and decisions of the State Council. Thus, it has functioned primarily as the State Council's rubber stamp.

During 1980 the NPC began to show signs that it was taking its role of watchdog over the State Council somewhat more seriously. Leading members of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry were questioned sharply about the construction of a new steel mill. The questioners were concerned about inefficiency, waste and improper practices.⁹ It may be that the NPC is beginning to become more independent in carrying out some of its duties.

Since the NPC meets infrequently, day-to-day approval of State Council activities comes from the NPC's permanent organ, the Standing Committee. Besides their supervisory activities, the NPC Standing Committee and its Chairman have inherited the ceremonial duties of the defunct Chairmanship of the Republic. These duties include promulgating decrees, formally accepting or rejecting treaties, and receiving and dispatching ambassadors. However, the actual decision-making power rests with the State Council, the Central Committee, the Politburo and its Standing Committee, and the various Party organs.¹⁰

The State Council, or cabinet, consists of the Premier, various Vice Premiers, and the heads of ministries and commissions. This is the governmental body of the state responsible for directing administration affairs, as well as drafting and implementing the national economic

plans and the government budget. The Constitution does not specify the number of ministries or commissions, and formal approval for the addition or deletion of any of these rests with the NPC or its Standing Committee. The Party actually decides what the state's administrative structure will be at any given time.¹¹

China is currently recovering from the Cultural Revolution, which was fomented and led by Chairman Mao as a means to regain his power that had been lost to other Party officials. Mao was capable of leading a successful Communist revolution, but he was apparently incapable of leading a state engaged in economic development. Mao believed that economic development occurred because of the triumph of national will rather than as the result of rational planning. He was more interested in ideological purity than in economic and political management. After the collapse of China's economy in 1960 because of Mao's Great Leap Forward, he was relegated to the role of Party theoretician, while most of the governing power passed into the hands of Party planners and managers. However, Mao's opinion remained influential in foreign affairs.¹²

The Cultural Revolution may be said to have occurred in two phases: (a) the phase of purges and violence from 1966-1969 and (b) the phase of rule by the ideologues and the military from 1970-1976. During the first phase middle and upper level schools and universities were closed and their faculties were purged. The students were formed into Red Guard units responsible for arresting Mao's enemies and others not sufficiently imbued with Maoist doctrine. Foreign-trained engineers, scientists and managers were suspected of ideological heresy and many were purged. Many Party and governmental officials were also purged; however, Zhou Enlai managed to protect a nucleus of pragmatic planners and managers. Governmental and

Party organs at all levels were replaced by Revolutionary Councils composed of industrial workers, peasants, and the military. The Red Guards were sent into the factories and communal farms to instruct the workers and peasants in Maoist doctrine. Workers and peasants clashed with the Red Guards, resulting in decreased production. The military was finally called in to restore order. Since the Red Guards did not want to submit to order and discipline, they were disbanded--sometimes forcibly--and millions of China's youth were sent to the countryside to engage in "productive labor."¹³

During the second phase China was controlled by Party officials and by the military. The military maintained order and, because it was the only organized and disciplined force in China, it came to dominate most of the Revolutionary Councils.¹⁴ Industrial and agricultural production continued to suffer because of ideological factionalism, the lack of material incentives, and compulsory ideological study during working hours. Schools and some universities reopened, but curriculae were shortened. Many substantive courses were replaced by courses in Maoist thought. Students were admitted on the basis of Party loyalty rather than academic qualifications.¹⁵

After the death of Mao in the fall of 1976, the military and the remaining pragmatic Party leaders joined together to oust the remaining extremist political leaders which were labelled the "Gang of Four."¹⁶ Since then, more purged Party officials have been returned to power. The military voluntarily relinquished its political power in favor of the Party officials. Both the government and the Party have been reorganized. Officials opposed to the new order in China are being purged.¹⁷ Schools and universities have been ordered to strive for academic excellence, and thousands of Chinese students are being sent abroad for studies in the

natural sciences, engineering, economics and management.¹⁸ Industrial and agricultural workers have been given raises and other material incentives.¹⁹ China's new pragmatic leadership is seeking domestic stability and order coupled with economic development based upon rational planning and the acquisition of foreign technology.

Attitude Towards the Internal Organization of Other States

As Communists, China's leaders are ideologically hostile to those states which are not also Communist. However, among the group of Communist states, China's leaders are hostile to the Soviet Union. Communist doctrine has been described sometimes by scholars as being almost a secular religion. From this point of view, China's opposition to the Soviet Union may be considered comparable to the opposition of a true believer to a heretic. As Milovan Djilas pointed out, the course of Russian history after the death of Stalin has resulted in the establishment of a new bureaucratic class, with all the special privileges and perquisites that adhere in the Capitalist world to managerial power and rank.²⁰ Since the Chinese leadership is trying to create a truly classless and proletarian state, they regard the Soviet Union as a "revisionist" state and a negative example:

A small number of people will take advantage of bourgeois rights to embezzle state or collective property and goods by illegal means under a legal signboard, acquire increasing amounts of money and commodities, and become new bourgeois elements. If this phenomenon is widespread and growing, a privileged stratum of people with unearned gains will emerge; the nature of the socialist system of ownership will change; there will be a change in socialist mutual relations between people; and this will lead to capitalist restoration. In the Soviet Union, because the revisionists have come to power, the socialist system has degenerated into a capitalist system. This also provides us with a profound lesson.²¹

Thus, in the sense that a true believer may be more hostile towards a heretic than towards an unbeliever, China is more hostile towards the Soviet Union than towards the Capitalist states.

China deals with other states at two different levels:

- (a) Normal government-to-government relations with most states.
- (b) Moral and sometimes military support for national liberation movements within non-Communist states.

Since the subsidence of the Cultural Revolution after 1968, China has sought to emerge from its international isolation and to establish normal diplomatic relations with the governments of most states. These relations are supposedly based upon the five principles of peaceful coexistence first specifically documented in the Sino-Indian Treaty of Tibet of April 1954. These principles are:

- (a) Respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- (b) Mutual non-aggression.
- (c) Non-interference in other states' internal affairs.
- (d) Equality and mutual benefit in state-to-state relations.
- (e) Peaceful coexistence and the spirit of the Bandung Conference.²²

Non-aggression, in the minds of China's leaders, means not invading another state with a national army. However, at the second level, i.e., the level below government-to-government relations, China's leaders feel it their duty to provide moral support, and sometimes military aid, to national liberation movements in non-Communist states. Thus, on November 23, 1974 Ling Jin, the Chinese Ambassador to the U.N., stated in a speech:

... With regard to the question of aggression or the victim of aggression, we maintain that any country which first uses armed forces to encroach upon the sovereignty, independence and

territorial integrity of other countries has naturally committed a crime of aggression, that a crime of aggression should be subjected to severe international condemnation and sanctions, and that the people of various countries have the right to wage sacred wars of national liberation and revolutionary wars of self-defense and it is absolutely impermissible to mention in the same breath wars of aggression and wars against aggression, which are different in nature.²³

Although they support the spread of the World Revolution, China's leaders reserve the right to pick the time and place to provide arms to national liberation movements. China reportedly sent 320,000 engineering and anti-aircraft troops to Vietnam and Laos during the Indochina War, as well as arms and ammunition.²⁴ Communist forces in Burma are reportedly equipped and trained in China.²⁵ However, it is reported that when North Korean President Kim Il Sung went to China in April 1975 to ask for aid in conquering South Korea, the Chinese leaders refused. The reasons reportedly were that the U.S. had troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea, and that China preferred detente with the U.S. so long as Soviet troops massed along the Sino-Soviet border posed a greater danger.²⁶ Thus Chinese military support of national liberation movements in other states is tempered by pragmatism and caution.

China's leaders, of course, do not regard the Republic of China on Taiwan as an independent state. Taiwan is regarded as a province of mainland China currently being occupied by the proscribed Guomindang Party, which is supported by U.S. arms. Any state which wants normal government-to-government relations with the People's Republic of China must first concede this. This also usually means that the state must agree to no longer accept diplomatic representation from Taiwan. This was the case when the U.S. granted diplomatic recognition to the government of Beijing.²⁷ Chinese doctrine states that Taiwan will eventually be liberated, but it

does not necessarily predict liberation by force of arms. Instead, China is attempting to woo Taiwan with offers to negotiate, and promises of political and economic autonomy.²⁸

Despite their theoretical opposition to Capitalism, China's leaders from Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping have feared and hated the Soviet Union more. Thus China seeks to use the Capitalist states both against the Soviet Union and to build up China's economic and military capabilities. China supports a strong NATO and increased Japanese rearmament.²⁹ Although China and the U.S. have publicly ruled out the possibility of a triple alliance between the U.S., China, and Japan, China is believed to actually favor such an alliance.³⁰

c. Attitude Towards the Organization of the International System

China views the international system in three perspectives: economically; China versus the U.S.S.R.; and Communism versus Capitalism. The theoretical basis for these three perspectives comes from Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and the discredited Lin Biao.

In terms of economics, China's leaders see the present international system as consisting of "Three Worlds": the First World, which consists of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as the two economic and military super powers; the Second World, which consists of the major industrialized states such as Western Europe and Japan; and the Third World, which consists of the less industrialized states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This perspective was developed by Mao and is still accepted by Mao's successors.³¹

The Chinese definition of a super power is also of interest. In an interview with an Egyptian newspaper editor during February 1973, Zhou Enlai defined a super power as being a "condition" and not just "attributes".

Thus, while a state might have enormous economic resources, large military forces with nuclear weapons, and a permanent seat on the U.S. Security Council, this did not necessarily make it a super power. A state might have these "attributes", but it was not a super power unless it also exercised a policy of force to obtain its international ends. According to Zhou, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were exercising policies of force and were seeking to exploit and dominate the world.³²

Since the mid-1960's Chinese doctrine has held that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are competing with each other for world domination and that eventual war between the two states is inevitable. Therefore detente between the two states is false because the amount of their conventional weapons and nuclear warheads continues to increase.³³ Of the two super powers, the U.S.S.R. is considered by China to be the biggest plunderer of the Third World, and the most active of the two in seeking hegemony.³⁴

China's leaders, then, apparently define hegemony as the act of one state compelling another state to do its will through the threat of use of its superior military capabilities. From their point of view, China's leaders are possibly being truthful when they claim that China will never be a super power and does not seek hegemony. China's leaders are publicly opposed to hegemony based upon military capabilities. China justified its invasion of Vietnam during February 1979 as a punishment against Vietnamese hegemonist activities in Indochina on behalf of the U.S.S.R.³⁵ James C. Hsiung argues that China's leaders intend China to be, "...a source of inspiration and ideological leadership for the underdeveloped world rather than a center of direct organizational control or direct participation."³⁶ This view is supported by various Chinese articles and speeches.³⁷ However, if hegemony is defined more broadly

as the act of one state compelling another state to do its will by various means rather than just the actual or implied use of force, then China also seeks hegemony. That is, hegemony based upon superior example and moral suasion. This might be considered indirect hegemony, as opposed to the more direct type of hegemony based on force.

China regards itself, through the thought of Mao, as the true interpreter of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Therefore, because of doctrinal differences, China regards the U.S.S.R. as being a "revisionist" Communist state; i.e. not a true Communist state but only masquerading as one.³⁸ China is angry with the U.S.S.R. for refusing to return territory which China regards as historically its own.³⁹ China sees the U.S.S.R. as seeking to rule the world as a counterfeit Communist state, thus perverting the World Communist Movement.⁴⁰ China also sees the U.S.S.R. as seeking to forge a system of alliances around China for the purposes of containment and eventual conquest.⁴¹ Therefore it is necessary for China to compromise with the U.S. and the Free World industrialized states in order to first defeat the U.S.S.R.⁴²

China's view of the struggle between the Communist Movement and the Capitalist states, and the eventual defeat of those states is contained in Lin Biao's monograph Long Live The Victory Of The People's War, published during 1965.⁴³ This study is based upon Mao's military writing concerning the conduct of the national liberation movement in China to 1949. However, Lin's work expands Mao's theories to encompass the whole world. His work was regarded as being semi-official when it was published and it is significant that, although his other writings have been criticized since his death, this work has thus far escaped. According to Lin, the ideological

justification for the war of national liberation was the Marxian dictum that a Communist party could only achieve state power by violence:⁴⁴

In the last analysis, the Marxist-Leninist theory of proletarian revolution is the theory of the seizure of state power by revolutionary violence, the theory of countering war against the people by people's war. As Marx so aptly put it, "force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one."⁴⁴

The proper instrument for guerilla warfare was an army with iron discipline under the absolute leadership of the Communist Party.

Lin attempted to adopt the lessons of the Communist takeover in China to the world situation. In China the PLA was recruited primarily from the peasantry and the rural areas were used as base areas. From these base areas the Communists moved to capture the Nationalist-held cities and supply lines serving them. Eventually, whole provinces were brought under Communist control by annihilating the enemy piecemeal.

Adhering to another tenet of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, Lin stated that a Communist revolution could not occur until after the completion of the national democratic revolution. China, he felt, had followed this pattern. The national democratic revolution, supported by the workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and the patriotic democrats had swept away the Manchu Dynasty and had begun the modernization of China. Later, these same elements, with the vital assistance of the Red Army, had defeated the Japanese. The workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie had then turned upon the other segments of society, under the red banner, and had successfully concluded the Communist revolution.⁴⁵

As he looked about him, Lin concluded that the world situation in 1965 was analogous to that of China in 1946. The world could be divided

into "rural" and "urban" areas. Asia, Africa, and Latin America constituted the "rural areas" while Europe (including the Soviet Union) and North America were analogous to the "urban areas". The national democratic revolution had occurred in the rural areas with the advent to power of indigenous governments supposedly based upon European and North American models. However, these governments were controlled by local elites and operated so as to benefit the ruling class. In many cases, he felt, these governments were propped up by the "Imperialist Powers" against the express wishes of the common people. Such governments could only be swept away by force:

So long as imperialism and the system of exploitation of man by man exists, the imperialists and reactionaries will invariably rely upon armed force to maintain their reactionary rule and impose war on the oppressed nations and peoples. This is an objective law independent of man's will.⁴⁶

Thus, through guerrilla warfare led by local Communist parties, the rural areas could eventually be "liberated". The United States, he said, had made Vietnam a testing ground for the suppression of such wars because it was afraid that the fall of Vietnam would lead to a chain reaction in Southeast Asia. Lin implied that such a chain reaction was the result desired by China. While China supported wars of national liberation, the Soviet Union had sponsored "capitulationism" and "defeatism."⁴⁷

As the rural areas of the world fell to the Communists, the urban areas would become progressively more isolated. Eventually the rural areas would be strong enough economically and militarily to lay siege to the urban areas. The main urban opponent was the United States; when the United States was defeated, the other urban states would follow. The implication was that

if the U.S. were to use nuclear weapons, then nuclear weapons would also be used against her;

U.S. imperialism relies solely on its nuclear weapons to intimidate people. But these weapons cannot save U.S. imperialism from its doom. Nuclear weapons cannot be used lightly. If it uses nuclear weapons again it will become isolated in the extreme. Moreover, the U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons has long been broken; U.S. imperialism has these weapons, but others have them too. If it threatens other countries with nuclear weapons, U.S. imperialism will expose its own country to the same threat.⁴⁸

At present, however, the Soviet Union appears to be considered as China's main urban opponent. The two super powers will eventually go to war with each other and dissipate their strength, which means that they will cease to impede the world-wide process of national liberation. If they do not go to war with each other, their governments will eventually be overthrown by the forces of other liberated states. The entire historical process has no time limit.

Lin's book is not only a theoretical text for guerrilla warfare, it is also an interesting exercise in geopolitics. On the face of it, the book appears to state that China will support any war that falls under the category of a war of national liberation. However, as was pointed out earlier, this support may only be moral in nature. By stressing the policy of self-reliance, Lin was saying that China's leaders would reserve the right to determine whether or not they would support such a war with material aid.⁴⁹ China has followed this policy in the past.

Control Factors Operating On The Elite

Nature of the Popular Allegiance To The Governing Elite

It is difficult, when analyzing any totalitarian state, to determine the depth of the popular allegiance to the regime. Lucian Pye has noted

that, historically, the Chinese people have always taken the pragmatic course and at least pretended to support those in a position of power even if the people did not agree with their policies.⁵⁰ A number of small groups have recently publicly opposed Communism in newspapers and big character posters and have advocated democracy and human rights. Supporters of radical Communism and the "Gang of Four" are known to be opposed to the regime.⁵¹ However, the depth of popular support for Communism and for China's new pragmatic regime is not known.

China is a developing state which, because of the downfall of the "Gang of Four" and the consequent decrease in political tensions, is currently facing a "crisis of rising expectations." The Chinese people as a whole are demanding higher living standards, as well as greater economic and political freedom.⁵² The people want more consumer goods and are also demanding goods of higher quality. In addition they want less bureaucratic red tape.⁵³ Students want more education and college graduates want jobs commensurate with their training and interests.⁵⁴ The military generally want modern weapons, increased training, a return to ranks and modern uniforms, and increased professionalism.⁵⁵ If enough of these needs are not satisfied, China's pragmatic leadership risks being overthrown. Thus the new leaders are showing a greater concern for the consumer and a greater interest in light industrial products and daily necessities. They are attempting to put the school system back on a rational basis to increase the prestige of college graduates. Further, they are attempting to purchase more modern weapons abroad.⁵⁶ The Chinese people have also been given a penal code, and they are allowed to complain publicly about the situation in China so long as they do not advocate the overthrow of Communism. Those who advocate "bourgeois democracy" are arrested.⁵⁷

A possible indication of the Chinese people's lack of enthusiasm for Communism may have been shown in the results of a test at a Beijing high school during 1979. When the students were asked the difference between Communism and Capitalism, a large percentage did not know. When they were asked what they wanted in life some students replied, "good work and high wages." The results of the test alarmed China's leaders because they reflected widespread doubts concerning Communism's superiority in furthering economic development and democracy. As a result, the leadership began a new campaign to sell Marxism to the people.⁵⁸

Latitudinal Discretion Allowed Elite Decision-making

As noted previously, actual decision-making power in China rests with the State Council, the Party Central Committee, the Politburo and its Standing Committees, and various Party Organs. Leading Party decision-makers often hold key government posts and vice versa. Fang Yi, for example, is thought to be one of China's main planners concerning the modernization of science and technology. Fang is a full member of the Politburo, Minister of the State Scientific and Technological Commission, the ninth ranking Vice Premier of the State Council, First Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (there is no president), and First Deputy Head of the Party Committee of the Academy.⁵⁹

Like the Soviet Central Committee and Politburo, the Chinese Central Committee and Politburo are believed to be made up of factions with differing points of view and power bases. Two major factions are known to exist:

- (1) The "Reinstated" or "Practice" faction led by Deng Xiaoping. This faction consists of many leading Party bureaucrats and government

administrators, as well as many rehabilitated pre-Cultural Revolution senior officials. It is labelled the "Practice" Faction because of its reported motto, "Practice is the sole criteria for testing truth." The faction favors rapid modernization of science and technology, industry, agriculture, and national defense. This can be accomplished more easily by purchasing foreign technology and studying foreign management practices. As the faction's name implies, it is pragmatic in thought and action and does not unquestioningly accept Mao's philosophy. It is currently the dominant faction within the Party.⁶⁰

(2) The "Whatever" Faction led in the past by Wang Dongxing. The faction's label comes from its philosophy that, "Whatever was set by Mao must not be changed and whatever was not said by Mao must not be done." This faction contains remnants of the adherents of the "Gang of Four", and is afraid that rapid modernization at the expense of Mao's ideology will result in the corruption of Mao's Revolution.⁶¹

Deng Xiaoping returned to power for the second time in July 1977. Since then he has attempted to consolidate his rule and that of the Practice Faction. A Central Committee session during December 1978 selected many of his closest aides to key Party posts.⁶² The leaders of the Whatever Faction were removed from both their Party and governmental posts at a Central Committee session during the spring of 1980. The vacant positions were filled by Deng's supports.⁶³ During a Central Committee session in June 1981, Hua Guofeng's resignation as Party Chairman was accepted and he was demoted to the position of a junior Vice Chairman. Hua was charged with having favored the Whatever Faction and having committed errors.⁶⁴ Hua was replaced by one of Deng's supporters, Hu Yaobang.

Meanwhile, another of Deng's supporters, Zhao Ziyang, became not only Premier of the State Council but a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.⁶⁵

Deng and the Practice Faction now possess almost all of the top Party and governmental positions. However, the Practice Faction now needs to induce ideological readjustment among the supporters of the Whatever Faction that are present at lower levels of the Party and governmental bureaucracies. An example of the Whatever Faction's strength is shown by the fact that the Central Committee session had to be postponed for six months while both factions wrangled over a proposed Party statement concerning Mao's errors. Deng and his supporters were forced to compromise: Mao was praised for his political theory and for having successfully led the Communist revolution, but he was condemned for being arrogant and arbitrary after the revolution and for causing most of China's political and economic upheavals after 1957.⁶⁶

The PLA is also divided into two factions. One tends to support the Practice Faction and advocates more modern weapons, adequate training, and a higher scientific and cultural level for all PLA personnel. The faction recognizes that China requires a modern economic base for a strong PLA. In the event of an attack on China by an aggressor, this faction would prefer to meet the attack as close to China's borders as possible.⁶⁷ The second faction tends to support the Whatever Faction and still favors Mao's concept of "People's War", relying primarily upon infantry and militia, to lure the enemy deep within China and drown it in a sea of people.⁶⁸

During 1979 and 1980 the commanders of nine military regions were transferred and a number of significant personnel changes took place within the upper echelons of the PLA.⁶⁹ In January 1981 Deng Xiaoping assumed

the position of Chairman of the CCP Military Commission. This move was reportedly taken by Deng to assure his authority over the PLA at a time when some generals had doubts over his pragmatic policies.⁷⁰ As noted previously, the Military Commission is the primary decision-maker concerning Chinese military policy. The Commission also makes all major PLA personnel appointments. The post of Chairman of the Military Commission is usually held concurrently by the Party Chairman. Thus, Deng's assumption of the post shows his concern over the future loyalty of some of the senior PLA officers. Later in the spring of 1981 another of Deng's loyal supporters, General Geng Biao, was appointed Minister of Defense. Geng is also General Secretary of the Military Commission and responsible for both implementation of the Commission's decisions and personnel matters.⁷¹

Once a policy has been agreed upon, all factions are expected to unanimously support it. This is democratic centralism. However, unanimous support has not been achieved in the past and probably cannot be achieved in the present. In his talks on the Lin Biao Affair during August and September 1971 Mao mentioned five instances since 1949 in which minority factions within the Party had either attempted to block the implementation of national Party decisions or had attempted to assume complete decision-making power.⁷² The winning faction usually either removes the leaders of the other faction or demotes them to positions where they cannot hinder the policies of the winning faction. Discredited leaders may also be sent to prison, put to hard labor, or executed. Except for the trial of the "Gang of Four" and six generals which ended during January 1981, the trend since 1976 has been to either remove dissidents from power or demote them. Two of the "Gang of Four" were given the death sentence with two years probation; the rest were given prison terms ranging from sixteen years to life. Their Party memberships were also removed.⁷³

Some Party and governmental officials at all levels have attempted to impede the implementation of policies made by the Practice Faction. A Party Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline was established in 1978 in order to stop such practices; similar commissions have been established at the provincial and local levels.⁷⁴

Nature and Security of Elite Tenure

There appear to be a number of criteria for high Party and governmental positions. One is long Party service. All of the current Politburo members joined the Party prior to 1949. A second criterion is distinguished service in either the Party, the government, or the military. A third criterion for inclusion in the decision-making elite is selection by that elite. The National Party Congress elects the Central Committee which, in turn, elects the Politburo and its Standing Committee.⁷⁵ However, it is believed that members of the Standing Committee are responsible for nominations to their own committee, to the Politburo, to the Central Committee, and to high governmental and military posts. Hua Guofeng, for example, was selected for high positions by Mao and Zhou.⁷⁶ Deng Xiaoping has engineered the selection to high positions of many people reportedly loyal to him.

It thus appears that party members are selected for high party, governmental, and military posts on the basis of merit and also because they support the views of senior factional decision-makers. If the senior decision-makers fall from power, either due to the ouster of their faction or for other reasons, their proteges may also fall.

Quantity of Disposable Resources

Persuasive Skills

In China, as in the Soviet Union, all legal means of disseminating information are owned and controlled by the state. The information disseminated can be divided into two groups: information for the general public, and information for the political and military elite. General public information will be discussed first.

The Chinese masses only receive information which the regime feels is proper for them to know. No book, magazine, newspaper, or article can be either published in China or brought into China without state approval. All public radio and television stations are owned and operated by the state. Strict state censorship exists on all forms of public information. Political indoctrination and the censorship of information also occurs in the educational system. In addition, the people are required to periodically attend study groups at work and at home where Communist theory and political events are discussed and interpreted. The purpose of all this is to persuade: that is, the regime wants the people to sincerely believe in the truth of what they are told. However, as was pointed out previously, China's ruling elite are unsure about the amount of mass acceptance of the regime's views and values.

China's political and military leaders have their own private, and less-biased, information system. Based upon external information sources, two journals are known to currently exist. A third, for the use of the military, has existed in the past and may exist now. The two currently existing journals are the Reference News and Reference Materials. Both of these publications deal with world affairs and contain excerpts

from foreign newspapers and journals that do not appear in the Chinese public press. Henry Schwarz analyzed six issues of the Reference News for 1960 and found that its readers, "received substantially different information about the outside world based on a vastly greater number of sources. Eighty-three percent of the information given to officials came from non-Communist sources, whereas about ninety-seven percent of the information given to the people came from Communist sources."⁷⁷ During the early 1960's the circulation of this publication was greatly restricted. However, it was reportedly downgraded at Mao's insistence during the Cultural Revolution.⁷⁸ It was estimated in 1974 to have a circulation of seven million.⁷⁹ Even though it is no longer read by a select few, its coverage of foreign news is much greater than that of the public press. For example, The Reference News had been carrying reports on the Water-gate Scandal for some months prior to President Nixon's resignation from office. The People's Daily had not mentioned Watergate, and only mentioned President Nixon's resignation in one terse paragraph on page six the day after it occurred.⁸⁰

The second journal, Reference Materials, is said to consist of only four pages and is circulated daily to members of the Chinese diplomatic corps and to those officials concerned with foreign affairs.⁸¹ However, it is believed that the material contained in the Reference Materials is usually extracted from the Reference News.⁸²

The third journal was the Bulletin of Activities, which was published irregularly during the early 1960's by the General Political Department of the PLA and sent to senior military and political officers. Issues of this journal were released by the U. S. Department of State through the Library of Congress during 1963, and are contained and analyzed in

J. Chester Cheng's The Politics of the Chinese Red Army. Cheng has stated that:

The principal function of the "Bulletin" was to speed the instructions of the Central Authorities and the Military Affairs Commission of the Party to higher ranking cadres in the field, as well as to report conditions in Army units and permit the wider exchange of working experience. . . . In addition to military affairs, it also reports on all major political-ideological conditions⁸³ and socio-economic issues facing the Chinese nation.

The Bulletin, or some similar journal for the military, probably exists today.

The journals discussed above are those that either are known to exist now or are known to have existed in the past. Other journals may also currently exist. Further, the regime also uses a system of oral briefings which are disseminated on tape recordings. They are sent from the senior Party leaders to the middle and lower-level cadres, and contain the senior leaders views on world events.⁸⁴ Their views on domestic affairs are probably disseminated in the same manner.

Thus, there is evidence that a special information system exists in China to inform the senior military and political leaders about global current events. There is also evidence that foreign military and political works are acquired and translated so that they may be read by China's senior officials.⁸⁵ The quality of China's foreign intelligence systems is, of course, not known. However, it is likely that China's leaders possess adequate information to make rational foreign and national security policy decisions. Whether they do so or not depends upon their own biases as Chinese and as Communists. The seven million readers of the Reference News, as well as middle and lower-level officials, are probably better informed on world affairs than the general public. The general public's

knowledge of world affairs is based, to a large extent, upon the biased accounts provided them by the regime. Thus, the regime's persuasive ability is probably quite high on foreign and national security policy matters.

Mobilizable Resources

Since 1949, China's leaders have sought to attain international recognition of their state as a major world power. They reasoned that such recognition would be dependent upon the Chinese development of a modern war machine or military-industrial complex. Thus, Chinese economic development programs since 1949 have concentrated upon establishing an industrial base capable of supporting modern armed forces with sophisticated weapons. In summing up a collection of papers on Chinese economic development presented by scholars to the U. S. Congress during 1972, John Hardt stated that:

. . . the Chinese have been generally successful both in building up a heavy industrial base and in gradually modernizing their armed forces. Among the major factors contributing to this success are: (a) the control of consumption at relatively austere egalitarian levels; (b) the use of foreign trade to get high-technology machinery and materials, which could be produced at home at very high cost and after long delay; and (c) the partial insulation of the nuclear and other high-technology programs from political⁸⁶ turmoil.

As Table I shows, it is estimated that China spends as much as ten percent of her annual GNP upon her armed forces. However, this figure does not take other expenditures into account in the industrial sector, which would affect the capability of Chinese industry to support the armed forces. Table I also shows that China has the largest number of total military manpower in the world, the third largest navy in the world, and

the second largest air force in the world. China also has a growing strategic missile force. However, these statistics are illusory. China's ground forces still consist primarily of conventional infantry, deficient in armor and artillery. China's combat ships and aircraft are considered to be technologically 10-20 years behind those of the Free World and U.S.S.R. To remedy this, China is seeking to acquire Free World military technology.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, when compared to the other states of East Asia, China ranks third in military capabilities, behind the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (Tables I and II).

China has the capability to project its conventional military forces against states on its land periphery, but China does not yet possess a credible amphibious capability against any major East Asian state.⁸⁸ Thus, while it might be feasible for China to seize the Paracel Islands from Vietnam, a seaborne invasion of Taiwan, Japan, or the Philippines would be currently impossible. Because of its growing strategic missile force China could threaten the other Asian states with nuclear blackmail, and it could probably retaliate, to some extent, against a Soviet nuclear strike. China does not yet have a landbased ICBM capable of reaching the continental U.S., but one is predicted for the 1980's. China is also believed to be developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile system.⁸⁹ If pragmatic leaders stay in power in China, and if China's military modernization program continues with Free World assistance, China will probably achieve global super power status by the year 2000.

Chinese Foreign Policy Assumptions, Goals, and Tactics

These have been discussed earlier and will only be listed here.

Assumptions

(1) In economic terms the planet consists of three worlds: the First World of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., which are super powers; the Second World, which consists of the major industrialized states; and the developing states of the Third World. These three worlds will eventually be conquered by the World Communist Movement. The first world to fall will be the Third World.

(2) In political terms the planet consists of three groups of states: the ideologically pure Communist states; the false or "revisionist" Communist states; and the Capitalist states. The duty of the ideologically pure Communist states is to convert or conquer the others.

(3) Both of the super powers seek world hegemony, but the U.S.S.R. is the most covetous and dangerous. The U.S.S.R. is particularly dangerous because, as a revisionist state, it is perverting the World Communist Movement. China, as an ideologically pure Communist state, should lead the Movement.

(4) Detente between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. is a sham and the two states will eventually go to war and dissipate their strength. China will benefit from this.

(5) The U.S.S.R. is seeking to establish a containment policy against China through a system of alliances. This must be resisted.

(6) Because the primary threat to China is the U.S.S.R., it is proper for China, as a temporary tactical move, to support and use the Capitalist states against the U.S.S.R.

(7) As a successful developing state, China's example provides a model which the other developing states should emulate.

(8) In order to be great and secure, a state must first be economically and militarily strong. China can only regain its past greatness and achieve international influence through economic and military development programs. Aid in advancing these programs is welcome from all sources.

(9) China must have peace, especially with the super powers, in order to successfully accomplish its economic and military development programs.

Goals

(1) To preserve the security and territorial integrity of the state.

(2) To reassert Chinese influence over that portion of the East Asian area once dominated by the Manchu Empire at the height of its power.

(3) To displace the U.S.S.R. as the leader of the World Communist Movement.

(4) To nullify the U.S.S.R.'s containment policy against China.

(5) To utilize the U.S. as a balancing force against Soviet hegemonial ambitions.

(6) To further the World Communist Revolution along Maoist lines. Despite the censure of Mao for his domestic activities after 1957, his world view has not been repudiated.

(7) To achieve a major role and voice in international affairs.

(8) To achieve international recognition as the model of the ideal Communist and developing state.

(9) To become the chief spokesman of the developing states.

Tactics

(1) Domestic economic and military development programs, aided by the technologically developed states.

- (2) Propaganda attacks against the U.S.S.R.
- (3) Aid to Third World states, such as Egypt, that oppose the U.S.S.R.
- (4) Normal state-to-state relations with every government, but support for Wars of National Liberation.
- (5) Opposition to Soviet-U.S. detente and support for U.S. security commitments abroad, including those in Far East.
- (6) Approval of strong regional collective security organizations, such as NATO, to contain Soviet expansion.
- (7) The use of any means, including the brief use of force, to offset Soviet encirclement of China through an Asian collective security system.
- (8) Chinese participation in major international organizations and conferences in order to obtain international respect.

JAPAN

Elite Direction or Ethos

Attitude Towards the Internal Organization of the State

The internal organization of the Japanese state is based upon the 1947 constitution which was imposed during the U.S. Occupation. Before discussing the attitude of the present governmental elite towards this organization, it will first be necessary to briefly sketch the basic provisions of the 1947 constitution, as well as some of the laws promulgated during the U.S. Occupation, and to discuss post-Occupation changes. It is felt that these changes are suggestive of the political and governmental elite's attitude towards the organization of the state, as well as of the value held by the elite.

The 1947 constitution established a constitutional monarchy. Actual political decision-making power now resides in a Cabinet, headed by a

Prime Minister, who is responsible to the Japanese parliament, or Diet. The Diet is divided into two houses: the upper house, or House of Councillors; and the lower house, or House of Representatives. Members of the upper house have a term of six years, with half being elected every three years. The members of the lower house are elected to four-year terms, but these are never completed because the Cabinet has always dissolved the lower house and called an election before its term ended, and at a time which seemed most favorable to the Cabinet. The lower house has the most power of the two in that, in the event of a disagreement between the two houses over a treaty or a budget bill, its decision stands. In addition to the Diet, each prefecture now has an elected governor and assembly.⁹⁰

The Prime Minister is the leader of the majority party in the lower house of the Diet. He appoints the members of his Cabinet, which need not necessarily be members of the Diet but usually are. A new member, the Minister of Labor, was added to the Cabinet during the Occupation. Article 9 of the constitution outlaws war and arms. However, this has been interpreted as allowing defensive armaments. The Director-General of the National Self-Defense Agency is a civilian who is also a member of the Cabinet, and is thus responsible to the Diet.

During the Occupation a Japanese "Bill of Rights" was promulgated, many bureaucrats and Diet members were removed from office because of their political views, the police administration was decentralized, greater local political autonomy was granted, and schools became responsible to locally elected boards of education. Measures were taken to break up the old business federations, the Zaibatsu, and to disassociate them from

politics. These measures were not totally successful. In addition, a land reform program was carried out with moderate payments to landlords.⁹¹

Since 1955 the majority party in the Diet has been the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which is actually conservative in ideology. As a result, governmental changes and activities since that time have been of a conservative nature. Some of the purged civil servants were rehired, and purged politicians were allowed to run for reelection. The landlords were awarded greater compensation for their land. The LDP draws much of its financial support from the giant corporations which, as a consequence, have a say in party and Cabinet decision-making.⁹² The police and educational administration have been recentralized. School textbooks, written under the supervision of the Occupation authorities, have been removed from use and new ones have been written from a more nationalistic point of view. The Communists were purged from the trade unions and from public employment, but they were allowed to hold office in the Diet. The right of teachers and civil servants to strike was revoked.⁹³ In 1974 Prime Minister Tanaka pushed a bill through the Diet for a state subsidy to the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial to Japan's military dead. He argued also that the spirit and principles of the Imperial Rescripts promulgated by the Emperor Meiji concerning education and the armed forces should once again become the code of conduct for contemporary and future Japanese: patriotism, self-sacrifice, discipline and respect for authority.⁹⁴

Japanese society has been described as one which, ". . . despite its democratic trappings, is still deeply conservative at heart."⁹⁵ The fact that the LDP has been the majority party in the Diet since 1955 would tend to bear this out. However, the laws promulgated in Japan after 1952 do not necessarily indicate an antidemocratic bias; they do show a trend

towards greater centralization of power in the hands of the national government, a desire for order, and a desire for a return to some of the old values. These values are not, in themselves, subversive of democracy. The other side of the coin is the fact that the parliamentary system seems to have worked well since the end of the Occupation, and voter turnout for national elections is usually high. Barring some national economic or political crisis which might create a popular disillusionment with democratic government, the parliamentary system will probably continue to operate in Japan.

Japan has had very little past experience with provincial autonomy and it is not surprising that the administration of police and education was recentralized. Frank Langdon has stated that, ". . . it has been roughly estimated that as much as eighty percent of local administration operates in behalf of the central authorities; this state obviously leaves little leeway for independent local action. Budgetary dependence is probably as important a factor in reducing the freedom of local authorities." He further pointed out, however, that local demands are voiced and are accommodated.⁹⁶

Thus the prevailing governmental elite attitude towards the internal organization of the state seems to be one of acceptance of a constitutional monarchy, respect for parliamentary democracy, and centralization of decision-making authority.

Attitude Toward the Internal Organization of Other States

Since the end of the Occupation, the Japanese governmental elite's attitude towards the internal organization of other states has been primarily conditioned by three factors: the elite's conservative and

Capitalistic ideology, the desire for world trade, and the defensive alliance with the U.S. From an ideological point of view, Japan's political elite is opposed to the governments of the Communist states. However, due to the elite's pragmatic concern for increasing their state's foreign trade, they have developed a policy of separating trade from politics. Japan has been perfectly willing to trade with some Communist states that have been willing to trade with her, so long as there are no major political implications. Japan traded with both Taiwan and China on this basis for a number of years.

Because of their regard for the defensive alliance with the U.S., and its nuclear umbrella, the attitudes of Japan's governmental elite towards the governments of the Communist states have been conditioned to a large extent by the attitude of the U.S. Government. Thus Japan was politically hostile to the Soviet Union for many years, and refused to recognize the Communist government of China until the U.S. began to negotiate for the commencement of normal diplomatic relations. After President Nixon's visit to China, Japan also sought to normalize its political relations with that state. Japan and China signed a peace and friendship treaty in October 1978, two months before the U.S. officially recognized the government in Peking. One of the primary reasons for doing so was probably trade. Sino-Japanese trade had grown steadily since 1971 and a long-term trade agreement was signed between the two states during February 1978. Japan was apparently willing to normalize relations with China, despite Soviet and Taiwanese disapproval, due to the future Sino-Japanese trade potential.

Although Japan's governmental elite is ideologically opposed to the political systems of China and the Soviet Union, it tends to be more

concerned over the intentions of the Soviet Union. This is buttressed by over a century of mutual hostility and distrust. The New York Times noted that:

They have always been bitter rivals for Siberia and Manchuria, and the history of their relations has been punctuated with violence such as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Japan's unsuccessful Siberian expedition at the time of the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union's last-minute attack on Japan at the end of World War II despite a nonaggression pact, and Soviet retention of four Japanese islands off Hokkaido, and continued Russian seizure of Japanese fishermen.⁹⁷

In summation, then, Japan is an island state with very few natural resources which depends for its existence upon trade. In general, Japan's government elite have tempered their conservative ideology with a pragmatic willingness to trade with any state that might be willing to trade with Japan on favorable terms. The one major exception to this rule has been the Soviet Union. In this instance the historic Japanese animosity towards Czarist and Soviet foreign policies, coupled with suspicion of future Soviet intentions in the Far East, have injected themselves into Soviet-Japanese commercial dealings. The Japanese leadership would, of course, be opposed to any state which, in their view, sought to limit Japanese economic expansion or to cause its regression.

Attitude Towards the Organization of the International System

The attitude of the Japanese governmental elite towards the organization of the international system is also an outgrowth of their political, military and economic views. At the end of the Occupation, Japan chose to place itself within the U.S. Bloc. As a result of the revulsion

of feeling against militarism following World War II, the Japanese chose to forego rearmament and to concentrate all their energies on industrial development. Japanese rearmament only occurred at U.S. insistence, and has been minimal. Japan also placed itself under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Thus Japan accepted the post World War II bipolar system, relied primarily upon the U.S. for national defense, and sought to increase its foreign trade within the system.

As the bipolar system changes towards a multipolar one, Japan is reaping both benefits and problems. The U.S. has put heavy pressure on Japan since the late 1960's to contribute more to its own defense and to become more involved in the political and economic problem of the East Asian states. Japanese trade with the Communist states is expanding, but growing economic protectionism in the U.S. and the European Economic Community has caused Japanese leaders grave concern and has been the subject of lengthy negotiations. Japanese distrust of the U.S.S.R. is limiting Japanese-Soviet trade. The Sino-Japanese friendship treaty has resulted in increasing trade between the two states, but it has increased Soviet-Japanese political tensions. In its dealings with the Third World Japan has sometimes been forced to disassociate itself from U.S. interests, as was the case during the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74.

Japan's minimum demands with regard to any international system are that no major regional bloc containing vital resources and/or markets refuse to trade with it, and that the world commercial transportation routes remain open. Japan would suffer economically if its free trade were restricted. As the bipolar system continues to change, and as economics and politics

become more intertwined, Japan will be forced to play a greater and more independent role in the workings of the system.

Control Factors Operating Upon the Elite

The Nature of the Popular Allegiance to the Governing Elite

The LDP has been in power in Japan since 1955. From 1955 through 1973 the great popularity of the LDP was due to:

- (1) The basic conservatism of the Japanese people.
- (2) A 10% increase in the GNP every year until 1973.
- (3) A corresponding rise in Japanese living standards.
- (4) A consequent increase in Japanese prestige abroad.

Popular support for the LDP dropped from 1974 through 1979 due to public concern over political corruption, fights between LDP leaders, inflation and the sagging economy, and the ecological quality of life.⁹⁸ During this time period the LDP retained bare majorities in both houses of the Diet by forming coalitions with conservative independents.⁹⁹ Then, during the spring of 1980, the opposition parties managed to pass a vote of no confidence in the House of Representatives against Prime Minister Ohira's government. Ohira resigned and asked the Emperor to call for new elections to the lower house. An election for half of the seats of the House of Councillors was already scheduled for June. Thus, for the first time in Japanese history, elections were scheduled for both houses of the Diet at the same time.

The opposition parties believed that the LDP would finally lose its control over the Diet and that a coalition government led by the Japanese Socialist Party was possible. However, the leaders of the LDP recognized that a crisis existed for their party; they agreed to put aside their

differences and mounted a massive campaign against the opposition. Ohira died of a heart attack at the height of the campaign.

The June 1980 election resulted in a landslide victory for the LDP in both houses of the Diet. The LDP obtained almost 48 percent of the votes for the House of Representatives, a gain of more than three percent over its share in the October 1979 lower house election. The LDP also obtained over 43 percent of the vote for the House of Councillors, a gain of almost four percent over its share in the July 1977 upper house election. The LDP won a total of 284 of the 511 seats in the lower house, a gain of 27 seats. It then allowed five independent members to join the party which brought its total representation up to 289 seats. This majority allowed the LDP to dominate the house leadership as well as the chairmanship of all committees. The LDP won 70 seats in the upper house, giving it an absolute majority of 135 out of 252 seats.¹⁰⁰ Thus, the LDP was once again in full control of the Japanese government.

There were a variety of reasons for the June 1980 election victory by the LDP. Some votes were obtained because of public sympathy over Ohira's death. There was a surge in LDP voter turnout due to the possibility that the opposition might obtain control of the Diet. There was evidently some lack of popular confidence in the opposition's ability to govern. The election results also showed that a significantly large plurality of the population preferred political stability rather than major change. Thus the Japanese voters chose caution in the face of inflation, the energy crisis, and international tensions.¹⁰¹

Although the problem of factional strife within the LDP seems to have died down, the party still faces the problems of an aging leadership and

political corruption, as well as national economic and ecological problems. If the LDP does not find adequate solutions to these problems during the next few years, the opposition parties may finally be given their chance to govern Japan.

Latitudinal Discretion Allowed Elite Decision-making

The current Japanese decision-making elite consists of the Cabinet, senior LDP members of the Diet committees, senior members of the bureaucracy, and leading industrialists. The reason for the inclusion of the latter group is the great dependence of the LDP upon industry for financial support. As a result, the LDP leaders must seriously consider the political wishes of the industrial leaders. The Far Eastern Economic Review has pointed out that, "Whereas U.S. businessmen can and do act independently of the U.S. government, Japanese companies are so woven into Tokyo's political fabric that trade and diplomacy cannot be wholly divorced."¹⁰² The latitudinal discretion allowed the elite in its decision-making by the population at large is quite broad. Langdon notes that, despite the infusion of democratic ideas into Japan after World War II, a majority of the Japanese people still retain a hierarchical view of society in which everyone has his place. Subordinates are supposed to look upon superiors with deference and trust, while superiors must have due regard for the welfare of subordinates.¹⁰³ Herman Kahn feels that:

The sense of hierarchy is so great that many men in the street have no sense at all of participating in the government, because to them such participation would have no real meaning. . . the average Japanese does not normally get concerned with national prestige issues, because they are the government's concern. It is particularly the conservatives and the elderly businessmen running the country who are very much involved with questions of national prestige; therefore the "common man" does not

have to worry about such issues. But if the national leaders did not, he would very much tend to reject them as being unworthy of his trust.¹⁰⁴

While the man in the street may be content to grant the nation's leaders wide decision-making powers, the leaders themselves tend to act as a check upon each other. The leaders are the representatives of factions based on personalities which seek to have their views recognized and their interests satisfied. The LDP in the Diet consists of five major factions, each one in competition with the others. The members of the Cabinet, as well as the members of the Diet committees, are chosen by the factional leaders. The factional leaders may either choose to serve in a Cabinet themselves or to designate someone to represent their faction.¹⁰⁵ The leading Japanese civil servants make up a faction by themselves in that most of them graduated from Tokyo University and represent the interests and views of the bureaucracy. Many of these civil servants join either the LDP or a corporation upon retirement, and thus provide valuable connections between business, the civil service, and the LDP. For example, a total of 180 of the high-ranking civil servants that retired during 1973 took up important posts in business corporations.¹⁰⁶ Many of the LDP leaders are retired civil servants. Corporate business is itself broken into factions, which tend to ally themselves with the various LDP factions.¹⁰⁷

Final foreign policy decision-making is performed by the Cabinet, in which the views of all of the different factions will be heard on an issue. Unanimity is usually desired before implementing a policy.¹⁰⁸ However, if a majority of the Cabinet feel strongly enough about a policy, they may force a decision over the objections of the minority. In such a case, the minority apparently does not feel bound to support the majority,

and may resort to tactics designed to embarrass the majority or to obstruct policy implementation.¹⁰⁹

The opposition parties have very little voice in foreign policy decision-making since they do not sit in the Cabinet. Because the LDP still retains a majority in both houses of the Diet, the Prime Minister can effect the passage of legislation and treaties through the Diet so long as there is party unanimity over it: LDP members usually vote as a bloc on treaties and major pieces of legislation. If the LDP is split over a treaty, as was the case in 1974 when Japan and China signed a commercial aviation treaty, the Prime Minister may obtain enough votes to pass it from opposition members who favor it.¹¹⁰

Nature and Security of Elite Tenure

Japan's Prime Minister is an elected member of the Diet who is also the president of the LDP. Cabinet members are usually selected from the LDP factions, but may also be brought in directly by the Prime Minister from business and the civil service. Only civilians may serve in the Cabinet. Since more than one member of a party can be elected by a prefecture to a seat either in the House of Representatives or the House of Councillors, party candidates must compete among themselves for these seats. Generally speaking, each candidate builds his own personal support group that is loyal to him but is not necessarily loyal to the rest of the party. If elected, the candidate is expected to provide for the needs of this group. Once elected to the Diet, the new member usually joins a faction. Each of the LDP factions has its own fund-raising organization. So long as a Diet member is in good standing with his faction, the faction will allocate part of its funds to him for reelection purposes; this supplements the funds

obtained by his own personal support group. Alternately, a retiring senior businessman or civil servant may be recruited by a Diet faction and provided with a part of the factional staff organization, as well as funds to run for election. Thus the members of party factions owe much of their future political careers to the factional reelection funds. Factional leaders usually pass from the scene due to death, or retirement because of illness or old age.¹¹¹ The LDP is currently dominated by men in their 60's and 70's. Since the LDP has maintained a majority in both houses of the Diet since 1955, the significance of a Diet election is the resulting number of elected members of each faction.

If a Diet member proves himself to be a loyal and able faction member, he can eventually expect to be nominated by his faction leader as an LDP committee chairman or as a Cabinet Minister. The more important Cabinet posts are usually taken by the factional leaders themselves. Factional deviants face the loss of financial support and the possible failure of reelection. Upon his retirement, a factional leader may designate his successor, or his successor may be elected by the membership. Alternatively, a faction may split into two factions or dissolve and join other factions. Factional members may desert a leader whose policies or activities impair their chances for reelection or for holding power, or whose actions damage the party's chances for survival. They may also desert him if he can no longer provide the necessary campaign funds.¹¹²

The President of the LDP becomes Japan's Prime Minister due to LDP control of both houses of the Diet. Prior to 1976 LDP Presidents were selected by factional negotiations. In December 1976 Prime Minister Miki was pressured by rival LDP faction leaders to step down. As part of his price for resigning, Miki persuaded the other factional leaders to accept a

new procedure for selecting the LDP President.¹¹³ A party primary is held in which all party members and major contributors may vote. The two candidates which receive the most votes during the primary then participate in a run-off election by LDP Diet members.¹¹⁴ Although Miki's new procedure was intended to rid the party of the evils of selecting a president by vote-buying and factional maneuvering, this has only been partially successful. Maneuvering still occurs among the Diet factions prior to the run-off election. Ex-Prime Minister Tanaka and his faction played a key role in the election of Prime Minister Ohira on December 1, 1978.¹¹⁵

If a Prime Minister's policies or actions are unpopular within the LDP he may be forced to resign by the major factional leaders. Another Diet run-off election can be held in which the incumbent Prime Minister may be stripped of his office. For example, after the LDP's poor showing in the October 7, 1979 parliamentary general election, Ohira came under heavy pressure by three factions to resign. Again, however, with the aid of Tanaka's faction Ohira was able to retain his office.¹¹⁶ Tanaka's faction was rewarded with four Cabinet posts.¹¹⁷

Quantity of Disposable Resources

Persuasive Skills

The possession of skills by a governmental elite for the purpose of persuading the national public of the rightness of elite decision-making presupposes the existence of a means of communication. Japan's leaders are fortunate in that respect. The Japanese literacy rate is 98-99 percent, one of the highest in the world. The state is saturated with newspapers, magazines, books, radio and television. There is a ratio of one daily newspaper for every two people. In addition, the political parties and many

of the party factions have their own weekly and monthly publications.¹¹⁸ By the mid-1960's more than ninety percent of all Japanese homes included a black and white television set. During 1974 it was estimated that eighty percent of all Japanese families owned a color television set.¹¹⁹ Thus Japan possesses a highly sophisticated and widespread public communication media.

The Japanese public media, according to Kahn, is a force in the shaping of national public opinion. It serves as a neutral sounding board, thus presumably aiding the decision-making process by airing the views of the public, the national leadership, and the national opposition. Once the national leadership makes a decision the media tends to support the leadership, or at least give it the benefit of the doubt.¹²⁰ However, the media can be highly critical of policies which do not appear to have been effective over a period of time. In addition the media is not hesitant to air charges of corruption or wrongdoing on the part of public officials.¹²¹ The Japanese media, therefore, appears to view its role as providing a means of communication between the national leadership and the people, as well as serving as a watchdog against governmental inefficiency and corruption. It also takes samples of public opinion on issues.¹²²

For a number of reasons the Japanese governmental leadership had not significantly utilized the public media in the past to directly communicate with the people. Most Japanese rely heavily upon personal contacts for interpretation of the news, and the politicians were aware of this. Due to the wide latitude of discretion allowed governmental decision-makers in the past, they had not felt much need to explain their policies to the public either directly or at great length. Also, since the leaders had relied primarily upon their factions and big business for support, they

concentrated upon communicating with and between these groups.¹²³ The Japanese public did not appear to be greatly concerned over national economic policies so long as these were successful. There was not much public willingness to discuss national security policy until the mid-1960's.

Since 1973, due to public concern over economic and defense issues, public irritation over LDP corruption, and the declining popularity of the party, the LDP leaders have been forced to utilize the media far more than was done during the 1950's and 1960's.

Mobilizable Resources

The fact that Japan possesses armed forces is primarily due to U.S. pressure. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution states that, "Land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." Thirteen days after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, General MacArthur directed the Japanese government to establish a police reserve force. He also interpreted Article 9 as not precluding Japan from defending itself.¹²⁴ Since then, there has been steady U.S. pressure on Japan for increased rearmament. Japan's armed forces have grown considerably since that modest beginning, but are basically defensive. Their size and status for the 1979 time period are provided in Table I. Unlike their World War II predecessors, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) are under civilian control and are apolitical.¹²⁵ From 1962-1979 Japan spent an average of nine-tenths of one percent of its annual GNP for defense. Since Japan's GNP has increased every year, its annual defense budget has also increased.¹²⁶ Japan now ranks seventh in world defense expenditures.

Nevertheless, the core of Japanese defense policy is its defensive alliance with the U.S. Japan's military doctrine assumes that a strategic

military balance exists in Northeast Asia and that the balancing forces consist of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and China. A massive conventional attack upon Japan by either the U.S.S.R. or China would meet with a response by Japan, the U.S., and the other of the two Communist states, because neither of the two Communist states would be willing to see Japanese industry controlled by the other. In the event of an attack, the role of the JSDF would be to defend the home islands until the arrival of U.S. help and that of the other Communist state. If Japan were threatened with nuclear weapons, it would rely upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella. (Japan is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.) Japanese planners feel that aggression from either China or the U.S.S.R. would most likely take the form of small-scale conventional attacks or insurgencies which can be dealt with by the JSDF. The planners also feel that the JSDF does not need to be greatly enlarged, but should instead be somewhat restructured and provided with more modern weapon system.¹²⁷ Thus Japanese military doctrine is primarily concerned with defense of the home islands.

Japan is also concerned about the security of South Korea because the peninsula is close to Japan and could be used as a springboard for invasion. Because of South Korean bitterness over the past Japanese occupation of the peninsula, as well as Japan's own desire not to undertake foreign military commitments, Prime Minister Fukuda stated in 1977 that Japan would not take over the U.S. military role on the peninsula when U.S. ground forces were withdrawn.¹²⁸ However, in the event of a major attack on South Korea, with U.S. ground forces not present, South Korea might desire Japanese help and Japan would probably not refuse. The Japanese Government was relieved when Secretary of State Vance informed

Foreign Minister Sonoda in May 1978 that the removal of U.S. troops from South Korean would be curtailed.¹²⁹

U.S. naval, marine, and air forces are stationed in Japan and Okinawa. In 1973 the U.S. and Japan signed a treaty reducing the number of U.S. bases on the home islands and Okinawa. As a land-poor state, Japan needed the extra space. However, since 1973 Japan has payed an ever-increasing share of the operational costs of these bases.¹³⁰

Japanese Foreign Policy Assumptions, Goals, and Tactics

Any discussion of current and future Japanese foreign policy assumptions, goals and tactics is made difficult by the fact that many of these are still being formulated. Japan has concerned herself primarily with her economic development and has not sought to play the part of a major international political power since 1945. Given the fact that Japan's present and future existence is based upon trade, it is reasonable to assume that her future foreign policies will be formulated in response to the effects of politics upon her trade.

Assumptions

(1) The world political situation is gradually becoming multipolar, and old alliances and trade patterns are changing. This creates opportunities and also poses problems for Japanese trade.

(2) Japan has learned during the 1970's that trade can no longer be divorced from politics. China versus Taiwan, and the OPEC community versus the world's industrialized states are cases in point.

(3) Japan is an industrial super power and must maintain itself as such. National self-interest dictates that Japan must judge each political

crisis on its merits so as to determine its effect upon the state's material well-being. However, Japanese sympathies are with the industrial nations of the free world.¹³¹

(4) Japan is a highly industrialized island nation with very few natural resources. As such, it requires reliable sources of raw materials and energy, as well as open markets for its finished products around the world. In addition, the world trade routes must be kept open.

(5) Japan's primary means of maintaining its national security against foreign invasion is its defensive alliance with the U.S. Thus in all of its foreign political dealings it must be cognizant of U.S. views and wishes.¹³² However, as in the case of the Arab oil embargo, Japan may refuse to side with the U.S. on an issue if Japan's vital interests might be adversely adversely affected.¹³³

(6) In the absence of a friendly U.S. as the dominant power in East Asia, no other state should be allowed to acquire hegemony over the region and the Pacific Basin. If the hegemonial state were unfriendly to Japan it could close many markets and trade routes.¹³⁴

(7) The U.S.S.R. is a greater threat to Japan's national security than China.¹³⁵

(8) China is a good market for Japanese industrial goods, a supplier of raw materials, and a potential major supplier of crude oil. There is also a cultural sympathy between China and Japan.¹³⁶

(9) Japan depends on the states of East Asia and the Pacific Basin both as suppliers of twenty-eight percent of her raw materials and as markets for thirty-three percent of her finished goods. In addition, these states provide many investment opportunities. Thus, good relations with them is very necessary.¹³⁷

Goals

(1) To enlarge and globally diversify her sources of raw materials and energy, as well as the markets for her industrial goods. As the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo showed, Japan cannot afford to become primarily dependent upon a particular state or region as a source of raw materials and energy. Japan also cannot rely on a small number of markets for her industrial goods. As politics and trade become more intertwined, Japan must have alternative sources of raw materials and energy, as well as globally diversified markets.

(2) Complementing the above, Japan seeks to have as few international enemies as possible since these might injure her trade.

(3) To encourage friendly relations with the states of East Asia because they are major sources of raw materials and because they lie along the trade routes. They are also potential markets for industrial goods.

(4) To work against the hegemonial ambitions of any power in East Asia, with the possible exception of the U.S. Thus Japan seeks to maneuver between the U.S., China, and the U.S.S.R.

(5) To maintain good relations with the U.S. so as not to jeopardize the U.S.-Japanese defensive alliance or the U.S. market for Japanese industrial goods.

(6) To achieve absolution of its World War II guilt, especially in the East Asia.

(7) To increase its international prestige by peaceful means, rather than by military ones.

(8) To eventually develop military forces capable of defending Japan from conventional foreign attack. The approach is to be gradual and to emphasize the least cost consonant with military sufficiency.¹³⁸

- (9) To reacquire historic territories lost during World War II.

Tactics

(1) Increased use of good-will tours and trade missions to all quarters of the globe to obtain or enlarge sources of raw materials and markets for industrial goods.¹³⁹

(2) Substantial investment in the Southeast Asian states, as well as liberalization of trade, use of low-interest loans, and significant funding of the Asian Development Bank.¹⁴⁰

(3) The promotion of cultural exchanges with East Asian states.¹⁴¹

(4) Negotiation of new trade agreements with the U.S. and the European Economic Community over trade imbalances which had been favorable to Japan, so as to retain their good-will and prevent exclusion from their markets.

(5) Refusal to accept a Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security agreement.

(6) Willingness to extend capital to the U.S.S.R. for energy exploration and development.

(7) Full diplomatic recognition of the government of mainland China, and the negotiation of numerous commercial agreements.

(8) Negotiations to reacquire historic territories lost to Japan after World War II, such as the Ryukyu Islands and the four southern Kurile Islands.

INDIA

Elite Direction or Ethos

Attitude Towards the Internal Organization of the State

India was granted its independence from the British Empire during August of 1947. About two and one-half years later, in January of 1950,

India's constitution was adopted. This document established India as a secular republic composed of federated states, with a parliamentary form of national government. Although the constitution created the office of President, its duties are largely ceremonial in nature except in cases of national emergency. Actual executive power rests in the hands of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, or cabinet, who are responsible to the powerful lower house of the Parliament. The Prime Minister may also hold other ministerial posts. For example, prior to her defeat at the polls in March 1977 Indira Gandhi held four of the twenty cabinet posts in addition to that of Prime Minister.¹⁴² She is currently both Prime Minister and Defense Minister.

India was a constitutional democracy from January 1950 until Mrs. Gandhi declared a state of national emergency in June 1975. The period of emergency rule lasted for one-and-a-half years. During this time Mrs. Gandhi turned the parliament into a rubber stamp, reduced the powers of the judiciary, censored the press, abolished civil rights and jailed over 100,000 political opponents, started a major sterilization program, and attempted to make major modifications to India's constitution enhancing the Prime Minister's powers.¹⁴³ The Indian Ambassador to the U.S. stated in July 1975 that Mrs. Gandhi felt forced to declare the emergency because of India's worsening economy and high inflation rate, poor harvests resulting in a lack of food, labor strikes and acts of violence, and the use of legal trickery by Mrs. Gandhi's opponents as a means to oust her from office.¹⁴⁴

During the emergency there was greater governmental control over business and industry resulting in economic stabilization and a decrease in the rate of inflation. India's harvests were also good, and crime decreased. In January 1977 Mrs. Gandhi relaxed her emergency measures, allowed opposition political leaders to leave jail, and called for new parliamentary

elections in March. Mrs. Gandhi reportedly did this because her advisors told her that her measures were popular and that her Congress Party of India--the Congress (I)--would easily win the election. The Congress (I)'s primary opponents was the Janata Party, a coalition of small opposition parties. The primary election issues were democracy and parliamentary rule versus arbitrary personal rule. Mrs. Gandhi's sterilization program had also alienated India's rural peasantry. Out of a total of 542 seats in the parliament's lower house, the Janata Party won 271, the Congress (I) received 153, and the rest were won by smaller opposition parties.¹⁴⁵ Thus India's electorate repudiated Mrs. Gandhi's dictatorial rule.

After twenty-nine months in power, the Janata coalition of five small parties collapsed due to internal dissension and clashing interests.¹⁴⁶ A new government was formed, but collapsed after a brief period of rule. Finally, the President of India called for new parliamentary elections to be held in January 1980.

Mrs. Gandhi's Congress (I) actively competed for all lower house seats. Her opponents claimed that she intended to do away with Indian democracy. Mrs. Gandhi and her party campaigned on a platform of law and order, and economic reform. The Business Times of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, predicted in September 1979 that the fiscal year 1979-1980 would be India's worst economic year since 1972-1973 with over twenty percent inflation.¹⁴⁷ As a result of the January election, the Congress (I) won 350 seats in the lower house, or more than double the seats obtained by all the other parties put together.¹⁴⁸ It appears that the Indian people voted for economic reform and stabilization over the possibility of a return to dictatorial rule.¹⁴⁹

Attitude Towards the Internal Organization of Other States

India's post-independence leaders have stated on many occasions that they are not concerned with the internal organization of the other states of the world, and that they adhere to the "Five Principles of Peace", or "Panch Shila", in their dealings with other states. This seems to be true except for India's dealings with Pakistan. These principles were first specifically documented in the Sino-Indian Treaty on Tibet in April of 1954, and have been listed previously in the section of this chapter on China. India's leaders have also stated their belief in promoting world peace and the freedom of all nations; in promoting racial equality; and in combatting imperialism and colonialism.¹⁵⁰ The Indian leaders' aversion to colonialism, as well as their ideological predilection towards socialism, has in the past caused them to be distrustful of the motives and intentions of the former European colonial states. This distrust has been detrimental to India's dealings with Western Europe's most powerful ally, the United States. India has been hostile in the past to the government of Portugal because of its African empire, and to the government of Rhodesia because of its racial policies. Indian is still hostile to the government of South Africa because of apartheid.

In contrast to their attitudes toward the U.S. and Western Europe, the views of India's leaders towards the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist states have been more favorable. As Norman D. Palmer explained:

Many Indians think that the Soviet experience offers a model for them to follow. They are also impressed by the apparent absence of racial and color consciousness in the multinational U.S.S.R., and by the treatment of minority groups; by the flattering attention which the Russian Communists pay to Asia and Asians; by the Soviet

encouragement of their independence struggles and their opposition to imperialism, capitalism, and racialism They do not accept the thesis of a Soviet-Communist threat, nor do they recognize the existence of a Soviet form of imperialism.¹⁵¹

While India's leaders are not especially concerned over China's internal organization, they are concerned over its intentions towards the Himalyan states and Southeast Asia, as well as its alliance with Pakistan. Indian leaders feel that China is seeking to weaken India's position as the dominant power in the subcontinental region. They are concerned over Chinese moves to draw the Himalayan states closer to it, and thus utilize them as paths of invasion into India should another Sino-Indian War occur. They are also concerned over China's alliance with Pakistan and its attempts to build up Pakistani military capabilities as a counterweight to India.¹⁵²

The Indo-Pakistani relationship has been characterized by fear and distrust ever since their partition and achievement of independence. This has been exacerbated by various wars and crises, such as the issue of Kashmir. Each of the two states has sought to achieve sufficient military capabilities to be able to dominate the other. Pakistan's military capabilities received a serious setback in 1971 as a result of the war for the independence of Bangladesh. India's development of an atomic device has greatly augmented its strength vis-a-vis Pakistan, but it has also increased Pakistan's fear of India. Because of India's development of a nuclear device, and because of the almost pathological hatred and distrust that exists between India and Pakistan, Pakistan is also reported to have begun a nuclear weapon development program.¹⁵³ In May of 1979, the Indian Government announced that it was reviewing its defense position.¹⁵⁴

Mrs. Gandhi was the one who initially ordered the development of India's nuclear device, but it is not known if an Indian nuclear weapons development or production program is underway.¹⁵⁵

Attitude Toward the Organization of the International System

The attitude of India's leaders towards the organization of the international system is a product of their attitudes towards the motives and intentions of other states. It is also a product of the Indian leaders' concepts of India's roles in the international system. When India achieved its independence in August of 1947, the Cold War was already underway and the bipolar international system was an established fact. Prime Minister Nehru, following the precepts of Mahatma Gandhi, stated that India's position in the international system would be one of nonalignment: India would not favor one bloc over another and would consider each international problem or crisis on its merits. Thus India would attempt to mediate between both blocs. However, the Indian leaders' suspicion of the moves of the U.S. bloc as being neo-colonist in intent has colored their judgment on international issues. That is, they were overly sympathetic towards the arguments of the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁶ Eventually, due to U.S. military aid to Pakistan and China's defensive alliance with Pakistan, India under Mrs. Gandhi's rule tilted towards the U.S.S.R. India also tilted towards the U.S.S.R. due to very favorable Soviet concessions in Soviet arms sales and economic aid.¹⁵⁷ In addition, U.S. detente efforts with China seriously disturbed India.

Despite India's tilt towards the U.S.S.R., Mrs. Gandhi has consistently refused either to endorse the Soviet Asian collective security proposals or to grant base rights to the Soviets. Indeed, a case can be

made that Mrs. Gandhi used the Soviets to her own advantage and gave them very little in return.¹⁵⁸ After Mrs. Gandhi's fall from power in 1977 the new leaders of the Janata Government announced that India would return to a policy of nonalignment. Indo-U.S. relations improved during the 1977-1979 time period, but Mrs. Gandhi's return to power in January 1980 and U.S. military aid to Pakistan in 1981 may again result in a worsening of relations.

India's leaders have consistently opposed mutual security arrangements and super power rivalries in Asia, believing that this would lead to war.¹⁵⁹ India is thought to have signed the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1971 both to counter a possibly emerging U.S.-China-Pakistan axis in East Asia and to use the entente as a means of eliminating Pakistan as a military threat to India.¹⁶⁰ India's leaders did not like the bipolar international system because of its great power and super power rivalries which threatened world peace. India's leaders have no cause to like the emerging multipolar system where most of the world's great and super powers face each other directly in East Asia. As a developing state, India also views the system in terms of two major competing groups: the developing states and the industrialized states. Many of the industrialized states are also former imperialistic states whom India regards as having increased their wealth in the past at the expense of their colonies. India views these states as being reluctant to help the developing nations at the expense of their own economic well-being. For example, at a national conference on population in New Delhi during December of 1974, Prime Minister Gandhi's speech stated that:

The most relevant and revealing fact is that a tiny minority in the affluent countries is using up food, petrol and other essential commodities out of all proportion to their needs The current (world)

economic predicament has arisen largely from the powerful nations' inability to manage the international economic system justly or efficiently The threat of their life styles has led some persons to blame the growth of population in countries like India.¹⁶¹

Therefore, a second role which India has sought to play in the global international system has been as the champion of the independence of former colonies, and as the leading spokesman of the developing states. Its primary tool for this has been the U.N., using the U.N. as a means of both putting pressure upon the Western European states for decolonization, and of putting pressure on the industrialized states for economic development aid. Since most of the European states have granted their colonies independence, this has ceased to be a major issue for India. India is, however, deeply interested in such world problems as racism, human rights, food and population, and economic and social development.

Control Factors Operating on the Elite

Nature of the Popular Allegiance to the Governing Elite

The Congress (I) has the largest popular base of any of India's political parties and, except for the 1977 election, has always obtained majorities in the lower house of India's parliament. Despite the popular repudiation of Mrs. Gandhi's policies in 1977 her party still won 153 seats, making it the largest opposition party in the lower house.¹⁶² The 1980 election showed a strong resurgence of popular support for the Congress (I). India's national governing elite, therefore, consists of the leaders of the Congress (I). More specifically, this means the Prime Minister, who is de facto leader of the party, her Council, and the leaders of the Congress (I) in the lower house of the Parliament. The aims of the

party are the aims of the government: to promote economic and technical development, to promote the growth of nationalism, to achieve the effective abolition of the caste system, to increase education and the standard of living, and to foster the growth of the welfare state.

The Congress (I) not only has Mrs. Gandhi's charisma and style, it is also well organized. As Piloo Mody, the ex-president of the defunct Swatantra Party, explained in 1974.

First of all, the Congress is a broad coalition, which can absorb all points of view. When I attack Congress I attack one section. When the Communists attack Congress, they attack another section. ¹⁶⁵It represents the entire political spectrum.

If the Congress (I) cannot solve India's economic problems, the voters will probably look again to other parties and leaders. Meanwhile, there is currently no other party equal to the size and organization of the Congress (I). The previous major rival of the Congress (I), the Janata Party, was a coalition primarily concerned with ousting Mrs. Gandhi from office. After that was accomplished, the Janata Party began to suffer from internal dissension. Any new coalition against the Congress (I) must have unity and concrete economic and social programs.

Latitudinal Discretion Allowed Elite Decision-making

The Indian decision-making elite consists of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers. However, although the Council may advise the Prime Minister, most of the initiatives and decisions in the areas of foreign and national security policy are made by the Prime Minister. India's Prime Ministers have traditionally taken great interest in foreign affairs and problems of national defense. Krishna Menon stated that Nehru

personally supervised activities in certain foreign policy and defense areas.¹⁶⁴ Mrs. Gandhi and Morarji Desai have also done this.

In addition, like other chiefs of government, the Indian Prime Minister has the power to withhold or disclose items of foreign policy information. David Bayley points out that, although the Indo-Soviet Treaty was signed in early August 1971, Mrs. Gandhi waited for a few days to disclose it. At that time she was under heavy pressure from opposition parties to recognize the independence of Bangladesh and, "With a timing that suggests design, the Indo-Soviet treaty was announced just before the climax of these demonstrations, completely deflating opposition pressure."¹⁶⁵

Foreign affairs and national security issues are normally debated in the Indian parliament; the majority of these debates have occurred in the upper house. The parliament may pass resolutions on foreign and defense policies, but these are advisory and need not be acted upon by the Prime Minister.¹⁶⁶ Of course, a Prime Minister could be faced with the possibility of a no-confidence motion in parliament's lower house over a foreign or defense policy. However, if the party in power has a majority in that house, and if the party is united on the policy, then the motion will fail.

Party unity is usually maintained by cabinet debate on a policy. For example, during early June of 1963 Nehru agreed to allow the Voice of America to share a transmitter that had been originally supplied to India by the U.S. However, Nehru's consent was reversed later in the month by a cabinet vote. The cabinet decision was that the agreement should be revised so as to accord more closely with the principle of nonalignment. The agreement was allowed to lapse after seven months of desultory negotiations.¹⁶⁷ If a Prime Minister were to refuse to accept a cabinet majority vote, this would probably lead to a party split in the lower house of parliament.

The preceding discussion presupposes that normal responsible cabinet and parliamentary government is operating in India. During a state of emergency, if the majority party in parliament agrees, the Prime Minister can assume dictatorial powers.

Nature and Security of Elite Tenure

As in most of the other parliamentary democracies, the Indian Prime Minister and Council of Ministers are elected members of the lower house of the parliament. Congress (I) members of parliament have usually served in the provincial legislatures, gaining legislative and party experience there. They must be nominated to a parliamentary seat by their provincial party branch. In practice, nominations are made as a result of deliberations between the provincial party leaders and the party's Central Election Committee (C.E.C.). The C.E.C. itself consists of Congress (I) parliamentary members who are elected by the party on nomination by the party leadership. Thus, the C.E.C. represents both the Congress (I) national leadership and the parliamentary leadership. In that sense, then, the parliamentary leaders have a hand in the selection of the parliamentary members, and of their future successors.¹⁶⁸ Mrs. Gandhi's opinion has great weight in member selection.

The Congress(I), like other dominant national parties, consists of factions. The party leaders at the provincial level are the leaders of their respective factions and factional coalitions. In the case of a dominant faction of a province, the C.E.C. will usually acquiesce in that faction's nominations for legislative and parliamentary seats. However, if there is strife between rival factions or coalitions, nominees are selected through negotiations between the C.E.C. and the factions. Thus nominees

must have the support of their provincial factional leaders, and may also require the support--or at least the neutrality--of the parliamentary leaders, and possibly also that of the Council of Ministers and Prime Minister.¹⁶⁹

Congress (I) members of parliament seeking to eventually become cabinet ministers must rise to leadership positions within the parliament and within one of the various factions. They do this by loyal party service, and by supporting programs favored by the national and provincial leaders and voters. The Congress Party in parliament elects a leader who then becomes Prime Minister if the party is in the majority. The nominations for his office are made after negotiations between the provincial Chief Ministers, the Working Committee members, and the parliamentary leaders. The goal of the negotiations is to obtain a consensus on one person, who will then be accepted unanimously by the C.P.I. parliamentary members. This was achieved in the cases of Nehru and Shastri. Mrs. Gandhi, on the other hand, has had a checkered career.

After Shastri's death in January 1966, Mrs. Gandhi became India's new Prime Minister. She was selected by the party leadership over Morarji Desai both because she was Nehru's daughter and because the party leaders thought they could control her. However, Mrs. Gandhi began to create her own power base within the party. In July 1969 Mrs. Gandhi ousted Desai from his posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister and seized control of the party from the other senior leaders. Desai and the others established a rival party known as the Old Congress Party, or Congress (O).¹⁷⁰ In June 1975 Mrs. Gandhi declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution and assumed dictatorial powers. In January 1977 Mrs. Gandhi listed the state of emergency and called for new Parliamentary elections.

Jagjivan Ram, a senior minister and leader of India's untouchables, left the Congress (I) and joined with Desai in forming the Janata Party coalition. The other opposition parties then joined the Janata Party. In March 1977 the Janata Party won a majority of seats in the lower house of the Parliament and Mrs. Gandhi was out of power.¹⁷¹

During the period from March 1977 to January 1980 Mrs. Gandhi suffered a number of vicissitudes. She herself was not reelected to the Parliament in March 1977; although she was the party leader, she had no seat in Parliament. She was blamed by other Congress (I) leaders for the party's election failure, and in January 1978 the party split into two factions. One faction was led by some of Mrs. Gandhi's former major supporters such as ex-Foreign Minister Y. B. Chavan. Mrs. Gandhi retained control of the other faction.¹⁷² In November 1978 Mrs. Gandhi won a seat in Parliament in a by-election, but she was expelled from Parliament on charges of breach of privilege and contempt of the lower house while Prime Minister.¹⁷³ During May 1979 she planned to seek election in a district of the state of Tamil Nadu, but she chose not to run when she was told that she would get no support from any of the local state parties. Then she decided to seek election in her home constituency of Chickmagalur. However, she quarreled with the state's Chief Minister, Devaraj Urs, who was the state leader of her party and did not file for election.¹⁷⁴

Meanwhile, her son Sanjay had been tried and sentenced to two years in jail for his role in the theft and destruction of a film criticizing her emergency rule. Sanjay appealed the sentence and was released on bond. He was the leader of the youth organization of the Congress (I) and was expected to succeed her eventually. At the end of May 1979, two special courts were established to try Mrs. Gandhi and a number of her

associates for crimes committed during her emergency rule.¹⁷⁵ Then in July 1979 there was a further split in the Congress (I) faction of Mrs. Gandhi and the defecting group joined Chavan's party. Chavan's party was labelled the Official Congress Party, or Congress (O).¹⁷⁶

Also in July 1979, the Janata Party began to come apart due to dissension among the coalition leaders. Desai resigned the Prime Ministership and his cabinet did likewise. Desai tried to form a new cabinet but failed. President Reddy then asked Chavan to form a cabinet, but he could not. Finally a coalition was formed by Chavan Singh, of the Lok Dal--the National People's Party--with Chavan's Congress (O). Mrs. Gandhi announced the Congress (I)'s support for the new government. Later she withdrew her support and the coalition collapsed. President Reddy decided to call for new Parliamentary elections.¹⁷⁷

Because of India's political troubles during the summer and fall of 1979, Mrs. Gandhi's trial and Sanjay's appeal were pushed into the background. Mrs. Gandhi, Sanjay, and other Congress (I) leaders campaigned throughout India on a platform of economic reform and governmental efficiency. Her opponents raised the specter of future emergency rule if she were to be elected. The Congress (I) changed its name to the Indira Congress Party, while the Congress (O) changed its name to the Anti-Indira Gandhi Congress Party (AIGCP). In January the Congress (I) won a two-thirds majority in the lower house. The Lok Dal obtained forty-one seats; the rump Janata Party obtained thirty-two seats, while the AIGCP only received thirteen.¹⁷⁸

As a result of Mrs. Gandhi's assumption of power the special trials were dropped and the Supreme Court reversed Sanjay's conviction.¹⁷⁹ Many AIGCP members rejoined the Congress (I). The AIGCP, now led by Devaraj

Urs, has changed its name to the Congress (U) for Urs. There are rumors that the Congress (U) may reaffiliate with the Congress (I).¹⁸⁰

In June 1980 Sanjay died in an airplane crash. Indira's other son, Rajiv, resigned his job as an airline pilot and has been brought into the party. He is expected to assume a large measure of party and governmental affairs.¹⁸¹

Quantity of Disposable Resources

Persuasive Skills

The Prime Minister and her cabinet have a variety of means at their disposal for purposes of persuasion. Some of these are party organs such as the Working Committee and the Parliamentary Board. The Working Committee, as pointed out earlier, is the chief executive and policy-making organ of the party. The Prime Minister is a member. One of the purposes of the Working Committee is maintaining overall party unity. Thus it functions as a means of communication and conflict conciliation between the party factions and organs on one hand, and the party leadership on the other. The Parliamentary Board is a subcommittee of the Working Committee. Its role is similar to that of the Working Committee, but its function is the coordination of party-government relations both at the national and at the provincial levels. In addition to these two national-level party organs, there are other party organs at the district and village levels that mediate disputes, and pass information above and below. The Prime Minister and the party leaders therefore have an all-India organization which can be used to pass information from the highest party and governmental levels down to the smallest village.¹⁸²

Since public communications systems are rather poor in many Indian rural

areas, and since the Indian illiteracy level is about seventy percent, the party performs a valuable national service in the areas of public information.¹⁸³ The party also owns a number of major newspapers.¹⁸⁴

Domestic problems and issues appear to be of interest to most Indians. However, except for an elite group, foreign policy and defense policy issues probably are not of great interest except as they directly affect the subcontinent. Palmer has characterized the Indian masses, most of whom live in rural areas, as ". . . living in mental and geographical isolation in a stratified society, accustomed to having decisions imposed on them from above, without any experience of cooperation in national efforts."¹⁸⁵ While Palmer's statement was published in 1961, it is still believed to be true today. The average rural Indian's nationalistic feelings are fragile at best. India's people are divided by religious, social, linguistic, and regional factors. The Chief Minister of the state of Kerala, E. K. Nayanar, has termed India "a nation of nations."¹⁸⁶ Thus, the growth of Indian nationalism is hampered by a strong sense of communalism among India's people.

The Indians whom the Prime Minister and her Ministers want to influence are those termed by Ashis Nandy as "strategic elites." These are, "political ultra-elites, counter elites, interest group elites, opinion leaders, 'scientists in power', and specialists in international relations, strategic studies and military affairs."¹⁸⁷ This is obviously a very small, and relatively highly educated, minority of the population. The decision-makers can communicate their views to this minority by face-to-face conversations, through the party, and through the news media. Thus, while the elite may not necessarily accept the decision-maker's points of view, they are readily accessible to the means of persuasion.

Again, the preceding discussion presupposes the normal functioning of a democratic government in India. During the emergency Mrs. Gandhi jailed those who disagreed with her policies, closed down some newspapers, censored the communications media, and essentially made policy as she pleased.

Mobilizable Resources

India's military capabilities are shown in Table I. Despite its economic and social problems, India's leaders have chosen to spend a substantial portion of each year's budget since 1962 on national defense. Their reasons for doing so have been national prestige and national security. After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Nehru reportedly decided that India should eventually become a military super power.¹⁸⁸ As a result of the Indian leadership's willingness to devote large budgetary sums to defense, India has become the fourth ranking military power in East Asia. As such, India ranks below the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and China. Since 1962 India's armed forces have emphasized mobility and firepower.

Because of the U.S. refusal to sell sophisticated weapons to India while selling them to Pakistan, India sought such weapons at reasonable prices. The Soviet Union became the major supplier of arms and armament plants to India. India has neither the financial resources nor the trained personnel to both R&D and produce sophisticated weapons and weapons systems. India has preferred to buy weapons and the facilities to produce them under license. Between 1963 and the present, primarily because of Soviet aid, India has achieved the capability to domestically produce combat aircraft such as the MIG-21, some types of guided missiles such as SAMS, anti-tank and naval cruise missiles, tanks and armored vehicles, warships,

cannon and small arms, and military-related electronics.¹⁸⁹ Also, over 2,000 Indian military personnel have received training in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern European Communist states.¹⁹⁰ Soviet military sales to India during the mid-1970's were estimated to average approximately \$1.2 billion a year.¹⁹¹ From 1977 through 1979 the Janata Government began to slowly move away from the U.S.S.R. as India's primary arms supplier. In 1979 Prime Minister Desai placed a \$2 billion order with Britain for the purchase of JAGUAR bombers.¹⁹²

Mrs. Gandhi seems to prefer to deal with the Soviet Union. In May 1980 India agreed to purchase \$1.6 billion in military equipment and weapons systems from the Soviet Union. The items purchased by India included T-72 tanks, the MIG-23 fighter, artillery, and naval equipment. India was allowed seventeen years in which to pay for the goods at an annual interest rate of 2.5 percent.¹⁹³ India may produce the MIG-23 under license in the future. Kasturi Rangan notes that, ". . . it is evident that President Brezhnev has at least insured Soviet dominance, if not monopoly, of India's economic and military development."¹⁹⁴

India's military doctrine is derived from the previous British doctrine for the defense of the subcontinent, and is based on the concept of two "rings" or "arcs" around India. The first ring consists of the Himalayan states, while the second consists of Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma.¹⁹⁵ So long as these areas posed no military threat to India, or were not occupied by a hostile outside power, India felt secure. However India and Pakistan have been hostile towards one another ever since the partition and have fought two wars. China seized Tibet and then occupied parts of Northern India in 1962. The Sino-Indian border is disputed and China has constructed highways to both the border and Pakistan. In addition,

China is providing military aid to Pakistan and is wooing the other Himalayan states. Thus, India has not felt militarily secure since 1962.

Soviet troops were sent into Afghanistan during December 1979, a month before Mrs. Gandhi took office again. The Soviets claim that, on the basis of the Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty of 1979, Amin's Marxist government had the right to request Soviet assistance in putting down a revolt in his country. The continuing presence of 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan is necessary, according to the Soviets, because the rebels are supported by the West, and have sanctuaries in Pakistan.¹⁹⁶ Mrs. Gandhi fears that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan might lead to a wider war, involving both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, that would spill over into the sub-continent and ruin India's economic development.¹⁹⁷

India has privately protested over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on several occasions.¹⁹⁸ During June 1980 U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher noted that New Delhi had, "moved from an uncritical view of recent events in Afghanistan to one opposing the Soviet invasion and calling for prompt Soviet withdrawal."¹⁹⁹ However, India has refused to publicly condemn the Soviet Union and has abstained from U.N. votes that did so. Public Indian criticism of the Soviet role in Afghanistan has been carefully linked with general criticism of alleged Western ambitions in the region.²⁰⁰ This is probably because India needs Soviet economic and military aid. The Indo-Soviet arms treaty of May 1980 has been discussed previously.

During December 1980 Leonid Brezhnev arrived in New Delhi on a state visit. Brezhnev brought with him a number of Soviet economic aid proposals and reportedly sought a greater Indian understanding and even a qualified endorsement of Soviet actions and attitudes toward China and Afghanistan.²⁰¹

In a speech to India's Parliament Brezhnev called up the West, China and Japan to establish a zone of peace in the Persian Gulf area free of foreign military bases and nuclear weapons. The U.S. replied that it did not take Brezhnev's proposals seriously.²⁰² India accepted Brezhnev's economic package, but India refrained from either endorsing the Soviet Union's activities or criticising the U.S. by name in the joint declaration at the end of Brezhnev's visit. One paragraph said that both the Soviet Union and India were opposed to all types of outside interference in the region. However, the United News of India said that both states differed as to their perceptions of outside interference in the region. Michael Kaufman believes that India tried to avoid controversy in the declaration.²⁰³ Thus, it appears that Brezhnev obtained very little from Mrs. Gandhi for his economic proposals.

An analysis of the weapons and weapons systems possessed by India's armed forces indicates that they are consistent with a defensive military doctrine. While India's surface ships and submarines could be sent anywhere in East Asia, India possesses no long-range strategic bombers or missiles, no troop ships, and no strategic airlift capability.²⁰⁴ Although India is technically a great power in East Asia, India only possesses the capability to defend the homeland and to undertake offensive operations not too far removed from India's borders. India's capacity to produce nuclear weapons will greatly augment its strategic capabilities if it ever decides to obtain strategic nuclear delivery systems.

Foreign Policy Assumptions, Goals, and Tactics

This section of Indian foreign policy assumptions, goals, and tactics is derived from the previous discussion of India's government

and leaders, as well as from an analysis of India's relations with the U.S., U.S.S.R., and China since 1947 which will be presented in Chapter V.

Assumptions

(1) Despite the fact that the international system is changing from bipolar to multipolar, the world is basically divided into industrially developed states and developing states. The developed states have a moral obligation to aid the developing states, but they have not done enough in this respect.

(2) The developing states must utilize all possible peaceful and legal means to secure their rights and sovereignty, and to increase the amount of aid coming to them from the developed states.

(3) The U.S. and its Western European allies, are still imperialistic and neocolonialist at heart. They are not greatly interested in helping the developing states. When they do aid the developing states, they do it because of ulterior motives or because of world public opinion.

(4) India's past view of the Soviet Union and the European Communist states was that they were not imperialistic because they had no history of colonialism. Moreover, as socialist states they were (as India saw it) morally superior to the U.S. and Western Europe. However, the June 1980 statement by Warren Christopher indicates that, at least by mid-1980, India's attitude towards the Soviet Union had changed. Thus, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has changed India's (and especially Mrs. Gandhi's) conception of Soviet foreign policy motives.

(5) China, as a socialist state, should be virtuous and a good neighbor. However, its past actions show that it is seeking to neutralize India as an Asian power, and it is competing with India for the position

of leading spokesman of the developing states. Nevertheless, a normalization of relations and a settlement of Sino-Indian differences may be possible.

(6) The U.N. is a major tool for world peace because it provides a forum for hostile states to debate their differences rather than fight. the U.N. and other world and regional economic and social organizations are major forces for economic and social development. In addition, such forums allow the lesser developed states to have a voice in world affairs in excess of their military and political capabilities. India has played a long-standing role as leader of the nonaligned bloc. India holds the chairmanship of the Group of 77, made up of developing states, and is leading these states in their efforts to restructure world economic relations.²⁰⁵

(7) India will conduct its foreign policy on the basis of Panch Shila, or the Five Principles of Peace. Despite its entente with the U.S.S.R., India is still a non-aligned state. This allows India to solve foreign policy problems based upon their merits, and also allows India to receive arms and aid from the world at large.

(8) India will always seek to negotiate its problems with other states, but it is not opposed to the use of force if that is required.

(9) India's national security basically depends upon strong and modern military forces, and upon its ability to dominate the two territorial rings around the state.

Goals

(1) To continue to increase India's military capabilities and industrial base.

(2) To obtain increased foreign aid for India's own economic and social development, and for that of the other developing states.

(3) To maintain peaceful relations with as many states as possible, but to continue to oppose racial and colonialist state governments.

(4) To increase India's own economic and political sovereignty and that of the developing states, at the expense of the developed states.

(5) To regain its position as chief spokesman for the developing states concerning economic and social development, as well as their sovereign rights.

(6) To aid in the removal of super power political and military influence (especially that of the U.S.) from Asia as a whole and from the subcontinent area in particular.

(7) To eventually possess dominant military, political, and moral influence over the subcontinent and its peripheral areas.

Tactics

(1) Purchases of sophisticated weapons, as well as of licenses to manufacture them.

(2) Possible development of nuclear weapons, and of longer-range carriers for such weapons.

(3) Active support of, and participation in, world and regional legal, economic, and social conferences and organizations.

(4) Public opposition to the racist and colonialist governments of some states.

(5) Public opposition to U.S. foreign policy activities in Asia, and especially in the subcontinent area.

(6) Military and political moves to extend Indian influence in the area of the two rings. An example is the Indian annexation of Sikkim during 1974.

FOOTNOTES

¹New York Times, 7 March 1981, p 8.

²New York Times, 31 August 1980, p. 1; "NPC Accepts Hua's Resignation, Elects Zhao Ziyang Premier," Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin, 10 September 1980, FBIS-PRC-80-177, 10 September 1980, Vol. I, No. 177, p. L1.

³"Text of CCP Constitution Adopted at 11th CCP Congress," Beijing NCNA in English, 23 August 1977, FBIS-CHI-77-163, 23 August 1977, Vol. I, No. 163, p. D20.

⁴Chinese Communist Party Organizations, CR-79-140-74, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1979. See also Frederic M. Kaplan, Julian M. Sobin and Stephen Andors, Encyclopedia of China Today (Fairlawn, New Jersey: Eurasia Press, and New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 83.

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CHAPTER IV

STRUCTURE AND CAPACITY OF THE EAST ASIAN SUBSYSTEM

Subsystem Structure

System structure consists of four analytical elements: system component stratification, polarity, distribution of power, and homogeneity.¹ The data shown in Tables I through VII of Chapter I will be used in discussing these four elements.

Subsystem Stratification

System stratification is defined as the amount of influence and access to resources possessed by all of the different states of the subsystem.² Table VI shows the final power assessment for the East Asian great powers, while the final power assessment for the lesser states of the region is shown in Table VII. These assessments are considered to be indicative of each state's access to the resources of the subsystem's environment. If a total of 100 points is established as the minimum standard for an East Asian great power, the five states shown in Table VI meet this criterion. Two of these states--the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.--have such a great accumulation of the concrete elements of perceived power that they must be considered to be super powers.

If a total of thirty points is established as the minimum standard for an East Asian middle power, seven states fall in this category. The other states with total points less than thirty--nine in all--may be considered minor powers. Thus twenty-three percent of the subsystem's states

are super and great powers; thirty-three percent of the states are middle powers; and forty-four percent of the states are minor powers.

When the totals of the five leading states are compared to those of the other states it is apparent that they have the greatest amount of access to the environment's resources, probably as much as sixty-five percent. However, the totals of two of the leading states are so high in relation to the other three states, it is evident that they have obtained the bulk of the access to the environment's resources possessed by the leading five states. The totals of the seven middle powers suggest that they only have twenty-five percent of the access to the environment's resources, while the ten minor states probably, at most, possess ten percent of the access to the resources.

Influence can be defined as the ability to affect or modify the behavior of others in accordance with one's own ends.³ The amount of a state's influence depends both upon its capabilities and upon its willingness to use them. Capabilities are defined by David O. Wilkinson as, "relatively material, changeable, measurable, and manipulable forms or factors of state power--military and economic means in particular."⁴ Thus those states with the greatest amount of economic and military capabilities, as well as the willingness to use them, would possess the greatest amount of influence in the subsystem. Examples of types of influence are:

- (a) Moral suasion
- (b) Propaganda
- (c) Political and economic threats
- (d) Inducements
- (e) Acts of reprisal
- (f) Actual penalties

(g) Threats of hostility

(h) War itself⁵

Table I-IV, and VI-VII show the factors related to the economic and military capabilities of the twenty-one states of the subsystem. As a group, the five states listed in Tables I and VI possess the majority of the military and economic capabilities of the region, and therefore they possess a majority of the influence. Again, the amount of this influence may be as much as sixty percent. The two super powers in terms of economic and military capabilities are the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The two great powers are China and India. Japan is an anomaly in that its economic capabilities make it a super power, but its military capabilities are those of a middle power. Japan has influence due to its economic capabilities, but it has been hesitant to exert this influence. However, Japan is gradually being forced to exert its influence due to pressure from the U.S. India is a great power which has not exercised much influence in the subsystem as a whole because it has been preoccupied with subcontinental affairs.

The subsystem has seven military middle powers: Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, North Korea, and Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. However, if the five states of ASEAN acted in concert militarily they could make up a sixth great power. The other states of the region are minor powers. It is estimated that the middle powers possess thirty percent of the military influence in the region, while the minor powers have ten percent at the most.

To summarize, it appears that the five super powers and great powers of the subsystem possess about sixty percent of the influence and access to environmental resources. Seven states possess about thirty percent of the influence and access to environmental resources. These are: Australia,

North Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. The remaining nine states have, at the most, ten percent of the influence and access of the subsystem. Thus the middle and minor powers cannot regulate the great and super powers.

Subsystem Polarity

System polarity is concerned with the number of great powers, blocs, and groups of states in the subsystem.⁶ Prior to 1963 the East Asian subsystem was merely an extension of the global bipolar system: two blocs, colonies, and a small group of neutral states. During the mid-to-late 1960's and 1970's the subsystem changed. China split off from the Soviet Union. Because of pressure from China and Pakistan, India tilted away from nonalignment towards the Soviet Union. The SEATO framework collapsed and the number of neutral states increased. Japan is still a military ally of the U.S., but has been pushed by the U.S. to assume greater political and economic responsibility in the region. The U.S.S.R. is seeking to build a framework of alliances around China. In 1978 Japan and the U.S. completely normalized relations with China, and all three states are cooperating against the U.S.S.R. while also pursuing their own ends.

As noted in Chapter I, the East Asian subsystem since 1945 has gradually changed from a tight bipolar one, to a loose bipolar one, to a very loose bipolar one or emerging quintipolar system.

Subsystem Distribution of Power

Distribution of power is defined as the division of power among the subsystem's super powers, great powers, and their blocs.⁷ Usually a state's power is calculated upon the basis of its economic and military capabilities,

and may be labeled "objective" or "concrete" power. This was reflected in Josef Stalin's probably apocryphal quip, "How many divisions has the Pope?"⁸ However, there is also intangible power which consists of the ability to influence and persuade based on propaganda and moral suasion. Actually, Stalin was well aware of this type of power. Adam Ulam feels that Stalin's quip about the Pope was probably apocryphal because, "A good Communist is aware that the propaganda resources of the church are not inferior to those of the Communist Party and the institution itself of considerably greater antiquity."⁹ Objective or concrete power will be discussed first.

As Table I shows, the economic and military capabilities of the subsystem's five leading states are quite disparate. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. are so powerful that only they can regulate each other. Japan is an economic super power which, however, is heavily dependent upon the good will of the other states of the world in order to obtain access to their markets and resources. China is a military great power on the verge of becoming a super power. With help from the Free World, China may become both a military and an economic super power by the end of this century. India is a real great power with a GNP slightly less than that of Australia. India's military capabilities are relatively high due to exceptionally generous Soviet arrangements in the sale of weapons and production technology to India. All of the five leading states of the subsystem, with the exception of Japan, possess nuclear capabilities of different degrees.

In military terms, Table I shows that the U.S. is somewhat unequal to the U.S.S.R. in strategic nuclear capabilities. However, the U.S.S.R. could probably only defeat the U.S. with catastrophic consequences to the Soviet population and economy. In terms of conventional strategic capabilities

the U.S. can still project its power anywhere on the globe while the U.S.S.R. cannot yet do this. China would suffer severely from a Soviet strategic nuclear attack, but might be able to retaliate by inflicting unacceptable damage upon the U.S.S.R. In a conventional war the U.S.S.R. would have to invade China. The U.S.S.R. might win after a long struggle, but the U.S.S.R.'s conventional military capabilities vis-a-vis the U.S. and NATO would be severely weakened. The U.S. could now defeat China both conventionally and with nuclear weapons with very little risk of damage to the continental U.S. However, a conventional war would probably be a lengthy one, resulting in economic and social dislocations. By the 1990's, when China has deployed a number of long-range ICBM's, a Sino-U.S. strategic nuclear exchange might obliterate China, but it might also result in unacceptable damage to the U.S. If left to themselves, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., as well as China could probably defeat both India and Japan.

During the 1970's, however, new power groupings became observable in East Asia. The U.S., China, and Japan appear to have an informal agreement to cooperate against the U.S.S.R. in case of war. The U.S.S.R. is forging a chain of ententes and alliances against China which include Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, India, and Afghanistan. Pakistan is also an ally of both the U.S. and China. Japan is seeking to placate the U.S.S.R. after its tilt towards China, and India appears to be seeking good relations with China which might cancel out its treaty with the U.S.S.R.

Due to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, many middle and minor East Asian states are drawing closer to the U.S. and China, as well as to each other. After the fall of South Vietnam many of the Southeast Asian states normalized relations with China.¹⁰ China also sought to improve its image with these states.¹¹ As a result of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia near the

end of 1978, China fought a border war with Vietnam during the spring of 1979. The states of ASEAN--Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines--unofficially supported China's show of strength. Henry Kamm observed during March 1979 that the ASEAN members, "are all strongly antiCommunist and therefore not disposed to favor either China or Vietnam. But they have decided that Vietnam is a direct threat at any moment, whereas China enjoys the privilege of a very large power, this privilege consists of attempting to dominate politically without physically occupying the smaller nation."¹² Because of Vietnam's control of Cambodia and Laos, as well as the possible threat to Thailand, the ASEAN states began circumspectly discussing mutual defense arrangements.¹³ As a group, the ASEAN states have more than doubled defense spending since 1975, and the amount of spending continues to increase. Much of this spending is for U.S. weapons and weapons systems. The U.S. is also providing military aid; President Reagan proposed \$80 million in military aid to Thailand for fiscal year 1982.¹⁴ The U.S. and China have both offered to provide assistance to Thailand in the event of an invasion by Vietnam. During June 1981 the U.S. assured ASEAN of its continued military presence and expanded security assistance to confront external threats.¹⁵

ASEAN has also used its intangible power against Vietnam. During July 1981 ASEAN sponsored a U.N. conference on Cambodia in which ninety-three states took part. Most of these states were Third World and normalized states. The purpose of the conference was to show support for a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia. One result of the conference was the formation of an ad hoc committee to continue efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the Cambodian problem. Vietnam did not attend the conference

and dismissed it as a farce, but moral pressure is being put upon Vietnam and Hanoi may eventually agree to seek a political settlement.¹⁶

India also has intangible power because of its position as a major voice and leader of the nonaligned states. India has used the U.N. and other forums to express both its views and those of the other developing states on such North-South problems as food, energy, economic and military aid, world market prices of raw materials, and human rights. India holds the chairmanship of the Group of 77, a bloc of developing states, and is leading these states in their efforts to obtain economic advantages.¹⁷ India also uses similar forums to put forth its views on great power rivalries, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, colonialism and neo-colonialism, racial discrimination and Zionism.¹⁸

Subsystem Homogeneity

Subsystem homogeneity refers to the amount of ideological similarity present among the states of the subsystem, and this affects subsystem regulations. Rosecrance notes that the amount of ideological similarity present in a system affects the amount of conflict that occurs there. Homogeneous ideologies tend to limit the actors' goals and types of competition. The less homogeneous a system, the greater the competition. He also observes that, in a heterogeneous system, the environmental supply of resources will be insufficient to satisfy all states because, "if one state gains its objective, another is frustrated."¹⁹

The East Asian subsystem is quite heterogeneous. China and the U.S.S.R., as opposing "True Believers" are deadly enemies. China is opposed to Vietnam because it sees the smaller state as a pawn of the U.S.S.R. China is also opposed to India, both because of their conflicting

ideologies and because India is an ally of the U.S.S.R. The U.S. and U.S.S.R are ideologically opposed, and China and the U.S. have become informal allies against the U.S.S.R. Japan and the U.S. are ideologically homogeneous, and Japan has incurred Soviet wrath because it is favoring China over the U.S.S.R. in its economic dealings. Although India is a democracy, it is also highly socialistic ideologically. Therefore India has tended to accept the Soviet view on international problems and crises and is somewhat predisposed against the U.S. India also dislikes the U.S. because of its aid to Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistan hatred runs so deep that India holds the view that any friend of Pakistan is India's enemy. India used to regard China as another peaceloving Socialist state. After the 1962 war India decided that China was bent on conquest. China's support of Pakistan further exacerbated Sino-India relations. India tilted towards the U.S.S.R. because of the military threat from both Pakistan and China and because of Soviet readiness to provide arms to India. Meanwhile the middle and minor states of East Asia are drawing closer to the U.S. and China due to the perceived military threat from Vietnam backed by the Soviet Union.

The situation in East Asia is potentially explosive because of the ideological heterogeneity: a gain by one major state may be regarded as unacceptable by another major state. This might result in a war which could involve all the great and super powers of the subsystem as well as many middle and minor powers. If a major war does not occur, the geographic subsystem may continue to evolve from very loose bipolarity to multipolarity.

Subsystem Capacity and Change

Rosecrance notes in Action and Reaction In World Politics that:

. . . capacity patterns have represented important variables of international relations. How well the international system can control disruptive influence is determined by its capacity. Capacity tends to shift from system to system because disruptive inputs, controlled in one epoch, will not be controlled in another. The kind of regulator devised by national actors in one²⁰ era will be quite different from that employed in another.

A system or subsystem seeks to reduce the stress upon it through the use of regulatory forces and environmental constraints in order to achieve equilibrium. Once the system no longer has the capacity to achieve equilibrium, it changes until it is able to do so. Alternatively, a system will change due to changes in the characteristics of its actors, especially the essential actors, which may also result in changes in their environmental demands.

Regulatory Forces

The purpose of regulatory forces in a system or subsystem is to block or limit potential or actual disruptive actors from carrying out their policies and achieving their goals and objectives. These forces may be either formal or informal. Formal regulation is done by institutions and organizations such as the U.N. or the International Court of Justice. Informal regulation is done by blocs or states.

Formal regulation of the East Asian subsystem since 1945 has been limited to one instance: the use of U.N. forces to block North Korean and Chinese expansion during the Korean War. Even in this instance the U.S. was the prime mover behind the U.N. action, and the U.S. also provided the bulk of the forces and directed the war in Korea.

Various types of informal regulation have been used in East Asia including economic agreements and sanctions, alliances, increased armaments, limited wars, international conferences, and diplomacy. A greater variety of strategies and options is available through informal regulation because formal regulation, by its very nature, is limited in scope due to charters and agreements.

Another type of informal regulation for the subsystem consists of the rules of interaction for its essential actors. This is omitted by Rosecrance, but is a major aspect of Kaplan's system theory. Kaplan defines the essential rules of a system as, "those rules which describe general relationships between the actors of a system or which assign definite systemic role functions to actors independent of the labelling of the actors."²¹ These rules are interdependent; a change in one rule will result in changes in others. This can result in system change.²²

The following rules are postulated for the current very loose bipolar system in East Asia based upon an analysis of the interaction of the five leading powers in the region with each other since 1945. A discussion of this interaction will be presented in Chapter V. The postulated current rules of interaction are:

1. Increase capabilities relative to each other's ideological opponents, but negotiate rather than fight. All the essential actors seek to reduce the danger of war between themselves.
2. Fight rather than lose territory, resources, or capabilities relative to each other. Minor wars are preferred to major ones, and conventional wars are preferred to nuclear ones.

3. Opposition to any other actor seeking hegemony within the subsystem, and a willingness to accept any of the other essential actors as partners in order to do this.

4. All essential actors have the right to seek influence and access to resources throughout the subsystem, and all are in competition with each other.

5. Commercial relations exist between the essential actors, while political and cultural relations may vary.

6. Each essential actor uses the universal actor, i.e., the U.N., for its own purposes.

Environmental Constraints

The actors of the subsystem seek resources from the subsystem's environment. These resources include national security, ideological gratification, economic goods, and territory. Those states that obtain the majority of these environmental resources are the subsystem's essential actors. The amount of these resources that each essential actor obtains also affects the amount and type of its inputs into the subsystem. That is, the amount of environmental resources obtained by an essential actor affects its capabilities. Changes in an actor's capabilities result in changes in the amount and type of inputs that a state either makes or is capable of making. This can result in system change.

Tables I and II show that the five leading states of the subsystem in terms of economic and military capabilities are also the subsystem's five essential actors. That is, they obtain greater amounts of the subsystem's environmental resources, by whatever means, than the rest of the subsystem's actors. This means that their economic and military capabilities are

greater than those of the rest of the states, and therefore the amount and variety of the inputs of the five leading states is greater than those of the other states. By their actions the five leading states tend to regulate each other.

However, Table I also shows that two of the states - the U.S. and U.S.S.R. - have such a large amount of economic and military capabilities that they must also receive the lion's share of the environment's resources. These two states, then, are the primary regulators and sources of disruption in the subsystem. Both have greater national security than China and India. Japan's national security is primarily tied to U.S. goodwill. Both China and the U.S.S.R. seek ideological gratification at the other's expense, but China has not the capabilities to defeat the U.S.S.R. without the help of other essential actors. China's share of the environment's economic goods has, until quite recently, been limited by the actions of the other essential actors, especially the U.S. Now that the U.S. sees China as an informal ally against the U.S.S.R., the U.S. is taking steps that will enable China to obtain greater amounts of environmental economic goods. Territory is still available for conquest by the essential actors, but it must either be obtained by proxy (as in the case of Vietnam's control over Cambodia and Laos with Soviet backing) or it must either be territory which is not linked to any of the essential actors by treaty or territory whose loss is not considered to seriously jeopardize another essential actor's national security or vital interests. Thus China did not go to war with India when India annexed Sikkim, but China might go to war with India if India sought to conquer and annex Pakistan. Both China and the U.S. would fight to keep Japan from being conquered by the U.S.S.R., and both the U.S. and China would aid Thailand if it were attacked by a Soviet-supported Vietnam.

Changes In Essential Actor Characteristics

Changes in an essential actor's elite direction or ethos, the control factors operating on the elite, or the quantity of an essential actor's disposable resources can ultimately result in system change. The changes in an essential actor's characteristics can cause changes in that actor's foreign policy goals, assumptions, and tactics. These result in system change. Obviously, the current international global system, as well as the East Asian subsystem, would be greatly changed if the U.S.S.R. ceased to be a Communist state. Change has occurred in the East Asian subsystem because of the growing military capabilities of China and India, and the great increase in Japan's economic capabilities. A change in Japan's political ideology and a growth in its military capabilities would also result in system change.

FOOTNOTES

¹Richard Rosecrance, International Relations: Peace or War? (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. 107.

²Ibid.

³This is derived from A. F. K. Organski's definition of power in World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1958), p. 96.

⁴David O. Wilkinson, Comparative Foreign Relations: Framework and Methods (Belmont, California: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 33-34.

⁵Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), paperback edition, p. 41.

⁶Rosecrance, International Relations: Peace or War?, pp. 114-115.

⁷Ibid., p. 119.

⁸Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973, second edition (New York and Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 377, footnote 133.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰New York Times, 10 June 1975, p. C3; Washington Post, 17 July 1975, p. A25.

¹¹New York Times, 18 November 1978, p. 3.

¹²Henry Kamm, "Asians Appear To Side With Peking Against Hanoi," New York Times, 14 March 1979, p. A3.

¹³Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Business Times in English, 12 May 1979, p. 6; South and East Asia Report, No. 832, JPRS 73879, 20 July 1979, p. 1.

¹⁴Bangkok, Thailand, Voice of Free Asia in English, 9 May 1981; FBIS-APA-81-091, 12 May 1981, Vol. IV, No. 091, p. A1.

¹⁵Manila, the Philippines, FEBC (radio station) in English, 27 June 1981; FBIS-APA-81-124, 29 June 1981, Vol. IV, No. 124, p. P1.

¹⁶Editorial, "Press Harder," Singapore The Straits Times in English, 20 July 1981, p. 16; FBIS-APA-81-141, 23 July 1981, Vol. IV, No. 141, p. C2.

¹⁷New York Times, 31 August 1980, p. 3.

¹⁸"'Informed Sources' Tell Stand On Nonaligned Document," Bombay, India, The Times Of India in English, 15 February 1981, p. 1; South and East Asia Report, No. 983, JPRS 77659, 24 March 1981, pp. 29-30.

¹⁹Rosecrance, International Relations: Peace or War?, p. 122.

²⁰Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems In Perspective, reprint of 1963 edition (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977), pp. 288-289.

²¹Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, second printing (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), p. 9.

²²Ibid., p. 25.

CHAPTER V

ESSENTIAL ACTOR INTERACTION

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the relations between the five essential actors of the East Asian geographic subsystem since 1945. The effect of the information variables of the essential actors on their foreign policies will be shown, as well as their foreign policy assumptions, goals, and tactics. By its very nature, this chapter also deals with outputs, i.e., authoritative allocations of value. The chapter also shows the operation of behavioral rules and their changes over time.

This chapter is divided into eleven sections, including the Introduction. The next three sections are concerned with the relations between the three predominant military powers in the area: the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and China. Since the focus of this chapter is upon the East Asian subsystem, the relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in other areas of the globe will not be discussed except as they have affected the relations of the two powers vis-a-vis East Asia. The relations of the other three major East Asian powers with each other, as well as with the U.S. and U.S.S.R., have primarily occurred within the confines of the geographic subsystem. Three later sections of this chapter are devoted to the relations between Japan and the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and China. The last four sections of the chapter are concerned with the relations between India and the other four powers.

THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R.

The Stalinist Period and U.S. Containment Policy

Soviet foreign policy between 1945 and 1953 was influenced primarily by Stalin. Remembering the Japanese occupation of eastern Siberia during the early 1920's, and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Stalin sought buffer zones around the periphery of the U.S.S.R. He felt that these areas and states could be tied to the Soviet Union either by direct military occupation or by the establishment and control of local Communist governments friendly to the U.S.S.R. In East Asia Stalin primarily wanted buffer zones in Outer Mongolia, China and Manchuria, Korea and Japan--that is, in Northeast Asia around the Soviet periphery. Stalin also recognized that the U.S. had special interests in China and Japan, and he was prepared to move cautiously there. A very important corollary to the Soviet policy of expansion, both in the East and in the West, was that it should be done without incurring the risk of war, especially with the U.S.¹

Stalin sought partial occupation of the Japanese island of Hokkaido, but was rebuffed by President Truman. However, the Soviet Union occupied as much of Northeast Asia as it could: Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin Island, and the Kurile Islands. The Soviet Union already controlled Outer Mongolia. Meanwhile the U.S. occupied Japan, parts of China, South Korea, and the Ryukyu Islands south of Japan in addition to U.N. trusteeship over various Pacific island groups.

The fact that the U.S. chose to occupy the Korean Peninsula below the 38th parallel is significant. The Japanese have always considered that the

occupation of Korea by a hostile power would be a major threat to Japanese national security. This is because of Korea's proximity to Japan and because an invasion of Japan could be launched from Korea. Harold Hinton suggests that the U.S. accepted this view and occupied South Korea, "Probably with the idea of giving Japan a buffer against the Soviet sphere of influence on the Northeast Asian continent."² Thus, it can be argued that, although the U.S. Policy of Containment against Soviet worldwide expansion was not officially announced until 1947, it was already operating with regard to the Soviet penetration of East Asia during 1945. This view is also supported by the U.S. refusal to grant the U.S.S.R. a zone of occupation in Japan.

The Truman Doctrine of the containment of Communist expansion became official U.S. policy during March 1947. However, between 1947 and 1950, the implementation of this doctrine was confined primarily to Europe and South Asia. In East Asia the U.S. had refused to send troops to aid the Chinese Nationalists and was not prepared to interfere if Taiwan were to be invaded by the Communists. By January 12, 1950, as outlined in Secretary of State Acheson's famous speech, the U.S. regarded its containment line in Northeast Asia as including Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. The Northeastern Asian mainland was not included.³ The U.S. was relying upon the colonial powers in Southeast Asia to prevent the spread of Communism there. Many authors feel that Stalin interpreted Acheson's speech as implying that the U.S. would not intervene to help defend South Korea from a Communist invasion. Therefore, as part of his opportunistic policy, Stalin favored such an invasion.⁴

Adam Ulam makes a convincing case for Stalin's possible reasoning that the fall of South Korea to the Communists would provide the Soviet Union with positive benefits. He feels that the Soviets were convinced that the

U.S. intended to rebuild Japan as a military power. Thus, Stalin might have reasoned that the fall of South Korea would persuade the Japanese that the Communist Movement would ultimately be successful in Asia. Faced with this Japanese pessimism the U.S. might decide not to rearm Japan. and might withdraw their forces. If that occurred, there was an excellent chance that Japan would become a Communist state. With a Soviet-controlled China and Japan, all of Asia would eventually become Communist as U.S. forces and influence were slowly pushed out of the region. However, if the U.S. chose not to retreat from Japan, the U.S. would have to increase its power in the Pacific and reduce it in Europe. Thus, the U.S.S.R. would have greater freedom of action in Europe. Further, the presence of the U.S. as an even stronger power in the Pacific would assure Chinese subservience to the U.S.S.R.⁵

Because of the Korean War, the U.S. decided to broaden the scope of its Containment Policy in East Asia. During and after the war this policy came to embrace all of the East Asian states not under Communist rule. It has been suggested that the primary purpose of this policy in East Asia was to prevent the Communist domination of Japan.⁶ While this may have been its initial purpose, in 1952 the U.S. National Security Council pointed out that Communist domination of the southern portion of East Asia could seriously affect U.S. security interests in the Middle East and in Europe.⁷

Thus, by 1952 all of East Asia was considered vital to U.S. security and the Domino Theory was being used to support the U.S. Containment Policy in the Pacific. This was official U.S. policy in the region until the announcement of President Nixon's Guam Doctrine during July 1969. During the 1950's and early 1960's the U.S. perceived a Soviet-controlled China to be the primary threat to the region. During the early-to-middle 1950's

the U.S. established a network of military alliances to combat this threat. On June 27, 1950 President Truman announced that the U.S. would prevent military movements of either the Chinese Nationalists or Communists across the Taiwan Strait; elements of the Seventh Fleet moved in to enforce this. The U.S. thus decided to protect Chiang Kai-shek's forces from Communist attack. On August 30, 1951 the U.S. and the Philippines signed a mutual defense treaty. On September 1, 1951 the Anzus Pact was signed. On September 8, 1951 the U.S. and forty-seven other allied powers (not including the Soviet Union) signed a peace treaty with Japan. On the same day the U.S. and Japan signed a mutual security agreement. On October 1, 1953 the U.S. and South Korea signed a mutual defense treaty. On September 8, 1954 the U.S., Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand signed the Pacific Charter and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO). On December 2, 1954 the U.S. and the Chinese Nationalists signed a mutual defense treaty.⁸ The U.S. was now deeply committed politically and militarily in East Asia. Also, during the 1950's the U.S. began economic aid programs to almost every non-Communist country in East Asia.

The Containment Policy in Operation Prior to the Vietnam War

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. faced each other directly at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina. Stalin had died on March 5, 1953, and the new Soviet collective leadership under Malenkov wanted to reduce the tension that had developed between the Soviet and U.S. Blocs. The Chinese leadership also specifically desired a reduction of tension in Southeast Asia so as to keep the U.S. out of the area as much as possible.⁹ The U.S. had been providing military aid to the French in Indochina, and Secretary

of State Dulles was also discussing with the French the possibility of committing U.S. ground troops and air power in the region. In early April 1954, prior to the beginning of the Geneva Conference, Dulles suggested that an allied military force be established in Indochina under a U.S. commander. While the U.S. and France would provide the majority of the troops under this plan, nominal British participation was desired. The British were opposed to hasty action and the French simply wanted an honorable peace.¹⁰

The Soviets were also concerned with events in Europe. The U.S. was attempting to establish a European Defense Community (EDC) which would include a rearmed West Germany. The possible rearmament of Germany seriously disturbed the Soviets at the time. However, the EDC was not possible without French participation and approval of German rearmament. Fifield suggests that, "The Soviet Union strongly opposed EDC and sought to link an end to the First Indochinese War with the French rejection of the treaty. Moscow, a Eurasian power, like Washington, an Atlantic-Pacific power, found itself occasionally torn between giving priority to objectives in Europe and in Asia."¹¹ In early 1954 the Soviets suggested that a conference of the Big Four, as well as Communist China, meet at Geneva to settle the problems of Korea and Indochina. The conference convened on April 26, 1954.

The Korean portion of the conference quickly reached an impasse. South Korea wanted a unified national Government based upon U.N. supervised elections. North Korea, supported by the U.S.S.R., stated that this was unacceptable since the U.N. participation in the Korean War had ruined that organization's objectivity. The real reason for North Korea's opposition was probably the fact that it only contained one-third of the total Korean

population, and was therefore likely to be outvoted. North Korea, with Soviet support, demanded equal representation on the electoral law-drafting committee as well as a veto power over the law itself. This was rejected by the U.S. and South Korea, and the Korean portion of the conference reached no agreement.¹²

The Indochina portion of the Geneva Conference began on May 8, 1954. The Soviets were more willing to achieve an agreement on Indochina than on Korea, and both the Soviets and Chinese put pressure on the North Vietnamese to accept a number of compromises in order to reach an agreement.

Had it not been for the Soviet desire to reach an agreement, Dulles might have been able to sabotage the conference. The original intent of the other conferees was to neutralize and demilitarize Laos and Cambodia. Dulles, however, was interested in the formation of a collective security agreement for Southeast Asia. His efforts later culminated in the creation of SEATO during September 1954. On July 10th, Dulles encouraged the Cambodian ambassador to believe that Cambodia might be allowed to join such an organization. Thus Cambodia would not have to be demilitarized. On July 12th, the Laniel Government in France fell and on July 14th Mendes-France became Premier. He stated that if an agreement on Indochina were not reached in 30 days, he would resign. Since Mendes-France was opposed to the EDC, it was in the Soviet interest to see that an agreement was reached within his time limit. Cambodia refused to sign the proposed agreement because this would limit its right to join an alliance or to import arms. This move deadlocked the conference. On the last day of Mendes-France's time limit, Cambodia announced that it had seventeen additional demands. The Soviets then accepted a compromise allowing Cambodia to import arms if its national security were threatened. This compromise

was also extended to Laos. Thus, the impasse was broken and the accords, were drafted.¹³

Dulles' attitude towards the conference resulted in a U.S. blunder. Dulles was opposed to the U.S. signing any treaty which he thought would ratify the Communist takeover of an area by force. Since the U.S. refused to sign the Geneva Treaty, China and the U.S.S.R. refused to sign it also. Then Britain and France refused to sign. Thus, although Cambodia, Laos, and the two Vietnamese governments signed agreements, these were not collectively guaranteed by the Big Four and Communist China. However, in a unilateral declaration the U.S. guaranteed the agreements.¹⁴ Dulles may have intended utilizing the emerging SEATO Pact as a collective guarantor of the Geneva Accords. However, when the U.S. sent troops into Vietnam in 1965 most of the Pact members did not follow suit. The Soviets, on the other hand, achieved more than they probably intended from the Geneva Conference. France refused to support the EDC. The Soviet pointed to the Conference as being indicative of their peaceful intentions, but they did not have to guarantee the results. Further, the threat had been averted of a possible war in Vietnam between an allied military force and Soviet-supplied Chinese and North Vietnamese forces. In other words, a situation similar to the Korean War and its concomitant drain on the Soviet treasury had been averted.

The Soviet desire to keep from being drawn into a war with the U.S. over Asian matters was shown by the Formosa Crises of 1954 and 1958. On both occasions the Soviets provided the Chinese with verbal support. However, in both cases this support was given as the crisis was beginning to ease. Thus the U.S.S.R. refused to allow China to use the 1950 Sino-Soviet military alliance as a means for drawing it into an Asian war with

the U.S. The U.S. also preferred not to fight a nuclear war with the U.S.S.R over an Asian problem if there was no serious effect on U.S. security interests abroad. Franz Schurman observed that, during the early 1960's:

The core of the strategic thinking of the Kennedy Administration was that America and Russia were caught in a global competition in which the chief prize was the Third World. Containment had succeeded in bringing about tacit agreement between the two superpowers that certain regions on both sides (the Socialist countries and the allies of the United States in Western Europe and East Asia) would not be attacked or subverted without risking the danger of central nuclear war. But there remained the vast regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America which had not yet been worked into those agreements. Both sides understood that the competition for these regions could not risk the danger of central nuclear war. If that should happen, as it did over Laos and Cuba, talks at the superpower level were immediately necessary so that the conflict could be limited, or better still an arrangement¹⁵ arrived at to settle it by some kind of consensus.

The Vietnam War and the U.S. Guam Doctrine

The U.S.S.R. had always been more interested in the affairs of Northeast Asia than those of Southeast Asia. Donald Zagoria notes that by 1964 Khrushchev wanted to totally disengage the U.S.S.R. from Southeast Asia.¹⁶ However, Khrushchev was removed from power during October 1964 before he could accomplish this. The new Soviet leadership, headed by Brezhnev and Kosygin, have been more concerned with Europe and the China problem. Ulam suggests that, until the U.S. began bombing North Vietnam during February 1965, the Soviets were trying to persuade the North Vietnamese to accept a coalition government over all of Vietnam in the belief that the Vietnamese Communists could eventually subvert and control this government. However, the U.S. bombing of Hanoi during February 1965,

with Kosygin present in the city at the time, forced the U.S.S.R. to become more actively involved.

. . . the bombing of the North was in the eyes of the Communist world a challenge, not to North Vietnam or even China, but to the senior Communist power. . . The Soviet failure to react sharply to the bombings would have eroded its credibility as the protector of Communist movements of states, and would have 'proved' the Chinese thesis that Russia was not a fit leader of world Communism.¹⁷

Nevertheless, from 1965 until the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. acted in such a manner as not to cause a face-to-face confrontation. The U.S.S.R. sent supplies and weapons to North Vietnam, but did not become significantly involved in the fighting. Soviet supplies came to North Vietnam either by ship or by rail across China.

Documents in the Pentagon Papers make it clear that the U.S. regarded China as the primary potential threat to U.S. forces in Vietnam after 1965. However, the U.S. felt that increased Soviet participation was unlikely so long as the U.S. refrained from mining, blockading, or bombing the port of Haiphong.¹⁸ When President Nixon did order the bombing of Haiphong during May 1972, he took a calculated risk that the U.S.S.R. would not retaliate because of the effect that such retaliation might have upon the SALT talks then in progress.¹⁹ His guess proved to be correct.

During the 1965-1969 time period the U.S. public, and many government officials and members of Congress, became more and more disenchanted with the war in Vietnam and the U.S. Containment Policy in the Pacific. Numerous noted scholars, businessmen, and government officials appeared before Congressional committees arguing that the U.S. had become overextended militarily. Most of the Congressional witnesses felt that the policy should be revised and made highly selective.²⁰ President Nixon's Guam

Doctrine, announced during July 1969, stated these same points. The new policy was discussed and amplified in President Nixon's U.S. Foreign Policy For The 1970's which was published and sent to the Congress every year.

In the 1973 document President Nixon noted that the international system was no longer a bipolar one. The Communist Bloc had broken into divergent groups, while the U.S. allies had grown stronger. He pledged that the U.S. would continue to honor its treaty commitments made with other states, especially Western Europe and Japan. However, he felt that the antiCommunist states should be increasingly prepared to, "man their own defenses and furnish more of the funds for their security and economic development."²¹ In East Asia this meant that the U.S. would continue to provide a nuclear shield over Japan, and honor its other treaty commitments with those states that might be attacked by China or the Soviet Union. However, the U.S. expected those states allied with it to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for their defense.²² Thus, the U.S. was willing to provide military and economic aid to friendly Asian states, but it would not provide U.S. ground troops unless it decided that a particular situation warranted doing so.

During President Nixon's one and one-half terms in office the U.S. carried out a policy in South Vietnam of "Vietnamization". The goal was to train and equip South Vietnam's forces so that they could eventually carry on the war without the aid of U.S. troops. During the early 1970's the U.S. began to reduce its troop strength in East Asia generally, and from Indochina in particular. In 1971 an agreement was reached with South Korea whereby the U.S. agreed to modernize the South Korean forces, but announced its intention of reducing its troop strength there by one-third.²³ The U.S. eventually withdrew all but 40,000 troops from South Korea.

Presidents Nixon and Ford intended to retain U.S. troop strength at that level so as to reassure South Korea, Japan, and its other East Asian allies of its commitment to the region.²⁴ However, in 1977 President Carter decided to gradually withdraw all U.S. ground troops from South Korea.²⁵ This decision was changed in 1979 when it was found that the North Korean ground forces were considerably more powerful than had previously been estimated.²⁶ President Reagan has continued Carter's policy.

On January 27, 1973 the U.S. signed an agreement with the three Vietnamese parties to the war in Indochina, and its remaining troops in Vietnam were withdrawn. About one year later, however, South Vietnam fell to the Communists and the Policy of Vietnamization was shown to be a failure. Cambodia and Laos fell to the Communists soon thereafter. The U.S. also began withdrawing its forces from Thailand, which had reached a peak of 50,000 during the Vietnam War. On March 20, 1976 the U.S. reached an agreement with Thailand whereby all U.S. personnel, except for 270 military advisors, would be withdrawn within four months.²⁷ The advisors were withdrawn later. The U.S. bombers that had been based in Thailand were withdrawn to Guam. This left no U.S. forces on the East Asian mainland except in Korea.

In addition, the U.S. removed most of its forces from Taiwan. In 1972 there were 10,000 U.S. troops on that island. By June 1976 their number had been reduced to only 2,300. Their numbers were further reduced during 1977 to 1,400.²⁸ U.S. combat aircraft had been withdrawn from the island by June 1975.²⁹ When the U.S. and China completely normalized relations, in 1979, the last of the U.S. troops were withdrawn.

During 1975 steps were taken which would lead to the dissolution of SEATO. Pakistan had withdrawn from it during 1973, and France had followed

during 1974. On July 24, 1975 Thailand and the Philippines called for the dissolution of the organization for the following reasons:³⁰

(a) The fall of Indochina to the Communists, and doubts about future U.S. intentions to support its allies in the East Asian region.

(b) The desire to achieve friendly diplomatic relations with China and North Vietnam.

The dissolution of the organization was agreed to by the SEATO foreign ministers on September 24, 1975 and it passed out of existence on June 30, 1977.³¹

Thus, by the mid-1970's, the U.S. position in East Asia had changed considerably from what it had been during the mid-1950's. The only U.S. troops still on the Asian mainland were stationed in South Korea, a token force. SEATO, which Dulles had envisioned as an Asian counterpart to NATO, had been dissolved. The U.S. retained its treaties with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan. However, owing to the unsuccessful outcome of the Vietnam War, as well as to the antiwar sentiment in the U.S., these allies doubted future U.S. willingness to honor its commitments. During December 1975 President Ford traveled to those East Asian states friendly to the U.S. His purpose was to reassure them of continued U.S. support. President Ford's Pacific Doctrine, delivered on December 7, 1975, was essentially a restatement of existing U.S. policy towards East Asia. He re-emphasized U.S. willingness to honor its commitments and pledged continued military and economic aid, as well as trade.³²

The Carter and Reagan Administrations have continued this policy. On January 15, 1979, in a speech justifying the U.S. recognition of the Beijing Government, Secretary of State Vance said:

We acted in a way that will move us toward our objective of a stable system of independent nations in Asia, and that will also increase the chances of maintaining a stable equilibrium among the United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. . . . For reasons of geography history and economics, we are as much a Pacific nation as an Atlantic nation with deep and abiding national interests in the region. We will maintain balanced and flexible military forces in the region. . . . And we will not hesitate to act, as required, to protect our vital national interest.

Even though the U.S.-Taiwan defense agreement became null and void in 1979 Congress passed a resolution, that was accepted by the President, which stated that an attempt to seize Taiwan by force would constitute, "A threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific areas and be of grave concern to the United States."³⁴

The shrinking of U.S. forces and commitments in East Asia had been watched with great interest by the Soviet Union. During June 1969, one month before the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, Brezhnev suggested the need for an Asian Collective Security System. Alexander Ghebhardt suggests that the Soviet leaders felt that the U.S. was in the process of formulating a new approach to East Asia, and wanted to offer the East Asians an alternative to this new approach.³⁵ The Soviets have pressed this proposal on both the East Asian and Middle Eastern states since 1969 and appear to have taken a long-term view towards the formation of such a bloc. They eventually hope to obtain bilateral treaties between the U.S.S.R. and the Asian states, and then eventually convert those treaty states into a bloc. If none of this is possible, they appear to be willing to accept the true neutrality of the Asian states.³⁶ There are a number of probable reasons for the Soviet proposals:

(a) England and France have left the Middle East and East Asia, and the U.S. presence in East Asia has diminished. Thus the U.S.S.R. sees a

growing power vacuum which it seeks to fill. A Soviet-sponsored collective security organization might further reduce U.S. influence in East Asia, with a concomitant rise of Soviet influence. If such an organization were to refuse to trade with the U.S., this would hamper the U.S. economy. Of the 54 raw materials used by U.S. industry, 38 are obtained from East Asia.³⁷

(b) The U.S.S.R. is concerned over a possible military threat from China. Although the U.S.S.R. denies it, the security aspects of its proposals are probably directed against China. A collective security organization would furnish the U.S.S.R. with allies and bases in East Asia. Further, the U.S.S.R. is concerned about the Sino-U.S. normalization of relations, and appears to fear a possible military alliance of the two states against it. Thus, the obvious solution is for the U.S.S.R. to develop a counter-coalition.

(c) A Soviet-sponsored collective security arrangement could contribute to the erosion or collapse of other regional alliances and organizations in East Asia, such as the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) and the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

By 1980 the U.S.S.R. had achieved bilateral security agreements with India, Afghanistan and Vietnam in Central and East Asia. Vietnam, of course, controls Cambodia and Laos. The response to the Soviet proposals by the other East Asian states has generally been negative. Even India, which has an entente with the U.S.S.R., has provided only tepid support for the overall concept. Most East Asian states welcome continued U.S. economic and military aid, as well as a continued U.S. role in Pacific affairs.³⁸

The member states of ASEAN have drawn closer together in regional economic and political cooperation. On February 24, 1976 the foreign

ministers of the five member states signed a treaty of amity and cooperation. A permanent secretariat for the organization was established at Jakarta, Indonesia. The document pledged cooperation in the areas of food, energy, industry, and trade. A High Council, composed of the foreign ministers of the member states is empowered to mediate disputes if all disputing parties will accept its mediation. While ASEAN is not a military alliance, the treaty approves of the, ". . . continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests."³⁹ As a result of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and the possible Vietnamese threat to Thailand, the ASEAN foreign ministers in 1979 were circumspectly discussing mutual defense arrangements.⁴⁰ As noted previously, the ASEAN nations have more than doubled their defense spending since 1975. Several ASEAN states are developing munitions industries and Singapore now exports small arms. New air and naval bases are planned by Malaysia and Indonesia. The ASEAN states now hold joint military maneuvers, have created an integrated defense command, and share intelligence information.⁴¹

Meanwhile, commencing in 1968 the U.S.S.R. established a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. From 1968-1971 this consisted of a small squadron of Vladivostok-based ships "showing the flag" in various Middle Eastern and East African ports and then returning to home port. Over the years, however, the number of combat vessels of the Soviet squadron increased. Although this naval squadron is located in Middle Eastern waters, any punitive actions on its part could affect the East Asian states and the U.S. Four-fifths of Japan's oil comes from the Middle East through the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. is also heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil. Hedley Bull has noted that states with ocean-going navies may use them to ". . .

ward off threats to their lines of communication, but also positively to bring military power to bear in distant waters in order to support local clients, coerce local enemies, or neutralize one another's ability to act in the area."⁴² A Soviet fleet based in the Indian Ocean would be able to exert influence not only in the Middle East, but also in Southeast Asia. Its actions, coupled with those of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, could also affect events in Northeast Asia.

Because of the growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. is developing a naval base on the British island of Diego Garcia which the U.S. leased during 1966 for a period of 50 years.⁴³ During December 1975 Congress appropriated funds to begin developing the island into a major base with berthing facilities for aircraft carriers, and an airfield capable of handling both fighter aircraft and large cargo aircraft.⁴⁴ The island is located about 1,000 miles south of India. During January 1980 President Carter announced his intention of creating a Rapid Deployment Force which could be sent anywhere in the world to counter Soviet military activities.⁴⁵ However, President Carter's plan was stalled because of Congressional opposition. Then, in November 1980, President Carter lost his bid for reelection and nothing more was done concerning the Rapid Deployment Force until President Reagan took office. He is currently attempting to create such a force. President Reagan has also continued Carter's policy of seeking South Asian and African bases, and of keeping significant elements of the Seventh Fleet stationed in the Indian Ocean.⁴⁶

Due to the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces in 1980, Pakistan and Iran are now potentially threatened by attacks on their flanks. The U.S. has a mutual security agreement with Pakistan. Soviet control of Iran would deny Iranian oil to other states and would also

provide the U.S.S.R. with permanent naval bases in the Western Indian Ocean. As a result the U.S. is currently seeking to acquire base rights in the area.

Thus it appears that after Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964 the U.S.S.R. has tended to become increasingly more interested in East Asia. Although the U.S. withdrew its forces from the Asian mainland after 1973, it still maintains a significant military presence in the region. Due to recent Vietnamese moves in the region and Soviet moves on the region's periphery, the U.S. military presence will probably increase. However, the U.S. no longer considers itself to be the policeman for the entire region; it expects the East Asian states to provide more for their own defense, although it will provide them with military and economic aid. The U.S. will use its own troops in the region only if it feels its vital interests are being adversely affected, or if it must honor previous treaty commitments. Meanwhile, the U.S. is seeking to increase China's military capabilities as a counterpoise to the U.S.S.R. in East Asia. Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are seeking to avoid a military confrontation between each other.

Sino-Soviet Relations

The history of Sino-Soviet relations since 1945 can be divided into three parts: The Stalinist Period, when Mao had to prove to Stalin that China was truly a Communist state; the period after Stalin's death in 1953 until 1963 when the final break occurred between the two states; and the relations between the two states after 1963 which resulted from the break.

The Stalinist Period: 1945-1952

From the end of World War II until the proclamation in 1949 of the People's Republic of China, Stalin tried to retard the progress of the Chinese Communist Revolution. He may have wanted China partitioned between the Guo-Mindang and the Communists so as not to provoke U.S. intervention in, and occupation of, parts of China.⁴⁷ After the surrender of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, the Soviet army was scheduled to leave by November 1945. Instead, it did not leave until May 1946 after it had dismantled a considerable amount of equipment from the Manchurian factories and shipped this to the U.S.S.R. Further, although members of the Guo-Mindang stated that the Soviet army turned over large supplies of captured Japanese weapons to the Communists, Lin Biao later asserted that this was untrue. He said that war materials were obtained from the rural areas and from Shenyang (Mukden) where Soviet security was lax.⁴⁸

Stalin also sought to strip China of some of its territory as part of his plan to create buffer areas around the Soviet Union's Asian border. He attempted to annex Chinese Inner Mongolia into the Mongolian People's Republic (M.P.R.), which had been a Soviet satellite since the early 1920's. This was foiled in 1947 when the Chinese Communists sent an army of occupation into the region.⁴⁹ It is also possible that, during the early 1950's, Stalin may have been plotting with Kao Kang, the Communist Party boss of Manchuria from 1948 to 1954, to turn that province into a Soviet satellite. In February 1954 the Chinese Central Committee filed charges against him and in June the administrative independence of Manchuria ceased. In 1955 it was announced that Kao Kang had committed suicide.⁵⁰

After the proclamation of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, Mao decided that he needed an ally against possible U.S. intervention

on the side of Chiang Kai Shek in the Chinese civil war. He also needed aid in developing China into a modern industrial and military power. Accordingly, during December 1949 Mao led a delegation to Moscow with a shopping list. However, Mao was also a nationalist. The Chinese Communists had eliminated the special privileges of other states in China, and Mao also hoped to end those of the Soviet Union. Mao's reception in Moscow was probably rather frosty. Mao stated in 1956 that Stalin had not at first accepted the new Chinese Communist Government as being truly communist:

When we won the civil war, Stalin suspected that ours was a victory of the Tito type, and in 1949 and 1950 the pressure on us was very great indeed.

After two months of hard bargaining between Mao and Stalin, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed on February 14, 1950. It contained the following provisions:

- (a) A defensive alliance against Japan or any of its allies, meaning the U.S.
- (b) The U.S.S.R. agreed to relinquish the use of the Port Arthur naval base and Manchurian Railway by the end of 1952.
- (c) China received a Soviet loan of U.S. \$300 million over five years, subject to repayment within 10 years from 1954 with an interest of one percent.
- (d) The U.S.S.R. promised to restore the property its army had removed from Manchuria during 1945-1946.
- (e) China agreed to recognize the independence of the M.P.R..
- (f) Both parties agreed to coordinate their foreign affairs with each other.
- (g) The treaty was to remain in force for 30 years.⁵²

The provisions of the treaty show that Mao received only part of what he desired. He obtained an alliance, and he did succeed in getting the Soviets to relinquish their special privileges in Manchuria. Because of the Korean War, however, the Soviet's navy continued to use Port Arthur as a fleet base. The Soviets did not finally vacate that facility until May 1955.⁵³ Mao received no free Soviet economic or military aid. The loan itself was small, although the terms were favorable. Further, Mao was forced to relinquish all claims to the M.P.R., which had been part of the old Manchu Empire, and which the Chinese leaders felt should be a part of the new China.

China gave moral support to North Korea's attack against South Korea during June 1950. After UN forces had reached parts of the Chinese border during November 1950, China committed its troops to the conflict. The Chinese reasons for doing so are still not known. Mao may have felt that intervention would prove China's loyalty to the Communist cause. He probably also expected that he would obtain significant Soviet military and economic aid by doing so. In this, he was disappointed. China later disclosed that it paid the U.S.S.R. \$2.3 billion for the arms and equipment it used in Korea.⁵⁴ Even so, Gittings notes that Soviet supplies to China were slow in coming, possibly deliberately.⁵⁵ Ulam suggests that the U.S.S.R. deliberately prolonged the war for two years so as to handicap the U.S. in its buildup of NATO strength.⁵⁶ At any rate, by the end of the war China's leaders probably felt that the U.S.S.R. was morally obligated to China for being its proxy in Korea.

The previous discussion shows that Stalin treated the Chinese Communists shabbily. He furnished them with very little military equipment during the final years of their revolution. He sought to take

advantage of unsettled conditions in China to strip it of three provinces. He tried to postpone giving up special Soviet privileges in Manchuria. He probably provided China with no free economic or military aid during the Korean War and was tardy in supplying purchased arms. Mao was probably resentful toward Stalin because of this; however, he needed the alliance. He was dealing with Stalin from a position of weakness and had to accept whatever terms were offered to him. Due to unsettled conditions in the Soviet bloc after Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, the new Soviet leaders courted Mao. In turn, Mao began to assert himself.

The Period of Partnership, 1953-1963

The new group of Soviet leaders which came to power upon Stalin's death were concerned over the unity of the Soviet Bloc now that his heavy hand was gone. As a result, they began to court China as an ally in dealing with the other Communist states. The pattern of the Sino-Soviet relationship began to shift from one of Soviet domination to one of interdependence. Evidence of this was the new Soviet Economic Assistance Treaty, which was signed on March 26, 1953. The Soviets agreed to aid Chinese industrial development by sending experts and by providing technological training to the Chinese. The Soviets may also have provided the Chinese with more economic credits.⁵⁷

The 1953 treaty was followed by a second one signed during October 1954. Significantly, the treaty was signed in Peking by Khrushchev who had been present at the October 1, 1954 Chinese National Day celebrations. A joint declaration issued on that day gave implied Soviet recognition of China as an independent state, and one coequal with the U.S.S.R. The

declaration also indirectly accorded Great Power status to China. The U.S.S.R. provided China with a number of concessions in the treaty, as well as a new credit of about \$130 million.⁵⁸

Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin at the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in early 1956 provided China with other opportunities to enhance its status. As Ulam points out:

Most of all they, the Chinese, perceived that this self-criticism would weaken the position of their Soviet colleagues in the Communist world, certainly psychologically, and would make them more eager to have their concurrence and support--and to pay for it. In that expectation, the Chinese were certainly justified. The next two years were the period of the Russians' most assiduous wooing of them, invoking their help in solving the troublesome situation in Eastern Europe and coming out forthrightly with the promise of helping them develop nuclear weapons.⁵⁹

However, the seeds of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute were also sown at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. In addition to denouncing Stalin, Khrushchev sought to revise Marxist-Leninist doctrine in the light of the current international situation:

(a) War was no longer inevitable between the Communist and Capitalist blocs. If a total nuclear war were to occur, both blocs would be devastated.

(b) Peaceful coexistence was possible between the Communist and Capitalist blocs. In this situation both blocs could compete with each other by all means short of war.

(c) Communist Parties no longer had to seize power solely by violent means. It was possible for the Communist Parties in some of the "bourgeois democratic" states to gain power through parliamentary elections.⁶⁰

Khrushchev's new doctrinal views shocked Mao. On two occasions during 1956 Mao, Zhou, and Liu Shaoqi remonstrated with Soviet officials over Khrushchev's speech.⁶¹ The Soviet leaders may have sought to ease Mao's injured feelings by providing new economic assistance to China. A new Sino-Soviet economic treaty was signed on April 7, 1956. The U.S.S.R. promised to provide China with approximately \$625 million in aid. This was to support 55 new Chinese industrial projects which were to be completed by the end of 1957.⁶² In the light of previous Sino-Soviet commercial dealings, the new Soviet aid could be considered magnanimous. A second reason for the Soviet generosity may have been the unrest against Soviet hegemony that had begun in Hungary and Poland during that year. The U.S.S.R. needed Chinese moral support to help it retain its leadership of the bloc. China publicly approved the crushing of the Hungarian revolt by Soviet troops during November 1956 and the execution of Imri Nagy in 1958.⁶³

The reward for China's support of the U.S.S.R. may have been the Sino-Soviet missile and nuclear treaty signed on October 15, 1957. Although Khrushchev probably considered the treaty to be a munificent gesture on his part, Mao was unhappy with it. Mao wanted the U.S.S.R. to provide China with strategic missiles, nuclear warheads, and missile and nuclear development facilities. Believing as he did in the inevitability of war between the Communist and Capitalist blocs, Mao probably also believed that the U.S.S.R. should share its advanced weapons and technology with China. However, China received no strategic missiles and no nuclear weapons. China received only tactical missile systems, and the facilities to produce both missiles and nuclear weapons.⁶⁴ The Soviet failure to provide strategic missiles, and its later search for detente with the U.S. were regarded by Mao as signs of weakness and revisionism.

Chinese distrust of the Soviet Union was further increased by Soviet inaction during the 1958 Sino-U.S. confrontation over Taiwan. Khrushchev acted very circumspectly during the crisis. In 1963 China complained that the Soviet Union only offered its support after tensions had begun to ease, and this amounted to no real support for China at all.⁶⁵

1958 was also the year in which the Chinese "Great Leap Forward" began. Once again Mao's ideological views came into conflict with those of the U.S.S.R. The purpose of the Great Leap, which was Mao's idea, was to bring the level of China's industrial and agricultural capacity up to that of Great Britain within twenty years. It was to be a triumph of Chinese Communist willpower. Not only was industrial growth to take place at a much more rapid rate than had occurred in the Soviet Union, but there was to be a rapid collectivization of farm lands which was expected to considerably surpass the agricultural production of the Soviet Union. In a speech on March 20, 1958 Mao stated that China could achieve economic development more quickly than the U.S.S.R. because, ". . . there are more of us, and the political conditions are different too: we are livelier, and there is more Leninism here. They, on the other hand, have let part of Leninism go by the boards, they are lifeless and without vitality."⁶⁶

Thus, by 1958 Mao had already decided that the Soviets were not as good Communists as the Chinese. While Mao needed the Soviets for economic and military aid, he secretly felt that the Chinese were superior to them. The Soviets, on their part, regarded Mao's views on economic development as heresy and as an ideological threat to their leadership of the World Communist Movement. The Soviets had previously experimented with the agricultural commune system and had failed; they probably regarded the Chinese cancellation of the Great Leap in 1960 with smug satisfaction.

The Soviet leaders must also have been having second thoughts concerning their aid to China in the development of nuclear weapons. The Chinese later asserted that:

. . . in June 1959, the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union in October 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture.⁶⁷

The ideological dispute became more heated during the fall of 1959 due to Khrushchev's continuing search for detente with the U.S. The Chinese press publicly supported Khrushchev's trip to the U.S. and the Camp David declaration of September 17, 1959, but continued to accuse the U.S. of being a warmonger and insincere in its desire for peace.⁶⁸ Privately, however, the Chinese voiced repeated objections to Khrushchev's visit to the U.S.⁶⁹ After his visit, Khrushchev flew back to Moscow and then on to Peking for the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Republic. A Chinese statement made during 1963 asserted that, during this visit, Khrushchev said that the Chinese agricultural communes were "in essence reactionary", that China was warlike and guilty of "adventurism", and that China should accept a "two Chinas" solution to the problem of Taiwan. He also reportedly read the Chinese a lecture against "testing by force the stability of the Capitalist system."⁷⁰

During June of 1960 Chinese and Soviet leaders met at the Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers Party in Bucharest to aid their ideological differences. No settlement was achieved. Probably as a result of this stalemate, the U.S.S.R. put further pressure on China. During July 1960 the U.S.S.R. recalled all of its experts working in China, causing

slowdowns and stoppages in many Chinese industrial programs, including the Chinese missile and nuclear programs.⁷¹

During November and December 1960, and again in October 1961. Chinese and Soviet leaders argued with one another at Communist Party Congresses in Moscow. The Soviets would not change their views and the other national Communist Parties, with the exception of Albania, generally supported the Soviets.⁷²

The low ebb of Sino-Soviet relations was shown by the events of 1962. On January 30th, during a speech at an Enlarged Central Work Conference attended by over 7,000 Chinese cadres, Mao stated that the Soviet leaders were revisionists and that the Soviet people would eventually overthrow them.⁷³ During August the Soviet Government formally notified China of its intention to conclude a nuclear test ban agreement with the U.S. in the near future. The Chinese leaders regarded this as Soviet-U.S. collusion to halt the Chinese nuclear weapons development program.⁷⁴ It was probably also clear to them that Soviet-U.S. detente was of more importance to the Soviet leaders than Chinese support of Soviet leadership of the World Communist Movement.

By the fall of 1962, all of the Soviet consulates in China were closed. Chinese consulates in the U.S.S.R. had been closed previously. However, both states continued to maintain embassies in their respective capitals.⁷⁵ Further, when the Sino-Indian War broke out during October of 1962, the Soviet Union provided military and economic aid to India and did not support the Chinese view of the conflict.

The Sino-Soviet ideological dispute became virtually irreconcilable during August 1963 when the U.S., U.S.S.R., and Britain signed a partial nuclear test ban treaty. In the minds of the Chinese leaders, the Soviet

signature on the document was a manifestation of revisionism and of the Soviet-U.S. desire to jointly administer the world's affairs.⁷⁶ The Chinese were also afraid that this treaty might be used by the Soviets and the U.S. to block the Chinese nuclear weapons development program.⁷⁷

Thus, by the fall of 1963 the Sino Soviet ideological split was complete. The Chinese leaders, and especially Mao, felt that the Soviet leaders were hopelessly revisionist. They apparently also felt that the two super powers wanted to eventually control the world between them. From this time on, one of the major aspects of Chinese foreign policy would be the harrassment of the U.S.S.R. in order to embarrass it both in the eyes of the other Communist states and in the eyes of the world. The Chinese leaders probably reasoned that, since they could not attack the Soviet Union militarily, ideological and diplomatic harrassment of the Soviet Union would cause it to reveal itself more fully as a revisionist state. They probably hoped that the other Communist Parties and states might eventually sever their ideological ties with the Soviet Union and come to regard China as possessing the true interpretation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

The Period of Hostility: 1963 to the Present:

One major source of Sino-Soviet contention has been their common border, which, if Mongolia is included, extends for approximately 5,000 miles. Many events in Sino-Soviet relations since 1963 can be traced to the problem of the border.

During 1963 the Chinese informed the Soviets that they regarded the previous land cession treaties made by Imperial China with Czarist Russia as "unequal" and not necessarily valid. These were the Treaties of Aigun (1858), Beijing (1860), and St. Petersburg (1881). Other boundary treaties

followed in 1882, 1883, and 1885. In all, China ceded her claims to Russia over territory totalling approximately 498,000 square miles. This territory primarily included what is now Soviet Kazakhstan, and the Soviet Maritime Province.⁷⁸ In 1919 the new Soviet Government repudiated the treaties. Later, however, it nullified that decision. In 1964 Pravda asserted that the present Sino-Soviet border was, "fixed by life itself and treaties concerning the border cannot be disregarded."⁷⁹ Border talks began during 1963, but were suspended in 1964.⁸⁰ Also, in 1964 the Soviets requested talks over a variety of issues to ease tensions.⁸¹ Mao replied that the Soviets wanted to keep China in a state of tutelage.⁸² Since 1962 there have been periodic reports of border clashes and troop reinforcements.

The Chinese position in the border dispute is, first, that the treaties were unequal. That is, China was forced to accede to the Czarist demands because of its inferior military power. China wanted the Soviet Union to agree publicly that these treaties were unequal. Second, China does not desire talks to settle the entire border issue at one time, but wants to reserve the right to discuss portions of the border at times of mutual consent in the future. Third, China wants both sides to withdraw their troops from all disputed areas and observe a cease-fire.⁸³

The Soviets have implied that the Czarist treaties were unequal, and are apparently willing to make some minor concessions. However, since every Soviet land boundary has resulted from what the Chinese call "unequal treaties", if the Soviets were to admit the validity of the Chinese claim they would probably have to renegotiate the status of every one of their land boundaries. Such an eventuality would greatly delight the Chinese. The major Soviet desire is a complete settlement of the entire Sino-Soviet border dispute. In addition, the Soviets have refused to remove their

troops from the border areas. To do so might give the Chinese a definite military advantage should a conventional land war commence.⁸⁴ The Soviets admitted in 1975 that the actual size of the contested area was about 13,000 square miles. Of this total, 9,600 square miles are located in the mountainous region northwest of China; the rest is located northeast of China along the Ussuri River.⁸⁵ However, both are Soviet strategic areas.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968 by Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian military forces profoundly disturbed the Chinese leaders. Chinese editorials at that time were full of denunciations of Soviet "aggression". On September 26, 1968 Brezhnev defended this tactic:

. . . when external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of a restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country--a threat to the security of the Socialist Commonwealth as a whole--this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem--the concern of all socialist countries.⁸⁶

While China could hardly be considered moving towards Capitalism, the message was there: given a threat to its security or to part of its bloc, the U.S.S.R. might consider itself justified in invading another Communist state. As if to underscore the point, an article in Kommunist stated that, "Events in China are not exclusively an internal affair. . . . The policies of the Mao Zedong group are harming the cause of socialism throughout the world."⁸⁷

Throughout 1968 the Soviets tried to bully the Chinese to the conference table to discuss the entire border situation, however, the Chinese refused. Then in March 1969 occurred the two Sino-Soviet clashes on the Ussuri River over Chen Bao/Damansky Island. The Chinese were

reported to have been severely beaten.⁸⁸ On March 21st Premier Kosygin attempted to get in touch with either Premier Zhou Enlai or Defense Minister Lin Biao by telephone. They refused to speak to him.⁸⁹ During June Brezhnev issued his first Asian collective security proposals. The Chinese view of these proposals has been that the U.S.S.R. wants to encircle China. Included in these proposals was "the immutability of existing borders." The Chinese have charged that this is a cover for "the illegal occupation of the territories of other countries which they hope to perpetuate and legalize."⁹⁰ During August the Soviets threatened China with the possibility of surgical nuclear strikes against its advanced weapons installations.⁹¹ On September 11, 1969, after attending Ho Chi Minh's funeral in Hanoi, Kosygin flew to Beijing to discuss the border problem with Zhou Enlai. Zhou told the press during 1973 that he had put forward a four-point proposal as a basis for negotiations:

(a) A written provisional accord agreeing to the boundary status quo until a permanent settlement.

(b) Avoidance of armed clashes and withdrawal by both sides of military forces stationed in border regions.

(c) Negotiation of a new boundary realignment.

(d) The Soviets must admit publicly that Sino-Soviet boundary areas are disputed.⁹²

Zhou stated that he was willing to accept the unequal treaties as a basis for negotiations with the Soviet Union and that Kosygin had originally agreed to his proposals, but later changed his mind.

Border negotiations commenced on October 20, 1969. Since that date, the negotiations have reportedly accomplished nothing. The Soviets have said that, "Peking puts forward demands that no sovereign state could

accept."⁹³ The Soviets have also offered China non-aggression treaties since 1969, but these have been rebuffed.⁹⁴ Meanwhile the Soviets have slowly built up their defenses and military manpower along the border. By 1979 a total of 46 Soviet divisions were posted along the Sino-Soviet border, including three in Mongolia.⁹⁵

China's growing advanced weapons arsenal continued to disturb the Soviet Union. When Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met with President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk during October 1966, he repeatedly stressed his state's concern over a China armed with missiles and nuclear weapons.⁹⁶ During the U.S.-Soviet SALT negotiations of 1970 the Soviets proposed that, if either state learned of plans for some provocative action or attack by another nuclear power, the two states should take joint actions against it. This proposal was clearly aimed at China and was rejected by the U.S.⁹⁷

The normalization of Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations has seriously disturbed the Soviet leaders. The normalization of diplomatic relations between China, Japan and the western European states, as well as their increasing trade relations, also worries the Soviet leaders. They are concerned over a possible future U.S.-China-Japan-NATO coalition against the U.S.S.R.⁹⁸ After U.S. Secretary of State Haig visited China in June 1981 and announced that the U.S. was willing to sell weapons to China, a Tass article said that Haig's visit, "shows that the U.S. has found in Peking a welcome partner in carrying out its military strategic objectives and that Peking has stooped to teaming up directly with imperialism."⁹⁹

Meanwhile, the Soviets have been gradually forging a system of bilateral alliances and ententes around China's periphery. The U.S.S.R. has such treaties with Mongolia, Vietnam (which controls Laos and Cambodia),

India, and Afghanistan in Southern and East Asia. China's only formal ally is Pakistan, although China appears to have drawn quite close to the U.S. and Japan.

Since the mid-1960's, the Soviet leaders had hoped that a more moderate and pragmatic group of leaders would come to power in China after Mao's death. The Soviet leaders expected that the new group of Chinese leaders would be more willing to reach a settlement on the ideological and border issues.¹⁰⁰ Although a more pragmatic group of leaders assumed power in Peking in 1976, they have made it clear that they still regard the Soviets as revisionists. Therefore, while state-to-state relations may exist between China and the U.S.S.R., Party-to-Party relations do not exist.¹⁰¹ However, in 1979 there were signs that China wanted to reduce tensions between it and the U.S.S.R., and improve state-to-state relations. In April 1979 China informed the U.S.S.R. that it did not intend to seek a renewal of the 1950 alliance treaty when it expired in April 1980. At the same time, however, China suggested new talks to improve state-to-state relations.¹⁰² In May 1979 China suggested that these talks be concerned with commerce, technology, and peaceful coexistence.¹⁰³

Faced with enemies on both its northern and southern borders, China is concerned that it may not have both peace and the time that it needs to complete its economic and military modernization programs. Therefore China may be sincere in its desire to normalize state-to-state relations with the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, the negotiations may be a Chinese ploy. It may also be that Sino-Soviet differences are completely irreconcilable. A high Chinese official commented during November 1979 that, "We have made, as expected, no substantial progress in the talks."¹⁰⁴ As of 1981, the talks had still not produced any results.

Sino-U.S. Relations

The Period of U.S. Ambivalence: 1945-1950

During World War II, U.S. leaders expected that Japan would cease to exist as a great power in East Asia for some time. U.S. intent, therefore, was to assist China to become a strong and stable great Asian power to fill the void left by Japan. Further, the U.S. wanted to build China up to the level of a great world power such as England, France, or the Soviet Union. The U.S. pressed these three states to accept China as a permanent member of the Security Council of the future U.N.¹⁰⁵ China was accepted by these states, but on the basis of her future power and not on the basis of her power as of 1945. The U.S. prediction of the growth of Chinese power was based upon the expectation that China would solve its internal problems and achieve political stability under a non-Communist government.¹⁰⁶

The U.S. expectation as to the type of government that would achieve political stability in China, of course, proved to be erroneous. U.S. Ambassador Patrick Hurley was sent to China in September 1944 to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists and to aid in the formation of a coalition government. Little headway was made in the negotiations and the Chinese Civil War began during October 1945. On November 26, 1945 Hurley resigned.¹⁰⁷ General Marshall was sent to China in December 1945 to:

- (a) Bring about a cease-fire between the Nationalist and Communist armies.
- (b) Develop a coalition government leading to the unification of China.
- (c) Evacuate the surrendered Japanese forces in China.¹⁰⁸

Marshall soon evacuated the Japanese, but he failed in the other two portions of his mission. Essentially, both the Nationalists and the Communists wanted to continue the civil war and each side felt that it would win. Marshall's negotiations led to brief cease-fires which were soon broken. On December 19, 1946 President Truman issued a statement in which he morally supported the Nationalist Government, but said that the Chinese would have to solve their political difficulties by themselves. He held open the offer of U.S. economic and financial aid if the Nationalists were able to achieve a coalition government which could work towards political and economic stability. John R. Beal, who was a U.S. adviser to the Nationalist Government at the time of the statement said, "In sum I thought it indicated confusion in policy. The U.S. did not know what to do next."¹⁰⁹ On January 8, 1947, his mission having failed, General Marshall departed China for the U.S. With his departure, all other official U.S. organizations also left China with the exception of a naval detachment.¹¹⁰

From the time of President Truman's December 1946 statement until the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. policy towards China was basically one of "watchful waiting". Because of the Wedemeyer Mission to China in July and August 1947, the U.S. felt that the lack of popular confidence in the Nationalist Government could only be overcome by genuine internal reforms. The Nationalists felt that U.S. aid was essential to their survival and they also hoped that the U.S. would send troops. However, with only a small peacetime military establishment, the U.S. was in no position to send troops. The U.S. was also more concerned about Soviet activities in Eastern Europe and Berlin.¹¹¹

On July 1, 1949 Mao published an article on Chinese Communist doctrine in which he stated that, "Internationally we belong to the anti-imperialist

front headed by the U.S.S.R., and we can look for genuine friendly aid only from that front, and not from the imperialist front."¹¹² Because of this article the U.S. leaders came to the conclusion that China was subservient to the U.S.S.R. The U.S. attitude did not change until the early 1960's.

During August 1949 Secretary of State Acheson sent a White Paper to Congress concerning U.S. relations with China since 1944. The administration was under pressure from certain congressmen to militarily intervene in China on the Nationalist's behalf. In the letter of transmittal of the document, Acheson stated the Administration's refusal to intervene.¹¹³ During December 1949 there was a complete collapse of all coordinated Nationalist resistance to the Communists, and a rump Nationalist Government was established in Taiwan. On January 5, 1950 President Truman declared that the U.S. had "no desire to establish military bases on Chinese territory" and that "it will not provide military aid and advice to the Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa."¹¹⁴ On January 12th Acheson made his famous speech concerning the U.S. strategic defense line in Asia, in which he excluded Taiwan and Korea.

Meanwhile, by mid-1949 the issue had arisen of U.S. diplomatic recognition of the new Chinese Communist Government. Acheson laid down three conditions for U.S. recognition of any new government:

- (a) It should effectively control the state over which it claims to rule.
- (b) It should accept its international obligations.
- (c) It should rule with the acquiescence of its people.¹¹⁵

However, the new government seemed bent on antagonizing the U.S. Communist troops invaded the U.S. embassy in Nanjing, harassed U.S. consular

officials in other cities, and refused to recognize the principle of diplomatic immunity. On October 24, 1949 U.S. Consul General Ward and four other U.S. officials were jailed on charges of having assaulted a Chinese employee. Ward was held for one month and then deported. There was no support for U.S. recognition within Congress. The Truman Administration held the question in abeyance until China's entry into the Korean War, at which time it decided not to recognize China.¹¹⁶

A second issue which arose during 1949 was the seating of the new Chinese Government in the U.N. This was raised in the General Assembly during September 1949 and in the Security Council during January 1950. On January 8, 1950 Premier Zhou Enlai cabled U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie demanding the ouster of the Nationalists and the seating of his government's representative. The Soviet representative in the Security Council then introduced a resolution proposing the expulsion of the Nationalists. The U.S. representative stated that his government regarded the resolution as procedural rather than substantive; therefore he intended to vote against the resolution, but would not exercise his veto power. The Council then voted down the Soviet resolution.¹¹⁷

The Period of Hostility: 1950-1969

On June 25, 1950 the Korean War began. Whereas prior to the war the U.S. had adopted a "hands-off" policy towards Taiwan, the U.S. now decided that it should not fall to the Communists. On June 27th Truman announced that the Seventh Fleet had been ordered to the Taiwan Straits to prevent any future Communist invasion. The U.S. also began sending military and economic aid to Taiwan; the amount of aid progressively increased over the years. Nuclear weapons were also deployed to Okinawa.¹¹⁸

On December 2, 1950, after Chinese troops attacked those of the U.S. in North Korea, Truman stated that the Chinese had done so at Soviet direction.

The U.S. now decided not to recognize China, to isolate it politically, and to keep it out of the U.N. On January 20, 1951 the U.S. introduced a resolution declaring China an aggressor in Korea. The General Assembly passed it on February 1st.¹¹⁹ When the Soviet Union introduced a resolution to expel the Nationalists and seat the Communists, the U.S. proposed that consideration of the resolution be deferred until the next year. The U.S. proposal passed.¹²⁰ This technique to block the seating of the Communists was used successfully by the U.S. for 20 years.

Mention has already been made previously in this chapter about the network of alliances in the Pacific formed between the U.S. and the various Asian and European states during the early-to-mid 1950's. The purpose of these alliances was to combat future Chinese aggression in East Asia. Many of these alliances were negotiated by John Foster Dulles first as Special Ambassador under President Truman, and later as Secretary of State under President Eisenhower. Eisenhower and Dulles favored a policy of isolating China, and hoped that the Communist regime would eventually crumble. Eisenhower stated in December 1953 that the U.S. would continue to oppose Chinese admission to the U.N. until China met a number of conditions:

- (a) Withdrawal of Chinese troops from Korea.
- (b) The end of Chinese support for the Viet-Minh rebellion in Indochina.
- (c) The abandonment of Chinese intent to take Taiwan by force.
- (d) The use by China of "decent deportment" in its diplomatic relations.¹²¹

The Chinese, of course, regarded these conditions as insulting.

Eisenhower and Dulles also did not want to take part in any conference which included China, for fear that this would imply U.S. recognition of the Chinese Communist Government. When Dulles did take part in a conference where China was represented, as was the case with the 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, his refusal to talk to the Chinese even extended to matters of common politeness.¹²²

From the end of the Korean War through the late 1960's the level of interaction between China and the U.S. was low, and most of the interaction that did occur was military-related. There were no Sino-U.S. commercial relations, and the U.S. did not recognize the government in Peking. Sporadic and informal talks did occur on particular issues at the ambassadorial level in Geneva and Warsaw. The U.S. and China faced each other militarily during the three Taiwan crises of 1954, 1958, and 1962. However, it can be shown that, on all three occasions, neither state really wanted war. It also appears that all three of the crises were triggered by the actions and propaganda of the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan.¹²³

During the Presidential Campaign of 1960, John Kennedy called for a reassessment of the U.S.-China policy. In one television debate with Richard Nixon he stated that, although Communism should not be allowed to spread through East Asia, the presence of Nationalist troops on Quemoy and Matsu were probably regarded by the Communists as a deliberate provocation. He also stated that the two islands were not essential to the security of Taiwan. In other campaign speeches he called for U.S. disengagement in China's near waters.¹²⁴

However, during the nearly three years that Kennedy was President there was no change in official U.S. policy towards China. Two reasons

have been given for this. Foster Rhea Dulles has suggested that, because the majority of U.S. public opinion was opposed to a shift in U.S. China policy, Kennedy felt that his hands were tied.¹²⁵ David Halberstam has postulated that when Kennedy came into office he was faced with a number of foreign policy problems and that a change in China policy was therefore given a low priority.

Early on, when Adlai Stevenson and Chester Bowles repeatedly mentioned China to Kennedy, saying that the policy was absurd and that it was urgent to try to change it, Kennedy would smile and agree and say yes. It was a stupid policy, but it would all have to wait until the second term. It could not be changed now. There was a limit to the things he could do. Nor was anyone other than Bowles at the state Department eager to look ahead.¹²⁶

The reasons given by Dulles and Halberstam are probably both valid. Kennedy probably realized that a change in the public attitude towards a new U.S. China policy would require an extensive governmental information campaign. Faced with more immediate foreign policy problems, Kennedy evidently decided to defer the issue until his second term.

The legacy of President Kennedy to President Johnson was the increasing conflict in Vietnam. By 1964 most U.S. leaders believed that China was no longer subservient to Moscow; however, many believed China was seeking to create a new empire in Asia. The actions of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong were believed in 1964 by the Johnson Administration to be manipulated by China. A C.I.A. study submitted to President Johnson on June 9, 1964 stated that the loss of South Vietnam and Laos would seriously affect the U.S. position in the Far East and would give China prestige at the expense of the "more moderate Soviet Union."¹²⁷ The Tonkin Gulf Resolution of May 25, 1964 publicly accused China of violating the 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina.¹²⁸ On February 13, 1965 President Johnson decided to commence

bombing attacks against North Vietnam. On February 24th the U.S. ambassador in Warsaw delivered a policy statement to his Chinese counterpart, which said that the U.S. did not desire any North Vietnamese territory and did not wish to destroy North Vietnam. The purpose of the statement, according to the Pentagon Papers was ". . . apparently aimed at helping to stave off any Chinese intervention as a result of the forthcoming bombing campaign."¹²⁹ On April 1, 1965 President Johnson made the decision to commit U.S. ground troops offensively in South Vietnam. It is likely that the U.S. provided further assurances to China, through the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, that it did not desire to invade or destroy North Vietnam. Thus the Johnson Administration was concerned over keeping China out of the war in Vietnam, and not over reassessing its relationship with China.

As a result of the lack of U.S. military success in Vietnam, the U.S. public became disillusioned with the war. Along with this disillusionment came a shift in U.S. public opinion towards the problem of China. Business organizations wanted segments of the U.S. trade embargo lifted. Many of the major newspapers called for a reassessment of the U.S. policy towards China. Numerous academicians also called for a change, both in scholarly journal articles, in newspaper articles, and in testimony before various Congressional committees.¹³⁰

Moving Towards Normalization: 1969-The Present

During November 1968 Richard Nixon was elected U.S. President. Among his campaign pledges he promised to end the war in Vietnam and to reassess U.S. policy in East Asia. This included a reassessment of the U.S. policy towards China. Nixon had called for normalizing U.S. relations with China in an article published in Foreign Affairs during October 1967.¹³¹

The article was a preview of Nixon's foreign policy with regard to East Asia during his Presidency. He stated that China posed a threat to the Pacific Region and the world because of its growing military power, especially with regard to missiles and nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the U.S. could no longer be the world's policeman. Therefore, China must be persuaded to change its attitude by two means:

(a) By bringing China into the "family of nations." This may have been an allusion to the U.N. and to a new Sino-U.S. relationship.

(b) By the U.S. helping to fashion a new Pacific defense community which must provide the initial response to aggression. Nixon recognized that SEATO was weak and ineffective. In the event of aggression, Nixon felt that the U.S. should determine its own course of action which could involve various responses.

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, according to A. Doak Barnett, felt that normalization of Sino-U.S. relations would provide the U.S. with greater leverage in dealing with the Soviet Union:

. . . they believed that improved U.S.-China relations could impose new constraints on the Russians and might push them toward greater compromise and detente. The earlier changes in U.S. public opinion and downgrading of the China threat paved the way for policy changes, and Nixon's invulnerability to attack from the Republican Party's right wing gave him a flexibility in considering China policy options that his Democratic predecessors had felt they lacked.¹³²

China's leaders were also reassessing their attitudes towards the U.S. and the Soviet Union. A content analysis study, published in 1977, of the Chinese public press indicated that, during the 1968-1969 time period, the Chinese leaders came to regard the Soviet Union as a greater military threat to China than the U.S. The reasons for this change in attitude were the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and

the Chenbao/Damanskiy Island border clash during March 1969.¹³³ Another reason may have been President Johnson's announcement of troop withdrawals from Vietnam during 1968. However, this did not mean that all of China's leaders were in favor of normalizing relations with the U.S. On November 26, 1968, after Nixon's election, China proposed resuming diplomatic talks in Warsaw. These had been suspended since January 8, 1968.¹³⁴ China withdrew this proposal on February 18, 1969, possibly because of internal pressure within the Chinese Communist Party caused by the Cultural Revolution.¹³⁵

During the spring and summer of 1969 Nixon sent messages of his desire to normalize relations with China through the governments of France, Rumania, and Pakistan.¹³⁶ On July 21, 1969 two new policies were announced by the State Department:

(a) The U.S. would validate passports for teachers, journalists, scientists, doctors, and Congressmen if they wished to visit China.

(b) U.S. citizens would be allowed to purchase up to \$100 worth of goods made in China.¹³⁷

On July 25, 1969 President Nixon announced his Guam Doctrine. Among other things, the President announced that the U.S. would be willing to provide military and economic aid to a state threatened with attack, but the threatened state must provide its own ground forces. Further, he announced that the U.S. would gradually withdraw its troops from Vietnam.¹³⁹ The President's statement could be considered a signal to China that the U.S. intent was to disengage itself from active participation and intervention in the politics of East Asia. A U.S. withdrawal from the region had been desired by China since 1949. However, since Nixon stated that the U.S. would honor its treaty commitments, this meant that the U.S. was still prepared to defend Taiwan if it were invaded.

On November 7, 1969 President Nixon ordered the cessation of patrols in the Taiwan Strait by the Seventh Fleet. On December 11, 1969, after informal consultations between U.S. and Chinese diplomats in Warsaw, both states announced simultaneously that ambassadorial talks would commence again in Warsaw on January 20, 1970. On December 15, 1969 the U.S. announced that the nuclear weapons on Okinawa would be removed by the end of the year.¹⁴⁰

On February 18, 1970 President Nixon transmitted his annual foreign policy report to the Congress. The document restated Nixon's Guam Doctrine in greater detail, and repeated his desire to normalize relations with China. In the document, Nixon also accepted legitimate Sino-Soviet interests in South Asia.¹⁴¹ Two days later, at the Warsaw talks, the Chinese ambassador expressed some interest in a possible future visit by President Nixon to China. China cancelled the Warsaw talks after the invasion of Cambodia; however, the U.S. reassured China of its desire to leave Vietnam and to improve its relations with China. As a result, the Warsaw talks began again during July.¹⁴²

Not all of China's leaders were in favor of better relations with the U.S. From August 23rd until September 6, 1970 the Second Party Plenum met at Lushan to discuss this and other matters. These included Lin Biao's desire to become Chairman of the Republic, as well as the issues of investment priorities between agriculture and industry, material incentives for the agricultural workers, and future Chinese strategy with the U.S. and the Soviet Union.¹⁴³ Lin is said to have believed that he would control a majority of the delegates at the Plenum. As it was, he was outvoted on every major issue.¹⁴⁴ Lin was adamantly opposed to normalizing relations with the U.S. and said that ". . . the Sino-U.S. negotiation was a betrayal of

principles, the revolution, and Vietnam." Zhou Enlai probably argued, as he did later on to lower level Party cadres during 1971 and 1973, that China's most immediate enemy was the Soviet Union. He felt that China should, " . . . take full advantage of and enlarge the contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union."¹⁴⁵ In other words, China should use the U.S. as a counterweight to the Soviet threat. He may also have pointed out that China might eventually be able to acquire Taiwan without the danger of a Sino-U.S. war. Zhou's arguments gained majority acceptance, and it then became Party policy to normalize relations with the U.S.¹⁴⁶ Lin's decision to foment a coup to take over the Party leadership may have been made soon after the end of the Plenum.

During the fall of 1970 several U.S. inquiries arrived in China, by various channels, in which President Nixon wanted to know whether he or his representative would be received in Peking. During December 1970 Mao told Edgar Snow that he would welcome a visit by President Nixon or his personal representative to Peking.¹⁴⁷ On July 9, 1971, in the course of a world trip, Kissinger flew secretly from Pakistan to China for two days of talks with Zhou. Snow reports that Zhou told Kissinger that he intended to discuss the following issues with President Nixon:

- (a) The seating of China in the U.N.
- (b) The return of sovereignty over Taiwan to China.
- (c) The total U.S. withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, and a negotiated settlement between the governments of Hanoi and Saigon.
- (d) The establishment of formal Sino-U.S. relations.¹⁴⁸

On July 15, 1971 both China and the U.S. issued a prearranged announcement that President Nixon would visit Peking sometime during 1972.¹⁴⁹

During August of 1971 there was an official change in the U.S. position towards the admission of China to the U.N. On August 2nd, Secretary of State Rogers told the press that, henceforth, the U.S. would not attempt to block China's admission to the U.N., but that the U.S. would support the admission of Taiwan to the U.N. as an independent state. This was a significant concession for the U.S.; however, the Chinese leaders had been on record since the 1950s as being opposed to "two Chinas". On October 25, 1971 the subject of China's admission was put to a vote in the U.N. China was admitted by a large majority. The U.S. gracefully acquiesced to the new situation.¹⁵⁰ Thus, one of the agenda issues for discussion proposed by Zhou to Kissinger had already been solved.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking from February 21-28, 1972. The talks ranged over problems related directly to Sino-U.S. relations, as well as problems related to Sino-U.S. interests throughout East Asia. This is shown by the Shanghai Communique issued by both governments on February 28, 1972. The document also shows that, although there was Sino-U.S. disagreement on a number of issues, both parties wanted to normalize relations. Therefore, each party stated its different views on different issues, but agreed on others. There was disagreement on the following points:

(a) China stated that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Asia. The U.S. agreed to withdraw its troops from Vietnam, but nowhere else.

(b) China stated that it favored the peaceful unification of Korea. The U.S. stated that it would continue to support South Korea, but would work for a relaxation of tension on the peninsula.

(c) China declared itself opposed to ". . . the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism." The U.S. merely stated that it placed "the highest value" on its relations with Japan, and would endeavor to continue to develop them.

(d) China stated that India and Pakistan should withdraw their troops back behind their own borders, and that it supported the independence of Pakistan, Jammu, and Kashmir. The U.S. agreed that India and Pakistan should withdraw their troops, but only advocated a ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir.

(e) The major area of disagreement was over the status of Taiwan. China stated that this was the crucial question obstructing the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, and reiterated that the government in Peking was sovereign over the island, that the "liberation" of Taiwan was a domestic matter, and that China was opposed to any activities aimed at the creation of an independent Taiwan or "two Chinas". The U.S. agreed that Taiwan was a part of China, but did not commit itself as to which government was the legal government of China. However, the U.S. advocated a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, and agreed to progressively withdraw its forces from Taiwan as the tension in the area diminished.

The U.S. and China agreed on the following points:

- (a) Both sides agreed to conduct their mutual relations upon the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
- (b) Both agreed to make progress in the normalization of relations.
- (c) Bilateral trade would be beneficial.
- (d) Neither party sought hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. This was aimed at the Soviet Union.

(e) Senior representatives would be exchanged by both states.

(f) Another paragraph, presumably directed at the Soviet Union, stated that no major state should, ". . . collude with another against other countries", and that they should not ". . . divide up the world into spheres of interest".¹⁵¹

Of interest is the fact that, before he left Peking, President Nixon told the Chinese leaders that he strongly desired to normalize relations with China and intended to do so during his second term if he were reelected.¹⁵² However, due to the crisis of Watergate, he never had an opportunity to establish complete diplomatic relations with China. The statement in the Shanghai Communique that the U.S. would send a senior representative, ". . . to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries" probably reflected President Nixon's intent. In later years, when Chinese officials criticized the U.S. for failing to live up to the Shanghai Communique, they may have been specifically referring to the statement quoted above.

China had gained a great deal from President Nixon's initiatives to normalize relations:

- (a) U.S. recognition of the government in Peking.
- (b) The right to trade with the U.S.
- (c) Admission of China to the U.N. and a permanent seat on the Security Council, which automatically gave it Great Power Status.
- (d) Guaranteed progressive withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan.
- (e) President Nixon's promise to achieve full diplomatic relations with China during his second term, and the implied abrogation of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Treaty.

(f) U.S. moral support in any future confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The U.S. had gained the following:

(a) An easing of tension in East Asia which would allow it to withdraw gracefully from the Asian mainland except Korea, and to implement the Nixon Doctrine.

(b) The right to trade with China. Traditionally, U.S. merchants had been tempted by the lure of the vast Chinese market. However, this market had never really materialized in the past.

(c) The ability to use China as a counterpoise to Soviet activities in East Asia, and eventually in the world at large.

However, after President Nixon's visit to China and the establishment of liaison offices in both capitals, Sino-U.S. relations tended to stagnate. During Nixon's second term he was confronted with the problems of the Middle East, the conclusion of a treaty with North Vietnam, and the withdrawal of the U.S. from Vietnam. Then he faced the crisis with Congress over Watergate and resigned. Thus there were no more real foreign policy initiatives toward China during Nixon's second term. If Nixon had cut U.S. ties with Taiwan, he might have alienated conservative members of Congress who were also his main supporters. President Ford may have decided to wait to normalize relations with China until after the 1976 election for similar reasons.¹⁵³ Also, Ford may have decided to wait until he had a popular mandate before he did anything about the China problem.

Meanwhile the Chinese were becoming increasingly concerned over Soviet-U.S. detente. They believed that the SALT talks would weaken the U.S. strategically, and that the MBFR talks would weaken the U.S. and NATO tactically. This would reduce U.S. military power and, consequently, the

U.S. ability to influence the actions of the Soviet Union. It might also mean that the Soviet Union would be able to concentrate more forces along the Sino-Soviet border. Thus, China became one of the foremost supporters of NATO.¹⁵⁴

China was also concerned that, with U.S. involvement in Vietnam ended, the U.S. was retreating too hastily from East Asia. China was afraid that the U.S. was becoming weak and ineffectual, and that the Soviet Union might actively seek to fill the power vacuum. Also, North Korea might interpret the U.S. withdrawal as a sign of weakness, and decide to attack South Korea. East Asia might then become critically destabilized. When the Premier of Thailand and the President of the Philippines were in Peking during 1975 they both received the impression that China did not want the U.S. bases in their states to be withdrawn.¹⁵⁵

Another irritant to the Chinese was the lack of progress being made towards normalization. President Nixon's resignation during August 1974 may have disconcerted them. They probably recognized that President Ford could not take any steps towards normalization until after the November 1976 election, but they were still unhappy over the situation. During February 1976 ex-President Nixon visited China at the Chinese leaders' request. His visit was interpreted as a sign of their respect for Nixon and as a reminder to President Ford of the Shanghai Communique.¹⁵⁶ It was probably also intended as a reminder to President Ford of Nixon's previous statement of intent. Then in November 1976 Jimmy Carter won the Presidential election and the Chinese had to deal with a new and unknown U.S. leader.

Upon taking office, President Carter ordered a reassessment of U.S. strategy and the global deployment of U.S. military forces. With regard to

East Asia, the study's conclusions were similar to those of the Nixon-Ford Administration:

(a) East Asia was regarded as a relatively stable area in which China did not have either the will or the capability to commit aggression.

(b) The U.S. vital interests in the region were limited to Japan and its Korean approaches.

(c) U.S. interests could best be protected by an offshore strategy built around air and naval power. The employment of U.S. ground troops in the region was ruled out.¹⁵⁷

Also, at the commencement of his administration, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski had advised President Carter to postpone the problem of normalizing relations with China because of more pressing issues such as SALT and NATO. However, with the failure of Carter's SALT initiatives during the spring of 1977, as well as the development of other strains with the Soviet Union, the normalization of relations with China became more important to him. That is, since the Soviet Union feared a possible Sino-U.S. alliance, U.S. moves to normalize relations with China might cause the Soviet Union to make concessions to the U.S. on various issues.

During the Presidential debates of the fall of 1976, Carter had said that he would not normalize relations with China at the expense of Taiwan's independence and freedom.¹⁵⁸ In a foreign policy speech delivered on July 1, 1977 Carter said that he hoped that relations could be normalized with China, ". . . and still make sure that the peaceful life of the Taiwanese, the Republic of China, is maintained." He also announced that Secretary of State Vance was to go to Peking in August 1977 to begin talks at the foreign minister level.¹⁵⁹ Vance had previously made a speech on June 29, 1977 in

which he seemed to urge China to take a more flexible attitude towards the problems of Taiwan. He stated that, "Mutual and reciprocal efforts in this regard are essential." He went on to say that, "We also place importance on the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."¹⁶⁰

The Carter and Vance speeches were answered on July 8, 1977 by Li Xiannian, the fourth ranking member of the Politburo and a senior Deputy Premier. In a conversation with retired Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Li listed the same three conditions for normalization that China had required for over a decade: severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan; withdrawal of U.S. troops from the island; and U.S. abrogation of the mutual security agreement.¹⁶¹ These terms were restated to Vance during his visit.¹⁶² Sino-U.S. relations had apparently reached an impasse.

Sometime during the spring of 1978 President Carter made the decision to actively pursue negotiations which might break through the impasse. During the same time period he also decided that the U.S. would no longer oppose the sale of "defensive" weapons by European states to China.¹⁶³ Brzezinski visited Peking during May 1978 and informed the Chinese of Carter's decisions. He and the Chinese then held exploratory discussions concerning normalization. During the summer and fall of 1978 Leonard Woodcock, the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking, held five meetings with the Chinese outlining U.S. views on the matter.¹⁶⁴

The primary U.S. concern during the negotiations was that the Taiwan issue be settled peacefully. The U.S. wanted a public commitment concerning this from China, but China refused. On September 19th President Carter informed the Chinese Liaison Officer in Washington that without a public commitment from China concerning Taiwan's fate, the U.S. wanted the following "understandings" inserted into the future normalization agreements:¹⁶⁵

(a) A unilateral U.S. statement that the fate of Taiwan should be settled by peaceful means. China eventually agreed not to contradict the statement.

(b) The U.S.-Taiwan security treaty was to be ended by its own provisions. That is, the treaty could be abrogated one year after one of the two signatories announced its intention to abrogate.

(c) The U.S. would honor all other treaties and agreements with Taiwan.

(d) The U.S. would continue trade with Taiwan.

(e) The U.S. intended to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan.

The U.S. had no problem in withdrawing its troops from Taiwan, since most had already been withdrawn.

During his fifth meeting with the Chinese on November 4th, Woodcock offered them the draft of a possible joint communique. Woodcock also stated that, if U.S. concerns over Taiwan were met, normalization might occur on New Year's Day 1979. During mid-December Deng Xiaoping became personally involved in the negotiations, and an agreement was concluded on December 14th.¹⁶⁶ On January 1, 1979 the liaison offices of China and the U.S. became embassies.

During the course of the year 15 bilateral agreements were signed covering trade, culture, science and technology, frozen assets, and consular relations. The total volume of Sino-U.S. trade during 1979 was \$2 billion, double that of 1978.¹⁶⁷ On January 24, 1980 the U.S. Congress approved most favored nation trading status for China.¹⁶⁸ During the same month Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited China. Although the U.S. was not willing to sell weapons to China, it was willing to sell technology. Some of this technology might be defense related. Brown

also suggested future discussions and personal contacts between U.S. and Chinese military officials.¹⁶⁹ At a banquet in Peking he stated that, "Any country threatening the shared interests of the United States and China could face their complementary military and diplomatic actions."¹⁷⁰

In January 1981 Ronald Reagan became President of the United States. This was a matter of serious concern for China's leaders. During his campaign for the Presidency Reagan had suggested that he might restore official relations with the Nationalist Government on Taiwan. During the spring of 1981 Taiwan requested permission from the U.S. Government to be allowed to purchase advanced U.S. jet fighters and other weapons. China warned the U.S. that such sales would lead to a retrogression in the development of Sino-U.S. relations.¹⁷¹

When ex-President Carter visited China during August 1981 he said that, during the negotiations for complete normalization of relations, the U.S. had informed China that it intended to provide a prudent supply of strictly defensive weapons to Taiwan, and that these weapons would be sold without any time limit.¹⁷² The Chinese Communist leaders object to any such weapons sales by the U.S. to Taiwan because they feel that these sales tend to stiffen the Nationalist Government's resolve not to achieve a rapprochement with the Communists.¹⁷³ James Sterba suggests that China has been strongly protesting U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since January 1981 for one of two reasons:

. . . Peking has been reacting to what it considers to be a violation of the Carter Administration's agreement to be prudent about such sales. The other possibility. . . is that Peking has reneged on the agreement and is now seeking stiffer terms from the Reagan Administration than it did from Mr. Carter.¹⁷⁴

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Haig visited China during June 1981 in an effort to reassure China's leaders about President Reagan's intentions concerning Taiwan. During his visit Haig announced that the U.S. was willing to supply weapons to China in the future on a case-by-case basis after consultations with Congress and U.S. allies.¹⁷⁵ This offer was a major concession by the U.S. and a major step forward in Sino-U.S. relations. However, James Sterba observed during August 1981 that the Chinese leaders were wary of the U.S. offer because if they were to accept military aid from the U.S. they might eventually be forced to agree to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.¹⁷⁶

China and the U.S. both gained from the normalization of relations. Both gained an informal ally against the Soviet Union. China gained the right to obtain U.S. goods, weapons, and technology, as well as U.S. approval of the sale of weapons and technology by its allies to China. The U.S. gained a new trading partner. Both states will probably seek stability in East Asian affairs until Chinese modernization is accomplished sometime during the next century. However, once China achieves its modernization its view of Sino-U.S. relations may change. The future view was summarized by the head of the Chinese Central Committee's International Liaison Department in a speech to the graduating class of the Institute of Diplomacy in Peking on August 24, 1976:

Just let the United States defend us against the influence of Soviet revisionism and guard the coast of the East China Sea so that we can have more strength to deal with the power in the North and engage in state construction. When we regard the time as right, we will be candid and say: Please, Uncle Sam, pack up your things and go.¹⁷⁷

U.S.-Japanese Relations

The history of U.S.-Japanese relations since 1945 can be divided into three parts: U.S. occupation policy from 1945 to 1952; Japan as a protege of the U.S. from 1952 to 1968; and the period of stress in U.S.-Japanese relations from 1969 to the present.

U.S. Occupation Policy In Japan: 1945-1952

The U.S. Occupation philosophy was one of preventing future Japanese aggression in East Asia, of fostering a democratic political system, and of both rebuilding and modifying the Japanese economy. Unlike the case of Germany, the U.S. had a free hand because it was the sole occupying power. In order to prevent future Japanese aggression and to cause the decline of the Japanese martial spirit, the U.S. abolished all of the Japanese armed forces. Further, Article 9 of the U.S.-imposed new Japanese Constitution stated that, "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation. . . ." ¹⁷⁸

Believing that the Japanese industrialists had helped promote past Japanese aggression, the U.S. attempted to break up the giant firms. However, this effort was never very successful. In addition, the U.S. undertook a comprehensive program of limiting the growth and recovery of major industries such as steel, chemicals, and machine tools. However, certain industries such as ball bearings, aircraft, and synthetic oil and rubber were banned. Japanese atomic research was also halted. The result was that the level of Japanese economic growth rose very slowly until the time of the Korean War. During that war the U.S. bought heavily from Japan, thus spurring Japanese economic recovery. Although some of the allies,

particularly the Soviet Union, demanded the removal of Japanese plants as reparations, this was done only on a very limited basis.¹⁷⁹

Meanwhile, the old Japanese Empire was dismembered. Taiwan, Manchuria, and the Pescadores Islands reverted back to China. Southern Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands were given to the Soviet Union to occupy or administer. The U.S. occupied the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, as well as the Bonin, Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands. The Japanese Empire was thus reduced to the home islands.

General MacArthur suggested the conclusion of an allied peace treaty with Japan as early as March of 1947. However, other U.S. civilian and military leaders were concerned over the civil war in China and the Communist regime in North Korea. They saw Communism gradually expanding in East Asia, and an unarmed Japan lying in the path of this expansion. Therefore, the U.S. did not want to give up its bases in Japan. However, by the spring of 1950 both the U.S. and Japanese people were getting tired of the Occupation. In addition, some U.S. leaders were already favoring Japanese rearmament and the recruitment of Japan as a U.S. ally against the world Communist Movement. Britain, acting on behalf of the Commonwealth, had begun suggesting the conclusion of a treaty during early 1949. The U.S. had been stalling on the matter because it feared that the Soviet Union would attempt to create a deadlock at the peace conference, and because it was uncertain which Chinese representatives it should invite. Further, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to a peace treaty because this might mean giving up bases there.¹⁸⁰

On May 18, 1950 President Truman appointed John Foster Dulles as Special Consultant to draft a peace treaty proposal. He worked out a seven-point position paper concerning the treaty, which included continued

U.S. use of bases in Japan. The paper also suggested that the U.S. not invite Chinese Communist representatives to the conference, and that a treaty be concluded with or without Soviet consent. The position paper was accepted by both the State and Defense Departments.¹⁸¹ Dulles regarded the Peace Treaty as part of a "package deal" which Japan would have to accept. The deal included a separate peace treaty between Japan and the Chinese Nationalist Government, and a U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty.¹⁸²

On January 10, 1951 Dulles was appointed Ambassador-At-Large and given instructions to implement his position paper. By midsummer of 1951 the U.S. had persuaded its former allies, except Communist China and the Soviet Union, of the necessity of a peace conference. Representatives of 55 states were invited to attend the conference in San Francisco during September 1951. Of these, Burma, India, and Yugoslavia chose not to attend. Communist China was not invited. The Soviet representative, as predicted, objected to the treaty on the grounds that it did not restrict future Japanese rearmament and that it did not adequately guarantee Japanese democratic institutions. However, the Soviet objections were voted down by a majority of the other participants. As a result, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia refused to sign the document. Japan and the other 48 states signed the treaty on September 8, 1951.¹⁸³ Article 5 of the treaty recognized that Japan possessed "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense". Article 6 stated that all "occupation" troops would be removed from Japan within 90 days after the treaty came into force. However, "foreign armed forces" could be stationed in Japan as a consequence of future bilateral or multilateral agreements.¹⁸⁴

On the same day that the Peace Treaty was signed, the U.S. and Japan signed a Security Treaty. This allowed U.S. troops to continue to be

stationed in Japan. They were to be used both to maintain "international peace and security in the Far East" and to protect Japan from invasion. They could also be used to suppress large-scale internal riots or disturbances upon request by the Japanese Government. Japan was to pay part of the cost of stationing the troops there. The Peace and Security Treaties went into effect on April 28, 1952 and the Occupation was officially ended.¹⁸⁵ Upon signing these two treaties, Japan became an ally of the U.S. Significantly, Article 5 of the Peace Treaty stated that Japan was free to rearm. Neither of the two treaties, both of which were imposed by the U.S., mentioned Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The implication of the two treaties was that the U.S. expected Japan to rearm and to become a military ally as well as a political one. The U.S. was to be disappointed in this expectation.

The Patron-Protege Relationship: 1952-1968

With the end of the Occupation, the U.S. and Japan embarked upon what has been described as a "patron-protege relationship."¹⁸⁶ The U.S. expected Japan to become a military and political ally against World Communism. The U.S. also expected Japan to eventually assume a position of economic leadership in East Asia. Japan was willing to be a political ally of the U.S., and to become an economic leader in East Asia, but it dragged its feet on the issue of rearmament. Because of the experience of World War II, Japanese public opinion was opposed both to rearmament and to a constitutional amendment to legalize the armed forces.¹⁸⁷ Japan rearmed gradually due to U.S. pressure. By 1956 the ground forces consisted of six divisions with 160,000 men. The infant navy totalled 19,000 men, and the tiny air force possessed 11,500 men. By 1955 the LDP only held a majority of 65 percent in the lower house of the Diet, or one percent

less than the two-thirds majority that would be required to initiate an amendment to Article 9 of the Constitution. The LDP majority has gradually declined since that date, so that such an amendment has not been possible.¹⁸⁸

During the late 1950's Japan began to press for a new Security Treaty which would place Japan and the U.S. on a more equal footing. The new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed in Washington on January 19, 1960. Both parties agreed to settle international disputes by peaceful means, and to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies. Both parties agreed to maintain and develop their capabilities to resist armed attack. Japan was thus committed to the continued growth of the JSDF. Both parties agreed to act together in the event of an armed attack on either party within Japanese administrative jurisdiction. Thus, the U.S. is obliged to defend Japan in the event of an attack, but Japan is not obliged to provide military support if other U.S. Pacific territories are attacked. Japan is only committed to help defend its own territory, which is consistent with its Constitution and the Peace Treaty. Japan again acquiesced in the stationing of U.S. troops in its home islands, and granted the U.S. the right to use and occupy Japanese land, air, and naval bases and facilities. After the treaty had been in force for 10 years, either party could terminate it upon giving one year's notice. In an exchange of notes both parties agreed that major changes in either U.S. troop deployments in Japan, or their equipment, or their use of Japanese facilities would be subject to prior consultation.¹⁸⁹

A Status of Forces Agreement was also signed in Washington on the same day as the treaty. This agreement stipulated the legal rights and obligations of U.S. troops stationed in Japan, and also provided the terms

under which the U.S. was allowed to use or occupy Japanese military and related facilities. Although these facilities were provided to the U.S. free of charge, the U.S. agreed to pay the cost of maintaining its troops in Japan.¹⁹⁰ The treaty has benefited both parties. Because of the U.S. commitment to defend Japan and to provide it with a "nuclear umbrella," Japan has been fortunate. Unlike most states, it has spent an average of less than one percent of its yearly GNP on defense. This has allowed Japan to concentrate on industrial development and foreign trade. This, in turn, has caused Japan to achieve the second largest GNP in the world. The treaty has provided Japan with security against a possible Communist military threat, and has also provided Japan with a special economic relationship with the U.S. The U.S. became the chief trading partner of Japan. As for the advantages to the U.S., Fred Greene observed that:

. . . it helped keep Japan out of Communist control at a time of genuine fear of outside aggression and internal subversion. . . during the 1960's, the United States saw Japan as an effective counterweight to China, the more valuable because it posed no military threat to its neighbors.¹⁹¹

During the period from 1960 through 1968, Japan's total military expenditures gradually increased. However, the expenditures as a percentage of GNP actually decreased. For example, in 1963 Japan's military expenditures totalled one percent of its GNP. But in 1968 Japan's military expenditures only totalled 0.83 percent of its GNP.¹⁹² Much of these expenditures were for surplus U.S. weapons and equipment. These weapons included obsolete U.S. tanks and Korean War vintage fighter aircraft. In 1967 the ground forces totalled 170,000 men organized into 13 divisions. The navy possessed 230 ships, of which the largest were several destroyer escorts.¹⁹³ Thus, protected by its alliance with the U.S., Japan had not devoted much effort towards increasing its military capabilities.

Meanwhile, from the beginning of the Korean War through 1968 Japan's economy continued to improve. The Korean War was the prime initiator of Japan's economic recovery because of the large-scale purchases by the U.S. of Japanese supplies and services. During 1955 there was a world-wide economic boom which further boosted Japan's economy. During the 1960's, Japan's GNP rose at an average of 10 percent per year. In 1963 Japan's GNP was estimated to be \$123.2 billion; by 1968 this had grown to approximately \$209.8 billion (constant dollars).¹⁹⁴

Since Japan possesses very few natural resources, it sought inexpensive foreign sources of raw materials. Many of these raw materials come from the Southeast Asian states, and Japan exports finished goods to the region. During the 1960's, Japan became the leading trading partner of the Southeast Asian states. However, as its economy flourished, Japan came under increasing U.S. pressure to assume a role of greater economic leadership in the region. Japan agreed with the U.S. that domestic instability in the Southeast Asian states was caused by a growing nationalism and a growing frustration over rising economic expectations. Japan slowly began to provide these states with long-term private and governmental loans, as well as direct governmental grants. However, as Japan's GNP continued its rapid growth, the U.S. felt that Japan was capable of providing greater economic development aid to these states than it had been doing.¹⁹⁵

During the 1960's Japan's foreign trade grew at an average rate of 17 percent per year. Prior to 1965 Japan had annual deficits in its balance of payments. However, after 1965 Japan achieved annual surpluses. This occurred, to a large extent, because of Japanese domestic economic protectionism. The U.S. was among the Japanese trading partners which were concerned over this. In an effort to assist Japanese economic development,

the U.S. had freely accepted the importation of Japanese goods. About 25 percent of Japan's exports went to the U.S. This was seven times as much as Japan exported to any other state. One-third of Japan's imports came from the U.S., and Japan was the chief market for U.S. agricultural products.¹⁹⁶ However, after 1965 the U.S. began to accumulate an increasing balance-of-trade deficit with Japan. This deficit became a source of friction between the U.S. and Japan during the 1970's.

The Period of U.S.-Japanese Stress: 1969 To The Present

The period of stress in U.S.-Japanese relations began with the Nixon Administration. President Nixon felt that Japan was capable of providing greater political, military, and economic leadership in East Asia than it had done previously. In his 1967 Foreign Affairs article Nixon noted that Japan was the principal Asian economic and industrial power, and that it would soon rank third in the world in this regard. This would eventually force Japan into a position of greater leadership in East Asia. He stated that Japan would probably want a greater military and diplomatic role in maintaining the Asian balance-of-power. In order to build up its military strength, Japan must amend its Constitution. This would require an educational effort on the part of the Japanese Government because the Japanese people were not aware of the state's military needs. He warned Japan that, ". . . it simply is not realistic to expect a nation moving into the first rank of major powers to be totally dependent for its own security on another nation, however close the tie."¹⁹⁷

Thus Nixon came into office in January 1969 determined to force Japan into a more equal East Asian security partnership with the U.S. Nixon wanted Japan to increase its conventional armaments, but he did not want

Japan to become a nuclear power. He expected Japan to be capable of militarily helping the U.S. honor its security commitments in the area around Japan. He also expected Japan to provide more economic aid to the developing Southeast Asian states. Further, Nixon was determined to reverse the unfavorable balance of payments that the U.S. had accumulated with Japan.

On July 25, 1969 President Nixon announced his Guam Doctrine in which he stated that the U.S. would honor its treaty commitments, but that it could not longer be expected to be the world's policeman. To the East Asian states this meant that they should be prepared to rely more on their own resources for defense in the event of a foreign attack. This produced uneasiness in Japan concerning U.S. willingness to honor the Security Treaty, and Prime Minister Sato visited the U.S. during November 1969. The resulting joint communique, issued on November 21st, contained two items that reflected the U.S. pressure on Japan to increase its role in East Asia.

(a) Japan recognized that the security of South Korea and Taiwan was essential to its own security.

(b) Japan stated that it was exploring what role it could play in bringing about stability in the Indochina area.¹⁹⁸

In return for the Japanese concessions, the U.S. agreed to the reversion of Okinawa by 1972. U.S. forces would still have base rights there, but nuclear weapons would not be kept on the island. The amount of Japanese commitment to South Korea and Taiwan was not clear. Fred Greene feels that the statements merely committed Japan to allow the U.S. to use Japanese bases in the event these two states were attacked.¹⁹⁹ He notes that a more concrete commitment would have encountered serious public

opposition. This view is supported by the results of a survey of Japanese public opinion taken during February 1970. Of the respondents, only 27 percent were in favor of an increased Japanese security responsibility for East Asia, and only seven percent were in favor of using the JSDF to help defend South Korea in case it was attacked.²⁰⁰ In the light of Japanese public opinion, the Sato statements on South Korea and Taiwan were probably the best that Nixon could obtain. The Sato statement concerning Japan's exploration of a role in the Indochina area indicated that Japan did not know what it could do to help bring about stability there.

During Sato's visit to the U.S., he and Nixon also discussed U.S.-Japanese trade relations and the U.S. balance of payments deficit. Nixon did not want to resort to higher tariffs or other methods in order to limit Japanese exports to the U.S. Instead, he sought informal commitments whereby the Japanese would themselves limit their exports. By the end of the talks, Nixon had obtained Sato's promise to limit exports, to lower tariffs, and to allow increased U.S. investments in Japan. However, because of the world economic recession during 1970-71, this promise was not kept. Sato's failure to keep his promise contributed to the "Nixon Shocks" of 1971.²⁰¹

During 1970-1971 the U.S trade deficit with Japan was \$3-4 billion.²⁰²

President Nixon was angry at Prime Minister Sato's failure to keep his promises. A few years earlier the U.S. had informally promised Japan that it would inform Japan of any intended changes in its China policy. If Nixon was aware of this promise, he chose not to fulfill it. Thus, Kissinger's preliminary negotiations with the Chinese were kept secret from the Japanese. The announcement of Nixon's intent to visit China in the

future shocked Japan's leaders like a lightning bolt from the blue.²⁰³

Many members of the LDP felt that the U.S. had duped Japan. Japanese confidence in the credibility of the U.S. foreign policy in the Pacific was shaken.²⁰⁴

During August 1971, without any warning to Japan, Nixon took steps to reduce the U.S. balance of trade deficit. The steps included minimal price and wage controls, suspension of the convertibility of the dollar, and a 10 percent surcharge on import duties. This shock, coming one month after the previous one, created great anxiety in Japan.²⁰⁵ As a result of the U.S. pressures Japan revaluated the yen, agreed to limit its exports of man-made fibers and wool to the U.S., and agreed to allow more U.S. imports and investment. During October 1971 the U.S. removed the surcharge.²⁰⁶

However, despite the 1971 Nixon economic measures the U.S. balance of trade deficit with Japan continued to grow. During 1972 this deficit increased to \$4.1 billion, or two-thirds of the total U.S. trade deficit.²⁰⁷ As a result, during early February 1973 the U.S. devalued the dollar by 10 percent in order to reduce the value of its payments to Japan. To further remedy the situation, on February 14th the Japanese Government announced that it would allow the yen to float on the world market and seek its own level. In the Smithsonian Agreement of 1971, Japan had agreed to a minimum exchange rate of 308 yen to the dollar. At the end of February 14th, the first day of floating, the yen had climbed to 264 to the dollar.²⁰⁸ This satisfied the U.S. During the spring of 1973 the Japanese Government announced its intention of reducing exports and increasing imports. It also announced its intention of commencing a five-year program

of "restructuring the archipelago". This was to be a program of increased government spending on health, welfare, housing, and ecological problems.²⁰⁹ Thus the Japanese Government intended to place less emphasis on economic growth.

From January to September 1973 the U.S. trade deficit with Japan sank to \$1.09 billion, and it was predicted that the deficit for the year would be considerably less than half that for 1972.²¹⁰ U.S.-Japanese economic relations would probably have continued to improve, had it not been for the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, and the subsequent Arab embargo of oil to states that were considered to be friendly to Israel. Japan's quota was cut 35 percent. The Japanese Government considered this to be a serious disaster because oil constituted 73.5 percent of Japan's primary energy supply, and 80 percent of the oil came from the Arab states including Iran.²¹¹ The U.S. wanted all of the states affected by the embargo to take a united stand against Arab states. However, the Western European states and Japan refused to do so. This was the first time that Japan had refused to go along with U.S. foreign policy initiatives.

Japan had been experiencing inflation prior to the oil embargo. Because of the oil shortage, the lack of basic materials made from oil, as well as the later high price of oil, the rate of inflation surged up to 50 percent and there was a slump in the GNP growth rate. As a result, Prime Minister Tanaka's programs to "restructure the archipelago" were scrapped. Due to inflation and the price of oil, Japan's international balance of payments went into the red. During 1973 Japan's foreign currency reserves dropped from \$19 billion in February to \$11.6 billion by the end of December, a loss of \$7.4 billion. Japan sought to increase its reserves and pay the additional cost of its oil by launching another

export drive. Despite the increased prices on Japanese goods, the goods were competitive because of the world-wide inflation caused by the increased oil prices.²¹²

Due to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Asia, the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam, and pressure from the U.S., Japan again began to analyze its national defense posture. Japanese defense planners began discussions with the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) as to ways and means of extending Japan's forward interceptive capability by air and sea forces in cooperation with the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The Japanese also were concerned about expanding their antisubmarine warfare capabilities, which would allow them to provide greater protection to their merchant shipping.²¹³ Also of significance, a special LDP study group was established during July 1975 concerned with defense and security.²¹⁴ Such study groups are usually created when new policies are envisioned.

During the same month, the U.S. again told Japan that it needed to update its military armament and plan its defense structure to complement the U.S. forces stationed there.²¹⁵ Much of the talks between President Ford and Prime Minister Miki during August 5-6, 1975 were devoted to the problems of the defense of Japan and South Korea.²¹⁶ During his trip to Japan and South Korea in August 1975 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger pointedly told the Japanese they were not doing enough for their own defense.²¹⁷ As a result, Japan began to restructure its forces and provide them with more modern weapon systems. Most of these new systems are being purchased from the U.S.²¹⁸ Japan's leaders devised a new military doctrine, discussed previously in Chapter III. During July 1976 a Joint Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation was established under the

U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. The subcommittee's purpose was to establish guidelines for joint measures to be taken in case of a foreign attack upon Japan.²¹⁹

In January 1977 Jimmy Carter became President of the U.S. He continued the policies of his predecessors by putting pressure on Japan to increase its military capabilities, to lower its exports to the U.S., and to allow more U.S. imports into Japan.

Japan received a shock in January 1977 when President Carter announced his intention of withdrawing all U.S. ground troops from South Korea over a 4-5 year period. Japan's response was polite disapproval.²²⁰ In October 1977 Japan's ambassador to the U.S. stated that political stability in the Pacific depended primarily upon, "the capacity and will of the United States to maintain the balance of power in that part of the world."²²¹ Prime Minister Fukuda stated in November 1977 that Japan would not take over the U.S. military role in South Korea when the U.S. ground forces were withdrawn.²²² However, considering the Japanese view that stability on the Korean peninsula is essential to Japan's national security, Japan might have come to South Korea's aid in the event of a North Korean invasion. The problem was resolved in 1979 when the U.S. decided to retain its ground forces in South Korea after determining that the size of North Korea's armed forces was greater than originally assessed.

During 1978 and 1979 Japan accelerated its defense spending program, increasing it to 0.9 percent of GNP. This was due to U.S. pressure, to the possibility of the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea, to the growing Soviet naval strength in Northeast Asia, and to China's moral support for further Japanese rearmament.²²³ However, in 1980 the U.S. put even greater pressure on Japan by asking it to spend up to one percent of

GNP on defense.²²⁴ The U.S. also began pressuring Japan to complete its projected defense buildup by the end of fiscal 1983 instead of the planned date of the end of fiscal 1984.²²⁵ Japan stated that it could not afford to spend more, and that if it used the formula for percentage of GNP which is used by the members of NATO members the figure for Japan would be 1.14 percent.²²⁶

In 1981 the Reagan Administration also brought pressure to bear upon Japan to increase its defense spending. During conversations between Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the Director-General of the Japanese Self-Defense Agency, as well as during conversations between President Reagan and Prime Minister Suzuki, Japan was urged to increase its air and naval forces well above the levels planned for 1983. The U.S. also urged Japan to acquire ammunition stocks sufficient for three months instead of two weeks. The Japanese leaders stated that Japan was constrained both by its constitution and by the need to balance military spending with spending for social welfare. However, Japan's leaders made a commitment to increase spending in the 1983-1987 defense plan. Thus, Japan has asked the U.S. to leave the matter pending until planning begins again in 1982.²²⁷ The U.S. is also studying a plan to deploy a theater nuclear force in Asia, including Japan, and intends to have consultations on the plan with Japan once it completed its study of the plan.²²⁸

A second shock to Japan since 1977 has been the U.S. drive to reduce its trade deficit with Japan. Due to a declining economic growth rate in 1976, Japan began a major export drive. In 1977 the U.S. absorbed about 23 percent of Japan's total exports. The Japanese home market was protected from imports by tariffs and a host of rules and regulations. The U.S. warned Japan of rising protectionist sentiment in the Congress, and

demanded that Japan lower its tariffs and reduce its other import impediments.²²⁹ The 1977 U.S. trade deficit with Japan was \$9 billion.²³⁰ In January 1978, after a series of hard-fought negotiations, Japan agreed in principle to lower its tariffs, remove import barriers, and increase imports of U.S. manufactured goods and farm products.²³¹ However, talks on these issues during the summer and fall of 1978 were generally unproductive.²³² In December 1978 a treaty was signed which allowed for increased U.S. farm, forestry, and fishery exports to Japan during 1979-1983.²³³ At the end of the year it was found that the U.S. trade deficit with Japan had increased to \$10.1 billion.²³⁴

In January 1979 the U.S. asked Japan to achieve a higher economic growth rate, stimulate domestic demand, and make the domestic market more open to U.S. imports.²³⁵ The U.S. also threatened to impose surcharges on Japanese goods if Japan did not comply with these requests.²³⁶ The results of negotiations during the spring were termed "wholly inadequate" by the U.S.²³⁷ Then in May Japan agreed to cut tariffs on 1,900 products by 26.3 percent over an eight year period.²³⁸ When Prime Minister Ohira visited the U.S. in May he promised to increase domestic demand and imports.²³⁹ During the fall Japan agreed to limit its textile exports to the U.S.²⁴⁰ Because of the ailing U.S. automobile industry, the U.S. considered a surcharge of imported Japanese automobiles. However, the U.S. decided to request that Japanese automobile companies construct factories in the U.S. so as to employ U.S. workers. During 1980 two companies did so.²⁴¹

Despite Japan's economic concessions to the U.S. in 1979 and 1980, they proved to be more apparent than real. The 1980 U.S. deficit to Japan was \$9.9 billion, which was not a significant decrease from previous years.

The U.S. deficit for 1981 is predicted to be about \$15 billion.²⁴² Protectionist sentiment and exasperation over Japan's failure to increase defense spending is mounting in Congress. Senator Tower, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Director-General Omura in June 1981 that Congress might restrict Japanese imports to the U.S. if Japanese defense spending "does not significantly increase."²⁴³

The Reagan Administration is applying great pressure on Japan to force a relaxation of Japanese unofficial trade barriers. U.S. Trade Representative Bill Brock told an audience of 80 senior Japanese government and corporate officials in September 1981 that there was a consensus among Americans that the trade deficit was a serious political issue. Brock informed his audience that "Japan must open its market much wider" or Japanese imports into the U.S. would probably be restricted. He went on to say that there was, "the widespread perception in America that Japan does not play fairly in the international trading arena."²⁴⁴

Thus, U.S. concern over both Japan's low defense spending and the U.S. trade deficit with Japan has reached the point that the U.S. may take punitive measures against Japan if Japan's present policies do not change significantly. The pressure on Japan that began during the Nixon Administration will apparently reach its peak during the Reagan Administration. If Japan does not make major concessions to the U.S. the future of the U.S.-Japanese alliance may be adversely affected.

Soviet-Japanese Relations

Soviet-Japanese relations since 1945 can be divided into two parts: the period of official hostility between 1945-1956, and the period of normalized relations from 1957 to the present.

The Period Of Official Hostility: 1945-1956

From 1945 to 1954 Soviet-Japanese relations were cool. The U.S.S.R. regarded Japan as a tool of the U.S. and was suspicious of the intent behind Japanese rearmament. Mention has already been made of the fact that the U.S.S.R. refused to sign the 1951 Japanese Peace Treaty. Thus Japan and the U.S.S.R. technically continued in a state of war. The U.S.S.R. also vetoed Japan's admission into the U.N.

During 1954 the U.S.S.R. softened its attitude towards Japan and proposed negotiations leading towards normalized relations. The Japanese eagerly accepted because they desired the return of the southern Kurile Islands, a comprehensive fishing agreement, a trade agreement, Soviet diplomatic recognition, and Soviet support of Japan's entry into the U.N.²⁴⁵ The Soviets probably wanted trade.

Japan's position regarding the Kurile Islands was based upon treaties signed with Czarist Russia. The Japanese-Russian Friendship Treaty of 1855 gave the southern Kuriles to Japan. These include the islets of Habomai and the islands of Shikotan, Kunashiru, and Etorofu, located near the Japanese home island of Hokkaido. The northern Kuriles were acquired by Japan in the Sakhalin-Kurile Exchange Treaty of 1875. By this treaty, Japan gave up its claim to the southern portion of Sakhalin Island in exchange for the northern Kuriles. While Japan is prepared to give up the northern Kuriles, the southern islands are regarded as "inherent Japanese territory."²⁴⁶ All the Japanese political parties, including the Japanese Communist Party, are united on this issue.

Negotiations began in 1955 over a Japan-Soviet peace treaty. When Japan broached the issue of the southern Kuriles, the Soviets stated that negotiations could begin on this issue once a peace treaty was signed.

However, Japan felt that the peace treaty should include a territorial settlement. The treaty negotiations continued. In December 1955 the Soviet Union once again vetoed Japanese admission to the U.N. During the spring of 1956 the Soviets stated that they were willing to agree that Japan had prior claims to the Habomai islets and Shikotan, and that these would be returned when Japan signed the peace treaty. However, the Soviets argued that the islands of Kunashiru and Etorofu were permanent Soviet territory based on the Yalta Agreement. The Japanese were not willing to accept half a loaf, and the negotiations became deadlocked.²⁴⁷

However, the leaders of both states believed that formal diplomatic relations needed to be resumed, and negotiations began again in the fall of 1956. On October 19, 1956 Japan and the Soviet Union signed a Joint Declaration of Peace. This was similar to a formal peace treaty but contained no territorial settlement. The Soviet Union recognized Japan's future claim to the Habomais and Shikotan, but not to Kunashiru and Etorofu. The declaration ended the technical state of war and reestablished diplomatic relations between the two states. Japanese POWs were to be repatriated. Japan declared its regard for the principles of the U.N. Charter, and the Soviet Union agreed to support Japan's admission to the U.N. Both parties promised to strengthen trade relations between their two states. A fisheries agreement had already been signed during March 1956. Japan was admitted to the U.N. during December 1956.²⁴⁸

Japan's desire to continue to negotiate for the return of the southern Kuriles was agreed to by Soviet Premier Bulganin in his welcoming speech to the Japanese delegation that signed the peace declaration.

The Japanese side is not ready to sign a peace treaty. It has now proposed that Japan-Soviet relations be normalized before signing a peace treaty, on condition

that after diplomatic relations are resumed, negotiations will be continued to discuss matters relating to signing a peace treaty, including the territorial issue. We have consented to this wish of the Japanese side.²⁴⁹

The Soviet recognition of Japan's future claims to part of the southern Kuriles, as well as Bulganin's consent to future negotiations over the islands may have been a major concession. Japan's claim to the islands was probably regarded by the Soviets in much the same fashion as its attitude towards the Chinese border claims. That is, any admission by the Soviet Union that territory on its periphery was held improperly would open up a Pandora's Box of territorial claims from all states bordering on the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet offer to return half of the Kuriles claimed by Japan probably indicated great Soviet interest in both a peace treaty and possible future trade relations. Also, the Soviets may have desired to end, once and for all, Japan's territorial claims on the Soviet periphery. They probably felt that, if Japan continued demanding a Soviet territorial readjustment, other states might follow Japan's example.

The Period of Normalized Relations: 1957-The Present

In 1959 the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) reportedly made a commitment to the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Japan and the U.S. were negotiating for a new Security Treaty at the time. Perhaps the JCP thought that it, in conjunction with the other opposition parties, could cause rejection of the new treaty by the Diet and eventually force all U.S. troops to leave Japan. According to the JCP, the CPSU promised in 1959 that if Japan were to scrap the Security Treaty, eject all U.S. troops, become a neutral state not subservient to the U.S., and establish friendly relations with the U.S.S.R., China, and North Korea, then the Soviet Union would adopt a new approach to the southern Kuriles issue.

In other words, if Japan became either a Communist state or a pro-Communist neutral, the Soviet Union would give the southern Kuriles back. The Soviet Government later proposed this in an official statement. However, according to the JCP, once Japan and the U.S. had ratified the new 1960 Security Treaty the CPSU changed its position. The CPSU notified the JCP that the territorial issue was a question "between states" and should not have been discussed by two fraternal political parties. The CPSU and the Soviet Government then returned to their previous position that the Habomais and Shikotan would be returned once Japan signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, and that the other islands were not a subject for negotiation.²⁵⁰

During the 1960s and early 1970s, Japanese-Soviet political and economic relations were poor. The Soviet Union saw no need to change its position concerning the southern Kuriles. If the Soviets had expected extensive trade relations with Japan, this did not materialize. In 1963 only 2.6 percent (\$320 million) of Japan's total trade was with the Soviet Union.²⁵¹ By 1972 Japan's trade with the Soviet Union had grown to \$1.1 billion, but this was still less than three percent of Japan's total trade.²⁵² In 1965 the Soviets began to encourage Japanese investments and technology in developing the resources, especially oil and natural gas, of Siberia and the Soviet Far East. This was the first Soviet offer to anyone for cooperative economic development since the 1920's. The Soviets had noted that Sino-Japanese trade had been increasing and that Japan appeared to be becoming more friendly towards China. The Soviets probably hoped that the offer of joint economic development, which would involve billions of dollars, would wean Japan away from China.²⁵³

However, Japan's suspicion of Soviet good faith and intentions, as well as a desire not to alienate China, made it hesitant to invest.

Meanwhile, during the 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet propaganda castigated Japan over its growing nationalism, its increasing military budget, the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and Japan's delay in ratifying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Because of their own intransigence over the southern Kuriles, the Soviets were particularly sensitive over the U.S. announcement during 1971 of its intention to return Okinawa to Japan. The Soviets were also concerned over a possible future rapprochement between China and Japan, and the eventual establishment of a Chinese-Japanese-U.S. alliance against the U.S.S.R.²⁵⁴

In late 1971, soon after President Nixon announced his intention to visit China, the Soviets announced that Foreign Minister Gromyko would visit Japan during January 1972. Gromyko was in Tokyo for a week and his primary purpose was to clear the way for negotiations over the territorial issue and a peace treaty. Foreign Minister Fukuda attempted to allay Soviet fears over Japanese rearmament and normalization of relations with China. He informed Gromyko that Japan would, "absolutely not become a militarized nation nor a nuclear-holding nation", and that no formula had yet been found for normalizing Sino-Japanese relations. Both parties agreed to begin negotiations on a peace treaty during 1972. The Japanese agreed to drop the return of the southern Kuriles as a precondition of negotiations over a peace treaty, and agreed to discuss the territorial issue during the peace treaty negotiations.²⁵⁵ However, the negotiations broke down over China and the territorial issue.

Prime Minister Tanaka visited Peking during late September 1972. In a joint declaration signed on September 29th, Japan and China agreed

to normalize relations and exchange ambassadors. The Soviet Union took a dim view of this. The Soviet newspaper Izvestia stated that Japanese foreign policy had been heavily influenced in the past by the U.S., and that Japan was now in danger of being used, "as a political tool by China's Maoist rulers". The article went on to state that it was a matter of importance to the Soviet Union whether Japan would now play a role, "in the interest of all Asia and the world or in the interest of Japanese monopolies eager to exploit present trends in China's policy."²⁵⁶ The Soviet stand on the southern Kuriles also hardened. Foreign Minister Ohira visited Moscow on October 21, 1972 to begin discussions on the peace treaty. He saw Premier Kosygin, but Party Secretary Brezhnev refused to see him in order to underscore Soviet displeasure over Japan's moves toward China. The Soviets also refused to change their previous position on the Kuriles. A short statement issued at the end of Ohira's visit stated that discussions on the peace treaty would continue the next year.²⁵⁷

The only positive step in Soviet-Japanese relations during 1972 was the signing of an accord to develop oil and natural gas from Sakhalin Island's continental shelf. Japan was to receive 50 percent of the crude oil produced over a ten-year period. The cost of development estimated at nearly \$1 billion, was to be shared equally.²⁵⁸

The territorial issue also affected Japan's reception of the Soviet Asian collective security proposals. The Soviets broached these proposals during Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Moscow in October 1973. The proposals imply the maintenance of an Asian territorial status quo, and are directed against China. Because of this, Japan cannot endorse them. Therefore Tanaka refused to allow any mention of the Soviet proposals in the

final communique. The communique merely stated that there was an "exchange of views on major problems of the present-day international situation which are of mutual interest."²⁵⁹

During 1974 Japan finally agreed to help finance three major Siberian development projects; Japan offered \$1.15 billion in loans to the U.S.S.R.²⁶⁰

Also during 1974, Brezhnev was scheduled to visit Japan to discuss a number of issues including the return of the southern Kuriles. However, his visit was cancelled. As a result, Foreign Minister Miyazawa visited Moscow during January 1975. Once again, he was rebuffed by the Soviets on the territorial issue.

Brezhnev proposed that Japan and the Soviet Union sign a "good neighbor" treaty, while continuing negotiations towards a peace treaty. Prime Minister Miki answered Brezhnev's proposals on February 13th, stating that a peace treaty could not be concluded until there was a territorial settlement, and that a good neighbor treaty must follow the signing of a peace treaty.²⁶¹

Meanwhile, Japan and China continued to negotiate over a peace treaty. China had stipulated that the treaty must include an antihegemony clause. Such a clause was clearly aimed at the Soviet Union. Not only were the Soviets concerned over the antihegemony clause, they were concerned that a Sino-Japanese peace treaty would enable China to acquire greater access to Japanese technical, industrial and financial resources. The Soviets wanted greater access to these themselves and had failed to achieve it because of their refusal to give back the southern Kuriles. By late 1975 the Soviets were apparently afraid that China and Japan were close to reaching an agreement. Thus, the Soviets decided to compromise somewhat over the islands. Gromyko arrived in Tokyo during January 1976 to discuss the matter with Foreign Minister Miyazawa. On January 11th Gromyko stated

that the Soviet Union would return the Habomais and Shikotan if Japan would sign a good neighbor treaty with the U.S.S.R. instead of a peace treaty; Miyazawa refused Gromyko's offer.²⁶² In September 1977 Japan's new foreign minister, Hatoyama, met with Gromyko at the U.N. Hatoyama repeated the Japanese position that a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty was not possible until the territorial issue was settled. However, the Soviet position had stiffened: Gromyko replied that the territorial issue was settled. In other words, the U.S.S.R. was not prepared to give up any of the islands.²⁶³

The Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed on August 12, 1978 and contained an antihegemony clause. However, another clause said that the treaty was not intended to affect either state's relations with a third state. Japan had insisted upon the inclusion of this clause so as to pacify the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Sonoda said in a television interview that Japan did not define any particular state as seeking hegemony.²⁶⁴ Although the U.S.S.R. officially had no objections to the treaty, Soviet leaders privately stated their misgivings.²⁶⁵ The Soviets had made vague threats of retaliation and dangled various joint economic projects before the Japanese to persuade them to drop the negotiations, but the Japanese had refused to be swayed. Japanese officials believed that there would be no serious repercussions because the U.S.S.R. needed Japan's investment loans and industrial technology.²⁶⁶

Japan now sought to mend its fences with the U.S.S.R. through trade and loans. In 1977 Soviet-Japanese trade totalled \$3.35 billion, and Japan was the Soviet Union's second greatest trading partner.²⁶⁷ This trade totalled \$3.9 billion in 1978.²⁶⁸ In addition, the Soviet Union

received nearly \$1.5 billion in development loans from Japan's Export-Import Bank.²⁶⁹ Total Soviet-Japanese trade increased in 1979 to over \$4 billion.²⁷⁰

However, Japanese-Soviet political relations became cool due to Soviet military moves that probably occurred as a result of the Sino-Japanese treaty. The southern Kuriles had been garrisoned by about 2,000 Soviet troops. In May 1978, before the Sino-Japanese treaty was signed, The U.S.S.R. began to enlarge the islands' garrison.²⁷¹ By the fall of 1979 the islands were reportedly garrisoned by a Soviet division of 10,000 troops with 260 tanks, SAM's and attack helicopters.²⁷² In addition, the strength of the Soviet Pacific Fleet was increased including the transfer of an aircraft carrier.²⁷³ In February of 1980 the head of the JSDF Agency stated his belief that the U.S.S.R. had moved nuclear weapons to the southern Kuriles.²⁷⁴

These Soviet military moves infuriated Japan's leaders because of Japan's claims to the southern Kuriles. They also increased Japan's anxiety concerning Soviet intentions in the Pacific. However, since the Soviet leaders are themselves concerned about a possible U.S-China-Japan alliance against the U.S.S.R, they probably considered that an increase in the strength of the Pacific Fleet was necessary. Further, the Kuriles form a defensive barrier to the eastern approaches of the big Pacific Fleet base at Vladivostok. Therefore it is understandable that the Soviets decided to increase the strength of the island garrison. Nevertheless, these Soviet moves, as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, have resulted in increasing political tension between Japan and the U.S.S.R.

Japan followed the U.S. lead in imposing trade sanctions on the Soviet Union because of the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Therefore, Japanese-Soviet trade did not decrease in 1980, but only grew minimally. The total volume of Japanese-Soviet trade in 1979 was \$4.4 billion, while that of 1980 was only \$4.6 billion. As a result, the share of Japanese-Soviet trade in Japan's total foreign trade for 1980 was only 1.7 percent.²⁷⁵ Despite pressure put upon the Japanese Government by Japanese business to ease the trade sanctions against the Soviet Union, the Japanese Government has refused to do so. In July 1981 Japan reaffirmed the policy along with the other participants of the Ottawa Summit Conference.²⁷⁶

Japanese-Soviet political relations were quite cool during 1980 both because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet position concerning the southern Kuriles. There was virtually no Japanese-Soviet political communication during 1980, although each state retained an ambassador in the other's capital. Finally, Soviet Ambassador Polyanski met with Foreign Minister Ito in mid-March 1981 and Japanese Ambassador Uomoto met with Foreign Minister Gromyko at the end of April. The talks concerned the increase in Soviet military forces in East Asia and the status of the southern Kuriles. However, the Soviet officials reportedly only reiterated the past Soviet stand on these issues.²⁷⁷

Although Japan has attempted in the past to divorce commerce from politics, Japan has been unable to do this with regard to the Soviet Union. Further, the fact that Japan clearly favors China over the Soviet Union in its commercial dealings must infuriate the Soviet leaders. However, so long as the Soviet Union refuses to make any significant concessions concerning the southern Kuriles, no major breakthrough in Japanese-Soviet

commercial and political affairs appear to be possible. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union is still a major trading partner of Japan and much of Japan's food, namely fish, comes from Soviet waters. Thus, although Japan may favor China over the Soviet Union, Japan is wary of being drawn into the Sino-Soviet antagonism.

Sino-Japanese Relations

This discussion of Sino-Japanese relations will be divided into two parts: the period of hostility from 1945 to 1971 and the period of normalized relations from 1972 to the present.

The Period of Hostility: 1945-1971

Between 1945 and the end of the U.S. occupation of Japan in 1952, Japanese foreign policy was formulated by the U.S. This included Japan's relations with China. Mao feared a possible rearmament of Japan under U.S. auspices, and a possible joint U.S.-Japanese invasion of the mainland to restore the Nationalists to power. This was the reason Mao sought an alliance with the U.S.S.R.²⁷⁸

Neither of the rival Chinese governments were invited to the Japanese Peace Conference in 1951; the Peking Government declared that it was not bound by the treaty. On April 28, 1952, by direction of the U.S. Government, Japan signed a separate peace treaty with the Nationalist Government on Taiwan. In doing so, Japan extended diplomatic recognition to the Nationalist Government and also accepted that government's claim to sovereignty over the Chinese mainland. The Peking Government, of course, was incensed.²⁷⁹ Since Japan was an ally of the U.S., and since the U.S. was now committed to defending Taiwan against the Communists, the Chinese leaders were afraid that Japan was also committed to the defense of

Taiwan.²⁸⁰ Thus, China saw itself potentially threatened by a possible U.S.-Japanese invasion of the mainland, as well as blocked in any future attempts to conquer Taiwan by a U.S. defense commitment and possibly by one on the part of Japan. This, added to the Chinese hatred caused by Japan's actions during World War II, as well as the Marxist ideology of the Chinese leaders, explains their dislike of Japan and their suspicion of Japanese intentions during the 1950's and 1960's.

Japan, however, was attempting to rebuild its economy and was seeking to trade with China. China expected to carry on most of its foreign trade with other Communist states, especially the Soviet Union. However, China wanted to obtain Japanese diplomatic recognition, to cause a rupture of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and to induce Japan to give up any defense commitment that it might have towards Taiwan. Therefore China was willing to have at least minimal trade relations with Japan. In doing so, China adopted the tactic of "people's diplomacy". This meant that contracts signed by Japanese firms would include political clauses which China hoped would embarrass the Japanese Government and create internal pressure upon that government to confer diplomatic recognition upon the Chinese Government. China would only trade with "friendly" Japanese companies which were willing to sign such contracts.²⁸¹ Thus Japan followed its policy of separating trade from politics while, for China, trade was a political weapon.

In addition to attempting to use Japanese business firms to apply pressure upon the Japanese Government, the Chinese Communist Party also attempted to subvert the Japanese socialist and other leftist-oriented opposition parties. China's leaders hoped to eventually cause the collapse of LDP power. The Chinese believed that this would result in the creation

of a Socialist government or a leftist coalition government which would dissolve the U.S.-Japanese alliance and become friendly with the Communist states.

Sino-Japanese trade commenced during 1953, but at a low level. China received only 0.4 percent of Japan's exports during that year.²⁸²

During 1954 China put forward proposals to improve relations, but the proposals were too hard for Japan to swallow. China refused to sign any type of peace agreement unless Japan severed its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Japan could not do this without alienating the U.S. and endangering the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Since Japan was not prepared to do this, the talks with China broke down.²⁸³ Sino-Japanese trade continued until 1958 when it too ceased. On May 2, 1958 a young Japanese rightist tore down a Chinese flag which had been illegally placed above a Chinese stamp exhibit in a Nagasaki department store by the Chinese trade mission. China demanded an official apology and, when one was not forthcoming, cut off all trade with Japan.²⁸⁴

In 1960 China's Great Leap Forward collapsed and the virulence of the ideological dispute caused a slackening of Sino-Soviet trade. As a result of China's desire for foreign technology, Sino-Japanese trade commenced again on a limited scale. By 1961 Japan's trade with China had increased to \$137 million, or 1.1 percent of Japan's total world trade.²⁸⁵ In 1962 a private Japanese trade delegation negotiated a five-year trade agreement with the Chinese Government. This trade was to total \$180 million per year.²⁸⁶

During November 1964 Eisaku Sato became Japan's new Prime Minister. Sato wanted to improve political and trade relations with South Korea, which had been poor since the end of World War II. Sato was also more

vocally anti-Communist than his predecessor. As a result, he was heartily disliked by China's leaders. In addition, China's leaders were opposed to closer Japanese and South Korean economic and political relations. In June 1965, when Japan and South Korea signed a friendship treaty, China began a propaganda barrage against Japan. This continued with varying intensity until late 1971 when the Chinese became aware of Sato's intention of leaving office.²⁸⁷

In the Nixon-Sato Communique of November 1969 Japan recognized that the security of South Korea and Taiwan were essential to its own security. This probably meant that Japan would allow the U.S. to use Japanese bases in the event either state were attacked. However, the Chinese leaders interpreted the statement as implying a definite Japanese commitment to help defend both states. In particular, the Chinese leaders were incensed over the implied Japanese commitment towards Taiwan. President Nixon's Guam Doctrine issued earlier during the same year, had implied a significant withdrawal of U.S. forces from East Asia. The Chinese leaders interpreted the Communique as signifying Japan's willingness to accept U.S. defense responsibilities after U.S. forces were withdrawn. As a result, Chinese propaganda attacks against Japan increased in virulence. Japan was accused of seeking to develop nuclear weapons and of rearming in order to commit aggression.²⁸⁸

The Period of Normalized Relations: 1972 to the Present

The Nixon Administration's efforts to normalize relations with China, the growing Soviet military threat to China, and the Chinese desire to divert Japanese trade and investment from the Soviet Union caused a softening of the Chinese attitude towards Japan.²⁸⁹ During the fall of

1971 the anti-Japanese propaganda barrage softened considerably. After President Nixon's visit to Peking, Prime Minister Sato also sought to normalize relations with China. However, he was too strongly identified with the pro-Taiwan elements of the LDP. Therefore, his overtures were met with open hostility on the part of the Chinese leaders.²⁹⁰ Sato wanted to remain in office until Okinawa reverted back to Japanese jurisdiction, and he considered the reversion of Okinawa to be one of the major accomplishments of his administration. After discussions with other LDP leaders, it was decided that Sato should resign after the reversion of Okinawa and that a new Prime Minister should be selected who would be more acceptable to the Chinese leaders.

Okinawa reverted to Japanese jurisdiction on May 15, 1972. Sato resigned the next month and the LDP factional leaders selected Kakuei Tanaka to succeed him. Tanaka was known to be acceptable to the Chinese leaders and also favored a foreign policy which was more independent of the United States.²⁹¹ The main impetus in Japan for normalizing relations with China came from the business leaders. These leaders were afraid that, unless Japan acted quickly, U.S. business firms would obtain preferred treatment in future Chinese economic relations with the industrialized states.²⁹² In 1971 China had listed three conditions which Japan must accept in order for normalization of relations to occur:

- (a) The Peking Government was the legitimate government of all China.
- (b) Taiwan was a part of China.
- (c) The peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan was illegal, and Japan must abrogate it.²⁹³

The Chinese conditions were acceptable to a majority of the LDP leaders, as well as business leaders, as a basis for negotiations. Some Japanese

officials were quoted as saying that they no longer regarded either the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty or the Nixon-Sato Communique as obligating Japan to contribute to the security of Taiwan.²⁹⁴

However, there was still a powerful pro-Taiwan group of about 91 members within the LDP.²⁹⁵ Also, Japan's total trade with Taiwan was still greater than that with China, and both LDP and business leaders did not want to sever commercial relations with Taiwan. In addition, Japanese leaders did not want to offend the U.S. They also hoped that Peking would accept tacit nullification of the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty through Japan's signing a future peace treaty with China.²⁹⁶

During July 1972 Zhou Enlai informed a visiting Japanese Socialist Party leader that China's leaders would be receptive to a visit by Tanaka. Tanaka was duly informed and indicated that he would be willing to visit China during late September or early October.²⁹⁷ The LDP and business leaders did not expect quick Japanese political recognition of China. Instead, they expected a lengthy period of bargaining in which Japan would refuse to recognize the Peking Government until Japan received definite commitments from China as to the amount and type of natural resources it would obtain, and as to what percentage of total Chinese trade Japan could expect to obtain.²⁹⁸

On August 31st Tanaka met with Nixon in Honolulu. This meeting reportedly occurred at the request of the U.S., which was afraid that new Japanese diplomatic moves with China might endanger the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. The two leaders promised that the treaty would continue in effect despite the fact that it was originally aimed more at China than at the Soviet Union. Thus, Japan's new relationship with China was to be

circumscribed by U.S. security interests in East Asia. At the conclusion of the talks, Tanaka received Nixon's blessings to proceed.²⁹⁹

On September 25th Tanaka left Tokyo for Peking. The official Communiqué resulting from Tanaka's visit was issued on September 29, 1972. This must have come as a shock to the pro-Taiwan members of the LDP because Tanaka was later reported to have created "anger" within the LDP as a result of his diplomatic initiatives in Peking.³⁰⁰ The Communiqué clearly stated that Tanaka came at the invitation of Zhou Enlai and that the visit had received the blessing of Chairman Mao. Japan apologized for the damage caused to China during World War II, accepted the Peking Government as the sole legal government of China, and included Taiwan as part of China. China renounced any demand for war indemnities against Japan. China apparently accepted the Japanese view that the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty would be annulled by any subsequent Sino-Japanese peace treaty, because the Communiqué only stated that both parties agreed to hold negotiations aimed at concluding such a treaty. Both parties renounced the use of force in settling any problem between them, and agreed to conduct their relations based upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Embassies were to be established in both capitals. There was an antihegemony clause which stated that, "The normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third countries. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony." Commerce between the two parties was given as one of the primary purposes of normalizing relations. Both parties agreed to enter into negotiations over treaties concerning aviation, fishing, navigation, and trade.³⁰¹

The Chinese leaders were no doubt aware of the discussions between Tanaka and Nixon during August-September 1972, and they were probably willing to normalize relations with Japan because of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. Thus, by 1972 the Chinese leaders probably regarded this alliance as a factor which would both retard the growth of Soviet influence in the East Asian region and possibly keep Japan from developing nuclear weapons. The shift in China's attitude towards both Japanese rearmament and the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty was illustrated by remarks allegedly made by Zhou to Tanaka during the latter's visit. The press was informed that Tanaka tried to reassure Zhou that Japan's rearmament plans were solely concerned with the defense of the home islands. Zhou is said to have replied that he welcomed "a reasonable growth" of Japanese military strength to help counter the Soviet Union's "aggressive designs" in Asia. He reportedly went even further and stated that, in the event the Soviet Pacific Fleet were deployed on a regular basis south of the Korean Strait and into the East China Sea, or in the event of a Soviet attack on Japan, he could "visualize a situation" in which China would come to Japan's aid, even alongside U.S. forces.³⁰² Zhou's statement can be interpreted as meaning that China expected Japan to continue to rearm conventionally, and that China would not be willing to stand by and see Japan's industrial capacity either conquered or demolished by the Soviet Union. The Japanese Government later officially denied that the conversation had occurred.³⁰³

During 1973 China publicly approved of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. On October 12th Chinese Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei granted an interview to a visiting group of members of the Japanese Diet. During the interview Ji remarked that it was quite natural for Japan to maintain the security treaty with the U.S. since Japan lacked sufficient self-defense

capacity, and that it would not be realistic for Japan to currently abrogate the treaty. He said, however, that it would be desirable for Japan to eventually become capable of defending itself. He also ruled out the possibility of a revival of militarism in Japan.³⁰⁴

The immediate result of the normalization of relations between Japan and China was that Japan withdrew its diplomatic recognition of the government on Taiwan. However, trade continued between Japan and Taiwan without Chinese criticism, and the Japanese Embassy in Taipei was converted into a liaison office. Trade between Japan and China soared. In 1972 the total trade between Japan and China was \$1.1 billion, and increase of 22 percent over the previous year. But in 1973 total Sino-Japanese trade was \$2.0 billion, an increase of 83 percent over 1972. Price increases accounted for much of this expansion, but there was considerable genuine growth because the economics of both states complemented each other.³⁰⁵

Tanaka returned to Tokyo to face the wrath of the pro-Taiwan group within his party. Presented with a fait accompli, the LDP as a whole was forced to accept the normalization of relations. However, the pro-Taiwan group tried to thwart Japanese moves on the aviation, navigation, and fisheries treaties referred to in the communique. Nevertheless, the treaties were signed during 1974 and 1974.

Foreign Minister Ohira flew to Peking to begin discussions on a Sino-Japanese treaty during January of 1974. Discussions on the treaty continued erratically throughout 1974 and finally broke down during February 1975. The primary cause of this failure was the Chinese desire to incorporate verbatim into the proposed treaty the antihegemony clause, Article 7 of the 1972 communique. Japan objected to the inclusion of an antihegemony

clause into the treaty because it felt that this would clearly be directed against the Soviet Union. Japanese-Soviet relations had not deteriorated to the low point they were to reach during the Prime Ministership of Tadeo Miki, and Japanese leaders entertained hopes of Soviet concessions over the disputed Kurile Islands. Thus, with Japan's polite refusal concerning the inclusion of any antihegemony clause, the treaty discussions broke down.³⁰⁶

Part of the impasse over the inclusion of an antihegemony clause in the proposed Sino-Japanese peace treaty was broken as a result of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's conversations with Prime Minister Miki during January 1976. Gromyko attempted to put pressure on Miki not to conclude such a treaty. Miki lost his temper and told Gromyko that a Sino-Japanese peace treaty was not the business of third parties. During a press conference held soon after Gromyko left Japan, Miki publicly announced that he would be willing to sign a peace treaty with China that contained an anti-hegemony clause.³⁰⁷ Thus Japan was on record as being willing to accept in principle the inclusion of an antihegemony clause in the proposed treaty.

However, the contents of such a clause were subject to negotiation. China took the position that Japan must at least accept in principle the view that the antihegemony clause referred to the Soviet Union.³⁰⁸ The Japanese position was that the clause:

- (a) Should not be directed against any specific third party,
- (b) Should not require any joint action by Japan and China,
- (c) Should be strictly in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter,

- (d) And should apply not just to East Asia, but to the entire world.³⁰⁹

Since neither state would compromise, part of the impasse concerning the clause remained.

Nevertheless, a Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty was eventually signed on August 12, 1978. Three factors probably contributed the most to the treaty's final conclusion: the desire of China's leaders for a treaty; the desire of the new Japanese Prime Minister and a majority of the LDP Diet members for a treaty; and the increasing growth of Sino-Japanese trade.

Fukuda became prime minister in December 1976 and began a campaign to persuade the LDP opponents of the treaty to accept it. He sought a consensus but failed to achieve it.³¹⁰ Judging by later events, he apparently finally decided to continue the treaty negotiations with only majority support from within his party.

Meanwhile, Sino-Japanese trade increased greatly. Total trade for 1977 was \$3.5 billion, an increase of 14.9 percent over 1976.³¹¹ China and Japan signed a long-term (1978-1985) trade agreement during February 1978. Each state expected to export about \$10 billion in goods to the other. This figure was later increased.³¹²

During March of 1978 China formally acceded to Japan's wishes on the antihegemony clause. A vice chairman of the National People's Congress had an interview with a visiting group of the Japanese Komeito Party and handed them a four-point position paper. The points were:

- (a) China still wished to conclude a treaty with Japan.
- (b) China did not feel that the treaty would be directed against any third party.
- (c) To take an antihegemonic position did not mean that the two states should take joint action against hegemony, since both states had their own foreign policies.

(d) China considered that there was no obstacle to the resumption of treaty negotiations and hoped that Fukuda would make a decision soon.³¹³

On March 18th the Director-General of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau told the Diet that diplomatic talks with China on resuming formal treaty negotiations were proceeding smoothly.³¹⁴ The talks were threatened by the Sino-Japanese dispute over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands during April, but China apologized and the incident was declared closed.³¹⁵

In early May Foreign Minister Sonoda met with Secretary of State Vance. Among other things, Sonoda briefed Vance on the Japanese Government's desire for an early signing of a peace and friendship treaty with China. Vance replied that the U.S. approved of Japan's move towards China.³¹⁶

Formal negotiations on the treaty began during July 1978, and it was signed on August 12th. The treaty was similar to the 1972 Communique in that it contained both an antihegemony clause and a clause stating that the treaty would not affect either party's relations with other states. All disputes between the two parties were to be settled by peaceful means. Economic and cultural relations between the two states were to be expanded.³¹⁷ The Diet ratified the treaty during October.

Sino-Japanese trade has steadily increased since the signing of the treaty. The February 1978 trade agreement was extended by five years in September, and its value was quadrupled.³¹⁸ Total Sino-Japanese trade for 1978 was \$5 billion, an increase of 13 percent over 1977.³¹⁹ In May 1979 Japanese banks agreed to give a \$2 billion regular loan and a \$6 billion short-term loan to China for plant construction and other projects. Japan's Export-Import Bank later offered China \$2 billion for the development of

natural resources.³²⁰ China also became a major supplier of oil to Japan. Total Sino-Japanese trade for 1979 was \$6.2 billion, while the total trade for 1980 has been tentatively assessed at \$8.7 billion. Japanese imports of Chinese oil in 1980 were double those of 1979. Because of the heavy Japanese purchasing of Chinese oil, Japan's trade surplus with China decreased from \$1 billion in 1978 to \$0.75 billion in 1979. This surplus was expected to decrease to \$0.3 billion for 1980.³²¹ China has become the fourth largest market for Japan's goods and is the sixth most important importer of goods into Japan.³²²

In 1981 China's leaders discovered that China's economy was not as healthy as they had at first been led to expect. Therefore they began a policy of economic retrenchment and told Japan that some of the projects might have to be deferred. However, Japan offered to extend China another \$1.3 billion in economic assistance so that first-phase construction of the two major projects could begin.³²³

The contrast between Japan's economic relations with China and its economic relations with the U.S.S.R. are marked. The estimated volume of Sino-Japanese trade for 1980 is 48 percent greater than the volume of Soviet-Japanese trade for the same year. Japan has been quite liberal in its loans to China, while it has been cautious in providing loans to the Soviet Union.

In foreign affairs Japan has also tilted somewhat towards China. Japan was very restrained in its criticism of China's invasion of Vietnam while Japan severely castigated the U.S.S.R. for its invasion of Afghanistan and stated its intent of increasing aid to Pakistan.³²⁴ Thus, the Soviet leaders probably cannot help but believe that an entente exists between China and Japan, and that a larger entente exists between China, Japan and the U.S. against the Soviet Union. This means that both Japan

and the Soviet Union will continue to be intransigent over the Kuriles, and that both economic and political relations between the two states will continue to be cool.

Indo-U.S. Relations

The two major leaders of India since it received its independence from Britain in 1947 have been Pandit Nehru and his daughter Mrs. Gandhi. Both have been strong prime ministers and major shapers of Indian foreign policy. Therefore this section will be divided into three parts: the Nehru years; the Gandhi years; and the Janata Government and Mrs. Gandhi.

The Nehru Years: 1947-1964

From the time of independence through 1949 there was considerable goodwill between the U.S. and India. During World War II the U.S. had put pressure upon Britain to grant India its independence as soon as possible after the war. Thus the U.S. pressure had been one factor contributing to Britain's decision to grant independence to India. During the 1947-1949 time period the U.S. was sympathetic to India's problems of economic and political development and wished the new democracy well. However, during this time period the U.S. was also preoccupied with European security problems.

Once the U.S. again began to be involved in Asian affairs Indo-U.S. relations worsened. Despite Nehru's avowed policy of non-alignment, India was a democratic state and U.S. leaders expected that India would view the world as the U.S. saw it. At the very least, U.S. leaders expected that India would give U.S. policies the benefit of the doubt. However, from the time of the beginning of the Korean War India has generally disagreed with U.S. foreign policy initiatives.

When North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950 India at first took the position that this was a civil war. India supported the U.N. resolution of June 1950 which stated that a breach of the peace had occurred in Korea. However, India was fearful that U.S. activities in Korea would lead to a general Asian war, and that India might be dragged into it. This would hinder India's economic development plans by diverting funds and resources. India never became a full-fledged participant in the U.N. command, and continually criticized U.S. actions.³²⁵

U.S. annoyance with India's attitude towards U.S. actions in Korea was reflected in the lengthy Congressional debate over a shipment of emergency wheat to India during 1951. India was suffering from a food shortage and had requested aid. Many Congressmen took the attitude that, "those who are not with us are against us."³²⁶ After several weeks of debate, the U.S. agreed to send India two million tons of wheat. However, the lengthy debate and the disparaging remarks made by some U.S. congressmen and journalists had hurt India's pride. The U.S. later agreed to provide economic aid to India under President Truman's Point Four Program. Indo-U.S. relations suffered further when India gave equal praise to both the U.S. wheat shipment of two million tons and a Soviet shipment of 500,000 tons. However, U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles worked to mollify the leaders of both states.³²⁷

The U.S. was further irritated by India's attitude towards the new Communist government in China. India extended recognition to the new government in the spring of 1950 and was one of the first states to do so. Nehru pointed out that the Communists had de facto control of the Chinese mainland. He stated that he was not interested in that government's politics, but was only interested in the fact that it existed.³²⁸ During the early 1950's many Indian leaders did not even believe that the new

Chinese Government was Communist. For example, in a speech in New Delhi during October of 1951 the Indian Ambassador to Peking said that the Chinese Government was not Communist, but consisted of a coalition which was engaged in implementing a social revolution.³²⁹ Indian leaders admired China's ability to carry out an economic development program and seemed to ignore the Chinese Government's political repression.³³⁰ From 1950 until the Sino-Indian War of 1962 India was the leading champion of the replacement of the Taipei Government in the U.N. by the Peking Government. Thus Indian policies towards China were in conflict with those of the U.S. during the 1950s. Until 1962, India regarded China as an essentially non-aggressive state while the U.S. fashioned a system of alliances to contain perceived Chinese expansionist policies.³³¹

India was opposed to the U.S.-sponsored mutual security arrangements in Asia. Indian leaders felt that a system of alliances would antagonize the Soviet Union and China and would eventually result in a war which the alliances had been designed to prevent. Nehru was particularly opposed to the SEATO arrangement which was signed on September 8, 1954. He said that the agreement smelled of colonialism because it allowed white states to meddle in Asian affairs. He also felt that Pakistan had now gained the U.S. as a military ally against India.³³² He later claimed that Pakistan's membership in SEATO had caused it to be intransigent over the issue of Kashmir, and that India had been forced to become intransigent also. He also stated that U.S. arms aid to Pakistan had forced India to spend money on arms that was badly needed for economic development. Since India had not had enough money for economic development, Nehru claimed, India had been forced to ask the U.S. and U.S.S.R. for economic aid.³³³ U.S. military aid to Pakistan has continued to adversely affect Indo-U.S. relations.

Throughout the 1950's and early 1960's India criticized the U.S. for using a diplomacy of intimidation and exercise of military strength in its dealings with the Communist states and the Third World. The U.S. was criticized for its continuing involvement in Indochina after 1954, for its roles in the Suez and Hungarian Crises, for its use of military force in Lebanon and Jordan, for its role in the Congo Crises of 1960 and 1964, and for its intervention in Guatemala and Cuba.³³⁴

On the other hand, the U.S. was also critical of India during the 1950's. U.S. leaders felt that India was "soft" on the Soviet Union and China, and they felt that non-alignment was a misguided policy. For example, on June 9, 1956 Dulles stated in a speech that neutrality in a Cold War environment is, ". . . an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, is an immoral and short-sighted conception."³³⁵ In a speech in Manila on July 4, 1956 Vice President Nixon asked, "How can we feel toward those who treat alike nations that believe in God and honor, religion and morality, and nations that boast of atheism and the rule of force and terror alone?"³³⁶ U.S. leaders felt that India should not have allowed China to annex Tibet without a struggle. India took the position that China had been the historic suzerain of Tibet, and that India was in no position to do anything about the annexation anyway.³³⁷ U.S. leaders noted Indian sponsorship of China in the U.N. and at Asian non-aligned conferences, and Indian respect for China's economic development program.³³⁸

U.S. leaders were irritated that India was highly critical of U.S. actions towards the Communist states and the Third World, while any Indian criticism of similar Soviet actions was quite mild.³³⁹ However, U.S. leaders also observed that Indian leaders justified their requests for large loans from the West with the argument that if India did not receive these

loans, the democratic government would be swept away by a Communist revolution.³⁴⁰ U.S. leaders noted that, although Nehru consistently called for the renunciation of force and for world disarmament, Indian troops were used to occupy some of the princely states and India's military budget increased every year. Indian leaders argued that the use of force in the princely states, Kashmir, and later in ejecting the Portuguese from Goa, were domestic matters and the completion of a national struggle for unity.³⁴¹ Finally, U.S. leaders were irritated by India's moral condemnation of U.S. international actions.³⁴²

Despite India's continuing criticism of U.S. foreign policy during the 1950's and early 1960's, the U.S. provided large amounts of food and economic aid to India. In terms of population, India is the world's largest democracy. It is adjacent to China, the world's most populous Communist state. Both are engaged in economic and political development, and China portrays itself as the model for the economic and political development of the Third World. U.S. leaders sought to use India as the democratic model for the Third world. In addition, U.S. leaders believed that Indian democracy must not be allowed to be swept away by a Communist revolution, or the world balance of power would be upset in favor of the Communist states.³⁴³

From 1950 to 1971, when U.S. aid to India ceased for a time, the U.S. provided India with approximately \$10 billion in assistance. This was the largest amount of economic assistance ever given by the U.S. to any state. Fifty percent of the aid was in concessional wheat sales and grants to help India feed its people during periodic famines. Forty percent of the aid was in the form of development loans for such projects as energy generation, agricultural and industrial development, health care, and family planning programs. The remaining ten percent consisted of technical assistance

grants.³⁴⁴ In 1960 the U.S. and the World Bank established a consortium of states to provide development aid to India. This consortium consisted of the U.S., Britain, Japan, Canada, West Germany, Australia and the World Bank, and began to operate during May-June 1961.³⁴⁵ India also received loans from the International Development Association, an agency of the World Bank, which received 40 percent of its capital from the U.S.³⁴⁶ Thus, in addition to being the principal donor of economic aid to India, the U.S. has also sponsored and/or partially funded other sources of economic aid for India.

When John F. Kennedy became President in 1960, Indo-U.S. relations began to improve. As a senator, Kennedy had been more sympathetic towards India's views and needs than many of his colleagues. He had co-sponsored the Kennedy-Cooper Resolution of 1959 which supported long-term economic aid to India. Kennedy also accepted India's non-alignment status and stated in an article that India, "is the leading claimant for the role of a 'broker' middle state in the larger bipolar struggle; she is also a centerpiece in a 'middle zone' of uncommitted nations extending from Casablanca to Djakarta".³⁴⁹ As President, Kennedy continued to soothe the pride of India's leaders. In addition, Kennedy remained neutral during the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmire in 1961.³⁴⁸

Indo-U.S. relations became considerably warmer as a result of the Sino-Indian War which broke out on October 20, 1962. At the time, the U.S. was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis, but Kennedy did establish a committee to monitor the conflict. He was concerned about the possibility of an all-out war in the subcontinent. He too believed that India should be used as a democratic model for the developing states, and he was afraid

that Chinese victory in a subcontinental war would seriously damage India's image in the Third World.³⁴⁹

On October 26th, Nehru sent a personal letter to Kennedy requesting military aid. He stated that he did not want to join an alliance with the U.S., but requested arms on the basis of U.S. sympathy for India's plight. This was the first of 15 letters that Nehru sent Kennedy over a period of six months. Kennedy only provided Nehru with light weapons, but he did send a carrier task force to the Bay of Bengal to provide an air defense for India's cities if the need arose.³⁵⁰

Throughout the conflict India took the view that the U.S. should, and probably would, help India in the event of a major Chinese offensive or the entire subcontinent would be overrun by Communist forces. Kennedy's prompt help to India during the crisis reinforced the Indian view and resulted in warm Indo-U.S. relations until after Nehru's death.³⁵¹ Kennedy and other U.S. leaders probably hoped that, because of the Sino-Indian War, India might now either join SEATO or align itself more closely with the U.S. However, India remained formally non-aligned until 1971. Due to both the U.S. unwillingness to provide India with sophisticated weapons and the Soviet willingness to do so, as well as India's fear of China, India drew closer to the U.S.S.R.

The Gandhi Years: 1964-1977

Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded Nehru as Prime Minister after his death in May 1964. However, Shastri himself died only 18 months later and was succeeded by Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Due to Shastri's limited time in office, the period from 1964-1977 is entitled "The Gandhi Years".

On October 16, 1964 China detonated its first nuclear device. This disturbed India. On the same day President Johnson stated that, even when China had developed an effective nuclear capability, the U.S. would still be willing to come to the aid of states suffering from future Chinese aggression. Two days later he pledged that non-nuclear Asian states, including India, which faced the future threat of nuclear blackmail would receive support from the U.S. Kapur interprets Johnson's statement as meaning that, in the event of a massive Chinese threat to the subcontinent which would upset the Asian balance of power, the U.S. would become involved because its containment policy would also be endangered. However, the U.S. was willing to let the U.S.S.R. play a peace-keeping role concerning Indo-Pakistani tensions.³⁵² Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. warned China not to involve itself in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, and the U.S. tacitly supported Soviet efforts to achieve a ceasefire. Further, the U.S. stopped all military aid to both India and Pakistan.³⁵³

After 1965, generally, the U.S. was not particularly concerned about providing military aid to either Pakistan or India. U.S. leaders saw no point in providing arms to the two states if they were going to use these arms against each other. U.S. leaders also doubted whether these two states would ever fall to Communism anyway. Additionally, there was a growing doubt among members of Congress that military aid was a useful instrument of U.S. foreign policy.³⁵⁴

During the late 1960's relations between the U.S. and India deteriorated. U.S. economic aid decreased because Congress believed that the aid allowed India to use additional funds to buy arms. U.S. food shipments also decreased because U.S. leaders felt that other states should supply a portion of India's agricultural aid needs.³⁵⁵ India's leaders complained

that their state was being neglected by the U.S. which was not really interested in India's problems or views, but was only concerned with keeping Communism out of the subcontinent. They also complained that the U.S. expected the developing states to accept its foreign policy views and actions as a price for U.S. aid.³⁵⁶ Mrs. Gandhi herself appeared to believe that the U.S., through the CIA, was attempting to oust her from power through political involvement and the donation of funds to political opponents. She constantly criticized the U.S. for this, but never provided either proof or specific examples.³⁵⁷ India also refused to bow to U.S. pressure and sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. India's leaders took the position that the treaty discriminated against the non-nuclear states while it did not force the nuclear states to give up any of their nuclear weapons. India was willing to sign the treaty only if the nuclear states agreed to disarm.³⁵⁸

There was also both personal and ideological antipathy between U.S. and Indian leaders. Many members of Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet, as well as her foreign policy advisers, disliked the Capitalist U.S. and were somewhat pro-Soviet in their orientation.³⁵⁹ President Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi did not like each other, and Nixon described her as being "cold-blooded."³⁶⁰ Nixon favored a balance-of-power in the subcontinent, while Mrs. Gandhi sought security from Pakistan by military supremacy. Indian leaders interpreted Nixon's Guam Doctrine as meaning that the U.S. was no longer willing to support India during a military crisis, and had this view confirmed during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Further, during the early 1970's India's leaders noted the growing rapprochement between the U.S. and China. Since both the U.S. and China were allies of Pakistan, India's leaders feared a possible future U.S.-China-Pakistan alliance.³⁶¹ It is interesting

that the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty was signed during November 1971, the month after the announcement of the Kissinger-Zhou talks in Peking.

During the December 1971 Indo-Pakistani War the U.S. declared India to be an aggressor and sent a carrier task force with 2,000 marines to the Bay of Bengal with the implied threat to India of military intervention. However, the war ended before the task force could be used to threaten India.³⁶²

As a result of U.S. actions before and during the 1971 war, Indo-U.S. relations became severely strained. Mrs. Gandhi criticized U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean, and U.S. plans to construct a naval base on Diego Garcia. She felt that U.S. forces in Asia would eventually cause the Soviet Union to send forces into the region and told John Hohenberg that, "one military presence brings about another military presence, which can go on indefinitely."³⁶³ After the war Mrs. Gandhi wanted all major foreign governments, and particularly that of the U.S., to acknowledge Indian supremacy in South Asia. However, the U.S. refused to do this.³⁶⁴ Unilateral U.S. economic assistance to India had ceased with the war. However, some U.S. aid funds continued to go to India through the World Bank Consortium.

During December 1973 the U.S. and India signed an agreement to terminate India's rupee debt. India agreed to pay the debt owed to the U.S. and to redeem the securities held by the U.S. For its part, the U.S. agreed to give most of the money away. India was to receive Rs 16.6 billion to help finance its Fifth Economic Plan. Rs 500 million were to be converted into dollars over a period of ten years to finance a number of U.S. programs in India. Rs 195 million were to be given as aid to Nepal over a period of three years. Another Rs 194.5 million were to be used to pay one-quarter

of the cost of extra-commercial purchases to be made by the U.S. from India. The remaining sum was to be used to pay for future U.S. Embassy expenditures.³⁶⁵ The effect of the treaty was that most of the aid received by India under PL480 and through the Development Loan Fund had been practically free. As a result of this agreement, Indo-U.S. relations warmed somewhat and the level of Indian criticism of U.S. foreign policies dropped considerably.

On May 18, 1974 India detonated a nuclear device. Although Indian leaders claimed that future nuclear devices would be used only for peaceful purposes, U.S. leaders were highly displeased. U.S. leaders felt that there was no distinction between nuclear weapons and devices for peaceful purposes. They felt that India's possession of nuclear weapons might cause other states such as Pakistan and Japan, to develop them. U.S. leaders were also disgusted that India had used funds for nuclear development which, they felt, could have been better spent to alleviate India's poverty.³⁶⁶

U.S. food shipments to India began again during December 1974 at India's request.³⁶⁷ However, Indo-U.S. relations worsened again during 1975, despite the U.S. food aid, when the U.S. lifted its arms embargo to Pakistan. The U.S. justified lifting the embargo by noting that India had been freely purchasing sophisticated weapons from the Soviet Union since 1971 while Pakistan, a U.S. ally, had been denied the right to buy arms from the U.S. to defend itself against perceived threats from India and Afghanistan. The U.S. stated that India was preeminent in the subcontinent and pledged not to seek a change in the subcontinental balance of power. The U.S. promised to encourage Indo-Pakistani reconciliation.³⁶⁸ The U.S. also

pledged that all sales would be paid for in cash. Nevertheless India lodged a strong protest and stated that it received the news with "deep regret and disappointment."³⁶⁹

During June 1975 Mrs. Gandhi declared a state of national emergency and assumed dictatorial powers. Possibly hoping for international support to buttress her new regime, she began seeking better relations with the U.S. However, the U.S. refused her its support. As a result, Indo-U.S. relations remained cool.³⁷⁰

The Janata Government and Mrs. Gandhi: 1977 to the Present

In January 1977 Mrs. Gandhi ended India's state of emergency and called for parliamentary elections to be held in March. The result of the elections was a complete defeat for Mrs. Gandhi and her Congress Party. The election was won by the Janata Party, a coalition of smaller opposition parties. Morarji Desai became India's new prime minister and Atal Bihari Vajpayee became the new foreign minister. Both men desired better relations with the U.S. and felt that India should be truly non-aligned. However, both agreed with Mrs. Gandhi on two other policies: opposition to the U.S. and Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean, and opposition to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.³⁷²

Meanwhile, Jimmy Carter had become President of the United States during January 1977. For many Indians, Carter's image was similar to that of President Kennedy.³⁷² The U.S. and India now made both formal and informal moves to improve relations. Soon after taking office, Desai began an exchange of warm personal letters with Carter. Carter flattered Desai by asking his advice on world issues concerning the Middle East, South Africa, and the world economy.³⁷³ Desai and Carter also selected ambassadors calculated to appeal to each other's sensibilities.³⁷⁴

The improvement in Indo-U.S. relations was shown by Deputy Secretary of State Christopher's visit to New Delhi during July 1977. Christopher said in a press interview that, "We feel that we are on the verge of a new era of close and friendly relations with India." He said that the U.S. "would look to India as the leader of South Asia." He also stated that the U.S. was willing to discuss a resumption of economic aid whenever India was ready.³⁹⁵ This began later in the year. President Carter visited India during January 1978, and Desai returned the visit during June of that year. Despite Carter's fear of the spread of nuclear weapons, the U.S. announced during Desai's visit that it would send nuclear fuel to India. The U.S. also announced that a non-governmental businessman would be attached to the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi to promote increased trade between India and the U.S.³⁷⁶

Indo-U.S. relations remained relatively cordial during the rest of President Carter's term despite Mrs. Gandhi's return to the prime minister-ship in January 1980. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan seems to have caused Mrs. Gandhi to have second thoughts concerning her past favoritism towards Moscow. Although she had tried to explain the Soviet move on the basis that the U.S.S.R. felt encircled by the U.S., China and Pakistan, she is concerned that the U.S. might also become directly involved in the region adjacent to the subcontinent, and that U.S. involvement might spill over into the subcontinent.³⁷⁷ Mrs. Gandhi also changed her policy somewhat concerning U.S. arms sales and aid to Pakistan. After she met with Pakistani President Zia Ul Haq in Salisbury, Rhodesia on April 19, 1980 she told reporters that she no longer opposed Pakistan's reception of U.S. military aid.³⁷⁸ India received permission from the U.S. in February 1980 to purchase U.S. weapons systems.³⁷⁹ However, the U.S. could not match

the Soviet business terms, and in May 1980 India concluded a \$1.6 billion arms deal with the Soviet Union.³⁸⁰

Indo-U.S. relations will probably worsen again in the future. President Reagan has proposed a five-year arms aid program to Pakistan which may total about \$2.5 billion, and which may include sophisticated F-16 aircraft.³⁸¹ Mrs. Gandhi is disturbed over the amount of this aid. Her argument is that arms supplied to Pakistan in the past have always been used against India. Thus, she is afraid that a massive U.S. infusion of arms to Pakistan might tempt Pakistan into a war of revenge against India. Further, she is disturbed that Pakistan's nuclear program may secretly be concerned with weapons development. At a press conference in Geneva, Switzerland on May 6, 1981 Mrs. Gandhi answered a question about India's reaction to possible Pakistani nuclear weapons development saying, "The Pakistan Government tells us that it has no intentions to take such an action, but we do not know what the situation is One must be fully aware of what is happening in the neighborhood and take necessary measures."³⁸²

Indo-Soviet Relations

It is believed that this section on Indo-Soviet relations since 1947 can best be organized into three parts: the period from 1947 until 1962, when Indo-Soviet relations progressed from coldness to cordiality; the period from 1963 to 1977, when the Soviets sought to build up Indian military capabilities as an ally against China; the period from 1977 to the present, as the Janata Government sought to become more non-aligned, and as Mrs. Gandhi seeks new directions in her foreign policy.

From Coldness to Cordiality: 1947-1962

Indo-Soviet relations were quite cold from 1947 to 1952. This was because, in Stalin's view, India was not truly independent from Britain. Stalin even refused to grant an interview to India's first ambassador. He did finally grant an interview to India's second ambassador, but relations did not improve. The Soviet press and radio referred to India as a "British colony"; the Indian Government was described as a tool of "Anglo American imperialism": Nehru was termed "India's Chiang Kai-shek".³⁸³ The Soviet Union also inspired an abortive Communist revolt in Hyderabad. However, Nehru took the view that Indo-Soviet relations would eventually improve as the Soviet Union became a satisfied power and grew more conservative.³⁸⁴

By 1952 Indo-Soviet relations began to warm up slightly, but not because the Soviet Union had become a satisfied power. The improvement was due to a change in Stalin's view of the international situation. He was no longer convinced of the inevitability of war between the Communist and Capitalist states. Soviet expansion had been checked in the West and stalemated in Korea. Stalin began to consider a policy of expanding Soviet influence in the Third World and he regarded India as the most important state of the Third World.³⁸⁵ However, no major improvement occurred in Indo-Soviet relations until 1955. This was due to Stalin's death in 1953, the assumption of power by new leaders, and the formulation of a new global foreign policy. This new policy has been discussed previously in Chapter II, and included plans for the expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World. India was considered to be the most important Third World state.

Khrushchev's new policy was inaugurated in the fall of 1955. During that time Khrushchev and Bulganin made a goodwill tour of India, Burma, and Afghanistan, of which India was their first stop. They flattered Nehru and other Indian leaders, discussed peaceful coexistence and identified Soviet aspirations with those of the Third World, and offered India economic and technical aid. Nehru gladly accepted the aid. India was about to complete its first Five Year Plan and the Indian Government intended for the second plan to be concerned with the development of heavy industry in the public sector. The U.S. was willing to help the private sector of India's economy, but was not interested in financing government-owned heavy industry. The Soviets were only too glad to help, and financed a number of steel mills which the Indians could point to as symbols of national pride.³⁸⁶

India's leaders were jubilant over both the Soviet Union's promises of aid and its new policy towards the Third World. Nehru expressed the hope that this policy was not just a relatively short-term tactical move on the Soviets' part. He said, however, that even if it were a tactical move, if the Soviets followed this policy for a time they would eventually be forced to make it a permanent one.³⁸⁷

From 1955 to 1975 approximately 18 percent of all Soviet economic aid went to India, or a total of \$2.4 billion in economic credits and grants.³⁸⁸ This was not a great deal in comparison to the \$10 billion that India received from the U.S., although a portion of that \$10 billion was in food aid. However, Indian leaders professed themselves to be as grateful for the Soviet aid as for that of the U.S. Also, since the Soviet aid was primarily directed towards the development of heavy industry, the results of the aid were more visually impressive and flattering to Indian national pride.

Because of their socialist orientation, their admiration for Soviet economic accomplishments, their distrust of the ex-colonial states of Europe, and their gratitude for Soviet economic aid, Indian leaders tended to accept the Soviet interpretation of the various international crises that occurred during the 1950's and early 1960's. Indian criticism of Soviet repressions in Hungary, Poland, and East Germany was either muted or nonexistent.

During the early 1960's two events caused India and the Soviet Union to draw even closer together: the Sino-Soviet ideological rift and the Sino-Indian War of 1962. By 1962 the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute had become extremely virulent in private, if not in public. Khrushchev may already have been considering the possibility of acquiring India as an ally against China because the first Soviet military aid agreement was signed with India prior to the Sino-Indian War.³⁸⁹

On October 20, 1962 the Sino-Indian War broke out. Khrushchev's attitude was ambivalent during the early stages of the war. One reason for his attitude was probably the fact that the Soviet Union was then in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Khrushchev was seeking to find a way out of his difficulties there. The war probably also created a dilemma for Khrushchev. China was still officially a fraternal state and should therefore receive Soviet support. Soviet geographies and maps of the Sino-Indian region all reflected Soviet acceptance of Chinese border claims against India. Unofficially, however, Sino-Soviet relations were worsening, the Soviet Union had lost its influence over Chinese foreign and domestic policies, and the Soviet Union might need India as an ally against China in the future.³⁹⁰

The Soviets provided half-hearted moral support to China during the early days of the war, but did nothing else. However when China began to criticize the Soviet decision to withdraw its missiles from Cuba, Khrushchev made up his mind to support India.³⁹¹ Soviet economic and military aid continued to flow to India despite the war but this was small. Shipments of Soviet fuel supplies to China were cancelled for the rest of the war. This had the effect of greatly reducing China's strategic and tactical air capability against India, as well as retarding the flow of Chinese supplies moving towards the war zone.³⁹² However, the Soviet Union appeared to do little else, and Soviet articles supporting India were tepid. Those Indian leaders who had expected the Soviet Union either to restrain China or to provide significant aid to India during the conflict were greatly disillusioned.³⁹³ Thus the Sino-Indian War greatly lowered Soviet prestige in India.

Friendship and Alliance: 1963-1977

Despite the Soviet Union's poor showing during the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the consequent loss of Soviet prestige in India, events and the desires of both Indian and Soviet leaders caused their two states to draw closer together. Before the war Indian leaders had been concerned only with the potential military threat from Pakistan. The war caused India's leaders to believe that India now faced potential military threats from both China and Pakistan. During the rest of the 1960's, as Sino-Pakistani friendship grew and Pakistan received Chinese military aid, Indian leaders feared a possible Sino-Pakistani alliance, Indian leaders were determined to acquire modern sophisticated weapons and to build up India's defense industries so as to be able to meet the perceived future threat. The

U.S. provided Pakistan with sophisticated weapons through aid and sales but would not do the same for India. Other western states were willing to sell weapons to India, but not on low credit terms. Therefore India turned to the Soviet Union.

Soviet leaders were concerned over the possibility of a future war with China, and became interested in India and Pakistan as allies against China. Therefore the Soviets were willing to provide India with sophisticated weapons. From 1962 to 1974 the Soviet Union extended approximately \$1.4 billion in military aid to India. This took the form of credits whereby India could purchase Soviet weapons and equipment, as well as the facilities to produce these items under license. The Soviet aid was particularly attractive to India because the Soviets offered low list prices, then discounted the list prices, and provided low interest rates with 8-10 years to repay the credits. The Soviets also provided quick delivery of items purchased.³⁹⁴ These terms could not be matched by the other states interested in selling arms to India.

Thus India and the Soviet Union ostensibly drew closer together because of their joint fear of China. Referring to this joint fear, Nehru remarked of the Soviet Union that, "We are their second front and they are ours."³⁹⁵ However, Pakistan always remained the most immediate military threat in the minds of India's leaders.

From the Soviet viewpoint, the policy of building up India as a potential threat to China's southern flank necessitated peace in the sub-continent. That is, the Soviets felt India's growing military and economic capabilities should not be dissipated in conflicts with Pakistan. Thus the Soviet Union decided to act as a mediator in Indo-Pakistani relations. During a visit to New Delhi in June of 1964 Soviet President Mikoyan told

Prime Minister Shastri that it was time for India and Pakistan to settle their differences.³⁹⁶ The Soviet Union also began giving economic aid to Pakistan. The Soviets probably felt that this aid would gain them some influence in Pakistani decision-making, and might wean Pakistan away from its growing friendship with China. The majority of the Soviet aid, however, was given to India. Despite the Soviet aid, Pakistan remained the sworn enemy of India. Desiring a subcontinental balance to offset the potential threat from India, China provided Pakistan with both military and economic aid. Pakistan continued to draw closer to China. Thus, both the Soviet Union and China played balance-of-power politics in the subcontinent while India and Pakistan both desired to eliminate each other.

When India and Pakistan went to war in September 1965 over Kashmir, the U.S.S.R. sought to mediate the dispute. On September 4th, the day before Indian troops invaded Pakistan, and again on September 7th, the Soviet Union proffered its good offices to both states to seek an armistice. However, neither of the disputants wanted peace. The Soviet Union also tried to keep the war from spreading. China had provided Pakistan with verbal support during the early days of the conflict. On three occasions during September China accused India of violations along the Sino-Indian border and threatened to invade. Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. publicly warned China against intervention. China may also have received private warnings from Moscow through the Soviet embassy in Peking. In any event, Peking chose not to intervene. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union supported U.N. Security Council efforts to achieve a cease-fire and continued to offer mediation. The war ceased on September 22nd when Pakistan and

India accepted a U.N. cease-fire proposal which was vague enough to suit both parties. Both disputants agreed to allow the Soviet Union to mediate a settlement.³⁹⁷

The leaders of India and Pakistan met in Tashkent from January 4 to January 10, 1966 while the Soviet Union sought to achieve a settlement. Both parties agreed to move their troops back to the positions that they had occupied prior to August 1965, and both parties agreed not to use force to settle disputes between themselves.³⁹⁸ Therefore, the Soviets probably considered the Tashkent negotiations to have been successful. The Soviets appeared to have achieved a military status quo ante bellum in the subcontinent and future disputes, including Kashmir, were to be settled peacefully. The Soviets could now pursue their primary goal in the subcontinent, increasing India's military and economic capabilities so India could become an effective ally against China. However, the Soviets did not realize that both Indian and Pakistani leaders genuinely wanted to settle their differences by military means. Therefore, the Tashkent Agreement only postponed the inevitable.

The Soviet Union also reverted to its policy of providing economic aid to Pakistan. However, in addition, the Soviet Union began to provide Pakistan with some military aid.³⁹⁹

It can be argued that, although India "tilted" towards the Soviet Union during Mrs. Gandhi's prime ministership of 1966-1977, she used the Soviet Union to her own advantage and gave the Soviet leaders very little in return. The first example is the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed on August 9, 1971. Negotiations had reportedly been going on desultorily for two years prior to both parties signing the treaty.⁴⁰⁰ Negotiations may have begun at the initiative of the Soviet

Union. Mrs. Gandhi's decision to finally conclude such a treaty was probably influenced by the U.S. Government's announcement of the secret Zhou-Kissinger talks of July 9-11, 1971. Thus, Mrs. Gandhi may have feared the emergence of a future U.S.-China-Pakistan axis operating in East Asia. To offset this future axis, she may have finally decided to enter into an entente with the Soviet Union.

The Soviets probably wanted the entente to formalize their position of influence in the subcontinent, to oppose the possible future U.S.-China-Pakistan entente, and to formally gain India as a partner against China. Further, Article IX of the treaty states that, in the event of an attack upon one of the parties, they will consult each other as to the best measures to be taken to remove the threat.⁴⁰¹ Thus, India could not count on Soviet assistance if it attacked Pakistan first, nor could it assume that the Soviet Union would automatically come to its aid if Pakistan invaded India. The Soviet Union, in consulting with India, might urge a cease-fire and offer mediation. The Indo-Soviet entente by itself might serve to halt an attack upon India by Pakistan and/or China. Therefore the Soviet leaders may have reasoned that the treaty could be used as a means for ensuring peace and the balance of power in the subcontinent.

While the Soviets may have thought that the treaty gave them most of the benefits, Mrs. Gandhi used it to her own advantage. Article IX also stated that, in the event of war between one of the signatories and another state, the other signatory could not provide any assistance to that third state.⁴⁰² Thus, in the event of an Indo-Pakistani war, the Soviet Union was automatically precluded from rendering Pakistan any assistance. According to Denzil Peiris Mrs. Gandhi ignored the consultations clause of Article IX:

Soviet propagandists have said that when Moscow signed the treaty, it declared that the Bangladesh crisis should not be resolved by war. The Soviet Union had hoped, they said, to restrain India from going to war with a mutual consultation clause. In fact, just before the Indian military action began, the Soviets complained through Polish officials that 'India acted first and consulted later'.⁴⁰³

The Soviet statement probably meant that Mrs. Gandhi had determined during the fall of 1971 to use the Bangladesh Crisis as a means of going to war with Pakistan. Consultations did, in fact, take place between Indian and Soviet leaders in Moscow during late September, and in New Delhi during late October and early November 1971. At the end of November eight shiploads of Soviet arms arrived in India. Robert Donaldson noted that, "Clearly, though the Soviets were publicly counselling against war, they were ensuring that India would be well-armed should it find a military solution necessary."⁴⁰⁴ On November 20, 1971 India sent troops into East Bengal to break up Pakistani artillery concentrations. On December 3rd Pakistan countered with airstrikes against several western Indian airfields, and Mrs. Gandhi declared war. The Soviets now had the option of trying to work for another cease-fire as they did in 1965 or to swing completely to the side of India. They chose the latter course of action. The Soviet Union and India coordinated their actions through the embassies in their respective capitals. The Soviet Union put pressure on China not to intervene in the war by troop movements along the Sino-Soviet border, as well as by statements in the public press.⁴⁰⁵ While India proceeded to defeat Pakistan, the Soviet Union vetoed at U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire.⁴⁰⁶ Soviet military aid to India just prior to, and during the war, reportedly totalled \$750 million.⁴⁰⁷

The Soviet Union also sought to either retard or counter any U.S. moves to help Pakistan. When President Nixon tried to bring pressure to bear upon Brezhnev to seek a cease-fire, Brezhnev was evasive.⁴⁰⁸ The U.S.S.R. also ordered a task force to the Bay of Bengal to keep an eye on that of the U.S. However, the war ended before the two task forces were close enough to confront one another.⁴⁰⁹ Because of its actions, Soviet prestige in India was quite high.

It seems clear from the preceding analysis of the possible reasons for India's signing the Indo-Soviet treaty and the events leading up to the Indo-Pakistani War, that Mrs. Gandhi used both the Soviet Union and the treaty as a means to help her eliminate Pakistan as a threat to India's security. India was now the dominant state in the subcontinent. However, Mrs. Gandhi was concerned over the Soviet desire to increase both its influence and presence in the East Asian region. A second example of how Mrs. Gandhi used the Soviet Union for her own ends is the way in which she treated Brezhnev's collective security proposal of November 1973.

Brezhnev arrived in New Delhi on November 26th and addressed the Indian parliament. His speech stressed the need for peace in Asia, the need for an Asian collective security arrangement, and the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. He suggested that it was time for all Asian states to work for peace through mutual cooperation. This was interpreted by some of his listeners as meaning that peace could be ~~achieved~~ through treaties of friendship and cooperation such as the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971.⁴¹⁰ Brezhnev also asked Mrs. Gandhi for Indian base rights for Soviet fishing trawlers, and for permission to establish a "sheep farm" near the Sino-Indian border.⁴¹¹ Since some Soviet trawlers are used for collecting electronic signal intelligence, the sheep farm may also have been intended for

the same purpose. Brezhnev offered significant inducements to Mrs. Gandhi to get her to accept his proposals and also to bind India more closely to the Soviet Union. India and the Soviet Union signed a 15-year economic agreement which included joint economic planning, aid for the construction of steel mills, oil refineries, petrochemical plants, and an underground railway for Calcutta. The Soviet Union was also to aid India in oil exploration, coal mining, and electric power generation, and to provide India with supplies of oil and fertilizer.⁴¹² Brezhnev also agreed to supply India with further substantial military aid.⁴¹³ However, Mrs. Gandhi still refused to explicitly endorse Brezhnev's collective security proposals. At a banquet in Brezhnev's honor she stated that India believed in Asian cooperation, "in as many forms as are freely agreed upon." Her foreign minister told the parliament that India still desired to improve relations with China.⁴¹⁴ Mrs. Gandhi also refused to grant Brezhnev either the trawler base rights or the sheep station. However, in the joint declaration signed by Mrs. Gandhi and Brezhnev prior to this departure, Mrs. Gandhi did offer some general support for his collective security proposals. She stated that India and the Soviet Union, "attach particular significance to the strengthening of peace and stability in Asia through common efforts by all the states of this largest and most populated area of the world."⁴¹⁵

Thus, Brezhnev's visit to India during November 1973 provided India with significant future economic benefits, and possible military benefits as well. These benefits appear to tie India even more closely to the Soviet Union. However, Brezhnev did not obtain either explicit Indian support for his Asian collective security proposals or the trawler base rights and sheep station he desired. In the light of her later normalization of relations with China, it can be seen that in 1973 Mrs. Gandhi had already begun

a policy of seeking to achieve good relations with all the states in East Asia while at the same time seeking to obtain as much economic and military aid as possible from the Soviet Union. Mrs. Gandhi did this by playing on the Soviet desire to have India as a credible ally against China.

Meanwhile, Mrs. Gandhi had also been attempting to normalize Sino-Indian relations. During April 1976 India and China agreed to exchange ambassadors, which quite upset the Soviet leaders.⁴¹⁶ Mrs. Gandhi visited Moscow in June 1976 to reassure the Soviet leaders of India's friendship towards the U.S.S.R. Once again she refused to explicitly endorse Brezhnev's Asian collective security proposals. But in the final communique she stated her opposition to the establishment of foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean; this referred to the U.S. base at Diego Garcia. Her visit to Moscow was apparently so successful that Brezhnev and Kosygin agreed to visit New Delhi later in the year. They also agreed to hold future meetings with India's leaders at regular intervals in the future.⁴¹⁷

The Janata Government and Mrs. Gandhi: 1977 to the Present

The electoral loss by Mrs. Gandhi and her Congress Party during March 1977 probably came as a great shock to the Soviet leadership. In his speech upon taking office, Prime Minister Desai said that he favored a policy of "proper non-alignment, fully non-aligned, with no suspicion of any alliance with anybody."⁴¹⁸ He also affirmed India's support of the British Commonwealth and his desire for better relations with China and Pakistan.⁴¹⁹

However, Desai recognized the realities of Soviet military and economic aid and invited Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to visit New Delhi. The Soviet Government accepted Desai's invitation a few days later. The Soviet leaders were no doubt concerned that India might break away from its dependency upon the Soviet Union, thus causing the collapse of Soviet

influence in the subcontinent. Therefore the leaders of both states were probably eager to mend their fences. Gromyko arrived in New Delhi on April 25th for a thorough review of Indo-Soviet relations. Desai may have wanted Indian independence on Soviet military and economic aid to cease, but this was not possible. As one Indian official gloomily remarked, "We have got into such a complex arrangement with the Russians that it is impossible to get out of the Soviet camp. They have only to press a button and perhaps the entire Indian air force, which uses Soviet equipment, will be grounded."⁴²⁰ The Indian official may have been overly pessimistic, but it was true that India had received better military trade arrangements from the Soviet Union than from any other state, and that most of India's sophisticated weapons were of Soviet origin.

When Gromyko arrived in New Delhi, Desai and Vajpayee told him that India valued the friendship and aid received from the U.S.S.R. However, Gromyko was also told that the friendship and aid received from the U.S., Britain, West Germany and Japan were valued equally as high as that from the U.S.S.R. The official communique issued at the end of Gromyko's visit was friendly but not effusive. No mention was made of the Soviet collective security proposals. However, two trade agreements were signed and India did not abrogate its 1971 treaty of friendship with the U.S.S.R.⁴²¹ This tended to show Desai's desire for a more truly non-aligned foreign policy, but it also underscored India's dependence on Soviet military and economic aid.

During October of 1977 Desai paid a six-day visit to Moscow where he met with a number of Soviet leaders and had three rounds of talks with Brezhnev. Desai stated that the purpose of his trip was to explain to the Soviet leaders his desire for a truly non-aligned foreign policy. Indian

officials stated that Desai's visit, occurring only one month before President Carter was due to visit India, was intended to calm Soviet fears over a possible Indian tilt towards the U.S.⁴²² Brezhnev and his colleagues reportedly showed Desai exceptional warmth and courtesy. Brezhnev's collective security proposals were also reportedly not discussed. The 1971 treaty was not abrogated, but was described as promoting, "peace and stability without coming in the way of either side's friendly relations with third countries."⁴²³ Thus the Soviet Union still had the entente, but had agreed that the entente did not prohibit India from seeking friendlier relations with the U.S. and China. India had moved closer to genuine non-alignment but would still receive Soviet military and economic aid. Desai had apparently persuaded Brezhnev that India would not tilt away from the Soviet Union towards the U.S. and China, but would become more truly non-aligned. Meanwhile, the 1971 treaty would presumably still be operative in the case of a war between one of the two parties and either China or Pakistan, or both.

Desai tried to move India away from relying exclusively on the U.S.S.R. as a source of sophisticated weapons. However, it was recognized that this would take many years. This policy, as well as a policy of greater non-alignment was followed by Desai and his successors until the collapse of the Janata Government in the fall of 1979.

Mrs. Gandhi might have tilted India's foreign policy back in favor of the U.S.S.R. had it not been for that state's intervention in Afghanistan. In a meeting with Gromyko in New Delhi on February 13, 1980 Mrs. Gandhi urged the U.S.S.R. to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and said that military intervention or interference in the domestic affairs of any nation was "inadmissible".⁴²⁴ She defended the Soviet intervention before French

reporters on March 3, 1980 saying that it was done in reaction to the Soviet perception of an alliance between the U.S., China, and Pakistan. But she was also deeply concerned that her long-held fear might come to pass of a U.S.-Soviet war which would involve the subcontinent and ruin its economic development.⁴²⁵

During June 1980 Mrs. Gandhi sent Foreign Minister Rao to Moscow to ask the Soviets to unconditionally withdraw all their troops from Afghanistan. The Soviets had previously announced that they were willing to withdraw their troops if the U.S. and other states would sign an agreement guaranteeing Afghanistan's security and territorial integrity. In other words, the Soviets were willing to withdraw their troops if the U.S. and other states would agree to ignore the situation in Afghanistan. The U.S. and other states had refused to agree to the Soviet proposal. When Rao met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko he was told that all attempts to change "existing realities" in Afghanistan were "hopeless." Gromyko went on to say that, "any discussions concerning this, any attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan are pointless."⁴²⁶

Mrs. Gandhi holds the view that the U.S. has used the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an excuse for moving heavy arms and military equipment into the region. She is also concerned that the war in Afghanistan may eventually involve the U.S., China and Pakistan, and spill over into the subcontinent.⁴²⁷ The Indian Government has publicly deplored the Soviet action in Afghanistan, but has abstained from votes in the U.N. condemning the Soviet Union.⁴²⁸

The Soviets have sought to obtain Mrs. Gandhi's public approval of their actions in Afghanistan and Southwest Asia by offering military and economic aid. In May 1980 India concluded a \$1.6 billion arms agreement with

the Soviet Union on very favorable terms.⁴²⁹ In December 1980 President Brezhnev arrived in New Delhi for a state visit. Brezhnev and Mrs. Gandhi signed a number of agreements for Soviet aid to various Indian industries, including one in which the Soviet Union agreed to furnish India with fuel for nuclear power plants.⁴³⁰ Brezhnev probably hoped that the Soviet largesse to India would cause Mrs. Gandhi to publicly support the Soviet role in Afghanistan. However, the joint declaration which was made public just prior to Brezhnev's departure showed India's intention of avoiding international controversy. The declaration stated that both parties were opposed to, "outside interference in the internal affairs of the other countries" of Southwest Asia, which could actually be considered by India as an implied rebuke of the Soviet Union. The document also called for "the dismantling of all foreign military and naval bases" in the Indian Ocean, which would include the U.S. base at Diego Garcia. However, with the exception of Israel, no other state was mentioned by name. The international statements of the declaration were actually rather mild.⁴³¹

Thus, although Mrs. Gandhi continues to accept Soviet military and economic aid, she is definitely unhappy over Soviet policies in Southwest Asia and she is not as anti-U.S. as she has been in the past. Further, as will be shown, she is seeking to settle India's border controversy with China and improve Sino-Indian relations. The Indo-Soviet entente appears to be a marriage of convenience with most of the benefits going to India.

Sino-Indian Relations

This section on Sino-Indian relations since 1949 will be organized into two parts: the period from 1949 to 1962, when Sino-Indian relations gradually deteriorated from friendship to hostility; and the period from 1963 to the present when relations gradually progressed from hostility to mild cordiality.

From Friendship to Hostility: 1949-1962

India recognized the Communist Government in Beijing during January of 1950 and was one of the first non-Communist states to do so. From Nehru's point of view this was the natural thing to do because the Communist Government controlled the China mainland. Because of their socialist orientation, India's leaders tended to be sympathetic towards a Communist government. Also, as noted previously, many Indian leaders felt that the new government in Beijing was not truly Communist but was rather a type of united front incorporating many parts of the Chinese political spectrum. From 1950-1962 India was the leading champion of replacing the Taipei Government in the U.N. by the Peking Government.

However, during 1950 to mid-1951 Sino-Indian relations were relatively cool. Mao, like Stalin, was not persuaded that India was truly independent of Britain, and regarded Nehru as a pawn of imperialism.⁴³² The Sino-Indian border became a problem at the end of 1950 as China moved to annex Tibet. One of the Chinese Communist goals was to unify China to the limits of the old Manchu Empire. Further, China's new leaders regarded the Himalayan states as China's soft underbelly, and considered the annexation of Tibet as being an imperative.⁴³³ Thus, the Chinese leaders felt that China could be easily invaded through the Himalayas and, since they did not regard India as truly independent, they probably felt that India would be used as a base from which an invasion might be launched by the Capitalist and Imperialist states.

Chinese suzerainty over Tibet had been accepted by Britain during the time of the Manchu Empire, but Tibet had de facto independence. Britain's special interests and trading rights in Tibet were transferred to India by Britain after India achieved its independence. During December of 1950

China moved to incorporate Tibet under the new Communist Government. A Chinese army invaded eastern Tibet to, "protect her against foreign imperialists." India tendered its good offices to achieve a settlement, but was told not to meddle in Chinese internal affairs.⁴³⁴ Tibet became an autonomous region of China during May 1951 and India was told to withdraw its mission from Lhasa.⁴³⁵

India was greatly concerned over the Chinese annexation of Tibet because it and the other Himalayan states were considered to form a buffer against invasion from the north. India had inherited special rights in these states from Britain after it was given its independence. In a speech to India's parliament during December 1950 Nehru warned China against invading Nepal. Thus, while Nehru was apparently willing to recognize China's claim to Tibet, and may also have felt that India couldn't afford a war with China, he was clearly telling China that any advance beyond Tibet would be regarded as a direct threat to India's security. He was no doubt aware of Tibet's historic suzerainty over Nepal and Tibet's historic ownership of part of Sikkim and all of Bhutan.⁴³⁶ By acquiring Tibet, China might also assume Tibet's claim on these states.

In mid-1951 China began a policy of reasonableness towards the Third World states. There may have been a number of reasons for this policy change. China was engaged in a war with the U.S. over Korea, and was also supplying the Viet Minh in Indochina. Because of past Chinese revolutionary pronouncements, China had no real friends or allies in East Asia. China's leaders may have felt that the goodwill of the other Asian states, and especially India, might act as a restraint on possible U.S. military actions against China during and after the Korean War. Thus China's new policy of reasonableness may have been caused by fear of the U.S., as well as by the

desire to have no more foreign ventures and to consolidate the power of the Communist regime.⁴³⁷ As a result of the Chinese policy shift, Sino-Indian relations began to improve. In December 1953 the two states began formal negotiations over the status of Tibet, and an agreement was signed on April 24, 1954. India recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet and Indian military garrisons in southern Tibet were withdrawn. China allowed India special trading rights in various Tibetan cities. Their mutual border was not mentioned in the treaty. The two states signed a commercial agreement during October 1954 whereby China was allowed to use certain Indian ports and railroads to trade with Tibet.⁴³⁸

From 1954-1959 Sino-Indian relations were extremely friendly on the surface. Zhou En-lai visited India several times during the period and was warmly received. Nehru visited China during October 1954 and was also warmly received. India championed China's admission to the U.N. and to other international bodies, and India acted as China's sponsor at the 1955 Bandung Conference.

However, below the surface of Sino-Indian relations all was not well. China observed the friendly Soviet overtures and economic aid to India after 1955. China's leaders probably felt that the Soviet Union was competing with China for India's friendship. Also, India received more Soviet aid than China did during this period. China's leaders saw U.S. economic aid flowing to India, and were doubtless aware that the U.S. was grooming India as a model of non-Communist economic development for the Third World states. Thus China was competing with India both as a model for economic development and as a recipient of Soviet aid.

China and India were also having problems over Tibet and the Sino-Indian border. China's leaders believed that India was supporting tribal

rebellions in Tibet, and believed that the Dalai Lama's escape from Tibet in March 1959 was achieved through help from the U.S. and India.⁴³⁹ In addition, when Nehru protested to Zhou Enlai over a road that China had constructed through the northern part of Ladakh to Tibet, Zhou informed him that China did not accept India's boundaries as valid. Zhou stated that the boundaries as drawn up by the British had never been acknowledged by China, but he said that he would be willing to accept the boundaries as a basis for negotiation. During November 1959 Zhou invited Nehru to meet with him and settle the border dispute. The talks occurred during April 1960 but achieved no results. During the talks Zhou told India's Home Minister that the road through northern Ladakh, now known as the Aksai Chin, was vital to China's security.⁴⁴⁰

Actually, there were two roads. While other roads existed from China to Tibet, the two through the Aksai Chin were the only ones that were not blocked by snow in the winter. Troops, military supplies, and commercial goods could be moved along these roads during all seasons of the year in considerably larger amounts than could be brought by air.⁴⁴¹

In 1961 Nehru began a policy of reclaiming land in the Aksai Chin from China. This policy finally led to war in 1962. Indian troops were sent to establish outposts in the Aksai Chin behind those of the Chinese. Nehru reasoned that once the personnel of a Chinese outpost found themselves cut off by the Indian outpost behind them, they would then move to the rear of the Indian outpost.⁴⁴² Thus, by a policy of leapfrogging the Chinese outposts, he believed that India would eventually regain the territory lost to China.

The 1962 Sino-Indian War resulted from the policy implemented by Nehru due to his misperceptions concerning both China and the global

international system. He believed that, as a Communist state, China was not aggressive and would not resort to force to gain its ends. He believed that, in the event of a major Sino-Indian War, India would be defended by the great powers. Also, he did not believe that China had the economic capabilities to carry on a major war with India. He did not consider the possibility that China might wage a limited war. He also apparently believed India to be militarily stronger than it was.⁴⁴³

China's reasons for going to war with India in 1962 are not known, but can be surmised. China was obviously not willing to lose its roads through the Aksai Chin. Since China and India were rivals as models for the Third World of economic and political development, a successful Chinese war against India would tarnish India's image and enhance that of China. China's leaders were probably angry with both India and the U.S.S.R. because India had received more Soviet aid during 1955-1961 than China. Thus one Chinese motive for the war may have been revenge. Also, China's leaders may have reasoned that a successful war against India might cause India to finally make concessions concerning the disputed border areas.

By the end of the war in late November 1962, China controlled approximately 16,000 square miles of northern Ladakh in the west, and 32,000 square miles of northern Arunachal Pradesh in the east.⁴⁴⁴ India was humiliated by its defeat and felt that its national security was adversely affected by China's border gains. India now regarded China as an unreasonable and predatory state seeking to enhance its power and prestige at the expense of other Asian states. India sought military and economic aid from the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to defend against future Chinese and Pakistani

aggression. China quite rightly believed that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. desired to develop India as a counterweight to China in Asia. China therefore sought to counterbalance India by providing military and economic aid to Pakistan.

From Hostility to Cordiality: 1963 to the Present

Sino-Indian relations remained frigid from 1963 to 1976 when, due primarily to Indian efforts, relations were normalized. Sino-Indian trade, which was very low in 1962, ceased entirely after the war.⁴⁴⁵ Because of Chinese economic and military aid to Pakistan, India began to fear that those two states had formed a secret military alliance. Pakistan tried to give India that impression and S. P. Seth suggests that one may have actually existed.⁴⁴⁶

During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 China provided Pakistan with moral support and appeared to be on the verge of providing military support by giving India an ultimatum. However, both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. warned China not to intervene and the war ended before the ultimatum expired. Hinton suggests that China was only trying to put pressure upon India so that Pakistan would not be forced to accept an armistice without having gained any Indian concessions concerning Kashmir.⁴⁴⁷ If so, China's effort was a failure. China's prestige also dropped because it appeared that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had prevented China from intervening on Pakistan's side.⁴⁴⁸

Mrs. Gandhi apparently regarded Pakistan as the primary threat to India's security, because after becoming prime minister she sought to improve Sino-Indian relations. On three separate occasions between late 1967 and early 1969 she indicated to the Chinese that she would be willing to discuss

both the disputed border and improved relations. However, she received no response from the Chinese.⁴⁴⁹ One reason may have been the fact that China's cultural revolution was in progress and China's leaders were primarily concerned with domestic developments.

Events in the subcontinent during 1971 seriously disturbed China's leaders. They believed that the Indo-Soviet treaty, besides being an alliance against China, was an instrument for the intended dismemberment of Pakistan and the eventual annexation of East Pakistan by India. China's leaders favored the creation of an independent Bangladesh, but were afraid to publicly advocate this because their same arguments could be used against them in support of Taiwan's independence.⁴⁵⁰

Chinese support of Pakistan during the December 1971 war was limited. China's leaders probably did not want to become involved in the war. Chinese troops and supplies could not be sent to Pakistan's aid, even if China had desired to do so, because of winter conditions in the Himalayas. If China had sent armed forces to aid Pakistan, the Soviet Union might have done the same for India. Also, China was concerned over Soviet troop movements along the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviet Union issued public warnings to China not to intervene in the subcontinent, and Chinese efforts in the U.N. to end the war were blocked by Soviet vetoes.⁴⁵¹

Having achieved its desires in the subcontinent, India put out feelers to China during 1972 and 1973 concerning improved relations.⁴⁵² Public speeches made by Chinese leaders during the spring of 1974 indicated that they desired in principle to normalize relations.⁴⁵³ However, any hopes for normalization were dashed by India's gradual annexation of Sikkim from the summer of 1974 through the summer of 1975.⁴⁵⁴ China was furious over Sikkim's annexation. This provided India with a highway into Tibet and

was regarded by China as another move whereby India might increase its capabilities in South Asia at the expense of China and Pakistan. China was also irritated with India for having developed a nuclear device.⁴⁵⁵ China once again regarded India as a pawn of the U.S.S.R. and described Sikkim's annexation as being part of the Soviet scheme to encircle China. China was also afraid that Sikkim would be used by India and the U.S.S.R. as a base for sponsoring secessionist movements and rebellion in Tibet.⁴⁵⁶

Nevertheless, Mrs. Gandhi continued to work to improve relations between China and India. She also began to make complimentary references to China in her public speeches and press interviews. During April of 1976 India and China agreed to exchange ambassadors; it had been 14 years since India and China had been represented in each other's capitals by ambassadors.⁴⁵⁷ Both ambassadors presented their credentials during the summer of that year. During August the Indian Parliament was informed that India was exploring prospects of trade with China.⁴⁵⁸ In a press interview during October 1976 Foreign Minister Vajpayee stated that India had taken the initiative to exchange ambassadors and to resume trade and shipping links with China. Some trade was resumed early in 1977.⁴⁵⁹

In March 1977 the Janata Party came to power in India, and China's leaders were pleased with Desai's announced desire for true non-alignment. They also hoped that he would abrogate the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty. However, when Desai did not, China's leaders became disillusioned with the Janata Government.⁴⁶⁰ Nevertheless, during 1978 and 1979 Sino-Indian relations became more cordial and trade increased. India pressured China for border talks, which finally resulted in a Chinese invitation to Foreign Minister Vajpayee to visit Beijing during the fall of 1978 for a discussion of both the border situation and the further improvement of Sino-Indian relations.⁴⁶¹

Vajpayee was unable to visit Beijing during the fall of 1978 due to sickness. The talks took place during February 13-15, 1979 and covered numerous subjects. Vajpayee assured his hosts that India was also opposed to any state seeking hegemony, and that Indo-Soviet relations were separate and apart from Indo-Chinese relations. He also stressed India's non-alignment policy, and stated that India was not supporting any subversive activity by the Dalai Lama in Tibet. The Chinese agreed to begin talks on the border as quickly as possible. The discussions also included ways and means to increase contacts and cooperation in the areas of trade, culture, and science and technology.⁴⁶²

After the talks ended, Vajpayee was supposed to spend a few days touring China. However, he returned to India in protest when he was informed that China had invaded Vietnam.

Upon taking office again in January 1980 as prime minister, Mrs. Gandhi also sought to further improve Sino-Indian relations and clear up the border issue. Although the new Congress Government is very desirous of resolving the border dispute, it does not intend to do so at the expense of the Soviet Union's goodwill. Foreign Minister Rao told a parliamentary committee on May 18, 1980 that India would normalize its relations with China "very circumspectly."⁴⁶³

During July 1980 India extended diplomatic recognition to Heng Samrin's Vietnamese-supported government of Cambodia. India was the first non-aligned state to extend such recognition.⁴⁶⁴ This act probably angered China's leaders both because China was supporting the Pol Pot forces in Cambodia and because India's recognition appeared to support Soviet policies in Indochina. During the fall of 1980 the Indian press noted that China appeared to have lost interest in normalizing Sino-Indian relations.⁴⁶⁵

Actually, the Chinese were probably waiting for the results of Brezhnev's trip to India in December as a further indication of India's attitude towards Soviet policies in Asia.

Mrs. Gandhi's action during Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi evidently convinced China's leaders that she did not approve of Soviet policies and actions in Asia. China's official press and radio broadcasts noted approvingly that Mrs. Gandhi had reiterated her public statements opposing foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the states of the region, and that she had refused to endorse Soviet actions in Afghanistan. China felt that India was acting "very circumspectly" towards the Soviet Union.⁴⁶⁶

Mrs. Gandhi's handling of Brezhnev evidently caused a thaw in the attitude of China's leaders towards India. Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited New Delhi in June 1981 and talked to President Reddy, Prime Minister Gandhi, and Foreign Minister Rao. The talks were described as being, "fruitful, positive, and forward-looking." It was decided at the meeting to actively promote cultural exchanges, trade, and economic and technical cooperation while, at the same time, exploring methods for the solution of the border dispute.⁴⁶⁷

The Indian press noted that Huang's attitude was polite and that his remarks were free from polemics. He went out of his way to emphasize China's interest in peace, stability, and cooperation in the subcontinent. Mrs. Gandhi told Huang that no real improvement in Sino-Indian relations was possible unless there was visible progress toward a settlement of the border issue.⁴⁶⁸

Talks on the disputed border were originally scheduled to be held in Beijing during October 1981, but were postponed so that the Prime Ministers of China and India might meet each other and have preliminary

discussions at the North-South Summit conference in Mexico during the last week of October.⁴⁶⁹ The Madras newspaper The Hindu observed on August 6, 1981 that:

The dialogue itself might drag on for a long time, but it will at least prevent a deterioration of Sino-Indian relations in the wake of the current superpower rivalries in the region. A lot of spadework remains to be done to generate the necessary degree of confidence in each other's desire for an overall settlement without harping on what happened in the past.⁴⁷⁰

Indo-Japanese Relations

In the section of Chapter I concerning actor interaction it was noted that such interaction may be nonexistent, partial or full.⁴⁷¹ Indo-Japanese relations since World War II provide an example of partial actor interaction. Relations between Japan and India have been primarily economic in nature, although political relations are increasing. Indo-Japanese military relations are nonexistent, while social and cultural relations are minimal. One reason for this may be India's preoccupation with political and military events in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean area. A second reason may be Japan's relative lack of interest, until recently, in political events in that region. Although in recent years India has publicly announced its intention to become more involved in the affairs of East Asia--an area of economic and political significance to Japan--India has moved very slowly. Indo-Japanese military relations do not exist because Japanese forces are defensive in nature and remain either on or around the Japanese islands. Japan has no security agreements in the South Asian region, and India would not welcome any Japanese forces coming into the region anyway. Sino-Indian economic relations will be discussed first, followed by political relations.

Economic Relations

Japan and India have been trading with each other since the mid-1950's, and this trade has been gradually increasing. During the past decade the total amount of Indo-Japanese trade rose from about \$500 million in 1970 to over \$1.8 billion in 1979. Japan now ranks as India's third most important trading partner.⁴⁷²

Indian exports to Japan include minerals (primarily iron and manganese ore), raw cotton, tobacco, and spices. Indian imports include machinery and processed goods. Indo-Japanese trade has increased and somewhat diversified, since 1972, but India still exports primarily raw materials and unfinished products to Japan. India is concerned over Japan's non-tariff import restrictions and is seeking greater access to Japan's markets. These restrictions include import controls, prior allotments, state monopolies, commodity taxes, import ceilings, and health and sanitary regulations.⁴⁷³ Thus India has the same problem with Japan that most other nations do, the inability to see more goods in Japan's home markets because of hidden restrictions.

Interestingly enough, Japan has made the same complaint about India's home markets. Japanese firms complain about trade restrictions imposed by the Indian Government. The Japanese firms want India to allow greater technical collaboration and joint ventures in manufacturing. Indian businessmen and government officials have expressed concern over the "unconventional styles" of Japanese trading firms in attempting to overcome bureaucratic delays and get things done the way they want it.⁴⁷⁴ Meanwhile, India is one of the few states that has a trade surplus with Japan. However, this situation is unlikely to become a major source of Indo-Japanese friction because Japan is also a major economic aid donor to India.

India has received millions of dollars in credits from Japan for railways, power projects, fertilizer projects, offshore oil drilling, coal and iron mines, shipbuilding, and industrial machinery and components, as well as social and historical projects. India has received this aid directly from the Japanese Government, from the Export-Import Bank, and from the Overseas Economic Corporation Fund (OECF). Japan uses the Bank and the OECF to provide capital to India with long term notes and low rates of interest, thus easing the strain of debt repayment upon India.⁴⁷⁵ Japan is also a member of the Aid-India Consortium and provides about 10 percent of the total consortium assistance to India.⁴⁷⁶ The two states have established an Economic Joint Committee to study Indian economic development. An Indo-Japanese Business Corporation Committee also meets periodically to promote better understanding in the field of bilateral economic cooperation. India might also receive loans through the Asian Development Bank--to which Japan provides funds--but India has never asked for a loan from this bank.⁴⁷⁷

Japan has provided a total of \$1.4 billion in official government loans to India since 1958. In addition, Japan has granted debt relief loans to India amounting to about \$480 million.⁴⁷⁸ Japan expects to double its total of official government loans to needy states over the next five years. Therefore, the amount of Japan's official governmental loans to India over the next five years is also expected to increase.⁴⁷⁹

Japan provides development aid by the various means noted above to India and other developing states because of the "North-South Problem", or the tension that exists between the world's developing and industrialized states. Since this tension exists, Japan provides aid for four reasons:

- (a) Japanese aid helps to reduce North-South tension.
- (b) If relations between the North-South states reached a crisis, i.e., if the Southern states refused to sell raw materials to the Northern states, Japan would be very vulnerable because of its lack of domestic raw materials and natural resources.
- (c) Japanese aid helps strengthen its bargaining position with the developing states and also increases Japanese economic and political influence in those states.
- (d) Since Japan is not a military great power, it must rely on other means to protect its economic and political interests.⁴⁸⁰

Political Relations

India signed a separate peace treaty with Japan during the mid-1950's. Since then, Indo-Japanese political relations have been cordial but of generally minimal importance until the late 1970's. The reason has been India's preoccupation with the affairs of the subcontinent and with the states that have had political interests in the subcontinent. Japan has not been one of those states until recently.

No Indian prime minister or foreign minister visited Tokyo until 1978. Japanese foreign ministers visited New Delhi in 1970 and 1977. When Foreign Minister Hatoyama visited New Delhi in 1977, he and Vajpayee signed an agreement providing for regular future consultations at the foreign minister's level on Asian affairs and economic cooperation.⁴⁸¹

Since then, discussions have been held concerning India's nuclear program, the Sino-Japanese friendship treaty, efforts to normalize Sino-Indian relations, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and the Sino-Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the possibility of establishing joint Indo-Japanese economic projects in the ASEAN states.

On May 30, 1979 Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Takashima met with Indian Foreign Secretary Mehta for two days of talks on bilateral relations, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and China's incursion into Vietnam. A statement was issued in which both India and Japan expressed the wish that each Southeast Asian states would be able "to maintain independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity."⁴⁸² There were no other apparent results of the meeting.

During February 1980 Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Katori visited India and Pakistan to discuss the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁴⁸³ Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda visited New Delhi in March 1980 to discuss the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its effect on the stability of the South Asian region. Prior to his trip, Sonoda was asked by China's leaders to sound out India's leaders as to the possibility of a future trip to India by Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua.⁴⁸⁴ On this and other occasions Japan has tried to facilitate the improvement of Sino-Indian relations.

During May 1980 India and the states of ASEAN held exploratory talks concerning steps that might be taken for cooperation in trade, industrial and technical fields.⁴⁸⁵ However, in July 1980 India became the first nonaligned state to recognize the Vietnamese puppet government in Cambodia. This action drew sharp protests from the ASEAN states.⁴⁸⁶ In February 1981 the governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos proposed a regional conference on peace and stability in Indochina. This proposal was endorsed by both the Soviet Union and India. However, the ASEAN states were opposed to this particular conference because they felt it would be used by Vietnam to ratify Vietnam's control of Laos and Cambodia.⁴⁸⁷ The ASEAN states are puzzled over India's apparent endorsement of Vietnam's

actions in Indochina, and this has caused a cooling of relations between India and the ASEAN states. As a result, the proposed cooperation between India and these states is progressing very slowly. Japan and India have discussed the possibility of joint economic projects in the ASEAN states.⁴⁸⁸ However, nothing substantial has resulted from the Indo-Japanese discussions because the political climate between India and the ASEAN states must improve before such projects can begin.

The Indo-Japanese discussions and the discussions between India and the ASEAN states indicate that India is becoming more interested in the affairs of the entire East Asian region. Since India does not actually share the views of Vietnam and the Soviet Union concerning the future of the region, the coolness between India and the ASEAN states will probably dissipate in the future. Joint Indo-Japanese economic cooperation in the affairs of the region will probably eventually be possible. Meanwhile, Indo-Japanese economic relations are currently cordial, although adjustments will be required in the future. Also, the political aims of Japan and India do not appear to conflict with each other. Future Indo-Japanese economic and political cooperation in the East Asian region would be beneficial to both India and Japan, and would also be beneficial to the economic and political stability of the region as a whole.

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CHAPTER VI

OUTPUTS, SYSTEM CHANGE, AND CONCLUSIONS

System Output

Outputs in any political system result from the interaction of the system's actors. According to David Easton, these outputs constitute "authoritative allocations of value" that are binding upon the system's actors.¹ The difference between the international political system and political systems at the national, state and provincial, or local governmental levels is that the international system possesses no sovereign entity capable of enforcing these allocations of value over long periods of time. Thus, these allocations of value are usually binding only in the short term for the international political system. For example, Germany seized the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from France in 1871, but was forced to give them back to France in 1919. Treaties and agreements may also be considered system outputs, and these are usually altered and/or nullified within, at most, 100 years after they have been signed. Most historical political and military alliances have not lasted longer than 50 years.

The stability of an international political system is affected by the outputs that result from the interaction of the major actors of the system. Lesser actors also provide inputs into the system and receive outputs, but only the major actors are capable either of regulating the system and maintaining system equilibrium, or of achieving system outputs that can result in system instability, modification, and change. Rosecrance

notes that, "An international system is conceived to be stable if its outcomes fall within limits generally 'accepted' by the major participants in the system. All [national] elites do not have to be 'satisfied' with all the outcomes."²

The outputs of the system contribute either to system stability, to system modification, or to major system change. In Chapter I of this dissertation an assessment was made that three regional international political systems have existed in East Asia since 1945: a tight bipolar system from 1945-1955; a loose bipolar system from 1956-1962; and a multipolar system that has been in the process of emerging since 1963. Examples of outputs that contributed to the general stability of the tight bipolar system in East Asia are:

(a) The Sino-Soviet alliance of 1951. As a result of this alliance, China was added to the hierarchical Soviet bloc. This bloc covered much of East Asia.

(b) The outcome of the Korean War of 1950-1953. As a result of this war, the U.S. was able to contain Communist expansion in Northeast Asia. The war contributed to the U.S. sense of the existence of a monolithic Communist bloc in East Asia.

(c) Because of the Korean War, the U.S. signed security agreements with a number of East Asian states including Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand, Japan, and the Philippines. The U.S. also created the SEATO regional collective security organization. By means of these treaties, the U.S. constructed a web of alliances against the Communist bloc in East Asia.

(d) The 1954 Geneva Conference on the status of Indochina achieved short term stability between the two opposing blocs in Southeast Asia.

Later U.S and Vietnamese actions created instability in that part of the East Asian subsystem.

Examples of outputs that caused modifications to the tight bipolar system that resulted in its evolution into a loose bipolar system are:

(a) The Sino-Soviet ideological dispute from 1956-1962. Because of this dispute, the Soviet Union could not always control China's actions, and China lost its influence over Soviet international policies.

(b) The withdrawals of France and Britain from East Asia despite U.S. pressure to keep those two states involved in the affairs of the region. Although the U.S. wanted France and Britain to maintain a military presence in the region to bolster the U.S. containment policy, the two states felt that it was in their own interest to withdraw from the region. This withdrawal weakened the U.S. bloc in the region and also showed that the U.S. could not always impose its will on its allies in the areas of defense and foreign policy.

(b) The U.S.-Japanese security treaty of 1960. This treaty redefined the partnership between the two states. Japan obtained greater equality with, and greater independence from, the U.S.

(c) The Sino-Indian War of 1962. China fought this war with India without the blessing of the Soviet Union. During the war the Soviet Union provided aid to India and is believed to have tried to hinder China's war effort. Thus, the Soviet Union opposed a member of its own bloc.

Examples of outputs that contributed to the evolution of the multipolar system in Asia are:

(a) The Sino-Soviet ideological break of 1963. This created two rival communist major actors in East Asia.

(b) The abandonment of the U.S. containment policy in East Asia as a result of the U.S. experience in Vietnam from 1964-1968. This was announced in President Nixon's Guam Doctrine of 1969. Because of the abandonment of its containment policy, the U.S. no longer claimed hierarchical authority over its allies in East Asia. SEATO was dissolved in 1977. Thus, although the U.S. still had bilateral security arrangements with a number of states in the East Asian region, a true U.S. bloc had ceased to exist.

(c) The Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese normalization of relations. This resulted in the gradual development of a triple entente in East Asia opposed to the Soviet Union.

(d) The creation of an Indo-Soviet entente. This entente is ostensibly directed against China, but India has used it to achieve military superiority in the subcontinent. The Soviet Union has provided military and economic aid to India, but has no control over India's policies and actions.

System Change

As noted in the previous section, outputs can contribute to system change. Other factors that contribute to change in an international political system are changes in the number of essential national actors, changes in the information variables of one or more of the system's essential actors including changes in the power and capabilities of the essential actors, and consequent changes in the behavior of the essential actors. These, in turn, may cause changes in environmental constraints. Thus,

system change occurs when the factors related to disturbance and regulation are significantly changed.³

System change can occur when the number of essential actors changes. i.e., when there is a change in system polarity. There are significant differences between the operations and outputs of bipolar, tripolar, quintipolar, and multipolar systems.⁴ The number of essential actors changes when the power and capabilities of the actors of the system change. Changes in the military and economic capabilities of various states in the international system can result in some middle powers becoming great or super powers, while some great powers may drop to the level of middle powers. China provides an example in the East Asian subsystem. Prior to 1949, China was at best a middle power in the subsystem. China has become a great power in the subsystem since 1949 because of its economic development and its military research and development. If China's economic and military development activities continue, China will eventually become a global great power.

Changes in the information variables of one or more essential actors can also contribute to system change. Changes in the ethos of the governing elite of a state, or changes in the control factors that either limit or augment the exercise of power by the governing elite, can have a direct effect upon the types of inputs into the system that are made by that state. For example, if the Soviet Union were to become either a non-Communist republic or a constitutional monarchy the types of its inputs into the system, as well as its desired outputs, would probably change drastically.

Japan provides a modern example of a state that has experienced both changes in the ethos of its governing elite and changes in the control factors affecting that elite's exercise of power. During the 1930's Japan was controlled by the military. The ethos of Japan's governing elite at that time was a mixture of feudal ideologies combined with a warlike desire for territorial and economic imperialism. There were very few political control factors limiting the elite's exercise of power. Japan's imperial ambitions were both limited and stimulated by its lack of natural resources. In the end, Japan chose to obtain through conquest the natural resources possessed by other states. The results of Japan's defeat during World War II and its occupation by the U.S. were the establishment of a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarch, the apparent acceptance by both the elite and the people of democratic political values and principles, the acceptance of a pacifist ideology and the desire for industrial expansion by peaceful means. Japan now has the second greatest GNP in the world.

The changes discussed above can also result in changes in environmental constraints. States make inputs into the system in order to obtain what Rosecrance terms "environmental resources." These resources include territory, ideological gratification, economic goods, and national security.⁵ The desire of states for certain types of environmental resources is related to changes in the information variables of the essential actors of the system. For example, the governing elites of the eighteenth century European states maneuvered diplomatically and fought wars in order to acquire territory. Ideological gratification was not a desired environmental resource because the essential actors of the eighteenth century European system shared the same basic ideology. However, the two primary

essential actors of the bipolar system that existed after World War II sought a combination of territorial and ideological gratification. The Soviet Union occupied adjacent states and established Communist governments in those states. This was also done for reasons of national security. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union sought states as ideological allies and vassals, but not as true territorial acquisitions. Nevertheless, the U.S. and Soviet leaders probably derived a certain satisfaction from looking at a world map to see how many states were either Communist or non-communist.

Changes in the regulatory forces of the international political system result from changes in the number of essential national actors, changes in the information variables of one or more essential actors, changes in the behavior of essential actors, and changes in environmental constraints. System regulation can occur by formal or informal means. Formal means of regulation are actions taken by international agencies and organizations, while informal means of regulation are actions taken by the essential actors or blocs within a system. However, past formal system regulation by international agencies has occurred with the consent and/or support of a system's essential national actors. Thus, states are assessed as being the ultimate source of system regulation. Regulatory methods used by essential systemic actors in the past to limit system disruption have included various types of international agreements and sanctions, alliances and ententes, increased armaments, economic and political pressures, and wars. Another informal regulatory method consists of the rules of the game which are accepted either implicitly or explicitly by the system's essential actors.

Thus, system change occurs because of the homeostatic relationship between the number of essential systemic actors, the information variables of the essential actors including power and capabilities, the environmental constraints, systemic regulatory forces, and system outputs. Minor changes in any of these factors may result in system modification, while major changes will result in system change.

Conclusions

Systems Theory In International Relations

One of the basic beliefs of the author of this dissertation is that the study of international relations, as a field of the discipline of political science, can be performed in a scientific manner; i.e., through the use of the scientific method. The scientific method, "involves the recognition and formulation of a problem, the collection of data through observation and experiment, and the formulation and testing of hypotheses."⁶ In order to scientifically study international relations, an analytical method must first be developed. Such a method should be capable of analyzing and comparing past and present data concerning international behavior, and should also be capable of making reasonable predictions concerning future behavior. Various analytical methods for studying international politics have been proposed since the end of World War II. These have included structural-functional theories, decision-making theories, game theories and systems theories, as well as more traditional theories.

A second belief of this author is that international politics can best be analyzed as a type of political system. The author agrees with Herbert J. Spiro that:

. . . anyone who attempts to study politics scientifically must at least implicitly think of politics as though it were functioning as some sort of system. That is, he must

assume that more or less regular relationships can be discerned among various aspects of politics and between phenomena he describes as political and certain other phenomena not so described.

All international systems theories deal with the following:

- a. Factors relating to system stability.
- b. Conflicts of various types within the system.
- c. The capabilities of the system to deal with disruption.
- d. The ability of the states within the system to acquire and mobilize resources and technology.
- e. The domestic forces within national political systems that have an effect on the international system.
- f. The roles of national governing elites as they provide inputs into the international system that affect system stability.
- g. The effect of the environment upon the international system.
- h. The flow of⁸ information between and within the actors of the system.

International systems theories can also incorporate other theories such as theories of international integration, foreign policy decision-making theories, conflict theories, game theories, and theories about the linkage between foreign and domestic policy. Such theories can provide information concerning the factors listed in the preceding paragraph. The use of international systems theory also necessitates the analysis of data from other disciplines such as history, economics, sociology, and psychology. For example, Rosecrance may have partially derived his concept of nine international systems from the ideas of Sir Robert Phillimore. In his Commentaries Upon International Law published in 1879, Phillimore divided European history since 1713 into six periods and discussed the characteristics of each period.⁹ Thus, the writings and data from other historical periods and other disciplines are of use to the analyst of international

politics. This is especially true in the case of history because the analyst of international politics cannot either adequately understand the present, or be able to predict the future with any confidence, if he does not have a clear knowledge of the past. An accurate understanding of system change requires a knowledge of past history.

A number of different systems theories and analytical models have been developed since World War II by analysts of international politics. Each theorist has emphasized different aspects of systems theory. Kaplan emphasizes system stability as well as rules and patterns of interaction.¹⁰ McClelland emphasizes the linkage between domestic and international politics.¹¹ Modelski attempts to blend structural-functionalism with systems theory.¹² Deutsch has developed a pluralism model and emphasizes communications.¹³ Rosecrance emphasizes stability, disturbance, and regulation.¹⁴

Rosecrance's basic analytical model has been selected for use in this dissertation because it is believed to provide a more balanced treatment of the factors influencing international politics than those of other theorists. Further, Rosecrance's analytical model provides a fairly direct means of analyzing these factors. The model also has merit in that the factors to be analyzed in the model are factors that are usually discussed by historians of international politics in some depth. Thus, the historical data necessary for system analysis is usually readily available.

Rosecrance's model has been modified, however, in this dissertation so as to provide even greater balance: the factors making up state power and capabilities are discussed in greater detail, and Kaplan's rules of the game are included. A more detailed treatment of state power and capabilities was deemed to be essential for any analysis of the essential,

middle, and minor actors of the international political system. Rosecrance also seems to ignore the fact that systemic rules of the game apparently exist and are accepted, either implicitly or explicitly, by the system's essential actors. The existence of such rules has been noted by past and present observers of the international scene.¹⁵ Changes in the rules of the game are indicative of system change.

As noted previously, there are numerous theoretical models for analyzing international political systems. However, one of the problems related to such systems theory is that, since the mid-1950's, more effort appears to have been spent in constructing models rather than in using them as analytical tools. The value of any model should be in its utility. One of the purposes of this dissertation has been to modify a theoretical model and actually use it as a means of analysis and prediction. The East Asian geographic subsystem was chosen as the region to be analyzed because of the author's belief that changes in the East Asian subsystem since 1945 have always preceded changes in the global international system. Further, most of the essential actors of the future global international system have faced each other directly in the East Asian region since 1945. The various components of the East Asian subsystem, as well as the interaction between these subsystem's essential actors, have been examined in preceding chapters of this dissertation. Predictions concerning the future global international system will be made in the following section of this chapter. Specific predictions for the East Asian subsystem are not made because the predictions for the global system, including those of the future rules of the game, are believed to also apply to the East Asian subsystem. The analytical model used in this dissertation is believed

to be suitable for use in analyzing both the global international political system and all the regional subsystems of that system.

A Critique of Systems Theory

Analysts of international politics have provided numerous criticisms of systems theory. These criticisms are summarized as follows:

a. The analytical models only seem to be useful for analyzing the past and the present. No meaningful future predictions have been made.

b. The analytical models have tended to be too generalized. Therefore, no findings of significant value have resulted from the use of such models.

c. It is difficult to know either what all the important elements and forces of the system are, or how they should be analyzed, so that meaningful comparisons can be made between different systems.

d. There has been too much emphasis on communications in the analytical models.

e. Systems theories and their resulting analytical models have an ideological bias towards the status quo because they emphasize system equilibrium.

f. The analytical models do not approximate the real world.

These criticisms are believed to be partially valid because of the variety of theories that have been developed and the emphasis that has been placed on theory development rather than on actual system analysis and proof. Most of the analytical models do appear to look at the past and the present, but some work concerning future systems has been done. Kaplan and Rosecrance have adumbrated a variety of possible future systems,

but they have not used their analytical models to specifically predict the characteristics of the emerging global system.

Different theorists have emphasized different components because of their own interests. For example, Rosenau is interested in the linkage between domestic and international politics, while Snyder and McClellan are interested in crisis management and decision-making. Their work should probably not be considered grand theory, but sub-theory. While their work is considered valuable, it appears to really relate to only part of what should be overall systems theory, i.e., the information variables of the systemic actors.

Identifying and analyzing the important systemic elements and forces is believed to be the major flaw of most systems theories. An analytical model cannot function properly if the elements and forces which should be analyzed have not been correctly identified. If some analytical models do not approximate the real world, it is because the significant elements and forces operating in the real world have not been correctly identified. Rosecrance's model, with modifications, is believed to be the closest to reality because it incorporates elements, forces and factors which historians, as well as present and past observers of international politics, have felt to be operating in the real world on specific occasions.

Communications are stressed in some analytical models, especially that of Deutsch, and a truly analytical systems theory should be balanced. However, communications both at the domestic and international levels are important both because they affect decision-making by governing elites and because they affect the way states perceive the actions and intentions of other states. Therefore, as has been done in this dissertation,

communications should be analyzed in terms of its effect upon other systemic factors.

Partial validity can also be granted to the criticism that systems theories are biased towards the status quo because they emphasize system equilibrium. Most theories and models do indeed seem biased toward systemic status quo, but this may be more apparent than real. System stability also relates to system change, and an analysis of the former involves an analysis of the latter. Thus, system change is discussed, although often not directly. For example, Kaplan's statements concerning system change are scattered throughout System and Process In International Politics, and the subject is never discussed in great detail.

It is hoped that Rosecrance's modified system, as presented in this dissertation will satisfy previous criticisms of international systems theory.

The Future International System

The general characteristics of the current global system are estimated to be as follows:

- a. Two blocs (the U.S. and Soviet) still exist, but China and Japan are also major power poles in the system. Lesser bloc members are becoming increasingly nationalistic and independent. Thus the blocs are in the process of fragmenting.
- b. Japan is still a part of the U.S. Bloc, but is being pushed towards greater responsibility and independence.
- c. China cooperates with the U.S. Bloc out of fear of the U.S.S.R. and the need for U.S. Bloc technology.
- d. The U.S.S.R. is the primary imperialistic essential actor within the system.

e. China has acquired a conservative "status quo" attitude towards the system because of its fear of the U.S.S.R.

f. The U.S. has retreated from overt interventionism except where it conceives its national interests to be directly affected.

g. Western Europe is gradually moving towards independence from the U.S. and towards a federated status. Meanwhile, some European states of the Soviet Bloc are seeking greater independence, particularly in the area of economics.

h. The credibility of nuclear deterrence for lesser bloc members, particularly those of the U.S. Bloc, is decreasing.

i. There is increasing instability in Soviet-U.S. relations.

j. Arms control agreements are minimal and Third World conflicts are increasing.

k. There is some nuclear proliferation, but the U.S., U.S.S.R., and China are nuclear super powers and cannot be seriously hurt by the other states.

l. The essential actors and/or their blocs compete with each other economically and sometimes militarily. Military conflicts are limited in scope, conventional with regard to weapons, and may involve the use of proxies.

m. The U.N. is used as a tool by its member states and blocs.

n. A large bloc of neutrals exists.

This is not a equilibrium system but a transitional one. System change appears to be caused by the increasing diversity of ideological and national interests, as well as by increases in the economic and military capabilities of both the essential actors and various other states due to

technological advances and technology transfer. The current global system may eventually evolve during the next century into a multipolar system with five essential actors, i.e., five military and economic super powers.

Rosecrance has postulated two future international systems models, both of which are designed to prevent war, and both of which are incomplete. Each deals with only one major aspect of the future system: a Military Model and an Economic Interpenetration Model.¹⁷ Both are extreme cases and he summarizes them by saying that the future international system will probably contain a mixture of elements from both. Rosecrance's Military Model is a deterrence model and consists of a multipolar systems with polarity based upon the possession of nuclear weapons. In such a system, there are problems concerning the numbers and types of nuclear weapons that a state requires. That is, in a relatively diffused nuclear environment each nuclear power must decide upon the types of delivery systems that it considers to be least vulnerable; in addition, in the event of a nuclear attack upon it, each state must decide how many states it will retaliate against. This system has the built-in problems of anonymous first-strike capabilities and catalytic nuclear wars. Thus, in some respects this system is more unstable than a bipolar system. On the other hand, the threat to a "victor" is greater:

If in these two respects a multipolar order could display greater instabilities than a dyadic bipolar systems, there is at least one respect in which strategic problems will be easier to solve. Multilateral strategic systems present the "dilemma of the victor's inheritance" in a way that bilateral systems do not. In a two-power strategic world, after eliminating the major opponent, one does not encounter other strategic opposition. In a multipolar context this is not true. After an attack on the United States the Soviets would have to consider whether their expenditures of missiles against the United States made vulnerable to the Chinese. If Chinese capabilities were large, Soviet unilateral aggression would be much less likely.¹⁸

Rosecrance feels that there is a greater chance of war between two or more nuclear alliances, unless these alliances are strictly defensive in nature. Thus a prerequisite for system stability is rational leadership in all the nuclear states. In an earlier work he pointed out another problem of deterrence in a multipolar environment: the problem of creating and maintaining popular support for large deterrence expenditures as the number of potential enemies increases. In other words, as the number of potential foes increases, it becomes more difficult to focus popular hatreds and fears against them and thus support large defense budgets. However, this is really a problem only for the democratic countries.¹⁹

Rosecrance's Economic Interpenetration Model, as the title implies, postulates an international system characterized by the economic interdependency of all of the system's actors due to low tariffs and minimum restrictions upon the flow of international trade. Thus the political interests of the system's actors are not allowed to hinder their economic interests. However, he does not feel that this would really be possible even if such interdependency were to occur:

. . . economic interpenetration by no means insures that there will not be conflict and tension between developed and developing states. It does not even greatly limit conflicts between the Communist and non-Communist worlds: the stakes of the participants are pretty minimal compared to those in the huge trade among developed non-Communist countries. Economic penetration serves, if at all, to limit conflict which might otherwise have broken out as nuclear multipolarity emerges among Europe, America, and Japan.²⁰

Thus Rosecrance does not feel that economic interdependence is a true antidote to war.

As can be seen from the above, Rosecrance has foreseen the world's five future super powers; the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China, Japan and Western

Europe. He also has foreseen some nuclear diffusion as well as growing economic interdependence in the world. However, he concerns himself only with those aspects of the future system that might deter war. He is not very sanguine about either military or economic deterrence.

Based on the previous analysis of the East Asian subsystem, it is believed that the emerging future global international system will contain elements of the two systems postulated by Rosecrance. Its essential actors will probably be the five military and economic super powers discussed previously. Through pressure from the U.S. and China, as well as lesser states, Japan's military capabilities will probably continue to increase and Japan may well develop tactical nuclear weapons. Japan's economic capabilities will probably also continue to grow and its GNP may eventually even surpass that of the U.S. Japan's conventional forces, particularly its navy, will grow so as to be able to better protect Japanese industry and national security. Because of technology transfer from the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe, China may become a military and economic super power by the end of the first quarter of the 21st century. Western Europe will probably federate, and nuclear weapons will probably be diffused throughout the federation. The economic capabilities of this federation will probably be equal to those of the U.S.

There should continue to be some economic interdependence between the five essential actors. However, there may be increasing competition among the essential actors for scarce raw materials such as oil. The U.S.S.R. will probably continue to be the most overtly imperialistic of the five super powers.

Nuclear diffusion will probably continue. The lesser nuclear states will probably include India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa. Other

states may also eventually possess nuclear weapons if they can either be obtained or if the technology can be acquired. Small local wars will probably continue to occur between the lesser states of the system and some may even involve the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Regional economic blocs, such as ASEAN, may emerge in Africa and Latin America. Other economic blocs that are oriented towards either a particular raw material or materials, similar to OPEC, may also emerge. The greater the proliferation of such Third World economic blocs, the greater the competition between the essential actors for these resources.

The essential actors will probably take care not to be drawn directly into Third World military conflicts, although they may supply military aid to opposing sides and may also use proxy troops. However, efforts by one of the essential actors to either acquire a monopoly over an economic resource or to affect another essential actor's economy in a seriously harmful manner would probably be met by the threat of military force. The essential actors will probably be covertly interventionist, although overt intervention by one essential actor might result in overt intervention by one or more other essential actors.

A global balance of power system with five essential actors may eventually evolve during the next century from the current global system. This would differ from previous balance-of-power international systems in that one, or possibly two, of the system's essential actors will seek to destroy the independence of the other essential actors. Since this system may not come into existence for the next 20-50 years, its rules of the game cannot be precisely predicted. However, they can be adumbrated:

- a. Each essential actor will seek to increase its military and economic capabilities, as well as its access to environmental resources.

b. Essential actors will form coalitions with other essential actors to oppose any other essential actor seeking predominance either globally or within a geographic subsystem, or in terms of an environmental resource.

c. The essential actors will settle disputes by either negotiating rather than fighting, or by fighting minor wars rather than major ones. This fighting will occur in lesser states and areas other than Europe, and may involve proxies.

d. In a conflict between essential actors, low-yield tactical nuclear weapons may be used. High yield weapons may be used if defeat is believed to involve either loss of political independence or extinction.

e. Essential actors will probably attempt to alter the political systems of other essential actors and lesser actors by covert means.

f. Lesser actors will seek to reduce the danger of major war between the essential actors.

g. The lesser actors will seek to combine to oppose the economic and political activities of the essential actors.

h. All essentials and lesser actors will use the U.N. for their own ends.

Footnotes

¹David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 21.

²Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction In World Politics (Westport, Connecticut: reprint of 1963 edition, Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 231.

³Ibid.

⁴Richard N. Rosecrance, International Relations: Peace or War? (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), pp. 114-117.

⁵Ibid., pp. 88-106.

⁶Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts: G & C Merriam Company, 1965), p. 771.

⁷Herbert J. Spiro, "An Evaluation of Systems Theory," James C. Charlesworth, ed., Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1967), paperback edition, p. 164.

⁸James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York, Philadelphia, Toronto: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1971), paperback edition, pp. 116-117.

⁹Sir Robert Phillimore, Commentaries Upon International Law, Vol. I (London: Butterworths, 1879), pp. 586-589, quoted in Frederick H. Gareau, ed., The Balance of Power and Nuclear Deterrence (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), paperback edition, pp. 38-41.

¹⁰Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957, second printing, 1967).

¹¹Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966).

¹²George Modelski, "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International Systems", Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The International System, Theoretical Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 121-139.

¹³Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: Press Press, 1964).

¹⁴Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics, reprint of 1963 edition, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977)

¹⁵Excerpts from The Political Writings of Richard Cobden (London: William Ridgway, 1868, 2nd edition), Vol. I, pp. 256-269 and 274-283 in Frederick H. Gareau, ed., The Balance of Power and Nuclear Deterrence, pp. 99-109.

¹⁶Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, pp. 135-137.

¹⁷Rosecrance, International Relations: Peace or War?, pp. 283-293.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 286.

¹⁹Richard N. Rosecrance, "Deterrence In Dyadic and Multipolar Environments," Richard N. Rosecrance, ed., The Future of the International Strategic System (San Francisco, California: Chandler Publishing Company, 1973), Chapter 8.

²⁰Rosecrance, International Relations, Peace or War?, p. 292.

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APPENDIX 1

Kaplan's Balance of Power System

This system was solely made up of essential national actors. In order for such a system to work, at least five essential actors were required: four states with shifting alliances and one state which acted as a balancer. Less actors would make the system unstable. An essential national actor was one which was capable of defending itself against all the other essential actors, if necessary. There was no ideological hindrance to prevent one actor from allying itself with another. The level of industrial and military technology during the lifetime of this system was not such that one or two essential actors were clearly super powers in comparison with the other essential actors. As a result of either implicit or explicit acceptance of the rules by the system's essential actors, alliances tended to be for specific purposes and short-lived. Wars were also fought for limited objectives. International law, accepted by the essential actors, helped to regulate the system.

Kaplan's essential rules of the balance of power system are:

- a. Increase capabilities, but negotiate rather than fight.
- b. Fight rather than fail to increase capabilities.
- c. Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential actor.
- d. Oppose any coalition or single actor that tends to assume a position of predominance within the system.
- e. Constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizational principles.
- f. Permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners, or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification. Treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners.

APPENDIX 2

Kaplan's Loose Bipolar System

The two opposing blocs of this system are hierarchical in nature in that they are made up of states with varying amounts of economic and military power, and each bloc is headed by a super power. The ideologies of the two competing blocs are antithetical, and each bloc seeks the destruction of the other. However, this system is characterized by a high degree of industrial and military technology, and each of the two super powers possesses sufficient nuclear weaponry to destroy the civilization of the other. Thus a decisive nuclear war between the two blocs is impractical. Therefore, while political and economic conflict occurs between the two blocs, wars between the super powers may be fought completely or partially by proxy, and at the non-nuclear level. The system's universal actor, the U.N., is used by the two blocs primarily as a propaganda sounding board and as a means of mobilizing support for their political ends.

Kaplan's essential rules of the loose bipolar system are:

- a. All blocs subscribing to hierarchical or mixed hierarchical integrating principles are to seek to eliminate the rival bloc.
- b. All blocs subscribing to hierarchical or mixed hierarchical integrating principles are to negotiate rather than fight, to fight minor wars rather than major wars, and to fight major wars--under given risk and cost factors--rather than to fail to eliminate the rival bloc.
- c. All bloc actors are to increase their capabilities relative to those of the opposing bloc.
- d. All bloc actors subscribing to non-hierarchical organizational principles are to negotiate rather than fight to increase capabilities,

to fight minor wars rather than fail to increase capabilities, but to³⁷⁸
refrain from initiating major wars for this purpose.

e. All bloc actors are to engage in major war rather than to permit the rival bloc to attain a position of preponderant strength.

f. All bloc members are to subordinate objectives of the universal actor to the objectives of their bloc in the event of gross conflict between these objectives, but to subordinate the objectives of the rival bloc to those of the universal actor.

g. All non-bloc member national actors are to coordinate their national objectives with those of the universal actor and to attempt to subordinate the objectives of bloc actors to those of the universal actor.

h. Bloc actors are to attempt to extend the membership of their bloc, but to tolerate the non-member position of a given national actor if the alternative is to force the national actor to join the rival bloc or to support its objectives.

i. Non-bloc members are to act to reduce the danger of war between bloc actors.

j. Non-bloc members are to refuse to support the policies of one bloc actor as against the other except in their roles as members of a universal actor.

k. The universal actor seeks to reduce the incompatibility between the blocs.

l. The universal actor seeks to mobilize non-bloc member national actors against cases of gross deviation, e.g., resort to force by a bloc actor. This rule, unless counterbalanced by the other rules, would enable the universal actor to become the prototype of a universal international system.

APPENDIX 3

Rosecrance's Nine International Systems

a. The Balance-of-Power System, 1740-1789. The variety of actor disturbance was minimal. The basic political, social, and economic structure of the old regime was regarded as satisfactory by the state's ruling elites. Elites were limited by their own codes in the selection of policy programs, rather than by popular opinion. The primary available resources were diplomatic skill and persuasiveness. Economic and technological resources were approximately equal for the system's essential actors. System regulation occurred through shifting alliances made possible by universally accepted elite ethos. Territorial resources were abundant. The outcome was a continuing multipolar international system.

b. The Bipolar System, 1789-1814. This system consisted of warfare between one bloc consisting of states of the old regime, and another bloc consisting of revolutionary France and its allies. The elites of the revolutionary bloc sought to change the previous pattern of international outcomes and to transform the international system. The resources available to the elites of the revolutionary bloc consisted of mass citizen armies, the total industrial capacity of the state, and public opinion. The elites of the opposing blocs were forced to imitate this in varying degrees. Military force was the characteristic means of exerting influence in this system. The Eighteenth Century regulative forces were carried over into this system and were inadequate. Thus the real regulative force was military force. The two blocs sought national security and ideological objectives from the environment. Any gain for one bloc was considered a loss for the other. The outcome was bipolar opposition.

c. The Concert of Europe System, 1814-1822. This was an institutional effort on the part of the essential actors to turn the clock back to 1789. The ethos of the system's elites were largely harmonious. The major regulatory force was the Concert, consisting of the system's five essential actors, who combined to oppose any outbreak of liberalism in Europe. The Concert was quite successful in holding international outcomes within stable limits. It substituted for the ideological uniformity of the Eighteenth Century national elites. National resources reverted somewhat back to their Eighteenth Century role: emphasis on elite-controlled professional armies, partial use of national industry, and little role of public opinion. The attainment of the objectives of one actor of the Concert was also a vindication of the objectives of the others.

d. The Truncated Concert of Europe System, 1822-1848. This system was similar to its predecessor except that England's liberalism forced her into political isolation from the rest of Europe, although at times she cooperated with France for liberal ideological purposes against Austria, Russia, and Prussia. The resources of the system's essential actors were similar to those possessed by the essential actors of the previous system. The Concert no longer maintained a firm grip upon internal domestic and international developments. The environment provided lands in the Middle East and North Africa as a means whereby national energies could be released. The national popular revolutions of 1848 ended this system.

e. The "Realpolitik" System, and partial operation of the Concert, 1848-1871. In this system disruptive influences far outbalanced regulatory ones. Popular liberal revolts manaced the security of the governing elites of every essential actors except Russia. Thus self-preservation was the dominant aim of every national elite, even if at the expense of other national elites. National foreign policies were primarily based on

elite self-interest. As a result of this power vacuum, Italy was unified at the expense of Austria and the German Empire was created at the expense of France. As a result of the popular revolts, public opinion once again became a significant factor in international relations. National power became based upon large standing armies with citizen reserves, new weapons based on industrial technology, communications and transportation, and the speed and efficiency of military mobilization. Formal and informal regulative mechanisms were virtually inoperable. War was considered as effective a technique as diplomacy. Outcomes were those of a multipolar international system: international disharmony.

f. The Bismarckian Concert System, 1871-1890. The key to this system was Bismarckian Germany with its network of alliances. Germany was allied with Austria and Russia against France. England remained to isolation. France was encouraged to release her energies in the form of colonial expansion. When colonial rivalries threatened to disturb the general European peace in 1879, they were settled at the Congress of Berlin chaired by Bismarck. Bismarck could act as an "honest broker" because Germany had no colonial aspirations at that time. However, he soon acquired them. National resources were the same type as in the previous system, but had increased in size and importance. The environment provided territory in Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East as an outlet for national energies. Regulatory mechanisms were the Bismarckian Concert and system of alliances. The ethos of the system's national elites was away from war and ideological concerns. Outcomes, due to lack of active national antagonisms, were those of a unipolar international system.

g. The Bipolar System and decline of the Concert, 1890-1918. In this system, the ethos of the national elites returned to one of

self-preservation. When Germany entered the colonial race, she lost her position as arbiter of Europe. After Germany failed to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, Russia then allied herself with France. Germany's bid for colonies and her naval expansion forced England into an entente with France, and eventually with Russia. Germany retained her alliance with Austria and added Italy as a partner. Both Austria and Russia sought to expand in the Balkans. Types of national resources remained the same. The environment no longer offered sufficient goods and resources to satisfy all of the system's essential actors. The regulative mechanism--the Concert and shifting alliances--became virtually inoperable. The system eventually became a bipolar one and degenerated into war.

h. The League of Nations System, 1918-1945. The League was established by the victorious allies to provide European collective security against Germany and any other potential aggressor. Thus it was intended to be a more formal version of the Concert of Europe. However, it failed to function as a regulator due to the isolationism and pacifism of the United States and England, and the rise of Fascism and militarism in Germany, Italy and Japan. Due to the ideological views and territorial demands of the Axis Powers, the system became a bipolar one and again degenerated into war. Thus, the regulatory mechanisms of the system failed to function. The ethos of the elites of the two opposing blocs were in sharp contrast to each other. The Allied elites were democratic, pacifistic, and oriented towards the status quo. The Axis elites were totalitarian, militaristic, and expansionist. The types of national resources were much the same as in the previous system, but the allies failed to increase their supplies of these resources. The Axis steadily increased theirs up to the outbreak of war. The major resource developments were the increased use of the airplane and the tank, and the

development of the atomic bomb.

i. The Present Bipolar System, 1945-to the Present. Again, the United Nations was established by the victorious Allies as a collective security institution against future aggressors. However, both the U.S. and Soviet blocs used it for their own ends. Procedural rules rendered the U.N. Security Council virtually powerless in a crisis. Two ideologically opposed blocs arose, led by super powers with nuclear weapons. In 1963 Rosecrance believed that a third bloc of neutralistic states had emerged, which would act as a balancing force and mediator between the other two blocs. In 1973 he acknowledged that this third bloc had not arisen as expected. Revolutionary ideologies gave the elites of the Soviet Bloc wider latitude in the choice of policies than those of the U.S. Bloc. Bloc resources had been increased by the addition of nuclear weapons and guided missiles. Personalities of the elites of both blocs, however, tended towards reason and caution. The tenure of both elites was reasonably secure. Whereas the environment did not at first contain sufficient goods and resources to satisfy blocs because of their ideological differences, the elites of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. became oriented towards the status quo. The threat of the consequences of nuclear war between the two blocs eventually forced the reduction of conflict to economic and political levels.